Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation 9783642404559

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Principles of Emissions Trading Julien Chevallier* IPAG Lab, IPAG Business School, Paris, France

Abstract International emissions trading schemes include the Kyoto Protocol and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. This chapter documents the main principles behind the functioning of such permits markets, which represent popular environmental regulation tools. Among other design issues, this chapter discusses the various allocation mechanisms available to the regulator. Besides, this chapter underlines the role played by intertemporal flexibility mechanisms (e.g., banking and borrowing) which allow reducing overall compliance costs. Overall, the goal of this chapter is to present in standard textbook reference terms the construction of an emissions trading program, be it at the regional, national, or international level. The interested reader can gain valuable insights by referring to this core text, which contains a descriptive analysis of the main provisions that need to be taken care of when creating such an environmental market.

Keywords Emissions trading; Allocation; Banking; Borrowing; Offset

Introduction Emissions trading, or cap-and-trade program, consists in setting a quantitative limit for the emission of a given pollutant and to let the market decide on its price. How do emissions trading schemes work in practice? This chapter aims at answering this question, by casting light on the functioning mechanisms of tradable permits markets. Such markets have been created in order to be able to trade polluted assets, as if they were standard production goods. By diminishing the circulation of pollutants, environmental benefits can be awaited from such schemes. The first issue raised by the creation of a tradable permits market is linked to the distortions which can occur as a consequence of the initial allocation. Initial allocation is the amount of pollutant that is distributed to preexisting agents to start with. Whereas Hahn (1984) contributed first to this debate by demonstrating the non-neutrality of permits allocation for an agent able to exert market power1 in a static context and concerning the spatial exchange of permits only, this chapter explicitly addresses the critical aspect of initial permits allocation in a dynamic context and concerning intertemporal emissions trading. It is important to bear in mind indeed that a permit can be exchanged across various geographical locations (e.g., from one country to another) but also through time (e.g., one firm transfers permits to the future or from the future). These different kinds of uses of permits are called, respectively, spatial exchange and intertemporal trading.

*Email: [email protected] 1 For an exhaustive literature review on permits trading and market power, see Petrakis et al. (1999). Page 1 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

On tradable permits markets, banking refers to the possibility for agents to save unused permits for future use, while borrowing represents the possibility to borrow permits from future allocations for use in current period. Agents are a very generic term in economics which can represent individuals (e.g., consumers), firms, or governments. In our context, agents are mostly understood here as polluting firms. By allowing agents to arbitrate between actual and expected abatement costs over specific periods, banking and borrowing permits form another dimension of flexibility where agents can trade permits not only spatially but also through time. Abatement cost represents the cost to diminish the quantity of pollution by one unit. In a continuous time model under certainty, Rubin (1996) shows that an intertemporal equilibrium exists on a permits market from the viewpoint of the regulator and the firm and that banking and borrowing allow firms to smooth emissions. Indeed, it is the role of the government (or the environmental agency) to manage the tradable permits market, which is an artificial construction coming from environmental policy. Regulator can therefore refer to the State or the environmental agency. Under uncertainty, Schennach (2000) shows the permits price may rise at a rate less than the discount rate and new public information may cause jumps in the price and emissions paths. Such provisions enabled agents to smooth their emissions stream and played a key role in the success2 of the US SO2 or Acid Rain Program. Surprisingly, the inclusion of banking and borrowing does not appear as a cornerstone of new “grand policy experiments”3 dealing with climate change. We bridge this gap by analyzing the various effects of banking and borrowing that need to be accounted for when designing tradable permits markets. This instrument is described indeed as a double-edged sword in the literature. On the one hand, banking provides incentives to over-comply and leads to an intertemporal reallocation of emissions so as to reach lower social damages. On the other hand, borrowing may give agents with high abatement costs an incentive to delay costly investments in clean technologies by borrowing allowances from future periods and to concentrate emissions in early periods. For example, if it is costly to diminish pollution when extracting coal, firms will pollute on a business-as-usual basis at the beginning of the scheme (by borrowing future permits), and they will wait for technological innovations to diminish their quantity of pollution in the future (and the associated use of pollutants). However, more pollution has occurred in the present time, which is not the objective of the tradable permits market. That is why the provisions on banking and borrowing need to be carefully designed. While the total allocation of permits sets the present value of discounted permits prices, we will see that other effects on the permits price may arise when introducing an intertemporal trading ratio for banked and borrowed allowances. Discounted permits prices can be defined as the total value of a permit discounted through time (by applying discounting as it would apply to any savings account for individual banks). We therefore address the following two key questions: What are the effects of the initial allocation mechanisms in emissions trading systems? What insights can we get from the existing literature concerning the use of banking and borrowing in tradable permits markets? To detail the impacts of banking and borrowing on environmental damages will also be a priority throughout our analysis. The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section “Initial Allocation Mechanics” provides a background discussion on the initial allocation mechanics. Section “Banking and Borrowing Provisions” deals with banking and borrowing provisions. Section “Additional Flexibility Mechanisms” introduces additional flexibility mechanisms. Section “Conclusion” concludes. 2

The notion of success may be approximated by various effects (preexisting regulatory environment, technology innovation and diffusion, reduction of regulatory uncertainty, aggregate cost savings, etc.), but we will focus on the efficiency of the permits price, i.e., its ability to reflect current information on spot and future prices. 3 This expression was coined by Stavins (1998). Page 2 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Initial Allocation Mechanics This section addresses allocation design issues of existing international emissions trading schemes, namely, the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS.

The Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto protocol is the first of its kind at the international level to introduce carbon trading, i.e., the exchange of carbon dioxide units worldwide. The question of the Kyoto Protocol as an “unfinished business” is often evoked. Very heterogenous sectors were included under the same regulation, which could be detrimental to find the right method to allocate permits depending on price elasticities between sectors. Since there exists no historical data for carbon emission reduction cost, it may prove particularly difficult to induce a cost-effective allocation of the initial quotas to participating countries. In the context of the Kyoto Protocol, the case of countries supplied with allocations in excess of their actual needs has been coined as hot air in the literature.4 The distribution of a large number of permits to Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern Europe countries (Russia, the Ukraine forming two thirds) may be seen indeed as an imperfection of the Kyoto Protocol, as those countries were given generous allocations to foster agreement during the first phase (2008–2012). Market power concerns arise as industrial firms may benefit from the gap between their initial permits allocation (based on 1990 production levels) and their real emission needs in 2008 (after a period of recession), and the use of these permits surpluses remains unclear. This situation emerged as a conflict between the internal and the external consistency of the permits market: • The internal consistency refers to the situation where agents freely receive or bid for permits according to their real needs. The regulator may be interested however in distributing more permits to a country than strictly needed (according to business-as-usual emissions or a benchmark for instance) in order to ensure participation to the permits market.5 As a consequence, one agent may achieve a dominant position which in turns threatens the efficiency of the permits market itself. • The external consistency of the permits market is linked to the broader debate of climate change as the purchase of a “global public good.”6 This altruistic view embodies the notions of “burden sharing” or “common but differentiated responsibilities”7 attached to the Kyoto Protocol, whereby developed countries agree to spend a higher income share on fighting climate change than developing countries.8 Those conflicting views undermine the negotiation of the cap, which is fixed at a suboptimal level compared to what would be needed to minimize the total damage to the environment. The cap can be defined as the overall quantitative limit of pollutants that can be emitted. The regulator sets the cap, 4

See Baron (1999), Burniaux (1999), Bernard et al. (2003), Bohringer et al. (2006), Holtsmark (2003). Such negotiation with Russia was determinant for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force on February 16, 2005. 6 See Guesnerie (2006). 7 See Muller (2002). 8 Note that the implicit assumptions of the existence of such an environmental Kuznets curve (the environment is a superior good and environmental regulation becomes stricter through time at higher levels of GDP per capita) are left out of the debate. 5

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

and the market defines the price of the permit. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol represent a mere 5 % reduction below 1990 levels. Now if early movers like EU countries are willing to ratchet down the cap, little progress can be achieved without luring in major players like the USA, India, and China. Thus, many difficulties arise to pierce the “veil of uncertainty” around international negotiation.9 The fact that the creation of a permits market gives some countries the opportunity to draw a financial advantage without a direct environmental gain (i.e., in the absence of effective emissions abatement) may be puzzling. Yet as stated by Maeda (2003),10 “[this debate] seems misguided because it focuses on the political importance of the issue, rather than addressing it from an economic perspective.” Overall, the hypothesis that generous allocations that broaden the scope of a cap-and-trade program might also give birth to dominant positions shall not be neglected. Recall that in a cap-and-trade program, the regulator sets the cap, and agents freely exchange permits to define their price.

The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme

This section deals with possible design flaws in the allocation of permits on the European carbon market. The EU ETS Design: An Overview The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has been established by the European directive 2003–7: this regional trading system for CO2 emissions covers, across the EU-27 member states, around 11,000 installations11 representing close to 46 % of Europe’s CO2 emissions. In order to help EU member states to achieve their Kyoto target of reducing emissions by 8 % from those of 1990 level in 2008–2012, the European Union began this commitment in a pilot period from 2005 to 2008. The third European commitment period has started in 2013. Since 2005, the ETS operates independently of the Kyoto Protocol but has been linked to International Emissions Trading (IET) and other flexibility mechanisms in 2007. In this framework, the “Linking Directive” provides the recognition of Kyoto projects credits, Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation credits from the second period in 2008, known as Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), respectively, for compliance use within the EU ETS.12 CERs are traded worldwide and not only in Europe as for the EU ETS. Therefore, they can be understood as world proxy for the carbon price. The EU ETS draws on the US sulfur dioxide (SO2)13 trading system for much of its inspiration but relies much more heavily on decentralized decision-making for the allocation of emissions allowances and for the monitoring and management of sources (Kruger et al. 2007). Within the EU-wide

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See Kolstad (2005). p. 295 11 The definition of an installation effected in the EU ETS is the same as for Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) that is a principal environmental regulatory directive in the EU. Installations are defined as a stationary technical unit where one or more activities covered by the EU ETS are carried out and any other directly associated activities, which have a technical connection with the activities carried out on that site and which could have an effect on emissions and pollution. 12 See Table 2 for a quick review of Kyoto units. 13 The EU CO2 emissions trading scheme was inspired by successful cap-and-trade programs for SO2 and NOx in the USA (Ellerman and Montero 2007). 10

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Kyoto target, each member state has its own national emissions target as determined under the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement that defines each member state’s emissions reduction obligation. Each country is required to develop a National Allocation Plan (NAP), which, among other design features, addresses the national emissions target. A NAP contains the amount of permits allocated to each firm for each country. Each member state has its own registry where changes in the portfolio of its companies are recorded. Furthermore, there is a European Central Administrator, the Community Independent Transaction Log, to oversee the registry systems that will be standardized under European legislation. In that registry, allocations are reflected along with the purchases and sales for each company of the country (Mansanet-Bataller et al. 2007). The EU ETS is expected to allow for cheaper compliance with the targets under the Kyoto Protocol by letting participating companies buy/sell their emission allowances. In this institutional framework, an amount of two billion allowances has been created each year during phases I and II (before the shift to auctioning in phase III). The EU ETS has started during 2005–2007 with the phase I, followed by phase II during 2008–2012, and phase III during 2013–2020. The price of the allowance is established by the supply and demand of market participants and the level of the scarcity created by the initial allocation. Over-allocation or Relative Success? The EU ETS gently constrains emissions (8 % reduction for EU-27) so as to enforce a low carbon price. Yet the debate has shifted toward a possible over-allocation of permits. The production decisions of private actors are under scrutiny: do permits surpluses constitute a relative success (i.e., firms have reduced their emissions above projected levels) or an imperfection in the design of the system? As long as governments continue to allocate allowances to existing facilities based on historic emissions, the scheme is flawed by a perverse “updating” incentive. Firms have indeed an incentive to delay early action in abatement technologies since higher emissions today will be rewarded with bigger allocations in future periods. Buchner and Ellerman (2008) provide a first empirical assessment of the EU ETS allocation process based on 2005 emissions data. They estimate a slight over-allocation of 4 % during the first period of allocation, while there are strong signs that some emissions abatement measures have occurred. But the analysis is not straightforward since “a long position is not per se evidence of overallocation.”14 The difference between 2005 allocation and verified emissions suggests too many allowances were allocated, but the benchmark against which this conclusion is reached may be biased by insufficient data reporting on emissions before 2005 and by a lack of comparability at the EU-wide level. Firms may also be long because of differences in marginal abatement costs or in expectations (regarding economic activity, energy prices, etc.) under uncertainty. This section has provided an overview of two major tradable permits market along with their allocation methodology. It revealed a wide range of opportunities for strategic behavior in the design of international permit trading regimes. The presence of countries with large permits holdings increases the probability of price manipulation and the risk of efficiency loss in the allocation of abatement efforts between countries.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Banking and Borrowing Provisions This section develops three kinds of issues surrounding banking and borrowing: (i) the environmental and economic effects, (ii) the distribution of the emissions stream through time, and (iii) the focus on the EU ETS experience (see also the paper by Chevallier (2012)).

Environmental and Economic Effects of Banking and Borrowing We review the main effects of banking and borrowing provisions from the theoretical literature and empirical experiences on the environmental performance and economic efficiency. When abatement together with endowment of emission allowances is above emissions levels, then regulated industrials bank surplus allowances for potential later use. Thus, an allowance issued for one compliance period may be used by an affected unit for a later compliance period. In the same way, if regulated industrials do not abate enough to cover their emissions level with their allowances endowment, they may borrow allowances from the future allocation. We already know as Haites (2006) noted,15 “allowance banking provisions affect basically environmental performance, economic efficiency and market participants’ behaviour.” Hence, the regulator’s decision of allowing banking creates the significant effects listed below: Environmental effects: • Allowance banking and borrowing change the temporal pattern of emissions and may change aggregate emissions and can have environmental, including public health, effects. Allowance banking and borrowing should facilitate adjustment to changes in the emissions cap. • Banking provisions could also affect the rate of noncompliance and the resulting excess emissions. Evidence suggesting that allowance banking increases the rate of noncompliance is limited. In their experiments, (Cason and Gangadharan 2006) found that allowance banking increases noncompliance and total emissions in a hypothetical scheme with weak enforcement. Economic effects: • Allowance banking links future allowance prices to the current (“spot”) market price as stated by Maeda (2004). • Allowance banking and borrowing should improve liquidity16 in the allowance market. Allowance banking tends to increase the quantity of allowances available to the market and increase the volume of allowances traded. In their experiments, Godby et al. (2000) and Cason and Gangadharan (2006) find that allowance banking increases trading activity. • Allowance banking and borrowing should improve price stability. If banking is not allowed, allowance prices are likely to be unstable at the end of each compliance period. With no banking, if actual emissions are lower than the cap for the compliance period, the price of allowances should fall to zero at the end of the period since any remaining allowances have no value. With no banking, if actual emissions are higher than the cap for the compliance period, the price of allowances should rise sharply at the end of the period. Allowance banking should dampen such end-of-period price fluctuations and improve price stability.

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p. 7 The liquidity market is defined as a market where a large volume of trades can be immediately executed with minimum effect on price (Kyle 1985).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Summary of banking provisions and liquidity data for different emissions trading schemes Allowances traded Bank as % of annual amount emissions

Scheme Gas Banking and related provisions Current emissions trading schemes Acid Rain Program SO2 No limit on allowance banking 11.62 75–180 % for electric utilities million RECLAIM NOx No allowance banking; can sell surplus allowances to a 0 20–125 % (Greater Los buyer with a later compliance deadline and buy Angeles Area) allowances with a later vintage SOx idem 0 10–105 % Future emissions trading scheme Kyoto mechanisms GHGs Banking of different units from 2008–2012 period to the subsequent commitment period is restricted as follows: RMUs may not be carried over ERUs, which have not been converted from RMUs, may be carried over up to a maximum of 2.5 % of the party’s assigned amount CERs may be carried over up to a maximum of 2.5 % of the party’s assigned amount CERs and lCERs may not be carried over AAUs may be carried over without restriction The quantities of RMUs, ERUs, CERs, tCERs, and lCERs are likely to be small relative to the quantity of AAUs, so the banking restrictions can effectively be avoided by using units other than AAUs first for compliance and then banking surplus AAUs

These theoretical considerations on the banking provisions are also supported by Ellerman et al. (2000) on the US Acid Rain Program and by the results of a business simulation game and controlled experiments (Schleich et al. 2006) on the EU ETS. The US Acid Rain Program has been one of the most successful attempts to introduce tradable permits markets in environmental policy. That is why the EU ETS draws mostly on it. The US Acid Rain Program provided empirical support to the view that market-based instruments may be more environmentally efficient than command and control regulation. SO2 emissions fell, and the program was characterized by a quick implementation, a positive role of banking (twice as much as required), a good compliance, and no hot spots.17 These optimistic results may be limited to flow pollutants since for stock pollutants like CO2, the incentive to abate is less temporally and spatially constraining. As documented by Ellerman and Montero (2007)18 for the US SO2 Program, “banking of allowances remains the predominant form of emissions trading in Phase I (. . .) nearly threequarters of the 9.5 million allowances freed up for emissions trading in the first three years of Phase I were banked for later use in Phase II.” This citation confirms the view of banking and borrowing as a key determinant for the success of a program. In fact, the salient example is the US Acid Rain Program, where banking has been a major form of emissions trading (Ellerman and Montero 2007; Ellerman et al. 2000). During the first 5 years of the program constituting phase I, 1995–1999, only 26.4 million of the 38.1 million permits distributed were used to cover emissions. The remaining 11.65 million allowances (30 % of all the distributed allowances) were banked and have been gradually consumed during phase II (2000 and beyond). As 17 18

Typically, the cheapest abatement source is found where the larger sources are located. p. 161 Page 7 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

a result, the phase II cap was expected to be reached sometime between 2008 and 2010. Ellerman et al. (2000) analyze in depth the efficiency of this banking behavior in the Acid Rain SO2 program. The economically optimal level of banking depends first on the SO2 emissions in the absence of the trading scheme, second on the SO2 emission reduction cost function, and third on the discount rate. Using ranges of reasonable values for the discount rate and the rate of growth of SO2 emissions in the absence of the trading scheme, Ellerman et al. (2008) find that banking behavior has been reasonably efficient during phase I and the first few years of phase II. We report in Table 1 the main features of banking provisions in existing trading schemes. In a game simulation of the EU ETS, Ehrhart et al. (2005) find that a ban on banking pre-2008 allowances into 2008–2012 leads to an inefficient adjustment to the more stringent cap assumed for the latter period. In their simulation of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the ban on banking leads to a low price for allowances during 2005–2007 and underinvestment in emission reduction measures. The more stringent cap triggers a price spike during 2008 and 2009. The higher allowance prices induce overinvestment in emission reduction measures, which causes the price to fall back to the optimal level by 2012. The comparison of the banking case with the banning banking case is based on the assumption that prices will develop differently in the two cases (Ehrhart et al. 2005): • If banking is allowed, it is reasonable (under some assumptions like participants having complete information and emission targets being known) to expect that the price development does not exceed Hotelling’s rule (i.e., prices develop according to the interest rate or more slowly). Otherwise, arbitrage between periods is possible (Kling and Rubin 1997). In practice, excess emissions permits can be saved for future use or present emissions can be extended for future abatement. As a result, the permit price becomes arbitraged over time. • In the banning banking case, a lower price is assumed in the first period than in the free banking period case because first period allowances cover only one period instead of two. Analogously, the price in the second period is assumed to be higher due to increasing scarcity of allowances in comparison to the banking case.

Distribution of the Emissions Stream Through Time Another question needs to be addressed when assessing the relative merits of allowing banking and borrowing in tradable permits systems: how do firms adjust their emissions stream when they benefit from the possibility to freely bank and borrow permits? A key issue lies in the discount rate picked by firms. Higher or lower discount rates imply respectively more or less borrowing, while a zero discount rate leads to the same level of pollution at each period. Our analysis therefore highlights potential negative consequences of the use of unrestricted borrowing: the concentration of emissions on early periods by delaying abatement decisions and borrowing may aggravate environmental harm. The positive effects of banking on total present environmental damages are reversed, and the level of global pollution is higher than in a situation without borrowing. Concerning banking, firms invest in abatement technologies and bank allowances when they anticipate an increase in abatement costs superior to the discount rate; otherwise they would not bear additional abatement costs in the current period. This mechanism corresponds to a situation where standards are stricter through time, which is often the case. In the presence of a convex damage function coming from emissions and stricter future standards, the decision to allow banking reduces social damages. Page 8 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

This positive effect of banking counterbalances the negative aspects of borrowing detailed above and gives us a more precise picture of the task of the regulator when tailoring regulation for permit trading systems. When social damages are an increasing function of the pollution level at time t, our policy recommendation consists in authorizing banking and enforcing stricter pollution standards through time. When the cap is constant or becomes less constraining, the decision to allow borrowing leads to either increasing social damages or decreasing costs for firms. We have seen how permits alter the timing and the magnitude of marginal damages. We address in the next paragraph the question of introducing a non-unitary Intertemporal Trading Ratio (ITR) including interests on banking and discouraging borrowing to correct these unwanted permits path. On the Use of the Intertemporal Trading Ratio In this section, we evaluate the merits of a modified model of banking and borrowing that explicitly takes into account the distribution of the emissions stream through time. Using the interest rate on allowance balances, the regulator may change the time profile and cumulative quantity to approximate more nearly the social optimum. There are two sources of inefficiencies that might affect the social optimum: 1. The discount rate used by firms 2. The fact that total damages depend on the distribution of the emissions stream through time A modified banking system may correct the first type of inefficiency highlighted above, but not necessarily the second type. Due to the effect of discounting future abatement costs, we need to penalize borrowing by an ITR exogenously chosen by the regulator19 so that if firms borrow a lot of allowances in early periods, they will reimburse more allowances than actually used in the next period. This “banking and restricted borrowing” according to Kling and Rubin’s (1997) contribution yields the following comments: • Setting ITR < 1 provides an efficient incentive to banking, since firms need to reimburse more allowances in second period than were borrowed in first period. • The weight of debt is greater under a modified banking system than under the original system. • Such a modified banking and borrowing system allows the private and social solutions to converge, assuming constant and linear social damages. Assuming both banking and borrowing are allowed and there is a positive private discount rate, the introduction of an ITR yields: • Concerning banking, the opportunity cost of not using the permit is compensated by the ITR payment. • Concerning borrowing, for each ton of CO2 non-abated, the gain from agents’ private interest rate is reduced by the ITR. • The primary effect of a nonzero ITR is on time profile, not quantities: there is a change in marginal stock damages over time (more banking and less borrowing relative to a permit system without ITR) and a small effect on quantities intertemporally exchanged. 19

Kling and Rubin (1997) suggest the implementation of a discount rate equal to the industry average rate of interest used to finance medium-term capital expenditures (p. 112). Page 9 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

For greenhouse gases, the optimal rate of intertemporal substitution has been suggested by Leiby and Rubin (2001) as being “the ratio of current marginal stock damages to the discounted future value of marginal stock damages less the decay rate of emissions in the atmosphere20,” increased by the difference between the firm’s discount rate and the social planner’s discount rate. This result is obtained in a different setting since they distinguish between flow (emissions flow) and stock (accumulated) pollutants. Typically, CO2 emissions are characterized by stock damages that do not stop at the end of the program. We have seen in this section that the correct determination of the intertemporal discount rate may yield greater efficiency gains. With reference to the discussion on the intertemporal trading ratio above, we may cite several time devices used in tradable permits programs: the Progressive Flow Control in the US Northeastern NOx Budget Program, changed redemption ratios in US Clean Air Interstate Rule (2:1 from 2010; 3:1 from 2015), and growth indexed caps. To sum up, characteristic features of intertemporal emissions trading include the fact that at the equilibrium abatement costs are equalized among sources and that the distribution of emissions through time need not yield to a concentration in early periods. The decision to allow or not borrowing depends on the arbitrage between the firm’s cost efficiency and a higher pressure on the environment. Firms tend to use borrowing if the environmental constraint is constant or does not become a lot stricter over time. That is why it is recommended to introduce a discount rate specific to borrowed allowances. Prospective Use of Banking and Borrowing in the Kyoto Protocol This section offers a description of the possible use of banking and borrowing in the Kyoto Protocol. On the one hand, provisions on banking are cited by Klepper and Peterson (2005)21: “Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) resulting from the Kyoto commitment can be banked without a time constraint. Credits from Joint Implementation (JI) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) can be banked up to a limit of, respectively, 2.5 % and 5 % of a Party’s initial assigned amount. Sink credits can not be banked.” On the other hand, implicit provisions on borrowing may be found in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or UNFCCC (2000) report.22 As explained by Newell et al. (2005)23: “International climate policy discussions have implicitly included borrowing within possible consequences for noncompliance under the Kyoto Protocol, through the payback of excess tons with a penalty (i.e., interest).” This penalty could be fixed to 40 % of additional emissions reduction for the next period of the Kyoto Protocol despite uncertainties regarding the enforcement of this particular provision. This question is addressed in depth by Alberola and Chevallier (2009). In the next section, we discuss the efficiency of the EU ETS intertemporal market. We also question the presence of institutional learning in the EU ETS.

A Focus on the EU ETS Experience The EUA price path reflected the evolution of market participants’ expectations about the scarcity of allowances. Beginning at 8€ on January 1, 2005, EUA prices increased to around 30€ in July 2005, fluctuated during the six following months in the range from 20€ to 25€, then to 30€ until the end of April. This price development surprised most experts and market participants. According to Sijm 20

p. 251 p. 295 22 Paragraph II.XV 23 p. 149 21

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

et al. (2005), the increase was largely due to political decisions on unpredictably strict national allocation plans, but the market reaction was to some extent exaggerated. Behind the price increase there were also high fuel prices, cold weather, the absence of suppliers in the market, and uncertainty about the political environment (Lecocq and Kapoor 2005). The price fell suddenly at the end of June because of weaker UK gas price and the entrance of Czech Republic into the market. The price fluctuated around 21–23€ for the rest of the year. At the beginning of 2006, the price increased to way above 25€ in consequence of cold weather and high fuel prices. For a couple of months the price stabilized, and then it reached a maximum of over 30€ in April driven by fuel prices. Around April 25, 2006, first rumors occurred about contents of the national emissions reports for the first year of compliance by the EU member states. The official publication of these emissions reports on May 15 verified the rumors. It became apparent that the market was not as short as expected; especially the power producer needed less EUAs than anticipated (Seifert et al. 2008). The release of the emissions data had a market effect on EUA prices, causing a sharp break in the price of all maturities of EUAs. There were further less severe price fluctuations until the complete data were released on May 15; however, the essential adjustment was made in these 4 days, and after May 15, the spot price remained close to 15€ until late September when a further less-pronounced adjustment occurred. As noted by Buchner and Ellerman (2008), “this price “collapse” demonstrated a readily observable characteristic of markets of reacting quickly (and from the standpoint of some, brutally) to relevant information.” This is a significant sign of the informational efficiency of the EU ETS. The EUA market can be considered as efficient if prices fully reflect all available relevant information divulged. And there should be no doubt that the release of reliable information concerning emissions covered by a cap-and-trade program is highly relevant. According always to Buchner and Ellerman (2008),24 “one plausible explanation is that market observers had over-estimated the level of CO2 emissions and the demand for allowances caused by rising real output, the adverse weather in 2005, and the higher prices for natural gas relative to coal. But, another more intriguing possibility is that market observers under-estimated the amount of abatement that would occur in the first year of the EU ETS (. . .).” The cap is always known, but until the release of aggregate emission data, no one has a really good idea of either the level of aggregate emissions or how much emission reduction/ abatement is required to comply with the cap. The same phenomenon was observed in the US SO2 emissions trading program when the first auction revealed emissions and the implied demand for allowances to be much less than expected (Ellerman et al. 2000). Each year, the European Commission will disclose the verified emissions, playing the role of a “banker.” After a new increase to 20€ in June, EUA prices stabilized in a range from 15€ to 17€ and then, in consequence of a less cold winter, they have been declining these last 3 months. Recall that European Union Allowances are the carbon trading unit that is exchanged under the EU carbon permit scheme for each ton of carbon dioxide emitted in the atmosphere. With two trading periods, EU ETS futures markets are divided in two segments which respond to two distinct fundamentals. As it approached the end of 2007, the EU ETS was characterized by two price signals responding to different dynamics, because of the very limited opportunity to carry over unused EUAs from phase I to phase II. While the prices of spot and futures contracts for the first period were down sharply, the prices of futures contracts for the second period surpassed 18€/t. This increase of the second period allowance price is primarily due to institutional factors: the European Commission issued its opinion on ten National Allowances Plans for the second period since the end of November 2006. In doing so, it established the basis for the institutional framework for 24

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2008–2012 and gave indications regarding three factors that will have a decisive effect on the allowance price: • The Commission has requested that the allowances awarded to installations be reduced. The Commission also reaffirmed its rejection of ex post allowances based on adjusted projections of growth and emissions. Brussels has therefore sent a clear signal of the scarcity of the allowances that will be available in 2008–2012. • The possible carryover of unused allowances from the first to the second period (“banking”) is now subject to conditions that are so restrictive as to make it practically impossible. Nevertheless, banking between the second and subsequent periods is still permitted, which could further increase the scarcity of allowances in 2008–2012. • The use of credits originating from project mechanisms created by the Kyoto Protocol (JI and CDM) has been significantly restricted. Ireland has thus been forced to reduce its ceiling from 50 % to 21 %, which corresponds to 35 MtCO2 less over the period; Sweden will have to reduce its own ceiling from 20 % to 10 %, i.e., 11 Mt CO2 less than planned. As Ellerman and Parsons (2006) noted,25 “it is virtually certain that the EU ETS will then be either long or short; the likelihood of a perfect match between 1st period EUAs and emissions are extremely small. This binary outcome places a limit on 1st period prices that, when coupled with the constraint on inter-period banking, allows a probability of shortage to be calculated taking into account all the uncertainties weather, economic growth, energy prices, and the abatement response to carbon prices.” Without banking between the two trading periods, they measure the probability of shortage at any point in time by the ratio of the first period price to the second period price plus 40€, which represents the penalty. The penalty will be 100€ thereafter and companies will also have to surrender a compensating amount of allowances. To wrap up, during the first 3 years, banking and borrowing of allowances are allowed. Therefore, we can expect that first period CO2 prices follow Hotelling’s rule which in its simplest model predicts that, under perfect information, the price of an exhaustible resource will rise at the rate of interest r. However, in the case of the ban of banking between the two periods 2005–2007 and 2008–2012, we highlighted a total disconnection between each exchange market and a decline of the first period prices. Evidence of Institutional Learning Within the EU ETS The previous discussion suggests that EUA prices are affected by institutional events such as the simultaneous release in April 2006 of 2005 verified emissions by the Walloon Region of Belgium, France, and Spain. Trading based on information before this price adjustment may be characterized as hazardous or speculative, and only these 2005 verified emissions could give a hint about the long and short positions at the installation level. Most of the verified emissions were reported by mid-May. The fact that the EUA price responded quickly to such relevant information may be interpreted as a strong sign of the efficiency of the intertemporal market in the EU ETS. The EU Commission has greatly learned from the 2005–2007 warm-up period. Namely, most of the issues regarding banking and borrowing have been fixed between 2007 and 2008. The transition from phase II to phase III has mostly been characterized by a change in the allocation methodology, going from free allocation (i.e., grandfathering) to actually having to bid for permits (i.e., auctioning).

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Table 2 Glossary of Kyoto units Assigned Amount Unit AAU means a unit derived from an Annex 1 Party’s assigned amount. They are tradable units that Annex 1 Parties may count toward compliance with their emissions target. Each AAU is equal to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent gases Certified Emission CER means a unit issued pursuant to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. These are tradable units Reduction generated by projects in non-Annex 1 Parties under the Clean Development Mechanism. They may be counted by Annex 1 Parties toward compliance with their UN and EU emissions target and are equal to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent gases Emission Reduction ERU is a unit issued pursuant to Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol. These are tradable units Unit generated by projects in Annex 1 Parties under Joint Implementation. Annex 1 Parties may count them toward compliance with their emissions target. Each ERU is equal to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent gases Removal Unit RMU is a tradable unit issued on the basis of removals of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere through LULUCF activities under Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol. Annex 1 Parties may count them toward compliance with their emissions target. Each RMU is equal to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent gases. Note: These are units derived from Annex 1 Party’s emissions target under the Kyoto Protocol. They may be counted by Annex 1 Parties toward compliance with their emissions target and are equal to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent gases. AAUs, RMUs, ERUs, and CERs are Kyoto units

Additional Flexibility Mechanisms In this section, we highlight the possibility for firms to achieve their abatement targets not only by intertemporal emissions trading but also by getting credits from projects (Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation, Domestic Offset). Firms may also take advantage of other tradable permits markets options designed to stabilize prices, such as a safety valve or minimumprice auctioning. Table 2 provides a useful glossary of Kyoto units.

Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation

Projects provide more flexibility to operators to fulfill their obligations and increase market liquidity. The use of credits generated by projects, additionally to the number of allowances distributed, may reduce EUA prices even in the presence of high transaction costs for early projects. It also enlarges the range of abatement opportunities for firms and may lower the compliance costs if it is cheaper to invest in JI or CDM projects than trading. But this hypothesis crucially depends on the relative price of credits, the possibility to access project credits at a lower cost than through trading on the market, and the size of the firm (due to informational and administrative requirements). If banking allows to reduce uncertainty on the delivery of CDM or JI projects, those two instruments may be complementary. From the viewpoint of economic rationality, carbon assets delivered by projects (be it AAUs, EUAs, CERs, or ERUs) should be fungible. This question implies creating gateways between different frameworks. As the second period of the EU ETS coincides with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, every transaction of EUA is simultaneously backed by a transfer of AAU between the registries of the different countries concerned. The Linking Directive recognizes JI/CDM credits as equivalent to EU ETS allowances. To maintain a single currency within the EU ETS, the participant delivers project credit to the national authority and gets issued an allowance in exchange for it. Since credits from the CDM projects can be used for compliance during both phases of the EU ETS,26 they should cap the price of 2008 allowances and provide a better long-term price signal than

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the price of 2005–2007 allowances to guide decisions as to which emission reduction measures are cost-effective during 2005–2007. No JI credits are available before 2008. In this context of interlinked schemes at the regional and international levels, the price stabilization properties of banking and borrowing may prove to be useful to convey a unique carbon price. Next, let us discuss innovative schemes at the domestic level.

Domestic Offset Projects

According to Egenhofer and Fujiwara (2007), “domestic offset projects (DOPs) mirror the concept of project mechanisms articulated in the Kyoto Protocol, but are used within the home country to reduce emissions in the non trading sectors.” Those voluntary agreements may incentivize low cost reductions in non-ETS sectors that were not identified previously due to the diffuse nature of polluters, provided the reductions are additional. In return, installations get credits in their respective carbon market. To overcome the potential complexities of administrative requirements for small units and to keep transaction costs at low levels, there is a need for pilot schemes with simplified rules for additionality, baselines, and discounting and that allow pooling. Some examples may already be found in New Zealand, New South Wales (NSW 2006), and proposals have emerged in Canada (Bramley 2003) and in the USA at the regional level.27 An experimental scheme is currently being implemented in France by the CDC Climat. Eligible projects have a concentration on waste, renewable energies, agriculture, and forestry but also concern the sectors of transport and energy efficiency. Within the JI framework, the CDC Climat selects for each project a foreign partner and will buy at a predetermined price ERUs that will be granted by the French government. The upper limit is set to five million ton equivalent CO2 between 2008 and 2012. Those emission reduction projects will impact the Kyoto target by an equivalent reduction in the national inventory. Such an innovative scheme is designed to foster the discovery of new low-cost emission reduction sources at the national level. However, its development may be hampered by the EUA price volatility that we commented above. That is why we recommend the adoption of a clear EU-wide institutional framework where a careful use of banking and borrowing may contribute to dampen allowance price fluctuations. Next, we discuss another flexibility mechanism to limit price volatility called a safety valve.

Safety Valve

Some propositions to cope with the EUA price volatility deal with the inclusion of a “safety valve” in the EU ETS. A safety valve is a hybrid instrument to limit the cost of capping emissions at some target level whereby the regulator offers to sell permits in whatever quantity at a predetermined price. If prices are greater than expected, the marginal cost of abatement would be limited to the safety valve price. The regulator tries to set the emissions cap at a level where the expected marginal cost of meeting the constraint will match the beliefs about marginal benefits. To avoid being too far away on the highcost side, the regulator includes a provision to sell emissions permits at some price near that expected cost level.

26

As soon as they are connected by the International Transaction Log See for instance the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative at http://www.rggi.org/ and a review of regional initiatives by Roy (2007).

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Jacoby and Ellerman (2004) report this idea emerged out of discussions in the USA around the costs related to the Kyoto Protocol as a way of raising the likelihood of Protocol’s ratification by blunting criticism that the cost of meeting the Kyoto targets would be too high. The best example to date of a system that would have required a safety valve is the RECLAIM Program in California.28 The inclusion of a safety valve to a tradable permits market is not new, despite strong criticisms about this instrument: • If the safety valve price is too high, it will have no effect. • If the safety valve is too low, the quantity constraint is not binding anymore and may be associated with a permanent tax. • There is a potential loss of “environmental integrity,” i.e., a fear of relaxing toward target reduction instead of supporting economically efficient implementation. These negative effects lead us to be skeptical about the inclusion of a safety valve as a policy recommendation for the EU ETS. Finally, we discuss another flexibility mechanism linked to the allocation process.

Minimum-Price Auctioning To improve the stability of EUA pricing during 2005–2012 (before the shift to auctioning), the National Allocation Plans may have included a provision to allocate permits not only by grandfathering, whose “updating” effects based on past emissions may be detrimental to the efficiency of the scheme, but also by auctioning. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with auctioning mechanisms in detail, it is worth emphasizing the benefits of a specific technique called “minimum-price auction” whereby governments could fix a minimum bid level that would serve as a price floor. Such an allocation process requires a certain degree of coordination between member states on basic auction rules, while the Commission supervises its enforcement as for each NAP. This device guarantees that prices will not drop below a predetermined level and helps restoring confidence in the efficiency of the EU ETS for market participants. But it needs to be configured in accordance to the quantitative limit on projects that might enter the EU ETS for instance. In this section, we stressed that the banking and borrowing mechanisms should not be seen in isolation of other flexibility mechanisms that firms could use to achieve compliance at a lower cost. Those include mainly projects (JI, CDM, DOP), whose efficiency may be increased by a careful use of banking and borrowing. We discard the use of a safety valve as a useful flexibility mechanism, but we recommend political savvy in auctioning permits using a minimum price.

28

According to Harrison (2003), this multisource program regulating SO2 and NOx emissions had overlapping control cycles and trading between control groups, so de facto 6-month banking and borrowing. But the temporal flexibility was not enough for such a limited geographic scope, and as unusual weather conditions and lack of new capacity placed high demand on existing units, the permit price rose from $5,000 to $90,000 per ton, i.e., multiplied by 18. The disconnection of electricity and environmental markets associated with other program design failures led the State to eventually take over and provide adequate electricity supply. At the same time, prices of future vintages (borrowing) revealed the shortterm nature of the crisis and recognized that it was an unusual case. This experience raises the question of adding several sectors in the same permit market like the EU ETS: wouldn’t it be preferable to have different prices for different markets? Page 15 of 18

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Conclusion This chapter summarizes the main functioning principles of tradable permits markets for use in environmental regulation along two dimensions: initial allocation and intertemporal trading. Among the international emissions trading schemes, we may cite the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS. From a political economy perspective, this chapter highlights the difficulties encountered by the European Commission during the validation of the EU ETS Second National Allocation Plans where each national regulator needs to arbitrate between various interests at stakes and reveals the necessary compromise that needs to be found between various conceptions on the role of environmental regulation. The negotiation process of each NAP at the member state level is typically an example of a manipulable rule whereby industries may conduct lobbying activities to extract more permits as a monopoly rent. With reference to the debate “rules versus discretion” in monetary economics, this unhealthy lobbying by major industries calls for further research to ascertain the conditions under which it would be optimal to delegate the determination of the cap and the distribution of permits to an independent agency (Helm et al. 2003). Regarding intertemporal flexibility, the theoretical studies agreed on the fact that when it is effective, banking and borrowing allow a reduction of climate policies costs. The incentive to bank emerges more especially with more stringent future environmental targets. Our review of the main theoretical results on the use of banking and borrowing for tradable permits markets provides a balanced picture of the pros and the cons of this instrument: while banking provides incentives for early compliance, unrestricted borrowing may aggravate the environmental harm by a concentration of the emissions stream over specific periods. Combined with generous and free permits endowments, this situation confirms the view that the EU ETS is only “warming up” in its first phase at the expense of suboptimal abatement choices. The regulator could adopt an intertemporal trading ratio specific to borrowing as discussed by Kling and Rubin (1997), allowing for a better grasp of the possibilities offered by intertemporal emissions trading. Indeed, a greater reliance on banking and limited borrowing (i.e., with a specific discounting factor) should be promoted to allow firms to smooth their emissions and take investment decisions in abatement technologies with a better capacity to react to the evolution of the carbon constraint over time.

References Alberola E, Chevallier J (2009) European carbon prices and banking restrictions: evidence from phase I (2005–2007). Energy J 30(3):51–80 Baron R (1999) Market Power and Market Access in International GHG Emission Trading, IEA information paper. International Energy Agency, Energy and Environment Division, Paris Bernard A, Paltsev S, Reilly JM, Vielle M, Viguier L (2003) Russia’s role in the Kyoto protocol. MIT Joint Program on the Science of Policy and Global Change, WP98, Boston, MA Bohringer C, Moslener U, Sturm B (2006) Hot air for sale: a quantitative assessment of Russia’s near term climate policy options. Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg and Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim Bramley M (2003) Doing their bit: ensuring large industrial emitters contribute adequately to Canada’s implementation of the Kyoto protocol. The Pembina Institute, Canada, Ottawa Page 16 of 18

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Buchner BK, Ellerman AD (2008) Over-allocation or abatement? A preliminary analysis of the EU ETS based on the 2005–06 emissions data. Environ Res Econ 41(2):267–287 Burniaux JM (1999) How important is market power in achieving Kyoto?: an assessment based on the GREEN model, OECD workshop on the economic modelling of climate change, WP13. OECD, Paris Cason TN, Gangadharan L (2006) Emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking. J Econ Behav Organ 61(2):199–216 Chevallier J (2012) Banking and borrowing in the EU ETS: a review of economic modelling, current provisions and prospects for future design. J Econ Surv 26(1):157–176 Egenhofer C, Fujiwara N (2007) Shaping the global arena: preparing the EU emissions trading scheme for the post-2012 period. Centre for European Policy Studies Task Force Reports, Brussels Ehrhart KM, Hoppe C, Schleich J, Seifert S (2005) The role of auctions and forward markets in the EU ETS: counterbalancing the cost-inefficiencies of combining generous allocation with a ban on banking. Clim Policy 5:31–46 Ellerman AD, Montero JP (2007) The efficiency and robustness of allowance banking in the U.S. acid rain program. Energy J 28(4):47–72 Ellerman AD, Parsons J (2006) Shortage, inter-period pricing, and banking. In: Tendances carbone, vol 5. CDC Climat, Paris Ellerman AD, Joskow PL, Schmalensee R, Montero JP, Bailey E (2000) Markets for clean air: the US acid rain program, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Ellerman AD, Buchner BK, Carraro C (2008) Allocation in the European emissions trading scheme: rights, rents and fairness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Godby RW, Mestelman S, Muller RA, Welland JD (2000) Emissions trading with shares and coupons when control of discharges is uncertain. J Environ Econ Manag 32:359–381 Guesnerie R (2006) The design of post-Kyoto climate schemes: an introductory analytical assessment. Working paper PSE number 2006–11, Paris School of Economics, Paris Hahn RW (1984) Market power and transferable property rights. Q J Econ 99:753–765 Haites E (2006) Allowance banking in emissions trading schemes: theory and practice. Margaree Consultants, Toronto Harrison D (2003) Ex post evaluation of the RECLAIM emissions trading program for the Los Angeles air basin. OECD workshop on ex post evaluation of tradable permits: methodological and policy issues, Paris Helm D, Hepburn C, Mash R (2003) Credible carbon policy. Oxf Rev Econ Policy 19(3):438–450 Holtsmark B (2003) Russian behaviour in the market for permits under the Kyoto protocol. Clim Policy 3:399–415 Jacoby HD, Ellerman AD (2004) The safety valve and climate policy. Energy Policy 32:481–491 Klepper G, Peterson S (2005) Trading hot air. The influence of permit allocation rules, market power and the US withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol. Environ Res Econ 32:205–227 Kling C, Rubin J (1997) Bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution. J Public Econ 64:101–115 Kolstad CD (2005) Piercing the veil of uncertainty in transboundary pollution agreements. Environ Res Econ 31:21–34 Kruger J, Oates WE, Pizer WA (2007) Decentralization in the EU emissions trading scheme and lessons for global policy. Resources for the future discussion paper 07-02, Washington, DC Kyle AS (1985) Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53:1315–1335

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Lecocq F, Capoor K (2005) State and trends of the carbon market. World Bank and International Emissions Trading Association, Washington, DC Leiby P, Rubin J (2001) Intertemporal permit trading for the control of greenhouse gas emissions. Environ Res Econ 19:229–256 Maeda A (2003) The emergence of market power in emission rights markets: the role of initial permit distribution. J Regul Econ 24(3):293–314 Maeda A (2004) Impact of banking and forward contracts on tradable permit markets. Environ Econ Policy Stud 6(2):81–102 Mansanet-Bataller M, Pardo A, Valor E (2007) CO2 prices, energy and weather. Energy J 28(3):67–86 Muller B (2002) Equity in climate change: the great divide, Working paper number EV31. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, UK Newell R, Pizer W, Zhang J (2005) Managing permit markets to stabilize prices. Environ Res Econ 31:133–157 NSW (2006) Greenhouse gas abatement scheme (GGAS), New Zealand. Available at http://www. greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au Petrakis E, Sartzetakis ES, Xepapadeas A (1999) Environmental regulation and market power: competition, time consistency and international trade. Edward Elgar, London Roy M (2007) US climate policy: where to from here? Conference on cap and trade: design and implementation, University of California, Berkeley Rubin J (1996) A model of intertemporal emission trading, banking, and borrowing. J Environ Econ Manag 31:269–286 Schennach SM (2000) The economics of pollution permit banking in the context of title IV of the 1990 clean air act amendments. J Environ Econ Manag 40:189–210 Schleich J, Ehrhart KM, Hoppe C, Hoppe C, Seifert S (2006) Banning banking in EU emissions trading? Energy Policy 34:112–120 Seifert J, Uhrig-Homburg M, Wagner M (2008) Dynamic behavior of CO2 spot prices. J Environ Econ Manag 56(2):180–194 Sijm JPM, Bakker SJA, Chen Y, Harmsen HW, Lise W (2005) CO2 price dynamics: the implications of EU emissions trading for the price of electricity. Working paper ECN-C-05-061, the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore Stavins RN (1998) What can we learn from the grand policy experiment? Lessons from SO2 allowance trading. J Econ Perspect 12(3):69–88 UNFCCC (2000) Procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto protocol: note by the co-Chairmen of the Joint Working Group on Compliance, Bonn

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Climate Change: Safeguarding Indigenous Peoples Through “Land-Sensitive” Adaptation Policy in Africa Ademola Oluborode Jegede* Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa

Abstract While, generally, climate change affects Africa negatively, indigenous peoples will suffer more, considering their lifestyle which is intricately attached to land. On three grounds, this chapter argues the importance of safeguarding indigenous peoples through “land-sensitive” adaptation policy at the national level in Africa. First, this is based on the evidence of existing forms of “land-sensitive” adaptation practices among indigenous peoples in the face of climate variability over time in Africa. Second, the current emerging range of climatic variation in Africa, however, challenges these “landsensitive” adaptation practices of indigenous peoples. Finally, although international climate adaptation policy requires the protection of indigenous peoples in its processes, states in Africa hardly comply with this prescription while engaging with these processes at the domestic level. The chapter concludes by suggesting what a “land-sensitive” adaptation policy at national level should embody for indigenous peoples in Africa.

Keywords Africa; Climate change; Adaptation policy; Adaptation practices; Indigenous peoples’ land use and tenure

Introduction The contributions of Working Group 1 to the Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990 (Watson et al. 1990), 1995 (Houghton et al. 1995), 2001 (Baede et al. 2001), 2007 (Le Treut et al. 2007), and 2013 (Stocker et al. 2013) have overwhelmingly explained the scientific and factual basis of climate change. According to these contributions, human activities are substantially increasing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, thus enhancing greenhouse effect, which has in turn led to increased warming of the earth’s surface resulting in climate change (Le Treut et al. 2007; Baede et al. 2001; Houghton et al. 1995; Watson et al. 1990). With an economy largely agrarian and limited adaptation capacity, populations in Africa are and will be seriously affected by climate change (Toulmin 2009; Wold et al. 2009, pp. 1–47; Collier et al. 2008, p. 337; Boko et al. 2007). Although, there is no Africa-wide climate homogenous effect (Collier et al. 2008, p. 338), in general terms, climate change’s negative impacts for Africa, actual and projected, is expected on areas such as water resources, food security, natural resource

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management and biodiversity, human health, settlements and infrastructure, and desertification (Toulmin 2009, pp. 15–87; Boko et al. 2007, pp. 10.2–10.6). Even though indigenous peoples have contributed least to climate change, according to the United Nations Development Group’s Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues (UNGGIPI 2008, p. 8), “they are the first to face its impact.” Indeed, indigenous peoples will be disproportionately affected by climate change (Crippa 2013, p. 124; UNHRC 2009 Resolution 10/4; Salick and Byg 2007, p. 4; Stern 2006, p. 95). Through a review of literature, using a descriptive and analytical approach, this chapter contends that safeguarding indigenous peoples through “land-sensitive” adaptation policy is important at the national level in Africa for three reasons. First, there are existing forms of “landsensitive” adaptation practices among indigenous peoples in Africa based on their experience of climate variability. Second, given the emerging range of climatic variation in Africa, these “landsensitive” adaptation practices of indigenous peoples are under threat. Finally, despite the requirement in international climate adaptation policy for the protection of indigenous peoples in its processes, states in Africa do not specifically attend to the adaptive concerns and practices of indigenous peoples while engaging with international adaptation policy requirement.

Understanding Terms: “Indigenous Peoples” in Africa, “Land- Sensitivity,” and “Adaptation” In the interest of clarity, there are key terms which are employed in this chapter that merit brief explanation. It is the foregoing worldview about land that supports several forms of adaptive practices among indigenous peoples in different parts of Africa in the face of adverse impacts of climate change over time. While these adaptive practices vary, a common trend is that these practices portray indigenous peoples’ resilient adjustment to the use of land, despite the harsh reality of climate change. This pattern of adjustment, as it is illustrated in the next section, cuts across different scenarios of climate impacts including prediction of weather, water scarcity, drought, land degradation, and food insecurity.

Prediction of Weather Indigenous peoples in Africa have devised diverse means of predicting the weather. Environmental conditions, such as rainfall, thunderstorms, windstorms, and dusty winds, have been reportedly used by indigenous peoples in preparing for future use of land and weather forecast in West Africa (Ajani et al. 2013; Ajibade and Shokemi 2003). More particularly, the Maasai in the eastern part of Africa do predict droughts by observing the movement of celestial bodies and combining such with watching the development of certain plants. This has been reported as useful in serving as an early warning signal of an approaching environmental disaster as well as an early indication of “the condition of the range of land and its likely changes” (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013a). Other forecasting approaches, according to Roncoli et al. (2001), include the timing of fruiting by certain local trees, the water level in streams and ponds, the nesting behavior of small quail-like birds, and the insect behavior in rubbish heaps outside compound walls. The foregoing has adaptive utility. Outcome of weather prediction enables indigenous peoples in Kenya to understand storm routes and wind patterns and, hence, to design local disaster management practices in advance. This is achieved by constructing appropriate shelters, windbreak structures, walls, and homestead fences (UNU-IAS-TKI 2009, p. 55). Also, as a result of prediction of weather, indigenous peoples are able to plan daily economic life and social activities with foresight. This Page 2 of 18

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possibility further results in adaptive strategy such as planting appropriate crops that suit a particular season (UNU-IAS-TKI 2009, p. 55). Generally in East Africa, knowledge about weather condition enables the pastoral Maasai to prepare for drought and make decisions about where to graze and which grasses recover faster than others (UNU-IAS-TKI 2009, p. 55).

Water Scarcity Coping Approach A range of adaptive measures is also being taken by indigenous peoples in conditions of scarcity of water. The Maasai accurately assess the water-holding capacity of distant pastures to plan transhumance activities. Generally, pastoral communities living in the water-deficient areas engage in rainwater harvesting which is conserved for all their needs. Other approaches include the construction of “sand dams” which slows down flash floods and holds the water in the sand of the riverbed (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013b). Shallow wells may also be provided with sanitary seals to protect them from contamination and unnecessary siltation after floods. This, in essence, helps in reducing the caving in of wells during the floods thus making water available for a longer period and reducing human stress (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013b).

Drought and Land Degradation Management Skills Among the Tuaregs in North Africa as well as in the south of the Sahara, adaptive practices of coping with drought and land degradation have been documented. “Fixation sites” are constructed since 1990 to assist in coping with spread of desertification (Woodke 2007, pp. 10–11; Harris 2007). Also, during drought periods, the pastoralists in this region change from cattle to sheep and goat husbandry (Seo and Mendelsohn 2006) or move from the dry northern areas to the wetter southern areas of the Sahel (McLean 2010, p. 60). Additionally, the Sukuma people of the north of Tanzania engage in soil conservation through which animal fodders are prepared and made available to very young, old, or sick animals unable to follow other animals to grazing lands. The process encourages the conservation of grazing and fodder lands by encouraging vegetation regeneration and tree planting (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013c).

Food Preservation To cope with loss of crops and food insecurity, fodder is of huge importance to nomadic people whose livestock is often the only source of income. Among the Tuaregs, there is evidence of enclosures designed to protect and safeguard pastures (Woodke 2007). Preservation of items such as fruits, vegetables, and edible insects is demonstrated in two ways: for vegetables, it is usually to immerse the fresh vegetables in salty boiling water and spread for drying after boiling for a few minutes to avoid loss of nutrient, and for drying caterpillars, termites, white ants, and other edible insects, this may be directly spread in the sun (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013d). The practice of sun drying among indigenous peoples is a coping mechanism found in several states in Africa including Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Tanzania, Senegal, and Democratic Republic of the Congo (FAO 1985). Notwithstanding these existing forms of adaptation among indigenous peoples, the “landsensitive” adaptation practices of indigenous peoples in Africa are threatened by a new emerging range of climatic variations requiring urgent policy attention by states in Africa.

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Increasing Climate Variation as a Threat Climate variation is increasing with peculiar adverse impacts on indigenous peoples’ land in different regions of Africa (IPACC 2012; IWGIA 2011; Mclean 2010; Tebtebba 2010). This arguably threatens the existing adaptive capacity of indigenous peoples in Africa. Although the experiences of indigenous peoples throughout Africa are not the same, they share common experience of vulnerability to climate change, notwithstanding adaptive practices. According to the ACHPR and IWGIA (2005, p. 18), among indigenous peoples in West Africa are the Baka, Mbororo, and Tuareg. In the territories of these groups, there is reported evidence that the consequence of climate change is typified by destruction of grazing lands, drought, reduced access to safe water, and destruction of plants and animals (IPACC 2012; Mclean 2010, p. 42; Woodke 2007, pp. 10–11). In East Africa, there are several indigenous peoples’ groups, among which are the Maasai, Ogiek, Endorois, and Yaaku in Kenya (CHARAPA et al. 2012, pp. 29–39; Tebtebba Foundation 2010, p. 440). These peoples experience several negative conditions as a result of a changing climate, including land degradation, drought, flood, famine, and displacement (UNFCCC 2013; CHARAPA et al. 2012, pp. 35–37; IWGIA 2011, p. 410). The Batwas in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), also known as Baka in Central African Republic (CAR) and Gabon, Baka, and Bagyeli in Cameroon, are in the Central Africa and Great Lakes region (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 16). The recent experiences of these peoples include a lengthy dry season and unpredictable weather conditions, which are affecting the agricultural calendar and bringing scarcity of forest products such as fruits and tubers, thereby disturbing their cultural lifestyle (Baka People Video 2013; Tebtebba 2010, p. 481; Mclean 2010, p. 44; CWE 2009, p. 2). More frequently, to the Mbororo and other pastoralists in the same region, transhumance calendars are being altered from January to late October due to a shift in the start of the dry season (Tebtebba 2010, p. 481; Mclean 2010, p. 44). In the north of Africa are indigenous peoples known as the Amazigh (or Imazighen), also referred to as the Berbers or Tuaregs (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, pp. 18–19). Evidence of climate impacts on their land includes scarcity of water, degradation, desertification, overgrazing, and salinization, in a changing climate (McLean 2010, p. 42; IISD 2001). In the southern part of Africa, the San, or Basarwa, peoples of the Kalahari (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17) face increasing dune expansion and increased wind speeds which have resulted in a loss of vegetation and negatively impacted traditional cattle and goat farming practices (UNPFII 2008). In the Horn of Africa, the Doko, Ezo, Zozo, and Daro Malo in the Gamo Highlands experience increasing pressures on local resources and great hardship through increase in temperature, scarcity of water, dying animals, and fewer grazing land (Gamo Video Report 2013). The “Outsa” leaf which is used for shelter, animal grazing, and food and hence crucial to the survival of these peoples is fast disappearing (Gamo Video Report 2013). The situation is not different with the Afar people to the northeast of Ethiopia. Living in an extremely fragile environment worsened by climate change, the Afar suffer damage of flash flooding, change in river courses, increased desertification, herd loss, hunger, thirst, and famine (Gardo 2008). In sum, across Africa, the foregoing emerging and increasing impacts of climate change are overwhelming and beyond the capability of existing adaptive measures being used by indigenous peoples in the face of droughts, flooding, famine, and loss of grazing land and livestock. This is largely because increasing variations of climate impact disrupt the land use and result into displacement of indigenous peoples from the land which is crucial to their adaptive practices. Generally, land degradation reduces the availability of ecosystem goods to these populations for adaptation purposes (Nkem et al. 2010; Tobey et al. 2010). More specifically, insecurity of land Page 4 of 18

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tenure and use has been found to constrain adaptation practices among indigenous peoples in states including Mali (Ebi et al. 2011) and Uganda (Hisali et al. 2011) and generally in the Congo Basin region (Nkem et al. 2010). Even where partial communal tenure is recognized as in Kenya, Namibia, and DRC, discrimination against traditional land use and livelihood strategies, logging concessions, commercial farms, and large-scale development projects (dams, oil exploitation, floriculture) are major constraint to local adaptation practices (CHARAPA et al. 2012, p. 87). Insecurity of land tenure and use and the resultant changing livelihood are a driver of declining traditional relationship with the land, a major source of adaptation information and knowledge (Pearce et al. 2011, 16.3.2.1; CHARAPA et al. 2012, p. 88). Besides, the emerging range of climate variation requires long-term adaptation strategies, which the existing adaptive practices of indigenous peoples cannot achieve on their own without nontraditional technology and resources as complements (CHARAPA et al. 2012, p. 87). The nontraditional measures refer to the transfer of modern technology and resources that most indigenous peoples do not possess. The need for technology and resources cannot be overemphasized considering that indigenous populations live in remote places of a country, characterized by poor infrastructure, limited basic services, and poor government presence (Macchi et al. 2008, pp. 49–50). Technology can help in complementing or improving existing adaptive strategies linked with their land in coping with increasing impacts of climate change resulting from the emerging range of climate variation (Fleischer et al. 2011). Also, availability of funds is a good resource that may improve traditional or indigenous adaptation practices (Peters et al. 2013, p. 16.6; Nakhooda et al. 2011, p. 7). Yet, while the existing climate variability challenges the adaptive capacities of indigenous peoples, the approach by states in Africa to this reality does not show an effective implementation of international processes for adaptation measures in such manner that addresses the adaptive challenges of indigenous peoples.

Weak States’ Role in Engaging Adaptive Processes Although the pillar instruments of climate change at the international level, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and a range of decisions by the Conference of the Parties (COP) and Meeting of the Parties (MOP) under the Kyoto Protocol, require states to follow certain processes in responding to adaptation concerns, indigenous peoples’ adaptive concerns and capacities are hardly specifically addressed in the framing of adaptive challenges by states in Africa.

International Climate Change Adaptation Processes The pillar instruments of the climate change, the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and a range of decisions by the COP under the UNFCCC and the MOP under the Kyoto Protocol, set out the standard processes for international adaptation measures. Article 4 (1) (b) of the UNFCCC enjoins all parties to “formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national. . .programmes containing measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change. . ..” Also, article 4 (1) (e) requires parties to the UNFCCC to cooperate “in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change” as well as plan for “coastal zone management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and Page 5 of 18

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desertification, as well as floods.” Under the Kyoto Protocol, it is similarly evident that the national level has the directing policy role to play in documenting and implementing adaptation measures. Article 10 (b) (ii) of the Kyoto Protocol enjoins parties to “include in their national communications as appropriate, information on programmes which contain measures. . .” which may be helpful in “addressing climate change and its adverse impacts, including. . .adaptation measures.” In the decisions of the COP or the MOP under the Kyoto Protocol, there is equally a requirement on the state government for the facilitation of adaptation process. This began to feature prominently since the COP 7 held in 2001, which acknowledged the specific needs and concerns of developing countries, including the least developing countries (LDC), and emphasized the unique role of states in addressing adaptation issues. It insisted that adaptation actions should follow a review process based on national communications and/or other relevant information (Decision 5/CP.7/2001, p. 2). It was equally stressed that support be given to the states in the preparation of the national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs) (Decision 5/CP.7/2001, p. 15). Furthermore, the decision acknowledges the importance of indigenous resources and urges parties to take these resources into consideration as part of options for addressing the impacts of climate change (Decision 5/CP.72002, p. 24). It also formulates guidelines to facilitate preparation for NAPA (Decision 28/CP.7/2001). The NAPA guidelines in its paragraphs 6 (a) and (c) affirm that it will be “action oriented.” Paragraph 7 (f) of the NAPA guidelines reiterates that it is “a country-driven approach.” While no specific mention is made of indigenous peoples, in paragraph 7 (a), it is pointed out that NAPA is “a participatory process involving stakeholders, particularly local communities,” while paragraph 7 (j) assures that the process will ensure “flexibility of procedures based on individual country circumstances.” The use of the term “local populations” arguably involves the indigenous peoples particularly when it is read together with paragraphs 16 (a), (f), and (h) which, respectively, require “loss of life and livelihood,” “cultural heritage,” and “land use management and forestry” as part of the criteria for prioritizing adaptation activities at the national level. These required items are core issues to the adaptive practices of indigenous peoples in Africa. Guidelines in relation to national adaptation plan of action were subsequently endorsed at COP 8 (Decision 9/CP.8/2002, p. 1), COP 9 (Decision 8/CP.9/2003, p. 1), and COP 10 (Decision 1/CP.10/2004, p. 4), for the developing countries in the LDC and non-LDC to document their adaptive concerns and need for funds. Furthermore, the COP 12 in Nairobi indicates that activities to be funded under climate funds may consider national communications or national adaptation programs of action and other relevant information from the applicant party (Decision 1/CP.12/2006). At COP 13 held at Bali, an “enhanced action on adaptation” was conceived as consisting of elements including international cooperation in order to support developing states in their vulnerability assessment and integration of actions into “national planning, specific projects and programmes” (Decision 1/CP.13/2007). This was also reinforced at the Cancun meeting of COP 16 (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, pp. 11–14) which highlighted the human rights implications for adverse impacts of climate change and the need to engage with stakeholders including indigenous peoples when developing and implementing their national action plans (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 12). At a subsequent meeting in Durban, parties were urged to include in their national communications and other channels the steps they have taken in actualizing NAPA (Decision 5/CP.17/2011, p. 33), as well as indigenous and traditional knowledge and practices in adaptation strategies (Decision 6/CP.172011, p. 4). These requirements are also evident in the key decisions dealing with the access of the state to adaptation funds (Decision 28/CP.7/2001, p. 4; Decision 8/CP.5/1999). Different categories of funds in relation to adaptation are mainly the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) established at COP 7, respectively, Page 6 of 18

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under Decisions 5/CP.7/2001 (p. 12) and 7/CP.7/2001 (p. 6) and Decision 7/CP.7/2001 (p. 2). Adaptation Fund (AF) was established pursuant to article 12 (8) of the Kyoto Protocol at COP 7 (Decision 10/CP.7/2001, p. 1), while a Green Climate Fund (GCF) was established pursuant to article 11 of the UNFCCC at COP16 held at Cancun (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 102). The funds under the LDCF and SCCF are voluntary contributions from developed country parties to the UNFCCC (Muyungi 2013; O’Sullivan et al. 2011, p. 15) and managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) (Decision 7/CP.7/2001, p. 6). The GCF is managed by the GCF Board (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 103), while the AF is managed by the Adaptation Fund Board (Decision 1/CMP.3/ 2007, p. 3). All of these funds, namely, AF (Decision 1/CMP.4/2008, p. 11), GCF (Decision 3/CP.17/ 2011, p. 31), LDCF, and SCCF (Xing and Fröde 2012; Bird et al. 2011), support direct access. The guidelines relating to the operationalization of these decisions at the national level emphasize the need to safeguard indigenous peoples’ adaptive concerns and experiences in national adaptation programs. For instance, GEF Principles and Guidelines for Engagement with Indigenous Peoples set out a minimum standard relating to indigenous peoples which is expected to be complied with by partner agencies seeking to implement projects under GEF auspices in response to NAPA proposal (GEF 2012, pp. 22–29). Also the negotiation around the GCF indicates that the participation of indigenous peoples from “the local to the national to the Board level” and inclusion of their knowledge are critical to the implementation of the GCF (Martone and Rubis 2012). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the effectiveness of the approach by states in Africa in engaging with these international adaptation processes to strengthen indigenous peoples’ adaptive practices and concerns is doubtful.

Weak Approach by States In order to comply with the requirement for adaptation funds, each of the 33 African states belonging to LDC has filed a NAPA (UNFCCC 2013b), while the developing states in Africa which are non-LDC have at least filed a national communication. The ensuing subsection demonstrates that the concerns of indigenous peoples in relation to their adaptive experiences are obscured in the official processes for capturing adaptation needs and funds. This is achieved by examining processes from Uganda, Tanzania, and Nigeria. Uganda The Uganda National Adaptation Programmes of Action (Uganda NAPA) was compiled in 2007. The formulation of Uganda’s NAPA claims to have been guided by the principle of participatory approach and benefited from the views of the vulnerable communities and their knowledge on coping mechanisms (Uganda NAPA 2007, VII). It describes the impacts of climate change on sample districts as destruction of infrastructure, deforestation, loss of lives, famine, poverty, water shortage and drying up, erratic seasons and rains, destruction of biodiversity, and epidemics of pests and diseases (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 27). It notes that indigenous knowledge has been employed by communities in Uganda to cope with climate events. As part of its adaptive strategies for funding, it suggests projects such as “Community Tree Growing Project” (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 51), “Land Degradation Management” (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 53), and “Indigenous Knowledge (IK) and Natural Resources Management Project” (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 63). In the document, however, impact scenarios of climate change in Uganda are discussed as though it is proportionately borne by all. It neither discloses the identity of the communities it identifies as “vulnerable” nor profiles as adaptation challenge the lack of protection of the land use and tenure of communities, such as the Batwas, who are indigenous and forest dependent in Uganda (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17). While it uses the word “indigenous” in describing “indigenous knowledge,” it Page 7 of 18

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is used to refer to every citizen of Uganda. This is the logical inference that can be drawn when the term “indigenous” is examined in the sense that it is used in the Uganda 2005 Constitution. According to article 10 (a) of the constitution of Uganda, all the communities found in Uganda as on February 1, 1926, are indigenous. The NAPA employs the concept of “vulnerability” and “indigenous” in referring to all the communities in Uganda without paying attention to the peculiar situations or circumstances of specific groups such as the Batwas who are understood under international human rights law as “indigenous” in Uganda (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17). Tanzania There is a similar trend in the NAPA of Tanzania, which was submitted in 2007 (Tanzania NAPA). The document indicates the adaptation concerns in Tanzania as including “loss of human, natural, financial, social and physical capital, caused by the adverse impacts of climate change.” It also documents “severe droughts and floods, among many other disasters” (Tanzania NAPA 2007, VI). It is further mentioned in the NAPA that climate change is expected to further shrink the rangelands which are significant for livestock-keeping communities in Tanzania (Tanzania NAPA 2007, p. 7). While this may be argued as embodying some of the concerns of indigenous peoples in Tanzania such as the Maasai and Barabaig (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17), it is not certain. This is because it proposes as adaptation measures the inclusion of some activities such as relocation of people living in wildlife corridors, zero grazing, and development of alternative means of income for communities in tourist areas (Tanzania NAPA 2007, pp. 29–31). These activities will disrupt the culture and lead to the displacement of indigenous peoples such as the Maasai and Barabaig in Tanzania and hence threaten their land use and local adaptive practices. Nigeria Nigeria is a non-LDC state and has shown no interest yet in filing a NAPA as a non-LDC. It has, however, filed a national communication which devotes a substantial attention to issues of adaptation in the country. In the communication which is the first and only national communication it has so far lodged under the UNFCCC, peculiar consequences resulting from climate change, and which require adaptive measures, include soil erosion and flooding in the southeastern part of the country. The impacts of climate change on agriculture are assessed as including the effects of changes in temperature and rainfall on plants and animals as well as sea level rise on agricultural land (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 73). Livestock production also suffers due to a decrease in rainfall which has led to a decline of pastureland and water resources (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 75). Sea level rise is also cited as an event likely to lead to considerable losses in the oil investments and developments in the Niger Delta zone. General reference is made to “the people in the coastal areas” as being impacted by challenges such as flooding and erosion in the Niger Delta and leading to the emergence of “environmental refugees” (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 82). Nonetheless, the Nigeria’s national communication largely focuses on the environmental impacts of climate change, relying “heavily on. . .existing records and documentation in various forms including socio-economic statistics, photographs, satellite imageries, geologic and oceanographic data, biological and fisheries data. . .” (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 70). Generally, communities affected by these impacts are not mentioned nor are the pertinent issues such as land use, land tenure, and resource rights relating to these communities discussed. For instance, a decline in pastureland as a result of climate change will not only affect the production of livestock, but it will negatively impact the peoples such as the Mbororo whose lifestyle is traditionally connected to the use of land for cattle rearing. Also, the passing reference to the people living in Page 8 of 18

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coastal areas as likely to experience flooding and erosion does not capture the larger problems which the peoples of this region, particularly the Ogoni, have for long faced and fought in terms of oil spillage, environmental protection, and compensation for environmental losses and land degradation on their land (Nzeadibe et al. 2011). It is difficult to anticipate that a national communication which fails to reflect key issues peculiar to these indigenous peoples will, even if allocated, apply adaptation funds for the purpose of supporting their adaptive practices and concerns. What emerges from the foregoing discussion are therefore the reasons why states in Africa neglect indigenous peoples’ concerns and land-based experiences in framing adaptation processes at national level. Basis for State’s Exclusion The approach by states of Africa in engaging adaptive processes in a way that strengthens adaptive practices and addresses the adaptive concerns of indigenous peoples is arguably shaped by two factors. These are the state-centered nature of the processes and the overriding claim to ownership of land and disposition to use same in accordance with its priority. State-Centered Process The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and indeed decisions of the COP and MOP, respectively, are state centered. In line with article 2 (1) (a) of the Vienna Convention which describes a treaty as an agreement concluded between states (UN 2005), the parties to the international negotiation of climate change instruments such as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are states and not community or group of people. Also, the Conference of the Parties (COP) which is the key decision-making body under the UNFCCC or the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol which makes the ultimate decisions in respect of climate change and response mechanisms is state based representing the interest of different negotiation blocs and states. The decisions of these bodies emphasize the “country-driven” nature of adaptation measures. For instance, the Cancun Agreement which serves as the basis for enhanced action on adaptation involving the developing country parties endorses this approach. It urges parties to strengthen and, in applicable circumstances, establish centers and networks to facilitate and enhance national and regional adaptation actions, in a manner that is country driven and with support from developed countries (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 30). This state-centered nature of adaptation processes also applies to funds relating to adaptation. For instance, the AF (Decision 1/CMP.4/2008, p. 11), GCF (Decision 3/CP.17/2011, p. 31), LDCF, and SCCF (Xing and Fröde 2012; Bird et al. 2011) support direct access to adaptation funds. By “direct access,” it is meant that these funds allow recipient countries to access financial resources, unlike the indirect access, where funding is channeled through a third-party implementing agency (Xing and Fröde 2012). However, this challenges the adaptation potentials of land use by the indigenous peoples in Africa. This is because the notion of direct access is understood in terms of the ownership of these funds by the state. This is clear, for instance, in the recommendations made by the African Development Bank (AfDB) on GCF where it employs the term “direct access” to fund largely as accessibility by national governments (AfDB 2012, p. 3). Also, according to the Operational Policies and Guidelines for Parties to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund (AF Guidelines 2013), projects may only be submitted and funds received directly by the national implementing entity (NIE) which may consist of government ministries and government cooperation agencies (AF Guidelines 2013, p. 27). The implication of state-centered focus of adaptation process is that it is coordinated by the states as has been shown and thus compromises ownership of process by indigenous peoples in Africa. Also, the lack of direct access to funds is that it undermines the utility of indigenous peoples’ Page 9 of 18

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adaptive practices and may, as climate change worsens, compromise their opportunity to strengthen capacity. Yet, an arrangement enabling indigenous peoples a direct access to funds is not unknown to the operation of some financial institutions. For instance, models on direct access to funds for indigenous peoples exist under the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility (IPAF), a former World Bank Facility for Indigenous Peoples; and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) which has a Capacity Building Program for Forest-Dependent People, all of which are dedicated indigenous funds (Martone and Rubis 2012). National Legal Framework In addition to the above, in Africa, key legal and policy framework relating to land use and tenure of indigenous peoples generally vests ownership of land in the state. For instance, article 44 of the Uganda Land Act (1998), articles 1 and 2 of Nigeria Land Use Act (1990), article 3 of Zambia Lands Act (1995), and Tanzania Land Act (1999) vest in the state the power to own and use land in accordance with its priority. This is similarly the case with the Forest Act of states in Africa which assumes the forests as “common goods.” Accordingly, articles 3, 10, and 11 of the Forests Act of Zambia (1999), respectively, vest the ownership of every tree and its produce in the presidency, which enjoys the power to compulsorily acquire any land for the purpose of national forests and restricts the activities of peoples dependent on land such as fishing and hunting from compensation. Article 26 of the Tanzania Forest Act prohibits every action of indigenous peoples that can be regarded as of adaptation relevance such as grazing, hunting and fishing, and erection of any buildings or other structures except with the permission of the minister or a local authority. According to article 5 (1) of the Uganda’s National Forestry and Tree Planting Act (2003), the state at different levels of governance is empowered to hold the forests in trust for the common good of Uganda. Also, according to the National Forest Policy of Nigeria (2006, p. 68), the government is empowered to hold in trust the forest set aside as reserve lands. While there are few exceptions within the legal framework on state ownership and control of land, this is often rendered redundant in the face of overriding public interest. Hence, the general implication of this land and forest regime is that government can legally own and use land for different priorities other than the strengthening of adaptive practices of indigenous peoples. For instance, this enables the state to pursue interests such as large-scale agricultural plantations, mining and logging, construction of roads and dams, as well as conservation which are often at crosspurposes with indigenous peoples’ adaptive practices. In addition to land degradation, the consequence of these activities for indigenous peoples is displacement from the land or territories to which they are culturally attached. This can be buttressed by the presence and consequences of such projects on indigenous peoples’ land in Africa. Large-scale agricultural plantations in several states of Africa including Benin, Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Namibia, and Ethiopia do not only disrupt the land use of indigenous peoples but also compromise their tenure rights (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). In particular, according to Laltaika (2009), massive Jatropha plantations are a new threat to the survival and livelihood of the Maasai in Tanzania. Through concession to private or public business, including logging and mining companies, the land regime also allows mining and logging activities on indigenous peoples’ lands (Barume 2010, p. 70). In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, which is rich in crude oil, oil exploration on the land of indigenous peoples such as the Ogoni, Efik, and Ijaw (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 18) has occasioned environmental degradation resulting from activities including gas flaring and deforestation (Oruonye 2012). Kidd and Kenrick (2009, p. 21) found that the Exxon’s World Bank oil pipeline project backed by the government in Chad and

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Cameroon which crossed Bagyéli land at least five times in the Bipindi area has severe impacts on these communities. These include their displacement and destruction of sacred sites and way of life. Roads and dam constructions have all played a part in the destruction of forests (rainforest deforestation), which are crucial to the shelter, survival, and livelihood of some indigenous peoples. In Namibia, the construction of dam at Epupa was considered environmentally and socially attractive but would displace 1,100 Himba and affect 5,000 occasional users of the grazing areas on the river bank, in addition to the loss of their cultural and religious sites (World Rainforest Movement 2013, p. 28). Conservation efforts in Central Africa have equally led to the dispossession and poverty of indigenous peoples such as the Batwas in that part of Africa. According to Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau (2006), the trend in this regard has been ongoing for long, taking place without due regard for consultation and compensation for forced removal. Essentially, this land regime allows the states in Africa to deflate their responsibilities toward indigenous peoples’ immediate adaptation concerns in the guise of accessing, using, and controlling land for public good. It is thus no surprise that, at international climate forum, indigenous peoples have made the claim for protection of land as key in climate change responses including adaptation. At Nakuru, Kenya, indigenous peoples, particularly of Africa, urge intergovernmental organizations, UN agencies, and international organizations and foundations to ensure that the principles of the UNDRIP are mainstreamed in the design and implementation of any program or project in their land (Nakuru Declaration 2009). At Anchorage, in addition to emphasizing the need for security of land of indigenous peoples as critical to climate programs, indigenous peoples call for adequate and direct funding to enable them to participate effectively in all projects or programs including adaptation (The Anchorage Declaration 2009, pp. 5–7). Also, the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC) in its closing statement before the 2012 SBSTA Working Group meeting calls for the strengthening of the adaptive strategies of indigenous peoples with appropriate policy framework which respect their rights to land and traditional practices (UNFCCC 2012).

Conclusions This chapter makes a case for the necessity for states to have in place adaptation policy in Africa. It bases this proposition on three premises. The first foundation is that there are existent adaptive practices of indigenous peoples which had been useful in coping with adverse range of climate conditions. These adaptive practices which are closely linked to the cultural relationship of indigenous peoples with their land include approaches in form of prediction of weather, water security, drought and land degradation management skills, and food preservation. The second premise is that indigenous peoples in Africa now face a new range of climatic variations beyond their coping adaptive capability. As the final basis of the argument, the chapter demonstrates that rather than addressing this situation, in engaging with international adaptation processes, states in Africa do not facilitate the profiling of indigenous peoples’ adaptive challenges and the development of their landrelated adaptive practices. Thus, the foregoing premises justify the necessity of formulating appropriate policy to safeguard indigenous peoples through “land-sensitive” adaptation policy in different states in Africa. Basic policy framework should include the recognition of indigenous peoples’ identity, land use, and land tenure as critical to adaptation approach. In line with UNDRIP principles of participation and benefit sharing and protection of land rights (UNDRIP 2007, art 26), it should reflect the vulnerability of indigenous peoples while engaging with international adaptation processes. Along similar line, it should include indigenous peoples in the framework for implementation of adaptation Page 11 of 18

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policy, grant them direct access to funds and culturally acceptable technology, address climate threats to their land, and commit funds for successful design and/or implementation of programs and projects under NAPA and national communications. Adaptation policy measure at the national level should include the recognition of indigenous peoples’ traditional institution structure in accessing funds for the implementation of adaptation projects and secure their land access and tenure. All this is important, not only for the purpose of giving hope to indigenous peoples who may yet face a somber future of difficult climate variability but because it will help states in Africa in investing time and resources into where they are needed most.

References ACHPR, IWGIA (2005) Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of experts on indigenous populations and communities (Working group report) Adeloye AA, Okukpe KM (2011) Climate change and sustainable development: the case of animal agriculture. In: Egbewole WO, Etudaiye MA, Olatunji OA (eds) Climate change in Nigeria. University of Ilorin, Nigeria AF Guidelines (2013) Operational policies and guidelines for parties to access resources from the adaptation fund (As amended in Nov 2013) African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (African Charter) adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) African Development Bank (AfDB) (2012) Operationalising the green climate fund: enabling African access. AfBD Ajani EN, Mgbenka RN, Okeke MN (2013) Indigenous knowledge as a strategy for climate change adaptation among farmers in sub-Saharan Africa: implications for policy. Asian J Agric Ext Econ Sociol 2(1):23–40 Ajibade LT, Shokemi O (2003) Indigenous approaches to weather forecasting in Asa L.G.A., Kwara State, Nigeria. Indilinga Afr J Indig Knowl Syst 2:37–44 Anaya SJ (2000) Environmentalism, human rights and indigenous peoples: a tale of converging and diverging Interests. Buffalo Environ Law J 7:1–3 Anaya SJ (2010) The evolution of the concept of indigenous peoples and its contemporary dimensions. In: Dersso SA (ed) Perspectives on the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples in Africa. Pretoria University Law Press (PULP), South Africa Asiemat JK, Situmatt FDP (1994) Indigenous peoples and the environment: the case of the pastoral Maasai of Kenya. Colo J Int Environ Law Policy 5:149–171 AU, ACHPR (2007) Advisory opinion of the African Commission on human and peoples’ rights on the United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (advisory opinion) Baede APM et al (2001) Climate change: the scientific basis. In: Houghton JT et al (eds) Contribution of working group I to IPCC TAR. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Baka People Video- Baka People: facing changes in African forests. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=AgerTDO4r6M. Accessed 14 Oct 2013 Barume AK (2010) Land rights of indigenous peoples in Africa: with special focus on central, eastern, and southern Africa IWGIA, Copenhagen, Denmark Berkes F, Colding J, Folke C (2005) Rediscovery of traditional ecological knowledge as adaptive management. Ecol Appl 10(5):1251–1262 Bird N, Billett S, Cristina C (2011) Direct access to climate finance: experiences and lessons. UNDP discussion paper Page 12 of 18

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Bojosi KN (2010) The African Commission Working Group of Experts on the Rights of the Indigenous Communities/Populations: some reflections on its work so far. In: Dersso S (ed) Perspectives on the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples in Africa. Pretoria University Law Press, Pretoria, pp 95–137 Boko M et al (2007) Africa: climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. In: Parry LM et al (eds) Contribution of working group II to IPCC (AR4). Cambridge University, Cambridge Burket V, Davidson M (eds) (2012) Coastal impacts, adaptation, and vulnerabilities: a technical input to the 2013 national climate assessment. Island Press, Washington, DC Burney JA, Kennel CF, Victor DG (2013) Getting serious about the new realities of global climate change. Bull At Sci 69(4):52 Caney S (2009) Climate change and the duties of the advantaged. Crit Rev Int Soc Polit Philos 13:203–228 Cernea MM, Schmidt-Soltau K (2006) Poverty risks and national parks: policy issues in conservation and development. World Dev 34(10):1808–1830 CHARAPA et al (2012) Indigenous peoples and climate change in Africa: traditional knowledge and adaptation strategies (Draft Report). World Bank Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Chennells R (2003) The Khomani San of South Africa. Forest peoples. In: Nelson J, Hossack L (eds) Forest peoples programme. pp 269–289 Cohen AP (1993) Culture as identity: an anthropologist’s view. New Lit Hist 24(1):195–209 Collier P, Conway G, Venables T (2008) Climate change and Africa. Oxf Rev Econ Policy 24(2):337–353 Conversations with the Earth (CWE) (2009) Hub Newsletter Crippa LA (2013) REDD+: its potential to melt glacial resistance to recognise human rights and indigenous peoples’ rights at the World Bank. In: Abate RS, Kronk EA (eds) Climate change and indigenous peoples: the search for legal remedies. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Daes E-I (2011) Principal problems regarding indigenous land rights and recent endeavours to resolve them. In: Eide A et al (eds) Making peoples heard- essay on human rights in honour of Gudmundur Alfredsson. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden D’Amato A, Chopra SK (1991) Whales: their emerging right to life. Am J Int Law 85:21–62 Desmet E (2011) Indigenous rights entwined in nature conservation. Intersentia, Cambridge Doubleday NC (1989) Aboriginal subsistence whaling: the right of Inuit to hunt whales and implications for international environmental law. Denver J Int Law Policy 17(373):374 Durning AT (1992) Guardians of the land: indigenous peoples and the health of the earth. World watcher paper 112 Ebi KL et al (2011) Smallholders adaptation to climate change in Mali. Clim Change 108(3):423–436 FAO (1985) Expert consultation on planning the development of sun drying. http://maindb.unfccc. int/public/adaptation/adaptation_casestudy.pl?id_project=133%26id_hazard=%26id_impact= %26id_strategy=%26id_region=techniques in Africa Fleischer A, Mendelsohn R, Dinar A (2011) Bundling agricultural technologies to adapt to climate change. Technol Forecast Soc Chang 78(6):982–990 Gamo Video Report (2013) Ethiopia: the changing climate in Gamo highlands, Gamo Video Report. http://indigenouspeoplesissues.com/index.php?option=com_content%26view=article%26id= 11105:ethiopia-the-changing-climate-in-gamo-highlands-video-report%26catid=37% 26Itemid=77 Page 13 of 18

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Gardo IA (2008) Effect of climatic change on indigenous peoples – the Afar experience in Ethiopia, AFARFRIENDS Web Global Environmental Facility (GEF) (2012) Principles and guidelines for engagement with indigenous peoples. The Global Environmental Facility, Washington, DC Goklany IM (2005) A climate policy for the short and medium term: stabilization or adaptation? Energy Environ 16:667–680 Harris R (2007) Drought forces desert nomads to settle down. NPR Web Hein€am€aki L (2010) The right to be a part of nature: indigenous peoples and the environment. Academic dissertation presented with the permission of the Faculty of Law of the University of Lapland. Unpublished Dissertation, University of Lapland, Finland Hisali E, Birungi P, Buyinza F (2011) Adaptation to climate change in Uganda: evidence from micro level data. Glob Environ Chang 21(4):1245–1261 Houghton JT et al (1995) Contribution of WGI to IPCC SAR. IPCC Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee (IPACC) ‘West Africa’ IPACC Web International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) (2001) Climate change in three Maghreb countries Special Report on Selected Side Events at UNFCCC COP-7, IISD IWGIA (2011) The world indigenous report Jaska MF (2006) Putting the “sustainable” back in sustainable development: recognizing and enforcing’ indigenous property rights as a pathway to global environmental sustainability. J Environ Law Litig 21(157):199 Johannes RE (2002) Did indigenous conservation ethics exist? SPC Tradit Mar Resour Manag Knowl Inf Bull 14:3–7 Kidd C, Kenrick J (2009) The forest peoples of Africa: land rights in context. In: Forests peoples programme land rights and the forest peoples of Africa. Forests Peoples, UK Kurukulasuriya P, Mendelsohn R (2008) A Ricardian analysis of the impact of climate change on African cropland. Afr J Agric Resour Econ 2(1):1–23 Laltaika E (2009) Biofuels in Tanzania: legal challenges and recommendations for change. Inst Secur Stud Monogr 167:117–128 Le Treut H et al (2007) Historical overview of climate change. In: Solomon S et al (eds) The physical science basis: contribution of Working Group I to IPCC AR4. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Lee R (2000) Indigenism and its discontents: anthropology and the small peoples at the millennium. Paper presented as the keynote address at the annual meeting of the American Ethnological Society, Tampa Lewis L (2001) Forest people or village people: whose voice will be heard? In: Barnard A, Kenrick J (eds) African Indigenous peoples: first peoples’ or marginalised minorities. Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh Lobell DB et al (2008) Prioritizing climate change adaptation needs for food security in 2030. Science 319:6–10 L€udert J (2009) Nature(s) revisited: identities and indigenous peoples. ANTH.UBC.CA Web Macchi M et al (2008) Indigenous and traditional peoples and climate change: vulnerability and adaptation. IUCN, Gland Maragia B (2006) The indigenous sustainability paradox and the quest for sustainability in postcolonial societies: is indigenous knowledge all that is needed? Georget Int Environ Law Rev 18:197 Martone F, Rubis J (2012) Indigenous peoples and the green climate fund. A technical briefing for indigenous peoples, policymakers and support groups, Forest Peoples Programme and JOAS Page 14 of 18

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McLean K (2010) Advance guard: climate change impacts, adaptation, mitigation and indigenous peoples – a compendium of case studies. United Nations University, Darwin Muyungi R (2013) Climate change adaptation fund: a unique and key financing mechanism for adaptation needs in developing countries. UNFCCC Web Nakhooda S, Caravani A, Bird N (2011) Climate finance in Sub-Saharan Africa climate finance policy brief. http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/ 7480.pdf. Accessed 13 Oct 2013 Nakuru Declaration- Declaration of the Indigenous Peoples Summit on Climate Change (2009) MOSOP Web National Forest Policy of Nigeria (2006) Ndahinda FM (2011) Indigenousness in Africa: a contested legal framework for empowerment of marginalized communities. Asser Press, The Hague Neely C, Bunning S, Wilkes A (2009) Review of evidence on dryland pastoral systems and climate change: implications and opportunities for mitigation and adaptation. Land and water discussion paper 8. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome Nelson F (ed) (2010) Community conservation and contested land: the politics of national resource governance in Africa. Earthscan, London Nhemachena C, Hassan R (2007) Micro-level analysis of farmers’ adaptation to climate change in Southern Africa. IFPRI discussion paper no. 00714. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC Nigeria First National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2003) Nigeria Land Use Act (1990) Nkem J, Kalame FB, Idinoba M, Somorin OA, Ndoye O, Awono A (2010) Shaping forest safety nets with markets: adaptation to climate change under changing roles of tropical forests in Congo Basin. Environ Sci Policy 13:498–508 Nzeadibe TC et al (2011) Farmers’ perception of climate change governance and adaptation constraints in Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, ATPS research paper 7. African Technology Policy Studies Network, Nairobi, p 11 O’Connor TS (1994) We are part of nature: indigenous peoples’ rights as a basis for environmental protection in the Amazon Basin. Colo J Int Environ Law 5:193–212 O’Sullivan R et al (2011) Creation and evolution of adaptation funds. WWF, Washington, DC Oruonye ED (2012) Multinational oil corporations in Sub Sahara Africa: an assessment of the impacts of globalisation. Int J Hum Soc Sci 2(4):152–156 Paavola J, Adger WN (2006) Fair adaptation to climate change. Ecol Econ 56(4):594–609 Pearce T et al (2011) Transmission of environmental knowledge and land skills among Inuit men in Ulukhaktok. Northwest Territories, Canada. Hum Ecol 39(3):271–288 Peters GP et al (2013) The challenge to keep global warming below 2C. Nat Clim Chang 3:4–6 Pielke R, Prins G, Rayner S (2007) Climate change 2007: lifting the taboo on adaptation. Nature 445:597–598 Rain Forest Deforestation available http://factsanddetails.com/world.php?itemid=1299%26catid= 52%26subcatid=329. Accessed 28 Mar 2013 Raygorodetsky G (2013) The Skolt Sámi’s path to climate change resilience. http://ourworld.unu. edu/en/the-skolt-sami-path-to-climate-change-resilience/ Roncoli C, Ingram K, Kirshen P (2001) The costs and risks of coping with drought: livelihood impacts and farmers’ responses in Burkina Faso. Climate Res 19:119–132 Salick J, Byg A (2007) Indigenous peoples and climate change. TYNDALL Web Page 15 of 18

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Seo SN, Mendelsohn R (2006) Climate change adaptation in Africa: a microeconomic analysis of livestock choice. Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa (CEEPA). Discussion paper no. 19. University of Pretoria, Pretoria Solomon S et al (2009) Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions. Proc Natl Acad Sci 106(6):1704–1709 Stern N (2006) The economics of climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Stocker TF et al (eds) (2013) The physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC summary for policy makers). Cambridge University, Cambridge Suagee DB (1999) Human rights and the cultural heritage of Indian Tribes in the United States. Int J Cult Prop 8(1):48–76 Tanzania Land Act (1999) Tanzania NAPA (National Adaptation Programme of Action) (2007) Tebtebba Foundation (2010) Indigenous peoples, forests & REDD plus: state of forests, policy environment and ways forward. Tebtebba Foundation, Baguio City The Economist (2012) Whales are people, too The World Indigenous Report (2011) IWGIA Tobey J et al (2010) Practicing coastal adaptation to climate change: lessons from integrated coastal management. Coast Manag 38(3):317–335 Toulmin C (2009) Climate change in Africa. Zed Books, London Tsosie RA (1996) Tribal environmental policy in an era of self-determination: the role of ethics, economics, and traditional ecological knowledge. Vt Law Rev 21:225 Uganda Land Act (1998) Uganda NAPA (National Adaptation Programmes of Action) (2007) Uganda National Forestry and Tree Planting Act (2003) UN (2005) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. Entered into force on 27 January 1980. United Nations, treaty series, vol 1155. p 331 UNDRIP- United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the UN General Assembly 13 Sept 2007 of the General Assembly UNFCCC (2012) Closing statement SBSTA working group On REDD + – international indigenous peoples’ forum on climate change (IIPFCC). UNFCCC, 25th May 2012, Bonn UNHRC (2009) Human rights and climate change. Resolution 10/4. http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/ E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_10_4.pdf. Accessed 24 Oct 2013 United Nations Development Group Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples Issues (UNGGIPI) (2008) United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) Seventh Session 2008 ‘Climate change and indigenous peoples’. http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/backgrounder %20climate%20change_FINAL.pdf UNU-IAS TKI (2009) Climate change, adaptations and indigenous peoples: compendium of case studies. Ver 0.7 Vermeulen S, Cotula L (2010) Over the heads of local people: consultation, consent, and recompense in large-scale land deals for biofuels projects in Africa. J Peasant Stud 37(4):899–916 Viljoen F (2012) International human rights law in Africa. Oxford University Press, Oxford Wachira GM (2010) ‘Indigenous peoples’ rights to land and natural resources. In: Dersso S (ed) Perspectives on the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples in Africa. PULP, Pretoria Watson RT et al (1990) Greenhouse gases and aerosols. In: Houghton JT et al (eds) Scientific assessment of climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

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West P, Brockington D (2006) An anthropological perspective on some unexpected consequences of protected areas. Conserv Biol 20(3):609–616 Wold C et al (2009) Climate change and the law. LexisNexis, Newark Woodke J (2007) The impact of climate change on nomadic people. TILZ Web Woodliffe J (1996) Biodiversity and indigenous peoples. In: Bowman MJ, Redgwell C (eds) International law and conservation of biological diversity. Kluwer Law International, London World Rainforest Movement (WFM) (2013) Dams struggles against the modern dinosaurs. pp 16–17. Available at http://www.wrm.org.uy/deforestation/dams/texten.pdf. Accessed 27 Mar 2013 Xing F-B, Fröde A (2012) It’s not just the money: institutional strengthening of national climate funds: lessons learned from GIZ’s work on the ground. Deutsche Gesellschaft f€ ur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) Zambia Forests Act (1999) Zambia Lands Act (1995)

UNFCCC Web Decision 1/CMP.3 Adaptation Fund. FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1 Decision 1/CMP.4 Adaptation Fund. CCC/KP/CMP/2008/11/Add.2 Decision 1/CP.8 Delhi Ministerial Declaration on climate change and sustainable development. FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.10 Buenos Aires programme of work on adaptation and response measures. FCCC/ CP/2004/10/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.12 Further guidance to an entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention, for the operation of the Special Climate Change Fund. FCCC/ CP/2006/5/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.13 Bali Action Plan. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.16 The Cancun Agreements: outcome of the work of the AdHoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 Decision 3/CP.17 Governing instrument for the Green Climate Fund. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 Decision 5/CP.7 Implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention (decision 3/CP.3 and Article 2, paragraph 3, and Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol). FCCC/CP/ 2001/13/Add.1 Decision 5/CP.17 National adaptation plan. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 Decision 7/CP.7 Funding under the Convention. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 Decision 8/CP.5 Other matters related to communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention. FCCC/CP/1999/6/Add.1 Decision 8/CP.8 Guidance to an entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention, for the operation of the Least Developed Countries Fund. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 Decision 8/CP.9 Review of the guidelines for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of action. FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1 Decision 9/CP.8 Review of the guidelines for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of action. FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1 Decision 10/CP.7 Funding under the Kyoto Protocol. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 Decision 11/CP.9 Global observing systems for climate. FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1 Decision 28/CP.7 Guidelines for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of action. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.4 The Anchorage Declaration 24 Apr 2009 Page 17 of 18

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UNFCCC (2013) List of LDCs Countries http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/national_adapta tion_programmes_of_action/items/4585.php. Accessed 18 Nov 2013 UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013a) Predicting drought and weather related diseases UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013b) Water harvesting structures in northern Kenya UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013c) Ngitili in Shinyanga UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013d) Sun drying food in Africa

Adaptation Fund Web Adaptation Fund Website Funded Projects Operational Policies and Guidelines for Parties to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund (Amended in July 2013)

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Climate Change: Safeguarding Indigenous Peoples Through “Land-Sensitive” Adaptation Policy in Africa Ademola Oluborode Jegede* Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa

Abstract While, generally, climate change affects Africa negatively, indigenous peoples will suffer more, considering their lifestyle which is intricately attached to land. On three grounds, this chapter argues the importance of safeguarding indigenous peoples through “land-sensitive” adaptation policy at the national level in Africa. First, this is based on the evidence of existing forms of “land-sensitive” adaptation practices among indigenous peoples in the face of climate variability over time in Africa. Second, the current emerging range of climatic variation in Africa, however, challenges these “landsensitive” adaptation practices of indigenous peoples. Finally, although international climate adaptation policy requires the protection of indigenous peoples in its processes, states in Africa hardly comply with this prescription while engaging with these processes at the domestic level. The chapter concludes by suggesting what a “land-sensitive” adaptation policy at national level should embody for indigenous peoples in Africa.

Keywords Africa; Climate change; Adaptation policy; Adaptation practices; Indigenous peoples’ land use and tenure

Introduction The contributions of Working Group 1 to the Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990 (Watson et al. 1990), 1995 (Houghton et al. 1995), 2001 (Baede et al. 2001), 2007 (Le Treut et al. 2007), and 2013 (Stocker et al. 2013) have overwhelmingly explained the scientific and factual basis of climate change. According to these contributions, human activities are substantially increasing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, thus enhancing greenhouse effect, which has in turn led to increased warming of the earth’s surface resulting in climate change (Le Treut et al. 2007; Baede et al. 2001; Houghton et al. 1995; Watson et al. 1990). With an economy largely agrarian and limited adaptation capacity, populations in Africa are and will be seriously affected by climate change (Toulmin 2009; Wold et al. 2009, pp. 1–47; Collier et al. 2008, p. 337; Boko et al. 2007). Although, there is no Africa-wide climate homogenous effect (Collier et al. 2008, p. 338), in general terms, climate change’s negative impacts for Africa, actual and projected, is expected on areas such as water resources, food security, natural resource

*Email: [email protected] *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 21

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management and biodiversity, human health, settlements and infrastructure, and desertification (Toulmin 2009, pp. 15–87; Boko et al. 2007, pp. 10.2–10.6). Even though indigenous peoples have contributed least to climate change, according to the United Nations Development Group’s Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues (UNGGIPI 2008, p. 8), “they are the first to face its impact.” Indeed, indigenous peoples will be disproportionately affected by climate change (Crippa 2013, p. 124; UNHRC 2009 Resolution 10/4; Salick and Byg 2007, p. 4; Stern 2006, p. 95). Through a review of literature, using a descriptive and analytical approach, this chapter contends that safeguarding indigenous peoples through “land-sensitive” adaptation policy is important at the national level in Africa for three reasons. First, there are existing forms of “landsensitive” adaptation practices among indigenous peoples in Africa based on their experience of climate variability. Second, given the emerging range of climatic variation in Africa, these “landsensitive” adaptation practices of indigenous peoples are under threat. Finally, despite the requirement in international climate adaptation policy for the protection of indigenous peoples in its processes, states in Africa do not specifically attend to the adaptive concerns and practices of indigenous peoples while engaging with international adaptation policy requirement.

Understanding Terms: “Indigenous Peoples” in Africa, “Land-Sensitive” and “Adaptation” In the interest of clarity, there are key terms which are employed in this chapter that merit brief explanation.

“Indigenous Peoples” in Africa Although the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was adopted in 2007 with the participation of states in Africa, the concept of indigenous peoples is disputed in Africa (Viljoen 2012, p. 230; Ndahinda 2011, pp. 1–13; Bojosi 2010; ACHPR and IWGIA 2005). The argument questioning their status stems from the difference in historical encounter with colonialism which, unlike in the Americas and Australasia, did not come with significant displacement of any population in Africa. In those parts of the world, the concept of indigenous peoples is understood as describing the identity of people who were the first to settle on the land from which they were displaced by European colonizers (Anaya 2010, pp. 23–42). In this context of displacement by colonialism, political leadership in Africa has generally argued that every “African is indigenous to Africa” (Viljoen 2012, p. 230; Barume 2010, p. 20; ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, pp. 86–89). However, this position, as it has been validly argued, ignores the situations of hunters and gatherers as well as pastoralists whose peculiar nature of land tenure and use had been disrupted due to internal suppression by dominant groups which existed in pre-colonial Africa and thereafter (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 92). Hence, scholarly writings, including Kidd and Kenrick (2009, pp. 8–9) and Wachira (2010, p. 313), and indeed the regional commissioned reports such as the Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005) and the Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (AU and ACHPR 2007), recognize the presence of indigenous peoples in Africa. According to the ACHPR and IWGIA (2005), the report of the Working Group prescribes the criteria for identifying indigenous peoples/populations in Africa and argues that the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) protects their collective rights. These are, namely, (1) the occupation and use of a specific land; (2) voluntary Page 2 of 21

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perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness; (3) self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, as a distinct collectivity; and (4) an experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion, or discrimination (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 93). While there is no requirement that all the four elements should be present for a given population to constitute indigenous peoples in Africa (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 93), the literature has stressed the importance of these criteria. Kidd and Kenrick (2009), Wachira (2010, p. 313), and ACHPR and IWGIA (2005, p. 93) emphasize the peculiar cultural lifestyle of indigenous peoples which is evidenced in a number of ways including language, social organization, religion and spiritual values, modes of production, laws, and institutions. Also, the writings of Daes (2011, p. 465, 2010, p. 18) and Anaya (2010, pp. 23–42) identify self-identification, marginalization, and collective cultural and physical dependence on land as some of the markers of their identity. More importantly, the report of the Working Group offers extensive examples of these groups in Africa, noting however that the list is not exhaustive (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, pp. 15–19). According to the report of the Working Group, those whose lifestyle defines these criteria in Africa are the hunters and gatherers as well as the pastoralists (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, pp. 14–61).

“Land-Sensitive”

Generally, considered from the lens of “indigenous peoples’ knowledge” or “indigenous peoples’ land ethics,” the worldview of indigenous peoples toward the environment has been robustly debated (Raygorodetsky 2013; CHARAPA et al. 2012; Desmet 2011; Hein€am€aki 2010; Nelson 2010; Jaska 2006; Berkes et al. 2005; Johannes 2002; O’Connor 1994; Tsosie 1996; Asiemat and Situmatt 1994; Durning 1992; Doubleday 1989). Particularly, in the context of climate change, the centrality of indigenous knowledge about their environment as a resource for adaptation has been well explored in climate-related literature (Raygorodetsky 2013; Burket and Davidson 2012; Macchi et al. 2008; Salick and Byg 2007). However, while this approach is useful, it should be embraced with caution in discussing climate change impacts on indigenous peoples in Africa. The exercise of caution is necessary because such an approach can potentially obscure the reality that adaptive challenges and practices of indigenous peoples are not isolated but dependent on a unique attachment to land. Also, while the focus on indigenous peoples’ knowledge may be helpful in addressing the scourge of climate change, this may be overrated and counterproductive. This is in the sense that the focus on indigenous peoples’ knowledge by policy makers may divert attention from the urgent need to address more fundamental issues such as land tenure and access that are central to the strengthening of indigenous peoples’ adaptive practices. Additionally, the land of indigenous peoples forms part of their worldview and so they are culturally dependent on the land (Asiemat and Situmatt 1994, p. 151). Hence, any change within the environment of indigenous peoples is best discussed in the context of changes “to and in the community’s right to land” (Asiemat and Situmatt 1994, p. 159). More importantly, a focus on land is crucial considering that the UNDRIP holds land as central in the protection of indigenous peoples (UNDRIP 2007, arts 25 and 26). Accordingly, “land-sensitive” connotes an adaptation policy approach that includes respects and enhances the land use and tenure of indigenous peoples in the light of climate change challenge in Africa.

Adaptation Adaptation has been a central part of international climate negotiation. Initially, it was thought of as a “taboo” to discuss adaptation in the climate change negotiation as advocates for climate mitigation feared that politicians were likely to lose interest in mitigation if adaptation options become the focus of discussion (Pielke et al. 2007, p. 598). However, for developing states and vulnerable Page 3 of 21

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populations, it has been argued that it will amount to playacting to imagine that adaptation is not urgent (Burney et al. 2013, p. 52). Adaptation is understood as measures that can be used in coping with the “ill-effects of climate change” (Caney 2009, p. 203) or activities geared toward the prevention of impacts of climate change from being harmful (Paavola and Adger 2006, pp. 594–609). The IPCC defines adaptation as an alteration in the natural or human systems in response to actual or expected impacts of climate change with the aim of moderating the harm in climate change or exploiting its beneficial opportunities (Watson et al. 1990, p. 398). Adaptation also connotes the adjustments to reduce vulnerability or improve flexibility to the observed or expected changes in climate, involving a range of options such as processes, perceptions, practices, and functions (Boko et al. 2007). The potentials and options for adapting to climate change at the domestic and regional levels have been given considerable attention in climate change literature. Adaptation, explains Goklany (2005, p. 675), can take advantage of positive impacts and reduce negative impacts of climate change. According to Solomon et al. (2009, p. 1708), some impacts of climate change, such as sea level rise, can be addressed by constructing sea walls. Also, as it has been generally shown, in some regions, an appropriate adaptive strategy might entail swapping from negatively impacted products to less impacted crops (Lobell et al. 2008, p. 610) or the use of new crop varieties and livestock species better suited for drier conditions, as well as the use of irrigation, crop diversification, adoption of mixed-crop and livestock farming systems, and alternating planting dates (Kurukulasuriya and Mendelsohn 2008, p. 6; Nhemachena and Hassan 2007). Having described the key concepts used in this chapter, three arguments proposed in favor of safeguarding indigenous peoples through “land-sensitive” adaptation policy in Africa are discussed in the next sections.

Indigenous Peoples’ Existing “Land-Sensitive” Adaptive Practices From the outset, it should be stated that there are arguments suggesting that indigenous peoples’ relationship with land is not harmonious or any different from the approach by mainstream society. For instance, L€ udert (2009, pp. 7, 20), citing the economic benefits derived by the Bayei in Northern Botswana from ecotourism projects in their territory, is of the view that indigenous peoples are involved in the commodification of nature. Also, attempting to show that the relationship of indigenous peoples’ with their land is not necessarily harmonious, The Economist (2012) and D’Amato and Chopra (1991) note that the activities of the Inuit, indigenous peoples of arctic Canada, Alaska, Greenland, and Siberia, are injurious to whales and should not be exempted if an international norm should emerge granting the whale a right to life. Maragia (2006, p. 219), Berkes et al. (2005, p. 1252), and Tsosie (1996, p. 268) equally demonstrate that not all traditional perception of the indigenous peoples in relation to their land is ecologically adaptive. According to Neely et al. (2009, pp. 9–10), herding of cattle may result in overgrazing and, in effect, land degradation, a major factor in climate change. As explained by Adeloye and Okukpe (2011, p. 56), the manure of herds, except if properly handled, is a major source of greenhouse gas emission which brings about global warming. However, the validity of these arguments is disputed. Although the activities of indigenous peoples may negatively impact their land, this is only minimal. More than any other populations, the indigenous peoples have reasons to be friendly with their land. Foremost, and according to West and Brockington (2006, pp. 609–616), indigenous peoples view their land as a divine gift or heritage and themselves as its guardian or protectors. Having lived in this land for long, indigenous Page 4 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

peoples hold their land in great respect (Woodliffe 1996, p. 256, Durning 1992, p. 112). Sensitivity to land is evidenced in the understanding that land is significant for their cultural preservation (Woodliffe 1996; Cohen 1993, p. 195). The land of indigenous peoples is a site of several items they hold dear to culture and spirituality such as sacred mountains, rivers, lakes, caves, single trees or forest groves, and coastal waters (McLean 2010). As Anaya (2000, p. 2) observes, indigenous peoples living in forested areas consider the survival of the forest as essential to the survival of human life. This is in fact generally the case with indigenous peoples in Africa. Among the San peoples of the Kalahari in Southern Africa, according to Lee (2000), land represents a “sense of place” and the means through which they display a sense of harmony with nature. The San peoples, as Chennells (2003, pp. 278–279) reports, “know what to do with the land” and “every plant, beetle, animal” in the Kalahari. Generally, the protection of the indigenous peoples’ land and its biological communities are therefore viewed as a prerequisite for survival (Suagee 1999, pp. 48–50). Findings also show that among the Mbendjele (pygmies) of Congo-Brazzaville, forests fulfill the cultural role including serving as places where pregnant women give birth to children, for finding indigenous foods, and for sharing stories relating to traditional practices such as “past hunting, fishing, or gathering trips” and eternal abode after death (Lewis 2001, p. 7). According to Asiemat and Situmatt (1994, p. 149), the Maasai of eastern Africa, particularly Kenya, conceive land as an important host not only of themselves as a people but of the plants, animals, trees, and fish which, among other things, all constitute their cultural and environmental universe. It is the foregoing worldview about land that supports several forms of adaptive practices among indigenous peoples in different parts of Africa in the face of adverse impacts of climate change over time. While these adaptive practices vary, a common trend is that these practices portray indigenous peoples’ resilient adjustment to the use of land, despite the harsh reality of climate change. This pattern of adjustment, as it is illustrated in the next section, cuts across different scenarios of climate impacts including prediction of weather, water scarcity, drought, land degradation, and food insecurity.

Prediction of Weather Indigenous peoples in Africa have devised diverse means of predicting the weather. Environmental conditions, such as rainfall, thunderstorms, windstorms, and dusty winds, have been reportedly used by indigenous peoples in preparing for future use of land and weather forecast in West Africa (Ajani et al. 2013; Ajibade and Shokemi 2003). More particularly, the Maasai in the eastern part of Africa do predict droughts by observing the movement of celestial bodies and combining such with watching the development of certain plants. This has been reported as useful in serving as an early warning signal of an approaching environmental disaster as well as an early indication of “the condition of the range of land and its likely changes” (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013a). Other forecasting approaches, according to Roncoli et al. (2001), include the timing of fruiting by certain local trees, the water level in streams and ponds, the nesting behavior of small quail-like birds, and the insect behavior in rubbish heaps outside compound walls. The foregoing has adaptive utility. Outcome of weather prediction enables indigenous peoples in Kenya to understand storm routes and wind patterns and, hence, to design local disaster management practices in advance. This is achieved by constructing appropriate shelters, windbreak structures, walls, and homestead fences (UNU-IAS-TKI 2009, p. 55). Also, as a result of prediction of weather, indigenous peoples are able to plan daily economic life and social activities with foresight. This possibility further results in adaptive strategy such as planting appropriate crops that suit a particular season (UNU-IAS-TKI 2009, p. 55). Generally in East Africa, knowledge about weather condition Page 5 of 21

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enables the pastoral Maasai to prepare for drought and make decisions about where to graze and which grasses recover faster than others (UNU-IAS-TKI 2009, p. 55).

Water Scarcity Coping Approach A range of adaptive measures is also being taken by indigenous peoples in conditions of scarcity of water. The Maasai accurately assess the water-holding capacity of distant pastures to plan transhumance activities. Generally, pastoral communities living in the water-deficient areas engage in rainwater harvesting which is conserved for all their needs. Other approaches include the construction of “sand dams” which slows down flash floods and holds the water in the sand of the riverbed (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013b). Shallow wells may also be provided with sanitary seals to protect them from contamination and unnecessary siltation after floods. This, in essence, helps in reducing the caving in of wells during the floods thus making water available for a longer period and reducing human stress (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013b).

Drought and Land Degradation Management Skills Among the Tuaregs in North Africa as well as in the south of the Sahara, adaptive practices of coping with drought and land degradation have been documented. “Fixation sites” are constructed since 1990 to assist in coping with spread of desertification (Woodke 2007, pp. 10–11; Harris 2007). Also, during drought periods, the pastoralists in this region change from cattle to sheep and goat husbandry (Seo and Mendelsohn 2006) or move from the dry northern areas to the wetter southern areas of the Sahel (McLean 2010, p. 60). Additionally, the Sukuma people of the north of Tanzania engage in soil conservation through which animal fodders are prepared and made available to very young, old, or sick animals unable to follow other animals to grazing lands. The process encourages the conservation of grazing and fodder lands by encouraging vegetation regeneration and tree planting (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013c).

Food Preservation To cope with loss of crops and food insecurity, fodder is of huge importance to nomadic people whose livestock is often the only source of income. Among the Tuaregs, there is evidence of enclosures designed to protect and safeguard pastures (Woodke 2007). Preservation of items such as fruits, vegetables, and edible insects is demonstrated in two ways: for vegetables, it is usually to immerse the fresh vegetables in salty boiling water and spread for drying after boiling for a few minutes to avoid loss of nutrient, and for drying caterpillars, termites, white ants, and other edible insects, this may be directly spread in the sun (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013d). The practice of sun drying among indigenous peoples is a coping mechanism found in several states in Africa including Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Tanzania, Senegal, and Democratic Republic of the Congo (FAO 1985). Notwithstanding these existing forms of adaptation among indigenous peoples, the “landsensitive” adaptation practices of indigenous peoples in Africa are threatened by a new emerging range of climatic variations requiring urgent policy attention by states in Africa.

Increasing Climate Variation as a Threat Climate variation is increasing with peculiar adverse impacts on indigenous peoples’ land in different regions of Africa (IPACC Web; IWGIA 2011; Mclean 2010; Tebtebba 2010). This arguably threatens the existing adaptive capacity of indigenous peoples in Africa. Although the Page 6 of 21

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experiences of indigenous peoples throughout Africa are not the same, they share common experience of vulnerability to climate change, notwithstanding adaptive practices. According to the ACHPR and IWGIA (2005, p. 18), among indigenous peoples in West Africa are the Baka, Mbororo, and Tuareg. In the territories of these groups, there is reported evidence that the consequence of climate change is typified by destruction of grazing lands, drought, reduced access to safe water, and destruction of plants and animals (IPACC Web; Mclean 2010, p. 42; Woodke 2007, pp. 10–11). In East Africa, there are several indigenous peoples’ groups, among which are the Maasai, Ogiek, Endorois, and Yaaku in Kenya (CHARAPA et al. 2012, pp. 29–39; Tebtebba Foundation 2010, p. 440). These peoples experience several negative conditions as a result of a changing climate, including land degradation, drought, flood, famine, and displacement (UNFCCC 2013; CHARAPA et al. 2012, pp. 35–37; IWGIA 2011, p. 410). The Batwas in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), also known as Baka in Central African Republic (CAR) and Gabon, Baka, and Bagyeli in Cameroon, are in the Central Africa and Great Lakes region (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 16). The recent experiences of these peoples include a lengthy dry season and unpredictable weather conditions, which are affecting the agricultural calendar and bringing scarcity of forest products such as fruits and tubers, thereby disturbing their cultural lifestyle (Baka People Video 2013; Tebtebba 2010, p. 481; Mclean 2010, p. 44; CWE 2009, p. 2). More frequently, to the Mbororo and other pastoralists in the same region, transhumance calendars are being altered from January to late October due to a shift in the start of the dry season (Tebtebba 2010, p. 481; Mclean 2010, p. 44). In the north of Africa are indigenous peoples known as the Amazigh (or Imazighen), also referred to as the Berbers or Tuaregs (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, pp. 18–19). Evidence of climate impacts on their land includes scarcity of water, degradation, desertification, overgrazing, and salinization, in a changing climate (McLean 2010, p. 42; IISD 2001). In the southern part of Africa, the San, or Basarwa, peoples of the Kalahari (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17) face increasing dune expansion and increased wind speeds which have resulted in a loss of vegetation and negatively impacted traditional cattle and goat farming practices (UNPFII 2008). In the Horn of Africa, the Doko, Ezo, Zozo, and Daro Malo in the Gamo Highlands experience increasing pressures on local resources and great hardship through increase in temperature, scarcity of water, dying animals, and fewer grazing land (Gamo Video Report 2013). The “Outsa” leaf which is used for shelter, animal grazing, and food and hence crucial to the survival of these peoples is fast disappearing (Gamo Video Report 2013). The situation is not different with the Afar people to the northeast of Ethiopia. Living in an extremely fragile environment worsened by climate change, the Afar suffer damage of flash flooding, change in river courses, increased desertification, herd loss, hunger, thirst, and famine (Gardo 2008). In sum, across Africa, the foregoing emerging and increasing impacts of climate change are overwhelming and beyond the capability of existing adaptive measures being used by indigenous peoples in the face of droughts, flooding, famine, and loss of grazing land and livestock. This is largely because increasing variations of climate impact disrupt the land use and result into displacement of indigenous peoples from the land which is crucial to their adaptive practices. Generally, land degradation reduces the availability of ecosystem goods to these populations for adaptation purposes (Nkem et al. 2010; Tobey et al. 2010). More specifically, insecurity of land tenure and use has been found to constrain adaptation practices among indigenous peoples in states including Mali (Ebi et al. 2011) and Uganda (Hisali et al. 2011) and generally in the Congo Basin region (Nkem et al. 2010). Even where partial communal tenure is recognized as in Kenya, Namibia, and DRC, discrimination against traditional land use and livelihood strategies, logging concessions, commercial farms, and large-scale development projects (dams, oil exploitation, floriculture) are Page 7 of 21

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major constraint to local adaptation practices (CHARAPA et al. 2012, p. 87). Insecurity of land tenure and use and the resultant changing livelihood are a driver of declining traditional relationship with the land, a major source of adaptation information and knowledge (Pearce et al. 2011, 16.3.2.1; CHARAPA et al. 2012, p. 88). Besides, the emerging range of climate variation requires long-term adaptation strategies, which the existing adaptive practices of indigenous peoples cannot achieve on their own without nontraditional technology and resources as complements (CHARAPA et al. 2012, p. 87). The nontraditional measures refer to the transfer of modern technology and resources that most indigenous peoples do not possess. The need for technology and resources cannot be overemphasized considering that indigenous populations live in remote places of a country, characterized by poor infrastructure, limited basic services, and poor government presence (Macchi et al. 2008, pp. 49–50). Technology can help in complementing or improving existing adaptive strategies linked with their land in coping with increasing impacts of climate change resulting from the emerging range of climate variation (Fleischer et al. 2011). Also, availability of funds is a good resource that may improve traditional or indigenous adaptation practices (Peters et al. 2013, p. 16.6; Nakhooda et al. 2011, p. 7). Yet, while the existing climate variability challenges the adaptive capacities of indigenous peoples, the approach by states in Africa to this reality does not show an effective implementation of international processes for adaptation measures in such manner that addresses the adaptive challenges of indigenous peoples.

Weak States’ Role in Engaging Adaptive Processes Although the pillar instruments of climate change at the international level, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and a range of decisions by the Conference of the Parties (COP) and Meeting of the Parties (MOP) under the Kyoto Protocol, require states to follow certain processes in responding to adaptation concerns, indigenous peoples’ adaptive concerns and capacities are hardly specifically addressed in the framing of adaptive challenges by states in Africa.

International Climate Change Adaptation Processes The pillar instruments of the climate change, the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and a range of decisions by the COP under the UNFCCC and the MOP under the Kyoto Protocol, set out the standard processes for international adaptation measures. Article 4 (1) (b) of the UNFCCC enjoins all parties to “formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national. . .programmes containing measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change. . ..” Also, article 4 (1) (e) requires parties to the UNFCCC to cooperate “in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change” as well as plan for “coastal zone management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and desertification, as well as floods.” Under the Kyoto Protocol, it is similarly evident that the national level has the directing policy role to play in documenting and implementing adaptation measures. Article 10 (b) (ii) of the Kyoto Protocol enjoins parties to “include in their national communications as appropriate, information on programmes which contain measures. . .” which may be helpful in “addressing climate change and its adverse impacts, including. . .adaptation measures.” Page 8 of 21

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In the decisions of the COP or the MOP under the Kyoto Protocol, there is equally a requirement on the state government for the facilitation of adaptation process. This began to feature prominently since the COP 7 held in 2001, which acknowledged the specific needs and concerns of developing countries, including the least developing countries (LDC), and emphasized the unique role of states in addressing adaptation issues. It insisted that adaptation actions should follow a review process based on national communications and/or other relevant information (Decision 5/CP.7/2001, p. 2). It was equally stressed that support be given to the states in the preparation of the national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs) (Decision 5/CP.7/2001, p. 15). Furthermore, the decision acknowledges the importance of indigenous resources and urges parties to take these resources into consideration as part of options for addressing the impacts of climate change (Decision 5/CP.72002, p. 24). It also formulates guidelines to facilitate preparation for NAPA (Decision 28/CP.7/2001). The NAPA guidelines in its paragraphs 6 (a) and (c) affirm that it will be “action oriented.” Paragraph 7 (f) of the NAPA guidelines reiterates that it is “a country-driven approach.” While no specific mention is made of indigenous peoples, in paragraph 7 (a), it is pointed out that NAPA is “a participatory process involving stakeholders, particularly local communities,” while paragraph 7 (j) assures that the process will ensure “flexibility of procedures based on individual country circumstances.” The use of the term “local populations” arguably involves the indigenous peoples particularly when it is read together with paragraphs 16 (a), (f), and (h) which, respectively, require “loss of life and livelihood,” “cultural heritage,” and “land use management and forestry” as part of the criteria for prioritizing adaptation activities at the national level. These required items are core issues to the adaptive practices of indigenous peoples in Africa. Guidelines in relation to national adaptation plan of action were subsequently endorsed at COP 8 (Decision 9/CP.8/2002, p. 1), COP 9 (Decision 8/CP.9/2003, p. 1), and COP 10 (Decision 1/CP.10/2004, p. 4), for the developing countries in the LDC and non-LDC to document their adaptive concerns and need for funds. Furthermore, the COP 12 in Nairobi indicates that activities to be funded under climate funds may consider national communications or national adaptation programs of action and other relevant information from the applicant party (Decision 1/CP.12/2006). At COP 13 held at Bali, an “enhanced action on adaptation” was conceived as consisting of elements including international cooperation in order to support developing states in their vulnerability assessment and integration of actions into “national planning, specific projects and programmes” (Decision 1/CP.13/2007). This was also reinforced at the Cancun meeting of COP 16 (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, pp. 11–14) which highlighted the human rights implications for adverse impacts of climate change and the need to engage with stakeholders including indigenous peoples when developing and implementing their national action plans (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 12). At a subsequent meeting in Durban, parties were urged to include in their national communications and other channels the steps they have taken in actualizing NAPA (Decision 5/CP.17/2011, p. 33), as well as indigenous and traditional knowledge and practices in adaptation strategies (Decision 6/CP.172011, p. 4). These requirements are also evident in the key decisions dealing with the access of the state to adaptation funds (Decision 28/CP.7/2001, p. 4; Decision 8/CP.5/1999). Different categories of funds in relation to adaptation are mainly the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) established at COP 7, respectively, under Decisions 5/CP.7/2001 (p. 12) and 7/CP.7/2001 (p. 6) and Decision 7/CP.7/2001 (p. 2). Adaptation Fund (AF) was established pursuant to article 12 (8) of the Kyoto Protocol at COP 7 (Decision 10/CP.7/2001, p. 1), while a Green Climate Fund (GCF) was established pursuant to article 11 of the UNFCCC at COP16 held at Cancun (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 102). The funds under the LDCF and SCCF are voluntary contributions from developed country parties to the Page 9 of 21

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UNFCCC (Muyungi 2013; O’Sullivan et al. 2011, p. 15) and managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) (Decision 7/CP.7/2001, p. 6). The GCF is managed by the GCF Board (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 103), while the AF is managed by the Adaptation Fund Board (Decision 1/CMP.3/ 2007, p. 3). All of these funds, namely, AF (Decision 1/CMP.4/2008, p. 11), GCF (Decision 3/CP.17/ 2011, p. 31), LDCF, and SCCF (Xing and Fröde 2012; Bird et al. 2011), support direct access. The guidelines relating to the operationalization of these decisions at the national level emphasize the need to safeguard indigenous peoples’ adaptive concerns and experiences in national adaptation programs. For instance, GEF Principles and Guidelines for Engagement with Indigenous Peoples set out a minimum standard relating to indigenous peoples which is expected to be complied with by partner agencies seeking to implement projects under GEF auspices in response to NAPA proposal (GEF 2012, pp. 22–29). Also the negotiation around the GCF indicates that the participation of indigenous peoples from “the local to the national to the Board level” and inclusion of their knowledge are critical to the implementation of the GCF (Martone and Rubis 2012). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the effectiveness of the approach by states in Africa in engaging with these international adaptation processes to strengthen indigenous peoples’ adaptive practices and concerns is doubtful.

Weak Approach by States In order to comply with the requirement for adaptation funds, each of the 33 African states belonging to LDC has filed a NAPA (UNFCCC 2013b), while the developing states in Africa which are non-LDC have at least filed a national communication. The ensuing subsection demonstrates that the concerns of indigenous peoples in relation to their adaptive experiences are obscured in the official processes for capturing adaptation needs and funds. This is achieved by examining processes from Uganda, Tanzania, and Nigeria. Uganda The Uganda National Adaptation Programmes of Action (Uganda NAPA) was compiled in 2007. The formulation of Uganda’s NAPA claims to have been guided by the principle of participatory approach and benefited from the views of the vulnerable communities and their knowledge on coping mechanisms (Uganda NAPA 2007, VII). It describes the impacts of climate change on sample districts as destruction of infrastructure, deforestation, loss of lives, famine, poverty, water shortage and drying up, erratic seasons and rains, destruction of biodiversity, and epidemics of pests and diseases (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 27). It notes that indigenous knowledge has been employed by communities in Uganda to cope with climate events. As part of its adaptive strategies for funding, it suggests projects such as “Community Tree Growing Project” (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 51), “Land Degradation Management” (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 53), and “Indigenous Knowledge (IK) and Natural Resources Management Project” (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 63). In the document, however, impact scenarios of climate change in Uganda are discussed as though it is proportionately borne by all. It neither discloses the identity of the communities it identifies as “vulnerable” nor profiles as adaptation challenge the lack of protection of the land use and tenure of communities, such as the Batwas, who are indigenous and forest dependent in Uganda (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17). While it uses the word “indigenous” in describing “indigenous knowledge,” it is used to refer to every citizen of Uganda. This is the logical inference that can be drawn when the term “indigenous” is examined in the sense that it is used in the Uganda 2005 Constitution. According to article 10 (a) of the constitution of Uganda, all the communities found in Uganda as on February 1, 1926, are indigenous. The NAPA employs the concept of “vulnerability” and “indigenous” in referring to all the communities in Uganda without paying attention to the peculiar Page 10 of 21

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situations or circumstances of specific groups such as the Batwas who are understood under international human rights law as “indigenous” in Uganda (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17). Tanzania There is a similar trend in the NAPA of Tanzania, which was submitted in 2007 (Tanzania NAPA). The document indicates the adaptation concerns in Tanzania as including “loss of human, natural, financial, social and physical capital, caused by the adverse impacts of climate change.” It also documents “severe droughts and floods, among many other disasters” (Tanzania NAPA 2007, VI). It is further mentioned in the NAPA that climate change is expected to further shrink the rangelands which are significant for livestock-keeping communities in Tanzania (Tanzania NAPA 2007, p. 7). While this may be argued as embodying some of the concerns of indigenous peoples in Tanzania such as the Maasai and Barabaig (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17), it is not certain. This is because it proposes as adaptation measures the inclusion of some activities such as relocation of people living in wildlife corridors, zero grazing, and development of alternative means of income for communities in tourist areas (Tanzania NAPA 2007, pp. 29–31). These activities will disrupt the culture and lead to the displacement of indigenous peoples such as the Maasai and Barabaig in Tanzania and hence threaten their land use and local adaptive practices. Nigeria Nigeria is a non-LDC state and has shown no interest yet in filing a NAPA as a non-LDC. It has, however, filed a national communication which devotes a substantial attention to issues of adaptation in the country. In the communication which is the first and only national communication it has so far lodged under the UNFCCC, peculiar consequences resulting from climate change, and which require adaptive measures, include soil erosion and flooding in the southeastern part of the country. The impacts of climate change on agriculture are assessed as including the effects of changes in temperature and rainfall on plants and animals as well as sea level rise on agricultural land (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 73). Livestock production also suffers due to a decrease in rainfall which has led to a decline of pastureland and water resources (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 75). Sea level rise is also cited as an event likely to lead to considerable losses in the oil investments and developments in the Niger Delta zone. General reference is made to “the people in the coastal areas” as being impacted by challenges such as flooding and erosion in the Niger Delta and leading to the emergence of “environmental refugees” (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 82). Nonetheless, the Nigeria’s national communication largely focuses on the environmental impacts of climate change, relying “heavily on. . .existing records and documentation in various forms including socio-economic statistics, photographs, satellite imageries, geologic and oceanographic data, biological and fisheries data. . .” (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 70). Generally, communities affected by these impacts are not mentioned nor are the pertinent issues such as land use, land tenure, and resource rights relating to these communities discussed. For instance, a decline in pastureland as a result of climate change will not only affect the production of livestock, but it will negatively impact the peoples such as the Mbororo whose lifestyle is traditionally connected to the use of land for cattle rearing. Also, the passing reference to the people living in coastal areas as likely to experience flooding and erosion does not capture the larger problems which the peoples of this region, particularly the Ogoni, have for long faced and fought in terms of oil spillage, environmental protection, and compensation for environmental losses and land degradation on their land (Nzeadibe et al. 2011). It is difficult to anticipate that a national communication

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which fails to reflect key issues peculiar to these indigenous peoples will, even if allocated, apply adaptation funds for the purpose of supporting their adaptive practices and concerns. What emerges from the foregoing discussion are therefore the reasons why states in Africa neglect indigenous peoples’ concerns and land-based experiences in framing adaptation processes at national level. Basis for State’s Exclusion The approach by states of Africa in engaging adaptive processes in a way that strengthens adaptive practices and addresses the adaptive concerns of indigenous peoples is arguably shaped by two factors. These are the state-centered nature of the processes and the overriding claim to ownership of land and disposition to use same in accordance with its priority. State-Centered Process The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and indeed decisions of the COP and MOP, respectively, are state centered. In line with article 2 (1) (a) of the Vienna Convention which describes a treaty as an agreement concluded between states (UN 2005), the parties to the international negotiation of climate change instruments such as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are states and not community or group of people. Also, the Conference of the Parties (COP) which is the key decision-making body under the UNFCCC or the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol which makes the ultimate decisions in respect of climate change and response mechanisms is state based representing the interest of different negotiation blocs and states. The decisions of these bodies emphasize the “country-driven” nature of adaptation measures. For instance, the Cancun Agreement which serves as the basis for enhanced action on adaptation involving the developing country parties endorses this approach. It urges parties to strengthen and, in applicable circumstances, establish centers and networks to facilitate and enhance national and regional adaptation actions, in a manner that is country driven and with support from developed countries (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 30). This state-centered nature of adaptation processes also applies to funds relating to adaptation. For instance, the AF (Decision 1/CMP.4/2008, p. 11), GCF (Decision 3/CP.17/2011, p. 31), LDCF, and SCCF (Xing and Fröde 2012; Bird et al. 2011) support direct access to adaptation funds. By “direct access,” it is meant that these funds allow recipient countries to access financial resources, unlike the indirect access, where funding is channeled through a third-party implementing agency (Xing and Fröde 2012). However, this challenges the adaptation potentials of land use by the indigenous peoples in Africa. This is because the notion of direct access is understood in terms of the ownership of these funds by the state. This is clear, for instance, in the recommendations made by the African Development Bank (AfDB) on GCF where it employs the term “direct access” to fund largely as accessibility by national governments (AfDB 2012, p. 3). Also, according to the Operational Policies and Guidelines for Parties to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund (AF Guidelines 2013), projects may only be submitted and funds received directly by the national implementing entity (NIE) which may consist of government ministries and government cooperation agencies (AF Guidelines 2013, para 27). The implication of state-centered focus of adaptation process is that it is coordinated by the states as has been shown and thus compromises ownership of process by indigenous peoples in Africa. Also, the lack of direct access to funds is that it undermines the utility of indigenous peoples’ adaptive practices and may, as climate change worsens, compromise their opportunity to strengthen capacity. Yet, an arrangement enabling indigenous peoples a direct access to funds is not unknown to the operation of some financial institutions. For instance, models on direct access to funds for indigenous peoples exist under the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); Page 12 of 21

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Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility (IPAF), a former World Bank Facility for Indigenous Peoples; and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) which has a Capacity Building Program for Forest-Dependent People, all of which are dedicated indigenous funds (Martone and Rubis 2012). National Legal Framework In addition to the above, in Africa, key legal and policy framework relating to land use and tenure of indigenous peoples generally vests ownership of land in the state. For instance, article 44 of the Uganda Land Act (1998), articles 1 and 2 of Nigeria Land Use Act (1990), article 3 of Zambia Lands Act (1995), and Tanzania Land Act (1999) vest in the state the power to own and use land in accordance with its priority. This is similarly the case with the Forest Act of states in Africa which assumes the forests as “common goods.” Accordingly, articles 3, 10, and 11 of the Forests Act of Zambia (1999), respectively, vest the ownership of every tree and its produce in the presidency, which enjoys the power to compulsorily acquire any land for the purpose of national forests and restricts the activities of peoples dependent on land such as fishing and hunting from compensation. Article 26 of the Tanzania Forest Act prohibits every action of indigenous peoples that can be regarded as of adaptation relevance such as grazing, hunting and fishing, and erection of any buildings or other structures except with the permission of the minister or a local authority. According to article 5 (1) of the Uganda’s National Forestry and Tree Planting Act (2003), the state at different levels of governance is empowered to hold the forests in trust for the common good of Uganda. Also, according to the National Forest Policy of Nigeria (2006, p. 68), the government is empowered to hold in trust the forest set aside as reserve lands. While there are few exceptions within the legal framework on state ownership and control of land, this is often rendered redundant in the face of overriding public interest. Hence, the general implication of this land and forest regime is that government can legally own and use land for different priorities other than the strengthening of adaptive practices of indigenous peoples. For instance, this enables the state to pursue interests such as large-scale agricultural plantations, mining and logging, construction of roads and dams, as well as conservation which are often at crosspurposes with indigenous peoples’ adaptive practices. In addition to land degradation, the consequence of these activities for indigenous peoples is displacement from the land or territories to which they are culturally attached. This can be buttressed by the presence and consequences of such projects on indigenous peoples’ land in Africa. Large-scale agricultural plantations in several states of Africa including Benin, Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Namibia, and Ethiopia do not only disrupt the land use of indigenous peoples but also compromise their tenure rights (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). In particular, according to Laltaika (2009), massive Jatropha plantations are a new threat to the survival and livelihood of the Maasai in Tanzania. Through concession to private or public business, including logging and mining companies, the land regime also allows mining and logging activities on indigenous peoples’ lands (Barume 2010, p. 70). In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, which is rich in crude oil, oil exploration on the land of indigenous peoples such as the Ogoni, Efik, and Ijaw (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 18) has occasioned environmental degradation resulting from activities including gas flaring and deforestation (Oruonye 2012). Kidd and Kenrick (2009, p. 21) found that the Exxon’s World Bank oil pipeline project backed by the government in Chad and Cameroon which crossed Bagyéli land at least five times in the Bipindi area has severe impacts on these communities. These include their displacement and destruction of sacred sites and way of life. Roads and dam constructions have all played a part in the destruction of forests (rainforest deforestation), which are crucial to the shelter, survival, and livelihood of some indigenous peoples. In Namibia, the construction of dam at Epupa was considered environmentally and socially Page 13 of 21

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attractive but would displace 1,100 Himba and affect 5,000 occasional users of the grazing areas on the river bank, in addition to the loss of their cultural and religious sites (World Rainforest Movement 2013, p. 28). Conservation efforts in Central Africa have equally led to the dispossession and poverty of indigenous peoples such as the Batwas in that part of Africa. According to Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau (2006), the trend in this regard has been ongoing for long, taking place without due regard for consultation and compensation for forced removal. Essentially, this land regime allows the states in Africa to deflate their responsibilities toward indigenous peoples’ immediate adaptation concerns in the guise of accessing, using, and controlling land for public good. It is thus no surprise that, at international climate forum, indigenous peoples have made the claim for protection of land as key in climate change responses including adaptation. At Nakuru, Kenya, indigenous peoples, particularly of Africa, urge intergovernmental organizations, UN agencies, and international organizations and foundations to ensure that the principles of the UNDRIP are mainstreamed in the design and implementation of any program or project in their land (Nakuru Declaration 2009). At Anchorage, in addition to emphasizing the need for security of land of indigenous peoples as critical to climate programs, indigenous peoples call for adequate and direct funding to enable them to participate effectively in all projects or programs including adaptation (The Anchorage Declaration 2009, pp. 5–7). Also, the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC) in its closing statement before the 2012 SBSTA Working Group meeting calls for the strengthening of the adaptive strategies of indigenous peoples with appropriate policy framework which respect their rights to land and traditional practices (UNFCCC 2012).

Conclusions This chapter makes a case for the necessity for states to have in place adaptation policy in Africa. It bases this proposition on three premises. The first foundation is that there are existent adaptive practices of indigenous peoples which had been useful in coping with adverse range of climate conditions. These adaptive practices which are closely linked to the cultural relationship of indigenous peoples with their land include approaches in form of prediction of weather, water security, drought and land degradation management skills, and food preservation. The second premise is that indigenous peoples in Africa now face a new range of climatic variations beyond their coping adaptive capability. As the final basis of the argument, the chapter demonstrates that rather than addressing this situation, in engaging with international adaptation processes, states in Africa do not facilitate the profiling of indigenous peoples’ adaptive challenges and the development of their landrelated adaptive practices. Thus, the foregoing premises justify the necessity of formulating appropriate policy to safeguard indigenous peoples through “land-sensitive” adaptation policy in different states in Africa. Basic policy framework should include the recognition of indigenous peoples’ identity, land use, and land tenure as critical to adaptation approach. In line with UNDRIP principles of participation and benefit sharing and protection of land rights (UNDRIP 2007, art 26), it should reflect the vulnerability of indigenous peoples while engaging with international adaptation processes. Along similar line, it should include indigenous peoples in the framework for implementation of adaptation policy, grant them direct access to funds and culturally acceptable technology, address climate threats to their land, and commit funds for successful design and/or implementation of programs and projects under NAPA and national communications. Adaptation policy measure at the national level should include the recognition of indigenous peoples’ traditional institution structure in accessing funds for the implementation of adaptation projects and secure their land access and tenure. All this Page 14 of 21

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is important, not only for the purpose of giving hope to indigenous peoples who may yet face a somber future of difficult climate variability but because it will help states in Africa in investing time and resources into where they are needed most.

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UNFCCC Web Decision 1/CMP.3 Adaptation Fund. FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1 Decision 1/CMP.4 Adaptation Fund. CCC/KP/CMP/2008/11/Add.2 Decision 1/CP.8 Delhi Ministerial Declaration on climate change and sustainable development. FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.10 Buenos Aires programme of work on adaptation and response measures. FCCC/ CP/2004/10/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.12 Further guidance to an entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention, for the operation of the Special Climate Change Fund. FCCC/ CP/2006/5/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.13 Bali Action Plan. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.16 The Cancun Agreements: outcome of the work of the AdHoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 Decision 3/CP.17 Governing instrument for the Green Climate Fund. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 Decision 5/CP.7 Implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention (decision 3/CP.3 and Article 2, paragraph 3, and Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol). FCCC/CP/ 2001/13/Add.1 Decision 5/CP.17 National adaptation plan. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 Decision 7/CP.7 Funding under the Convention. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 Decision 8/CP.5 Other matters related to communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention. FCCC/CP/1999/6/Add.1 Decision 8/CP.8 Guidance to an entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention, for the operation of the Least Developed Countries Fund. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 Decision 8/CP.9 Review of the guidelines for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of action. FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1 Decision 9/CP.8 Review of the guidelines for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of action. FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1 Decision 10/CP.7 Funding under the Kyoto Protocol. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 Decision 11/CP.9 Global observing systems for climate. FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1 Decision 28/CP.7 Guidelines for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of action. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.4 The Anchorage Declaration 24 Apr 2009 UNFCCC (2013) List of LDCs Countries http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/national_adapta tion_programmes_of_action/items/4585.php. Accessed 18 Nov 2013 UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013a) Predicting drought and weather related diseases UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013b) Water harvesting structures in northern Kenya Page 20 of 21

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UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013c) Ngitili in Shinyanga UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013d) Sun drying food in Africa

Adaptation Fund Web Adaptation Fund Website Funded Projects Operational Policies and Guidelines for Parties to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund (Amended in July 2013)

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Climate Change and Water Issues in Mesopotamia: A Framework for Fostering Transboundary Cooperation in Euphrates-Tigris Basin Vakur S€ umer* Department of International Relations, Selcuk University, Konya, Turkey

Abstract This chapter starts with presenting an overview of the current situation in Mesopotamia in terms of both water resources and increasing impacts of climate change over water resources. The existing literature on potential problems of climate change in Euphrates-Tigris region will also be discussed. Then the chapter turns to the question of how countries of the region may come together around the theme of water and increase their adaptive capacities in the face of climate-related threats.

Keywords Mesopotamia; Euphrates; Tigris; Iraq; Syria; Turkey; Climate change; Water resources; Macroregion

Introduction The two significant rivers in the Middle East, Euphrates and Tigris (ET), characterize the area which was historically known as Mesopotamia. The Mesopotamia region constitutes a single basin ending in the Persian Gulf. The area witnessed the earliest urban civilization in Sumerian times and is called as the “Cradle of Civilization.” It also historically is part of the greater “Fertile Crescent” stretching from the Nile Delta through Jordan River and through Euphrates-Tigris into the Persian Gulf. Food production in the region continues to be vital not only for the population living in the basin but for the entire populations of the riparians. The water-dependent area of Mesopotamia now faces with the threats of climate change which could turn out to be disastrous if adaptation strategies are not implemented in timely manner. There is a growing literature on the possible impacts of climate change on Mesopotamia.1 However, little has been done in order to improve the adaptive capacity in the face of climate change in the region. Moreover, despite this recent literature, there is a lack of reliable historical data which renders it difficult to develop robust models of changes in time (Rifai 2008; Voss et al. 2013). Adaptation to climate change, certainly, entails a wide range of issues (Moser and Dilling 2004). One significant part of climate change adaptation is to develop the transboundary cooperation since the basin is shared by a number of countries, and as it is already known, climate change knows no boundaries.

*Email: [email protected] 1 See, for instance, Voss et al. (2013), Yilmaz and Imteaz (2011), Topcu et al. (2010), Sowers et al. (2011), Kitoh et al. (2008). Page 1 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_3-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Within this framework, this chapter aims to present a model for transboundary cooperation, particularly with regard to transboundary water resources in the region. Building upon a recent EU model and taking water as a common ground for action, this chapter tries to propose a coherent and holistic perspective for an ever climate-adaptive Mesopotamia. The chapter starts with presenting an overview of the current situation in Mesopotamia in terms of both water resources and increasing impacts of climate change over water resources. The existing literature on potential problems of climate change in Euphrates-Tigris region will also be discussed. Then the chapter turns to the question of how countries of the region may come together around the theme of water and increase their adaptive capacities in the face of climate-related threats.

Climate Change Impacts on Water Resources in Mesopotamia Euphrates and Tigris are two significant rivers in the southwest Asia. They are important not only because of their length which makes them “transboundary” rivers but also because of their water volume which makes the region of Mesopotamia as one of the most fertile agricultural regions in the world as well as their potential in terms of hydroelectricity. Euphrates is the longest river of the region (approx. 2,700 km). The Kara Su and the Murat are two main tributaries of Euphrates in the headwaters. These two tributaries, along with the Balikh and Khabur tributaries which join Euphrates downstream, drain the heavy winter/spring precipitation in the form of runoff from the southeastern Taurus Mountains. The Tigris River, the second longest river in southwest Asia (1,840 km), originates in eastern Turkey near Lake Hazar and flows southeast where it forms the border with Syria for approximately 40 km and then enters into Iraq. Several tributaries contribute to the Tigris including the Greater Zab, the Lesser Zab, the Adhaim, and the Diyala. The Tigris and Euphrates converge near the Iraqi city of Qurna and continue as the Shatt al Arab, and finally, they drain into the Persian Gulf (Kolars and Mitchell 1991). There are three major riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris River basin: Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.2 Euphrates annual mean flow is 32 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/year). Ninety percent of the mean annual flow of the Euphrates originates from Turkey, and the 10 % originates from Syria. Tigris, on the other hand, has 52 bcm/year of annual average flow. While 40 % of the total discharge originates from Turkey, 51 % originates from Iraq and 9 % from Iran (Kibaroglu) (Fig. 1). There was not a serious water issue in the region – at least in the political arena – until the second half of the twentieth century. Until then rivers were utilized by the populations living nearby. The water question emerged as a significant political – as well as a societal – issue when the three riparians initiated major water development projects in 1960s. The main reason for this was the decreasing sufficiency of water resources of the basin for the local communities in the basin and, more importantly, the need for supplying water and energy (hydroelectricity) for the rapidly increasing populations of urban agglomerations whether close by or distant from the source (Elhance 1999). Therefore, the rapid demographic changes in Mesopotamia could be seen as one of the reasons for making water resources more critical. The increase in Turkey’s population could be a good example. The total population of Turkey was 13.5 million in 1927. It increased to 31.2 million by 1965. This means a 2.5-fold increase in less than 40 years. Syria’s and Iraq’s populations demonstrate similar trends during these times.

2

It should be noted, however, that some territories of Iran and Saudi Arabia belong to the ET basin geographically and that Iran contbitutes 5–8 % of the river flow of Tigris. Page 2 of 13

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Fig. 1 Map of Mesopotamia (Source: Heston et al. (2012))

And despite the decreasing rates of population increase in Turkey, Syria and Iraq continued to increase at higher percentages.3 Iraq’s population, for instance, grew from 6 to 32 million in the last six decades. Syria’s population, likewise, grew from 3.5 to 22.5 million during the last 60 years. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi and Oskar Svadkovsky summarize the official population policy in Syria in the last 60 years: The seeds of the current disaster were planted as far back as 1956, when Youssef Helbaoui – head of economic analysis in Syria's Planning Department – famously declared: “A birth control policy has no reason for being in this country. Malthus could not find any followers among us.” Since then Syria has been living in a state of one uninterrupted demographic cataclysm. The regime was so obsessively pro-natalist that in the early 1970s, the trade and use of contraceptives in Syria were officially banned. By 1975, the birth rate reached 50 live births per 1,000 people, with Hafez al-Assad asserting that a “high population growth rate and internal migration” were responsible for stimulating “proper socio-economic improvements” within the development framework. Even when other nations in the Middle East began to take measures to curb their population growth as the danger of demographic collapse started to loom over the region, the regime in Syria was struggling to make up its mind on the issue.” (Al-Tamimi and Svadkovsky 2012)

Now, there are more than 100 million additional people living in these three basin countries when compared with 1950 numbers. This huge increase in the basin countries’ population largely remained dependent to water resources of Euphrates and Tigris and, when taken in conjunction

3

Note that the population of Turkey increased less than four times of its 1950 number, while Syria grew more than six times, and Iraq grew nearly six times during the last six decades. Page 3 of 13

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Population for Turkey (POPTTLTRA173NUPN) Source: University of Pennsylvania 80,000

70,000

(Thousands)

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000 1950

1960

FRED

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2000

2010

2013 research.stlouisfed.org

Fig. 2 Population of Turkey (Source: Heston et al. (2012))

Population for Iraq (POPTTLIQA173NUPN) Source: University of Pennsylvania 32,000 28,000

(Thousands)

24,000 20,000 16,000 12,000 8,000 4,000 1950

FRED

1960

1970

1980

1990

2013 research.stlouisfed.org

Fig. 3 Population of Iraq (Source: Heston et al. (2012)) Page 4 of 13

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Population for Syria (POPTTLSYA173NUPN) Source: University of Pennsylvania 24,000 22,000 20,000 18,000

(Thousands)

16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 1950

FRED

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2013 research.stlouisfed.org

Fig. 4 Population of Syria (Source: Heston et al. (2012))

with climate change-induced decreasing levels of available water in the rivers, resulted in a water crisis, which is still surmounting (see Figs. 2, 3, and 4). Combinations of these push factors with a pull factor, i.e., the advent of new construction technologies enabling huge dams to be built which characterized the “hydraulic mission”4 era, resulted in huge infrastructure plannings throughout the region countries (see Table 1). In other words, countries of the region hitherto dealt with these decreasing levels of per capita water with supply-side measures. They constructed a considerable number of reservoirs in order to continue to supply water for irrigation during dry seasons. Among these, Southeastern Anatolia Project (Turkish acronym GAP) of Turkey appears to be the biggest water-related infrastructure project undertaken in the basin.5 Construction of additional water supplies did contribute to the water management in the basin in several aspects. Built reservoirs provide water supply guarantee throughout the year. They also appeared to be useful when recurring floods are considered. Since they regulated the water flow, floods became unusual events. However, despite these contributions, huge reservoirs in the basin bear a number of potential harms, particularly in the face of climate change. For instance, huge surface area of these man-made lakes (or canals) has a problem of evaporation. Evaporation losses amount to be huge in shallow water bodies in downstream like Thartar canal in Iraq. Therefore, countries in the region might need to focus also on better management of reservoirs in the basin. If countries could agree, in accordance with the topographic and climatic imperatives, reserving much of the water in upstream could be a solution. Thus, since the 1960s, not only Turkey and Syria began developing the potential of EuphratesTigris River system for basically energy production and irrigation, but also Iraq initiated new schemes for irrigation. The culmination of all these unaligned efforts was an increased water imbalance in the region and, not to mention, a patchwork approach to climate change-related threats. Hydraulic mission is a concept within a modernist world view, meaning “the strong conviction that every drop of water flowing to the ocean is a waste and that the state should develop hydraulic infrastructure to capture as much water as possible for human uses” (Wester et al. (2009). The hydraulic mission and the Mexican hydrocracy: Regulating and reforming the flows of water and power. Water Alternatives 2(3): 395–415). 5 GAP consisted of 22 big dams and 19 hydropower plants in Turkish parts of Euphrates and Tigris basin. 4

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Table 1 Dams in the Tigris–Euphrates watershed Name Dokan Derbendikhan Keban Tabaqa Hamrin Mosul

Completion 1961 1962 1975 1975 1980 1985

Haditha

1984

Karakaya Ataturk

1987 1992

Kralkizi Batman

1997 1998

Tishreen

1999

Usea IRR IRR HP HP IRR HP, IRR HP, IRR HP HP, IRR HP HP, IRR HP

Prin. vol (109 m3)c 4.6 2 21.6 9.6 2.15 8

Max. SA (km2)d 270 121 675 610 440 371

Prin. SAe 200 78 458 447 195 285

Res. Kf 1 1 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5

Euphrates 8.2

7

500

415

4

Turkey Turkey

Euphrates 9.6 Euphrates 48.7

7.1 38.7

268 817

198 707

1 2

Turkey Turkey

Tigris Tigris

1.1 0.745

57.5 49.3

39.2 37.3

2 2

Syria

Euphrates 1.9

1.8

166

142

2

Country Iraq Iraq Turkey Syria Iraq Iraq

Basin Tigris Tigris Euphrates Euphrates Tigris Tigris

Iraq

Max. vol (109 m3)b 6.8 3 31 11.7 3.95 11.1

1.9 1.175

Source: Jones et al. (2008) a IRR irrigation, HP hydroelectric power b Maximum volume in billion cubic meters c Principal volume in billion cubic meters d Maximum surface area in km2 e Principal surface area in km2 f Reservoir hydraulic conductivity in mm/h

As FAO noted, it is clear that water resources in the semiarid or arid zones like the Middle East are already stressed, independent of climate change, and any additional stress from climate change or increased variability will only intensify the competition for water resources. The Middle East, being the world’s most water-stressed region, climate change – which is projected to cause sea-level rise, more extreme weather events such as droughts and floods, and less precipitation – will contribute to even greater water stress in the region (Freimuth et al. 2007). Within this context, “future vulnerability depends not only on climate change but also on development plans, so that appropriate strategies followed for sustainable development can reduce vulnerability to climate change” (Topcu et al. 2010). To date, most governments in the wider Middle East have concentrated largely on large-scale supply-side measure including desalination, dam construction, interbasin water transfers, tapping fossil groundwater aquifers, and importing virtual water. According to Sowers et al. (2011), societal involvement is one of the keys in a successful climate adaption strategy, where it lacks in the Middle East region. Sowers et al. (2011) conclude that “the key capacities for adaptive governance to water scarcity in MENA remains to be underdeveloped.” What is more, all intended solutions remain to be uncoordinated and single-country solutions, lacking the transboundary dimension which needs to be taken seriously for a working climate adaptation strategy.

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Climate Change and Increasing Pressures on Water Resources The Mediterranean basin and its surrounding area, which includes Mesopotamia, are regarded as among the most climate-vulnerable regions in the world. Climate change is already underway in the ET region. The increasing impacts of climate change in the Euphrates-Tigris region have been experienced by a number of indications. Voss et al. (2013) analyzed the changes in overall freshwater storage in the Euphrates-Tigris basin from January 2003 to December 2009. Their study indicated alarming rate of decrease in total water storage of approximately 27.2  0.6 mm yr 1 equivalent water height, equal to a volume of 143.6 km3 during the course of the study period. The Euphrates also has been widely reported to have become very narrow and shallow.6 Indeed, a decreasing trend in lower Euphrates streamflows based on historical flow data analysis has already been demonstrated (Yilmaz and Imteaz 2011, p. 1277). Moreover, despite the decrease in overall precipitation, flood intensity and frequency have a tendency to rise (IPCC 2007). Shifts in rain patterns have led to prolonged droughts all around the Middle East in recent years. As pointed out by Shetty (2006), for instance, “dramatic changes in climatic and hydrologic features in recent years have affected the economies of the region and specifically those of the dry areas where rainfed agriculture is the dominant activity and the only source of income for a majority of the rural population.” The drought in Iraq in 2008, a case in point, was one of the harshest ones in the country’s history which forced the country to enter into new negotiations which then culminated in signing of a memorandum of understanding in September 2009. Climate change-induced impact was particularly devastating in Syria, as al-Tamimi and Svadkovsky (2012) note, “agriculture remains a major part of the economy and the lifestyle of a large section of the population, some 20 % of Syria’s GDP being generated by this sector.” It was reported that “aggravation of water scarcity led to the abandonment of around 160 villages in northern Syria in the period 2007–2008. In eastern Syria, the Inezi tribe saw some 85 % of its livestock killed between 2005 and 2010 because of prolonged drought. In 2010 the United Nations estimated that more than a million people have left the northeast of the country” (Al-Tamimi and Svadkovsky 2012). Apart from these experienced changes, recent scientific studies also warn about the expected magnitude and threats of future climate change. Therefore, the recent trends of climate change seem to continue in the upcoming years and decades. In a widely cited paper, Chenoweth et al. (2011), on the other hand, found that the average annual Euphrates-Tigris River discharge could decline by 9.5 % by 2040–2069 with the greatest decline (12 %) in Turkey.7 Another study suggests that climate change has the potential to severely reduce (between 10 % and 60 %) the amount of this water source and place increased stress on the water-dependent societies of the region8. The decrease in the Euphrates basin, in particular, appears to be more alarming: “Discharge of the Euphrates River is projected to decrease between 29–73 percent by the end of the 21st century” (Kitoh et al. 2008; Granit and Joyce 2012). Dai (2011), reviewing recent literature on drought of the last millennium, concludes that most of the Middle East will experience an increased aridity in the twenty-first century. In light of the above, 6

Faisal Rifai, Impact of Collaboration in the Euphrates Tigris Region, http://www.inbo-news.org/IMG/pdf/rifai.pdf It should be noted at this point that both Euphrates and Tigris are largely snow-fed rivers which are dependent on winter precipitation, particularly in Turkey. The Taurus Mountains and the Anatolian Highlands of eastern Turkey are the headwater regions for the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, whose waters are shared primarily between Turkey and, downstream riparians, Syria and Iraq. In other words, the runoff from the Taurus Mountains of Turkey supplies water to 2/3 of the Arabic-speaking population of the Middle East (Cullen and deMenocal 2000). 8 Ozdogan (2011). 7

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although there is a remarkable variance in study findings, nearly all of studies agree on the prospect that there will be less water in the Euphrates-Tigris basin in the future. Bozkurt and Şen provide a synopsis of what could be expected in the twenty-first century in the Euphrates basin which is worth quoting: Temperature: All scenario simulations indicate surface temperature increases across the entire Euphrates-Tigris bsin. Projected increase in annual surface temperature in the highlands ranges between 2.1  C and 4.1  C for 2041–2070, and between 2.6  C and 6.1  C for 2071–2099. Precipitation: Projected precipitation decrease in the highlands by the end of the present century in 33 % under the higher emissions scenario (A1F1) and 6–24 % under the A2 scenario. Snow water equivalent precipitation in the highlands is projected to decrease by 55 % for B1 scenario, 77–85 % for A2 scenario and 87 % for A1F1 scenario. River discharge: The territory of Turkey will likely experience more adverse direct effects of the climate change compared to the territories of the other countries in the basin. The annual surface runoff is projected to decrease by 26–57 % in the territory of Turkey by the end of the present century. (Bozkurt and Şen)

Then, the question, is not whether or how the climate will change in Mesopotamia, but the questions that experts and decision-makers should be dealing with are, first, what these adaptive strategies are and, perhaps more importantly, how these adaptive strategies that are necessary for mitigating climate change could be implemented in the region as a whole, because climate change is such a phenomenon that renders national or regional boundaries obsolete and that necessitates a holistic approach, including spatial integration among other “integrations.” In other words, in order to succeed in designing and implementing basin-wide measures aiming a successful climate adaptation, we need to transcend national boundaries and integrate the climate-vulnerable zones of the region into a unified whole. Within this context, a successful climate adaptation strategy necessarily means a transboundary cooperation. A number of measures are hitherto taken from the supply-side thinking. One key element of adaptation is diversification of water management strategies; another is ensuring equitable access for vulnerable populations. Most MENA countries already employ a variety of supply-side measures, including dams, water transfer schemes, desalination, reuse of treated wastewater, and procuring “virtual water” (Allan 2001) through imports. Water experts in the region, in concert with international institutions, increasingly advocate demand management to promote conservation and increase efficiency. Any cooperation attempt in the Euphrates-Tigris basin should aim at improving the water use in agriculture, because the greatest consumer of water, by far, in the Middle East is irrigation/ agriculture. On average, more than 70 % of water in the region is used in agriculture. As pointed out by Shetty (2006), countries in the region now face with “increasing pressure to allocate water away from agricultural to industrial and municipal uses, as well as to increase water efficiency within the agricultural sector.” On the other hand, rapid population increases put the region in a difficult dilemma. Improving agricultural water use appears to be difficult with the continuing trends of population increases in the basin. Recent climatic models for eastern Mediterranean and Turkey predict a significant reduction in precipitation (Gao and Giorgi 2008) that would require additional water withdrawals from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to meet agricultural demand throughout the basin. This “could have devastating effects on the water availability” in the whole basin. As Voss et al. (2013) conclude, “the decline in agricultural output significantly influences economic stability in the region and will continue to be a threat owing to perennial limitations on water availability and the emerging threats of climate change, including more prolonged drought.” Thus, whereas better climate mitigation requires water savings particularly in agriculture (this means countries of the region must focus their

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efforts in reallocating water towards nonagricultural water uses and use water more efficiently in agriculture9), this is not straightforward because of the fact that water is an indispensable element in food production in these countries and also farmers comprise big constituencies in all three countries. One possible way out of this deadlock seems to be utilization of “virtual water,” which is already in place to some extent. Both Iraq and Syria are increasingly importing foods. This is partly because of the recent warlike situation in these countries. In other words, if opportunity appears, these countries will opt for growing their own food instead. Therefore, there is a limit for virtual water: “food security.” Countries of the region do not want to rely on foods from international market.

Adaptation to Climate Change in Mesopotamia Through Transboundary Water Cooperation Steps necessary for climate adaptation need a holistic perspective in terms of national or regional boundaries. Therefore, intrastate solutions may not yield optimum outcomes when the question is about a phenomenon that does not know borders (Solomon et al. 2007). However, it appears to be quite difficult to realize a “transboundary” approach to climate change-related threats, particularly since it is mostly interconnected with the sensitive issue of water. A number of studies have long focused on methods of how to foster the cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris region.10 Nevertheless, given a number of factors limiting the construction of trust among countries, a workable solution for cooperation in this region of the world could not be easily implemented. Any attempt towards cooperation needs to take into account of the past experiences and long-lasting clashes of views and try not to cause additional problems instead of resolving them. In the past, several concepts and proposals were found “hegemonic” or “biased” and did not find ways of implementation.11 Therefore, there is the need for a neutral approach which would not create antagonisms. The “macro-region strategy” could be treated such an unbiased concept. Instead of facing the multifaceted and complex “water sharing” problem bluntly and as a single case for solution, the macro-region concept proposes an “issue-based” and “project-oriented” cooperation with an aim of making cooperation a habit in the region through working together around the priorities of all. Deconstructing the bigger problem of “lack of water cooperation” into smaller projects for attainable goals could work better. Within this context, climate change-related threats could be more easily dealt with.

This strategy is also known as “more crop per every drop.” For discussions on ET cooperation, inter alia, see Asit Biswas (ed.), International waters of the Middle East from Euphrates-Tigris to Nile, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994; Ayşeg€ul Kibaroğlu, Building a regime for the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river system. Kluwer Law International, London, The Hague, New York; Naff and Matson, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation. Westview Press, Boulder, 1984; Scheumann W, Schiffler M (eds) Water in the Middle East: potential for conflicts and prospects for cooperation. Springer, Berlin; G€un Kut Burning Waters: Hydropolitics of the Euphrates and the Tigris. In New Perspectives on Turkey, (9) (Fall), 1993. 11 See Warner (2008). 9

10

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Box 1. The EU Model of Macro-Region: Lessons from Neighborhood (Excerpts from INTERACT 2009)

Definition of macro-region: “an area including territory from a number of different countries or regions associated with one or more common features or challenges.” “An area covering a number of administrative regions but with sufficient issues in common to justify a single strategic approach.” “Its borders are not delimited once and for all, but their ‘extent depends on the topic: for example, on economic issues it would involve all the countries in the region, on water quality issues it would involve the whole catchment area’. The macro-region is thus presented as a functional region, sharing challenges, opportunities and solutions. The antecedents of the EU’s currently-promoted macro-regional conceptualization can be traced back to the Brussels European Council of 14 December 2007, with the Council’s ‘invitation to the Commission to present an EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region’. “Macro-regional strategy requires no new ad hoc legislation. The main content is the preparation and implementation of a Plan of Action that derives from a strategic paper mostly drafted by national governments and the European Commission through a consultative approach. It is an endogenous ‘bottom up’ process: contrary to policies that descend from a communitarian strategic approach, the macro-region establishes its strategy through the involvement of local actors. Furthermore, the Plan of Action is concrete and contains tangible effects thanks to the identification of flagship projects.” “In all cases, the principle will be to add value to interventions, whether by the EU, national or regional authorities or the third or private sectors, in a way that significantly strengthens the functioning of the macro-region. Moreover, by resolving issues in a relatively small group of countries and regions the way may be cleared for better cohesion at the level of the Union.” “Working together can become a habit and a skill. In addition, overall coordination of actions across policy areas will very likely result in better results than individual initiatives.” “Concreteness: The one indispensable element in a macro-regional strategy is the resulting action. Strategies that consist of words in documents, and nothing more, will not achieve their objectives. An action plan, or something comparable, is therefore the sine qua non of an effective strategy. However, an action plan that stands alone risks being little more than a wish list. There is a need for an organising approach that explains and justifies the selection, prioritisation and sequencing of selected actions.”

Risks and Opportunities for the Mesopotamia EU’s functional model of macro-regions (Dubois et al. 2009; Stocchiero 2010) is a relatively novel approach which needs to be carefully studied and adapted to the conditions of the Middle East. When the Euphrates-Tigris basin is concerned, there are a number of certain risks and opportunities associated with this proposed scheme. It could be summarized as follows: Opportunities: (a) New and neutral concept (it is easier to build trust in the region with an unbiased concept). (b) Possible EU support and possible UN support (as well as other donors may contribute funding for establishing a secretariat, educational aid, training aid for relevant personnel). (c) The issue of water is common to many problems of all three countries of the region (gathering around common conflicts).

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(d) Establishment of a governing commission could be a starting point for further cooperation. (e) There are a clear model (EU) and a clear timetable to follow. Challenges: (a) Lack of political will for such a framework of action (two countries of the region, Iraq and Syria, are presumably in flux, and water cooperation has not been given due attention). (b) Lack of accountability and the problem of democratic deficit. (c) Capacity (technical, personnel) and funding is problematic in war-torn countries of Syria and Iraq. (d) There is no EU Commission-like body for acting as a guardian of the agreed projects. Building upon the opportunities and challenges listed above, the third stage would be composed of drawing up a “roadmap” for initializing and sustaining the cooperative framework of macroregion. One of the most significant parts of this roadmap would be the discussion of different scenarios of the institutional setup. For instance, creating a working commission (like the one in the EU) would be conducive to cooperation, but it could be easily abused and become a way of limiting the cooperation. Therefore, the institutional design of the new cooperative scheme should be meticulously analyzed with its far-reaching implications. In the fourth stage, designation of a number of flagship projects will be designed. These will be the beacons of cooperation for particularly the initial phases of the macro-region strategy. Anchoring in these flagship projects would have a likelihood to create a path-dependent attitude towards cooperation. The success of such a cooperative action framework will largely depend on the level of political commitment of the countries concerned rather than the foreign support. Therefore, the bulk of the needed investments are to be covered by the countries of the region, which renders this project difficult since both Iraq and Syria would not like to initiate and financially contribute to this framework. And Turkey, on the other hand, has not much to gain with this cooperative scheme given its dominant position in terms of geographic position (upstream) and water resources utilization.

Conclusions This chapter aims to analyze water-related implications of climate change in Euphrates-Tigris (ET) transboundary river basin and create a framework for advancing the international level of cooperation in order to better deal with common challenges that countries of the region began to face. The chapter began with a discussion of the possible undesirable water-related implications of climate change in ET basin countries (namely, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey) through utilization of existing scientific literature, then presents the current level of cooperation among three riparians and the gap between these challenges and existing transboundary water cooperation, and finally proposes a framework and an action plan for deepening water-based cooperation in the basin in order to tackle with the climate change-related challenges. Reports originating from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) conclude that freshwater systems are among the most vulnerable to climate change. In snow-dominated basins (such as the ET), hydrologic studies have long agreed that warming will result in earlier peak flows, greater winter flows, and lower summer flows. Also, climate models suggest that warmer temperatures will very likely lead to greater climate variability and an increase in the risk of extreme hydrologic events such as floods and droughts. The existing level of cooperation among three Page 11 of 13

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riparians does not allow for successful management of the impacts of climate change, because there is hitherto no multilateral and comprehensive agreement involving all three riparians and all waterrelevant issues. The chapter attempts to provide a detailed framework for addressing the water-related risks of climate change in ET basin and discuss the applicability and effectiveness of possible solutions. Climate change-related impacts of desertification and water scarcity which could worsen the prevailing poverty in vast areas of the region necessitate systematic action by all countries of the region. In order to open up underexplored venues for target-oriented cooperation, the neutral concept of “macro-region” – which would be a project-driven process (Bialasiewicz et al. 2012; Medeiros 2011) – has been presented. Successful implementation of flagship projects in priority areas would become a basic trust-building measure for strengthening the development of a common understanding for regional problems, which appears to be one of the prerequisites for mitigating climate change-related problems. According to various scenarios, the climate change will be one of the most challenging phenomena in the Middle East, including the ET basin. Common challenges of this magnitude could only be dealt with collaborative action. To this end, this chapter proposed a neutral concept not only for advancing the practical cooperation among basin countries in the face of climate change but for also promoting the trust between three countries, which appears to be one of the prerequisites for strengthening cooperative ties. The chapter adopted a novel approach and focused on issue-based and attainable targets and project-driven solutions for lessening the adverse impacts of climate change in the region.

References Allan JA (2001) The Middle East water question: hydropolitics and the global economy. I.B Tauris, London/New York Al-Tamimi AJ, Svadkovsky O (2012) Demography is destiny in Syria: the “peripheralism” and Malthusian underpinnings of an unexpected uprising. The American Spectator. Retrieved from http://spectator.org/archives/2012/02/06/demography-is-destiny-in-syria. Accessed 27 Aug 2013 Bialasiewicz L et al (2012) Re-scaling ‘EU’rope: EU macro-regional fantasies in the Mediterranean. Eur Urban Reg Stud 20(1):59–76 Chenoweth J et al (2011) Impact of climate change on the water resources of the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East region: modeled 21st century changes and implications. Water Resour Res 47(6):1–18. doi:10.1029/2010WR010269 Cullen HM, deMenocal PB (2000) North Atlantic influence on Tigris-Euphrates streamflow. Int J Climatol 20:853–863 Dai A (2011) Drought under global warming: a review. WIREs Clim Change 2(1):45–65. doi:10.1002/wcc.81 Dubois et al (2009) EU macro-regions and macro-regional strategies – a scoping study. Nordregio Electronic working paper 2009, vol 4, Nordregio, Stockholm, Sweden Elhance AP (1999) Hydropolitics in the 3rd world: conflict and cooperation in international river basins. US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC Freimuth L, Bromberg G, Mehyar M, Al Khateeb N (2007) Climate change: a new threat to Middle East security. EcoPeace/Friends of the Earth Middle East, Amman/Bethlehem/Tel Aviv Gao X, Giorgi F (2008) Increased aridity in the Mediterranean region under greenhouse gas forcing estimated from high resolution simulations with a regional climate model. Global Planet Change 62(3–4):195–209 Page 12 of 13

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Granit J, Joyce J (2012) Options for cooperative action in the Euphrates and Tigris Region. Stockholm International Water Institute paper 20, Stockholm International Water Institute, Stockholm Heston A, Summers R, Aten B (2012) Penn world table version 7.1, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, November 2012 Interact (2009) Macro-regional strategies in the European Union. Retrieved from http://www.interacteu.net/downloads/1682/Macro-regional_strategies_in_the_European_Union.pdf. Accessed 28 Aug 2013 IPCC (2007), The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Jones C et al (2008) Hydrologic impacts of engineering projects on the Tigris–Euphrates system and its marshlands. J Hydrol 353(1–2):59–75 Kitoh A, Yatagai A, Alpert P (2008) First super-high-resolution model projection that the ancient “Fertile Crescent” will disappear in this century. Hydrol Res Lett 2:1–4 Kolars JF, Mitchell WA (1991) The Euphrates river and the Southeast Anatolia development project. Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale Medeiros E (2011) Euro–Meso–Macro: the new regions in Iberian and European space. Reg Stud 1–18 Moser SC, Dilling L (2004) Making climate hot. Communicating the urgency and challenge of global climate change. Environment 46(10):32–46 Ozdogan M (2011) Climate change impacts on snow water availability in the Euphrates-Tigris basin, Hydrology and Earth System Science, Vol. 15, pp. 2789–2803 Rifai F (2008) Impact of Collaboration in the Euphrates Tigris Region, http://www.inbo-news.org/ IMG/pdf/rifai.pdf Shetty S (2006) Water, food security and agricultural policy in the Middle East and North Africa Region. World Bank working paper series, vol 47, Office of the Chief Economist, Washington, DC Solomon S et al (eds) (2007) The physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York, p 996 Sowers J, Vengosh A, Weinthal E (2011) Climate change, water resources, and the politics of adaptation in the Middle East and North Africa. Clim Change 104:599–627 Stocchiero A (2010) Macro-regions of Europe: old wine in a new bottle? CeSPI, Background Paper, CeSPI, Rome, Italy Topcu et al (2010) Vulnerability of water resources under changing climate conditions in Upper Mesopotamia. In: BHS third international symposium, managing consequences of a changing global environment, Newcastle, UK Voss KA et al (2013) Groundwater depletion in the Middle East from GRACE with implications for transboundary water management in the Tigris-Euphrates-Western Iran region. Water Resour Res 49(2):904–914. doi:10.1002/wrcr.20078 Warner J (2008) Contested hydrohegemony: hydraulic control and security in Turkey. Water Altern 1(2):271–288 Wester P, Rap E, Vargas-Velázquez S (2009) The hydraulic mission and the Mexican hydrocracy: regulating and reforming the flows of water and power. Water Altern 2(3):395–415 Yilmaz AG, Imteaz MA (2011) Impact of climate change on runoff in the upper part of the Euphrates basin. Hydrol Sci J 56(7):1265–1279

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Climate Change and Displacement in Bangladesh: Issues and Challenges Nour Mohammad* Assistant Professor of Law, Premier University, Chittagong, Bangladesh

Abstract The purpose of this chapter is to explain and come to understanding of causes of forced migration and climate displacement due to the climate change in the present era of globalization. Environmental crisis along with the increasing impacts of climate change in Bangladesh has become an important cause of cross-border migration to South Asian countries. This chapter attempts to focus on migration and climate displacement in Bangladesh. The research is based upon theoretical sources and empirical data. The consequences of such movement of population in South Asian context will generate a range of destabilizing sociopolitical, economic, and climate change impacts in the future. Bangladesh is commonly recognized as one of the most climate-vulnerable countries on earth and is set to become even more so as a result of climate change. This chapter underlines that climate displacement is not just a phenomenon to be addressed at some point in the future; it is a crisis that is unfolding across Bangladesh now. Sea-level rise and tropical cyclones in coastal areas as well as flooding and riverbank erosion in mainland areas, combined with the socioeconomic situation of the country, are already resulting in the loss of homes, land and property which are common phenomenon in Bangladesh. Among the many causes of vulnerability of people, crossborder migration due to climate change might increase the susceptibility of people to climate change in South Asian countries. This chapter examines the details of legal framework of current and future causes of climate displacement in Bangladesh. It further analyzes existing government policies and programs intended to provide solutions to climate displacement and relief to climate displaced persons and emphasizes that rights-based solutions must be utilized as the basis for solving this crisis.

Keywords Climate change; Displacement; Environmental migrants; Vulnerability; Policy; Bangladesh

Introduction Climate change is one of the most serious threats in the present world. It will affect all of us but will have a disproportionate impact on millions of poor rural people of developing countries. It puts more people at risk of hunger and makes it more difficult to reduce the proportion of people living in extreme poverty. For development work to be effective, we must help poor rural people cope with and mitigate the impact of climate change. The concept of climate and displacement is not a new phenomenon and can be traced back to earlier deliberations on environmental displacement, which *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 16

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were particularly prominent during the 1990s. Climate change has emerged as the greatest threat faced by human beings in the modern world (Clime Asia 2009). The adverse effects of climate change destabilize the human displacement, economic development, human security, and people’s fundamental right (UNDP 2007). Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration are among the key topics that dominate the international and national political arena today. Environmental migration is a reality that can no longer be overlooked. Millions of people have already been displaced as a result of climate change and climate-related natural disasters like Alia and Sidr in Bangladesh. The affected people are also moving from one place to another because of environmental disaster and not able to continue their livelihood anymore. The Red Cross research shows that more people are now displaced by environmental disasters than by war. The United Nations University predicts that 50 million people globally will be displaced by environmental crises by the year 2010. According to other experts in the relevant field, there could be as many as 200 million displaced worldwide by 2050. Although these numbers are expertly researched estimates, even the predictions on the lowest end of the scale are immense. The concept of migration is not a new one; it has been developed for thousands of years ago. This phenomenon is new because there are more and more people that are forced to flee their homes due to environmental factors and natural disaster related to climate change. The complex interdependence between these phenomenon and the potential consequences of the failure to tackle them in time are beginning to attract increasing public and scientific attention. The manifested political commitments to the pursuit of sustainable development, environmental protection, and the respect, protection, and fulfillment of human rights and even more so to their interlinkages are often limited by narrow geopolitical interests when action becomes necessary. Bangladesh is widely recognized to be one of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world. It is found that in every year, natural disaster frequently happens, which causes loss of life and damage to infrastructure and economic assets and adversely impacts on lives and livelihoods, especially of poor people (BCCSAP 2008). Climate change is considered to be a critical global challenge and recent events have demonstrated the world’s growing vulnerability to climate change. The impacts of climate change range from affecting agriculture to further endangering food security, to rising sea levels and the accelerated erosion of coastal zones, and to increasing intensity of natural disasters, species extinction, and the spread of vector-borne diseases (United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 2007). Bangladesh has developed some facility for dealing with the impacts of climate change at the national level and policy response options has been mobilized that deal with vulnerability reduction to environmental variability and most recently to climate change in particular (Saleemul Haq. Ayers 2007).

Climate Change and Bangladesh Bangladesh is one of the largest deltas in the world which is highly vulnerable to natural disasters because of its geographical location, flat and low-lying landscape, population density, poverty, illiteracy, lack of institutional system, etc. In other words, the physical, social, as well as economic conditions of Bangladesh are very typical to any of the most vulnerable countries to natural disasters in the world. The total land area is 147,570 km2 and consists mostly of floodplains (almost 80 %) leaving major part of the country (with the exception of the northwestern highlands) prone to flooding during the rainy season. Moreover, the adverse affects of climate change especially high temperature, sea-level rise, cyclones and storm surges, salinity intrusion, heavy monsoon downpours, etc. has aggravated the overall economic development scenario of the country to a great extent Page 2 of 16

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(Anne Katrien 2012). Climate change is an important issue in the effort for global peace. The global temperatures and sea levels are changing day by day. The whole world is apprehended about the unnatural changes occurring in global climate. The issue of global climate change that we are facing is more pressing than ever (BCCSAP 2009). In Bangladesh the climate change is affecting the human life and economical development and causing displacement of human being. Due to global warming, the country has experienced unusual changes in seasons and faces unexpected rains, dry spells, temperatures, and other symptoms of changes in global weather patterns. Bangladesh’s vulnerability to climate change lies mainly in its density of population and that a large part of its area consists of low-lying coastal areas and expansive floodplains. Now Bangladesh has a population of 163 million people (Bangladesh Demographic Report 2013). While the country’s population has been increasing, on the one hand, its forests are being depleted on the other (Jahangir Alam 2009). An increasing world population and harmful industrialization by the developed countries are the main causes of climate change. The severity of storms, droughts, rainfall, floods, and other natural disasters has been increasing in developing countries like Bangladesh in particular, due to climate change. Global warming threatens our agriculture also, which is the backbone of a country. Every year, natural disasters occur like Sidr and Alia causing havoc effects on Bangladesh agriculture, touching every corner of the country. Due to lack of resources and other causes, Bangladesh does not have the capacity to ensure that appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the damage (Ahamed 2008). The coastal areas of Bangladesh and the coastal people are mostly affected by the climate change and they are losing ponds, lakes, dams, and forestry due to natural disaster. National and regional varieties of fish are being lost due to such climate disaster. Specialists have consensus that 54 varieties of fish in Bangladesh have already been lost due to climate change and natural disaster, and forest and animals are also being lost. Most of the people in Bangladesh are living in rural areas and lead a very poor life. According to the Water Development Board, there is a total of 11,000 km of embankment that the Water Development Board developed, of which around 250 km were damaged by water surges during cyclones Sidr and Alia. The existing embankment at Moheshkhali under Cox’s Bazar District requires a 4.5 m height increase to protect against storm surges and sea-level rises due to the effects of climate change. Any future embankments should be designed to be 2–4 m higher than the existing ones. Due to climate change, the weather in Bangladesh has changed. Water levels have fallen, temperatures have risen, and the incidence of floods, dry spells, and cyclones have all increased, affecting both people’s lifestyle and the crops. At least 30 rivers, including the Padma, the Gomti, and the Teesta, have dried up. And most of the other rivers in Bangladesh are being lost because they are being filled with soil. Parts of northern Bangladesh are becoming desert. Geological and biological changes in the area are threatening normal life (Shamsudoha and Chy 2009). Bangladesh needs technological and economic support to survive the effects of a changing climate. Just as important is the proper handling of any foreign funds Bangladesh may get, since we know that corruption is another large barrier to our prosperity.

Causes of Climate Change and Displacement: The Present Scenario The main causes of environmental deterioration or devastation forcing people to move from their natural habitat are many and varied. The primary causes of climate displacement in Bangladesh tidal height increases in the coastal areas and riverbank erosion in the mainland areas. The secondary causes of displacement are tropical cyclones and storm surges in the coastal regions and river flooding in the mainland. The main scenario sites of displacement have been in the coastal areas and Page 3 of 16

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in the river delta regions in the mainland. Bangladesh has 64 districts of them 24 coastal and mainland districts have already producing climate displaced peoples (Climate displacement Report 2012). Impacts related to climate change could be divided into two distinct drivers of migration: (a) Long-term climate processes (for instance, sea-level rise, salinization of agricultural land, desertification, soil erosion, water scarcity) (b) Short-term extreme climate events and extreme weather events (for instance, flooding, hurricanes, storms) According to International Organization for Migration (IOM), climate change is likely to affect the movement of people in at least four ways: (i) the intensification of natural disasters like both sudden and slow onset leading to increased displacement and migration; (ii) the adverse consequences of increased warming, climate variability and of other effects of climate change for livelihoods, public health, food security, and water availability; (iii) rising sea levels that make coastal areas tumble down; and (iv) competition over scarce natural resources potentially leading to growing tensions and even conflict and, in turn, displacement. The consequences of climate change (including its effects on migration) will be most severe for the developing world like Bangladesh. Particular areas including the Asian mega deltas have been identified as “hotspots” where greater revelation and sensitivity to climate change combine with limited adaptive capacity to suggest that impacts will be most significant (IOM 2008). The proposed working definition of migrant by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is that environmentally induced migration or environmental migrants to encompass people who move as a result of natural or human-made disasters as well as those who migrate because of deteriorating environmental conditions. According to this definition, environmental migrants are those “Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to have to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their territory or abroad.” This definition is inclusive of all persons who have an environmental factor as the major cause of migration and acknowledges that environmentally induced migration can be internal as well as international and a short- or long-term phenomenon, due to sudden or gradual environmental change, without ignoring other intervening political, economic, and social factors. One of the most basic issues in climate change and environmentally induced migration is that it is an international issue or process, but not a regional or local issue. The international community has the responsibility to provide adequate measures for prevention, adaptation policy, and mitigation community in order for the mostly affected countries to reduce their vulnerability to the impacts of environmental disasters and manage the development of environmental processes. The local and national authorities have no power to engage in proactive intervention to reduce the crisis of climate change. Environmentally induced migration is rarely mono-causal. The cause-consequence relations are increasingly complex and multifactorial (Myers et al. 1995). A growing number of people flee because of multiple causes of injustice, exclusion, environmental degradation, competition for scarce resources, and economic hardship caused by dysfunctional states. Some people leave voluntarily, some flee because there is no other choice, and some may make the decision to move before they have no other choice but to flee. The different degrees of force and the complex set of influencing factors blurs the traditional concepts of migration and displacement, creating confusion

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among the academia and the international community about whether to talk about migration or displacement in the case of people fleeing disasters and environmental degradation (Tina 2008). There is a scientific perception that the effects of the climate change are frustrating; many of the natural environmental hazards already faced by Bangladesh in every year (McAdam and Saul 2010) are sudden-onset events including floods, cyclones, storm surges, waterlogging, salinity intrusion, and riverbank erosion and slow-onset events such as coastal erosion, sea-level rise, saltwater intrusion, etc. Bangladesh’s vulnerability to natural hazards leads to climate displacement – the forced displacement of individuals and communities from their homes and lands. This is as a result of both “suddenonset events” such as floods, cyclones, and riverbank erosion as well as “slow-onset processes” such as coastal erosion, seal-level rise, saltwater intrusion, changing rainfall pattern and drought, etc. (Siddiqui 2011). Alarmist prediction is that some 30 million people will be displaced from Bangladesh by 2050 as a result of climate change (McAdam and Saul 2010). It is projected that six million people have already been displaced by the effects of climate hazards in Bangladesh. However, human displacement and migration is a multi-causal phenomenon even in cases where climate change is a predominant driver of migration; it is usually compounded by social, economic, political, and other factors. Resource, social network, cultural ability to cope with change, individual’s attitude, position in family decision making, and gender contribute to decision to migrate or not (Matthew 2010). It is estimated that 60,000 deaths from climate-related natural disasters occur every year (UN News Service 2007) and that 30 million people worldwide are being displaced because of serious degradation of environmental conditions, natural disasters, and depletion of natural resources. This figure is expected to soar by the middle of this century. While there are no authoritative global figures on the number of people who will move for environmental reasons in the future, the Stern Review provides an estimate of 150–200 million becoming permanently displaced due to the effects of climate change by the year 2050 (Stern 2006). However, the international community is largely ignoring the issue that may potentially become one of the greatest global demographic and humanitarian challenges for the twenty-first century (Myers and Kent 1995).

Climate Displacement in Bangladesh: Future Situation Bangladesh has total 64 districts, of which 24 districts are coastal and mainland from which people are displaced. Bangladesh having 160 million people is highly vulnerable to climate change and displacement due to sea-level rise (Rabbani 2009). Twenty-eight percent of the population of Bangladesh lives in the coastal regions of the country (Rafiqul Islam 2007). Climate change is one of the greatest challenges for the world today. The effects of climate change will aggravate many of the natural hazards faced by Bangladesh in every year, including all of the natural hazards currently leading to climate displacement: flooding, tropical cyclones, storm surges, salinity intrusion, and riverbank and coastal erosion and SLR. The Intergovernmental Penal of Climate Change (IPCC) has provided that climate change and global warming are likely to lead to an increase of rainfall, rise in the frequency of flash floods and large-area floods, earlier melting of snowpacks and melting of glaciers, frequent and intense droughts, intense tropical cyclones, rising sea levels, frequent and intense storm surges, and intense inland rainfall and stronger winds

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(IPCC 2007). Sea-level rise from climate change is anticipated to worsen many of these processes and to subsume up to 13 % of Bangladesh’s coastal land by 2080 (Pender 2008). Heavier and more erratic rainfall in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna system is likely to lead to further riverbank erosion resulting in mass displacement in the mainland areas of Bangladesh. Besides, erratic rainfall is also likely to lead to overtopping and breaching of embankments resulting in widespread flooding in both urban and rural areas. In addition, it is likely to lead to increasing droughts, especially in the drier northern and western regions of Bangladesh which record significantly less rainfall causing the destruction of crop yields and severe disruption to livelihoods (IPCC Third Assessment Report 2001). Erratic rainfall is likely to lead to increasingly frequent and severe landslides in the hill regions of Bangladesh triggering human exodus. As the Himalayan glaciers continue to melt, it is likely that there will be higher river flows in the warmer months of the year, followed by lower river flows and increased saline intrusion after the glaciers have shrunk or disappeared (Displacement Solution Report in Bangladesh 2012). The difficulty inherent in predicting the future impact of climate change on displacement in Bangladesh means that any attempt to quantify the exact number of climate displaces should be treated with some caution. However, as all of the key current drivers of displacement are expected to increase in both frequency and intensity due to climate change, it is highly likely that the number of climate displaced due to existing factors will continue to increase in the future in Bangladesh. In addition, the number of climate displaced is likely to rise even higher due to secondary and as yet unforeseen effects of climate change (Haque 1996).

Existing Potential Policies and Institutional Frameworks in Bangladesh Bangladesh, being one of the most vulnerable countries, has adopted a number of policies and institutional frameworks over the recent years. These measures have been undertaken to combat frequent natural disasters and the adverse effects of climate change.

Policies and Institutional Framework on Environment in National Level The Government of Bangladesh has adopted a number of national policy and framework for the protection of environment and natural disaster. National Environmental Policy 1992 and the Coastal Zone Policy 2005 deal with the adverse effects of disasters and environmental problems (Roy 2012). But there is no clear indication about the problems of population displacement. In terms of guiding strategies on the environment, among the key documents is the National Environmental Management Action Plan 1996, the more recent National Capacity Self-Assessment (NCSA) for Global Environmental Management 2007, and the sector-specific environmental policies such as the National Water Policy 1999 and the Guidelines for Participatory Water Management. All of these documents are understandably focused on meeting Bangladesh’s current environmental challenges and make few specific references to the migration effects of environmental change and degradation (although the NSCA refers to the problems of displacement by riverbank erosion, rural-urban migration, and the potential for out-migration from coastal zones). In contrast, policies on disaster management such as the Draft National Plan for Disaster Management 2008 do make reference to displacement and specific vulnerabilities related to migration, such as problems faced by families who are left behind when men out-migrate following an event (Walsham et al. 2012). The institutional framework of Bangladesh consists of different disaster management committees at different levels comprising government, nongovernment, voluntary, and other relevant stakeholders. The National Disaster Management Council (NDMC), headed by the Prime Minister, is Page 6 of 16

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established to provide guidance towards disaster risk reduction and emergency response management in Bangladesh and is the highest-level forum for the formulation and review of disaster management policies. The Inter-Ministerial Disaster Management Coordination Committee is responsible for implementing disaster management policies and the decisions of the NDMC and is assisted by the National Disaster Management Advisory Committee (Roy 2011). The Ministry of Food and Disaster Management is the focal ministry for disaster management in Bangladesh. Its Disaster Management Bureau (DMB) is mainly responsible for coordinating national disaster management interventions across all agencies. In 2000 the government published “Standing Orders on Disaster” which provides a detailed institutional framework for disaster risk reduction and emergency management and defines the roles and responsibilities of different agencies and committees (BCCSAP 2008).

Existing Policies and Institutional Mechanisms on Climate Change in Bangladesh The Government of Bangladesh has taken many steps to address adaptation to climate change including the establishment of a 45-million-dollar Climate Change Fund, the development of the Bangladesh National Adaptation Programme of Action in 2005 (NAPA), and the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009 (Fatima and Anita 2010). The National Adaptation Programme of Action in 2005 (NAPA) The Government of Bangladesh has adopted the National Adaptation Programme of Action in 2005 (NAPA) prepared by the Ministry of Environment and Forests. The NAPA aimed to accumulate the understanding of the current state of affairs from discussions with appropriate stakeholders from four subnational workshops and one national workshop (MOEF 2005). The NAPA was prepared keeping in mind the sustainable development goals and objectives of Bangladesh where the importance of addressing environmental issues and natural resource management with the participation of stakeholder in bargaining over resource use, allocation, and distribution was recognized (BCAS 2008). The NAPA recognizes that Bangladesh will be one of the most adversely affected countries due to climate change especially because of Bangladesh’s “low economic strength, inadequate infrastructure, low level of social development, lack of institutional capacity and a higher dependency on the natural resource base.” The NAPA suggested adopting the following measures for Bangladesh to adverse effect of climate change including variability and extreme events based on coping mechanisms and practices. The suggested future adaptations are (MOEF 2005): (i) Reduction of climate change hazards through coastal afforestation with community participation (ii) Providing drinking water to coastal communities to combat enhanced salinity due to sea-level rise (iii) Capacity building for integrating climate change in planning, designing of infrastructure, conflict management, and land-water zoning for water management institutions (iv) Climate change and adaptation information dissemination to vulnerable community for emergency preparedness measures and awareness rising on enhanced climatic disasters (v) Construction of flood shelter and information and assistance center to cope with enhanced recurrent floods in major floodplains (vi) Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change into policies and programs in different sectors (focusing on disaster management, water, agriculture, health, and industry)

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(vii) Inclusion of climate change issues in curriculum at secondary and tertiary educational institution (viii) Enhancing resilience of urban infrastructure and industries to impacts of climate change (ix) Development of eco-specific adaptive knowledge (including indigenous knowledge) on adaptation to climate variability to enhance adaptive capacity for future climate change (x) Promotion of research on drought-, flood-, and saline-tolerant varieties of crops to facilitate adaptation in the future (xi) Promoting adaptation to coastal crop agriculture to combat increased salinity (xii) Adaptation to agriculture systems in areas prone to enhanced flash flooding in North East and Central Region (xiii) Adaptation to fisheries in areas prone to enhanced flooding in North East and Central Region through adaptive and diversified fish culture practices (xiv) Promoting adaptation to coastal fisheries through culture of salt-tolerant fish special in coastal areas of Bangladesh (xv) Exploring options for insurance and other emergency preparedness measures to cope with enhanced climatic disasters In 2005 NAPA identified some adverse impacts of climate change, many of which link with climate displacement such as scarcity of freshwater due to less rain and higher evapotranspiration in dry seasons, drainages congestion due to higher water level in the confluence of the rise of sea level, riverbank erosion, frequent flood and widespread drought, and salinity in the surface, ground, and soil in the coastal zone due to migration; however, these links were not expressed in concrete terms. The document also stated that a potential long-term consequence of the “adaptation to agriculture systems in areas prone to enhanced flash flooding” project would be that “people might get a means to continue with farming, instead of migrating to cities after the flood.” Bangladesh NAPA has moved from the urgent needs to wider adaptation requirement to address medium- and long-term climate issues. It gave emphasis on four basic national security issues of Bangladesh, i.e., (a) food security, (b) energy security, (c) water security, and (d) livelihood security (including right to health) and respect for local community on resource management (Haque 2011). The Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan in 2009 (BCCSAP) Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan is the most recent document formulated by the government aiming to address the adaptation and mitigation to build the capacity and reliance of the country to climate change for a period of decade 2009–2018. The plan was prepared in 2009 focusing on a 10-year program to encounter the potential challenges and variation condition (BCCSAP 2009). BCCSAP identifies all the climate-induced hazards, including flood, drought, salinity intrusion, cyclone and storm surge variations in temperature and rainfall, etc., and their associated impacts on different sectors. BCCSAP identifies a set of activities/measures under the following six major themes: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)

Food security, social protection, and health Comprehensive disaster management Infrastructure Research and knowledge management Mitigation and low carbon development Capacity building and institutional strengthening Page 8 of 16

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The BCCSAP recognizes that “Bangladesh is one of the most climate vulnerable countries on earth and will become even more so as a result of climate change” (IPCC Third Assessment Report 2001) and highlights the many risks of the effects of climate change that have led to displacement, including floods, tropical cyclones, storm surges, and droughts. It states that increased riverbank erosion and saline water intrusion in coastal areas “are likely to displace hundreds of thousands of people” and that if sea-level rise is higher than currently expected and coastal polders are not strengthened and/or new ones built, “six to eight million people could be displaced by 2050 and would have to be resettled.” The BCCSAP provides that “it is now evident that population in many parts of the country will be so adversely affected [by climate change] that they will have to move out. . .The process of migration of climate change-affected people, both inside and outside the country, need[s] to be monitored closely. . .and adequate institutional support should be provided for their proper resettlement.” In addition to these two mechanisms, there are some existing traditional climate change-related fund mechanisms in Bangladesh to address the issue of climate change. Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF) based on revenue from the national budget, within a legal mandate by the Climate Change Trust Act passed in Parliament in 2010. At the same time, an alternate Bangladesh Climate Change Resilient Fund (BCCRF), which was formerly known as the Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF), was created to pool funds from the country’s development partners. Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF) The Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund is a “block budgetary allocation” of US$ 100 million each year for 3 years (2009–2012). The Climate Change Act provides that an amount equivalent to 66 % of the total fund is being spent for the implementation of BCCSAP while 34 % will be maintained as a “fixed deposit” for emergencies. The interest accrued on the 34 % fixed deposit will also be spent on project implementation. Funds from the BCCTF can be used to finance public sector and 10 % for nongovernment projects, and it is not mandatory to spend the total grant within a given financial year (Munjurul et al. 2006). Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF) Bangladesh Climate Resilience Fund (BCRF) has also been created by the government for supporting actions to address climate change. Mainly international development partners of Bangladesh are contributing to create this fund. In April 2008, a UK-Bangladesh Climate Change Conference was held in Dhaka. The development partners expressed their view for the urgency of establishing a “financial mechanism” to assist Bangladesh in combating the impacts of climate change. Subsequently, the London Climate Change Conference was organized jointly by Bangladesh and the UK in September 2008. However, finally in May 2010, DPs in Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) agreed the establishment of BCCRF which would be managed by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB). World Bank is providing “fiduciary” support to the BCCRF with an objective of handing it over to the GoB in the next 3 years. By this time the BCCRF has received an approximate amount of 200 million USD from different DPs including UK, EU, Denmark, Sweden, and Australia. An amount of 90 % of the total amount would be spent by different ministries while the rest 10 % would be managed by PKSF to support initiatives taken by NGOs and Bilateral Development Partners (Hoque 2007). Sectoral Adaptation Policies Bangladesh has developed a good number of sectoral adaptation policies since 1990. Considering the fact that Bangladesh is highly susceptible to climate change, only one sectoral policy on the coastal zone has considered climate change (BCAS 2010). The National Water Policy (NWP) was Page 9 of 16

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formulated in 1999, considered firstly short-, medium-, and long-term perspectives for water resources in Bangladesh. The NWP was followed by the National Water Management Plan (NWMP) in 2001. Though there is a huge effect of climate change on water resources in Bangladesh, the NWP does not mention the climate change issue at all. However, the NWMP identifies climate change as one of the future elements affecting supply and demand of water. The National Environmental Management Action Plan (NEMAP), which was published in 1995, does not illuminate climate change. Similar to NEMAP, the National Land Use Policy (NLUP) and the National Forest Policy (NFoP) do not make direct reference to climate change. Climate change was not also addressed in the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) papers until recently. The present PRS recognizes the threat of climate change and its adverse impacts on the development process. It understands the need for integration/mainstreaming. Integration/mainstreaming of adaptation measures into other policy areas and the implementation of the adaptation projects were identified in the NAPA (BCAS 2010). Institutional Mechanisms There are many departments in Bangladesh working for institutional mechanisms for climate change. The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) is mainly responsible for policy formulation on climate change and its adaptation while the Climate Change Unit (CCU) and Department of Environment (DOE) implement projects and programs under NAPA and BCCSAP at the community level. The National Steering Committee on Climate Change (NSCCC), chaired by the Minister of MOEF, is composed by secretaries of all climate-affected ministries, divisions, and representatives of civil society and business community. The National Environment Committee under the ministry is expected to mainstream climate change into national development planning. Climate Change Focal Points (CCFP) in various ministries are expected to provide collaboration. Five technical working groups have been constituted for adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer, financing, and public awareness (Country Summary Report 2010).

Climate Change and Internal Displacement: International Legal Framework Bangladesh ranks as the country most at risk of natural disaster. The displacement occurs in the immediate, sudden onset such as flood, cyclones, and riverbank erosion, etc.; the people move from one place to another place and seek to return to their homes as soon as they can, but sometimes it is quite impossible to return to their homes when the areas are repeatedly inundated. Displacements due to sudden onset are predominantly localized in Bangladesh. The people living in the vulnerable areas are very poor and lack resources; they do not move to a long-distance place and do not have any support from the networks of other countries. They remain in their home country and qualify as an internal displacement.

Guiding Principles in Internal Displacement (1998) The guiding principle on internal displacement is one of the promising initiatives at the international level to promote and provide protection and assistance for internally displaced person (IDPs). These principles fill a major gap in the international protection system for the rights of IDPs and the obligation of governments and insurgent forces in all phases of displacement. They offer protection before internal displacement occurs (i.e., protection against arbitrary displacement), during situations of displacement, and in postconflict return and reintegration. Page 10 of 16

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The United Nations officially first dealt with internally displaced persons in 1972, but did not define who exactly would be considered to be internally displaced. ECOSOC res. 1705 (LIII), 27 Jul. 1972. Para. 1 of resolution 1705 provides that “The Economic and Social Council urges Governments, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, specialized agencies and other organizations associated with the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations concerned, to provide the assistance required for the voluntary repatriation, rehabilitation and resettlement of the refugees returning from abroad, as well as persons displaced within the country.” Francis Deng, nominated as Special Representative of Secretary-General on the human rights issues related to internally displaced persons by Commission on Human Rights in 1992, further refined the existing definitions. In 1998, he submitted a set of “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” to the Human Rights Commission. The needs of the IDPs stem from twofold danger (Geissler 1999): (a) Whenever persons are forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, multiple human rights violations, such as acts of violence, armed attack, torture, disappearances, or rape, are committed on them. (b) There is no clearly defined institutional protection for IDPs and have only little coordinated ad hoc responses. Several initiatives have been taken to address the plight of internally displaced persons more efficiently. In the quest for a more effective response, the international community has concentrated its efforts along two main lines, that of identifying an appropriate normative framework and that of developing effective institutional arrangements. The Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis Deng, has been catalytic to these initiatives and, more generally, to stimulating a better understanding of the numerous complex issues associated with internal displacement. A number of international bodies, guidelines, and standards also exist which specifically protect the rights of displaced persons. These include the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the Pinheiro Principles, the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters, the Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 and 10/4 on Human Rights and Climate Change, the 1951 Geneva Convention, the Code of Conduct for the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes, the Responsibility to Protect of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, and the Humanitarian Charter of the Sphere Project. The United Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (the Pinheiro Principles) (UN Sub-Commission 2005). There are 23 principles recognizing the right to be protected from displacement, right to housing and property restitution, right to nondiscrimination, right to equality between men and women, right to privacy and respect for the home, right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, right to voluntary return and safety, right to freedom of movement, etc. The United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters (IASC 2006) ensures that displaced persons or those otherwise affected by natural disasters do not lose the rights of the population at large, and at the same time, they have particular needs which call for greater protection and assistance measures. It also states that protection is not only limited to securing survival and physical security but also encompasses all aspects of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights as afforded by international standards.

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The Human Rights Council Resolution on 28 March 2008 adopted its first resolution 7/23 (HRCU 2008) and on 25 March 2009 adopted another resolution 10/4 on Human Rights and Climate Change, recognize the relationship between human rights and climate change, and also climate change-induced displacement. It also recognizes that climate change is a global problem and that it requires global solution. The Human Rights Council has taken the decision to hold panel discussions on the relationship between climate change and human rights in order to contribute to the realization of the goals set out in the Bali Action Plan. The 1951 Refugee Convention while not providing protection for persons fleeing environmentally harm and natural disaster could be useful in narrow circumstances whereby victims are entitled to protection under the principle of non-refoulement. This would prevent a government’s return of a person from their country regardless of legal status, where the person’s life or integrity are at risk or where return would subject the person to cruel, unusual, or degrading treatment. The Code of Conduct for the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and NGOs in Disaster Response Programme affirms that the humanitarian imperative comes first and without any discrimination and that disaster-affected victims will be recognized and treated as dignified humans. The doctrine of responsibility to protect was first established in 2001 by a group of prominent human rights leader comprising the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty on the Responsibility to Protect which aims to develop “global political consensus about how and when the international community should respond to emerging crises involving the potential for large-scale loss of life and other widespread crimes against humanity.” The said doctrine reaffirms that the primary responsibility for the protection of its displaced people, but that in situations where this is not possible or not being done, the international community will intervene which includes scenarios of overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes. The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards of the Sphere Project is structured around the three core principles of the right to life with dignity, the right to protection and security, and the right to receive humanitarian assistance. The minimum standards ensure that affected persons have access to at least the minimum requirements of water, sanitation, food, nutrition, shelter, and healthcare in order to satisfy their basic right to life with dignity. Although these guidelines and instruments are not legally binding, they provide a soft law approach to dealing with the issue of displaced persons. It should be mention here that most of these instruments only cover displacement caused by natural disasters and do not take into account displacement caused by environmental degradation such as desertification or movement caused indirectly by climate change. It is predicted that the majority of climate change-induced displacement be caused indirectly, and therefore, there is an urgent need to formulate a framework for the protection of their rights (Fitma et al. 2010).

Conclusion Climate change poses a dreadful challenge for all countries, but its major impact will be on developing countries like Bangladesh. Climate displacement in Bangladesh, which is increasing day by day due to climate change, increases the frequency and intensity of the natural hazards that are already leading to displacement in Bangladesh. It is very essential to take effective and appropriate arrangement to make a durable solution to this growing issue. However, migration policy should be better integrated into the national development agendas as well as development cooperation. Development cooperation can help vulnerable communities living in absolute poverty Page 12 of 16

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to mitigate the impacts of environmental degradation and climate change and to reduce their vulnerability to the effects of such phenomena. Development strategies must in the future also pay more heed to the sustainability of development plans in the light of foreseeable climate impacts at local level. For example, the agricultural development of a region likely to be strongly affected by drought in the future should be reevaluated (Committee on migration, refugee and population 2008). Climate change and climate change-related effects have a horrific impact not only on the environment but also on the human inhabitants. The number of natural disaster is growing together with the number of people who are migrating from one place to another place due to climate change. If the process is continued, between 50 million and 350 million climate migrant will be expected by 2050. The existing policies and institutional mechanism should be reviewed for better disaster responses. The primary responsibility goes to the government to address the immediate and future displacement crisis in Bangladesh. The capacity of the government and other national and international concerned authority has to plan and implement adaptive program to meet the challenge of climate change. Proper training, education, and awareness program has to be undertaken for the capacity building. Additionally proper implementation of the policies and guidelines needs to be ensured for better displacement of the person. Every attempt should be taken by the concern authority to find domestic solution to displacement, in the event that domestic solution is no longer viable. The international environmental law as well as international human rights law can play a vital role as appropriate mechanisms are crafted to support developing countries in their response to the adverse impacts of climate change. The international community has also taken the matter as an urgent and calls for political will to make it happen.

References Association for Climate Refugees (2012) Climate “refugees” in Bangladesh – answering the basics: the where, how, who and how many? Available at http://displacementsolutions.org/?p¼547. Accessed 20 Aug 2012 Climate Change (IPCC Third Assessment Report) (2001) Available at http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/. Accessed 20 Aug 2012 Climate Displacement in Bangladesh (2012) The need for urgent housing, land and property rights solutions, displacement solutions climate displacement in Bangladesh report, May 2012, p 4. Available at http://displacementsolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/DS-Climate-Displacementin-Bangladesh-Report-LOW-RES-FOR-WEB.pdf. Accessed 20 Aug 2012 Clime Asia (2009) Editorial: Clime Asia, a Climate Action Network-South Asia (CANSA) Newsletter. BCAS, Dhaka CSR (2010) Country Summary Report, Bangladesh (2010) Project for increasing stakeholder utilization of GAR 11, Preparation Study for Asia, Compiled by Practical Action for UNISDR, p 12. Available at http://www.undp.org.bd/info/pub/Country%20Summary%20Report.pdf Fatima R, Anita JW (2010) Human rights, climate change, environmental degradation and displacement: a new paradigm. In: Rahman M (ed) Human rights and sovereignty over natural resources. Empowerment Through Law of the Common People (ELCOP) & Palal Prokashoni, Dhaka, p 192 Geissler N (1999) The international protection of internally displaced person’s. Int J Refug Law 11(3):452 Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and Forests (2008) Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Dhaka, p 4 Page 13 of 16

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Haque M (1996) Climate change: issues for the policy makers of Bangladesh. Environment and Development Alliance, Dhaka, pp 13–14 IASC (2006) The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and natural disaster. Available at http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx? page¼content-products-products&sel¼1. Accessed 30 Aug 2012 IOM (2009) International Organization of Migration Compendium of IMO’s activities in migration, climate change and environment. International Organization for Migration, Geneva IPCC (2001) Climate Change (IPCC Third Assessment Report), 2001. Available at http://www. grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/. Accessed 20 Aug 2012 IPCC (2007) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group II: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, fourth assessment report: Climate Change 2007. Genava, Switzerland McAdam J and Saul B (2010) Displacement with dignity: international law and policy responses to climate change migration and security in Bangladesh, University of New South Wales, and Faculty of law research series, Paper 63 Myers N, Kent J (1995) Environmental exodus: an emergent crisis in the global arena. Climate Institute, Washington, DC Pender J (2008) Community-led adaptation in Bangladesh. Forced Migration Review 31, p 54, citing research by the UK Institute of Development Studies. Available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/ climatechange/orchid Rabbani MG (2009) Climate forced migration: a massive threat to coastal people in Bangladesh, clime Asia: Climate Action Network-South Asia Newsletter. BCAS, Dhaka Roy D (2011) Chandra vulnerability and population displacements due to climate-induced disasters in coastal Bangladesh. In: Leighton M, Shen X, Warner K (eds) Climate change and migration: rethinking policies for adaptation and disaster risk reduction, Studies of the University: Research, Counsel, Education (SOURCE), no. 15/2011, publication series of UNU-EHS, p 30. Available at http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/8468. Accessed 30 Aug 2012 Siddiqui T (2011) Climate change induced displacement: migration as an adaptation strategy, The Daily Star. Available http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid¼210113. Accessed 20 Aug 2012 Stern N (2006) The economics of climate change – the Stern review. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 77 The Code of Conduct for the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and NGOs (2012). Available at http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/code-of-conduct/. Accessed 30 Aug 2012 The Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 on Human Rights and Climate Change (2012). Available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_7_23.pdf. Accessed 30 Aug 2012 Tina A (2008) Sweden, alliance of liberals and democrats for Europe, 23 Dec 2008 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (2008) Principles on housing and property restitution for refugees and displaced persons, 28 June 2005, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17 UNA (2007) United Nations Agency, highlight climate change’s impact on human security, health, UN News service, 5 June 2007 UNDP (2007) Climate change and the MDGs, United Nations Development programme. http:// www.undp.org/gef/adaptation/dev/o2a.htm. Accessed 3 Apr 2007

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UNFCC (2007) Climate change: impacts vulnerabilities and adaptation in developing countries, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publication/impacts.pdf. Accessed 15 May 2010 Walsham M (2010) Assessing the evidence: environment, climate change and migration in Bangladesh, International Organization for Migration. Available at http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/environment_climate_change_bangladesh.pdf. p 3

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Index Terms: Bangladesh 1 Climate change 1 Displacement 1 Environmental migrants 4 Policy 6, 9–10 Vulnerability 3, 5

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Designing an Adaptation Strategy in a Complex Socioecosystem: Case of Territorial Climate and Energy Plans in France Stéphane La Branche* Institute of Political Studies at Grenoble, Pierre-Mendes-France University, Grenoble, Cedex 9, France

Abstract Adaptation has become an obligatory part of larger Territorial Climate and Energy Plans, mandatory by law for all communities over 50,000 in France. This chapter first described these TCEPs and then analyzes the elaboration process of two different approaches for an adaptation strategy. The first one is incremental, sector specific in an urban setting, and tightly associated to urban planning in the city of Dijon. The other is holistic, multisectorial, and multi-issue, in a semi-urbanized area that includes agriculture, very high-tech production, valleys, and high mountain areas. We then offer an evaluation of both approaches, with respective strengths, weaknesses, and potentials.

Keywords Adaptation policies; Strategy; Design; Formulation construction Limits of survival are set by climate, those long drifts of change which a generation may fail to notice. And it is the extremes of climate which set the pattern. Lonely finite humans may observe climatic provinces, fluctuations of annual weather and occasionally may observe such things as ‘this is a colder year than I’ve ever known’. Such things are sensible. But humans are seldom alerted to the shifting average through a great span of years. And it is precisely in this alerting that humans learn how to survive. . .They must learn climate. (Frank Herbert 1976: 350)

For the first time in human history, even since the first great human revolution, the Neolithic, and then the sedentarization of the human species, not only are we facing a truly global crisis due to climate change (CC) and its impacts, but more importantly, for the first time, we are aware of this crisis and are trying consciously to create planned solutions and apply them. This can be termed climate energy governance, or even meta-governance. But we have never attempted such an effort and thus have no real past experience to draw from. In the past few years, efforts at decreasing greenhouse gases – mitigation – have increased and improved in terms of efficiency and diversity. While much work remains to be done on mitigation measures, adaptation strategies to climate change are far from being as well understood and developed. Different countries have different methods, but to our knowledge, France remains unique in that adaptation is part of a legally binding territorial-level climate and energy package called Territorial Climate and Energy Territorial Plans (TCEPs). Indeed, in 2012, the French central government imposed TCEPs on all communities or “community of communities” with over 50,000 people, attempting to implement national climate and

The material from case studies comes from projects undertaken with Patricia Dubois and the Equineo team (www. equineo.com). I deeply thank her for her as-always pertinent comments. *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 12

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energy governance measures at the territorial level, including both mitigation and adaptation measures. This followed several years of voluntary experimentations on the part of a few cities (Lyon, Grenoble, and Paris were leaders among them) starting in 2006 with Grenoble launching the country’s first territorial climate plan (a medium-size city of about 300,000 pop). Then, a nationalwide multi-actor participatory procedure was conducted (the Grenelle de l’environnement), whose purpose was to design a national strategy related to energy, the environment, water, climate, and other related issues(?). The general conclusions of this multi-stakeholder process then led to a law project, linked to the Environmental Code. Several laws were indeed passed, but we focus on the now legally mandatory TCEP. Three fundamental differences can be noted between the previous Plans and the new, binding, ones. First, previous ones were strictly voluntary. Efforts, experimentations, and measures were entirely left to the will of collectivities, with some state financial and expertise support. Second, these plans focused very strongly on the climate question and worked on the energy issue as a corollary of climate change. The new Plans put energy on the same level. And indeed, 2013 has seen a real turn with a strong focus on the energy dimension. Finally, the previously great ignored child of climate governance, adaptation, has become the third pillar of the new TCEPs. One of the issues in this process is that the national-level efforts at designing a new national climate and energy governance remain on the level of a general strategy. Some actual exemplary measures and methods are proposed by the national administration, but these apply better to mitigation measures than to adaptation ones. While mitigation policies are beginning to be well understood and tried, the “real,” operational, adaptation policies still need to be designed and implemented, and even sometimes invented, at the territorial level. More than mitigation, adaptation is indeed a territorial-level, local, issue. As such, it is difficult to offer exemplary measures that would work on all territories. This explains in part why the national adaptation strategy guidelines and measures are so little consulted by local policy makers. They do not feel that these recommendations apply well to their territory and their local situation (both natural and socioeconomic and political). The first part of this paper will quickly present some of the common points and differences between mitigation and adaptation policies in general. Then, we will analyze two case studies, focusing on adaptation: one city (Dijon) and a semi-urbanized rural and mountainous territory, the Gresivaudan Valley. Ambition and breadth vary but it is on the construction process of the adaptation strategy that we will focus on. Lessons for the operational dimensions of designing adaptation policy will then be drawn out. One of the difficulties is that neither mitigation nor adaptation is sector specific: they are multiand cross-sectorial. In addition, in France, TCEPs are supposed to give direction and a framework for other territorial planning documents: urban planning, mobility, housing, and other planning documents have to conform to TCEPs. This has direct consequences on agenda setting, institutional arrangement, and policy design, since traditionally separated sectors must now be harmonized toward general climate and energy goals. But adaptation presents additional challenges which I will expand on later.

Differences Between Mitigation and Adaptation for Policy Design Mitigation aims at reducing GHG emitted on a territory and TCEPs give a clear numbered mitigation objective, the EU’s 20 % reduction in GHG emissions, 20 % reduction in overall energy consumption, and 20 % renewable energy in the territorial energy structure, by 2020. Territorial policy design Page 2 of 12

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in the case of mitigation does not require anything really revolutionary. First, a carbon evaluation is undertaken – akin to the work and analyses preceding any type of policy. While the ADEME (a state energy and environmental agency) offers a method (which needs to be paid for), territorial collectivities may use any method deemed appropriate. The carbon analysis offers numbered data on emissions by sector, and thereby, a baseline from which to reach the 20/20/20 objective. In an urban setting, we find the same three main sources in France, but in different proportion, depending on the territory: transports, housing, and industry. In rural areas, of course, the agricultural sector takes more importance. There is no need to expand on mitigation measures here aside from a few precisions. In France (and this is akin to the rest of the world), mitigation measures are rather well known and well developed in the transport and housing sector (and by extension but to a lesser extent, urban management and land use) and do not represent much of an issue in terms of policy design. While the translation phase from policy formulation to implementation (e.g., the reduction of the share of car mobility and urban management – multifunctional polycentric, semi-dense urban development seems to be the general direction) still represents challenges (types of incitement, control, constraints, social acceptability, costs, training, etc.), the design phase of mitigation policies is “classical.” Finally, while mitigation measures can be implemented immediately and be evaluated in the very short term (diminution of CO2 emissions due to personal vehicles, number of buildings respecting energy consumption targets, etc.), adaptation requires a different approach. But before touching on this at the territorial level, it is important to remind why and how adaptation has been emerging in the last few years as an inescapable issue in climate governance.

Adaptation and Climate Change as Meta-risk Climate change is now seen by the international scientific and institutional community as both the number one accelerator and amplifier of natural risks and the single most important obstacle to development efforts in the third world. In wealthy countries, it raises issues about the deep economic structure of our society and discussions about post-carbon or non-carbon-based production and consumption – or the green economy – emerging. In fact, the impacts of climate change and its origins linked to the very fundamental energy structure of our society mean that CC is slowly inserting themselves into every aspect of our societies. This also raises issues regarding the impacts of mitigation and adaptation efforts on other policies and on policy design itself. The underlying hypothesis that climate governance is emerging as a new type of total governance through four different means (La Branche 2013): (i) It is inserting itself in the issue-specific or sector-specific governance (water, energy, security, housing, transports, research, development, public policies, health, economic development), as well as individual values and legal international, national, and local norms. (ii) It tends to redefine these types of governance, from above, as an overarching framework. (iii) It is also diffusing through sectors in a transversal (and multidisciplinary) manner. (iv) It is emerging from below, from local actors, territorial communities, etc. As such, climate and energy governance is emerging as a meta-governance that tends to restructure and redefine other forms and types of governance. In other words, it is increasingly offering a general framework and even a regime of truth in Foucault’s sense (1980), in which policy design and implementation are taking place. Indeed, the challenge is total and global in the sense that

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it involves all human activities. In this sense, climate change is not only a phenomenon; it is an epiphenomenon (Olivier 2005), affecting the way we think and perceive the world as a globality. Indeed, since 2006, climate and energy issues have been explicitly and increasingly integrated in different international programs and norms, such as the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, water management and risks, insurance policies, construction norms, agriculture, local urbanism, etc. These are all slowly being redefined, reworked, reconceptualized, re-practiced, and even retaught in our teaching institutions with climate and energy objectives in mind. All these issues are both affected by the “objective” reality of CC and by the “subjective” efforts at dealing with it and managing it – i.e., governance. Our different field researches explore the impacts of efforts at climate governance on our institutions’ structures, identities, strategies, policy formulation, and daily operations. This change does not occur without obstacles linked to a carbon-based path dependency (Pierson 2000) or to Young’s arguments (2002a) regarding how an institution’s structure and identity may prevent it from reaching its own environmental objectives. Developing efficient and cogent adaptation strategies is thus framed by this emerging understanding of CC as a “meta-risk” (notion derived from Braithwaite and Williams 2001). My argument, derived from a social science framework of CC, puts forward that CC does not only amplify and modify existing risk, it also tends to modify our classical ways to manage and understand it. Not only does CC change the physical aspects of a risk, it also tends to redefine what is deemed to be a significant risk or not, “a risk that is worth trying to manage or not” because it may or may not increase vulnerability or decrease resilience. The objective of a climate adaptation strategy is not to adapt once the impact has taken place: it is to predict what the potential natural impacts might be in order then, to prepare for them before they happen, so as to reduce vulnerability and increase climate change resilience. But this depends greatly on social, organizational, cultural, and economic factors. Indeed, most recent studies on adaptation put forward the idea that the most important factors playing a role in resilience (the capacity of a society to adapt to change) are not natural but rather, those that play a role in a society’s capacity at preparing for climate-induced changes.1 In the case of adaptation, policy building needs to take a new form because of adaptation’s very nature. First, because climate as risk is redefining the perception of risk as such, from punctual and extreme events to recurrent, permanent pressure. Secondly, this is why the approach to adaptation policy design must change: it requires self-adjusting policies to constant yet uncertain change uncovered by science, territorialized observations. This needs to be combined with analyses at different and changing probability and uncertainty levels and thus varying (and uncertain) levels of success. These all meet at the intersection between vulnerability and more importantly, capacities. But how is this perceived and practiced at the local level by local administrations?

Adaptation in French TCEPs Adaptation became, in 2012, an obligatory sector of the new French TCEPs, but its application and the diffusion of this issue through different administrative levels differs from mitigation in several ways. First, adaptation has yet to enter most actors’ awareness, aside from specialists. Its necessity is At last, the international scientific community has recognized the importance of social issues: the fifth IPCC Assessment Report will specifically focus on the social dimensions of climate change for both mitigation and adaptation. Hence, the idea now largely recognized that climate change is only secondarily a hard science issue: it is far more a social science one.

1

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not perceived in large part because CC’s impacts are not being felt nor experienced by actors living in developed countries. Second, adaptation is much less well scientifically understood. Indeed, projection and computer simulations of present and future impacts rarely go below a 100 km2 area. Thus, the level of scientific and political uncertainty is much greater than with mitigation policies and makes both decision making and policy design more difficult. Third, adaptation is a far more complex issue than mitigation: understanding the natural impacts is only the first part of the process. Indeed, these impacts are not limited to the “objective,” natural, biological, and morphological levels – whose frontiers do not often coincide with political-territorial boundaries but also require an understanding of the natural impacts’ effects on human activities at the territorial level. Thus, natural sciences link to specific interests, administrative services, and economic activities come into contact with human activity and the social sciences. A third phase is thus required: evaluating a society’s capacity at organizing itself to impacts, i.e., its resilience. Only then can we have a relatively good idea of a territory’s vulnerability in the full sense of the word and only then can potentially cogent adaptation strategies be developed. For political scientists, policy design extends to both the mechanisms through which policy goals are given effect, and to the goals themselves, since goal articulation involves considerations of feasibility (what is practical or possible to achieve in given circumstances given the means at hand). Adaptation thus represents a real challenge, far greater than mitigation in part because designing adaptation policies requires steps that include a high level of uncertainty and unknowns and thus lower potential of feasibility. How is one to about then? The following steps proposed here are “ideal” and rarely to be found in actual policy settings and framing, but they seem to be the goal to be attained: (i) Identify what the probable increase in temperature might be at a chosen time frame (2030, 2050). (ii) Identify the probability level of natural impacts (rainfall, heat, cold, avalanche, landslides, as well as impacts on living beings – plants and animals – such as reproduction cycles, migration, feeding areas, and growth rate). (iii) Identify the impacts of these changes on human activities and population. (iv) This is where resilience, both collective and individual, plays a key role: a younger population (aside from newborns) suffers less from a heat wave than an aging one; a ski-dependent local economy will be more vulnerable to a decline in snowfall, a semiarid-based agriculture will have to face even more arid conditions, etc. Generally, poorer, less educated populations are more vulnerable to climate change than wealthier, more educated ones. Designing an adaptation strategy thus requires not only a relatively high level of natural scientific input but also an association with social sciences and economic territorialized analyses of what these impacts may mean in the future. But it also requires a different view of what the foundation for policy design and decision are: a backward management approach is necessary with, for example, a prediction for what these impacts might be in 2050 and then backtracking to what should be done in the short term in order to reduce the social and economic effects of future climate change. Adaptation is not a reaction; it is preparation to a specific, given, constraint based on as yet uncertain impacts in the future. The problem is that this constraint remains often uncertain. In order to reduce the high level of uncertainty of these impacts, a significant input of scientific expertise is often asked in the development of climate adaptation policy. But this expertise meets policy and institutional logics that may or may not favor its development (Young 2002a, b). As an example, hydroelectric dams will be directly affected by variations in water quantity (either not enough or too much) as well as regularity. Indeed, in France, dams are in many regions used as Page 5 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

equalizers of peaks in electricity demand, but they may start to fail filling this role if water is insufficient. As for water temperature, which has increased by a couple of degrees on average in most European countries in the last decade, it cannot go beyond 28 to cool nuclear power plants. Over this limit, a plant has to be shut down. In 2011, an energy crisis in France was very closely averted, when after over 2 months of high temperature and little rainfall, it finally started raining, avoiding the shutdown of a nuclear power plant. This raises the following very hard question: how is one to design a policy or a set of policies that can take these types of effects into account? Is a new approach to policy design necessary? The next section develops this section through two case studies: Dijon and the Gresivaudan. We will see that while the Gresivaudan offers a real example of our argument that adaptation necessitates a different model of designing policy, the Dijon case is more classical. This points to the importance of political decision framed by institutional constraints and experience. We then draw conclusions on the weaknesses and strengths of each.

Adaptation in the City of Dijon: Integration in Urban Planning Dijon is a large city, with an extensive, mineralized historical center. Already vulnerable to urban heat island effects, the population suffered during the 2003 heat waves. Recent local studies show an important disparity in terms of heat vulnerability between the center (with little vegetation and parks) and the periphery. The city of Dijon launched its Climate Plan 2 years before the 2012 deadline. Dijon had been, several years before, well known for its environmental approaches in an urban setting but had lost this image in the last few years, surpassed by a few cities ambitious on climate and energy objectives. Dijon wanted to “catch up” and go beyond by implementing an ambitious climate plan, to coincide with a new tram network. Indeed, there is a strong multiparty political program called “Dijon ville écologiste” (Dijon, an ecological city) that aims at giving an ecological direction to all urban policies. At the institutional level, the city’s urbanism service is quite active and important in the political and budgetary landscape of the city’s administration. It is also highly sensitive to ecological questions and, more specifically, to climate change issues. The work aimed at developing an adaptation strategy was headed by the urban ecology service, in coordination with the urbanism department. This department is closely linked to the city’s urban developer agency which developed an ecodistrict standard (with several criteria taken into account such as water, energy, vegetation, energy standards, etc.). Urban projects had to follow these standards in order to be accepted by the city urban planning council. But the adaptation issue was largely unknown. More at issue, while there were individuals who knew about CC’s potential impacts and adaptation, measures to address these impacts were not integrated in the services as practices or norms. To be noted: while the urbanism department was very present in the adaptation strategy development process, the elected official in charge of urbanism was not in charge of the TCEP. They did not share the same vision of urbanism nor of climate adaptation nor of its urban aspects. Indeed, economic arguments were more important to the first: What would be the impacts of costs of integrating adaptation measures in urban projects? What would be the benefits and for whom and when? Nevertheless, they agreed on the importance of developing an ecological urbanism. Indeed, the city implemented an ambitious ecodistrict development policy, strong on energy efficiency – and mitigation – but weaker on other climate issues. Our task was to develop an adaptation framework and criteria for these new projects. Indeed, while planning and integration of mitigation measures in urban projects was well under way, adaptation appeared far more difficult, less well-known issue, filled with uncertainties in terms of likelihood of occurrence and impacts as Page 6 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

well as time frame. In addition, an earlier multisectorial strategy had been proposed but had failed for several reasons, among which, it was judged to be too general, nonoperational, and not tied enough to its territorial setting and issues. While territorial data did exist on urban climate change vulnerability, those had not been translated into an operational approach. Thus, the decision was, first, to address urban adaptation issues. But the question was: Which ones? The weakness of the previous approach, coupled with the political project (Dijon, an ecological city), and the desire to develop an operational adaptation strategy led to the adoption of a new approach: less ambitious, but more cautious and more gradual, and more sectorial, over a 3-year period, with two or three specific adaptation issues per year to be co-defined with elected officials and appropriate administrative services. In order to select the issues to be worked on, we first organized a series of multi-stakeholders’ meetings (with semi-directive interviews, either individually or in small groups) in order to: 1. Understand administrative actors’ level of knowledge of the adaptation issue in general. 2. Understand the level of knowledge of the adaptation issue on Dijon’s territory specifically. This also allowed us to: 3. Identify key actors and resources that could produce or offer already produced knowledge and data. To be noted: the information produced was not always recognized by those who produced it as useful for adaptation, yet it was. Key actors were University of Bourgogne, Alterre Bourgogne – an ecological association – Météo France, the Regional authorities, and two national government regionalized bodies. 4. Identify potential issues to be developed in the first phase of the adaptation strategy. 5. Develop operational adaptation indicators and measures in urban projects. But again, this raises the question: Which ones specifically? We then met again with these different actors in order to select the issues to be dealt with in priority. Several selection criteria were applied: political (the public image an issue would get, including the Dijon’s ecological vision); a previous vulnerability study confirmed the risk of urban floods due to water overflow and very insufficient infrastructure; and the emergence of a new issue in the different discussions, and proposed by the project team – urban heat effects and measures to counteract it, including district and building conception approaches and vegetalization. This concurred with a previous study on CC’s potential impacts on average rainfall and average urban temperature (associated with an aging population, also important to the actors involved). But even once identified, these issues can only remain nonoperational if a temperature increase scenario is not chosen. Indeed, an increase of +2 would have only small effects, but climate studies’ impacts on vegetation and rainfall and temperature show that an increase of +3 would, probably, have a significant impact. This raised a real debate among some of the actors: Why a +3 scenario rather than a +2 ? National mitigation targets were defined (in 2010) according to a +2 scenario. And national climate change mitigation information campaigns were entirely based on a +2 scenario. The discussion mainly revolved around scientific arguments being thrown against institutional ones. Finally, the +3 scenario was politically chosen, the elected official in charge of the TCEPs using his decision power to resolve the issue, as he felt that the scientific arguments but also the precautionary (if one is ready for a +3 , then one is also ready for a +2 , but the opposite does not hold) one were valid. The scenario chosen led to a few specific adaptation issues emerging, deemed to be both more important in terms of impacts and more likely to occur. Two of these could be associated closely under the same general theme – and associated to the importance of the urban setting: the fight Page 7 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

against urban heat effects. Indeed, IPCC +3 projections show that before 2050, 2 years out of 3 would have the same mean temperature as the European 2003 heat waves (which killed 50,000 people), with the additional issue of an even older population by 2050. Two different approaches were co-defined in part because our benchmark of international studies showed that two main sources of the urban heat effect were bad spatial planning and lack of vegetation. In addition to this, another factor was interesting to the responsible elected officials: it would improve citizens’ urban daily quality of life. In other words, improving spatial planning and increasing vegetation cover in an urban setting were no regret measures and were relatively certain to produce the effects expected. A second benchmark of good urban adaptation and vegetalization practices in cities was undertaken. Results and evaluation of these measures for the Dijon contact were produced and diffused in different services and applied to a new urban construction project. A method by which these issues could be integrated in urban planning documents, in services’ practices, and in the first phases of urban projects was also developed. Special attention was paid to the different phases of urban projects: measures to be integrated in the conception phase, those that could be integrated during construction, and finally, those that could be added to an already built project. For example, building orientation (north-south) and height need to be included in the conception phase (Is the aim to increase or to decrease exposure to the sun? Where can one integrate a pond for runoff water, which can also be used to increase cooling in the summer?), while planting specific species of trees (high and narrow or short but wide, and where? Is vegetalization on walls or rooftops possible?) can be done in the construction phase. Another issue emerged, strongly in this context: national historical building protection legislation narrows very much the scope of measures possible in the historical center and may even, in some cases, forbid vegetalization. This issue was still not entirely resolved at time of writing. While interesting, the final result falls outside the scope of this paper. More to the point, there are the lessons to be learned from the Dijon case for reflections on policy designs, and we develop those in the last section. It is now interesting to turn, as a counterpoint to the strategy developed in Dion, to the Gresivaudan case.

The Gresivaudan Case The Gresivaudan is a semi-urban, complex geographic territory, with three main economic activities partly linked to its geographical diversity: the territory is made of a wide valley encased in high mountains. The third economic activity, in terms of economic revenue generated, is high mountain winter tourism – skiing and thus, highly dependent on snow fall. Low-altitude ski stations are already negatively affected by CC, with reactive “adaptive” actions such as artificial snow and attempts at diversifying activities toward summer tourism only being slowly put into place. The second economic activity lies in the valley, with the production of high-yield, very high-quality, low inputs, high revenue generating corn production for oil dedicated to high-tech processes. The first activity is nanomicrotechnologies, with the world’s third most important research site, also in the valley. CC impacts on these different sectors (as well as others, such as forest exploitation and pastoralism) and urban areas were thus highly complex and potentially key to wealth generation, employment, choice of housing, quality of life, and modes of living. It thus raised very sensitive issues for the majority of the population as well as for elected officials and heads of services. The adaptation strategy proposed was both experimental and ambitious: an integrated, holistic, multi-actors multiissue adaptation comprehensive strategy. The method with which this strategy was designed was Page 8 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

thus deeply different from the one used in Dijon. So were the results. Our choice of approach in assisting the territorial administration in designing its adaptation strategy was due to several factors, both natural and human. The natural set of factors was the geomorphological diversity, with a valley between two mountain chains with different rock formation, one retaining water more than the other, with different vegetal species associated. These three geographical zones were linked to each other by a fourth, the mountain slopes flanking the valley on both sides, with different levels of access and economic activity, and peopled with sparse small villages, on the way to ski stations. The adaptation strategy development team and the administration were very keen on understanding the impacts of CC on these different natural (and human) zones, associated to different economic activities (especially winter sports on one mountain chain), corn production, and nanomicrotechnologies. Note as well that the valley is far more urbanized than the other zones and at risk of flood, due to a river running through it. Note that in this phase of the process, we use notions and terms that are very close to social geography. The second set of factors was institutional. The Gresivaudan administration had decided to be ambitious and experimental in their adaptation approach but also insisted on being operational. They also possess a rather strong territorial identity that they wish to put forward. Thus, they felt that operational recommendations on our part had to be based on a clear understanding of their territory’s specific issues and form. Territorial-based data needs to be accumulated, to which the team could only concur since adaptation is first and foremost a local issue that needs to be developed from that level. But the Gresivaudan administration was also more ambitious on another level: the development of a holistic adaptation strategy was to be the first step in the development of a permanent program that had to include the development of territorial multi-issue multi-stakeholder knowledge for CC adaptation, made possible by the permanent integration of scientists and studies in the adaptation process. Thus, knowledge development was seen as an essential part of a successful adaptation strategy. This is important: usually, public policy is seen as a closed process, where the implementation of a policy is seen as the last phase. Sometimes, an evaluation is undertaken but this is more the exception than the rule. Not in the Gresivaudan’s case: evaluation and reformulation of issues, their importance, and impact evaluation are seen to be as a continuous process, to be adjusted according to new knowledge, real and predicted temperature increases. Thus, the administration saw its adaptation strategy not only as an end (be adapted to future climate change impacts) but also as a means, an experimental laboratory by which understanding of all phases of adaptation would be improved. This was greatly helped by the fact that the elected official in charge of the emerging TCEP was a climatologist working for a national agency (Météo France). As a scientist, he was thus very well informed and up to date on climate issues (as well as aware of the uncertainties linked to adaptation). And, as an elected official, he was also “politically savvy” and sensitive to both internal political dynamics and to the population. He was also very insistent that the recommendations be understandable, operational, and potentially (he was also aware that one could not ask hard results from an adaptation strategy) effective for his territory. But faced with such a complexity, how were we to proceed? This is where a third set of factors needs to be taken into account: the role of science. Indeed, one may wish to develop scientific knowledge but there has to be the means to do this. The Gresivaudan territory is located near Grenoble, a midsize university city, with a highly active scientific, and very diverse in terms of disciplines, community working on climate change. This represented a real opportunity: use this scientific community to gather information and data on the potential impacts of a +3 scenario on the territory. Rather than overlooking the uncertainty issue, and pretend to offer hard answers, we opted for the following approach: identify with these scientists Page 9 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

through collective work what the impacts of a +3 scenario would be on that territory according to a 4-level scale: high, mid, low, and unknown probability. This was then coupled with a 4-scale potential severity of CC impacts on, first, the “natural” world. Our diagnostic of the territorial vulnerability, through multipartenarial working sessions, included the following sectors, with a map that offered a visualization of the areas and their vulnerability: – – – – – –

Water resources: impacts on water quality and availability Natural risk: floods, storm flashfloods, etc. Biodiversity Agricultural and forest activities Mountain tourism: especially snow levels for ski stations and CC’s economic impacts Energy and economic activity energy production for dams and impacts on tertiary activities and industrial zones (including water management and runoff) – Urban planning and buildings, including impact on behaviors and uses (i.e., air-conditioning in the summer and its impacts on energy demands)

Local nonscientific and nonadministrative actors were also involved, such as forest managers, owners and exploiters, industrialists, farmers, etc. The second phase of working sessions aimed at building an integrated adaptation strategy, composed of different policy sectors. It included both scientific actors and institutional actors (forestry, agriculture, industries, urbanism, mobility, and others) working together on the probable effects these impacts could have on activities. The goal was to move from natural vulnerability to socioeconomic vulnerability of natural impacts, with two other, policy-oriented, goals in mind. First, we were able to define levels of priorities to the different issues in the short, middle, and long term. Then, discussions and policy-setting, policy-building, and actions were co-constructed between the adaptation team and the different heads of the territorial administration. This was also used to improve knowledge of administrative actors, so that they would start integrating the adaptation issue in their specific areas of competence and actions.

Conclusion: Lessons from Both Case Studies Different lessons can be learned from these two case studies, in terms of internal and external factors in how adaptation policies were constructed. Note that while population density or urbanization levels played a role on specific actions and policies that are to be built, this did not play a role in how the strategies were built, and only a minor role on the issues chosen: organizational framework and local scientific resources were clearly more important. In both cases, probable and high-impact territorial natural vulnerabilities were first identified, and then, “social” vulnerabilities were declined. In both cases, a collective (institutional) decision was made regarding which issue was to receive priority, based on the previous more scientific and technical assessments. In Dijon’s urban setting, the urban heat island phenomenon and vegetalization were chosen, whereas in the Gresivaudan, an identification of all possible impacts was made, and then priorities defined. The urban heat effect was not a priority, in large part due to the fact that it is a semi-urban setting. But more significant differences, in terms of policy design, can be identified. In Dijon, the adaptation strategy is being built piece by piece, two issues per year over several years, whereas in the Gresivaudan, the aim was to build in about 1 year an integrated, multisectorial Page 10 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

adaptation strategy from the very first phase of the TCEP’s construction. The aim to create a permanent scientific knowledge development was also decided from the onset. The differences between the two cases were due to several reasons. In Dijon, a previous “failure” in building the adaptation strategy had led to an attitude of precaution on the part of the administration, who wanted to avoid another failure, so close to the legislative 2012 December 31st deadline. But also, and perhaps more importantly, this failure ran against the city’s political vision “Dijon, an ecological city.” Dijon’s step-by-step strategy offers clear advantages: each step is more likely to succeed in terms of integration by services and operational measures, since it requires less change at once and less human power. It also is less disrupting of everyday work habits, skills, and networks. It is also much easier to correct if need be. Another factor was internal, in the administration itself, which offers a few reflections on Young’s work regarding internal institutional obstacles (2002a, b). The different visions between Dijon’s elected official in charge of the climate plan and the official in charge of urbanism meant that issues interesting to both had to be defined. The debates did not prevent the development of a strategy, on which both essentially agreed. In the Gresivaudan, the elected official was a climatologist who not only understood the scientific aspects of climate change but also the potential risks and social and economic and political impacts. He had an integrated and holistic conception and expected, explicitly and from the start, a corresponding adaptation strategy, which had to be operational, on which both cases agreed. Another difference was the territorial scientific resource. As pointed out earlier, the Gresivaudan Valley is located near a Grenoble where, by a series of historical coincidence and scientific laboratories’ strategies, research on climate change and its impacts has been developed for several years and in many disciplines, and this is important, including in the social sciences: technologies, urbanism, sociology, political science, natural and social geography, economics, etc. This is coupled with a high level of interest, knowledge, and policy development in the field of energy and climate change on the part of the territorial administration. Hence, it was relatively easy for the team to gather different resources to help identify the natural and social impacts, their probability of occurrence as well of probable level of severity. The social and institutional resilience aspects were explored through a social science and economics perspective. Both methods for building an adaptation strategy have pros and cons. The Dijon strategy requires less effort during the initial phases and may well be easier to internalize and apply by services, as well as conditions in urban projects imposed on constructors or architects. Initial successes in specific sectors then help diffuse the approach to other services, even though this may take more time. In the second phase, the project is to take the previous year’s work and integrate the recommendations in daily work routines and institutional texts, in the urban development services, by integrating new adaptation (urban heat effects and vegetalization, as well as the use of water) norms and methods in urban projects. The risk is that the strategy could remain sectorial and not be integrated transversally in the different structures and services. It could eventually lose in efficiency and, or even, face contradictions and tensions between services that could slow down or even block adaptation strategy’s diffusion to other departments. As for the Gresivaudan, it is too early yet to say whether its integrated holistic strategy will not be too complex and heavy to handle for a rather small administration. But if the transversal work is done, it fares a better chance at being efficient and cost effective in more areas at the same time. Its drawback is its potential (un)replicability to other territories. Indeed, not all elected officials (who give the political leadership and general direction and level of ambition of the TCEP) in charge are climatologists and thus understand as well the climate change issue and its link to impacts and social vulnerability. Nor do most territories have such a wealth of scientific expertise on adaptation at its Page 11 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

disposal. Taken together, the opportunities for scientific input to the territorial agenda setting, policy objectives, and design were quite specific to the Gresivaudan. Perhaps, too specific for replicability? Our adaptation strategy development approach was indeed developed so as to be replicable: evaluation of potential impacts on the natural milieu, then on the social one, and finally, evaluation of the territorial vulnerability and resilience. Efforts at improving resilience are an integral part of the Gresivaudan’s strategy at developing scientific knowledge on a permanent basis. A last point needs to be addressed here. Organizational framework and local scientific resources were identified as being clearly significant factors in the elaboration of the adaptation strategies. But one can wonder whether the natural factors did not also play a role, even if indirect. Dijon is a “typical” city with typical functions and services associated to urbanization. It is located in a homogeneous geomorphological (flat, with a few rivers) and climate milieu. But the Gresivaudan territory is made up of two different mountain chains and a valley, with different significant economic activities associated to each, to which we can add high-tech research and development, with different milieus, interconnected by population movements and activities, with related social and economic issues. It may be that these natural characteristics are more conducive to a multisectorial and holistic approach, i.e., a more complex socioeconomic system requires a more complex and holistic adaptation strategy. Further research, comparative as well, is necessary on this point. This also raises a more anthropological and ecopolitical theory question: How much does natural territory affects policy, its design, and its implementation?

References Braithwaite J, Williams R (2001) Meta risk management and tax system integrity. Centre for Tax System Integrity/Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Sydney Foucault M (1980) Power/knowledge. Harvester, Brighton Herbert F (1976) Children of Dune. Orion, p 350 La Branche S (2013) Paradoxes and harmony in the energy-climate governance nexus. In: Dyer H, Trombetta J (eds) The international handbook of energy. Edward Elgar, Northampton Olivier L (2005) Le savoir vain. Relativisme et désespérance politique. Liber, Montreal Pierson P (2000) Increasing returns, path dependency, and the study of politics. Am Polit Sci Rev 94:251–267 Young OR (2002a) The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and Scale, Cambridge and Massachusetts: MIT Press Young OR (2002b) ‘Why Is There No Unified Theory of Environmental Governance?’, PDF document: dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00000943/00/youngo020402.pdf. p.23–24

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_6-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Security Implication of Climate Change Between Farmers and Cattle Rearers in Northern Nigeria: A Case Study of Three Communities in Kura Local Government of Kano State Salisu Lawal Halliru* Geography Department, Federal College of Education Kano, Kano, Nigeria

Abstract This study focused on the implication of climate change between cattle rearers and farmers in the desert-prone line in northern Nigeria which led to unavoidable crisis and insecurity in Nigeria and Africa in general. The consequence of climate change has untold security implications on the life of Nigerians; attacks in the country have been traced to the doorsteps of two strange groups that are forced to live together as a result of unfavorable climatic conditions in the Northern part of the country. The conflict between Fulani and farming communities linked to disputes over grazing land has become frequent in parts of central and northern Nigeria in recent years. The method of purposive random sampling was employed to select the local government and communities where data was collected for this study. The measures for selecting the communities include the following: community with a sizable number of cattle rearers with at least ten (10) heads of cattle and above, community with more than one communal clash which involves the farmers and the Fulani, community with both permanent cattle rearers’ settlement and transit Fulani that are always on the move, and agricultural economy-based community. Interviews were also conducted, and 60 respondents were purposively selected: fifteen (15) Fulani, six (6) traditional rulers, and 39 farmers. A qualitative method of data collection was used to gather information, and in-depth interviews were chosen as an appropriate data collection tool; the interview was drafted in Fulfulde language and was later translated into English and the Hausa language was translated into English as well. Multiple data were collected from February to April 2010 and July to September 2010. The study revealed population increase also takes over grazing land as a result of development, paths of animals (Burtali) in the past are now taken over by farmers, desert encroachment has taken over vast farmland, and the quest for a greener pasture usually brings the Fulani crisis among others. These researches also join others before it to call for more research on climate change and insecurity in Africa generally. Finally, this paper recommended ways on how to address immense challenges of adaptation, through educating farmers and the Fulani on the implication of climate change, and reduce human activities which further aggravate and cause climate change – planting of Jatropha plants to prevent animals from going into farms to destroy crops and creating grazing land.

Keywords Climate change; Security; Fulani; Farmers; Conflicts

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_6-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Introduction A clash over land ownership and grazing land for animals has continued to grow in the few years. The growing pressure for land these past few years has been described by many experts and onlookers as a clear manifestation of the impact of climate change across Nigeria with most states in the far North being the worst affected by these changes. Security has been a major issue in Nigeria’s development crisis. Climate change is one of such problems that are globally identified but the effects of which are more pronounced in developing countries. Recurrent droughts, in conjunction with other social and economic factors, have led to conflicts among farmers and cattle rearers. These conflicts are a constant threat to the security of those in the community affected. Sudano-Sahelian zones of northern Nigeria have suffered environmental degradation caused by successive years of poor rainfall and recurrent droughts, exacerbated by the combined effects of natural population growth and in-migration with the growing population; more land is being cultivated and less is available for pasture and traditional land use systems that rely on mobility. As average rainfall decreases, pastoralists have migrated south into land occupied by sedentary farmers (Nyong 2009). It is predicted that the majority of Nigerian and all African countries inclusive will have novel climates over at least half of their current crop year by 2050 (IPCC 2007). Already climate change rate is gradually exceeding the adaptive capacity of a broad range of crop and forage varieties, animal breeds, and tree populations in Nigeria, ten years earlier than the IPCC climate model prediction of 2020 (IPCC 2007). The descriptions of the climate of Nigeria and northwest Nigeria have been rather simplistic due to paucity of data, but with the availability of data manipulation techniques, it is possible to discuss more fundamental features of the climate. Such is necessary at this point in time as recent droughts, water shortages, and fauna and flora depletion have highlighted how important it is to understand weather phenomena (Oguntoyimbo, 1982 in Obioha 2005) and how they affect human security. Nigeria is one of the countries in the West African subregion; it has an estimated population of 140,003,542 people (NPC 2006) spread over a land area of 932,768 km2 (Fig. 1). Disasters such as cyclone Nargis and the China earthquake claimed thousands of lives, ruined millions of livelihoods, and caused billions of pounds worth of damage. Disasters have always been with us, but they are becoming more frequent and more severe. As global warming increases the frequency and severity of climate extremes, there are more weather-related disasters. It can leave people without access to food and water, without incomes as crops fail, and displaced from home by flooding or drought (DFID 2009). Climate changes have forced some cattle rearers (Fulani) to leave their region and migrate to the southwest where the effects of climate change have not been so severe. If the harmattan is not well pronounced in a particular month/season, the hot condition often takes over, creating a strong heat stress in the atmosphere. The stress so created is highest in the region of convergence between the two air masses often referred to as ITD (Inter Tropical Discontinuenity) – the zone of meeting between the dry northeast harmattan wind and wet southwest wind (Michael 2010). The intercommunal crises have been traced to the aftermath of the effects of climate change in Nigeria. People that have been affected by the consequences of climate change move to other communities where the effects of climate change are less severe or that have not experienced disaster occasioned by the effects of climate change. The rate at which intercommunal clashes occur between the Fulani herdsmen and their host communities is recurrent event in Nigeria. Most of these crises have been traced to pressure on land and destruction of farmland by the Fulani herdsmen during cattle grazing (Michael 2010).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_6-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig 1 Map of Nigeria

Aim and Objective The main aim of the study is to examine the security implication of climate change between farmers and cattle rearers that led to communal conflicts in Kura, Kano state (Fig. 2). From which the following objectives were derived: 1. To examine the communal conflicts resulting from climate change and agriculture 2. To observe the physical exposure and the immense challenges of adaptation in northern Nigeria where the study area falls 3. To highlight the potential impacts of climate change on security and the strategies for addressing these challenges

Statement of the Research Problem Conflicts between cattle rearers and farming communities linked to disputes over grazing land have become frequent in parts of central and northern Nigeria in recent years. Some analysts have blamed the trend on increasing desertification which is pushing cattle rearers southward in their search for pasture, often putting them in conflict with farmers (Olabode and Ajibade 2010). In view of the above, there is a serious need to answer the regular question “what have been the causes of the conflict?” so that we can draw a line and come up with a solution.

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Justification and Importance of the Study In the world, generally, conflicts have led to grave consequences like starvation, death, social unrest, poverty, and unquantifiable losses among the citizens of different nations. There is therefore a need to study and understand the causes and processes of conflict and find appropriate strategies for addressing these challenges. The intensity of the conflict between cattle rearers known as BAKWALOGI or BORO, herdsmen with red cows and sheep migrating from Niger every year to enter Kano state, where the study location is, call for timely mitigation and adaptation measures of reducing the frequent conflict occurrence that displaces local farmers and claims lives and crops as well.

Study Area This study was carried out in Kura local government area of Kano state, Nigeria. The area was selected because agriculture is the bedrock of its economy and it has been victim of the Bakwalogi–farmer conflict for a long time. The study area is located at the southern part of Kano state with a population of 144,601 million people (NPC 2006) with a land mass of 206 km2, located between 11
460 12.8400 N and longitude 8
350 29.0200 E; it is about 900 km from the edge of the Sahara desert and 1,140 km away from the Atlantic Ocean approximately. The study area shares a boundary in the north and the east with Kumbotso local government; west to south, it boarders with Madobi and Garun Malan local government areas, respectively, and extreme south to east, it boarders with Bunkure local government area (Fig. 2). The area has three marked temperature regimes (warm, hot, and cold) with mean annual temperature of 26
C and 21
C main monthly range of maximum temperature in December/January and over 35
C which is hottest (April/May); wet season starts in May and ends in October, while November to February is a dry

Fig 2 Map of Kano state showing the study area

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Fig 3 Climate of Kano state (Source: Field study 2010)

cool season with harmattan haze. Vegetation is savanna (grassland) of Sahel–Sudan Guinea type (Salisu 2009; Fig. 3).

Methodology Three communities were selected from this local government; purposive random sampling was employed to select the local government and communities where data was collected for this study. Three communities were chosen to represent the local government purposively selected. The measures for selecting the communities include the following: 1. Community with a sizable number of cattle rearers with at least ten (10) heads of cattle 2. Community with more than one communal clash which involves the farmers and cattle rearers 3. Community with permanent cattle rearers’ settlement and transit Fulani that are always on the move 4. Agricultural economy-based community On the above criteria, Karfi, Dukawa, and rigar-gundutse were selected as the study location. Sixty respondents were also purposively selected (twenty from each community). The following distribution of respondents was obtained: cattle rearers (5), traditional rulers (2), and farmers (13) from each of the three communities selected for this study (Table 1). A qualitative method of data collection was used to gather information from the respondents, because majority of the respondents are not formally educated and cannot fill in questionnaires Page 5 of 11

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Table 1 Totality of the respondents S/no 1 2 3 Total

Respondent Cattle rearers Traditional rulers Farmers Respondent

Number 15 06 39 60

Source: Field study 2010

adequately. In-depth interviews were chosen as an appropriate data collection tool. The interview guide was wholly structured but also contained open-ended questions to allow a free-flow discussion and unedited information from respondents. The cattle rearers’ interview was drafted in Fulfulde; the data collected was later translated into English for the purpose of analysis. Also, the traditional rulers’ and farmers’ interviews were prepared in Hausa language for data collection. The data collected was also translated into English language for data interpretation.

Data Collection Multiple data were collected over six months, three months during the dry season (February to April 2010) and the three months during the rainy season (July to September 2010). Data were collected during the dry season since this is the critical period when there is no pasture for grazing and farmers are busy during irrigation activities.

Findings and Discussion The study revealed that in the past, people were very few and there was enough land for grazing, but now the population has increased so there are fewer lands to farm on. Desert encroachment has not eaten deeper to the southern Kano. Cattle rearers are nomads who move from one location to another to find pasture for their cattle. Changing climate forces them to move where they can get a greener pasture, water, and a friendly environment for their cattle and families. Variability in climate has altered the environment with unbearable effects which are significant in severe desert encroachment, drought, etc. The place with high cattle population lament for the highest cases of conflict between cattle rearers and farmers due to limited dry season grazing resources (Table 2). Another observable and major thing that brings clashes between the Fulani and farmers in the study area is paths for animals in the past (Burtali) are now taken over by the farmers and other developments; hence, the paths are taken over in the process of searching their way to available grazing land and they end up destroying crops in the farmland that is why there are always clashes between the cattle herders and farmers. The cattle come in droves, invading most farmlands in search of better grazing land as desert encroachment seems to have taken over vast farmlands in the far north, while the farmers who are already feeling the impact of the changes, especially delayed and interrupted rainfall, are protesting the invasion of their farms by the cattle rearers.

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Table 2 Observed number of cows kept by cattle rearers Location Rigar-gundutse Dukawa Karfi Total

1 200 250 100 550

2

3

4

20 200 60 280

50 300 100 450

30 200 200 430

5 150 200 50 400

6 100 200 150 450

7 30 150 70 250

8 300 50 100 450

9

10 150 60 30 240

50 80 100 280

11 100 150 30 280

12 30 150 20 200

13 40 60 100 100

14 50 20 80 150

Source: Field study (2010)

Table 3 Typologies of climatically induced violent conflict over land resources in northeast Nigeria Types Level TP1 Interethnic

Actors Indigene/ settler TP2 Interethnic Indigene/ settler TP3 Interethnic Indigene/ settler TP4 Interethnic Indigene/ settler TP5 Interethnic Indigene/ indigene TP6 Interethnic Indigene/ indigene TP7 Interethnic Settler/ settler TP8 Interethnic Settler/ settler TP9 Interpersonal Settler/ settler TP10 Interpersonal Settler/ indigene TP11 Interpersonal Indigene/ indigene

Occupation Cultivators/ herdsmen Cultivator/ cultivators Herdsmen/ herdsmen Cultivator/ cultivators Cultivator/ cultivators Herdsmen/ herdsmen Herdsmen/ herdsmen Cultivator/ cultivators Cultivator/ cultivators Cultivator/ cultivators Cultivator/ cultivators

Stake Vegetation and land Arable land

Dimension Domestic/ international Domestic

Grazing land Domestic/ international Arable land Domestic Arable land

Domestic

Objective sort Relief from scarcity/reinforcement of group identity Relief from scarcity/reinforcement of group identity Relief from scarcity/reinforcement of group identity Relief from scarcity/reinforcement of group identity Distributive justice

Grazing land Domestic

Relief from scarcity

Grazing land Domestic

Relief from scarcity

Arable land

Domestic

Distributive justice

Arable land

Domestic

Distributive justice

Arable land

Domestic

Distributive justice

Arable land

Domestic

Distributive justice

Source: Adopted after Obioha 2005, classifications of conflict in North East Nigeria

The above are conflicts where actors rationally calculated their interest in a zero-sum or negativesum situation such as might arise from resource scarcity. Table 3 shows that there is a positive feedback relationship between the northwest as it is in the northeastern Nigeria and quest by competing interests to control the available scarce resource in the area (Obioha 2005). The need for more food has led to a serious conflict over land. Violent conflicts involving different typologies that were identified in the study area are very recurrent. Another agent of conflict which we identified arises from large-scale movements of (Bakwalogi/Baroroji) Fulani herdsmen from neighboring countries (Niger and Chad axis) as a result of environmental change.

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Security Implications of Violent Conflict Human security involves the protection of individuals from a sudden violent attack on one person or property, the security being described as having two principal aspects: the freedom from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression, coupled with the protection from sudden calamities, and a number of significant harms that go unmitigated. The seven components of human security are economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security (United Nations Development Programme 1994). In a more analytically useful manner, Owens (2004) and Obioha (2005) defined human security as protection of the “vital core” of all human lives from “critical and pervasive” environmental, economic, food, health, and personal threats due to climate change. A drop in agricultural output may weaken rural communities.

Identified Security Implication at the Study Area • • • • • • •

Decreased agricultural production Hunger, disease, and malnutrition Destruction of farmland/farm crops Killing of livestock owned by the herdsmen Economic decline Population displacement Fighting between cattle rearers and farmers which results in loss of lives and injuries every year

The consequence of climate change has untold security implications on the life of Nigerians. A series of interethnic, interreligious, and reprisal attacks in the country have been traced to the doorsteps of two strange groups that are forced to live together as a result of unfavorable climatic conditions in the northern part of the country (Adediran 2010; Table 4). The above are pushes and pull factors that attracted the cattle rearers which eventually led to unavoidable crisis, conflict, and insecurity. The following are the extracts from the interview conducted with the cattle rearers and farmers in the three communities selected for this study: We travel from far away to find grass for our cows to feed on and how ever we get a Small area to graze on, the farmers come and tell us to go away, where do they want Us to go and feed our cows. (Musa/cattle rearer) We travel to far away state close to the border of Niger Republic to feed our cows but Now the weather has changed and the place is full of dry ground and sand which why We came here as we used to do before but now we are always fighting with the Farmers Before we can feed our animals we are not allowed to let our animals drink even water In the river. (Bello/cattle rearer) Farm lands are no longer as fertile as they use to be in the past so it is really painful For farmers to struggle and spend so much money buying fertilizer and then watch As cattle herders drive their animals to feed on the crops. (Yawale/farmer) It is difficult to avoid confrontation with cattle rearers these days because more of them are coming into our farms more especially in the night to destroyed our crops their animals and runaway. (Abdulmumini/farmer)

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Table 4 Factors that attract the cattle rearers Push factors Drought and desert storm Poor weather condition Strange diseases No water for animals Lake Chad is dried up

Pull factors Green vegetation Moderate weather Hope and aspiration Market opportunity Forage

Source: Field study 2010

Conclusion The devastating impact of climate change is expected to force more people into the north central except if mitigation and adaptation strategies are put in place immediately; most farmers interviewed in Kura local government were not aware of the impacts of climate change, but they said they noticed the gradual changes in the weather and the environment but are not aware of what is causing the changes. The quests for greener pasture by the (Fulani) herdsmen usually bring them in contact with farmers involved in crop production. In most cases, this contact results to invasion of the cropland of the farmers by the livestock of the migratory group. Conflicts that usually arise in this process are usually violent and long lasting, which may have some internal repercussion around neighboring states and borders. From all observations, the human security implication of the conflict is enormous, because other areas of human needs are usually in danger wherever there is conflict. This study also found that climate change has and still is affecting farmers and the people in northern Nigeria economically, socially, and otherwise.

Recommendation • People must be educated on the need to reduce human activities such as tree felling, burning of carbon fuel and biomass, as well as gas flaring which further aggravate and cause climate change. • Farmers are to demarcate areas of the farms by planting Jatropha plants around it to prevent animals from going into the farms to destroy crops. Animals do not feed on Jatropha nor do they go near the plant because it emits an odor that repels animals. • Reforestation in the drought-prone areas of northern Nigeria needs to be boosted. • Nigeria as a country should invest more in combating climate change; agricultural and climatological research should be enhanced to combat desert encroachment. • Creation of grazing land in each state, local government and communities with standard ranching method that can bring reduction of seasonal in- regional movement of the Fulani, periodic orientation for the Fulani at the grazing point, viable economic value both on the animals and herdsmen.

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Acknowledgments I am very grateful to Dr. (Mrs.) R. J. Muhammad (provost FCE, Kano) for her support and encouragements all the time directly or indirectly; Mohammed A. Mohammed; Sani Danladi; Musa Sule; Haruna Abdulhamid; all academic staff of the Department of Geography, FCE, Kano; and the entire management and staff of the Federal College of Education, Kano, who have in one way or the other contributed to the success I have achieved nationally and internationally. I am greatly indebted to the Education Trust Fund (ETF) for funding my attendance at an international conference in Cairo and FCE, Kano, in Nairobi to mention but a few. Thanks also to Associate Professor A. I. Tanko, Department of Geography, Bayero University Kano, Nigeria; Professor S. U. Abdullahi (former VC ABU, Zaria), Brig. Gen. Ibrahim Attahiru, General H. M. Lai, Ibrahim Ahmad Gundutse, and Dr. M. L. Mayanchi. All errors and omissions, and all views expressed, remain solely my responsibility.

References Adediran DI (2010) The socio- economic implication of climate change, Desert Encroachment and communal conflicts in Northern Nigeria. Being a research paper presented at conference on climate change and security organized by the Norwegian academic of science and letters on the occasion of 250 years anniversary in Trondien Department for Foreign and International Development (2009) Climate change issue 49 Intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC) (2007) Special report on regional impacts of climate change; an assessment of vulnerability. Summary for policy makers Michael FO (2010) Climate change and inter-ethnic conflict between Fulani herdsmen and host communities in Nigeria. Being a paper presented at conference on climate change and security organized by the Norwegian academic of science and letters on the occasion of 250 years. Anniversary in Trondien, Norway National Population Commission (2006): Federal Republic Of Nigeria 2006. Population Census; Official Gazatte (FGP 71/52007/25000(0L24); Legal, Notice on publication of the details of the Breakdown of the national and state provisional totals 2006 census. National Bureau of statistics. www.nigerianstat.gov.ng Nyong A (2009) Climate- related conflicts in west Africa Report from Africa, population health, environment and conflict ECSP report issue 12 Obioha EE (2005) Climate change, population drift and violent in North Eastern Nigeria. Being a paper presented at an International workshop; Human security and climate change. Holman Fjord Hotel, Asker, Oslo Olabode AD, Ajibade LT (2010) Environmental induced conflict and sustainable development. A case of Fulani, farmers conflict in Oke- Ero L.G.A, Kwara state, Nigeria. J Sustain Dev Africa 12(5):259–273 Owens T (2004) Challenges and opportunities for defining and measuring human security in human rights. Hum Secur Disarmament: 6:pp 15–23

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Salisu LH (2009) Infrastructure and rural development a panacea for achieving food security in Kura, Kano state. Being a paper presented at the 51st annual national conference of the Association of Nigerian Geographers at the Department of Geography and planning, Kogi state University Anyingba, Kogi state United Nations Development Programme (1994) New dimensions of human security. Human development report, 1994. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 22–25

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Climate Change and Urban Development in Africa Asfaw Kumssaa*, Aloysius C. Moshab, Isaac M. Mbechec and Enos H. N. Njerud a United Nations Centre for Regional Development, Africa Office, Nairobi, Kenya b University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana c University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya d College of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya

Abstract Climate change poses a major threat to sustainable urban development in Africa. Changes in the frequency, intensity, and duration of climate extremes (droughts, floods, and heat waves, among others) will affect the livelihoods of the urban population, particularly the poor and other vulnerable communities who live in slums and marginalized settlements. Extreme changes in weather patterns will increase incidences of natural disasters and impact on all key sectors of the economy, including the urban economy, agriculture and forestry, water resources, coastal areas and settlements, and health. In Africa, where livelihoods are mainly based on climate-dependent resources and environment, the effect of climate change will be disproportionate and severe. Moreover, Africa’s capacity to adapt to and cope with the adverse effects of climate variability is generally weak. This Chapter examines the relations between climate change and urban development in Africa and looks at the role and effect of climate change on urban development. It also assesses the available policy options for adaptation and mitigating climate change effects in urban Africa.

Keywords Africa; Climate change; Urban development; Adaptation and mitigation policies

Introduction Climate change is one of today’s emerging threats and challenges to humanity. The signs are visible, while its adverse effects are felt across both the developed and developing nations. The high incidences of flooding and intense rainfall (Trapp et al. 2007), drought and heat waves, cyclones, hurricanes, and the frequent erratic weather patterns, which have exacerbated poverty, displacement, and hunger among millions of people, are partly attributable to climate change (Pall et al. 2011). The term climate change has been defined as a statistically significant variation in either the mean state of climate or in its variability, persisting for an extended period (WMO 2012). The major causes of climate change include natural variations in sunlight intensity and human activities, which have led to an increase in greenhouse gases and a steady rise of the earth’s temperatures.

The views expressed here are the authors’ own and not necessarily those of the United Nations Centre for Regional Development. *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 11

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Global warming, which entails a rise in the earth’s temperature, is caused by the use of fossil fuels such as wood, coal, oil, and petrol, among other industrial processes that have led to a buildup of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons (IPCC 2007). Human activities that are related to biomass burning during shifting cultivation and domestic fuel are responsible for increasing greenhouse gases in Africa. Besides rendering traditional agriculture across African countries less profitable, climate change has driven an unprecedented number of people into cities as they search for alternative livelihoods (Barrios et al. 2006). The resultant urban population increase has exerted pressure on urban services and resources such as urban space, urban water supply and infrastructure, and sanitation systems. Apart from posing a daunting challenge to urban planners and policymakers (Thynell 2007; Choguill 1999), climate change has become a major national, regional, and international problem and has limited human capabilities and undermined the international communities’ efforts to attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Consequently, UNDP has declared climate change “the defining human development issue of our generation” (UNDP 2007, p. 1). This Chapter looks at the relationship between climate change and urban development and examines the impact of climate change on urban development in Africa. It also assesses available policy options for adaptation and mitigating climate change effects in urban Africa.

Climate Change and Its Impacts The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has declared that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increase in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level” (IPCC 2007, p. 30). Consequently, warming of the climate will not only hinder the achievements of MDGs and sustainable development, but it will also increase the risk of violent conflicts and therefore adversely affect human security (Barnett and Adger 2007). Therefore, concerted efforts are required to tackle climate change since failure to address this challenge will result in diminished future prospects for humanity. UNDP (2007) reports that average annual global temperatures have been rising by 0.7  C (1.3  F) since the industrial revolution. The report also notes the rapid rate at which CO2 concentrations are increasing, leading to rising air temperatures. It is expected that with the rise in temperatures, droughts will be frequent as rainfall patterns change. In the next 100 years, climate-induced temperatures in Africa could increase by between 2  C and 6  C (Hulme et al. 2001). This will have adverse effects on agricultural productivity and food security. It will also mean less water for poor people, increased floods, and a rise in sea level, thereby posing a great threat to coastal regions and small island nations (Tacoli 2009). The rise in temperatures will also increase incidences of diseases such as malaria (in areas that were originally malaria free) and other communicable diseases. Unfortunately, climate change disproportionately affects the poor and poor countries since it impacts on the very resources that the poor depend on, e.g., agriculture, forests, rivers, and lakes. Most importantly, poor countries are extremely vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change due to their low physical and financial capacity to withstand the economic shocks triggered by climate change (Ward and Shively 2012). Worsening climatic conditions, coupled with other factors such as political and ethnic conflicts, erosion of traditional safety nets, and the deteriorating physical infrastructure, besides the absence of general security in rural areas, have forced some people to migrate to urban areas, exerting further Page 2 of 11

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Table 1 Percentage of African population residing in urban areas by subregion, 1980–2030 Region Africa Eastern Africa Northern Africa Southern Africa Western Africa

1980 27.9 14.4 44.4 31.5 29.2

1990 32.0 17.7 48.5 36.7 33.0

2000 35.9 21.1 51.1 42.1 38.4

2010 39.9 24.6 53.5 47.1 44.1

2020 44.6 29.0 56.8 52.3 50.1

2030 50.0 34.8 61.3 57.9 56.1

Source: UN-HABITAT 2008

pressure on cities and compounding their socioeconomic problems (Choguill 1999). As centers of innovation, cities have the capacity and the technical know-how of dealing with climate change. Unfortunately, they are also the major contributors to greenhouse gases. City-based commercial, industrial, and domestic refrigeration facilities, for instance, discharge large amounts of gaseous emissions (Mosha 2011). There is therefore a need to critically examine the role of cities vis-à-vis the process of climate change and its impacts.

Urbanization and Urban Development in Africa As people migrate from the rural areas to urban regions, global settlement patterns are gradually changing. For instance, in 2008, 3.3 billion people lived in urban areas, a number that is expected to reach 4.9 billion by 2030. Despite being the least urbanized continent in the world, Africa has the highest urbanization rate of 3 % per annum. In 2007, the African urban population was 373.4 million, a figure that is projected to reach 759.4 million by the year 2030. It is further projected that more than 1.2 billion Africans will be living in urban areas by the year 2050 (UN-HABITAT 2008). Table 1 profiles the past, current, and projected urban population by subregion between 1980 and 2030. From the data, northern Africa and southern Africa are the most urbanized regions in Africa, while East Africa is the least urbanized (but nevertheless the most rapidly urbanizing region). This rapid urbanization can be explained by both the natural growth of the urban population (the net excess of births over deaths in urban areas) and the rural–urban migration. On the other hand, Potter (2012) argues that rapid urbanization in Africa is due to the reclassification of small rural settlements as urban areas, while others (Zachariah and Conde 1981; Kelley 1991) argue that rural–urban migration is the main contributor to urbanization in Africa. Rural–urban migration has been triggered mainly by both the pull-and-push factors (Barrios et al. 2006) as well as past development strategies adopted by African countries, including socialistleaning development policies and structural adjustment programs, which are biased against rural and agricultural development (Hope 2009). A dismal consequence of these policies is that the nonagricultural population now exceeds the available nonagricultural employment, leading to over-urbanization (Hope 1998). African urban economies (weakened by institutional problems such as extreme centralization, rampant corruption external factors, and unfair global trade practices) have failed to absorb the growing urban populations. As a result, in most cities of Africa, shanty towns and squatter settlements have developed along the periphery of the major cities (Mosha 2011). The poor who live in these areas face tremendous economic and social hardships since they do not have access to basic human services such as shelter, land, water, safe cooking fuel and electricity, heating, sanitation, garbage collection, drainage, paved roads, footpaths, street lighting, etc. (Tacoli 2009; World Bank 2009). Page 3 of 11

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Urban areas in Africa host major government agencies and the private sector. These sectors contribute significantly to economic growth and create much-needed employment. According to the UN-HABITAT (2008), urban areas account for about 55 % of Africa’s GDP. They therefore play a pivotal role in the production of goods and services, besides generating employment for the growing urban populations. Unfortunately urbanization in Africa is not accompanied with an increase in economic growth or improved living standards. This is a unique phenomenon, which the World Bank has called “urbanization without growth” (Fay and Opal 2000; Barrios et al. 2006). This pattern of “urbanization without growth” is the result of inappropriate policies that could not cater for properly managed and planned urban development. In developed countries, urbanization took root during the industrial revolution. At a time when there was “redundant” labor in the rural areas, there was an increase in demand for labor in urban areas (Potter 1995). The same cannot be said about the process of urbanization in Africa. The process of urbanization in Africa is usually highly influenced by the movement of people displaced by drought, famine, ethnic conflicts, civil strife, and war. Acute levels of urban poverty and haphazard urban settlements are also common characteristics of urbanization in Africa. The poor live in poor neighborhoods where they face dire economic and social hardships. Most are uneducated and unskilled workers who have migrated to urban areas, encouraged by the push-andpull factors associated with rural–urban migration. Women and children are most affected according to Bartlett (2008), who says that children under the age of 14 are 44 % more likely to die due to urban environmental problems compared to the rest of the population. Bartlett further argues that “globally children under five are the victims of 80 % of sanitation-related illnesses and diarrhoeal diseases, primarily because of their less-developed immunity and because their play behaviour puts them into contact with pathogens” (2008, p. 505). The immediate challenges facing slums could be addressed through provision of basic services such as water, sanitation, and affordable housing. However, the long-term policy response should focus on economic growth, poverty reduction policies, and institutional capacity building, as well as on improved governance. If properly managed and planned for, urbanization could be an engine of economic growth and industrialization. However, without a proper policy in place, urbanization will contribute to the rising urban poverty, proliferation of slums, regional inequalities, and degradation of urban infrastructure and environment. As a result, some African cities could become centers of crime and slum settlements rather than being engines of industrialization and economic growth.

The Impact of Climate Change on Urban Development in Africa With erratic rainfall and frequent drought, rural dwellers in the continent find it very difficult to work on their farms. Therefore, they abandon their rural settlements and migrate to urban areas in search of better opportunities. Unfortunately, the urban economy is weak and cannot absorb these environmental refugees (Barrios et al. 2006). It is estimated that by the year 2050, there may be as many as 200 million environmental refugees, people who are forced to move due to environmental degradation (Myers quoted in Tacoli 2009). The migrants are generally younger, landless men with few dependants (Tacoli 2009). Unfortunately, most of these migrants are lowly farmers with limited skills and education. They therefore cannot secure employment in the urban economic sector. Consequently, they almost always end up in slums and shanty towns.

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Besides being the most marginalized, these settlements are also prone to flooding and landslides and have very limited or no social amenities such as running water, electricity, proper health care, and infrastructure. The largest slum in East Africa, Kibera, is located about 5 km southwest of Nairobi. It has about 250,000 people but has no proper sanitation and garbage collection systems, toilet, and infrastructure. Kibera is heavily polluted by human refuse, garbage, and other wastes, including human and animal feces, courtesy of the open sewage system and the frequent use of “flying toilets.” This poor sanitation, combined with poor nutrition among residents, accounts for the many illnesses and diseases in Kibera. Climate change will eventually lead to a rise in sea level and threaten small island nations and coastal areas, especially those located near the sea. With nine of the world’s ten most populated cities located in the coastal zones, the effect of a rise in sea level on the population and ecosystem of these cities will be enormous (UNEP 2005). The major and direct impact of sea-level rise on coastal ecosystems will be erosion, submergence, and increase in salinity (Armah et al. 2005). It is estimated that more than 600 million people (10 % of the world’s population) live in coastal regions that have an elevation of up to 10 m (about 2 % of the world’s land area) above the seal level. Out of this, 360 million live in urban areas (13 % of the world’s urban population) and about 247 million live in low-income countries (McGranhan et al. 2007). With the rise in sea level, coastal towns will be susceptible to cyclones, typhoons, hurricanes, and floods. It is projected that a 3–4  C rise in temperature will expose between 134 and 332 million people to coastal flooding (UNDP 2007). Desertification due to drought and man’s actions, especially in the Saharan and Sahelian environment, results in sand and dust storms that could affect urban communities in many ways. Apart from the inconvenience and the disruption of transport and communications infrastructure, the increased risk of health-related problems such as respiratory diseases will continue to plague the continent. Many African cities will experience severe water shortages as the ravages of climate change, especially due to persistent droughts, continue to deepen. Large cities such as Lagos, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and others have a permanent water crisis. Unfortunately, women and children have to bear the burden of walking long distances in search of water. Assuming that current levels of investment in the sub-Saharan African urban water supply and sanitation continue over the next 20 years, as many as 300 million people in African cities will be without proper sanitation; and 225 million will be without potable water supply by 2020 (World Bank 1996). Besides the physical hazards from floods, droughts, and hurricanes, health-related risks will be on the rise as impacts of climate change bite deeper. Heat stress and respiratory distress from extreme temperatures might combine with air quality decreases to create higher mortality in urban areas. Changes in temperature, precipitation, and/or humidity will result in water- and vector-borne diseases. Less direct risks are expected as well; these include negative effects on livelihoods, food supplies, the psychological state of people, or access to water and other natural resources. The urban populations exposed to disease, such as dengue fever and malaria, already killing people in sub-Saharan Africa, are spreading to urban centers located in previously safe higher latitudes and altitudes (Wilbanks et al. 2007). The highland cities of Nairobi and Harare are a case in point (IPCC 2007). The geographical distribution of some infectious diseases will be altered, as warmer average temperatures permit an expansion of the area in which malaria, dengue fever, filariasis, and other tropical diseases are likely to occur. It should be noted that many of these health risks are already evident among most urban populations of Africa, even in the absence of full-blown effects of climate change, and are related to such factors as age, gender, socioeconomic status, and access to health

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services. Extreme weather events will likely create new health hazards and disrupt public health services, thereby leading to increased disease incidences. Infrastructure in urban areas is already showing evidence of destruction due to climate impacts such as flooding and sea-level rise. Some of the most vulnerable infrastructures include industrial plants; equipment for producing and distributing energy; roads, ports, and other transportation facilities; residential, institutional, and commercial properties; and coastal embankments. The economic consequences of these impacts are severe. For instance, in Uganda, the record-breaking rains of 1997 destroyed 40 % of the country’s 9,600 km feeder road network. Similarly, between 1997 and 1998, a prolonged drought in the Seychelles led to the closure of the Seychelles Breweries and the Indian Ocean Tuna Company (Mosha 2011). Rather than alter existing infrastructure, cities would probably choose to abandon it and relocate in upland areas at a cost of billions of dollars. People and jobs will be forced to relocate, and land use will change dramatically.

Adaptation and Mitigation Policies: Implications for Urban Development in Africa Urban governments play a critical role in climate change adaptation and in mitigating (reducing) greenhouse gas emissions. They however need a supportive institutional, regulatory, and financial framework, backed by their highest decision-making organs. In addition, low- and middle-income nations need the backing and full support of international agencies (Satterthwaite 2007). Emission of GHGs is one of the major policy issues that need to be addressed (APF 2007). Urban authorities in Africa should have in place policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions, but this should be reciprocated by a commitment to the reduction of global greenhouse emissions. For these policies to be effective, there must be incentives that recognize the development needs of urban authorities. Africa has legitimate energy needs, hence the problem of carbon emission in her urban centers. Policies encouraging clean energy technologies should be formulated and encouraged through capacity building and financial support from national governments. International partnership should also be established in a bid to bolster these efforts. Most African urban centers are located within the tropics or subtropic regions where solar energy and hydropower are abundant. Policies encouraging development of Africa’s vast solar energy potential and hydropower should be enacted. The World Bank and the African Development Bank Clean Energy and Development Investment Framework should be fully implemented as a mitigation measure. To mainstream adaptation to climate change in urban areas, the strategy should be a continuous process, which addresses both current climate variability and extremes and future climate risks. Africa’s urban authorities should take actions that link climate change adaptation to disaster risk management. A number of African countries such as Botswana, South Africa, Uganda, and Kenya have put in place national policies for disaster management that address issues such as prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery, and development (Mosha 2011). In Uganda, for instance, the government has created a climate change unit within the Ministry of Water and Environment to coordinate all climate change concerns and spearhead policy formulation in the country (Magezi 2011). At the local and urban authority levels, cities such as Cape Town have developed a municipal adaptation policy (MAP) that includes proper management and control of water supplies, storm management, bushfires, and coastal zones (Hope 2009). Similarly, the city of Durban has also came Page 6 of 11

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up with a climate change adaptation strategy that includes human health, water and sanitation, coastal zones, food security and agriculture, infrastructure, and cross-sectoral activities. Many African countries have now recognized that policies on climate change adaptation and mitigation need to shift from a purely environmental concern to addressing a growing threat to sustainable development. Managing both current and future climate risks should be an integral part of development processes at both the national and regional levels and should involve a cross-sectoral approach that is reflected in the budget, thus the need for greater attention by ministries of finance and national planning. Urban authorities in Africa should adapt to climate change impacts through: • Increased efforts to improve access to climate data • Investment and transfer of technologies for adaptation in key sectors • Developing and implementing best practices for screening and assessing climate change risks in development projects and programs • Mainstreaming climate factors into development planning and implementation • Providing significant additional investment for disaster prevention For Africa to adapt to the impacts of climate change, it will need development partners to deliver on their commitments. Assisting Africa’s development through its largely unexploited hydropower potential will help to meet her objective of increasing energy access while limiting GHG emissions. Compensation for avoiding deforestation could also be introduced so as to limit GHG emissions, but this will require an understanding of the factors that encourage deforestation. Incentives to landholders could also be considered in a bid to discourage deforestation. Policies that build on existing strategies to support adaptation to climate change are among the most likely to succeed. Growing evidence suggests that mobility, in conjunction with income diversification, is an important strategy for reducing vulnerability to environmental and non-environmental risks (Tacoli 2009). Some of the climate change problems envisaged include drought, desertification, land degradation, floods and the rise of sea level. It is projected that between 75 and 250 million people in Africa will not have access to freshwater by 2030 (IPCC 2007). Climate stress usually overlaps with other factors in determining migration duration and composition. It is therefore important that socioeconomic, political, and cultural factors are integrated into the adaptation policies. The high vulnerability of urban systems and their impact on climate can be reduced through adaptation and mitigation measures based on known technology and design methodology. To counter climate change disasters, African urban authorities must have preparedness programs and plans, ingredients often lacking in most African cities (WMO 1994). African urban centers located along the coast and river deltas (or estuaries) are highly exposed to flooding due to their proximity to the sea (e.g., Free Town, Alexandria, Cairo, Beira). In this regard, mitigation measures required include designing and building appropriate flood shelters, improving and expanding sewerage and drainage systems, and putting in place an information system on climate change effects and responses (WMO 1994). Governance is an important element in climate change risk exposure. Urban authorities with limited incomes or assets are the most exposed. This is because they lack quality infrastructure and have poor disaster-preparedness provisions for planning and coordinating disaster response. Besides, the extent to which the poor can buy, build, or rent “safe” housing in “safe” sites and the degree to which the local government creates an enabling environment for local civil-society action

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to address these issues are limited (Satterthwaite 2007). Most urban authorities in Africa cannot afford the requisite cost of reducing the impact of climate change. Climate change health adaptation and mitigation measures required in African urban centers include putting in place an information system that profiles air conditions, observation networks and programs, and impact assessments and predictions. Bioclimatic GIS can be a useful tool in urban planning and design and can be used in predicting climate change impact on mortality. In terms of the impact of climate change on planning and architecture, there is need to take into account proper use of materials and architectural detailing, as well as drafting plans that maximize on outdoor spaces. Climate-sensitive designs should be done in a way that protects the environment from pollution. Architects and planners should use widely available knowledge and information on climate, while urban climatologists need to simplify the language in which climatic data is availed to planners and architects. Planning and building codes should be made public and their objectives clearly set out. A specific design guide that incorporates climate information is required. In a nutshell, the key to adaptation is competent, capable, and accountable urban governments that understand how to incorporate adaptation measures into aspects of their work and departments (Satterthwaite 2007).

Conclusion Climate change is both a threat and a challenge to Africa. Climate variability affects agricultural production and influences hunger, health, access to water, and consequently food security and poverty in the continent. Prolonged droughts and floods, which are associated with climate change, impact negatively on the livelihoods of farmers, making traditional agriculture across Africa less profitable. This in turn results in a number of people from rural areas migrating to cities in search of better livelihoods. The increased urban population in turn exerts pressure on urban services and natural resources such as urban space, urban water supplies, infrastructure, and sanitation systems, creating a challenge for urban planners and policymakers. The effects of climate change must therefore be factored into African countries’ urban policies and unequivocally address the current and emerging urban challenges, especially the rapid urbanization, poverty, informality, and safety. While Africa is the most vulnerable and most affected by climate change, it has the weakest coping mechanism and less financial and human resources. The support of the international community to help Africa build the requisite capacity to adapt to climate change is therefore very crucial. Municipal governments and urban authorities should design policies that are sensitive to energy saving, fewer sprawls, and climate-resilient infrastructure, especially with respect to drainage, flood control, housing, sanitation, transport, and water distribution systems. In the USA, for example, the 2005 Energy Policy Act creates policies and incentives for developing renewable energy. The Act aims to enhance and expand domestic energy production. Brazil’s government instituted the Incentives for Small Hydro Facilities policy to exempt small hydro facilities (those which produce less than 30 MW) from paying financial compensation for the use of water resources. To encounter the expected climate change disasters, urban authorities must also have preparedness programs and plans. Urban policies in Africa should also emphasize and focus on new techniques and methods of seasonal prediction, early warning systems, monitoring, and risk management.

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References APF (African Partnership Forum) (2007) Climate change and Africa. Document prepared jointly by the African Partnership Forum (APF) and the secretariat of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) for the 8th APF Meeting in Berlin, 22-23 May, 2007 Armah AK, Wiafe G, Kpelle DG (2005) Sea-level rise and coastal biodiversity in West Africa: a case study from Ghana. In: Low PS (ed) Climate change and Africa. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York, pp 204–217 Barnett J, Adger WN (2007) Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict. Political Geography 26:639–655 Barrios S, Bertinelli L, Strobl E (2006) Climate change and rural–urban migration: the case of sub-Saharan Africa. J Urban Econ 60(3):357–371 Bartlett S (2008) Climate change and urban children: impacts and implications for adaptation in low-and middle-income countries. Environ Urban 20(2):501–519 Choguill CL (1999) Sustainable human settlements: some second thoughts. In: Foo AF, Yuen B (eds) Sustainable cities in the 21st century. Singapore University Press, Singapore, pp 131–143 Fay M, Opal C (2000) Urbanisation without growth: a not so uncommon phenomenon. Policy research working paper 2412, August 2000. World Bank, Washington, DC Hope KR (1998) Urbanisation and urban growth in Africa. J Asian Afr Stud 33(4):345–357 Hope KR (2009) Climate change and urban development. Int J Environ Stud 66(5):643–658 Hulme M, Doherty R, Ngara T, New M, Lister D (2001) Africa climate change1900–2100. Clim Res 17:145–168 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2007) Summary for policymakers. In: Metz B, Davidson OR, Bosch PR, Dave R, Meyer LA (eds) Climate change 2007: mitigation. Contribution of working group III to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York Kelley A (1991) African urbanisation and city growth: perspective, problems, and policies. Duke University (Unpublished manuscript), Durham NC, USA Magezi SA (2011) Climate change and sustainable housing in Uganda. In: Yuen B, Kumssa A (eds) Climate change and sustainable urban development in Africa and Asia. Springer, London/New York, pp 153–166 McGranhan G, Balk D, Anderson B (2007) The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks of Climate Change and Human Settlements in Low Elevation, Coastal Zones. Environment & Urbanization 19(1):17–37 Mosha AC (2011) The effects of climate change on urban human settlements in Africa. In: Yuen B, Kumssa A (eds) Climate change and sustainable urban development in Africa and Asia. Springer, London/New York, pp 69–100 Pall P, Aina T, Stone D, Stott P, Nozawa T, Hilberts A et al (2011) Anthropogenic greenhouse gas contribution to flood risk in England and Wales in autumn 2000. Nature 470(7334):382–385 Potter R (1995) Urbanisation in the third world. Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York Potter D (2012) Challenging the myths of urban dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa: the evidence from Nigeria. World Dev 40(7):1382–1393 Satterthwaite D (2007) Climate change and urbanisation: effects and implications for urban governance. United Nations expert group meeting on population distribution, urbanisation, internal migration and development. UN/POP/EGM-URB/2008/16, 27 Dec 2007, United Nations, New York

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Tacoli C (2009) Crisis or adaptation? Migration and climate change in a context of high mobility. Environ Urban 21(2):513–525 Thynell M (2007) Political actors and urban development. Reg Dev Stud 11:127–153 Trapp RJM, Diffenbaugh NS, Brooks HE, Baldwin ME, Robinson ED, Pal JS (2007) Changes in severe thunderstorm environment frequency during the 21st century caused by anthropogenically enhanced global radiative forcing. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 104(5):19719–19723 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2007) Human development report 2007/2008: fighting climate change, human solidarity in a divided world. Palgrave Macmillan, New York UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) (2005) Assessing coastal vulnerability: developing a global index for measuring risk. UNEP, Nairobi UN-HABITAT (United Nations Human Settlement Programme) (2008) The state of African cities 2008: a framework for addressing urban challenges in Africa. UN-HABITAT, Nairobi Ward P, Shively G (2012) Vulnerability, income growth and climate change. World Dev 40(5):916–927 Wilbanks TJ, Romero-Lankao P, Bao M, Berkhout F, Cairncross S, Ceron JP, Kapshe M, Muir-Wood R, Zapata-Marti R (2007) Industry, Settlement, and Society. IPCC WGII Fourth Assessment Report (pp. 357–391). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press WMO (World Metrological Organization) (1994) Report of the Technical Conference on Tropical Urban Climates. 28 March to 2 April 1993, Dhaka, Bangladesh. WCASP-30, WMO/TD-No. 647, Geneva WMO (2012) What is climate change? http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/wcp/ccl/faqs.htmln Accessed 29 Oct 2012 World Bank (1996) African Water Resources: Technical Paper No. 331.World Bank, Washington, DC World Bank (2009) ECO2 Cities: Ecological Cities as Economic Cities. World Bank, Washington, DC Zachariah KC, Conde J (1981) Migration in West Africa: demographic aspects. Oxford University Press, New York

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Index Terms: Adaptation and mitigation policies 8 Africa 2 Climate change 2 Urban development 8

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Climate Change Governance: Emerging Legal and Institutional Frameworks for Developing Countries Martin Oulu* Environment, Energy and Climate Change Consultant, Inscape Research and Consulting, Nairobi, Kenya

Abstract Climate change is a relatively new governance area in which policy and practice tend to precede theory or advance simultaneously. Establishing effective legal and institutional frameworks is crucial to its management. This chapter conducts a comparative analysis of the climate change governance frameworks of four developing countries, namely, the Philippines, Mexico, South Africa, and Kenya, all of which have enacted or propose climate change legislations, strategies, and related institutional structures and have decentralized governments. These are contrasted with the UK, the first to globally enact a framework climate change law. The results indicate that despite being time- and resource consuming, enactment of stand-alone framework climate change legislation is preferred over piecemeal amendments to relevant laws. Another key finding is the overwhelming adoption of mainstreaming as an important approach to managing climate change. Moreover, both adaptation and mitigation are considered equally important, mitigation being seen as a function of adaptation. This disabuses the notion that developing countries do not or should not focus much on mitigation. Institutionally, establishment of (often) a new high-level cross-sectoral climate change coordinating institution domiciled in the office of and/or chaired by the head of state is common. Such institutions offer general policy guidance and are supported at lower levels by an advisory panel of experts and a technical administrative secretariat. Procedures to ensure clear coordination between the central and devolved governments are in many instances outlined. Climate finance sources and management strategies are mixed. Sharing of experiences and strong support for national climate change legislations under ongoing post-Kyoto negotiations are recommended.

Keywords Climate change; Governance; Policy; Legal and institutional frameworks; Developing countries

Introduction Warming of the climate system is unequivocal as per the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007). Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration recently hit the 400 parts-per-million mark. While developing countries’ contribution to the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is negligible, they suffer most from the impacts of climate change because they lack the necessary institutional, economic, and financial capacity to cope (Huq et al. 2003). The vulnerability, coupled with the pressing need to grow their economies in order to reduce poverty levels, has traditionally underlined many developing countries’ focus on adaptation *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 20

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efforts at the expense of mitigation. The situation is however steadily changing as many now strive to reduce their emissions by integrating emission reduction strategies into regular socioeconomic policies in pursuit of low-carbon development paths (cf. Reid and Goldemberg 1998). Their motivations are myriad: (i) mitigation is seen as a function of adaptation, that is, it offers opportunities for enhancing development and boosting adaptive capacity, (ii) opportunity to leapfrog into newer low-carbon technologies, (iii) promise of access to international climate finance, and (iv) the ideological commitment to show leadership. The crosscutting nature of climate change has seen mainstreaming being widely advocated as an important approach to its management (cf. Oulu 2011). Mainstreaming is the integration of climate change vulnerabilities or adaptation into some aspect of related government policy (IPCC 2007). Its potential benefits, dimensions, and assessment criteria have been extensively discussed (cf. Huq et al. 2003; Klein et al. 2007; Lasco et al. 2009; Mickwitz et al. 2009) and implementation guidelines published (cf. UNDP-UNEP 2011). It can be operationalized horizontally by different policy sectors or departments, vertically at different hierarchical administrative levels, and internationally by embodying multilateral cooperation (Persson and Klein 2008). The three dimensions highlight the multilevel and complexity of climate change governance. Nevertheless, addressing climate change is ultimately a local-scale affair. While international efforts are crucial, it is individual countries which determine relevant policy by translating both local and global goals into either adaptation or mitigation actions. Doing so requires effective national climate change policies, legislations, and institutions. In fact, advancing domestic climate legislations can help create the necessary conditions for an international deal (Townshend and Mathews 2013). Some even consider creation of durable regulatory frameworks and institutions as more important than the choice of particular programs (Stavins 1997). Yet, even as literature places governance at the center of future adaptation and mitigation efforts, many national governments have paid little attention to legislations and institutions (Agrawal and Perrin 2009). This chapter conducts a comparative analysis of the climate change governance structures of four developing countries with decentralized government systems, namely, the Philippines, Mexico, South Africa, and Kenya. In particular, it focuses on the legal and institutional frameworks with the aim of identifying emerging best practice. These are contrasted against the UK, a developed country and first globally to enact a framework climate change law. The UK is often touted as having both the “hardware” (institutions) and “software” (necessary knowledge) (Persson 2004), key ingredients in dealing with climate change. The chapter is organized into five sections. After the Introduction, section “Climate Change Governance: Role of Law and Institutions” examines the role of law and institutions in climate change governance. The individual country governance structures are analyzed in section “Individual Country Governance Frameworks,” while section “Synthesis of Emerging Climate Governance Best Practice” provides a synthesis of the emerging legal and institutional frameworks. Section “Concluding Remarks” makes some concluding remarks.

Climate Change Governance: Role of Law and Institutions Governance is a fuzzy concept with many definitions but no consensus. Some view governance as a political process of setting explicit societal goals and intervening in their achievement, translating into a generic term for the coordination of social actions rather than an antonym for government (Fröhlich and Knieling 2013). Three dimensions of governance are distinguished (Homeyer 2006; Herodes et al. 2007): policy (the nature and implementation of policy instruments), politics (actor constellations), and polity (institutional properties), each with a continuum of possible Page 2 of 20

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subdimensions. The vagueness of the term nonetheless allows for its use in a variety of disciplines and contexts. In climate change, it encompasses a broad range of forms of coordination of adaptation and mitigation characterized by cross-boundary, multilevel, multi-sector, and multiagency settings as well as long-term challenges and uncertainty (Fröhlich and Knieling 2013). Climate change is, essentially, a “wicked” problem (Balint et al 2011) or “super wicked problem” (Lazarus 2008). Its enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, and conflicting stakeholders lack a single problem formulation or solution. Moreover, the longer it takes to address it, the harder it becomes, while those best positioned to do so have the least immediate incentive to act, making its governance a complex reality. The field is also still a relatively new area in which policy and practice tend to precede theory or advance simultaneously. Lack of middle-range adaptation theories to help frame policy debates and absence of comparative empirical studies to support policy interventions are glaring challenges (Agrawal 2008). Domestic climate change legislation has traditionally been viewed as something for governments to enact after an international agreement has been reached to support implementation. However, there is a growing global trend in which individual countries, states, or even cities are unilaterally implementing their own climate change regulations. While this could be attributed to frustrations with stalled United Nations (UN) climate agreements, it is also indicative of a growing recognition of the crucial role of domestic legislations and measures (Stavins 1997). By disregarding the so-called matching principle (cf. Butler and Mecey 1996), these countries are rebutting the skeptics’ claim that it is self-defeating for a country to act alone on climate change. Apart from the possibility of regulation at lower jurisdictional level triggering regulation at a higher (international) level (Engel and Saleska 2005), the inclination toward domestic climate change legislations also signal a “portfolio” approach in which a suite of different plans spread risks across individual countries (Vance 2012). Many developing countries are beginning to implement national emission reduction actions, fully aware that it is in their self-interest to do so and make their economies climate resilient even in the absence of a global deal or sufficient action by developed countries (Townshend and Mathews 2013). Some have even suggested that combined emission savings from such national actions may be greater than those attained by industrialized countries (Reid and Goldemberg 1998). Clearly, the ongoing Durban Platform negotiations should involve a formal recognition of and active support for the advancement of national climate legislation. Modes of environmental governance are variously categorized. Regulation or command and control is the most common approach. Literature is also awash with many types of “new” or “newer” policy instruments (NEPIs) which include market-based instruments, eco-labels, and voluntary agreements (Jordan et al. 2005). They have been hailed as able to offer cost-effective alternatives, provide dynamic incentives for technological change, address distributional equity concerns, and raise revenue (Stavins 1997; EEA 2005). Despite the “frenzy” surrounding the apparent popularity of NEPIs, regulation still dominates. Barring noncompliance may be the only means of ensuring environmental integrity. Importantly, many of the NEPIs require legislation to be effective (EEA 2005; Jordan et al. 2005; Herodes et al. 2007). But legislation also has its challenges and the nature varies greatly. Subsequent amendments, limited budgets, financial conditionality, delays in operationalizing regulations, vested interests, and simple nonenforcement can render a seemingly strong legal mandate mere symbolic aspirational statement. Successful climate change legislations must therefore be simultaneously flexible in certain respects and steadfast in others (Lazarus 2008). They should incorporate institutional design features that significantly insulate implementation from vested political and economic interests. Such design features should include precommitment strategies which deliberately make it hard, though not impossible, to change the law in response to emerging concerns and insights, as well as those intended to keep the statute on course over time. Page 3 of 20

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Examples include requirements for consultation with other agencies, scientific advisory committees, and stakeholders; judicial review provisions; and preemption triggers that accommodate competing interests while exploiting the resulting tension to further climate change policy. Institutions are systems of rules and decision-making procedures that give rise to social practices, assign roles, and guide interactions (Gupta et al. 2010). Categorized into public, civil society, or private sector, institutions are humanly created formal and informal mechanisms which shape social and individual expectations, interactions, and behavior initiatives (Agrawal and Perrin 2009). They play a major role in assisting countries anticipate and respond to climate change by structuring the distribution of risks, constituting and organizing incentive structures, and mediating external interventions into local contexts. Effective adaptation-enhancing institutions encourage the involvement of a variety of perspectives and actors, allow continuous learning and behavior change, and can mobilize resources (Gupta et al. 2010). Fragmentation, conflicting mandates, and capacity challenges plague many developing country institutions.

Individual Country Governance Frameworks The Philippines Climate Change Vulnerability and Government Structure The Philippines is an archipelagic country in Southeast Asia classified as lower middle income by the World Bank. Due to its location in the Pacific Ring of Fire, it is prone to earthquakes and active volcanoes and is ranked highest in the world in terms of vulnerability to tropical cyclone occurrence (Yumul et al. 2011; RoP 2011). The country lies within the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), a source of heavy rains and storms. Its geography and location therefore puts it at a high risk from sea level rise (Lofts and Kenny 2012). The Philippines and similar small island developing states are particularly vulnerable to global environmental change (Pelling and Uitto 2001; IPCC 2007; Yumul et al. 2011; Guillotreau et al. 2012). Their disproportionate natural resource dependency and extensive coastlines expose them to high climate change risks. The country’s GHG emission in 2000 was 21,767.41GgCO2e (RoP 2011). The 1987 Philippine Constitution provides for a unitary multitiered government (Diokno 2009; Manasan 2009). The country is divided into 15 administrative regions and two additional autonomous regions, Mindanao and Cordillera. The president is the head of state and government, and the bicameral legislature is made up of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Devolved local government units (LGUs) consist of provinces each subdivided into cities, municipalities, and barangays – the smallest political unit. They have authority over natural resource management, pollution control, and environmental protection but are under considerable supervision by higherlevel government in areas like budgeting and legislation. Legislative Framework Well aware of its particular vulnerability to climate change, the Philippines developed the comprehensive Climate Change Act of 2009, the first in the developing world and second globally after the UK. The Act aims to “mainstream(ing) climate change into government policy formulations, establish(ing) the framework strategy and program on climate change, creating for this purpose the Climate Change Commission” (RoP 2009, p. 1). The unequivocal intent to systematically mainstream climate change is noteworthy, suggesting that the mainstreaming mantra is slowly finding its way from academia into policy and, hopefully, practice. Both adaptation and mitigation measures have since been implemented through formulation of a Framework Strategy and Program Page 4 of 20

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on Climate Change (2010–2022) and the National Climate Change Action Plan (2011–2028), but with no emission reduction targets. Interestingly, the Framework Strategy “treats mitigation as a function of adaptation” (RoP 2010, p. 17). That is, it recognizes the mutually beneficial relationship in which mitigation strategies offer opportunities for enhancing adaptive capacity. The close interrelation between climate change and disaster risk reduction (DRR) is particularly evident in the Philippines. As such, the Climate Change Act integrates DRR into climate change initiatives, while the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act 2010 considers disasters as inclusive of climate change impacts (RoP 2010). Institutional Framework Climate Change Commission The Climate Change Act (2009) establishes the Climate Change Commission (CCC) as the sole policy-making body charged with coordinating, monitoring, and evaluating climate change-related programs and action plans. It is chaired by the president of the republic and is administratively located in the Office of the President, making it very high level. This arrangement has several potential advantages. First, it enhances the profile of and puts climate change firmly and high up on the national agenda. Second, it is a way of procuring and maintaining the political will and commitment to implement climate change actions by the executive. From a political ecology perspective, climate change is inherently political (cf. Eriksen and Lind 2009). Making the president by law the head of the premier climate change outfit does not automatically translate into political will. Rather, political competition potentially does the trick. That is, the incumbent will be motivated to bring to bear his or her political and executive powers on climate change programs as a way of endearing oneself to the electorate. The Act can, therefore, by design or default, create climate change champions out of the president, the executive, and the ruling political party or coalition. Champions play a critical role in rallying necessary support and educating the public on climate change (cf. Roberts 2008). Third, although enhancing mainstreaming, listed as the first function of the Commission, should essentially happen at all levels, the higher the better as this allows greater possibility of integration at lower political and administrative levels. The high-level status of the Commission gives the convening powers necessary to integrate climate change horizontally and vertically across all levels of governance. The Commission is made up of three other Commissioners who must be climate change experts. It is supported by a broad-based, cross-sectoral, and cross-departmental advisory board with representatives from relevant government ministries, local government, academia, the private sector, and civil society. Involvement of key stakeholders enhances the quality of climate change policies and their implementation but could also pose a challenge as it might prove difficult to reconcile the myriad of interests at play. Nevertheless, the Commission is mandated to meet once every 3 months or as often as deemed necessary, an arrangement which could help resolve any deadlocks in good time. Infrequency of meetings can impede the functioning and effectiveness of institutions. The day-to-day running of the Commission is assigned to a secretariat, the Climate Change Office headed by the Commission’s vice chairperson. In addition, a Panel of Technical Experts provides technical advice to the Commission in climate science, technologies, and best practices for risk assessment and enhancement of adaptive capacity. Surprisingly, the experts are to be permanently employed by the Commission. Without a clear definition of what particular “technical advice” they are to provide and for how long, it would be cost-effective to make the panel ad hoc. Nevertheless, the panel of experts incorporates a science- and evidence-based approach to climate change management.

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Other Institutions Government ministries and agencies are assigned specific roles based on their core mandates in the Climate Change Act. For example, the Department of Education is to integrate climate change into the primary and secondary education curricula, while government financial institutions are required to give preferential financial packages for climate change-related projects. Some of the specified roles and responsibilities are, however, quite restrictive and do not allow for an innovative interpretation of their mandates with regard to climate change. Local government units (LGUs) are at the forefront in formulating, planning, and implementing local climate change action plans. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is to monitor implementation of provisions of the Act and recommend any necessary legislation. Climate Finance Climate finance is crucial to addressing climate change. All relevant government agencies and local government units are to allocate adequate funds from their annual budgets for the implementation of their respective climate change programs and plans. No special fund is set up although the Commission is authorized to accept financial support from local and international sources. No carbon trading schemes are to be set up or funding expected from such, a cautious move given that they have not benefitted the intended developing countries and their underlying logic for net emission reductions has been questioned (cf. Mulugetta 2011; Reddy 2011; Bond et al. 2012). International funds, though often necessary, should complement, not replace, domestic resource mobilization.

Mexico Climate Change Vulnerability and Government Structure Mexico, a Latin American country bordering the United States of America (USA), is categorized as upper-middle-income economy by the World Bank (2013). Its GHG emissions are quite high, about 616 Mt CO2e in 2010 excluding land-use change (Höhne et al. 2012) and ranked eleventh globally (Vance 2012). Its climate is projected to become drier and warmer, with several hydrological regions highly vulnerable to decreased precipitation and higher temperatures (IPCC 2007). This makes major economic support sectors vulnerable to climate change (Liverman and O’Brien 1991). For example, the agricultural sector employs more than a third of its growing population, yet only one-fifth of the country’s cropland is irrigated. Rainfed agriculture supports subsistence farmers and provides most of the domestic food supply. Frequent droughts already reduce harvests and jeopardize food and energy security. About one-fifth of Mexico’s electricity is hydroelectric, hence susceptible to reduced water levels. Significant mismatch between water supply and population will see increased problems for cities and industrial production. Mexico is a three-tier federal government with 31 relatively autonomous states and a federal district which encompass Mexico City (Rodríguez and Ward 1994; Lankao 2007; Höhne et al. 2012). The president is the head of the federation and government, the bicameral legislature (Congress) is made up of the upper and lower chambers, while the judiciary is divided into federal and state systems. Unlike other Latin American countries, the president is directly elected for a single 6-year term. From the state, lower levels of devolution include the municipality (municipio) and municipal council (ayuntamiento). Although the devolved units are supposedly autonomous, the hegemonic nature of the ruling party often muzzles such autonomy, for example, in financial resources (cf. Höhne et al. 2012).

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Legislative Framework The General Law on Climate Change (Ley General de Cambio Climático) was enacted in 2012, making Mexico the most recent country and third globally to enact a framework climate change law. The law seeks to facilitate the transition to a competitive low-carbon emission economy by consolidating the institutional framework across the three levels of government, regulation of adaptation and mitigation actions, and promotion of research, innovation, and technology transfer. It fulfills Mexico’s Cancún pledge to voluntarily reduce its emissions to 30 % by 2020 and 50 % by 2050 (based on 2000 baseline), conditional on international financial support. This is in addition to generating 35 % of the country’s electricity from renewable sources by 2024. The 2020 target is considered the most stringent for a developing country, and Mexico is the only developing country so far to set itself an absolute reduction target by 2050 (Höhne et al. 2012). Mechanisms for gradual establishment of market-based instruments and emission trading are included (IDLO 2012). The General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection (LGEEPA), Mexico’s framework environmental law, was amended in 2011 to incorporate some climate change provisions, including the authority of environmental agencies to formulate and execute mitigation actions (Ruffo and Vega 2011). However, the enactment of the comprehensive General Law on Climate Change has incorporated and harmonized many such provisions. Institutional Framework The General Law on Climate Change establishes an institutional framework that emphasizes the need for a transversal, cross-sectoral approach to climate change and the critical importance of wide stakeholder participation (IDLO 2012). They include the following. Intersecretarial Commission on Climate Change (Comisión Intersecretarial de Cambio Climático, CICC) Originally administratively established in 2005 (Höhne et al. 2012), the CICC became embedded in the 2012 climate change law. Charged with formulating national climate change policies, coordinating actions across the federal government, and ensuring mainstreaming and participation of key stakeholders, the CICC is composed of several relevant government ministries. Similar to the Philippines’ Climate Change Commission, the CICC is chaired by the president of the federation who may delegate this function to the minister responsible for environmental matters. It could not be established if the CICC is administratively located in the Office of the President. As already discussed under section “Institutional Framework” of the Philippines, making the president by law the chairperson and therefore directly the head of the premier, the climate change coordinating institution has positive ramifications for climate change management. Again, mainstreaming is clearly stated as one of the key objectives of the Commission and the law. The CICC is to have several permanent Working Groups, including one on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). Deforestation is a major source of GHG emissions in Mexico and therefore an appropriate target area. Linked to the CICC is the Council on Climate Change (Consejo de Cambio Climático, CCC), a permanent consultative body comprised of representatives from the private sector, civil society, and academia. Its objective is to foster broad stakeholder participation, collaboration, and support for climate change policies and actions (IDLO 2012). It can be equated to the Philippine’s Climate Change Commission’s Advisory Board. National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change (Instituto Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático (INECC)) INECC is the main public agency responsible for climate change policy development and evaluation (IDLO 2012). Specifically, it is to prepare, conduct, and evaluate the national climate change policy; design market-based instruments; prepare an emissions inventory; Page 7 of 20

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and build scientific and research capacity. Its management is under a governing board comprised of heads of several ministries and chaired by the sectoral minister responsible for environmental matters. It has a director general appointed by the president and chairperson of the CICC. The INECC’s functions and composition are similar to the Philippine’s Climate Change Office (CCO). However, the similarity of its functions to and unclear relation to the CICC might create institutional conflict if clear coordination and communication mechanisms are not put in place. Other Institutions The National System for Climate Change (Sistema Nacional de Cambio Climático, SNCC) is a permanent communication and coordination mechanism between the federal government and devolved governments. Made up of the CICC, CCC, INECC, state governments, LGU representatives, and the Congress, it is aimed at promoting the cross implementation of the national climate change policy (IDLO 2012). In a decentralized system such as in Mexico, clear coordination and communication between different governance levels are very crucial for the effective implementation of a crosscutting policy issue like climate change. The Evaluation Committee (Coordinación de Evaluación, CE) reports to the SNCC and is an expert body made up of the head of INECC and representatives from the scientific, academic, and technical communities charged with periodically and systematically evaluating progress on implementation of aspects of the climate change law. Climate Finance The General Law on Climate Change establishes a Climate Change Fund (Fondo Para el Cambio Climático) aimed at sourcing and channeling funds from public and private sectors, at both national and international levels (IDLO 2012). This is in addition to annual budgetary allocation and proceeds from carbon trading. The CICC is legally mandated to establish an emission market, including a regulating agency (Höhne et al. 2012).

South Africa Climate Change Vulnerability and Government Structure South Africa is the only African country whose contribution to global warming is significant (Chevallier 2010) due to its energy-intensive, fossil-fuel-powered economy. The 2000 estimate was 435 million tons of CO2 (Letete et al. 2009). A greater warming trend has been observed throughout the continent since the 1960s (IPCC 2007). Even under very conservative emission scenarios, it is predicted that by mid-century the South African coast will warm by around 1–2
C and the interior by around 2–3
C (RSA 2011). Declining rainfall patterns and increased frequency of extreme climate events such as droughts and floods are projected (Maponya and Mpandeli 2012; IFRC 2011). These changes will significantly affect human health, agriculture, and other waterintensive economic sectors such as mining and electricity generation. Moreover, a large number of South Africans live in conditions of chronic disaster vulnerability such as fragile ecologies or marginal areas (RSA 2005). The severe June 1994 floods in Cape Town’s historically disadvantaged Cape Flats exposed the country’s disaster soft underbelly. South Africa is a federal government comprised of a three-tier devolved system: national, provincial, and local. The president is the head of state and government. The Parliament is made up of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. Each of the nine provincial governments is allowed to make provincial laws and may adopt their own constitution. Three categories of local governments (or municipalities) exist (Pasquini et al. 2013): metropolitan, local municipalities, and district. Many of their responsibilities have important implications for climate change management. The constitution also recognizes the role of traditional leadership. Page 8 of 20

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All the three levels of government must observe and adhere to the principles of cooperative government. As is expected, the country’s decentralization has its challenges (cf. Koelble and Andrew 2013). Legislative Framework South Africa does not have a framework climate change law. The National Climate Change Response White Paper (2011) is the key policy document guiding climate change management. It sets mitigation targets that should collectively result in a 34 % and a 42 % deviation below its “business as usual” emission growth trajectory by 2020 and 2025, respectively, conditional on international financial and technological support (RSA 2011). It also outlines the institutional and other planning frameworks. Existing legislations, especially those dealing with disaster risk reduction and general environmental regulation, e.g., the Air Quality Act 2004, are also relevant to adaptation and mitigation efforts. To ensure that climate change is fully mainstreamed into the work of all three spheres of government, all government departments and state-owned enterprises are to regularly review their policies and plans (RSA 2011). The Disaster Management Act of 2002 definition of “disaster” as a progressive or sudden, widespread or localized, and natural- or human-caused occurrence (RSA 2003) can be interpreted as inclusive of climate change. The White Paper also considers DRR as short-term adaptations to climate change and acknowledges the existence and crucial role played by the Disaster Management Act. Overall, South Africa seems to have no immediate intention of enacting a stand-alone framework climate change law. Implementation of the actions stipulated in the White Paper will, where necessary, be implemented through piecemeal changes to relevant existing legislations and regulations. This is at variance with all the other countries analyzed. Mainstreaming is however at the core of its climate change management efforts. Institutional Framework Unlike the Philippines and Mexico, South Africa’s climate change institutional framework is fragmented. Several institutions are responsible for various aspects of climate change, many of which overlap, thus creating possibilities of conflict. Most are also not anchored in any law and lack administrative capabilities or budgetary allocation. Interministerial Committee on Climate Change (IMCCC) Established in 2009, the IMCCC is to oversee all aspects of the implementation of the climate change policy. In justifying the need for the IMCCC, the White Paper states that “the strategic, multi-faceted and crosscutting nature of climateresilient development requires a coordination committee at executive (Cabinet) level that will coordinate and align climate change response actions with national policies and legislation” (RSA 2011, p. 36). This illustrates the necessity of a high-level cross-sectoral institution with convening powers as is similarly applied by the countries analyzed so far. However, contrary to the above statement and at variance with the other developing countries, the IMCCC is to be chaired by the minister responsible for the environment rather than the president or Cabinet secretary. Additionally, technical, analytical, and administrative capacity to the IMCCC will be provided by a secretariat based in the sectoral Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA). Though interministerial, the arrangement makes the IMCCC less high level relative to the rest of the countries analyzed. The net effect is a lowering of the profile of climate change in the national agenda and potential challenges in integrating climate change across government. In many governments the world over, ministries of environment are rarely viewed as “powerful” based not only on their perennial paltry annual budgetary allocation but also because of the late entry of environmental issues on the national Page 9 of 20

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agenda, many countries having only established environmental ministries after the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Environmental ministries thus lack the political clout, financial muscle, and convening powers necessary to effectively coordinate and mainstream a crosscutting issue such as climate change across government. Moreover, Giordano et al. (2011) view the IMCCC as merely an information platform which does not include all relevant ministries, especially that of finance. Forum of South African Directors-General Clusters Forum of South African Directors-General (FOSAD) was established in 1998 to enhance integration of crosscutting issues within the overall policy and implementation framework and address identified coordination weaknesses such as lack of alignment between different governmental planning cycles and between the central and devolved units (RSA n.d.). Mirroring the main Cabinet committees, they are to provide strategic leadership for the national climate change response actions. However, their structure and functioning has been criticized as potentially inappropriate for the prioritization of climate change issues (Giordano et al. 2011). Intergovernmental Committee on Climate Change (IGCCC) Established in 2008, the IGCCC’s role is to operationalize cooperative governance in the area of climate change by bringing together the relevant national, provincial, and municipal departments under the principle of cooperative government. It fosters information exchange and consultation. However, lack of representation of the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), inability to provide practical assistance in policy development or implementation, and lack of an administrative budget or structure (Giordano et al. 2011) potentially weaken its effectiveness. Other Institutions The National Committee on Climate Change (NCCC), which is to be formalized into an advisory council with statutory powers and extended responsibilities beyond the current communication function, is one of two mechanisms set up to coordinate activities and consult with key stakeholders (RSA 2011). Its upgrade could remedy its current lack of legal backing, a secretariat, and regular budget and lack of executive power (Giordano et al. 2011). The second stakeholder coordination mechanism is the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) which brings together the government, business, and labor unions. The environment, including climate change, is a concurrent function between the provincial and national government. Each province is to develop its own climate response strategy, and municipalities are to integrate climate change considerations and constraints into their development plans and programs. To make clear local governments’ mandate and assign them specific climate change-related powers, COGTA is to review relevant policies and legislations. Parliament is to review legislation and determine the legal requirements to support the existing or proposed institutional and regulatory arrangements, while line ministries and agencies are to integrate climate change into their policies and programs. Climate Finance By necessity, South Africa’s climate finance strategy comprises a comprehensive suite of measures, including market-based ones, to create and maintain a long-term funding framework for mitigation and adaptation actions. In the short- and medium-term period, a transitional climate finance system and interim climate finance coordination mechanism are to be established, the nature of which is not outlined. In the long term, however, climate change actions will be integrated into the fiscal budgetary process of all the three tiers of government.

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Kenya Climate Change Vulnerability and Government Structure Kenya has experienced increasing temperature trends over most parts of the country for the past 60 years (GoK 2010a). The time series of annual and seasonal rainfall for the standard seasons of December–January–February, March–April–May, June–July–August, and September–October–November indicates a neutral to slightly decreasing trends. The effects of the observed climatic changes include a reduction in the glacier on Mt. Kenya, variability in weather patterns, and frequent, prolonged, and severe drought and flood conditions (NEMA 2008). Kenya’s natural resource-based economy makes it particularly vulnerable to climate change. Agriculture is mainly rainfed, while tourism largely depends on wildlife and the ecosystem, both highly susceptible to climate change (cf. GoK 2010a; Kameri-Mbote and Odote 2011; NEMA 2008; Mutimba et al. 2010). Some estimates put the future net economic costs of climate change at 2.6 % of GDP per year by 2030 and doubling by 2050 (SEI 2009). The new (2010) constitution makes Kenya a presidential republic with a two-tier decentralized system of distinct and interdependent central and 47 county governments (GoK 2010b). The president is the head of state and government and together with the deputy president, attorney general, and several Cabinet secretaries form the Cabinet. The bicameral Parliament is made up of the National Assembly and Senate. The Senate represents the interests of the counties, while county assemblies have legislative powers. County governments’ functions have a bearing on climate change management and include county planning, controlling air pollution, natural resource and environmental conservation, agriculture, health, transport, and trade. Legislative Framework Kenya, like South Africa, is yet to enact a framework climate legislation. However, Kenya has made strong indications of its intention to do so in the near future. The country’s climate change governance scope is encompassed in various policy and regulatory frameworks interrelated to its natural resources (Mutimba and Wanyoike 2013). This analysis will focus primarily on the National Climate Change Response Strategy 2010 (NCCRS), National Climate Change Action Plan 2013–2017 (NCCAP), and, briefly, the Climate Change Authority Bill 2012. The NCCRS was developed in 2010 with the aim of achieving a prosperous and climate change-resilient Kenya. It admits that “the integration of climate information into Government policies is important. . . (but) the same has not been adequately factored into most of the sectors of the country’s economy including government development policies and plans” (GoK 2010a, p. 6), an endorsement of mainstreaming. It outlines an enabling policy, legal, and institutional framework. It recommends the development of a comprehensive climate change policy which should be translated into a climate change law by either strengthening existing legislations or developing a new stand-alone law (GoK 2010a). Despite being time-consuming and expensive, the NCCRS prefers an entirely new climate change law. Launched in March 2013, the NCCAP operationalizes the NCCRS. It covers, among others, low-carbon development strategies; adaptation and mitigation options; climate finance; and an enabling policy, legislative, and institutional framework intended to enhance mainstreaming. The actions are premised on their contribution toward achieving Kenya’s long-term development goals in addition to intermediate benefits such as improved livelihoods, attracting international climate finance, as well as demonstrating global leadership (GoK 2013). It further commits all government ministries, departments, and agencies to play a role in mainstreaming climate change across their functions and processes. No emission reduction target is set. Rather, priority low-carbon development areas and options are outlined. In keeping with the NCCRS, the NCCAP recommends Page 11 of 20

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development of a coherent stand-alone climate change policy to, among others, provide guidance on (i) the envisaged legislative framework to be established through a climate change law and (ii) the specific sectoral legislative amendments that will enable full implementation of the NCCAP’s priorities. It reaffirms “the need to enact a stand-alone framework climate change law to facilitate the necessary direction, coordination, policy setting and high-level political prioritization in order to mainstream climate change across government functions” (GoK 2013, p. 100). The stand-alone climate law is to be accompanied by a series of sectoral legislative and regulatory amendments through either an omnibus bill or a number of separate legislative amendments in order to bring sectoral legislation in harmony with the framework climate change law. The Kenya Climate Change Authority Bill, 2012, is a private member’s bill presented to the Parliament in April 2012. Some of its proposals are at variance with those of the government which consider it a parallel effort (GoK 2013). Developed mainly by the civil society under the aegis of the Kenya Climate Change Working Group, the Bill seeks to establish a Climate Change Authority and provide a framework for mitigation and adaptation (GoK 2012). A Climate Change Trust Fund is also proposed. The Bill is, however, not comprehensive since beyond the proposed institutional framework, it covers very little else. It is evident from the NCCAP that the government has sidestepped the Bill and is focused on enacting an entirely new stand-alone framework climate change law. It seems that the proposals in the NCCRS and more specifically the NCCAP are the official Government of Kenya position on climate change. Consequently, the proposals in the Bill will not be considered any further. Institutional Framework The NCCRS considers a dedicated climate change institution as important in establishing a coordination instrument to ensure that all cross-sectoral activities match the overall vision of a prosperous and climate change-resilient Kenya (GoK 2010a). But its proposed institutional structure gives the sectoral ministry responsible for the environment a dominant role, with all the key institutions placed under it. The potential lack of effectiveness of such a sectoral and non-highlevel institutional arrangement is already discussed under section “Institutional Framework” of South Africa. In summary, the National Climate Change Secretariat (NCCS), which was instrumental in developing the NCCAP, was established. In addition, the National Climate Change Steering Committee (NCCSC) was charged with gathering and collating information from various stakeholders, while the existing cross-sectoral National Climate Change Activities Coordination Committee (NCCACC) continued in its advisory capacity. Perhaps recognizing the potential weaknesses of the NCCRS proposal, the NCCAP proposes a radically different institutional framework intended to achieve high-level oversight and policy guidance, mainstream climate change, involve county governments and stakeholders, and enhance technical and scientific analysis capabilities (GoK 2013). The following institutions proposed in the NCCAP will most likely receive the necessary legal backing with the eventual enactment of a stand-alone climate change legislation. National Climate Change Council (NCCC) The proposed NCCC will be responsible for policy direction, coordination, and oversight across government. Consistent with similar institutions in the Philippines and Mexico, it will be located in the Office of the President and, therefore, high level. Although initial proposals (in which the author was involved as a consultant) involved making the president of the republic the chairperson of NCCC, the government eventually settled on the secretary to the Cabinet. Reporting annually to the Parliament, it has representatives of both the national and county governments as in the UK’s Committee on Climate Change (see section “Institutional Framework” of the UK). Interministerial and interagency, the NCCC represents a wide Page 12 of 20

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cross section of stakeholder interests from public, private, academia, research, and civil society. The mandate, location, and composition of the NCCC accord it the necessary political clout, convening, and resource mobilization powers necessary to adequately champion and effectively mainstream climate change across government, both national and devolved. The NCCC will be supported by a technical National Climate Change Secretariat located within the sectoral ministry responsible for climate affairs. Its functions will include continuous revision of climate policy, proposal of relevant legislation, and program implementation. It may have decentralized structures at the county level to collect and collate climate change data. Other Institutions The ministry in charge of national planning is to spearhead integration of climate change into planning processes. One way will be through installation of climate change desk officers in all line ministries. The National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) remains the Designated National Authority (DNA) on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the National Implementing Entity (NIE) for the Adaptation Fund. County governments will have climate change functions coordinated and supported by the National Climate Change Secretariat (NCCS). A Climate Change Resource Center hosted by the NCCS is to become the one-stop shop for Kenya’s climate change information and knowledge. Climate Finance A Kenya Climate Fund (KCF) located within the ministry responsible for finance intended as a vehicle for mobilizing and allocating both international and domestic financial resources toward climate change activities is proposed. The public sector’s capacity to efficiently and effectively absorb the expected funding, scaling up access to international carbon markets and possible establishment of a carbon trading platform, as well as improving the “investment climate for climate investment” are some of the proposed climate finance strategies. Climate change funding will also be prioritized in the annual budget by creating climate change line items and coding them for ease of tracking.

The UK Climate Change Vulnerability and Government Structure The UK was the first country globally to enact a framework stand-alone climate change legislation in 2008. A developed country, the UK has a long, even intimate, history with GHG emissions based on its role in igniting the industrial revolution and the transition to the current fossil-fuel economy, the “anthropocene” (cf. Crutzen 2000). The warming trend throughout Europe is well established (IPCC 2007). The UK’s first Climate Change Risk Assessment indicates both positive and negative impacts of climate change on production systems such as agriculture, forestry, and fisheries and key economic sectors such as tourism and energy (DEFRA 2012). The UK is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarch. While the prime minister is the head of government, the queen is the head of state. The Cabinet is made up of the prime minister and several secretaries of state. Some power is devolved to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland which are in charge of local environment, health, education, and transport. Legislative Framework Response to climate change in the UK has been varied (cf. Hulme and Turnpenny 2004). The first attempt to enact legislation aimed at reducing GHG emissions was through the Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Act 2006 which sought to promote renewable energy and compliance with GHG emission-related building regulations (UK Govt. 2006). The Act was not comprehensive, lacking in Page 13 of 20

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areas such as adaptation, emission trading, and enabling institutional structures. A new comprehensive Climate Change Act 2008 was therefore enacted. It sets a legally binding 2050 emission target of at least 80 % lower than the 1990 baseline, establishes an institutional framework and emission trading schemes, and makes provisions for adaptation (UK Govt. 2008). It also amends and harmonizes relevant existing legislations and regulations. While the legally binding emission reduction target is an obligation under the UNFCCC, the attention given to adaptation illustrates the need to plan for and build adaptive capacity even by developed countries. Institutional Framework Committee on Climate Change The Committee on Climate Change is to give advice to the government and its agencies, including the devolved units. It is composed of a chairperson and five to eight members jointly appointed by the national authorities, i.e., the secretary of state and Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Ireland ministers responsible for climate change affairs. Cumulatively, the Commission must have experience in or knowledge of a set of expertise or knowledge areas crucial to a holistic understanding and management of climate change. The Committee appoints a chief executive and may establish several subcommittees, but with a mandatory adaptation subcommittee. It makes regular progress reports to the Parliament. Other Institutions Implementation of the advice and recommendations of the Committee on Climate Change are entirely left to the central and devolved governments. The Parliament plays its oversight role by receiving regular progress reports, while the Committee is required to involve the public and other stakeholders in carrying out its functions. Unlike the developing countries analyzed, the Climate Change Act 2008 does not provide for any resource mobilization strategy since requisite resources are to be included in the relevant implementing agencies’ annual budgets. Relation to Developing Countries’ Frameworks The UK’s enactment of a stand-alone climate change law is in tandem with that of most of the developing countries analyzed. Institutionally, the UK adopts a lean structure. Relative to the developing countries, the composition, appointing authority, and apparent administrative independence give the impression that the Committee is not high level. However, this might not necessarily be the case given the UK’s unique system where the executive, just like the Committee, is accountable to the Parliament. That all government agencies must seek and consider its advice further raises its profile and potential buy-in for its recommendations. However, the Committee’s role is limited to advice, and its membership is expert led rather than stakeholder based. Such a scientific approach potentially depoliticizes and reduces conflicts within the Committee but can be criticized for ignoring the positive aspects of stakeholder participation. Its success is thus contingent on a high degree of public faith in science for policy. The direct inclusion of representatives of devolved units in the premier climate change institution is shared by the UK and Kenya. This could be attributed to their unique devolved systems which wield significant powers and autonomy. The arrangement enhances interpretation and smooth implementation of climate change goals at the local levels and is worth emulating. Overall, despite being the pioneer in enacting framework climate change legislation, it is hard to tell to what degree the UK has influenced the legal and institutional structures of the other developing countries.

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Synthesis of Emerging Climate Governance Best Practice Climate change governance frameworks are still evolving. The few but growing number of countries that have proposed legal and institutional structures provide insight which can guide other countries. The foregoing comparative analysis has revealed certain emerging best practice, summarized below, which forms elements of a climate change governance structure developing countries can reproduce, expand, or tailor to their domestic sociopolitical situations.

Enactment of New Stand-Alone Framework Climate Change Legislation Except South Africa which has no immediate intention of enacting a stand-alone framework climate change law, all the rest either have done so or have unequivocally demonstrated their intention to do so. Two key factors seem to favor such a framework law: (i) the “wicked” nature of climate change requires strategies and policy instruments that go beyond what existing sectoral legislations might have been conceived to deal with, and (ii) the nature and degree of potential amendments to existing sectoral laws are so extensive that they are best captured in a comprehensive stand-alone legislation. The UK’s experience of initially opting for the limited Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Act, 2006, before settling on the more comprehensive Climate Change Act, 2008, illustrates this point.

Mainstreaming Is Key to Climate Change Management Mainstreaming of climate change into policies, legislations, and programs is widely advocated in literature as a more effective approach to tackling climate change. Yet, its uptake and application in laws and institutions are yet to be fully assessed. This comparative analysis provides some empirical evidence that mainstreaming is finding its way into policy and planning instruments from academia. All the countries assessed embrace mainstreaming and commit to integrating climate change through various strategies. This calls for early targeted training on how to mainstream climate change at different levels and constant monitoring and evaluation of applied strategies.

Mitigation Actions Are as Domestically Beneficial as Adaptation The need to grow their economies in order to lift their growing populations out of poverty has traditionally been used to explain a seeming focus on adaptation at the expense of mitigation by many developing countries. However, empirical evidence from this analysis indicates that most of these countries now view mitigation as a function of adaptation, basing their emission reduction actions on envisaged benefits or “win-win” outcomes. These are generally packaged as low-carbon development strategies or pathways. Apart from the urge to demonstrate global leadership, a possible frustration with international efforts, and jab at the developed countries for perceived lack of commitment, such benefits include job creation and access to new technology and international finance. The distinction between mitigation and adaptation actions is increasingly becoming blurred. Many mitigation actions have adaptation benefits and vice versa.

High-Level Climate Change Institution The dominant trend across the countries analyzed is the establishment of a new high-level crosssectoral climate change institution with representation from a wide cross section of stakeholders. Charged with overall advice, policy guidance, coordination, and oversight, its high-level status emanates from being chaired by the country’s president, or secretary to the Cabinet, and location in the Office of the President (OP) or Cabinet Office, or both. Remember most of the countries are presidential systems. The UK and Kenya go a notch higher by including representatives of the devolved units in this premier climate change institution. Such an arrangement puts climate change Page 15 of 20

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high up on the national agenda, enhances political commitment, and promotes mainstreaming. Complementing the climate change institution is an advisory board made up of academia, private sector, civil society, and other special interests. A dedicated secretariat to oversee the technical aspects of the climate change policy and handle day-to-day affairs completes the institutional structure.

Clear Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination Mechanisms Clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of institutions with regard to climate change reduces conflicts and leads to effective resource use. However, in doing so, the ability to innovatively interpret such roles and responsibilities should be allowed by not being so prescriptive. For institutions, it is especially important to harmonize their roles and responsibilities if any meaningful results are to be achieved, a situation South Africa currently faces. Clear coordination and communication within and between central government, devolved units, and other governance levels are critical for effective implementation of planned climate change actions. Various mechanisms of doing so are highlighted in the case studies, including oversight, financial and other capacitybuilding assistance, and regular progress reporting.

Mixed Climate Finance Strategies

The climate finance mobilization and management strategies are mixed. While expected sources of finance include public and private funds from both local and international sources, some countries opt to align climate-related actions to regular budgetary process and/or establish climate change funds along the lines of the UNFCCC’s Adaptation Fund. Setting up and/or trading in the carbon market is still popular with many countries. Other proposals include improving the capacity of the public sector to efficiently and effectively absorb the expected climate finances and improving the general investment climate.

Concluding Remarks Responding to the threat posed by climate change requires establishment of effective and efficient governance structures. For many developing countries, this process is already underway. The comparative analysis of the climate change legislative and institutional frameworks of the four developing and one developed country presented in this chapter reveals several emerging best practices which can constitute elements of a broad governance framework developing countries could reproduce or tailor to their domestic situations. However, the results also raise broader issues that need closer attention and focus. One such concern is the need to incorporate and actively support the development of national climate change governance structures in discussions leading to the achievement of the outcomes of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. The “Durban Platform” is tasked with developing “a protocol, another legal instrument or a legal outcome” under the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) applicable to all member countries by 2015. Such consideration would ensure synergy between national- and global-level efforts while appreciating the multilevel nature of climate change governance. The lack of an international enforcement body for UNFCCC-related proposed actions should reinforce the need to support national-level actions. It is hard to tell whether the seeming enthusiasm by the developing countries sampled in this study to prepare national climate change legislations will spread significantly to other countries. However, success in their implementation will more likely inspire confidence in others to follow suit. Yet, such Page 16 of 20

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a successful implementation requires a range of other conditions to be met, resources or otherwise. There are many potential challenges which could derail the achievement of the intended outcomes of the so established climate change legal and institutional frameworks. Targeted capacity building in various areas is thus necessary. More important, however, is the need for sharing experiences by the different countries. The apparent significance which developing countries attach to mitigation represents an important paradigm shift in the way mitigation is viewed. For a long time, mitigation and adaptation have been separated in both the academic and policy fields. The view that mitigation is a function of adaptation and that the two complement rather than antagonize each other, adopted by most of the developing countries analyzed in this study, is the closest to reality. What this reveals is that reducing emissions does not necessarily lead to a reduction in socioeconomic development. Such a revelation should inspire developed countries to cut their emissions not only as a way of slowing and hopefully reversing the current rate of global warming but also as a way of increasing welfare in those very countries and beyond. Genuine efforts at tackling climate change are linked to sustainable consumption and production. Dematerialization, decoupling, degrowth, and such sustainability buzzwords should not be mere rhetoric.

References Agrawal A (2008) The role of local institutions in adaptation to climate change. http://www.icarus. info/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/agrawal-adaptation-institutions-livelihoods.pdf Agrawal A, Perrin N (2009) Climate adaptation, local institutions and rural livelihoods. In: Adger W, Lorenzoni I, O’Brien K (eds) Adapting to climate change: thresholds, values, governance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Balint P, Stewart R, Desai A, Walters L (2011) Wicked environmental problems: managing uncertainty and conflict. Island Press, Washington, DC Bond P, Sharife K, Allen F, Amisi B, Brunner K, Castel-Branco R, Dorsey D, Gambirazzio G, Hathaway T, Nel A, Nham W (2012) The CDM cannot deliver the money to Africa: why the clean development mechanism won’t save the planet from climate change, and how African civil society is resisting. EJOLT report no 2. http://www.ejolt.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ 2013/01/121221_EJOLT_2_Low.pdf Butler H, Mecey J (1996) Externalities and the matching principle: the case for reallocating environmental regulatory authority. Yale Law Policy Rev 23:23–66 Chevallier R (2010) Integrating adaptation into development strategies: the Southern African perspective. Clim Dev 2:191–200 Crutzen P (2000) Have we entered the “Anthropocene”? IGBP. http://www.igbp.net/5. d8b4c3c12bf3be638a8000578.html DEFRA (2012) UK climate change risk assessment: government report. The Stationery Office, London Diokno B (2009) Decentralization in the Philippines after ten years – what have we learned? In: Ichimura S, Bahl R (eds) Decentralization policies in Asian development. World Scientific, Singapore Engel K, Saleska S (2005) Subglobal regulation of the global commons: the case of climate change. Ecol Law Rev 32:183–233 Eriksen S, Lind J (2009) Adaptation as a political process: adjusting to drought and conflict in Kenya’s drylands. Environ Manage 43:817–835 Page 17 of 20

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European Environment Agency (EEA) (2005) Market-based instruments for environmental policy in Europe. EEA, Copenhagen Fröhlich J, Knieling J (2013) Conceptualizing climate change governance. In: Knieling J, Filho W (eds) Climate change governance. Springer, Berlin Giordano T, Hall L, Gilder A, Parramon M (2011) Governance of climate change in South Africa. South Africa Department of Environmental Affairs, Pretoria GoK (2010a) National climate change response strategy. GoK, Nairobi GoK (2010b) The constitution of Kenya 2010. National Council for Law Reporting, Nairobi GoK (2012) The climate change authority bill 2012. Kenya Gazette supplement no 61 (Bills no 29) 18 June 2012. Government Printer, Nairobi GoK (Government of Kenya) (2013) National climate change action plan 2013–2017. GoK, Nairobi. http://www.kccap.info/ Guillotreau P, Campling L, Robinson J (2012) Vulnerability of small island fishery economies to climate and institutional changes. Curr Opin Environ Sustain 4:287–291 Gupta J, Termeer C, Klostermann J, Meijerink S, van den Brink M, Jong P, Nooteboom S, Bergsma E (2010) The adaptive capacity wheel: a method to assess the inherent characteristics of institutions to enable the adaptive capacity of society. Environ Sci Policy 13:459–471 Herodes M, Adelle C, Pallemaerts M (2007) Environmental policy integration and modes of governance – a literature review. Ecologic Institute, Berlin Höhne N, Moltmann S, Hagemann M, Fekete H, Grözinger J, Sch€ uler V, Vieweg M, Hare B, Schaeffer M, Rocha M (2012) Assessment of Mexico’s policies impacting its greenhouse gas emissions profile. Climate Action Tracker, Mexico Homeyer I (2006) EPIGOV common framework. Ecologic Institute, Berlin Hulme M, Turnpenny J (2004) Understanding and managing climate change: the UK experience. Geogr J 170(2):105–115 Huq S, Rahman A, Konate M, Sokona Y, Reid H (2003) Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change in least developed countries (LDCs). Russell Press, Nottingham IDLO (2012) The new general law of climate change in Mexico: leading national action to transition to a green economy. IDLO, Rome. http://www.idlo.int/Publications/MexicoClimateChangeLWB.pdf IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) (2011) Analysis of legislation related to disaster risk reduction in South Africa. IFRC, Geneva. http://www.ifrc. org/PageFiles/86599/1213900-IDRL_Analysis_South%20Africa-EN-LR.pdf IPCC (2007) IPCC fourth assessment report: climate change 2007. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#1 Jordan A, Wurzel R, Zito A (2005) The rise of ‘new’ policy instruments in comparative perspective: has governance eclipsed government? Polit Stud 53:477–496 Kameri-Mbote P, Odote C (2011) Kenya. In: Lord QC, Goldberg S, Rajamani L, Brunnee J (eds) Climate change liability: transnational law and practice. Cambridge University Press, New York Klein R, Eriksen S, Næss L, Hammill A, Tanner T, Robledo C, O’Brien K (2007) Portfolio screening to support the mainstreaming of adaptation to climate change into development assistance. Clim Change 84(1):23–44 Koelble T, Andrew S (2013) Why decentralization in South Africa has failed. Gov Int J Policy Adm Inst 26(3):343–346 Lankao P (2007) How do local governments in Mexico City manage global warming? Local Environ 12(5):519–535

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Lasco R, Pulhin F, Jaranilla-Sanchez P, Delfino R, Gerpacio R, Garcia K (2009) Mainstreaming adaptation in developing countries: the case of the Philippines. Clim Dev 1:130–146 Lazarus R (2008) Super wicked problems and climate change: restraining the present to liberate the future. Cornell Law Rev 94:1153–1243 Letete T, Guma M, Marquard A (2009) Information on climate change in South Africa: greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation options. http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/Information/Climate%20change/ Climate_change_info-complete.pdf Liverman D, O’Brien K (1991) Global warming and climate change in Mexico. Glob Environ Chang 1(5):351–364 Lofts K, Kenny A (2012) Mainstreaming climate resilience into government: the Philippines Climate Change Act. CDKN Inside Stories, London Manasan R (2009) Local public finance in the Philippines – balancing autonomy and accountability. In: Ichimura S, Bahl R (eds) Decentralization policies in Asian development. World Scientific, Singapore Maponya P, Mpandeli S (2012) Climate change and agricultural production in South Africa: impacts and adaptation options. J Agric Sci 4(10):48–60 Mickwitz P, Aix F, Beck S, Carss D, Ferrand N, Görg C, Jensen A, Kivimaa P, Kuhlicke C, Kuindersma W, Máñez M, Melanen M, Monni S, Pedersen A, Reinert H, van Bommel S (2009) Climate policy integration, coherence and governance. PEER, Helsinki Mulugetta Y (2011) Climate change and carbon trading in Africa. In: Reddy T (ed) Carbon trading in Africa: a critical review. Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria Mutimba S, Wanyoike R (2013) Towards a coherent and cost-effective policy response to climate change in Kenya: country report. Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Nairobi Mutimba S, Mayieko S, Olum P, Wanyama K (2010) Climate change vulnerability and adaptation preparedness in Kenya. Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Nairobi National Environment Management Authority Kenya (NEMA) (2008) Effects of climate change and coping mechanisms in Kenya. NEMA, Nairobi Oulu M (2011) Mainstreaming climate adaptation in Kenya. Clim Law 2(3):375–394 Pasquini L, Cowling R, Ziervogel G (2013) Facing the heat: barriers to mainstreaming climate change adaptation in local government in the Western Cape Province, South Africa. Habitat Int 40:225–232 Pelling M, Uitto J (2001) Small island developing states: natural disaster vulnerability and global change. Environ Hazard 3:49–62 Persson A (2004) Environmental policy integration: an introduction. SEI, Stockholm Persson A, Klein R (2008) Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change into official development assistance: integration of long-term climate concerns and short-term development needs. http:// userpage.fu-berlin.de/ffu/akumwelt/bc2008/papers/bc2008_71_Person-Klein.pdf Reddy T (2011) Climate change, carbon trading and the purpose of this study. In: Reddy T (ed) Carbon trading in Africa: a critical review. Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria Reid W, Goldemberg J (1998) Developing countries are combating climate change: actions in developing countries that slow growth in carbon emissions. Energy Policy 26(3):233–237 Republic of the Philippines (RoP) (2010) National framework strategy on climate change 2010–2022. Climate Change Commission, Manila Roberts D (2008) Thinking globally, acting locally: institutionalizing climate change at the local government level in Durban, South Africa. Environ Urban 20(2):521–537 Rodríguez V, Ward P (1994) Disentangling the PRI from the government in Mexico. Mex Stud 10(1):163–186 Page 19 of 20

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RoP (2009) Philippines Climate Change Act 2009. RoP, Manila RoP (2010) Philippines Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010. RoP, Manila RoP (2011) National climate change action plan 2011–2028. Climate Change Commission, Manila RSA (2003) Disaster Management Act. 2002. Government gazette no 24252 RSA (2005) Introduction: a policy framework for disaster risk management in South Africa. http:// www.capetown.gov.za/en/DRM/Documents/SA_National_Disaster_Man_Framework_2005.pdf RSA (2011) National climate change response white paper. RSA, Pretoria RSA (n.d.) A guide to the national planning framework. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/ pcsa/general/npf1.pdf Ruffo J, Vega M (2011) Mexico. In: The international comparative legal guide to environment & climate law: a practical cross-border insight into environment and climate change law. Global Legal Group, London Stavins R (1997) Policy instruments for climate change: how can national governments address a global problem? Univ Chic Legal Forum 2:93–329. http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage? collection¼journals%26handle¼hein.journals/uchclf1997%26div¼12%26id¼%26page¼ Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) (2009) The economics of climate change in Kenya. SEI, Stockholm Townshend T, Mathews A (2013) National climate change legislation: the key to more ambitious international agreements. CDKN, London UK Govt. (2006) Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Act 2006. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/2006/19/pdfs/ukpga_20060019_en.pdf UK Govt. (2008) Climate Change Act 2008. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/pdfs/ ukpga_20080027_en.pdf UNDP-UNEP (2011) Mainstreaming climate change adaptation into development planning: a guide for practitioners. Poverty-Environment Facility, Nairobi Vance E (2012) Mexico passes climate change law. Nature, 20 Apr. http://www.nature.com/news/ mexico-passes-climate-change-law-1.10496 World Bank (2013) Country and lending groups. http://data.worldbank.org/about/countryclassifications/country-and-lending-groups#Low_income Yumul G Jr, Cruz N, Servando N, Dimalanta C (2011) Extreme weather events and related disasters in the Philippines 2004–08: a sign of what climate change will mean? Disasters 35(2):362–382

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Conservation of Urban Biodiversity Under Climate Change: ClimateInformed Management for Chicago Green Spaces Abigail Derby Lewisa,b*, Robert K. Moseleyc, Kimberly R. Halld and Jessica J. Hellmanne a The Field Museum, Chicago, IL, USA b Chicago Wilderness, Chicago, IL, USA c The Nature Conservancy, Peoria, IL, USA d The Nature Conservancy, Lansing, MI, USA e Department of Biological Sciences and Environmental Change Initiative, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA

Abstract Chicago Wilderness, a multistate alliance of more than 300 organizations dedicated to restoring biodiversity, is leading the effort to bridge the gap between climate science and biodiversity adaptation practices in urban natural areas and green spaces. In 2010, Chicago Wilderness completed the Climate Action Plan for Nature (CAPN), which describes potential climate change impacts within the 221,000 ha of protected areas in the region, and actions managers can take to help species and ecosystems adapt to climate change. The CAPN represents the first Climate Action Plan to address issues of biodiversity conservation in the Great Lakes region and is the only known example of place-based adaptation strategies for urban biodiversity. This chapter depicts the creation of the Chicago Wilderness Climate Action Initiative and the ensuing work to implement the CAPN, highlighting the challenges and importance of creating landscape level conservation approaches that integrate climate science information into best management practices. This collaborative effort can serve as a model for use in other urban centers.

Keywords Biodiversity; Urban; Climate change; Adaptation strategies

Introduction Recognizing the potential for changes in climate to disrupt their social and economic fabric, cities around the world are developing strategies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, modifying programs to adapt to a warmer future, and engaging civil society in this effort. In addition to individual actions, cities have banded together to collectively advance local climate actions through the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, a network of 58 of the world’s largest cities, and the World Mayors Council on Climate Change, with more than 80 members (Rosenzweig et al. 2010). In North America, more than 1,000 mayors signed the US Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (Hamin and Gurran 2009). Because urban areas are responsible for nearly three-quarters of global energy-related carbon emissions (Rosenzweig et al. 2010), the early emphasis of individual cities and these collaborations understandably was on reducing greenhouse emissions (Wheeler 2008).

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Only recently, as the inevitability of a rapidly changing climate has become apparent, have cities begun to focus on approaches to reduce risks in the face of climate change as being of equal importance (Bulkeley and Betsill 2013). However, urban adaptation efforts focus on protecting values like public health, livelihoods, and infrastructure, with little or no attention paid to protection of urban nature and the benefits nature provides to urban residents. At the same time, cities and associated metropolitan areas are becoming increasingly important to global biodiversity conservation. Most cities have been founded in places that are biodiverse and functionally valuable to society, such as in floodplains, along coasts, on islands, or near wetlands. Today, urbanization continues to expand into these valuable habitats and into the hinterland where society most often placed its biological reserves (McDonald et al. 2008). Species previously outside city limits may need to migrate through urban areas as they adjust to a changing climate (Hellmann et al. 2010). Some metropolitan areas now contain important populations of rare species (e.g., Blanding’s turtle and the prairie white-fringed orchid occur in the greater Chicago region), made more vulnerable to extirpation by their typically small population sizes and fragmented distribution patterns (McDonald 2013). Terrestrial natural areas in urban settings provide critical habitat for resident and migratory native species but tend to be small and isolated remnants of formerly widespread habitats that are increasingly vulnerable to loss and degradation from a host of urban-centric stressors (Kowarik 2011; Cook et al. 2013). Often termed “green” or “natural infrastructure” by urban planners, the ecological functions of these natural areas and other undeveloped or formerly developed spaces provide increasingly important, but highly threatened, benefits to biodiversity and human communities of metropolitan regions (Goddard et al. 2011; Hostetler et al. 2011; Kattwinkel et al. 2011). Likewise, freshwater biodiversity is threatened by both water withdrawal for urban consumption (McDonald et al. 2011) and the addition of pollutants from urban stormwater, industrial, and residential sources (Alberti 2005; Blanco et al. 2011). These biodiversity impacts are all projected to accelerate as global urbanization trends continue to increase (McDonald 2013). Despite the regional and global importance of urban biodiversity, its conservation has rarely been addressed directly in urban climate change planning. As stated earlier, most of the focus of urban climate planning is on the reduction of greenhouse gases and on protecting public health and safety. If natural areas are addressed in a city-focused plan, it is typically in the context of green infrastructure, such as wetlands or plantings that help absorb stormwater, or as an adaptation strategy for reducing risks to people, for example, by helping to reduce the urban heat island effect (Enarsson 2011; Gill et al. 2007). Urban climate plans have not addressed the adaptation needs of open spaces, remnant natural areas, and populations of native species to help them to become resilient, persist, and continue to contribute to a biodiverse urban ecosystem and provide benefits to the human community. A considerable gap therefore exists in most municipalities between conservation planning for nature and natural remnants and adaptation of urban environments for people. Hamin and Gurran (2009) point out that uncoordinated planning for biodiversity and ecosystem processes, on the one hand, and the built environment, on the other, can put the two in conflict. Turner and his coauthors go even further: “At present, climate change is seen as one problem for nature and another for people” (Turner et al. 2009, p. 278). This chapter is a case study in metropolitan Chicago (population 9.5 million) where a conservation alliance is reconciling this dichotomy by taking a comprehensive regional approach to climate planning and action that incorporates the full range of assets, from social capital (human communities and the built environment) to natural capital (native species and ecosystems). The aim of describing this case study is to help advance such efforts in other cities around the world. Page 2 of 17

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In the sections that follow, efforts by the Chicago Wilderness alliance to develop climate change planning for urban nature and actions taken to develop and share adaptation strategies for natural areas in Chicago will be presented. It is the hope that lessons learned from the Chicago experience can be applied elsewhere.

Climate Change Planning for Urban Nature Chicago Wilderness In the early 1990s, conservation leaders in the Chicago metropolitan area recognized that a unified vision for biodiversity conservation was needed among their organizations in order to achieve sustained results (Ross 1997). The Chicago Wilderness alliance was launched in 1996 and has grown to include over 300 member organizations and corporations working toward common goals to restore nature and improve the quality of life for native biodiversity and human communities (Moskovits et al. 2004; Miller 2005). The Chicago Wilderness area includes parts of four states at the southern end of Lake Michigan (Fig. 1: Chicago Wilderness map; Caption: The Chicago Wilderness region), one of the Laurentian Great Lakes, and encompasses 221,000 ha of protected natural land

Fig. 1 Chicago Wilderness map. The Chicago Wilderness region

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that harbors rare natural habitats for resident and migratory species, including nearly 200 species threatened with extirpation either regionally or throughout their range (Brawn and Stotz 2001; Wang and Moskovits 2001; Miller 2005). The Chicago Wilderness alliance accomplishes its work through four interrelated initiatives: (1) protect and restore nature and the ecological health of the region’s land and waters; (2) advance a 567,000-ha natural infrastructure network that contributes to the quality of life of all residents; (3) provide places and programs for generations of families to connect with nature; and (4) develop and deploy actions through the alliance in the areas of climate change mitigation, adaptation, and education. The Chicago Wilderness Climate Change Initiative began in 2007 with establishment of a Climate Change Task Force comprised of individuals from a wide range of organizations, including federal, state and local governments, NGOs, research institutions, zoos, museums, and an aquarium. Its first undertaking was to prepare the alliance for action by reviewing potential climate change impacts to regional biodiversity (Sullivan and Clark 2007; Chicago Wilderness 2008; Riddell 2009). Following this foundational review, the Task Force embarked on two phases that are described in the following sections: climate planning for urban nature, followed by the implementation of planned actions. During the start-up period for the Chicago Wilderness climate initiative, the City of Chicago was well on its way toward preparing a Climate Action Plan. Released in 2008, it is the first such plan to be based on a thorough climate change impact assessment exploring the implications of a range of future scenarios on city life during the next century (Wuebbles et al. 2010). The City of Evanston, abutting Chicago to the north, also released a Climate Action Plan that year, and other municipal and university campus plans were being developed in metro Chicago at the same time. As is typical, all these plans have an overwhelming emphasis on mitigation; collectively they propose significant actions that would lower greenhouse gas emissions from metropolitan Chicago. Actions to reduce risks related to climate change through adaptation were addressed only in the Chicago Climate Action Plan and only in relation to human communities, city services, and the built environment (Coffee et al. 2010). While the effect of climate change on ecosystems was part of the science assessment that informed the Chicago plan (Hellmann et al. 2010) and the city has passed ordinances to reduce impacts on natural resources, the Climate Action Plan did not include any actions to reduce risks to native species or ecosystems in its adaptation strategy (City of Chicago 2008). Following the release of the Chicago Climate Action Plan in 2008, it became clear to both the Chicago Wilderness and the City of Chicago that complementary climate strategies were needed for the natural capital of metropolitan Chicago. Goals for such strategies would balance the municipal plans that emphasized mitigation and adaptation for the built environment by focusing on the persistence of native species and ecosystems, provisioning of services to citizens provided by natural infrastructure, as well as the “adaptation services” that open space provides in creating communities more resilient to climate change (Fig. 2: Chicago Climate Action Plan and Climate Action Plan for Nature; Caption: The complementary relationship between the City of Chicago Climate Action Plan and Chicago Wilderness Climate Action Plan for Nature). Chicago Wilderness also recognized that, done in isolation, the human response to climate change could compromise biodiversity, thereby accelerating climate change and reducing the planet’s capacity to accommodate climate impacts (Turner et al. 2009). But there were no models for coupled human-nature climate planning in urban settings. Guidance for Climate Action Plans available at the time stressed reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, for example, with model plans for states (US Environmental Protection Agency 2012), cities (ICLEI no date), and even university campuses (Egan et al. 2008). Through a collaborative process, the Climate Change Task Force created a new

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Fig. 2 Chicago Climate Action Plan and Climate Action Plan for Nature. The complementary relationship between the City of Chicago Climate Action Plan and Chicago Wilderness Climate Action Plan for Nature

template that became the Chicago Wilderness Climate Action Plan for Nature (Chicago Wilderness 2010). Climate Action Plan for Nature The Climate Action Plan for Nature was completed in 2010 with the primary goal of creating momentum across the diversity of organizations in the Chicago Wilderness alliance. Recognizing the rapidly evolving nature of climate change knowledge and practices, it was also meant to be the first iteration of planning for a dynamic climate action program for urban biodiversity in metropolitan Chicago. The plan includes three major components, engagement, mitigation, and adaptation. All three are tightly linked to the other Chicago Wilderness strategic initiatives mentioned above and mirror the three components of the Chicago Climate Action Plan. Engagement – The primary engagement objective is for Chicago Wilderness members to become fluent in the vocabulary, concepts, and programs of a new era for urban conservation that includes climate change mitigation and, especially, adaptation. Ultimately, it is envisioned that well-informed members of the alliance will go on to influence decision-makers and their fellow citizens more broadly. Three sets of actions are outlined to achieve this. The first focuses on adaptation by establishing a Climate Clinic program within Chicago Wilderness (described in the next section). The second set of actions build the capacity of informal educators at the region’s many environmental education centers to communicate the science and solutions of climate change to the public, especially young audiences and families. The third, more explicitly external, set of actions is to incorporate key climate messages into the general Chicago Wilderness public communications effort. Adaptation – In this initial version of the Climate Action Plan for Nature, the emphasis is on catching up, that is, taking action to make current conservation strategies “climate informed.” While most current protection and management activities in the Chicago region will help make nature more resilient to climate change to some degree, actions in this section of the CAPN focus on evaluating and modifying existing programs that were designed prior to knowledge of climate-induced challenges to enhance the ability of these practices to reduce climate-related risks and help resource

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managers avoid poor investments. The next sections of this chapter review progress toward meeting these adaptation goals since the 2010 release of the plan. Mitigation – As a relatively small part of the plan, the CAPN mitigation actions focus on the role that protection and restoration of natural areas play in sequestering atmospheric carbon and the parallel risk of carbon release when habitats are destroyed. The primary mitigation objective is to create recognition of the need for land conservation in climate change decision-making. The plan also recognizes that protected areas play a dual role in climate programs by mitigating emissions as well as increasing the adaptive capacity for biodiversity and human communities. Climate Change Update to Biodiversity Recovery Plan The Chicago Wilderness Biodiversity Recovery Plan was collaboratively developed in the late 1990s to be the unifying driver of conservation strategies across the alliance. It was intentionally produced as a living plan that would continue to evolve as new information and new ideas arose. Not surprisingly, the focal biodiversity targets and critical threats that the plan identified 15 years ago were never evaluated with climate change impacts in mind. Since its formation in 2007, the role of the Climate Change Task Force has been to help the Chicago Wilderness alliance incorporate climate change into best management practices for restoring and managing natural communities. Much of what natural resource managers, and certainly restoration ecologists, are already doing to restore the health and functionality of natural areas “counts” as adaptation because it is making these areas more resilient to whatever changes may occur. Thus, the Task Force focused on what, if anything, is needed to be altered, included, or re-prioritized in the context of best management practices given the projected changes and likely impacts both to the region’s biodiversity and to the threats species and natural systems were already facing (e.g., pollution, habitat degradation, fragmentation, etc.). This focus guided development of the CAPN, described above, and subsequent activities that include updating the Biodiversity Recovery Plan from a climate change perspective. Over the past decade, it has become clear that climate change is one of the top threats facing Chicago’s environment and its biodiversity (Wuebbles et al. 2010). Projections from climate models suggest that temperatures in the central USA, where Chicago lies, will rise from 2.1 to 2.7  C by the mid-century compared with the recent past (Pryor and Scavia 2013). Beyond average temperature trends, summer heat waves in the city and extreme precipitation events during winter and spring are expected to increase (Hayhoe et al. 2010; Vavrus and Van Dorn 2010). These changes are predicted to affect human quality of life through public health, flooding, and water security impacts, as well as affecting aquatic and terrestrial biodiversity in myriad ways (Francl et al. 2010; Hellmann et al. 2010; Pryor and Scavia 2013). Many locations in the Chicago region will be climatically and ecologically unrecognizable by historic standards. In the absence of actions that adapt protection and management practices, climate change has the potential to jeopardize many biodiversity conservation investments made in the Chicago Wilderness region during the past 30 years. Hence, the importance is given to adaptation in the CAPN and, the first priority in its implementation, to prepare a climate change update of the Biodiversity Recovery Plan. With this in mind, the Task Force initiated an in-depth effort to assess how a changing climate may impact the region’s natural communities and compound existing threats to their ecological integrity (i.e., fragmentation, pollution, habitat degradation, and invasive species). This process involved translating downscaled climate change projections developed for the Chicago Climate Action Plan (Hayhoe and Wuebbles 2008) into an understanding of how a warmer, drier, and more extreme environment could affect regional biodiversity and, importantly, what management actions could be taken to reduce the impacts.

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Fig. 3 Chicago Wilderness Climate Clinic. Resource managers and scientists discussing climate impacts to natural resources at the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore

A great challenge to this endeavor is that understanding the vulnerability of species and systems to climate change is inherently interdisciplinary, requiring integration of information on climate science and modeling, theoretical knowledge of community, behavioral and restoration ecology, and on-the-ground knowledge of best management practices for natural resources in urban landscapes. As observed more broadly among resource managers in the Great Lakes region (Petersen et al. in press), managers within the Chicago Wilderness alliance were found to be often very aware of and interested in planning for climate change but felt they lacked the information and expertise needed to make updates in their management or restoration practices. This challenge of integrating available information to inform adaptation, however, is one Chicago Wilderness has been well positioned to address because the alliance can tap into the collective knowledge of a vast intellectual network, ranging from research scientists in many academic fields to natural resource managers. Between 2009 and 2012, the Task Force deployed Climate Clinics to marshal this knowledge network in beginning the process of ensuring resilient natural areas and open space in metropolitan Chicago. The Climate Clinic approach developed by The Nature Conservancy, whereby climate adaptation strategies are incorporated into ongoing conservation projects through an iterative, peerlearning process (Poiani et al. 2011), served as a model for these clinics. Beyond the important task of informing updates to the Biodiversity Recovery Plan, Climate Clinics also provide peer-to-peer interactions across several sectors of conservation science and practice and are useful for general capacity building of Chicago Wilderness members (Fig. 3: Chicago Wilderness Climate Clinic; Caption: Resource managers and scientists discussing climate impacts to natural resources at the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore). Along with some individual interviews and topic-focused content reviews, the Task Force was able to solicit relevant expert opinion from over 100 regional conservation researchers and practitioners through two Climate Clinics. The clinics were full-day events that included a mixture of presentations and breakout group discussions, ending with an informal social setting and activity to promote networking and reinforce peer-to-peer learning. Often, simply presenting data and information is not sufficient to encourage dialog about how or

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whether concepts are meaningful and resonate with people, let alone persuade them to share their opinions based on personal observations of managing the landscape. The clinic format creates a comfortable and relaxed atmosphere, an important element in achieving critical idea sharing. After two and half years of collaborative work, the Chicago Wilderness Executive Council approved the Biodiversity Recovery Plan Climate Change Update final document in the spring of 2012. This place-based climate change tool for the Chicago region now exists as a web-based resource (climate.chicagowilderness.org), where it continues to be updated as new information becomes available.

Place-Based Actions for Climate Adaptation The CAPN created momentum for climate action across the Chicago Wilderness alliance, and the Biodiversity Recovery Plan Climate Change Update framed key risks to nature from climate change and linked those to possible adaptation strategies. From these plans, several projects naturally emerged to help the alliance take the next steps of connecting species and systems at risk in particular locations to actions that can be taken to help promote adaptation. Accelerating the Pace of Adaptation: “Climate Considerations” for Urban Open Space Building on the development of adaptation strategies for natural areas in the Chicago Wilderness region, the Chicago Department of Environment requested a partnership with The Field Museum, The Nature Conservancy, and University of Notre Dame to create a Climate Considerations Guidebook for natural areas and greens spaces in the urban landscape. The project was originally designed to develop an adaptation “checklist” that would assist City departments in implementing adaptation strategies. However, discussion with stakeholders quickly indicated that a universal checklist for all departments would not provide the kind of specific and useful information that was desired because sites have distinctly different goals and purposes (e.g., forest preserve conservation site versus a multiuse park district site), thus requiring different types of adaptation approaches. Instead, the concept of a guidebook that could help managers identify which of their management decisions may be sensitive to warmer, drier, and more extreme weather and provide resources to help them develop relevant adaptation strategies was the preferred path to follow. The intended audience of the guidebook is mid-level managers of natural areas and green spaces in a highly urban setting. The first section of the guidebook is intended to convey the relevant information needed to begin the process of developing site-specific adaptation strategies. It begins with an overview of local climate change impacts and an explanation of why adaptation is important, followed by a seven step “workflow” that helps to walk the reader through the process of how to ask the “climate question” of urban natural area and green space projects. The next section poses probing questions in five categories (I. Getting started, II. Safeguarding species and systems, III. Climateinformed land management decisions, IV. Operations and maintenance, and V. Rethinking goals) to help managers think through which management aspects may be affected by climate change. Following the questions in each category, specific tools and resources are suggested to help managers answer the questions and design their own approaches to reduce the vulnerability of a site to climate change. There are 63 tools and resources available in the guidebook, many of which connect managers to the place-based resources developed by the Chicago Wilderness, such as the Biodiversity Recovery Plan Climate Change Update and the Green Infrastructure Vision, but tools such as Climate Wizard and reports from other urban centers struggling with the same questions (e.g., Climate Change Adaptation Options for Toronto’s Urban Forest) are included as well. The last

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section includes appendices intended to give additional background information (e.g., General adaptation principles, What does adaptation look like?) and an annotated list of all the tools and resources included in the guidebook. A unique feature of this guidance is that it was developed with the intention of being deployed in an interactive format within the Collaboratory for Adaptation to Climate Change (www.adapt.nd. edu), in addition to being available as a stand-alone document. Funded by the US National Science Foundation and developed at the University of Notre Dame, the Collaboratory is a virtual community that is accessible to the public worldwide and can be used as a collaborative workspace and repository of documents and other information relevant to adaptation planning. The idea behind the Collaboratory is that by promoting more rapid sharing of information and ideas, networks can collectively speed up the pace and effectiveness of adaptation actions. The connection between the Collaboratory and adaptation efforts in the Chicago Wilderness again shows the importance of strong networks: the Collaboratory project leads were attracted to testing out novel technologies with the Chicago Wilderness alliance because of the strong history of collaboration, and several Collaboratory project team members have contributed to the Chicago Wilderness Climate Change Projects, as well as the City of Chicago Climate Action Plan. Climate Clinics were again used as a mechanism to facilitate the collaborative effort between Chicago City departments and the Field Museum-Nature Conservancy-Notre Dame adaptation team. Participants in the clinics were named “Climate Adaptation Fellows,” and their advice was gathered in regular meetings and through a private workgroup on the Collaboratory. Whereas the Biodiversity Recovery Plan Climate Change Update focused mainly on climate impacts to the region’s larger natural areas (e.g., wetlands, woodlands, prairies, etc. in the Cook County forest preserves), this project was intended to help facilitate climate-ready decision-making by individuals working on smaller-scale urban natural areas and green spaces (street trees, park districts, boulevards, parkways, university campuses, etc.). This guidebook was crafted from a combination of stakeholder engagement and a literature survey, creating a tool that is both useful and informative. The guidebook now lives in both a static and interactive format on the Collaboratory for Adaptation to Climate Change (available at, adapt.nd.edu/resources/1019/). The interactive format, or “workflow,” walks users through the climate clinic process, with links to useful tools and resources. At every step, users are also prompted to contribute to discussions within a public workgroup and to provide feedback on the guidance that will inform updates (The workflow based on the guidance can be accessed at https://adapt.nd.edu/adaptationworkflows.). As of July, 2013, a simple search of “Chicago” in the Collaboratory yields 50 hits to documents, events, or other resources used or generated in the adaptation planning process, most of which are connected to the Chicago-focused workspace. Over time, the Notre Dame team will study and implement improvements to the workspace and workflow, allowing lessons learned from Chicago to be shared with and benefit the broader adaptation community. To test the utility of the guidebook, project leaders recruited four undergraduate interns to work with urban natural resource managers to evaluate the recommendations at five Chicago sites during the summer of 2013. Sites were selected based on interest from organizations that were involved in the development of the guidebook as well as a desire to represent a broad range of urban sites (e.g., park district sites with multiuse grounds, museum and university campuses, nature preserves, and natural area restoration sites). Each organization was required to designate one of their natural resource managers to be a mentor to the team of interns who collectively assessed each site. Mentors worked with interns to go through each section of the guidebook and answer as many of the questions as were relevant to a site and provided assistance in developing recommendations for incorporating adaptation into different aspects of their management and planning process. The Page 9 of 17

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mentors were also asked to provide feedback on how relevant and/or helpful the guidebook content was to them, including language and concepts used, extent of background information, questions posed, and resources provided. This feedback will be summarized for posting in the collaboratory and used to revise the guidebook in hopes of making it as useful as possible. Additional sites will continue to be piloted in 2014, and a comparative review of all the sites will be completed in order to gain an understanding of the different ways the guidebook can be used and the types of adaptation recommendations urban natural resource managers are developing. Community Action Strategies In order to empower and encourage Chicago communities to take action, social scientists from the Field Museum developed a set of Community Action Strategies designed to engage residents of the Chicago region in the goals of the CAPN in their own community through climate-friendly gardens and lawns, water conservation, monitoring, open space stewardship, and climate change education (Climate Action Plan for Nature, Community Action Strategies, www.climatechicago.fieldmuseum. org/sites/default/files/Climate-Action-Plan-for-Nature.pdf). To implement this set of strategies, the Museum led a coalition of over 40 partner organizations in Chicago neighborhoods to develop a bilingual Chicago Community Climate Action Toolkit (climatechicago.fieldmuseum.org). An interdisciplinary team from the Museum facilitated a research-to-action process for involving Chicago communities in implementing city (Chicago Climate Action Plan) and regional (Chicago Wilderness Climate Action Plan for Nature) strategies for climate action, in ways that simultaneously advance their local agendas for social change. This work built upon previous ethnographic research the Museum conducted to understand sociocultural viewpoints on climate change in Chicago’s diverse neighborhoods (Hirsch et al. 2011). The toolkit comprises 60+ multimedia tools that communities can use to nurture local efforts tailored to their unique cultures that support city and regional climate action strategies. Chicago Wilderness Green Infrastructure Vision The Chicago Wilderness Climate Change Task Force was also moving forward during this time to integrate climate change impacts to biodiversity into another Chicago Wilderness effort, the Green Infrastructure Vision project (http://www.chicagowilderness.org/what-we-do/protecting-greeninfrastructure/epdd-resources/biodiversity-and-natural-habitats/green-infrastructure-vision/). This project provides a visionary, regional-scale map of the Chicago Wilderness region that reflects both existing green infrastructure – forest preserve holdings, natural area sites, streams, wetlands, prairies, and woodlands – and opportunities for expansion, restoration, and increasing the connectivity of natural areas. The broader goal of this effort is to bring the Chicago Wilderness Biodiversity Recovery Plan to life in a more meaningful, visual, and accessible way for Chicago Wilderness members and outside audiences. In order to bring an explicit climate perspective to the project, the Task Force created a GIS layer to assess the pattern and magnitude of regional carbon storage, information that can be used to help quantify the climate-related co-benefit of keeping natural areas healthy and intact, and to assess where the biggest storage areas were located. This preliminary map, based on aboveground carbon storage associated with habitat types defined from 2006 National Land Cover Data, revealed the region stores more than 77 million tons of carbon, but only 5.4 % occurs on protected land. This illustrates the critical need to engage public and private landowners in conservation management issues. In addition to assessing the role natural areas and green spaces play in storing carbon, the Task Force initiated a working group to evaluate how well the conceptual corridor models of the Green Infrastructure Vision work in reality for particular species, especially those that are climate-sensitive, Page 10 of 17

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at a particular site. As is the case with all Chicago Wilderness working groups, the individuals involved are self-selected and interested in contributing to the collaborative effort because the topic or project is specifically tied to either their own interest or that of their organization; in other words, their involvement helps to forward their own work as well as that of the Chicago Wilderness. The Green Infrastructure Vision conceptual models for corridors, developed by The Conservation Fund (http://www.conservationfund.org/projects/refinement-of-the-chicago-wilderness-greeninfrastructure-vision), were created for individual habitat types (woodlands, wetlands, prairies, etc.) using GIS Terrestrial Movement Analysis software (Norman 2012). This analysis tool uses the average dispersal distance for several habitat-specific species to create minimum movement pathways and corridors between landscape features [e.g., the average dispersal distance for the common muskrat (Ondatra zibethicus) and Blanding’s turtle (Emydoidea blandingii) was used to create the wetland corridor] (CMAP 2012). The Task Force selected the federally endangered Hine’s emerald dragonfly (Somatochlora hineana) to pilot this work and found corridors generally reflected the real biological conditions of the dragonfly at the site scale (Hasle unpublished data). Work is currently underway to test the model’s validity for additional climate-sensitive species, with a goal of helping identify site-scale management implications. Other related projects that are in progress include working with municipalities on climateinformed stormwater management and developing a regional urban forest adaptation guide. Overall, the Biodiversity Recovery Plan Climate Change Update resource has enabled Chicago Wilderness to effectively integrate both a climate and a biodiversity perspective into work being done at the site, neighborhood, community, and regional scale. These efforts are not only useful for the Chicago Wilderness region but can be scaled up to help inform similar work in other urban centers.

Lessons Learned As stated earlier in this chapter, there were no models to follow that incorporated biodiversity conservation into urban climate change adaptation programs. Not surprisingly then, important lessons regarding helpful ways to frame the climate conversation and how to respond to challenges and barriers were learned along the way. Below are seven lessons learned, all arising from adaptation planning activities that were pursued in the Chicago region. These might benefit others contemplating similar efforts in their organizations or communities.

Frame the Climate Question in a Local Context Mid-latitude regions, such as the Midwestern USA, are not yet experiencing the magnitude of temperature change occurring at high latitudes, or highly visible impacts like sea-level rise. While many climate change outreach efforts focus on threats to polar bears or coastal cities, framing this global issue in terms of how climate change is affecting (or expected to affect) species and habitats in the Chicago Wilderness region, as these are what local conservationists really care about was found to be very important. This was a particularly important way to connect with resource managers at Climate Clinics. Thus, Chicago Wilderness Climate Action efforts highlighted strong local impacts and worked with resource managers to connect these impacts to potentially vulnerable species and systems. For example, over the past several decades, the Great Lakes have seen dramatic changes in average ice cover, and the upper Great Lakes (Michigan, Huron, and Superior) have shown rapid increases in summer surface water temperatures, two changes that tend to act in a positive feedback as open water absorbs more heat, and warmer water takes longer to cool and freeze. Specifically, Lake Michigan has shown a 77 % decrease in ice cover (1973–2010; Wang et al. 2012), and summer Page 11 of 17

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surface water temperatures in southern Lake Michigan have increased by 1.4  C, and the rate of increase is about 30 % higher than increases in air temperature during the same time period (1979–2006; Austin and Colman 2007). While it is not clear how these strong changes in local conditions will impact regional biodiversity, focusing on local changes provides both a sense of urgency and a place to start the dialog on how to respond.

There Are No “Experts” There was a near universal reticence among conservation practitioners, especially resource managers, to participate in climate planning or adaptation clinics because they are not “climate change experts.” Apparently there was an expectation that there were climate adaptation experts who already knew what to do and how to do it. These experts do not exist, however, because adapting to such rapid rates of climate change is a new challenge, and as of yet, there are few examples of adaptation implementation and learning from experience. Further, adaptation at the scale of a natural area requires integrating regional changes in climate drivers with information on local ecosystems, management practices, and constraints. Thus, it is always “local,” and the most appropriate strategies will vary from site to site such that expertise from one location or habitat will not apply exactly in another. Finally, while many managers look to university partners to find “experts” on relevant topics, experts on adaptation theory do not fully understand the constraints and opportunities of applications in a particular place, as each place has a unique history, set of stakeholders, and priorities. This issue was addressed head-on in Climate Clinics and other engagement actions, telling people that advice about climate change abounds, but that no expert would be able to tell a manager what to do, because they did not know the specific system, decision context, and suite of (often competing) values to be considered. Partners were encouraged to develop their own expertise through helping us to write the Climate Considerations Guidebook and discussing ideas and adaptation options with their peers in the “Climate Fellows” meetings. It is not yet known if this strategy was effective, but there was a sense of increasing confidence among clinic participants that they have the knowledge and institutional capacity to implement adaptation and craft their own climate-informed conservation actions. The Collaboratory for Adaptation to Climate Change has a similar goal in the online universe – to remove institutional, temporal, and geographic barriers to information and knowledge sharing about climate change so that new expertise can grow in diverse places and at a pace that helps us keep up with the changing climate. Uncertainty Is No Excuse for Inaction Uncertainty about climate change has been used in political arenas to stall mitigation activities and that the same uncertainty can plague adaptation activities (Morton et al. 2011; Gifford 2011). Uncertainty about the future climate implies uncertainty about the specific stresses that adaptation actions should address. In some cases, for example, the potential for increases or decreases in future Lake Michigan water levels (Gronewald et al. 2013) in the context of a coastal wetland restoration and adaptation actions designed for one scenario could represent a waste of resources under the alternate scenario. Sometimes these conflicts and trade-offs cannot be avoided, and choices will need to be made. But a better starting point is identifying robust strategies that are likely to be beneficial under a range of possible futures (Hallegatte 2009). For example, designing wetland restoration efforts with a landward buffer that permits inland shifts and with native species that can tolerate drying. The existence of these robust strategies is the best argument for taking adaptation action today and avoiding the uncertainty trap. It also is critical to recognize that inaction is a policy choice as well. Climate change presents a unique challenge because we cannot go back to the way things

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used to be, and leaving this as is could represent steady erosion in environmental quality and ecosystem services (Schwartz et al. 2009).

Personal Interaction Is Important and Stakeholder Engagement Is Critical In an era where people increasingly interact via email, listservs, wikis, blogs, webinars, conference calls, and online social networks, the importance of in-person meetings and interactions should be recognized, particularly when a socializing component can be integrated into the experience. Sharing personal opinions and ideas about climate change impacts among professional colleagues, particularly if not everyone is well acquainted, can require a great deal of confidence and/or trust. Important qualitative information (e.g., how extremely low river levels due to changes in precipitation patterns resulted in increased predation on exposed mussel populations) tended to arise organically in an informal conversation. This information is often more forthcoming when personal relationships have been formed to create an atmosphere of trust and confidence for two-way dialog and iterative learning. It is critical to include stakeholder input from the onset so that useful products can be created. Natural resource managers are busy people; providing them with information that they have reason to consult/include is key if their participation is desired.

Adaptation Will Most Likely Occur in Places Where There Is a History of Collaboration It is perhaps no accident that Chicago Wilderness is in the forefront of advancing ideas on how to design adaptation actions to benefit nature and people. The significant, long-term investment in support for collaboration across organizations to benefit nature is a major factor facilitating integration of information across disciplines and provides a network for sharing observations of climate impacts and critical support for creative problem solving. This bottom-up collaboration also includes the business sector, in addition to the government agencies, research institutions, and NGOs that typically dominate climate-planning processes in the USA. More than 40 enterprises are members on the Chicago Wilderness Corporate Council, ranging in size from multinational corporations to local businesses. Harnessing strategic partnerships among organizations with differing talents and differing capacity for research and outreach has been found to be very effective. These organizations can come together to develop useful products for adaptation action. Our collaboration between a museum, a university, and a nongovernmental organization is one such example. Most major cities or regions will have each of these institutions.

Consider Multiple Audiences An important lesson learned as part of the climate clinic process, and in developing the Climate Considerations Guidebook, was that adaptation needs to be defined and illustrated with examples in ways that are accessible to multiple audiences within the resource management sector. Outreach efforts targeted the practitioners, but a message heard repeatedly from this audience was that they needed clear information, and when possible, estimates of likely costs savings, so that these messages could be relayed to higher level managers and policy makers that have the decisionmaking authority to promote changes in key protocols or practices. Similarly, decisions to participate in collaborative management efforts that extend across ownership boundaries are often not within the control of individual site managers.

Ecosystem Services Have Their Limits, Especially in Urban Settings A common approach in helping build support for investments in nature conservation under climate change is to highlight nature-based services that can help reduce climate-related risks to people. As Page 13 of 17

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we discussed this idea with resource managers, their response was that services, like retention or slowing of stormwater, could come with clear costs in this human-dominated landscape – fragile plants can be uprooted, and wetlands can be contaminated with road salt and other pollutants. Highlighting the service, an idea that we thought would help gain financial support for management and restoration could instead lead to a risk of additional stormwater being diverted to an ecological reserve, reducing its viability. As with other strategies for protecting the nature, all climate adaptation strategies need to be tested with those that know the system, stressors on that system, and the sociopolitical context for management.

Conclusion Most greenhouse gases emanate from urban areas of the world, and it is critical that cities continue on the path of mitigating their impacts on the global climate by reducing emissions and creating more climatically sustainable energy policies and practices. In terms of recognizing that some level of climate change is inevitable in the coming century, some cities, such as Chicago, have begun implementing robust adaptation programs (Wheeler 2008; Stone et al. 2012). Cities, however, need to look beyond just their built environment to include natural capital in their adaptation efforts. Native species, remnant natural areas, and urban open space, along with a city’s built infrastructure, must be included in climate adaptation programs to assure that cities reduce their vulnerability and increase their resilience to rapid climate change. Urban biodiversity is becoming increasingly important globally, and natural assets provide many ecological benefits and climate adaptation services that urban residents count on. There is no assurance that native species and ecosystem services will persist on their own in urbanized landscapes under fast-changing climate regimes. This chapter has described a regional approach to climate change adaptation for urban biodiversity and ecosystem services that is transferrable to other metropolitan areas. This model complements the current strengths of cities in the climate change arena that primarily focus on mitigation and adaptation for the human community and the built environment. The approach is built around the power and success of the Chicago Wilderness alliance in metropolitan Chicago (Miller 2005), where a long-standing collaborative history was used to marshal a diverse range of resources and knowledge. Our model is best emulated in other areas with collaborative processes that can channel the knowledge of natural resource managers and research scientists into practical place-based adaptation solutions for urban nature.

Acknowledgments We want to acknowledge the generous funding organizations that made this work possible, including Boeing Corporation, Chicago Department of Environment, National Science Foundation, Gaylord and Dorothy Donnelley Foundation, and Kresge Foundation. We would also like to sincerely thank Chris Mulvaney from the Chicago Wilderness for his continued support and assistance in helping to organize the Climate Change Task Force, Doug Stotz from the Field Museum for his leadership of the Climate Change Task Force, and former Deputy Commissioner for Chicago Department of Environment Aaron Durnbaugh for leading the charge to develop the Climate Considerations Guidebook. None of this work would be possible without the participation and support from Chicago Wilderness members and City of Chicago natural resource managers.

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Finally, we would like to thank Joyce Coffee, Rob McDonald, Laurel Ross, and Doug Stotz for their thoughtful reviews and insightful comments in helping to develop this chapter.

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Hallegatte S (2009) Strategies to adapt to an uncertain climate change. Glob Environ Chang 19:240–247 Hamin EM, Gurran N (2009) Urban form and climate change: balancing adaptation and mitigation in the U.S. and Australia. Habitat Int 33:238–245 Hayhoe K, Wuebbles D (2008) Climate change and Chicago: projections and potential impacts. City of Chicago, Chicago, http://www.chicagoclimateaction.org/filebin/pdf/report/Chicago_climate_ impacts_report_Executive_Summary.pdf Hayhoe K, Sheridan S, Kalkstein L, Greene S (2010) Climate change, heat waves, and mortality projections for Chicago. J Gt Lakes Res 36:65–73 Hellmann JJ, Nadelhoffer KJ, Iverson LR et al (2010) Climate change impacts on terrestrial ecosystems in metropolitan Chicago and its surrounding, multi-state region. J Gt Lakes Res 36(Suppl 2):74–85 Hirsch J, Van Deusen PS, Labenski E, Dunford C, Peters T (2011) Linking climate action to local knowledge and practice: a case study of diverse Chicago neighborhoods. In: Kopnina H, Shoreman-Ouimet E (eds) Environmental anthropology today. Routledge, New York Hostetler M, Allen W, Meurk C (2011) Conserving urban biodiversity? Creating green infrastructure is only the first step. Landsc Urban Plann 100:369–371 ICLEI (No date) U.S. Mayors’ Climate protection agreement: climate action handbook. ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability, Oakland Kattwinkel M, Biedermann R, Kleyer M (2011) Temporary conservation for urban biodiversity. Biol Conserv 144:2335–2343 Kowarik I (2011) Novel urban ecosystems, biodiversity, and conservation. Environ Pollut 159:1974–1983 McDonald RI (2013) Implications of urbanization for conservation and biodiversity protection. Encyclopedia Biodivers 7:304–313 McDonald RI, Kareiva P, Forman RTT (2008) The implications of current and future urbanization for global protected areas and biodiversity conservation. Biol Conserv 141:1695–1703 McDonald RI, Green P, Balk D et al (2011) Urban growth, climate change, and freshwater availability. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 108:6312–6317 Miller JR (2005) Biodiversity conservation and the extinction of experience. Trends Ecol Evol 20:430–434 Morton TA, Robinovich A, Marshall D, Bretschneider R (2011) The future that may (or may not) come: how framing changes responses to uncertainty in climate change communications. Glob Environ Chang 21:103–109 Moskovits DK, Fialkowski CJ, Mueller GM et al (2004) Chicago Wilderness: a new force for conservation. Ann N Y Acad Sci 1023:215–236 Norman JB (2012) Terrestrial Movement Analysis for ArcGIS 10 sp4. Colorado State University (unpublished) Petersen, B, Hall KR, Doran PJ, Kahl KJ In their own words: perceptions of climate change adaptation from the Great Lakes region’s resource management community. Environ Practice (in press) Poiani KA, Goldman RL, Hobson J, Hoekstra JM, Nelson KS (2011) Redesigning biodiversity conservation projects for climate change: examples from the field. Biodivers Conserv 20:185–201 Pryor SC, Scavia D (2013) Midwest. In: National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory Committee (eds) Third National Climate Assessment (Draft). US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington, DC Page 16 of 17

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Riddell J (2009) Our climate challenge. Chicago Wilderness Magazine, Winter 2009 Rosenzweig C, Solecki W, Hammer SA, Mehrotra S (2010) Cities lead the way in climate-change action. Nature 467:909–911 Ross L (1997) The Chicago Wilderness and its critics I. The Chicago Wilderness: a coalition for urban conservation. Restor Manag Notes 15:17–24 Schwartz MW, Hellmann JJ, McLachlan JS (2009) The precautionary principle in managed relocation is misguided advice. Trends Ecol Evol 24:474 Stone B, Vargo J, Habeeb D (2012) Managing climate change in cities: will climate action plans work? Landsc Urban Plann 107:263–271 Sullivan RG, Clark M (2007) Can biodiversity survive global warming? Chicago Wilderness J 5:2–13 Turner WR, Oppenheimer M, Wilcove D (2009) A force to fight global warming. Nature 462:278–279 US Environmental Protection Agency (2012) Developing a plan. http://epa.gov/statelocalclimate/ state/activities/action-plan.html Vavrus S, Van Dorn J (2010) Projected future temperature and precipitation extremes in Chicago. J Gt Lakes Res 36(Suppl 2):22–32 Wang Y, Moskovits DK (2001) Tracking fragmentation of natural communities and changes in land cover: applications of Landsat data for conservation of urban landscapes (Chicago Wilderness). Conserv Biol 15:835–843 Wang J, Bai X, Hu H, Clites A, Colton M, Lofgren B (2012) Temporal and spatial variability of Great Lakes ice cover, 1973–2010. J Climate 25:1318–1329, http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/ 2011JCLI4066.1 Wheeler SM (2008) State and municipal climate change plans: the first generation. J Am Plann Assoc 74:481–496 Wuebbles D, Hayhoe K, Parzen J (2010) Introduction: assessing the effects of climate change on Chicago and the Great Lakes. J Gt Lakes Res 36(Suppl 2):1–6

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Climate Change Knowledge Platforms Targeted at West Africa: A Review and a Focus on the New CILSS Platform T. Ourbak* and A. Bilgo Centre Régional AGRHYMET/CILSS, Niamey, Niger

Abstract Climate change in West Africa has important impacts due to the low resilience capacity of the majority of the population in these territories. However, on the contrary, in most regions of the world, data and informations on climate change and particularly adaptation are sparse and sometimes difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, scientific state of the arts, policies, as well as tools and funding opportunities and agenda on climate change initiatives are a great challenge for West African stakeholders. To fill the gap, in November 2012, CILSS/AGRHYMET launched their climate change and sustainable land management platform to allow for easy access to informations targeted at West Africa. The goal of this chapter is to propose an overview of existing platforms, analyzing assets and differences, and to present CILSS/AGRHYMET platform in this context. Details are given on the platform structure, the “opportunity,” “agenda,” and “news” parts. A rapid focus on CILSS past and present projects is also presented. Thematic articles concerning essentially agriculture and water, the heart of AGRHYMET’s actions, are presented then in the resources part: documents, tolls (to challenge vulnerability), and database (AGRHYMET master’s students, institutional and individuals, etc.). A presentation of different tools available for download or access on the Web, adapted to a West African use to study vulnerability to climate change and other aspects like mitigation, is made.

Keywords Platform; Climate change; Sustainable land management; Africa; CILSS; ECOWAS

Introduction Sahel is often designated as the territory in the south of the Saharan border. It is characterized by low precipitation rates, sparse vegetation, and a rain-fed agriculture mainly based on crops and livestock breeding. Although indigenous knowledge has proved to facilitate adaptation (e.g., Waha et al. 2013), Sahelian countries, among the poorest of the world and also the ones that are the most vulnerable (Niasse et al. 2004), are subjected to drought periods such as the 1973–1974 one or more recently in 1983 (Sarr 2007). Recently, flooding events have been recorded, with important societal impacts (thousands of deaths, Sarr 2010). After the 1973 drought, a few governments decided to create an institution to fight against drought: the Interstate Committee for Drought *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 8

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Control in the Sahel (CILSS). This organization is working to lower the vulnerability of Sahelian countries, this vulnerability being exacerbated by climate change-related phenomena such as temperature increase (Sarr 2012), precipitation variability (Ali and Lebel 2009), and sea level rise. More and more focus is given to climate change impacts: sea level rise, temperature warming, droughts, extreme events, etc. (IPCC 2007). However, there is a gap between scientific data, research activities, operational needs on the ground, and political action. It has been reckoned that capacity building was necessary to help stakeholders to tackle climate change issues: the way the information is transmitted, popularization processes, and stakeholder empowerment need to be reinforced. The webscape is growing in West Africa, and a lot of UN organizations, NGOs, and institutions are willing to make the information available; but if a myriad opportunities exist for Web users, most of the websites are very specific or, on the contrary, with a large geographical scale with a proliferation of “global” websites not specifically adapted to local West African needs. In the context of raising attention toward climate change and sustainable development, Africa has around 14 % of the population, but release less than 4 % of greenhouse gases. Thus, although mitigation (i.e., emission reduction with renewable energy or forestry practices), is receiving more and more attention, the main concern for the African population is to be able to be resilient to climate changes (adaptation). The following text will focus on adaptation, specifically to West Africa, where 13 out 17 of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)/CILSS countries are part of the 49 least developed countries according to UN classification (see http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/). It is important to note that adaptation, especially in West Africa, is a transversal topic covering both climate change and desertification under the United Nations negotiations. The CILSS/AGRHYMET website presented here is unique in the sense that it addresses topics related to both UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) and UNCCD (United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification).

The Climate Information Knowledge Gap Since 1992 and the Rio conferences, environmental issues have raised more and more attention. In particular, climate change has drawn a lot of attention, notably because of IPCC’s successive reports, alerting the world on the potential impacts and effects of a changing climate on various sectors (health, economy, environment, etc.). Most attention has been recently focused on the lack of information available for both policymakers and nonspecialists (media, civil society). The latter is particularly effective when looking at Sahel and West Africa. For instance, the 1970s and 1980s presented noticeable drought periods, which had impacts on the population (food security, livestock issues, water shortages, etc.). Sahelian governments (up to 13 countries are part of the CILSS in 2013) joined efforts in order to work for food security and sustainable environment. Although data do exist on climate and also on land management, there is a gap between stakeholders and data users.

Overview of Existing Informations The World Wide Web had been a revolution for the diffusion and access to information. Nowadays, a lot of websites are focused on climate change and particularly, in the context of this chapter, climate change adaptation. Page 2 of 8

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Snapshot of existing platforms Name and website link WASCAL (West African science service center on climate change and adapted land use) https://icg4wascal. icg.kfa-juelich.de/

Principal organization/ institution/program Federal Ministry of Education and research. Center for Development research (Univ. Bonn)

Réseau AfricaAdapt (consortium) http://www.africaadapt.net/

ENDA (Environnement et Développement du Tiers-Monde), FARA (Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa), ICPAC (IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre), IISD (Institute of Development Studies) UNEP (consortium of 9 partners)

AAKNet: Africa adaptation knowledge network (UN) www.africa. ganadapt.org

Geography Ten West African countries

Africa

Africa

Thematic Climate and weather, landscape dynamics, agricultural systems, markets and livelihoods, risk management Adaptation (thematic or geographical entries)

Plus Minus Focus on research Site under construction, English only

Thematic, geographic, projects, knowledge base entries

Dynamic, lot of documents

Research, policy, good practices, indigenous knowledge, finance and geographical entries blogs

Filtered parts, practical (e.g., financing guidebook)

A real network of Portal could be people, sharing more dynamic ideas

Difficulties to download in African places, mix of languages (mainly English but sometimes in French) Program will end in 2014, not specific to Africa

AfriCAN climate (EU) http://www. africanclimate.net/

Africa Funded by UE, coordinated by WIP Renewable Energies (Germany) with 5 European and 5 African organizations

ACCRA (African climate change resilience alliance) http://community. eldis.org/.59d66929/ Climate change knowledge portal http://sdwebx. worldbank.org/ climateportal/index. cfm WEADAPT http://weadapt.org/

Consortium of NGOs

Africa

World Bank

Global

For development practitioners and policymakers

Easy to use, data and maps accessible

Not focused on a specific region: general approach

Community (less than Global 2,000 in May 2013), define as an “open space”

Collaborating on climate change

Innovation such as Adx (climate adaptation options explorer Adx, adaptation layer)

Easy design to get lost for firsttime user

Files not regularly Growing updated community (less than 600 members in May 2013)

(continued) Page 3 of 8

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 (continued) Name and website link CDKN (climate and development knowledge network) http://cdkn.org/ regions/africa/

Principal organization/ institution/program Geography Thematic Alliance of organizations (leader: PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC))

http://www.undpaap.org/

UNDP and other UN agencies

Africa

Adaptation learning Joint effort from main Global mechanism UN agencies + UNFCCC http://www. adaptationlearning. net/ Community adaptation based adaptation exchange http://community. eldis.org/cbax/ The knowledge resources page of UNFCCC adaptation http://unfccc.int/ adaptation/ knowledge_resources/ items/6994.php

Community (more than 1,000 in May 2013), launched by NGOs

Countries, resources, work areas entries (+newsletter) Based on communities

Plus Technical advices, build partnerships (climate compatible development strategies and plan). 3 languages User friendly with a lot of technical and political informations Interactive map, very diverse entries (from agriculture to workshop materials)

Minus Only 4 countries in Africa

A complete website from the international climate change negotiations

Portal could be more dynamic and focus on user needs and user friendliness

Program finished in 2012

Difficulties in accessing the website (download elements from the map)

Global

UNFCCC (different work Global streams: Nairobi Work Programme, NAPs, NAPAs, loss and damages)

Databases, publications, LDC portal, newsletters

Table 1 summarizes some of the major available websites. The main feature concerning Table 1, which is not an exhaustive and complete panel of existing efforts available, is that a lot of websites have a global approach. The first website is the only one targeted at West Africa. The West African Science Service Center on Climate Change and Adapted Land Use (WASCAL) is very specific, as it is dedicated to training and research, with PhD and master’s programs. The next 5 first platforms presented in Table 1 are dedicated to the whole African continent, and the Web user could find a lot of very useful informations such as updated newsletters and detailed documentation on specific topics. The other websites presented have a worldwide view and, again, bring to the table several crucial informations (the World Bank website presents climate situation nationally, for instance); many specific tools are presented that could be used by policymakers as well as development practitioners on the ground (e.g., methods to mainstream climate change into policies to climate proofing tools). Most of the websites are user friendly and easy to discover for the nonspecialist while containing targeted documents or informations.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 Snapshot of CILSS/AGRHYMET platform (July 14, 2013)

One notes that most of the websites are from international organizations, such as United Nations websites, or NGOs (nongovernmental organizations). It is important to note the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change website, very complete, which addresses the outcomes and presents the material of the negotiations. Some websites are project related, such as the Africa Adaptation Programme, which could lead to a potential problem of durability and dynamism once the funding is over. Most of them contain a lot of informations that are user friendly. A lot of different languages are used in Africa. In Table 1, all the websites are accessible in English and 7 out of 12 in French, and other languages such as Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, or Deutsch are also available. It is to note that two websites propose translation in numerous languages such as Afrikaans or Swahili. However, some websites propose only the translations of titles and rubrics. Most of the sites are aimed at disseminating information to professionals and not to producers and politicies makers. The forum is a way for users to ask specific questions. The CILSS/AGRHYMET website is doing an effort to adapt the knowledge and science presented, for instance, thematic pages, with simple figures helping the reader to have a better understanding of complex topics. However, not a lot of governmental websites such as the ones you could find in most of the developed countries exist in Africa. This could bring the issue of the validity of information found for policymakers and governmental stakeholders. For instance, a politician working in health issues could be interested to have access to several informations such as climatology of flooding events or heat waves. This specific example could be translated to many sectors where the information could be very difficult to obtain. We already have had feedbacks from local and national West African agricultural organizations using technical informations provided on the platform. Moreover, although the number of platforms is important, most of them are not specifically targeted at West

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Africa, although recognized as a very vulnerable region, and bring a large amount of general considerations on climate change.

Presentation of the CILSS Platform When creating the CILSS climate change and sustainable land management platform, the idea was to create a unique site where one can find diverse informations targeted at West African needs. Figure 1 presents a snapshot of the CILSS/AGRHYMET platform (www.agrhymet.ne/portailCC). Six parts have been created: • The NEWS part is the most consulted one so far. It is regularly an updated source for opportunities of training and funding, for example, but also news and agenda. For instance, call for grants and application for projects or programs are recorded. Any stakeholder could find a peculiar call for grants and a researcher could have information on a specialized workshop as well as general conference and could find an updated intergovernmental negotiations process; the three rubrics are the unique entry to keep up with what is ongoing for the West Africa Adaptation world. • The MENU part is a more classical package, with a presentation, informations on teaching activities from the AGRHYMET Regional Center, useful links to navigate the Web, and a presentation of the platform, contact, and a research tool. • The PROJECTS part presents emblematic ongoing or achieved CILSS projects. This is a unique way to capitalize a multi-project database and to make sure the information is still available even after the end of funding (e.g., the “Projet d’appui aux capacités d’adaptation des pays du CILSS au changement climatique” project was a pioneer and innovative project tackling climate change issues in West Africa, and some of the most important documents produced are made available). • The THEMATICAL part presents popularized, easy-to-understand access to the following areas of CILSS expertise: climate science, adaptation, mitigation, climate governance, and water management. The climate science part describes West African climatology, monsoon system, and hydrology regimes and presents the climate change context. The adaptation part describes some generalities that focus on agricultural practices adapted to climate change in a rain-fed context, an irrigated context, and finally a pastoral context. The mitigation part presents several aspects of the mitigation issues for West African countries, such as financing processes and CILSS actions. The climate governance presents the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change process, as well as the negotiations under UNFCCC, and focuses on the regional as well as national level of political documents. Finally, the water sector is presented with a special attention drawn on impacts of climate change on water and a few adaptation strategies. • The RESOURCES part presents several documents such as CILSS documents, national and regional documents (National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) (under UNFCCC) but also national action programs (under UNCCD) as well as West African organizations such as ECOWAS policy papers), synthesis documents and also tools and products (mitigation, impacts and vulnerability, sustainable land management, etc.), database on CILSS students, and finally scientific publications. It is sometimes a unique way to have access to such documents. • The FORUM part is a very new part and is trying to bring experts to discuss various topics. As an example, the first topic is the cost of adaptation in rain-fed West African agricultural systems. This site has been launched at the end of 2012. So far, 7 months after launching the report, it has received more than 30,000 views. The question of language is crucial to reach a maximum of users. Page 6 of 8

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

At the beginning, we have produced only a French version. However, noting that around 15 % of our users are connected from English-speaking countries, we have added an English translation to reach more users. However, CILSS is willing to translate the website in Portuguese to cover the official languages of the CILSS/ECOWAS region. It is important to note that a mean of 5 min is spent by every user and that around 40 % are regular users (i.e., which come back regularly to the website) visiting 3 pages on average. Concerning the geographical origin of the Web users, the vast majority are connected from African countries, namely, Niger, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast, and Mali, whereas less than 15 % originated from developed countries (France and the United States).

Conclusions While climate change impacts are widespread all over the planet, a lot of attention has been given in order to make information accessible to Web users. However, although very vulnerable, the West African region has not received a lot of attention specifically focused on West African regional circumstances. After reviewing the existing platform, the chapter has presented detailed informations related to the CILSS climate change and sustainable land management platform. The next step to improve the platform is to work with more focus on user needs. The CILSS is willing to start a dialogue with different types of stakeholders in order to publish informations useful for the most part. A fine analysis of the utility actual users are making of individual pages is in progress and should flourish the development of new informations. It is expected to produce a questionnaire and to send it to Web users, to produce more demand-driven information. The forum part should be more active, and a work is also under progress by CILSS experts in order to determine the most effective way to make experts react to posted articles. Finally, the network should be strengthened inside and outside West Africa in order to transfer knowledge and to spread out good practices and tools, for example, by presenting the platform to international fora, such as the Conferences of the Parties of the United Nations Framework on Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) or other relevant fora, but also by having a communication strategy to “spread the word,” by e-mail lists, newsletters, and interaction with other platforms. The lesson learned is that the strong demand for information posted on the platform is a real challenge. While climate change issues are getting more and more attention, there is room for information sharing and dissemination of all kinds of informations to those who need it; however, there is a lot of overlapping and much attention is done to specific topics or areas. Although not directly linked to it, this website is part of a broader Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation to climate change ongoing under UNFCCC. An incoming challenge will be to make this platform more interactive, with a discussion forum, and the possibility for the Web users to ask for specific questions to the community and for specific topics to be treated in the website. The first feedbacks we had are encouraging, and counting methods teach us that the vast majority of users are coming back regularly. The next step is to better understand their needs (so far, the majority looks for opportunity) as well as attracting new users. This website is one of the milestones in building a common response to climate change and building a more resilient Africa.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Acknowledgment This work is funded by the Fonds Français pour l’Environnement Mondial and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

References Ali A, Lebel T (2009) The Sahelian standardized rainfall index revisited. Int J Climatol 29:1705–1714 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007) The IPCC fourth assessment report (AR4). In: Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 976 pp Niasse M, Afouda A, Amani A (eds) (2004) Reducing West Africa’s vulnerability to climte impacts on water resources, wetlands and desertification. IUCN, Gland/Cambridge, UK, xviii + 66 pp Sarr B (2007) Le climat Ouest Africain et son évolution depuis les années 1950. Centre Régional AGRHYMET CRA/CILSS, Niamey Sarr B (2010) Recrudescence des fortes pluies et des inondations dans un contexte de changement climatique 9–11 in Le Sahel face aux changements climatiques, bulletin mensuel spécial du Centre Régional AGRHYMET Sarr B (2012) Present and future climate change in the semi-arid region of West Africa: a crucial input for practical adaptation in agriculture. Atmos Sci Lett 13:108–112 Waha K, M€ uller C, Bondeau A, Dietrich JP, Kurukulasuriya P, Heinke J, Lotze-Campen H (2013) Adaptation to climate change through the choice of cropping system and sowing date in sub-Saharan Africa. Glob Environ Change 23(1):130–143, ISSN 0959–3780

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Strategic Environmental Assessment as a Tool to Integrate Climate Change Adaptation: A Perspective for Nigeria Chika Ubaldus Ogbonna* and Eike Albrecht* Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus - Senftenberg Germany, Senftenberg, Germany

Abstract Nigeria is one of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa vulnerable to current and future climate variability and change. The effects of climatic changes in Nigeria would vary significantly and set to occur in several regions of the country and all sectors of the economy. Climate change is a great challenge to the sustainable development and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Nigeria. The main purpose of this chapter is to highlight the challenges associated with the current and projected impacts of climate change on the human environment in Nigeria, to review and explore the potentials of Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), and to propose its use in making informed decisions relevant to the implementation of the newly established adaptation programs in the country. Current measures on how Nigeria is responding to recent impacts of climate change are presented. It is imperative that an appropriate environmental assessment tool such as SEA be employed in making rational decisions regarding adaptation options. SEA offers a structured and proactive environmental tool for integration of climate change adaptation into formulating policies, plans, and programs (PPPs) across relevant sectors.

Keywords Nigeria; Climate Change; Adaptation; Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA); Decisionmaking

Introduction Climate change is occurring and may have more consequences on the human environment in the future. The fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published in 2007, fully confirmed the occurrence of global climate change particularly in developing countries. This report also categorically emphasized that human activities are the main cause of observed changes in climate today (IPCC 2007a). This fact was also restated by the recent published 5th assessment report of the IPCC in 2014 (IPCC, 2014, p. 5). Such anthropogenic influences that contribute to climate change include the burning of fossil fuels, the combustion of biomass, agriculture, and deforestation. According to a German Watch Report, more than 710,000 people have lost their lives as a result of direct effects of over 14,000 recorded extreme weather and climate events which resulted in some damages worth above USD 2.3 trillion (in Purchasing Power Parity) observed globally between 1991 and 2010 (Harmelling 2011, p. 4). *Email: [email protected] *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 19

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The UNFCCC has already identified adaptation as an option to address climate change. Adaptation in the context of climate change refers to any adjustments that take place in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects or impacts, aimed at moderating harm or exploiting beneficial opportunities (Klein 2004; IPCC 2007b; IPCC 2014). “Adaptation, therefore, includes several types of actions (direct protection of people and assets, actions to support this protection, reactions with respect to impacts, etc.), which can be implemented in several sectors such as (agriculture, water, energy, transportation, infrastructural development etc.), associated with different climatic challenges depending on geographic scales and zones (coastal, mountains, urban areas, etc.) and using widely diversified instruments (standards, information, tax measures, transfers, investment choices in infrastructure, etc.)” (IPCC 2007b cited in Hallegatte et al. 2011, p. 3). To deal with the impacts of climate variability and change in Nigeria, there is a need for robust adaptation measures to be implemented. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which entered into force on 21 March 1994 provides the basis to adapt to climate change impacts. Nigeria signed the convention on 13 June 1992; its ratification took place on 29 August 1994 which entered into force from 27 November 1994. Article 4(1)(f) of the UNFCCC urges all members to “take climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in the relevant social, environmental, economic and environmental policies and actions, and employ appropriate methods, for example, impact assessments [such as Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA)], formulated and determined nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on public health and on the quality of the environment, of projects, programs or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate change” (See full text of the Convention).

The Effects of Climate Variability and Change in Nigeria Climate change is the latest challenge to achieving sustainable human development targets such as the Millennium Development Goals and objectives set out in the Nigerian development agenda termed “Vision 2020” (NASPA-CCN 2011, p. 1). “Nigeria has a long history of changing weather and environmental conditions this is due to its many climatic zones, ranging from the long coastal zone in the South and the large arid area in the North” (NEST and Woodley 2012). Such changes in climate and weather patterns are now on the increase in several parts of the country. Such trends are validated by recent research, for instance, Nwajiuba and Onyeneke (2010) applied regression model and trend analysis of climate data for a period of 30 years (1978–2007) in the Southeast Rainforest Zone of Nigeria. The outcome of this research shows that decreasing trends for rainfall and relative humidity and increasing trends in temperature and sunshine hours pose severe effects on major crop yields such as maize, cassava, and yam which serve as major food crops in the region. The impact of climate change can already be seen across the country starting from the Sahel in the North to the rainforest and coastal zone in the South (BNRCC 2011). A study carried out by Odjugo (2010) shows that air temperature is constantly on the increase, especially since the 1970s. Despite the relative increase in temperature across Nigeria, observational trends in temperature indicate higher temperature anomalies in the semiarid region of the country than the coastal regions (Odjugo 2010, p. 1). In fact, urban areas and cities are facing new challenges of the so-called urban heat islands. The changing climatic conditions are apparent and have become a big challenge in Nigeria today, posing severe effects on social infrastructure and people’s livelihoods. Some of the potential effects of climate change and variability in the country include extreme weather events, temperature increase, increase in flooding, coastal erosion, sea-level rise, and long periods of droughts in the North and Page 2 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Highest per capita displacement worldwide, 2012 (4.2% of population displaced)

The Sahel Senegal 30.000

Niger 531,000

Mali 10.000 Benin 10.000

Gambia 8,000

Nigeria 6.1 million

Sudan 84.000 Chad 500,000 CAR 13.000

Largest displacement event in Africa: second largest worldwide, 2012. 33/35 states affected.

Flood-affected areas The Sahel Countries with conflict-induced displacement

South Sudan 340,000

Cameroon 30.000

Gabon 2.000

DRC 2.000

Nigeria Niger Chad S Sudan Sudan 0

1

2 3 4 5 6 People displaced (millions)

7

Sources: CRED/EM-DAT,IFRC, Nigeria-NCFRMI/IOM, IOM, OCHA, UNICEF.

Fig. 1 Map of West and Central Africa flood displacement, June to October 2012 (Source: IDMC/NRC (2013, p. 20))

variability of rainfall in the South. The expected climate impacts in urban areas in the country are likely to include extreme flooding due to heavy storms, heat waves, freshwater scarcity, and extreme weather events. Furthermore, such climate impacts may add more stress to public infrastructures and on urban sectors such as tourism, transportation, energy generation, and agricultural production. For example, flooding is one of the most pressing environmental challenges in Nigeria today. There are three major ways in which flooding occurs in Nigeria, namely, river flooding, urban flooding, and coastal flooding (Gwary 2008; Adeoti et al. 2010; Bashir et al. 2012). The impacts of flooding have been observed in Nigeria for decades. However, increase in flooding as a result of storm surge and variation in sea levels may become more frequent in the country in the future considering global and regional predictions. There are several projections, which point to increase in sea-level rise in the Nigerian coastal waters. For instance, a rise in sea level of 0.462 m (above sea level) was recorded in the coastal areas between the year 1960 and 1970 (Udofa and Fajemirokun 1978, Boateng (2010, p.13). It is projected by Awosika et al. (1992) that the Niger Delta area of the country could lose more than 15,000 km2 of land by 2100 with only a one meter rise in sea level. Lagos and the low-lying coastal areas of the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria are predicted to be equally affected by such events (Awosika et al. 1992). Nwajiuba (2008) foresees that important coastal cities in Nigeria such as Lagos, Port Harcourt, Calabar, and Warri are potential areas for inundation exposure as a result of the projected sea-level rise and storm surge events. Moreover, urban flooding has become one of the greatest environmental challenges in most of the Nigerian cities nowadays (Etuonovbe 2011). Settlements in the coastal region of Nigeria are being seriously affected due to severe flooding (Uyigue and Agho 2007). Similarly, the International Displacement Monitoring Centre Report (2013) mapped and documented the severe heavy rainfall that affected about 18 countries in Africa from June to November 2012 as can be seen in Fig. 1. The map shows that heavy rainfall event caused flash flooding, inundation, and displacement of vulnerable communities in the region including about 6.1 million people in Nigeria alone.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Factors Increasing Nigeria’s Vulnerability to Climate Change There are several factors that exacerbate the vulnerability of Nigeria to climate change. For example, the rapid shift in Nigeria’s demography poses own challenges in the face of climate change. Nigeria’s current population is estimated to be about 160 million people and a population density of 138 people per km2 is growing tremendously (BNRCC 2011, p. 1; Ndujihe 2013). According to a report from the “Building Nigeria’s Response to Climate Change project” (BNRCC 2011), increasing population density in the country is an additional pressure on scarce natural resources and food security (BNRCC 2011, p. 1; Nest and Woodley 2011, p. 5). This further increases the vulnerability of the most particularly exposed communities. The rate of population growth and urbanization may also increase vulnerability through inappropriate land-use and land fragmentation. Furthermore, rapid population growth (2.9 % per year) and urbanization with nearly 50 % of the population now living in the urban area has added demand for public infrastructural services (NASPA-CCN 2011, p. 3). This present situation reduces the resilience to a range of climate risks in the country (NASPA-CCN 2011, p. 3). Furthermore, some fast-growing cities and urban areas in Nigeria are mostly situated along the coast and therefore highly vulnerable to the impact of sea-level rise. For instance, the urban and suburban areas of Lagos and the Niger Delta could be adversely affected considering the predictions. The ever-growing coastal slum population living in floating slums and flood-prone wetlands in and around Lagos suburban area is a challenge to urban planning and development. In addition to slum development, the city of Lagos faces a problem of coastal erosion and flooding (Mehrotra et al. 2011, p. 30). Such areas may be drastically affected by climate hazards if the projected climate events would occur (Awosika et al. 1992; Mehrotra et al. 2011, p. 32). Another factor is land degradation as a result of deforestation and overgrazing in Nigeria (Abiodun et al. 2011, p. 1). This accumulates to large environmental challenges, which have been seen in various parts of the country, in recent times. Climate change would intensify such environmental problems. The incessant oil spillage and gas flaring in the Niger Delta had contributed immensely to the environmental degradation of the region (Ugochukwu and Ertel 2011). Climate change will add to such challenges, as a result will increase the region’s vulnerability. Indeed, both physical and socioeconomic factors dispose Nigeria to the adverse effects of climate change (BNRCC 2010). According to the Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team Report (NEST) (2010), some of these factors include (1) Nigeria’s long coastline (800 km), prone to impacts from the rise in sea level; (2) Nigeria’s North prone to drought and desertification; (3) threatened water and energy resources; (4) more than 60 % of the population depends on threatened agricultural and fishing resources; (5) increasing population; and (6) inadequate policies and programs, especially among vulnerable communities and in vulnerable regions. Nigeria is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change largely because approximately 70 % of Nigerians are engaged in smallholder rain-fed agricultural production (NEST and Woodley 2011, p. 10). In this respect, however, the current and potential impacts of climate change are likely to be different in several parts of the country. For instance, Nigeria’s long coastline to the South situated in the coastal/rainforest region implies that a huge number of people living close to the coast are vulnerable to sea-level rise and storm surges, while several communities residing in the Northern part of the country particularly in the Sahel region could experience increased effects of cyclical drought (BNRCC 2011). Current observations in the Sahel region show that the area is susceptible to aridity as a result of increasing high temperatures and reduced frequency of rainfall (BNRCC 2011). Furthermore, biodiversity, coastal settlements, water, agriculture, and land use are expected to be affected by the fast-increasing trend of climate variability in the country. Page 4 of 19

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Policy Response to Climate Change Adaptation There are several new challenging issues associated with changes in weather and climate deserving adaptation considerations in Nigeria today, perhaps more than the several impacts highlighted as the increase in extreme climatic events pose an enormous challenge to the Nigerian economic growth (DFID/ERM 2009; Sayne 2011). As such, many parts of the country have recorded different kinds of climatic changes, which have led to increase in flooding, heat waves, erosion, and droughts. Erratic increase in rainfall, flooding, and drought, for instance, can reduce efforts being made to achieve sustainable development and the Millennium Development Goal (MDGs) in Nigeria, especially as future vulnerability may not only depend on climate change but also on several other factors such as development pathways (UNFCCC 2010). In this regard, adaptation is essential to reduce the present and future impacts of climate change in Nigeria in order to rescue vulnerable communities, agricultural sectors, ecosystems, and at the same time increase the adaptive capacity of the population. Globally, awareness on climate change in recent times has been on the increase as well as vulnerability research. As a result, there are several actions from many stakeholders in the public and private sectors especially at the national and local levels that focus on understanding the challenges that besiege climate change issues and what they can do to reduce the associated effects (Hallegatte et al. 2011, p. 3). Such trend is peculiar to Nigeria today although more effort is needed from individuals, nongovernmental organizations, institutions, and particularly from the government, for increasing awareness and public education with respect to climate change adaptation and even on Clean Development Mechanism that targets climate change mitigation in the country. As climate policy objectives are partly formulated at the international level, policies need to be implemented on a national, subnational, or even on the local scale (NEAA 2009, p. 81). The UNFCCC obliges all parties to prepare for adaptation to the impacts of climate change. In recent times adaptation policy has become a focus of researchers and stakeholders as an option to tackle climate change in addition to mitigation. Adaptation in contrast to mitigation is more feasible on a local scale as it addresses specific local impacts of climate change. Moreover, there is not yet an international guideline or perhaps a fit for all approach to adaptation on global scale. This is due to the different levels of vulnerability of social, economic, and ecological systems to myriad consequences of the impact of climate variability and change, and even the cross-sectoral challenges arising from different institutional systems (UNFCCC 2012, p. 4). Recognizing these challenges, increasing number of developing countries has initiated independent adaptation plans and strategies. The coherent approach being taken by these countries aimed to “contribute to efforts towards climate-resilient development, suggesting a long-term continuous process and most importantly periodic revisions” (UNFCCC 2012, p. 4).

Climate Change Adaptation Policy Response in Nigeria In addition to the drafting of the National Climate Change Policy in Nigeria, the country has also developed adaptation plans that will enable the country to address the emerging challenging issues associated with climate change. The Nigerian national adaptation plan was initiated after accessing the risk and vulnerability of the entire country on current and potential impacts of climate change (UNFCCC 2012, p. 5; Abiodun et al. 2011; NASPA-CCN 2011). The national adaptation plan also considered lessons and knowledge generated from the several project components, such as a research pilot project (e.g., future climate scenario studies, policy development, communication, Page 5 of 19

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and outreach as well as youth and gender initiatives (Abiodun et al. 2011). The National Adaptation Plan and Strategy of Action on Climate Change for Nigeria was developed in partnership with the Special Climate Change Unit (SCCU) of the Federal Ministry of Environment of Nigeria and other relevant stakeholders such as the Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team (NEST) with a financial support from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The Nigerian National Adaptation Plan has, therefore, been developed in a coherent manner, thereby serving as an exemplary document and a case study on the national adaptation plan for other developing countries that aim to initiate adaptation plans or strategies (UNFCCC 2012). Laudable as the Nigerian adaptation plan could be, there is a need for adequate decision-making during the implementation. Reminiscence that climate change may lead to loss of between 2 % and 11 % of Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Products (GDP) by 2020 and between 6 % and 30 % by the year 2050 as pointed out in the National Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action on Climate Change for Nigeria. To reduce such potential loss the Nigerian National Adaptation Strategy shows that adaptation planning will take a strategic approach in addressing climate change impacts in the country. Adaptation measures shall focus on all the affected sectors including agriculture (crops and livestock), livelihoods, education, freshwater resources, coastal water resources, fisheries, forest, biodiversity, energy, transportation, communication, industry and commerce, emergency and disaster response, vulnerable groups, migration and security, human settlement and housing, health, and sanitation.

Initiatives for Climate Change Adaptation Nigeria as a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) plays a key role in developing Climate Change Adaptation Strategies that can help reduce the impacts and consequences of climate change in the region. ECOWAS is making strong efforts to integrate climate issues into economic planning and management at the regional and national scales. The West African Climate Change Adaptation Program initiative is a milestone towards the formulation of the “Regional Plan of Action for reducing vulnerability as climate change impact increases in the West African States” (OECD 2009). Another important step, is a recent establishment of Graduate Programs in two Nigerian Universities under the German initiative on the “West African Science Service Centre on Climate Change and Adaptive Land Use (WASCAL)” which aims to enhance the capacity building in Nigeria and across the West African States. Furthermore, in order to address the impacts of climate change and global warming in Nigeria and to respond to international obligations, the former president of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, endorsed the creation of a new unit – “Special Climate Change Unit (SCCU)” – under the Federal Ministry of Environment, Housing, and Urban Development. The unit is established to ensure that the UN conventions and the Kyoto Protocol activities such as the implementation of Clean Development Mechanism and other related issues are effectively addressed. The department has the mandate, to oversee initiatives geared towards reducing climate change impacts on the Nigerian environment and coordinate sectoral measures that can help achieve its goals. The Special Climate Change Unit was commissioned in 2006. Recently it has been established as a full department within the Ministry of Environment. The department is exclusively responsible for coordination of matters relating to mainstreaming climate change adaptation into the national policies. Also, efforts are being made by the Nigerian government, to create a National Climate Change Trust Fund that could help finance strategic actions so as to curb the impacts of climate change (M€ uller 2013, p. 5).

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The Need for Integrated Assessment of Adaptation Options In order to minimize the impacts of climate change on the most vulnerable communities, integrated assessment of adaptation options is imperative. In this regard, implementation of adaptation measures should be supported by adequate environmental assessment procedures. This is very essential in order to make robust decisions regarding adaptation to the impact of climate change hence such decisions remain complex. However, to reach this target, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) are the two unique environmental assessment tools that are used internationally for wide-ranging environmental assessment such as prediction and evaluation of social, economic, health, and environmental impacts of a proposed plan (UNEP et al. 2004, p. 6). According to Sadler et al. (2011) “the introduction of SEA has an integral part of the development of EIA.” SEA was developed together with EIA in 1969 with the United States National Environmental Policy Act (João 2005, p. 5). Nigeria does not yet have a legal requirement and a framework for SEA, but EIA is well established. For instance, Adebanji (2010) pointed out that neither policies, plans, nor programs (PPPs) have been regulated under SEA at the national, regional, or sectoral/industrial level in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria considering several social and environmental challenges that need to be addressed in the area (Adebanji 2010, p. 5). Now, the question is how can the environmental impact of adaptation programs be reduced and positive effects enhanced in order to avoid decisions that may lead to maladaptation. To address this issue, it is important to first identify the kind of adaptation programs that could help reduce the risks posed by a particular climate hazard and at the same time being environmentally conscious. This challenging task could be possibly addressed through the application of appropriate environmental assessment and decision aiding tool such as SEA. Such assessment procedures can also help phase out programs that may pose a risk to the environment while pursuing the win-win option characterized by overarching benefits of climate change mitigation and adaptation. Therefore, SEA is an important tool to be considered in making informed and robust decisions at the early stage before such policies, plans, or programs can be implemented (OECD 2008a, p. 21). EIA can then be used at a later phase with the aim of improving a particular proposed project. The Implementation of the Nigerian Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action should be considered in this context. EIA is very relevant in assessing the possible impact that proposed projects particularly infrastructural related adaptation may pose on the environment (Agrawala et al. 2010). On the other hand, “the integration of climate change into strategic planning through the application of SEA should lead to better informed, evidence-based PPPs that are more sustainable in the context of changing climate and more capable of delivering progress on human development” (OECD 2010, p. 4). The authors will not go into details on EIA process in Nigeria, and the overall basic principles of SEA; however; it is assumed that the reader is familiar with EIA. In addition, appropriate citations and links will be provided.

Evolution of EIA There are many driving forces for the use of EIA worldwide. Firstly, EIA serves as an instrument for sustainable development in developed and developing countries though it has its limits, which are sometimes covered through early assessment of three levels of SEA linked to EIA (see Fig. 2). According to Albrecht (2011) one of the reasons for assimilation of EIA by several developing countries is due to the World Bank policy in 1988 which adopted EIA for major development Page 7 of 19

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Fig. 2 Links between EIA and SEA (Source: Adapted from Albrecht (2011, p. 156))

projects. This World Bank operational directive entails that any country seeking development assistance carries out an EIA especially under the World Bank supervision. Henceforth, “EIA of World Bank became mandatory for all projects that may potentially have a significant influence on the environment” (Albrecht 2011, p. 152). The target of the World Bank EIA recommendation is to make sure that projects on funding considerations by the institution are environmentally friendly and sustainable.

A Brief Overview of EIA Administration in Nigeria Nigeria recognizes the achievement of environmental protection as an integrated policy issue rather than standalone policy targets. The country also seeks to achieve sustainable development through enforcement of adequate environmental policies, laws, and regulations. The EIA Decree No. 86 of 1992 was established under the defunct Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA). The FEPA Act and Regulations were replaced in 2007 by the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) Act which established the NESREA, giving it the mandate to oversee the protection of the Nigeria’s environment through enforcement of these environmental laws in collaboration with the Federal and State Ministry of Environment. Nigeria runs a federal system of government – today the Federal Ministry of Environment is the central environmental authority as it contains the legal requirements to carry out EIA and evaluate the consequences of proposed projects on the environment. The Nigerian Federal Ministry of Environment is therefore bestowed with the mandate of EIA administration in Nigeria. On the other hand, the NESREA is responsible for the enforcement of environmental regulations, rules, laws, policies, and guidelines. NESREA has the entire competence for enforcement of environmental control measures through registration, licensing, and permitting system other than in the oil and gas sector. However, the EIA law and the Urban and Regional Planning Decree No. 88 of 1992 provided principles guiding development of major projects that may likely affect the environment significantly (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1992a, b; Agwu et al. 2000; Ladan 2012b; Ugochukwu and Ertel 2011; Olokesusi 1998). The Nigerian EIA decree contains the procedure to be followed. In addition, it provides a checklist, for the categorization of projects subject to EIA (Echefu and Akpofure 2003; Ugochukwu and Ertel 2011, p. 18). EIA is mandatory for all major projects that may likely pose significant impacts on the Nigerian environment considering location or size of the project. An example of such projects may include major road construction, industrial and infrastructural

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development, mining, housing development and projects located in environmental sensitive areas. It is worthy to note that EIA in Nigeria is a licensing tool for proponents, especially those in the oil industry and other mining development to carry out before going ahead with their operations. EIA must be carried out with the input of all the stakeholders and the Ministry of Environment and all other competent authorities. An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is usually produced at the end of this process.

Institutional and Legal Challenges of EIA in Nigeria The Nigerian EIA practices and legal and institutional frameworks have for several years been attributed to several problems and challenges. These include low public access to final EIA reports, insufficient interagency coordination (overlapping of competencies; federal system’s challenges), and inadequate stakeholder consultations and public participation. Even though access to environmental information is given by the Decrees No. 86/1992, information dissemination is difficult in practice. Furthermore, full public participation is given but only for 21 days (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1992a; Ugochukwu and Ertel 2011, p. 169; Nwoko 2013, p. 26), and Environmental Impact Statements are not published online. However, it is expected that the Federal Ministry of Environment and the young NESREA will through their good practices and monitoring responsibilities enhance the EIA practice and address such pitfalls recorded in enforcing the provision therein in the past years. More especially as NESREA allows for the collaboration of local and international agencies and nongovernmental organizations including international regulatory bodies such as the UN Agencies, World Bank, Partners for Water and Sanitation (PAWS-UK), United Kingdom Environment Agency (Ladan 2012a), and other interested corporate bodies around the world. Such local and international cooperation could reduce these shortcomings; such cooperation is in the right direction as environmental challenges become more global. However, climate change was not considered during establishment and formal requirement of EIA decree No. 86/1992 procedures; yet, the integration of climate change into the stages of SEA/EIA could be an important step to be realized under the new NESREA enforcement responsibilities and the good practices of the Federal Ministry of Environment in collaboration with relevant environmental departments in the country. Having in mind that climate change is a crosscutting issue, the Federal and State Ministry of Environment, the National and State Urban and Regional Planning Authorities, and other relevant Environmental Agencies can play a key role that could help enhance adaptation decision-making and reduce climate-induced risks.

Aims of SEA The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) established in the United States in 1969 promulgated the first Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) regime. SEA is a tool designed to achieve the overarching target of sustainable development, for example, the national targets for the implementation of Agenda 21 and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development known as the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. The tool being flexible also applies to new environmental challenges such as climate change. The major aim of SEA is to incorporate environmental concerns into strategic decisions which may include policies, plans, programs, regulatory frameworks, and legislations depending on the respective area of application in the SEA provisions. For example, policies and legislations are not included in the area of application Page 9 of 19

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of the EU SEA Directive. SEA helps to protect the environment by improving decisions that lead to sustainability targets. The uniqueness of SEA lies in the consideration of environmental concerns from the onset of decision-making in relation to development of proposed plans and subsequent projects such as public infrastructures. Considering the characteristics, “it can be argued that EIA procedure is at times analogous to that of SEA” (João 2005, p. 5). It is worthy to note that countries or nations having an effective EIA procedure as an environmental assessment tool can easily apply SEA using existing EIA institutional structures. This way SEA framework can easily be incorporated within the planning and institutional decision-making procedures. This is possible in the case of Nigeria EIA institutional framework and planning system. There are two key principles of SEA (João 2005, p. 7). According to João (2005) one of the major principles of SEA is to explicitly identify potential PPPs (or alternatives) and evaluate these alternatives in an assessment context. She emphasized that SEA likewise EIA should not be employed to mitigate environmental impacts of actions that have already been decided upon. Rather the environmental assessment process should be used to inform the decision of what action should take place, i.e., what alternative should be chosen (João 2005, p. 7). The second principle of SEA relates to the improvement of proposals. João (2005) posits that SEA must improve, instead of just analyze policy or programs, meaning that SEA should be effectively used in the formulation of strategic actions: “looking at evolving strategic action afresh and being willing to change and improve such strategies in the light of the SEA findings.” Furthermore, the SEA should explicitly contribute to the decision-making process (João 2005). SEA procedure should, therefore, fit more elegantly in the strategic decision-making process (Therivel 2004, p. 61). There is no common definition of SEA; however, Sadler and Verheem (1996) provides a very well-cited definition; thus SEA is “a systematic process for evaluating the environmental consequences of proposed policy, plan or program initiatives in order to ensure they are fully included and appropriately addressed at the earliest appropriate stage of decision making on par with economic and social considerations.” Similarly, João (2005) provides a brief definition thus SEA is “the process of evaluating the environmental impacts of proposed PPPs, in order to inform decision making.” One of the main differences between EIA and SEA is that the scope and processes of the latter are characterized by greater diversity (UNEP 2002 p. 493). Furthermore, the SEA “process extends the aim and principles of EIA upstream in the decision-making process, beyond the project level and when major alternatives are still open” (UNEP 2002, p. 493). SEA represents a proactive approach to integrate environmental considerations into the highest level of decision-making, consistent with the principles outlined in Agenda 21 (UNEP 2002, p. 493). Both SEA and EIA have common elements, although increasing modifications to the procedure and methodology are necessary when moving from the project to the policy level (UNEP 2002, p. 493). While EIA is widely practiced, SEA is increasingly being recognized in several developed and developing countries and international and local organizations as a better tool to make informed decisions and improve developmental programs. Table 1 shows a comparison of the key characteristics of both processes as is given by UNEP (2002, p. 493). The link between SEA and EIA is established in a tiered manner. According to João (2005) SEA deals with a hierarchy of strategic actions, which ultimately affects what projects are built on the ground (Oxford Brooks University 2004 cited in João 2005). “This hierarchy might differ in detail from country to country but it is usually there, and it is a key aspect of what SEA is all about” (João 2005, p. 5). According to Albrecht (2011) the hierarchical order is ideal as plans and programs usually set a framework for the subsequent project realization (Albrecht 2011, p. 155). The tiered concept helps in sustainable decision-making regarding the implementation of PPPs and any project under such developmental process. SEA is, therefore, largely linked to EIA (Albrecht 2011, p. 155). Page 10 of 19

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Table 1 Some Comparisons between EIA and SEA EIA of projects* Takes place at end of decision-making cycle Reactive approach to development proposal Identifies specific impacts on the environment Considers a limited number of feasible alternatives A limited review of cumulative effects Emphasis on mitigating and minimizing impacts Narrow perspective, high level of details Well-defined process, clear beginning and end Focus on standard agenda, treats symptoms of environmental deterioration

SEA of policy, plans, and programs** Takes place at earliest stages of decision-making cycle Proactive approach to development proposals and programs Identifies environmental implications, issues of sustainable development Considers a broad range of potential alternatives Early warning of cumulative effects and synergistic impacts Emphasis on meeting, environmental objectives, maintaining natural systems Broad perspective, lower level of details to provide a vision and overall framework Multistage process overlapping components, policy level is continuing iterative Focuses on sustainability targets, get at source of environmental deterioration

Source: CSIR (1996) cited in UNEP (2002, p. 495) *EIA usually assesses only negative effects on the environment **SEA (for example the SEA-Directive of the EU) assesses positive and negative effects of plans and programs

Figure 2 shows the linkage between policy, plan, and program of SEA and project-specific EIA. It is to be noted that the words policies, plans, and programs are used differently in countries considering the best-suited terminology (Sadler et al. 2011, p. 2; Albrecht 2011, p. 156). However, it is important to define the meaning of policy, plan, and program (PPP) as used in this context. A policy is an inspiration and guidance for action; a plan is a set of linked proposed action with a specific time frame that will implement the policy, while a program can be regarded as a set of proposed projects in a particular area that will implement the plan (João 2005 p. 4; Schmidt et al. 2010).

The Need to Integrate Climate Change Adaptation into SEA in Nigeria Nigeria has no legal or formal requirement for SEA; however, several developing countries and international organizations are rapidly adopting SEA as a decision-making support tool (Schmidt et al. 2005; OECD 2010; Sadler et al. 2011, p. 2). To better address the numerous environmental challenges such as climate change and environmental degradation in Nigeria, there is a need to supplement EIA with SEA. As climate change becomes a new challenge in planning, incorporating appropriate environmental assessment tool that can aid decision-making has become urgent. SEA is a very relevant tool in this context. “SEA provides a methodology not only for evaluating the impact of policies, plans and programs on the environment, but also for addressing the impact of environmental change on PPPs” (OECD 2009, p. 80). Practical examples documented by the OECD suggest that SEA is an appropriate and more rational environmental assessment tool for climate change adaptation. In order to fulfill the adaptation initiatives effectively, it is imperative to follow good practices. For example, the OECD has produced guidance for practitioners on how to apply and incorporate climate change adaptation within the SEA process (OECD 2006). Furthermore, SEA being a flexible tool can be tailored to the local context or the specific strategic decision-making or planning process that it seeks to support. SEA can, therefore, serve as an assessment tool for both adaptation and mitigation purposes. In terms of mitigation SEA assesses

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the environmental effects of the plan in terms of potential emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) that could be released from the plan and how to reduce them (Larsen and Kørnøv 2009; Larsen et al. 2012, p. 33). For example, any SEA of a development plan for a new urban area can include assessments of GHG emissions generated from traffic (Larsen et al. 2012, p. 33). On the other hand, Larsen and Kørnøv (2009) cited in Larsen et al. (2012) envisage that adaptation considers climate change as an environmental problem of relevance to plan and if and how it is expedient to adapt the plan for future climate change. For example, the SEA of an overall spatial plan can include assessment of appropriate building sites in the light of future sea-level rise (Larsen et al. 2012, p. 33). As stated earlier, countries and organizations are increasingly undertaking SEA, using formal or informal procedures (Sadler et al. 2011, p. 2). To the present authors’ perspective, there are several reasons why SEA is increasingly adopted. Perhaps, the first reason is that SEA is widely recognized as being effective in integrating environmental protection measures in strategic decision-making. Secondly, several countries are creating activities geared towards sustainable development. SEA is an effective instrument for sustainable development (Albrecht 2011, p. 152). As pointed out earlier in the chapter, the purpose of SEA is to ensure that environmental considerations are taken into account and in order to inform high levels of decision-making, which facilitates assessments of policies, plans, and programs. Furthermore, SEA has the potential of improving PPPs, making sure that they take climate change issues into consideration, especially in countries with the legal provision for SEA (OECD 2009, p. 94). Another reason pointed out by Sadler et al. (2011) is that SEA serves as a lending and aid instrument used by donor agencies. SEA is a multistage process that encompasses a spectrum of approaches and diverse arrangements, procedures, and methods (UNEP 2002, p. 493). Considering the diverse nature of climaterelated impacts and adaptation issues in Nigeria, SEA is a structured planning tool to grind such hydra-headed challenges. An ideal SEA focuses on potential interrelations between concrete plans and programs and environmental changes by looking at the projected future of key socioeconomic variables, like trade patterns, commodity prices, population growth, migration flows while considering climate factors (OECD 2009, p. 80). The Nigerian national adaptation plan is geared towards strategic objectives comprising several sectors and ministries. SEA is better positioned to help improve relevant decisions towards achieving such integrated adaptation targets. According to the OECD (2009), an institution centered SEA approach may be best suited for mainstreaming climate change adaptation into national-level policy-making. Moreover, in order to enhance national adaptive capacity, important environmental assessment tools should be in place as this will enable mainstreaming of climate change adaptation into sectoral policies. According to the IPCC “one way of increasing adaptive capacity is by introducing the consideration of climate change impacts in development planning, for example, by including adaptation measures in land-use planning, and infrastructure design or by including measures to reduce vulnerability in existing disaster risk reduction strategies” (IPCC 2007, p. 20; IPCC 2014, p.27). Furthermore, considering SEA in a regional land use development plan can enhance potentials for adaptation and make adaptation constraining decisions transparent (Helbron et al. 2011). In this light, quality of the regional plan-making weighting process is potentially improved (Helbron 2008). Climate change adaptation through SEA in Nigeria can be realized by following the existing relevant institutional arrangement and decision-making structures; however, therefore, the tiered approach is pertinent in order to avoid overlap with the existing EIA process. The definition of policy, plan, and program is given nevertheless. To be precise in relation to climate change adaptation in Nigeria, an example of a policy is the proposed National Policy on Climate Change while a plan is the National Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action on Climate Change for Nigeria

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(NASPA-CCN). On the other hand, a program could be, for example, Climate Change Migration and Security Initiatives for Nigeria introduced within the Nigerian National Adaptation Plan.

New Strategic Programs That Need to be Integrated into SEA Hence adaptation to climate change has become very necessary. Nigeria has established new strategic actions to be considered when implementing the national adaptation plan. This gesture is a milestone towards addressing the impacts of climate change ravaging several communities in the country. However, the national adaptation plan must be implemented in a sustainable manner. Adopting a guidance framework relevant for assessing environmental risk that may occur through adaptation actions is imperative. Such a framework would help in improving the integration of climate change consideration into PPPs relevant to carrying out robust adaptation strategies (OECD 2008a). Even though the proposed strategic programs are designed to reduce the impact of climate change on vulnerable communities in Nigeria and enhance adaptive capacity of the affected communities, SEA can be employed as an environmental assessment tool. In this context, SEA could help to make informed decisions so as to ensure that communities are not adversely affected after implementation of such strategic actions, at the same time, improving such adaptation strategies. It is worthwhile to keep in mind that “any adaptation action can create unintended impacts on other natural and social systems” (Adger et al. 2005, p. 81). Some of these new strategic programs for adaptation to climate change provided in the National Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action for climate change in Nigeria (NASPA-CCN 2011) include: • • • • •

Agricultural Extension Programs Services Integrated Water Resource Management Program (watershed and coastal) Community-based Natural Resources Management Program (forest sectors) Comprehensive Emergency Management Program Climate Change, Migration, and Security Initiative (e.g. Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy).

Furthermore, implementation of the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) is a relevant aspect that needs to be considered in SEA. Hence, the need for action on climate change and biodiversity loss is firmly acknowledged as one of the new environmental challenges in Nigeria (NASPA-CCN 2011, p. 49; NEST 2011, p. 127). SEA is also required by Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Biodiversity Convention.

Benefits and Potential of SEA Within the Context of Climate Change Adaptation Integration of climate change adaptation into SEA is relatively new particularly in those developing countries without formal requirement for SEA. However, in developing countries where SEA has become part of environmental assessment tool, it provides a ready entry point for climate change consideration in strategic decision-making at the sector level (OECD 2009, p. 101). “SEA as a decision-aiding instrument can contribute to the prevention of conflicts with a policy for adapting to climate change” (Helbron et al. 2011). According to OECD (2009) building climate change consideration into an SEA can help: Page 13 of 19

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• To identify whether sectoral strategies are viable and sustainable under different climate scenarios. For example, in areas facing increasing water stress, SEA can help to assess different strategies for the reform of the agricultural sector with different water requirements to identify which strategy is most sustainable under different climate scenarios. • To analyze whether a sectoral strategy might lead to increased vulnerability of the sector where natural and human systems are affected by climate change and thus prevent maladaptation. • To identify which adaptation intervention can enhance the resilience of the sector in the face of climate change (OECD 2009, p. 101).

Potentials of SEA for Climate Change Adaptation in Nigeria There are several benefits that could be associated with considering climate change adaptation in SEA. Most importantly, SEA application is imperative in meeting relevant policy commitments related to climate change in Nigeria. For example, SEA can help improve decision-making related to proposed adaptation programs of the Nigerian Ministry of Environment to achieve the objectives of NASPA-CCN by: • • • • • • • •

Identifying policy, plans, and programs that are sensitive to climate change Incorporating stakeholders and public views at an early stage of planning Providing environmental-based evidence to support informed decisions Improving strategic actions (e.g., national and sectoral adaptation programs) and avoiding the risk of maladaptation Determining communities and socioeconomic groups that are increasingly vulnerable to climate change impacts Integrating environmental aspects that are often disregarded in sectoral plans, e.g., vulnerability to climate variability and change Evaluating the environmental impacts of adaptation strategies as well as possible conflicts with other existing regional or national plans and programs Addressing cumulative and synergistic effects which may lead to decisions that could prevent adverse consequences on urban and rural communities.

Conclusion The present and future climatic changes in Nigeria could be very detrimental to ecosystems and vulnerable communities. Hence, the impacts of such climatic events have become inevitable. Climate change considerations should become part of policy-making and planning process in Nigeria. Adaptation is widely recognized by decision-makers as one of the effective measures to reduce the unavoidable impacts of the changing climate on the human environment. Given that Nigeria has initiated and designed a national adaptation plan with the aim of addressing the emerging climate change impacts across the country, it is also indispensable for a robust implementation of the national adaptation plan. While some progress has been made especially through establishing a National Adaptation Plan for Nigeria, a lot more remains to be done. It is, therefore, imperative to adopt a guidance framework for assessing several environmental risks which may improve the integration of climate change consideration into PPPs in order to make informed decisions and carry out robust

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adaptation strategies (OECD 2008b). SEA provides a structural approach to incorporating environmental considerations into PPPs at different levels, including sector level (OECD 2009, p. 185). SEA can help to improve the adaptation programs laid in the national adaptation plan by bringing transparency in their implementation from the early stage of decision-making. SEA can help in improving adaptation programs as it allows for the participation of the public and relevant stakeholders, particularly at the early stage of the overall decision-making putting their suggestions into consideration and even strengthening the subsequent project-specific EIA. Flexibility is one of the characteristics of SEA. This assessment tool is not only a useful tool for climate change adaptation decision-making but also for making decisions related to climate change mitigation and poverty reduction strategies (PRS). However, following good practice climate change adaptation could be considered in the SEA/EIA framework. Adaptation to climate change is a crosscutting issue that needs to be addressed through integrated decision-making. SEA allows for a better cooperation between crosscutting environmental sectors. In this respect, regional environmental authorities have a key role to play in carrying out robust adaptation strategies. There is, therefore, a need for capacity building and training of relevant staff in SEA, EIA, and climate forecast. Training is very essential and crucial to take full advantage and to promote new skills. This would enable stakeholders and policy-makers to envisage the alternatives of future development and to apply the precautionary principle when necessary, so as to reduce climate risks. Therefore, an appropriate environmental assessment tool such as SEA can help spur robust decision-making regarding adaptation options in Nigeria.

References Abiodun BJ, Salami AT, Tadross M (2011) Climate change scenarios for Nigeria: understanding biophysical impacts. Climate systems analysis group, Cape Town, for building Nigeria’s response to climate change project. Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team (NEST), Ibadan, p 35 Adebanji A (2010) Environmental and resource conflicts in The Niger Delta: an impediment for Nigeria’s transition to the green economy. In: IAIA conference proceedings. The role of impact assessment in transition to the green economy 30th annual meeting of the International Association for Impact Assessment, 6–11 April 2010. International Conference Center, Geneva, pp 1–6 Adeoti A, Olayide O, Coater A (2010) Flooding and welfare of Fisher’s household in Lagos State, Nigeria. J Hum Ecol 32(3):161–167 Adger WN, Arnell NW, Tompkins EL (2005) Successful adaptation to climate change across scales. Glob Environ Chang 15(2):77–86 Agrawala S, Kramer AM, Prudent-Richard G, Sainsbury M (2010) Incorporating climate change impacts and adaptation in environmental impact assessments: opportunities and challenges. OECD Environmental Working Paper No. 24. OECD, Paris, pp 1–29 Agwu EIC, Ezedike CE, Egbu AU (eds) (2000) The concept and procedure of environmental impact assessment. Crystal Publishers, Owerri, pp 93–97 Albrecht E (2011) EIA and SEA in International Environmental Law: In: Albrecht E, Egute TO, Forbid GT (eds) Risk assessment and management for environmental protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. Lexxion, Berlin, pp 151–159 Awosika LF, French GT, Nicholls RJ, Ibe CE (1992) The impact of sea level rise on the coastline of Nigeria. In: Proceedings of IPCC symposium on the rising challenges of the sea, Magaritta, 14–19 Mar 1992

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Bashir O, Oludare AH, Johnson O, Aloyius B (2012) Floods of fury in Nigerian cities. Can Cent Sci Educ J Sustain Dev 5(7):69–79 Boateng I (2010) Spatial planning in coastal regions: facing the impact of climate change. The International Federation of Surveyors (FIG), Frederiksberg, pp 13–14 Building Nigeria Response to Climate Change – BNRCC (2010) Local action on climate change: BNRCC’s quarterly news letter October 2010. BNRCC, Ibadan, pp 1–12 Building Nigeria’s Response to Climate Change (BNRCC) (2011) National adaptation strategy and plan of action on climate change for Nigeria (NASPA – CCN). Nigeria. [Online]. http:// nigeriaclimatechange.org/naspa.pdf. Accessed 20 May 2013 CSIR (1996) Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). A primer, CSIR report ENV/S-RR 96001, Stellenbosch Department for International Development (DFID)/Environmental Resource Management (ERM) (2009) Impact of climate change on Nigeria’s economy, DFID/ERM report, Abuja Echefu N, Akpofure E (2003) Environmental impact assessment in Nigeria: regulatory background and procedural framework. In: McCabe M, Sadler B (eds) UNEP: studies of EIA practice in developing countries. UNEP Division of Technology, Industry and Economics and Trade Branch, Geneva pp 63–74 Etuonovbe AK (2011) The devastating effect of flooding in Nigeria. FIG working week 2011 bridging the gap between cultures Marrakech, Morocco 18–22 May 2011 Federal Republic of Nigeria (1992a) Environmental impact assessment decree (No. 86), Gazette 79 (73) Federal Republic of Nigeria (1992b) Nigerian urban and regional planning decree (No.88) 1992, Gazette 79 (75) Gwary D (2008) Climate change, food security and Nigeria agriculture. In: Workshop on the challenges. Climate change in Nigeria, 19–20 May 2008. NISER Hallegatte S, Lecocq F, Hallegatte S, Perthuis C (2011) Designing climate change adaptation policies: an economic framework. The World Bank, Washington, DC, pp 1–39 Harmelling S (2011) Global climate risk index 2012 : who suffers most from extreme weather events? Weather – related loss events in 2010 and 1991 to 2010, pp 28. [Online]. http://www. germanwatch.org/klima/cri.pdf. Accessed 17 May 2013 Helbron H (2008) Strategic environmental assessment in regional land use planning: indicator system for the assessment of degradation of natural resources and land uses with environmental potential for adaptation to global climate change (LUCCA). Doctoral thesis at the Faculty of Environmental Sciences and Process Engineering at the Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus, Germany [Online]. http://opus.kobv.de/btu/volltexte/2008/584/. Accessed 16 Aug 2014 Helbron H, Schmidt M, Glasson J, Downes N (2011) Indicators for strategic environmental assessment in regional land use planning to assess conflicts with adaptation to global climate change. Ecol Indicat 11:90–95 International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)/Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Yonetani M, Morris T, Flyktningeråd (eds) (2013) Global estimates 2012: people displaced by disasters. IDMC/NRC Norway, Geneva, p 40 IPCC (2007a) Climate change 2007: synthesis report. In: Core Writing Team, Pachauri RK, Reisinger A (eds) Contribution of working groups I, II and III to the fourth assessment report of the international panel on climate change. IPCC, Geneva, p 104 IPCC (2007b) Summary for policymakers. In: Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of

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working group II to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, p 20 IPCC (2014) Summary for policymakers. In: Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects. In: Field CB, Barros VR, Dokken DJ, Mach KJ, Mastrandrea MD, Bilir TE, Chatterjee M, Ebi KL, Estrada YO, Genova RC, Girma B, Kissel ES, Levy AN, MacCracken S, Mastrandrea PR, White LL (eds) Contribution of Working Group II to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK/New York, pp 1–32 João E (2005) Key principles of SEA. In: Schmidt M, João E, Albrecht E (eds) Implementing strategic environmental assessment. Environmental protection in the European Union, vol 2. Springer, Heidelberg, pp 1–13 Klein R (2004) Approaches, methods and tools for climate change impact, vulnerability and adaptation assessment. Keynote lecture to the in-session workshop on impacts of, and vulnerability and adaptation to, climate change. Twenty-first session of the UNFCCC subsidiary body for scientific and technical advice, Buenos Aires, 8 Dec 2004 [Online]. http://unfccc.int/files/ meetings/COP_10/in_session_workshops/adaptation/pdf/081204_Klein_adaptation_abstract.pdf. Accessed 22 May 2013 Ladan MT (2012a) Review of NESREA act 2007 and regulations 2009–2011: a new dawn in environmental compliance and enforcement in Nigeria’. Law Environ Dev J 8/1:116. [Online]. http://www.lead-journal.org/content/12116.pdf. Accessed 28 May 2013 Ladan MT (2012b) Trends in environmental law and access to justice in Nigeria. Recent trends in environmental law and access to justice in Nigeria. Lambert Academic, Saarbr€ ucken Larsen S, Kørnøv L (2009) SEA of river basin management plans: incorporating climate change. Impact Assess Proj Apprais 27(4):291–299 Larsen S, Kørnøv L, Wejs A (2012) Mind the gap in SEA: an institutional perspective on why assessment of synergies among climate change mitigation, adaptation and other policy areas are missing. EIA Rev 33:32–40 Mehrotra S, Rosenzweig C, Solecki WD, Natenzon CE, Omojola A, Folorunsho R, Gilbride J (2011) Cities, disasters and climate risk. In: Rosenzweig C, Solecki WD, Hammer SA, Mehrotra S (eds) Climate change and cities: first assessment report of the urban climate change research network. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 15–42 M€ uller1 B (2013) ‘Enhanced (direct) access’ through ‘(national) funding entities’ etymology and examples: information note on the green climate fund business model framework. The Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, Oxford University Press, London, pp 1–10 NASPA-CCN (2011) National adaptation strategy and plan of action on climate change for Nigeria (NASPA-CCN), Ibadan NEST (2011) Reports of research projects on impacts and adaptation. Building Nigeria’s response to climate change (BNRCC). Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team (NEST), Ibadan NEST, Woodley E (2011) Reports of research projects on impacts and adaptation. Building Nigeria’s response to climate change (BNRCC). Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team (NEST), Ibadan, pp 122 NEST, Woodley E (2012) Learning from experience- community-based adaptation to climate change in Nigeria. (Building Nigeria’s response to climate change Project). Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team (NEST), Ibadan Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (NEAA), Vuuren DP, Hof A, Elzen MGJ (2009) Meeting the 2 C target: from climate objective to emission reduction measures. Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Bilthoven Page 17 of 19

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Ndujihe C (2013) Population: how many are we in Nigeria? Vanguard Newspaper, 28 Sept 2013 [Online]. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/09/population-many-nigeria/. Accessed 15 Aug 2014 Nigeria Environmental Study Action Team (NEST) (2010) Local action on climate change: BNRCC’s Q Newsl 1–15 Nwajiuba C (2008) Adapting to climate change: challenges and opportunities. In: Nwajiuba C (ed) Climate change and adaptation in Nigeria. Margraf, Weikersheim, pp 1–6 Nwajiuba C, Onyeneke R (2010) Effects of climate on the agriculture of sub-Saharan Africa: lessons from Southeast rainforest of Nigeria, Oxford business and economic conference program. ISBN 978-0-9742114-1-9 Nwoko CO (2013) Evaluation of environmental impact assessment systems in Nigeria. Greener J Environ Manag Public Safety 2(1):22–31 Odjugo PAO (2010) The impact of climate change on water resources: global and Nigerian analysis. Paraclete Publishers, Yola, Nigeria. FUTY J Environ 4(1):59–77 Olokesusi F (1998) Legal and institutional framework of environmental impact assessment in Nigeria: an initial assessment. Environ Impact Assess Rev 18(2):159–174 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2006) Applying strategic environmental assessment: good practice guidance for development co-operation, DAC guidelines and reference series. OECD, Paris Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2008a) Strategic environmental assessment and adaptation to climate change: DAC network on environment and development co-operation (ENVIRONET). OECD, Paris. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2008b) Strategic environmental assessment and adaptation to climate change 8th meeting of environment & development co-operation 30 Oct 2008, pp 5–15 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2009) Integrating climate change adaptation into development co-operation: policy guidance. OECD, Paris, pp 1–193 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2010) Strategic environmental assessment and adaptation to climate change. OECD, Paris, pp 1–30 Sadler B, Verheem R (1996) Strategic environmental assessment: status, challenges and future directions, Report No. 53. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, The Hague, p 27 Sadler B, Aschemann R, Dusik J, Fisher TM, Partidario MR, Verheem R (eds) (2011) Handbook of strategic environmental assessment. Earthscan, London Sayne A (2011) Climate change adaptation and conflict in Nigeria: United States Institute of Peace Special Report 274, June, p 16 Schmidt M, João E, Albrecht E (eds) (2005) Implementing strategic environmental assessment. Environmental protection in the European Union. Springer, Heidelberg Schmidt M, Palekhov D, Atkinson R (2010) Environmental impact assessment and strategic environmental assessment. Learning materials. BTU Eigenverlag, Cottbus, pp 93–113 Therivel R (2004) Strategic environmental assessment in action, vol 5. Earthscan, London, p 61 Udofa IM, Fajemirokun FA (1978) On a height datum for Nigeria. In: Proceedings of the international symposium on geodetic measurements and computations. Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria Ugochukwu CNC, Ertel J (2011) The state of the art application of environmental sustainability tool: environmental impact assessment (EIA) practice in Nigeria. In: Albrecht, E, Egute TO, Forbid GT (eds) Risk assessment and management for environmental protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. Brandenburgische Technische Universität Cottbus. Lexxion, Berlin, pp 160–170 Page 18 of 19

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UNEP (2002) Environmental impact assessment training resource manual, 2nd edn. UNEP, Geneva, pp 491–525 UNEP, Abaza H, Bisset R, Sadler B (2004) Economics and trade branch. Environmental impact assessment and strategic environmental assessment: towards an integrated approach. UNEP, Geneva UNFCCC (2010) Adaptation assessment, planning and practice. An overview from The Nairobi work program on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change. UNFCCC Secretariat, Bonn, p 73 UNFCCC (2012) Compilation of case studies on natural adaptation planning process. Subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice. Thirty-seventh session Doha, 26th Nov to 1st Dec 2012. Nairobi work program on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to Climate Change. Note by the secretariat, Bonn Uyigue E, Agho M (2007) Coping with climate change and environmental degradation in the Niger Delta Southern Nigeria. Community Research Development Center (CREDC), Edo State, pp 1–31

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Climate Change Aspects of International Knowledge Exchange About Water: Experiences from Mozambique and Ecuador Christoph Rappa* and Andreas Zeiselmairb a Director of the Verein zur Förderung des internationalen Wissensaustauschs e.V., Munich, Germany b Commissioner of the Verein zur Förderung des internationalen Wissensaustauschs e.V., Munich, Germany

Abstract By outlining the central role of water in the global warming process, the necessity of international collaboration in terms of tertiary education in hydraulics and hydrology is being derived. In this chapter an integrated approach of knowledge exchange in the framework of a descriptive education concept and applied university research projects is being elaborated. The focus is placed on descriptive teaching of fundamental flow physics, the application of a sophisticated but opensource software tool for the prediction of flood areas, and a small hydropower project plant which was designed to enhance the living quality of indigenous people in the middle of Ecuador’s rainforest. These projects were mutually realized with committed and open-minded local partners.

Keywords Water; International knowledge exchange; Descriptive education concept; Hands-on projects; Flood prediction; Small-scale decentralized renewable energy systems

Introduction Over the past and the current century, the so-called developed part of the world has almost entirely exploited the Earth’s resources which have been built up over billions of years. And it was only in 1972 when the so-called civilized part of the world realized “the limits to growth” which were formulated by the Club of Rome. The irreversible consumption of fossil fuels satisfies the quenchless hunger of an exponentially increasing living standard. This process goes in line with (a) a rapidly growing world population and (b) a continuously growing percentage of people benefitting from technical progress. The latter fact is truly a great achievement but nevertheless still a few percent of the people live on the cost of the majority. With the UN millennium goals (United Nations 2013), the gap between the rich and the poor should be reduced which means to significantly enhance the living quality in developing and emerging countries. However, one has to learn from the mistakes mankind has made and support the erection of a sustainable infrastructure in such regions. Therefore, one does not only have to set an example but also to put effort in developing smart and peripheral renewable energy supply units and to implement them in collaboration with the local people. It is needless to mention the imperative of curtailing the impact of global warming on the Earth’s ecosystems.

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 14

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Climate Change: Greenhouse Effect Global warming is a highly complex physical phenomenon; it is a consequence of solar energy entering the Earth’s atmosphere as shortwave radiation, whereas its longwave reflection is captured to a certain percentage by the so-called greenhouse gases. Without the natural greenhouse effect, the world would look differently – and a lot (32
C) colder (Roedel 2000). However, there is a quite instable equilibrium between the planet’s temperature and the greenhouse gas content of the atmosphere. When the shortwave radiation from the sun enters the atmosphere, only a negligible fraction is being reflected at the outer atmosphere and the rest reaches to the ground. There, dependent on the material, parts of the rays are directly (same wavelength) reflected. This process is called albedo effect; glaciers, e.g., directly reflect 30–75 % of the sun’s radiation, whereas liquid water only mirrors 5–22 % and clouds 60–90 %. The rest of the energy is absorbed by the Earth’s surface which radiates heat waves back to the atmosphere. So-called greenhouse gases act membrane-like and reflect these longwaves back to the Earth whereupon a gradual temperature rise ensues. Greenhouse gases are mainly water vapor (H2O, CO2 equivalent due to strong temperature dependency not allocated), carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4, 25 times CO2 equivalent), and nitrous oxide (N2O, 298 times CO2 equivalent), which is produced by nitrification and denitrification (Sloss 1992). Water vapor in the atmosphere contributes, for instance, 36–66 % to the natural greenhouse effect; carbon dioxide and methane come up to 9–26 % and 4–9 %, respectively. While the CO2 content increased from the preindustrial era from 280 ppm to 390 ppm in 2011, it is responsible for 60 % of the anthropogenic greenhouse effect. Methane increased from 730 ppbV in 1750 to 1,741 ppbV in 1998. Nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions arise mainly from cropland (69 %) and grew from about 270 to 323 ppbV and account for 6 % of anthropogenic global warming (Blasing 2013). It can be concluded that 50 % of the anthropogenic impact on climate change can be traced back to the energy sector where mainly CO2 is being emitted (Schabbach and Wesselak 2012). The cement industry, deforestation, and mainly agriculture, particularly livestock farming and rice cultivation, add up to the other half (IPCC 2007). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the anthropogenic impact on global warming is in all probability. Between 1906 and 2006, the spatial average close-to-ground air temperature has risen globally for about 0.74 K  0.18 K (IPCC 2007). The oceans, with a much greater specific heat capacity, heated up by 0.037 K from 1955 (surface temperatures increased by 0.6 K) which corresponds to an atmospheric temperature rise of 11
C (NOAA 2007). The risky issue is that ocean streams are density driven so that they react very sensitively on changes in temperature or salt contents. The Gulf Stream, e.g., carries northwards twice the heat every day that is produced annually by all the thermal power plants worldwide at a velocity of 1.8 m/s at Florida’s coast (Ball 2001). However, according to the IPCC (2007), there is a probability smaller than 10 % that a transition of the streams takes place before 2100. Depending on the future emissions, the IPCC predicts an atmospheric temperature rise with respect to the preindustrial era (1750 CE) of 1.1–6.4 K in 2100 (IPCC 2007). For comparison, the greatest warming after the last ice age was 1
C within a millennium (Leggett 2005). It is important to mention that local impacts show greater amplitudes than global mean values do. A global 4
warming means, for instance, a temperature rise of 8
C in the Mediterranean (Wicke 2013).

Water: Global Warming’s Central Element Water as life’s central element plays an important role in the global warming context. Water in its three phases – gaseous (0.001 % water vapor), liquid (97 % saltwater and 0.7 % freshwater), and solid (2.3 % ice) – has got a significant impact on the Earth’s climate. The oceans absorb CO2, water Page 2 of 14

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vapor is the number one greenhouse gas, and the ice-albedo is the most substantial rebound effect (see below). Even more important rising temperatures affect the hydrologic circle immensely. On the one hand, greater water vapor contents will lead to a greater probability and more severe thunderstorms with subsequently following flood events, and on the other hand, water shortage will increase dramatically. According to Hare, a temperature rise of 1
C with respect to the preindustrial era will imply 400–800 million people living in water-shortage areas by the 2020s; at 1–2
C rise, a peak risk of 1.5 billion by the 2050s follows and a rise of 2.5
C makes 2.4–3.5 billion people suffer from water shortage (Hare 2005). Katrina 2005, Rita 2005, Ike 2008, 243 hurricanes only in April 2011 in the USA, Irene 2011, Sandy 2012, and the latest striking storm in Oklahoma in 2013 underline that the recurrence interval of such events becomes shorter and shorter. In Germany, for instance, historical floods were recorded in the years 1342, 1501, 1787, 1899, and 1954. Devastating floods then occurred in 1991, 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2013 which makes global warming effects obvious, while there are regions on Earth much more prone to flood fortification. Hydrology and hydraulics are therefore the basis of climate change adaptation.

Attenuating and Cumulative Effects on Global Warming Aerosols in higher layers, e.g., reduce the planet’s temperature; in lower layers or even on snow or ice, they increase global warming immensely. Particles in the atmosphere reflect the incident sunlight back to outer space, whereas on snow, for instance, they absorb the energy and warm the planet’s surface. Especially sulfate aerosols are said to have a cooling effect as the particles in the atmosphere shield the sun’s radiation. It seems bizarre that sulfate filters of coal-fired power plants have a negative effect on the climate. The reduction of the ozone layer actually cools the planet, too. The radiation is not absorbed by the ozone in the stratosphere anymore yet in the troposphere as it reaches there more likely (0.15  0.10 W/m2). However, the outer layer, the stratosphere, is cooler and therefore cools the troposphere more pronounced than the absorption takes place. The so-called ice-albedo rebound effect, in contrary, enhances warming. While glaciers melt their surfaces shrink which leads to less reflection and therefore more absorption of sun radiation. The hydrogen-vapor feedback is yet another self-reinforcing factor which, however, cannot be traced back to industrialization. At greater temperatures air can hold more hydrogen vapor, which is yet another greenhouse gas that boosts global warming (Rahmstorf and Schellnhuber 2007). Taking the impact of water vapor on the natural greenhouse effect into account a not negligible fraction of global warming will result from its rebound effect. Greenhouse gas molecules do have different life spans. In average CO2 is being dissolved in the oceans after 5 years, although it is released again so that 30 % of the anthropogenic CO2 will stay in the atmosphere for a couple of centuries and 20 % for a couple of millennia. Methane has a life span of 12 years (IPCC 2007) and nitrous oxide even 114 years.

Consequences of Global Warming The consequences of global warming are versatile. Melting glaciers lead to a greater sea level (0.19–0.58 m (IPCC 2007)); the vegetation will change; deserts will grow. These issues will have a direct impact on habitats of flora and fauna. Regionally, an increase of 1–2
C carries substantial, above 2
C serious dangers (Hare 2005), whereas the total collapse of ecosystems is feared at 3
C ascent. But it has also got a crucial impact on mankind, mainly through food production (although plant growth increased by 6 % between 1982 and 1999 due to a greater CO2 content (Nemani et al. 2003), the agricultural production will develop locally different; however, a global reduction of 3–16 % is assumed by the World Health Organization). Higher temperatures lead to greater Page 3 of 14

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evaporation which enhances the probability of hurricanes or massive floods threatening animals and people, destroying the harvest. Geopolitical problems, e.g., due to lack of water or food impend and lead to more environmental migration. The financial damage of global warming was assessed by the German Institute for Economic Research to sum up to US$200 billion; the Stern review emanates from 5 % to 20 % loss of the global economic performance. Every region of the world will be affected by global warming, but the poorest that are not able to protect themselves against extreme conditions will be hit hardest (PICIRCA 2012). According to Hare “Africa seems to be consistently amongst the regions with high to very high projected damages” (Hare 2005). Global warming is the first man-made global threat; however, the ones suffering most from it are not its major contributors.

Adaptation to Global Warming People had to adapt to their environment ever since. All over the place, they suffered from thunderstorms and the subsequently following flood events. Our ancestors had to learn how to cope with extreme climate or weather conditions and drought periods. The major step of mankind to civilization was the control of natural runoff that in some areas even made settlements possible. Freshwater needed to be held back in times of over capacities and released when the crops required it. That process marked the end of the Neolithic Age which took place in the so-called Fertile Crescent (Pleticha 1995). Although a bit later, one of the most impressive monuments that document the effort that has been made to protect people from floods has been erected in Egypt during the Cheops dynasty (approx. 2620–2580 BCE, when hydrologists were worshipped as high priests): Sadd-El-Kafara, a 10 m high, 45–82 m wide and 61–112 m long dam. There are numerous examples for adaptation technologies in terms of protection from natural hazards worldwide. Flood control became even more important during the industrial revolution when the risk potential grew enormously as almost all crafts needed water and settled close to rivers. And nowadays, imagine the economic threat of a flooded subway network. As elaborated above, the risk of such hazardous floods increases dramatically due to global warming. Even in Central Europe which is a region not prone to an enhanced thunderstorm probability, extreme flood events occurred more often in recent times. To cope with the challenge, Bavaria’s (Germany) adaptation method is a 15 % supplement on the previous design discharge which induces an extensive enlargement of retention potential and embankment strengthening (KLIWA 2012).

International Knowledge Exchange About Water Academic Education In this heavily interconnected world knowledge can be exchanged easily (e.g., through wikipedia. org). And it is evident that knowledge exchange has always been the base of development. The permanent gains of cognition and perception, however, convey complexity which requires specialists to handle certain responsible duties. The word exchange means mutual give and take. Thus, international and intercultural knowledge exchange is essential for the solving of regional and global current and future troubles. Primary education, which is aimed to be made accessible to every child (United Nations 2013), is the first step only. Fundamental tertiary education for an appropriate fraction of people (for the smartest not for the richest) is essential for the sustainment and development of good living conditions. The universities and academies have to make sure that knowledge which is accessible at all hours all over the world is being prepared, shared, explained, and set into the right context. Enthusiastic knowledge imparting which is important for the learning success can be handled by passionate pedagogues only. At Technische Universität M€ unchen (TUM), Page 4 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

a concept for fundamental hydraulic education has been developed and conducted over several years. It is based on the train of thought that education has to follow the same path research does (Rapp 2012): Observe ! comprehend ! deduce ! challenge ! apply This descriptive method has been quite successfully implemented in conjunction with the von Humboldt principle (bond between research and education) and hands-on projects. To share the knowledge and the lecturing experiences internationally, the “Association for International Knowledge Exchange” (German: Verein zur Förderung des internationalen Wissensaustauschs e.V.) has been founded in Munich. In the following some of the experiences gathered in Mozambique are being described. A hands-on project where students from Ecuador and Germany applied their knowledge will be described in Chapter “▶ Renewable Energies in Developing and Emerging Countries”.

Experiences from Mozambique: Flood Protection Collaboration TUM-UEM In developing and emerging countries, the protection standard is still very poor. Ever since, Mozambicans, e.g., have suffered from disastrous floods. A tragic example is the year 2000 Limpopo flood which caused some hundred deaths and hundreds of thousands who have lost their homes (650,000 according to GIZ). Only 1 year later, a flood devastated the Zambezi banks. The reasons are on the one hand geographical and topographical and on the other political and socioeconomic. The great African streams Zambezi and Limpopo flow through Mozambique before they discharge into the Indian Ocean at Africa’s east coast. After centuries of colonial suppression, Mozambique gained independence only in the mid-1970s. A bloody civil war followed which was aggravated by the Cold War claiming approx. 5 % of the population dead and countless injured. Africa typical threats, e.g., poor educational standard or diseases like malaria or AIDS, contribute to prevent Mozambique from developing. Since the end of the militant actions in the mid-1990s, a gradual improvement, especially in the education sector, can be noticed. Academic structures are being established in the framework of ambitious policies, although the country depends on massive support from international institutions. To enhance the education of Mozambican engineers, collaboration has been established between Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) in Maputo and TUM, Germany, and is based on a Memorandum of Understanding between the two federal states. Several courses have been given so far by German lecturers and the hydraulic laboratory of UEM has been assessed and improved through provision of measuring techniques as well as training of the staff (see Fig. 1). Special software has been developed to evaluate these experiments but also to predict, e.g., transient flow phenomena such as water hammer in penstocks. The codes have been written in Octave – a MatLAB substitution which is free to use and to modify (www.octave.org). Hydrodynamical Approach of Flood Area Prediction Fluid flows are generally three dimensional and time dependent what makes the partial differential equations that were derived independently by Claude Navier and Gabriel Stokes almost 200 years ago solvable for a handful laminar problems only (e.g., very low velocities like in veins or groundwater flow). The default flow condition, however, is turbulent where a chaotic behavior can be noticed. To predict such flows, the so-called Navier–Stokes Equations have to be solved at discrete points in space and at certain time steps. The more turbulent a flow is, the finer the Page 5 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Fig. 1 Practical courses and digital transient pressure measurements in the Laboratório Hydraulico of Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, Mozambique

computational grid has to be and the time step shorter which makes the solution of a relevant industrial or environmental problem computationally unaffordable or even physically impossible. Therefore, different strategies have been developed to cope with this challenge. For the prediction of flood areas, the state-of-the-art method is to solve the 2D shallow water equations numerically. Deriving the shallow water equations from the three-dimensional Navier–Stokes Equations, the vertical momentum is being neglected and the velocity in the horizontal direction is depth-averaged (Beffa 1994). The momentum balance in the z direction becomes the description of hydrostatic pressure distribution. Integration of mass conservation over the flow depth leads to a transport equation of the flow depth. For these reasons, the Navier–Stokes Equations can be simplified in such way that they can be applied to solve even great domains, though the preconditions, hydrostatic pressure distribution, and a comparatively small vertical velocity component have to be met. These assumptions generally hold very nicely in natural waters where exact specifications of the bounding geometry are lacking so that the simulation strategy provides significant information. At TUM’s Chair for Hydromechanics, a shallow water equation solver based on the open-source software package OpenFOAM (www.openfoam.org) has been developed to approach such problems efficiently. The solver called shallowFoam and the underlying software package OpenFOAM have been developed under the GNU license agreement so that it is free to use and to customize for any purpose. For the post-processing step, the freely available software ParaView is applied. Especially in developing countries, this approach has got manifold advantages. Firstly, opensource code licenses are free of charge and the code can be adapted to whichever problem. Secondly, there is comprehensive support available on the Internet because of countless OpenFOAM users worldwide. Thirdly, this software package belongs to the most powerful tools for the solving of partial differential equations like the shallow water equations. Fourthly, the program is massively parallelized and with the solver shallowFoam flood scenarios of even great computational domains can be simulated on servers all over the world in an acceptable timespan. Finally, a link has been programmed to convert GIS data to be OpenFOAM standard (e.g., Jud et al. 2011). A crucial drawback of the method is that – except for ParaView – graphical user interfaces (GUIs) are lacking which makes the application not easy to handle or even inconvenient for beginners. However, additional university courses on numerical river hydraulics form the integrated approach that the Association for International Knowledge Exchange follows.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Fig. 2 Risk potential: example for a design flood in an arbitrary domain (From Schäffler et al. 2011)

Flood Area Prediction Simulation of flood events requires input data such as the topography (underlying the computational grid, roughness, and discharge). Worldwide topographical data can be downloaded for free – at least at a resolution of 25 m  25 m – from http://eoweb.dlr.de:8080. Depending on the assignment, finer resolutions are available at different websites. Roughness of the ground depends mainly on the land use and can be gained from aerial photos (e.g., Google Earth). As profound hydrologic data are mostly not available in developing or emerging countries, extreme flood event discharges can be reconstructed by so-called inverse simulations (Motzet 2003) or they can be reconstructed from the Global Runoff Data Centre (German Federal Institute of Hydrology 2013). By modifying the inflow into and rainfall onto the surveyed region, the different simulation results are being compared with observed data. At the best match, the required parameters can be identified. The procedure has to be done for different events which will help to derive flood probabilities. Future events with certain occurrence probabilities can be subsequently investigated. Safety margins to account for increasing precipitation intensities due to global warming can be considered in the computations (KLIWA 2012). Figure 2 exemplarily depicts a flood risk plan gathered through shallowFoam simulations and illustrated in ParaView (blue ¼ low risk, red ¼ high risk). The consideration of global warming effects, thus increasing peak discharges, in these numerical simulations leads to appropriate flood risk plans which are the basis for adaptation means.

Remarks on the Academic Concept

This integrated approach – fundamental and depictive hydraulic education, provision of free-to-use software, computer training, and enabling of discrete modification and application – helps to cope with the water-based challenges arising from climate change. The fundamentals in hydraulics are needed for the planning of drinking water supply, wastewater discharge, flood protection, irrigation, and many more. In the example in the section “Flood Area Prediction,” a certain approach to identify areas prone to damage and to ascertain the protection of the people has been elaborated.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Renewable Energies in Developing and Emerging Countries Energy has become an essential livelihood. What energy means to people can best be assessed where it is not accessible to everyone. William Kamkwamba, an uneducated engineer from Malawi, is a renowned genius. He has built a wind turbine from scrap supplying his family shack with electric light and even being able to charge other people’s mobile phones (Kamkwamba and Mealer 2009). Access to power changes life completely and makes development possible. However, providing the global population with Western European standard will soon lead to a total environmental collapse which thwarts Millennium Goal 7 (ensure environmental sustainability). Despite the additional warming effects and general availability of resources (even for uranium which is by far no alternative), their accessibility is limited (Schabbach and Wesselak 2012). The so-called energy turnaround implies renunciation from a centralized and grand-scale electricity generation to communal renewable energy plants with high harvesting factors (energy gain over energy need for erection and operation). Conventional plants receive the fuel from remote point sources mainly in Asia, America, Australia, or Africa. The plants are not where the sources are. The combustion of fuels in grand plants and the ensuing delivery to the end user are physically and economically more efficient rather than the resource distribution to the end user with local generation. Renewable energy sources are being used where they appear. For example, it is hardly imaginable that wind is taken from all over the world to a central spot where one huge turbine generates power for a whole city. Hence, where development takes place, the focus has to be placed on small-scale decentralized renewable energy systems. Hands-on projects based on these principles collaboratively realized with the local population create acceptance enable them to understand the technique and maintain the facilities on their own while rural areas are ecologically friendly empowered (Rapp et al. 2012). And a not negligible side effect is that the added value stays local. One project that has been realized in a smaller scale only is being presented in the following.

Overview of the Project In 2010 a group of students of Technische Universität M€ unchen had the opportunity to conduct their final theses within a hands-on project in the Ecuadorian rainforest. Focus was put on fresh and wastewater as well as electricity supply. The latter will be specified by a feasibility study on micro hydropower that was done during a 2-week stay in the village of Yuwientsa. The results were presented and discussed with students from Quito in the framework of a “seminario transatlántico” at Ecuador’s oldest and greatest University – Universidad Central del Ecuador. Yuwientsa is situated in the rainforest about 1 h distance by small aircraft to the nearest town of Puyo in east Ecuador. Up to now, it only had sparse access to electricity although there is an urgent need, i.e., for medication cooling, education, and lighting. There are some PV cells installed and diesel (has to be flown in) generators but by far not enough to cover all basic needs. The region with an almost closed rainforest area possesses an overwhelming biodiversity and a vivid culture of local indigenous tribes who struggle to preserve their identity and livelihood for their future generations. As this region is also blessed with different kinds of natural resources, there are various commercial ambitions for exploitation. International companies try to get access to believed oil fields or the huge potential of precious tropical wood. UNESCO declared the region a biosphere reserve to support the sustainable development of the indigenous population. As energy forms the basis for it, a special focus needs to be placed on renewable supply. The goal is to share simple but effective technical solutions in order to enable Page 8 of 14

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locals to implement and spread the technology on their own. This can also form an appeal for the young indigenous generation not to leave for the cities but to stay in their communities to protect their forest and therefore play an essential role in global climate preservation. With the implementation of rainforest academies, designed by German artist Markus Heinsdorff, UNESCO provides secondary and tertiary education for the indígenas of the Shuar tribe.

Electricity in the Middle of the Rainforest

The assignment was to find a solution in collaboration with the indígenas to provide sustainable energy supply that is exactly customized to the local needs and on-site conditions. This demands special requirements as robustness and low-maintenance effort of the technology as well as minor ecological impact. External dependencies regarding technical support or fuel supply should be abstained from and low construction and operation cost guaranteed.

Scope of the Project In order to assess the impact on the local society of the 250 inhabitants of Yuwientsa but also further upcoming project regions, a “social impact assessment” has been conducted according to the suggestions of the UN Centre for Good Governance (2006). The result of the assessed electrification was in overall positive under the constraint of close cooperation and involvement of the local population. The provided electricity demand of approx. 10 kW is mainly needed to illuminate the classrooms and housings. Furthermore, a computer with satellite-based Internet access and a refrigerator for medication need to be supplied. The abundant and reliable availability of water in this region proves the reasonable application of micro hydropower. During a 2-week stay in the village of Yuwientsa, appropriate installation sites were searched for. It turned out that several layout possibilities are conceivable. A fundamentally important factor was the assurance of flood protection of the installed technical appliances. Several sites were excluded because of spiritual relevance. Finally two preferred sites were identified and surveyed in detail. The first one gave the opportunity of installing an overshot water wheel. The second would use a conventional, i.e., Pelton or crossflow turbine. Close cooperation and information exchange with the local decision makers as well as with surrounding residents formed the basis of a successful joint project.

Hydrology The conditions in Yuwientsa are determined by tropical daytime climate with an almost constant mean temperature of more than 20
C. There is daily cloud cover with convective precipitation. Furthermore, there are distinguished dry (August until November) and rainy seasons (December, January, and May to July). Surveillance of the hydrological conditions was the first step to assess the feasibility. As there was almost no information on the characteristic water discharges in and around Yuwientsa, the most important fact sources were the experiences and observations of the locals. Nevertheless, some short-term measurements were conducted to get a first impression. After a number of interrogations with people living in the surroundings of the streams, a first insight over long-term hydrological discharges could be gained. Important to mention are the very quick discharge reactions after heavy rainfall as a result of the hilly topography and rather small catchment areas. In order to assess the seasonal deviations, a measuring gauge was installed at a close river together with the indígenas who check the level daily. But even with all the collected data, the hydrology can only be estimated basically. Through constructional measures, a minimization of negative impact was aspired. Page 9 of 14

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On-Site Approach

The equipment was rather basic and aimed to be flexibly applied in rough terrain. GPS, altimeter, and measuring tape were used for spatial localization; bucket and stopwatch or yardstick for the cross section and leaves as tracers for the flow velocity were the low-tech but sufficient discharge measuring gears. Clear documentation with photos and sketches made later assessment and construction planning possible. Installation potentials were approximated by Eq. 1 with discharge Q and geodetic head Hgeo: PTurbine ¼ 8  Q  H geo ½kW

(1)

Using a water wheel, the result will be reduced due to lower efficiency. Eleven potential installation sites were identified around the village with a power range of 5–35 kW. After a detailed evaluation regarding energy demand, ecological impact, and flood safety, two preferred options were finally chosen. Water Wheel First option considered the use of an overshot water wheel at the river Yuwints close to the settlement. A small river drop with a head difference of 2.2 m ends in a bigger basin. The constant (according to the indígenas) discharge of 1.2 m3/s (measured with tracer yardstick and stopwatch) will therefore offer a permanent hydropower potential of approx. 18 kW. The water wheel with 3.5 m width and 2 m of diameter can be constructed using mainly locally available material (Nuernbergk 2007). The foundation needs to be handled with special caution as it was not possible to further examine the underground conditions. Flood protection forms the most important challenge as an open water wheel is very prone to floating refuse. Therefore, the wheel will be installed in a protected

Fig. 3 Plot of the water wheel layout

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

recess with a separately controllable channel inlet. The powerhouse will be placed on an elevated position and driven by a V-belt (see Fig. 3). Conventional Turbine The second installation option uses a conventional water turbine with penstock. Best choices are constant pressure turbines like Pelton or crossflow. The latter are especially beneficial with unknown discharge changes and unknown water quality conditions. They possess a sturdy design and low maintenance effort in combination with flexible operation. The considered site is located at the small river Río Yangunts close to the village center. With a penstock length of approx. 600 m a head of 82 m can be used. The water discharge of around 25 l/s would result in 10–13 kW of electrical power. According to the residents, the water yield is a little fluctuating but constantly available. The penstock alignment is best done along the brook – also in order to avoid air entrapments. The natural water reservoir with a volume of approx. 20 m3 can easily be used as inlet structure. Due to logistic but also economic reasons, a PVC penstock is the preferred option. The use of a pipe with 0.125 m diameter – as it is available in Ecuador – will result in a usable net head of Hn ¼ 58.3 m and therefore 11 kW of electrical output. The maximum pressure according to hydraulic hammer calculations (Joukowsky equation) is pmax ¼ 15.3 bar (Giesecke and Mosonyi 2009). Electrical Installation For both installation options, the electricity is distributed through an island grid. For economic reasons as well as the lower freight weight, an asynchronous generator is recommended – even though it has a higher control demand (Williams and Simpson 2009). Basically the produced electrical energy needs to be stored and buffered in batteries.

Outlook

The choice between the suggested options will finally be done by the community of Yuwientsa – also with regard to financing options. Therefore, the results of this study were translated to Spanish and handed over to the village elders. It forms the basis for financial aid requests. Costs are approximated at 30,000 € for the water wheel option and around 50,000 € for the conventional turbine layout (not including labor). The central concern of the project was and still is knowledge exchange. This is accompanied by the training of hydropower specialists. Close cooperation during the whole stay, permanent consultation, and inclusion of the indígenas made a vivid exchange of experience and knowledge possible for both sites. This formed the foundation of a better understanding of the other’s lives (Fig. 4).

Fig. 4 Indigenous hydropower specialist Tibi with water wheel model (left) and in operation (right) Page 11 of 14

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Conclusion Climate change happens. A mean temperature rise of 2
C is said to be severe but somehow controllable. So if mankind succeeds to limit warming to acceptable temperatures, still any effort has to be taken to adapt to the changing conditions. Any effort means to integrally collaborate worldwide. Here, a fairly minor approach has been presented. From the reflections that (a) water is global warming’s central element, (b) the poorest will be hit hardest, and (c) higher education is the basis of development, an integrated concept of hydraulic knowledge exchange with emerging and developing countries has been elaborated. The importance of the bond between research and higher education – the von Humboldt ideal – has been noticed, and a teaching concept from descriptive fundamental hydraulics to state-of-the-art open-source research and application software for the hydrodynamic determination of flood risk areas has been illustrated. Finally, the electrification of a village and a rainforest academy in Ecuador using hydropower has been shown. With UNESCO’s support the living quality of the indigenous people is improved by satisfying their basic needs and offering higher education; they abstain from moving to cities and protecting their precious land from international timber and mineral oil enterprises. Unfortunately, the hydropower project was only realized in a much smaller scale.

References Ball P (2001) Biographie des Wassers. Piper, Munich Beffa C (1994) Praktische Lösung der tiefengemittelten Flachwassergleichungen. ETH Z€ urich, Z€urich Blasing TJ (2013) Carbon dioxide information analysis center; recent greenhouse gas concentrations. http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/current_ghg.html. Accessed 26 May 2013 German Federal Institute of Hydrology (2013) Global runoff data center. http://www.bafg.de/ GRDC/EN/Home/homepage_node.html. Accessed 9 May 2013 Giesecke J, Mosonyi E (2009) Wasserkraftanlagen, vol 5. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg Hare B (2005) Global mean temperature and impacts. In: UK Met Office conference: avoiding dangerous climate change, Exeter IPCC (2007) Fourth assessment report – working group 1; report on physical science. Intergovernmental panel on climate change Jud M, Schäffler U, Bierhance D, Schilcher M, Schwertfirm F, Rapp C (2011) Coupling of ArcGIS with a CFD-based hydrodynamic model. ESRI International User Conference, San Diego Kamkwamba W, Mealer B (2009) The boy who harnessed the wind. HarperCollins, New York KLIWA (2012) Klimawandel im S€ uden Deutschlands Ausmaß–Auswirkungen–Anpassung, Landesanstalt f€ ur Umwelt, Messungen und Naturschutz Baden-W€ urttemberg, Karlsruhe Leggett J (2005) Dangerous fiction, review of michael Crichton’s state of fear. New Sci 2489:50 Motzet K (2003) Bestimmung des Extremabflusses € uber Inverse Numerische Simulation. Forum Hydrol Wasserbewirtsch Fachgemeinschaft ATV-DVWK 4:111–114 Nemani R et al (2003) Climate-driven increases in global terrestrial net primary production from 1982 to 1999. Science 300:1560–1563 NOAA (2007) NOAA celebrates 200 years of science, service and stewardship, top 10: breakthroughs: warming of the world ocean. http://celebrating200years.noaa.gov/. Accessed 24 May 2013 Page 12 of 14

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Nuernbergk DM (2007) Wasserräder mit Freihang: Entwurfs- und Berechnungsgrundlagen. Moritz Schäfer GmbH & Co. KG, Detmold PICIRCA (2012) Turn down the heat. Why a 4
C warmer world must be avoided. A report for the world bank. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics Pleticha H (1995) Weltgeschichte – Morgen der Menschheit – Vorgeschichte und fr€uhe Hochkulturen. Bertelsmann, Bielefeld Rahmstorf S, Schellnhuber HJ (2007) Der Klimawandel, vol 6. C.H. Beck, Munich Rapp C (2012) Forschung und Lehre im Hydromechanik-Labor der Technischen Universität M€ unchen. 2. € uberarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. Vol. Mitteilungen. Fachgebiet Hydromechanik, TUM, M€ unchen Rapp C, Zeiselmair A, Lando E, Moungnutou M (2012) Knowledge exchange and application of hydro power in developing countries. In: International conference on technology transfer and renewable energies, Small Developing Island Renewable Energy Knowledge and Technology Transfer Network, Mauritius Roedel W (2000) Physik unserer Umwelt: Die Atmosphäre, vol 3. Springer, Berlin Schabbach T, Wesselak V (2012) Energie: Die Zukunft Wird Erneuerbar. Springer Vieweg, Berlin Schäffler U, Jud M, Bierhance D, Schilcher M, Schwertfirm F, Rapp C (2011) Gis-gest€ utztes Preprocessing zur Generierung der Inputdatensätze f€ ur ein Computational Fluid Dynamicsbasiertes hydrodynamisches Modell. In: DWA-Tagung Kassel: GIS und GDI in der Wasserwirtschaft. DWA, Kassel Sloss L (1992) Nitrogen oxides control technology fact book. Noyes Data Corporation, Park Ridge UN, Centre for Good Governance (2006) A comprehensive guide for social impact assessment. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cgg/unpan026197.pdf. Accessed 12 June 2013 United Nations (2013) UN millennium goals. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. Accessed 19 June 2013 Wicke L, interview by Markus Schulte von Drach (2013) Die nachfolgenden Generationen werden uns Klimaforscher verfluchen, S€ uddeutsche Zeitung, M€ unchen. Accessed 9 May 2013 Williams A, Simpson R (2009) Pico hydro – reducing technical risks for rural electrification. Renew Energy 34:1986–1991

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Index Terms: Descriptive education concept 5 Flood prediction 5 Hands on projects 8 International knowledge exchange 4 Small decentral renewable electricity supply 8 Water 2, 4

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Climate Change Adaptation Through Grassroots Responses: Learning from the “Aila” Affected Coastal Settlement of Gabura, Bangladesh A. F. M. Ashraful Alam*, Rumana Asad and Afroza Parvin Khulna University, Khulna, Bangladesh

Abstract The southwestern coastal region of Bangladesh has faced thirty large- and moderate-scale natural disasters since the last two decades. Aila, the extreme disaster event, has unveiled major shortfall in the approach of conventional disaster preparedness. Gap between planned intervention and the way coastal inhabitants respond to climatic exposures has widened due to lack of understanding of the grassroots risk perception and effectiveness of associated responses from them. The research examines locally adopted measures taken for disaster risk mitigation in the coastal settlements of Gabura, Bangladesh, and recommends future directions for climate change adaptation. As grassroots responses, firstly, the age-old spontaneous coping mechanisms of the individual households with particular emphasis on their baseline vulnerability were explored. Secondly, the nonphysical and physical responses before, during, and after disaster were categorized. Finally, with a strength and weakness matrix, the effectiveness and limitations of grassroots responses related to typical exposures and extremes were pinpointed. The study concludes that grassroots responses are mostly effective as adaptive measures during typical hazards; however, they have limitations in extreme events. Most importantly, adequate recognition of grassroots responses will not only inform better adaptation but also contribute to broader regional development planning and climate change policy context.

Keywords Climate change adaptation; Grassroots responses; Baseline vulnerability; Coastal settlements

Introduction Bangladesh is globally considered one of the most vulnerable countries to sea level rise.1 This is obvious for its very low elevation geographical setting with a flat deltaic topography exposed to extreme climate variability. The coastal settlements comprise 32 % of the country’s total area.2 Nearly seven million households are exposed to frequent storm surge and cyclones.3 According to *Email: [email protected] *Email: [email protected] 1 World Bank (2010, 2013) recognizes Bangladesh the third most vulnerable country to sea level rise and it will be worsening with an expected 2  C rise in the world’s average temperature in the next decades. 2 The coastal settlements cover an area of 47,211 km2. 3 Coastal settlements in Bangladesh receive 40 % of the impact of total storm surges in the world (Dasgupta et al. 2010). Page 1 of 20

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(Parry et al. 2007), with a one meter sea level rise, about 20 % of the country will be not only inundated with saline water but also the poor and marginal groups will be critically affected (Rahman et al. 2007). Apart from the anticipations concerning climate change, the region remains vulnerable due to large population size, low economic strength, inadequate infrastructure, and chronic inefficiency with institutional capacity (MoEF 2005, 2009 World Bank 2010). Post-disaster experience4 in recent years unveiled shortfalls in the approach of government-led disaster preparedness. NAPA (MoEF 2005) and BCCSAP (MoEF 2009) have been criticized as top-down and unable to recognize the role of community in the process. Gap between the conventionally advocated adaptation strategies and the way coastal grassroots respond to hazard consequences has widened due to inadequate knowledge of associated risks and vulnerability. To date, attempts to recognize the role of grassroots responses in climate change adaptation of coastal settlements are scanty and, therefore, could not be effectively included in government’s policy responses, except Parvin and Cassidy (2012), who recently examined the role of indigenous knowledge towards resilient coastal settlement planning. This chapter investigates in Gabura, one of the most disaster-prone settlements in the southwestern coastal region of Bangladesh that was hit by the deadly cyclone “Aila” in 2009. The research explores the individuals’ survival responses inherent in grassroots lifestyle before, during, and after disaster. Underpinned with an analytical framework for vulnerability, grassroots responses, and adaptation, it examines the effectiveness of individuals’ responses during typical and extreme hazard events. Finally, insights on how to mainstream grassroots responses into the process of climate change adaptation have been given.

Analytical Framework for Vulnerability, Grassroots Responses, and Adaptation During exposure to a given hazard, individual responds in various degrees. Based on the severity of disaster, the effectiveness of responses is quantified. As the human being’s responses to a hazard are based on his social, political, and economic conditions, there is an increasing recognition that disasters including the components of vulnerability, adaptation, and resilience are socially constructed (Cannon and M€ uller-Mahn 2010). To understand the effectiveness of grassroots responses in the coastal settlements of Gabura, which is the aim of this chapter, an analytical framework has been proposed. The framework defines baseline vulnerability of the coastal grassroots instigating responses.

Climatic and Non-climatic Vulnerability of the Coastal Settlement The coastal settlements of Bangladesh are witnessing a number of climatic impacts, i.e., frequent flood, erosion of the coastline, rising water tables, long-term inundation, saltwater intrusion, and other biophysical effects.5 These are proxy for social vulnerability in sectors concerning water resources, agriculture, human health, fisheries, tourism, and above all the human settlements of the Category-1 cyclone “Sidr” in 2007 and “Aila” in 2009 In Bangladesh, the floodplains of the lower Ganges and the Surma basins became exceedingly vulnerable (Alam et al. 1999). Elevated riverbeds due to continued sedimentation induced backwater effect, which eventually increased both the frequency and severity of floods (Huq et al. 1996). Increased magnitude of cyclonic storm surges inundated the coastal unprotected lands with saline water (Islam et al. 1998). The forest ecosystem of the resourceful Sundarbans has been disturbed by floods in monsoon and moisture stress in winter (Ahmed et al. 1999). 4 5

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coast itself (Klein and Nicholls 1999). On top of the anticipated and observed climate changeinduced risks, the settlements face high level of threats caused by various non-climatic factors. The coastal grassroots suffer from unequal distribution of resources and welfare incentives compared to those in the rest of the country. Even the existing institutional structures are not favorable to ease the hardship of people through providing minimum level of support, which translates into accelerated economic difficulties and social deprivation. Interestingly, the coastal settlements contain twofold characteristics in themselves, because, at one hand, they possess visible disparities triggered by the formal institutional channel coupled with climatic impacts and, all at once, are affluent in natural resources and biodiversity to offer varying livelihood opportunities, which assist people to adapt and retain there for centuries. Scholars claim that deprivation of resources induces non-climatic vulnerability to individuals and societies in the form of poverty and marginalization (Adger and Kelly 1999; Hewitt 1983, 1997; Watts and Bohle 1993). These may refer to economic resources, technology, information, skills, infrastructure, institutions, and equity. They are often termed “generic determinants” of adaptive capacity of the social system (Brooks et al. 2005, p. 153), often specified by the political economy of the context that determine the sensitivity of the system to climate change. They constrain endogenous factors (i.e., the characteristics and behavior of the community) of coping responses (Cannon 1994). In this sense, vulnerability of the grassroots in coastal settlements is likely to have climatic and non-climatic differentiations and they are mutually inclusive. Irrespective of hazard circumstances, individual’s accessibility and reliance on resources determine the first layer of vulnerability. In fact, the degree of accessibility determines the baseline status of the individual.

Baseline Vulnerability

The most widely accepted meaning of vulnerability has been defined as the “susceptibility of exposure to harmful stresses” and “the ability to respond” to those stresses (Adger 2006; Adger et al. 2007; Bohle et al. 1994; Kelman and Lewis 2005; Lewis 1999). Vulnerability, according to the IPCC definition (Houghton et al. 2001; McCarthy et al. 2001), includes “exposure” of a system as an external dimension to climate variations (Few 2003), as well as an internal dimension of its “sensitivity” and its “adaptive capacity.” The two sets of definitions have some commonality within them – where “susceptibility” counterparts “sensitivity” of the later definition and “the ability to respond” resembles to the “adaptive capacity.” It is to be noted that sensitivity is reliant on the baseline characteristics (climatic and non-climatic) induced by the whole (natural and social) system as discussed in the preceding segment, whereas adaptive capacity links more to the individual’s willingness, understanding of priorities, and ability to perform in the system. As exposure and climatic variability vary across contexts, vulnerability has geographical dimension (Lewis and Kelman 2010) and links to specific hazards and the likely exposure to hazard impacts (Brooks et al. 2005). A settlement having shelters made of permanent materials may not be that much susceptible to windstorm compared to those with temporary structures. Along this line, Lewis (1999) and Wisner et al. (2004) suggested that any kind of vulnerability assessment would focus on the susceptibility of concerned variables that characterize the well-being of people and, in other words, the root causes of sensitivity to a specific disaster and setting. While the social interpretations of disaster are not new (Burton 1993; O’Keefe et al. 1976), whatever their cause, their effects are perpetually rooted in societal processes that render certain groups or individuals particularly vulnerable to the impacts (Wisner et al. 2004) and over time (Uitto 1998). However, the term vulnerability has become highly contested due to lack of precision (Cannon 2008b). It is often confused with poverty, marginalization, or any other conceptualizations that recognize sections of the disadvantaged population (Wisner et al. 2004). In order to comprehend Page 3 of 20

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vulnerability, it is clearly not adequate to understand only the types of hazards and the natural system themselves, but the hazard impacts on groups of people who are at different level of preparedness with varying capacities to recover. Therefore, the research employed a simple working definition from Wisner et al. (2004, p. 11), where vulnerability was meant as the “characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard.” The definition implies that in order to understand the grassroots responses, it is important to identify the characteristics and condition of individuals in the community. Cannon demonstrated conditions of social vulnerability as root causes of an individual that include one’s initial well-being, livelihood and resilience, self-protection, social protection, and social and political networks including institutions (Cannon 2008a; Cannon et al. 2003). Others identify factors that hinder capacity of individuals as economic imbalances, disparity in power and knowledge among social groups, and inequality in welfare and social protection (Adger and Kelly 1999; Blaikie et al. 1994; Dow 1992). However, individuals’ vulnerabilities change over time through changes in one’s institutional and economic position (direct) and condition of shelter, food, and health (indirect); and these changes are affected by environmental changes (Adger 1999). In the present research, they have been termed as baseline parameters of vulnerability. Together they determine individual’s instinct, relying on which one starts to respond to a given disaster event either normal or extreme. These parameters have been further illustrated as livelihood, food and health, education, kinship, and shelter as being considered the basic survival tectonics for an individual to constitute his/her household. Among the five parameters, livelihood (diversity of jobs, income and savings, assets), education (access to knowledge), and kinship (at neighborhood level, family and community) are independent although some may defy that livelihood and education depend on each other. It is true that certain livelihood opportunities are quasi-independent due to educational qualification remains as prerequisite to access them. However, in an underdeveloped and natural resource-based setting, livelihood opportunities are naturally in place. The component of access to education may not only rely on income than willingness and awareness to be literate based on the level of subsidy from government, whereas livelihood opportunity is central to establish individual’s command over economic performances and resources to satisfy fundamental needs. Security of food and health (sources and supply of basic nutrients including safe drinking water) and decision of shelter (settlement, built environment, build form, natural resources/vegetation) are dependent variables as they are highly relied on individual’s income, educational attainment, and network of kinship. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the parameters of baseline vulnerability do not necessarily constitute resilience, but determine the capacity to some extent to adapt to climate change scenarios. An important point also to be noted is that the main difference between baseline vulnerability and vulnerability definition is therefore the first one is a more intimate assessment of individual’s ability than the society as a whole. Therefore, the parameters remain as the first-stage manual to assist individual households to analyze risk and prioritize allocation of resources to reduce immediate vulnerability arising from the household core.

Grassroots Responses in Climate Change Adaptation Process Recognition of grassroots responses, the aim of this research, requires a clear understanding of the grassroots first. The verbatim “grassroots” encompasses the common and ordinary people at a local level rather than at the center of any major political affiliation or social organizations. Grassroots responses in this chapter limit themselves to those simple individual household-level coping strategies in face of continuing hazard exposures and are not subject to any planned intervention Page 4 of 20

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except from the grassroots community itself. Obviously, the grassroots coping strategies are hereditary in nature and central to the assumption that “an event will follow a familiar pattern and that previous coping actions are a reasonable guide for similar events” (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 320). It is the “learning by doing” evolution which makes use of indigenous knowledge gained over centuries. The indigenous knowledge is constituted through gathering of social memory of past weather extremes (Harley 2003). Strauss and Orlove (2003) refer to such practices as use of “intuitive data” derived from individual perception of recent experience of weather guided by historical weather data. Since data are always context specific, grassroots responses are highly localized, generating community-wide ownership and commitment (Jabeen et al. 2010, p. 418). Parvin and Johnson (2012) identified that indigenous knowledge-based responses occur through stages of anticipation, coping, adaptation, and recovery. Based on their timing, grassroots responses can also be referred to craft passive (concurrent), reactive (responsive or ex post), and anticipatory (proactive or ex ante) (Fankhauser et al. 1999; Smit et al. 2000) “adjustments” (Brooks 2003; Carter 1996; Smit 1993; Stakhiv 1993; Watson et al. 1996), in response to the expected or real-time climatic consequences. Such adjustments take place in the social, economic, and ecological spheres (Smit et al. 2000). According to Cannon (2008b), people, when faced with crisis, would behave “culturally” to respond in ways so unique that sometimes they seem to be quite irrational from outside. However, by virtue of the very notion of culture as unique to a system, grassroots responses as processes of cultural adjustments are spontaneous; hence, the grassroots own full autonomy on their actions (Carter et al. 1994). As Smithers and Smit (1997) claim that spontaneous adaptation is the activity of an individual, his decision making of autonomous responses is embedded in social processes that reflect the relationship with other individuals, his networks, capabilities, and social capital where unmanaged natural systems often are hotbed to stimulate them.

The Analytical Framework To develop the analytical framework of this chapter, vulnerability has been scaled down to baseline vulnerability. Exposure is the key stimulus against which vulnerability can be traced. Scale of analysis is highly important to understand the layers of changes in the vulnerability condition against a given exposure. When exposed to a hazard, individual responds selectively according to the level of basic vulnerability one withstands and sets the priority areas of response. The ability of one to control the parameters that determine vulnerability might be translated into one’s capacity to adapt. As for a fisherman, his livelihood depends on the workable condition of a fishing boat. Therefore, during disaster securing the boat is his first priority than saving his own life. It is the spontaneous responses of that particular individual the framework of this present research identifies as “grassroots.” In contrast, a poor day laborer who lives in a comparatively unsafe shelter in a risky location and has nothing much to lose materially would migrate to a safer place at the first instance leaving everything behind. Although the fisherman is wealthier than the poor day laborer in terms of their respective asset share, the first one is more vulnerable according to the differences in the priorities. In these sense, the scope of this analytical framework has tended to consider baseline vulnerability of individuals as the most important aspect to examine the effectiveness of grassroots responses. Figure 1 shows the range of climate variability and on the eve of exposure how sensitivity of the individual is determined based on his access to resources. Priorities of responses are set depending on the baseline vulnerability. The individual then starts to respond in the adaptation process through bringing changes to the physical and nonphysical attributes of vulnerability parameters. This is the boundary of autonomous adaptation as long as there is no external intervention involved (such as planned government intervention). The baseline condition and associated responses together constitute residual impact towards the next layer of vulnerability. This is the point where planned Page 5 of 20

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Fig. 1 Analytical framework for vulnerability, adaptation, and grassroots responses

adaptation starts to operate and determines total vulnerability of the system to climate change. It further trickles back and suggests change of state to the sensitivity of individual. Future alteration in planned intervention also takes place based on the changed situation.

Climate Change Adaptation and Grassroots Responses: The Case of Gabura Profile of Gabura Gabura6 is in the eastern part of Shyamnagar Upazila in Satkhira district of Khulna division in Bangladesh. It is a small island, bounded by Kholpetua and Kopotakhsa rivers, which are subject to year-round strong wind and tidal interactions. It was once part of the Sundarbans.7 More than a century ago, people cleared this part of the forest for shelter and livelihood opportunities. However, in recent period, excessive reliance on forests is being controlled by restrictions to protect loss of biodiversity.8 Recently, during the aftermath of extreme disaster, significant portion of inhabitants was forced to retreat from their hereditary occupations of agriculture. At present, 80 % of the economically active population is involved in fishing or activities related to marketing and processing of fish. Most inhabitants, particularly the fishermen, now live along the embankment9 and on the highlands near the water interface, while farmers live in the middle part.

6

Gabura union covers an area of 10,195 acres, with an estimated population of more than 31,115. Most inhabitants (about 96 %) are Muslim. The male–female ratio is 49:51 and literacy rate of this region is 35.9 %. The union consists of 9 wards and 15 villages. 75 % people are involved in fisheries and 20 % rely on crop farming. The rest lives on occupations like industrial labors, rickshaw, and boat puller. The average income is 4000 BDT (BBS 2012). 7 Sundarbans, the largest mangrove forest in the world, was declared UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1999. 8 The forest department introduced a “pass” system to restrict the abuse of forest resources. 9 In early 1960 the then East Pakistan Power and Water Development Authority (after independence it is named WAPDA) surrounded the coastal cropland with embankment to protect it from saline water flooding. Apparently, it ensured good cropping in the coastal area, however, from the ecosystem perspective; it has badly altered the natural water–coast interaction, barring the natural siltation process. Consequently the area has gone lower than the sea level and has become subject to water logging and saline water intrusion (Parvin and Johnson 2012). Page 6 of 20

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The way people of Gabura perceive disaster is unique. They are used to typical climate-induced hazards of heat, storm, cyclone, heavy rainfall, and flood. Disaster is part of their daily life as normal as seasonal variation. They are skilled to predict the timing and type of disaster by applying indigenous techniques of observing the weather condition. According to the inhabitants, Gabura is relatively protected, firstly, by the vast natural barrier of the Sundarbans and, secondly, by the embankment. However, “Aila” was the most sudden catastrophe of an unprecedented scale. Within less than an hour, the tidal waves leaped up as high as it could overflow the embankment and rolled into inland washing out every man-made and natural element along its path.10 Seawater, once entered the inland, could not return to the river and retained for 3 months. The whole island went “green to gray.” In addition to physical impacts, vulnerability increased through disrupted livelihoods, long-term displacement of people from their homesteads, and increased health risks due to shortage of drinking water and food supply. Schools remained closed for as long as 2 years. Although the massive momentary shock of Aila had exhausted every possible means to cope with the event at that time, significance of the grassroots responses started to show its upshot at a more profound pace during the 4 years’ recovery stage.

Study Approach and Methodology of Field Investigation An interpretive analysis was done to explain the everyday life in Gabura in relation to climate variability. Qualitative survey was conducted in depth among 20 households to identify their demographic characteristics and perception of hazards, risks, and responses to disaster. Family history of households and their tenure of association with Gabura were critical for selection of interviewees. Afterwards, the unique grassroots responses attributed to their baseline vulnerability were explored through semi-structured interviews. Sample households were selected based on their dwelling location and occupation. Ten households were fishermen with few having business stakes relating to fish marketing and processing, eight were involved in multiple jobs as available and suitable across different season, and the rest two were farmers. Except the fact that the farmers only lived in the middle part of the island, where farmlands got sizeable recovery during last 4 years after Aila, the rest lived in clusters within proximity of the water edge along the peripheral high embankment. Households with firsthand experience in Aila incident were only included in the sample. In addition, physical features of homesteads including landscape elements, organization, and distribution of homesteads were observed carefully. It helped to understand the spatial manifestation of grassroots responses. Focus group discussion was conducted primarily to unveil the history of community in general and the nature of collective responses. Moreover, cross-checking the authenticity of the household interviews was a secondary concern. Based on the analytical framework, grassroots responses were analyzed in terms of physical and nonphysical key attributes. An effectiveness matrix of grassroots responses was built to understand the level of resilience.

Priority Setting for Grassroots Responses in the Adaptation Process

Neither the buzzword “climate change” nor the issue of “sea level rise” is familiar among the inhabitants of Gabura, except those who received formal education. Nevertheless, they were found highly sensitive to those climate-created stimuli, which would influence to identify their adaptation 10

According to Upazila Nirbahi office, Shyamnagar (local authority) around 41.11 km2 area of Gabura union was undulated where 4324.97 ha of shrimp land was destroyed, 12,280 households were destroyed, 28 people were dead, 467 people were injured, and more than 30,034 people were affected. More than 3,000 people took shelter in nearby cyclone center and 13,000 people on embankments (Kumar et al. 2010). Page 7 of 20

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Table 1 Perceived climate change impacts by households in Gabura Climate change stimulus Climate variability Sea level rise Untimely rainfall Less rainfall Less seasonal variation Frequent cyclone

Increased heat Cold wave during summer nights Annual flooding

Disaster impact Disturbed cropping pattern Disturbed fish farming Scarcity of natural fish in rivers and canals Loss of working days Temporary interruption of communication Temporary interruption of schooling Heat stress Chronic fever Pneumonia to children Short-term displacement Medium-term interruption of schooling Damage to homestead

Heavy rainfall for short time period Storm surge that crossed over Medium- and long-term the embankment displacement Prolonged water logging Damage to household assets Damage to water supply system Scarcity of food and drinking water Increased waterborne diseases Damage to livelihood assets Damage to fish ponds Long-term interruption of schooling Increased salinity of soil and water Scarcity of drinking water Salt in air during summer

Effects Loss of livelihood Insecurity of food

Level of perceived risk Medium

Loss of livelihood Interrupted education

Low

Deterioration of health

Low

Loss of kinship Interrupted education

Medium

Loss of life

High

Loss of farmland Loss of traditional and other livelihood

Insecurity of food and water Interrupted education Loss of kinship Loss of shelter Deterioration of health

Source: Field Survey, 2013

responses. However, responses vary not only for climatic stimuli but also for the non-climatic conditions (Smit et al. 2000, p. 235). Together they determine the sensitivity of the social system and assist in setting priority towards adjustments. Table 1 depicts a relationship among climate variability, disaster, their impacts, and perception of risk by the grassroots. Most respondents feel that after the year 2000, nature has been extreme and frequency of disaster intensified. They recognized changes in seasonal variations including increased heat, cold wave in summer nights, untimely rainfall, or no rain however, they impose low to moderate risk on livelihood, food, and health status. There has been increased frequency of cyclones during monsoon, Page 8 of 20

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however, they impose low risk on the livelihood and education sectors and cause minor damage to shelter. Typical annual flooding causes short-term displacement and sometimes interruption in education. Increased water logging condition due to heavy rainfall and storm surge including saline retention in the subsoil pose high risk and destabilize most of the baseline vulnerability parameters. These are caused by extreme climatic hazards and eventually they push grassroots responses to the thresholds of limit.

Grassroots Responses Before, During, and After the Disaster Given the fact that Gabura is incessantly exposed to different degree of climatic hazards, grassroots responses are the inbuilt elements of the daily life of the islanders. It is hard to differentiate from one another as they are overlapping. The interview unveiled the nonphysical and physical grassroots responses before, during, and after disaster that have been categorized in Tables 2 and 3. Aila is the major disaster event in recent years. Therefore, responses after Aila have been considered ex post responses. The key findings are as follows: Before Disaster Historically, the geographical setting of Gabura has provided spontaneous choices of cropping, fishing, and other livelihood opportunities. While the fishermen have inherited unique time-bound fishing techniques11 from the river system of the Sundarbans, farmers held intimate knowledge of soil, water, and seeds that are resistant to flood and saline water. It is the harsh reality that, throughout the year, all have to maintain rationing of drinking water through rainwater harvesting system. The bountiful forest and water system has ensured supply of high-carbohydrate and high-protein daily food.12 Previous experiences have taught them to store dry food, matchbox, cooker, and cooking fuel (enough for couple of days) on a relatively higher place – a preparedness strategy based on anticipation. They usually maintain extended family networks inside and outside of village through marriage and kinship to secure assistance (usually in monetary form with unconditional loan) during disaster. Timing of schools is scheduled based on the changing time of high tide and low tide. Children take plastic bags to carry books for protection from unwanted rain. They chose higher land for homesteads along the embankment or internal high-water edges in proximity to their working place. Plantation of mangrove trees13 along the embankment as well as the periphery of homesteads helps to withstand soil erosion, gusty wind, and wave. Supply of food, fuel, and building materials comes as by-product. Families within blood relation build house around courtyard and share services (e.g., toilet, vegetable gardens, and animal rearing spaces) except cooking. Houses are built on raised earthen plinth.14 Height of the plinth is determined based on previous mean level of flooding observed. Mud for the plinth is collected through excavating ponds. These ponds are used to retain rainwater15 for cooking and fish culture. False ceiling with local materials is used to store valuables and insulation from heat. To protect the roof from hauling, they tie bamboo frame or net on the roof and maintain the roof slope less than 40 . Anticipating storm, they tie the roof with nearby trees or ground with strong rope, so that it may not waft away. They follow a cycle of three “Gone”– “Omabossha,” “Purnima,” and “Bosa” – according to the behavioral pattern of fishes with tidal variation. 12 The Sundarbans and its streams are source of honey, fruits, edible shoots of trees, fishes, and crabs. 13 “Keora,” “Goran,” “Golpata,” “Geoa,” “Sundari,” Coconut, Tal, etc. 14 Locally called “vita” 15 Salinity of pond water reduces if the ponds can be retained for at least two seasons, as the salt sediments. The rainwater also helps to reduce the salt content. Water with reduced saline in this way is called “Dudh–Pani” (milk–water). 11

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Table 2 Nonphysical responses of the grassroots in Gabura Island Attributes of responses Ex ante (before) Concurrent (during) Livelihood Majority involved in crop farming Occupation sectors, i.e., farming, and fishing, few in fish farming fishing, boat-pulling practices are disrupted a Time-bound fishing strategies based on the lunar calendar Cropping pattern based on the quality and classification of soil

Ex post (after) Adoption of alternative sources of income gets priority during recovery stage Fishing from the river becomes predominant occupation Male members from poorest families travel to nearby towns for jobs Forced to enter into the Sundarbans and narrow canals for collection of honey, wood, and fishes Food and Sufficient consumption of locally Less consumption as norms Less consumption as norms Health available foods with high impeded by food shortage impeded by food shortage during carbohydrate and protein on daily Consumption of wild fruits (i.e., recovery stage basis across all classes Keora) and seeds from the Sundarbans during extreme events Education Setting up school hours according Receipt of education disrupted An increased number of children to the timing of high tide and low receive education with the belief tide that they may change family hardship in the future through jobs in government sector Kinship Extended family structure for Immediate assistance comes from Financial assistance from relatives shared assistance family members and neighbors living in town in the reconstruction within village level during phase Safeguarding strong kinship disaster networks within the same community Female children of the family receive early marriage and usually sent out of the island as long-term strategy of extending kinship beyond Gabura Increased interest in saving money Shelter Few literate people save money for Immediate response during for shelter repairing and shelter extreme condition includes securing educational certificates, construction legal documents of land ownership than the physical shelter itself Source: Field Survey, 2013 Locally called “Gone”

a

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Table 3 Physical responses of the grassroots in Gabura Island Attributes of responses Livelihood

Ex ante (before) Selection of agricultural land in relatively higher part of island Shrimp farming in the lower part Narrow canals to control saline water for fish farming Food and Health Storage of dry food, matchbox, cooker, cooking fuel in relatively higher place Rainwater harvesting through use of plastic sheet on roof surface to collect water and preservation in clay pots Homestead ponds for sweet water fish culture and water with reduced saline contenta for cooking Education Use of plastic shopping bag to protect dry clothes and books during extreme weather Kinship

Shelter

Concurrent (during) Relocating livelihood assets (i.e., poultry, livestock, fish net, boat) in higher place near roadside/ embankment or temporary elevated structure or even on the rooftop

Ex post (after) Increased engagement in shrimp farming due to salinity intrusion during Aila

Clay pots sealed to secure drinking water during storm surge Temporary latrine on stilt above water closed to embankment

Underground storage of foods, matchbox, cooker, cooking fuel after experience from Aila Increased protection measures for homestead ponds

Temporary cooking facilities on Homestead/kitchen garden as top of bed or any higher place source of vegetable for daily available consumption

Primary schools and mosques used for cyclone shelters during disaster Use of temporary boats either made of banana tree or large cooking pots to maintain connection with relatives and rescue effort Appropriate mix of mangrove Children moved to elevated Compact and organic plants to withstand soil erosion structure or even on the rooftop distribution of homesteads in river banks during the four years’ recovery phase after Aila Raised earthen mound for Construction of makeshift Selection of high land to build plinth of house or use of stilt shelter along the roadside and shelter along both sides of the embankment embankment Use of locally available Bracings made with chords and Homestead forest in the materials for construction of bamboo to avoid upward hauling periphery to protect from gusty shelter of the roof during cyclone wind and source of wood for shelter repair/construction Construction of smaller false Increased height of the plinth ceiling for storage and shelter based on the flooding experience in Aila Roof slope less than 40 , use of Roofing material changed from bamboo frame bracing and thatched roof to CI sheet and preferably asbestos fishing net on roof surface to protect from gusty wind Annual maintenance of weaker parts of built structure

Source: Field Survey, 2013 Water with reduced saline content is locally called “Dudh-Pani.” The literal translation in English should be “milk–water” a

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During Disaster During disaster, the most preferable option is to stay at homestead as long as possible. During regular flooding and storm surge, people keep on waiting in the house observing how high the water gets in and build elevated structures16 for storing foods, valuables, and livestock. The flood hinders livelihood activity and they pass lazy time on furniture above flood level, and use moveable cooker for food preparation. Children move to a higher place, such as on false ceiling and sometimes even on rooftop. During long-standing inundation, people move to makeshift shelters on embankments or nearby cyclone shelter, usually schools. However, such makeshift shelters are inadequate in numbers. Temporary shelter consists of one single room to accommodate the whole family. Shortage of food supply leads to consumption of wild fruits and seeds. Immediate assistance comes from family members and neighbors within village level during disaster. Handmade boats17 or large water pots as substitute of boats are used for communication. Interestingly, both the higher- and lowerincome population travel to nearby city centers for social safety by choice and livelihood by need, respectively. It is hard for the middle class to opt for migration. Neither the job opportunity in cities suits their class, nor can they risk on their last piece of land to be illegally grabbed. After “Aila” By nature, the people of Gabura did not learn to save money for the future; rather, they followed a day-to-day livelihood path. Therefore, during recovery stage after a major disaster like Aila, search for alternative sources of income gets priority as the regular job options are disturbed. As farmland goes under long-term inundation, fishing from rivers becomes a predominant response. Shift to large-scale shrimp farming was limited to powerful elites as it was never a labor-intensive sector. Consequently, some male members from poorer families migrated to town centers for jobs. Many (including females) were forced to enter into the Sundarbans to collect honey, wood, and fishes. Less consumption was established as norms impeded by food shortage after Aila. Nevertheless, during the 4 years’ recovery period after Aila, the grayed landscape is showing signs to get greener. Homestead level ponds, vegetable gardens, and forests are being reinstated with cautions (increased plinth level, high trees in the windward direction of homestead, raised embankment for the pond to withstand flood, roofing materials changed from CI sheet to asbestos, etc.) that are learned from Aila experience. The number of children receiving education has increased with the belief that they may change family hardship in the future through better jobs. Financial assistance in the form of unconditional loan from relatives living in town has contributed immensely in the reconstruction phase. However, it is limited to the well-off families only. Increasing awareness to save money for future survival responses is evident. More dense and organic distribution of homesteads is taking place along the embankment. Briefly, with many creative interventions, grassroots responses are being evident as ex post measures after Aila. However, confusion remains among them, whether these adaptations, although improved from the past, would withstand a next disaster as extreme as Aila.

Effectiveness of Grassroots Responses Analysis of grassroots responses in relation to the effects of disaster reveals their effectiveness, which has been presented in Table 4. The evaluation in terms of strengths and weaknesses suggests that most responses are quite effective in relation to the typical hazard condition including minor weaknesses. However, the analysis also reveals that some of the grassroots responses did not 16 17

Locally termed “Matcha” Locally called “Vela,” made of bamboo or banana trunk Page 12 of 20

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Table 4 Effectiveness of grassroots responses Typical hazard Grassroots responses Strength Nonphysical responses Adoption of new livelihood strategies Multiple livelihood options and income opportunities Adaptation to changed environment Male–female equal participation Increased interest in receiving New job opportunity education Increased self-dependency and awareness Increased tendency of savings Indigenous knowledge-based Better adaptation with mother nature weather forecasting Productive cropping and fishing pattern Optimum utilization of time Better preparedness to fight with disaster Short-, medium-, and long-term Alternative skill for livelihood displacement New networks

High level of kinship and social capital

Physical response Life safety measures and protection of livelihood asset Increased dependency on natural resources from surroundings and the Sundarbans

Rainwater harvesting in homestead

Strong social ties irrespective of occupation, religion, ethnicity, or economic status Mutual trust Cooperating attitude High human value Initial preparedness for the recovery stage Alternative source of income Source of local and organic construction material Source of high-nutrient food supply Protection from cyclone and storm surge Source of potable water Source of basic nutrient from sweet water fishes Reduced salinity Contribution to the homestead morphology

Weakness

Extreme event

Loss of traditional occupation  New land use distribution detrimental to ecology Loss of labor force in traditional occupations Displacement





Displaced from the hereditary √ land Declination of community bondage Destruction of traditional lifestyle and settlement Increased social liabilities √

 Detrimental to natural biodiversity

○

Probability of waterborne health hazard

○

(continued)

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Table 4 (continued) Grassroots responses Plantation in homesteads

Use of community infrastructure

Typical hazard Strength Reduced heat Source of food and fuel Source of building construction material Protection from gusty wind and storm surge and soil erosion Contribution to the homestead morphology Optimum use of homestead leftover space Adaptive reuse of embankment Safe shelter during disaster

Recycling and reuse of natural and man-made resources

Protection of shelter based on indigenous knowledge

Efficient use of resources Sustainable use of resource Cost efficiency in shelter reconstruction Preservation of traditional homestead and settlement morphology

Extreme event 

Weakness Damage to shelter due to fallen big branches of trees during storms

Deterioration in longevity of infrastructure Unhygienic physical environment due to adaptive reuse Depletion of resource due to repeated use

√

√



Source: Field Survey, 2013 √ effective, ○ effective with limitations,  failed with limited effectiveness

succeed during extreme event of Aila, which was too unpredictable in nature. During typical hazards, the indigenous knowledge base helps better adaptation through decisions to change cropping and fishing pattern and optimum utilization of time in different livelihood sectors. Usually, the natural weather indicators help better preparedness on the eve of any exposure. Yet during extreme event, it failed to anticipate the severity and timing of hazard. Field survey revealed that most interviewees could hardly perceive the extremity of “Aila.” Although the resourceful natural system has offered an array of livelihood opportunities, traditional occupations could not sustain the aftermath of the extreme event. The settlement has undergone a slow process of deterioration in ecology. Growing literacy among the inhabitants has been opening new avenues for livelihood and enhanced preparedness. In contrast, the traditional skills are diminishing and stimulating displacement to make way for the formal scientific knowledge. However, after extreme event like Aila, education system terminated as long as 2 years. Most interestingly, the nonphysical responses of migration and safeguarding kinship were powerful coping strategies during extremes. Among the physical responses, the typical life safety measures have been proven useful during both the normal and extreme hazard conditions. However, they lost their usefulness as the impact of “Aila” had lasted for a longer period. Even after extreme events, the natural system of the Sundarbans requires time to get back to its earlier state. Yet excessive dependency on the Sundarbans for livelihood and food supply is exhausting the natural setting. Cyclone shelters and schools, although very limited in number, play positive role through providing alternative shelter during all events including extremes. Physical responses like rainwater harvesting and homestead vegetable

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gardens are critical to meet requirement of safe drinking water, supply of nutrition, and other costsaving household income during and after disaster. They are highly vulnerable during extreme events as whichever falls in the direction of storm surge gets wiped out. Terminologies such as “community-based adaptation,” “participatory adaptation,” “climate change adaptation from below,” and even “grassroots responses” bear romanticism within them because of their inherent “people-centered” notion. There is a wider belief in theory and practice that grassroots can solve everything. However, in reality, during disasters in coastal settlements, grassroots remain handicapped due to limitation of adequate resources and institutional support. In extreme event, livelihood options and education system are severely disrupted. As it is an independent parameter of baseline vulnerability, the command on other dependent parameters like food, health, and shelter naturally are invalidated. During the aftershock of extreme events, even the bountiful resource base of the Sundarbans enters into a crisis state and fails to meet the demand side with its disrupted supply side for a while. Recalling from the history, people know that there has been an extreme event in every 5–10 years or so. The gap between extreme events has been decreasing over last two decades. Nevertheless, successive improvements in grassroots responses are pushed to the “critical thresholds” (Adger et al. 2003) as every time new hazards hit with higher extremities.

Climate Change Adaptation Through Grassroots Responses: Future Direction It is somewhat unanticipated that people often become vulnerable because they are excluded from safer places due to their structural inequality and forced to choose locations that are exposed to extreme events; at the same time, the vulnerable locations have provided them with livelihood options (Kelman and Mather 2008; Lewis and Kelman 2010). In this sense, the natural system of the coastal settlements is not to be blamed but the governance system that has set up unequal access to resources resulting into deprivation. Cannon (2008b) argued that culture plays a powerful role for people willing to live in peril where livelihood is able to connect to well-being. Hence, willingness for self-protection comes naturally with livelihood and well-being. This is the limit of an individual’s response without any external intervention (Cannon 2008a). Beyond this point, external incentives should be required either in the form of societal protection or through a favorable government that would facilitate grassroots responses more effectively through optimum allocation of resources. The empirical findings of this chapter have an important implication suggesting insights to facilitate grassroots responses in the process of climate change adaptation. Evidence from this study suggests that the first step to reduce the baseline vulnerability is to facilitate livelihood options and ensure their long-term sustenance. The study undoubtedly revealed storm surges that overflowed the embankment causing long-term inundation of inland pose highest level of risk through disrupting livelihood and other parameters of baseline vulnerability. It is of extreme necessity to scrutinize the existing settlement morphology and identify what is problematic towards long-term inundation. Therefore, more sustainable settlement-planning strategies have to be formulated which would not only reduce the risk but also offer scope to nurture traditional livelihood practices. One of the major challenges should be to upkeep the delivery of education, which can be an escape route for many in the future through better livelihood opportunity and scientific knowledge base. Therefore, disaster adaptive schooling system (physical design or policy support) has to be ensured, so that delivery of education may not be stopped under any circumstances. The number of schools has to be increased in strategic locations, so that they may cater adaptive utilization during disasters and overcome the present supply shortage of cyclone shelters. Page 15 of 20

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Contrary to the expectations, as the indigenous way of anticipating weather events fails to predict extreme event, awareness should be created among the grassroots, which would result in increased reliance on scientific warning systems. Individual’s life safety measures are not that useful in the end until one’s livelihood assets are secured during disaster. New policy and planning responses are needed towards a comprehensive safety net. Biodiversity of the Sundarbans should be protected at any cost. However, an equitable policy support is necessary to establish a sustainable baseline supply chain of food and fuel for the indigenous people. Strong social ties of mutual trust and kinship have to be properly utilized for both individual and collective disaster responses. In this regard, some of the individual level responses (i.e., rainwater harvesting and gardening in homesteads) can be scaled up to community-level practice to build on collective resilience. Responses to the improvement of shelter are piecemeal. Research-led design interventions are needed to combine traditional building technologies and science of building to cater resilience and shelter’s sustainability. Nevertheless, strength–weakness matrix of grassroots responses demonstrated that “displacement” either temporary or permanent has been a common phenomenon during all disasters. Gabura is a disaster-prone island and disaster extremities will increase year on year due to unavoidable consequences of sea level rise. Long-term strategies may be adopted through creating diversified job opportunities in nearby safer locations, so that people may respond through trading off their risky living place with better livelihood options. The process of planned gradual relocation over a decade or so would eventually leave less people exposed to future extremes in places like Gabura. The resulting settlement initiative would provide reasonable setback for both the Sundarbans and Gabura Island to recover back to their earlier state of resourcefulness. This strategic intervention should be integrated into the regional planning strategy for the central government to redistribute and decentralize resource base. As a result, it would ensure equitable scope of resource share for the vulnerable communities of the coastal settlements to build up nationwide resilience.

Conclusion Climate change is a reality and cannot be denied. Living with disaster is part of everyday life for millions of people dwelling in the disaster-prone areas of Bangladesh and in other places of the world. However, the baseline vulnerability arisen from the root causes of this large population’s socioeconomic strata is yet intimately embedded in the mainstream understanding of disaster preparedness through either risk reduction or adaptation. This is probably because preparedness has been still enclosed around the dimensions of broader hazard-centric paradigm than considering as an active socioeconomic development process (Gaillard 2010; Kelman and Gaillard 2008). Neither has been many attempts visible to place adaptation scholarship within the paradigm of disaster risk reduction (Kelman and Gaillard 2010). The present study confirms that adaptation starts at local level as part of the individual’s fundamental urge for survival. Grassroots responses are spontaneous and they facilitate community to adapt to climate variability respective of their socioeconomic status. Yet the responses are inadequate during extreme event. Mismatch is evident among the increasing level of extremities in disasters from climatic hazards and the improvement of grassroots responses over time. Integration of grassroots response with relevant policies and development mechanisms of the existing developmental programs to cater the needs of climate variability can be a first step. Integrated policy to address the baseline vulnerability of the community is important. Interventions compatible to the coastal settlements system itself may significantly reduce its vulnerabilities and create opportunities for the country’s large coastal population. Experiences from the category one cyclone “Aila” Page 16 of 20

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revealed weakness of existing grassroots responses. However, the importance of community-led adaptation can never be ignored. Rather, they need to be adequately equipped with reasonable climate change adaptation planning and policy responses. Failure in doing so may pose a threat to extinction of indigenous knowledge base climate change responses and lead the large coastal population to an uncertain future.

References Adger WN (1999) Social vulnerability to climate change and extremes in coastal Vietnam. World Dev 27:249–269 Adger WN (2006) Vulnerability. Glob Environ Chang 16:268–281 Adger WN, Kelly PM (1999) Social vulnerability to climate change and the architecture of entitlements. Mitig Adapt Strat Glob Chang 4:253–266 Adger WN, Huq S, Brown K, Conway D, Hulme M (2003) Adaptation to climate change in the developing world. Prog Dev Stud 3:179–195 Adger WN, Agrawala S, Mirza MMQ, Conde C, O’Brien K, Pulhin J, Pulwarty R, Smit B, Takahashi K (2007) Assessment of adaptation practices, options, constraints and capacity. In: Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of IPCC the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp 717–743 Ahmed AU, Alam M, Rahman AA (1999) Adaptation to climate change in Bangladesh: future outlook. In: Huq S, Karim Z, Asaduzzaman M, Mahtab F (eds) Vulnerability and adaptation to climate change for Bangladesh. Springer, Netherlands, pp 125–143 Alam M, Nishat A-U, Siddiqui SM (1999) Water resources vulnerability to climate change with special reference to inundation. In: Huq S, Karim Z, Asaduzzaman M, Mahtab F (eds) Vulnerability and adaptation to climate change for Bangladesh. Springer Netherlands, pp 21–38 BBS (2012) Bangladesh population and housing census 2011: socio-economic and demographic report. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, National Report. Statistics and informatics division (SID), Ministry of Planning, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Blaikie P, Cannon T, Davis I, Wisner B (eds) (1994) At risk: natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters. Routledge, London Bohle HG, Downing TE, Watts MJ (1994) Climate change and social vulnerability: toward a sociology and geography of food insecurity. Glob Environ Chang 4:37–48 Brooks N (2003) Vulnerability, risk and adaptation: A conceptual framework. Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Working Paper 38:1–16 Brooks N, Adger WN, Kelly PM (2005) The determinants of vulnerability and adaptive capacity at the national level and the implications for adaptation. Glob Environ Chang 15:151–163 Burton I (1993) The environment as hazard. Guilford Press, New York Cannon T (1994) Vulnerability analysis and the explanation of ‘natural’ disasters. In: Varley A (ed) Disasters, development and the environment. Wiley, New York/Brisbane/Toronto/Singapore, pp 13–30 Cannon T (2008a) Reducing people’s vulnerability to natural hazards communities and resilience. Research paper/UNU-WIDER, No. 2008.34, ISBN 978-92-9230-080-7 Cannon T (2008b) Vulnerability, “innocent” disasters and the imperative of cultural understanding. Disaster Prev Manag 17:350–357 Page 17 of 20

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Cannon T, M€ uller-Mahn D (2010) Vulnerability, resilience and development discourses in context of climate change. Nat Hazards 55:621–635 Cannon T, Twigg J, Rowell J (2003) Social vulnerability, sustainable livelihoods and disasters. Report to DFID Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department (CHAD) and Sustainable Livelihoods Support Office DFID, London Carter TR (1996) Assessing climate change adaptations: The IPCC guidelines. In: Smith JB, Bhatti N, Menzhulin GV, Benioff R, Campos M, Jallow B, Rijsberman F, Budyko MI, Dixon RK (eds) Adapting to climate change: an international perspective. Springer, New York, pp 27–43 Carter TR, Parry ML, Harasawa H, Nishioka N (1994) IPCC technical guidelines for assessing climate change impacts and adaptations. University College London, London Dasgupta S, Huq M, Khan ZH, Ahmed MMZ, Mukherjee N, Khan M, Pandey K (2010) Vulnerability of Bangladesh to cyclones in a changing climate: potential damages and adaptation cost. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5280 Dow K (1992) Exploring differences in our common future (s): the meaning of vulnerability to global environmental change. Geoforum 23:417–436 Fankhauser S, Smith JB, Tol RSJ (1999) Weathering climate change: some simple rules to guide adaptation decisions. Ecol Econ 30:67–78 Few R (2003) Flooding, vulnerability and coping strategies: local responses to a global threat. Prog Dev Stud 3:43–58 Gaillard J-C (2010) Vulnerability, capacity and resilience: perspectives for climate and development policy. J Int Dev 22:218–232 Harley TA (2003) Nice weather for the time of year: the British obsession with the weather. In: Strauss S, Orlove BS (eds) Weather, climate, culture. Berg, Oxford, pp 103–120 Hewitt K (1983) Interpretations of calamity: from the viewpoint of human ecology. Unwin Hyman, Boston Hewitt K (1997) Regions of risk: a geographical introduction to disasters. Longman, London Houghton JT, Ding YDJG, Griggs DJ, Noguer M, van der Linden PJ, Dai X, Maskell K, Johnson CA (2001) Climate change 2001: the scientific basis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Huq S, Ahmed AU, Koudstaal R (1996) Vulnerability to Bangladesh to climate change and sea level rise. In: Downing TE (ed) Climate change and world food security. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, pp 347–379 Islam SMR, Huq S, Ali A (1998) Beach erosion in the Eastern Coastline of Bangladesh. In: Huq S, Karim Z, Asaduzzaman M, Mahtab F (eds) Vulnerability and adaptation to climate change for Bangladesh. Springer, Netherlands, pp 71–92 Jabeen H, Johnson C, Allen A (2010) Built-in resilience: learning from grassroots coping strategies for climate variability. Environ Urban 22:415–431 Kelman I, Gaillard J (2008) Placing climate change within disaster risk reduction. Disaster Adv 1(3):3–5 Kelman I, Gaillard J (2010) Embedding climate change adaptation within disaster risk reduction. Community Environ Disaster Risk Manag 4:23–46 Kelman I, Lewis J (2005) Ecology and vulnerability: islands and sustainable risk management. Insula Int J Island Aff 14:4–12 Kelman I, Mather TA (2008) Living with volcanoes: the sustainable livelihoods approach for volcano-related opportunities. J Volcanol Geotherm Res 172:189–198 Klein RJT, Nicholls RJ (1999) Assessment of coastal vulnerability to climate change. Ambio 28:182–187

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Kumar U, Baten MA, Masud A, Osman KS, Rahman MM (2010) Cyclone Aila: One Year on Natural Disaster to Human Sufferings. Unnayan Onneshan, Dhaka, Bangladesh Lewis J (1999) Development in disaster-prone places: studies of vulnerability. Intermediate Technology Publications, London Lewis J, Kelman I (2010) Places, people and perpetuity: community capacities in ecologies of catastrophe. ACME 9:191–220 McCarthy JJ, Canziani OF, Leary NA, Dokken DJ, White KS (2001) Climate change 2001: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability: contribution of working group II to the third assessment report of the IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK MoEF (2005) National adaptation programme of action (NAPA). In: MoEF (ed) Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Ministry of Environment and Forests, Dhaka MoEF (2009) Bangladesh climate change strategy and action plan (BCCSAP). In: MoEF (ed) Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Ministry of Environment and Forests, Dhaka O’Keefe P, Westgate K, Wisner B (1976) Taking the naturalness out of natural disasters. Nature 260:566–567 Parry ML, Canziani OF, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (2007) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability: working group II contribution to the fourth assessment report of the IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York Parvin A, Johnson C (2012) Learning from local knowledge: towards disaster-adaptive costal settlements in Bangladesh. In: 1st international conference on urban sustainability and resilience, University College London Rahman AA, Alam M, Alam SS, Uzzaman MR, Rashid M, Rabbani G (2007) Risks, vulnerability and adaptation in Bangladesh. Human Development Report 8. UNDP Smit B (1993) Adaptation to climate variability and change. Report of the task force on climate adaptation. Canadian Climate Program Board, Department of Geography, University of Guelph, Occasional paper no. 19. Environment Canada, Downsview Smit B, Burton I, Klein RJT, Wandel J (2000) An anatomy of adaptation to climate change and variability. Clim Change 45:223–251 Smithers J, Smit B (1997) Agricultural system response to environmental stress. In: Ilbery B, Chiotti Q, Rickard T (eds) Agricultural restructuring and sustainability: a geographical perspective. CAB International, Wallingford, pp 167–183 Stakhiv E (1993) Evaluation of IPCC adaptation strategies. Institute for Water Resources, US Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Belvoir, VA, draft report Strauss S, Orlove BS (2003) Up in the air: the anthropology of weather and climate. In: Strauss S, Orlove BS (eds) Weather, climate, culture. Berg, Oxford, pp 3–16 Uitto JI (1998) The geography of disaster vulnerability in megacities: a theoretical framework. Appl Geogr 18:7–16 Watson RT, Zinyowera MC, Moss RH, Dokken DJ (1996) Climate change 1995: impacts, adaptations and mitigation of climate change: scientific-technical analyses. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Watts MJ, Bohle HG (1993) The space of vulnerability: the causal structure of hunger and famine. Prog Hum Geogr 17:43–67 Wisner B, Blaikie P, Cannon T, Davis I (2004) At risk: natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters. Routledge, London Page 19 of 20

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World Bank (2010) The social dimensions of adaptation to climate change in Bangladesh. Discussion paper number 12, Washington, DC World Bank (2013) Turn down the heat- climate extremes, regional impacts, and the case for resilience, Washington, DC

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Changes of South Baltic Region Climate: Agroecological Challenges and Responses Galina M. Barinovaa*, Evgeny Krasnovb and Dara V. Gaevab a Department of Geoecology, Baltic Federal University of Immanuel Kant, Kaliningrad, Russia b Department of Geoecology, Kaliningrad, Russia

Abstract In this chapter, the regional dynamics of climate change and the subsequent agricultural challenges and responses are discussed by referring to the Kaliningrad region of the Baltic coast and some neighboring areas. The impacts of temperature and fluctuations in precipitation are discussed in relation to grain-crop harvesting and yields and other green crop productions. Furthermore, we observe the connection between pests and diseases and climate change, which affects livestock breeding, arable farming, and human living conditions. Some forms of adaptation to climate-related events (flooding, soil erosion, selection of appropriate crops) are also presented. In the past, during the Soviet era, new uncertainties and consequently deplorable ecological changes for the investigation area were caused by excessive use of pesticides, deforestation, and expansion of monoculture. Mathematical modeling and system approaches are thus becoming important tools for the creation of forecasting procedures and solution strategies and measures for feasible future development of agriculture. Special attention is given to a decreasing number of pollinators (domestic and wild). Finally, new forms of agricultural management (landscape planning, balanced and environmentally friendly agriculture practices) are stressed.

Keywords Regional climate aspects; ecosystem impacts; strategies of adaptation

Methodology and Methods The selection of materials for this study is based on annual and monthly averages of surface air temperature and precipitation at meteorological stations in the southern Baltic region from 1949 to 2011. A set of statistics referring to the period of time from 1960 to 2011 was collated relating to the agrarian structure in the Kaliningrad region (Russia) and the dynamics of crop yields and, more particularly, the total yield of grain and honey production from 1990 to 2011. Anomalies in average values of air temperature and precipitation were measured and recognized as deviations from the reference value recommended by the World Meteorological Organization for the period between 1961 and 1990. In order to analyze the variability of extreme air temperatures, minimum and maximum temperatures were each selected for every month in the period from 1949 to 2011. These data serve to determine the ratio between climatic aridity and humidity and, therefore, in concrete terms, the index of aridity (understood here as the ratio between air temperature and *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

precipitation values). The analysis reveals a significant interannual variability. The calculation of the atmospheric aridity index (S) (Frolov and Strashnaja 2011), using the values of temperature and precipitation for a certain period of time, reveals an increase in air temperature and a destabilization of hydrothermal conditions for the period 1949 to 2011: S¼

DT DP þ sT sP

DT, DP = air temperature and precipitation deviations from monthly mean values, respectively. sT, sP = air temperature and precipitation from mean monthly values, respectively. The atmospheric aridity index (S) is evaluated using the following scale: – “Norm” = 1  S 1. – “Humid” = S 1. – “Arid” = S 1.

History This chapter focuses on the analysis of regional climate changes based on published studies, but also from different sources of information such as ancient chronicles, traditional knowledge and folklore, and natural scientific items such as the speed of lake sedimentation, analysis of annual rings, and measurements of land near-surface air temperature. Three climate periods can be distinguished over the last thousand one hundred years: (a) The warming during the first period, the Medieval Warm Period (from the end of the ninth to the beginning of the twelfth century), which began in the Baltic Sea area, resulted in shifts of vegetation zones and changes in vegetation. Thus, grapes were cultivated in northern Germany and even in Latvia. The increase in temperature during the early middle ages led to a corresponding increase in the numbers and concentration of different sections of the ancient population. (b) The second main period (from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century), known as the “Little Ice Age,” followed, during which the sea level lowered considerably, with extremely cold winters occurring over the ensuing centuries and the Baltic Sea being completely frozen. People could move over the ice-bound sea from Sweden to Denmark and could cover even longer distances by sledge, conquering new frontiers in the true sense of the word by traveling hundreds of kilometers, for instance, from Latvia to Sweden. (c) It was only at the end of the nineteenth century that a new warming of the climate started to introduce the current climate conditions we live under and which are still going on, leading to the rise of the average global temperature and earth warming. Reliable climate observations concerning climatic historical temperature variations are accessible at numerous meteorological stations that have existed for some centuries and deserve to be mentioned, such as St. Petersburg (beginning observations in 1725), Vilnius (1777), Warsaw (1779), Riga (1796), Tallinn (1806), Konigsberg-Kaliningrad (1848), and Tartu (1876). Analysis

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

of the long-term data allows some conclusions to be drawn about the variation of air temperatures in the last two centuries: • The second half of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries are characterized by distinctive oscillations and low values of annual air temperature. For example, the average annual temperature in the period between 1781 and 1790 in St. Petersburg was 2.8  C. • The lowest average annual air temperature of 4.7  C was registered in both Warsaw in 1829 and in Königsberg/Kaliningrad in 1871. The coldest annual temperature (1.2–1.3  C) was measured in St. Petersburg in 1809 and 1810. • A new warming of the climate began at the end of the nineteenth century, leading to an average annual temperature of 7.5  C in Kaliningrad and 8.4  C in Warsaw.

Climate Change Dynamics In the Kaliningrad region there are three main types of climate that, on the whole, can be subdivided into ten types of microclimates (Barinova et al. 2012): 1. Marine type: (a) A long period without freeze (190–200 days), a large number of serene days (30–32 days), normal humidity (750 mm) with strong winds and possible fog (b) The longest period without freezing (over 200 days), high recurrence of winds, annual rainfall of 600–650 mm 2. Transitional type: (a) Sufficient amounts of heat, strong winds, high temperature differences, and microclimatic difference in soil moisture (b) The lowest amounts of heat or a short period without freezing (5.0  C was 2,200  C, and the duration of the period was 201 days. For the period 1980–2010, there was a markedly significant fluctuation in the duration of the growing season and the amount of heat. Combined with the moisture regimen, this is reflected in the varying yields of cereals (wheat) and perennial grasses. The index of aridity of the atmosphere (S) (the ratio between air temperature and precipitation) showed a significant interannual variability. Therefore, 2002 was characterized by an aridity index in May of 3.7, with the amount of heat during the growing season being 2,940  C, and low yields of wheat and perennial grasses: 23 and 15.3 hwt/ha, respectively (Table 2). The highest wheat yield in a single year was in 2008, when the total accumulated air temperature was 3,029  C and the growing season was the longest. The highest wheat yield was observed from 2005 to 2009, with accumulated temperatures from 2,900  C to 3,055  C (Figs. 3 and 4). At the same time, the areas of perennial grasses were reduced due to the high temperatures and high aridity index. Long-term dynamics of crop yields reveal that, with the intense warming from 2000 to 2009, a substantial growth in wheat yields was achieved compared with the previous decade. In contrast, the growth of perennial grasses was abundant in cool and wet years (Figs. 1 and 3). Analysis of hay yields on the floodplain meadows (Romanenkova 2008) also shows that the temperature has a significant cumulative effect. In connection with climate change (Roger and Pielke 2005; Fedoroff et al. 2010; Eckersten et al. 2012; Fedorov and Krasnov 2012) and rising accumulated temperatures in the Kaliningrad region, there is the possibility of introducing thermophile plants (in particular soya), both as rotation elements and as crops used for the expansion of production areas. At the same time, considerable interannual air temperature fluctuations and snowless winters pose a risk for the cultivation of winter crops. In winter 2010, for example, the average January temperature reached 8.10  C, the lowest average in the preceding 20 years, causing a loss of about 70 % of the winter rapeseed crop, which has been actively introduced in the rotation since 2000 and covered about 20 % of arable land in 2009. Page 6 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 3 y = 0.0233x - 0.4084

2.5

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Fig. 5 Deviation from the norm in air temperature in Kaliningrad

Therefore, a prerequisite for increasing the profitability of agriculture in the current climate conditions in the South Baltic area should be conversion to other crops such as perennial legumes and grasses that are resistant to temperature changes. This could increase the duration of the grazing season and reduce the nutrient load of the water by reducing the doses of organic fertilizers required for annual crops. Meanwhile, one can say for certain that the increasing negative impacts of climate change enhance the frequency of extreme and unpredictable situations (Lobell et al. 2011). Official statistics show that the frequency of freak weather (such as heavy cloudbursts accompanied by floods, frequent heavy storms, etc.) has increased in the Kaliningrad region. This of course raises the question of what to do given the effects of climate change. The first approach could be to examine the features of natural resources in the Kaliningrad region taking into consideration the current phenomena of climate change (Chistyakov 1997; Drozdov and Smirnov 2011). The materials for the study are based on data relating to the near-surface air temperature and precipitation in the Kaliningrad station for the period from 1949 to 2010 and the anomalies of temperature and precipitation calculated as deviations from the long-term average for the period from 1961 to 1990, recommended by the World Meteorological Organization as the basis for such calculations. The main air temperature trends in the southeastern Baltic coast are comparable with trends observed in the average temperature of the Northern Hemisphere (temperature rise in the last quarter of the nineteenth century; rapid temperature rise in the last decades of the twentieth century). Globally, there are an increasing number of natural disasters involving hazardous meteorological or, more precisely, hydrometeorological processes (storms, strong winds, very intense rainfall, floods, glaze effects, etc.) as well as rigors of temperature (extremely high temperature values, increasing forest fires, higher incidence of heat waves and droughts, etc.). Linear trends in air temperature reveal a sharp rise in temperature and a rise in its variability from year to year. Climate warming in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century exceeds the rate of increase during the rest of the twentieth century by far (Jacob 2005; Kyslov et al. 2008; Getzlaff et al. 2011). Analysis of changes in annual precipitation values during the study period also reveals a significant positive trend, namely, an average growth rate of 20 mm within 50 years, an additional symptom of global warming. An essential feature is the increase in the amplitude range of precipitation beginning in the late 1970s. Of considerable interest is a large asymmetry in the number of positive and negative deviations of air temperature during the study period: the number of positive deviations is two times

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y = 2.6337x - 87.786 R2 =0.1191

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Fig. 6 Deviation from the norm in precipitation in Kaliningrad

higher than negative deviations. The largest positive deviations, exceeding the value of 1.5  C, were observed in 1975, 1989 (the warmest year of the twentieth century), 1990, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2000, and 2008. The largest negative deviations were observed in 1956 and 1987 (the coldest years). Air temperature anomalies, calculated as deviations from the average for the 1961–1990 period, ranged from 1.5  C to 1.5  C. The highest average annual temperature abnormality of 2.5  C was seen in 1989. In the past decade there have been several record temperatures that had not previously been observed in the history of meteorological observations (Fig. 5). The annual air temperature in 1989, 1998, 2007, and 2008 exceeded the normal values by 9  C. The maximum air temperature was 12.6  C in January and 34.6  C in July 2007. In July 2010 a maximum value of 33.8  C was reached. The average air temperature (the norm), defined for the period 1961–1990 in Kaliningrad, was 7.2  C. However, the last quarter of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century are characterized by a significant increase in the surface air temperature (Fig. 5). For example, the average annual air temperature measured over the decade from 1991 to 2000 increased by 0.9  C compared with an average of 7.8  C in the decade from 1961 to 1970. In 1989, there was a maximum average annual air temperature of +9.7  C. A high average annual temperature exceeding the “norm” by 1.5–2  C was observed in 1990, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2007. This very strong warming is typical for the autumn–winter period; the speed of summer temperatures rising is lower. The beginning of the study period is characterized by negative deviations from the long-term average precipitation level. In the late 1970s there was a change in the rise of precipitation values (Fig. 6). In general, noticeable sharp fluctuations could be observed from year to year for the period of investigation. In 2006, for example, rainfall levels were almost two times lower than in 2007, which was characterized by wet weather during the entire study period with 1,214 mm of precipitation. This can be compared with the rates of deviation in rainfall for the two 30-year intervals, namely, from 1949 to 1979 and from 1980 to 2009. In the first period, especially at the beginning of the period, there were more frequently observed adverse deviations, whereas in the second period there were years in which the rainfall exceeded the normal rate by threefold. The graphs in Figs. 5 and 6 show clearly visible sharp short-period fluctuations that characterize the interannual variability of temperature and precipitation. Seasonal variability of temperature is

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 40.0

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–10.0 –20.0 –30.0 –40.0 months

Fig. 7 Extreme maximum and minimum air temperatures for the period from 1949 to 2011 in Kaliningrad

also quite evident. Comparing the monthly average and the annual air temperature for the two 30-year periods observed, we can record the following fact: the average annual temperature for the last 30 years (1981–2010) is higher by 0.8  C than for the period with normal values (1961–2010). As can be seen, the speed of the trend differs in some months: the most intense warming occurs during the winter and spring months, and the most significant warming is evident for January and February. The average temperature in the last 30 years has increased by 1.7  C to a value of 1.4  C in February. In summer and autumn, the rate of warming is reduced, especially in June, September, and October. In the last 30 years of abnormally warm winter seasons, mild spring temperatures have become more frequent than cold ones in Kaliningrad. As a result, a comprehensive statistical analysis of long-term climate indicators makes it clear that during the study period there were sharp fluctuations in both temperature and precipitation. Variability of extreme temperature indices for the period 1949–2011 is shown in Fig. 7. As can be seen, the maximum amplitude of the oscillations of air temperature is characteristic of the winter months. In January, the lowest temperature was observed in 1956 (32.5  C) and the highest in 2007 (12.7  C); the range of variation was 45.2  C. During the summer, the oscillation amplitude of extreme values of air temperature is significantly reduced and is about 32  C. It is noticeable that the lowest temperature in all seasons of the year can be observed until 2000, whereas the highest temperature could be fixed to three times, namely, in January 2007, April 2000, and December 2006. In recent decades, there have been some maximum values that had not occurred in the previous history of the observations, with comparable positive annual temperature anomalies. In Kaliningrad, the mean annual air temperature amounted to 9.2  C in 1989 and 9.3  C in 1998. The growth of weather variability: • The number of severe weather events and associated risks: strong winds, very heavy rainfall, and rising of water levels in the rivers above alarming marks. • Since most precipitation falls as rain rather than as snow and water seeps faster, the soil absorbs less moisture than with a melting snow cover. This has a negative effect on the moisture balance, leading to more erosional activity. • In western Russia, dramatically higher river flow rates are expected up to 2015. This will lead to lower soil freezing due to a rise of groundwater levels and poor drainage capacity.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 3 Regional specificity of the morbidity of tick-borne encephalitis and Lyme disease during the period from 1999 to 2008

Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Annual mean

Morbidity (per 100,000 population) Tick-borne encephalitis Kaliningrad region Karelia region 1.3 4.4 1.2 5.6 1.2 6 1.2 7.2 3.8 15.2 1.3 11.6 1 9.2 0.9 7.6 0.8 8.8 0.8 – 1.4 8.4

Belarus 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.5

Lyme disease Kaliningrad region 8.2 19.9 7.8 7.2 22.7 13.3 13.2 20.9 20.8 12.5 14.6

Belarus 1 1.9 1.8 1.8 5.1 5.2 5.4 9.1 6.7 6.6 4.5

As the region of Kaliningrad is situated in the west wind belt, westerly, southwesterly, and southerly winds predominate in various meteorological manifestations with diverse effects. Above all, in autumn and winter intense low-pressure systems can sweep across the Baltic Sea in the form of heavy storms causing floods and other damages. Environmentally negative impacts can also occur such as transboundary contamination (sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, heavy metals, etc.). The most frequently measured speeds during storms are 12.5–15.2 m/s (52.9 %) and 15.3–18.2 m/s (21.4 %). Winds with a speed of more than 8 m/s occur in 13 % of all cases. This is a problem as unfavorable conditions for treating agricultural crops with pesticides occur.

Analysis of the Impacts of Climate Change In connection with climate change, there are also negative effects affecting human and animal health. For example, infections such as Lyme borreliosis (Lyme disease) that have been by no means unusual in the Kaliningrad region spread more and more like an epidemic. Thus, the increase of ticks creates a critical situation when cattle are kept in outdoor husbandry systems in the Kaliningrad region. Human infection may occur through tick bites as well as by drinking the milk of infected animals. Table 3 provides an overview of tick-borne morbidity. Long-term analysis of natural focal infections of the population (1999–2008) detects different trends in the number of victims in some regions of Russia and the world, including the Kaliningrad region (Barinova and Kochanowskaja 2011). Also, the morbidity of tick-borne encephalitis in the Kaliningrad region for the period under review decreased from 1.3 per 100,000 population in 1999 to 0.8 in 2008. A similar trend is observed in Karelia. In Belarus, the spread of tick-borne encephalitis as well as Lyme disease also has a tendency to increase (Table 3). This may be associated with an increase in winter air temperatures and, at the same time, an increased frequency of extreme weather conditions. Growth in the number of insect pests increased pesticide use. A longterm analysis of natural focal infections among the population provides evidence that there is a connection between the high frequency of morbidity, particularly in encephalitis, and high temperatures. Thus, in 2003 and in 2010, the morbidity values were clearly higher than in previous years,

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 4 Adaptation of land use management to climate change in the Kaliningrad region Type of nature management Challenge Adaptation Agricultural Increased frequency and variability from year to year of severe Restore drainage weather events (storms, frosts, droughts, storms) The danger of erosion processes Regulation of the soil water regimen (including bilateral) on the polder lands Loss of humus, soil salinity increased Selection of thermophile crops Increased risk of infectious and parasitic diseases of plants and Increase the area of meadows animals Forestry The loss of forests Increase forest area up to 25–30 % with the introduction of broad-leaved Water logging, changes in groundwater levels trees Growth pathology of tree crops Expansion of distribution ranges of tick-borne encephalitis

Pathology monitoring

and it was that summer in which the temperatures were the highest measured since the beginning of weather records. Growth in the number of insect pests and diseases of plants depends on the following factors: • Measures need to be improved to keep pests in the soil during the winter. • High humidity, high frequency of surface inversions, weakening of the wind in the second half of the growing season, and air stagnation cause the growth of fungal diseases of plants. • Cultivation is sensitive to weather variability in monocultures (corn, rape).

New Uncertainties and Needs In the context of climate warming, a relatively large impact is expected on the productivity and structure of agroecosystems; forest biotic communities; the quality of agricultural, pastoral, and forest land; the spread of diseases; and the survival of some wild plants, domestic animals, and cultivated plants. For the Kaliningrad region, one has to face up to major challenges relating to climate change and measures that are suited to mitigate at least the most dangerous effects need to be proposed (Table 4). The structure of rural landscapes has changed when viewed in the context of natural and agricultural factors that, unfortunately, have not necessarily had desirable effects. The invisible chemical changes in connection with pesticide use, the continuing urbanization process, and even the military activities are the negative and yet dramatic consequences. Total forest coverage is now no more than 17–18 %. Deforestation is probably the biggest environmental problem for the Kaliningrad region. However, to stop cutting the forests down is nearly impossible without the political will of regional and federal decision makers. Another environmentally harmful example is the planting of crops without using rotation to avoid soil degradation. Thus, rapeseed is sowed over several years. The abovementioned negative processes occur because of a lack of collaboration for various reasons. Being ready to start dialogue with different groups of society is a prerequisite to generate an institutional and social consensus to preserve the natural foundations for both humans and animals.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Pollinator’s Drama The almost complete anthropogenic transformation of nature in the Kaliningrad region – like in most countries of the Baltic region (Palang and Ryden 2003) – has resulted in only a small remnant (not more than 18 % nowadays) of an originally widespread forest area, thus creating one of the major problems in agriculture and forestry, namely, a small number of pollinators, in particular bees. In addition, the increase in precipitation and intraday fluctuations in temperature during the winter also cause a decrease in the bee population (Gaeva and Barinova 2013). Documentary sources in East Prussia mention beekeepers for the first time in 1367. From this year on, free hunting, fishing, and beekeeping were allowed. Everything that was found in the forests or that could be caught in the rivers was allowed to be sold, but the authorities set stringent prices for honey. Furthermore, each beekeeper could possess part of the forest. On the trunk of a tree inhabited by bees, the beekeeper (or “bee hunter”) marked a sign by cutting a square, cross, crescent, etc. As the parts of the forest with good honey yield were mostly to be found on the edges, within clearings, and burnt areas, beekeepers often set fire to the young forest. Beforehand, the hives were gathered up and put in a suitable place with a ditch dug around it. Later, in the fifteenth century, due to frequent uncontrolled fires, a law prohibited forest burning after 8 April, when the dry season began. From the mid-fifteenth century onward, anyone who lived in the forests of Prussia had to obey the laws and pay taxes – apiaries in the gardens around the houses, however, were exempt from taxation and, thus, from that time on, hives were moved from the forests into the villages. The “rules for bee hunters” stipulated penalties for those persons who damaged hives and who failed to act in case of fire. By law, beekeepers had to keep forest areas in order, and in case they did not know how to cut down or burn wood in their territory, they had to repair any possible damage. In the middle of the nineteenth century, there was quite high productivity in beekeeping in East Prussia. In 1773, in the area around Schlohauer, a beekeeper was given 507 thalers for the production of honey in comparison with 14 thalers given as profit from the sale of timber harvested in the same piece of forest. However, as early as the nineteenth century, a decline of beekeeping took place because of the war in 1812 and adverse weather conditions in later years (cold winters in 1824/1825, 1844/1845, and 1848/1849). Moreover, in the middle of the nineteenth century, active deforestation began. All trees with hollows were allowed to be cut down. Yet, according to estimates, at the end of the nineteenth century, one single hive yielded 13–20 kg of honey per year. Over the 48 years from 1864 to 1912, the number of bee colonies in East Prussia increased from 85,168 to 186,644. The distribution of bee colonies in East Prussia (with distribution in the Kaliningrad region after 1945 in brackets) was as follows: in 1907, 4.3 beehives existed on 1 km2 (5.9 beehives on 1 km2 of farmland), and in 2010, 5.9 beehives existed on 1 km2 (2.5 on 1 km2). In 1938, there were 244,024 beehives in the whole of Prussia and 96,757 in East Prussia (in 1943, there were 88,000 bee colonies); the average productivity of bee colonies was 30 kg of gross honey and up to 10–15 kg of salable honey (Hansen 1916; Bloech 1932). During the Second World War, honey production almost came to a stop, but in the first years after the war, in the newly established collective farms, specialists began to restore beekeeping. Before the Second World War, the European dark forest bee (Apis mellifera mellifera) was prevalent. This bee species was well adapted to the cold and wet climate: their natural habitat extended from the tundra to the steppes. In the postwar period, a new bee species, the gray Mountain Caucasian bee Apis m. caucasica, was introduced, and the Carpathian bee Apis m. carpatica, bred in Maykop, was imported to the Kaliningrad region. These breeds of bees did not tolerate long winter Page 12 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 1.8 1.6 1.4

kg/ha

1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1996

1997

1999

2000

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

year

Fig. 8 Pesticide use on arable land in the Kaliningrad region (kg/hа)

periods (over 4 months) or high humidity, and crossbreeds with local bees were often susceptible to infectious diseases and proved unproductive. Uncontrolled importation of unadapted species of bees to the Kaliningrad region led to the loss of local bee populations, which were more adapted to the habitat, especially to the cool climate. Finally, 50 or 60 years later, more than 5,000 bee colonies were killed through fungal infections and the first reports of the tick-borne disease varroa appeared. In the 1990s, beekeeping in the Kaliningrad region fell into decay. Apiaries were destroyed or subdivided among private owners. According to the National Agricultural Census held in 2006, the number of bee colonies totaled 14,000 in the Kaliningrad region, but by 2008 there were only 6,588 registered bee colonies left. According to our data, approximately 20,000 beehives show no more than an average productivity of 15–20 kg of honey per family. Thus, beekeeping can be classified as an informal sector in agriculture. A significant problem lies in the fact that there is a lack of annual records of bee colonies, especially of the morbidity of bees and their intoxication by pesticides in different areas of the Kaliningrad region. The increase in the use of high doses of pesticides (Fig. 8) is a threat to wild pollinators (wild bees, bumblebees) and to populations of honeybees (Apis mellifera) in agro-geosystems. In order to control pests, farmers now use registered insecticides that are toxic to bees from the class of neonicotinoids. According to environmental restrictions on the use of this kind of substance, regulations on temperature and spatial isolation within 5 km of the honeybee (Apis mellifera L.) have been established, but solitary bees are not covered (Dixon 2003; Tyliniakis 2013; Burke et al. 2013). Evidence of a negative impact from the use of neonicotinoids on entomophilous crops has been found. Processing of wheat crops in a farm leads to the death of solitary bees and to a lack of pollinators, even in neighboring farms, and to a ten times higher reduction of yields of sunflower and alfalfa (Artohin et al. 2013). Under such conditions, controlled pollination of cultures is only possible with the help of honeybees. Modern beekeeping is an agricultural branch, engaged in breeding honeybees for beeswax and other bee products as well as for the pollination of crops in order to increase their productivity. The main challenge for beekeeping is based on its environmental and economic efficiency for specific regions. As the demand for environmentally friendly products is still high, beekeeping requires suitable regions to be found for honey production, as well as exploring the possibility of combining

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

crops, livestock, and beekeeping in the same area without any of these inflicting damage on any of the others.

Modeling of Climate-Dependent Events in Agriculture Mathematical models and system analysis of data play a more and more decisive role in the environmental sciences against the background of regional climate change and its consequences for agricultural development. Methods of mathematical simulation describing the Pregel river basin (the main drainage basin in the Kaliningrad region) were presented as a balance system of differential equations where a variety of variables relating to the different components of a climate system such as temperature and precipitation and elements of vegetation such as forested area and cultural phytomass, soil humus, etc. (Zotov 1997) are put in. Retrospective experiments were conducted using data from the years 1960 to 1989 (showed the sufficient exactness). Scenarios in a model with climate warming [average annual temperature (T) = 9  C] show a significant increase in the forest and agricultural phytomass (10–15 %) with the level of underground water going down. In scenarios with a colder climate (T = 5  C), the variable quantities showed the opposite trends. By generating development models we have the possibility to calculate the quantitative character of changes in agroecosystems. So, for a change in forest phytomass, humus, and nitrogen content in the soil dependent on climate change, more than 100 years will be needed, and for the regeneration of soil humus, more than 1,000 years will be needed, whereas for 1-year crop phytomass, production under new climatic conditions only 1 year of data will be required. Nitrogen content in river water reacts to climate change (increase of precipitation) in a similarly sudden rapid way (i.e., a sudden leap). The use of mineral fertilizers is the main cause of water nitrogen pollution. If we increase the normal level of fertilizers by two to four times, the nitrogen content in underground water grows at a rate of between 1.3 and 1.5 times and in river water at a rate of between 2.0 and 2.5 compared to the norm. It is evident that the eutrophication of Baltic coastal bays and lagoons will continue without changes in the management of agriculture. In scenarios with an increasing forested area (and other equal conditions), the content of nitrogen in waters is decreased, whereas the level of underground water grows in such a negative way that the Kaliningrad region registers a historical excess of moisture. Increased drainage of farmland is leading to a decrease in the groundwater level, but the surface nitrogen flow is growing. So, in order to reduce the complex negative environmental consequences, it is necessary to use the right complex method for modeling climate-dependent parameters. For example, a scenario with a four- or fivefold increase in the application of organic and mineral (nitrogen) fertilizers compared to the former level, an increase in land drainage by 10 %, and an increase in woodland to a level 1.5 times higher than before ended with the best results, namely, an increase of cultural phytomass production and soil fertility on the one hand and a decrease in the nitrogen content of surface water and in the groundwater level on the other hand. The most significant aspect of balanced land use in agriculture is the creation of natural space differentiation in accordance with environmental (including meso-climatic) conditions. To achieve this, it is important to consider the landscape–basin approach, in which the area model is described in relation to elementary landscape–basin systems. The model also has to include the space changes in local climate caused by rivers, lakes, the coastal zone, etc. (Orlenok et al. 2000).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

To define the causes of excessive moistening of sandy soil in the Curonian Spit, the “meteofactorlevel regime of subterranean waters” model was used. The following parameters play a significant role: the coefficient of filtration, the average viscosity of underground waters, the duration of filtration of the soil horizon, the initial level of underground water, and the position of these levels on the borders between the sea and the lagoon. On the basis of the model calculation, there was a fixed time for water coming to the surface on the low parts of the sand spit in connection with the intensity of filtration and its position to the earth surface. Such a forecast can help to organize protection against erosion and destruction of the spit by the outcropping of subterranean waters in a timely fashion (Korneevets 1998). These scenarios are based on the knowledge of modern natural processes and the mechanisms of their effects that are possible under the current system of wildlife management in the Kaliningrad region. For example, in the next 15 years, along with a continued growth of the mean annual air temperature and annual precipitation, the waterlogged area of the farmland could grow by 15–20 %. On the flat plains with poorly drained soil, the moraine ridge on upland plains along with the current trend of deforestation will exacerbate the risk of erosion, the rise of groundwater levels, and the flooding of low landforms. Adverse climate conditions, especially in the form of an increase of precipitation in the South Baltic area as described in the REMO is regional climate model with horisontal resolution 50 50 km scenario for the period between 2020 and 2029, could lead to an expected increase by 15–20 % compared with the norm of 800 m. According to the model that HIRHAM projected for the South Baltic, winter temperatures will range between 4  C and 5  C during the period from 2071 to 2100. In the Gwardejsk District (Kaliningrad region), the area of waterlogging and flooding of arable land had increased by 43 %, hayfields by up to 46 %, and pastures by up to 40 % by 2008. If current trends continue for 15 years from 2008, i.e., by 2023, the flooded area and waterlogged arable land will increase by up to 47 % (corresponding to 10,800 ha), hayfields by up to 48 % (4,625 ha), and pastures by up to 48 % (6,620 ha). It should be noted that there is a current increase in flooded agricultural land, especially arable land. The results of a survey of overgrown farmland show that by 2009, the Kaliningrad region had undergone an increase of scrubby parts of arable land by 5.2 %, of grasslands by 15.8 %, and of pastures by 17.6 %.

Geoinformational Databases: A New Strategy in Agricultural Management A geoinformational database is a necessary aspect of regional environmental management. It is an ecological cartography and regionalization, modeling and prognosis. The cartography may be complex and branch out in different directions and reflects spatial temporal coherence (maps and atlases characterize the areas and estimate the state and reproduction of bioresources). The relationship between the climate, biosphere, and environment and the increasing adverse human influence on the ecosystem require a systematic and methodical approach. It is necessary to estimate the conditions of natural and economic activities and their effects. To provide the composition and quality of geoinformation, models and expert values are needed to build a system that is best adapted to changing environmental conditions.

Conclusion With the current state of knowledge, we cannot exhaustively estimate the negative impacts of climate change from a quantitative and qualitative point of view; however, we can assume some Page 15 of 17

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of the possible consequences. Regarding the Kaliningrad region, we should consider the following factors of climate change: • • • • •

An increase in the average air temperature Changes in the amount and patterns of precipitation A shift of agroclimatic zones to the north An increased atmospheric aridity An increased frequency of severe weather events (storms, hail, floods) occurring more or less frequently over the years

The rational use of agricultural landscapes under conditions of climate warming is a combination of arable land with seminatural areas (Tishkov 2006). The use of waterlogged and flooded areas as meadows will reduce the leaching of the soil. Reducing the crops that are sensitive to fluctuations in temperature and humidity and that require multiple treatments with pesticides will help to stabilize the size of pollinator populations.

References Artohin KS, Ignatova PK et al (2013) Changes in fauna of Hymenoptera insects of the Rostov area and forecast of environmental effects. Living Bio-inert Syst 2:1–10 Barinova GM, Kochanowskaja MI (2011) Climate change and the dynamics of the natural focal disease of the population in the Kaliningrad region. Bull Baltic Fed Univ I Kant Nat Sci 7:36–44 Barinova G, Koroleva Y, Krasnov E (2012) Indicative modeling and spatial evaluation of air pollution risk. In: Kremers H (ed) Risk models and applications. CODATA, Berlin Bloech H (1932) Ostpreussens. Landwirtschaft, Koenigsberg Burke L et al (2013) Plant-pollinator interaction over 120 years: loss of species, co-occurrence, and function. Science 339:161–162 Chistyakov V (1997) Solar cycles and climate fluctuations. Dalnauka, Vladivostok Deutsche Wetter Dienst http://www.dwd.de Dixon K (2003) Pollination and restoration. Science 325:571–572 Drozdov VV, Smirnov NP (2011) Long-term dynamics of climate and hydrological conditions in the Baltic Sea and her causes. Meteorol Hydrol 5:77–87 Eckersten H, Andersson L, Holstein F et al (2012) An evaluation of climate change effects on crop production. In: Jakobsson C (ed) Ecosystem health and sustainable agriculture, vol 1. Sustainable Agriculture, Uppsala Fedoroff NV et al (2010) Radically rethinking agriculture for the 21st century. Science 327:833–834 Fedorov G, Krasnov E (2012) Agriculture in Kaliningrad. In: Jakobsson C (ed) Ecosystem health and sustainable agriculture, vol 1. Sustainable Agriculture, Uppsala Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring http://meteo.ru Frolov AV, Strashnaja AP (2011) About the drought of 2010 and its impact on crop yields. In: Analysis of abnormal weather conditions on the territory of Russia in the summer of 2010: Sun. Reports GU “Hydrometeorological Center of Russia”, Moscow Gaeva D, Barinova G (2013) The geoecological conditions of apiculture product manufacturing in the Kaliningrad region. Vestn Immanuel Kant Baltic Fed Univ Russ 1:13–20 Getzlaff K, Lehman A et al (2011) The response of the general circulation of the Baltic Sea to climate variability. BALTEX Newsl 14:13–16 Page 16 of 17

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Hansen F (1916) Die Landwirtschaft in Ostpreussen, Jena Jacob D (2005) A short note on the role of the atmospheric circulations apart of the hydrological cycle. BALTEX Phase I, 1993–2003 State of the Art Report 31:8–14 Korneevets LV (1998) Hydrogeological conditions and the main features of the groundwater regime of the Curonian Spit. In: The study and conservation of the Curonian Spit, Kaliningrad Kyslov AVet al (2008) Forecast of climatic resource supply in the East European Plain under climate warming in the XXI century, Moscow Lobell D et al (2011) Climate trends and global crop production since 1980. Science 333:616–620 Orlenok V, Krasnov E, Barinova G (2000) Geoecological base on nature management in the Baltic Sea coastal zone. Geography and Environment, Moscow Palang H, Ryden L (2003) Society and landscape: space intrusion and habitat destruction. In: Lars Rydén, Pawel Migula,Magnus Andersson (ed). Environmental science. The Baltic University Press, Uppsala Roger A, Pielke S (2005) Land use and climate change. Science 310:1625–1626 Romanenkova SA (2008) Environmental aspects of the yields formation water meadows of the river Deima. Successes of agriculture: interuniversity collection of scientific papers KSTU, Kaliningrad Tishkov A (2006) Ecosystems services of Russia in the assessments of “Millennium Goals” and in the system of indicators of its sustainable development. In: Environmental management and sustainable development. World ecosystems and Problems of Russia, Moscow Tyliniakis J (2013) The global plight of pollinators. Science 339:1532–1533 Zotov S (1997) Modeling adaptation of basin-landscape systems to climate change and economic activity. Adaptive strategies of nature (ecological and geographical aspects), Kaliningrad

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An Analytical Framework for Investigating Complex Institutions in Climate Change Adaptation: The Institutional Environment Matrix Sining C. Cuevas*, Ann Peterson and Tiffany Morrison School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Management, The University of Queensland, St. Lucia, Australia

Abstract This chapter introduces the institutional environment matrix (IEM), a diagnostic and planning framework designed to analyze complex institutional environments and determine the institutional fit of climate change adaptation responses. The framework argues that the institutional environment is comprised of rules, social structures, and organizations. It establishes the vital role of institutional arrangements in characterizing the functions and functional interdependencies of institutions. The IEM framework has a dual layer design that allows complex institutional relationships to be examined across scales. The institutional environment layer is a comprehensive inventory of institutions that outlines institutional complexities. The institutional matrix layer is the system of institutional arrangements that determines the functional interdependencies of institutions. The matrix explores institutional interplay in relation to several general institutional functions: reducing uncertainty, connecting individuals to society, fostering adaptive capacity, and mobilizing resource utilization. By providing a structure to examine complex institutional relationships, the IEM is a significant innovation for assessing the institutional fit of and interplay between existing and planned climate change adaptation responses. This framework may also be used as an analytical tool in adaptation planning and evaluation.

Keywords Institutions; Institutional environment; Climate change adaptation; Analytical framework

Introduction Urban and rural systems are increasingly subject to complex and uncertain problems such as climate change, biodiversity loss, land-use conflict, pandemic disease, and rapid market fluctuations. These problems challenge the abilities of societies to manage change in traditional ways. Subjective perceptions, cross-sectoral misunderstandings, and technological contingencies only increase this challenge (Gunderson and Holling 2002; Crowder et al. 2006). Institutions play a critical role in ensuring successful adaptation to rapid and unpredictable change yet are one of the least examined and ambiguous aspects of climate change adaptation (O’Riordan and Jordan 1999; Adger 2000; Adger et al. 2005a, b). Following the works of North (1990) and Ostrom (1990), several facets of institutions have been examined in the literature (Young 2002; Sabatier 2007; Oberth€ ur and Stokke 2011). Recently, of particular interest to scholars are the linkages between institutions, climate change, and adaptation *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

with studies addressing the effects of institutional barriers and constraints on adaptation (Inderberg and Eikeland 2009), the fundamental functions of institutions in facilitating climate change adaptation (Rodima-Taylor 2012), and the institutional requirements for adaptation (Adger et al. 2005a). Yet, despite these works, the research area is still in its infancy, as evidenced by a number of competing frameworks. To analyze these institutional concerns more effectively, scholars have developed a variety of frameworks to examine the role of institutions in the context of climate change adaptation. These analytical frameworks are differentiated by how they define institutions – in essence, whether they consider institutions as rules, social patterns of behaviors, or organizations. In other words, the types of analysis that can be performed using these frameworks are bound by the frameworks’ institutional perceptions. For example, one framework that focuses on organizational institutions examines the institutional linkages between and among public, private, and civil society institutions and the significance of institutional partnerships in enabling adaptation. It provides a tool to analyze organizational partnerships and the impacts of these associations on the access of vulnerable social groups to resources (Agrawal 2008). Another framework that defines institutions in terms of rules, customs, and norms concentrates on the intrinsic characteristics of institutions in influencing the behaviors of individuals and in fostering collective action. Essentially, this framework deals with understanding and assessing the ability of institutions to raise the adaptive capacity of society (Gupta et al. 2010). This raises two significant issues. First is the disharmony in defining institutions in the context of climate change. Research has focused on institutions as rules and social structures (O’Riordan and Jordan 1999; Eriksen and Selboe 2012) and also as organizations (Agrawal et al. 2008; Vallejo 2011). Therefore, as climate change research advances, there is a discrepancy on how the concept of institutions is founded. Second is the inability of the frameworks to simultaneously analyze the various facets of institutions. If these gaps are not addressed, it can lead to a divergence in institutional concepts and the direction of research. To address the first concern, a conceptual framework was developed that defines institutions as a triad of rules, social structures, and organizations in the context of climate change adaptation. Thus, institutions are the commonly known and acknowledged rules, social structures, and organizations founded on common belief systems that transform individual acts and expectations into collective actions; convert personal values into social norms and shared beliefs; and define the formal and informal behavioral systems of human existence. As an extension of this endeavor, this chapter develops an analytical framework that helps to examine the complexity of the triad institutions in climate change adaptation responses. Institutional interventions formulated and implemented to adapt to climate change bring either conflict or harmony into existing institutions and arrangements (Young 2002; Nilsson et al. 2012). A framework that can be utilized to examine the relationships between and among rule-based, social structure-based, and organizational institutions is useful in planning for and evaluating the effects of these institutional changes. Moreover, the efficiency and success of adaptation responses rest on how they fit in the institutional environment and institutional arrangements that are in place (Theesfeld et al. 2010). Every case has a unique institutional environment or array of institutions that influence and affect climate change adaptation behaviors and decisions. Therefore, the institutional fit of the adaptation measures, i.e., whether adaptive institutional interventions are synchronized or in harmony with the existing institutions, is vital to effectively implement an adaptation response. The more fitting the adaptive institutions are with the other institutions in the system, the better each institution performs and, thus, the more relevant each one becomes.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Definition of key terms Term Rule-based institutions

Social structure-based institutions

Organizational institutions

Institutional arrangements Institutional fit Institutional interplay Functional interdependencies Institutional environment (IE) Institutional matrix (IM) Institutional environment matrix (IEM) framework

Definition Constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions and determine decisions, actions, information, payoffs, and actors in various conditions and situations (North 1990; Ostrom 1990) Self-sustaining, salient patterns of social interactions (Aoki 2007) that form individual and social expectations, relations, conduct, interactions, and behavior (Agrawal 2008) Structures of power that form the social, economic, legal, and political organizations of a society (O’Riordan and Jordan 1999; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005) Structures of the rules that govern human decisions (Tang 1991) or the specific guidelines designed to facilitate social interactions (Klein 2000) State where the adaptive institutional interventions are synchronized or in harmony with the existing triad of institutions – rules, social structures, and organizations Interactions and reactions between and among institutions that build institutional linkages, relationships, and interdependencies Relationships built resulting from the interactions among the arrangements that allow institutions to perform their functions Comprehensive inventory of the differing institutions – rules, social structures, and organizations – that may influence adaptation responses System of institutional arrangements that determines the functional interdependencies of institutions A planning and diagnostic framework designed to analyze institutional environments and determine the institutional fit of climate change adaptation responses

Sources: North (1990), Ostrom (1990), Tang (1991), O’Riordan and Jordan (1999), Klein (2000), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Aoki (2007), and Agrawal (2008)

This chapter is divided into two major parts. The first establishes the theoretical foundations of the framework by presenting the concept of institutions as rules, social structures, and organizations in the context of climate change adaptation (Institutions in Climate Change Adaptation Planning); examining the concepts of institutional arrangements (Institutional Analysis and Institutional Arrangements); and classifying institutional functions (Institutional Functions). The second part synthesizes these concepts (Institutional Environment Matrix Framework) to form a framework termed as the institutional environment matrix (IEM). In developing the IEM, this paper adopts the definitions established by other authors and develops some new definitions befitting the context in which they are used (Table 1).

Institutions in Climate Change Adaptation Planning There are varying notions of what constitutes an institution. Institutions are rules, procedures, conventions, and protocols in rational choice, economics, and game theory; moral templates, cognitive scripts, and frames of meaning in sociology and anthropology; and organizations in comparative politics and state theory (North 1990; Jordan and O’Riordan 1997; O’Riordan and Jordan 1999; Markvart 2009). In climate change adaptation, institutions should have a synthesis of definition that has crossdisciplinary relevance. Therefore, institutions are the commonly known and acknowledged rules, Page 3 of 22

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Fig. 1 A conceptual framework for institutions in the context of climate change adaptation (Source: Authors)

social structures, and organizations founded on common belief systems that transform individual acts and expectations into collective actions; convert personal values into social norms and shared beliefs; and define the formal and informal behavioral systems of human existence. Hence, rules, social structures, and organizations are all institutions. The core relationships among the three forms of institutions are illustrated in the Venn diagram (Fig. 1). Rules, social structures, and organizations are linked through a system of beliefs that allow them to exist and continue to persist as institutions. The beliefs associated with rules and organizations are significant components shaping the self-enforcing expectations, which consequently affect behavior and motivate individual actions (Greif and Kingston 2011). The belief system itself is a part of what constitutes social structure-based institutions (Nelson and Sampat 2001; Nelson and Nelson 2002). Rule-based and social structure-based institutions are further linked through informal rules. This linkage is shown in the overlap between the spheres representing rule-based and social structurebased institutions (Fig. 1). Together with formal rules, informal rules such as practices, norms, and traditions comprise part of the rule-based institutions. Formal rules define the hierarchical structure, decision-making powers, contracts, and property rights allocation in the political and economic systems (Pejovich 1995). Meanwhile, informal rules determine individual interactions and are engraved in society’s culture and heritage (North 1990; Hasan 2000; Hodgson 2006). These same social patterns of behaviors are the elements that form social structure-based institutions (Nelson and Sampat 2001; Aoki 2007). The conceptual framework considers organizations as an assembly of rules and contracts that operate through some type of relationship among individuals. This perception interlaces organizations – perceived as a “collection of rules” (March et al. 2011, p. 239) – with the rulebased institutions. Organizations rely on the norms and patterns of behaviors to be implemented (Hodgson 2006), which tie organizations to the social structure-based institutions.

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The formal and informal structures of organizational institutions are rationalized by the formal rules and social customs, values, and beliefs, respectively (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Shafritz et al. 2005). Formal rules are the written and legally sanctioned rules, whereas informal rules are represented by the unwritten social patterns of interactions and behaviors (Nabli and Nugent 1989). Formal rules are usually applied, managed, observed, and monitored by formal political, legal, and government institutions. Conversely, informal institutions fall under the private realm (Williamson 2009). Formal structures have a special relationship with informal rules (illustrated by the broken arrow linking the two factors) (Fig. 1). Formal organizations are created and legitimized by formal rules, whereas the relationships among the members of formal organizations are typically governed by informal rules. Hence, “in every formal organization, there arise informal organizations” (Shafritz et al. 2005, p. 205), thereby forming an additional linkage between formal and informal organizations (indicated by the broken arrow between the two entities). This relationship denotes that informal organizations do not directly affect the structure, composition, or creation of formal organizations. However, informal organizations are defined as collective behaviors (in the form of organized groups of people) that influence the choices and decisions of the formal organizations’ members. Meanwhile, formal organizations directly affect informal organizations through the formal rules they implement or the actions they perform (solid arrow in Fig. 1). In essence, “the root of informal systems are imbedded in the formal organization itself and nurtured by the very formality of its arrangements” (Shafritz et al. 2005, p. 205). For example, a formal organization that funds the activities of an informal organization may influence the latter to become formal itself, especially if formality is a requirement to gain further financial assistance. Alternatively, the funds provided may have allowed the informal organization to expand its operations, with the transition to a formal structure being essential to continue these new activities. This unified definition of institutions is vital in analyzing linkages among climate-adaptive institutions. Climate change impacts include extensive aspects of human existence (i.e., social, economic, political, ecological, and environmental). Hence an amalgam of ideas from various disciplines befits the concept of institution in the climate change adaptation context. This synthesized definition should be further investigated, particularly in relation to how rules, social structures, and organizational institutions function together in systems where adaptation responses are applied.

Institutional Analysis and Institutional Arrangements Institutional arrangements are critical to address the climate change challenge as adaptation “never occurs in an institutional vacuum” (Agrawal et al. 2008, p. 2). The success of adaptation practices rests on specific institutional arrangements, such as well-defined property rights that address resource access and risk exposure (Agrawal 2008). For example, building a seawall would not depend only on the physical construction of the structure itself, the costs associated with it, or the science that projects the rate of sea level rise. It also would be affected by the rules governing property (Caldwell and Segall 2007), including the agreements on the allowable height, thickness, and length of the structure; the social norms of the communities affected by the predicted sea level rise and storm surge; and the rights of private property owners. Therefore, developing suitable adaptation responses entails institutional arrangements that enable these measures to be implemented (Rodima-Taylor 2012, p. 12).

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Arrangements in Rule-Based and Social Structure-Based Institutions Institutional analysis assumes that institutional change will affect some areas of reality that already are exposed to existing institutions. Therefore, the environment where the institutional changes (e.g., the creation of new policies or amendments in prevailing regulations) are to be implemented must be understood first before the possible consequences of such changes can be determined (Theesfeld et al. 2010). More importantly, intensive institutional analysis involves understanding the detailed working rules and norms that influence people’s decisions (Ostrom 2011). In rule-based and social structure-based institutions, these rules exist at three levels, namely, operational rules, collective-choice rules, and constitutional-choice rules (Ostrom 1990). Among the three, constitutional-choice rules are the most extensive. They are the basis of all rules – the set which determines who and what (specific rules) are authorized to create the other levels of rules. Next in the hierarchy are the collective-choice rules – the rules created to resolve conflicts, impose decisions, and formulate or transform operational rules (Ostrom 1990). Essentially, they are the rules which underpin operational rules (Tang 1991). Lastly, operational rules are those that directly influence the daily decisions about who oversees the actions of others and how or who takes part in which situation, what information must be given, what are the participants allowed to do, and what rewards or penalties will be designated to various sets of acts and consequences. Operational rules are typically known as policies (Ostrom 1990). Ostrom’s (1990) classic text, “Governing the Commons,” identified specific processes at each level of rules. Operational rules cover appropriation, provision, monitoring, and enforcement; the collective-choice level encompasses policy-making, management, and mediation of policy decisions; and the constitutional level includes formulation, governance, adjudication, and modification of constitutional decisions. Through these rules, institutions are able to affect and influence individual and collective actions. For instance, operational rules, such as those that specify fishing technologies permitted at a particular fishing ground, constrain and predict operational actions. Similarly, collective-choice rules are translated into collective-choice actions and constitutional rules into constitutional-choice actions (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). These levels of rules form the categories of institutions (Feder and Feeny 1991). The constitutional-choice rules comprise the

Fig. 2 Institutions and institutional arrangements (Source: Authors)

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constitutional order, whereas the collective-choice rules and operational rules constitute institutional arrangements (Fig. 2) (Feder and Feeny 1991; Tang 1991). Institutional arrangements are the structure of rules governing human decisions (Tang 1991) or the specific guidelines which facilitate social interactions (Klein 2000). Institutional arrangements are also sets of rules or agreements with a common objective (e.g., contract) that preside over the activities of people. For instance, a group of farmers may enter into an agreement to jointly purchase agricultural inputs or supply products to buyers, thus forming a producer’s organization (Eaton et al. 2008). Institutional arrangements likewise identify an individual in relation to others within the group that she/he belongs to, as well as with those outside the group. For example, in property regimes, the property relation between individuals is defined by the interest of one that is protected by virtue of the right and the duty of others to follow the arrangement (Bromley and Cernea 1989). Institutional arrangements, therefore, guide individual behaviors toward collective actions.

Arrangements in Organizational Institutions In terms of institutional organizations, institutional arrangements involve the system of (organizational) units that plan, support, and/or implement programs, practices, and actions. These arrangements include the linkages between and among organizations at different administrative scales (national, regional, state, provincial, and local) or sectors (economic, political, legal, social). They also represent relationships between government and nongovernment units such as households, communities, and civic organizations (Mattingly 2002). As institutions, organizations are governing structures that motivate collective behaviors and actions (Nelson and Sampat 2001; Williamson 2009), while institutional arrangements are the governance arrangements (Klein 2000; Kooiman 2008). Institutional arrangements oversee the relationships and interactions between, among, and within groups of individuals and, thus, influence the variability of commitments of institutions to governance (Klein 2000; Andersson and Ostrom 2008). These ideas are significant because they link organizational arrangements to the rule-based and social structurebased arrangements (Fig. 2). To illustrate, policy goals depend on the set of dominant actors and ideas in the area and when these policy debates and decision-making occur. Governance arrangements then determine the aims and the general implementation preferences of policies, regulations, and state-society interactions (Howlett 2009). Institutional arrangements allow multiple types of linkages between and among institutions (Heikkila et al. 2011). As guidelines, they are the means by which institutional interplay (i.e., in the form of functional interdependencies or consequences of institutional design and management) is implemented (Young 2002). Accordingly, institutional interplay refers to the interactions among institutions that build institutional relationships (Young 2002). Institutional interaction is determined by the impact of one institution on another, thereby exhibiting causation (Gehring and Oberthur 2009; Oberth€ ur and Stokke 2011). Thus, the effect or interaction will not be observed without a stimulus and a receiver. The stimulus is the source institution (independent variable), and the receiver is the target institution or system (dependent variable) (Gehring and Oberthur 2009). For example, an introduced institutional adaptive measure (the independent variable) will interact with the existing institutions in the system (the dependent variable). Institutional interplay, however, is not one directional. Interplay involves functional interdependencies (Young 2002; Linnér 2006) and thus includes mutual influences or effects. Although the interaction may be triggered by a stimulus, the outcomes or institutional linkages are the result of the institutional integration. Therefore, the interplay exists in the institutional environment comprised of the adaptive institution and the other existing institutions. Page 7 of 22

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Institutional interactions may be complementary, neutral or coexisting, counterproductive, conflicting, or overlapping (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Young 2002; Nilsson et al. 2012). In relation to the triad institutional concept introduced in this chapter, institutional linkages encompass relationships within, between, and among laws, policies, regulations, traditions, norms, practices, government units, civic organizations, and community groups, among others. Institutional linkages must be understood to determine how institutions influence adaptation practices and responses (Agrawal 2008). Consequently, institutional functions in the context of this institutional definition should be determined to understand the institutional fit of adaptation responses.

Institutional Functions Institutions are crucial in promoting successful adaptation to climate change. They influence key decisions in the system, shape the direction of adaptation efforts, frame the adaptive capacities of systems, and enable collective action toward attaining the adaptation goals (Næss et al. 2005; Agrawal et al. 2008; Eriksen and Selboe 2012). Institutions accomplish these tasks through their innate characteristics and the functions they perform. Institutions, as rules, social structures, and organizations serve the same functions, thus they are interdependent. These institutional functions can be classified into four main types, namely, reducing uncertainty (by forming individual and social expectations), connecting individuals to society, fostering adaptive capacity, and mobilizing resource utilization. These functions are performed by all institutional types, thereby, strengthening the interconnections among these institutions (Fig. 3).

Converts personal values into social norms Influences individual acts into collective actions

Coordinates collective behavior

Creates (dis)incentives

CONNECTS INDIVIDUALS TO SOCIETY Delivers external resources

MOBILIZES RESOURCE UTILIZATION

Social structurebased institutions

Rule-based institutions Determines transaction costs

Defines information systems

FOSTERS ADAPTIVE CAPACITY Mediates external interventions

Organizational institutions

REDUCES UNCERTAINTY Identifies Establishes systems inclusions and of power and exclusions authority Creates rights and entitlements

Fig. 3 Functions of institutions (Source: Authors)

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Table 2 Institutional functions by type of institution Types of institutions Features/descriptions Rules Organizations Social Formal Informal structures Formal Informal

Functions of an institution Reduces uncertainty Establishes systems of power ✓ and authority

✓

✓

✓

✓

Actors and actions involved in decision-making; who has the authority and what kind of authority Scope and jurisdiction of actors (who) and actions (what) allowed and constrained Claims, privileges, etc. to resources, i.e., access rights, management rights

Identifies inclusions and exclusions

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Creates rights and entitlements

✓

✓

✓

✕

✕

✓

✓

✓

✓

Social principles, beliefs, and philosophies

✓

✓

✓

✓

Plans and programs for collective efforts and actions

✓

✓

✓

✓

Rewards and penalties; payoffs on actions

Connects individuals to society Converts personal values ✓ into social norms and shared beliefs Influences and transforms ✓ individual acts and expectations into collective actions Creates (dis)incentives for ✓ individual and collective actions Coordinates individual or ✓ collective behaviors Fosters adaptive capacity Defines information systems ✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Management of multiple efforts

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Provision of information (who, what, when, where, and for whom) Access to and management of outside resources (how, what, when, where)

✕

✕

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Mediates external interventions

Mobilizes resource utilization Means of delivery of external ✕ resources Determines transaction costs ✓ of activities and decisions

Actors facilitating access to outside resources (who and for whom) Integration of multiple efforts; internal costs (financial or otherwise)

Sources: North (1990, 1994), Ostrom (1990), O’Riordan and Jordan (1999), Jentoft (2004), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Pfahl (2005), Agrawal (2008), Adkisson (2009), Dorward and Omamo (2009), Kirsten et al. (2009), Gupta et al. (2010), Greif and Kingston (2011), and Berman et al. (2012)

The different characteristics of rules, social structures, and organizations limit their respective capabilities to perform some of these functions. For example, organizations (as a collection of rules and bundles of relationships and interactions) can establish systems of power and authority and identify the people included and excluded from the organization. However, the entirety of

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organizations, including their characteristic as “actors” (Gupta et al. 2010), constrains the organizations’ ability to create rights and entitlements but promotes their capacity to deliver external resources into the system (Table 2).

Reduces Uncertainty Institutions reduce uncertainty by forming individual and collective expectations and by developing a constant structure of social interactions (North 1990; Ostrom 1990; Kirsten et al. 2009; Brousseau et al. 2011). They also provide stability and predictability by establishing the power and authority systems (O’Riordan and Jordan 1999; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Berman et al. 2012) and creating rights and entitlements (Ostrom 1990). Institutions also identify inclusions and exclusions by determining which actions are permissible and the conditions by which to undertake certain activities (North 1990; Ostrom 1990; Klein 2000). By outlining constraints, institutions set up the boundaries for each individual and society as a whole (Ostrom 1990). For example, as an institution, property rights form expectations that the claims to the property would be respected and be abided by all, thereby reducing the uncertainty associated to these claims (Bromley and Cernea 1989).

Connects Individuals to Society Institutions connect individuals to society by giving everyone a shared identity (Jentoft 2004). They convert personal values into social norms and shared beliefs as individuals get emotionally attached and identify with the institutions. This function is specifically attributed to social structures, informal rules, and informal organizations. Thus, institutions become the social standard for understanding and reacting to circumstances, which accordingly become the source of people’s compliance and submission to institutions. As such, institutions influence and transform individual acts and expectations into collective actions (Kirsten et al. 2009). Institutions also create the incentive structure that determines the actions of people as individuals and as a society (Agrawal 2008). Incentive structures incorporate behavioral patterns that encourage actors to change norms and practices, implement the changes, uphold the changes, and stand by the decisions to change (Biermann 2007; Gupta et al. 2010). Thus, incentive mechanisms enable individuals to choose how to respond efficiently to goals and objectives such as those of climate change adaptation (Young 2002). Conversely, institutions also influence behaviors by providing disincentives or penalties to various actions and consequences (Ostrom 1990). Thus, choosing to conform to institutional arrangements becomes attractive. Institutions are also the means by which people coordinate their beliefs, interactions, and activities, thereby affecting how individuals and society make decisions (Pfahl 2005; Adkisson 2009; Greif and Kingston 2011). For instance, the local governing body in the Carteret Island in Papua New Guinea (i.e., the Council of Elders) organized the voluntary relocation of community households to the main island of Bougainville (Rakova 2009). Labeled as one of the first climate change refugees, the Carteret people were forced to leave their homes due to the accelerated sea level rise and the worsening extreme coastal events in the area (Boano et al. 2008). The Council formed a nongovernment organization, named Tulele Peisa, which designed and administered the Carterets Integrated Relocation Programme (CIRP) (Rakova 2009; Boege 2011). In this case, the organizational institutions such as the Council of Elders and the Tulele Peisa were vital in planning and mobilizing the relocation efforts. The community’s norms and traditions authorized the organizations (specifically the Council of Elders) to make decisions for the whole community. Meanwhile, the CIRP guided the people on how to follow through with the community resettlement. Thus,

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the social and cultural norms, organizations, and formal policies all affect how an individual, a household, and/or a community responds to climatic and other stressors (Young 2002).

Fosters Adaptive Capacity Institutions are critical in building the adaptive capacities of systems (Berman et al. 2012; Pradhan et al. 2012). They affect information systems (Dorward and Omamo 2009) and strengthen the ability of vulnerable communities to prepare for the impacts of climate change. They influence the flow of information, the types of studies undertaken, and the interpretations made from the research results (March and Olsen 1996). Moreover, they influence the kind of information to be disseminated (Ostrom 1990) and how this knowledge is disseminated (Agrawal 2008). Institutions are mediators of external interventions that affect how individuals, communities, and social groups utilize assets and resources (Agrawal 2008). Institutions provide leadership, facilitate negotiations, and create networks with other institutions such that external interventions can be systematically filtered, effectively absorbed, accepted, or refused (Agrawal 2008; Rodima-Taylor 2012). For example, a culture of solid community ties suggests an accommodating attitude for external interventions promoting community-based management; but the reverse can be expected if individualism is the norm.

Mobilizes Resource Utilization In mediating external interventions, organizational institutions are the means by which the external resources that facilitate adaptation are delivered, and they accordingly administer access to such resources. These resources may be information, technical inputs, and/or financial support. Institutions “mediate the extent to which climate change affects communities” (Pradhan et al. 2012, p. 9); therefore, they are crucial to the successful implementation of externally facilitated adaptation strategies (Agrawal 2008). Institutions matter because they determine the cost of transacting activities (North 1994) and are comprised of “transaction-cost–reducing arrangements” (Kirsten et al. 2009, p. 43). Transaction costs pertain to the costs incurred from the activities that lessen the risk of transaction failure such as planning, negotiating, creating, monitoring, and enforcement of an agreement. These also include the costs of maladaptation, bargaining, and other operations related to governance and securing the commitment of actors to the contracts (Kirsten et al. 2009). Institutions will fail to reduce transaction costs if the institutional context where the transactions take place is in disarray (Theesfeld et al. 2010). Similarly, a weak institutional environment, specifically in terms of legal frameworks, makes it difficult to enforce contracts and agreements that exchange goods and services and to coordinate activities (Eaton et al. 2008). The norms and practices existing in the system also affect the cost of transactions. For example, if bribery is the custom, then people may bribe corrupt law enforcers to accomplish their goals. Costs would include resources (e.g., money, time, and people) in bribing transactions plus the regular expenses incurred in undertaking such tasks. If the rule of law is upheld, then bribing will be useless and the associated costs will not exist. Likewise, if cheating is the norm, then there will be additional costs to prevent other parties from cheating. The effectiveness and efficiency of actions and activities depend on the institutional environment and arrangements in place. Interdependencies and linkages among institutions occur through these functions. These associations are the product of the interactions between and among institutional arrangements (Young 2002). In this sense, functional interdependencies can be defined as the relationships between institutions resulting from the interactions among arrangements that allow institutions to perform Page 11 of 22

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their functions. These linkages are explored in the IEM framework that analyzes the institutional environment in adaptation responses.

Institutional Environment Matrix Framework The proposed framework incorporates two layers, the institutional environment (IE) and institutional matrix (IM) (Fig. 4). The institutional environment focuses on a specific type of system, a particular adaptation goal, or a type of adaptation strategy. It is a comprehensive inventory of the differing institutions – rules, social structures, and organizations – that may influence adaptation responses. This layer assumes that examining the institutional environment in assessing and planning for climate change adaptation responses is a significant feat. For instance, the coastal management and governance arrangements in the East of England showed that there exist: three central government departments, four regional bodies, five statutory agencies, four ad-hoc groupings, seventeen local authorities, and four forums with an interest in coastal planning, but not necessarily working together. . .. five sets of overlapping plans, fourteen designations of coastal sites and landscapes, a mix of

Fig. 4 Institutional environment matrix (IEM) framework (Source: Authors) Page 12 of 22

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management bodies, many organizational cultures, un-coordinated organizational activity at different scales, and overlapping jurisdictions, responsibilities and functions. (Nicholson-Cole and O’Riordan 2009, p. 373)

Analyzing or planning for adaptation responses incorporates an exhaustive assessment of the institutional environment in which these responses have been or will be applied. This is important in institutional analysis because the number of institutions in a given system is directly related to the rate and complexity of the institutional linkages (Young 2002). The institutional matrix (IM) can analyze the interactions among the arrangements. It is defined as the system of institutional arrangements – including operational and collective-choice rules and governance arrangements – that determines the functional interdependencies of institutions. This layer examines the various relationships among the institutions and assumes that institutions affect an adaptation response via the institutional arrangements that enable institutions to perform their functions. The IE and the IM stages are closely linked, such that the IM is dependent on the information provided by the IE. This relationship, however, is one directional. Significant IE analyses can be done even without proceeding to the IM level, but the reverse is not possible. Various institutional interactions, like complementary, neutral, and counterproductive relationships, are realized from the IM layer. Complementary interaction indicates beneficial associations such that institutions perform better because of the creation or existence of the other (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). Conversely, counterproductive interactions result when institutional arrangements either destabilize or weaken one another, thus impeding the ability of institutions to perform their functions effectively. Neutral interaction suggests that institutions just simultaneously exist in the institutional environment without interacting with each other. The institutions neither improve nor worsen each other. Contradicting relationships arise when institutions are mismatched, thereby creating situations in which institutional arrangements are not attuned with each other. This institutional linkage forms tensions and conflicts among institutions and the corresponding elements that function within these institutions (Nicholson-Cole and O’Riordan 2009). Overlapping associations involve disputes in jurisdictions (Davis 2006), especially when institutions have similar mandates (Aggarwal 2005). Institutional overlaps are common and more significant in a high-frequency institutional environment where there is a high density of institutional arrangements operating in a single system (Young 2002). Lastly, redundancy signifies complete duplication of all institutional functions (Fig. 3). All the relationships, except redundancy, may exist in a single or multiple types of institutional functions. Policy 1 may be counterproductive with Policy 2 in establishing systems of power and authority but may be complementary in creating incentives for individual and collective actions. Likewise, there might not be any connection (neutral) between the two on defining information systems on climate change and adaptation. These linkages can be thoroughly examined using the institutional matrix analysis, which is further explained in the succeeding sections.

Institutional Environment (IE) The IE layer (Table 3) is comprised of formal rules (FR), social structures (SS), formal organization (FO), and informal organization (IO). Formal rules represent the written laws, policies, and regulations, whereas social structures are the traditions, norms, and practices affecting social collective behaviors. This framework incorporates informal rules in the social structure-based institutions, following the notion that they are linked. Formal organizations are the groups legitimized by the formal rules, whereas the informal organizations are those sanctioned by informal

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Table 3 Institutional environment framework layout Institutional systems: complex system/ adaptation response

Institutional environment Formal rules Social (FR) structures (SS) FR1 SS1 FR2 SS2 FR3 SS3 FR4

Formal organizations (FO) FO1 FO2 FO3

Informal organizations (IO) IO1 IO2

Source: Authors

rules. The institutions comprising the IE may have been created to address a variety of issues, some of which may not be related to climate change. These rules, social structures, and organizations have particular arrangements that can affect climate change adaptation decisions, hence their inclusion in the IE. Take the case of Carteret climate change refugees.1 The adaptation response – community relocation – involves property institution and property right arrangements, both of which have been existing and working in the systems long before climate change concerns emerged. In this hypothetical case (Table 3), the institutional framework identifies four formal rules (FR1, FR2, FR3, FR4); three social structures (SS1, SS2, SS3); three formal organizations (FO1, FO2, FO3); and two informal organizations (IO1, IO2) that affect the adaptation response. All types of institutions are included in this layer regardless of scale. For example, FR1 may be a national program, FR2 a regional regulation, and FR3 and FR4 local policies. This is possible because the IE layer assumes that the institutions existing in various scales may simultaneously affect (or be affected) by the same adaptation response(s) through their arrangements. These institutional arrangements cut across differing scales, and they structure the relationships and functional interdependencies of institutions. The arrangements associated with each institution are critical in determining the extent of the institution’s influence in the decision-making process (Fig. 5). For instance, the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (EP Act) – an act primarily concerned with environmental pollution in the state of Queensland, Australia – can influence local authorities’ responsibilities and decisions. Though a state law, the EP Act specifies the responsibilities of local governments in notifying administering authorities of violations at the local level (EP Act, Part 8 [2]). (Commonwealth of Australia 1994). Thus, the IE layer is composed of all institutions that may affect climate change adaptation, regardless of the scale at which the institution primarily operates. In contrast, the institutional matrix layer is limited to a single scale analysis – only those institutional arrangements that cover the scale (federal/national, state/regional/territory, provincial/local) being analyzed will be examined. In the previous hypothetical case (Table 3), while FR1 is a national program and FR2 is a regional regulation, only those arrangements affecting the local scale will be included in the matrix if the scale of analysis is local. These notions are further elaborated below.

Institutional Matrix (IM) From the IE, the analysis progresses to the individual institutional arrangements in the institutional matrix (IM). The IM is dependent on the set of information provided by the IE stage, and those institutions identified in the environment are incorporated in the matrix (Table 4). In this hypothetical case, the IM analysis focuses on the local scale.

1

People were forced to leave their homes and resettle elsewhere because of climate change-related events. Page 14 of 22

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Fig. 5 Multilayered institutional linkages (Source: Authors)

The functions are the source of interdependencies among institutions, which are vital elements of the IM layer. Institutional interplay is observed by analyzing the institutional arrangements that shape these functions. With this, the institutional functions compose the row headings, and they are the categories by which the institutional arrangements are organized in the IM cells.

Framework Analyses: Vertical and Horizontal

The framework offers two types of analyses – vertical and horizontal. Vertical analysis (Table 5) shows the influence of individual institutions on the adaptation response by examining each institution’s function. As the hypothetical case has a local scale, only local arrangements will be included in the matrix. The vertical analysis of the formal rules indicates that the national program (FR1) incorporates local arrangements that establish systems of power and authority, identifies inclusions and exclusions, influences and transforms individual acts and expectations into collective actions, coordinates individual or collective behaviors, and defines information systems. The regional regulation (FR2) performs the same tasks in addition to determining transaction costs of activities and decisions. The IM vertical analysis also outlines the dominant institution in the institutional environment. In the example, the local policy FR3 is the most influential among all four formal rules (Table 5). An empty cell signifies that the institution does not perform the associated function at the specific scale in question. However, this does not imply that the institution does not implement the function at all. For example, FR1 may not create rights and entitlements at the local scale but may have such arrangements in either the national or regional scales. This aspect is the major difference between the IE and IM layers. Although cross-scale investigation is possible in the IE, this cannot be done in the IM. Overall, the vertical analysis shows the extent of the institution’s influence on the adaptation response. It also compares its functions across institutions in a specific scale.

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Table 4 Institutional matrix (IM): an institutional framework for adaptation analysis TYPES OF INSTITUTIONS FUNCTIONS OF AN

Formal Rules (FR)

INSTITUTION

Social Structures (SS)

Formal Informal Organizations Organizations (FO) (IO)

FR1 FR2 FR3 FR4 SS1 SS2 SS3FO1 FO2 FO3

IO1

IO2

Reduces uncertainty Establishes systems of power and authority Identifies inclusions and exclusions Creates rights and entitlements Connects individuals to society Converts personal values into social norms and shared beliefs Influence and transforms individual acts and expectations into collective actions Creates (dis)incentives for individual and collective actions Coordinates individual or collective behaviors Fosters adaptive capacity Defines information systems Mediates influence of external interventions Mobilizes resource utilization Means of delivery of external resources Determines transaction costs of activities and decisions

Notes: The function “creates rights and entitlements” does not apply to organizations, while the function “means of delivery of external resources” does not relate to formal rules and social structures. The cells are shaded accordingly Source: Authors

The horizontal analysis is more complicated as it studies the functional interdependencies of institutions and assesses the relationships across various institutions based on their functions. In the hypothetical case (Table 6), the institutional linkages of all 12 institutions are illustrated in relation to the function “establishes systems of power and authority.” The cells in red are negative relationships, specifically counterproductive and contradicting. Conversely, the green cells are positive associations, particularly the complementary type. Neutral and overlapping relationships are white and

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 5 Vertical analysis for formal rules

Functions of an institution Reduces uncertainty Establishes systems of power and authority Identifies inclusions and exclusions Creates rights and entitlements Connects individuals to society Converts personal values into social norms and shared beliefs Influences and transforms individual acts and expectations into collective actions Creates (dis)incentives for individual and collective actions Coordinates individual or collective behaviors Fosters adaptive capacity Defines information systems Mediates external interventions Mobilizes resource utilization Means of delivery of external resources Determines transaction costs of activities and decisions

Type of institution Formal rules FR1 FR2 FR3

FR4

✓ ✓

✓ ✓

✓ ✓ ✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓ ✓ ✓

✓ ✓ ✓

✓

✓

✓ ✓

✓

✓

✓

Source: Authors

yellow, respectively. With regard to structuring power and authority systems, some of the possible interpretations of the matrix are as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10.

Formal rules generally have negative relationships with informal organizations. Informal organizations are in harmony with the social structures. Formal organizations typically have overlapping jurisdictions with one another. Informal organizations typically have overlapping jurisdictions with one another. Formal rules are generally counterproductive or contradictory to social structures. The national program, FR1, has relationships only with social structures and other formal rules. It does not affect organizations, whether formal or informal. The national program, FR1, contradicts with the regional regulation, FR2. The national program, FR1, complements the local policy, FR3. As the national program and the regional regulation have a negative relationship, it is consistent that FR2 and FR3 are also contradicting each other. Thus, the regional regulation has a negative linkage with all other formal rules. Local policies FR3 and FR4 overlap. Both local policies are not attuned with the existing local norms, SS2, but are neutral to the local practices, SS1 and SS3.

Other assessments can be gleaned from this example. This type of analysis can be duplicated to the other functional classifications, thereby creating the overall assessment of the linkages between and among institutions. The matrix, thus, enables a planner or analyst to structurally examine complex institutional relationships, thus, possibly effectively evaluate and plan adaptation responses to climate change.

Page 17 of 22

Source: Authors

Informal Organizations

Formal Organizations

Social Structures

Formal Rules

Neutral

Neutral

Neutral

IO1

IO2

Neutral

Complementary Complementary Complementary

Neutral

Neutral

SS1 Complementary Complementary

Contradicting

Contradicting

Complementary

Counterproductive Contradicting Complementary

Contradicting

Complementary Complementary

Neutral

Neutral

Neutral

Neutral Complementary Complementary

Neutral

Neutral

Social Structures SS2 SS3 CounterCounterproductive productive

CompleCompleNeutral Contradicting Contradicting mentary mentary CounterCounterCompleCompleContradicting productive productive mentary mentary CounterCompleCompleContradicting Contradicting productive mentary mentary

Formal Rules FR2 FR3 FR4 CompleContradicting Neutral mentary CounterContradicting Contradicting productive CompleCounterOverlapping mentary productive Contradicting Overlapping Neutral CompleCompleNeutral Neutral mentary mentary CounterCounterContradicting Contradicting productive productive CounterNeutral Neutral Neutral productive CompleCompleContradicting Neutral mentary mentary CompleContradicting Contradicting Neutral mentary

FR1

FO3

FO2

FO1

SS3

SS2

SS1

FR4

FR3

FR2

FR1

Establishes Systems of Power and Authority

Table 6 Horizontal analysis for structure power and authority system function

Neutral

Neutral

Formal Organizations FO2 FO3

Neutral

Neutral

Informal Organizations IO1 IO2

CompleCounterCounterCompleContradicting mentary productive productive mentary CompleCompleCompleCounterContradicting mentary mentary mentary productive Contradicting Contradicting Contradicting Contradicting Neutral CompleCompleCompleContradicting Neutral mentary mentary mentary CompleCompleContradicting Contradicting Contradicting mentary mentary CompleCompleNeutral Neutral Neutral mentary mentary CounterCompleOverlapping Overlapping productive mentary CompleOverlapping Overlapping Neutral mentary CounterCounterOverlapping Overlapping productive productive CounterCompleCounterOverlapping productive mentary productive CompleCounterNeutral Overlapping mentary productive

Neutral

FO1

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Conclusion Institutions in climate change encompass rules, social structures, and organizations. The institutional dimension of climate change adaptation involves an intricate web of relationships between and among these institutions. In analyzing the complexity of institutions, a number of factors need to be considered such as institutional functions and interplay, as well as issues of scale (national, state, regional, and local) and jurisdiction. Thus, a purpose-built framework that can perform these kinds of analysis, such as the institutional environment matrix (IEM) framework, is needed. The IEM adopts a dual-layered approach in examining the various institutions that directly or indirectly influence adaptation decisions and responses in a particular system. Institutions are intrinsically complex; hence a single layer analysis cannot cover the intricacies involved in an institutional analysis. Furthermore, this design allows institutions to be examined across scales and provides an easy transition toward a single scale analysis. The dual layer design of the IEM allows the institutional environment and arrangements to be extensively studied. The IE layer includes all kinds of institutions in the environment regardless of scale, identifies the dominant institutions in the system affecting adaptation responses, and outlines the complexity of institutions in the institutional environment. Meanwhile, the IM layer enables a scale-focused analysis by dealing with particular institutional arrangements. The matrix allows for complex analysis of institutional linkages and interactions through the vertical and horizontal analytical approaches. By using these techniques, the functional interdependencies of institutions can be identified and institutional interplay can be explored. The institutional dimension of climate change adaptation is motivated by the need to design or redesign arrangements to address the risks and impacts of climate change (Young 2002). Accordingly, the IEM framework helps identify whether the existing institutions hinder effective adaptation, especially when there are negative relationships among the institutional arrangements. This condition may warrant modifying or replacing the arrangements such that institutions will fit more effectively in the institutional environment. When new institutions need to be introduced into the system, the IEM framework may be useful in developing arrangements that will be compatible with the existing ones. This will help avoid mismatches among institutions and thus minimize conflicts. This chapter has outlined a theoretical tool that can be used in adaptation planning and evaluation. However, the real value of the framework lies in its applicability in empirical cases. The need for further research in this area is vital.

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Agrawal A (2008) The role of local institutions in adaptation to climate change, a paper prepared for the Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Social Development Department, Washington, DC Agrawal A, McSweeney C, Perrin N (2008) Local institutions and climate change adaptation. In: Social development notes: the social dimensions of climate change, vol 113. The World Bank, Washington, DC Andersson KP, Ostrom E (2008) Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective. Pol Sci 41(1):71–93 Aoki M (2007) Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes. J Inst Econom 3(1):1–31 Berman R, Quinn C, Paavola J (2012) The role of institutions in the transformation of coping capacity to sustainable adaptive capacity. Environ Develop 2(2):86–100 Biermann F (2007) “Earth system governance” as a crosscutting theme of global change research. Glob Environ Change 17(3):326–337 Boano C, Zetter R, Morris T (2008) Environmentally displaced people: understanding the linkages between environmental change, livelihoods and forced migration. Forced Migration Policy briefing no. 1. Refugee Studies Center, Oxford Boege V (2011) Challenges and pitfalls of resettlement measures: experiences in the Pacific Region. Working papers no. 102. Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development, Bielefeld Bromley DW, Cernea MM (1989) The management of common property natural resources: some conceptual and operational fallacies. In: The World Bank Discussion Papers, vol 57. The World Bank, Washington, DC Brousseau E, Garrouste P, Raynaud E (2011) Institutional changes: alternative theories and consequences for institutional design. J Econom Behav Org 79(1):3–19 Caldwell M, Segall CH (2007) No day at the beach: sea level rise, ecosystem loss, and public access along the California Coast. Ecol LQ 34(2):533–578 Commonwealth of Australia (1994) Environmental Protection Act 1994. Queensland, Australia Crowder LB, Osherenko G, Young OR, Airamé S, Norse EA, Baron N, Day JC, Wilson JA (2006) Resolving mismatches in US ocean governance. Science 313(5787):617–618 Davis CL (2006) The choice of institutions for trade disputes, a memo prepared for the Princeton Conference on Nested and Overlapping Institutions, Princeton University Dorward AR, Omamo SW (2009) A framework for analyzing institutions. In: Kirsten JF, Dorward AR, Poulton C, Vink N (eds) Institutional economics perspectives on African agricultural development. IFPRI, Washington, DC Eaton D, Meijerink G, Bijman J (2008) Understanding institutional arrangements: fresh fruit and vegetable value chains in East Africa. Markets, chains and sustainable development strategy and policy paper, Wageningen Eriksen S, Selboe E (2012) The social organisation of adaptation to climate variability and global change: the case of a mountain farming community in Norway. Appl Geo 33(9):159–167 Feder G, Feeny D (1991) Land tenure and property rights: theory and implications for development policy. WB Econ Rev 5(1):135–153 Gehring T, Oberthur S (2009) The causal mechanisms of interaction between international institutions. Eur J Int Rel 15(1):125–156 Greif A, Kingston C (2011) Institutions: rules or equilibria? In: Schofield N, Caballero G (eds) Political economy of institutions, democracy and voting. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg Gunderson LH, Holling CS (eds) (2002) Panarchy: understanding transformations in human and natural systems. Island Press, Washington, DC Gunningham N, Grabosky P (1998) Smart regulation: designing environmental policy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK Page 20 of 22

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Gupta J, Termeer C, Klostermann J, Meijerink S, van den Brink M, Jong P, Nooteboom S, Bergsma E (2010) The adaptive capacity wheel: a method to assess the inherent characteristics of institutions to enable the adaptive capacity of society. Environ Sci Policy 13(6):459–471 Hasan L (2000) Property regimes in resource conservation- a framework for analysis. MPRA paper no. 7430. University Library of Munich, Munich Heikkila T, Schlager E, Davis MW (2011) The role of cross-scale institutional linkages in common pool resource management: assessing interstate river compacts. Policy Stud J 39(1):121–145 Hodgson GM (2006) What are institutions? J Inst Econ 40(1):1–25 Howlett M (2009) Governance modes, policy regimes and operational plans: a multi-level nested model of policy instrument choice and policy design. Pol Sci 42(1):71–89 Inderberg TH, Eikeland PO (2009) Limits to adaptation: analysing institutional constraints. In: Adger WN, Lorenzoni I, O'Brien KL (eds) Adapting to climate change: thresholds, values, governance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Jentoft S (2004) Institutions in fisheries: what they are, what they do, and how they change. Marine Policy 28(2):137–149 Jordan A, O’Riordan T (1997) Social institutions and climate change: applying cultural theory to practice. CSERGE working paper GEC 97–15. CSERGE, UK Kirsten JF, Karaan ASM, Dorward AR (2009) Introduction to the economics of institutions. In: Kirsten JF, Dorward AR, Poulton C, Vink N (eds) Institutional economics perspectives on African agricultural development. IFPRI, Washington, DC Klein PG (2000) New institutional economics. In: Bouckeart B, de Geest G (eds) Encyclopedia of law and economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK Kooiman J (2008) Exploring the concept of governability. J Comp Pol Anal Res Pract 10(2):171–190 Linnér B-O (2006) Authority through synergism: the roles of climate change linkages. Eur Env 16(5):278–289 March J, Friedberg E, Arellano D (2011) Institutions and organizations: differences and linkages from organization theory. Gest Pol Púb 20(2):235–246 March JG, Olsen JP (1996) Institutional perspectives on political institutions. Gov An Intl J Pol Admin 9(3):247–264 Markvart TI (2009) Understanding institutional change and resistance to change towards sustainability: an interdisciplinary theoretical framework and illustrative application to provincialmunicipal aggregates policy. University of Waterloo, Canada Mattingly S (2002) Policy, legal and institutional arrangements, proceedings of the regional workshop on best practices in disaster mitigation. Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, Bangkok Meyer JW, Rowan B (1977) Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony. Am J Soc 83(2):340–363 Nabli MK, Nugent JB (1989) The new institutional economics and its applicability to development. World Dev 17(9):1333–1347 Næss LO, Bang G, Eriksen S, Vevatne J (2005) Institutional adaptation to climate change: flood responses at the municipal level in Norway. Glob Environ Change 15(2):125–138 Nelson RR, Nelson K (2002) Technology, institutions, and innovation systems. Res Pol 31(2):265–272 Nelson RR, Sampat BN (2001) Making sense of institutions as a factor shaping economic performance. J Econ Behav Org 44(1):31–54 Nicholson-Cole S, O'Riordan T (2009) Adaptive governance for a changing coastline: science, policy and publics in search of a sustainable future. In: Adger WN, Lorenzoni I, O'Brien KL (eds) Page 21 of 22

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Adapting to climate change: thresholds, values, governance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Nilsson M, Zamparutti T, Petersen JE, Nykvist B, Rudberg P, McGuinn J (2012) Understanding policy coherence: analytical framework and examples of sector-environment policy interactions in the EU. Environ Pol Gov 22(6):395–423 North DC (1990) Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK North DC (1994) Economic performance through time. Am Econ Rev 84(3):359–368 O’Riordan T, Jordan A (1999) Institutions, climate change and cultural theory: towards a common analytical framework. Glob Environ Chang 9(2):81–93 Oberth€ur S, Stokke OS (2011) Decentralized interplay management in an evolving interinstitutional order. In: Oberth€ ur S, Stokke OS (eds) Managing institutional complexity: regime interplay and global environmental change. MIT Press, London Ostrom E (1990) Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, New York Ostrom E (2011) Background on the institutional analysis and development framework. Policy Stud J 39(1):7–27 Pejovich S (1995) Economic analysis of institutions and systems. Kluwer, Dordrecht Pfahl S (2005) Institutional sustainability. Int J Sustain Dev 8(1):80–96 Pradhan NS, Khadgi VR, Schipper L, Kaur N, Geoghegan T (2012) Role of policy and institutions in local adaptation to climate change: case studies on responses to too much and too little water in the Hindu Kush Himalayas. ICIMOD, Kathmandu, Nepal Preston BL, Westaway R, Dessai S, Smith TF (2009) Are we adapting to climate change? Research and methods for evaluating progress, a paper presented at the Greenhouse 2009: climate change and resources, Perth Rakova U (2009) How-to guide for environmental refugees. United Nations University, Tokyo Rodima-Taylor D (2012) Social innovation and climate adaptation: local collective action in diversifying Tanzania. Appl Geogr 33(1):128–134 Sabatier PA (ed) (2007) Theories of the policy process, 2nd edn. Westview Press, Boulder Schlager E, Ostrom E (1992) Property-rights regimes and natural resources: a conceptual analysis. Land Econ 68(3):249–262 Shafritz JM, Ott JS, Jang YS (eds) (2005) Classics of organization theory. Thomson Wadsworth, Belmont Tang SY (1991) Institutional arrangements and the management of common-pool resources. Pub Admin Rev 51(1):42–51 Theesfeld I, Schleyer C, Hagedorn K, Callois J-M, Aznar O, Olsson JA (2010) The institutional dimension in policy assessment. In: Brouwer FM, Ittersum M (eds) Environmental and agricultural modelling: integrated approaches for policy impact assessment. Springer, New York Vallejo L (2011) From international to local: the role of coordination across institutions working on adaptation to climate change. ICARUS II conference – climate vulnerability and adaptation, Ann Arbor Williamson CR (2009) Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance. Publ Choice 139(3–4):371–387 Young OR (2002) The institutional dimensions of environmental change: fit, interplay, and scale. MIT, London

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Smart Metering and Sustainable Behavior in Low-Income Households in the Mediterranean Ales Podgornik*, Boris Sucic and Damir Stanicic Energy Efficiency Centre, Jozef Stefan Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Abstract Comparison between the EU’s 2020 energy efficiency targets and the forecasted energy savings clearly indicates a gap for expected energy savings in 2020. One of the reasons lies in the lack of specific policies for low-income households, which represent about 40 % of Mediterranean households and are considered as far to reach through traditional public policies. Due to their complexity, low-income households require innovative financial approaches for implementation of energy efficiency measures. Smart metering has been identified as one of the climate change adaptation technologies which can be used to encourage people in low-income households to become more aware of their energy consumption and stimulate them to change their energy-related behavior. Activities presented in this paper have been evaluated within the EU-funded project ELIH-Med with the objective to identify innovative energy efficiency measures and financial instruments for low-income households in the Mediterranean area. Also, this paper evaluates the impact of customized and adaptive consumption feedback on energy behavior patterns and energy savings in low-income households. Energy and cost saving prediction and verification flowchart are outlined to yield different combinations of suggested smart metering services, which would enable the minimization of households’ environmental impacts.

Keywords Energy efficiency; Smart metering; Consumption feedback; Behavior; Low-income housing; Mediterranean

Introduction The European Union (EU) has set a primary energy saving target of 20 % below the 2007 projections for 2020 (European Commission 2007). The success in achieving this goal will largely depend on promoting efficient energy end use in households. Many studies have confirmed that decisions and concrete actions of individuals have greater power and effects than capability of municipal administration to interfere in their actions. End-user’s (consumer) behavior is a very important parameter for the success of each national energy efficiency policy and related programs. It is necessary that the government efforts on the state level address not only what state or city can do directly to improve energy efficiency but also how the state can promote greater adoption of new and efficient technologies by consumers. According to (Birnera and Martinot 2005), this can come through changes in regulation, taxes, subsidies, access to capital, and provision of trusted information, as *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

well as marketing and campaigning to raise the awareness and encourage consumers to make choices that are both economically and environmentally sustainable. In the present moment in the framework of sustainable and climate-friendly development of urban areas, the most often highlighted problems are efficient spatial planning, efficient and secure energy supply, and efficient public transport. Energy efficiency is a red line, which connects all abovementioned areas. However, many contemporary policies and instruments for reaching energy saving potential are mainly oriented on technical systems (building envelope, heating systems, electrical appliances), while behavioral changes are addressed only by improved information availability through awareness campaigns. As presented by Gram-Hanssen (2013), user behavior is at least equally important as building physics when it comes to energy consumption for heating, while electricity consumption for lighting and appliances is more dependent on the user behavior than on energy-efficient appliances. Interactions between different parameters that have the effect on households’ energy consumption are presented in (Haas 1997). In general, energy consumption in households depends on many different parameters, namely, household structure (dwelling area, number of occupants, etc.), occupant’s behavior, technical efficiency of the installed equipment, and climate variables. In the present economic and financial crisis, the costs for energy and related challenges become even more important, and new and innovative approaches need to be considered in the residential sector where low-income households (LIH) must be specially targeted. Energy efficiency in low-income housing in the Mediterranean (ELIH-Med) project (strategic project within the MED Program, started in 2011) focuses on energy efficiency in the context of EU climate and energy targets for 2020. The LIH represent about 40 % of Mediterranean households and are considered as far to reach through traditional public policies (ELIH-Med 2010). Smart metering and its consumption feedback approach can be used for encouraging improvement of end-use energy efficiency and environmentally sustainable behavior in the targeted sector. As pointed out by European Smart Metering Alliance (2010), smart metering adds value to the ordinary utility service, giving better information to consumers and optimizing the use of the demanded power and consumed energy. Smart metering is widely used as a synonym for a system that records energy consumption and other parameters with bidirectional communication between utility and its clients. It implies a new relation model between the utility and its clients, using Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to interchange information between the utility and the devices installed at consumer’s premises. The majority of people tend not to see or feel the link between their actions (behavior) and the households’ energy performance and impact on the environment. Households’ behavior has been of great interest to social and psychological scientists as presented in (Abrahamse et al. 2005; McCaley 2006; Faiers et al. 2007; Steg 2008). Also, in many empirical studies, it can be found that individualized energy use information in the form of more informative bills, periodic feedback, and continuous feedback can lead to reductions in energy use. However, from the scientific point of view, it is not clear whether feedback needs to be more frequent to be effective and the sophisticated real-time monitors are more effective than simpler versions (Allen and Janda 2006). On the other hand, as pointed out by Fischer (2008), relevant features of consumption feedback that may determine its effectiveness are frequency, duration, content, breakdown, medium and way of presentation, comparisons, and combination with other instruments. In spite of considerable data restraints and research gaps, there are some indications that the most successful feedback combines the following features: it is given frequently and over a long time, it provides an appliance-specific consumption breakdown, it is presented in a clear and appealing way, and it uses computerized and interactive tools (Fischer 2008). Considering the socioeconomic factors, household income has been found to be a significant determinant of baseline energy use, but not of energy conservation behavior in reaction to feedback (Heslop et al. 1981; Brandon and Lewis 1999; Matsukawa 2004). Page 2 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

On the other hand, it is undeniable that human behavior impacts energy consumption and varies from culture to culture (Wang 2011). To evaluate the social dimensions of energy use, initiatives that combine society, energy, and technology in various permutations are needed (Janda 2009). This paper evaluates the impact of customized and adaptive consumption feedback on energy behavior patterns and energy savings in LIH. Activities presented in this paper have been evaluated within the EU-funded project, ELIH-Med. Several pilot project locations were selected for the installation of different smart metering and advanced consumption monitoring systems with the objective to identify innovative energy efficiency measures and financial instruments for low-income households in the Mediterranean area. Participating Mediterranean countries are Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia. Besides analysis of consumption feedback, supported by different smart metering solutions, the ELIH-Med project also focuses on identifying and demonstrating the feasibility of other innovative energy efficiency measures and financial instruments with the deployment potential relevant to Mediterranean territories and supported by European Regional Development Funds (ERDF).

Reaching EU 2020 Objectives in the Mediterranean Area In 2008, the share of energy consumption in households was 25.3 % of the total EU final energy consumption (European Environment Agency 2011). While space heating and cooling remains the most significant component of households’ energy consumption in EU, electricity consumption associated with the use of electrical appliances increased the most rapidly in percentage terms during the recent years – increase of more than 21 % per dwelling comparing with 1990 (European Environment Agency 2011). According to the requirements of directive on energy end-use efficiency and energy services (Directive 2006/32/ΕC), each EU Member State had to adopt and achieve an indicative energy saving target of 9 % by 2016 in the framework of the first National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP). Despite the commitment and huge policy efforts to boost energy efficiency improvements by EU Member States, the EU is far from reaching its 2020 energy saving target as shown in Fig. 1 (European Commission 2009). In 2010, after a large and long-lasting consultation with the public, the European Commission presented the Energy 2020 – A strategy for competitive, sustainable, and secure energy (European Commission 2010). Within the strategy for competitive, sustainable, and secure energy, the

Fig. 1 Energy saving policy gap in the EU countries: development and projection of gross inland energy consumption for EU by 2020 (European Commission 2009) Page 3 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

European Commission defines the energy priorities for the next 10 years and sets the actions to be taken in order to tackle the challenges of saving energy, achieve a market with competitive prizes and secure supplies, boost technological leadership, and effectively negotiate with EU’s international partners. The objectives presented in the European Commission (2010) are part of the EU’s 2020 strategy and in 2011 posted Resource-Efficient Europe initiative (European Commission 2011a). The aim of both documents is to make far-reaching changes to the way in which Europe produces and consumes energy, while building on what has already been achieved in the area of energy policy. Also, the European Commission recognizes the importance of the energy cooperation in the Mediterranean region and suggests improvements to the regulatory framework and stresses that an integrated regional market in the Maghreb would facilitate large-scale investments in the region and enable Europe to import renewable electricity. According to the European Commission (2011b), the EU needs to act immediately to get on track to achieve its targets, and a two-step approach was proposed for energy efficiency target setting. In the first step, Member States should set their own national efficiency targets, and in the second step, if the review of the set targets and programs shows that EU is not on track to reach 20 % target, the European Commission will propose legally binding national targets. This is formally laid down in the Energy Efficiency Directive from 2012 (Directive 2012/27/EU). Unfortunately, forecasted energy savings may be rather optimistic if the measures (according to the first and second NEEAPs) will not be implemented successfully and in that case, the expected gap by 2020 will be even larger. Unfortunately, there are many causes for the projected gap in the residential sector by 2020, and the most of them are associated with symptomatic unbalance between efforts for preparing polices and preparations for policy implementation. A major policy barrier is the absence of the implementation program follow-up and the clear definition of responsibilities of the management bodies on the state, regional, and local level. Almost all Mediterranean countries have defined long-term objectives in their energy strategies, but lack of clear definition of responsibilities with deadlines for the implementation was the crucial reason why many goals have not been achieved. As long as there is no clear definition of responsibilities of the management on the state, regional, and local level and consequences in the case of not fulfilling its obligations, there is no basis for involvement of other stakeholders. This reveals another key barrier for the successful implementation of the energy efficiency programs: lack of implementation capacity! Current situation is characterized by the fact that more people are working on planning of the energy efficiency measures than on its actual implementation. With the aim to make any energy efficiency action plan or strategy alive in the real terms, comprehensive and adaptive implementation and follow-up mechanisms have to be developed. The vast majority of policymakers are focused on transposition of common EU energy policies and requirements into national strategic and legislative framework, without in-depth evaluation of the energy efficiency developments in their countries. Unfortunately, in many Mediterranean countries, energy efficiency is not perceived as the most proper instrument for the future sustainable growth. Proper energy and growth policy can play an important role in overcoming these transition challenges, especially by providing financial incentives that lead to accelerated energy efficiency technology development and deployment. Having in mind high percentage of LIH in residential sector and scarce financing resources hardly accessible to LIH, each Mediterranean country will have to revise its energy policy and introduce effective and innovative energy saving mechanisms available for LIH. In the majority of cases, the private-public financing sources are not enough for all the LIH end users. Even the scheme of tax incentives for energy efficiency investment is not followed by the most of LIH due to lack of information and awareness of economic and environmental benefits in terms of the energy and money savings. Therefore, energy-efficient end-user behavior can be an important parameter for the success of national energy policy and Page 4 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

programs, especially in LIH residential sector. Correctly navigating the interface between policymaking and human behavior is the key for achieving sustainable energy consumption (European Environment Agency 2013). As demand for electricity from appliances is increasing, one of the effective and innovative measures includes installation of smart metering. Smart metering can provide desired and necessary link between end-user behavior and energy consumption. Introduction of smart metering, besides the benefits for the utilities, suppliers, and distributions, in its essence has the goal to help consumers to understand their energy consumption. Only a consumer who understands its energy consumption is capable to systematically and sustainably decrease it. On the other hand, utilities are already well aware of their total energy balancing, but with the additional amount of consumption information provided by smart metering, they will be able to better understand and anticipate the end-user behavior and explore this knowledge in synergy of utility measures for optimizing its overall energy performance.

Consumption Feedback Influence on Behavior According to (Darby 2006), improved feedback may help consumer to reduce its energy consumption by up to 20 %. However, to properly understand the consumption feedback influence on behavioral change, it is necessary to define and understand what is the relation between environmentally and energy-relevant behavior. According to Markowitz and Malle (2012), the environmentally relevant behavior refers to any behavior that can be identified as having a significant direct or indirect impact, negative or positive, on the health and stability of natural (eco)systems. Energyrelevant behavior refers to any behavior that can be identified as having a significant direct or indirect impact, negative or positive, on the energy consumption in selected object or energy system. Since there is a direct link between energy consumption and environmental impact of that consumption, it can be concluded that the energy-relevant behavior is the subset of the environmentally relevant behavior. Integrative influence model of environmentally relevant behavior (influence model) has been introduced by Matthies (2005) (see Fig. 2). These kinds of models are necessary to understand what

Fig. 2 Integrative influence model of environmentally relevant behavior Page 5 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

consumers do and why they do so. Also, a model proposed by Matthies (2005) can be used for explaining why and how feedback on electricity consumption can reduce consumption (Fischer 2008). According to (Fischer 2008), the influence model distinguishes between two types of environmentally relevant behavior. The first is habitual behavior or routine, called environmentally detrimental habits. The second and above the habits are conscious decisions. Habitual behavior or routine is the behavior performed regularly in the same way, and it is not reflected upon. Day-to-day household activities can be classified as such, and many of them are related to household’s environmental footprint, mostly through energy consumption activities (such as cooking, washing, turning on the lights, etc.). Once the routine is established, it may spiral into suboptimal way of doing things because majority of people never really think about an optimum way of doing it anymore. In the field of environmentally relevant behavior, many habits are environmentally detrimental because the environment or energy was not a relevant issue to consider at the time the habit was formed, or because beliefs about environmental effects held at that time have been shown to be wrong, or because the situation has changed so that a once beneficial behavior is not useful anymore (Fischer 2008). On the other hand, a conscious decision needs to be taken for new norms and considerations to enter the established behavior patterns and break the habits. To do this, a person has to be aware of various options to choose from and to establish proper norms and criteria to evaluate his/her own decisions. The influence model describes this process as norm activation and includes three stages of awareness: • Awareness of an environmental issue which is not solved or tackled by established habits • Awareness of relevance of one’s behavior to the environmental issue • Awareness of one’s possibilities to influence personal behavior to have sense of control. This process can be illustrated by correlating electricity consumption and electricity bill. One can improperly attribute the high electricity bill to electricity prices and not to one’s consumption behavior; therefore, no decision on behavior change will be made. If consumption costs are correctly linked to one’s behavior, a person has to realize how to control it. This can only be achieved if a person has sufficient information (i.e., consumption feedback on appliance-specific consumption). After successful norm activation, a person faces different motives (motivation) in order to reach a decision on how to act. Firstly, one is confronted with his/her personal norms and evaluates his/her personal ideas of how to act. Secondly, one is confronted with social norms and what one may consider as socially appropriate or desired behavior. People may sometimes make decisions based on the beliefs and values they perceive to be prevalent in their culture instead of their personal beliefs and values (Chiu et al. 2010). Lastly, there are also other motives not specifically defined in the influence model. In the case of energy consumption in households, these motives may comprise the need or desire for the services associated with electricity consumption on one side and a desire for comfort on the other. When norms and motives conflict with each other, a person has to go through evaluation or decision-making process, where moral, social, and other costs and benefits are weighed. During the decision-making process, the persons’ norms and motives may be influenced and redefined by available information. According to the model, the final stage is a decision for an environmentally friendly action. Under specific conditions, such an action may be performed regularly and develop into a new habit or routine (Fischer 2008). Four processes described in this model (norm activation, motivation, evaluation, and action) can be used for detecting the ways on how consumption feedback can be used to stimulate the conscious Page 6 of 22

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decision and development of new energy-efficient habits. In general, consumption feedback gives clear and comprehensive information about energy consumption and can direct consumers’ attention toward energy consumption of everyday household activities. Concerning the energy consumption, feedback may focus on two consumption-related problems, problem of consumption costs and problem of pollution (environmental or sustainability issue). With the help of consumption feedback, these issues can influence reasoning process and motivate the consumer for cost savings or for minimizing environmental footprint. Past studies have shown that combining real-time consumption feedback with competition can additionally motivate consumers to reduce their energy consumption and stimulate behavioral change (Petersen et al. 2005). According to Fischer (2008), consumption feedback is most effective if it: • Successfully captures the consumers’ attention • Draws a close link between specific actions and their effects • Activates various motives that may appeal to different consumer groups, such as cost savings, resource conservation, emissions reduction, competition, and others.

Smart Metering in LIH In the light of EU energy saving efforts, the ELIH-Med pilot projects try to identify the most effective smart metering functionalities and services to increase energy efficiency in LIH and achieve measurable energy savings. Within the ELIH-Med project, analysis of twelve multi-energy smart metering projects in the Mediterranean area was performed. Performed analysis confirms that electricity has the leading role in the smart metering projects. Also, electricity smart grids are foreseen to be the backbone of the future energy grids, and smart electricity meters are expected to have the data concentrator role for other sources (heat, cold, natural gas, and water). EU Member States are obliged to roll out smart electricity meters for at least 80 % of their end consumers by 2020 and to achieve full coverage by 2022 (European Commission 2011b). In spite of this, smart grid concept cannot be taken for granted as the universal solution for all problems. It is a powerful framework which can assure that the full potential of concrete energy efficiency measure is systematically utilized and verified. Evaluated smart metering projects were sorted according to nine topics representing different benefits of smart metering for the end consumers on one side and suppliers and utilities on the other, as shown in Table 1. Evaluation confirms that the majority of benefits are at the supply side, Table 1 Benefits allocation of evaluated smart metering projects Topic

No. of projects

1

Customer feedback / change of behavior

8

2

Advanced tariff systems Other / new customer services (energy service companies)

3

3

Final beneficiary Consumer

4

4

Demand response / demand side management

5

5

Utilization of reusable energy sources

6

6

Standardization

1

7

Interoperability

7

8

Equipment testing

11

9

System services (distribution, supplier)

8

Suppliers utilities

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indicating the need to put bigger emphasis on exploring consumer benefits in upcoming smart electricity meter rollout. Unfortunately, in the current situation of economic crisis and cheap electricity available on the market, there is little interest in demand side management, and each Member State is facing the problem of funding the smart metering implementation. Rollout of smart electricity meters should be set in the development plans of individual distribution network operator(s) in each Member State. It is assumed that the necessary funds for implementation would be allocated from the grid fee and distribution network operator(s) would be the equipment owners. In many states, the current practice is that costs of implementing additional services and additional smart metering equipment (i.e., in-home display or individual appliance consumption metering) are charged separately and directly to the consumer. Such practice limits the availability of these services. In the case of LIH, it is crucial that electricity suppliers offer innovative ways of funding for additional services and the equipment. Due to the specific structure of this customer group, one of the options is to stimulate the implementation of additional energy services for energy efficiency by awarding the achieved energy savings in LIH and all in the framework of energy efficiency obligation scheme (Directive 2012/27/ EU) where the energy suppliers are obliged to report about achieved energy savings at the end consumers. In this way, suppliers will be more interested in the preparation of suitable energy efficiency programs for the LIH.

Smart Metering and Energy Efficiency Benefits The use of electrical appliances within households varies significantly in time. The most common measurement interval for load profile analysis in today’s electricity grids is 15-min interval. This resolution is satisfactory to show variations in electricity consumption, and it is used for billing purposes. Considering the climate change mitigation activities, smart metering represents technology with the potential for encouraging sustainable change toward the energy-efficient behavior. Smart metering introduces real-time automated meter reading, enables two-way communication, and is suitable for dynamic pricing. Also, the availability of accurate and almost online data for the evaluation of energy consumption has the potential to transform demand forecasting and detection of consumption patterns from a passive historical data-based activity to an active real-time datadriven process. However, smart metering without consumer participation and additional services will, by itself, do nothing to change behavioral pattern and save energy since the meter is simply an enabler. Energy savings will be achieved only if the installation of meters is connected with the comprehensive informational campaign which will help consumers to actually understand their energy consumption and stimulate them to move toward sustainable behavioral changes (European Smart Metering Alliance 2010). Also, traditional approaches that focus just on instrumentation and tend to ignore social characteristic of the target group are not suitable for the LIH. In order for energy savings to be realized, problem-oriented approach and customized financial incentives have to be introduced to make energy saving measures more attractive to LIH in economic terms (European Smart Metering Alliance 2010). According to the analysis performed within the ELIH-Med project, these incentives are usually in the form of demand response services and dynamic pricing, introduced by energy utilities.

Demand Response The target of demand response is to enable active participation of consumers in the market through the provision of consumption flexibility services to different players in the power system. Page 8 of 22

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Particularly challenging is the integration of households in the demand response programs due to almost stochastic nature of domestic electricity consumption and available load flexibilities. Therefore, the typical demand response of household consumers is a voluntary reaction to a price signal (Joint Research Centre 2011). Typical response is load shifting where electricity demand is delayed. Although the deployment of smart meters can enable active participation of consumers in the market (i.e., purchase of home energy sources), it is the energy savings and cost reduction which are of interest to LIH consumers and can potentially range up to 15 % (Joint Research Centre 2011). Understanding the relationship between consumption feedback measures, demand response measures, and energy efficiency programs is important to avoid potential conflicts and ultimately failure to capture the full energy saving potential available (European Environment Agency 2013).

Dynamic Pricing Dynamic pricing encourages consumers to shift consumption away from the peak consumption periods to lower consumption periods, lowering distribution and supply costs. This is achieved through dynamic pricing mechanisms which reflect the cost of supplying electricity. Dynamic pricing is suitable for LIH as it reflects immediately in the lower consumption costs. This mechanism can also utilize the characteristics of Mediterranean environment with high potential for solar electricity generation within certain time of day. In practice, there are several methods and degrees of dynamic pricing, but due to its simplicity Time-Of-Use (TOU), pricing scheme was recognized as the most appropriate for the LIH consumers. TOU tariffs stimulate people to switch their electricity consumption from peak to off-peak hours. The peak hours are known in advance and properly communicated to consumers. The prices may also vary according to the season. Potential for consumer financial savings using TOU tariffs is estimated up to 5 % (Stromback et al. 2011). Dynamic pricing enables energy savings only on the supply side by comprising intelligent integration of centralized and distributed energy generation resources and lowering transmission and distribution losses during peak hours.

Tariff Use Planning and Home Automation Advanced tariffs are pointless if consumers do not have a proper understanding of its time frames, possible money savings, and environmental benefits due to energy savings on the supply side. For this reason, the consumption feedback introduced in ELIH-Med project (through informative billing and interactive web page) includes additional explanation of implemented tariff systems and proposed the use of home appliances with high intensity of consumption (space heating and cooling systems, electrical boilers for domestic hot water preparation, appliances with adjustable time of operation) according to the implemented tariff system. The home automation in LIH concentrates on installation of electronic plug timers for demand shifting of energy-intensive appliances according to optimal tariffs and programming appliances with integrated time controllers for use in low or off-peak tariff. Proposed concept follows the rules of the simple home automation since the advanced home automation with remote load controllers is out of scope for LIH.

Consumption Feedback Services The role of consumption feedback is to make the consumption of energy/electricity visible. Feedback can also provide a more direct, detailed, comparable, and comprehensive information about households’ energy consumption pattern. Indirect or direct consumption feedback can be provided to consumers utilizing smart metering and its services. Page 9 of 22

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Indirect Feedback According to (Darby 2006), the indirect feedback is more suitable for demonstrating longer term effects on the energy consumption as the consequence of behavioral changes and applied energy efficiency measures. Through indirect feedback, the consumer has no direct access to the real-time consumption data and is therefore responding to previous consumption behavior and has to rely on processed information. Examples of indirect feedback appropriate for use in LIH are through informative billing and interactive web page. These types of feedback are based on smart meter readings with a combination of appropriate and tailor-made energy efficiency indicators, disaggregated consumption data, detailed energy reports, and other forms of presenting the energy consumption patterns. Informative Billing and Interactive Web Page As indicated by Saving Energy in Social Housing with ICT project (eSESH deliverable 2010), from the consumers’ point of view, one of the biggest advantages of the smart metering implementation is accurate and informative billing. Informative billing includes explanations of the energy saving options regarding the received monthly bill, and it is the favorable feedback option for tenants in social housings (eSESH deliverable 2010). Even though that informative billing provides real and accurate energy consumption data to domestic consumer, the biggest challenge is making this data understandable to all consumers including tenants in LIH. From the ELIH-Med perspective, the informative billing should have the following features: • Monthly billing based on actual consumption • Interpretation of monthly consumption in kWh and local currency (EUR) • Graphic representation of monthly consumption (load profile) with appliance-specific consumption breakdown (where utility provides individual appliance metering). Additionally, a graphic representation must include monthly consumption for at least past 3 months or more (up to 12 months) • Comparative and normative feedback (efficiency indicators) – e.g., graphic representation of billing consumption compared to consumption in comparable past periods, to average consumption in the past year, correlated to inside and outside temperature difference, etc. • Common bill for all on-site utility meters (electricity, natural gas, heat, cold, and water). Interactive web page with the secured personal access can also be utilized as indirect consumption feedback service in LIH. Similar to online banking, energy utilities should provide an option of e-billing (same characteristics as for the classical informative billing) and some degree of energy management (e.g., planning the use of home appliances with high intensity of consumption according to implemented tariff system). As indicated by eSESH project (2010), web services can reach a wider group of tenants also in social housings, and according to eSESH project survey, 85 % of tenants own a PC, and 77 % have access to the Internet.

Direct Feedback The main characteristic of the direct feedback is that consumers have an immediate and easily accessible display either directly on the smart meter or associated to the smart meter. The primary role of the smart meter is to provide a clear, concise, and understandable information or point of reference for improved feedback, preferably in combination with a separate in-house display (IHD) and individual appliance consumption metering. Using only smart meters, display for direct

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consumption feedback has its advantages in LIH as it does not bring additional costs for separate IHD. According to the ELIH-Med project, the direct feedback provided to LIH should include: • Appropriate indication that allows consumers to easily distinguish between high and low levels of electricity consumption (intensity of consumption) • Appropriate indication that allows consumers to easily distinguish between peak and off-peak times (indication and price of active tariff) and clear overview of billing consumption (in kWh and currency), broken down by tariff. Besides meter’s display and potential use of IHD, direct feedback allows alarm notification of tenants in the events when abnormal or extensive electricity consumption occurs. Such alarms may prove to be the most influential on behavior changes. Due to already available communication channels (SMS or smartphone applications, e-mail), this way of communication is very simple to implement in LIH. According to ELIH-Med, possible triggering events are: • Tariff switch. • Steep deviation from average hourly consumption. • Monthly threshold (average monthly consumption) has been reached.

Pilot Households Selection of ELIH-Med pilot households, participating in ELIH-Med smart metering experimentation, was based on the household matrix according to which each participating household was categorized. Required data was gathered with the comprehensive survey which was also used to establish the baseline energy consumption for each observed household/tenants and energy-related behavior. One of the purposes for thorough household categorization was to enable long-term comparisons with an average normalized or benchmarked consumer in the same user category. The need for this comparison is specified in the new Energy Efficiency Directive (Directive 2012/27/EU). Economic characteristics define the dwellings in LIH category where low income refers to households who usually do not have sufficient resources to have an easy access to credit or capital in order to invest in energy efficiency. Social characteristics define the target groups by social and behavior aspects. They are further divided into three subgroups: • Dwellings size and typology • Social structure of tenants in household • Usage of social media. Technical characteristics define the technical features of LIH. They are further divided into five subgroups: • • • •

Type of appliances used and their typical usage Use of home automation Use of lightning Heating, cooling, and domestic hot water (DHW) Page 11 of 22

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Table 2 Groups of representative cases Category Mediterranean space Tenants income

Household

Dwelling typology

Ownership

Included cases Cyprus and Malta; Mediterranean region of France, Greece, and Spain Retired Employed Unemployed Scholarship Family with children Family without children Single occupant Students Single house Semidetached house Apartment in multiple dwelling building Student dorm Private property Rent Social housing

• Historical data on energy consumption (past energy consumption). During the pilot households’ selection, a special care has been taken to include all envisioned use cases, as defined in groups of representative cases (Table 2). Surveys of pilot households have highlighted some of the LIH and Mediterranean characteristics which were considered during the use cases development. LIH characteristics: • • • •

Moderate electricity consumption (reaching national average or below average). Energy costs present significant part of household income. Use of old and inefficient household appliances. Use of passive ventilation is more common than use of advanced cooling or air-conditioning systems. • Frequently suboptimal living conditions due to inadequate maintenance of living quarters. Mediterranean: • Higher demand for cooling Cooling degree days (CDD) exceed heating degree days (HDD) as show in Fig. 3 for one of the pilot locations (Larnaca, Cyprus) in years 2010 through 2012 • Low penetration of efficient heating systems (i.e., central heating) • Low penetration of natural gas grids and district heating • Electricity as main energy source for cooking It was noticed that even in cases where natural gas is used for DHW, electricity is usually used for cooking. Also, there is a noticeable rise of electricity consumption during summer months (direct consequence of higher cooling than heading demand) as shown in the case of pilot dwellings in Larnaca, Cyprus (Fig. 4). Page 12 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Fig. 3 Cooling and heating degree days for Larnaca, Cyprus

Fig. 4 Sample household electricity consumption

Implementation of Consumption Feedback Services Different types and forms of consumption feedback can be used to influence the reasoning process as described in integrative influence model of environmentally relevant behavior. Three types of consumption feedback presentation were used in selected pilots to target the desired action of the consumer: • Presentation as environment/pollution problem – equivalent of energy used in CO2 emissions • Presentation as family budget problem – costs of energy consumption • Presentation as consumption problem – consumption in kWh. To maximize the consumption feedback impact on the consumer’s behavior, ELIH-Med project follows the previously suggested feedback types and include four forms of implementation as shown in Table 3. The first three forms are targeting the behavior of single households, and the last one is targeting the change of behavior on a group of residents. All forms can use several types of presentation. The focus can be either on environment (CO2 emissions) or energy (consumption in kWh) or on the costs related to consumption. Reduction of costs is particularly important for LIH as even small energy cost savings can have significant impact on the household budget.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 3 Forms of smart metering implementation

1.

2.

3.

4.

Form Appliance-specific consumption breakdown with simple kWh, CO2, and costs presentation of energy consumption on IHD. Web access with additional consumption breakdown is also available. The pilot projects without web access or in cases where tenants are not customized or willing to use the Internet and monthly reports provided by installed metering equipment are printed by equipment maintainers and distributed to tenants. The form of report is suited to the tenant’s needs in each case Sophisticated environmental feedback including consumption and environmental parameters in the form of advanced consumption and environment monitoring system, where energy consumption, temperature, humidity, and other parameters are monitored and presented in individualized web page Utility smart meters are used as main focus point of consumption monitoring, and informative billing is used as main consumption feedback medium. Installation of smart meters is coupled with installation of photovoltaic system as complementary utilizing Mediterranean-specific climate conditions Comparative consumption feedback between several buildings (student dorms) in the form of public dashboards to initiate and stimulate the competition

Type of presentation (in the order of focus) Consumption Budget Environment

Target Behavior of single household

Number of cases 60 households

Environment Consumption Budget

Behavior of single household

40 households

Budget Consumption Environment

Behavior of single household

60 households

Environment Consumption

Behavior of a group of residents

5 buildings 144 rooms

Smart Metering Experimentation Plan Smart metering experimentation plan of the ELIH-Med project was divided into four phases, preinstallation, installation, monitoring, and evaluation (Fig. 5). Phases were designed to follow the integrative influence model of environmentally relevant behavior. Also, the first three phases had an important role in helping LIH consumers to understand how they can use the information provided by smart metering to manage their energy consumption effectively and to save energy.

Preinstallation Main purpose of preinstallation phase was to assure that selected dwellings comply with LIH criteria and to additionally motivate households participating in experiment (norm activation). Awareness campaign included information concerning all renovation (other ELIH-Med project initiatives) and installation works which were carried out through the experiment. Within the preinstallation phase, the baseline consumption data and past behavioral patterns through survey of participating LIH were obtained. Figure 6 shows the main activities and scope of preinstallation phase. Experiences from this phase clearly confirm that people welcome the works and changes in their premises when actions are previously well explained. Following a presentation of the project objectives, tenants were in favor of installing smart metering systems into their premises. The second and equally important finding from this phase was related with the importance of community involvement. The best way of motivating households for installation works and other initial activities is to designate the local representative who coordinates the building activities Page 14 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Fig. 5 Four phases of interactions in smart metering experimentation

Fig. 6 Preinstallation phase

(organization of education and awareness sessions, coordination of installation process between installers and tenants, etc.). Including the representatives of the local community (neighborhood or building representative) in the preparations and awareness campaigns has proved to be a crucial point in the transfer of sustainable ideas. Initial skepticism, which was particularly present in LIH, has turned into enthusiasm and a desire to cooperate.

Installation of Smart Metering Equipment During equipment installation phase, it was essential to assure that all LIH participating in the experiment are familiar with installed smart metering equipment. Figure 7 shows the main inputs of the installation phase. This phase has highlighted the poor condition of LIH living premises. In several cases, due to safety reasons, old wiring needs to be replaced before the installation of new equipment.

Monitoring Main purpose of this phase was to monitor the effects of implemented consumption feedback services on behavior of the LIH and adjustment of individual smart metering services according to the survey feedback from households, facilitating the living lab approach to fine-tune different smart metering services to different households (impact of social, cultural, and regional differences). Survey feedback from the tenants on their experience regarding available services was collected and evaluated. Based on these results, the additional adjustment of consumption feedback was done during the monitoring phase: • Adjustment of monthly report with consumption indicators (printed report or interactive web page). • In the cases of individual appliance monitoring, it was enabled that the monitored appliances might be changed.

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Fig. 7 Smart metering equipment installation phase

Fig. 8 Monitoring phase

During this phase, three main findings of recognizable benefits have been recorded: • Tenants have become aware of individual appliance consumption and expressed the surprise of their effects on the monthly electricity bill. In some cases, tenants turn down the heating/cooling when prompted on excess consumption. • Awareness of current consumption and households’ environmental footprint has initiated clear interest about additional energy efficiency measures to be implemented in the households. • Multiplying the effect of complementary energy efficiency measures. When other energy efficiency measures are implemented (i.e., thermal insulation, double-glazed windows, etc.), the consumption feedback additionally motivates the tenants to adapt behavior to implemented technical updates and modifications. Figure 8 shows the main characteristics of the monitoring phase.

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Evaluation Within this phase, household consumptions as a result of smart metering experiment and induced behavioral changes are to be analyzed. Monitoring and review of the experimentation progress include the consumer experience of the process, new smart metering functionalities, and identified services. Results of the analysis will be used as input in the process of the development of the Energy Savings Verification Model. The preliminary analysis of LIH electricity consumption within the ELIH-Med project has clearly confirmed electricity saving potential with employment of smart meters and described functionalities. In all cases, principles of demand response and sustainable behavior changes have provided up to 5 % of electricity savings. In the cases where LIH consumers have applied additional load optimization techniques (economical usage of household appliances) stimulated by consumption feedback, up to 7 % savings have been achieved.

Future Research Challenges Smart metering is primarily intended as an active element of utilities’ energy distribution operations in smart grid infrastructure, but it has also shown potential as climate change mitigation tool through two additional side effects. The first is a support for the energy efficiency services and measures as an independent and customizable tool providing a more direct, comparable, and comprehensive information about households’ energy consumption pattern. Secondly, smart metering infrastructure enables proper energy saving verification and validation. Based on the preliminary results from the ELIH-Med project, electricity utilities have the vital role in the smart metering implementation and must be involved in providing LIH with new customized services. Also, multi-energy metering must be established when other energy utilities are present (water, natural gas, district heating, and cooling), and the advantage of existing electricity grid infrastructure has to be explored. If smart meters are used for all utilities on-site, communication with these meters can be done via a smart electricity meter since the electricity meter can always provide the power supply for the communication. Sharing the remote communication channel can also greatly reduce the combined costs of communication and therefore costs for the consumer, which is vitally important for LIH. Even though that electricity is the most dominant energy carrier in the Mediterranean area, only a complete overview of household energy balance from all utilities (electricity, water, natural gas, district heating, and cooling) can induce proper consumer behavior changes as savings in one energy form may be replaced by increased consumption in the others.

Energy Saving Verification Results of the ELIH-Med smart metering experimentation process will be used to build an algorithm for the verification of energy savings considering different functionalities of smart meters in combination with the behavioral changes, implemented energy efficiency measures, and other influential factors. The experimental results enabled contextualization of the energy consumption where the notion of context refers to (actual) characteristics of the household and its environment, typology, social status, appliances, and devices. Database of performance results will also enable energy performance benchmarking, where a selected and comparable LIH can be benchmarked based on the input data gathered by household survey. Finally, the prediction algorithm based on the results of smart metering experiment will enable the forecast of energy savings and energy consumption cost reductions as shown in Fig. 9.

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Fig. 9 Energy and cost saving prediction and verification flowchart

The outcome of validation model should also help Member States to decide which energy efficiency objectives and which benefits to the end consumers are taken into account when obliging market participants and setting minimum functionalities for smart meters. This obligation is established in the new directive on energy efficiency (Directive 2012/27/EU), which in Article 9(2)(a) states that Member States must ensure that “objectives of energy efficiency and benefits for final customers are fully taken into account when establishing the minimum functionalities of the meters and the obligations imposed on market participants.”

Conclusion Successful energy efficiency policy must be adaptive and must rely on the empirical data. Smart metering is a powerful tool for monitoring and verification and must be part of the comprehensive energy efficiency and climate change mitigation policy. Implementation of energy efficiency measures and utilization of the smart metering and its consumption feedback services in LIH may prove to be quite challenging introduction of changes in a very complex environment. However, energy-efficient behavior is a critical parameter for the success of each national energy policy and programs. The ELIH-Med project clearly confirmed the importance of community involvement before and during the smart metering implementation. Also, in the case of LIH, it has been confirmed that proper and tailor-made consumption feedback has a potential to influence on the established behavioral patterns, break the habits, and initiate environmentally friendly actions. To make such feedback available, energy suppliers should offer innovative ways of covering the costs of additional smart metering services and equipment in LIH. Although individual consumption registration of energy-intensive household appliances may prove to have big influence on consumer behavior, it is

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

the notification about relevant and extraordinary events in energy consumption that proved to have the biggest impact to behavioral changes in LIH. Also, it has been noticed that the awareness about energy consumption and households’ environmental footprint has raised the interest for additional energy efficiency measures. In cases where other energy efficiency measures were implemented, the consumption feedback additionally motivated the tenants to adapt their behavior and achieve even bigger savings. Internet access has proved to be available for the majority of LIH and should be used for enriched consumption feedback. As consumption feedback will be specific to LIH, this is also an opportunity for different social programs to act through energy efficiency awareness campaigns in providing additional information and programs utilizing smart metering communication channels.

References Abrahamse W, Steg L, Vlek C, Rothengatter T (2005) A review of intervention studies aimed at household energy conservation. J Environ Psychol 25(3):273–291 Allen D, Janda K (2006) The effects of household characteristics and energy use consciousness on the effectiveness of real-time energy use feedback: a pilot study. 2006 ACEEE summer study on energy efficiency in buildings [Online]. Available: http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/publications/downloads/janda06aceee.pdf Birnera S, Martinot E (2005) Promoting energy-efficient products: GEF experience and lessons for market transformation in developing countries. Energy Policy 33:1765–1779 Brandon G, Lewis A (1999) Reducing household energy consumption: a qualitative and quantitative field study. J Environ Psychol 19:75–85 Chiu CY, Gelfand MJ, Yamagishi T, Shteynberg G, Wan C (2010) Intersubjective culture: the role of intersubjective perceptions in cross-cultural research. Perspect Psychol Sci 5(4):482–493 Darby S (2006) The effectiveness of feedback on energy consumption. A review for DEFRA of the literature on metering, billing and direct displays [Online]. Available: http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/ research/energy/downloads/smart-metering-report.pdf Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on energy end-use efficiency and energy services (2006) Off J 114:64–85 Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency (2012) Off J L 315:1–56 ELIH-Med Energy Efficiency in Low-income Housing in the Mediterranean, MED (2007–2013) Ref: 3677, Submitted project, September 2010. Available: http://www.elih-med.eu eSESH deliverable (2010) eSESH D1.1 Requirements for eSESH services and systems [Online]. Available: http://esesh.eu/outputs/ European Commission (2007) Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament: an energy policy for Europe, COM (2007) 1 final [Online]. Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri¼COM:2007:0001:FIN:EN:PDF European Commission (2009) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 7 measures for 2 Million new EU Jobs: low carbon eco efficient & cleaner economy for European citizens, COM (2009), draft European Commission (2010) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – energy 2020 a strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy, COM (2010) 639 final, [Online]. Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? uri¼CELEX:52010DC0639:EN:NOT Page 19 of 22

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European Commission (2011a) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – a resource-efficient Europe – flagship initiative under the Europe 2020 Strategy, COM (2011) 21 final, [Online]. Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? uri¼COM:2011:0021:FIN:EN:PDF European Commission (2011b) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: energy efficiency plan 2011, COM(2011) 109 final [Online]. Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri¼COM:2011:0109:FIN:EN:PDF European Environment Agency (2011) Final energy consumption by sector (CSI 027/ENER 016) [Online]. Available: http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/final-energyconsumption-by-sector-1/final-energy-consumption-by-sector-6 European Environment Agency (2013) Achieving energy efficiency through behaviour change: what does it take? (Technical report No 5/2013) [Online]. Available: http://www.eea.europa.eu/ publications/achieving-energy-efficiency-through-behaviour European Smart Metering Alliance (2010) Annual report on the progress in Smart Metering 2009 [Online]. Available: http://www.eaci-projects.eu/iee/fileshow.jsp?att_id¼13064&place¼pa&url¼ESMA_Annual_Report_2009.pdf&prid¼1564 Faiers A, Cook M, Neame C (2007) Towards a contemporary approach for understanding consumer behaviour in the context of domestic energy use. Energy Policy 35(8):4381–4390 Fischer C (2008) Feedback on household electricity consumption: a tool for saving energy? Energy Effic 1(1):79–104 Gram-Hanssen K (2013) Efficient technologies or user behaviour, which is the more important when reducing households’ energy consumption? Energy Effic 6:447–457 Haas R (1997) Energy efficiency indicators in the residential sector: what do we know and what has to be ensured? Energy Policy 25(7–8):789–802 Heslop LA, Moran L, Cousineau A (1981) “Consciousness” in energy conservation behavior: an exploratory study. J Consum Res 8:299–305 Janda K. (2009) Exploring the social dimensions of energy use: a review of recent research initiatives. ECEEE 2009 summer study. pp 1841–1852. Available: http://www.eceee.org/ library/conference_proceedings/eceee_Summer_Studies/2009/Panel_8/8.300 Joint Research Centre – Institute for Energy (2011) Smart grid projects in Europe: lessons learned and current development, Reference Report [Online]. Available: http://ses.jrc.ec.europa.eu/sites/ses/ files/documents/smart_grid_projects_in_europe_lessons_learned_and_current_developments.pdf Markowitz EM, Malle BF (2012) Did you see that? Making sense of environmentally relevant behavior. Ecopsychology 4:37–50 Matsukawa I (2004) The effects of information on residential demand for electricity. Energy J 25(1):1–17 Matthies E (2005) Wie können PsychologInnen ihr Wissen besser an die PraktikerIn bringen? Vorschlag eines neuen, integrativen Einflussschemas umweltgerechten Alltagshandelns. Umweltpsychologie 9(1):62–81 McCaley LT (2006) From motivation and cognition theories to everyday applications and back again: the case of product-integrated information and feedback. Energy Policy 34(2):129–137 Petersen J, Shunturov V, Janda K, Platt G, Weinberger K, Murray ME (2005) Does providing dormitory residents with feedback on energy and water use lead to reduced consumption?. Greening the campus VI, 15–17, Ball State University, Muncie Steg L (2008) Promoting household energy conservation. Energy Policy 36(12):4449–4453 Page 20 of 22

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Stromback J, Dromacque C, Yassin MH (2011) The potential of smart meter enabled programs to increase energy and systems efficiency: mass pilot comparison [Online]. VaasaETT, Available: http://www.esmig.eu/press/filestor/empower-demand-report.pdf Wang JH (2011) Behavioral policy modelling: consumer behavior impacts on residential energy consumption [Online]. Available: http://www.spp.gatech.edu/faculty/WOPRpapers/Wang. WOPR11.pdf

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Index Terms: Behavior 2, 4–5, 11, 13, 15 Consumption feedback 3, 5, 9, 15 Energy efficiency 2, 4, 7–11, 17 Low-income housing 2–3, 11 Mediterranean 2–4, 7, 9, 12, 17 Smart Metering 2, 5, 7–8, 10, 14

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Development and Application of Good Practice Criteria for Evaluating Adaptation Measures Christian Kinda*, Andreas Vetterb and Rupert Wronskic a adelphi, Berlin, Germany b Federal Environment Agency (UBA), Dessau-Rosslau, Germany c Green Budget Germany, Berlin, Germany

Abstract Decision-makers on different levels face an information deficit with regard to choosing promising adaptation measures. While the ever present concept of good practice may prove helpful in closing this gap, the term is often poorly defined. Therefore, this article attempts to substantiate the concept of good practice in climate change adaptation by developing a set of key criteria for evaluating adaptation measures. This potentially leads to sounder decision-making and a better transfer of experiences. By way of an extensive literature review, a variety of definitions and criteria for good practice in adaptation is revealed. Using predefined selection rules like non-redundancy, applicability, comprehensibility, completeness, and measurability, the identified criteria are condensed and then ranked by experts. This way, the article identifies six key evaluation criteria that should be considered when deciding whether an adaptation measure can be deemed good practice example or not. These are effectiveness, robustness, sustainability, financial feasibility, positive side effects, and flexibility. Subsequently, the set of criteria is illustrated by evaluating several good practice examples on the local level in Germany. Eventually, limits of the derived good practice criteria are discussed.

Keywords Climate change; Adaptation; Good practice; Set of criteria; Decision support; Adaptation measure

Introduction For many stakeholders involved, the development and implementation of climate change adaptation measures is a new challenge. It implies, inter alia, the necessity to react to already occurred climatic changes and to yet uncertain future changes (Bedsworth and Hanak 2010). In the face of this uncertainty, public and private stakeholders may find it difficult to develop suitable measures to adapt to climate change impacts or determine which of the potentially available measures are the most appropriate options (Hecht 2009). Learning from good examples for climate change adaptation is a promising approach to support stakeholders with the planning and implementation of measures. Today, the concept of good or best practice is already used frequently in the communication of experience gained in the context of climate change adaptation (Land Use Consultants et al. 2006; Islington Government n.d.). However, *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

at the same time, it has to be noted that the use of the concept of good practice is often vague and unspecific (Jennings 2007) requiring further research to specify the concept of good practice in the context of climate change adaptation (Foster et al. 2011). For an effective and inspiring communication of a good adaptation practice, it seems necessary to substantiate the concept of good practice. A transparent approach to this lies in the development of a set of criteria, which can be applied to evaluating adaptation measures to determine whether respective actions constitute a good practice. Thus, the objective of this article is to identify good practice criteria for climate change adaptation measures in the context of industrialized countries, such as Germany. Relevant publications and websites are analyzed for that purpose. The research is based on preparatory work on the prioritization of adaptation measures carried out by the Federal Environment Agency (Tröltzsch et al. 2011, 2012; Kind et al. 2011). A consistent and compact set of criteria for good practice is derived on the basis of literature research and inputs from an expert survey. The focus is not so much the analysis of individual examples of good practice as such, but rather the highlighting of general criteria of good practice that help identify measures as good practice. The particular measure and its nature or effects are more at the center of attention than the process of identifying or implementing the measures (as opposed to, e.g., the guiding principles for adaptation by Prutsch et al. 2010). Measures for the application of the set of criteria are primarily spatially and temporally defined activities that directly reduce risks of climate change and often have a more technical or structural nature. Informatory or regulatory measures are, however, not in the focus.

Pervasiveness and Challenges of the Good Practice Concept Good practice usually describes a procedure that is considered exemplary and worthy of imitation because it has proven to be suitable and extremely successful in certain situations (UNESCAP 2012). The term practice refers to a measure, a strategy, a specific procedure, an approach, a methodology, a technique, a system, or a process (UNESCAP 2012). The good practice concept is an extenuated form of the best practice concept (Krems 2012). The identification and communication of good or best practice is carried out with the aim of using these initiatives as inspirational guidelines for the decision-making process in similar contexts. Due to the fact that it is often difficult or virtually impossible to determine a solution that is the only and best solution in terms of all objectives and all criteria, the good practice concept meets factual restrictions and demands better than the best practice concept. Therefore, the following remarks refer to good practice. Although there are a variety of publications such as scientific articles or practical manuals and guidelines for adaptation measures, there are only few approaches for a systematization and evaluation of good practice in the context of adaptation measures (Abegg 2008; Laaser et al. 2009; de França Doria et al. 2009; Eriksen et al. 2011). However, in the field of climate change adaptation, it can be useful for decision-makers to review or develop envisaged activities with the help of concise criteria in order to ensure that the plans follow recognized standards for good adaptation. The development of a set of criteria to assess good adaptation practices is meant to provide private and public stakeholders with some guidance for climate change adaptation. In the following, set of criteria refers to a group of defined criteria, which an adaptation activity should meet in order to be deemed good practice, i.e., exemplary and worthy of imitation. This plan is, however, subject to four key challenges. First, the explicit consideration of climate change in different activities constitutes a very recent practice. For that reason, there is only little data available when it comes to defining successful adaptation and establishing why certain Page 2 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

activities taken were particularly successful. Second, good practice criteria must ensure a balance between abstractness and concreteness in order to cover as many different areas of activity as possible and provide a sufficient guidance function for the planning or evaluation of measures. Third, experience with successful adaptation gained in other contexts, e.g., agriculture in a developing country, cannot be transferred unconditionally to the aforementioned scope of this article, which concentrates on industrialized countries. Fourth, the good practice criteria should be defined in a way that ensures that their implementation can be verified without an unreasonable effort. At the same time, however, the definitions must be sufficiently specific in order to avert unwarranted and objectively unfounded positive reviews of good practice. In order to address these challenges, the identification of criteria within this research included manifold sources from industrialized countries. In addition, the subsequent choice of criteria was also based on interviews with experts from different subject areas to ensure a broad thematic validation of the selected criteria. Furthermore, the test application of the criteria toward the end of the article also discusses the risks that transferring good practice involves.

Methodology In general, there are different potential approaches to identify a set of good practice criteria. One can roughly distinguish between three general approaches (Jennings 2007): the consideration of expert opinions, the analysis of theoretical literature, and the analysis of empirical evidence. In the first approach, a number of experts in the field of climate change adaptation are asked to name criteria that they think an adaptation measure has to fulfill to be considered a good practice. In the second approach, good practice criteria are derived from an analysis of relevant literature and the criteria that are mentioned in these publications. The last approach requires the analysis of successful adaptation measures for deducing common characteristics that were essential for their success. To make use of the strengths of each of the approaches, the development of a set of good practice criteria in this article is based on the combination of an analysis of theoretical literature and the incorporation of judgments of experts from the field of climate change adaptation. The derived criteria set is then applied to a number of implemented measures to test for their applicability. This particular path has been adopted since there are only very few empirical studies concerning the success of adaptation measures. The derivation of a set of practical criteria for the identification of good practices in climate change adaptation is based on seven consecutive steps. A large number of criteria that are deemed to define good practice are identified through a comprehensive literature search in relevant journals, monographs, and websites (1). Subsequently, these criteria are divided into thematic categories (2) and preselected according to predefined selection principles (3). The subsequent expert evaluation is used to prioritize and reduce the discussed criteria (4). An argumentative analysis then compiles a draft set of criteria (5). In order to test the applicability of the set, a number of adaptation measures will be evaluated tentatively considering the criteria developed (6). Following this test, the paper will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the good practice approach in general and the set of criteria in particular (7).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Identified Categories and Criteria of Good Practice As a basis for the identification of good practice criteria in the context of adaptation, 48 documents that touch on the characteristics of good adaptation in industrialized countries were identified with the help of a keyword search in a bibliographic database and evaluated subsequently. The majority of the identified sources are research papers or guidelines that have been funded by public bodies with a slight focus on publications stemming from Germany. Table 1 provides an overview of the 31 identified good practice criteria for the evaluation of adaptation measures or strategies. Because of duplications in terms of the mentioned criteria, only 21 of the 48 analyzed documents are specified in this table. For reasons of clarity, the table lists only that particular definition which the authors found to provide the most relevant explanation, regardless of the fact that some of the criteria have several descriptions. This overall view reflects the broad scope of the identified good practice criteria. The criteria have been sorted thematically in Table 1. The identified criteria were divided into the following categories: goals, goal achievement, costs and incentives, dealing with uncertainty, consideration of side effects and other objectives, consideration of stakeholders, as well as the collective category miscellaneous. This method was chosen in order to structure the variety of criteria used in the literature and thus establish key issues, which can be evaluated subsequently by experts. Table 1 does not only reflect the large range of potential criteria. It also indicates that these criteria or principles address different stakeholders: some authors refer to practitioners who deal with the implementation of measures, and others address policymakers who shape the strategic framework for adaptation measures. Furthermore, also the analyzed subject matter varies: to some extent, the analyses address rather comprehensive adaptation strategies, while others address more concrete measures. Linguistically, it can be noted that some sources adopt an evaluation perspective (“Was the adaptation strategy developed with the participation of all stakeholders concerned?”) or provide practical guidelines (“Adaptation strategies should take concerned stakeholders into account”). Other sources, however, specify particular characteristics (“flexible”) or effects of adaptation measures (“effective”). An evaluation of the 48 sources analyzed throughout the project shows that 25 sources (approximately 52 %) do not provide any information as to how the authors actually derived the criteria. In 16 (33 %) of the analyzed publications, the criteria are exclusively derived from literature searches and evaluations. Considering expert consultations (6 cases) or carrying out own investigations or resorting to own experiences with climate impacts and adaptation (2 cases) – however, only played a minor role – in total, this only amounts to approximately 15 % of the analyzed sources. Overall, the analysis shows that in spite of several guidelines and brochures found throughout the research, practical experiences or expert interviews are only scarcely used for the purpose of establishing evaluation criteria for good practice in the area of adaptation. In many sources, the plausibility and thus the validity of the results is relatively small due to the lack of information on the methodology of deriving the criteria. Although the limited experience with climate change adaptation measures justifies such an approach to some extent, it does not explain why expert assessments are not increasingly taken into account. Against this background, expert opinions on the criteria of good practice seem to be of particular importance.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 1 Evaluation criteria for good practice of climate change adaptation Criterion GOALS Clear objectives Verifiable indicators

Description Develop and communicate verifiable goals for the adaptation project (UBA 2010) Qualitative or quantitative evaluation of the different adaptation options is available (F€ unfgeld and Mc Evoy 2011)

GOAL ACHIEVEMENT Effectiveness The degree of goal achievement or the likelihood that goals are achieved (UNECE 2009) Feasibility The measure is practical, i.e., the adaptation is not limited significantly by institutional, social, cultural, financial, or technological barriers (Smit and Pilifosova 2001) Strategic importance The course of action especially addresses seriously affected and endangered regions or areas of activity; the option has a reliable and long-term, goal-oriented effect (risk reduction); the option averts irreversible and dramatic damages (Vetter and Schauser 2013) COSTS AND INCENTIVES Efficiency Do the benefits of the adaptation’s effects outweigh the costs and the expenditures of the measure (UBA 2010)? Dynamic incentive Does the measure entail a dynamic incentive toward a better adaptability or does it merely have a one-time effect (Tröltzsch et al. 2011)? UNCERTAINTIES Flexibility The measure can be modified or further developed; in case of a change of circumstances, the measure can be reversed (Vetter and Schauser 2013) Dealing with uncertainties The scope of potential future climate changes is taken into account (UBA 2010) Reversibility The measure can be reversed without causing unreasonable costs (definition following Prutsch et al. 2010) No regret measures The implementation of the measure is recommendable, irrespective of the climatic developments (De Bruin et al. 2009) Robustness The measure is effective not only in the context of one scenario but also under the different future climatic conditions (Hallegatte 2009) Resilience Measures that broaden the possibilities to prevent climate change and recover from its impacts (Land Use Consultants, Oxford Brookes University, CAG Consultants, Gardiner and Theobald 2006) SIDE EFFECTS AND INTEGRATION Sustainability Risks and measures are assessed by taking into account the interactions between economic capacity, social responsibility, and environmental protection; actions are aligned accordingly (following Bundesregierung 2011) Positive side effects The measure supports or does not conflict with goals of other federal strategies (sustainability, biodiversity, climate protection, etc.); it has positive side effects in different areas of action (Vetter and Schauser 2013) Win-win effects Apart from their immediate effects, adaptation measures can entail further benefits also in other areas (Smit and Pilifosova 2001); win-win effects are often mentioned in the context of adaptation and climate protection measures (IFOK 2009) Avoiding negative side Adaptation measures can have unintentional negative effects on humans and the effects environment; these should be avoided by following sustainable adaptation strategies and measures (Eriksen et al. 2011) Integration If possible, measures should be integrated into an adaptation strategy and a multi-sectoral policy (Doswald and Osti 2011) Mainstreaming Integration of climate change adaptation into all relevant planning processes and development strategies (IFOK 2009) (continued)

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 1 (continued) Criterion PARTICIPATION Participation Cooperation Informative supervision Political and cultural acceptability

Equity

MISCELLANEOUS Innovativeness Priorities Long-term perspective Evidence-based adaptation Transferability Subsidiarity

Urgency

Description Systematic involvement of all relevant stakeholders (IFOK 2009) The capacity to establish good relations with other stakeholders; capacity to cooperate; capacity to deal with and resolve conflicts (Grothmann and Siebenh€uner 2012) Develop an understanding and knowledge of climate changes, define climate risks and critical thresholds (UBA 2010) Social acceptance: to what extent do the affected social spheres accept the respective measure? Political acceptance: which degree of support can the measure expect at the political level? In that context, it has to be taken into consideration that the political acceptance is often closely linked to the social acceptance (Tröltzsch et al. 2012) The effect (regarding costs and benefits) the adaptation activity has on various sectors, socioeconomic groups, and countries/regions and its temporal dimension should be taken into account (Feenstra et al. 1998) Climate adaptation measures are particularly effective when they are innovative – technologically as well as institutionally (Rodima-Taylor et al. 2012) Measures should address particularly important climate risks and chances (UKCIP 2005) Continuity in terms of planning and implementation and regular goal verification (following IFOK 2009) Use of the most recent research results, data, and practical experience in order to guarantee well-founded and informed decisions (DEFRA 2010) The measure can be applied also to other regions (cp. Prutsch et al. 2010) Required adaptation measures have to consider regional differences; in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, they should be adopted and implemented at the most appropriate decision-making level. Strengthening the individual responsibility is an important guiding principle. Precautionary measures taken by other adaptation stakeholders ought to be promoted (Bundesregierung 2011) Urgency of the options refers to the need implementing the adaptation option immediately or whether it is possible to defer action to a later point in time (van Ierland et al. 2007, p. 258)

Applying Selection Principles All of the seven established categories (goals, goal achievement, costs and incentives, dealing with uncertainty, consideration of side effects and other objectives, consideration of stakeholders, and the collective category miscellaneous) can be considered of relevance for the identification of good practice because each category covers several criteria mentioned a number of times in the literature. However, within the respective categories, there are considerable overlaps between some of the criteria. Some of the 31 identified criteria are rather different in nature. Due to their variety and scope, they would hardly have a useful guiding effect when compiled as a set. Such an effect can only emerge if duplications are reduced, inapplicable criteria are sorted out, and definitions are specified. In order to identify particularly central criteria of good practice, selection principles will be used in the following to determine which criterion from one category can be deemed the most relevant. In three of seven cases, several criteria from the same category will be chosen (within the categories dealing with uncertainty, consideration of side effects and further objectives, and miscellaneous), since their respective content differs sufficiently from the other criteria’s content (e.g., flexibility and Page 6 of 19

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robustness, sustainability, positive side effects and integrated approach/integration or innovativeness, and evidence-based adaptation). In the remaining four cases (the categories goals, goal achievement, costs and incentives, and consideration of stakeholders), it was possible to identify just one criterion that is representative of the other criteria of that respective category. In line with Abegg (2008), selection criteria for a preselection are: • Applicability/feasibility – the criterion can be applied to as many measures as possible. • Clarity/comprehensibility – the criterion’s intention is clear and distinct. • Assessability/measurability – the quality and quantitative scope of the measure’s effect can be verified. • Non-redundancy – no criterion overlaps with other criteria so that duplications and overvaluations of individual aspects are avoided. • Completeness – the set of criteria covers all important aspects; at the same time, it is concise and manageable. The arguments for and against each of the criteria can be found in Table 2. To begin with, a large number of criteria were sorted out due to a violation of the requirement of non-redundancy in favor of other, superior, or broader criteria. In fact, 12 of the 20 criteria were sorted out because of a violation of this principle. The most important categories within which it was possible to integrate and thereby sort out several of the identified criteria are the following: dealing with uncertainty (4 criteria), consideration of side effects and other objectives (3 criteria), and consideration of stakeholders (3 criteria). In the abovementioned cases, the contents of the different criteria are so closely related (e.g., dealing with uncertainties, reversibility, no regret measures, and resilience) that it seemed reasonable to integrate them into the most comprehensive concept (which in this case was flexibility). The same applies to the category consideration of side effects and other objectives within which different criteria (win-win effects, negative side effects, mainstreaming) were summarized in the category either positive side effects or sustainability. The criteria cooperation, informative supervision, and political and cultural acceptability were summarized within the category consideration of stakeholders (covered by the criterion of participation). Furthermore, two criteria (verifiable indicators and strategic importance) were sorted out within the categories goals and goal achievement. Additionally, several other criteria were sorted out due to a violation of the selection principle applicability/feasibility. Thus, five of the 20 criteria were sorted out because of a violation of this principle: within the category miscellaneous, the criteria subsidiarity and urgency were discarded. Furthermore, the criteria feasibility, dynamic incentives, and equity were sorted out from different categories. The remaining three criteria that were sorted out entailed violations of the following selection criteria: assessability/measurability (the criteria priorities and transferability) and clarity/ comprehensibility (the criterion of long-term perspective). The 31 identified criteria have already been assigned to seven categories (goals, goal achievement, costs and incentives, dealing with uncertainties, consideration of side effects and other objectives, consideration of stakeholders, miscellaneous). The number of identified criteria was reduced from 31 to 11 with the help of the selection criteria. Table 2 summarizes the selection process for the reduction of the identified criteria which were then presented to adaptation experts for further evaluation.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 2 Overview of the selection process to select a reduced set of criteria Criterion Compatibility with selection principles GOALS Clear objectives Yes Verifiable No: (1) non-redundancy principle is not met; indicators for significant overlaps with the criterion “clear goal achievement objectives” GOAL ACHIEVEMENT Effectiveness Yes Feasibility No: (1) applicability/feasibility (unnecessary in the context of evaluating already implemented measures); (2) clarity/comprehensibility (before the actual implementation, it is slightly unclear under which circumstances a measure can be held to be realizable); (3) non-redundancy (feasibility and transferability are closely connected) Strategic No: (1) applicability/feasibility (the criterion importance focuses on a prioritization of measures rather than an identification of good practice) COSTS AND INCENTIVES Efficiency Yes Dynamic No: (1) applicability/feasibility (suitable for incentive comprehensive policy instruments but not for implementation measures) UNCERTAINTIES Flexibility Yes Dealing with No: (1) non-redundancy (content overlaps with the uncertainties criteria “flexibility,” “reversibility,” “no regret measures,” “robustness,” and “resilience”); (2) clarity/comprehensibility (very general, procedural criterion) Reversibility No: (1) non-redundancy (content overlaps significantly with the criteria “flexibility,” “no regret measures,” “robustness,” and “resilience”) No regret No: (1) non-redundancy (content overlaps measures significantly with the criteria “flexibility,” “dealing with uncertainties,” “positive side effects,” and “robustness”); (2) applicability/feasibility (not a criterion but rather a type of measure) Robustness Yes Resilience No: (1) clarity/comprehensibility or (2) non-redundancy (difficult to distinguish from the criterion “robustness”); (3) assessability/ measurability (does not actually describe a feature of adaptation measures but rather a complex and specific effect) SIDE EFFECTS AND INTEGRATION Sustainability Yes, even though the measurability is questionable

Conclusions Adoption for expert consultation Sort out in favor of the criterion “clear objectives” because that criterion has a better applicability Adoption for expert consultation Sort out because several selection criteria are not met

Sort out because the selection criterion applicability/feasibility is not met

Adoption for expert consultation Sort out in favor of the criterion “efficiency” because the latter is more exhaustive and comprehensive Adoption for expert consultation Sort out in favor of the criterion “flexibility” because that criterion is more precise and descriptive

Sort out in favor of the criterion “flexibility” because that criterion is comprehensive and also covers reversibility Sort out in favor of the criteria “flexibility” and “positive side effects” because both can be held to constitute features of measures, whereas no regret refers to a number of measures Adoption for expert consultation Sort out in favor of the criterion “robustness”

Adoption for expert consultation (continued)

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 2 (continued) Criterion Positive side effects Win-win effects

Compatibility with selection principles Yes

No: (1) non-redundancy (content overlaps significantly with the criteria “positive side effects” and “robustness”); (2) applicability/ feasibility (not a criterion but rather a type of measure) Avoiding negative No: (1) non-redundancy (overlaps with the criteria side effects “positive side effects” and “sustainability”) Integration Yes Mainstreaming No: (1) non-redundancy; clarity/comprehensibility (overlaps significantly with the criterion “integration”) PARTICIPATION Participation Yes Cooperation No: (1) non-redundancy (overlaps with the criterion “participation”) Informative No: (1) applicability/feasibility (not relevant for supervision every measure) Political and No: (1) non-redundancy (overlaps with the cultural criterion “participation”); (2) applicability/ acceptability feasibility (“good practice” should be evaluated regardless of the political will for implementation) Equity No: (1) non-redundancy (overlaps with the criterion “participation”) MISCELLANEOUS Innovativeness Yes Priorities No: (1) assessability/measurability (much contextual knowledge is required in order to be able to assess the fulfillment of the criterion – which regions? which temporal scope?); (2) applicability/feasibility (more suitable for a prioritization of measures); (3) non-redundancy (closely linked to the criterion “evidence-based adaptation”) Long-term No: (1) clarity/comprehensibility (criterion is perspective unclear)

Evidence-based adaptation Transferability

Yes No: (1) assessability/measurability (much contextual knowledge is required in order to be able to assess the fulfillment of the criterion – applicable to whom? with what effort?); (2) clarity/comprehensibility

Conclusions Adoption for expert consultation Sort out in favor of the criterion “positive side effects”

Sort out in favor of the criteria “sustainability” and “positive side effects” Adoption for expert consultation Sort out in favor of the criterion “integration”

Adoption for expert consultation Sort out in favor of the criterion “participation” Sort out in favor of the criterion “participation” Sort out in favor of the criterion “participation”

Sort out in favor of the criterion “participation” Adoption for expert consultation Sort out because the criterion focuses on a prioritization of measures rather than an identification of good practice

Sort out due to the fact that it is unclear whether the criterion refers to (a) the longevity of a measure or (b) the long-term effects of climate change Adoption for expert consultation Sort out due to the fact that too much contextual knowledge regarding the circumstances to which the criterion should be transferred is required (continued)

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 2 (continued) Criterion Subsidiarity

Urgency

Compatibility with selection principles No: (1) applicability/feasibility (the criterion is irrelevant for local/regional measures); (2) non-redundancy (participation) No: (1) applicability/feasibility (the criterion focuses on a prioritization of measures rather than an identification of good practice); (2) assessability/measurability (much contextual knowledge is required in order to be able to assess the fulfillment of the criterion)

Conclusions Sort out because it is irrelevant for local/ regional measures and is closely linked to participation Sort out because the criterion focuses on a prioritization of measures rather than an identification of good practice

Results A compact set of criteria is developed on the basis of the preselection of good practice criteria in the previous section and under consideration of experts from different scientific and practical fields. The expert opinions were determined with the help of questionnaires. For that purpose, eight climate change experts from German-speaking regions and with different professional backgrounds were asked to assess the preselection of eleven criteria in view of the following specifications: 1 point ¼ less important (an adaptation measure can be deemed to be exemplary without meeting this criterion), 2 points ¼ important (meeting this criterion is important for the measure’s exemplary nature), 3 points ¼ of crucial importance (a measure does not have an exemplary nature unless it meets this criterion), and further option (I do not understand this criterion). In addition to evaluating the criteria, the experts were also asked to answer a few questions. The objective was to establish the appropriate scope of the set of criteria, optimize the comprehensibility of the respective criteria, and examine whether important criteria are missing and whether the content of individual criteria overlaps. Table 3 shows how the experts rated the individual criteria. The criteria are ranked according to their average rating. The differently colored sections reflect the evaluations of the expert consultations. Because there were differing evaluations of some criteria, the table also indicates the standard deviation: the closer the figure is to the number 1, the stronger the expert assessments varied. However, if the figure is zero, there was a consensus among the experts. Additionally, the table indicates also the median and mode in order to meet the frequently rather high standard deviation. Especially where the results are particularly scattered, these parameters have a greater significance than the arithmetic mean. Table 3 is divided into four areas differentiated by color: (1) Out of the eleven criteria the experts evaluated, the three criteria marked in red received the lowest ratings. The respective criteria are integration, innovativeness, and evidence-based adaptation. Their average rating is much lower than the medium answer category awarding two points. In all three cases, also the median and the mode were awarded with less than or exactly two points. (2) The four following categories marked in orange received an average, median, and mode close to two points. These criteria are positive side effects, efficiency, participation, and flexibility. (3) The criterion clear objectives that is marked in yellow approximates the leading group. While its average is in the upper middle range, its median and mode are already in the leading group. However, the standard deviation is relatively high. (4) The leading group is marked in green. It includes the criteria effectiveness, robustness, and sustainability. These criteria received positive ratings for the categories average, median, and mode.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 3 Results of the expert consultations, sorted according to the arithmetic mean Criterion

Evaluation Average

Median

Mode

Standard deviation

Effectiveness

2,63

3

3

0,74

Robustness

2,50

3

3

0,76

Sustainability

2,50

2,5*

2,5*

0,53

Clear objectives

2,25

2,5*

3

0,89

Positive side effects

2,25

2

2

0,71

Efficiency

2,13

2

2

0,64

Participation

2,09

2

2

0,59

Flexibility

2,00

2

2

0,76

Integration

1,66

1,65**

1

0,72

Innovativeness

1,54

1,5*

1,5*

0,58

Evidencebased adaptation

1,50

2

2

0,76

* These evaluations indicate decimal places because it was impossible to determine a distinct value if, for example, the number of times the ratings “2” and “3” were given is the same (“Most frequent rating” therefore “2,5”). ** This rating came up because an expert extended the given scale and used decimal places himself/herself.

In addition to the evaluation of the criteria, the results of the expert consultations also provided information on the designation and definition of some criteria. Against this background, some of the criteria were renamed and provided with amended definitions. For the further identification of the set of criteria, the following criteria were renamed: • Evidence-based adaptation ¼ > climate knowledge-based adaptation • Participation ¼ > legitimacy • Efficiency ¼ > financial feasibility To ensure a transparent renaming, the criteria are referred to both with their previous and with their new denotation (e.g., “efficiency/financial feasibility”). In view of the definition of flexibility, it was noted by an expert that the definition’s focus on costs is too narrow because transaction and opportunity costs should be taken into account, too (e.g., the period of time required to agree on the readjustment of a measure). The definition of sustainability was partially held to be linked too closely to the economic development. Therefore, the definition was broadened accordingly. The notion of efficiency/financial feasibility should also be accentuated differently because two elements of the original definition were repeatedly addressed: firstly, it was noted that it is usually not easy to determine the relationship between costs and benefits due to insufficient data, and secondly, those who implement a measure may find that the costs and benefits relation is often less relevant than the absolute costs and the related question of whether it is

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 4 Expert answers concerning the optimal number of criteria Number of criteria Number of times mentioned

3 1

4 1

5 5

6 3

7 4

8 2

9 1

10 1

affordable at all. Therefore, a stronger focus on the overall financial viability and the benefits of financially comparable measures seems appropriate. In view of the criterion positive side effects, it was noted that its narrow focus neglects positive effects on the environment. Accordingly, the definition has been broadened. The definition of effectiveness was amended so as to focus less on the terminology “probability”; the aspect of entailed opportunities has been explicitly included in order to contribute to a broader understanding of the criterion. Furthermore, the experts were asked about what number of criteria for the set of criteria they assume to be manageable (Table 4). The values given range between three and ten criteria; the two smallest and the two highest values appear only once. Only the numbers five to eight were mentioned more than once. The most frequently mentioned value is five. The average of all answers is 6.28, and the median that amounted to six criteria has a similar dimension. Based on this survey, six criteria seem like a reasonable size for the set. Due to the relatively unanimous below-average rating of the criteria in the red group (integration, innovativeness, and evidence-based adaptation), they were excluded from the final set of criteria immediately. Therefore, eight potential candidates for the final set of criteria remain.

Final Set of Criteria Based on the expert survey, it was possible to define the criteria and the scope of the criteria set. The evaluation of each criterion enabled the rejection of three other criteria. Proceeding from here, a simple definition of the set of criteria based on the mean values of the evaluations does not seem sensible due to the relatively small number of consulted experts, the proximity of the evaluations, and the continued overlapping of contents. In order to ensure the objective of establishing a compact set of criteria, it is necessary to further reduce the number of criteria. In that regard, it is reasonable to consider the number of times the criteria were mentioned in the initial search and the standard deviations of the ratings. Although the clear objectives criterion has received an above-average rating, it also has the highest standard deviation, i.e., the consulted experts held differing views in that regard. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the distinct (or clear) objectives criterion was mentioned less often in the analyzed sources than the other eight criteria. For these two reasons, the clear objectives criterion seems the least relevant and will therefore not be included in the final set of criteria. The experts gave the criterion participation/legitimacy an average rating. Also, the number of times it was mentioned in the sources was average. The category consideration of stakeholders covers a relatively large number of criteria, which suggests that it generally constitutes a muchdiscussed aspect with great importance for the model nature of measures. Feedback given within the course of the expert survey emphasized, however, that participation is not an end in itself but rather a means to achieve legitimacy. Provided that legitimacy is ensured by other means, participation is therefore not always crucial for the model character of a measure. Thus, in comparison with the other criteria, this criterion appears to be less significant because it can be assumed that the majority of actions have sufficient legitimacy. Accordingly, the criterion participation/legitimacy will not be included in the final set of criteria.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 5 Final set of criteria for good practice in the field of adaptation Criterion Effectiveness

Robustness

Definition The measure reduces the risks of climate change and contributes to the permanent use of opportunities. The measure has positive effects under different climate scenarios.

Sustainability

The measure is well suited in terms of meeting all interests (economy, environment, society) and enables an environmentally and socially equitable development of society.

Financial feasibility

The adaptation measure is affordable for those who implement it, and alternative measures that cost the same do not yield higher benefits.

Positive side effects

In addition to the adaptation to climate change, the measure has further positive effects on the environment, the society, or the implementing organization and the achievement of its objectives. These take effect even without occurring climatic changes.

Flexibility

The measure can be modified with relatively low costs.

Example A logistics warehouse in a region that is highly prone to floods is moved to a higher location in the context of a restructuring of the company. A chemical company that uses cooling water from a watercourse sets up an alternative cooling process, which does not require water and can replace the water cooling system if necessary. This measure can ensure a smooth operation also in high summer, regardless of how the summer water levels are affected by climate change. On the occasion of renewing the road surface, an administrative district chooses heat-resistant asphalt with vegetable oil in the bitumen content. Although it is slightly more expensive, its production and overall longevity is more environmentally friendly than conventional asphalt. The installation of percolation basins in a development area as a precautionary measure to avert the effects of heavy precipitation was easily financed due to low investment costs and hardly any maintenance costs. Comparatively low-priced measures could not be identified. When selecting new suppliers, a tool manufacturer decides to choose companies that are closer to the production location than before. The shorter delivery routes reduce the risk of damages to the supply chain occurring due to extreme events. The lower absolute fuel consumption also contributes to climate protection. An organization that has been increasingly affected by extreme weather events in recent years insures itself against natural hazards. The selected insurance package can be terminated, reduced, or expanded annually.

Therefore, the remaining six criteria are included in the set of criteria for good practice in the field of adaptation (Table 5). Thus, the criteria in the set represent four of the seven categories of criteria – the categories goals, consideration of stakeholders, and miscellaneous are not taken into account. The categories dealing with uncertainties and consideration of side effects and other objectives are represented by two criteria. Although their respective contents contain some overlap, it seems reasonable in the light of the challenges of adapting to climate change to emphasize these two categories. At this stage, it still remains open how the set of criteria should be applied, i.e., whether a measure should, for example, meet all criteria or only a minimum number of criteria in order to be considered good practice. Furthermore, it was not investigated whether particular criteria have greater significance than others in terms of evaluating good practice for individual sectors or measures.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Application of Set of Criteria In 2010, the German Federal Environment Agency established a database for measures to adapt to climate change in Germany. By now, this database has about 110 entries. It documents measures whose implementation phase has begun or been completed already. To select the best examples among the entries, the Federal Environment Agency started a competition in 2011. The selection of the award-worthy measures was based on the criteria effectiveness and cost-benefit ratio, further benefits, participation and acceptance, feasibility, and transferability. It had, however, not yet been systematically investigated whether this set of criteria suffices when it comes to identifying a good practice in climate change adaptation. Based on the expanded, consolidated set of criteria outlined above, the adaptation measures in the database were then evaluated to test the applicability of these criteria. The specific conditions of the Federal Environment Agency’s database have to be taken into consideration. Adaptation measures included by external actors are the starting point for the evaluation. The entry of a measure follows a data entry form which has been provided by the Federal Environment Agency and addresses, for example, the following aspects: title, goal, and description of the measure, addressed climate impacts and fields of action, trade-offs and obstacles to implementation, participation, and financing. The evaluation had to deal with the following practical challenges: • The data entry form was not drafted in line with the subsequently identified set of criteria. • It does not require that all entry fields are filled in. • There are no requirements in terms of how detailed the description of the measure has to be, i.e., there is no guidance as to how to answer the individual questions of the form. • The type of measures vary; often, there are conceptual preparatory works or strategic inventory analyses which in fact only prepare the actual implementation of the measure. • Different stakeholders fill in the form. • The self-portrayal by the measure’s guarantor implicates that positive aspects are emphasized, while adverse effects may not be mentioned at all. After screening the database entries, 25 measures were found to be suitable for an application of the criteria set. Furthermore, the screening found that 27 measures could be evaluated by the good practice criteria at least to some extent. In general, the application of the criteria shows that they are primarily suited for spatial and structural implementation measures, i.e., approaches for adapting so-called “gray” and “green” infrastructure. This includes, for example, flood polders and renaturation of water meadows for preventive flood protection, climate-adapted forest conversion, urban fresh air corridors, and adaptation measures in buildings. In contrast, the application of the criteria to regulatory, informational, communicative, and decision support measures is not useful. While applying the criteria, the following aspects became apparent: • The criteria effectiveness, positive side effects, and flexibility could overall be evaluated reliably. • In many cases, it was not possible to apply robustness usefully; other cases only allowed for very general evaluations; however, in exceptional cases, the criterion was very relevant, for example, in the context of cooling through evaporation (cisterns) if potentially decreasing precipitation is not considered.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

• Often, it was not possible to evaluate the financial feasibility because the total costs of the project were unclear or not communicated; in addition, it was difficult and time-consuming to determine the respective benefit and to compare the benefit with the benefit of other measures. • The sustainability of several measures could not be portrayed in detail due to the fact that the term rather comprehensive and because its definition is relatively broad. • Overlaps between sustainability and positive side effects were identified. The main challenges when applying the criteria uncover the obvious methodological uncertainties. In view of several criteria, it is still unclear with which methodology they should be assessed. To this end, further research is required. Considering all criteria, a good practice measure was identified when all criteria were rated positively. In some cases, however, a practice can also be held to be good although individual criteria were not met. Robustness, for example, is an important criterion when it comes to long-term, costly infrastructure decisions. However, if a measure is flexible and its implementation is cost-efficient, its implementation may remain useful even if the measure cannot meet all potentially possible climate developments. In general, the set of criteria is suitable for the purpose of identifying good practice measures within the database of the Federal Environment Agency and to substantiate the preparation of the selection process. It contributes to the transparency of the evaluation process and covers important aspects that a suitable adaptation measure should fulfill. In order to provide an overall judgment on the basis of the individual evaluations of the criteria, a further consultation of experts considering the respective field of action seems appropriate to further consolidate the results.

Conclusion In addition to suggesting a set of criteria, the derivation of good practice criteria entailed further conclusions. The research of criteria used in the literature in view of good adaptation has shown that the sources only very rarely relied on practical observations or opinions of other experts in order to justify the adopted criteria. So far, very limited experience with the effect of adaptation measures can be deemed to constitute a reason for the limited consideration of empirical data. Another reason can be seen in the fact that the majority of the criteria are very general in nature and are important for the selection and implementation of appropriate measures also in other topical areas (e.g., efficiency, effectiveness, and participation). Their general desirability then might not call for elaborate definitions and justification in the literature on climate change adaptation. The challenge that arises when deriving a compact and easily applicable set of criteria is to justify which combination of the fewest number of criteria has the greatest relevance for the identification of good practice. The approach adopted here is based on a thematic grouping of the criteria followed by a selection of certain criteria on the basis of selection principles, which, for example, ruled out redundancies. Subsequently, experts evaluated the preselected criteria. In all three steps (grouping, preselection, and especially the evaluation by experts), the tension between the comprehensiveness of the respective definition and the comprehensibility of the criterion became apparent: the shorter and more abstract the description, the more difficult the evaluation within the preselection and the more frequent the different interpretations by the experts. It was not possible to dispel this tension in the final set of criteria. The application of the set of criteria to adaptation measures from the database of the German Federal Environment Agency has shown that the problem with briefly formulated criteria can often Page 15 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

not be resolved and the ratings thus forfeit their objectivity. In many cases, it was, for example, not possible to verify in detail the fulfillment of the rather abstract criterion “sustainability.” This is due to both the lack of detailed information about the measure and the less concrete definition of the criterion itself. The problem with criteria which do not have a sufficiently precise formulation or for which there is no transparent methodology to examine their implementation entails the risk of window dressing, i.e., the whitewashing of suboptimal adaptation measures by decorating them with the criteria. If, however, one would reformulate the criteria in terms of maximum precision, the original purpose of this set of criteria – practical assessment of good practice – could no longer be met. Due to the existing uncertainties, the set of criteria cannot provide final judgments in terms of the evaluation of good adaptation practice. It can, however, prepare the according decisions through the structure of the criteria. The set of criteria achieves this with its special focus on the two issues that play a significant role in the context of adaptation: dealing with uncertainties and consideration of side effects.

References Abegg B (2008) Developing evaluation scheme. cc.alps working paper. http://www.cipra.org/de/ klimaprojekte/cc.alps/090519eEvalSystemOnlineBa.pdf. Accessed 14 Feb 2013 Bedsworth LW, Hanak E (2010) Adaptation to climate change. A review of challenges and tradeoffs in six areas. J Am Plann Assoc 76:477–495 Bundesregierung (2011) Aktionsplan Anpassung der Deutschen Anpassungsstrategie an den Klimawandel, adopted by the parliament on 31. August 2011. http://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/ bmu-import/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/aktionsplan_anpassung_klimawandel_bf.pdf. Accessed 23 Mar 2013 De Bruin K, Dellink RB, Ruijs A, Bolwidt L, van Buuren A, Graveland J, de Groot RS, Kuikman PJ, Reinhard S, Roetter RP, Tassone VC (2009) Adapting to climate change in The Netherlands: an inventory of climate adaptation options and ranking of alternatives. Clim Change 95:23–45 De França Doria M, Boyd E, Tompkins EL, Adger WN (2009) Using expert elicitation to define successful adaptation to climate change. Environ Sci Policy 12:810–819 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, DEFRA (2010) Measuring adaptation to climate change – a proposed approach. http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/climate/documents/100219-measuring-adapt.pdf. Accessed 23 Mar 2013 Doswald N, Osti M (2011) Ecosystem-based approaches to adaptation and mitigation – good practice examples and lessons learned in Europe. BfN-Skripten 306. http://www.bfn.de/ fileadmin/MDB/documents/service/Skript_306.pdf. Accessed 31 Mar 2013 Eriksen S, Aldunce P, Bahinipati CS, D’Almeida Martins R, Molefe JI, Nhemachena C, O’Brien K, Olorunfemi F, Park J, Sygna L, Ulsrud K (2011) When not every response to climate change is a good one: identifying principles for sustainable adaptation. Climate Dev 3:7–20 Feenstra JF, Burton I, Smith JB, Tol RSJ (1998) Handbook on methods for climate change impact assessment and adaptation strategies. UNEP/Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam Foster J, Winkelman S, Lowe A (2011) Lessons learned on local climate adaptation from the urban leaders initiative. http://ccap.org/assets/LESSONS-LEARNED-ON-LOCAL-CLIMATE-

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ADAPTATION-FROM-THE-URBAN-LEADERS-ADAPTATION-INITIATIVE_CCAPFebruary-2011.pdf. Accessed 11 Aug 2013 F€unfgeld H, Mc Evoy D (2011) Framing climate change adaptation in policy and practice. VCCAR project: framing adaptation in the Victorian context. Working paper 1. http://www.climateaccess. org/sites/default/files/Funfgeld_Framing%20Climate%20Adaptation%20in%20Policy%20and %20Practice.pdf. Accessed 22 Jan 2013 Grothmann T, Siebenh€ uner B (2012) Reflexive governance and the importance of individual competencies – the case of adaptation to climate change in Germany. In: Brousseau E, Dedeurwaerdere T, Siebenh€ uner B (eds) Reflexive governance for global public goods. MIT-Press, Cambridge Hallegatte S (2009) Strategies to adapt to an uncertain climate change. Global Environ Chang 19:240–247 Hecht D (2009) Anpassung an den Klimawandel – Herausforderungen f€ ur Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Staat. Raumordn Raumforsch 67:157–169 IFOK and Meister Consultants Group (2009) Anpassung an den Klimawandel: Die unterschätzte Herausforderung. http://www.ifok.de/uploads/media/Pluspunkt_Klimastudie.pdf. Accessed 11 Jan 2013 Islington Government (n.d.) Climate change adaptation. Good practice guide 3. http://www.ukcip. org.uk/wordpress/wp-content/PDFs/LA_pdfs/CC_adaptation_gd_prac.pdf. Accessed 14 Jan 2013 Jennings ET Jr (2007) Best practices in public administration: how do we know them? How can we use them? Adm Si Manag Public 9:73–80 Kind C, Mohns T, Sartorius C (2011) Unterst€ utzung des Managements von Klimarisiken und -chancen. Umweltbundesamt, Dessau-Roßlau Krems B (2012) Gute Praxis-Beispiele (“Good Practice”). Article in the online administration dictionary olev.de. http://www.olev.de/g/good_practice.htm. Accessed 14 Feb 2013 Laaser C, Leipprand A, de Roo C, Vidaurre R (2009) Report on good practice measures for climate change adaptation in river basin management plans. http://icm.eionet.europa.eu/ETC_Reports/ Good_practice_report_final_ETC.pdf. Accessed 11 Jan 2013 Land Use Consultants, Oxford Brookes University, CAG Consultants, Gardiner and Theobald (2006) Adapting to climate change impacts – a good practice guide for sustainable communities. http://www.hertsdirect.org/infobase/docs/pdfstore/ccadapting.pdf. Accessed on 14 Feb 2013 Prutsch A, Grothmann T, Schauser I, Otto S, McCallum S (2010) Guiding principles for adaptation to climate change in Europe. ETC/ACC technical paper 2010/6. http://acm.eionet.europa.eu/ docs/ETCACC_TP_2010_6_guiding_principles_cc_adaptation.pdf. Accessed 14 Feb 2013 Rodima-Taylor D, Olwig MF, Chhetri N (2012) Adaptation as innovation, innovation as adaptation: an institutional approach to climate change. Appl Geogr 33:107–111 Smit B, Pilifosova O (2001) Adaptation to climate change in the context of sustainable development and equity. In: McCarthy JC, Canziani OF, Leary NA, Dokken DJ, White KS (eds) Climate change 2001: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge € Tröltzsch J, Görlach B, L€ uckge H, Peter M, Sartorius C (2011) Okonomische Aspekte der Anpassung an den Klimawandel. Literaturauswertung zu Kosten und Nutzen von Anpassungsmaßnahmen an den Klimawandel. Umweltbundesamt, Dessau-Roßlau Tröltzsch J, Görlach B, L€ uckge H, Peter M, Sartorious C (2012) Kosten und Nutzen von Anpassungsmaßnahmen an den Klimawandel – Analyse von 28 Anpassungsmaßnahmen in Deutschland. Umweltbundesamt, Dessau-Roßlau

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Umweltbundesamt, UBA (2010) Der Klimalotse – Leitfaden zur Anpassung an den Klimawandel. Leitlinien f€ ur erfolgreiche Anpassung. http://www.klimalotse.anpassung.net. Accessed 31 Mar 2013 United Kingdom Climate Impact Programme, UKCIP (2005) Identifying adaptation options. http:// www.ukcip.org.uk/wordpress/wp-content/PDFs/ID_Adapt_options.pdf. Accessed 21 Jan 2013 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, UNESCAP (2012) Good practices. http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/StrategyMandates/Strategy/practices.asp. Accessed 27 Feb 2013 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, UNECE (2009) Guidance on water and adaptation to climate change. United Nations, Geneva Van Ierland EC, de Bruin K, Dellink RB, Ruijs A (2007) A qualitative assessment of climate adaptation options and some estimates of adaptation costs. http://www.levenmetwater.nl/static/ media/files/Adaptatiestrategien.pdf. Accessed 14 Jan 2013 Vetter A, Schauser I (2013) Anpassung an den Klimawandel – Priorisierung von Maßnahmen innerhalb der Deutschen Anpassungsstrategie. GAIA 22:248–254

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Index Terms: Adaptation 1–5, 13 Adaptation measures 1–2, 4, 14 Climate change 1–3, 5, 10, 14 Decision support 2 Good practice 1 Set of criteria 2, 10–12

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_21-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Enhancing Biodiversity Co-benefits of Adaptation to Climate Change K. Moritaa* and K. Matsumotob a Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University, Fujisawa, Kanagawa, Japan b School of Environmental Science, The University of Shiga Prefecture, Hikone, Shiga, Japan

Abstract We explore effective management of the interplay between the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) to enhance the biodiversity co-benefits of adaptation. By using the framework of interplay management in environmental governance, this research analyzes (1) the interactions between the UNFCCC and the CBD via ecosystem-based adaptation discussions, interactions that could reduce negative impacts and enhance positive effects on biodiversity, and (2) the efforts of the relevant actors in these interactions. We show that the CBD is addressing tangible ecosystem-based adaptation issues and that the UNFCCC refers to these efforts. However, there is limited explicit collaboration between the two Conventions because of their different characteristics. The key actors who are especially important in efforts to strengthen linkages between the two agencies with respect to ecosystembased adaptation are the UNFCCC and CBD secretariats; the Joint Liaison Group (JLG), which links national adaptation programs of action and national biodiversity strategies and action plans; multilateral aid agencies such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) that serve as financial mechanisms to UNFCCC and CBD; and national government ministries that address environmental problems in developing countries and can coordinate relevant actors at the national level.

Keywords Ecosystem-based adaptation; Interplay management; UNFCCC; CBD

Introduction Climate change and biodiversity issues are interlinked, although they are addressed by distinct governing bodies. Climate change needs to be considered within biodiversity conservation action because climate change affects biodiversity. Similarly, aspects of biodiversity conservation must be part of climate change mitigation and adaptation because if not well planned, these activities could impact biodiversity negatively. This chapter explores the management of interaction between climate change and biodiversity governance agents, with a focus on adaptation. Adaptation is a response to climate change, and it can influence biodiversity in positive or negative ways. Although the primary institutional frameworks of adaptation currently fall under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), reducing the negative impacts and enhancing their positive effects of adaptation on biodiversity are within the purview of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Successful

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_21-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

management of the interaction between climate change and biodiversity governance agents could maximize the positive effects of adaptation in terms of both climate change and biodiversity. This research uses the framework of interplay management in the field of international politics, which focuses on efforts by relevant actors to address and improve institutional interaction and its effects (Stokke 2001; Oberth€ ur 2009; Oberth€ ur and Stokke 2011). This chapter analyzes the negotiation processes and relationships of the UNFCCC and the CBD, with a focus on ecosystem-based adaptation. Ecosystem-based adaptation applies biodiversity and ecosystem services as part of an overall strategy of response to the adverse effects of climate change (SCBD 2009). It can not only play a role in reducing climate change impacts but could provide social, cultural, economic, and biodiversity co-benefits. The CBD has been developing tangible, ecosystem-based adaptation activities, and the UNFCCC acknowledges these efforts. There is however limited explicit collaboration between them because of their different mandates, negotiation processes, and actors involved. This chapter goes on to analyze the key actors involved in efforts to improve collaboration and implementation of ecosystem-based adaptation. These actors include the UNFCCC and CBD secretariats, parties to the UNFCCC and CBD (national governments of developing countries), aid agencies, and NGOs. Our analysis identifies efforts to improve institutional interactions between the UNFCCC and CBD.

Increase Positive and Minimize Negative Effects of Adaptation on Biodiversity In most cases, adaptation can increase positive and reduce negative effects on biodiversity through such initiatives as environmental impact assessments, technology impact assessments, or strategic environmental assessments (SCBD 2009, p. 38). In this chapter, we focus on ecosystem approaches to adaption as defined above. Ecosystem-based adaptation may include sustainable management, conservation, and restoration of ecosystems as parts of an overall adaptation strategy that hopes to achieve social, economic, and cultural co-benefits for local communities (CBD Decision X/33). Table 1 presents examples of ecosystem-based adaptation measures that achieve co-benefits, including biodiversity. An example is mangrove conservation, which not only provides protection from storm surges, a rising sea level, and coastal inundation (thus addressing climate change issues) but also protects biodiversity and conserves the habitats and species that live and breed in mangrove areas. Ecosystem-based approaches to adaptation have been defined and examined by the CBD. Ecosystem-based adaptation has also been reflected in UNFCCC adaptation discussion although the discussion is less extensive than that of the CBD. Ecosystem-based adaptation has been initiated by various actors in both developed and developing countries (UNFCCC 2013a). Multilateral organizations and aid agencies such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) launched the Ecosystem-based Adaptation Flagship Programme, whose activities include providing policy support and decision-making tools for policies and programs and piloting activities on the ground. The work is carried out in collaboration with numerous partners, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), United Nations Habitat, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and donors, civil society organizations, and academia (UNEP 2013). Ecosystem-based adaptation projects are also implemented by aid agencies, national governments, and international NGOs. The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) supports a project to increase taro crop diversity

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_21-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Examples of ecosystem-based adaptation Adaptation measure Mangrove conservation

Co-benefits Social and Adaptive function cultural Protection against Provision of storm surges, sea employment level rise, and coastal options inundation (fisheries and prawn cultivation) Contribution to food security Maintenance of Opportunities nutrient and water for recreation

Forest conservation and sustainable forest Flow management Prevention of land slides

Restoration of degraded wetlands

Establishment of diverse agroforestry systems in agricultural land

Culture protection of indigenous peoples and local communities Maintenance of Sustained nutrient and water provision of: flow, quality, storage, livelihood and capacity Protection against Recreation floods or storm Employment inundation opportunities

Diversification of agricultural production to cope with changed climatic conditions

Conservation of Provision of specific agrobiodiversity gene pools for crop and livestock adaptation to climatic variability

Economic Generation of income to local communities through marketing of mangrove products (fish, dyes, medicines)

Biodiversity Conservation of species that live or breed in mangroves

Potential generation Conservation of of income through: habitat for forest plant ecotourism, and animal species recreation Sustainable logging

Increased livelihood Conservation of generation wetland flora and fauna through maintenance of breeding grounds and Potential revenue stop over sites for from recreational migratory species activities Sustainable use Sustainable logging of planted trees Conservation of Contribution to Generation of food and fuel income from sale of biodiversity in wood security timber, firewood, agricultural and other products landscape

Enhanced food security Diversification of food products Conservation of local and traditional knowledge and practices Conservation of Local medicines Local medicinal plants available for health communities used by local problems resulting have an and indigenous from climate change independent communities or habitat and sustainable

Possibility of agricultural income in difficult environments

Mitigation Conservation of carbon stocks, both above- and belowground

Conservation of carbon stocks Reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation Reduced emissions from soil carbon mineralization

Carbon storage in both aboveand belowground biomass and soils

Conservation of genetic diversity of crop varieties and livestock breeds

Environmental services such as bees for pollination of cultivated crops Potential sources of Enhanced medicinal income for local plant conservation people Local and traditional knowledge

Environmental services such as bees for pollination of (continued) Page 3 of 16

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Table 1 (continued) Adaptation measure

Adaptive function degradation, e.g., malaria, diarrhea, and cardiovascular problems

Sustainable Protection against management of flood grassland Storage of nutrients Maintenance of soil structure

Co-benefits Social and cultural

Economic

source of medicines Maintenance of local knowledge and traditions Recreation and Generate income for tourism local communities through products from grass (e.g., broom)

Biodiversity

Mitigation cultivated crops

recognized and protected

Forage for grazing animals Provide diverse habitats for animals that are predators and prey

Maintenance of soil carbon storage of soil carbon

Source: SCBD (2009)

in Samoa, and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) supports a project for the Mesoamerican reef in Belize (see Table 4). In this chapter, we analyze ecosystem-based adaptation in developing countries, which are generally more vulnerable to climate change than are developed countries, and where multiple aid agencies and international NGOs are involved. Note: ecosystem-based adaptation is an emerging concept and research is therefore constrained by limited data.

Analytical Framework The academic literature contains studies of the interactions among environmental institutions, where one institution affects the development or performance of another. Young (2002), Oberth€ ur and Stokke (2011) and others have developed case studies of various international environmental institutions in areas such as climate change, biodiversity, ozone depletion, ocean-related issues, and trade policy. Young (2002) studied the characteristics of interactions among environmental institutions and categorized the interactions as vertical/horizontal or political/functional interplay. In contrast, Stokke (2001) and Gehring and Oberth€ ur (2008) focused on the causal mechanisms of institutional interplay. The research cited above focuses on institutional relationships, but does not identify factors that enable the creation of effective institutional interactions that can resolve conflicts between institutions. Recent studies of interplay management examine the governance of institutional interactions by focusing on the efforts and effects of relevant actors in addressing and improving institutional interactions (Oberth€ ur 2009; Oberth€ ur and Stokke 2011). This research uses an actor-centered approach and examines how conflicts can be avoided through: (1) analysis of the relationships between the UNFCCC and CBD and the interactions between these two agencies in regard to adaptation and (2) analysis of the roles of the relevant actors, including the secretariats of the UNFCCC and CBD, aid agencies, national governments in developing countries, and NGOs.

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Several studies analyze the differences and similarities between climate change and biodiversity regimes for forest issues (Morgera 2011; Savaresi 2011; McDermott et al. 2012; van Asselt 2012). However, there is no research on adaptation that analyzes the contribution of actors in managing climate change and biodiversity governance.

Institutional Interactions and the Role of Actors in Adaptation Adaptation Negotiation Under the UNFCCC and CBD Ecosystem-based adaptation has been discussed under both the UNFCCC and CBD. The UNFCCC and CBD are part of the three Rio Conventions (the third is the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, UNCCD), which emerged from the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. Although the UNFCCC and CBD are sister Conventions, they have different objectives, administration, secretariats, and party members. Table 2 shows the structure and characteristics of the two Conventions. The UNFCCC primarily focuses on climate change mitigation, particularly those issues identified in the Kyoto Protocol. However, the necessity of adaptation is also explicitly stated in the text of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, acknowledging that climate change impact is unavoidable (Morita 2010). Adaptation has been discussed under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol in relation to: the clean development mechanism, technology transfer, research and systematic observation, capacity building, adaptation to adverse effects of climate change, Least Developed Country (LDC) assistance, national communications, and financial mechanisms. Adaptation began to receive increasing attention following the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP 6) in 2000 (Morita 2010). Currently, there are four workstreams on adaptation under the UNFCCC: the Nairobi work program on impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation to climate change (NWP), National Adaptation Table 2 Structures of the UNFCCC and CBD UNFCCC Establishment Opened for signature in 1992 at the UNCED Entered into force in 1994 Objectives Stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system

CBD

Entered into force in 1993 Conservation of biological diversity Sustainable use of its components Fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources Administration Under the UN Under the UNEP Secretariat Headquarters: Bonn Headquarters: Montreal Parties 193 parties + European Union 192 parties + European Union (the USA is nonparty) Related to Workstream: Nairobi Work Programme, National Workstream: Biodiversity and Climate adaptation Adaptation Programmes of Action, National Adaptation Change including ecosystem approaches to Plans, Loss and Damage adaptation Adaptation-related funds: Special Climate Change Fund Least Developed Countries Fund Adaptation Fund (under the Kyoto Protocol) Source: Created based on the information in UNFCCC and CBD websites Page 5 of 16

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Programmes of Action (NAPA), National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), and the Work Programme on Loss and Damage (UNFCCC 2013b). In 2010, the Cancun Adaptation Framework resulted in negotiations on greater action, grouped into five clusters: implementation, support, institutions, principles, and stakeholder engagement. The Framework includes establishing processes for NAPs and the Work Programme on Loss and Damage. In addition to the workstreams, the Framework includes establishment of an Adaptation Committee to promote timely and coherent action under the Convention: 1. NWP: This work program is established to assist all parties, in particular developing countries, LDCs, and small island developing states, to enhance knowledge about adaptation. The NWP is undertaken under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and is implemented by parties, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, communities, and other stakeholders. Currently, ecosystem-based adaptation has been discussed under the NWP. COP 12 renamed the 5-year program of work “Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change” in 2006. 2. NAPA: This process was established in 2001 to provide LDCs the opportunity to identify priority activities that respond to their urgent and immediate needs to adapt to climate change. The LDC Expert Group provides technical support and advice. 3. NAP: This process was established under the Cancun Adaptation Framework to enable LDCs to formulate and implement national adaptation plans as a means of identifying medium- and longterm adaptation needs and developing and implementing strategies and programs to address those needs. The LDC Expert Group for NAPA also provides technical guidance and support to NAPs. 4. Work Programme on Loss and Damage: This program, also established under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, aims to consider approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in especially vulnerable developing countries. Article two of the UNFCCC mentions the importance of ecosystem-based adaptation, stating that “the ultimate objective of this Convention . . .is to achieve. . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change. . ..” At the UNFCCC COP 14 in 2008, Sri Lanka and Palau proposed an ecosystem approach to adaptation (IISD 2008, p. 13), and at the UNFCCC COP 16 in 2010, the Cancun Agreement was adopted. As the Agreement states, it “Invites all Parties to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, . . .by undertaking, inter alia, the following: . . . Building resilience of socioeconomic and ecological systems, including through economic diversification and sustainable management of natural resources” (UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16, II paragraph 14(b)). Ecosystem-based adaptation has also started to receive attention under the NWP. In June 2011 at the UNFCCC SBSTA 34 session, the SBSTA request of the secretariat to undertake interim activities under the NWP included compilation of information on ecosystem-based approaches to adaptation (FCCC/SBSTA/2011/L.13). This information was compiled prior to the UNFCCC COP17 in 2011, and it reflected activities of the CBD. The UNFCCC also created an ecosystem-based adaptation database on its website (UNFCCC 2013a). At the COP 17, the secretariat was asked to organize workshops in collaboration with NWP partner organizations and other relevant organizations. Included was “a technical workshop on ecosystem-based approaches for adaptation to climate change, before the 38th session of the SBSTA, taking into account the role of ecosystems, including forests, in adaptation; vulnerability and impacts in ecosystems; the implementation and benefits of Page 6 of 16

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ecosystem-based approaches for adaptation; and lessons learned, including through the three Rio Conventions” (UNFCCC Decision 6/CP.17, paragraph 4 (b)). This workshop, organized under the NWP, was held in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, in March 2013 (FCCC/SBSTA/ 2013/2). At the subsequent SBSTA 38 meeting in June 2013, ecosystem-based adaptation was mentioned in the NWP draft conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2013/L.9). Specific ecosystem-based adaptation measures have been subject to more discussion by the CBD than by the UNFCCC. At the CBD COP 7 in 2004, recorded decisions cite the potential of an ecosystem-based approach to adaptation (CBD Decision VII/15, paragraph 8), and under the CBD COP 8 and COP 9, decisions established the links between adaptation and biodiversity conservation (CBD Decision VIII/3 and IX/16). The CBD COP 10 in 2010 invited “Parties and other Governments. . ..to consider the guidance below on ways to conserve, sustainably use and restore biodiversity and ecosystem services while contributing to climate-change mitigation and adaptation: Recognizing that ecosystems can be managed to limit climate change impacts on biodiversity and to help people adapt to the adverse effects of climate change; implement where appropriate, ecosystembased approaches for adaptation, . . ..as part of an overall adaptation strategy that takes into account the multiple social, economic and cultural co-benefits for local communities;. . .” (CBD Decision X/33, paragraph 8 (j)). The CBD COP 11 in 2012 addressed ecosystem-based adaptation and the NWP, encouraging parties and other governments to “. . .support the strengthening of inventorying and monitoring of biodiversity and ecosystem services at appropriate scales in order to evaluate the threats and likely impacts of climate change and both positive and negative impacts of climatechange mitigation and adaptation on biodiversity and ecosystem services” (CBD Decision XI/21, paragraph 6 (e)), “Encourages Parties and other Governments to. . . consider reviewing land-use planning with a view to enhancing ecosystem-based adaptation to climate change. . .” (paragraph 6 (f)), and “Requests the Executive Secretary. . . to. . . identify relevant workshops and activities within the NWP and countries’ NAPs under the UNFCCC, and disseminate such information. . .. with a view to enhancing knowledge-sharing on ecosystem-based approaches” (paragraph 7 (a)). The first Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group (AHTEG) on Biodiversity and Climate Change, established in 2001, extended the CBD discussions. The AHTEG aimed to add technical and scientific advices for the integration of biodiversity considerations into the measures that might be taken under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol to implement mitigation and adaptation (SCBD 2003). The second AHTEG on Biodiversity and Climate Change, which convened in 2008, complied and described the characteristics of ecosystem-based adaptation in the CBD Technical Series (SCBD 2009). The CBD has attempted to add ecosystem-based adaptation to the discussion on the NWP and has attempted to unite the two Conventions in the ways in which they address adaptation. In the UNFCCC SBSTA 31 Plenary (COP15) in 2009, the CBD stated at the conclusion of the work of the second AHTEG on Biodiversity and Climate Change, “ecosystem-based adaptation is not sectorally limited, but addresses potential adaptation needs across many sectors,” “ecosystembased adaptation is highly relevant because it: can be applied at all levels; may be more costeffective and more accessible to rural or poor communities than measures based on hard infrastructure and engineering; and can integrate and maintain traditional and local knowledge and cultural values,” and “ecosystem-based adaptation approaches can also contribute to climate change mitigation by conserving or enhancing carbon stocks and reducing emissions caused by ecosystem degradation and loss” (Statement of the CBD at UNFCCC SBSTA 31 Plenary). Furthermore, the final report of the AHTEG on Biodiversity and Climate Change (SCBD 2009) was transmitted to the UNFCCC COP 15 by the CBD COP 9 with a view to convening a joint meeting of the two bureaus (CBD Statement at the UNFCCC SBSTA 31 Plenary). Page 7 of 16

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At the UNFCCC COP 16, the CBD highlighted the outcomes of its COP 10, stating that the discussions focused on a number of issues related to the NWP, including the development of joint activities at national levels, the promotion of ecosystem-based approaches for adaptation and mitigation especially for protected areas, and improving information on the impact of climate change on biodiversity (CBD Statement at the UNFCCC SBSTA 33 Plenary). The CBD also invited the UNFCCC to collaborate with it (CBD Statement at the UNFCCC SBSTA 33 Plenary). Thus, although there is limited explicit collaboration between the UNFCCC and the CBD, the CBD has actively discussed ecosystem-based adaptation, and the UNFCCC has acknowledged CBD’s work. Table 3 summarizes the adaptation discussions under the UNFCCC and CBD. Table 3 Adaptation discussions under the UNFCCC and CBD UNFCCC COP 6–9 (2003)

COP 10 (2004)

COP 11 (2005)

COP 12 (2006)

COP 13 (2007)

CBD Adaptation issues were discussed under various agendas. Adaptation begins to receive more attention following COP 6 (2000) Decided the Buenos Aires program of work on adaptation and response measures, which describes ways to respond to the adverse effects of climate change (UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.10) Adopted a 5-year work program on the SBSTA on impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation to climate change (Decision 2/CP.11) Renamed the program to NWP (FCCC/ CP/2006/5)

COP 7 (2004)

Stated that the application of an ecosystem approach could facilitate the formulation of climate change mitigation and adaptation projects that also contribute to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use at the national levels (CBD Decision VII/15)

COP 8 (2006)

Parties, other governments, and so on are encouraged to development rapid assessment tools for the design and implementation of biodiversity conservation and sustainable use activities that contribute to adaptation (Decision VIII/ 30)

COP 9 (2008)

Showed the proposals for the integration of climate change activities within the work programs of the Convention, including conducting in-depth reviews of the work programs by considering such as the contribution of biodiversity to adaptation and measures that enhance the adaptive potential of components of biodiversity (Decision IX/16)

Decided to launch “a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012,” including addressing “enhanced action on adaptation” (Decision 1/CP.13)

COP 14 (2008)

Sri Lanka and Palau, speaking also for Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, proposed an ecosystem approach to adaptation

(continued)

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Table 3 (continued) UNFCCC COP 15 (2009) COP 16 (2010)

COP 17 (2011)

COP 18 (2012)

CBD Decided to establish the Cancun COP Adaptation Framework including 10 (2010) establishing NAPs process, Work Programme on Loss and Damage, and Adaptation Committee (Decision 1/CP.16) Decided the structures and functions of the Adaptation Committee (Decision 2/CP.17). Adopted COP decisions on NWP (6/CP.17), NAPs (5/CP.17), and Work Programme on Loss and Damage (7/CP.17) NWP: secretariat and NWP partner organizations, etc., are requested to organize a technical workshop on ecosystem-based approaches for adaptation Adopted COP decisions on approaches to COP address loss and damage (Decision 11 (2012) 3/CP.18), work of the Adaptation Committee (11/CP.18), and NAPs (12/CP.18)

Mentioned the role of ecosystem-based adaptation and call for the integration of ecosystem-based adaptation into relevant strategies and careful consideration of different ecosystem management options and objectives (Decision X/33)

Decisions touch on ecosystem-based adaptation and NWP such as encourages parties to support strengthening inventorying and monitoring of biodiversity and ecosystem services to evaluate both positive and negative impacts of climate change mitigation and adaptation on biodiversity and ecosystem services. Also requests the Executive Secretariats to identify relevant workshops and activities within the NWP and countries’ NAPs under the UNFCCC (CBD Decision XI/21)

Efforts of the Relevant Actors to Support Interaction We next analyzed the contribution of relevant actors in efforts to encourage discussion and interaction between the UNFCCC and CBD on ecosystem-based adaptation. The actors are the UNFCCC and CBD secretariats, multilateral and bilateral donors, national governments in developing countries, and NGOs. Table 4 presents examples of ecosystem-based adaptation activities in developing countries. This table illustrates the many actors involved in projects, and their efforts are analyzed in terms of the identified activities. Secretariat Efforts Secretariats are important for improving the interactions between the UNFCCC and CBD vis-a-vis ecosystem-based adaptation, but they currently play differing roles. The CBD secretariat has developed significant influence in international negotiations and cooperation (Siebenh€ uner 2009), while the UNFCCC secretariat has not promoted the political ideas of the committee or proposed specific technical approaches (Busch 2009). The Joint Liaison Group (JLG) was established in 2001 as an informal forum among the three Rio Conventions for exchanging information, exploring opportunities for synergistic activities, and

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Table 4 Examples of ecosystem-based adaptation in developing countries Name Responding to shoreline change and its human dimensions through integrated coastal area management Enhancing adaptive capacity in semiarid mountainous regions, Bolivia The CEIBA-PILARES project Coping with drought and climate change in the Chiredzi district Integrated National Adaptation Plan – Colombia highland ecosystems Drought-resistant agriculture in El Salvador Community-based coastal habitat restoration (“Green Coast Project”)

Country Ecosystem Mauritania, Marine and coastal Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde Bolivia Mountain, forest, and woodland

Name of implementing institution UNDP, GEF, UNESCO

Ecuador and Peru Forest and woodland Zimbabwe Agriculture, rangelands, and grasslands Colombia Mountain; Inland water

Nature and Culture International Government, UN Agency

El Salvador

Agriculture

Red Cross, World Food Programme

Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, and Malaysia Grenada

Marine and coastal, Wetlands International, Both Ends, forest and woodland WWF, IUCN

Integrating agroforestry practices in the farming system in Grenada Integration of climate change risk and Samoa resilience into forestry management (ICCRIFS) Jordan Valley Permaculture Project Jordan

Kikuyu Escarpment Forest Kimbe Bay: scientific design of a resilient network of marine protected areas Assessing the Impacts of Climate Change on Madagascar’s Biodiversity and Livelihoods Using the Maya Nut Tree to increase tropical agroecosystem resilience to climate change in Central America and Mexico Adapting to climate change in the Mesoamerican Reef Coping with drought and climate change, Mozambique

Kenya Papua New Guinea

The Netherlands Climate Assistance Programme (NCAP)

GEF; World Bank; Conservation International

Agriculture, Government of Grenada mountain Forest and woodland UNDP, GEF, Government of Samoa

Agriculture

National Center for Agricultural Research and Transfer of Technology, Jordan; Permaculture Research Institute (PRI) of Australia Forest and woodland Birdlife, Kenyan Forestry Service Marine and coastal The Nature Conservancy

Madagascar

Forest, marine and coastal

Government of Madagascar, USAID, Conservation International, WWF

Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and Mexico Belize

Forest and woodland, agriculture

Maya Nut Institute

Marine and coastal

WWF

Agriculture, rangeland, and grassland Mountain, rangeland, and grassland

UNDP

Mozambique

Mongolia and Nomadic herders: enhancing the resilience of pastoral ecosystems and Russian livelihoods Federation

UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Association of World Reindeer Herders, UArctic EALAT Institute (continued)

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Table 4 (continued) Name Orito Ingi Ande Medicinal Plants Sanctuary The Pangani River Basin Management Project (PRBMP) Rio de Janeiro’s Community Reforestation Project Conservation and management of high altitude peatlands of Ruoergai Marshes for water security and climate change adaptation Maintenance of hydropower potential in Rwanda through ecosystem restoration South Africa: ecosystem-based planning for climate change Community-based rangeland rehabilitation

Country Colombia Tanzania Brazil China

Ecosystem Name of implementing institution Forest and woodland Government of Colombia, local communities Inland water, Pangani River Basin Management agriculture Project, IUCN, UNDP Urban, forest and City of Rio woodland Mountain, inland Wetlands International water

Rwanda

Inland water

Government of Rwanda

South Africa

All

Government of South Africa

Sudan

Rangeland and UNDP, GEF grassland, agriculture Forest and GEF, UNDP, Government of woodland, mountain Armenia

Adaptation to climate change impacts Armenia in the Syunik Mountain Forest Ecosystems of Armenia Increasing Taro Crop Diversity Samoa

Tonle Sap

Cambodia

Climate Change Governance Capacity: Building Regionally and Nationally Tailored EcosystemBased Adaptation in Mesoamerica Ecosystem-Based Adaptation in Marine, Terrestrial, and Coastal Regions as a Means of Improving Livelihoods and Conserving Biodiversity in the Face of Climate Change

Mexico, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama

Agriculture

Forest and woodland, inland water Marine and coastal, agriculture, inland waters

Secretariat of the Pacific Community, AusAID, Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Conservation International, Government of Cambodia Federal Environment Ministry of Germany, IUCN

Brazil, Marine and coastal; Federal Environment Ministry of Philippines, South forest and woodland; Germany, Conservation International Foundation Africa agriculture; inland water

Source: UNFCCC 2013a

increasing coordination (CBD 2013). The JLG comprises the members of the secretariats, the executive secretariats, and the officers of scientific subsidiary bodies (CBD 2013). The JLG clearly has the potential to strengthen the links between the UNFCCC and CBD secretariats concerning ecosystem-based adaptation. The COPs of the three Conventions have recognized that adaptation is an area of importance (JLG 2004). The executive secretaries of each Convention identify adaptation, capacity building, and technology transfer as priority areas for their discussion (JLG 2004). The three secretariats have also identified options for improving cooperation, including: (1) the promotion of complementarity among the national biodiversity strategies and action plans (NBSAPs) under the CBD, national

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action programs of the UNCCD, and the UNFCCC NAPA for LDCs; (2) the development of joint work programs or plans, joint international workshops, and joint capacity-building activities (including training and local, national, and regional workshops to promote synergy in implementation); and (3) case studies on interlinkages (CBD 2013). In 2007, at the seventh JLG meeting it was agreed that an information note on adaptation activities, plans, and programs adopted within the framework of each Convention should be drafted (JLG 2007). The degree of willingness to enhance links between the UNFCCC and CBD executing secretariats is different: in general, the CBD more actively connects UNFCCC and CBD processes. For example, at the tenth JLG meeting in 2010 the Executive Secretary of the CBD invited his counterparts at the UNFCCC and UNCCD to convene a high level dialogue between themselves and the Secretary General at the CBD COP 10. He also shared the CBD proposal for a joint work program between the three Rio Conventions and a proposal to have an extraordinary meeting of the Rio Convention COP (JLG 2010). Although the UNFCCC is generally passive about linking the two processes, it admits the importance of interaction on specific topics like adaptation. In 2010, also at the tenth JLG meeting, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC expressed concern about the CBD proposals for a joint work program and an extraordinary meeting of the Rio COPs. The concern was that the proposals would infringe on the mandate of the UNFCCC secretariats and that the topic of adaptation is still under active negotiation. Nevertheless it was acknowledged that focusing on specific topics can move the synergies agenda forward and that the NAPA, NBSAP, and national action programs of the UNCCD may be conducive to the promotion of such synergies (JLG 2010). Although the JLG does not explicitly address ecosystem-based adaptation, the Group is important in linking the adaptation work of the UNFCCC and CBD secretariats. Further, the JLG links the works of NBSAP and NAPA, which are vital for strengthening ecosystem-based adaptation discussions. Donor Efforts Although the number of ecosystem-based adaptation programs and projects remains limited, multilateral aid agencies such as the GEF and the World Bank and bilateral aid agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and AusAID have engaged in research and implementation of ecosystem-based adaptation. In this section, we describe the efforts of both multilateral and bilateral aid agencies. With regard to multilateral aid agencies, the GEF (see chapter “▶ Financing Adaptation to Climate Change in Developing Countries” in this handbook), serving as the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC and CBD, plays a vital role implementing ecosystem-based adaptation and linking the two Conventions. In 2004, at the fifth JLG meeting, the secretariats of the Rio Conventions discussed adaptation, capacity building, and technology transfer. This discussion was in preparation for an informal meeting with the GEF CEO (JLG 2004). The point was made that “synergy (among the objectives of the three conventions in adaptation activities) can be promoted through meetings between the Executive Secretaries of three conventions, the GEF and the Implementing Agencies, and further supported through cooperation between the Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) of the GEF, and the respective scientific and technical subsidiary bodies of the conventions” (JLG 2004). In 2012, the GEF developed Operational Guidelines on Ecosystem-based Approaches to Adaptation (GEF/LDCF.SCCF.13/Inf.06) which assists agencies and project proponents that seek aid through the Least Developed Countries Fund or the Special Climate Change Fund. The GEF has supported ecosystem-based projects such as Adaptation to Climate Change Impacts in the Syunik

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Mountain Forest Ecosystems of Armenia and Integrated National Adaptation Plan: Colombia Highland Ecosystems (see Table 4). Furthermore, the implementing agencies of the GEF such as the World Bank, the UNEP, and the UNDP are also actively engaged in research and projects on ecosystem-based adaptation. World Bank projects and programs support biodiversity conservation and the protection of natural habitats and ecosystem services, thereby contributing to effective mitigation and adaptation strategies (World Bank 2009). Other organizations including the International Union for Conservation of Nature, United Nations Habitat, as well as donors, civil society organizations, and academia have established ecosystem-based adaptation flagship programs (UNEP 2013). Bilateral aid agencies and countries such as the Netherlands and Germany support ecosystembased adaptation activities. The USAID supports the ecosystem-based adaptation project Assessing the Impacts of Climate Change on Madagascar’s Biodiversity and Livelihood, and AusAID supports the Increasing Taro Crop Diversity project. Although the number of projects funded by both multilateral and bilateral donors is limited, the ecosystem-based adaptation activities of bilateral donors are more often confined to specific areas and sectors, than those of multilateral aid agencies like the GEF (UNEP 2013). Bilateral aid agencies also lack the comprehensive guidance and strategy on ecosystem-based adaptation supports and implementation and have less influence in discussions of the UNFCCC and CBD. National Government Efforts Several developing countries are beginning to discuss ecosystem-based adaptation activities. Although it is early to evaluate their efforts in promoting ecosystem-based adaptation and linkage between the UNFCCC and CBD, national ministries with environmental mandates in developing countries are likely to play a significant role. Although a number of industry or sector-specific ministries are involved in adaptation issues (e.g., Ministry of Agriculture of Grenada, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries of Samoa, and Kenya Forest Service), many of the ecosystem-based adaptation projects implemented in developing countries are funded by multilateral and bilateral donors and are likely to be endorsed and managed by the national ministries that address environmental problems (e.g., Environmental Management Agency of Zimbabwe, Ministry for the Environment and National Natural Parks of Colombia, and Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of Samoa). Cambodia’s Ministry of Environment approves and supports projects such as ecosystem-based approach to integrate climate change-resilient livelihoods and floodplain management for the Tonle Sap supported by Conservation International and ecosystem-based adaptation approach to climate change along the Mekong River (Kratie Province in Cambodia) supported by the WWF (Cambodia’s Ministry of Environment 2013). Examples in other countries include Integration of Climate Change Risk and Resilience into Forestry Management project in Samoa, executed by Samoa’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment through supports from UNDP (Samoa’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 2013), and Adaptation to Climate Change Impacts in the Syunik Mountain Forest Ecosystems of Armenia, executed by the Ministry of Nature Protection in Armenia. The ministry that addresses environmental problems is likely to be a key to supporting ecosystem-based adaptation in developing countries, because it is usually the focal point of the UNFCCC and the CBD, and has the capacity to both coordinate actors at the national level and to help link the UNFCCC and CBD.

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NGO Efforts Many international NGOs working in nature conservation actively support and implement ecosystem-based adaptation in developing countries, including the World Wildlife Fund, Nature Conservancy, BirdLife International, CARE, and Conservation International. Conservation International is supporting ecosystem-based adaptation projects, such as the Tonle Sap project in Cambodia (see above), the Integrated National Adaptation Plan (Colombia highland ecosystems), and Ecosystem-Based Adaptation in Marine, Terrestrial, and Coastal Regions as a Means of Improving Livelihoods and Conserving Biodiversity in the Face of Climate Change projects in Brazil, Philippines, and South Africa. Such international environmental NGOs are actively encouraging ecosystem-based adaptation activities, but their support and activities are limited to specific areas or they play only a subsidiary role of multilateral and bilateral aid agency support. NGOs therefore have limited influence in strengthening links between the UNFCCC and CBD on adaptation.

Conclusion Ecosystem-based adaptation, which has the potential to improve biodiversity conservation and reduce climate change impacts simultaneously, is addressed by both the UNFCCC and CBD. This chapter explores the management of the interaction between climate change and biodiversity governance, which could enhance ecosystem-based adaptation efforts and maximize the positive effects of adaptation on both climate change and biodiversity. This research used the conceptual framework of interplay management in international politics. This chapter shows that the CBD has been involved in a greater number of tangible ecosystembased adaptation activities than the UNFCCC, and coordinated ecosystem-based adaptation dialogue between the UNFCCC and CBD has been attempted. However, they are not fully coordinated because of the different characteristics of the two Conventions. To promote ecosystem-based adaptation and improve collaboration between the UNFCCC and CBD, this research analyzed how the key actors can develop adaptation discourse and strengthen the links between the two UN Conventions when approaching the topic. The study suggests that to enhance links between the two Conventions, it is important to involve: the secretariats of UNFCCC and CBD, the JLG that links NAPA and NBSAP, multilateral aid agencies like the GEF that serve as financial mechanisms to the UNFCCC and CBD, numerous key actors, and the various national government ministries that address environmental problems in developing countries and who can coordinate relevant actors at the national level.

Acknowledgements This research was supported by grants from the Global Environment Research Fund of the Ministry of the Environment of Japan S-11, S-10, E-1201 and JSPS KAKENHI 24710046.

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References Busch PO (2009) The climate secretariat: making a living in a straitjacket. In: Biermann F, Siebenh€ uner B (eds) Managers of global change: the influence of international environmental bureaucracies. The MIT Press, Cambridge MA/London Cambodia’s Ministry of Environment (2013) CCCA-TF approves 11 new pilot projects to help develop national capacities for climate change response. Available at http://www.camclimate.org. kh/index.php/trust-fund-news/73-ccca-tf-approves-11-new-pilot-projects.html. Accessed 19 July 2013 CBD (2013) Joint Liaison Group. Available at http://www.cbd.int/cooperation/liaison.shtml. Accessed 19 July 2013 Gehring T, Oberth€ ur S (2008) Interplay: exploring institutional interaction. In: Young OR, King LA, Schroeder H (eds) Institutions and environmental change: principal findings, applications, and research frontiers. The MIT Press, Cambridge MA/London International Institute for Sustainable Development Reporting Services (2008) Summary of the fourteenth conference of parties to the UN framework convention on climate change and fourth meeting of parties to the Kyoto Protocol: 1–12 December 2008. Earth Negotiat Bull 12(395): 1-20 JLG (2004) Fifth meeting of the Joint Liaison Group, Bonn, Germany, 30 January, 2004, report of the meeting. Available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/workshops/other_meetings/application/ pdf/reportjlg5.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2013 JLG (2007) Report of the seventh meeting of the JLG of the CBD, the UNFCCC, and UNCCD, Bonn, 7 June 2007. Available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/reports/jlg-07-report-en.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2013 JLG (2010) Report of the tenth meeting of the Joint Liaison Group of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 23 September 2010. Available at http:// www.cbd.int/doc/reports/jlg-10-report-en.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2013 McDermott CL et al (2012) Governance for REDD+, forest management and biodiversity: existing approaches and future options. In: Parrotta JA, Wildburger C, Mansourian S (eds) Understanding relationships between biodiversity, carbon, forests and people: the key to achieving REDD+ objectives. A global assessment report prepared by the Global Forest Expert Panel on Biodiversity, Forest Management, and REDD+. International Union of Forest Research Organizations, Vienna. IUFRO World Series (31) Morgera E (2011) Faraway, so close: a legal analysis of the increasing interactions between the convention on biological diversity and climate change law. University of Edinburgh School of Law, Working Paper Series No. 2011/05 Morita K (2010) Financing systems for climate change adaptation: lessons from case studies in Samoa, Tuvalu and Vietnam. PhD Dissertation, Tokyo, Tokyo Institute of Technology Oberth€ ur S (2009) Interplay management: enhancing environmental policy integration among international institutions. Int Environ Agreem 9(4):371–391 Oberth€ ur S, Stokke OS (eds) (2011) Managing institutional complexity: regime interplay and global environmental change. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA/London Samoa’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (2013) ICCRIFS Project. Available at http://www.mnre.gov.ws/index.php/divisions/forestry-division/iccrifs. Accessed 19 July 2013 Savaresi A (2011) Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries under the UNFCCC: caveats and opportunities for biodiversity. 21. Yearbook Int Environ Law 22(1):41–87

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Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2003) Interlinkages between biological diversity and climate change: advice on the integration of biodiversity considerations into the implementation of the United Nations framework convention on climate change and its Kyoto protocol. Montreal, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD Technical Series No. 10 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2009) Connecting biodiversity and climate change mitigation and adaptation: report of the second Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change. Montreal, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD Technical Series No. 41 Siebenh€ uner B (2009) The biodiversity secretariat: lean shark in troubled waters. In: Biermann F, Siebenh€ uner B (eds) Managers of global change: the influence of international environmental bureaucracies. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA/London Stokke OS (2001) The interplay of international regimes: putting effectiveness theory to work. The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, FNI report 14/2001 UNEP (2013) Ecosystem-based adaptation programme. Available at http://ebaflagship.org/index. php. Accessed 16 July 2013 UNFCCC (2013a) Database on ecosystem-based approaches to adaptation. Available at http:// unfccc.int/adaptation/nairobi_work_programme/knowledge_resources_and_publications/items/ 6227.php. Accessed 16 July 2013 UNFCCC (2013b) Adaptation. Available at http://unfccc.int/adaptation/items/4159.php. Accessed 8 July 2013 van Asselt H (2012) Managing the fragmentation of international environmental law: forests at the intersection of the climate and biodiversity regimes. NYU J Int Law Politics 44(4):1205–1278 World Bank (2009) Convenient solutions to an inconvenient truth: ecosystem-based approaches to climate change. The World Bank, Washington, DC Young OR (2002) The institutional dimensions of environmental change: fit, interplay, and scale. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA/London

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Financing Adaptation to Climate Change in Developing Countries Kanako Moritaa* and Ken’ichi Matsumotob a Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University, Kanagawa, Japan b School of Environmental Science, The University of Shiga Prefecture, Shiga, Japan

Abstract Adaptation assistance is a key element in promoting adaptation measures in developing countries. However, adaptation finance has not fully met the needs of adaptation in developing countries because of its limited amount and ineffective distribution. This chapter provides implications for designing more effective financing for adaptation under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, by analyzing the characteristics of two types of existing adaptation financing targeting Asia–Pacific developing countries: (1) multilateral adaptation funds related to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and (2) bilateral official development assistance. The effects of the two financing schemes are compared, focusing on their financing rules and procedures and their targets and effects. The chapter shows that the adaptation finance schemes have strengths and weaknesses. The GEF-related multilateral adaptation finance has the potential to bring together various donors and organizations in implementing adaptation, while it has complex financing procedures and rules. Bilateral official development assistance is able to provide more adaptation finance, while it is more influenced by donors’ interests. To promote adaptation activities effectively in developing countries, there is a need for an international framework for coordinating adaptation financing that enhances the strengths and minimizes the weaknesses of both financing systems.

Keywords Financing; Adaptation; Global environment facility; Bilateral official development assistance; Asia–Pacific

Introduction Climate governance involves the provision of financial resources to developing countries which are vulnerable to climate change. Assistance for adaptation to climate change is one of the key elements in promoting adaptation measures in developing countries. Developing countries are expected to be more affected by climate change than developed countries (IPCC 2007) because of geographical reasons and the lack of capabilities, financial resources, and technologies to implement adaptation measures. Further, climate change will ultimately threaten to prevent developing countries from achieving and sustaining their poverty reduction and development goals. Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), developing countries have called for developed countries, which are primarily responsible for climate change, to assist their implementation of adaptation. The UNFCCC article 4, paragraph 4, calls for developed

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 19

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countries to assist developing countries “that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects,” and financing for adaptation has been one of the key agendas in the UNFCCC negotiations on adaptation. Three adaptation-related funds – the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF), and Adaptation Fund – were established under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, in the seventh session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in 2007. In the sixteenth session of the COP in 2010, the Cancun Agreements were adopted; the agreements included US$30 billion in fast-start financing from developed countries to support both mitigation and adaptation in developing countries up to 2012, and the intention to raise a further US$100 billion per year by 2020. At the meeting, the parties also decided to establish the Green Climate Fund, which aims to support developing countries by financing mitigation and adaptation projects, program policies, and activities (launched in the next COP meeting in 2011). Further, developed countries have started to finance adaptation-related activities through official development assistance (ODA), and multiple aid agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have started to assist adaptation in developing countries. However, current adaptation finance has not fully met the needs of adaptation in developing countries. This is because of not only the lack of adaptation finance but also the lack of effectiveness of the distribution of adaptation finance. This chapter presents implications for designing more effective financing for adaptation under the UNFCCC, by analyzing existing multilateral adaptation funds under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and bilateral ODA for adaptation, targeting developing countries in the Asia–Pacific region.

Multilateral and Bilateral Finance for Adaptation Although the estimates of costs of adaptation for developing countries are vague because of the complexity and variety of adaptations, all the estimates suggest the adaptation costs in developing countries will be in the ballpark of tens of billions of US dollars per year (UNDP 2007; UNFCCC 2007) or even higher, at US$70–100 billion per year (World Bank 2010). Compared with the level of discussion on how to mobilize funds to achieve the adaptation needs of developing countries, there has been less discussion on the effective distribution of financing for adaptation. To mobilize finance for adaptation and to increase the willingness of donors to increase funds, it is necessary to show how funds are used. This chapter focuses on multilateral adaptation funds under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and bilateral ODA for adaptation outside the UNFCCC.

Multilateral Finance for Adaptation: Funds Related to the Global Environment Facility (GEF)

In the case of multilateral finance, this chapter focuses on GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds, which are the SCCF, LDCF under the UNFCCC, Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol, and GEF Trust Fund. The GEF operates the SCCF and LDCF, which are funded by voluntary contributions from individual countries. The GEF provides secretariat services to the Adaptation Fund Board on an interim basis, and the Adaptation Fund Board supervises and manages the Adaptation Fund (Decision 1/CMP.4 [decision adopted by the fourth session of the COP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto protocol]).

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(1) SCCF: Finances projects relating to adaptation; technology transfer and capacity building; energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry, and waste management; and economic diversification (UNFCCC Decision 7/CP.7). The SCCF has received approximately US$189 million as of October 1, 2012 (GEF/LDCF.SCCF.13/Inf.02). (2) LDCF: Supports a work program to assist LDC Parties to carry out, inter alia, the preparation and implementation of national adaptation programs of actions (UNFCCC Decision 7/CP.7). The LDCF has received approximately US$370 million as of October 1, 2012 (GEF/LDCF. SCCF.13/Inf.02). (3) Adaptation Fund: Finances concrete adaptation projects and programs in response to the Kyoto Protocol in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. It is financed by a share of proceeds of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project activities and other sources of funding. The CDM allows a country with an emissionreduction or emission-limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol to implement an emission-reduction project in developing countries, and such projects can earn saleable Certified Emission Reduction credits, each equivalent to one ton of CO2, which can be counted toward meeting Kyoto targets (UNFCCC 2013a). The share of proceeds amounts to 2 % of Certified Emission Reductions issued for a CDM project activity. The Adaptation Fund is supervised and managed by the Adaptation Fund Board, which comprises 16 members and 16 alternates and meets at least twice a year (UNFCCC 2013b). There is a strong mandate from the UNFCCC (LDCF and SCCF) and the Kyoto Protocol (Adaptation Fund) to keep these as distinct funds, and the Adaptation Fund is unique in its revenue regime, the composition of its governing body, and the “direct access” modality (the Adaptation Fund provides eligible developing countries direct access to the fund; GEF 2009). The Adaptation Fund has received approximately US$325 million as of March 31, 2013 (AFB/EFC.12/8). GEF also operates its GEF Trust Fund, which has been the primary financial source of the GEF and also supports adaptation. The GEF, established in 1991, is the largest public funder of projects to improve the global environment (GEF 2013a), and the GEF provides grants in seven different areas: biodiversity; climate change; chemicals; international waters; land degradation; sustainable forest management/reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+), one of the climate change mitigation measures discussed under the UNFCCC; and ozone layer depletion. Additionally, the GEF supports cross-cutting issues and programs: results and learning of the projects, earth funds and public–private partnerships, capacity development, smallgrant programs, country support programs, and gender mainstreaming (GEF 2013b). The GEF formally serves as a financial mechanism for the UNFCCC, Convention on Biological Diversity, Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, and United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and supports the implementation of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (although there is no formal link between the GEF and Montreal Protocol). The GEF is managed by 10 implementing agencies, namely, the United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Inter-American Development Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development, and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (GEF 2013c). The GEF Trust Fund is replenished every 4 years. During the period of GEF 4 from 2006 to 2010, adaptation measures were supported by Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA) funding (US$50 million), which was provided by the GEF Trust Fund. The SPA was a groundbreaking initiative Page 3 of 19

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designed to support pilot and demonstration adaptation projects that provide real benefits and can be integrated into national policies and sustainable development planning (GEF 2013d). In GEF 5, from 2010 to 2015, adaptation-related works are financed through the LDCF and SCCF, and the GEF Trust Fund does not finance adaptation.

Bilateral Finance for Adaptation: Bilateral ODA

With regard to bilateral finance for adaptation, bilateral ODA outside the UNFCCC including European countries, Japan, and Australia has supported adaptation in developing countries. For example, so far, Japan, Germany, and Australia are the three largest bilateral donors financing adaptation in developing countries in the Asia–Pacific region. In 2010 and 2011, Japan financed US$2486 million, Germany US$480 million, and Australia US$318 million. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), of which the developed countries mentioned above are members, has worked mainly on three areas on adaptation: (1) economic aspects of adaptation (providing guidance on a range of different economic policies and tools that countries will need to implement efficient adaptation), (2) adaptation and development (work to integrate effective adaptation into development activities for developing countries), and (3) adaptation in OECD countries (helping developed countries to ensure that key economic sectors and vulnerable groups are prepared for adaptation; OECD 2013a). The second area focuses on providing guidance for bilateral donors, by providing policy guidance to offer concrete information on how to facilitate the integration of adaptation within development processes (OECD 2009), providing an overview and assessment of tools for screening climate risks and integrating adaptation into development planning processes (Hammill and Tanner 2011), and providing the first empirical assessment of monitoring and evaluation frameworks used by development cooperation agencies and sharing lessons learned and common characteristics of monitoring and evaluation for adaptation (Lamhauge et al. 2012). Unlike the case for GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds, it is difficult to track the process of adaptation finance from bilateral ODA. Atteridge et al. (2009) calculated the amount of annual adaptation finance (as ODA) of Agence Française de Développement, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and the German Development Bank in 2008, but there were no comprehensive data on adaptation finance of bilateral ODAs. In December 2009, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members approved a new marker to track aid in support of adaptation, which complements the existing climate change mitigation marker and allows the presentation of a more complete picture of aid in support of developing countries’ efforts to address climate change (OECD 2013b). Data have been obtained using the adaptation marker since 2010. In 2011, DAC members also agreed to extend the application of the mitigation and adaptation markers to non-concessional development loans (OECD 2012). According to the OECD data, OECD countries provided approximately US$16795 million in the form of bilateral ODA to assist adaptation in developing countries in 2010 and 2011 (OECD Creditor Reporting System database, see page 5).

Research Approach In adaptation research, financing for adaptation has begun to receive more attention (Klein et al. 2007; Möhner and Klein 2007; Barr et al. 2010). However, much discussion and research have focused on how to mobilize adequate funds to promote adaptation in developing countries (M€uller 2008; Persson 2011; Eisenack 2012), and there has been less discussion regarding effective Page 4 of 19

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and efficient ways to distribute these funds (Barr et al. 2010; Fankhauser and Burton 2011). There has not been much progress toward the design of effective and efficient financing for adaptation in developing countries. This chapter analyzes the characteristics of existing multilateral and bilateral adaptation financing for developing countries in the Asia–Pacific region, by focusing on how the financing is allocated to these countries, which is an important element in examining the effectiveness of the financing. As mentioned above, this study focuses on two types of funding sources: (1) GEF-related multilateral funds for adaptation, namely, the SCCF, LDCF, Adaptation Fund, and GEF Trust Fund and (2) bilateral ODA adaptation finance. The effects of the two financing systems are compared, focusing on their differences and similarities in how finances for adaptation are distributed and the institutional barriers to finance for adaptation. To be more specific, this study analyzes (1) adaptation financing rules and procedures and (2) adaptation financing targets and effects (i.e., characteristics of adaptation distributions by country and sector). With regard to the GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds, this study especially focuses on the SCCF and LDCF as these are the two major adaptation-related funds that the GEF is currently managing. This research uses not only the qualitative data from related reports published by donors and NGOs and academic papers but also quantitative data from databases mainly constructed by the GEF, OECD, and Climate Funds Update, as described below. (1) GEF Project Database (GEF 2013e): The GEF provides information on projects that are funded by the GEF Trust Fund, and also the SCCF and LDCF. Also, adaptation project data received from GEF officers are used (GEF 2013f, g). (2) OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database (OECD 2013c): Unlike the DAC annual aggregates database, which provides comprehensive data on the volume, origin, and types of aid and other resource flows, the CRS provides detailed information on individual aid activities, such as information on sectors, countries, and project descriptions. As stated above, in 2010, an adaptation marker was added to the CRS database, and adaptation data have been collected since 2010 using the marker. (3) Climate Funds Update (Climate Funds Update 2013): This database is a joint initiative of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Overseas Development Institute. Climate Funds Update tracks all multilaterally governed funds focused on climate change and major bilateral initiatives. The database focuses on the funding of adaptation, mitigation, and REDD+. This study focuses on developing countries in the Asia–Pacific region, which include Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, TimorLeste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Niue, Tokelau, and Wallis and Futuna. The countries include small-island developing states (SIDS) and LDCs that are particularly vulnerable to climate change. SIDS in Asia Pacific include Fiji, Kiribati, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Cook Islands, and Niue. LDCs in Asia Pacific include Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Nepal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Adaptation measures involve multiple sectors. This study uses the following categories of adaptation: water (water supply and sanitation), natural resource management (biosphere and biodiversity protection), agriculture (agriculture, forestry, fishing, and food), infrastructure (social Page 5 of 19

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infrastructure and services, transport, communication, energy, industry, mining, construction, tourism, and education), human health (health and population), disaster risk management and coastal zone management (reconstruction relief and rehabilitation, disaster prevention and preparedness, and emergency response), and others (climate information services, etc.).

Characteristics of Multilateral and Bilateral Adaptation Finance Institutional Strengths and Challenges in Implementing the Rules and Procedures for Adaptation Financing GEF-Related Multilateral Adaption Finance As mentioned above, the SCCF, LDCF, and GEF Trust Fund are all managed by the GEF, and the GEF also provides secretariat services to the Adaptation Fund Board on an interim basis. This section mainly focuses on the SCCF and LDCF rules and procedures. Table 1 shows the processes and key concepts in preparation for project implementation in the SCCF and LDCF project cycle. The project cycle for the SCCF is similar to that employed by the GEF Trust Fund, while that for the LDCF is more streamlined than that employed by the GEF Trust Fund. Each of the stages of the project cycle is approved by the LDCF/SCCF Council and/or GEF chief executive officer (CEO). The GEF Agency works closely with the country at each successive step and ultimately assists the country in implementing the project (GEF 2011a, b). Following the CEO endorsement of the project, the SCCF and LDCF funding is ready to be released to the country through the implementing agency, and the project can begin implementation. The implementing agency is responsible for preparing specific reports during certain stages of the project, and the agency is required, for example, to submit project implementation reports on an annual basis and to submit a terminal evaluation to the GEF Evaluation Office within 12 months of the operational completion of a project (GEF 2011a, b). To measure the progress and results of the Table 1 Processes and key concepts in preparation for project implementation in the SCCF and LDCF project cycle Funding request Endorsement

Project type

FSPs

MSPs

SCCF The SCCF project proponent develops a concept for a project and requests assistance from an Implementing Agency of the GEF The SCCF project proponent secures the endorsement of the national GEF Operational Focal Point Projects over US$1 million are referred to as fullsized projects (FSPs); those of US$1 million or below are referred to as medium-sized projects (MSPs). MSPs, compared with FSPs, follow a further streamlined project cycle For FSPs, submission to the GEF under the SCCF starts with a Project Identification Form (approved by the LDCF/SCCF Council), followed by a CEO Endorsement Form MSPs may start with the CEO Endorsement Form. Once the GEF CEO endorses the project, the funding is released to the implementing agency

LDCF The LDCF project proponent develops a concept for a project and requests assistance from an Implementing Agency of the GEF The LDCF project proponent secures the endorsement of the national GEF Operational Focal Point Projects over US$2 million are referred to as FSPs; those of US$2 million or below are referred to as MSPs. MSPs, compared with FSPs, follow a further streamlined project cycle For FSPs, submission to the GEF under the LDCF starts with a Project Identification Form (approved by the LDCF/SCCF Council), followed by a CEO Endorsement Form MSPs may start with the CEO Endorsement Form. Once the GEF CEO endorses the project, the funding is released to the implementing agency

Source: GEF 2011a, b

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project, the GEF secretariat and its agencies have developed a Results-Based Management Framework. The work plans of the Results-Based Management in GEF 5 include establishing and implementing an updated Annual Monitoring Review process for GEF 5, upgrading and integrating portfolio monitoring in the Project Management Information System, and developing tools to enhance portfolio monitoring (GEF/C.39/6/Rev.1). Furthermore, to assist the tracking of project-specific outcomes and output indicators, which are reported in the annual Project Identification Form, the LDCF/SCCF Adaptation Monitoring and Assessment Tool has been devised (GEF 2011a, b, 2013h). The strength of the GEF in financing adaptation is that it operates funds in close connection with the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC requests that the GEF finances adaptation in developing countries. Additionally, since the financial mechanism of the GEF involves several implementing agencies, and co-funding agencies, the GEF is able to bring together various donors and organizations in implementing adaptation. The former CEO and Chairperson of the GEF, Monique Barbut, stated that the GEF is important in financing adaptation. She listed the general strengths of the GEF as follows: The GEF is a financial mechanism under the United Nations conventions. Unlike other aid agencies, the GEF receives guidance from the conventions. The GEF has institutional links with the United Nations conventions and United Nations systems. The legitimacy of the GEF is different from any other aid agencies. The GEF is able to fund the projects which produce the global environmental benefits. The GEF is able to support the environmental projects which have technical and institutional risks. GEF funding is based on grants. When an agency agrees to a loan, it has to be sure that the loan will be repaid and it thus has to ensure that only confirmed technologies are being used, so as to avoid large risks in the project. However, the GEF has not been built on this logic. The GEF is supposed to test new technologies in pilot projects and to be innovative, and it is able to do this because most of the GEF’s assistance is from grants. (Interview with Monique Barbut, the CEO and Chairperson of the GEF, 23 May 2009). Other aid agencies only take little technical and institutional risks of the environmental projects. (Interview with Monique Barbut, 23 May 2009)

As for the strengths of the GEF in funding adaptation, she stated: The GEF is able to play a central role in coordinating a variety of people in different aid agencies and organizations. The GEF is only a funding mechanism and does not have enough money itself. However, the GEF is able to bring together the various donors and organizations to implement climate change adaptation projects, and is able to be a central part of the climate change adaptation financing. (While, for example, if the money is put to other aid agencies like the UNDP, the money will be used only for the UNDP projects.) The UNFCCC asks guidance and strictly review reports on climate change adaptation to the GEF. (Interview with Monique Barbut, 23 May 2009)

In this way, the GEF has general strengths in financing adaptation in terms of having strong links with the UNFCCC, receiving guidance from the UNFCCC COP, and involving multiple donors and organizations in the financing process. Additionally, since the GEF financing is based on grants that recipients do not need to repay, the GEF can take risks in implementing new pilot adaptation projects (Interview with Monique Barbut, 23 May 2009). However, the general challenges facing GEF-related funds are as follows. First is that the GEF’s governance structures are seen by developing countries as complex and weighted in favor of donor countries, and the rules and structures make accessing funding difficult and time-consuming (Mitchell et al. 2008). Second, there is a lack of transparency in decision making that appears to be the prerogative of powerful individuals (Mitchell et al. 2008). Compared with the one-countryone-vote voting procedure of the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol, the GEF is subject to the traditional and, according to developing countries, far less democratic GEF voting procedure that requires a majority of both countries and donations to carry a vote (Grasso 2011, p. 364). This has

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been made evident by the negotiation processes of the Adaptation Fund; developing countries constantly demanded their inclusion in the governance structures of the Adaptation Fund and strenuously rejected the GEF as the financial entity to manage it, owing to their scant participation in the GEF governance system (Grasso 2010, p. 146). Thirdly, there is a fundamental concern about the low level and the lack of predictability of funding provided through the LDCF and SCCF (GEF NGO Network Statement on GEF Programming Strategy paper for Adaptation to Climate Change under the LDCF and SCCF [GEF Meeting on Financing for LDCF and SCCF, 4 April 2013]). With regard to the complex and time-consuming processes, although funding through the GEF is not formally conditional, requirements attached to funding include burdensome reporting and co-financing criteria (Ayers and Huq 2008). For example, the LDCF and SCCF, addressing the adverse impacts of climate change, impose additional costs on vulnerable countries striving to achieve their development goals. The LDCF and SCCF finance the “additional costs” imposed on vulnerable countries to meet their adaptation needs due to the adverse impacts of climate change, while the costs associated with baseline development activities must be supported by co-financiers (Ayers and Huq 2008; GEF 2009). Although the GEF Trust Fund is not used for financing adaptation in GEF 5, unlike the SCCF and LDCF, the GEF Trust Fund needs to act according to GEF principles. The two main principles of the GEF, regarding “global environmental benefits” and “incremental costs,” particularly limit the implementation of adaptation projects. Concerning global environmental benefits, mitigation activities, which aim at reducing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, clearly have global benefits; however, for adaptation activities, it is difficult to imagine how global benefits can be gained, for adaptation mostly takes place at the local level (Klein 2002). The SCCF and LDCF under the UNFCCC must follow the decision of the COP, and “additional costs,” which SCCF and LDCF finance, cover the full cost of adaptation if the developing country already has resources for its basic development program. Conversely, the GEF Trust Fund’s “incremental costs” associated with transforming a project with national benefits into one with global environmental benefits are more difficult to identify. Table 2 shows the major distinctions between the GEF Trust Fund and SCCF/LDCF. Bilateral ODA Finance for Adaptation Bilateral ODA mainly supports adaptation in developing countries through mainstreaming adaptation into traditional ODA. Mainstreaming involves the integration of policies and measures that address climate change within development planning and ongoing sectoral decision making so as to ensure the long-term sustainability of investments and to reduce the sensitivity of development activities to both the current and future climates (Klein et al. 2007). OECD members agreed on the Declaration on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development Co-operation at the Table 2 Distinctions between the GEF Trust Fund and SCCF/LDCF

Project must have global benefits Projects must have adaptation benefits Funding allocated according to the Resource Allocation Framework or STARa Projects financed according to the “incremental costs” principle

Conventional GEF Trust Fund Yes No Yes

SCCF No Yes No

LDCF No Yes No

Yes

No

No

Created from GEF (2011a, b) The recently denominated STAR has been developed for climate change mitigation (GEF 2009)

a

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Fig. 1 Japanese environmental ODA (Source: Ministry of the Environment of Japan (2013))

meeting of the OECD DAC and the Environment Policy Committee at the ministerial level in 2006. Additionally, the Statement of Progress on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development Co-operation was adopted at the 2008 DAC High-Level Meeting. As mentioned above, the OECD has worked on adaptation and development (work to integrate effective adaptation into development activities for developing countries) as one of its three main areas. The OECD has, for example, provided policy guidance to bilateral donors to help facilitate the integration of adaptation within development processes (OECD 2009) and provided an overview and assessment of tools for screening climate risks and integrating adaptation into development planning processes (Hammill and Tanner 2011). Further, the application of the adaptation marker to data beginning in 2010 has allowed the tracking of adaptation finance through bilateral ODA. Although the OECD provides general policy guidance for integrating adaptation in development processes, each bilateral aid agency establishes its adaptation support strategy for developing countries. Japan is the largest bilateral ODA adaptation funder for developing countries in the Asia–Pacific region. Figure 1 shows the general environmental ODA from Japan to developing countries. The JICA published the report JICA’s Assistance for Adaptation to Climate Change (JICA 2007) and presented the JICA’s possible cooperation for adaptation by sector, and the JICA’s approaches to adaptation. Further, the report showed how existing development projects had potential effects on adaptation. Since then, the JICA has supported projects that will enhance adaptation effects. In 2011, the JICA published JICA Climate Finance Impact Tool for Adaptation (JICA 2011), which is a reference document that discusses issues in mainstreaming adaptation during the planning stages of country assistance strategies and individual projects by summarizing them as concepts and guidelines. Figure 2 shows the formulation processes for adaptation projects and business-as-usual development with adaptation options.

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Each bilateral aid agency has its own strategy and focus. With regard to Germany, the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), which is now part of the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), has worked on mainstreaming adaptation. The GTZ (GIZ) published a manual for practitioners, Climate Change Information for Effective Adaptation, which aims to enhance the capacity of those practitioners and decision makers in developing countries by translating relevant aspects of climate change research into their everyday working contexts, by describing the concrete steps of (1) how to obtain climate change information, (2) how to interpret it adequately, and (3) how to communicate the resulting knowledge in a careful and responsible way (Kropp and Scholze 2009). Further, the GIZ has developed a Climate Proofing for Development method. Applying Climate Proofing for Development at the scale of an entire country is a very efficient means of mainstreaming the issue of adaptation in national agendas and budgetary decisions (Hahn and Fröde 2011). Bilateral ODA could use financial and human resources effectively and efficiently by mainstreaming adaptation into the development process, rather than by designing, implementing, and managing climate policy separately from ongoing activities (Klein et al. 2007). As mentioned above, several bilateral aid agencies such as the JICA and GIZ have started to integrate adaptation 1. Survey of the Existing Condition Study situation of adaptation measures

Study current condition of the target area

Study current condition of the sub-sector

2. Vulnerability Assessment Step1: Identification of the Hazards and Sensitivity to Climate Change 1) Assess Past and Present Climate Trends and Risks

2) Assess Future Exposure to Climate Hazards and Perturbations Study future weather condition Study other factors related to socio-economic changes

3)Assess Future Sensitivity to Climate Change Study past disaster Study present condition of facilities and measures

Assess future sensitivity to climate change

Step2: Identification of Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change 4) Determine and Project Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change

Identification of adaptive capacity Clarify Exacerbating Factors for Climate Change Impacts

Step3: Assessment of Vulnerability 5) Vulnerability assessment

3. Examination of the Adaptation Project Preparatory Survey Concept and objective of the project Project planning (consideration to maladaptation and flexibility to climate change) Project implementation plan Project budgeting Project evaluation Monitoring and review planning (evaluation based on alternative indicators)

Fig. 2 (continued)

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_22-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

1. Survey of the Existing Condition Study situation of adaptation measures

Study current condition of the target area

Study current condition of the sub-sector

2. Vulnerability Assessment Assess Future Exposure to Climate Hazards and Perturbations

3. Examination of the Preparatory Survey for the BAU Development with Adaptation Options Concept and objective of the project Project planning (consideration to maladaptation and flexibility to climate change) Project implementation plan Project budgeting Project evaluation Monitoring and review planning (evaluation based on alternative indicators)

Fig. 2 Formulation processes for an adaptation project and business-as-usual development with adaptation options (Source: JICA (2011))

into their ODA activities. In this way, by mainstreaming adaptation into bilateral ODA activities, the recipients are able to make good use of bilateral aid agencies’ experience and skills that have been acquired from previous development projects involving adaptation-related activities. Additionally, unlike the case for GEF-related financing, bilateral aid agencies can provide the full costs of projects, as they do not require co-funding from other donors. This makes it easier for developing countries (which have difficulty finding co-funders) to implement projects. Furthermore, bilateral aid agencies finance projects not only through grants but also by loans. Developing countries that have a relatively strong economic basis can thus implement large-scale projects funded by loans. In addition to the abovementioned benefits, when the interests of bilateral aid agencies match the needs of developing countries, the developing countries can more easily receive funds from bilateral aid agencies than from multilateral aid agencies. However, in general, the bilateral development assistance is one of the tools at the disposal of developed country governments as an element of their foreign policies and is usually aligned with their strategic objectives and interests, and the mix of aid motivations varies from one donor country to another and also over time (Sagasti et al. 2005, p. 69). Sagasti et al. (2005) described that there appear to be three main sets of rationales for development assistance: international solidarity and religious motivations, narrow and enlightened self-interest, and the provision of international public goods. For example, in general, Japan allocates more aid to its neighbors in East and Southeast Asia, which are also its main trade partners and the principal destinations of its foreign investments (IBON International 2009). As described, when the interests of bilateral aid agencies match the adaptation needs of developing countries, it is likely that the developing countries will be more easily able to receive funds for adaptation from bilateral aid agencies than from multilateral aid agencies. However, since bilateral aid is generally more influenced by donor interests as compared with multilateral aid, when the interests of bilateral aid agencies do not match developing countries’ adaptation needs, developing countries will have difficulty receiving sufficient funds. Furthermore, another controversial point in

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funding adaptation through bilateral ODA is the additionality to existing ODA commitments (i.e., ODA contributions at 0.7 % of gross national income). There are concerns that the use of existing funds such as ODA for adaptation could take the pressure off donors to provide additional resources (Yamin 2004) and that ODA-related adaptation activities are diverted from ODA commitments (Oxfam 2007).

Adaptation Financing Targets and Effects

The previous section compared the characteristics of two types of adaptation financing according to their rules and procedures. This section describes how these adaptation finances are actually distributed to adaptation in developing countries in the Asia–Pacific region quantitatively. As mentioned above, this study analyzes the allocation of adaptation finance using the data from the OECD CRS, GEF, and Climate Funds Update databases. Further, to examine the characteristics of distribution of adaptation finance to developing countries in the Asia–Pacific region, this research uses the accumulated amount of finance. This is because aid agencies usually provide finance to adaptation programs and projects that are implemented for several years, and the amount of finance in only a specific year does not present fairly the trends of distribution of adaptation finance. As for GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds, the total accumulated amount of finance is used. With regard to bilateral ODA, since the OECD has introduced an adaptation marker for data from 2010 onwards, the accumulated amount of finance for 2010 and 2011 is used. Allocation of Adaptation Finance to Developing Countries in the Asia–Pacific Region Financial support for adaptation contributed to developing countries in the Asia–Pacific region through multilateral funds is so far limited. As described in Table 3, GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds (accumulated) are much less than the accumulated amount of adaptation finance from bilateral ODA to developing countries in the Asia–Pacific region (total for 2010 and 2011). Further, although bilateral ODA provides more adaptation finance than GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds, the average share of adaptation financing to the total climate change finance in the Asia–Pacific region (total for 2010 and 2011) is only 29.8 %. This shows that the bilateral ODA has more interest in financing mitigation than adaptation. Allocation of Adaptation Finance to Different Countries in the Asia–Pacific Region Next, this study focuses on how the adaptation finance is distributed to each developing country in the Asia–Pacific region. Figure 3 shows the amount of finance that developing countries in the Table 3 Adaptation finance for developing countries in the Asia–Pacific region (US$ million)a GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds (accumulated) SCCF: 75 LDCF: 181 Adaptation Fund: 78 GEF Trust Fund: 20 Total: 354

Bilateral ODA adaptation finance of five major countries and the total (2010 and 2011) Japan: 2486 Germany: 480 Australia: 318 EU institutions: 243 Korea: 202 Total: 4771

Data source: Climate Funds Update, OECD CRS, and GEF databases (detailed GEF data received from the GEF on June 5, 2013) a The amount of GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds is approved and distributed dataThe amount of bilateral ODA adaptation finance reflects current prices

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Fig. 3 Allocation of adaptation finance from four GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds to the Asia–Pacific region (Data source: Climate Funds Update database)

Table 4 Allocation of adaptation finance from the SCCF, LDCF, Adaptation Fund, and GEF Trust Fund to the Asia–Pacific region (million US$) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

SCCF China Regional 1 Philippines Vietnam India Indonesia Sri Lanka Mongolia Thailand Regional 4

15.8 14.8 11.0 10.7 9.8 5.0 3.1 3.0 1.7 0.5

LDCF Cambodia Bhutan Nepal Regional 2 Lao PDR Bangladesh Maldives Timor-Leste Samoa Vanuatu

24.0 22.0 15.5 13.7 13.6 12.7 11.8 10.9 10.8 10.6

Adaptation Fund Maldives Sri Lanka Samoa Solomon Islands Papua New Guinea Pakistan Mongolia Cook Islands Cambodia

14.4 10.8 10.2 8.6 8.3 6.5 6.5 6.2 6.1

GEF Trust Fund (GEF4) – SPA India Sri Lanka Kiribati Regional 3

9.6 4.2 4.1 2

Data source: Climate Funds Updates

Asia–Pacific received from the four GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds. Table 4 shows the finance received from each GEF-related multilateral adaptation fund. Note that “Regional” in Figure 3 and Table 4 is finance contributed to regional projects. The countries included in Regional 1 are the Cook Islands, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu; Regional 2 comprises the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu; Regional 3 comprises Asia and the Pacific; and Regional 4 comprises Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. The same regions are used in Table 4. Figure 4 shows the amount of adaptation finance that developing countries in the Asia–Pacific region received from all bilateral ODA. Table 5 presents the finance that developing countries in the

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_22-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 4 Allocation of adaptation finance from bilateral ODA to the Asia–Pacific region (Data source: OECD CRS database)

Asia–Pacific region received from three of the largest bilateral ODA funders (i.e., Japan, Germany, and Australia). Note that “regional” includes finance to regional projects and initiatives. “Asia regional” comprises Far East Asia, South and Central Asia, and the Middle East. “Far East Asia regional” comprises Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, North Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam; “South and Central Asia regional” comprises Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Georgia, India, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; “Oceania regional” comprises the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Wallis and Futuna. As the countries in the Central Asia and Middle East are outside the scope of this research, the data of finance to each country in these areas is not included. Comparing GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds with bilateral ODA adaptation finance, GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds in general support adaptation in developing countries of the Asia–Pacific region more broadly in terms of having fewer gaps in financing among developing countries including SIDS and LDCs. However, bilateral ODA adaptation finance focuses on emerging countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and India. However, there are differences in the characteristics of adaptation finance among GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds and among bilateral ODA adaptation finance. As for GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds, compared with the SCCF and LDCF, which finance a wide range of developing countries and regional projects, the Adaptation Fund and GEF Trust Fund finance only a limited range of countries. With regard to bilateral ODA adaptation finance, Japan has intensively financed Vietnam (followed by India and Indonesia), while Germany intensively finances China (followed by Vietnam and India) in the Asia–Pacific region. Unlike Japan and Germany, which intensively finance adaptation in emerging countries, Australia intensively finances adaptation in the Oceania region including SIDS and LDCs, because the primary geographic emphasis of its adaptation program is on Australia’s neighboring island countries (Australian Agency for International Development 2013).

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Table 5 Allocation of adaptation finance from Japan, Germany, and Australia to the Asia–Pacific region (US$ million) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Japan Vietnam India Indonesia Pakistan Bangladesh Cambodia Sri Lanka Philippines Mongolia Lao PDR

679.6 402.4 357.3 257.6 215.3 149.4 145.7 144.3 41.6 19.4

Germany China Vietnam India Bangladesh Lao PDR Asia, regional Philippines Cambodia Nepal Far East Asia, regional

181.6 53.8 43.3 40.4 32.5 22.8 22.7 17.2 17.1 13.8

Australia Oceania, regional Solomon Islands Indonesia Kiribati Papua New Guinea Asia, regional Philippines Timor-Leste Vanuatu Vietnam

56.3 34.1 27.9 21.9 19.5 18.5 15.8 14.8 14.2 11.1

Data source: OECD CRS database

Allocation of Adaptation Finance to Different Sectors in the Asia–Pacific Region Figures 5 and 6 show that the financing targets of GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds and bilateral ODA adaptation finance differ. The former focuses on financing adaptation in disaster risk and coastal zone management sectors, while the latter focuses on financing natural resource management, water, and infrastructure sectors. The differences in the main targeted sectors of the two types of financing probably arise from the differences in the adaptation needs of the main targeted developing countries in the Asia–Pacific region. Roughly, GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds mainly finance SIDS and LDCs in the Asia–Pacific region, which require adaptation in terms of disaster risk and coastal zone management, while bilateral ODA adaptation finance is mainly used by emerging countries that are likely to require assistance in natural resource management, water, and infrastructure sectors. Neither fund well finances adaptation in the human health sector.

Concluding Remarks: Creating an Effective Institutional Framework for Financing Adaptation This chapter presented the characteristics of GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds and bilateral ODA adaptation finance, especially focusing on the distribution of adaptation finance to developing countries in the Asia–Pacific region. Finance for adaptation is one of the key elements of climate change governance. By analyzing the rules and procedures and the financing distributions of the two types of adaptation financing, this study showed that both multilateral and bilateral methods of financing adaptation have various strengths and challenges, and different characteristics, and showed the importance of enhancing their strengths. For example, GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds are controlled in close connection with the UNFCCC. The GEF is able to bring together various donors and organizations in implementing adaptation projects and programs and also to comprehensively finance SIDS and LDCs in the Asia–Pacific region. Additionally, the funds are particular focused toward financing adaptation measures in the sectors of disaster risk management and coastal zone management in the area. However, the complex financing procedures and rules pose challenges to the effective implementation of GEF-related funds; the funds usually go toward additional costs or

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Fig. 5 Allocation of GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds to sectors in the Asia–Pacific region (Data source: Climate Funds Update and GEF databases)

Fig. 6 Allocation of bilateral ODA adaptation finance to sectors in the Asia–Pacific region (Data source: OECD CRS database)

incremental costs of adaptation programs and projects and are limited compared with bilateral ODA adaptation finance. Conversely, this analysis showed that bilateral ODA adaptation finance is larger and able to meet the full cost of adaptation projects. However, bilateral ODA is more influenced by donors’ interests, and the bilateral aid agencies tend to focus on financing adaptation in emerging countries in the Asia–Pacific region. Additionally, each donor has different strategies in terms of their financing targets: countries and sectors. Bilateral ODA tends to finance more adaptation in the sectors of natural resource management, infrastructure, and water in the Asia–Pacific region, compared with GEF-related multilateral adaptation funds. To promote adaptation activities effectively in developing countries in the Asia–Pacific region, this research shows that it is important to enhance the strengths of each financing scheme. In doing so, it is necessary to construct an international framework for coordinating adaptation financing. The Page 16 of 19

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Green Climate Fund, which was launched at the UNFCCC COP meeting in 2011, will finance both mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries. To make effective use of the existing funds and new Green Climate Funds for adaptation, it is necessary to establish common rules and criteria to identify the needs of adaptation in developing countries and to monitor and evaluate the adaptation activities.

Acknowledgments This research was supported by grants from the Global Environment Research Fund of the Ministry of the Environment of Japan (S-11, S-10, and E-1201) and JSPS KAKENHI (24710046).

References Atteridge A, Siebert CK, Klein RJT, Butler C, Tella P (2009) Bilateral finance institutions and climate change: a mapping of climate portfolios. Working paper, Stockholm Environment Institute Australian Agency for International Development (2013) Climate change adaptation. Available at http://www.ausaid.gov.au/aidissues/climatechange/Pages/adaptation.aspx. Accessed 20 July 2013 Ayers JM, Huq S (2008) Supporting adaptation to climate change: what role for official development assistance? Available at http://www.iied.org/supporting-adaptation-climate-change-what-rolefor-official-development-assistance. Accessed 22 July 2013 Barr R, Fankhauser S, Hamilton K (2010) Adaptation investments: a resource allocation financing systems for adaptation framework. Mitig Adapt Strat Glob Chang 15(8):843–858 Climate Funds Update (2013) The latest information on climate funds. Available at http://www. climatefundsupdate.org/. Accessed 8 July 2013 Eisenack K (2012) Adaptation financing in a global agreement: is the adaptation levy appropriate? Clim Policy 12(4):491–504 Fankhauser S, Burton I (2011) Spending adaptation money wisely. Clim Policy 11(3):1037–1049 GEF (2009) Strategy on adaptation to climate change for the Least Developed Countries (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), Global Environment Facility report: 56. Available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/publication/GEF-ADAPTION%20STRATEGIES.pdf. Accessed 6 July 2013 GEF (2011a) Accessing resources under the special climate change fund. Global Environment Facility report. Available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/publication/ 23470_SCCF.pdf. Accessed 6 July 2013 GEF (2011b) Accessing resources under the least developed countries fund. Global Environment Facility report. Available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/publication/ 23469_LDCF.pdf. Accessed 6 July 2013 GEF (2013a) What is the GEF. Available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef. Accessed 6 July 2013 GEF (2013b) Areas of work. Available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/Areas_work. Accessed 6 July 2013 GEF (2013c) GEF agencies. Available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/gef_agencies. Accessed 6 July 2013 Page 17 of 19

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GEF (2013d) SPA. Available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/SPA. Accessed 20 July 2013 GEF (2013e) GEF projects. Available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/project_list. Accessed 7 July 2013 GEF (2013f) Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF). Available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/ldcf. Accessed 8 July 2013 GEF (2013g) Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF). Available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/sccf. Accessed 8 July 2013 GEF (2013h) LDCF/SCCF Adaptation monitoring and assessment tool (AMAT). Available at http:// www.thegef.org/gef/tracking_tool_LDCF_SCCF. Accessed 8 July 2013 Grasso M (2010) Justice in funding adaptation under the international climate change regime. Springer, Dordrecht Grasso M (2011) The role of justice in the North–South conflict in climate change: the case of negotiations on the Adaptation Fund. Int Environ Agreem Polit Law Econ 11(4):361–377 Hahn M, Fröde A (2011) Climate proofing for development: adapting to climate change, reducing risk. Deutsche Gesellschaft f€ ur Internationale Zusammenarbeit Report. Available at http://www2. gtz.de/dokumente/bib-2011/giz2011-0223en-climate-proofing.pdf. Accessed 10 July 2013 Hammill A, Tanner T (2011) Harmonising climate risk management: adaptation screening and assessment tools for development co-operation. OECD environment working papers 36. OECD Publishing IBON International (2009) Ibon primer on ODA and development effectiveness: can aid be a key contribution to genuine development? Ibon Center report. Available at http://www.dochas.ie/ Shared/Files/4/Primer_on_oda_and_development_effectiveness.pdf. Accessed 12 July 2013 IPCC (2007) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge JICA (2007) JICA’s assistance for adaptation to climate change (in Japanese). JICA report. Available at http://jica-ri.jica.go.jp/IFIC_and_JBICI-Studies/jica-ri/publication/archives/jica/field/ 200707_env.html. Accessed 12 July 2013 JICA (2011) JICA climate finance impact tool for adaptation. Final report for study on mainstreaming climate change considerations into JICA operation (adaptation) by Nippon Koei Co., Ltd., (Draft Ver. 1.0.) JICA report. Available at http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/ climate_change/pdf/adaptation_all.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2013 Klein RJT (2002) Climate change, adaptive capacity and sustainable development. Paper presented at an expert meeting on adaptation to climate change and sustainable development, OECD, Paris, Mar 2002 Klein RJT, Eriksen SEH, Næss LO, Hammil A, Tanner TM, Robledo C, O’Brien K (2007) Portfolio screening to support the mainstreaming of adaptation to climate change into development assistance. Clim Change 84(1):23–44 Kropp J, Scholze M (2009) Climate change information for effective adaptation: a practitioners’ manual. Deutsche Gesellschaft f€ ur Technische Zusammenarbeit report. Available at http://www2. gtz.de/dokumente/bib-2009/gtz2009-0175en-climate-change-information.pdf. Accessed 7 July 2013 Lamhauge N, Lanzi E, Agrawala S (2012) Monitoring and evaluation for adaptation: lessons from development co-operation agencies. OECD environment working papers 38. OECD Publishing Ministry of the Environment of Japan (2013) Cooperation through JICA. Available at http://www. env.go.jp/earth/coop/coop/english/cooperation/jica.html. Accessed 8 July 2013

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Mitchell T, Anderson S, Huq S (2008) Principles for delivering adaptation finance. Institute of Development Studies, Brighton Möhner A, Klein RJT (2007) The global environment facility: funding for adaptation or adapting to funds? Climate and energy working paper, Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm M€uller B (2008) International adaptation finance: the need for an innovative and strategic approach, EV42. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford OECD (2009) Integrating climate change adaptation into development co-operation—policy guidance. OECD report. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/9/43652123.pdf. Accessed 10 July 2013 OECD (2012) Financing climate change action. Available at http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/ 49096643.pdf. Accessed 7 July 2013 OECD (2013a) Adaptation to climate change. Available at http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/adaptation. htm. Accessed 6 July 2013 OECD (2013b) Focus on aid targeting the objectives of the Rio Conventions. Available at http:// www.oecd.org/dac/stats/rioconventions.htm. Accessed 7 July 2013 OECD (2013c) International Development Statistics (IDS) online databases. Available at http:// www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm. Accessed 8 July 2013 Oxfam (2007) Adapting to climate change: what’s needed in poor countries, and who should pay. Oxfam briefing paper 104. Oxfam International, Oxford Persson Å (2011) Institutionalising climate adaptation finance under the UNFCCC and beyond: could an adaptation ‘market’ emerge? Working paper, Stockholm Environment Institute Sagasti F, Bezanson K, Prada F (2005) The future of development financing: challenges and strategic choices. Palgrave Macmillan, New York UNDP (2007) Fighting climate change: human solidarity in a divided world. Human Development report 2007/2008, UNDP report UNFCCC (2007) Investment and financial flows: to address climate change. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn UNFCCC (2013a) Clean development mechanism (CDM). Available at http://unfccc.int/ kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php. Accessed 11 July 2013 UNFCCC (2013b) Adaptation Fund. Available at http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/ financial_mechanism/adaptation_fund/items/3659.php. Accessed 12 July 2013 World Bank (2010) The economics of adaptation to climate change. A synthesis report, final consultation draft, World Bank report Yamin F (2004) Overview. IDS Bull 35(3):1–10

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_23-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Assessing the Impact of Rainwater Harvesting Technology as Adaptation Strategy for Rural Communities in Makueni County, Kenya Jokastah Wanzuu Kalungua*, Walter Leal Filhob, Duncan Onyango Mbugec and Hillary Kibet Cheruiyotd a South Eastern Kenya University, Nairobi, Kenya b Applications of Life Sciences, Hamburg University of Applied Sciences, Hamburg, Germany c Department of Environmental and Biosystems Engineering, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya d Crop Improvement and Management Programme, Tea Research Institute, Kericho, Kenya

Abstract Rainfall scarcity is a constraint to productivity in arid and semiarid regions of Kenya. This chapter identifies the common rainwater harvesting technologies used in Makueni County, a semiarid region, both for domestic and agriculture production as a way of adapting to climate change and variability. Household interviews were held for 134 households from five villages in addition to collection of secondary data from the area. The results revealed that 30 % of farmers have water tanks in their home, 90 % are members of communal sand dams and ponds, while 70 % use road water harvesting to supplement rain-fed agriculture. The constraints for adoption included lack of labor and skills. Different coping strategies applied by small-scale farmers who practice rain-fed agricultural production in this region include soil moisture retention practices such as terracing and use of sand dams as well as storage of water for domestic use in tanks. This valuable information will provide best home-grown practices and reveal gaps on rainwater harvesting which can be implemented by extension officers and local stakeholders. The adoption of these important technologies can be a basis of curbing related problems under similar conditions.

Keywords Adaptation strategy; Makueni County; Rainwater harvesting; Climate change and variability

Introduction The Effect of Climate Change on Water Resources Africa is characterized by a wide variety of climate systems ranging from humid equatorial systems through seasonally arid tropical to subtropical Mediterranean-type climates (Hulme 2001). These climates exhibit differing degrees of temporal variability, particularly with regard to rainfall amount and distribution. Climate change is often used to include the occurrence of medium-term changes in weather patterns, increased climate variability, and more frequent climatic extremes such as droughts and floods (IPCC 2001). It is usually associated with increasing frequency and intensity of droughts and water scarcity that aggravate food insecurity and poverty in rural communities.

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_23-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

The Fourth African Assessment Report on climate change released by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) highlights major issues related to potential impacts due to climate change (IPCC 2007). It indicates that Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climatic variability. This is a result of the interaction of multiple stresses including land degradation and desertification, declining runoff from water catchments, high dependence on subsistence agriculture, HIV/AIDS prevalence, inadequate government mechanisms, and rapid population growth occurring at various levels. Africa also has low adaptive capacity due to factors such as extreme poverty, frequent natural disasters such as droughts and floods, and rainfalldependent agriculture (Boko et al. 2007). Due to this vulnerability, it is estimated that between 75 and 250 million people are likely to be exposed to increased water stress by 2020. The rain-fed agricultural yields could also be reduced by up to 50 % (Boko et al. 2007). These impacts will be aggravated by climate change unless strategies to address climate change-induced water stress are adopted. In an attempt to overcome climate change and other challenges facing them, many African countries have crafted strategic plans detailing how they intend to deal with these global issues. For instance, Kenya has developed the Kenya Vision 2030 plan. One of the key factors of Kenya Vision 2030 is to transform Kenya into a newly industrializing middle-income country providing a high-quality life to all its citizens by the year 2030 (GoK 2007). This is also emphasized in the Kenya Economic Stimulus Program (ESP) objectives of investing in long-term solutions to the challenges of food security and economic opportunities in rural areas for employment creation (KNAMP 2010). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 1 also aim at eliminating extreme poverty and hunger using sustainable methods by the year 2015. However, by the projections of the year 2008, it was apparent that no African country was likely to achieve all its goals by 2015 (Achim 2006). Despite the Kenyan new constitution promulgated in 2010 stating that “Every person has the right to clean and safe water in adequate quantities” (GoK 2010), an estimated 41 % of Kenya’s population live without access to safe drinking water, relying on unprotected wells, springs, or informal water providers (UNICEF 2010). With regard to water availability, like many other countries, Kenya is below the international water scarcity threshold (1,000 m3 per person per year) with only 935 m3 available per person per year (FAO 2007), and population growth is forecasted to reduce this figure to 359 m3 by 2020 (UN-Water 2006). To curb water scarcity, programs such as the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) project were established in 2002. This project promoted and coordinated development and management of water, land, and related resources in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems (GWP 2010). The project was done in Makueni County. Makueni County, located in Eastern Kenya, is hot and dry with erratic and unreliable rainfall. The people of Makueni rely on an inadequate, fragile, and uncertain resource base under constant threat of drought, resulting in food insecurity and undernutrition (Ismail and Immink 2003).

Introduction to Makueni County Makueni County is one of the most food-insecure areas of the country with over 70 % of households classified as poor or very poor (WMS 1998). The farmers practice subsistence farming under rainfed agriculture. It is for this reason that Makueni County was selected as a case study, and any results obtained in the county would be fairly representative of the other parts of the arid and semiarid regions. The county is unique because climate in this region falls under two climatic zones: arid and semiarid with most of the district being classified as arid. Researching in this county therefore offers a very good opportunity to see the difference in the coping strategies to climate change for the people Page 2 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_23-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

in arid and semiarid regions. This is important because with the high rate of impacts of climate change, the semiarid regions may in the future be arid. The lessons learned in the arid regions may be used to prepare the people in the semiarid areas in Makueni County and other currently semiarid areas to cope with the expected and impending aridity in the near future.

Adaptation of Makueni Residents to Climate Change Some of the adaptation measures to water stresses during droughts and high rainfall variability include adoption of supplemental irrigation, rainwater harvesting, and storage (Nkomo et al. 2006; Osman et al. 2005). Measures used specifically for agriculture in Makueni include planting of drought-resistant crop varieties, use of certified seed as opposed to planting grain from previous harvests, early-maturing crops, promotion of small livestock improvement, establishment of group seed bank, promotion of credit access and food storage, and improvement of water exploitation methods such as shallow wells, roof catchment, and sand dams among other water harvesting technologies (Speranza 2008). Crop and animal diversification, income diversification, and feeding animals on preserved hay and mineral salts are also some of the strategies for adapting to climate change (Mutambara et al. 2012). Adaptation to climate change and its variability necessitates the adjustment of a system to moderate the impacts of climate change through taking advantage of new opportunities and coping with the resulting consequences (IPCC 2001).

The Need for Rainwater Harvesting in Makueni Makueni has only one perennial river with numerous streams. Therefore, alternative ways of addressing the drawbacks and water scarcity in this region are through maximizing the use of rainwater through rainwater harvesting (RWH) as well as improving soil and water management. Rainwater harvesting is mainly the collection of runoff for its productive use. It can also be defined as a method for inducing, collecting, storing, and conserving local surface runoff for agriculture in arid and semiarid regions (Boers and Ben-Asher 1982). It is one adaptation measure that does not require large capital investment and is essentially a management approach, to provide water resources at the community level and ensure livelihoods are maintained (IRIN 2006). The use of rainwater harvesting leads to a reduction in water costs, ease of water acquisition, and control of floods and soil erosion (Reiz et al. 1988; Zhao 1996; Li et al. 1999; Wang et al. 2005). RWH is also simple to operate and manage and therefore ideal to rural communities such as those in ASAL regions (Li et al. 1999). Soil and water management is a must for agricultural production in ASAL regions. The harvested water seeps into the ground through embankments and impediments such as bunds and terraces, where it is stored in mulch in the case of in situ micro-catchments for prolonged use by plants. Encouraging infiltration of rainwater also raises the water table and makes water readily available for plants or in shallow wells. While RWH systems can improve agricultural production and reduce drought in semiarid environments, their performance and effectiveness is limited by high water losses, inadequate storage capacity, and poor water management (Ngigi 2009). Thus, improving the access of poor people to water has the potential to make a major contribution toward poverty eradication through improved agricultural production as well as enhanced food security. RWH promotes gender equality and empowers women by availing water close to their homes and limiting the distance they have to travel to fetch it as well as increasing food production and nutrition (Lehmann 2010). It has however been shown that water-related enterprises such as agricultural development projects have a far greater success rate when women are involved than when they are excluded (Achim 2006). According to the World Water Development Report, many girls are prevented Page 3 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_23-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 Water tank 1 for domestic use

from attending school because they are in charge of collecting domestic water (Achim 2006). Thus, rainwater harvesting as a decentralized water supply system eliminates women’s burden of collecting domestic water. Rainwater harvested from rooftops supplies relatively clean water, which when filtered, treated, and stored, provides a safe and clean source of drinking water. Thus, women and the girl child use the time saved from collecting water on education and other income-generating activities. Adoption of RWH ensures environmental sustainability because communities are able to engage in more crop production including tree planting activities that lead to increase in the proportion of land area covered by forest, which help to maintain biodiversity. According to Mati (2006), rainwater harvested from rooftops coupled with storage and use of drip irrigation kits has relatively increased in East Africa.

Description of RWH Systems Commonly Used for Domestic and Agricultural Use Inadequate access and quality water for both domestic and agricultural use was identified as the main challenge in the Makueni District Vision and Strategy 2005–2015 (PWC 2005). Due to this there exist various water harvesting technologies in the county. Water Tanks Water tanks mostly harvest water from rooftops. Tanks are popular for saving water, are easy to use, and are available in styles to suit most homes. Harvesting water with tanks involves three primary components: catchment, conveyance, and a collection device. Rainwater drains down the slanted rooftop to the conveyance instruments, or gutters, at the base of the roof. The gutters transport the water from the rooftop to the collection device. The advantages of water tanks include the fact that it is a simple technology which provides free soft water that lathers easily, saving on soap and detergent. It also provides extra water available for kitchen gardening and one can get any size of the tank. However, the cost of tanks is high for most smallholder farmers with the rainwater tanks needing careful management to prevent mosquitos from breeding in them (Kheradi 2011). Figures 1 and 2 show different types of tanks used by the community. Sand Dams Sand dams are small impermeable barriers constructed across the bed of seasonal streams. Sandy riverbeds are required for a sand dam to work properly. Sand dams vary in size according to the riverbed. It is a very simple technology and inexpensive since construction materials are locally

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_23-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 2 Water tank 2 for domestic use

Fig. 3 Sand dam at Makueni County

available. In most cases, the labor required to build the barrier comes from the local community. Another benefit of having the water stored underground is that it is less vulnerable to contamination and disease-carrying insects, such as mosquitoes, since there is no medium for laying their eggs. Sand dams are very low in construction costs. All that is needed to build them is wood to form the barrier, reinforcing material, and concrete or masonry as shown in Fig. 3. Being a simple structure, there are minimal to zero maintenance costs associated with sand dams (PA 2008; RHIN 2007; Stern 2011). Zai Pits and Negarims Zai pits were traditionally invented by farmers in Burkina Faso (NDMA 2011). In Kenya, they are referred to as planting pits and are boxlike structure in cross section as shown in Fig. 4. They are constructed by excavating the soil and returning the rich top soil with organic mulch, while the subsoil acts as an embankment behind the pit. A tree crop or several plants like maize and beans are then planted in the pit. The mulch soaks up the water and stores it throughout the dry season. Similarly, negarims act in the same way except that they are mostly used for tree crops and involve a formation of square embankments. Some of the advantages of using Zai pits and negarims are the fact that they can be reused for up to four crop seasons or two seasons without the need to add more manure. In addition they increase crop yield and enable better crop survival in drought time,

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_23-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 4 Zai pits at Makueni County

Fig. 5 Rock catchment

promote ease of weed control, conserve water through reduction of soil erosion, as well as improve soil fertility and environmental conservation (NDMA 2011). However, Zai pits require heavy labor for preparation and may not work well in waterlogging soil. Rock Catchment Rock catchments are systems which mainly use natural rock surfaces to divert rainwater to a central collection area (Fig. 5). The collected rainwater passes through sand and gravel before storage in a water reservoir or tank. The sand and gravel act to filter and make the water clean. Bunds Bunds are large earth banks on the contour that trap runoff (Fig. 6). Bunds vary in shape. They are usually built to prevent runoff and conserve water. Bunds are simple to build, improve productivity, and keep water in the soil. Despite this, bunds use a lot of land, may create temporary logging, and may interfere with farm operations if the bunds are too close to each other. However, they are labor intensive (Yongon 2008).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_23-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 6 Trapezoidal bunds

Fig. 7 Water pans

Water Pans and Ponds Water pans and ponds are excavations or embankments that are constructed on the path of natural rainwater catchments and used as water reservoirs (Fig. 7). To create a leakproof water reservoir, it is necessary to use an impervious layer of soil or line the reservoir with plastic material to form the plastic-lined dam. A recent innovation in Kenya used by farmers that lack a large catchment area is the diversion and collection of rainwater from road drainage, a method commonly known as road runoff harvesting. This method has become so popular along some roads, some farmers have conflicts as farmers up the road divert all the water leaving little or no water for farmers down the road (Ngigi 2009). This study identified the types of rainwater harvesting method for domestic and agricultural use and the impact to smallholder farmers in Makueni County (Table 1).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_23-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Classification of uses of RWH technologies Domestic use Water tanks Water pans Farm ponds Sand dams

Agricultural use Water pan Road harvesting Zai techniques Bunds

Domestic and agriculture Water pans Farm ponds Sand dams

Methodology Description of the Study Area The study was conducted in Makueni County which is located in the southern part of the Eastern Province of Kenya in East Africa. The elevation is 1125 m above sea level, latitude 1
500 S and longitude 37
140 E in the transitional zone between agroecological zones IVand V. Makueni County is characterized by extreme rainfall variability. The region receives mean annual rainfall of about 500–600 mm annually (Njiru 2012). The rainfall pattern is bimodal with two rainy seasons with two peaks in March/May (long rains) and October/December (short rains). The dry period occurs from June to October and from January to March. Precipitation is highly influenced by topography; the hill masses receive higher amounts of rainfall in the range of 1,200 mm, the medium zone receives up to 750 mm, and the very low-lying zone averaging 600 mm of rainfall per year, respectively. Temperatures in Makueni County are high throughout the year
which causes high evaporation. The area experiences temperature ranges of between 18 and 24 C during the cold seasons and
24 and 33 C in the hot seasons. The mean annual potential evaporation in the central and northwestern ranges between 1,800 and 2,000 mm, while in eastern and northeastern is from 2,200 to 2,400 mm (PWC 2005). However, the overall drainage pattern in the county is from west to east. Figure 8 shows a map of Makueni County.

Sampling Techniques and Data Analysis

A two-stage sampling technique was applied to select the households. In the first stage, 178 households were randomly interviewed from a list of 400 households. In the second stage, a total of 134 households from 178 households who were practicing at least two rainwater harvesting systems were considered for the analysis. Data analysis involved both the primary and secondary data. The analysis of quantitative data was done using MS Excel and presented as percentages in graphs. The study was conducted in June 2011.

Results and Discussion Summary of Results Farmers were asked to point out the rainwater harvesting technologies they were using. Majority (95 %) were using terraces, with 90 % mentioning communal sand dams. Road harvesting (70 %) was also popular among the farmers. Water tanks were used by 30 % of households, and this may be due to the fact that only 48.1 % of the housing units in Eastern Kenya are roofed with iron sheet roofs, asbestos cement sheets, concrete, or clay tiles. Figure 9 indicates that on average, 51 % of the households were using water pans, farm ponds, and sand dams for multipurpose use, while 30 % used water from water tanks for domestic use especially for drinking.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_23-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 8 Map of Makueni County (CRA 2012)

Fig. 9 Classification of rainwater harvesting technologies according to use

The Adoption of Rainwater Harvesting Technologies The rainfall data presented in Fig. 10 gives an interesting picture of rainfall in Makueni. Although most references talk of a bimodal rainfall pattern, it would seem that there is only one rainy season that starts around October and peaks in November or December. These rains continue through April, albeit in suppression save for a small blip in March or April. There is then a 6-month dry spell with almost no rain at all. This is the period where rainwater for domestic use becomes a critical factor. This is because of the need to have a storage structure large enough to store water to last households over the 6-month dry spell. It may therefore be concluded that the construction of water tanks may not be as viable as construction of water pans. This is because one would require a relatively large (and costly) tank to cater for the household for half a year. On the other hand, sand dam stores large volumes of water

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_23-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 10 Rainfall (mm) in Makueni County (GoK 2011)

Fig. 11 Rainwater harvesting technologies

for long distances behind the barrier. Since the water is under the sand, it is safe from the high evaporation due to the high temperatures in the dry spell. In this study, 90 % were harvesting water from sand dams as to 30 % from water tanks. However, there was no difference in terms of the percentage of households harvesting water from water tanks and water pans (Fig. 11). Of the farmers, 95 % use terraces for soil and water conservation while 70 % harvest water from roads. This shows that almost half the farmers understand the importance of in situ rainwater harvesting technologies for improvement of yields. The unpopular technologies included Zai pits (7 %) and negarims (9 %). The reason for the low adoption was that these are relatively recent technologies on which the farmers have not been fully sensitized. However, Zai pits have been shown to increase yields in Kitui and Mwingi (Tran 2011; Njue 2012). For this reason, sensitization should be done to farmers by extension workers and other stakeholders particularly for the improvement to fruit trees like mangoes.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_23-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 12 Motivation for harvesting rainwater

The case of Zai pits and negarims is in sharp contrast to terracing which has been adopted by 95 % of the residents. There was aggressive promotion of terracing in the area by the Ministry of Agriculture since the 1960s, and the wide adoption of terracing shows that farmers understand the need for soil and moisture conservation. All the in situ RWH technologies such as bunds, negarims, Zai pits, and terracing are labor intensive. But given the enthusiastic adoption of terracing, it seems that the farmers are not discouraged by the labor intensity of the technology. The results of this study were different from the CSTI (2009) whereby the most common sources of water in Makueni for domestic use during the dry season were rivers/streams (72 %), followed by wells (28 %) while boreholes and dams had 2.7 %. However, during the wet season the sources of water change with 46.7 % using rainwater for domestic use. The use of shallow wells also increases from 6 % during the dry season to 16 % during the rainy season. This points to the fact that even though the residents are increasingly adopting rainwater harvesting, the volume of water stored is low, and this is probably the reason why they resort to stream water as soon as the dry season sets in.

Motivation for Adoption of Rainwater Harvesting Technologies

According to Makabila (2013), the rainwater flowing on the seasonal rivers of Makueni County gets harvested in close to 100 sand dams. The water harvested is later used for domestic and agricultural use when the dry spell sets in. Between 2007 and 2008, Welthungerhilfe (WHH), a German relief organization, constructed five rock catchments in the Makueni District in Kenya’s Eastern Province, providing safe drinking water to more than 19,000 people. However, this did not feature among the farmers interviewed. This may be because the project was implemented in a single village or it had not been adopted largely by most inhabitants as to spread to all farmers. Rainwater harvesting systems are mostly practiced in ASAL regions. These regions are characterized with intense runoff events which make water storage a necessary integral part of the system (Oweis et al. 1999). This helps in mitigating the effects of temporal shortages of rain for domestic and agricultural purposes (Oweis et al. 1999; TWDB 2006). With Makueni being a semiarid region, the main reason for harvesting the rainwater was due to low and unreliable rainfall with 96 % of households. The second motivation was presence of seasonal rivers with 81 % (Fig. 12). The presence of seasonal rivers provided a conducive environment for construction of sand dams. Promotion and creation of awareness from Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) besides subsidizing of the materials to the farmers also made 65 % of the household harvest water from the rainfall as shown in Fig. 12. Page 11 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_23-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 13 Reasons for rainwater harvesting

Water availability saves energy, time, labor, and money, since water does not have to be carried to households from distant sources. While the harvested water leads to more reliable and greater yields, the members of the households can use their saved time to do other work, therefore generating more income as an output of the saved time. On the other hand, RWH at schools improves hygiene and nutrition, and pupils can spend more time learning, as they do not need to carry water to the school (Lehmann et al. 2010). Rainwater harvesting has also been found to increase the number of children attending school as well as decrease the walking distance to fetching water (Hauser 2012). Since women are usually in charge of the household water supply (Lehmann et al. 2010), adoption of RWH empowers women because it gives them the possibility to get paid work where the presence of local employment is allowed. Also, RWH provides them with more time at their disposal, which can be utilized in other daily chores. Thus, their status as a decision-maker in the household increases. Most importantly, properly stored rainwater provides households with safe and hygienic water which reduces the risk of infection and child mortality and helps combat other severe diseases. It was estimated that poor water quality is responsible for the deaths of 1.8 million people every year worldwide (WHO 2004). RWH ensures environmental sustainability and can provide access to safe drinking water without threatening natural water sources.

Adoption of Rainwater for Domestic and Agricultural Use The success of rainwater harvesting in arid and semiarid lands (ASALs) depends on the high demand of clean water supplies given that in Kenya, more than 67 % of rural households still have no access to clean and safe drinking water (Wanyonyi 1998). One of the main reasons the farmers were harvesting water was to increase yield (96 %) and get water for domestic use (96 %). Other reasons were to preserve water for use during the dry season (66 %) which is connected to increased yields, prevention of soil erosion (39 %), as well as irrigation (29 %) (Fig. 13). The availability of this water increases crop production because of the continuity in supply of this water to the farms in the form of drip irrigation or kitchen gardening. Most of the collected rainwater is used for irrigation, aquifer recharge, and storm water abatement (WHO 2006).

Factors Limiting the Uptake of Water Harvesting Technologies

Some of the identified constraints for implementing water-related projects in Kenya are financial constraints as well as lack of skills (Kinyua 2010). This is because rainwater harvesting technology

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_23-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 14 Constraints of implementing rainwater harvesting

can either be a complex or a simple technology to implement. However, for the people in Makueni, the major constraint was lack of labor with 69 % citing it (Fig. 14). From the study it was also found that the more compelling reason for the adoption of terracing is the recognition of its role in soil and water conservation arising from active promotion by extension officers over the years. To encourage increased adoption of terracing, perhaps the government can invest in community earth movers for hire or train the farmers in the use of animal draft technology for terracing and scooping dams. The second constraint was lack of information about some of the technologies. This was evident in the low adoption of technologies such as negarims, bunds, and Zai pits. Lack of capital did not feature as a main problem with 32 % of the farmers citing it. Only 1 % indicated that their farms had enough water (Fig. 14). RWH technology in Kenya is mostly implemented by self-help groups or communities that are not registered as required by the Water Act 2002. It has to be assumed that the Water Act 2002 does not encourage people to invest in RWH when there is no other option but to act outside a legal framework. Many organizations operating in community self-help water systems are not formally registered by the Ministry of Water.

Conclusion and Recommendations It may be concluded that sand dams are an important source of domestic water with over 90 % of the population using it, while terracing is the preferred method of soil and water conservation. There is need to sensitize farmers on new technologies such as the use of negarims, Zai pits, and trapezoidal bunds since these are beneficial technologies that have not been adopted. The high rate of adoption of terraces indicates that farmers are aware of the need to conserve soil and water, and even the labor intensity of the technology may not hinder them from practicing conservation measures that may help them to boost production of crops. However, investment in machinery for hire may encourage faster adoption. Rainwater use seems to be confined to the wet season, with the residents using the streams and wells during the dry season. It may therefore be concluded that there is a problem of water storage that would otherwise extend the water availability through the dry season. It is therefore necessary to invest in water storage structures to ensure water availability all year round. Alternatively,

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_23-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

groundwater recharge may be encouraged so as to raise the water table and ensure water availability close to the surface for enhanced crop production. Since the dry spell is long, the only viable technology for storage of water for domestic use is sand dams and more investment in this technology should be encouraged. Rainwater harvesting forms the basis of solving water shortage problems in the ASALs. The government should fund such projects through the concerned Ministries of Water Resources Management and Development and provide reasonable percentages in the annual budget. Nonetheless, NGOs and Community-Based Organizations at national and local levels should be encouraged and allowed to play a role in putting rainwater harvesting in the limelight. Though this has been seen through the Southern and Eastern Africa Rainwater Network (SearNet) established with the assistance of the International Rainwater Catchment Systems Association and the support of the Regional Land Management Unit of UNEP (2009), more outreach programs should be put in place to expand the knowledge of water harvesting. Related workshops should also be used to expand this knowledge. The research recommends that at the local level, the government should fund water harvesting projects and provide farmers with harvesting materials such as gutters, roofing materials, concrete, and water tanks. An adaptation of the Kenya Water Act (2002) is necessary, in order to clarify the conditions under which various RWH structures can be implemented.

References Achim S (2006) Achieving MDG 7 is an important precondition for achieving all the other MDGs, Environment programme (UNEP), Chapter 2, Secl:41, pp 1–26. http://na.unep.net/atlas/kenya/ downloads/chapters/Kenya_Screen_Chapter2.pdf Boers TM, Ben-Asher J (1982) A review of rainwater harvesting. In Agric. Water Management 5:145–158 Boko M, Nain I, Nyong A, Vogel C, Githeko A, Medany M, Osman-Elasha B, Tabo R, Yanda P (2007) Africa. In: Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp 433–467 CRA (Commission on Revenue Allocation) (2012) Kenya county fact sheets, Makueni. http:// kenya.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/profiles/Makueni CSTI (2009) Increasing community resilience to drought in Makueni District: the Sakai community’s experience, Kenya, Project report FAO (2007) Climate change and food security: a framework for action. Report by an interdepartmental working group on climate change. FAO, Rome Global Water Partnership (2010) A water secure world. http://www.gwp.org/en/Press-Room/AWater-Secure-World/. Accessed 15 June 2013 GoK (2007) Kenya vision 2030, a globally competitive and prosperous Kenya. http://www.kilimo. go.ke/kilimo_docs/pdf/Kenya_VISION_2030-final.pdf GoK (2010) National climate change response strategy. Government Press, Nairobi GoK (Government of Kenya) (2011) Drought monthly bulletin for 2011. Office of the Prime Minister Hauser K (2012) Harvesting rain with rocks in Kenya, a publication of ONE is a hard-headed movement of people around the world fighting the absurdity of extreme poverty. http://www.one. org/us/2012/05/12/harvesting-rain-with-rocks-in-kenya/ Page 14 of 17

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Hulme M, Doherty R, Ngara T, News M, Lister D (2001) African climate change: 1900–2100. Journal of climate research, Vol. 17: 145–168, 2001 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007) Working Group I (AR4, 2007): summary for International Water Association (2009) Vulnerability of arid and semi-arid regions to climate change – impacts and adaptive strategies, pp 29–30 Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (2008) Climate change and water, report IV IPCC (2001) Climate change 2001: the scientific basis. In: Houghton J, Griggs T, Nquer M, van der Linden PJ, Dai X, Maskell K, Johnson CA (eds) Contribution of working group 1 to the third assessment, report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York, p 881 IRIN (2006) Humanitarian news and analysis Africa: rainwater harvesting could solve water Shortages, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, On press. www.irinnews. org/africa-rainwater-harvesting-could-solve-water-short Ismail S, Immink M (2003) Community-based food and nutrition programmes what makes them successful, a review and analysis of experience. FAO Food and Nutrition Division. http://www. fao.org/docrep/006/y5030e/y5030e00.htm#TopOfPage Kenya National Accord Monitoring Project (2010) Agenda 4: long-term issues addressed, draft report on status of implementation Kheradi W (2011) Sustainable building, 2011, why install a rainwater tank? The advantages and disadvantages. http://sustainablebuilding.net.au/water-tanks/. Accessed 20 June 2013 Kinyua, MG (2010) Rainwater harvesting: Kenya. Vol. 11, Safe Drinking Water. http://tcdc2.undp. org/gssdacademy/sie/docs/vol11/sie.v11_ch6.pdf Lehmann C, Tsukada, R, Lourete A (2010) Low-cost technologies towards achieving the millennium development goals: The Case of Rainwater Harvesting. International policy research brief 2 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth Li FM, Wang J, Zhao SL (1999) The rainwater harvesting technology approaches for dry land agriculture in semi-arid Loess plateau of China. Acta Ecol Sin 19(2):259–264 Makabila S (2013) Technology saves villagers as floods continue to ravage country. http://www. standardmedia.co.ke/m/story.php?articleID=2000081987%26story_title=Technology-savesvillagers-as-floods-continue-to-ravage-country Mati BM (2006) Capacity development strategies: lessons from Promoting Farmer Innovation (PFI) in East Africa. In: Workshop proceedings on design and implementation of capacity development strategies. IPTRID, FAO, Rome, pp 37–48. http://www.fao.org/landandwater/iptrid/EN/publica tions.html#grid Mutambara J, Dube IV, Mvumi BM (2012) Agroforestry technologies involving fodder production and implication on livelihood of smallholder livestock farmers in Zimbabwe. A case study of goromonzi district. Livest Res Rural Dev 24(11):2012 National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) (2011) Zai (planting) pits, world food programme report. http://ffa.kenyafoodsecurity.org/index.php?option=com_content%26view= article%26id=92:soil-bund-fanya-chini-%26catid=25:the-project%26Itemid=154 Ngigi SN (2009) Climate change adaptation strategies: water resources management options for smallholder farming systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. The MDG Centre for East and Southern Africa, The Earth Institute at Columbia University, New York, p 189 Nkomo J, C. Gomez Bernard, (2006) Estimating and Comparing Costs and Benefits of Adaptation Projects: Case Studies in South Africa and the Gambia Studies in South Africa and the Gambia

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Njiru BN (2012) Climate change, resource competition, and conflict amongst pastoral communities in Kenya. In: Scheffran J, Brzoska M, Brauch HG, Link PM, Schilling J (eds) Climate change, human security and violent conflict: challenges for societal stability. Springer, Berlin, pp 513–527 Njue JN (2012) Water harvesting for ASAL maize production using modified Zai pits: In Press: Kyuso maarifa centre. Acessible on http://kyusomaarifa.blogspot.com/2012/05/waterharvesting Osman B, Elhasssan NG, Ahmed H, Zakieldin S (2005) Sustainable livelihood approach for assessing community resilience to climate change: case studies from Sudan. Policymakers, Footnote 1 Oweis T, Hachum A, and Kijne J (1999) Water harvesting and supplemental irrigation for improved water use efficiency in dry areas. System-Wide Initiative on Water Management (SWIM) Paper, 7 Practical Action (2008) Sand Dams feasible rainwater harvesting technology for arid and semi-arid lands. http://practicalaction.org/sand-dams-2 Pricewater Coopers. Makueni district vision and strategy: 2005–2015. http://www.aridland.go.ke/ NRM_Strategy/makueni.pdf Reiz C, Maulder P, Begemann L (1988) Water harvesting for plant production. World Bank Technical paper 91, Washington, DC RHIN (2007) Kenya sand dams provide water access points in a semi-arid environment. http://www. clean-water-for-laymen.com/kenya-sand.html Speranza CI, Kiteme B, Wiesmann U. (2008) Droughts and famines: The underlying factors and the causal links among agro-pastoral households in semi-arid Makueni district, Kenya. Global Environmental Change, 18 (1), 220–233 Stern JH (2011) Water harvesting through sand dams, Utooni Development Organization Kenya, Echo technical note. http://www.ircwash.org/sites/default/files/Stern-2011-Water-Techn.note.pdf Tran M (2011) Small farmers in vanguard of Africa’s battle for agricultural development, Guardian news, supported by Bill and Melinda Gates. http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/ 2011/sep/13/africa-small-farmers-agricultural-development Texas Water Development (TWDB), (2006) Rainwater harvesting potential and guidelines for Texas. Report to 80th Legislature, Texas, USA. http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/innovativewater/ rainwater/doc/RainwaterCommitteeFinalReport.pdf United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), (2009) Climate change in African dry lands: adaptive livelihood options. Nairobi, Kenya. http://www.frameweb.org/adl/en-S/3625/file/447/ Discussion%20Paper%20on%20Climate%20Change%20in%20Afican%20Drylands%20-% 20Adaptative%20Livelihood%20Options.pdf UNICEF (2010) Water, sanitation and hygiene. http://www.unicef.org/wash/. Accessed 20 May 2013 UN-Water (2006) Kenya national water development report. United Nations. http://unesdoc.unesco. org/0014/0014/001488/148866E.pdf. Accessed 10 May 2013 Wang XL, Li FM, Jia Y, Shi WQ (2005) Increasing potato yields with additional water and increase soil temperature. Agric Water Manage 78:181–1994 Wanyonyi JM (1998) Possibilities and challenges in rainwater harvesting KBC Radio English Service Water and Society program. http://www.unep.org/gc/gcss-viii/Kenya-IWRM.pdf. Accessed 10 June 2013 Welfare Monitoring Survey System (WMS) (1998) The constitution of Kenya (Kenya), 27 Aug 2010. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c8508822.html. (Accessed 3 July 2013). Accessed 17 June 2013 WHO (2004) WHO | Burden of disease and cost-effectiveness estimates, Water Sanitation Health. http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/diseases/burden/en/. Accessed 14 June 2013 Page 16 of 17

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World Health Organisation, (2006) Guidelines for the safe use of wastewater, excreta and greywater. Geneva, Switzerland Yongon KY, (2008) Soil contour bunds, Dry Zone Food Security Project, MYA/96/006, United National development programme human development institute extension tour bunds. http:// www.mamud.com/Docs/contbu3e.pdf Zhao SL (1996) Introduction of catchment agriculture. Publishing House of Science and Technology, Shaanxi

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Strategic Military Geography: Climate Change Adaptation and the Military Jane Hollowaya*, Michael Durant Thomasb and Cheryl Durrantc a Department of Defence, F4-G-039, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Canberra, Australia b School of Physical, Environmental and Mathematical Sciences and School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia c Department of Defence, R1-2-D009, Russell Offices, Canberra, Australia

Abstract Purpose. This chapter explores climate change impacts on defense forces (militaries) and suggests ways for them to respond. It considers general military capacity to become more involved in climate adaptation, proposes some best practices, and articulates a decision framework for action. Methodology/Approach. We have developed a framework for capture and analysis of the military role within broader climate adaptation. The Strategic Military Geography (SMG) Framework is a decision framework that allows collaborative exploration of the relationship between climate change impacts and military activities. SMG employs systemic action research, which integrates systems thinking, participatory action research, and triple-loop learning to address the complex, interlinked issues relating to global change, including climate change. Findings. Defense forces can play a significant role in climate adaptation, in armed conflict situations, and in military operations other than war, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. For example, military personnel are regularly involved as responders to natural disasters and often play a central role in reconstruction. Practical Implications. Practical ways that defense forces can build climate adaptiveness include incorporation of projected change and associated uncertainty into preparedness (readiness) planning, improved forecasting, regional and whole-of-government engagement on climate adaptation, and building energy sustainability that reduces carbon emissions. Originality/Value. The framework presented supports system-wide long-term planning, fosters greater dialogue between critical stakeholders, and enables transfer of learning between defense forces and other organizations.

Keywords Defense; Strategic military geography; Climate change; Adaptation; Security; Decision framework

Introduction This chapter draws on an Australian Defence study of global change impacts and engagement with other defense and national security organizations including military forces. Defense forces have no

*Email: [email protected] *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 18

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choice but to take an interest in adaptation to physical environmental and geographical change. The Australian strategic policy, for example, has formally identified climate change as a threat to national security and homeland infrastructure since at least 2008 (Thomas 2013). Regardless of cultural or philosophical views on the role of military organizations, a great many of them will be central players in climate change adaptation and response. Climate change, and more broadly global change, is often characterized as a complex, evolving problem. To address such problems, holistic and systemic approaches are advocated (Commonwealth of Australia 2007). One way to contextualize climate change impacts into military organizations is via the construct of Strategic Military Geography (SMG). The SMG Framework draws on systemic methods of inquiry and learning to explore and take action in a large, diverse military organization. SMG provides ways to frame issues in a military context and collaboratively explore the relationships between global change, including climate change adaptation, and military organizations. Using the SMG framework has facilitated identification of priority issues for the military in four key areas. These are the operating environment, mission profiles (tasking), supporting infrastructure, and business continuity. Business continuity in this context is a holistic management process that identifies potential impacts that threaten an organization and provides a framework for building resilience and the capability for an effective response that safeguards its critical functions. This framing and analysis has aided the Australian Defence Organisation to begin to prepare for and adapt to global change, including climate change.

The Strategic Context of Climate Change Military organizations have a keen interest in climate change adaptation. The US Navy, in particular, has arguably been at the forefront of raising awareness and responding to climate change implications for defense and national security (US Navy 2010). Other militaries active in climate adaptation include the UK Ministry of Defence, Indonesia, New Zealand, the Maldives, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, and NATO members. In 2010, for example, NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen wrote: “Climate change presents security challenges of a magnitude and a complexity we have never seen before. We must be prepared for them” (Rasmussen 2010). A literature review by Thomas (2013) shows that a range of defense and security scholars have explored the implications of climate change for military forces, particularly in terms of their future capabilities, tasking, and ability to support their nations. Serving and retired military personnel have also been active in raising awareness and talking about the implications for defense and national security (Barrie 2013). This has led to some debate more broadly about the “securitization” of climate change and some suspicion of military intentions. The alternative view is “normalization” of the military as an instrument of state in achieving national goals including greenhouse gas reductions and climate change adaptation (Thomas 2013). In the Australian SMG study, the latter view has been taken, that is, that defense forces or militaries – as large employers, as a key implementer of national security policy, and as significant purchasers, custodians, and users of government assets – can legitimately play a role in climate change adaptation efforts. In Australian security discourse, the strategic risks of climate change have been identified in academic and think-tank literature as well as formal strategic policy since at least 2006 (Thomas 2012). The First National Security Statement to the Australian Parliament, published in 2008, described climate change as a “new and emerging challenge” and one that represented a “most fundamental Page 2 of 18

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national security challenge.” This Statement also called for climate change threats to be formally incorporated into Australia’s national security policy and analysis process (Rudd 2008). The 2009 Defence White Paper: Force 2030 subsequently crystallized two major security implications of climate change. The first was that climate change may exacerbate the severity and frequency of natural disasters, thereby requiring increased military support to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations. The second described how climate change may exacerbate existing precursors to conflict whereby vulnerable states (with limited capacity to respond) may dissolve into violent conflict, thus triggering military intervention as a “stabilizing” force. Climate change here is seen as a “threat multiplier” rather than a distinct driver of hostilities (Department of Defence 2009). More recent guidance from the 2013 National Security Strategy and the 2013 Defence White Paper has reiterated the strategic risks of climate change (Department of Defence 2013). Related literature including from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and internal analyses have identified a range of other areas in which climate change may affect the Australian Defence Force.

Investigation, Decision, and Action Framework To identify and understand climate, and other global, change impacts on military forces, a decision support framework called Strategic Military Geography (SMG) has been developed. The SMG framework employs systemic action research as its main methodology. This methodology integrates systems thinking, participatory action research, and triple-loop learning as these conceptual approaches are useful for investigating complex, multifaceted issues where there is limited or incomplete knowledge of all the affecting factors (Bawden 1990). Implicit in systemic action research is an assumption that people in a given field of activity are attempting to adapt themselves and their environments in the face of change. Burns (2009) describes systemic action research as: The Systemic aspect is crucial because any action taken will be affected by underlying patterns and social norms; complex power relationships between a range of stakeholders; activities that may seem peripheral and beyond the immediate operating environment, non-linear effects of multiple linear interactions and different, sometimes contradictory, impacts at different levels of the system under review.

The entry points where possibilities for change can occur, and the “tipping points” which support sustainable phase change, are often invisible in typical research analysis or organizational development practices. In this methodology, systems are broadly encompassing, affecting the whole of life. That is, systems can be an understanding of the way the world is, a way of thinking about the world, an approach to dealing with problems, a set of methods and techniques, or all of these. A system is defined as a set of elements connected in some way to form an identifiable whole. The properties of this whole emerge as a result of the relationships between the component parts, rather than being the sum of the properties of the parts (Bawden 1990). Action is fundamental because action learning provides insights and practices not generated by other types of learning. New opportunities and entry points for development or system change become available through action. In systemic action research, there is an explicit presumption that action does not necessarily follow from analysis. Here, action can – and ought to – inform analysis which in turn can generate new action (Burns 2009).

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Research is important because evidence is required; thus inquiries need to be documented so as to generate a sufficient and useable evidence base. Evidence enables the building of a case for action, testing of resonance within the system, and consideration of action options including the teasing out of unintended consequences. The corollary concept, triple-loop learning, draws on a range of theoretical works and is used as a means to critically examine how a military organization “learns” and whether it is “learning” the things that most matter. This leads to three questions: “Is the organization doing things right? Is the organization doing the right things? How does the organization know what is right?” (Argyris and Schön 1996). It is a process that can be used to critically reflect on the military’s ability to adapt to complex change and thereby fulfill its task of upholding national security. Systemic action research, as a whole, has a number of key aspects. It is multistranded. This enables stakeholders and participants to consider issues from a range of different perspectives and so begin to understand the interconnections and influences between issues, for example, via co-learning and joint analysis. It involves multiple stakeholders and interest groups at different but related levels of hierarchy, for example, “on the ground” or in the immediate unit, within the wider local grouping or system, and in organizational or more strategic settings. This allows the range of key players to engage in “learning, dialogue and the co-construction of action; enhancing the chances that solutions will sustainable” (Burns 2009). Of critical interest, systemic action research links informal inquiry and action with formal decision-making systems and networks of power. It gauges the significance of issues through the use of resonance rather than representativeness. This methodology is highly emergent in its design, thus seeking to mirror the emergence of the phenomena that it is exploring. Lastly, it requires the research convenors and participants to identify underlying patterns; surface and challenge underlying assumptions so as to identify systemic blockages; identify possible entry points, opportunity spaces, and leverage points to generate action and enter these “entry points” to discover where they lead; be bridges between different parts of the wider system; identify and catalyze powerful sources of leadership; and support action in multiple arenas (Burns 2009). These distinctions and definitions are important because of the way different approaches can shape the problem definition, analysis, and subsequent solution options or recommendations. How a problem is viewed initially – and what the roots of the problem are – is often a judgment call. In this context, judgment is defined as a combination of experience, knowledge, and learning preferences (Bawden 1990).

Strategic Military Geography Judgment is often required by military personnel, particularly in operations – be they war or non-conflict activities such as HADR. A key support to judgments and decision-making is military geography, which has long been part of defense doctrine and concepts because military activities are inherently geographic in nature (O’Brien 1991). “Military activities occur on landscapes with distinct physical and cultural character. Understanding how the spatial distribution of landscape elements affects the military operating environment at the tactical and operational scales, and how this applies to military concerns are the strategic scale, is the substance of military geography” (Harmon et al. 2004). Military geography therefore provides an appropriate basis for a conceptual framework to enable analysis of climate change impacts, consider their implications for the military, decide on priorities, and take action. The term Strategic Military Geography (SMG) is derived from “military Page 4 of 18

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geography” and also draws upon the characterization of “global change” in the earth sciences, ecology and humanities, and “geopolitics” and “strategic geography” in the security and international relations disciplines. Using these different – and sometimes competing – constructs helps to encourage the multiple perspectives and cross-fertilization of ideas formalized in the systemic action research methodology. There are four key tenets in the SMG Framework. The first is to think “big picture” and take a holistic or “helicopter” view, to look at the whole set of challenges and potential changes in the military operating environment in its broadest definition. This helps users to get a sense of the range of issues and how they interact and influence each other. The second tenet is to consider the relationships between the issues as well as understanding specific issues, that is, to take a systems view. The third tenet is to take a participatory approach and engage as broadly as possible – within the military, within the government, and within the science and research communities. The fourth tenet is to use a multilevel learning process that maps across tactical, operational, and strategic military domains. SMG employs these different principles concurrently and iteratively to provide a more comprehensive understanding and analysis, with which to generate options for situation adaptation or improvement.

The Multiplicity of Geographies Traditionally, the two prime aspects of military geography are the physical terrain or landscape and the cultural characteristics or societal makeup of groups in the military operating area. In the SMG framework, the virtual world or cyber geography has been added as a distinct geography. Thus, in this Framework, global changes in SMG can be analyzed as the nexus between biogeochemical changes in the Earth system (physical geography) and social, economic, and technical responses (cultural or human geography) and intangible technological considerations (virtual geography). Physical geography encompasses the military geography domains of air, land, maritime, and more recently space (orbital and intra-solar). Physical geography also includes the diversity of the natural sciences and phenomena, such as sea straits, volcanoes, topography, weather, orbital space, terrain, vegetative cover, natural features, flora and fauna, wind and wave patterns, temperature, and rainfall. Human or cultural geography is the human world and covers society, politics, philosophy, economics, science and technology, culture, and concepts such as the nation state, transnational corporations, international relations, the precautionary principle, and peacekeeping to name a random few. The focus here is on human activity systems, that is, particular and cumulative effects of human activities on groups of people and on their environment. Human or cultural geography includes allied nations, neighbors, community values, local economies, recruitment, fallout from the global financial crisis, new technologies such as algae-derived biofuels, sustainable chemistry, gas-to-liquid conversion, nanotechnology, and gene therapy. It also encompasses attitudes and behaviors – individually and collectively, for example, toward physical environmental change, conventional power and energy generation, and future human development. Socio-technical and economic responses fit within human geography and include domestic and international regulation, economic instruments, societal (nongovernment) reactions, and government activity as well as broader human activities, such as changing patterns of settlement, human demography, impacts of technology applications, and regional/global relationships including disasters and conflict. Virtual geography (also known as cyber geography) is a recent addition to traditional military geography. It covers activities, phenomena, and effects in the virtual world. These include cyber Page 5 of 18

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terrain, simulation, satellite data, virtual reconnaissance, planning, and training as well as online gaming, communications such as e-mail and video link, social media, control networks for electricity grids and other applications, massive open online education courses, global research, and other types of collaboration via the Internet plus commerce, entertainment, and crime. More and more is happening in the virtual world, such that cyber security, hacking, and other types of activities designed to disrupt, disable, mislead, or financially disadvantage are becoming constant features of cyber space.

Interfaces and Interactions All these worlds interact and influence each other, and all are affected by global change, including climate change. For example, the virtual world has physical aspects such as power sources, hardware and equipment, and development, trade, and disposal of hardware and software. Data collection and storage also have physical aspects. Hardware for the virtual world currently requires rare earths and precious metals, many of which occur in limited quantities globally. The food-energy-water nexus is another example of the interactions between the three geographies. Production of food for human and livestock consumption depends upon water and energy and for much of it arable land as well, thus linking physical and cultural geography. Agricultural commodity and processed food production, trade, and distribution can be researched, modeled, and simulated virtually, thus linking physical and cultural geography to the virtual world. Production systems can be controlled electronically and growing conditions monitored and adjusted, for example, by restricting or releasing water, via the Internet, situating these in the virtual geography domain. Food production and consumption often have social rituals attached to them, as well as financial value and social status. Competition for energy sources and energy efficiency also has effects in the physical, cultural, and virtual worlds. Physical geography, for example, yields locations of sources, production, distribution, and consumption. Cultural geography encompasses investment finance, pricing, and social attitudes to different types of energy and how much people or organizations are willing to pay. Virtual geography provides for aspects such as exploration imagery and analysis, planning and design of production facilities, calculations of cost-effective shipping routes and tonnages, data collection on things like consumption interests and intentions that can be used to inform extraction or production adjustments, and complex, real-time price calculations of end products.

Analysis of Global Changes in Strategic Military Geography The implications, particularly for future operating conditions, mission profiles, and energy resilience, of global changes in SMG, including climate change, are of great significance to military organizations, especially for future preparedness and planning. As military forces with a range of responsibilities, as large employers, as key implementers of government policy, as consumers of goods and services, and as stewards of national technological and biophysical assets, military organizations need to be cognizant of the implications of these changes for organizational and capability decisions that need to be taken now that will have impacts over the coming decades. Reducing greenhouse gases (mitigation) while implementing adaptation measures represents a fundamental two-track climate change risk management strategy. Military planners routinely operate under uncertainty and make decisions based on incomplete information. If a battlefield commander waited until all facts were known about an advancing enemy, they would put their troops at

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risk (O’Brien 1991). Addressing climate change impacts on defense and national security can be seen in the same way.

Climate Change Effects Changing geography and climate will have a range of effects on military forces. These can be categorized in three ways to enable understanding, help generate responses, and aid in decisionmaking: First-order or direct effects include changes in the physical operating domains of land, sea, air, and space. This covers effects such as changing wind and wave patterns, strength, speed, direction, more turbulent, and variable. Changes in ocean circulation, wind currents, and atmospheric composition will impact on the conduct of operations, the usability and livability of military bases and facilities, and access to civilian infrastructure. The conduct of operations may be more challenging physically and psychologically for military personnel training and conducting missions in harsher operating conditions and in dealing with civilians in desperate circumstances. Harsher operating conditions and more frequent support to disaster relief will reduce the service life of many military platforms and much equipment and require more maintenance at shorter intervals. This will affect military budgets, planning and acquisition cycles, and training regimes as military hardware is replaced more often. Life cycles of military equipment, particularly major platforms such as ships, planes, and ground vehicles, may be shortened as a consequence of changed conditions, placing increased demand also on maintenance, life-cycle costs, capability replacement, and disposal regimes. Without remediation, the usability and livability of military bases and facilities may also be degraded. Airfields, ranges, wharves, fuel, and chemical storage facilities, for example, may become subject to flooding and inundation, increase maintenance in hotter drier conditions, or require upgrade or early replacement due to changed building codes or other regulations. There are implications too for the military workforce in terms of work health and safety, which would likely have organizational impacts on duty of care obligations, workforce productivity, and injury compensation arrangements. These physical effects, particularly more severe weather events, changing rainfall patterns, and increased temperatures, are already causing greater stress on human populations; their infrastructure and support systems including food, water, and other supplies; and their distribution and waste disposal. Primary health impacts for people, plants, and animals include greater heat stress, more injuries, and reduced productivity because of warmer weather, particularly during the night as this affects rest and refreshment. Operations and training may also be affected by changed access to harbors due to altered wind and ocean currents. On the east coast of Australia, for example, this could be exacerbated by the loss of significant portions of the Great Barrier Reef. Second-order or indirect effects include changing mission profiles particularly the likelihood of greater demand for military support to civil communities, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping, and reconstruction activities. A sufficiently large increase in demand for such missions will have impacts on training regimes, mission planning, disposition of forces, acquisitions, strategic planning, and military-military and civil-military cooperation. For example, increased deployment of military forces for reconstruction efforts, certainly in the Australian context, could require greater recruitment and training of people with the required trades and skills. Another second-order effect is the impact on tasking and range. For example, Antarctica is changing much more quickly than scientists expected. At the same time, international interest is

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steadily increasing in Antarctica’s role in global climate change and in Antarctica’s biological and other resources (ASPI 2013). Changing patterns of diseases, disorders, and pests are already affecting people, commercially valuable and emblematic (or psychologically valuable) animal, and plant species. These include changes in the ranges of vector-borne diseases, increased allergies, and air pollution. The risks to human health from climate change include: injuries and fatalities related to heat waves and other severe weather events; spread of some infectious diseases from rising temperatures and changes in rainfall; water and food contamination from rising temperatures, changes in rainfall patterns, and extreme events; exacerbated respiratory allergies from increased allergens (pollens and spores) in the air; exacerbated respiratory and heart diseases in response to increases in some air pollutants; mental health problems in those experiencing physical and economic impacts; and the health consequences of population dislocation as some regions become uninhabitable (McMichael and Butler 2009). A further second-order effect relates to energy – access, reliability, and security of supply and storage, as well as increased cost volatility. Energy sustainment is a major issue for most, if not all, military forces and a key part of building organizational resilience. Military organizations tend to be significant users of liquid fuels and to have some specialized fuel requirements. Given the rising cost of fossil fuels and the declining energy-returned-on-energy-invested surrounding extraction and production of liquid hydrocarbon deposits, energy sustainability is likely to become a critical issue for military organizations. This is particularly so as many military assets, including most of the larger platforms such as ships, planes, and submarines, are optimized for fossil fuel use. An exacerbating factor is that many military assets have specialized requirements that cannot be met by the current suite of alternative fuels. Thus, there are risks and vulnerabilities in current military energy acquisition and management. In particular, change in energy demand, plus gaps in energy management, research, and reporting, could lead to significant unfunded cost pressures and potential future restrictions on operational capability. Third-order or distant effects include economic losses which can have flow-on effects to military funding, implications for the military’s reputation, ability to recruit and retain staff, and changes in the broader workforce that will impact on the recruitment pool. Feedback loops are important to consider. In terms of individual and population health, tertiary (or systemic multiplier) effects include famine, increased likelihood of conflict, large-scale migration or species decline, and potentially economic collapse (Butler 2014). More severe weather will not only create social and economic adversity, it will have knock-on effects in terms of greater insurance premiums and more stringent or changed requirements for buildings, energy efficiency, the use of renewable energy, further or new restrictions on access to and use of chemicals harmful to humans, biodiversity, or the climate. This could loop back to restrict access and operational capability of military forces to finance, facilities, and essential resources such as specific chemicals. Another financial impost may be liability for carbon taxes or carbon emissions – both directly as an organization and indirectly through increased cost transfers from industry to military forces. This may manifest in higher initial costs, increased legal liabilities and higher maintenance, and disposal costs. For example, in 2012/2013 the carbon tax liability of the Australian military was around A$80 million, which was not included in budget estimates and as a consequence was unfunded (Thomas 2012).

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Military Implications and Risks Internal Australian military analysis and broader analysis of available literature reveal four broad risks for the Australian military. These are (1) increased international, regional, national, and human security risks, (2) degraded homeland infrastructure, (3) altered environmental operating conditions, and (4) business continuity risks. Firstly, climate change is set to have major geostrategic implications that will affect global, regional, national, and human security. The 2014 US Quadrennial Defense Review (USDOD 2014) stated climate change “will devastate homes, land and infrastructure,” exacerbate water scarcity, jeopardize food security, increase resource competition, and place stress on economics, societies, and governance institutions around the world. This Review reflected earlier US national security assessments by reiterating that climate change will act as a “threat multiplier,” thereby “increasing the frequency, scale and complexity of future [Defense] missions.” The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5 Working Group II 2014) also identified a number of geopolitical and human security risks due to climate change including new contestations over territory on land and sea, threats to territorial integrity, and the very viability of states. The IPCC report also noted that “there is justifiable common concern that climate change . . . increases the risk of armed conflict in certain circumstances” and that “human security will be progressively threatened as the climate changes.” Indeed, climate change is provoking an upsurge in the intensity and frequency of natural disasters including floods, wildfires, cyclones, droughts, and extreme weather events. Data from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) shows an unprecedented growth in natural disasters since 1900 and their attribution to climate-related events (Fig. 1) (CRED 2012). Total global natural disasters in 2011, for example, killed around 31,000 people, generated a further 245 million victims, and resulted in economic losses of US$366 billion (GuhaSapir et al. 2012). Most of the damage caused by natural disasters consistently occurs in the AsiaPacific region. In the same year, Asia accounted for 44 % of global disasters which equated to 86 % Number of natural disasters reported 1900 - 2011 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 climatological Meteorological

Hydrological

Geophysical

Biological

Fig. 1 Number of natural disasters reported by category 1900–2011. Note the increase in climate-related natural disasters (climatological, meteorological, and hydrological) (Source: CRED) Page 9 of 18

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of victims and 75 % of the damage (CRED 2012). Civilian authorities (at domestic and international levels) now regularly expect (and demand) military capabilities in order to cope with the increasing scale of natural disaster effects. Even as a developed nation, Australian people are vulnerable to climate change. Major climaterelated events in recent years have seen large-scale deployments of Australian military forces to restore services, repair infrastructure, administer aid and medical provisions, as well as conduct low-level security tasks. Recent Australian military support to the 2009 Victorian bushfires, Queensland floods, and Cyclone Yasi in 2011 saw substantial military contributions to response and recovery. During the Operation Flood Assist in Queensland, some 1,500 military personnel were deployed to 58 townships across 21 municipalities from Townsville to Toowoomba (Department of Defence 2011). No longer is the summer break considered a “stand-down” period of rest and relaxation – rather it has become part of the Australian defense operational rhythm. In 2011 the Headquarters Joint Operations Command issued a standing order requiring particular defense force units to be ready at short notice over Australian summers in the event of a troika of natural disasters including floods, fires, and cyclones. Almost unwittingly, climate change is now influencing Australian military force generation. The second implication of climate change on the ADF concerns the degradation of its homeland strategic infrastructure. Rising sea levels, as an example, are set to pose significant risks for a number of military bases located at or near sea level. The damage caused by a combination of sea-level rise, storm surge, and river flooding may, however, extend far beyond maritime infrastructure. Impacts could include degradation of military buildings via inundation, coastal erosion, or direct wave action; degradation of roads on military land via coastal erosion from inundation, restricting base access and capability or damaging road surfaces and foundations; degradation of airstrips via inundation, restricting base access or damaging runway, taxiway, and flight apron surfaces and foundations; and degradation of military pier and marine infrastructure via inundation or wave damage, restricting base access, safe use, or capability. Other impacts include damage to environmental assets via inundation or wave damage leading to degradation of important flora and fauna habitat, changes to the nature of contaminated land or failure of storage facilities, and environmental pollution; degradation of heritage sites via inundation or wave damage leading to damage to built or cultural sites of significance; degradation of training areas and ranges leading to reduced preparedness; degradation of communications, explosive ordnance testing, logistics, and storage sites; and increased risk of large-scale fires on military training grounds due to lengthening fire seasons and reduced precipitation causing a “drying out” of critical areas. The costs of relocation or adaptation measures for military bases are not insignificant. A proposed relocation of Fleet Base East from Sydney Harbour 200 km south to Jervis Bay in the 1980s was estimated at over A$2 billion (2011 prices) (Thomas 2012). Arguably, such risks are already eventuating and being experienced by the Australian military. In October 2013, around 50,000 ha was burnt out and three homes destroyed during the State Mine fires which began during a military training activity at the Marangaroo training area. As noted by the Australian Climate Council in its 2014 report, the Angry Summer, the Australian fire season, is increasing in duration – starting earlier and ending later – with the added threat that “climate change is [now] driving an increase in the risk of bushfires” and is concomitantly “increasing the intensity and frequency of [such] extreme weather events.” The Australian military must adapt to this increased risk, for example, by enforcing stricter risk assessments during training activities. Likewise, the military will need to enhance the resilience of Page 10 of 18

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its infrastructure to withstand extreme fire events and perhaps to develop the capability to respond to such events in case civilian fire services are overwhelmed. This latter point raises an important facet of how climate change will have second-order impacts on the Australian military by degrading broader national infrastructure that is crucial to supporting operations and business continuity (Thomas 2014). A 2011 report Climate Change Risks to Coastal Buildings and Infrastructure (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency 2011) concluded that A$226 billion in commercial, industrial, road, rail, and residential assets are potentially exposed to sea-level rise. Included in this assessment were many facilities and services that support defense activities including 258 police, fire, and ambulance stations, five power stations, 75 hospitals and health services, 41 landfill sites, three water treatment plants, and 11 emergency services facilities. Suffice to say, climate change has second-order impacts on Australian infrastructure that if degraded might significantly disable elements of the Australian military or, as a minimum, its ability to respond to either warlike or natural disaster situations. The third area of impact on the Australian military is that climate change will alter the fundamental environmental conditions in which the military will raise, train, sustain, and operate. Examples include rising sea levels; increasing ocean acidification; increasing ocean and atmospheric temperatures; changes to rainfall patterns; increasing intensification of extreme weather events; increasing rates of glacial, polar, and permafrost melting; and broader spread of disease. Arguably, the greatest long-term risk (30–50 years) is the risk of sea-level rise. More immediate, however, is the increased risk of extreme weather and hotter temperatures. Increases in temperature, for example, may change how forces train, particularly as extreme temperatures become the norm rather than the exception. Australia’s lead scientific research organization the CSIRO, for example, predicts that under the IPCC business-as-usual scenario, Darwin (home to a significant proportion of Australia’s military ground forces and visiting military forces) will experience more than three times the number of extreme temperature days (above 35  C) by 2030 (Cleugh et al. 2013). Increases in ocean acidification may also lead to maritime vessels requiring more frequent maintenance regimes. Changes to ocean buoyancy due to lower densities from ice melt may affect submarine operations. Extreme weather events are also likely to see a larger portion of the Australian military’s operational duties committed to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Finally, there is the impact that climate change will have on business continuity. This is a broadranging concept that includes regulatory impacts, research and development opportunities, personnel, and recruitment.

Military Responses From this suite of risks, three response or action areas were identified. These are (1) preparing for changes in mission profiles or military tasking; (2) adapting to changes in operating conditions, risks, and costs; and (3) building infrastructure resilience and energy sustainability.

Changes in Mission Profiles Changes in military tasking are likely in the next 10–30 years as climate and other global change impacts intensify and interact. Military organizations often play a central role in risk mitigation and as responders in the case of natural disasters, pandemics, and humanitarian catastrophes. Militaries also often play central roles in reconstruction activities and may, in extremis, be required to help

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restore law and order and contribute to stabilization and resource protection activities in the case of national, regional, or global crises. There is an expectation – and emerging evidence – of greater demand for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Campbell 2013). Militaries are also likely to experience greater deployment to peacekeeping missions, support to the civil community, border protection, and support to civil authorities in emergencies. New roles for the military could well include providing support to research, trials, and deployment of geo-engineering activities as well as protection to civilian geo-engineering actions. Military interdiction of unauthorized geo-engineering activities is equally, if not more, likely. Given military observation capabilities, an even more likely role for military forces will be monitoring geo-engineering research and trials and environmental conditions to ensure that any geo-engineering activities are detected and the impacts recorded for military and civilian analysis. Such monitoring would need to be done in cooperation with other government agencies, research communities, and international organizations. Military organizations could also be tasked to monitor potential geo-weaponeering developments, including technologies, tactics, trials and simulations, strategy, and planning. A New Zealand Defence Force study also pointed to new or intensified activities such as persistent border surveillance against illegal resource extraction, for example, fishing or mass people movement. This could be done nationally, for and with neighboring countries without the necessary assets, or in a regional partnership (Boxall 2012). Given that the polar regions are changing far more quickly than scientists expected and much faster than many other regions (IPCC AR5 WGI 2013), there is increasing activity and interest in both the Arctic and the Antarctic, for shipping, biological and other resource extraction, surveying, and research. Parts of Tasmania, New Zealand, the Antarctic, and Southern Ocean provide near-ideal conditions for climate remediation activities such as stratospheric sulfate seeding and ocean iron seeding (Karoly 2012). Construction of research centers in the Antarctic, resource surveying, mapping, and other research are expanding with many countries using their military assets to undertake these operations (ASPI 2013). More countries are joining the Antarctic Treaty as well. While there is currently a moratorium on the exploration and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources (the Madrid Protocol 1991), this expires in 2041. In any case, it is currently uneconomic to extract land or seabed-based minerals. This may, however, change in the coming decades if the globe continues to warm and the human world becomes more resource hungry (ASPI 2013). Antarctic Treaty member countries therefore may increasingly deploy military assets to support their strategic, research, and economic interests in the southern polar region. Similarly, as the Arctic Circle continues to lose ice mass and with projections of a summer ice-free Arctic before 2050 and very likely earlier (Overland and Wang 2013), countries with interests in the Arctic are tasking their militaries with exercises, research, and exploration in the northern polar region. Tensions are surfacing over shipping routes and rights of passage through specific waterways that some countries argue are sovereign and others view as international shipping lanes. There are also increasing interest and activity in Arctic hydrocarbon fields, exacerbating tensions between Arctic Council member countries (Masters 2013). Expansions in space-based surveillance, communications, and in the future possibly energy generation, industrial manufacturing, and climate remediation are also likely to provide new tasking for military organizations. These kinds of activities are likely to mean military organizations will need to cooperate more and more closely with other government agencies and commercial entities.

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Changes in Operating Conditions, Risks, and Costs This likely increased demand for military operations other than war, including HADR, comes at a time when many governments are reducing spending on military forces (Perlo-Freeman and Solmirano 2014). Increasingly constrained defense budgets means that many military forces will need to rethink how they conduct military operations and how they maintain military capabilities, both human and technological. Changes in operating conditions, such as severe weather and changing patterns of diseases, are likely to pose greater risks and increase the costs for military forces in terms of damage to infrastructure, bases, and equipment and harm to personnel and their families.

Infrastructure Resilience and Energy Sustainability Reducing demand, increasing efficiency of energy use, hardening infrastructure, and increasing energy self-sufficiency through the use of alternatives and renewables can enhance national security and military operational effectiveness. It thus makes sense environmentally, operationally, and financially, though there are challenges. Alternatives include synthetic fuels, gas to liquid and coal to liquid and renewable energy derived from solar, wind, biomass, and geothermal energy, waste to energy, hydrokinetic and ocean energy, and fuel cells. Another way to increase energy sustainability is to take an integrated systems approach, one that encompasses activities and issues across the military rather than leaving energy issues to each service or part of the organization. This could reduce cost pressures by lowering energy demand, enhancing supply chain reliability, and increasing energy efficiency. Military energy requirements, both physical and strategic, could also be situated within broader government and industry energy contexts, enabling systems-level linkages to broader policies and also other military energy strategies. Australian, the US, the UK, and many NATO militaries, for example, have developed or are developing comprehensive energy frameworks or strategies to maximize operational energy effectiveness and minimize demand and energy costs across the board. Assuming this is the “critical decade” (i.e., that decisions made between now and 2020 will determine the severity of climate change over the next 50–100 years), military forces – like other organizations – need to start making some hard decisions that balance current costs against future well-being. Taking such an approach will also have consequences for future military planning and acquisitions, particularly if it is accepted that the range of technologies available now are the tools to be used for adapting to, and mitigating, climate change.

General Military Capacity to Engage in Climate Adaptation Militaries generally have much of the capability and competence required to address climate change impacts but can benefit from more collaboration internally and by reaching out to expertise and experience elsewhere – such as gaining insights from other militaries, government agencies, scientists, and other subject matter experts. There are three broad categories of military capacity that could, in combination, be applied to climate adaptation: institutional, organizational, and individual. In an institutional sense, governments and military leaders can reorientate military forces and expand their raison d’être to include addressing climate change – directly and indirectly – directly via explicit inclusion in military strategic objectives of concepts such as collective environmental security, defense of national critical resources, and carbon-neutral operations and indirectly through a greater focus on military operations other than war, especially resilience building, HADR, and aid Page 13 of 18

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to civil authorities. This could be promulgated through strategic planning, implementation of operational guidance, joint exercises, war gaming and simulation, future capability planning, and acquisitions. Organizationally, military forces can consider how missions are achieved including mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and recovery/return. Focus issues include: How are power and energy thought about and managed? Are there carbon and cost savings to be had by changing practices and attitudes toward liquid fuels and fixed power? Understanding adaptation approaches, particularly methods for analyzing the likely impacts on military capability, personnel, and budget, can be incorporated into organizational structures and processes, for example, by requiring that military groups and agencies take climate change issues into account in planning and other activities. Military research can also inform other national and local decision-making process. Adaptation responses for military bases often have impacts for local infrastructure such as changed drainage patterns and do not present cost-effective options in isolation requiring planning to be conducted collaboratively. Another organizational response is the appointment of a high-ranking military officer to be an advocate and focal point for climate change and related issues, including coordination of effort across the military and between the military, government, and broader society. This may require a small, dedicated specialist team to coordinate analyses of change impacts, military operational and estate vulnerability assessments, and strategic response planning across the organization. Military organizations can also support action at the individual level of defense personnel and their families. Militaries can be viewed as human activity systems, wherein the individuals in the system have some influence over the behavior of the system as a whole. This military system interacts with other systems – or, in this context, communities. The individuals within the military system can choose to change their personal habits and, by demonstration or advocacy, encourage change in others, for example, by taking “green days” and/or by cycling, walking, car-pooling, or taking public transport to work whenever possible. Low-carbon commuting can be encouraged by individuals or units setting up a “green miles” club or competition. Governments and military organizations can, for example, support cycling schemes through tax rebates, subsidized prices, or providing a pool of bicycles as well as infrastructure such as bike lockers, shower and change facilities, and bicycle paths or lanes on roads and tracks. Support for public transport can include provision of tickets or transport and lobbying governments to provide public transport and bus stops. Car-pooling can be encouraged through privileged parking and reductions in parking fees.

Best Practices Military organizations are developing best practice approaches to deal with climate change adaptation. These include adopting strategy development principles that support a coherent approach to climate change adaptation. To achieve best practice adaptation, current military experience shows that there is a need to develop a coherent climate change adaption strategy that is phased by decade and synchronized with capability acquisition; it is necessary to collaborate more internally to enable a coherent and coordinated whole-of-organization approach to climate change adaptation and to increase energy efficiency, reduce demand, and consider alternatives to fossil fuels wherever possible. This includes the use of reusable rather than disposable equipment, for example, utensils and water bottles; developing public private partnerships, for example, the Carnegie wave energy trial at Page 14 of 18

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HMAS Stirling Naval Base in Western Australia; and renewable energy, for example, powering forward bases via energy from waste. These kinds of activities will have the added benefit of reducing the bulk and cost of supply chains and protective details for liquid fuel convoys. Larger militaries with alliances requiring interoperability can use this need to encourage and support allied militaries to use blended fuels or other lower-carbon alternatives. Militaries of medium to large size can contribute to adaptation by building future resilience into reconstruction, peacekeeping, and disaster relief efforts. Likewise, military forces can use exercises to practice HADR, cooperate with nongovernment organizations and other government agencies, and enhance the skills and reputation of military forces by delivering aid and support to communities. For example, New Zealand has undertaken a very successful series of exercises, called Operation Twilight, in the South West Pacific along these lines (Boxall 2012). Further research and investigation by military forces will help to determine, quantify, and cost impacts on them and enable the development of strategies and actions to adapt better to climate change and support their countries to do so as well. Some issues that ought to be considered are: More research could be conducted on the impacts on service life of hardware and impacts of atmospheric and marine environment changes on observation and communication technologies, optimizing effectiveness and minimizing energy expenditure through a balance of live exercises, training, and simulation. In the same vein, research could be conducted on changing technical specifications, for example, for military-specific fuels, to accommodate new power and energy technologies and alternative fuels. This would include certification of new fuels, oils, and lubricants. Military organizations could, on their own or in collaboration with commercial providers, conduct trials of alternative energy generation such as wave power and biogas from waste. This would include ensuring that any alternatives meet military specifications for current and future assets. Another key area is energy efficiency research, for example, into reducing surface ship fuel use through design changes and bio-repellent hull coatings and changing the energy generation mix on board to ensure least use and highest benefit from fossil fuels and other high-polluting inputs. Military assets, such as hydrographic research and mapping facilities, could be used to contribute to data collection and understanding of oceanic and other climate change impacts. These are suggested contributions and support that military forces can make to climate change adaptation and are not meant to be definitive. There would be many other ways in which military forces can demonstrate best practice and support to climate change adaptation.

Conclusion As demonstrated in this chapter, climate change adaptation is a significant issue for military organizations. They are regularly involved as responders to natural disasters and often play a central role in reconstruction. Climate change impacts on the military include potential changes in mission profiles, increased costs, more humanitarian and disaster relief operations, and changes to their power and energy arrangements for cost, carbon reduction, and operational reasons. Many military organizations will be pivotal in climate adaptation and response. One way to contextualize climate change impacts into military organizations is via the construct of Strategic Military Geography (SMG). This is a three-dimensional decision framework, underpinned by the systemic action research methodology which integrates systems thinking, participatory action research, and triple-loop learning.

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Military issues, especially those with global drivers and connections to other issues – such as climate change and energy – can be teased out through the SMG framework, enabling identification of key implications and how they relate to each other as well as impact on military operations and organizations. This provides a richer picture of issues and their context, which in turn means that organizational impact analysis will be more comprehensive and decision-making can be more keenly focused with better results and fewer unintended consequences now and in the future. Thus the SMG Framework supports system-wide long-term planning, fosters greater dialogue between critical stakeholders, and enables transfer of learning between militaries and other organizations. Roles for military organizations in climate change adaptation include building resilience within themselves and their communities, hardening infrastructure to ensure continued operations when required, and providing technological and other leadership in seeking out or developing costeffective adaptation measures.

References Argyris C, Schön D (1996) Organizational learning II: Theory, method and practice, Addison Wesley, Reading, Mass., USA Australian Climate Council (2014) The angry summer. Online at http://www.climatecouncil.org.au/ angry-summer Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2013) Cold calculations: Australia’s Antarctic challenges. ASPI Strategic Insight No 66, The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited, Canberra. Online at https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/strategic-insights-66-cold-calculations-australiasantarctic-challenges/SI66_Antarctic.pdf Barrie C (2013) Why the defence force must plan for climate change. ABC News, 17 June 2013, Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Online at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-06-17/ climate-commission-report-warns-emissions-need-to-start-falling/4757550 Bawden RJ (1990) Towards action researching systems. In: Zuber-Skerritt O (ed) Action research for change and development. Griffith University Press, Brisbane, pp 21–50 Boxall S (2012) Complexities, uncertainties and climate securitisation – tools for exploration, headquarters New Zealand Defence Force presentation to the Global Change and Energy Sustainability Forum 2012. Australian Department of Defence, Canberra Burns D (2009) Systemic action research. National Co-ordinating Centre for Public Engagement, UK. Online at http://nccpe.ilrt.bris.ac.uk/sites/default/files/NCCPE%20Systemic%20Action% 20Research.pdf Butler C (ed) (2014) Climate Change and Global Health, CABI, Wallingford, UK, online at www. cabi.org Campbell C (2013) Future HADR projections. Unpublished paper, Department of Defence, Canberra Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) (2012) Natural disaster trends. Online at http://www.emdat.be/natural-disasters-trends. Accessed 23 Aug 2012 Cleugh H, Stafford Smith M, Battaglia M, Graham P (eds) (2013) Climate change: science and solutions for Australia. Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) Publishing, Collingwood. Online at http://www.csiro.au/Outcomes/Climate/Climate-ChangeBook.aspx

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Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (2013) Fifth assessment report: climate change 2013 – working group 1 report. The physical science basis. Online at ipcc.ch/publications_ and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml. September 2013 Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (2014) Fifth assessment report: climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability, IPCC Working Group II Contribution to AR5. Online at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/ Commonwealth of Australia (2007) Tackling wicked problems: a public policy perspective, Commonwealth Copyright Administration, Attorney-General’s Department, Robert Garran Offices, National Circuit, Barton, ACT 2600, or posted at http://www.ag.gov.au/cca. ISBN 978-0-9803978-4-0 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (2011) Climate change risks to coastal buildings and infrastructure. Commonwealth of Australia. Online at http://www.climatechange. gov.au/sites/climatechange/files/documents/03_2013/risks-coastal-buildings.pdf Department of Defence (2009) Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, ISBN: 978-0-642-29702-0, Commonwealth of Australia. Online at http://www.defence.gov.au/ whitepaper2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf Department of Defence (2011) Operation Yasi Assist in Defence annual report 2011. Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p 74 Department of Defence (2013) Defence white paper 2013. Commonwealth of Australia. Online at http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf Guha-Sapir D, Vos F, Below R, Ponserra, S (2012) Annual disaster statistical review 2011: the numbers and trends. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Belgium, p 1 Harmon RS, Dillon III, Francis H, Jr G, John B (2004) Perspectives on military geography – the military operating environment. In: Caldwell DR, Ehlen J, Harmon RS (eds) Studies in military geography and geology. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 7–20 Karoly D (2012) The current status of geoengineering, presentation to the 2012 global change and energy sustainability forum. Australian Department of Defence, Canberra Masters J (2013) The thawing Arctic: risks and opportunities. Dec 2013. Council on Foreign Relations. Oct 2014. Online at http://www.cfr.org/arctic/thawing-arctic-risks-opportunities/ p32082 McMichael AJ, Butler CD (2009) Climate change and human health: recognising the really inconvenient truth. Med J Aust 191(11):595–596 O’Brien JJ Major (1991) Coup d’Oeil: military geography and the operational level of war. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Online at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a243343.pdf Overland JE, Wang M (2013) When will the summer Arctic be nearly sea ice free? Geophys Res Lett 40(10):2097–2101. 28 May 2013, first published online 21 May 2013. doi:10.1002/grl.50316 Perlo-Freeman S, Solmirano C (2014) Trends in world military expenditure, 2013. SIPRI fact sheet. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Online at http://books.sipri.org/prod uct_info?c_product_id=476# Press A, Bergin A, Garnsey E (2013) Heavy weather: climate and the Australian Defence Force, Special report issue 49, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, Australia, available online at https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/special-report-issue-49-heavy-weather-climate-and-theaustralian-defence-force Rasmussen AF (2010) Press conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen following the informal meeting of the NATO-Russian Council at the level of Foreign Ministers in New York. 23 Sept 2010. Online at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_66436.htm Page 17 of 18

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Rudd K the Right Honourable (2008) The first national security statement to the Australian parliament, speech to the parliament by the Prime Minister. Online at http://www.royalcommission. vic.gov.au/getdoc/596cc5ff-8a33-47eb-8d4a-9205131ebdd0/TEN.004.002.0437.pdf Thomas M (2012) Assessing the risk of global climate change on the ADF, e-International relations. 8 Mar 2012. Accessed at http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/08/assessing-the-risk-of-global-climatechange-on-the-australian-defence-force/. Accessed on 10 Sep 2012 Thomas M Major (2013) The securitisation of climate change: a military perspective. ADF J (192), pp 7–18 Thomas MD Major (2014) Climate securitization in the Australian Military. Refereed paper presented to the second oceanic conference on international studies, University of Melbourne, Australia, 9–11 July 2014 United States Department of Defense (2014) Quadrennial defense review 2014, Government of the United States of America, online at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_ Review.pdf United States Navy, Navy Climate Change Roadmap, Document Reference SER NO9/10U103021 downloaded from http://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/CCR.pdf. June 2010

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Climbing the Adaptation Planning Ladder: Barriers and Enablers in Municipal Planning Elisabeth Hamina* and Nicole Gurranb a Landscape Architecture and Regional Planning, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA b Faculty of Architecture, Design and Planning, The University of Sydney, New South Wales, Australia

Abstract Local municipal governments have a crucial role in helping communities adapt to climate change. Recognizing different levels of climate preparedness, this chapter analyzes what steps communities tend to follow when they move forward on climate adaptation, including prerequisites for planning and the selection of policies. Drawing on content analyses of local climate adaptation plans from the USA and Australia, as well as interviews with municipal planners in both nations, the chapter explores the adaptation policy choices communities are making and explains the range of strategies local governments have used to move forward on a “ladder” of climate adaptation, proceeding from awareness and constituency building activities through formal risk analyses and strategic planning for climate adaptation, through implementation through specific changes to land-use planning and infrastructure investment. Factors found to support or hinder these efforts relate to political will, staff resources, technical information, and training in potential policy responses. Significant barriers include issues of property rights and sunk investment in vulnerable locations (particularly along the coast), as well as shifting community and political views about the reality of climate change. Overall, progress in municipal climate adaptation planning is patchy and affected by wider policy frameworks and access to state- or national-level support. However, this chapter highlights opportunities for municipalities to move forward on climate adaption planning, despite local barriers to action.

Keywords Municipal responses; Adaptation barriers; Local planning

Introduction Adapting to climate change is, in many ways, a local issue. The interaction of climate with specific local geographies and populations means that each place has unique issues and opportunities, and planning to increase resilience has to occur at this local level to accommodate that variability. Improving local governance, infrastructure, and built form in urban areas provides great potential to increase the safety of the world’s majority-urban population while improving quality of life. However, urban policy frameworks and technical expertise among planning practitioners remain in a state of evolution, two decades since the passage of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). Early urban policy action focused on reducing greenhouse gas emissions through policies to limit sprawl and reliance on private automobiles and to shift patterns of energy *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 19

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use in the built environment – termed “mitigation planning.” “Adaptation” approaches have the goal of reducing the vulnerability of communities and the built and natural environment to the impacts of now-unavoidable climate change. Appropriately, in developed countries, the first attention went to mitigation, and only recently has there been much uptake of local policies for adaptation. Research on climate change adaptation (CCA) planning emphasizes a number of barriers impeding local response, such as insufficient data on potential climate risks, a lack of political will to change, and a lack of state- or national-level mandate for action. Nevertheless, some communities have made important progress in addressing climate risk within their local planning frameworks. Organized local action on climate change really commenced with the implementation of Local Agenda 21 (LA21), a set of commitments for local engagement in sustainability planning, agreed by municipalities from throughout the world, at the 1992 United Nations meeting just described. At the subsequent 2002 World Summit held in Johannesburg, emphasis moved more explicitly to local sustainability “action.” Since this time, climate change has become an increasing theme in local environmental initiatives. The Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) campaign, spearheaded by ICLEI, has resourced and encouraged many of the municipal actions around greenhouse gas reduction, with more than 1,000 cities, towns, counties, and associations’ worldwide members of ICLEI by 2013 (ICLEI: Local Governments for Sustainability 2014). However, overall, municipal actions have related to climate change mitigation, rather than adaptation (Measham et al. 2011; Castán Broto and Bulkeley 2013). Many of the world’s global cities, particularly within the developed world, have demonstrated significant leadership, with cities such as London, New York, Amsterdam, and Sydney all developing landmark plans and programs across a spectrum of carbon reduction and climate adaption approaches, particularly in relation to energy, water, waste, and, increasingly, risk reduction planning (EEA 2012). However, smaller municipalities and those in the global south have made more varied progress, particularly in relation to considering potential increased climate risk within their land-use planning framework (Baker et al. 2012; Carmin et al. 2012; Romero-Lankao 2012; Bierbaum et al. 2013). Given that the effects of climate change seem to be consistently “ahead of schedule” (Betts et al. 2011; McKibben 2011) and the long-time horizon for built form to change in response to changes in policies and plans, this is a significant problem. To give a sense of what sorts of actions are possible at the municipal level, the chapter begins by identifying the policies and practices that first-adopter communities are undertaking. Following that, the chapter focuses in on the process that these communities are using to reach those policies and the conditions and actions that enable or disable progress particularly in relation to land-use planning for climate adaptation. The empirical data suggests that the steps undertaken by communities lie along an adaptation “ladder.” In conclusion, policy interventions and other forms of support needed to help local communities move forward on the adaptation ladder are proposed.

Research Method Three empirical studies of adaptation practice by the authors, plus insights from the research and practice literature, are synthesized to inform this chapter. Hamin and Gurran (2011) examined the small number of climate change adaptation plans that had been prepared by communities as early as 2010, comparing practice in two nations – the USA and Australia, which both have similar governance and land-use planning systems. Both nations have three-tier federal, state, and local governments, with planning law defined by the states but implemented by municipalities who show varying levels of heterogeneity in their policy approaches and priorities. This means that even when Page 2 of 19

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strong state policy exists, very different local planning frameworks and outcomes are typical in both nations. We identified stand-alone climate adaptation plans and separate adaptation chapters in wider municipal documents from two sources. One was the American Planning Association's (APA) list of cities and towns that had undertaken climate planning (APA's Green Communities Research Center 2010); the second was Australia’s local government database Commonwealth Government’s Local Adaptation Pathways Program, which provided financial support for local adaptation between 2009 and 2011. Despite this wide net, only eight municipalities were identified to have full adaptation plans in place or exhibited drafts with specific spatial or land-use policies as of November 2010. Each climate plan was analyzed in relation to climate threats and impacts, key goals and recommendations, and the relationship between the adaptation plan and other local climate change mitigation strategies or plans. The analysis provided a suite of local options for addressing climate change in municipal planning, as discussed below. Two next-phase studies sought to understand the issues and barriers facing other municipalities, and steps taken to move forward. Primary research was carried out in Australian coastal councils between 2010 and 2011 (Gurran et al. 2012a) and in coastal Massachusetts of the USA between 2011 and 2012 (Hamin and Gurran 2013). The focus on coastal locations reflects the particular issues arising from climate risk in coastal areas, and the likelihood that community sentiment toward climate risk is heightened in these contexts, thus providing an important political impetus for action. For Gurran et al. (2012a), 55 local government areas (just under 10 % of Australia’s total local municipalities) were surveyed, representing coastal areas with identified common issues arising from population growth and change, inadequate or declining infrastructure, and economic instability. The companion study undertaken in coastal Massachusetts in the USA involved 15 interviews with 15 cities and towns, conducted in 2011. The results presented below represent a synthesis of the findings of these three studies as well as the broader literature.

Climate Change, Spatial Planning, and Municipal Action Planning Processes The impacts of climate change are already being observed many parts of the world, as documented elsewhere in this book. Rising temperatures, more frequent and intense heat waves, water shortages, rain events, and changes in the spatial range of bushfire risk all have implications for the siting and design of new development and for the ongoing utility of existing homes and infrastructure. Global sea level rise represents a particular threat to coastal ecosystems and settlements. Social and economic implications of increased climate changes are also significant and will vary across geographic areas and community groups. In the major cities, hotter temperatures and more frequent storms or flooding cause major disruption due to the density of people and major infrastructure affected. However, in many regional areas, drought, inundation, and storm events can ravage the economic base of small settlements, while providing or restoring services and infrastructure to rural and isolated communities can be much more difficult (IPCC 2012). Although future impacts of climate change are uncertain, decisions regarding settlement patterns and building design will have lasting impacts – with most buildings and infrastructure designed to a 50–70-year life span. Current planning frameworks must neither exacerbate contributions to greenhouse gas emissions nor increase community exposure to climate threats (Hamin 2011). Rather, strategic planning decisions should actively facilitate climate change mitigation and adaptation opportunities. Overall then, climate change represents multifaceted challenges for spatial planning – the decision-making framework governing the location and design of development and Page 3 of 19

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infrastructure. Given that climate impacts will differ markedly between places, local planning is particularly important. The following principles have been identified to guide local planners in developing adaptation responses to climate change for their communities: 1. Adaptation energies should complement strategies for greenhouse gas reduction. Climate change mitigation should be seen as long range adaptation, and adaptation approaches that might increase carbon pollution or have other negative environmental effects should be avoided. 2. Secondly, because decisions about the built environment will have lasting impacts, planners must be ready now to prevent further risks associated with climate change and to support rapid adoption of new approaches if and when required (Gurran et al. 2008). 3. Social equity considerations in climate change adaptation are also important, and planners must recognize that vulnerability is not evenly spread across a community. Poorer and minority constituents are more likely to be located in geographically vulnerable areas to start with. As harms occur, less-resourced groups will tend to be disadvantaged by costs needed to cope with increased climate volatility and have less capacity to enact dwelling modifications for climate safety or comfort. 4. In deciding whether or not to move forward, it is worth prioritizing actions with multiple benefits for the environment or community (like enhancing natural ecosystems to improve resilience to climate impacts, or providing more opportunities for non-motorized transport) (Gurran et al. 2012a). It is important to recognize that the techniques and processes of planning practice must also respond to new pressures and challenges associated with climate change. Traditional planning practice draws heavily on research and data based on past trends and generally assumes a stable framework of a predictable future. However, unpredictability is one of the major challenges associated with climate change. Faced with uncertainty as to the timing, nature, and magnitude of risks, planning needs to include adaptive management, where decision and response frameworks are designed to adjust to changing circumstances and information. Such approaches can be designed into statutory planning documents through controls that are triggered when a particular “threshold” is reached or when new information comes to light (Folke 2006; Abunaser et al. 2013). A second approach is that of scenario building, whereby potential story lines about the future are developed as a way of exploring or testing different possible approaches in a more creative way (Wilson 2009). One of the major differences between local climate mitigation strategies and the commencement of adaptation efforts is the need to understand potential local climate change risk. Climate vulnerability assessments generally provide the basis for informing strategic land-use planning decisions on levels of risk in relation to an entire local area, site, or development proposal (National Research Council 2010). In drafting planning instruments and criteria for development assessment, existing information used to support land-use planning decisions – including floodplain and bushfire protection thresholds or models – may need updating or reconsideration over time as new data becomes available, particularly in relation to likely increases in the intensity or frequency of these events and projected new geographical range. It may be necessary to reorient natural hazard assessment methodologies from historical events to forecasted impacts associated with climate change scenarios.

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Policy Responses There are quite a variety of possible policies to respond to climate change at the municipal level. As noted above, all policies should seek to achieve dual goals to adapt to climate change impacts and promote long-term mitigation (reductions) of greenhouse gas emissions. Infrastructure examples include establishing new, decentralized energy, water, or waste management plants that reduce the carbon impact of settlements while contributing to resilience of the entire network in case of natural hazards. Self-provision of distributed and smaller-scale key infrastructure services – like energy, water, and waste management, through technologies for micro-energy generation, water retention, reduction technologies, and waste minimization, reuse, and recycling – tends to create a more disaster-resilient community. Part of resilience is assuring that new facilities can be retrofitted for more sustainable technologies as they become financially feasible. For instance, solar access should be protected to ensure future capacity for onsite solar generation. Regulatory burdens to require proposals for renewable energy infrastructure should be minimized, and where possible, the planning policy should be shifted to favor renewable energy projects (Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 2007). Similarly, there are a number of basic approaches to reducing the carbon impact of transportation systems and improving resilience to future climate impacts and potential oil scarcity. New and existing settlements should be designed or reconfigured to reduce trip generation and to encourage public transport use and active transportation such as walking and cycling. Safe, naturally vegetated walkways and cycle paths should connect residential, retail, employment, and recreational areas. Proposals for new development should include travel plans which include a range of sustainable transport options – walking, cycling, public transport, and only lastly the private motor car (Newman et al. 2009). Urban design guidelines and building codes for public and private buildings should be designed for future climate scenarios. While much has been written about sea level rise, addressing potential urban heat island effects arising from hotter temperature and heat waves is also an important consideration when preparing urban design guidelines and assessing public and private buildings in built-up areas (Stone 2012). Requirements for urban vegetation, “green” (planted) roofs, and specific colors for building and paving materials can be considered. Public space designs must anticipate more severe local climatic conditions, with shading, shelter, and appropriate vegetation to cool areas of open space and walkways or cycle paths, as well as designing public amenities for safety and storage during disaster events. In planning for areas where risk is found to be high, decisions fall roughly into three categories: to protect infrastructure through engineered fortification, such as a sea wall; to accommodate threat through planning and design modifications; or to retreat, by relocating infrastructure and activities. Such decisions often need to be made at a local scale, responding and adapting to specific circumstances as they unfold (de Vries and Wolsink 2009). In planning for new settlements, or for new development within existing areas, it is important to reserve space for emergency access, congregation, shelter, and evacuation. In particularly vulnerable areas, locations for intermediate post-emergency recovery, such as temporary housing, should be identified. Long-term planning ensures that intermediate land-use decisions do not compromise future opportunities (Meck and Schwab 2005).

Climate Adaptation Plans: Policies Actually Chosen The literature described above outlines potential policies for CCA. But what steps are communities actually choosing? Table 1 identifies the actions taken by eight early-adopting communities in Australia and in the USA who prepared specific plans for adaptation. Page 5 of 19

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Table 1 Policies recommended in climate adaptation plans, USA and Australia (Adapted from Hamin and Gurran 2011) Local authority Keene

Olympia

Berkeley

Chicago

King County

Hornsby

Gold Coast

Population State category Location Key land-use planning actions New 0–50 K Inland Scientific staff to provide climate change Hampshire information to policymakers for consideration in regulation and decisions; review comprehensive plan; hazard mitigation; and relevant building ordinances/design standards in light of potential climate change impacts; create flood control zone; protect and rehabilitate historic and cultural resources to reduce vulnerability; code and plan revisions for water quality protection Olympia’s Response to Washington 0–50 K Inland Develop new sustainability design the Challenge of Climate standards (green building materials, Change 2007 energy conservation principles); design standards for greater resilience to severe weather, floodplain identification; identify alternative route options for movements of goods and people; sustainable transportation mode choices; promote locally generated; secure energy sources; increase protection of existing/ future wetlands to enhance resilience of ecology and hydrology; increase waterstorage capacity; increase food security – identifying and protecting prime agricultural soils Berkeley Climate Action California 50–300 k Coastal Encourage water efficiency; expand and Plan 2009 diversify water supply; increase urban tree cover 1–3 M Inland Refers to previous efforts in encouraging Chicago Climate Action Illinois denser less car dependent development; Plan 2008, Especially Chapter 5: Adaptation introduction of stormwater regulations Washington 1–3 M Inland Update heat response plan – research into King County Climate Plan 2007, Especially urban heat island effect; encouragements for innovative cooling/energy efficiency Section 6B On Adaptation in properties; “Green Urban Design Plan” (permeable pavements; rooftop gardens; green alleys; onsite mechanisms to prevent flooding); amendment of landscape ordinance for climate tolerant plants Climate Change New South 50–300 K Coastal Review planning controls to strengthen Adaptation Strategic Plan Wales requirements in locations of increased 2009 vulnerability Gold Coast Climate Queensland 300 K–1 M Coastal Designate climate sinks in local planning Strategy 2009 scheme; scope local food production opportunities and requirements; implement coastal planning measures

Plan name Adapting to Climate Change: Planning A Resilient Community 2007

(continued)

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Table 1 (continued) Local authority Sunshine Coast

Plan name Sunshine Coast Climate Change and Peak Oil Strategy 2010

Brisbane

Brisbane’s Plan for Action on Climate Change and Energy 2007

Darebin

Climate Change and Peak Oil Adaptation Plan 2009

Melbourne Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2009 City of Port Phillip

Draft Climate Adaptation Plan 2010

Mandurah Coastal Zone Climate Change Risk Assessment and Adaptation Plan 2009

Population State category Location Key land-use planning actions Queensland 300 K–1 M Coastal Revised sea level rise projections; planning controls to improve resilience of natural systems; risk assessments in planning decisions; planning controls to encourage localization Queensland 1–3 M Inland Planning controls to prevent flood/storm surge exposure; shade and weather protection; transit-oriented development to reduce emissions; reducing barriers to urban food production; improve resilience of natural systems – no net loss of natural vegetation Victoria 0–50 K Inland Zoning flexibility – provision for local food production; assessing planning controls to remove impediments to resilience strategies; appropriate development in areas subject to climate risks Victoria 0–50 K Coastal Revised planning controls for sea level rise; new building standards to manage heat island effect Victoria 0–50 K Coastal Revise planning controls to restrict building in areas of coastal vulnerability; require climate adaptive building design and vulnerability to be considered in planning decisions; amend planning controls and permit requirements accordingly Western 0–50 K Coastal Modifying planning process; amending Australia standards; reviewing information requirements for decision-making

As shown in Table 1, the full suite of potential policy responses is being attempted across the plans reviewed, although not necessarily within the one local area. The most comprehensive adaptation planning frameworks (for instance, plans for Keene, Olympia, and King County in the USA and Brisbane and the Gold and Sunshine coasts in Australia) cover land-use allocation, development and design controls, infrastructure provision, urban transport, and even the ongoing resilience of food supplies. By contrast, more targeted frameworks focus more on direct climate risks (e.g., Chicago, Hornsby, Melbourne, Mandurah).

Climbing the Adaptation Ladder As the literature has progressed, a general perspective on the process of adaptation has emerged. Moser and Eckstrom (2010) suggest that adaptation occurs in these phases: • Understanding the problem (detect the problem, gather and use information, re-/define problem)

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• Planning phase (develop options, assess options) • Managing stage (implement options, monitor outcomes and environment, evaluate effectiveness of option) (see also Arnell and Delaney 2006; National Research Council 2010) This of course mirrors the general comprehensive planning process. One key difference is that built into the “understanding the problem” phase are forecasts of climate change and analysis of who and where is most vulnerable to those changes. More precisely, our empirical research suggests a continuum of stages in developing climate adaptation responses within local areas, beginning with risk analysis moving through the preparation of an adaptation strategy to changing planning controls. This pattern is consistent with previous research identifying a climate risk analysis as a precondition for further adaptation action in Australian public and private sector organizations (Gardner et al. 2010). This risk analysis informs the development of a framework for strategic adaptation action across the many responsibilities of local government and might include actions ranging from community education through to developing applications for external funding and resources. With a risk analysis in place, communities’ next typical step was to change the planning and regulatory framework governing future development, so that such development enhances resilience to climate risks, rather than furthering exposure. Subsequent actions involve rethinking the ways in which local infrastructure (both public and private) is designed and delivered, before finally establishing a funding strategy to resource ongoing intervention. These last two stages have as yet been undertaken by only a few of the municipalities or councils involved in our study, but the vast majority of responding agencies indicated that they intended to commence such work in the near future. In doing so, a strong evidence base will be needed with detailed local-level information, including costings on necessary adaptation expenses over time. Strategic assistance to help councils overcome barriers to the adoption of more resilient forms of infrastructure design and delivery will also be needed. Note that the actions above are being taken in regard to new development permits and infrastructure. The literature may suggest substantial changes to existing property such as retreat, but that is much harder to accomplish for obvious reasons. Absent a major loss or disaster, our survey respondents were not attempting to force change to existing properties. Taken together, these series of actions suggest a ladder of adaptation that communities are tending to follow, at least in coastal Australia (Fig. 1). The ladder begins with institutional awareness of climate change issues through to developing an information base (risk analysis) and to preparing an umbrella framework for adaptation action. Subsequent implementation stages typically include amendments to land-use planning controls and, finally, investment in infrastructure augmentation or change (see also Tompkins et al. 2010). Although regulatory change itself is time-consuming and costly, involving consultant studies, legal opinions, local politics, and potentially, litigation, these costs are far less than those anticipated for key municipal infrastructure upgrade or relocation. Retrospective adaptation action for existing infrastructure will likely be delayed until the infrastructure requires replacement, resources are available, and/or the risk becomes quite urgent.

Barriers to Adaptation Action The sections above have identified what typical actions are and the steps through which communities tend to move. This section discusses the process itself – what has enabled governments to move forward, what tends to slow them down, and the processes that are most appropriate. Page 8 of 19

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Adaptation Planning Approach

Change local regulations

Change infrastructure

Prepare CCA plan Analyze climate risk and vulnerability Develop awareness of CCA need

Increasing CCA Fig. 1 Adaptation ladder (Adapted from Gurran et al. 2012b)

Barriers can cover a wide range of issues, but, following Adger (2009), they are socially constructed and thus not insurmountable. Moser and Ekstrom (2010), building from the wide range of research identifying barriers to adaptation planning (Mukheibir and Ziervogel 2007; Amundsen et al. 2010; Nielsen and Reenberg 2010; Measham et al. 2011; Mozumder et al. 2011; Rosenzweig et al. 2011), explain the necessary conditions for CCA as the following: • Leadership, whether in the government or grassroots-level activism. Leadership is particularly essential when there is no regulatory mandate or local public demand for action. • Resources, including technical information such as regional climate forecasts as well as staff time and expertise. • Communication and information , which is particularly understood to be public participation and the flow of communication among those responsible for action; there is a sense in the article that this is a top-down flow of information from agencies to the public as well as cross-flow among members engaged in a CCA planning process. Note that in this formation, technical information needs are included in the resources category above. • Values and beliefs, especially regarding risk and how it should be managed and what concerns have standing. Although not explicit in the original framework, for our purposes, belief (or lack thereof) in the anthropogenic causes of climate change would be categorized here (Moser and Ekstrom 2010; Hamin and Gurran 2013). Adaptation barriers thus arise when deficiencies across any of these elements occur during any stage of the adaptation planning process. For instance, Arnell and Delaney (2006) characterize barriers in relation to missing operators, arising from a lack of awareness by leadership of the need for adaptation, and missing means – that is, limited institutional capacity, budgetary constraints, and lack of regulatory authority (see also Gupta et al. 2010; Berkhout 2012). They also point to the problem of unemployed means, where because of misallocation of costs and benefits, actions are not taken. A relevant example would be homeowners not moving because low-priced nationally

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subsidized flood insurance will reimburse their losses or local government officials prioritizing other budgetary items – such as short-term infrastructure upgrading (Measham et al. 2011). Empirical studies generally support these theoretical frameworks. Among the most basic needs are climate change awareness and technical knowledge of how to proceed; Australian research has found that planners express uncertainty about how to begin CCA planning, despite evident awareness and conviction about the need for action (Measham et al. 2011; Baker et al. 2012; Gurran et al. 2012a). Consistently, if regulatory authority or mandates to support adaptation efforts are absent, it is much more difficult for planners overcome local barriers arising from insufficient information and capacity constraints (Few et al. 2007; Funfgeld 2010; Tang et al. 2010). State mandates, while sometimes viewed by local officials as intrusive and controlling without the benefit of additional funding, can provide both an alignment of values and the political cover needed when facing opposition from constituents (Bedsworth and Hanak 2010; Dalton and Burby 1994). Guidance from the state or region should present the best available science in order to influence beliefs while considering financial compensation to constituents adversely affected by the policies (Bedsworth and Hanak 2010). By implication, a state mandate would overcome concerns about the legal basis for changing zones or ordinances in relation to climate adaptation. For other activities, such as provision of water infrastructure, specific state regulations need to change for local authorities to modify their own systems. Previous research and policy development work has emphasized the importance of access to additional resources in helping local governments build capacity for climate change adaptation, particularly in local government areas already struggling with resource constraints (Baker et al. 2012; Bierbaum et al. 2013). This is similar to many topics – a study of 100 cities in California’s Central Valley found a link between the cities’ fiscal means and the occurrence of sustainability policies (Lubell et al. 2009). In well-resourced communities, addressing barriers tends to be more an issue of facilitating effective use of resources rather than a need to create capacity per se (Burch 2010). But this requires political leadership to push adaptation to the top of the priority list. As Measham et al. (2011) have suggested, because climate change adaptation is not embedded within local planning practice, it is easily displaced by the context of routine demands.

Case Study: Barriers to Action in Massachusetts Coastal Communities To ground this discussion of barriers and enablers of CCA, it may be helpful to provide two case studies, one focusing on what prevents forward movement and one on what enables it. These are of course closely interrelated, but not exact mirror opposites. In Massachusetts, cities and towns update their master (comprehensive) plans when they wish to – there is no legal requirement for updates. There is no state or national mandate or funding for CCA; there are not even any accepted projections for climate change upon which towns can rely. Consequently, local CCA planning can only happen through very conscious effort to undergo dedicated CCA planning process, or if a town happens to be updating their master plan. Unsurprisingly, forward movement on adaptation at the local level has been quite slow. In reviewing all 351 cities and towns of the Commonwealth, only Boston had prepared a dedicated CCA plan as of 2012. One town is including a CCA chapter in their new master plan, which is now underway. Despite this, most of the planners in our 15 case study communities saw value in including CCA in their comprehensive or capital improvement plans. Many of the responses resonate with previous research: the three most common barriers to taking action reported were resources (staff and money), the sense that climate projections or climate science remains uncertain, and concern over politics or lack of leadership (Hamin and Gurran 2013).

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Less reported previously is the impact of high private property values in motivating opposition to policy changes involving retreat options and in stimulating pressure to enable hard shoreline defense. After this, a range of barriers are mentioned: challenges from existing land-use patterns (which limit adaptation options), lack of public support or contrary local values, and the distant time frame of adaptive need. Various institutional constraints were occasionally mentioned: the lack of regional planning in the state, the lack of federal or state mandates for action, and difficulty in finding a legal basis for including adaptation in regulations. Planners also reported political unwillingness to threaten property interests in expensive coastal land. In coastal Massachusetts as well as many beach areas, the residents most likely to be affected by sea change policies tend to be quite wealthy and have the ability to concentrate resources to prevent change they consider undesirable (Hamin and Gurran 2013). This is evident in the Australian case study as well, discussed below.

Case Study: Planning, Property Values, and Community “Pushback” in Australia Local values can provide an atmosphere of support for climate change adaptation or, alternately, can act as a barrier to that process (Wolf et al. 2013). The politics of risk are a major concern for Australian local governments. Councils that had reasonable success in making general plans for adaptation found it much harder to move to implementing regulatory policy (Gurran et al. 2012b). Vague comments regarding the need to adapt are one thing; plans and regulations that identify the affected properties are quite another. It did not seem to make much difference whether the property owner was a long-term owner or a “wash-ashore” who was just thinking about buying land. Several participants described pressure from affluent newcomers who had purchased sites in vulnerable locations and now sought to secure approval for new development, despite climate risk. These conflicting pressures arising from various stakeholder groups are a major concern for local councilors and professional staff. Respondents described a growing community “pushback” against climate change, driven by concern that identifying areas of climate risk and imposing exposurereducing development controls would lower private property values, that has strong potential to erode local political support for adaptation measures. Given that the benefits of adaptation occur in the distant and uncertain future and that there is no obvious constituency for adaptation action, it has proven difficult even for local communities that started a solid CCA process with state funding to move into the implementation stage. The public – and often the planners – perceives climate change as part of the distant future, and it is difficult to care about that when there are pressing issues at hand.

Overcoming Barriers Through Alternative Processes In general, the literature and discussions on climate adaptation tend to propose two basic approaches to forward movement of CCA policies. The first is overt adaptation planning (Adger et al. 2005), in which the city or town prepares a comprehensive strategic framework based on climate forecasts and vulnerability analyses. The advantages here include the comprehensive nature of the method, which should assist in preventing maladaptation, the ability to include the public through regular participatory processes, and having as one product of the process an agreed-upon climate projection or set of scenarios (Preston et al. 2011). It appears that the comprehensive planning approach may overcome several barriers: it provides the ability to request resources for CCA, to develop an accepted climate projection for use in guiding policy, and to generate public support through participatory processes.

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Adaptation Planning Approach Change local regulations

Change infrastructure

Prepare CCA plan

Develop awareness of CCA need

Analyze climate risk and vulnerability

Public and Expert Engagement

Increasing CCA

Fig. 2 CCA planning approach

Figure 2 reprises the ladder of adaptation as a planning process, with a focus on the potential to engage the public throughout many steps of the process, thereby bringing in better transparency and potentially building political support. The second approach is often termed “mainstreaming” and implies moving directly from climate forecast to changing technical specifications and regulations without going through a full, standalone climate planning process (Klein et al. 2005; Sharma and Tomar 2010). In this approach, officials can avoid discussion with the public or formal planning processes and instead focus on changing regulations and technical specifications and including future climate as a normal variable in municipal management decisions. For example, at the urging of their regional planning body, several Massachusetts towns are including climate change projections in the vulnerability analyses for their, mandatory multi-hazard mitigation plans. The advantages here include speed, as climate becomes a normal part of the municipal processes quite directly; implementation, as the goal is to bypass a long planning process and go directly to changing policy; and integration, as climate adaptation is situated within existing cross-sectoral plans and activities. The disadvantage is that there is little ability to engage the public and minimal ability to coordinate policies or undertake a proper risk analysis. Given this, mainstreaming may lead to more maladaptation over time, as there is little chance to consider action in its fuller environment or compare actions to assure they work together. But it does allow quicker forward movement and may be a good response when the issues are primarily technical, when upper-level political support is weak but department-level support is strong, or when too much publicity is likely to lead to community pushback. The general steps are demonstrated in Fig. 3. There is in addition a third potential approach which can be thought of as “stealth,” but might be less controversially be described as the “no regrets + co-benefits, no discussion” approach. The idea here is to achieve some climate adaptation goals without identifying the actions as adaptation. Instead, the focus is on the other or “co-benefits” of a policy (United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) 2011). Indeed, research suggests that at the national level at least, climate change is rarely the primary or stated motivation for adaptive action (Berrang-Ford et al. 2011), but the extent of incorporation of climate adaptation measures within other policy frameworks is largely unknown. With anticipated increases in sea level, floods, and stormwater intrusion (Frumhoff et al. 2007), most planners know there is pressing need for policy, but remain largely unable to Page 12 of 19

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Municipal Mainstreaming Approach

Collaborate to change technical specifications Informally analyze climate risk and vulnerability

Change infrastructure and other policy

Expert engagement

Develop awareness of CCA need among public works and other decision-makers Increasing CCA

Fig. 3 Municipal mainstreaming approach

Fig. 4 Stealth approach

publically frame the problem as one of climate change (Ruth and Coelho 2007). It may even be that adaptation actions situated within established policy areas, such as natural hazards frameworks, are more likely to endure changing political cycles (Gurran et al. 2012a). This approach had been used in the Australian context, with some local council professionals addressing skepticism by using a language of climate “variability” rather than climate “change,” which they felt helped counteract the growing political pushback against climate change. Even more so than mainstreaming, this approach lacks the advantages that a public process can bring and cannot achieve the perspective of a planning process. It works hit or miss. But in the hardest situations, it may be the way to start. Illustrative steps are identified in Fig. 4.

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Choosing Your Approach/Overcoming Barriers and Engaging Enablers The short story is, not surprisingly, that undertaking a proper plan enables engaging the public and thus can build political support and create long-lasting credibility. A plan can also assist in requests for funding and enable a more comprehensive view that may help in overcoming limits from lack of information and technical knowledge. Both the quality of the plan (clarity of goals, policies, and regulation (Neuman 1998)) and the quality of the process (participation, community education, and support (Baer 1997; Laurian et al. 2004; Burby 2003)) are important, and the plan can provide a bottom-up, participatory approach. Mainstreaming, in contrast, encourages the technical uptake and integration of CCA into a range of municipal decision-making, which can address important infrastructure issues such as how high a bridge should be, or how large a water reservoir may be needed under changed climate. But mainstreaming is unlikely to build political support. Both mainstreaming and stealth may be efficient in getting movement quickly – for instance, in assembling data and undertaking basic changes to local strategies, guidelines, and, perhaps, regulations, without inflaming climate change debate. However, stealth is unlikely to be able to move CCA very far along given the need to gain political support for increased expenditure, when actions need implementing, or for the exercise of unpopular decisions, both of which depend on leadership- and community-endorsed policy (Rosenzweig et al. 2011; Brody and Highfield 2005). A logical approach then could engage all three: beginning with overt CCA builds constituency, mainstreaming achieves integration, and stealth is an option if political change threatens policy commitment. If politics are an initial barrier, start with a stealth approach, seeking co-benefits policies first while laying political ground work for a comprehensive CCA planning process and mainstreaming into a range of policies. Further work is needed to know whether, in the case of climate adaptation, an explicit process, including community engagement, delivers better outcomes (in which case actions by stealth are best used as a last resort) and whether explicit climate adaptation strategies are more, or less, effective than those incorporated within other frameworks (“mainstreaming”), over the long term. Then, there are the questions of ethics and process, which are conveniently ignored here but must be part of the considerations when actually selecting actions.

Conclusions: Connecting the Dots Between Barriers and Approaches CCA action in the communities studied is at too early a phase for strong conclusions. But some strategies for overcoming typical barriers nevertheless emerge. Even without a strong legal framework, local governments have the potential to embed climate change considerations across all aspects of strategic planning and development assessment, as well as their wider operational, environmental management, and natural hazard activities, as outlined in this chapter. The strategies for low carbon development, which emphasize local and decentralized approaches to food, energy, water, waste, and transportation and preserving and enhancing biodiversity and natural processes, provide a blueprint for the wider sustainable community agenda, emphasizing resilience not only to future climate impacts but also to many of the other economic and social challenges likely to arise during the twenty-first century. Adaptation, by improving resilience to extreme events as well as the increasing hardships of climate, provides local benefits. But getting that message across requires overcoming the typically short time frame of politics and budgets and considering instead a longer investment that matches investments and built form to the climate that is to come, rather than climates past. Some cities and towns have taken a leadership role and undergone adaptation planning without significant support from upper government levels. However, having state support through an existing state-level Page 14 of 19

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adaptation plan appears a far more reliable way to encourage local governments to make local adaptation plans. Ultimately, this analysis of early generation local adaptation planning suggests that more sophisticated and detailed policy and practice innovation is needed to allow municipalities to translate climate vulnerabilities into a concrete response framework, particularly in relation to land-use planning. That adaptation actions are arising within the context of larger mitigation planning efforts suggests strong potential for synergistic solutions to be devised. Nevertheless, when new information about likely sea levels, flooding, and fire risks comes to light, difficult decisions regarding landbased adaptation measures will be needed, potentially including identifying new areas as no-build zones. This implies a need for specific planning tools – such as planned retreat and transferrable development rights (enabling historical development entitlement to shift to more appropriate locations) – to provide a basis for offsetting some of the inevitable costs to individuals associated with such decisions. Vulnerability analyses need to become more common to assure that the least resourced are not the most affected. There is also a danger that in failing to clearly connect mitigation and adaptation decisions in new generation plans, misalignment may seep into the ellipsis. But as more examples, technical/policy guidance, and nongovernmental support become available, in part building from the experiences of these early adopters, it appears reasonable to expect adaptation planning to spread, particularly with more explicit state and federal encouragement. Overall, there is an urgent need to move beyond vulnerability analysis and into implementation of adaptation action. While “global” cities have been able to move forward, smaller cities are falling behind. Aid agencies have tended to prioritize rapid mainstreaming, while planners and policymakers want a comprehensive analysis of the adaptation situation. The frameworks presented here could encourage a more place-sensitive approach that matches barriers to approaches, encourages a more realpolitik awareness of the local challenges of adaptation implementation, and thereby assists smaller cities in making on-the-ground progress in implementation.

References Abunnasr Y, Hamin EM, Brabec E (2013) Windows of opportunity: addressing climate uncertainty through adaptation plan implementation. J Environ Plan Manage 1–21 Adger W (2009) Are there social limits to adaptation to climate change? Climate Change 93:335–354 Adger NW, Arnell NW, Tompkins EL (2005) Successful adaptation to climate change across scales. Glob Environ Chang Part A 15:77–86 Amundsen H, Berglund F, Westskog H (2010) Overcoming barriers to climate change adaptation a question of multilevel governance? Environ Plan C-Gov Policy 28:276–289 APA’s Green Communities Research Center (2010) Planners energy and climate database, vol 2013. American Planning Association. Chicago, IL Arnell NW, Delaney EK (2006) Adapting to climate change: public water supply in England and Wales. Clim Change 78:227–255 Baer WC (1997) General plan evaluation criteria: an approach to making better plans. J Am Plan Assoc 63(3):329–344 Baker I, Peterson A, Brown G, McAlpine C (2012) Local government response to the impacts of climate change: an evaluation of local climate adaptation plans. Landsc Urban Plan 107:127–136 Bedsworth LW, Hanak E (2010) Adaptation to climate change a review of challenges and tradeoffs in six areas. Journal of the American Planning Association 76(4):477–495 Page 15 of 19

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Berkhout F (2012) Adaptation to climate change by organizations. Wiley Interdiscip Rev Clim Change 3:91–106 Berrang-Ford L, Ford JD, Paterson J (2011) Are we adapting to climate change? Glob Environ Chang 21:25–33 Betts RA, Collins M, Hemming DL, Jones CD, Lowe JA, Sanderson MG (2011) When could global warming reach 4 degrees C? Philos Trans R Soc A Math Phys Eng Sci 369:67–84 Bierbaum R, Smith J, Lee A, Blair M, Carter L, Chapin FS III et al (2013) A comprehensive review of climate adaptation in the United States: more than before, but less than needed. Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Chang 18:361–406 Brody SD, Highfield WE (2005) Does planning work?: testing the implementation of local environmental planning in Florida. J Am Plan Assoc 71(2):159–175 Burby RJ (2003) Making plans that matter: citizen involvement and government action. J Amer Plan Assoc 69(1):33–49 Burch S (2010) Transforming barriers into enablers of action on climate change: insights from three municipal case studies in British Columbia, Canada. Glob Environ Chang 20:287–297 Carmin J, Anguelovski I, Roberts D (2012) Urban climate adaptation in the global south: planning in an emerging policy domain. J Plan Educ Res 32:18–32 Castán Broto V, Bulkeley H (2013) A survey of urban climate change experiments in 100 cities. Glob Environ Chang 23:92–102 Dalton LC, Burby RJ (1994) Mandates, plans, and planners: building local commitment to development management. J Amer Plan Assoc 60(4):444–461 de Vries J, Wolsink M (2009) Making space for water: spatial planning and water management in the Netherlands. In: Davoudi S, Crawford J, Mehmood A (eds) Planning for climate change; strategies for mitigation and adaptation for spatial planners. Earthscan, London, pp 191–204 Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) (2007) Planning policy statement: planning and climate change. Supplement to planning policy statement 1. TSO, London EEA (2012) Urban adaptation to climate change in Europe: challenges and opportunities for cities together with supportive national and European policies, vol 2/2012. European Environment Agency, Luxembourg Few R, Brown K, Tompkins EL (2007) Climate change and coastal management decisions: insights from Christchurch Bay, UK. Coast Manag 35:255–270 Folke C (2006) Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for social-ecological systems analyses. Glob Environ Chang-Hum Policy Dimens 16:253–267 Frumhoff PC, McCarthy JJ, Melillo JM, Moser SC, Wuebbles DJ, Synthesis report of the Northeast Climate Impacts Assessment (NECIA) (2007) Confronting climate change in the U.S. Northeast: science, impacts, and solutions. UCS Publications, Cambridge, MA Funfgeld H (2010) Institutional challenges to climate risk management in cities. Curr Opin Environ Sustain 2:156–160 Gupta J, Termeer C, Klostermann J, Meijerink S, van den Brink M, Jong P et al (2010) The adaptive capacity wheel: a method to assess the inherent characteristics of institutions to enable the adaptive capacity of society. Environ Sci Pol 13:459–471 Gurran N, Hamin E, Norman B (2008) Planning for climate change: leading practice principles and models for sea change communities in coastal Australia. University of Sydney, Sydney, p 66 Gurran N, Norman B, Gilbert C, Hamin EM (2012a) Planning for climate change in coastal Australia: state of practice. Report no. 4 for the Australian Sea Change Task Force, Sydney, p 84 Gurran N, Norman B, Hamin EM (2012b) Climate change adaptation in coastal Australia: an audit of planning practice. Ocean Coast Manag (in press) Page 16 of 19

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Gurran N, Norman B, Hamin EM (2013) Climate change adaptation in coastal Australia: an audit of planning practice. Ocean Coastal Manage 86:100–109 Hamin E, Gurran N, Emlinger AM (2014) Planning approaches for addressing barriers to municipal climate adaptation: examples from coastal Massachusetts’ smaller cities and towns. J Amer Plan Assoc. In press Hamin EM (2011) Integrating adaptation and mitigation in local climate change planning. In: Ingram G, Hong H (eds) Climate change and land policies. Lincoln Land Institute Press, Cambridge, MA Hamin EM, Gurran N (2011) Local actions, national frameworks: a dual-scale comparison of climate adaptation planning on two continents. University of Massachusetts, p 34 Hamin EM, Gurran N (2013) Planning, mainstreaming, and co-benefits: matching barriers to adaptation approaches. J Am Plan Assoc ICLEI: Local Governments for Sustainability (2014) Homepage, vol 2013 IPCC (2012) Summary for policymakers. In: Field CB, Barros V, Stocker TF, Qin D, Dokken DJ, Ebi KL, Mastrandrea MD, Mach KJ, Plattner G-K, Allen SK, Tignor M, Midgley PM (eds) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation: a special report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK/New York, pp 1–19 Klein RJT, Schipper ELF, Dessai S (2005) Integrating mitigation and adaptation into climate and development policy: three research questions. Environ Sci Pol 8:579–588 Laurian L, Day M, Berke P, Ericksen N, Backhurst M, Crawford J, Dixon J (2004) Evaluating plan implementation. J Amer Plan Assoc 70(4):471–480 Lubell M, Feiock R, Handy S (2009) City adoption of environmentally sustainable policies in California’s central valley. J Am Plan Assoc 75:293–308 McKibben B (2011) Earth: making a life on a tough new planet. Henry Holt, New York Measham T, Preston B, Smith T, Brooke C, Gorddard R, Withycombe G et al (2011) Adapting to climate change through local municipal planning: barriers and challenges. Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Chang 16:889–909 Meck S, Schwab J (2005) Planning for wildfires (PAS 529/530). APA Planning Advisory Service, vol 529/530. American Planning Association. Chicago, IL Moser SC, Ekstrom JA (2010) A framework to diagnose barriers to climate change adaptation. Proc Natl Acad Sci 107:22026–22031 Mozumder P, Flugman E, Randhir T (2011) Adaptation behavior in the face of global climate change: survey responses from experts and decision makers serving the Florida Keys. Ocean Coast Manag 54:37–44 Mukheibir P, Ziervogel G (2007) Developing a Municipal Adaptation Plan (MAP) for climate change: the city of Cape Town. Environ Urban 19:143–158 National Research Council (2010) Adapting to the impacts of climate change. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC Newman P, Beatley T, Boyer H (2009) Resilient cities: responding to peak oil and climate change. Island Press, Washington, DC Nielsen JO, Reenberg A (2010) Cultural barriers to climate change adaptation: a case study from Northern Burkina Faso. Glob Environ Chang-Hum Policy Dimens 20:142–152 Preston B, Westaway R, Yuen E (2011) Climate adaptation planning in practice: an evaluation of adaptation plans from three developed nations. Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Chang 16:407–438 Romero-Lankao P (2012) Governing carbon and climate in the cities: an overview of policy and planning challenges and options. Eur Plan Stud 20:7–26 Page 17 of 19

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Rosenzweig C, Solecki W, Hammer S, Mehrotra S (2011) Climate change and cities: first assessment report of the urban climate change research network. Cambridge University Press Ruth M, Coelho D (2007) Understanding and managing the complexity of urban systems under climate change. Clim Pol 7:317–336 Sharma D, Tomar S (2010) Mainstreaming climate change adaptation in Indian cities. Environ Urban 22:451–465 Stone B (2012) The city and the coming climate: climate change in the places we live. University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge Tang ZH, Brody SD, Quinn C, Chang L, Wei T (2010) Moving from agenda to action: evaluating local climate change action plans. J Environ Plan Manag 53:41–62 Tompkins EL, Adger WN, Boyd E, Nicholson-Cole S, Weatherhead K, Arnell N (2010) Observed adaptation to climate change: UK evidence of transition to a well-adapting society. Glob Environ Chang-Hum Policy Dimens 20:627–635 United Nations (1992) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). United Nations, New York United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) (2011) Cities and climate change: global report on human settlements 2011. Earthscan, London United Nations (2012) Parties and observers: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Retrieved 2013, January 18, from http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/ items/2704.php Wilson E (2009) Use of scenarios for climate change adaptation in spatial planning. In: Davoudi S, Crawford J, Mehmood A (eds) Planning for climate change: strategies for mitigation and adaptation. Earthscan, London, pp 223–235 Wolf J, Allice I et al (2013) Values, climate change, and implications for adaptation: evidence from two communities in Labrador, Canada. Glob Environ Chang-Hum Policy Dimens 23:548–562

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Index Terms: Adaptation barriers 8 Local planning 3–4, 15 Municipal responses 2, 12

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Disaster Vulnerability in the Policy Context of Bangladesh: A Critical Review Afroza Parvina* and Cassidy Johnsonb a Architecture Discipline, Khulna University, Khulna, Bangladesh b The Bartlett Development Planning Unit, University College London, London, UK

Abstract This chapter attempts to have an in-depth understanding of the climate change policy context of Bangladesh with regard to the notion of disaster vulnerability as a policy concern. The chapter reviews the policy from a social vulnerability perspective. With regard to the socioeconomic and environmental context of Bangladesh, it develops an analytical framework to examine the climate change policy. There is a lack of conceptualizing disaster vulnerability in policy formulation that makes it biased towards “physical adaptation” measures to reduce disaster risk. The political economy of climate change initiatives in Bangladesh leaves little scope to address vulnerability of grassroots communities. The chapter argues that in a country like Bangladesh where lack-ofdevelopment-led problems are persistent, there is an urgent need to develop context-responsive policies and action plans that should address the causes and dynamic processes of disaster vulnerability and lack-of-development issues in an integrated manner. Existing climate change policies do not address the structural dynamics of disaster vulnerability adequately. To this end, the chapter suggests policy-relevant insights towards the formulation of people-centered policies and strategies for Bangladesh.

Keywords Climate change; Disaster; Vulnerability; Political economy; Policy

Introduction Bangladesh is recognized worldwide as one of the countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (WB 2012). This is due to its unique geographic location, dominance of floodplains, low elevation from the sea, high population density, high levels of poverty, and overwhelming dependence on nature (CCC 2007). Global warming has affected weather patterns and disrupted variability and trends in climate. This is resulting in an increase in climate-related extreme events like heavy rainfall, flood, cyclone, storm surge, etc. (Alam 2004; Alam and Murry 2005; Mahtab 1989). These extreme events claim thousands of lives, destroy assets and properties, and disrupt livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people. Because of sea level rise, coastal Bangladesh has already been experiencing the worst impacts especially in terms of coastal inundation and erosion, saline intrusion, deforestation, and loss of biodiversity (BCAS et al. 1996; BCAS and BUP 1994; BIDS 1994). More than 40 million people of Bangladesh still live in poverty. Many of these people *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 20

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live in remote or ecologically fragile parts of the country, such as river islands (chars) and cycloneprone coastal belts, which are especially vulnerable to natural disasters. In the recently released Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2009–2011) and the Sixth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) (GOB 2012), the government has reaffirmed its commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) targets, including halving poverty and hunger by the year 2015, through a strategy of pro-poor growth and climate-resilient development. Climate change will severely challenge the country’s ability to achieve the high rates of economic growth needed to sustain these reductions in poverty. The government has recognized climate change as an important issue and attempts are being made to incorporate potential response measures for reducing impacts of climate change into overall development planning process. Many sectoral policies have recognized the issues of climate change and highlighted the importance of integration of environment and resource management for achieving sustainable development of the nation (Parvin and Johnson 2012; MOEF 1995; GOB 2003). However, until 2005 the government of Bangladesh did not have any climate change policy to address anticipated impacts of climate change. The National Adaptation Program of Action 2005 (NAPA) (MOEF 2005) is the first policy document in this line. In 2009, Bangladesh government has prepared the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) (MOEF 2009). Both policy documents have recognized disaster threats and emphasized on the institutional and functional arrangements required to prepare responses to and recover from disaster events. However, the policies conceived disaster risk and vulnerability from a hazard-centric technocratic approach where the physical impacts of climate change are considered as indicators of disaster vulnerability with little or no consideration of the underlying structural systems, i.e., the social, economic, and political systems that make people vulnerable to natural hazards. The policy context is yet to conceptualize the notion of disaster vulnerability with regard to the structural factors and dynamic processes shaping it. This policy lag is reflected explicitly in the domination of physical intervention-biased adaptation and mitigation strategies outlined in the said documents.

Conceptualizing Disaster Vulnerability as a Policy Concern An increasing number of devastating disaster events all over the world has caused disaster researchers to rethink the nature and causes of disaster vulnerability. Instead of regarding disaster as a purely physical occurrence, requiring largely technological solutions, as was widespread until the 1970s, scholars have attempted to unmask the naturalness of disasters since 1980s. The dominance of technical interventions focused on predicting hazards or modifying their impacts have been increasingly challenged by alternative approaches that examine disasters through the lens of vulnerability, primarily viewed as the result of human actions. This advancement in disaster studies can be understood in terms of two competing paradigms – the technocratic or hazardcentered paradigm and the constructivist or structural paradigm (Hilhorst 2004; Smith et al. 1999; Oliver-Smith 1996). The technocratic paradigm is dominated by behavioral approach, focused on geophysical processes to monitor and predict hazards, where social scientist is brought in to explain people’s behavior to risk and disaster and to develop early warning mechanisms and disaster preparedness schemes (Oliver-Smith 1996). This hazard-centered approach was challenged by the researchers from social sciences and applied sciences arguing that disasters are not primarily the outcome of geographical processes but rather should be understood as the interaction between hazard and vulnerability (Hewitt 1983).

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In the structural paradigm social vulnerability is the key to the understanding of disaster risk based on the premise that while hazards are natural, disasters are not (Cannon 1994). Structural forces, such as social, economic, and political processes, generate unequal exposure to risk making some people more vulnerable to disaster than others, and these inequalities are largely a function of the power relations operative in every society (Cannon 1994; Hilhorst and Bankoff 2004; Wisner et al. 2003). Thus, vulnerability is socially constructed and is the result of structural processes (Susman et al. 1983; Lewis 1999). For a particular community, vulnerability to disaster is shaped by the multidimensionality of disaster impacts by combining both the structural and environmental dimensions of disasters (Blaikie et al. 1994). Therefore, during climate change policy formulation, it needs to be understood in the context of social, political, and economic systems that operate on national and even international scales: it is these which decide how groups of people vary in relation to health, income, building safety, location of work and home, and so on (Wisner et al. 2003). In the structural paradigm of disaster research, the root causes of disaster vulnerability are expressed in terms of various social, economic, political, and physical aspects. Blaikie et al. (1994) expressed the underlying factors shaping vulnerability in terms of ideological root causes, dynamic processes, and unsafe conditions into causal chains. In the “pressure and release model,” the notion of vulnerability is explained in terms of social pressures and relations from a global to local level. At the global level different forms of relationship between society and nature, i.e., the social, political, and economic structures, are identified as the ideological root causes of disaster vulnerability. At an intermediate level, the dynamic processes include population growth, urban development and population pressure, environmental conditions, loss of ethics, etc., while at a local level the unsafe conditions include social fragility, potential harm to natural and built environments, poverty, etc. In this approach, disaster prevention and mitigation is conceived of as releasing the pressure of what is global over what is local and signifies intervention at each level (Wisner et al. 2003; Wisner 1993; Cannon 1994; Blaikie et al. 1994). Unsafe condition at local level is shaped by the baseline status (i.e., the basic needs such as income, food, health, education, and shelter) and degree of exposure of individuals to hazards. Irrespective of hazard circumstances, degree of individual’s accessibility and reliance on resources determine the first layer of vulnerability, i.e., the baseline vulnerability. Disaster risk is generated as a result of the difficulties that some social groups or households have in accessing resources and facilities which are important to build capacity to face potential disaster (Sen 1981; Chambers 1989; Winchester 1992). Thus, baseline vulnerabilities change over time through changes in one’s institutional and economic position, condition of shelter, food, and health, and these changes are affected by environmental changes (Adger and Kelly 1999). Increased attention to environmental processes and human-induced climate change has marked the emergence of another paradigm – complexity paradigm in the 1990s that takes the constructivist paradigms of disaster a step further (Hilhorst 2004). This paradigm was based on systems theory related to the theories of complexity, chaos, cybernetics, and complex adaptive systems. In system approach, disaster vulnerability is shaped by the complex interaction among three major systems – (1) environmental systems, which include the physical dimensions of earth’s hazardous events; (2) social systems, which include the structural and demographic characteristics of the communities that experience disasters; and (3) constructed systems, which include the components of man-made built environment (Mileti 1999). This approach offers a venue for understanding vulnerability and disaster in terms of multiple realities. Instead of capturing and controlling complexity, the challenge then becomes to acknowledge multiple realities shaped by culturally and politically informed selections and to embody the realization of complexity in developing institutional relations, mediations, and identities (Shackley et al. 1996). Regarding response to risk Page 3 of 20

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and disaster, Hilhorst (2004) interprets the complexity theory in terms of three main social domains – the domain of “science and disaster management,” the domain of “disaster governance,” and the domain of “local responses.” They are the respective domains of scientists and managers, bureaucrats and politicians, and local producers and vulnerable people. Disaster responses come about through the interaction of science, governance, and local practices, and they are defined and defended in relation to one another (Hilhorst 2004).

The Analytical Framework for Policy Review Despite the noteworthy advances in conceptualizing disasters, there is yet to develop a consistent and coherent theory of disaster vulnerability. This is mainly due to the inherent complexity and multiple realities of disaster impact and vulnerability. However, real-life disaster response requires a consistent and coherent conceptual framework to help formulate policies responsive to a given social, political, and environmental context. With an aim to understand the climate change policy context of Bangladesh, disaster vulnerability in this chapter is conceived as the societal condition of grassroots community created by the particular social systems and power relations in which the state apportions risk unevenly among its people and in which society places differing demands on the physical and natural environment. As suggested by Blaikie, Wisner, and Cannon (Wisner et al. 2003; Wisner 1993; Cannon 1994; Blaikie et al. 1994), this societal condition stretches along the three-tier vulnerability continuum from local to global level, where the condition is shaped by the dynamic interaction of ideological root causes at global level, dynamic processes at intermediate level, and unsafe condition at local level. Ensuring “safe conditions” at household level is fundamental to reduce local baseline vulnerability and enable the household to move onto the intermediate level of vulnerability continuum. The dynamic processes at intermediate level involve development needs such as basic infrastructure and services, population pressure, livelihood opportunity, natural resource base, environmental conditions, social capital, and so on. These processes are attributed to the structural forces interacting at global level – such as social deprivation, economic disparity, unequal distribution of wealth, global warming, power relations, and so on. Climate change policy should address these interacting dynamics as a strategic focus for adaptation through disaster risk reduction. Underpinned by this notion of disaster vulnerability, this chapter attempts to examine the climate change policy context of Bangladesh in light of the analytical framework shown in Fig. 1. The framework comprises two major components to analyze climate change policy in Bangladesh. First is the climate change context; it examines the conceptual focus and contextual brief of the policy document. This includes evaluation of policy objectives, strategic focus, and institutional environment with regard to climate change impacts and vulnerability. Second is the action plan; it examines the thematic areas of action plan, adaptation and mitigation measures, and detailed programs and actions with regard to the strategic focus and objectives.

The Political Economy of Disaster Vulnerability and Climate Change Since Bangladesh has got its sovereign identity in 1971, the rest of the world has known it mostly as a disaster-prone country with high level of poverty. Despite having very rich sociocultural background, natural resources, and geopolitical opportunities, this image and identity of being a “disasterprone” and “poor” country have always been singled out and portrayed with much enthusiasm into Page 4 of 20

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Fig. 1 Analytical framework to examine climate change policy

the international arena by most of the policymakers and power elites of this country. Promulgating this image has been associated with a hazard-centered attitude to disaster vulnerability. This attitude has made profound impacts on the national policy initiatives and actions concerning the climate change issues. Over the last three decades, with the financial support from international donors and development partners, the government of Bangladesh has invested over $10 billion (at constant 2007 prices) to make the country “less vulnerable” to natural disasters. These investments in many cases included large-scale physical adaptation measures such as flood management schemes, coastal polders and embankments, cyclone and flood shelters, and the rising of roads and highways above flood levels (MOEF 2009). Owing to the disaster-prone image and hazard-centered attitude, the investment went mostly for physical intervention, while reducing the root causes of disaster vulnerability has largely been ignored. Within the key policy documents of Bangladesh, climate change as a strategic focus was absent until 2005. Environment and sustainability, as the concerns for development, were first addressed in the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1990–1995) and received more emphasis in the Fifth Five-Year Plan 1997–2002 (GOB 1998). Chapter 10 of this plan, “Environment and Sustainable Development,” recognizes the need for integration of environmental issues into development planning and activities and suggests a policy outline and brief strategies for sustainable environment management. The plan Page 5 of 20

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mentions “disaster management” in subsection 10.8 of this chapter and suggested five measures, mostly physical, to reduce “disaster impact” – (1) massive afforestation, (2) construction of appropriate housing and cyclone shelters in the coastal belt and raised earthen platforms in the flood-prone areas, (3) construction of strong embankments in the coasts and islands, (4) implementation of an effective early warning system, and (5) incentives and awareness creation at the grassroots level. The underlying factors other than natural hazards that make a group of people more vulnerable to disaster impacts were completely overlooked in this plan. Climate change, as a main policy focus, was first incorporated in the National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) (MOEF 2005) in 2005. The policy suggested future coping mechanisms to reduce adverse effects of climate change, including variability and extreme events, and to promote sustainable development. It outlined 15 adaptation strategies that included several measures for sectoral intervention. It also outlined some facilitating measures such as capacity building, research, and dissemination of knowledge and information. The policy emphasized physical vulnerability to climate change and accordingly it suggested large-scale physical intervention projects. The conception of social vulnerability is literally absent throughout the document. NAPA had never been implemented; however, building on this document, the then government had prepared and adapted the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) in 2008. BCCSAP was prepared as a response to the decision of the Seventh Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP7) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The postNAPA preparation of BCCSAP was one of rapid development in policy context targeting the then Copenhagen Summit. This quick revision of national policy suggests that earlier documents might have been prepared hastily to tap into the growing possibility of international funds in climate change adaptation (Nicola et al. 2011). It is also not unlikely that the possibility of harnessing international finance for adaptation might have been a reason to identifying costly physical interventions. Building on the BCCSAP 2008, in 2009 the government of Bangladesh prepared the Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009 (BCCSAP 2009) which is at present the most important climate change policy document in place. The BCCSAP 2009 mentions six key mitigation measures. Most of the adaptation and mitigation measures, however, are physical, immediate effects centered, short to medium term, and to be achieved through external intervention. The most recent policy document, Sixth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) (GOB 2012), includes climate change issues as an integral part of development plan. Chapter 8 of this plan, “Environment, Climate Change, and Disaster Management for Sustained Development,” suggests supporting communities and people in rural areas to strengthen their resilience and adaptive capacity as a high priority for the coming decades. However, the document outlined its target based on benchmarks identified against the six-pillar framework of BCCSAP 2009. As a whole, the policy context suggests a hazard-centered attitude to disaster vulnerability, which is reflected explicitly in the adaptation and mitigation strategies that focused more on “physical vulnerability” to hazard than on social vulnerability to disasters. Alongside the image of a “disaster-prone” country coupled with the “hazard-centered” attitude to disaster vulnerability, a number of political economic factors make the pursuit of root causes of disaster vulnerability less attractive for the power elites and policymakers. Three main obstacles in this regard are characteristic to the institutional environment – (1) top-down development paradigm and technocratic bias to climate change, (2) hidden power struggles and lack of coordination in the institutional environment, and (3) lack of political will and vested interest of the stakeholders.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_26-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Top-Down Development Paradigm and Technocratic Bias to Climate Change Historically the process of development has been dominated by bureaucrats and power elites, who are more concerned about the development work outlined in the national policy and programs at national level than the people-centered initiatives needed by people living in the disaster-prone areas like coastal belts, char island, and urban informal settlements (Taher 2003). The existing top-down development process and technocratic approach to climate change risk management leaves little scope for participation of the disaster-affected communities in the policymaking and implementation process. Even with the recognition of climate change adaptation and mitigation as integral parts of development process, the conventional attitude to development works undermines context-specific and community-based responses to climate change. The responses are therefore more about physical construction, pre-disaster warning system, and post-disaster relief and construction management, leaving little or no room for the active participation in terms of representation and ownership of the grassroots communities. Subsequently, the rigid policy institutional environment allows no mechanisms through which the vulnerable communities and households can influence national policy and development process.

Hidden Power Struggles and Lack of Coordination in the Institutional Environment The institutional structure dealing with implementation and monitoring of climate change policies at the local level comprises three broad categories of organizations – public sector (e.g., administrative departments, elected local government bodies), private sector (e.g., NGOs, profit-oriented business concerns, donor agencies), and community-based social groups (e.g., Shalish committee, Samiti, school committee, branches of political parties, religious committee). The government sector has a three-tiered structure of elected local governance – Zila Parishad, Upazila, and Union Parishad (UP), at district, Thana or subdistrict, and village level, respectively. The public administration system generally follows a vertical pattern of authority where local bodies are linked vertically with its respective Ministry in Dhaka with a minimum delegation to the lower levels. Disaster management, adaptation, and mitigation initiatives are coordinated and monitored at district level and subdistrict level. The coordination mechanism at Upazila level is useful but only to a limited extent at the post-decision stage (Taher 2003). There is no room for the local level bodies to coordinate at the policymaking or planning stage. Being without elected representative for a long time, only recently (in 2011) the senior district level leaders of the ruling political party have been appointed as the Zila Parishad Proshashok (District Administrator) with very limited power and authority. Among the three tiers of administration, Upazila is considered to be pivotal in the decision-making structure of the government having relatively better linkage and contacts with grassroots people through the Union Parishads. But in reality, the Upazila chairman, with no executive power, seems to exist with no natural upward link, and the UPs can barely relate to similar bodies of administration above. This situation has given rise to a very strange and inconsistent pattern of governance, which promotes a rather contorted system of hierarchy and lack of coordination (Taher 2003). Even though the Upazila chairmen are the responsible persons, in effect the Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO), if not the Member of Parliament (MP), exercises real power. In many instances, the MP’s interference and influences of other political leaders in local level decision-making and resource allocations also contribute to the disparaging governing system (Siddiqui 2000). In the absence of a democratic structure, it is further aggravated by the rivalry of two groups of officers of the civil service cadres at district and subdistrict levels. The Union Parishad (UP) is currently the only local administrative tier closest to the grassroots communities. But despite having a legitimate mandate to “govern,” the UP Page 7 of 20

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chairmen are unable to assert their authority because they have to almost fully rely on resources or block grants under the Annual Development Plan (ADP) sanctioned from the central government, which often comes late and is far too inadequate to address disaster vulnerability of the local communities (Verulam 2002). However, in some UP’s where the chairman is in “good power relation,” can wield more financial support and sanctions from above (not necessarily from the electorate), for his constituency. But sometimes success through this informal and rather partisan ways of dealings outside the institutionalized procedure often leads to financial corruption and jealousy and rivalry among the local administration (UZ), resulting in tacit noncooperation (Taher 2003).

Lack of Political Will and Vested Interest of the Stakeholders

Disaster-prone Bangladesh and sufferings of the affected communities bring financial gains, job opportunities, fame, and wealth for a large number of people from different strata of society from home and abroad. These people have their own interests gained through a wide variety of involvements in the process of climate change impact and adaptation. Processes of policymaking, program formulation, research, consultancy, preparation of action plan, international collaboration with donors and aid agencies, project implementation, and so on predominantly involve those who are not “disaster vulnerable.” Therefore, for those with vested interest in climate change impacts, the question of whether the initiatives truly build resilient community by eliminating the underlying factors shaping disaster vulnerability or not is rather less important than continuing with whatever initiatives are there, at any cost. Given this national and international network of vested interest surrounding climate change issues, it is difficult to make any paradigm shift in the possessive and defensive mind-set of the concerned policymakers, power elites, and other stakeholders about what makes people vulnerable to natural hazards. Rather the existing hazard-centered mind-set gives them indemnity of the denial of their social responsibility to the grassroots people who are the victims of the unequal social system and power relations. Given this lack of political will, it is hard to challenge the structure of interests in favor of reducing vulnerability of the poor. The interests that must be influenced in order to reduce disaster vulnerability are the powerful elites and political parties with wealth and power over issues such as decentralization of power and bottom-up democratic governance. Only those with high levels of commitment – and power themselves – could consider such a risky venture.

The Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009: A Critical Review Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009 (MOEF 2009) is the most recent and important climate change policy. It is in fact a revised version of the BCCSAP 2008 and has been prepared by the current government as a part of the overall development strategy of the country. Climate change constraints and opportunities are being integrated into the overall plan and programs involving all the sectors and processes for economic and social development. The policy is divided into two parts, comprised of six sections and an annex. In five sections part one includes the context, outlines the implications and likely impacts of climate change, and provides an overview of different adaptation strategies and mitigation measures. It outlines six pillars or broad areas of strategic intervention. Part two is comprised of section six and an annex provides the strategy with a 10-year action plan based on six pillars. A set of 44 programs under the action plan is outlined in the annex.

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Conceptual Focus: Disaster Vulnerability in BCCSAP 2009 Understanding the notion of disaster vulnerability as a conceptual basis is crucial for climate change policy formulation. The strategy has a hazard-centered conceptual focus and deals with climate change issues from a centralized technocratic approach. Lack of conceptualization of the meaning and causation of disaster vulnerability is evident in different components of the policy statements. For example, in the introduction, it states – “Given the specific nature, however, of the problem of climate change particularly those related to future bio-physical and natural processes which are yet uncertain and the intimate link of the relevant national actions with international negotiations for emission control as well as their financing and technological support by and from the developed countries, for continuous monitoring of processes and events (natural, scientific, and negotiations) the Action Plan needs to be coordinated by a body such as a Climate Change Unit specifically created for the purpose by the ministry of Environment and Forests” (MOEF 2009, p. 3). The statement reveals that the policy conceives climate change primarily as a biophysical and natural problem, subject to technological solutions. There is no definition of disaster vulnerability, neither any explanation of the underlying factors, causes, or dynamic processes that shape vulnerability throughout the document. It mentions the term vulnerability at several sections merely as a general word that refers to its literal meanings such as susceptibility, weakness, defenselessness, helplessness, exposure, etc. Table 1 shows specific examples of indiscriminate use of the term vulnerability throughout the document.

Climate Change Context in BCCSAP 2009 The background discussion on the core socioeconomic reality provided in the document sheds light on the need for accelerated development through poverty eradication. The strategy is underpinned by the conception that accelerated development is the most effective way to eradicate poverty and build resilience to climate change. It conceives the poverty issue from a traditional economic development perspective and considers poverty as a development problem of a particular socioeconomic group of people living in a particular area (disaster prone). Core issues, such as what makes some people poorer while others richer?, is poverty the result of development or lack of development?, what are the causes of poverty?, and are the poverty issues local or global?, are addressed inadequately in the background section of the strategy. Addressing these issues is important to understand how natural hazards turn into disasters for a particular group of people and what makes some people vulnerable to disaster, others not, within the given socioeconomic and political systems. Thus, the document lacks focus on the structural dynamics and political economy of poverty and development in the context of Bangladesh. The strategy outlines the climatic context in terms of “climate hazards in Bangladesh” and “impacts of climate change.” It summarizes the context as “Likely impacts of global warming on Bangladesh and required investment” in Box 8 (MOEF 2009, p. 26). The policy highlights climate change issues in terms of “global warming,” “immediate impact,” “result,” and “investment needed” (MOEF 2009, p. 26). It suggests adaptation and mitigation measures in terms of “investment needed” and refers to the goal in terms of “social protection for the vulnerable/community-based adaptation” (Table 2). The strategy looks into the climate change impacts and effects from a hazard-centered approach, which emphasizes the geophysical impacts and consequent physical effects, damages, and loss of assets and property caused by natural environmental phenomena and hazards. It does not mention anything about how, when, and why natural hazards turn into disasters for a particular group of people. It does not address the structural factors, i.e., the social, economic, and political aspects of vulnerability. As shown in Table 2, this hazard-centric approach is explicitly reflected in the suggested adaptation and Page 9 of 20

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Table 1 Use of the term vulnerability in BCCSAP 2009 Sections and page no. Message, p-xi

Use of the term vulnerability We are most vulnerable to climate change, and consequently adaptation is our priority Preface, p-xv Poverty eradication and increased well-being of all vulnerable groups in the society with special emphasis on gender sensitivity Summery, p-xvii Bangladesh is one of the most climate vulnerable countries in the world and will become even more so as a result of climate change Summery, p-xvii Pillar one – food security, social protection, and health: food security, social protection, and health to ensure that the poorest and the most vulnerable in society, including women and children, are protected from climate change and that all programs focus on the needs of these groups for food security, safe housing, employment, and access to basic services, including health Summery, p-xviii Pillar six – capacity building and institutional strengthening: the needs of the poor and vulnerable, including women and children, will be prioritized in all activities implemented under the action plan Context, p-2 The challenges now facing the country are to scale up its preparedness and resilience and protect the lives and livelihoods of the people, especially the poorest and the most vulnerable families, including women and children Climate hazards Flood: during severe floods it is the poorest and most vulnerable suffer most because their houses are often in in Bangladesh, more exposed locations p-8 High incidence of poverty and heavy reliance of poor Adapting to climate change, people on agriculture and natural resources increase their vulnerability to climate change p-18

Varied terminology Vulnerable Vulnerable groups

Climate vulnerable countries

The poorest and the most vulnerable in society, including women and children

Poor and vulnerable

Vulnerable families

The poorest and most vulnerable

Vulnerability to climate change

Source: Extracted from MOEF (2009)

mitigation measures which are mostly top-down and technocratic intervention by nature. However, the strategy mentioned about “social protection for the vulnerable,” but it does not provide any definition or elaboration of attributes of social protection or vulnerability.

Policy Objectives and Strategic Focus Adaptation to climate change is the major strategic focus of BCCSAP 2009. The thrust of the strategy is on sustainable development, poverty eradication, and increased well-being of all vulnerable groups in society with special emphasis on gender sensitivity. Drawing on the principles of sustainable development, the strategy suggested activities in all four building blocks of the Bali Action Plan – adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer, and adequate and timely flow of funds. The main objectives of the strategy are (1) to increase the country’s resilience to climate change, (2) to reduce and/or eliminate the risks climate change poses to national development, and (3) to rapidly develop the country following a low-carbon growth path. In general, the strategic focus is broadly pro-poor and responsive to the notion disaster vulnerability. In a consistent manner, the first and second objectives are about resilience and risk reduction with strategic potentially of being a people-centered policy. However, as the strategic focus and objectives are translated into the action Page 10 of 20

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Table 2 Climate change impacts, effects, and suggested interventions in BCCSAP 2009 Climate change context Cyclones with increased frequency and severity Heavier more erratic rainfall in the monsoon seasons Lower more erratic rainfall in dry seasons

Resultant impacts Higher storm surges

Melting of Himalayan glaciers Sea level rise

Riverbank erosion

Higher wind speed

Higher river flow

Increased sedimentation in riverbeds

Warmer and more humid Increasing drought and scarcity of weather drinking water Higher river flows in warmer months then reduced flows and increased saline intrusion Submergence of low lying coastal areas

Primary physical effects Damage to natural and built environment Damage to agriculture (crop, livestock, and fisheries) Scarcity of water and shortage of safe drinking water Displacement of people Threat to food security and livelihoods and health Over-topping and breaching of embankments Widespread flooding

Loss of homes and agricultural land into the river Saline water intrusion into rivers and into Drainage congestion groundwater aquifers Increased prevalence of disease and Water logging disease vectors Loss of fertility of agricultural land Displacement of settlements

Key adaptation and mitigation measures Cyclone shelters Forestation

Polders

Embankments Raised roads and railways Water management

Flood proofing

Improved crops and cropping system Possible industrial relocation Early warning system Health, education, and awareness building Communications

Source: Extracted from MOEF (2009, pp. 14, 18, 26)

plan in terms of mitigation measures and detailed programs, it confirms the hazard-centered and physical intervention-oriented adaptation strategy of the policy as discussed in the next sections.

The Action Plan The strategy outlines an action plan based on six thematic strategic focus or six pillars: (1) food security and social protection, (2) comprehensive disaster management, (3) infrastructure, (4) research and knowledge management, (5) low-carbon development, and (6) capacity building and institutional strengthening. The action plan provides a 10-year program to build the capacity and resilience of the country to meet the challenge of climate change over the next 20–25 years. The BCCSAP 2009 mentions six key mitigation measures: (a) cyclone shelter, (b) embankments, (c) afforestation, (d) early warning systems, (e) awareness building, and (f) communications. There are 44 programs outlined under six pillars that include the first set of activities which are to be undertaken for adaptation in line with the needs of the communities and the overall development program of Bangladesh. Page 11 of 20

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Fig. 2 Strategic framework of BCCSAP 2009 (Source: Diagrammatic interpretation by the authors based on the first five sections of MOEF 2009)

Owing to the technocratic approach to climate change issues, except the first and the sixth pillars, all the other four pillars reveal top-down macroscale strategies. The thematic strategies hardly outline any bottom-up and people-centered strategic words. The strategies are devoid of significance of the age-old local knowledge and coping strategies and social capacity of the grassroots households or community (Fig. 2). Most of the adaptation and mitigation measures are physical, immediate effect-centered, short to medium term, and to be achieved through external intervention rather than community-based actions (Table 2). The programs (P) detailed under the six thematic strategies (T) reflect the technocratic nature of the action plan. Except few exceptions, in general, the programs are prescriptive, top-down, and meant more for the government, private, NGOs, and other stakeholders, less for the grassroots community people. The community people are treated as passive actors and left at the receiving end of the program, while other stakeholders are treated as the active players in preparation, implementation, and monitoring of the action plan. Table 3 reveals examples of some programs and actions detailed under the action plan. Comments are included against the programs in support of this argument.

Institutional Environment It is argued in BCCSAP 2009 that the strategy and action plan were developed through a participatory process involving relevant ministries and agencies, civil society, research organizations, the academia, and business community. However, since the preparation, consultation, and formulation of the strategy, there was no real participation of the grassroots community. The consultations were limited to experts, government officials, selected local government representatives, NGOs, and other stakeholders that hardly allowed for grassroots community participation; reflections of their voice; alternative proposals and strategies for adaptation; or community-based policy preparation.

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Table 3 Examples of programs designed in a top-down approach Thematic ID strategy T1P7 Food security, social protection, and health T3P1 Infrastructure T3P3 Infrastructure

T3P6 Infrastructure

T4P1 Research and knowledge management T4P4 Research and knowledge management

T6P3 Capacity building and institutional strengthening

Program Water and sanitation program for climate vulnerable areas

Example of action Investment for additional water supply, adopt deep-set groundwater technology

Authors’ comments Community and householdbased rainwater harvesting is an important local adaptation strategy already in place which needs to be explored Repair and maintenance of Continuing flood protection by Should rethink continuing existing flood embankments embankments construction of embankments and polders for flood control, as Repair and maintenance of Repair and construct polders existing coastal polders based on higher sea level and it is detrimental for the natural environmental system. Coastal storm surge Adaptation against future Construct new polders, cyclone polders are historic strategic mistake done by the then cyclones and storm surge shelters decision makers in the 1950s, which was a technocratic military solution hostile to the natural environmental system. These types of engineering solutions in coastal belts have already altered the natural deltaic land-water system of coast, resulting in higher riverbed and water logging in lower inland. Should consider alternative land use and spatial planning, and planned resettlement Does not include capacity Establishment of center for To increase institutional and human capacity of concerned building of local community, research, knowledge households, and communitymanagement, and training professionals, government based organizations officials on climate change Does not include research and Set up monitoring system, Monitoring of ecosystem monitoring of cultural and report, and recommend and biodiversity changes behavioral changes and their and their impacts adaptation measures impacts on the social systems, which are crucial for building resilient community Strengthening human Enhance capacity of key staff of Does not include enhancement resource capacity government, private sector of local institutions, people, and community-based organizations, ad NGOs for organization’s capacity accessing international and national carbon and climate change funds

Source: Extracted from the Annex of BCCSAP (2009), MOEF (2009, pp. 39–73)

The institutional setup of the strategy suggests that the action plan will be implemented under the guidance of the National Environment Committee, chaired by the prime minister, and will be coordinated by the Minister of Ministry of Environment and Forests (Fig. 3). The institutional setup reveals a top-down, centralized, rigid environment dominated by the ministers and government officials. It does not elaborate how the high-profile national committees, particularly the Page 13 of 20

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Fig. 3 Institutional setup of climate change action plan (Source: MOEF 2009, p. 30)

“climate change focal point” at different ministries, will delegate administrative power and coordinate with the local government. The policy does not mention any reform for the existing institutional environment, which is not very efficient in dealing with climate change adaptation and mitigation initiatives. Regarding the local level governance, it does not suggest any effective institutional mechanisms for horizontal coordination to deal with inter-sectoral issues across different sectors. This is particularly important for the management of inter-sectoral policy and action plans. There exists an environmental committee at divisional level chaired by the commissioner with representation from different government agencies at division level. However, the committees for the most part are nonfunctional and no such committees exist at lower administrative levels. The suggested institutional setup thus is the reiteration of the existing nondemocratic and bureaucratic governance system. Therefore, risk remains that the same political economy might hinder successful implementation of the policy.

Integrating Disaster Vulnerability in Policy Context: A Conceptual Framework Climate change is not only an environmental concern but also a development concern for Bangladesh (Parvin and Mostafa 2012). This means that climate change as an issue must come out of the environmental problem to take a center stage as a major development problem created by the unjust structural systems. This requires a paradigm shift in the policy context that would support structural reform with the strategic vision to eradicate social vulnerability of people. However, this type of fundamental shift in policy meets serious resistance from the power elites, policymakers and bureaucrats, and numerous beneficiaries of the prevailing systems. Nonetheless, that resistance is not stronger than the threats of climate change which must have to be addressed not by individual power and wealth but by communal spirit and capacity. With this hypothesis, the study suggests an alternative conceptual framework for the integration of social vulnerability approach in the climate change policy context of Bangladesh (Fig. 4). Page 14 of 20

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Fig. 4 Conceptual framework for the integration of social vulnerability approach in the climate change policy context of Bangladesh

Outline of the Conceptual Framework • Policy Context The policy should understand the climate change context not merely from a hazard-centered perspective but as a result of dynamic interrelationship among the social, economic, and environmental systems. • Policy Objectives The policy objectives should focus more on pro-poor community-driven climate-resilient development targets in place of traditional economic growth-laden development. • Approach to Climate Change Climate change issues should be conceived from a people-centered participatory approach instead of technocratic approach. • Conceptual Focus The policy environment should be underpinned by the conceptualization of the notion of climate change impacts and adaptation from structural perspective instead of hazard-centered perspective.

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• Strategic Focus The strategic focus should be on “climate change adaptation through eradication of social vulnerability and reduction of structural inequality that results in disaster risks.” • Thematic Strategies The policy should be based on following seven thematic strategies as seven pillars of climate change adaptation plan: 1. Social-ecological justice – strategies to eradicate the root causes of vulnerability through necessary reform in the social systems such as equal access to assets, infrastructure, and ecological services; re-distribution of safer land; and ensuring food, health, education, and income security 2. Economic parity – strategies to ensure equal distribution of wealth, diversified livelihood opportunities, and equal access to productive sectoral resources 3. Environmental justice – strategies to ensure environmental protection and biodiversity, prevention of environmental degradation, mitigation of global warming, and environmentally friendly development 4. Local capacity – strategies to research and build on the indigenous knowledge and local adaptation practices and strengthening community capacity learning from their inherent strengths of living with disasters 5. Planned resettlement – strategies to support gradual migration of people living in disasterprone areas, planned evacuation of settlements from ecologically fragile areas, and long-term guided development of potential destinations (at national, regional, and international level) for the climate-induced migrants 6. Decentralization of political and institutional power – strategies for the development of local government institutions with the objectives of “devolution” and “deconcentration” of decision-making power and creating a community-based enabling institutional environment 7. Comprehensive climate change management – strategies for short-, medium-, and long-term management of climate change impacts; hazard-research, knowledge, and information management; and ensuring sufficient fund raising and management • Institutional Environment The institutional structure should be people centered, democratic, and participatory. The governance should be by the people, of the people, and for the people. In place of vertical top-down administration, there should be horizontal, community-based, bottom-up administration where the government’s role should be of coordinator, facilitator, and fund provider.

Conclusion In the backdrop of a social system characterized by a high level of inequality, poverty, and deprivation, climate change is only one aspect of the social vulnerability of grassroots people in Bangladesh. Impacts of climate change therefore adversely affect the capability of the poor and disadvantaged to reduce their vulnerabilities. This implies that any responses to reduce disaster risks should start off with a clear recognition of social vulnerability at every stage of adaptation process. Bangladesh government is fully committed to manage climate change with a vision to eradicate poverty and achieve economic and social well-being for all the people. This will be achieved through a pro-poor climate change strategy, which prioritizes adaptation and disaster risk reduction and also addresses low-carbon development, mitigation, technology transfer, and the mobilization and international provision of adequate finance (MOEF 2009). Notwithstanding the resource Page 16 of 20

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constraints, Bangladesh has already developed state-of-the-art warning system and has taken the lead among the LDCs in climate change response in terms of policy initiatives, research, program design, and implementation of adaptation strategies, and this work is continuing. However, Bangladesh is yet to develop context-responsive comprehensive policies that will guide climate change adaptation as an indispensible part of development process in an integrated manner. The critical review of the policy context reveals that existing climate change policies lack in conceptualization of disaster vulnerability as a social phenomenon and, therefore, do not address the structural dynamics of disaster vulnerability adequately. In a country like Bangladesh, where lack-of-development led problems are persistent, there is an urgent need to reform the unequal structural systems through a paradigm shift in the policy context. Climate change impacts in this regard offer an opportunity to formulate policies and adaptation strategies in such a manner that would enable the country to develop resilience not only to climate change but also to poverty and social inequality.

References Adger N, Kelly M (1999) Social vulnerability to climate change and the architecture of entitlements. Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Chang 4:253–266 Alam M (2004) Adverse impacts of climate change on development of Bangladesh: integrating adaptation into policies and activities. CLACC working paper no. 1. Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS), Dhaka Alam M, Murry LA (2005) Facing up to climate change in South Asia, vol 118, IIED gatekeeper series. IIED, London BCAS, BUP (1994) Vulnerability of Bangladesh to climate change and sea level rise. Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS), Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP), Resource Analysis (RA)/Approtech Ltd., with support from The Netherlands Government, Dhaka BCAS, BIDS, BUP (1996) Climate change country study Bangladesh. Climate Change Study Programme US Government. Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS), Bangladesh Institute of Development, Studies (BIDS), Bangladesh Unnayan parishad (BUP), Dhaka BIDS (1994) Country study on Bangladesh under regional study of global environmental issues project on the impact of climate change in Bangladesh, the available options for adaptation and mitigation measure and response strategies. Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Dhaka Blaikie P, Cannon T, Davis I, Wisner B (1994) At risk: natural hazards, people’s vulnerability, and disasters. Routledge, London Cannon T (1994) Vulnerability analysis and the explanation of “natural” disaster. Wiley, Chichester/ New York/Brisbane/Toronto/Singapore CCC (2007) Climate change and Bangladesh. Department of Environment, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka Chambers R (1989) Vulnerability, coping, and policy. IDS Bulletin. Institute of Development Studies, Sussex GOB (1998) The fifth five year plan 1997–2002. Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka GOB (2003) A national strategy for economic growth social development and poverty reduction. Economic Relations Division, Ministry of Finance, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka

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GOB (2012) The sixth five year plan FY2011-FY2015: accelerating growth and reducing poverty, part 1, strategic directions and policy framework. Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka Hewitt K (1983) The idea of calamity in a technocratic age. In: Hewitt K (ed) Interpretations of calamity from the viewpoint of human ecology. Allen and Unwin, London/Sydney Hilhorst D (2004) Complexity and diversity: unlocking social domains of disaster response. In: Bankoff G (ed) Mapping vulnerability: disasters, development, and people. Earthscan, London/ Sterling Hilhorst D, Bankoff G (2004) Introduction: mapping vulnerability. In: Bankoff G (ed) Mapping vulnerability: disasters, development, and people. Earthscan, London/Sterling Lewis J (1999) Development in disaster-prone places: studies of vulnerability. Intermediate Technology Publications, London Mahtab F (1989) Effect of climate change and sea level rise on Bangladesh. Commonwealth Institute, London Mileti D (1999) Disasters by design: a reassessment of natural hazards in the United States. Joseph Henry Press, Washington, DC MOEF (1995) National environment management action plan (NEMAP). Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka MOEF (2005) National adaptation program of action 2005. Department of Environment, Ministry of Environment and Forest (MOEF), Government of Bangladesh, Dhaka MOEF (2009) Bangladesh climate change strategy and action plan 2009. Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka Nicola B, Manoj R, David H (2011) Neglecting the urban poor in Bangladesh: research, policy and action in the context of climate change. Environ Urban 23:487–502 Oliver-Smith A (1996) Anthropological research on hazards and disasters. Annu Rev Anthropol 25:303–328 Parvin A, Johnson C (2012) Learning from the indigenous knowledge: towards disaster-resilient coastal settlements in Bangladesh. In: Proceedings of the 1st international conference on urban sustainability and resilience, University College London, 5–6 Nov 2012 Parvin A, Mostafa A (2012) Re-thinking disaster-prone vernacular settlement: a comprehensive strategic planning towards disaster-adaptive settlements in Bangladesh. In: Proceedings of the 5th international seminar on vernacular settlements (ISVS 5), Colombo, 30–31 July 2010 Sen A (1981) Poverty and famine: an essay on entitlement and deprivation. Clarendon, Oxford Shackley S et al (1996) Imaging complexity: the past, present, and future of complex thinking. Futures 28:201–225 Siddiqui K (2000) Local governance in Bangladesh: leading issues and major challenges. UPL, Dhaka Smith DI, Schreider S, Jakeman AJ, Zerger A, Bates BC, Charles SP (1999) Urban flooding: greenhouse-induced impacts, methodology and case studies, Resource and environmental studies. The Australian National University, Canberra Susman P et al (1983) Global disasters: a radical interpretation. In: Hewitt K (ed) Interpretations of calamity from the viewpoint of human ecology. Allen and Unwin, London/Sydney Taher M (2003) Review of local institutional environment in the coastal areas of Bangladesh. Working paper (WP018). Program Development Office for Integrated Coastal Zone Management Plan (PDO-ICZMP), Dhaka VERULAM (2002) Inception report for the design of the proposed facilitating poverty reduction through local governance project. Verulam Associates Ltd., Dhaka Page 18 of 20

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WB (2012) Turn down the heat: why a 4  C warmer world must be avoided. A Report for the World Bank by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, Washington, DC Winchester P (1992) Power, choice and vulnerability: a case study in disaster mismanagement in South India, 1977–1988. James and James Science, London Wisner B (1993) Disaster vulnerability: scale, power, and daily life. GeoJournal 30:127–140 Wisner B, Blaiki P, Cannon T, Davis I (2003) At risk: natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters. Routledge, London

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Index Terms: Climate change 2–10, 14–16 Disaster 1 Policy 1 Political economy 4 Vulnerability 1

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Pricing Innovation in Climate Change Adaptation (CCA): Hedonic Valuation of R&D That Can Favor CCA Johann Jacob*, Jessica Bouchard, Moktar Lamari and Éva Anstett Centre for Research and Expertise in Evaluation (CREXE), École nationale d’administration publique (National School of Public Administration), University of Quebec, Quebec, Canada

Abstract Ever since climate change became a collective concern, governments have diversified incentives encouraging firms to mitigate climate change by investing in new technology development. However, many decision makers still question their value and wonder what determines climate change adaptation (CCA) at the firm level. This chapter deals with two questions: What makes some firms more committed to CCA than others? To what extent do R&D-active firms invest in new technologies required by CCA? Data were gathered using a 2012–2013 online survey conducted among 255 R&D-active firms in Canada (Quebec). Our dependent variable measures firm investment in technology acquisition, and independent variables are related to firms’ CCA effort and to their context. Our results suggest that CCA-active firms are (i) highly innovative, (ii) intensive in R&D, (iii) investors in physical capital, and (iv) open to external knowledge. The model developed suggests that firms invest, on average, $5,358 a year to acquire new technologies related to climate change adaptation for each level of impact on CCA (10 levels used in our research). Our results are groundbreaking in terms of pricing the specific R&D impacts on CCA at the firm level. They indicate that the activities of research centers like technology transfer organizations make a difference in terms of CCA, especially to enable actions in the private sector. Our findings also help the public sector to improve its actions targeting CCA (e.g., tax credit or grants for firms acting in CCA).

Keywords Climate change adaptation; Public-private R&D collaborations; Technology transfer organizations; Cost-benefit analysis

Introduction Existing productive processes used by industries and firms have major and increasing impacts on climate change. On this subject, the works of Stern (2006) are eloquent, if not alarming. In their pursuit of productivity and optimization of profits, firms generate negative externalities on several fronts (i.e., some results affecting not only the firm but some other parts of the society): air pollution, fumes from harmful waste, overexploitation of fossil fuel resources, greenhouse gas emissions, etc. and the ensuing consequences for climate change (Zarka 2010). At the same time, to assist firms in innovating and adopting technologies that pollute less and are more adapted to the risks of climate

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_27-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

change, several government policies and measures have been implemented, particularly in the last decade, to assist and encourage firms in reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable, namely, the requirements of profitability versus the requirements of climate change adaptation (Gupta et al. 2007; Bra€ uninger et al. 2011). In Canada, these efforts have notably expanded in the last 6 years through, for instance, public subsidies that were given to some research centers: technology transfer organizations (TTOs). These organizations (which are research centers specially created to help transfer knowledge from universities and scientific literature to firms) aim to help firms which are seeking to innovate to reconcile their performance objectives with those of adapting to climate change. More generally, these organizations create, acquire, adapt, and transfer new technologies for firms wanting to innovate and improve their competitiveness, not only in local markets but also internationally. All evidence suggests that an apparent evolution is taking place, pressuring firms to consider the effects of global warming and invest in “green” technologies that are more adapted to the specificities of their local environment. Everything seems to indicate that these firms are part of a movement favoring the global environment, like an ecosystem transcending time, space, and the wealth of nations (Gupta 2005). The complexity of climate change phenomena requires expertise and technologies that firms cannot always acquire alone without any public assistance (Osberghaus et al. 2010). The issues raised by climate change require resilience and a proactive approach that take into account intra- and intergenerational interests, in keeping with the aspirations of the Brundtland Report on sustainable development of the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987, taken up again by the United Nations at the Rio Conference 5 years later (Zarka 2010). Public funding of research and development aims at correcting certain market failures related to innovation by encouraging private-sector actors to produce technological innovations enabling the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions or by providing adaptation options. At the same time, recent years have witnessed the appearance of many writings on the relationships linking the necessity of climate change mitigation and the progressive commitments of firms to invest in the acquisition of new technologies that can help them do better in their markets but with productive procedures and processes that are less prejudicial to climate change (Howarth 2003). However, these writings do not help to understand why only some firms invest in the acquisition of new technologies that are compatible with concern for climate change mitigation and CCA. They remain dominated by descriptive and reflective analyses (Paehlke 2014). Not much is yet known about these attributes and, quantitatively, even less about the net economic value attributed by firms to the beneficial spinoffs of climate change adaptation within firms. To our knowledge, no study has valuated the use of grants as a mechanism for stimulating technology transfer in CCA specifically (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014a). The investigations presented in this text advance knowledge by offering empirical evidence concerning the behavior of firms receiving support from TTOs in the area of CCA. In concrete terms, this chapter highlights the determinants that influence certain firms to be more committed than others to climate change adaptation thanks to their effort to acquire new technologies required in CCA. This chapter provides answers to two key questions within the Canadian context. The first question deals with the principal attributes characterizing firms that collaborate with TTOs with regard to climate change adaptation. The second question deals with the economic value of the demands of climate change adaptation according to these R&D-intensive firms. The remainder of the text has been divided into four parts. The first part puts into perspective the conceptual and theoretical issues linked to the challenges of climate change within the context of industrial activities, in general, and of firms, in particular. The second part presents the empirical approach and data used to respond to the questions asked. The third part deals with the results and Page 2 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_27-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

interprets their scope and implication for public policies targeting climate change adaptation in the context of firms and industrial activities. The conclusion takes stock of the results and introduces perspectives for action, not only for the public decision makers concerned but also for future empirical research dealing with the same subject.

Theoretical Background The issue of climate change encompasses several aspects that have raised controversy and differences of opinion in scientific writings. These differences can be explained in large part because the evidences produced cannot be compared regarding the validity of the estimates and hypothesis presented. The estimated costs associated with respect to reducing greenhouse gases are an example, and the economic forecasts concerning the possible expected damages also differ, if the present emission rates are maintained. The recognition of climate change as a significant global challenge originated in the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. Since then, global negotiations on this issue have tended to emphasize minimizing the costs related to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The preservation of ecosystems and the population’s adaptation to these changes have been dealt with less (Gupta 2005). Obviously, all societies are affected by climate change and must face the issue of mitigating its effects and adapting to it. In recent years, the World Bank and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have published reports exposing the urgency for all states to establish strategies to control climate change. Whereas climate change mitigation programs have tended to have a global focus, adaptation programs have had a regional or local dimension. The IPCC defines adaptation to climate change as an “adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities. Various types of adaptation can be distinguished, including anticipatory, autonomous and planned adaptation” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014a). Climate change mitigation is stated as “an anthropogenic intervention to reduce pressure on the climate system.” It includes strategies to reduce the sources and emissions of greenhouse gases and enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014a). Unquestionably, the strategies implemented to respond to the requirements of climate change involve costs and benefits that are distributed asymmetrically through time and generations. The extent of future greenhouse gas emissions depends on the paths of economic, demographic, technological, and energy development of each nation (Pielke 2007; Hallegate et al. 2011). These parameters are therefore complex and linked to the uniqueness of states and regions. In addition, significant uncertainties surround the estimated long-term impacts of climate instability (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2013) that are, in turn, subject to uncertainty regarding the future paths of socioeconomic development, climate policies to be implemented in the future (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2013), and the response and adaptation of ecosystems (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014b). For example, based on a literature review, the IPCC estimated that the present level of greenhouse gas emissions could cost about 1.5–2 % of the global economic output, with greater impact on developing countries. However, a consensus about these estimates does not exist in the literature, and they differ according to the disciplines and researchers (Howarth 2003). Stern (2006) estimates that these costs would be in the order of 5–20 % in terms of GDP per state. The most recent estimates from the World Bank place climate change adaptation costs at between $70 billion and more than $100 billion annually by 2050 (World Bank 2010). Page 3 of 14

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Climate change has undeniable economic impacts. From an economic standpoint, political entities and socioeconomic organizations combine their climate change efforts by introducing programs that are in the interests of their population. Climate change is indivisible and cannot be measured with precision. This leads firms to adjust their efforts between adaptation and mitigation measures (Maybee et al. 2012). Nevertheless, there is a consensus surrounding the adaptation measures taken during the last century that turned out to be insufficient. Autonomous actions can be undertaken by the civil society, in particular, but also by private enterprise. In this sense, private actors are expected to take autonomous adaptation measures based on their interests and whose anticipated benefits will be greater than the costs (Maybee et al. 2012). Nonetheless, several experts highlight the fact that autonomous adaptation initiatives can fail for several reasons, in particular, because the agents affected by climate change do not always have the capacities, resources, and other factors necessary to undertake such measures. Moreover, many of these actions cost more than the estimated benefits (Eisenack 2013; Hughes and Chaudhry 2011). Finally, in certain cases, the adoption of a socially desirable behavior (specifically an adaptation action) does not appear to be profitable to a private agent, constituting market weakness situations. For example, negative externalities may result from the adaptation actions taken by certain agents leading to even more harm to third parties (Goulden et al. 2009). As well, a moral hazard situation occurs when a climatic risk is transferred to the population, in particular, through an insurance mechanism or through post-disaster aid offered by the state (Laffont 1995). Within this framework, some states and international government organizations have recognized the necessity to manage this question and to develop public policies of adaptation and reduction of the effects of climate change. Governments are mainly concerned with formulating adaptation policies and strategies for climate change, as well as developing a governance structure to ensure their implementation. As this policy development process is relatively recent, studies have looked into climate change adaptation measures by setting out their limitations. They have dealt with government failures, in particular, the lack of political and conscientious leadership with regard to needs, as well as the weak financial resources available for these initiatives. In addition, there is the presence of a lack of political commitment, inadequate interstate cooperation, an insufficient level of government expertise (Clar et al. 2013), and limited adaptation capacities, especially in developing countries or in countries with limited access to capital (Brooks et al. 2005). Also, decision makers can occasionally set barriers through their cognitive and behavioral biases (Podsakoff et al. 1990). The literature includes a large number of studies analyzing policies and interstate cooperation with regard to climate change, but only a minority take an interest in non-state actors and their climate change adaptation and mitigation initiatives. Even so, recent research in this area has permitted to illustrate the importance of accompanying national and supranational CCA measures with additional policies, enabling the mobilization of other actors, such as firms, business associations, and local organizations (Hamit-Haggar 2012; Craft et al. 2013). Burch et al. (2013) examined this question and brought to light the importance of governments resorting to innovative approaches to encourage industry and private enterprise to take action in this area. By studying Canadian firms involved in R&D having a positive impact on climate change adaptation, they advanced the idea that firms assume an innovative, creative, and dynamic character (Burch et al. 2013, p. 822). They also emphasize that the issue of climate change must be handled by different governance levels; measures must be implemented at the local, regional, national, and international levels. Several governance experts acknowledge that the rigid, centralized state method cannot respond to all public-policy issues, and the climate change question requires a multi-sectoral, multilevel Page 4 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_27-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

governance model (Burch et al. 2013, p. 822). This allows actors involved in R&D and CCA to increase their ability to act and make their initiatives more effective while, at the same time, fostering the horizontal and vertical transfer of technologies, knowledge, and information among them (De Coninck et al. 2008). There is also a consensus that initiatives in the fight against global and national climate change must be accompanied by local action (Craft et al. 2013). As stated above, this issue has major economic impacts that are already being felt. To limit the negative externalities of climate change adaptation and mitigation, measures must be taken to limit the damage and ensure longer-term economic growth. So, it is essential that governments take into account that effective parallel mitigation factors must also be implemented in order to enable climate change adaptation (Paehlke 2014). In the Canadian context, climate change adaptation and mitigation have followed a tortuous path. A clear example is the Canadian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the subsequent withdrawal of approval. In 2007, the Canadian federal government acknowledged that meeting the objectives set by Kyoto would be unachievable and introduced new greenhouse gas reduction targets in a document entitled Turning the Corner. This new policy involves reducing GHG emissions by 20 % by the year 2020, based on 2006 levels (Hughes and Chaudhry 2011). Industry also has a role to play in this issue. In 2007, the industrial sector was responsible for 32 % of GHG emissions in Canada (Hamit-Haggar 2012). Overall, GHG emissions increased by 16.9 % in Canada between 1990 and 2009, representing 22.9 % over its commitments made within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. In 2011 and 2012, Canada formally withdrew from Kyoto and drastically reduced the size of its environment ministry. The significance of these developments is that they increase the importance of developing innovative local actions and the development of networks devoted to the strategic sharing of information permitting state and private actors working for climate change mitigation and adaptation to work together (Burch et al. 2013). Thus, Canadian federal and provincial governments resort to a system of governance that is more and more widespread in industrialized countries with regard to climate change. It involves a partnership between the public and private sectors, including the participation of several actors: government agencies and organizations and large, small, and medium-sized businesses. In this chapter, we are targeting this type of partnership between firms and technology transfer organizations (TTOs) that are funded in part by the federal and Quebec governments. Technology transfer organizations are defined as entities acting as catalysts between government and academic research teams, on one hand, and industries, on the other (Grosse 1996, p. 782). Technology transfer is defined as “the process of transferring skills, knowledge, technologies, methods of manufacturing, samples of manufacturing and facilities among governments or universities and other institutions to ensure that scientific and technological developments are accessible to a wider range of users who can then further develop and exploit the technology into new products, processes, applications, materials, or services. It is closely related to knowledge transfer. Horizontal Transfer is the movement of technologies from one area to another. Vertical Transfer is when technologies are moved from applied research centers to research and development departments” (Grosse 1996, p. 782). The TTOs have the characteristic of assisting firms in R&D and in adopting technologies that are more adapted to the risks of climate change. Their large network is made up of public administrations but, even more so, of small- and medium-sized private-sector firms. There is evidence in the literature suggesting that, despite their size and limited resources, small and medium-sized businesses are able to have significant positive impact on climate change adaptation and mitigation. This can be explained by the fact that, compared to large firms, smaller firms have a closer relationship Page 5 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_27-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

with their community and their workers and are less subject to pressure from shareholders to maximize profits (Burch et al. 2013, p. 826). In addition, by taking into account the fact that a multi-sectoral, multilevel governance favors the development of climate change adaptation measures, TTOs can play a key role in capitalizing the strengths of the actors in their climate change adaptation efforts, while maximizing their innovation potential and establishing channels of communication among these firms. Furthermore, to respond to the uncertainty surrounding the question of climate change, several economists and economic actors tackle the problem in terms of cost-benefit analysis (Maddison 1995; Tebaldi et al. 2005). Such an approach evokes the rationality of the economic optimization of dividends anticipated by the actors. This approach consists in taking into account the costs and benefits that would result from a project, in discounting them, then in calculating the real net value. The cost-benefit analysis thus permits to demonstrate the practical implications of a decision from a welfare standpoint (Townley 1998). The cost-benefit method is also thoroughly documented in the literature on R&D. It has been retained for this analysis. In cost-benefit analysis, the choice of the discount rate has a significant impact on the net present value and is the subject of debate in the literature. The cost-benefit analysis applied to climate change is linked to this debate since it is spread over a long time horizon (Baum 2009; Heal 2009). As a result, choosing a higher discount rate will tend to dissuade taking mitigation measures because the related costs will be higher than the expected benefits to be reaped further along in the future. Conversely, choosing a lower discount rate will permit attributing a higher value on anticipated future benefits and thus gives more importance to decision making to control climate change (Hof et al. 2010). In addition, as this type of analysis focuses on impacts affecting several generations, ethical and moral questions come into play in choosing the discount rate (Stern 2006). It emerges that there is no consensus among experts with respect to this question. In the latest report of the IPCC, it is stated that the rates used vary between 0.1 % and 2.5 % for CCA projects (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014a). The Stern Report (2006) exposed the seriousness of the harm to the global economy as a result of climate change, a negative externality whose extent should increase in the future. Nonetheless, this report was the subject of criticism since the discount rate used by the author was 0.1 % which, according to some, resulted in an overestimation of the future impacts linked to climate change and an underestimation of the extent of the costs to be assumed to contain their effects (Dietz et al. 2007). And so, the principal reason why climate change damage estimates in the Stern Report are high is the low discount rate. Furthermore, to include all impacts in the cost-benefit analysis, economists have developed methods to assign a monetary value to intangible impacts. In fact, certain impacts to be considered in public projects are not exchanged on the market and do not have an assigned monetary value. To assign a value to this type of impact, innovative methods have been developed for this purpose. The most widespread are contingent valuation and hedonic prices.

Method This analysis was conducted by the Centre de recherche et d’expertise en e´valuation (CREXE) within the framework of a mandate for the Ministère de l’Économie, des Innovations et des Exportations du Que´bec, Canada. This mandate consisted in carrying out a cost-benefit analysis involving the study of 41 technology transfer organizations (TTOs), three of which are independent and 38 of which are members of a vast regional network. These organizations offer innovation services for local firms, specifically small- and medium-sized businesses, in the province. Their Page 6 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_27-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

research activities are focused on applied and adapted research for direct use by their partners of the private sector; consequently, TTOs are closely in touch with firms’ needs, whereas other research centers undertake more fundamental or basic research which is not directly applicable for the private sector. This policy is an example of public-sector intervention created to encourage innovation in the private sector in order for the state’s grants to create leverage to increase private investment in R&D. The data presented are from several sources and databases which can be explained because the costs and benefits studied are felt by different actors, including government agencies, firms, and TTOs. The data relating to impacts concerning governments and public organizations are from internal documents, official reports, and directed and semi-directed interviews carried out with representatives of these organizations. The internal data concerning the three Quebec TTOs were gathered from financial documents, annual reports, and strategic plans supplied by the three firms. Two types of surveys were conducted between October 2012 and March 2013 among 1,500 firms and public organizations involved in R&D in Canada (Quebec) and working in collaboration with the TTOs studied. First, a telephone survey was carried out by an external firm, with a response rate of 65 %. Then, an electronic survey was carried out. The data were collected using the Survey Gizmo platform; the average response rate for this survey was 25 %. These two surveys enabled the estimation of costs and benefits, as well as the impacts taken into account in the analysis. The questions were formulated in order to obtain continuous numerical data. For the variables that were more difficult to measure, the questions provided possible responses from 0 to 10 in order to allow respondents to estimate the extent of the impacts studied. The collaboration with the TTO of the firms included in the sample was therefore analyzed to assess whether their collaboration had an impact on investments targeting CCA. The questions asked to respondents within the framework of the surveys focused mainly on assessing the impact of their firm’s collaboration with the TTO: on climate change adaptation, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the environment, and sustainable development. The sample included 255 firms that completed the survey and offered valid responses to the questions. A descriptive statistical analysis was then carried out using all these data with the help of SPSS software. These results are presented in the following section. Moreover, to determine the estimated monetary value of the public expenditures leading to the innovations linked to CCA, the hedonic price method was used, which will be described in the next section. This economic method helps to estimate the value of intangible elements, in our case the value of firms’ actions in CCA. For the purposes of assigning a value to these intangible attributes, correlation and regression analyses were produced with SPSS. The dependent variable of the multivariate regression that is presented in the following section is the total amount of the firm’s contracts with the TTO for 1 year (continuous variable), and the independent variable that interests us is the impact of the firm’s collaboration with the TTO on climate change adaptation (the values vary from 0, if the firm perceives no impact, to 10, if the firm perceives a major impact). Two control variables were then introduced into the model. First, as stated in the literature, R&D-intensive firms are characterized by a large workforce devoted to R&D (Grosse 1996). To cover this aspect, we added the variable of the number of staff members allocated to R&D in the firm (continuous variable). We then added the variable of innovation in terms of organizational processes and marketing activities (the values vary from 0, if the firm perceives no impact, to 1, if the firm perceives a major impact). We also introduced other control variables measuring the duration of collaboration with TTOs (number of years) and technological services (training, technological counseling, testing products, etc.), specified as a binomial variable (1 ¼ yes, 0 ¼ no).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_27-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Characterization of Quebec firms producing impacts on CCA Question : Please estimate the impact of your collaboration with the TTO on CCA (on a scale from 0 to 10, 0 representing no impact and 10, a maximal Impact on CCA impact) >1 (n ¼ 31) n (%) Sector Public services 3/29 (10 %) Primary sector 3/29 (10 %) Secondary sector 13/29 (45 %) Tertiary sector 13/29 (45 %)

Impact on CCA ¼ 0 (n ¼ 224) n (%) 23/204 (11 %) 25/204 (12 %) 86/204 (42 %) 93/204 (46 %)

Results The findings of this study will be presented in four steps. We first present the sample characteristics and the descriptive analysis, then the statistical analysis, the hedonic evaluation, and, finally, an ordinary linear regression (OLR) explaining the determinant of investment in collaboration with TTOs.

Descriptive Analysis

To understand further the main attributes of Quebec firms collaborating with TTOs on R&D related to CCA, a characterization of Quebec firms producing impacts on CCA has been produced. As presented in Table 1, the sample is composed of 255 Quebec firms collaborating with TTOs on R&D. The respondents are divided into two categories: those who perceived an impact of their collaboration with the TTO on CCA and those who did not. 31 respondents perceived impacts of their collaboration on CCA, which represents 12.5 % of this sample. These 31 firms and organizations are involved in the following sectors: public administration (10 %), primary sector (10 %), secondary sector (45 %), and tertiary sector (45 %). In contrast, 224 respondents did not see impacts of their collaboration with the TTO on CCA. This subsample is composed of similar proportions of public administration (11 %) and firms working in the primary (12 %), secondary (42 %), and tertiary sectors (46 %). Table 2 presents other attributes of firms investing in R&D impacting on CCA. These firms employ an average of 1,028 employees, and their mean annual earnings total $173 million. The mean impact of the collaboration with the TTO is estimated at $183,662 by the respondents, and the contract amount with the TTO totals an average of $29,358 annually. In contrast, the respondents who do not see impacts of the collaboration with the TTO on CCA present a lower mean number of employees (596) but higher mean annual earnings ($81.3 M). However, these firms have a mean annual contract amount of $16,676 with the TTO, which is lower compared to the firms perceiving impacts on CCA.

Chi-Squared Test and T-Test

As presented in Table 3, the collaboration between the firms investing in R&D impacting on CCA (n ¼ 31) and the TTO led to investments in internal R&D (71 %), external R&D (70 %), access to tax credit for R&D (70 %), and acquisition of machines, equipment, and software (57 %). Furthermore, this collaboration leads to the acquisition of exterior knowledge (39 %), the hiring of specialized human resources (37 %), and other innovation-related activities. These results are statistically significant at the 5 % level (chi-square lower than 0.05).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_27-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 2 Characterization of firms investing in R&D impacting on CCA Respondents seeing impacts of the collaboration with the TTO on CCA Mean (SD) Median n Number of employees of the firm 1,028 40 23 (3,390) Earnings ($) (annual) $17.3 M $7.9 M 26 ($26.8 M) Profits ($) (annual) $906,577 $191,326 18 ($2.03 M) Estimate of the impact ($) of the collaboration with the TTO $183,662 $50,000 19 ($312,643) Spin-off benefits ($) due to collaboration $100,834 $22,843 22 ($248,510) Contract amount with the TTO (for 1 year) $29,358 $17,500 27 ($70,157)

Respondents not seeing impacts of the collaboration with the TTO on CCA Mean (SD) Median n 596 55 191 (1,814) $81.3 M $8 M 195 ($332.5 M) $3.9 M $391, 143 ($22 M) 000 $215,740 $10,000 127 ($652,189) $355,835 – 177 ($2.6 M) $16,676 $6,644 184 ($31,283)

Table 3 Characterization of the sample (firms and CCA)

Collaboration with the TTO led to investments in Internal R&D in the firm or organization External R&D Acquisition of machines, equipment, and software Acquisition of immovable property Acquisition of other exterior knowledge (except hiring specialized HR) Hiring specialized HR Training Marketing activities Other innovation-related activities Firm is eligible for an R&D tax credit

Firms seeing impacts of their collaboration with the TTO on CCA (n ¼ 31) n (%)

Firms not seeing impacts of their collaboration with the TTO on CCA (n ¼ 224) n (%) Chi sq

20/28 (71 %)

95/209 (45 %)

0.01**

19/27 (70 %) 17/30 (57 %)

55/208 (26 %) 70/209 (33 %)

0.000*** 0.014**

1/28 (4 %)

18/206 (9 %)

0.348

11/28 (39 %)

39/205 (19 %)

0.014**

11/30 (37 %) 14/29 (48 %) 11/28 (39 %) 19/28 (68 %)

33/209 (16 %) 94/209 (45 %) 63/208 (30 %) 96/207 (46 %)

0.006*** 0.738 0.335 0.033**

16/23 (70 %)

98/150 (65 %)

0.690

**p < .05 ***p < .01

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_27-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 4 Ordinary linear regression (OLR) explaining the determinant of investment in collaboration with TTOs Nonstandardized coefficients B SE Constant 76,979.219*** 19,688.503 Innovation 10,573.764 13,199.239 Climate change adaptation (CCA) 5,358.041** 3,637.278 Duration of the collaboration with the TTOs 5,319.612*** 1,210.648 Services received from the TTOs 55,294.401*** 13,135.475 Number of R&D employees (Ln) 8,368.429*** 3,138.098 Number of observations 143 R2 0.294 P-value 0.000 F 9.036

Standardized coefficients Beta 0.065 0.120 0.366 0.346 0.224

t 3.910 0.801 2.173 4.394 4.210 2.667

Sig. 0.000 0.425 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.009

Dependent variable: Total amount of contract with the TTOs **p < .05 ***p < .01

These statistics show that firms that adopt CCA are highly innovative and more R&D-intensive, both internally and externally. Moreover, these companies make investments in capital and are more open to external skills and knowledge. This evidence suggests that TTOs can play an important role in innovation related to CCA. However, there is no statistically significant difference regarding other parameters, such as the number of employees, the annual earnings, and profits. However, the companies that adopt CCA do not necessarily have large earnings but employ a large workforce. Overall, it emerges that these firms present the common characteristics of employing large workforces, particularly in R&D, and of being highly innovative in their sector of activity.

Pricing CCA from Implicit Behavior Hedonic Evaluation To assess the value attributed by the actors doing R&D on CCA innovation, we used the hedonic pricing method. This method aims to give a monetary value to impacts, which can be broken down into price and measurable quantities. This involves deducting intangible individual preferences and behavior on the markets from other goods and services (Townley 1998). Formulating the argument that the goods themselves are not useful to consumers but the attributes that compose them, Lancaster (1966) established the theoretical basis of this method. A good’s overall price results from an implicit valuation of each of its attributes, and it is possible to determine a demand function for each attribute (Travers et al. 2008). This explicit identification of characteristics aims to compare goods despite their heterogeneity (Townley 1998). Regressions To understand further how the collaboration with a TTO leads to tangible impacts on CCA felt by companies, a regression model has been developed. The dependent variable is each firm’s contract amount for one year (CA) with the TTOs. The independent variable is the impact perceived by the respondents of the collaboration on CCA; the values range from 0, if the firm sees no impact to 10, if the firm sees a major impact (Likert scale). We added several control variables to the model: the number of employees working in the R&D department of the firms, the implementation of Page 10 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_27-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

innovative products following collaboration with the TTO, the duration of the collaboration with the TTO, and the technological services received from the TTO. Table 4 presents an ordinary linear regression explaining the determinant of investment in collaboration with TTOs. The regression exhibits an R2 of 0.294, significant at the 1 % level (P-value ¼ 0.000; F ¼ 9.306) and comprises 143 observations. The results suggest that our model explains 29 % of the variation of the dependent variable (total amount of the contract with the TTOs). These feet indicators are acceptable, indicating the quality of our model specification. Of these five control variables, four regression coefficients are statistically significant, besides the constant. The CCA variable is significant at the 5 % level, and the other three control variables are significant at the 1 % level. (1) The relationship between the total amount of the contract with the TTOs and the CCA is positive. Other things being equal, firms allocate, on average, $5,358 for each level of impacts on CCA. (2) The duration of the relationship with the TTOs is also positively associated with the dependent variable and, other things being equal, the amount of the contract increases each year, on average, by $5,320. (3) The services received from the TTOs in terms of training, technological counseling, and testing products increase, all else being equal, the value of the dependent variable by $55,294, which is very high. (4) The number of R&D employees (Ln) is also highly and positively associated with the dependent variable. Our findings are very inspiring in terms of the amount of money firms are investing in order to acquire useful new technologies devoted to CCA. These results enhance the importance of R&D employees for innovating firms and in this case in the CCA.

Conclusion The results of this research suggest, first of all, that Canadian TTOs can play a crucial incentive role regarding innovations related to climate change adaptation. Our study’s respondents have perceived that their collaboration with a TTO generated both internal and external R&D investments while, at the same time, promoting other innovation activities. Thus, our conclusions from the analyzed descriptive statistics are that innovative firms in the area of climate change adaptation are more R&D-active and make large investments in physical capital and specialized human resources. They are also more open to acquire external knowledge. On the other hand, contrary to our expectations, there are no significant differences with regard to the other parameters taken into account (see Table 3), such as the number of employees, the marketing activities, and annual profits. At the same time, this research extends knowledge about the ways of assigning a monetary value to firms’ R&D activities impacting on climate change adaptation. The regression model developed suggests that firms invest, on average, $5,358 a year to acquire new technologies related to climate change adaptation, for each level of impact on CCA. In the light of the content of this chapter, climate change mitigation and adaptation are major economic issues whose costs and benefits are spread throughout a broad time horizon. Even if autonomous private-sector initiatives have been observed, the risks and uncertainties surrounding climate change can curb investments in this area since private firms protect themselves against large potential losses and make sure they obtain a return on their spending (Howarth 2003). Therefore, what emerges from the literature relating to climate issues is that states and public administrations must encourage climate change adaptation efforts by industry and firms and establish conditions guaranteeing their success (Paehlke 2014). To this end, the Canadian government provides financial Page 11 of 14

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assistance to technology transfer centers directly targeting R&D-active firms in order to reconcile their performance objectives with those of adapting to issues related to climate change. The results of this research show that TTOs can play a key role in climate change adaptation within the framework of their collaboration with the member firms of their network. Our work demonstrates how this type of public-private partnership can lead firms to invest in CCA while still developing profitable innovations for the whole society. Our conclusions are also the same as those of writings dealing with the importance of local and regional initiatives concerning climate change. Hence, the development of policies targeting intersectoral exchanges between R&D firms committed to climate change adaptation is an option to be considered by public decision makers. This research therefore suggests the implementation of measures to strengthen private CCA initiatives in order to make them more effective, on one hand, and to make entrepreneurs aware of the crucial role they can play in reducing the risks associated with this issue, on the other. Public authorities should also consider additional incentives, perhaps in the form of tax credits or grants that would then likely stimulate private investment in CCM and CCA. In addition, public funds could also introduce services and activities fostering networking among firms involved in CCA to permit the exchange of good practices, as well as to feed and accelerate the innovation process. Our analysis opens several possibilities for future research. First of all, the model developed in this study could be improved through the use of a greater number of variables and a larger sample. The addition of new data would thus increase the model’s statistical strength and permit a deeper interpretation of the results. This exercise would also make it possible to identify other characteristics attributable to R&D-active firms committed to climate change adaptation. Moreover, other research could be conducted with regard to the intangible attributes surrounding CCA innovations. For example, access to Statistics Canada’s chronological data would enable the study of the impacts of public knowledge transfer programs on R&D activities concerning climate change adaptation.

References Baum SD (2009) Description, prescription and the choice of discount rates. Ecol Econ 69(1):197–205 Bra€uninger M, Butzengeiger-Geyer S, Dlugolecki A et al (2011) Application of economic instruments for adaptation to climate change. Report to the European Commission, Directorate General CLIMA, Brussels Brooks N, Adger NW, Kelly MP (2005) The determinants of vulnerability and adaptive capacity at the national level and the implications for adaptation. Glob Environ Chang 15(2):151–163 Burch S, Schroeder H, Rayner S et al (2013) Novel multisector networks and entrepreneurship: the role of small businesses in the multilevel governance of climate change. Environ Plan C Govern Policy 31:822–840 Clar C, Prutsch A, Steurer R (2013) Barriers and guidelines for public policies on climate change adaptation: a missed opportunity of scientific knowledge-brokerage. Nat Res Forum 37:1–18 Craft J, Howlett M, Crawford M et al (2013) Assessing policy capacity for climate change adaptation: governance arrangements, resource deployments, and analytical skills in Canadian infrastructures policy making. Rev Policy Res 30(1):44–65 De Coninck H, Fischer C, Newell RG et al (2008) International technology-oriented agreements to address climate change. Energy Policy 36:335–356 Dietz S, Hope C, Patmore N (2007) Some economics of dangerous climate change: reflections on the stern review. Global Environ Change 17:311–325 Page 12 of 14

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Eisenack K (2013) The inefficiency of private adaptation to pollution in the presence of endogenous market structure. Environ Res Econom. doi:10.1007/s10640-013-9667-6 Goulden M, Conway D, Persechino A (2009) Adaptation to climate change in international river basins in Africa: a review. Hydrol Sci J 54(5):805–828 Grosse R (1996) International technology transfer in services. J Int Business Stud 27:780–792 Gupta V (2005) Climate change and domestic mitigation efforts. Econ Pol Wkly 40(10):981–987 Gupta S, Tirpak D, Burger N et al (2007) Policies, instruments and co-operative arrangements. In: Metz B, Davidson O, Bosch P et al (eds) Climate change 2007: mitigation. Contribution of working group III to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Hallegate S, Lecocq F, De Perthuis C (2011) Designing climate change adaptation policies: an economic framework. Policy research working paper, 5568. The World Bank, Washington, DC Hamit-Haggar M (2012) Greenhouse gas emissions, energy consumption and economic growth: a panel cointegration analysis from Canadian industrial sector perspective. Energy Econom 34:358–364 Heal G (2009) Climate economics: a meta-review and some suggestions for future research. Rev Environ Econom Policy 3(1):4–21 Hof AF, Van Vuuren DP, Den Elzen MGJ (2010) A qualitative minimax regret approach to climate change: does discounting still matter? Ecol Econ 70:43–51 Howarth RB (2003) Discounting and uncertainty in climate change policy analysis. Land Econ 79(3):369–381 Hughes L, Chaudhry N (2011) The challenge of meeting Canada’s greenhouse gas reduction targets. Energy Policy 39:1352–1362 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2013) Working group I report: climate change 2013: the physical science basis. Retrieved from www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014a) Working group II report: chapter 17. Economics of adaptation. Retrieved from www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014b) Working group III report: chapter 3 and 13. Economics of adaptation. Retrieved from www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/ Laffont JJ (1995) Regulation, moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks. J Public Econom 58(3):319–336 Lancaster K.J (1966) A new approach to consumer theory. The Journal of Political Economy 74(2): 132–157 Maddison D (1995) A cost-benefit analysis of slowing climate change. Energy Policy 23(4):337–346 Maybee BM, Packey DJ, Ripple RD (2012) Climate change policy: the effect of real options valuation on the optimal mitigation-adaptation balance. Econom Papers 31(3):216–224 Osberghaus D, Dannenberg A, Mennel T et al (2010) The role of the government in adaptation to climate change. Environ Plan C Govern Policy 28(5):834–850 Paehlke R (2014) Climate change: mitigation, adaptation, and development. Environ Polit 23(1):179–184 Pielke R Jr (2007) Mistreatment of the economic impacts of extreme events in the Stern review report on the Economics of Climate Change. Glob Environ Chang 17:302–310 Podsakoff PM, MacKenzie SB, Moorman RH et al (1990) Transformational leader behaviors and their effects on followers’ trust in leader, satisfaction, and organizational citizenship behaviors. Leadership Q 1:107–142 Stern N (2006) The economics of climate change: the stern review. HM Treasury, London Page 13 of 14

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Tebaldi C, Smith R, Nychka D et al (2005) Quantifying uncertainty in projections of regional climate change: a Bayesian approach to the analysis of multi-model ensembles. J Clim 18:1524–1540 Townley PCG (1998) Principles of cost-benefit analysis in a canadian context. Prentice-Hall, Canada Travers M, Nassiri A, Appéré G et al (2008) Évaluation des bénéfices environnementaux par la méthode des prix hédonistes: une application au cas du littoral. Économ Prévision 4(185):47–62 World Bank (2010) The costs to developing countries of adapting to climate change: new methods and estimates. World Bank, Washington, DC Zarka YC (2010) Le monde émergent: Les nouveaux défis environnementaux. Armand Colin, Paris

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Adaptation as Climate Risk Management: Methods and Approaches Paul Bowyera*, Michaela Schallera, Steffen Bendera and Daniela Jacoba,b a Climate Service Center, Chilehaus – Eingang B, Hamburg, Helmholtz Zentrum Geesthacht, Germany b Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, Hamburg, Germany

Abstract This chapter highlights the benefits of framing adaptation to climate change as an issue of climate risk management and describes a number of methods and approaches that may be applied in the process of developing adaptation strategies. A key consideration when developing adaptation strategies is to have a sound understanding of how a given system functions in response to changes in both climate and non-climate factors, and thus the need for a causal model which represents this understanding. There are a range of methods and tools that may be applied to assist with developing this system understanding in a climate risk assessment, and a number of these are described here. Moreover, given that adaptation planning is to a large degree about forward planning, all adaptation strategies will need to appropriately consider the implications of uncertainty on their likely effectiveness. This chapter provides a discussion of the ways in which adaptation strategies can be developed and decisions made when appraising different adaptation strategies. As such, it provides a basis upon which users can assess how they may approach adaptation as an issue of climate risk management and select and apply suitable methods. It provides a useful accompaniment to any practitioner or organization, as they proceed on their adaptation journey.

Keywords Risk management; Climate change; Adaptation; Climate information; Impact assessment; Adaptation assessment; Robust decision making; Uncertainty

Introduction Adaptation is an iterative process of defining a problem, planning and implementing action, and monitoring and reviewing these actions, in the light of new or changing risks, regulations, policies, and/or new information about a given system response. Adaptation action involves making changes in management practices and business systems in order to reduce the potential for harm or negative consequences and maximize or exploit any opportunities or positive consequences that may arise under climate change (Adger et al. 2007). These actions may range in size from relatively small changes, or larger transformations, depending on the size and scale of the adaptation problem. Adaptation will need to take place in order to cope with the impacts of climate change over the shorter term, e.g., due to climate variability and extremes, and to ensure that business objectives are able to be met over the longer term, and thus will involve long-term forward planning. Moreover, adaptation to climate change is not just about thinking in terms of how the climate may change in

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_28-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

isolation. Adapting to the impacts of climate change should be integrated into all climate-sensitive areas that an organization may have, and thus any adaptation actions will need to fully consider the non-climate factors that are key to understanding the impacts of climate change in their proper context. Only by doing this will a sound foundation be laid for developing adaptation measures and strategies. Dealing with adaptation as part of an overall organizational risk management strategy should ensure that climate impacts are not considered in isolation, and make it easier to address adaptation as an issue of risk management. It is also important to state that adaptation may not be successful. The success of adaptation will depend on a wide range of factors including the size and/or complexity of the problem, good governance structures, adequate resourcing, a sound understanding of system function, and appropriate incentives (Moser and Boykoff 2013). Chief among these factors will be the size and complexity of the problem. The larger the changes in climate and associated impacts, the less likely it is that adaptation will be successful as physical, technical, and social limits of adaptation are approached (Dow et al. 2013). This discussion leads to a suitable definition of adaptation as: Adaptation involves changes in social-ecological systems in response to actual and expected impacts of climate change in the context of interacting nonclimatic changes. Adaptation strategies and actions can range from shortterm coping to longer-term, deeper transformations, aim to meet more than climate change goals alone, and may or may not succeed in moderating harm or exploiting beneficial opportunities. Moser and Ekstrom (2010)

Adaptation is about forward planning in both the short and long term and as such involves large uncertainties: these include uncertainty about the possible future climate, uncertainty about the possible future development of human society, uncertainty in understanding the sensitivity of a given system to changes in climate and non-climate factors, and uncertainty around the effectiveness of any adaptation strategies that may be implemented. These uncertainties need to be appropriately considered when developing adaptation strategies. These characteristics of adaptation make a risk management framework particularly well suited to dealing with adaptation (Jones and Preston 2011). This chapter provides an overview of the risk management process within an adaptation context, a summary of key issues, and methods and approaches that may be applied at the risk assessment and adaptation appraisal stages of the risk management process. As such, this chapter provides a useful accompaniment to any practitioner or organization, as they proceed on their adaptation journey.

What Is Risk and the Risk Management Process? The International Standards Organization (ISO) 31000 (2009) defines risk as the “Effect of uncertainty on objectives.” Organizations will have a wide range of objectives which operate under conditions of uncertainty, and the impact that this uncertainty has on being able to successfully meet objectives is the focus of the risk management process. These objectives include strategic objectives, such as the reputation of an organization with its stakeholders; operational objectives such as meeting certain levels of service provision, e.g., ensuring a reliable water supply to a city or region; and objectives relating to compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, e.g., chemical concentrations in industrial effluents or water discharge temperatures. All of these kinds of objectives may be influenced in some way by changes in climate. In this chapter, the ISO 31000 (2009) calculation of risk is used, being the combination of the likelihood of an event and its consequences:

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_28-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Risk ¼ Likelihood  Consequences: If the likelihood of a given event is assessed as being zero, then there is no risk; likewise if there are no consequences from an event, then the risk is also zero. Generally, when the likelihood and consequences are higher than the greater the risk, however, things are more complicated than this, as the significance of a given level of risk is what matters to organizations, when deciding whether the risks need treating. The consequences of an event may be positive, which may sometimes be referred to as opportunities, or negative, which may be referred to as threats or vulnerabilities. In this chapter, threats and opportunities are used to refer to negative and positive consequences, respectively. An organization may face more than one event which presents a risk to the achievement of objectives, and managing one risk may have implications for the management of other risks, and so it is important to consider risk interactions – this is particularly relevant for reducing the potential for maladaptive strategies. The likelihood of an event can be assessed in qualitative or quantitative terms. In the context of risk and vulnerability, it is worth stating that in the climate adaptation research arena, a lot of effort has been devoted to investigate the vulnerability of various countries and communities to climate change, to the extent that it has become a widely applied method (Malone and Engle 2011). For adaptation in practice, a risk management framework can incorporate vulnerability analyses as part of a risk assessment. Regardless whether the risks that a given organization may face have positive or negative consequences, in order to adapt to climate change, a coherent framework is needed within which these risks can be managed. The risk management process provides such a framework. The ISO 31000 (2009) defines the risk management process as the: Systematic application of management policies, procedures, and practices to the activities of communicating, consulting, establishing the context, and identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring, and reviewing risk. (ISO 31000 2009)

The various stages involved in the risk management process and their interconnections are shown schematically in Fig. 1. The focus of discussion in this chapter is on the risk assessment stage and assessing adaptation measures as part of the risk treatment stage (Fig. 1).

What Are the Benefits of a Risk Management Approach? There are various reasons as to why adopting a risk management framework to address adaptation to climate change is attractive and powerful; these include (adapted from ISO 31000 2009; Jones and Preston 2011): • It is all about uncertainty: adaptation to climate change is characterized as operating under uncertainty and deep uncertainty, in relation to the future development of climate and socioeconomic systems, and what this may mean for a given organization. A risk management framework involves explicit consideration of uncertainty in climate risks, their likelihood, and consequences. • It is solution focused: adaptation is about taking action in the real world, reducing threats, and seizing opportunities presented by climate change. This means finding and implementing effective solutions. The risk treatment stage in the risk management process makes this focus on finding solutions explicit. In addition, in relating the level of risk determined in the risk analysis to what is significant for an organization, a rational basis is provided on which to stimulate action. • Communication and consultation is integral: key to developing effective solutions is establishing the proper context for identifying risks, having sound causal models of how

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_28-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 Adaptation as a process of risk management. The various stages involved in the risk management process and their interactions, as applied to climate change adaptation (Source: Adapted from the ISO 31000 (2009) risk guidelines. The risk management process may not proceed in a linear process from step 1 through 7, and in practice steps 3 and 5 may be performed in combination. The steps are separated out simply to enable clarity of explanation

a system functions, and identifying and being able to implement adaptation strategies. All these activities demand that there is effective communication and consultation with a range of people, to ensure that the right people are on board in gaining knowledge and understanding, formulating and asking the “right” questions, and identifying practical adaptation strategies and any potential for maladaptation. • It is a well-established method: risk management is not new, and many businesses and organizations will already have risk management strategies in place. As such, it may be possible to incorporate climate risk existing mechanisms rather than requiring new mechanisms to be implemented. This familiarity can aid the uptake and mainstreaming of adaptation into all relevant business activities and can increase the chances of considering climate as an additional factor in managing risks. • It is an iterative process: adaptation takes place in a dynamic environment where external and internal factors change over time, there are deep uncertainties, and new information is developed which may be brought to bear in informing decision making. As such, adaptation is a continual process and as such requires an iterative process.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_28-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

• It is flexible: a range of different methods may be applied to the discovery and generation of information in relation to climate impacts and considering and planning adaptation options. Thus, the risk management process can be tailored to the information needs and level of detail required to analyze a particular adaptation problem. • Facilitates a learning environment: while a range of different methods can be applied in carrying out a risk assessment (described in section “Methods and Tools for Climate Risk Assessment”), it is the case that the very act of committing to a process of considering how changes in climate (and other factors) may impact on business objectives can provide an environment in which much learning about how an organization operates is obtained. In addition, where the adaptation problem involves a range of stakeholders with different values and perspectives, the process provides a forum in which these issues can be discussed, networks built, and knowledge shared and contested, thus facilitating social learning (Yuen et al. 2013). The process will also generate learning about which factors were instrumental in being able to engage with stakeholders, and possibly arrive at mutually agreeable adaptation strategies. That a risk management process provides an attractive framework for approaching adaptation is also evidenced by its use in other countries, for example in the UK (Willows and Connell 2003). Adopting a risk management framework was also one of the recommendations from the US national research project, America’s Climate Choices (NRC 2010), which sets out the direction in which the USA should deal with climate change.

Methods and Tools for Climate Risk Assessment In order for an organization to assess how their business objectives may be affected by changes in climate, and other non-climate factors, and thus understand how large a threat or opportunity may exist, methods and tools are needed with which an evidence base can be generated to help answer these questions. Understanding how a given system responds to climate and non-climate factors is central to successful adaptation planning. The greater the understanding of how a given system functions, the more guidance there is as to which factors could be acted upon in order to manage the risk and thus aid the search for, and development of, successful adaptation strategies. Consequently, all risk assessments need a causal model that links the changes in climate and non-climate factors to the risks. These models can vary from conceptual to quantitative impact models (Jones 2001; Jones and Preston 2011). It is the case that there will be many adaptation problems and issues that are so complex that there will not be existing quantitative impact models available for a given system. Thus, it may be necessary to develop a new model, or modify existing models, if a quantitative approach is sought. Alternatively, an adaptation problem may be so complex and poorly quantified that it will be necessary to generate conceptual models whereby the way in which expected changes in climate may impact a system is thought through, using methods such as brainstorming sessions, workshops, and logical reasoning. The choice then as to which method or tool to use will depend upon a number of factors, chief among which will be the complexity of the adaptation problem (which may mean a complex or more simple method is pursued), the available resources (time, financial, expertise), and the nature of the uncertainty involved in the problem (ISO 31010 2009). While it should be clear that the kinds of climate risks that organizations face are generated by both climate and non-climate factors, there is a focus, in this section, on describing those methods Page 5 of 18

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and tools that may be used to investigate what the impact of changes in climate may have on a given system. It is important to state, however, that this is not an exclusive focus, for example, the use of scenarios for forward planning can be applied to both climate and non-climate factors. Moreover, many of the methods can make use of and may even in some way depend on the use of socioeconomic and sociopolitical data. A wide range of statistical data of past changes in economy and society, as well as some projections of future changes, e.g., population change, are available from various national governments and international organizations, for example, the UN and the World Bank.

Scenarios and Scenario Planning Adapting to climate change and variability essentially means developing plans or strategies that are able to reduce the negative consequences and maximize any positive consequences that may occur. This clearly implies the need to think about the future and how a given system may function or respond, under future conditions of changed climate and non-climate factors. It is not possible, however, to predict the future with certainty and as such there is uncertainty as to what the future may hold. The use of scenarios is one way of dealing with this uncertainty (Rounsevell and Metzger 2010). The value of scenarios as a forward planning tool is to consider the effect that different plausible futures might have for the achievement of business objectives. Scenarios are used in various economic sectors, and perhaps one of the most successful examples of the development and use of scenarios is Royal Dutch Shell Plc, who, through the use of scenarios, were well prepared to respond to the oil price shock of the 1970s (http://www.shell.com/global/future-energy/scenarios. html). Other examples of scenarios are those developed by the International Energy Agency (IEA) (http://www.iea.org/publications/scenariosandprojections/), the World Business Council for Sustainable Development Vision 2050 (http://www.wbcsd.org/vision2050.aspx), and the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (Nakićenović et al. 2000). Scenarios may be defined as: A plausible and often simplified description of how the future may develop, based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about driving forces and key relationships. IPCC (2007)

Scenarios are, thus, not predictions about how the future will turn out, rather plausible possibilities or alternatives that may appear. As such, they serve as an aid to critical thinking when developing strategies or policies to manage or ensure success under different futures. In other words, they provide a framework for asking questions such as: How would our existing strategy work under different future conditions? How might alternative strategies perform under future conditions? Scenarios may be qualitative or quantitative, and often the two are combined, with a qualitative scenario being used to run a quantitative simulation model under the assumptions contained in the qualitative scenario. For example, global climate models are used to generate quantitative scenarios or projections, of how a range of different climate variables may change in the future, based on the assumptions in the SRES qualitative scenarios. Qualitative scenarios are normally accompanied by a “storyline,” which provides a narrative description of how a given scenario materializes. In adaptation planning, the need for developing scenarios will most likely center around developing scenarios in relation to changes in the non-climate factors, for example, how a water supplier would be able to meet a possible rise in water demand of 25 % over the next 25 years. The need for an organization to develop customized climate scenarios (based on climate models) is likely very low, since there are a number of climate scenarios which are available and as such may be used as “offthe-shelf” products, which can then be tailored according to the needs of a given organization. The

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_28-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

task then is linking these scenarios which describe different plausible futures to a model of how a given system functions. Scenarios thus offer a potentially powerful means of supporting adaptation planning, but key to the process is the accurate identification of the key driving forces, how these are then characterized, and the avoidance of bias in thinking about uncertainties (Reed et al. 2013).

Making Use of Climate Information What Kinds of Climate Information Are There? Essentially there are two main kinds of climate information of relevance to adaptation planning, derived from observational and modeled data. Observational data are clearly most useful for learning about past and present changes, while modeled data can be used for both learning about the past and also possible future climates. Using these two sources, it is possible to generate information relating to basic changes in climate variables, e.g., surface air temperature, climate indices, and extremes, for example number of days when summer maximum temperature is >25  C, and to generate projections of possible future climates. Deciding which kind of climate information to use will depend largely on the time horizon over which a given adaptation strategy may be operative, and the available expertise and resources. If time or planning horizons are relatively short, i.e., the next one or two decades, then adapting to recent climate variability and trends based on observed data may be sufficient. When the lifetime of a given strategy or action has implications for many decades, the performance of adaptation measures should be investigated across a range of climate change scenarios, and modeled climate information will be needed. The focus in this section is on the use of modeled climate information for informing adaptation planning. Simulating Future Climates In order to be able to assess future climate risks, it is necessary to have some idea as to how future climate may change, and for this some kind of model is needed. The most sophisticated tool for this is to make use of global climate models (GCMs). It is, however, also possible to simulate or construct future climates using synthetic data (e.g., Lempert and Groves 2010). Performing a climate risk assessment however is not simply about changes in climate, it is also necessary to understand what effect or impact possible changes in climate may have on a given system of interest. In the following sections, some of the main methods and tools that may be used to assess climate risks are described, and the various issues that are associated with their use and application discussed. What Is a Global Climate Model? A global climate model (GCM) is a numerical representation of the various processes that take place in the Earth’s atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere, and land surface. These models are based on well-established physical laws and observations of physical processes. They simulate, for example, incoming and outgoing radiation, cloud formation and atmospheric and ocean circulation, and they also try to simulate the interaction of these various processes (McGuffie and Henderson-Sellers 2005). GCMs are highly complex and are extremely computationally demanding, making the use of supercomputing a prerequisite. GCMs solve these various processes mathematically at a series of grid points in the atmosphere and ocean, and across the land surface, and as such have both horizontal and vertical resolution. Because of the complexity, GCMs are only currently tractable when run at relatively coarse spatial resolutions, on the order of 100–300 km.

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How Is Future Climate Model Information Generated? Future climate will be largely determined by the concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs), and aerosols in the atmosphere, and the changes this leads to in the functioning of the Earth system. Future atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and aerosols will be determined in large part by human activities. In order to be able to simulate future climates, it is necessary to make some assumptions about the way in which human activities will be organized in the future, and thus produce plausible scenarios of how concentrations of GHGs and aerosols may develop. The IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (Nakićenović et al. 2000) represents a major activity which has formed the basis for the generation of a large number of climate model simulations. These scenarios make various assumptions about, for example, global human population development, how our economic affairs will be organized, what technologies might be employed, and the fossil fuel intensity of human activities. Recently, a new set of emissions scenarios has been developed by the science community to try and address some of the constraints that use of the SRES scenarios placed on the climate simulations. These new scenarios are called the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) and take a different philosophical approach to that of the SRES (Moss et al. 2010; van Vuuren et al. 2012). Whereas the SRES scenarios assumed a given pathway of socioeconomic development would lead to a particular level of emissions, the RCPs do not. Instead, many different development pathways may be consistent with the level of emissions and thus concentrations of GHGs and aerosols, under the RCP scenarios. A new set of socioeconomic scenarios have been developed, called the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs), which may be used in conjunction with the RCPs (O’Neill et al. 2013). Using these emissions or concentration scenarios with global climate models allows future climate projections (or scenarios) to be made, which are conditional upon the assumptions made in a given emissions scenario. In this way, it is possible to obtain quantitative information on the way in which future climate may evolve. What Kind of Information Can These Models Generate? Global climate models can be used to generate information for a few months ahead and these are known as seasonal forecasts; for the next decade – these are known as decadal predictions; or for many decades ahead, i.e., 20–100 or more years – these simulations are known as multi-decadal or centennial projections. To date, most focus in adaptation planning has tended to use multi-decadal projections, which is a function of the relative maturity of this field, and data availability, compared to the seasonal and decadal projections. Seasonal forecasts do have some skill in some parts of the world and are used to help people adapt particularly in less developed nations (Lizumi et al. 2013). Decadal predictions on the other hand also have some skill in predicting certain climate variables and phenomena in certain parts of the world and/or at the global scale. However, these predictions are very much an experimental research area (Meehl et al. 2009). As such, despite their clear appeal in terms of the time horizon, a major amount of progress is needed in this area before they may be suitable for assisting with typical adaptation planning problems (Tollefson 2013). Deciding which climate model data to use, and for which emissions scenarios, will depend upon the nature of a given adaptation problem, and specifically the associated planning horizon. Clearly, if there is a business decision that needs to be made which is climate sensitive but can be adjusted within a short time period, then using observed data, statistical relationships, or learned experience may be a suitable approach, rather than using modeled data. If, however, there is a business decision whose lifetime will extend over a couple of decades or more, then climate change and climate models will need to be consulted and incorporated into the planning and decision-making process.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_28-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Downscaling Global Climate Model Data Global climate model outputs are not particularly well suited to the kinds of questions related to adaptation planning, owing to their coarse spatial resolution. In order to bring the results of global climate models closer in line with the needs of users, the global climate data may be downscaled (Fowler et al. 2007; Jacob et al. 2013). There are two main approaches to downscaling climate information to the regional level, dynamical and statistical downscaling. Dynamical downscaling proceeds through the use of regional climate models, whereas statistical downscaling can proceed via a range of methods, for example, regression analysis. A precondition for all downscaling, however, is the realistic representation of large-scale circulation patterns from the driving GCMs. Uncertainty in Climate Model Information and How to Deal with It Uncertainty in climate model information stems from three main sources: natural or internal variability, model uncertainty, and emissions uncertainty (Hawkins and Sutton 2009). This issue is discussed in more detail in the chapter by Bowyer et al. (2014) in this volume. The most common way in which uncertainty is quantified is through the use of probability. This can mean specifying a percentile range or possible variation to be expected, through to generating full probability density functions (CCSP 2009; Collins et al. 2012). The way in which uncertainty is quantified is important for the meaning that may be attached to the results of any model or statistical analysis, and thus how this may be used and interpreted in informing the adaptation decision support process. Given the sources of uncertainty in climate modeling, when generating data that may be used in support of adaptation planning, one would ideally have data available that were generated from multiple different climate models which had each been run multiple times, exploring a very wide range of uncertainty in parameter values. This would also ideally be done for a range of different future emissions or concentration scenarios. Unfortunately, because of the large compute time required to run GCMs, this is not practical at the present time, although progress is being made (Sexton et al. 2012). What options exist for dealing with this uncertainty? One approach for which suitable data are currently available is to make use of what are known as multi-model ensembles (MME). Because different international climate modeling centers have different models, and structure them in certain ways, combining these simulations into an ensemble is one way in which uncertainty can be explored in the climate modeling. A multi-model ensemble is then a collection of different climate model simulations obtained from a number of different models. Overall, the MME approach does not explore a lot of variation in uncertain process parameters, with typically only a small number of simulations being performed with each model. As such, this approach provides a limited quantification of uncertainty (Stainforth et al. 2007). An additional way in which uncertainty can be dealt with is to generate what is known as a perturbed physics ensemble (PPE). In this approach, a single climate model is used, in which a large number of model parameter values are varied across their plausible range of values, and the climate model run for each instance. This approach allows the generation of a large number of model versions, each one being part of the ensemble. There are, however, very few examples of such PPEs being generated, owing to the fact that they are so time consuming to generate (Sexton et al. 2012). Climate Indices and Extremes Both observed and modeled data can be used to obtain information on changes in climate indices and extremes (defined as any change above a commonly accepted statistical measure of rarity, e.g., 95th or 99th percentile). In relation to adaptation planning, it is often the case that direct experience of, or Page 9 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_28-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

information related to, extremes can often provide the stimulus for action, in that the direct experience of an extreme weather event creates a so-called window of opportunity (Adger et al. 2007), raising awareness of climate risks, and that action may be needed to address them. Often, information relating to extremes is presented in the form of indices, e.g., the number of summer days with mean temperature above 25  C. Information on climate indices and extremes can be used to form either a quantitative or qualitative assessment of what the changes may mean, or indicate, for being able to meet business objectives, either in the past or in the future. It is also worth stating that the use of observed changes in indices and extremes, and any trends in these, can be very powerful in raising awareness of climate change, establishing an evidence base, and helping build a case for the need for adaptation. If the observational data sets can show a clear trend of change, then this can often be sufficient evidence to stimulate adaptation action. Climate indices contain information relating to changes in climate variables, which may be of relevance to different economic sectors, for example, in the energy sector, the number of cooling degree days and heating degree days is used to help plan and manage energy demand. Indices may be derived or calculated directly from climate observations or modeled data. Information on changes in extremes is highly in demand particularly for future time periods, from, for example, insurance companies. Figure 2 provides examples of ways in which climate extremes may change under a changed climate. Possible changes in the mean, variability, and shape of climate statistics will lead to different possible changes in the frequency and magnitude of extremes. It should be clear from Fig. 2 that even relatively small changes in the climatology of a given variable can have significant implications for the frequency and magnitude of extreme events (Coumou and Rahmstorf 2012; Rahmstorf and Coumou 2011).

Simulating the Impacts of Climate Change While the use of climate change data may be of use to develop a broad understanding of possible ways in which a system may be affected under climate change, for example, as part of risk identification, or a preliminary risk screening exercise, the question that really needs to be answered however is: How will a given system be impacted by these changes in climate, and thus the ability of an organization to meet its business objectives? This section provides a discussion of some of the main methods and approaches that can be used to develop an understanding of how a given system functions. Modeling Climate Impacts A powerful way of obtaining more detailed information on the way in which a given climatesensitive system may respond to changes in climate is through the use of environmental modeling tools, which may also be referred to as climate impact models (Challinor et al. 2009). These may be either statistically or physically based models and are used to model various environmental systems and economic sectors, e.g., water, agriculture, forestry, coastal systems, energy, and food. Impact models will typically be driven by climate variables, and other system relevant variables, and may offer some scope for the inclusion of socioeconomic variables. These models may be used to perform sensitivity analyses (discussed in section “Model Sensitivity Analysis”), to try and understand better the way in which a given system responds to climate, and should ideally be able to simulate or integrate the action of adaptation measures or strategies on the system function (Lempert and Groves 2010).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_28-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 2 The effect of changes in temperature distribution on extremes. Different changes in temperature distributions between present and future climate and their effects on extreme values of the distributions: (a) effects of a simple shift of the entire distribution toward a warmer climate, (b) effects of an increased temperature variability with no shift of the mean, and (c) effects of an altered shape of the distribution, in this example an increased asymmetry toward the hotter part of the distribution (Source: IPCC (2012))

Using impact models can often be a very resource-intensive approach, particularly if a number of climate model simulations, or ensembles, are to be investigated to quantify uncertainty. This need not be the case, however, but careful consideration should be given to the level of detail that is

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_28-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

needed in order to answer the kinds of adaptation questions or problems that may exist, and thus using impact models may only be deemed necessary for particularly significant risks. Model Sensitivity Analysis A model sensitivity analysis quantifies the way in which the model output responds to variation in the model inputs, and can be used to determine the relative importance of the model parameters in driving variation in the model output (Saltelli et al. 2000). Using a given impact model, sensitivity experiments can be conducted where a wide range of known or expected variation in the relevant climate and non-climate parameters is explored and then analyzed to see how the given system (model) responds. This could be done with modeled climate data, or a less resource-intensive approach would be to generate synthetic climate data. Sensitivity analysis can be used to help identify those factors which are most important to control or which have most influence on the functioning of a system, and thus can be very instructive in the search for adaptation measures or strategies. Moreover, it may be possible to explore the efficacy of potential adaptation measures across a large range of possible futures, using a sensitivity analysis. This would serve to highlight where, or under what conditions, a given adaptation measure may be suboptimal or less robust. This kind of information is potentially very informative in the process of selecting adaptation measures. Model sensitivity analysis provides a powerful means of learning about the functioning of a system and is less resource-intensive than generating an ensemble of impacts based on a climate model ensemble. The results of a model sensitivity analysis can also be used to generate what are known as impact response surfaces. Climate Impact Response Surfaces Model sensitivity analyses can lead to the identification of a set of model parameters which are most influential in driving the system response. Using this approach, it may be possible to generate a functional relationship between a small set of model parameters and the system response (Fronzek et al. 2010). In so doing, it is possible to generate what is known as a climate impact response surface, which represents this functional relationship. This system response could be a threshold value of high relevance to a given business objective. For example, it may be necessary to have a certain water level in a river to allow transportation of manufactured goods or river water temperatures which may place a constraint on the availability of cooling water for power stations (van Vliet et al. 2012). An impact response surface could be used to investigate how often in the future this threshold level would be exceeded, and thus help support decisions in relation to developing adaptation measures. An example of an impact response surface is shown in Fig. 3. This method provides a rapid, quickly updateable and reusable tool for understanding the effects of changes in climate on the system response. As new climate data sets become available, they can simply be plotted over the existing surface (assuming no change in the functional relationship), and analyze if new information leads to any change in the exceedance of a valued threshold. This attractive feature of reusability and being easily updateable as new climate information becomes available or, as business objectives change, means that this approach may represent a good return on any investment made to develop such tools, and is easily incorporated and used as part of an iterative review process of climate risk management. This approach is most suitable for systems whose response is driven very strongly by a few climate variables, e.g., in the water and forestry sectors (Prudhomme et al. 2010; McDaniels et al. 2012). Also, the accuracy of these surfaces compared to a full modeling approach should be assessed and reported. Also consideration of the uncertainty in the modeled response itself needs to be considered in the sense that a different impact model may give a different surface. These response Page 12 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_28-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 3 An example impact response surface for Lake M€alaren in Sweden. Diagonal black lines are the likelihood in percent of summer water level being below the target operating threshold for a consecutive period of 50 days for the change in summer temperature and precipitation. Climate projections for the time period 2031–2050 are shown as probability density plots in the colored area, which encloses approximately 90 % of all projected outcomes. The colored dots are projections from regional climate models (Source: van der Linden and Mitchell (2009))

surfaces serve to highlight visually when business objectives may be vulnerable, or alternatively, where a particular risk may become worth exploiting. Challenges arise when this response surface cannot be defined with less than four parameters, because one of the big attractions of response surfaces is the rapid assessment that visualization provides. With more than three parameters, visualization becomes difficult.

Decision Making Under Uncertainty The foregoing discussion has focused on a range of methods and tools that may be applied at the risk assessment stage of the risk management process, in order to establish a basis upon which the significance of any risks can be assessed. Any risks which are deemed to need treating will then require an adaptation strategy and will need to appropriately consider the issue of uncertainty. Because of the various sources of uncertainty in adaptation decision making, it is simply not possible to accurately predict what the future world will be or look like. The only credible way of acknowledging and dealing with this uncertainty is to explore as wide a range of different possible futures as possible. The task then is to endeavor to understand what this may mean for the functioning of a given system, and the effect it may have on an organization being able to successfully meet its business objectives, and thus planning and implementing adaptation strategies. Moreover, it is also a fact that developing an effective adaptation strategy will also need the approval of a range of different stakeholders, who will have different values and priorities. As such, developing an adaptation strategy is not simply about having an evidence base and information but obtaining stakeholder engagement and buy-in. This adds another layer of uncertainty to the

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_28-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

process, such that it may be said that adaptation takes place under conditions of deep uncertainty. Lempert et al. (2004) characterize deep uncertainty as being the situation where “decision makers do not know or cannot agree on (1) the system models, (2) the prior probability distributions for inputs to the system model(s), and their interdependencies, and/or (3) the value systems used to rank alternatives.” Given this reality, an organization is faced with the question of how best to make decisions in these circumstances. Should an organization seek to predict the future and strive to optimize an adaptation strategy around what is determined to be the “most likely” future? Or, instead, should an organization acknowledge that pursuing an optimizing approach is highly vulnerable to futures different from what was considered to be most likely, and accordingly seek robust adaptation strategies that perform reasonably well across a range of different possible futures? This section discusses the implications of deep uncertainty for developing adaptation strategies, whether to optimize, or hedge and seek robust decisions (Weaver et al. 2013). In addition, a discussion of the robust decision-making framework is provided.

To Hedge or Not to Hedge: That Is the Question In the context of using climate information to support adaptation planning and decision making, there are two alternative decision frameworks that are applied, a predict-then-act framework and a robust decision making (RDM) framework (Weaver et al. 2013): 1. Predict-then-act: this has been the most commonly adopted framework, under which optimal strategies are sought which seek to maximize the expected utility of a given adaptation strategy. This framework relies on the ability to predict the “most likely” future (Lempert et al. 2004). To determine the “most likely” future requires that probabilities are assigned to model predictions. 2. Robust decision making: this framework has more recently gained traction in the adaptation arena (Lempert et al. 2006; Lempert and Groves 2010; Kunreuther et al. 2013). This framework seeks to minimize the regret associated with a given adaptation strategy, by evaluating a number of different strategies and selecting that strategy which performs relatively well compared to the alternatives, across a large range of possible futures. This relative performance measure is the robustness criterion and, because it does not seek to provide an optimal outcome under one “most likely” future, provides a hedge against uncertain futures. The performance criterion is the level of robustness offered by a given strategy, in the sense that it fails to meet its objectives on fewer occasions, or is less sensitive to uncertainties, than the alternative strategies. Deciding which of these two frameworks is most suitable for application essentially comes down to how seriously a given adaptation strategy is, or may be afflicted by, the issue of deep uncertainty. Clearly, deep uncertainty will be more or less important depending on the decision context and nature of the uncertainty associated with a given strategy. If the strategy does not affect external stakeholders, has a short decision lifetime, has flexibility, and/or is a no, or low regret, option, then the predict-then-act framework may be suitably applied. If, however, the strategy has a long decision lifetime, has limited flexibility, and/or involves external stakeholders, then an optimal strategy designed under the predict-then-act framework may be too vulnerable or risky in the face of futures different from what was considered most likely when the decision was made. In addition, pursuing a predict-then-act approach will also be more vulnerable to the occurrence of surprises. In these cases, a robust decision-making framework is likely to be more suitable. It is worth stating that there may also be pragmatic reasons for adopting one or the other decision framework.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_28-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 4 Steps involved in a robust decision-making analysis (Source: Adapted from Lempert and Groves (2010). In operation, the RDM method combines steps 3 and 5 of the risk management process (risk analysis and adaptation option appraisal))

Robust Decision Making Under the robust decision-making framework, one accepts that there are multiple plausible futures, and seeks to explore how a given business objective may fare under a range of different futures (Weaver et al. 2013). The approach starts first with the candidate adaptation strategies and then uses a modeling framework which samples a range of uncertainty in the main decision relevant system driving variables to generate a large number of scenarios. The question then asked is, under what future conditions would a particular adaptation strategy fail to meet its business objectives, as represented by some performance criterion (Lempert and Groves 2010)? The RDM approach is an iterative method which tests out different candidate adaptation strategies, seeking to characterize the vulnerabilities associated with each and using this information to inform and identify alternative strategies that may be more robust. The RDM approach is summarized schematically in Fig. 4. As originally conceived, RDM was a quantitative computational model approach (Lempert et al. 2006) and as such can require a lot of resources. However, the principles involved in the approach can be equally well be applied to qualitative conceptual models of how a given system functions, which provides a much less resource-intensive approach, as recently demonstrated by McDaniels et al. (2012).

Conclusion Framing adaptation as an issue of climate risk management provides a range of attractive features which should ensure adaptation can be understood and acted upon within existing management structures. A range of different issues are involved at the different stages and these need proper consideration in adaptation planning. There are several different methods and tools available that may be applied to help carry out a risk assessment, in order to generate an evidence based upon which the significance of climate risks can be assessed, and the necessity of treating them analyzed. Key to the risk assessment stage is having or developing a causal model which explains the way in which changes in climate can lead to impacts on the activities of a given organization and thus understanding how a given system functions. This understanding is central to the search for effective adaptation strategies. Developing adaptation strategies also involves a range of different issues, not the least of which is how best to develop a strategy in the face of deep uncertainty. The two main approaches of predictthen-act and robust decision making can equally well be justified in practice, depending on the exact nature of the uncertainty associated with a given adaptation problem and strategy. The key issue in thinking about adaptation and making decisions is that it is an analytical process which needs to draw on a wide range of different expertise and stakeholder involvement. At different stages of the adaptation process, different information, skills, and approaches are needed. A risk management framework provides a well-established method which can accommodate all these different aspects. Page 15 of 18

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Acknowledgments The authors acknowledge the work of the EU-funded FP6 integrated project ENSEMBLES (contract number 505539), from which Fig. 3 is reproduced.

References Adger WN et al (2007) Assessment of adaptation practices, options, constraints and capacity. In: Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp 717–743 Bowyer, P et al (2014) The Role of Climate Services in Adapting to Climate Variability and Change, In this volume CCSP (2009) Best practice approaches for characterizing, communicating, and incorporating scientific uncertainty in decision making. [Granger Morgan M (Lead author), Dowlatabadi H, Henrion M, Keith D, Lempert R, McBride S, Small M, Wilbanks T (Contributing authors)]. A report by the climate change science program and the subcommittee on global change research. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington, DC, 96 pp Challinor AJ et al (2009) Methods and resources for climate impacts research. Bull Am Meteorol Soc 90:836–848. doi:10.1175/2008BAMS2403.1 Collins M et al (2012) Quantifying future climate change. Nat Clim Change. doi:10.1038/ NCLIMATE1414 Coumou D, Rahmstorf S (2012) A decade of weather extremes. Nat Clim Change. doi:10.1038/ NCLIMATE1452 Dow K et al (2013) Limits to adaptation. Nat Clim Change 3:305–307 Fowler H et al (2007) Linking climate change modelling to impacts studies: recent advances in downscaling techniques for hydrological modelling. Int J Climatol 27:1547–1578 Fronzek S et al (2010) Applying probabilistic projections of climate change with impact models: a case study for sub-arctic palsa mires in Fennoscandia. Clim Change 99:515–534. doi:10.1007/ s10584-009-9679-y Hawkins E, Sutton R (2009) The potential to narrow uncertainty in regional climate predictions. Bull Am Meteorol Soc 90:1095–1107 IPCC (2007) Synthesis Report. In: Pachauri RK, Reisinger A (eds) Climate Change 2007: Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, pp 104 IPCC (2012) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation. In: Field CB, Barros V, Stocker TF, Qin D, Dokken DJ, Ebi KL, Mastrandrea MD, Mach KJ, Plattner G-K, Allen SK, Tignor M, Midgley PM (eds) A special report of working groups I and II of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK/New York, 582 pp ISO 31000 (2009) Risk management – principles and guidelines. http://www.iso.org/iso/home/ store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber¼43170 ISO 31010 (2009) Risk management – risk assessment techniques. http://www.iso.org/iso/home/ store/catalogue_ics/catalogue_detail_ics.htm? ics1¼03&ics2¼100&ics3¼01&csnumber¼51073 Page 16 of 18

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Jacob D et al (2013) EURO-CORDEX: new high-resolution climate change projections for European impact research. Reg Environ Change. doi:10.1007/s10113-013-0499-2 Jones RN (2001) An environmental risk assessment/management framework for climate change impact assessments. Nat Hazard 23:197–230 Jones RN, Preston BL (2011) Adaptation and risk management. WIREs Clim Change 2:296–308. doi:10.1002/wcc.97 Kunreuther H et al (2013) Risk management and climate change. Nat Clim Change. doi:10.1038/ NCLIMATE1740 Lempert RJ, Groves DG (2010) Identifying and evaluating robust adaptive policy responses to climate change for water management agencies in the American west. Technol Forecast Soc Change 77:960–974 Lempert R et al (2004) Characterizing climate-change uncertainties for decision-makers. Clim Change 65:1–9 Lempert RJ et al (2006) A general, analytic method for generating robust strategies and narrative scenarios. Manag Sci 52(4):514–528 Lizumi T et al (2013) Prediction of seasonal climate-induced variations in global food production. Nat Clim Change. doi:10.1038/NCLIMATE1945 Malone EL, Engle NL (2011) Evaluating regional vulnerability to climate change: purposes and methods. WIREs Clim Change 2:462–474. doi:10.1002/wcc.116 McDaniels T et al (2012) Using expert judgments to explore robust alternatives for forest management under climate change. Risk Anal 32(12):2098–2112. doi:10.1111/j.15396924.2012.01822.x McGuffie K, Henderson-Sellers A (2005) A Climate Modelling Primer, Third Edition. Wiley, pp 296 Meehl GA et al (2009) Decadal prediction, can it be skilful? Bull Am Meteorol Soc 90:1467–1485 Moser SC, Boykoff MT (2013) Successful adaptation to climate change linking science and policy in a rapidly changing world. Routledge, Abingdon Moser SC, Ekstrom JA (2010) A framework to diagnose barriers to climate change adaptation. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 107:22026–22031, http://www.pnas.org/content/107/51/22026 Moss R et al (2010) The next generation of scenarios for climate change research and assessment. Nature 463:747–756. doi:10.1038/nature08823 Nakićenović N et al (2000) Special report on emissions scenarios: a special report of working group III of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 600 pp National Research Council (2010) Informing an effective response to climate change, America’s climate choices: panel on informing effective decisions and actions related to climate change. The National Academies Press, Washington, DC O’Neill BC et al (2013) A new scenario framework for climate change research: the concept of shared socioeconomic pathways. Climatic Change. doi:10.1007/s10584-013-0905-2 Prudhomme C et al (2010) Scenario-neutral approach to climate change impact studies: application to flood risk. J Hydrol 390:198–209 Rahmstorf S, Coumou D (2011) Increase of extreme events in a warming world. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 108(44):17905–17909, www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1101766108 Reed M et al (2013) Participatory scenario development for environmental management: a methodological framework illustrated with experience from the UK uplands. J Environ Manag 128:345–362

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Rounsevell MDA, Metzger MJ (2010) Developing qualitative scenario storylines for environmental change assessment. WIREs Clim Change 1:606–619 Saltelli A et al (2000) Sensitivity analysis. Wiley, Chichester, 494 pp Sexton DMH et al (2012) Multivariate probabilistic projections using imperfect climate models part I: outline of methodology. Clim Dyn 38(11–12):2513–2542 Stainforth DA et al (2007) Confidence, uncertainty and decision-support relevance in climate predictions. Philos Trans A Math Phys Eng Sci 365:2145–2161. doi:10.1098/rsta.2007.2074 Tollefson J (2013) The forecast for 2018 is cloudy with record heat. Nature 499:139–141 van der Linden P, Mitchell JFB (2009) ENSEMBLES: Climate Change and its Impacts: Summary of Research and Results from the ENSEMBLES Project (Met Office Hadley Centre), Exeter, UK van Vliet M et al (2012) Vulnerability of US and European electricity supply to climate change, Nature Climate Change, 2, 676–681, doi: 10.1038/NCLIMATE1546 van Vuuren D et al (2012) The representative concentration pathways: an overview. Climatic Change. doi:10.1007/s10584-011-0148-z Weaver C et al (2013) Improving the contribution of climate model information to decision making: the value and demands of robust decision frameworks. WIREs Clim Change 4:39–60. doi:10.1002/wcc.202 Willows R, Connell R (2003) Climate adaptation: risk, uncertainty and decision-making. UKCIP technical report. UKCIP, Oxford Yuen E et al (2013) Climate change vulnerability assessments as catalysts for social learning: four case studies in south-eastern Australia. Mitig Adapt Strat Global Change 18:567–590. doi:10.1007/s11027-012-9376-4

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_29-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

The Role of Climate Services in Adapting to Climate Variability and Change Paul Bowyera*, Guy P. Brasseura,b and Daniela Jacoba,c a Helmholtz Zentrum Geesthacht, Climate Service Center, Hamburg, Germany b National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, CO, USA c Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, Hamburg, Germany

Abstract Adaptation to climate change has risen up the political agenda in recent years, as the realization that we are committed to at least some level of climate change over the next few decades has been acknowledged. It is also the case that a range of different economic sectors, both public and private, increasingly recognize the need for, and importance of, adapting to climate change and the need to manage their climate risks. Adaptation to climate change is a complex issue, and successful adaptation will depend on the intelligent use and combination of a range of different factors, including scientific, organizational, social, and governance structures. This chapter focuses on the role that climate services can play in helping organizations and societies adapt to climate change and variability. It provides an overview of the key components of climate services and details the essential functions which climate services must develop, in order to fully play their role in supporting adaptation decisions and thus, helping society adapt to climate change.

Keywords Climate services; Adaptation; Decision support; Risk management; Climate modeling

Introduction There is an increasing demand from society and governments to have access to information related to weather and climate to assist in the development of adaptation responses to climate risks (Parry et al. 2007; DAS 2008; Cane 2010). This demand places greater importance on the need to support and develop appropriate institutions and resources and has helped spur the development of climate services and climate service centers (Barron et al. 2001; Miles et al. 2006; Visbeck 2008; Tollefson 2010). Climate services may be defined as the provision of timely, decision-relevant, actionable, science-based information, and guidance on climate variability and change, and the associated environmental and social impacts, to assist decision makers (users) in the public and private sector in the development of responses to manage their climate risks. The provision and development of such information represents a considerable challenge, and is one that cannot be met by the resources and capacity of one organization alone, and indeed, in some cases might require international collaboration. To develop actionable climate information that can inform adaptation decision making is a challenge for society in general and climate research and climate services in particular.

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_29-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Recognizing this challenge, various international initiatives have been developed recently to support the provision of climate services, in particular the Global Framework on Climate Services (GFCS) from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the Climate Service Partnership (CSP), and the Joint Programming Initiative (JPI). The main aim of the GFCS is to support strong interaction between science and research on the one hand, and communication with stakeholders on the other, to ensure that the climate information is both actionable and usable (Cash et al. 2003; Meinke et al. 2006; Lemos and Rood 2010; Lemos et al. 2012). Additionally, the CSP and JPI go further and advocate for the co-creation of knowledge between users and providers of climate services. Climate services information comprises a range of products and services, including climate observations, climate model forecasts, predictions and projections of possible future climates at a range of timescales (months, seasons, decadal, and centennial), projected environmental and societal impacts, vulnerability and risk assessments, and decision support tools, among others. As such, climate services can offer an end-to-end analysis and presentation of information relevant to adaptation decisions; they will require strong partnerships and networks between all actors concerned and will support the co-production of knowledge on climate-related issues. The disciplinary breadth required from climate services therefore needs to go far beyond that offered by national meteorological and hydrological services (NMHSs), although clearly these organizations have an extremely important role to play. Climate services should therefore be developed and provided by inter- and transdisciplinary teams including climate, environmental, social, and political scientists, economists, and risk and decision theorists, as well as stakeholders. Climate information needs to incorporate strong communication channels between decision makers and knowledge providers, to ensure knowledge exchange, facilitate two-way dialogue and shared learning, particularly in relation to understanding user needs and existing knowledge and the limits and capabilities of the science-based information in meeting them. This chapter provides a discussion of the various elements that are likely to be central to the successful development of climate services, with particular emphasis on the use of climate modeling to support adaptation decision making. The focus is therefore on summarizing key developments, the current state-of-the-art and future prospects for developing seasonal and decadal climate model predictions, and the use of multi-decadal projections of changes in climate. In addition, the need for effective user engagement, and the co-production of knowledge, is argued. Moreover, the institutional challenges including funding of climate services and the role of the public and private sectors in developing climate services are discussed. The chapter finishes with a discussion of the future direction of climate services and conclusions on the current state of climate services and their role in enabling adaptation responses.

Providing Decision-Relevant Climate Information Climate information can be and has been used in both top-down “scenario led” approaches and bottom-up vulnerability approaches to climate risk assessment (Carter et al. 2007; Wilby and Dessai 2010; Weaver et al. 2013; Stern et al. 2013). The top-down approach has been criticized for not providing decision-relevant information, owing to the fact that the analysis is not structured around valued objectives that a given organization may have and also because the range of uncertainty that can be generated may often overwhelm decision makers (Wilby and Dessai 2010). The discussion presented here is based on the methods that are used in the top-down approach, where global and regional climate models are used in connection with impact models. However, it should be stated that the use of model information in itself does not mean that a top-down approach has been Page 2 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_29-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

followed, and the limitations of this approach for providing useful information for developing adaptation strategies is acknowledged. Rather, an explicit recommendation for incorporating the use of climate model information into a bottom-up vulnerability or risk-based approach to developing adaptation strategies is made, whereby climate information is used in relation to answering specific questions about system performance. In doing so, a link between the conventional top-down and the bottom-up approaches is made (Mastrandrea et al. 2010; Weaver et al. 2013). This conceptual difference between the top-down and bottom-up approaches is illustrated in Fig. 1.

Uncertainty and Predictability in Model-Based Information This section reviews the production of model-based climate information at the seasonal to decadal timescales and multi-decadal or centennial projections. The way in which this modeled information can be used in supporting adaptation decision making is discussed in (Bowyer et al. 2014 this volume). The development of future climate information based on global climate model (GCM) outputs is confronted by three sources of uncertainty related to internal variability, uncertainty in the climate response to radiative forcing (model spread in Fig. 2a), and greenhouse gas scenario or emission uncertainty (scenario spread in Fig. 2a). The relative importance of these different sources of uncertainty varies with the timescale considered. As one moves through time, uncertainty increases (Hawkins and Sutton 2009; Kirtman et al. 2013). This has implications for the kind of methodological approaches that are employed to provide useful future climate information at different timescales and the way in uncertainty in each different source needs to be sampled. For the development of future climate information at monthly, seasonal, and interannual timescales, internal variability is the main source of uncertainty, while at decadal timescales model spread and internal variability (e.g., dynamical modes such as El Niño) dominate, with scenario uncertainty playing a relatively minor role. At multi-decadal to centennial timescales, scenario spread is the main source of uncertainty. The skill of model predictions and projections is determined in large part by how well the relevant processes can be represented in the models and how well the different sources of predictability in the climate system can be incorporated. These sources of predictability at different timescales, and in the different Earth system components (ocean, land, atmosphere, cryosphere), are summarized in Fig. 3. Because of the relative importance of different sources of uncertainty at the monthly to seasonal and interannual timescales, the nature of the problem is one of initialization (Shukla 1998), whereas at the centennial scale it is the representation of external forcing (scenario spread) and the climate response to this. At the decadal timescale the problem is thought to be one of initialization and external forcing (Meehl et al. 2009). It is important to state that although novel approaches to initializing the climate system may reduce the uncertainty attributable to internal variability, there will always be uncertainty as a result of the chaotic nature of the Earth’s climate system. Climate information developed at monthly to seasonal to interannual timescales currently derive their skill from the inclusion of in situ and remotely sensed observations of the initial state of the ocean surface and subsurface and the atmosphere (Goddard et al. 2010; Stockdale et al. 2010). These observations are assimilated into coupled atmosphere–ocean climate models, thus sampling the main source of uncertainty in climate predictions at this timescale (Palmer and Anderson 1994; Stockdale et al. 1998; Palmer et al. 2004; Rodwell and Doblas-Reyes 2006; Weisheimer et al. 2009). The skill of seasonal forecasts varies temporally and spatially, however, which is determined by the persistence and power that an initialization contains for making predictions in different areas of the Page 3 of 16

Fig. 1 Top-down scenario, impact-first approach (left panel), and bottom-up vulnerability, thresholds-first approach (right panel) – comparison of stages involved in identifying and evaluating adaptation options under changing climate conditions (Source: Lal et al. 2012)

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_29-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 2 Sources of uncertainty in climate projections. Sources of uncertainty in climate projections as a function of lead time based on an analysis of CMIP5 results. (a) Projections of global mean decadal mean surface air temperature to 2100 together with a quantification of the uncertainty arising from internal variability (orange), model spread (blue), and RCP scenario spread (green). (b) Signal-to-uncertainty ratio for various global and regional averages. The signal is defined as the simulated multi-model mean change in surface air temperature relative to the simulated mean surface air temperature in the period 1986–2005, and the uncertainty is defined as the total uncertainty. (c–f) The fraction of variance explained by each source of uncertainty for global mean decadal and annual mean temperature (c), European (30 N to 75 N, 10 W to 40 E) decadal mean boreal winter (December to February) temperature (d) and precipitation (f), and East Asian (5 N to 45 N, 67.5 E to 130 E) decadal mean boreal summer (June to August) precipitation (e) (Source: Kirtman et al. 2013)

world. To date, the greatest skill in seasonal forecasting has been demonstrated over tropical regions (Palmer et al. 2008; Lavers et al. 2009; Weisheimer et al. 2009), though this skill also changes with the climate variable concerned and also the time of year. Moreover, this skill is greater for climate variables over the ocean than the land surface, raising questions about the usefulness of such forecasts for informing decision making and underlining the importance of reporting skill scores or measures of reliability with the products.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_29-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

A-L-I interaction A-O interaction External forcing

Source of Predictability Solar Radiation Fluctuations Green House Gases Land Use Aerosols Volcanoes AMOC

Conveycr Belt

ENSO Sea Ice Monsoon-WPO/IDO/ZM Water Table Vegetation Soil Moisture Snow Cover Land Heat Content

Atmosphere-ocean internal dynamics

QBO Oceanic Waves MJO/MISV NAM/SAM/NAO/AO

Blocking/Strat-polar vortex TIW CCEW 100 synoptic

101 5~20d

102 20~100d ISV

103 1 yr AC

2~7 yr IAV

104 8~70 yr IDV

105 70~500 yr Centennial

106 500~3000 yr Millennial

107 (days) Orbital

Fig. 3 Sources of predictability in climate modeling. Processes that act as sources of ISI climate predictability extend over a wide range of timescales and involve interactions among the atmosphere, ocean, and land. CCEW convectively coupled equatorial waves, TIW tropical instability wave, MJO/MISV Madden–Julian Oscillation/Monsoon intraseasonal variability, NAM Northern Hemisphere annular mode, SAM Southern Hemisphere annular mode, AO Arctic oscillation, NAO North Atlantic oscillation, QBO quasi-biennial oscillation, IOD/ZM Indian Ocean dipole/zonal mode, AMOC Atlantic meridional overturning circulation. For the y-axis, “A” indicates “atmosphere,” “L” indicates “land,” “I” indicates “ice,” and “O” indicates “ocean” (Source: Adapted from NRC 2010)

On the basis that initialization at monthly to seasonal and interannual timescales contains predictability about the climate system, there has been much recent interest in combining the initialization approach with external forcing, to develop model predictions at the decadal timescale (Haines et al. 2009; Meehl et al. 2009; Keenlyside and Ba 2010). This is a timescale for which there is burgeoning demand, owing to the fact that this is often a timescale which is more closely aligned with the planning horizons of a number of adaptation decisions (Cane 2010). Developing decadal prediction systems has duly seen a significant amount of research over the last few years; however, the use and availability of such predictions remains very much in its infancy, and the approach overall is still very much experimental (Meehl et al. 2010; Tollefson 2013). Initializing with observations of the ocean and atmosphere, and using prescribed radiative forcing, has been shown to improve decadal prediction of global surface temperature anomalies (Smith et al. 2007). Work initializing with information on sea surface temperature, and prescribed radiative forcing, has shown improved surface temperature prediction over the North Atlantic (Keenlyside et al. 2008; Pohlmann et al. 2009). These latter two studies did not, however, report increased skill when hindcasting global mean temperature. Other research has shown that initialization contributes little additional predictability compared to changes in external radiative forcing (Troccoli and Palmer 2007; Meehl et al. 2010; Hermanson and Sutton 2010). Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that under a warming world, the predictive power of initialization will decrease in decadal temperature and precipitation predictions (Boer 2009). Multi-decadal or centennial projections of climate change have seen widespread use and application in the adaptation decision-making process, whether this be for the identification of possible

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_29-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

climate risks or more detailed studies of what future changes may mean for various economic sectors (Vermeulen et al. 2013). Being able to test or validate multi-decadal projections is clearly very difficult, as one would have to wait for a number of years to be able to test this (Allen et al. 2013). Often what is done to test the various different models is to use hindcasting and use an error statistic to represent how skillfully a given model is able to represent recent and historical climate changes. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the use of multi-decadal climate projections in adaptation decision making. This, in addition to the long timescale that is being dealt with, means that there are very large uncertainties associated with the use of these projections. This raises an issue as to how best, or most suitably, to make use of such projections in supporting adaptation decisions (Weaver et al. 2013). Clearly, much more research is required in monthly, seasonal, interannual, and decadal prediction to establish the reliability of these approaches (Hurrell 2008), such that they may prove suitable for use in informing adaptation decision making. The research community is currently addressing this through such activities as the WCRP/CLIVAR Working Group on Seasonal to Interannual Prediction (WGSIP). In addition, the pursuit of the seamless prediction system, whereby processes relevant to sources of predictability are represented at all scales, is one that would be of enormous benefit to climate services in making reliable and useful information available to decision makers (Rodwell and Palmer 2007; Lavers et al. 2009). This vision is one that will require enormous effort and resources, both human and financial (Shukla et al. 2010). Similarly, large investments in land-, ocean-, and space-based observing systems need to be maintained and improved through the work of programs like GCOS, GOOS, GMES, and the Group on Earth Observations (GEO). The assimilation of, for example, subsurface ocean heat content from ARGO floats (Roemmich et al. 2009) will likely yield further advances, but this will also require advances in data assimilation schemes, if potential improvements are to be realized.

Downscaling Model-Based Information Regardless of the timescales and methods used to develop predictions or projections from GCMs (usually at a spatial resolution of 100–300 km), some form of downscaling will be necessary to provide climate information at the regional to local scales (typically less than 50 km), suitable for use with impact models (Wilby and Wigley 1997; Fowler et al. 2007). Downscaling will be needed for a long time in the future since, even with access to the most powerful computer facilities, it is unlikely that global climate models will soon provide information at a spatial resolution that is sufficiently high to meet the needs of most impact models. Given the diversity of uses of regional scale information, it seems sensible that both statistical and dynamical downscaling approaches are adopted, as the relative merits of each are better suited to some applications than others (Déqué et al. 2007; Jacob et al. 2007; van der Linden and Mitchell 2009). For example, dynamical downscaling is more suitable in areas with complex topography and where the local observational data are sparse. In contrast, operational applications where the time frame of analysis is relatively short (e.g., seasonal forest fire risk) may dictate that more computationally efficient statistical downscaling is used. Further, it is currently not possible to say conclusively that one method is better than another. In light of the foregoing discussion, the choice of downscaling method should be guided by the climatic region, local topography, variables of interest, and application to which the results are to be put. However, regardless of which method is used to downscale, all results will ultimately be limited

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_29-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

by the accuracy of the driving boundary conditions supplied by the GCM, and as such, research priorities in global modeling are also relevant to the regional models (Schiermeier 2010).

Model Quality Assessment If users are to apply climate and impact model information to their adaptation decision-making process, they will rightly ask and need to know: are the models any good? Can they be trusted? Which one should I use? Climate service providers need to be able to answer these questions. This issue is related to model skill, and the development of model quality metrics, and is an increasingly important research area (Glecklers et al. 2008; Knutti et al. 2010). Model skill or performance is typically evaluated with respect to how closely the model simulation corresponds to observations, quantified via some error statistic, e.g., RMSE (Murphy et al. 2004; Reichler and Kim 2008; Flato et al. 2013). This approach is suitable for quantifying the skill of monthly to seasonal forecasts. However, for decadal to centennial timescales, this approach is less suitable, due to a lack of sufficient observations at these timescales. Moreover, it doesn’t automatically follow that a model that performs well with respect to past and recent climatology will have future predictive skill. Although there is some evidence that strong relationships do exist between past and future trends (Boer 2009), in the main, this is not the case (Knutti et al. 2010). The evaluation of model performance at decadal (and longer) timescales thus needs to be evaluated against longer timescale data (palaeoclimate data), and how well key climate processes and feedbacks are represented, in addition to observations, if a broader level of evidential support is to be established for the credibility of models at these timescales. Moreover, these evaluations need to be made over a number of different climate variables and for different statistical properties (e.g., mean state, variability amplitude) and at a range of time and space scales. Having calculated model performance metrics, how are users able to make sense of them in determining model quality? Currently, there is no clear set of metrics which are commonly agreed to serve as useful indicators of overall model quality. Accordingly, it is important when trying to distinguish between different models that more than one metric is used to establish model quality, because a model that simulates one variable well may simulate other variables less well. Therefore, a range of different metrics should be used, and the actual assessment of model quality should be determined on a case-by-case basis, according to the performance of a given model with respect to the key variables and processes that are key to the accurate simulation of the intended application (Wilby and Harris 2006; Flato et al. 2013). This also raises the question of which impacts models are most accurate and thus suited for purpose? This reinforces the importance of quantifying uncertainty along the model chain from GCMs through to the impacts models themselves. Clearly, there is a long way to go before a commonly agreed set of metrics for evaluation of model quality can be determined and that are application specific. The challenge of communicating these metrics to users, however, will require that the metrics are relatively simple to calculate.

Communication and User Engagement Challenges For climate services to be useful and usable, i.e., provide decision-relevant information, it is imperative that a sustained two-way dialogue is established between providers and users to support the co-generation of knowledge (Lemos et al. 2012). The best science in the world may “sit on the shelf” and be irrelevant, if users are not able to make use of the knowledge. There has been research Page 8 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_29-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

to suggest that there are three essential elements to ensuring “actionable” climate knowledge (Cash et al. 2003; Meinke et al. 2006). These essential elements are saliency (the perceived relevance of the information), credibility (the perceived technical quality of the information), and legitimacy (the perceived objectivity of the process by which the information has been produced). A related issue to the development of actionable knowledge is that the usability of any products developed should integrate smoothly with existing management structure systems (Lemos et al. 2012). This provides a useful framework within which to discuss user engagement in relation to climate services. To ensure salient climate information is developed, demands that the climate-related problems faced by different economic sectors are well known and explained before product development is embarked upon. This requires the gathering of key people and decision makers from the different economic sectors, together with scientists and other experts, to engage them in a discussion and to learn about their problems. This engagement should be a proper discussion of the issues and possibilities for development of climate products, such that the process is much more than simply asking users what they want. A good example of where such an exchange has taken place is the US Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), whereby a large number of “Listening Sessions” have been held to garner the views of key stakeholders in helping to shape the USGCRP, thus ensuring user-relevant research programs, and user buy-in to subsequent developments. Institutes developing climate services will require to implement these and similar kinds of mechanisms. Furthermore, saliency will relate to the provision of easily accessible and understandable products. Credibility in the development of climate information and products demands that efforts are made to report and inform on the reliability of different products, both in relation to the methodological approach and the subsequent model results. This underscores the importance of sustained research efforts in the development of model and product quality metrics. Establishing credibility in the products also requires that the institutes and centers that are developing and delivering products are themselves credible. This relates to being open and honest in discussions and genuinely informing and building capacity with users. This will help to build trust, which in turn will aid credibility. The legitimacy of the process by which climate information and products are developed is related to the way in which the needs of different users have been considered and realized in the final product. This involves having a sustained, mature, constructive, two-way dialogue between users and providers that facilitates the co-production of knowledge, where users can make their needs clear and providers can explain the status of the science to meet these needs, and the implications for possible product development. Only by doing this will users buy into the information and products that are subsequently developed. This issue of legitimacy also relates to the perceived independence of the organizations developing or delivering the climate products and is an issue related to the kind of organizational and institutional framework within which climate services are situated and associated funding models. Ensuring actionable products are delivered will thus demand a large investment of time and effort on the part of both users and providers, and developing this partnership will be critical to the success of climate services. Another key aspect of user engagement is open and honest discussion of the limitations associated with various climate products and their suitability for, and practical use in, decision making and policy development (Lempert et al. 2004; Lemos and Rood 2010). This discussion of limitations should be accompanied by the provision of advice, training, and genuine knowledge exchange between experts and users with real-world problems. Educating users about limitations, and the appropriate use of observations and climate model information, provides an advisory and consultative function for climate services, which, done well, should reduce the chance of unrealistic expectations on the part of users. Successful user engagement will also depend on the use and development of clear and unambiguous language, so that experts and non-experts alike can Page 9 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_29-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

understand each other. Accordingly, effective communication is a major task for climate services. Moreover, close collaboration between users and climate services will be essential for the identification of critical thresholds, current coping ranges and vulnerability, and how adaptive measures can help manage current and future climate risks (Jones and Mearns 2005).

Institutional and Organizational Challenges While a number of developments are underway in developing climate services, there are various challenges that need to be overcome, if climate services are to play their full role in supporting adaptation decision making. To be successful, climate services cannot be isolated from the research community and user needs. The quality of the products to be developed by these services is directly dependent on advances made by the fundamental and applied science. Strong ties between climate services and research institutions are therefore essential. Climate services make use of information derived from observations and model projections. It is perhaps insufficiently stressed that there is a need to improve access to data and to develop a more integrated monitoring and data management system (Stern et al. 2013). At the same time, the development by the international research community of the next-generation high-resolution Earth system models (Shapiro et al. 2010) and analysis systems requires the development of interdisciplinary teams and dedicated access to state-of-the-art supercomputers. In parallel to these scientific and technical developments, more resources will have to be invested in the analysis of observation and modeling data (to ensure quality control), the development of integrated assessments, risk management and in economic evaluations of adaptation policies. The provision of suitable infrastructure for running the very high-resolution Earth system models, and handling the very large data sets that will be generated, is an area where the private sector has an important role to play, in ensuring that climate services can be successfully developed. In addition, significant resources will need to be invested in ensuring that these data sets are translated into products and information that are easily accessible and understandable to users. This development will require the close collaboration of scientists and users, and this is a function that will likely best be performed by climate service centers and similar organizations. The private sector will also need to collaborate as users. The climate risks that an organization may face will vary with the type of business and location. Tourism, energy, agriculture, and water, for example, operate where supply, demand, and price fluctuate considerably with weather conditions. Investments are considerably affected in areas prone to frequent drought, flooding, and other extreme events. In the long term, proactive responses of business to climate-related risks and the early implementation of adaptation measures will likely confer competitive advantage. The information provided by climate services must be objective, legitimate, authoritative, and relevant and thus independent of economically driven pressures. Transparent interactions with the private sector, however, must be established so that decision makers better appreciate climate risks in their business activities and thus their relevance for the success of their business (Ruth 2010). The financial arrangements in support of climate services must ensure the intellectual, economic, and political independence of the groups generating knowledge and disseminating information. Sustained public funding is therefore a requirement for many of the activities conducted by climate services. The development of constructive interfaces between the services and the users remains, however, a challenge. A possible solution is to create small start-up private companies that work directly with businesses and corporations, regional governments, municipalities, and other local communities (Brooks 2013). These companies would develop joint projects with their customers, Page 10 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_29-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

address their specific needs, and provide tailored information to facilitate future planning and investments. Even with such institutional arrangements that clearly separate the respective roles of the public and the private sectors, communicating complex and evolving information in terms that are easily understood remains a challenge. There is a long way to go between the production of scientific knowledge by the research community and, for example, the implementation of adaptation measures by the different economic sectors. The psychological and procedural aspects of the communication process also need to be considered (Pidgeon and Bischhoff 2011). It is therefore crucial to develop efficient and targeted communication channels that highlight the economic benefits for corporations and other entities to immediately prepare themselves for climate change. Finally, the international dimension of climate services is of crucial importance. Observation infrastructures operate at the local to global scale, and data exchange is of primary importance. Supercomputing facilities may also need to be shared between different research and operational groups from different countries. In addition, in the same way that the national meteorological services from all countries cooperate, it is important that similar institutional partnerships be established to deal with climate information, risk assessments, and adaptation policies. One way in which this could be organized would be to have five or six regional centers distributed around the world, with the dedicated focus of developing research to support climate service activities internationally. International discussions should lead to a better assessment of the demand from society, the need and role of climate services, sustainable funding mechanisms, quality data and information, targeted scientific research and innovation, systematic knowledge exchange, and capacity building.

Conclusion The development of climate services that play their full role in helping society to respond and adapt to climate variability and change faces many challenges. At the heart of climate services is strong communication between users and providers, ensuring that actionable climate information is delivered. This will only be possible, with a committed and concerted effort on the part of users in the private and public sectors, researchers, government, and society in general. This effort will only be assured when the size and urgency of the adaptation challenge is widely recognized and acted on. This is likely to require some form of legislation, regulation, and incentives to promote a response, e.g., in ensuring that building standards and codes require that possible future climates are considered in the design phase. For climate services to be successful, they will need to demonstrate that they can meet the needs of users and thus contribute value to adaptation decisions. The use of climate observations and centennial timescale model projections has already demonstrated their value in a number of adaptation responses. For seasonal and decadal timescale model predictions to also provide value to users, however, clearly requires much more research. At present, the state of the science in seasonal, interannual, to decadal predictions is such that it may well be several years and possibly decades before scientifically reliable products can be delivered the world over, at all times of year, and for a wide range of climate variables and spatial scales. Despite this, there are already operational seasonal forecasts generated by, for example, the European Centre for Medium Range Weather Forecasting (ECMWF) and the National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) in the USA, which are applied to a range of activities and from which users derive value.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_29-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Regardless of the timescale, deriving value from climate information will need to be patiently constructed and will only be possible through the close collaboration, shared learning, and knowledge exchange between users and providers over a sustained period of time (Brooks 2013). With respect to downscaling to regional scales, there is much research still to be done in both the global and regional modelling communities. This will likely be achieved through increased resolution and better process representation. In addition, advances in the development of model quality metrics will be needed for a range of different application areas, before users can make a truly informed choice on the types of products they may like to make use of and the range of uncertainty to be expected. Clearly, these issues demand significant investment in fundamental research. The way in which uncertainty is dealt with is a major issue for making decisions in relation to adaptation. Given the number of different models and the cascade of uncertainty from the global to regional scales through impact models, and the possibility that uncertainty can increase as models become more complex, users need to carefully structure their analyses and assessments based on a careful consideration of the decision context. In addition, advances are needed in the development of dynamically coupled and integrated assessment models, to more realistically simulate the real world, and the interactions between climate, socioeconomics, and the environment (F€ ussel 2010; Nobre et al. 2010). Given the large range of uncertainty from models, together with the fact that there are many uncertainties that are not quantified, necessitates the need for robust adaptation, where decision makers seek flexibility and strategies that perform well across a range of different future climates, rather than striving for optimality (Bowyer et al. 2014 this volume, Weaver et al. 2013). Climate services offer much potential to help support adaptation to climate variability and change. There is strong institutional support at the global level through the GFCS, CSP, and other initiatives, and this is being accompanied by strong support in a number of countries around the world. Sustaining these activities will require long-term commitment and significant investment in fundamental research, observation platforms, institutions, user engagement, and capacity building, if this potential is to be realized.

Acknowledgments The authors acknowledge Roger Wakimoto, Rick Anthes, and Mel Shapiro for providing helpful comments on a previous version of the manuscript. The German Climate Service Center is funded by the Bundesministerium for Education and Research (BMBF), under contract number FZK: 01LK0903A. The National Center for Atmospheric Research is sponsored by the US National Science Foundation.

References Allen MA, Mitchell JFB, Stott PA (2013) Test of a decadal climate forecast. Nat Geosci 6:243–244 Barron EJ et al (2001) A climate services vision: first steps toward the future. Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, National Research Council, National Academies Press, Washington, DC. ISBN 0-309-07633-1, 2001 Boer GJ (2009) Changes in interannual variability and decadal potential predictability under global warming. J Clim 22:3098–3109 Brooks MS (2013) Accelerating innovation in climate services. Bull Am Meteorol Soc. doi:10.1175/ BAMS-D-12-00087.1 Page 12 of 16

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Bowyer P et al. (2014) Adaptation as climate risk management, Chapter 28 in Leal W Climate Change Adaptation Manual Cane MA (2010) Climate science: decadal predictions in demand. Nat Geosci 3:231–232 Carter TR et al (2007) New assessment methods and the characterisation of future conditions. In: Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 134–171 Cash DW et al (2003) Knowledge systems for sustainable development. Proc Natl Acad Sci 100(14):8086–8091 DAS (2008) German strategy for adaptation to climate change. http://www.bmu.de/english/climate/ downloads/doc/42841.php. Accessed 1 Dec 2010 Déqué M et al (2007) An intercomparison of regional climate simulations for Europe: assessing uncertainties in model projections. Clim Change 81:53–70 Flato G, Marotzke J, Abiodun B, Braconnot P, Chou SC, Collins W, Cox P, Driouech F, Emori S, Eyring V, Forest C, Gleckler P, Guilyardi E, Jakob C, Kattsov V, Reason C, Rummukainen M (2013) Evaluation of climate models. In: Stocker TF, Qin D, Plattner G-K, Tignor M, Allen SK, Boschung J, Nauels A, Xia Y, Bex V, Midgley PM (eds) Climate change 2013: the physical science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK/New York Fowler HJ, Blenkinsop S, Tebaldi C (2007) Linking climate change modelling to impacts studies: recent advances in downscaling techniques for hydrological modelling. Int J Climatol 27:1547–1578 F€ ussel HM (2010) Modelling impacts and adaptation in integrated assessment models. WIRE Clim Change 1:288–303 Glecklers PJ, Taylor KE, Doutriaux C (2008) Performance metrics for climate models. J Geophys Res 113, D06104. doi:10.1029/2007JD008972 Goddard L et al. (2010) Providing seasonal-to-interannual climate information for risk management and decision making. Proc Env Sci 1:81–101 Haines K, Hermanson L, Liu C, Putt D, Sutton R, Iwi A, Smith D (2009) Decadal climate prediction (project GCEP). Philos Trans R Soc Lond A 367:925–937 Hawkins E, Sutton R (2009) The potential to narrow uncertainty in regional climate predictions. Bull Am Meteorol Soc 90:1095–1107 Hermanson L, Sutton RT (2010) Case studies in interannual to decadal climate predictability. Clim Dyn 35:1169–1189 Hurrell JW (2008) Decadal climate prediction: challenges and opportunities. J Phys conf series 125, doi:10.1088/1742-6596/125/1/012018 Jacob D et al (2007) An inter-comparison of regional climate models for Europe: model performance in present day climate. Clim Change 81:31–52 Jones RN, Mearns LO (2005) Assessing future climate risks. In: Lim B, Spanger-Siegfried E, Burton I, Malone E, Huq S (eds) Adaptation policy frameworks for climate change: developing strategies, policies and measures. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York, pp 91–118 Keenlyside NS, Ba J (2010) Prospects for decadal climate prediction. WIREs Clim Change 1:627–635 Keenlyside NS, Latif M, Jungclaus J, Kornblueh L, Roeckner E (2008) Advancing decadal-scale climate prediction in the North Atlantic sector. Nature 453:84–88 Kirtman B, Power SB, Adedoyin JA, Boer GJ, Bojariu R, Camilloni I, Doblas-Reyes FJ, Fiore AM, Kimoto M, Meehl GA, Prather M, Sarr A, Sch€ar C, Sutton R, van Oldenborgh GJ, Vecchi G, Wang HJ (2013) Near-term climate change: projections and predictability. In: Stocker TF, Qin D, Page 13 of 16

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Plattner G-K, Tignor M, Allen SK, Boschung J, Nauels A, Xia Y, Bex V, Midgley PM (eds) Climate change 2013: the physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK/New York Knutti R, Furrer R, Tebaldi C, Cermak J, Meehl GA (2010) Challenges in combining projections from multiple climate models. J Clim 23:2739–2758. doi:10.1175/2009JCLI3361.1 Lal PN, Mitchell T, Aldunce P, Auld H, Mechler R, Miyan A, Romano LE, Zakaria S (2012) National systems for managing the risks from climate extremes and disasters. In: Field CB, Barros V, Stocker TF, Qin D, Dokken DJ, Ebi KL, Mastrandrea MD, Mach KJ, Plattner G-K, Allen SK, Tignor M, Midgley PM (eds) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation. A special report of working groups I and II of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK/New York, pp 339–392 Lavers D, Luo L, Wood EF (2009) A multiple model assessment of seasonal climate forecast skill for applications. Geophys Res Lett 36, L23711 Lemos MC, Rood RB (2010) Climate projections and their impact on policy and practice. WIRE Clim Change 1:670–682 Lemos MC et al (2012) Narrowing the climate information usability gap. Nat Clim Change 2(11):789–794. doi:10.1038/NCLIMATE1614 Lempert R, Nakicenovic N, Sarewitz D, Schlesinger M (2004) Characterizing climate-change uncertainties for decision makers. Clim Change 65:1–9 Mastrandrea MD et al (2010) Bridging the gap: linking climate-impacts research with adaptation planning and management. Clim Change 100:87–101. doi:10.1007/s10584-010-9827-4 Meehl GA et al (2009) Decadal prediction, can it be skilful? Bull Am Meteorol Soc 90:1467–1485 Meehl GA, Hu A, Tebaldi C (2010) Decadal prediction in the Pacific region. J Clim 23:2959–2973 Meinke H, Nelson R, Kokic P, Stone R, Selvaraju R, Baethgen W (2006) Actionable climate knowledge: from analysis to synthesis. Clim Res 33:101–110 Miles EL et al (2006) An approach to designing a national climate service. Proc Natl Acad Sci 103:19616–19623 Murphy JM et al (2004) Quantification of modelling uncertainties in a large ensemble of climate change simulations. Nature 430:768–772 Nobre C et al (2010) Addressing the complexity of the Earth system. Bull Am Meteorol Soc 91:1389–1396 NRC (2010) Assessment of intraseasonal to interannual climate prediction and predictability. The National Academies Press, Washington DC, USA, ISBN 978-0-309-15183-2 Palmer TN, Anderson DLT (1994) The prospects for seasonal forecasting – a review paper. Quart J R Met Soc 120:755–793 Palmer TN et al (2004) Development of a European multimodel ensemble system for seasonal-tointerannual prediction (DEMETER). Bull Am Meteorol Soc 85:853–872 Palmer TN, Doblas-Reyes FJ, Weisheimer A, Rodwell MJ (2008) Toward seamless prediction, calibration of climate change projections using seasonal forecasts. Bull Am Meteorol Soc 90:1549–1551 Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) (2007) Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Pidgeon N, Bischhoff B (2011) The role of social and decision sciences in communicating uncertain climate risks. Nat Clim Change 1:35–41. doi:10.1038/nclimate1080 Page 14 of 16

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Pohlmann H, Jungclaus JH, Köhl A, Stammer D, Marottzke J (2009) Initializing decadal climate predictions with the GECCO oceanic synthesis: effects on the North Atlantic. J Clim 22:3926–3938 Reichler T, Kim J (2008) How well do coupled models simulate today’s climate? Bull Am Meteorol Soc 89(3):303–311 Rodwell MJ, Doblas-Reyes FJ (2006) Medium-range, monthly and seasonal prediction for Europe and the use of forecast information. J Clim 19:6025–6046 Rodwell MJ, Palmer TN (2007) Using numerical weather prediction to assess climate models. Quart J R Met Soc 133:129–146 Roemmich D et al (2009) ARGO the challenge of continuing 10 years of progress. Oceanography 22(3):46–55 Ruth M (2010) Economic and social benefits of climate information: assessing the cost of inaction. Proc Env Sci 1:387–394 Schiermeier Q (2010) The real holes in climate science. Nature 463:284–287 Shapiro M et al (2010) An Earth-system prediction initiative for the twenty-first century. Bull Am Meteorol Soc 91:1377–1388 Shukla J (1998) Predictability in the midst of chaos: a scientific basis for climate forecasting. Science 282:728–731 Shukla J et al (2010) Toward a new generation of world climate research and computing facilities. Bull Am Meteorol Soc 91:1407–1412 Stern PC et al (2013) Managing risk with climate vulnerability science. Nat Clim Change 3:607–609 Stockdale TN, Anderson DLT, Alves JOS, Balmaseda MA (1998) Global seasonal rainfall forecasts using a coupled ocean–atmosphere model. Nature 392:370–373 Stockdale TN et al (2010) Understanding and predicting seasonal-to-interannual climate variability – the producer perspective. Tollefson J (2010) US prepares for climate burden, Nature, 465:535 Smith DM et al. (2007) Improved surface temperature prediction for the coming decade from a global climate model. Sci 317:796–799 Tollefson J (2013) The forecast for 2018 is cloudy with record heat. Nature 499:139–141 Troccoli A, Palmer TN (2007) Ensemble decadal predictions from analysed initial conditions. Philos Trans R Soc Lond A 365:2179–2191 van der Linden P, Mitchell JFB (eds) (2009) ENSEMBLES: climate change and its impacts: summary of research and results from the ENSEMBLES project. Met Office Hadley Centre, Exeter Vermeulen et al (2013) Addressing uncertainty in adaptation planning for agriculture. Proc Natl Acad Sci 110(21):8357–8362. doi:10.1073/pnas.1219441110 Visbeck M (2008) From climate assessment to climate services. Nat Geosci 1:2–3 Weaver C et al (2013) Improving the contribution of climate model information to decision making: the value and demands of robust decision frameworks. WIRE Clim Change 4:39–60. doi:10.1002/wcc.202 Weisheimer A et al (2009) ENSEMBLES: a new multi-model ensemble for seasonal-to-annual predictions – skill and progress beyond DEMETER in forecasting tropical Pacific SSTs. Geophys Res Lett 36, L21711 Wilby RL, Dessai S (2010) Robust adaptation to climate change. Weather 65(7):180–185. doi:10.1002/wea.543

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Wilby R, Harris I (2006) A framework for assessing uncertainties in climate change impacts: low flow scenarios for the river Thames, UK. Water Resour Res 42, W02419. doi:10.1029/ 2005WR004065 Wilby RL, Wigley TML (1997) Downscaling general circulation model output: a review of methods and limitations. Progr Phys Geogr 21:530–548

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_31-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions for the Dairy Sector in Malawi: Needs and Opportunities Irina Arakelyan* and Dominic Moran Scotland’s Rural College (SRUC), Edinburgh, Scotland

Abstract Developing country agriculture makes a significant contribution to climate change, and the sector offers considerable potential for exploring synergies and trade-offs between mitigation, food security, and poverty reduction. But few developing countries will adopt unfunded measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions if they compromise development and growth. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) have been mooted as a means to develop possible funding modalities either within the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC), from aid donors, or other parties seeking to fund emissions offsets in low-income countries. This chapter explores the identification of climate-smart practices that might be included under the definition of agricultural NAMAs. It outlines elements relevant to the development of triple-win agricultural NAMAs in the smallholder dairy sector in Malawi and offers survey evidence identifying pro-poor mitigation practices, technologies, and policies for the dairy sector by assessing the current baseline and analyzing barriers to growth.

Keywords Mitigation; Greenhouse gas emissions; Nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs)

Introduction Climate change seriously compromises food security in some of the least developed countries, and there is an urgent need to enhance local adaptive capacity to minimize impacts and to maintain the required levels of food production (Rosenzweig and Tubiello 2007). Agriculture is also a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions, estimated to be around 10–14 % of the global total (Smith et al. 2007a), and it is the largest source of non-CO2 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (De Pinto et al. 2013). To meet the demands of a growing world population, agricultural production also needs to grow, and in the absence of a stepchange in the emissions intensity per unit product, this will almost inevitably lead to an increase in GHG emissions and in the sector’s contribution to climate change (The Meridian Institute 2011). Assuming the sector can adapt, one of the most important areas where trade-offs might occur in coming decades is between GHG mitigation and food security. Recent research has shown that agriculture offers significant mitigation opportunities. Smith et al. (2007b) estimate the global technical GHG mitigation potential for agriculture by 2030 to be about 5,500–6,600 Mt CO2-eq. per year, with around 70 % of this potential thought to be in developing countries (CCAFS 2012b) and much of it potentially achievable at low cost. But realizing this potential will be challenging since under UNFCCC, non-Annex 1 (including most developing) countries do not *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_31-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

have to subscribe to binding emissions targets, and even if they did, agricultural emissions are a particularly complex source to regulate in all contexts. Some countries such as Brazil have identified potential business opportunities in undertaking mitigation actions as part of an agenda to maintain a business edge in important livestock export sectors (BMA 2010). But the mitigation agenda also opens the potential for global aid transfers to affect low-cost mitigation in lower-income countries that could be convergent with development objectives. Agriculture is a conduit for affecting the well-being of a large proportion of the world’s poorest. But it is also biophysically heterogeneous and institutionally diverse between countries and regions, conditions that complicate the definition of climate-smart interventions. Nevertheless, agricultural systems can be better designed to include farm management measures that combine complementary mitigation, adaptation, and food security or poverty alleviation outcomes. These can build on practices and technologies that are already available but need to be tailored to specific contexts including smallholder systems that characterize the sector in many developing countries. A key point is that these actions must offer a net benefit to farmers and be easily incorporated within farm practice. But mitigation actions are also likely to require incentives to help farmers adapt their practices. These incentives should provide demonstrable benefits in order to be successful. Agriculture is the main economic activity in Malawi (Malawi Government 2011a). Food security has been a government strategic priority for the last few decades, and sectoral policy has been strongly focused on increasing food security at the household level, via improving access to essential inputs (Malawi Government GoM 2011b). Rain-fed agriculture practiced by the majority of smallholders is particularly vulnerable to climate change and the increasing incidence of droughts and erratic rainfall (99 % of 3 million ha of agricultural land in Malawi are rain dependent; FAO 2011). Changing weather patterns have led to an increase in food security risks (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 2011), with the country applying for an emergency food relief as a result of the droughts in 2001 and 2005. With the climate threat, Malawian farmers need to diversify their agricultural practices in order to have access to a reliable income stream and to maintain food security. The dairy sector is ideal for this, since it is less weather dependent than arable cropping. Assisting the development of the dairy industry in Malawi could have a positive impact on the livelihoods of the rural population which is the poorest in the country. Despite the present danger of climate change in Malawi, there is concern that the policies and measures needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions may impede the country’s economic growth. The main challenge therefore is to control greenhouse gas emissions without negative impacts on the economy (van Asselt et al. 2010). Agricultural adaptation and (pro-poor) mitigation agendas are thus convergent in a country like Malawi, which offers a context to explore so-called climate-smart interventions. These can be defined to encompass actions that will help implement these technologies on the ground, or via, for example, policy interventions at the national level or via regional projects (e.g., supply chains) that can nevertheless deliver local benefits. The remainder of this chapter reviews issues of mitigation in the dairy sector and reflects on synergies with increasing food security and adaptation. It considers the development of a potential financing mechanism – agricultural nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) – in the dairy sector. The chapter is structured as follows. Section “Background” provides background on the links between animal agriculture and climate change. It describes the current situation in the Malawian dairy sector and outlines potential opportunities for the development of dairy sector NAMAs. Section “Materials and Methods” provides information on survey data collected to understand farming practices and attitudes to climate change and presents results and discussion. Conclusions and implications are discussed in section “Results and Discussion.”

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_31-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Background The Role of Livestock in Climate Change Livestock are a significant source of GHG emissions including the largest source of global methane emissions from manure and enteric fermentation and N2O from manure. Both gases have global warming potentials considerably higher than CO2. In a comprehensive life cycle assessment (LCA), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has estimated that the sector contributes approximately 18 % (7.1 billion tons of CO2 equivalent) of total GHG emissions (FAO 2006). A growing world population, predicted to reach 9 billion by 2050, will lead to an increase in the demand for livestock products with the corresponding increase in GHG emissions (Gerber 2010). The increase in livestock populations is predicted to happen mainly in the developing world, where there are currently fewer opportunities for emissions mitigation. The impacts of the increase in food production on climate change are likely to be significant. Adopting mitigation and adaptation strategies that simultaneously reduce the worst impacts of climate change on the livestock-based systems, while reducing the contribution of these systems to climate change, is therefore essential. Within the livestock sector, rapid growth in dairy production is significant in terms of its impact on climate change and the environment. FAO estimated that in 2007, the contribution of global milk production, processing, and transportation to total anthropogenic emissions (excluding meat) was estimated at 2.7 % of total anthropogenic GHG emissions reported by IPCC (FAO 2010). The study shows that emissions per unit of milk product vary greatly across regions, with the highest emissions estimated for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with an average of 9.0 kg CO2-eq per kg fat and protein-corrected milk (FPCM) at the farm gate. This compares to a global average estimated at 2.8 kg CO2-eq (FAO 2013c). This disparity exists because of low protein production in SSA – ruminants have a very high emission intensity and low protein output (i.e., low milk production) leading to higher emissions per kg of milk in SSA than in North America or Western Europe (FAO 2013c). But there are challenges in terms of designing interventions to redress this difference. Firstly, relative to other sectors (e.g., transport and energy), emission mitigation in agriculture is biophysically more complex and dependent on specific farm conditions. Moreover, trying to address the actions of millions of smallholders confronts behavioral and socioeconomic barriers that need to be understood in order to facilitate monitoring and verification of emission reductions.

Smallholders and Climate-Smart Practices Smallholder agriculture is still the main economic activity in much of SSA, the livelihoods of millions being closely linked to farming (Pye-Smith 2011). Economic vulnerability is influenced by the quality of the natural resource base. But smallholders are often unable to practice sustainable land management, either due to a lack of resources or know-how (Havemann and Muccione 2011). Smallholder systems can potentially play an important role in both mitigation and adaptation to climate change. Whereas they may be inclined to perceive private benefits to adaptation, smallholders are unlikely to be motivated to reduce emissions without demonstrable net benefit or an incentive (Havemann and Muccione 2011). This is particularly so if such action requires a change from current practices. Net benefits can be tangible, for example, an increased profit from their agricultural activities achievable in a relatively short time frame, risk reduction, or payment for environmental services (PES), the latter involving cash payments to the smallholder to take part in conservation activities. Benefits linked to mitigation can also be indirect, such as access to training programs and institutional support, for example, through cooperative organization, extension services, and increased tenure security (Havemann and Muccione 2011).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_31-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Further, even though a failure to reduce agricultural GHG emissions would put future food security at risk, no government will adopt measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions if they threaten a nation’s current ability to feed its population (Pye-Smith 2011). The main challenge is to increase food production without increasing (or even reducing) greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural activities. Thus, the recent focus on climate-smart agriculture (CSA), a relatively new term that describes a range of practices that could increase food production, helps farmers to become more resilient to climate change and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (Pye-Smith 2011). FAO (2012) define “climate-smart” technologies as those delivering multiple benefits, specifically, “food security and development benefits together with climate change adaptation and mitigation co-benefits.” The implementation of CSA does not presuppose a unique role for smallholders, and the challenges of monitoring actions on thousands of holdings add substance to arguments about the relative inefficiency of small-scale production (Collier and Dercon 2009). But smallholdings occupy large areas of land offering potentially cost-effective mitigation potential, and associated financing offers the potential for poverty alleviation. Unlocking this through climate-smart practices will require considerable investment, institutional and financial support, and capacity building. In many countries, these climate-smart practices can potentially be developed under NAMAs.

NAMAs as a Financing Mechanism for Mitigating Climate Change To date, agricultural mitigation has not been a focus of international negotiation in developed or developing countries. The costs related to the adoption of mitigation practices, as well as potential difficulties associated with the monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of mitigation measures all contribute to maintaining agriculture’s position as a non-priority sector for climate change mitigation (FAO 2013b). Recognizing the mitigation potential available in non-Annex 1, the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC 2008) following COP 13 introduced a funding modality that potentially allows developing countries to propose voluntary mitigation actions termed NAMAs, which may be verified for potential bilateral or multilateral funding. NAMAs can be described as actions that contribute to the economic development of the country without contributing further to climate change or, indeed, reducing GHG emissions from a given sector (Wang-Helmreich et al. 2011). UNFCCC (2010) describe NAMAs as voluntary mitigation actions undertaken by developing countries “in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner, aimed at achieving a deviation in emissions relative to “business as usual” emissions in 2020” (CCAFS 2012b). Three main types of NAMAs have been described: unilateral NAMAs involving actions that a country plans to pursue for reasons other than reductions in GHG emissions; conditional/supported NAMAs that would only be agreed by a developing country if developed countries provide financial or technological support; and credited/market-oriented NAMAs that can generate credits that will be sold on the global carbon market (CCAP 2009). Each of these three types of NAMAs can be project based, sector based, or at a national scale. NAMAs are expected to be assessed based on the performance and to be linked to real and measurable emission reductions. Apart from unilateral NAMAs, the other two types involve high costs and stringent MRV requirements. Where NAMAs are implemented with international support, they are subject to both national and international measurement, reporting, and verification (CCAFS 2012a). There are no defined rules for international support to NAMAs, but it is clear that public sector finance alone will not be able to fully finance NAMAs in developing countries, and private sector involvement will be necessary (CCAFS 2012a). Although NAMAs are expected to contribute towards mitigation, they should not be independent of a developing country’s national priorities, such as poverty alleviation and economic growth (Upadhyaya Page 4 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_31-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

2012). This raises an obvious question about the definition of potential agricultural sector NAMAs that can be anticipated as a promising instrument for advancing climate change abatement policies (FAO 2012). Agricultural NAMAs can provide additional resources for agriculture with multiple benefits, including adaptation, food security, and sustainable development, i.e., they should not be considered in isolation as a stand-alone mitigation tool. Adding further to the related nomenclature, some commentators suggest that NAMAs may become Nationally Appropriate Climate-Smart Actions (NACSAs) and, potentially, be incorporated in the country’s National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). The question is how to ensure that these multiple objectives are achieved simultaneously (Upadhyaya 2012). Some countries have been proactive in proposing agricultural NAMAs, motives of which vary. NAMAs are regarded as an entry point for a transition to a low-carbon development or green growth path, or they are seen as an opportunity to access new sources of finance for sustainable development; in some cases agricultural mitigation is needed to meet voluntary national emission reduction. To date, mitigation actions in the agricultural sector are mentioned in 40 % of NAMA submissions (21 out of 55 country submissions) to the UNFCCC Secretariat, mainly by African countries (CCAFS 2012b; FAO 2013b). These focus on agricultural technologies and practices, including the restoration of degraded grazing land, the use of improved seed varieties, agroforestry, application of composts, and minimum or no-tillage, all of which provide some ancillary adaptation benefits. Increasing agricultural productivity is at the center of the majority of proposed NAMAs. Malawi has been active in exploring the potential for agricultural NAMAs, with a 2012 UNFCCC submission proposing actions on biogas for energy and manure waste management (Malawi Government 2011b, 2012a, b). As yet, there is no specific analysis to guide the potential inclusion of the dairy sector though its mitigation potential is recognized.

The Development of the Dairy Sector in Malawi The Malawian dairy sector is still in its infancy and makes a small contribution to the livestock subsector (livestock accounts for approximately 10 % of the country’s agricultural gross domestic product (GDP) (National Statistical Office of Malawi 2012); but the exact contribution of the dairy sector to the GDP has not been estimated). The sector mainly relies for milk supply on smallholder farmers who normally own between one and four dairy cows (Chitika 2008). Most dairy farmers are situated around the three large cities in Malawi: Blantyre (the Southern Region), Lilongwe (Central Region), and Mzuzu (the Northern Region), where they are organized into milk bulking groups (MBGs) (see Fig. 1). These groups are local farmer associations with cooling centers where milk is centrally collected from farmers within a radius of 8–10 km. Recent data suggest that there are currently around 16,000 smallholder dairy farmers in the milkproducing regions (CISANET 2013). In 2012 these smallholders produced around 13.5 million liters of milk marketed through the formal channel (data received from three main milk-producing associations in Malawi), 91 % of which was produced in the Southern region. A further 16.5 million liters is estimated to be produced in the informal sector, which is currently the dominant marketing channel (Imani Development Consultants 2004). The two channels differ in the way milk reaches the final consumer. In the formal sector, milk is processed and sold to the consumer via retail outlets; informal sector milk is sold raw (and often diluted) to either vendors or direct to consumers (Chitika 2008). Official estimates show an increasing trend in the number of dairy cattle in the country partly through import of animals into the country (see Fig. 2). Banda et al. (2012) estimate that there has been a 65 % increase in dairy cattle between 2004 and 2010, mainly as a result of government and aid donor support. Data provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security of Malawi shows that milk production has been steadily increasing in recent years (FAO 2011). This can be attributed to increasing cattle Page 5 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_31-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 Dairy production regions (Source: FAO, http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPC/doc/counprof/malawi/Malawi.htm) % crosses

% dairy cattle

20

10

/1 1

/1 0 09 20

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08

/0 9

8 20 07 /0

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Fig. 2 Increasing trend in dairy cattle numbers in Malawi since 2003 (Source: USAID 2012)

numbers, a result of development efforts, and a desire of many smallholders to diversify out of standard agricultural practices and to earn a reliable income. Despite the growth in dairy cattle numbers (currently comprising about 5 % of the national cattle population), only 13 % of smallholder farmers in Malawi own cattle (CISANET 2013), reflecting a lack of emphasis on livestock in official agricultural strategies and policies. Moreover, poor performance in the arable sector has caused many farming families to expand their arable cultivation into areas traditionally grazed by livestock (CYE Consult 2009). Diary productivity (i.e., milk output per cow) is generally low. Nakagava (2009) estimates the average production per day between 5.7 and 9 l per cow, mainly produced by the local Zebu breed. This is mainly Page 6 of 17

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due to the lack of good husbandry practices, long calving intervals, lack of good quality feed, and insufficient veterinary and artificial insemination (AI) and extension services (CISANET 2013). Productivity depends on breed choice with nonnative Friesians being most productive but also on the management quality (Chagunda et al. 2010). Zimba et al. (2010) estimate that even though individual farmers produce about 7 l of milk a day on average, there is a potential to produce up to 40 l by changing current management practices. Milk consumption in Malawi is low, estimated at 4–6 kg/capita/year (Tebug 2012). This is much lower than the Africa average of 15 kg/capita/year and significantly lower than 200 kg/capita/year recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) and FAO (Banda 2008). In other sub-Saharan countries, such as Kenya, milk consumption is 95 kg/capita/year with smallholder dairy farming playing a key role (Tebug 2012). Low consumption is partly explained by the limited supply of milk (CYE Consult 2009), leading to some of the highest consumer prices for milk products in Africa (The Dairy Task Team 2010; USAID 2012). Tebug et al. (2012a) suggest that factors like population and income growth, plus dietary change and urbanization, have led to increased milk demand in Malawi in the recent years, consumption increasing by 40 % between 1980 and 2002 (FAO 2011). Malawi’s population is predicted to grow from 15.4 million to 37 million by 2050 from its current level (Malawi Government 2012a, b; The World Bank 2012), meaning that the demand for dairy products is likely to increase further. There is thus a clear need to address barriers to sector development. But increasing milk production by increased herd size in the smallholder sector or via increasing the number of smallholder farmers diversifying into the dairy farming, while in the national interest, will almost inevitably lead to an absolute increase in GHG emissions. Introducing good farm management strategies to help reduce GHG emissions is therefore a potential entry point for climate-smart NAMA support that moves the country onto an emissions trajectory without compromising its development goals.

Opportunities and Challenges for Developing Dairy Sector NAMAs Dairy is considered a key investment sector within agriculture for the Government of Malawi (MIPA 2011), and dairy development has become a government priority and a flagship of the livestock sector aimed at enhancing household livelihoods. Most recently, the dairy sector in Malawi has also been widely supported and promoted by international donors and NGOs that have developed business models for upscaling breeding, livestock management, value chain, and risk insurance support. In capitalizing on the synergies in dairy sector development, it is important to recognize and reconcile the key policy drivers and extant constraints affecting sector development. Economic development and livelihoods are the key objectives of agricultural development. Malawi’s National Dairy Development Programme (NDDP) aims to contribute to improved livelihoods of both producers and consumers, as well as provide economic benefits for the national economy. NDDP aims to increase the total milk production in Malawi from around 30,000 metric tons to 61,000 t per annum by 2017 (Malawi Government 2011b). As a result, it has been calculated that with current farm levels emissions will double with doubling total milk production (Wilkes et al. 2012). Like any non-Annex 1 country, Malawi is unlikely to adopt mitigation measures if they compromise food security and unless there is some form of international compensation. Further, current lack of economic incentives for livestock farmers in Malawi to reduce GHG emissions means that any mitigation which lowers emissions at the expense of productivity is certain to be nonviable (CCAFS 2012a). These conflicting objectives can potentially be reconciled in the dairy sector by a focus on smarter production practices and sector development. A number of constraints have been reported to the development of the dairy sector in Malawi at the farm level (Tebug et al. 2012b). These include poor farm management practices, including inadequate feed and Page 7 of 17

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feeding technologies often leading to low production of milk, and poor manure management, as well as poor animal health and high mortality rates of the dairy cattle (Sindani 2012). Addressing these barriers offers opportunities for pro-poor development in the sector, through improving food security (i.e., availability of safe and affordable dairy products) and smallholder incomes. Dairying can provide a regular income with monthly payments and relatively easy work often undertaken by women. Smallholders can earn on average more than $300/year from milk sales (USAID 2008), providing regular and relatively high income, as well as a diversification of household risk.1 This is because income from dairying is less affected by the change in weather patterns compared to maize and tobacco. Dairying has an added advantage of being successfully practiced in areas with limited land, less labor supply, and even in poor rainfall environments (CISANET 2013). Dairy sector NAMAs can potentially be an important option for accessing climate finance opportunities directed at scaling up best practices in agriculture. Compared to other sectors, agriculture has an advantage in that many mitigation technologies and practices are already relatively well understood and available (CCAFS 2012b; Ogle et al. 2013). But important knowledge gaps persist in terms of the technical applicability of measures at significant scale across smallholdings. Furthermore, there is currently little information on the acceptability of measure implementation by low-income householders. The remainder of this chapter provides survey evidence exploring these elements.

Materials and Methods To explore NAMA options, an extensive survey of 460 smallholder dairying households in all three milkproducing regions in Malawi was carried out in February 2013. The survey sought insights into the relationship between climate change and smallholder dairying in Malawi. A more specific aim was to explore mitigation and adaptation practices that can inform national policies and potential NAMA development. The questionnaire contained 165 questions and included elements on dairy farm management and milk production, the dairy marketing chain and market access, and access to animal health and livestock extension services. Further sections sought information on household structure, animal numbers and breeds kept, milk sales, and feeding methods and constraints faced in production. In essence, the aim was to explore both on-farm and post farm gate issues that influenced production and could become potential entry points for NAMA design. A sampling strategy was developed using information provided by the MBGs and the University of Malawi and covered selected MBGs in the three milk-producing regions – Mzuzu Milk Shed Area in the Northern region, Lilongwe Milk Shed Area in the Central region, and Blantyre Milk Shed Area in the Southern region. It considered only smallholder farmers who were members of a MBG, the majority of the farmers in Malawi. Inactive MBGs (those no longer actively involved in marketing milk) were excluded from the sample. Stratified random sampling was used for the survey, based on the available farmer lists, with the number of female farmers in the milk shed areas taken into account to ensure the gender balance. Surveys were administered over a period of 3 weeks by trained enumerators and supervisors split into three groups. The team ensured quality of the data through a regular review of all questionnaires by the supervisors and research assistants after each data collection day. Further data were collected through direct observation and key informant interviews. 1

According to CYE Consult (2009), one cow gives a monthly profit that is three times the minimum wage (MK317 per day as of 1 July 2012). Page 8 of 17

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In terms of mitigation options, the survey focused on baseline practices related to practical measures identified in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (Smith et al. 2007b), specifically livestock feed practices, including grazing management, pasture improvement, manure management, and biogas production from manure.

Results and Discussion NAMA Development: Baseline Survey Evidence from Smallholder Agriculture Key response data on relevant survey questions are summarized in Table 1. The survey observations point to a number of key observations relevant to NAMA design.

Table 1 Main survey questions and summary observations Question Proportion of respondents Pasture production and feed management Pasture size 50 % of surveyed farmers do not own pasture land, and 90.9 % of those who do own areas of less than 1 ha What type of grazing do you 95.4 % of respondents practice zero grazing practice? (or cut and carry) feeding regime Do you make conserved feeds 59.5 % do not make conserved feeds (e.g., hay)?

Do you regularly experience a shortage of feed? Do you have enough fodder for your animals for the whole year? Do you purchase crop by-products during the year (as feed for the dairy animals)? Do you use concentrated feed?

50.0 % of respondents regularly experience shortage of feed 53.4 % of respondents do not have enough fodder for their animals

Observations on current constraints and barriers Absence of established pastures leading to common feed shortages Low digestibility grass/forage leading to high methane emissions Feed is not efficiently utilized as feed conservation practices such as hay making are not often practiced leading to frequent feed shortages Feed shortages are a significant limitation to increasing animal productivity Lack of fodder can have a significant impact on animal productivity

78.1 % do not purchase crop by-products

Crop by-products contribute to the higher yields in dairy cows leading to reduced emissions per kg of milk Only 35.6 % of farmers use concentrated feed Concentrated feed improves yields and thus reduces emissions per kg of milk

Milk production Do you plan to increase the 89.5 % of respondents plan to increase milk amount of milk you produce? production, the majority via producing or buying more feed Do you think there are 94.5 % of respondents think there are significant constraints to dairy significant constraints on production, the most production on the farm? important being low market prices of milk, low milk yield, high price of concentrate feed, and prevalence of animal disease or infertility

Farmers appreciate the importance of improved feeding practices for increasing milk production High price of concentrates and supplements reduce productivity and contribute to higher emissions as animals then rely on less easily digestible grass from pastures or dambos (hydromorphic areas owned by the whole community). Low milk prices indicate how supply chain structure (i.e., post farm gate) also influences production decisions

Manure management (continued) Page 9 of 17

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Table 1 (continued) Observations on current constraints and barriers Uncovered manure heaps are a source of CH4 emissions that can be reduced by changing manure management system The majority of farmers do not produce biogas The technology requires high up-front costs but can be greatly beneficial to farmers and help reduce emissions

Question Proportion of respondents Most common manure storage Dry lot/heap storage used by 54.7 % of system? farmers; pit storage – by 37.7 % Biogas production from manure? Agroforestry Are you involved in any agroforestry work?

Animal health Did you see any diseased animals on your farm in the past 12 months?

59.5 % of all respondents are not involved in Lack of know-how and lack of awareness of any agroforestry work the benefits of agroforestry (such as providing fuel and feed for the animals) are the main reasons for farmers not practicing 43.8 % have seen diseased animals on their farm in the past 12 months. 12 % of the respondents have experienced dairy cattle deaths

Poor animal health is a major issue, mainly associated with lack of knowledge and training in animal health

Supply chain Do you have difficulties selling your milk?

91.2 % of farmers experience difficulties Poor quality milk often leading to milk when selling their milk; 70 % of these – due to wastage is mainly due to the lack of the the poor quality and low price of milk refrigeration facilities at dairy farms, milk souring while being delivered to the MBG, because of the distances and fresh milk souring after having been delivered to the MBG as a result of frequent power cuts. This, coupled with the low milk prices offered by the dairy processors irrespective of the season, does not provide incentives for farmers to produce more milk Do you have your milk 66.1 % of respondents regularly experience Even though farmers might deliver good rejected by an MBG? their milk being rejected by the MBGs quality milk to the MBG and milk is initially accepted, it may later be rejected by the processors if it gets sour due to frequent power outages and generator break downs. This wastage encourages some farmers to sell outside the formal market Do you experience delays in 88.6 % experience delays in getting paid for Delays in payments often lead to farmers getting paid for the milk sold? the milk, with 48.5 % experiencing delays of turning to the informal market for selling their milk, as the price is paid up-front. This leads to up to 1 month a significant amount of milk being sold outside the formal channels 93 % of all MBGs do not have any incentives The absence of incentives often makes Are there any incentives in your local MBG for delivering in place to reward farmers delivering milk in farmers sell in the informal market, where the milk in low season? low season or producing higher amounts of price paid per liter is higher milk Are there any dairy More than 99 % of farmers do not belong to Lack of farmer organizations makes farmers any dairy cooperatives more vulnerable and unable to negotiate better cooperatives (apart from payment conditions with the dairy processors MBGs) that you are a member of?

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Pasture Production and Feed Management Feeding practices are clearly relevant to animal productivity and hence emissions, but current inefficiencies have much to do with limited plot sizes and the use of cut and carry forage of low digestibility and customary tenure systems working against any improvement incentive. Pasture improvement and hay making are not often practiced. Even though supplemental feeding is becoming more common among dairy farmers, with maize bran being the most common supplement, the price of dairy mash and other supplements as well as the availability of minerals and molasses constrain regular use. A very small proportion of the households use minerals or molasses. Increased use of crop by-products and feed supplements has been suggested as an economical way of ensuring access to adequate supplies of nutrients (Mtimuni 2012). Capacity building of farmers on locally available and potential feed resources and the importance of these in improving production efficiency will be essential. Size of Herd and Milk Production A revealing survey finding is that a high percentage – >80 % – own pure breed cattle rather than cross or local Zebu cattle. The latter breed is better adapted to local conditions, but milk production from Zebu is lower than from crossbreed or pure breed cows, which largely explains farmer breed preferences. Around 80 % of the sample also own only one animal, thus limiting production with obvious implications for the types of cattle-related investments they can be expected to make. The majority of respondents think there are significant constraints on production; the most important being low milk yield and market prices, high price of concentrate feed, as well as animal disease including infertility. Manure Management and Biogas Production Manure is an important source of methane, whereas manure excreted during grazing, as well as emissions from livestock sheds is one of the most important sources of the N2O. The most common manure storage system is dry lot – followed by pit storage. More than 80 % of this manure is produced when the cattle are housed. CH4 emissions from manure management greatly depend on the time manure is stored inside sheds or kholas or in outdoor manure stores (Chadwick et al. 2011). The majority of surveyed farmers store manure between 6 and 8 months before use or disposal. Removal of manure from animal housing into outside storage is infrequent, and the storage areas are normally not covered. More than 90 % of farmers do not cover manure with any material, and more than 40 % mix it with other material. It has been shown that emissions from cattle housing can be reduced through a more frequent removal of manure to a closed storage system (Monteny et al. 2006). Unsurprisingly for this sample, the majority of surveyed farmers do not produce biogas on their farms, even though only 19 % of surveyed farming households have access to electricity (including solar power), and biogas production can generate energy (heat or electricity) and produce residual fertilizer. However, digesters involve significant capital costs, and finance and farmer cooperation are barriers that would need to be overcome. Agroforestry Practices Agroforestry is important both for both mitigation (carbon sequestration, improved feed, and consequently reduced enteric methane) and for adaptation (improving the resilience of agricultural production to climate variability by using trees to intensify and diversify production and buffer farming systems against hazards; FAO 2013a). Shade trees reduce heat stress on animals and help increase productivity. Page 11 of 17

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Trees also improve the supply and quality of forage, which can help reduce overgrazing and curb land degradation (Thornton and Herrero 2010). Furthermore, crop by-products and co-products from agroforestry can be used as low-emission feeds for cattle. More than half of respondents were not involved in any agroforestry work; the majority of these mention lack of knowledge/training or know-how as the main reason for not practicing agroforestry. Animal Health The survey revealed that nearly half of all respondents had detected diseased animals on their farm in the previous 12 months leading to cattle deaths on 12 % of farms. Better nutrition, improved animal husbandry, regular animal inspection, and the use of antibiotics can improve reproduction rates and reduce mortality (Tebug 2012). All of these measures can therefore increase animal productivity at relatively low cost. Supply Chain Efficiency Some of the most revealing survey responses related to supply chain relationships. The survey revealed that low milk procurement prices and quality requirements are a considerable barrier to participation in formal milk marketing by smallholders. The current supply chain structure means that smallholders are reliant on conditions for quality and prices set by the MBGs. Since the latter do not return milk that fails a quality threshold, there is a risk for small producers who lack the equipment and expertise to reach these thresholds. On the other hand, reliance on informal marketing does not always guarantee higher prices or a more regular outlet for produce. An added disadvantage is that smallholders involved in the informal marketing are unable to access credit as a basis for livestock improvement (Sindani 2012). There is also a lack of farmer organizations/cooperatives at the level below Milk Bulking Groups (CISANET 2013). Survey results show that the majority of all respondents are not part of any dairy or farmer cooperative, mostly due to the lack of these. The establishment and participation of effective and representative farmer organizations that are able and willing to communicate on behalf of their members are essential. But establishing such groups requires support and capacity development. Overall, the survey indicates that supply chain efficiency is as important as on-farm measures for increasing productivity, hence reducing emissions. A NAMA approach that considers the entire dairy supply chain is essential.

Potential Dairy Sector NAMAs Findings summarized in the previous section indicate considerable scope for NAMA design, with mitigation options available along the entire supply chain. The most immediate and low-cost options are likely to be targeted to feed production, enteric fermentation and adopting composting, improved manure handling and storage, as well as adoption of different application techniques. Most of these will not require any capital costs, but farmer training and knowledge dissemination will be essential. Most on-farm interventions aim to improve basic farm productivity and resource use. For example, the use of improved feeding technologies, manure management (e.g., composting), and agroforestry are readily available for implementation and have been successfully trialed in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa (FAO 2013b). It has been shown that a relatively small change in the efficiency of dairy feeding can have a major effect on animal productivity and farm profitability (Gerber et al. 2011). A feeding intervention NAMA will need to focus on capacity building for farmers on the benefits of introducing improved feeding techniques. Improved manure management via deployment of technology for biogas-based electricity generation is also a promising basis for a NAMA helping to reduce CH4 emissions from manure and provide Page 12 of 17

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smallholder households with much needed energy. Introduction of this technology would require credit agencies or donors to cover costs for purchasing bio-digesters, as well as training of farmers on biogas production. In this regard the NAMA objective overlaps with that of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which is a longer established financing mechanism that can be used for biogas energy. Most recently CDM funding was used, for example, in the Nepal Biogas support programs (Doyle 2013). Experience with biogas CDM projects has demonstrated practical MRV approaches that can clearly facilitate NAMA development (FAO 2013b). An agroforestry NAMA will need to focus on knowledge dissemination, awareness raising and training of farmers on the benefits of agroforestry for the productivity of the farm and income generation, provision of seeds to farmers, and follow-up work with farmers to achieve returns in terms of improved resilience and increased household incomes. Again, because of overlapping objectives, payment for environmental services mechanisms could also be explored to encourage farmers to participate in agroforestry practices. But like PES mechanisms, institutional (e.g., legal and policy) reforms would be necessary to foster the development of agroforestry and recognize its contribution to national development and mainstreaming of agroforestry in national policies. Animal health intervention NAMA should focus on farmer training on animal health-related issues and provision of higher-quality extension advice and artificial insemination and veterinary services. Poor farm management practices may be partly addressed by improved access to information including breeding and veterinary services; the latter could have a significant impact on reducing animal mortality. Overall, improving the efficiency of the dairy supply chain is an explicit barrier emerging from the survey, since one of the most important constraints to increasing productivity is low price paid for milk, which is an underlying reason for the lack of investment in animal productivity, thus locking farmers into a downward spiral that ultimately retards investment in animals as a capital asset. These barriers can be overcome with specially targeted supply chain and policy interventions, such as extension work, farmer training, and financing mechanisms, including improving access to credit and payment for environmental services. Supply chain interventions can offer verifiable interventions that may be amenable to coordinated government and donor interventions. This is paramount for sector development and increasing production as current oligopolistic structure of bulking groups is a potential target for concerted intervention between government and donors. The initial supply chain NAMA could focus on organizing the dairy cooperatives where dairy farmers will have a stronger collective voice and can negotiate with the MBGs and, directly, with the dairy processors regarding the prices paid per unit of milk and reducing wastage, access to feed and feeding supplements, and negotiate with the credit organizations with regard to obtaining credit for dairy farming. Higher prices paid for milk will encourage farmers to increase investment in dairy farming and to improve their knowledge of dairy farming and management practices. Furthermore, it is important for any supply chain NAMA to focus on improving links between multiple stakeholders within the supply chain and providing greater coordination among the different stakeholders. It is important to stress that from both national and international funders’ perspectives, a robust system of measuring, reporting, and verifying is essential for effective monitoring of the NAMA implementation and for assessing its impact in terms of greenhouse gas emissions reductions, cost-effectiveness, and other co-benefits (UNEP 2013). Proposed NAMAs are summarized in Table 2 below. At the current time, it is important to improve the evidence base to demonstrate that measure implementation can reduce emissions and improve or maintain smallholder livelihoods. This might require specific farm-scale modeling of identified options. Even then some of the identified options, such as using more concentrated feed or biogas production from manure will require financial assistance to implement, and capacity building will be necessary to make farmers more aware of the potential benefits of these strategies. Page 13 of 17

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Table 2 Proposed NAMAs for the smallholder dairy systems in Malawi Sector Feeding practices

Proposed NAMA Benefits to farmers Use of improved feed and feeding Higher yields, improved animal technologies, increased use of health crop by-products, supplements and concentrated feed

Manure management

Activities aimed at composting, improved manure handling and storage Biogas Provision of grants to farmers to production purchase biogas digesters, training and follow-up support Animal health Targeted farmer training on maintenance of animal health and improved animal husbandry

Higher crop yield if using manure as a fertilizer

Agroforestry

Improved feed and resilience, increased animal productivity

Supply chain

Provision of training on agroforestry practices targeted at dairy farmers, provision of seeds and follow-up support Organizing dairy cooperatives/ farmer organizations at a level below MBG level

Constraints High cost for purchasing concentrates, supplements, and vitamins. Lack of established pastures to grow feed with a low-carbon output Lack of knowledge and incentives

Improved farmer livelihoods through access to energy

High capital costs, lack of knowledge and incentives

Improved reproduction rates, reduced mortality, increased productivity

Lack of knowledge and know-how, poor animal management practices, limited access to extension and veterinary advice Limited land, lack of knowledge and know-how

Empowering farmers to negotiate Lack of knowledge and know-how, higher milk prices, access to credit inertia to purchase more animals or feed, accessing high-quality extension advice as a group

Conclusions Current farm management practices in the smallholder dairy sector in Malawi offer significant options for agricultural-based NAMAs that could potentially reduce emissions and improve livelihoods. The smallholder survey found a number of farm management practices that could be modified to be climate smart and potentially funded under a NAMA modality. These options can initially be implemented as pilot project-based NAMAs, a climate change mitigation modality that has the potential to dovetail with a range of existing development aid objectives. But development of agricultural NAMAs requires further analysis. Specifically, the adoption of measures by farmers must be locally appropriate and clearly beneficial before behavioral change can be expected. At present, the evidence on the farm-scale profitability of measures is unproven in all cases. Many of the available options could build on, or scale up, current practice; however, in some cases (such as biogas production), technical innovations may be required. Even though a diversity of mitigation options provides flexibility, it creates extra challenges in measuring, reporting, and verification. Furthermore, the potential mitigation strategies need to be thoroughly assessed in terms of their emission reduction, additionality, and cost-effectiveness. Specific interventions might only make sense and achieve a net mitigation effect if greater on-farm efficiency does not instead displace emissions to other parts of the food chain. Finally, the proximity of NAMA and climate-smart agendas suggest that the former need to be designed with clear reference to the ongoing agenda on climate change adaptation. This places emphasis on combinations of mitigation and adaptation practices adapted to specific production systems and environments (e.g., interventions addressing the management of feed, genetic resources, and manure). The

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potential aggregated effects that changes in farming systems may have on food security and the use of natural resources at the regional level also need to be better understood. It will be essential for the NAMA interventions to take into consideration whole production systems and supply chains, as addressing mitigation or adaptation issues requires paying attention to spillover and feedback effects along the chain.

Acknowledgements This research is funded by the Climate and Development Knowledge Network – http://cdkn.org/. The authors would like to acknowledge further funding from the Scottish Government’s Rural and Environmental Science and Analytical Services division (RESAS) through ClimateXChange (http:// www.climatexchange.org.uk/) and ANIMALCHANGE funded from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/ 2007–2013) under the grant agreement n 266018.

References Banda JW (2008) Revolutionising the livestock industry in Malawi. In: The 12th university of Malawi Inaugural Lecture. Bunda College, University of Malawi, Lilongwe Banda L, Gondwe T, Chagunda M (2012) Dairy cow fertility in Malawi. In: Smallholder dairy production in Malawi: current status and future solutions. Scoping papers: optimising smallholder dairying project. Scottish Agricultural College BMA (2010) Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, Programa Agricultura de Baixo Carbono-465 ABC. Brasília. Disponivel em http://www.agricultura.gov.br/desenvolvimento466sustentavel/programa-abc. Accessed 12 2012. Brasil, Ministerio da Agricultura, 467 Pecuaria e Abastecimento CCAFS (2012a) Helping smallholder farmers mitigate climate change. Policy brief no 5 CCAFS (2012b) Paving the way for nationally appropriate mitigation actions in the agricultural sector. Policy brief no 7 Chadwick D, Sommer S, Thorman R, Fangueiro D, Gardenas L, Amon B, Misselbrook T (2011) Manure management: implications for greenhouse gas emissions. Anim Feed Sci Technol 166–167:514–531 Chagunda G, Gondwe T, Banda L, Mayuni P, Mtimuni PJ, Chimbaza T, Nkwanda A (2010) Smallholder dairy production in Malawi: current status and future solutions. Scottish Agricultural College. Edinburgh, Scotland Chitika R (2008) Marketing channel choice: its determinants and evaluation of transaction costs in smallholder dairy farming in Lilongwe milkshed area. University of Malawi, Malawi Civil Society Agriculture Network (CISANET) (2013) Challenges facing the dairy industry development in malawi: rough road to sustainable dairy industry development – need for bold policy reforms and implementation. Policy brief, vol 1 Collier P, Dercon S (2009) African agriculture in 50 years: smallholders in a rapidly changing world. Paper presented at the expert meeting on How to Feed the World in 2050, FAO, Rome CYE Consult (2009) Value chain analysis of selected commodities. Institutional Development Across the Agri-Food Sector (IDAF). Final report De Pinto A, Robertson RD, Darko Obiri B (2013) Adoption of climate change mitigation practices by risk-averse farmers in the Ashanti Region, Ghana. Ecol Econ 86:47–54 Doyle J (2013) Review of available information on how the CDM can produce greater benefits for poor people. Evidence on demand FAO (2006) Livestock’s long shadow: environmental issues and options. FAO, Rome Page 15 of 17

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FAO (2010) “Climate-smart” agriculture: policies, practices and financing for food security, adaptation and mitigation. In: The Hague conference on agriculture. FAO FAO (2011) FAOSTAT statistics division. Malawi country statistics. Retrieved from http://faostat.fao.org FAO (2012) Identifying opportunities for climate-smart agriculture investments in Africa. FAO, Rome FAO (2013a) Climate-smart agriculture sourcebook. Rome FAO (2013b) National integrated mitigation planning in agriculture: a review paper. Rome FAO (2013c) Tacking climate change through livestock. A global assessment of emissions and mitigation opportunities. Rome Gerber P (2010) Greenhouse gas emissions from the dairy sector: a life cycle assessment. FAO, Rome Gerber P, Vellinga T, Opio C, Steinfeld H (2011) Productivity gains and greenhouse gas emissions intensity in dairy systems. Livest Sci 139:100–108 Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (2011) Vulnerability, risk reduction and adaptation to climate change: Malawi strategy. Strategy Havemann T, Muccione V (2011) Mechanisms for agricultural climate change mitigation incentives for smallholders. CCAFS report no 6, pp 1–36 Imani Development Consultants (2004) Review of the dairy industry in Malawi Malawi Government (2011a) The second national communication of the republic of Malawi to the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Environment, Lilongwe, Malawi Malawi Government (2011b) Malawi’s Agriculture Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp). A prioritised and harmonised Agricultural Development Agenda 2011–2015. Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Lilongwe, Malawi Malawi Government (2012a). Why population matters to Malawi’s development. Managing population growth for sustainable development. Department of Population and Development. Lilongwe, Malawi Malawi Government (2012b) Malawi submission on issues related to agriculture for consideration by SBSTA at its 36th session. URL: http://unfccc.int/files/methods_science/redd/submissions/application/ pdf/20120308_malawi_subm_agriculture.pdf. Accessed November 2013 MIPA (2011) Malawi investment promotion agency. Information retrieved on 3 Jan 2014 from http:// www.com4dev.com/fr/node/5139 Monteny G-J, Bannink A, Chadwick D (2006) Greenhouse gas abatement strategies for animal husbandry. Agric Ecosyst Environ 112:163–170 Mtimuni JP (2012) Forage and food resources. In: Smallholder dairy production in Malawi: current status and future solutions. Scoping papers: optimising smallholder dairying project. Scottish Agricultural College Nakagava S (2009) Foreign direct investment in Blantyre, Malawi: opportunities and challenges. MCI and VCC working paper on investment in the millennium cities. No 7/2009. Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs National Statistical Office of Malawi (2012). Welfare Monitoring Survey 2011. Lilongwe, Malawi Pye-Smith C (2011) Farming’s climate-smart future: placing agriculture at the heart of climate-change policy Rosenzweig C, Tubiello FN (2007) Adaptation and mitigation strategies in agriculture: an analysis of potential synergies. University of Nebraska/NASA, Lincoln City Sindani GW (2012) The dairy industry in Malawi – a description of the milk bulking groups in Malawi. A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of North Carolina State University in partial fulfilment of the requirement of the Degree of Master of Science. Raleigh

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Smith P, Martino D, Cai Z, Gwary D, Janzen H, Kumar P, McCarl B, et al. (2007a). Policy and technological constraints to implementation of greenhouse gas mitigation options in agriculture. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 118(1–4), 6–28 Smith P, Martino D, Cai Z, Gwary D, Janzen H, Kumar P, McCarl B, Ogle S, O’Mara F, Rice C, Scholes B, Sirotenko O (2007b) Agriculture. In: Metz B, Davidson OR, Bosch PR, Dave R, Meyer LA (eds) Climate change 2007: mitigation. Contribution of working group III to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York Tebug SF (2012) Smallholder dairy farming in Northern Malawi: husbandry practices, constraints and revalence of major production and zoonotic disease. Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Agrar- und Ern€ahrungswissenschaftlichen Fakult€at der Christian-Albrechts-Universit€at zu Kiel. Kiel Tebug SF, Chikagwa-Malunga S, Wiedemann S (2012a) On-farm evaluation of dairy farming innovations uptake in northern Malawi. Livest Res Rural Dev 24:5 Tebug SF, Kasulo V, Chikagwa-Malunga S, Wiedemann S, Robert DJ, Chagunda M (2012b) Smallholder dairy production in Northern Malawi: production practices and constraints. Tropl Anim Health Prod 44:55–62 The Center for Clean Air Policy (2009) NAMAs and the NAMA registry: key issues to be resolved for an international agreement at Copenhagen. Washington, DC, pp 1–12 The Dairy Task Team (2010). Malawi’s Smallholder dairy development plan: 2010 smallholder dairy budget proposal. Proposition paper. Civil society agriculture network. Lilongwe, Malawi The Meridian Institute (2011) Agriculture and climate change: a scoping report The World Bank country data (2012). Available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/malawi. Accessed 1 March 2012 UNEP (2013) Guidebook for the development of a nationally appropriate mitigation action on efficient lighting. United Nations Environment Programme UNFCCC (2010). The cancun agreements. URL: http://cancun.unfccc.int/mitigation/decisionsaddressing-developing-country-mitigation-plans/#c178. Accessed 10 December 2013 UNFCCC (2008). United nations report of the conference of the parties on its thirteenth session , held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007 Part Two : Action taken by the conference of the parties at its thirteenth session decisions adopted by the conference of the parties, pp. 1–60 Upadhyaya P (2012) Scaling up carbon markets in developing countries post-2012: are NAMAs the way forward? Ecologic Institute, Berlin USAID (2008) Best analysis – Malawi Bellmon estimation studies for title II (Best project). Washington, DC USAID (2012) Participatory evaluation of feeding concentrates to dairy: a case of farmer, private sector and public participatory demonstration in Malawi. In: Presentation by Dr Timothy Gondwe at the 8th African dairy conference and exhibition, 24–27 April, 2012; KICC, Nairobi van Asselt H, Berseus J, Gupta J, Haug C (2010) Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) in developing countries: challenges and opportunities. Scientific assessment and policy analysis report. University of Amsterdam Wang-Helmreich H, Sterk W, Wehnert T, Arens C (2011) Current developments in pilot Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions of Developing Countries (NAMAs). JIKO policy paper Wilkes A, Tennigkeit T, Chagunda M (2012) Supporting dairy sector development in Malawi through NAMAs: addressing design features in the development context. Policy brief Zimba G, Kalumikiza Z, Chanza W (2010) Application of the Agriculture Science Technology and Innovation (ASTI) systems to assess performance of Malawi’s dairy industry. Bunda College of Agriculture, Lilongwe, Malawi

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_32-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Adaptation to Climate Change Effects Among Rural Women in Savannah and Forest Zones of Oyo State, Nigeria Nathaniel S. Sangotegbea*, Janet O. Obayomia and John O. Oluwasusib a Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria b Afebabalola University, Ekiti State, Nigeria

Abstract The study assessed adaptation strategies to climate change effects among rural women in savannah and forest zones of Oyo State, Nigeria. A total of 117 rural women were randomly selected from the two randomly selected LGAs in the state. Data were collected through a structured interview schedule. A higher percentage in the savannah (88.2 %) than the forest (67.8 %) was in their active years (20–50 years). About 41 % (savannah) and 32 % (forest) had no formal education. Awareness of climate change was high (78.7 % and 69.6 %, respectively), while farming-related activities were the main livelihood. Also, 93 % admitted that climate change had a severe influence on their livelihoods through reduction in the amount of rainfall on their farmland. Respondents adopted different strategies such as multiple cropping, crop rotation, changing planting periods, storage of water for future use, and diversifying into other areas of livelihood to adapt to climate change effects. However, there was also a significant difference in the influence of climate change (t = 4.605, p = 0.000) and adaptation strategies (t = 6.637, p = 0.000) between the women in the two ecological zones. Adequate funding and locality-specific climate change-related information on adaptation strategies are recommended to be made available across the two ecological zones of the state.

Keywords Climate change; Adaptation strategies; Rural women; Nigeria

Introduction Climate change is one of the major environmental problems facing humanity. It is the cause of the mixture of extreme adverse phenomena such as drought, flood, and heat and cold waves. The problem of climate change in the world affects Nigerians and rural women most especially since they form the majority of producers and processors of agricultural crops, Nigeria being an agrarian society. At the same time, the change from traditional to intensive agricultural systems largely contributes to climate change. Land use changes, flooding areas for rice and sugarcane production, burning crop residues, raising ruminant animals, and using nitrogen fertilizers are all activities that release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_32-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Developing countries are hard hit by climate change, particularly countries which depend largely on rain-fed agriculture. Climate change affects changes in plant growth and in production by promoting the spread of pest and diseases, increased exposure to heat stress (Fischer et al. 2002), changes in rainfall patterns, greater leaching of nutrients from the soil during intense rains, greater erosion due to stronger winds, and more wildfires in drier regions (Akonga 2001). For Nigeria, climate change poses a great challenge to livelihoods and remains the overriding priority impetus to the promotion of sustainable economic development. Several authors have reported the negative impacts of climate change, most observed as change in weather patterns, increased rate of desertification, flooding, coastal erosion, increased water pollution and reduction in crops and livestock productivity, and consequently, lower income (Adejuwon 2004; Titilola et al. 1996; Nwajiuba et al. 2008; Ogbuehi et al. 2008) According to IPCC (2001) projections for the humid tropics, rainfall is expected to increase in Southern Nigeria. However, in view of the expected increase in evaporation and evapotranspiration, there is likelihood of localized drought in parts of this humid area of the country. The effects of climate change to date have been small, but are projected to progressively increase in all countries and regions. In Nigeria, climate change often appears very obscure but it is real. According to Ihedioha (2007), parts of the outcome of climate change in some parts of the Nigerian economy are situational. The gender-related impacts of climate change have also received some attention in the literature. Generally, the causes of climate change are closely related to struggles over resources between men and women in rural areas, but women are particularly affected because of their socially ascribed roles. Also in Nigeria, the altered rain patterns which disrupt planting seasons and adversely affect crop yields resulting in devastating consequences for livelihoods and economic security have been noted by indigenous peasant women. The end result of this is increased hunger and poverty to most rural women in Nigeria. There are numerous significant linkages between gender and agriculture. Gender aspects in agriculture affect access to and control over resources, with consequences for food security as well as for market and policy decisions. In many countries, women’s access to land is limited. At the same time, they account for 70 % of agricultural workers and 80 % of food producers (Fresco 1998). Bzugu and Kwaghe (1997) reported that women form the highest proportion of the economically active population in rural Nigeria and play an important role in agricultural activities, particularly in subsistence food production, where they contribute an estimated 60–80 % of the total labor used. Corroborating Bzugu and Kwaghe, Mabogunye (2010) asserted that an estimated 54 million of Nigeria’s 78 million women are based in rural areas and make a living from the land. Also, because of their labor- and time-intensive work in order to care for their families, the share of women hit by poverty is high. Their responsibility for using and preserving land for food and fuel production and the resulting dependency on the soil make them vulnerable to climate change effects and consequences. Also it may be necessary to compare the degree to which climate change impacts the lives of rural women in the different ecological zones of Nigeria. This would be of great importance to develop principles and procedures to protect and encourage women in two of the distinctively different agroecological areas to national climate change mitigation and adaptation programs and projects. It has also become imperative to look into the extent and various ways by which change in climate has adversely affected livelihoods in the two ecological zones of the study area. Oyo is one of the 36 states in Nigeria and it lies in the western part of the country. The state is divided into two ecological zones (rainforest to the south and savannah to the north) and is well suited for food crop production, as farming is being practiced by both men and women of the area. The bulk of food consumed in the southwestern part of Nigeria is being produced by farmers in Oyo Page 2 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_32-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

State, while Oke-Ogun, in the savannah zone of the state, has been labeled the food basket of Southwestern Nigeria (Sangotegbe et al. 2011). Therefore, the assertion of Oluwasegun and Olaniran (2010) that Southwestern Nigeria is a region that feeds more than 45 % of the nation’s population implies that the contribution of the Oyo to the nation’s food security is significant. While the savannah zone favors mainly arable crops such as sorghum, maize, cowpea, and yam with some parcel of land, which supports tree crops, the forest zone favors the cultivation of some tree crops like cocoa and oil palm, alongside other crops as cassava, maize, and yam. Women are directly involved in the cultivation, processing, and marketing of these crops, especially the arable crops in both zones. However, processing and marketing are their important roles for cocoa and oil palm enterprises.

Objectives of the Study The following specific objectives were achieved: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Assess the socioeconomic characteristics of the rural women in the study areas. Determine the livelihood activities of respondents in Oyo State. Compare the influence of climate change on the women’s activities in the two ecological zones. Identify the various adaptation strategies adopted by women in the two ecological zones of the study area.

Review of Relevant Literatures Implications of Climate Change for Agriculture Greater poverty impacts agriculture hugely since it hampers human energy/effort to plant and restricts capacity to afford necessary inputs. Smith (2006) notes that over 40 % of the world’s people are unable or barely able to meet their needs for survival. Attainments of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) may therefore have been overtaken by events as the expiry is around the corner. It will result in greater poverty, wider discrepancy between rich and poor, sea level rises, and more precarious livelihoods challenging survival. Already, 2.7 billion people try to live on £1 or less per day. Smith (2006) argues that action on climate change is integral to poverty reduction. Such action requires both mitigation of the rate of change (Keller et al. 2005) and adaptation to that which does occur. Stabilizing CO2 at 450 ppm (requiring cuts of 60–90 % in GHG emissions before 2100) may limit the mean global temperature rise to 2  C. Mitigation of climate change is affordable; to stabilize at 450 ppm CO2 would cost 1–4 % of global average GDP over 50 years. Kyoto protocol implementation would cost 0.1 % of GDP over 10 years.

Concept of Adaptation to Climate Change Different authors have come up with different definitions of adaptation to climate change. Burton et al. (1998) define it as all those responses to climate change that may be used to reduce vulnerability. According to Burton (1997), adaptation to climate is the process through which people reduce the adverse effects of climate on their health and well-being and take advantage of the opportunities that their climatic environment provides. Downing et al. (1997) asserted that adaptation is synonymous with “downstream coping.” F€ ussel and Klein (2002) defined it as all changes in a system, compared to a reference case, that reduce the adverse effects of climate change. IPCC (2001) Page 3 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_32-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

defined adaptation to climate change as adjustment in ecological, social, or economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts. This term refers to changes in processes, practices, or structures to moderate or offset potential damages or to take advantage of opportunities associated with changes in climate. It involves adjustments to reduce the vulnerability of communities, regions, or activities to climatic change and variability. Adaptation strategies to climate change in this study are being viewed as a combination of adjustment and/or responses within the human capacity, put up to reduce the undesired impacts of climate change on the livelihood of the people, making use of the opportunities within the local environment.

Gender and Climate Change There are numerous significant linkages between gender and agriculture. Gender aspects in agriculture affect access to and control over resources, with consequences for food security as well as for market and policy decisions. In many countries, women’s access to land is limited. Patrilineal inheritance customs regulate land ownership and property rights and thereby influence control over land and food sovereignty. At the same time, women make up 54 % of the agricultural labor force worldwide, significantly more in the Global South. For example, 80 % of female employees and selfemployed in sub-Saharan Africa are working in the agricultural sector. Women make up a large number of poor people in communities that are highly dependent on local natural resources for their livelihood and are disproportionately vulnerable to and affected by climate change. Zabbey (2011) opined that women’s limited access to resources and decisionmaking processes increases their vulnerability to climate change. Additionally, women in rural areas in developing countries have greater responsibility for household water supply, energy for cooking and heating, and for food security. Thus, women are negatively affected by drought, uncertain rainfall, and deforestation. Again, because of their roles, unequal access to resources, and limited mobility, women in many contexts are disproportionately affected by natural disasters, such as floods, fires, and coastal erosion (Zabbey. 2011). Women are the main producers of the world’s staple crops, providing up to 90 % of the rural poor’s food intake and producing 60–80 % of the food in most developing countries. Maize, sorghum, millet, and groundnut yields have a strong association with the year-to-year variability of ENSO (El Niño-Southern Oscillation) in Africa. For Southern Africa, the productivity is expected to drop by 20–50 % in extreme El Niño years (Stige 2006). If global climate changes move more toward El Niño-like conditions, crop production in Africa will decline (Stige 2006). Insect outbreaks could increase due to changes in climate. For example, locust outbreaks in China are associated with cold and wet periods, floods, and droughts (Stige 2007). Climate variability, according to Stireman et al. (2005), also affects the relationships between parasite and host, and parasitoids are key agents of control of herbivore populations. An increase in pest outbreaks would not only reduce crop and milk yields but also add to the number of hours and resources women had to invest in pest control. However, women are not just helpless victims of climate change, they are powerful agents of change and their leadership is critical. Women can help or hinder in dealing with issues such as energy consumption, deforestation, burning of vegetation, population growth and economic growth, development of scientific research and technologies, and policy making, among many others.

Methodology The study was carried out within Oyo State. The two major ecological zones in Oyo State are the forest and savannah. Oyo State is located within the western region of the southern part of Nigeria. It Page 4 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_32-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Distribution showing sampling procedure and sample size in the two ecological zones of the study Ecological zones Savannah zone (Saki West local government area) Forest zone (Ido local government area)

Total

No. of wards 10

10

20

30 % of wards Ajegunle Keli Ogidigbo OmiAdio Akufo Apete 6

No, of villages 51 51 41 30

10 % of villages 5 4 4 3

No. of household sampled per village 5 5 4 7

Total no. of respondents sampled 25 20 16 21

29 39 241

3 4 23

5 5 31

15 20 117

covers a total of 27,249 km2 of landmass. Oyo State enjoys the characteristic West African monsoon climate, marked by distinct seasonal shifts in the wind pattern. Between March and October, the state is under the influence of the moist maritime southwest monsoon winds, which blow inland from the Atlantic Ocean. This is the raining season. The dry season occurs from November to February, when the dry northeast trade dust harmattan winds blow from the Sahara desert. The state thus is characterized by two climate seasons, raining season and dry season. Oyo State was stratified into rainforest and savannah zone (Table 1) being the two ecological zones in the state. In the rainforest zone, Saki West and Ido LGAs were purposively selected for being most predominantly savannah and rainforest, respectively. Of 10 wards in each of the LGAs, 30 % were selected, to give a total of six wards. Twenty-three villages were selected in all, while a total of 117 rural women were sampled. Table 1 presents the summary of the sampling procedure. Structured interview schedule was used to obtain information from the women. Primary data were obtained on socioeconomic characteristics of respondents, livelihood activities, awareness of climate change, and impact of adaptation strategies to climate change effects. The level of awareness of climate change was measured by using a three-point scale indicating whether the selected impact items have increased (2), no change (1), or decreased (0). Perceived effects of climate change in the two area were measured in terms of yes = 0 or no = 1. Perceived effect of climate change was then operationalized as negative and positive, using the mean effect score as the benchmark. Adaptation strategies adopted by rural women in coping with the effect of climate change were measured as respondents indicated “yes” or “no” to a list of adaptation strategies employed and not employed, respectively. Scores of 1 and 0 were assigned to “yes” and 0 to “no.” An index of each of the influence of climate change effects and adaptation strategies was then obtained and abstracted to interval levels of measurement. The mean scores of influence of climate change as well as farmers’ level of adaptation strategies were then compared, each between women in savannah and forest zones of the state, as stated in hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively.

Conceptual Framework Figure 1 below presents the conceptual framework that relates the negative effects of climate change and their adaptation strategies to these effects. This is not to imply that climate change is only associated with negative consequences. However, the study focuses on only the various negative effects of climate change against which rural women in the two ecological zones have developed adaptive measures. The framework borrows from a number of frameworks that have been used in analyzing risk, vulnerability, and poverty (Smith et al. 2005 and Hoddinott and Quisumbing 2003). Page 5 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_32-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 Conceptual framework for adaptation strategies to climate change of women in two ecological zones of Oyo State. Source: Authors’ idea

The socioeconomic characteristic of an individual has an influence on the various forms of livelihood activities (livelihood strategies) a typical rural dwellers engages in. In recent years, farming is becoming a far less potent source of livelihood in the rural areas of many sub-Saharan African nations; therefore, multiplicity of these activities has become a trend. It is therefore expected that, for example, membership of social organization could avail a rural dweller access to credit facilities and extension education. These and many more opportunities derivable from being members help an individual to diversify into other forms of livelihood activities, since assets (in this case, social asset) determine to a large extent an individuals’ livelihood activity in terms of number and type. Smith et al. (2005) support this notion by positing that in the rural communities, the capacity to resist poverty and improve livelihoods often depends on the opportunities offered by natural resource-based production systems as conditioned by wider economic, institutional, and political environment. Bebbington (1999) posited that these assets are not simply resources that people use in building livelihoods but they are also assets that give them capabilities. For example, possession of human capital is not only the means people produce more and more efficiently, it also gives them the capability to engage more fruitfully and meaningfully with the world (Sen 1997). The framework also establishes a direct and vice versa relationship between these livelihood activities and the influence climate change has on the people. This is because climate-related shocks often affect stock of livelihood assets, which eventually have their tolling effects on livelihood Page 6 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_32-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

activities. These often result in reduced production, poor health, insecurity, loss of capitals, poor harvest, and post-harvest losses. On the other way round, these resultant effects of climate change affect the extent to which the people are engaged in one form of livelihood activity or the other. For example, a woman farmer with poor health condition (an example of influence of climate change) has less human capability to work and therefore limit her engagement in livelihood activities and even her holding of assets. At the last level of the framework are the adaptation strategies to climate change of rural women which are a function of the kind of influence climate change has on their livelihood activities. This partly agrees with Smith et al. (2005) that depending on the assets (as a proxy for activities) the people have access to which defines livelihood activity opportunities, a household will then choose a set of adaptation strategies to climate change effects. Bebbington (1999) posited that assets are not simply resources that people use in building livelihoods but also gives them capabilities. Adaptation strategies are also directly influenced to a very large extent by some socioeconomic characteristics such as educational status, membership of social organization, and access to credit facilities. Also, the level and how effective are the adaptation strategies of the people, to a large extent, impact upon their livelihood activities and assets in terms of extent of use (for activities) and value and number (for assets) for building resilience against climate change effects.

Results and Discussion Table 2 reveals that 26.2 % and 19.3 % of the respondents were 30 years and below in savannah and forest zones, respectively, while 33 % and 30 % falls within middle-age range of 41–50 years. The mean age of the women in savannah zone was 40 years, while those from forest zone were 43 years. The result implies that more of the rural women from savannah zone (88.2 %) are in their active age of 20–50 years when compared with respondents from forest zone (67.8 %); hence, they can actively engage in productive activities and thereby contribute effectively to food production in Nigeria. The result also shows that 80.3 % and 63.4 % of the respondents from savannah and forest zones respectively were married. This implies that since women in the two zones were predominantly married, this could influence the adaptation strategies of the majority through spousal supports and thereby reduce the effects of climate change on their activities. Also, 41 % and 34 % of the respondents from savannah and forest zones respectively do not have formal education, while 32.8 and 32.1 % respectively had primary education. This shows that there is a very large case of illiteracy, as level of literacy was low. Accessing relevant information through the use of the modern-day ICTs as well as the print media may therefore be difficult for the respondents. The result further shows that 55 % and 44 % of the respondents from the respective zones were Christians, while 42.6 % and 53.6 % were Muslims. The result reveals that 52.6 % and 66 % of the women in savannah and forest zones respectively belongs to various religious groups in their communities and this constitutes a greater proportion compared with other social groups in the zone. This is a clear indication that most of the women will have quick access to information about their community, family, and other areas of concern. Also women join voluntary formal groups to be better informed and for economic gains.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_32-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 2 Distribution of respondents according to their socioeconomic characteristics Variables Age (years) 20–30 31–40 41–50 51–60 61–70 Marital status Single Married Widowed Divorced Educational attainment No formal education Primary education Secondary education Tertiary education Religion Christianity Islam Traditional Membership of socio-organizationsa Trade union Corporative society Religious association Tribal group Age group Other social organizations

Savannah zone Freq 16 18 20 2 5

% 26.2 29.4 32.6 3.2 8.0

Forest zone Freq 11 10 17 14 4

3 49 5 4

4.9 80.3 8.2 6.2

2 36 12

3.6 64.3 21.4 10.7

25 20 11 5

41.0 32.8 18.0 8.2

19 18 6 13

33.9 32.1 10.7 23.2

34 26 1

55.7 42.6 1.6

25 30 1

44.6 53.6 1.8

16 3 32 6 1 3

26.2 4.9 52.5 9.8 1.6 4.9

15 2 37 2 –

26.8 3.6 66.1 3.6 – –

% 19.8 18.0 30.0 25.0 7.2

Source: Field Survey, 2011 a Multiple response option

Livelihood Activities Engaged in by Respondents Table 3 reveals that in the savannah zone, 41.0 % of the respondents were fully involved in crop farming, while 18.0 % are occasionally involved. Few of the women (6.6 %) were fully engaged in rearing of animals, while 50.8 % of the women occasionally rear livestock such as goats, sheep, and fowl. About one third (34.4 %) of the women also reported significant involvement and direct marketing of their farm products such as cassava, maize, palm produce, etc. These are farm products cultivated by the women or by their husbands, thereby eliminating the position of middlemen and more profits are made. The results agree with Dercon and Krishnan (1996), Bryceson and Jarnal (1997), Little et al. (1998), and Barret and Webb (2001) who argue that farming on its own rarely provides a significant means of survival in rural areas of low-income countries including Nigeria. Rural livelihood diversification also serves as means of spreading risks associated with climate change among respondents in the study area. The result also shows that majority of the respondents do not engage in hired labor activities (77 %), fish farming (95.1 %), and harvesting of farm produce

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_32-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 3 Distribution of respondents by livelihood activities (farming-related activities) in savannah and forest zones

Livelihood activities Crop farming Livestock rearing Crops processing Marketing of farm produce Gathering and sales of firewood Gathering and sales of snails Hired labor Fish farming Fish and feed production Harvesting of farm produce Others

Fully Occasionally Savannah zone F % F % 25 41.0 11 18.0 4 6.6 31 50.0 8 13.1 21 34.4 21 34.4 21 34.4 5 8.2 5 8.2 – – 1 1.6 3 4.9 11 18.0 1 1.6 1 1.6 – – 3 4.9 7 11.5 20 32.8 2 3.2 1 1.6

Not F 25 26 32 19 51 60 47 59 58 34 56

% 41.0 42.6 52.5 31.1 83.6 98.4 77.0 96.7 95.1 55.7 91.8

Fully Forest zone F % 29 51.8 – – 17 30.4 29 51.8 – – 2 3.6 1 1.8 – – – – 7 12.5 2 3.6

Occasionally

Not

F 7 34 25 16 6 28 7 – 2 20 2

F 20 22 14 11 50 26 48 56 54 29 52

% 12.5 60.7 44.6 28.6 10.7 50.0 12.5 – 3.6 35.7 3.6

% 35.7 39.3 25.0 19.6 89.3 46.4 85.7 100 96.4 51.8 92.9

Source: Field survey, 2011

(95.7 %). The implication of this is that these activities are considered for the men folk since it requires lot of energy. Table 3 further shows that of all the farming-related livelihood activities in the forest zone, larger proportion of the respondents were fully engaged in crop farming (51.8 %), crop processing (30.4 %), and marketing of farm produce (51.8 %). Also, none of the respondents was fully involved in livestock rearing, gathering and sales of fuelwood, fish farming, fish processing, and hired labor work. This implies that majority of the women in the zone derived their living through farming; hence, their survival depends on agricultural land which must be rich and fertile in order to increase productivity. The result concurs with the study of Asunmgha and Nwosu (2006) and Ajeih and Uzokwe (2007) that women play a leading role in agricultural enterprise, contributing about 58 % in southwest and 88 % in north-central zones, with involvement in virtually all activities, namely, hoeing, planting, weeding, harvesting, transporting, storing, processing, marketing, and domestic chores.

Influence of Climate Change on the Livelihood Activities of the Respondents in the Two Zones Table 4 reveals that majority (80.3 % and 100 %) of the respondents residing in savannah and forest zones respectively had experienced an increase in intensity of sunlight over the years. The result shows that majority of women in savannah zone (63.9 %) and 100 % of women in forest zone also experienced decrease in the frequency of rainfall. In a study in the northern part of Nigeria, Ojo et al. (2001) showed a decrease in rainfall in the range of about 3–4 % per decade since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The result also reveals that 63.9 % of women in savannah zone and 82.1 % in forest zone lamented an increase in incidence of pest and diseases, while very few (6.8 % and 1.6 % of women) in these zones reported that there is no change being witnessed. This implies that change in climate favors emergence of pest and disease which feeds on farmers’ crops leading to decrease in farm yield and consequently lower income of the farmers. WHO (1990) supported this view that adequacy of food production could be affected by reduction in the quantity of water

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_32-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 4 Distribution of respondents’ awareness on climate change Savannah zone Increase Decrease F % F % Increased intensity of sunlight 49 80.3 11 18.0 Increased frequency of rainfall 21 34.4 39 63.9 High incidence of pest and diseases 39 63.9 18 29.5 High incidence of skin and airborne diseases 40 65.6 7 11.5 Heat stress on human productivity 46 75.4 6 9.8 Reduced availability of forest products 12 19.7 41 67.2 Increased cases of soil erosion and flooding 8 13.1 21 34.4 Reduced availability of portable water 8 13.1 45 73.8 Loss in crop productivity 42 68.9 12 19.7 Loss of animal productivity 46 75.4 6 9.8 Variables

No change F % 1 1.6 – – 4 6.8 14 23.0 9 14.8 8 13.1 32 52.5 8 13.1 7 11.5 9 14.8

Forest zone Increase Decrease F % F % 56 100 – – – – 56 100 46 82.1 9 16.1 14 25.0 12 21.4 52 92.9 – – 1 1.8 44 78.6 4 7.1 18 32.1 34 60.7 20 35.7 33 58.9 14 25.0 33 58.9 14 25.0

No change F % – – – – 1 1.6 30 53.6 8 13.1 11 19.6 34 60.7 2 3.6 9 16.1 9 16.1

available for irrigation, loss of farmland through rise in sea level, changes in crop yield, livestock production, and geographical shifts in the agroclimatic zones suited to the successful cultivation of specific crops. The study further revealed that 67.2 % and 78.6 % of the respondents from savannah and forest zones respectively reported a decrease in availability of timber and other forest products such as mushrooms, snails, breadfruit, and so on. A large number (68.9 % and 58.9) of the women in the respective zones reported increasing cases of crop losses and declining animal productivity. The implication of this is that there would be a decrease in supply of animal protein to the community which could lead to insufficient protein, deficiency diseases, and low income with consequent poverty being on the increase. Kurukulasuriya et al. (2006) and Ole et al. (2009) asserted that analysis of 9,000 farmers in 11 African countries predicted falling in farm revenues with current climate scenarios. Also Butt et al. (2005) predicted future economic losses and increased risk of hunger due to climate change.

Adaptation Strategies to Climate Change Due to the influence of climate change on livelihood activities, women in the two ecological zones of the study employ different adaptation strategies to climate change effects on their activities. The study reveals that adaptation strategies employed by the respondents to various extremes of climatic variables varied across the two ecological zones of Oyo State. In the savannah zone, for example, the most important adaptation strategies included water storage for future use, diversification into other activities, and changing planting dates. This establishes the low level of water available for the crop plants, as well as for other livelihood and domestic activities of the rural women in the study area. It also implies the irregular rainfall annual calendar. On the other hand, while diversification into other activities was the most used adaptation strategies to climate change, practicing multiple cropping and changing planting dates were also important adaptive measures against climate change effects. These results are in line with Molua (2008), Rudolf and Hermann (2009), and Apata et al. (2009) who reported that main strategies for reducing climate risk is to diversify production and livelihood systems like soil and water management measures. In the two zones, however, the least adopted adaptation strategies to climate change included rearing snail and/or grass cutter, use of fertilizer on farmland, as well as planting of Jatropha to help

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Table 5 Distribution of respondents according to adaptation strategies to climate change in savannah zone Adaptation strategies Crop rotation Planting of trees Cultivating wetlands (Akuro) Planting early maturing crop Use of fertilizer on farmland Practicing multiple cropping Planting improved seed variety Planting of Jatropha Water storage for future Changing planting dates Rearing snail and/or grass cutter Planting of cover crops Diversification into other activities

Savannah F 27 20 25 15 6 30 11 11 55 31 7 27 46

% 44.3 32.8 41.0 24.6 9.8 49.2 18.0 18.0 90.2 50.8 11.5 44.3 75.4

Rank 5 8 7 9 13 4 10 10 1 3 12 5 2

Rainforest F 37 8 14 17 11 39 14 3 23 39 6 27 43

% 66.1 14.3 25.0 30.4 19.6 69.6 25.0 5.4 41.1 69.6 10.7 48.2 76.8

Rank 4 11 8 7 10 2 8 13 6 2 12 5 1

Source: Field survey, 2011

conserve water through reduction of evapotranspiration. The low-level adoption of use of fertilizer may be due to low access to production resources which very often are the cases in sub-Saharan Africa. This is in line with Ajani (2008) who asserted that despite significant contributions of women to economic development and the household, overall, they have less access to land, capital, credit, technology, and training than men do. This significantly entrenches poverty in the female gender. It also agrees with Sangotegbe et al. (2012) who reported lack of access to fertilizer as an important constraint limiting food crop farmers’ adaptive capacity to climate change in Oke-Ogun, an area in the savannah region of Oyo State (Table 5).

Hypothesis 1 Ho1 There is no significant difference in the influence of climate change on rural women in the two ecological zones. Result shows that there is a significant difference in the influence of climate change on the activities of rural women in the two ecological zones (t = 4.605, p = 0.000), with the effects being more in the forest zones. The implication of this is not far from the fact that savannah zone experiences shorter duration of rain period with longer period of dry season than forest zone which enjoys abundance of rain. This could mean more hardships to the rural women in this zone (savannah), many of whom depend on the natural sources for water and other resources as sources of livelihood and household energy needs (Table 6).

Hypothesis 2 Ho2 There is no significant difference between the levels of adaptation strategies adopted by rural women in the two ecological zones. Page 11 of 15

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Table 6 t-test analysis of the influence of climate change on rural women in the two ecological zones Variables Savannah Forest

Mean 8.10 16.21

Degree of freedom 116

t-value 4.605

p-value 0.000

Mean difference 8.11

Standard deviation 2.160

Decision Significant

Table 7 t-test analysis on adaptation strategies adopted by rural women in the two ecological zones Variables Savannah Forest

Mean 13.202 18.331

Degree of freedom 30

t-value 6.637

p-value 0.000

Mean difference 5.129

Standard deviation 4.303

Decision Significant

The findings further reveal that there is significant difference between adaptation strategies adopted by rural women in the two ecological zones (t = 6.637, p = 0.000), with the forest zone adopting a higher level of adaptation measures than their savannah counterparts. This may be expected since rural women in the forest zone of the state experienced higher effects of climate change. It should however be noted that majority of the adaptation strategies being adopted to reduce climate change effects on the activities of women are those within their very limited economic power. It therefore suggests that the higher level of adaptation strategies were informed by the higher level of effects in the forest, rather than being indicative of higher level of access to resources (Table 7).

Conclusion and Recommendations Women in the two agroecological zones are engaged in farming-related activities as their means of livelihood although very few of them engage in non-farming-related activities such as trading, hairplaiting, tailoring, pottery, craft work, and tie-dye. The result of the research reveals that majority of the respondents in the two zones agreed to have been highly affected by climate change, in their various livelihood activities. Influence of climate change on respondents’ livelihood activities and adaptation strategies adopted against climate change effects were both higher in the forest than in savannah zones of the state. However, adaptive capacities of the women were limited as strategies to climate change were restricted to those within the limited local resources available to the rural women in the two ecological zones of Oyo State.

Recommendations Based on the results and conclusion of the study, the following recommendations are important: 1. Government should provide irrigation facilities especially in the drier region of the state (savannah zone) so as to boost agricultural activities during dry season. 2. The use of alternative energy fuel such as biofuel for domestic and household cooking should be encouraged among women. 3. Affordable technology that will adequately help rural women to cope with negative effects of climate change such as improved planting material, drought-resistant crop, planting early maturing varieties, and cultural means of reducing infestation of pest and diseases should be within the reach of the rural women. Page 12 of 15

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4. Rural women should be encouraged to form groups where they can get access to short- term credit facilities at lower interest rates to help finance agricultural production and as such improve their lives and that of their family. 5. The Nigerian government should develop a gender strategy, promote women representatives as official focal points, invest in gender-specific climate change research, and establish a system for the use of gender-sensitive indicators and criteria for governments in national adaptation planning.

References Adejuwon SA (2004) Impacts of climate variability and climate change on crop yield in Nigeria. In: Paper presented at the stakeholders workshop on assessment of impacts and adaptation to climate change. Conference centre Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, 20–21 Sept Ajani OIY (2008) Gender dimensions of agriculture, poverty, nutrition and food security in Nigeria. Nigeria Strategy Support Program (NSSP) Background Paper No. NSSP 005 Ajeih PC, Uzokwe UN (2007) Adoption of Cassava production technologies among women farmers in Aniocha South Local Government Area, Delta State, Nigeria. J Global App Extension Pract (GAEP) 3(2):15–20 Akonga AZ (2001) The causes and impacts of drought. ANIS Monograph No. 3, pp 1–16; Awake 2009. Are we running out of water? Awake! Jan 2009, pp 3–7 Apata TG, Samuel KD, Adeola AO (2009) Analysis of climate change perception and adaptation among arable food crop farmers in south western Nigeria. Paper presented at the conference of International Association of Agricultural Economics, pp 2–9 Asunmgha GN, Nwosu JN (2006) The Cassava sector and background integration in sustaining the raw material requirement of existing and emerging agro- allied industries in Nigeria. In: Proceedings of the 40th annual conference of the agricultural society of Nigeria (ASN) held at NRCRI, Umuahia Abia State, 16–20 Oct, pp 137–140 Barret CT, Webb P (2001) Non-farm income diversification and household livelihood strategies in rural Africa: concepts dynamics and policy implications. Food Policy 26:315–331 Bebbington A (1999) Capital and capabilities: a framework for analyzing peasant viability, rural livelihoods and poverty. World Dev 27(2):2021–2044 Bryceson DF, Jarnal (eds) (1997) Farewell to farms: De-agrarianization and Employment in Africa, Leiden: Ase Research Series 1997/10 Burton I (1997) Vulnerability and adaptive response in the context of climate and climate change, clim. Change 36:185–196 Burton IJB, Smith S, Lenhart S (1998) Adaptation to climate change: theory and assessment. In: Feenstra JF, Burton I, Smith JB, Tol RSJ (eds) Handbook on methods for climate change impact assessment and adaptation strategies, Version 2.0. UNEP/RIVM, Nairobi, Amsterdam Butt TA, McCari BA, Angerer J, Dyke PT, Stuth JW (2005) The economic and food security implications of climate change in Mali Journal Climatic change 6(8):355–378 Bzugu PM, Kwaghe PV (1997) Constraints to farm resources acquisition by women farmers in Konduga L.G.A. of Borno State, Nigeria. J Rural Dev Admin XXIX:27–36 Downing T, Ringius L, Hulme M, Waughray D (1997) Adapting to climate change in Africa. Mitig Adapt Strat Glob Chang 2(1):19–44 Fischer G, Shah M, Velthuizen H (2002) Climate change and agricultural vulnerability. Special report by International Institute for applied system analysis, Vienna Page 13 of 15

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Fresco LO (1998) Higher agricultural education: an opportunity in rural development for women. Sustainable Development Department, Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), for the United Nations, Rome, p 4 F€ usel HM, Klein RJT (2002) Assessing vulnerability and adaptation to climate change: an evolution of conceptual thinking. Paper for the UNDP expert group. In: Integrating Disaster Reduction and Adaptation to Climate Change, Habana, Cuba Hoddinott J, Quisumbing A (2003) Methods for microeconometric risk and vulnerability assessments. Social protection discussion paper series No. 0324. The World Bank Ihedioha CN (2007) Contributing to global efforts to combat climate change (Nigeria), http://www. acdi-ada.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf IPCC (2001) Climate change 2001: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Keller KM, Hall S, Kim R, Bradford DF, Oppenheimer M (2005) Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference with the Climate System, Climatic Change 73:227–238 Kurukulasuriya P, Mendelsohn R, Hassan R, Benhin J, Deressa T, Dip M, Fosu KY, Jain S, Mano R, Molua E, Ouda S, Sene I, Seo SN, Dinar A (2006) Will African agriculture survive climate change? World Bank Econ Rev 20(3):67–88 Little PD, Cellarius B, Barret C, Coppock DI (1998) Economic diversification and risk management among East African herders: a preliminary assessment and literature review. GL-CRCP Pastoral risk management project technical report, pp 211–215 Mabogunye AL (2010) Land reform in Nigeria: progress, problems & prospects. http://siteresources. worldbank.org/EXTARD/Resources/336681-1236436879081/58933111271205116054/mabogunje. pdf Molua EL (2008) Turning up the heat on African Agriculture: the impact of climate change on Cameroon’s agriculture. Afr J Agric Res Econ 2(1):45–64 Nwajiuba CU, Onyeneke R, Munonye J (2008) Climate change: perception and adaptation by poultry farmers in Imo state. In: Nwajiuba C (ed) Farming & rural systems economics. Margraf, Weikersheim, pp 53–64 Ogbuehi H, Onuh M, Ohazurike N (2008) Consequences of climate change on physiological processes in agriculture. In: Farming & rural systems economics. Margraf Verlag, Weikersheim, pp 17–26 Ojo O, Ojo K, Oni F (2001) Fundamentals of physical and dynamic climatology. SEDEC, Nigeria Ole M, Cheikh M, Anette R, Awa D (2009) Farmers’ perceptions of climate change and agricultural strategies in rural Sahel. J Environ Manage 4(3):804–816 Oluwasegun OA, Olaniran JM (2010) Effects of temporal changes in climate variables on crop production in tropical sub-humid South-western Nigeria. http://www.academicjournals.org/ AJEST. Accessed May, 2011 Rudolf W, Hermann W (2009) Climate risk and farming systems in rural Cameroon. Institute of Development and Agricultural Economics. University of Hannover, Hannover, pp 21–24 Sangotegbe NS, Odebode SO, Onikoyi MP (2012) Adaptation strategies to climate change by food crop farmers in Oke-Ogun area of South Western Nigeria. J Agric Ext 16(1):119–131 Sangotegbe NS (2011) Adaptation strategies to climate change by food crop farmers in Oke-Ogun area of Oyo state. An MSc Desertation in the Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, pp 121 Sen A (1997) Editorial: human capital and human capability. World Dev 25(12):1959–1961 Smith DM (2006) Just One Planet: poverty, justice and climate change. Practical Action Publishing, Intermediate Technology publications, Rugby, UK, pp 123 Page 14 of 15

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Smith LED, Nguyen Khoa S, Lorenzen K (2005) Livelihood functions of inland fisheries: policy implications in developing countries. Water Policy 7:359–383 Stige LC (2006) The effect of climate variation on agro-pastoral production in Africa. Proc Natl Acad Sci 103(9):3049–3053 Stige LC (2007) Thousand-year-long Chinese time series reveals climatic forcing of decadal locust dynamics. Proc Natl Acad Sci 104(41):16188–16193 Stireman JO, Dyer LA, Janzen DH, Singer MS, Lilly JT, Marquis RJ, Ricklefs RE (2005) Climatic unpredictability and parasitism of caterpillars: implications of global warming. Proc Natl Acad Sci 102(48):17384–17387 Titilola SO, Akande SO, Olomola A, Akpokdje G (1996) Population Pressure and Environmental Degradation: A Pilot Study of the Economic Effects of Soil Erosion in Efon-Alaye In: Population Environment Interactions in Nigeria. (eds). Phillips AO, Ajakaiye DOO. The Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER) Ibadan Nigeria. West Africa. 1990, March 20–26 WHO (1990) Potential health effects of climate change. WHO, Geneva Zabbey N (2011) Mainstreaming climate change mitigation and adaptation in Niger delta communities: the role of women. Paper delivered at a workshop organised by Kabetkache Women Development and Resource Centre for Erema Women to mark the International Women’s Day, Erema Town Hall, Erema, Rivers State, 8 March 2011, pp 4–5

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From Risk to Opportunity: Climate Change and Flood Policy in Bangladesh Muhammad Jahedul Huq* and Louise Bracken Institute of Hazards, Risk and Resilience (IHRR), Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, UK

Abstract This study identifies current gaps and opportunities of existing flood regulatory frameworks and national climate change strategies of Bangladesh. In so doing, the research develops a framework to reconcile the interest of land, water, and people in order to reduce the vulnerability of extreme flooding and develop strategies for future flood management. The study reveals that the existing flood regulatory framework is only effective for relief and response during times of flooding but has significant gaps and inadequate provisions to increase communities’ adaptive capacity and resilience to deal with future flooding vulnerability under climate change. The flood management system also suffers from a lack of coordination, complex institutional frameworks, and budgetary constraints. The findings of the study also reveal that people’s/communities’ participation is at a very early state in flood-related project formulation and implementation, and they are totally absent at the level of flood management committees. In addition, the study strongly urges introduction of evidence-based flood policy formulation to reconcile the interest of land, water, and people. Working in this way will give people and communities a voice in the decision-making process, ensure the participation of vulnerable people in decision-making around flooding, and take immediate initiatives to fill the existing gaps and weaknesses of flood management system in Bangladesh.

Keywords Flood; Disaster risk reduction; Climate change adaptation; Resilience; Bangladesh

Introduction Fluvial flooding is unquestionably the most recurrent and devastating natural disaster in Bangladesh, and further increases are estimated due to climate change projections (GOB 2009a, b; Mirza et al. 2003; Mirza 2002; Agrawala et al. 2003; Ali 2011; Dasgupta 2007). Fluvial flooding occurs when rivers overflow and burst their banks, due to high or intense rainfall which flows into them. Typically, fluvial flooding in Bangladesh occurs when discharges from several major rivers coincide within a short period of time with heavy monsoon rainfall. It is stated that unprecedented population growth, continuous wetland encroachment, and unplanned increases of infrastructure on floodplains in Bangladesh will accelerate this flooding vulnerability under climate change. This increased flooding vulnerability and uncertainty will diminish the flexibility of the country’s ability to react to flood events as well as the appropriateness of traditional flood management strategies. Consequently, changes in duration, depth, and timing of fluvial flooding might bring drastic changes in the *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 22

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country’s subsistent agriculture (Younus 2010) and livelihood of the poor in particular, with the possible result of pushing more people below the poverty line (Mirza 2002). Hofer and Messerli (2006) contend that in the last two decades, the people of Bangladesh have demonstrated resilience to flooding in the form of autonomous adaptation, but at the present time, their ability is exhausted due to the changing pattern of floods in terms of frequency, intensity, and time of occurrence. Furthermore, historical and contemporary data clearly demonstrate that the impact of floods is a key factor hindering the development process of Bangladesh. The study presented follows a critical review method in order to investigate and strengthen flood management policies to facilitate adaptation and to increase resilience of those communities most vulnerable under climate change in Bangladesh (Samuels et al. 2006; Mirza 2002). This paper begins presenting a brief overview of key concepts (disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, and resilience) and the notion of people-centered policy as a framework of research. Section Flood Management in Bangladesh then provides an evaluation of existing flood management strategies in Bangladesh including the regulatory framework around flooding; a critical review of existing flood regulatory frameworks to address flooding under climate change with special regard to the contribution of resilience. Climate change adaption (CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) are found in Section Review of Flood Regulatory Frameworks in the Context of DRR, CCA, and Resilience. Section Key Issues, Gaps, and Constraints identifies the opportunities and constraints of existing flood management policies to reduce the vulnerability due to extreme flooding and potential damages and transferring risks in terms of changes in monsoon, temperature, and sea level rise for long-term climate change. Conclusions are reported in section “Conclusion”.

Analytical Framework This section provides an analytical framework for the concepts of disaster risk reduction (DRR), climate change adaptation (CCA), and resilience. These three concepts provide a suitable analytical framework, which focuses on people-centered policy (development) within the context of flood- and climate change-induced vulnerability. In effect, this foundation for analysis highlights the importance of people’s participation in decision-making in increasing the effectiveness of flood vulnerability reduction under climate change.

Understanding the Key Concepts Considering the notion of risk and vulnerability as the key underlying concept of DRR (UNISDR 2004; Concern 2005; White et al. 2004), this paper views DRR as “the systematic development and application of policies, strategies and practices to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society, to avoid (prevent) or to limit (mitigate and prepare) adverse impacts of hazards, within the broader context of sustainable development” (UNISDR 2002, p. 25). Therefore, DRR adopts a broad range of guidelines including policy/regulatory issues and planning practices to fill the gaps between development and humanitarian works to protect lives and assets by reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing resilience (Concern 2005; Mitchell and van Aalst 2008; Twigg 2004). Similarly, the conceptualization of CCA includes an open process or ongoing actions to improve the condition, measures, or strategies to reduce vulnerability and to introduce new initiatives to increase resilience in order to cope or to adjust with climate change-associated adverse effects (Andreasen 2011; Schipper 2004). So, adaptation can be a specific action, for instance, changing cropping pattern, employing water efficient irrigation practices in drought-prone areas, planting saline-tolerant rice varieties, and a system change such as diversifying livelihoods. Additionally, it Page 2 of 22

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Resilience promotes to cope with shocks after disaster.

Resilience increases the adaptive capacity through asset building, diversifying livelihood or ensuring the acess or right of vulnerable.

Resilience

People centred policy Disaster Risk Reduction

Climate Change Adaptation

Facilitate living with risk reducing vulnerability to extreme weather events due to climate change.

Fig. 1 Conceptual framework for people-centered policy (development)

incorporates policy and institutional reform, which might change particular activities or make available additional services to vulnerable people, which in turn may help them to make better decisions (Raihan et al. 2010). Therefore, in the context of DRR and CCA, this paper characterizes resilience as the long-term ability or capacity of individuals, communities, organizations, or countries to take/make effective strategies and measures to reduce and to cope with and respond to extreme events as well as organize recovery after these shocks (Twigg 2001, 2009; IFRC 2012; UNISDR 2002).

The Framework of Research: People-Centered Policy Development It has been established that the relationship between nature and society is complex and that their association is nonlinear. Nature and society also interact in a coupled and integrated way. Hence the study uses the concept of socio-ecological resilience to examine the floods in Bangladesh. The socio-ecological resilience approach greatly enhances understanding the nature of processes and socio-ecological system response, which in turn facilitates achieving socioeconomic development as well as maintaining a healthy ecosystem of rivers and floodplains simultaneously. Here, socioecological resilience is the capacity or ability of a human and physical environment to respond or absorb or shape each other within their own domain in an informed manner (Adger 2000; Peterson 2000). Moreover, this approach is a tool rather than being a theory that engages different stakeholders, particularly the poor and most vulnerable communities, in the decision-making process to reduce flood risks and floodplain development (Warner et al. 2002). The approach also incorporates new ideas from resilience in order to better analyze and manage transitions to more sustainable development pathways in social-ecological systems. The concept of people-centered policy integrates DRR and CCA in development policies and programs. Thus DRR polices incorporate the preferences/priorities of communities most at risk. It also follows a bottom-up approach by power sharing and access to justice against discrimination and exclusion. Moreover, this approach not only gives the primary responsibility to vulnerable communities to protect their own land and properties from floods but also creates an opportunity to perform active citizenship through collective action to reduce flood risks (Johnson et al. 2007, 2008). Figure 1 provides an overview of people-centered policy development, which places the poor and vulnerable Page 3 of 22

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community at the center of the policy formulation process. This facilitates the participation of floodafflicted groups from project formulation to its implementation. The diagram represents three different circles, which are denoted as DRR, CCA, and resilience. The characteristics of these three concepts are different from one another, but there is an increasing recognition that DRR, CCA, and resilience share a common focus in reducing vulnerabilities and thus contribute to sustainable development (CEPA 2012). In so doing, this study argues that a people-centered flood policy framework provides support to increase and build people’s resilience and adaptive capacity through diversifying livelihoods and by ensuring access and rights of poor and socially disadvantaged groups to reduce vulnerabilities to flooding under climate change.

Flood Management in Bangladesh Flood management in Bangladesh has continuously evolved over the last 60 years from relief rehabilitation, to flood prevention, toward flood preparedness. In early periods, particularly before the political partition of the Indian subcontinent, there were no government-led flood management systems. In the 1960s, after a series of disastrous floods, large-scale engineering structures gained importance to control flood water in order to introduce high-yielding rice varieties to meet the demand of a growing population (Haque and Zaman 1993; Haskoning 2003; Cook 2010). After the independence of the country in 1971, small-scale flood control and drainage projects were implemented by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Dutch government. Similarly, after the floods of 1987 and 1988, the Flood Action Plan (FAP) was formulated with the help of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, focusing on traditional large structure-oriented plans. However, actual actions have not been taken yet due to people’s resistance against structural measures. Later in 1995, FAP was accepted by the Government of Bangladesh (GOB), and donor agencies incorporated local people in partnership with experts and professionals in water management (Chadwick and Datta 2003; Sultana et al. 2008). In 1998 a disastrous flood brought a new dimension to flood management strategy in Bangladesh emphasizing “integrated water management, floodplain morphology and flood forecasting and warning” (UNEP 2002, p. 35). This strategy takes into account livelihood development and reduces the vulnerability of the most disadvantaged in society. However, the big floods of 1987, 1988, and 1998 also brought changes in policies, in particular the formulation of new plans/strategies and incorporation of new institutions for future flood management. As Sultana et al. (2008, p. 7) explain: . . .the 1987 and 1988 floods resulted in the FAP process which led to debate over policy directions and delayed any structural works. These floods also catalyzed changes in policy direction and brought forward the involvement of new actors who introduced new concepts to public discourse such as compartmentalization. Similarly, environmentalist and civil society lobbies emphasized land-use planning and flood retention in 1998, indicating a major change from the ‘engineering coalition’ and its policy beliefs that had dominated much of the previous 50 years.

At present, there are different regulatory frameworks and stakeholders (Fig. 2) involved directly and indirectly at different levels of flood management in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) is the principal national institution concerned with flood management and disseminates flood information to all related government departments and organizations. Additionally, the Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR) and recently (2012) established Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MDMR) act as national level coordinators of flood management relating to water and disaster management, respectively. However, during flood events, overall coordination is the responsibility of the latter ministries and the Inter-Ministerial Disaster Page 4 of 22

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International Development Organizations

National disaster management council Inter-Ministerial Disaster management Co-ordination committee National disaster management Advisory Council NGO Coordination Committee on Disaster Management District Disaster Management committee

GLOBAL

REGIONAL

NATIONAL

Union Disaster Management committee

DISTRICT

UpZila Disaster Management committee SUB - DISTRICT

Related Ministries Bangladesh Water development Board Water Resources Planning Organization Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre Disaster management Bureau Directorate of Relief and Rehabilitation Local Government Division Local Government Engineering Department

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

UN organizations (UNDP, UNISDR, UNEP etc.)

Asian Development Bank (ADB)

Bilateral and Multilateral agencies, Academic and research institutions, National and International NGOs, Media

The Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission

IFRC

Fig. 2 Different levels of stakeholders’ engagement in flood management in Bangladesh

Management Committee. Although Bangladesh has no specific plans and policies for flood risk management, the National Water Policy and Water Management Plan is especially formulated for effective management of the country’s flooding problem. A Comprehensive National Strategy for Disaster Management and Standing Orders on Disaster (GOB 2010a) has also been developed, which defines the roles and responsibilities of different agencies in different stages of disaster management. The following section examines these national flood regulatory frameworks to identify existing efforts and responses in the context of risk reduction, adaptation, and resilience to flooding under climate change.

Review of Flood Regulatory Frameworks in the Context of DRR, CCA, and Resilience Although flooding is an annual phenomenon in Bangladesh and costs about 0.5–1.5 % of total GDP (World Bank 2010), the country has no specific flood regulatory frameworks. Here, flood regulatory frameworks mean a set of acts, policies, and plans/strategies, which are related to flood management in Bangladesh. There are few regional and international regulations which Bangladesh considers for flood management. However, after the independence of the country in 1971, major changes in flood regulatory frameworks occurred after the devastation caused by floods in 1987 and 1988 and the beginning of the country’s new political era in 1990 (Sultana et al. 2008; Chadwick and Datta 2003; Pal et al. 2011). Section Review of Flood Regulatory Frameworks in the Context of DRR, CCA, and Resilience consists of three subsections which present a critical analysis of the legal frameworks, sectoral policies, and different planning documents in order to identify the gaps and opportunities of existing flood management in Bangladesh.

Review of National Legal Frameworks The Standing Order on Disaster (SOD) The SOD was first prepared in 1997 and later revised in 1999. SOD is formulated to “outline the role and responsibilities of the ministries, divisions, agencies, organizations, committees, public Page 5 of 22

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representatives and citizens to cope with any natural disaster” (GOB 2010a, p. i). It also instructs all concerned authorities and responsible persons to follow respective guidelines during the normal time for disaster preparedness, emergency period, precautionary and warning stage, disaster stage, and post-disaster stage. Moreover, the order also provides an institutional mechanism to ensure the coordination of disaster-related activities among and within the different levels of actors. Significant changes to SOD took place in 2010 when the recommendations of the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (2005) on vulnerability to climate change were adopted. The SOD also evolved when Bangladesh became a signatory to the Hyogo Framework Action (HFA) (2005–2015), which mainstreamed DRR and CCA in all natural disasters. At present, disaster management in Bangladesh is regulated under the SOD and follows reactive approaches of disaster management, particularly centered on traditional relief and responses during and post disaster. SOD adopted DRR in 2008 and highlighted disaster preparedness as the basis for autonomous adaptation, but in reality it is not present at the local level (Haque and Haque 2009), and there is no contingency plan for flood management. Additionally, SOD does not clearly define the roles and participation of affected communities. A study by Rashid (2008) on the implementation of SOD at the local level found that most Union Disaster Management Committee (UDMC) members have no knowledge about SOD nor their roles and responsibilities. Resource constraints to execute disaster management plans are also a challenge. As a result, local-level disaster management committees only function during the disaster period for relief distribution and response operations. Although this regulation clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of each institution, it does not provide any indicative guideline for reducing risks and vulnerabilities, e.g., building code for floods, or specific directions such as spatial planning for infrastructure (road, culvert, and rail). National Disaster Management Act (DMA) The DMA (2011) is enacted to enforce the SOD, especially to ensure the accountability of all disaster-related agencies and persons, who are responsible to reduce disaster risks for protecting people’s lives, livelihoods, and assets. The key provision of the DMA is to establish a disaster management department to coordinate the activities of all government and development partners. It also gives power to the president to declare a “national disaster” and to form a “national disaster fund” (MODMR 2012b). Most importantly, this act gives preference to the ultra-poor and socially excluded people in DRR and emergency response activities. However, this act inherited its strategy from the country’s traditional disaster management approach – relief and rehabilitation – and is therefore reactive. It calls for flood risk assessment before doing any construction but does not give any instruction to real estate developers. It does not even provide any opportunities to perform collective actions for flood risk reduction. Additionally, it proposes punishment for negligence of emergency response, but does not make any legal provision for those who are responsible to increase people’s vulnerability by occupying floodplains or flood flow zones for further use. Draft Water Act The draft water act (2012) is prepared to adopt and to make effective the National Water Policy (1999). This draft act entrusts the Executive Committee of the National Water Council to ensure integrated, equitable, and sustainable management, development, utilization, and protection of water resources of the country. However, it does not directly deal with climate change and floods in Bangladesh, but makes provisions for catchment-wide river management. It also insists on exchanging regional data and information for transboundary rivers with neighboring countries for long-term water resources as well as flood planning and management. Additionally, the draft act emphasizes not to build any infrastructures that may affect the natural flow of rivers, but allows for Page 6 of 22

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embankments along the major rivers to protect people and their assets from future floods. It does not give any clear direction ordering conservation and protection of other wetlands and floodplains as designated flood flow zones, which might indirectly induce unplanned use of floodplains to meet the growing demand of land. Moreover, people’s participation in water resource planning and management is not included in the draft act, while the National Water Policy operates to ensure stakeholder engagement at all levels.

Review of National Sectoral Policies

As previously mentioned, Bangladesh has no single flood management policy. But national water policy plays an important role in directing and guiding reduction and management of flood-related problems. Apart from this, there are other policies, which are directly related to causes, impacts and management of flooding in Bangladesh. The following policy matrix (Table 1) provides an overview of those policy objectives and their key thrusts, which are focused on risk reduction, adaptation and resilience to flooding.

Review of National Plans/Strategies National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) NAPA-2009 is an updated and revised version of NAPA-2005, which originated under the guidance of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in response to the Seventh Conference of Parties to address the countries’ urgent and immediate actions in regard to CC (GOB 2005). The new plan identified 45 adaptation measures classified into six broad thematic areas, which were intended to contribute toward enhancing adaptive capacities and resilience of vulnerable communities. The revised NAPA set its strategic goals to facilitate DRR, on sustainable development and also on institutional capacity building to accelerate adaptation. However, this plan has no special measures. In fact no provisions for making space for water, to reduce flood risk and vulnerability, are made. Although NAPA claims to follow a participatory approach during preparation, it does not incorporate local-level stakeholders, and even the role of community and non-state actors in project implementation is not clearly spelled out. NAPA-2009 does not provide any guidelines to mainstream the identified adaptation measures in other government plans. Moreover, the plan lacks the institutional framework and economic capacity to put all adaptation measures into operation. Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) BCCSAP, as an extension of NAPA, was prepared in 2008 and later revised in 2009. This 10-year (2009–2018) plan had 44 programs grouped into six broad sectoral pillars in order to “build the capacity and resilience of the country to meet the challenge of climate change” (GOB 2009b, p. 27). Following a sectoral approach, the plan of action emphasized infrastructure-based flood control management including construction of embankments, dikes, and excavation of rivers to increase the water retention capacity. Similarly, it suggested improvement of early warning and community capacity building for flood preparedness and development of insurance schemes for future risk management. As a way to support resilience, it developed nine programs under the theme of food security, social protection, and health and six programs to strengthen institutional adaptive capacity and mainstream CC into regulatory frameworks. In this context, GOB formed the Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF) to execute this plan and made a provision of US$100 million per year since 2009 from the annual national budget. Despite the fact that Bangladesh has suffered and is still suffering due to heavily engineered flood control projects developed in the 1990s, BCCSAP surprisingly endorses similar programs to reduce Page 7 of 22

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Table 1 Matrix of flood-related policies Sectoral policy and implementing ministry National Disaster Policy (draft) (2012), Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief

Objective(s) Reducing people’s vulnerability and unacceptable risks through effective response and recovery management at all levels

National Agriculture Policy (final Increase food production to meet the draft) (2010), Ministry of Agriculture growing demand and to attain food security at all levels

Key policy thrusts related with DRR, CCA, and resilience Focuses on people’s participation in disaster management (DM), floodbased risk management programs using social vulnerability analysis and participation of co-riparian countries on data exchange for flood forecasting and early warning dissemination Section 8 raises the profile of DM in different sectors like agriculture, education, health, water, food security, land use, and planning to enhance the adaptive capacity and resilience of the community Calls for humanitarian assistance during and after floods to cope with that adverse effects and put importance on social safety nets to increase the resilience of poor and vulnerability communities This draft policy also details out the responsibilities of different state and non-state actors. But it lacks specifics contribution from the annual budget and coordination mechanism among the institutions and actors This revised policy identifies CC and increasing intensity and frequency of floods as key threats for future agriculture and calls for research to develop weather forecasting and early warning for the primary economic sector, to invent new flood tolerant varieties and deep water crop management Under section 5 in the policy (agriculture extension), it proposes a bottom-up approach to include the needs of farmers and to provide extension services to “landless, marginal, small, medium, large with special emphasis on women and youth” It also highlights promotion of suitable crops considering different agroecological zones and expertise of farmers To increase resilience, the policy suggests adequate financial support and ensuring the availability of agricultural commodities (fertilizer, (continued) Page 8 of 22

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Table 1 (continued) Sectoral policy and implementing ministry

Objective(s)

Key policy thrusts related with DRR, CCA, and resilience

seeds, irrigation) to all particularly, small, marginal, and tenant farmers to enhance productivity and also makes provision for special programs for low-lying areas of the country to protect crops from flood Recommends special assistance and agricultural rehabilitation during and after disaster, respectively, introduces insurance scheme and generates income activities for affected farmers to cope and adapt with respective disasters National Wetland Policy (2009), Sustainable use of wetland to increase Revenue-driven rural wetland Ministry of Land and maintenance of the existing level management motivates this legislation of biological diversity including fish No specific mention to use and resources and to promote the value of conserve wetlands for flood wetland for economic development management There are few condition/obligations of leasing wetland like give preference to poor and socially disadvantaged fishing community, ensure the irrigation water during dry season, which might increase the resilience of fishing and farming community National Urban Sector Policy (2006), Ensure sustainable urban development Focuses on local urban planning including land-use zoning, Ministry of Local Government, Rural through decentralized development, incorporation of green infrastructures, optimal utilization of land use, Development and Cooperatives and restrictions of housing in floodfunctional local government, and prone areas and suggests protecting participation of community environmentally sensitive areas to reduce the vulnerability of flooding It also deals with the improvement and rehabilitation of slums, housing for the poor, and different measures to cut the number of poor. Additionally, it emphasizes community participation for flood preparedness and response capabilities National Land Use Policy (2001), Land zoning to control unplanned land Although the policy is very much Ministry of Land use and loss of croplands, sustainable diverted to ensuring economic development of the country, it also land use comply with natural recommends ensuring environment environment and to ensure better utilization for economic development sustainability through protection of the of the country (continued)

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Table 1 (continued) Sectoral policy and implementing ministry

Objective(s)

National Rural Development Policy (2001), Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives

Rural poverty reduction and socioeconomic improvement through increasing food production, development of physical infrastructure and skill human resources, ensuring participation of women with men, and promoting effective local government system

National Water Policy (1999), Ministry of Water Resources

Maximum and efficient utilization of all available water resources in order to attain self sufficiency in food production and managing all waterrelated disasters

Key policy thrusts related with DRR, CCA, and resilience natural environment to reduce disaster vulnerability It does not make any direct observation on climate change, flooding, and the role of land-use planning It identifies unplanned urbanization, and low land filling might increase the intensity of flooding, but it does not suggest any specific measures to make space for the water or make room for rivers It proposes construction of road cum flood embankments in a way that will not affect the natural flow of water and minimize encroachment of wetlands This policy gives priority in financing and implementing flood control project and encourage environment friendly land use to increase food production. Besides, it also allows use of unutilized low lands for cultivation It highlights poor and socially disadvantaged communities for housing, access to credit, insurance for agriculture, health, education, women empowerment, etc. to increase adaptive capacity and resilience to future flooding This policy does not mention any specific measures on flood and CC but indirectly addresses, which might facilitate DRR and adaptation to climate change In section 4.1 of the policy, it emphasis on comanagement of international rivers and exchange of data and information (hydrology, morphology, changing basins characteristics, and flood early warning) to understand and management of existing and future extreme events Policy also calls for developing flood forecasting, flood-proofing systems, i.e., designating flood risk zones, flood embankments for urban and economic importance areas, raising plinth of infrastructure in rural areas, and (continued)

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Table 1 (continued) Sectoral policy and implementing ministry

Objective(s)

National Forests Policy (1994), Afforestation, enriching biological Ministry of Environment and Forests diversity, control forest depletion and social forestry for poverty reduction

National Environmental Policy and Action Plan (1992), Ministry of Environment and Forests

Protecting natural environment, controlling pollutions and sustainable use of natural resources

Key policy thrusts related with DRR, CCA, and resilience cropping patter adjustment to cope with extreme flooding Section 4.13 of the policy accounts for the preservation of haor, boar, and beels to gain optimum economic benefits rather than conservation for retaining flood water and a source of livelihood of rural people Most importantly, it highlights stakeholder participation as an “integral part of water resource management” and makes a provision to engage target groups in all waterrelated projects This policy starts with the recognition of forestry to reduce the impact of global warming and CC and to maintain an ecological balance It demands plantation on flood embankments and river banks and highlights the need to keep 20 % of total country’s land as forest – in order to decrease surface runoff and soil erosion to avert disastrous flooding and rising river beds due to sedimentation This policy does not deal with CC but specially recommends for control and management of those factors, which might exacerbate flooding risks and vulnerabilities under climate change

Source: MOWR 1999; WARPO 2001, MOFDM 2012; MOL 2009; 2001; MOEF 1992, 1994; MOA 2010; MOLGRD&C 2006; Haque and Haque 2009; Nishat et al. 2011; IUCN 2008; Pal et al. 2011; MODMR 2012a

future flood risks (Alam et al. 2011). For instance, Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) under the Ministry of Water Resources is responsible for constructing highly engineered flood infrastructure (e.g., embankment, dam, etc.) and receives the largest budget, 36 % of the allocation made under BCCTF (Khan 2012). This plan of action is developed without any policy reference and does not give any policy direction to formulate any national climate change policy. Like NAPA, this plan is prepared by experts and consultants to the detriment of the landless and the sharecropper. Poor fishermen’s participation is ignored during its formulation process. Moreover, it does not focus on any regional cooperation for flood risk reduction, which is an imperative to address flooding under climate change in Bangladesh (Alam et al. 2011; Raihan et al. 2010). National Water Management Plan (NWMP) The NWMP was developed in 2001 and adopted by the GOB in 2004. It provides a framework for development, management, and use of water resources aiming to attain the country’s national development goals. This plan adopts light structural measures in the name of river improvement

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programs such as flood control and drainage schemes to increase food production. It also encourages improvement of flood forecasting and flood preparedness for flood risk management and advocates involvement of local people in water resource planning and management. Moreover, it proposes flood proofing of 3.5 million dwellings in river islands and haor areas and raises all national and regional roads and railways for temporary safe haven for flood victims and movement during flood emergencies. It is frustrating that only a very small part of the plan is implemented. Lack of continuous and sufficient funding, and clear authority and coordination of the agencies involved are also major challenges to implementing and managing flood-related interventions. National Sustainable Development Strategy (NSDS) NSDS (2008) has been developed with the vision to “ensure sustained economic growth, environmental protection and social justice which implies improvement of livelihood options of the people, reduction of poverty; ensuring wise use of natural resources, good governance and people’s participation” (DOE 2008, p. i). It recognizes natural disaster (flood and cyclone) and climate change as the key challenges to sustainable development in Bangladesh. It identifies the impact of floods on the national economy and infrastructure as well as on human security due to future increased vulnerability. But the strategy focuses on future water security to ensure food security of the country rather than a well-defined flood risk management under climate change. The proposed strategies under the theme of agriculture and rural development, and social security and protection might contribute toward increasing resilience and adaptation with climate change-induced flood risks. Although this strategy emphasizes peoples’ participation at all levels to attain sustainable development in Bangladesh, its implementation is hampered by a lack of an institutional framework and absence of coordination with other regulatory frameworks. National Plan for Disaster Management (NPDM) The NPDM (2010–2015) aims to introduce a comprehensive risk reduction culture and thus bring changes to strengthen institutional capacity for better disaster recovery and response management at all levels. This is why it makes provisions for accountability of institutions, involvement of all stakeholders, and empowerment of at-risk communities. It indicates all relevant sectoral plans to adopt DRR and CCA, where the NPDM will act as a basic guideline. Additionally, this plan makes a requirement to prepare all local-level risk assessments and risk reduction action plans by 2010. But up to October 2009, this had only taken place in 622 Union Councils from 16 districts (of Bangladesh’s 4451 Union Councils in 64 districts) under the project of Comprehensive Disaster Management Project (CDMP-I) (CDMP 2010). However, meteorological data and information on climate change at the lowest level are not available in Bangladesh, and the guideline for preparing local-level risk assessment does not adequately address climate change (CDMP 2010). Similarly, this plan is not developed and does not create space for participation of vulnerable communities in its implementation. This plan announced two distinct funds for relief and rehabilitation, and risk reduction, respectively, but these have not yet been formed. Sixth Five-Year Plan The fundamental objective of the sixth 5-year (2011–2015) plan is to “develop strategies, policies, and institutions that allow Bangladesh to accelerate growth and reduce poverty” (GOB 2010b, p. 2). This plan identifies seven key priority areas, including environmental sustainability. This broad thematic area includes important initiatives which might reduce flooding vulnerability under climate change. These initiatives consist of increasing forest coverage to 15 % by 2015, restoring and protecting wetlands and natural water flows in line with conservation act, implementing land zoning Page 12 of 22

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for sustainable management of land and water, and also integrating DRR and CCA into development project design and budgetary allocations. As a way of increasing resilience, the plan suggests that the government should allocate more resources for social protection and promote pro-poor natural resource management. However, very little has been done in the past due to a limited budget and resource constraints. Since DRR has no specific budget and is not yet mainstreamed in all sectoral plans and institutions, DMB as well as its local committees cannot implement any interventions. Perspective Plan of Bangladesh The perspective plan (2010–2021) recognizes the impacts of climate change on development, particularly acknowledging the impact of flooding due to climate change on the national economy, and identifies it as one of the key challenges to becoming a middle-income country by 2012. This plan defines flooding as a problem of “excessive water during wet/monsoon season” and recommends mixed (structural and nonstructural) measures for flood prevention. Further emphasis is put on constructing new embankments and strengthening flood forecasting and warning for future flood risk reduction. Similarly, it points out adaptation to climate change as a prime force for the development of Bangladesh. As the plan (GOB 2010c, p. 110) states: “adaptation to increased flooding would require full flood protection embankments along the major and medium riverbanks. Since the country’s population continues to grow resulting in huge pressures for settlements to extend into flood vulnerable zones, embankments are sine qua non for flood protection in Bangladesh.” In addition, the plan outlines a number of key strategies including mainstreaming climate change issues in sectoral policies, plans, and programs, facilitating adaptation to climate change, and increasing institutional capacity. These strategies have to be carried out in order to enhance resilience to climate risks and impacts mobilizing resources from bilateral, multilateral, and other international donors.

Key Issues, Gaps, and Constraints This section details the findings of the study and analysis based on the research questions. Analysis and discussion is conducted in light of the theoretical framework and review of flood regulatory frameworks of Bangladesh.

Risk-Based Approach

Considering risk as the probability of occurrence and adverse consequence of flooding, flood regulatory frameworks in Bangladesh adopt a technocratic approach to flood management, which alters the risks by modifying the physical vulnerability of the people and built environment in order to limit the losses from flooding (Warner et al. 2002; Sayers et al. 2002; Samuels et al. 2006). These planning policies emphasize site-specific flood risk assessment to determine the flooding vulnerability of a particular area and suggest engineering solutions as mitigation strategies to eliminate or reduce the level of risk (DMB 2010). Although the planning policies propose flood risk assessment to limit the extent of development in flood-prone areas, it promotes more urbanization to fulfill the short-term demand of housing and carefully avoids the natural flood risk reduction as a long-term objective (MOWR 1999; WARPO 2001). Therefore, the provision of “full protection against floods” for urban areas might encourage others to develop floodplains into new urban areas. This in turn exacerbates the conflict between land and water in the future. In addition, this way of occupying floodplains has a detrimental effect on the natural environment as it hampers biological productivity and reduces the ecosystem services. Page 13 of 22

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To increase the resilience of communities, planning policies offer mostly short-term DRR rather than reduction of vulnerabilities per se. The flood management decision-making process is developed on the basis of the outcome of the risk-based approach, which avoids the root causes of vulnerability. In this instance, risk is therefore seen as a technocratic and scientific view of disaster, which blames nature and its hazards as the causes of people’s vulnerability (Collins 2009; Wisner et al. 2004). This is interpreted as the reason why authorities avoid the social, political, and economic aspects of flooding vulnerability and promote flood-proofing infrastructure for flood risk reduction. The root causes of anthropogenic drivers (i.e., high population growth, land-use change) are the pathways to increase the intensity of effects of flooding, which are not taken into account. Research has found that people who live in floodplains and are most vulnerable to flooding are the poor (Walker and Burningham 2011). Thus hazard risk reduction rather than vulnerability will not enhance the people’s adaptive capacity and improve their socioeconomic resilience. Furthermore, the key objective of all policy frameworks is to increase or ensure economic growth and economic development of the country. As a result, the market-based policy frameworks do not increase the adaptive capacity and resilience of the poor and socially marginalized groups but rather increase flood risks of the country by deteriorating the natural environment (Alam 2008). As a nonstructural measure, Flood Forecasting and Early Warning (FFEW) in Bangladesh is not adequate due to limited communication and dissemination facilities (USAID 2008). These include limitation of accuracy and reliability of forecast, limited coverage, insufficient coordination and feedback, and ambiguity of warning messages (ADB 2006). Here, river water level is used for FFEW, which is a concept not well understood by the community. Additionally, the warning message does not carry other relevant information such as the expected flood water travel time in respective areas, potential inundated area, and water depth due to flooding. The inundation map, which is prepared by the flood forecasting and warning center, does not cover subdistrict (Thana) level flooding information. Moreover, inadequate access to upstream inflows and rainfall data and information from India is still a key weakness for accurate flood forecasting (MOWR 2006; ADB 2006).

(Social) Justice and Equity

The flood regulatory frameworks of Bangladesh adopt a top-down and heavily engineered approach (Rasul and Chowdhury 2010) as well as the principles of maximum utility, whereas sustainable flood management requires the principles of equality and vulnerability (Johnson et al. 2008; Brown and Damery 2002). The principle of maximum utility uses cost-benefit analysis for decision-making, which places emphasis on only the economic efficiency of risk reduction. As a consequence, it favors the well-being of majority of taxpayers or economic importance areas and ignores the communities at risk in the rural areas (Newborne 2009; Samuels et al. 2006). This principle is very much evident in most flood-related policies of Bangladesh. Additionally, most of the flood management frameworks are prepared by experts and consultants where people’s participation or a deliberate process with real flood sufferers is absent. There is no representation from vulnerable or flood-affected communities in local-level disaster management committees. This technocratic approach of flood risk identification and management is a barrier to attain a fair and sustainable flood management policy in practice. The two key documents (NAPA and BCCSAP) of climate change in Bangladesh have been prepared and revised without any participation of vulnerable communities (GOB 2009a, b; Raihan et al. 2010; Alam et al. 2011). As mentioned previously, NAPA follows an expert-driven and impactbased approach for adaptation formulation. It therefore misses the key features of vulnerability and is likely to lead to ineffective resources use. It might also intensify the vulnerability of the most Page 14 of 22

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vulnerable (Ayers 2011). Similarly, the sectoral approach of adaptation to climate change in BCCSAP left behind the poor, landless, and socially disadvantaged communities’ involvement and priorities in respective sectoral programs, although it indicates mainstreaming vulnerable communities including women and children (Alam et al. 2011). These observations make it clear that the issue of vulnerability and targeting the vulnerable are inadequately addressed in existing flood management frameworks including policy making. This “multifaceted nature of vulnerability” might be a key challenge for successful execution of flood policies in Bangladesh (Johnson et al. 2008).

Coordination and Management Flood risk management in Bangladesh is centralized and follows a command and control approach. The two leading ministries (MOWR and MOFDM) are responsible for the implementation of flood control projects as well as relief and response works during and after flooding events. But climate change and its related issues are only dealt with by MOEF. There are other institutions, which are directly and indirectly involved in flood management. This large institutional involvement lacks coordination and creates conflict of interests among the institutions. Zimmermann et al. (2010) argue that there is no coordination between GOB and donors for risk reduction and preparedness. Policy is still focused on emergency response. GOB also states that harmonization among donors and regional coordination is not still institutionalized. Furthermore, international and national development organizations implement their own DRR action plan in many different ways. It is well acknowledged that DRR and adaptation to climate change is location specific. But surprisingly, the local government of Bangladesh has no specific involvement in flood risk reduction except emergency management. Even local governments of flood-prone areas have no budgetary allocations for immediate emergency response. Flood-prone communities also have no role in flood management.

Climate Change and Uncertainties

Climate change is acknowledged as one of the key flood drivers in global policies, and it poses a significant threat to flood-prone counties like Bangladesh. But very few policies, plans, and acts incorporate it to address future development challenges. GOB and other bilateral development agencies (World Bank, Danida, DFID, ADB, etc.) develop special plans where climate-induced flood risks receive special importance. Those plans provide guidance as well as formulate different programs to increase communities’ adaptive capacity and resilience to reduce flooding vulnerability. However, the majority of the climate change projection scenarios have been derived from regional climate change models where the study of Agrawala et al. (2003) is widely cited in the literature related to CC in Bangladesh. Recently, the Climate Change Cell (CCC) of Bangladesh has generated new temperature and rainfall scenarios using another regional model – PRECIS (CCC 2009). But the results of this model are not used in BCCSAP, which is the national plan of Bangladesh for climate change adaptation and mitigation. This first NAPA (2005) of Bangladesh adopted the findings of Agrawala et al. (2003) for changes in temperature but used a modified version for changes in precipitation. This modification was carried out on the judgment of the NAPA core team rather than any GCM modeling exercise (Ahmed 2006). Later, the same scenarios of NAPA 2005 were applied in BCCSAP (GOB 2008, 2009b). NAPA 2009 which uses the partial output of the PRECIS model for changes in temperature and the rest of the data (changes in precipitation and sea level rise) is taken from NAPA-2005. This inconsistency in climate change documents shows a high level of uncertainty, which in turn limits the potential accuracy of future flood projections under climate change. It may also cause difficulties Page 15 of 22

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for policy makers and planners when making decisions on risk reduction and adaptation to flooding. Moreover, India is going to implement a river-linking project to redirect the flow of the Brahmaputra and Ganges basin toward the south and eastern parts of India to irrigate drought-prone areas (Bandyopadhyay and Perveen 2003; Shukla and Asthana 2005; Rahman 2005). This might cause a significant impact on the future discharge and flow velocity of transboundary rivers, which is not taken into consideration when estimating future changes in flood regime (GOB 2009a).

Opportunities in Existing Flood Regulatory Frameworks

The existing flood policies in Bangladesh are designed for effective relief and response to flooding but also have provision to increase the capacity to cope with disasters. Existing policies only respond to flood season, whereas floods at other times can also have a serious impact on poor people’s lives and livelihoods, contributing to increase future vulnerability. Therefore, apart from the effective and timely response to flooding, it is imperative to help affected communities to enhance their adaptive capacity to cope with flooding and preparing for the future (Mutasa 2010). Additionally, the current draft of the National Disaster Policy (2012), draft of the National Agriculture Policy (2011), and new NPDM (2010) merely emphasize access and availability of resources in order to ensure sustainable livelihoods to create a “buffer” against flooding. Moreover, these policy frameworks still consider flooding along with other disasters as a crisis management rather than long-term planning. The GOB acknowledges CC as a catalyst for future extreme flooding and has accordingly placed emphasis on flood risk reduction to increase the people’s adaptive capacity as well as their resilience (GOB 2009a, b). NAPA and BCCSAP, as a part of medium-term and long-term climate change planning, highlight different flood risk management and reduction strategies including risk sharing such as insurance mechanism for the future. Additionally, these strategies adopt capacity-building programs for vulnerable communities and institutions and also “research and knowledge management” to assess the scale and impact of CC on the national economy for future informed planning. As a part of integrated disaster management, it incorporates the strengthening of community-based programs, a component which is missing in other flood-related policy frameworks. Moreover, it highlights the importance of increasing resilience of the poor and vulnerable “through development of community level adaptation, livelihood diversification, better access to service and social protection” (GOB 2009b, p. 27). Most importantly, BCCSAP has a specific annual allocation from the national budget to implement its programs and projects. There are few opportunities available in existing flood regulatory frameworks in Bangladesh, and now it depends on GOB to initiate and translate these opportunities into programs and projects in order to prepare the vulnerable communities to face future climate change-induced extreme flooding.

Conclusion The above evaluation of flood regulatory frameworks provides an overview of the effectiveness of existing flood risk reduction, CCA, and resilience-related policies, plans, and strategies of Bangladesh. This study reveals significant gaps in policies/plans/acts to offer an effective mechanism to deal with climate change and future flooding across all sectors and their limited understanding of DRR and its linkages with CCA. It finds that there are policies/plans/acts that have recently incorporated climate change issues, but not all are finalized and no specific budgetary allocation and institutional framework for effective implementation of DRR and CCA activities has been initiated. Policies and regulations also fail to ensure the participation of vulnerable communities in flood risk planning and management. These planning policies are strongly in favor of flood-proofing Page 16 of 22

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urban areas and emphasize the significance of housing in the name of broad social and economic development. As a result, the policy fails to accommodate the approach of social justice, which is the key principle of sustainable development to target the poor and most vulnerable, creating new forms of vulnerability. Moreover, there is no clear direction or guideline to mainstream DRR and CCA into the overall development of planning frameworks to enhance the resilience of vulnerable communities. Appropriate and efficient implementation of flood regulatory frameworks and responsible institutions is seen as crucial in building the capacity of communities to resist flood risks and effects of CC, which might have the potential to reduce their vulnerabilities and increase their resilience to CC. Considering the gaps in existing regulatory frameworks, evidence-based people-centered policy formulations should be introduced to ensure the effective participation of all stakeholders including the active participation of vulnerable people for better flood management system in Bangladesh. Overall, “the overhauling of class relations” and narrowing the gaps between rich and poor through social transformation can provide a platform to ensure sustainable flood management under climate (Custers 1992). This is the prerequisite of all effective measures to reduce flood risks and vulnerabilities and to enhance people’s resilience accordingly.

Acknowledgment The first author of this chapter is grateful to Christopher Moyes Memorial Foundation for their unconditional financial support to pursue MSc in Risk and Environmental Hazards at the Institute of Hazards, Risk and Resilience (IHRR), Durham University, and this chapter is part of that MSc thesis.

References ADB (2006) Bangladesh: early warning systems study (final report). ADB, Manila Adger WN (2000) Social and ecological resilience: are they related? Prog Human Geogr 24(3):347–364 Agrawala S, Ota T, Ahmed AU, Smith J, van Aalst M (2003) Development and climate change in Bangladesh: focus on coastal flooding and the Sundarbans. OECD, Paris Ahmed AU (2006) Bangladesh climate change impacts and vulnerability: a synthesis. Climate Change Cell, Department of Environment, Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF), Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (GOB), Dhaka Alam MK (2008) From unilateral and bi-lateral to mutual obligation for disaster management: a critical reflection on SAARC disaster management processes. http://machizo.com/khurshid/ images/stories/publicaton/pe/02.doc Accessed 11 August 2012 Alam K, Shamsuddoha M, Tanner T, Sultana M, Huq MJ, Kabir SS (2011) The political economy of climate resilient development planning in Bangladesh. IDS Bull 42(3):52–61 Ali MS (2011) Effect of climate change on the floods of Bangladesh: learning from the past. Khulna University of Engineering and Technology (KUET), Bangladesh http://ars.gcoe.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ index.php?id¼148. Accessed 25 July 2012 Andreasen MH (2011) Struggling to survive or adapting for the future: understanding climate change problems, responses, and capacities from the perspectives of farmers, fishermen and

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workers in rural Bangladesh. Unpublished thesis (Masters in International Development). Roskilde University, Denmark Ayers J (2011) Resolving the adaptation paradox: exploring the potential for deliberative adaptation policy-making in Bangladesh. Glob Environ Polit 11(1):62–88 Bandyopadhyay J, Perveen S (2003) The interlinking of Indian rivers: Some questions on the scientific, economic and environmental dimensions of the proposal. Occasional paper no 60. School of Oriental and African Studies/King’s College London, University of London, London Brown JD, Damery SL (2002) Managing flood risk in the UK: towards an integration of social and technical perspectives. Trans Inst Br Geogr New Ser 27(4):413–426 CCC (2009) Characterizing long-term changes of Bangladesh climate in context of agriculture and irrigation. Climate Change Cell (CCC), Department of Environment, MOEF, GOB, Dhaka CDMP (2010) Comprehensive disaster management programme (CDMP) phase-II (2010–2014). Project documents. http://www.cdmp.org.bd/modules.php?name¼Publications. Accessed 27 June 2012 CEPA (2012) Policy framework for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction in Malawi: a review of key policies and legislation. Malawi, Centre for Environmental Policy and Advocacy. http://www.cepa.org.mw/publications.php. Accessed 23 July 2012 Chadwick M, Datta A (2003) Water resources management in Bangladesh: a policy review. Livelihood-policy relationships in South Asia working paper 1. DFID, London Collins AE (2009) Disaster and development, Perspectives in development series. Routledge, London Concern (2005) Approaches to disaster risk reduction. http://www.concernusa.org/Public/ PublicationsAndResources.aspx. Accessed 14 June 2012 Cook B (2010) Knowledge, controversies and floods: national-scale flood management in Bangladesh. Unpublished thesis (PhD). Durham University Custers P (1992) Cyclones in Bangladesh: a history of mismanagement. Econ Pol Wkly 27(7):327–329 Dasgupta A (2007) Floods and poverty traps: evidence from Bangladesh. Econ Polit Wkly XLII (30):3166–3171 DMB (2010) National plan for disaster management 2010–2015. Disaster Management Bureau, Disaster Management & Relief Division, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, GOB, Dhaka DOE (2008) National sustainable development strategy. Department of Environment, Ministry of Environment and Forests, GOB GOB (2005) Bangladesh National Adaptation Program of Action. Ministry of Environment and Forests, GOB GOB (2008) Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. Ministry of Environment and Forests, GOB GOB (2009a) Bangladesh National Adaptation Program of Action. Ministry of Environment and Forests, GOB GOB (2009b) Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. Ministry of Environment and Forests, GOB GOB (2010a) Standing orders on disasters. Disaster Management Bureau, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, GOB GOB (2010b) Sixth five year plan (FY2011–FY2015): accelerating growth and reducing poverty (Part 1&2). Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning, GOB

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GOB (2010c) Outline perspective plan of Bangladesh 2010–2021 (Making vision 2021 a reality). Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning, GOB Haskoning R (2003) Controlling or living with floods in Bangladesh: toward an interdisciplinary and integrated approach to agricultural drainage. Agriculture & Rural Development working paper 10. The World Bank, Washington, DC Haque CE, Zaman MQ (1993) Human responses to riverine hazards in Bangladesh: a proposal for sustainable floodplain development. World Dev 21(1):93–107 Haque MS, Haque N (2009) Enhancing national and community resilience: integrating disaster risks reduction and climate change adaptation measures into development planning and processes in Bangladesh. Comprehensive disaster management programme, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, GOB, Bangladesh Hofer T and Messerli B (2006) Floods in Bangladesh: History, dynamics and rethinking the role of the Himalayas. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. IFRC (2012) Disaster risk reduction: a global advocacy guide. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva IUCN (2008) Policy reforms in response to climate change and capacity of local institutions: Bangladesh perspective. IUCN Bangladesh Country Office, Dhaka Johnson C, Penning-Rowsell E, Parker D (2007) Natural and imposed injustices: the challenges in implementing “fair” flood risk management policy in England. J Geogr 173(4):374–390 Johnson C, Tunstall S, Priest S, Mccarthy S and Rowsell EP (2008) Social justice in the context of flood and coastal erosion risk management: a review of policy and practice. Main report: R&D technical report FD2605TR. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Flood Management Division, London Khan MZH (2012) Climate finance governance project: the Bangladesh context. In: regional conference on sustainable forestry through good governance, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Feb 2012. www.transparency.org.my/event.html. Accessed 25 June 2012 Mirza MQM (2002) Global warming and changes in the probability of occurrence of floods in Bangladesh and implications. Glob Environ Change 12:127–138 Mirza MQM, Warrick RA, Ericksen NJ (2003) The implications of climate change on floods of the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers in Bangladesh. Clim Change 57(3):287–294 Mitchell T, Van Aalst M (2008) Convergence of disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. DFID, London MOA (2010) National agriculture policy (Final draft). Ministry of Agriculture, GOB MOEF (1992) National environmental policy and action plan. Ministry of Environment and forests, GOB MOEF (1994) National forests policy. Ministry of Environment and Forests, GOB MODMR (2012a) National disaster policy (Draft). Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, GOB MODMR (2012b) National Disaster Management Act (2012). Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, GOB MOL (2001) National landuse policy. Ministry of Land, GOB MOL (2009) National wetland policy. Ministry of Land, GOB MOLGRD&C (2001) National rural development policy. Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives, GOB MOLGRD&C (2006) National urban sector policy. Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives, GOB MOWR (1999) National water policy. Ministry of water resources, GOB Page 19 of 22

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MOWR (2006) Consolidation and strengthening of flood forecasting and warning services. Flood forecasting and warning centre, Bangladesh water development board, Ministry of Water Resources, GOB MOWR (2012) Bangladesh water act 2012 (Draft). Ministry of water resources, GOB http://www. warpo.gov.bd/. Accessed 25 July 2012 Mutasa M (2010) Zimbabwe’s drought conundrum: vulnerability and coping in Buhera and Chikomba districts. Unpublished thesis (MSc). Norwegian University of Life Science, Norway Newborne P (2009) Flood management and equity: the missing piece in the policy puzzle, ODI background notes. Overseas Development Institutes, London Nishat A, Khan MFA, Mukherjee N (2011) Assessment of investment and financial flows to adapt to climate change effects in the water sector. Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and UNDP, Bangladesh Pal KS, Adeloye AJ, Babel MS, Gupta AD (2011) Evaluation of the effectiveness of water management policies in Bangladesh. Water Resour Devt 27(2):401–417 Peterson GD (2000) Political ecology and ecological resilience: an integration of human and ecological dynamics. Ecol Econ 35:323–336 Rahman MM (2005) Bangladesh – from a country of flood to a country of water scarcity –Sustainable perspectives for solution. In: Paper presented in seminar on environment and development, Dec 2005, Germany. http://users.tkk.fi/~mizanur/Rahaman_Hamburg.pdf. Accessed 25 July 2012 Raihan MS, Huq MJ, Alsted NG, Andreasen MH (2010) Understanding climate change from below, addressing barriers from above: practical experience and learning from a community-based adaptation project in Bangladesh. ActionAid Bangladesh, Dhaka Rashid MH (2008) Implementing standing orders on disasters (SOD) at union level: the case of Kakua union, Tangail district and Kazipuir union of Sirajganj district. Unpublished thesis (Masters in Disaster Management). BRAC University, Dhaka Rasul G, Chowdhury AKMJU (2010) Equity and social justice in water resource management in Bangladesh, Gatekeeper series-146. IIED, London Samuels P, Klijn F, Dijkman J (2006) Analysis of the current practice of policies on river flood risk management in different countries. Irrig Drain 55:141–150 Sayers PB, Hall JW, Meadowcroft IC (2002) Towards risk-based flood hazard management in the UK. Proc ICE Civil Eng 150(5):36–42 Schipper ELF (2004) Exploring adaptation to climate change: a development perspective. Unpublished thesis (PhD). School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich Shukla AC, Asthana V (2005) Anatomy of interlinking rivers in India: a decision in doubt. Research of the program in arms control, disarmament, and international security, University of Illinois at Urbana, Champaign Sultana P, Johnson C, Thompson J (2008) The impact of the major floods on flood risk policy evaluation: insights from Bangladesh. Int J River Basin Manage 6:1–10 Twigg J (2001) Sustainable livelihoods and vulnerability to disasters. Disaster management working paper 2/2001. Benfield Greig Hazard Research Centre, UC, London Twigg J (2004) Good practice review: disaster risk reduction, mitigation and preparedness in development and emergency programming. ODI, London Twigg J (2009) Characteristics of a disaster resilient community. A guidance note. http://community. eldis.org/.59e907ee/Characteristics2EDITION.pdf. Accessed 15 June 2012

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UNEP (2002) Early warning, forecasting and operational flood risk monitoring in Asia (Bangladesh, China and India). A technical report of a project. UNEP/Division of Early Warning & Assessment-North America, USA UNISDR (2002) Living with risk: a global review of disaster reduction. UNISDR, Geneva UNISDR (2004) Living with risk: a global review of disaster reduction initiative. UNISDR, Geneva USAID (2008) Community flood information system. Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), USA. http://pdf.usaid.gov/ pdf_docs/PDACL719.pdf. Accessed 15 Aug 2012 Walker G, Burningham K (2011) Flood risk, vulnerability and environmental justice: evidence and evaluation of inequality in a UK context. Crit Soc Policy 31(2):216–240 Warner J, Waalewijn P, and Hilhorst D (2002) Public participation in disaster-prone watersheds. Time for multi-stakeholder platforms? Disaster studies, irrigation and water management group, Wageningen University, Netherlands. www.disasterstudies.wur.nl/NR/rdonlyres/. . ./ no6mspindisaster.pdf. Accessed 23 June 2012 WARPO (2001) National water management plan. Water resources planning organization, Ministry of Water Resources, GOB White P, Pelling M, Sen K, Seddon D, Russel S, Few R (2004) Disaster risk reduction: a development concern; a scoping study on the links between disaster risk reduction, poverty and development. ODI, London Wisner B, Blaikie P, Cannon T, Davis I (2004) At risk: natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters, 2nd edn. Routledge, London World Bank (2010) Economic of adaptation to climate change: Bangladesh. The World Bank, Washington, DC. http://climatechange.worldbank.org/content/economics-adaptation-climatechange-study-homepage, Accessed 15 July 2012 Younus MAF (2010) Community based autonomous adaptation and vulnerability to extreme floods in Bangladesh: processes, assessment and failure effects. Unpublished thesis (PhD). The University of Adelaide, Adelaide Zimmermann M, Glombitza KF, Rothenberger B (2010) Disaster risk reduction programme for Bangladesh 2010–2012. Directorate of Humanitarian Aid and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Bern

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Index Terms: Bangladesh 1 Climate change adaptation (CCA) 2, 5 Disaster risk reduction (DRR) 2–3, 5 Flood 1 Resilience 5

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International Policy on Climate Change and Its Influence on Russian and Belarusian Legislations and Practice Siarhei Zenchanka* Department of International Relations and Marketing, Minsk Branch of Moscow State University of Economics, Statistics and Informatics, Minsk, Belarus

Abstract This chapter attempts to illustrate the influence of international policy and legislation on national ones and their implementation in practice of environmental protection. Comparative analysis norms of Russian and Belarusian legislation in climate change with international policy are used. The practical results of realization of these norms are considered. The comparison of environmental legislations of Russia and Belarus with international ones shows the concurrence and the difference of the laws. Consequently, there is the need to develop new laws and improve the existing ones. This chapter considers possible ways to improve the national legislations in climate change and presents a good practice in Russia and Belarus in environmental protection which shows social responsibility of leading enterprises. Climate change impact on economic development is considered. Russia and Belarus are the countries where the quantity of greenhouse gases is below the limit. Nevertheless, a great work has been done in these countries to limit emissions. The national policies are not always concurrent with international, which tend to remove these countries from the world process of sustainable development.

Keywords Environmental policy; Climate change; International legislation; National legislation; Greenhouse gases; Environmental protection

Introduction The climate changes have always been present in the Earth history. Glacial periods alternated with the periods of warming, i.e., ages of reduction of glaciations (interglacial periods). Now the Earth is in the Quaternary period which ends the Cainozoe. Approximately 12 thousand years ago, the Holocene began which is being continued to present time and is characterized by relatively stable climate. The last climatic period of the Holocene is the Sub-Atlantic period. The average annual temperature in the Sub-Atlantic period was lower than that in the previous Atlantic period (World Climate 1934). During the Sub-Atlantic period, there were fluctuations in temperature that led to ecological effects influencing life and activity of people. This period can be divided into several ages (Chromov and Petrossiants 2012):

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 12

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• Period of warming (2500–1600 years ago) when climate conditions moved to modern conditions; Period of dry and warm climate (1600–1200 years ago, fourth–eighth centuries A.D.) • Period of soft and warm climate, small climatic optimum, (1200–800 years ago, eighth–fourteenth centuries A.D.) • Fall in temperature, small glacial period (800–150 years ago, fourteenth–nineteenth centuries A.D.) • Climate warming from the middle/end of the nineteenth century to present time (with a small fall in temperature in the middle of the twentieth century and renewing of warming in the last half century) These climate changes were due to natural phenomena in general – the sun activity, tectonic process, and change in the parameters of the Earth orbit. The changeability of the climate system is determined by different mechanisms of positive and negative feedback between the components of the system: atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere, land surface, and biosphere, which can have an impact at time period from 10 to 100 years. The process of the warming acceleration started from the second half of the twentieth century which is linked with anthropogenic activity. It was established that the influence of anthropogenic activity is due to the action of the several main factors: • The increasing quantity of atmospheric carbon dioxide and some other gases come to atmosphere due economic activity so-called hotbed gases or greenhouse gases (GHG) • The increasing volume of atmospheric aerosol intensifying the dispersion and absorption of radiation in aerosol particles • The increase of heat quantity formed due to economic activity that acts on atmosphere heating The first factor of anthropogenic climate change has the largest influence. Therefore, at the present stage, it is very important to combine the efforts of mankind to reduce the influence on the Earth climate of the economic activity connected with the increase in quantity of GHG in the Earth atmosphere. It is necessary to consider the third factor, i.e., the growth of the quantity of heat due to economic activity as the Earth is an open system and the input flow of energy must be equal to output flow of energy for its stable operation. When this condition is not fulfilled, the Earth will be heated or cooled. Using of mineral sources of energy of the Earth leads to the increase of the Earth temperature. The work of heat power stations causes the increase of the mass of atmospheric aerosol which results in strengthening of scattering and absorption of radiation on its particles (the second factor of anthropogenic impact on climate). The aim of this chapter is to analyze international and national policies of Russia and Belarus in the area of climate change and to consider the implementation of these policies.

Methodology International legislation has priority over the national one. At the same time many international agreements do not have the status of law, and to put them into effect, the consent of a certain number of parties is required. Documents adopted at national level do not sometimes meet international agreements. The comparative analysis of international agreements and national documents will help in understanding of the national aspects of legislation. Page 2 of 12

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Materials from the official sites of UN, EU, Russia, and Belarus were used for the comparative analysis. The results of different investigations published in the reports of international and national official and nongovernmental organizations were also used.

International Climate Change Policy The international community started to pay special attention to climate change since the mid-1980s of the twentieth century. Scientists all over the world have come to the conclusion that climate change and human activities are linked (Forrester 1971; Medous et al. 1972; Meadows et al. 1992, 2004; Budyko and Izrael 1991; Report 2002). It also became clear that the problem is very complex, and therefore it is necessary to bring together scientists from all countries to obtain more precise conclusions and forecasts. In 1988 the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nation Environmental Programme (UNEP) created the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The global task of IPCC is preparing the regular reports in environmental fields. The first report was published in 1990 (Houghton et al. 1990). In this report IPCC confirmed the threat of climate change due to anthropogenic activity and called to prepare a special global treaty to solve this problem. The last IPCC (2007) report pointed that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from the observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level.” Considering the reasons of such warming, the authors of the report mention that “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-twentieth century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations. This is an advance previous conclusion that “most of the observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in GHG concentrations.” “It is likely that there has been significant anthropogenic warming over the past 50 years averaged over each continent (except Antarctica).” It is necessary to point that experts are very careful calling the reason of climate change and noting at the same time that “the observed patterns of warming, including greater warming over land than over the ocean, and their changes over time, are simulated only by models that include anthropogenic forcing.” Besides that IPCC publishes special reports, methodic reports, technical papers, and supporting materials accessible at IPCC site (https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data. shtml). Modeling and scenario tools form the basis of a number of global and regional assessments that project future environments on the basis of changes in drivers of ecosystem change and biodiversity loss according to various development scenarios (IEEP 2009). Ministry Declaration adopted at 2nd World Climate Conference in Geneva in October–November of 1990 supported the idea of preparing special global agreement on solution to climate change. United Nations General Assembly in December of 1990 adopted a resolution 45/212 (UN 1990), on the bases of which a special Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on this problem was formed. As a result of its work, the framework convention was adopted by governments at the 5th session of the committee (UNFCCC 1992). The convention was open to signing at UN Conference in Rio at 1992 and came into force on the March 21, 1994. At present more than 190 countries are the parties of the convention including Russia and the Republic of Belarus, all industrial countries, countries with transition economy, and most developing countries. Page 3 of 12

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The object of this convention is “to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” UNFCCC maintained the total concept for the realization of international activity directed to solving the problem of climate change. The main goal of this concept is stabilization of GHG concentration at the level that prevents their adverse effect on the climate system. Convention parties adopted some obligations directed on the solution of the problem of climate change. All countries have to develop and present special reports called national communications. These national communications should have the information about the level of GHG emission and fulfilled and planned actions in the country. It was clear that the positions of the convention could not solve the problem of climate change and the decision on the expansion of the convention was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, December 1997. Kyoto Protocol (1998) defines the goals on limiting of emission for industrial countries, and the innovation mechanisms were suggested to achieve these goals. The Kyoto Protocol came into force on February 16, 2005, when 55 parties ratified it. Countries with well-developed industries must reach 95 % level of CO2 in comparison with its level in 1990. Kyoto mechanisms are: • International emissions trading. Parties with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Parties) have accepted targets for limiting or reducing emissions. These targets are expressed as levels of allowed emissions, or “assigned amounts,” over the 2008–2012 commitment periods. The allowed emissions are divided into “assigned amount units (AAUs).” Emissions trading, as set out in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows countries that have emission units to spare – emissions permitted to them but not “used” – to sell this excess capacity to countries that are over their targets. Thus, a new commodity was created in the form of emission reductions or removals. Since carbon dioxide is the principal greenhouse gas, people speak simply of trading in carbon. Carbon is now tracked and traded like any other commodity. This is known as the “carbon market.” • Clean development mechanism (CDM). The clean development mechanism (CDM), defined in Article 12 of the Protocol, allows a country with an emission reduction or emission limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to implement an emission reduction project in developing countries. Such projects can earn saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one ton of CO2, which can be counted toward meeting Kyoto targets. The mechanism is seen by many as a trailblazer. It is the first global environmental investment and credit scheme of its kind, providing a standardized emission offset instrument, CERs. A CDM project activity might involve, for example, a rural electrification project using solar panels or the installation of more energy-efficient boilers. The mechanism stimulates sustainable development and emission reductions, while giving industrialized countries some flexibility in their emission reduction or limitation targets.

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• Joint implementation (JI). The mechanism known as “joint implementation,” defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows a country with an emission reduction or limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to earn emission reduction units (ERUs) from an emission reduction or emission removal project in another Annex B Party, each equivalent to one ton of CO2, which can be counted toward meeting its Kyoto target. Joint implementation offers Parties a flexible and cost-efficient means of fulfilling a part of their Kyoto commitments, while the host Party benefits from foreign investment and technology transfer. United Nation Environmental Program considers climate change as one of the major challenges of our time (Climate Change 2010) and suggested climate change subprogram for strengthening the ability of countries, particularly developing countries, to integrate climate change responses into national development processes. The subprogram has four key goals: • Adapting to climate change: UNEP helps countries reduce their vulnerability and use ecosystem services to build natural resilience against the impacts of climate change. • Mitigating climate change: UNEP supports countries in making sound policy, technology, and investment choices that lead to GHG emission reductions, with a focus on scaling up clean and renewable energy sources, energy efficiency, and energy conservation. • Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) is an effort to create a financial value for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable development. REDD+ goes beyond that to include the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. • Enhancing knowledge and communication: UNEP works to improve understanding of climate change science and raise awareness of climate change impacts among decision-makers and other target audiences. The detailed rules for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol for developing countries were adopted at the Conference of the Party in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 2001, and are referred to as the “Marrakesh Accords.” Without waiting for the end of the Kyoto Protocol, the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol took part at conferences of the Parties (COP) and discussed problems connected with its realization and extension. The COP16 took place at Cancun and was hosted by the Government of Mexico. The meeting produced the basis for the most comprehensive and far-reaching international response to climate change the world had ever seen to reduce the carbon emissions and build a system which made all countries accountable to each other for those reductions. The COP17 took place from November 28 to December 9, 2011, in Durban, South Africa, as a part of the United Nations Climate Change Conference which delivered a breakthrough on the international community response to climate change. Progress was made toward establishing a new international framework in which all states participate. In Doha, Qatar, on December 8, 2012, the “Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol” was adopted. The amendment includes (Doha 2012): • New commitments for Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol which agreed to take on commitments in a second commitment period from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2020 • A revised list of greenhouse gases (GHG) to be reported on by Parties in the second commitment period Page 5 of 12

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• Amendments to several articles of the Kyoto Protocol which specifically referenced issues pertaining to the first commitment period and which needed to be updated for the second commitment period On December 21, 2012, the amendment was circulated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, acting in his capacity as Depositary, to all Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in accordance with Articles 20 and 21 of the Protocol. The 19th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC and the 9th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol will take place from November 11 to 22, 2013. The conference will be held in Warsaw, Poland. During the first commitment period 37 industrialized countries and the European Community committed to reduce the GHG emissions to an average of five percent against 1990 levels. During the second commitment period, Parties committed to reduce GHG emissions by at least 18 percent below 1990 levels in the eight-year period from 2013 to 2020; however, the composition of Parties in the second commitment period is different from the first (Doha 2012).

Russia and Climate Change Russia ratified UNFCCC in 1994 and Kyoto Protocol in 2004 году. As a result Kyoto Protocol entered into force for all its parties. The main goal of Russia in accordance with Kyoto Protocol was not to overcome the average level of emission of GHG in the period 2008–2012 years against 1990. In spite of the intensive economy growth, the common level of anthropogenic emissions of GHG in Russia at present time is less than in 1990. Commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol was established within the period of 2008–2012. In the Federal Law (2004), Russia declared that its participation in the second period of commitments would be decided separately and depend on the progress of the international negotiations, on international agreements, and on its understanding what measures should be taken to prevent global environmental challenge. In the communication dated December 8, 2010, and sent to the secretariat of the UNFCCC on December 9, 2010, the Russian Federation indicated that it did not intend to assume a quantitative emission limitation for the second commitment period. In accordance with UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, Russia develops its national policy on preventing the climate changes and their negative consequences, on limitation and reduction of anthropogenic emissions, and on increase of GHG. Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC provided the following conditions necessary for participation at Kyoto mechanisms: • Fulfillment of quantitative obligations on emission reduction • Adoption of National Action Plan and measures for reduction of GHG emissions in accordance with the quantitative commitments • Creation of National system of accounting of GHG emissions and discharges • Organizing the National register of the accounting units of GHG emissions • Establishment of a quantitative value carbon credits on the basis of the inventory data in 1990 • Reporting to the UNFCCC secretariat in the form of national communications • Examination of reports by international team of experts, etc. • Development of National Climate Change Policy • Creation of national system of monitoring of GHG emission Page 6 of 12

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Action plan (2005) for the realization of the Kyoto Protocol in Russia was adopted on July 15, 2005. Plan involved four sections. The first section included measures for reduction of GHG emission in different sectors of economy. The second was dedicated to the creation of national system of inventory of GHG emissions and their removal by forests. Economic mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol were considered in the third section. International activity and negotiation process on the following international convention were discussed in the fourth section. Starting from 2007 different legislation acts aimed at the further realization of the measures for mitigation of climate change and adaptation to climate change have been adopted: • Decree of the President of Russia of June 4, 2008, № 889 “On some measures to improve the energy and environmental efficiency of the Russian economy” • The concept of long-term socioeconomic development of the Russian Federation until 2020 • Russian Government Resolution № 1-r of January 8, 2009, “On the main directions of the state policy in the sphere of electrical energy efficiency from renewable energy sources till 2020” • The program of anti-crisis measures of the Government of the Russian Federation in 2009 • Federal Law of November, 2009, “On energy saving and energy efficiency” • “Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation” of December 17, 2009 • “The Energy strategy of Russia until 2020” • “Action plan for realization of Climate Doctrine” of April 25, 2011 All these documents contain regulations concerning the conditions of realization of the Kyoto Protocol. Climate Doctrine (2009) is based on fundamental and applied scientific knowledge about climate and related areas: • Assessment of the past and the current state of climate system • Assessment of the factors of the influence of anthropogenic activity on climate • The forecast of the possible climate changes and their influence on the quality of life of people in Russia and other regions • Assessment of the security and vulnerability of ecosystems, economy, population, governmental institutions, and infrastructure of the state in relation to climate change and adaptation of the existing facilities to climate change • Assessment of the possibilities to mitigate human impacts on climate Action plan (2011) for the realization of Climate Doctrine considers all measures and organizations to achieve the goals. Fundamental principles of the Russian climate change policy are (Communication 2010) as follows: • • • •

Global feature of Russian interest in climate change and its consequences National interest priority in the development and realization of climate policy Clarity and availability of the information on climate policy Recognition of the need for actions, both within the country and as a part of the full international partnership of the Russian Federation in international research programs and projects relating to climate change • A comprehensive account of the possible losses and gains due to climate change • Precaution in the planning and implementation of measures to ensure the security of the person, the economy, and the state from the adverse effects of climate change Page 7 of 12

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From 1990 to 1998 there was a decline in emissions, affecting all sectors, it related with the dynamics of the economic situation in the country in the Russian Federation. Later, during the period of economic growth, there was a steady increase in emissions. In 2011, total GHG emission was by 16.3 % higher against 1998, but remained 30.8 % against 1990 emissions (Report 2013). Decline in GHG emission in Russia directly depends on the energy strategy. At present the energy consumption of Russian economy 2.3 times greater than the average world index on the average and 3.2 times greater than EU indexes (Climate Change 2012). Climate doctrine (2009) considers the increase of energy efficiency in all sectors of economy and the development of renewable and alternative energy sources ad priority direction of the development. In accordance with Kyoto Protocol, Russia could take part in all mechanisms of protocol. But actually Russia did not realize this opportunity. Analyzing the use of flexible mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, Gromova (2011) demonstrated inefficiency of the existing system of implementation of the emissions trading, clean development mechanism (CDM), and joint implementation (JI) in Russia. The procedure of taking decision on the presented projects is very complicated and need to be improved. At the end of July 2010, the first 15 JI projects were with CO2 equivalent reduction about 30 million tons. In November 2010 the expertise of 58 projects with 75.6 million tons of CO2 equivalent was fulfilled. The program “Climate and Energy” of WWF is aimed at the decrease of global emission of CO2 and other GHG and at the timely assistance to adaptation of ecosystems to climate change. From 2011 WWF started the “green” development of energy directed at technological modernization of Russia. Some large Russian companies adopted their own program of energy saving and resource economy: • Corporation “Gazprom” estimated GHG emission at their enterprises and created an emission register. • Oil company “Lukoil” adopted the corporative conception and activity plan on the bases of the Kyoto Protocol. • Company “Norilski Nikel” estimated GHG emission in its Polar division and developed “Information analytical system making inventory and monitoring GHG,” the forecast of emissions till 2015 was fulfilled.

Belarus and Climate Change Climate change is a complex problem, which, although environmental in nature, has the consequences in all spheres of existence on our planet. Belarus shares global concerns on the impact of climate change and supports international efforts on reducing carbon emissions. The norms of international agreements in the field of climate change act in Belarus are the following: • United Nation Framework Convention on climate change was signed on June 12, 1992, at the UN conference in Rio de Janeiro and was approved on April 10, 2000, by the President of the Republic of Belarus. • Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC. The Republic of Belarus joined it in 2005 in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Republic of Belarus.

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At present the Republic of Belarus has well-developed legal system with a remarkable number of the subordinate laws which may be found at site (www.minpriroda.by). The law “On environmental protection” is the basic environmental law. This law defines principles and goals of environmental protection, objects and parties involved in environmental protection. The law “On atmospheric air protection” is directed at the conservation and improvement of the quality of atmospheric air. Joining the Republic of Belarus to UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol involves the adoption of legal acts regulating the relations in the field of GHG emissions and the rights on GHG emissions. Some of such acts are as follows: • The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus of December 30, 2005, No 1582 “On realization of norms of the Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC.” This Resolution adopted the action plan on realization of norms of the Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC for 2005–2012. • The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus of April 10, 2006, “On State cadastre of anthropogenic emissions of GHG from sources and their removal by sinks.” • The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus of August 25, 2006, No 1077 “On National register of carbon units of the Republic of Belarus.” • The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus of September 7, 2006, No 1155 “On the Strategy of decreasing of emissions of GHG and their removal by sinks in the Republic of Belarus in 2007–2012.” • The resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus of August 4, 2008, No 1117 “On the National programme of measures on mitigation of climate change in 2008–2012.” It is seen that the Republic of Belarus has fulfilled its obligations on UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. Institutional and legal bases were created to take part in the flexible mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. “Strategy of decreasing of emissions of GHG and their removal by sinks in the Republic of Belarus in 2007–2012” and “The National programme of measures on mitigation of climate change in 2008–2012” were adopted. National system of GHG inventory was also developed. The Republic of Belarus regularly presents National Communications under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Fifth National Communication (2009) contains the results of implementation of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol from 2006 up to 2009 and includes the information on national circumstances, generalized data on inventory of the GHG emissions and their removals in sectors of energy, industry, agriculture, land use change and forestry, waste, policies and measures on decrease in GHG emissions and their forecast indicators, the assessment of vulnerability and adaptation of the national economy to climate change; data on newly adopted normative and legal documents in the country; data on the National Registry of Carbon Units; and information on current R&D facilitating to reduce GHG emissions and prevent their impact on climate change. The analysis of various projection scenarios of GHG emission reduction shows that Belarus has exhausted the potential of relatively low-cost actions for the reduction of these emissions. Any other emission reduction measures as well as the mechanisms to support environmentally sensitive actions require substantial investment of funds which are not available in the country, specifically in the crisis situation. It was expected that the resources the country needs could be partially raised by selling available emission quotas in 2008–2012.

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There is a national procedure defined by legislation act to approve the project directed at decreasing of GHG emission. Some projects were approved, but their realization will be possible when Belarus gets access to flexible mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless there is an activity on preparing and realization of the volunteer projects directed at the reduction of the GHG emission. One of such projects is “Restoration of peat lands.” The fact that the amendment of the Republic of Belarus to the Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol stipulating quantitative obligations and providing the opportunities for using flexible mechanisms has not been ratified by the required number of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (only 26 Parties from 141 needed) poses an obstruction to this. It is expected that Belarus will be a party of the second commitment period of the Protocol. It can help Belarus to fix its obligations and present the possibility to use the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. But at the consultations held in Minsk on January 21–22, 2013, with the participation of the representatives of public authorities and experts from Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, the sides postponed the ratification of the Doha amendment to Kyoto Protocol, regulating the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, at least until the end of 2013. Belarus continues its work on the reduction of climate change. New “State programme of measures directed at mitigation of climate change consequences in 2013–2020” was adopted by the government decree on June 21, 2013, № 510. As the previous program, it is aimed at: • Realization of measures on fuel and energy economy in energy sector • Stabilization of the level of GHG emissions due the use of resource saving technologies in energyconsuming sectors of economics • Optimization of waste management • Improving of the quality and increase of the volume of GHG absorbers

The Climate Change Performance Index The analysis of the results presented in the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI 2013) shows that the climate policies of Russia as well as Belarus are estimated negatively. Russia dropped to 56th position of 61 participants and Belarus dropped to 35th position (it lost 8 positions). This data was calculated on the statistics of 2010 and the use of the performance indices – the level of emissions, the development of emissions, renewable energy, and climate policy. All these performance indices for Russia were found as very poor, whereas the performance indices for Belarus were at moderate and poor levels.

Conclusion Up to the present, the Kyoto Protocol is the only international legal document that at least to some extent regulates the global climate change and the reduction of GHG emissions. The new agreement will start working only in 10 years; it is unknown if it is going to be efficient. Note that the withdrawal of Canada from the Kyoto Protocol and refusal of Japan and Russia to take any obligations on the second commitment period lead to the loss of status of the protocol. The USA and China are not the parties of the protocol. These countries produce the greatest amount of emissions.

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At the same time the developed countries make considerable efforts to decrease the level of emissions. The data in The Wall Street Journal presented on the site (http://bin.ua/news/economics/ faec/140951-ssha-otkazavshiesya-podpisat-kiotskij-protokol.html) indicated that in 2011 against 2005 China, India, and Russia showed the increase of emissions, but Japan, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, and EU as a whole showed the decrease of emissions; the most significant progress in decreasing of emissions was being demonstrated by the USA. If Russia and Belarus do not join the second commitment period, their companies will no longer be able to benefit from carbon market. They will not get investments for modernization and reconstruction of enterprises, for creation of new high technological enterprises. As a consequence the competition of Russian and Belarusian producers will fall.

References Action Plan (2005) for realization in Russia the Kioto Protocol to UNFCCC, 15 July 2005, Interdepartmental Commission on realization the Kyoto Protocol in Russia. http://www. climatechange.ru/files/Action_plan.doc. Available July 2013 Action Plan (2011) for realization the climate doctrine of the Russian Federation on period to 2020. http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req¼doc;base¼LAW;n¼133663. Available July 2013 Budyko MI, Izrael YA (eds) (1991) Anthropogenic climatic change. University of Arizona, Tucson CCPI (2013) The climate change performance index. Results 2013. Germanwatch, Climate Action Network Europe Chromov SP, Petrossiants MA (2012) Meteorology and climatology, 8th edn. Moscow University, Moscow Climate Doctrine (2009) of the Russian federation. http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi? req¼doc;base¼LAW;n¼94992. Available July 2013 Climate Change (2010) UNEP. http://www.unep.org/climatechange. Available July 2013 Climate Change (2012) and possibility of low carbon energy in Russia. Russian Social and Ecological Union, Moscow Communication (2009) Fifth national communication under the United Nations framework convention on climate. Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection of the Republic of Belarus. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/blr_nc5_en.pdf. Available July 2013 Communication (2010) Fifth national communication under the United Nations framework convention on climate change. Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology and Federal Agency on Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring. Moscow. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ natc/rus_nc5_resubmit.pdf. Available July 2013 Doha (2012) Amendment. https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php. Available July 2013 Forrester JW (1971) World dynamics. Wright-Allen Press, Cambridge, MA Gromova A (2011) Lost air of Kyoto. Chem J 1–2:28–31 Houghton JT, Jenkins GJ, Ephraums JJ (1990) Climate change: the IPCC scientific assessment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK/New York/Melbourne IEEP (2009) Alterra, ecologic, PBL and UNEP-WCMC scenarios and models for exploring future trends of biodiversity and ecosystem services changes. Final report to the European Commission, DG Environment on Contract ENV.G.1/ETU/2008/0090r. Institute for European Environmental

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Policy, Alterra Wageningen UR, Ecologic, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, United Nations Environment Programme World Conservation Monitoring Centre IPCC (2007) Climate change 2007: synthesis report. Contribution of working groups I, II and III to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri RK, Reisinger A (eds)]. IPCC, Geneva Kyoto Protocol (1998) to the United Nation framework convention on climate. http://unfccc.int/ resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. Available July 2013 Meadows DH, Meadows DL, Randers J (1992) Beyond the limits: global collapse or a sustainable future. Earthscan Publications, Oxford Meadows DH, Randers J, Meadows DL (2004) Limits to growth-the 30 year update. Chelsea Green Publishing, Vermont Medous DH, Medous DL, Randers J, Behrens WW III (1972) The limit to growth. Universe Book, New York Report (2002) of the World summit on sustainable development, United Nations, A/CONF. 199/20. New York. www.un.org. Available July 2013 Report (2013) Russian inventory report. http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventories_submissions/items/7383.php. Available July 2013 The Federal Law (2004) Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC, 4 Nov 2004 no 128–ФЗ UN (1990) Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind. Resolution 45/212 of 21 Dec 1990. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r212.htm. Available July 2013 UNFCCC (1992) United Nations framework convention on climate change. http://unfccc.int/ resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. Available July 2013 World Climate (1934) World climate during the quaternary period. Nature 133:785–786

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Mainstreaming Integrated Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction in Local Development Plans in the Philippines Ebinezer R. Florano* National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines

Abstract This chapter illustrates how the two conceptually distinct climate change adaptation (CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) are mainstreamed in the development plans of local government units in the Philippines using integrated frameworks for vulnerability analysis and the development of climate-resilient local Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) and Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP) prescribed by the national government. The integration of CCA and DRR in the Philippines came after the failure of the passive disaster management, utilized since 1954, to prepare and response to disasters caused by extreme weather events of climate change. Using the case study approach, this chapter narrates how disaster-prone Sorsogon City was able to incorporate CCA and DRR measures and strategies in its CLUP and CDP.

Keywords Mainstreaming; Climate change adaptation; Disaster risk reduction; Vulnerability analysis; Local development planning

Introduction Climate change adaptation (CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) have always been treated as two distinct epistemic communities in scholarly literature (Mercer 2010; Schipper and Pelling 2006; Tearfund 2008; Thomalla et al. 2006; UNISDR 2008a, b, c). Thus, it is no wonder that even in practice, the two coexist, but they are operationalized independently of one another. In the Philippines, for example, there are two separate laws on climate change (CC) and disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM), namely, the Climate Change Act of 2009 (Republic Act No. 9729 or RA 9729) and the Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 (Republic Act No. 10121 or RA 10121), respectively. They are implemented by separately funded national government agencies – the Climate Change Commission (CCC) and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC). Both laws mandate local government units (LGUs), namely, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays (villages), to mainstream their local CCA and DRR plans to their local development plans. Is this possible, given the conceptual and operational divide between CCA and DRR? Can the two be reconciled? Can an integrated CCA and DRR be mainstreamed in local development plans? To answer these questions, this study *Email: efl[email protected] *Email: erfl[email protected] Page 1 of 21

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revisits the discourses on the similarities, differences, and signs of convergence between the two communities. It also examines the nexus between the two based on the implementation of the CC and DRRM laws in the Philippines. Finally, using a case study on an LGU, this chapter proves that, indeed, the two can be integrated and mainstreamed in local development plans.

Similarities, Differences, and Points of Convergence Between CCA and DRR Theoretically speaking, it is inconceivable to integrate CCA and DRR primarily because of their temporal and spatial nuances. According to generally accepted views, CC-induced hazards and disasters are less predictable because they are based on projections of the atmospheric and ocean conditions which are still to happen in the future, while non-CC-related hazards and disasters are studied based on historical records and, hence, are relatively predictable. Second, due to the uncertainties in projecting CC, its impacts are difficult to calculate, while those in DRRM are easily discernible because it relies on records to determine the extent of damages that can be caused by particular hazards in the future. Third, in terms of origin, CC originated from scientific theory, while DRRM evolved out of the need to provide humanitarian assistance to disaster victims (Mercer 2010; ProAct Network 2008; Schipper and Pelling 2006; Tearfund 2008; Thomalla et al. 2006; UNISDR 2008a, b, c). There are many other points of divergence between the two (as can be seen in Table 1), but there are also points of convergence, the most important of which is to reduce risk and enhance resilience. In the Philippines, it is argued that there are “conceptual” and “operational” divide between CCA and DRR in terms of approach, organization and institutions, strategies, policies, and funding as shown in Table 2. Initially, “conceptual divide” permeated the debates between CCA and DRR in the Philippines immediately after the laws that created them were passed. However, not long afterward, it was finally recognized that although the two are distinct fields, they are connected in their objective to reduce risk to CC-induced hazards and disasters. While DRR deals with both man-made and “natural disasters” caused by geophysical and ecological hazards, it is also concerned with climate- and weather-related hazards which fall within the ambits of CC, i.e., gradual changes in climatic parameters (e.g., sea-level rise, rising mean temperature, and changes in precipitation patterns) and extreme weather events with increased frequency and severity. Figure 1 below illustrates the conceptual convergence between the two. The “operational divide” is believed to be the most persistent issue between the two because the evidences are clear – two distinct laws, two government agencies, separate budgets, and distinct approaches. Although CCA came a year ahead (through the Climate Change Act of 2009) of DRR (through the Philippine National Disaster Risk and Management Act of 2010) in terms of enactment, the latter has been institutionalized since 1954 with the creation of the National Civil Defense Administration via Republic Act No. 1190 also known as the Civil Defense Act of 1954. Seven presidential issuances after that law, the National Disaster Coordinating Council was created through Presidential Decree No. 1566 issued in 1978. Hence, DRR acquired “seniority” over CCA and its operating agency (the NDRRMC) gets more funds, has a larger bureaucracy, has longer track record, and is relatively more technically competent to do its tasks. CCA and its operating agency (the CCC), on the other hand, is still in its infancy stage. Yet, a closer scrutiny of the laws, institutional and operational arrangements reveal points of operational convergence.

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Table 1 Summary of similarities, differences, and signs of convergence between CCA and DRR DRR Relevant to all hazard types Origin and culture in humanitarian assistance following a disaster event Most concerned with the present – i.e., addressing existing risks

CCA Relevant to climate-related hazards Origin and culture in scientific theory

Signs of convergence Not applicable CCA specialists now being recruited from engineering, agriculture, health and DRR sectors Most concerned with the future – i.e., DRR increasingly forward-looking addressing uncertainty/new risks Existing climate variability is an entry point for CCA Historical perspective Future perspective as above Same as above Traditional/indigenous Traditional/indigenous knowledge at Examples where integration of scientific knowledge at community level community level may be insufficient for knowledge and traditional knowledge for is a basis for resilience resilience against types and scales of risk DRR provides learning opportunities yet to be experienced Structural measures designed Structural measures designed for safety DRR increasingly forward-looking for safety levels modelled on levels modelled on current and historical current and historical evidence evidence and predicted changes Traditional focus on Traditional focus on physical exposure Not applicable vulnerability reduction Community-based process Community-based process stemming Not applicable stemming from experience from policy agenda Practical application at local Theoretical application at local level CCA gaining experience through practical level local application Full range of established and Limited range of tools under development None, except increasing recognition that developing tools more adaptation tools are needed Incremental development New and emerging agenda Not applicable Political and widespread Political and widespread recognition None, except that climate-related disaster recognition often quite weak increasingly strong events are now more likely to be analyzed and debated with reference to CC Funding streams ad hoc and Funding streams sizeable and increasing DRR community engaging in CCA insufficient funding mechanisms Source: Tearfund 2008, p. 10

First, both laws, even though they use two interventions, i.e., adaptation and disaster mitigation, aim to reduce risks or vulnerabilities from natural hazards. • Section 3n of the CC Act of 2009: Adaptation – “refers to the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” • Section 3 of the DRRM Act of 2010: Disaster mitigation – “. . .Structural and non-structural measures undertaken to limit the adverse impact of natural hazards, environmental degradation and technological hazards and to ensure the ability of at-risk communities to address vulnerabilities aimed at minimizing the impact of disasters. . .” Thus, the visions of the two, as contained in their national plans of action, for a climate-resilient Philippines also converge: • National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP): “Build the adaptive capacities of women and men in their communities, increase the resilience of vulnerable sectors and natural ecosystems to

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Table 2 General characterizations of the CCA and DRR communities in the Philippines DRR Organizations and institutions United Nations ProVention Consortium (the World Bank) International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies International, national, and local civil society groups and NGOs National DRRM Council Department of National Defense as lead agency Departments of the Interior and Local Government, Social Welfare and Development, Science and Technology, and National Economic and Development Authority Strategies National Disaster Coordinating Council Response Systems UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Hyogo Framework of Action Four-point Agenda from 2005 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (NDRRM) Framework Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (SNAP) Major policies Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 (Republic Act No. 10121), 27 May 2010 Adopting SNAP and institutionalizing DRR (Executive Order No. 888), 7 June 2010 Funding National DRRM Fund International Humanitarian Funding

CCA UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Academe and research National and local NGOs Climate Change Commission Departments of Environment and Natural Resources, Agriculture, Energy, and National Economic and Development Authority

National Communication to the UNFCCC National Framework Strategy on Climate Change National Climate Change Action Plan

Philippine Climate Change Act of 2009 (Republic Act No. 9729), 23 October 2009

Special Climate Change Fund People’s Survival Fund (Republic Act No. 10174), 25 July 2011

Multilateral Bank Bilateral Aid Source: Modified and updated from Lasco and Delfino 2010, pp. 54–55

climate change and optimize mitigation opportunities towards gender-responsive and rightsbased sustainable development.” • National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP): “Safer, adaptive and disaster-resilient Filipino communities toward sustainable development.” Second, both laws recognize the two fields (CCA and DRR) and their interrelationships: • Section 2 of the CC Act of 2009: “Further recognizing that climate change and disaster risk reduction are closely interrelated and effective disaster risk reduction will enhance climate change adaptive capacity, the State shall integrate disaster risk reduction into climate change programs and initiatives.” Page 4 of 21

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Climate Change Adaptation:

Disaster Risk Management

Reduce risk to:

Reduce risk to:

Extreme weather events with increased frequency and severity

Gradual changes in climatic parameters

Sea level rise

Changes in mean temperature

Changes in precipitation patterns

Climate-and weather-related events

Geophysical events

Direct connection

Ecological events

Other events (e.g. technological, terrorism)

Hazards that are associated with extreme events

Hazards that are associated with changing climate “normals”

Fig. 1 CCA and DRR: point of conceptual convergence (Source: Gotangco 2012)

• Section 6 (n) of the DRRM Act of 2010: “In coordination with the Climate Change Commission, formulate and implement a framework for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction and management from which all policies, programs and projects shall be based. . .” Third, both laws aim to mainstream CCA and DRR in local development plans. The CC Act of 2009 mandates all government agencies to draw up their CC action plans which are going to be mainstreamed, in synergy with DRR, in national, sectoral, and local development plans. On the other hand, the DRRM Act of 2010 orders all local governments to come up with their local DRRM plans which are going to be incorporated in their CLUPs and CDPs. Fourth, the CCC and NDRRMC are headed by the President of the Philippines as their chairman. Hence, should conflicts arise, they can be resolved under the supervision of one person – the President of the Philippines. Fifth, heads of both agencies are members in the decision-/policy-making units of the other. The Executive Director of the Climate Change Office (CCC) is a council member of the NDRRMC. On the other hand, the chair of the NDRRMC (i.e., Secretary of National Defense) is a member of the advisory board of the CCC. Sixth, even though the CCC and the NDRRMC have separate budgets at the national level, local governments are free to use their 5 % Local DRRM Fund and 20 % Local Development Fund for CCA- and DRR-related activities. Seventh, in a memorandum of understanding for collaboration program on Philippine climate risk reduction signed in April 2011, the NDRRMC and the CCC pledged to work together to harmonize, coordinate, and support the implementation of the local CC action plans and local disaster risk reduction and management plans of LGUs (NDRRMC-CCC 2011). Last, the most important of all, the operational plans of the CCC’s NCCAP and the NDRRMC’s NDRRMP have integrated the activities of both fields. In the NDRRMP, all DRR phases (i.e., mitigation and prevention, preparation, rescue and relief, and recovery and rehabilitation) integrate two major priority areas of the CCC’s NCCAP, namely, “human security agenda” and “ecosystem and environmental stability” (see Table 3). Majority of these integrated CCA and DRR operational activities can be mainstreamed in the local development plans of LGUs.

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Table 3 Points of integration of the operational plans of the NCCAP and the NDRRMP NCCAP Human security agenda Conduct of provincial-level vulnerability and risk assessments Mainstream and implement local plans based on information from the vulnerability and risk assessment Develop and implement knowledge management on CC and disaster risks Increase local and community capacities for CCA/DRRM Integrate CC and DRR in the training of health personnel and community workers Improve system for health emergency preparedness and response for climate and disaster risks Improve system for post-disaster health management Develop a long term plan for adaptation of highly CC vulnerable population and climate refugees Extensive IEC program on CC risks and population management

Ecosystem and environmental stability Conduct a nationwide gendered ecosystem vulnerability and risk assessment Derive and implement mitigation and adaptation strategies for key ecosystems Implement the National REDD Plus Strategy Expand the network of protected areas (PAs) and key biodiversity areas (KBAs) Establish ecosystem towns or eco-towns in PAs and KBAs Design gender-fair innovative financing mechanisms and a bundle of CC adaptation assistance for eco-towns/communities Implement moratorium on polluting and extractive industries in PAs, KBAs, and other environmentally critical areas Increase knowledge and capacity for integrated ecosystem-based management at the national, local, and community levels Review and revise Philippine Economic-Environmental and Natural Resources Accounting (ENRA) Implement training programs on wealth accounting or ENRA for key government agencies

NDRRMP Prevention & mitigation Prevention & mitigation

Crosscutting concerns Strategies Prevention & mitigation Preparedness Prevention & mitigation Strategies Prevention & mitigation Preparedness Crosscutting concerns Prevention and mitigation Prevention and mitigation Prevention and mitigation Prevention and mitigation Crosscutting concerns Prevention and mitigation Strategies Prevention and mitigation Preparedness Prevention and mitigation Prevention and mitigation

Source: NDRRMC 2011, p. 65

Mainstreaming CCA and DRR in Local Development Plans LGUs in the Philippines are mandated to formulate two major local plans which serve as the entry points for CCA and DRR integration. These are the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) and the Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP). They are both formulated with guidance from political leaders’ visions for their localities and constituencies. Ideally, the CLUP is formulated first to serve as framework for the CDP and other plans (see Fig. 2). However, the planning of both the CLUP and the CDP can proceed simultaneously once the visions of the local leaders are known and have been validated.

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Fig. 2 Level of local development plans (Source: DILG-BLGD 2008, p. 19)

Integrating CCA and DRR in the CLUP The CLUP is the long-term (10–15 years) physical development plan for the management of local territories. It is formulated by the local planning and development office and approved by the local legislative council, i.e., Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Provincial Legislative Council) in case of a province, Sangguniang Panglungsod (City Legislative Council) in case of a city and Sangguniang Pangbayan (Municipal Legislative Council) in case of a municipality. CLUPs spell out local governments’ land use policies in the areas of settlements, infrastructures, production areas, and protected areas. These land policies are aimed to rationally distribute population in the territory, ensure that the population has access to basic social and economic services and opportunities, protect the environment, and promote sustainable development. CLUPs at the municipal and city levels must be aligned with their higher counterparts, i.e., Provincial Physical Framework Plan, Regional Physical Framework Plan and National Physical Framework Plan (see Fig. 3). Once approved, the CLUPs are enforced through zoning ordinances (ZOs) and become the basis for the formulation of CDPs (refer again to Fig. 2). In the preparation of CLUPs, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), a national quasi-judicial government agency tasked in planning and regulating housing and land development matters, prescribes the following 12-step process for comprehensive land use planning: (1) getting organized; (2) identifying stakeholders; (3) setting the vision; (4) analyzing the situation; (5) setting the goals and objectives; (6) establishing the development thrust and spatial strategies; (7) preparing the land use plan; (8) drafting the ZO; (9) conducting public hearing on the draft CLUP and ZO; (10) reviewing, adopting, and approving the CLUP and ZO; (11) implementing the CLUP and ZO; and (12) monitoring, reviewing, and evaluating the CLUP and ZO. In 2011, the HLURB, in consultation with CC and DRRM experts, identified the entry points of CCA and DRR in each step of the planning process. The factors considered were funds, CC/DRRM experts/agencies’ involvement; inclusion of CC and DRR concepts, measures, strategies, and indicators in each step; etc. For details, see Table 4.

Integrating CCA and DRR in the CDP The CDP contains the multi-sectoral medium-term (6 years) plans of a local government that promote the general welfare of its inhabitants. It consolidates the goals, objectives, strategies, Page 7 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_36-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013 PLAN/LEVEL

NATIONAL (N)

PHYSICAL FRAMEWORK AND COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLANS 1

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS (DPs) 2

NPFP

INVESTMENT PROGRAMS (IPs)

3

MTPDP

MTPIP

National Agency Plans and Programs

REGIONAL (R) RPFP

RDP

RDIP Regional Agency Plans and Programs

PROVINCIAL (P) / CITY (C)

1 PPFP 2 CCLUP

PCDP / CCDP

PDIP / CDIP Provincial/City Agency Plans and Programs

MUNICIPAL (M) MCLUP

2

MCDP

MDIP

Acronyms: PFP–Physical Framework Plan MT - Medium Term

Municipal Agency Plans and Programs

Fig. 3 Hierarchy and linkages of plans (Source: HLURB 2006, p. 4)

Table 4 Entry points for CCA/DRR integration into the 12-step planning process for CLUP Step no. Process 1 Getting organized Getting endorsement/approval from local legislative council Preparation of work program Organization and briefing of planning team 2 Identify stakeholders Listing of stakeholders Action planning Information dissemination 3 Setting the vision Conduct of visioning workshops Adoption of vision and informing the public 4 Situation analysis Data gathering and land use surveys Base map preparation Sectoral studies and physical/land use studies Mapping of results Consultation/validation workshops Need/issues analysis and projections Cross-sectoral analysis and integration 5 Setting the goals and objectives Goals and objectives formulation workshops

Entry point for CCA/DRR integration Include budget for DRR/CCA Involve representative from DRR Office in the planning team

Involve DRR/CCA stakeholders and collective strengthening on community awareness on natural disasters (CSCAND) agencies

Include DRR/CCA concepts in the vision (e.g., “safety,” “secured,” “climate resilient,” “climate proof,” etc.)

Conduct CCA/disaster risk assessment and vulnerability assessment Conduct adaptive capacity assessment Use results to conduct analysis of climate change/risk impacts to land use and exposed population, socioeconomic conditions, infrastructure system Identify/propose policies/mitigating/adaptation measures

Identify development issues and their translation to goals, objectives, and targets Include CCA/DRR concepts in the goals, objectives, and targets (continued)

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Table 4 (continued) Step no. Process 6 Establishing desired development thrust and defining spatial strategies Development options Preferred development thrust and spatial strategy Structure plan/conceptual framework plan 7 Preparing the land use plan Proposed land and water uses policies Proposed circulation network Major development programs/projects 8 Drafting of zoning ordinance (ZO) and other development controls

9

10

11

12

Conduct public hearing Conduct of public hearings/ consultations Refinement of draft CLUP and ZO CLUP review/adoption and approval Endorsement for review of appropriate body Conduct of review by appropriate body Refinement of CLUP by local government unit Local legislative council adoption of refined CLUP Endorsement to local legislative council/ HLURB for ratification/approval Ratification of local legislative council/ HLURB Implementing the CLUP Required operating bodies/offices Permitting and clearance system CDP-LDIP-AIP-PPP implementation Monitoring, reviewing, and evaluating the CLUP

Entry point for CCA/DRR integration Consider CCA/DRR strategies and measures to respond to identified CC/DR

Involve representative from DRR office in the planning team Ensure land use and zoning policies address identified CC/DR such as disaster risk zoning Identify CCA/DRR projects, plans, and activities (PPAs) Involve representative from DRR office in the planning team Ensure land use and zoning policies address identified CC/DR such as disaster risk zoning Identify CCA/DRR projects, plans, and activities (PPAs)

Involve representative from DRR office in the regional/provincial land use committee (RLUC/PLUC)

Ensure strict implementation of CCA/DRR-enhanced CLUP and ZO

Include CCA/DRRM indicators in the monitoring and evaluation system Continually monitor level of disaster risks/CC effects and emerging threats

Source: HLURB 2012 Acronyms: CDP Comprehensive Development Plan, LDIP Local Development Investment Plan, AIP Annual Investment Plan, PPP public-private partnership

programs, projects, and legislative measures of the following development sectors: economic, social, environmental, physical/infrastructure, and institutional. CDPs are crafted by Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are composed of technical experts and political leaders. At the technical side, members include representatives from local special bodies (e.g., local school board), sectoral and functional committees, department heads, local planning and development office, national government agencies and private sector. At the Page 9 of 21

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Table 5 Major plans of local government units Plan Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP) ExecutiveLegislative Agenda (ELA)

Definition Main contents Policy guide for the regulation of land uses Policies on settlements, protected embracing the LGU’s entire territorial jurisdiction areas, production areas, and infrastructure Multi-sectoral (economic, social, environmental, Sectoral goals, objectives, physical/infrastructure, institutional) plan to strategies, programs, projects, and promote the general welfare of the LGU legislative measures Term-based counterpart of the CDP Sectoral goals, objectives, strategies, prioritized programs and projects, and legislative measures Principal instrument for implementing the CDP Prioritized projects, plans and and ELA activities (PPAs) and program for planned financing

Local Development Investment Plan (LDIP) Annual Investment One year slice of the LDIP Plan (AIP)

Prioritized PPAs proposed for inclusion in the annual local budget

Timeframe 10–15 years 6 years

3 years

3 years

1 year

Source: DILG-NEDA-DBM-DOF 2007, p. 9

political side, there are representatives from the LDC itself, local legislative council, the congressional representative and civil society organizations. LDCs are chaired by local chief executives. A CDP’s timeframe is coterminous with the term of the elected local chief executive. Once a CDP has been written, it serves as inputs to Executive-Legislative Agenda (ELA) of the local leaders. The development sectors’ programs and projects are then incorporated in the Local Development Investment Program (LDIP) which, in turn, is implemented through the Annual Investment Program (AIP) and the Annual Budget (AB). Refer to Fig. 2 above and Table 5 below for the hierarchy and relationship of these major local government plans. In 2008, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the central planning agency of the Philippines, published the Guidelines on Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction in Subnational Development and Land Use/Physical Planning. It is a tool to improve regional and provincial planning analysis by recognizing risks posed by natural hazards and the vulnerability of the population, economy, and the environment to these hazards. The guidelines were initially focused on mainstreaming DRR to CLUPs, CDPs, and other local development plans because, as was stated before, the Philippines has a long history with disaster management. Later, CCA was incorporated into the DRR mainstreaming framework. At first, the guidelines advise LGUs to undertake disaster risk assessment (DRA). Briefly, DRA involves the following: (a) hazard characterization/frequency analysis, (b) consequence analysis, (c) risk estimation, and (d) risk prioritization. Below are the summaries for each of the processes involved in each step of DRA: Hazard characterization/frequency analysis – the in-depth study and monitoring of hazards to determine their potential, origin (i.e., geologic or hydrometeorologic), geographical extent, and hazard impact characteristics including their magnitude-frequency behavior, historical behavior, and initiating (or triggering) factors Consequence analysis – determining or defining the elements at risk from a given hazard and defining their vulnerability

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_36-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013 Disaster Risk Assessment

Development Planning Planning Environment Vision

Population Hazard Characterization/ Frequency Analysis

Consequence Analysis

Economic Activity Physical Resources/ Transport

Income and Services

Land Use and Physical Framework Risk Estimation

Project Evaluation and Development

Development Issues, Goals, Objectives/Targets Risk Evaluation Strategies and Projects, Plans, and Activities

Investment Programming

Budgeting Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation

Fig. 4 Framework for mainstreaming DRR in subnational plans (Source: NEDA-UNDP-ECHA 2008, p. 32)

Risk estimation –involves the integration of the results of hazard characterization and frequency analysis (or hazard analysis) with consequence analysis to derive an overall measure of risk Risk prioritization – is undertaken to guide the identification of areas needing urgent attention Source: NEDA-UNDP-ECHA 2008, pp 35–47 The results in the DRA are then mainstreamed in development planning through the following primary entry points: (a) analysis of the planning environment; (b) identification of issues and problems; (c) formulation of goals, objectives, and targets; (d) formulation of development strategies, and (e) identification of programs, projects, and activities (PPAs). Refer to Fig. 4. Issues and problems are based on either existing or potential land use conflicts associated with the risks or their impacts to the developmental objectives of LGUs. From these analyses, goals, objectives, and targets are identified and refined according to the vision of local governments. Once these had been made, the corresponding interventions, in the forms of PPAs, of the local government vis-à-vis the disaster risks are formulated and prioritized. These interventions may come in the form of the following measures: (a) risk avoidance or elimination, (b) risk reduction or mitigation, (c) risk sharing or transfer, and (d) risk acceptance or retention. The secondary entry point for the mainstreaming of the integrated CCA/DRR is in the plan implementation stage. This involves investment programming, budgeting/financing, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. In investment programming, the LDIP is drafted. It is a prioritized list of PPAs for 3 years with the corresponding annual expenditures. The LDIP is then sliced into 1-year AIP whose expenditures are to be included in the annual local budget. Funds for the budget come from local development fund, local DRRM fund, local taxes, risk transfer/transfer financing, etc. The implementation of the PPAs are then monitored and evaluated to determine the project outcomes and impacts. Refer again to Table 5 for the details of these plans. CC was later incorporated into the DRA mainstreaming framework. In the area of risk assessment, climate scenarios based on projected temperature and precipitation data are incorporated in hazard characterization/frequency analysis. Sectoral impacts and their vulnerability are, then, integrated in consequence analysis and risk evaluation, respectively. See Fig. 5.

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Fig. 5 Incorporation of climate change in disaster risk assessment (Source: De Guzman 2010)

Development Planning Planning Environment Population Economic Activity

Climate variability Income & Services

Physical Resources/ Transport Land Use & Physical Framework

Development Issues, Goals, Objectives / Targets

Strategies and PPAs

Sectoral impacts Vulnerability analysis

Investment Program

Budgeting Project Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation

Fig. 6 Incorporation of climate change in local development planning (Source: De Guzman 2010)

In the development planning stage of the mainstreaming framework, climate variability, sectoral impacts, and vulnerability analysis are incorporated in the planning environment (refer to Fig. 6). In particular, the effects and impacts of climate variability to population, economic activities, income and services, physical resources, transportation, land use, and physical framework are taken into consideration. The results of vulnerability analysis are, then, factored in the formulation of development issues, goals, objectives/targets, strategies, and PPAs. Finally, a framework for integrating CCA and DRR into local development planning was conceived (see Fig. 7). The formulation of CCA/DRR-enhanced plans starts with the projection of CC scenarios in the future. Its impacts on various sectors (i.e., coastal areas, health, agriculture, Page 12 of 21

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Fig. 7 Framework for the integration of CCA and DRR in local development planning (Source: De Guzman 2010)

water, forestry, etc.) and on known “natural” hazards (i.e., typhoons, earthquakes, rain- and earthquake-induced landslides) are then assessed using the DRA tool. Integrated CCA/DRR strategies are then identified and prioritized. These can be now included in the CDPs. Demonstration projects are implemented to pilot test the PPAs.

The Integration of CCA and DRR in the Local Development Plans of Sorsogon City Brief Profile of Sorsogon City Sorsogon City, a component capital city of Sorsogon Province, was created in August 2000 through a national law (Republic Act 8806). The law combined two municipalities – Bacon and Sorsogon to create the new city. Sorsogon City is bordered in the east by Albay Gulf which opens up to the Pacific Ocean and in the west by Sorsogon Bay which is connected to China Sea, making it a coastal local government. Because of its geographical location, it is a transshipment corridor and gateway for the islands of Visayas and Mindanao (UN Habitat-Philippines n.d., p. 3) (see Fig. 8). The city is the largest city in the Bicol Region – it measures up to 31,292 hectares (ha.) with 9,930 ha. dedicated to agriculture, 7,612.76 ha covered by forests, and 72 ha. for built-up areas. It is divided into three districts and 64 barangays (towns), 37 of which lie along the coastal areas. As of 2010, its population was pegged at 151,454 with an annual growth rate of 1.78 (in 2000–2007). It is the most populous city in the region (UN Habitat-Philippines n.d., p. 3). The main economic activities in the city are agriculture, fishing, trade, and services. In the Philippine local government classification, the city is classified as second class for having obtained the second to the highest income among its peer cities. As the capital city of Sorsogon Province, it serves as the latter’s administrative, commercial, and educational center (UN Habitat-Philippines n.d., p. 3). Sorsogon City’s climate is classified as type II (Modified Coronas Classification System) where there is no dry season but with a pronounced rainfall from November to January. According to local data, rainfall usually starts late September or early October and rainfall ranges from 2,800 to 3,500 mm. Rains usually last 200 days in a year which continue even in the driest months (UN Habitat-Philippines n.d., p. 3).

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Fig. 8 Locational map of Sorsogon City (Source: UN Habitat-Philippines n.d., p. 3)

The city experiences temperate temperature from 21
C to 32
C and relative humidity of 82 %. The prevailing winds are the monsoons and Pacific trade winds (which visits the city every April and May). From October to March, the northeast monsoon blows, while the southwest monsoon occurs from June to September. Unfortunately, the city is located at the Philippines’ geographical zone 6 where three typhoons/cyclones pass every 2 years (UN Habitat-Philippines n.d., p. 7).

Vulnerability to Climate Change and Natural Disasters According to the projections of the national government’s meteorological agency (i.e., Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical, and Astronomical Services Administration or PAGASA), under the A1B scenario (using the PRECIS model of the UK Met Office Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research), the whole province of Sorsogon, which includes the city, will experience 0.8–1.1
C increase in temperature in 2020 and 1.5–2.1
C in 2050 (UN Habitat-Philippines n.d., p. 10). On the other hand, seasonal rainfall in the province and city will decrease by as much as –6.8 % in the March-April-May period and will increase from 5.1 % to 10.8 % in the other periods of the year 2020. By 2050, the decrease in seasonal rainfall in the March-April-May period will be almost double, –11.4 % and substantial increase to 7.4–27.3 % in the other periods of the year (UN HabitatPhilippines n.d., p. 10). Owing to its geographical location and climatic conditions, it comes as a no surprise that it is always visited by strong tropical cyclones. In 2006 alone, two super tropical cyclones (locally named “Milenyo” in September and “Reming” in November) with more than 200 km per hour sustained maximum wind struck the city leaving more than 10,000 houses (33 % of the city’s houses) and PhP208 million (around US$50 million at US$1 ¼ PhP42) worth of damages. The city’s poor and informal settlers were the hardest hit sector by the two typhoons which wiped out not only their houses but also their livelihoods. From the vulnerability assessment conducted by the city government, it is estimated that 34 coastal barangays out of 64 barangays (or 53 %) are in danger from strong surges brought by tropical cyclones (UN Habitat-Philippines n.d., pp. 10, 13).

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Increase in rainfall is another direct CC problem by the city. With torrential rains, the city has experienced floods year in and year out. In 2009, for example, a weak storm (signal no. 1) brought extremely heavy rains to the city which measured 300 mm within a short period of time. It brought massive destruction worth PhP200 million (around US$48 million at US$1 ¼ PhP42) in infrastructure and agricultural products. Again, from the vulnerability assessment of the city government, 20 barangays (or 31 % of 64 barangays) are prone to floods (UN Habitat-Philippines n.d., p. 15). The city fears that it would also fall victim to sea-level rise (SLR) just like its neighboring city, Legaspi City, which had experienced seawater rising since 1970 from the Pacific Ocean. According to stories of local residents, SLR must have already taken place in Barangays Poblacion and Cambulaga where about 50 and 15 m of their lands were inundated by seawater since the 1950s. It is estimated by the city government that, again, 34 coastal barangays (53 % of 64 barangays) are in danger from SLR (UN Habitat-Philippines n.d., pp. 11, 18). Landslide is another hazard that the city constantly faces. It comes with soil erosion and flashfloods which are triggered by increase in precipitation and volume of rainfall. Eight barangays or 13 % of 64 barangays have been identified as vulnerable to landslides (UN Habitat-Philippines n.d., p. 16). In an assessment conducted by UN Habitat-Philippines in cooperation with the city government, it was found out that the city’s adaptive capacity is low due to poor housing structures and infrastructure, climate-sensitive livelihoods, poor state of the environment, high health risks, etc. (for details, see UN Habitat-Philippines n.d., pp. 20–31).

Mainstreaming CCA and DRR into Sorsogon City’s CLUP and CDP The revisions in the CLUP and CDP of Sorsogon City were undertaken through the conduct of vulnerability and adaptation assessment (V&AA) and the integration of the V&AA findings into the CLUP and CDP Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment In April 2009, UN Habitat-Philippines and the City Government of Sorsogon inked an agreement of cooperation which aimed to implement a project that will enhance the CC mitigation and preparedness of the city through the former’s Cities in Climate Change Initiative (CCCI). The local project is under the Strengthening Philippine Cities to the Impacts of Climate Change program funded by the Millennium Development Goals Fund (MDGF)-1656, spearheaded by NEDA, and financially supported by the Spanish Government. Both sides provided financial, technical, and manpower assistance to implement the project. The V&AA was conducted for the entire city to study the impacts of CC such as storm surges, strong typhoons, sea-level rise, increased precipitation, and higher temperature increase, especially to urban coastal settlements and hotspot areas which are highly at risk. Briefly, the V&AA was conducted through the following processes: (a) Collection of data/information on CC scenario (present and future), the socioeconomic profile of the city, land use plan, maps, and the capacity of the city to address CC (b) Analysis of the data to determine the vulnerability of the city by identifying the exposed elements (people, places, sectors, etc.), the sensitivity of the city, and its adaptive capacity (c) Visualization of the CC hazards and risks through maps In the visualization process, seven hazard maps were generated. These were for flood, ground subsidence, landslide, liquefaction, sea-level rise, storm surge, and tsunami. All of these were combined in multi-hazard maps, one of which is shown on Fig. 9. Page 15 of 21

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Fig. 9 A multi-hazard map of Sorsogon City (Source: Sorsogon City Government)

Fig. 10 Hotspot barangays (villages) in Sorsogon City (Source: Sorsogon City Government)

It was found out from the multi-hazard maps that the following coastal barangays are vulnerable to the hazards and disasters that could be caused by CC: Cabid-an, Sampaloc, Sirangan, Bitan-o/ Dalipay, and Talisay (see Fig. 10). Moreover, it was pointed out that the barangay residents have limited knowledge on CC, its impacts, and how to adapt. It was suggested that these barangays be made as sites of demonstration projects for CCA and DRR. These findings and suggestion were validated in a multi-stakeholder consultation conducted in May 2009. In the same consultation, the following sectors were prioritized: housing and urban infrastructure, livelihood, environmental

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Fig. 11 Four policy zones in Sorsogon City (Source: Sorsogon City Government)

management, and disaster risk management. Workshops were also conducted for these four sectors to identify specific short- and long-term action plans. Mainstreaming CCA/DRR in the CLUP and CDP In July 2010, UN Habitat-Philippines and the Sorsogon City Government agreed to make the city the pilot site of mainstreaming the integrated CCA/DRR in its CLUP and CDP. This move received financial and technical support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG). The mainstreaming processes were composed of the following steps: 1. Assessment and updating of the existing situation 2. Assessment and updating the vision and development goals and objective 3. Assessment and updating of a 15-year CLUP and long-term (15 years) CDP and updating of medium-term (6 years) CDP and 3 years Executive-Legislative Agenda (ELA) The V&AA hazard maps served as inputs in the review of the existing CLUP and CDP. Workshops among relevant city government officials, technical experts, barangay officials, and representatives from national government agencies and nongovernmental organizations were held to propose revisions in the two major local development plans. Sectoral consultations in the areas of environmental management and livelihood were conducted in November and December 2010 to refine the situational analyses. In addition, members of the local legislative council were briefed in February 2011 on its role in the formulation of the CLUP and CDP. In a multi-stakeholder workshop on mainstreaming CCA and DRR in CLUP and CDP in March 2011, the participants identified four policy zones – areas which will be regulated and planned by the city for CCA and DRR through the CDP (Fig. 11). These areas, with the corresponding level of risks, are:

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Fig. 12 New CLUP map of Sorsogon City (Source: Sorsogon City Government)

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1. 2. 3. 4.

Coastal/built-up/hazard prone Inland/agricultural/low risk Upland/agri-forest/medium risk Upland/protected forest/high risk

As a result of the formulation of the four policy zones, the city government, with approval from its legislatives council, decided to change the city vision. The new city vision is “A model city in CC and disaster risk resiliency with a contented, empowered and values oriented society that pursues socio-economic developments within the limit of nature thru genuine commitment to good governance.” Aside from changing the city vision, a new CLUP map was drawn that incorporates findings from 12 socioeconomic maps (agriculture, commercial, built-up, infrastructure, informal settlers and settlement areas, rice, fishing grounds, urban areas, tourism, protected areas, minerals, and road networks) and four geographical feature maps (topographical, elevation, slope, and rivers). Refer to Fig. 12. In November 2011, a new CLUP was written which was submitted to the local legislative council for approval.

Conclusions Generally, CCA and DRR are treated as conceptually and operationally distinct because of their spatial and temporal nuances. In the Philippines, the passages of two separate laws on CC and DRRM seemed to have sealed these so-called conceptual and operational divide. A closer scrutiny, however, reveals that they complement each other and they converge for the purpose of reducing risks to natural disasters and promote resilience. The national government has already laid down the guidelines for the integration of CCA and DRR in local development planning. Aided by these guidelines, Sorsogon City has shown that, given enough technical and financial assistance, the integrated CCA/DRR can be mainstreamed to local development plans, namely, CLUP and CDP.

References De Guzman, MV (2010) Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in development planning in the Philippines. A PowerPoint presentation made on 22 October 2010 at the 2nd Asia-Pacific Climate Change Adaptation Forum, Bangkok Department of the Interior and Local Government-Bureau of Local Government Development (DILG-BLGD) (2008) Rationalizing the local planning system: a source book Department of the Interior and Local Government-National Economic and Development AuthorityDepartment of Budget and Management-Department of Finance (DILG-NEDA-DBM-DOF) (2007) Integrated guide for local planning, investment programming, budgeting, revenue administration and expenditure management Gotangco CK (2012) Developing a community-based co-benefits framework for climate change adaptation and disaster risk management in Oriental Mindoro. In: Gotangco CK, Perez R (eds) Understanding vulnerability and risk. A PowerPoint presentation delivered at the UNEP Regional Adaptation Platform on 21 March 2012, Philippines Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) (2006) CLUP guidebook: a guide to comprehensive land use plan preparation, vol 1 Page 19 of 21

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Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) (2012) Overview: integrating climate change in land use and CLUP process. A PowerPoint presentation made on 22 Nov 2011 Lasco R, Delfino JP (2010) Institutional and policy landscapes of disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in Asia and the Pacific, Philippines Mercer J (2010) Disaster risk reduction or climate change adaptation: are we reinventing the wheel? J Int Dev 22:247–264 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) (2011) The national disaster risk reduction and management plan 2011 to 2028 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council and Climate Change Commission (NDRRMC-CCC) (2011) Memorandum of understanding between the National Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) and Climate Change Commission (CCC) for collaboration programme on Philippine climate risk reduction ProAct Network (2008) Environmental management: multiple disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation benefits for vulnerable communities Schipper L, Pelling M (2006) Disaster risk, climate change and international development: scope for and challenges to, integration. Disasters 30(1):19–38 Tearfund (2008) Linking climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction Thomalla F, Downing T et al (2006) Reducing hazard vulnerability: towards a common approach between disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation. Disasters 30(1):39–48 UN Habitat-Philippines (n.d.) Sorsogon City climate change vulnerability assessment UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) (2008a) Briefing note 01: climate change and disaster risk reduction UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) (2008b) Briefing note 02: adaptation to climate change by reducing disaster risks: country practices and lessons UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) (2008c) Briefing note 03: strengthening climate change adaptation through effective disaster risk reduction

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Index Terms: Climate change adaptation (CCA) 1 Disaster risk reduction (DRR) 1 Local development planning 12 Vulnerability analysis 15

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_37-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Linkage of Agricultural Productivity Improvement and Climate Mitigation Action in Africa Labintan Adeniyi Constant* and Harald Winkler Energy Research Centre (ERC), Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, University of Cape-Town, Rondebosch, South Africa

Abstract This study explores the relations between agricultural productivity improvement and mitigation potentiality in Africa mainly in Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, and Zambia characterized by different agricultural production system and agroecological zones. Firstly it used Decomposition of Productivity Number Index approach to evaluate the country’s agricultural productivity during their pre- and post-economic market openness. Secondly, the country’s agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU) emission is assessed, while the last part uses robust regression to determine their impact on country’s agricultural productivity. It is found that agricultural productivity is improved relatively during the country’s post-economy liberalization. Annual agriculture emission is higher in Kenya with relative annual changes, while changes in forest land emission are considerably in Rwanda. The regression analysis showed that an increase in agricultural emission contributes to a relative decrease in, respectively, Ghana, Rwanda, and Zambia agricultural performance. This means a decrease in their agricultural productivity. However, agricultural emission is contributing to improvement of Kenya agricultural performance. This means an increase in Kenya’s agricultural productivity. Furthermore, forest land sink has positive implication of agricultural productivity in Rwanda. Forest land therefore is contributing to an improvement of Rwanda agriculture production performance. In addition, there is no significant impact of land use change emission on the selected countries’ agricultural performance. Finally, this chapter found that under the selected country’s production system, their goal of improving their agricultural sector performance by 6 % toward 2015 will reduce Ghana agriculture emission intensity, transform Zambia in agriculture carbon neutral country, increase Rwanda forestry sink potentiality, and increase Kenya agriculture net emission intensity. This chapter highlights on the need to investigate the linkage on case-by-case basis due to the difference in the country’s agricultural system and agroecological zones, while the cost of mitigation will constitute an important indicator in decision making.

Keywords Agricultural productivity; GHG emission; Mitigation; Africa

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_37-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Introduction Agricultural sector in Africa is a key source of economic growth and a large source of foreign exchange, saving, and tax revenue. It contributes to over 40 % of currency earning, feeds and generates income for low-income household, and alleviates poverty. Despite several agricultural reforms undertaken in African countries, the gap between the sector supply and the demand is still very high. The sector is characterized by low productivity, high production cost, low mechanization, intensive labor use, limitation in credit accessibility, and market accessibility difficulties. Furthermore, it is estimated that the region population will rise from 770 million to 2 billion by 2050 (FAO 2009) which will significantly increase the agricultural demand. Moreover, increase in climate change extreme events frequency such as drought and flood increased more pressure on agricultural inputs accessibilities such as water and arable land. This is likely to result in a decrease of the sector production yield. A recent study in assessing the impact of climate change on agricultural productivity reveals that average cereal yield in sub-Saharan Africa will decrease at 3.2 % in 2050 (Nelson et al. 2009; Ringler et al. 2010) with an aggregate decrease in yield, respectively, of 17 %, 5 %, 15 %, and 10 % of wheat, maize, sorghum, and millet (Knox et al. 2012). This will affect the region’s food availability and increase the vulnerability of low-income households. The agricultural sector including crop and livestock production, forestry, and associated land use changes are also identified to be major sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) in Africa and in addition has great sink potentiality (IPCC 2006). It has been estimated that in sub-Saharan Africa, over 43 % of the total CO2 emissions originate from land clearing from agricultural use and a further 316 billion tons of CO2 eq is stored in top soils at risk from degradation (Gledhill et al. 2011). According to IPCC (2006) the sector’s major emission sources are enteric fermentation (natural digestive process in ruminant animal), manure (manure management, manure applied to soil, and manure left on pasture), synthetic fertilizers, rice cultivation, crop residues, cultivated organic soil, and CO2 emission from burning crop residues, forest, and land use. Indeed, the trade-offs between agricultural growth and GHG emission intensity in Africa have been recognized by scholars and policy makers; however, more efforts were allocated to adaption strategies instead of mitigation actions. The mitigation matter started after COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009 where non-Annex 1 parties were invited to submit their “Nationally Appropriate Mitigations Actions” in order to ensure “sustainable development.” Therefore, the concern about mitigation of climate change in the agricultural sector grew in Africa. Climate change mitigation action in the agricultural sector will have co-benefit effects for the sector. On one hand, they will improve the sector inputs efficiency. Sustainable land management (SLM) practices will contribute to mitigating climate change in sub-Saharan Africa, by sequestering carbon in soils and vegetation (sink potentiality), reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide), and reducing the use of fossil fuel and agrochemicals (Woodfine 2010). This will improve land resource resilience and productivity by maintaining long-term productivity and ecosystem functions (land, water, biodiversity) and increase productivity (quality, quantity, and diversity) of goods and services (including safe and healthy food). On the other hand, SLM practices will offer smallholder’s opportunities to reduce the need for labor, capital- and fuel-intensive land preparation, and tillage. This can constitute a very good agricultural financing opportunity in Africa through carbon trade system and improve rural household development (Shames et al. 2012; Winston et al. 2012; Byamukama et al. 2012; Masiga et al. 2012). Although the African agricultural sector present an important potential of mitigation, very limited research does quantify the mitigation level, the cost of possible mitigation actions in the region Page 2 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_37-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

agricultural sector, and how mitigation action will influence the country’s agricultural development policy goals and vice versa. The region’s key agricultural development policies include the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) launched in 2003. The policy aims to boost African country’s agricultural annual productivity performance by 6 %, enhancing economic growth, eliminate hunger, and reduce poverty through sustainable agricultural production practices and intensive investment (NEPAD-CAADP 2010). This includes sustainable and efficient agricultural input such as land and water resources management. The policy may have some implication on the region climate change mitigation policy option. This chapter then explores the contribution of country’s agricultural productivity improvement policies in mitigating climate change in African countries. This means assessing the contribution of agricultural productivity improvement to carbon dioxide equivalent GHG emission abatement and the associated cost. It highlights policy maker on appropriate actions to yield the sector sustainable development policy goal.

Theoretical Approach of Agricultural Productivity Assessment Chambers (1988) defined the concept of productivity measurement as an approach to assess the production rate of technical change. He emphasized that firm productivity is conceptualized by two main components. The first component is partial factor of productivity (PFP) which is the ratio of firm total output Qi and any mi input used to produce that output. The second component is the total factor of productivity (TFP) which is the firm total output Qi ratio with summation of all input xi. Indeed, Farrell (1957) following Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951) analyzed difference in performance of firms which yield each a given quantity of output (oriented output) using a certain amount of inputs. They found that difference in the firm’s productivity is explained by their ability to produce the given amount of output using minimal input (technical efficiency) and economics scale. The last term is the firm’s allocation efficiency of producing a maximum quantity of output using an optimum input. Taken into account technological progress, the technical efficiency change will also contribute to their productivity component (to their performance). This is illustrated in Fig. 1 where xns is the quantity of input use to produce and Qns quantity of output during the first period using technology s. Using the same technology s, x*s is the minimum input required to produce an optimal quantity of output Q*s . When the firm production technology changed to new technology t during the second period, xnt is the quantity of input used to produce a given quantity of output Qt. Notwithstanding, under the new technology, x*t is the minimum quantity of input required to produce an optimal level of output Q*t . However, Balk (2001) argues that firm productivity is not only explained by technical change and economics scale. He concludes that output mix effect could also influence firm productivity. This means the combination of firm’s given producing total output. Similar conclusion has been made by Coelli et al. (2005) and O’Donnell (2010). This is illustrated in Fig. 2. Nonetheless, it is common to assess firm’s production performance for a given time period using these approach and investigate explanatory exogenous driving factors of difference in yield performance. This is essential to investigate why a firm performs differently within one period or across period. However, nowadays, the concern of climate change and introduction of climate change mitigation policy could also considerably influence the firm’s performance in agriculture sector; the concern on the sector contribution to GHG emission and goal of improving agricultural productivity raise interest to explore how mitigation policies could influence this goal in Africa. But how could this be investigated? Page 3 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_37-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Technical Change Total Quantity Of Produced Output V

Qt S

Period-t frontier Period-s frontier

E

Q'*t

L

T R

Qns Q'*s

Z A

e

r

z

a xs* xt*

Total Quantity of Input Use xnt

xns

Fig. 1 Decomposition of firm production performance using respectively technology s and t (Source: author own composition)

Total Quantity of Produced Output Residual mix inefficiency

Pure scale inefficiency Q s* Q nt

C

E D

A

Q t*

Pure technical inefficiency

Qn

e d c

d x ns x t*

x s*

x nt Total Quantity of Input Used

Fig. 2 Robust decomposition of firm production performance under respectively technology s and t (Sources: author own composition)

Agricultural Productivity Driving Factor and Mitigation Potential Most studies which evaluate agricultural productivity improvement conclude that agricultural research (Ruttan 1996; Chang and Zepeda 2001), agricultural extension, agricultural infrastructure (Evenson and Pray 1991; Antonio and Robert 2001; Evenson 2000), resources allocation (Jorgenson Page 4 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_37-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

1988), climate change, and government effectiveness are major driving factors of agricultural productivity (Sharmistha and Richard 2006; Mandemaker et al. 2011). However, unlike climate change, a change indicator which can contribute to an increase or a decrease in productivity, most studies emphasize extreme events such as drought or flow. Usually, rainfall is the proxy used for drought or flow. This leads more to adaptation strategy to control drought and flood in order to reduce their effect on agricultural crop productivity (You and Ringler 2010). Moreover, uncertainties in rainfall used as drought or flood proxy reveal the difficulty of using this approach (Jemma et al. 2010). Perhaps, a recent study emphasizes that emission reduction from agricultural sector present great potential for agricultural productivity improvement (Pete Smit et al. 2008; Capper 2011; Baker et al. 2012; Gerber et al 2013). Capper (2011) in analyzing mitigation in livestock sector argues that improving productivity has considerably reduced the carbon footprint of dairy and beef production and its share by consumers is extensive, when traditional systems have a lower carbon footprint. Pete Smit et al (2008), by exploring GHG mitigation potential in agriculture sector, conclude that agricultural practices can potentially mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions which will contribute to improving land productivity. This includes improving cropland and grazing land management and restoration of degraded lands and cultivated organic soils with high potential, while water and rice management, set aside, land use change and agroforestry, livestock management, and manure management have low potential. Baker et al. (2012), by assessing US agricultural productivity growth contribution to mitigation potential with focus on land management, found that lower crop and livestock productivity growth leads to higher emissions from land use change and management, while lower emissions from livestock operations has a minimal net impact on aggregate emissions. Indeed, Bryan et al. (2011) evaluated the linkage between agricultural productivity and mitigation potential in Kenya at a small-scale level and found that small-scale mitigation action thought integrated soil fertility management and soil water conservation has contributed to the improvement of crop productivity in Kenya. Recent developments show that an adoption of climate smart practices will contribute to achieve emission target in the agriculture sector (World Bank 2011) and could also affect the sector productivity. This will be achieved through sustainable farming practices contribution to land fertility and water. However, very limited research does investigate how AFOLU emission intensity can also affect the agricultural sector through their direct impact. This constitutes another exogenous factor which may be a robust proxy than annual rainfall accounting.

Methodology and Data Sources Sample: The study considers four African countries, namely, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, and Zambia where agricultural sector account for, respectively, 26 %, 28 %, 32 %, and 20 % of their GDP (WRI 2013). Among different economic reforms undertaken in those countries as in most African countries, the agricultural sector has been fundamental. Indeed, in 1990 their agricultural sector was liberalized in order to stimulate the sector competitiveness and create good private investment climate. This also has included improvement of their land policies. This contributes to increase in their agricultural production and their exportation. However, the intensification of their agricultural production contributes differently to each country’s agriculture, forestry, and other land use emission typology. Page 5 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_37-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

The first part then assesses their agricultural productivity, profitability, and changes in their production abilities. It applied the decomposition of Productivity Index Number proposed by O’Donnell (2010) to assess selected countries’ total productivity factor (TFP), profitability (PROF), and term of trade (TT). The TFP is the appropriate indicator which quantifies their agricultural production performance or frontier, while the PROF measures their agricultural sector profitability which depends on their production cost and their production output cost. However, the TT indicate the ratio between country exported output price and imported output price. Simulation is done using DPIN software. Inputs and outputs agricultural data have been collected from FAO database, Ghana Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA), Kenya Ministry of Agriculture, Rwanda Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources, Zambia Ministry of Agricultural and Livestock Agricultural Science and Technology (ASTI). Land: Arable land and permanent crop area (ha) Labor: Economically active population in agricultural sector (man/ha) Fertilizer: Amount of fertilizer and herbicide used (kg/ha) Seed: Planted material (kg/ha) Agricultural machine: Total agricultural machine and tractor used per 100 m2 Crop: Aggregated major crop production (kg/ha) Vegetable: Aggregated vegetable and fruit production (kg/ha) Cash crop: Aggregated major cash crop production (kg/ha) Due to limitation in prices data availability, input and output prices on 2008 have been used. Statistical descriptions of the input and output data used are presented in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 below. The second part access their figure of AFOLU emission intensity per ha. Emission data is collected from FAO statistical database. The third part evaluates the effect of AFOLU emission on selected countries’ agricultural productivity using two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach. However, the two-stage results can suffer from correlation error between input variables used in the first stage when assessing firm performance and explanatory variables used in the second stage when assessing firm performance driving factors (Wilson 2003; Simar and Wilson 2007). An alternative approach was proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007), who developed single and double bootstrap procedures to reduce the drawbacks. Their approach also allows the second-stage regression to be estimated and inferences to be made using robust logit regression method. This is done using Stata11. The regression formula is explicit as follows: Table 1 Summary of agricultural inputs-outputs in Ghana Variable Grain (kg/ha) Vegetable (kg/ha) Livestock (kg/ha) Cash crop (kg/ha) Land (ha) Labor (man-day/ha) Fertilizer (kg/ha) Machine (tractor/ha) Seed (kg/ha)

Number of observation 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45

Mean 2316.464 709.5128 1029.185 654.1043 3,186,133 1.223616 1.279142 0.412761 135.9314

Standard deviation 916.1159 181.5059 573.8502 160.4685 1,100,011 0.17456 0.465231 0.928791 21.13657

Minimum 1171.769 421.8656 404.8069 422.1081 1,700,000 0.993947 0.77 0.000944 113.3871

Maximum 4793.525 1116.542 2230.692 974.9874 4,700,000 1.607059 3.217391 3.306134 186.9893

Sources: author own composition based on FAO statistical database Page 6 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_37-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 2 Summary of agricultural inputs-outputs in Kenya Variable Grain (kg/ha) Vegetable (kg/ha) Livestock (kg/ha) Cash crop (kg/ha) Land (ha) Labor (man-day/ha) Fertilizer (kg/ha) Machine (tractor/ha) Seed (kg/ha)

Number of observation 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45

Mean 2.707777 2.899466 4.23476 7.626318 3,964,365 2.927053 0.024941 0.002677 0.000706

Standard deviation 0.555002 0.630181 10.01279 2.32105 645518.6 0.352239 0.008803 0.001035 0.000121

Minimum 1.634514 1.724518 1.456301 4.689775 2,890,922 2.277508 0.010526 0.001733 0.000497

Maximum 3.88598 4.165102 69.76406 16.56608 5,562,561 3.848183 0.04019 0.00876 0.000938

Standard deviation 145.3263 124.3971 119.5598 66.52187 1.25E + 07 0.000236 0.067029 3.00E-06 0.209604

Minimum 80.50747 67.57427 66.13531 36.44341 6,324,502 0.00015 0.002654 1.09E-06 0.088782

Maximum 716.3804 604.8115 594.1937 295.893 5.50E + 07 0.000962 0.449412 0.000013 0.862426

Standard deviation 4119.331 3953.428 369.9031 4569.216 282034.7 0.186121 610.9167 0.00106 2.556435

Minimum 1539.036 1526.518 605.7938 1116.385 2,213,000 0.484641 22.80398 0.000707 6.755079

Maximum 21374.53 18114.82 1837.185 17306.37 3,700,000 1.069713 2566.615 0.008248 14.40485

Sources: author own composition based on FAO statistical database

Table 3 Summary of agricultural inputs-outputs Rwanda Variable Grain (kg/ha) Vegetable (kg/ha) Livestock (kg/ha) Cash crop (kg/ha) Land (ha) Labor (man/day/ha) Machine (tractor/ha) Fertilizer (kg/ha) Seed (kg/ha)

Number of observation 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45

Mean 193.8665 175.9184 160.194 87.35256 3.37E + 07 0.000301 0.041725 3.01E-06 0.213096

Sources: author own composition based on FAO statistical database

Table 4 Summary of agricultural inputs-outputs in Zambia Variable Grain (kg/ha) Vegetable (kg/ha) Livestock (kg/ha) Cash crop (kg/ha) Land (ha) Labor (man/day/ha) Fertilizer (kg/ha) Machine (tractor/ha) Seed (kg/ha)

Number of observation 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45

Mean 12019.81 11346.91 1240.849 9236.526 2,765,822 0.760114 307.6056 0.00206 11.49622

Sources: author own composition based on FAO statistical database

Page 7 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_37-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013







LnðTFPÞ ¼ c þ alnðAgriex þ blnðR&D þ ’lnðGoveff þ do lnðLand þ d1 ðLabor þ flnðA þ
glnðFoÞ þ llnðLu þ e Where c is constant coefficient and a, b, ’, d0, d1, f, g, l are elasticity of explanatory variables driving factors of the agricultural productivity. e is the term of random error. Agriex is the number of agricultural research staff; R&D means the expenditure for agricultural R&D. These data have been collected from Agricultural Science and Technology Indicator database. GOVEFF quantifies government effectiveness. This data is collected from the United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistical database. Land, labor, and AFOLU emission data are collected from FAO statistical database. The last part concludes and gives some recommendations.

Result and Discussion Analysis of crop land use emissions across those four countries reveals that between 1990 and 2010 land use, net emission has been relatively much higher with relative change over a year in Zambia and in Rwanda with an average of 0.065 Gg CO2 eq. which is lower in Ghana and Kenya. This is illustrated in Fig. 3 below. Analysis of forest land net emission reveals that forest land emission is much important in Kenya, Ghana, and Zambia over the period 1990–2010. However, after 2010 forest land net emission/ removal has been negative in Rwanda. This is illustrated in Fig. 4 below. However, emission from agriculture is much important in Kenya with an average of 0.056 Gg CO2 eq./Ha and much lower in Ghana, Rwanda, and Zambia. This is illustrated in Fig. 5 below. From AFOLU emission perspective, it can be concluded that emission level varied considerably between sources and within countries. Land use emission did not change significantly after the agricultural sector market openness, while high land use emission is observed in Zambia. Similar for forest land net emission, while forest land sink potential increased in Rwanda. Furthermore, agriculture emissions varied considerably in Kenya which is the higher agriculture emitter among these countries. Analysis of agricultural productivity, profitability, and term of trade reveal that: In Ghana, before the agricultural market liberalization, there is a decrease in the country’s agricultural productivity by 46 %. This follows an increase by 46 % after the sector liberalization. While

Fig. 3 Crop land CO2 eq. net emission variation in selected countries between 1990 and 2010 (Sources: author own composition based on FAO emission database) Page 8 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_37-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Fig. 4 Forest land CO2 eq. net emission variation in selected countries between 1990 and 2010 (Sources: author own composition based on FAO emission database)

Fig. 5 Agricultural land CO2 eq. emission in selected countries between 1990 and 2010 (Sources: author own composition based on FAO emission database)

within the same period, there is a net increase by 197 % in the sector profitability. Similarly, there is a net increase in the sector term of trade by 196 %. This is illustrated in Fig. 6a below. However, this performance has been achieved with relatively low change in input technical change efficiency and significant change in input mix efficiency while input scale efficiency does not change. This is illustrated by the Fig. 6b below. In Kenya, during the reference period, there is a net increase in agricultural productivity by 23.4 %. The net increase in country agriculture profitability is 100 %. Similarly the net increase in the sector term of trade is 39 %. This is illustrated in Fig. 7a. However, a change in inputs scale efficiency is not significant while there is relative change in input scale mix efficiency and input technical change efficiency. This is illustrated in Fig. 7b below. In Rwanda, during the considered period, the net increase in agricultural productivity is 13.4 %, while there is net decrease in the sector profitability by 95 %. Similarly the net decrease in the sector term of trade is 148 %. This is illustrated in Fig. 8a. However, analysis of inputs efficiency reveals that there are no significant changes in inputs scale efficiency while input mix efficiency does change considerably with relatively lower changes in the country’s inputs technical change. This is illustrated in Fig. 8b. Finally in Zambia, agricultural productivity increased by 69.9 % before 1990 and increased by 16.4 % after, while the profitability has increased by 2.1 before 1990 and decreased by 0.6 after the liberalization. The term of trade decreased over the period with 1.18 decreases before 1990 and 1.13 decreases after. This is illustrated in Fig. 9a. However, analysis of oriented input

Page 9 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_37-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

a

Ghana Agricultural PROF-TFP-TT variation 6 PROF TFP TT

index

4 2

19

66 19 70 19 74 19 78 19 82 19 86 19 90 19 94 19 98 20 02 20 06 20 10

0

year

b

Ghana Agricultural Oriented Input Efficiency

index

1.5 1

ITE

0.5

ISE IME

19

66 19 70 19 74 19 78 19 82 19 86 19 90 19 94 19 98 20 02 20 06 20 10

0

year

Fig. 6 (a) Ghana agricultural productivity profitability and term-of-trade variation between 1965 and 2010. (b) Ghana agricultural oriented inputs efficiency variation between 1965 and 2010 (Sources: author own composition based on FAO emission database) Kenya Agricultural PROF-TFP-TT variation 4 3 2

PROF TFP TT

19

19

70 19 74 19 78 19 82 19 86 19 90 19 94 19 98 20 02 20 06 20 10

1 0 66

index

a

year

index

b

Kenya Agricultural Oriented Inputs Efficiency 1.5 1

ITE ISE IME

0.5

19 66 19 70 19 74 19 78 19 82 19 86 19 90 19 94 19 98 20 02 20 06 20 10

0 year

Fig. 7 (a, b) Kenya agricultural oriented inputs efficiency variation between 1965 and 2010 (Sources: author own composition based on FAO emission database)

efficiency reveal relative change in input technical changes over the period and significant change in inputs mix efficiency before the agricultural sector market openness while this change is much lower after. There is no significant change in scale efficiency. This is illustrated in Fig. 9b. In summary, over the considered, period agricultural productivity is low across countries with relative improvement after the liberalization. However, in term of inputs used efficiency, there is no observed changed at scale level over the whole period. This explains that producer resource allocation does not change significantly, while production technical change has relatively changed over the years. This highlights on inefficiency of agricultural inputs such as labor fertilizer, water used in these countries, and their intensive agricultural production system. Therefore, inefficient

Page 10 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_37-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

a

Rwanda Agricultural PROF-TFP-TT variation

Index

4 3

PROF TFP TT

2 1 19 65 19 70 19 74 19 78 19 82 19 86 19 90 19 94 19 98 20 02 20 06 20 10

0 year

Index

b

Rwanda Agricultural Input Oriented Efficiency 1.5 ITE ISE IME

1 0.5

70 19 74 19 78 19 82 19 86 19 90 19 94 19 98 20 02 20 06 20 10

19

19

65

0

year

Fig. 8 (a) Rwanda agricultural productivity, profitability, and term-of-trade variation between 1965 and 2010. (b) Rwanda agricultural oriented inputs efficiency variations between 1965 and 2010 (Sources: author own composition based on FAO emission database)

a

Zambia Agricultural TFP-PROF-TT Variation

Index

15 10

PROF TFP TT

5

2009

2005

2001

1997

1993

1989

1985

1981

1977

1973

1969

Year

0

Years

b

Zambia Agricultural Oriented input Efficiency

Index

1.5 1

ITE ISE IME

0.5

2010

2006

2002

1998

1994

1990

1986

1982

1978

1974

1970

1966

0

Years

Fig. 9 (a) Zambia agricultural profitability, productivity, and term-of-trade variation between 1965 and 2010. (b) Zambia agricultural oriented inputs efficiency between 1965 and 2010 (Sources: Author own composition based on FAO emission database)

fertilizer applied may contribute to increase in the sector emission, while climate change impact on water may increase water availability which in return will affect the sector productivity. However, analysis of the result of the regression between country agricultural productivity and number of agricultural research staff, expenditure in agricultural R&D, government effectiveness, land, labor, and AFOLU emission reveals that agricultural emission and forest land net emission have similar Page 11 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_37-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

significant impact on agricultural productivity as R&D, agricultural extension, government effectiveness, land, and labor, while the impact of land use on agricultural productivity is not significant. This is illustrated by list of Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8. Therefore, mitigation action in land use could be a possible option but will not have any gain or loss in this study’s selected countries performance improvement. It shows that total agricultural emission has considerably reduced country agricultural productivity respectively by 1.67 at 70 % in Ghana, by 0.04 at 35 % in Zambia, and by 0.66 at 19 % in Rwanda. This means that emission from agriculture sector does contribute to decrease in Ghana, Zambia, and Rwanda agricultural production performance. However, in Kenya, it is found that the emission from agricultural sector contributes to improvement of the country agricultural productivity. This confirms the need of exploring the linkage between agricultural productivity improvement and emission impact according to each country’s statement. The main reason is the complexity of country’s agricultural production system and their agroecological zones. The result of this study of course does not support emission increase in Kenya but highlights that emission reduction could improve the country’s agricultural production performance, as can constitute constraints for a country like Kenya that will need to achieve national goals in this sector. The cost of any emission reduction strategies then needs to be evaluated. Notwithstanding, forest land net emission/sink impact on agricultural productivity has been significant only in Rwanda. It has contributed to the improvement of the country’s agricultural performance by 2.1 at 19 %. This supports the fact that forest land in Rwanda has high carbon sink potential and deforestation will obviously reduce that sink. This is also consistent with the result of Rose et al. (2012) on analysis of agricultural productivity and deforestation. He found that improvements in Latin America or Southeast Asian crop TFP (ceteris paribus) led to an increase in inaccessible and accessible forest loss and pasture land conversion to cropland. Table 5 Robust regression with standard error assessing Ghana agricultural TFP driving factor TFP Agriex R&D GOVEFF Land Labor A Constant

Coefficient (robust) 4.050169 0.3604969 0.6753189 0.8363213 3.773906 1.672057 33.75379

Standard error 1.025168 0.2699032 1.478932 0.266972 1.021545 0.6883586 10.51329

t 3.95 1.34 0.46 3.13 3.69 2.43 3.21

P>t 0 0.19 0.651 0.003 0.02 0.02 0.003

95 % Conf. 6.125514 0.185893 2.318622 1.376778 1.705897 3.065566 55.03685

Interval 1.97482 0.906887 3.66926 0.2958 5.841915 0.27854 12.4707

Number of observation 45, F(6,38) ¼ 16.85, Prob > F ¼ 0, R-square ¼ 0.7098, Root MSE ¼ 0.24017

Table 6 Robust regression with standard error assessing Kenya agricultural TFP driving factor TFP Agriex R&D GOVEFF Land Labor A Constant

Coefficient (robust) 0.242240 0.3246712 0.1349451 0.0686824 0.0741058 0.6603873 2.002648

Standard error 0.367796 0.362694 0.2387321 0.3998275 0.353813 0.4720294 6.287847

T 0.66 0.9 0.57 0.17 0.21 1.4 0.32

P>t 0.514 0.376 0.575 0.865 0.835 0.17 0.752

95 % Conf. 0.9868058 0.4095651 0.3483428 0.740726 0.6421513 0.2951861 10.72643

Interval 0.5023245 1.058907 0.6182329 0.8780908 0.7903628 1.615961 14.73173

Number of observation 45, F(6,38) ¼ 16.85, Prob > F ¼ 0, R-square ¼ 0.1920, Root MSE ¼ 0.24017

Page 12 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_37-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 7 Robust regression with standard error assessing Rwanda agricultural TFP driving factor TFP R&D Agriex GOVEFF Land Labor A FO Constant

Coefficient (robust) 0.4369153 1.3845 0.1145932 0.0259382 0.153022 0.004775 2.156108 1.481708

Standard error 1.753359 0.706660 0.15654 0.022671 0.278233 0.212172 0.71087.537 0.4931127

T 0.25 1.96 0.73 1.14 0.55 0.02 0.3 0.3

P>t 0.805 0.058 0.469 0.26 0.586 0.982 0.763 0.765

95 % Conf. 3.989559 0.0473301 0.202605 0.019999 0.716776 0.434676 0.1224759 0.8509705

Interval 3.115728 2.81633 0.431791 0.071875 0.410731 0.165598.1 0.165598.13 0.114731.2

Number of observation 45, F(6,38) ¼ 16.85, Prob > F ¼ 0, R-square ¼ 0.197, Root MSE ¼ 0.24017

Table 8 Robust regression with standard error assessing Zambia agricultural TFP driving factor TFP R&D Agriex GOVEFF Land Labor A

Coefficient (robust) 0.175120 1.349458 0.9373663 2.215054 0.512447 0.0664795

Standard error 0.2671969 0.579199 0.8151916 0.8151916 0.9919933 2,412,561

T 0.66 2.33 1.15 2.23 0.93 0.28

P>t 0.516 0.025 0.257 0.032 0.358 0.784

95 % Conf. 0.7160325 0.1769307 0.7129029 0.2068688 1.628473 0.421918

Interval 0.3657911 0.3657911 2.587635 4.22324 0.6035787 0.5548769

Number of observation 45, F(6,38) ¼ 16.85, Prob > F ¼ 04, R-square ¼ 0.35, Root MSE ¼ 0.36

Therefore, considering 2010 as baseline, any 1 % increase in agriculture emission will decrease agricultural productivity in Zambia by 0.04 %, in Rwanda by 0.66 %, and in Ghana by 1.67 %. This will contribute to a decrease in their respective performance and will require then more investments in order to mitigate emission from agriculture. This will cost respectively 46.40Cedis/t/ha(US$ 23.2) in Ghana, 49.25 ZMK (US$ 0.09) in Zambia, and 346 FR/t/ha(US$0.53) in Rwanda. While in Kenya any 1 % decrease in agriculture emission will cost 2062.5 Ksh/t/ha(US$23.5). Therefore, the opposite scenario means a gain in each country. Similarly, any 1 % decrease in forest emission through afforestation/reforestation in Rwanda will contribute to improve the country’s agricultural productivity by 2.15 %. This will contribute to save 152 Rwanda Franc/tone/ha(US$ 0.23). In a related development, the CAADP goal of achieving 6 % of agricultural productivity toward 2015 will increase the country’s annual mitigation potential in agricultural sector by respectively 3.75 % in Ghana, 100 % in Zambia, and 150 % in Rwanda. While in Kenya it will contribute to an increase of the country emission by 9 %. Moreover, in Rwanda it will create an additional 2.85 % increase for the country forestry land emission. This means that the policy will help to reduce the total agriculture emission in Ghana and yield 0.00019 Gg CO2 eq., while in Zambia the agriculture will become carbon neutral. Nonetheless, the policies will transform Rwanda from net total agricultural emission to yield agricultural sink country at 0.0000319 Gg CO2 eq., while the country forestry sink potentiality will increase and yield 1.31 Gg CO2 eq. In contrast, the policies will increase the total agriculture emission in Kenya and will yield 0.0068 CO2 eq.

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Conclusion Agricultural productivity is relatively low in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite several reforms, it is even below the world average. Indeed, most countries did integrate the sector economics liberalization into their economics market liberalization in 1990. The agricultural productivity did increase relatively during the period of post-economic openness. The relatively low agricultural productivity during the post-market liberalization is also observed in this study’s selected countries. Indeed, the goal of improving the sector productivity rises during this decade and becomes a priority in most government policies’ agenda. This includes the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme. The policy is expected to bring annual growth of 6 % of TFP. This leads to expansion and intensive agriculture practices in some countries. However, the debate created by recent study which identifies agricultural sector as main emission sources in Africa raises more interrogation between scholars and government on the trade-off between productivity improvement and mitigation action in agriculture sector. This study finds that mitigation action in agriculture sector could help to reduce emissions and improve the sector productivity. However, not all mitigation action will contribute to improvement of the agricultural sector performance improvement. Therefore, some mitigation will also contribute to deterioration or decline in country agricultural production performance. This is the finding in this study’s sampling countries. Mitigation action will increase agricultural productivity in Ghana, Zambia, and Rwanda, while it will decrease productivity in Kenya. The need of implementing appropriated mitigation action is therefore essential. Appropriated sustainable land management (SLM) practices taking into account the country’s agroecological zone, appropriate technology, and farmer ability to adopt the technology coupled with available resources will be more suitable for improving the country’s agricultural production performance. Moreover, SLM could be developed toward climate smart agriculture (CSA) concept. Indeed, the effects of land use changes are not significant and do not contribute to any changes in the selected country’s agricultural production performance. This emphasizes that mitigation action can be assessed only by analysis of the response of each country’s agricultural production system. Therefore, the debate on how African countries will respond to mitigation action commitment in agricultural sector will depend on the impact of emission in agriculture sector and how emission reduction could benefit the sector. This includes the cost of the implemented mitigation action.

References Agricultural Science and Technology (ASTI). http://www.asti.cgiar.org/ Antonio, F, Robert E (2001) Total factor productivity growth in agriculture: the role of technological capital. Yale University Press, New Haven Baker JS, Murray BC, McCarl BA, Feng S, Johansson R (2012/2013) Implications of alternative agricultural productivity growth assumptions on land management, greenhouse gas emissions, and mitigation potential. Am J Agric Econ 95(2):435–441 Balk BM (2001) Scale efficiency and productivity change. J Prod Anal 15:159–183 Bryan E, Ringler C, Okoba B, Koo J, Herrero M, Silvestri S (2011) Agricultural management for climate change adaptation, greenhouse gas mitigation and agricultural productivity: insights from Kenya. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC

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Byamukama B, Michael M,Hailu T, Assefa T (2012) Case study : Humbo Ethiopia assisted natural regeneration project. In: Institutional innovations in African smallholder carbon projects .CCAFS Report No.8 .CGIAR Research Capper JL (2011) Understanding greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural management (eds: Guo L, Gunasekara AS, McConnell LL). American Chemical Society, USA Chambers RG (1988) Applied production analysis, a dual approach. Cambridge University Press, New York, p 331 Chambers RG (1998) Applied production analysis. A dual approach. Cambridge University Press, New York Chang H, Zepeda L (2001) Agricultural productivity for sustainable food security in Asia and the Pacific: the role of investment in agricultural investment and productivity in developing countries. FAO Economics and Social Development Paper 148. University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison Coelli TJ, Rao DSP (2005) An introduction of productivity analysis, 2nd edn. Springer, New York, pp 41–81 Cooper PJM, Cappiello S, Vermeulen SJ, Campbell BM, Zougmoré R, Kinyangi J (2013) Largescale implementation of adaptation and mitigation actions in agriculture. CCAFS working paper no. 50. CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS), Copenhagen. Available online at www.ccafs.cgiar.org Debreu G (1951) The coefficient of resource utilization. Econometrica 19:273–292 Evenson RE (2000) Economic impact of agricultural research and extension. In: Gardner BL, Rausser GC (eds) Handbook of agricultural economics. Elsevier Science Armesterdam, Holland Evenson RE, Pray C (1991) Research and productivity in Asian agriculture. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 383p Farrel MJ (1957) The measurement of productive efficiency. J R Stat Soc Ser A Gen 120(3):253–281 FAO (2009) The special challenge for Sub-Saharan Africa. In how to feed the world in 2050. High Level Expert Forum. FAO Agricultural Development Economics Division, Rome. http://www. fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/Issues_papers/HLEF2050_Africa.pdf Gerber PJ, Steinfeld H, Henderson B, Mottet A, Opio C, Dijkman J, Falcucci A, Tempio G (2013) Tackling climate change through livestock – a global assessment of emissions and mitigation opportunities. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Rome Ghana Ministry of Food and Agriculture. http://mofa.gov.gh/site/ Gledhill R, Herweijer C, Hamza-Goodacre D, Grant J, Steege CJ (2011) Sustainability and climate change, PwC LLP UK, November 2011 IPCC (2006) Agriculture, forestry and other land use. In: Eggleston HS, Buendia L, Miwa K, Ngara T, Tanabe K (eds), IPCC guidelines for national greenhouse gas inventories, prepared by the National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Programme. IGES, Japan Jemma G, Richard B, Eleanor B, Robin C, Joanne C, Kate W, Andrew W (2010) Implications of climate change for agricultural productivity in the early twenty-first century. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 365(1554):2973–2989 Jorgenson DW (1988) Productivity and post war US economic growth. J Econ Perspect 2(4) Jorgenson DW, Ho MS, Stiroh KJ (2008) A retrospective look at the U.S. productivity growth resurgence. J Econ Perspect 22(1):3–24 Kenya Ministry of Agriculture. http://www.kilimo.go.ke/ Knox J, Hess T, Daccache A, Wheeler T (2012) Climate change impacts on crop productivity in Africa and South Asia. Environ Res Lett 7:034032 (8pp) Koopmans TC (1951) An analysis of production as an efficient combination of activities. In: Koopmans TC (ed) Activity analysis of production and allocation. Wiley, New York Page 15 of 17

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Mandemaker M, Bakker M, Stoorvogel J (2011) The role of governance in agricultural expansion and intensification: a global study of arable agriculture. Ecol Soc 16(2):8 Masiga M, Mwima P, Kiguli L (2012) Case study: trees for global benefit program. In: Environmental conservation trust (ECOTRUST) of Uganda. CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS). Copenhagen Nelson GC, Rosegrant MW, Koo J, Robertson R, Sulser T, Zhu T, Ringler C, Msangi S, Palazzo A, Batka M, Magalhaes M, Valmonte-Santos R, Ewing M, Lee D (2009) Impact on agriculture and costs of adaptation. International Food Policy Research Institute Report, Washington, DC NEPAD-CAADP (2010) Renewing the commitment to African agriculture. CAADP review final report, NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, Midrand O’Donnell CJ (2010) Measuring and decomposing agricultural productivity and profitability change. Aust J Agric Resour Econ 54:527–560 Pete S, Daniel M, Zucong C, Daniel G, Henry J, Pushpam K, Bruce M, Stephen O, Frank O, Charles R, Bob S, Oleg S, Mark H, Tim M, Genxing P, Vladimir R, Uwe S, Sirintornthep T, Martin W, Jo S (2012) Greenhouse gas mitigation in agriculture. Phil Trans R Soc P789–P813 Ringler C, Zhu T, Cai X, Koo J,Wang D (2010) Climate change impacts on food security in SubSaharan Africa: insights from comprehensive climate change scenarios. IFPRI. Discussion Paper No. 1042. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC, US Rose SK, Golub A, Hertel T, Sohngen B (2012/2013) Relative agricultural productivity and tropical deforestation. Am J Agric Econ 95(2):426–434 Ruttan VW (1996) Induced innovation and path dependence: a reassessment with respect to agricultural development and the environment. Technol Forecast Soc Change 53:41–60 Rwanda Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources Shames S, Wollenberg E, Buck LE, Kristjanson P, Masiga M, Biryahaho B (2012a) Institutional innovations in African smallholder carbon projects. CCAFS Report No. 8. CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS), Copenhagen Shames S, Amos W, Emmanuel W (2012b) Case study: Western Kenya smallholder agriculture carbon finance project: Vi Agroforestry. In: Institutional innovations in African smallholder carbon projects, Copenhagen Sharmistha S, Richard D (2006) Agricultural development, state effectiveness and long run economics development. J Econ Dev 31(2):P73–90 Simar L, Wilson PW (2007) Estimation and inference in two-stage, semi-parametric models of production processes. J Econom 136(1):31–64 Wilson PW (2003) Testing independence in models of productive efficiency. J Prod Anal 20:361–390 Winston A, Eunice A, Rebecca A (2012) Case study: cocoa carbon initiative. In: Institutional innovations in African smallholder carbon projects. CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) Copenhagen Woodfine A (2010) Using sustainable land management practices to adapt and mitigate climate changes in Sub-Sahara Africa. In: Resources and guide, Version 1.0, August 2009 World Bank (2011) Climate-smart agriculture a call to action. http://www.worldbank.org/content/ dam/Worldbank/document/CSA_Brochure_web_WB.pdf World Resources Institutes Database (2013). Access in July 2013. http://www.wri.org/ You GJ-Y, Ringler C (2010) Hydro-economic modeling of climate change impacts in Ethiopia. IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 960. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC Zambia Ministry of Agricultural and Livestock

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Index Terms: Africa 1 Agricultural productivity 1 Greenhouse gas (GHG) emission mitigation 5

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_38-1 # The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the “OECD”) 2014

National Adaptation Planning: Lessons from OECD Countries Michael Mullan*, Nicolas Kingsmill, Shardul Agrawala and Arnoldo Matus Kramer Climate, Biodiversity and Water Division, Environment Directorate, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Abstract National governments have a crucial role to play in facilitating preparations for the effects of climate change. This chapter provides an overview of adaptation planning and implementation at the national level in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It compares different approaches and discusses emerging lessons learnt and challenges faced based on a survey of OECD countries’ National Communications to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and discussions at a workshop with adaptation policymakers from 25 developed countries, held by the OECD in 2012. Finland was the first OECD country to publish its strategy in 2005 and, since then, a further 17 OECD countries have published national strategies to coordinate and communicate their approach to climate change adaptation. Of the remaining OECD countries, eight have plans or strategies under development. The OECD workshop revealed three emerging challenges faced by countries as they move from planning to implementation: addressing capacity constraints, securing adequate financing, and measuring the success of adaptation interventions. Addressing these challenges will be essential to ensure that progress in planning translates into being better prepared for the effects of climate change.

Keywords Adaptation; Climate change; National planning; Risk management

Introduction National governments have a vital role to play in determining their countries’ success at preparing for the effects of a changing climate. This can be through action, such as raising awareness of the likely effects of climate change, or inaction in the face of policies that provide the wrong incentives to individuals or businesses. Examples of the latter include insurance schemes that encourage excessive development in high-risk areas or underpricing of resources that will become scarcer in

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this chapter are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the OECD or the governments of its member countries. This chapter has been adapted from OECD Environment Working Paper “National Adaptation Planning: Lessons from OECD Countries” (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/national-adaptation-planning_5k483jpfpsq1-en). This report was drafted by Michael Mullan, Nicholas Kingsmill, Shardul Agrawala, and Arnoldo Matus Kramer. *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_38-1 # The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the “OECD”) 2014

the future. Increasingly, governments are using national adaptation planning to provide an evidencebased, coordinated, and systematic approach to their preparations for climate change. Much of the policy and academic literature on adaptation to date has focused on developing countries, because of their high socioeconomic vulnerability to climate change. However, a growing body of activity and experience of adaptation planning in OECD countries has shed new light on existing challenges. Finland was the first of the 34 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to publish a national adaptation strategy. Since then, a further 17 OECD countries have developed national adaptation strategies or plans. These have focused on mainstreaming climate risks into local and national policies but with variation in the policy instruments being used, the role of the state, and the assignment of responsibilities between national, state, and local governments. This chapter provides an overview of the current status of national planning activities and remaining challenges in OECD countries. These countries have made different choices about the degree of central direction, the balance of public and private provisions, and the arrangements for financing adaptation. National governments in federal countries and those with strong local autonomy face different opportunities and constraints than those with more centralized systems. Given this variety, this chapter draws upon the experiences of OECD countries to identify emerging lessons. It is intended to help inform the development and refinement of adaptation policies within OECD countries but also to be informative for developing countries as they develop and implement national adaptation plans (NAPs). This chapter is organized as follows: “Status of National Adaptation Policies in OECD Countries” examines the record so far in implementing adaptation strategies within OECD countries, drawing on discussions at the Policy Forum on Adaptation to Climate Change in OECD Countries in May 2012 and a review of countries’ National Communications to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and complementary sources. “Emerging Lessons Learnt” builds on the review of OECD-wide progress to identify some of the lessons learnt from the design and implementation of adaptation programs and their implications for the future.

Status of National Adaptation Policies in OECD Countries At the international level, adaptation has taken its own prominent place alongside mitigation within climate negotiation processes and is likely to be a critical component of the post-2015 international climate regime. Similar signs of progress can be seen at the national level within OECD countries. This section surveys the current levels of activity across the 34 OECD countries, updating and expanding an earlier analysis by Gagnon-Lebrun and Agrawala (2006).

Overview of Relevant Literature A major element of the adaptation literature has aimed to provide recommendations on what planning ought to consist of and how governments ought to enact adaptation plans. OECD (2009) provides guidance on integrating climate change adaptation into development cooperation at the national, sectoral, and project levels (OECD 2009). Although targeted at developing countries, the underlying approach of applying an integrated approach to adaptation is consistent with that adopted in OECD countries. The World Resources Institute developed a framework for national adaptive capacity that can be used to evaluate countries’ progress and to identify priorities for improvement (World Resources Institute 2009). This framework evaluates institutional arrangements based on

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_38-1 # The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the “OECD”) 2014

their performance in providing five functions: vulnerability assessment, prioritization of measures, coordination, information management, and climate risk management. These frameworks and guidance have been complemented with analyses of progress to date with respect to national-level planning and implementation of adaptation policies. Gagnon-Lebrun and Agrawala (2006) assessed activity in Annex 1 (developed) countries, largely based on an analysis of National Communications to the UNFCCC. Their review found that adaptation received limited attention relative to mitigation and that countries were at the stage of identifying generic options for responding to climate change rather than formulating comprehensive, mainstreamed adaptation strategies. More recent studies have looked in greater depth at subsets of OECD countries. These have primarily focused on European countries but some have also included non-European OECD countries, for example, Australia and the United States (Bauer et al. 2011; Preston et al. 2011). Swart et al. (2009) provide an in-depth review of development processes for European countries’ national adaptation programs, focusing on six areas: motivating factors for strategy development, research and scientific assessment, communication and awareness raising, multilevel governance, integrating climate change adaptation into sectoral policies, and monitoring and review of adaptation policies. The review identifies several typical strengths and weaknesses in adaptation strategies. The strengths include targeted research and good planning for implementation, review, and funding; weaknesses include a lack of coordination between sectors and unclear allocations of responsibilities between different administrative levels. Preston et al. (2011) further highlight institutional and capacity challenges to implementation. Other reviews have focused on particular aspects of implementing adaptation policies. Bauer et al. (2011) examines coordination and integration in ten OECD countries, both horizontally across policy sectors and vertically across jurisdictional levels. They find that vertical coordination is usually addressed earlier in federal political systems than in unitary systems but that this difference fades as national adaptation strategies are developed. Westerhoff et al. (2011) analyze the relationships between national-level policies and local-level actions in four European countries. The authors note that national political support and leadership are key factors in the development of national adaptation activities but highlight some regional- and city-level activities that developed in the absence of specific national initiatives. They attribute some of these subnational activities to facilitation through climate change networks. A common feature of the comparative literature is the emphasis on description rather than evaluation, reflecting both the newness of the field as well as a lack of consensus about the most appropriate approaches for implementation and criteria for judging success. While there is agreement over many of the broad principles for efficient adaptation (such as the need to account for uncertainties), there are still a range of views about how those principles should be put into practice. Swart et al. (2009) stated that it was not possible to provide policy recommendations at the time of their analysis because of the variation between countries’ adaptation priorities, climate impacts, and political systems. It cautions that measures that have been successful in one context may not be directly transferable to other countries.

Overview of Progress to Date This section provides an overview of the status of activities across the OECD as of March 2013, updating the analysis originally undertaken by Gagnon-Lebrun and Agrawala (2006). It uses a survey of National Communications (NCs) to the UNFCCC as the initial source of information on the extent of activity that is underway within OECD member countries.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_38-1 # The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the “OECD”) 2014

NCs have three characteristics that make them a useful starting point for this analysis (GagnonLebrun and Agrawala 2006). The first is that they have comprehensive coverage. All OECD member countries have submitted at least one report, and 29 countries published their fifth NCs in 2009 or 2010. For the remaining OECD members – Chile, Israel, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey – the analysis is based on their most recent NCs. Chile, Israel, Korea, and Mexico are the only OECD member countries that are classified as “non-Annex 1” countries under the UNFCCC. This means that they are considered as developing countries and that their NCs are not subject to in-depth expert reviews. Turkey is an Annex 1 country but has only published one NC. The second reason for using NCs is that their format is standardized, which facilitates comparison between countries. The third is that they are official statements and, as such, should reflect the government’s perspectives and priorities. The approach adopted for this section has been adjusted to address the limitations with using NCs as a sole data source. NCs may not fully reflect the progress to date within their respective countries (Gagnon-Lebrun and Agrawala 2006). Some elements may be missed because the NCs are intended to provide an overview of the main activities underway, rather than an exhaustive account of all the adaptation activities taking place within a country. Additionally, the majority of NCs included in the analysis were published in 2009 or 2010, which means that they may precede some important recent developments. Complementary sources of information were used to identify completed and ongoing activities relating to the establishment of institutional mechanisms for adaptation responses and the formulation of adaptation policies that were not identified in the NCs. These sources of information included: documents available on the Climate-Adapt website for EU member states (http://climateadapt.eea.europa.eu/) and follow-up by email with government officials. The review, presented in Table 1, is based on a qualitative analysis of every OECD country’s NC, assessing eight components of national adaptation planning with regard to both the scope and the depth of coverage. The assessment of the scope of discussion is based on the level of attention paid to the topic, classified as: (i) extensive, (ii) limited, or (iii) not included. The assessment of the depth of coverage is based on the quality of the discussion: (i) detailed, (ii) generic, (iii) limited, or (iv) not included. Where there was no coverage of activities for a specific component within a country’s NC, but complementary sources indicated that actions had been taken or are currently underway, these additional activities have been identified in the table using cross-hatching. The analysis distinguishes between two different levels of planning: adaptation strategies and adaptation plans. In this study, adaptation strategies refer to countries’ initial planning or framework documents, which commonly set out governmental approaches to adaptation and communicate general priorities. Adaptation plans refer to more substantive planning documents that identify specific policies and measures to be taken. This division is reflected in Table 1, which groups countries into four subcategories: (i) those that have not published an adaptation strategy, (ii) those that have not published a strategy but have taken significant national action, (iii) those that have published a strategy but not a full adaptation plan, and (iv) those that have published both a strategy and a plan. The distinction between strategies and plans is necessarily imprecise; countries’ adaptation planning documents vary widely in their coverage and concreteness. Also, the table only includes national-level documents that target the main climate change impacts (the composition of sectors will depend on specific country contexts). Some countries have published subnational adaptation strategies or plans concerning specific sectors or geographic regions, which can contribute to preparations for climate change but are not included in this analysis. There has been progress since the review undertaken in 2006 by Gagnon-Lebrun and Agrawala. Table 1 shows that all countries provide information on climate change impacts and future scenarios in their NCs, which was not the case in 2006. According to the current review, 31 countries cover Page 4 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_38-1 # The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the “OECD”) 2014

Table 1 Coverage of adaptation in National Communications

No adaptation plan published Actions without strategy

Adaptation plan published

Adaptation strategy published

No adaptation strategy published

Explicit incorporation of adaptation in projects

Establishment of institutional mechanisms for adaptation responses Formulation of adaptation policies/ modification of existing policies

Identification of adaptation options

Mention of policies synergistic with adaptation

Adaptation options and policy responses

Impact assessments

Climate change scenarios

Historical climatic trends

Impact assessments

Czech Rep. * Estonia * Greece Iceland Israel * Italy * Japan Luxembourg Poland * Slovak Rep. * Canada New Zealand Norway * Slovenia * Sweden United States Australia Belgium ** Chile ** Hungary ** Ireland ** Portugal ** Switzerland ** UK ** Austria Denmark Finland France Germany Korea Mexico Netherlands Turkey Spain

Legend Coverage in NCs:

Coverage in complementary sources:

Extensive discussion

Activities discussed in other sources

Some mention / limited discussion No mention of discussion

Activities currently underway * **

Developing a national adaptation strategy Developing a national adaptation plan

Quality of discussion in NCs: Discussed in detail, i.e. for more than one sector or ecosystem, and/or providing examples of policies implemented, and/or based on sectoral/national scenarios. Discussed in generic terms, i.e. based on IPCC or regional assessments, and/or providing limited details/no examples/only examples of planned measures as opposed to measures implemented.

Source: Based on National Communications, supporting publications and complementary information, as of March 2013

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_38-1 # The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the “OECD”) 2014

adaptation options in their NCs, compared to 16 OECD countries in 2006 (Gagnon-Lebrun and Agrawala 2006). There has also been significant activity in developing adaptation policies – 27 OECD countries mention policies that are synergistic with adaptation (compared with 13 in 2006), and 27 countries discuss specific adaptation policies or the modification of existing policies to include adaptation (compared with five in 2006). The scale of activity in this area becomes even more apparent when additional sources of information are considered. According to this, 8 of the 16 countries without strategies are currently developing them. All but one of the countries with strategies have either developed or are developing plans.

Emerging Lessons Learnt The previous section provides an overview of the reported level of activity across countries, but countries with similar levels of activity may adopt substantively different approaches. These differences reflect varying political, social, and geographical contexts, needs, and priorities. Countries with federal systems or strong localized decision-making processes, such as Australia and Norway, have produced overarching strategies for adaptation that establish frameworks within which local adaptation efforts can be implemented. In contrast, unitary states have tended to produce national plans that outline specific adaptation policies and measures for different sectors or geographic areas. Overall, there is a growing volume and a growing diversity of experience to draw upon from OECD countries. Based on OECD countries’ experiences at varying levels of adaptation planning, this section outlines some of the key areas identified by participants at the 2012 workshop.

Evidence Provision OECD countries have demonstrated significant advances in evidence gathering and in providing tools to assist end users in making use of increasingly sophisticated climate information. Nonetheless, the policy-makers at the 2012 workshop identified two main unresolved issues: developing capacity for adaptation among key decision-makers and reconciling the needs of users with the evidence that can feasibly be supplied. Capacity for Adaptation Providing information on climate change and improving decision-makers’ capacity to use that information is a central focus of adaptation strategies in OECD countries. Mainstreamed approaches depend upon the relevant decision-makers being aware of the need to consider climate change but also having access to the data and tools required to do so. Investments in climate projections and impact assessments are necessary, but not sufficient, for achieving this (Pfenninger et al. 2010; Swart et al. 2009; Westerhoff et al. 2011). There is a continuing mismatch between the types of climate information and data available and those required to meet policy-makers’ needs (OECD 2012). For example, it is currently very difficult to model the variations in microclimates across mountainous regions, but understanding these variations is essential for disaster risk management. Part of the challenge lies in the tension between the requirements of decision-makers for greater technical sophistication while also ensuring that the outputs are accessible to end users. Progress on the former has been more rapid than on the latter, sometimes reflecting a lack of communication between researchers and end users. In some countries, “boundary organizations,” such as the United Kingdom Climate Impacts Programme, have been created to bridge the gap between producers and consumers of knowledge. Page 6 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_38-1 # The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the “OECD”) 2014

OECD countries have adopted a number of approaches to increase capacity for climate change adaptation. For example, Mexico has established a distance learning program to enhance the capacity of subnational-level municipal staff. The United States White House Council on Environmental Quality has issued guidance to United States federal departments to support their development of adaptation policy statements and departmental plans, while supportive working groups and a practitioner-level community of practice facilitate information sharing and capacity development. The United Kingdom’s adaptation program has supported the development of multiple tools to assist private actors in making adaptation decisions. This includes the Adaptation Wizard and Business Areas Climate Assessment Tool developed under the UKCIP. However, despite these clear examples of measures to build capacity, workshop participants felt that there was a continuing need for OECD countries to apply a systematic approach to capacity development.

Strategic Planning OECD governments have taken a variety of approaches to the processes of achieving national coordination, mechanisms for soliciting stakeholder input, institutional structures adopted, and approaches to prioritizing measures. A clear lesson from this experience is that a strategy document alone is not enough to direct national adaptation. The structure and components of the document are important, but there also need to be effective mechanisms in place to implement the strategy (OECD 2012). National-Level Coordination Improving the coordination of adaptation actions is a central aim of adaptation planning, but adaptation plans and strategies differ in how this is achieved. Adaptation plans typically contain greater detail on adaptation needs and measures, including responsibilities for different actions. This makes it more comparatively clear to assign roles and identify coordination needs for those specific actions. In contrast, adaptation strategies have a different set of needs for coordination. As strategies tend to describe activities and objectives in broader terms, there is a stronger need for general coordination mechanisms to achieve progress. A common approach taken in OECD countries, both for adaptation strategies and plans, has been to establish a central coordinating mechanism to oversee and direct adaptation. Coordinating units vary across countries in terms of the parties involved, their remits and their powers; they include interministerial committees, working groups, and task forces. Of the 24 OECD countries that have established coordinating units, 21 have been led by environment or climate change departments; the exceptions are Hungary, Norway, and the United States. In the context of developing countries, OECD (2009) recommended that coordination be led by an executive office, in order to provide adaptation efforts with sufficient convening and leadership powers to effectively coordinate actions across departments or sectors. This recommendation was also made by the Independent Evaluation Group’s assessment of the World Bank’s interventions to support adaptation (IEG 2012). The rationale being that in many countries the environment or climate change departments may be in a weaker position relative to other departments, such as planning or finance. These imbalances – both in terms of political power and funding – can create barriers to sustaining political support for adaptation across government. This can make it more difficult to maintain adaptation objectives in the long term and to negotiate sustainable financial support over time within budget allocations. However, an advantage of coordination by environment or climate change ministries is that they are likely to be the most aware of the technical requirements of national adaptation plans. For example, French government officials reported that relocating the body responsible for adaptation Page 7 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_38-1 # The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the “OECD”) 2014

planning from the prime minister’s office to the environment ministry in 2007 helped it to address operational issues and to increase collaboration. Additionally, locating responsibility within a central ministry does not in itself guarantee long-term political or financial support. It may well be a lower priority for central ministries themselves than it would be in a dedicated environment department, which can offset some of the benefits of being in a politically stronger ministry. The experience of OECD countries has not demonstrated a consistent relationship between the location of the coordination unit and the effectiveness of adaptation policy. The existence of high-level formal structures, such as ministerial coordination groups, can be a weak proxy for the degree of on-the-ground coordination. Given the recent implementation of many countries’ national adaptation programs, it may be too early to evaluate coordination groups’ effectiveness beyond their initial success in convening representatives from different departments. However, the challenges that these mechanisms are intended to overcome – addressing crosscutting issues and managing cross-departmental actions – require a firm grounding in adaptation policy. This issue is especially pertinent for countries with technical adaptation plans that specify required outcomes and measures for different departments and/or sectors. Some OECD member countries have found it valuable to complement high-level coordinating with working-level groups to provide technical direction. For example, the United States adaptation working group and practitioner-level community of practice support the higher-level coordinating efforts of the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force. Stakeholder Engagement There is inevitably a strong technical element to national adaptation planning, but it is not a purely technocratic process. Policy-makers viewed it as essential to involve a broad set of stakeholders at strategic planning and policy design stages to assist the development of national programs (OECD 2012). As well as improving the quality of policy-making, the process of stakeholder engagement can be useful for raising awareness and interest among key groups. A common feature of national adaptation planning has been the establishment of comprehensive consultation processes to solicit input from key stakeholders and the general public. For example, Austria sought additional stakeholder input for its national planning through expert consultation, an extensive round of workshops with relevant organizations and internet-based engagement. Several countries have relied upon umbrella or intermediary organizations to facilitate the consultation process, given the large number of potential stakeholders. The benefits of this approach are particularly marked when interacting with large, dispersed groups of stakeholders such as the general public or small businesses. The use of intermediary organizations has also been driven by pragmatism, as smaller stakeholders tend to have less capacity to engage with the process (Bauer et al. 2011). In the United Kingdom, the adaptation program partnered with the Confederation of British Industry and the Trades Union Congress to solicit input from employers and employees, while also raising awareness and disseminating guidance. Identifying and addressing the needs of indigenous groups is a particular concern in some OECD countries. Indigenous groups, who often face significant social and economic challenges, are likely to be at particular risk due to climate change (International Union for Conservation of Nature 2008; Galloway McLean et al. 2009). Indigenous groups may also be less well represented in traditional stakeholder engagement processes (Gardner et al. 2010). In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency developed a policy statement and plan to ensure consultation and coordination with Indian tribes (Environmental Protection Agency 2011). Although there has been progress made through initiatives such as this, ensuring appropriate engagement and input from indigenous groups remains a challenge for some countries. Page 8 of 15

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Program Structure In designing their national adaptation programs, OECD countries have had to choose how to organize the delivery of adaptation actions: either mainstreamed within existing departmental portfolios or addressed thematically (e.g., “infrastructure” or “water”). Aligning adaptation to existing departmental responsibilities may help to ensure clear accountability for results but may come at the risk of making cross-departmental interactions less frequent – for example, those between land-use planning and flood risk management. In principle, these interactions should already be addressed by existing policy structures, but in practice this is often not the case. Encouraging integration is particularly important during the development of plans or strategies, as adaptation needs can fall between traditional departmental operations or face overlapping or contradictory approaches from different departments (Bauer et al. 2011). Crosscutting thematic approaches may better enable policy-makers to deal with these critical interactions. This choice is important for setting the direction of both adaptation strategies and adaptation plans. However, the greater level of detail on actions and policies in adaptation plans requires a more thorough examination of organizational responsibilities and greater specificity on responsibilities for implementing actions. The most common approach in OECD countries has been to combine elements of the two approaches in “sectoral” national programs (though definitions of sectors are flexible and vary across countries). For example, the federal approach in the United States has developed along departmental, regional, and thematic lines. In 2012, federal agencies were required to develop agency-level adaptation plans. In addition to these plans, three national-level strategies that address crosscutting issues (such as the management of freshwater resources) have been developed or are in the process of being developed, and there are a number of other regional initiatives and partnerships. England’s approach initially closely aligned adaptation roles to traditional ministerial responsibilities, with each individual government ministry responsible for developing Departmental Adaptation Plans. However, the forthcoming national adaptation plan will move towards a more thematic approach (UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 2012). Mexico’s Special Program of Climate Change is based on a combination of departmental and thematic sectors, including a mix of economic sectors (e.g., “agriculture, cattle, forestry, and fisheries”), social concerns (e.g., “health sector”), and crosscutting issues (e.g., “land-use management and urban development” and “disaster risk management”). A number of other OECD countries are also pursuing mixed sectoral approaches, including Chile, Korea, Poland, and Turkey. Regardless of whether governments take a departmental, thematic, or sectoral approach, coordinating activities within adaptation programs poses a key challenge. Under a thematic approach, governments have to coordinate measures across departments to ensure that thematic goals are met, generally using central coordination groups or mechanisms. Lessons can be learnt from other fields of public policy that face similar coordination challenges. For example, there is a growing body of work in the water policy domain to address issues such as overlapping and unclear allocations of responsibilities, lack of institutional incentives for cooperation, mismatches between impact areas and administrative boundaries, and competition between different departments (OECD 2011). Prioritization The selection and prioritization of adaptation options are an essential part of adaptation planning. Governments need to identify the impacts likely to be most socially and economically significant. They also need to prioritize specific issues or actions to ensure an efficient use of public resources. The specific challenges faced by governments depend upon the planning approach taken. In theory, adaptation strategies do not need to include prioritization of vulnerabilities or responses. The key Page 9 of 15

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activities proposed in strategies (such as improving the evidence base, capacity building, and mainstreaming adaptation within government activities) do not depend upon the precise details of the climate change impacts faced by the country. In practice, however, adaptation strategies often include some prioritization, in part to communicate important risks or vulnerable sectors. As adaptation plans include greater detail on specific activities and measures, they require a better understanding of key risks and of the options for addressing them. Prioritization is therefore a critical component of adaptation plans and needs to be more comprehensive and based on firmer technical foundations than in adaptation strategies. Several promising approaches for prioritization have been developed within OECD countries. The approach used by Switzerland identifies key adaptation challenges within individual sectors. This approach uses three criteria to produce an overall “importance” ranking: (i) whether an issue is sensitive to climate change impacts, (ii) whether the impact is important relative to other impacts within the sector, and (iii) whether there is a need for action to address the issue. This ranking feeds into the identification of action areas and key priorities in their strategy (Office Fédéral de l’Environnement 2012). The United Kingdom government’s prioritization system draws on their Climate Change Risk Assessment study, which enables the government to identify key climate change risks and to prioritize adaptation policy development both geographically and by sector. This information feeds into the high-level adaptation planning process. Thus, policy development, both for the current program and for the national adaptation plan, is geared towards addressing the critical issues identified. Some governments have also established criteria for choosing between individual adaptation policy options. For example, the Netherlands’ national adaptation program used a multicriteria analysis approach to rank a wide range of adaptation policies according to five criteria: (i) the importance of the policy, (ii) the urgency of the policy in terms of timing, (iii) whether it is a “noregret” policy, (iv) whether the policy has ancillary benefits for non-climate change policies, and (v) the policy’s impact on mitigation policies. Each criterion is weighted according to perceived importance to produce a weighted sum value for ranking policy options (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment et al. 2007; van Ierland et al. 2007). Countries’ prioritization systems vary in their choice of criteria, the level of importance attributed to each criterion, and the extent to which prioritization is based on quantitative or qualitative inputs. Some of this variation is accounted for by different prioritization needs for adaptation strategies versus those for adaptation plans. For instance, the issue of quantitative versus qualitative decision making is particularly salient for adaptation plans. The lack of sufficient or suitable projections of climate impacts is a key challenge for developing adaptation plans (OECD 2012). This poses less of an issue for adaptation strategies, as they tend to be less specific than plans about the measures to be implemented. It was, however, noted that the lack of climate impacts data does not need to delay the development of national adaptation plans. The evidence base will never be perfect and the benefits of waiting for improved information must be balanced against the costs of delay. As with other areas of public policy, the challenge for policy-makers is to make the best decisions given the available evidence.

Implementation

The overview of national adaptation planning in OECD countries in the section “Status of National Adaptation Policies in OECD Countries” shows that there has been progress in the planning of adaptation but that implementation remains at an early stage. This section examines countries’ implementation experiences in two specific areas: financing of adaptation and monitoring of implementation.

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Financing the Implementation of Adaptation Measures There is a choice about how to fund adaptation measures, either through mainstreaming or the use of “ring-fenced” funding. Dedicated funds provide an impetus for action on adaptation but can distort spending decisions and work against coordination with wider government objectives. Conversely, mainstreamed approaches should allow for a more flexible and efficient use of resources but are much less transparent about where resources are being allocated. Although estimates vary widely, the global costs of adaptation are likely to be in the order of tens to hundreds of billions of United States dollars per year (Parry et al. 2009). Even at the lower end of this spectrum, funding is likely to be a significant hurdle to implementing effective adaptation policies and measures. Securing financing for adaptation programs is therefore a key concern for policy-makers and a key challenge to be addressed in adaptation programs. As in other policy areas, challenges will differ at different stages of adaptation planning. Given their broad focus on improving the evidence base, building capacity and creating an enabling environment for adaptation, strategies have required relatively modest funding for initial climate information and capacity building activities. Adaptation plans, which set out specific actions and establish responsibilities for implementation, ought to be based on an understanding of the likely costs of measures and their benefits. This ensures that funding is sufficient and that the chosen adaptation options represent good value for money. Few OECD countries specify how their adaptation programs will be funded or the scale of resources required for implementation. Of those that explicitly mention funding, they predominantly focus on preliminary activities such as vulnerability assessments and climate research, rather than the implementation of measures. England’s adaptation program has allocated some core funding for adaptation research but has been designed on the basis that the funding of adaptation measures will be achieved by reallocating existing resources. France has estimated the costs of adaptation measures at €171 million per year, but these are expected to be delivered through the usual budgeting process. Mexico’s Special Program on Climate Change identifies investment priority areas, but does not specify how such investments would be funded. The United States’ program also does not specify how adaptation should be funded, but leaves the financing to individual departments. The lack of clarity on financing can, in part, be explained by the short time adaptation has been on the policy agenda. Additionally, the focus on mainstreaming in most strategies and plans reduces the need to discuss specific funding mechanisms, as actions are expected to be funded through existing departmental budgetary processes (OECD 2012). Limited details on the actual costs of many adaptation options can also complicate discussions around financing needs and value for money (Biesbroek et al. 2010). Lastly, given current fiscal pressures, the limited discussion of funding in adaptation plans may be a reflection of the limited scale of public resources that are likely to be made available. Countries’ experiences in implementing adaptation also suggest actions that can increase resource availability and maximize the impact of those resources that are available. These include building government support for adaptation by ensuring that adaptation aims are linked to current government priorities (notably economic growth) and by proposing adaptation options that serve multiple purposes and have multiple benefits (OECD 2012). Additionally, participants recommended adapting policy instruments or regulations that are already in place, rather than starting from scratch. Financial constraints have also encouraged governments to engage the private sector in adaptation. As a starting point, governments have started to encourage the private sector to secure its own resilience to climate change (Agrawala et al. 2011), which ought to reduce the need for public investments in adaptation. Page 11 of 15

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Monitoring and Evaluation of National Adaptation Strategies As countries implement adaptation programs, they will also need to track the effectiveness of actions and the outcomes of adaptation interventions. Sophisticated approaches to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are currently being developed in Finland, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. A common characteristic of these frameworks is their initial focus on monitoring progress in creating the right enabling environment for adaptation (Swart et al. 2009). In essence, this entails a focus on monitoring processes (e.g., the number of government departments that have assessed their exposure to climate risks) rather than outcomes (e.g., reductions in vulnerability to climate change). However, regular monitoring must be complemented by longer-term evaluations that examine if set objectives have been achieved, whether these objectives are still valid in the light of new evidence, and if the identified results can be attributed to the adaptation actions taken. Participants at the policy-makers workshop noted the challenges involved in conducting M&E assessments, including generating baselines for use in assessing progress, attributing causality of outcomes to actions, the high costs of data gathering, and the long time horizons of climate change. Given these challenges, most countries are not yet in a position to evaluate the effectiveness of adaptation efforts using outcomes-based approaches. However, certain M&E approaches can help governments to address these issues. Notably, the United Kingdom’s approach combined progress and outcome indicators and should help in making the connection between adaptation policies and observed outcomes. The frequent snapshots of vulnerability provided by the United Kingdom’s five yearly Climate Change Risk Assessments (CCRA) are expected to help policy-makers assess progress and provide updated baselines against which adaptation interventions can be assessed. Vulnerability assessments such as these may give countries a means of assessing the broad effectiveness of adaptation programs, as a complement to or in support of tracking the effectiveness of specific adaptation measures. France’s M&E strategy provides an alternative approach intended to help overcome technical and financial challenges to evaluation. France’s approach uses existing tools and procedures to review progress. It combines comprehensive monitoring of the implementation of measures (using both process and outcome indicators) with targeted evaluation of key sectors using a range of evaluation techniques, such as impact assessment, cost-effectiveness, and cost-benefit analysis. It also includes a qualitative review of climate change preparedness before and after adaptation interventions. This approach should reduce the need to develop new technical evaluation techniques and the associated costs and challenges with gathering data. While addressing political and technical challenges in the design and implementation of M&E approaches is critical, policy-makers emphasized the importance of ensuring that the results from M&E assessments feed into the development and evolution of national adaptation programs. This requires both continuous learning (such as regular assessments or periodic reviews) and feedback mechanisms that outline how M&E results, and new information will contribute to ongoing planning and implementation processes (Pringle 2011). To facilitate this, some OECD countries have provided a statutory basis for periodic reviews. For example, in the United Kingdom the 2008 Climate Change Act requires a review of the national adaptation program every 5 years. In Finland, the national adaptation strategy underwent a midterm review in 2009, with a more comprehensive review scheduled for the 2011–2013 time frame. Similarly, there will be a midterm review of the French national adaptation plan in 2013, which will feed into the development of the next plan for 2015, and the Danish strategy will be revised before the completion of its implementation phase at the end of 2018, drawing on annual reports produced by a national coordination body (Swart et al. 2009).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_38-1 # The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the “OECD”) 2014

Conclusion Overall, there has been considerable activity since the 2006 stock take of activity in OECD countries. In 2006, the National Communications focused on discussing projected climatic changes and the resulting impacts. There were some examples of stand-alone adaptation projects but limited evidence of coordinated approaches being adopted (Gagnon-Lebrun and Agrawala 2006). As of May 2013, the majority of OECD countries have started the process of national planning for adaptation: 18 countries have implemented strategies or plans, and a further eight are in the process of producing them. Some of the remaining countries have put in place systems for national coordination, as in the United States, or focused on enabling local and regional action, as in Canada, without articulating their strategies in a single document. OECD countries have made significant investments in providing evidence and tools to inform the national planning process, for example, developing an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the potential risks of climate change and a growing volume of work on possible adaptation options. Several countries are now planning to go further than this and assess the costs and benefits of adaptation options. These investments, and the prior decades of work they build upon, have already proved a useful input into the policy-making process. The approaches taken have reflected national circumstances, but some common themes have emerged. The first is that the financing of adaptation actions remains an area with limited evidence on the scale of resource requirements and the sources of funding. In part, this is because there is still a gap between high-level global estimates and localized studies. The costs of adaptation at the national level remain largely speculative at this stage. The second theme is that the development of evidence on adaptation should go hand in hand with efforts to increase the capacity of end users to understand and apply those resources. Efforts to increase the technical sophistication of climate projections (and related tools) are needed to provide data that are tailored to the decisions being made. But this needs to be complemented with efforts to increase the usability of the evidence that is made available. Finally, an area that has received limited attention to date is assessing the results of the actions that have been implemented. Economic theory provides some indication of the types of approaches that are likely to be efficient or effective, for example, adopting a flexible approach and aiming for “winwin” and “no- or low-regret options.” However, there are different ways of achieving these objectives, and they will not be equally effective. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is important for political accountability but also for learning lessons that can be used to inform revisions to the design of programs. Even countries with plans specifying actions, responsibilities, and timescales are at an early stage in their development of M&E strategies. This limited attention to M&E partly reflects the high-level, strategic nature of many adaptation policies, where there is still more work to be done to specify the objectives and trade-offs in ways that are sufficiently detailed to enable assessments of progress.

References Agrawala S et al (2011) Private sector engagement in adaptation to climate change: approaches to managing climate risks. OECD Environment Working Papers No. 39. OECD Publishing Bauer A, Feichtinger J, Steurer R (2011) The governance of climate change adaptation in ten OECD countries: challenges and approaches. In: Institute of Forest, Environmental and Natural Resource

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Policy (InFER) Discussion Paper 1–2011. University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences, Vienna Biesbroek GR, Swart RJ, Carter TR et al (2010) Europe adapts to climate change: comparing national adaptation strategies. Glob Environ Chang 20:440–450 Environmental Protection Agency (2011) EPA policy on consultation and coordination with Indian tribes. EPA, Washington, DC Gagnon-Lebrun F, Agrawala S (2006) Progress on adaptation to climate change in developed countries: an analysis of broad trends. OECD, Paris Galloway McLean K, Ramos-Castillo A, Gross T et al (2009) Report of the indigenous peoples’ global summit on climate change 20–24 April 2009 in Anchorage, Alaska. United Nations University Traditional Knowledge Initiative. Darwin, Australia Gardner J, Parsons R, Paxton G (2010) Adaptation benchmarking survey: initial report. CSIRO Climate Adaptation Flagship working paper 4 Independent Evaluation Group (2012) Adapting to climate change: assessing the world bank group experience – advanced edition. IEG, Washington, DC International Union for Conservation of Nature (2008) Indigenous and traditional peoples and climate change: issues paper. IUCN, Gland Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Ministry of Agriculture et al (2007) National programme for spatial adaptation to climate change. Available via www.climateresearchnetherlands.nl/gfx_content/ documents/documentation/National_Adaptation_Strategy_The_Netherlands.pdf. Accessed 3 Aug 2012 OECD (2009) Integrating climate change adaptation into development co-operation: policy guidance. OECD Publishing, Paris OECD (2011) Water Governance in OECD Countries: A Multi-level Approach, OECD Studies on Water, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264119284-en. http://www.oecdilibrary.org/environment/water-governance-in-oecd-countries_9789264119284-en OECD (2012) Policy forum on adaptation to climate change in OECD countries: summary note. OECD, Paris Office Fédéral de l’Environnement (ed) (2012) Adaptation aux changements climatiques en Suisse: Objectifs, défis et champs d’action. OFEV, Bern Parry M, Arnell N, Berry P et al (2009) Assessing the costs of adaptation to climate change: a review of the UNFCCC and other recent estimates. International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and Grantham Institute for Climate Change, London Pfenninger S, Hanger S, Dreyfus M et al (2010) Report on perceived policy needs and decision contexts. In: Methodology for effective decision-making on impacts and adaptation (MEDIATION) delivery report 1.1 Preston B, Westaway R, Yuen E (2011) Climate adaptation planning in practice: an evaluation of adaptation plans from three developed nations. Mitig Adapt Strat Glob Chang 16(4):407–438 Pringle P (2011) AdaptME: adaptation monitoring and evaluation. United Kingdom Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP), Oxford Swart R, Biesbroek R, Binnerup S, Carter TR et al (2009) Europe adapts to climate change: comparing national adaptation strategies. In: PEER report No. 1. partnership for European environmental research, Helsinki UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2012) Climate ready: co-creation progress update and an invitation to respond. UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, London Page 14 of 15

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van Ierland EC, de Bruin K, Dellink RB et al (2007) A qualitative assessment of climate adaptation options and some estimates of adaptation costs. In: Netherlands national programme for spatial adaptation to climate change. www.climateresearchnetherlands.nl/ARKprogramme. Accessed 3 Aug 2012 Westerhoff L, Keskitalo EC, Juhola S (2011) Capacities across scales: local to national adaptation in four European countries. Climate Policy 11(4):1071–1085 World Resources Institute (2009) The national adaptive capacity framework: key institutional functions for a changing climate. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC

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Local Determinants of Adaptive Capacity Against the Climatic Impacts in Coastal Bangladesh Mustafa Saroara* and Jayant K. Routrayb a Urban and Rural Planning, and Development Studies Discipline, Khulna University, Khulna, Bangladesh b Regional and Rural Development Planning, and Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Management Program, School of Environment, Resources and Development (SERD), Asian Institute of Technology (AIT), Pathumthani, Bangkok, Thailand

Abstract A growing body of literature came up with suggestion to enhance adaptive capacity of poor and marginalized population to build a resilient society against climatic disasters. Although many earlier qualitative works have indicated the factors that should be addressed to enhance such adaptive capacity, however very scanty of them quantitatively assessed the influences of those factors on various dimensions of people’s adaptive capacity. This chapter assesses quantitatively the influences of various demographic and socioeconomic, past adaptive behavioral, climate/weather information/ knowledge products, and physical environmental (spatial/locational) factors on the adaptive capacity of coastal people against the livelihood insecurity that are caused by hydrometeorological events. The empirical part of this research was conducted in three villages of Kalapara Upazila (subdistrict) located close to the shoreline of Bay of Bengal in southwest part of Bangladesh. A total of 285 respondents were randomly interviewed using a semi-structured questionnaire in 2009. Respondents were asked to rate their adaptive capacity against 25 impacts that cause their livelihood insecure. The principal component analysis (PCA) technique was employed to identify the major dimensions of livelihood insecurity. Livelihood insecurities are related to (a) severe constraints in agriculture farming and allied activities; (b) severe damage of physical and socioeconomic infrastructures; (c) severe constraints in fishing (mostly offshore) related activities; and (d) severe crisis in freshwater supply and public health risk. How does adaptive capacity against each of these four dimensions of livelihood insecurity differ due to the influence of various factors is assessed by employing multiple analysis of variance (ANOVAs) technique. The ANOVAs show that among the demographic and socioeconomic factors, sex, education, occupation, farmland holding, membership status (of social institution), and social capitals have the strongest influence on differential adaptive capacity in general. Similarly, among the past adaptive behavioral factors, except the freshwater crisis all other variables, namely, adaptation against flood, rainfall, and salinity intrusion have strong influence in making difference in adaptive capacity. Likewise, almost all climate/weather information/knowledge products have statistically significant influence on various dimensions of adaptive capacity. The policy implication is that while launching any program to enhance the adaptive capacity of coastal people against the threats of hydrometeorological disastrous events on their livelihood security, the identified factors need to be accounted.

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 26

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_39-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords Adaptive capacity; Climate change; Hydrometeorological disasters; Livelihood insecurity; Coastal Bangladesh

Introduction This chapter identifies the determinants of adaptive capacity of coastal people in their battle against climate change induced various hydrometeorological events including sea level rise (SLR). Despite considerable uncertainty about the extent and timing of climate change, scientific advances have established a clear link among global warming, climate change, and extreme events (IPCC 2001, 2007). Climate change is basically a gradual change in long-term average conditions, greater variability within the range of normal conditions, and changes in the types of extreme events which are possible or probable (Hare 1991). Common manifestations of climate change is change in global mean temperature, pattern of precipitation, amount of melting of snow and ice, and rising global sea level (Nerem et al. 2006). However, all these have the potential to exacerbate various hydrometeorological disastrous events including cyclonic storms, tidal surges, floods, salinity intrusion, and drought (Wilbanks et al. 2007). The spatial and temporal dimensions of these disastrous events may not be the same across the globe. Therefore, the disastrous events that are more likely for tropics and subtopics may be less likely for arid and semiarid regions and vice versa. Such a variation in climatic events may be felt within a region as well. For example, countries that are located at very lower latitude in the tropics/subtopics may experience noticeably different disastrous events than countries located at more high latitude (IPCC 2001). Although effects of climate change will be felt across the globe, the growing body of literature have warned that small island countries and countries having low-lying deltaic coasts are particularly vulnerable to hydrometeorological disasters (Nicholls et al. 1999; Klein et al. 2001; Karim and Mimura 2008; Tol et al. 2008). Vulnerability will even more increase for countries having low adaptive capacity (Adger et al. 2003; Adger 2006; Stern 2006). Bangladesh is one of the countries that are susceptible to most of the hydrometeorological disasters, such as floods, cyclones, tidal surges, salinity intrusion, and SLR (Singh et al. 2001; Karim and Mimura 2008; UNDP 2009; GOB 2010; Alvi and Dendir 2011; Pethick and Orford 2013; Ravenscroft et al. 2013; Alam and Rahman 2014; Kulatunga et al. 2014). The vulnerability of this country is attributed to low adaptive capacity and high exposure and sensitivity to these disastrous events (World Bank 2000, Agrawala et al. 2003). It is true that people of Bangladesh have been adapting with natural calamities of various types since time immemorial. They have had accumulated experience of coping and adaptation. However, in the changing context of climate, many of the known hydrometeorological disastrous events may appear very differently than what were earlier. Various climate projection and hydrodynamic models have already warned that Bangladesh may experience more intense cyclonic storms, surges, prolonged flooding, salinity intrusion of perpetual nature, and accelerated SLR (Ali 1999, Singh et al. 2001; Karim and Mimura 2008; GOB 2010; Alvi and Dendir 2011; Pethick and Orford 2013; Ravenscroft et al. 2013; Kulatunga et al. 2014). As Bangladesh is located in a very peculiar geographical setting where the Himalayas is in the north and the Bay of Bengal is in the south, the melting of Himalayan glacier may contribute substantially to exacerbate the flooding situation (Alvi and Dendir 2011; Rahman et al. 2011). In fact, two-third of Bangladesh is located only 5 m above the mean sea level (MSL) and one-fifth of the landmass is within 1 m from the MSL (Islam et al. 1999; Brammer 2014). Past experience shows that decadal Page 2 of 26

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developmental gains are ruined by a single episode of massive flood or cyclone (World Bank 2000; GOB 2010). Before reaching the middle of this century, this problem may even get worse primarily because of excessive salinity intrusion in surface, subsurface water table, and in top soil. All these will seriously impact the crop agriculture – the mainstay of the country’s economy (Sarker et al. 2012). Increase in salinity is projected to jeopardize the growth of inland fisheries, horticulture, and forestry as well (Swapan and Gavinb 2011; Islam et al. 2014; Karim et al. 2014). After agriculture, these are the most dominant sources of livelihood in the coastal Bangladesh. Numerous studies already have made strong assertion that if these really happen, a significant number of people with low adaptive capacity will turn out as climate migrants from this fragile coast before the middle of this century (Ali 2006; GOB 2009; Bhuiyan and Dutta 2012; Akter and Mallick 2013; PenningRowsell et al. 2013). As any failure to adapt to these impacts of hydrometeorological disasters will cause huge out migration, these massive relocation for a land-scarce country like Bangladesh could only be avoided through enhancing the adaptive capacity of the affected coastal people (Saroar and Routray 2012; Penning-Rowsell et al. 2013). While enormous literature on adaptive capacity against famine and food vulnerability to natural disasters such as droughts are available in global context, only scanty of literature on adaptive capacity of coastal people against the impacts of hydrometeorological disasters in Bangladesh are found (Adger and Barnett 2009; Adger et al. 2009; Wolf et al. 2010). Often the works of Cannon (2002), Choudhury et al. (2005), Thomalla et al. (2006), Paul and Vogl (2011), Khandker (2012), and Mottaleb et al. (2013) are cited in this regard. While these qualitative studies have unveiled many insightful examples of adaptation against flood, cyclone, drought, even salinity intrusion, those very compelling narratives, however, have the common limitation of analyzing the adaptive capacity qualitatively from a macro perspective. In this regard, notable exception is Saroar and Routray (2012) who have quantitatively assessed the adaptive capacity of coastal people from a micro perspective. However, they have failed to come out from the compartmentalization approach of assessing adaptive capacity. For instance, they have assessed adaptive capacity against major groups of impacts. They have assessed how a person’s adaptive capacity differs for different groups of impacts. However, this has little policy significance as it does not empirically tested the causes that make difference in people’s adaptive capacity against various hydrometeorological events. Readers may find this chapter as a departure from those qualitative and compartmentalization approaches to identifying the determinants of adaptive capacity at local scale. The practical significance of the finding is that it may help policy makers, planners, and practitioners alike while designing a program of interventions for enhancing people’s adaptive capacity.

Adaptive Capacity Against Livelihood Insecurity: Literature Review and the Hypothesis Livelihood insecurity is often understood as the susceptibility to circumstances of not being able to sustain a livelihood (Alwang et al. 2001; Adger 2006). Therefore, a person’s livelihood is considered secure when the person can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resources base (Scoones 1998). Livelihood security depends on peoples’ knowledge and ability to use their assets in such a way that the family can make a living, meet their consumption and economic needs, cope with uncertainties, and respond to new opportunities (de Haan and Zoomers 2005). This means, given the scenarios of changing climate, livelihood security of coastal inhabitants of low-income societies by and large will depend on their ability to adapt to the impacts of climatic disasters as they heavily depend on coastal ecosystem services and agriculture for their livelihood (Wall and Marzall 2006; Allison et al. 2009). Ability to adapt means adaptive capacity which includes some processes Page 3 of 26

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_39-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

or actions, in order to better cope with, manage, or adjust to some changing conditions, stresses, hazards, risks, or opportunities (Fankhauser et al. 1999; Kelly and Adger 2000; Smit and Pilifosova 2001; Brooks et al. 2005; Smit and Wandel 2006). In the changing context of climate, IPCC conceptualizes adaptation as an adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climate stimuli or their effects, which moderate harm or exploits beneficial opportunities (McCarthy et al. 2001). Although adaptation is essential, it does not take place automatically. Adaptive capacity largely determines the adaptive potential (Adger et al. 2005; Perry 2007; Norris et al. 2008). Now the question is what motivates individuals to go for anticipatory adaptation against the climatic disasters when there is wide uncertainty? Although both basic research and empirical studies have identified some of the factors that determine general adaptability of people, none did it quantitatively in the specific context of coastal people. For instance, Kellstedt et al. (2008), and Roser-Renouf and Nisbet (2008) conclude that people adapt when they have the knowledge about the benefit of adaptation and risk of nonadaptive/ maladaptive responses (Steel et al. 2005). Their argument is that if the people are well aware about the benefit of adaptive response, they bolster their adaptive capacity. Conversely, people employ their full force to adapt due to fear of loss from no adaptive response. However, other scholars argue that while informedness is necessary but not sufficient. To them, only comprehension of the need for adaptation cannot guarantee any adaptive response in absence of the people’s ability to adapt (Smith 1997; Smithers and Smit 1997; Adger et al. 2005). To them, individual’s adaptation is largely determined by the material resources that they possess (Blaikie et al. 1994). Drawing on the literature of Maddux and Rogers (1983) personal motivation theory (PMT), some scholars even argue that psychological and behavioral factors also determine people’s adaptive capacity. Those who place higher emphasis on disposition of various physical resources argue that a person without these at best can initiate a maladaptive response (Wisner et al. 2004; Pelling and High 2005; Allison et al. 2009). Those who give higher emphasis on psychological matters, they basically point finger to a person’s belief about his/her ability to adapt and belief about the effectiveness of such adaptive responses (Maddux and Rogers 1983; Leiserowitz 2006; Semenza et al. 2008; Blennow and Persson, 2009). On the other hand, the proponent of adaptive behavioral factors argues that past experience of adaptive response are invaluable to demonstrate adaptive capacity against a new episode of disastrous event (Patt and Gwata 2002; Grothmann and Patt 2005; Grothmann and Reusswig 2006; Saroar and Routray 2012). The logic here is the utilization of accumulated experience helps them to initiate a new adaptive response. In fact, all arguments have their own merits. Recently, the need for climate information communication appeared as an important determinant of people’s adaptive response (Kurita et al. 2006; Collins and Kapucu 2008; Leal Filho 2009; Saroar and Routray 2010). The argument here is timely access to climate/weather information products help people to prepare themselves to adapt. This is vital both for sudden and rapid onset disastrous events such as cyclones, wave surges, tsunamis, and for slow onset or creeping disasters such as desertification or some kinds of floods as well. The bottom line is that timely access to information through various public and private channels help enhancing adaptive capacity. In this respect, another often ignored dimension that some scholars count is the physical environmental or spatial/location factors (Nicholls et al. 1999; Klein et al. 2001; Tol et al. 2008). Some locations due to their geographical/morphological character are more exposed to natural disasters. People who have been living in such marginalized areas are often the disadvantaged groups having very thin adaptive capacity (Adger et al. 2003; Molnar 2010). Although they have very thin physical and financial capital, they often possess solid experience of recurrent adaptation. Apart from these abovementioned factors, various demographic and socioeconomic factors are often counted as cross cutting elements of adaptive capacity (Adger et al. 2003, Moser and Satterthwaite 2009). In Page 4 of 26

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_39-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

fact, adaptive capacity is determined by a bundle of all of the above factors. A right combination of many of these factors can work better in a particular situation, although the same combination may not probe effective while adapting to a very different situation. The essence derived from various scholarly works cited in the forgoing section leads one to hypothesize that adaptive capacity of coastal people against the threats of various hydrometeorological events on their livelihood security in a multi-hazard-prone area is a function of multiplicity of factors such as demographic and socioeconomic, adaptive behavioral, access to climate/weather information and knowledge products, and physical environmental (spatial/locational) aspects. The general hypothesis is decomposed in the following ways. Hypothesis 1: Demographic and socioeconomic factors cause differences in adaptive capacity. Hypothesis 2: Past adaptive behavioral factors cause differences in adaptive capacity. Hypothesis 3: Access to climate/weather information/knowledge products causes differences in adaptive capacity. Hypothesis 4: Physical environmental (spatial/locational) factors cause differences in adaptive capacity.

Research Design Study Area, Survey Procedures, and Respondents

Empirical evidences and many earlier works suggest that “Kalapara Upazila” (subdistrict) of Patuakhali district (an administrative unit below Province/Division) which is roughly above 1 m from the mean sea level (MSL) and located along the Bay of Bengal is worst affected by various hydrometeorological disasters including cyclonic storms, surges, salinity intrusion, tidal floods, and may experience the same in the years to come (Ali 1999; Ali Khan et al. 2000; Singh et al. 2001; Karim and Mimura 2008; Pethick and Orford 2013; Kulatunga et al. 2014). Three villages from three “Union Parishad” (lowest level local government unit) such as Dulasar, Mithaganj, and Nilganj were selected from this subdistrict for the study (See Fig. 1). As a sample unit, individual household was selected. Data and information were collected through administering a semi-structured questionnaire. Randomly selected 285 respondents (usually the head of household) among which 175 males and 110 females were interviewed during January–April, 2009. Although, the original questionnaire was in English, a Bengali version was administered to facilitate the process of data and information collection. The entire study area is crisscrossed by numerous natural cannels/creeks, which are immediately connected to the Bay of Bengal through a network of river system. All the three study sites, which are located roughly within 5–20 km from the shoreline, may experience 10–40 cm inundation due to cyclonic storms, surges, and accelerated SLR before the end of this century (GOB 2005). The study area is predominantly rural and most land parcels are used for crop agriculture. Cultivation of rice is by far the highest, followed by winter beans, legumes, nuts, and watermelon. Most land parcels are used for wet season rice which is grown during May–November. Peasants and subsistence farmers use family labor, yet agricultural activities generate employment opportunity for a significant number of people during this time. As this time many people go for both freshwater and marine fishing as wel, this brought opportunity for female labors in the farming activities. Usually the day laborers try to earn their maximum during this period to offset the loss of income in unemployed period (winter season). During winter (November to March) people cannot cultivate winter rice because of severe shortage of salt free fresh water. This causes localized seasonal unemployment. Page 5 of 26

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_39-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 Study sites (marked with black circle) at Dulasar, Mithaganj, and Nilganj Union Parishad of Kalapara subdistrict in Bangladesh

Table 1 shows that the average age of the respondents is 49 years. Nearly half of them belong to senior age group (50 years and above) and almost one-third are in their middle age (35 to below 50). Marginally above 10 % heads of family are within the active age group (below 35 years) who can best utilize their physical labor. Almost 40 % households are comprised of 5 members followed 6-member families (30 %). Almost 60 % of the respondents are illiterate, followed by educational attainment of 5-grade (20 %) and high school graduate (~18 %). In the traditional society of Bangladesh, the size of landholding determines social position and standing of an individual. Land distribution system is very uneven. Only handful of rich people, locally called jutders (landlords) traditionally own most parcels of land. Although one in every four households does not have any cultivable land of their own, some households even have more than 10 acres (~4 hectors) of land. In fact, almost 25 % households do not have any land of their own. Almost half of the households are functionally landless, possessing less than half acre (0.2 hectors) of cultivable land. Yet 8.8 % households possess more than 2.5 acres (~1 hector) of arable land. Even few households possess more than 10 acres of farmland. Therefore, the average farm size is 0.89 acres (0.36 hectors) with a standard deviation of 2.285. This uneven land distribution helps to strengthen a kind of patron–client relationship among the few landlords and the landless/ functionally landless households who cultivate the land of lords accepting often terms and condition unfavorable to them. The crop agriculture is the most dominant economic activity. Almost one-third of the respondents are engaged in crop agricultural activities. About 20 % families depend on selling labor (day laborer) and almost a similar proportion catch fish (both freshwater and marine) to make a living. Other observed occupations are petty trade, business, transport work, formal job, and various off-farm and on-farm economic activities that combinedly offer livelihood for about 25 % families. However, most of the families possess diversified portfolios of income. For most of the occupational groups, flow of income is not smooth throughout the year. The yearly average income of the respondents’ families is 141,438 BDT (US$ 2,065; during interview in 2009 the exchange was 68.5 BDT for

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_39-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Socio-demographic profile of respondents and their families Male f Age group (year): Below 35 35 to below 50 50 and above Education: Nil Primary level (5th grade) Secondary level (12th grade) College graduate (14 year plus schooling) Family size: 3 4 5 6 7 8 Farmland holdinga: Landless Functionally landless (200 mm/month) and a total annual rainfall of 1,500 mm or more. (d) Watershed and service areas – SFRs are best suited for areas with undulating topography where the shortest embankment spans across the valley. The size of the watershed must be adequate and compatible with the proposed reservoir size, and a service area should be included to ensure full use of the SFR. For sites with ample rainfall, a minimum catchment area of 0.2–0.5 ha of terraced rice land is adequate to store a water volume of 1,000 m3. Using sound water management practices in conjunction with this volume of water stored in the reservoir at the beginning of dry season, 0.33 ha of rice land can be supported (Guerra et al. 1990). It is assumed that planting is performed early in the season and that rainfall occurs during the growing season. Embankment Design An SFR should ideally have a storage capacity that is adequate to supply water to the intended service area. Moreover, in terms of cost, there must be a sufficiently high storage ratio, i.e., the ratio of maximum volume of water stored in the reservoir to the volume of earth moved to construct it. The average storage ratio for completed SFRs ranges from 2.6 to 3.5. Being designed to hold water and resist pressure, the reservoir embankment must be stable and easy to maintain. A maximum top width of 2 m is recommended for a dam height of less than 4 m. The recommended side slopes fro clayey soils are 2.5–3 horizontal to 1 vertical at the pond side and 2 horizontal to vertical 1 at the downstream side, while for silty or sandy soils, it is recommended that both slopes be 3–4 horizontal to 1 vertical. Hydrological Characteristics For the sound operation and management of SFRs, it is essential to gain a quantitative understanding of the following hydrological characteristics: Page 8 of 19

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(a) Water collection: SFR field studies indicate that direct interception of rainfall accounts for about 36 % of SFR inflow, with the remaining 64 % coming from runoff collection. Moreover, due to the dynamic nature of inflow and water used for irrigation, the total annual water flow into an SFR is two to three times higher than the storage capacity. (b) Water loss: seepage and percolation (S&P) account for about 45 % of the total volume of water outflow from the SFRs. Minimum and maximum S&P losses are typically 4 and 5 mm/day, respectively, with average evaporation loss accounting for 25 % of total outflow volume. The relationship between S&P loss and SFR water depth varies with the square of water depth. (c) Water use: water use for land preparation and irrigation accounts for 30 % of total outflow volume, while the volume of water available for irrigation during the dry season crop is approximately equal to 65 % of reservoir capacity. Utilization of Reservoir Water The rain and surface runoff from three heavy rainfalls occurring in June, July, and August are normally sufficient to fill an SFR. Important factors regarding water utilization are: (a) Irrigation practice: SFRs provide supplemental irrigation during the wet season, with the accumulated water enabling farmers to prepare the nurseries and land earlier than would be possible without reservoirs. During short periods with limited or no rainfall, SFR water can also be released by furrow or hand watering. (b) Freshwater fish culture: for SFRs designed for dual use as both an irrigation and a fish culture resource, either organic or inorganic fertilizer can be added to enhance growth of plankton at the reservoir filling stage. Once the water turns bluish green, fingerlings can then be seeded in the pond at the recommended rate. (c) Rice-based cropping systems: for SFRs used in rice-based cropping systems. Farmers must plant early in the main season in order to allow for an early start of the next drops in the dry season. The common cropping patterns adopted are rice + fish, rice (+fish) – rice, rice (+fish) – watermelon, rice (+fish) – vegetable, and rice (+fish) – rice – watermelon. Water Management Practices Water from the reservoir is released through flexible siphon hoses. This simple method has distinct merits as the education system in many rural areas is insufficient to effectively implement more technical methods without major help from government. Vegetable and fruit trees can even be irrigated using a bucket or watering container. Such crops are important as they supply a ready source of cash and food on a daily basis. Depending on the market demand and availability of capital and labor, this method could control the periods when a portion of the service area is planted with vegetable, watermelon, and/or other cash crops. Financial Viability of SFRs The adoption of SFRs at an annual interest rate of 18 % and 15-year life span with a periodic 3-year maintenance cycle provides a high value benefit-cost ratio of 5.1 and an internal rate of return of 177 %. Indeed, this is why such an overwhelming majority of SFRs are a lucrative capital investment. Even with a life span of only 5 years, an SFR investment pays for itself in 3 years with rice and fish alone, whereas with rice + fish + rice combination in which 2 and 0.5 ha of rice are irrigated during the wet and dry seasons, respectively, with tilapia being grown at the same time, the payback period is reduced to 2 years. Such a return is considerable in that properly maintained SFRs would naturally Page 9 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_66-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 SFR features and technical specification Typical features and technical specification of SFR 1. Watershed Area (ha) Proposed land use Soil type 2. Reservoir area (m2) 3. Project facilities (a) Dam Type Height, m Crest width Upstream slope Downstream slope (b) Spillway Width, m Depth, m 4. Design service area Components 5. Water use 6. Conservation showcases

7. Project cost construction

3 ha Vegetable and trees Clayey loam 1,000

Straight embankment 3m 2m 1:3 1:2 1.5 1.0 1 ha Fish + vegetables + animal + mushroom + grasses Irrigation, livestock watering, fish culture Water harvesting, contour farming Crop-animal-fish integration Micro-irrigation P900 USD

provide irrigation service for much longer than 5 years. A summary of the features and technical specification of an SFR is presented in Table 1. Government Support and Program Impact Even for highly suitable areas, the initial cost of an SFR is too high for an average farmer to afford. Accordingly, the Philippine Government has implemented a financing scheme in which farmers use a government loan to construct their own SFR. While the repayment period is 5 years, a hardworking farmer can repay the loan in less than 2 years. To ensure technical assistance is provided in every aspect of the technology transfer, government technicians are regularly dispatched for this purpose.

Socioeconomic Impacts of Water Harvesting Systems for Agriculture: Case Studies of 10 Water Harvesting Projects This section presents results of case studies on the socioeconomic impact of ten (10) small reservoir irrigation projects located in the northern region of the Philippines. The irrigation systems studied were small, low cost, communally owned and managed, and located in vulnerable areas with slope greater than 20 % (Balderama et al. 2006). Operated by an Irrigator’ Association, the purpose of the irrigation project is to increase production through increasing water supply and protect the environment that supports the project with the community as the main actors in the development process.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_66-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

The study area covers a total of 267 ha planted into rice, a combination of rice and vegetables and vegetables only.

System Performance As a whole, the systems had an increased cropping intensity of 21 %, a distribution efficiency of 40 %, and a fair satisfaction rating given by the members interviewed. One notable problem is a poor collection of Irrigation Service Fee (ISF) in 70 % of the project area. However, all the projects are believed to be functioning efficiently with minimal conveyance losses because of the use of pipes and canal lining.

Overall Benefits Derived from the Project (a) Economic impact – results show that most of the impact was due to increases in productivity and increases in cropping intensity. Across all crops, average productivity per hectare was highest in vegetable-producing areas. The average aggregate annual benefit per project was P5,150.00 USD. Considering the total construction cost as the initial investment of the various projects and the increases in the value of benefits due to increases in productivity, cropping intensity, and area as the project benefits, the average payback period is 1.95 years. This payback period for investment projects is quite fast. This result implies that the investment cost in these projects can be recouped very quickly. Also, this implies that the direct benefits from the projects are high. (b) Social impact – the project created positive impact at three levels: community, organization (IA), and households. The positive impact at the community level included increased access to resources like the construction of water bridges out of collected service fees and external sources for microfinancing. At the organization level, the IAs generally learned to cope up with maintenance problems especially when their livelihood security was threatened with inadequate irrigation water. These enhanced the cooperation among farmers and ness in others, leadership development, market integration among vegetable growers, and more cohesive relationship of the IAs and the local government units.

Impact of Participatory Approach in Project Development Participatory development in the communities was legally established through Republic Act 7160 signed in 1992. The law provides decentralized decision-making at the lowest local government unit – the barangay or village level. Projects were established based on needs of the community. Through the representation of their officials, the community decides on what type of projects will be established. Each barangay is granted Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA) from the national government based on their population, land area, and revenue collections for development projects. In the implementation of the communal irrigation projects, the participatory development strategies employed are as follows (ERP-CASCADE 1998; CASCADE 1998, 2000): (a) Involvement of the local government officials from the provincial to the community in the planning and operation of the projects. This strategy gave the local government a firsthand look on the economic and environmental conditions in the project sites. (b) Facilitating the integration of various government services and programs into the community. (c) Formulation of “Rules-in-Use” by the members of the IAs. (d) “Counterparting Scheme” for various stakeholders (i.e., IAs contributing labor in the construction and operation and maintenance of the irrigation projects). Page 11 of 19

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(e) Trainings on capability building not only on maintenance and operation of the projects but also on negotiations, decision-making, resource generation, and communications strategies.

Evidences of Participation (a) Contribution to the construction of the project – participation is in itself shown primarily in the construction of the facilities. On the average, the beneficiaries contributed more than 22 % of the total project cost in the form of labor and food. (b) Indicative increase in organizational control – the level of organizational control increased in most of the projects. Maintenance and operation have become easier to implement in IAs with high to medium level of organizational control. (c) Development of new leaders – in some IAs, new sets of leaders were regularly elected to manage the projects. This is one of the offshoots of participatory approach.

Characteristics of Sustainable and Stable Irrigators Associations From the case studies conducted, several characteristics of the Irrigators Association found to be good measure for their long-term sustainability are as follows: (a) (b) (c) (d)

The members are involved in the planning, operation, and maintenance of the irrigation systems. Support services were broadened and integrated into the project operations. Rules formulated were tied up with water distribution criteria. The members and young leaders are mentored on how to make rational decisions

Water Harvesting as Adaptive Strategy for Climate Change Evaluation of seasonal climate impacts on crop production as well as on crop growth and development will enable agricultural managers and researchers to formulate strategies and mitigation techniques to counter such impacts. Figure 4 shows the result of data analysis at Echague climate station at different levels of rain probability using dependable rainfall approach. Eighty percent probability represents a dry year that approximates the 2009 actual record which was an El Nino year. As presented, the figure conforms to climate agency’s estimate that the El Nino phenomenon causes rainfall to be 60 % lower than the historical average. A simulation study was conducted to establish a relationship between reservoir volume and rain probabilities and their effect on income. Important result of the simulation for selected crop combination planted after rice is presented in Table 2. From the sample result and analysis, important finding reveals that increasing reservoir volume will have significant effect on income of non-rice crops during normal (50 % probability) and dry (80 % probability) years. If a wet year (20 % probability) is expected, optimum yield and cropping intensity will be realized provided that a minimum of 2,000 cubic meters of reservoir water is available for supplemental irrigation.

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Rainfall, mm

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_66-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

2009 wet

20% 50% 80% 2009

average El Nino phenomenon

dry year

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Month

Fig. 4 Rainfall at different probabilities compared to 2009 data

Table 2 Effect of varying volume of reservoir and rainfall probability to gross income Income (US dollars) Selected cropping pattern Garlic-mungo

Garlic-soybean

Garlic-peanut

Tomato-mungo

Tomato-soybean

Volume of reservoir (cubic meters) 1,000 1,500 2,000 1,000 1,500 2,000 1,000 1,500 2,000 1,000 1,500 2,000 1,000 1,500 2,000

Rainfall probability (%) 20 50 1,714 1,657 1,857 1,829 1,971 1,943 1,714 1,657 1,829 1,800 1,914 1,886 1,717 1,657 1,800 1,786 1,857 1,829 1,229 1,200 1,371 1,314 1,457 1,429 1,200 1,171 1,286 1,229 1,371 1,343

80 1,429 1,800 1,914 1,429 1,771 1,857 1,143 1,771 1,800 1,143 1,286 1,371 1,143 1,171 1,286

Model Institutional Framework on Successful Implementation of Community Water Harvesting Irrigation System From lessons learned in the past, Balderama et al. 2006 developed a framework on implementation of communal irrigation projects as a guide to planners and managers.

Process Framework on Planning and Implementation The process framework on planning and implementation of a community reservoir irrigation project is described below. The principal actors in the planning stage are the community and municipal local government units. There are three important milestones to attain in this process: (1) formal request for funding by the proponent group, (2) decision to implement by all stakeholders, and (3) forging of construction agreements by concerned parties including a contractor, if there is any. Page 13 of 19

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Formal Request The first activity is the issuance of formal request by the village local government or farmer organization to the funding agency with accompanying proposal that contains basic data and information pertaining to engineering and agro-socioeconomic aspects of the proposed irrigation project. The engineering data/informations are the following: (a) (b) (c) (d)

Service area Soil suitability Water availability Existing farming systems

The agro-socioeconomic data/informations are the following: (a) (b) (c) (d)

No. of households to be impacted Existing land tenure arrangement Projected benefits Market opportunities

The time frame is about 2 weeks for the engineering survey and up to 6 weeks for the agrosocioeconomic data gathering. At this stage, the role of the municipal local government is very crucial in the packaging and endorsement of the proposal considering that farmer groups usually lack skills on this kind of work. Decision to Implement The “decision to implement” would depend on the results of more detailed investigation by the agency-commissioned multidisciplinary team of evaluators. Data/Information to be gathered and activities to be undertaken are as follows: (a) (b) (c) (d)

Environmental impact assessment. Organization of water users group. Agreement on management scheme. Counterparts’ agreements of the different stakeholder are finalized.

This process may take up to 4 months to complete. Construction Agreement The third phase, “construction agreement,” should require the following documents: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

Detailed intake and canal design General layout design and view Mitigation works design Agreement of future maintenance and development cum water fee Agreement on sharing of works (i.e., agency provides engineers and materials, LGU with equipments, and members free labor)

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_66-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Successful Operation and Adequate Maintenance of Small Reservoir Irrigation Project

Improved Management:  Systematic operation and maintenance procedure  Adequate funding  Training and motivation of O&M personnel  Regular Dialog and consultations with Project, LGU and farmers  Guided by a good water management philosophy

Sufficient, Reliable and Equitable Water Supply

⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒

Increased Increased Increased Increased

Farmer’s participation and Responsibilities (Effective Water Users Associations)

Farmer’s Constructive Behavior

Crop Production Cropping Intensity Participation in Decision Making Awareness on Long-term Benefits

Increased Farm Productivity, Social Cohesion and Environmental Protection

High Impact and Sustainable Smallholder Irrigated Agriculture

Fig. 5 Framework on the management of communal irrigation system

Preparation of engineering designs shall be the responsibility of local government and project engineers in close consultation with the water users group. The final agreement may require 2–3 months.

Framework on Sustainable Management of Communal Irrigation Project Figure 5 presents a framework on successful operation and management of a communal irrigation system. Main consideration is to address major factors causing inefficient operation and poor maintenance of an irrigation system such as the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Lack of systematic operation and maintenance procedure Inadequate training of the O&M staff Insufficient fund for O&M works Lack of farmer participation Lack of farmer education

Considering the abovementioned factors, it is evident that the success and sustainability of any communal project would largely depend on the strength of the association that runs and manages the system. The framework shows the indicative output of a successful communal irrigation system and the input parameters that cause its successful performance. The improved management factors contributing to its performance are systematized O + M, adequate funding and training, regular dialog of stakeholders, and good water management philosophy. The social factor that is equally important is the participation and responsibility of the water users. Strengthening the individual farmer’s constructive behavior strengthens the farmers group. Page 15 of 19

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The strengthening of the water users group will provide them enough skill to do the routine O + M in a systematic way, generate their own resources for O + M funds, and mobilize enough manpower at the right time for O + M. In addition, core values (i.e., responsibility, accountability, and resourcefulness) are instilled to every member through regular seminars and dialogs. The sufficiency, reliability, and equitability of water supply across the system should be a water management philosophy every single member should adhere to. The dynamic interplay of improved management and good social behavior will result to efficient, reliable, and equitable delivery system of irrigation water to farmers. These result to positive impact due to increase in crop production with environmental protection, increase in cropping intensity using different crops, and increase in participation in any decision-making process and increase in awareness on long-term benefits. The attainment of improved water management in a system will also have positive impact on the constructive behavior of members who will in turn become more responsible members and better assets of the group.

Perceived Constraints in Linking Water Harvesting Technologies to Agricultural Development and Suggested Research Topics 1. Dissemination of water harvesting techniques to other areas has never been explicitly a subject of research. The socioeconomic and environmental conditions should be the key criteria for selecting the most suitable techniques. 2. Lack of adequate hydrological, soil, and land use data which often results in applying design criteria for water harvesting structures which have been designed from questionable assumptions. 3. Soil erosion in the cultivated areas resulting from poor farming practices. 4. Lack of technical advice, training, and other services including incentives for farmers. 5. Lack of documentation and analysis of existing indigenous water harvesting system. 6. The lack of risk analysis studies of crop failure due to low reliability of rainfall. 7. Lack of large-scale demonstration projects. To generate information to address the above constraints, research and development topics are suggested: 1. Detailed hydrometeorological analysis of rainfall data (daily and storm by storm) is needed, including probability and risk analysis of intra-storm drought periods, rainfall intensities, and duration of single rainfall events. 2. Analysis of the effect of different water harvesting and farming techniques on soil erosion and on soil and water conservation. 3. Establishment of rainfall and surface runoff measurement networks to obtain basic data for project planning and design. Community watersheds would provide realistic data on surface runoff from measured rainfall events and would thus facilitate the use and calibration of simulation models. 4. Use of geographic information system(GIS) and other IT-based tools for the identification of potential areas for water harvesting and planning for community watershed development. 5. More attention must be given to socioeconomic aspects in project planning, implementation, and maintenance such as viability of indigenous systems and local experience, people’s priorities and participation, land tenure, subsidies and incentives, and the role of women. Page 16 of 19

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6. Development of a package of appropriate and cost-effective technologies to optimize soil and water management and to intensify agricultural production.

Conclusion In the rainfed and upland areas which are also considered as fragile ecosystems, rainfall variability is an important factor in development and translates directly into a need for water storage and harvesting system. In areas of developing and underdeveloped societies, existing variability and insufficient capacity to manage rainfall will exacerbate the already prevailing poverty and food insecurity. Thus, these places are predicted to experience the greatest negative impacts of climate change. Successful undertakings show that by making water available at times when it would not be naturally available, water harvesting can significantly increase agricultural and economic productivity and enhance the well-being of the environment and the people. Future population growth, in conjunction with climate change, will increase the importance of putting in place water harvesting technologies and systems especially in the rural communities. However, as water resources are increasingly utilized and climate variability increases, planning will become even more difficult. Without greater understanding of which types of storage are best utilized under specific agroecological and social conditions and in the absence of much more systematic planning, there is the risk that many water harvesting investments will fail to deliver the intended benefits. Current research and development activities are aimed to better understand water resources and storage under different social and ecological conditions. This will provide insights into potential climate change impacts on water supply and demand, the social and environmental impacts of different storage options, the implications of scaling up small-scale interventions, and the reasons for success/failure of past storage schemes. Systematic methods for evaluating the suitability and effectiveness of different storage options are being developed to assist planning and facilitate comparison of storage options, individually and within systems.

References Balderama O (1998) Development of crop and water management model for reservoir irrigation in the Philippines. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Department of Agricultural Engineering, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo Balderama OF et al (2006) Impact assessment of communal irrigation systems in upland and mountain environments. Cagayan Valley Agriculture Research and Resources Development. RDE J 1(1), Isabela Bureau of Soils and Water Management (2003) Water harvesting technologies. www.bswm.da.gov.ph CASCADE Annual Report 1998 and 2000. Bayombong Nueva Vizcaya CASCADE Highlights Publication. Jan–Mar 2000. Vol. 3 Issue No. 1. Bayombong Nueva Vizcaya Cruz RD (2002) Municipal irrigation master plan for Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya. volume 2 – Project monitoring tools. CASCADE, Bayombong Nueva Vizcaya Dar WD (2010) In Science and Technology Post, Department of Science and Technology, Bicutan Taguig City

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Dar WD, Obien RO (2007) In: Proceedings of the conference on dryland agriculture, Clark Pampanga, Apr 2008 Emerton L, Bos E (2004) Value: counting ecosystems as an economic part of water infrastructure. IUCN, Gland/Cambridge, 88 pp ERP-CASCADE/Economic Self-Reliance Programme-Caraballo and Southern Cordillera Agricultural Development Programme-Philippines (1998) Global work plan for 1997–2004. Bayombong Nueva Vizcaya FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) (2008) Water for the rural poor: interventions for improving livelihoods in sub-Saharan Africa. FAO Land and Water Division, Rome, Italy Fatondji D, Martius C, Bielders CL, Vlek PLG, Bationo A, Gerard B (2007) Effect of planting technique and amendment type on pearl millet yield, nutrient uptake and water use on degraded land in Niger. In: Bationo A (ed) Improving human welfare and environmental conservation by empowering farmers to combat soil fertility degradation. African Soils Network (AFNet). Springer, pp 179–193 Gregory PJ, Simmonds LP, Pilbeam CJ (2000) Soil type, climatic regime and the response of water use efficiency to crop management. Agron J 92:814–820 Guerra LC, Watson PG, Bhuiyan SI (1990) Hydrological analysis of farm reservoirs in rainfed areas. Agric Manag 17:351–366 Liebe JR, van de Giesen N, Andreini M, Walter MT, Steenhuis TS (2009) Determining watershed response in data poor environments with remotely sensed small reservoirs as runoff gauges. Water Resour Res 45:W07410. doi:10.1029/2008WR007369 Maglinao LC et al (1994) Philippines National Program of small farm reservoir: organization, experiences and challenges. In: Bhuiyan SI (ed) On-farm reservoir systems for rainfed ricelands. International Rice Research Institute, Manila, 164 p Meigh J (1995) The impact of small farm reservoirs on urban water supplies in Botswana. Nat Res Forum 19(1):71–83 Twomlow S, Hove L (2006) Is conservation agriculture an option for vulnerable households? Briefing note no. 4. International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), Bulawayo Vohland K, Barry B (2009) A review of in situ rainwater harvesting (RWH) practices modifying landscape functions in African drylands. Agric Ecosyst Environ 131(3–4):119–127 Wisser D, Frolking S, Douglas EM, Fekete BM, Schumann AH, Vörösmarty CJ (2010) The significance of local water resources captured in small reservoirs for crop production – a global scale analysis. J Hydrol 384:264–275

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Index Terms: Climate change 12 Rainfed agriculture 7 Small farm reservoir (SFR) 7 Upland area 2

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Adaptation to Climate Change in the Cities Magali Dreyfus* Institute of Advanced Studies, United Nations University, Shibuya, Japan

Abstract Urbanization and climate change are two current significant trends of the Earth’s history. Both influence one another. Given the increasing disastrous impacts of global warming, it is vital to understand their development and interaction. The concentration of people, infrastructures, and economic activities in urban areas contributes to the global growth of greenhouse gas emissions. But it also makes cities particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Yet many opportunities lie within the powers held by local governments. In fact, through their sectoral policies (land-use planning, transport, buildings, energy use, waste management, etc.), city governments can develop efficient strategies to mitigate and adapt to the effects of global warming. Adaptation strategies are especially important as they allow connecting local needs with global concerns. The governance structure of the city and the capacity of the different stakeholders to collaborate in the definition and implementation of adaptation plans are therefore essential to ensure that local actions are efficient. This chapter presents the implications of climate change in urban environments and the challenges it raises in terms of adaptation policies. It provides illustrations of responses adopted at the city level and points out at the barriers and opportunities faced by local policy-makers.

Keywords Adaptation; Cities; Climate change; Local governance

Introduction Urbanization and climate change are two of the few certain global trends for the future. Both raise economic, social, and environmental issues (Moensch et al. 2011). The study of their development and interaction is therefore key for enhancing scientific knowledge and taking action to promote a sustainable future. Since the mid-2000s, about half of the world population lives in cities, and it is expected that by 2050, this number will raise to 7 out of 10 people (UN 2011; UNHABITAT 2012). One century ago, only 2 people out of 10 were living in urban areas. Moreover, in the past, urbanization went faster in industrialized countries than in developing countries. Nowadays it is the opposite. Today about 70 % of urban residents live in developing countries, which are also hosts to an overwhelming proportion of the world population (82 %). In richer nations, urban population growth is close to stagnant (0.67 % on an annual average basis since 2010). The United States has the highest urbanization rate This research was funded by the AXA Foundation post-doctoral fellowship. *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 17

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among these countries (nearly 1 %). But developing countries are projected to have urban growth rates that are roughly the double. Moreover, the number of so-called megacities, which represents urban centers with more than 10 million people, is also increasing. They were 9 in 2008 and they should be 27 in 2025 (UN 2011; Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009). These impressive numbers have an impact on climate change adaptation as well as the well-being of its citizens, in terms of education, housing, and access to services. Yet there is no standard definition of what a city is, and it may differ largely from one academic discipline to another. For instance, legal scholars and statisticians will often pay attention to the administrative borders of settlements and to the powers held by local governments over these. But a geographer may have a different territorial approach and focus on interconnections that sometimes overtake the formal limits of a settlement. One definition of the city is that it is a geographically limited area, which hosts a high density of population in a densely built environment. It is argued that cities are the results of a surplus in food production. This surplus allowed people to engage in other activities than agriculture and to produce goods as well as services outside of rural areas (Puppim et al. 2012). Thus, cities became key units in the economic welfare of a country. Some estimates say that urban-based economic activities account for up to 55 % of gross national product (GNP) in low-income countries, 73 % in middle-income countries, and 85 % in high-income countries (Kessides 2000). Consequently the development of cities has an impact over climate change. Through the concentration of economic activities and production, urban areas are responsible for the consumption of most of the world’s energy, and 60–80 % of world energy use emanates from them (IEA 2008; Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009). They are therefore directly as well as indirectly among the largest emitters of CO2 emissions. On the other way round, climate change impacts may be worsened by the urban settings. This led some commentators to declare that “the fate of the Earth’s climate is intrinsically linked to how our cities develop over the coming decades” (Tyndall Centre 2004). All the more, urban settlements are heavily dependent on what is produced outside their limits, may that be the nearest countryside or the products imported from farther countries. There climate change impacts may have important consequences. It may affect water and land availability, and thus local and global agricultural production, raising the prices of the products. Moreover, rural land in the peripheries is now often dedicated to urban use. As a result a common phenomenon in developed and developing countries is the growth of low-density-based suburbanization (UNHABITAT 2012). Sustainable cities must therefore be thought outside of their administrative and urban borders. This chapter sets aside this complex rural–urban issue and focuses on urban areas, but this is an important issue to bear in mind. Policy-makers have a direct interest in climate change issues because urban areas are directly and particularly vulnerable to its impacts. In particular adaptation has to be thought locally as it requires taking into account the impacts of climate change on the local territory and the elements of vulnerability (physical, socioeconomic) upon which actions may be taken (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2011). In fact local governments are best placed to provide efficient solutions. Early in 1987, the Brundtland Report on “our common future” included a chapter on cities underlying their importance to design solutions to promote sustainable development (WCED 1987; Betsill and Bulkeley 2006). Then in 1992 during the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio, the role of local authorities in meeting global environmental goals was fully recognized and included in Agenda 21, the United Nations (UN) voluntary action plan to promote sustainable development (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003). Lately scholars have slowly turned their attention to them to draw out barriers and opportunities for urban settlements in coping with climate change. They point out that cities concentrate resources and constitute “pools of labour and Page 2 of 17

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talent, together with concentration efficiencies for both producers and consumers, and a more fluid exchange of ideas and innovations” (UNHABITAT 2010). The IPCC itself in its fourth Assessment Report acknowledges the role of the cities. In particular, local governments hold responsibilities in sectors, which are relevant to the definition and implementation of mitigation and adaptation strategies. These vary from one state to another and depend on the level of decentralization. They are, for instance, transport, energy, waste, water, land-use planning, and social services. Moreover, local governments are the closest institutional link to the citizens and therefore may be in touch with a wide variety of stakeholders who can help define locally tailored solutions to the climate problem. Finally cities are important economic actors in the national economy, and as such they also have an influence on the definition of national policies and may act as a “role model” for other public authorities. This chapter first examines the contribution of the cities to global warming (section “Contribution of the Cities to Climate Change”) and the impacts of climate change that they bear (section “Impacts of Climate Change and Vulnerability of the Cities”). Then it shows how activities have moved focus from mitigation to adaptation (section “From Mitigation to Adaptation”) and examples of some adaptation strategies (section “Urban Adaptation Actions”). Subsequently it dwells on the important questions of urban adaptation’s governance (section “Governance of Adaptation in the Cities”) and the barriers faced by decision-makers to adopt or implement adaptation strategies (section “Barriers to Cities’ Adaptation to Climate Change”). Then in conclusion, three kinds of strategies highlighting potential opportunities for the future are presented.

Contribution of the Cities to Climate Change The contribution of cities to climate change is highly debated. Some authors reckon that they have an important share of responsibility, as they are heavy emitters of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Some estimate show that urban activities generate close to 80 % of all carbon dioxide (CO2) as well as significant amounts of other greenhouse gases. Direct sources of greenhouse gas emissions include energy generation, vehicles, industry, and the burning of fossil fuels and biomass in households. Emissions from vehicles and transport equipment are rising at a rate of 2.5 % each year (UNEP-UN HABITAT 2005). Moreover cities consume two-thirds of total primary energy and produce over 70 % of global energy-related CO2 emissions. The IEA projects predict that by 2030, as a result of increased urbanization, cities and towns will be responsible for 76 % of global energy-related CO2 emissions (IEA 2009). But other studies discuss these findings (Hoornweg et al. 2011; Dodman 2009; Satterthwaite 2008). Some reckon that the actual share of GHG emissions generated in the cities is 40 %. Satterthwaite has described this phenomenon very well. The main source of greenhouse gas emissions in cities is energy use – in industrial production, transport, as well as residential, commercial, and government buildings (heating or cooling, lighting, and appliances). Transport is also an important contributor to greenhouse gas emissions in almost all cities, although its relative contribution varies a lot from one city to another. But the emission profile varies from one city to another depending on their activities as well as on their design and governance. A dense built environment and the use of public transport in a big city may result in lower emissions than in a smaller city where the use of private vehicles is more important because of the urban sprawl. For instance, as Table 1 shows, Tokyo’s emissions per capita are much lower than in Glasgow, although the latter is smaller in size and population (36,669,000 inhabitants in urban agglomeration in 2010 and 1,170,000, respectively (UNHABITAT 2012)). Even within one urban area, the household’s Page 3 of 17

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Table 1 Greenhouse gas emissions per capita (tons of CO2 equivalent) City Washington, DC (USA) Glasgow (UK) Toronto (Canada) Shanghai (China) New York City (USA) Beijing (China) London (UK) Tokyo (Japan) Seoul (Republic of Korea) Barcelona (Spain) Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) Sao Paulo (Brazil)

GHG emissions per capita (tons of CO2eq) (year of study in brackets) 19,7 (2005) 8,4 (2004) 8,2 (2001) 8,1 (1998) 7,1 (2005) 6,9 (1998) 6,2 (2006) 4,8 (1998) 3,8 (1998) 3,4 (1996) 2,3 (1998) 2,1 (2003)

Source: Dodman 2009

socio-demographic characteristics influence energy use. As a result, a suburban space may have, on average, higher per capita residential energy consumption with respect to central city dwellers (Estiri 2012). Moreover, places with large coal-fired power stations will be very high greenhouse gas emitters, although most of the electricity they generate may be used elsewhere (Satterthwaite 2008). So a central question is whether greenhouse gas emissions used in producing goods or services are allocated to production or consumption. As a producer of GHG emissions, cities are not necessarily heavy emitters, but if emissions are assigned to the final consumer’s home, most emissions from agriculture, deforestation, and industry could be assigned to cities where the goods produced from these sectors are consumed. Moreover, a comparison between energy use in urban and rural areas seems to show that with economic growth, city dwellers tend to consume more and more energy. Krey and others studied urban and rural energy use patterns in China and India functions of three development models that they have defined. On this basis, they show that in most cases, per capita energy use is initially lower in urban areas compared to rural areas, due to higher shares of modern fuels, which are energy efficient. But economic growth shall reverse that trend, and by 2050, urban energy use per capita will have tripled with respect to 2005 (Krey et al. 2012). This might have important consequences in defining responsibilities for reducing greenhouse gas emissions between nations and within nations between cities and other settlements. Therefore, in the end, an important step to address climate change is to assess the consumption patterns of middle- and upper-income groups within an area (Satterthwaite 2008).

Impacts of Climate Change and Vulnerability of the Cities Direct impacts of climate change are various, and all of them may affect cities: increased intensity and higher frequency of disasters (storms, rainfall, and typhoons), sea-level rise, and draughts. Indirect impacts will also be born at the local level such as the arrival of refugees fleeing the impacts of climate change or new diseases caused by the apparition of new vectors. As everywhere, climate change will worsen existing problems as well as creating new ones. But some impacts will be stronger or specific to the urban environment (see Table 2 below).

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Table 2 Climate change impacts on urban areas Change in climate Changes in means Temperature

Precipitation

Sea-level rise

Changes in extreme Extreme rainfall Tropical cyclone

Drought

Heat or cold waves Abrupt climate change Changes in exposure Population movements Biological changes

Possible impact on urban areas Increase in energy demands for heating/cooling Worsening of air quality High-temperature impacts exaggerated by urban heat islands in the cities Increased risks of flooding Increased risks of landslides Distress migration from rural areas Interruption of flood supply networks Coastal flooding Reduced income from agriculture and tourism Salinization of water sources Damages to home, businesses, and infrastructures More intense flooding Higher risk of landslides Disruption to livelihoods and city economies Water shortage Higher food prices Disruption of hydroelectricity Distress migration from rural areas Short-term increase in energy demands for heating/cooling Health impacts on vulnerable populations Possible significant impacts from rapid and extreme sea-level rise/temperature change Movements from stressed rural habitats New disease vectors

Source: Adapted from Bartlett et al. (2009)

Then the vulnerability of a city, that is, its ability to withstand direct and indirect impacts, depends on of three factors: its exposure, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity. In a city, physical elements (infrastructure and ecosystems), agents (people, organizations, and administrative and elected bodies), and institutions (the rule that guide behavior) (Moensch et al. 2011) may be more or less exposed, sensitive, or capable of adapting. Exposure is the nature and degree to which a system may be directly or indirectly exposed to climate conditions such as temperature changes, rainfall variability, and change in extremes and frequency of other hazards (Moensch et al. 2011). Sensitivity is the degree to which a system is affected, either adversely or beneficially by climate variability (IPCC 2007). Indeed the concentration of people and economic activities make cities more likely to bear greater impacts. And the adaptive capacity is the ability of a system to adjust to climate change to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences (IPCC 2007). It can also be described as the ability to shift strategies as conditions change in order to maintain the well-being of populations and ecosystems on which they depend (Moensch et al. 2011). Typically cities are exposed because they are located in strategic areas such as near the coasts or rivers. Thus, they suffer particularly from sea-level rise and floods. Moreover, cities concentrate a lot of people, and in many countries, the poorest of them live in informal settlements, slums, and Page 5 of 17

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townships. This is especially true for developing countries where the urban growth rate is the highest. As it goes faster than the infrastructure capacity, these settlements are very sensitive and their capacity to recover is limited. These are especially vulnerable, as they tend to be built on hazardous sites and to be susceptible to floods, landslides, and other climate-related disasters (IPCC 2007). Although exposure is strong, the vulnerability of the cities mostly lies on their sensitivity and low adaptive capacity. In particular as seen above, the urban poor are the most vulnerable population to climate change impacts (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009). Sensitivity is high and adaptive capacity is low among marginalized populations (slum-dwellers, recent migrants, women, etc.) as they are often unable to access or use effectively the services provided in the cities (Moensch et al. 2011). Moreover, institutions affect vulnerability as they determine how other dimensions are managed (provision of essential services, infrastructure investments, zoning regulations, social assistance, etc.) (Moensch et al. 2011). In least developed countries, these may be weak. Finally as mentioned in introduction, the vulnerability of the cities cannot be fully detached from its surroundings as climate change may affect food production or transport systems causing an increase in price and thus affecting the lives of citizens. Urban areas are affected by three kinds of change caused by climate change (Bartlett et al. 2009): changes in means, changes in extreme, and changes in exposure. In the first category lie temperature, precipitation, and sea-level rise. In the second one stand extreme rainfall and tropical cyclone, droughts, heat or cold waves, and abrupt climate changes. Finally the last category refers to migration of population and biological changes. The impacts of climate change may be exaggerated by the urban setting. A notorious illustration of this phenomenon is the urban heat island (UHI) effect. It refers to the temperatures of urban centers, which are higher than in the surroundings of the city (about 3–4
C and this can go up to 10
C). The built environment, impervious surface, and lack of vegetation impede the soil to moisture, which would normally use the absorbed sunlight to evaporate water. The UHI in turn affects the level of air pollution as warmer temperatures favor the concentration of conventional air pollutants such as ozone, acid aerosols, emissions of particles, and allergens (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009). The health of vulnerable populations such as young children and older people is then even more at threat than in a common hot environment. All these impacts ultimately result in health impacts such as infectious diseases transmitted by mosquitos or tick, water- or food-borne diseases, air pollution, and heat morbidity (Bartlett et al. 2009). In addition the impacts have an economic cost. Some assets and infrastructures may be lost and economic activities may be disrupted. Structures such as underground transport systems may be affected by weather disaster events (Hunt and Watkiss 2010). For instance, during the heat wave that hit Europe in 2003, many French cities suffered from high temperatures. Electricity demand increased with the high heat levels, but electricity production was undermined by the facts that the temperature of rivers rose, reducing the cooling efficiency of thermal power plants (conventional and nuclear), and that flows of rivers were diminished. As a result, six power plants were shut down completely (IPCC 2007), which resulted in economic losses for utility companies and individuals.

From Mitigation to Adaptation Mitigation policies aim at reducing GHG emissions in order to curb climate change at the global level. Adaptation tends to minimize the effects of climate change by adjusting the systems; it also Page 6 of 17

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allows grabbing any opportunity, which may arise. Adaptation activities have a local nature. They are largely determined by local circumstances such as the physical and built infrastructures environment, by the perception of vulnerability and risks by citizens and policy-makers, or even by a long history of dealing with natural hazards and disasters (Satterthwaite 2008; D’Almeida Martins and da Costa Ferreira 2011). But mostly because cities are considered to be heavy emitters, literature has focused on urban mitigation actions so far. Moreover, mitigation activities have found important financial support and thus became profitmaking actions for local governments. These financial flows originate for instance in the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC) international regime, which binds the most industrialized states to curb their GHG emissions. To do so, they can implement projects such as clean development mechanism (CDM) or emission reduction certifications (CER) in countries which are not bound by any emissions target. Obligations on adaptation are limited to financial and technical assistance from industrialized countries to the lesser-industrialized nations. In that contex, most of the climate city plans focus on mitigation and only a few deals with adaptation (OECD 2009). Many cities have assigned themselves GHG emissions reduction targets (e.g., London, Tokyo, and Paris). Some go even further than the national target. For instance, in the European Union and in France, the targets are 20 % for the reduction of GHG emissions, 20 % less energy consumption, and a 20 % energy consumption coming from renewable energy by 2020. But for the Parisian territory, the local council targets a rate of 25 % (and for the administration itself 30 %). ()). This leads to a general phenomenon of well-developed mitigation project, whereas adaptation policies are still at an early stage of development and hardly implemented (D’Almeida Martins and da Costa Ferreira 2011). Some authors have criticized this focus on mitigation stating that it is too techno-centric and falls to address the more complex task of defining the nature of vulnerability (Revi 2008). But the difficulty to quantify and monetarize the benefits of adaptation, makes it difficult for decisionmakers to justify their choices when they develop adaption strategies. How do you measure the success of an adaptation measure? And how long does it take before you can actually make an assessment? In fact most of the studies assessing adaptation policies options in the cities are qualitative (Hunt and Watkiss 2010). However, the case for adaptation in the cities in literature is increasing. The importance of this action is recognized. Among the studies, Hunt and Watkiss (2010) have observed that the most addressed risks are sea-level rise, heat, and water resources. Yet to date most of the case studies deal with OECD countries. This is why international agencies now try to promote adaptation through development as a way to incentivize actions in less developed countries (OECD 2009; SanchezRodriguez 2009; UNEP 2011). The following section turns on some of these initiatives.

Urban Adaptation Actions Adaptation actions are not always labeled as such nor are they systematically connected to the issue of climate change. This could be the case for instance, for urban environmental projects such as planting trees or the opening of green spaces. However, these actions definitely have an adaptive scope. Moreover, the variety of administrative organization between cities also complicates the possibility to classify actions by sector. They may be overlapping. Therefore, it is difficult to make

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an exhaustive list of adaptation actions. Before summarizing some of them in a table, here are some more developed examples. First there are some hard measures meaning that they require some financial and technological investments. For instance, in the building sector, local governments have power to take action. Isolation of buildings is a key activity for local governments. It allows bringing down temperature and reducing the need for air conditioners. Thus, energy demands and consequently emissions are reduced. This is a much more efficient adaptive measure than the mere spreading of air conditioner appliances which might not be affordable for the poorest and which will be counter-effective in terms of mitigation (OECD 2009). Harvesting of rainwater can also offset the lack of water in hot summers. In London, a rainwater harvesting system has been incorporated in the design of a community center building. The rainwater is collected from the roof and is stored in an underground tank for future use. This system is supplying water used for toilet flushing and irrigation. It is expected to contribute to save 50 % of water use every year (UKCIP 2007). Bigger infrastructures may also be necessary. Infrastructures and the built environment in general are mostly affected by extreme events such as floods, storms, and, to a lesser extent, heat waves and drought (Hunt and Watkiss 2010). The construction of flood defense mechanisms, dikes, or break walls is a common response. However, it is a high investment operation, and local governments may not always have the financial resources and technical capacities to undertake these operations. Softer measures are also efficient to define adaptation strategies. They consist in policy programs. A common measure is to move the location of activities (recreational, farming, and businesses) set in high-risk areas (flood/erosion prone areas) to safer places. To do so, local governments usually use regulatory instruments such as zoning regulations or master plans. The table below (Table 3) presents some adaptation action functions of the climate challenge they want to tackle. The columns also indicate the sector of intervention and the nature of the corresponding policy instrument. However, this table is only illustrative. Cities are very much different from one place to another in political, economical, social, and physical terms. As a result, the decisions they take vary to adapt to local circumstances. Likewise the sectors and policy instruments are different. As for sectors, the department of a city responsible for a certain matter may differ from one place to another. There are several kinds of policy instruments, which may support adaptation strategies. They can be combined to ensure a better efficiency. Regulatory tools are binding measures, which fix environmental targets or standards to be reached by some stakeholders. They can also consist in provisions and technical requirements in public procurements. To that regard, local authorities as a major buyer of public works, infrastructures, and constructions may follow a green approach to favor environmentally friendly projects (e.g., climate change may fall within the scope of the environmental, energy, or land use department). Planning tools are regulatory instruments. Planning is a political process, which organizes the completion of predefined political goals in time. It helps in dealing with uncertainty of future risks relying mainly on data from the past and present and the analysis of trends. It states which policy instruments are going to be used and fix a calendar. Fiscal mechanisms are financial incentives and disincentives to guide behavior towards environmentally responsible activity, and curb undesirable activities, in an effort to reduce damage to the environment. They consist in grants, low-interest loans, loan guarantees, or favorable tax treatment to promote specific activities, technologies, or behaviors of businesses and individuals. For example, in mitigation policies, charges are levied on energy sources and fossil fuels. Informational instruments are campaigns or public announcements to inform and communicate with the citizens on risks, to learn to deal with them, and to be resilient. Page 8 of 17

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Table 3 Examples of adaptation actions in cities Climate challenge Urban heat island Heat waves

Measure Increasing tree canopy Reforestation Green roofs

Policy Sector instruments Parks, environment Regulatory

Buildings and construction

Building regulations (e.g., color of the roofs, standards of Buildings and energy efficiency) construction District cooling through the use of absorption cooling methods Energy (using the heat of other resources, e.g., waste incineration) Heat alert systems

Public health

Heat threat educational and awareness program

Education

Drought Building regulations (e.g., installation of rainwater collection Water efficiency systems, reservoirs, promote the use of water-efficient technologies and devices) Building retrofitting (e.g., shower timers and shower heads)

Biodiversity loss Floods Sea-level rise

Crosscutting adaptation issues

Building and construction

Water Environment Securing drinking water resources (e.g., designation of drinking Water water protection areas and well construction) Environment Biodiversity strategy to protect flora and fauna Environment Green spaces Tourism and leisure Flood risk mapping Flood/coastal management Disaster management Urban planning Flood alert systems Flood/coastal management Disaster management Dikes, break waves Infrastructures Build environment and construction Vulnerability assessments and development of blueprints or Crosscutting scenarios to guide local stakeholders

Planning Regulatory Fiscal Voluntary agreements Regulatory Regulatory Planning Informational instruments Informational instruments Regulatory

Informational Regulatory Regulatory Planning Regulatory Planning

Informational

Regulatory Planning Planning

Source: Adapted from Ecologic Institute, AEA, ICLEI, REC 2011

Finally voluntary agreements are measures, which are negotiated between local authorities and industry to achieve environmental targets. In the end, the table shows that adaptation strategies are based on a mix of soft (policy) and hard (infrastructures and built environment) measures.

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Some actions address physical drivers such as dikes and built protection infrastructures, and others address systemic drivers such as laws, urban planning, alert warning systems, or efforts to build capacity to adapt (CorfeeMorlot et al. 2011).

Governance of Adaptation in the Cities Listing initiatives to adapt to climate change in urban settings is not enough to get a complete picture of the challenge that it represents. In fact sectoral approaches are not enough and a systemic approach is necessary. It means that several administrative departments and stakeholders have to collaborate with one another. Moreover, climate change impacts are not limited to the administrative territory borders, so often collaboration is needed beyond borders, between local governments. Finally upper levels of governments have some adaptation programs and regulations. They may ask local governments to collaborate to implement them. There is therefore a huge governance1 challenge. Urban governance processes are actually central to understand the impacts of climate change and to reduce vulnerability. Good governance schemes allow working closely with local stakeholders and understanding how to incorporate climate change impacts in the reform of land use and urban planning instruments. It also gives the possibility to experiment and learn about various responses and the most cost-efficient ones (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2011, D’Almeida Martins and da Costa Ferreira 2011). Literature has often focused on governance to identify successful factors for adaptation (Tanner et al. 2009; Birkmann et al. 2010; Adger et al. 2005; Amundsen et al. 2010; Dodman and Satterthwaite 2008). They also drew some good governance GG criteria, which enable developing efficient adaptation strategies. GG criteria and adaptive criteria are often redundant. These criteria vary according to authors and often overlap according to their definition. Referring to GG in the framework of enhancing resilience, Moensch et al. (2011) mention decentralization and autonomy, transparency and accountability, and responsiveness and flexibility (Tanner et al. 2009). Other scholars add participation and consensus, effectiveness and sustainability, and rule of law, equity, and fairness (Dreyfus 2013). For Adger et al. (2005), adaptation shall rely on effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and legitimacy. Almost all authors acknowledge participation as a major success criterion. It refers to the degree of involvement of the different stakeholders in decision-making. It is key to understand all the risks, define adaptation objectives, and ensure a good implementation of the measures adopted. The roles of stakeholders are numerous: awareness raising, involvement in understanding the problem, agreeing adaptation objectives, securing financial and human resources, implementation, as well as monitoring and evaluation (Ecologic Institute et al. 2011). Leadership is another relevant factor at the local level (Ecologic Institute et al. 2011, Schreurs 2008). It is illustrated by the important adaptation strategies developed by some proactive local governments. Being a pioneer can be positive in political terms but also even in economic terms by creating new business opportunities. Sometimes single individuals or “policy entrepreneur” can champion the issue and, this way, adjust the local agenda to include it (Bulkeley 2010). Moreover, in their analysis, scholars insist on the need to adopt a multilevel governance approach (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009). This refers to the processes of governance Governance refers to “the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions” (Hyden et al. 2003).

1

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happening across the scales, formally or informally, between state and non-state actors and between public and private actors. Participation is a central process of it. This conceptual approach helps to understand how local governments are embedded in a complex system of actors and how they design and implement policies tackling climate change. Thus, there is a vertical and a horizontal dimension to consider. The vertical dimension focuses on a legal traditional approach where local governments are at the bottom of the state administrative organization and where the central government possesses the supreme authority. Here local governments mostly implement upper level of legislation (international, national, state, or regional). The horizontal dimension focuses on various actors intervening at the city scale: citizens, associations, business actors, and transitional networks of local governments, foreign investors, and experts. In that context, local governments are responsible for defining policies relevant to the local affairs. Relations between them are not necessarily formalized, and they are constantly evolving. Their influence over one another very much depends on the local context (Puppim et al. 2012). This approach allows identifying bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal influences, all of them playing a part in the definition and implementation of adaptation strategies.

Barriers to Cities’ Adaptation to Climate Change There are some conceptual barriers and some practical barriers to adaptation (Ecologic Institute et al. 2011). Conceptual barriers relate to the understanding of the problem. It consists in climate skepticism, uncertainty, and defining what is adaptation. This mostly affects decision-making. It can be overcome by the involvement of external actors such as researchers or international agencies with an interest in the question. Transnational networks of local governments are also helpful, as they allow knowledge and best practice sharing between public authorities. Practical barriers are more related to organization and resources. They mostly affect the implementation of adaptation strategies. Adapting to climate change is a long-term process, which as such is not a priority for local governments who have to deal with many other pressing issues, such as the eradication of poverty, public services provision, and development. The uncertainty of climate scenarios and its controversial aspect (some scientists denying its scope) makes it a second rank issue. Uncertainty is also true for socioeconomic trends, which affect the vulnerability of population and activities. Yet this information is as important as climate data. Moreover, analyses of impacts and adaptation options at the city-scale level are at a very early stage and difficult to provide in poorer countries. There is a lack of tools and methodologies to inform decision-makers about risks exposure, which is a main barrier for adaptation decisions in land-use planning (Storch and Downes 2011). Most of the studies are qualitative, and thus, the advance understanding of costs and benefits of local adaptation action is difficult (Hunt and Watkiss 2010; OECD 2009). Yet the making up of climate and urban development combined scenarios could be very profitable. A study on Ho Chi Minh City adaptation strategy shows that the combination of sea-level rise with the planned urban development will increase the exposure and consequently the vulnerability of the city. But it is mostly because of the second factor, which is the land-use plan, that the city will be affected. The decision-makers have not considered exposure and climate risks in the plan (Storch and Downes 2011). Indeed climate change impacts cannot be avoided, but prohibiting constructions on threatened areas can reduce exposure. This will allow avoiding at a later stage the costs of relocation, reconstruction, and disaster relief action. Nevertheless pressed by short public mandate, local governments sometimes focus on policies that can bring more immediate results. Page 11 of 17

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The lack of resources is another major issue. Despite the political will or the adoption of a strategy, the question of financial as well as human resources is a limit. This is therefore sometimes a problem, which precedes issues such as the lack of access to sophisticated datasets or new technologies (Roberts 2010). When there is no support from national authorities, resources may come from external actors. In fact many adaptation programs in developing countries are sponsored from outside, by the World Bank, UN-HABITAT, or UNDP for instence. But then the question is how these initiatives will carry on after the withdrawal of this external funding. There may also be a problem of overlapping competencies and lack of coordination between authorities and policies. As Table 3 shows, initiatives may be shared between various sectors and use different policy instruments. This makes coordination a key step.

Conclusion: Opportunities for Climate Change Adaptation in the Cities In conclusion, three tracks can provide opportunities for climate change adaptation in the cities.

Adopt a Comprehensive Strategy for the Local Territory Adopting a comprehensive adaptation strategy will allow defining policy direction for the entire city. It is important because no single measure will allow reducing vulnerability on a long term basis. It is rather a set of different cross-sectoral actions that will allow to improve the current and future situations. A mix of policy measures, technologic, institutional, infrastructure, is necessary. Cities must in fact be thought as a system (Dawson et al. 2007). It means that cooperation between various administrative departments is essential. Planning is a key process to organize this cooperation. Creating a specific agency or unit in charge of dealing with adaptation issues may also be useful. It may then identify synergies between sectors. This institution can develop knowledge and expertise between the sectors and lead the policies and organize the cooperation. So far, only a few general municipal adaptation plans have been adopted. Most of them are in cities of industrialized countries as, for instance, New York or London. But there are some exceptions in developing countries as Durban, Cape Town, Ho Chi Minh, or Quito demonstrate. The motivations behind the adoption of municipal plans lie in the need to assess local impacts carefully and ensure resilience. In Ho Chi Minh, a particular objective is to put in line hard infrastructure responses with a socioeconomic vulnerability assessment of the city (Storch and Downes 2011). In Durban, the need to adapt is perceived in relation with the need to increase the resilience of poorer people by enforcing measures enabling development (Roberts 2010). Moreover, in compliance with the UNFCCC regime, adaptation in least developed countries is supported financially and technically by industrialized countries as well as by some international agencies. One requirement is to adopt a National Adaptation Programme of Actions (NAPA), which identify priority activities. However, in these programs, little attention has been paid to the local level and urban areas. The adoption of Local Adaptation Programme of Actions (LAPA) and City Adaptation Programme of Actions (CAPA) could be helpful. On the long term, they can underpin and drive innovations in NAPAs (Moser and Satterthwaite 2008).

Use Local Capacities and Share Knowledge Instead of creating new programs and plans, for which officers may be reluctant to act, it may be worth relying on existing capacities.

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A lot of local governments already have experience with planning and environment. For instance, local Agenda 21, which deals with sustainable development, has created an enabling context for environmental issues (Bulkeley 2010; D’Almeida Martins and da Costa Ferreira 2011). Also synergies between disaster risk management and climate change adaptation can be found. In the more exposed cities, there is often a long and old practice of risk management. Moreover, using local capacities means enhancing participation of the various urban stakeholders. This enhances knowledge about the local context and the necessary adherence for implementation. There should be therefore a collaborative approach to decision-making when dealing with adaptation (OECD 2009; D’Almeida Martins and da Costa Ferreira 2011). For instance, in London and New York, the involvement of sectoral stakeholders is deemed to have been key in defining responses to climate change impacts. They created coordinating bodies including sectoral and cross-sectoral representatives who spread in different sector the general policy directions and the results of consultation and studies (Hunt and Watkiss 2010). In particular the most vulnerable people in the cities need to be heard. As shown in introduction, cities from developing countries are growing very fast. Their population grows more rapidly than their financial, organizational, and infrastructure capacity. Decision-makers are therefore faced with a big number of informal settlements exposed to disasters. Helping the poorest community may therefore increase resilience. It has been observed in developing countries that partnerships between poor communities and local governments focusing on development and tackling risks helped to increase their incomes and thus to reduce health effects of hazards (Satterthwaite et al. 2007). In line with this reasoning, authors promote community-based adaptation (CBA).2 It is a process which put people at the center of the adaptive strategy. Through learning and development, the poorest appear to increase their resilience and anticipatory capacity. Sharing knowledge with peers is another good way to highlight potential local capacities. It creates conditions to be inspired and to inspire other local governments who may be faced with the same challenges and constraints. Literature has demonstrated how being part of a network may foster or even be a catalyst in the development of a strategy. Moreover, these networks mobilize also private actors, especially from the business side (e.g., ICLEI’s Cites for Climate Protection) (Bulkeley 2010). Finally, it is important that local governments find support form upper levels of governments which often dictate the norms to implement and the distribution of resources. Central governments should therefore acknowledge the role played by local authorities and consider it the definition of national adaptation strategy. On this basis, they may then provide financial support.

Mainstream Climate Change Adaptation Mainstreaming climate change adaptation in sectoral policies means considering the impacts of climate change in each sector and providing adapted solutions. A general adaptation strategy is important to raise awareness and may be catalyst in considering climate change impacts, but it needs to be trickled down in the sectors. In Durban, the local government adopted a general adaptation strategy in 2006. But it did not bring any result until some sectors were chosen to further develop an adaptation program, i.e., According to CBA, it is “an approach that is putting people in the centre of their own development, by facilitating a learning process that increases resilience and anticipatory capacity. It is not just a response to climate events and shocks, but rather a complex and holistic process that includes personal development and organizational development to ensure an enhanced problem solving capacity, and the capacity to anticipate events and plant so that future shocks are buffered” (Koelle and Annecke 2011).

2

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health, water, and disaster management (Roberts 2010). In fact within local governments, administrative departments are more or well developed, have more or less resources, or even have already undertaken initiatives regarding climate change. On this basis, some departments may be able to adopt more ambitious and efficient strategies. In that framework, the general adaptation strategy will be an umbrella avoiding contradictory sectoral policy objectives and ensuring coherence. This will also achieve multiple goals (not only mitigation and adaptation targets) (Schreurs 2008). In particular, mainstreaming climate change adaptation within development programs can prove very efficient. People with higher education level, training, and access to services are less vulnerable. Decision-makers must therefore engage in the development of win-win scenarios, that is, policies, which achieve both adaptation and other development goals. Decisions taken today will determine the future development path of the city. Yet how cities develop is part of the climate problem but also the solution. Choices regarding long-lived infrastructures (transport networks, buildings, ports, and water systems) are decisive to improve the energy and emission of the built environment as well as to determine their capacity to resist future climate disasters. Also land use and zoning decisions are important to increase or limit the exposure and vulnerability or urban dwellers and activities to climate hazards. It is therefore vital to integrate now climate change impacts and risks in the decision-making process. Combined with socioeconomic data and development policies, it will enable cities to develop in a sustainable manner for the benefit of the local as well as the global environment.

References Adger N, Arnell NW, Tompkins EL (2005) Successful adaptation to climate change across scales. Glob Environ Chang 15(2):77–86 Amundsen H, Berglund F, Westskog H (2010) Overcoming barriers to climate change adaptation – a question of multilevel governance? Environ Plan C Govern Policy 28(2):276–289 Bartlett S, Dodman D, Hardoy J, Satterthwaite D, Tacoli C (2009) Social aspects of climate change in urban areas in low- and middle-income nations, Contribution to the World Bank fifth symposium, Marseille. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTURBANDEVELOPMENT/Resources/ 336387-1256566800920/6505269-1268260567624/Satterthwaite.pdf Betsill M, Bulkeley H (2006) Cities and the multilevel governance of global climate change. Glob Govern 12:141–159 Birkmann J, Garschagen M, Kraas F, Quang N (2010) Adaptive urban governance: new challenges for the second generation of urban adaptation strategies to climate change. Sustain Sci 5(2):185–206 Bulkeley H (2010) Cities and the governing of climate change. Routledge, London Bulkeley H, Betsill M (2003) Cities and climate change – urban sustainability and global environmental governance. Ann Rev Environ Res 229–253 Centre T (2004) A briefing on climate change and cities: briefing sheet 30. British Council, London Corfee-Morlot J, Kamal-Choui L, Donovan M. G., Cochran I, Robert A, Teasdale P-J (2009) Cities, climate change and multilevel governance. OECD environmental working papers no. 14. OECD Publishing, Paris Corfee-Morlot J, Cochran I, Hallegatte S, Teasdale P-J (2011) Multilevel risk governance and urban adaptation policy. Clim Change 104:169–197

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D’Almeida MR, da Costa Ferreira LC (2011) Opportunities and constraints for local and subnational climate change policy in urban areas: insights from diverse contexts. Int J Glob Environ Issues 11(1):37–53 Dawson R, Hall J, Barr S, Batty M, Bristow, Carney S, Evans S, Ford A, Kohler J, Tight M, Walsh C (2007) A blueprint for the integrated assessment of climate change in cities, Working Paper. Tyndall Centre, Norwich Dodman D (2009) Blaming cities for climate change? An analysis of urban greenhouse gas emissions inventories. Environ Urban 21(1):185–201 Dodman D, Satterthwaite D (2008) Institutional capacity, climate change adaptation and the urban poor. IDS Bulletin, Brighton Dreyfus M (2013) The Judiciary’s role in environmental governance, the case of Delhi. Environ Policy Law 43(3):167 Ecologic Institute, AEA, ICLEI, REC (2011) Adaptation to climate change: policy instruments for adaptation to climate change in big European cities and metropolitan areas. Ecologic Institute, Berlin/Vienna Estiri H (2012) Residential energy use and the city-suburb dichotomy. Available at SSRN: http:// ssrn.com/abstract¼2226806 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2226806 Hoornweg D, Sugar L, Trejos Gomez CL (2011) Cities and greenhouse gas emissions: moving forward. Environ Urban 23(1):207–227 Hunt A, Watkiss P (2010) Climate change impacts and adaptation in cities: a review of the literature. Clim Change 104(1):13–49 Hyden G, Court J, Mease K (2003) Making sense of governance: the need for involving local stakeholders. Discussion paper. Overseas Development Institute, London IEA (2008) World energy outlook. OECD/IEA, Paris IEA (2009) Cities, towns and renewable energy – yes in my front yard 200. IEA, Paris IPCC (2007) Fourth assessment report. IPCC, Geneva Kessides C (2000) Cities in transition. World Bank, Washington, DC Koelle B, Annecke W (2011) Adaptation and beyond no. 1. Community based adaptation (CBA), Indigo development & change, Nieuwoudtville. Available at: http://www.indigo-dc.org/documents/Adaptationandbeyond01small.pdf Krey V, O’ Neill BC, van Ruijven B, Chaturvedi V, Daioglou V, Eom J, Jiang L, Nagai Y, Pachauri S, Ren X (2012) Urban and rural energy use and carbon dioxide emissions in Asia. Energy Econ 34(3):S272–S283, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2012.04.013 Moensch M, Tyler S, Lage J (2011) Catalyzing urban climate resilience: applying resilience concepts to planning practice in the ACCCRN Program (2009–2011). ISET, Boulder Moser C, Satterthwaite D (2008) Towards pro-poor adaptation to climate change in the urban centres of low- and middle-income countries. IIED, London OECD (2009) Integrating climate change adaptation into development co-operation: policy guidance. OECD Publishing, Paris Puppim de Oliveira J, Suwa A, Balaban O, Doll C, Jiang P, Dreyfus M, Moreno-Penaranda R, Dirgahayani P, Kennedy E (2012) Governance challenges for greening the urban economy: understanding and assessing the links between governance and green economy in cities. UNU–IAS policy report. UNU Press, Tokyo Revi A (2008) Climate change risk: an adaptation and mitigation agenda for Indian cities. Environ Urban 20(1):207–229 Roberts D (2010) Prioritizing climate change adaptation and local level resilience in Durban, South Africa. Environ Urban 22(2):397–413 Page 15 of 17

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Sanchez-Rodriguez R (2009) Learning to adapt to climate change in urban areas. A review of recent contributions. Curr Opin Environ Sustain 1(2):201–206 Satterthwaite D (2008) Cities’ contribution to global warming: notes on the allocation of greenhouse gas emissions’. Environ Urban 20(2):539–549 Satterthwaite D, Huq S, Pelling M, Reid H, Romero Lankao P (2007) Adapting to climate change in urban areas: the possibilities and constraints in low- and middle-income nations. Working paper, IIED, London Schreurs MA (2008) From the bottom up: local and subnational climate change politics. J Environ Dev 17(4):343–355 Storch H, Downes NK (2011) A scenario-based approach to assess Ho Chi Minh City’s urban development strategies against the impact of climate change. Cities 28:517–526 Tanner T, Mitchell T, Polack E, Guenther B (2009) Urban governance for adaptation: assessing climate change resilience in ten Asian cities. IDS, Brighton UKCIP (2007) Identifying adaptation options. ECI, Oxford. http://www.ukcip.org.uk/wordpress/ wp-content/PDFs/ID_Adapt_options.pdf UN (2012) World urbanization prospects: the 2011 revision. http://esa.un.org/unup/pdf/ WUP2011_Highlights.pdf UNEP (2011) Mainstreaming climate change adaptation into development planning. www.unep. org/pdf/mainstreaming-cc-adaptation-web.pdf UNEP-UNHABITAT (2005) Climate change: the role of the cities. http://www.unep.org/ urban_environment/PDFs/Brochure_Climatechange.pdf UNHABITAT (2010) The state of the world cities, 2010/2011. UN-HABITAT, Nairobi UNHABITAT (2012) State of the world’s cities 2012/2013: the prosperity of cities. UN-HABITAT, Nairobi United Nations (UN) (2011) World urbanization prospects: the 2007 revision. www.un.org/esa/ population/meetings/EGM_PopDist/Heilig.pdf World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) (1987) Our common future, Brundtland report. WCED, Geneva

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Index Terms: Adaptation 6, 13 Cities 3 Climate change 3, 13 Local governance 10

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Assessing How Participatory/Community-Based Natural Resource Management Initiatives Contribute to Climate Change Adaptation in Ethiopia Hannah Reida* and Lucy Faulknerb a International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), London, UK b Independent Consultant, London, UK

Abstract This chapter assesses the role of community-based/participatory natural resource management (CB/PNRM) in supporting adaptation to current and potential future climate change impacts among pastoral communities in Ethiopia. Such communities are expected to experience significant changes in the natural environments on which their livelihoods rely. Climate impacts are set to exacerbate and intensify an existing dynamic risk landscape characterized by persistent poverty, social and political marginalization, land degradation, and conflict largely due to policy and governance failures undermining dryland productivity. Present pastoralist coping capacities are not sufficient to cope with existing recurrent drought periods and other climate variability impacts, with climate change risk factors likely rendering traditional coping strategies unsustainable. In response, this chapter focuses on selected CB/PNRM initiatives undertaken by Save the Children to show the value of CB/PNRM as an adaptation strategy that builds climate resilience and delivers adaptation benefits for targeted pastoralists/agropastoralists. While climate change was not a specific focus of development investment design, important contributions to strengthening local adaptive capacity through the implementation of transformative processes and practice have been made. This suggests that newer fields of study such as community-based adaptation can learn from older disciplines such as CB/PNRM, with the potential role that development actors can play in the context of building climate resilience meriting further attention among governments and policymakers. Drawing on the development of bespoke methodology for monitoring and evaluating effective adaptation, this chapter also contributes to adaptation evaluation knowledge.

Keywords Climate change; Drought; East Africa; Ethiopia; Pastoralists; Agropastoralists; Participatory natural resource management; Community-based natural resource management; Community-based adaptation; Adaptive capacity; Resilience; Transformation; Monitoring and evaluation

Introduction Many pastoralist communities in East Africa experience persistent poverty, social and political marginalization, land degradation, and conflict (although experiences vary widely both within and

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 25

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between pastoral groups and pastoral areas). These are due to failures of policy and governance rather than the pastoral system itself. Pastoralism is often (wrongly) viewed as economically inefficient and environmentally destructive despite evidence that it often brings economic and environmental benefits beyond those achieved by alternative land uses such as ranching. In addition, the pastoralist way of life is often more resilient to changing climatic conditions because over the years pastoralists have developed strategies to cope with difficult conditions (Riché et al. 2009). In many instances, pastoralists are able to positively exploit greater climate variability to increase their resilience and generate higher returns than would be the case if the environment/climate were more stable or predictable (Krätli and Schareika 2010; Hesse 2010). This is because pastoral systems often have institutions and strategies that can harness the ephemeral, variable, and unpredictable distribution of resources (particularly highly nutritious pastures) to their advantage. This in turn contributes to greater accumulation of assets, better diets, and more income – in other words a more resilient community. Wellfunctioning pastoral systems can also often cope better with periodic extreme events such as drought when compared with institutions and strategies better suited to managing more stable resources. This is because they reduce the loss of assets and have a greater capacity to “bounce back” and resume high productivity once the extreme event is over (Ced Hesse personal communication, Nov. 2012). Climate change is predicted to have severe impacts in East Africa. While some of these impacts will be positive, including bringing more rainfall to certain dry areas, most are likely to be negative. The natural environments on which many of the poorest rely are expected to experience significant changes. Sound risk management to increase livelihood resilience and maintain ecosystem services can be an important component of a cost-effective approach to help people adapt to climate change, especially the most vulnerable groups, including women and children (Ambani and Nicholles 2012). While most development interventions are not designed with climate change adaptation as a key objective, it is likely that they influence community capacity to adapt to changing shocks and trends – whether as a result of climate change or other pressures associated with development (Jones et al. 2010). There is the potential for “double dividends” resulting from adaptation and development interventions due to the strong synergies between the two (Ambani and Nicholles 2012). There is also a growing appreciation that newer fields of study, such as community-based adaptation, have much in common with older disciplines such as CB/PNRM and can both learn and adopt many principles from this older field of study (Chishakwe et al. 2012; Munroe et al. 2011). Research that assesses the role of CB/PNRM interventions in adaptation, however, are in short supply, and evidence of these “double dividends” is mostly anecdotal. This chapter aims, in part, to help fill this information gap by conducting a more rigorous assessment of the contribution that selected Save the Children CB/PNRM initiatives have in contributing to climate change adaptation through building climate resilience and delivering adaptation benefits to the poorest and most marginalized pastoralists and agropastoralists. This includes details of the bespoke methodology developed to achieve this goal and the results and recommendations generated from applying this methodology at the study sites.

Study Site Profiles Selected Save the Children CB/PNRM interventions are located in Liben, Gordola, and Arero districts (“woredas”) in the lowlands of Borana and Guji Zones of Oromia Regional State in Ethiopia (Fig. 1). Similar sites in Horbtor Kebele, Yabello District, with the same history of preexisting development and humanitarian initiatives, but no Save the Children CB/PNRM interventions, were

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_68-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 Oromia Regional State showing the Borana Region in the south and the study sites in this region

also visited for comparative purposes. Both study sites experienced droughts in 2011, which is the primary climate-related hazard (Riché et al. 2009). Study sites are predominantly arid and semiarid rangelands dominated by tropical savannah vegetation with open grassland and perennial woody vegetation. People are primarily pastoralists with cattle, sheep, goats, and camels, or agropastoralists cultivating maize, teff, sorghum, and haricot beans (Riché et al. 2009). Average annual rainfall ranges between 350 and 900 mm, with considerable spatial and temporal variability in quantities and distribution. Rainfall usually occurs from March to May and September to November. Average annual temperature ranges between 19  C and 26  C. Ethiopia is considered one of the most vulnerable countries to the impacts of climate change (World Bank 2010; Adem and Bewket 2011). Potential climate change impacts in the study sites are increasing temperatures and changing rainfall patterns, with study sites located in medium and high drought probability zones (NAPA 2007). Mean annual temperature increases of 1  C, 1.8  C, and 2.9  C by 2030, 2050, and 2080, respectively, are expected compared to 1961–1990 levels (NAPA 2007). Existing trends in increased hot days and hot nights and decreasing annual cold days are set to continue (Conway et al. 2007; Levine et al. 2011). Precipitation patterns are less certain with discrepancies between climate models on modest increases or reductions in rainfall (Conway et al. 2007; NAPA 2007). Similarly, Ethiopia’s exposure to drought and floods is heavily influenced by the El Niño/La Niña phenomena, and the impacts of climate change on these phenomena are currently unclear (ACCRA 2012). Models are, however, broadly consistent in suggesting that rainfall across the study sites will fall more in heavy events (McSweeney et al. 2007). Likewise, local and scientific observations are consistent with drought frequency increasing from every 6–8 years to every 1–2 years (Riché et al. 2009). These climate changes however form only part of the study sites’ vulnerability landscape (McDowell 2011). Changes in non-climate contextual trends regarding livelihood and resource needs have contributed to reducing pastoralist resilience over time. This includes a reduction in natural resource and rangeland availability, especially to key dry season grazing areas due to commercial farming and increasing population pressures resulting in a constant flow of people

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moving from highland areas to lowlands in search of productive natural resource assets for livelihood sustainability. Pastoralist communities themselves have also increased in number, contributing to an overall increase in human population size. Widespread bush encroachment has increased pressures on reduced rangeland resources, and changes in government regional administrative boundaries between Oromia and Somali states have resulted in many Boran and Guji pastoralists losing previously available land. Furthermore, increasing state government administrative influence at local community level has resulted in reduced power and influence yielded by traditional customary institutional leaders. This shift has seen traditional pastoralist processes ignored by formal administrative bodies who provide legal backing and policy support to permanent settlements and farming, therefore reducing access to, for example, existing migration routes and water points that are key to pastoralist livelihoods. Additional changing trends of increased social and economic differentiation combined with weakened indigenous safety net systems, resulting in smaller herd sizes per household with increasing poverty levels, have also contributed to increased livelihood vulnerability for pastoralist households. In light of the above, although the future landscape of risk is uncertain, it is evident that climate change will provide an additional stressor for study site communities. Drought combined with extreme heat events is set to increasingly negatively affect the availability, productivity, and quality of pastures and farmland leading to negative consequences on household food and income levels and human and livestock health. With pastoralists identified as among those most vulnerable to climate change impacts (NAPA 2007), present coping capacities are not sufficient to cope with recurrent drought periods, including those of 2008 and 2010/2011 (Weiser 2012). Other impacts of current climate variability and poverty combined with climate change risk factors are set to render traditional coping strategies unsustainable (Adem and Bewket 2011; Venton et al. 2012).

Project Structure Phase II of the Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative began in 2009 (Box 1 below), yet this study focuses on Save the Children’s upgraded CB/PNRM work implemented under this initiative in 2012 (Box 2 below). Prior to 2009, Save the Children was engaged in the same CB/PNRM project sites where this study was conducted through phase I of the Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative (2004–2008), that focused on short-term drought response, child education, and health initiatives. Box 1: The Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative (Stockton et al. 2012)

Phase II of the Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative is a US$16-million US-Aid-funded project implemented by Save the Children, CARE, Mercy Corps, and International Rescue Committee from 2009 to 2013 Stockton et al. (2012). It aimed to improve pastoralist and ex-pastoralist livelihoods in the above study sites through a range of initiatives including: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Improving community-based natural resource management Improving the ability of pastoralists to gain more economic value from their livestock Diversifying their ability to generate income Improving the effectiveness of early warning systems Implementing selected interventions relating to maternal and child health and HIV/AIDS Integrating drought response and recovery through crisis modifier mechanisms to protect livelihoods during drought periods

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Box 2: Save the Children’s Upgraded CB/PNRM Strategy

Overall goal: Enhanced community resilience to shocks, especially drought, through strengthening of pastoral livelihood systems and their resource management Strategic objectives 1. Stronger stakeholder institutions, cooperation, and cohesion 2. Institutionalized, mutual learning for enhancing adaptive capacities and transformation 3. Improved land use (including secured assess) and sustainable NRM in the context of increasing climate variability

Measuring Adaptation Benefits To assess the effectiveness of Save the Children CB/PNRM interventions in building resilience to climate change risk and delivering adaptation benefits for targeted pastoralists and agropastoralists, new methodology developed for the monitoring and evaluation of community-based adaptation (M&E for CBA) by research program Action Research on Community Adaptation in Bangladesh (ARCAB) is used. In line with current frameworks under development at the international level for successful adaptation M&E, this M&E for CBA system is universal in application and use and has been adopted for this study based on its rapid recognition and uptake by the international community. The approach measures and evaluates the processes used and results obtained by Save the Children’s CB/PNRM interventions in building transformed resilience. This means resilience is built at scale across the following three key components, resulting in climate vulnerable poor communities being able to successfully adapt to long-term uncertain future climate change impacts through sustainable adaptation strategies Ayers and Faulkner (2012), Faulkner (2012): 1. Geographic scale: Resilience is achieved beyond isolated development projects. Effective practice is mainstreamed into long-term institutional structures (scaled up), and activities are replicated beyond immediate project boundaries (scaled out). 2. Time scale: Resilience is sustainable, with communities continuing to maintain and build resilience after project activities have finished. 3. Beyond business as usual approaches: Resilience-building challenges existing development and DRR approaches and retargets efforts towards building the knowledge, capacity, and practice of vulnerable groups to longer-term climate and other risks, not just current risks. This requires using a climate lens to rethink the way existing development and DRR is done as part of the progression towards adaptation to climate change. It also requires refocusing how projectized development and DRR have been operationalized to date. ARCAB describes the range of stakeholders and scales across which change needs to occur in order for the above to take place. These include the following: (1) the climate vulnerable poor, who are generally the poorest and most marginalized people in society (Smith et al. 2003); (2) the local formal and informal institutions needed to deliver adaptation services to these groups at the local level, including community-based organizations, local NGOs, and local government service delivery providers; and (3) the wider “community of practice” including national governments,

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international finance institutions and funds, and national and international learning forums such as the annual international community-based adaptation conferences. Two components of this approach are used in this study. First, a framework for the identification of priority indicators to measure progress of Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention towards transformed resilience. To realize this goal, the framework focuses on three domains of change: (i) Meaningful and locally relevant knowledge (K) about climate change and adaptation science, and non-climate-related information, for the design of feasible, credible, and useful adaptation options. (ii) Knowledge is not enough unless people and institutions have the capacity (C) to act on it. This means having the skills, power, and ability (including finances) to turn knowledge into practice. This applies in the context of both the individual, in terms of having access to the basic assets, resources, and institutions that enable them to adapt to climate variability and change. It also applies to institutions that need access to resources and incentives to turn knowledge into action and the mandate to do this. (iii) Supporting knowledge and capacity will lead to changes in practice (P). These can be adaptive strategies undertaken by local people or shifts towards a more integrated, long-term, flexible, strategic, and participatory way of development planning. These domains are applied to the following outcome areas under which indicators are formed in light of climate and other risks identified as important at local level (Fig. 2 below): • Indicators assessing the knowledge and capacity of climate vulnerable poor community stakeholders to improve their long-term adaptive capacity through the following prerequisites for adaptation: good development coupled with access to and ability to use information related to climate and non-climate risks

Climate and other risks

‘Upstream’ mainstreaming & institutional capacity indicators

KCP

Evidence that people and institutions are adapting and innovating in response to risks

‘Downstream’ adaptive capacity indicators

KCP

Fig. 2 Conceptual framework for outcome indicator areas used in the ARCAB M&E for CBA framework translated to fit Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention (Ayers and Faulkner (2012), Faulkner (2012) adapted from brooks et al. 2011)

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• Indicators assessing mainstreaming and institutional capacity to demonstrate if local institutions have the knowledge, capacity, and incentives to provide climate risk management and deliver adaptation benefits to climate vulnerable project participants • Indicators of evidence that people and institutions are adapting to climate change risk through changing practice as a result of improved adaptive capacity and access to adaptation services Indicator choice for this study was guided by an extensive review of literature and external expert advice on the specifics of adaptation in the context of dryland pastoralist systems in Ethiopia and East Africa. In addition, strong collaboration with Save the Children staff ensured indicators were not only scientifically rigorous but also locally relevant, meaningful, and context specific (Ayers et al. 2012).

Data Collection in the Field Mixed methods of data collection were employed. This consisted of predominantly qualitative but also quantitative measurements of evidence through focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews, participant observation, and field notes. Households from different gender, wealth, age, and livelihood systems were selected based on random sampling. Where possible, research validity was strengthened through the triangulation of data sources. Supplementary secondary evidence was also collated during fieldwork to support information required for quantitative data analysis from Save the Children CB/PNRM project documents.

Analytical Framework Used To aid analysis of field and desk-based research results, another component of the selected methodology was adapted: the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale (Fig. 3 below).

Conventional

-

Projectised development

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Inflexible linear planning

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Poor participation

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Short term focus

ACV / DRR - Use of scientific information on climate variablity and disasters

+

- Largely disaster response than preparedness

ACC - Climate impacts focused

+

- Prioritises climate impact information over local knowledge - Top down approach, ‘ rolled out’ rather than ‘scaled out’ - Mainly technological interventions implemented

Transformative

CB/PNRM Resilience Scale

Development

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Empowerment of vulnerable HHs

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Community-driven

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Bottom up accountability

+ -

Flexible responsive planning

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Strong institutional processes

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Good participatory approaches

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Strong community knowledge of climate variability / disaster impacts

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Use of scientific information on climate variability / disasters

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Development needs addressed as first step towards adaptation

- New climate knowledge blending climate change science with meaningful local knowledge

+

- Climate change adaptation mainstreamed across all project operational levels - Scaling out driven by knowledge changes in all stakeholder groups - Long-term focus

Fig. 3 An analytical framework for assessing CB/PNRM through a climate change lens – the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale

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The CB/PNRM Resilience Scale moves horizontally from development to adaptation to climate variability, including disaster risk reduction (ACV/DRR), to adaptation to climate change (ACC). Vertically, the scale moves from conventional approaches to development, ACV/DRR and ACC, to those that are transformative. To move towards “transformed resilience,” progress towards the bottom right-hand box is recommended: “transformative ACC.” To move towards this goal, changing the methods undertaken and approaches used under what is classed conventional development and ACV/DRR in Fig. 3 above is required. This includes: • Revisiting conventional development and ensuring that the basic needs of the poorest and most marginalized people vulnerable to climate change are being addressed • Empowering climate vulnerable poor groups to ensure that their knowledge and demands are reflected in decision-making processes • Moving beyond short-term projectized approaches to planning towards integrated approaches that engage with and build the capacity of local to national institutions, with associated sustainable institutional and resource bases • Creating spaces for knowledge sharing and knowledge transfer, to support the scaling up and scaling out of effective processes and practice • Ensuring flexible approaches to planning that can respond to changing needs and incorporate a range of knowledge bases, especially that generated by ultimate project participants. Moving towards transformative ACC is largely driven by the integration of new knowledge about adaptation and future climate change. This knowledge is coproduced from both improved scientific information about future climate change impacts and adaptation science and locally generated knowledge from the climate vulnerable poor about past climate trends and the interaction between climate impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation. This blending of scientific and local knowledge is transformational, because it forces development practitioners to rethink the way development planning and implementation are undertaken. Scientific information specifies that climate impacts are becoming more uncertain; hence, a lens that provides more dependable information on possible outcomes at the local scale is needed in order to understand what matters to local people. Relying solely on scientific expertise is not enough. Local knowledge is also needed to develop a new kind of knowledge that all stakeholders can use in practice. However, moving towards transformative ACC is not just about new climate change information and adaptation science. It also requires transformative development and transformative ACV/DRR approaches to be operationalized (along with associated transformations in attitudes, skills, and actions) to support moving towards this goal. This is shown on the scale by the addition signs (+). Transformative ACC requires transformative development, plus transformative ACV/DRR approaches, and plus other components that may be required. This is particularly important for this assessment, where project activities were not initiated with improving climate change resilience as a key goal – and yet many of the development-oriented interventions implemented will likely still make important contributions to transformed climate change resilience. Similarly, making the distinction between conventional and transformative ACC is important, because moving towards more sustainable and transformative resilience does not advocate undertaking any adaptation measures. Adaptation interventions can be viewed on a continuum ranging from specific climate change impacts-based approaches to those that view adaptation as development (Ayers and Dodman 2010; McGray et al. 2007). On the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale in Fig. 3 above, conventional ACC takes the former approach where climate change impacts such as droughts or floods are taken as the starting point for vulnerability assessments, giving rise to largely Page 8 of 25

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technological adaptation solutions through a top-down approach such as insurance schemes for livestock losses. In comparison, transformative ACC takes the latter approach that views adaptation as increasing the adaptive capacity of people to climate and non-climate risk by taking a livelihoodsbased view to assessing vulnerability. Consequently, this results in adaptation interventions that target the underlying drivers of vulnerability as specified by climate vulnerable poor groups themselves, such as improved household access to safe water sources. This perspective is important in the context of this assessment where confidence in what to expect in terms of specific climate change related impacts for project sites in the coming years is not high.

Results and Analysis of CB/PNRM Effectiveness Through a Climate Change Lens The following results and analysis of Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention have been made to provide insight into how much it contributes to building resilience to current and potential future climate change impacts and delivers adaptation benefits for targeted pastoralists and agropastoralists. For ease of comparison, results are summarized alongside those from the non-Save the Children intervention site in Table 1 below. Discussion and analysis of results follows, including examples of key differences between research study sites and justifications to support why results are placed in each position on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale in Figs. 4 (Save the Children site) and 5 (non-Save the Children site) below.

Table 1 Fieldwork results comparing resilience-building outcomes of Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention site with the non-Save the Children site Results from Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention site 1. Awareness of, access to, and integration of weather and seasonal forecasts in planning and decision-making processes at community and local institutional level

2. Shift from seasonal planning to more forward-thinking longer-term foresight, including community perceptions of increased ability to cope with and adapt to future drought conditions 3. District government engagement supporting revitalization and potential sustainability of upgraded traditional pastoralist rangeland management systems 4. Implementation of new and improved livelihood and rangeland management practices increasing respondent knowledge and capacity skills sets leading to improved livelihood outcomes, land productivity, and biodiversity 5. Two-way knowledge exchange on NRM processes between local government and community facilitating improved practices in a climate variability context

Results from the non-Save the Children site Lack of access to and integration of short-term weather and longer-term climate information in planning and decision-making processes at community level, but understanding of need for longer-term climate information to support community preparedness measures to increasing drought risk Lack of long-term, forward-thinking foresight in planning processes including ability to trade off possible futures and consequences given uncertainty Good relationship with local government institutions offering community support with rangeland management through by-law enforcement Implementation of existing livelihood and land use strategies despite perceived climate variability changes to local context leading to reduced livelihood outcomes, land productivity, and biodiversity Lack of community access to new and improved information and capacity bases required for alternate livelihood strategies, improved rangeland management practices, and adaptation (continued)

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Table 1 (continued) Results from Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention site 6. Reducing development deficits through appropriate seasonal mobility and improved access to nutritious pasture, water sources, salt licks, and forest areas facilitating increase in wealth, livestock health, and food security 7. Community perceptions of increased ability to cope with and adapt to future drought conditions including appropriate seasonal mobility and new knowledge and capacity to produce and store hay 8. Increased female inclusiveness in decision-making processes across pastoralist institutional scales, including women empowerment with perceived ownership of and right to rangeland and natural resources coupled with shift in male mindset on cultural role and value of women 9. Utilization of participatory resource mapping and action plans supporting collective problem solving and consensus building, possible reduced conflict situations, and perceived system flexibility 10. Community openness to test indigenous knowledge systems with external relevant information bases 11. Responding to climate vulnerable poor needs through inclusivity respectful of pastoralist traditions, including benefit sharing mechanisms resulting in reduced livelihood vulnerability and improved coping capacity

Results from the non-Save the Children site Appropriate seasonal mobility restricted due to reduced access to nutritious pasture and water sources in wet and dry seasons facilitating increased livelihood and livestock insecurity Community perceptions of inability to cope with and adapt to current and future climate/drought conditions due to lack of access to new and improved knowledge and capacity bases required for adaptation Male-orientated decision-making processes undertaken with lack of female inclusiveness and empowerment, but new understanding and insight into the beneficial role of women in NRM processes Evidence of collective problem solving and consensus building through discussion within male community committee members Community openness to improve traditional NRM knowledge bases through expert information integration and learning-by-doing approaches Inclusion of poorer and more marginalized households in community planning with specified benefits and needs addressed unclear

Save the Children’s CB/PNRM Intervention 1. Awareness of, access to, and integration of weather and seasonal forecasts in planning and decision-making processes at community and local institutional level Community and local institutional stakeholders have access to up-to-date weather and seasonal forecasts from a mix of traditional and more scientific sources. These are harmonized at community scale to respond to local needs and are used in planning and decision-making processes. Information is useful, yet access to comprehensive earlier weather forecasting is needed to strengthen community climate preparedness. Similarly, local institutional weatherrelated information provided is primarily short-term in focus, with weather information not the same as rigorous scientific information on longer-term climate change trends. As Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention did not consider climate change from its outset, this weak integration of climate change foresight is unsurprising. Yet, to support project participants adapt to current and potential future climate changes, engaging with the scientific community to provide access to locally relevant and meaningful scientific and adaptation information is required. When integrated with local knowledge on vulnerability and adaptation, new knowledge is formed that can support changes in practice that lead to stronger resilience outcomes. It is not just what is being done that is important, but why and with what knowledge that is key. Undertaking practice that is not planned action based on climate change foresight reflects a coping paradigm compared to practice driven by new climate change knowledge. Page 10 of 25

Fig. 4 Assessment of Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention in building resilience to climate change risk for pastoralists and agropastoralists

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_68-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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ACC

⊗ Community openness to improve traditional NRM knowledge-bases through expert information integration and learning-by-doing approaches

⊗ Good relationship with local government institutions offering community support with rangeland management through by-law enforcement

⊗ New understanding and insight into the beneficial role of women in NRM processes

⊗ Evidence of collective problem solving and consensus building through discussion within male community committee members

⊗ Male-orientated decision-making processes undertaken with lack of female inclusiveness and empowerment

⊗ Community perceptions of inability to cope with and adapt to current and future climate/drought conditions due to lack of access to new and improved knowledge and capacity-bases required for adaptation

⊗ Appropriate seasonal mobility restricted due to reduced access to nutritious pasture and water sources in wet and dry seasons facilitating increased livelihood and livestock insecurity

⊗ Lack of community access to new and improved information and capacity-bases required for alternate livelihood strategies, improved rangeland management practices and adaptation

⊗ Implementation of existing livelihood and land use strategies despite perceived climate variability changes to local context leading to reduced livelihood outcomes, land productivity and biodiversity

⊗ Lack of long-term, forward thinking foresight in planning processes including ability to trade-off possible futures and consequences given uncertainty

⊗ Understanding of need for longer term climate information to support community preparedness measures to increasing drought risk

⊗ Lack of access to and integration of short-term weather and longer term climate information in planning and decision-making processes at community level

ACV / DRR

Fig. 5 Assessment of the non-Save the Children CB/PNRM intervention site in building resilience to climate change risk for pastoralists and agropastoralists

CB/PNRM Resilience Scale

l

a

n

o

i

t

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Transformative

Development

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_68-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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Consequently, this result is placed under conventional ACV/DRR on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale in Fig. 4 below. 2. Shift from seasonal planning to more forward-thinking longer-term foresight, including community perceptions of increased ability to cope with and adapt to future drought conditions Although community climate change foresight is not strong, CB/PNRM planning processes have supported pastoralist and agropastoralist groups in shifting beyond the immediate confines of a seasonal planning approach towards a longer-term vision incorporating longer-term contextual trends. This includes the proper utilization of wet and dry season grazing areas and the systematic management of increasing herd mobility that promotes sustainability of key natural resources supporting improved capacity to adapt to current climate variability impacts. This change in planning foresight is a strong entry point to build upon for adaptation to future climate change risk through the incorporation of locally meaningful scientific climate change information as discussed above. As a result, this evidence is placed under transformative on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale. It is considered ACV/DRR as it supports community adaptation to current climate risk. 3. District government engagement supporting revitalization and potential sustainability of upgraded traditional pastoralist rangeland management systems Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention has strengthened the existing relationship between relevant government departments, customary institutional leaders, and male and female community members – an important factor for adaptation. This includes government enforcement of traditional pastoralist rangeland management systems providing more secure access to and control over land and resources for community stakeholders. This strengthened government-community partnership signals a foundation for sustainability. Community stakeholders perceive they will reap benefits beyond initial project time boundaries. This is an important aspect of building resilience that moves beyond short-term projectized approaches to planning towards longer-term approaches that are integrated with key institutions for an enabling environment for adaptation. This evidence is transformative on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale in Fig. 4 below, because it facilitates institutional processes that enhance longer-term access to resources communities require to adapt to climate and other risks. It is ACV/DRR because institutional engagement supports reduction of development deficits of community stakeholders as the first step towards adaptation. By improving access to the institutions and key assets people need to fulfill their basic capabilities, the ability of project participants to cope with and manage the additional stresses presented by climate variability and climate change are likely to be enhanced. 4. Implementation of new and improved livelihood and rangeland management practices increasing community knowledge and capacity skill sets leading to improved livelihood outcomes, land productivity, and biodiversity management Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention provided community stakeholders with access to relevant and meaningful knowledge and capacity bases for the implementation of new and improved livelihood and NRM practices (examples in Table 2 below) that build resilience to current and potential future climate change impacts – ACV/DRR on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale. Similarly, a learning-by-doing approach was undertaken, which is important in the context of adaptation, as not all future climate change impacts are known. Learning what works and what does not will need to be iterative as is discussed in further detail below. Likewise, evidence shows project participants view their surrounding ecosystem and its services in a holistic Page 13 of 25

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Table 2 Examples of new and improved NRM-related knowledge, skills, and competencies for project participants under Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention Proficiency sets “Hard” asset oriented New Improved – Hay preservation – Selected bush clearing and storage

– Debarking for bush – Soil/water conservation clearing – Aloe vera soap – Use of crop residue (for production livestock fodder) – Upgrading drought reserves for weak and lactating livestock

“Soft” process oriented New – Participatory resource mapping

– Shift in understanding from land and water being only perceived key resources to inclusion of forest capital (leading to forest protection)

Improved – Ability to organize wet/dry season grazing areas leading to herders and households undertaking appropriate seasonal mobility – Ability to assign and reallocate appropriate settlement locations

manner, rather than just as the provider of natural resources. Both these aspects form important components of resilience-building that are considered transformative on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale. 5. Two-way knowledge exchange on NRM processes between local government and community facilitating improved practices in a climate variability context Local government stakeholders feel CB/PNRM fosters two-way knowledge exchange between government, customary institutional leaders, and community members on effective processes and practices. This merging of knowledge to create new knowledge is important. It suggests potential sustainability of CB/PNRM processes in light of changing contexts. “We can continue with PNRM because we have the knowledge, skills and capacity to manage resources effectively” (Deedha Customary Institution members). This improved capacity to combine local knowledge and “expert” scientific knowledge is important in the context of building resilience to climate change impacts as scientific predictions at a geographical and time scale that would help pastoralists plan livelihood activities accordingly are currently lacking and are not always in agreement with local knowledge of what has been experienced so far, and what changes local people feel are likely to be experienced in the future. This evidence is placed under transformative ACV/DRR on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale. It is “transformative” based on the strong network between community respondents and local government and the corresponding two-way flow of knowledge sharing between these stakeholders. It is considered ACV/DRR because it results in improved respondent resilience and ability to adapt to climate variability risk. This result would move closer towards “transformative ACC” if knowledge sharing included the integration of longer-term scientific climate information with local vulnerability insights to form new knowledge required to support changes in planning and practice. 6. Reducing development deficits through appropriate seasonal mobility and improved access to nutritious pasture, water sources, salt licks, and forest areas facilitating increases in wealth, livestock health, and food security Evidence suggests that development capacity to cope with and respond to climate variability and environmental hazards has improved by ensuring that the basic needs of community stakeholders are addressed as a first step towards adaptation. Examples of this are presented

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in Table 3 below. Looking through a climate change lens on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale, this result is considered transformative development. 7. The above evidence, together with new hay making skills, links to another result on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale: increased community perceptions of ability to cope with and adapt to drought conditions. 8. Increased female inclusiveness in decision-making processes across pastoralist institutional scales, including women empowerment with perceived ownership of and right to rangeland and natural resources coupled with shift in male mindset on cultural role and value of women Female inclusiveness in CB/PNRM decision-making processes across pastoralist management system scales presents a considerable change in cultural values within the traditional maleorientated pastoralist system. “The past system is wrong. Women are equal in NRM. They know the problems we face so it’s advantageous for us to have them as part of the process” (Aardha Customary Institution members). Female benefits include attending meetings to discuss and disseminate issues within the community and perceived increases in rights and empowerment. Community benefits include the provision of instrumental support with access to natural resources through active engagement in decision-making processes. This result moves beyond conventional towards transformative development on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale in Fig. 4 below.

Table 3 Example results, short-term benefits, and outcomes as a result of traditional pastoralist rangeland management processes being revitalized under Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention Result of Save the Children CB/PNRM intervention (in which research for this study took place) – 2,000,000 ha of rangeland under improved management, including wet season grazing areas – 4,365 ha of private enclosures dismantled – 16 settlements relocated – 10,396 ha of communal enclosures established/upgraded

Short-term benefit – Increased access to nutritious pasture for livestock during dry seasons leading to improvements in livestock body condition and reduced livestock mortality

Outcome – Increase in livestock market price – Shift in livestock market value from wet season to wet and dry season – Two-year-old bull increase in price during dry season from 1,000–2,000 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) without access to communal grazing enclosures to 3,000–4,000 Birr with access under PNRM – One-year-old shoats and calves now hold market value – Perceived shift in livestock market access: traders coming to the community – Increase in number and more drought resilient livestock types owned per household (i.e., camels) – Increase in meat and milk production – Increased food security for children and due to access to increased number of households improved (nutritious pasture quality and – Change from no dry season milk size of pasture available) communal pre-intervention to 2–3 caps of milk per grazing areas for livestock in dry seasons day per cow (continued)

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Table 3 (continued) Result of Save the Children CB/PNRM intervention (in which research for this study took place) Short-term benefit

– 67 migration routes reopened – 55 salt lick routes reopened – Nine traditional water points rehabilitated – Seven shallow well water points rehabilitated – Three pond water points rehabilitated

– Better access to existing grazing and water sources due to reopening of roads/ migration routes – Salt licks reopened facilitating improved access to a key natural resource for livestock health

– Reduced water collection time for women due to improved access to water sources (from a 3-am start and 6-pm finish to a 10-am start to 3-pm finish) and change in water management structures reducing manpower required to physically retrieve water (from eight to four people needed) – Reduced time searching for grass for livestock during dry seasons due to wet/dry season grazing divisions and new hay making skills fostering availability of grass in dry seasons

Outcome – Ability to sell excess dry season milk production in the local market – Improved access to water sources for livestock during wet seasons after the rainy season has ended, although secure access still problematic leading to potential early migration to dry season grazing areas – Increase in access to mineral and salt lick sites resulting in improved livestock health especially during wet seasons – Farmers reducing enclosed land holding areas to perimeters of cultivatable agricultural land rather than extended plots blocking road and migration route access and privatizing large areas of key rangeland resources that were previously “common” property – Increased time for alternate household responsibilities, including attending decision-making meetings for women engaged in PNRM processes

9. Utilization of participatory resource mapping and action plans supporting collective problem solving and consensus building, possible reduced conflict situations and perceived system flexibility Undertaking resource mapping has fostered collective problem solving and consensus building reflecting priorities of all rangeland users resulting in “reduced conflict through sharing and saving resources” (Reera Customary Institution members). In light of an uncertain future climate where potential demand and competition for natural resources and ecosystem services may increase, this outcome is important. Likewise, the participatory approach used provides perceived system flexibility, with community plans regularly monitored and changed if required. These results provide examples of transformative development processes on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale that aid building climate resilience: community-driven responses; flexible planning approaches; empowerment of respondents through increasing knowledge and capacity bases; and the facilitation of spaces where people can unite to discuss, share, and generate meaningful information deemed important by them.

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This links to another result on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale in Fig. 4 below: building community cohesion through bottom-up participatory approaches leading to a shift in mindset from “individualism” to “communal” use of rangeland and natural resources and wider stakeholder solidity across the broader institutional landscape. The bottom-up approach used at large in Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention is also transformative development as it moves beyond conventional development planning and project processes that focus on “outcomes” rather than “process” as well. The “conducive environment to participate actively in managing resources properly” has facilitated a change in community mindset from individualism to communal use of rangeland resources (Deedha and Reera Customary Institution members). It has also enabled community and institutional cohesion with increased accessibility to government institutions identified as important for livelihood support at community level. “Before all stakeholders worked separately. PNRM is best as it brings people together” (Liben District Land and Environmental Protection Office). Working together through collaborative practice is also transformative development. This is because it breaks the boundaries of conventional practice that often isolate different stakeholders and their needs from each other. 10. Community openness to test indigenous knowledge systems with external relevant information bases By merging traditional knowledge with external expert information to generate improved community outcomes, community stakeholders are open to move beyond the boundaries of their own traditional knowledge base and adjust systems with relevant information to meet community needs in light of changing circumstances – a key component of adaptive capacity. “Save the Children told us to enclose an area but we knew this before. What is different now is that we use new skills in this area such as piling of hay [and prescribed fire] so the area of land is more productive for us” (Reera Customary Institution members). Also, project participants are innovating through altering practices shared on a small scale – another key component of adaptive capacity. These results suggest a move beyond conventional approaches to those that are more transformative, and closer to ACV/DRR than development, because the mechanisms in place facilitate improved practice in the current context of climate variability. 11. Responding to climate vulnerable poor needs through inclusivity respectful of pastoralist traditions, including benefit sharing mechanisms resulting in reduced livelihood vulnerability and improved coping capacity In a climate change context, ensuring the needs of the poorest and most marginalized are identified and addressed is important, as climate impacts will potentially increase respondent vulnerability levels. Save the Children has targeted most vulnerable needs through an inclusive community approach that is culturally appropriate for pastoralist groups. This evidence is viewed as transformative development on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale. Similarly, this evidence is transformative as empowerment of the climate vulnerable poor has been increased through benefit sharing mechanisms that adjust previous structures that did little to support the poorest and most marginalized households engaged in NRM (Napier and Desta 2011). For example, shifting allocation from livestock grazing to hay making in upgraded community enclosures results in less well-off households incurring more benefits than better off households due to increased numbers of poorer households engaged in improved hay making practices. Likewise, assigning less well-off households without livestock designated areas to practice

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improved irrigated farming supports reduced livelihood vulnerability and improved coping capacity.

The non-Save the Children CB/PNRM Intervention Site The overriding comparison between study sites is that Save the Children’s results primarily fall between transformative development and transformative ACV/DRR on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale. Results from the non-Save the Children site fall largely under conventional development. In addition to the results presented in Table 1 above, discussion and analysis highlighting key differences is presented here. Community stakeholders at the non-Save the Children study site were operating on an existing pastoralist livelihood system paradigm that was no longer producing effective results in light of local changing circumstances with respondents unable to adapt with change. One component contributing towards this outcome is as follows: lack of access to and integration of short-term weather and longer-term climate information in planning and decision-making processes at community level. This result is placed under conventional development on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale in Fig. 5 below. New climate change and adaptation science that integrates local knowledge with relevant and meaningful scientific climate information is required for effective adaptation. Another key component for why coping strategies undertaken were not forming the basis of successful long-term adaptive strategies needed to address current and future climate change risk is that non-Save the Children respondents lacked understanding, ability, innovation, and access to relevant information regarding how to adapt their livelihood and rangeland management strategies to address perceived climate variability changes. “We’re still keeping livestock in the old ways when there was grass and water” (male non-Save the Children intervention site members). In addition, community stakeholders view their surrounding ecosystem not as a holistic functioning system for resilience-building but as the provider of key natural resources that their livestock depend on. The results of this approach are shown in Table 4 below. The outcome of implementation of existing livelihood and land use strategies despite perceived climate variability changes to local context leading to reduced livelihood outcomes, land productivity, and biodiversity, and its associated results highlighted in Table 4 below are placed under conventional development on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale. Likewise, lack of community access to new and improved information and capacity bases required for alternate livelihood strategies, improved rangeland management practices, and adaptation that contributes towards the results in Table 4 above renders its position under conventional development on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale in Fig. 5. Non-Save the Children community stakeholders do have access to local government institutions, but government capacity for meaningful support through desired learning-by-doing approaches is lacking. “We want practical training so we can learn properly” (male non-Save the Children intervention site members). Nevertheless, community openness to improve traditional NRM knowledge bases through expert information integration and more beneficial learning mechanisms to support adaptation moves towards transformative development. One important difference between study sites relates to gender. Women at the non-Save the Children site were not empowered. They were unable to raise their voices and participate in community decision-making and therefore unable to realize their potential role as strategic agents of community adaptation processes. Consequently, this result of male-orientated decision-making processes undertaken with lack of female inclusiveness and empowerment is placed under conventional development on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale. Page 18 of 25

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Table 4 Results showing lack of rangeland resilience and its consequences for non-Save the Children community stakeholders Absence of new/improved action – Wet/dry season mobility operational but ineffective in providing access to sufficient pasture and water access in changing context circumstances – Increasing lack of access to water in dry season for livestock and households – Lack of access to salt lick resources – Lack of conservation of degraded land (e.g., through soil/water conservation techniques; planting grasses) – Lack of diversified livelihoods (e.g., hay making) – Lack of improved crop cultivation techniques

Outcome of absence of new/improved action – Pasture in dry season enclosures being consumed quickly due to increased number of livestock rendering insufficient pasture for length of dry grazing seasons – Reduction in livestock body condition and livestock price (6,000–8,000 ETB to 300–1,000 ETB) – Reduction in milk availability for household consumption – Livestock able to migrate when grass is available – Salt licks not easily accessible as located in far distances – Teff/crop residue/straw/hay purchased from highland areas at high prices – Understanding of need to keep hay for crisis periods – Donkeys used for water collection from far distances to support access to water, especially for weaker calves – Women undertake a 14-h journey to collect and carry 20 l of water from nearest town areas – Trees and plants drying out and dying – Reduction in wildlife – Reduction in land productivity and ecosystem services – Shift from multi- to mono-crop cultivation

Evidence does however highlight signs of male community stakeholders potentially shifting mindsets on women’s role in NRM processes. “Our previous thinking was that women are not fit for our work as it requires strength. But now we realize that women would be beneficial. A kallo protected by women in another area is in much better condition that ours” (Male non-Save the Children intervention site members). This new understanding and insight into the beneficial role of women in NRM processes is considered transformative development on the CB/PNRM Resilience Scale.

Key Recommendations This study has shown the value of CB/PNRM as an adaptation strategy in the context of the Ethiopian dryland pastoralist communities. While climate change was not a specific focus of the Save the Children CB/PNRM intervention design, many of the activities implemented made important contributions to building local adaptive capacity. Comparisons with the non-Save the Children site, where most activities were closer to conventional development than transformative development or transformative ACV/DRR, reinforced these observations. This suggests that the potential role that development actors, such as Save the Children, can play in the context of adapting to climate change merits further attention among governments and policymakers. Likewise the role that sustainable natural resource management can play as an adaptation strategy, particularly for poor and vulnerable groups such as the Borana pastoralists, merits further attention when compared to alternative infrastructure or technological adaptation solutions. Chishakwe et al. (2012) and Munroe et al. (2011) argue for the need for newer fields of study such as community-based

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adaptation to learn from older disciplines such as CB/PNRM, and this study reinforces this recommendation.

Conclusions The aim of this study has been to assess the effectiveness and contribution of CB/PNRM in building resilience to current and potential future climate change impacts for pastoralists and agropastoralists in Ethiopia. To achieve this, the processes used and the results obtained by Save the Children’s upgraded CB/PNRM intervention compared to CB/PNRM with no external support has been analyzed in light of local climate and non-climate risk factors. Based on the long-term presence and existing rapport between Save the Children and project stakeholders in the selected CB/PNRM intervention sites, together with a thorough understanding of the pastoralist systems in play and a more conducive institutional environment for change supported by recent government learning, Save the Children’s CB/PNRM work has produced strong results. Results show that much has been done towards moving from conventional approaches to development (and adaptation to climate variability including disaster risk reduction) to transformative development approaches that empower local people and support bottom-up, participatory, flexible decision-making and planning processes within a strong institutional context. This includes incorporating local and scientific climate knowledge focused on climate variability trends into planning. However, locally meaningful scientific climate change information still needs to be merged with local knowledge bases so it can be mainstreamed into community and institutional decision-making processes across scales to support adaptation to uncertain future climate change impacts. Much has also been done towards moving from conventional development approaches towards those that support adaptation to climate variability including disaster risk reduction (ACV/DRR). Although project activities were not initiated with improving climate change resilience as a key goal, evidence shows that many of the development-oriented processes implemented have made important contributions towards this outcome. In an adaptation to climate change context, this is significant as it means that Save the Children has largely moved beyond conventional development and ACV/DRR methods that typically lack the ability to foster sustainable resilience-building in an uncertain and changing environment. Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention has achieved this through the following means: • Moving from a short-term projectized approach to planning towards the facilitation of longerterm change processes • Application of an integrated project approach that has engaged local institutions and improved partnerships between government and community members, including joint action between government and traditional customary institutions • Strengthening local institutional processes fostering an enabling environment for adaptation by addressing basic needs through improved access to key assets and resources and new and improved livelihood strategies leading to enhanced local adaptive action • Meaningfully engaging respondents in PNRM community-driven planning and decision-making processes, especially women, through strong participatory and collaborative methods increasing individual and community empowerment plus bottom-up accountability, especially for those most marginalized community members

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• Project participants shifting their mindset from viewing their ecosystem as a provider of natural resources to a more holistic understanding of environmental system linkages • Targeted community members possessing improved development capacity to cope with and respond and adapt to current context situations including climate variability, with subsequent decreases in poverty levels, and increases in food security and livelihood outcomes As a result, targeted community stakeholders feel they possess the knowledge and capacity to cope with and adapt to increasing drought scenarios. Joint community and local government action plans and agreements by local government authorities facilitating improved access to appropriate wet and dry season grazing areas, combined with new livelihood and rangeland management techniques, have led to an increase in adaptive capacity which evidence suggests is likely to increase respondent resilience in light of, or in spite of, climate risk. This means that Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention has helped strengthen the local institutions and strategies required by respondents to ensure higher productivity levels and thus greater accumulation of assets, improved diet and income, and the increased capacity to protect these gains, in a context of unpredictable distribution of resources and periodic extreme events. In stark comparison, a site visited without Save the Children CB/PNRM interventions to provide comparative results of project and adaptation outcomes showed that existing pastoralist livelihood systems were no longer producing effective results in light of local changing circumstances with respondents unable to adapt with change. Evidence showed that respondents’ were not bouncing back to previous productivity levels before changing drought conditions, with productivity levels appearing to be in slow decline over time. Coping strategies undertaken were not forming the basis of successful long-term adaptive strategies needed to address current and future climate change risk. This reflects the results of previous research in the Borana Zone, which found that while communities were in agreement “that diversification of financial resources and income generating activities is key to adapting to changing conditions, whether this means engaging in petty trade, sale of firewood and charcoal, construction and renting of houses, honey and alcohol sale, business creation and management, or learning to save money using financial institutions,” limited access to information and “limited education, skills and access to financial services and markets required to diversify their livelihoods” limited pastoralists’ ability to adapt (Riché et al. 2009). The research found that a lack of appropriate knowledge and experience meant that communities suggested different and sometimes contradictory adaptation strategies in light of expected changes: “For example, pure pastoralists suggested that agro-pastoralism would be a better livelihood strategy to deal with climate change, while agro-pastoralists would like to drop out of their farming activities due to increasing crop failure” (Riché et al. 2009). The results of Save the Children’s CB/PNRM intervention have contributed towards reducing livelihood vulnerability and increasing resilience for its project participants by leaving behind a legacy of empowered people more able to cope with and adapt to current climate variability risk through strong development-based outcomes of “good” development and improved institutional governance. However, more progress needs to be made to further strengthen respondents’ ability to adapt to current climate variability risk and importantly to future climate change impacts. Undertaking transformative development and transformative ACV/DRR approaches is necessary but is only part of the process towards the long-term goal of transformed climate change resilience, whereby resilience is built at scale, resulting in the successful longer-term adaptation of the climate vulnerable poor to climate change impacts through sustainable adaptation strategies Ayers and Faulkner (2012), Faulkner (2012). Among others, improvements in generating and integrating new knowledge about Page 21 of 25

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adaptation and future climate change across scales from community to local institutional levels is required.

References ACCRA (2012) Climate trends in Ethiopia: summary of ACCRA research in three sites. Africa climate Change Resilience Alliance (ACCRA). Available at http://community.eldis.org/ .5a3ed4ef/ACCRA_Policy_Brief_Ethiopia_Climate_Trends.pdf Adem A, Bewket W (2011) A climate change country assessment report for Ethiopia. Submitted to forum for environment (on behalf of ECSNCC). Epsilon International R&D, Addis Ababa Adger WN, Arnell NW, Tompkins EL (2005) Successful adaptation to climate change across scales. Global Environ Change 15:77–86 Ambani M, Nicholles N (2012) Why community based adaptation makes economic sense. Policy brief: Climate change. CARE/new economics foundation, London Ayers J, Faulkner L (2012) Action research for community adaptation in Bangladesh: monitoring and evaluation framework paper. Draft for feedback. April 2012 Faulkner L (2012) Action research for community adaptation in Bangladesh: monitoring and evaluation and baseline strategy for CBA. Final report. Nov 2012 Ayers J, Dodman D (2010) Climate change adaptation and development: the state of the debate. Prog Dev Stud 10(2):161–168 Ayers J, Huq S (2013) Adaptation, development and the community, chapter 19. In: Palutikof J, Boulter SL, Ash AJ, Smith MS, Parry M, Waschka M, Guitart D (eds) Climate adaptation futures, 1st edn. Wiley, London Ayers J, Anderson S, Pradhan S, Rossing T (2012) Participatory monitoring, evaluation, reflection and learning for community-based adaptation: a manual for local practitioners. CARE International, London Ayers J, Forsyth T (2009) Community-based adaptation to climate change: strengthening resilience through development. Environment 51(4):22–31 Beautement P (2012) ACCRA Phase II research: transforming to flexible forward looking decision making. PowerPoint presentation, 4 Sept 2012, the abaci partnership Burton I (2004) Climate change and the adaptation deficit. Adaptation and impacts research group occasional paper 1. Environment Canada, Quebec Brooks N, Anderson S, Ayers J, Burton I, Tellam I (2011) Tracking adaptation and measuring development. IIED Climate Change Working Paper, London Calow R, Bonsor H, Jones L, O’Meally S, MacDonald A, Kaur N (2011) Climate change, water resources and WASH: a scoping study. ODI, London Carlson K et al (2012) Tradition in transition: customary authority in Karamoja. Feinstein International Centre/Tufts University, Uganda Chishakwe N, Murray L, Chambwera M (2012) Building climate change adaptation on community experiences. IIED, London Conway D, Schipper L, Yesuf M, Kassie M, Persechino A, Kebede B (2007) Reducing vulnerability in Ethiopia: addressing the implications of climate change. Report prepared for DFID and CIDA. University of East Anglia, Norwich DFID (2011) Defining disaster resilience: a DFID approach paper. Department for International Development, London

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Dida BT (2000) Boorana pasture resources management, chapter 5. In: Individualising the commons: changing resource tenure among Boorana Oromo of Southern Ethiopia. Unpublished Masters thesis, Addis Ababa University Dodman D, Ayers J et al (2009) Building resilience. In: State of the World: into a warming world. Norton, New York/London, pp 151–168 Faulkner L (2012) Save the children Somalia/Somaliland monitoring and evaluation framework. For project: DRR and CCA in Odwayne district, Toghdeer region, Somaliland (2012–2013). Final report, Oct 2012 Faulkner L, Ali I (2012) Moving towards transformed resilience: assessing community-based adaptation in Bangladesh. Action Aid Bangladesh, Action Research for Community Adaptation in Bangladesh, International Centre for Climate Change and Development, Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies, Dhaka Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2011) Ethiopia’s climate-resilient green economy: green economy strategy. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa Flintan F, Cullis A (2009) Introductory guidelines to participatory rangeland management in pastoral areas. Save the Children USA Frankenberger R et al (2012) Enhancing resilience to food security shocks in Africa. Discussion paper Funk C, Senay G, Asfaw A, Verdin J, Rowland J, Eilerts GDK, Michaelsen J, Amer S, Choularton R (2005) Recent drought tendencies in Ethiopia and equatorial subtropical eastern Africa. Fews net famine early warning system network. Vulnerability to food insecurity: factor identification and characterization report. Number 01/2005. Fews Net Girot P, Ehrhart C, Oglethorpe J, Reid H, Rossing T, Gambarelli G, Jeans H, Barrow E, Martin S, Ikkala N, Phillips J (2012) Integrating community and ecosystem-based approaches in climate change adaptation responses. ELAN, unpublished. Available at www.elanadapt.net Hesse C (2010) Tracking the real value of pastoralism: a reevaluation of traditional livestock herding in Tanzania reveals the system’s economic viability, climate resilience and fit with local needs. IIED Reflect & Act paper. May 2010 Huq S, Rabbani G (2011) Climate change and Bangladesh: policy and institutional development to reduce vulnerability. J Bangladesh Stud 13:1–10 IISD (2012) CRiSTAL user’s manual version 5. Community-based risk screening tool – adaptation and livelihoods. International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg Independent Evaluation Group (2012) Adapting to climate change: assessing World Bank group experience (Phase III of the World Bank Group and climate change). Independent Evaluation Group, Washington, DC Jones L, Ludi E, Levine S (2010) Towards a characterisation of adaptive capacity: a framework for analysing adaptive capacity at the local level. Overseas Development Institute, London Krätli S, Schareika N (2010) Living off uncertainty: the intelligent animal production of drylands pastoralists’. Eur J Develop Res 22(5):605–622 Levine S, Ludi E, Jones L (2011) Rethinking support for adaptive capacity to climate change: the role of development interventions. ODI, London Ludi E, Getnet M, Wilson K, Tesfaye K, Shimelis B, Levine S, Jones L (2011) Preparing for the future? Understanding the influence of development interventions on adaptive capacity at local level in Ethiopia. Africa Climate Change Resilience Alliance (ACCRA) Ethiopia synthesis report. Overseas Development Institute, London McDowell S (2011) Drought in the Horn of Africa: don’t blame it on the rain. Opinion piece. International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) Page 23 of 25

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McGray H, Hammill A, Bradley R, Schipper EL, Parry J-E (2007) Weathering the storm: options for framing adaptation and development’. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC McSweeney C, New M, Lixcano G (2007) Ethiopia – UNDP climate change country profiles, Ethiopia MoFED (2010) Growth and transformation plan (GTP) 2010/11-2014/15. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa Munroe RN, Doswald N, Roe D, Reid H, Giuliani A, Castelli I, Möller I (2011) Does EbA work? A review of the evidence on the effectiveness of ecosystem-based approaches to adaptation. Research highlights, November 2011. BirdLife International, UNEP‐WCMC, IIED, Cambridge, UK NAPA (2007) Climate change national adaptation programme of action (NAPA) of Ethiopia. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Water Resources, National Meteorological Agency. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. GEF/UNDP Napier A, Desta S (2011) Review of pastoral rangeland enclosures in Ethiopia. PLI Policy Project. Feinsten International Center, Tufts University and USAID Njoka JT (2012) Enhancing resilience to climate change in the Horn of Africa. Produced in collaboration with USAID, IFPRI, ILRI and the University of Nairobi OECD (2009) Integrating climate change adaptation into development co-operation: policy guidance. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Publishing, Paris Reid H (2011) Improving the evidence for ecosystem-based adaptation. IIED Opinion: lessons from adaptation in practice series. IIED, London Reid H, Alam M, Berger R, Cannon T, Huq S, Milligan A (2009) Community-based adaptation to climate change: an overview. Participatory Learn Action 60:11–38 Riché B, Hachileka E, Awuor CB (2009) Climate-related vulnerability and adaptive-capacity in Ethiopia’s Borana and Somali communities. Final assessment report. IISD, IUCN, Save the Children UK and CARE Save the Children USA, Save the Children UK, CARE, Mercy Corps and International Rescue Committee (2011) Pastoralist livelihoods initiative phase two (PLI II). Reporting period: Oct 2010 to Sep 2011. Report submitted to USAID Save the Children USA, December 2011, PNRM steps Smith JB, Klein RJT, Huq S (2003) Climate change, adaptive capacity and development. Imperial College Press, London Spearman M, McGray H (2011) Making adaptation count: concepts and options for monitoring and evaluation of climate change adaptation. GIZ, Germany Stockton G, Greene McMillin J, Desta S, Beyero M, Tadele A (2012) Mid-term performance evaluation of the pastoral livelihoods initiative phase II. Final report. USAID/Ethiopia Thomas AW (2011) Ecosystem-based adaptation: bridging science and real-world decision-making. Second International Workshop on Biodiversity and climate Change in China. The Nature Conservancy Global Climate Change Adaptation Program Travers A, Elrick C, Kay R, Vestergaard O (2012) Ecosystem-based adaptation guidance: moving from principles to practice. UNEP UNEP (2012) Making the case for ecosystem-based adaptation: building resilience to climate change. UNEP, Nairobi Venton CC, Fitzgibbon C, Shitarek T, Coulter L, Dooley O (2012) The Economics of Early Response and Disaster Resilience: Lessons from Kenya and Ethiopia. Economics of Resilience Final Report

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Weiser A (2012) Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative Phase Two (PLI II): Annual Report October 2011 to September 2012. Report submitted to USAID. Save the Children, CARE, Mercy Corps, and International Rescue Committee World Bank (2010) Economics and adaptation to climate change: Ethiopia. World Bank, Washington, DC Yohe G, Tol R (2002) Indicators for social and economic coping capacity—moving toward a working definition of adaptive capacity. Glob Environ Change 12:25–40

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Build Sponge Eco-cities to Adapt Hydroclimatic Hazards Chung-Ming Liua*, Jui-Wen Chenb, Yin-Si Hsiehc, Ming-Lone Lioud and Ting-Hao Chene a The Chinese Association of Low Carbon Environment, Taipei, Taiwan b Dingtai Co. Ltd, Shulin, New Taipei, Taiwan c Environmental Quality Protection Foundation, Taipei, Taiwan d Graduate Institute of Environmental Engineering, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan e Dingtai Co. Ltd., Shulin, New Taipei, Taiwan

Abstract Global population increases steadily and the majority are moving into cities. In the meantime, fastgrowing cities are suffering with intensified hydroclimatic hazards. In this chapter, the authors propose to transform cities to sponge eco-cities so as to enhance their capacity on flood prevention, water resources replenishment, heat-island mitigation, biodiversity development, and air and water quality improvement. The strategy proposed is to replace all urban pavements with load-bearing, permeable, breathable, and sustainable pavements, so that rainwater will be stored underneath on raining days and water vapor will be released on sunny days. With water and air reaching soil underneath, underground ecosystem will flourish to enrich urban biodiversity. The JW eco-technology meets the seven criteria specified in this chapter to construct desired pavements. JW refers to the initials of the first name of the inventor, Jui-Wen Chen. These criteria are loadbearing capability, permeability, water storage capacity, breathability, underground ecosystem enrichability, affordability, and sustainability. In Taiwan, this JW eco-technology has been tested successfully for 10 years and is recommended by the official agency responsible for the green building certification. Certainly, it is not a trivial task to replace all man-made pavements of any city within a short period of time. A “Build Sponge Taiwan Initiative” has been launched by environmental groups in Taiwan to promote the idea to the general public and to hopefully build sponge eco-communities island-wide in the nearest future.

Keywords Sponge eco-city; JW eco-technology; Urban-hydrological hazards

Introduction Global population converges steadily into cities, and cities are expanding fast (UN 2012). Challenged by abnormal climatic events, record-breaking rainfall easily results in widespread floods in cities (Hibbs and Sharp 2012). A typical example was the devastating flood happened on July 21, 2012, in Beijing. Within a short period of time, many areas were buried in water with depths up to 2 m. Losses were severe. People are pondering how to avoid similar disasters in the future (Olesen 2012). Some experts on flood control suggest lifting the storm drainage standard from the current

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 12

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1–3 years’ recurrence period to a higher interval. However, with more extreme rainfall events are expected to occur (IPCC 2012), how much higher the recurrence interval should be raised? Besides, such strategy may not be affordable to all other cities (Searle 2004). In the meantime, Beijing, with a population of 20 million living in a semiarid region, is hungry for more water resources. Overexploiting of groundwater with a yearly volume of 10 million is blamed for local land subsidence (Wang 2004). Therefore, storing record-breaking rainfalls for later usage may be more beneficial than diverting rainwater downstream for flood prevention. Such dilemma poses a profound challenge to all city governments. In addition, accelerated urban growth leads to intensified urban heat island (Lin and Yu 2005; Liu et al. 2007). Shortage of green zones and water worsen the condition and put stress on elderlies when unexpected heat waves prevail (Jenerette and Larsen 2006; Kovats 2008). Clearly, for a modern city, a balance between stormwater drainage (Butler and Davies 2010) and rainwater harvesting (Pandey et al. 2003) must be tackled respectably. In this report, the authors propose to transform each city to a sponge eco-city, which is supposed to store rainwater during each rainfall event and to release water vapor on sunny days. Ideally, it is like a sponge absorbing and releasing water spontaneously. No mechanical or chemical or electrical energy is needed. With enhanced detention capacity and extra water storage, a sponge eco-city can prevent flood and mitigate urban heat island smoothly. How to create a sponge eco-city? The approach is to replace all man-made pavements with high load-bearing, high permeable, and high breathable pavements and to store rainwater within a gravel layer right below. With water and air reaching to the underground soil layer, tree roots and microorganisms will flourish underneath and pollutants captured will be decomposed and become nutrients to the ecological system (Liu et al. 2012; Fan et al. 2013). Seven criteria are specified to select desired technique for paving the high load-bearing, high permeable, and high breathable pavement. Only the JW eco-technology (Chen 2004) meets these criteria and the completed pavement is named as the JW pavement. In the following, ideas about a sponge eco-city, the JW eco-technology, and the benefits accompanying with a sponge eco-city are explored.

Sponge Eco-city The term “sponge city” was used by demographers in population studies to describe the fact that urban cities concentrate and absorb the surrounding rural populations like a sponge, resulting in a continuous, steady decrease in rural populations and a simultaneous expansion of urban areas (Budge 2006). However, urban development results in compactly built buildings, congested roads, traffic, pollutant accumulation, and the pooled consumption of a variety of materials, such as electricity, oil, food, water, and medicines (Van Rooijen et al. 2005; Grimm et al. 2008). Thus, while cities are very important for the development of modern human civilization, they also produce many problems, especially when they encounter hydroclimatic hazards (Hibbs and Sharp 2012). In this report, a sponge city represents a city with all man-made pavements being replaced by permeable and breathable pavements which will store rainwater underneath and let water evaporate on sunny days. Since ecological system will flourish underneath, the authors name this kind of city as a sponge eco-city. The idea of reducing effective impervious area in city so as to reduce surface runoff, thus reducing the amount of water directly entering the drainage system and increasing the retention time of rainwater in natural ecosystems to filter the surface impurities carried by rainwater, is proposed in the low-impact development (LID) strategy (Dietz 2007; USEPA 2000, 2006) and the sustainable urban Page 2 of 12

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drainage systems (SUDS) in UK (Ellis et al. 2002) and the water-sensitive urban design (WSUD) in Australia (Donofrio et al. 2009). In principle, concepts outlined in LID, SUDS, and WSUD are sound, but they are difficult to make an impact on either an ancient or a fast-growing city, such as Beijing. The key problem is lacking an innovative technology to pave a permeable, breathable, loadbearing, and sustainable pavement to replace all impervious man-made pavements with limited resources. In the following, seven criteria are specified for identifying a qualified pavement technology: 1. Load-bearing capability: The compressive strength of the constructed pavement should reach 600 kg f/cm2; that is, the pavement is with strength greater than 8,000 lb f/in2 and is able to withstand the pressure from grinding by a heavy tank (Papagiannakis and Masad 2008). 2. Permeability: The pavement must be permeable to 10,000 mm/h of water under clean conditions and 1,000 mm/h when covered with leaves and dust (Scholz and Grabowiecki 2007). One advantage of such pavement is that no matter how strong a rainfall occurs, the surface runoff would be close to zero (Wu 2005). Thus, the construction of drainage ditches around the pavement may be unnecessary. 3. Water storage capacity: In many areas, it is specified that permeable pavements must be accompanied with gravel layers underneath (Krueger and Smitha 2012). The purposes are for stormwater detention and pollutant filtering (Sansalone et al. 2008). Since the environmental condition of each city is different, the designated water detention amount can be different. In this chapter, an effective 10-cm water storage layer is proposed, which can be achieved with a 33.4cm-depth gravel layer of porosity 0.3 or in any other combinations of gravels and water-storing materials. Then, as the road area in Beijing is 62.7 Mm2 (BSIN 2013), thus 6.27 Mm3 of water, or 6.27 MT of water, could be stored underneath. 4. Breathability: Detectable movement of air flowing freely up and down through the pavement is specified. The purpose is to cool the ambient air through vaporing the underground water and to absorb air pollutants substantially into layers below the pavement (Liu et al. 2012). Also, the air provides necessary nutrients and active agents to the ecosystem underneath (Paul 2007). 5. Underground ecosystem enrichability: With air and water flowing freely into layers below the pavement, tree roots and microorganisms will flourish. Such underground ecosystem development is not detectable with eyes, which is in contrast to the ecosystem linked with the urban green landscape, but will function similarly, i.e., to decompose pollutants absorbed and clean the environment (Chapelle 2000; Liu et al. 2012). Such system may be named as an underground wetland (Mitsch and Gosselink 2007). 6. Affordability: This is an important factor to consider when transforming an ancient city in the third world to a sponge eco-city. The construction cost should not be a burden; the maintenance spending must be negligible; and, most importantly, there are minimized needs to repair or replace the pavement for a long period of time, such as more than 30 years. Therefore, when estimating the total budget for a period of 30 years or more, the cost will be affordable to almost all cities in the world. 7. Sustainability: With suitable maintenance being applied, major characteristics of the pavement, such as smoothness, evenness, load-bearing, permeability, water storage, breathability, and underground ecosystem development, must be kept for a period of 30 years or more. Thus, a considerable amount of resources and funding involved in replacing the pavement could be saved in the long run. These all meet the specification as a sustainable pavement (Gopalakrishnan 2011).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_69-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

The JW Eco-technology To every place explored by man, there must be a road. Under every road built by man, there must be an interruption of soil linking with nature. Therefore, all man-made pavements, such as walkways, road, etc., can be viewed as the first act of destruction by humans to the environment. Taking human skin as an example, if covered by paints, the skin would be deteriorated to a deceased condition. Hence, humans are practically living above deceased Earth surface with man-made pavements extending widely all over a city and are wishing that all urban-hydrological problems can be managed through engineering measures, which is clearly an impossible mission. To sustain urban environment, pores of all man-made pavements must be opened up so as to cooperate with Earth while facing the challenge of long-lasting heat waves, severe droughts, devastating floods, etc. The pavement paved with the JW eco-technology (Fig. 1) is characterized with a specific thickness of gravels under a concrete pavement, which uses structured plastic frames with hydraulic conductivity (Liu et al. 2012), named as the JW aqueduct frame (Fig. 2), to replace traditional reinforced steels to ensure the compressive strength and flexural strength of the concrete pavement (Chen 2004). The JW aqueduct frame has a covering stripe which is removed after the solidification of concrete, so as to reveal holes of water pipes. These holes are named as pores of the JW pavement. Since reinforced steels would oxidize, rust, and expand upon contact with water, efforts are needed to block water entry below the conventional reinforced concrete pavement (Papagiannakis and Masad 2008). In contrast, with the JW aqueduct frame, water is welcomed to flow freely into layers below. Furthermore, a conventional rigid pavement would crack with rainwater seeping underneath or tree roots extending below (Papagiannakis and Masad 2008). This is not the case with the JW pavement. In Taiwan, a 50-meter length JW road was constructed within the campus of the Taipei National University of Technology (TNUT) since 2003, with tree roots unblocked along the pavement. Until now, the road maintains similar functions with no crack or bumps (Tsai JH, 2010, Long-term monitoring of the pervious pavements in front of the architecture building of the National Taipei University of Technology, personal communication. (in Chinese)). Liu et al. (2012) and Fan et al. (2013) opened up portion of this pavement and revealed that tree roots were growing widely

Fig. 1 Illustration of the JW pavement. The upper section is a rigid concrete block with the concrete being reinforced by the JW aqueduct frame (Fig. 2). Covering stripe of the aqueduct frame is removed after the solidification of concrete, so as to reveal holes of all aqueducts. These holes are named as pores of the JW pavement. Water and air are flowing freely through aqueducts. Below, gravels function as pillars to maintain the stability of the upper solid block, while the upper gravel layer facilitates air circulation and the lower gravel layer is for water storage Page 4 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_69-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Fig. 2 The JW aqueduct frame

underneath. In Taiwan, a 10-year guarantee for the evenness and smoothness of the JW pavement is provided by the inventor. Theoretically, if damages caused by earthquake would not happen, the JW pavement could last for more than 30 years and hence qualify as a sustainable concrete pavement (Van Dam et al. 2012). The JW plastic frame composes of many air-cycle aqueducts (Fig. 2). On the surface, it is about 100 pores per square of meter, acting as skin holes for allowing the flow of rainwater and air circulation. In comparison to the conventional porous asphalt pavement, grass bricks, and permeable tiles, negligible surface runoff can be measured over the JW pavement during each rainfall event (Wu 2005), for the rainwater penetrates directly through each aqueduct into the lower gravel layer (Fig. 1) rather than slowly seeping through the pavement as most other permeable materials. Tests done by Li (2004) showed that when all the aqueduct entrances were free from dusts and leafs, the pavement had an average infiltration rate of 12,557 mm/h; if occupied thoroughly by dusts and leafs, it still recorded an average infiltration rate of 1,487 mm/h. Still, routine maintenance is recommended to keep the aqueducts free from clogs and maintain a good condition. In Taiwan, the Architecture and Building Research Institute recommends the usage of the JW pavement in the green building evaluation manual and specifies the porosity below the JW pavement as 0.3, which is about six times of those conventional permeable tiles sold in Taiwan (Lin et al. 2012). The mission and bearing load of each man-made pavement is designed differently; therefore, the underlying depth of the gravel layer, the thickness of the concrete pavement (i.e., the length of the air-cycle aqueduct), the artistic surface treatment, etc., can all be different. For instance, the thickness of a road pavement must be larger than that of a walkway. In short, the thicker the concrete pavement, the more weight the pavement can bear. Li (2004) measured the vertical point load on a JW concrete block with a thickness of 60
60
7.5 cm by the test specifications for flat-panel concrete given by the European Federation for Specialist Construction Chemicals and Concrete Systems (EFNARC). The authors found that the block could withstand 20–30 kg/cm2 (equivalent to 300–420 psi), while the standard load of a general large vehicle is 90 psi. Pavements with thicknesses of 10 cm and 15 cm could withstand 30–40 kg/cm2 and 40–60 kg/cm2, respectively. Acceptable ductility, malleability, and toughness of the JW concrete block were also noted. In addition, according to the standard specification CNS1232 of Taiwan, the compressive strength of JW pavement could reach 1,980 kg f/cm2; according to the standard specification CNS1011 of Taiwan, the tensile strength of JW pavement reached 74 kg f/cm2; according to the standard specification CNS10757 of Taiwan, the wear resistance of JW pavement reached 0.51–1.22 %; according to the standard specification CNS6471 of Taiwan,

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_69-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Fig. 3 Underneath the JW pavement, permeable pipes within the gravel layer can direct rainwater into the stormwater drainage system

soluble sulfate only affected the JW pavement by 0.38  0.01; according to the standard specification ASTMC979 of Taiwan, alkaline substances would not affect the surface characteristics of the pavement. Meanwhile, the gravel layer can be specified with a longer depth for regions wishing to store more water. Or permeable pipes can be placed within the gravel layer to direct rainwater into the underground stormwater drainage system, as shown in Fig. 3. In Taiwan, a 4
120 m JW road was recently constructed in Xizhi, New Taipei City, with two parallel underground water tanks capable of storing 70 t of rainwater. Measurements on April 18, 2013 show that around noontime the ambient temperature was about 33  C, while the surface temperature of the JW road and the nearby asphalt road was about 26.2  C and 38.2  C, respectively. On August 12, 2013, the noontime air temperature was about 38.3  C, while the surface temperature of the JW road and the nearby asphalt road was about 41.8  C and 63  C, respectively. With the pavement breathability, the surface temperature of the JW road is clearly much lower than that of the asphalt road. Furthermore, it is due to a significant amount of rainwater stored underneath in spring that the surface temperature of the JW pavement was lower than that of the ambient air (Chen et al. 2013). Fan et al. (2013) compared the ecological activities below the JW pavement installed in TNUT with those under three other adjacent permeable pavements by collecting samples in the gravel and soil layers underneath and concluded that the microbial compositions and their activities under the JW pavement were both superior to those under other pervious pavements. Bacterial communities under the JW pavement were more abundant and diverse. The soil under the JW pavement also reflected more activated and versatile microbial activities in all substrates and for specific types of functional guilds. Liu et al. (2012) also studied the function of the JW pavement in TNUT and designed experiments to compare the variation of the air pollutants concentrations within a fenced area over the JW pavement with one vehicle emissions discharging into with results from similar experiments over a non-JW pavement. Under stagnant condition, it was found that the JW pavement diluted vehicle pollutant emissions near the ground surface by 40–87 % within 5 min of emission, while the data at 2 m height suggested that about 58–97 % of pollutants were trapped underneath the pavement

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_69-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

20 min after emission. Those quantitative estimations may be off by 10 %, if errors in emissions and measurements were considered. SO2 and CO2 underwent the most significant reduction. Very likely, pollutants were forced to move underneath due to the special design of the JW pavement. In order to track the fate of pollutants, parts of the pavement were removed to reveal a micro-version of wetland underneath (Fan et al. 2013), which could possibly hold the responsibility of absorbing and decomposing pollutants to forms harmless to the environment and human health. According to the “2012 Yearly Parliamentary Validation of the Budget Price for Engineering Projects” of the Taipei City Government (TCG 2012), the JW permeable pavement has a unit installation price close to that of highly compressed bricks which is about 30 % lower than that of permeable tiles. But the compressed bricks require 21 times more than the JW pavement for the maintenance cost, which is mostly for replacing broken bricks every year. Also, the former is officially recommended to be replaced in every 5 years, while the latter has a life expectancy more than 30 years. In reality, local government would replace the former in every 10 years and pay more on the yearly maintenance. Therefore, with the JW pavement, the total budget would be at least 3–7 times lower than that using the highly compressed within a 30-year time span or 5–10 times lower than that of permeable tiles. To all cities in the world, the JW aqueduct frame can be manufactured locally, while materials such as concrete and gravels are from local origin and the construction workers are trained local labors. Under the principle of “everything local” and with a sustainable nature, paving of the JW pavement is absolutely affordable to all cities in the world. In all, this section explains how the JW eco-technology meets the seven criteria specified for constructing a sponge eco-city: load-bearing, permeable, water-storing, breathable, underground ecosystem friendly, affordable, and sustainable.

Benefits of a Sponge Eco-city What are the benefits of a sponge eco-city? In the following, a few cities are selected for illustration. Using Beijing as an example, given that 10 % of the 3,377 km2 of the developed areas (337.7 million m2) (BSIN 2012) are sidewalks, squares, and parking lots with 62.7 million m2 of road areas, there are approximately a total of 400 million m2 of man-made pavement that can be changed to the JW pavement. If the space under the pavement is designed to store 10-cm effective thickness of rainwater, approximately 40 MT of water can be stored, which is equivalent to 80 streams of the Cheonggyecheon in Seoul, Korea. Here the Cheonggyecheon is selected for comparison due to it being a successful urban renovation project. The Cheonggyecheon was once covered with an intraurban double-deck highway and the ambient air temperature of the area was about 5 higher than that of the central area. In early 2000s, a nature restoration project was executed and the stream with approximately 500 KT of water storage was restored (Cho 2010). The ambient temperature of the area is now about 3.6 lower than that of the central area (RESTORE 2013). If one restored Cheonggyecheon-type stream is enough to cool the nearby area by 8.6 with respect to the previous covered condition, a weakened urban heat island could be expected in Beijing with 80 streams of Cheonggyecheon flowing underneath. With such detention capacity, the chance to observe serious flooding in Beijing would be lowered. Moreover, future record-breaking rainfalls will be kept to replenish local water resources. There are other unexpected benefits: every degree of the ambient temperature lowered will lead to less air-conditioning demands and hence less energy consumed and less carbon dioxide and air pollutants emitted from power plants (Kan and Tien 2004). Also, at least 50 % of carbon dioxide and air pollutants emitted by vehicles will be captured Page 7 of 12

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by the JW road to become nutrients for the underground ecological system (Liu et al. 2012). Clearly, reduction of ambient PM2.5 level and haze could be expected and hence the public health risk would be lowered considerably (Liu et al. 2013). The benefits to create a sponge eco-city are impressive. If 10 % of the following urban areas, London (1,623 km2), Paris (2,844 km2), Berlin (1,347 km2), Moscow (4,403 km2), Warsaw (544 km2), Cairo (1,709 km2), Istanbul (1,399 km2), Delhi (1,943 km2), Bangkok (2,331 km2), Shanghai (3,497 km2), Tokyo (8,547 km2), Los Angeles (6,299 km2), Houston (4,644 km2), Rio de Janeiro (2,020 km2), Buenos Aires (2,642 km2), and Sydney (2,031 km2) (DEMOGRAPHIA 2013), are man-made pavements and can be converted to the JW pavements with a designated 10-cm effective depth of rainwater storage, then about 16, 28, 14, 44, 5.4, 17, 14, 19, 23, 35, 86, 63, 46, 20, 26, and 20 MT of water can be stored, respectively, which is equivalent to 32, 56, 28, 88, 10, 34, 28, 38, 46, 70, 172, 126, 92, 40, 52, and 40 Cheonggyecheon streams, respectively. The benefits to all these cities with such a tremendous amount of detention capacity are astonishing. Although the exercise here only provides a rough idea of the potential in changing these cities to sponge eco-cities, it gives a hope to sustain these cities and other expanding urban areas to adapt hydroclimatic hazards under the ongoing climate change.

Discussion and Conclusion This chapter proposes a daring and innovative idea: transform urban cities to sponge eco-cities by replacing all man-made pavements to load-bearing, permeable, water-storing, breathable, underground ecosystem flourishing, and sustainable pavements. The goal is to store rainwater below the urban pavements on raining days and to release water vapor on sunny days. It will function as a sponge spontaneously with no extra efforts needed. Benefits include enhancing the detention capacity and hence strengthening local flood prevention capability, storing rainwater to replenish local water resources, cooling pavement temperature and mitigating urban heat island, nursing the development of the underground ecosystem, capturing vehicle-emitted pollutants and CO2 to clean the ambient environment, filtering stormwater pollutants, reducing haze and public health risks, saving long-term costs on pavement replacement, and adapting hydroclimatic hazards and climate change. As global population is growing steadily and congesting restlessly into cities, they are becoming the most vulnerable areas in facing hydroclimatic hazards (Mitchell 1999; Pelling 2003). Transforming cities to sponge eco-cities will lower this risk and, therefore, is the most favorable approach toward sustainability. It is worthwhile to note that the transformation toward sponge eco-cities has no conflict with the installation of the current urban stormwater drainage system (Butler and Davies 2010). Rather, the combination will surely enhance the local water storage and the detention and drainage capacity (Sansalone et al. 2008), as shown in Fig. 2. The idea has already been exercised in Taiwan (Chen et al. 2013). In this chapter, seven criteria are specified for identifying the suitable technology: load-bearing capability, permeability, water storage capacity, breathability, underground ecosystem enrichability, affordability, and sustainability. Among them, affordability is the most important factor for cities in the third world, i.e., low costs in installation, maintenance, and replacement for at least 30 years or more. In this chapter, the JW eco-technology is recommended for fulfilling those seven criteria with supporting experimental data outlined. This technology has been tested in Taiwan for 10 years and is now recommended in the Taiwan green building evaluation manual (Lin et al. 2012) and is certainly ready to be tested and implemented in any place in the world. Page 8 of 12

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Certainly, it is not a trivial task to replace all man-made pavements to the JW pavements within a short period of time; but for reducing the urban vulnerability and for sustaining nature and human population, it is better to start the task as early as possible. In Taiwan, a “Build Sponge Taiwan Initiative” (Liu and Hsieh 2013) has been launched by environmental groups to promote the idea to the general public. To create JW sponge eco-cities may be a dream difficult to fulfill, but it is possible to construct sponge eco-communities at every place in the nearest future. Hopefully, similar activities will be launched soon all over the world.

References Budge T (2006) Sponge cities and small towns: a new economic partnership. In: Rogers MF, Jones DR (eds) The changing nature of Australia’s country towns. Victorian Universities Regional Research Network Press, Ballarat, pp 38–52 Butler D, Davies J (2010) Urban drainage. CRC, Boca Raton, 656 pp BSIN (Beijing Statistics Information Network) (2013) Beijing annual statistics. Beijing municipal bureau of statistics. http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/ (in Chinese) Chapelle FH (2000) Ground-water microbiology and geochemistry. Wiley, New York, 496 pp Chen JW (2004) Maintenance and improvement in the ecological environment of the island: the design and application in high bearing structure pervious pavement. In: The international conference on the Islands of the World VIII, 1–7 Nov 2004, Kinmen Island, Taiwan Chen S-H, Fu L-Y, Chen J-W, Chen T-H, Liu C-M (2013) Adapting climate hazards by paving the JW pavement: implementation of the Qiedong Riverbank Breathable Road at Xizhi, New Taipei City, Taiwan. In: The 9th APRU research symposium on multi-hazards around the Pacific Rim. 28–29 Oct 2013, Taipei, Taiwan Cho M-R (2010) The politics of urban nature restoration: the case of Cheonggyecheon restoration in Seoul, Korea. Int Dev Plann Rev 32:145–165 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2012) Summary for policymakers. In: Field CB, Barros V, Stocker TF, Qin D, Dokken DJ, Ebi KL, Mastrandrea MD, Mach KJ, Plattner G-K, Allen SK, Tignor M, Midgley PM (eds) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation. A special report of working groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK/New York, pp 1–19 Demographia (2013) Demographia world urban areas. 175 pp. Downloaded on 28 July 2013.http:// www.demographia.com/db-worldua.pdf Dietz ME (2007) Low impact development practices: a review of current research and recommendations for future directions. Water Air Soil Pollut 186:351–363 Donofrio J, Kuhn Y, McWalter K, Winsor M (2009) Water sensitive urban design: an emerging model in sustainable design and comprehensive water cycle management. Environ Practice 11:179–189 Ellis JB, D’Arcy BJ, Chatfield PR (2002) Sustainable urban‐drainage systems and catchment planning. Water Environ 16:286–291 Fan L-F, Wang S-F, Chao W-L, Chen C-P, Hsieh H-L, Chen J-W, Chen T-H (2013) Microbial community structure and activity under various pervious pavements. J. Environ. Eng. 10.1061/ (ASCE) EE.1943-7870-0000798.04013012 Gopalakrishnan K (2011) Sustainable highways, pavements and materials. Transdependenz LLC, Ames, 186 pp Page 9 of 12

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Grimm NB, Faeth SH, Golubiewski NE (2008) Global change and the ecology of cities. Science 319:756–760 Hibbs BJ, Sharp JM Jr (2012) Hydrogeological impacts of urbanization. Environ Eng Geosci 18:3–24 Jenerette GD, Larsen L (2006) A global perspective on changing sustainable urban water supplies. Global Planet Change 50:202–211 Kan Y-B, Tien M-J (2004) Analysis of the energy saving effect by raising air-conditioned setting temperature. China Energy 26:28–31 (in Chinese) Kovats RS (2008) Heat stress and public health: a critical review. Annu Rev Public Health 29:41–55 Krueger DW, Smitha CW (2012) Infrastructure design manual. July 2012. Department of Public Works and Engineering, City of Houston, 327 p Li W-F (2004) Research project for JW precautionary air-cycle aqueduct pavement method. Taiwan Construction Research Institute, Apr 2004, 59 p (in Chinese) Lin X-C, Yu S-Q (2005) Inter-decadal changes of temperature in the Beijing region and its heat island effect. Chinese J Geophys 48:47–54 Lin C-D, Chung H-W, Chang C-I, Chen G-N (2012) Evaluation manual of green building – basic, the architecture and building research institute, 163 pp (in Chinese) Liu C-M, Hsieh Y-S (2013) Build sponge Taiwan initiative. http://eqpf.myweb.hinet.net/download/ 2.pdf (in Chinese) Liu W, Ji C, Zhong J, Jiang X, Zheng Z (2007) Temporal characteristics of the Beijing urban heat island. Theor Appl Climatol 87:213–221 Liu CM, Chen J-W, Tsai J-H, Lin W-S, Yen M-T, Chen T-H (2012) Experimental studies of the dilution of vehicle exhaust pollutants by environment-protecting pervious pavement. J Air Waste Manage Assoc 62:92–102 Liu C-M, Chen C-W, Fan L-F, Chao W-L, Tsai J-H, Chen T-H (2013) Haze reduction through the JW pavement absorption. In: The 9th APRU research symposium on multi-hazards around the pacific rim, 28–29 Oct 2013, Taipei, Taiwan Mitchell EK (1999) Crucibles of hazard: mega-cities and disasters in transition. United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 535 pp Mitsch WJ, Gosselink JG (2007) Wetlands. Wiley, New York, 600 pp Olesen A (2012) Tough questions after Beijing rain storm kills 37. The Associated press, 23 July 2012. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/china-storms-kill-20-including-10-beijing Pandey DP, Gupta AK, Anderson DM (2003) Rainwater harvesting as an adaptation to climate change. Current Sci 85(1):46–59 Papagiannakis AT, Masad EA (2008) Pavement design and materials. Wiley-Blackwell, New York, 552 pp Paul EA (2007) Soil microbiology, ecology and biochemistry. Academic, New York, 522 pp Pelling M (2003) The vulnerability of cities: natural disasters and social resilience. Earthscan, London, 212 pp RESTORE (the RESTORE partnership for river restoration in Europe) (2013) Cheonggyecheon restoration project. Retrieved on July 28, 2013, http://www.restorerivers.eu/Portals/27/ Cheonggyecheon%20case%20study.pdf. Sansalone J, Kuang X, Ranieri V (2008) Permeable pavement as a hydraulic and filtration interface for urban drainage. J Irrig Drain Eng 134:666–674 (Special issue: Urban storm-water management) Scholz M, Grabowiecki P (2007) Review of permeable pavement systems. Building Environ 42:3830–3836 Page 10 of 12

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Searle G (2004) The limit to urban consolidation. Australia Planner 41:42–48 TCG (The Taipei City Government) (2012) Yearly parliamentary validation of the budget price for engineering projects. 12 Dec 2012. http://www.dba.tcg.gov.tw/DO/DownloadController.Attach. asp?xpath¼public/Attachment/112613225649.pdf (in Chinese) UN (United Nations) (2012) World urbanization prospects, the 2011 revision. http://esa.un.org/ unpd/wup/index.htm USEPA (United States Environmental Protection Agency) (2000) Low impact development (LID): a literature review. U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC. EPA-841-B-00-005 USEPA (2006) Fact sheet: low impact development and other green design strategies. U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC Van Dam T, Taylor P, Fick G, Gress D, Van Geem M, Lorenz E (2012) Sustainable concrete pavements: a manual of practice. Federal Highway Administration, DTFH61-06-H-00011 (Work Plan 23), 114 pp Van Rooijen DJ, Turral H, Biggs TW (2005) Sponge city: water balance of mega-city water use and wastewater use in Hyderabad. India Irrig Drain 54:S81–S91 Wang YP (2004) Study on land subsidence caused by overexploiting groundwater in Beijing. Site Invest Sci Technol 5:46–49 (in Chinese) Wu C-S (2005) Analysis of the environmental benefits of the permeable pavements. Master Thesis, Graduate Institute of Engineering, National Central University, Taiwan, 193pp (in Chinese)

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Index Terms: JW eco-Technology 4 Sponge eco-city 2 Urban hydrological hazards 4

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_70-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Climate Change and Health in Colombia Tam Trana*, Salua Osorio Mradb and Gilma C. Mantillaa,c a International Research Institute for Climate and Society, Columbia University, Palisades, NY, USA b Instituto Nacional de Salud, Bogotá, Colombia c Centro de Estudios e Investigación en Salud, Fundación Santa Fe de Bogotá, Bogotá, Colombia

Abstract As the impacts of climate change become more widely acknowledged, federal governments are beginning to address the subject in the national agenda. However, the difficulty in determining the magnitude and impacts of climate change has led to challenges in policy-making. This chapter seeks to create a comprehensive understanding of how Colombia and the federal government have made important advances in implementing a climate change framework with a focus on health. This chapter will provide context on the role and responsibilities of the government before discussing the climatic conditions of Colombia and how climate change is impacting the country, especially on the health sector. Such discussion will justify why climate change is a major current and future priority for the country. The chapter will then examine the existing climate change policy framework and ongoing projects that are targeted toward climate and health. This chapter will show that there is still a need to improve the capacities and interest of the public health research community by improving the evidence and knowledge about climate change impacts, vulnerability, and risk. Understanding Colombia’s national circumstances will allow other countries and decisionmakers to potentially use Colombia as an example to define their own health and climate change agendas.

Keywords Colombia; Climate change; Health; Policy adaptation; Mitigation; Climate impacts

Introduction With the annual carbon dioxide maximum having recently exceeded 400 ppm, the IPCC reports have agreed that climate change will likely impact society but there is a great deal of uncertainty on the extent and timing of such impacts. Developing countries currently and will continue to experience the most negative impacts. Many countries lack the necessary resources and do not have an existing framework to create federal policies to respond to climate change. Furthermore, it is anticipated that public health will be highly impacted by climate change but the health sector currently lacks the federal support and resources to create and tailor policies accordingly. Climate change and health issues have recently become a large concern globally and they are starting to be addressed in many developing countries. A climate change policy framework, with a focus on health, will be provided on Colombia because of the progress that has been made within

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_70-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

the country and by the government. Brief pertinent background information on the political structure of Colombia will be illustrated so context can be provided on the role and responsibilities of the government. The chapter will then discuss the climatic conditions of Colombia and how climate change is impacting the country, especially in the health sector. Such discussion will justify why climate change is a major current and future priority for the country. The chapter will then examine the existing climate change policies, with a focus on climate change and health policies, in Colombia where advances have been made. The hope is that by illustrating existing federal policies in a developing nation, other developing nations may also learn and replicate the successes of Colombia’s policies within their own respective countries. By demonstrating the progress that has been done within Colombia, the goal is that other countries may eventually use similar Colombia’s climate change framework to define their own health and climate change agendas. Providing information on a government’s current capabilities and how climate change impacts each nation is crucial because without such background, context cannot be provided to justify why federal policies should be prioritized or enforced. This chapter utilized governmental documents, publications from major organizations, and scientific articles to discuss the current policies in Colombia. The authors of this chapter relied on peer-reviewed publications, when available, but this was not often possible because of the lack of available publications on the Colombian policies. The greatest efforts were thus made to utilize documents published by the Colombian government in an attempt to ensure accuracy on Colombia’s status. By doing so, this allowed less limitation in illustrating the current political framework in Colombia.

Background Despite contributing only 0.2 % of the total global carbon dioxide emissions, Colombia is considered highly vulnerable to the negative social, economic, and environmental impacts of climate change (Ideam 2010). Certain climate change impacts are already occurring in the country based on studies such as the Integrated National Adaptation Project (INAP) conducted by the Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology, and Environmental Studies of Colombia (IDEAM); the Institute of Marine and Coast Research (INVEMAR); the Corporation for the Sustainable Development of the Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina (CORALINA); and the National Institute of Health (NIH) (World Bank 2012). Colombia has been cited as a leader in developing climate change policies (Comstock et al. 2012). Colombia is a party to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change and has signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol (European Commission 2009). As part of its commitments to the Convention, Colombia published its First National Communication (NC-1) in 2001, identifying malaria and dengue fever/DHF as climate-sensitive diseases of primary concern (IDEAM 2001). The Second National Communication (NC-2) was published in 2010 and updated the greenhouse gases inventory, the climate change scenarios, and the national policies and plans associated with mitigation and developed a method to estimate vulnerability to compare the different sectors, ecosystems, and institutions (Ideam 2010). Colombia is currently developing the Third National Communication. The main national environmental authority in Colombia is the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MEDS), which is responsible for the climate change agenda (MinAmbiente). The IDEAM, affiliated with MEDS, is responsible for producing and managing the scientific and technical information on the environment (IDEAM 2001). IDEAM is the country’s leading agency for climate change and is responsible for producing United Nations Framework Page 2 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_70-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) documents and relevant supporting material (IDEAM 2001). The main health authorities in Colombia are the Ministry of Health and Social Protection (MSPS) and the National Institute of Health (NIH). The Ministry is responsible for directing the health-care system and social protection through policies on health promotion, prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation (MinSalud). It is also responsible of the inter-sectoral coordination to develop the public health policy (MinSalud). The National Institute of Health (NIH), affiliated with the MSPS, promotes scientific research, innovation, and formulation of studies according to the public health priorities. NIH is the lead institution on the public health surveillance system (Ministerio de Salud y Protecciòn Social 2012). Using governmental documents and scientific publications, this chapter will provide insight on how climate change impacts Colombia and health, and governmental actions on this subject. Background will first be provided on the climate in Colombia and how climate change impacts health.

Climate Colombia is located on the equator and is thus affected by the intertropical convergence zone, ITCZ (Ideam 2010). The migration of the ITCZ is the dominant factor in controlling the annual hydroclimatic cycle and corresponds to the trade winds movement (Poveda et al. 2005). The average annual precipitation in Colombia is 3,000 mm but varies drastically in different parts of the country due to the geography and topography (Ideam 2010). While temperatures range from very hot to very cold, the temperatures show minimal seasonal variation at the same altitude (World Bank 2011b). Most of the climatic differences are due to the differences in elevation. The spatial variability is controlled by Colombia’s geography, such as the eastern Pacific and western Atlantic oceans, the Andes mountains, atmospheric circulation over the Amazon basin, and soil and vegetation moisture contrast (Poveda et al. 1999). The Choco jet, a westerly at 5
N, and the easterly San Andres jet at 12–14
N are low-lying jet stream that affects climate variability (Poveda et al. 2005). ENSO, the El Niño Southern Oscillation phenomenon, is a major driver in the climate and the hydrological cycles at interannual timescales in the Pacific (Poveda et al. 2005). It has particularly strong impacts on the northern regions of South America (Poveda et al. 2005). During El Niño events, Colombia is more likely to experience droughts, reduced rainfall, and increased air temperature (Poveda 2009). During La Niña, Colombia generally experiences wetter conditions (World Bank 2011b). ENSO occurs later and is weaker in the east than in the western and central part of Colombia (Poveda 2009). ENSO affects the ITCZ in northern South America by causing a decrease in convection by a weaker land-sea thermal contrast and extra subsidence over the ITCZ (Poveda 2009). In recent years, from 2009 to 2011, El Niño caused the reservoirs for water supply to drop to critical levels, whereas La Niña resulted in heavy rainfall that led to landslides and major floods and maximized the capacity of reservoirs (Barriga 2011). According to IDEAM, Colombia has five major climatic regions: hot (with elevations below 900 m below sea level), temperate (900–1,980 m), cold (1,980–3,500 m), high-altitude grasslands (the so-called paramos, 3,500–4,500 m), and areas of “permanent” snow (above 4,500 m) year (Colombia dashboard: climate baseline). Under the Holdridge classification, 60 % of the Colombia territory is warm humid, 8.9 % is warm dry, 7.65 % is warm very humid, 4.63 % is template humid, 4.13 % is template dry, 2.76 % is cold humid, and 2.17 % is very cold humid (Atlas climatológico de Page 3 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_70-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Colombia: Segunda Parte). The remaining categories do not exceed 1 % (Atlas climatológico de Colombia: Segunda Parte). The hot region experiences temperatures from 24
C to 38
C and alternates between dry and wet interannual seasons (World Bank 2011b). The temperate has an annual temperature range between 19
C and 24
C; there are two wet seasons, from April to June and October to December, and two dry seasons from January to March and July to September (World Bank 2011b). The cold zone has an average temperature range between 10
C and 19
C and the wet seasons are bimodal, occurring from April to May and September to December (World Bank 2011b).

Climate Change Impacts In the last 20 years, the temperature has increased by 1
C (Colombia overview). From 1974 to 1998, the temperature change in the Central Andes was 0.34
C, 70 % greater than the average global temperature change (European Commission 2009). Precipitation has increased in Colombia by 5 % from December to February (World Bank 2011b). Precipitation is decreasing in the north while increasing in the south (Blanco and Hernández 2009). In central Colombia, rainy seasons have recently been occurring earlier, with positive anomalies for intense rainfall events and consecutive dry days (Colombia dashboard: climate baseline). As aforementioned, climate change is currently and will further impact Colombia in the future. The Pacific Decadal Oscillation, PDO, is expected to enter a negative phase in the upcoming years (Barriga 2011). This will likely result in more frequent La Nina events and wetter than average conditions, thus prolonging the rainy period cycle (Barriga 2011). Extreme climatic events and variability are predicted to increase (Barriga 2011). The long 2005 drought period led to projections that the savannah region will expand in Colombia (European Commission 2009). Snow-covered regions are likely to completely vanish and over half of the moorland may disappear (World Bank 2009). This will result in a loss of natural resources, especially water (World Bank 2009). A simultaneous increase in the rainy season could result in higher risks of flooding (World Bank 2009). These climate change forecasts will be especially problematic for the future of Colombia because the country already suffers from water shortages and land instability in the Andes (Slunge 2008). Along with drastically affecting land settlements and economic activities, climate change is expected to negatively impact those in poverty and will thus challenge the country’s Millennium Development Goal of reducing poverty (Côté et al. 2010). Using 1971–2000 as a base period, climate change scenarios have projected an increase in the mean temperature of 0.13
C per decade for 1971–2000 (Climate change). The multi-model ensembles have predicted that the average air temperature will increase to 1.4
C for 2011–2040 and 2.4–3.2
C from 2041 to 2070 and for 2071–2100 (Climate change). In the next century, the total amount of precipitation will reduce between 15 % and 36 % for much of the Caribbean and Andean regions and increase around the Pacific Region (Climate change). Predictions have indicated that there may be a rise of 40 and 60 cm of sea level in the Caribbean and Pacific Coasts, respectively, compared to the base period (Impactos del cambio climático del nivel nacional; World Bank (2013b). Based on these results, the following socioeconomic sectors and natural systems were identified as the most vulnerable: costal zones, water resources, glaciers, highland Andean ecosystems and associated forest cover, soils and land undergoing desertification, the agricultural sector, and human health due to an expected increase in exposure to tropical vector diseases such as malaria and dengue (IDEAM 2001). INAP, based on the NC-1 results, identified areas of primary concern: high Page 4 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_70-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

mountain ecosystems (notably moorlands), insular and coast areas, and human health (World Bank 2012). These topics were selected as topics of significant concern due to their high vulnerability to climate variation and their importance for human populations (World Bank 2012). The INAP project has made several important advances in response to climate change by producing important results regarding water and carbon cycle in high mountain ecosystems; glaciological mass balance related to interannual climate events such El Niño and La Niña; planning models of land use that incorporate climate change impacts through an “Adaptive Ecological Territorial Structure” (EETA); the establishment of the system of observation of the oceans (GOOS) in the Caribbean based on the installation of physical and biological monitoring stations; supporting the implementation of a marine protected area in the area of Corales del Rosario, San Bernardo, and Isla Fuerte; development of a management system for managing groundwater reserves in the San Andres; and implementation of a monitoring system of coastal erosion (World Bank 2011a).

Climate Change Impacts on Health Most of the evidence of the impact of climate and climate change on health is on communicable diseases, mainly vector-borne diseases (Epstein 1997). The information available in Colombia is regarding malaria, dengue fever, leishmaniasis, and leptospirosis. There are also some preliminary studies about acute respiratory disease (ARD). Recent information has been released in Colombia on how climate change impacts health so this chapter will provide an update on published information. Malaria is a protozoal disease caused by infection with Plasmodium spp. and is transmitted to humans through the bite of an infected female mosquito, Anopheles species. Of the four known parasite species that cause malaria, three are found in Colombia: Plasmodium vivax, Plasmodium falciparum, and Plasmodium malariae (Blanco and Hernández 2009). Malaria transmission is highly sensitive to climate conditions. Temperature is a significant driver and determines their reproduction and maturation rates for both the mosquito vector and the Plasmodium parasite (Blanco and Hernández 2009). The parasite is unable to develop in its vectors when ambient temperature is below 18
C (Olano et al. 2001). Rainfall and humidity provide essential environmental characteristics for juvenile mosquito development (breeding sites) and adult survivorship (Blanco and Hernandez 2009; Wernsdorfer and McGregpr 1988). Consequently, it is expected that climate change will affect malaria transmission dynamics (Blanco and Hernández 2009). Approximately 13 million Colombians live in regions with endemic malaria transmission (MSPC 1996, 2000, 2003a, b). Malaria incidence is mostly rural (Valero-Bernal 2006). The annual parasite index (total infectious/population at risk) increased from 6.2 (2008) to 7.9 (2009) to 11.48 (2010) to 6.3 (2011) (INS). Approximately half of malaria cases are concentrated in two states; 75 % of them are reported by 44 municipalities (World Bank 2011a). The Colombian Pacific coast (with an area of about 72,000 km2 and almost 2.2 million inhabitants) typically concentrates 10-30 % of the total malaria cases in Colombia for the last 50 years, with 24 % in 2008 (Rodríguez et al. 2011). The Urabá-Sinu and Bajo Cauca region (43,400 km2 and 2.5 million inhabitants) comprised of 60 % of total cases in 2010 and the Amazon-Orinoquia region concentrated nearly 8 % (Rodríguez et al. 2011). Even though malaria is a highly complex multifactorial disease, some studies have demonstrated a significant relation between the occurrence of ENSO and the increase in malaria cases in South America (Barnston et al. 1997, Gagnon et al. 2002). Several studies on Colombia’s nationwide Page 5 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_70-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

malaria situation showed a significant association between ENSO and increases in the number of malaria cases (e.g., Poveda and Rojas 1997; Bouma et al. 1997; Poveda et al. 2001; Mantilla et al. 2009). Poveda and Rojas (1997) reported evidence of the association between malaria epidemics and the occurrence of the warm phase of ENSO (Poveda et al. 2001). Based on malaria morbidity profiles observed over the period from 1960 to 1992, Bouma et al. (1997) suggested that malaria cases are likely to increase by 17.3 % during El Niño years and by 35.1 % in the post-Niño years. Poveda et al. (2001) stated that the El Niño event intensifies the annual cycle of Colombia’s P. falciparum and P. vivax malaria cases in endemic rural areas as a consequence of the concomitant anomalies in the normal annual cycles of temperature and rainfall. More recently, Mantilla et al. (2009) further reinforced these observations by showing that ENSO is a significant predictor of the number of malaria cases in Colombia, particularly in lowland regions along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. Other studies have also quantified projections in the number of expected malaria cases. In a study by Blanco and Hernández (2009), they used the IPCC scenarios to predict the climate change impacts on temperature and precipitation. Based on those scenarios, the study calculated the additional increase in malaria cases based on the 6-year disease period from 2000 to 2005 (Blanco and Hernández 2009). During this 6-year period, P. falciparum had 184,350 cases; for a 50-year scenario, cases are expected to increase by over 19,000 cases and nearly 57,000 cases over a 100-year scenario (Blanco and Hernández 2009). During the same 6-year period, P. vivax had 274,513 cases; for a 50-year scenario, cases are expected to increase by over 16,000 cases and over 48,000 cases over a 100-year scenario (Blanco and Hernández 2009). According to the results of INAP (World Bank 2011a), the impact of temperature and precipitation varies from region to region. Temperature is the key determinant for malaria transmission in the Pacific zone, precipitation for the Orinoquia zone, and both temperature and precipitation for the Atlantic zone. Forecasts were made using dynamic models. In the medium term (2015), the model suggested increases of 6–15 cases per 1,000 habitants assuming constant socioeconomic and entomological conditions. For the long term, the model suggested a strong increase in the number of cases until 2040 where the prevalence starts to decrease. Dengue is a viral and urban disease transmitted to humans through the bite of an infected female mosquito, Aedes aegypti (Padmanabha et al. 2012) The mosquito species are particularly susceptible to environmental conditions, an important factor in dengue transmission (CDC 2010). The viability and reproductivity of mosquitoes are dependent on temperature, precipitation, and humidity (CDC 2010). Higher temperatures have been noted to reduce the life cycle of the virus in the vector (CDC 2010). As temperature increases, mosquitoes will have a higher likelihood of transmitting dengue fever to humans (CDC 2010). Four dengue serotypes exist worldwide and Colombia is at risk for all four serotypes (WHO 2009). The report conducted by Bello Pérez (2011) showed that 75 % of the national territory, located at altitude of 1,800 m, has conditions of temperature, relative humidity, and rainfall suitable for dengue transmission. This is distributed in 620 endemic municipalities with a total population of 23,607,414 people at risk. 80 percent of the disease burden is recorded in 100 endemic municipalities. Since its reemergence in the 1970s, dengue transmission has presented a wide geographic expansion and intensification in the Colombian territory. This phenomenon was especially evident during the last decade. There was an increasing trend in the number of municipalities where dengue cases were recorded annually, from 402 municipalities with endemic transmission in 1999 to 621 municipalities in 2009 (Vigilancia Rutinaria). In 2010 Colombia experienced the largest epidemic in the history of the country, with a total of 147,426 cases of dengue in total, 221 confirmed deaths, and a case fatality rate of 2.26 % (Vigilancia Rutinaria). Page 6 of 16

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There are mix reports on the effect of temperature on dengue fever. It has been suggested that herd immunity, rather than temperature, is the limiting factor on transmission intensity (Blanco and Hernández 2009). Other reports have linked disease transmission to temperature. The larval mosquito matures over a specific temperature threshold and freezing temperatures will kill the eggs (Poveda et al. 2005). Moderately high temperatures can accelerate the larval stage, causing smaller mosquitoes that feed more frequently (Poveda et al. 2005). With climate change, temperature ranges are expected to shift geographically and may allow transmission of dengue fever into new locations. The aforementioned study by Blanco and Hernández (2009) included predictions on the additional increase in dengue fever based. During the 6-year period from 2000 to 2005 which was used as their base study, there was a total of 194,330 dengue cases recorded (Blanco and Hernández 2009). For a 50-year scenario, cases were expected to increase by over 41,000 cases and over 123,000 cases for a 100-year scenario (Blanco and Hernández 2009). The INAP report (World Bank 2011a) included a summary of the dengue fever situation in Colombia. The use of climate and dengue models currently has limited impacts on controlling dengue fever. Colombia has focused on intervention strategies that focus on dengue vector production because it is easier to control the transmission dynamics. INAP uses a targeted approach to determine how climate change affects dengue fever in the country by understanding four key processes. First, INAP recognizes that water insecurity and high costs affect human behavior; improper storage due to instable conditions can lead to increased vector production. Climate change is expected to further increase the cost and instability of water, which will require people to have better water storage. Second, the density of people and displacement are significant considerations. Cities with more than 150,000 people constantly suffer dengue fever, suggesting that epidemics are amplified by high population density. Human migration between cities can spread transmission. Third, property size and precipitation affect dengue fever dynamics because close quarters increase the density of the population, thus causing a higher risk of human contact. Furthermore, living in cities with water storage containers reduces seasonal variation and changes how mosquitoes have seasonal production. Lastly, variation in temperature and height affects mosquito interaction. Overall models suggest that human adaptation to water uncertainty will have a larger impact on dengue risk for regions above 1,200 m and below 600 m compared to the intermediate regions. Larval mortality is generally greater at 24–26
C than 20–22
C or 28–30
C. Currently, dengue fever activities are based on local health authorities. The present control activities for epidemics are often expensive because they require vector control resources and short-term intervention strategies, e.g., spraying insecticides during epidemics. While these methods have not been very effective, the increase in population immunity has led to reduced epidemics, creating a false sense of success. More effective control strategies will require more spatiotemporal adaptation to water insecurity access, a risk assessment of dengue fever, and connecting the ongoing work at a local and national level. Leishmaniasis is caused by Leishmania species and is vectored by sand flies, the Lutzomyia species (Cardenas et al. 2006). Of the three forms of the disease, cutaneous comprises 95 % of reported leishmaniasis cases in Colombia (Valderrama-Ardila et al. 2010). The disease distribution can occur in different climates and habitats, with the Andean region having the highest disease rates (Valderrama-Ardila et al. 2010). Leishmaniasis has been linked to ENSO cycles in northeastern Colombia (Cardenas et al. 2006). During El Niño, the rate of incidence increases because of the dry conditions (Cardenas et al. 2006). In contrast, during La Niña, the rate decreases because of the wetter season (Cardenas et al. 2006). The number of cases reported in the country has increased significantly from 6,500 cases per year in the 1990s to over 16,000 cases per year by 2006

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_70-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

(Valderrama-Ardila et al. 2010). As the climate warms in the future, it is suggested that this will lead to ideal conditions for Leishmania development (Cardenas et al. 2006). Climate variability has also been demonstrated to affect rodent-borne diseases in Colombia, including leptospirosis. Humans and susceptible animals acquire disease by contact with surfaces, water, or food contaminated with urine infected by the bacteria. The most common reservoirs are rats, dogs, wild animals, cows, and pigs. The incidence of leptospirosis depends on the environmental and climatic conditions influencing the dynamics of the rodent population, size, and behavior. In 1995, there was a significant outbreak of leptospirosis, in Colombia along the Caribbean coast (Cardenas et al. 2006; Pappas et al. 2008). From 1990 to 1995, the El Niño period was linked with a long drought period (Epstein 1997). However, the drought period ended with an extreme rainfall that marked the beginning of a La Niña period, which lasted from 1995 to 1996 (Epstein 1997). As a result, rodents left their burrows and caused an increase in leptospirosis outbreak (Epstein 1997). For other diseases like acute respiratory disease (ARD), most of the information is from studies conducted in Bogotá by Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá et al. (2011). The epidemic peak of acute respiratory disease develops between the months of March and June and is associated with phenomena like intensification of rainfall, changes in ambient temperature, and changes in the circulation of respiratory viruses. However, in the winter season of 2010, the torrential rains presented since June and became stronger in August and extended until November. This resulted in flooding in the rainy season, which began in August, and an increase in cases of ARD in Bogotá from this month was observed. For other types of diseases in Colombia, the effect on climate change on health is inconclusive. There is the general belief among the health sector that climate can be associated with the increase in some diseases but further research will be required.

Policies on Health and Climate Change In recognition that climate change will impact all sectors, the Colombian government is encouraging a multi-sectoral approach to programs and policies. A summary on climate change policies that are relevant to the health sector responding to climate change impacts will be provided as a framework (see Fig. 1).

Climate Change Policy Framework Along with Colombia’s international commitments, Colombia has made several advancements in linking policies with climate change in the National Development Plan (PND) from 2006 to 2010 and 2010 to 2014. The National Economic and Social Policy Council (CONPES) 3550 and 3700 articulated support for these plans and the the Basic Adaptation Concepts (ABC), included in PND 2010–2014, outlined the conceptual framework for climate change adaptation. These documents have provided the fundamental concepts for the different sectors, including health, when integrating climate change into their sector’s agenda. The PND of 2006–2010 endorsed the NC-2 and identified the necessity to support Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, to seek options for reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions, and to call for a national climate change policy and a comprehensive action plan on the issue (IDEAM 2001). The policy defined the institutional framework to coordinate the actions proposed therein (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2006–2010). The PND of 2010–2014 focuses its attention in relation to climate change in the following issues: National Plan for Climate Change Page 8 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_70-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

1993

MEDS-IDEAM

2000

Approval of the Kyoto Protocol

2001

IDEAM: First National Communication

2002

MEDS Office of Climate Change; DNP-IDEAM Guidelines of climate change policy

2005

MEDS Office of Climate Change Mitigation

2006

Project INAP; PND 2006–2010, which endorsed the Second National Communication

2008

DNP: CONPES 3550

2010

PND 2010–2014

2010

IDEAM: Second National Communication; Finalization of INAP

2011

DNP: CONPES 3700

2012

Initiated the formation of PNACC by sector; Risk Measurement Protocols; separation MEDS

2013

Currently working on Third National Communication

Fig. 1 Milestones in climate change adaptation and mitigation

Adaptation, Strategy for Disaster Financial Protection, Forest Policy and Avoided Deforestation (REDD+), and Colombian Strategy of Low Carbon Development (Sostenibilidad ambiental y prevención del riesgo). The National Adaptation Plan 2010–2014 is coordinated by the Department of National Planning (DNP) with the support of the MEDS and IDEAM and is intended to reduce risk and socioeconomic impacts associated with climate variability and change (ABC: Adaptación bases conceptuales). It consists of four phases from 2012 to 2014 (ABC: Adaptación bases conceptuales). The Basic Adaptation Concepts (ABC), by the DNP, represents the first part under this plan and consists of four sections (ABC: Adaptación bases conceptuales). It is intended to build a conceptual framework for climate change adaptation for the country and establish guidelines to be followed during the formulation process for the different sectors and territories (ABC: Adaptación bases conceptuales). The first section explains the context that the National Adaptation Plan of Climate Change (NAPCC) was developed under, the second presents a conceptual framework that explains adaptation concepts, the third presents the main reasons to promote adaptation in Colombia, and the last defines the necessary guidelines for planned adaptation (ABC: Adaptación bases conceptuales). CONPES 3550 was published on November 2008, with the main objective to define general guidelines that will strengthen the comprehensive management of the environmental health (DNP 2008). CONPES 3550 is oriented to prevent, manage, and control adverse health effects that result from environmental factors (DNP 2008). It serves as a basis for the formulation of the Comprehensive Environmental Health Policy (DNP 2008). CONPES 3700 of July 2011, as stated by the DNP (2011), is a strategy to configure an intersectoral coordination mechanism to facilitate and promote the formulation and implementation of

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_70-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

policies, plans, programs, incentives, projects, and methodologies in climate change. This will allow the inclusion of climate variables as determinants for the design and planning of development projects. CONPES 3700 is currently establishing the Climate Change National System (SNCC). The SNCC will consist of an Executive Committee of Climate Change (COMECC), a Financial Management Committee, a steering group, an advisory group, and four permanent subcommittees (sectoral, territorial, international affairs, and climate change studies and information production). The COMECC will be responsible for giving guidance and guide discussions on climate change at the national level and for ensuring the implementation and evaluation of policies, plans, and programs on the subject. Similarly, it will allow socializing at the highest level of government. The Financial Management Committee’s main function will be to give technical feasibility and manage funding sources for projects submitted by the sectors, territories, or agent developers of adaptation and mitigation projects that do not have financial resources for its implementation. The permanent subcommittees will collect, analyze, and coordinate information, recommendations, and actions of the subjects in charge. They are to discuss and define studies and sectoral and territorial policies. In addition to the national efforts, there are international efforts in Colombia as discussed by Côté et al. (2010). The Climate Change Mainstreaming Project was implemented between January 2009 and January 2010. It was implemented with assistance from UNDP, a 100,000 USD budget, and a four-person team. The project consisted of four stages. From January to March 2009, climate risks were assessed and a climate profile was produced; these were presented to the UN agencies and national entities to gain support. The second step occurred between April and July 2009 and resulted in the evaluation of risks and opportunities of climate change in national policy documents, development plans, UN plans, and UN projects, with an especially detailed analysis provided on the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The third phase occurred during July, August, and November 2009; this organized public activities to present and gain feedback on previous efforts. This phase resulted in building capacities and the organization of a National Dialogue. The final phase, from September 2009 to January 2010, resulted in the publication of the Evaluation of Climate Risks and Opportunities in the Colombian UNDAF (2008–2012); in addition, it also involved correspondence with the IGCC and UN Agencies. The project resulted in a risk and opportunity assessment of climate change in national policy, development plans, and UN projects (ALM 2011). Along with identifying stakeholders and UN initiatives in climate change issues and producing workshops, the Inter-agency Group on Climate Change of the Colombia UN Country Team was also created (ALM 2011). A UNDP methodology was produced for the evaluation of climate change risks and opportunities: “Quality Standards for the Integration of Adaptation to Climate Change into Developing Programming” (ALM 2011). It is intended to allow for the screening of climate change implications on projects and uses four “standards” (ALM 2011). This methodology was piloted in Colombia as a part of the Climate Change Mainstreaming Project and resulted in the recommendation of adaptation measures (ALM 2011). The principal aim for Colombia is to now launch a mechanism that will assimilate climate risks into a development assistance agenda (ALM 2011). Using this framework, the Colombian Adaptation Plan will mainstream and integrate climate change considerations into the national agenda to develop capacities to face climate change challenge as further discussed by Côté et al. (2010). These adaptation measures are being implemented in high-priority regions, including the Caribbean islands and the Colombian mountain range, and in fundamental sectors, e.g., health and agriculture. Regional and local communities are now creating their own climate change adaptation plans, such as in the Coffee Belt and Capital Regions. Page 10 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_70-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

2001

NC-1

2006

INAP—focuses on human health

2008

CONPES 3700

2010

INAP ends

2011

ABC; NIH strategic plan which incorporated the climate change framework

2012

Design of the Vulnerability Index based on climate sensitive diseases

Fig. 2 Milestones in climate change and health policy

Climate and Health Policy Climate change adaptation policies are targeted toward increasing research and building resilience (Ceron 2012). National public entities must incorporate an adaptation strategy to climate change into their agenda (Ceron 2012). The strategies should comply with the methodology defined by DNP, MEDS, and IDEAM (ABC: Adaptación bases conceptuales). In turn, the MEDS will support these public entities and require them to develop adaptation plans (ABC: Adaptación bases conceptuales). INAP is the most important health and climate change project and will be discussed in detail with brief insight on other ongoing governmental initiatives. INAP was based on the TF Grant Agreement 056350 with 14.9 million USD (World Bank 2012). This project was partially founded by the GEF-World Bank and was coordinated by IDEAM and Conservation International-Colombia (Ideam 2010). This project had support from Accion Social, World Bank, IDEAM, Global Environment Facility, CORALINA, INVEMAR, and NIH (World Bank 2011a). The project was intended to span over the course of 5 years, from 2006 to 2011 (World Bank 2009). The objective of INAP was to support the Colombian government in implementing novel adaptation measures and policy options in anticipation of the impacts of climate change in high mountain ecosystems, Caribbean island areas, and human health (Ideam 2010). INAP resulted in the opportunity for the health sector and the NIH to begin including climate change and the climate as a factor of consideration for the current and future status of health (World Bank 2011a). It allowed the incorporation of climate change into the NIH strategic plan 2011–2014 (World Bank 2011a). In addition, it provided the opportunity to participate in the CONPES document 3700 (World Bank 2012). INAP opened the discussions among the different sectors to face climate change impacts by allowing better understanding in the dynamics and effects of climate change (World Bank 2011a) (see Fig. 2). Under INAP, Colombia proposed an Integrated Malaria and Dengue Surveillance and Control System, in order to avoid the potential negative impacts of climate change on human health in its territory (World Bank 2012). Some of the specific goals of this project included: (a) to strengthen the capability of the Colombian Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies to produce and disseminate continuous and reliable climate information relevant to the health sector and (b) to incorporate epidemiological, entomological, sociodemographic, and climatic data in the malaria and dengue surveillance system for proper understanding of malaria transmission and to

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regularly evaluate the spatiotemporal risk of infection in specific pilot sites and to develop locally adapted malaria and dengue control strategies (World Bank 2011a). Furthermore, there have been efforts in Colombia on the vulnerability assessment front by including the most relevant findings from INAP as well as lessons from several other adaptation projects. The NIH is working on the development of a Vulnerability Index. The purpose of the vulnerability index is to guide the health sector adaptation plans, according to the DNP guidelines. The vulnerability index will allow identification and prioritization of adaptation measures. The conceptual framework is under construction and defines vulnerability as a function of sensitivity and adaptive capacity. As stated by Ceron (2012), sensitivity consists of: (i) disease burden of climate-sensitive diseases and (ii) climate-sensitive risk factors associated to those diseases and that cannot be directly intervened by human action. A list of disease events that are sensitive to climate has been identified, including influenza, cholera, asthma, cardiovascular diseases, etc. A criterion was created to guide which diseases to focus in the Vulnerability Index in Colombia. The diseases must be a relevant public health burden in Colombia and there must be evidence that the diseases are impacted by climate. There must be at least 5 years of information from the surveillance system and information from other sources. It is also necessary that response to the disease is possible in the short and long term. The risk factors will be identified from literature review and expert focus groups. The diseases will also rate the sensitivity of the risk factor to the climate. The adaptive capacity consists of governance and anthropogenic risk factors that are sensitive to climate, e.g., using bed nets with malaria (Ceron 2012). The conceptual framework should be consistent with DNP guidelines and its construction should include the participation of different sectors and institutions. There are also local efforts to address the impacts of climate change on health, most notably in Bogotá, the capital city of Colombia whose population exceeds seven million inhabitants (DANE 2013a). As of 2011, several problems have been identified with climate change in Bogotá, including: increased risk of mortality due to the recurrence of extreme events, increase in diarrheal diseases due to changes in water supply, changes in patterns of viral circulation due to temperature and rainfall variation, changes in food security, effects of heat waves on morbidity and mortality, and increase in vector-borne diseases (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá et al. 2011). As a result, Bogotá has created a district environmental health policy that includes an intervention line related to climate change. This intervention line has five main axes, as described by Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá et al. (2011). First, there will be research development on the effects of climate change on health. Second, the plan will implement adaptation and mitigation processes to prevent further decline in health. Third, this will include the surveillance of events related to climate variability and change. Fourth, the plan will improve joint inter-institutional and inter-sectoral collaboration for the design of adaptation and mitigation measures. Lastly, the plan will strengthen community participation to reduce vulnerability.

Conclusion Colombia has made important advances in implementing climate change adaptation and mitigation projects. Like many other developing countries, initial efforts and projects were concentrated in climate change mitigation and greenhouse gases inventory in response to the interests of information from UNFCCC. Even though these projects were responsible for introducing the topic, it is not until 2006 that the first national adaptation project (INAP) was developed. Since then, the federal Page 12 of 16

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government is slowly addressing the subject in the national agenda, which is being led by the National Planning Department (DNP). The DNP has mainstreamed and integrated climate change into the National Development Plan. The department is also currently defining the strategy to configure an inter-sectoral coordination mechanism to facilitate and promote the formulation and implementation of policies, plans, programs, projects, and methodologies in climate change. This will allow the inclusion of climate variables as determinants for the design and planning of development projects. Given the prioritization process that will be required at the time of defining resources allocated for climate change adaptation, the leading role of DNP will be the key to successfully incorporating climate change adaptation into national policies. Understanding and measuring vulnerability and risk to climate change is the first step in formulating and implementing adaptation plans. Although the initial efforts in Colombia were in identifying and implementing adaptation measures directly, the health sector has now focused on understanding and measuring vulnerability as one of the lessons learned from the INAP project. Despite the advances in Colombia, there is still a need to improve the capacities and interests of the public health research community and decision-makers and to further use climate information as another method of improving policies.

References Adaptation Learning Mechanism [ALM] (2011) Lessons learned from the Project – Colombia. http://www.adaptationlearning.net/experience/lessons-learned-project-colombia. Accessed 13 Jan 2013 Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, Secretaría distrital de salud, and Secretaría distrital de ambiente (2011) Política distrital de salud ambiental para Bogotá DC, 2011–2023. Bogotá. http://ambientebogota.gov.co/politica-distrital-de-salud-ambiental-para-bogota-d.c-2011-2023. Accessed 18 Feb 2013 Barnston AG, Chelliah M, Goldenberg SB (1997) Documentation of a highly ENSO-related SST region in the equatorial Pacific. Atmos Ocean 35(3):367–383. http://iri.columbia.edu/%7Etonyb/ nino3.4.pdf. Accessed 2 Feb 2013 Blanco JT, Hernández D (2009) The potential costs of climate change in tropical vector-borne diseases-a case study of malaria and dengue in Colombia. In: Vergara W (ed) Assessing the potential consequences of climate desestabilization in Latin America. The World Bank: Latin America and Caribbean Region Sustainable Development, Washington, DC. http://siteresources. worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Assessing_Potential_Consequences_CC_in_LAC_7.pdf Barriga JEC (2011) Floods in Colombia (2009–2011): rethinking our response to climatic variability AGU Fall Meeting abstracts, vol 1 Bello Pérez SL (2011) Comportamiento epidemiológico del dengue en colombia año 2011. http:// www.ins.gov.co/lineas-de-accion/Subdireccion-Vigilancia/Informe%20de%20Evento% 20Epidemiolgico/Dengue%202011.pdf. Accessed 18 Mar 2013 Blanco JT, Hernández D (2009) The potential costs of climate change in tropical vector-borne diseases–a case study of malaria and dengue in Colombia. Assessing the consequences of climate destabilization in Latin America

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Bouma MJ, Poveda G, Rojas W et al (1997) Predicting high‐risk years for malaria in Colombia using parameters of El Niño Southern Oscillation. Trop Med Int Health 2(12):1122–1127 Cardenas R, Sandoval CM, Rodríguez-Morales AJ et al (2006) Impact of climate variability in the occurrence of leishmaniasis in northeastern Colombia. Am J Trop Med Hyg 75(2):273–277 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] (2010) Dengue and climate. http://www.cdc.gov/ dengue/entomologyEcology/climate.html. Accessed 24 May 2013 Ceron V (2012) Indice de vulnerabilidad en salud por cambio climático: articulación metodología del índice de vulnerabilidad con las Bases Conceptuales de Plan Nacional de Adaptación, Informe proyecto BID ATN/OC-11909-RG. Bogotá Comstock M, Santelices I, Vanamali A (2012) Case study: Colombia’s national climate change process. CCAP, Washington, DC, p 20 Côté M, Martin P, Iwanciw J et al (2010) Mainstreaming climate change in Colombia. Bogotá, pp 1–8. http://www.ss.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/environmentenergy/www-ee-library/climate-change/mainstreaming-climate-change-in-colombia/CC%20risk %20Mainstreaming%20Climate%20Change%20in%20Colombia-EN.pdf. Accessed 10 Oct 2012 Departamento Nacional de Planeación [DNP] (2008) Documento conpes 3550. Bogotá, pp 1–53. https://www.dnp.gov.co/Portals/0/archivos/documentos/Subdireccion/Conpes/3550.pdf. Accessed 4 Nov 2012 Departamento Nacional de Planeación [DNP] (2011) Documento conpes 3700. Bogotá, pp 1–75. https://www.dnp.gov.co/Portals/0/archivos/documentos/Subdireccion/Conpes/3700.pdf. Accessed 27 Nov 2012 Departamento Nacional de Planeación [DNP]. ABC: Adaptación bases conceptuales.http://www. sigpad.gov.co/sigpad/archivos/ABC_Cambio_Climatico.pdf. Accessed 8 Dec 2012 Departamento Nacional de Planeación [DNP]. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2006–2010. https:// www.dnp.gov.co/PND/PND20062010.aspx. Accessed 1 Mar 2013 Departamento Nacional de Planeación [DNP]. Sostenibilidad ambiental y prevención del riesgo https://www.dnp.gov.co/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket¼pWe6xuYO5b0%3d&tabid¼1238. Accessed 12 Mar 2013 Departmento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica [DANE] (2013). http://www.dane.gov.co/ files/censo2005/PERFIL_PDF_CG2005/11000T7T000.PDF. Accessed 27 Jan 2013 Epstein PR (1997) Climate, ecology, and human health. Conseq Nat Implic Environ Change 3(2):2–19 European Commission (2009) Climate change in Latin America, pp 1–120. http://ec.europa.eu/ europeaid/where/latin-america/regional-cooperation/documents/climate_change_in_latin_america _en.pdf. Accessed 3 Jan 2013 Gagnon A, Smoyer-Tomic K, Bush A (2002) The El Niño Southern Oscillation and malaria epidemics in South America. Int J Biometeorol 46(2):81–89 Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales [IDEAM] (2001) Colombia. Executive summary of Colombia’s first national communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Bogotá, pp 62–84. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/colnc1e. pdf. Accessed 9 Oct 2012 Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales [IDEAM] (2010) Colombia. Executive summary of Colombia’s second national communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Bogotá, pp 45–70. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/ colnc2exsume.pdf. Accessed 9 Oct 2012

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Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales [IDEAM]. Atlas climatológico de Colombia: segunda parte. http://institucional.ideam.gov.co/jsp/815. Accessed 19 Feb 2013 Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales [IDEAM]. Impactos del cambio climático a nivel nacional. http://www.cambioclimatico.gov.co/jsp/1329. Accessed 2 May 2013 Instituto Nacional de Salud [INS]. Vigilancia Rutinaria. http://www.ins.gov.co/lineas-de-accion/ Subdireccion-Vigilancia/sivigila/Paginas/vigilancia-rutinaria.aspx. Accessed 12 Mar 2013 Mantilla G, Oliveros H, Barnston A (2009) The role of ENSO in understanding changes in Colombian’s annual malaria burden by region 1960–2006. Malar J 8(6):1–11 Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible [MinAmbiente]. Misión y visión. http://www. minambiente.gov.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID¼463&conID¼1074. Accessed 4 Jan 2013 Ministerio de Salud y Protecciòn Social (2012) Decreto 2774 del 28 de Diciembre, 2012. http://wsp. presidencia.gov.co/Normativa/Decretos/2012/Documents/DICIEMBRE/28/DECRETO% 202774%20DEL%2028%20DE%20DICIEMBRE%20DE%202012.pdf. Accessed 28 Apr 2013 Ministerio de Salud y Protecciòn Social [MinSalud]. Misión, visión y principios. http://www. minsalud.gov.co/Ministerio/Paginas/Misión,VisiónyPrincipios.aspx. Accessed 22 Jan 2013 MSPC (1996) Guia integral de manejo de las enfermedades transmitidas por vectores. Ministerio de Protección Social de Colombia, Bogotá, pp 1–20 MSPC (2000) Memorias reunión Impulso a la iniciativa hacer retroceder la malaria. Ministerio de Protección Social de Colombia, Bogotá MSPC (2003a) Malaria: Estrategias para afrontar una prioridad en salud pública. Memorias cursotaller. Ministerio de Protección Social de Colombia, Bogotá MSPC (2003b) Plan nacional de vigilancia y control de la malaria en Colombia 2003–2006. Ministerio de Protección Social de Colombia, Bogotá Olano VA, Brochero HL, Saenz R et al (2001) Mapas preliminares de la distribución de especies de Anopheles vectores de malaria en Colombia. Biomedica 21:402–408 Organización Mundial de la Salud [WHO] (2009) Dengue guias para el diagnóstico, tratamiento, prevención y control. Geneva, pp 1–154. http://new.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2011/ ndeng31570.pdf. Accessed 14 Feb 2013 Padmanabha H, Durham D, Correa F et al (2012) The interactive roles of Aedes aegypti superproduction and human density in dengue transmission. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 6(8):e1799 Pappas G, Papadimitriou P, Siozopoulou V et al (2008) The globalization of leptospirosis: worldwide incidence trends. Int J Infect Dis 12(4):351–357 Poveda G (2009) Climate and ENSO associations with malaria incidence in Colombia. The International Research Institute for Climate and Society. http://iri.columbia.edu/climate/ENSO/ societal/example/Poveda.html. Accessed 4 Jan 2013 Poveda G, Rojas W (1997) Evidencias de la asociación entre brotes epidémicos de malaria en Colombia y el fenómeno El Niño-Oscilación del Sur. Revista de la Academia Colombiana de Ciencias 21(81):421–429 Poveda G, Graham NE, Epstein PR et al (1999) Climate and ENSO variability associated with vector-borne diseases in Colombia. In: Diaz HF, Markgraf V (eds) El Niño and the Southern Oscillation, multiscale variability and regional impact. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Poveda G, Rojas W, Quinones ML et al (2001) Coupling between annual and ENSO timescales in the malaria-climate association in Colombia. Environ Health Perspect 109(5):489–493 Poveda G, Waylen PR, Pulwarty RS (2005) Annual and inter-annual variability of the present climate in northern South America and southern Mesoamerica. Palaeogeogr Palaeoclimatol Palaeoecol 234(1):3–27 Page 15 of 16

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Rodríguez JP, Uribe GA, Araújo RM et al (2011) Epidemiology and control of malaria in Colombia. Memórias do Instituto Oswaldo Cruz 106:114–122 Slunge D (2008) Conflict, environment and climate change in Colombia. http://sidaenvironmenthelpdesk.se/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Environmental-policy-briefColombia-2008.pdf. Accessed 17 Nov 2012 The World Bank (2009) Colombia: country note on climate change aspects in agriculture. pp 1–9. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Climate_ColombiaWeb.pdf. Accessed 3 Oct 2012 The World Bank, Global Environmental Facility, IDEAM, Conservación Internacional, CORALINA, INVEMAR, INS (2011a) Presentacion: resultados del proyecto INAP (Donacion TF 056360) Informe Final The World Bank (2011b) Vulnerability, risk reduction, and adaptation to climate change: Colombia. Washington, DC, pp 1–15. http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportalb/doc/GFDRRCountryProfiles/wb_gfdrr_climate_change_country_profile_for_COL.pdf. Accessed 23 Feb 2013 The World Bank (2012) Implementation completion and results report (TF-56350). pp 1–45. http:// www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/07/11/000333037 _20120711003513/Rendered/PDF/ICR22980P083070LIC0dislosed07090120.pdf. Accessed 20 Mar 2013 The World Bank. Climate change. http://institucional.ideam.gov.co/jsp/cambio-climatico_1074. Accessed 10 Mar 2013 The World Bank. Colombia dashboard: climate baseline. http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/ climateportalb/home.cfm?page¼country_profile&CCode¼COL&ThisTab¼ClimateBaseline. Accessed 7 Jan 2013 The World Bank. Colombia dashboard: impacts & vulnerabilities. http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/ climateportalb/home.cfm?page¼country_profile&CCode¼COL&ThisTab¼ImpactsVulnerabilities. Accessed 1 Feb 2013 The World Bank. Colombia overview.http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/colombia/overview. Accessed 11 Nov 2012 Valderrama-Ardila C, Alexander N, Ferro C et al (2010) Environmental risk factors for the incidence of American cutaneous leishmaniasis in a sub-Andean zone of Colombia (Chaparral, Tolima). Am J Trop Med Hyg 82(2):243–250 Valero-Bernal MV (2006) Malaria in Colombia: retrospective glance during the past 40 years. Revista de Salud Pública 8(3):141–149 Wernsdorfer WH, McGregor I (eds) (1988) Malaria: principles and practice of malariology, vols 1 and 2. Churchill Livingstone, New York

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Understanding and Managing Climate Change Risks and Adaptation Opportunities in a Business Context Ioannis Chrysostomidisa* and Lisa Constableb a Sustainable Futures, London, UK b Air Quality and Climate Change, Environmental Resources Management, London, UK

Abstract Climate change poses complex challenges for business not only because of uncertainty associated with the timing and magnitude of projected changes but also because of the interconnectedness between risks and impacts in the modern globalized economy. Drawing on the practical experience with forward-thinking companies in the extractives, chemicals, power, transport, and agriculture sectors, this chapter introduces the concept of systems thinking for managing climate risk and developing adaptation strategies and presents four key steps that businesses can take to (1) understand climate context, (2) assess climate risks and opportunities, (3) develop a business case for managing climate risk and build resilience throughout their value chain, and (4) create a strategy to provide direction and ensure integration within the business. It also presents practical examples of how businesses are addressing these challenges through case studies in a number of business sectors. By providing a means for companies to “see the wood for the trees,” the practical actions required to manage climate risk are demystified, and business leaders are provided with tools to help ensure that their companies are proactive in understanding and managing climate risk and adaptation.

Keywords Climate risk and adaptation; Resilience; Risk management; Systems thinking; Scenario planning and strategy

Introduction The Earth’s atmosphere has always contained greenhouse gases (GHGs), and their ability to trap heat within the atmosphere is responsible for the ambient temperatures under which communities and economies have developed (IPCC 2013). The concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere has always varied naturally as a result of complex cause and effect feedback cycles within the long-term carbon cycle, which is affected by photosynthesis and respiration of plants, weathering of silicates and organic carbon, ocean circulation, and precipitation (IPCC 2013). Temperature and atmospheric GHGs are intricately linked in this system, and the Earth has already experienced a modest increase in global average temperature of 0.8  C since preindustrial times (World Bank 2012). Changing mean surface temperatures affect atmospheric circulation, and even small variations in average conditions can have a big influence on weather extremes such as

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_71-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 Systems diagram for risks associated with “failure of climate change adaptation” (WEF 2013)

droughts, floods, and hurricanes, as have been witnessed around the world over the last decade (IPCC 2012). As climate-related risk events become more frequent and climate change continues to modify operating environments, risks and opportunities will grow in importance for business. Given the complexities of the natural system, the impact of climate change is far reaching and has numerous interconnections with other risks and facets of society as illustrated in Fig. 1 which shows risks linked to failure of climate change adaptation. A system is a set of interdependent components that through their relationships with each other form a complex integrated whole. Changes in any of the systems components illustrated in Fig. 1 can have domino effect implications for any of the others given the feedbacks integrated within the system. For example, failure of climate change adaptation can exacerbate both the likelihood and impact of other risks, and the bolder the line, the stronger the correlation. Global governance failure, water shortage crises, water supply crises, persistent extreme weather, and rising greenhouse gas emissions are the categories most correlated with failing to adapt to climate change (WEF 2013). A web of interdependencies can give rise to additional risks that are connected within the risk system and once manifested can have knock-on implications within business and societal systems.

Risk Interconnectedness and Domino Effects Take, for example, the agriculture sector which is being impacted by persistent extreme weather such us flooding and droughts. A failure to adapt to such events could cause food shortage and water supply crises and subsequently increase the risk for other connected events such as unmanaged migration (e.g., millions of people in East Africa as the region suffers its worst drought in half a century) (BBC 2011). It can also cause governance failure and nondiplomatic conflict resolution (e.g., the Darfur conflict in Sudan was fueled by decades of persistent drought) (Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 2008). When risk interconnectedness is “unpacked,” it becomes evident that there is a lot more at stake than just what is obvious. Furthermore, like the complex system which creates the risk, modern business is globalized, interconnected, and interdependent, both vertically (throughout the value chain) and horizontally (companies among same sector), and this can further complicate profiling business risk for

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_71-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 2 Climate variability and coping ranges (Willows and Connell 2003)

a company. A good example is the 2011 floods in Thailand which caused a number of computer hard disk (HD) drive manufacturers to shut down. Aside from businesses like Western Digital and other HD manufacturers who were directly impacted by flooding, the domino effects of this incident resulted in a global shortage of HD drives impacting the sector’s customers (the computer manufacturer Hewlett Packard lost approximately US$2 billion) and employees (NEC slashed 10,000 jobs worldwide amid performance fears of its platform business that was hit due to flooding), all the way down to consumer and business level (adding $5–10 to the cost of each hard drive and ultimately computers) (Associated Press 2012). One way to analyze these interconnected risks and opportunities is with systems thinking. A systems thinking is a “dynamic thinking” approach which promotes the understanding of risks and their boundaries within a system, how they influence one another, and what patterns emerge and manifest within a value-generating system. It encourages one to “push back” from events and points in time to see the pattern of which they are a part of. The implication is that one will be capable of dealing with a dynamic, rather than only a static, view of reality and thus manage risks better (Barry Richmond 2004). These interconnected risks and systems are usually beyond a company’s capacity to influence or control, but systems thinking combined with approaches like scenario planning offers management a means to entertain possibilities and attempt to both strengthen resilience and reduce the impact cost where this is needed. This chapter introduces the concept of using systems thinking in conjunction with traditional risk management methodologies to support adaptation and provides a step-by-step guide to understanding and managing climate risk and adaptation – including discussion on scenario planning and how it can be used in a business context to strengthen resilience.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_71-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Overview of Climate Risk Weather varies around long-term climatic averages with some years experiencing above or below average rainfall/temperature producing one-off extreme events such as flooding, heat waves, drought, cyclones, etc. The frequency and severity of events have traditionally been relatively predictable within critical coping thresholds as illustrated on the left-hand side of Fig. 2. The critical threshold is the point beyond which the consequences are considered unacceptable to the business. Thresholds may be natural, such as the water level at which a river bursts its banks, or a temperature threshold above which machinery cannot operate effectively, or they may be socially constructed based on risk attitude, such as the 1 in 200-year return period for coastal inundation. The increase in atmospheric GHG concentrations is causing long-term average climate and weather conditions to change. This means that weather vulnerability could increase as the number of extreme events exceeding the critical coping threshold rises over time, as illustrated on the righthand side of Fig. 2. Basically, climate change loads the dice in favor of more frequent and/or severe extreme weather events. Consequently, a critical design threshold (e.g., 200 mm rain in 24 h, 160 km/h wind speed) is expected to be breached more often and/or more severely now, compared to 20 years ago, and in the future compared to now. The risks and opportunities from long-term climate change are not as easy to identify as those from extreme weather events. There is an anecdote about boiling a frog which is useful in explaining our collective fundamental difficulty in reacting to significant changes that occur gradually. As the explanation goes, if a frog is placed in a pot of boiling water, it will quickly jump out of harm’s way. However, if the frog is placed in a pot of water at room temperature and the temperature is slowly turned up over time, the frog will only seek to adjust its own body temperature to match that of the environment, and by the time the temperature becomes deadly, it is too late for the frog to escape. Jumping into boiling water can be compared with experiencing extreme weather events – generally easy to detect and relatively easy to enhance resilience. On the other hand, the impact of incremental changes in temperature are not necessarily easy to identify, and it is important to think about how long-term climate change might affect activities before getting too comfortable in the cooler water and becoming less attuned to the change taking place gradually. In this context, forward-thinking businesses are beginning to identify their exposure not only to extreme events but also to gradual climate change. They are looking to understand the financial implications, enhance the resilience of their operations, and readjust their core business strategy going forward. Such companies already identify innovative advantage and competitive edge through adopting strategies which provide solutions to real problems posed by climate change, in the same way that digital technology has been the driver for consumer growth in the last decade. For example, companies are already moving to take advantage of significant market opportunities that exist in providing solutions to water scarcity (e.g., desalination, water efficiency, water distribution, manufacture of pipes/pumps, wastewater treatment projects, and irrigation projects) to key industries such as power, steel, paper and pulp, and cement (HSBC 2011). Traditional risk management techniques can help manage and adapt to the operational risks amplified by the changes in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. Long-term climate changes tend to be systemic, i.e., influence many parts of the environmental, business, and societal systems with a wide web of impact connections, and can bring risks and opportunities of a different scale. Resilience to risks or positioning to enhance opportunities can be built by taking a more holistic systemic and scenario planning approach to managing climate change and enhancing traditional risk management approaches (see Step 2 below).

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Fig. 3 Climate risk map example for a mining complex

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_71-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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Fig. 4 Overview of step-by-step approach to understanding and managing climate risk and opportunities

Managing Extreme Weather Climate change is transforming primary weather/climatic conditions, which in turn influences the frequency and severity of extreme weather events, resulting in unexpected impacts. Interconnected feedback loops within the broader climate system as well as between the cause and effect illustrated in Fig. 3 could result in numerous difficult-to-predict consequences for business activities, a selection of which are illustrated below. The feedback loops that exist between events and consequences are important to consider as they can create a web of domino effects between orders of cause and effect with the resultant systemic risks being more complicated to manage than the initial link. Systemic risk is a risk that has multiple pressure points and is affecting numerous components within a system. Such risk could potentially influence and impact the entire system, as opposed to risk associated only with any one individual entity, group, or component of a system. In order to understand the impact of climate change, it is necessary to appreciate both the biophysical impacts of altered weather patterns and the operational, social, and institutional implications of these changes. Climate change impacts are seldom discrete as described in the case study below. Case Study A mining company operating in water-stressed South America pumps water from a desalination plant at the coast to the mine in the mountains. Changes in precipitation could cause landslides and compromise the integrity of the water pipeline. To secure water supply, the site applies for and secures a temporary groundwater abstraction license. This source is already under pressure due to historical water stress conditions, and this is exacerbated by reduced groundwater recharge from rainwater due to changing precipitation patterns – the thing causing the problem from the start. Abstraction of groundwater for industrial use at the mine further exacerbates drought in the area and has unintended and unforeseen impacts on local ecosystems and farming activities, erodes local community support, and seriously jeopardizes the project’s license to operate. Business leaders are becoming increasingly more adept at thinking commercially about the system within which they are operating. What this means is framing the systems boundary, identifying the critical interacting elements in the “business system” and how they relate with and

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affect each other, and keeping the big picture in mind without reducing it down to its component parts in such a way that ignores the interconnectedness. A key aspect to all this is the ability to see relationships between components where once they might have only seen individual parts and to be able to identify the critical relationships that cause the significant positive or negative impacts. It also means being able to look at problem situations and knowing how to resolve them from a variety of points of view and using different systems approaches in combination. This approach encourages a kind of creativity to managing a problem. A certain tolerance to messiness, uncertainty, and ambiguity is needed in order to avoid jumping to solutions too quickly. Spending time in the ambiguity and confusion tends to lead to more elegant, resourceful, and effective responses. Mapping systems dynamics and identifying and mitigating potential risks early give business leaders the opportunity to refashion their operations, reposition their products and services, and ensure an increasingly sustainable market position. The remainder of this chapter looks at ways in which climate risk management can be embedded within a systems approach to scenario planning and organizational management aimed at enhancing the resilience and therefore profitability of companies in the face of climate change.

Step-by-Step Guide to Understanding and Managing Climate Change Risks and Opportunities Understanding the impact of climate change on an organization or site might seem like a daunting task, but focusing the activity in a few simple steps will allow for comprehensive analysis of the business case for undertaking adaptation and the development of a strategy for managing climate risk in the future. The four-step approach summarized in Fig. 4 and discussed in detail in the remainder of this section aims to provide guidance on where to find information and how to interpret it within existing business processes. It draws on the systems approach to ensure that the full range of risks and opportunities are considered and that holistic approaches to managing and leveraging these are identified.

Step 1: Understand the Climate Context The historic climate baseline and projected change in the climate for a project area should be understood so that information on key climate change risks or opportunities can later be identified and ultimately considered in project investment decision making. Historic Climate Baseline Information on the climate baseline for an area is important in helping to understand risks associated with current climatic conditions and to provide a reference point from which future climate changes can be assessed as illustrated by the case study below. Case Study A coal-fired power station in Asia regularly experiences typhoons. Coal storage facilities were originally built to withstand the maximum wind gust speeds experienced at the site in the past 50 years. During typhoons in 2004 and 2005, the domes covering all three storage facilities were torn off resulting in business interruption, reduced efficiency (from wet coal), and high maintenance costs. Analysis of maximum wind speeds in the region around the plant suggests that gusts have reached up to 110 m/s in the past. This figure should form the baseline from which to

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Protectors

Enablers • • • • • • • • • • • •

Water supply Energy/Power Supply Transport network Supply chain Mine infrastructure and facilities Land access Community support Social License Regulatory Consent License to operate Health Safety

Inputs

Eroders Activities

• • • • •

People Technology Materials Energy Water

• Opportunity Identification • Evaluation • Implementation • Operations • Closure

• Mineral waste • Non-mineral waste • Landscape/ecosystem alteration • people displacement • Acid / wastewater • Air/GHG emissions

• Tailing facility • Waste rock facility • Hazardous waste storage/disposal • Water capture, recycling, treatment and/or disposal • GHG mitigation activities • Materials stewardship • Air quality controls • Land stewardship • Rehabilitation • Mine closure planning

Fig. 5 Mining value generation map

assess changing typhoon intensity as a result of climate change as it provides an estimate of a possible worst-case scenario in the region. The following information is useful when compiling the baseline: • Local weather stations can provide valuable site-specific weather data, including historical temperatures, wind speeds, and precipitation levels. Local environmental/meteorological agencies should be contacted to explore what climate data may be available for an area and how useful it could be in informing the climate baseline. • National meteorological agencies can provide useful information on “typical” conditions in various regions, such as average temperatures and precipitation levels by month. Information on historical incidences of severe weather events in the region (e.g., floods, droughts, and storms) may also be useful in informing the climate baseline for a site area. • Global climate datasets (e.g., Climate Research Unit Global Climate Dataset (UAE 2013)) frequently have lower resolution and are therefore less accurate at a site level but can be useful in providing climate data where more local information is lacking. In addition to establishing an understanding of the physical climatic conditions for the site, information on the social and regulatory climate context for the site should also be gathered. Climate Change Projections Having constructed the climate baseline for a site, projections of the estimated change in the regional climate should be analyzed. Climate change projections are typically determined for future scenarios in the middle to the end of the twenty-first century. It is recommended that the climate change horizon selected is in line with the projected lifetime of operations including a period post-closure. Climate change projections are based on the output of global or regional climate models. These models can be used to obtain climate change projections and data for a particular area. A more textured understanding of projected changes can be achieved through “downscaling” with modeling at regional, provincial, or catchment level. It should be noted that there will be uncertainty in the climate change projections for all climate variables and this needs to be considered in the development of impact scenarios as discussed in Step 2. Understanding the potential impact to project/operations involves analysis of the climate baseline and projections for the site area in order to understand how current conditions may change in the future. Some example interpretations of climate change projections are provided below:

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Fig. 6 Flooding risk map for a mining complex

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_71-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_71-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Likelihood

X

Consequence

X

Value at stake

=

Existing risk

Flooding risk at location Frequency Every 10 yrs

Severity

X

220mm in 24 hour downpour causes shut down for 20 days

Value at stake

X

Cost of downtime $5m/day

=

Existing risk potential $10m

Fig. 7 Assessing baseline (existing) risk (ERM 2012)

• Projected increases in precipitation intensity and winter rainfall could mean that in future there is increased flood risk in localized sites in the region that are vulnerable to flooding, for example, sites located at the base of a hill, near to a body of water, or in a relatively flat area with poor drainage capacities. • Projected increases in average and maximum temperatures could mean that there is increased risk of heat wave events during the hot summer months. • Projected intensification of tropical storm and cyclone events for a site area located in a tropical cyclone zone could mean that there is increased risk of damage and disruption from storm events in the future.

Step 2: Analyze Impacts and Risk Scenarios Having understood the impact of climatic events in the past and assessed potential climate change projections in a region of interest, the assessment can now focus on analyzing the impacts and risk scenarios facing the organization. Risk Mapping A useful starting point is to generate a value generation map. Value generation is the process by which a business creates value from a commodity, e.g., mining activities which create concentrate from ore in the ground; refining raw fossil fuels into other fuels, plastics, etc; and converting crops into luxury products. The value generation process involves a series of inputs, outputs, and associated activities. Figure 5 presents a simple value generation map for a mine and includes the critical inputs that need to be sourced (e.g., people, technology, materials, energy, and water) and the value eroders associated with mining activities (e.g., mineral and non-mineral waste, landscape/ ecosystem alteration, air/GHG emissions, people displacement, etc.). Then follows an identification of a number of value enablers and value protectors that have to be in place to ensure the uninterrupted flow of inputs (water supply, energy power supply, transport network, etc.) and management of value erosion (e.g., tailing facility, waste rock facility, etc.). It is worth noting that this map is not linear and there are also connections between enablers and connections themselves, e.g., failure of the tailing facility (i.e., a value protector) can jeopardize the presence of a series of value enablers (e.g., community support, license to operate, etc.). Developing such a map will allow for better identification of the critical business components and how they are connected and where the climate risk assessment should focus from an impacts perspective. Following the identification of value enablers and protectors, the next task is to develop a climate risk map in order to obtain a complete overview of the situation including systemic interconnections. This includes identifying the possible risk sources and associated events, the influence these may have to different components within a business value-generating system, and the likely consequences should the risk materialize. The way climate change interacts with a business system

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_71-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Existing risk

X

Climate change projections

=

Future climate risk

Example for future flooding risk at location Existing climate related risk $10m

Increase in flooding frequency and/or severity at location

X 100% (e.g. 1/10 year event will be 1/5 year event in 2025)

Increase in risk

=

$10m ($20m future climate risk)

Fig. 8 Estimating future risk (ERM 2012)

represents complex systems dynamics that would be influenced by long-term climate change (i.e., risk sources) but manifested in distinct events (e.g., risk of flooding, risk of landslides, etc.). A simplified example of this focused only on flooding at a mining complex, and how this might impact value generation protectors and enablers is illustrated in Fig. 6. Quantifying Risk Using Traditional Methods Quantitative methods have been developed to help respond to the need to understand and assess the potential impact of extreme weather events and the associated risks. Quantitative assessments focus on assessing risks that arise from an increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events using likelihood/consequence based on traditional risk management approaches. Insurance records, underwriters’ reports, insurer’s catastrophe modeling and operating data, and historical incidence databases along with climate change projections and other data sources can be used in conjunction with sensitivity analysis to quantify relative changes in risk. The purpose is to support judgments about typical business interruption delays or proportion of assets damaged to take account of the specific vulnerability to a given threat. For example, a transport route that has experienced damage or closure due to flooding in the past would be considered highly vulnerable. The key calculation traditionally combines event frequency, severity, financial consequence, and projected climate change to determine the level of risk to a company’s operations and assets. This standard risk assessment process typically involves two steps, with the baseline or existing risk assessed in the first stage as illustrated in Fig. 7. Once the baseline risk has been identified, frequency and severity parameters can be modified based on values that come either from climate change projections (depending on level of confidence), stress testing or scenario planning (see below), or a combination of these as illustrated in Fig. 8. Likely impacts to an asset should be considered for the life of the facility including a period following closure and should typically cover the assets, activities, and operations, including the supply chain, as illustrated in the following case studies: Case Studies Increased precipitation, flood, and landslide risk – A regional transport infrastructure development project in Africa looks to ensure that upgrade and new infrastructure projects are resilient to changing risk profiles in 50–100 years by designing bridges, roads, ports, and railways to higher flooding, rainfall, and land stability specifications than has been the case in the past. More frequent or severe heat wave events – A gas-fired power station in India currently experiences 1.5–3.5 % reduction in generating capacity per year as a result of for each day exceeding 28  C. As mean temperature in the area is projected to increase by 3  C, the number of days

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_71-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

exceeding 28  C will increase further reducing the generating capacity of the plant. Given that power demand rises during heat waves through increased use of air conditioners, this reduction could risk security of supply and contribute to heat stress in employees and the local population. More frequent or intense cyclone events – A chemical manufacturing company’s facilities in Mozambique and the USA are shut down during cyclones to ensure employee safety and limit the number of people on site in the event that access is restricted. Their facilities in South Africa have experienced supply chain disruption with heavy seas, caused by cyclone/storm activity, preventing feedstock import. Changing temperature and precipitation patterns – Recognizing the impact of climate change on biodiversity and ecosystems, a mining company considers how natural vegetation might change in the future in order to ensure that rehabilitation activities and the mine closure plan reflect the potential climate once operations cease in 50 years’ time and that sustainable measures are recommended rather than trying to replicate an environment which no longer occurs in the area. Enhancing Traditional Risk Management Approaches Risk Amplification Businesses are constantly undertaking investments on the basis of a set of technical or nontechnical risks that in most cases are considered static and unrelated. For example, social issues in relation to water resources and resettlement may have been identified and are being addressed, but if the effects of climate change are not taken into account, then the sustainability of the solution is not secure and water and social issues may be amplified in the future. Business leaders would be well advised to further consider how climate change and other critical factors might amplify seemingly unrelated risks and their relationships among them or create new opportunities. Some questions which should be considered during decision-making processes include: • To what extent will climate change amplify items in the existing risk register? • How would changes in one set of risks affect other risks in the register or create new risks? • Proposed resettlement, closure, or environmental/biodiversity management plans will perform differently 30 years from now. How can these plans be modified, and/or what measures can be put in place now to ensure effective performance within and outside the organization in the future? • How can an operation’s supply chain and logistics strategy take advantage of the new transport routes (e.g., arctic passage) or future changes in market conditions? Stress Testing In addition to using climate projections, stress testing can be a useful exercise where a “what-if analysis” can be used to assess the resilience of a given operation to hypothetical external shocks. This could assess, for example, what might happen to a project’s risk register if future climatic extremes are being underestimated by 20 %. This process can help with uncertainty associated with climate change projections and identify vulnerabilities and opportunities for quick wins. Scenario Planning Scenario planning recognizes that many factors may combine in complex ways to create future scenario stories both plausible and surprising. Scenarios take into account climate change and how it might interact with other risk drivers that are not necessarily solely climaterelated. For example, scenarios should be developed for social, political, economic, and regulatory issues relating to water scarcity, temperature rise, etc. The types of indicators used to develop scenarios fall into two broad categories: 1. Those which are relatively certain such as demographics, water users in the area, etc. Page 12 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_71-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Do not build / source from high risk locations

Reduce Exposure Take on insurance

Transfer and Share Risks Adaptation Approaches

Have an up-to-date emergency plan in place

Prepare, Respond and Recover

Increase Resilience to Changing Risks

Transformation

Construct a water storage unit

Find alternative production processes

Reduce Vulnerability

Recycle / reduce water use

Fig. 9 Types of adaptation approaches with examples relating to drought (ERM 2012; IPCC 2012)

2. Those which are relatively uncertain such as the exact timing and impacts of changes in precipitation, the magnitude of a landslide, etc. By collecting information about trends and attempting to spot a pattern, trend analysis can be used to inform a series of possible future events. By combining certainty with uncertainty, business leaders can start forming future scenarios beyond the obvious asset impacts. The value of scenarios is that they help companies understand how the various components of their complex and interconnected risk landscape are changed if one or more parameters change. This approach can be used for decisions at a project level, e.g., optimizing economic performance of a manufacturing facility, and for strategic planning at a corporate level as illustrated in the case study below. Case Study A global agribusiness company informed their medium-/long-term global expansion strategy by using scenario planning to build an understanding of future water scarcity issues and how these will be influenced by climate change among other risks (e.g., regulatory, social, economic, political). The exercise involved undertaking trend analysis for all risk categories and developing scenarios by providing different contexts for each region of expansion so strategic investment decisions can be made with these issues in mind at global level. The process helped to identify “red” and “green” flags in their expansion strategy, ideas, and management options for dealing with risks in existing operations and priority areas that might need additional investment in response to issues as influence by climate change among other interconnected risk sources. Most corporate risk departments already run scenario planning exercises. There is a need for this process to take into account climate change, climate risk, and broader sustainability aspects as they become material issues for doing businesses. The risk management process can be enhanced by integrating climate change and sustainability issues into company’s risk management and strategy and by deepening skills in systemic thinking. Scenario planning, used in this way, can then be seen as a key activity for developing the future leaders, giving them the understanding and skills to help shape the future direction and philosophy of the business.

Step 3: Develop the Business Case for Adaptation Managing climate risk involves intervening in the system and implementing adaptation measures which alter the flow and feedbacks within the system. A comprehensive understanding of how the Page 13 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_71-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 50% 40% 30%

Cumulative expected averted losses ($m)

10% 0%

35 Recycle water used in closed circuit cooling

30 Insurance medium

25 Insurance high

20 Desalination plant

Install HE generator

15 Switch to renewable energy (reduction of water usage in cooling towers)

−50%

10 Collect water from drainage system

−40%

3

−30%

3

−20%

Construct 200m water storage unit

5 −10%

Construct 100m water storage unit

Internal Rate of Return

20%

Fig. 10 An example of an adaptation investment curve in relation to water scarcity

system functions is essential to ensure holistic solutions are identified which minimize unintended negative consequences. The value generation and climate risk mapping undertaken in Step 2 will provide valuable input to this process. Intervening in a system means understanding the critical relationships and focusing interactions with these. It means taking account of the intended and unintended consequences – positive and negative – that result from these interactions and consequences in different interconnected parts of the system; the “problem” may well be a symptom of a problem elsewhere. It means being alert to and able to see and detect patterns that emerge and are unintentional as well as those that are designed and intentional. The individual risks identified in Step 2 should be considered in relation to the web of impacts, with the aim of increasing the coping threshold increased through identification of adaptation measures to prevent, minimize, and/or mitigate the risk. Key is identifying a small number of measures which address a large number of risks. The type of intervention selected depends on the site-specific nature of the problem and the extent to which it is connected with other impacts. Figure 9 outlines various types of adaptation approaches, and examples of how these can be used to manage water scarcity. The potential avoided loss and the capital cost of implementing each option should be quantified and analyzed against the cost of the risk determined in Step 2 in order to create the business case for adaptation. Once the adaptation options to mitigate climate risks have been identified, realistic costs should be estimated, input to a cost-benefit analysis (CBA), and contrasted against the potential averted losses from impacts analysis in Step 2. The CBA aids the decision-making process by giving monetary values to the risks and opportunities and enables a comparison of like quantities. A CBA can help companies in making decisions on whether previously identified adaptation options are reasonably practicable.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_71-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 11 Stages of integrating management of adaptation in organizations

Adaptation options aimed at reducing risk linked to extreme weather events can also be evaluated on the basis of their internal rate of return and make the business case for themselves as with any other type of investment. An example of a water scarcity adaptation investment curve for a mining complex is provided in Fig. 10. It presents a list of adaptation options by positive or negative return of investment (y-axis) and the cumulative expected averted losses in $million (x-axis). Although there is uncertainty associated with the timing of impacts that could represent challenges when calculating the return on investment of adaptation options, companies still find this a useful tool to prioritize and present results to senior management in a clear and concise manner. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis with regard to the timing of impacts can be undertaken to better describe the uncertainty associated with the investment profile of adaptation options. It is important to note that financial analysis should not be the only decision-making tool for evaluating adaptation options. In some cases, there will be unquantifiable risks and benefits which need to be considered such as those linked to social and environmental outcomes. It may be that a higher cost option has more unquantifiable benefits than a lower cost option which makes it the preferred course of action as described in the case study below. All the above should be taken into consideration in order to formulate an effective intervention strategy for climate change adaptation. Case Study Flooding regularly occurs in and around a mining complex in South Africa. The mine is surrounded by local communities housing mine workers and their families and other mining companies. Focusing on managing flooding and storm water discharge within the boundaries of the mine complex misses an opportunity to work with other companies in the area to develop an integrated water management plan and to help reduce the vulnerability of local communities – particularly the informal settlements in the floodplain which are destroyed on an almost annual basis. Collaborative working and a low additional cost could potentially enhance the quality of life for the mine’s workforce significantly, in addition to providing a more sustainable solution to water management in a water-stressed area.

Step 4: Create an Adaptation Strategy The Strategy Development Process The management of climate risk and adaptation within organizations currently sits somewhere on the continuum illustrated in Fig. 11. The aim of an adaptation strategy is to move toward embedding a systematic approach to climate risk and adaptation into business practices. How an organization chooses to do this depends on the nature of the risks identified, the business case for adaptation, and Page 15 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_71-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

the company values/ambitions. An adaptation strategy will provide clarity and direction for the steps to address climate risks and opportunities. Traditional strategy development involves the exploration of the answers to the following questions: • Where are we as a business today? • Where are we do we want to be in X years? • What are the key climate change issues that our business (or project) strategy needs to address now and in the future? • How can we best position ourselves to take effective action? The outcomes of steps 1–3 above should provide a wealth of inputs to feed into the standard strategy development process outlined above. Optimization of the outcomes, however, comes with the adoption of a systems approach to strategy creation and organizational leadership. In developing a strategy, it is critical to “get the whole system in the room” in order to understand it, engage with it, and see how and where it is relevant for the organization. Rather than seeing strategic planning as the preserve of the “numbers people,” collaborative tools for strategy making become essential here in order to bring together all those affected within the system and on the systems boundaries and to engage them in understanding the nature of the situation and its implications. Data and analysis come to the process as inputs, but the key is bringing together different functional disciplines, stakeholders, and generations to interpret the data through multiple lenses and to obtain the deepest insights and uncover solutions to which all players can commit. The value generation process illustrated in Fig. 5 provides an example of the various connections and interconnections between different elements of the business system. These elements are affected by impacts and adaptation measures and should be considered when developing an adaptation strategy in order to ensure that management of climate risk and the leveraging of opportunities occurs in the most appropriate fora. The strategy that is developed is not only a strategy for the company adapting to climate change but impacts the broader business environment in which the company exists. It recognizes interdependencies between players, climate, and time and puts a value to these. Finally, the strategy should look to ensure that the organization maximizes opportunities and enhances resilience in the short, medium, and long term depending on the nature of the impacts it is dealing with. This will help ensure that future expenditure and planning take place with an “adaptation lens” and that consideration of climate risk and adaptation is fully integrated within business processes. The Process and Skills Required Developing an adaptation strategy this way requires leaders and managers to have a level of fluency in systems thinking or the willingness to acquire this mindset and associated skills. The mindset and skills can be seen as a distinct portfolio of: • • • •

Recognizing systems boundaries Perceiving interdependencies in and between systems Appreciating the dynamics that underpin complex systems Seeking out the points of greatest influence within a system and designing and implementing interventions at these points

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_71-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 12 Example of a strategic implementation framework for adaptation

• Staying alert to the unintended as well as the intended consequences and responding to these in a way that optimizes outcomes This portfolio can enlarge the traditional expectations of business leaders around vision and strategy, planning, and execution. It can enable leaders to navigate more effectively through increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous times and find the right path to address the significant problems that face not only their business but also their broader communities and the Earth. Using the systems approach as a leadership practice as well as a tool to understand how climate change might influence the relationships within the business system is the key element of the strategy making process and will be what ensure its implementation and sustainability. So a company should ensure that its future managers and leaders participate in the strategy development process, because it is these individuals who need to: • Own it, be committed to it, and take it forward. • Understand the climate-related risks and opportunities from a systems perspective, such that this becomes integrated into their way of understanding the business context in which they are operating and that they act from this standpoint. • Develop and deepen relationships with other stakeholders and build the reservoirs of trust that ensure effectiveness. Trust is the glue that ensures that when unforeseen things happen, stakeholders draw together, rather than pull apart, and find the right path forward together. Framework for an Adaptation Strategy The form of a climate change adaptation strategy depends very much on the nature of the business and the values of the company. Ultimately it should become an integral component of corporate strategy development rather than a stand-alone document as this will ensure proper integration with day-to-day activities. To this end, the strategy should build on the company’s existing values and policies and focus on priority areas for action. An example of how a strategic implementation framework for adaptation is outlined in Fig. 12.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_71-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Conclusion Climate change poses complex challenges for business not only because of uncertainty associated with the timing and the magnitude of projected changes but also because of the interconnectedness between risks and impacts in the modern globalized economy. There are traditional approaches for assessing and managing risks and these can be supplemented and further analyzed with systems thinking. Traditional risk management techniques can help manage and adapt to the operational risks amplified by the changes in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. However, understanding of risks and their boundaries within a system and how they influence one another and manifest in impacts within a value-generating system is of paramount importance. Understanding the impact of climate change on an organization or site might seem like a daunting task, but focusing the activity in a few simple steps will allow for comprehensive analysis of the business case for undertaking adaptation and the development of a strategy for managing climate risk in the future. The four-step approach outlined below aims to provide guidance on where to find information and how to interpret it within existing business processes. It draws on the systems approach to ensure that the full range of risks and opportunities are considered and that holistic approaches to managing and leveraging these are identified: • Step 1 – Understand the climate change context within which the company is and will be operating through analysis of historic and projected climate data. • Step 2 – Assess the risks and opportunities that are linked to future scenarios. • Step 3 – Develop a business case for adaptation through simple economic analysis. • Step 4 – Create a strategy to ensure consideration of climate risk and adaptation is fully integrated within business activities. Long-term climate changes tend to be systemic with a wide web of impact connections and can bring risks and opportunities of a different scale. Resilience to risks or positioning to enhance opportunities can be built by taking a more holistic systemic and scenario planning approach to managing climate change and enhancing traditional risk management approaches. By “seeing the wood for the trees,” managers can identify the practical actions required to manage climate risk, and business leaders are provided with tools to help ensure that their companies are proactive in understanding and managing climate risk and adaptation and leading the companies in the “path of least resistance.” And last but not least, this process is not only about identifying immediate issues and finding solutions but also going through the process itself, building leadership skills, and transforming for organizations and individuals engaged in this process and acquiring a new “systems thinking lens” of the world.

Acknowledgment The authors would like to thank Alison Sayers from ERM for her contribution to the development of the strategy elements of this chapter.

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References Associated Press (2012) Thai flooding impact on tech companies, suppliers, Yahoo Finance. Available from http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Thai-flooding-impact-tech-apf-672914039.html. Accessed 24 July 2013 BBC (2011) UN declares Somalia famine in Bakool and Lower Shabelle. http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-africa-14211905. Accessed 7 July 2014 ERM (2012) Weathering the storm: a business guide to climate change risk and adaptation. Available from http://www.erm.com/PageFiles/7092/ERM-Guide-Climate-Change-AdaptationAug2012.pdf. Accessed 24 July 2013 HSBC (2011) Carbon Disclosure Project response. Available from http://www.cdproject.net Humanitarian Exchange Magazine (2008) Environmental degradation and conflict in Darfur: implications for peace and recovery, Issue 39 July 2008, http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarianexchange-magazine/issue-39/environmental-degradation-and-conflict-in-darfur-implicationsfor-peace-and-recovery. Accessed 7 July 2014 IPCC (2012) Changes in Climate Extremes and their Impacts on the Natural Physical Environment. In: Field CB, Barros V, Stocker TF, Qin D, Dokken DJ, Ebi KL, Mastrandrea MD, Mach KJ, Plattner G-K, Allen SK, Tignor M, Midgley PM (eds) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation. A special report of working groups I and II of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK/New York IPCC (2013) Technical Summary Chapter Contribution of working group I to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. In: Stocker TF, Qin D, Plattner G-K, Tignor M, Allen SK, Boschung J, Nauels A, Xia Y, Bex V, Midgley PM (eds) Climate change 2013: the physical science basis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK/New York Richmond B (2004) An introduction to systems thinking with STELLA. ISEE Systems inc, USA University of East Anglia (UAE) (2013) Climate Research Unit Global Climate Datasets. Available from http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/data. Accessed 24 July 2013 Willows RI, Connell RK (eds) (2003) Climate adaptation: risk, uncertainty and decision-making, UKCIP technical report. UKCIP, Oxford World Bank (2012) Turn down the heat: why a 4  C warmer world must be avoided. Available from http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_Why_a_4_degree_centrigrade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf. Accessed 24 July 2013 World Economic Forum (WEF) (2013) Global risks 2013, eighth edition: an initiative of the risk response network. Available from http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2013.pdf. Accessed 24 July 2013

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_72-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Streamlining Climate Risk and Adaptation in Capital Project Development Lisa Constablea* and Ioannis Chrysostomidisb a Air Quality and Climate Change, Environmental Resources Management, London, UK b Sustainable Futures Ltd, London, UK

Abstract Climate change is already presenting material risks and opportunities to business and industrial sectors. As extreme weather events appear to become more frequent with climate change, these risks and opportunities have grown in prominence and, for a growing number of companies, have become closely aligned with project performance. Understanding and managing climate risk and adaptation, at a project level, will be central to ensuring business continuity and reducing costs. Key to enhancing the resilience of future economic stability and growth is to ensure that new project developments consider climate risk and incorporate adaptation measures in their design. This is particularly important in relation to utilities, infrastructure, and the extractives sector (i.e., mining and oil and gas activities). Furthermore, building resilience to climate change and incorporating adaptation measures into project design, as well as impact management programs – such as Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) –, is now being mandated by a growing number of financial institutions, as well as national and state governments. Climate change also presents a new dimension to the traditional impact assessment conceptual framework in that it implies a dynamic rather than static baseline from which project impacts occur. This means that climate change, occurring irrespective of the project, may have the effect of altering the overall significance or magnitude of project impacts on the human and natural environment. This chapter outlines these requirements at a high level and discusses integration of climate risk and adaptation into the capital project development life cycle through compliance with lender requirements, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment procedures, and internal risk management processes. It also presents a simple step-by-step approach to streamlining assessment within the project development process.

Keywords International finance institutions; IFI; Environmental and social impact assessment; ESIA; Climate change; Business risk; Adaptation; Risk management

Introduction Climate change is already presenting material risks and opportunities to business and industrial sectors. As extreme weather events appear to become more frequent with climate change, these risks

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_72-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

and opportunities have grown in prominence and, for a growing number of companies, have become closely aligned with project performance. Understanding and managing climate risk and adaptation, at a facility or project level, is central to ensuring business continuity and reducing costs. Key to enhancing the resilience of future economic stability and growth is to ensure that new project developments consider climate risk and incorporate adaptation measures in their design. This is particularly important in relation to utilities, infrastructure, and the extractives sector (i.e., mining and oil and gas activities). Climate resilience and mitigation actions should be firmly on the agenda, particularly for major new infrastructure that can benefit from climate risk, impact, mitigation, and adaptation insights throughout its lifetime. Furthermore, building resilience to climate change and incorporating adaptation measures into project design, as well as impact management programs – such as Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) – is now being mandated by a growing number of financial institutions, as well as national and state governments. At the forefront of this effort is the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group, which revised its Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability in January 2012. The Performance Standards (PS) now recommend the consideration of “relevant risks associated with a changing climate and the adaptation opportunities” associated with these risks (IFC PS1 2012) and identify the need to consider the impact of climate change on community risk and vulnerability as well as on ecosystem services and natural habitats, especially where they play a role in mitigating climate risk. These revised standards have since also been formally adopted by the Equator Principles Association, which provides a risk management framework for financial institutions in relation to determining, assessing, and managing environmental and social risk. In addition to legislative and lender requirements, companies have internal processes aimed at managing risk through the project development cycle. Engineers routinely factor weather-related meteorological information into project design (e.g., operating envelopes, production schedules), but the extent to which this includes possible variations due to climate change is typically limited. There are a number of complementary reasons why organizations undertake structured analysis of climate change impacts and adaptation within their capital project development proposals. A climate change risk and adaptation study can: • Ensure identification and management of all project impacts, in light of changing baseline vulnerability of the receiving environment: Climate change not only poses risks to project infrastructure and operations but may also alter the sensitivity profile of both human and natural receptors to project impacts, resulting in potential increased significance and magnitude rankings for some impacts. If these issues are not explicitly evaluated, the project may result in unmitigated and unmanaged impacts to surrounding communities and natural environment, with potential regulatory, operational, and reputational implications for the project developer. • Help identify key vulnerabilities of the project to climate impacts and provide opportunities for adaptation/risk mitigation through design/operational measures: Analysis and review of risks in the early design stages of a project will provide scope to identify risk mitigation (adaptation) actions that are integral to the project rather than “bolt-on,” thus potentially reducing both the costs of belated remediation and the probability of costly impacts due to lack of project design resilience. • Demonstrate compliance with lender/donor requirements: As mentioned above, international financing institutions are increasingly extending the scope of their requirements with respect to climate resilience and greenhouse gas mitigation. Page 2 of 15

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• Demonstrate compliance with emerging national regulatory requirements: Some national and state governments are starting to formally require that the effects of climate change be considered in project ESIAs and associated studies submitted for regulatory approval. For example, governments in Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands are beginning to implement legal frameworks for incorporation of climate change within the ESIA process (Agrawala et al. 2010). • Identify the developer as forward-looking and responsible: Well-designed and de-risked development solutions make good business sense over the lifetime of the project and create a positive reputation for those responsible. This chapter outlines these requirements at a high level and discusses integration of climate risk and adaptation into the capital project development life cycle through compliance with lender requirements, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment procedures, and internal risk management processes. It also presents a high-level approach to streamlining assessment within the project development process.

Climate Risk and Adaptation in Project Finance Requirements International Finance Corporation Performance Standards

The IFC, a member of the World Bank Group, provides financial services and investment in support of development in developing countries. Since many developing countries do not have stringent environmental and social legislation, the IFC has developed policies and standards against which investments are assessed to ensure that projects effectively address environmental and social issues. The IFC adopted a sustainability framework in 2006 which sets out its strategic commitment to sustainable development and risk management. This was subsequently reviewed and the latest revised version came into effect in January 2012 (IFC 2012). Included in this framework are eight performance standards (PS) against which a number of environmental and social sustainability risks and impacts of IFC funded projects are assessed. Recognizing the changing global risk landscape associated with climate change, the revised performance standards explicitly include the requirement to consider “relevant risks associated with a changing climate and the adaptation opportunities” associated with these risks (IFC 2012) and identify the need to consider the impact of climate change on community risk and vulnerability as well as on ecosystem services and natural habitats, especially where they play a role in mitigating climate risk. The specific climate change-related requirements are summarized in Box 1. Note that since PS 3 relates exclusively to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, the conditions have not been considered further in this chapter. PS 1 is an overarching standard which mandates the need to consider climate risk within the project development process. The accompanying guidance note emphasizes that “a project’s vulnerability to climate change and its potential to increase the vulnerability of ecosystems and communities to climate change should dictate the extent of climate change considerations in the risks and impacts identification process” (IFC 2012). Proportional to that vulnerability profile, the project should “(i) identify potential direct and indirect climate-related adverse effects that may affect the project during its life-cycle, (ii) identify potential direct and indirect climate-related adverse effects that may be exacerbated by the project, and (iii) define monitoring programs and mitigation and adaptation measures, as appropriate” (IFC 2012). Page 3 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_72-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

PS 4 recognizes that project activities, equipment, and infrastructure can increase community exposure to health and safety risks and impacts, particularly for vulnerable groups, and requires that “communities that are already subjected to impacts from climate change may also experience an acceleration and/or intensification of impacts due to project activities” (IFC 2012). The standard further requires identification of “risks and potential impacts on priority ecosystem services that may be exacerbated by climate change” (IFC 2012). The guidance notes accompanying PS 6 on Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources note that determination of areas of critical habitat should consider “ecosystems of known special significance to endangered or critically endangered species for climate adaptation purposes” (IFC 2012) as well as “sites of demonstrated importance to climate change adaptation for either species or ecosystems” (IFC 2012). Selection of mitigation measures should furthermore take into consideration “existing non-project related threats to biodiversity values,” which include, among other threats, climate change (Farell et al. 2013). Box 1 (IFC) PS Climate Change Requirements

IFC PS 1 The risks and impact identification process will consider the emissions of greenhouse gases, the relevant risks associated with a changing climate and the adaptation opportunities, and potential trans-boundary effects, such as pollution of air or use or pollution of international waterways (IFC 2012).

IFC PS 3 Requires • Measures for improving efficiency in consumption of energy, water, as well as other resources and material inputs • Options to reduce project-related greenhouse gas emissions during the design and operation of the project • For projects > 25,000tCO2e/year quantification of direct greenhouse gas emissions within the physical project boundary and indirect emissions associated with off-site production of energy (i.e., purchased electricity)

IFC PS 4 Requires • Projects must take into account the fact that communities that are already subjected to impacts from climate change may also experience an acceleration and/or intensification of impacts from project activities, since climate change effects may exacerbate their vulnerability. • Projects must identify and mitigate risks and potential impacts on priority ecosystem services that may be exacerbated by climate change.

IFC PS 6 Requires Determination of critical habitat should consider sites of demonstrated importance to climate change adaptation for either species or ecosystems.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_72-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Equator Principles The Equator Principles (EP) represent the best available risk management framework for commercial financing institutions in relation to determining, assessing, and managing environmental and social risk. At the time of writing, 78 financial institutions in 35 countries have signed up to the EP, covering over 70 % of international project finance debt in emerging markets (EP 2013). Member institutions commit to implementing the principles within their project financing policies and procedures on environmental and social issues. They will not provide project finance or corporate loans (on arrangements exceeding US$10 million) to organizations which are unable to comply with the EP (EP 2013). For projects in “non-designated countries,” i.e., those judged not to have sufficiently robust national environmental impact legislation, the assessment process must be in compliance with the IFC performance standards and environmental, health, and safety guidelines. Of the 31 designated countries, 21 are members of the European Union and the others are all industrialized countries. The third version of the EP published in June 2013 lists “viability of Project operations in view of reasonably foreseeable changing weather patterns/climatic conditions, together with adaptation opportunities” as a potential issue to be addressed in the ESIA (EP III 2013). Many of the environmental elements of the PS and EP are considered during the ESIA process and an example of how this is achieved is provided in the section below.

Climate Risk and Adaptation in Environmental and Social Impact Assessments The International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) defines an Environmental [and Social] Impact Assessment as: “The process of identifying, predicting, evaluating and mitigating the biophysical, social, and other relevant effects of development proposals prior to major decisions being taken and commitments made” (IAIA 1999). The objectives of ESIA are: • To ensure that environmental considerations are explicitly addressed and incorporated into the development decision making process; • To anticipate and avoid, minimize or offset the adverse significant biophysical, social and other relevant effects of development proposals; • To protect the productivity and capacity of natural systems and the ecological processes which maintain their functions; and • To promote development that is sustainable and optimizes resource use and management opportunities. (IAIA 1999)

Since most major capital project developments are required to undertake an ESIA, it makes sense to integrate climate change within this assessment. A 2010 study by the OECD indicates that a number of countries and multilateral organizations had begun working on incorporating climate change within the framework of environmental or Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (EIA/ESIAs) (Agrawala et al. 2010). Interestingly, more developing than developed countries had begun exploring options and developing guidance – predominantly small island developing nations and countries in the Caribbean (see Fig. 1). This is likely to be due to the significant projected impact of climate change on these nations in the future.

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Level 1 – Intention

Level 2 – Guidance

Level 3 – Implementaion

Developed Countries

Developed Countries

Developed Countries

Canada Spain European Union

Australia Canada Netherlands

Australia Canada Netherlands

Developing Countries

Developing Countries

Bangladesh Dominica Kiribati Saint Lucia Samoa Solomon IsIands Caribbean Community

Grenada Kiribati Trinidad and Tobago Caribbean Community

Multilateral Organisations Asian Development Bank Inter-American Development Bank World Bank

Fig. 1 The evolution of integrating climate change adaptation within ESIA (Agrawala et al. 2010)

In the years since this study, the IFC has produced guidelines as discussed above and the European Union has issued detailed guidance (although not binding) on integrating climate change and biodiversity into EIA pursuant to the 2011 EIA Directive 2011/92/EU (EU 2013). There are a number of entry points for incorporating climate change in the strategic phase preceding the initiation of the EIA/ESIA to the scoping, detailed assessment, and implementation stages. Figure 2 outlines how a climate risk and adaptation assessment could be included in the ESIA assessment process and asks key questions which can help focus the work. An example of consideration of climate change during the ESIA process is the case of a proposed mine in the Northern Cape province of South Africa (confidential project). The area is hot and arid with rainfall occurring in infrequent intense thunderstorms. Climate change is likely to lead to hotter weather and less rainfall, exacerbating problems in an already water-stressed area. Specialists conducting studies during the ESIA process were provided with climate change projections in order to include changes in baseline meteorological data in their modeling to understand the impacts on surface water flow and groundwater recharge. This information allowed the design engineers to ensure the site selection and location of key infrastructure was designed to withstand the magnitude of future events rather than only those experienced in the past. The potential impact of reduced water availability on local communities and agricultural activities was also investigated to ensure that the mitigation measures (climate change adaptation measures) identified during the ESIA process would be relevant in the long term with a changing climate and could help ensure the sustainability of the project and surrounding community.

Integrated Climate Risk Management Most, if not all, companies have some sort of risk management procedure which allows them to identify, analyze, evaluate, and treat business risks which arise during project development or operation. The International Standards Organization (ISO) has developed a standard for integrating risk management practices within organizations (ISO 2009). The aim is to provide principles and generic guidelines on risk management to apply the procedures to existing management systems rather than to replace them. The standard provides a framework for integrated risk management and advice for risk identification, analysis, evaluation, and treatment.

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EIA Steps

Concept Phase

Strategic Phase

Project Need and Justification

Detailed Assessment Phase

Phase 1: Climate Change Screening Level of effort: a few days Key Questions:

Strategic Environmental Assessment

• Does the project scope (e.g. design life and investment level) justify considering climate change risks and vulnerability? • Could the project potentiallty be sensitive to climate change? • If so, what would the broad implications be?

Project Identification

Phase 2: Scoping the Climate Change Risk and Adaptation Assessment Level of effort: a few days

EIA Scoping

• What climate variables need to be assessed? • Are some climate-driven risks more significant–for example are high winds known to be an issue causing damage in the project vicinity • Is the geographical/ temporal scope of the project clear? • Some projects may face climate risks anising from their supply chains–how will these be reflected in the assessment?

Key Questions:

Determine what elements would need to be assessed

Conducting EIA

Implementation Phase

Entry Points for Climate Change

- Baseline environmental characteristics - Potential impacts - Management measures

Formal Public Consultation

Determination - Submission - Review - Conditions

Implementation - Construction - Operation - Maintenance

Phase 3: Undertaking Climate Change Risk and Adaptation Assessment Level of effort: 1-3 months Key Questions to be answered: • • • •

What is the baseline climate risk for the location? How is the future climate predicted to change? How will the key climate risks develop over time? How do these risks map onto project activities (planning, construction, operation, decommissioning)? • What measures has the project proposed to deal with the climate baseline? Are they sufficient? • What is the likelihood and consequence of each of the principal risks, for the baseline and for the future climate? • What are the most appropriate mitigation measures for each of the principal risks (physical, operational, management or strategic)?

Phase 4: Implementing Climate Change Adaptation Measures Level of effort: 4-6 weeks Key Questions to be answered: • Implementation of what climate change adaptation measures should we aim through the CMP, OMP AND EMP? • What Key Performance Indicators (KPI) can be used to monitor climate change and climate proofing over time?

Fig. 2 Entry points for climate change risk and adaptation within the ESIA process (Adapted from Agrawala et al. (2010))

Consideration of climate risks within a standard risk management approach can sometimes go a long way to managing the impact of climate change on the organization in a manner which does not require new systems or approaches. Figure 3 illustrates how assessment of climate change risk and adaptation could be embedded within the integrated risk management framework outlined in ISO 31000. This process is explained in more detail below. Many organizations will already be managing risks from extreme weather events and assessment of how climate change might amplify these risks simply requires addition of the increase/decrease expected in the future based on climate change projections.

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Establish context Characterise the climate context based on historic weather events and future climate projections

Risk assessment Identify risk Assess climate risks for portfolio and/ or sites

Communication and consultation

Monitoring and review

Analyse risk

Engage company experts and engineers in analysis and report progress

Monitor meteorological data and weather related disruptions

Analyse climate risks and assess adaptation measures

Evaluate risk Quantify the cost:benefit of risks and adaptation measures

Treat risk Implement adaptation measures and revise risk registers

Fig. 3 Embedding climate change assessment within the integrated risk management framework

X

Likelihood

Consequence

X

Value at stake

=

Existing risk

Flooding risk at location Frequency Every 10 yrs

Severity

X

220mm in 24 hour downpour causes shut down for 20 days

Value at stake

X

Cost of downtime $5m/day

=

Existing risk potential $10m

Fig. 4 Assessing baseline risk (Chrysostomidis and Constable 2014)

Quantitative assessments focus on assessing risks that arise from an increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events using likelihood/consequence based on traditional risk management approaches. Baseline or existing risks are assessed according to the method outlined in Fig. 4. Once the baseline risk has been identified, frequency and severity parameters can be modified based on values that come from climate change projections as illustrated in Fig. 5. The approach outlined above has been piloted through the development of guidance for integrating analysis of weather and climate risk into the operational risk management procedures of a global mining house (confidential project). By utilizing existing processes, the burden of additional processes/requirements is reduced and the effectiveness of risk management enhanced through ensuring that the amplification of existing risks as a result of climate change is effectively captured in the risk register. For example, fatigue management plans consider the impact of higher temperatures on staff working outside; slope management plans consider the risk of erosion/landslides from more intense rainfall in the future. The result is that the amplification of risks as a result of climate

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_72-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Existing risk

X

Climate change projections

=

Future climate risk

Example for future flooding risk at location Existing climate related risk $10m

Increase in flooding frequency and/or severity at location

X 100% (e.g. 1/10 year event will be 1/5 year event in 2025)

Increase in risk

=

$10m ($20m future climate risk)

Fig. 5 Estimating future risk (Chrysostomidis and Constable 2014)

Fig. 6 Overview of climate risk and adaptation assessment process (Chrysostomidis and Constable 2014)

change is automatically considered within the day-to-day management of risks and controls and the likelihood of unanticipated events causing damage or business interruption is reduced.

Streamlining Climate Risk and Adaptation in the Project Development Process Businesses already have numerous risk management and impact assessment procedures in place, and incorporation of climate change assessment within these processes could help enhance resilience in a more efficient and effective manner than implementing stand-alone procedures in parallel. Figure 6 illustrates a simple four-step approach to understanding and managing the risks associated with extreme weather and climate change in a business context. The approach is discussed in detail by Chrysostomidis and Constable (2014) and provides a good starting point, in conjunction with the IFC Performance Standards and associated guidance, for the analysis required to ensure that climate risk is appropriately considered during the capital project development process.

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The remainder of this section provides advice on how climate change can be incorporated in the capital project development life cycle through incorporation in ESIA as well as internal project team activities.

Project Team Analysis of Climate Risk and Adaptation in the Project Development Cycle The approach to assessing climate risks differs depending on the stage of project development. While climate risk and adaptation can be addressed to a certain extent through the ESIA process, it is important that it is also incorporated in the business project approval process (i.e., each decision stage gate in the project development and evaluation process) in order that the risks and opportunities are fully considered through the decision-making stage gates throughout the project life cycle. It is recommended that a designated person act as liaison between the ESIA team and project team to ensure that the necessary information is gathered and incorporated effectively with the project development and evaluation process. This role will be particularly important where climate risks are expected to be the greatest. Figure 7 provides an overview of activities associated with climate risk and adaptation through the project development life cycle, and these are discussed in further detail in the remainder of this section. Concession, Acquisition Climate risk should be considered at a high level during due diligence prior to acquisition of a site or concession area. If a company is investigating a range of options in different geographical locations, it may be that the risks from weather at one site, e.g., in an area which is regularly subjected to hurricanes and flooding, outweigh the benefits and that the site (with similar reserves and potential economic return) in a more temperate climate would be preferred. Exploration During exploration, the main purpose of considering climate risk is to protect the health and safety of the exploration project team and, if possible, collect baseline climate and weather information. It is not necessary to undertake a detailed climate risk assessment during the exploration stage, but rather a high-level understanding of where weather events pose risks to activities or people and whether more detailed assessment is warranted. Phase 1: Identify and Assess Opportunities During the phase when the technical and economic viability of exploiting the resource is determined, it is important to understand the climate context (current baseline and future projections), within which the proposed project might be developed, and the associated risks for the project. The objective of considering climate risks during this phase is to ensure that climate and weather risks associated with construction, operation, closure, and post closure at that site do not materially impact the viability of the concept. Much of the information required for this assessment could be obtained through the ESIA process. The activities that could be conducted during this phase include characterizing the climate context for the project, identifying climate risks, identifying key project decisions affected by climate and weather, and identifying further research requirements. Phase 2: Select from Alternatives Phase 2 provides the widest scope for the generation, investigation, and elimination of alternatives. At this stage, the purpose of assessing climate risks and adaptation measures is to inform the Page 10 of 15

Exploration

PHASE 1 Identify and Assess Opportunities PHASE 2 Select from Alternatives

Fig. 7 Overview of climate change activities within the project development cycle

Concession, Acquisition

PHASE 3 Develop Preferred Alternative FID

PHASE 4 Execute (Detail EPC)

PHASE 5 Operate and Evaluate Closure

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_72-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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generation and elimination of project options such that the optimal option (in terms of all technical, commercial, and sustainability aspects, including the climate risk profile) is selected to be put forward for consideration. In addition, adaptation measures to mitigate key risks should be identified for each alternative. Climate risks and opportunities should be assessed at this stage to the greatest possible level of detail for the site as well as the supply chain (based on the information available at that time, much of which could be generated during the ESIA process). The work undertaken during Phase 1 provides a base upon which to assess risks from extreme weather and climate change in further detail during the option identification and appraisal process in Phase 2. Phase 3: Develop Preferred Alternative During Phase 3, the alternatives selected and approved at the end of Phase 2 are refined and finalized to a level of detail and accuracy normally associated with project execution plans. The purpose of climate risk and adaptation assessment at this stage is to ensure that the “Final Investment Decision” (FID) is based on a design that includes all necessary measures to optimize the climate risk profile of the operation. Should any new information arise at this stage that raises the climate risk profile of the selected alternative to an unacceptable level, this should be flagged as soon as possible. In this situation, adaptation measures should be identified to bring the climate risk level down to acceptable levels. Phase 4: Execute and Phase 5: Operate and Evaluate Once the project design has been finalized and activities turn to construction and operations, the adaptation measures identified need to be implemented and residual risks (i.e., those which cannot be prevented through design such as flooding exceeding thresholds) should be managed through the company’s integrated risk management procedures as described above. It is also important that weather data is monitored on a regular basis and the impact of extreme events tracked in order to feed into risk registers and for additional adaptation measures/controls to be implemented as required during the life of the operations. Closure Given the long-term nature of climate change, a company’s liability in relation to climate change may continue post closure. For example, in the mining sector an increase in rainfall may threaten the integrity of tailings storage facilities or increase runoff through waste rock leading to contamination of groundwater sources. A hydropower plant may experience generation difficulties during droughts or periods of particularly heavy rainfall.

ESIA Practitioner Guidance for Including Climate Risk and Adaptation in ESIA Climate change presents a new dimension to the traditional impact assessment conceptual framework in that it implies a dynamic rather than static baseline from which project impacts occur. This means that climate change, occurring irrespective of the project, may have the effect of altering the overall significance or magnitude of project impacts on the human and natural environment. It is critical to capture both elements through the impact assessment and project planning process. In order to ensure that climate change is effectively incorporated within the capital project impact assessment process, the ESIA project management team should follow the steps below to ensure that the need for and the level of detail required in a climate change risk and adaptation study is carefully considered.

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Step 1: Climate Change Vulnerability Screening and Scoping During the scoping stage, it is important to ascertain the degree to which climate change is a significant consideration in project design and impact assessment. Key questions to answer at this stage are: • • • •

Is the project climate dependent? Is the project climate vulnerable? Are communities and local ecosystems climate vulnerable? Could project impacts exacerbate vulnerabilities?

The project developer, and ESIA team, should consider each of these questions in the context of each phase of the project life cycle, taking into account current climate variability as well as likely future trends in the project’s location. “Climate dependency” refers to the degree to which the project requires resources or operating conditions to function which may become more scarce or less predictable because of climate change – for example, reliable freshwater supply (a requirement for most industries), a specific temperature range (such as for agricultural development projects or tourism ventures), a specific sea level (such as for a port), etc. “Climate vulnerability” encompasses the elements of climate dependency but also includes consideration of whether a project’s assets or productive capacity may be directly affected by climate related hazards which may become more frequent or intense under future climate scenarios. Such effects may include more frequent or intense floods, hurricane force winds, storm surges, etc. This will necessarily be a high-level initial assessment but will provide an indication of the potential importance of climate change impacts on the future operations of the project and therefore the level of analysis required during the ESIA process. The climate change specialist study and ESIA proposal should be drafted based on the findings of these deliberations. Step 2: Include Climate Change in Specialist Studies Each project will have its own unique issues relating to the proposed activities, and ESIA specialists are well placed to investigate how climate change might influence the impacts identified during the ESIA process. While it is possible to conduct a high-level – stand-alone – climate risk and adaptation specialist study, it is recommended that all specialists providing input into the ESIA process are requested to assess the potential impact of climate change on their findings. This will ensure site-specific analysis of the potential impacts to the project, environment, communities, and ecosystem services. Examples of the types of analysis which could be undertaken include: • Surface and groundwater hydrology studies to look at how changing precipitation and evaporation might affect stream flow and groundwater recharge • Biodiversity studies to look at how local ecology and agricultural practices might change with changing temperature and precipitation patterns to feed into decisions on rehabilitation, resettlement, and impacts on local community livelihoods • Flood risk assessments, including research on the frequency and severity of historical flooding in the area, the influence of topography on flood prone areas within the site, and the projected trends for flood events in light of predicted climate change • Ecosystem services assessments to consider how the availability and use of services might change in the future and the associated impacts Page 13 of 15

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Fig. 8 An approach to incorporating climate risk and adaptation in the ESIA process

Where possible, the first phase of the climate risk and adaptation approach outlined in Fig. 8 should be undertaken at the very start of the ESIA in order for the findings to feed into the work of the specialists – i.e., hydrologists will be able to model increase/decrease in precipitation into water balance/stream flow/groundwater assessments. Step 3: Summarize Climate Change Risks, Vulnerabilities, and Adaptation Measures In Line with IFC Requirements If the project is required to comply with the IFC Performance Standards or Equator Principles, it is important to ensure that the ESIA covers all of the requirements on climate change risk, impact, and vulnerability included in the 2012 IFC Performance Standards and their accompanying guidance notes. In this final step, a report should be prepared summarizing the climate change context for the project and collating the information gathered in the specialist studies and any stand-alone analysis required to ensure that the impact of climate change on the project is fully understood and discussed within the ESIA. The report could follow the basic framework outlined in Fig. 8.

Conclusion As was described in this chapter, understanding and managing climate risk and adaptation, at a facility or project level, is central to ensuring business continuity and reducing costs. This is particularly important in relation to utilities, infrastructure, and the extractives sector (i.e., mining and oil and gas activities). Furthermore, building resilience to climate change and incorporating adaptation measures into project design, as well as impact management programs – such as ESIAs –, is now being mandated by a growing number of financial institutions, as well as national and state governments.

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Climate change can also present a new dimension to the traditional impact assessment conceptual framework in that it implies a dynamic rather than static baseline from which project impacts occur. This means that climate change, occurring irrespective of the project, may have the effect of altering the overall significance or magnitude of project impacts on the human and natural environment. In order to ensure that climate change is effectively incorporated within the capital project impact assessment process, the ESIA management team of the project can follow the steps outlined in this chapter to ensure that the need for and the level of detail required in a climate change risk and adaptation study is carefully considered. Furthermore, incorporation of climate change assessment in the existing risk management and impact assessment procedures could help enhance resilience in a more efficient and effective manner than implementing stand-alone procedures in parallel.

References Agrawala S, Matus Kramer A, Prudent-Richard G, Sainsbury M. (2010) Incorporating climate change impacts and adaptation in environmental impact assessments: opportunities and challenges. In: OECD environmental working paper no. 24. OECD Publishing, # OECD. doi: 10.1787/ 5km959r3jcmw-en. Available from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/ 5km959r3jcmw.pdf?expires¼1377518501&id¼id&accname¼guest&checksum¼B2D45C045 BC8845C8A2161F966CB7A1B. Accessed 26 Aug 2013 Chrysostomidis I, Constable L (2014) Understanding and managing climate change risks and adaptation opportunities in a business context. In: Handbook of climate change adaptation. Springer, New York EP (2013) About the equator principles on equator principles website. Available from http://www. equator-principles.com/index.php/about-ep/about-ep. Accessed 27 Aug 2013 EP III (2013) The equator principles: a financial industry benchmark for determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risk in projects, 3rd edn. June 2013. Available from http:// www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles_III.pdf. Accessed 27 Aug 2013 EU (2013) Guidance on integrating climate change and biodiversity into EIA. Available from http:// ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/EIA%20Guidance.pdf. Accessed 27 Aug 2013 Farell L, Burwell A, Mwangi W (2013) Applying new IFC standards on climate change risk analysis: lessons from “early cases” of post‐2012 ESIAs aiming for IFC compliance. http://www.iaia.org/conferences/iaia13/documents/Finalpro_13%20web.pdf?AspxAutoDetect CookieSupport=1 IAIA (1999) Principles of environmental impact assessment: best practice. International Association of Impact Assessment in association with the Institute for Environmental Assessment (UK). Available from http://www.iaia.org/publicdocuments/special-publications/Principles%20of% 20IA_web.pdf. Accessed 27 Aug 2013 IFC (2012) Performance standards on environmental and social sustainability. International Finance Corporation -World Bank Group. Available from http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/ Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/IFC+Sustainability/Sustainability+Framework/ Sustainability+Framework++2012/Performance+Standards+and+Guidance+Notes+2012. Accessed 27 Aug 2013 ISO (2009) ISO 31000 – Risk management (reference ISO/FDIS 31000:2009(E)). Available from http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso31000.htm. Accessed 27 Aug 2013

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_73-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Making Adaptation Fit: Analysis of Joint Climate Change Adaptation Programs of the MDGF S. Czunyia*, L. Pintéra,b and J. Perryb,c a Central European University, Budapest, Hungary b International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, MB, Canada c University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA

Abstract Climate change adaptation governance is characterized by complexity and uncertainty, requiring harmonization across different sectors and scales as well as flexibility to respond to changing realities. International organizations have been increasingly involved in adaptation activities, particularly targeted at vulnerable populations, under established project management routines. However, to be effective, adaptation must be inherently context specific and dynamic to suit the ecological conditions and socioeconomic aspects of any given locale. This poses a dilemma: how can international organizations translate their often broadly defined global mandates, while simultaneously downscaling those mandates to suit the specific adaptation needs of given populations and ecosystems? This research takes a case study approach to investigate the climate change adaptation experience of selected United Nations-led programs, investigating their responses to context-specific needs and highlighting the opportunities and challenges found in these experiences. The case study countries comprised of Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Peru, and Turkey. Through the use of the 5C+ Protocol theoretical framework, the experiences of these country programs were compared to determine which factors were of greatest influence in successful program implementation. The research concludes that the most significant challenges were: early inclusion of stakeholders to enable support and ownership of adaptation activities, meaningful participation by people at all levels in the identification of problems and solutions, and proper coordination of activities across affected sectors and governance levels. Paying specific attention to these challenges will allow for greater program effectiveness. However, incorporating such measures into adaptation must also include deliberate learning processes, to allow flexibility in response to potential nonlinearities of climate change.

Keywords Climate change; Adaptive capacity; Learning; International institutions; 5C+ Protocol

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_73-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Introduction The Problem: Downscaling Complexity Climate change adaptation is an emerging need worldwide because of the imminent threats of new climate regimes and the high levels of vulnerability of many socioeconomic groups and regions (IPCC 2007). In response, numerous international organizations have been planning and implementing climate change adaptation measures. Yet, adaptation to climate change is a complex governance challenge, characterized by uncertainty, long time frames, and nonlinearities. Adaptation normally requires coordination among a range of sectors, agencies, and interests, who traditionally may not have the working culture or framework for such collaboration – making not only the issues addressed but also the response methods novel and unprecedented in their complexity. To be successful, climate change adaptation measures must take into account processes at multiple spatial and temporal scales and be inherently context specific to suit the ecological conditions, socioeconomic aspects, and institutional framework of any given locale (Cash et al. 2006). This poses a significant obstacle for international organizations. Such organizations usually have broadly defined global mandates, but the complexities of climate change adaptation require those mandates to be downscaled to suit the specific needs of individual populations and ecosystems (Hilde 2012; Wiechselgartner and Marandino 2012). It also raises the question of generality: how can practitioners learn from, generalize, and transfer lessons learned in different contexts in a way that is relevant elsewhere? With these questions in mind, the aim of this research was to investigate how international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), might most effectively apply their broadly defined global mandates by addressing specific local adaptation needs. Using a case study approach and a common analytical framework, this chapter first provides an assessment of the programmatic ability to respond to context-specific needs and, second, highlights the opportunities and challenges found within several such experiences. The case study in question focuses on the climate change adaptation experiences of selected Joint Programs (JPs) operating under the UN Millennium Development Goal Achievement Fund (MDGF). The lessons learned from the MDGF are intended for use by international organizations to inform the design of future adaptation-related interventions in the field.

The Case Study and Rationale The MDGF was established by the UN with funding by the Spanish government to advance international efforts towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). All MDGF programming is implemented in the spirit of the UN “Delivering as One” initiative, which aims to improve harmonization of UN efforts in relevant member states (MDGF 2011a). MDGF programming was implemented in eight thematic windows, one for each of the MDGs. Several countries implemented programs in several windows. Within a country activities were implemented through a Joint Program (JP) that drew together UN agencies and national collaborators (MDGF 2011b). The MDGF case study looks in depth at the work of JPs in ten countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Peru, and Turkey, that implemented activities between 2006 and 2012, under the MDGF environment and climate change window, related to MDG 7 to improve environmental sustainability. In each country, a variety of activities were undertaken, ranging from national policy mainstreaming to localized community-based climate change adaptation projects. Examples include a community-based forest management program in Mozambique, development of a national climate change and health

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_73-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 MDGF case study countries (Image Source: Adapted from WikiCommons 2005)

adaptation strategy in Jordan, conservation and adaptation programs with indigenous populations in Colombia, and partnering with private sector industries in China (Fig. 1). Data for the case study analysis are drawn directly from the specific experiences of the ten countries. Each JP is part of a global program, yet given the broad geographical scope and range of activities, the comparison among their experiences revealed different approaches to regional differentiation and contextualization. The rich diversity, due to the wide range of programs and experiences from the case study countries, allows the outcomes from our analysis to have generality, making them relevant in other contexts. These ten MDGF programs were chosen as the basis for analysis for two primary reasons. First, the MDGF operates under the UN, which plays an important role globally in norm-setting and guiding country-level programs (UN 2008). The UN’s international influence, particularly its leadership in global environmental governance, puts it at the forefront of emerging activities in the field of climate change. Second, the institutional framework of the MDGF has been set up to complement the UN’s current efforts to “Deliver as One” – a direct response to institutional fragmentation and program inefficiency problems and an effort to improve harmonization of cross-sectoral activities (UNSGHLP 2006). The MDGF JPs implemented their activities jointly with several UN agencies, as well as government and community partners at both national and subnational levels. This institutional framework reflects the emerging role of collaborative environmental governance (CEG) and its importance in addressing complex problems such as climate change (Andresen 2001; Gunningham 2009). Due to its potential for playing a norm-setting role through the UN, and manifestation of CEG, the lessons from the MDGF provide real value for emerging climate change adaptation interventions implemented through other international organizations.

Methodology The Framework: 5C+ Protocol An analytical framework, the 5C+ Protocol, was used to investigate how the JPs responded to context-specific needs, both opportunities and challenges faced through implementation. The research relied mostly on the use of a rich database of qualitative information, but quantitative information was also used where available and relevant. The experiences of the JPs were compared

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_73-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Variables and definitions associated with the 5C+ Protocol (Modified after Najam 1995) Institutional corridor Content

Commitment Capacity Clients and coalitions Environmental conditions

The institutional environment through which policy and activities must travel, a variable that also provides the boundaries for specific implementation activities The content of a policy or program is threefold: what it sets out to do (i.e., goals), how it problematizes the issue (i.e., causal theory), and how it aims to solve the perceived problem (i.e., methods) The commitment of those entrusted with carrying out implementation, at various levels The capacity of implementers to carry out the changes desired by the policy, program, or activities; this includes both human and financial resources The groups or individuals whose interests are enhanced/threatened by the policy and/or program and the actions they take in response to its implementation either in support or opposition The environmental characteristics (i.e., elements, state, dynamics, challenges, and opportunities) of a given geographical location

to each of several variables in the 5C+ Protocol, and relationships among those variables, to determine which were of greatest significance to the work of the JPs. The 5C+ Protocol was developed as a modification of an original 5C Protocol framework by Najam (1995) that was based on a synthesis of literature on policy implementation, intended to help analyze and diagnose practical policy implementation measures. Najam identified five common variables – the “5Cs” – which he argued are interlinked explanatory variables essential for reviewing the effectiveness of policy implementation, particularly the “domestication” of international environmental measures (Najam 1995). The 5C Protocol was modified by adding a sixth variable (thus, 5C + Protocol) to provide a common structure for analyzing the diverse experiences of the MDGF JPs. This framework was deemed appropriate for analysis of the MDGF case studies because it guides the investigation of several factors which influence practical implementation measures. As the 5C Protocol was developed for use in a general policy context, it was assumed that it also applies, with possible fine-tuning, to adaptation-related policies and activities. The framework also emphasizes how different variables, at various levels, interrelate and impact upon one another. The framework therefore has a dynamic element and simultaneously provides structure so the user does not get lost in the complexity of the issues studied. We addressed each of the six variables individually, and in relation to one another, for each of the case study countries (Table 1). Critically, it is not only the variables themselves but also the relationships among them that provide insight into implementation effectiveness. Najam posited that in the 5C Protocol “the task is to catalog the strength and influence of each variable on specific implementation efforts as well as to identify critical linkages between them on the basis of their strengths and weaknesses, and, most importantly, their potential to enhance the effectiveness of the particular implementation process” (Najam 1995, p. 36). The variables in the 5C+ Protocol are interlinked with one another (Fig. 2). This framework was used to analyze and compare the MDGF case study countries.

Data Collection and Analysis Data for the study were collected using a variety of methods, including targeted literature reviews, participation in MDGF meetings and processes, and interviews. Primary data were collected through in-depth interviews with selected JP representatives. The interviews were guided by the 5C+ Protocol and analyzed according to the variables shown in Fig. 2. The interviews were semistructured, using open-ended questions, which alluded to each of the variables in tandem. Interviews

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_73-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Institutional Corridor

Clients and Coalitions

Environmental Conditions

Content

Commitment

Capacity

Fig. 2 5C+ protocol

Table 2 Total counts by variable Clients and coalitions Content Institutional corridor Commitment Capacity Environmental conditions

65 60 52 40 30 26

took place both face-to-face and online. The interviews were transcribed and coded manually using the ATLAS.ti software. All data were coded according to the variables of the 5C+ Protocol then analyzed quantitatively, using total counts and co-occurrences to identify the strength of each variable and relationships to one another. A second round of interviews was conducted with climate change adaptation experts not involved in MDGF, to validate and cross-check the results and conclusions of the primary interviews. Further, all results were compared to similar relevant findings in the literature and sharpened where warranted to ensure relevance for a wider audience.

Research Results The primary interviews produced very rich qualitative data on the nature of the JPs and the challenges and opportunities experienced in implementation. The use of the theoretical framework and the coding software allowed these data to be analyzed quantitatively by use of total counts per variable and the co-occurrences (relationships) among the variables. Note that in this section, unless otherwise stated, all quotes come directly from the primary interviews.

Variable Counts After transcription and coding of the interviews with representatives from the ten case study countries, the total count for each of the six variables in the framework was identified. The range of occurrences was 26–65 (Table 2). It is clear from the aggregated results that the most commonly discussed variable, among all interviews, was clients and coalitions – the groups or individuals whose interests are enhanced/

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_73-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

threatened by the policy and/or program and the actions they take in response to its implementation either in support or in opposition. This is unsurprising due to the crosscutting nature of the climate change field. The clients and coalitions variable was discussed by the JP representatives mostly with regard to the challenges they faced when dealing with competing and/or conflicting interests. The JPs faced various challenges when trying to understand the perspectives of different sectors and integrating these perspectives according to the aims of their various activities. For example, the Jordan JP representative stated that: If I say that we have been supported by all partners from all sides from the beginning, I wouldn’t be telling the truth. We have different partners who are looking at the JP from different perspectives, so some of them see it as an opportunity to gain out of the JP, and some of them have seen it as an initiative that will make them lose some of their benefits and privileges.

Similar sentiments were repeated by each of the JPs interviewed. In all cases, they faced various camps of support and opposition, which had to be addressed in order to ensure implementation of the JP work. Another common topic of discussion within the clients and coalitions variable was that of champions, i.e., finding the right individuals or groups who will showcase their support and through their convening power help the JP activities to gain the trust of potential ambivalent or opposition groups. These champions could be government or nongovernmental officials, the key point being that influential champions play a major role in a successful intervention. For example, the Mauritania JP representative emphasized in the interview how they utilized traditional leaders in their field activities: We use [non-state local leaders] as speakers, moderators or organizers. When they ask for a meeting, people will come. And when they speak, also the people listen to them.

From the perspective of the Ethiopia JP, it was a lack of champions that seemed to hinder their work at the national level: . . . you have to have champions – and champions mean having one or two key people in the policy process. . . Some of the issues we are dealing with are the allocation of national resources – the more you have a champion, that’s why you get better access to the resource. I think that’s one area where the JP didn’t put in the list of priorities, but it should.

Other countries, for example, Peru, Mozambique, Jordan, China, and Bosnia and Herzegovina also highlighted the important role of champions within the governmental system. On the other hand, in some countries champions were explicitly nongovernmental. In Colombia, for example, tensions between the government and local communities made a local representative a more effective champion. It is clear, therefore, that while important in general, the selection of champions must also be highly sensitive to local opinions and realities. Another frequently cited variable in the interviews with a total score of 60 was content, i.e., what a program sets out to do (its goals), how it problematizes the issue (causal theory), and how it aims to solve the perceived problem (methods).This variable was referenced during JP interviews most often in regard to the methods used to determine problems and solutions. For example, one of the main aims of the JPs was to ensure high levels of ownership on the part of domestic stakeholders (i.e., government officials at the national level or community members in field-level projects). With this aim in mind, the majority of JPs utilized participatory methods to engage local stakeholders. A parallel aim of such participation was to achieve better contextualization of the problems at hand. For example, the Turkey JP representative emphasized that:

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_73-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

We tried to be participatory at maximum extent. . . When you talk about climate change adaptation, the national strategies or efforts are too generic. Because even between two villages, 5 km from each other, your adaptation efforts may change when it comes to climate change.

Another important point brought up repeatedly during the interviews with regard to content was the need to include livelihood activities and income generation options in all “solutions.” The Mauritania JP representative, for example, stated that the environment had to be seen as “natural capital,” so as to engage poor and vulnerable populations in the JP activities. Similar sentiments were described by the Mozambique JP representative: [We have] activities designed to help people to adapt to climate change, and also to help them to diversify their livelihoods – you can’t really disassociate those two.

Particularly in field-level activities, the JPs were working mostly with vulnerable socioeconomic groups. Even at the national level where the JPs worked largely on mainstreaming climate change into national strategies and programs, there was a clear demand for economic benefits as part of any adaptation work. This need to integrate economic needs with environmental ones was very clearly emphasized throughout all of the JP interviews, showing that climate change adaptation cannot be achieved for environmental benefits alone; it must be seen as integrated with other pressing social and economic realities. The third most common variable discussed in the interviews with a score of 52 was institutional corridor – the institutional environment through which policy and activities must travel, which also provides the boundaries for specific implementation activities. Related to the clients and coalitions variable discussed above, institutional corridor was most often brought up in relation to the crosscutting nature of the work and the difficulties faced in integrating several parties and interests, both within the UN and between UN and national government agencies. For example, the Turkey JP representative stated: It was very challenging putting all of them together in one team, because they have their own working cultures, their own administrative rules, plus no culture of working together.

Similar issues were raised by each of the JPs. Because climate change adaptation work requires the collaboration of several different sectors, it faces challenges not just on the administrative front but also in terms of culture. Many of these forms of behavior have been established over time and resilient to change even by a “joint” program. Often a series of behaviors and methods must be unlearned, and new ones learned to overcome traditional silo mentalities. An observation from the Ethiopia JP representative was: My assessment is that we have to do this several times before agencies can work together. The issue is sometimes mandates are overlapping, sometimes there is problems of synchronization. . . [all] this has an impact on the overall delivery of the program. There definitely needs to synchronize and harmonize a bit more, and if possible talk a little bit more to each other.

Another common thread raised by the JPs was the issue of institutional misfits. For example, several UN agencies were tasked to provide specialized input into the programs. Some of those agencies were nonresident (i.e., did not have permanent presence and staff within a country) and were asked to work alongside resident agencies. In some cases, it was clear only after implementation started that some agencies did not have the capacity or structure to allow them to operate effectively at the field level. For example, as revealed in the interview with the Mozambique JP representative:

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_73-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

[As a non-resident agency] we’re not really geared to delivering at the field, so it’s not necessarily that people don’t want to support, it’s just the rules don’t allow the level of flexibility that you need working in the field. . . I think there’s a tension between the field and headquarters within the UN.

That same theme was apparent at more local levels when certain institutions were not capable of carrying out tasks, even if they were mandated to do so. In Mauritania, for example, this problem was apparent with respect to selected civil society organizations: . . . we call them ‘ONG cartables’ – it’s the NGO with an empty bag. . . as the country is poor, the civil society is not very strong, so maybe it’s the only NGO you find there and you will be supposed to work with them. There is no way you can work with someone else, but you know from the beginning that there is also a lack of capacity.

In some circumstances therefore, even though there is a need to integrate the expertise of different agencies or sectors, it is clear that there also is a need for realism to ensure the most appropriate partner is tasked with carrying out each activity, and if even the most qualified and appropriate partner lacks capacity, then capacity building must be a significant element of the work. This requires a careful balance between involving different areas of expertise and allowing actual implementation to be carried out by the most appropriate actors. The other variables within the 5C+ framework were addressed less frequently, but revealed rich information. The commitment variable with a score of 40 was mostly clearly related to the JPs’ need to gather the right agencies and groups early in the process, in order to develop ownership of the activities. A failure to do so was often counterproductive to the work of the JPs. The capacity variable was often related to capacity building as an inbuilt component of the JPs. However, this variable was also referenced in regard to capacity-related realities that JPs faced on the ground, which required them to change their approach or alter certain implementation activities. The variable of environmental conditions occurred least frequently in the interviews with a score of 26. This is likely due to the close relationship between environmental conditions and content (i.e., the circumstances the JP itself was addressing). Notable within discussion of this variable, however, is that whenever environmental conditions were mentioned, the human dimension was always emphasized, as was the need for strengthening people’s adaptive capacities to deal with both rapidly changing and slowly changing environmental conditions.

Variable Relationships The discussion above reveals that there is a degree of overlap among the variables. For example, the clients and coalitions variable was closely related to institutional corridor, with respect to the crosscutting nature of climate change adaptation work. The content variable and participatory methods was closely related to commitment, as an avenue for trying to encourage ownership of JP activities. The relationships among variables (i.e., “co-occurrences” between codes) were quantitatively analyzed using ATLAS.ti version 7. Out of all the variables, there were 15 possible relationships. The number of co-occurrences (Table 3 below) helps understand the strength of these relationships. The co-occurrences can be expressed graphically (Fig. 3).The thickness of the lines indicates the relative strength of the relationship between two variables. The thickest line indicates the highest count (19), the medium-thickness line shows strength of 8–11, the thinnest lines indicate strength of 2–5, and the dotted line indicates the weak relationship of only 1. The absence of a line indicates that there was no mention of a relationship (0 count) between variables. Based on the raw co-occurrences therefore, it can be seen that the strongest interrelationship is between clients and coalitions and commitment. To see whether this relationship strength remained true for all case study countries, another dimension of analysis was added to show the distribution of

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_73-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 3 Codes co-occurrences

Content Institutional corridor Commitment Capacity Clients and coalitions Environmental conditions

Institutional Content corridor 9 9 5 3 4 4 8 11 5 0

Commitment 5 3 3 19 1

Capacity 4 4 3 10 0

Clients and coalitions 8 11 19 10

Environmental conditions 5 0 1 0 2

2

Institutional Corridor

Clients and Coalitions

Environmental Conditions

Highest count (19) Medium count (8 to 11) Low count (2 to 5) Very low (1)

Content

Commitment

Capacity

Fig. 3 Strength of factor relationships based on total count of co-occurrences

Institutional Corridor

Total Count - Factor 60 to 65 counts 40 to 52 counts

Clients and Coalitions

Environmental Conditions

26 to 30 counts Co-occurences - Relationshiops Highest count (19) Medium count (8 to 11) Low count (2 to 5) Very low (1)

Country Distribution

Content

Commitment

10 countries 4 to 6 countries 2 to 3 countries 1 country

Capacity

Fig. 4 Combined counts, relationships, and country distribution

the relationships. The combined total variable counts, the level of co-occurrences, as well as the country distribution of the relationships are plotted in Fig. 4. The darkest blue line shows that the relationship occurred in all of the case study countries, while the lighter blue shows a lower level of occurrence in the case study countries. The relationship between clients and coalitions and commitment remains the strongest, in all dimensions of the analysis. The previous section revealed how the variables clients and coalitions and commitment were related strongly to the crosscutting nature of climate change work; it also demonstrated the

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_73-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

importance of ownership and champions. Based on the experiences of the MDGF JPs, it is clear that the ability to include clients (i.e., targeted beneficiaries of a program) from the onset is necessary, not only to correctly identify needs and responses but mostly to garner their support for program aims and intentions. Getting the beneficiaries “on board” is also a key avenue through which positive coalitions can be built. Thus, it can be seen that both ownership and sustainability of program interventions are interconnected with the commitment and the clients and coalitions variables. This point was also strongly raised in various arenas outside of the JP interviews, including additional materials and discussions with the MDGF representatives (e.g., progress and evaluation reports, regular online “Weeks in Focus,” and meetings in Kenya and Ecuador). The relationship between commitment and clients and coalitions is also an important consideration when downscaling an intervention from a broad, global mandate to a more specific national or subnational program. If people with more localized responsibilities – both clients and potential coalitions – are not involved early and in a meaningful way, they are only given the possibility to react to a strategy and not have significant influence on design and execution of activities (Deri A. Independent consultant specialized on capacity development, including the role of learning and knowledge systems in resilience and adaptive capacity, “Personal interview,” online, 6 May 2012). Similar points were also raised by Swanson et al.(2004) and Mitchell et al. (2006), who argued for the early inclusion of program participants. In fact, stakeholders should be involved in a process of “coproduction of knowledge” (Mitchell et al. 2006, p. 19), and not just be passive recipients, in order to ensure relevance of and commitment to program goals. Without this, it is not surprising if commitment or ownership is weak or nonexistent; as ownership must derive from a process of involvement, it cannot be simply superimposed at a later stage externally. This finding, of course, is not specific to adaptation, but given the highly contextual nature of this work, it is not surprising to find it particularly important. Champions, on the other hand, are not only important for showcasing commitment but also for gaining support of other groups (i.e., forging partnerships and developing supportive coalitions with those who may have been external to the initial process). An inability to develop a sense of commitment to and identify a champion for a program’s cause can be counterproductive by allowing negative coalitions to emerge among those who have an interest in blocking certain processes. There is therefore a cautionary tale to be told in that the relationship between clients and coalitions and commitment must be considered from the outset when planning or designing a program. This is particularly pertinent for issues of climate change adaptation, which are often crosscutting and likely to affect and be affected by various sectors and groups, at multiple levels of influence (Bulkeley and Newell 2010). This linkage between commitment and clients and coalitions is intuitive and was hypothesized by Najam in his discussion of the clients and coalitions variable: “. . . with regards to commitment, the linkages are likely to be the strongest” (Najam 1995 p. 54). Thus, it can be seen that these variables have a very strong influence on determining the nature of each other, even outside of the specific experience of the MDGF JPs. Another striking relationship with the clients and coalitions variable is that of institutional corridor. This relationship is characterized by the identification (either prior to or during the JP implementation) of clients and coalitions within the existing institutional framework, who could either support or actively block the JP processes. For example, at the national level, the ways in which the JP worked through the institutional framework could create blocking coalitions, by either failing to take some parties into account or by not including them in JP processes. On the other hand, actively involving key actors within the existing institutional framework often was deemed positive not only for the duration of the program but also for the sustainability of program interventions. Page 10 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_73-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

An example of this was provided by the Ethiopia JP. In this case, although the JP had a limited impact on the policy level, it was reported that because all program activities were carried out through the conduit and preexisting framework of the Ministry of Environment, the work begun by the JP would still be carried through beyond the formal life span of the MDGF. Hence, by institutionalizing the aims of the JP within an existing framework, the clients of the program formed a supportive “advocacy” coalition (Sotirov and Memmler 2012). The relationship between clients and coalitions and institutional corridor further highlights the comparative advantages of different institutional frameworks. In the majority of JPs, for example, particular activities were implemented by those UN and government agencies that had a specialized advantage in the activity (e.g., the Food and Agriculture Organization carried out agricultural activities, while the World Health Organization carried out health-related activities). Looking at external partnerships, however, in a number of instances, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or community-based organizations were deemed more appropriate for carrying out specific activities because their institutional framework was a better fit. In some cases, JP representatives commented that they had failed to capitalize on such positive external coalitions. It is clear that institutional framework can greatly affect the types of activities that can be carried out, as well as their appropriateness to the specific problem at hand. This issue of institutional fit, and matching the correct institutional form with function, has been raised as an important point in the literature on institutional relevance for adequately addressing environmental concerns (Young 2002). In certain circumstances, a conscious choice must be made as to which institutional contexts are the best fit for certain activities. This may require delegation of different roles and responsibilities to external partners of a different institutional form where their form is deemed to be better suited to the task at hand (i.e., coalitions or clients). The relationship between institutional corridor and clients and coalitions can also extend to include the capacity variable. For example, at the local level, the existing institutional framework and capacity levels of civil society and/or government determined which clients and/or coalitions were brought into the JP work. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, high levels of civil society capacity allowed the JP to select NGOs that could actively carry out the work required and garner the necessary support for the work to go through. In contrast, the communities in which the Mauritania JP worked often had low capacity levels, which could have led to existing NGOs having a monopolistic effect on the selection of JP activities. These examples show a complex relationship in which capacity levels, clients and coalitions, and institutional corridor can impact each other. This is a particularly important point for those UN agencies that do not themselves have strong implementing capacity in a given country. These agencies by definition must rely on partners with reliable capacity to deliver. A further significant relationship is between capacity and clients and coalitions. This relationship was highlighted by Najam, who stated that “. . . the linkage [of capacity] with clients and coalitions, although less obvious, is. . . critical” (Najam 1995, p. 51). In the identification and selection of clients and coalitions, for example, existing capacity levels can be a determining factor. As an example, targeted beneficiaries may be required to have specific capacity levels or a longer track record of relevant experience in order to facilitate program implementation. Moreover, the nature of capacities found among clients and coalitions may affect program delivery as well as support. In the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, local government activities were facilitated largely through select municipalities who already had high capacities and could spread their own work to others through a peer-review process. On the other hand, the Turkish JP experienced differentiated capacity levels. Despite the high capacities of technical staff with respect to climate change science, capacity at the level of political decision makers to understand climate Page 11 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_73-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

change and impacts was very low. As a result, at the government decision-making level, the JP faced a great deal of opposition to the program in certain sectors. This was only remediated through targeted capacity development measures. Lastly, a relatively strong relationship was seen between the institutional corridor and content variables. This relationship is based largely on how the different JPs designed their specific activities using the countries’ existing institutional framework. For example, at the policy level of environmental mainstreaming, target clients and activities were identified using existing institutional frameworks. At the field level, the JPs often capitalized on existing institutional arrangements or frameworks – such as local government authorities or existing community-based organizations/ cooperatives – and used these as channels to identify as well as deliver JP activities. Therefore, the linkage between institutional corridor and content derives mostly from the goal and causal theory levels; by targeting existing institutional arrangements, the JPs designed their activities according to existing gaps or opportunities. As mentioned above, utilization of existing institutional arrangements (both formal and informal), as opposed to investing in creating new institutions, seems a key factor in sustainability of program efforts.

Discussion All of the analysis, including interviews with JP stakeholders as well as external climate change adaptation experts and cross-checking with the literature, has allowed the validation of the external relevance of the results of this research as well as the applicability of the 5C+ Protocol for analyzing climate change adaptation interventions.

Relevance The multifaceted relationships described above resonate strongly with other studies. In particular, a study carried out by Cash et al. (2002) investigated key factors in transferring knowledge from environmental assessments into practical action. They highlighted three factors, salience, credibility, and legitimacy, as central to success (Cash et al. 2002): • Salience – the relevance of information to decision making of various actors • Credibility – how scientifically plausible an actor views information • Legitimacy – if the process of knowledge creation is perceived as unbiased All three of these factors have resonance to the key variables and relationships described above. Salience is linked closely to the capacity levels of actors receiving the information, clients and coalitions through early engagement, the realities of environmental conditions and points of comparison, as well as to the type of institutional frameworks at which these types of information are being directed. Credibility links closely to capacity, as well as the content of an information source (e.g., how an issue has been problematized and the process of this problematization). Legitimacy is linked clearly to content, clients and coalitions, as well as commitment. The resonance of the interview results, both of isolated variables and their relationships to one another, with external sources, including expert opinion and research papers, highlights the utility of the results.

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Utility and Lessons for the 5C+ Protocol The 5C+ Protocol served as a valuable framework through which to investigate the experience of the JPs’ work on climate change adaptation. The relationships among the different variables are complex and multifaceted; yet the lens of the 5C+ Protocol has allowed a systematic and guided analysis of these relationships. The chosen approach utilized both quantitative and qualitative data and analyses. This systematic information gathering and analysis serves as the basis for the conclusions and recommendations. However, this research also revealed several lessons with regard to the limitations of the use of the 5C+ Protocol: identification of specific climate change adaptation practices and missing elements of time and learning. The first limitation of the 5C+ Protocol is that, through its focus on institutional or procedural aspects of an intervention, it does not suggest specific climate change adaptation measures. The Protocol cannot be readily used to develop a set of best practices or guidelines related to specific types of climate change vulnerabilities or adaptation activities. Rather, the 5C+ Protocol-based analysis has greater utility in highlighting procedural aspects of climate change adaptation interventions, such as partnerships and participatory implementation. This may have applicability at broader climate change activities, which have to be inherently context specific (Schipper and Burton 2008). While it is often difficult to determine specific transferable activities (outputs) within climate change adaptation, particularly on shorter time scales, focusing on process elements/characteristics arguably has significant utility. The second limitation of the 5C+ Protocol is that it does not include a built-in element of time and learning, which are critical components for climate change adaptation. An essential element of the management of complex and nonlinear issues such as climate change is the need for time frames that include adaptive management, revision of strategies, and corrective actions taken in response to changing circumstances (Swanson et al. 2004). Deliberately incorporating time as a variable would create the conditions for learning to take place (Siebenh€ uner 2002). However, this element of time will not automatically lead to learning if it is not a conscious part of an evaluation or assessment process (Siebenh€ uner and Arnold 2007). By not including a time component, the 5C+ Protocol remains limited in its ability to help facilitate learning processes. As it is, therefore, the 5C+ Protocol cannot be considered as an overall guiding framework for adaptive management in response to climate change. To do so, there must be specific recognition of this limitation. To help facilitate learning, however, the 5C+ Protocol could be used as a common framework for a series of periodic assessments. The common framework can allow analysis of the current state (characterized by the variables and their relationships) and comparison of these states among different time periods. These comparisons can be used to track progress as well as highlight specific intervention needs. Therefore, organizations such as the UN could use the 5C+ Protocol as a quick analysis tool, prior, during, and after program implementation to identify specific challenges and opportunities related to the different variables, as well as identifying progress made in different areas (Bizikova L. Project Manager at International Institute for Sustainable Development, whose recent work is focused on adaptation to climate change, “Email communication,” 22 May 2012). The common framework could also be used as a point of comparison among different, but similar, program implementers, helping to share experiences and methods to overcome procedural challenges.

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Outreach to potentially supportive/disruptive groups

Vertical and horizontal cooperation (sectors and levels) Match function to institutional realities; delegate externally when necessary Institutional Corridor

Invest time in creating common ground; relationship building

Interim 6 month ‘adjustment’ phase to ensure goal relevance

Strengthen scientific /monitoring capacities from onset

Environmental Conditions

Clients and Coalitions

Early and meaningful inclusion of key stakeholders Content

Commitment

Capacity

Build on pre-existing mechanisms

Champions - national leaders with common interests; influential local leaders with convening power

Utilize local knowledge and skills

Fig. 5 Summary recommendations based on the 5C+ Protocol and JP experiences

Recommendations This chapter shows that the implementation of national and subnational climate change adaptation activities, when derived from a general global mandate, faces specific challenges. A series of synthetic recommendations (Fig. 5) show a broad set of procedural measures that can aid international organizations such as the UN in addressing these challenges and effectively delivering context-specific climate change adaptation interventions. However, to provide a more practical focus, there is a need to prioritize the most pertinent recommendations, based on the experience of the MDGF JPs and the results of this research. The most significant challenges we found were related to support and ownership of program activities, identification of most relevant problems and solutions, and coordination across sectors and governance levels. These challenges and possible measures to address them are summarized below: • Support and ownership of program activities (clients and coalitions/commitment): It is important to involve stakeholders early in the design of adaptation programs. Identifying and allowing for the meaningful participation of relevant stakeholders from an early stage increases commitment and ownership needed to carry out adaptation activities. As a specific element, the engagement of influential champions (individuals or groups) who can serve as program advocates is also important for rallying support from relevant clients and coalitions in the broader society. • Identification of most relevant problems and solutions (content): This point also relates to the early inclusion of relevant stakeholders. By incorporating the inputs of program beneficiaries or partners early on – including the vulnerability problem identification and adaptation response in the design stage – there is a higher likelihood that problems and targeted activities for the intervention will focus on what really matters. This is particularly important for adaptation measures that are being “downscaled” based on higher-level templates or thinking and thus may not have full contextual information of the specific intervention area. It also raises the potential for including the results of technical or scientific assessments as well as local knowledge at an early stage in the process. To facilitate this, we suggest incorporating an initial period for substantive stakeholder engagement at when adaptation programs are conceptualized, planned, evaluated, or adjusted. Additionally, later in the implementation

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stages, the work should have sufficient flexibility to incorporate the perspectives of significant stakeholders that may not have been included in initial stages, and in response to adaptation program results, as a form of institutional learning. • Coordination across sectors and governance levels (institutional corridor): The majority of JPs faced significant challenges in coordinating their work not only across different sectors (e.g., agriculture, water, health) but also between and across different types of governance and levels (e.g., national government ministries, UN agencies, and local communities). Addressing the potential for fragmentation is essential to ensure that competing interests and organizational mandates of diverse institutions do not compromise the program’s ability to address adaptation needs. These needs, by definition, often cut across institutional, geographic, and other boundaries. To successfully manage issues as crosscutting as climate change adaptation, there must be a concerted effort to enhance coordination and harmonization and offer truly “joint” implementation of activities. Remediation of these challenges will increase the probability of greater program effectiveness, building greater adaptive capacities, and ultimately a higher probability of long-term sustainability of climate change adaptation measures. However, to be effective, such adaptation measures must incorporate long-term planning and deliberate learning processes, to respond to the changing circumstances and potential nonlinearities associated with the effects of climate change.

Conclusion It is notable that the JP operating framework and types of issues being addressed were in many circumstances the first of their kind in the countries where these programs were implemented. Jointly run climate change adaptation interventions are still young for the UN, and significant scope for learning remains. The experiences and lessons from the work of the JPs provide an important step towards improving the governance and management of climate change adaptation measures and enhancing effectiveness as well as building adaptive capacities of the most vulnerable. However, this learning potential will not be achieved without targeted efforts. To be effective, adaptation measures must incorporate deliberate learning, to respond to the influence of various sectors, scales, and levels, their changing circumstances, and the nonlinearities associated with the effects of climate change (Berkhout et al. 2006). International organizations such as the UN must engage in intentional and effective organizational learning and adaptation processes, both to allow necessary adjustments within a program’s life cycle and to ensure that the relevant and valuable lessons from specific program experiences can be accessed and used by others engaged in similar activities (Swanson et al. 2004; Swanson et al. 2010; Walker et al. 2001). Moreover, given that the field of climate change adaptation is young – and the danger of no or maladaptation has severe consequences, particularly for vulnerable populations – efforts towards such learning and information sharing should be enhanced. Another cautionary point is related to the nature of prioritized adaptation activities. Adaptation to climate change is a long-term process, where building adaptive capacity (to respond to and thus reduce vulnerabilities) in the face of climate change is key. Climate change adaptation may require societies to respond/adapt to often completely new and hard-to-predict extreme events or “surprises” (Patt 1997). In such cases, following the traditional project cycles of development interventions is an ill fit. In part, the issue is that projects are often too short – generally not over 3–4 years and typically much shorter. Building real adaptive capacity often requires deeper structural changes that take more Page 15 of 18

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time to conceptualize, establish, and put into practice, whether it involves new measures or integrating new measures into existing mechanisms. Projects by definition also tend to have tightly defined objectives and activities with limited maneuverability during the project life cycle if conditions change. While this is desirable from the project management and accountability point of view, it limits flexibility and learning within the project if new learning emerges or if conditions change. Such project designs and time frames limit the relevance, flexibility, and responsiveness of the work that effective climate change adaptation requires. If international organizations such as the UN want to implement truly effective climate change adaptation interventions, they must adopt a more long-term view that incorporates flexible project design and budgeting requirements, geared specifically towards building adaptive capacities rather than just adaptation activities (Folke et al. 2002). It may also require mechanisms that allow longer project life cycles, involving dynamic partnerships with other donors and participants from the public and private sector, considering the shifting modality of international development assistance. Having a longer-term view and involving additional partners may also require addressing the reality that adaptation activities cannot be restricted to climate change in a narrow sense of the term. While climate change is a significant new source of vulnerability, it is certainly not the only one. Climate vulnerability is often coupled with vulnerability due to other factors, and thus both for reasons of effectiveness and efficiency, adaptation responses should where possible also be integrated. Moving in this direction will require concerted efforts and time to design and implement adaptation measures based on principles of meaningful joint planning, participation, and thematic integration. Adaptive, cross-scale and collaborative management approaches are key to ensuring that international organizations are able to address the complexities and urgency associated with climate change vulnerability and adaptation. However, an important challenge faced by international organizations such as the UN is the relevance of downscaling their global initiatives to suit localized needs. By its very nature, climate change adaptation requires a high level of context relevance and specificity. As such, it also requires international organizations to invest time and effort required to build relationships with beneficiaries and/or to forge strong relationships with key counterparts who may be a better fit for delivering such contextualized measures.

References Andresen S (2001) Global environmental governance: UN fragmentation and co-ordination. In: Thommessen Ø, Stokke O (eds) Yearbook of international co-operation on environment and development 2001/02. Routledge, New York Berkhout F, Hertin J, Gann D (2006) Learning to adapt: organisational adaptation to climate change impacts. Clim Change 78:135–156 Bulkeley H, Newell P (2010) Governing climate change. Routledge, New York Cash D et al (2002) Salience, credibility, legitimacy and boundaries: linking, research, assessment and decision making. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Faculty Research working paper series, RWP02-046 Cash D et al (2006) Scale and cross-scale dynamics: governance and information in a multilevel world. Ecol Soc 11(2):8 MDGF (Millennium Development Goal Achievement Fund) (2011a) MDG achievement fund: lessons learned. Montevideo, Uruguay, 8–10 Nov 2011

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Folke C et al (2002) Resilience and sustainable development: building adaptive capacity in a world of transformations. J Hum Environ 31(5):437–440 Gunningham N (2009) The new collaborative environmental governance: the localization of regulation. J Law Soc 36(1):145–166 Hilde TC (2012) Uncertainty and the epistemic dimension of democratic deliberation in climate change adaptation. Democratization 19(5):SI 889–SI 911 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2007) Assessment of adaptation practices, options, constraints and capacity. In: Parry M, Canziani O, Palutikof J, van der Linden P, Hanson C (eds) Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the IPCC. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge MDGF (2011b) MDG-F about us. URL: MDG-F http://www.mdgfund.org/aboutus[consulted 20 September 2011] Mitchell R et al (eds) (2006) Global environmental assessments: information and influence. MIT Press, Cambridge Najam A (1995) Learning from the literature on policy implementation: a synthesis perspective. Working paper WP-95-61. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria Patt A (1997) Assessing extreme outcomes: the strategic outcome of low probability impacts of climate change. ENRP discussion paper E-97-10, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Schipper E, Burton I (2008) The Earthscan reader on adaptation to climate change. Taylor & Francis, London Siebenh€uner B (2002) How do scientific assessments learn? Part 1. Conceptual framework and case study of the IPCC. Environ Sci Policy 5:411–420 Siebenh€ uner B, Arnold M (2007) Organisational learning to manage sustainable development. Bus Strat Environ 16:339–353 Sotirov M, Memmler M (2012) The advocacy coalition framework in natural resource policy studies: recent experiences and further prospects. For Policy Econ 16(SI):51–64 Swanson D et al (2004) National strategies for sustainable development: challenges, approaches and innovations in strategic and co-ordinated action. International Institute for Sustainable Development and Deutsche Gesellschaftf€ urTechnischeZusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Winnipeg, Canada Swanson D et al (2010) Seven tools for creating adaptive policies. Technol Forecast Soc Change 77(6):924–939 UN (United Nations) (2008) Acting on climate change: the UN system delivering as one. Prepared by the United Nations System Chief Executive Board for Coordination. Climate Change DPI/2526 UNSGHLP (United Nations Secretary General’s High Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence) (2006) Delivering as one: Report of the secretary-general’s high level panel. United Nations, New York Walker W, Rahman S, Cave J (2001) Adaptive policies, policy analysis, and policy-making. Eur J Oper Res 128(2):282–289 Wiechselgartner J, Marandino CA (2012) Priority knowledge for marine environments: challenges at the science-society nexus. Curr Opin Environ Sustainab 4(3):323–330

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WikiCommons (2005) Maps of the World: World Without Borders, image file. URL: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Maps_of_the_world#mediaviewer/File:BlankMap-World-nobord ers. png [consulted April 2012] Young O (2002) The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and Scale. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Interviews Interviews with MDGF Joint Program representatives held between 27 Feb to 2 Mar 2012, at a MDGF workshop held in Ecuador, and two online interviews conducted later in Mar and Apr 2012

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Agriculture and Climate Change in Southeast Asia and the Middle East: Breeding, Climate Change Adaptation, Agronomy, and Water Security Ijaz Rasool Noorkaa* and J. S. (Pat) Heslop-Harrisonb a University College of Agriculture, University of Sargodha, Sargodha, Pakistan b Department of Biology, Molecular Cytogenetics and Cell Biology lab, Leicester, UK

Abstract The agriculture of Southeast Asia and the Middle East is under threat due to vagaries of abiotic stress including climate change and water-related factors. With a particular focus on the challenges facing non-industrialized and developing countries, this paper attempts to create a framework for policy makers and planning commissions as well as increasing national and regional water stress awareness. The study elaborates the agriculture eminence, water provision, conventional water usage, and adverse consequences of water status under the changing climatic conditions and urban or industrial development. The study addresses the nature of problems, regional issues, current barriers, farmer’s perceptions, and concrete efforts to save regional agriculture for sustainable food security. The consequences of climate change, water stress, and salinity have affected huge areas of developing countries from an economic and resource security perspective that leads to disaster and unstable law and order issues. Long-term planning over timescales beyond the human lifespan and anticipation of threats and opportunities is required. Consequently, an emergency plan is also needed for international, national, and regional footprints including procedures for climate change mitigation and to implement inclusive plans to combat prevailing poverty, social changes, and allied anticipated risks. It elaborates the attempts to provide a framework for policy makers and political understanding to check the hidden but viable issues relating risks of climate change in local and global scenario. It is concluded that a viable charter of climate proofing and domestication is the way to success from on-farm-to-lab and lab-to-field outreach to mitigate declining food issues. The regional and international collaborative efforts are focused to modernizing crop genetics, agronomy, field-to-fork scrutiny, and adaptation training to increase quantity and quality of food with sustainable use of water.

Keywords Climate change; Irrigation scheduling; Quality food; Southeast Asia

Introduction The agriculture of Southeast Asia and the Middle East is mainly dependent on rain and groundwater which is, with current crops and management practices, neither sufficient nor reliable to meet the requirements of the crops (Noorka and Afzal 2009). Due to this, crop production is under serious *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 8

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_74-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

threat, and potentially for survival, given the vagaries of abiotic and biotic stress under the changing climatic conditions. The consequences of climate change, water stress, and salinity have not only affected huge areas but also health and socioeconomic issues throughout the world particularly in the developing countries, leading to severe poverty, shaken resources, food insecurity, internal and external security issues, and catastrophes. Under the burgeoning population pressure including increasing urbanization, and severe weather conditions, Southeast Asia and Middle East countries will suffer food shortage in the coming decades if the present momentum of climate change situation persists for longer time as it is predicted. So short- and long-term planning over timescales, according to the wishes and necessities of human lifespan, is needed.

Climate Change and Agriculture Climate is considered as the average weather and variations in relevant quantities for a number of decades, centuries, or potentially years. According to the World Meteorological Organization, the classical periods lag for a long time with the surface variables like wind, rainfall, and prevailing temperature. Change in climatic conditions result from natural climatic variations, solar cycles, volcanic eruptions and atmospheric changes and have direct consequences on land and water inhabitants flora and fauna (Pahl-Whost 2007; O’Brien et al. 2008). The climate change commitment is simply an account of predicted future changes in shape of hydrological cycle, changes in sea level, and rise and fall in weather conditions with constant anthropogenic emissions. It is anticipated that climate change takes place over a few decades or less, which directly or inversely has the potential to provide substantial interferences in humans as well as in ecosystems (Kashyap 2004; New et al. 2007). The immediate action to combat climate change is adaptation, a process of larger and smaller changes required to anticipate expected outcomes of climatic effects, by exploiting beneficial opportunities and minimizing harmful effects. In our natural systems, the process of sectioned resources management by augmentation of applied and basic research is suggested to tackle the forthcoming climatic threats (Power et al. 2005; One World Sustainable Investments 2008). Climate change and agriculture are interrelating and dependent on each other (IPCC 2007). Climate proofing and domestication of plants have played significant role to counteract changes in climate over the 10,000 years of human agriculture and have the potential to meet the challenges of global warming which have significant impacts on agriculture by the interaction of various elements like rainfall, fluctuating temperature and carbon dioxide concentration, glacial runoff, etc. to ensure crop maximization (Challinor et al. 2009; Fischer et al. 2002). Lobell et al. (2008) concluded that due to climate change, by 2030, Southern Africa may show 30 %yield loss of maize (Zea mays) crop, while in Southeast Asia is predicted 10 % yield loss in staple crops such as rice (Oryza sativa), maize, and millet (Pennisetum glaucum). It is a matter of grave importance that agricultural production will definitely be affected by the predominance and pace of climate change, if it will transpire step by step, but in contrast the rapid climate change will upset the present momentum of agriculture production in a lot of countries, exclusively having poor and degraded soil with hot weather and under drought condition (Ziervogel et al. 2010) (Fig. 1). The optimum natural selection and adaption could lead to genetic erosion as well as nonconservation of genetic resources, so care must be taken to avoid such loss of valuable genetic resources. Thus, the affiliation in climate change and agriculture is in multiple ways confounded and contrasted: agriculture significantly contributes towards climate change, and climate change can detrimentally distress agriculture.

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Fig. 1 Shallow terracing seen here allows efficient use of water in rainfed agriculture while preserving soil and slowing runoff

Adverse Consequences of Water Status Under Changing Climatic Conditions Water, the necessity of life, has emerged as the top commodity of present and future time and shall remain on top of planning concerns for farmers, policy makers, and researchers (Noorka et al. 2013a). Frontline workers responsible for water management to combat water stress and occasional drought have been as well as seasonal climate forecasts support decision making to manage water resources and dam management (David et al. 2008; Noorka and Schwarzacher 2013). Drought is considered as the complex natural hazard that causes corrosion of water resources by quantity and quality (Noorka and Teixeira da Silva 2012). Droughts have imposed a serious menace to agricultural production and development of socioeconomic activities in the semiarid and arid regions which are more susceptible to the effect of drought (Noorka et al. 2013b). Agricultural production in semiarid and arid regions is constrained by low rainfall, poor or low-nutrient soils, high temperatures, high solar radiation, and low precipitation, raising food insecurity. IPCC (2007) highlighted the large potential for biofuels to meet the growing energy needs as well as contributing to GHG emissions reduction and enhancement of carbon sequestration in soils and biomass (Fig. 2).

Agriculture in Southeast Asia and the Middle East The agriculture of Southeast Asia and the Middle East is under threat due to ultimate vagaries of abiotic stress including climate change and water-related factors (Angus and Van Herwaarden 2001; Ahmad 2005), and it is expected that it will affect the agriculture by a series of steps, e.g., change in rainfall, extreme temperature, and water stress will open the doors of severe drought by direct and indirect ways. With the increase in temperature, some specific areas like the Philippines will lose its agriculture production, while Indonesia and Malaysia are projected to gain the rice yield. Resultantly Page 3 of 8

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Fig. 2 Overgrazing and lack of terracing lead to low grassland productivity, soil erosion, and invasion by aggressive aliens (here, Argemone mexicana)

Fig. 3 Wheat trials exploiting diversity in the search for plants with efficient growth under rainfed conditions. Here, selections with and without awns are being trialled under low-input conditions

the driving force in agriculture is increasing the demand for food and fiber throughout the globe. With particular focus on the challenges facing developing countries, this paper attempts to create a framework for policy makers and planning commissions as well as increasing national and regional water stress awareness (Singh 2002) (Fig. 3). The geographical situation in this area predicts that under the changing set of climatic situation up to 2050, most countries will become hotter, have less and un-reliable rainfall, and as a consequences sever reduction in agricultural production if the current policies, crops and genetic attributes are retained unchanged.

Agriculture Eminence Agriculture is the social and economic core and main employer in many developing countries. Drought and its consequence of desertification with salinity and soil loss are expected to increase in the coming decades, with disastrous consequences from climate change (Moss and Dilling 2004; Hampel 2006). Droughts impose a serious threat to agricultural production and development of socioeconomic activities in the semiarid and arid regions by low rainfall, poor or low-nutrient soils, high temperatures, high solar radiation, and low precipitation. A viable charter of climate proofing and super-domestication through genetic improvement, in combination with optimized agronomy, is Page 4 of 8

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the way to success from on-farm to lab and lab to field outreach to mitigate declining crop productivity and food issues. The regional and international collaborative efforts are focused on research and experiments to modernize the crop genetics, agronomy, field-to-fork scrutiny, and adaptation training to increase quantity and quality of food with sustainable water harvest.

Current Barriers in Understanding Introduction and problem identification of climate change is expected to make this seasonal distinction even stronger, with more frequent summer droughts coupled with increased winter rainfall and more floods. On-farm water storage of the higher winter flows is one of the main options for securing a more reliable water supply for irrigation. The media, the most effective weapon of present time, have to play a major role in converting the people’s perception to portraying climate change (Hampel 2006). Sometimes, media reports create confusion using their own perception without considering the expertise and scrutiny of the scientific community (Moss and Dilling 2004). Water availability and its predicted more frequent shortage are important barriers for efficient crop productivity that vary from one spatial scale to another. Reckoning crop water productivity, it is determined that there is gap among policy makers, consultant, researcher, extensionist, agronomist, and farmers themselves to enjoy the full supply of crop water productivity. However, a big breakthrough was observed with the employment of molecular breeding, domestication, and climate proofing (Heslop-Harrison and Schwarzacher 2012).

Farmer’s Perceptions The farmers are the most beleaguered community of Southeast Asia and Middle East societies. The governmental policies to confront the negative image of climate change, food insecurity, middleman role in agricultural marketing, insufficient storage facilities, conventional agricultural production practices, lack of extension services, and technology transfer (Schulze 2000; Roux et al. 2006). The young people in the farming community are absconding towards the big cities in search of livelihood and ignoring their small landholdings. The old people, their forefathers, are unable to understand the latest technologies to employ in agriculture and to achieve the potential of the varieties. The media and agriculture department can play an important role to educate the farmers (Jury and Vaux 2005), while governmental healthy and farmer-friendly policies like timely announcement of support price of staple food as well as cash crops, farms to market road access, water provision, water stress tolerant varieties, and quality production.

Concrete Efforts to Save Regional Agriculture for Sustainable Food Security Genetic resources are the vital source of crop production and food security across the borders (Von Bothmer et al. 1992; Skovmand et al. 1992). The range of genetic diversity within crops and their relatives is a precarious source for potential increase in crop production and for new sources of resistance and tolerance against biotic and abiotic stresses (Ahmad et al. 2010). The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), and the Page 5 of 8

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International Board of Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR) have played an important role in the publication and preservation of germplasm (Skovmand et al. 1992). The International community has the obligation to aid agricultural research systems world-wide in the context of climate change to ensure world’s food security and peace. Building a partnership for development is one of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals.

Conclusions The consequences of climate change, water stress, and salinity have affected huge areas of developing countries from an economic and resource security perspective, which leads to disaster and unstable law and order issues. Long-term planning – over timescales beyond the human lifespan – and anticipation of threats and opportunities are required. Consequently, an emergency plan is also needed for international, national, and regional footprints including procedures for climate change mitigation and to implement inclusive plans to combat prevailing poverty, social changes (including urbanization of populations and changes in diets), and allied anticipated risks. The researchers urge more climate proofing infrastructures, water scheduling, improved drainage, and water harvesting. The water resource management, use of treated wastewater, serious attempts to limit greenhouse gas emissions, societal impacts on climate change, and shortening/shifting the growing periods of crops will definitely help the researchers to cut down the negative impact of climate change. The study attempts to provide a framework for policy makers and political understanding to check the hidden but viable issues relating to risks of climate change in local and global scenarios.

References Ahmad S (2005) Water resources of Pakistan and strategy for climate change adaptations in Pakistan. In: APN and capable stake holders workshop on “Climate change impact on water in South Asia,” 13 Jan 2005, Islamabad Ahmad S, Afzal M, Noorka IR, Iqbal Z, Akhtar N, Iftkhar Y, Kamran M (2010) Prediction of yield losses in wheat (Triticum aestivum L.) caused by yellow rust in relation to epidemiological factors in Faisalabad. Pak J Bot 42(1):401–407 Angus JF, Van Herwaarden AF (2001) Increasing water use and water use efficiency in dry land wheat. Agronom J 93:290–298 Challinor, A. J., Ewert, F., Arnold, S., Simelton, E., & Fraser, E. (2009). Crops and climate change: progress, trends, and challenges in simulating impacts and informing adaptation. Journal of experimental botany, 60(10), 2775-2789. http://jxb.oxfordjournals.org/content/60/10/2775.short David BL, Marshall BB, Claudia T, Michael DM, Walter PF, Rosamond LN (2008) Prioritizing climate change adaptation needs for food security in 2030. Science 319(5863):607–610. doi:10.1126/science.1152339 Fischer G, Shah M, van Velthuizen H (2002) Climate change and agricultural vulnerability. In: International institute for applied systems analysis. Report prepared under UN Institutional Contract Agreement 1113 for World Summit on Sustainable Development, Luxemburg Hampel J (2006) Different concepts of risk – a challenge for risk communication. Int J Med Microbiol 296:5–10

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Heslop-Harrison JS, Schwarzacher T (2012) Genetics and genomics of crop domestication (archive preprint). (Published version). In: Altman A (ed) Plant biotechnology and agriculture: prospects for the 21st century. Paul Michael Hasegawa, pp 3–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12381466-1.00001-8 IPCC (2007) Summary for policymakers: C. Current knowledge about future impacts. In: Parry ML et al (eds) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, New York Jury W, Vaux H Jr (2005) The role of science in solving the world’s emerging water problems. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 102(44):15715–15720 Kashyap A (2004) Water governance: learning by developing adaptive capacity to incorporate climate variability and change. Water Sci Technol 49(7):141–146 Lobell DB, Burke MB, Tebaldi C, Mastrandrea MD, Falcon WP, Naylor RL (2008) Prioritizing climate change adaptation needs for food security in 2030. Science 319(5863):607–10. doi:10.1126/science.1152339. PMID 18239122 Moss SC, Dilling L (2004) Making climate hot. Communicating the urgency and challenges of global climate change. Environment 46(10):32–46 New M, Lopez A, Dessai S, Wilby R (2007) Challenges in using probabilistic climate change information for impact assessments: an example from the water sector. Phil Trans R Soc 365:2117–2131 Noorka IR, Afzal M (2009) Global climatic and environmental change impact on agricultural research challenges and wheat productivity in Pakistan. Earth Sci Front 16(Si) 100 Noorka IR, Schwarzacher T (2013) Water a response factor to screen suitable genotypes to fight and traverse periodic onslaughts of water scarcity in spring wheat (Triticum aestivum L.). Int J Water Res Arid Environ 3(1):37–44 Noorka IR, Teixeira da Silva JA (2012) Mechanistic insight of water stress induced aggregation in wheat (Triticum aestivum L.) quality: the protein paradigm shift. Notulae Scientia Biologicae 4(4):32–38 Noorka IR, Batool A, AlSultan S, Tabasum S, Ali A (2013a) Water stress tolerance, its relationship to assimilate partitioning and potence ratio in spring wheat. Am J Plant Sci 4(2):231–237. doi:10.4236/ajps.2013.42030 Noorka IR, Tabassum S, Afzal M (2013b) Detection of genotypic variation in response to water stress at seedling stage in escalating selection intensity for rapid evaluation of drought tolerance in wheat breeding. Pak J Bot 45(1):99–104 O’Brien K, Sygna L, Leichenko R, Adger WN, Barnett J, Mitchell T, Schipper L, Tanner T, Vogel C, Mortreux C (2008) Disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and human security, a commissioned report for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. GECHS Report 2008, 3 One world Sustainable Investments (2008) A climate change strategy and action plan for the Western Cape, Report commissioned by the Provincial Government of the Western Cape. Department of Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape Pahl-Whost C (2007) Transition towards adaptive management of water facing climate and global change. Water Res Manag 21:49–62 Power S, Sadler B, Nicholls N (2005) The influence of climate science on water management in Western Australia: lessons for climate scientists. Bull Am Met Soc 87(2):839–844 Roux DJ, Rogers KH, Biggs HC, Ashton PJ, Sergeant A (2006) Bridging the science management divide: moving from unidirectional knowledge transfer to knowledge interfacing and sharing. Ecol Soc 11(1):4 Page 7 of 8

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Schulze RE (2000) Modeling hydrological responses to land use and climate change: a Southern African perspective. Ambio 29:12–22 Singh HS (2002) Impact of climate change on mangroves. In: South Asia Expert Workshop on adaptation to climate change for agricultural productivity, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, United Nations Environment Programme and Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, New Delhi Skovmand B, Varughese G, Hettel GP (1992) Wheat genetic resources at CIM-MYT: their preservation, documentation, enrichment, and distribution. CIMMYT, Mexico, p 20 Von Bothmer R, Seberg O, Jacobsen N (1992) Genetic resources in the Triticeae. Hereditas 116:141–150 Ziervogel G, Shale M, Du M (2010) Climate change adaptations in a developing country context: the case of urban water supply in Cape Town. Clim Dev 2:94–110

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Responding to Climate Change: Ecological Modernization in Bangladesh's Agriculture Saleh Ahmed* Department of Sociology, Social Work and Anthropology, Utah State University, Logan, UT, USA

Abstract Climate change is one of the biggest humanitarian challenges in many parts of the world. Unfortunately, low-income developing countries in the Global South will be the major victims, even though they are not the major driver of this global environmental change. It is not very uncommon that the people, community, and the country in the Global South are putting efforts to develop their own resiliency strategies to confront this challenge. With a regional focus on southwest Bangladesh, which is one of the major climate hot spots in the world, this chapter tries to explain climate resilient efforts particularly in agriculture sector with a lens of ecological modernization theory. The findings of this chapter highlight the importance of understanding ecological modernization as well as required process and mechanisms for climate resilient agriculture practice. Even though the findings are theoretically grounded, the focus is on how the theory can be translated with further modifications, if necessary, into local communities. It is expected that this chapter will have larger implications by generating further theoretical and empirical discourse focusing on low-income developing countries in the Global South.

Keywords Bangladesh; Climate change adaptation; Climate change; Ecological modernization theory

Background Changing climate and associated impacts are among the major humanitarian crises of our contemporary society. It can obviously make changes to our economy, society, politics, and environment at large. It will have influence on our food supply and the patterns of livelihoods. However, the impacts of changing global environment will not be homogenous. People in the low-income developing nations will face larger exposure and vulnerability. Even though in most cases poor people are not the major driving forces for environmental or climate change, unfortunately they will be the major victims of this changing environment. Climate policy, or more generally nation’s environmental policy, is increasingly intertwined with the logic of ecological modernization (Curran 2009). While in Bangladesh the term “ecological modernization” is not officially adopted or widely used, the nation’s climate policy or climate adaptation debate increasingly takes place within the larger domain of ecological modernization. In the present context of climate vulnerability and risks, the logics and promises of ecological The contribution is meant to: volume 3 – Climate Change Adaptation, Agriculture, and Water Security *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 12

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modernization have never been so compelling. Like many other social sciences theories, this is also not an exception from criticisms and proposals for refinements. This particular chapter reviews the perspectives of ecological modernization with a regional focus on southwest Bangladesh. Climate resilient agriculture is at the core of this discussion. As the major share of population are predominantly engaged in agriculture-related activities, changing pattern of agriculture has large implications on society and economy. Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated and poorest countries in the world (Streatfield and Karar 2008; Clayton 2013). One in every three Bangladeshis is poor and the ratio is slightly more in the rural areas (Clayton 2013). Despite huge population and pervasive poverty, the country has demonstrated progressive trajectories towards growth and development, based on a number of development indicators, such as the Human Development Index (BBS 2007). On the contrary, the global environmental change, e.g., climate change, can jeopardize the country’s current trend with social and economic progresses. It is one of the most vulnerable countries due to extreme climate events. Low-lying topography of the southwest coastal landforms of Bangladesh suggests that minimal increase in sea level can have catastrophic impacts on the coastal communities and the country at large (Abedin and Shaw 2013). One meter rise in sea level can be the reason for landlessness of 14.8 million people. That can also make 40 million people internally displaced due to the loss of 29,846 km2 of land area in largely coastal areas (Brown 2011). The majority of the affected people will be poor that are dependent on local and regional natural resources such as fisheries, forestry, agriculture, etc. In this changing situations of climate, agriculture, the major economic base in the country, can be affected severely followed by damages to many other livelihood opportunities (Brown 2011; Madhu and Jahid 2010). In Bangladesh, agriculture is a climate-sensitive sector. It is dependent on seasonal weather variability (Abedin and Shaw 2013). Due to the changing pattern of climate, rice production in Bangladesh is predicted to fall by 8 % and wheat production by 32 % until 2050 (Climate Change Cell 2009). Southwest Bangladesh is often treated as the most disaster-prone region in the country due to its exposure to extreme climate events in coastal areas, such as salinity intrusion, increased intensity and frequency of tropical cyclones, tidal surges, floods, repeated water logging, etc. Approximately ten million people live in this region. Apart from this, the region is treated as one of the poorest regions in the country. Often the regional poverty dynamics is shaped by the ecological conditions and entitlements. The Sundarbans, world’s largest mangrove forest, is one of the major suppliers of livelihood opportunities to majority of the coastal population, illustrating people’s interactions and dependencies on nature and natural resource as a whole (Pravda Bangladesh 2009). Extreme climate events will eventually have adverse impacts on this regional resource base and at the end will disrupt this coupled human and natural system in local and regional scale. To confront climate challenge, now Bangladesh is also focusing on climate resilient agriculture to feed its burgeoning population. Often this comes with different forms of ecological modernization such as agriculture intensification. The available lands for agriculture are not abundant in Bangladesh. This illustrates that there are not many options available for horizontal expansion of agriculture; rather vertical expansion is often treated as the most affordable option. Vertical expansion of agriculture, a form of intensification, can be perceived within the larger framework of ecological modernization. Bangladesh is a cosigner country with the Kyoto protocol along with other major environmental treaties, and therefore, the country is legally bonded for its improvements towards ecological efficiency. In a low-income developing country like Bangladesh, there usually exists a huge vacuum to conceptualize the ecological modernization theory with implications. People often strive for sustainability without any substantial theoretical focus. As a consequence, society experiences the Page 2 of 12

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80

1400000 Crop Damage

Area inundated

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Fig. 1 Crop damage (in metric ton) due to historical flood (Source: Madhu and Jahid 2010)

malpractices and implications of innovations and technological advancement. The theoretical development of ecological modernization was largely taken in the western European countries. Till to date, there is little to no research discussing the Global South and its connection to climate change adaptation mechanisms. This chapter is an attempt to contribute to the discourse of ecological modernization focusing on the Global South, where the majority of the world population resides. This chapter discusses how climate resilient agriculture can be discussed within the larger framework of ecological modernization theory in the context of southwest Bangladesh. Even though the findings in this chapter are largely theoretically grounded, however, it is intended to focus on how the theory can be translated with further modifications, where necessary, into local communities of the Global South.

Local Environmental Challenges Bangladesh is often characterized by her yearly monsoon patterns. Therefore, in Bangladesh, agriculture is largely treated as a weather-sensitive sector. Even though local agriculture is heavily dependent on monsoon rains, excessive monsoon rains can cause substantial crop damages. Therefore, delay of plantation and damage of produced crops are among the most significant losses due to the unpredictable pattern of monsoon rains. Often it creates massive flash floods. The flood in 1988 caused the reduction of agriculture production by forty-five percent. In a resource-constrained country like Bangladesh, it was a big national security challenge. The country became heavily dependent on food exports and aid for meeting the local consumption demands. However, flood in this extent is not rare in Bangladesh. In the recent years, the frequency and the extent of floods have substantially increased (Fig. 1). Apart from floods, tropical cyclones and storm surges can also make damages to agriculture. The Cyclone Sidr struck the coastal Bangladesh on November 15, 2007. The total damage of crops was approximately Bangladesh Taka 28.4 billion (76 BDT ¼ 1 US$), and the total loss of production in all crops was 1.3 million metric tons (Madhu and Jahid 2010). Natural hazards like floods, droughts, cyclones, etc. are likely to increase in frequency and in intensity due to the changing nature of climate (Abedin and Shaw 2013; IPCC 2007), and it is not a surprise that these disasters will generate further challenges for agriculture in Bangladesh (Abedin and Shaw 2013). Salinity

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Fig. 2 Southwest coastal area of Bangladesh (Source: CoastalCare 2011)

intrusion is another major environmental challenge in the region. If it generates regional humanitarian crisis due to the lack of drinkable water and cultivable land, then southwest coastal Bangladesh will be treated as one of the major climate hot spots in human history. A migration from coastal Bangladesh to other parts of the country is already an increasing phenomenon. Lack of drinking water and salinity intrusion in land and water are shaping this migration dynamics. This process with salinity intrusion can be further increased by the reduced dry-season freshwater supply from upstream sources resulting from climate change (IPCC 1998) as well as by the increasing salinity intrusion due to sea-level rise (Abedin and Shaw 2013). These mentioned environmental challenges, heightened mostly due to climate change, will gradually contribute to the fact of decreasing amount of available agriculture lands. In addition to that, population growth and unplanned and uncontrolled urbanization also contribute to the declining trends with prime agriculture land. Right now the declining rate of agriculture land is approximately 1 % per annum (Ahmed 2010). The land use change from farm to nonfarm activities is another phenomenon in this land-constrained country. The loss of agricultural lands and the adverse impacts on overall agriculture warn us about the possible future food shortage for the country’s growing population. An emerging middle-class population will likely consume more and that will eventually increase the demand for consumption in the entire country. The conflict or mismatch between demand and supply of agriculture products will most likely increase the country’s vulnerability to further social, economic, and political chaos (Fig. 2). The national picture of agriculture challenges is not very different in southwest coastal Bangladesh. The region is the home of 35.1 million people (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2011). The majority of populations are poor, mostly marginalized farmers and fishermen, or dependent on other natural resources. The net cultivable lands are 1.95 million hectares. This average landholding per household is half of national average (Abedin and Shaw 2013).

Possible Solution: Climate Resilient Agriculture As the climate change is not any more a theoretical or abstract concept, rather very much visible in regional context, the southwest Bangladesh is in urgency to focus on different climate resilient

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Fig. 3 Floating agriculture practice (Source: Rahman 2013)

agricultural practices (Mahmood 2006). However, evidence shows that in the southwest coastal areas, the evaluation and demonstration of climate resilient high-yielding rice varieties have been neglected until recently (Clayton 2013). Fewer farmers adopted the modern agricultural practices and mostly remained lock with traditional agriculture practice (Clayton 2013). It is important to reinforce that climate resilient agriculture practice will reduce substantially the risks and vulnerabilities associated with climate change (Abedin and Shaw 2013) and that is particularly relevant and have larger implications in the low-income developing countries where the adaptive capacities are extremely limited. Climate resilient agriculture can contribute to four strategic objectives: it can contribute to ensure the production of adequate food for the bourgeoning population; alleviation of poverty particularly among the poor and marginalized farmers can be promoted; access to food will help to achieve better health and nutrition; and finally, it contribute to conserve the local natural resource base, which is not only helpful for the environment, but can also contribute to the local productivity, economy, and long-term sustainability (CGIAR 2011). Even though the climate resilient agriculture has a paramount importance, the implications of modernization and associated consequences are not very clear to the local policy makers and also to the farmers. This makes the situation complicated, because without understanding the process of (ecological) modernization, the local society might end up by generating further negative impacts on nature, such as loss of biodiversity. Business-as-usual can no longer any effective mechanism to understand the context and challenges. Innovative concepts and practices are required therefore for a region’s sustainability. Evidence shows in the southwest coastal regions, improving water efficiency and crop diversification should be at the core of local adaptation efforts (Abedin and Shaw 2013; Fig. 3). Apart from environmental dimension, climate resilient agriculture has social dimensions. In some situations, it is primarily driven by social forces like local consumption pattern or profit-oriented production systems. Changing agricultural pattern can alter this conventional trajectory. The entire process of climate resilient agriculture should be conceived as a coupled interaction between human and nature. One-dimensional approach of climate resiliency can disrupt the entire systems of sustainability. Agricultural modernization (or ecological modernization) largely depends on how the people can link their eco-efficiency of production system with the market force. It is not an easy process; rather it involves farmers’ awareness and engagement with climate resilient farming Page 5 of 12

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practice along with the state and policy supports for coupled understanding of modernization and long-term impacts.

Theoretical Framework: Ecological Modernization Core Arguments

Joseph Huber was among the first group of ecological modernization theorists who put substantial importance on the role of technological innovations in environmental reform. Even though the theory of ecological modernization presents a complex array and understanding of postindustrial modern society, however, the core argument involves contemporary technological innovation. Therefore, the proponents of ecological modernization see continued industrial development as the best possible option for escaping from the advanced societies’ ecological crises (Fisher and Freudenburg 2001). Ecological modernization can be one of the major reference points in contemporary social sciences disciplines for analyzing society-environment interactions (Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000). A large share of ecological modernization literature has been developed by the sociologists, and therefore, the theory or the perspective has become influential within the subdiscipline of environmental sociology (Buttel 2000). Initially ecological modernization perspective emerged as the hegemonic environmental discourse focusing on the advanced developed societies. Gradually, it shows its prospective neoliberal solution to the global environmental crisis, such as climate change (Lippert 2010). The core argument of the ecological modernization is to reach a balanced and synergistic relationship between industrialized societies and their environment. Therefore, these developed societies need to engage with nature more techno-scientifically efforts. At the same time, the market economy should mediate the process (Lippert 2010). In summary, the core arguments of ecological modernization could be as follows: An ecological modernization perspective hypothesizes that while the most challenging environmental problems of this century and the next have (or will have) been caused by modernization and industrialization, their solutions must necessary lie in more – rather than less – modernization and ‘superindustrialization.’ (Buttel 2000, p. 61)

The logic of ecological modernization entails a postmodernist perspective. The ideological development surrounded on the perceived inadequacy of neo-Marxist interpretation schemes. Ecological modernization perspective challenges the core ideas of de-modernization (Mol and Spaargaren 2000). The core of ecological modernization illustrates that increasing industrialization can solve contemporary environmental problems. An ecologically modernized society should adopt the core principles of environmentalism in the design of locally available institutions to regulate human interactions with nature (Mol and Spaargaren 2005). Therefore, a vibrant local market economy and democratically elected government, along with constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms, are basic prerequisites for realizing ecological modernization. It is clearly evident that ecological modernization theorists highlight the process of structural change in economic, political, and cultural institutions that can directly influence the environmental outcomes. These propositions are closely aligned with the contemporary sustainable development agenda and initiatives where substantial importance on institutions and institutional capacity is clearly evident (Mol and Spaargaren 2005). Proponents of ecological modernization believe that currently we are exposed to ecological modernization and, to tackle global environmental challenge, we need more modernized efforts in terms of eco-efficiency (Lippert 2010). So far the empirical evidences of ecological

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modernization are largely from advanced industrial societies. One of the major reasons is that ecological modernization requires advanced technological development, a state regulated economy, and widespread environmental consciousness and behavior for the desired green industrial restructuring.

Criticisms The logic of ecological modernization is not beyond criticisms. It argues that eco-efficiency can be achieved without radical structural changes in state and civil society (Buttel 2000). A majority of criticisms are surrounding to this argument. Therefore, if we really need to understand the theoretical arguments of ecological modernization and its implications on some specific geographical context, it is also important to discuss the counterarguments of ecological modernization. Firstly, the perspectives of ecological modernization differ from neo-Marxist social theories in paying little attention to changing relations of production or to altering the capitalist mode of production altogether. Therefore, ecological modernization perspective misses the point, how modernization exploits labor and resource base for the sake of increasing profits. In addition to that, the proponents of ecological modernization also believe that some institutions and/or organizations will become more “ecologically rational” at the later stages of development or modernization. However, developing countries might respond to this differently. Even though at the later stage of modernization it can be ecologically rational, that process of development already can make substantial damages of resource base with the exploitation of labor and production interaction, where the working class usually get exploited by the capital class. This process of development can actually generate increasing phenomenon with the treadmill of production. Apart from that, evidence shows that ecological modernization efforts were mostly successful to produce solutions to “conventional” environmental problems such as surface water pollution and solid waste management; however, high-consequence risks like climate change can only be explained with more rational integration of social and natural systems. Neo-Marxist perspective also criticizes ecological modernization because it overlooks the effect of modernization by additions to and withdrawals from nature (Schnaiberg 1980). For example, modern production systems require greater material inputs, e.g., fertilizers. It is capital intensive, and hence, more energy is needed to run the system. It is intended to increase the production levels, thus requiring far more raw materials. Usually agricultural intensification (modernization) can lead substantial chemical additions to the nature. It can generate environmental problems, such as natural resource depletion and pollution of land and water. This can adversely impact the land’s productive capacity. From the very beginning the major critique of ecological modernization theory is the technological optimism as well as perceived technocratic character (Mol and Spaargaren 2000). It is mostly based on the invention, innovation, and diffusion of newer technologies and associated techniques of operating industrial processes (Murphy 2000). This is clearly evident that ecological modernization advocates for super-industrialization. It will generate substantial pressure on economy, nature, and society, and at the same time, not all developing countries in the Global South can follow this modernistic trajectory with ecological modernization due to its own social, economic, and political situations. Without having some levels of economic efficiency, it is very hard to generate and/or promote ecological modernization. It can generate extra burden to the economy as well as to the society. More elaborately, even if the low-income developing countries follow the trajectory with ecological modernization, it will be interesting to explore at what cost and what would be the implications for labor and production relationship. Will the modernization generate profits for the

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large corporates or continue to marginalize the working class people? Still the proponents of ecological modernization are not very clear on these questions focusing on Global South. If we summarize the major critics of ecological modernization, we can see that there is no compelling evidence available from where see can see that the ecological sphere has been detached from the economic sphere in decision-making criteria. In addition to that, ecological modernization has focused narrowly on ecological issues by neglecting or overlooking other equally important components of social processes, such as social equity (Pellow et al. 2000). Without considering these challenges, modernization can generate even further pollution by increasing environmental and economic loads to the working class people, who will be the major victims of adverse impacts of changing climate. Apart from that, in many of the developing countries, the quality of governance and political and social institutions is very weak to support the country’s endeavor towards ecological modernization. It is a concern that might derail the ecological modernization efforts in low-income developing countries.

Perspectives on Bangladesh In Bangladesh, ecological modernization is at the very early stage of conceptualization and implementation. The process is going through restructuring in the local sociopolitical context and challenges. Not only in developing countries like in Bangladesh but also in developed societies it is not very uncommon that agricultural modernization or intensification as part of ecological modernization without proper supervision can cause the loss of fertility of prime agriculture lands. By modernizing agriculture sector in Bangladesh, there is a big chance that the farmers will not be the ultimate beneficiary groups. Big corporates might consume the major share of profits. Apart from that, as the ecological modernization process is technology driven, it might disrupt the local community structure and practice. Therefore, it is a critical issue for Bangladesh how the country can follow the trajectory of growth and modernization within the larger framework of ecological modernization. Even though the agricultural vulnerability is high and adaptation needs are paramount, very little efforts have made so far to understand the potentials of agricultural adaptation (Abedin and Shaw 2013) and more particularly from the theoretical point of view. Since the very beginning of ecological modernization discourse, scholars identified two distinct patterns within this framework: weak ecological modernization and strong ecological modernization (developed by Christoff 1996, but also discussed in Blowers 1997; Mol 2001; Dryzek et al. 2002). Weak ecological modernization can be characterized for its sole focus on efficiency and technological solutions by promoting technocratic and corporatist patterns of decision-making. It is treated as an initiative to introduce a single, focused, nondemocratic, and closed-ended framework and initiatives on political and economic structures and development. The core ideology of weak ecological modernization is to maintain both the political legitimacy and market competitiveness, because the state and market emphasize on environmental benefits through technological advancements (Schlosberg and Rinfret 2008). However, this narrowly defined ecological modernization reflects no significant changes to corporate or political structures and often provides minimal ecological outcomes (Christoff 1996). However in contrast, a stronger ecological modernization considers broad ranging changes to the society’s institutional structures and economic systems (Schlosberg and Rinfret 2008). The process often involves open democratic decision-making by using precautionary principles of modernization, and in addition to that it involves opportunities for political development (Schlosberg and Rinfret 2008). Within the discourse of ecological modernization, we can see that even if Bangladesh adopt ecological modernization perspective, the process entails the components of weak ecological Page 8 of 12

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modernization, because its framework narrowly focuses on how alternative technological advancement can enhance the agriculture productivity as well as local economy. This narrowly focused conceptualization of ecological modernization does not involve opportunities for broader societal change in response to changing climate. The current trajectory of ecological modernization in Bangladesh clearly misses the opportunity for conceptualizing the situation from a holistic perspective, and it argues on more importance for broader change with enhanced democratic governance on crucial issues (Schlosberg and Rinfret 2008).

Summary Agriculture is the major defining factor for food security and social development in Bangladesh. The associated problems of agriculture are multifaceted. Therefore, responding to climate change is complex and interdependent. The local society needs to understand the coupled relationships of human and natural systems prior to any specific modernization efforts. Ecological modernization is a relatively new concept, and in many ways it is an improved perspective towards sustainable development. It is obviously an attractive concept of modernization, because it provides us an alternative to the pessimistic connotations of development frameworks such as the treadmill of production and growth machine (Buttel 2000). Considering the local economy, society and political structure ensuring “strong” ecological modernization is a challenging task in Bangladesh. It is important to mention that ecological modernization is not necessarily a uniform prescription for all sectors. It can work better in some particular sectors than others. Advanced developed countries with mature governance are in advantageous position for ensuring ecological modernization. Low-income developing countries have contrasting scenarios. In Bangladesh, climate adaptation strategy particularly the climate resilient agriculture practice is very much aligned with the concept of “weak” ecological modernization. To avoid further distress, it would be important for the local society to focus more on the “community-based” side of the process; that means, the process should be led by the local community. The technocratic approach of ecological modernization can generate further disarray in the system and society. In general, the farmers of the southwest Bangladesh are now interested on innovation and adaptation of climate resilient agriculture practice, such as floating-bed cultivation system. It is a good sign for eco-efficiency responding to climate change. However, it is important to mention that to speedup the process, the market and state should continue further research and development on new varieties of saline- and flood-tolerant crops and strive to disseminate new information and skills among the farmers and local community to create locally conducive environment and precondition for “strong” ecological modernization in southwest Bangladesh.

References Abedin MA, Shaw R (2013) Agriculture adaptation in coastal zone of Bangladesh. In: Rajib S, Fuad M, Aminul I (eds) Climate change adaptation actions in Bangladesh. Springer, Tokyo/ Heidelberg/New York/Dordrecht/London Ahmed CQKM (2010) Agriculture in Bangladesh: present position, problems, prospects and policy. Available at www.bpatc.org.bd/handouts/Agriculture_Bangladesh.ppt Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2007) Year books (2006–07). BBS, Dhaka Page 9 of 12

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Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2011) Population and housing census report 2011. BBS, Dhaka Blowers A (1997) Environmental policy: ecological modernisation or the risk society? Urban Stud 34(5–6):845–871 Brown LR (2011) World on the edge: how to prevent environmental and economic collapse. Earth Policy Institute, New York/London Buttel FH (2000) Ecological modernization as social theory. Geoforum 31:57–65 CCC (2009) Impact assessment of climate change and sea level rise on monsoon. Climate Change Cell, Department of Environment, Ministry of Environment and Forest, Dhaka CGIAR (2011) Research on gender and agriculture. Available at http://www.cgiar.org/our-research/ research-on-gender-and-agriculture/ Christoff P (1996) Ecological modernisation, ecological modernities. Environ Polit 5(3):476–500 Clayton S (2013) Catching up in southwestern Bangladesh. Rice Today 12(3), July–September 2013. Available at http://irri.org/rice-today/catch-up-in-southwestern-bagladesh CoastalCare (2011) One million Bangladesh homes on solar power. Available at http://coastalcare. org/2011/06/one-million-bangladesh-homes-on-solar-power/ Curran G (2009) Ecological modernization and climate change in Australia. Environ Polit 18(2):201–217 Dryzek J, Hunold C, Schlosberg D (2002) Environmental transformation of the state: the USA, Norway, Germany and the UK. Polit Stud 50:659–682 Fisher DR, Freudenburg WR (2001) Ecological modernization theory and its critics. Soc Nat Resour 14(8):701–709 IPCC (1998) The regional impacts of climate change: an assessment of vulnerability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge IPCC (2007) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Lippert I (2010) Agents of ecological modernization. Der Andere Verlag, Toenning/Luebeck/ Marburg Madhu MK, Jahid SA (2010) Climate change and agriculture in the south-west coastal of Bangladesh. Available at teacher.buet.ac.bd/akmsaifulislam/climaterisk/student/Group-2.ppt Mahmood N (2006) Prawan (Changri). Banglapedia – the national encyclopedia of Bangladesh. Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, Dhaka Mol A (2001) Globalization and environmental reform: the ecological modernisation of the global economy. MIT Press, London Mol APJ, Sonnenfeld DA (2000) Ecological modernisation around the world: an introduction. Environ Polit 9(1):1–14 Mol APJ, Spaargaren G (2000) Ecological modernisation theory in debate: a review. Environ Polit 9(1):17–49 Mol APJ, Spaargaren G (2005) From additions and withdrawals to environmental flows: reframing debates in the environmental social sciences. Organ Environ 18:91–107 Murphy J (2000) Editorial – ecological modernization. Geoforum 31:1–8 Pellow DN, Schnaiberg A, Weinberg AS (2000) Putting the ecological modernization thesis to the test: the promises and performances of urban recycling. Environ Polit 9(1):109–137 Pravda Bangladesh (2009) Climate change in southwest Bangladesh. Available at http:// pravdabangladesh.wordpress.com/climate-change-in-southwest-bangladesh/ Rahman H (2013) Vegetables on water. The Daily Star. Available http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/ news/vegetables-on-water/. Accessed 22 Aug 2013 Page 10 of 12

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Schlosberg D, Rinfret S (2008) Ecological modernization, American style. Environ Polit 17(2):254–275 Schnaiberg A (1980) The environment: from surplus to scarcity. Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford Streatfield PK, Karar ZA (2008) Population challenges for Bangladesh in the coming decades. J Health Popul Nutr 26(3):261–272

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Index Terms: Bangladesh 1 Climate change 1–2, 4, 7 Climate change adaptation 3 Ecological modernization theory 2–3

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Climate Change and Agriculture in Dry Areas Muhammad Saqib*, Javaid Akhtar, Riaz H. Qureshi and Ghulam Murtaza Institute of Soil and Environmental Sciences, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan

Abstract This chapter explores the implications of climate change for agriculture in dry areas in the context of decreasing quantity and diminishing quality of water. It proposes adaptation strategies for planning national and regional responses to climate change. This chapter analyzes the impacts of climate change on agriculture in dry areas taking into consideration different adaptation efforts underway and the bottlenecks faced. On the basis of this analysis, it presents certain guidelines for responses to climate change in dryland agriculture. The findings of this chapter include an elucidation of the impacts of climate change on agriculture in dry areas and the factors which contribute to these impacts. In addition certain adaptation guidelines are proposed. Agriculture is the most important sector of life affected by climate change. The findings of this chapter will be useful for all the stakeholders including policy makers, agricultural managers, and the farmers. Agriculture in general and in drylands in particular is vulnerable to climate change. However, the impacts of climate change on agriculture and the possible adaptations are not studied extensively. Therefore, the present chapter is expected to provide original information on the subject of climate change and agriculture in dry areas.

Keywords Climate change; Agriculture; Dry areas; Environment; Mitigation; Adaptation

Introduction According to the World Atlas of Desertification, the areas where the ratio of mean annual rainfall and mean annual potential evapotranspiration is between 0.05 and 0.20 are classified as arid areas, and the areas where this ratio is between 0.2 and 0.5 are classified as semiarid areas (UNEP 1992). About 41 % of the Earth’s land surface is covered by drylands with a population of more than two billion people and more than 90 % of these are in the developing countries (IIED 2008). This makes the drylands home to about one-third of the global population. However, according to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the arid and semiarid regions occupy about 30 % of the total area of the world and are home to 1.10 billion people or around 20 % of the total world population. About 24 % of the total population of Africa, 17 % of the Americas and the Caribbean, 23 % of Asia, 6 % of Australia and Oceania, and 11 % of Europe live in the arid and semiarid areas (UNSO 1997). The major dryland areas of the world include West African Sahel and Dry Savannas, East and Southern Africa, North Africa and West Asia, Central Asia and the Caucasus, and South Asia.

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Dry areas are home to most of the world’s poor and many poorest of the poor who live on less than 1$ a day (White et al. 2002). The dry areas have high population growth with low employment rate and high number of youth population, rapid urbanization, poverty, social inequality, and poorly developed markets and institutes. The health, nutrition, and living conditions are very poor in the dry areas. The drylands are very poor in renewable water supply (less than 8 % of the renewable water resources of the world) and have low and variable precipitation and very low organic matter (IIED 2008). Low water availability is the most important limiting factor for sustainable food production from drylands. The most water-scarce regions of the world are Middle East and North Africa. The problem of water scarcity is compounded with groundwater depletion. The dry areas are also home to the most vulnerable agricultural ecosystems which are hit hard by the climate change. World food production is seriously affected by climate change particularly in the arid and semiarid regions. The productivity of dry areas is much less than their potential and the need of the people living in these areas. For example, wheat yields are up to 30 % lower in dry areas than the global average. Similarly, the livestock and poultry production is very low in the dry areas. This low productivity leads to food imports and price hikes which threatens the food security and livelihoods of the poor people of these areas. Drylands often witness famines and natural disasters which lead to resource damage and political unrest. History shows that extremes of heat, cold, droughts, and floods have caused devastation to the agricultural systems in the dry areas. Climate change has added to susceptibility of these areas to poverty, hunger, famine, and dislodgment. It therefore needs time to develop strategies and policies to increase food production on sustainable basis in the drylands of the globe. The agricultural and pastoral systems in dry areas are very complex and include pastures, rangelands, forests, fish and livestock, and rainfed and irrigated production systems. The management and development of the dry areas require an approach that can integrate different cropping, pastoral, forest, and livestock systems.

Climate Change-Induced Problems of Dry Areas Climate change is the change in the weather over a long period of time. Rising levels of greenhouse gases in the global atmosphere and increasing concentrations of aerosol particulates are considered to noticeably affect the world climate systems (Santer et al. 1996). These changes lead to a rise in the world mean temperature and sea level. The mean surface temperature of the world has increased by about 0.6  C over the twentieth century (IPCC 2001). The data from the northern hemisphere showed that this rise in temperature during the twentieth century is the maximum during a century since 1000 A.D. According to IPCC (2013), over the period of 1880–2012, the global average temperature has increased by 0.85 (0.65–1.06)  C. Agriculture is very sensitive to climate changeinduced long-term trends and short-term variability of rainfall and temperature and of the occurrence of droughts, floods, heat waves, frosts, and other extreme events (IPCC 2012). Climate change is increasing threats to food safety and post-harvest losses and danger from invasive species, pests, and diseases (Vermeulen et al. 2012). The incidence and geographic spread of diseases of the human beings, animals, and plants is also likely to increase in a warming climate. Climate change particularly challenges the sustainability of food production systems and the natural resources in the areas of widespread or intense water stress and environments prone to degradation and desertification and where the poor people cannot take the needed preventive steps (IPCC 2012). Almost all the global circulation models predict that the dry areas will be hit hard by the climate change. Page 2 of 9

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Fig. 1 Projected changes in agricultural production in 2080 due to climate change. Projections assume a uniform 15 % increase in yields due to the fertilization effect of rising carbon dioxide in the atmosphere on some plant species (Note that this coarse-grain analysis does not project local-scale impacts which require geographically specific analysis) (Cline 2007)

The agroecosystems of dry areas are challenged with drought, floods, salinity, extreme temperatures, biodiversity loss, and land degradation. The farmers of the dry areas often have smallholdings and practice a mixed farming system comprising of rainfed cropping and livestock. These activities are mostly vulnerable to climate change that results in loss of biological potential and desertification of these areas. Climate change results in demographic changes in the agricultural areas. People migrate from one place to the other along with their livestock and enhance the load on water and soil resources of an already stressed area. This leads to poor resource management and conflicts between the nomads and the farmers of a particular area. The food security, life quality, poverty, agriculture, and climate change are strongly linked with agriculture playing a key role in the linkage. Climate change is intensifying the problems of drylands, and the situation is predicted to get worse with time, and the drylands will have to rely more and more on the unreliable food imports. Agriculture in drylands is highly vulnerable to climate change (Fig. 1). The crop and livestock yields in the dry areas are reduced or crop failure occurs due to unreliable precipitation pattern. The overall rainfall levels have declined with climate change, and the drought events have become frequent and more intense. A change in global temperature is causing a shift in the climatic zones. The length of growing seasons is decreasing, and the pests and diseases are increasing and spreading in the areas where they were not prevalent in the past. New pests and diseases are also emerging under these conditions. A decrease in food production in the dry areas has occurred under the changing climatic conditions, and the situation is expected to get worse. This lowers the farm income, spikes the commodity prices, and increases the import of food commodities. These developments as a result of climate change are going to affect the sociopolitical stability of already geopolitically volatile dryland countries.

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Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies for Agriculture in Dry Areas Agriculture, food security, and environmental resilience in dry areas essentially need widespread adoption of sustainable agricultural practices. The global burden of hunger is bound to increase as the frequency of extreme weather events like droughts and floods is predicted to increase (Beddington et al. 2012). Therefore, future global agriculture needs to produce more food for the growing population while adapting to changing climate (Foresight 2011; Lobell et al. 2011). Agriculture can enhance as well as decrease the climate change and its impacts. Greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture include emissions from ruminant digestion (sheep, goat, and cattle), rice fields, and fuel use. Methane, nitrous oxide, and carbon dioxide emitted by livestock activities (i.e., enteric fermentation and manure management) and land-use changes make a substantial contribution to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Steinfeld et al. 2006). Deforestation for land clearing for agriculture also significantly contributes to greenhouse emissions (Smith et al. 2007). These greenhouse gas emissions enhance climate change. On the other hand, agriculture provides a major sink of carbon in vegetation and soil that contributes to adaptation and mitigation of climate change. Therefore, better and improved agricultural activities can reduce risk and may create a win-win situation for agriculture in dry areas. These activities may include better resource management, genetic improvement, and socioeconomic institutional support for these areas (Anonymous 2012, 2013). This section describes these activities for sustainable dryland agriculture systems.

Prioritization of Resource Utilization Land and water resources are under tremendous pressure in dry areas and need to be used very wisely and judicially. Producing more with little is the major challenge for agriculture in the dry areas. To meet this challenge, it is very important to prioritize the resource utilization on high potential lands and marginal lands. The high potential lands and marginal lands need different strategies to maximize returns from these lands. There are drylands with good production potential, relatively friendly environmental conditions, better access to markets, and institutional support. These areas should be targeted for intensive food production using high-yielding, resource-efficient, and stress-resistant crop varieties and livestock breeds. There are the dry areas with poor/marginal land and water resources with poor access to markets and poor institutions. The major focus in these areas should be to reduce their vulnerability to climate change and avoid resource degradation. Therefore, the aim here is to decrease risk and vulnerability of these rural communities and to increase their resilience to climate change. These areas may support only very hardy plants and animal species. Rearing goats and sheep is a good option in these areas as different fodder species are hard enough to be grown in these areas. Awassi sheep is a good example as it supports the livelihood of many people in the dry areas of Middle East through providing milk, meat, and wool. This may also be used in other dryland areas.

Diversification and Integration of Crop-Livestock Systems Land and environment suitability of crops and livestock should be extensively studied and explored. Diversification of crops, livestock species, vegetables, and trees is needed in the dry areas. A shift from high water-using crops and animals to low water-using crops and animals should also be encouraged. The diversification of agricultural systems can mitigate risk and improve income in dryland areas. Introduction of innovative uses of the arable land resources, introduction of new

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plants, and value addition to the existing food production in the existing agricultural systems can improve economic returns and mitigate risks.

Genetic Improvement of Crop and Livestock Genetic improvement of crops and livestock is a key toward sustainable agriculture and food security in the dry areas. This can improve the efficiency and resilience of the food production systems in the dry areas under changing climatic conditions. The breeding programs need to be more site specific toward the environmental conditions, pests and diseases at a particular area. The genotypes developed for a particular situation may be more resource efficient under these conditions. The “Gokce,” a drought-tolerant variety of chickpea introduced in Turkey, is a good example (Anonymous 2012). Biotechnology is applied in the development of varieties with superior traits including resilience to climate change and low input requirements. Some crops have been genetically engineered to reduce GHG emissions from agriculture and therefore contribute to climate change mitigation. Genetic improvement in the livestock sector also helps the farmers to adapt to climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Crops and livestock with low greenhouse gas production should be selected and promoted. Seed has become a very costly input in agriculture. Therefore, seed development and seedkeeping are very important for a better harvest. The farmers of the dry areas may be trained in seed-keeping to reduce crop raising costs and increase farm income. The women of the Matigsalog tribe in Davao City, Philippines, were trained for selection of suitable rice varieties for different conditions which helped them to select and preserve right seeds and improved their resilience to climate change-induced problems in rice production (APEC 2012).

Conservation Agriculture Conservation agriculture and site-specific management have found to be suitable for farming in the dry areas. Conservation agriculture involves reduced soil disturbance, retaining crop residues and conserving water and crop nutrients. It follows zero till or no-till system of cultivation. It reduces costs and improves soil health, nutrient cycling, and crop yields. It increases carbon sequestration and decreases greenhouse gas emission from agricultural land and contributes to climate change mitigation. Efficient input utilization in agriculture minimizes input use and carbon emission. Fertilizer application may be reduced by nutrient recycling through the decomposition of plant residues. When used with other improved crop management practices, conservation agriculture has given good results for wheat, barley, chickpea, and lentil. A change in animal feed, improvement in animal housing, and better waste and manure management in livestock can reduce CH4 emissions. Alternative agricultural practices, suitable for a particular region, can reduce the emission of greenhouse gases and hence will help to maintain or improve yields and to adapt to extreme weather events (Pretty et al. 2011). However, the farmers are reluctant to follow conservation agriculture at many places as it may involve initial costs and the initial benefits are gained after some time. The policy makers are also afraid that not as much food can be produced from conservation agriculture as from the conventional ways. Similarly, limited availability of resources is a hindrance toward changing to a more conservative approach (FAO 2006).

Water Conservation and Management Water is the most important but limited and endangered entity in dry areas. It is the single most important factor controlling the sustainability of dryland agriculture systems and dryland communities. Therefore, efforts at all levels are needed to increase its utilization efficiency. Improved water use efficiency is also needed to reduce fresh water use in agriculture which is up to 90 % in some Page 5 of 9

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countries. Water resources management is complicated as the key physical water bodies like rivers, lakes, and watersheds cut across the political borders. These water resources and their management provide the basis of agricultural development in dry areas. The related problems like flooding, drought, and rise in sea level also go across the political boundaries. Therefore, a cost-efficient and environment-friendly water management requires integration at farm, ecosystem, and policy levels. A successful integrated water resources management requires “top-down” as well as “bottom-up” approach including policy, funding, and institutional support and farm-level activities. Irrigation systems giving high water use efficiencies should be introduced in the dry area.

Agricultural Research, Education, and Extension Climate change adaptation and mitigation and sustainable food production from the dry areas need modernization of agriculture. Introduction of new technologies has improved wheat yields of the dryland farmers by 22 % in Egypt and 58 % in Sudan. Agricultural adaptation to climate change is very costly and needs to be supported financially from different climate change adaptation funds. Climate smart initiatives and climate smart technologies can be helpful in sustaining and increasing food production and protecting the natural resources of the dry areas. The improved adaptation and mitigation measures will not only improve food security but will also reduce the agriculture-induced climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture.

International and National Policies and Agreements There is a strong need to increase human capacity to benefit from current and future trade-offs and to capitalize on synergies between food security and climate change adaptation and mitigation options. A strong leadership is needed at international institutes and policy processes for this purpose. It is the dire need of the dryland countries that agriculture and food security should get an important place in the discussions in the global bodies including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Group of 20 nations (G20), and the United Nations Convention on Sustainable Development (the organizing body of the Rio + 20 Earth Summit). These bodies should be persuaded to adopt appropriate actions including policy and financial measures to improve implementation of sustainable solutions to climate change in drylands on a global level. All the dryland countries essentially need agriculture-friendly policies in this era of climate change. COP-17 in Durban has been good as the agriculture has been specifically mentioned for the first time in the text of UNFCCC. Long-term investment and funding is needed to finance the new technologies. Climate change adaptation and mitigation are costly, and a considerable funding from international agencies is required, if the dryland communities are to be sustained and further developed. A number of technologies are available today to overcome the problems of the drylands; however, these need to be taken to the field through financing, training, and advocacy to the governments as well as to the farmers. Climate change will continue to challenge the livelihoods of the people of dryland areas. These areas are difficult to manage but need more attention of the policy makers and donors as these areas have received less investment in the past. In the twenty-first century, agricultural development is important for achieving food security and adaptation to and mitigation of climate change. Agriculture is a key sector for climate change resilience particularly in the drylands as it is accepted that climate change will severely affect the development and life in the rural areas. A concentration on the dry areas is very important for improving food security, nutrition and health, conservation of natural resources, and decreasing social inequality.

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Dryland Development Beyond 2015: Beijing Statement Dryland Development Beyond 2015: Beijing Statement of the 11th International Drylands Development Conference of the International Dryland Development Commission (18–21 March, 2013, Beijing, China) summarizes the issues, options, and solutions related to the drylands (ICDD 2013). The statement narrates as: Drylands – comprising deserts, rangelands, rainfed croplands, wastelands, and some savanna woodlands – cover about 41 % of Earth’s land surface and are inhabited by more than 2 billion people. More than 50 % of the poor and malnourished of the world live in the dry areas and suffer from food insecurity, and socio-economic and sociopolitical instability. Many of these areas face severe land degradation, potentially undermining the productivity of these important ecosystems. Natural and semi-natural ecosystems are being degraded by the mismanagement of water resources, inappropriate land use practices and overgrazing. Increasing fuel prices are making agricultural inputs and operations more costly, reducing agricultural productivity, and increasing food prices. The impact of global climate change would worsen the situation. Therefore, there is an urgent need to pay attention to improving coping capacity of the people in the dry areas and minimizing vulnerability by developing knowledge-based adaptation and mitigation modalities through global cooperation. Hence, it is imperative that the post-2015 development agenda by the international community takes account of the challenges faced by over 2 billion people living in these drylands. Consolidated responses must undertake drylands development in a manner that adequately addresses water, food, feed, and energy security concerns and offer opportunities for economic development while respecting the rich and varied social and cultural heritages. The Participants of the Conference, representing research and development community from 29 countries and 14 regional and international organizations, have come to the conclusion that this can be achieved in two ways:

First, the sustainable development goals (SDGs) should maintain a sharp focus on issues that are of relevance to drylands: reducing poverty through sustainable land management, protecting livelihoods and ensuring human wellbeing, adequate management of scarce water resources, and providing incentives to governments for initiating proactive responses to land degradation. The notion of green economy may provide us a useful starting point for formulating such SDGs. In this new paradigm of sustainability, the notions of carbon footprint and water footprint must figure centrally within green economy policies. However, this must be balanced to become globally equitable. Second, countries and people must be resourced to meet with new and emerging challenges, the awareness of which has to be enhanced amongst all stakeholders. As climate change exposes us to unprecedented water stress and impacts on biodiversity, no region is more adversely impacted than drylands – and we must therefore work on building societal resilience against such new challenges. This can be achieved by: (a) developing scientific and technological resources and making them available to governments and other stakeholders in drylands developing countries; (b) mobilizing and further developing human and institutional capacity in developing countries, ensuring gender equity and empowerment, particularly around sustainable land, water and genetic resource management, adopting an agro-ecosystem approach; (c) mobilizing new capital, both in the public and private sectors, to develop institutions and infrastructure and sustainable renewable energy sources; and (d) introducing specific enabling policies and legislation.

Conclusions Climate change is a reality and no more a speculation. The occurrence of extreme weather events has become a routine around the globe particularly in the dryland regions. Drylands are home to a significant human population who has no other option except to earn their livelihoods from these vulnerable areas. They are already living in the poorest living conditions which are faced with increasing challenges and problems with time. Agriculture is the only sector which can ensure the sustainability, food security, and improvement of life quality of dryland communities. Therefore,

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agricultural research should emphasize to develop new resource-efficient genetic materials and technologies which can tolerate the extreme climatic events under dryland conditions. It is not possible without financial and policy support from national and international institutions, governing bodies, and commissions.

References Anonymous (2012) Strategies for combating climate change in drylands agriculture. Synthesis of dialogue and evidence presented at the international conference on food security in drylands, Doha, Qatar, Nov 2012 Anonymous (2013) Integrated agricultural production systems for improved food security and livelihoods in dry areas (Dryland Systems). Inception phase report. CGIAR Research Program on Dryland Systems. http://www.icarda.org/dryland_systems/teaser Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (2012) APEC symposium on climate change: adaptation strategies with mitigation potential for food and water security, Manila, 6–8 Feb 2012 Beddington JR, Asaduzzaman M, Clark ME, Fernandez Bremauntz A, Guillou MD, Howlett DJB, Jahn MM, Lin E, Mamo T, Negra C, Nobre CA, Scholes RJ, Van Bo N, Wakhungu J (2012) What next for agriculture after Durban? Science 335:289–290 Cline WR (2007) Global warming and agriculture: impact estimates by country. Peterson Institute, Washington, DC. http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/projected-agriculture-in-2080-due-toclimate-change_15f0 (Hugo Ahlenius, UNEP/GRID-Arendal) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2006) Agriculture and consumer protection department. Rome, Italy. http://www.fao.org/ag/magazine/0110sp.htm Foresight (2011) Migration and global environmental change: future challenges and opportunities. Final project report. Futures. Government Office for Science. London ICDD (2013) Dryland development beyond 2015 – Beijing statement of the 11th international Drylands development conference. International dryland development commission. Beijing, 18–21 March 2013 International Institute for Environmental Development (IIED) (2008) Climate change and drylands. Commission on Climate Change and Development. Kräftriket, Sweden. www.ccdcommission.org IPCC (2001) Climate change 2001: the scientific basis, contribution of working group I to the third assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. In: Houghton JT, Ding Y, Griggs DJ, Noguer M, van der Linden PJ, Dai X, Maskell K, Johnson CA (eds) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK/New York IPCC (2012) Summary for policy makers. In: Field CB, Barros V, Stocker TF, Qin D, Dokken DJ, Ebi KL, Mastrandrea MD, Mach KJ, Plattner G-K, Allen SK, Tignor M, Midgley PM (eds) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation. A special report of working groups I and II of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK IPCC (2013) Working group I contribution to the IPCC fifth assessment report climate change 2013: the physical science basis: approved summary for policymakers. IPCC, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, USA Lobell DB, Schlenker W, Roberts JC (2011) Climate trends and global crop production since 1980. Science 333:616–620

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Pretty J, Sutherland WJ, Ashby A, Auburn J, Baulcombe D, Bell M, Bentley J, Bickersteth S, Brown K, Burke J, Campbell H, Chen K, Crowley E, Crute I, Dobbelaere D, Edwards-Jones G, Funes-Monzote FH, Godfray CJ, Griffon M, Gypmantisiri P, Haddad L, Halavatau S, Herren H, Holderness M, Izac A, Jones M, Koohafkan P, Lal R, Lang L, McNeely J, Mueller A, Nisbett N, Noble A, Pingali P, Pinto Y, Rabbinge R, Ravindranath NH, Rola A, Roling N, Sage C, Settle W, Sha JM, Shiming L, Simons T, Smith P, Strzepeck K, Swaine H, Terry E, Tomich TP, Toulmin C, Trigo E, Twomlow S, Kees Vis J, Wilson J, Pilgrim S (2011) Sustainable intensification in African agriculture. Int J Agric Sustain 9(1):5–24 Santer BD, Wigley TML, Barnett TP, Anyamba E (1996) Detection of climate change and attribution of causes. In: Houghton JT et al (eds) Climate change 1995. The IPCC second scientific assessment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Smith P, Martino D, Cai Z, Gwary D, Janzen H, Kumar P, McCarl B, Ogle S, O’Mara F, Rice C, Scholes B, Irotenko O (2007) Agriculture. In: Metz B, Davidson OR, Bosch PR, Dave R, Meyer LA (eds) Climate change 2007: mitigation. Contribution of working group III to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Steinfeld H, Gerber P, Wassenaar T, Castel V, Rosales M, de Haan C (2006) Livestock’s long shadow. Environmental issues and options. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome UNEP (1992) World atlas of desertification. Edward Arnold, London UNSO (1997) Aridity zones and dryland populations: an assessment of population levels in the world’s drylands. Office to Combat Desertification and Drought (UNSO/UNDP), New York Vermeulen SJ, Aggarwal PK, Ainslie A, Angelone C, Campbell BM, Challinor AJ, Hansen JW, Ingram JSI, Jarvis A, Kristjanson P, Lau C, Nelson GC, Thornton PK, Wollenberg E (2012) Options for support to agriculture and food security under climate change. Environ Sci Policy 15:136–144 White RP, Tunstall D, Henninger N (2002) An ecosystem approach to drylands: building support for new development policies. Information policy brief no 1. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC

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Integrated Biophysical and Socioeconomic Model for Adaptation to Climate Change for Agriculture and Water in the Koshi Basin Nilhari Neupane*, Manchiraju Sri Ramachandra Murthy, Golam Rasul, Shahriar Wahid, Arun B. Shrestha and Kabir Uddin International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), Kathmandu, Nepal

Abstract Water vulnerability is one of the major challenges facing people in the Himalayan river basins and is expected to increase with climate and other change. In order to develop appropriate and effective adaptation strategies, it is necessary to understand the level and spatial distribution of water vulnerability and the underlying factors contributing to it, both biophysical and socioeconomic. The development and application of a water vulnerability assessment model at district level, and its use in adaptation planning, is described using the transboundary Koshi River basin as an example. The whole basin showed a relatively high degree of water vulnerability, with mountain districts the most vulnerable followed by the mid-hills and the plains. The mountain and mid-hill areas were more vulnerable in terms of resource stress and ecological security, whereas the plains areas were more vulnerable in terms of development pressure; all parts of the basin were vulnerable in terms of management capacity. Significant correlation among the four components indicated that improvements in resource availability, ecological security, and management capacity would reduce development pressure and overall vulnerability. Adaptation plans need to be based on district-specific vulnerability characteristics; some suggestions and recommendations for adaptation plans are made.

Keywords Koshi basin; Integrated model; Climate change; Adaptation; GIS; Socioeconomics

Introduction Water is a multidimensional resource used for industrial, domestic, agricultural, and recreational purposes. In the majority of developing countries, a significant proportion of the total water withdrawal is for agricultural purposes, and there is a very strong linkage between water availability and peoples’ livelihoods, as most livelihoods depend on agriculture. Water availability is mainly influenced by climatic parameters, such as rainfall, temperature, and snowfall, and anthropogenic changes, such as changes in the human and livestock populations, economic development, and urbanization (Kundzewicz and Somlyody 1997). The anthropogenic changes can in turn affect the climatic parameters leading to further change. Many drivers of change impact on current and future water availability, and water is considered to be a vulnerable resource to different degrees globally (Rosenzweig et al. 2004; Bates et al. 2008) increasing the challenges to water resource management *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 23

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(Kojiri 2008). The vulnerability of water resources directly affects peoples’ livelihoods leading to increased poverty and problems of food and energy insecurity (Rasul 2012, 2014). Normally, poorer people in developing countries are more, and more rapidly, affected (Sullivan and Meigh 2005) because they are less resilient and have limited options for coping. A water vulnerability assessment is a key entry point for suggesting suitable policy options for the sustainable utilization of water resources and plans for adaptation (Kelly and Adger 2000). The concept of vulnerability is complex and context specific, and different assessment tools have been developed for different purposes at different scales. The study described here focused on developing a water-based vulnerability assessment that could be used to develop adaptation strategies based directly on the parameter and linked indirectly with water resources specific to the study area. The study used UNEP water vulnerability assessment tools (Babel and Wahid 2009a, b; UNEP 2011) as a framework, with some modifications and additional context-specific water-related variables so that it can be replicated in transboundary river basins of the Hindu Kush Himalayas. The strength of the approach is that it treats the biophysical and socioeconomic aspects of the river basin equally, in contrast to other studies which have tended to ignore the socioeconomic component. The water issues of the Koshi basin were used as a case study for transboundary river basins of the Hindu Kush Himalayan region; districts were taken as the smallest unit to allow empirical estimates of the current vulnerability scenarios of the basin at district level, identify basin specific vulnerability factors, and suggest suitable policy options. The study contributes to the conceptualization and methodological advance of water vulnerability assessment tools and demonstrates the applicability of the model and its contribution to adaptation planning using the Koshi basin as an example. Notable studies on water vulnerability assessment in South Asian river basins include one for the lower Brahmaputra river basin (Gain et al. 2012) and one for the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna river basin (Babel and Wahid 2011), both at macro-levels. Microlevel water vulnerability assessments have been conducted for the Bagmati River basin (Babel et al. 2011; Pandey et al. 2011) and medium-sized river basins in Nepal (Pandey et al. 2010, 2012), and a water poverty analysis for the Kali Gandaki river basin (Manandhar et al. 2012). Until now, no vulnerability assessments have been carried out at a transnational scale using district-level data (third-level administrative unit) to bridge the scales. The Koshi River is one of the major tributaries of the Ganges, and the river basin is characterized by a high level of poverty and food insecurity and thus offers a useful example for developing and testing the assessment approach. The development of the water vulnerability assessment model, and application in planning for adaptation to climate change, is described in the following: the framework is presented in the first section; the second section describes the application of the model in a vulnerability assessment of a transboundary river basin at district level and its use in adaptation planning using the Koshi River basin as an example; and finally the approach and results are discussed and conclusions drawn.

Framework for a Vulnerability Assessment Vulnerability is a complex concept; it differs from one discipline to another and is highly context specific (Young et al. 2010). The most widely used definition of vulnerability is that given by the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change): “Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes” (McCarthy et al. 2001). Vulnerability (V) can be expressed as V ¼ f ðexposure, sensitivity, adaptive capacityÞ Page 2 of 23

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_77-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

The exposure and sensitivity of a system are related to hazards and cause the vulnerability, while the adaptive capacity is a “shock absorber” and has an inverse relationship to exposure and sensitivity (Brooks et al. 2005; Hamouda et al. 2009). Biophysical forces are responsible for the exposure and sensitivity of the system, while sociocultural, political, and economic forces contribute to the adaptive capacity (Adger 2006; Smit and Wandel 2006).

Why Use an Integrated Modeling Approach for Water Vulnerability Assessment? Most vulnerability assessments have been based on physical or biological disciplines (Sullivan and Meigh 2005) which view vulnerability in terms of the likelihood of occurrence of climate-related events (Adger 2006). This conventional approach is a top-down or end-point approach and does not look at adaptation options to cope with the vulnerability (Young et al. 2010). In contrast, social scientists view vulnerability as a set of socioeconomic and institutional factors that determine people’s ability to cope with stress or change (Kelly and Adger 2000; Brooks 2003). According to Sen, socioeconomic parameters such as access to essential resources like forest, land, and water should also be reflected in the vulnerability analysis (Sen 1981, 1990). Similarly, Adger et al. (2005) strongly emphasized the importance of incorporating socioeconomic systems with biophysical systems at varied spatial and social scales in the vulnerability assessment. O’ Brien et al. defined vulnerability to climate change as a function of a range of biophysical and socioeconomic factors (O’ Brien et al. 2004). Incorporating socioeconomic parameters into a vulnerability assessment is called a bottom-up or starting-point approach and has direct application in adaptation planning (Young et al. 2010). In the past, the vulnerability created by socioeconomic factors was largely ignored (Adger and Kelly 1999), in part because of the quantification and indexing problems for qualitative and quantitative data (Cutter et al. 2003; Plummer et al. 2012). Water-based vulnerability assessments should also incorporate socioeconomic factors (Sullivan 2011) because people constantly interact with water resources for their livelihoods, and social factors make a significant contribution to water vulnerability (Sullivan and Meigh 2005). Incorporating socioeconomic factors in water vulnerability assessments will enable more effective adaptation strategies to be developed (Vorosmarty et al. 2000; Sullivan and Meigh 2005) and provide a holistic approach along the lines of integrated water resources management (IWRM) (Vorosmarty et al. 2000; Babel and Wahid 2011; Plummer et al. 2012). Two of the earliest studies using biophysical and socioeconomic parameters in water vulnerability assessments are those by Boruff et al. (2005), who combined physical and socioeconomic factors in a model used to determine county-level vulnerability caused by coastal erosion in the USA, and by Sullivan and Meigh (2005), who developed a climate vulnerability index (CVI) focused on waterrelated variables which considered a wide range of socioeconomic and physical parameters at different spatial scales. In the UNEP methodologies guideline for vulnerability assessment of freshwater resources (Huang and Cai 2009), water resource vulnerability is decomposed into resources stress (RS), development pressure (DP), ecological security (ES), and management challenges (MC). The first three are linked to the parameters of exposure and sensitivity in the conventional definition of vulnerability, while the last is linked to adaptive capacity. Sullivan (2011) considered the resource stress component to be the supply-driven aspect of water vulnerability, and the other three components to be the demand-driven aspect of water vulnerability.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_77-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Define the system

Define the problem and choose the scales

Select vulnerability analytical tool/model

Identify, define, evaluate screening indicators and sub-incdicators based on the literature survey and expert judgment

Data collection ( primary and secondary sources) and triangulation

Redefine the indicators and sub-indicators based on data availability

Operatrionalize the model: weighing, normalization, indexing

Vulnerability assessment (current assessment and scenario development)

Contribute to policy level decision making and evaluation or modification of adaptation plans

Fig. 1 Framework for water vulnerability assessment

Steps in Vulnerability Assessment Figure 1 shows a schematic outline of the water vulnerability assessment framework (modified from Hamouda et al. 2009; Gain et al. 2012). The first step is to define the water resource system that defines the biophysical and socioeconomic components. The second step is to define the problems in the system and choose the scale. Major water-related problems include the degree of water scarcity for different sectors, water pollution, erosion, upstream deforestation, land degradation, upstream and downstream conflicts, food insecurity, and incidence of poverty. Spatial scales can range from the whole basin or sub-basin to watershed, community, or individual levels; temporal scales decide whether the study is a monthly, seasonal, annual, or long-term assessment. The selection of spatial and temporal scales depends on the nature and scope of the work. Page 4 of 23

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_77-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

The third step is to select an appropriate analytical tool or model. There are more than 50 models available for water vulnerability analysis (Plummer et al. 2012). The most suitable model for the study should be selected and modified based on the nature of the problem to be addressed. The next step – identifying and defining the indicators of vulnerability – is a very important part of the analysis. Vulnerability is a complex concept and cannot be measured directly. It has to be represented using a combination of proxy indicators and variables, even though this does not represent it fully (Brenkert and Malone 2005). Sullivan and Meigh (2005) defined an indicator as a statistical concept that provides an indirect way of measuring a given quantity and state and allows for current assessment and comparison over time. According to Vorosmarty et al. (2000), the indicators should be relevant to the issues, policy relevant, analytically and statistically sound, understandable, and easy to interpret. There are two approaches to indicator selection: firstly, from the literature, using inductive or deductive approaches, and secondly, from expert judgment (Hinkel 2011). After the list of indicators and subindicators has been developed, the data collection can proceed. Stakeholder’s participation and field visits are important for triangulation. After the data has been compiled, the indicators should be redefined based on the data availability. The indicators are then normalized and entered into the vulnerability model. Finally, the model is run, the results are interpreted, and policy recommendations are made.

Application of the Vulnerability Framework to the Koshi River Basin The water vulnerability assessment framework (Fig. 1) was applied to the Koshi River basin at district scale. The aim was to identify the vulnerable districts and the biophysical and socioeconomic factors contributing to basin vulnerability and to use this to recommend location-specific adaptation strategies that can help policy makers to evaluate or modify existing policy options for adaptation management strategies for water resources (Babel et al. 2011). The individual steps in the assessment are described in the following.

Defining the Koshi System and the Problem The Koshi River basin is a transboundary basin which originates in the southern area of the Tibetan Plateau in China, passes through Nepal from north to south, and then crosses the northern part of Bihar in India before joining the Ganges. The basin can be broadly divided into four geographical regions (Fig. 2): the Transhimalayan region, which consists of six counties in Tibet Autonomous Region of China (>3,500 masl); the mountains, comprising five mountain districts in eastern Nepal (3,500–8,000 masl); the mid-hills, comprising 11 mid-hill districts in Nepal (1,000–3,500 masl); and the Terai (plains area), comprising 11 Terai districts in Nepal and 16 districts in Bihar state in India (1) 26 (3)

Nepal (Koshi) 18 (6) 24 (1) 19 (8)

Pakistan (Upper Indus) 21 (>1) 4 (>1) 37 (3)

24 (11)

32 (8)

54 (8)

laborers worldwide come from HKH countries and many of them from mountain regions (Banerjee et al. 2011). This was reflected in the HICAP data, which showed that off-farm employment has become a popular livelihood strategy (see Table 2). In 2010 households in India received remittances from abroad of 55 billion USD, 51 billion in China, 9.4 billion in Pakistan, and 3.5 billion in Nepal. Migration is a challenge, but as a source of social and financial remittances, it also provides benefits (ibid.). Not only does it help to fulfill basic needs (e.g., food), but it can also support people to recover from disaster (reconstruct houses and rebuild livelihoods after floods), prepare for disaster (invest in irrigation in drought areas, boats in flood areas), and adapt to climate change (purchase drought-resistant seeds or technology). In HKH migration is a highly engendered process (up to 40 % of males absent) and leads to feminization of agriculture and the whole mountain economies. The drudgery on women increases and negatively affects agricultural outputs, time allocation for food preparation, and caring of children and livestock. Especially if migrants are in poorly paid employment, remittances do not compensate for the missing male workforce and the money is not sufficient to employ laborers – so people are at risk to be less food secure than before. In contrast, if remittance earnings are good and women become the de facto heads of households, they tend to take better decisions for child nutrition and spend more on education and health of children. But often enough then agriculture is abandoned. Nowadays agriculture is perceived as a “socially demeaning occupation” in the region, meant for the illiterate (Hoermann et al. 2010, p. 7). The shift from subsistence to market orientation and out of agriculture shows this change in values. Agriculture as it used to be is not viable anymore, and in many places it does not provide income to fulfill material needs and health and education requirements.

Adaptation Options to Improve Food Security in HKH Nowhere else in the climate change discourse is the issue of adaptation more present than in food production and security. Here also a trend from single technological solutions toward structuring adaptation along the value chain from production to consumption can be seen (Douglas 2009; Jhoda 1996) to tackle institutional, structural, and economic weaknesses of the food system. One reason is that the need to develop innovative forms of production and distribution or storage has been recognized. Integrative approaches such as the food-water-energy nexus (Rasul 2012) are also recommended to address the high interdependence of food, water, and energy security. Even though climate change adaptation has not much been investigated through the gender lens, women’s contribution in agriculture and as food managers is more and more recognized and investigated (Krishnaraj 2006; Rao 2006). Farmers are struggling to maintain availability in food security in the context of climate change and environmental degradation. The perceived changes are also reflected in adaptations in the Page 7 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_103-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 3 Applied coping strategies by households in three river basins (in percent, in the last 10 years) HICAP PVA Coping strategy Given up planting certain types of crops (livestock) Introduced new crop or livestock varieties Changed grazing practices Changed farming practices, e.g., delayed sowing/ harvesting Taken on new off-farm activities/migrated for work Farmland was left fallow/farming abandoned HH invested in irrigation (community investment) Community invested in irrigation HH invested in disaster preparedness Community invested in disaster preparedness Have done nothing

Eastern Brahmaputra (India) 15 (2) 11 >1 14

Koshi (Nepal) 16 (9) 17 7 15

Upper Indus (Pakistan) 22 (18) 30 16 33

23 3 6 4 10 3 76

15 11 7 3 5 1 51

20 6 2 9 13 9 4

investigated river basins, where the research showed that coping practices are applied (see Table 3). Most common is the change in farming practices (21 %): delayed sowing (especially paddy) and harvesting but also resowing of crops such as maize, barley, buckwheat, or vegetables. Traditional staple crops such as paddy, maize, or wheat are given up (18 %), and livestock varieties such as cattle and goats are abandoned by 10 % of households. The percentage of adaptations in disaster preparedness and irrigation also shows that people mostly move forward individually. Communities expressed the need for systematic support to develop community strategies in water and disaster management. Because farmers lack knowledge and resources, a large number of households have not applied any strategies. Adaptation, defined as “an adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (IPCC 2001), is found in forms of very different sets of strategies in the literature on HKH to spread or transfer risk and improve food security. The adaptation approaches can be divided into holistic approaches that remain rather general and combine different adaptation strategies (integrated farming system approaches, farming flexibility, institutional innovation, etc.) and the specific ones that have been evaluated or piloted and often are described as complementary with other options to be effective (climate-resistant crop varieties, crop insurance and microfinance schemes, water storage and harvesting infrastructure). Many issues are already taken up by institutions such as the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), but open questions for policy makers remain which to prioritize, how to identify and disseminate the best simple low-cost technologies, and how to reach the most vulnerable groups with low capital profiles. Six categories of adaptation options were identified, which will be introduced in the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Information and knowledge management Institutional and social innovation Modification of agricultural practices Water resource management Financial security (crop insurance schemes, microfinance, etc.) Livelihood diversification and integrated approaches

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_103-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Information and Knowledge Management Participatory information management aims at capacity building of farmers and wants to train “climate managers” whose knowledge will be based on agroclimatic zones, climate models and simulation in the form of weather forecast, agro-advisory services, and the establishment of mini agro-met observatories (Pande and Akermann 2008). Information such as market developments and specific weather codes, which recommend farming practices based on conditions of droughts (drought code) or floods (flood code), can be communicated through these risk managers, cropweather watch groups, or village knowledge centers (Swaminathan and Kesavan 2012). In addition participatory management of resources (collective vegetable planting, breeding crop varieties with desirable properties of stress resistance, management of forests) and indigenous knowledge (bio-farming, water conservation, etc.) can establish climate-resilient farming systems. However, before information management can take off, knowledge management is required. As long as research is producing data that is of high uncertainty and not shared or coordinated, how can risk or climate managers be provided with adequate information? Coordinated research and databases are suggested. A cross-regional database on land use, demography, infrastructure, water resources, and best practices can improve risk assessment for disaster preparedness (Sharma and Sharma 2010). To improve adaptive capacity, disaster management capability of institutions and efficient communication systems and logistics are needed. Coordinated research on early warning systems, refined flood and water level forecasting (GIS), and upgraded flood planning and vulnerability maps are required. Karki (2011) recommends a transboundary IWRM database for Pakistan and the region for long-term documentation and the assessment of climate change impacts and adaptation measures. Research and farmer’s ground realities need to be linked through participation and information backed up by scientific knowledge to increase resilience and improve food security. Having databases is not sufficient; dissemination and access to the information need to be thought out in detail.

Institutional and Social Innovation Institutional and social innovation is one response to the information and communication gap between policy makers, researchers, and farmers. The problem of the high uncertainty of data and predictions, the question of local applicability, and the low reliability of institutions trigger responses such as farming flexibility, redefined social capital, or institutional adaptation. Farming flexibility as a form of adaptation aims at identifying “uncommitted potentialities” in farming systems, using the example of Manang (Nepal) to expand spaces of opportunities and increase adaptive capacity (Aase et al. 2010). The critical question of this approach remains, who is going to or supposed to identify the many different localized potentialities? One form of flexibility can also be the use of new local social institutions (Chaudhary et al. 2012), where participatory setups for agricultural and disaster management are used. Community-based biodiversity management (setting up home gardens, group funds) and participatory plant breeding and variety selection of stress-tolerant crops and livestock are at the center of this approach. As precondition for effective adaptation, institutional flexibility is as much required as on community level (Bartlett et al. 2010). Many autonomous adaption options are available, but building and expanding basic infrastructure at local level will be indispensible such as expansion and refurbishing of irrigation or improvement of water storage infrastructure. Capacity building is needed on all levels to develop parallel strategies for autonomous adaptations and for drafting and implementing effective national adaptation plans. Also “alternative” paths need to be considered. In Chinese agriculture, where conventional approaches dominate, the lack of a redefinition of social capital is described as missed opportunity to enable coping with pressures of modernization; often Page 9 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_103-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

much more conform to sustainable rural livelihoods. “Sharing local knowledge” could become a distinctive form of asset in addition to the other five capital forms (Shiro et al. 2007).

Modification of Agricultural Practices The focus is put on investment in science and technology, and recommendations range from climatefriendly and biodiversity-based organic farming practices to the testing and dissemination of highyielding varieties in the mountains. The investment into fruit tree species that are more resistant to climate stress is suggested as well as the establishment of sustainable agricultural systems and no-regret adaptations that are needed for sustainable development. Bhatt’s (2012) emphasis is put on diversified crop rotations, mixed cropping, integrated agroforestry systems with leguminous crops, and limited synthetic fertilizer usage. Local low water-demanding crops and animals suitable for the climate should be promoted and genetic material be preserved in local seed and grain banks. Other authors recommend high-yielding varieties for mountains (Hussain and Mudasser 2007) and targeted breeding, where genotype selection is based on weather extremes for autumn crops and erratic rain and temperature changes for spring crops (Mall et al. 2006). Aggarwal et al. (2004) base their no-regret adaptations on augmenting production through biotechnology and increased income from innovative agricultural enterprises (value addition). However, the dissemination of high-yielding varieties brings about the risk of an increased amount of fertilizer, pesticides, and water and implies a high environmental risk. Generally, genotype selection and breeding should always be done in cooperation with the local communities. As tree species (Lu et al. 2012) can be more resistant to climate stress than field crops, improve soil fertility, and conserve water and nutrient cycles, planting trees (fruit, fodder, carbon), which is less labor and input intensive, could be one long-term solution for the restructuring of agriculture in HKH.

Water Resource Management Water seems to become the issue for food security in mountains, where infrastructure maintenance and feasibility for the topography are most important factors. The main objective is storage of water through natural and artificial reservoirs. One option is to use existing infrastructure, e.g., reviving of dying springs (based on experiments from Sikkim, India). There micro springs, located in farm fields, were revived and used as source of piped water (through gravity flow), fed by groundwater, and recharged by rainwater and infiltration (Tambe et al. 2012). In order to “capture rain where it rains” (Pandey et al. 2003, p. 53), the development of microcatchments is necessary to make use of available runoff, aiming at extending storage periods (in the Global North harvested water is stored for up to 1,000 days). This includes the restoration of traditional village tanks, ponds, or earthen embankments that still exist, for example, in India, and are often not well maintained (sediments). Treatment of (polluted) rainwater, e.g., through solar filtration, might also be needed along with restoring decentralized facilities or recreating freshwater fisheries. Local cheap and farmer-oriented solutions to water scarcity also need to explore innovative technologies such as roof water harvesting for drinking, shallow aquifers using treadle pumps, fog collection, and micro-irrigation for cash crops (sprinkler, drip irrigation, or bubble irrigation as used in Pakistan). Farming practices need improvements such as soil moisture retention through traditional mulching or new plastic film technologies, and recharge areas of spring and groundwater require protection (restrictions for cattle, closed spring boxes) (Merz et al. 2003). Sharma (2010) and Laghari et al. (2011) follow a broader integrated water resource management approach. Sharma supports an approach that combines simple indigenous structures with large sectoral or multipurpose reservoirs and watershed management. Simple low-cost options such as rainwater harvesting are an important priority to capture water for domestic use (rooftop storage). Page 10 of 17

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Watershed management is needed along with water-conservation techniques for rainwater harvesting and soil moisture storage, which can lead to increased soil infiltration, recharging groundwater. Laghari recommends aquifers for artificial groundwater recharge due to a good storage capacity and reservoir management to solve the problems of sedimentation. Waste water infrastructure and water pollution prevention strategies e.g., in form of legislation are required. In addition green approaches to farming are needed that improve water productivity, promote suitable crops to surface and groundwater and integrate livestock or fisheries to increase value per unit of water. The water issue, supply, demand, and quality management is complex and needs well-planned IWRM with a strong focus on rainwater harvesting and other locally tested low-cost options for the diverse areas in HKH. Policy needs to foster planned adaptation in order to solve issues of irrigation, storage, and maintenance and improve farming practices while meeting the high uncertainty.

Financial Security

Adaptation strategies of financial security that transfer or spread risk are still underexplored. Migration enhances the overall capacity of households to adapt to climate change and can positively influence resilience for those left behind through a reliable flow of remittances. Remittances can enable smooth consumption, positively influencing food security, and often bring back entrepreneurial and agricultural skills as well as nutritional knowledge (Barnett and Webber 2010). However, the loss of labor in agriculture can adversely affect food security, so that channeling of remittances and support in climate-smart investment decisions are needed. Agrawala and Carraro (2010) show how channeled resources (microfinance) at subnational level in Bangladesh have responded to needs of disaster preparedness and the agricultural sector. Microfinance there is targeted at reducing vulnerability to weather and climate risks (water management, agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and health) and contributes to adaptation through supporting the accumulation and management of assets. Critical points remain that microfinance usually targets the economically active poor, has high monitoring and administrative costs, and is not suitable as a long-term solution. In microfinance flood risks and general management of hazards are absent and crop production risks neglected. The Climate Change Cell (2009) has investigated the potential of crop insurance products to strengthen financial security and spread risk in agriculture in Bangladesh (production of yield, price, and market asset). The weather index-based insurance scheme came out as the most affordable and accessible to rural poor and the most practical to implement. However, insurance remains a business and not an income opportunity. Problems to be solved are lack of reliable data on weather patterns, crop yields, and land record systems, lack of insurance consciousness and poverty of farmers, lack of trained personnel, and limited financial resources.

Livelihood Diversification and Integrated Approaches to Adaptation Because often government services are not responsive to climate change threats, livelihood diversification is an important adaptation strategy, which addresses underlying causes for vulnerabilities and can spread risk within agriculture and outside. Macchi et al. (2011) show the need for knowledge on climate-adapted crops and multiple cropping, water harvesting structures, and livelihood diversification options. Because living conditions determine adaptive capacity, flexible incomegeneration strategies are needed along with resilient resource management institutions, enhancement of knowledge and skills, and social capital (Bhandari and Grant (2007) to cope with constraints of insufficient agricultural land, insufficient labor within families, and lack of access to ecological agricultural services.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_103-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

An integrated approach to adaptation (Gurung and Bhandari 2009) needs to be localized. For Nepal tested recommendations included sustainable intensification, considering water management and integrated trainings on marketing and agricultural techniques, livestock health management, and new business models (community-based), including cooperatives and crop insurances. In water resource management especially the rehabilitation of infrastructure (e.g., irrigation canals) was important for growing HVPs. Tree planting (fodder, timber, fruit) through forest user groups and the SALT practice for multipurpose cropping proved to be successful as well. Agricultural livelihoods need to become more resilient, and opportunities in the form of new enterprises (selling milk, etc.) should be explored. Last, climate change needs to be mainstreamed across the institutional landscape, so that it enables the efficient implementation of adaptation activities.

Prioritizing Adaptation Solutions: Disaster Preparedness, Water, and Climate-Smart Livelihoods The analysis of the food security situation in HKH and current trends in climate and agriculture strongly suggest certain priorities for adaptation. The communities already experiment, so do researchers and policy makers in a rather uncoordinated way. Ideally, adaptation is done in an anticipatory rather than responsive way. People should at least be prepared to respond and develop a kind of adaptive thinking. The social acceptability and socioeconomic affordability is one major concern as well as it being endogenous to society and contingent on ethics, knowledge, attitudes to risk, and culture (Adger et al. 2009). A two-pronged strategy is suggested, which supports technologies and actions through planned adaptation based on current trends and needs of communities and upgrades knowledge for autonomous adaptation, strengthening farmers’ overall adaptive capacity and flexibility. It can be seen as a quantum jump to single out priorities for planning adaptation, jointly tackling different dimensions of food security. For policy makers in the HKH region, these should be: Priority List for Policy Makers I. Planned adaptations: 1. Short-term improvements in disaster preparedness (early warning systems, natural protection, and insurance schemes) 2. Adaptations that with a long-term perspective test and upscale options for local large-scale water storage and maintenance 3. Diversification of agriculture with focus on localized climate- and nutrition-sensitive farming II. Supporting autonomous adaptation (contributing to I.1-I.3): 4. Enabling rainwater harvesting on HH level through dissemination of knowledge on simple technologies and quality management 5. Enabling efficient investment of remittances and other income sources in order to increase livelihood security, including access to food and nutrition (social organization/investment) The first priority, a planned adaptation, tackles stability of ecosystems and nutrition and health environments. The projections for extreme weather events, water scenarios, and the high exposure to disaster in many areas in HKH require, first of all, improved risk assessment and disaster management capability to minimize human death, disease, and losses. Therefore, vulnerable areas need to be Page 12 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_103-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

identified and prioritized in planned adaptation (vulnerability, flood, and drought maps), flood forecasting needs to be improved, and early warning systems need to be tested and installed in disaster-prone areas. For flood- and drought-prone areas, insurance systems should be supported and monitored and communication systems (institutional and communities) improved. The second priority is a planned adaption and focuses on availability and stability of food production. The projections and current experiences of reduced water sources, decreased reliability in precipitation, and competition for resources suggest an integrated water resource management strategy, where local water storage is of highest priority, aiming at testing and upscaling large-scale water storage solutions (reviving existing infrastructure, installing aquifers, etc.). Additionally, improved maintenance, increased water productivity (irrigation techniques, crops), and conservation (water sources) should be promoted on district level. The aim is to improve long-term water security for agriculture and other purposes. The third priority is a planned adaptation option that addresses challenges for agriculture such as disaster, water stress, temperature stress, and intensification stress resulting in decreasing productivity and nutrition performance. It tackles the availability and utilization of food and implies a policy reorientation toward climate and nutrition performance of agriculture instead of a profitability-first approach. Livelihood options also need to be evaluated and promoted according to their performance under climate change stress (traditional field crops, cash crops, tree crops, medicinal herbs, livestock, etc.) and nutrition and resource intensity (work, inputs such as water, fertilizer, etc.) and not only based on market value. Because biodiversity is important to spread risk and increase resistance and nutrition security, agricultural policy should discourage the silver bullet philosophy of monoculture cash crop systems in mountains. The integration of local knowledge and innovative approaches of collective management will ensure higher effectiveness and affordability of strategies. More coordinated research, including the compilation of existing techniques, is needed to give recommendations on climate-smart agricultural solutions for mountains. The fourth and fifth priorities support autonomous adaptations and provide an increase in flexibility and adaptive capacity, which will help to achieve priority one to three. On the household level, water scarcity can be reduced with the help of rainwater harvesting technologies. It requires the dissemination of knowledge on simple technologies along with quality management and the provision of access to credit and technology are needed. This priority touches upon all dimensions of food security at household level. The support of social organizations might be useful to initiate installation of water solutions on community level, e.g., during winter. Best practice examples are known from Nepal, where communities jointly invested in infrastructure. The fifth priority aims at enabling autonomous adaptation in the form of making better use of remittances and nonfarm-based income sources in order to increase livelihood security, tackling the dimensions of access to food and better nutrition. Knowledge on investment options and credit facilities need to be provided to encourage people to set up innovative agricultural or nonagricultural enterprises. Education is needed on how to best fulfill nutritional needs with available assets, because higher incomes do not automatically ensure better nutritional practices. Especially women are in need of knowledge of where to invest in order to become more efficient food and risk managers under changing circumstances (disaster management, farm management, nutrition, etc.). If remittances are used for investments in climate-smart agriculture, disaster preparedness (insurance), or irrigation, it can create win-win situations because the farmer, the farming system, and the community might benefit. Also social organization (e.g., water or women self-help groups) can be encouraged to jointly invest in irrigation systems, crop insurances, etc. Appointed climate change managers or knowledge centers could also help in spreading information.

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Overall, a parallel approach of information and knowledge management is needed to fill knowledge gaps on climate-resilient farming systems and mountain nutrition. Information management needs coordinated communication, reliable research results, and proactive governance, whereas knowledge management requires intensified and tested localized research with regard to crop varieties, farming practices, water management, or financial insurance schemes. The final destination should be autonomous learning and exchange and transferability in the form of planned adaptation.

Conclusion The food security situation in the Hindu Kush-Himalayan region is serious, and climate and socioeconomic change pose new challenges to its four dimensions (availability, access, utilization, and stability). This chapter identified adaptation priorities and showed that no panacea exists and a flexible approach should be followed in farming, institutions, and science. Policy reorientation will only be brought forward by well-informed policy makers backed up by research, development, and community support. Only a mixed approach of promoting tested climate-smart technologies and strengthening capacities of farmers (in and outside of agriculture) seems promising in order to spread risk and prepare farmers for the unknown. Adaptation options need to be reevaluated for local circumstances before implementation, and increased flexibility and capacity of institutions and farmers can help mountain communities to handle uncertainty and to spread out as much as possible. Much remains to be done in terms of mainstreaming adaptation to climate change within the national policy-making processes of the HKH countries. Policy makers need targeting, and, to facilitate this, scientific research must be translated into appropriate language, practices, and timescales. Combining planned adaptation and fostering autonomous strategies by making use of scientific and local knowledge can prevent a science-first approach as well as free falling into the unknown transformation state. ICIMOD with the help of CGIAR (Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security) is piloting and developing a concept of climate-smart villages for the mountain areas. It could become a role model for knowledge exchange and strategy development and through that provide an experimental ground for planned adaptation but will need institutional support to out- and upscale climate smartness in livelihood systems to improve food and nutrition security in HKH.

References Aase TH, Chaudhary RP, Vetaas OR (2010) Farming flexibility and food security under climatic uncertainty: Manang, Nepal, Himalaya. Area 42(2):228–238 Abrol IP (1999) Sustaining rice-wheat system productivity in the Indo-Gangetic plains: water management-related issues. Agric Water Manag 40:31–35 Adger WN, Dessai S, Goulden M, Hulme M, Lorenzoni I, Nelson DR, Naess LO, Wolf J, Wreford A (2009) Are there social limits to adaptation to climate change? Clim Chang 93:335–354 Adshead F, Griffiths J, Rao M, Thorpe A (2010) The health practitioner’s guide to climate change: diagnosis and cure. Routledge, London Aggarwal PK, Joshi PK, Ingram JSI, Gupta RK (2004) Adapting food systems of the Indo-Gangetic plains to global environmental change: key information needs to improve policy formulation. Environ Sci Policy 7:487–498 Page 14 of 17

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Agrawala S, Carraro M (2010) Assessing the role of microfinance in fostering adaptation to climate change. Working paper. OECD, Paris Banerjee S, Gerlitz J-Y, Hoermann B (2011) Labor migration as a response strategy to water hazards in the Hindu Kush-Himalayas. ICIMOD, Kathmandu Barnett J, Webber M (2010) Accommodating migration to promote adaptation to climate change. Policy Research Working Paper 5270. The World Bank, Washington, DC Bartlett R, Bharati L, Pant D, Hosterman H, McCornick P (2010) Climate change impacts and adaptation in Nepal. IWMI Working Paper 139. International Water Management Institute, Colombo Beniston M (2003) Climatic change in mountain regions: a review of possible impacts. Clim Chang 59:5–31 Bhandari BS, Grant M (2007) Analysis of livelihood security: a case study in the Kali-Khola watershed of Nepal. J Environ Manag 85:17–26 Bhatt V (2012) Case study India: biodiversity-based organic farming with climate resilient crops. In: Diakonie, Katastrophenhilfe, Brot fuer die Welt (eds) Women farmers adapting to climate change. Stuttgart Chaudhary P, Thapa K, Lamsal K, Tiwari PR, Chhetri N (2012) Community-based climate change adaptation for building local resilience in the Himalayas, In: Netra C (ed) Human and social dimensions of climate change. INTECH Open Science. ISBN: 978-953-51-0847-4, InTech, DOI: 10.5772/50608. Available from: http://www.intechopen.com/books/human-and-socialdimensions-of-climate-change/community-based-climate-change-adaptation-for-building-localresilience-in-the-himalayas Climate Change Cell (2009) Crop insurance as a risk management strategy in Bangladesh. Department of Environment, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Dhaka Cruz RV, Harasawa H, Lal M, Wu S, Anokhin Y, Punsalmaa B, Honda Y, Jafari M, Li C, Huu N (2007) Asia. Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 469–506 Dame J, Nuesser M (2011) Food security in high mountain regions: agricultural production and the impact of food subsidies in Ladakh, Northern India. Food Secur 3(2):179–194 de Schutter O (2012) Women’s rights and the right to food. Report submitted by the special rapporteur on the right to food. Human Right’s Council, New York Douglas I (2009) Climate change, flooding and food security in South Asia. Food Secur 1(2):127–136 Ebi KL, Woodruff R, von Hildebrand A, Corvalan C (2007) Climate change-related health impacts in the Hindu Kush-Himalayas. EcoHealth 4:264–270 FAO (2009) The state of food insecurity in the world: economic crises – impacts and lessons learnt. FAO, Rome FAO (2010) Assessment of food security and nutrition situation in Nepal. FAO, Nepal FAO (2012) Mountains and food security. FAO, Rome Gurung GB, Bhandari D (2009) Integrated approach to climate change adaptation. J For Livelihood 8(1):90–99 Hoermann B, Banerjee S, Kollmair M (2010) Labor migration for development in the Western Hindu Kush-Himalayas. ICIMOD, Kathmandu Hunzai K, Gerlitz J-Y, Hoermann B (2011) Understanding mountain poverty in the Hindu KushHimalayas. ICIMOD, Kathmandu

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Hussain SS, Mudasser M (2007) Prospects for wheat production under changing climate in mountain areas of Pakistan – an econometric analysis. Agric Syst 94:494–501 ICIMOD (2008) Food security in the Hindu Kush-Himalayan Region. ICIMOD, Kathmandu IPCC (2001): Climate Change 2001 - Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. UNEP/WMO Jhoda NS (1996) Enhancing food security in a warmer and more crowded world: factors and processes in fragile zones. In: Downing TE (ed) Climate change and world food security. NATO ASI series, Springer, Berlin, vol 137, pp 381–418 Joshi AK, Chand R, Arun B, Singh RP, Ortiz R (2007) Breeding crops for reduced-tillage management in the intensive, rice -wheat systems of South Asia. Euphytica 153:135–151 Kalra N, Chakraborty D, Ramesh Kumar P, Jolly M, Sharma PK (2007) An approach to bridging yield gaps, combining response to water and other resource inputs for wheat in northern India, using research trials and farmers’ fields data. Agric Water Manag 93:54–64 Karki MB, Shrestha AB, Winiger M (2011) Enhancing knowledge management and adaptation capacity for integrated management of water resources in the Indus River Basin. Mt Res Dev 31(3):242–251 Krishnaraj M (2006) Food security, agrarian crisis and rural livelihoods – implications for women. Econ Polit Wkly 41:5376–5388 XLI No. 52 Kristjanson P, Neufeldt H, Gassner A, Mango J, Kyazze FB, Desta S, Sayula G, Thiede B, Forch W, Thornton PK, Coe R (2012) Are food insecure smallholder households making changes in their farming practices? Evidence from East Africa. Food Secur 4(3):318–397 Laghari AN, Vanham D, Rauch W (2011) The Indus basin in the framework of current and future water resources management. HESSD 8:2263–2288 Lu J, Yufang S, Manandhar S, Ahmad A (2012) The role of tree crops in local adaptations to climate variability – cases in China, Nepal and Pakistan. Centre for Mountain Ecosystem Studies, Kunming Institute of Botany, Kunming Macchi M, Gurung AM, Hoermann B, Choudhury D (2011) Climate variability and change in the Himalayas – community perceptions and responses. ICIMOD, Kathmandu Mall RK, Singh R, Gupta A, Srinivasan G, Rathore LS (2006) Impact of climate change on Indian agriculture: a review. Clim Chang 78:445–478 Merz J, Nakarmi G, Weingartner R (2003) Potential solutions to water scarcity in the rural watersheds of Nepal’s Middle Mountains. Mt Res Dev 23(1):14–18 Murray WJ (2010) Sustainable crop production intensification. In: Burlingame B, Dernini S (eds) Sustainable diets and biodiversity – directions and solutions for policy, research and action. FAO, Rome Nadeem S, Khan MY, Rehman ZU, Iqbal A, Fayaz M, Azam S, Bahadar S (2012) Role of local governance in strengthening adaptive capacity to water stress: cases in Pakistan. AKRSP/ ICIMOD, Kathmandu National Planning Commission (2013) Nepal thematic report on food security and nutrition 2013. NPC, Kathmandu Nautiyal S, Kaechele H, Rao KS, Maikhuri RK, Saxena KG (2007) Energy and economic analysis of traditional versus introduced crops cultivation in the mountains of the Indian Himalayas: a case study. Energy 32:2321–2335 Pande P, Akermann K (2008) Adaptation of small scale farmer to climatic risks in India. Sustainet, Eschborn Pandey DN, Gupta AK, Anderson DM (2003) Rainwater harvesting as an adaptation to climate change. Curr Sci 85(1):46–59

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Quadir M, Sharma BR, Bruggeman A, Choukr-Allah R, Karajeh F (2007) Non-conventional water resources and opportunities for water augmentation to achieve food security in water scarce countries. Agric Water Manag 87:2–22 Rao N (2006) Land rights, gender equality and household food security: exploring the conceptual links in the case of India. Food Policy 31:180–193 Rasul G (2012) Contribution of Himalayan ecosystems to water, energy and food security in South Asia: a nexus approach. ICIMOD, Kathmandu Sharma KD (2009) Groundwater management for food security. Curr Sci 96(11):1444–1447 Sharma KR (2010) Water storage for food security in Nepal. Hydro Nepal 7:35–37 Sharma BR, Sharma D (2010) Impact of climate change on water resources and glacier melt and potential adaptations for Indian agriculture. International Water Management Institute, New Delhi Shiro C, Furtad JI, Shen L, Yan M (2007) Coping with pressures of modernization by traditional farmers: a strategy for sustainable rural development in Yunnan, China. J Mt Sci 4(1):057–070 Singh SP, Bassignana-Khadka I, Karky BS, Sharma E (2011) Climate-change in the Hindu KushHimalayas. The state of current knowledge. ICIMOD, Kathmandu Su Y, Li Q, Fu Y (2012) Diversified livelihoods in changing socio-ecological systems of Yunnan province, China. ICIMOD, Kathmandu Swaminathan MS, Kesavan PC (2012) Agricultural research in an era of climate change. Agric Res 1(1):3–12 Tambe S, Kharel G, Arrawatia ML, Kulkarni H, Mahamuni K, Ganeriwala AK (2012) Reviving dying springs: climate change adaptation experiments from the Sikkim Himalaya. Mt Res Dev 32(1):62–72 Tulachan PM (2001) Mountain agriculture in the Hindu Kush-Himalaya – a regional comparative analysis. Mt Res Dev 21(3):260–267 Zhao J, Chen S, Wan R, Lu T, Wang Z, Zheng K (2013) Status of malnutrition and its influencing factors in children under 5 years old in Guangnan district of Yunnan province in 2009–2010. Pubmed 42(1):67–71

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The Role of National Development Banks in Catalyzing International Climate Finance: Empirical Evidences from Latin America Chiara Trabacchia*, Barbara Buchnera, Diana Smallridgeb, Maria Nettoc, José Juan Gomes Lorenzoc and Lucila Serrac a Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), Venezia, Italy b International Financial Consulting Ltd., Ottawa, ON, Canada c Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, DC, USA

Abstract Significant investments are needed to support the global transition to a low-carbon, climate-resilient future. Unlocking private capital at scale is essential to fill the current financing gap and achieve transformational impacts, but there are several barriers to overcome for this to happen. This study sought to analyze the role that national development banks (NDBs) could play to bridge the financing gap by scaling up private investment. Their knowledge and long-standing relationship with the local private sector places them in a privileged position to understand local barriers to investment as well as risks and opportunities. Drawing empirical evidence from NDBs’ experiences within the Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) region, the study finds that while many NDBs are already piloting an array of financial and nonfinancial instruments to promote and leverage private low-carbon investments, these institutions are at diverse stages of “readiness” to fully promote climate-related programs. Several NDBs still need to build and/or strengthen capacity and acquire experience in the structuring, risk assessment, and monitoring of climate-relevant projects in order to take a more central role in the international climate finance landscape.

Keywords National Development Banks; Low carbon; Climate finance; Private finance; Latin America and the Caribbean

Introduction Climate finance has become a key topic in international climate negotiations over the past years, as it is a critical element to address the global climate change challenge. Large-scale investments are required to support countries’ transition toward a low-carbon and climate-resilient development path (Buchner et al. 2012 based on IEA 2012; World Bank 2010). This has resulted in a developed countries’ commitment to mobilize US$100 billion per year by 2020, to collectively support This chapter is a shorter and adapted version of Smallridge et al. (2013), which was prepared based on the results of a survey, and a series of interviews undertaken between April and July 2012 to 9 (nine) national development banks from the Latin American and the Caribbean region, and a series of workshops and dialogues organized by the IDB over the course of 2011–2012. Several professionals contributed their expertise for the development and review of the research study. *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 20

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developing countries’ mitigation and adaptation needs to respond more effectively to the climate change challenge (UNFCCC 1/CP.16). Annual global support to low-emission, climate-resilient development activities is estimated in the range of US$ 343–385 billion for 2011, about 47 % of which invested in projects in developing countries (Buchner et al. 2012). While this is a start, this level of investment is far from what is required. The IEA (2012), for instance, suggests that over the 2012–2050 approximately US$ 1 trillion each year will be needed to finance incremental investment in the energy sector alone to promote a low-emission growth. Financial resources have therefore to be scaled up significantly to foster a sustainable development pathway and to address mitigation activities and adaptation needs of a world on a path to 4
C temperature increase (World Bank 2012; UNFCCC 2008). Unlocking private sector capital will be essential to ensure large, transformational, and long-term impacts across all economies given that public resources are far too scarce to finance the transition alone, particularly in times of fiscal austerity (e.g., OECD 2012). Increased private sector engagement in these activities will also help to reduce the reliance on international and national public finance in the long run and to seeking out and implementing least cost options for climate mitigation and adaptation. However, efforts to date have not yet been able to mobilize private financing for climate change projects at the scale and speed required (e.g., AGF 2010; The World Bank 2010; Brown and Jacob 2011; UNEP-FI 2009). In practice, it is challenging to align private sector incentives with public goals. Significant questions remain about how to best mobilize private climate investments and how to design riskreturn arrangements that are attractive to private, but also public actors’ investments. International climate finance can play a catalytic role in this regard, and national development banks (NDBs) can help to overcome some of the difficulties. While, until recently, little attention has been paid to NDBs’ role in raising and delivering climate finance, the international climate finance community is increasingly aware of NDBs’ potential to promote and catalyze private climate finance in developing and emerging countries. This growing awareness is also confirmed by, for instance, the establishment of the International Development Finance Club (IDFC), a network of renowned national and subregional development banks with total assets of more than USD 2.1 trillion (see IDFC.org). NDBs can play a potentially crucial role in facilitating climate investments and delivering climate finance directly to investors or by leveraging private capital. Their focus is unique, particularly compared to other national public institutions and international financial institutions intermediating climate finance. NDBs are mandated by their respective governments to support the fulfillment of national low-carbon resilient development goals and plans and have the backing of their governments to do so. Furthermore, NDBs’ knowledge and long-standing relationship with their local markets and institutions places them in a privileged position to understand local barriers to investment and opportunities, thereby favoring the financing of private sector activities. NDBs seem to understand better than many other players the conditions necessary on the ground for long-term investment and can better assemble the financing packages tailored to the needs of domestic investors (authors’ elaboration based on ALIDE et al. 2012). NDBs are already playing a significant role in the climate change finance landscape. In 2011 alone, a selected number of NDBs provided around US$ 42.7 billion in financing to programs addressing climate change, around 55.6 % of the total climate finance distributed by public intermediaries (Buchner et al. 2012).

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The question is: How could they do more and fully harness their potential? More evidence is needed to understand the conditions and the institutional capacities required for NDBs to become more proactive and effective intermediaries in climate finance. This research aims to build knowledge and evidence about the key role of NDBs in the climate finance landscape, and the conditions that would enable them to channeling and leveraging climate finance in the most effective way. Specifically, this research analyzes the leverage potential of NDBs, by looking at their unique characteristics and role in scaling up private sector financing for climate change mitigation projects and programs through the leveraging of international and national climate finance in their respective markets. The study does not specifically assess the role NDBs could play to scale up financing of climate change adaptation due to the complexities associated to what is and what counts as adaptation finance and tracking issues (see, e.g., Terpstra 2013 and Jones et al. 2012). To this end, the study draws empirical evidence from NDBs in the Latin American and the Caribbean region (LAC) – where NDBs have a long tradition and experience in financing private sector investments – by assessing and presenting: • The key features of NDBs (section “Key Features of NDBs to Scale Up Climate Finance”) • The type of financial and nonfinancial instruments at their disposal to promote private investment in low-carbon, climate-resilient activities and scale up climate finance efforts (section “NDBs’ Financial Instruments to Promote Private Finance and Scale Up Investments”) • NDBs’ current involvement in the climate finance landscape – i.e., volume of financial resources committed, dedicated financing programs, and participation in international initiatives – and their level of “readiness,” i.e., of institutional and technical development (section “Overview of NDBs in the Latin American and the Caribbean Region”) • NDBs’ leverage potential (section “How NDBs Can Leverage Private Finance”) A better understanding of these aspects could help NDBs to develop a proactive and efficient strategy for playing a greater role in the international climate finance architecture, in terms of both accessing and leveraging finance from a broader range of sources, and influencing the operational design of future delivery climate mechanisms and channels such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The study concludes offering recommendations on how to fully enable these players to scale up investments to the scale needed. The study adopts a multi-method approach comprising of: (i) a financial survey, (ii) interviews to NDBs, (iii) desk-based analysis, and (iv) a case study approach. It also incorporates insights from a series of workshops and dialogues organized by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in 2011–2012 (see, e.g., ALIDE et al. 2012). The financial survey was undertaken to elicit the main features of NDBs operating in the LAC region. It contained a series of questions aimed to understand NDBs financial and business activities, the instruments used, and their level of involvement in climate financing and tracking of private finance mobilized. The survey was conducted between April and July 2012 to the NDBs’ members of the Latin American Association of Financial Institutions for Development (ALIDE), and targeted nine (9) NDBs involved in climate financing to different extents, and at different stages of institutional development. This sample included the largest NDBs in the region, representing over one-third of the region’s NDBs’ assets and capital. Concerned NDBs are Agencia Financiera de Desarrollo (AFD) (Paraguay), Banco del Estado del Ecuador (BEDE) (Ecuador), Banco de Comercio Exterior de Colombia (BANCOLDEX) (Colombia), Banco de Desarrollo de El Salvador (BANDESAL) (El Salvador), Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) Page 3 of 20

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Development mandate

Public sector entity

Financial institution

Promotes financing and associated market development in underserved sectors

Can interact with different levels of governments and potentially influence policy making

In the business of financing and risk taking, particularly in support of long-term investments

Mobilizer

Project structurer

Risk taker

Works with private financial institutions and seeks to mobilize or attract co-financing

Understands the risks and barriers and can shape and influence the project structure

Can identify, manage, mitigate, and assume risks that the private sector local finance instutions cannot

Incubator and aggregator

International partner Have access to long-term hard currency borrowings and work closely with other development finance institutions

Connector Have connections to all of the relevant public and private sector actors in their sector or areas of influence.

Can develop innovative and catalytic financial instruments and can manage small-scale projects

Fig. 1 The key features of National Development Banks (source: Authors’ elaborations based on, e.g., Smallridge et al. (2012), ALIDE et al. (2012), UN (2006))

(Brazil), Corporación Financiera de Desarrollo (COFIDE) (Peru), Fideicomisos Instituidos en Relación con la Agricultura (FIRA) (Mexico), Financiera de Desarrollo Territorial (FINDETER) (Colombia), and Financiera Rural (FINRURAL) (Mexico). While there is not yet an internationally acknowledged definition of climate finance, the term refers to both public and private. Following Buchner et al. (2011, 2012, 2013) and given the lack of an internationally acknowledged definition, in this study, climate finance refers to both public and private resources targeting low-carbon and climate-resilient development, with direct and indirect greenhouse gas mitigation or adaptation objectives/outcomes. To determine whether an activity qualifies as mitigation and/or adaptation, the study follows the criteria of the OECD-Development Assistance Committee Creditor Reporting System (see OECD 2011).

Key Features of NDBs to Scale Up Climate Finance NDBs are well suited to play a critical role in climate finance by delivering financial resources directly to support climate-relevant projects and programs and/or by leveraging private capital toward this end. This is thanks to a number of characteristics (see Fig. 1 which, based on ALIDE et al. (2012), Smallridge et al. (2012) and UN (2006), presents NDBs’ key features at a glance), which are also confirmed in concrete examples drawn from NDBs’ experiences within the LAC region I. Development Mandate: NDBs are mandated and supported by their respective governments to provide long-term financing to sectors promoting economic and sustainable development, particularly to projects, activities, or sectors of the economy that are underserved by private sources of finance (UN 2006) such as climate-relevant sectors (i.e., energy efficiency and renewable

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energy). By providing capital at terms and conditions generally more favorable than those prevailing on the market, they help to improve the risk-return profiles of climate mitigation projects, thereby enhancing their attractiveness to investors and encouraging low-carbon technologies to scale up. The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) places sustainable development at the core of its operations, which is proven by its significant support to the rollout of the country’s renewable energy, energy efficiency, and deforestation programs (BNDES.gov.br, BNDES 2012). In 2011, BNDES’ disbursements to renewable energy and energy efficiency reached about US$ 7.2 billion (R$ 12.3 billion), 31 % higher than in 2008, making it the largest provider of credit to the country’s clean energy sector (Buchner et al. 2012, IRENA 2012).

II. Public Sector Entity: NDBs have strong relationships with national government and hence can interact with different government agencies and administer nonreimbursable budgetary resources to support national or subnational priority programs, including climate-relevant projects promoted by private sector actors. Because of their involvement and interaction with the financial and nonfinancial private sectors, NDBs can also contribute to policymaking, sharing information about impacts and implementation of various policy options. This is particularly important to create the conditions necessary to scale up climate finance to mitigate climate change and adapt to its impacts. III. Financial Institution: NDBs are in the business of financing and risk taking, particularly in support of long-term investments. Indeed, NDBs are first and foremost financial institutions, often under the same bank supervision rules as commercial banks. They can be mandated to support improvement of financial conditions in local financial markets by “crowding-in” private financial intermediaries into new and innovative areas of investment. IV. Mobilizer: It is typically not in the nature of NDBs to compete. They are expected to complement and “crowd-in” private financial intermediaries by providing appropriate financial and nonfinancial instruments. This role is particularly relevant for leveraging private capital for climate financing. In the fulfillment of their mandate, however, NDBs may also have a reverse effect, “crowding-out” private sector investment or lending. V. Project Structurer: NDBs can promote market development through the provision of additional resources, such as technical assistance, capacity building, and training to project developers, and small- and medium-sized enterprises, to create the demand for financing by helping to develop and structure projects and programs. They also can put together financing packages with terms and conditions in line with local project developers’ needs, taking into account local market specificities. It should be noted, however, that many NDBs still have to develop the capabilities necessary to evaluate, analyze, and structure low-carbon projects (Buchner et al. 2012; ALIDE et al. 2012). In 2006, BANDESAL, the Development Bank of El Salvador established “Empresa Renovable,” a financing program aimed to promote micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprise investments in industrial energy conversion, energy efficiency, and renewable energy (mainly solar PV and small hydro). To incentivize investments, it structured a program entailing:

• A technical assistance grant covering a portion of the costs of feasibility studies and consultancy services to overcome knowledge and capacity barriers • A credit line at preferred terms and conditions to overcome the lack of long-term finance at competitive rates for investment in these sectors (Bandesal 2012)

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VI. Risk Taker: NDBs have long-standing relationships with local private sector financial institutions and hence understand the risks and barriers that these institutions confront when financing underserved sectors. Moreover, NDBs – which generally benefit from governments’ guarantees – can assume certain project risks that private sector entities cannot or will not take, and therefore can draw incremental private capital into projects. This is particularly relevant for renewable energy investors whose central challenge is getting an attractive return for the risks taken. FIRA, a Mexican second-tier development bank, has historically acted as a risk taker, offering guarantee products to tier 1 banks and other financial intermediaries to share the risk of lending, hence facilitating access to credit to local private investors. To overcome private banks’ reluctance in financing renewable energy projects, FIRA’ and the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture’s guarantee fund, FONAGAVerde, covers first-loss credit defaults in renewable energy and biofuel generation projects. Another Mexican development bank, NAFIN, has a guarantee program intended to support credit granting through a capital recovery guarantee for financial intermediaries. In the context of energy conservation, renewable energy, and the environment, the program offers up to 50 % selective guarantee, if certain eligibility criteria are fulfilled (Olade and UNIDO 2011; Rangel 2010).

VII. Innovator and Aggregator: NDBs can aggregate small-scale projects by adopting a portfolio approach when assessing the credit risk and streamlining the application process to minimize transaction costs, to encourage participation of local financial institutions (LFIs). NDBs can develop and incubate innovative and catalytic financial instruments and demonstrate to the private financial sector the potential profitability within these areas. VIII. International Partner: NDBs have access to long-term sources of local and international financing as well as to nonreimbursable resources for development purposes. Multilateral and bilateral development banks, foreign export credit agencies, and also dedicated climate funds use NDBs as financial intermediaries for long-term hard currency loans as well as for the allocation and disbursement of development grants. NDBs can also blend resources at market and concessional terms from different sources. Financiera Rural (FINRURAL), a Mexican Development Bank aimed at promoting the development of economic activities linked to the rural sector, was chosen to channel US$15 million from the Forest Investment Program (FIP), a specialized program under the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) aimed at supporting governments in their efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Through a dedicated financing line, Financiera Rural will help improve communities’ access to finance for low-carbon activities in forest landscapes (IADB 2012).

IX. Connector: NDBs’ linkages with national and international institutions and between public and private actors enable them to easily establish the connection with all of the relevant players involved in financing climate change mitigation activities and programs. NDBs also have close interactions with social and environmental organizations, as well as with civil society, and are thus often more easily accepted as partners than other lending institutions.

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NDBs’ Financial Instruments to Promote Private Finance and Scale Up Investments NDBs’ activities and instruments can address both demand and supply needs for finance to overcome constraints associated to the pre-investment and investment phases, thereby fostering private investments in climate-relevant projects (Smallridge et al. 2009, 2012). In particular, NDBs can apply the tools they have to: • Increase the demand for investments in climate-relevant projects (pre-investment stage) by helping to address sector- and country-specific constraints, promote appropriate and stable enabling environments for investment, build awareness and capacity to analyze and structure climate-related interventions, and bring projects and companies to a state of investment readiness. The focus is to encourage, prepare, and educate project proponents to undertake the investments. • Provide the necessary incentives to mobilize the supply of climate-relevant investments from the private sector (investment stage) by offering financial instruments at adequate terms and conditions for such projects and by supporting private investors and local finance institutions to understand and tackle the specific investment and financial risks and barriers. The goal is to attract capital, both debt and equity. Typical NDBs’ financial instruments to leverage climate finance (UN 2009, Smallridge et al. 2012 and NDBs’ websites) include: i. Grants: Grants can be used for a variety of activities in both the pre-investment and the investment stages. In the pre-investment stage, grants can finance technical assistance activities to help the project or company become investment ready. Assistance may include training or capacity building at the company level, or financing for the preparation of feasibility studies. Grants can also be more widely used for building awareness and national dialogue to strengthen and/or create environments conducive to climate-relevant investments. In the investment phase, grants can lower the interest rate of loans, extend repayment terms/grace periods, or serve as a guarantee fund for losses. These grants can be blended with NDB loans to support projects directly or to channel them via LFIs. The Chilean CORFO (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción) has established a program supporting small and medium enterprises to optimize energy consumption. It subsidizes studies for energy efficiency audits, the implementation of energy efficiency measures, and the preparation of investment plans for submission to a funding source. CORFO covers up to 70 % of the total cost of the consultancy, with a limit of about US$10,000. It also supports renewable energy generation projects by subsidizing preliminary pre-investment studies or specialized assessments for up to 50 % of their total costs, up to a maximum of US$60,000 (CORFO.cl, Duffey 2010).

ii. Tier 1 Loans: Tier 1 loans are direct loans with some or all of the obligor’s credit risk assumed by the NDB. The NDB thus acts like a commercial bank, extending credit directly to a project or a company. The long-term financing can be senior debt, that is, pari passu with other lenders, or subordinated debt, putting the NDB in a role of secondary creditor. In these cases, NDB financing can be blended with concessional funding (grant or low-interest loans) from international partners.

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In the case of Brazil, BNDES has participated on a pari passu basis with commercial banks on a number of large wind projects to attract local and international financing. BNDES and the concerned local commercial bank participated in the transaction based on the same terms and conditions. Because such transactions are too large to be funded by a single finance institution, BNDES provides additional capacity through direct tier 1 loans (BNDES.gov.br).

iii. Tier 2 Loans: Tier 2 loans are loans by NDBs to a local financial institution – typically commercial banks or other financial intermediaries – for on-lending. NDBs take the credit risk of this financial institution directly, which in turn assumes the credit risk of the project. As in the case of tier 1 loans, NDBs can blend their own resources with highly concessional resources obtained from their own government, international sources of public financing, and multilateral and bilateral institutions to improve the terms and conditions of their funding to tier 1 banks. As such, they can offer better loan terms and conditions to project developers. COFIDE the Development Bank of Peru, uses an innovative and unusual channel for financial intermediation for taxis and buses owners that convert their vehicles into natural gas in Lima, namely, local gas stations. The loan repayments are collected via the gas station every time the vehicles are refilled. COFIDE provides tier 2 loans at concessional rates to participating banks. The usage of an existing and secure platform for loans repayment helps to improve the credit risk of individual loans, buying down transaction costs, and allowing wide-scale deployment (COFIDE.com.pe, ALIDE 2011).

iv. Equity: Some NDBs have a mandate to provide equity. They invest in companies and projects directly or via private equity, venture capital, or seed funds. NDBs can be in a first-loss position vis-à-vis other investors, or they can invest alongside other investors. BANCOLDEX Capital, a subsidiary of BANCOLDEX in Colombia, addresses the market gap for venture capital resources by providing equity capital via venture funds managed by a private fund manager (e.g., Progresa Capital, a small venture capital fund focused, inter alia, in alternative energies), rather than investing directly in companies or projects (Bancoldex.com). Often, the NDB investment is seen as an anchor in a fund, drawing additional local and international capital.

v. Guarantees: Guarantees and related contingent liability instruments typically involve a NDB providing credit enhancement to a local finance institution, or another third-party financial intermediary providing direct funding or other investments. The NDB assumes some or all of the credit risk associated with a project that might otherwise prevent investors and/or lenders from providing funding. There are different types of guarantees. Those related to credit risk are most straightforward and generally better understood by market players. Traditional credit guarantees provide unconditional, irrevocable assurance to a third-party lender that principal and interest will be paid when due in the event the borrower is unable or unwilling to pay. Such guarantees normally cover less than 100 % of the borrower’s payment obligations. Many of the larger finance institutions in Peru have significant exposure and experience in financing hydropower projects and, for internal risk reasons or existing regulations, may have reached their limits in this sector. COFIDE provision of loan guarantee would allow local financial institutions to transfer the risk of financing, thereby promoting investment in the hydropower sector.

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Another example is CORFO’s capital guarantee and risk capital fund in support of clean energy and energy efficiency projects. This instrument was introduced in 2009 within the bank’s Non-Conventional Renewable Energy program to address the specific investment risks of wind, solar, geothermal, and other renewables. In the case of capital guarantee funds, the instrument applies to both CORFO-funded projects and self-funded projects, up to a total of US$7.5 million.

vi. Management of Funds: In some instances, NDBs are asked to manage funds on behalf of other entities. In these cases, the NDB is not using its own resources, but rather capital provided by a third party – such as the national government or a foreign donor – managing it for a fee. As a public sector entity which acts within the financial sector, a NDB is an attractive player to take on this role, given its skills, expertise, and reliable systems. BNDES is the manager of the Amazon Fund, created in 2008 to raise donations for nonreimbursable investments aimed to prevent, combat, and monitor deforestation in the Amazon. In addition to managing the fund, the Bank also raises funds, selects projects, and monitors their progress after they have been contracted. The Bank is also the trustee of the Brazil National Fund on Climate Change, which was created to finance mitigation and adaptation projects and to support studies on climate change and its effects. The Fund is funded via a special tax on the profits made in the oil production chain; other contributions are collected from public, private, national, and international donors (UNDP 2011).

Table 1 summarizes how NDBs’ instruments can be deployed to meet the needs described both in the pre-investment and the investment stage. During the pre-investment phase, grants or financial contributions can meet technical assistance needs, e.g., capacity building, developing expertise in the preparation and assessment of climate projects, undertaking feasibility and environmental impact studies, and designing and implementing systems for monitoring and reporting results. During the investment phase, there are two elements in the capital structure to advance investment meeting private actors’ needs: debt and equity. On the debt side, the NDB can provide a tier 2 loan if local financial institutions struggle to offer long-term debt for climate projects. Depending on the expected cash flow from the project, the loan can be at market or concessional rates. The latter are, generally, preferable for climate projects to increase the competitiveness of “clean” fuels in comparison to fossil fuels in energy generation. In other cases, the project or company might require the NDB to offer a tier 1 loan, possibly alongside commercial banks on a pari passu basis or on more generous terms, such as longer tenors or lower interest rates to improve the repayment profile of commercial bank debt. The NDB could also provide a guarantee to bear the risks that the private sector is not willing or able to bear. Similarly, the NDB can help the equity structure by providing additional equity on equal or more favorable terms.

Overview of NDBs in the Latin American and the Caribbean Region

To bring evidence on NDBs’ current level of involvement in the climate finance landscape, this section presents insights gathered from the nine (9) NDBs of the Latin American and the Caribbean region ad hoc surveyed. The survey and dedicated discussions held (see ALIDE et al. 2012) highlighted that NDBs have been increasingly integrating climate change considerations into their core operations and become more active in financing climate change interventions. This goes hand in hand with the growing

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_104-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 NDBs’ instruments to address needs to enhance effectiveness of climate finance Phase Preinvestment phase

Climate finance needs Technical assistance

Investment phase

LFI needs funding LFI needs funding/projects needs subsidized interest rates Project needs additional capital Project needs additional subsidized capital

Technical assistance Financial contribution

Climate finance activities Policy development and capacity building Demand creation Feasibility study/project preparation Debt

Project needs early stage cash flow room LFI needs risk sharing Projects needs capital Project needs equity Project needs additional equity to draw in additional investments

Equity

NDBs’ financial instruments Grants Grants Partial grant or reimbursable contribution Tier 2 loan market terms Tier 2 loan subsidized interest Tier 1 loan market terms Tier 1 loan subsidized interest Tier 1 longer tenor/grace period Guarantee Mezzanine debt Equity market terms Equity first-loss position

Source: Authors’ elaborations based on, e.g., UN (2006), Smallridge et al. (2012), NDBs’ web sites

realization that NDBs have a critical role to play in channeling funds toward low-emission projects and programs. Buchner et al. (2012) estimate that NDBs in the LAC region contributed at least USD 15.2 billion in 2011, which is about 20 % of the 2011 total commitments of the Development Finance Institutions captured by Buchner et al. (2012). The contributions of NDBs in the LAC region are likely to grow as governments increasingly involve Development Banks to promote the structuring and financing of mitigation and adaptation projects in an effort to cover the incremental costs of these projects with funds at more favorable terms and conditions. This entails funding their participation in financing and technical assistance programs with multilateral development banks (MDBs) in order to acquire the technical and financial support needed to fulfill this new mandate (ALIDE 2011). This is, for instance, highlighted by NAFIN’s role as the trustee of the Climate Change Fund recently established by the General Climate Change Law in Mexico, as well as the initiatives under development in two Caribbean islands, Saint Lucia and Jamaica, within the adaptation-focused window of the Climate Investment Funds (CIF 2011, 2012). The engagement of these NDBs helps create the institutional framework necessary to channel the Funds’ resources to local private entities (e.g., small and medium enterprises and farmers), thereby enabling them to undertake climateresilience-building measures. Table 2 provides an overview of the products offered by the nine NDBs surveyed. According to survey responses, some banks are tier 2 only (AFD, BANCOLDEX, COFIDE, FINDETER, and FIRA), while others (BEDE, BANDESAL, BNDES, and FINRURAL) can lend directly to projects (tier 1) or indirectly via LFIs (tier 2). Nearly half of them offer guarantees and other contingent facilities. Technical assistance is an important product for six of the nine NDBs, but only three approved financing in the past three years. Investment of equity, either directly into projects and companies or via funds, is provided by four of the nine banks. Page 10 of 20

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All nine NDBs are involved in climate financing, albeit to different extents, using various instruments, and at diverse stages of “readiness” for actively promoting climate-related programs and activities. For example, AFD Paraguay has only recently become involved in this area, contributing US$220,000 in 2011 for a small reforestation project. Considering Paraguay’s commitment to addressing the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, and the recent kickoff of a dedicated UN program (UNREDD + National Program), AFD Paraguay has an increasing role to play in the forestry sector. Other NDBs have already accessed, or are about to access, international climate funds from bilateral and multilateral entities. BANCOLDEX and FINRURAL, for example, will receive – through the IADB – international public climate funds, including US$50 million and US$15 million from the Climate Investment Funds, respectively. BANCOLDEX will receive funds from the CIF’s Clean Technology Fund (CTF) to finance two programs, one to convert the public transport system in Bogotá (US$40 million) and another to promote energy efficiency measures in hotels and hospitals (US$10 million). FINRURAL, which has financing instruments in place tailored to support the rural sector, will also channel resources from the Forest Investment Program (FIP) in 2013 to local communities, through credit lines dedicated to low-carbon projects in forest landscapes. BANDESAL and FIRA accessed bilateral funds from KfW, Germany’s leading Development Bank. With this bilateral funding, BANDESAL supports “Empresa Renovable,” while FIRA – under the framework of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – has financed on a zero-return basis the early stages of implementation of a Programme of Activities (PoA) aimed at facilitating the capture and utilization of methane emitted from the anaerobic digestion of wastewater and/or sludge in relevant agro-industries in México. KfW also provided its expertise to develop FIRA’s capacity in structuring such programs. In addition to KfW, FIRA has established strategic alliances with several national and international specialized partners to capitalize on their expertise in the development of long-term sustainable projects while improving its knowledge about environmental issues. Among these alliances are the United Nations Environment Program, its Finance Initiative, and the Sustainable Energy Finance Alliance (UNEP-FI 2012; ALIDE 2011). To incentivize green investments and address their specific financing needs, all nine NDBs have dedicated programs and instruments in place to finance climate-related projects. With the exception of AFD Paraguay, all offer climate finance on more favorable terms and conditions compared to their conventional credit activities. BNDES, for example, has supported renewable energy projects at interest rates 1.4 % below those practiced for coal or oil thermal plants, and with longer repayment terms (16–20 years versus 14 years for conventional plants). Moreover, BNDES maximum financing participation for renewable sources varies between 70 % and 90 %, while for coal or oil thermoelectric plants is capped at 50 % (IDFC 2012).

How NDBs Can Leverage Private Finance By channeling national and international sources of funding into country-driven climate change mitigation activities through various financial instruments, and their comparative advantage to other intermediaries more distant from the market, the potential of NDBs to leverage public and private sector resources appears significant. To our best knowledge, no published work exists so far on the leverage potential of NDBs. It is in fact complex to aggregate the true volume of financial flows from these institutions to private Page 11 of 20

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investment in climate-relevant activities, as also noted in IMF (2011). Also, while there is broad agreement on the need to leverage private sector involvement (see, e.g., IMF 2011; AGF 2010), there is no single, universally applicable definition of this term, or methodology to calculate leverage ratios. There is uncertainty about how best to quantify its extent, as this term has different meanings in different contexts and to different people (Buchner et al. 2011; Brown and Jacobs 2011). Furthermore, the leverage factor is not only dependent on the instruments being used, but can vary considerably according to the barriers being addressed, the country/region where the investment takes place, and the specific project characteristics (see Brown and Jacobs 2011). The nature of the intermediary delivering climate finance also impacts the level of leverage potentially achieved. In financial terms, leverage refers to the ratio of equity to a blend of debt. Financial institutions such as MDBs measure it as the ratio of public to private cofinancing, as they aim to understand and demonstrate the multiplier effect generated by their contributions. Given that private finance represents the lion’s share of the climate finance landscape (Buchner et al. 2011, 2012) and that it is the source that needs to be incentivized and scaled up to achieve the required funding to finance climate change mitigation and adaptation interventions, this study defines leverage as “the process by which private sector capital is ‘crowded-in’ as a result of the use of public sector finance, and of the financial instruments deployed by public financial intermediaries.” This definition builds on Brown and Jacobs (2011). It is difficult to estimate a specific and sound leverage ratio for NDBs. Few of them consistently track and measure the amount of private sector capital mobilized as a consequence of their activities. This is even more complex in the context of climate finance. However, a look at their advantages and disadvantages compared to those of MDBs indicates the scale of the catalytic effect generated by NDBs. Case studies analysis can also help to shed light into this. NDBs have a variety of financial instruments at their disposal to facilitate low-emission, climateresilient investments, many of which are the same as those available to MDBs, but the conditions under which they are provided are different. Building on the methodology developed by the United Nations’ High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF 2010) to calculate the potential leverage effect exerted by public financing instruments used by MDBs, the study derives the leverage effect that could potentially be exerted by NDBs in LAC. Table 3 compares the MDBs and NDBs leverage factors of various financing instruments, some of which are generally available to NDBs, but for which no analysis on the use of them by MDBs has been conducted (and therefore N/A is listed in the MDBs column). The leverage factor assumes that the only private capital directly mobilized comes from other financiers, such as local financial institutions. The leveraging potential triggered by a combined set of instruments has not been considered. Tier 1 loans (both concessional and non-concessional) apply the same leverage factor that has been proposed for MDBs, as there is no reason to believe that the ability of a NDB to draw private capital to projects is any better or worse than that of a MDB. MDBs will have a better credit rating for foreign currency loans, which may entice foreign banks to lend alongside of them. However, for local finance institutions working in local currency, NDBs could have a similar level of leverage. In terms of equity, leverage is assumed to be higher for NDBs than MDBs. NDBs typically focus on local funds and often act as anchor investors. These funds will then invest in a number of smaller projects in early stages of development. NDBs can draw other institutional investors into the funds, and these, in turn, can draw coinvestors into projects and companies. MDBs tend to work alongside offshore equity providers and can opt for direct investments in larger and relatively more established projects. Sometimes, MDBs will also invest in funds, but the rationale is that local investors will rely more on NDBs to provide a signal or a demonstration effect. Page 12 of 20

√ √ √ √ √

√ √

X √ √ √ √

√ √ X X

√ X √

√ X √ X X

X *

X *

X X

√ X

*

X

X √

√ √ X X √ X √

X X X √ √

Other contingent Other Guarantees facilities X X X X X X

X X

X X √ X √

Direct equity X X

Equity

√ X

√ X √ X √

Equity into funds X X

√ √

X √ √ √ √

Management of funds √ √

X √

X X X X √

Cofinance with other funds X √

Source: direct reporting from the NDBs, as of April 2, 2012 Note: TA, technical assistance; LT, long term; ST, short term Note: (*) since 2012, with the introduction of the Ley del sistema financiero Para el desarrollo, BANDESAL, can provide tier 1 loans. Through May of 2012, no tier 1 loans had been granted. The bank has also recently established a credit line for tier 1 renewable energy generation projects

NDBs AFD Banco del Estado (BEDE) BANCOLDEX BANDESAL BNDES COFIDE Financiera Rural FINDETER FIRA

Tier 2 loans (via LFIs) √ √

Grants/ TA X √

Tier 1 loans (direct) LT investments ST working loans capital loans X X √ X

Table 2 Instruments offered by the surveyed Latin American NDBs

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_104-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_104-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 3 Comparison of MDBs and NDBs leverage factor Category of instrument Tier 1 Non-concessional debt Debt financed via grants Tier 2 Non-concessional debt Debt financed via grants Tier 1 Direct equity Equity financed via grants Tier 2 Direct equity Equity financed via grants Guarantees at non-concessional rates Guarantees financed via grants

MDBs theoretical leverage factor 2–5 x 8–10 x N/A N/A 8–10 x 20 x N/A N/A N/A 20 x

NDBs theoretical leverage factor 2–5 x 8–10 x 1x 4–8 x 12–15 x 20 x 12–15 x N/A 4–8 x 25 x

Source: Adapted from AGF 2010; Brown and Jacobs 2011 N/A, no data available

As for guarantees, the leverage factor depends on the type of guarantee offered, but in all cases it is reasonable to expect that a NDB’s leverage factor exceeds that of a MDB (i.e., NDB guarantees will be less likely to be called; thus, less capital needs to be allocated) for two main reasons: (a) the NDB can more readily anticipate – and possibly even influence – host country factors, which could impact, directly or indirectly, the likelihood of a guarantee being called, and (b) by operating directly and solely in the host country, the NDB intimately understands local market conditions and the potential impact such conditions may have on the credit quality or commercial performance of a climate-related project. NDBs’ proximity to local finance institutions and local private actors thus suggests that their ability to leverage is equal to or potentially better than that of MDBs for the same instruments.

Leverage Effect by LAC NDBs At the end of 2011, NDBs in the LAC region had outstanding assets of nearly US$1 trillion and a capital base of US$100 billion, which combined with their capacity to leverage resources makes them unique players in scaling up private investments for climate change mitigation. Table 4 shows the nine NDBs sampled and the size of their capital, assets, and annual business volume for 2009–2011. The banks analyzed in Table 4 represent over one-third of the LAC region’s NDB assets and capital. Five out of the nine banks sampled have systems in place to track how much private finance is being leveraged by their operations, BNDES, COFIDE, FINRURAL, FINDETER, and FIRA, but the majority lack system for specifically monitoring, reporting, and verifying climate investments. The information provided suggests that these institutions look at leverage in terms of cofinancing. For instance, BNDES reports an average multiplier of about 1.4 times its own contributions for its general operations (based on data from 2009 to 2011). Following the same approach, COFIDE estimates that its tier 2 loans mobilize an additional 20–30 % more from private sources. Commercial banks generally finance up to 60 % of project costs, while the remainder has to come from other private capital. FIRA estimates the relative share of their lending to individual borrowers to be, on average, 54 % of their entire portfolio (over 2009–2011). An average of 31 % has to come from commercial banks, while the remaining from other sources, including other development banks and external sources.

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Table 4 Capital, assets, and annual business volume of the sampled NDBs, 2009–2011 (in US$ millions) NDBs US$ million AFD Paraguay Banco del Estado Ecuador BANCOLDEX Colombia BANDESAL El Salvador BNDES Brazil COFIDE Peru Financiera Rural Mexico FINDETER Colombia FIRA Mexico

Capital base 2011 101

Total assets 2011 275

Annual business volumes (approvals) 2009 2010 2011 43 82 110

247

1,239

741

885

927

694

3,069

2,449

2,677

2,828

198

575

213

212

291

32,526

333,099

72,186

96,322

82,716

804

2,005

824

1,039

1,570

2,128

2,174

1,854

1,738

1,928

0.444

3,380

1,029

1,046

1,368

4,687

7,104

7,986

8,331

7,935

Source: direct reporting from the NDBs, as of April 2012

Case Study: NAFIN’s Role in Leveraging International and National Public Climate Finance To shed light on the leverage potential possibly exerted by NDBs, this case study presents how international public climate finance channeled through NDBs can be deployed to mobilize private finance toward public objectives. Nacional Financiera (NAFIN) has become a key partner in the implementation of the Mexican government’s low-carbon development strategies and for accelerating private investments in low-carbon technologies in the country. Engaging the private sector in low-carbon financing has been a particular challenge in Mexico where, in addition to sector-specific issues (e.g., high investment needs, technology-specific risks, banks’ lack of relevant expertise, and high risk aversion), access to credit and the relatively underdeveloped size of the financial sector are major structural barriers in the local economy (IADB 2011a, b). These factors result in a lack of adequate financial instruments to support the renewable energy sector, which results in high interest rates, high transaction costs, a need for large amounts of collateral, and an unexploited renewable energy potential. Within Mexico’s Country Investment Plan, endorsed by the Clean Technology Fund Trust Fund Committee in 2011, these barriers were tackled through international financial and nonfinancial support to structure financing solutions such as the Renewable Energy Financing Facility (REFF) (IADB 2011a, b). This facility was established within NAFIN to fill the financing gap through the provision of: (a) direct loans to project developers, with maturities in the 10–15-year range, and fixed interest rates, to finance the construction of new renewable energy projects (final terms and conditions for borrowers will depend on the characteristics of the project, its internal rate of return, and its risk profile), and (b) contingent credit lines to cover transitory cash flow shortages during the Page 15 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_104-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 2 The estimated leveraging effect of CTF-REFF and NAFIN (source: Authors’ elaboration based on IADB (2011a, b))

project life cycle (e.g., due to lower than expected energy generation, energy demand, or prices) up to the volume needed to service senior debt (IADB 2011b). NAFIN was chosen because of its privileged position for channeling – directly or indirectly – international resources, along with its own resources, to local players (i.e., other financial intermediaries or project developers), ultimately enhancing the overall leverage impact of the international funds. The program aimed to leverage the US$70 million of the Clean Technology Fund concessional resources, with at least US$70 million that would come from IADB cofinancing from an existing credit line and a similar amount from NAFIN’s own resources (see Fig. 2). NAFIN would then leverage the overall total (minimum) amount of the US$210 million facility at the project level by catalyzing private capital. Since a single project is not entitled to receive more than US$10 million of the resources of the Clean Technology Fund, and no more than 50 % of its total investment needs from the facility, these conditions aim to maximize the leverage effect as well as the number of projects financed. The IADB estimates that at least US$1.19 billion–US$1.54 billion will have to be mobilized to cover the investment costs of the projects financed by the facility (IADB 2011a, b). This amount is estimated considering a total 1,000 MW of installed generation capacity and investment costs of US$2–2.5 million per MW, assuming an equity to debt ratio of 30/70 (IADB 2011b). NAFIN is key to make this happen, as it is in charge of project selection, demand stimulation, and the structuring of financial packages appealing to local project developers and tailored to their needs. The risk-sharing arrangements put in place between NAFIN and borrowers will be critical for unlocking financing, as developers depend on the off-takers’ credit qualifications. NAFIN was a natural partner for the IADB for the execution of this program, given the long relationship between the two and the fact that NAFIN supports private sponsors in the financing of projects with climate change mitigation objectives. NAFIN has proven to be a solvent institution with adequate risk management systems and practices in place. NAFIN has established a sustainable Project Directorate, a unit dedicated to supporting climate-related projects, which received technical assistance from the World Bank. NAFIN has already experience in structuring the financing of wind energy projects, which will likely constitute the majority of the projects supported under the REFF. In fact, it has already supported the financing of the EURUS and the Piedra Larga wind farms in the region of Oaxaca, which are also part of the overall CTF investment plan. By executing the REFF program, NAFIN’s capacity in the preparation, assessment, evaluation, and monitoring of risks in this type of project is expected to be further strengthened. In turn, this capacity and know-how can also then be extended to the local banking system. Local finance institutions that take part in projects will develop their own capacity, familiarize themselves with the risk management and financing requirements of these projects, and develop the institutional capacity Page 16 of 20

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required to handle them. This can help to unlock their financing potential ultimately boosting renewable energy investments in the country by exploiting their ability to reach a wide group of interested recipients.

Conclusions To support the global transition toward a low-carbon, climate-resilient future, there is a pressing need to scale up investments in climate change mitigation. As public financial resources cannot finance this transition alone, unlocking private capital is essential. International and national public funds are critical to mobilize private climate finance by taking on the classes of risks and costs that the private market will not bear. A number of key features unique to NDBs make them well placed to play a significant role in supporting the transition by acting as intermediaries or sources of climate finance. Their proximity, knowledge, and long-standing relationship with the private sector put them in a privileged position for accessing local financial markets and understanding local barriers to investment. NDBs’ services and range of instruments can help to tackle the specific investment and financial obstacles that prevent private actors from engaging in low-carbon projects, thereby promoting private investments. The study shows that their ability to leverage is equal to or potentially better than that of MDBs for the same instruments. Nevertheless, many NDBs are at different stages of the learning curve for supporting climate finance efforts. Many require technical assistance to develop the capacity needed to assess, analyze, and structure green investment projects. This was also highlighted by the result of the survey conducted with nine NDBs operating in the LAC region and the discussions had in dedicated forum (see ALIDE et al. 2012). The survey, in particular, highlighted that NDBs in this region are already piloting the use of dedicated instruments in support of climate change mitigation investment, both at the investment and pre-investment stage, and have significant potential for leveraging national and international public and private resources. At the end of 2011, surveyed NDBs in the region had outstanding assets of nearly US$1 trillion and a capital base of US$100 billion that, combined with their capacity to leverage resources, makes them unique players in scaling up private investments for climate change mitigation. However, the following actions are deemed necessary to enable these players to more effectively scale up private investments: I. Enhance the dialogue between national policymakers and NDBs to promote an active role of NDBs in delivering international climate finance. While in several countries such as Brazil NDBs have a clear government mandate to promote national climate change mitigation programs, most lack such mandate and are rarely involved in the design of such programs. Their advice is also rarely considered for the design and functioning of new climate finance mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund. To fully harness the potential of NDBs in climate finance, there is the need for considering NDBs’ experience and advice for the design and functioning of new climate finance mechanisms, and further use NDBs as vehicles to manage and channel climate finance resources. II. Encourage NDBs to develop readiness strategies for international climate finance mobilization and intermediation. NDBs are at distinct stages of institutional development to operate in new areas of financial practice, such as climate finance. While some like BNDES already have the capacity to be active in climate finance, others still need to develop and strengthen their Page 17 of 20

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capabilities in this area. To strengthen NDBs’ participation in climate finance, a clear mandate and support from their respective governments, as well as by increasing interactions with relatively more developed regional, national, and international financial institutions such as MDBs. To become credible and reliable intermediaries and access international climate funds, they must also develop the capacity for monitoring, reporting, and verifying climate investments and their environmental benefits. This requires NDBs to develop considerable capacity. III. Build knowledge about best practices of NDBs in climate finance. A better understanding of effective funding sources and channels and the catalytic potential of different instruments can provide lessons to the international climate finance community on what works and what does not, informing the design of existing and emerging financing mechanisms, and helping governments to spend their limited financial resources more effectively. Given the ongoing efforts in the design of the Green Climate Fund, there is a window of opportunity for NDBs to feed lessons from their own financing practices on the ground and experiences with the private sector, thus influencing the future of climate finance. Assigning NDBs a key role in mobilizing and intermediating international climate finance increases the potential to achieve climate and development goals. Targeted efforts to address a number of issues and themes could substantially improve the capacity of NDBs to make gamechanging contributions to the international climate finance landscape.

References Banco de Desarollo de el Salvador (BANDESAL) web site at http://www.bandesal.gob.sv/ https:// www.bandesal.gob.sv/portal/page/portal/INICIO/SERVICIOS/GUIA/GARANTIAS/BMI_REC ONVERSION_INDUSTRIAL. Accessed June 2013 BANDESAL (2012) Empresa Renovable. Rauda I, Fuentes F and Corno R Smallridge D, Gomes Lorenzo JJ, Ratinger MP (2012) Public development banks addressing the challenges of financing climate change mitigation. Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC. http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2012/11265.pdf BNDES (2012) The role of BNDES in fostering sustainable development, power point presentation, June 2012. Available at http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/Institucional/ Press/Noticias/2013/20130711_maio.html Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) web site at http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/ bndes_en/Institucional/Social_and_Environmental_Responsibility/support_for_social_environmental_projects.html. Accessed June 2013 Brown L, Jacobs M (2011) Background note: leveraging private investment: the role of public sector climate finance. Overseas Development Institute, London Buchner B, Brown J, Corfee-Morlot J (2011) Monitoring and tracking long-term finance to support climate action. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and AIE, Paris Buchner B, Falconer A, Hervé-Mignucci M, Trabacchi C, Brinkman M (2011) The landscape of climate finance. CPI report, Oct 2011 Buchner B, Falconer A, Hervé-Mignucci M, Trabacchi C (2012) The global landscape of climate finance. A CPI report, Venice. http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-ofclimate-finance-2012/ Climate Investment Funds (CIF) (2011) Strategic program for climate resilience St. Lucia, PPCR/ SC.8/5, Cape Town Page 18 of 20

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Climate Investment Funds (CIF) (2012) Strategic program for climate resilience Jamaica, PPCR/ SC.9/6, Washington, DC Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO) web site at www.corfo.cl Corporación Financiera de Desarrollo S.A. (Cofide) web site at www.cofide.come.pe Duffey A (2010) Opportunities and domestic barriers to clean energy investment in Chile, IISD. Bali to Copenhagen trade and climate change project, Washington, DC FIRA website at: http://www.fira.gob.mx/Nd/index.jsp High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF) (2010) Work stream 7 paper: public interventions to stimulate private investment in adaptation and mitigation, New York Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (2011a) IADB Public sector CTF proposal, Mexico renewable energy program, proposal III, Washington, DC Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (2011b) CTF renewable energy financing facility (CTF-REFF). ME-L1109 Public Information Document, Washington, DC Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (2012) Mexico, FIP/IADB Program financing low carbon strategies in forest landscapes, IADB public sector FIP proposal, Washington, DC International Development Finance Club (IDFC) (2012) Work plan 2: leverage private and public funds position paper on leverage of public and private funds, Germany International Energy Agency (IEA) (2012) World energy outlook 2012. OECD/IEA, Paris International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2011) Mobilizing climate finance. A paper prepared at the request of G20 finance ministries. http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/110411c.pdf International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (2012) Financial mechanisms and investment frameworks for renewables in developing countries, Abu Dhabi Jones L, Mitchell T, Villaneuva PS, Standley S (2012) Coding and tracking adaptation finance: lessons and opportunities for monitoring adaptation finance across international and national scales. http:// www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7821.pdf Latin American Energy Organization (Olade) and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) (2011) Observatory of renewable energy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Mexico: final report product 3: financial mechanism Nacional Financiera (NAFIN) web site at http://www.nafin.com/portalnf/content/productos-yservicios/programas-empresariales/proyectos-sustentables.html Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD) (2011) Handbook on the OECD-DAC climate markers. OECD, Paris. http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/48785310.pdf Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD) (2012) Development: aid to developing countries falls because of global recession. http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3746, en_2649_37413_50058883_1_1_1_37413,00.html Rangel H (2010) Financiamiento para proyectos de energía renovable. México: taller cambio climático, energías renovables, eficiencia energética y finanza (20 y 21 de mayo 2010) Smallridge D, Claes W, de Olloqui F (2011) A health diagnostic tool for Public Development Banks. Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC Smallridge D, Buchner B, Trabacchi C, Netto M, Gomes Lorenzo JJ, Serra L (2013) The role of national development banks in catalyzing international climate finance. IDB-MG-148 Terpstra P (2013) The difficulty of defining adaptation finance. World Resources Institute. http:// www.wri.org/blog/difficulty-defining-adaptation-finance The Latin American Association of Development Financial Institutions (ALIDE) (2011) Intervención del las IFD en el financiamiento a proyectos medioambientales. Informe Técnico

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The Latin American Association of Development Financial Institutions (ALIDE) et al (2012) The role of national development banks in mobilizing international climate finance. summary notes of a dedicated workshop hold in Washington, DC. 18, 19 Apr 2012. http://events.iadb.org/calendar/ eventDetail.aspx?lang¼en%26id¼3472 The World Bank and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics (2012) Turn down the heat. Why a 4
C world must be avoided, Washington, DC The World Bank Group (2011) Mobilizing climate finance. Paper prepared at the request of G20 finance ministers. Washington, DC. http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/110411c.pdf The World Bank (2010) World development report 2010: development and climate change, Washington, DC United Nations (UN) (2006) Rethinking the role of national development banks. UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs – Financing for Development Office. http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/ msc/ndb/NDBs-DOCUMENT-REV-E-020606.pdf United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2011) Blending climate finance through national climate funds. A guidebook for the design and establishment of national funds to achieve climate change priorities. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Environment%20and %20Energy/Climate%20Change/Capacity%20Development/Blending_Climate_Finance_Throu gh_National_Climate_Funds.pdf United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI) (2012) Integración de la sostenibilidad en las instituciones financieras Latino Americanas. Énfasis en los aspectos medio ambientales, Encuesta regional, June 2012 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2008) Financing climate change action. Investment and financial flows for a strengthened response to climate change. http://unfccc.int/press/fact_sheets/items/4982.php United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1/CP.16 (2010) Report of the conference of the parties on its sixteenth session. Held in Cancun from 29 Nov to 10 Dec 2010. Part 2: action taken by the conference of the parties at its sixteenth session. Decisions adopted by the conference of the parties. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Linking Social Perception and Risk Analysis to Assess Vulnerability of Coastal Socio-ecological Systems to Climate Change in Atlantic South America J. P. Lozoyaa, D. Condea*, M. Asmusb, M. Polettec, C. Píriza, F. Martinsd, D. de Álavaa, R. Marenzic, M. Nina, L. Anellob, A. Moraesc, M. Zaguinic, L. Marreroa, N. Verrastroa, X. Lagosa, C. Chretiesa and L. Rodrigueza a Universidad de la Republica, Uruguay b Universidade Federal do Rio Grande, Brazil c Universidade do Vale do Itajaí, Brazil d Universidade de Aveiro, Portugal

Abstract Nowadays no other region on earth is more threatened by natural hazards than coastal areas. However the increasing risk in this area is not just a climate extreme events’ result. Coasts are the places with highest concentration of people and values, thus impacts continue to increase as the values of coastal infrastructures continue to grow. Climate change aggravates chronic social vulnerabilities since social groups may be affected differently both by climate change as well as by risk management actions. Relationships between these groups are often characterized by inequality, with different perceptions, response, or adaptation modes to climate hazards. Misperception of these differences often leads to policies that deepen inequities and increase the vulnerability of the weakest groups. Population affected by climatic extreme events increases dramatically resulting in urgent adaptation intervention. We address the interdependence of risk perception and vulnerability of coastal communities and the relevance of ecosystem services for adaptation. We developed a methodology where risk analysis and communities’ risk perception are linked through key actions at strategic points of risk assessment: (i) initial interviews with qualified local informants to complete an inventory of ecosystem services, (ii) a social valuation of ecosystem services by local people, and (iii) assessment of stakeholders’ social vulnerability. This approach allows a truly socially weighted risk assessment to be validated in three sites: Valle de Itajai (Brazil), Estuary of Lagoa dos Patos (Brazil), and Laguna de Rocha (Uruguay). In this novel approach, risk assessment is forced by social perceptions, thus risk treatment can better contribute to realistic adaptation arrangements to cope with climate forces. Public policies could be improved, recognizing healthy functioning ecosystems as key factor for coastal resilience and well-being.

Keywords Ecosystem services; Risk assessment; Social perception; Extreme climatic events; Coastal areas

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 The role of risk assessment in assisting decision-making to prioritize issues and define management options to cope with climate change. Without a quantitative rank of the risks, the decision where to focus management efforts is unfounded

Introduction In the next decades, the global population affected by coastal flooding and other extreme climatic events will increase dramatically, resulting in a growing need for adaptive interventions (Adger et al. 2005). The increasing impact of climate change is exacerbated because the speed of change is uncertain. The implementation of appropriate actions by the various levels of government is difficult because of the uncertainty of timing and magnitude of climate change and also because of the small window of time of the administrative mandate of governments compared to the time required for the climate change to be perceived. There is a need to implement actions to assist in the development of robust and adaptive management to address uncertain future conditions (IPCC 2007). Studies have shown that socio-ecological systems do not generally respond to changes, such as those induced by climate change, in a linear manner. Tipping points, described as the achievement of critical thresholds in the system, manifest themselves only after cumulative effects are reached, thereby producing dramatic fast changes (Westley et al. 2011). The capacity of socio-ecological systems to adapt to external disturbances (e.g., flooding) without shifting to different states is known as resilience (i.e., less vulnerable to external forces) and depends on factors such as biological, institutional, and knowledge diversity. Biodiversity and ecosystem services, especially those associated with wetlands (Boyd and Banzhaf 2007), are natural benefits that people obtain from natural processes (e.g., availability of food and freshwater, protection from erosion, disease regulation, and landscape values) and can be classified as provisional, regulation, support, and cultural services. Ecosystem services are tied to human health, well-being, and ecosystem health and integrity (WHO 2010). The recognition of the key role played by ecosystem services in reducing the effects of climate change is growing worldwide (MEA 2005), although the interdependence is complex and sometimes hidden. Risk analysis framework is accepted to assist decision-making systematically in doing recommendations as a response to risks and prioritize issues where to focus management efforts (Fig. 1) to address human and natural topics with potential impact (Gimpel et al. 2013), like climate change. The risk analysis approach allows to define links between hazards and ecosystem services (i.e., depicting a pathway effect), which can be used to take the best decision during risk management and risk communication (Lozoya et al. 2011; Cormier et al. 2013). Enormous discrepancies are commonly observed in risk definitions, perceptions, and evaluations, mainly between public opinion and scientific perspectives (Figueiredo 2009).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Understanding social perceptions of climate change risks is critical to motivate public support to promote adequate policies. According to Mastrandrea et al. (2006), climate-related risks are commonly perceived by the public as remote, deniable, or manageable, and these misunderstandings must be overcome to motivate support for policy actions (Franck 2009). Risk perception is important because individuals and institutions must be aware and understand climate change as a present threat in order to develop planned adaptation (Burton et al. 2002).

An Interdisciplinary Approach to Risk Assessment Coastal Areas Within the Anthropocene The implications of a changing climate are more significant for coastal areas than anywhere else. No other region is more threatened by natural hazards, including winds, storms surges, large waves, hurricanes, and tsunamis (Kron 2013). However, it is not the natural hazard as such that accounts for the consequences of an extreme event. These hazards are natural processes that have always affected the coastal zone. Natural hazards become disasters only if people are killed or injured and/or their possessions damaged or destroyed. Thus, “catastrophes are not only products of chance but also the outcome of the interaction between political, financial, social, technical and natural circumstances” (Kron 2013). Coasts are not just subject to more intense and more frequent natural events, but they are also the places with the highest concentration of people and values. The impacts and associated costs of these natural hazards to humans continue to increase as the amount and values of coastal infrastructures continue to grow (Shepard et al. 2011; Santoro et al. 2013). Few years ago ca. 3,000 million peoples lived within 200 miles of the sea, which is to say that almost half of our species lives in the coastal zone (i.e., the 10 % of land), bearing densities 2.5 times greater (Tett et al. 2011). This large concentration of population and activities in coastal areas, with its associated effects on the environment, would be part of what a growing number of scientists call a new geological epoch: the Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000). Over the past decades, there has been a significant economic growth worldwide. Although uneven and mainly benefiting developed countries, this growth allowed people to access more resources (including natural resources) and thus have more services. While this has contributed to satisfying more needs, current models of growth and development also generated environmental degradation. This upward trend enhancing general vulnerability makes coastal regions ever riskier. Certainly, the number of natural catastrophes in these areas has been increasing in recent decades (Kron 2013). In this scenario, to achieve a sustainable development (natural, socioeconomic, and cultural) in coastal areas is even more significant. Integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) arises as a strategy that promotes this kind of development, especially after the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, when it incorporates the principles of the ecosystem approach.

Integrated Coastal Zone Management and Risk ICZM strive for achieving a balance between social, environmental, and economic interest in coastal areas, through an approach based on ecosystem-based management, stakeholders’ involvement, and the development of operational tools (Conde et al. 2012). During the last decade, countless countries, governments, and organizations have adopted ICZM as the most suitable policy to effectively address issues and problems in the complex coastal domain. It is seen as the superior course of action to integrate technical, political, and communities’ interests and considers the participation by local stakeholder as an elementary component for a successful management (Christie et al. 2005). Page 3 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 2 Key components of the Risk Management Process (Modified from Australian/New Zealand Risk Management Standard)

As an important component of ICZM planning, the interest in coastal risks analysis and assessment has been growing in the last decade. Risk analysis is internationally recognized as an approach to assist decision-making. It is a systematic way of gathering, evaluating, and disseminating information leading to recommendations in response to an identified risk. It is a tool intended to provide decision makers with an objective, repeatable, and documented assessment of the risks posed by a particular action (Cormier et al. 2013). Yet risk fields are characterized by a certain lack of clarity on many concepts and principles (Aven 2012). Risk analysis has been broadly defined as including risk assessment, risk characterization, risk communication, risk management, and policy relating to risk (e.g., Society for Risk Analysis). However, to many (e.g., ISO, FLOODsite, UNISDR), risk analysis is part of risk assessment and is defined as “a methodology to determine the risk by combining probabilities and consequences.” In turn, risk assessment implies to understand, evaluate, and interpret the perception of risk and societal tolerance and to inform decisions and actions in the risk management process (see Fig. 2). Given this lack of clarity on many concepts and principles, it is essential, when seeking to carry forward researches on these topics, to establish a priori certain terms and common language in order to be sure of being all talking about the same concepts. This lack of clarity may be even more troubling considering that interdisciplinary cooperation between physicists, ecologists, economists, and social scientists is essential in risk management processes. Even the use of English is not already a guarantee, since several terms may be interpreted differently in different countries (FLOODsite 2005). Following previous experiences (e.g., FLOODsite 2005; UNISDR 2009; DEFRA 2011), we agreed on a set of key definitions to be used in our project and in this chapter that are presented in the glossary in Table 1. The set of terms defined in Table 1 present its own particular relationships, which are tentatively depicted in Fig. 3. Key components of the risk assessment method, both addressing the risk on ecosystems and stakeholders derived from climate change hazards, are shown as the central mechanism of an integral risk management process. Ecosystem services are presented as the vital connecting component between end users and ecosystems and human adaptation and ecosystem conservation as the strategies to cope with natural and anthropic hazards.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Glossary developed from previous risk management projects (FLOODsite 2005; UNISDR 2009; DEFRA 2011), establishing main key definitions used in this chapter Concept Acceptable risk Adaptation Consequence Disaster

Ecosystem services Ecosystem service value Engagement Exposure Hazard Impact Inherent risk Qualitative risk assessment Quantitative risk assessment Residual risk Resilience

Response

Risk

Risk analysis Risk assessment

Risk management Risk mitigation

Definition The level of potential losses that a society or community considers acceptable given existing social, economic, political, cultural, technical, and environmental conditions Adjustments in socio-ecological systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities An impact such as economic, social, or environmental damage/improvement. May be expressed descriptively, by category (e.g., high, medium, low) or quantitatively (e.g., monetary value) Serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic, or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources The benefits that people and communities obtain from ecosystems Public’s net willingness to pay for an ecosystem service (economic definition); relative value given by stakeholders to ecosystem services in relation to their well-being (social definition) Where the public and/or stakeholders are asked to directly and actively take part in decision processes, but a public agency/authority is still responsible for the decision Quantification of the receptors that may be influenced by a hazard (e.g., number of people and their demographics, number and type of properties, etc.) A physical event, phenomenon, or human activity that may lead to harm or cause adverse effects. A hazard does not necessarily lead to harm. Can be natural or human induced The effect that a risk would have if it happens Risk arising from a specific hazard before any management action has been taken Describes the probability of an outcome in terms that are by their very nature subjective as the assessment typically assigns relative values to assets, risks, controls, and effects A methodology used to organize and analyze scientific information to estimate the likelihood and severity of an outcome. Objective numerical values are calculated for each component gathered during risk analysis The exposure arising from a specific risk after action has been taken to manage it (making the assumption that the action is effective) Ability of a system, community, or society exposed to hazards to resist, accommodate, absorb to, and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including the preservation of its essential structures and functions Provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety, and meet the basic needs of the people affected The consequence(s) of hazard(s) being realized and their likelihood/probabilities The combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences A function of probability, exposure, and vulnerability. Exposure could be incorporated in the assessment of consequences; therefore, it can be considered as having two components: the probability that an event will occur and the impact (or consequences) of the event Methodology to determine risk by analyzing and combining probabilities and consequences A methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk by analyzing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that could pose a potential threat or harm to people, property, livelihoods, and the environment on which they depend. Comprise understanding, evaluating, and interpreting the perceptions of risk and societal tolerances of risk to inform decisions and actions in risk management process The complete process of risk analysis, risk assessment, options appraisal, and implementation of risk management measures (i.e., risk treatment) The reduction of the likelihood of harm, by either reduction in the probability of hazard occurring or a reduction in the exposure or vulnerability of the receptors (continued) Page 5 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 (continued) Concept Risk perception Risk strategy Risk treatment Stakeholders Susceptibility Vulnerability

Vulnerable groups

Definition Subjective appraisal of people (individual or group) on the characteristics and severity of risk, reflecting cultural and personal values, experience, and acquired information An organizational approach to risk treatment, well documented and accessible Management measures taken to reduce either the probability or the consequences of the hazard or some combination of the two Individuals or representatives of groups who are directly or indirectly interested in or affected by an issue or situation The propensity of a particular receptor to experience harm. Also a condition that increases the likelihood that an environmental component will be exposed to a particular hazard The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system, or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard. Vulnerability is the result of the whole range of economic, social, cultural, institutional, political, and even psychological factors that shape people’s lives and create the environment that they live in Human groups who are prone to show more adverse responses than other groups, given the same exposure

Fig. 3 Flowchart depicting key concepts and terminology related to climate change risk management (and other associated terms), according to the definitions and agreements of the interdisciplinary consortium in charge of this chapter

The Inclusion of Risk Perception in the Integral Analysis of Risk Risk management calls for integrated processes including all the stakeholders affected (e.g., populations, companies, government, and scientists), joining the main principles of ICZM. Disaster prevention could be truly effective only if all of the stakeholders cooperate in a spirit of partnership (Kron 2013). Communication and consultation are highlighted as relevant at each step of the process (see Fig. 2). However, this dialogue must be bidirectional, stressing consultation and not merely information from managers to stakeholders.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

During the last decades, the treatment of public affairs has progressively become more complex. While government agencies maintain significant influence on management, they are just one of multiple actors. In many countries, societies have slowly advanced in the construction of more flexible forms of governance, which are more effective and representative of the interests of diverse social groups. Key factors explaining why new models of governance are emerging include governments’ action seeking to implement policies and programs more cost-effective and equitable as well as social demands, which increasingly influence the decision-taking process. It is extremely important to involve a wide range of stakeholders, particularly scientists with access to detailed knowledge and also those who are most vulnerable and often least consulted. Since climate change affects women and men differently, it is important to consider gender issues such as the unequal power relationships between genders (CEDRA 2012). People’s risk perception is based on the expected number of deaths or injuries but also on how well the process is understood, how equitably the danger is distributed, how well individuals can control their exposure, and whether risk is voluntarily assumed. People rank risks based on three major factors: the degree of dreadfulness of the event (e.g., determined by the scale of its effects and the degree to which it affects innocent bystanders), how well the risk is understood (or accepted as fate), and the number of people exposed (Slovic 2000). It is therefore highly reasonable to search for methodologies that take into account social differences, since social groups may be affected differently both by climate change and by risk management actions. Identifying different interest groups is relevant because they may also have different perceptions, response, or adaptation modes to climate hazards. Furthermore, the relationships between different social groups are asymmetric and often characterized by inequality. Thus, misperception of these differences often leads to policies and actions that deepen inequities and increase vulnerability of the weakest groups (Fig. 4). Modified from Shaw et al. (2005), candidate risk perception indicators to these events include, among others, lives threatened during events, impacts on physical and psychological health, and effectiveness of government’s and individuals’ prevention methods. Although quantification is an essential tool for risk management orientation, the complexity of social/environmental scenarios suggests the necessity integrating the perception of actors and social vulnerability to overcome the merely probabilistic quantification, assuming these are key factors influencing both the final impacts and the adaptive responses.

Fig. 4 Asymmetrical relationships among social groups leading to social inequality and how misperception of these differences increases the vulnerability to climate change of the weakest groups, through inadequate policies and actions Page 7 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Ecosystem Services as a Vehicle for Improving an Integral Approach to Risk During the past two centuries, the dominant paradigm held that natural threats should be managed through better technical protection (Kron 2013). Traditional engineering approaches optimizing for coastal safety are often suboptimal with respect to other functions and are neither resilient nor sustainable. Historically, coastal protection has been based on hard infrastructures (e.g., walls, jetties, and groins) ignoring and even destroying coastal ecosystems that could provide the necessary protective function. Natural coastal ecosystems are critical to human societies, providing a diverse range of goods and services that are vital to our well-being, known as ecosystem services (e.g., Costanza et al. 1997; MEA 2005). While scientists and environmentalists have discussed ecosystem services for decades, the UNEP’s Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005) marked a major milestone in the historical development of the ecosystem services concept. The MEA distinguished four categories of ecosystem services: provisioning, regulating, cultural, and supporting services, while since then several categorizations have been developed concerning biodiversity conservation, integral environmental assessment, or economic valuation. The focus on environmental and resources management through the ecosystem services and their link to human well-being proposed by MEA has been pioneering in environmental research. It becomes much clear to identify how changes in ecosystems can affect human welfare. Damage to natural ecosystems will seriously jeopardize their ability to provide these critical goods and services, causing considerable economic and social consequences. One of the most significant contributions of the MEA has been the introduction of ecosystem services in the sustainability’s global agenda. The modern concept of ecosystem services has progressed significantly in recent decades, incorporating economic dimensions and providing useful information to decision makers for implementing effective conservation policies which support human well-being and sustainable development (de Groot et al. 2010). The real importance of coastal services occurred fundamentally after two recent natural disasters: the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) and hurricane Katrina (2005). Both scientists and press highlighted the role of marshes as buffers in protecting coastlines, as well as their loss as possible explanation of the disaster. Quickly the protective service eventually provided by coastal marshes against extreme storm surge waves became a contentious issue. Thus the protection of ecosystems and the services they provide can form an important part of climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies (Berry 2013). Nowadays, ecosystem-based solutions start to be an important component of collaboration between the hazard mitigation and climate change adaptation research communities (Munang et al. 2013). There is a growing interest in identifying where ecosystem-based approaches can fit into the preparation and response to climate change. The importance of ecosystem protection is increasingly recognized (e.g., EU Adaptation Strategy) highlighting the cost-effectiveness and multiple benefits of ecosystem-based strategies that integrating climate and biodiversity policy can help to meet the challenges of a changing climate ensuring the protection of vital ecosystems. However, concerning coastal risk management programs, natural ecosystems and the services they provide to human well-being have just occasionally been considered. The current practice of risk analysis still focuses on damages that can be easily measured in monetary terms. Hence risk assessment mainly deals with damage to assets, while social and environmental consequences are often neglected; this means that risk treatment frequently only manages a part of the total risk (Meyer et al. 2009).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

A Regional Approach Linking Social Perception and Risk Analysis to Assess Vulnerability of Coastal Socio-ecological Systems to Climate Change A Regional Project and Three Pilot Sites Low-lying coasts in Latin American countries are highly vulnerable to climate variability and extreme climatic events (rain, windstorms and subtropical cyclones, and associated storm surges). The increase of sea level exerts extra vulnerability to low-lying coastal areas already subjected to increasing storm surges and heavy precipitation (Magrin et al. 2007). The coastal area of southern South America is diverse and ecologically stunning, providing a diversity of ecosystems and receiving freshwater from heavily populated watersheds, thus posing substantial risks (Seeliger and Kjerfve 2002). These effects have been shown to cause substantial modifications of the ecosystems’ resources, resulting in social impact at diverse scales since communities and institutions have severe difficulties to deal with such changes. These social, economic, and environmental consequences may be synergistically magnified by climate change. On the Atlantic coast of southern Brazil and eastern Uruguay, low-lying coastal plains formed by sediment accretion, especially during last Holocene period, are susceptible to the effects of flooding and represent a risk to urban areas. Many human groups reveal scarce capacities to cope with further losses of ecosystem services. Although there is an increasing regional recognition of the supporting role played by ecosystem services for human welfare, the perception by communities and managers is still insufficient. Rising sea levels and the increase in frequency and intensity of storms will magnify areas under risk. Coastal vulnerability to climate change has been suggested to generate diverse social and environmental impacts in the region (IPCC 2007). Impacts at diverse social scales are boosted also because regional communities and institutions still lack capacities and integrated management approaches to deal with climatic long-term changes. Nevertheless, because of the relative homogenous regional culture, opportunities to foster cooperation toward an Atlantic Southern Cone integrated coastal management model are assumed to exist (Menafra et al. 2009). An opportunity to join regional efforts to design and implement management strategies requires identifying lessons learned and sharing previously isolated experiences for strengthening impact mitigation of climate change effects. To address these topics at a regional, an ongoing research project is specially addressing the interdependence between risk perception and vulnerability of coastal communities to flooding and other extreme events, as well as their perception of the relevance of ecosystem services in reducing the consequences of climate change. This effort is supported by a grant from IDRC-Canada (106,923-001). Universities from Uruguay, Brazil, Canada, and Portugal strengthened an existing consortium addressing integrated coastal management to enable carrying on this research project. The goal of the study is to contribute to develop resilience to climate change in selected coastal wetland ecosystems and communities of the Atlantic Southern Cone of Latin America, especially threatened by extreme climatic events, and to improve recognition of the role of ecosystem services in coping with and adapting to climate change. Three coastal sites were selected, namely, Valle de Itajai, Santa Catarina; Estuary of Lagoa dos Patos, Rio Grande (in Brazil); and Laguna de Rocha, Rocha (in Uruguay) (Fig. 5). Specific information on relevant socio-ecological features, ecosystem services, and climatic hazards from the three sites are detailed below. Some of the topics now addressed by this consortium have been previously assessed in each of the specific sites, through diverse approaches by coauthors of this chapter. Now, the innovative aim is to develop a regional analysis of these issues, using previous existing information and improving and standardizing the previous experiences, from where to derive lessons learned on a broader scale. Tables 2 and 3 contain comparative listings of major ecosystem services and climatic and anthropic drivers, in the three sites. Page 9 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 5 Map of the coastal zone of Atlantic South America, showing the three sites where this study was carried out: Valle de Itajai, Santa Catarina; Estuary of Lagoa dos Patos, Rio Grande (in Brazil); and Laguna de Rocha, Rocha (in Uruguay)

Itajai Valley, Santa Catarina (Brazil) The Itajai Valley is located in the northern portion of Brazil, being drained by the largest river in the state of Santa Catarina, the Itajai River. Floods in the region in the nineteenth century were recognized as a recurring phenomenon. People migration process and occupation on the banks of the rivers turned the situation more complex because of the intense urbanization process. In the last 30 years, countless lives and material losses occurred from major floods (1983, 1984, 2008, and 2011). Society and government efforts with the purpose of seeking, diagnosing, planning, and implementing actions and nonstructural actions to mitigate the problems have taken place (e.g., regional economic-ecological zoning strategies, municipal master plans oriented by precautionary principles, National Policy on Climate Change). In this context lies the city of Itajai, the most important fishing port in Brazil and second largest exporter of containers. The municipality has an area of 289 km2 and a population of 190,000 inhabitants. It is located in a vast coastal plain in the central portion of the north-central coast of Santa Catarina. Its high urbanization further contributes to economic losses due to flood. The floods of 1983 and 1984 severely affected Itajai, and in 2008 ca. 90 % of the city was flooded. In 2011 the floods affected more than 60 % of the area. To mitigate the existing problems, recent governmental initiatives led to developing models, strategies, and tactics not based on the recognition of local features. There is an urgency of analyzing different low-cost regional planning options, including education, and to propose strategies based on models involving society, governments, and private sector, along a local process of integrated management and governance explicitly recognizing climate change.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Relevant research done at the Itajai Valley includes contributions on major climatic hazards (Polette et al. 2012), present coastal challenges (Ferreira and Polette 2009), main management tasks (Polette and Vieira 2009), and environmental education (Acauan and Polette 2011). Estuarine Region of Lagoa dos Patos, Rio Grande (Brazil) The estuarine region of Lagoa dos Patos, located at the southern Brazilian coast, may be considered as an environmental system with a high ecological, economic, and social importance. Lagoa dos Patos is a coastal system of impressive dimensions. Having an area of 9,913.93 km2, it is classified as the largest coastal lagoon of the “choked” type (with a restricted connection to the sea) in the globe. The estuarine region, approximately limited by coordinates 52
140 4600 W and 31
410 4000 S and 51
580 2400 W and 32
110 5900 S, encompasses important urban centers of the Brazilian southern shore, such as the cities of Pelotas and Rio Grande, as well as a substantial pool of production, transformation, and business activities. In ecological terms, it may be classified as a typical estuary of a transition system between ocean and continent, thus suffering the influence of processes, sources, and controls from both. There is great use, diversity, and density in the water body itself and by the margins of the estuary of Lagoa dos Patos, including urban occupation, port and industrial activities, an important summer resort and tourist activity, as well as environmental protected areas and artisanal and industrial fisheries. These issues are tightly related to impacts by climate change-related events. Recently, new discoveries of important oil and gas fields concentrated in the exclusive economic zone in the southeast region of Brazil – a deep-ocean, subsalt formation known as pré-sal – have generated a big thrust in the sector related to the exploration, refining, and transportation of those energy sources. Similarly, the new and important phase in Brazilian oil production has significantly stimulated the national shipbuilding sector, with ships for oil and gas exploration and transportation, and the development of port areas to provide logistic support to the endeavor. In the estuarine region of Lagoa dos Patos, where the Port of Rio Grande is located, the installation of an offshore naval construction pool has brought a sizeable enhancement to local economy and may generate considerable environmental impacts on estuarine ecosystems. Research done at Lagoa dos Patos, relevant for our proposal, includes studies on socio-ecological effects of climate (Janeiro et al. 2008; Leão et al. 2010) and management (Asmus and Tagliani 2009). Laguna de Rocha, Rocha (Uruguay) The Atlantic coast of Uruguay, which has recorded the increasing trends in temperature, precipitation, and sea level rise, includes four important coastal lagoons with intermittent connection to the ocean, which belong to one of the largest systems of coastal lagoons on the planet, extending northward to Brazil and southward to Argentina. Most of these coastal lagoons are natural protected areas according to national and international agreements like UNESCO-MaB, the RAMSAR Convention, and others. These highly productive systems sustain important traditional artisanal fisheries, provide relevant ecosystem functions such as reproductive and feeding areas for fish and shrimp of commercial relevance, constitute feeding and resting areas for Nearctic migratory birds, and provide habitat for endemic vertebrate and plants species. Other ecosystem services include hydrological control, soil generation and maintenance, buffering of basin contamination, and aesthetic values for ecotourism. Laguna de Rocha is the second largest coastal lagoon of Uruguay and presently the most studied aquatic ecosystem in the country. Land use in the basin (which includes the capital city and nearby tourist seaside towns, with ca. 40,000 inhabitants; up to 80,000 in summer) is mainly extensive cattle rising on natural prairies, but forestry with exotic pines and eucalyptus, artificial prairies, and intensive agriculture have increased 5–10 % in the last decade. These towns commonly suffer Page 11 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 2 Listing of ecosystem services in three coastal pilot sites in Brazil and Uruguay Ecosystem services Itajai Inland artisanal and coastal industrial fisheries

Rio Grande Food supply from industrial and artisanal fisheries and shrimp intense production Water supply (watershed basins) Water for domestic, agriculture, and industrial consumption Riparian services (riparian wetlands Salt marsh services (taking excess taking excess of nutrients and nutrients and protecting the estuarine protecting river margins from erosion) margins from erosion)

Rocha Traditional artisanal fisheries and shrimp natural production Water supply for nearby seaside

Freshwater marsh and salt marsh services (nursery areas, taking excess nutrients and protecting lagoon margins and coastal front from erosion) Organic production of the low river and Organic production of the estuary and Organic production of the lagoon and soil formation (supports productive soil formation (supports multiple soil formation (supports multiple ecosystems like agricultural areas, productive ecosystems like productive ecosystems like extensive marshes, and beaches) low-energy agricultural areas, cattle grounds, marshes, freshwater marshes, sea grass beds and algal macrophyte beds, sea grass beds, and mats, and beaches) beaches) Biodiversity (riparian ecosystem and Biodiversity (freshwater and brackish Biodiversity (freshwater and brackish Atlantic rain forest) wetland and lowlands) wetland and prairies) Cultural spiritual and intellectual needs Attractive landscapes suitable for Astonishing pristine landscape (local people and intensive tourism) recreation and tourism activities offering recreational, aesthetic, and cultural services

Table 3 Relevant climatic hazards and anthropic pressures in three coastal pilot sites in Brazil and Uruguay Climatic hazards and anthropic pressures Itajai Rio Grande El Niño phenomenon (1982/83 The combination of high tides with the and 1997/98) passage of fronts from south can produce First hurricane ever observed in the meteorological tides that can easily South Atlantic demolished over double its heights, producing severe 3,000 houses in southern Brazil storm surges with strong erosion effects Storm surges can block the large estuary water discharge and produce floods during severe rain periods Unregulated urban growth along Recent population increase due to new the Itajai River, demographic port development pressure, poverty, and rural Lack of adequate urban infrastructure migration and services Low investment in infrastructure A myriad of social and economic and services activities going on simultaneously

Rocha Storm surge formation producing coastal impacts Flooding in upstream county city (Rocha city) and coastal villages (La Riviera, Puerto Botes) and cities (La Paloma) Coastal erosion and morphological modification of lagoon’s mouth

Potential touristic development (in nearby La Paloma city) toward the lagoon’s coastal fragile stripe Promotion of urbanization in potentially flooding areas Artificial opening of the lagoon (natural hydrology modification) Intersectoral uncoordination of Improper integrated management to deal Intensive unplanned tourism at the leading agencies and stakeholders with the complexity of the present protected area and lagoon in the region situation Lack of a local management plan and scarce monitoring

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 6 Prospective analysis to identify the most important risks to climate change in three pilot coastal sites along the Southern Cone of Latin America. Without an objective, but socially meaningful, quantification of the risks, the uncertainty of which of them are to be prioritized reduces the effectiveness of the management efforts

flooding events. Traditional tourism is increasing around the fragile sandbar area, and environmental impacts, including eutrophication, coastal erosion, and natural habitat degradation, increased threats to endangered species; loss of scenic values, water quality degradation, and alteration of the natural hydrology can be predicted. The sandbar is opened artificially to reduce flooding of adjacent grasslands used for livestock grazing and to permit the entry of important marine larvae, especially commercial shrimp and fishes. Biodiversity and ecosystem services of Laguna de Rocha and its basin are thought to be heavily threatened by climate change. Relevant research in Laguna de Rocha includes ecosystem services (Nin 2013), effects of climate on ecosystem services (Fanning 2012), and basin management (Rodríguez-Gallego et al. 2012). Prospective Analysis of Risks Derived from the information on the most relevant ecosystem services and hazards in each pilot site (Tables 2 and 3), we performed a prospective analysis to tentatively (and nonquantitatively) identify the major risks to climate change (Fig. 6). As seen, in the three sites, the climate hazard that apparently would impose major effects on ecosystem services and stakeholders is flooding, although due to different causes like precipitation, storm surges, and sea level rise, among others. Changes in wind pattern and induced changes in salinity are also indicated as relevant hazards in some of the sites.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 7 Methodological proposal for integral risk assessment (dotted arrows indicate key points of the framework where social and nonacademic perspectives do feed the risk analysis; colored boxes in 2 show an example of how to link one ecosystem service with its climatic hazards, the ecosystems that support that service as well as the related benefits and stakeholders; red dotted arrows show the rational pathway from hazards, ecosystems, and services to the risk analysis; blue dotted arrows show the rational pathways from stakeholders to the perception analysis) (for abbreviation and other explanations see section “Methodological Development”)

Ecosystem services affected include a large and diverse list where the loss of productive areas both for agriculture and fisheries, as well as for urbanization and industrial development, are highlighted, especially in Itajai and Lagoa dos Patos. Only in Laguna de Rocha ecosystem, natural functions are listed as under thread (sandbar dynamics and hydrology) although in Lagoa dos Patos the loss of wetland areas is also emphasized. Stakeholders potentially impacted by these losses are diverse, from traditional fishermen to port industry, including the tourism sector and poor settlements, among others. Optional management practices to be taken include structural and nonstructural actions, as well as coastal zonation, adaptation of fisheries models and operational port protocols, and environmental education. Nevertheless, this analysis lacks a quantitative approach to enable prioritizing the risks, in order to adequately rank the management options to be adopted. Without objective and socially meaningful risk quantification, the effectiveness of the management efforts is significantly reduced (Dovers et al. 2008). For these reasons and because of the problems arising when risk is analyzed with no support from stakeholders’ interests and opinions, the interdisciplinary consortium carrying on the regional project developed a new methodological framework, taking into account these shortcomings, with the aim of adequately linking the approaches of risk analysis and risk perception (see next section). Methodological Development The proposed framework consists of several steps, from defining critical ecosystem services to be selected for detailed analysis of risk and perception to finally obtaining a socially prioritized set of risks that can help managers to decide where to focus management efforts for adaptation. For the explanation we will follow the schematic depiction showed in Fig. 7. As seen in the scheme and

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

a

CASE 1- Decrease in the provision of a single ES provided by ONE ecosystem (E) affected by SEVERAL hazard*, which intensities (IH1,...,IH 4 ) vary in the different Scenarios (1, 2,..., 6). E IH1

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

Scenario 5

Scenario 6

0,0001

1

0,5

0,004

0,6

0,99

IH2

0,0001

1

0,5

0,7

0,7

0,9

IH3

0,0001

1

0,5

0,03

0,9

1

1

IH4

0,0001

1

0,5

RCE

1

1

1

weighted IH

0,0001

1,0000

D ES

0,0001

1,0000

0,8 1

=F16/3+F17/3+F18/3| 0,5000

0,2447

0,8967

0,7333

0,8967

∗ In these examples, all hazards were considered equal respect to their impacts on each ecosystem (i.e. k =1). CASE 2- Decrease in the provision of a single ES provided by SEVERAL ecosystems (E1, E2, E 3 ) affected by SEVERAL hazards*, which intensities (IH1,...,IH 5 ) vary in the different Scenarios (1,...,4). E E1

E2 E3

ES

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

RCE1

0,1

IH1

0,0001

0,1

0,1

0,1

0,9

0,25

1

IH2

0,0001

0,1

0,25

1

RCE2

0,8

0,8

0,8

0,8

IH3

0,0001

1

0,5

0,0001

RCE3

0,1

0,1

0,1

0,1

IH4

0,0001

0,5

0,25

1

IH5

0,0001

0,5

0,25

0,9

Total RC

1

1

1

1

Scenario 1

Scenario 3 Scenario 4 =(F31/2+F32/2)∗F30|

IH¥RC1

0,00001

IH¥RC2

0,00008

0,80000

0,40000

0,00008

IH¥RC3

0,00001

0,05000

0,02500

0,09500

DES

0,00010

0,90000

0,45000

0,19508

CASE 2- Decrease in the provision of a single ES provided by SEVERAL ecosystems (E1, E2, E 3 ) affected by SEVERAL hazards*, which intensities (IH1,...,IH 5 ) vary in the different Scenarios (1,...,4). E E1

E2 E3

ES RCE1

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

0,1

IH1

0,0001

0,1

0,1

0,1

0,9

0,25

1

IH2

0,0001

0,1

0,25

1

RCE2

0,8

0,8

0,8

0,8

IH3

0,0001

1

0,5

0,0001

RCE3

0,1

0,1

0,1

0,1

IH4

0,0001

0,5

0,25

1

IH5

0,0001

0,5

0,25

0,9

Total RC

1

1

1

1

b

Scenario 2

c

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

IH¥RC1

0,00001

0,05000

0,02500

0,10000

IH¥RC2

0,00008

0,80000

0,40000

0,00008

IH¥RC3

0,00001

0,05000

0,02500

0,09500

DES

0,00010

0,90000

0,45000

0,19508

∗ In these examples, all hazards were considered equal respect to their impacts on each ecosystem (i.e. in all cases k=1, see general equations).

Fig. 8 Examples of the calculation of the decrease of the ecosystem service provision (DES) for different hypothetical scenarios (screen catches from the supporting information http://mcisur.edu.uy/contenidos/Riesgo-Costero/riskexamples.xls)

explained below, there are three entries where social perception feeds the risk analysis: Phase 1 (qualified informants to develop an inventory of ecosystem services), Phases 2–3 (selection of relevant services), and Phase 4 (valuation of services and vulnerability assessment of diverse social groups). Initially, some agreements must be made on several topics and specific strategies to be followed, by the interdisciplinary consortium. For example, on ecosystem services we decided to follow the classification proposed by Fisher et al. (2009) that differentiates ecosystems (i.e., functions) which provide services, which in turn generate social welfare. To classify ecosystem services, we decided to use a combination of classifications including Fisher et al. (2009), the MEA (2005), and Costanza (2008). Another relevant initial agreement is the definition of the spatial extent of the analysis, which in our case, given we had three different sites, included the provisioning area of the services, as well as the affectation and benefits area. The decision also took into consideration ecological management and operability of the project. These initial definitions are open to any kind of agreement, but it is critical to take place before the further application of the framework. The first step of the framework consists of the delineation of an inventory of ecosystem services in the working area previously defined (Phase 2 in the scheme of Fig. 8). This must be done as a cooperative effort between scientists and local stakeholders (Phase 1), to obtain the inventory derived from the existing literature (Phase 1b) for the area, as well as from traditional local

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

knowledge. Even if an inventory developed by the academia do already exists for the location under analysis, a series of interviews to qualified informants (Phase 1a) should be carried out to complete it or at least confirm that no relevant information for the local stakeholders is missing. The inventory needs to link climatic forces (hazards) with ecosystems (and ecosystem functions) affected. Then, based on the ecosystem functions, ecosystem services, as well as their associated benefits and stakeholders, can be listed. The potential links between these sequential elements (climate forcing, ecosystems/functions, services, benefits, and stakeholders) can be quantified, especially those critical links between ecosystems/functions and services, using the categorical method proposed by Maynard et al. (2010) based on expert opinion. When the inventory is defined in its wholeness, a decision on which is the critical set of ecosystem services to be addressed in detail can take place (Phase 2 to 3). It is highly probable that this decision is taken by scientists or managers, but it is relevant that this is done as an artisanal balance taking into consideration not only the scientific opinion by specialized academic staff (e.g., based on climatic scenarios and its potential effect on ecosystems) but also on stakeholders’ opinion (i.e., local traditional knowledge), which will obviously prioritize those critical issues that mostly affect their well-being (influenced by their past life experience and the adaption actions they already made, individually or as a community). Seeking for this balance is not an easy task but represents a critical point where a major effort and time must be placed to enable the rest of the framework to be both ecologically and socially relevant. Considering the amount of connections and the number of links between all the sequential elements of the inventory, for the validation of this methodology, one or at least two ecosystem services must be selected, depending on the availability of information and resources at each study site. After defining these critical ecosystem services potentially affected by climate change, which are also relevant for the local community, the next phase represents the central section of the proposal. Phase 4 corresponds to the risk assessment process, which includes both the risk analysis and the stakeholders’ risk perception analysis. Even both analyses have their own methodologies; they are linked through the valuation of the ecosystem services and the inclusion of the stakeholders’ vulnerability, as detailed below. By modifying the methodological development proposed by Lozoya et al. (2011), a risk analysis (Phase 4 in Fig. 7) has to be performed for each ecosystem service and stakeholder (RESSTK), based on three components: (a) the decrease of the ecosystem service provision (DES), (b) the value of the service (VALES), and (c) each stakeholder’s vulnerability (VULSTK) (see Eq. 1). This calculation gives an estimation of the risk of losing each ecosystem service due to a number of hazards, weighted by the differential vulnerability of each stakeholder associated to the service: RESSTK ¼ DES  VALES  VU LSTK

(1)

It is important to state that some methods included in this phase (e.g., intensity of hazards, valuation, vulnerability, etc.) can be substituted by other specific methods, but it is relevant that these changes are discussed and agreed in advance by the interdisciplinary consortium. Decrease of Ecosystem Service Provision (DES) The provision of the ecosystem service of concern will be affected according to the intensities of hazards affecting the ecosystems involved in that provision. Therefore, the decrease of the ecosystem service provision (DES) is calculated as the summation of the relative contribution of each ecosystem (RCE) weighted by the intensities of the hazards ( IH) affecting each ecosystem (see Eq. 2):

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

DES

E ¼x H ¼n X X IH  RC E ¼ kn E¼1 H¼1

! (2)

where IH is the intensity of each hazard affecting each ecosystem (E) providing the service, n is the number of hazards affecting each ecosystem, and k is a weighting factor that allows incorporating differences in the relative weights of each hazard, in terms of their effects on each ecosystem. The relative contribution (RCE) of each ecosystem to the service provision varies between 0 and 1, being the latter the case where a single ecosystem is responsible for the 100 % of the provided service. RCE can be estimated based on the methodology proposed by Maynard et al. (2010). The intensity of each hazard (IH) affecting the ecosystems can be estimated considering the likelihood of its occurrence (LH) (e.g., recurrence interval or return period, probability of occurrence, etc.) and its consequences on each ecosystem (CSE) (e.g., area reduction, functionality reduction, etc.) (see Eq. 3): I H ¼ LH  CS E

(3)

Given that several hazards can affect one ecosystem at the same time or space (even producing synergies), their intensities are added in a weighted manner in order to obtain the total intensity affecting each ecosystem (weighted IH). Finally, if the intensity of hazards increases, the affectation of ecosystem service provision (AES) will also increase, and therefore the risk of reducing (or even loosing) the ecosystem service will also increase (assuming up to this point that VALES and VULSTK are nonzero) (see Eq. 4).  XE¼x XH¼n I H RESSTK ¼ (4)  RC E  VALES  VU LSTK E¼1 H¼1 k  n In order to illustrate these calculations, two hypothetical cases are presented. Links to the calculations included in each case can be seen and downloaded from http://mcisur.edu.uy/contenidos/ Riesgo-Costero/risk-examples.xls. In Case 1, the decrease of the ecosystem service provision (DES) is calculated for an ecosystem service (ES) that is provided by a single ecosystem (E) (i.e., RC ¼ 1) affected by several hazards (H1, H2, . . ., H4). Weighted IH is the total intensity of hazards affecting the ecosystem, and in this case all of them have the same importance (i.e., k ¼ 1). In this case the affectation of the ecosystem service provision (AES) is equal to weighted IH, since a single ecosystem is providing the service (i.e., RC ¼ 1) (see Fig. 8a below). In Case 2, the ecosystem service is provided by three ecosystems (E1, E2, and E3), each one of them with different relative contributions (RC1, RC2, and RC3) and affected by different hazards (H1, H2, . . ., H5). As in the first case, for each ecosystem providing the service, the intensities of the hazards affecting were weighted (obtaining the weighted IH, again assuming that all hazards have the same importance, i.e., k ¼ 1) and multiplied by the respective relative contribution (see Fig. 8b below). Then, following the main equation presented above, these estimations are added in order to obtain the whole decrease of the ecosystem service provision (DES) for each scenario (see Fig. 8c below). Service Valuation (VALES) and Stakeholders’ Vulnerability (VULSTK) Commonly, an economic valuation of the service is used, based on classical methodology of environmental economics (TEEB 2010; Beaumont et al. 2010). Nevertheless, as part of the methodological development arising from

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

this framework, the interdisciplinary consortium decided to modify this step by replacing the economic valuation by a “social valuation,” i.e., based on the relevance of the environmental service for the stakeholders (VALES). This will be done through the principles of the analytical hierarchical process (Banai-Kashani 1989), where each interviewed stakeholder (or eventually reaching a consensus in cases of small communities or specific cases of homogeneous opinion) define, on a 1 to 9 scale, how much important are different services, from their viewpoint. Eventually, according to the capacities of the project, an economic valuation can be done in parallel, and results compared or analyzed separately. A final step in Phase 4 (see Fig. 7) addresses the vulnerability of stakeholders (VULSTK) involved with each service and hazards. It is clear that some groups are to be more vulnerable in losing a specific service by climate drivers. According to Pizarro (2001), the concept of vulnerability seems to be the most appropriate for understanding the transformative impact caused by increased exposure to risks, allowing centering the discussion on social disadvantages, by focusing on the relationships between (i) the physical, financial, human, and social assets available to individuals and groups and (ii) the set of available opportunities delimited by the market, the state, and civil society. Vulnerability analysis emphasizes on quantity, quality, and the diversity of assets (physical, financial, human, and social) that can be mobilized to address environmental dynamics. In this sense, the differential vulnerability among stakeholders will be quantified combining three subindexes that aim to cover all these dimensions: (a) Index of unsatisfied basic needs (UBNs): developed by United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (UNELAC or CEPAL), this index combines population census information on the condition of households (construction material and number of people per room), access to sanitary services, children attending school and education, and economic capacity of household members. (b) Index of linkage with the ecosystem service: based on a set of indicators, this index, developed by this consortium, will measure how connected are actors with the ecosystem service under study, integrating socioeconomic and cultural dimensions (e.g., livelihood, sense of ownership). (c) Index of risk perception: this index, also developed by the consortium, will assess how vulnerable the population perceives itself against the identified hazards. That will be obtained based on indicators providing data on infrastructures, social cohesion, and economic-productive dimensions. This quantification of the vulnerability will finally allow weighting results of the risk analysis, to be used in the decision process where priorities and issues to be addressed were defined in terms of management, including budget distribution and normative support, among others. In our case, a further phase (Phase 5 in Fig. 7) of the framework will be pursued, which will allow the regional consortium to derive a series of lessons learned and recommendations based on a metaanalysis of the results from the three cases (Itajai Valley, Lagoa dos Patos estuary, and Laguna de Rocha). These three cases represent a regional gradient which allow for an interesting analysis on how the reduction of wetland areas (i.e., the sequence Itajai ! Lagoa dos Patos ! Laguna de Rocha) and their associated services, not only due to climate forces but also due to anthropogenic pressures (e.g., urbanization and industrialization), can impact the welfare of local communities and stakeholders and hence reduce their resilience.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_105-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Perspectives and Conclusions The methodology proposed above derives from an interdisciplinary process lasting several months. Experts from several countries, various academic institutions, and a diversity of disciplines developed and adapted a framework that allows prioritizing different risks associated to climate change, according not only to the impacts on ecosystems but also on their services and the human groups that get benefit from them. The framework will now be tested in the three pilot coastal sites along the Southern Cone of Latin America (Laguna de Rocha in Uruguay and Itajai Valley and Lagoa dos Patos estuary in Brazil). Understanding the link between social vulnerability to climate change impacts and the social perception of the risk, as well as of the relevance of coastal ecosystem services, will be valuable to coastal communities, grassroots organizations, governments, and managers at all administrative levels. Regional recommendations, enhancing coastal communities’ awareness about the importance of wetland ecosystem services mitigating flooding events, could be derived based on the strength of lessons learned on a regional perspective. This consciousness could lead to the improvement of environmental public policies of the region and involved nations. These local communities affected by climate change will be the major beneficiaries through a better local application of more adequate public policies. On a more global perspective, in responding to the need for an improved science-policy and science-society interface to manage coastal systems the most sustainable way, the framework presented in this chapter aims to evaluate in a more realistic way the possible effects of climate forces on ecosystems and coastal populations. For it, perception and valuation of local stakeholders are included from the very beginning as a main component of the risks assessment. Community consultation and the need of bottom-up approaches in coastal management have been highlighted since the 1990s as an essential component of the ICZM process. Yet, participation could be seen as more than a democratic right of stakeholders. Cooperation and true engagement is an important condition for successful management, improving equitability and transparency in processes, avoiding the gap between decision makers and affected communities and thereby the failure of planning measures (Jentoft 2000). This approach is of great importance at present, when climate change aggravates chronic social vulnerabilities, since ecosystem services losses reduce welfare and development opportunities, especially for poorest communities (Malik 2013). On the other hand, considering the relevance of ecosystems and their services to human welfare, as well as its central role in current management and adaptation strategies, it seems essential to place them in the center of the risk management. Thus, this approach may lead to more reliable results in which management decisions can be based on and to improve public policies for better and equitable adaptation strategies, highlighting the central role of healthy ecosystems to cope with climate change.

Acknowledgments We are in debt with the International Development Research Centre of Canada (IDRC-Climate Change & Water Program; Project 106,923-001) and with the Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research (IAI-CRN3038) which is supported by the US National Science Foundation (Grant GEO-1,128,040).

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References Acauan R, Polette M (2011) Educação ambiental como método de intervenção comunitária na gestão ambiental local: o projeto meros do Brasil. Braz J AquatSci Tech 16:31 Adger WN, Hughes TP, Folke C et al (2005) Social-ecological resilience to coastal disasters. Science 309:1036 Asmus M, Tagliani R (2009) The Costa Sul program: integrated coastal management with Latin American applicability. Ocean Yearb 23:345 Aven T (2012) Foundational issues in risk assessment and risk management. Risk Anal 32(10):1647 Banai-Kashani R (1989) A new method for site suitability analysis: the analytic hierarchy process. Environ Manage 13:685 Beaumont N, Hattam C, Mangi S et al (2010) Economic analysis coastal margin and marine habitats. National Ecosystem Assessment, Economic Analysis Report, UK Berry P (2013) Ecosystem-based adaptation: a powerful ally. Sci Environ Policy 37TI:3 Boyd J, Banzhaf S (2007) What are ecosystem services? Ecol Econ 63(2–3):616 Burton I, Huq S, Lim B et al (2002) From impacts assessment to adaptation priorities: the shaping of adaptation policy. Clim Policy 2:145 CEDRA (2012) A strategic environmental risk assessment process for agencies in developing countries. Climate change and environmental degradation risk and adaptation assessment (CEDRA), Tearfund, Teddington Christie P, Lowry K, White AT et al (2005) Key findings from a multidisciplinary examination of integrated coastal management process sustainability. Ocean Coast Manag 48(3):468 Conde D, de Álava D, Gorfinkiel D et al (2012) Sustainable coastal management at the public university in Uruguay: a southern cone perspective. In: Leal W (ed) Sustainable development at universities: new horizons. Peter Lang Scientific Publishers, Frankfurt, pp 873–885 Cormier R, Diedrich A, Dinesen G et al (2013) In: Cormier R, Kannen A, Elliott M, Hall P, Davies IM (eds) Marine and coastal ecosystem-based risk management handbook. ICES cooperative research report: 317. 60 pp Costanza R (2008) Ecosystem services: multiple classification systems are needed. Biol Conserv 141(2):350 Costanza R, d´Arge R, de Groot R et al (1997) The value of the world´s ecosystem services and natural capital. Nature 387:253 Crutzen P, Stoermer E (2000) The anthropocene. Glob Change Newsl 41:17 de Groot RS, Fisher B, Christie M, Aronson J, Braat LR, Haines-Young, Gowdy J, Maltby E, Neuville A, Polasky S, Portela R, Ring I (2010) Integrating the ecological and economic dimensions in biodiversity and ecosystem service valuation. In Kumar P (Ed.), TEEB Foundations, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Ecological and Economic Foundations, Earthscan, London (2010) DEFRA (2011) Guidelines for environmental risk assessment and management: green leaves III. Department for Environment/Food and Rural Affairs, London Dovers S, Hutchinson M, Lindenmayer D et al (2008) Uncertainty, complexity and the environment. In: Bammer G, Smithson M (eds) Uncertainty and risk: multidisciplinary perspectives. Earthscan Publications, London, pp 245–260

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Fanning A (2012) Assessing monetary valuation methodologies for estimating the impacts of climate change in the Laguna de Rocha (Uruguay). Master of Development Economics at Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia Ferreira J, Polette M (2009) The coastal artificialization process impacts and challenges for the sustainable management of the coastal cities of Santa Catarina. J Coast Res 56:1209 Figueiredo E (2009) Entre os actos de Deus e a expertise científica – reflexões acerca da dêscoincidência entre as percepções leigas e as avaliações técnico-científicas dos riscos. Rev Estud Univ 35(2) Fisher B, Turner R, Morling P (2009) Defining and classifying ecosystem services for decision making. Ecol Econ 68(3):643 FLOODsite (2005) Language of risk: project definitions. FLOODsite project: T32:04–01 Franck T (2009) Coastal communities and climate change: a dynamic model of risk perception storms and adaptation. Doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Gimpel A, Stelzenm€ uller V, Cormier R et al (2013) A spatially explicit risk approach to support marine spatial planning in the German EEZ. Mar Environ Res 86:56 IPCC (2007) In: Pachauri R, Reisinger A (eds) Synthesis report contributions of working groups I II and III to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. IP Climate Change, Geneva Janeiro J, Fernandes E, Martins F et al (2008) Wind and freshwater influence over hydrocarbon dispersal on Lagoa dos Patos Brazil. Mar Pollut Bull 56:650 Jentoft S (2000) Commentary – co-managing the coastal zone: is the task too complex? Ocean Coast Manag 43:527–535 Kron W (2013) Coasts: the high-risk areas of the world. Nat Hazards 66:1363 Leão E, Oliveira I, Olinto O Jr (2010) On the dynamics of Mangueira Bay Lagoa dos Patos (Brazil). J Coastal Res 10047:97 Lozoya J, Sardá R, Jiménez JA (2011) A methodological framework for multi-hazard risk assessment in beaches. Env Sci Policy 14:685 Magrin G, Gay C, Cruz D et al (2007) Latin America climate change 2007. In: Parry ML et al (eds) Impacts adaptation and vulnerability contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Malik K (2013) El ascenso del Sur: progreso humano en un mundo diverso. Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano, PNUD, Nueva York Mastrandrea M, Luers A, Schneider S (2006) Changing perceptions of changing risks: climate change and the California public. Woods Institute for the Environment California Climate Change Project, policy brief Maynard S, James D, Davidson A (2010) The development of an ecosystem services framework for south east Queensland. Env Manag 45:881 MEA (2005) Ecosystems and human well-being: synthesis. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Island Press, Washington, DC Menafra R, Conde D, Roche I et al (2009) Challenges and perspectives for integrated coastal management in Uruguay. Ocean Yearb 23:403

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Meyer V, Scheuer S, Haase D (2009) A multicriteria approach for flood risk mapping exemplified at the Mulde river, Germany. Nat Hazards 48:17–39 Munang R, Thiaw I, Alverson K et al (2013) Climate change and ecosystem-based adaptation: a new pragmatic approach to buffering climate change impacts. Curr Opin Env Sust 5:67 Nin M (2013) Mapeo de servicios ecosistémicos en la cuenca de la laguna de Rocha como un insumo para la planificación territorial. Tesis de Maestría en Ciencias Ambientales, Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad de la República (UdelaR, Uruguay), Montevideo, 117 pp Pizarro R (2001) La Vulnerabilidad Social, Una Mirada desde América Latina. CEPAL, Chile Polette M, Vieira P (2009) The strides and gaps in Brazilian integrated coastal zone management: an undercover evaluation of the scientific community, perceptions and actions. Ocean Yearb 23:670 Polette M, Muehe D, Soares M (2012) The challenge of the process of coastal management in Brazil in times of global climate change. In: Glavovic B et al (eds) Climate change and the coast: building resilient communities. Taylor and Francis, London Rodríguez-Gallego L, Achkar M, Conde D (2012) Land suitability assessment in the catchment area of four southwestern Atlantic coastal lagoons: multicriteria and optimization modeling. Env Manag 50(1):140–152 Santoro F, Tonino M, Torresan S, Critto A, Marcomini A (2013) Involve to improve: A participatory approach for a decision support system for coastal climate change impacts assessment. The North Adriatic case. Ocean Coast Manag 78:101–111 Seeliger U, Kjerfve B (2002) Coastal marine ecosystems of Latin America series: ecological studies. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York Shaw D, Huang H, Ho M (2005) Modeling flood loss and risk perception: the case of typhoon Nari (2001) in Taipei poster presented at the 5th annual meeting of the IIASA-DPRI (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis-Disaster Prevention Research Institute) meeting, Beijing Shepard CC, Crain CM, Beck MW (2011) The Protective Role of Coastal Marshes: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis. PLoS ONE 6(11): e27374. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027374 Slovic P (2000) The perception of risk. Earthscan, London/Washington, DC TEEB (2010) The economics of ecosystems and biodiversity: mainstreaming the economics of nature: A synthesis of the approach, conclusion and recomendations of TEEB. Progress Press, Malta. ISBN 978-3-9813410-3-4 Tett P, Sandberg A, Mette A (2011) Sustaining coastal zone systems. Dunedin Academic Press, Edinburg UNISDR (2009) Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, Geneva Westley F, Olsson P, Folke C et al (2011) Tipping towards sustainability: emerging pathways of transformation. Ambio 40:762 WHO (2010) World Health Organization. Retrieved 11 Nov, www.who.int/globalchange/ ecosystems/en/

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Web-GIS Tools for Climate Change Adaptation Planning in Cities Gina Cavana,b*, Tom Butlinc, Susannah Gillb,c, Richard Kingstonb and Sarah Lindleyb a School of Science and the Environment, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK b School of Environment, Education and Development, The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK c The Mersey Forest, Warrington, UK

Abstract This chapter explores the state of the art in existing climate change risk, vulnerability, and adaptation assessment tools, with a focus on web-based tools. It then details the development and application of two online decision support tools created for climate change adaptation planning in cities – a Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Tool and Surface Temperature and Runoff (STAR) Tools. Both are freely available web-GIS tools that can be used to inform policy, strategy, and development. The Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Tool, developed through a collaborative and iterative process, follows the principles of an online public participation GIS. The Assessment Tool delivers GIS data and analysis functions online, widening the possibilities for participation in climate change adaptation planning. The STAR Tools enable assessment of the impacts of climate change on temperature and runoff in a specified urban area and evaluate the potential of green infrastructure as a climate change adaptation response. The STAR Tools can be used to develop “what if” scenarios, to illustrate how changes resulting from different land surface cover and climate change scenarios can impact upon local surface temperatures and runoff. The chapter presents the lessons learned from the development and application of these tools in municipalities across Europe and discusses key challenges for developing such tools to aid effective climate change adaptation planning in cities.

Keywords Climate change adaptation; Urban areas; Climate resilience; Vulnerability; Risk assessment; PPGIS; Web-GIS

Introduction Climate change, causing temperatures and sea levels to rise and an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme events such as heat waves, droughts, heavy rainfall, and storm, presents risks to human and natural systems (IPCC 2014). The IPCC assessment reports confirm that climate change should be addressed by both mitigating the greenhouse gas emissions that are causing global warming and adapting societies to a new climate context to enhance resilience to current and future climate hazards (IPCC 2013, 2014). While mitigation actions have been acknowledged as essential for some time, adaptation has more recently emerged as a central area in climate change research, in country-level planning, and in the implementation of climate change strategies (IPCC 2014).

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Since around 50 % of the world’s population is now urban and with further growth anticipated within cities in developing countries, increasing concern is being raised about the potential impacts of climate change on urban environments and their growing populations and valuable assets. The assessment of climate change risk can help with improving the resilience of urban areas to present climate hazards in addition to providing information to guide adaptation strategies necessary for reducing future risks associated with climate change impacts. Risk can be conceptualized through a framework comprising hazard, vulnerability, and exposure (Crichton 2001). Thus, the assessment of climate change risks can be undertaken through detailed understanding the three components – hazard, vulnerability, and exposure – where: • Hazard is defined as the extent, severity, and probability of the climatic hazard of interest (such as a heat wave or flood event). • Exposure refers to the degree to which elements at risk (such as people or infrastructure) may come into contact with the hazard of interest. • Vulnerability is defined as the susceptibility to damage of the elements at risk (such as people or infrastructure) to a particular hazard at a particular intensity (as determined by the degree of exposure which could occur) (Lindley et al. 2006). Risk assessment with the use of the hazard–exposure–vulnerability framework is useful because it enables consideration of the inherent vulnerability of elements at risk such as infrastructure or populations, rather than focusing on impacts only (Lindley et al. 2006). Identifying where vulnerability is high is central to targeting locations which require climate change adaptation strategies. Adaptation strategies act to reduce vulnerability by lowering exposure and increasing resilience of elements at risk to climate hazards. Thus, where vulnerability is reduced, the risk associated with impacts of climate hazards is significantly reduced (Lindley et al. 2006). Appropriate data, knowledge, and information are vitally important to enable the assessment of climate change-related risks and a prerequisite to identifying city-scale adaptation responses. Spatial data and information in particular can provide the knowledge needed to identify context-specific vulnerability, thereby enabling spatially targeted assessments of risk and implementing appropriate adaptation responses across cities. A web-GIS (or Internet GIS) approach enables delivery of GIS data and analysis functions on the Web through the Internet (Peng 2001). Web-GIS tools therefore enable spatial information to be integrated and readily accessible to a wide range of stakeholders, creating a participatory environment and facilitating collaboration in climate change adaptation planning. This chapter focuses on the development and application of two web-GIS tools to aid climate change adaptation planning, produced as part of the GRaBS Project (see section “The GRaBS Project”). A review of the state of the art in existing online vulnerability, risk, and climate adaptation decision tools was undertaken before the development of the GRaBS Tools began. This review is presented in section “Review of Online Tools for Climate Change Vulnerability, Risk, and Adaptation Assessment.” Sections “The GRaBS Climate Change Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Tool” and “The Surface Temperature and Runoff (STAR) Tools” discuss the development and application of the two GRaBS Tools created. Section “Conclusions: Lessons Learned and Key Challenges” concludes the chapter with a discussion of the lessons learned and key challenges for developing and implementing such tools for climate change adaptation planning in cities.

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Table 1 GRaBS project partners GRaBS project partner Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA)a The University of Manchesterb London Borough of Sutton North West Regional Development Agency and Community Forests Northwest Southampton City Council Provincial Government of Styria Municipality of Kalamaria KU CORPI The Amsterdam City District of Nieuw-West Regional Environment Centre for Eastern Europe Etnambiente SRL University of Catania Province of Genoa City of Malmö a

Location of organization London, UK Manchester, UK Sutton, UK North West Region, UK Southampton, UK Styria, Austria Kalamaria, Greece Klaipeda, Lithuania Amsterdam, Netherlands Bratislava, Slovakia Catania, Sicily, Italy Catania, Sicily, Italy Genoa, Italy Malmö, Sweden

Lead partner, with central management, communication, and administrative responsibility Responsible for developing the Assessment Tool, STAR Tools, and a database of case studies

b

The GRaBS Project The Green and Blue Space Adaptation for Urban Areas and Eco Towns (GRaBS) project (2008–2011) was a network of 14 leading pan-European organizations involved in integrating climate change adaptation into regional planning and development (Table 1). A key emphasis of the project was upon much needed exchange of knowledge and experience and the actual transfer of good practice on climate change adaptation strategies to local and regional authorities. The ten European municipalities involved represented a broad spectrum of authorities and climate change challenges, all with varying degrees of strategic policy and experience. These authorities were required to develop Adaptation Action Plans (AAPs) – documents to help guide adaptation decisionmaking within their organizations. The AAPs were informed by exchanges of knowledge and experience, together with evidence tools delivered by the research institutions to support policymaking, which included a database of case studies (Kazmierczak and Carter 2010) and online climate change risk and vulnerability assessment tools.

Review of Online Tools for Climate Change Vulnerability, Risk, and Adaptation Assessment Prior to designing a web-based GIS tool for urban climate change adaptation assessment, a review was undertaken in 2009 to explore existing vulnerability, risk, and adaptation assessment tools. This review has been updated here to include some more recent examples of tools. A “tool” was interpreted as anything which identified itself as such within the broad climate and adaptation field, found through literature search terms and selected online search engines. Although tools are emerging which attempt to integrate mitigation and adaptation goals, tools focused on mitigation tend not to include strong adaptation elements. There are widely different views on what constitutes a tool for vulnerability and risk assessment and for risk management in relation to climate adaptation. Certain key criteria used in past reviews were applied here in order to ensure that similar tools were assessed. A review conducted for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) refined the definition of an

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adaptation decision tool, specifying that it must have a clear user dimension and the possibility for users to be assisted in the process of evaluating options (Stratus Consulting Inc 1999). In particular it required tools to be able to link adaptation options to impacts and allow an assessment of trade-offs. Tools were also required to have a clear user group, have available documentation, and be applicable at the national, regional, or local scale (Stratus Consulting Inc 1999). While this is a useful definition of an adaptation decision tool, it is also very specific and, subsequently, may be restrictive. For example, applying this definition may exclude some of the useful models or methods subsequently developed, such as the UKCIP Adaptation Wizard (UKCIP 2008). More recent reviews such as Scholze and Wahl (2009) and Garg et al. (2007) apply broader criteria and definitions to adaptation decision tools, allowing inclusion of the most recent developments in adaptation decision tools. For example, Garg et al. (2007) considered tools which tackle both risk and adaptation themes in keeping with the IPCC’s definition of vulnerability: “the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity” (IPCC 2007, p. 883). Garg et al. (2007) analyzed the specific aims and requirements of climate change-related decision support tools for the US Global Change Research Program. The analysis revealed that three core elements were required, as follows: • Climate change policy development should be supported by providing mechanisms through which methods can be evaluated (such as scenario evaluations, integrated analyses, and alternative analytical approaches). These methods should be demonstrated using case studies. • Successful climate change adaptive management and planning requires the development of information and other resources. Resources need to be clearly transferred from a research-based environment to an operational environment. • Assistance is required to help stakeholders prepare appropriate scientific assessments and summaries of information to be used within the decision-making process and as a means to inform other relevant stakeholders as well as the media and the general public. In this context, the IPCC (2007) Fourth Assessment Report indicates that assessments need to be consistent, comparable, and transparent, allow integration, and represent reality as accurately as possible. Given the huge variation in types of tools which could now be considered a form of climate change vulnerability and risk assessment tool, this review attempts a broad categorization of tools and provides indicative examples of each. Tools can be grouped into five key types. A brief introduction to each of these types is presented below, together with a number of exemplars of each type. It is notable that some tools may cut across one or more of these groups (Garg et al. 2007). Integrated Assessment Models are designed to look at a range of impacts and feedbacks in related sectors. However, no models directly dealing with urban climate risk and adaptation themes were found during the research for this review. The five key groups of tools are as follows: 1. Risk and adaptation decision-making frameworks (process orientated): These tools are guidelines to completing risk assessments for the purposes of risk management: they do not actually provide the means to conduct risk assessments themselves. These tools guide users through the decisionmaking framework by using the questions that decision-makers would want to have answered as prompts and provide links to other sources to assist with collecting data to answer questions. Examples include the UKCIP Adaptation Wizard and UKCIP Risk Framework, Climate-ADAPT Page 4 of 27

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2.

3.

4.

5.

Adaptation Support Tool, and the Quality Standards for the Integration of Adaptation to Climate Change into Development Programming (CCA QS, UNDP’s structural framework) (Table 2). Although many of these frameworks are generic and valid for all climate-related risks, some are specific to a single-risk theme and provide guidance and examples pertinent to that theme only. Portals or “platforms”: These provide a gateway to direct users to a set of more specific tools where information and/or guidance for risk and adaptation decision-making can be obtained. Some include the functionality to support limited manipulation or visualization of data from other sources. In general, they do not enable the creation of new data in response to specific user inputs. Examples include the World Bank Climate Change Data Portal and weADAPT (Table 2). The World Bank Portal includes additional tools for visualizing climate data, specifically the Climate Mapper (also a tool in its own right due to not being fully integrated within the host website). Other portals are much more independent from the tools to which they link, as is the case with the Adaptation Learning Mechanism (ALM) as the tools here are provided as links in a separate resource area. General vulnerability, risk, or impact assessment techniques and approaches which can be applied to climate change risk and adaptation assessment: These are more generic methods, including cost–benefit analysis, expert judgment, and scenario analysis (Willows and Connell 2003; Stratus Consulting Inc 1999). Additional tools useful to spatial planners include identifying constraint (or sieve mapping), tipping points/threshold analysis, high-level risk assessments, and decision pathway tools (ESPACE 2008). For vulnerability assessment a range of indicators, methods, and datasets have been produced, for example, the Social Vulnerability Index for the USA (SoVI). Individual computer-based tools usually incorporate one or more of these approaches, e.g., cost–benefit in addition to other assessment elements. High-level or screening models where new data are created based on input datasets from one or more offline models: These would usually provide functionality to allow data to be manipulated and analyzed to provide new information which may be in real time. Examples include the Climate Wizard (Table 2). Given the challenges for hosting very complex tools on the Internet, online tools are usually of this form rather than very detailed models. These high-level models tend to be at national or regional level, with data at relatively coarse scale. Examples include the MIST tool (Table 2). There are few screening tools available below city scale. Detailed models (usually for individual risk themes or sectors) which require considerable data and resource input and often a high level of technical competence: Such sophisticated models take a long time to run and are therefore less suited to online deployment, though they may run on intranet sites. An example is the Met Office PRECIS tool, a scaled-down climate model which takes days or months to process simulations. These tools have an important role to play, since once processing has completed offline, data outputs can be integrated into high-level models or portals. The AUSSSM and ENVI-met are detailed models for understanding urban heat island mitigation options.

Recommendations for a New Climate Adaptation Decision-Making Tool Scholze and Wahl (2009) analyzed the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) of existing adaptation decision-making tools (Table 3), which are particularly valuable to reflect upon before developing a new tool, both to establish technical and functional requirements and to assist with developing the general “look and feel” of the tool. The opportunities highlighted in Table 3, including awareness raising, stakeholder interest to use and apply, customization to local settings, and developing a toolbox of all tools, are useful ideas to progress. Identified threats to be Page 5 of 27

Name/type of tool Purpose Risk and adaptation decision-making frameworks (process orientated) UKCIP Adaptation Wizard A guided five-step process to aid organizations to assess their vulnerability to climate change and aid adaptation planning UKCIP Risk Framework A process based on standard decision-making and risk principles to identify risks, adaptation options and make decisions Quality Standards for the Integration of A framework for best practices to facilitate successful incorporation Adaptation to Climate Change into of climate change adaptation concerns in development projects Development Programming (CCA QS) Adaptation support tool from Climate-ADAPT Assists users in developing climate change adaptation policies by providing guidance and links to relevant sources and tools. Based on the UKCIP Adaptation Wizard and other risk assessment frameworks Portals or platforms World Bank Climate Change Data Portal “One stop shop” for climate-related data and tools. Produces map output, online summaries and links to additional tools weADAPT Portal to a range of tools for assisting climate change adaptation Climate Mapper Maps and visualizes climate model data for onward use by a wider user community to improve vulnerability assessments Adaptation Learning Mechanism (ALM) A knowledge-sharing platform providing an information database of resources on adaptation knowledge Climate-ADAPT The European Climate Adaptation Platform is a portal to a large amount of information and includes tools such as the adaptation support tool, case study search and map viewer General vulnerability, risk, or impact assessment techniques Social Vulnerability Index for the USA A comparative metric that facilitates the examination of geographic variation in social vulnerability and an indicator of disaster recovery Severe Weather Impacts Monitoring System Online data capture tool enabling users to record impacts and (SWIMS) responses to assess vulnerability to severe weather events

Table 2 Examples of climate change vulnerability, risk, and adaptation assessment tools

http://webra.cas.sc.edu/hvri/products/sovi_32. aspx http://www.kent.gov.uk/business/Business-and -the-environment/severe-weather-impacts-mon itoring-system-swims

http://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/

http://www.weadapt.org/ http://www.iagt.org/focusareas/envmon/climat echg.aspx http://www.adaptationlearning.net/

http://www.worldbank.org/climateportal

http://www.ukcip.org.uk/wizard/about-the-wiza rd/ukcip-risk-framework/ https://unfccc.int/adaptation/nairobi_work_pro gramme/knowledge_resources_and_publicatio ns/items/5467.php http://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/web/guest/ adaptation-support-tool/

http://www.ukcip.org.uk/wizard/

Web link

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ENVI-met

Detailed models PRECIS (Providing Regional Climates for Impacts Studies) AUSSSM

MIST (Mitigation Impact Screening Tool)

High-level or screening models Climate Wizard

Enables experimentation with The Hadley regional climate modeling system, including various data output options A numerical model that simulates the urban microclimate and enables analysis of the impact of changes in design parameters on the urban heat island effect Stand-alone fine-scale model which allows the impacts of different types of urban greening on buildings to be quantified

http://www.envi-met.com/

http://ktlabo.cm.kyushu-u.ac.jp/e/UHI/ausssm _tool/ausssm_top_e.htm

http://precis.metoffice.com/index.html

Shows historical and future climate projections for technical and http://www.climatewizard.org/ nontechnical audiences and enables spatial data download Determines potential impacts of different Urban Heat Island (UHI) http://www.heatislandmitigationtool.com mitigation strategies on average temperatures

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Table 3 Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis of adaptation decision-making tools (after Scholze and Wahl 2009) Strengths Capacity-building elements Improved access to climate change information Evidence of entrepreneurial spirit in the tool developer community Good handling of physical aspects very well (but are not as good on socioeconomic factors) Provision of data for nonexperts in an easy to understand format Free, simple to use and open-source tools

Weaknesses Lack of tools designed for the national level Lack of consideration of cross-sectoral interactions Lack of consideration of financial implications (e.g., cost–benefit analysis) Lack of linkage to disaster risk management

Lack of communication of limits and constraints Tools are not always developed with partners and can be donor-centric Assistance with open and transparent decision-making process Lack of monitoring and evaluation Assistance with decision-making process Tools do not handle implementation issues Richness in the diversity of tools serving different needs; all are Online tools depend on good Internet connectivity useful in some way Need more engagement with soft solutions Opportunities Threats Customization to local settings Resources could be wasted if there is too much overlap and poor coordination Stakeholder interest to use and apply tools Oversimplistic tools Creation of a toolbox of all tools Overshadowing of existing tools and policies and creation of “climate bias” Cataloging all tools to see whether new tools are necessary to Competing tools fill gaps Greater coordination/collaboration needed Creation of high-quality tools through links to research and the scientific community Awareness raising (public and data needs) Business opportunities Development of peer review mechanisms Including adaptation and mitigation Capturing of local knowledge Handling trade-offs Identification of tools useful in particular settings and for particular tasks Integration of disaster risk management ideas to ensure valuable knowledge not missed Data quantity/quality transparency and assessment

avoided include the challenge of making tools sufficiently reliable yet easy to use for a wide audience. Further, while online tools enhance access to evidence to support climate change adaptation and decision-making, a key weakness identified is the dependence on good Internet connectivity. Internet connection speeds and coverage have greatly improved in the last 20 years. However, detailed climate change information may by necessity be data intensive, and therefore models over the Internet may be prone to slow down. Drawing upon this SWOT analysis, recommendations for new tools include to place the tool within a clear risk management and adaptation assessment framework/process, to house the tool within a website which acts as a data/tool portal, to ensure that terminology is clear and full

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documentation is provided for users, to ensure that the functions include those provided in existing tools, and to consider the possibility of a data upload element in the tool. This review identified that there was no existing tool specifically for vulnerability assessment and that there was scarcity of tools specifically focused on cities and associated themes of interest. Furthermore, the use of a web-GIS approach is an accepted format for the development of tools in climate change adaptation planning. A web-GIS (or Internet GIS) approach enables delivery of GIS data and analysis functions on the Web through the Internet (Peng 2001). Spatial representations are important in the planning process, and web-GIS can enhance the traditional planning process through its interactive map exploration features (Dragicevic and Balram 2004). Dragicevic (2004) identifies three main ways that web-based GIS has enhanced the open use of GIS: spatial data access and dissemination; spatial data exploration and geovisualization; and, spatial data processing, analysis, and modeling. Web-GIS can effectively support the task of integrating data from disparate sources, making these available through the whole planning process, thereby enabling open and transparent decision-making (Dragicevic and Balram 2004).

The GRaBS Climate Change Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Tool The GRaBS Climate Change Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Tool (hereafter, Assessment Tool) follows the principles of an online Public Participation GIS (Kingston et al 2000; Kingston 2007). The main aim was to develop web-based Geographical Information Systems (GIS) to enhance public involvement and participation in environmental planning and decision-making. These systems are referred to as PPGIS and are a form of Planning Support System. The main objective is based on the belief that by providing all stakeholders, including citizens, with access to information and data in the form of maps and visualizations, they can make better informed decisions about the natural and built environment around them.

Development of the GRaBS Assessment Tool Development of the Assessment Tool followed an explicit methodology (Fig. 1). Following the review of existing state-of-the-art risk and adaptation tools, the project team embarked on a collaborative process of tool development with all the GRaBS partners (Table 1), in order to shape the exact form and function of the final Assessment Tool (Fig. 1). This process involved using Checkland’s (1999) soft systems methodology to inform system development. Firstly, a user

Fig. 1 The GRaBS Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Tool development process (Cavan and Kingston 2012) Page 9 of 27

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needs and requirements analysis of all partners was carried out via an online questionnaire to inform the writing of the functional specification which fed into the building of the beta version of the tools. This was piloted at a user workshop to test functionality and usability. Feedback from this workshop then led to numerous refinements to the tool followed by further user testing and refinement before the tools were fully deployed. This process is reported in detail in Cavan and Kingston (2012). The nature of the GRaBS project with a pan-European user-base meant that the tool had to be built using a common map base for all partners. Using Google Maps’ Application Programming Interface (API) which is free, generic, highly customizable, and probably, most importantly from a user perspective, very simple to use and navigate, meant that a single generic tool could be built for all partners. The GIS data is served over the top of Google Maps using MapServer, which converts proprietary spatial GIS data into an image format (in this case png) which speeds up the map rendering process for the user. This also means that the user of the Assessment Tool does not have access to the source GIS data, overcoming data access restrictions which might apply to some of the datasets depending upon their source of origin. The tool can therefore be categorized as a high-level or screening tool because the data used in the model is processed offline and the tool does not involve real-time processing of models (Scholze and Wahl 2009). The Assessment Tool adopts a spatial screening risk assessment framework (Lindley et al. 2006, 2007), whereby an explicit set of spatial data layers are created in order to represent each component of risk (including separate layers representing hazard, vulnerability, and exposure). GIS overlay is used to represent the spatial coincidence that would be required in order for risk to be realized at a particular location. Thus, the online Assessment Tool presents climate change risks and vulnerabilities at a range of spatial scales from EU-wide to the neighborhood. The Assessment Tool allows decision-makers to overlay different raster, point, and polygon data layers to visually assess their spatial relationships and examine appropriate attribute information (Fig. 2b). For example, the user can investigate the spatial incidence of flood hazard, together with the distribution of vulnerable people, social and critical infrastructure. There are over 350 different spatial layers in the Assessment Tool, with 32 EU-wide layers, and individual partner level data ranging from 7 to over 60 layers. This includes geospatial data from the following categories: • • • • • • • •

Green and blue space, e.g., parks, public open space, rivers, canals, and lakes Vulnerability indicator, e.g., people aged over 75 years, people living on a low income Social infrastructure, e.g., schools, hospitals, fire stations, and public buildings Civil infrastructure, e.g., power stations, water treatment works, and railway stations Hazard, e.g. river, surface water, and sewer flood risk areas Vulnerability index, e.g., people vulnerable to flooding and high temperatures Population structure, e.g., population density and deprivation Urban development, e.g., building types and residential areas

The variability in the amount of local level data reflects both the extent to which different municipalities have been collecting relevant geospatial data and their ability to work across departmental boundaries to obtain necessary information. Additionally, qualitative information provided in hundreds of data notes offers important background information on the issues of climate change, vulnerability, and adaptation, including an explanation of key terms and why each layer may be important to consider in climate change adaptation planning. A summary of the key elements and functions of the Assessment Tool is provided in Fig. 3.

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Fig. 2 (continued)

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Fig. 2 The Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Tool: partner level interface (a) Climate Impacts Assessment and (b) vulnerability map

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Fig. 3 Key elements and functions of the Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Tool (Cavan and Kingston 2012)

User guidance included the creation of three storylines or use cases (Cockburn 2000), which offer typical examples of how an individual or organization might use the Assessment Tool to support climate change adaptation policy and decision-making within their organization.

Application of the Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Tool Across Europe Adaptation Action Plans (AAPs) were the key output of the GRaBS project from 11 of the partners – the municipal or regional planning authorities and partners that provide a planning support function. The AAPs were developed via a six-stage cyclical process, as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Baseline review and process launch Raise awareness and explore adaptation responses Agree high-level aim and objectives Agree delivery program Implementation and monitoring Evaluation and reporting

The AAPs represent a potentially significant influence over adaptation issues in the areas that they cover and support the partner urban areas and regions in developing responses to climate change and extreme weather. The key role of the Assessment Tool in supporting the GRaBS AAPs was identified through better understanding the connections between the Assessment Tool and three interlinked issues – the objectives of AAP development, the stages of AAP development, and the generic barriers constraining effective adaptation (Carter et al. 2010; Fig. 4). Taking these issues collectively, the Assessment Tool was identified as able to support adaptation planning and decisionmaking in four key areas: (1) raising awareness of climate change impacts and adaptation responses, (2) encouraging participation in adaptation planning, (3) enhancing data availability and use, and (4) supporting decision-making.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_106-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 4 The role of the Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Tool in supporting the GRaBS Adaptation Action Plans (After Carter et al. 2010)

A questionnaire sent to GRaBS partners (Table 1) in January 2011 allowed an evaluation of how the Assessment Tool had been applied, the identification of lessons learned, and suggestions for future development. The following sections present an analysis of this information in the context of the key areas identified above. Raising Awareness of Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Responses Raising awareness of climate change is an important early stage in the process of developing adaptation responses and can help to improve the adaptive capacity of individuals and stakeholders who have an important role in responding to associated impacts (Carter et al. 2010). The Assessment Tool was an excellent means of raising awareness of climate hazards and vulnerability among the public and decision-makers and a way to visualize “what can happen and what we need to take action on” (Cavan and Kingston 2012, p. 265). The Assessment Tool was demonstrated at many awareness raising events held for both internal and external stakeholders focused upon climate change impacts and local adaptation responses. A common structure to these events involved providing an introduction to climate change adaptation issues, the GRaBS project and Assessment Tool, a live demonstration of the Assessment Tool, and/or hands-on workshop session, questions, and discussion. The feedback from workshops was positive, with an emphasis on its user-friendly interface and useful spatial and contextual information provided in data notes. It was noted that specific discussion at awareness-raising events depended upon the audience. When the Assessment Tool was presented to the public or private sector stakeholders with greater adaptation expertise, discussions often stimulated more questions than answers, for example:

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• Regarding the capability (or limitations) of the Assessment Tool • How to plan for future scenarios • Its transferability to local authorities beyond the GRaBS partnership and the accessibility of relevant data • Its principle use for awareness raising among local councilors or communities • Conflicts with existing GIS tools in terms of building an evidence base for planning Encouraging Participation in Adaptation Planning Developing adaptation responses in urban areas is complex due to the ubiquitous nature of climate change impacts occurring across different sectors and spatial scales. Bringing stakeholders together in stakeholder workshops and community events can facilitate establishment of collaborative networks and generate consensus and a shared vision toward adaptation issues and responses, which will enhance the effectiveness of the AAP implementation process. The Assessment Tool was valuable in encouraging participation in adaptation planning at stakeholder workshops and community events. For example, the London Borough of Sutton held a stakeholder workshop which incorporated a practical computer session for around 35 participants, including representatives of statutory bodies such as the Environment Agency, Natural England, and utilities (e.g., Thames Water), in addition to officers from a range of local authority departments. After an introduction to the GRaBS project, a hands-on workshop session enabled participants to explore the Assessment Tool. The discussion and feedback sessions were particularly valuable for the development of Sutton’s “Community Map” (see section “Enhancing Data Availability and Use”). The Northwest England partner (NWDA and Community Forest Northwest) connected the Assessment Tool to other resources and tools aimed at encouraging participation in adaptation planning. The Community Forest Northwest website “Green Infrastructure to Combat Climate Change”1 includes a wealth of resources developed through the GRaBS project including action guidance, an evidence base, an evidence report, and a link to the Assessment Tool. Specifically, the Community Forest Northwest encouraged stakeholders and community groups to apply the Assessment Tool through two key mechanisms: • The “Framework for Action” – an action guidance document that can be used to aid issues concerning policy development and delivery. • “Community Adaptation Training” – whereby the Assessment Tool is provided as one activity for community groups in the training materials. The training is intended for use by professionals with community groups to engage them on the need for climate change adaptation and/or how their local green infrastructure helps to adapt their neighborhood to climate change. Enhancing Data Availability and Use Data availability was highlighted as a key barrier to climate change adaptation planning. The process of developing the Assessment Tool raised significant issues regarding data accessibility and availability within planning authorities, which need addressing if adaptation action is to be delivered successfully. A key function of the Assessment Tool is that it required the collation of spatial data in a consistent format to support adaptation planning. For the Municipality of Kalamaria, a lack of access to relevant data in relation to climate change vulnerability was a pertinent issue, and the AT’s role also included identification of the gaps in necessary data: 1

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Awareness raising may be the most important use. The general lack of data on our behalf grabbed the attention of the attendees. . . Vulnerabilities have not been recorded for the climate change impacts at a local level in Greece so there is a need for them for proper estimation of risk.

Using a consistent framework throughout the Assessment Tool added significant value and allowed partners to investigate each other’s local datasets, to assist in the development of their own tool. For example, the Amsterdam City District of Nieuw-West revealed that: We used other partner tools to demonstrate that there are still crucial data layers missing in our tool. By showing the value of these layers we hope that in the future, we can still gather these data and add them to the tool.

The Assessment Tool development process required the collation of data across different departments, thereby facilitating cross-departmental working and awareness raising among local authority staff. A key finding of the project was the need to break down silos between departments in order to gather evidence on the need to act on adaptation and to support adaptation planning. The development of the Assessment Tool also stimulated GRaBS partners to develop local online GIS tools and portals. This includes the Province of Genoa’s ADAPTO Adaptation Action Planning Toolkit, which enables visualization of local indicators for the assessment of the vulnerability of environmental parameters (Provincia di Genova 2013). In addition, the London Borough of Sutton developed their own web-GIS to facilitate community engagement and feedback on climate change and flooding issues at the neighborhood scale. The London Borough of Sutton (2013) online “Community Map” incorporates a comprehensive range of environmental issues relating to the delivery of council services, in addition to adopting the conceptual risk framework and relevant geospatial information from the Assessment Tool. Supporting Decision-Making The Assessment Tool supported decision-making in three ways: within Adaptation Action Plans, internal strategies, and through guidance documentation. The role of the Assessment Tool in the GRaBS AAP process differed between partners according to the form and function of the AAP, the stage of the AAP process that the Assessment Tool was applied, and the local information available to each partner (Carter et al. 2010). Thus, the application of the Assessment Tool within AAPs also differed between partners, which ranged from explicit inclusion in high-level policy statements and delivery programs to use for gathering material to inform the development of the AAP, e.g., through analysis of the spatial data, to stakeholder workshops and meetings. Within the time frame of the GRaBS project, the Assessment Tool was applied at the first two stages of the AAP process by all of the GRaBS partners responsible for producing AAPs, where stage 1 is a baseline review and process launch and stage 2 is raise awareness and explore adaptation responses (Fig. 4). Additionally, the Province of Genoa, Southampton City Council, and London Borough of Sutton incorporated the Assessment Tool into stages 4 and 5 (agree high-level aim and objectives and agree delivery program; Fig. 4). For example, Action 4 of the Province of Genoa’s high-level policy statement states that Vulnerability to climate change risks, and adaption measures should be evaluated through a reliable, updated and flexible tool, able to answer specific local issues; then, the GRaBS assessment tool should be used both for building programmes and Provincial level, both for delivering green and blue infrastructure projects in homogenous physical contexts. (Provincia di Genova 2011)

Priority 4 of Southampton City Council’s AAP “we will minimise the impact from flooding for the city” stated that it should implement the Assessment Tool in the Council’s delivery program (Fig. 5). Additionally, Southampton City Council applied the Assessment Tool in internal strategies, specifically, strategic decision-making for climate change adaptation planning: Page 16 of 27

Fig. 5 Southampton City Council’s Low Carbon City Strategy 2011–2020. A section of the delivery program for priority 4 (Southampton City Council 2011)

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It has been used internally by officers, already familiar with climate related risks, to help inform strategy work that is currently underway. In particular, it has been used to test the validity of assumptions about areas of the city that were believed to experience problems.

Suggestions for Future Tool Development The final part of the questionnaire aimed to gather comments about future tool development, specifically, if there was a future version of the tool, what would users want it to do? Many of the GRaBS partners expressed the desire for the Assessment Tool to include future modeling scenarios, e.g., for land use, development, and climate, over various time horizons, including the “possibility to show a “before and after” situation about climate change adaptation effects in the region,” and “the tool should also include the information on vulnerable objects (not only existing ones, but also planned developments).” The flexible spatial screening risk assessment framework adopted does allow assessing scenarios of different adaptation options, by adding new layers representing each component of risk according to potential future changes. However, such scenario development requires significant scientific research to be conducted at case study level before such spatial data layers can be included. The Assessment Tool therefore can at present only deal with current vulnerability to climate change. The Surface Temperature and Runoff (STAR) Tools were later developed to address this limitation and provide some modeling capabilities, which is the focus of the next section.

The Surface Temperature and Runoff (STAR) Tools There is an increasing body of literature that emphasizes the multifunctional benefits of green infrastructure and its important role in adapting urban areas to climate change through, for example, flood alleviation and temperature regulation (Gill et al. 2007; Bowler et al. 2010). However, it is important to be able to quantify such benefits in order to illustrate the importance of green infrastructure and to highlight how changes to the built environment at a local level can affect the delivery of important ecosystem services it provides. The STAR Tools is an online toolkit that enables users to assess the potential of green infrastructure in adapting urban areas to climate change (Fig. 6a). It includes two modeling tools – a Surface Temperature (ST) and a Surface Runoff (SR) Tool – both of which are underpinned by scientific models (see Gill 2006 for full details): • Surface Temperature Tool: developed from an urban climate model (Tso et al. 1990, 1991; Whitford et al. 2001) and produces outputs of maximum surface temperature expected during the two hottest days in summer for a specified study area (98th percentile). Since the mix of different land surfaces (such as proportion of green cover, water, and buildings) is an important determinant of the land surface temperature, these parameters are also accounted for in the model. • Surface Runoff Tool: based upon the US Soil Conservation Service approach (SCS 1972), this tool outputs the percentage of the rainfall that becomes surface runoff and the volume of the surface runoff for a given amount of daily rainfall. The Surface Runoff Tool thus calculates how much rainfall from a given event will not be converted to surface runoff; this could be because this rainfall is intercepted (e.g., by plants and vegetation), infiltrated (e.g., into the soil), or stored (e.g., on surfaces). The remaining rainfall is converted to surface runoff. Again, the land surface cover type is an important determinant of rainfall runoff and is accounted for in the model, as is soil type. Page 18 of 27

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_106-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 6 The STAR Tools interface, (a) homepage, (b) defining a case study area, http://maps.merseyforest.org.uk/grabs/

The STAR Tools are applicable for the “neighborhood” scale (recommended between 0.4 ha and 4 km2), though they can be run for more than one neighborhood or study area at a time. The STAR Tools have few input requirements and are straightforward to use. The key benefit of the STAR Tools is that they allow the role of urban vegetation to be explored. This is possible through creating “what if” scenarios for both climate and land surface cover, for example, running the STAR Tools with the

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“business as usual” or current climate and land surface cover, compared to adding 10 % green cover and comparing the resulting output surface temperature or runoff. If several neighborhoods are run, the results can be mapped using GIS (see sect. ▶ Application of the STAR Tools to inform the Mersey Forest Plan), although this functionality is not available in the tool itself. The STAR Tools enable assessment of how surface temperatures and runoff may vary under future climate projections and as the proportion of green space is increased or decreased. Thus, it can help to answer important questions such as: given the changing climate, how much greening do we need in particular areas to achieve certain reductions in temperatures or runoff in the future? What impact would a proposed development have upon temperature or runoff at the neighborhood scale? Such information could also be used to set targets for green infrastructure provision within new developments or in existing neighborhoods. In this way, the information could be used to guide policy and strategy development – both urban development and green infrastructure policies. The outputs of the STAR Tools are thus potentially of use to a range of professionals including planners, developers, master planners, local authority officers, NGOs, urban forestry initiatives, and academics.

Developing the STAR Tools The STAR Tools were developed as an addition to the Assessment Tool, in response to feedback regarding the desire to project future land use scenarios and their potential impact. While the development of the STAR Tools was focused upon North West England (one of the GRaBS case study locations), it was important that users outside of this area could also apply the STAR Tools to investigate the potential of green infrastructure in adapting their specific urban neighborhood to climate change. Therefore, users enter the Tools in two ways (Fig. 6b). If the study area is located in the UK, users can define their study area(s) on an interactive map, driven by OpenLayers and Ordnance Survey’s OpenSpace. All default input values are automatically provided for the Mersey Belt within North West England, including climate projections, land surface cover, and soil data, together with detailed information about data sources and model assumptions. Users also have the option to simply list their study areas. At the next stage, the user is then able to both insert their own input values (including climate projections, land surface cover, and soils) and modify the default model parameter values (set to North West England climate and environment context) to adapt the STAR Tools to their particular case study area. While this option may be more suited to academic or more technical users, it ensures that the STAR Tools can potentially be used for any location, and full guidance is provided regarding the default parameters and model assumptions. The technical development of the STAR Tools involved representing the two underpinning models as web-based tools. Server side, the processing is carried out in PHP running on an Apache server with MapServer. Spatial processing is carried out using GDAL/OGR and MapScript. Data is stored in a MySQL database. AJAX techniques are used to communicate between the client- and server-side scripts. Web Map Services and Web Feature Services are used to serve spatial data to the front end. Since the STAR Tools were launched in early 2012, they have had 1,100 unique visitors, with over 200 progressing to the results page.2 Regarding the origin of users, 64 % of visitors are from the UK, 5 % from the USA, and smaller numbers were from Brazil, Spain, Belgium, and other countries. Information captured by the optional online questionnaire reveal that the STAR Tools have been used by policymakers, researchers, and green infrastructure professionals to guide policy and for academic research purposes.

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Application of the STAR Tools to Inform The Mersey Forest Plan The Mersey Forest is a community forest in North West England, covering 1,370 km2. Established in 1991, it is a partnership of local authorities, national government agencies, land owners, businesses, and local communities. Its vision is to get “more from trees” to help make Merseyside and North Cheshire one of the best places to live in the country. The partnership has planted over nine million trees and doubled woodland cover since 1991, with three times more trees planted than the England average. This has attracted investment, boosted health and well-being, and improved the local environment. The Mersey Forest Plan is the long-term and strategic guide to the work of The Mersey Forest team and partners. While it is not a statutory planning document in its own right, under the National Planning Policy Framework “an approved community forest plan may be a material consideration in preparing development plans and in deciding planning applications” (DCLG 2012). The Mersey Forest Plan was first written in 1994, updated in 2001, and has been refreshed again in 2014. Since the earlier versions of the plan, climate change has risen up the policy agenda. In the early versions there is a brief acknowledgement of the “local and global atmospheric benefits” of trees and woodlands. In addition, reference is made to what we would now recognize as both the mitigation and adaptation benefits of trees and woodlands; specifically, “forestry locks up carbon and offsets other carbon dioxide emissions, helping to reduce global warming. Forests also have more local benefits in filtering out air pollutants, especially dust, reducing noise and acting as windbreaks. The shelter they provide will also improve the local climate of open spaces and has been shown to reduce the cost of heating buildings” (The Mersey Forest 1994, p. 16). There was a clear need, which was recognized by The Mersey Forest partners, for climate change to have greater prominence in the refreshed plan. As such, it features as one of 20 policies set out under the headings “Who, What, How and Why” and is also cross-referenced in many of the other policies. The specific policy on climate change states, “We will safeguard, plant and manage trees and woodlands for their role in climate change mitigation, adaptation, and resilience – such as providing urban cooling, carbon storage, flood alleviation and water management, helping wildlife adapt, low carbon fuels and products, sustainable travel routes, and outdoor recreation opportunities. We will design, plant and manage them to increase their resilience to potential climate change impacts, such as changing pests and diseases” (The Mersey Forest 2014, p. 52). The STAR Tools and the Surface Temperature Tool in particular provided evidence to support this policy. The Surface Temperature Tool was run for the 210 wards within The Mersey Forest for the baseline climate (1961–1990) and for the 2050s high emissions scenario (at the 10 %, 50 %, and 90 % probability levels). The default temperature scenarios supplied with the tool (available for North West England) were used. It was also run for the current land cover scenario (again, using the default values supplied) and for two further scenarios where 10 % green cover was either added or removed. When green cover was added, the same percentage was removed firstly from other impervious surfaces and then, if this did not meet the full 10 %, sequentially from major roads, buildings, and bare soil or gravel (and vice versa for when green cover was removed). In a few instances, in wards where either green cover was already above 90 % or below 10 %, it was not possible to add or remove the full 10 % green cover, and therefore, green cover was only added or removed to the maximum amount possible. Since the Surface Temperature Tool was run for 210 case study areas (wards), the output was mapped using GIS and features within the plan (Fig. 7). The results found the hottest ward to be

2

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_106-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 7 Maximum surface temperatures on a hot summer’s day (98th percentile summers day) (Mapped at the ward level; the 2041–2060 mapping used is for the 2050s high emission scenario, at a 50 % probability level) (# Crown copyright and database right 2012 Ordnance Survey 100031461)

Liverpool Central, with a maximum surface temperature of 31.7  C, whereas the coolest ward is Tilston in Cheshire West and Chester at 18.3  C. There is a surface temperature difference of 13.4  C between the hottest and coolest wards. These are also the wards with the lowest and highest green cover (Liverpool Central is 16.7 % green, whereas Tilston is 97.7 % green). By the 2050s (at a 50 % probability level), the maximum surface temperature in Liverpool Central increases to 33.9  C (2.2  C hotter than in 1961–1990). Removing green cover from this ward would further exacerbate the situation; if 10 % green cover is removed, then the maximum surface temperature in the 2050s would be 38.5  C (6.8  C hotter than the maximum surface temperature in 1961–1990 with current land cover). However, adding green cover can help to ameliorate the situation; if 10 % green cover is added, then the maximum surface temperature in the 2050s would be 30.6  C (1.1  C cooler than the maximum surface temperature in 1961–1990 with current land cover). The Surface Temperature Tool output was used to support the argument in The Mersey Forest Plan that increased tree planting will provide shade and evaporative cooling that help keep neighborhoods cooler and ensure that towns and cities continue to be healthy, comfortable, and attractive places to live, work, visit, and invest. The results can also be analyzed further by The Mersey Forest team in order to support ongoing activities in delivering the plan.

Conclusions: Lessons Learned and Key Challenges The overall aim of the GRaBS project was to enhance local and regional planning policy in respect of climate change adaptation. The Assessment Tool is a useful decision-aiding tool, enabling support of the sharing of knowledge and expertise and helping to build the evidence base available to decision-makers and other stakeholders when developing adaptation plans and strategies. Similarly,

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the STAR Tools can be used to inform climate adaptation plans, green infrastructure plans and strategies, as well as local plans and developments. Since planning is an integrative data-driven activity to enable effective decisions (Stillwell et al. 1999 cited in Dragicevic and Balram 2004), data availability, quality, and scale are key issues. It is notable that the GRaBS Assessment Tool local partner level tools vary in their comprehensiveness to assess risk and vulnerability based upon the existing spatial data that has been collected. The experience of developing the tools has highlighted the need for a common framework to help identify, collect, distribute, share, and prioritize the data that is required to inform the evidence base and enable a more harmonized approach to spatial planning for adaptation to climate change. This would need to be flexible to enable modification to the user’s particular location, specifically in terms of context-specific vulnerability and climatic hazards. The process of developing the Assessment Tool was invaluable for the GRaBS partners, particularly in helping to build bridges between departments (both internally and externally) during collation of spatial data. A key finding of the project was the need to break down silos between departments in order to gather holistic evidence of the need to act on adaptation. A key lesson is the importance to invest in a collaborative development process with the user, not only because the user can benefit significantly from this process, but also to ensure that resulting tools are not donorcentric, and the end product is provided in an accessible format for the intended user. Generic challenges have been raised previously in relation to applying a PPGIS approach and are applicable to the GRaBS web-GIS tools – firstly, the cost and time involved in maintaining the currency of tools, including updating the spatial data and information. When developed, the STAR Tools included input data for the complete region of North West England; however, the ongoing data license for the soils input data remained too excessive, and this area was thus reduced to the Mersey Belt area. Further, while the importance of ensuring that the development and maintenance of the Assessment Tool continued beyond the GRaBS project was identified at an early stage, a funding stream through which this could be supported was not secured. The Assessment Tool is hosted as an open-source project at the University of Manchester and is available for use in other case study areas by changing the spatial data and associated metadata – although this requires knowledge of the Google Maps’ API and JavaScript programming. Further work in the future could investigate how the Assessment Tool could be easily updated and edited by nonspecialists, to keep it up to speed with changing knowledge and the underlying spatial data. Secondly, restrictions due to license agreements and confidentiality of sensitive data are a challenge to optimize access to information for the public. Free and open-source tools may conflict with the license agreements of many geospatial datasets (both public and private sectors), constraining the amount of data that can be included in the tool, thereby limiting its effectiveness. The Assessment Tool included a function to add data locally, thereby addressing this issue to some extent. The STAR Tools provide a modeling environment and were designed to enable application in any location, relying more upon user input data and thus minimizing the problem of license restrictions. A third challenge in developing web-GIS tools is balancing the performance with data resolution. The Assessment Tool achieved fast performance by outputting spatial GIS data into an image format to speed up the map rendering process for the user. However, this approach meant that other useful web-GIS functionalities were restricted, such as changing data classifications or color schemes. Balancing user-friendliness with flexibility was also important in the STAR Tools development. Since the STAR Tools are complex scientific models, it was important that casual users were able to produce their outputs without having to consider or understand the full complexities of the model

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while also allowing more comprehensive users to interact with all underlying model parameters if they so desired. A fourth challenge is providing enough information for the user to be able to apply the tool and interpret the data or output effectively. Detailed notes and guidance materials (including storylines) provided for the GRaBS Tools go some way to aiding this issue, but training events may also be beneficial, both to enhance understanding of the tools and ensure greater application. A more recent review of tools by Climate UK (2012), which included review of the Assessment Tool and STAR Tools, suggested that there is little demand from UK stakeholders for new tools but more demand in terms of awareness raising and use of existing tools, including clear guidance on how the tools can be best applied. As the STAR Tools were released toward the end of the GRaBS project, buy-in from GRaBS partners was limited, and encouraging stakeholders to use the tool is challenging. Despite efforts to publicize the STAR Tools, usage remains low relative to the investment in developing the tools. Creation of a “toolbox of tools” by national and cross-sectoral organizations would therefore be useful to signpost stakeholders to the tools. A final challenge for web-GIS tools is the fast pace of change in technology. When the Assessment Tool was envisaged, Google Maps was the only viable mapping Application Programming Interface (API). Since then, a number of other APIs, including Bing and OS OpenSpace have arisen, with functionality advancing at an unchecked rate. Additionally, post-GRaBS, a significant change in Web Map Services (WMS) in the UK in particular has occurred, with national organizations shifting to deliver their spatial data via WMS. Linking to the spatial data via WMS means there is no need to keep a local copy of the data that becomes outdated. While challenging, these fast changes are also very encouraging for the development of web-GIS tools and enhancing public participation in planning. In terms of the future development of tools for climate change adaptation planning in cities, it is clear that the Public Participatory (“PP” in PPGIS) element could be advanced much further. Additional functions for the Assessment Tool such as push pins (to enable highlighting of locations of interest) and comment boxes could be applied to enable a more interactive facility, which could be extremely effective when utilizing the tool for community participation events. Gathering of user experiences and evidence could be particularly beneficial for climate change adaptation planning. For example, crowdsourcing local flooding evidence may be very useful to verify modeled flooding hazard outputs and official flood records utilizing the geo-referencing capabilities within social media applications. Finally, Climate UK (2012) highlights that the greatest demand from existing tools is to help with prioritizing clear next steps and actions. Many tools, including the Assessment Tool and STAR Tools, are very effective in their ability to raise awareness about climate impacts and the need for adaptation responses, though they do not necessarily aid prioritization of risks and opportunities. This is an area that should be considered in future developments.

Acknowledgments The GRaBS project was funded under Interreg IVC, project number 0108R1. The authors would like to thank the GRaBS project partners in addition to Dr Stephen Lynch, from Manchester Metropolitan University, for assistance with the mathematics of the ST Tool. The Mersey Forest Plan was part funded by the EU Interreg IVB GIFT-T! (Green Infrastructure For Tomorrow – Together!) project. The GRaBS Tools build on research from the EPSRC-funded project Adaptation Strategies for Climate Change in the Urban Environment (ASCCUE), EPSRC GR/S19233/01. Page 24 of 27

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References Bowler DE, Buyung-Ali L, Knight TM, Pullin AS (2010) Urban greening to cooltowns and cities: a systematic review of the evidence. Landsc Urban Plan 97:1477–155 Carter J, Kazmierczak A, Cavan G (2010) Linking the GRaBS assessment tool and adaptation action plans. A report for the GRaBS partnership. University of Manchester Cavan G, Kingston R (2012) Development of a climate change risk and vulnerability assessment tool for urban areas. Int J Disaster Resilience Built Environ 3(3):253–269 Checkland PB (1999) Systems thinking, systems practice. Wiley, Chichester Climate UK (2012) Review of adaptation tools, sustainability West Midlands. Available from: http:// media.climateuk.net/sites/default/files/Tools_Review.pdf Crichton D (2001) The implications of climate change for the insurance industry. Building Research Establishment, Watford Cockburn A (2000) Writing effective use cases. Addison-Wesley, Boston Department for Communities and Local Government (2012) National planning policy framework. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 6077/2116950.pdf Dragicevic S (2004) The potential of web-based GIS. J Geogr Syst 6:79–81 Dragicevic S, Balram S (2004) A Web GIS collaborative framework to structure and manage distributed planning processes. J Geogr Syst 6:133–153 ESPACE (2008) Climate change impacts and spatial planning decision-support guidance. Available at http://www.espace-project.org/publications/Extension%20Outputs/EA/Espace%20Final_Guidance_Finalv5.pdf Garg A, Rana A, Shukla PR, Kapshe M, Azad M, (2007) Handbook of current and next generation vulnerability and adaptation assessment tools. Paper 8 BASIC project. Available from: http:// www.basic-project.net/ Gill SE (2006) Climate change and urban greenspace. Unpublished PhD thesis, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester Gill SE, Handley JF, Ennos AR, Pauleit S (2007) Adapting cities for climate change: the role of the green infrastructure. Built Environ 33:115–133 IPCC (2007) Climate Change 2007, The physical science basis: summary for policy makers. Contribution of the Working Group 1 to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press IPCC (2013) In: Stocker TF, Qin D, Plattner GK, Tignor M, Allen SK, Boschung J, Nauels A, Xia Y, Bex V, Midgeley PM (eds) Climate change 2013: the physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York, p 1535 IPCC (2014) Summary for policymakers. In: Field CB, Barros VR, Dokken DJ, Mach KJ, Mastrandrea MD, Bilir TE, Chatterjee M, Ebi KL, Estrada YO, Genova RC, Girma B, Kissel ES, Levy AN, MacCracken S, Mastrandrea PR, White LL (eds) Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects. Contribution of working group II to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York, pp 1–32 Kazmierczak A, Carter J (2010) Adaptation to climate change using green and blue infrastructure. A database of case studies. Interreg IVC Green and blue space adaptation for urban areas and eco towns (GRaBS) project. Available from: http://www.grabs-eu.org/membersArea/files/ Database_Final_no_hyperlinks.pdf Page 25 of 27

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Kingston R (2007) Public participation in local policy decision-making: the role of web-based mapping. Cartogr J 44(2):138–144 Kingston R, Carver S, Evans A, Turton I (2000) Web-based public participation geographical information systems: an aid to local environmental decision-making. Comput Environ Urban Syst 24(2):109–125 Lindley SJ, Handley JF, Theuray N, Peet E, McEvoy D (2006) Adaptation strategies for climate change in the urban environment – assessing climate change related risk in UK urban areas. J Risk Res 9(5):543–568 Lindley SJ, Handley JF, McEvoy D, Peet E, Theuray N (2007) The role of spatial risk assessment in the context of planning for adaptation in UK urban areas. J Built Environ 33(1):46–69 London Borough of Sutton (2011) Borough climate change adaptation strategy. Available at: http:// www.grabs-eu.org/downloads/Sutton%20Climate%20Change%20adaptation%20strategy% 20march%202011.pdf London Borough of Sutton (2013) Community map. Available from: http://gis.sutton.gov.uk/ CommunityMap/Default.aspx Peng Z (2001) Internet GIS for public participation. Environ Plan B Plan Des 28:889–905 Provincia di Genova (2011) Climate change adaptation action plan. Executive summary. Available at: http://www.grabs-eu.org/downloads/Province%20of%20Genoa%20AAP_Executive%20summary.pdf Provincia di Genova (2013) ADAPTO adaptation action planning toolkit. Available from: http:// cartogis.provincia.genova.it/cartogis/grabs/adapto.htm Scholze M, Wahl M (eds) (2009) Report of the international workshop on mainstreaming adaptation to climate change guidance and tools. In: Workshop held at GTZ House Berlin, Potsdam Square May 28th – 30th, 2009 organised by DFID – GTZ – USAID – World Bank. Deutsche Gesellschaft f€ur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH Climate Protection Programme for Developing Countries, Eschborn, July 2009 SRS (1972) Soil conservation service national engineering handbook – Section 4: hydrology. United States Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, Washington, DC Stillwell JCH, Geertman S, Openshaw S (1999) Developments in geographical information and planning. In: Openshaw S (ed) Geographical information and planning. Springer, Berlin and New York, pp 3–22 Stratus Consulting Inc (1999) Compendium of decision tools to evaluate strategies for adaptation to climate change. Prepared for: UNFCCC Secretariat Bonn, Germany, May 1999. Available from: http://www.atmosfera.unam.mx/cclimat/Taller_CCA_INE_dic08/UNFCCC_adaptation_compend ium.pdf Southampton City Council.(2011) Low carbon city 2011–2020. Part 3: the delivery plan. Available at: http://www.grabs-eu.org/downloads/Part%203%20-%20The%20Delivery%20Plan %202011%20-%202014.pdf The Mersey Forest (1994) The Mersey forest plan, Merseyside, UK The Mersey Forest (2014) More from trees: the Mersey forest plan. Available from: www. merseyforest.org.uk/plan Tso CP, Chan BK, Hashim MA (1991) Analytical solutions to the near-neutral atmospheric surface energy balance with and without heat storage for urban climatological studies. J Appl Meteorol 30(4):413–424 Tso CP, Chan BK, Hashim MA (1990) An improvement to the basic energy balance model for urban thermal analysis. Energy Build 14(2):143–152 UKCIP (2008) The UKCIP adaptation wizard v 2.0. UKCIP, Oxford Page 26 of 27

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Whitford V, Ennos AR, Handley JF (2001) “City form and natural process” – indicators for the ecological performance of urban areas and their application to Merseyside, UK. Landsc Urban Plan 57(2):91–103 Willows R, Connell R (2003) Climate adaptation: risk, uncertainty and decision-making. UKCIP technical report, Oxford

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Enabling Policies for Agricultural Adaptations to Climate Change in Sri Lanka Buddhi Marambea*, Pradeepa Silvab, Jeevika Weerahewac, Gamini Pushpakumarad, Ranjith Punyawardenae and Ranga Pallawalaf a Department of Crop Science, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka b Department of Animal Science, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka c Department of Agricultural Economics and Business Management, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka d Department of Crop Science, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka e Natural Resource Management Centre, Department of Agriculture, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka f Janathakshan, Colombo, Sri Lanka

Abstract Climate change has imposed an extra burden on the social and economic challenges faced by Sri Lanka, due to increasing vulnerability of a majority of its people whose livelihoods are dependent on climate-sensitive natural resources, mainly dealing with agriculture. The National Agriculture Policy (NAP) of 2007, National Livestock Development Policy (NLDP) of 2007, and National Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Policy (NFARP) of 2006 are the key policies that govern Sri Lanka’s crops, livestock (including poultry), and fisheries sectors, respectively, under variable and changing climatic conditions. Sri Lanka has taken measures to adapt to climatic risks in these sectors at various levels. The establishment of Climate Change Secretariat of Sri Lanka is a significant step towards integrating and mainstreaming climate change adaptation activities to the development planning of the country. Sri Lanka, being a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) since 1994, has made considerable attempts in its policy framework and strategic approaches to address the impacts of climate change in crops, livestock, and fisheries sectors, which are directly related to food production. Adaptation to climate change in these three key sectors of Sri Lankan economy is supported by the National Environmental Policy (NEP) of 2003, National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) of 2012, and National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) 2011–2016. As discussed in detail in this chapter, Sri Lanka has an enabling policy environment in supporting the adaptive strategies and building resilience to climate change. However, given the inherent complexity in adaptation to climate change, the country is facing a challenging situation especially due to the intricacy brought by the institutional coordinating mechanism in the three sectors. A significant level of capacity constraints exists in the sectoral institutes in meeting their mandates to implement policies and strategies related to climate change in Sri Lanka.

Keywords National policies; Agriculture; Crops; Livestock; Fisheries; Adaptation; Sri Lanka

*Email: [email protected] *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 22

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Introduction Sri Lanka is located about 80 km southeast to the Indian subcontinent, lying between 5
550 and 9
500 north latitudes and between 79
420 and 81
530 east longitudes. The country comprises of a main island and several small islands off the northern end. The mainland has a maximum length of 435 km in the north–south direction and a maximum width of 240 km in the east–west direction. It covers a total area of 65,625 km2, including 2,900 km2 of inland water bodies. The island consists of a mountainous area in the south-central part and a vast surrounding coastal plain. The population is estimated to be 20.3 million (Central Bank 2013), and the highest projected population (23.3 million) would be in the year 2046 (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2011). There are 103 natural river basins in Sri Lanka, with a total length of about 4,500 km. In addition, there are a significant number of reservoirs including ancient irrigation tanks and recently constructed multipurpose reservoirs with a total area of 169,941 ha (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2009). Sri Lanka can be divided into 46 agroecological regions based on the amount of monthly rainfall and its distribution, soil type, altitude, terrain, and land use (Punyawardena 2007).

Climate and Climate Change in Sri Lanka The climatic pattern of Sri Lanka is determined by the generation of monsoonal wind patterns in the surrounding oceans. Four basic seasons exist based on rainfall, namely, the first inter-monsoon (FIM) period from March to April, the southwest monsoon (SWM) period from May to September, the second inter-monsoon (SIM) period during October to November, and the northeast monsoon (NEM) period from December to February. Out of the major climatic parameters, temperature, rainfall, and humidity are of special significance, which can cause a substantial impact on the agricultural productivity of the country. The relative humidity (RH) generally ranges from 70 % to 90 % during morning and 55 % to 80 % during late afternoon depending on the geographical location. Nevertheless, being a tropical country, solar radiation hardly limits the crop growth under general weather conditions. Analysis of climate data has shown that the country’s average temperature is significantly increasing at a rate of 0.01–0.03
C per year (Fernando and Chandrapala 1995; Premalal and Punyawardena 2013). Recent studies have also shown that cumulative annual or seasonal rainfall of major climatic zones in Sri Lanka during the last few decades has not undergone a significant change (Nissanka et al. 2011; Marambe et al. 2012).

Crops, Livestock, and Fisheries Sectors in Sri Lanka The agriculture sector includes crops, livestock (including poultry), and fisheries as main subsectors. About 33 % of the employed population is involved in agriculture-related activities. Though the contribution of the agriculture sector to the gross domestic production (GDP) is only 11.1 % with an annual growth rate of 5.8 %, this sector plays a vital role in the rural economy (Central Bank 2013). The composition of the agriculture GDP in Sri Lanka as of 2012 is illustrated in Fig. 1. Sri Lanka is rich in agro-biodiversity (Pushpakumara and Silva 2008) with different rice (dehusked paddy), other cereals, pulses, vegetables, roots and tubers, spices, and fruit varieties. Among them, paddy is the main agricultural crop cultivated in the country, while tea and coconut have the highest contribution to the GDP of the plantation sector (Central Bank 2013). Paddy cultivation has received a greater attention from the ancient times, especially in the dry zone of the Page 2 of 22

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Other Agricultural Crops, 3.4%

Firewood and Forestry, 5.1%

Plantation Development, 2.3%

Other Food Crops, 33.3%

Fishing, 12.1%

Tea, 8.3%

Rubber, 2.0% Coconut, 9.3% Livestock, 7.5% Minor Export Crops, 3.4%

Paddy, 13.3%

Fig. 1 Composition of the agriculture GDP of Sri Lanka (Source: Central Bank 2013)

country. The paddy sector contributes about 1.3 % to the GDP. The other food crops consisting of coarse grains, condiments, grain legumes, vegetables, tuber crops, and fruit crops contribute to 3.3 % of the GDP. The majority of the other food crops are mainly cultivated in the dry zone of Sri Lanka under rainfed and irrigated conditions. The livestock sector contributes to about 0.8 % of the GDP of Sri Lanka. In the rural economy, livestock species such as cattle, buffalo, goats and pigs, and poultry are reared as an additional source of income, whereas more attention is directed toward crop cultivation. The fisheries sector contributes around 1.8 % to the GDP of the country. Fish products are an important source of protein, providing around 54 % of the animal protein consumed in Sri Lanka (Census and Statistics 2010). Out of the four rainfall seasons, two consecutive rainy seasons make up the major growing seasons of Sri Lanka, namely, Yala and Maha seasons. Generally Yala season is the combination of FIM and SWM rains. Since SWM rains are effective only over the country’s southwestern sector, the length of this season in the rest of the country confines only to 2 months. Hence, the Yala season is considered as the minor growing season of the country. The major growing season of the island, Maha season, begins with the arrival of SIM rains in October and continues up to late January/ February with the NEM rains. In each agroecological region, the traditional and modern farming systems have developed fitting into the local climatic conditions. Thus, the changes in climatic factors such as temperature, rainfall (including rainfall pattern), relative humidity, air temperature, solar radiation, air circulation, and wind are highly linked to the variability observed in the agricultural productivity of the country.

Climate Vulnerabilities and Impacts Climate change is a crosscutting issue, and it is increasingly recognized as a necessary component of development-oriented decision-making process. In order for development investments to become resilient to anticipated climate change, it is important to understand the nature of vulnerability from a subnational perspective and reflect this variance in development strategies that are formulated at different administrative levels. The climate vulnerability of Sri Lanka has been assessed considering the major development sectors such as agriculture, water resources, coastal resources, and human health and nutrition,

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which are the mostly vulnerable sectors in the economy that determine the livelihoods of the people. Apart from these, climate change has already created changes in the dynamics of invasive alien fauna and flora (Marambe et al. 2010), while the national parks situated in the dry zone have already felt the impact of climate changes on the wildlife. Zubair et al. (2005) reported that the seasonal and multiyear climatic anomalies would probably contribute to the human-elephant conflict in Sri Lanka. Climate change has also affected the infrastructure of the country, namely, transport, roadways, and makeshift dwellings. The two National Communications on Climate Change (Ministry of Forest and Environment 2000; Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2011) discuss the effect of climate change on food security with special emphasis on vulnerable groups of Sri Lanka. The Second National Communication (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2011) clearly states that the rural populations in Sri Lanka are exposed to the adverse impacts of climate change as their livelihood is mainly dependent on agriculture, fisheries, and forestry, which are vulnerable to climate change. Change in the climate temporally and quantitatively would affect the national food supply and livelihoods of the farming community. Seo et al. (2005) identified that the developing countries will be more vulnerable to climatic changes due to being located in hot climatic zones, having a greater fraction of their economies in climate-sensitive sectors (e.g., agriculture), and the economy relies on labor-intensive technologies with fewer adaptation opportunities. However, the climate change impacts on developing countries remain poorly understood as only few studies have successfully measured the effects of climate on the developing economies. Eriyagama et al. (2010) reported that the change in climatic factors has direct impacts on the agricultural production of Sri Lanka. A recent study conducted by Punyawardena et al. (2013) based on 22 physical and socioeconomic parameters that are directly related to the three components of climate change vulnerability, namely, exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (McCarthy et al. 2001), has revealed that spatial variations of vulnerability of Sri Lanka to climate change vary according to socioeconomic, environmental, and institutional conditions of respective administrative districts. This pattern does not necessarily follow in the most exposed and geographically sensitive districts. The Climate Change Secretariat of Sri Lanka has mapped the vulnerability of different crops and livestock to drought, flood exposure, and sea-level rise changes with the agroecological zone of the country. The crop and livestock production systems of dry and intermediate zones of Sri Lanka are more vulnerable for the impacts of the climate change. The impacts of climate change and the vulnerability of the agriculture sector are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.

The Global Context of Climate Change, Regional Initiatives, and National Commitments The Global Context In response to the warnings issued by scientists in the 1970s on the impact of enhanced natural greenhouse gas effect, causing the Earth to become warmer if the pattern of emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) continues, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to develop an international policy instrument to address the issue of global warming, leading to the development of the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC was adopted at the Rio Summit of the United Nations (UN) in 1992 with the objective of stabilizing the atmospheric GHG concentration at a level that will prevent dangerous human interferences with the climate system. Page 4 of 22

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Table 1 Major impacts of climate change on the agriculture sector in Sri Lanka Climate change Temperature increase

Tea Rubber Affects quality Not known parameters of highgrown tea

Erratic Affects harvesting rainfall – too Enhances soil high erosion Erratic Affects yield rainfall – too low Sea-level rise Not known

Climate dependency

Entirely rainfed Low temperature at high elevations affects quality

Reduce days available for tapping Not known

Not known

Coconut Affects pollen development and viability; number of nuts per bunch Not known

More than two consecutive months without rain is detrimental Salinization of coastal coconut lands

Entirely rainfed Entirely rainfed If less than 500 mm Annual rainfall not less affects yield; non-rainy than 1,500 mm days for tapping

Paddy Affects pollen development causing sterility and empty grains Affects land preparation and sowing and needs no rains at harvesting Affects land preparation. Insufficient soil moisture affects growth Loss of paddy lands in coastal areas; salinization of soil and irrigation water Rainfed with supplementary irrigation

Table 2 Major impacts of climate change on livestock and fisheries sectors in Sri Lanka Climate change Temperature increase Erratic rainfall – too high Erratic rainfall – too low Sea-level rise Climate dependency

Livestock Affects the fertility, influences the quality of feeds available for ruminants, and changes the disease and parasitic occurrence Threat to animal life due to floods

Fisheries Affects breeding habits and levels of production and influences the quantity and quality of feed available Loss of habitat in inland water bodies

Threat to animal life due to water and food scarcity

Threat to animal life in inland water bodies

Loss of habitat Direct effect on fertility and indirect effect on production

Loss of habitat Direct effect on breeding and indirect effect on production

Since then, the parties have continued to negotiate in order to agree on decisions and conclusions that will reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 is a landmark event in such negotiations where the developed countries collectively committed to reduce emissions of six key greenhouse gases at least by 5.2 % from their total GHG emissions recorded in 1990, during the first commitment period 2008–2012 (Ministry of Environment 2006).

Regional Initiatives The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC; comprises of eight countries, namely, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka) has moved along with the global and other regional mandates in tackling issues related to climate change (http://www.saarc-sec.org/). The SAARC has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Page 5 of 22

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South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP; July 2004), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP; June 2007), and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR; September 2008) and was accredited as an observer to the UNFCCC process at the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16) in 2010. Since 1987, SAARC has reiterated the need to strengthen and intensify regional cooperation to preserve, protect, and manage the diverse and fragile ecosystems of the region including the need to address the challenges posed by climate change and natural disasters. Accordingly, a Technical Committee on Environment (TCE) was established in 1992 to examine the recommendations of the regional studies to identify measures for immediate action and decide on modalities for their implementation. The SAARC countries have adopted common positions at various international negotiations related to environment and climate change. The TCE has been entrusted with the coordination and monitoring of implementation of the 1997 SAARC Environment Action Plan and SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change (July 2008) under Article VI of the SAARC Charter (http:// saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/cat-detail.php?Cat_id¼54). The SAARC also has established the SAARC Coastal Zone Management Centre (SCZMC) in 2004 to promote cooperation in planning, management, and sustainable development of coastal zones, including research, training, and awareness in the region (http://www.sczmc.org/). The SAARC Environment Action Plan has been adopted by the Third Meeting of SAARC Environment Ministers (Male, 15–16 October 1997), which have identified some of the key concerns of member states and set out the parameters and modalities for regional cooperation. A SAARC Convention on Cooperation on Environment as stipulated under the Item 17 (Legal Framework) of the Action Plan was signed during the 16th SAARC Summit (Thimphu, 28–29 April 2010) and was entered into force after it has been ratified by all member states. The key initiatives and proposals in the Thimphu Summit in 2010 are as follows: (a) establishing an Intergovernmental Expert Group on Climate Change to develop clear policy direction and guidance for regional cooperation; (b) exploring the feasibility of a SAARC mechanism that will provide financial capital for low-carbon technology and renewable energy projects; (c) strengthening the understanding of shared water bodies in the region through a marine initiative; (d) establishing the Intergovernmental Mountain Initiative to study mountain ecosystems and glaciers and their contribution to livelihoods and sustainable development; (e) establishing the Intergovernmental Monsoon Initiative on the evolving pattern of monsoons to assess vulnerability due to climate change; (f) commissioning a SAARC Inter-governmental Climate-Related Disasters Initiative on the integration of climate change adaptation (CCA) with disaster risk reduction (DRR); (g) establishing institutional linkages among national institutions in the region to facilitate sharing of knowledge and capacity building programs in climate change; (h) enhancing cooperation in the energy sector to facilitate energy trade and development of efficient conventional and renewable energy sources including hydropower; (i) preparing an action plan on energy conservation by the SAARC Energy Centre (SEC); and (j) creating a web portal on energy conservation for exchange of information and sharing of best practices among SAARC member states. The SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change (2009–2011; http://saarc-sdmc.nic.in/pdf/publications/climate/chapter-2.pdf) has identified seven thematic areas of cooperation in relation to climate change, namely, adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer, finance and investment, education and awareness, management of impacts and risks, and capacity building for international negotiations. Though there is no direct identification of agriculture-related sectors in this action plan, the issues have been embedded in areas such as adaptation and management of impact. However, SAARC has now formed a focal group to identify the adaptation measures to minimize the impacts of climate change on agriculture. The action plan lists the areas of capacity building for Clean Development Page 6 of 22

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Mechanism (CDM) projects: exchange of information on disaster preparedness and extreme events, exchange of meteorological data, capacity building and exchange of information on climate change impacts (e.g., sea-level rise, glacial melting, biodiversity, and forestry), and mutual consultation in international negotiation process as the priorities. The SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC; http://saarc-sdmc.nic.in/index.asp) was established in New Delhi, India, in 2006 to provide policy advice and facilitate capacity building including strategic learning, research, training, system development, expertise promotion, and exchange of information for effective DRR and management. The mandate of the center has been expanded to include the development of a Natural Disaster Rapid Response Mechanism. Road maps have been developed to include coastal and marine risk management plan, community-based disaster risk management, application of science and technology in DRR, and urban risk management, drought management, and flood risk management in South Asia. Apart from the SAARC initiative, there are two regional neighboring corporations in Asia that have strong and committed efforts in adapting and mitigating global climate change. Both Central Asia (CA) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN; http://www.asean.org/) regional corporations have climate change response policies and environmental, legal, and regulatory framework for meeting their commitments under the UNFCCC. The details of these corporations on climate change mitigation policy and activity frameworks are not discussed in this chapter.

National Commitments Sri Lanka ratified the UNFCCC on 23 November 1993 and entered into force on 21 March 1994 and was among the first 50 countries to have ratified the convention. This was followed by becoming a signatory to the Montreal Protocol (on substances that deplete the ozone layer) and the Kyoto Protocol, which commits countries, i.e., mainly Annex I parties, to reduce their collective emissions of greenhouse gases. Even though Sri Lanka is a non-Annex I country with a per capita emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) as low as 0.6 t of CO2 equivalent per year and the total emissions from all sectors at 20,794 GgCO2 equivalents (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2010), it is the objective of the Government of Sri Lanka to encourage and facilitate investments in climatefriendly development activities while fulfilling the country obligations and contributing to the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC. Sri Lanka has established a Climate Change Secretariat (CCS) within the Ministry of Environment and Renewable Energy (ME&RE) to facilitate, formulate, and implement projects and programs at the national level with regard to climate change. The GHG inventory for the year 2000 has been prepared (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2011) and an update is currently being done. The Centre for Climate Change Studies (CCCS) was established in 2000 (http://www. meteo.slt.lk/cccs.html) under the Department of Meteorology of Sri Lanka to conduct research, monitor climate change, and provide the general public with current information on climate change and allied issues. The Initial National Communication on Climate Change under the UNFCCC was prepared in 2000 (Ministry of Forest and Environment 2000), which indicated sectors that are most vulnerable to climate change and subsequent impacts, the sectors that mostly contribute to climate change, and the required mitigation options and adaptation responses, while the Second National Communication was completed in 2010 (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2011). The national capacity needs to implement the UNFCCC have also been identified (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2007a).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_108-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

The Policies and Legislations Related to Climate Change and Relevant Sectors in Sri Lanka Being a crosscutting phenomenon, the climate change issues have been addressed in different sectoral policies in Sri Lanka. These policies have addressed the adaptive and migratory capacities of the country at different priority levels.

National Environmental Policy (NEP) of 2003 The National Environmental Policy (NEP) of 2003 (http://www.climatechange.lk/ccs_index.html) provides the direction and framework for managing and caring for the environment in Sri Lanka and spells out the directions needed in relation to the basic natural resources such as land, water, atmosphere, and biological diversity and the environmental strategies to be followed by key economic sectors. Under the segment on land resource management, the NEP recognizes the need for providing interventions to increase agricultural productivity and sound agricultural practices in all cultivated land in the island, especially where land degradation is the most serious issue. The NEP also states that the environmental changes that affect land resources will be monitored and the real costs of environmental damage from the misuse of land will continually be assessed, on the basis of recognized priorities. Article 2.2.10 of the NEP on reducing the risk of climate change states that “The risks of climate change will be managed by implementing adaptive strategies that minimize the impact of climate change on both the people, and the economy, of Sri Lanka.” The policy directives identified in NEP to accomplish this are as follows: (a) review the effect of climate change on Sri Lanka through the development of impact scenarios and response strategies, (b) develop policy scenarios for the use of CDM and its application for Sri Lanka, (c) evaluate the needs to enter into future potential trading system for carbon reduction including the necessity for clear and secure property rights or entitlements to land and carbon, and (d) develop an information database through the ministry in charge of the environment.

The National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) of 2012 The National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) of 2012 is the overarching policy dedicated to address the issues of climate change in Sri Lanka. Paragraph 14 of Article 27 in Chapter 6 (Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Duties) of the Constitution (1978) of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka clearly states that “the state shall protect, preserve and improve the environment for the benefit of the community.” This governs the activities of all state, private sector and nongovernmental organizations, and individuals in protecting the environment of the country. Besides that, the NEP of 2003 carries the Policy Statement 4 indicating that “Environmental management systems will be encouraged to be flexible so as to adapt to changing situations (e.g., climate change, invasive species and living genetically-modified organisms) and adopt the precautionary principle as priority areas requiring action.” In addition, the National Environmental Outlook (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2009), the Caring for the Environment II 2008–2012 (Marambe and Silva 2008), the Addendum to the Biodiversity Conservation Action Plan (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2007b), the Initial and Second National Communications to UNFCCC (Ministry of Forestry and Environment 2000; Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2011), and the National Action Plan for the Haritha Lanka (Green Page 8 of 22

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Lanka) Programme (National Council for Sustainable Development 2009) highlight the need to address climate change issues as priority interventions. The Initial (Ministry of Forestry and Environment 2000) and Second (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2011) National Communications to the UNFCCC presented by the Sri Lankan government have identified agriculture, water resources, and public health as the most affected sectors due to climate change. While Sri Lanka is vulnerable to many impacts of climate change, the island nation’s contribution to GHG emissions is relatively low when compared even with other developing countries, and hence, adaptation has naturally been a priority in climate change policy in Sri Lanka. The NCCP clearly states that while taking adaptive measures as the priority, Sri Lanka will actively be involved in the global efforts to minimize the greenhouse gas emissions within the framework of sustainable development and principles enshrined in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. The NCCP of Sri Lanka provides guidance and directions for all the stakeholders to address the adverse impacts of climate change efficiently and effectively. Accordingly, the NCCP has included statements related to periodic assessment of vulnerability to adverse impacts of climate change in the socioeconomic and environmental sectors. This information will be highly useful in adaptation to adverse impacts in short as well as long term and mitigation, which are the two main pathways to minimize the adverse impacts of climate change. The NCCP of Sri Lanka has been formulated with the primary goal of “Adaptation to and mitigation of climate change impacts within the framework of sustainable development,” with seven objectives, namely, (1) sensitize and make aware the communities periodically on the country’s vulnerability to climate change; (2) take adaptive measures to avoid/minimize adverse impacts of climate change to the people, their livelihoods, and ecosystems; (3) mitigate greenhouse gas emissions in the path of sustainable development; (4) promote sustainable consumption and production; (5) enhance knowledge on the multifaceted issues related to climate change in the society and build their capacity to make prudent choices in decision making; (6) develop the country’s capacity to address the impacts of climate change effectively and efficiently; and (7) mainstream and integrate climate change issues in the national development process. The NCCP contains broad policy statements under the thematic areas of vulnerability, adaptation, mitigation, sustainable consumption and production, knowledge management, and general statements. As the NCCP is the key policy directive in relation to climate change, it links to the sectoral policies. The key issues in relation to crops, livestock, and fisheries are directly addressed under the themes of adaptation and mitigation and indirectly addressed in themes on sustainable consumption and production, knowledge management, and general areas. Table 3 provides the summary of those areas addressed in NCCP.

National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Sri Lanka (2011–2016) The National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) for Sri Lanka (2011–2016; Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2010) has been developed while accepting the fact that Sri Lanka is not a significant contributor to global warming. However, being an island nation, it is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change mainly due to the increases in the frequency and intensity of disasters such as droughts, floods and landslides, variability in climate, and sea-level rise. The adaptation strategies in relation to agriculture are entrusted mainly under the thematic area of “Minimize Climate Impacts on Food Security.” In addition, the plantation sector has been addressed Page 9 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_108-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 3 Issues related to agriculture (crops), livestock, and fisheries sectors addressed in the NCCP Thematic area in NCCP Direct approach Adaptation (food production and security)

Adaptation (conservation of water resources and biodiversity) Mitigation (agriculture and livestock)

Indirect approach Sustainable consumption and management Knowledge management

General statements (institutional coordination)

Issues related to agriculture, livestock, and fisheries Take timely action to address the adverse impacts on crop and animal production and fisheries sectors due to climate change and to minimize the impacts on food production and to ensure food security Encourage climate resilient, environmentally friendly, and appropriate innovative technologies while recognizing and promoting the utilization of appropriate traditional knowledge and practices in food production Promote integrated watershed and water resource management and efficient water use through technologies and behaviors adaptive to changing weather patterns and trends Encourage environmentally sound and socially acceptable agriculture and livestock practices within the framework of sustainable development Promote appropriate innovative technologies while encouraging the utilization of appropriate traditional knowledge and practices Promote sustainable consumption and production considering the family as the center of focus to ensure wide dissemination of environment-friendly lifestyles and practices in the path of sustainable development Adopt multiple approaches to enhance knowledge, skills, and positive attitudes of different stakeholders at all levels to address multifaceted, current, and emerging issues of climate change Facilitate and promote the availability, accessibility, and sharing of climate change-related information across all sectors at all levels Develop and strengthen an interinstitutional coordinating, collaborating, and monitoring mechanism for effective implementation of the activities related to climate change at national, provincial, district, and divisional levels under the National Focal Point to the United Nations Climate Change Multilateral Agreements

Source: http://www.climatechange.lk/policy.html

under “Improve Climate Resilience of Key Economic Drivers” as the plantation agriculture is more of an economic activity. The adaptation strategy has followed an integrated approach to minimize the climate change impacts on food security involving irrigation, crops, livestock, fisheries, nutrition (health), and environment sectors as part of the initiative to ensure Sri Lanka’s national interests are adapted to be resilient to potential climate change-induced risks. Table 4 summarizes the adaptive strategies related to the crops and livestock sectors in NCCAS. The adaptation strategies for the fisheries sector have been addressed under the thematic area of “Safeguard Natural Resources and Biodiversity from Climate Change Impacts.” Since this thematic area is commonly addressing the broad environmental issues, the strategies are mostly crosscutting. However, there are two strategies listed under this theme, which are directly related to the inland fisheries and coastal sector as given in Table 5. Though the NCCAS is supported with comprehensive sectoral analysis under different thrust areas related to food security, agriculture, livestock, and fisheries, it suffers with a serious lapse in two important areas, namely, energy and health. While the energy sector is completely missing in the priority strategic thrust areas, the health sector has not been adequately addressed in NCCAS probably due to the overemphasis on production aspects. The proposed strategic interventions and

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_108-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 4 The adaptive strategies related to agriculture (crops) and livestock Adaptation strategy 1. Ensure ability to meet food production and nutrition demand

Priority adaptive measures (i) Increase awareness on alternative options to meet nutrition requirements (ii) Improve weather forecasting and information dissemination (iii) Ensure easy access to seed stock alternatives to counter rainfall variability (iv) Research climate impacts/adaptive measures for the agriculture, livestock, and fisheries sectors (v) Conserve genetic resources for future crop and livestock improvement 2. Ensure adequate water availability for agriculture (i) Promote water-efficient farming methods and crops to improve water productivity (ii) Improve maintenance of existing tanks and reservoirs including their watersheds and catchments (iii) Adopt and promote the principles of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) (iv) Construct new reservoirs and trans-basin diversions to meet demand 3. Mitigate food security-related socioeconomic (i) Encourage risk transfer methods such as insurance impacts (ii) Research climate impacts on long-term food security and agriculture value chain (iii) Identify and help vulnerable fishing communities to adapt or relocate 4. Increase awareness and mobilize communities for (i) Increase awareness on climate impacts on food security and on climate change adaptation the potential adaptive measures (ii) Pilot test and scale up community-level agriculture/livestock/ fisheries adaptation models (iii) Improve utilization of field-level coordination mechanisms and civil society organizations (iv) Promote risk transfer initiatives 5. Minimize impacts of climate change on the (i) Research climate impacts and adaptive measures in plantation plantation sector subsectors (ii) Pilot test and scale up subsector-specific adaptation measures (iii) Evaluate and exploit potential productivity benefits due to climate change Source: Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (2010)

implementation strategies for the priority thrust areas in the NCCAS (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2010) are summarized in Table 6.

The National Adaptation Plan (NAP) Sri Lanka is currently in the process of developing the national adaptation plan (NAP) according to the adaptation strategies laid down to tackle variable climatic conditions.

Other Policies and Actions Related to Climate Change The national overarching policy of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Chintana, Vision for the Future (MFP 2010), envisages an agricultural renaissance and spells out activities to develop the agriculture (crops), livestock, and fisheries sectors and to ensure future food security. Likewise, the Mahinda Page 11 of 22

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Table 5 The adaptive strategies related to fisheries and wetlands Adaptation strategy 1. Enhance the resilience of coastal and marine ecosystems and associated vulnerable species

Priority adaptive measures (i) Promote integrated coastal resource management, particularly at Special Area Management (SAM) sites (ii) Restore and rehabilitate degraded coastal ecosystems and depleted coastal species 2. Enhance climate change resilience of natural inland (i) Protect marshes/flood retention areas in urban areas and wetlands and associated species limit land conversion (ii) Prevent discharge of industrial effluents and solid waste into inland wetlands (iii) Control and manage saltwater intrusion into coastal freshwater wetlands (iv) Strengthen coordination and streamline management of wetlands across relevant agencies Source: Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (2010)

Chintana 10-year Horizon Development Framework 2006–2016 (Ministry of Finance and Planning 2006) provides commitment for the rehabilitation of degraded agricultural lands, establishment of a early warning system or drought and strengthening drought relief, strengthening rainwater harvesting systems, promotion of sustainable agriculture, and adoption of an integrated management system for the land resource, among the many aspects of work to be undertaken to conserve and sustainable use of land in the country. Hence, Mahinda Chintana focuses on majority of the issues faced by Sri Lanka related to environment and climate change. The National Council for Sustainable Development (NCSD) was established in Sri Lanka under the Presidential Secretariat in 2009. The NCSD is chaired by H.E. the President of Sri Lanka with the purpose of seeking a successful blend of the best of modern science and the richness of traditional knowledge for natural resource management and sustainable use, facing the major challenges of climate change and protection of the environment. The NCSD was instrumental in ensuring government policies on environment, and climate change has been translated into action through “Green Lanka for Sustainable Future” (Action Plan for Haritha Lanka Programme; National Council for Sustainable Development 2009) and also further entrust stating that “Sri Lanka abides by the global treaties and agreement on environmental and climatic change and will strengthen Sri Lanka’s tie with the UN Agencies.” Ten missions included in the action plan are (1) clean air; (2) saving the fauna, flora, and ecosystems; (3) meeting the challenge of climate change; (4) wise use of the coastal belt and sea around; (5) responsible use of the land resources; (6) doing away with the dumps; (7) water for all and always; (8) green cities for health and prosperity; (9) greening the industries; and (10) knowledge for the right choice. The Action Plan for Haritha Lanka Programme directly addresses climate change through its Mission 3 focusing on establishing food security in the face of climate change threats. The program also indirectly supports measures needed for adaptation in the crops and livestock sectors through Missions 5 (land) and 4 and 7 (water). This Action Plan has short-term, medium-term, and long-term targets spanning 2009–2016 that are relevant for adaptation to climate change. The National Policy on Air Quality Management of 2000 and the Draft National Policy on Clean Development Mechanism (NPCDM) are two policy and planning instruments, which directly address climate change in Sri Lanka but with no direct reference to the crops, livestock, and fisheries sectors, as they deal especially on the mitigation. However, the NPCDM has indirect implications on those three sectors. The NPCDM is in total compliance with and complementary to the Sri Lanka

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Strategy on Sustainable Development (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2007c) and the National Action Plan for Haritha Lanka Programme of Sri Lanka. The Ministry of Environment, while recognizing the need to embark on CDM activities, has also established two study centers at the University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka (agriculture and forestry), and at the University of Moratuwa, Sri Lanka (transport and industry), to ensure that there will be continuous interventions and input from the researchers and academia on implementing the CDM projects. In light of the increasing impact of climate change and the need for future preparedness, the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (as the leading ministry) and the Disaster Management Centre (DMC) (as the national-level agency) have been mandated to formulate Table 6 Strategic interventions for climate change adaptation Identified area of adaptation Adaptation actions 1. Minimize climate change impacts on food security Ensure ability to meet food (i) Prioritization of nutritional issues production and nutrition expected to exacerbate with climate demand change (ii) Implementation of awareness program to different population categories (iii) Empowerment of women in poor farming communities in sustaining household-level food security and nutrition (iv) Adopting new/improved forecasting technology (v) Increasing the technical capacity on forecasting (vi) Development of information dissemination mechanism

(vii) Implementation of communitylevel seed stock program (viii) Technical capacity building for community on seed stock

Responsible agencies Department of Agriculture (DOA)

Department of Meteorology (DOM)

Department of Health (DOH)

Disaster Management Centre (DMC) DOA DOM Department of Irrigation (DOI) Department of Agrarian Development (DOAD) DOA

DOAD Community-based organizations (CBOs) (ix) Update gene banks to address needs DOA of climate change (x) Identification and protection of Department of Export Agriculture (DOEA) germplasm conservation areas Tea Research Institute (TRI) Coconut Research Institute (CRI) Rubber Research Institute (RRI) Sugarcane Research Institute (SRI) Department of Animal Production and Health (DAPH) National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency (NARA) Veterinary Research Institute (VRI) CBOs (continued) Page 13 of 22

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Table 6 (continued) Identified area of adaptation Ensure adequate water availability for agriculture

Adaptation actions (i) Programs for promotion of waterefficient farming techniques

Responsible agencies DOA DOI DOAD CBOs (ii) Assessing the maintenance levels of DOI tanks, reservoirs, and irrigation systems (iii) Implementation of renovation and Mahaweli Development Authority of Sri maintenance of those systems Lanka (MDASL) (iv) Development and adaptation of DOA water resource management plan for Sri Lanka (v) Implementation of trans-basin CBOs diversion activities (vi) Assessment of future water requirements (vii) Assessment of the need for new reservoirs Mitigate food security-related (i) Introduction of insurance schemes DOA socioeconomic impacts (ii) Identify the components in the value DAPH chain system (iii) Identification of alternative NARA livelihood activities (iv) Identification and relocation of Insurance companies highly vulnerable communities (i) Develop and implement of national All line ministries Increase awareness and information, education, and mobilize communities for Ministries of Education (MOE) communication strategy climate change adaptation Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) Media 2. Safeguard natural resources and biodiversity from climate change impacts (i) Facilitate the implementation of Coast Conservation Department (CCD) Enhance the resilience of coastal and marine ecosystems sensitive area management activities and associated vulnerable (ii) Rehabilitation of key coastal NARA species ecosystems (continued)

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Table 6 (continued) Identified area of adaptation Adaptation actions Enhance climate resilience of (i) Regulate and manage urban wetlands natural inland wetlands and associated species

Responsible agencies Urban Development Authority (UDA) Central Environmental Authority (CEA) Local government units CBOs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (ii) Development of urban wetlands for DOI different purposes such as recreation (iii) Development of cost-effective Ministry of Environment and Renewable purification programs for release of Energy (ME&RE) effluent (iv) Avoid the water body pollution by CEA development of waste processing program and guidelines for waste disposal (v) Monitoring the water flow at river basins (vi) Controlling of sand mining (vii) Establishment and monitoring of coordination mechanism for the activities of coastal and marine ecosystems and inland water bodies

Source: updated from Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (2010)

national- and local-level disaster risk management programs and aligning them with the sectoral development programs. In addition, an intragovernmental network has been established with the assistance from Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to connect the Department of Irrigation (DOI), National Building Research Organization (NBRO), Department of Meteorology (DOM), DMC, Police Communications, Media Networks, and seven district offices that are most vulnerable to disasters. This network is expected to facilitate the sharing of GIS maps and other data to better coordinate and manage response activities. Being cognizant of the irreversible impacts of climate change on the ecosystems and development programs of Sri Lanka, in 2006, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Sri Lankan government directed all government agencies to undergo a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) for all policies, plans, and programs prior to their implementation. The Central Environmental Authority (CEA) of Sri Lanka has carried out SEAs for Trincomalee Development Plan (Eastern Province) and Greater Hambantota Development Plan (Southern Province) and for the Northern Province Development Program (http://www.isea.lk), while the Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority (SLTDA) has completed two SEAs for tourism development in the Dedduwa Lake area (Southern Province) and in Kalpitiya area (Northwestern Province). The SEA activities are expected to fine-tune the development programs in Sri Lanka while incorporating environmental concerns to them. The SEAs for Gampaha District (Western Province) and Uva Province are currently being conducted. The sectoral policies and legislations governing the crops, livestock, and fisheries sectors of Sri Lanka play a crucial role in embedding the climate change concerns in plans and programs implemented under respective sectors. The linkages of these policies in relation to climate change concerns of the country are highlighted below.

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Key Development Policies That Govern the Crops, Livestock, and Fisheries Sectors The National Agriculture Policy (NAP) of 2007 The National Agriculture Policy (NAP) of 2007 deals with food and export agricultural crops and floriculture with the aim of solving problems in these sectors and facilitating their rapid growth. The objectives stipulated in the NAP have been designed to meet the basic needs of the farming community in terms of food security and nutrition and enhanced employment opportunities and income generation by the adoption of technically feasible, socially acceptable, economically viable, and environmentally friendly agricultural production technologies, marketing, and related strategies. The policy includes promoting agricultural production, seeds and planting materials, fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural machinery, postharvest technology, irrigation and water management, land use, soil conservation, traditional agricultural crops, home gardening, and agricultural research. It also deals with providing agricultural credit, agricultural insurance, and agricultural extension and education and promoting marketing, agro-based industries, investments in agriculture, institutional development, sharing of plant genetic resources, and youth involvement in agriculture. The key issues promoted in relation to climate change in the NAP are (a) production and utilization of organic and bio-fertilizers to gradually reduce the use of chemical fertilizers through Integrated Plant Nutrition Systems (IPNS); (b) minimizing the use of synthetic pesticides through promoting biopesticides and Integrated Pest Management (IPM); (c) conservation of water resources, efficient water management, and soil moisture retention techniques; (d) prevention of water pollution from agriculture; (e) adhering to the National Land Use Policy when allocating land for cultivation purposes; (f) land conservation within watershed areas; (g) enforcing the provisions of the Soil Conservation Act; (h) conservation of traditional agricultural crops and methodologies relating to organic farming, pest control, preservation and processing of food for nutritional and medicinal purposes, and facilitation of the exchange of such knowledge among the farming community; and (i) home gardening and urban agriculture to enhance household nutrition and income.

The National Livestock Development Policy (NLDP) of 2007 The National Livestock Development Policy (NLDP) of 2007 deals with developing the dairy and poultry subsectors and animal feed resources of Sri Lanka. The dairy sector is regarded as the priority for public sector investment in livestock development in the country. There is no direct government involvement or support in the meat subsector, but private sector activities are permitted, and the government takes responsibility for ensuring public health safeguards and quality standards in the meat industry. The goals and targets of NLDP are as follows: (a) the achievement of sustainable and equitable economic and social benefits to livestock farmers; (b) increasing the supplies of domestic livestock produce at competitive prices to the consumers; (c) achieve increased self-reliance of at least 50 % in domestic milk by 2015; (d) double the current domestic production of poultry products by 2015; and (e) domestic livestock products to be competitive with the imported livestock products. Though there is no explicit reference to climate change scenario in the NLDP, the achievement of the objectives of the policy could only be realized by being cognizant of the variable and changing climate in Sri Lanka, which will be facilitated by the NCCP.

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The National Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Policy (NFARP) of 2006 The National Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Policy (NFARP) of 2006 promotes increasing the production of marine and inland fisheries and conserving the resource; development of aquaculture; improvement of infrastructure facilities for fisheries, including fishery harbors, product marketing, research, and use of nonliving aquatic resources; extension and training; uplifting of the socioeconomic status of the fisher community and rehabilitation of fisheries affected by the conflict and the tsunami; institutional and legal framework; and international cooperation and conservation of the environment. The objectives of the NFARP are to (a) improve nutritional status and food security of the people by increasing the national fish production, (b) minimize postharvest losses and improve quality and safety of fish products to acceptable standards, (c) increase employment opportunities in fisheries and aquatic resource-related industries and improve the socioeconomic status of the fisher community, (d) increase foreign exchange earnings from fish and aquatic product exports, and (e) conserve the aquatic environment.

Institutional Setup for Managing the Crops, Livestock, and Fisheries Sectors and Implementing Climate Change Policies and Programs The management of the crops, livestock, and fisheries sectors is carried out by completely different institutions and agencies in Sri Lanka at both national and provincial levels with many commonalities and complexities. The crop production subsector is divided into plantation crops, non-plantation food crops, and export crops. Accordingly, these sectors are coming under the purview of different ministries and line agencies and research centers/institutes. At the national level, the plantation crops sector is under the purview of the Ministry of Plantation Industries (MPI) with the Tea Research Institute (TRI). The Coconut Research Institute (CRI) and Rubber Research Institute (RRI) are mandated to carry out research, development, and extension work related to the respective disciplines. The non-plantation food crops sector is under the purview of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) with the Department of Agriculture (DOA) being the responsible entity, while the Ministry of Minor Export Crop Promotion (MMECP) looks after the interests of the export crops sector (except tea, rubber, and coconut) with the Department of Export Agricultural Crops mandated for research, development, and extension activities. The Ministry of Sugar Industry Development (MSID) with the line agency Sugarcane Research Institute (SRI) is responsible for research and development of the sugar sector in the country. The Department of Animal Production and Health (DAPH) and the Veterinary Research Institute (VRI) are mandated with research and development in the livestock subsector as well as with the conservation of indigenous livestock germplasm. The livestock sector is under the purview of the Ministry of Livestock and Rural Community Development (MLRCD). The Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MFAR) is primarily responsible for formulating policies, plans, and programs for the development of fisheries and aquatic resources with the Department of Fisheries (DOF) being the main responsible entity for program implementation. The provincial-level activities concerning the three sectors are carried out by the relevant provincial ministries and provincial departments of respective sectors. For example, there are eight provincial ministries representing the crops, livestock, and fisheries sectors identified at different levels of importance according to the area of interest within the province. The Department of Agriculture, Department of Animal Production and Health, and Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Development are devolved subjects by the constitution of Sri Lanka having their sister departments at the provincial levels. Page 17 of 22

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Given the diverse and dispersed policy framework and the related institutional setup in place with regard to crops, livestock, and fisheries sectors, the governance and regulations of adapting to and mitigating climate change risks are even more dispersed. Though the coherence of policies could be seen in sectoral policies and a good integration of those in the environmental and climate change policy, the strategic priorities and action plans need a close attention as there is a certain level of non-coherence and non-integration when policies are translated to the work plans, the implementation of which is coming under the purview of different government institutions working independently.

UNFCCC Negotiation and Adaptation-Related Policies of Sri Lanka Though Sri Lanka was a party for the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol as discussed above, the internal development thrust was not focusing on climate change and its impacts until recent years. This was mainly due to the domestic security issues, which were also aggravated with the devastating Asian tsunami disaster in 2004 that affected Sri Lanka significantly. The national policy focus on climate change was boosted mainly with the intense negotiations on adaptation at the UNFCCC COP13 held in Bali, Indonesia. At the COP7 held in 2001 in Marrakesh, Morocco, the decision was taken to establish a work program to support the least developed countries (LDCs) to include the development of the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA). The NAPA focuses on urgent and immediate needs for which further delay could increase vulnerability or lead to increased costs at a later stage. During the negotiations, it was implied that NAPA would be the base document for provision of immediate adaptation finances for vulnerable countries. Though this was a turning point in adaptation-related actions globally, not being an LDC, Sri Lanka was not included in the program. However, this decision created a momentum within Sri Lankan environment discourse evident with different dialogues and events on adaptation requirements. The famous Bali Action Plan (BAP) that laid the road map for a global agreement in 2009 (at COP15) recognized the four main pillars of negotiations, viz., mitigation, adaptation, technology, and finance, and had a significant influence in local climate change policies, especially in relation to adaptation. Adaptation was brought up frequently in national policy discussions in post-BAP times. This is evident in the Action Plan for Haritha Lanka Programme in Sri Lanka, which included a dedicated mission on climate change with predominant focus on adaptation. In 2009, the Sri Lankan government forwarded an “information and views” submission to UNFCCC as agreed upon in COP 14. This submission proposed to promote “Sustainable Human Development Index (SHDI)” as the main global development index while recognizing ecosystem-based adaptation as the main strategy for adaptation. It also recognized the requirement of “hardware” (such as infrastructure) and “software” (socioeconomic processes) for adaptation. This vision laid the foundation to the development of the NCCP and NCCAS. The similarities between this submission and the NCCAS structure are high so that the national policy development on climate change could be attributed to global policy processes. Mainstreaming climate change sensitivity into development process has been discussed widely in UNFCCC processes. This was highly emphasized in the Cancun Adaptation Framework agreed by the parties at COP 16 of the UNFCCC. The Sri Lankan government initiated a process of interministerial committees and discussions in 2010 along with the intersessions. The focus of NCCAS of Sri Lanka was placed at mainstreaming adaptation to economic development strategy of Sri Lanka, which shows how the international negotiation outcomes have put into action in national policy level. In addition, Sri Lankan cases have been submitted to UNFCCC in adaptation-related Page 18 of 22

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discussions (http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/srilanka060209.pdf). For example, Sri Lanka forwarded a submission (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/sbsta/eng/misc02.pdf) on Nairobi Work Program (NWP) rollout to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to the Bonn session in 2013 highlighting the adaptation requirements of its main economic crop, tea. This was the first time that Sri Lanka highlighted the adaptation requirements to stabilize its economy at SBSTA level and was a result of in-country discussions pertaining to climate policies. As per the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAP Decision 1/CP17; http://unfccc.int/ resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page¼4) of 2010, all developing country parties were requested to develop and implement national adaptation plans (NAPs) building upon the experiences on developing NAPAs (Decision 1/CP.16, UNFCCC). As stated previously, Sri Lanka is currently in the process of developing the NAP bringing in an additional policy framework on climate change adaptation.

Conclusion Sri Lanka, while being vulnerable to climate change in social, economic, and resource perspectives, has shown promise and strength to build up resilience with effective adaptive action to minimize the adverse effect of the inevitable changes of the climate. Despite the magnitude of the efforts and initiatives taken by the government, demonstrating its commitment and obligations to the global context by ratification of conventions, a serious gap still exists especially in the implementation of policies and strategies. Creating awareness among the general public for constructive actions to address complex climate change issues is still far below the expected levels. Increasing speculations make the much needed mainstreaming difficult to agree upon and implement, further exacerbating climate risks. Sri Lanka pays more attention on adaptation to climate change, which is a reasonable decision as the country is not a main polluter in the global scenario. However, mitigation also needs to be considered when planning national development programs to support internationally accepted targets to reduce GHG emissions. In the context of managing expectations of the public and decision makers regarding the adaptation process, it is an urgent need to formulate a coherent work plan focusing on a commonly shared vision, involving all principal stakeholders, and reconciling diverse perspectives. One key recommendation is to carefully plan and execute long-term national programs for supporting public participation in climate change adaptation aimed at educating and building capacity of all stakeholders. Sri Lanka owns a cohesive policy environment, which is conducive for implementation of appropriate climate change adaptation and risk reduction plans. Hence, it is a duty left with the policy implementers to identify the specific needs of the sectors and climate-proof the sectoral development initiatives of the country to ensure sustainability. Participation of all stakeholders, especially the general public, needs to be realized in every single step during this process by building capacity especially at the local level to help communities understand the climate risks and link them to sectoral activities. Thus, the programs should be designed and targeted accordingly to meet the expectations of a diverse group of stakeholders. Effective mainstreaming requires informed consensus on climate change risks, objectives, and policies that are based on a good understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all players, including ministries representing the crops, livestock, and fisheries sectors, other line ministries on environment and planning, and the participation of vulnerable communities. Shared responsibility is fundamental to successful implementation of targets having common goals. Page 19 of 22

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As perceived especially in the Asia-Pacific region, responding or reacting to climate change has become the sole responsibility of environmental agencies. This situation is particularly challenging for a country like Sri Lanka where an accelerated growth rate in the economy is expected during the postwar period and due to the Herculean task of obtaining participation of people in the war-affected areas in the implementation of activities for a common goal. Given that the adaptation strategies are always entangled with livelihood activities, the responses to climate change will no doubt come under increased scrutiny and pressure. Hence, the mainstreaming of climate change adaptation actions needs to be matched by adequate capacity building and awareness attempts, tailor-made for the different role players.

References Census and Statistics (2010) Food balance sheet. Department of Census and Statistics, of Sri Lanka. Available at http://www.statistics.gov.lk/agriculture/FoodBalanceSheet/index.html Central Bank (2013) Annual report – 2012. Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo. Available at http:// www.cbsl.gov.lk/pics_n_docs/10_pub/_docs/efr/annual_report/AR2012/English/content.htm Eriyagama N, Smakhtin V, Chandrapala L, Fernando K (2010) Impacts of climate change on water resources and agriculture in Sri Lanka: a review and preliminary vulnerability mapping. International Water Management Institute, Colombo Fernando TK, Chandrapala L (1995) Climate variability in Sri Lanka – a study of trends of air temperature, rainfall and thunder activity. In: Proceeding of the international symposium on climate and life in Asia-Pacific, Brunei Marambe B, Silva KAID (eds) (2008) Caring for the environment II 2008–2012. Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Battaramulla Marambe B, Silva P, Wijesundara S, Atapattu N (eds) (2010) Invasive alien species – strengthening capacity to control introduction and spread in Sri Lanka. Biodiversity Secretariat of the Ministry of Environment and United Nations Development Programme, Colombo Marambe B, Weerahewa J, Pushpakumara G, Silva P, Punyawardena P, Premalal S, Miah G, Roy J, Jana S (2012) Adaptation to climate change in agro-ecosystems: a case study from homegardens in South Asia. In: Proceeding of the MARCO symposium 2012 – strengthening collaboration to meet agro-environmental challenges in monsoon Asia. National Institute for Agro-Environmental Science, Tsukuba, pp 81–87 McCarthy JJ, Canziani OF, Leary NA, Dokken DJ, White KS (eds) (2001) Climate change 2001: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Ministry of Environment (2006) National carbon finance strategy of Sri Lanka. A report submitted to the Ministry of Environment and the Carbon Fund Assist Program, Carbon Finance Unit, The World Bank. Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Battaramulla. Available at http://www.climatechange.lk/DNA/data/Carbon_Finance_Strategy_Full_report-%201st% 20%20Draft_.pdf Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (2007a) Capacity assessment and action plan for developing capacity for compliance with global conventions on biodiversity, climate change, and land degradation. Environmental Economics and Global Affairs Division, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Battaramulla

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Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (2007b) The biodiversity conservation in Sri Lanka: a framework for action – addendum. Biodiversity Secretariat, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Battaramulla. Available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/world/lk/lk-nbsap-oth-en.pdf Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (2007c) Sri Lanka strategy for sustainable development. Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Battaramulla. Available at http://www. rrcap.ait.asia/nsds/uploadedfiles/file/sa/sl/srilanka%20nsds%20report/SL-SDS%20report.pdf Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (2009) Sri Lanka environment outlook. Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources and United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), Battaramulla. Available at http://www.environmentmin.gov.lk/web/pdf/annual_reports/Book-1.pdf Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (2010) National climate change adaptation strategy for Sri Lanka 2011–2016. Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Battaramulla. Available at http://www.climatechange.lk/adaptation/Files/Strategy_Booklet-Final_for_Print_Low_res(1).pdf Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (2011) Sri Lanka’s second national communication on climate change. Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Battaramulla. Available at http://www.climatechange.lk/SNC/snc_index.html Ministry of Finance and Planning (2006) Mahinda Chintana: vision for a New Sri Lanka – Ten Year Horizon Development Framework 2006–2016. Department National Planning, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Colombo. Available at http://www.treasury.gov.lk/depts/npd/publications/MahindaChintanaTenYearDevelopmentPlan.pdf Ministry of Finance and Planning (2010) Sri Lanka – the emerging Wonder of Asia, Mahinda Chintana vision for the future. Department of National Planning, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Colombo. Available at http://www.treasury.gov.lk/publications/ mahindaChintanaVision-2010full-eng.pdf Ministry of Forestry and Environment (2000) Initial national communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Ministry of Forestry and Environment, Colombo. Available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/srinc1.pdf National Council for Sustainable Development (2009) National action plan for Haritha Lanka Programme. National Council for Sustainable Development, Presidential Secretariat, Colombo. Available at http://www.environmentmin.gov.lk/web/pdf/Harita_Lanka_Book_small.pdf Nissanka SP, Punyawardena BVR, Premalal KHMS, Thattil RO (2011) Recent trends in annual and growing seasons’ rainfall of Sri Lanka. In: Proceedings of the international conference on impact of climate change in agriculture. Faculty of Agriculture, University of Ruhuna, Kamburupitiya, pp 249–263 Premalal KHMS, Punyawardena BVR (2013) Occurrence of extreme climatic events in Sri Lanka. Abstracts. In: International conference on climate change impacts and adaptations for food and environment security. Hotel Renuka, Colombo, p 24 Punyawardena BVR (2007) Agro-ecology (map and accompanying text), National Atlas of Sri Lanka, 2nd edn. Department of Survey, Colombo Punyawardena R, Dissanaike T, Mallawathanthri A (2013) Vulnerability of Sri Lanka to climate change – monograph. Department of Agriculture, Peradeniya Pushpakumara DKNG, Silva P (2008) Agriculture biodiversity in Sri Lanka (in Sinhala). Biodiversity Secretariat, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Battaramulla

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Seo S-N, Mendelsohn RO, Munasinghe M (2005) Climate change and agriculture in Sri Lanka: a Ricardian valuation. Environ Dev Econ 10:581–596 Zubair L, Blumenthal B, Ndiaye O, Perera R, Ward N, Yahiya Z, Chandimala J, Ralapanawe V, Tennakoon U, Siraj MRA, Manthrithillake H, Hendawitharna WL (2005) Evaluation of climate and habitat interactions affecting the conservation and management of Asian elephants in South-East Sri Lanka. International Research Institute for Climate and Society, Earth Institute, Columbia University, New York

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Role of Wetlands in Mitigating the Effect of Climate Change in Nigeria Nasiru Idris Medugu* Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Johor Bahru Johor, Malaysia

Abstract This chapter reviews the place of wetlands in climate change within the overall frame of environmental resource planning. This is against the background of the importance of wetlands as environmental resources which have been described as the kidneys of the landscape as a result of its hydrological and chemical functions and as atmospheric carbon sinks which stabilize the climate. The study reviewed mitigating and adapting measures in literatures that may be adopted in Nigeria in order to enhance the potentials of wetland resources in the country. The chapter asserts that the declining environmental resource base of the country is mainly due to anthropogenic influences because wetlands in Nigeria are largely exploited for economic gains and are basically used for subsistence living or for physical development. Statistical data from the government shows that 60 % of Nigerian population depend solely on the natural resource base and are engaged in farming, cattle rearing, and fishing. This chapter provides measures which include restoration programs, reduction of further disturbance on wetlands, and legislative and policy formulations for protecting wetlands which are considered appropriate and can contribute greatly in mitigating climate change when properly harnessed as a way forward toward climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Keywords Wetlands; Climate change; Resource conservation; Adaptive planning; Developing countries, Nigeria

Introduction Wetlands are the transitional zones between the aquatic and terrestrial environments. Though there is a controversy over its precise definition because of variety in its types and boundary limits, generally it refers to the intermediary zone between permanently wet and permanently dry environments (Barbier et al. 1997). However, during the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, 100 countries adopted an extremely wide approach and defined wetlands as “areas of marsh, fen, peat land or water, whether natural or artificial, permanently and temporary with water that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including areas of marine water, the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six meters” (Barbier et al. 1997). Mitsch and Gosselink (1993) and Barbier et al. (1997) also described wetlands as “the kidneys of the landscape, because of its role in the hydrological and chemical cycles, functioning as “biological supermarkets” and serving as food webs and supporting rich biodiversity.” As an interface or the intermediary between land, sea,

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 12

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groundwater, and atmosphere, wetlands are being regarded as one of the most complex regions on earth (Semeniuk 2012). In relation to climate change, intact wetlands serve as buffers in the hydrological cycle (Bergkamp and Orlando 1999; Junk et al. 2013) and absolve organic carbon from the atmosphere, neutralizing the effects of atmospheric increase in CO2 (Junk et al. 2013). In fact, the place of wetlands as an environmental resource is monumental, justifying why research is needed to harness its linkage with climate change, especially in developing countries where coping ability is low. Unfortunately there is paucity of research results that attempt to establish a nexus between wetlands and climate change. This is corroborated by Erwin (2008), who observed that after examining over 250 articles pertaining to wetlands and climate change in peer-reviewed journals and pertinent texts, there was very little discussion of wetland restoration in the climate change literatures, with only an occasional comment in a very small fraction of the documents. Odjugo (2010) is also of the opinion that though the effects of climate change are more pronounced at the regional levels, most data on it are global in scope. This underscores the need for research initiatives to shed light on wetlands within the frame of climate change adaptation at regional levels using Nigeria as case study. The study therefore aims at assessing wetland resource services in the context of environmental resource planning for climate change adaptation in Nigeria. The specific objectives are as follows: • To review the impact of industrialization, urbanization, and subsistence living on wetland resource depletion generally but with specific bias to Nigeria • To review mitigating and adapting measures in literatures that may be adopted in Nigeria in order to enhance the potentials of wetland resources in the country in the light of climate change

Climate Change and the Environment The environment operates like a giant single, self-regulating, and self-sustaining organism made up of different components that are intricately interdependent. Each and every component has got a vital function for the sustenance of the system. Any dislocation in one generates multiplier effects on other components; thus climate, for example, has an important influence on any environment and can trigger changes, if altered. Climate changes and the impacts of these changes may affect the environment in diverse ways. Warming, for instance, is capable of forcing species to migrate to areas with lower temperatures and more conducive to their survival. Climate change causes irreversible multiplying effects, manifesting in species adapting, migrating, or perishing which ultimately result to losses in local population (Boer 2012). This development can affect environmental services of a particular environmental resource. Brundtland report on our common future in 1987 stresses the need for counterbalancing the unmet needs of the current generations with the needs of the future generations (Sneddon et al. 2006). They said most scholars and practitioners have come to accept the Brundtland definition of sustainable development as the most appropriate which hinged on environment and development dilemmas. Mohammad (2011) looks at the environment as the composition of the natural, artificial, physical, chemical, and biological elements that make the existence, transformation, and development of living organisms possible. He went further to say that an environment can only be referred to as sustainable when it possesses the ability to continue to function properly and indefinitely. Environmental sustainability therefore aims at reducing environmental degradation, through the process of stopping or reversing any human activities that lead to it. Page 2 of 12

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The United Nations IPCC report established that human activities, especially those associated with consuming energy from fossil fuel, remain the major source for climate change (IPCC 2007). The panel substantiates the above assertion by reporting that between 1970 and 2004, annual CO2 emission grew by about 80 % due to human activities from fossil fuel burning. Over the years, humanity has solely depended on fossil energy use because of the huge capital and economic benefits. But the global antecedences attached with this source of energy consumption have proved that it is not sustainable. In search of the earth’s vast seemingly unlimited resources, fossil fuels discovery led to a great transition in our societies which became highly dependent on energy use (Agudelo-Vera et al. 2011). Additionally, industrial societies use three to five times as much energy and materials as did agrarian ones (Krausmann et al. 2008). Available statistics shows that resource consumption by the end of the twentieth century already exceeds the productive capacity of critical biophysical systems on every continent and waste production already breaches the assimilative capacity of many ecosystems at every scale (Rees 1999). To add credence to the above assertion, Vitousek et al. (1997) affirm that we are changing earth more rapidly than we can understand it. The rates at which we generate waste exceed the rate at which the earth can assimilate. Though we have made significant progress in reducing industrial pollution and increasing efficiency, globalization is devastating natural habitats, speeding global warming, and increasing air and water pollution (Mohammad 2011). He went further to establish that the yearning for global nature of trade and business has rendered traditional national environment protection techniques less or ineffective. The reviewed literatures so far are unanimous in supporting the fact that in climate change and sustainability, the environment occupies a central stage. Hossain et al. (2010) affirm that in sustainability studies, the closest element that should be dealt with in climate change is the environment. An unsustainable situation takes place when natural capital (the sum total of nature’s resources) is used up faster than it can be replenished. Sustainability requires that human activity only uses nature’s resources at a rate at which they can be replenished naturally. Natural vegetation, green spaces, wetlands, waterfronts, etc., can be affected by urbanization and development. The key manifestations of environmental change are global warming and climate change. In fact, global warming is considered to be one of the most stressing issues that are currently facing humanity (Mezher 2011). However, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment in 2001 has reported that global warming and climate change are receiving a great deal of attention by governments, businesses, consumers, and the mass media due to its publicized impact on human society, biodiversity, water supply, infrastructure, and desertification (Santos 2011). This is in agreement with the European Commission 2005 report on winning the battle against global warming, who also affirmed that there is general awareness in tackling the problem of greenhouse gases (GHG) emission in the light of its damaging effects on the global environment, economy, and international security (Minoia et al. 2009). But this increasing awareness of the impact of GHG and climate change on the environment is still low in the developing countries compared to that in the developed countries. There is general lack of awareness of the role of the natural environment in mitigating climate change in the developing countries. This again underscores the need for research initiatives to shed light on the role of the wetlands as component part of the environment in mitigating climate change at regional levels using Nigeria as case study.

Wetlands and Climate Change Statistics has shown that 6 % of the land area of the world is occupied by wetlands (Acreman et al. 2007; Erwin 2008). This contains approximately 12 % of the global carbon cycle (Erwin 2008). Page 3 of 12

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Earlier statistics however ascribed greater value indicating that nearly 10 % of the earth’s surface is wetlands, of which 2 % are lakes, 30 % bogs, 26 % fens, 20 % swamps, and 15 % floodplains (Bergkamp and Orlando 1999). Wetlands are significant carbon stores, and so the role of their conservation also needs to be considered in the development of climate change mitigation strategies. This is in line with what Bergkamp and Orlando (1999) see as the ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which is to reduce GHG emissions. Wetlands represent a significant storage reservoir of carbon in the global carbon cycle. Statistics shows that of the total storage of carbon in the earth’s soils (1,400–2,300 Pg, where 1 Pg = 1,015 g), about 20–30 % is stored in wetlands, much as peat in wetland soils, and that 0.08 Pg/year is stored as peat in wetlands, a small percent of the 6.3 Pg/year that are produced by humans (Cudmore 2011). He also asserts that disturbance of peat deposits can influence global carbon budgets, combustion, and oxidation of peat deposits, and drainage of wetlands also can release carbon back into atmosphere (could be 45–89 % of the carbon being sequestered by wetlands). Over the years, however, there has been a remarkable loss of wetlands globally though there are no statistics to support this assertion (Barbier et al. 1997). They however reported significant loss in some countries such as the United States put at 87 ha that is 54 % of its original wetlands, Portugal 70 %, and various degrees of loss in European countries. Factors responsible for natural change on the wetlands include issues such as drought, sea-level rise, and infilling with sediment or organic material. Anthropogenic activities on the other hand, such as subsistence agricultural activities, constructions, developments, etc., are human-induced factors that have affected the wetlands over the years. As a temporary feature of the landscape, natural or human phenomenon can introduce change to the fragile landscape, and without some precaution over its usage, it might eventually disappear with time. Climate change is perhaps the greatest challenge facing wetland management. And wetlands are perhaps the most susceptible to climate change in the aquatic ecosystem. Shallow wetlands that are dependent on precipitation will be the most vulnerable to drying, warming, and changes in water quality. Intermittent and perennial streams, vernal pools, and coastal wetlands and marshes will also be particularly vulnerable to projected changes in temperature, precipitation, and sea-level rise. Wetlands that depend on precipitation for their source of water according to Winter (2000) are the most vulnerable to changes in climate. The features of the wetlands in developed economy are slightly different from that of the developing countries. Kulkarni and Ramanchadra (2006) established that the environmental challenges confronting the developing countries are considerably different from those facing the industrialized economies. Their assessment shows that in the developing economies, the rural population depends directly in exploiting the natural resources for fishing, rearing livestock, agricultural, fuel, etc., to meet their subsistence needs and gain income. This has escalated land use change in the natural environment causing habitat disappearance and results to loss of the ecological resources and the functions disrupted or loss culminating in climate change. Although African countries are exonerated from being major contributors to GHG emissions, as the continent’s contribution is relatively low compared to other continents, unfortunately climate change does not know regional boundaries and the region is more vulnerable. In recent years, some countries in Africa such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, and Sudan are experiencing increase in severe droughts as a result of climate change (Spence 2005). Increased dependence on firewood has aggravated forest depletion in most African countries. And accelerated forest depletion according to Alaci and Ato (2012) can alter the microclimatic scenario of an area. Some of the forests depleted are actually wetland forests, apart from the fact that what happened to the forests is a bigger picture of what happens to other components of the ecosystem, wetlands inclusive. Page 4 of 12

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Regional evidence shows that some tropical rainforests in western Africa have become drier since 1960 (Malhi and Wright 2004). This according to Velarde et al. (2005) is an indication that shifts in ecosystems or species habitats in Africa due to climate change are expected and are happening already. The continent is most vulnerable to climate change because most African governments may not have the coping abilities to actively react to climate change and global warming (IPCC 2007). Odjugo (2010) also upheld the above assertion, arguing that even though climate change and its impacts are global, the developing countries will experience more of its biting effects most especially in Africa because coping capabilities are low, coupled with the fact that the region is the least equipped to mitigate climate change impacts (Velarde et al. 2005). And more often in Africa, issues of climate change are neither incorporated in policy development matters nor invested in decision making that mitigates it (UNDP 2006). According to Hossain et al. (2010), striking a balance between climate change and development is essential for identification and implementation of wholesome approaches that will bring more and more management aspects into fore across different sectors in an efficient way. This they said becomes the bedrock of our achievement in development or managing problems, in a sustainable and advanced manner. Hjorth and Bagheri (2006) have however argued that “managing the future is a ‘wicked’ problem, meaning that it has no definitive formulation and no conclusively ‘best’ solutions and furthermore, that the problem is constantly shifting.”

Wetland Resource Depletion and Climate Change in Nigeria The landscape of Nigeria is dotted with wetland resources that spread across the northern and southern regions of the country (Ajibola et al. 2011). The wetlands in the country are categorized into two, the freshwater floodplain (FF) wetlands and the saline coastal mangrove swamp (MS) wetlands (Ajibola et al. 2011). FF wetland occupies an area of 9,000 km2 in the coastal states of Akwa Ibom, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo, Lagos, Ondo, and Rivers (Agbi et al. 1995), while the MS wetland occupies an area of 858 km2 located in states such as Rivers, Cross Rivers, Imo, and parts of Edo and Lagos (Eregha and Irughe 2009). However, these are not the only locations where wetlands are found in the country as vast wetlands also stretch along the fronts of river Niger and Benue, the two major rivers in the country. Large quantities of wetlands are found therefore in states such as Kogi, Benue, Niger, Taraba, etc., where these rivers and their tributaries navigate. While the wetlands in the riparian rural communities in the country are being used mainly for farming as the local populations depend on it for their livelihoods, the ones in the urban and suburban communities are being heavily encroached upon by anthropogenic activities such as industrialization, urbanization, recreation, and developments. These encroachments have also been confirmed by the Federal Government of Nigeria who reported that the proportion of land covered by forest has been reducing by 0.28 % on the average in the country (Federal Government of Nigeria 2008). Alaci et al. (2011) and Kodiwo et al. (2012) confirmed that the declining environmental resource base of the country is due mainly to anthropogenic influences. This declining environmental resource includes the wetlands. Available statistics have shown that the 140 million population in the country is impacting on the country’s land area of 923,000 km2 through various physical environmental activities (Gbadegesin et al. 2011). In addition they established that 60 % of this population depend solely on the natural resource base of the country and are engaged in farming, cattle rearing, and fishing while the informal sector still largely controls the economic activities in the urban areas and that the wetlands in the country are basically used for subsistence living or for physical development especially in the Page 5 of 12

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semi-urban and urban areas. These activities especially physical development are causing a reduction in the wetland resource base of the nation. This is because physical development has the tendency of changing the entire ecosystem of the wetlands. If the human impact on the wetlands in the country continues in this manner, it will reduce the hydrological and atmospheric carbon reduction capacity of the nation’s wetlands. Unfortunately activities on the wetlands are not regulated, although the country has planning authority that is vested with such power. Most of the wetlands in the urban areas are not delineated as planned areas; hence, activities on it are not controlled and the public opinion formed about wetlands is that of free for all properties. The effect of climate change that has caught up with Nigeria culminated in the flood event of 2012, reckon to be the worst disaster in the history of the country. Lives were lost, thousands of people were displaced, and properties worth millions of dollars were lost. The riparian communities were badly affected, and even communities that were relatively distanced away from the rivers were amazingly taken over by the flood. The destructions that were caused by this flood were monumental, and for many years to come, many people will still live with shock. The wetland floodplains were believed to have played a vital role in absorbing the excess water, without which probably the magnitude of the disaster would have been more. Statistical values have also indicated that rainfall in recent time has consistently decreased for decades in the Sudano-Sahelian Region of Nigeria, reflecting in significant changes in the climate in the form of desertification (Olatunde and Alaci 2012). In crop yields, for instance, Adejuwon (2006) predicted that even though there will be increase in some areas in the country toward the early part of the twenty-first century, toward the end, however, there will be a decrease. Rise in temperature beyond the coping capability of the crops he maintained could cause the decrease in yields. Some parts of the country are experiencing this already.

The Way Forward in Management of Wetland Resource in Nigeria Alwi et al. (2011) are of the opinion that in order to achieve sustainable development, conservation, appropriate planning, and management of natural resources remain the key elements to be considered. Planning according to Taylor (2010) should not only be concerned with planning the overall physical environment but should encompass the planning and management of the environment in all its aspects including especially the natural environment with its delicate ecology and pattern of habitats. In the forest resource conflict, for instance, Campbell (1996) reported that industrialists must curb their profits increasing tendency to boost timber yields, so as to ensure that enough of the forest remains to “reproduce” itself. He called this practice “sustainable yield,” though timber companies and environmentalists disagree about how far the forest can be exploited and still be “sustainable.” Although at least this is a sector that has been identified in the environment, methods on how to enhance sustainable practice in the sector can be explored in spite of the debate. This idea can be applied to wetland resource, identifying it as an important sector of the environment in mitigating climate change and controlling its uses as we advance on the debate on the best possible ways in sustaining its usage. Unfortunately these suggested methodologies are nonexistent in Nigeria; if conservation does occur, they are incidental unless were adopted as open space in urban master plan. Destruction of wetlands in attempt for new buildings in urban areas and farming activities is rampant in many rural communities across Nigeria. Deliberate policy guideline on wetland protection is absent, while games harvested from such areas remain choice delicacy among Nigerians. To ensure that sustainability is achieved both at the global and regional levels, a reduction in resource consumption is particularly relevant. Nature is the common heritage of mankind; to preserve this heritage, mankind must learn the culture of conservation. In spite of the designation Page 6 of 12

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of few wetlands as Ramsar sites, Gopal (2013) argues that there are very weak or nonexistent policies concerning wetland conservation globally. This is certainly more obvious in the developing countries, Nigeria inclusive. The idea that has been promoted by both Taylor (2010) and Alwi et al. (2011) as discussed previously remains ideal for the management of wetlands in Nigeria. The frontiers of planning rules and regulations should go beyond the built environment to the fragile component of the landscape like the wetlands since they play a vital role in absorbing excess CO2 from the atmosphere. Previous studies on wetlands in Nigeria have not adequately related it to climate change and formulation of relevant planning policy that enhance wetland protection. Although many people are aware that one of the problems facing mankind today is climate change and sustainability, only very few are however conscious of engaging in behaviors that will mitigate climate change (Gifford 2011). Since it is no longer possible to avoid some degree of global warming and climate change, even if efforts to reduce GHG emissions are successful, studies are therefore needed on how to overcome or minimize impact of climate change especially in a developing country like Nigeria. There are two possible strategies, one is mitigation and the other is adaptation. While mitigation is the effort put forth in reducing the accumulation of GHG in the atmosphere, adaptation is all about adjusting to the impact of global warming (Kwok and Rajkovich 2010). This implies that mitigation is attempting to prevent global warming from happening; adaptation is looking for better ways to live with it since it has happened. Adger et al. (2003) look at adaptation to climate change as the adjustment of a system in moderating the impact of climate change by taking advantages of new opportunities or deciding on the best way to cope with the consequences. The IPCC (2007) report said it is the natural or human system adjustment in response to climate stimuli or their effects. Burley et al. (2012) sum it up as exploiting opportunities or moderating harm. Literature concurs that for adaptation to climate change to be effective, it has to be at the individual finer level of scale such as nature reserve, parks, or watersheds (Mawdsley et al. 2009). Wetland therefore is considered appropriate as one of the finer scales in the environment that can contribute greatly in mitigating climate change when properly harnessed. Wetland users in Nigeria need to seek for fresh environmentally friendly resource utilization of the wetlands by seizing the opportunities that climate change offers or devising conservative measures to cope with its impacts. There are diverse ways or methods for wetland adaptation to climate change from the literature. But the method to adapt should be a function of prevailing situation because the scope and the nature of the challenge are not the same. According to Mawdsley et al. (2009), no one particular method or strategy is considered optimal over others; hence, the circumstances under review determine which one is more or less appropriate. Others have also concurred asserting that an action that is acceptable by one group, government, or individual may not be acceptable for another and that success should be defined by scale of implementation and the criteria used for evaluation (Adger et al. 2005). Adaptation to climate change however should be ultimately a collective responsibility of the society, while its application may involve individuals, groups, civil society, or the government (Tompkins and Adger 2004; Adger et al. 2005). Rebecca et al. (2012) have put forward several strategies in coping with climate change. Their strategies are summed up in promoting system resistance and resilience. The ability to withstand environmental change is what they referred to as resistance, while bouncing back or absorbing environmental change is resilience. However, some broad-based practical strategies have been recommended in the literatures on the use of wetland resource as mitigating or adapting measures to climate change. Since the assessment of the wetland resource in Nigeria shows lack of regulatory rules on its usage and the country is already experiencing climate change, there is a need to look for ways of reducing or minimizing human impacts on the wetlands. Page 7 of 12

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Among the volumes of the recommended strategies in the literatures, we put forward three for adoption in Nigeria. These strategies are recommended against the background that they are simple to practice as some have been applied in other developing countries like Nigeria. Some of the strategies are not particularly on the wetlands but may be applied. These strategies include issues such as the restoration of wetlands or the entire ecosystem (Erwin 2008; Lawler 2009; Mawdsley et al. 2009), reduction of further disturbance (Erwin 2008; Lawler 2009; Harvey et al. 2012), and legislative and policy formulations (Hartig et al. 1997). The views and principles surrounding these strategies are discussed in the following subsections accordingly.

Wetland Restoration Erwin (2008) suggested that wetland restoration programs should form part of the restoration projects and policy makers should strategically inculcate wetland restoration into the overall plan as climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. Boer (2012) concurs and is of the views that when wetlands, streams, or riparian zones are restored, it provides buffers that cushion the effects of climate change on the species and the ecosystem at large. Acreman et al. (2007) on the other hand recognize wetland water management as key element in wetland restoration efforts, because hydrology plays a crucial role in wetland maintenance. Created and restored wetlands have the potential to play an important role in carbon sequestration. Rates of 180–190 g C/m2/year have been reported for created wetlands in Ohio (Cudmore 2011).

Reduction of Further Disturbance on Wetlands The diminishing ability of the wetlands to respond to climate change among other factors is the issue of intensive use by man in quest for industrialization or subsistence living. Management strategy requires further minimal use of the wetlands. Prevention or reduction of additional stress should be avoided so as to allow the wetlands’ response to climate change (Erwin 2008). This stress includes issues such as maintaining hydrology, reducing pollution, controlling exotic vegetation, and protecting wetland biological diversity and integrity. Lawler (2009) on the other hand has confirmed that removal or reduction in the existing environmental stresses and threats to population or species does enhance resilience to climate change in some cases.

Legislative and Policies Formulations for Protecting Wetlands Hartig et al.’s (1997) review on Eastern Europe’s wetlands advanced that the formulation of policies that will protect wetlands will be of assistance to countries that are vulnerable to climate change. They suggested precautionary management measures for sustainable wetland utilization such as establishing buffer zone, advocating for sustainable uses of wetlands, and recapturing of farmed or mined wetland areas. These measures are conspicuously absent in Nigeria as established previously. In the light of the function of wetlands in mitigating climate change as carbon sink, there is a need for policy makers to establish wetland buffer zones, reclaim wetlands that have been lost to other economic activities, and encourage sustainable use of the wetlands, among others. This will entail that wetland legislative and regulatory laws have to be enacted and enforced. Individuals are not autonomous in decision making in respect to adaptation. There ought to be guiding rules by government institutions that should cover areas such as regulatory structures, property rights and social norms, and associated rules in use (Adger et al. 2005). Adapting measures that will mitigate climate change has to be multidimensional and not necessary restricted to one component of the environment. Others have also suggested that a multilevel governance approach, by cooperative actions at the different institutional scales, is a step in the right direction toward mitigating and adapting to climate change (Minoia et al. 2009). This they said can Page 8 of 12

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be accomplished through delegations of functions from the central government to regional and local governments, so as to support and contribute to the overall effort in reducing GHG through their own policies and actions. GHG emissions can be reduced by the regional or local governments through spatial planning and transport policy, energy-efficient construction, and the renovation of energywasting buildings (Minoia et al. 2009) and by promoting renewable sources of energy (Minoia et al. 2009; Mezher 2011). In Nigeria as of the moment, there are no relation between all levels of governance in respect to wetland protection and no regulatory laws, exposing the wetlands to untamed usage. The wetlands for now are synonymous to being an open access. Promulgating laws to protect the wetlands is eminent. However, policy makers are not only expected to enact laws but ensure that they are enforced. An assessment of the study by Sonak et al. (2011) on Goa wetlands shows that although there were existing legislative rules put in place to protect this particular wetland, implementation was marred by corrupt practices of the officials, leading to policy distortions and weak implementation. Unfortunately, corruption for now is a serious epidemic problem confronting governance in Nigeria at all spheres. Nigerian government therefore has to ensure that laws for protecting the wetlands are not only formulated but implemented. Adopting the above-recommended strategies will not only enhance wetland ecosystem but ensure that it continues to provide its ecological services amidst changing climate.

Conclusions The management of the natural resources, the natural environment, and the wetlands in particular is therefore crucial to sustainability and climate change mitigation in Nigeria, Africa, and the world at large. Local authorities need to pay attention to the stocks of natural, social, and cultural capital in their communities, since all of these can decline over time in the absence of private and public investment to maintain or increase their value (Saunders and Dalziel 2010). In accordance with Ramsar recommendation, the government and the planning authority in Nigeria can identify wetlands that are of ecological importance and designate their sites for protection at the local levels. This according to Minoia et al. (2009) can be accomplished by the local planners and institutions through evaluation of all the sectors so as to identify the best sectors that needed to be regulated locally and by which planning tool. Research gap exists in information dissemination among researchers, policy makers, and wetland users in respect to human impacts on the wetlands and the resultant effects on global warming and climate change especially in the developing countries. Research findings on wetlands and climate change for now are within the corridors of academicians and researchers. Further studies may therefore focus on reviewing studies on dissemination of research findings on wetlands and climate among the various stakeholders in Nigeria and other developing countries. Erwin (2008) established the need for educating both the public and private sectors so that wetland protection, management, and restoration can be redefined by all in view of climate change.

Acknowledgments The authors would like to acknowledge the research support received from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) in Johor, Malaysia.

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References Acreman MC, Fisher J, Mould DJ, Stratford CJ, Mountford JO (2007) Hydrological science and wetland restoration: some case studies from Europe. Hydrol Earth Syst Sci 11(1):158–169 Adejuwon J (2006) Food crop production in Nigeria, II: potential effects of climate change. Clim Res 32:229–245 Adger NW, Huq S, Brown K, Declan C, Hulme M (2003) Adaptation to climate change in the developing world. Prog Dev Stud 3(3):179–195 Adger WN, Arnell NW, Tompkins EL (2005) Successful adaptation to climate change across scales. Glob Environ Chang 15:77–86 Agbi JA, Abang SO, Animashaun AI (1995) Nigerian environment, Nigerian conservation, module 2. Macmillan Nigeria, Lagos Agudelo-Vera CM, Mels AR, Keesman KJ, Rijnaarts HHM (2011) Resource management as a key factor for sustainable urban planning. J Environ Manag 92(10):2295–2303 Ajibola MO, Oloyede SO, Atere OO (2011) Estate surveyors and valuers’ perception and methods of wetland valuation in Lagos metropolis. Int Res J Manag Bus Stud 1(4):85–95 Alaci DSA, Ato E (2012) Mainstreaming residential-based green area in physical development. Paper presented at the 43rd annual conference/general meeting of the Nigerian Institute of Town Planners (NITP), Abuja, 7–11 Nov 2012 Alaci DSA, Amujabi FA, Baba AN, Ogbjaje D (2011) Spatial growth assessment with remote sensing data for central Nigeria. J Agric Soc Sci 7:1–6 Alwi SRW, Manan ZA, Jaromír Klemeš J (2011) Recent advances in resource conservation and planning – a review. Asia Pac J Chem Eng 6(5):689–695 Barbier EB, Acreman M, Knowler D (1997) Economic valuation of wetlands: a guide for policy makers and planners. Ramsar Convention Bureau, Gland, p 148 Bergkamp G, Orlando B (1999) Wetlands and climate change- background paper from IUCN, Exploring collaboration between the convention on wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971) and the UN framework convention on climate change, Ramsar Convention on Wetland, Ramsar, 1–22 Oct 1999 Boer H (2012) Policy options for, and constraints on, effective adaptation for rivers and wetlands in northeast Queensland. Australas J Environ Manag 17(3):154–164 Burley JG, Mcallister RRJ, Collins KA, Lovelock CE (2012) Integration, synthesis and climate change adaptation: a narrative based on coastal wetlands at the regional scale. Reg Environ Chang 12:581–593 Campbell S (1996) Green cities, growing cities, just cities? Urban planning and the contradictions of sustainable development. J Am Plan Assoc 62(3):1–30 Cudmore WW (2011) Wetlands and climate change, Northwest center for sustainable resources, The NCSR wetland ecology and management series. Chemeketa Community College, Salem, pp 1–47 Eregha PB, Irughe IR (2009) Oil Induced environmental degradation in the Nigeria’s Niger-Delta: the multiplier effects. J Sustain Dev Afr 11(4):160–175 Erwin KL (2008) Wetlands and global climate change: the role of wetland restoration in a changing world. Wetl Ecol Manag 17(1):71–84 Federal Government of Nigeria (2008) Mid-Point assessment of the Millennium development goals in Nigeria, pp 2000–2007 Gbadegesin AS, Olorunfemi FB, Usman AR (2011) Urban vulnerability to climate change and natural hazards in Nigeria. In: Brauch HG et al (eds) Coping with global environmental change, Page 10 of 12

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disasters and security, vol 5, Hexagon series on human and environmental security and peace. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, pp 669–687 Gifford R (2011) The dragons of inaction: psychological barriers that limit climate change mitigation and adaptation. Am Psychol 66(4):290–302 Gopal B (2013) Future of wetlands in tropical and subtropical Asia, especially in the face of climate change. Aquat Sci 75:39–61 Hartig EK, Grozev O, Rosenzweig C (1997) Climate change, agriculture and wetlands in eastern Europe: vulnerability, adaptation and policy. Clim Change 36:107–121 Hjorth P, Bagheri A (2006) Navigating towards sustainable development: a system dynamics approach. Futures 38:74–92 Hossain MMM, Rahman MH, Park K (2010) Manifestations of climate change impacts affecting socio-economy in Bangladesh: looking through the framework of sustainable development. Int J Clim Change Strateg Manag 2(2):180–190 IPCC (2007) Climate change 2007: impact, adaptation and vulnerability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Junk WJ, An S, Finlayson CM, Gopal B, Kvet J, Mitchell SA, Mitsch WJ, Robarts RD (2013) Current state of knowledge regarding the world’s wetlands and their future under global climate change: a synthesis. Aquat Sci 75:151–167 Kodiwo MO, Ang F, Okere AWA (2012) Analysis of spatial and temporal changes and the correlation between agricultural land use intensity and land degradation. Mod Soc Sci J 1(1):21–43 Krausmann F, Kowalski MF, Schandl H, Eisenmenger N (2008) The global sociometabolic transition, past and present metabolic profiles and their future trajectories. J Ind Ecol 12(5/6):637–656 Kulkarni V, Ramanchadra TV (2006) Environmental management: commonwealth of learning Indian Institute of Science. Capital Publishing Company, New Delhi, p 367 Kwok A, Rajkovich NB (2010) Addressing climate change in comfort standards. Build Environ 45(1):18–22 Lawler JJ (2009) Climate change adaptation strategies for resource management and conservation planning. The year ecological & conservation biology. Ann N Y Acad Sci 1162:79–98 Malhi Y, Wright J (2004) Spatial patterns and recent trends in the climate of tropical rainforest regions. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 359:311–329 Mawdsley JR, Malley RO, Ojima DS (2009) A review of climate-change adaptation strategies for wildlife management and biodiversity conservation. Conserv Biol 23(5):1080–1089 Mezher T (2011) Building future sustainable cities: the need for a new mindset. Constr Innov Inf Process Manag 11(2):136–141 Minoia P, Calzavara A, Lovo L, Zanetto G (2009) An assessment of the principle of subsidiarity in urban planning to face climate change: the case of Martellago, Venice Province. Int J Clim Change Strateg Manag 1(1):63–74 Mitsch WJ, Gosselink JG (1993) Wetlands, 2nd edn. Wiley, New York Mohammad N (2011) Environment and sustainable development in Bangladesh: a legal study in the context of international trends. Int J Law Manag 53(2):89–107 Odjugo PAO (2010) Regional evidence of climate change in Nigeria. J Geogr Reg Plann 3:42–150 Olatunde A, Alaci DS (2012) Is the trend and persistence of drought in the Sudan-Sahel region of Nigeria an indication of climate change? In: Illiya MA, Abdulrahim MA, Danka IM (eds) Climate change and sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Department of Geography, Usumanu Dan Fodio University, Sokoto

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Rebecca GH, Laura AB, Frank JM (2012) Climate change adaptation: new perspectives for Natural Resource Management and Conservation, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida, Gainesville Rees WE (1999) The built environment and the ecosphere: a global perspective. Build Res Inf 27(4–5):206–220 Santos MAOD (2011) Minimizing the business impact on the natural environment: a case study of Woolworths South Africa. Eur Bus Rev 23(4):384–391 Saunders C, Dalziel P (2010) Local planning for sustainable development: a small rural district case study from New Zealand. J Enterp Commun People Places Glob Econ 4(3):252–267 Semeniuk V (2012) Predicted response of coastal wetlands to climate changes: a Western Australian model. Hydrobiologia 708:23–43 Sneddon C, Howarth RB, Norgaard RB (2006) Sustainable development in a post-Brundtland world. Ecol Econ 57(2):253–268 Sonak S, Sonak M, Kazi S (2011) Determinants of successful environmental regimes in the context of the coastal wetlands of Goa. Land Use Policy 29:94–101 Spence C (2005) Global warming: personal solutions for a healthy planet. Palgrave Macmillan, New York Taylor N (2010) What is this thing called spatial planning? An analysis of the British government’s view. Town Plann Rev 81(2):193 Tompkins EL, Adger WN (2004) Does adaptive management of natural resources enhance resilience to climate change? Ecol Soc 9(2):10 UNDP (2006) Human development report: beyond scarcity; power; poverty and the global water crisis. United Nations Development Programme, New York Velarde SJ, Malhi Y, Moran D, Wright J, Hussain S (2005) Valuing the impacts of climate change on protected areas in Africa. Ecol Econ 53:21–33 Vitousek PM, Mooney HA, Lubchenco J, Melillo JM (1997) Human domination of earth’s ecosystems. Science 277:494–499 Winter TC (2000) The vulnerability of wetlands to climate change: a hydrologic landscape perspective. J Am Water Resour Assoc 36(2):305–311

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Transition to Low-Carbon Future in Nigeria: The Role of Pro-Environmental Behaviors Oluwatosin E. Ilevbarea*, Maruf Sannia, Femi M. Ilevbareb and Godwin A. Alia a National Centre for Technology Management (NACETEM), Federal Ministry of Science and Technology, Ile-Ife, Nigeria b Department of Psychology, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria

Abstract Various environmental challenges pose a lot of threats to sustainable development, among which are global warming, air pollution, and loss of biodiversity. Many of the causes of these challenges are rooted in unsustainable human behaviors and thus can be managed by changing the relevant behavior so as to reduce its ecological and detrimental impacts. This chapter explores the potential for discouraging behavior that contributes to greenhouse gas emission into the atmosphere. It also suggests alternatives to fossil fuel-dependent pathways, giving attention to the behavioral and social drivers of change in Nigeria. The chapter further prescribes behavioral and social changes into the roles played by households, business sector, and government policies. Strategic framework and initiatives for energy saving and adoption of low-carbon pathways in the medium- to long-term were suggested. The chapter concludes that to move toward a low-carbon economy in Nigeria, there is the need to institutionalize appropriate behavioral and social changes in the society as well as developing technological capabilities in the area of clean technologies.

Keywords Low-carbon future; Nigeria; Greenhouse gas emissions; Climate change; Pro-environmental behaviors

Introduction Global warming caused by climate change has been regarded by many scholars to be the most severe environmental challenge of the present time. Metz et al. (2007) estimated that the average global temperature has increased by approximately 0.6  C over the past 150 years and projected to increase between 1.4  C and 5.8  C by 2100 if greenhouse gas emissions are not significantly reduced. Many developed and developing countries are faced with the dilemma of reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere or face the considerable risks associated with global warming such as drought, excessive flood, sea level rise, food insecurity, increasing number of extreme events, etc. A lot of evidences in the literature support the fact that human activities are contributing immensely to global warming and that our failure to act now could lead to disasters such as increase mortality, disease, injury, heat waves, storms, and floods (Anderegg et al. 2009). Consequences of extreme climatic changes as a result of global warming are severe, and there has been considerable

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 20

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Fig. 1 Major sources of CO2 emissions in 1994

and disturbing concern among various environmental scientists and policy makers in various countries of the world. According to the World Health Organization (2002), it was estimated that global warming is responsible for 154,000 deaths worldwide by creating conditions more favorable for the spread of diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, and diarrhea. Although the total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Nigeria is minimal compared with the global average, nonetheless the carbon footprint in the country is on the increase due to her large population and fossil fuel-dependent economy. The major contributors of CO2 in Nigeria include land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF), energy consumptions, industry, solvents use, agriculture, and waste management (see Fig. 1). In 1994, the gross carbon emission was 52.5 Tg–CO2–C, while the net uptake, principally from land use change, was 10.4 Tg–CO2–C. This gives a net carbon emission of 42.1 Tg CO2–C (FME 2003). The summary of national emissions of GHG is 192 Tg CO2, 17.0 Tg CO, 5.9 Tg CH4, and 2.2 Tg NMVOC. Others include 660 Gg of NOX and 12 Gg of N2O. Meanwhile, the total GHG emissions (in CO2 equivalent) for the three main greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4, andN2O) and from the five main sectors (energy, industry, agriculture, land use change and forestry (LUCF), and waste) were about 330,946 Gg CO2e in 2000. The net CO2 was 214,523 Gg, representing 65 % of the national GHG emissions, methane (CH4) was109,319 Gg CO2e or 33 %, and nitrous oxide (N2O) totaled 7,104 Gg (CO2e) or 2 % (FME 2010).

Climate Change Impacts in Nigeria Over the years, the conditions of human and capital developments remain challenging. Out of 187 countries ranked on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report (2013), Nigeria’s position is 153. Average life expectancy is 52.3 years compared with 64.6 years in Ghana. Today, the maternal mortality ratio (deaths per 100,000 live births) is 630. The country’s Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) value (the share of the population that is multidimensionally poor adjusted by the intensity of the deprivations) is 0.31, while the adult literacy rate stands at around 61.3. Climate change impacts are bound to add to some of these challenges. Climate change occurs when there is a change in the steady state of equilibrium in the climate system causing changes in one or more of the components making up the system (Metz et al. 2001; Kak’mena et al. 2012). Climate change is anticipated to impact across ecosystem, societies, human livelihoods, food security, human health, and well-being. This could be changes in

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temperature, changes in seasonal occurrences of rainfall, etc. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Metz et al. 2001), a rise in temperature of between 1.4  C and 5.8  C by 2100 will have serious negative effects on the socioeconomic well-being of the people. Some of these effects in Nigeria include the following, among others: increase in amount of rains and number of rainy days, flooding in the coastal areas, and higher risk of 100-year flood occurring at shorter intervals. Africa is believed to be one of the most vulnerable continents to the effects of climate change (Obasi 2000; Metz et al. 2007). Nigeria, like other African nations which are at the receiving end of the effect of global climate change, is counting its losses from the impact of the phenomenon. From desertification and drought in the north to gully erosion and flooding in the south, the Nigerian citizens are directly feeling the effect of climate change on their socioeconomic life. There are many indications in the literature that the climate has not just changed, it has affected the way people conduct business in Nigeria. For instance, there has been increasing incidence of health risk (Eke and Onafalujo 2013), reduction in agricultural productivity (Dinar et al. 2006; Ayinde et al. 2010), reduced access to quality education, reduction in rainfall in already desert-prone areas of northern Nigeria (Medugu 2011), and increase in conflict occurrence and insecurity. All these have serious effects on the standard of living of the Nigerian populace and hence on their quality of life. Over the past few decades, Nigeria like many other parts of the world is not immune to the adverse effects of climate change. For instance, studies have predicted that there is a possible sea level rise from1990 levels to 0.3 m by 2020 and 1 m by 2050 and rise in temperature of up to 3.2  C by 2050 under a high climate change scenario (IFAD 2001). Under a low climate change scenario, however, there is possibility for a sea level rise of 0.1 m and 0.2 m by 2020 and 2050, respectively, and a temperature increase of 0.4–1  C over the same period (IFAD 2001). The study also stated that a sea level rise of 1 m could result in loss of 75 % of the Niger Delta. The negative impacts of climate change such as temperature rise, ill-health, erratic rainfall, sand storms, desertification, low agricultural yield, drying up of water bodies, and excessive floods are already being experienced most especially in the semiarid parts of Nigeria (Medugu 2011). Environmental degradation and attendant desertification are major threats to the livelihoods of the inhabitants of these dryland states of Nigeria. Also the increasing population pressure has led to intensive agricultural land use, overgrazing, bush burning, and high rate of extraction of fuel wood. Nigeria’s strategy has been to reduce greenhouse gas emissions while promoting sustainable economic development. Some of the ways proposed to achieve this include the passing into law the climate change policy and use of clean natural gas for productive uses in the power sector and in homes for cooking and in transport as compressed natural gas (CNG), among others. Few attempts have however been made by the government to explore behavioral approach to environmental sustainability in Nigeria.

Environmental Sustainability and Low-Carbon Development in Nigeria Environment has been defined as the totality of the places and surroundings in which we live, work, and interact with other people in our cultural, religious, political, and socioeconomic activities for self-fulfillment and advancement of our communities, societies, or nations (Akinbode et al. 2003). Sustainability is a development that meets the need of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their needs (WCED 1987). Sustainable development stands on three pillars: social, economic, and environmental development. Sustainability in the area of environmental development is a policy by which the environment can be protected from pollution and dilapidation and replaced or restituted after degradation. In other words, environmental Page 3 of 20

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sustainability involves making decisions and taking action that can contribute to low-carbon economy in the interests of protecting the natural environment, with emphasis on preserving the capability of the environment to regenerate and ensure good quality of life. Public perceptions and attitudes are critically important to both the supply and the demand side of the transition to a low-carbon economy (Poortinga et al. 2004). The reluctance of the public to accept new energy development in their community has been highlighted by the UK government as one of the main challenges to the transition to a low-carbon economy. On the demand side, perceptions of the need to take mitigating action against climate change, and of the ability to act on this, can be key precursors to personal behavior change and compliance with wider policies aimed at modifying behavior (Spence and Pidgeon 2009). As Nigeria firms up strategies to promote environmental sustainability and improve quality of livelihood of the populace, there is the need to promote a low-carbon society through changing or modifying what people buy and how they work and travel. A low-carbon society has been described as the one that uses less energy and fewer resources through greater energy efficiency, which can also mean reduced costs for households and businesses (Scottish Government 2010). Such society consciously incorporates renewable sources such as wind, water, wave, and solar power in the energy mix. In all, a society such as this will be able to realize the economic opportunities that come from developing clean technologies, creating low-carbon manufacturing industries, and building more sustainable infrastructures and creating thousands of green jobs. In essence, people will be able to live healthier and more sustainable lifestyles. There are clear benefits in moving toward a low-carbon society. For instance, in the analysis of options for low-carbon development in the oil and gas sector of Nigeria, the low-carbon scenario reduced emissions by 750 MtCO2e (million metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions) or 34 % of the reference emissions. The revenues from sale of the additional gas and associated liquid petroleum gas (LPG) generated a positive net present value (NPV) of $7.5 billion at a 10 % real discount rate. It was concluded that the low-carbon scenario not only significantly reduces emissions but also generates higher economic returns from Nigeria’s gas resources (Raffaello et al. 2013). However, there are challenges in trying to transition to low-carbon economy. For example, the capital cost of implementing the emission reduction options included in the low-carbon scenario is estimated at US$17 billion (Raffaello et al. 2013), but it is generally believed that the benefits of low-carbon economy generally outweigh the challenges in the long run. Understanding how to change people’s behavior toward more pro-environmental actions is thus a critical part of these processes. This study examines the evidence currently available on changing attitudes to sustainability and offers views on a number of different ways in which behavioral change could be encouraged among the key stakeholders in the country. In order to be able to achieve this, these critical questions are raised: Why do we consume in the ways that we do? What factors shape and constrain our choices and actions? Why (and when) do people behave in pro-environmental ways? And how can we encourage, motivate, and facilitate more sustainable attitudes, behaviors, and lifestyles?

Climate Change Response in Nigeria Responding to climate change from both mitigation and adaptation perspectives involves strategic approaches from policy, regulatory, and institutional frameworks as well as technological point of views (FMENV 2010). It requires that all sectors of the economy be comprehensively addressed because of the multifaceted nature of the expected impacts of climate change. Another key aspect of Page 4 of 20

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these strategies is that of mobilization of financial resources to implement the programs. All these activities would only be possible with the establishment of a sustainable national climate change policy framework. However, Nigeria’s response to climate change threats in the context of policy development framework remains a major challenge. Despite its high dependence on fossil fuel and high vulnerability to climate change, Nigeria has just passed into law the climate change policy. This policy has a response strategy that could address the issues of mitigation and adaptation measures and financial requirements and mobilization. As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, the country has come up with this policy to address the impacts as well as maximize the opportunities there in. The policy focuses on adaptation, mitigation, finance, and technology. Presently, there are a number of existing policies that could be adapted and implemented in anticipation of climate change to reduce its potential adverse effects (FMENV 2010). Some of them include the first national communication to the United Nations Framework for Climate Change (UNFCCC), National Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action on Climate Change for Nigeria, Greenhouse Gases Mitigation Options Assessments for Nigeria (2000–2040), National Energy Policy, Renewable Energy Master Plan, Natural Gas Flare Out Policy, etc.

National Policy Efforts to Combat Climate Change in Nigeria The Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV) is in charge of addressing issues related to climate change in Nigeria. The ministry has mandates to address the challenges of key environmental issues such as that of land degradation (deforestation, desertification, and coastal and marine environment erosion), air and water pollution, urban decay and municipal waste, as well as hazards of drought, coastal surges, floods, and erosion. The Nigerian government elaborated a National Environmental Policy in 1989. The policy was revised in 1999 to accommodate new and emerging environmental concerns. The goal of the revised policy is to achieve sustainable development in Nigeria and, in particular, to (i) secure a quality environment adequate for good health and well-being, (ii) promote the sustainable use of natural resources, (iii) restore and maintain the ecosystem and ecological processes and preserve biodiversity, (iv) raise public awareness and promote understanding of linkages between the environment and development, and (v) cooperate with government bodies and other countries and international organizations on environment matters (FMENV 2010). In order to coordinate activities related to climate change matters, the FMENV created a Special Climate Change Department (SCCU). It was established in recognition of the importance attached to the issue of climate change and global warming and in view of the enormity of activities required for the implementation of the Climate Change Convention and the Kyoto Protocol (FMENV 2010). This unit has since been upgraded to the status of a substantive department in the ministry. The department has been the driver of the ministry’s policy and programs on climate change. In addition to responding to international obligations, the Climate Change Department has been coordinating the activities of the Inter-ministerial Committee on Climate Change. It also oversees the activities of the Presidential Implementation Committee on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in Nigeria. The Nigerian government also upgraded the Department of Meteorology in the Ministry of Civil Aviation to a full-fledged Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NIMET) in 2003. This was carried out so as to improve the national capacity to generate observational climate data and climate monitoring systems. The Federal Government has also enacted quite a few number of specific policies and action plans that could be adapted to support national climate change mitigation and adaptation response. Some of these initiatives include (i) National Policy on Drought and

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Desertification; (ii) Drought Preparedness Plan; (iii) National Policy on Erosion, Flood Control and Coastal Zone Management; (iv) National Forest Policy; and (v) National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan. Other initiatives include the creation of the House Committee on Climate Change. This committee is mandated to promote sustainable behavior across the civil society, private sector, and government. Many states across the country are also taking a proactive stance with regard to climate change issues. For instance, Lagos State created a Climate Change Department and raised awareness through the Lagos State Public Schools Climate Change Club. Lagos State is also the only state in Nigeria that has a functional climate change policy. However, Niger State was the first state to convene a climate change dialogue and has harmonized legislation and restructured institutions to promote sustainable development and respond to climate change issues (FMENV 2010). Nigeria’s First National Communication (FNC) was produced in 2003. This communication presented Nigeria’s gross national emissions of GHGs by sources and by sinks as well as impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation measures against climate change impacts. The draft report of the Second National Communication (SNC) to the United Framework Convention for Climate Change has been finalized and the country is in the process starting the Third National Communication. The government of Nigeria has finalized a 10-year plan for stimulating Nigeria’s economic growth (Vision 20:2020). The plans aim, among others, to reduce the impact of climate change on socioeconomic development processes in the overall context of preserving the environment for socioeconomic development. Other initiatives along this line include National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) I and II, 7-Point Agenda, etc. It is envisaged that these economic initiatives will strengthen environmental governance and optimize economic benefits from sustainable environmental management (FMENV 2010). Many local and international development partners have also intervened with a lot of activities to raise awareness on climate change impacts in Nigeria. For instance, the British High Commission, with ICED and Christian Aid, supported advocacy programs to raise awareness in the National Assembly through the Nigeria Climate Action Network. A working document on adaptation strategies of actions which identifies interventions across 11 different sectors in which adaptation will be crucial for Nigeria has also been developed by the Climate Change Department and the Heinrich Böll Stiftung (HBS) Foundation. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) supported the Building Nigeria’s Response to Climate Change (BNRCC) program in a bid to explore the ecological problems and perceived impacts in certain ecological zones in Nigeria. The study covers the assessment of vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation to climate change in two sectors: agricultural production and food security and water resources (marine, freshwater/underground, rain) and water quality change. FAO has also carried out the assessment of potential impacts of climate change on agriculture, food security, and the environment in Nigeria.

Low-Carbon Society and Behavioral Strategies: The Conceptual Framework A global treaty which encouraged action to reduce/stabilize greenhouse gas emissions was agreed upon in 1992. This treaty led to the establishment of the UNFCCC. The treaty was later strengthened by committing the signatories to agree to take action to cut their greenhouse gas emissions through the Kyoto Protocol. In 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force and later ended in 2012 (UNESCO 2010). At COP 17 in Durban, the EU agreed to a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol (KP2), but there was no time to finalize all the rules. In Doha, at COP 18 the rules for Page 6 of 20

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that second commitment period were finally agreed upon, allowing it to move forward for another 8year period (2013–2020). It is however surprising that most of the international agreements failed to incorporate human dimension which is key to the analysis of climate change issues. Rather most of the discussions rationalize human behavior and assume that they can be guided by just the economic tools (Kloeckner and Blobaum 2010). As such, the effects of climate change on humans’ experiences and behavior as well as the psychological explanations behind humans’ climate-related behaviors have not been adequately reflected in many of these agreements (Kloeckner and Blobaum 2010). As a result of this, many of the approaches to the issue of climate change have fallen short of addressing the average human’s pro-environmental behaviors. Climate change adaptation and mitigation is a multidimensional issue that demands integration across various key elements of the society such as household, business sector, and government. This multi-stakeholder dimension and approach is one of the best ways to successfully guide the process of changing human attitudes, perceptions, and behavior toward climate change impacts. Kloeckner and Blobaum (2010) and UNFCCC (2007) substantiated this fact by reiterating that understanding people’s behavior related to climate change (mitigation and adaptation) is crucial for successfully dealing with the future challenges. The conceptual framework in Fig. 2 underscores the need for attitudinal change and energy-efficient behaviors among key stakeholders: household, business sector, and government. It is believed that the highlighted activities under these key stakeholders could contribute substantially to effective low-carbon economy.

Thinking Forward: Reducing Nigeria’s Carbon Footprints There are many interventions that can be used to generate desirable pro-environmental behavior changes. These varieties of strategies can be broadly categorized into two: regulatory and nonregulatory or voluntary (see Fig. 3) measures. Regulatory interventions involve making and changing laws or establishing rules that eliminate or restrict choice. A good example of this type of initiative is the fiscal measures which are financial incentives and disincentives that can encourage behavior change. Other examples of regulatory measures include performance and technology standards. Within the category of nonregulatory or voluntary interventions (Fig. 3), examples include nudges (see Table 1), labeling, negotiated agreements, training, and awareness. A mix of these policies has the capacity to provide better information, enabling emitters (both consumers and producers) to make better decisions to reduce their carbon footprints. With regard to climate change impacts, it has now become a common knowledge in the private, public, and policy arenas that in order to secure more sustainable future, current patterns of behavior have to be modified. Although modifying behavior can be beneficial to the environment, change often does not occur among individuals on their own accord (Cervigni et al. 2013). It has been discovered that people still choose to act in an environmentally unfriendly manner even when they are aware of the benefits attached to acting differently. The reasons for such behavior fall into a number of categories that include financial cost (Stern 2000), lack of alternatives, anticipated regret, inconvenience (Stern 2000), ignorance, lack of concern, laziness or habits, the common dilemmas (Cervigni et al. 2013), and perceptions that their contribution can make no difference, i.e., powerlessness (Jackson 2005). Klockner and Blobaum (2009) proposed a model named Comprehensive Action Determination Model (CADM). This model conceives behavior to be predicted directly by three different motivational paths: The first is that “what people intend to do has an impact on their behavior,” i.e., part of a person’s behavior is assumed to be under the control of intentional decisionmaking processes. Secondly, “a person’s behaviour is under the control of the objective situational Page 7 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_110-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 2 The conceptual framework of action for the key stakeholders

conditions and their subjective perception,” for example, when there is no mode of transportation that prevents carbon emission, an individual will not be able to enact the desired behavior even if they intended to do so. The third motivational path is “If people perform an action repeatedly, they start building routines and habits that over time, take control over their actions.” That is, habitual processes have the power to moderate the relations between intentions and behavior. These factors have contributed significantly to the understanding of environmental behaviors among consumers such as individual households, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, etc. Meanwhile, studies have shown that one of the best determinants of future behavior is past behavior: people tend to be regimented in carrying out their tasks and stick with the old habits (Ouellette and Wood 1998). As a result of this, to change from undesirable old habits, there is the need for deliberate intention. In view of this, interventions that motivate or nudge (see Table 1)

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Awareness campaigns

Labelling

Enable voluntary emissions reductions

Actions and choices of firms and households that reduce GHG emissions

Persuade emitters to reduce emissions voluntarily

Negotiated commitments

Training

Fig. 3 Voluntary and information-based programs

people toward pro-environmental behaviors should be targeted at their behavioral choices. It has been noted that such guided interventions enhance an individual’s capacity to change (Verplanken et al. 1998). Meanwhile, pro-environmental behavior has been described as action that reduces harm to the environment or even benefits it (Steg and Vlek 2009). However, it should also be noted that there are certain barriers to pro-environmental behaviors most especially as it relates to energy use (see Box 1). Examples of pro-environmental behaviors include recycling household wastes, purchasing “sustainable” products, using energy-efficient appliances, choosing green electricity tariffs, composting garden and kitchen waste, conserving water or energy, buying organic food, returning electrical goods for reuse or recycling, switching transport mode to more sustainable ones, buying remanufactured or reused goods, reducing material consumption, etc. (Jackson 2005). Failure of several interventions has been linked to the complexity involved in changing behaviors. For instance, have argued that many interventions to promote sustainable behaviors do not take into consideration the rich mixture of cultural practices, social interactions, and human feelings that influence the behavior of individuals, social groups, and institutions. It is within this context that this chapter examines the roles of households, business sector, and the government in engraining low-carbon future in the country. Box 1: Barriers to Energy Behavior Change There are many barriers to energy behavior change to be considered when designing policy: Low prominence of energy efficiency – energy is “invisible” and saving energy is often a low priority. Low cost of energy – efficiency measures can be, or are perceived to be, relatively expensive. Availability of energy-efficient technology. Lack of knowledge and understanding of energy-saving behavior and efficiency measures available. Hassle factor of installing efficiency measures, such as the need to clear out the loft before insulation. Aesthetics, for example, where people are concerned about the attractiveness of energy-saving alterations. (continued)

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Social norms (what other people are doing around you) – norms influence people’s behavior and can prevent them from adopting a new efficiency measure. Policy acceptability – for example, the government is unlikely to heavily regulate energy use because of a lack of acceptability within the electorate. Source: POSTNOTE (2012)

Households Households are vital to delivering pro-environmental change, not just for themselves but also within organizations and networks as “agents of change.” Everyday choices can make a difference from household travel, to use of electrical appliances, to cutting down of trees, to shopping choices. Households could engage in behavior geared at restoring and conserving the environment such as the use of energy-efficient lighting, household greening program, adoption of renewable energy, avoidance of forest deforestation, proper use of outdoor lighting, planting of appropriate tree species, use of energy-efficient stove at home, and planting of drought-resistant crops. Household Attitudinal Change Perceptions of the need to take mitigating action against climate change and capacity to take action are key determinants to personal behavioral or attitudinal change toward compliance with policies Table 1 Types of interventions Interventions Eliminate choice

Regulation

Fiscal measures

Nonregulatory and non-fiscal measures

Illustrative examples to encourage energysaving light bulbs Prevent the use of conventional, inefficient light bulbs Stop selling conventional light bulbs Increase tax on conventional light bulbs Reduce tax or subsidize energy-saving light bulbs Offer a reward, e.g., entry into a prize draw, for buying energy-saving light bulbs

Restrict choice Guide through financial disincentives Guide choice through financial incentives Guide choice through nonfinancial incentives or coerce through nonfinancial disincentives Persuade individuals using argument and Persuade people that improving energy coercion efficiency is important and that energy-saving light bulbs help save energy while reducing bills Nudges Guide choices through changing the Supply energy-saving light bulbs in new light default policy fittings and lamps Enable choice by designing or Make energy-saving light bulbs the most controlling the physical or social prominent type at the point of sale environment Use social norms and salience, provide Use advertisements to show how many people information about what others are doing are buying energy-saving light bulbs Provide information to educate and Explain how energy-saving light bulbs work increase knowledge and understanding and how they save energy Do nothing or monitor the current Track sales in different types of light bulb situation

Source: POSTNOTE (2012)

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aimed at motivating such behavioral changes. Attitudes are the evaluations and associated beliefs and behavior toward some object or new experience. Attitudinal change most often precedes behavior. Explained that the idea behind attitude-behavior relationship is that the more people know about and understand the connections between their own behavior and a range of environmental threats, the more likely they will adjust their behavior accordingly. In essence, this requires households to logically consider incoming information and apply this new knowledge to their own behavior. Public perception and attitudes play a vital role in the transition to low-carbon emissions. However, it has been argued that attitudes are mainly context dependent and therefore not stable over time; thus they are not really suitable as a stable predictor of behavior. It has been suggested that the causal relation between attitude and behavior can also be bidirectional. For instance, Dwyer et al. (1993) and Leiserowitz et al. (2010a) found that in examining attitudes toward climate change, behavior influences attitudes more strongly than the other way around. In spite of this, whichever way we choose to look at it, it is clear that there is a strong link between attitude and behavior, and as such pro-environmental interventions targeted at households should take cognizance of this connection. Energy-Efficient Lighting Energy efficiency means using less energy to provide the same service. For instance, a compact fluorescent bulb or energy-efficient bulb is more efficient than a traditional incandescent bulb as it uses much less electrical energy to produce the same amount of light. Similarly, an efficient refrigerator takes less fuel to cool the items in it than a less efficient model. It has been reported that Nigeria’s energy consumption can be reduced drastically if households use energy-efficient fluorescent bulbs. GEF reported that households could save up to 67 % of the energy they use if the use of traditional fluorescent tubes and incandescent bulbs are discouraged. Compact fluorescents consume an average of 75 % less electricity than conventional incandescent lights, thereby reducing the overall demand for electricity and the resulting greenhouse gas emissions and environmental impacts. Energy-efficient bulbs may be more expensive at the point of purchase but help save more in the long run because they last longer than the incandescent bulbs. Household should be encouraged and supported to use energy-saving lighting and appliances. Household Greening Program This is a concept that suggests the need for households to green the environment. This concept suggests that each building could be built in such a way that there is room for green plantation within the surrounding so as to allow the plant to absorb carbon dioxide in the environment as well as reduce excessive flood by increased infiltration rate. Household greening program contributes to the mitigation of climate change impacts. In addition to storing carbon, trees planted in and around our environment especially urban areas and residences can provide much-needed shade in the hot season, reducing energy bills and fossil fuel use. It could also serve as resistance during severe rainstorm as well as reduce air pollution. Adoption of Renewable Energy Energy plays a leading role in any economy. It supports practically every other sector. Renewable energy comes from natural resources such as sunlight, wind, rain, tides, and geothermal heat, which are naturally replenished. This is an important area for intervention, since burning fossil fuels accounts for nearly 70 % of all electricity generation (Energy Information Administration 2003a). With the abundance of renewable energy sources in Nigeria, the country could effectively mitigate the impacts of climate change. Individual household reliance on alternative sources of energy Page 11 of 20

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Fig. 4 Useful energy projections for Nigeria

instead of relying solely on fossil fuel will likely contribute to climate change mitigation. Some of these alternatives include biogas, solar, and wind which are more environmentally friendly for cooking, heating, lighting, refrigerating, etc. It has been projected that residential energy demand for cooking and lighting will increase rapidly in the next decades, and as such integrating renewable energy into the energy mix at this level will be very important in the country (see Fig. 4). Education and awareness may, however, be needed to sensitize and orientate households toward the benefits of these renewable energy technologies. Proper Use of Outdoor Lighting Outdoor lighting is used at night to illuminate the surroundings. In Nigeria, however, most outdoor lights are often left on during the day. The proper use of outdoor lighting needs to be instilled among the populace. Lighting needs to be switched off when areas are unoccupied such as toilets, corridors, or even office areas out of hours. Outdoor lighting should only be on when needed. In Nigeria, where energy is generated mostly by burning of fossil fuel, leaving outdoor lights on when not needed increases consumption of fossil fuel and emission of carbon into the atmosphere. However, deployment of smart-metered electricity is expected to curb this behavior. Altering Transportation-Related Behavior Reducing vehicle emissions is often thought of as a technological challenge, with efforts going into the development of more efficient cars or fuels that produce fewer greenhouse gases per unit energy. Vehicles account for most of the carbon monoxide (CO) and a large share of the hydrocarbons (HC), nitrogen oxides (NO x), and particulates in major urban areas (ICCT 2013). In Nigeria, most automobiles imported into the country are old cars with inefficient fuel combustion system. It has been estimated that the export of used cars to developing countries and emerging markets worldwide will create additional pollution of 1.8 million tonnes of carbon dioxide (Bertinelli et al. 2005). However, behavioral change could contribute to a low-carbon future by altering transportationrelated behavior (Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002). Individuals could reduce travelling with personal cars, use video conferencing to attend meetings instead of travelling, join mass transit buses to office instead of taking personal car, etc. The proper maintenance and use of automobiles can help increase fuel efficiency and reduce energy consumption as well as pollution.

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Household Energy Savings Energy use at home contributes immensely to the total energy consumption of a country. The major energy-consuming activities in many homes in Nigeria are cooking, lighting, and use of electrical appliances (ECN 2005). Cooking accounts for a staggering 91 % of household energy consumption, lighting uses up 6 %, and the remaining 3 % can be attributed to the use of basic electrical appliances such as televisions and electrical irons (ECN 2005). Household activities can be tuned toward a low-carbon emission by encouraging individuals and households to turn off appliances instead of using standby mode and supporting the use of renewable energy, such as solar and wind energy. These activities will lead to low energy consumption at home and as such could help mitigate climate change impacts. Smart metering system that shows the amount of energy consumed daily could also be used to nudge household toward pro-environmental behavior.

The Business Sector Climate change is affecting the ecosystems, marketplaces, and stakeholder needs in a remarkable way. This has created strategic new risks and opportunities for the business sector of the economy. For instance, many companies are now adopting pro-environmental innovative strategies so as to make them competitive in the global market. There is a large body of opinion that believes that an organization’s culture plays an essential role in shaping the workplace behavior of employees in making them a low-carbon employee and hence widely considered to be crucial to an organization’s performance. Organizations have roles to play in mitigating and adapting to the impacts of climate change in Nigeria. Industry and organizations use large amount of energy to power diverse range of manufacturing and resource extraction processes. Many industrial processes require large amounts of heat and mechanical power, most of which is delivered as natural gas, fuels, thermal, etc. In the past, most businesses in Nigeria have acted with little regard or concern for the negative impacts their production processes have on the environment. Many oil and gas companies in Nigeria were guilty of significantly flaring gas into the atmosphere until recently when the government has put some regulations in place to curb these activities. Subsequently, there are now an increasing number of businesses that are committed to reducing their damaging impact and even working toward having a positive influence on the environment. Below are suggested ways organizations can contribute to ensuring low-carbon future in Nigeria through the adoption of pro-environmental behavior. Prompts/Green Messages Prompting strategies are verbal or written antecedent messages that designate desirable target behaviors. Prompts are short messages used to elicit desirable behaviors. The message should be stated politely to avoid negative reaction. Geller et al. (1982) identified several conditions under which prompting strategies are most effective. Messages such as “Please, don’t step on the Lawn,” “Plant a TREE today,” and “Switch off the Light” are simple messages that can remind people to mitigate climate change and as such preserve the environment. Prompt reminds people to make change again and again, until it becomes habitual. Prompts are most effective if specific and close to where and when the desired behavior occurs. Staats et al. (2000) found that office workers improved their energy-conserving behaviors (keeping thermostat settings consistent and putting off electrical appliances when not in use) immediately after an informational brochure was delivered. Later, other intervention components (posters and feedback) were added to maintain these energy-conserving practices.

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Feedback Feedback is vital to driving and sustaining change. Instead of understanding the changed behavior to be the end of the process, interventions should build in “feedback loops,” i.e., opportunities to feed learning from the change process back into subsequent behaviors (Metz et al. 2007). Feedback should also be accounted for between individuals and organizations in networks and across society as a whole. A feedback strategy could involve providing information to staffs about their environment-relevant behaviors. Such data make the consequences of behavior (e.g., money spent, environmental degradation, or protection) more relevant and increase the likelihood of behavior change corresponding with the consequences. Some environment protection research that employed feedback strategy focused on household energy use and revealed that there was a modest and consistent reduction in energy consumption (Geller et al. 1982; Dwyer et al. 1993). Feedback reduces anxiety, encourages repetition of desirable behavior, and helps people know that they are making a difference. Feedback on energy use has been shown to have created savings of up to 20 % (Darby 2006). Recognition Organizations could engage in activities with the intention of reorienting the behavior of staff members toward reducing their carbon footprints. For instance, a form of recognition through monthly appraisal could help staff members in an organization to adopt energy-saving attitude. This could be in the form of award such as the “Most environment-friendly staff of the month.” Also, offices can install a smart metering system which informs individual occupants how much they have consumed for the week and at what cost. Through this, individuals would become conscious of putting on appliances when they are not ready to use them. Green Building/Zero-Carbon Buildings Green building is defined as a structure that is environmentally responsible and resource efficient throughout a building’s life cycle: from citing to design, construction, operation, maintenance, renovation, and demolition (World Bank Institute 2013). A green building is designed through architecture, materials, and fixtures to have a minimal impact on the environment. Improving the energy efficiency of organizational buildings through architectural building design will likely have the potential to reduce energy bills and building maintenance costs and more productive workers and increased building value. Organizations can adopt energy-efficient housing design principles with the aim of reducing the amount of energy consumed within the building. For instance, when the structure of a building adopts the use of fewer walls, it allows for reflection from outside, thereby reducing the need for artificial lighting during the day and access to ventilation resulting in less need of air conditioners. Electrical Appliances Sharing The concurrent use of electrical appliances in shared offices is a common sight in Nigerian offices. Appliances such as refrigerators, air conditioners, photocopy machines, fans, etc., can be shared among common-office occupants to reduce energy consumption. Organizations could inculcate in their employees the culture of putting appliances off especially when not in use, and they should encourage sharing of appliances among congruent office occupants.

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The Role of Government The government has a major role to play in the transition toward low-carbon economy. Government interventions in fostering human activities toward low-carbon emission can be of great benefit in terms of policy making, subsidizing the cost of energy-saving appliances, carbon tax on high emission appliance, ensuring importation of quality energy-saving appliances, and providing environmental education and regulatory guidelines. Energy Policy Issues such as energy crisis in the 1970s and concerns over climate change impacts have attracted the interests of policy makers in supporting incentives for electricity from renewable energy sources (Fischer and Preonas 2010). The IPCC has reported that apathy for fossil fuel could lead to the promotion of alternative sources of energy. Renewable energy technologies are being rapidly commercialized in developed countries. In 2012, about 26 % of the global final energy consumption came from renewable energy and supplied 21.7 % of global electricity (REN21 2013). During the 5 years from the end of 2004 through 2009, worldwide renewable energy capacity grew at rates of 10–60 % annually for many technologies. Nigeria is yet to harness this independent source of generating income for the economy and in solving the electricity crisis ravaging the country. However, the Energy Commission of Nigeria has developed a Renewable Energy Master Plan for the country. The main objective of the master plan is to promote clean, reliable, secure, and competitive energy supply into the national energy mix as well as meeting up with the national sustainable development agenda. The main goal of this project is to reduce projected energy use by 20 % by 2020 and meet 20 % of the country’s electricity needs with renewable energy sources by 2020. This initiative combines energy efficiency, conservation, and renewable energy resources to meet future increase in energy demand while reducing its dependence on nonrenewable resources. As part of the implementation of this initiative, NNPC set up a Renewable Energy Division (RED) to develop private sector-driven investments in ethanol production as alternatives to fossil fuels. However, there is still a lot to be done in terms of national implementation, capacity building, and strong institutional framework to support this policy. Transport Policy In Nigeria, two main types of environmental policies could be proposed to alter or modify people’s transportation behavior. These could be in the form of information and regulatory measures. In Nigeria, regulatory measures should include rebuilding and reintroducing rail transport in order to reduce the present massive use of buses for long distance travel, restructuring urban transportation to introduce car-free zones and urban mass transit system, subsidizing urban mass transportation, and improving the infrastructure for cycling and walking as well as green parks. In addition, informational measures could be achieved through mass media by discouraging the use of personal cars or making it less desirable by raising awareness of the problems caused by carbon emissions from multiple cars on the road. Awareness should also be created on using mass transit buses, discouraging frequent travels, encouraging the purchase of eco-friendly vehicles, and changing in driving behavior (improved vehicle maintenance, fuel-efficient driving, and using telematics to provide information on traffic situations) (Jalel et al. 2011).

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Role of Information/Communication One enduring assumption of much public policy in the environmental domain claims that when provided with information, people will change their behavior toward low-carbon society. Human beings have the capacity to use information-based approaches to change significant others’ behavior. Awareness creation can play a big role in changing the attitude of Nigerians on the need to develop a low-carbon economy toward mitigating and adapting to the impact of climate change. Nudging: In recent times, many policy makers have incorporated the use of nudges on pro-environmental behavior change strategy. “Nudges” have been defined as “any aspect of the choice architecture (the context in which people make decisions) that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way, without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives” (Thaler and Benartzi 2008). For instance, while removing incandescent bulb from the point of sale in a supermarket is a nudge, banning it or significantly raising its price is not (see Table 1). Carbon Tax The government can introduce environment-related tax reduction for organizations with less carbon emission during production/manufacturing in order to encourage organizations to adopt such production processes. For individuals that decide to leave their cars at home to use public transport, the government can subsidize mass transit buses and introduce congestion charges and subsidies for alternative fuel vehicles to encourage such activities. The Nigerian government could encourage businesses to reduce their carbon footprint by providing grants to invest in energy-efficient equipment and supporting the private sector for renewable and clean technology projects. Energy-Efficient Equipment Standardization The government has the obligation to ensure that the quality of energy-efficient appliances and equipment imported into the country is of high standard. If the standard of these appliances can be assured to be of good quality, it will encourage buyers and users to take the pain of paying more for these appliances. Also, the government can help subsidize these appliances in order to increase the willingness to buy. Government policies can be directed to encourage the importation and local production of energy-efficient light bulbs so as to reduce the cost of these bulbs. Penalties for Deforestation Strict penalties should be in place for the cutting down of trees unjustly. Deforestation should be discouraged as much as possible, and human activities that encourages the cutting of trees for survival and economy purposes could be diversified. Planting of trees will help increase mitigating climate change impacts. Trees are 50 % carbon. When they are felled or burned, the CO2 they store escapes back into the air. According to the UNFAO (2006), about 13 million hectares of forests worldwide are lost every year, almost entirely in the tropics. The government can even take up the initiative of rewarding tree planting as it is done in the developed world. A nationwide program of reafforestation can also be developed. A case in point is the “Igi Iye” reafforestation initiative of the Osun State government in Nigeria. Gas Flaring Penalties Despite the legislative framework pegging the deadline for gas flaring of Nigeria’s petroleum sector on December 31, 2012, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation recently stated that gas flaring has only dropped by 15 % as of 2013 (Yakubu 2013). Nigeria flares volumes of carbon daily as part of its oil exploration activities. Gas flaring has raised temperatures and rendered large areas uninhabitable. According to the World Bank 2012 Report on Global Gas Flaring Reduction Page 16 of 20

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partnership (GGFR), Nigeria is second next to Russia in terms of gas flaring and has remained so over a period of 5 years between 2007 and 2011. Nigeria, the highest producer of gas in Africa, loses about $1.789 billion or N286.24 billion to gas flaring annually (Deziani 2010). Due to the contained methane and carbon dioxide, Nigeria’s gas flaring contributes more to global warming than all the other emissions in the whole sub-Saharan Africa. The Nigerian government needs to double its effort in addressing this situation by ensuring compliance with regulations and issue stiff penalties to nonadhering companies.

Conclusion Climate change is a challenge that requires effort across individuals, organizations, and government levels. This chapter discusses the human behavioral contributions to climate change issues. It also addresses both the psychological and contextual drivers of these concerns in Nigeria. Pro-environmental behaviors are multifaceted, context specific, and affected by numerous factors, many of which need to be addressed simultaneously to facilitate the desirable change. Policies that aim to encourage pro-environmental behavior need to reflect these intricacies. As outlined above, there are a number of specific actions that key stakeholders can undertake to heal the environment and “green” their lifestyles. However, there is the urgent need to collectively focus on a more limited set of pro-environmental behavior goals for the purpose of public policy and awareness creation. This is important as it will ensure that a clearer focus would reduce some of the current confusion over conflicting information about what people can or should do as well as establishing a baseline against which progress could be assessed.

Policy Implications In view of the issues raised above, the effectiveness of any strategic policy framework to address the effects of climate change in Nigeria both in the medium and longer term depends largely on achieving changes in behavior and attitudes among the key stakeholders. This will involve changing behavior by the households, government, and the practitioners in the business sector. In addressing these issues, some of the policy strategies should involve the widespread adoption of more sustainable options over the conventional alternatives, increased awareness about climate change, more increased support for the development of renewable energy infrastructure (such as waste to energy plants, wind farms, and related transmission infrastructure), and cumulative small-scale actions in individual homes (e.g., waste reduction, energy efficiency measures). This chapter reiterates that the specific objective of low-carbon future for the country should be the development, adoption, and implementation of sustainable policies, action plans, strategies, and regulation that promote pro-environmental behaviors as well as enhancement of increased investments in sustainable energy utilization via energy planning, nudging, regulation, enabling carbon tax, and improved public-private partnership options. These initiatives, if properly implemented, will stimulate the development of pro-environmental behaviors and implementation of environmentally sustainable policies, strategies, and regulation.

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References Akinbode OM, Eludoyin AO, Fashae OA (2003) Temperature and relative humidity distributions in a medium-size administrative town in southwest Nigeria. Journal of Environmental Management 87:95–105 Anderegg JW, William RL, Prall JH, Stephen HS (2009) Expert credibility in climate change. Proc Natl Acad Sci (PNAS) early edition Ayinde OE, Ajewole OO, Ogunlade I, Adewumi MO (2010) Empirical analysis of agricultural production and climate change: a case study of Nigeria. J Sustain Dev Afr 12(6):131–140 Bertinelli L, Strobl E, Zou B (2005) Sustainable economic development and the environment: theory and evidence. IMW working paper, no 369 Cervigni R, John AR, Irina D (2013) Assessing low-carbon development in Nigeria: an analysis of four sectors, World Bank study. World Bank, Washington, DC. doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-9973-6 Darby S (2006) The effectiveness of feedback on energy consumption: a review for DEFRA of the literature on metering, billing and direct displays. Environmental Change Institute, Oxford Deziani AM (2010) Keynote address under the conference theme: energy market consequences of an emerging US carbon management policy at the international conference on energy and climate policy organized by the James Baker Institute for Public Policy Rice University, Houston Dinar A, Hassan R, Kurukulasuriya P, Benhin J, Mendelsohn R (2006) The policy nexus between agriculture and climate change in Africa. A synthesis of the investigation under the GEF/WB project: regional climate, water and agriculture: impacts on and adaptation of agro-ecological systems in Africa. CEEPA discussion paper no 39. Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa, University of Pretoria Dwyer WO, Leeming FC, Cobern MK, Porter BE, Jackson JM (1993) Critical review of behavioral interventions to preserve the environment. Environ Behav 25:275–321 Eke PO, Onafalujo AK (2013) The impacts of climate change on health risks of Nigerians. Asian J Bus Manag Sci 1(1):204–215 Energy Commission of Nigeria and United Nations Development Programme [ECN-UNDP] (2005) Renewable energy master plan: final draft report. http://www.iceednigeria.org/REMP% 20Final%20Report.pdf Energy Information Administration (2003a) Electricity generation and environmental externalities: case studies. Retrieved 18 July from http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/external/external_ sum.html Federal Ministry of Environment [FMENV] (2003) Nigeria’s First National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Federal Republic of Nigeria, The Ministry Environment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Abuja Federal Ministry of Environment [FMENV] (2010) State of Nigerian environment report Fischer C, Preonas L (2010) Combining policies for renewable energy: is the whole less than the sum of its parts?. Resources for the future discussion paper Geller ES, Paterson L, Talbott E (1982) A behavioral analysis of incentive prompts for motivating seat belt use. J Appl Behav Anal 15(3):403–13 Human Development Report (2013) The rise of the south: human progress in a diverse world. The United Nations Development Programme, New York IFAD (2001) Rural poverty report 2001. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press International Council on Clean Transportation [ICCT] (2013) The impact of stringent fuel and vehicle standards on premature mortality and emissions. ICCT’s global transportation health and climate roadmap series Page 18 of 20

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Jackson T (2005) Motivating sustainable consumption: a review of evidence on consumer behaviour and behavioural change. A report to the sustainable development research network Jalel S, Joshua SA, Derek ML, Daniel MK (2011) Reduce growth rate of light-duty vehicle travel to meet 2050 global climate goals. Environ Res Lett 6:024018 Kak’mena AG, Hemba EC, Eyimoga HA (2012) The impact of climate change in Nigeria: implications for schooling. Eur Sci J Special edition 8(25) Kloeckner CA, Blobaum (2010) A comprehensive action determination model-towards a broader understanding of ecological behaviour using the example of travel mode choice. Journal of Environmental Psychology 30:574–586 Kollmuss A, Agyeman J (2002) Mind the gap: why do people act environmentally and what are the barriers to pro-environmental behavior? Environ Educ Res 8:239–260 Leiserowitz A, Maibach E, Roser-Renouf C (2010a) Climate change in the American mind: Americans’ global warming beliefs and attitudes. Yale project on climate change. Yale University and George Mason University, New Haven. http://environment.yale.edu/uploads/Americans Global warming Beliefs 2010.pdf Medugu NI (2011) Comprehensive approach to drought and dissertation in Nigeria. Available at: http://www.Wordpress.com/. Comprehensive approach to drought and dissertation in Nigeria Metz B, Davidson O, Swart R, Pan J (2001) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) TAR WG3 mitigation, contribution of working group 3–4th. Assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-80769-7 Metz B, Davidson OR, Bosch PR, Dave R, Meyer LA (2007) Intergovernmental panel on climate change: mitigation of climate change. Contribution of working group 3–4th. Assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. ISBN 978-0-521-88011-4 Obasi GP (2000) Climate change. The role of WMO and national meteorological and hydrological services Ouellette JA, Wood W (1998) Habit and intention in everyday life: the multiple processes by which past behaviour predicts future behaviour. Psychol Bull 124(1):54–74 Poortinga W, Steg L, Vlek C (2004) Values, environmental concern, and environmental behavior: a study into household energy use. Environment and Behavior 36:70–93. DOI: 10.1177/ 0013916503251466 POSTNOTE (2012) Energy use behaviour change. Number 417 August 2012. House of Parliamentary. The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology REN21 (2013) Renewables 2013 Global Status Report. Paris: REN21 Secretariat Raffaello C, Irina D, John AR (2013) Assessing low-carbon development in Nigeria: an analysis of four sectors: a World Bank study. The World Bank, Washington, DC Resources for the Future [RFF] (2003) Motor vehicles and the environment. Report edited by Winston Harrington and Virginia McConnell. http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-RPTcarsenviron.pdf. Accessed 12.10.2013 Scottish Government (2010) Low carbon Scotland: public engagement strategy. The Scottish Government, Edinburgh Spence A, Pidgeon N (2009) Psychology, climate change & sustainable behaviour. Environment (November-December) Staats H, Van Leeuwen E, Wit A (2000) A longitudinal study of informational interventions to save energy in an office building. J Appl Behav Anal 33:101–104 Steg L, Vlek C (2009) Encouraging pro-environmental behaviour. J Environ Psychol 29:309–317

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Stern PC (2000) Psychology, sustainability, and the science of human-environment interactions. Am Psychol 55:523–530 Thaler R, Benartzi S (2008) Save more tomorrow: using behavioral economics to increase employee saving. J Polit Econ 112(1):164 UNESCO (2010) Climate change education for sustainable development. UNESCO, Paris United Nations Food Agriculture Organization [UNFAO] (2006) Deforestation causes global warming: a workshop organized by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and hosted by FAO United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] (2007) Climate change: impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation in developing countries. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn Verplanken B, Aarts H, Van Knippenberg A, Moonen A (1998) Habit versus planned behaviour: a field experiment. Br J Soc Psychol 37(1):111–28 World Bank Institute (2013) Carbon finance-assist annual report 2013 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) (1987). Our common future. Annex to document A/42/427. Oxford University Press, Oxford World Health Organization (2002) The world health report 2002. World Health Organization, Geneva Yakubu A (2013) “No end in sight to zero gas flaring in Nigeria.” A lecture delivered at 42nd annual general meeting, conference and exhibition of the Nigerian Society of Chemical Engineers (NSChE)

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_111-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Climate Variability and Climate Change Impacts on Smallholder Farmers in the Akuapem North District, Ghana Kwadwo Owusu, Peter Bilson Obour* and Selina Asare-Baffour Department of Geography and Resource Development, University of Ghana, Legon Accra, Ghana

Abstract Climate change is unequivocal and these changes have increased over the past few years. The recent vulnerability and prospect of climate variability and change impact, thus, warrants measures now to reduce the adverse impacts. This is especially important in relation to smallholder farmers whose activities provide large proportion of the food consumed in the developing world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. A qualitative approach was used to collect data on the perceptions of smallholder farmers from three communities in the Akuapem North District in Ghana. The perceptions of the farmers about rainfall changes were compared with the empirical daily rainfall total data from the Ghana Meteorological Agency to corroborate changes in rainfall. By comparing the perceived changes in the rainfall of the district with the empirical data, it was identified that shifts in the rainfall regime was the main cause of crop failures in the study area but not decline in the annual rainfall total. Farmers being aware of changes in the rainfall have employed new stresses to improve their productivity. However, it was observed that non-climatic stresses such as low capital and absence of institutional support in the district have increased smallholder farmers’ vulnerability.

Keywords Adaptation; Akuapem North; Climate change; Climate variability; Ghana; Smallholder farmers; Subsistence agriculture; Vulnerability

Introduction Climate change is unequivocal according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as there is now ample evidence that the earth’s climate system is warming at an unprecedented rate leading to ice melting and sea-level rise (IPCC 2007). No wonder the impact of climate variability and change has taken a center stage in many scientific research worldwide (Hulme et al. 1999; Tauli-Corpuz and Lynge 2008). In the coming decades, global climate change will have an impact on all sectors of the global economy. But most impacts will fall on the agricultural sector, creating food insecurity and heightened water stress, most especially in the developing world (Ringler 2008; Nelson et al. 2009). Poor farmers who are (referred to as subsistence or smallholder farmers) and predominantly in the low-latitude developing countries living in remote and fragile environments are expected to become the most vulnerable (Altieri and Koohafkan 2008; IFAD 2008). According to IFAD (2010), by 2050 food production needs to increase by 70 % but the total arable area in developing countries may increase no more than 12 % mostly in sub-Saharan Africa *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_111-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

and Latin America. This implies that the burden of increasing food production rests on the shoulders of these farmers whose occupation would be most affected and who are also poor and technologically deficient to master effective adaptation. Morton (2007) describes smallholder farmers as rural producers, predominantly in the developing countries, who farm using mainly family labor and for whom the farm provides a principal source of income. Their activities depend directly on climatic factors while climate also indirectly affects the terrain and the environment on which they depend. Smallholder farmers are the backbone of the rural economy but bear the brunt of climate change impacts (IFAD 2009). Worldwide, there are 500 million smallholder farms supporting some 2 billion people. Smallholders provide up to 80 % of food consumed in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Although it is held that some regions in the world will enjoy increase in agricultural production as a result of climate change (a slight increase in temperature could increase crop production in higherlatitude regions), the net impact of climate change on sub-Saharan Africa would be negative (Boko et al. 2007; Vermeulen 2011). Khamis (2006) stated that smallholders in Malawi have been exposed to tremendous drought and flood affecting food security and their livelihood. In Ghana, food security and rural incomes are under threat from unpredictable changes in rainfall and shifts in the rainfall regime (Owusu and Waylen 2009, 2013). The smallholder farmer in Ghana is facing the negative impacts also as a result of many non-climatic stresses that make him or her vulnerable. In developing countries in general, vulnerability of smallholder farmers to climate change impacts has been exacerbated by non-climatic stresses like population increase, low capitalization, rural–urban migration, health problems like HIV/AIDS and malnutrition, government policies, and market shocks (Morton 2007; Osbahr et al. 2008; Francis 2002). In Ghana in particular, lack of credit, lack of storage facilities, low levels of technology, lack of access to market, and land tenure complications which occasionally result in conflicts have heightened the smallholder farmer’s vulnerability to climate variability and change (Kunateh 2011). Such stresses have been exacerbated by the fact that smallholder activities in the country are mainly rain-fed. For example, the total arable land under irrigation in Ghana was reported to be less than 3 % (GIDA 2010; MOFA 2011). Climate change poses serious problems for these farmers to deal with since their main source of livelihood is being threatened through “crop failures and livestock death leading to economic losses, high food prices thereby undermining food security” (IFAD 2009). It is thus very important to assess how climate variability and change affect the living conditions of smallholder farmers since they are responsible for cultivating a greater chunk of arable lands in Ghana. Over the years, smallholders have learned to adjust to climate variability and change to increase agricultural sustainability (AAFRD 2005). However, the current speed and intensity of climate change and associated extremes are posing problems for smallholders and their capacity to adapt. This is more so as the prospect of adverse climate variability and change is not going to diminish in the very near future (Downing et al. 1997). This chapter investigates the impacts of climate change and its effects on the incomes and food security of the smallholder farmers in the Akuapem North District of the Eastern Region of Ghana. The adaptation strategies used by the smallholder farmers are also examined. The objectives are to assess smallholder farmers’ perception and knowledge on climate change and the related risks, to account for the factors other than climate which make smallholders vulnerable to climate variability and change, and, finally, to assess the various mechanisms used to reduce the effect of climate variability and change on their system of farming.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_111-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 Conceptual framework for climate change impacts on smallholder farmers (Source: Adapted from Morton 2007)

Conceptual Framework for Smallholder Farmers' Vulnerability to Climate Change In this study, the conceptual framework proposed by Morton (2007) was adapted to understand the various ways in which climate change impacts on the livelihoods of subsistence farmers and how such impacts heighten their vulnerability. The framework distinguished between climatic and non-climatic stresses which integrate together to impact on smallholder farmers. Climate-related stresses such as droughts and floods affect farmers in diverse ways such as constraints on soil quality and inducing crops and animal diseases (Scoones et al. 1996; Lal 2000). The non-climatic stresses on the other hand include land fragmentation due to population growth, market failures, and prevalence of diseases affecting the health of farmers (Morton 2007). However, as indicated in Fig. 1, unlike Morton’s originally proposed framework, another impact propeller “institutional constraints” (such as public, private, and civil society support) was introduced. The reason for distinguishing between institutional constraints from non-climatic stresses is that, if well managed, institutional supports are able to cushion the impacts of both climatic and non-climatic stresses and vice versa (Agrawal and Perrin 2008). It must be pointed that the effects of the three (3) distinguishing stresses on smallholder farmers’ vulnerability depend on their sensitivity and resilience capacities (IPCC 2007). But in order to reduce such vulnerabilities, this study will examine the different livelihood adaptive and coping strategies that smallholder farmers adopt in order to reduce the risks and shocks of the stresses. The study also outlines the roles of institutions in climate change adaptation in the Akuapem North District of Ghana.

Study Area The Akuapem North District is one of the administrative districts in the Eastern Region of Ghana and is located in the southeastern part of the region. Akropong, the district capital, is roughly 58 km from Accra. The district lies between latitude 5
50 North and 6
80 North and longitude 0
40 West and 0
190 West. It shares boundaries to the northeast with Yilo Krobo, north with New Juaben Municipal, southwest with Akuapem South Municipal, and in the west with Suhum-Kraboa-Coaltar District. The Akuapem North District covers a land area of about 450 km2, representing 2.3 % of the total land area of the Eastern Region (Ghana Districts. com 2006) (see map of district in Fig. 2).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_111-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 2 Administrative map of Akuapem North District

The vegetation of the district is made up of a mixture of forest and shrub. Geologically, the district is dominated by rocks of the Precambrian era, the Togo and Birimian series. Its terrain is mountainous and hilly ranging between 381 and 488 meters but the highest peak reaches 500 m above sea level. It has mean daytime temperature ranging between 24 and 30
C and night temperature between 13
C and 24
C. Rainfall in the district is bimodal (with a mean value of 1,270 mm). The major rainy season usually comes between May and August and the minor peaks in October. The physical factors, especially geology and climate, have greatly influenced the demographic and economic activities in the district. According to the 2010 Population and Housing Census, Akuapem North District has a population of 136,483 (Ghana Statistical Service 2012). The population is composed of different ethnic groups dominated by the Twi- and Guan-speaking people as well as Ewes and Krobos settlers. The less rocky nature of soils in the district and the relatively high annual rainfall totals (compared to the dry Accra plains) make farming very conducive. This might account for why majority of the inhabitants, especially those who live in rural communities within the district, are smallholder farmers. The main crops grown in the area are maize (Zea mays), yam (Dioscorea spp.), cassava (Manihot esculenta), plantain (Musa species), vegetables, and fruits. Few of the people are also engaged in the production of cocoa on small-scale basis. Nontraditional products such as mushrooms and snails are also produced to serve the nearby urban markets in Accra.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_111-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Methodology Sixty (60) structured and open-ended questionnaires were directly administered to smallholder farmers from three communities in the Akuapem North District, namely, Adukrom, Akropong, and Bipoase. The questionnaires were structured into themes to capture respondents’ background information (age, educational attainment, and sources of household income), knowledge and perception about climate variability and change, climatic and non-climatic factors that increase farmers’ vulnerability, adaptive strategies, and the roles of public and private institutions in supporting climate change adaptation in the district. The farmers who were interviewed were selected purposively and this was based on the size of their farms and long period of at least 10 more years of farming. A farm size of less than 0.4 ha (1 acre) to a little above 1.2 ha (3 acres) was established as a measure of a smallholder farmer. The technique was achieved by seeking advice from the local agriculture extension officers in the study communities who helped to identify smallholder farmers in their respective communities. Appointment was sought with each of the farmers who consented to participate in the survey. Home visits were made to the farmers during which the questionnaires were administered. The researchers also visited few farms within the vicinities of the communities which provided them the opportunity to observe and understand some of the effects of climate change and adaptation practices of the farmers discussed in the interviews. The fieldwork lasted for a period of three (3) months. In all, twenty (20) respondents were interviewed from each of the three communities, adding up to a total of sixty (60) participants. Deliberate efforts were made to ensure that participants of different gender, age, and educational backgrounds were reached. Chi-square (x2) goodness of fit test was used to test the hypothesis that respondents’ perceptions about causes of climate change differed across their socioeconomic characteristics. A significant level of 0.05 was used for the computation. Daily rainfall data from 1965 to 2011 was obtained from the Ghana Meteorological Agency (GMet) for the Koforidua station to facilitate the analysis on the spatial pattern of rainfall amount and distribution in the district. The data were of high quality with only 3 years (1976, 1998, and 2005) having missing values and were therefore excluded from the analyses. Data of total annual rainfall covering the 44 years between 1965 and 2011 were utilized. The 44 years were then divided into two 22-year periods as P1 (1965–1987) and P2 (1988–2011). The division was based on the acceptable notion that the pre-1980s were wetter periods than the post1980s in West Africa (Owusu and Waylen 2009). The means and standard deviations were calculated for P1 and P2. In addition to the mean and standard deviation, changes in the variances and means of rainfall distribution for P1 and P2 were computed using F- and t-tests. The F-test was first performed to determine the appropriate type of t-test to be performed. From the F-test, it was indicated that the difference in variance between P1 and P2 was not statistically significant, shown by F > F critical (2.23 > 2.08). Based on the results, a t-test of two samples assuming equal variance at a value of 0.05 was tested using the formula: T ¼ Y1  Y2 pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 1=N1 þ 1=N2 Sp where N1 and N2 are the sample sizes for P1 and P2, Y1 and Y2 are the sample means, and sp is the pooled standard deviation.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_111-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Socioeconomic characteristics of respondents Background characteristics

Percentage of respondents Adukrom (n ¼ 20) Akropong (n ¼ 20)

Gender Male 55 Female 45 Total 100 Average age (years) 55 Average number of years of farming 15 Highest level of education No formal education 35 Primary 25 Middle school/JHS 15 Secondary school 15 Tertiary 10 Total 100 Household income (source) Average annual income from farm GH $ 1,200 Average annual income from nonfarm GH $ 500 Exchange rate 18 June, 2014: US$ 1 ¼ GH $ 3

Bipoase (n ¼ 20)

45 55 100 47 17

50 50 100 58 23

25 15 30 25 5 100

45 30 10 5 10 100

GH $ 1,500 GH $ 250

GH $ 700 GH $ 400

Results and Discussion General Characteristics of Respondents In total, equal numbers of male and female smallholder farmers were interviewed. The average age of respondents from Bipoase was the highest (58 years) and the lowest occurred in Akropong (47 years). All the respondents have lived in their respective communities for more than 20 years and have at least 10 years of farming experience. Educational attainment of respondents in all the three communities is generally low and this reflects the general pattern of low education in rural Ghana (Ghana Statistical Service 2012). As already mentioned, the farmers interviewed practice subsistence system of agriculture. The farms serve two important roles: provide household source of food and income. The average annual household income from farm among respondents from Adukrom and Akropong was relatively higher (GH $ 1,200 and GH $ 1,500, respectively) than those from Bipoase because these communities have access to large market centers which enable farmers to sell some of their farm products. The respondents also get some proportion of their incomes from nonfarm sources, namely, petty trading, craftsmanship, and remittances (details shown in Table 1).

Farm Sizes and Type of Crops Cultivated Farm sizes in the Akuapem North District are generally small with majority ranging between 0.4 ha (1 acre) and 1.2 ha (3 acres). This is attributed to many factors including the subsistence nature of farming and the complexities of land tenure system in the area as described by a cross section of the farmers who were interviewed. It was highlighted that farmlands are family owned and distributed among family members which results in land fragmentation. This does not promote mechanization or commercial farming. Table 2 shows the distribution of farm sizes of farmers interviewed during the survey.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_111-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 2 Average farm sizes of respondents interviewed from the three communities Farm size (in hectares) Small (1.2) Total

Location Adukrom (n ¼ 20) 7 (35 %) 4 (20 %) 9 (45 %) 20 (100 %)

Akropong (n ¼ 20) 7 (35 %) 9 (45 %) 4 (20 %) 20(100 %)

Bipoase (n ¼ 20) 10 (50 %) 5 (25 %) 5 (25 %) 20 (100 %)

Total (N ¼ 60) 24 (40 %) 18 (30 %) 18 (30 %) 60 (100 %)

A large proportion of farmers (40 %) had their farm sizes averaging less than 0.4 ha as against 30 % who also had their farm sizes ranging between 0.8 and 1.2 ha. Another 30 % of the farmers cultivate above 1.2 ha. These statistics on farm sizes of respondents give an indication of the subsistence nature of farming as alluded to earlier. In view of this, farmers within the three study communities are largely engaged in crop production as the main preoccupation is to feed themselves and their families. The findings indicate that maize (Zea mays), cassava (Manihot esculenta), plantain (Musa species), and vegetables like okra (Abelmoschus esculentus), tomatoes (Lycopersicon esculentum), and pepper (Capsicum spp.) dominate the type of crops cultivated by the farmers. It is, however, worth noting that majority of the farmers cultivated about two or three crops simultaneously between cassava, maize, plantain, and tomatoes. Also, all farming activities are rain-fed, meaning that any anomaly in rainfall amount or distribution could have significant impact on agricultural production in the district.

Smallholder Perception of Climate Variability and Change The survey also shows that the participants have different knowledge and understanding about climate change. Respondents’ knowledge, however, did not vary significantly (p < 0.5) across their age, level of education, and the number of years of farming experience. Some of the common attributes of climate change outlined by the respondents were excessive heat, drought conditions, irregular onset and cessation of rainfall, and too much rainfall. In terms of causes of climate change, wide variations of explanations were given by the respondents. According to 20 % of the respondents, climate change is due to deforestation and bushfires. Another 15 % believed that climate change is a sign of the end of the world. The majority of the respondents (50 %) associated climate change to the anger of ancestors. According to them, this is a vivid signal that “our ancestors do not like our modern way of life.” The rest of 15 % attributed climate change to anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases. The responses of the farmers differed significantly (p > 0.5) according to their level of educational attainment and number of years of farming. All the farmers appreciated that the climate is really changing and this has affected agriculture. However, 85 % of the farmers who have long period of farming experience (10 or more years) appreciated the phenomenon of climate variability and change as they were able to compare present climatic conditions with those that used to pertain over the past decades. The main climatic changes and variations these farmers stressed on were excessive heat, dryness, and too much rainfall leading to wilting of crops or even unable to till their lands. According to the farmers, beside rainfall variations and changes, temperatures have also increased, particularly, during the dry seasons in the last decade. The temperature increases perceived by the farmers are consistent with observations by Minia (2004) and Agyeman-Bonsu et al. (2008). According to Agyeman-Bonsu et al. (2008), temperature in Ghana has increased by 1
C since 1960.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_111-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Length of Dry Spell during the Major Rainy Season 1965-2011 Length of Dry Spell (days)

25 20 15

y = 0.0161x + 8.1462

10 5 0 1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990 Years

1995

2000

2005

2010

Fig. 3 Length of dry spell during the major rainy season

Realization of changes in rainfall was as a result of its unpredictable patterns during these few years, leading to high incidence of crop failures. The rain either delays than the expected time, lasts within a very short period during the planting season, or falls in torrent. All these have negative effects on agriculture production. To this end, it was necessary to compare the changes in rainfall over the years as recorded in the memories of the participants to the empirical rainfall data obtained from the GMet.

Statistical Analysis of Annual Rainfall Variability and Changes The mean and standard deviation of annual rainfall totals were calculated for the two periods. P1 has mean of 1,373.9 and standard deviation of 256.6. And for P2, the mean and standard deviation are 1,340.7 and 171.8, respectively. It was determined that there has been a slight reduction in mean annual rainfall from P1 to P2. The 22-year average for P1 was 1,373.9 mm, while that of P2 was 1,340.9 mm. The standard deviation had, however, decreased from 256.6 in P1 to 171.8 in P2. This seems to imply that the rainfall in P2, even though low, is less variable on the year to year basis. In order to confirm the observation made by the farmers that the frequency of dry spells has increased in the last two decades, the length of dry-spell days during the major rainy season from 1965 to 2011 was calculated using the statistical software Instat Plus version 3.36. Dry spells were defined as the number of consecutive non-rainy days after the start of the rainy season (Tadross et al. 2009; Ratan and Venugopal 2013). Figure 3 shows that dry spell of 10 days or more are more frequent in P2 (1988–2011) as compared to P1 (1965–1987) which confirmed the observations made by the older farmers that rainfall frequency has slightly decreased in the last decades. The implications of these findings also support the long-known fact that annual rainfall totals have less agronomic significance than intraseasonal variability. Before probing further into monthly analysis of the rainfall distribution, a test for statistical significances in the differences in means and standard deviation of the mean annual rainfall totals was made. The t-test indicates that the means of rainfall between P1 and P2 in Akuapem North District are not significantly different, shown by tcalc < ttable (0.50 < 2.02) as illustrated by the means for the two periods although P2 shows a slight decline. Guided by the farmers’ assertion that rainfall has changed in the district resulting in crop failures and the fact that the annual rainfall total was not significantly different for the two periods, further probe was made to ascertain the rainfall distribution at the monthly level. The monthly rainfall total as percentages of the annual rainfall totals was calculated for the two 22-year periods as shown Fig. 4. Page 8 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_111-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Monthly Rainfall as a Percentage of Annual Total 1965-2011 Monthly Percentage of Annual Rainfall

18.0 P1(%) P2(%)

16.0 14.0 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

Fig. 4 Monthly rainfall total as percentages of the annual rainfall totals in P1 and P2

Figure 4 shows that rainfall distribution and amount in the district for P1 and P2 have mostly increased for the major rainy season, March to June in P2. The decrease in rains appears to occur in the minor season, July to August for P2. This pattern of minor season rainfall declines has been observed by Owusu and Waylen (2012) and by a cross section of the respondents who were interviewed from the three communities. Although the reduction has been very slight, the effects could be very crucial for agronomical activities by increasing crop failures during the minor rainy season in the district. This is because, unlike the major rainy season that spans a period of about 5 months, the bulk of rain in the minor rainy season only occurs in 2 months (September and October). The results of the monthly analysis seem to be in tandem with the views of older farmers in the study area that tie the high risk of crop failure in recent decades to changes in the rainfall regime rather than declines in the mean annual totals. The implication is that because produce from farms serves as the main source of household food and income, crop failure has significant adverse impacts on food security and household poverty in the study communities.

Non-climatic Factors That Make Smallholder Farmers Vulnerable Apart from climatic factors of increasing temperatures and variation in the rainfall pattern, non-climatic but socioeconomic factors were also identified as major challenges impacting negatively on the smallholder farmers and making them vulnerable to climate variability and change. Notable among these factors are poverty and inadequate funds. According to the farmers, the most important constraint to their activities is inadequate capital to enable them pay for hired labor and buy fertilizers, pesticides, and other farming equipment. There are no banks or government agencies ready to loan money to the smallholder farmers in the district. As a result, they are unable to expand the sizes of their farms to increase production for home consumption and for the market due to land fragmentation and tenure complications. Another constraint they mentioned was scarcity of labor. According to the district migration data, emigration predominantly of the youth from the district has increased to more than 10 % since the past decades (Assan 2007; Akuapem North District Assembly 2012). The participants explained that most of the youth in the communities keep emigrating in search of greener pastures elsewhere in response to increased crop failure and loss. A low price of farm products is another constraint that increases farmers’ vulnerability to climate change and variability in the district. Sixty (60) percent of the farmers interviewed, predominantly those from Bipoase, explained that they do not have direct access to large market to sell their produce because of poor road transportation network and the higher cost they have to incur to convey their goods to the market. Instead, they trade directly with middlemen who come to them to do the buying,

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Table 3 Frequency distribution of main adaptation strategies (N ¼ 60) Class of adaptation strategy Small-scale businesses

Specific adaptation practice (i) Rearing of farm animals (ii) Sale of bushmeat and fruits (iii) Making of gari, cassava dough, and palm oil (iv) Engage in driving and carpentry work to supplement farm income Adjustment to variations in (i) Diverting from farming activities and resuming when farming conditions rains become favorable (ii) Waiting for the rains to come before planting begins (late planting) (iii) Early planting of seeds before rains Family support/ (i) Depending on family labor to carry out farm activities remittances (ii) Depending on financial support of family members in the urban areas Indigenous methods (i) Watering of plants such as tomatoes (ii) Planting of crop varieties more resistant to drought conditions (iii) Rainfall harvesting for watering vegetables Total

Frequency 10

20

8

22

60

usually on the farm. These middlemen come with their own prices, which are very low, but since the farmers have no other alternatives, they accept the prices to prevent their products from going bad. The middlemen then sell the produce at very high prices in the urban markets. According to the farmers, although they do the hard work, they are the least profit beneficiaries. Less profit means they are unable to save some of their earning against unforeseen events. This problem together with those already discussed makes farmers less resilient and more vulnerable to climate change impacts, especially during prolonged drought or excessive rains leading to crop failures.

Strategies for Adaptation to Climate Change The effects of climate change are likely to increase risk among smallholder farmers in Akuapem North District. According to the farmers interviewed, because climate change is a phenomenon that may persist for a long time, they have over the years put into place some measures that enable them cope and adapt to both adverse climatic and non-climatic stresses which increase their vulnerability. The adaptation practices are summarized in Table 3. The most common adaptation practices are using indigenous planting techniques predominantly, doing watering, planting more resistant varieties of crops, and adjusting to rainfall variability, especially during the minor season. The farmers also engaged in on-farm activities like rearing of animals to supplement their household income, particularly during climate failures. Thirteen percent (13 %) of the farmers who have friends and relatives living outside the local community receive remittances to pay for labor and save some as a form of collateral against unexpected events. They, however, mentioned that such supports are sometimes unreliable because the amount and frequency of remittance depend on conditions in the source region.

Institutional Support for Climate Change Adaptation In a typical rural setting like Akuapem North District, three major forms of institutions could be identified, namely, public, private, and civic institutions (Agrawal and Perrin 2008). In terms of public or government support, it was found out that although there are national climate adaptation strategies and programs, these have not trickled down to rural communities like Akropong,

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Adukrom, and Bipoase where the research was conducted. This is evident from the fact that there is presently no government policy intervention like sensitization and education program on climate change adaptation that can guide farmers to know what and when to plant in order to reduce the risk of climate failures. For instance, there are no seasonal forecasts given to the farmers during the cropping seasons. Farmers who were interviewed were ignorant of the existence of any national climate change adaptation program in the country. The farmers indicated that about a decade ago, the government used to distribute farm implements like cutlasses, hoes, and small funds for farmers in the district. However, these were not specifically to support climate change adaptation, but rather it was to help expand and sustain the breadbasket to reduce the risk of food insecurity in the district. Also the farm materials and funds were not for free but have to be repaid in installment. For instance, at Akropong it was reported that some years ago, they received loans from the government in aid to boost up their production levels. Unfortunately, most farmers were unable to honor their debt because that year happened to be one of the most unfavorable farming years (high temperatures and low and sporadic rainfall). With such bitter memories, when respondents were asked if they will like to receive loans in the future, the majority were reluctant because of the fear of going through the same sour experience which will end them and their families up in jails because of inability to repay such loans. At present, there is no private or civil society organization in the district that is into climate change adaptation to help the smallholder farmers. Similarly, none of the study communities has a civic institution like smallholder farmers’ cooperatives that is focused on assisting members to cope in the event of crop failures due to variability and climate change.

Conclusion and Recommendations In general, climate variability and change have adverse effects on smallholder farmers in Akuapem North District. Vulnerability and low resilience of farmers to climate variability and change impacts has been exacerbated by multiple non-climatic factors. Autonomous and reactive types of adaptation are the major strategies for adapting to the impacts of climate variability and change. So far, there have not been any planned and anticipatory types of adaptation assistance such as institutional support from the government, private businesses, and civil society organizations to help farmers in the district. The following are recommended to help reduce farmers’ vulnerability and increase their resilience to the impacts of climate variability and change. There is the need to strengthen their adaptation capacities mainly through institutional assistance in the form of government, NGOs, and cooperative bodies. These could help provide financial support to smallholder farmers to enable them adapt and increase output. The study, however, revealed that provision of loans for farmers to boost farming may not be successful because the farmers expressed their unwillingness to receive loans, citing past experiences and the possibility that crop failures could prevent them from paying back the loans. Educating the farmers through outreach extension programs about climate change and its effects and cost-effective adaptive strategies such as water management would enable farmers cope with long periods of droughts and early rainfall cessations. Also, there is the need to improve farmers’ access to certain farming equipment like pumping machines, tractors, and spraying machines among others to help them increase their output within a short period of time. This will ensure that the scarcity and high cost of labor is substituted for by the farming equipment. A key strategy in achieving this goal will be through the formation of smallholder association. Page 11 of 13

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References Agrawal A, Perrin N (2008) Climate adaptation, local institutions, and rural livelihoods. In: Paper prepared for the social dimensions of climate change, social development department, March 5–6. The World Bank, Washington, DC Agyeman-Bonsu W, Minia Z, Dontwi J et al (2008) Ghana climate change impacts vulnerability and adaptation assessments. Environmental Protection Agency, Accra Akuapem North District Assembly (2012) Demographic characteristics of Akuapem North District. Available at http://akuapemnorth.ghanadistricts.gov.gh/?arrow¼atd&¼65&sa¼4582. Accessed 2 May 2013 Alberta Agriculture, food and Rural Development (AAFRD) (2005) Agriculture adaptation to climate change in Alberta: focus group result. AAFRD, Edmonton Altieri AA, Koohafkan P (2008) Enduring farms: climate change, smallholders and traditional farming communities. Third World Network (TWN). Juta Print Assan JK (2007) Effects of rural out-migration and remittance culture on livelihood diversification and innovation in Ghana, an unpublished article, Department of Geography, The University of Liverpool, UK Boko M, Niang I, Nyong A et al (2007) Africa. Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Downing TE, Hulme M, Ringius L et al (1997) Adapting to climate change in Africa. J Mitigat Adapt Strat Global Change 2(1):19–44 Francis E (2002) Making a living: changing livelihoods in rural Africa. Can J Afr Stud 36(1):148–150 Ghana Districts.com (2006) Akuapem North District: physical characteristics. Available at http:// www.ghanadistricts.net/districts/?r¼5&_¼65&sa¼6625. Accessed on 6 Jan 2013 Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) (2012) 2010 Population and housing census. Summary report of final results. GSS, Accra GIDA (2010) National irrigation policy, strategies and regulatory measures. Available at http://mofa. gov.gh/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/GHANA-IRRIGATION-DEVELOPMENT-POLICY1.pdf. Accessed 28 Sept 2011 Hulme M, Barrow EM, Arnell NW et al (1999) Relative impact of human induced climate change and natural climate variability. Nature 397:688–691 IFAD (2009) Climate change: building smallholders resilience. Available at http://www.ifad.org. Accessed 2 Oct 2011 IFAD (2010) Climate change strategy. Available at http://www.ifad.org. Accessed 28 Sept 2011 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2008) Climate change and the future of smallholder agriculture. Available at http://www.ifad.org. Accessed 2 Oct 2011 IPCC (2007) Climate change (2007) synthesis report, contribution of working groups I, II and III to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. IPCC, Geneva Khamis M (2006) Climate change and smallholder farmers in Malawi. Available at www.actionaid. org.uk/doc_lib/malawi_climate change_report.pdf. Accessed 18 Sept 2011 Kunateh AM (2011) Climate change threatens Ghana’s food security. The Ghanaian Chronicle. Available at http://www.ghanaian-chronicle.com/climate-change-threatens-ghana%E2%80% 99s-food-security/. Accessed 29 Dec 2011 Lal R (2000) Soil. Science 165(1):57–72

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Minia Z (2004) Climate scenarios developed for climate change impacts assessment in Ghana. The Netherlands Climate Change Studies Assistance Program (NCCSAP). Phase 2 – Part 1. EPA, Accra Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) (2011) Agriculture in Ghana: facts and figures. Statistics Research and Information Directorate (SRID), Accra Morton JF (2007) The impact of climate change on smallholders and subsistence agriculture. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC Nelson GC, Rosegrant MW, Koo J et al (2009) Climate change impacts on agriculture and costs of adaptation. Research report, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC Osbahr TCH, Adger NW, Thomas GSD (2008) Effective livelihood adaptations to climate change disturbance: scale dimensions of practice in Mozambique. Geoforum 39(6):1951–1964 Owusu K, Waylen PR (2009) Trends in spatio-temporal rainfall variability in Ghana, (1951–2000). Weather 64(5):115–120 Owusu K, Waylen PR (2012) The changing rainy season climatology of mid-Ghana. Theor Appl Climatol 112(3–4):419–430 Owusu K, Waylen PR (2013) Identification of historic shifts in daily rainfall regime, Wenchi, Ghana. Climatic Change 117:133–147 Ratan R, Venugopal V (2013) Wet and dry spell characteristics of global tropical rainfall. Water Resour Res 49(6):3830–3841 Ringler C (2008) Climate variability and change impact on water and food outcomes. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, DC Scoones I, Chibudu C, Chikura S et al (1996) Hazards and opportunities; Farming livelihoods in dryland Africa: lessons from Zimbabwe. Zed, London Tadross M, Suarez P, Lotsch A, Hachigonta S, Mdoka M, Unganai L, Lucio F, Kamdonyo F, Muchinda M (2009) Growing-season rainfall and scenarios of future change in southeast Africa: implications for cultivating maize. Climate Res 40:147–161 Tauli-Corpuz V, Lynge A (2008) Impact of climate change mitigation measures on indigenous peoples and on their territories and lands. In: Submitted to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues Seventh session, 21 April2 May 2008, New York Vermeulen S (2011) The economies of climate change: potential impact on the agricultural industry in sub-Saharan Africa. Available at http://www.consultancyafrica.com. Accessed 30 Sept 2011)

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Climate Migration Governance Benoît Mayer* Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore

Abstract This chapter engages with the current political and academic debate on the governance of “climate migration.” It highlights the difficulties of ascribing a unique cause to migration and questions the relevance of distinguishing “climate migration” from other forms of migration. It then exposes the opportunities and challenges of this concept for international cooperation. Finally, it assesses the potential of different policy options. Despite the difficulties related to the attribution of migration to a unique driver, the concept of “climate migration” appears as a powerful communicative strategy to trigger important international and domestic actions with regard to climate change adaptation and to the protection of the rights of migrants, even though a specific legal regime remains unlikely and perhaps undesirable.

Keywords Climate migration; Governance; Multicausality; Norm entrepreneurship

Introduction Every society comprises migrants. Individuals migrate in response to a multitude of factors – political, economic, social, cultural, demographic, or environmental. The impacts of climate change on the environment and societies are therefore likely to have consequences on the way people migrate or do not migrate. Since the late 1980s, a literature has developed on a new issue, first labeled “environmental migration” (i.e., migration attributed to environmental factors) but soon refurbished as “climate migration” (i.e., environmental migration that can be attributed to climate change) as climate change was attracting an increasing amount of public attention. Norman Myers ventured to predict the number of “environmental refugees” in the coming decades: 150 millions (Myers 1993), 200 millions (Myers 2002), or 250 millions (Myers 2007). Climate change affects the probability of slowonset environmental changes (desertification, land degradation, sea-level rise) and sudden-onset events (cyclone, storm surge, etc.), and both of them may have an impact on migration. Walter K€alin distinguished between five scenarios leading to environmental migration: (1) “sudden-onset disasters, such as flooding, windstorms [. . .] or mudslides caused by heavy rainfalls”; (2) “slow-onset environmental degradation caused, inter alia, by rising sea levels, increased salinisation of groundwater and soil, long-term effects of recurrent flooding, thawing of permafrost, as well as droughts and desertification”; (3) “so-called ‘sinking’ small island states”; (4) areas designated by governments as “high-risk zones too dangerous for human habitation on account of environmental

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dangers”; and (5) displacement following “unrest seriously disturbing public order, violence or even armed conflict” that “may be triggered, at least partially, by a decrease in essential resources due to climate change” (K€alin 2010). The concept of “climate migration,” more specifically, reflects a growing understanding that, climate change affecting a large array of human activities, climate change governance needs to expand beyond, in particular beyond in situ adaptation. On this understanding of climate change-induced migration, political scientists and lawyers suggested solutions directed to address the vulnerability of “climate migrants,” mostly conceived as forced and international migrants. By analogy to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees adopted in Geneva in 1951 (Refugee Convention), Biermann and Boas proposed an international “climate refugee” convention to “prepar[e] for a warmer world” (Biermann and Boas 2010). A group of French lawyers even designed a ready-to-sign project of convention (CRIDEAU 2008). Discussions were initiated in multiple domestic or regional political constituencies, although the adoption of a multilateral treaty never really appeared as a realistic option (Mayer 2011; McAdam 2011). A more cautious, “skeptical” school came to dominate the literature (Morrissey 2009). This school has three main credos. Firstly, it insists on the diversity of the migration strategies that are affected by climate change. In particular, internal migration (i.e., within a state) must be distinguished from international migration (i.e., across international borders). Both raise significantly different legal issues, as internal migrants remain within the jurisdiction of a same state responsible for the realization of their human rights, whereas international migrants need to be admitted to a third country. In most circumstances, the effects of climate change are limited to internal migration (EACH-FOR 2009; UNU 2012), and they are particularly unlikely to trigger significant longdistance migration flows. The exception relates to the hypothesis that small, low-lying island developing states such as the Maldives or Tuvalu may become uninhabitable because of sea-level rise, drought, more extreme and frequent weather events, and the impact of the acidification of the ocean. Secondly, this “skeptical” school rejects a simple and direct causal link through which climate change would force individuals to migrate. In 2001, Richard Black already opposed the “multiple and overlapping causes of most migration streams” to Myer’s alarmist predictions (Black 2001). Just as there is no purely “natural” disaster, the impacts of climate change depend on the social, political, economic, demographic, and cultural factors that define a society’s vulnerability. Nor does any more or less “natural” disaster determine a migratory behavior: different societies and different individuals react in various ways to the same events. Rather than the driver of a specific form of migration, the impact of climate change appears now as one in a cluster of causes; rather than purely “forced migration,” climate migration may range on a continuum between voluntary and forced migration (Hugo 1996). Thirdly, and largely as a consequence of this, the “skeptical” school questions our capacity to identify individual “climate migrants,” as would be necessary if a personal status was to be granted. An influential report to the British Foresight agency concludes that “the range and complexity of the interactions between the [multiple economic, social and demographic] drivers means that it will rarely be possible to distinguish individuals for whom environmental factors are the sole driver (‘environmental migrants’)” (Foresight 2011). This credo makes it virtually impossible to conceive the governance of climate migration by analogy with that of international protection of refugees through the conference of an individual status. Under the Refugee Convention, a refugee is a person who (1) “is outside the country of his nationality” or habitual residence and (2) “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, . . . is unable or . . . unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (1951 art. 1(A)(2)). Page 2 of 14

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Climate migrants do not normally qualify, even the few who cross an international border, because it is difficult to conceive climate change as a form of persecution and if this was the case, such “persecution” could not be related to one of the five grounds enumerated in the Convention (McAdam 2012), and in most cases there would likely be reasonable internal flight alternatives. The legal definition of a “refugee” can however be extended to other individuals, fleeing for instance situations of generalized violence, as has been done regionally in particular in Africa, Latin America, and Europe (McAdam 2007); a further extension to other forced migrants could certainly be considered – but this would only address a small part of the issue, letting aside the vast majority of internal migrants affected by the impacts of climate change. In what follows, I question the possible responses that international governance can realistically bring to address climate migration. This requires a more thorough look at certain difficulties that relate to “climate migration,” a concept that appears as impractical, arbitrary, yet promising.

Conceiving Climate Migration: From Ethics to Norm Entrepreneurship Practical and Conceptual Difficulties

It is difficult to reconcile the concept of “climate migration” with the understanding that migrations result from a multitude of factors (Lee 1966). The abovementioned report to the Foresight agency concluded that “[e]nvironmental change is equally likely to make migration less possible as more probable” (Foresight 2011), in particular because environmental stress may decrease the resources available to a population and consequently deprive individuals from the capacity to invest in the costs of migrating – including travel expenses, dangers, and temporary unavailability of income (Brown 2007). On the other hand, the same environmental stress may increase the need for income diversification. Which tendency will prevail – less migration because of resource deprivation or more migration for resource diversification – depends on the complex circumstances that define each case at the domestic, local, and individual scale. Similarly, insecurity may be a factor of migration in some cases, but the fear of land-grabbing or theft may also force individuals to remain or rapidly return in the vicinity of their property after an environmental disaster. More generally, the ability and propensity of individuals displaced by a disaster to return to their place of origin depends, among others, on social resilience (e.g., the reconstruction of infrastructures in the place of origin) and on the capacity of the displaced individuals to integrate in the place of destination. Following the earthquake that struck Lisbon in the mid-eighteenth century, French philosopher Rousseau (1756) disputed Voltaire’s blame of the Providence; accordingly, “it was hardly nature who assembled there twenty-thousand houses of six or seven stories.” Natural disasters result from a combination of physical elements on which humans have no direct control (although they have an indirect control on global anthropogenic climate change) and social elements that define the vulnerability of a society. Future numbers of migrants who can be attributed to climate change depend on many political, economic, social, cultural, and demographic factors. In particular, demographic growth will have an influence on the number of persons affected by any environmental change and so will also any policies that have an impact on the distribution of a population within a territory (Hugo 2011). Development also plays an important role: a country such as Bangladesh is vulnerable to sea-level rise because of its exposure (low altitude of most of its territory) but also because it does not have financial capacities comparable to the Netherlands to build dikes and seawalls. In some countries, the adverse effects of climate change may significantly impact the economy, thus further increasing the country’s vulnerability to climate change.

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Nonetheless, there are some estimates of the numbers of individuals displaced by sudden-onset natural disasters. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that between 2008 and 2012, an average of 29 million persons had been displaced each year (143.9 million persons in 5 years) by such rapid-onset natural disasters, although not all countries reported (Yonetani 2013). Eighty-two percent of these persons were in Asia, 9 % in the Americas, and another 9 % in Africa. Moreover, 16.7 % were displaced due to geophysical disasters (e.g., earthquakes, tsunamis) that are not a priori related to the climate, while the remaining 83.3 % were displaced by weather-related disasters, comprising 62.4 % displaced by hydrological disasters (e.g., floods, wet mass movements), 20.2 % by meteorological disasters (e.g., storms), and 0.7 % by climatological disasters (e.g., extreme winter conditions, heat waves, etc.) (Yonetani 2013). These statistics are produced by estimating the number of persons displaced following a disaster, thus ignoring the contribution of different factors in creating a “natural disaster.” On the other hand, however, this approach cannot readily be applied to measure the consequences of the diffuse economic impact of slow-onset environmental disasters such as sea-level rise, land degradation, desertification, or droughts. If some contend that environmental degradation may have consequences on security, possibly making conflict escalation more likely through increased competition for essential resources, the number of additional migrants that can be attributed to environmental degradation would also be particularly difficult to measure – and identifying individual migrants would be virtually impossible. Often, the migratory impact of environmental changes is statistical (increased numbers) but cannot be established at the individual level through an individual status determination procedure. Beside the difficulty of attributing individual migrants to a “natural disaster,” there is a difficulty in attributing a “natural disaster” to climate change. A media and political discourse has attributed super typhoon Haiyan that struck the Philippines in November 2013 to climate change, although scientific evidence only suggests that cyclones might become less frequent but more violent (IPCC 2014, 216–217 (sect. 2.6.3), 913–614 (sect. 10.6.1.5)). Nor can climate change be considered as the cause of the 2010 monsoon floods in affected China that IDMC identifies as the greatest displacement (15.2 million persons) between 2008 and 2012 (Yonetani 2013). Besides the inevitable element of scientific uncertainty of the climate models, the scientific community only asserts that “global monsoon precipitation will likely strengthen” (IPCC 2014 1234 sect. 14.2.5), saying that the probability of such floods increasing does not mean that a specific flood is caused by climate change. In other words, the statistical concept of climate (change) does not allow for the binary determination of whether or not a disaster is caused by climate change and, even less, whether or not an individual is a “climate migrant.” Therefore, “climate migration,” as individuals displaced because of climate change and who can be distinguished from economic migrants and treated differently, is an impractical concept. Dramatic but controversial forecasts of small island developing states being submerged by sea-level rise draw a wrong picture of environmental changes as direct, isolable factors of migration, letting little to no place for human agency (Farbotko 2005; Gemenne 2010; K€alin 2010). Whereas refugees are often opposed to “voluntary” economic migrants, environmentally induced displacement is not distinct from economic migration: most “climate migrants” are, indeed, economic migrants, as economic factors are the most proximate cause of their flight. This should not, however, mean that environmental change does not “force” people to move, but rather that the dichotomy between “voluntary” economic migrants and “forced” refugees is artificial: economic conditions leading to migration, be they triggered by an environmental change or not, can be and often are tragic.

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Discourse Inconsistencies The concept of climate migration is not only impractical: it is also arbitrary. No valid ethical discourse seems able to plead for a governance of climate migration rather than for responses to larger issues. To support this claim, three narratives can be identified: one on the protection of the rights of climate migrants as migrants (rights narrative), another one on the responsibility of polluting states for the adverse impacts of climate migration (responsibility narrative), and the last one on conceiving climate migration as a security issue (security narrative) (Mayer 2012a). Each of these three narratives is rooted in a different disciplinary background and leads to a different justification for an engagement of the international community, but none of them identify climate migration as a unique issue needing a specific form of governance. Firstly, the rights narrative often relates to a broader humanitarian discourse, conceiving the governance of climate migration as essentially a question of international solidarity. It puts forward the need for the protection of climate migrants. It proposes in particular an analogy between refugees and climate migrants, suggesting either to expand to the latter the protection that benefits many of the former or to create an alternative system of protection. Many such works call for an ambitious engagement of the international community to protect environmental migrants (Bell 2004; Brindal 2007). However, what this narrative really looks at is not climate migrants, but forced migrants. Limiting a new instrument to “climate migrants” (besides being impractical) would reproduce the arbitrary distinction between refugees and other forced migrants. The rights narrative addresses vulnerability, but the cause of vulnerability is irrelevant. If this narrative focuses on international migration, then Betts’ argument for a protection of “survival migrants” is more coherent (Betts 2013); if it turns to internal migration, then it should propose mechanisms to reinforce the protection of internal migrants. Furthermore, the rights narrative cannot ignore that migrants are generally not the most vulnerable in a society, as the poorer often lack the resources necessary to move (Foresight 2011) – this issue of the “invisibility” of more vulnerable nonmigrants is well known in other situations of forced migration (Lubkemann 2008). In a humanitarian perspective, many climate migrants should certainly be of concern, but any governance endeavor limited to climate migrants would be arbitrary: other migrants in a similar situation of vulnerability and arguably, even more, those “trapped in place” should also be of concern. Secondly, the responsibility narrative highlights the inequity that results from the poor, who benefit the less from greenhouse gas emissions, being the most severely affected by anthropogenic climate change. There are multiple technical hurdles to the legal argument that Tuvalu and Palau considered to bring to the International Court of Justice and that the inhabitants of Kivalina, an Alaskan village displaced because of the melting of a natural seawall, brought before American courts against multinational companies (Ielemia 2007; Kysar 2011). The ethical argument, however, is relatively straightforward, even through its modalities such as the discounting of past emissions, the possible excuse of ignorance, or the level of excusable emissions are subject to debates (Shue 1999; Caney 2005). Migration might be one of the adverse effects of climate change, and it was identified as such during recent international negotiations on loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change (UNFCCC 2012). Yet arguments for the responsibility of greenhouse gas emitters do not lead specifically to the governance of climate migration. The responsible parties ought arguably to cease their wrongful conduct and to repair the harm they already caused (see by analogy ILC 2001), but responsibility can in no case justify the imposition of specific norms on the injured parties. How to respond to migration through climate change adaptation policies should be within the sovereign prerogatives of each state, as long as this state complies with its general international obligations such as under international human rights law.

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Specific humanitarian standards may be desirable, as the rights narrative suggests, but they should not be specific to climate migration, as mentioned above. Thirdly, the security narrative, constructed by military and intelligence research, approaches climate migration in a very different way by putting forward the interests of powerful actors (generally states, but also possibly corporations) rather than their ethical duties. This narrative contends in particular that states should act early in order to prevent future political instability and that they should cooperate in order to avoid illegal migration and the concomitant development of issues such as drug or human trafficking, failing states and wars affecting commercial interests overseas, and international terrorism (e.g., Söderblom 2008). In other words, states should cooperate because this is in their own, well-understood interests. This narrative may come along with an incentive to militarization, although some have tried to reframe climate migration as rather a “human security” issue (Elliott 2010). Here again, however, it is not evident how climate migration appears as a different sort of issue from other humanitarian situations leading to migration, most obviously in cases of non-climate-related environmental disasters. When a state goes through a spiral of environmental, economic, political, and military issues leading to its failure to protect its population, the contribution of climate change to this spiral is irrelevant in terms of international security. At most, by possibly making such scenarios more likely, climate change calls for more attention to larger security issues.

Momentum for Change Because the concept of climate migration is both impractical and arbitrary, Betts (2013) and Nicholson (2014) have suggested abandoning it altogether. Consistency would dictate the definition of different issues: the rights narrative suggests a governance of migration or forced migration; the responsibility narrative calls for a commitment of greenhouse gas emitters toward mitigation and compensation, arguably not only through adaptation but also through a substantial loss and damage mechanism; and the security narrative calls for international cooperation reflective of our growing complex interdependence. The problem is that neither the rights nor the responsibility narratives are very effective on their own as both are ethical arguments about what actors should do – and actors do not always do what they should. In particular, these two narratives are grounded in cosmopolitan ethics or “global justice” theories that are yet to be fully endorsed by sovereign states: international governance remains grounded on the concept of sovereign states pursuing their own interests, the rebirth of autocratic monarchs “owing” their country. Within the climate regime, for instance, the responsibility narrative is less influential than the interests of each state (Posner and Weisbach 2010); it is in particular on a purely voluntary basis that states commit (or not) to contribute to mitigation, only vaguely guided by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s ambiguous references to principles of “equity” and “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (art. 3.1). The recent negotiations on a loss and damage mechanism show the fierce opposition of developed states to anything approaching compensation, despite compelling ethical arguments. On the other hand, the security narrative is able to create a political momentum by “speaking to states’ interests,” that is, by explaining why states could be motivated in doing something that happens also to be ethically sound. James Hathaway (1990) demonstrated that the international refugee regime was not developed out of pure generosity (how could the limitation of the definition of a refugee to persons persecuted on a specific ground be explained?), but rather because of the conjunction of a humanitarian narrative with a persuasive interpretation of states’ interests, generating a shared willingness to “govern disruptions of regulated international migration in accordance with the interests of states,” “a compromise between the sovereign prerogative of states to control Page 6 of 14

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immigration and the reality of coerced movements of persons at risk.” Hathaway’s conception of the rationale of the refugee regime suggests an alternative analogy with climate migration, not on the substance by pleading for the expansion of a regime already running out of political support but rather on the method of constructing a political support, a momentum for change, by joining ethical arguments with an interpretation of the states’ own interests. Despite its logical inconsistencies, the case for climate migration appears as a magical recipe for norm entrepreneurs (Mayer 2014). There is no essential reason why migrants should be protected rather than other vulnerable people, but migrants attract more attention, if only because of the fear that they may be approaching “us.” Nor is there any reason to focus on climate migrants specifically – other environmental migrants are most obviously in a similar situation of human suffering – but anything related to climate change attracts a unique degree of public attention and, possibly, of engagement. By joining the deep-rooted fears of migration with the existential uncertainties raised by climate change, climate migration has an immense marketing potential. Climate change fuels fears that, if well directed by skillful norm entrepreneurs, may be overcome through fair international cooperation. Similar moments of doubt, such as the end of the Second World War, led to great progress for international governance – including the formalization of the international refugee regime. The same could be done today, in response to climate change, with regard to larger populations of unprotected migrants or other vulnerable individuals throughout the world. Climate migration might not be a practical or consistent concept, but it is a popular one – it is a concept that may trigger a first step toward fairer international cooperation.

The Challenges of Governing Climate Migration Reconciling the Fair and the Realistic Governing climate migration poses a broad challenge: how to reconcile the sovereign rights of states with the human rights of climate migrants or, more broadly, of any migrants or anyone affected by climate change? Meaningful preliminary steps have been made to realize the rights of all migrants and to promote cooperation with regard to climate change, but new steps need to be conceived. The control of migration has generally been conceived as the preserve of states, despite some ethical arguments for an opening of international borders (Carens 1987). A report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the relationship between climate change and human rights clearly recognized that persons affected by climate change “would often not have a right of entry” to another state (OHCHR 2009). As noted before, the refugee regime has arguably been developed as the exception that reinforces the rule. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), however, confers to everyone “the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State,” although the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) allowed for restrictions of this right “which are provided by law [and] are necessary to protect national security, public order . . ., public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.” More than the right to move, however, it is often the many other rights of the migrants that are at issue: right to health, education, decent conditions of living, certain economic opportunities, etc. Both the UN Human Rights Council and the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change recognized that the adverse effects of climate change have a range of direct and indirect implications for the effective enjoyment of human rights (HRC 2008, 2009, 2011; UNFCCC 2010). Migrants, as human beings, are protected under international human rights law like anyone else; foreigners benefit from all human rights with the sole exceptions of the right to vote and to be elected and the right to enter a country (OHCHR 2009). The Page 7 of 14

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International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families was adopted in 1990 in order to emphasize the human rights of all migrants, including those who lack regular documentation. It is significant that, after 23 years, no more than 47 states ratified this convention (as of January 2014). Regarding internal migrants, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1998 clarified and promoted state human rights obligations, and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa adopted in Kampala in 2009 and entered into force on 6 December 2012 (Kampala Convention) is an important development in a regional context. The lack of capacities of local governments may however significantly hinder the realization of human rights, in particular by limiting the implementation of programs of humanitarian assistance that are costly but indispensable. This might be specifically the case for developing states that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, whose capacities may shrink while needs expand. The general reliance of international human rights law on the obligation of each state to protect the persons within its jurisdiction is inadequate to address the circumstances where the impacts of climate change may affect a state as a whole. Existing mechanisms of humanitarian assistance and aid to development are of paramount importance, but they are also strikingly insufficient, attached with detrimental conditions and extraneous political priorities, and contingent to inconsistent levels of public attention (Fassin 2012; GHA 2013). Linking migration with climate change, however, suggests that the human rights of migrants could more efficiently be implemented through international cooperation. Climate change is by essence a global issue, the substantiation of our growing complex interdependence (Singer 2004). It is also by essence a moral issue, through which the action of some causes harm to others, although in a complex manner (Gardiner 2011). The wide gap between the “haves” and the “have-nots” in terms of historical or present emissions and the concentration of most of the physical and social impacts on the “have-nots” ground a compelling case for not only a form of international solidarity but also for a full-fledged causal (tort-like) responsibility. The ethical responsibility of greenhouse gas emitters substantiates demands for international cooperation in the realization of human rights, not as a “soft duty” of humanitarian assistance but as a “hard duty” of compensation: aid is a due, not a charity. Yet such ethical arguments are unlikely to have a substantial political impact on their own. NGOs, intellectuals, and some politicians play an important role in raising public awareness, and public opinions may contribute to frame international politics. The success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in the 1990s, despite the economic interests of weapon-exporting developed states, evidences the ability of relatively powerless actors, as “norm entrepreneurs,” to impact public opinion and thus to shape international relations (Wexler 2003). Yet the interests at stake with regard to climate change far exceed the concessions that some developed states made with regard to the exportation of landmines. Ethical arguments, even if accompanied with a high degree of pathos, will not suffice to convince any democratic government to make the economic sacrifices necessary to fully compensate affected countries. An advocacy that is solely based on the rights of climate migrants and the ethical obligations of other states toward them is unlikely to lead to anything else than an increase in humanitarian assistance. Some American scholars argue that ethical arguments impede international negotiations and should be avoided: rather, states should openly seek their own interests (Posner and Weisbach 2010). This is a dead end, for rational, profit-seeking states are likely not to participate in a climate treaty, preferring to free ride over the sacrifices of other states. The flaw in the arguments based on states’ interests is that these “interests” are assumed to be known, uncontroversial givens. There is in particular a tendency to equate “interests” with “rational economic interests” that economists can calculate. Yet the economic value of avoiding climate Page 8 of 14

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change is difficult to evaluate, not only because of scientific uncertainty and contingence to a range of other processes such as development but also because there is no agreement as to how future costs should be discounted (Nordhaus 2007). Furthermore, states are also prone to take noneconomic interests into account, especially when discussing an issue such as climate change with potential tremendous security consequences. Unaddressed disasters may conceivably contribute to induce famines, extreme poverty, epidemics, failing states, conflicts, and terrorism, which will have consequences in the whole of an interdependent world. Just like there is no one rational magical formula to discount future events, there is also no such formula to measure existential risks. How much a state is willing to invest today in order to address such undefined future security risks depends on a complex process of political deliberation, in particular social and cultural settings. The current divergence between the European Union and the United States in climate negotiations reflects different political deliberation rather than radically different economic interests. As long as states’ interests are opposed to their ethical obligations, these ethical obligations will be left behind. It may therefore be advisable for norm entrepreneurs to focus on reinterpreting the interests of states in terms that are at least roughly ethical. Linking climate migration to security may appear as a promising strategy to trigger change. Under the influence of this discourse, the UN Security Council has already discussed the impact of climate change on international peace and security and requested a report of the Secretary-General on this topic (UN Secretary General 2009). The same discourse, however, has also been used to justify US military investments in Africa (Hartmann 2010) or India to fence part of its border with Bangladesh – but containment is not a sustainable response to humanitarian crises. Contemporary history shows that no crisis is set to remain purely domestic. The neglecting of the Afghan humanitarian crisis by the rest of the world over the last decades of the twentieth century allowed the development of a terrorist movement that led to the worst terrorist attacks in the United States. It is rather through an intense and responsible investment in human development that the international community may reduce threats to international peace and security.

Possible Steps Forward Some form of international governance might be both realistic and desirable and, indeed, is already being discussed. Proposals for an international treaty that would be inspired by the Refugee Convention and would establish an individual status for international climate migrants, or forced migrants more generally, are not among such realistic and desirable steps. It is unlikely that states will agree to bind themselves to provide international protection to an unknown number of future migrants. Many states that have ratified the Refugee Convention are increasingly reluctant to comply with the specific obligations that it defines. Furthermore, whereas it is in Asia that climate change has the impact on migration, few Asian states are party to the Refugee Convention – even fewer would possibly ratify a convention protecting any broader categories of migrants (Mayer 2012b). The adoption of a treaty promoting the rights of internal migrants is less unlikely, as the recent entry into force of the Kampala Convention shows, and it might be desirable. As it would be impossible and arbitrary to distinguish “climate migrants” within the flow of internal migrants, such a treaty should extend to all internal migrants. Such a treaty would essentially interpret and repeat the existing obligations of states under treaty and customary international human rights law rather than create brand new rights and obligations – for it is common ground that international human rights law lays down the basic principles that should be implemented while addressing climate migration (Crépeau 2012). A new treaty could play an important role in setting the agenda or advocating for domestic policies, but “soft law” instruments (like a resolution of the UN Human Rights Council or of the UN General Assembly) could play the same role without requiring the long and difficult Page 9 of 14

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process of signature and ratification by states (Mayer 2011). Indeed, the “Nansen initiative towards a protection agenda for people displaced across borders due to natural disasters and the adverse effects of climate change,” established by a few states in October 2012 as a consultative process, may be taking the direction of promoting some sort of guiding principles on disaster-induced migration (K€alin 2012). While the adoption of such instruments may be promising, a word of caution is necessary. As explained above, the concept of “climate migration” is essentially arbitrary. Following the rights narrative, it would be arbitrary to limit protection to migrants attributed to climate change, as the cause of migration should be indifferent, or to limit protection to migrants, as the most vulnerable are often unable to migrate. Following the responsibility narrative, the international community should certainly organize a form of reparation for states and individuals affected by climate change, but this reparation does not justify an interference with the way a state decides to adapt to climate change. There is something profoundly disturbing in the possibility that the international community may impose arbitrary humanitarian priorities upon developing countries. There would in particular be important costs of opportunity if scarce domestic resources were focused on climate migrants rather than being more equitably distributed among all of those who need assistance within the state (migrants and nonmigrants), or if these resources were all diverted to address present humanitarian crises rather than dedicating some resources to promote long-term sustainable development and resilience to climate change. The advocacy for international regulation often lies on two assumptions, according to which, firstly, the states affected are reluctant to protect climate migrants within their jurisdiction and, secondly, that international law can do something about it. Both assumptions are questionable. On the one hand, the need for protection of climate migrants often results from the lack of capacities rather than from the unwillingness of a state to protect its population. It must be kept in mind that the impacts of climate change in developing states such as the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Nigeria do not only affect individuals: they considerably diminish the capacities of states, some of which already face many other severe issues such as poverty, violence, and corruption. On the other hand, it is also uncertain that international law can curb the conduct of those states that are able but unwilling to act in a certain way. There is no direct way to enforce international law (like police does in domestic contexts). The international trade sanctions that are often used against pariah states affect the population more than their leaders. In any case, a treaty only obligates those states that have decided to ratify it. Most of the norms that an instrument on the protection of climate migrants would contain are already norms of international law, and simply rehearsing those norms will not automatically lead to a change of conduct, although it may contribute to different political, social, and cultural processes through which the international community influences domestic politics. Rather than international regulation, attention should be given to institutional governance as a possible element to promote international cooperation with regard to climate migration and other forms of migration. In the many states that show willingness but are unable to provide protection, cooperation is essential to supplement the capacities that a country needs, among others, through international assistance and capacity building. In those other countries that would be able but are unwilling to comply with their obligations, international socialization would help to prompt compliance. Rather than state-to-state discussions, an international organization would provide a greater authority as a unique voice, relatively independent from global day-to-day politics, established on a solid expertise. Therefore, perhaps the most worrisome issue raised by the debate on climate migration is the absence of an international institution with a specific mandate of protecting migrants. On the one hand, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, which is the “UN refugee agency,” has developed Page 10 of 14

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significant expertise on assistance and protection, but its mandate is narrowly conceived. The agency’s initial focus on refugees has been extended to other persons of concern, such as stateless persons, returnees, asylum seekers, and some internally displaced persons, and it has provided some assistance in responding to natural disasters. Yet the UNHCR has no general mandate covering generally all migrants or climate migrants. On the other hand, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is a self-standing international organization, outside of the United Nations system, which has significantly expanded its membership since the end of the Cold War, reaching 155 parties in January 2014, but has no proper protection mandate. The IOM provides logistical assistance as requested by states, for instance with regard to the control of migration and to the recruitment, transfer, and voluntary return of migrants. As the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants recently noted, “the mandate and funding of IOM pose structural problems with regard to fully adopting a human rights framework for its work: both would need to be revised if the organization is to become a key player in the promotion and protection of the human rights of migrants” (Crépeau 2013). The Special Rapporteur considered new institutional arrangements, such as a new UN agency, the expansion of the mandate of the UNHCR or the transformation of that of the IOM, or, on a shorter term, a set of measures to strengthen the current institutional framework such as through increasing the frequency of High-Level Dialogues on Migration and Development within the UN General Assembly. Such options suggest relevant responses to many of the questions raised by the debate on climate migration. Other institutional questions relate to the ability of today’s international institutions to channel efficient international funding to support development and capacity building, in particular in countries affected by climate change. Important discussions are ongoing, within the climate regime, on international funding for climate change adaptation as well as loss and damage mechanisms that may support countries affected by climate change. The voluntary nature of states’ contributions and the limited amounts proposed so far fail however to respond to the constant calls for the responsibility of greenhouse gas emitters.

Conclusion Social progress rarely comes straightforwardly from fully reasoned ethical arguments. Rather, biased representation and emotions are some of the factors that allow the success of certain arguments instead of others in public deliberation (Crawford 2006). That the concept of climate migration is essentially flawed and virtually impossible to implement should accordingly not be the end of our discussion: because of its ability to generate momentum for change, the concept appears as a rare opportunity for meaningful progress toward fairer international governance. The refugee regime succeeded in the post-Second World War, thanks to its ability to reconcile individuals’ rights with states’ “enlightened self-interests” (Hathaway 2005), thus fostering an important step toward what was to become international human rights law. The concept of climate migration is a powerful one as it calls to two of our deepest contemporary fears: climate change and migration. Doing nothing in front of such fears is politically impossible, while granting an individual status to “climate migrants” is practically impossible. It belongs to us to foster advocacy and create institutions that are able to direct the momentum for change toward meaningful progress toward the protection of the rights of migrants and the responsibility of greenhouse gas emitters. There are major risks, however, that such fears may rather fuel xenophobia and tense the relations between developed and developing countries or at least impose inappropriate policy priorities on resource-constrained states. Page 11 of 14

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References Bell D (2004) Environmental refugees: what rights? Which duties? Res Publ 10:135–152 Betts A (2013) Survival migration: failed governance and the crisis of displacement. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Biermann F, Boas I (2010) Preparing for a warmer world: towards a global governance system to protect climate refugees. Glob Environ Polit 10:60–88 Black R (2001) Environmental refugees: myth or reality? UNHCR Working Paper on New Issues in Refugee Research No. 34 Brindal E (2007) Asia Pacific: justice for climate refugees. Altern Law J 32:240–241 Brown O (2007) Eating the dry season: labour mobility as a coping strategy for climate change. In: IISD (International Institute for Sustainable Development), Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada Caney S (2005) Cosmopolitan justice, responsibility, and global climate change. Leiden J Int Law 18:747–775 Carens J (1987) Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders. Rev Polit 49:251–273 Crawford N (2006) How previous ideas affect later ideas. In: The Oxford handbook of context political analysis. Oxford University Press, Oxford. p 266 Crépeau F (2012) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants: climate change and migration. UN General Assembly, doc. A/67/299 Crépeau F (2013) Report by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants: global migration governance. UN General Assembly, doc. A/68/283 CRIDEAU (2008) Draft convention on the international status of environmentally-displaced persons. Rev Droit Univ Sherbrooke 39:451–505 EACH-FOR (2009) Synthesis report of the research project. European Commission, Brussels Elliott L (2010) Climate migration and climate migrants: what threat, whose security? In: McAdam J (ed) Climate change and displacement: multidisciplinary perspectives. Hart, Oxford Farbotko C (2005) Tuvalu and climate change: constructions of environmental displacement in the “Sydney Morning Herald”. Geogr Ann Ser B Hum Geogr 87:279–293 Fassin D (2012) Humanitarian reason: a moral history of the present. University of California Press, Berkeley Foresight (2011) Migration and global environmental change: final project report. The Government Office for Science, London Gardiner S (2011) A perfect moral storm: the ethical tragedy of climate change. Oxford University Press, Oxford Gemenne F (2010) Tuvalu, un laboratoire du changement climatique? Rev Tiers Monde 204:89–107 GHA (2013) Global humanitarian assistance report 2013. Development Initiatives, Bristol, UK Hartmann B (2010) Rethinking climate refugees and climate conflict: rhetoric, reality and the politics of policy discourse. J Int Dev 22:233–246 Hathaway JC (1990) A reconsideration of the underlying premise of refugee law. Harv Int Law J 31:129–183 Hathaway JC (2005) The rights of refugees under international law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge HRC (2008) Human rights and climate change. Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 HRC (2009) Human rights and climate change. Human Rights Council Resolution 10/4 HRC (2011) Human rights and the environment. Human Rights Council Resolution 16/11 Hugo G (1996) Environmental concerns and international migration. Int Migr Rev 30:105–131

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Hugo G (2011) Future demographic change and its interactions with migration and climate change. Glob Environ Chang 21(1):S21–S33 Ielemia A (2007) A threat to our human rights: Tuvalu’s perspective on climate change. UN Chron 44:18 ILC (2001) Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, doc. A/56/10 IPCC (2014) Working group I contribution to the IPCC fifth assessment report: the physical science basis. International Panel on Climate Change, Geneva K€alin W (2010) Conceptualizing climate-induced displacement. In: McAdam J (ed) Climate change and displacement: multidisciplinary perspectives. Hart, Oxford K€alin W (2012) From the Nansen principles to the Nansen initiative. Forced Migr 41:48–49 Kysar DA (2011) What climate change can do about tort law. Environ Law 41:1 Lee E (1966) A theory of migration. Demography 3:47–57 Lubkemann S (2008) Involuntary immobility: on a theoretical invisibility in forced migration studies. J Refug Stud 21:454–475 Mayer B (2011) The international legal challenges of climate-induced migration: proposal for an international legal framework. Colo J Int Environ Law Policy 22:357–416 Mayer B (2012a) Fraternity, responsibility and sustainability: the international legal protection of climate (or environmental) migrants at the crossroads. Supreme Court Law Rev Can 56:723 Mayer B (2012b) Environmental migration in the Asia-Pacific region: could we hang out sometime? Asian J Int Law 3:101–135 Mayer B (2014) “Environmental migration” as advocacy: is it going to work? Refuge Can J Refug 29:2–27 McAdam J (2011) Swimming against the tide: why a climate change displacement treaty is not the answer. Int J Refug Law 23:2–27 McAdam J (2012) Climate change, forced migration, and international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford McAdam J (2007) Complementary protection in international refugee law. Oxford University Press, Oxford Morrissey J (2009) Environmental change and forced migration: a state of the art review. Refugee Studies Center, Oxford Department of International Development, Oxford Myers N (1993) Environmental refugees in a globally warmed world. BioScience 43:752–761 Myers N (2002) Environmental refugees: a growing phenomenon of the 21st century. Phil Trans R Soc Biol Sci 357:609–613 Myers N (2007) Interview. Reported in Christian Aid (2007) Human tide: the red migration crisis. London Nicholson C (2014) Climate change and the politics of causal reasoning: the case of climate change and migration. Geogr J 180:2–151 Nordhaus W (2007) A review of the Stern review on the economics of climate change. J Econ Lit 45:686–702 OHCHR (2009) Report of the Office of the UN OHCHR on the relationship between climate change and human rights. High Commissioner for Human Rights, doc. A/HRC/10/61 Posner E, Weisbach D (2010) Climate change justice. Princeton University Press, Princeton Rousseau (1756) Letter to Voltaire (trans: Spang R). Reproduced in http://www.indiana. edu/enltnmt/texts/JJR%20letter.html Shue H (1999) Global environment and international inequality. Int Aff 75:531–545 Singer P (2004) One world: the ethics of globalization. Yale University Press, New Haven Page 13 of 14

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Söderblom JD (2008) Climate change: national and regional Security threat multiplier for Australia. Secur Solut 52:58 UN Secretary General (2009) Climate change and its possible security implications. UN General Assembly, doc. A/64/350 UNFCCC (2010) Cancun agreements: outcome of the work of the ad hoc working group on longterm cooperative action under the convention. In: 16th conference of the parties to the UN framework convention on climate change, decision 1/CP.16, Cancun UNFCCC (2012) Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to enhance adaptive capacity. In: 18th conference of the parties to the UN framework convention on climate change, decision 3/CP.18, Doha UNU (2012) Where the rain falls: global policy report. United Nations University, Bonn Wexler L (2003) The international deployment of shame, second-best responses, and norm entrepreneurship: the campaign to ban landmines and the landmine ban treaty. Ariz J Int Comp Law 20:561 Yonetani M (2013) Global estimates 2012: people displaced by disasters. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, Geneva

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Improving Capacities and Communication on Climate Threats for Water Resources Adaptation in Paraguay Genaro Coronela,b*, Max Pasténa,b, Julián Báezc, Roger Monte Domecqd, Mario Bidegaine and Gustavo J. Nagyf a Facultad Politécnica, Universidad Nacional de Asunción (FP-UNA), San Lorenzo, Paraguay b Maestría en Cambio Global: Énfasis en Riesgos Climáticos (FP-UNA), Campus Universitario San Lorenzo, San Lorenzo, Paraguay c Dirección de Meteorología e Hidrología, DMH-DINAC, Asunción, Paraguay d Unidad de Estudios Hídro-Ambientales, Centro de Tecnología Apropiada, Universidad Católica Nuestra Señora de la Asunción, Asunción, Paraguay e Instituto Uruguayo de Meteorología (INUMET), Montevideo, Uruguay f IECA, Facultad de Ciencias, UdelaR, Montevideo, Uruguay and Maestría en Cambio Global: Énfasis en Riesgos Climáticos (FP-UNA), Campus Universitario San Lorenzo, San Lorenzo, Paraguay

Abstract Successfully improving the capacities and communication on climate adaptation in water resources in Paraguay requires enhanced acceptance and understanding of both climate change and variability adaptation (CCA and CVA respectively). This is firstly to realize that the country has some intrinsic vulnerability being already impacted by climate threats on specific geographic and time scales. Climatic trends, cycles, and extremes impact the rich agropastoral basis of the economy, e.g., GDP and exports. The current deficit of CVA implies some lack of CCA to future scenarios. Secondly, we suggest focusing on building capacity on climate science and management through the (i) reinforcement of science-driven knowledge, e.g., future climate projections and scenarios; (ii) enhancing the communication of climate services within the Rio de la Plata basin (RPB) to make them more user-friendly; and (iii) training of climate science managers (CSM) capable of understanding and communicating climate-related issues, as well as to plan management policies. Thirdly, the coproduction of knowledge by natural and social scientists, engineers, managers, and users is necessary in order for them to be better informed and to produce flexible scenarios and plans. Journalists should participate to be acquainted with climatic events and time scales. Some of these activities have already been done or are being developed: (i) the reinforcement of science-driven knowledge, i.e., a dynamic climate downscaling was carried out with PRECIS tool; (ii) a master’s degree in global change was created; (iii) regional climate services are improving; and (iv) the understanding of the impacts of CCA and CVA is increasing. A climate forum can provide the required platform to build capacity and communication awareness and the coproduction of knowledge with elected authorities, stakeholders, and journalists, further allowing for a consensual climate adaptation process.

Keywords Paraguay River basin; Rainfall regime; Climate variability impact; Building capacity; Climate management; Mass media

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 16

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Introduction Paraguay is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and variability; however, the country’s social, economic, and environmental sectors do not perceive it yet. The main conclusions of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC/CEPAL) named “Regional Study of Economics of Climate Change South America” (CEPAL 2010) on climate vulnerability, impacts, and adaption on water resources and agriculture in Paraguay can be summarized as follows: • The country is rich in water resources and does not have to implement adaptation measures yet but for specific cases. However, it could be impacted whether locally or seasonally by 2050. • Summer crops and livestock (beef and dairy cattle) will suffer the effects of warming and rainfall regime changes, whether by less precipitation during summer or more intense short-term rainfalls; thus water storage could become a usual practice by 2050. • The impact of droughts in terms of affected people should increase from the baseline (2007) by 23 %, 39 %, and 74 % by 2020, 2030, and 2050, respectively. Since 2009, the pressure of climate stressors is very likely increasing. Gross domestic product (GDP) average country’s increase from 2009 to 2013 was above 5 % (from 4 % to +14 %, BBVA 2013; DGEEC 2013). More than half of these changes are associated with agriculture and livestock production and exports (soybean and beef). The GDP will continue increasing at high rates during 2014 (BBVA 2013) which will push both the inflation and the interest rates (García 2014). The observed warming and wetting signals over South America (Skanski et al. 2013), the likely expected warming and uncertain precipitation evolution for 2020–2050 (Bidegain et al. 2012; Pasten and Giménez 2012), and the disaggregation of climate impacts on regional and seasonal basis in Paraguay suggest that adaptation to climate change could not be evaded over the next decade. This article focuses on building capacity and communication on climate threats on water resources adaptation in the Paraguay River basin as follows: (i) regional climatic and water resources information; (ii) the frameworks of climate variability and change adaptation (CVA and CCA); (iii) the perception of climate variability in the media; (iv) the existent regional climate scenarios and services useful to support both current climate variability and future climate change adaptations; (v) the development of a master in global change degree devoted to climate science and management within the Paraguay River basin (PRB); (vi) the regional climate services to cope with climate variability within La Plata basin (LPB); and (vii) the communication of climatic data to stakeholders.

Geographical Setting and Climate Vulnerability of Paraguay Paraguay is located in the center of South America, having 406,752 km2 land area with a population of 6.7 million inhabitants (DGEEC 2013). It accounts for 13 % of the Rio de la Plata River basin (3.1  106 km2, La Plata basin from now), almost one third of which within the Paraguay River basin (the Paraguay basin from now on). The country is divided by the Paraguay River into two major regions – Western (Chaco) and Eastern (Fig. 1) – and 17 departments (provinces). The former is part of the ecosystem known as “Gran Chaco Americano” shared with Argentina and Bolivia, a large plain in which the main economic activity is beef production. The latter is confined between the Paraguay and Parana rivers, having a more undulating topography, good drainage, and large Page 2 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_113-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 The Rio de la Plata basin and Paraguay. The Paraguay River divides the country into a western dry region named El Chaco and an Eastern wet region (es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuenca_del_Plata)

subtropical forests. Because of the increasing exploitation of agriculture, e.g., soybean and livestock, the Eastern Region, border with Argentina and Brazil, suffered a high rate of deforestation over the last few decades. The Pantanal wetlands shared by Paraguay, Bolivia, and Brazil are placed to the north of the basin. The agropastoral activities use about 70 % of the available water resources. Threats in their ecological and hydrological functions from climate change and variability are already installed in the region, requiring a proper planning and management of water resources to successfully cope with current variability and to adapt to future changes. Thus, water availability and allocation is central for the prosperity of Paraguay and the other countries of the La Plata basin (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Uruguay) which are world’s leading exporters of soybean and beef, as well as strong producers of other cereals and dairy products. Riverine populations are the most vulnerable to climate risks due to floods and inundations. The consequences of long-term climate change and variability in the Paraguay basin are not well known yet, but observed changes in extreme events have been associated with loss of life, economy, infrastructure, and biodiversity of ecosystems (Wantzen et al. 2008). Future climate scenarios (2030–2080) for Southeastern South America (SESA) centered on Paraguay were generated for temperature and precipitation (Alves and Marengo 2010; Bidegain et al. 2011, 2012; Pasten and Giménez 2012) from global climate models (GCMs) outputs with IPCC socioeconomic scenarios SRES A2 and B2 (Carter et al. 1994). Despite the uncertainties inherent in this type of construction of future scenarios, the greatest warming is expected over the north and northwest (Chaco and the Paraguay basin) and the least over the southeast (Eastern Argentina, Uruguay, and Southern Brazil). Paraguay would experience for the 2020s and 2050s a warming around +1  C and 2.5  C, respectively. There is a significant difference in the precipitation estimation; the greatest reductions ( 6 %) would be located over the Paraguay basin and the largest increases (+5 %) in the Eastern Region. Most models’ outputs show an increase in rainfall over November and December. This trend should already occur in the 2020s but should be more

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_113-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Yearly means of temperature and accumulated rainfall (1961–1990) for 7 of the 17 departments of Paraguay (Source: Climatic Research Unit-CRU, Hadley Centre, UK; 50  50 km) Department Alto Paraguay Alto Paraná Boquerón Canindeyú Central Itapúa Presidente Hayes

Region Chaco Eastern Chaco Eastern Eastern Itapúa Chaco

Yearly mean temperature and accumulated rainfall  C mm/year 25.2 839 21.3 1,620 24.1 596 22.0 1,543 22.7 1,401 21.4 1,668 23.7 1,013

Fig. 2 Paraguay River floods at Asuncion from 1905 to 1998 (above, Barros et al. 2006) and from 1999 to 2009 (below)

noticeable in the 2050s, when it is expected up to 1 mm/day in October at Asuncion and other sites within the PRB.

Climatic and Hydrologic Setting Paraguay has a great regional climatic variability. The vegetation in the Chaco Region is semiarid to the northwest and subhumid megathermal savanna to the northeast and the Paraguay River basin. The rest of the Eastern Region is humid wet megathermal with maximum humidity levels in the departments of Alto Paraná, Itapúa, and Canindeyú (Table 1 and Figs. 2 and 3). Rainfall has an annual cycle with a period of high (October to March) and one with low rainfall (April to September). The Western Region has minimum precipitations during the months of austral winter (July and August), when rainfall becomes scarce, and the maximum is observed during summer (December and January). Although in the Eastern Region, especially in the southeastern zone, the same seasonal variation is also observed, it is not as pronounced as in the Western Region.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_113-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Precipitation Anomaly A2 scenario, Annual Average (2031-2040) 19’S

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Fig. 3 Expected precipitation (mm/day) anomaly for 2031–2040 from the climatic reference 1961–1990: (above) scenario A2. (below) scenario B2 (From Pasten and Giménez 2012)

The behavior of the annual rainfall totals (Table 1) for the period 1961–1990 shows a minimum of 596 mm/year in Boquerón (Chaco region) and a highest of 1,667 mm/year in Itapúa (Eastern Region) where two large hydroelectric power generation dams are located (Itaipú and Yacyretá). The seasonal rainfall is well defined, the summer (DJF) and spring (ND) being the rainiest and the winter (JA) the driest.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_113-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Water Resources and the Paraguay River Basin The nature and extent of current environmental impacts within the Paraguay River basin are of mixed nature: primary human induced, such as deforestation and land degradation, and increasingly climate induced, mostly climate variability impacts such as drought and flooding. Some of the environmental impacts on the La Plata basin and particularly the Paraguay basin water resources are the following (modified from Tucci and Clarke 1998): • • • •

Evolution of hydroelectric dam reservoirs in the upper Parana basin in Brazil since 1960 Deforestation since 1950 Agricultural intensification since 1970 Urban developments due to changes of inundation, navigation, and conservation patterns in the upper Paraguay River basin • River flow increase since 1970 attributable to changes in land cover and climate The Paraná and Uruguay rivers together with Paraguay River (a tributary of the former) are the main tributaries of the La Plata River. The Paraguay River has a low gradient in its origins giving rise to vast Pantanal wetlands (Fig. 1), the largest wetlands in the world, with ca. 220,000 km2. This gradient causes a delay in the flood wave around 4 months between the north and south of the Pantanal region. The Paraguay River flow is maximum during austral winter and minimum in September and January. Average river flow is 3,000–4,000 m3/s (varying from 800 to 12,000 m3/s). These extremes are about 1–9 m water level at Asunción. Most floods in Asuncion take place between May and July in phase with the winter maximum annual flow cycle. They are originated in the upper and middle Paraguay basins, mostly related to El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) warm phase (El Niño) and are independent of the Pantanal output (Barros et al. 2004). The typical occurrence of floods up to 2–3 m is each 3 years covering 80 % or plus of the country’s plains reaching 4–5 m or plus during El Niño events, e.g., 1983. Wetlands have a great flood buffer capacity protecting agriculture, infrastructure, and human settlements (Neiff et al. 2000). Time series of yearly maximum floods during the period 1905–1998 shows a slight decreasing trend with cycles, such as the one from 1999 to 2009 (Fig. 2). To forecast these cycles of ca. 10–15 years is a challenge to manage the basin. The potential impacts of climate change in the Paraguay basin are the increases in temperature, rainfall intensity, and the frequency and severity of extreme events such as inundations, heat waves, storminess, and prolonged droughts. These events would impact agriculture, livestock, and human populations due to the increased risk of urban flooding and water-borne diseases. The rise in upper basin erosivity as a consequence of summer rainfalls and of the sedimentation in the lower basin should increase the risk of droughts and forest fires because of greater evapotranspiration and less precipitation during the low-water level period. These changes should impact the aquatic ecosystems all over the basin (IPCC 2007; Project Sinergia 2011). The data presented in Table 1 which shows likely temperature increase and uncertain rainfall evolution support changes in evapotranspiration.

Climate Change and Variability Adaptation Adaptation is “the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities”. (IPCC 2007)

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_113-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Because of the extensive uncertainties that exist in the future drivers of and responses to climate change, future scenarios are necessary to explore the potential consequences of different management response options (Moss et al. 2010). The construction of climate scenarios and adaptation strategies (Climate Science Management, CSM) evolved over the last two decades from a sciencedriven approach led by earth and natural scientists to a citizen-driven one where social scientists have an important role. However, the concepts and framing of adaptation are not the same worldwide. Here “climate adaptation” is referred to as “The adjustment to any threat or harm from continuous climate change or discrete climatic and meteorological events” (Nagy et al. submitted). Since the strong El Niño event of 1997–1998, ENSO-related variability has become the Climate Science Management priority in Latin America (IPCC 2001) including Paraguay (Grassi 2001; CEPAL 2010). We take for granted that climate adaptation is a top priority in our region and suggest that the highly distributed extreme hydrometeorological events since 2012 are changing the perception and interpretation of climate threats and vulnerabilities worldwide, as well as the need for both mitigation and adaptation now. Three framing of adaptation can be distinguished (Dupuis and Knoepfel 2013): • Climate change adaptation (CCA) • Climate variability adaptation (CVA) • Vulnerability-centered adaptation (VCA) These authors argue that a lack of adaptive capacity is not sufficient for explaining the implementation deficit related to CCA which relies on different limiting factors depending on the context. A lack of adaptation to current climate variability and observed change is a failure to keep pace with development in the “adaptation deficit” (Burton 2004). This concept captures the notion that countries are underprepared for current climate conditions, much less for future climate change. The shortfall is not the result of low levels of development but of less than optimal allocations of limited resources (EACC 2012). “Persistent vulnerability to climate variability is a symptom of an adaptation deficit in socio-ecological systems” (Preston et al. 2013).

Climate Change and Variability in the Media The media ABC Color is an important disseminator of information in Paraguay based in Asunción. It is the most widely circulated daily newspaper, fostering civic consciousness of citizenship providing sustained support for education at all levels. It summarizes important concepts, which may reflect and even create public opinion on climate change. When we were finishing this article, a press article about the current climate extremes was published in Paraguay (ABC Color Newspaper, January 16, 2014). We do not agree with all what is written in the article, but have synthesized the most important concepts because it could reflect and/or create public opinion about climate change. As many press articles do all over the world, it mixes climate anomalies, variability, and change and accuses the government of inaction. Paraguay is gradually suffering the impacts of climate change. There are extremely hot days and heavy rainfalls, without precedent in the last few decades. Experts from the unit of Risk Management of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock highlight the impacts of water stress on crops, fruits, pasture and livestock. The drought and heat excess difficult navigation in the Paraguay River. There is little action on mitigation or

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_113-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

adaptation. The Directorate of the Environment (SEAM) generates the ideas for mitigation and adaptation. Notwithstanding, these problems are not having an adequate response yet.

We agree with ABC with regard to the impacts and the need of increasing actions, especially preparedness to climate extremes and adaptation. The increase in climate analysis and modeling, information and public awareness, and education of managers are key steps to facilitate government and NGO’s climate adaptation planning.

How to Deal with Adaptation Under Uncertainty in Paraguay? Here we suggest that in order to cope with variability, emphasis must be put on building capacity to develop a community of experts in Climate Science Management and the coproduction of knowledge with the aim of increasing public awareness and trust, through a participatory and informed process. Climate variability adaptation (CVA) facilitates coping with unexpected extremes and planning climate change adaptation (CCA). The countries of the La Plata basin have been learning to cope with variability (CVA) to sustain growing local consumption and food exportation. However, “managing variability” seems not to be enough because of the ongoing changes in climatic patterns and the high level of dependence their economies have on climate, water resources, and grasslands. Under a likely warming scenario of 1  C or plus and uncertain rainfall in a decade or so, the top priority CVA in the Paraguay basin should evolve together with planned CCA plans based on natural or socioeconomic accepted thresholds to continue a sustainable development. Even if Paraguay is very rich in natural resources and the Chaco region is naturally dry and resilient, it is vulnerable to changes in water availability which could worsen under expected changes (CEPAL 2010). A good strategy could be based on the concept of Butler and Coughlan (2011) “Adapting to variability before change and using preexisting adaptation strategies for climate variability as a proxy for future adaptation planning” Climate variability has been a driver to increase regional capacities to forecast and manage resources and production under uncertainty which is basically risk management (Jones 2010), even if risk probability is often only estimated. There is also a need of better vulnerability assessments and VCA. The region is suffering an increase in seasonal, interannual, and decadal variability. Thus, to forecast short-term events within the boundaries of synoptic and climatic scales is becoming more difficult in spite of more resources allocated. There are several ongoing climate vulnerability, impacts, and/or adaptation projects on water resources, agriculture, health, and biodiversity in Paraguay, mostly with neighboring countries Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia (CEPAL 2010; Project Sinergia 2011, www.portalsinergia.org.br; Báez et al. 2014; REGATTA Project “Gran Chaco y Cono Sur,” www.granchaco13.wix.com/ comunidad). They are mostly focused on CVA, environmental degradation and preservation, early warning and monitoring, risk analysis, and transboundary water. From now on, we present some activities we have been developing over the last few years to build capacity to understand global change science and management.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_113-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Future Climatic Scenarios A dynamic climate downscaling centered in Paraguay was carried out with PRECIS tool (UK Met Office Hadley Centre-HADC) based on the runs of the HadRM3P mesoscale Global Circulation Models (Pasten and Giménez 2012). The comparison between the observed climatology (data from Climatic Research Unit-CRU, University of East Anglia, UK) and the modeled one for the period 1961–1990 shows the model reproduces very well the precipitation in much of Paraguay, except in Alto Paraguay, Boquerón, and Presidente Hayes in the Chaco region. The correlation of expected temperature trends for the time frame 2011–2050 is significant (95 % confidence interval) for temperature in the departments of Alto Parana, Boquerón, Central (Asuncion), Itapúa, and Presidente Hayes with both scenarios A2 and B2, whereas the expected increases in precipitation are not significant. The temporal behavior of rainfall is quite well reproduced but overestimated in the months of high precipitation. In the north, center, and south of the Eastern Region, both climatologies are quite similar. With regard to temperature, the model reproduces very well the seasonal behavior in the Chaco region. However, in most cases, the model underestimates the average temperature in the hottest months, whereas in the Eastern (wet) region, there is a good fit between both climatologies. Modeled future increase in both precipitation and temperature for 2013–2040 is shown as anomalies (Figs. 3 and 4, respectively). The future A2 and B2 scenarios for 2031–2040 can be summarized as follows: a marked and significant increase of the mean annual temperature, with increases between 1.3  C and 1.6  C for the scenario A2 and 1.1–1.4  C to the B2 scenario from the period 1961–1990. The precipitation shows a slight increase for 2040, but the trend is not significant. The outputs of the Japanese MRI-CGCM2.3 high-resolution model for SESA (Bidegain et al. 2011) give quite similar results. Yearly mean temperature and precipitation fields for the La Plata basin are very well and well represented, respectively, for the calibration period (1979–2003) which already includes a significance increase in both parameters. Expected warming varies from +1  C to +2  C for 2015–2039 and from +3  C to +4  C for 2075–2099, which are less to the southeast and greater to the northwest of the La Plata basin. Thus, for the time horizon 2040–2060, a likely range is +1.5–2.5 ºC, which is in close agreement with the previous results from GCM downscaling. Precipitations are expected to increase in Eastern Paraguay, Southern Brazil, and Uruguay by + 5 % (2013–2039) and 10 % (2075–2099) with regard to 1979–2003, which is very similar to the values around 1990.

Regional Climate Services: Technological Resources to Cope with Climate Variability Adaptation One of the drivers of climate variability in the La Plata basin is El Niño Southern Oscillation (Barros et al. 2004, 2006). However, there are deficits in the knowledge of other climate drivers, and so climate prediction is still limited. Since December 1997, there have been developed regional climate forum for Southeastern South America (SESA) in the form of a climate forecast consensus expressed as tertile probability (less than the normal, normal, and above normal) for the region between the latitudes 19  S and 35  S and to the east of the Andes. This prognosis is developed by experts of the Meteorological Services of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay; the Center of Weather and Climate Forecasting of Brazil; the University of Buenos Aires with its partners; and the University of the Republic of Uruguay.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_113-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Average Temperature Anomaly A2 scenario, Annual Average (2031-2040) 19’S

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Fig. 4 Expected yearly temperature anomaly for 2031–2040 from the climatic reference 1961–1990: (above) scenario A2. (below) scenario B2 (From Pasten and Giménez 2012)

While these forecasts are widely used by the various user sectors, an urgent upgrade of both the methodology of development and communication to users is required. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) joined the Board of Intergovernmental Climate Services (JISC) within the Global Framework of Climate Services in July 2013. This initiative seeks to develop climate services at global, regional, and local scales as a response to climate variability and change. Four priority areas were defined: • Food production and agriculture

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_113-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

• Water and energy • Health • Risk reduction of natural disasters The climate services are based on the following pillars: • • • •

Scientific knowledge Climate observing networks Platform for users Training

The overall goal is the production of climate forecasts on monthly, seasonal, yearly, and decadal time scales, oriented to the four sectors of users aforementioned. Two Regional Climate Centers (RCCs) are being implemented in South America: 1. The western center placed in the International Center for Research on the El Niño Phenomenon (CIIFEN), with headquarters in Guayaquil, Ecuador (http://ac.ciifen-int.org/rcc/) 2. The southern center (RCC-SAS), whose concept is a virtual center, managed by the meteorological services of Argentina and Brazil, with the participation of the meteorological services of Paraguay and Uruguay These centers are staffed with a structure and governance and must comply with the standards of the WMO. The RCC-SAS developed an experimental website, which will be available in the short term. Both centers will monitor the main climatic variables as well as weather forecasts, supported by the regional climate forum.

Capacity Building: The Master Degree in Global Change and Climate Risks The capacity of communities to adapt to global change and climate threats is determined by their level of development and allocation of resources and its scientific and technical capacity. The direction of climate change is uncertain, so that emphasis should be put in the increase of the capacity for adaptation and risk management in relation to key sectors in the Paraguay basin, such as agriculture, water resources, biodiversity, and health. To decrease the impact of climate threats, adaptation must be integrated into the overall development policies (Watson et al. 1998), and scholars must promote an interdisciplinary knowledge management to face global change and its impacts. It is important to address the threats from climate change and variability issues beyond science, without forgetting that the human dimensions are indispensable so that climate adaptation be effective. Global change is recognized as the greatest challenge that humanity has to face in the coming decades, being a challenge for science, given that it transcends the traditional boundaries between disciplines. This requires an integration of inputs that overflows the conventional structure of the existing educational programs. There are two important questions that require more qualified staff in global change teaching and research with regard to water resources. Firstly, how does it work for the Paraguay basin, within the regional system, in relation to the biogeochemical cycles? Secondly, how could the land use and climate changes affect the functioning of the Pantanal-Paraguay ecosystems? Page 11 of 16

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The Polytechnic Faculty of the Universidad Nacional de Asuncion (FP-UNA) developed a master’s degree (MSc) in global change with emphasis on climate risks (Coronel et al. 2012) offered since 2014. This degree was designed to understand, from the scientific knowledge, factors and sectors in which there is a need to intervene (management). The program will trigger among its participants a search process for innovative alternatives that have to be translated into the design and implementation of research and development projects and implementation of alternative technologies in the productive processes, e.g., agriculture and hydroelectric power generation. It is hoped also to reinforce the generation of novel regulations, education, awareness, and citizen participation. Graduates will be knowledgeable about the use of climate scenarios and the approaches to evaluate climate vulnerability, adaptation, mitigation, and risk management. The degree emphasizes education and research on global change science and management. To achieve this goal, professors and experts from Paraguay and the region have been integrated within the program. The MSc degree is addressed to graduates in sciences, social sciences, agriculture, and health that are working or have the chance to work as teachers or researchers or are at the forefront of public and private units which are engaged in environmental issues sensitive to climate change and variability.

Communicating Climate Data and Scenarios to Stakeholders in Order to Improve Adaptation What do stakeholders and decision-makers need to know in order to plan and implement adaptation? When the media analyze climate issues, e.g., the ABC Color Newspaper article of January 16, 2014, focus is on to the current climate, especially extremes. Thus, they may both increase public awareness and confusion about climate threats and perspectives, searching more for government level responsibilities than focusing on climate change and variability. We suggest building capacity and public awareness on climate science and management. The director of the Risk Management Unit of the MAG had said (ABC Color June 6, 2011) that he is taking into account the regional climate services forecast and that he is aware of the increasing trends in temperature and precipitations. He outlined the need to have a good prognosis and communication to farmers on extreme meteorological events to manage crops and of El Niño events which can cause floods in the upper and middle RPB where agriculture and livestock activities are predominant. In order to achieve a better communication between scientists and stakeholders, there needs to be a coproduction of knowledge (Roux et al. 2006; Biesbroek et al. 2009; Nagy et al. 2014). We suggest to focus on the enhancement of both top-down and bottom-up approaches which requires not only resources but also the integration of all involved representative citizens (stakeholders at all levels of making decisions). However, we must avoid the illusion of public participation being that crucial as to scientists’ information and feedbacks being underestimated. The ways to achieve a better integration of experts from the academia, government, and users are by means of education and training, e.g., the MSc in global change, and the increase of public awareness and participation through workshops and webinars. Stakeholders are included to not only be informed and give their opinions but also participate together with experts on building future scenarios and participatory planning. These meetings should serve to discuss current priorities with expected future threats, harms, and thresholds. The participation of journalists is desired in order for them to be acquainted with climate issues and to communicate them.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_113-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

A simplified mix of risk management and adaptive management approaches to deal with both climate threats and uncertainty could be summarized as follows: • What are the main directions of change? • To focus on “what if” and “what is at risk” statements. • To integrate scientists and stakeholders the best available “science and monitoring in order to gradually change plans accordingly to how climate changes/varies.” • To better communicate current and expected climate evolution and associated impacts at all climate management time scales. A good example of participation and communication on what has been done over the last 2 years is the periodic webinars of REGATTA Climate Adaptation Project Gran Chaco y Cono Sur Americano (http://kp.iadb.org/Adaptacion/es/Cono-Sur/Paginas/inicio.aspx).

Conclusion In order to achieve a better communication of climate information and capacities to address adaptation regarding water resources will require the following steps: • To assume the threats of current and plausible climate futures • To increase scientific knowledge and monitoring • To train climate science managers in order to transcend the boundaries of disciplines and climate threats and impacts • To increase the quality of climate information from both the climate services and the media, further allowing to have a better informed population • To produce cooperative knowledge based on both the science and the needs and perceptions of stakeholders We, as scientists and engineers from the academia and government, strongly believe on scientific knowledge and – as practitioners – the need of integrating local knowledge. We support the promotion of climate forum on water resources, agriculture, hydroelectric power generation, and riverine populations’ risks, where the state of the art on climate variability and change and the perception and needs of stakeholders are discussed. We also believe that it is necessary to avoid the illusion of participation as it was the “approach to truth” but the way to generate feedbacks to learning by doing.

References Alves L, Marengo J (2010) Assessment of regional seasonal predictability using the PRECIS regional climate modeling system over South America. Theor Appl Climatol 100:337–350 Baez J, Monte Domecq R, Lugo L (2014) Risk analysis in transboundary water of the rivers Pilcomayo and Paraguay. In: Leal W (ed) International perspectives on climate change: Latin America and beyond. Springer, Heidelberg

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Banco Bilbao y Vizcaya (BBVA) (2013) Situación del Paraguay: Análisis económico, BBVA Research, servicio de estudios. bbva.com/. . ./1305_SituacionParaguay_1S13_tcm346. Accessed Jan 2014 Barros VR, Chamorro L, Coronel G, Baez J (2004) The major discharge events in the Paraguay River: magnitudes, source regions and climate forcings. J Hydrometeorol 5:1161–1170 Barros V, Clarke R, Silva Días P (2006) El cambio climático en la cuenca del plata. 1ª ed. Buenos Aires: Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas – CONICET, p 230. ISBN: 950-692-066-4 Bidegain M, de los Santos B, Skusunosky S, Kitoh A (2011) Escenarios Climáticos futuros con el modelo japonés MRI-CGCM2.3. Anais do 7 Simpósio de Meteorología e Geofísica da APMG y XIV Congreso Latinoamericano e Ibérico de Meteorología, Portugal. March 2011 Bidegain M, Coronel G, Ríos N, de los Santos B (2012) Escenarios climáticos futuros para Paraguay. Meteorologica 37:2 Burton I (2004) Climate change and the adaptation deficit. Occasional paper 1, Adaptation and Impacts Research Groupe, Environment Canada, Ottawa Butler K, Coughlan E (2011) Adapting to Variability before Change. An analysis of preexisting adaptation strategies for climate variability through a socioecological resilience framework: The Case of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Paper presented at ICARUS II Conference, May 2011. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA. Available at: www.icarus.info/wp.../ 2011/.../Butler Coughlan. Accessed Mar 2013 Carter TR, Parry ML, Harasawa H, Nishioka S (1994) IPCC technical guidelines for assessing climate change impacts and adaptations. Center for Global Environmental Research and National Institute for Environmental Studies, London Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) (2010) La economía del cambio climático en América Latina y el Caribe: Síntesis 2010 (2010). CEPAL, Santiago de Chile, p 113. Available at: www.eclac.cl/. . ./2010-913_Sintesis-Economia_cambio_climatico-COMP Coronel G, Pasten M, Bordas M, Nagy GJ, Bidegain M (2012) Desarrollo del Programa de Maestría en Cambio Global: Énfasis en Riesgos Climáticos (MCG). Documento de Trabajo, FP-UNA, Asunción Dirección General de Estadísticas, Encuestas y Censos (DGEEC) (2013) Anuario 2012, Paraguay. www.dgeec.gov.py. Accessed Jan 2014 Dupuis J, Knoepfel P (2013) The adaptation policy paradox: the implementation deficit of policies framed as climate change adaptation. Ecol Soc 18(4):31. doi:10.5751/ES-05965-180431 Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change Team (EACC) (2012) The costs to developing countries of adapting to climate change new methods and estimates. The global report of the economics of adaptation to climate change study. Consultation draft García M (2014) ABC color press article. LANACION.com.py. Accessed 17 Jan 2014 Grassi B (2001) Reducing the impacts of environmental emergencies through early warning and preparedness: the case of the 1997–98 “El Niño”-southern oscillation. CD ROM, FP UNA, Paraguay International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) (2001) TAR IPCC Working Group II – climate change 2001: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability Jones RN (2010) The use of scenarios in adaptation planning: managing risks in simple to complex settings. A report done for the project “Clarifying and mapping the use of scenarios in climate change adaptation strategies for the state of Victoria” at the Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University, Australia. A good, relatively accessible 13-page paper giving

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a typology of scenarios, and the optimal use of scenarios for climate change adaptation planning. Accessed Dec 2013 Magrin G, Gay García C, Cruz Choque D, Giménez JC, Moreno AR, Nagy GJ, Nobre C, Villamizar A (2007) Latin America. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. In: Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp, 581–615 Moss RH, Edmonds JA, Hibbard KA, Manning MR, Rose SK, van Vuuren DP, Carter TR, Emori S, Kainuma M, Kram T, Meehl GA, Mitchel JFB, Nakicenovic N, Riahi K, Smith SJ, Stouffer RJ, Thomson AM, Weyant JP, Wilbanks TJ (2010) The next generation of scenarios for climate change research and assessment. Nature 463:747–756 Nagy GJ, Seijo L, Bidegain M, Verocai JE (2014) Stakeholders’ climate perception and adaptation in coastal Uruguay. J Clim Change Strateg Manage 6(1):63–84, Climate change Nagy GJ, Muñoz N, Verocai JE, Bidegain M, Seijo L (submitted). Adjusting to current climate threats and building alternative future scenarios for the Rio de la Plata coast and estuarine front, Uruguay. International Journal of Integrated Coastal Zone Management. Special Number Lay Rationalities on Climate Change in the Coastal Zone: Climate Change Adaptation and adjustment to threatening events Neiff JJ, Patiño CAE, Casco SL (2000) Atenuación de las crecidas por los humedales del Bajo Paraguay. Centro de Ecología del Litoral, Corrientes, pp 261–276 Pasten M, Giménez A (2012) Adaptación para los cambios climáticos el sector salud en América Latina. Escenarios Climáticos para Paraguay. Informe de Avance Preston BL, Dow K, Berkhout F (2013) The Climate Adaptation Frontier, Sustainability, 5, 1011–1035. doi:10.3390/su5031011. Projeto Sinergia (2011) Cambios Climáticos – impactos y desafíos en la cuenca del rio Paraguay. ProjetoSinergia, CPP/UFMT. Available at: www.portalsinergia.org.br. Accessed Dec 2013 Roux DJ, Rogers KH, Biggs HC, Ashton PJ, Sergeant A (2006) Bridging the science management divide: moving from unidirectional knowledge transfer to knowledge interfacing and sharing. Ecol Soc 11(1):4 Skansi MAM, Brunet M, Sigró J, Aguilar E, Arevalo JA, Bentancur OJ, Castellón YR, Correa RL, Jácome H, Ramos AM, Oria C, Pasten M, Sukarni M, Villaroel C, Martínez R, Alexander LV, Jones PD (2013) Warming and wetting signals emerging from analysis of changes in climate extreme indices over South America. Global Planet Change 100:295–307 Tucci CEM, Clarke RT (1998) Environmental Issues in the la Plata basin. Water Resour Dev 14:157–167 Wantzen KM, Nunes da Cunha C, Junk WJ, Girard P, Rossetto OC, Penha J, Couto E, Becker M, Priante G, Rossetto OC, Penha J, Couto E, Becker M, Priante G, Tomas WM, Santos SA, José M, Ivens D, Sonoda F, Curvo M, Callil C (2008) Towards a sustainable management concept for ecosystem services of the Pantanalwetland. Ecohydrol Hydrobiol 8(2–4):115–138 Watson RT, Zinyoera MC, Moss RH (1998) The regional impacts of climate change: an assessment of vulnerability. Special report of IPCC Working Group II. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

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Index Terms: Building capacity 8, 11 Climate management 7, 13 Climate variability impact 7–9 Mass media 7, 12 Paraguay River basin 6 Rainfall regime 2

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Social Capital and Local Institutions: A Perspective to Assess Communities Adaptation Potential to Climate Change Bhaskar Padigala* Center for Environmental Planning & Technology, Ahmedabad, India

Abstract Communities residing in Himalayan mountain environment are particularly at risk to climate changes externalities owing to their high dependence on natural resources, relatively high contact to severe climatic events, and prevalent economic and infrastructural marginalization. The present article tries to explore the nature of local society-environment interactions, particularly the role of social institutions and social capital in adaptive capacity to possible climate change impacts in Miyar watershed situated in the northeastern part of Lahaul and Spiti district of Himachal Pradesh, India. The first part of the article deals with climate change perception among local communities and the following part deals with identification and evaluation of adaptive capacities and prevailing institutional mechanisms. Study findings indicate that local community in Miyar valley, over the time, has developed variety of efficient resource (natural and human) management strategies and institutions (like Jowari system and Kuhl Committee, etc.) formed as a result of social cohesiveness (social capital), collective action, and common motivation to deal with both environmental and nonenvironmental changes. These aspects of local institutions and social capital are directly related to resource management and community development, but it also provides a buffer zone for the communities to adapt against any future changes (climatic variability, social or economic, etc.) up to some extent.

Keywords Climate change; Social capital; Adaptation; Local institutions; Collective action

Introduction Vast amount of scientific literature suggests that the climate is gradually altering and that anthropogenic activities like GHG emissions and ecosystem degradation have resulted in accelerating these climatic variability’s and its associated disastrous impacts (Aizebeokhai 2009; Hansen et al. 2000). Alarming projections by IPCC 2001 indicate that the global temperature is on rising trend, and by the end of twenty-first century and depending on the emissions, these raise in the global mean temperatures likely varies anything between 1.4
C and 5.8
C (Lal 2002). These increases in climate variability are likely to have wide range of impacts, ranging from sea level rise (Hallegatte et al. 2011; Galbraith et al. 2002), forest degradation (Watson 2000), glaciers melting (Barnett et al. 2005; Singh and Kumar 1997), and many more (Parmesan and Yohe 2003; Thomas et al. 2004; Watson et al. 1998). Even though, the probability, intensity, and geographical *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_114-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

distribution of these impacts are still a lot unclear (Schneider 2001). But, the fact remains that despite the type and location of these impacts, marginalized communities (both economically and socially) are likely to be the most vulnerable sections in the society (Furgal and Seguin 2006; Raleigh 2010; Downing 2003). Similarly, communities inhabiting Himalayan mountain ecosystem are likely to be more vulnerable and impacted to climate variability owning to fragile environment, lack of proper infrastructure, livelihood instability, and their high dependence on local natural resources (Macchi 2011). But, care must be taken not to attribute all these impacts to environmental and climatic availabilities, since communities and their interactions are very complex and there are many other factors or drivers that also influence communities’ actions and responses like social, political, and economic factors. Mountain communities have always been at risk due to limited natural resources and fragile ecosystem they live in, but at the same time, these communities have also developed a great potential resilience to these limitations by incorporating interventions at different scale like traditional land and water management practices (Gadgil et al. 2003; Friedman and Rangan 1993; Padigala 2013), village institutions and resource governance (Agrawal 2001; Ostrom 2005), etc. Still, very limited studies have been carried out to understand impacts of climate variability on Himalayan communities and their resilience capacities to the same (Eriksson et al. 2009; Ensor and Berger 2009). Thus, it is imperative to understand these local adaptive capacities and assess their potential for climate change.

Understanding Human Adaptive Potential and Social Capital Wide-ranging discussions revolving around the topic of climate variability deal with vulnerability and impacts on the natural ecosystem and especially on human systems (Smith et al. 2000). As a consequence, assessment of community vulnerability and its adaptation capacity is garnering rising interest among wide range of stakeholders like grassroot organizations, policymakers, researchers, etc. (Burton et al. 2005; Thomas and Twyman 2005; Moser and Ekstrom 2010). However, measuring adaptation capacities is difficult to ascertain, as it involves predicting the adaptive capacity for potential crisis periods. Even more, the adaptive capacity to climate variability is also influenced by other dependent aspects like social, political, economic, technological, and institutional factors, thus making assessment of adaptation potential all the way more uncertain (Van Aalst et al. 2008). Throughout the literature many researchers through their research have tried to define a complex aspect, i.e., adaptive capacity (Folke et al. 2002; Grothmann and Patt 2005). Brooks (2003) in his work define adaptive capacity as “reductions in social vulnerability as arising from the realization of adaptive capacity as adaptation. The term adaptation means adjustments in a system’s behaviour and characteristics that enhance its ability to cope with external stresses.” This hereby means that, a system over the time will cultivate capacity of adaptation to reduce its vulnerability with consistent levels of risks. Adaptive capacity is many times used as an indicator for climate change adaption potential of a society (Grothmann and Patt 2005; Adger and Vincent 2005; Adger 2003; Kelly and Adger 2000). However, it is important to understand that this potential is based on various interconnected asset bases like financial capital, human capital, social capital, etc. Thus, cumulative vulnerability and adaptive capacity of a society can be estimated by understanding resource management strategies and these assets. The one element which is common to all the five forms of capital is that there is a stock associated with each capital, which can be channelized into a flow of benefits. The stock of financial capital, for example, is associated with a flow of benefit, which is the interest. Similarly, social capital is

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_114-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

associated with a benefit which has been termed as “Mutually Beneficial Collective Action” or MBCA (Krishna and Uphoff 2002). Adaptive capacity is a multivariate idea, not only it is interconnected with different assets but this interrelationship also runs across different scales. At the national level, adaptive capacity is represented by the accessibility of financial resources and institutional and governance capability for resource management thereby reducing the vulnerability of marginalized sections of the society. At the household level, this capacity is more dependent on the livelihood and knowledge base of the individual. Thus, assessing adaptive capacity based on different assets and across different scales is very important for building up successful adaption model for future climatic as well as non-climatic variability’s (Vincent 2007). Thus, it is therefore very difficult to create a universal set of indicators to determine adaptive capacity hence these indicators need to be devised and modified suiting to individual cases (Adger et al. 2004). Speaking of adaption strategies and models, their success largely depends on the identification of the indicators or assets and also on the willingness of the vulnerable community. Thus, adaptive potential of a community primarily depends upon local institutions, governance aspects, and the social capital. Communities have innate capability to acclimatize to environmental variability’s. These capacities are outcome of society’s capability to work cooperatively. These choices of adaptation strategies are taken by institutions formed by individuals from within the community. Hence, one of the key elements of this article has been to explore the nature of these society-environment interactions, particularly the role of social institutions and social capital in adaptation processes and capacity. Social capital and its role in adaptation have been getting lot of interest among researchers and practitioners alike (Pretty 2003; Katz 2000; Pretty and Ward 2001; Adger 2003; Pretty and Smith 2004; Adger 2001). Social capital can be understood as a system of networks, concurrence, and information flow that is integrated into the fabric of society. The scope of the concept of social capital varies considerably in the literature. Putnam provides a more narrow theory of social capital. According to Putnam (1993), social capital can be viewed as a set of “horizontal associations” between people: social capital consists of social networks (“networks of civic engagement”) and associated norms that have an effect on the productivity of the community. Defining social capital in two-way process, Coleman (1988) defines it as a network of vertical and horizontal associations, wherein social capital encompasses both the positive and negative aspects of the associations. Lastly, defining it in more border sense, North (1990) suggests that social capital embraces the social and political situations and transforms the social arrangements and interactions thereby helping the society to develop. Adger (1999, 2000) in his studies has indicated economic and political processes in Vietnam that have led to reviving of resilience of informal networks against the risks of sea-flooding. This argument directly indicates the role of institutions and networks among the society and its significance in economic and social development. It should be understood that social capital is a system of institutions governing a society, but it is also an aspect that encompasses relations and interactions among the individuals which are facilitated and governed by institutions, norms, values, and extent of the capital (economic, human, and natural) commanded by these connected individuals. Social capital is more than a theoretical notion, and it does provide variety of social benefits like increased collective actions among individuals (Knack and Keefer 1997) and efficient functioning of local governmental and civic institutions (Bebbington 1997). But, understanding and measuring social capital is fraught with uncertainties and probabilities. However, over the years many researchers across the globe have attempted to understand this aspect, in rural Tanzania (Narayan Page 3 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_114-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

and Pritchett 1999) using Social Capital and Poverty Survey (SCPS) found that at village level, increasing income levels have direct correlation with the extent of social capital. Similarly, Knack and Keefer (1997) in their research used the indicators of trust and civic norms to understand the correlation between economic development and social capital. Traditional notion of community development is based on the four capitals or assets, i.e., financial, natural, physical, and human capitals, but with predicated impacts due to climatic variability and urgent need for inclusive sustainable development, it is imperative that the social capital needs to be also brought into the mainstream planning and decision making (Grootaert 1998). Since, social capital is the crucial link that governs the nature and extent of interactions between different societal entities to generate growth and development.

Local Institutions and Climate Adaptation As discussed in previous sections, communities have inherent capacity to reduce vulnerability to climatic variability owning to many adaptation strategies developed over the time. But the effectiveness of these adaptations largely depends on the structure and operation of the institutions. According to Agarwal (2010) these institutions can be classified into three categories, namely, (1) public or state (local agencies & local governments), (2) private or market (service organizations & private businesses), and (3) civic (membership organizations, cooperatives). And these organizations through its range of activities like capacity building, resource mobilization, information channelling, etc., reduce the community’s vulnerability and increases resilience. Undeniably, the role of institutions at multiple scales, including household level, has been identified; Eakin (2005) in his study across three communities in Mexico observed that resource management strategies applied in these communities are largely successful due to presence of local institutions. Similarly in Trinidad and Tobago, formation of informal institution has led to successful coastal management thereby highlighting the role of local institutions, social capital, and information flow in natural resource management (Tompkins and Adger 2004). Related studies on various themes like water conservation (Padigala 2013; Mosse 1995; Cleaver 1998), agricultural management (Uphoff 1992; Little and Brokensha 1987), pastoral management (Niamir-Fuller 2005), and forest governance (Gibson et al. 2000; Hayes 2006) have all indicated the significant role of institutions in the management of resources. But relatively limited studies have been carried out to assess the institutions role in climate change adaptation (Naess et al. 2005; Berkes and Jolly 2002), especially in Himalayan ecosystem. From the above discourse it is evident that local institutions are vital component in community’s resilience and adaptation to climate change. However, there is still information gap on measuring the effectiveness of these local institutions and social capital against climate change impacts and ways to mainstream these “bottom up” aspects in the traditional climate change adaptation planning and decision-making process, which follow a “top-to-bottom” approach. The following section would shed light on these very issues of community-based natural resource management strategies and social capital and role local institutions in Miyar valley and asses effectiveness of these interventions against likely climate change impacts on the communities.

Introduction to Miyar Valley The Miyar watershed lies in the northeastern part of Lahaul and Spiti district of Himachal Pradesh extending between 32
420 3600 N – 33
150 2400 N – 33
150 2400 N latitude to 76
400 1200 E – 77
101500 E longitude (Fig. 1). The community living in the area is exclusively dependent on the climate, natural resources, and social collective action for their survival. The study area included five villages (Tingrit, Ghumpa, Urgos, Sukto, and Khanjar) (Table 1) which were taken to learn the Page 4 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_114-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 Figure showing a digital elevation model of Miyar valley

Table 1 Showing population growth in the area Village Khanjar Sukto Urgos Ghumpa Tingrit

Total population 1999 Male Female 25 26 Data not available Data not available Data not available 154 123

Total population 2001 Male Female 29 32

167

144

Total population 2010 Male Female 25 23 20 17 114 112 21 24 93 78

Source: District Census Handbook 1991, 2001, Lahaul & Spiti, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India

socioeconomic aspects, land use dynamics, and community adaptive capacity of the area. The site was selected considering the two circumstances (viz., climate dependency and changing economic pattern) and how these situations and community will behave in the light of current global environmental change. Page 5 of 21

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The main livelihood source in the valley is agriculture; being a rain shadow area, the only source of irrigation water is snow meltwater along with some amount of glacial water. Also the area receives heavy snowfall during winters from October to March causing complete halt to agricultural activities and hindrance to the normal life; this means that people get only the remaining six months to do agriculture and gather food and fodder for themselves and for their livestocks. From the last few years, the area is witnessing change in the economic and land use pattern due to the introduction of cash crops like peas, seed potato, etc., which has lead to increased economic stability in community and also change in the land use of the area like conversion of small patches of forest and grazing lands into agricultural fields by villagers. However, Sen et al. (2011) indicate that the major recent economic transformation in Miyar valley has been diversification of traditional agricultural practice towards cash crops like peas, which is a perishable commodity. The possibility of better income thus is connected to transportation of the commodity to the market in time. Thus, road or transport seems to be the single major reason for diversification. Majority of small farmers report higher income as the driving force; a large section of larger farmers feel that the road is what makes commercialization possible. The major conclusion that comes out from this study is that the recent changes in the valley cannot be directly related to climate change only. Though there is a lack of benchmark data, there is no doubt that the current trend of commercialization has uplifted the livelihood status of the valley which has been primarily driven by increased connectivity of sthe region. Thus, it becomes important to inquire as to whether the community sees commercialization as a risky proposition and, subsequently, to identify the major risk variables (climatic as well as non-climatic) as perceived by the communities.

Methodology In this study the adaptive capacity of the communities were assessed using the model of sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA). The SLA was employed to create an understanding of the livelihood patterns among the inhabitants, since the livelihood assets are important parameters to assess the vulnerability and capacity of the communities to adapt against environmental and socioeconomic changes. Livelihood can be defined as “the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources), and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base” (DFID 1999). Being geographically located in fragile and extreme ecosystem, these communities have already developed livelihood assets to adapt to environmental and socioeconomic changes. Thus, sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA) also provides crucial impetus on strongly and weakly developed assets in the community. This in turn is crucial to strengthen these weakly developed assets, so as to increase community’s adaptive capacity. The sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA) exhibits the primary issues that have impact on people’s livelihoods and their different assets. SLA categorizes these assets into five types: human capital, financial capital, physical asset, environmental capital, and lastly, social capital (Fig. 2). Table 2 shows the various proxy indicators used during the study to assess the adaptive capacity of the communities inhabiting Miyar valley. Study involved the collection of primary data (field verification and mapping, household surveys with sample size of 80 households out of 120 houses in the selected five villages) from the field. This primary data was supported by a wide-ranging study and examination of secondary literature and Page 6 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_114-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 2 Figure showing sustainable livelihoods framework (Source Macchi 2011)

Table 2 Showing sectors/capacities and proxy indicators applied to measure adaptive capacity of community for the study Adaptive capacity Sectors/resources Human capital Financial capital Physical capital Environment (resources) capital Social capital

Proxy indicators Family size, education, knowledge, and skills Income sources, savings, credits and loans House structure and materials, road connectivity, local technologies and equipments Natural resources (pasture land, forest, fresh water resources), land holding per family Social structure and relationships, local governance, community support, trust, bonding, and network

other region specific documents like census data, topographic sheets and satellite data, and climatic data of the study area. Primary data from the study area was collected according to the community-based vulnerability and capacity assessment approach (CBVCA) framework. This framework was modified to suit the site conditions. In a community-based vulnerability and capacity assessment approach (CBVCA), primary informations are collected using different quantitative and qualitative research techniques including focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews and participatory rural appraisal (PRA) methods at the community and household levels. While conducting the evaluation to the household residents and the community members or the representatives of different institutions, it was made sure that the idea “climate change” and its aspects and impacts were not directly incorporated or mentioned. This was done so as to forbid any predisposition in their answers. Principally, apart from collecting primary data, to gather data on community-based VCAs, qualitative research methods were undertaken since qualitative research techniques provides an achievable scenario to study the history of that community and its different crucial aspects like gender, culture, ethnicity, etc. These factors are essential in observing and understanding the source

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reasons for social and economic susceptibility to transformations, environmental, as well as other aspects (Birkmann and Wisner 2006). Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) and Excel computer software were used to analyze the collected quantitative data. From a researcher’s perspective, it was taken care that there are also other factors or drivers of change in the Miyar valley like infrastructure development, change in land use, agricultural patterns, and outmigration, etc., apart from climate change, thereby not attributing every change (both externalities as well as opportunities) to climate change. Furthermore, to validate the collected data, during the study the communities’ perception on climate change aspects were authenticated using information gathered from secondary literature and sources. This was done so that the conclusions coming out from this study were realistic and in turn facilitates future policy and developmental interventions that ensures enhanced resilience of the communities.

Results and Discussions Environmental Change Perception Miyar region is heavily dependent on the temperature variability and water availability, because the main source of livelihood for the community in the area is agriculture. With increasing temperature the cropping season might increase, and also the availability of irrigation water will fluctuate. A variety of literature on climatic variability and climatic modelling on Himalayan region suggests an increasing trend in temperature in the near future (Bhutiyani et al. 2007; Ageta and Kadota 1992; IPCC 2007). More than 65 % of the respondents from across the villages perceived that there has been change in the temperature of the valley and the change has been on the higher side, i.e., villagers felt that the temperature has increased a little since the past 10–30 years. Along with temperature respondents also perceived a slight increase in the duration of the summer season (Table 3). Correlating to the temperature change, villagers were asked about change in the agriculture practices due to increased duration of the summer season, and it was found that more than 90 % farmers from all villages (up to 100 % in Sukto and Tingrit) have not increased the cropping numbers. Likewise, 100 % of the respondents from all villages replied that they have not adapted to any new variety of crop. However, respondents do feel that the cropping season has extended a little. It was very interesting to know that, despite perceiving increase in temperature and extension in the cropping season, farmers were not taking advantage of it. This could be attributed to two reasons: first that though there seem to be some change in temperature but the change is small and not that significant to which they should adapt in agricultural practices and secondly, farmers experienced that the annual snowfall is increasing and its season is getting erratic, due to which there is a great risk if people try to harvest a second crop. Since the first crop harvesting lasts up to October the month for potatoes and August the month for peas, if they try to harvest the second crop after the peas, the crop will require 2–3 months time before it could yield and thus the harvesting time overlaps with the commencement of the winter season with snowfall that could pose a huge threat to standing crop if the snowfall occurs little early that year. With rain almost unknown and erratic, the amount and availability of the irrigation water greatly depends on the yearly snowfall. For the year with scanty snowfall, streams dwindle quickly and dry up in the beginning of August and hence crops suffer. Thus, during this study it became important to understand the observation of the community with respect to snowfall variability in the area. During the survey it was found out that all villages expect village Khanjar to display above 50 % agreement to the phenomenon of increased snowfall in the area. Villagers also feel that duration of Page 8 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_114-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 3 Respondents perception to changes Parameters

Village Thingrit Ghumpa Urgos Sukto Khanjar

Change in Change in cropping Change in Change in Change in temperature number cropping type cropping time snowfall Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) No (%)

Change in drinking water availability Yes (%) No (%)

80.0 70.0 84.8 66.7 72.7

10.0 10.0 15.2 16.7 18.2

20.0 30.0 15.2 33.3 27.3

0 10.0 6.1 0 9.1

100.0 90.0 93.9 100.0 90.9

0 0 0 0 0

100 100 100 100 100

15.0 40.0 18.2 16.7 9.1

85.0 60.0 81.8 83.3 90.9

55.0 60.0 72.7 50.0 45.5

45.0 40.0 27.3 50.0 54.5

90.0 90.0 84.8 83.3 81.8

onset and the season of snowfall have reduced slightly. Moreover when inquired about water-related hazards to the area such as cloud burst-induced floods or GLOFs (glacial lake outburst floods), villagers felt positive risk about it, though the occurrence of the floods in the area has been very sporadic, like the only recent case of flood was back in year 2000, where only one small village (Changut) was partially affected by the flood. One of the most observable changes of global warming in the Himalayan region is the withdrawal of the glaciers, at advanced rates than glaciers in other regions (Pathak 2010). This continued deglaciation could have an intense impact on the hydrology and water flows in the river basins starting off in the NW Himalayan region (Rao et al. 2008; Jianchu et al. 2009). Owing to this increased speed of glacier melting, water discharges in the glacial-fed rivers are more expected to rise for some time, before decreasing as the ice storage of the glaciers gradually decreases (Karki et al. 2009). With several literature predicting scarcity of drinking water in it was surprising to find that majority of the local community did not recognize any change in the drinking water availability (more than 80 % respondents across all villages). The major source for drinking water for the village in the study area is spring water; occasionally following the year with less snowfall few spring sources got dried up. To which villagers have no problem in adjusting and finding a new source for water supply. But these predicted changes in water regime due to likely future environmental variability will no doubt change and up to some extent disturb the local economy and natural resource availability and accessibility. It can also be believed that these changes will certainly transform the functioning of local institutions and governance along with social capital and communal actions in the region.

Local Adaptations and Institutions for Resource Management From the above sections it is evident that climatic variability has been also perceived by the locals, yet they do not feel any risk associated with it (Table 4). Following section tries to explore what are the different resources available to the community, what strategies are being employed to manage these resources for their development, and whether these adaptive mechanisms can be seen as indicators for adaptive potential to climate change. The valley has almost unrestrained source of water supply for both irrigation and drinking purposes. The majority of the villages which lie on the plateaux on both sides of the main river get water from the streams which trickle down from the cliffs (Saini 2008). The amount and availability of the irrigation water greatly depends on the yearly snowfall and glacier meltwater.

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Table 4 Coping and adaptation mechanisms implemented by the communities Communities perception of S. No. Parameter change 1. Temperature Slight increase change 2.

Snowfall

Increased

3.

Drinking water availability

No significant change

Impact on livelihood No significant impact Little impact

Communities perception of risk to change No risk

No risk (risk is there if, they try to take two crops in a season) No risk (risk is there if, following year after less snowfall spring dries up)

Coping and adaptation No coping and adaptation

No coping and adaptation Diversion of the spring water system to the new source

Drinking water is obtained from the springs. The gravity-type water supply schemes have been installed in every village to provide drinking water. Vegetation cover of the Miyar watershed is of central Asian or Siberia type with dry alpine character at lower elevation. Low precipitation is another reason for scanty vegetation in the area. Vegetation distribution of the region has been divided into three zones. First zone extends from 2,590 to 3,350 m.s.l and contains maximum vegetation with nearly all the trees that exist in the watershed, viz., juniper, blue pine; and birch. Second region ranges from 3,350 to 4,875 m.s.l where most characteristic plant Rheum moorcroftiana is which does not thrive below that height. Total number of species recorded from the study area is 142, from which 17 are trees, 18 shrubs, 85 herbs, and 22 lichens. Asteraceae and Fabaceae are the dominant family in the area with 15 and 12 species, respectively. In trees Salicaceae and Pinaceae are represented by 5 and 4 species, respectively; Asteraceae and Fabaceae are also dominant families in the herbaceous layer (Forest Working Plan 1996–2006). Quite a few patches of juniper tree (Juniperus semiglobosa) can be seen here, which represents subalpine forests in the region. This is one of the featured species of high conservation and religious importance in the valley. Glaciers are devoid of any vegetation while a narrow belt below glacier contains lichen, mosses, and few other grasses. The forest patches are very sparse and were depleting before 1980 because forest wood was the only material available for house construction and fuel wood. This led to rapid reduction in forest area; to this with this situation Mahila Mandal was formed and it has proven successful in its mission. Miyar valley is also endowed with large areas of grasslands with nutritive grasses (Poa sp and Agropyron sp) which attract many heads of sheep and goats with transhumance. The valley due to its climatic and geographical condition and various other reasons lacks the luxury of abundance of natural resource (except for water resource), and also the valley people cannot undertake large scale developmental interventions because of various constraints like only limited season to grow crops, loss of physical contact with the outer world during winters due to avalanches and road blockages, etc. But people in the Miyar valley, over the ages, have adapted to manage and sustainably utilize resources like forest resources, pasture, water resources, manpower, etc., for their development. Mentioned below are the few fine examples of the collective action, awareness, resilience, and excellent social bonding to adapt community against resource scarcity and to attain overall community development.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_114-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 3 Jowari: Labor Exchange (Resource Management)

Jowari: Labor Exchange (Resource Management) One of the best examples of efficient resource management and collective community action is reciprocal labor exchanges in agriculture. There is no class of landless agricultural labors in the villages; even the poorest owns a small patch. The short season between snowfalls for cultivation creates an immense time constraint on production along with shortage of casual labors (usually Nepali migrants). People have adapted to this by pooling their labor. A labor pool will usually include 4–5 families who share manpower, bullocks, and plow; weed; and harvest the fields in rotation. Generally women are the ones who work in labor exchange (Fig. 3). Community Livestock Grazing Due to short season of summer season, farmers have to deal with maintaining duel economic task of farming and livestock rearing to keep their financial condition stabilized. Now due to greater financial gains, villagers are more involved in farming and hence they have adopted an innovative way to tackle the problem of livestock rearing by practicing community livestock grazing. Each village has extensive private irrigated grasslands, usually on slopes which are too steep for cultivation or on large bunds between fields. These areas are opened as commons to the cattle in April and closed when the fields are put under cultivation. The livestock are then taken to alpine pastures by a grazier who receives payment from all households in the village (e.g., village Tingrit has employed two grazier for a sum of INR 50,000 to look after village livestock and to graze them in pasture for a period of 6 months). The alpine pastures are managed as a common property by the villages. The decision on when to open and close the fields for grazing, and when to start plowing, is taken jointly by Yuva Mandal (representative from every household is part of this institution) and is based on a commitment to collective action. Mahila Mandal (Local Women’s Group) Mahila Mandal is a community-based rural women organization. Generally it has about 20 members. It has an elected executive body consisting of a president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer. In all of the five villages surveyed, the Mahila Mandal has been in existence since the early 1980s. Total of three mandals have been observed in the area. Each household of the village has one representation in the Mahila Mandal. The mandals has INR 12 to INR 50 per month as

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membership fee and INR 1000 to INR 1500 as joining fees. This amount is then deposited into a bank account which is opened under the name of the Mahila Mandal of the respective village. The main functions and activities of the Mahila Mandal are: • Mobilization, networking with community groups especially Yuva Mandals and Panchayat, to strengthen participation and interlinkages, and participation in Yuva Mandals and Panchayat meetings. • Addressing issues affecting women and village as a whole such as gender, social injustice, alcohol abuse awareness, women’s role in Panchayat, cleanliness drives, clean water sources, and tree plantation. • Efforts in organizing work for the village, such as fixing the walkways through the village, or putting in a water system, labor exchange in fields for mandal members. • Acts as a nodal agency along with Panchayat between block office and village for release and utilization of development funds. • Mahila Mandal also provides loans between 10,000 and 15,000 Rs to the members with interest rates of 2 %. • Lastly, one of main function of the Mahila Mandal in the area is forest and natural resource conservation. However, the flexibility in terms of the purpose and objectives of Mahila Mandals has meant that in some cases it has been adapted to the local needs of the village. Almost all Mahila Mandals of the five villages surveyed during field study indicated that they were active to a large degree in forest protection. Yuva Mandal (Youth Group) Yuva Mandal is a community-based organization and is a good example of informal institution working parallel with formal local institution such as village Panchayat. The formation of the Yuva Mandal in Miyar valley was around 1985–1986 mostly after the formation of the Mahila Mandals in the area. Generally the number of members depends on the number of households in the village as it is mandatory for each family in the village to have one representative in the mandal. In the study area, size of the mandals ranges between 16 and 45. It has an elected executive body of Pardhan (head), Up-pardhan (deputy head), secretary, and treasurer. The term for an executive body is 1 year, and after the completion of the term, a new body is selected within the members unanimously. The main objective or motivation for formation of the mandals was to discuss and agree on village requirements (infrastructure, education, health, etc.) and to put it forward through village Pardhan (head) during village meetings for the approval and grants. The main functions and activities of the mandals are to: • Lead construction activities: Yuva Mandals constructed internal roads, temples, Kuhls (irrigation channels). • Provide loans between 10,000 and 15,000 Rs to the members without any interest rates. • Work also as a Kuhl committee (construction and maintenance of Kuhls, distribution of water rights, etc.) • Decide on working and payment-related community livestock grazing. Kuhl Committee (Water Institution) Irrigation in the Miyar valley is done by Kuhls (Fig. 4), channels which harness water from snow meltwater glaciers. These Kuhls are built with the collective labor of the village, and the water is distributed according to the share of labor contributed by a family; the distribution of the water rights Page 12 of 21

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Fig. 4 Kuhl Head, Village Tingrit

Fig. 5 Kuhl Committee (Water Institution) Village Tingrit

is done in impartial lottery system, where each house name is written on a chit and sequence of water rights is decided by lottery system. The labor contribution is annual process as avalanches often destroy the kuhls during the winter. Failure to contribute family labor can lead to a withdrawal of water rights and penalties. The decision related to kuhls construction, maintenance, and water rights distribution is taken by Kuhl committee (Fig. 5), and this committee represents whole village as each house has to nominate one member from house who will represent house in committee meeting and also will provide money and manpower for construction for the maintenance of kuhls (Padigala 2013). From the above examples of both the resource management efforts and the functioning of the institutions, it is observed that there are internal capabilities within the communities in Miyar valley to deal with various kinds of shocks and uncertainties. Thus, this existing adaptive potential will be very crucial in case any transformation related to climate change occurs in near future. Another important characteristic of these strategies is that they are tailor made to suit the community need at utmost local level and are dynamic in themselves to modify according to the changing need and requirements of the village. A good example is of the water right distribution in upstream villages like Tingrit and downstream village like Shansha in the Chamba valley, where in upstream village

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Fig. 6 Village wise social capital index

Table 5 Showing village wise institutional setup Village Tingrit Ghumpa Urgos Sukto Khanjar

Mahila mandal Yuva mandal Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Combined with Khanjar village Yes Yes

Community grazing Yes Combined with Urgos village Yes Yes

Gram panchayat representation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

water for irrigation is in plenty due to which the water right distribution rules are less stringent, but in the downstream village where water availability is little less, local institution has modified the water distribution rules and has made it strict so that there must be equity and no fights over water distribution.

Assessment of Existing Adaptive Capacity in the Local Communities The study has incorporated the sustainable livelihood (SLA) framework which advocates the classification of the assets or capitals into five classes (Table 2). According to the framework adaptive potential of a person or community can be evaluated by using these capitals (or indicators). Present capacity assessment encapsulates evaluation of the five capital indexes based on the proxy indicators (Table 2) by using graded codes, summation, and simple averaging. Figure 6 shows the status of the social capital in the five villages studied. It was found that two villages Sukto and Ghumpa have low social capital index (SCI) compared to the rest of the villages. This can be attributed to lack of local institutions (Table 5) like Yuva Mandal and Mahila Mandal in these villages, as these institutions help in keeping community bonded and generate mutual trust. These institutions have crucial significance in initiating and managing resource management interventions like Jowari, Kuhl works, and community grazing, etc., which leads to formation of social capital since these works involve collective action and management of common village property resources (Table 6). Based on the social capital index and remaining four capital all the five indexes a cumulative capacity index (Figs. 7 and 8) was generated along final adaptability index ranking was created. In this ranking exercise, it was found that Ghumpa village scored better than Khanjar village despite

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Table 6 Table showing village wise social capital index Rank 1 2 3 4 5

Village Tingrit Urgos Khanjar Ghumpa Sukto Total

Social capital index (mean) 2.80 2.69 2.63 1.95 1.66 2.54

N 20 33 11 10 6 80

Fig. 7 Village wise capacity index

Fig. 8 Village wise cumulative capacity index

having low index score in SCI; this could be ascribed to higher financial capacity index and natural capital index. Khanjar village has a healthy landholding to family ratio; hence it has scored more points and ultimately exceeded in the ranking scale (Table 7). Table 8 shows that villagers with low land holdings are weak in terms of financial and natural capital compared to large land holders. Comparing SCI with land holdings, it can be said that small land owners tend to have more social capital as a compensatory mechanism to counter low financial Page 15 of 21

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Table 7 Table showing Village wise capacity index Village Tingrit Ghumpa Urgos Sukto Khanjar

Financial capacity index 2.15 2.20 1.48 1.00 1.72

Physical capacity index 3 2 3 1 1

Natural resource capacity index 2.43 2.43 2.15 2.00 2.30

Human capacity index 2.02 1.55 1.66 1.83 1.77

Social capacity index 2.80 1.95 2.69 1.66 2.63

Table 8 Land holding and it’s relation to adaptive potential Land holdings Small Medium Large Total

Human capacity index 1.42 1.73 2.15 1.77

Financial capacity index 1.00 2.00 2.19 1.74

Natural capacity index 2.00 2.33 2.46 2.27

Physical capacity index 2.31 2.46 2.58 2.45

Social capacity index 2.70 2.69 2.23 2.54

Cumulative capacity index 1.88 2.25 2.32 2.15

Source: Sen et al. (2011)

and natural capital. Alternatively it can be stated that with increasing financial capital there is a decreasing trend in SCI, which can be related to changing economic pattern (cash crops and high returns) in the valley. Social capital and collective action can be used as an indicator to assess the adaptive capacity, and when faced with considerable environmental and economic risks, the ability of these societies to mitigate these risks relies heavily on intersocietal networks and social capital (Adger 2003). In case of the Miyar valley, the villages which did not have any local institution (Yuva Mandal and Mahila Mandal) had less social capital than the other villages which have the institutions in place. Since during crisis situations, these very institutions play a crucial role (like providing intercommunity loans and food/fodder etc.) and create a bond of trust, cohesiveness, and network which motivates community to work collectively to any issue and problem among the community. And as already discussed previously, the key to adaptability against environmental variability or any other resource scarcity is the community’s collective actions, trust, and social bonding. The more the social capital, the greater will be the chance of successful adaptation by the community to the changes.

Conclusion The communities in Miyar valley have long been fighting with the harsh environments of the mountain region for survival, not only they have succeeded in it but ongoing economic trade, education, institutional mechanisms, and overall village development despite various limiting factors (such as lacking infrastructure, short cropping season) represents communities’ superior resilience, adaptive capacity, and high level of social capital. The community has developed various village level adaptations strategies and institutions to manage and sustainably make use of natural resource and avoid resource scarcity in future. These adaptations strategies and institutions provide

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a buffer zone for the community to adapt against any change (environmental, social, or economic, etc.) up to some degree. From the study it can be concluded that local institutions, governance, social capital, and collective actions are directly related to development, resilience, and increased adaptive capacity of the society and of the whole region. But with the predicted future, environmental changes coupled with changing economic and infrastructure scenario will defiantly alter and transform the current functioning of local institutions and governance. It can be assumed that with increased uncertainty, climate risk and resource scarcity communities will have no other option but to adapt to the situation and work collectively to sustainably consume scarce and declining natural resources. This may lead to increased social interaction, bonding, and trust which will be a crucial factor for the community to adapt to environmental changes.

Acknowledgement The author would like to gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Prof. Milap Chand Sharma and Prof. Sucharita Sen for providing valuable inputs and guidance throughout the project work. The author would also like to thank Mr. Sunil Kraleti for his support in field survey and documentation exercise. Lastly, the author would like to thank the locals of Miyar valley for their helpful participation in this project and warm hospitality.

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Grothmann T, Patt A (2005) Adaptive capacity and human cognition: the process of individual adaptation to climate change. Glob Environ Chang 15(3):199–213 Hallegatte S, Ranger N, Mestre O, Dumas P, Corfee-Morlot J, Herweijer C, Wood RM (2011) Assessing climate change impacts, sea level rise and storm surge risk in port cities: a case study on Copenhagen. Clim Change 104(1):113–137 Hansen J, Makiko S, Ruedy R, Lacis A, Oinas V (2000) Global warming in the twenty-first century: an alternative scenario. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 97(18):9875–9880 Hayes TM (2006) Parks, people, and forest protection: an institutional assessment of the effectiveness of protected areas. World Dev 34(12):2064–2075 IPCC (2007) Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Working group II contribution to the intergovernmental panel on climate change fourth assessment report. Summary for policy makers. IPCC, Geneva Jianchu X, Shrestha A, Eriksson M (2009) Climate change and its impacts on glaciers and water resource management in the Himalayan Region. Assessment of snow, glaciers and water resources in Asia. International hydrological programme of UNESCO and hydrology and water resources programme of WMO, Koblenz, pp 44–54 Karki M, Mool P, Shrestha A (2009) Climate change and its increasing impacts in Nepal. Initiation 3:30–37 Katz EG (2000) Social capital and natural capital: a comparative analysis of land tenure and natural resource management in Guatemala. Land Econ 76(1):114–132 Kelly PM, Adger WN (2000) Theory and practice in assessing vulnerability to climate change and facilitating adaptation. Clim Change 47(4):325–352 Knack S, Keefer P (1997) Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country investigation. Q J Econ 112(4):1251–1288 Krishna A, Uphoff N (2002) Mapping and measuring social capital through assessment of collective action to conserve and develop watersheds in Rajasthan, India, Social capital initiative working paper no. 13. The World Bank Lal M (2002) Possible impacts of global climate change on water availability in India. Report to global environment and energy in the 21st century. Indian Institute of Technology, New Delhi Little PD, and Brokensha DW (1987) Local Institutions, Tenure and Resource Management in East Africa. In: D. Anderson and R. Grove (eds), Conservation in Africa - People, Policies and Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 193–210 Macchi M (2011) Framework for community-based climate vulnerability and capacity assessment in mountain areas. Kathmandu: ICIMOD, Nepal Moser SC, Ekstrom JA (2010) A framework to diagnose barriers to climate change adaptation. Proc Natl Acad Sci 107(51):22026–22031 Mosse D (1995) Local institutions and power: the history and practice of community management of tank irrigation systems in India. In: N. Nelson, and S. Wright (eds), Power and participatory development. Theory and practice. Intermediate Technogies, London, UK, pp. 144–156 Naess LO, Bang G, Eriksen S, Vevatne J (2005) Institutional adaptation to climate change: flood responses at the municipal level in Norway. Glob Environ Chang 15(2):125–138 Narayan D, Pritchett L (1999) Cents and sociability: household income and social capital in rural Tanzania. Econ Dev Cult Change 47(4):871–897 Niamir-Fuller M (2005) Managing mobility in African rangelands. Collective action and property rights for sustainable rangeland management. CAPRi research brief, CAPRi North DC (1990) Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge university press, Cambridge/New York Page 19 of 21

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Ostrom E (2005) Self-governance and forest resources. Terracotta reader: a market approach to the environment. Academic Foundation, New Delhi, pp 131–154 Padigala B (2013) Traditional water management by mountain communities of Lahaul and Spiti, Himachal Pradesh. Spandrel 6:106–116 Parmesan C, Yohe G (2003) A globally coherent fingerprint of climate change impacts across natural systems. Nature 421(6918):37–42 Pathak M (2010) Climate change: uncertainty for hydropower development in Nepal. Hydro Nepal Issue 6:31–34 Pretty J (2003) Social capital and the collective management of resources. Science 302(5652):1912–1914 Pretty J, Smith D (2004) Social capital in biodiversity conservation and management. Conserv Biol 18(3):631–638 Pretty J, Ward H (2001) Social capital and the environment. World Dev 29(2):209–227 Putnam RD (1993) The prosperous community: The prosperous community: social capital and public life. The american prospect, 4(13), 35–42 Raleigh C (2010) Political marginalization, climate change, and conflict in African Sahel states. Int Stud Rev 12(1):69–86 Rao P, Areendran G, and Sareen R (2008) ‘Potential impacts of climate change in the Uttarakhand Himalayas,’ Mountain Forum Bulletin, Vol. 8, Issue 1, January [Online]. Available at: http:// www.mtnforum.org/sites/default/files/publication/files/1092.pdf Saini R (2008) Glacier dynamics water resource assessment and landscape evolution in Miyar basin, Lahaul Himalayas, Himachal Pradesh. M Phil dissertation. JNU, India Schneider SH (2001) What is “dangerous” climate change? Nature 411:17–19 Sen S, Sharma M, Padigala B, Kraleti S, Deswal S, (2011) Response and adaptability to climatic variability in agro-ecosystems: a case of Miyar basin, Lahaul Himalaya, India. Unpublished paper Singh P, Kumar N (1997) Impact assessment of climate change on the hydrological response of a snow and glacier melt runoff dominated Himalayan river. J Hydrol 193(1–4):316–350 Smith B, Burton I, Klein RJ, Wandel J (2000) An anatomy of adaptation to climate change and variability. Clim Change 45(1):223–251 Thomas DS, Twyman C (2005) Equity and justice in climate change adaptation amongst naturalresource-dependent societies. Glob Environ Chang 15(2):115–124 Thomas CD, Cameron A, Green RE, Bakkenes M, Beaumont LJ, Collingham YC, Eramsus BF, De Siqueira MF, Grainger A, Hannah L, Hughes L, Huntley B, Van Jaarsveld AS, Midgley G, Miles L, Ortega-Huerta MA, Peterson AT, Phillips OL, Williams SE (2004) Extinction risk from climate change. Nature 427(6970):145–148 Tompkins EL, Adger W (2004) Does adaptive management of natural resources enhance resilience to climate change? Ecol soc 9(2):10 Uphoff NT (1992) Local institutions and participation for sustainable development. Sustainable Agriculture Programme of the International Institute for Environment and Development, London Van Aalst MK, Cannon T, Burton I (2008) Community level adaptation to climate change: the potential role of participatory community risk assessment. Glob Environ Chang 18(1):165–179 Vincent K (2007) Uncertainty in adaptive capacity and the importance of scale. Glob Environ Chang 17(1):12–24 Watson RT (ed) (2000) Land use, land-use change, and forestry: a special report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Watson RT, Zinyowera MC, Moss RH (eds) (1998) The regional impacts of climate change: an assessment of vulnerability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK

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Index Terms: Adaptation 2, 4, 9 Climate change 4, 7 Collective action 3, 16–17 Local institutions 4 Social capital 2

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Environmental Law, Public Policies, and Climate Change: A Social-Legal Analysis in the Brazilian Context Thiago Lima Klautau de Araújo* Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal

Abstract This chapter aims to analyze the laws and public policies in relation to climate change in Brazil, its implementation, and concrete results. Through a review of legislation and state of the art, this chapter gives evidence to the positive and negative interventions of the public policies since the 1950s until the present moment, using some examples, such as the bad initiative of construction of roads that promoted the deforestation and the good work made in Paragominas, Pará, to reduce environmental degradation and deforestation. As results, this chapter proposes a new perspective of the environmental law and reveals its importance in order to cope with the challenges of climate change and environmental issues, in an integrative way. In order to do so, it seeks to integrate society and governments’ efforts to make possible the changes in the present climate situation, as it has been made in some isolated cases, such as Paragominas.

Keywords Climate change; Environmental law; Greenhouse gases emission; Public policies; Sustainable development

Introduction Currently the approach to climate change focuses on technical issues and possible solutions for reducing the emission of greenhouse gases. Rising chances of international agreements and treaties are one of the, or perhaps the only, alternatives to the reformulation of the paradigm of the relationship between man and nature. Little is said about the importance of environmental legislation and regional public policies as an alternative solution. It happens that, while it awaits a global decision, if nothing is done at national or local areas, the climate change issue is getting worse. International law is essential to resolve the issue, but alone will not take effect. This is because law is an area full of meanings that makes sense to those related to a particular reality and so is considered a local knowledge (Geertz 1983). This chapter tries to rescue the importance of law and public policies for the solution of climate change problems, understanding that both are essential for achieving a positive or negative response. Having as context the legal and legislative axe and the one of public policies, as a way to define, understand, and deal with the climate changes, this chapter was organized into three complementary parts. The first part is an overview of environmental issues discussed globally since the 1970s. The *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 8

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second part deals with the Brazilian environmental legislation and brings some challenges and inconsistencies between theory and practice. The third part discusses the need for the implementation of sustainable development as a tool for equalization of climate change problems; points out the good example of Paragominas, Pará; and discusses the importance of an integrated action across the whole society. At all points, it is evidenced the need of a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary analysis, where natural and social sciences are considered sources of environmental law, but it can also be an valuable tool for the practical implementation of the acquired knowledge in those areas.

Climate Change and Legislation: Old and New Environmental Problems That Societies Have to Deal with Nowadays, climate change is recognized as the major environmental problem and has long been a matter of global concern of societies. Climate change public policies express the formal position of governments, somehow synthesizing scientific contributions, the political positions, and economic, social, and cultural constraints, “mainly emphasizing the mitigation and adaptive processes to CC and the possibilities of intervention at the level of ecosystems and human actions” (Alves et al. 2014). In the public discourse, the debate on the need for change in public policy and on what role business and society has to perform in order to prevent the progression of global warming or to develop the mitigation of impacts caused by climate change is usual, among other phenomena associated with it. In international agreements and conventions, this is a very recurrent theme, in which countries commit themselves to freely accept targets for reducing the emission of greenhouse gases. This innovation in discussions about environmental issues has resulted, around the 1970s and the 1980s, from the realization of the fact that the planet could, actually, join an unprecedented environmental crisis, caused by human activity, and whose main target would be mankind itself. In the words of Édis Milaré (Milaré 2009, p. 171): The sustainability of the planet is, without doubt, in the hands of man, the only being capable of, with his actions, break the dynamic equilibrium produced spontaneously by the interdependence of the forces of nature and modify the regulatory mechanisms that, under normal conditions, maintain or renew natural resources and life on Earth. It is not to be against progress, but to promote and harmonize the economic and social development with minimum environmental requirements, using and conserving the natural resources and commiserating synchronously (at the present time) and diachronically (through successive times) with all humanity. The fate of future generations is thus in the hands of present generations.

It is true that such international laws have the mission of transformation of the global mentality. But it is also true that the attention given to them is not the most satisfying and does not even make big differences in the situation. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, was a very positive initiative in theory, but in practice it did not bring great results, since most countries did not comply and will not be able to meet its goals and others do not even come to sign it, as the United States. The decrease or increase in the emission of greenhouse gases turns out to be much more related to public policies of national of local governments than actually to international agreements or treaties. To understand the legal systematic of climate change and what is being done to combat them through laws, it is necessary to first understand the environmental legislation.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_115-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

The specific case addressed in this chapter is that of Brazil, whose federal legislation on environment has many commendable points, but its application in everyday life does not get the expected results. This could end up meaning that a country that has enormous potential to be strategic and decisive in mitigating the effects of the uncontrolled environmental situation, end up turning over a polluter country.

Brazil’s Environmental and Legal Contexts The environmental issue in Brazil presents a slightly different situation from the global context. Despite being one of the first countries to formalize strict laws in the sphere of protection of environment, its territorial extent, the lack of political will and oversight, and insufficient resources for maintenance and expansion of certain state measures preclude effective implementation of law. Already in 1967 was the creation of the Law n. 5197, which deals with the protection of wildlife (Brasil 1967). Many other laws came before the 1980s, a period in which there was a spread of environmental discourse, however, without actually producing effects in the real world. What is considered the major mark in the Brazilian environmental legislation, and particularly interesting in this analysis of climate change, is the creation of the Law n. 6938, of August 31, 1981, which established the National Environment Policy (Brasil 1981). This law provides incentives for environmental protection and defense against pollution, in order to balance the environment and preserve the biota, air, natural resources, etc. Despite not specifically addressing climate change in the conceptualization of the law, one can understand that they fall into the category of environmental degradation (Art. 3, II), as denoting “adverse change in the characteristics of the environment.” There is also needed to emphasize that some principles in the existing Law n. 6938/81 are related directly to the combat against climate change. They are presented in Art. 2 of that law and are listed as items. Let us look at the most important for this issue: I, government actions to maintain the ecological balance, considering the environment as a public asset to necessarily be secured and protected in order to allow its collective use; II, rationalization of land use, water, and air; VI, encouraging study and research oriented to the technologies for the rational use and protection of environmental resources; VII, monitoring the state of environmental quality; and X, environmental education at all levels of instruction, including community education, aiming to enable communities to participate actively in environmental protection. It happens that this statute, although advanced for the time, only received regulation nearly nine years after its enactment, with the Decree 99.274/90 (Brasil 1990), which brought the form with which the National Environmental Policy could be implemented. For nine years, the law has had its effectiveness limited by the fact that it provided “what to do,” but did not provide “how to do.” So it has been the rhythm of environmental policies in Brazil and is no different in relation to climate change. Emission control is regulated by the National Council of the Environment – CONAMA – through resolutions (a kind of normative with legal value reduced, compared to the laws). This greatly hinders the access of citizens to the rules, because it is necessary that it has a very specific legal knowledge to seek regulations conducted by environmental agencies. However, this is not a prediction of the 1988 Constitution (Brasil 1988). In its Art. 225, the Constitution says: “Everyone has the right to an ecologically balanced environment, property of common use to people and essential to a healthy quality of life, imposing upon the Government and the community the duty to defend and preserve it for present and future generations.” This is called

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_115-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

the “principle of participation,” which talks about the need for civil society to participate in the preservation, discussions, decisions, and surveillance. This provision is important, but with the way it operates the Brazilian government today, it has not been fulfilled as it should. How to participate if the population has no access to effective legislation and regulation? How to help in the preparation of laws and regulations, if the competent organs are dressed of technicality but are influenced by economic power? The Brazilian environmental doctrine (Milaré 2009, p. 194) states that there are three forms of popular participation in the protection of the environment: The planning and management of the environment are thus shared between the Government and society, since the environment as a resource for the development of mankind, is, of course, one of the highest expressions of the “common good.” There is the need therefore to examine in what extent the Brazilian legislation contemplates public participation in environmental protection. Álvaro Mirra, in excellent exposition on the subject, points out three basic means by which social group can act: (i) Participating in the process of creating the Environmental Law; (ii) Participating in the formulation and implementation of environmental policies, and (iii) Acting through the judiciary.

However, it is almost impossible to have direct participation of the population in environmental issues. Not to be long on a subject that is important to this chapter, but it is not your main theme, we will analyze the situation of acting through the judiciary. There are five types of judicial actions, which are very rare to be used by the population. The main reasons for this are related to technical or specific legal issues (for example, it is difficult to find a lawyer specialized in environmental law or afford to pay one), and the legitimacy to propose a lawsuit in this field. Not only the citizens do not have money to afford the costs of a lawsuit, as in almost all cases, the population does not know where to turn. The five possible actions are: direct action of unconstitutionality of a law or normative act; public civil action; popular action; collective writ; and writ of injunction. In the large majority of cases, the active role (legitimacy) is carried by the Public Ministry, which overloads the prosecution, and does not solve the situation. One has to make the observation that despite not being legitimized by law, doctrine and jurisprudence can claim to be bringing collective writ by the Public Ministry. This reflects that although the five judicial means are celebrated by the doctrine (that considers them a meaningful intervention of population), in practice this popular participation through judiciary does not exist. One of the reasons that explain this situation is amount of bureaucracy to sue with a direct action of unconstitutionality, popular action, or writ of injunction. It is very common that people would rather give up before the action. In most cases, citizens don’t know who are the authorities that have the legitimacy to propose the lawsuit. This is one of the types of political influence on the environmental determination, and they exist in all forms of public policies for the environment. There is much political influence in the decisions of an environmental nature that Brazil has limitations for emissions of harmful gases to human health, such as carbon monoxide, but has not yet established limits to vehicular emission of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide. The lack of this regulation is the opposite of all global policies aimed to minimize the degradation of the environment. In addition to this, the lack of emission control does not allow that cars circulating in Brazil are more economical and efficient, which, besides polluting the atmosphere and harming the climate, imposing more costs to Brazilians, both in private cars or public transport. Regulating vehicle emissions is not as complicated as it sounds, even in the case of the Brazilian automotive industry. The manufacturing facilities in Brazil produce engines for several countries

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_115-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

that have already established emission limits. The Brazilian automakers have the technology to build more economical engines, but they do not make them available to the domestic market due to a possible decrease in the profit margin, as the pieces for more efficient cars encumber production. As the cars sold in Brazil are already the most expensive in the world, market hardly would accept higher prices, which would force declining corporate earnings. Something that is urgent is being stalled by economic interests. Since the 1980s there are discussions about the need to reduce vehicle emissions of carbon dioxide, but governments do not show concern in addressing this demand. Environmental congresses invoke that need for at least 10 years, but there is no practical advance in the regulations. Anfavea (National Association of Automobile Manufacturers) presses the government to postpone the limitations and thus gain time, as Anfavea did to delay turning airbags into required items of security, for example, or to increase the taxes for imported cars. Attitudes like these, as well as highly reprehensible, are extremely harmful to the environment, consumers, and the market. We must mention that it is very important to change habits and tailor products to the needs of preserving and avoid catastrophic climate changes to come, and for this reason, the limitation of vehicular emissions of pollutants of all kinds is so necessary. More economical and efficient cars pollute less, and if they do not solve completely the problem, they would help to mitigate some aspects of climate change. Another element that draws attention in Brazil is the kind of pollutant emissions. There are considerable emissions in agricultural activities, in deforestation, fires, transport, power generation (since the policy established by the governments of Lula and Dilma directed to energy sources privileging thermoelectric power plants), etc. The main source of emissions of greenhouse gases in Brazil is deforestation that is being decreased for five consecutive years, and in 2012 Brazil registered the least amount of these gases in 20 years. The worrying fact is that the high emissions in all other branches mentioned above was alarming, especially in the energy sector with an increase of 126 % between 1990 and 2012 (Miranda 2013). To get even worse this scenario, after years of decline in deforestation, between 2012 and 2013, there was an increase of 28 % in the deforested area (Miranda and Nublat 2013), which incurs more emissions and worsening climate change. The Brazilian Federal Government fails to invest in environmental enforcement, not to restrain conduct detrimental to the environment and not to encourage the prevention of environmental damage. It does not stimulate popular participation in environmental protection and also does not promote environmental education in schools. In the long term this is extremely harmful, since mankind races against time and tries to remedy the damage already installed on the grounds of lack of appreciation of the importance of the environment and climate balance. However, some measures have enabled local governments amazing changes in this pessimistic scenario.

The Effects and Side Effects of Public Policies In addition to the principles laid down in the Constitution, it is necessary to articulate public policies in all sectors in order to make possible to solve social problems, protect the environment, and develop the economy.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_115-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

These three points mentioned above are the basis for sustainable development. It is hard to achieve the point of balance between them, but it enables real progress as it combines advances in all relevant areas to society. Brazilian public policies in general, have failed in recent years, especially considering the catastrophic results of federal government interventions since the end of the 1950s until the present time. On becoming president of Brazil, Juscelino Kubitschek – loved or hated political figure in Brazil – motivated by interests which are not ours to comment on this chapter, encouraged what would be the biggest mistake of Brazilian history since the proclamation of the republic: the destruction of railroads and their replacement by roads. Began the works starting in Brasilia and trying to interconnect it with other cities, Juscelino did the federal government getting numerous debts – which are still being paid – for the construction of several roads to major Brazilian cities, called BRs. The intention was to develop the national automobile industry, which until then only produced the “refined” Romi Isetta (version BMW Isetta) and Fusca (VW Beetle), both with 100 % of imported pieces. Indeed, the creation of highways has greatly increased the production, sale, and diversity of national car models; however, the negative effects were extremely negative. There was degradation of the Amazon forest, with numerous fires, eliminating several green areas and the beginning of landholdings in the region. This degradation affected strongly the environmental biodiversity, delivered over the years, at least hundreds of millions of tons of carbon into the atmosphere. Some of these roads were created within areas of native vegetation, native forest that is absolutely necessary for the ecological balance. It happens that these roads ultimately attract people who did not have land in other regions of Brazil, to occupy marginal lands to BRs. The state of Pará was one of the most affected and still suffers from the almost uncontrollable deforestation. The majority of municipalities in this federal unit were created as a consequence of this road expansion, because there were no such settlements before installation of roads. One of these newborn cities is Paragominas, Pará, near the BR-010, called the Belém-Brasília road. Planned from one of the defeated projects for the construction of the Federal Capital, Paragominas was a small town, but because of its diverse forest, mineral resources and its strategic location began growing faster than his frame stand (like Belém after the construction of the highway), and the chaos was settled. Paragominas was known internationally by the number of homicides, by the increasing violence, environmental degradation, and the high rate of deforestation. As a way of getting this scenario worse, another activity developed in the region was the production of charcoal, highly polluting and greenhouse gas emitter. This city was the example of chaos and lack of public intervention, both in environmental and climate issues. The emission of gases arising from fires and charcoal production contributed not only to the increase of global temperature but also to the occurrence of respiratory problems in the population, especially in the summer season (in the Amazon there is only summer and winter), when the proliferation of smoke coming from those predatory activities was common. However, with a well-succeeded articulation between the city government, the state government, farmers, and population, Paragominas radically changed its course. Currently, it is known as a fine example of the performance of the government that can change the reality of a place and positively modify the relationship between man and nature. The deforestation started to be near to zero, and the deforestation area was 0.032 % in 2012 (Instituto Ethos et al. 2013).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_115-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Government intervention occurred in several areas, as has been well elucidated by a Brazilian magazine of general circulation (Barbosa 2011): Over time, the project that was born of a social pact was expanding partnerships with government institutions and the private sector. Then Paragominas decided to be the first municipality in Pará to monitor and verify deforestation, in a partnership with the Institute of Man and Environment of Amazon (Imazon). In one year they achieve a reduction of almost 90 % in deforestation. In March 2010, the Ministry of Environment announced the exclusion of Paragominas from the list of the largest Amazon loggers. Currently, the city has 66 % of preserved forests and vast extension of Permanent Protection Areas in agricultural properties. Inspired by the social and environmental transformation of Paragominas, 94 other municipalities of Pará today develop similar initiatives. “Before, to grow, we were destroying the forest. Now, we are the municipality that restores more green areas in the Amazon,” boasts Demachki. The importance of preserving the environment is diffused by a program of environmental education in schools. “It is our mission and converge arms and minds towards social development and environmental preservation,” says.

This successful example was adopted as a reference to 11 other cities in Pará (Carvalho 2011), which joined the Green Cities Program of the state government in order to get out of the list of cities that most deforest the Amazon forest. The most important lesson that can be drawn from the case of Paragominas is that it is possible to recover environmentally highly degraded areas, help the planet, and interfere positively to the reduction of global warming, without losing the ability of economic growth. The ones who visit the city have a good surprise to find that it is a lively, cheerful, well-urbanized, organized city, with a dynamic and growing economy, where the population have excellent quality of life. However, such results would be much easier to achieve if they would not be dependent on the political will. What occurred in that city is a reflection of a good relationship between all sectors of society, with the collective effort to balance a state of degradation. The global challenge of public policies related to climate change is exactly the same that was in Paragominas: changing paradigms of using natural resources so that people can live better. Although, in a global scale, local differences between political groups are replaced by very expressive differences between countries and economic forces, which defend at all costs to maintain the environmental problems that currently occur. Something has to be done urgently. However, one cannot expect that people individually can solve the problem of climate change, because the major causes for greenhouse gas emissions are not only the individuals. Governments need to intervene in an integrated and systematic way. But it seems that countries are waiting to see who will be the first to take steps in this direction. No nation is truly committed to tackling climate change without first checking if other competing countries will. The restriction of pollutant emissions is often misunderstood because it’s seen as implying a decrease in industrial capacity and production of a country. But this is not true, if we observe that what is needed is to check the other alternatives and doing so to prevent recession or economic downturn. Paragominas reached a stable social and economic level, even without degrading nature, and keeping their activities into new ecological standards. If it was possible there, it is possible globally. Undoubtedly it was possible using a tool often overlooked and discredited, called “public policy.”

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_115-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Conclusions National environmental laws, combined with effective and integrated public policies created by the dialogue between producers, investors, local power, and population, can effectively contribute to an improvement in climate change solutions. International laws and treaties will only take effect if built on a structural transformation of industrial production and ways to maintain, or improve, economical context of the signatory countries, never forgetting that are indeed less polluting alternatives and viable solutions. Paragominas managed to continue growing and producing wealth, however, without destroying and degrading the municipal area, preserving the environment and health of all citizens. This is possible globally, if there is the participation of companies and local governments, sharing good examples and building a more positive reality for all.

References Alves F, Caeiro S, Leal Filho W, Azeiteiro U (eds) (2014) Special issue on “Lay rationalities of climate change”. International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management, vol. 6 n. 1, pp. 2–4. Emerald Barbosa V (2011) Paragominas: inspiração verde no Pará. Available in: http://planetasustentavel. abril.com.br/noticia/desenvolvimento/paragominas-inspiracao-verde-645308.shtml Brasil (1967) Lei 5197, de 3 de Janeiro de 1967. Available in: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ leis/l5197.htm. Brasil (1981) Lei 6938, de 31 de agosto de 1981. Available in: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ leis/l6938.htm Brasil (1988) Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, promulgada em 05 de outubro de 1988. Available in: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao. htm Brasil (1990) Decreto nº 99.274, de 6 de junho de 1990. Available in: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ ccivil_03/decreto/antigos/d99274.htm Carvalho C (2011) Onze cidades já seguem modelo de Paragominas contra o desmatamento da Amazônia. Available in: http://oglobo.globo.com/politica/onze-cidades-ja-seguem-modelo-deparagominas-contra-desmatamento-da-amazonia-2687290 Geertz C (1983) Local knowledge: further essays in interpretive anthropology. Basic Books, New York Instituto Ethos, Rede Nossa São Paulo, Rede Social Brasileira por Cidades Justas e Sustentáveis (2013) Paragominas combate o desmatamento e vira exemplo de sustentabilidade na Amazônia. Available in: http://www.cidadessustentaveis.org.br/boas-praticas/paragominas-combate-odesmatamento-e-vira-exemplo-de-sustentabilidade-na-amazonia Milaré É (2009) Direito do Ambiente: a gestão ambiental em foco. Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo Miranda G (2013) Emissões de gases-estufa no Brasil em 2012 foram as menores em 20 anos. Available in: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/2013/11/1368065-emissoes-de-gasesestufa-no-brasil-em-2012-foram-as-menores-em-20-anos.shtml. São Paulo Miranda G, Nublat J (2013) Desmatamento na Amazônia sobe 28 % em 2013. Available in: http:// www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/2013/11/1371434-desmatamento-na-amazonia-sobe-28-em2013.shtml. São Paulo

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_116-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Arable Crop Farmers’ Decision Making and Adaptation Strategies on Climate Change in Ogun State, Nigeria S. B. Ibrahima*, Carolyn A. Afolamib, I. A. Ayindea und and C. O. Adeofunc a Department of Agricultural Economics and Farm Management, Federal University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, Nigeria b Agricultural Media Resources and Extension Centre (AMREC), Federal University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, Nigeria c Department of Environmental Management and Toxicology, Federal University of Agriculture, Agriculture, Nigeria

Abstract Climate and rural farmers’ resource allocation behavior are primary determinants of agricultural productivity in Nigeria. Hence, knowledge of the rural farmers about climate change is important in order to offer adaptation practices that mitigate its adverse effects. This study thus investigated the effects of climate change at the grassroots by considering the determinants of the communities’ adaptation to changes in climate in Ogun State, Nigeria. The study utilized primary data collected from 150 arable crop farmers selected across Ogun State through a multistage sampling technique. The data were obtained through administration of questionnaire designed to elicit information on socioeconomic characteristics and adaptation behaviors of the respondents to climate change. The multinomial logit regression model was used to capture choice probabilities across the various options of climate change adaptation strategies. Most (81.08 %) of the arable crop farmers were males with an average farming experience of 24 years. Some (22.97 %) respondents did not take up any climate change adaptation strategy, 45.95 % targeted rains to plant, 12.16 % used multiple strategies, 10.81 % adopted good soil conservation techniques, while 8.11 % adopted wetland farming. The significant factors explaining the choice of climate change adaptation strategies taken up by the respondents were household size (p < 0.05), gender (p < 0.10), years of residence in a community (p < 0.05), educational level (p < 0.10), frequency of extension contact (p < 0.01), access to agricultural credit, and income from secondary occupation (p < 0.05). This paper provides interesting information on natural adaptation practices and these indigenous approaches would be useful to researchers and policy makers worldwide.

Keywords Arable crop farmers; Decision making; Adaptation strategies; Climate change

Introduction Agriculture places heavy burden on the environment in the process of providing humanity with food and fiber, while climate is the primary determinant of agricultural productivity. Studies indicate that Africa’s agriculture is negatively affected by climate change (Pearce et al. 1996; McCarthy et al. 2001). Given the fundamental role of agriculture in human welfare, concern has been expressed by federal and state agencies and other countries regarding the potential effects of climate change on

*Email: [email protected]. Page 1 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_116-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

agricultural productivity. Climate change according to IPCC (2001b) can be defined as the change in the state of the climate that can be identified using statistical data by changes in the mean and variability of climate properties that has persisted for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It also refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. This usage however differs from that in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC, 1992), where climate change refers to a change of climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of global atmosphere and that is, in addition to natural climate variability, observed over comparable time period (Currents 2008). Interest in this issue has motivated a substantial body of research on climate change and agriculture over the past decade (Fischer et al. 2002; Wolfe et al. 2005; Lobell et al. 2008). Climate change is expected to influence crop and livestock production, hydrologic balances, input supplies, and other components of agricultural systems. However, the nature of these biophysical effects and the human responses to them are complex and uncertain. Adaptation to climate change refers to adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2001a). Common adaptation methods in agriculture include use of new crop varieties and livestock species that are more suited to drier conditions, irrigation, crop diversification, mixed crop livestock farming systems, and changing planting dates (Bradshaw et al. 2004; Kurukulasuriya and Mendelsohn 2006; Nhemachena and Hassan 2007). It is evident that climate change will have a strong impact on Nigeria – particularly in the areas of agriculture, land use, energy, biodiversity, health, and water resources. Nigeria, like all the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (IPCC 2007; Nigeria Environmental Study Team 2004). Rain-fed agricultural practice and fishing activities from which two-third of the Nigerian population depend primarily on foods and livelihoods are also under serious threat besides the high population pressures of 140 million people surviving on the physical environment through various activities within an area of 923,000 km2 (IPCC 2007; NEST 2004). Food crop farmers in Southwestern Nigeria provide the bulk of arable crops that are consumed locally and transported to other regions in the country. These farmers are also experiencing climate change even though they have not considered its deeper implications. This is evidenced in the late arrival of rain, the drying-up of stream and small rivers that usually flow year-round, the seasonal fluctuation of rains, and the gradual disappearance of flood-recession cropping in riverine areas (Building Nigeria’s Response to Climate Change 2008). Consequently, this research intends to investigate the effects of climate change at the grassroots by considering the determinants of the communities’ adaptation to changes in climate. This is important because sustainability of agricultural production depends largely on actions of farmers and their ability to make decisions given the level of knowledge and information available to them. This study takes into account the local communities’ understanding of climate change and assumed that these communities have an inborn, adaptive knowledge from which to draw and survive in high-stress ecological and socioeconomic conditions. The study further described the adaptation strategies of arable crop farmers to climate change and also estimated the determinants of arable crop farmers’ decision on climate change adaptation strategies.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_116-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Methodology Description of the Study Area This study was carried out in Ogun State. Ogun State is one of the 36 states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It was carved out of the defunct Western State on the 3rd day of February, 1976, and it has a total land area of 16,409.26 km2. The estimated population is 3,728,098 according to Nigerian 2006 National Census figure (Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) 2009). The climate of Ogun State follows a tropical pattern with the raining season starting about March and ending in November, followed by dry season. The mean annual rainfall varies from 128 mm in the southern parts of the state to 105 mm in the northern areas. The average monthly temperature ranges from 23
C in July to 32
C in February. The northern part of the State is mainly of derived Savannah vegetation, while the Central part falls in the rain forest belt. The southern part of the State has mangrove swamp. The geographical landscape of the state comprises extensive fertile soil suitable for agriculture and savannah land in the northwestern part of the state, suitable for cattle rearing. There are also vast forest reserves, rivers, lagoons, rocks, mineral deposits, and an oceanfront. The rivers in the state provide veritable opportunities for farmers’ to access the potentials of dry season as well as fadama farming. The main occupation of the people of the state is farming, which is largely subsistence in scale. The state is known to have a virile Agricultural Extension Programme which comprises four agricultural zones identified by OGADEP as Abeokuta, Ilaro, Ijebu, and Ikenne. Each zone is divided into blocks, and each block into circles or cells and each of these is anchored by a Village Extension Agent (VEA) who oversees the activities of farmers in his coverage area, while a Block Extension Agent (BEA) anchors a block by overseeing activities of farmers in the coverage area.

Data Types, Sources, and Sampling Technique This study was based on primary data. The primary data were obtained through administration of structured questionnaire on arable crop farmers in the study area. Data collected included the arable crop farmers’ socioeconomic and production characteristics, actual adaptation strategies adopted by the respondents, as well as barriers to adaptation faced in the study area. The sample size used for this study was 150 arable crop farmers. Multistage sampling technique was used to select arable crop farmers from whom data were generated for this study. The first stage of sampling involved a random selection of two zones from the four Ogun State Agricultural Extension Development Programme (OGADEP) zones, that is, Abeokuta and Ikenne zones (OGADEP divided the state into four zones – Abeokuta, Ilaro, Ijebu, and Ikenne, on the basis of geographical spread and ease of administration. Each zone is divided into blocks and each block into circles or cells and each of these is anchored by a Village Extension Agent (VEA) who oversees the activities of farmers in his coverage area, while a Block Extension Agent (BEA) anchors a block by overseeing activities of farmers in the coverage area). The second stage involved a random selection of 50 % of the total number of blocks in both Abeokuta and Ikenne zones, resulting in the selection of three blocks from Abeokuta zone, and two blocks from Ikenne zone using list of blocks in the zones as the sampling frame. The third stage involved a random selection of three cells from each of the selected five blocks in each zone using the list of cells obtainable from OGADEP as the sampling frame. The fourth stage involved a random selection of 10 arable crop farmers from each of the selected cells (using a list of arable crop farmers from each cell obtainable from OGADEP) thereby giving a total number of 150 respondents. Page 3 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_116-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Sampling procedure for the study Stage Procedure 1. Random selection of two zones from the four OGADEP zones 2. Proportion random selection of half of the total number of blocks within each selected zone 3. Simple random selection of three cells each from the above selected blocks 4. Simple random selection of 10 respondents from each of the cells selected above

Sampling frame List of all the four OGADEP agricultural zones List of all blocks under the OGADEP agricultural zones selected List of all cells under the five OGADEP agricultural blocks selected List of all arable crop farmers under each cell obtainable from OGADEP was the sampling frame

The sampling procedure for this study is summarized in Table 1.

Analytical Techniques Descriptive statistics and multinomial logit (MNL) regression model were used to analyze the data collected. The advantage of using MNL is that it permits the analysis of decisions across more than two categories, allowing the determination of choice probabilities for different categories of climate change adaptation being modeled by the study. It is also known for its computational simplicity in calculating the choice probabilities that are expressible in analytical form (Tse 1987). Hence, this model provides a convenient closed form for underlying choice probabilities with no need of multivariate integration, making it simple to compute choice situations characterized by many alternatives. The main limitation of the model is the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property, which states that the ratio of the probabilities of choosing any two alternatives is independent of the attributes of any other alternative in the choice set (Hausman and McFadden 1984; Tse 1987). The decision of whether or not to use any adaptation option could fall under the general framework of utility and profit maximization. Consider a rational farmer who seeks to maximize the present value of expected benefits of production over a specified time horizon and must choose among a set of J adaptation options. The farmer i decide to use j adaptation option if the perceived benefit from option j is greater than the utility from other options (say, k) depicted as
 (1) U ij b’j X i þ ej > U ik ðb’k X k þ ek Þ where j is not equal to k; Uij and Uik are the perceived utility by farmer i of adaptation options j and k, respectively; and ej and ek are the error terms. Under the revealed preference assumption that the farmer practices an adaptation option that generates net benefits and does not practice an adaptation option otherwise, we can relate the observable discrete choice of practice to the unobservable (latent) continuous net benefit variable as Yij ¼ 1 if U ij > 0, and Yij ¼ 0 if U ij < 0 In this formulation, Y is a dichotomous dependent variable taking the value of 1 when the farmer chooses an adaptation option in question and 0 otherwise. The probability that farmer i will choose adaptation option j among the set of adaptation options could be defined as follows:

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_116-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014


 PðY ¼ 1=X Þ ¼ P U ij > U ik =X

(2)


  ¼ P b’j X i þ ei  b’k X i  ek > 0=X 
  ¼ P b’j  b’k Xi þ ej  ek > 0=X

(3)







¼ P ðb Xi þ e > 0=XÞ ¼ F ðb Xi Þ In this analysis, the five climate change adaptation categories considered are given below: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Good soil conservation techniques. Irrigation/drainage/wetland farming. Targeting rains to plant. Multiple strategies. No adaptation: this was used as the reference category. In order to estimate this model, there was the need to normalize one category of the adaptation strategies, for effective analysis. This is also known as “reference state.” where e* is a random disturbance term, b* is a vector of unknown parameters that can be interpreted as the net influence of the vector of explanatory variables influencing adaptation, Xis are the explanatory variables, and they included the following: X1 ¼ Farming experience in years X2 ¼ Educational level X3 ¼ Age in years X4 ¼ Household size X5 ¼ Years of residence in a community X6 ¼ Secondary occupation income in naira X7 ¼ Frequency of extension contact X8 ¼ Gender X9 ¼ Marital status X10 ¼ Religion (Islam ¼ 1, Christianity ¼ 2, traditional worshipper ¼ 3) X11 ¼ Land size (ha) X12 ¼ Access to credit (access to credit ¼ 1, and 0 if otherwise) and F (b* Xi) is the cumulative distribution of e* evaluated at b* Xi. The multinomial logit model is thus specified according to Green (2003) as Pij ¼ probðY ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1þ

ex’b j X

(4) e

x’b

J¼1

where j ¼ 1 . . . n and b is a vector of parameters that satisfy ln (Pij/Pik) ¼ X’ (bj  bk) (Greene 2003). Unbiased and consistent parameter estimates of the MNL model in Eq. 4 require the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) to hold. Specifically, the IIA assumption requires that the likelihood of a household using a certain adaptation measure needs to be independent of other alternative adaptive measures used by the same household. Thus, the IIA assumption involves the independence and homoscedastic disturbance terms of the adaptation model in Eq. 3. The

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_116-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 2 Description of respondents by personal characteristics Personal characteristics Age (years) of respondents 30 or less 31–40 41–50 51–60 Above 60 Gender of respondents Male Female Marital status Married Single Divorced Widow Religion Islam Christianity Traditional worshipper Educational level No formal education Adult literacy training Primary education Secondary education Technical/vocational education Tertiary education Secondary occupation income 0 or less 5,000–20,000 21,000–40,000 41,000–80,000 81,000–150,000 150,000–400,000 401,000 and above

Frequency

Percentage

Mean

20 26 48 44 10

13.51 17.57 32.43 29.73 6.76

47.5

120 28

81.08 18.92

128 10 4 6

86.49 6.76 2.70 4.05

55 90 3

37.16 60.81 2.03

54 4 45 29 5 11

36.49 2.70 30.41 19.59 3.38 7.43

90 30 16 5 3 2 2

60.81 20.27 10.81 3.38 2.03 1.35 1.35

26,387

Source: Field survey, 2010

validity of the IIA assumption is based on the fact that if a choice set is irrelevant, eliminating a choice or choice sets from the model altogether will not change parameter estimates systematically. Differentiating Eq. 3 with respect to each explanatory variable provides marginal effects of the explanatory variables given as " @pj =@xk ¼ Pj bkj 

j1 X

# Pj bjk

(4)

J¼1

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_116-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 3 Description of respondents by production characteristics Extension contact 0 or less 1–6 7–12 13–18 19–25 Above 25 Household size 1–4 5–9 10–14 Above 15 Land size group 0.5 ha or less 0.501–1 ha 1.01–1.5 ha 1.501–2 ha 2.01–2.5 ha Above 2.5 ha Crop types grown Vegetables Cassava Maize Pepper/tomato/okra Yam Garden egg/potato/beans Rice Melon

20 40 47 11 20 10

13.51 27.03 31.76 7.43 13.51 6.76

23 77 41 7

15.54 52.03 27.70 4.73

47 50 16 20 2 13

31.76 33.78 10.81 13.51 1.35 8.78

51 123 133 15 10 3 20 14

34.5 83.1 89.9 10.2 6.8 2.0 13.5 9.5

10.89

8.1

1.11

Source: Field survey, 2010

Results and Discussion Distribution of Respondents by Personal Characteristics Age is generally believed to be an important factor in farming activities. This is because younger farmers are believed to commit more energy into production activities, while older ones are likely to be more experienced which may also impact positively on their productivity. As shown in the Table 2, majority (79.70 %) of the respondents were between the economically active age of 31–60 years with a mean age of 45.7 years. With respect to gender of surveyed respondents, 81.08 % of the respondents were males, while only 18.92 % of the respondents were females showing that arable crop farming in the study area was more popular among the males. Furthermore, most (86.49 %) of the respondents were married. Majority (60.81 %) of the respondents were Christians, while 37.16 % of the respondents were Muslims. Traditional worshippers constituted 2.03 % of the respondents. In terms of education, 36.49 % of the respondents had no formal education, 30.41 % were educated up to the primary school level, and 19.59 % up to secondary school level. Only 7.43 % of the respondents have tertiary education. This suggests a reasonable level of literacy among the respondents. From Table 4, about 43.92 % of the sampled respondents have secondary occupation, Page 7 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_116-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

while the remaining 56.08 % do not have. The secondary occupation included mainly artisanship, trading, carpentry, hunting, and cattle rearing, among others. Furthermore, 86.49 % of the respondents had extension contact, while the remaining 13.51 % do not have. This implies that the farmers would have access to regular update of improved farming technologies which is likely to boost their productivity. Out of this, 86.49 %, majority (72.3 %) of the respondents had up to 12 times of extension contact in the last production season, while the mean contact frequency is 11 times in the last production season. The study further showed that 82.43 % of the respondents had no access to credit facilities. This may limit the ability of the farmers to expand their scale of production. This lack of access to credit facilities may be due to high interest rates being charged by financial institutions, and other bureaucratic bottlenecks which always characterize loan acquisition and disbursement in the country, in general.

Table 4 Determinants of adaptation behavior of respondents’ Variables Intercept

Good soil conservation technique Parameter Odd-ratio 21.98 – (6942.07) 0.04 0.96 (0.05)

Farming experience in years Educational 0.08 level (0.31) Age 0.05 (0.06) Household 0.35b size (0.17) Years of 0.07b residence (0.03) Secondary 0.00b occupation (0.00) income Extension 0.15a contact (0.06) frequency Respondent 0.60 is a male (1.34) Respondent 0.00 is a female – Respondent 1.36 is married (3934.40) Respondent 2.65 is single (3934.40) Respondent 1.75 is divorced (3934.40)

1.08 1.05 0.70 1.08 1.00

1.16

Irrigation/drainage/wetland farming Parameter Odd-ratio 4.25 – (6277.93) 0.09 1.09 (0.07)

Targeting rains to plant Parameter Odd-ratio 29.99 – (3731.61) 0.02 0.98 (0.04)

Multiple strategies Parameter Odd-ratio 23.09 – (6528.41) 0.02 0.98 (0.05)

0.57c (0.44) 0.02 (0.06) 0.32 (0.18) 0.09b (0.05) 0.00 (0.00)

0.72

0.14 (0.21) 0.00 (0.03) 0.12 (0.09) 0.03 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00)

0.77a (0.31) 0.03 (0.04) 0.17 (0.12) 0.03 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00)

0.84

0.06 (0.09)

0.94

1.14

0.12b (0.06)

1.12

0.28

0.49 (1.13) 0.00 – 1.79 (5142.36) 1.61 (5142.36) 2.59 (5142.36)

0.61

2.30c (1.45) – 0.00 – 3.89 15.15 (2941.33) 14.10 14.38 (2941.33) 5.73 31.79 (4387.86) 0.55

1.78 0.98

1.09 1.00

0.13a (0.05)

1.28c (0.86) – 0.00 – 0.00 14.58 (2941.33) 0.00 13.53 (2941.33) 0.00 15.59 ( 2941.33)

0.10

1.15 1.00 0.88 1.03 1.00

– 0.00 0.00 0.00

2.17 1.03

1.04 1.00

– 5.98 5.00 13.31

(continued)

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_116-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 4 (continued) Variables Respondent is widowed Respondent is a Muslim Respondent is a Christian Respondent is a traditional worshipper Land size of 1 ha or less Land size of 1.01–1.5 ha Land size of 1.501–2 ha Land size of 2.01 to 2.5 ha Land size of above 2.5 ha Credit access No credit access

Good soil conservation technique Parameter Odd-ratio 0.00 – – 0.09 0.92 (4049.14) 0.17 1.18 (4049.14) 0.00 –

–

Irrigation/drainage/wetland farming Parameter Odd-ratio 0.00 – – 0.70 0.50 (3862.53) 1.45 0.23 (3862.53) 0.00 –

–

Targeting rains to plant Parameter Odd-ratio 0.00 – – 15.24 0.00 (2296.42) 16.12 0.00 (2296.42) 0.00 –

12.86 384785.82 20.92 1219116463.91 0.78 (4039.47) (3980.19) (1.59) 17.91 59722836.13 17.27 31727484.63 1.38 (4039.47) (3980.19) (1.42) 17.60 43947663.81 18.41 98786329.21 2.02 (4039.47) (3980.19) (1.50) 18.97 173140484.39 19.08 193586592.25 1.83 (4039.47) (3980.19) (1.67) 0.00 – 1.65c (1.01) 0.00 –

– 5.21 –

0.00 – 0.26 (1.54) 0.00 –

– 0.77 –

0.00 – 0.62 (0.77) 0.00 –

–

2.17 3.99 7.53 6.25

– 1.85 –

Multiple strategies Parameter Odd-ratio 0.00 – 1.48c 4.41 (0.78) 0.12 0.88 (0.00) –

0.00 –

17.51 40328369.50 (4021.98) 17.30 32638405.51 (4021.98) 17.14 27827995.26 (4021.98) 2.58 13.19 (4391.45) –

0.00 – 1.01 (1.02) 0.00 –

2 .74 –

Source: computed from survey data; 2010 Standard errors are in parenthesis a Coefficients significant at 1 % b Coefficient significant at 5 % c Coefficient significant at 10 % chi-square of log likelihood ¼ 117.76a

The distribution of respondents by household size is also shown in Tables 2 and 3. From the table, 52.03 % of the respondents had between 1 and 4 household members, while 27.07 % have household size of between 10 and 14 members. The mean household size for the sampled respondents is approximately eight persons, implying that other members of the household can provide family labor in agricultural production. This could however lead to the use of child labor at the expense of formal education. It is obvious from Table 3 that 65.54 % of the respondent cultivated less than 1 ha of farmland and 10.81 % cultivated between 1.101 and 1.5 ha of farmland, while 13.51 % cultivated between 1.50 and 2.0 ha of farmland. This corroborates the true picture of subsistence nature of arable crop farming in Nigeria. The mean land size cultivated by the respondents’ was approximately 1 ha. The table also revealed that the predominant crop types grown by the arable crop farmers was maize, followed by cassava and vegetables, while other crop types grown included rice melon and pepper.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_116-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

12.162

22.973

10.811 45.946 8.108

No Adaptation

Good soil conservation technique

Irrigation/ Drainage/ Wetland Farming Targeting rains to Plant

Multiple Strategies

Fig. 1 Distribution of respondents by adaptation strategies to climate change

Distribution of Respondents by Adaptation Strategies to Climate Change As indicated in Fig. 1, targeting rains to plant (leading to either early or late planting) was the most commonly (45.95 %) adopted strategy to reduce the effect of climate change. Use of irrigation coupled with construction of proper drainage channels as well as wetland farming was the least practiced (8.11 %) adaptation strategy among the major adaptation methods identified among arable crop farmers interviewed for the study. Targeting rains for planting as an adaptation strategy by the farmers was not surprising giving the inherent nature of peasant farmers as they rely on natural weather conditions for crop production. Furthermore, the limited use of irrigation coupled with construction of proper drainage channels as well as wetland farming, was due to the resource-poor nature of the farmers in the study area. Moreover, 10.81 % of the respondents adopted good soil conservation techniques (such as planting cover crops, mulching) as a strategy in this respect, while only 12.16 % of the respondents engaged in multiple strategies to combat climate change. It was, however, interesting to note that 22.97 % of the arable farmers reported that they have not used any adaptation strategy.

Determinants of Arable Crop Farmers’ Decisions on Climate Change Adaptation Strategies Multinomial logit model was used in this study to estimate the determinants of respondents’ adaptation behavior to climate change in the study area. Eight adaptation strategies were practiced by the sampled respondents in the study area. These are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Good cultural practices such as mulching and resupplying of seedlings Planting cover crops Irrigation of farmland Construction of proper drainage channels Wetland/Fadama farming Targeting rainfall to plant, leading to either early or late planting Praying for God’s intervention

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_116-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

8. No adaptation For the purpose of analysis using multinomial logit, these adaptation strategies were restructured by grouping closely related choices together in the same category. Good cultural practices and planting of cover crops were grouped in the same category labeled as “good soil conservation techniques,” while irrigation of farmland, construction of proper drainage channels, and wetland farming were grouped and labeled as “irrigation/drainage/wetland farming” category. The third category is “targeting rains to plant,” followed by “multiple strategies” category which is a series of combination of the first three categories. Lastly, the fifth category is a combination of praying for God’s intervention and no adaptation, and it is labeled “no adaptation.” Accordingly, the choice set in the restructured multinomial logit model included the following adaptation options: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Good soil conservation techniques Irrigation/drainage/wetland farming Targeting rains to plant Multiple strategies No adaptation

In this analysis, the last category (no adaptation) was used as the “reference state.” Thus, results obtained from the multinomial logit analysis were in reference to no adaptation, and the result is presented in Table 4. The result revealed that explanatory variables in the model significantly explain the determinants of adaptation behavior of respondents to climate change in the study area. The chi-square value of 117.76 associated with the log likelihood ratio was significant (p < 0.01) suggesting strong explanatory power of the model. The study found out that household size is significant (p < 0.05) but negative, implying that an increase in household size will decrease the probability of respondents’ choosing good soil conservation techniques such as good cultural practices and planting cover crops as an adaptation option. Also, the odds of choosing good soil conservation adaptation option as opposed to not adapting at all is 0.70 (70 %) per unit decrease in household size. The coefficient of number of years of residence in a community is also significant (p < 0.05) and positive both for “good soil conservation techniques” and “irrigation/drainage/wetland farming,” implying that an increase in this variable will increase the probability that the respondents will choose each of these adaptation options, respectively. This is because with increase in the years of residence of an individual in the community, there is higher possibility of an individual having access to more social capital in the community, thus aiding his ability to adopt new innovations to improve his farming activities and livelihood in general. In the same vein, the odds of adopting each of these strategies by the respondents compared to not adopting at all are 1.08 and 1.09, respectively, for each of the adaptation strategies mentioned above. Moreover, coefficient of income from secondary occupation was also found to be significant (p < 0.05) and positive for the adaptation strategy of good soil conservation technique, implying that a change in income from secondary occupation will likely cause an increase in the respondent’s behavior towards choosing this adaptation strategy. This is because wealthier households are likely to be willing to adapt by investing in good soil conservation techniques. This follows the view of Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) that the adoption of agricultural technologies requires sufficient financial well-being. Thus, expanding smallholder farmers’ access to off-farm sources of income increases the probability that they will invest in good farm practices. The associated odd of respondents adopting this strategy Page 11 of 14

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compared to the reference category for each unit increase in income from secondary occupation is 1.00. Coefficient of educational level of respondent was also found to be significant (p < 0.10) and positive for strategies of irrigation/drainage/wetland farming and multiple strategies, implying that an increase in this variable will increase the likelihood of sampled respondents choosing these strategies, with associated odd values of 1.78 and 2.17, respectively . Generally, higher level of education is believed to be associated with access to information on improved technologies and productivity consequences as evidence from various sources indicates that there is a positive relationship between the education level of the household head and the adoption of improved technologies and adaptation to climate change (Maddison 2006). Therefore, farmers with higher levels of education are more likely to better adapt to climate change by taking up multiple strategies. Furthermore, the coefficient of frequency of extension contact was found to be significant and positive, for strategies of good soil conservation techniques (p < 0.01), targeting rains to plant (p < 0.01), and for multiple strategies (p < 0.05) implying that an increase in this variable will increase the likelihood of sampled respondents choosing these strategies, respectively. The associated odd values of choosing the strategies by respondents as opposed to not adapting at all are 1.16, 1.14, and 1.12, respectively. With these in mind, farmers who have access to extension services are more likely to be abreast of information on changing climatic conditions and the various management practices they can use to adapt to these changes. In terms of credit access, the result revealed that this variable is significant (p < 0.10) and positively affects adaptation behaviors of respondent to good soil conservation techniques, with an associated odd value of 5.21 per unit increase in access to credit facility. From the table, an increase in the number of respondents having credit access will increase the likelihood of this adaptation. This is true because poverty or lack of financial resources is one of the main constraints to adjusting to climate change. The result further shows that the dummy variable representing religious beliefs of the respondents is in favour of those practicing Islam, despite majority (60.81 %) of the sampled respondents' being Christians. Religion is significant (p < 0.10), and positively affecting adaptation behaviors of respondent to taking multiple adaptation strategies with an associated odd value of 4.41 per unit increase in this variable. This implies that farmers who are Muslims show positive disposition towards using multiple adaptation strategies towards combating climate change. In the same vein, the analysis result of gender, which is also a dummy variable in this model, is in favor of the males given the fact that the males constituted 81.08 % of the respondents, while the females constituted 18.92 % of the respondents. Gender is significant (p < 0.10) and negatively affecting adaptation behaviors of respondent to irrigation/drainage/wetland farming as well as targeting rains to plant, each with associated odd values of 0.10 and 0.28, respectively, per unit increase in number of male respondents. From the table, as male respondents increase, there is likelihood of decrease in taking up these adaptation options.

Conclusion and Recommendations This study establishes the fact that arable farmers adapt to climate change situation in their local settings. The multinomial logit results clearly emphasized that household size and gender in favor of the males negatively influenced adaptation behaviors to climate change. On the other hand, years of residence in a community, educational level, frequency of extension contact, access to agricultural credit, married respondents, and income from secondary occupation are variables which engender

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_116-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

positive adaptation behaviors of respondents to climate change. From the foregoing, the study recommends that: Policies from government and other stakeholders should ensure that farmers have access to sufficient credit; this will increase their ability and flexibility to change production strategies in response to the harsh forecasted climate conditions. There should also be investment on yield increasing technology packages to increase farm income. Also, there should be encouragement of informal social networks among farmers and in rural communities as it has the potentials of increasing social capital useful for adaptation. Farmers should be encouraged to acquire formal education as it has the likelihood of increasing the possibility of responding to positively to adaptation strategies against climatic change. Allied to this is the need for increased access to extension services by farmers in order to educate farmers more and disseminate useful agricultural innovations that will improve living agricultural production in the face of changing weather condition while also improving the standard of living of the farmers.

References Bradshaw B, Dolan H, Smit B (2004) Farm-level adaptation to climatic variability and change: crop diversification in the Canadian prairies. Clim Change 67:119–141 Building Nigeria’s Response to Climate Change (2008) Annual workshop of Nigerian Environmental Study Team (NEST): the recent global and local action on climate change, held at Hotel Millennium. Abuja, 8–9th Oct 2008 Currents (2008) Local Adaptation under further stress. Current issues in International Rural Development published by Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences issue 44/45, December, 2008. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Federal Republic of Nigeria (2009) Release of final figures for 2006 censuses Official Gazette, vol 1, number 96. Abuja Fischer G, Shah M, Van Velthuizen H (2002) Climate change and agricultural vulnerability. International Institute for applied systems analysis report prepared under UN Institutional contract agreement 1113 for World Summit on sustainable development. Laxenburg Greene WH (2003) Econometric analysis, 5th edn. Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River Hausman J, McFadden D (1984) Specification tests for the multinomial logit model. Econometrica 52(5):1219–1240 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2001a) Climate change 2001: The Scientific Report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Third Assessment Report. http:// www.ipcc.ch/ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2001b): Report of the Intergovernmental panel on climate change, climate change 2001, impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1032 p IPCC (2007) : Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptations and Vulnerability. Contributions of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC. Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, Vander Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1000 pp Knowler D, Bradshaw B (2007) Farmers’ adoption of conservation agriculture: a review and synthesis of recent research. Food Policy 32(1):25–48

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Kurukulasuriya P, Mendelsohn R (2006) A Ricardian analysis of the impact of climate change on African crop land. CEEPA discussion paper no. 8. Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa, University of Pretoria, Pretoria Lobell DB, Burke MB, Tebaldi C, Mastrandrea MD, Falcon WP, Naylor RL (2008) Prioritizing climate change adaptation needs for food security in 2030. Science 319(5863):607–610 Maddison D (2006) The perception of and adaptation to climate change in Africa. CEEPA Discussion paper no. 10. Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa, University of Pretoria, Pretoria McCarthy JJ, Canziani OF, Leary NA, Dokken DJ, White KS (eds) (2001) Climate change 2001: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Nhemachena C, Hassan R (2007) Micro-level analysis of farmers’ adaptation to climate Change in Southern Africa. IFPRI discussion paper no. 00714. International Food Policy Research Institute. Washington, DC Nigerian Environmental Study Team (NEST) (2004) Regional climate modelling and climate scenarios development in support of vulnerability and adaptation studies: outcome of regional climate modeling efforts over Nigeria. NEST, Ibadan Pearce D et al (1996) The social costs of climate change: greenhouse damage and benefits of control. In: Bruce J, Lee H, Haites E (eds) Climate change 1995: economic and social dimensions of climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 179–224 Tse YK (1987) A diagnostic test for the multinomial logit model. J Bus Econ Stat 5(2):283–286 UNFCCC (1992) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, USA Wolfe DW, Schwartz MD, Lakso AN, Otsuki Y, Pool RM, Shaulis NJ (2005) Climate change and shifts in spring phenology of three horticultural woody perennials in northeastern USA. Int J Biometeorol 49:303–309. Meteorological Organization, Geneva

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Sustaining Cooperation in the International Climate Change Regimes: Employing Game Theory and Network Theory Joon-hyuk Chung* Ewha Womans University High School, Seoul, South Korea

Abstract For decades, the leverage of transnational actors has skyrocketed, while still an international regime is crucial in managing climate change. Acknowledging this point, this chapter aims to find how to analyze the structure of climate change regimes, why international cooperation is hardly maintained in the regimes, and how to sustain it. To narrow the gap between theory and reality, this chapter integrates the game theory and the network theory. Game theory is used to analyze the negotiations in the regime, and network theory is widely applied to discuss the structure and interactions among diverse actors. The author verifies that the system inside the regime is still international, whereas outside the regime is similar to the network shape. Furthermore, the structure of the regime analyzed proves to be disadvantageous for sustaining cooperation. Thus, the author proposes practicable solution to sustaining cooperation by finding the actor who could fill the structural holes created in the regime. This chapter is one of the first to implement an interdisciplinary study merging game theory and network theory to deal with climate change regimes. This chapter might be helpful to the policy makers and scholars devising methods to improve the efficacy of regimes on managing climate change.

Keywords Climate change; International regime; Metaphor of castle; Prisoner’s dilemma; Tit-for-tat strategy; Stag hunt; Network; Structural hole; Post-developing country; Power division

Introduction Since the 1970s, international regime has drawn attention from states as an effective tool for counteracting the effects of environmental problems (Young 1989). Regime is defined as “a set of explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner 1982, p. 186). As the demand for climate change regimes had also been proliferated, Rio Earth Summit declared to establish United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the first formal and legal international

The author has contracted many debts in writing this chapter. First of all, the author should like to thank Professor Robert O. Keohane and Professor Lawrence E. Susskind for their perceptive criticism and kind encouragement. Also, the author has indebted to Geena Kim, former teacher of Ewha Womans University High School, for her invaluable advice on elaborating this chapter. Lastly, the author sincerely thanks the editors for giving the author special opportunity to participate in this work. *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 20

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regime specialized in climate change, in 1992. From then on, international regimes have encouraged nations’ responsible actions toward climate change. To the contrary, still a great crux exists. In 2010 and 2011, the quantity of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission has rather swelled twice faster than the worst-case projections leading to 6
C warming (Voorhar and Myllyvirta 2013). This insinuates that nations have made airy promises, which have barely been kept. To improve the efficacy of climate change regimes, this international practice of negligence ought to be ameliorated. With this perspective, two questions could be raised. First, why does the cooperation achieved in the period of resolution-making hardly sustain to the period of each state’s practicing policies? Second, how could the international cooperation achieved by international regime sustain for a long period, without any state’s defection? Before answering to the questions, this chapter casts a cardinal question for the first: Why are international regimes still the crucial tool to manage climate change, in the more dynamically changed world system?

International Climate Change Regimes Two mainstream international relations theories that have contributed to the discussion on the international regimes are realism and institutionalism. They have antithetic perspectives on the most roles of international regimes. However, there are some hypotheses about international regimes, on which both realists and institutionalists agree (Little 2011, p. 375). 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

States interact with each other in the anarchic international system. States are rational and monolithic players. States are the unit which is responsible for the formation of regimes. Regimes are established based on mutual cooperation in the international system. Regimes promote international orders.

These major hypotheses of regime theory were established in the twentieth century. However, from then on, many other transnational actors, such as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs), and epistemic community (which refers to the group of scholars), have grown as pivotal players in the world politics along with the globalization (Duffield 2001; Edwards and Gaventa 2001; Kahler 2009). Even some studies (Latour 1987; Kim 2011a) applied Actor–Network Theory (ANT) and suggested that the technologies also operate as a key actor in the world politics. That is to say, states are not the only actors in the world politics, and the international system has evolved into a more sophisticated system, which is unwieldy to be dealt with the only international political approaches. Given the rise of the transnational actors, the “states” in the hypotheses (1) and (2) would rather be understood as signifying state governments. This would facilitate explaining the presence of transnational actors, for it does not reckon the state per se as a unified actor (Willetts 2011, p. 413). On the contrast, the international regimes still thrive. Then how could this be explained? First, path dependence could be one of the conceivable answers (Keohane 1984). When the international regimes were established, states legalized themselves to be the sole formal actors in those regimes. Even if the whole international system has transformed into more complicated ways, the dominant status of states inside the regime is still maintained by the inertia. Other transnational actors could merely have indirect clout on the decisions of regimes by lobbying or acting as facilitators. Thus, the states are the only de facto actors inside the international regimes. Page 2 of 20

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Second, the regimes now simultaneously operate as a contrivance for states to preserve their vested rights against transnational actors. By monopolizing the role of decision-making, they conserve the status as the most authoritative actors in the regimes. Especially, given the fact that environment is a common-pool resource managed perfectly by states and that states retain the best capability to protect the environment (Barry and Eckersley 2005), the leverage of states in the international climate change regime is inapproachable. Due to this vantage of states, other transnational actors would hardly dominate the state (Shaw 2000). This disjunction between the systems in and out of the regime could be easily explained by the metaphor of castle in Fig. 1. States have built a castle called international regime and maintain their ascendancy by disrupting other transnational actors’ foray to directly participate in decision-making, with the wall of international regime. Understandably, states not only act inside the regime but also actively interact with other actors outside the regime. Thus, inside the regimes do states retain the clout, and the anarchic system persists. This implies that employing game theoretical approaches, which has been applied by the institutionalism, is still valid in analyzing the international regimes. This chapter employs a few elementary game theories: prisoner’s dilemma and stag hunt. First of all, the author would briefly explain what game theory is. Game theory could be defined as “the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decisionmakers” (Myerson 1991, p. 1). The components of game theory often considered to be essential are players, actions, information, iteration, and payoffs. Players are literally the actors of the game, the people, or parties participating in it. Actions are options that players could choose during the game, which is often divided into two, cooperation (C) and defection (D). Information provided for players before the game decides whether the game is perfect, which means the player knows what the other would choose if they choose a given action, and complete, which implies one knows the characteristics or strategies of the other. Iteration is about whether the game is repeated or merely one off. Payoffs are the results, which could be either benefits or damages, one receives from the game, depending on what himself/herself and the other chose (Kim 2013).

International Political

Local Governments

Approach Other Transnational Actors

State Governments

International State Governments

Regime = Castle

TNCs

Epistemic Communities

INGOs

Network-archical Approach

Fig. 1 The metaphor of castle

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Prisoner’s dilemma has been thoroughly particularized in the field of environmental economics to account for climate change negotiations (Barrett 2003; Decanio and Fremstad 2013; Finus 2001; Wood 2010). On the contrary, few have attempted to exploit the payoff structure of stag hunt (Endres and Ohl 2002). Game theories are expected to analyze what the real model of international regimes is and find out why current regime is insufficient for sustaining cooperation although some criticisms against adopting the model of Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma exist (Harrison 1983). Also, to elucidate the structure of the regimes more realistically and contain the oversimplification induced by the game theory (Haggard and Simmons 1987), this chapter employs a network theory in discussing some complex aspects of international regimes. Network theory, more precisely social network theory (SNT), is the theory essentially developed in the field of sociology, which is to systematically analyze relationships between individuals. In dealing with the interactions between transnational actors outside the regimes, this chapter fully adopts network-archical approaches. Current world system is continuously transforming and restructuring through the polymorphous activities of transnational actors. Network theory is congenial to discuss this dynamic system, for it focuses on the interactions between actors and the structure itself and makes it possible to analyze relationships in various levels (Maoz 2010). Also a few studies have successfully employed the network theory to methodically apprehend the international environmental issues (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004). In specific, this chapter employs the perspective of SNT. Through social network analysis (SNA), which has recently been used in the field of sociology to analyze the social network between people by using software such as Ucinet 6.504 and NetDraw 2.137, this chapter tries to analyze the dynamic world politics related to climate change, finding some solutions to make effective resolutions in climate change regimes. This chapter also analyzes the relationship between actors with Ucinet 6.504 and NetDraw 2.137, acknowledging its efficacy verified in some studies (Kim 2011b). Still the author recognizes that the results from SNA could not be absolute, since the analysis of network through SNA is essentially rooted in the researcher’s observation (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). This chapter opts for UNFCCC as a subject matter, as “the UNFCCC continues to play an umbrella role and provides the framework for a number of essential functions, including serving as a legal setting, providing information, and constituting a forum for negotiations” (Keohane and Victor 2010, p. 21).

The Payoff Structure of Current UNFCCC: Prisoner’s Dilemma Ostensibly, UNFCCC seems to be an effective international regime, as it provides and contrives many methods to manage climate change. However, the total amount of emitted GHG has rather increased. This obvious growth of GHG emission negatives the efficiency of UNFCCC. Then, to figure out why current UNFCCC is of little efficacy, the structure of UNFCCC should be analyzed thoroughly. Thus, this chapter systematically analyzes it mainly harnessing the game theory, with supplementing some points through network theoretical approach.

Players The total number of states currently (2013. 12.) participating in COP is 194. It seems at a glance that analyzing with N-person (N > 2) game theory is congruent, as the number of states is more than 2. However, every single state has diverse interests and objectives, due to the significant variances in the international relationship, impact of climate change that states confront, and energy reserve, etc. Due to this divergence of each state’s goal, analyzing the game of UNFCCC with N-person Page 4 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_117-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 2 Two-person game network of parties in UNFCCC

Fig. 3 Coalition building in UNFCCC

game would not be appropriate. N-person game might exceedingly simplify the intricate relationship of parties’ interests. Rather, it is desirable to grasp the game of UNFCCC as a complex of 2-person games, which is associated with various interests of states. Given states forge linkages with others through the games, the complex could be represented as a complicated network in Fig. 2. After establishing this network with each other, states discerned that there are some kindred states whose opinions are similar to themselves. As a result, through many times of UNFCCC meetings, states have gradually established coalitions (Shin 2011) as shown in Fig. 3. The classification of the coalitions is majorly based on the standard stated in the UNFCCC homepage (UNFCCC n.d.). Those coalitions have been the de facto players in the COP. Brief recitation for key stances of each group is stated below. Page 5 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_117-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 100 Total OPEC

%

74.3%

80 60 40

Venezuela

UAE

Saudi Arabia

Qatar

Nigeria

Libya

Kuwait

Iraq

Iran

Indonesia

Ecuador

Angola

0

Algeria

20

Fig. 4 OPEC member countries’ dependence on fossil fuel export in 2008 (Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010). *Vertical axis: fossil fuel export-to-total export ratio (%)

LDC (Least Developed Countries) LDC is a group of nations designated by the United Nations as the most impoverished countries. They are indebted to many developed nations, and those debts are unaffordable. Due to their chronic poverty, they are susceptible to the climate change impacts. Especially, as most of them are located near the equator or deserts, where natural disasters frequently strike, their capacity of climate change adaptation is significantly weak.

OPEC + Petroleum-Exporting Countries (More Than 100,000 bbl/day) OPEC member countries mainly assert that if states are to regulate the quantity of oil usage to dwindle GHG emission, their economy would be severely damaged. They also have pressed for compensation for the reduction in using petroleum and intentionally disturbed the passage of effective resolutions. Rather, they are more interested in developing clean technologies and carbon capture and storage technologies. Since their major exporting items are crude oil and associated by-products, the chance of their converting stance is scarce (Fig. 4). Huge petroleum exporting countries are also prudent in agreeing on GHG emission reduction, since exporting an oil has been a major source of their incomes. However, as they retain other industries to substitute it or they exert themselves to expand other industries, their opposition to GHG emission reduction is not so serious as that of OPEC member nations.

Developing Economies Developing economies are represented by China and India. These two mogul states recently give an eye to environmentally friendly industries, including alternative energies. They traditionally stressed the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR), which is to induce more active supports of developed nations for their sustainable development.

AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States) Small island states are in the peril of losing territory and even their whole countries, due to the global warming and consequent rise of sea level. They desperately need the international cooperation to protect their living foundation. Unless the situation hectoring their right to live is completely

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_117-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

ameliorated, their stance would be immutable. They clamor for the responsible and effective actions from the whole states to restrain GHG emissions.

EIG (Environmental Integrity Group) EIG is a group of middle power countries, which are not incorporated in other groups, such as Mexico, Korea (Rep. of), and Switzerland. They aim to mediate between developed nations and developing nations, partially to make constructive plans to manage climate change and partially to hold a leadership in the climate change regime. One of their most remarkable achievements was the establishment of NAMA (Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions) Registry, suggested by Korea. It was to encourage the GHG emission reduction and sustainable development of developing economies, by letting them voluntarily construct the mitigation projects and providing the support of developed nations depending on their efforts.

EU (Europe Union) EU has long been the leading group in the climate change regime. They have acknowledged their own responsibility for climate change and tried to make effective results to mitigate climate change. However, although EU has achieved notable strides in the negotiation, some express concerns on the future of EU’s leadership (Obert€ ur and Kelly 2008). Also, lately, the emission trade market of EU has significantly declined both in its size and influence.

Umbrella Group The Umbrella Group is not a cohesive coalition built with strong fellowship or common interests. Component states, such as the USA, Japan, and Russian Federation, separately try to take the hegemony in the climate change regime. Also, some states constituting this group, such as the Russian Federation, Canada, and New Zealand, are expected to favor with the climate change later (Globalagriculture 2012). This is part of the reason they are not proactive in GHG reduction emission and climate change mitigation.

Synthesis As UNFCCC majorly pursues climate change mitigation through restricting GHG emissions, players have bickered mostly about whom and how to reduce GHG emissions. It could be called a GHG Emission Reduction Game. From now on, this chapter concentrates on this game of UNFCCC. It is the only game that the entire players participate in and could be measured as twenty-one dissimilar 2-person games between coalition groups. The comprehensive frame concerning these twenty-one games is a North–South problem. Thus, the discussion on GHG Emission Reduction Game in this chapter would essentially focus on the altercations related to the North–South problem. This provokes the serious opposition between Developing Economies, LDC, and EU, Umbrella Group. In most conflicts in UNFCCC until now, EU has mediated through its own concession, following the principle of CBDR. This has been the staunch ground for the legitimacy of EU holding the leadership. Considering the current status of UNFCCC, Fig. 5 shows the game network between coalitions. The relationship between coalitions this chapter discusses is restricted to the climate change issues. For instance, although OPEC and EU are in conflict on climate change issues, they could cooperate in other fields such as economy or security.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_117-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 5 Network of GHG emission reduction game

Information UNFCCC is fundamentally an international regime, and thus it curtails the transaction cost and asymmetry of information among nations (Keohane 1984). In doing so, information about one state’s climate change policies or favored strategies would have been apprehended by other states. As the nations have communicated with each other at the UNFCCC for 19 times until now, they definitely have understood and accumulated empirical information about other countries’ policy preference. In this case, the game could be categorized into perfect and complete information game.

Iteration An international climate change problem accompanies irreversible damage, which could not be perfectly restored. Although its major agenda could be changed as time moves on, UNFCCC would not be easily disbanded. This implies that the game of UNFCCC would be iterated infinitely, unless the other apparatus is seriously needed. In specific, considering the role of UNFCCC and COP, two phases are infinitely repeated during the process of the GHG Emission Reduction Game: phase (1) planning (setting GHG emission reduction goals such as predicted amount of reduction, deadline for achieving the reduction goals, etc.) and phase (2) practicing (implementing actual policies for fulfilling the planned goals such as emission trading or carbon tax, etc.). If the players fail to build an effective and realistic plan, players would renegotiate about the plan and redeem it. In this case, the game could not proceed to the next phase, and keeps abiding on the phase 1. During the procrastination in making effective plans, states often take quite extemporaneous or perfunctory measures. If the players successfully devise an effective and realistic plan, they proceed to the next phase, fulfilling the promise stipulated in the resolutions. This cycle of phase 1 and 2 would indefinitely ingeminate as climate change problem could not be perfectly resolved. Figure 6 shows the iteration of two phases and what exactly sustaining the cooperation means. Sustaining the cooperation means the situation where players keep choosing C and endeavoring to cope with the climate change. The mutual cooperation should sequentially occur in phase 1 and 2 to consummate the whole process with efficacy.

Actions Actions that players could choose in the game theory are comprehensively classified into cooperate (C) and defect (D). In the GHG Emission Reduction Game of UNFCCC, C is to cooperate for managing the climate change problem and D is to neglect the indispensability of managing the climate change, implementing makeshift policies. In specific, international cooperation connotes Page 8 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_117-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 6 Iteration model of UNFCCC game

Table 1 Results of choosing C and D in each phase of GHG emission reduction game C D

Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2

Producing an effective and realistic mitigation/adaptation plan Making an effective and realistic efforts to fulfill the plan Exercising a veto on an effective and realistic plan or producing an abstract and perfunctory plan Neglecting the duty stipulated in the plan or implementing perfunctory countermeasures for the plan

that every player in the game yields their self-interest to some extent, which is usually economic interests. States which choose to cooperate should bear the burden of managing the global commonpool resource. Therefore, strictly speaking, agreements made by one player’s unilateral concession could not be called as a result of international cooperation. Table 1 shows the results of choosing C and D in each phase.

Outcome and Payoff Given the characteristic of climate as a common-pool resource, theoretically players could secure the biggest interest when they unilaterally defect (DC) in the GHG Emission Reduction Game. In this case, the player who defected could obtain profit from economically developing and receiving boons from another player’s effort of protecting the environment. This is called a free riding, which could generate social dilemma of inequity (Olson 1971). And these egoistic behaviors result in the tragedy of commons, which is consequently prejudicial to everyone (Hardin 1968). When putting climate into the category of national interest, it could fall under the purview of longterm interest. The profit states could acquire from mitigating the climate change is not quantitatively measurable in a short period of time. This characteristic of the climate as an economic good would be referential to the concept of the shadow of the future (Oye 1986) in the game theory. For nations to value the climate change issues more than now they do, the shadow of the future for managing climate change problems has to be lengthened.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_117-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 2 Payoff structure of prisoner’s dilemma C D

C 3,3 5,0

D 0,5 1,1

Next-best payoff could be achieved by mutual cooperation (CC). To cooperate with each other, players have to abandon some of their short-term interests by investing in the long-term interest. In doing so, players could effectively cope with climate change and guarantee a secure future. Third-best choice is mutual defection (DD). By defecting each other, players could strive to economy or national security issues. However, the time keeps moving on and the quantity of irreversible damage would be swelled apace. This possibly would provide short-term benefits of economic development or advanced security which players value the most, but the natural environment would cause grave problems in the near future. The worst payoff for players is the case of CD, achieved by unilateral cooperation. In this case, the player who chose C turns out to have beaten the air. However much effort the player made to manage climate change, the other player would keep emitting GHG, resulting in the efforts of the player who chose C become profitless. Therefore, the preference ordering of the game is DC > CC > DD > CD. This implies that the payoff structure could be best explained by prisoner’s dilemma. Table 2 is the generic payoff structure of prisoner’s dilemma. The numbers in Table 2 are not used to signify specific features, but to simply represent the relative size of payoffs.

Synthesizing Aspects of the Game When aggregating all the aspects mentioned above, the payoff structure of the GHG Emission Reduction Game is infinitely iterated 2-person prisoner’s dilemma. In the most cases of prisoner’s dilemma (PD), the payoff results in DD. This is because a rational player chooses D, for D is a strictly dominant strategy, which could provide the highest payoff to the player. Also, it is a common knowledge that the other player is also rational and would choose D. Considering this, DD becomes the dominance solvable, as it is the only rationalizable strategy. Here the Nash equilibrium, the payoff with no incentive for both players to change their actions (C or D) and reached by the best response to the other player’s choice (Nash 1951), is established in DD. Thus, repeated PD itself has a characteristic of terminating in infinite DD (Kim 2013). If the situation of DD is iterated in aeternum, what would happen to the game network? To answer this question, this chapter applies the concept of closeness, which is one of the most representatively exploited concepts when examining the centrality of nodes in the social network theory (Freeman 1979). Closeness is about the distance between the nodes. The concept of closeness is often restricted to the physical distance when analyzing the structure of societies. However, the distance between actors could also represent the psychological distance in the game network of UNFCCC, for players decide to choose C or D by anticipating what the other player would choose in the iterated game, and that process of determining is a mental work, where reputation becomes of importance (Mailath and Samuelson 2006). If players keep choosing D, the distance between them might be elongated. The GHG Emission Reduction Game would end in the dissolution of linkages between players in conflict and debilitation of linkages between players once negotiated as represented in Fig. 7 (conflict: blank, negotiate: dotted, cooperate: solid). As shown in the Fig. 7, the cohesive game network would become a loose network with many structural holes. Through 19 regular meetings of COP, the network between coalition groups has

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_117-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 7 The dissolution of network between coalitions in GHG emission reduction game

been metamorphosing into the type in Fig. 7. Although states periodically congregate to take measures against climate change, they are mostly disappointed with each other and merely pursue their own interests. If the entire game network were to be imploded in the end, the climate change regime per se would also become obsolete. Thus, in order to make effective and realistic measures, it is crucial to end the iteration of DD (in the game theoretical approach), which means to bridge the structural holes (in the network theoretical approach). In the next section, this chapter examines the possibility of ending an iterated DD by using tit-for-tat strategy in the PD of the GHG Emission Reduction Game.

Sustaining International Cooperation with Tit-For-Tat Strategy: Is It Possible? Tit-For-Tat Strategy

Tit-for-tat (TFT) first received a widespread attention after having been introduced in The Evolution of Cooperation (Axelrod 2006). TFT program constructed by Anatol Rapoport won the first place in the computer tournament Axelrod held. TFT first chose C and then follows what the other player chose at the previous period. TFT never scored better than others in the specific period of game, as it allows them to defect. However, TFT induced other players to pursue mutual cooperation by letting them perceive the game to be nonzero sum, and as a result, it became a winner in the end. From the success of TFT, Axelrod (2006) suggests players practice “reciprocity” (pp 136–139). By maintaining the equipoise between the cooperation and retaliation phase, and never defecting first, the simplest strategy of TFT could promote the possibility of mutual cooperation (CC). Acknowledging that TFT is the best to promote cooperation in PD, this chapter examines what the result would be when (1) one player (unilateral) and (2) both players use (bilateral) TFT strategy in the game of climate change.

Limitations of Using TFT Strategy It is undoubtedly explicit that TFT generates CC better than any other strategy in PD. However, when a player unilaterally uses TFT strategy, it also has a limitation. Axelrod (2006) also states, “The trouble with TIT FOR TAT is that once a feud gets started, it can continue indefinitely” (p. 138). This Page 11 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_117-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 8 TFT versus nasty strategy – perpetuated defection

Fig. 9 TFT versus alternation – iteration of CD and DC

is a significant disadvantage of TFT in dealing with climate change, now that it would be laborious to sustain international cooperation by using TFT strategy. First, this chapter takes cases where player 1 uses TFT and player 2 uses (1) nasty and (2) alternation strategy to illustrate the possible quandary induced by the unilateral TFT strategy. Nasty strategy is to choose D for every period of the iterated game. In this case, feud might be perpetuated, since TFT would follow D which nasty always chooses. By doing so, coalition groups could not achieve any further cooperation. Rather, the situation ends with the unremitting DD, which means that the players immerse themselves in managing their short-term benefits, especially the economic development (Fig. 8). Next, alternation strategy is to choose C at the odd number period and choose D at the even number period. In this case, using TFT would result in the endless iteration of CD and DC. The revealing point is that player 1 always cooperates in an even number phase (except for CC at the first period) and player 2 always cooperates in an odd number phase. As players both choose C in the first period, they could draw a specific resolution. However, in the next period, which is phase 2 (practicing), player 2 chose D, neglecting the duties stipulated in the agreed resolution. To punish this negligence, player 1 chose D in the third period, which is again phase 1 (planning). By doing so, players could not set specific goals of effectively responding to climate change. Then again player 2 and player 1 alternately defect each other. This would not induce effective and realistic measures against climate change (incurring infinitely iterated phase 1) and the mutual cooperation would never be achieved. Eventually, this would end in the perpetuated DD. Rational players would realize it is not of assistance to choose C in case where the other player would certainly choose D. In other words, there is no incentive for players to choose C in the iterated CD and DC. Thus, a rational player would forsake choosing C and adopt the nasty strategy (Fig. 9). During the successive vicious cycle of defection, the quantity of irreversible damage would uprise as time goes by. If players do not cooperate until the quantity of irreversible damage reaches the point where climate change catastrophe would inevitably occur, there would be no alternative to manage the problem. Understandably, by adopting some strategies such as nice strategy (always choose C), CC could be achieved in the case of unilateral TFT. However, it is a handful of exceptions, which is almost infeasible in the international world. In most cases, where players try to choose D to get more outcome, CC would not be achieved whatsoever. Adopting a unilateral TFT could not completely solve the problem of sustaining international cooperation. Second, although both players use TFT strategy, sustaining cooperation is not always practicable. To sustain CC, Nash equilibrium has to be formed in CC. In the infinitely iterated game, how much the players value the shadow of the future is to be analyzed. To measure the shadow of the future, the value of future payoff should be converted into the value of current payoff. The average of converted

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_117-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 10 Evaluation of discounted average payoff

Fig. 11 TFT versus TFT after player 1 first chose D

future payoff’s value in each period is called discounted average payoff (Kim 2013). Figure 10 shows how to find the discounted average payoff. First, the discounted average payoff of choosing C (vc) when both players are using TFT strategy could be evaluated, based on the structure of PD in Table 2, as below:  
3 2 ¼ 3 vc ¼ ð1  dÞ 3 þ 3d þ 3d þ    ¼ ð1  dÞ  1d Next, to find the discounted average payoff of choosing D (vd), this chapter hypothesizes that player 1 chose D at the period t. Then player 2 would punish it by choosing D at the period (t + 1). This cycle of DC and CD will be infinitely iterated (Fig. 11). In the indefinite iteration of DC and CD, a player receives 5 in the period of DC and 0 in the period of CD. Thus, the discounted average payoff of choosing D (vd) is  
5 5 2 3 ¼ vd ¼ ð1  dÞ 5 þ 0  d þ 5d þ 0  d þ    ¼ ð1  dÞ  2 1þd 1d Last, to establish a Nash equilibrium in CC, vc should be bigger than vd (vc > vd):   5 ¼ ðd > 0:66Þ ðvc > vd Þ ¼ 3 > 1þd This implies that bilateral TFT not always maintain a mutual cooperation. Also, sustaining a CC with bilateral TFT requires players to rate the future payoff monumentally high (d > 0.66). However, realistically, long-term behoof of managing climate change problem could not be more valued than economy or national security, directly pertaining to the everyday survival of nations. Also, as the payoff from DC is bigger than that from CC, it is exacting to concern to managing long-term interests. This difficulty in recognizing the value of long-term interests makes it almost impossible to take care of the climate change problem. Page 13 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_117-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

It is an unquestionable truth that TFT could promote the possibility of cooperation. However, the game of UNFCCC is constituted of two different phases. If one of them results in DD, DC, or CD, the other phases where CC was achieved also become profitless, as phase 1 and 2 compose a uniform process of effective response to climate change.

Radical Change Is Needed The key reason TFT could not readily sustain the cooperation is that the payoff from DC (5) is bigger than from CC (3). In other words, although CC is achieved at one period, still an incentive to choose D remains mighty. Technically speaking, this is not the problem of TFT. Instead, it is an essential problem that PD has. With TFT, the payoff structure of PD could not be hypostatically ameliorated. TFT could only promote the possibility of cooperation in the iterated game. Thus, the game structure of UNFCCC needs a radical change. The radical change means the transformation between the first and second preference order as CC > DC. The most well-known structure that satisfies this condition is a stag hunt. In the next sectionhapter, this chapteraper explores the structure of stag hunt (SH) as a substitute for PD and ultimately how it could sustain the international cooperation. The analysis of SH not only takes theoretical approaches but also proposes some realistic methods to change the payoff structure from PD to SH.

Stag Hunt as an Alternative to Prisoner’s Dilemma Stag Hunt The stag hunt game structure was derived from a fable stated in A Discourse Upon the Origin and the Foundation of the Inequality Among Mankind (Rousseau 1755). Hunters are gathered to hunt a deer. Then, suddenly the hare appears near the hunters. Here, Rousseau set some conditions. A hunter could not capture a deer by oneself, for it is very fast. The possibility of successfully hunting a stag scales as the number of hunters hunting a stag increases. A hunter could readily catch a hare, regardless of what the other hunters do. However if one catches a hare, the other hunters indispensably could not catch a stag. Also, the value of a hare is less than that of a stag divided into N (the number of hunters). In this game structure two problems occur in achieving cooperation. First, the problem of uncertainty. Although all hunters cooperate to catch a deer, it is not of certainty whether the hunters could hunt it. Only the possibility of successful stag-hunting increases. This could make hunters encounter a dilemma about which to hunt. Second, the problem of mutual distrust. Hunters do not know what the others would choose to hunt. Each hunter distresses oneself about the possibility of other hunters’ catching a hare, while oneself chooses a stag. These problems become the main obstacles that make choosing to catch a stag quite risky. If at least one hunter among the hunters chooses a hare, the other players who choose a stag would gain absolutely nothing. Nevertheless, this chapter suggests to transform into infinitely iterated 2-person stag hunt. Every other factor of the payoff structure is unchanged, except for the payoffs. In this structure, the preference order of payoffs could be CC > DC > DD > CD, as a stag divided into N is more invaluable than a hare. As a result, mutual cooperation (CC) is more worthy than unilateral defection (DC). This makes a plethora of changes in the choice of players (Table 3). As the game is constantly repeated, the players (or the hunters) would to some degree discern what each other would choose at the next period. This could help resolve the problem of mutual distrust. Page 14 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_117-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 3 Payoff structure of stag hunt C D

C v,v 1,0

D 0,1 1,1

v>1

In the iterated games, rational players choose the best response to the other player’s choice. If the other player is expected to choose a stag, oneself would rather choose a stag and vice versa. There is no incentive for players to choose a stag, when the other player is choosing a hare. It would lead to the outcome of 0. In this case, the Nash equilibrium is formed in CC and DD (Skyrms 2003). This means the iterated SH could beget the sustenance of cooperation or the sustenance of defection. In addition, the iteration of game could solve the problem of uncertainty. If the mutual cooperation (CC) is eternally iterated, players could share the information and contrive improved methods to catch a stag. This could naturally diminish the uncertainty in catching a stag. However, this could be only resulted from an iteration of CC. Then among the two possible Nash equilibriums (CC and DD), which payoff would be realized? The answer could be found by employing the concept of payoff dominance and risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten 1988). Payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium refers to the Nash equilibrium which is Pareto optimal (Pareto efficient) among two or more Nash equilibriums in one payoff structure. In other words, if players choose to deviate from the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, one or more players would suffer a loss. In the SH structure, the outcome of catching a stag is always absolutely bigger than that of catching a hare (v > 1). Thus, CC is the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, and choosing C is a strictly dominant strategy, which could lead to the maximum outcome. Still, the payoff dominance does not guarantee the realization and sustenance of CC. Risk dominance should also be considered. Risk-dominant payoff is the payoff which is more worthy to take a risk for choosing than the other one. Although v > 1, if the value of v is too small (e.g., 1.0001), selecting C becomes a risky choice. It is because hunting a stag when the other player is choosing a hare could result in receiving 0, while hunting a hare always guarantees a payoff of 1 (Kim 2013). Then when could hunting a stag risk dominates hunting a hare? To answer to this question, this chapter compares the risk factor of choosing a stag and a hare. To calculate the risk factor, suppose p is the probability of the player 2 to choose a stag. Then the outcome player 1 could earn from choosing a stag (C) is p  v + (1  p)  0 ¼ pv and from choosing a hare (D) is p  1 + (1  p)  1 ¼ 1. The risk factor for choosing a stag is the value of p which makes two outcomes of catching a stag and a hare equal. It is 1/v. Also, the risk factor for D is the value of (1  p) which makes two outcomes equal. It is (v  1)/v. Last, the risk-dominant payoff is the payoff with the less risk factor. Hence, for CC to be less risky than DD, v should be 1 v1 < ) 1 < v  1 ð∵v > 1Þ ) v > 2 v v However, in fact, risk dominance problem is not a big obstacle in sustaining cooperation in the iterated game. In the repeated game, the best response is to choose what the other player frequently selects. In this case, the dilemma of risk dominance is naturally diminished, since what the other player would choose becomes obvious as time goes by. Also, due to the payoff dominance of choosing a stag, the possibility of rational players’ choosing a stag is far higher than choosing a hare. Hence, if players rationally seek for a bigger payoff and choose C, the situation of CC would be

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_117-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

achieved. Then, players would keep choosing C through the iteration process, for they could predict that the other player would also choose C. At this point, due to the iteration, the problem of mutual distrust and the risk dominance becomes nothing to consider. As the payoff of CC is bigger than DC, there is no incentive for rational players to choose D when cooperation is on the way. This is the supremacy of the SH structure per se against the PD. In the PD structure, although a mutual cooperation is achieved, an incentive to defect always presents. If the payoff earned from the mutual cooperation is the biggest, rational players would not try to defect. Therefore, the solution to sustaining international cooperation is a transformation of the payoff structure from PD to SH.

How to Change Into SH Changing a payoff structure means to change the value of payoffs which comprise the structure. A transformation from PD to SH requires a change in the ordering between CC and DC. In other words, (1) the benefit received from choosing C should be increased or (2) the disadvantage received from choosing D should be strengthened. However, strengthening the disadvantage of defection is treacherous. International climate change regimes, including UNFCCC, have a binding power, while they do not hold a coercive power. Even if UNFCCC could warn the parties which neglect their duties, it is mostly restricted to psychological burdens and a little amount of taint on their escutcheons. Especially, as most states themselves do not zealously endeavor to manage climate change, they seldom castigate other nations’ negligence. In this circumstance, reinforcing an economic sanction against states which choose defection could even make states resign from the UNFCCC. Realistically, it is also difficult to increase the absolute payoff of cooperation in the game. The cooperation in this case means to put national interests little aside and concern about global public interests. However, in the real world, the absolute value of protecting the environment could not be higher than that of the daily livelihood. The absolute benefit associated with daily living is more material to state governments than that of global public interests. States would hardly value the environment higher than the economy and national security, unless the quantity of irreversible damage crosses the Rubicon. At this point, game theoretical approach could not give us a clear solution. As an alternative, this chapter employs the network theory. The iteration of DD in PD means the formation of structural holes in the network theory. Likewise, the change into SH, which encourages CC, could be interpreted as filling in the structural holes in the network theory. However, all coalition players of the UNFCCC game pursue their own interests, and those rational players do not have any incentive to bridge the structural holes to sustain the cooperation. Therefore, an adequate actor could not be found in the level of coalition groups, and instead it would be discovered from the level of discrete state governments constituting the coalitions. Still, some incentive should be provided for each state to take mediating roles. The incentive for the states could be the leadership. Currently, it is of certainty that some states in coalition groups, such as EU, Umbrella Group, EIG, and Developing Economies, vie for the initiative in UNFCCC so as to improve their soft power (Shin 2011). However, as they already belong to one coalition group, they inevitably reflect the major stances of the groups they belong to. The exceptions are the states of Umbrella Group, which is somewhat loose. However, it is doubtful that they could truly arbitrate between different opinions from, generally, developed nations and developing nations, for they have not experienced the circumstances of developing countries.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_117-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

This implies that regrouping is necessary so as to forge a new group of countries that could mediate between the existing groups. Some middle power countries scattered in each group would be suitable for building a new coalition group and interceding between other groups. Some studies maintain that middle powers are “more responsive to humanitarian values than most, particularly larger states” (Black and Smith 1993, p. 763) and they have played a role as a mediator for a long time in other fields (Holmes 1965). In specific, the new group should consist of middle power, which underwent the experience of being a developing country. Middle power countries which are still classified as developing nations by IMF would not be appropriate, since they could not comprehend the stance of developed nations. Additionally, to ensure the active intercession with unwavering objective, the states’ economy should not resort heavily to producing or exporting fossil fuels. Some representative states that satisfy these all conditions are Singapore and Korea (Rep. of) from the Four Asian Tigers, and Czech Republic from countries recently joined EU. The appellation of the group that binds them into one could be called post-developing countries. This is to emphasize the distinct characteristic these countries have, the transition from developing nation to developed nation. The only problem left is that the post-developing countries do not have enough political leverage to play a role as a connector, who reconstructs the broken linkages in the same level of network. Some studies suggest that middle powers have to obtain support from other international actors to take international leadership (Yamasaki 2009). Thus, given that post-developing countries are originally categorized as middle powers, it would be helpful for them to tighten solidarity with transnational actors, such as INGOs, local governments, and epistemic communities, by working as a translator. Especially as INGOs per se have a form of transnational advocacy network (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and local governments have established their own network called ICLEI, postdeveloping countries could create a cohesive synergy effect when forming a network with those networked actors. Moreover, INGOs or epistemic communities could provide eclectic policy options that could embrace the opinions of multiple coalitions (Raustiala 1997) for the postdeveloping countries. Translator links the nodes in the different levels, conveys the flow of meaning, and makes the meaning compatible so that the nodes could assimilate it (Kim 2011a). By operating as a translator connecting the transnational actors outside the regime to the state governments inside the regime, the post-developing countries could hold a high degree centrality and betweenness centrality (Freeman 1979), as shown in the Fig. 12.

Fig. 12 Post-developing countries as a connector and translator Page 17 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_117-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Through this process, the post-developing countries group is expected to consolidate the leverage in the UNFCCC and ultimately act as a catalyst for sustaining the cooperation among states. Then the regime would operate more effectively and the transnational actors would more dynamically and actively participate in the regime.

Conclusion This chapter started with raising three major questions and endeavored to find the answers. By applying the game theory and network theory, and sectionalizing the international system into in and out of the regime, this chapter was able to find to some extent realistic answers. 1. Why international regimes are still the crucial tool to manage climate change, in the more dynamically changed world system? States have path dependence on the regimes, and they effectively harness regimes to maintain their ascendancy in the international world. This results in the rearing up of transnational actors outside the regime, and the state’s insistent dominance inside the regime. 2. Why does the cooperation achieved in the period of resolution-making hardly sustain to the period of each state’s practicing policies? According to the game theoretical analysis, the payoff structure of games constituting the 2person game network of UNFCCC is PD. Due to the intrinsic-inferiority of the PD in sustaining the cooperation, the game of UNFCCC has gotten bogged in a quagmire of ethereal DD, which means creation of structural holes in the network theory. 3. How could the international cooperation achieved by international regime sustain for a long period, without any state’s defection? As the best strategy of TFT could not essentially solve the problem of PD, the radical change into intrinsically superior SH is needed, by filling in the structural holes. The role of doing so could be performed by the post-developing countries, through operating as a connector in the regime and translator out of the regime and establishing a staunch network. Some studies (Kim 2010; Ha and Kim 2010) argue that the rise of transnational actors would lead to the power shift or power transformation in the international system. However, the analysis on the international regime verifies that the states still own a castle that could protect their dominance. Thus, power shift would hardly occur until at least the near future, and rather the expected change could be called a power division among international actors. Furthermore, as regimes are expected to continuously operate as a critical instrument in managing climate change, sustaining cooperation with the method suggested by this chapter might be of importance. Some states or coalition groups trying to take the initiative might hamper the process of strengthening the position of post-developing countries. Thus, the ultimate success of this network depends on how astute the post-developing countries perform the task as a connector and translator. This chapter would leave it as a subject for future studies.

References English Axelrod R (2006) The evolution of cooperation, Rev. edn. Basic Books, New York

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Barrett S (2003) Environment and statecraft: the strategy of environmental treaty making. Oxford University Press, Oxford Barry J, Eckersley R (eds) (2005) The state and the global ecological crisis. MIT Press, Cambridge Betsill MM, Bulkeley H (2004) Transnational networks and global environmental governance: the cities for climate protection program. Int Stud Q 48(2):471–493 Black DR, Smith HA (1993) Notable exceptions? Can J Politi Sci 26(4):745–774 DeCanio SJ, Fremstad A (2013) Game theory and climate diplomacy. Ecol Econ 85(c):177–187 Duffield M (2001) Global governance and the new wars. Zed, London Edwards M, Gaventa J (2001) Global citizen actions: lessons and challenges. LynneRienner, Boulder Endres A, Ohl C (2002) Introducing “cooperative push”: how inefficient environmental policy (sometimes!) protects the global commons better. Public Choice 111(3):285–302 Finus M (2001) Game theory and international environmental cooperation. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Freeman LC (1979) Centrality in social networks: conceptual clarification. Soc Netw 1:215–239 Global agriculture (2012) Adaptation to climate change. http://www.globalagriculture.org/reporttopics/adaptation-to-climate-change.html. Accessed 19 Jan 2014 Haggard S, Simmons BA (1987) Theories of international regimes. Int Organ 41(3):491–517 Hanneman RA, Riddle M (2005) Introduction to social network methods. University of California, Riverside Hardin G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science 162(3859):1243–1248 Harrison WR (1983) The theory of games and the problem of international cooperation. Am Polit Sci Rev 77(2):330–346 Harsanyi JC, Selten R (1988) A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. MIT Press, Cambridge Holmes JW (1965) Is there a future for middlepowermanship? In: Gordon JK (ed) Canada’s role as a middle power. Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, pp 13–38 Kahler M (2009) Networked politics: agency, power, and governance. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Keck ME, Sikkink K (1998) Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks in international politics. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Keohane RO (1984) After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton University Press, Princeton Keohane RO, Victor DG (2010) The regime complex for climate change. Perspect Polit 9(1):7–24 Krasner SD (1982) Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables. Int Organ 36(2):185–205 Latour B (1987) Science in action: how to follow scientists and engineers through society. Open University Press, Milton Keynes Mailath GJ, Samuelson L (2006) Repeated game and reputations: long run relationship. Oxford University Press, Oxford Maoz Z (2010) Network of nations: the evolution, structure, and impact of international networks. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Myerson RB (1991) Game theory: analysis of conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Nash JF (1951) Non-cooperative games. Ann Math 54(2):286–295 Obert€ ur S, Kelly CR (2008) EU leadership in international climate policy: achievements and challenges. Int Spect: Ital J Int Aff 43(3):35–50

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Olson M (1971) The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups, Rev. edn. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Oye KA (ed) (1986) Cooperation under anarchy. Princeton University Press, Chichester Raustiala K (1997) States, NGOs, and international environmental institutions. Int Stud Q 41(4):719–740 Shaw M (2000) Theory of the global state: globality as unfinished revolution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Skyrms B (2003) The stag hunt and the evolution of social structure. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (n.d.) Party groupings. http://unfccc.int/ parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/items/2714.php. Accessed 19 Jan 2014 Voorhar R, Myllyvirta L (2013) Point of no return: the massive climate threats we must avoid. http:// www.greenpeace.org/international/en/publications/Campaign-reports/Climate-Reports/Point-ofNo-Return/. Accessed 22 Dec 2013 Wood PJ (2010) Climate change and game theory. Research report no 62. Environmental Economics Research Hub, Australian National University Yamasaki M (2009) A study of middle power diplomacy: as a strategy of leadership and influence. MA dissertation, University of Waterloo Young OR (1989) International cooperation: building regimes for natural resources and the environment. Cornell University Press, Ithaca

Korean Ha YS, Kim SB (eds) (2010) World politics of networks: from metaphor to analysis. Seoul National University Press, Seoul Kim SB (2010) Information revolution and power transformation. Hanul, Seoul Kim SB (ed) (2011a) Weaving a spider web and building a bee’s nest. Hanul, Seoul Kim YH (2011b) Social network analysis, 3rd edn. Parkyoungsa, Seoul Kim YS (2013) Game theory: economics of strategy and information, 6th edn. Parkyoungsa, Seoul Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010) OPEC outlook. http://www.mofa.go.kr/trade/economy/ issue/index.jsp?mofat¼001&menu¼m_30_160_20&sp¼/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/ korboardread.jsp%3FtypeID¼6%26boardid¼185%26tableName¼TYPE_DATABOARD% 26seqno¼332621. Accessed 22 Dec 2013 Little R (2011) International regime. In: Baylis J, Smith S, Owens P (ed) The globalization of world politics, 5th edn (trans: Jeon JS). Eulyoo Publishing, Seoul, pp 375–389 Rousseau JJ (1755) A discourse upon the origin and the foundation of the inequality among mankind (trans: Kim JH). Penguin Classic Korea, Seoul Shin BS (2011) Post-crisis global order and international politics of environment: the present and future of the climate change response system. In: Ha YS (ed) Crisis and complexity. EAI, Seoul, pp 227–260 Willetts P (2011) Transnational actors and international organizations in the global politics. In: Baylis J, Smith S, Owens P (ed) The globalization of world politics, 5th edn (trans: Nam-gung G). Eulyoo Publishing, Seoul, pp 412–431

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Guiding Regional Climate Adaptation in Coastal Areas Helge Bormanna*, Rob van der Krogtb, Leo Adriaansec, Frank Ahlhornd, Ruben Akkermanse, Yvonne AnderssonSköldf, Chris Gerrardg, Nelie Houtekamerh, Ger de Langei, Anders Norrbyj, Niels van Oostromi and Renaat De Sutterk a Department of Civil Engineering, University of Siegen, Siegen, Germany b TNO, Utrecht, The Netherlands c Rijkswaterstaat, Middelburg, The Netherlands d K€ uste & Raum, Varel, Germany e Province of Zeeland, Middelburg, The Netherlands f COWI, Göteborg, Sweden g Anglian Water, Huntingdon, UK h Houtekamer & Van Kleef, Veere, The Netherlands i Deltares, Utrecht, The Netherlands j Arvika Kommun, Arvika, Sweden k Gent University, Gent, Belgium

Abstract Global climate change will have significant impacts on natural systems and human societies throughout the world. Therefore, climate adaptation strategies need to be developed at multiple scales. The Interreg IVB project “Climate Proof Areas” (CPA) has focused on climate adaptation at a regional scale in twelve pilot areas across four North Sea countries. It showed that the regional scale provides challenging opportunities of cross-sectoral climate adaptation. This paper gives an overview of experiences from the CPA pilot studies and embeds these in a generic approach for regional climate adaptation. Attention is paid to typical issues of coastal regions: water management, coastal protection, freshwater supply, land use, and spatial planning. Based on typical challenges of climate adaptation such as low sense of urgency, high degree of uncertainty regarding future development, and decision-making on a long term, a number of illustrative components are discussed which can contribute to the guidance of regional climate adaptation. These components cover different themes including communication issues, physical solutions, knowledge, and process-oriented approaches and result in a so-called adaptation toolkit. Finally we draw conclusions and derive recommendations about how certain approaches and policies at different levels can contribute to successful regional climate adaptation in coastal areas.

Keywords Climate change adaptation; Regional scale; Pilot studies; Adaptation toolkit; Policy recommendations

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_118-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Introduction Climate change is one of the key challenges in recent environmental and societal research and studies on sustainable development. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated that global warming has accelerated significantly in the second half of the twentieth century and that humans have caused the dominant part of global warming (IPCC 2013). The envelopes of reasonable climate scenarios project further global warming until the end of the twenty-first century. Even if greenhouse gas concentrations will not increase from the level reached in year 2000, global mean temperature will continue to rise by approximately 0.1
C per decade during the twenty-first century due to delayed response of slow components in the climate system (van den Hurk and Jacob 2009). For the North Sea region, in addition to rising temperatures and sea levels, an increasing rainfall variability is expected which is likely to cause droughts as well as flood events in the future (IPCC 2013; Verhofstede et al. 2011). Therefore proactive strategies are required to react to future climate change. Based on these commonly accepted facts, science and society are debating on how to react to climate change. Two main complementary strategies are basically agreed on: (1) to mitigate future climate change, e.g., by reducing the emission of greenhouse gases and (2) to adapt to those changes which cannot be mitigated. While mitigation needs to be implemented on a global scale, adaptation to climate change is a local to regional scale issue (F€ ussel 2007). Independently of the effectiveness of future mitigation, adaptation to climate change is necessary if such climate change exceeds current climate variability. Adaptation to climate change, therefore, has raised public interest in recent years, mainly driven by climate-related disasters (F€ ussel 2007; Krysanova et al. 2010). As a consequence, preliminary national frameworks have been established towards the development of national adaptation strategies (e.g., for Germany: Bundesregierung 2008). Due to the increasing relevance of adaptation to climate change, the scientific community as well as the government has paid more attention to this issue in recent years. General concepts and approaches for adaptive planning were introduced (e.g., F€ ussel 2007) and analyzed with regard to regional possibilities for and limitations of climate change adaptation (e.g., Kabat et al. 2005; de Bruin et al. 2009). Adaptation strategies were compared among different regions and river basins (e.g., Krysanova et al. 2010) as well as their recent status in adaptation planning (e.g., Huntjens et al. 2010). Most studies agreed that adaptation needs to be at a regional scale (e.g., Wesselink et al. 2009) and consider different issues (de Bruin et al. 2009; Veraart et al. 2010) such as nature protection, agriculture, economic development, and water management. Water management is of particular importance in coastal environments (Woltjer and Al 2007; Wesselink et al. 2009; Veraart et al. 2010). Nevertheless the question remains still open how to organize such an adaptation process at the regional scale. Considering the importance of water management in coastal environments, climate adaptation is required to be in accordance with the European Water Framework Directive (EC 2000), an Integrated Coastal Zone Management (EC 2002, 2013), and the European Flood Risk Management Directive (EC 2007). These EC documents emphasize an intense involvement of stakeholders in terms of participation and collaborative planning of management plans. Guiding principles are required to efficiently organize the regional adaptation process based on practical experience. At present, a gap between the mostly well-figured out adaptation plans at a national level and the implementation in the regional and local development plans can be observed in the North Sea countries. In addition, current regional and local development plans often do not consider the effectiveness of planned measures with respect to climate change (adaptation). Such experiences have been collected in the framework of the Interreg IVB North Sea Region Program project Page 2 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_118-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 Location of the pilot areas across the North Sea region

“Climate Proof Areas” (CPA) which focused on climate adaptation on a regional level in a number of pilot areas in four North Sea countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK). Based on the experiences from twelve pilot studies, an adaptation toolkit has been developed as well as a collection of recommendations and guiding principles for regional adaptation, based on good practice examples. Such guiding principles consider typical challenges of climate adaptation such as low sense of urgency, high degree of uncertainty regarding future development, and decisionmaking on a long term. While it is not feasible to develop a “cookbook” for regional climate change adaptation, the adaptation toolkit, recommendations, and guiding principles consider the limiting factors of adaptation processes and aim at achieving consensus of as many actors as possible on the basis of the best available knowledge and experience. This chapter is structured in order to (1) briefly introduce the pilot studies, (2) characterize regional climate adaptation along coastlines, (3) highlight some adaptation-specific lessons learned from the pilot studies, (4) introduce the main elements of the adaptation toolkit, and (5) finally derive recommendations and draw conclusions about how certain approaches and policies at different levels can contribute to successful climate adaptation in coastal regions.

Pilot Studies Within the CPA project a number of pilot studies provided information and experience relevant for regional climate adaptation (Adriaanse et al. 2011). The case areas were located in four countries: Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK (Fig. 1).

Case Area in Germany The German case area within the CPA project was the Wesermarsch County in the north of the country, near the North Sea. A regional analysis of climate change-induced hydrological impacts served as basis for participatory problem analysis and the development of adaptation options (Bormann et al. 2009, 2012). Pilot studies and activities within this area concentrated on both rural and urban areas. Within the rural areas, attention was paid to climate change issues concerning

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_118-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

the water management system, salt intrusion, and the drainage function for the low-lying hinterland, taking into account the consequences for agriculture, safety against flooding, and nature protection. Another important issue was coastal defense, because of the long dikes which surround the area and the possible consequences of sea level rise and higher flooding of the Weser River. For the urban areas of the county, different focus issues were identified. There, the connection was made with spatial planning solutions and possible investments in waterworks. Solutions for increasing water storage in urban areas were identified as well as interactions between the urban areas and rural hinterlands (Ahlhorn et al. 2011). Regarding both urban and rural areas, attention was also paid to the possible consequences of higher precipitation in the future and possible technical and planning solutions for increasing water storage capacity.

Case Areas in the Netherlands Schouwen-Duiveland: The island of Schouwen-Duiveland is completely surrounded by dikes and dunes and connected to some of the main Dutch Deltaworks. It was used to study and demonstrate different potential solutions for climate adaptation in practice. A broad regional climate impact analysis provided the basis for a number of follow-up studies and projects within the area. Particular attention was paid to the adaptation of local agriculture to saltwater intrusion and changing freshwater supplies, new approaches for spatial planning and flood safety management, and new combinations of coastal defense, urban development, and cultural heritage. Oosterschelde (Eastern Scheldt): Since the creation of the Oosterschelde storm surge barrier for coastal defense purpose, the ecological balance of most of the inhabited areas surrounding the estuary has been disturbed. Due to the altered tidal characteristics, the current area of sand flats within the estuary is becoming gradually smaller year by year. Climate change will accelerate this process due to sea level rise. As a result the unique ecological features of the Oosterschelde estuary will disappear until the end of the twenty-first century. To impede this process a number of experiments and pilot projects were executed within the area, such as sand nourishment and the creation of shellfish reefs.

Case Area in Sweden The Swedish case area within the CPA project was located in the municipality of Arvika, located near Lake Glasfjorden. The area and its surroundings have been identified as an area particularly at risk to flooding as a result of climate change. The water level adjacent to Arvika is partly dependent on the water level of the lake and the water flow of the river Byälven. In Arvika there have been damaging floods (e.g., year 2000). Scenario-based impact studies revealed that climate change will have an impact on the long-term behavior of inflow patterns into the lake, impacting flood risk. Climate change is expected to result in more frequent and severe events, unless proactive steps are taken. The CPA project has analyzed the possible impacts of climate change and identified the consequences for the local infrastructure and storm water drainage systems (Olsson et al. 2013). To cope with future events, a number of physical adaptation solutions have been designed, and implementation has been guided within the CPA project.

Case Areas in the UK Wicken Fen: Wicken Fen is one of the most important low-lying wetlands in Europe. Below sea level, it is also one of only a few surviving unimproved wetland fens in the East of England. The CPA project has contributed to create a vital green lung and a recreational resource for the nearby highly urbanized growth area of Cambridge. The innovative activities at Wicken Fen not only prepare this vitally important natural site for climate change, but it also makes the area more Page 4 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_118-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

attractive for tourism and recreation. CPA activities contributed to four major challenges: creating new wetland mosaic habitats, developing water management plans, gaining a clear understanding of the potential of topography and re-wetting peat soils to reduce carbon loss from soil oxidation. Titchwell Marsh: This pilot project dealt with raising awareness of the need for innovative forms of flood defense as part of adaptation to the impacts of climate change. By raising public awareness and understanding of the issues surrounding climate change and its impacts on coastlines, the CPA project supported the Titchwell Marsh Coastal Change Project. CPA has contributed to educate the public and stakeholders about the necessity of innovative flood management techniques. The main focus has been on communication issues and the construction of an innovative visitor hide, providing a fantastic opportunity for the reserves 80,000 visitors a year to see a managed realignment scheme at first hand and experience how the habitat develops over time. The Coastal Change Project plans to move parts of the present sea defenses, improving it in other areas, allowing the sea to reclaim some land, while protecting the freshwater habitats. Great Fen: This project created an opportunity to reconnect and buffer two National Nature Reserves, providing a solution to flood risk problems to protect surrounding farmland and property, stop the loss of carbon to the atmosphere, and sequester carbon from it. With regard to these issues, this project anticipated effects of climate change and ensures that the wider area as a whole is climate proof on the long term. The pilot studies and activities concentrated on understanding flood risks, sustainable water resource management, and conservation of the heritage and natural resources. Attention was also paid to a planning framework that supports tourism and the economy. More detailed information on the pilot projects with CPA is available at www.climateproofareas. eu.

Characteristics of Regional Climate Adaptation The CPA project was connected to a cross section of a wide variety of projects, initiatives, studies, and stakeholder processes aiming at climate adaptation in a region or area (Adriaanse et al. 2011). Based on the outcomes and experiences of these activities, a number of specific issues can be summarized that are characteristic for regional climate adaptation in general and specific for coastal environments.

“Typical” Climate Impacts in Coastal Regions In coastal regions the most relevant impacts of climate change are related to the following issues: • Coastal defense and flood safety structures are primary elements to protect coastal areas against floods, in particular with regard to built-up and inhabited areas, but also rural. Increasing flood risks caused by climate change is related to the expected sea level rise, higher precipitation, higher river discharges, and in some areas ground subsidence. Already today waterlogging is a big problem in built-up and rural areas due to increasing precipitation, heavy peak showers, and groundwater flow, making enhanced drainage infrastructure necessary. • Natural areas and ecological balance of coastal areas are of high value. Large protected areas have been established, aiming at the conservation of wetlands, tidal areas, and estuaries. A complexity of changes within climate, water management, and land use will cause increasing hazards for nature conservation areas and valuable ecological systems. • Smart water management is essential for agriculture. Coastal soils are very productive at tidal coasts; therefore, agriculture is of high societal importance. Due to climate change and current Page 5 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_118-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

water management, there is an increasing probability of droughts and ongoing salt intrusion in regional surface and groundwater systems. Increased effort will be required to maintain freshwater supplies for agriculture and, in some cases, drinking water as well (Faneca Sanchez et al. 2012). • From the perspective of the tourism industry, coastal regions are highly attractive. Climate change will bring threats and opportunities for leisure and tourism. Expected rising temperatures and changing precipitation patterns will influence leisure and tourism. Investment programs in coastal defenses and improvement of nature reserves can offer new opportunities. Although climate change studies often refer also to increasing heat stress in cities, this has not been identified as a relevant issue within the CPA case areas, probably because of the absence of larger towns within these cases and the proximity of nearby “cooling” seashores. Many climate change impacts deal with water issues that have an influence on local and regional land use (e.g., Woltjer and Al 2007; Veraart et al. 2010). Therefore, in most coastal regions climate change has serious consequences for current water management strategies and spatial planning on a local and regional scale. Combinations of land use and water management, or multiple land use options, require additional attention, e.g., combinations of coastal defense with urban development or water storage in combination with improving ecological balance, nature conservation, and supporting tourism.

Decision-Making on a (Very) Long Term Climate change will happen very gradually during the twenty-first century. As a result, climate proofing is a process that will continue in the long term. This must be remembered when taking measures for current problems at hand. It is vital that decisions made in the short term do not reduce adaptive capacity in the long term.

Interaction Between Different Scales Climate adaptation must accommodate interactions between local, regional, national, and international scales. First of all, climate change is a worldwide challenge, but the impacts (and how these are perceived) are different for different countries, regions, or local areas (Verhofstede et al. 2011). It is also perceived that the coordination of climate (change) adaptation strategies between different policy levels is often inadequate, including a lack of bottom-up and upscaling mechanisms. Measures, solutions, and regulations on the international and national scales may affect the regional scale and vice versa. Additionally, measures taken in one area can affect another area. Therefore, more detailed site-specific information and data is required than what is actually available on global and national scale.

Uncertainties Due to (the Sum of) Incremental Deviations An almost inherent aspect of climate adaptation is the uncertainty that comes with the predictions and scenarios for the future. This is not only the case for climate scenarios but also for the socioeconomic development and the (un)foreseeable changes in the views of the involved parties. What may be a problem today, doesn’t necessarily have to be a problem in 2050 or even 2100. Especially on the regional and local scale, there is often a lack of relevant scenarios regarding climate change impacts as well as future socioeconomic development. In order to be able to deal with the uncertainties on the long term, the Dutch Delta program has introduced the principle of adaptive delta management. Key elements in adaptive delta management are (http://deltacommissaris.nl/english/topics/adaptive_deltamanagement): Page 6 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_118-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 2 Elements of the problem-solving cycle (Changed after Bots 1997; Simon 1977)

• Linking short-term decisions to long-term issues in the fields of water safety and the freshwater supply • Adopting a flexible approach in the possible solutions • Working with several strategies and allowing for switches (adaptation tracks) • Interlinking various investment agendas

Weak Commitment and Low Sense of Urgency Climate change is a slow process. Therefore in many cases the sense of urgency is still low, especially at the regional and local level. Consequently, climate adaptation is often perceived as an abstract challenge resulting in little commitment from parties to actively participate in the process of climate proofing. The initially unstructured, multilevel, and multi-sectoral character of climate adaptation makes it difficult to identify which parties or stakeholders should be committed or responsible and to set widely agreed deadlines on decision-making. The necessity to develop and maintain consistent strategies and to implement disputable measures also requires commitment from decision makers on higher levels within organizations.

Process Rather than a Number of Projects Climate adaptation policy has to cover the gap between long-term effects and short-term decisionmaking. Therefore, and because of the often unstructured, multi-sectoral, and multilevel character and the possible involvement of many different stakeholders, climate proofing has to be considered as a process rather than a sequence of projects. In most cases the different phases of this climate proofing process are aligned with a “traditional” problem-solving cycle (problem definition, problem specification, generation of solutions, choice, implementation, evaluation, and back again to problem definition; Fig. 2) that is often referred to form the perspective of policy processes. While climate proofing does not tend to follow straight paths through the different phases of this cycle, the distinct phases can very well serve as a framework to describe the process and practices connected to it.

Lessons Learned from Pilot Studies Emerging from the pilot cases and studies within the CPA project (Adriaanse et al. 2011), a number of practices and measures were identified as being potentially successful in contributing to regional

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climate adaptation. These can be tools, methods, physical measures, or any kind of practices that deal with one or more of the characteristics of regional climate proofing as part of the problemsolving cycle. They served as good practice examples for the development of the “adaptation toolkit for the North Sea Region in a changing climate” (van Oostrom et al. 2011) developed in the framework of CPA.

Physical Measures and (Physical) Planning Solutions The CPA project paid attention to a large variety of possible concrete physical and planning solutions, connected to the “typical” climate impacts as presented in the previous section. Although not every solution is already implemented, the following examples illustrate the character of the different contributions to climate change adaptation. They are structured with regard to some of the main climate adaptation-related challenges on coastal regions: (1) coastal defense and flood safety, (2) water management, (3) nature protection, (4) agriculture, and (5) tourism. With regard to coastal defense and flood safety, the different pilot studies suggested a wide spectrum of measures including removable storm surge barriers (Arvika); realignments of coastal defenses connected to habitat development (Titchwell Marsh); sand nourishment; creation of shellfish reefs and “hanging beaches,” also connected to habitat development (Oosterschelde former estuary); multifunctional sea defenses combining flood safety with urban reconstruction, cultural heritage, and nature conservation (Schouwen-Duiveland); regional strategies for so-called multilayer safety where land use characteristics and infrastructure become part of regional flood safety and related emergency facilities (Schouwen-Duiveland); and strengthening of the existing canal system and secondary embankments near and within urban areas (Wesermarsch). Some of these measures follow the current code of practice, but some are innovative and contribute to several targets of regional development. With regard to water retention and management, suggested measures were to promote “green” roofs for temporary water storage in urban areas (Wesermarsch), temporary water storage in areas characterized by low damage potential in urban areas (e.g., ponds, parking areas, public parks) and polders in the rural surroundings (Wesermarsch), and the climate proof development of public sewage and drainage systems as well as private pipelines (Arvika). With regard to ecological balance and nature conservation, a number of measures were suggested in combination with structures designed for coastal defense and flood safety (Oosterschelde; see above). Alternative solutions were creating new wetland mosaic habitats, developing water management plans, and re-wetting peat soils to reduce carbon loss from soil oxidation (Wicken Fen, Great Fen). With regard to agriculture and water supply, measures included adapting agricultural land use to changing hydrological conditions and water management targets (Wesermarsch). Additionally, a study was conducted to adapt crops to increasing salinity, e.g., salt-tolerant potatoes (SchouwenDuiveland). Two pilot studies aimed to improve water management by enlarging freshwater lenses above saline groundwater (Schouwen-Duiveland, Wesermarsch) and one by the exchange of water supplies between individual farms and areas with different water system characteristics (SchouwenDuiveland). Selected pilots suggested measures with regard to leisure and tourism. Synergies of nature protection and nature watching could be generated by the construction of recreational resources and a unique visitors’ hide near attractive natural sites that are prepared for climate adaptation (Wicken Fen, Titchwell Marsh, Great Fen). In Schouwen-Duiveland, designs for sea defenses, in combination with urban redevelopment, new leisure zones and the reconstruction of cultural heritage were developed. Page 8 of 18

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Knowledge-Oriented Practices The measures mentioned above serve as good practice examples but cannot be implemented adequately without regional scale information on climate change impacts. Therefore, every CPA pilot area undertook a regional climate impact analysis, consisting of the following components: • Translation of existing international or national climate scenarios to regional climate scenarios by dynamic or statistical downscaling techniques • Model- and fact-based quantitative analyses of climate change impacts on physical (e.g., hydrology) and biological processes (e.g., ecology) • Translation of expected regional climate change impacts on different economic sectors and land uses For a more realistic assessment of the possible impacts of long-term climate change, analyses should also consider views on long-term socioeconomic development. Since such information often is not available on regional scale, available information from international (e.g., European Union) or national scenarios can be downscaled to the regional level. Another approach is to use the regional climate impact assessment as a starting point for developing regional long-term visions. These visions can partly be guided by conditioning national and European programs, policies, and regulations. Relevant examples are the Dutch national Delta Program (regarding flood safety and water supply), the EU Water Framework Directive, EU Floods Directive, and EU Bird and Habitat Directives. In order to boost the regional climate adaptation process, an inventory of relevant national and European programs, policies, and regulations is recommended.

Process-Oriented Practices and Approaches For a proper implementation of adaptation measures, in addition to physical- and knowledgeoriented practices, process-oriented practices and approaches are required. Such measures aim to involve communities and relevant stakeholders from the region. Practices and approaches are required in order to organize the adaptation process and to maximize the acceptance of the measures among those affected. Participation is one of the main issues for successful climate adaptation. Involving different stakeholders such as decision makers, entrepreneurs, and the public is necessary to raise awareness, to achieve consensus, and to retrieve information to accelerate the implementation as well as to increase the acceptance of solutions. Based on the experience of the CPA pilots, the following good practice activities can be recommended in the field of process organization: • A communications plan should be developed early on in order to inform all relevant participants. Within the Titchwell Marsh and Schouwen-Duiveland cases, communication strategies were established and successfully implemented. A communication plan provides for a structured process, ensuring that all relevant stakeholders have the opportunity to engage with the project. It clarifies key messages for each audience. This involves, for example, newsletters, press contacts, participation in events, targeted meetings, posters, brochures, maps, reports, and even museum expositions. • Organizing stakeholder involvement is essential for the development of a joint vision and raising acceptance of the adaptation process. This was achieved in the CPA pilot projects through a variety of forms, e.g., regional fora and focus groups (Wesermarsch), public drop-in sessions (UK), and bilateral and multilateral meetings, workshops, and events. Special attention should be Page 9 of 18

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dedicated to the involvement of the private sector to better utilize local and regional knowledge and their innovative capacity for the climate adaptation process. School projects can help increase awareness of climate change issues. The involvement of scholars and students in the development of adaptation options in the Schouwen-Duiveland pilot project proved to be successful for creating awareness. Scholars themselves are future stakeholders in their region, and they spread awareness through their networks and parents as well as other stakeholders involved. As part of the pilot project, they developed innovative solution based on new and unexpected views. A tool which can contribute to active participation of stakeholders is a matrix-based decision support tool. Such a tool has been developed in Sweden and provides a checklist for monitoring complex integrated processes and a methodology to stimulate discussion among stakeholders about crucial items (Andersson-Sköld et al. 2011). It facilitates the identification of potential measures and land use consequences from short- as well as long-term perspectives. It contributes to a more transparent decision-making process, allowing different stakeholders to give weights to various consequences and actions. Alternatively, a participatory integrative assessment can be applied following Ahlhorn (2009). As mentioned above, climate adaptation can be characterized by a long-term perspective and a low sense of urgency. To overcome this obstacle and accelerate the process, climate adaptation can be connected to local problems and initiatives. One of the strongest approaches to achieve commitment for climate adaptation proved to be the connection to current regional problems, projects, and initiatives in which stakeholders are already involved. Examples are flood mitigation programs, initiatives on urban (re-)development, or ecological habitat improvement programs. Beyond this, currently experienced climate impacts (e.g., within the agricultural sector) can function as a good starting point for climate proofing activities. Often, regions or countries are known for their expertise in a specific field of action (e.g., Dutch water and dike boards for their innovative sea defense and water management systems). Crossnational exchange between climate adaptation projects can transfer knowledge and experiences to other regions. During the CPA project there have been several exchanges of experience between the different project areas. Project members from different countries acted as so-called Community of Practice, exchanging experiences and information by means of excursions, project meetings, and mutual presentations. These have been valuable in contributing to the solution of pilot project-related problems and served as a catalyst for successful progress. Finally, specific attention can be paid to more strategic local and regional policy making, which has been accomplished, for example, in Schouwen-Duiveland by getting connected to the municipal strategic vision for 2040.

Adaptation Toolkit: Towards Regional Climate Adaptation Analyzing the experiences from the CPA project in terms of successfully applied practices and approaches, it appears meaningful to structure the good practice examples in terms of assigning them to the different phases of the problem-solving cycle. Thus, a more generic approach for regional climate adaptation in coastal areas can be outlined, as realized as part of the Adaptation toolkit towards regional climate adaptation developed with the CPA project (van Oostrom et al. 2011). This will be illustrated by a number of recommendations and specific issues attached to different phases of the problem-solving cycle.

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Problem Definition First of all, regions should be encouraged to undertake regional climate adaptation initiatives. Climate change is an important issue worldwide, and the regional level provides challenging opportunities to link this issue to different sectors and regional land use planning from an integrative perspective. Assuming there is enough awareness among stakeholders, they are able to form a regional alliance (see, e.g., Goltemann and Marengwa 2012) and initiate a climate proofing process. Stakeholders need to be integrated in the climate proofing process from the beginning.

Problem Specification In most cases it is recommended to undertake a regional climate impact analysis, including the items as listed in the previous section. This analysis should have regard to the abovementioned climate impacts issues that are particular for coastal regions. Stakeholders representing different sectors have to be involved in the regional analysis. Modeling and the development of (long-term) scenarios is needed to understand the range of possible effects, especially at local and regional scales. Therefore, more detailed site-specific information and data is required than what is actually available on global and national scale. Timescales need to be adjusted to planning periods in order to facilitate the development of no-regret (or at least low-regret) adaptation options.

Generation of Solutions The CPA project showed that pilot projects can generate a large number of possible options to adapt to the identified climate impacts. In order to raise acceptance (in subsequent phases), it is recommended to involve stakeholders also in this phase of the process. CPA itself was a valuable knowledge base for climate proofing activities in other regions. It is recommended that accessible and clustered information platforms on regional, national, and EU levels are created in order to share experience. It is a challenge to create consistent and comprehensive regional adaptation strategies, especially those involving both physical and socioeconomic actions. Regional and local knowledge and the innovative capacity of the private sector should be harnessed at the earliest opportunity to better ensure the success of solutions chosen.

Choice of the Best Solution Regional and local administrations must embed climate adaptation within decision-making processes with regard to any plans, policies, and land use programs that might affect the ability of a region to adapt to climate change in the future. It is therefore essential to integrate climate impact assessment into formal processes such as the environmental impact assessment (EIA). Whether chosen solutions are successful or not depends on the future development of a region. Therefore, before choosing adaptation solutions, decision makers should agree on a common vision for the region, having involved stakeholders and the public. Adaptation solutions that match the vision should have broader acceptance and accelerate the implementation process. Finally, adaptation strategies should aim to add value. Socioeconomic and environmental benefits should be identified and considered together in order to generate no-regret solutions and should aim for win-win outcomes.

Implementation of the Selected Solution Climate adaptation can be accelerated by creating so-called windows of opportunity. Thus, climate adaptation should be delivered through ongoing plans and projects in different sectors. Climate adaptation should make use of the climate and weather impacts already experienced by stakeholders. Page 11 of 18

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Awareness of today’s climate variability can be very valuable when linking the assessment of possible impacts of climate change in the future to more strategic local and regional policy making. Current weather impacts can be used during the problem specification phase to contribute to analysis and solutions generation.

Evaluation of the Adaptation Process

Climate proofing projects and processes can play an important role in “learning by doing.” The results and experiences should be monitored and evaluated and contribute to new projects and initiatives. In this respect it is particularly important to inform the public on experiences and successes. Adaptation is a continuous process, and successful implementation does not mean the future is secure. When further action is needed, at least one stakeholder should take the coordinating role and restart the process.

Recommendations for Regional Scale Climate Adaptation Some general recommendations can be given in order to optimize the regional climate adaptation process. • While climate proofing has to be considered as a process rather than a project, a clear process management (and process manager) is required, including a process plan. The role, position, and responsibilities of different stakeholders, often from different sectors or administration levels, have to be clear and agreed. • Through all stages of the process, participation of stakeholders is a major issue. There are different ways available to facilitate this. Several examples are mentioned in the previous sections (e.g., regional fora, workshops, exhibitions). • From the beginning of the climate proofing process, communication and awareness raising is crucial, especially because climate change is often still perceived as an abstract problem. A communication strategy is a necessity. • Organization of cross-regional and cross-national exchange between climate proofing areas and projects is recommended. This can be very valuable to achieve progress and to improve the quality of analyses, methodologies, solutions, knowledge, and information sharing. Although most climate adaptation activities are – or will be – undertaken at national, regional, or local level, these can be supported and strengthened by an integrated and coordinated approach at EU level (Com 2009). This is one of the main reasons why the CPA project has been executed under the umbrella of the EU Interreg IVB North Sea Region Program. In connection with the experiences and results from the CPA project, we conclude with a couple of perspectives on European support for regional climate adaptation in coastal areas.

Research The complexity of climate proofing processes and climate impact analyses requires coordinated and continued research on a number of subjects that are relevant for all regions involved. The CPA project did not generate a research agenda but identified the following issues as illustrative: • Water and groundwater management under a changing climate must be linked to the framework of national and EU regulations (e.g., Water Framework Directive, Groundwater Directive, Flood Page 12 of 18

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Directive, proposed Soil Framework Directive). Although climate change is already implicitly considered, a more explicit consideration is required. Management of freshwater supply and (innovative) food production must take care of changing climate conditions. Droughts, waterlogging, and salt intrusion may have severe impacts which might be compensated by innovative drainage systems, fish and seaweed farms, or salt-tolerant agricultural crops (e.g., potatoes). Flood risk management has to cope with climate change. The EU Flood Directive has to be connected with climate impacts. Climate and socioeconomic scenario development, alignment, and application are necessary to understand and illustrate the potential impacts of climate change. Uncertainties in the science, long-term developments, and working at different temporal and spatial scales make scenario development challenging. Governance issues should be applied to regional climate adaptation processes. Stakeholder involvement, cross-sectoral and cross-level cooperation, institutional and planning frameworks, as well as cooperation with the private sector and communication are relevant issues in this respect.

Exchange of Knowledge and Information Cross-national and cross-regional exchanges between climate proofing pilot areas and projects proved to be very valuable and stimulating in terms of regional climate adaptation. The North Sea Region (NSR) and EU can support these exchanges in many ways, e.g., by the connection to research programs, conferences, and communities of practice and the creation or strengthening of dedicated platforms (e.g., climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu). In addition, the ongoing improvement of information and expert databases or web portals at EU level will contribute to these exchanges (e.g., www.wiser.eu). In this respect it is important that these facilities are promoted, easily accessible, and harmonized as far as necessary. The EU and regional stakeholders should cooperate more to connect regional climate proofing programs to enduring national and international climate research programs.

Policy and Regulations An important recommendation from the CPA project is that a new systematic tool should be developed which can help “insert” climate adaptation into decision-making. Therefore, a so-called Climate Adaptation Pre-Assessment (CAPrA) should be developed. This should focus on the development and application of climate adaptation criteria within relevant plans and decisionmaking processes, according to and based on the spirit of a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). This is in line with the EU Impact Assessment Guidelines, stating that for any relevant planning option, it should be identified if it affects our ability to adapt to climate change. European regulations and their translation into national policy frameworks play an important role defining roles and boundaries for climate adaptation at the regional scale. It is therefore important to incorporate climate adaptation strategies in relevant European policies and regulations and to align them with different administration levels in countries and regions. The CPA project has focused less on this issue. Within the different pilots, projects, and analyses, the following relevant directives and policies have been referred to Bird and Habitat Directives (and Natura 2000), Water Framework Directive (and the related Groundwater Directive), EU Flood Directive, Soil Framework Directive (proposed), and the Common Agricultural Policy. Connected with the previously mentioned characteristic climate impacts in coastal areas, in most cases these policies and regulations should be taken into account in climate proofing projects. Page 13 of 18

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Investment Programs Most of the presented supportive activities can be connected to ongoing EU investment programs regarding research, regional and economic development, or infrastructure. On the other hand, regional authorities and stakeholders should continuously and in a coordinated way specify their needs and present promising strategies in order for relevant EU programs and networks to take them into account. Finally, a number of specific remarks can be added regarding European support for regional climate adaptation: • The EU and the NSR play an important role in raising awareness on climate change and climate adaptation. Keeping adaptation on the agenda, creating easy access to information and knowledge and connecting this to all relevant EU-programs will contribute to continued awareness on different stakeholder levels. • (Inter-)National cooperation between regions can address how to handle differences in regional or local vulnerability to climate change and how to learn from experiences. • For relevant programs and activities, closer connections with the mitigation domain (regarding CO2 policy and regulations, renewable energy programs) can possibly strengthen the achievements in the adaptation domain, especially because of the extensive involvement of the EU in mitigation.

Conclusion Since climate change will affect coastal regions, it is necessary to foster climate (change) adaptation at different spatiotemporal scales. This should mutually be done from an integrated perspective and be embedded in current projects, initiatives, and policies. The regional level is a very appropriate scale in which to link climate adaptation with different sectors and land use planning. The CPA project provided various ideas and experiences to deal with “typical” climate impacts in coastal regions such as higher flood risk, waterlogging, droughts, salinization, ecological disturbance, and freshwater supply for agriculture. Furthermore, the project suggested a more generic approach to guide regional climate adaptation in coastal areas. However, regional climate adaptation is not yet common practice. It is a long and continuous process that requires close coordination between regional, national, and international levels. At EU level, this can be supported by an integrated and coordinated approach regarding research, exchange of knowledge and information, and mainstreaming of policies and regulations and investment programs. At national level, financial and organizational boundary conditions for climate adaptation are set. But at regional level, tailormade solutions need to be developed and implemented. The tools and approaches presented in this chapter cannot guarantee a successful climate adaptation. Decisions must be made under uncertainty (e.g., with regard to scenario projections), and decisions are made by people often thinking in timescales of elections, investments, or life span of measures rather than of decadal or centennial visions. No-regret solutions and win-win outcomes will not be available in every case. However, the presented tools and approaches can significantly contribute to a successful adaptation process at regional scale since they aim at increasing integration and acceptance of climate change adaptation measures by identifying joint targets and by involving people. In accordance with Integrated Water Resources Management and Integrative Coastal Zone Management, feedback loops will increase the efficiency of adaptation through learning from successes and mistakes and considering information and knowledge gathered meanwhile. Page 14 of 18

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Acknowledgment The authors thank the European Union for their partial funding of the “Climate Proof Areas” project in the framework of the Interreg IV B North Sea Region program.

References Adriaanse L, van Zanten E, Ciarelli S, Houtekamer N, Ahlhorn F, Bormann H, Gerrard C, Dåverhög M, Deavin H, Soans C (2011) Time to adapt – 8 pilots that show you how. www.newsletter. climateproofareas.com/reports/end%20products/CPA-WP2-endreport_web.pdf. Accessed 11 Feb 2014 Ahlhorn F (2009) Long-term perspective in coastal zone development: multifunctional coastal protection zones. Springer, Berlin Ahlhorn F, Bormann H, Klenke T, Restemeyer B (2011) Regionale Klimaanpassungsstrategie f€ur tief liegende K€ ustengebiete: Lösungsoptionen f€ ur urban-ländliche Interaktionen im Rahmen der Wasserwirtschaft. In: TUTech Innovation: Conference Publication acqua alta 2011. Hamburg, Germany ISBN: 978-3-941492-38-7 Andersson-Sköld Y, Helgesson H, Enell A, Suer P, Bergman R, Frogner-Kockum P (2011) Matrix decision support tool for evaluation of environmental, social and economic aspects of land use. CPA Report and Statens geotekniska institut, SGI. Varia 613 Bormann H, Ahlhorn F, Giani L, Klenke T (2009) Climate proof areas – Konzeption von an den Klimawandel angepassten Wassermanagementstrategien im Norddeutschen K€ ustenraum. Korrespondenz Wasserwirtschaft 2(7):363–369 Bormann H, Ahlhorn F, Klenke T (2012) Adaptation of water management to regional climate change in a coastal region – hydrological change versus community perception and strategies. J Hydrol 454–455:64–75 Bots PWG (1997) Inleiding Technische Bestuurskunde. TU Delft (University of Delft) Bundesregierung (2008) Deutsche Anpassungsstrategie an den Klimawandel: vom Bundeskabinett am 17. Dezember 2008 beschlossen. Berlin, Germany; www.bmub.bund.de; accessed 10 June 2014 Com (2009) White paper (147). Adapting to climate change: towards a European framework for action. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri¼COM:2009:0147:FIN:EN:PDF. Accessed 11 Feb 2014 de Bruin K, Dellink RB, Ruijs A, Bolwidt L, van Buuren A, Graveland J, de Groot RS, Kuikman PJ, Reinhard S, Roetter RP, Tassone VC, Verhagen A, van Ierland EC (2009) Adapting to climate change in The Netherlands: an inventory of climate adaptation options and ranking of alternatives. Clim Change 95:23–45 EC (European Community) (2000) Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for community action in the field of water policy. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid¼1398946815665&uri¼CELEX:02000L006020140101. Accessed 1 May 2014 EC (European Community) (2002) Recommendation of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2002 concerning the implementation of integrated coastal zone management in Europe (2002/ 413/EC). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri¼OJ:L:2002:148:0024:0027:EN: PDF. Accessed 1 May 2014

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EC (European Commission) (2007) Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks. http://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri¼CELEX:32007L0060. Accessed 1 May 2014 EC (European Commission) (2013) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning and integrated coastal management (2013/0074 (COD)). http://ec.europa.eu/environment/iczm/pdf/Proposal_en.pdf. Accessed 1 May 2014 Faneca Sànchez M, Gunnink J, van Baaren ES, Oude Essink GHP, Elderhorst W, de Louw PGB, Siemon B, Auken E (2012) Modelling climate change effects on a Dutch coastal groundwater system using airborne Electro Magnetic measurements. Hydrol Earth Syst Sci 16:4499–4516 F€ ussel HM (2007) Adaptation planning for climate change: concepts, assessment approaches, and key lessons. Sustain Sci 2:265–275 Goltemann D, Marengwa J (2012) SAWA Final report. Summary. http://www.sawa-project.eu/ index.php?page¼documents. Accessed 11 Feb 2014 Huntjens P, Pahl-Wostl C, Grin J (2010) Climate change adaptation in European river basins. Reg Environ Change 10(4):263–284 IPCC (2013) Summary for policymakers. In: Stocker TF, Qin D, Plattner G-K, Tignor M, Allen SK, Boschung J, Nauels A, Xia Y, Bex V, Midgley PM (eds) Climate change 2013: the physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York Kabat P, van Vierssen W, Veraart J, Vellinga P, Aerts J (2005) Climate proofing the Netherlands. Nature 438:283–284 Krysanova V, Dickens C, Timmerman J, Varela-Ortega C, Schl€ uter M, Roest K, Huntjens P, Jaspers F, Buiteveld H, Moreno E, de Pedraza CJ, Slámová R, Martínková M, Blanco I, Esteve P, Pringle K, Pahl-Wostl C, Kabat P (2010) Cross-comparison of climate change adaptation strategies across large river basins in Europe, Africa and Asia. Water Resour Manage 24(14):4121–4160 Olsson J, Amaguchi H, Alsterhag E, Dåverhög M, Adrian P-E, Kawamura A (2013) Adaptation to climate change impacts on urban storm water: a case study in Arvika, Sweden. Clim Change 116(2):231–247 Simon HA (1977) The new science of management decision. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs van den Hurk B, Jacob D (2009) The art of predicting climate variability and change. In: Ludwig F, Kabat P, van Schaik H, van der Falk M (eds) Climate change adaptation in the water sector. Earthscan, London, pp 9–21 Van Oostrom N, Andersson-Sköld Y, Bormann H, de Lange G, van der Linden L (2011) Adaptation toolkit for the North Sea Region in a changing climate. www.newsletter.climateproofareas.com/ reports/end%20products/CPA-WP4-endreport_web.pdf. Accessed 11 Feb 2014 Veraart JA, van Ierland EC, Werners SE, Verhagen A, de Groot RS, Kuikman PJ, Kabat P (2010) Climate change impacts on water management and adaptation strategies in The Netherlands: stakeholder and scientific expert judgements. J Environ Plann Policy Manage 12(2):179–200 Verhofstede B, Ingle R, de Sutter R, Bormann H, de Lange G, van der Linden L, Gerard C, Andersson-Sköld Y, Graham P (2011) Comparison of climate change effects across North Sea countries. www.newsletter.climateproofareas.com/reports/end%20products/CPAWP1_endreport_web.pdf. Accessed 11 Feb 2014

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Wesselink A, de Vriend H, Barneveld H, Krol M, Bijker W (2009) Hydrology and hydraulics expertise in participatory processes for climate change adaptation in the Dutch Meuse. Water Sci Technol 60(3):583–595 Woltjer J, Al N (2007) Integrating water management and spatial planning – strategies based on the Dutch experience. J Am Plann Assoc 73(2):211–222

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Index Terms: Adaptation toolkit 12 Climate change adaptation 14 Pilot studies 5 Policy recommendations 13 Regional scale 7, 14

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Multilevel Analysis and Comparison of Climate Change Policies in Argentina and Canada Margot A. Hurlberta*, Paula C. Mussettab and Jorge Ivarsc a Department of Justice Studies and Department of Sociology and Social Studies, CL 235, University of Regina, Regina, SK, Canada b Human, Social and Environmental Sciences Institute, Scientific and Technical National Research Council CCTCONICET-Mendoza, Mendoza, Argentina c Quilmes National University and INCIHUSIA, Buenos Aires, Argentina

Abstract Purpose – This chapter discusses and compares the climate change policies of Argentina and Canada at the international, national, and local level. Starting with a discussion of both Argentina and Canada’s positions in the UNFCCC, the chapter then explains the positions and policies that have been implemented in the national and then local level of each country. Methodology/approach – This chapter is an analysis and comparison of laws, policies, and practices through not only a discursive analysis of their official positive legal meaning but also through an analysis of their actual applied impact. A multilevel institutional analysis is utilized such that the climate change policies of Argentina and Canada are analyzed at the international, national, and local level. Findings – At the international level, a discourse surrounds Argentina and Canada in terms of developing and developed country and global justice. At the national level, each country has different official laws and discourses surrounding climate change; however, at the regional level in both countries, many similarities exist in respect of climate change mitigation and adaptation in both positivistic legal meaning and actual applied reality. This chapter hypothesizes that a problematic gap exists between the climate change institutional framework and the “real” climate change being experienced by local people. Practical implications – The similarities in the actual applied experience of climate change mitigation and adaptation in Argentina (a developing country) and Canada (a developed country) at the regional level, contrasted with the different characteristics at the national and international level, offer insights into the challenge of effective implementation of climate change mitigation and adaptation. Originality/value – The multilevel institutional analysis and comparison of Argentina and Canada in respect of climate change mitigation and adaptation reveal significant structural governance challenges for the effective implementation of climate change mitigation and adaptation goals of the UNFCCC. Overcoming these challenges may facilitate implementation of climate change mitigation and adaptation goals.

Keywords UNFCCC; Climate change mitigation; Climate change adaptation; Multilevel institutional analysis

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 20

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Introduction This chapter discusses and compares the climate change policies of Argentina and Canada using a multilevel institutional approach focusing on the international, national, and local level. The local level selected in Argentina is Mendoza; in Canada, the Prairie Provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan have been selected. Argentina and Canada’s positions in the UNFCCC are strikingly different, but many similarities exist at the local level. Both are water-scarce areas with significant irrigation and some similarities in institutional context at the local level surrounding climate change, although at the international level they are very different, one being a developed and the other a developing country. This chapter explains the positions and policies that have been implemented in the national and then local level of each country, assessing the policies’ actual impact hypothesizing that there is a problematic gap between the climate change institutional framework and the “real” climate change local problem. In the Canadian case, it is anticipated that climate change will result in increased water scarcity, more frequent extreme events (e.g., droughts, floods, storms), and changes or disturbances in climate regimes which will impact ecosystems with such events as forest fires; insect outbreaks (e.g., mountain pine beetle); vector-borne disease, such as West Nile virus; and the introduction of nonnative plants and animals. All of these impacts will place significant pressure on the environment as well as on human activities, such as farming, agriculture, forestry, development, and industry in the Prairie Provinces (Sauchyn and Kulshreshtha 2008). Mendoza’s regional productive model, based on Andean irrigated oasis agriculture, is seriously threatened in the context of most climate change scenarios. Global climate change projections indicate a probable decrease of snow in the mountains with a consequent decrease in the yearly streamflow (Boninsegna and Villalba 2006a, b). These climate factors could seriously increase the water deficit and compromise the oasis survival (Boninsegna and Montaña 2013). The Prairie Provinces are in central Canada. Mendoza Province is in the Central West region of Argentine, by Andean cordillera. The yearly precipitation is scarce (200 mm) and occurs during hot summers, frequently with hail. Additionally, the high levels of sun radiation have a direct impact on evapotranspiration and therefore on crops’ water stress. This chapter will demonstrate that the institutions that best address the “real” climate-related local problem of water scarcity are very far from the mitigation and adaptive practices that the climate change paradigm promotes. The practices of institutions with climate and agriculture mandates focus on an agricultural production model, not the climate change problem. These institutions are good information producers, but are not grasping the “real” climate change local problem of water scarcity.

Position of Argentina and Canada at the UNFCCC The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the international treaty whereby parties cooperatively consider actions to limit average global temperature increases and resulting climate change, was ratified by Canada in 1992 and Argentina in 1994 (UNFCCC 2013). Kyoto was the significant legally binding agreement on emission reductions. Kyoto, however, did not provide for legal remedies and was therefore a rather toothless agreement (Pardy 2004). In Doha, Qatar, in 2012 the Kyoto Protocol was amended such that Annex I parties agreed to a second commitment period from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2020 (UNFCCC 2013). Canada, an Annex I country,

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_119-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol providing notice in December 2012 and terminating its commitment in 2013 (United Nations 2012). The communication filed by Canada in 2010 with the UNFCCC Secretariat stated that Canada expected to be 802 Mt above its Kyoto Protocol target of 2,792 Mt during the 2008–2012 period (Government of Canada 2010). The latest communication filed by Canada states that Canada emitted 702 Mt of GHGs that year, about 19 % above its 1990 total of 591 Mt, excluding the land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector. Currently the energy sector is responsible for the majority of emission (81 % consisting of stationary combustion, transport and fugitive emission sources) and the agricultural sector responsible for only 8 % of emission. Some reduction has occurred since 2008 (Government of Canada 2013). These reductions are touted to be as a result of regulation within the transportation and energy sector, as well as reduced manufacturing sector emission. Unstated is the fact these reductions could be as a result of the global recession that has occurred since 2008. When in December of 2011, Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, the conservatives blamed the liberal government for having made an error committing to the protocol. Prime Minister Stephen Harper has set a target of reducing annual emissions to 17 % below 2005 levels by 2020. This is a much lower threshold to meet than the initial Kyoto Protocol target of cutting below 1990 emissions levels (CBC 2011; De Souza 2012). Publicly the Prime Minister had rejected carbon pricing or a carbon tax (supporting regulating each sector instead) and closed the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy because the research group promoted carbon taxing (Scoffield and Ditchburn 2012). However, in Privy Council documents obtained under access to information legislation, Canada stated it supported the development of new market-based mechanisms expanding the scale and scope of carbon markets (De Souza 2013). It would appear that currently the Canadian government’s position on climate mitigation is somewhat confusing. At this time, no legislated carbon reduction measures are in place in Canada. Argentina ratified the UNFCCC in 1994 and the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. Argentina, a non-Annex 1 country, has submitted two national communications: the first one in 1997 – revisited in 1999 – and the second one in 2006. The third communication is in the process of being prepared. During this period, Argentina has adopted several mitigation norms and regulations, specifically to reduce emissions. Argentina’s position in the context of climate change commitments has changed since the signature of the agreement, moving from a proactive innovative position to a low-profile one. In 1999, at COP 15, Argentina announced an emission reduction target linked to its GDP (SAyDS 1999). At that moment, this was an innovative event because it was the first time that a developing country had agreed to meet a voluntary quantified GHG limitation target. The proposal meant that Argentina was not locked into a fixed emission level as had been the case of the commitments adopted by developed countries under the Kyoto Protocol. Rather, Argentina would be allowed emission increases according to economic development (Conte Grand and D’Elía 2011, p. 2). But this active role and innovative goal lasted a short while. Actually, by the time this target was presented, a new government had already been elected in Argentina, and its new authorities had announced that they would not agree with this commitment. Following governments have maintained the same position (Conte Grand and D’Elia 2011). Argentina’s current position is the “common but different responsibilities” principle (Chojo 2011). (This principle indicates that developed countries with greater resources (the historically responsible countries) must fund projects outside its borders in developing countries.) As was defined by the now ex-president Kirchner, Argentina is an environmental creditor, and it will charge developed countries in sustainable growth. Nowadays Argentina generates 6 % of the global emissions (WRI 2011). Overall emissions increased by 4.1 % from 1997 to 2000. As has been Page 3 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_119-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

evidenced in the 1990–2000 inventories, GHG emissions originate mainly in the energy sector (including transportation) and 44 % in the agriculture and livestock production sector (Di Paola and Rivera 2012, p. 14) The weight of agriculture emissions (half of total national emissions) is very important. This is why taking only into account the energy sector emissions may lead to erroneous interpretations of the local contribution to climate change (Honty 2011, p. 55). Actually, some reports (not authored by the government) assessing scenarios emissions by sectors claim that the agricultural sector is not the second but the first source (CEADS 2012). In addition, agriculture emissions are also alarming in another sense. Argentina’s profile as a highly agriculture country, where grain and agricultural products export are the main national revenue, makes it very vulnerable to climate variability. Extreme events could seriously affect the prices of commodities. Emission scenarios emphasize the importance of making changes, if Argentina wants to improve its resilience. The national positions of Argentina and Canada are very different. Canada appears committed in principle to the reduction of GHG emissions and its pledges at Copenhagen; however, it has pulled out of any legally binding pledges of emission reductions. From a legal positivist stance, it is not required to take any future action. Argentina on the other hand has claimed entitlement to increasing its GHG emissions through the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. Each country has situated itself within the discourse that exists at the international level surrounding developing and developed country and global justice. The situation at the national and regional levels of each country is, in contrast to this, quite similar.

Climate Change Institutions at the National, Regional, and Local Level in Argentina and Canada The institutions involved in climate change at the national level, and then the regional/local level, will be discussed starting with Canada and then Argentina. Thereafter, the climate change policies at the national, regional, and local level in Argentina and Canada will be outlined. An analysis and comparison of Canada and Argentina, their institutions, mandates, and practices will follow.

Climate Change at the National Level in Canada Canada is a federal country, and accordingly different functions are assigned at the federal and provincial level. In Canada, at the federal level of government, two departments have been tasked with key lead climate change responsibilities: Environment Canada has a specific role in relation to mitigation of greenhouse gases, while Natural Resources Canada has specific responsibilities in relation to adaptation to a changing climate. These are the two most important departments, although other federal government agencies and departments also have roles in relation to climate change such as Health Canada with its role in safe drinking water and Parks Canada with its mandate for water resource management and protection within national parks. Environment Canada has a mandate to preserve and enhance the quality of the natural environment, conserve and protect Canada’s water resources, forecast weather and environmental change, enforce regulations relating to trans-boundary waters (international and interprovincial), and coordinate environmental policies and programs for the federal government. Because of Environment Canada’s mandate, changing weather and, hence, climate change itself are central to aspects of its mandate. In addition to its long-standing environmental protection mandate, Environment Canada is responsible for overseeing the federal government’s plan on the reduction of greenhouse gas Page 4 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_119-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

emissions and the regulatory framework supporting this plan. The central regulatory tool in the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions established by the federal government is the Clean Air Act (Bill C-30 tabled in 2006 as “An Act to amend the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999” in the First Session of the 39th Parliament) which will be the responsibility of Environment Canada. However, this act still has not been proclaimed and become Canadian law. Canada’s latest communication to the UNFCC states that Canada takes a sector-by-sector approach to mitigation and cites regulatory changes in the transport and energy sector (Government of Canada 2013). One group, the Large Final Emitters Group, was established in 2002 as part of Natural Resources Canada, but with the release of Project Green: Moving Forward on Climate Change in 2005 (Environment Canada 2009), the group was transferred to Environment Canada given the government’s intent to regulate Large Final Emitters under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33. This group, made up of staff of Environment Canada, is responsible for working with key industry sectors to reduce annual greenhouse gas emissions. Through its discussions with industry, provinces and territories, and other stakeholders, the Large Final Emitters Group was tasked with designing policies and measures that are effective in encouraging reductions and are administratively efficient and clear while still maintaining the competitiveness of Canadian industry. In 2004 Environment Canada mandated that large facilities report greenhouse gas emissions through the Facility Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting Program (Canada 2012a). The 2001 report shows that while large electrical utilities in Canada have reduced greenhouse gas emissions in Canada by 32,278 kt, non-conventional oil extraction have increased this number by 20,706 kt from 2005 to 2011 (Environment Canada 2013). Natural Resources Canada promotes the responsible use of natural resources (mining/materials, energy, forests, hazards, explosives, the north, earth sciences, and the environment) for the protection of human health, the environment and the landmass, and other research related to forestry, mining, and energy sectors. Natural Resources Canada leads the development of the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project, a contentious development to transport energy across Canada’s north for export. At the same time, Natural Resources Canada’s Environment section leads impacts and adaptation to climate change and conducts climate change research. Although other departments may have minor roles in climate change, the next most significant federal department involved in climate change, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC), has undergone significant cuts in the recent past reducing its climate change mandate. The Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration (PFRA) was created as a special agency in 1935 in response to severe climate impacts on the Prairies caused by the multiyear droughts of the 1920s and 1930s. Its mandate related to improving the security of prairie land and water resources to achieve greater economic security of agriculture in the semiarid prairie region; its role recently evolved to include national agri-environmental activities related to promoting farm practices that afford a competitive profitable agricultural sector with improved protection of the environment from potential agricultural contamination risks. PFRA was incorporated into Agri-Food Canada in 2009, and then its staff mostly phased out through retirement in 2012 onwards (Hurlbert et al. 2010).

The Provincial Level in the Prairie Provinces The provincial governments of the three Prairie Provinces have similar challenges within the bureaucratic structure in responding to climate change because of the breadth and depth of the challenge and the preexisting government structure of institutions created prior to today’s focus on climate change and water. Each province’s response to climate change has been somewhat different Page 5 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_119-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

in both form and substance. Generally, one particular provincial department is tasked with climate change, and a few others have supporting mandates or programs. One similarity between the provinces is that municipalities have a very localized role in relation to providing drinking water to residents, responding to floods and emergencies, and land-use planning decisions within their borders. In Alberta, Alberta Environment is tasked with addressing climate change. After establishing its 2002 climate change plan and after a series of public meetings, Alberta renewed its climate change plan early in 2008 (Alberta Environment 2008). Alberta Environment is also tasked with both the protection and wise use of the environment and natural resources. Most activities affecting the environment must be reviewed through environmental assessment by Alberta Environment. Alberta Environment also carries the bulk of the responsibilities relating to both water and the environment, which includes surface and groundwater allocation, flow regulation, water supply and flood forecasting, pollution control, regulation of municipal potable water systems, and developing watershed management plans in conjunction with local groups. Alberta Environment also establishes and enforces drinking water and wastewater objectives and legislation. In Saskatchewan, the ministry of the environment has been central in developing a climate change strategy. This ministry protects and manages Saskatchewan’s natural resources, leads environmental water quality monitoring and enforces environmental protection guidelines, sets water quality regulations and objectives (including those for drinking water and waste water), and retains legislative responsibility for enforcing municipal drinking water regulations. Unlike Alberta, which manages both climate and water resources under the environment department, Saskatchewan manages its water resources by a separate Crown corporation, the Saskatchewan Water Security Agency. The Saskatchewan Watershed Authority (the Saskatchewan Water Security Agency’s predecessor) was created to manage water in a holistic fashion aimed at protecting water source; the agency was established in 2002 as a direct response to the North Battleford drinking water disease outbreak in 2001. Saskatchewan Watershed Authority is responsible for protecting source water by promoting stewardship, water management, and water allocations and diversions and developing watershed and source water protection plans in partnership with watershed groups. Other departments also play a key role in responding to climate change, including the Ministry of Agriculture in respect of farming, improving farming practice, enforcing the Agricultural Operations Act, promoting environmental farm planning, and encouraging the adoption of agricultural beneficial management practices (BMPs) to protect water resources and the environment.

Climate Change at the National Level in Argentina Argentina, as Canada, is a federal country and its national constitution (1994) confers provincial states primary ownership (dominio originario) of natural resources (including water and land). In relation to adaptive practices, the federal government’s ability is limited as it does not have any jurisdiction in relation to natural resources. Argentina does not have a specific national law or legislation on climate change (in fact, the minimum environmental protection Presupposition law does not contemplate climate change or adaptation practices). General Environment Law N. 25.675 is the most general related law and stresses the necessity of interjurisdictional coordination in terms of environment ordering. It is a thoroughly promising law as it establishes interesting guidelines that help decrease national state development which would be at the expense of that of provincial states (thereby retarding their development) (Salerno 2009, p. 310). However, its resource limitations restrain an adequate enforcement of the law (Cetrángolo et al. 2004). Page 6 of 20

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Also at the federal level is the Secretary of Environment and Sustainable Development (SAyDS). This entity is the authority for the enforcement of the law 24295 by which Argentina ratified the UNFCCC (Presidential Decree 2213 of year 2002). Within this Secretary, the Unit of Climate Change (UCC) was created to advise SAyDS Director on Law 24295 application and UNFCCC implementation. Many other governmental areas have responsibilities on climate change issues. One of these is the Environmental Federal Council (COFEMA) which brings together all provincial environment departments with national government representatives. Within this council, there is a special group on climate change. The expectations on this council were many because it was supposed to be an organ exclusively created to integrate provincial and national visions. However, so far it has shown major limitations of resources (technical and financial) and an unbalanced political weight. So as yet, it has not achieved a genuine incorporation of provincial visions within the national environmental strategy. The last institution is the Climate Change Government Committee where government organisms, important public institutions, and COFEMA representatives meet. All these institutions lead by CCO develop the Climate Change National Strategy (CCNS), the major national climate change policy instrument.

The Provincial Level in Mendoza At the provincial level, in Mendoza two institutions are supposed to be related to climate concerns – at least they have the “climate” word in their name. The Climate Change Agency was created in 2007 as a coordination arena between public and production sectors, science institutions, and NGOs. According to its official site, its goal is “to promote programs and environmental, social and economic projects including provincial, national and international public and private sectors. . .; to prevent actions that may cause ecological damage or affect province natural resources quality and preservation. . . and to recommend mitigation practices and adaptation strategies to minimize climate change consequences in Mendoza” (Agencia Mendocina de Cambio Climático (n.d.)). An intention so wide, intangible, and nonspecific has left this institution achieving little. But the real weakness of this institution is that it does not handle its own funds. Instead, it must rely on the meager amounts derived from federal programs which in turn are received from international organizations. This situation leaves this agency as just as a lot of good intentions. The second climate provincial institution is the Agriculture and Climate Contingency Directorate. This is the provincial agri-climate referent. Its goal is to assess extreme climate events, but it is mainly concerned with supporting farmers avoiding agricultural damages, specifically hail and frost. The Climate Change Agency depends on the Land, Environment, and Natural Resources Ministry and is oriented toward sustainability and resource conservation; the Agriculture and Climate Contingency Directorate depends on the agri-industry and technology ministry with a completely different orientation toward agricultural development. One last institution in Mendoza is definitely dominant in dealing with climate and water resources: the General Irrigation Department (DGI). Although formally it does not have a climate mandate, it does in practice given that the main local global change problem is drought. As DGI is the most important water government institution – in a land where irrigated agriculture is the only possible – it turns into the most significant institution for coping with “real” global change problems, even more than the other two mentioned. DGI is a strong institution that since 1884 has been modeling the wine regional agriculture production model. This strength comes from a development model established in 1884 (the year in which the current water law in the province was enacted): Page 7 of 20

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water coming down the Andes is stored, distributed, and systematized in agricultural irrigation systems and finishes as crops or virtual water for export. Water management is a key support for this model which is still valid today. In 1884 it was designed by a planning elite with enough political, social, and economic power to influence the productive destinations of the region. This has not changed: today DGI meets the interest of the most wealthy and powerful regional producers and remains far from adaptive also avoiding mitigation practices that climate problems demand. Currently Mendoza’s provincial constitution states guidelines for water, but environmental policy is lacking here. Finally, at the bottom level, municipalities also have specific domains related directly to environment, but these are mainly rhetorical offices. Instead, these are the municipalities’ production offices which are, “in the real world,” the closest government institutions to small farmers. But at the same time they are the least economically empowered institutions. They can hardly provide material support but advice small farmers how they should proceed claiming other levels.

Climate Change Policies at the National, Regional, and Local Level in Argentina and Canada In Canada, provincial and federal ministries appear to overlap or duplicate climate and water mandates and services. Because climate was not contemplated when Canada mapped out jurisdictional matters between the federal and provincial governments in its constitution of 1867, it spans both levels of government. Similarly, the jurisdictions of natural resource management are shared by mutual agreement and often by joint programming and funding between the national and provincial governments in Canada. The potential duplication is resolved in practice in two ways. Firstly, matters which are within federal jurisdiction such as First Nation lands, international and interprovincial waters, and interprovincial undertakings are governed by the federal government departments and legislation; matters within provincial control, such as provincial lands and natural resources (including water management), are governed by the provincial legislation and policy of the provincial government departments. Secondly, in the event that it is not clear whether a particular issue or activity falls under provincial or federal government jurisdiction, there are many federal and provincial agreements resolving these issues, which generally provide that the strictest legislation shall apply. For example, under administrative or equivalency agreements with many provinces, federal environment legislation is held in abeyance providing provincial legislation is equivalent to, or more stringent than, that expressed in federal acts. Agriculture, water, and environmental issues are commonly shared jurisdictional matters between the federal and provincial governments. The Prairie Provinces have had specific policies surrounding climate change and adaptation for the past several years. The Canadian government, led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, has been accused of “muzzling” its scientists by not allowing them to speak to journalists without preapproval, which is often denied (Ghosh 2012; Burgmann 2012). Having pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol and having officially rejected a carbon tax, the federal government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper introduced the Clean Air Act (Bill C-30 tabled in 2006 as “An Act to amend the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999” in the First Session of the 39th Parliament). This draft bill was amended in 2007, but has not yet been passed into law. Instead, $345 million of funding was allocated to promoting the use of biodiesel and ethanol and $300 million to helping homeowners become more energy efficient (CTV News 2006, 2007). In addition to other grants to cities and provinces for various initiatives including transit initiatives and climate impact research in the Page 8 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_119-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Arctic, in 2009 billions of dollars were allocated to clean energy research and development and demonstration projects such as carbon capture and storage and energy retrofit programs, aimed at improving the environment as well as employment opportunities (Canada 2009). Canada has invested $236 million since 2006 in climate adaptation initiatives (Government of Canada 2013). Saskatchewan’s previous New Democratic Party Government issued an Energy and Climate Change Plan in 2007 which was a cross-governmental vision in response to climate change and the development of a province-wide climate change adaptation strategy which included working with research organizations and supporting critical local research on climate change and adaptation (Government of Saskatchewan 2007). These goals have been reiterated in the 25-Year Saskatchewan Water Security Plan (2012). Several watershed groups have developed drought plans as outlined above. Currently, climate legislation relating to mitigation remains on the legislative agenda but is yet to be proclaimed. In Alberta legislation has been in existence since the Climate Change and Emissions Management Act (2003), a precursor for Alberta’s Climate Change Strategy (Alberta Environment 2008). In addition to establishing a carbon offset market and providing consumer rebates in relation to energy efficient products, two programs were also introduced, a greenhouse gas reporting program and a greenhouse gas reduction program. These relate to the establishment of a greenhouse gas limit. In 2003 Alberta also created a “Water for Life Strategy” focusing on issues of quantity, quality, and conservation of water, all important issues in preparation for and during drought. The strategy initiated three important activities: (1) planning for future management of water via the provincial climate Change Adaptation Strategy, (2) development of land-use frameworks, and (3) watershed planning through local watershed groups. Alberta has policies in place to mitigate climate change. Alberta has passed legislation requiring large emitters to reduce their emissions by 12 % using an average of 2003 as a baseline. These requirements apply to emitters making up 70 % of Alberta’s emissions. In Argentina the Climate Change National Strategy (CCNS) is the most important climate policy instrument. Although it is not finished yet, since its origin in 2009, the strategy set up under two axes (mitigation and adaptation) which include a considerable number of action guidelines that include commitment and participation of different sectors, institutions and important actors, programs, projects, and also specific indicators to assess or measure the changes (Nazareno 2013). According to what has been reported in its Second National Communication, Argentina has implemented some measures to comply with the UNFCCC, especially mitigation practices to cope with GHG reduction. These include a carbon fund to encourage projects under the UNFCCC’s Clean Development Mechanism (SAyDS 2008), a National Program for Rational Use of Energy and Energy Efficiency (United Nations 2011), a national program encouraging the use of bioethanol and biodiesel (ibid.), a law for the sustainable management of forests, and an urban solid waste management plan supported by a loan from the World Bank for constructing sanitary landfills and landfill gas capture (ibid.). The SAyDS, in agreement with the provinces and with the funding of the World Bank, has developed since the year 2005 an Urban Solid Wastes National Strategy. Given that around 60 % of the disposal of urban solid wastes is still in open air dumps, the central objective of this strategy is the protection of the health of the population by the replacement of these dumps with controlled landfills. Likewise, the subsequent capture and elimination of the methane are also contemplated in this strategy (second communication). Lastly, the glaciers preservation, Law N. 32.016, which has been recently created dictates minimum budgets for core presuppositions to protect nationally glacial water sources. Adaptation measures at the national level are much more limited than mitigation practices and include actions to reduce risk disasters in the land-use planning process and the agricultural sector. Page 9 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_119-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

At the provincial level, the Climate Change Agency defines as a priority energy and water efficiency, but their practices are limited to audits, diagnosis, and awareness of the population. Occasionally these activities articulate with activities in the municipalities but always limited within the framework of education campaigns. The Agriculture and Climate Contingency Directorate, as stated above, orients its policy toward damage prevention and mitigation, managing support and providing advice to farmers affected by frost and hail. DGI water policy is the most related to extreme drought events associated with GC in the region. Among the most important measures, Mendoza’s DGI stated in 2014, for fourth consecutive year, water emergency. This statement is put into effect by decree of the governor, and it is a portfolio of measures to be implemented after the finding of a severe decline in river flows. While it is a big scope policy which it is supposed to reduce water availability for all uses, it affects mainly irrigation. The effect on livelihoods of farmers using irrigation water is different, as not all producers depend in the same way from water coming “down the river and channels.” This large number of institutions formally designed to address the global change problem and their policies overlapped each other in their functions, which creates confusion among producers. More importantly, this situation creates few opportunities to be sensitive to the needs of producers affected by the effects global change.

Analysis and Discussion The comparison of Canada and Argentina has been organized into three themes: the dominance of a model of production, institutional fragmentation, and institutional silos. In respect of institutional silos, the most problematic features of this are climate, water, and territory. Each feature will be discussed in turn.

The Dominance of a Model of Production Argentina is an agricultural exporter and here lies its main income source. Therefore, it is highly vulnerable to climate variability and extreme events, as these can severely affect domestic production and the price of commodities worldwide. However, the long-term goals proposed in the CCNS are framed in the same production, reproduction, and consumption model that makes Argentina vulnerable (Llanos 2014). The national strategy planned to address global change focuses on how to adapt the current model of production to new climate conditions. The CCNS does not set specific rules to limit the expansion of the agricultural frontier and thereby to limit deforestation and soil degradation. This will result in the displacement of small farmers and original people living on the existing agricultural lands. Further, the strategy does not promote agri-ecological practices or introduce regulations to native seed conservation. Neither the global change nor climate change plans offer a strategy for the improvement of small and medium producers (Llanos 2014). By this, the government does not define clear measures that improve Argentina or reduce its vulnerable condition. Although a radical change of the agricultural model isn’t anticipated, there is no clue of any robust mechanisms or alternative agricultural model that could take Argentina into a sustainable long-term adaptation process. Also considering that half of the total national emissions comes from agriculture sector, the current agriculture model reproduction included in the CCNS does not show a very promising picture for the country. The continuity of the dominant agricultural model underlying Argentina’s national position is also reflected at the provincial level. Although the wine production of Mendoza is not within the main exporting commodities of Argentina, the agency that administers the water (for irrigation)

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_119-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

reproduces the poorly sustainable extractive production model through an unequal water allocation and discount system. Intuitively, opportunity to increase the export of this product is being foregone. Canada too has a dominant model of production, albeit slightly different than the Argentinean agricultural model. In Canada, in the study region of the Prairie Provinces and post 2008 recession, the dominant model is that of energy exporter. Canada is the sixth largest energy producer in the world, after Russia, China, Iran, the United States, and Saudi Arabia (International Energy Agency 2013). This energy production predominantly occurs in the study region. The current national Canadian government and governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan are expending considerable effort in maintaining the energy industry attempting to build several pipelines to take the crude oil and tar sand oil out of the northern area of the province to refineries and customers around the world. This production model also exists within the agricultural sector in Canada where focus is on exports and increasing food production. Any adaptation measures focus on the adaptation of farming practices to meet a changing climate with very little, but occasional, consideration for or focus on an alternative model of agricultural production (See Magnon and Sommerville 2012). This dominant production model especially that of energy production could be a cause for the skepticism to climate change among local producers, albeit change of this attitude was noted (as reported in Hurlbert 2011). A struggle is ongoing in the Canadian media in relation to climate change between deniers and science (Arnott 2013). The government agenda appears to support climate change deniers. Funding cuts to scientific research (CAUT 2013) and massive cuts to federally employed scientists have occurred and will impact the northern Prairie Provinces and its oil sands in a unique way. One specific example is the loss of 11 regional libraries of aquatic research and the disposal of a environmental study in relation to building an oil pipeline in the 1960s and 1970s (Galloway 2014). This research would have acted as a baseline for current proposed pipelines in the same area.

Institutional Fragmentation The global change institutional framework in Argentina shows a multilevel network of global change – related institutions. But this complexity does not translate into better support to local actors who are affected by the events of global environmental change in different sites of the country. The continuity from national to provincial levels is a fragmented framework that becomes evident at the regional level (the province and municipal levels) and has a greater consequence on everyday life of regional production and its actors. DGI is the local institution that should best address the “real” global change local problem, although as it was already mentioned it is very far from mitigation and adaptive practice. DGI focus on an agricultural production model that does not consider the global change problem. At the same time, provincial climate institutions’ practices do not grasp the “real” climate change local problem (drought and water scarcity). Due mostly to lack of funds, they are just good information producers. A problematic gap exists between the global change institutional framework and the “real” global change Mendoza regional problem: drought and water scarcity. Each institution meets or deals with different actors. One (province institutions governing water) oriented toward large (powerful) actors and the other (climate institutions governing emergencies and municipalities) to small (disempowered) producers. Argentina’s institutional features have an impact on local farmers and in their capacity to overcome climate problems. A study of local producer’s perceptions on state institutions confirms the hypothesis about the gap and the lack of capacity to cope with and reduce the impacts of climate change events on local actors (Mussetta and Ivars, Interviews, Mendoza, September 2012). This fragmentation creates a situation of uncertainty within actors and gives them a negative opinion of state institutions. This perception is general, but it changes within different actor profiles. Page 11 of 20

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Small producers have the firm conviction that they obtain “nothing” from the state. They evaluate it as a single homogeneous entity, and they do not distinguish between local, provincial, or national authorities or type of institution (if they are talking about tax collection agencies, research organizations, or others). The exception to this generality is the municipality. This is the closest state arm to small farmers, and accordingly, these are the institutions approached by farmers for immediate assistance, especially in extreme climate event situations. However, producers do not receive as much as they claim because municipalities do not have very limited resources or competences to solve the problems. Instead, local municipalities work as mediators between small farmers and other government levels. From a different standpoint, larger producers understand and clearly differentiate the various state levels, and they have a much more complete knowledge of the complexity of the state bureaucracy in its various offices and functions. This knowledge allows them to access privileged information provided by the state and therefore be in a better position to access economic benefits (tax breaks, direct subsidies, state grants). Further, these actors distinguish “political” from “technical” agencies which allows them to make informed decisions on issues such as water supply, efficiency, and financing (ibid.). In Canada, a multitude of water organizations and climate institutions exist at the federal, provincial, and municipal level which make interagency coordination an issue. Government officials are often confused themselves about mandates and roles let alone the public and agricultural producers. This has resulted in often frustration by agricultural producers in having to deal with a large number of agencies in relation to a specific problem (Hurlbert and Diaz 2013; Bakker and Cook 2011). There is not a national water strategy, therefore no effective Canadian water vision with clear priorities and a comprehensive policy approach and no comprehensive climate change and adaptation plan (Hurlbert et al. 2010). In Alberta, this has constrained the development of more agriindustry and further irrigation systems. Clear inequity also exists in Canada in respect of adaptive capacity. First Nation communities are the most vulnerable, partly because of a history of colonialism that characterizes the integration of indigenous people in Canada (Magzul and Rojas 2006). The Canadian government agencies and their incentives and adaptation mechanisms have aimed at improving the competitiveness of the sector in global markets and thus fostered larger-scale production, larger farms, and larger equipment. Fewer producers are producing more crops. A relatively small group of large farmers has replaced many small producers (Hurlbert and Diaz 2013).

Institutional Silos Another significant feature of the framework fragmentation is that climate and water (as well as territory, since local governments are responsible for land use) are separated and managed by different institutions as if they were three separate dimensions. Climate is institutionally managed by provincial agencies that are almost exclusively rhetorical and whose policies do not have any specific scope for adaptation to global change. Water, the main natural resource to address the climate change in dry lands such as Mendoza, is administered by an institution with a long-standing history which has all the resources to decide what, who, and how to target, not only the management of the natural resource, but the entire provincial production system. Finally territory is formally the responsibility of municipalities. If the attention of climate change problems requires a comprehensive approach, the design and institutional practice of what should be understood as the same interconnected problem is empirically separated and fragmented. A similar situation exists in Canada. Climate is the jurisdictional responsibility of both the national government and the provincial governments. Only paltry amounts have been spent on Page 12 of 20

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addressing adaptation to global change. Water is a matter of provincial jurisdiction and managed in very different and disparate ways by the provinces. However, in reality a patchwork exists as pockets of federal jurisdiction are situated in interprovincial and international water, federal lands, and First Nation lands. Territory is situated at the municipal and provincial level with an interesting separation between land-use planning and water planning making integrated watershed management a stretch goal. The most problematic feature of this situation in both Argentina and Canada is the consequences on actors’ adaptive capacities. The following pages, reflecting local producer perceptions, will set out this idea. Climate: In the Argentinean case, climate effects assistance mechanisms (that the Provincial Climate Contingency manages) are designed for the larger producers, not for small ones. This is because this office sets so many restrictions (such as regulations, guarantees, or financial solvency) that small farmers are unlikely able to access benefits. Therefore, not only must producers cope with the significant problems associated with lack of water, but they also have to manage to overcome hail and frost damage. Supportive mechanisms are mostly only affordable by wealthier farmers. The Climate Contingency office in the end becomes barely helpful because it appears far from the small actors and has little influence on their likelihoods. On those occasions when small producers get some kind of aid, it is never enough to recover from damages. In addition to this situation, these groups of producers are also affected by other non-climate processes such the low crops prices in the general price structure. For small producers, it represents more a state-constraints source than a supportive office for contingency. Similarly in Canada, large producers are the biggest recipients of national and provincial assistance. As an example, small farmers often find crop insurance unaffordable, and complaints have historically been more common in Saskatchewan than in Alberta (RCAD 2012; Warren and Diaz 2012). Alberta has more consistently provided financial resources to maintain attractive premium rates in the wake of major drought events. Frustration in Saskatchewan stemmed from the effects of severe drought in the late 1980s and 2001–2002 on the finances of the program when payouts overtook the value of farmer premiums and government contribution levels; the Saskatchewan program fell into deficit. In response, premiums were raised to levels that farmers found exorbitant, and payout levels were reduced during the 1990s and early 2000s. A new government elected in 2007 addressed farmer concerns by injecting the cash required to make premiums and payouts more attractive. Since 2007 farmer participation in crop insurance in Saskatchewan has increased significantly. Paradoxically, in both Argentina and Canada, the state discourses, small producers emerge as the main object of protection. Among the major producers, and to a lesser extent among medium-sized producers, who are able to access those benefits, negative perceptions of state are not associated with lack of help for climate contingencies events but about the constraints of economic policies at the national level. In short, crop insurance in Canada and Argentina is not the same for all: not because climate contingency is not a general event, but because some are better prepared to avoid or overcome these effects (because in turn they can reach state-offered climate protection). Others are not, and this makes them more vulnerable. Water: Water scarcity is a general problem, and all actors recognize it. In Argentina, the unequal treatment is seen both in superficial and underground water distribution. In the former, only those with water rights take part in the decision making processes. In the second, underground water pumping is not an actual option for everyone because of its high pumping cost. On the other hand, pumping permissions are not always within the legal framework. They are managed by DGI in a centralized and discretionary manner, in favor of powerful actors. Underground water is really significant as it is what makes the difference during scarcity and restricted irrigation. Fragmentation Page 13 of 20

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and differentiated traits depicted previously are confirmed by actors, especially the disadvantaged (small producers located in middle and low areas of the basin) far from the big water storage at the top of the basin (Montana and Boninsegna (forthcoming)). Producers recognize that it is the provincial irrigation institution (DGI) which would have the power and ability to solve this problem. But they also recognize that they cannot reach this institution, just the same as with the climate agency, although with some differences. Here, the restrictions identified by the producers are not exclusively objective (regulations, taxes impositions). Rather, the problem with DGI is associated with a nontransparent policy making style that for many years has been supporting wealthier wine producers. Small producers explain that in the middle part of the basin, the DGI allows large water splurges and nonlegal water appropriations, while in distal areas there are serious water shortages. Both situations are attributed to the poor organization of the DGI (ibid.). Perceptions are different from the large producers’ standpoint, especially situated at the beginning of the basin. This group suffers from water shortage problems, but when water coming down the channels is not enough – a regular occurrence – they use groundwater. So, their complaints are about restrictions on obtaining groundwater licenses during strong water crisis periods. However, they recognize DGI’s effort in organizing a water supply system. This difference can be explained because large producers are located upstream and small producers instead are located at the most distal part of the basin. As big water reservoirs are at the origin of the basin, the impacts of a water crisis are notably different in each place. DGI emergency policies during water crisis periods do not ensure an equalitarian water distribution. In the study area in Canada, only in Alberta is water fully allocated such that no further water allocations can be made. As a result, Alberta has pioneered a water system which operates both on water license allocation from the province as well as allows these interests to be traded separately from the land. Albeit this process has only occurred a handful of times, it is believed by some Albertans in the study area to have been facilitative in meeting challenges in the last significant drought event of 2001 and 2002. The ability to transfer water interests separate from land was cited as a reason why irrigators in the South Saskatchewan River Basin were able to trade water interests in exchange for compensation allowing some producers with adequate capital to grow a crop, while others received compensation. A very robust system of water monitoring and enforcement in this region exists which would have enforced a first in time first in right system allocating the scarce water to a handful of the oldest water licensees. Instead, government officials, irrigators, and others quickly negotiated a compromise allowing municipal water use and the arrangement previously referred to. In accordance with an interprovincial water sharing arrangement, water was delivered downstream to Saskatchewan at this time where water is not yet fully allocated and problems such as these are only starting to arise. Territory: According to a provincial Territory Ordering Law (8051, year 2009) of Mendoza which establishes policy and guidelines for municipalities and provincial coordinated territory planning, the DGI is supposed to dictate where it would be possible or desirable to expand agricultural area. However, this expansion does not occur, rather the opposite, an encroachment on agricultural land. It is the municipality which grants land-use permissions, and as a result, urban encroachment regularly occurs. Some protection does occur for medium and small producers in the middle and lower areas of the basin in relation to industries such as that of small brick manufacturing expansion. As long as the industry is not too powerful, some protection is attained. An opposite situation is the case of businesses whose powerful real estate interests progress over the best land in the foothills, in the upland areas of the basin. Powerful groups lobby on urban land use and usually determine or influence water allocation and land-use changes to the detriment of those in the middle and lower areas of the basin. Page 14 of 20

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In the Canadian province of Alberta where water is fully allocated, several plans have been drafted. Alberta’s Water Act integrates water planning with a consultative policy first created in 2003, Alberta’s Water for Life Strategy through s. 7 (Alberta Government 2013). A Water Management Plan for the South Saskatchewan River Basin has been established for the study area which addresses the issue of full allocations and includes the water resources of the Bow, Oldman, and South Saskatchewan River sub-basins; however, no real mention of climate change is made (Alberta Environment 2006). Further complicating this management instrument is the creation of land-use frameworks through the Alberta Land Stewardship Act administered by a Land-Use Secretariat. A Draft South Saskatchewan Regional Plan relates to the case study area and does mention climate change and refer to other pieces of legislation (Alberta Government 2013); this area does not align with the watersheds and the regions of the Watershed Planning Advisory Councils. Further, the landuse framework plan is advisory and not binding, so it is unclear how influential at the end of the day this document will be. However, the municipalities participate in the drafting of the water and integrated land-use plans such that jurisdiction is truly on a regional basis. In Saskatchewan as well, land-use planning has been conducted through the Ministry of Environment of the Government of Saskatchewan, while source water protection more recently facilitated by the Saskatchewan Water Security Agency through local watershed groups. As a result, the issue of “territory” and source water is not integrated.

Conclusion Although the international positions of Argentina and Canada are very different, many similarities in climate change laws and policies exist at the regional levels. Internationally Canada officially is not legally bound to emission reductions but appears committed to a target. Argentina on the other hand has claimed entitlement to increasing its GHG emissions through the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. The positions of each country are situated within the discourse that exists at the international level surrounding global justice and developing and developed countries. The situation at the national and regional levels of each country is in contrast to this and quite similar. Although Canada has reported reductions in emissions through regulatory efforts, very little legislation has been enacted and no commitment made to carbon taxes. The province of Alberta has legislation in place but Saskatchewan, like Canada, is without a solid legislative framework. In Argentina, several financial tools exist to assist with emission reductions as well as a glacier preservation law but only at the national level. Far from reducing emission targets, at the provincial level of Mendoza, two agencies operate with financial constraints attempting to meet the challenge of climate change. One institution operates within a resource conservation framework; the other embraces an agriculture development orientation. Institutional adaptation in both countries is oriented to “maintaining the same” in respect of development and resulting emissions, both of which are increasing. The relatively sparse progress in passing and implementing laws and policies in relation to climate change may be as a result of a fragmentation that exists in relation to institutions within the governments at the national, provincial, and regional level in responding to climate change. This fragmentation also means that the real problems of climate change and global change, drought, and water scarcity are not dealt with. Further, a clear inequity between small and large producers is continuing to increase in both Argentina and Canada. Institutional silos have also been created within government organization. Firstly, climate occupies a very shallow position with institutions appearing more on paper in form than substance. Page 15 of 20

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Water agencies and agricultural departments operate within a model of production together with a goal to increase agricultural export instead of adaptation to climate change and mitigation of GHGs. In a similar manner, this model of production results in small producers being further marginalized as the impacts of a changing climate are experienced. Lastly, the territory, or landuse planning, is once again separated from concerns of climate and water and also contains a dominant theme of increasing production. This situation questions the utility of many tools such as Integrated Water Management or Integrated Natural Resources Management that works very well in a conceptual level but experiences serious inconsistencies when put into practice. Although both Canada and Argentina have been developing many global change policies since the UNFCC C commitments and have demonstrated progress, especially in mitigation strategies, only small gains in legislative implementation have been made. However, regarding adaptation policies, the national political strategy in both Canada and Argentina is oriented to how to fit the extractive agriculture model with new and future climate conditions. This current development strategy followed by both countries appears to be worsening the problem of climate change. Obviously this strategy is problematic, and it is questionable that maintaining the same strategy in the context of harsher climate conditions is feasible. A serious increase of an already existent vulnerability is the most certain scenario. Global change institutions move as if they weren’t aware of this situation; they move by parallel paths that hardly meet. The close link between global change policy and development policy in Argentina and Canada generates unsustainable effects on the climate and natural resources and emphasizes economic inequalities between actors whose livelihoods depend on them.

References Agencia Mendocina de Cambio Climático (n.d.) Homepage. http://www.ambiente.mendoza.gov.ar/ index.php/organismos/unidad-de-proyectos-criticos/agencia-mendocina-de-cambio-climatico Alberta Environment (2006) Approved water management plan for the south Saskatchewan River Basin (Alberta). Calgary. Available at http://environment.alberta.ca/documents/ SSRB_Plan_Phase2.pdf Alberta Environment (2008) Alberta’s 2008 climate change strategy, responsibility, leadership, action, Jan 2008 [online]. Government of Alberta, Edmonton. Available from the World Wide Web http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/7894.pdf. Accessed 25 Feb 2009 Alberta Government (2013) Draft south Saskatchewan regional plan 2014–2024. Available at https://landuse.alberta.ca/LandUse%20Documents/SSRP%20Draft%20SSRP%202014-2024_201310-10.pdf Arnott S (2013) Social norming, agenda setting and discourse about climate change. Available at http://www.sherwinarnott.org/epistemology/social-norming-agenda-setting-discourse-about-climatechange/. Accessed 27 June 2013 Bakker K, Cook C (2011) Water governance in Canada: innovation and fragmentation. Water Resour Dev 27(2):275–289 Boninsegna J, Montaña E (2013) Drought in the central west oasis of Argentina (in press) Boninsegna J, Villalba R (2006a) Los condicionantes geográficos y climáticos. Documento marco sobre la oferta hídrica en los oasis de riego de Mendoza y San Juan. Primer informe a la Secretaria de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustentable de la Nación, 19pp

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Boninsegna J, Villalba R (2006b) Los condicionantes geográficos y climáticos. Documento marco sobre la oferta hídrica en los oasis de riego de Mendoza y San Juan. Segundo informe a la Secretaria de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustentable de la Nación, 19pp Burgmann T (2012) Ottawa “muzzling” scientists, panel tells global research community. The Globe and Mail, 17 Feb 2012 Canada (2009) Canada’s economic action plan. Budget 2009. Department of Finance Canada, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Ottawa. Available at http://www.budget.gc.ca/2009/pdf/ budget-planbugetaire-eng.pdf Canada (2012a) Canada’s action on climate change. Available at http://www.climatechange.gc.ca/ default.asp?lang¼En&n¼72F16A84-1#X-201312101524591 Canada (2012b) Notice in Canada Gazette. Available at www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2012/ 2012¼09¼22/html/notice-avis-eng.html#d104 CAUT (2013) Get science right town halls kick off across the country. Caut Bulletin 60(9) Nov 2013 CBC (2011) Canada pulls out of Kyoto Protocol. Posted Dec 2011. www.cbc.ca CEADS (2012) Escenarios de emisión de gases de efecto invernadero. Consejo Empresario Argentino para el Desarrollo Sustentable Cetrángolo O, Chidiak M, Curcio J, Gutman V (2004) Política y gestión ambiental en Argentina: gasto y financiamiento. CEPAL, Santiago de Chile Chojo M (2011) http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/sociedad/317793220111001.html. Accessed Jan 2014 Conte Grand M, Delia V (2011) Argentina y su posición pendular frente al Cambio Climático. Available at http://colectivoeconomico.org/2011/03/23/argentina-y-su-posicion-frente-alcambio-climatico/. Accessed Jan 2014 De Souza M (2012) Canada officially pulls out of Kyoto agreement. Postmedia News, 15 Dec 2012. The Leader Post, C7 Saturday, 15 Dec 2012 De Souza M (2013) Federal report supports carbon pricing. At odds with PM’s public position. Postmedia news. The Leader-Post, 20 Aug 2013. Available at http://www.leaderpost.com/technology/Federal+report+supports+carbon+pricing/8809705/story.html Di Paola M, Rivera MI (2012) Informe Nacional sobre el Estado y Calidad de las Políticas Públicas sobre Cambio Climático y Desarrollo en Argentina. Sector agropecuario y forestal. Plataforma Climática Latinoamericana (PCL). Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales Environment Canada (2009) Project green – moving forward on climate change [online]. Government of Canada, Ottawa. Available from World Wide Web http://www.team.gc.ca/english/publications/team-200305/project-green.asp. Accessed 14 Jan 2009 Environment Canada (2013) Facility greenhouse gas emissions reporting overview of reported emissions 2011. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Ottawa, Apr 2013 Galloway G (2014) Purge of Canada’s fisheries libraries a “historic” loss, scientists say. The Globe and Mail, Wednesday, 8 Jan 2014. P. A8. Available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/ politics/purge-of-canadas-fisheries-libraries-a-historic-loss-scientists-say/article16237051/ Ghosh P (2012) Canadian government is “muzzling” its scientists. BBC, 17 Feb 2012 Government of Canada (2013) Canada’s sixth national report on climate change, 2014. Available at https://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/submitted_natcom/application/pdf/ final_nc_br_dec20,_2013[1].pdf Government of Saskatchewan (2007) Energy and climate change plan 2007. Premier’s Office, Regina Government of canada (2010) Fifth national communication on climate change 2010. Available at: unfacc.intl resource/docs/natc/can_nc5.pdf Page 17 of 20

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Honty G (2011) Cambio climático: negociaciones y consecuencias para América Latina. Coscoroba Ediciones. CLAES – Centro Latino Americano de Ecología Social. Montevideo. http://www. ambiente.gov.ar/?idarticulo¼1124. Accessed Jan 2014 Hurlbert M (2011) Perceptions of climate risk in the South Saskatchewan River Basin and impacts on climate policy choice. Clim Carbon Law Rev 3:341–355 Hurlbert M, Diaz H (2013) Water governance in Chile and Canada – a comparison of adaptive characteristics. Ecol Soc 18(4):61–76 Hurlbert M, Corkal D, Diaz H (2010) Government institutions and climate change policy. In: Sauchyn D, Diaz H, Kulshreshtha S (eds) The new normal: the Canadian prairies in a changing climate, chapter 12. CPRC Press, Regina International Energy Agency (2013) Key world energy statistics. Available at http://www.iea.org/ publications/freepublications/publication/kwes.pdf Llanos M (2014) De la seguridad a la soberanía alimentaria. http://blognuso.wordpress.com/2013/ 09/05/de-la-seguridad-a-la-soberania-alimentaria/. Accessed Jan 2014 Magnon A, Sommerville M (2012) Land rush, Speculators stake claim to Prairie farmland. Briarpatch Magazine, 28 Feb 2012. Available at http://briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/ land-rush Magzul L, Rojas A (2006) Reporton the Blood Tribe (Kainai Nation): community vulnerabilities. Institutional Adaptation to Climate change (IACC) Project report, IACC, La Sarena [online]. http://www.parc.ca.mcri/pdfs/papers/iacc051.pdf Montana E, Boninsegna JA (forthcoming) Drought scenario for Mendoza, Argentina. In: Diaz H, Hurlbert M, Warren J. (eds) Vulneral and adaptation to Drought on the canada Praini. University of Calgary Press, Calgary Nazareno C (2013) Director Nacional de Cambio Climático. Interview. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v¼oDxJB9I89NQ. Accessed Jan 2014 CTV News (2006) Ambrose, Strahl announce new biofuel regulations. CTV, 20 Dec 2006 CTV News (2007) Tories pledge $300M to boost energy efficiency. CTV, 19 Jan 2007 Pardy B (2004) The Kyoto Protocol: bad news for the global environment. J Environ Law Pract 144:27–43 RCAD (Rural Community Adaptation to Drought project) (2012) Rural communities adaptation to drought: research report. Canadian Plains Research Center, Regina Salerno G (2009) Actualidad del marco jurídico de bosques nativos y ordenamiento territorial en la República Argentina. In: Álvaro Sánchez Bravo (ed) Ordenación del Territorio & Medioambiente. ArCiBel Editores, Endesa Saskatchewan Water Security Agency (2012) 25 year Saskatchewan water security plan. Government of Saskatchewan, Regina Sauchyn D, Kulshreshtha S (2008) Prairies. In: Lemmen DS, Warren FJ, Lacroix J, Bush E (eds) From impacts to adaptation: Canada in a changing climate 2007. Government of Canada, Ottawa SAyDS (1999) Revision of the first national communication. Argentine Republic. According to the UNFCCC, Secretariat for Natural Resources and Sustainable Development, Buenos Aires, 1999. Available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/argnc1e.pdf. Accessed Jan 2014 SAyDS (2008) Segunda Comunicación Nacional del Gobierno de la República Argentina, Secretaría de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustentable. Available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ natc/argnc2s.pdf Scoffield H, Ditchburn J (2012) Tories admit to closing enviro research group because they disliked results. Winnipeg Free Press, 14 May 2012

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United Nations (2011) Ad hoc working group on long-term cooperative action under the convention. Compilation of information on nationally appropriate mitigation actions to be implemented by Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention. Framework convention on climate change United Nations (2012) Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, Doha, 8 Dec 2012. CN 718 Treaties – XXVII7c (Depositary Notification). Available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2012/CN.718.2012-Eng.pdf United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2013) Home page. Available at http:// unfccc.int/2860.php Warren J, Diaz H (2012) Defying Palliser: stories of resilience from the driest region of the Canadian prairies. CPRC Press, Regina WRI (2011) Climate analysis indicators tool (CAIT). Version 8.0. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC

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Index Terms: Climate change adaptation 9, 11 Climate change mitigation 7, 9 Multi-level institutional analysis 4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 2

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Climate, Climate Risk, and Food Security in Sri Lanka: Need for Strengthening Adaptation Strategies Buddhi Marambea*, Ranjith Punyawardenab, Pradeepa Silvac, Sarath Premalald, Varuna Rathnabharathiee, Bhathiya Kekulandalae, Uday Nidumoluf and Mark Howdeng a Department of Crop Science, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka b Natural Resource Management Centre, Department of Agriculture, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka c Department of Animal Science, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka d Department of Meteorology, Colombo, Sri Lanka e Practical Action, Colombo, Sri Lanka f Ecosystem Sciences, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO), Canberra, Australia g Climate Adaptation Flagship, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO), Canberra, Australia

Abstract Climate is one of the main determinants of agricultural productivity in Sri Lanka. Of the major climatic parameters, temperature, rainfall, and humidity are of special significance, as these cause a substantial impact on the agricultural productivity of the country. Consequently, farming systems and agronomic practices in most agricultural regions of Sri Lanka have evolved in close harmony with the prevailing climatic conditions of respective climatic regions of the island. The overwhelming scientific research has provided evidence of two general trends in Sri Lankan climate, i.e., increasing ambient temperatures resulting in more heat stress, and more frequent and severe occurrence of extreme rainfall anomalies such as droughts and floods. Both of these conditions strongly affect the crop and animal production and thus the food security in the country. The National Climate Change Policy of Sri Lanka, which was adopted in 2012, clearly endorses the need of appropriate adaptation strategies to reduce the impacts on crop and animal production so as to ensure national-level food security. While some of the strategies and actions have already been implemented as an effort to address the emerging negative impacts of climate change, scope still exists for new entry points for adaptation with a view to reduce the climate vulnerability of the agricultural sector in Sri Lanka while increasing the resilience of the entire community. One example of these actions is the development of seasonal climate forecasts that could assist farmers, business across the value chain, and the policy makers to develop improved climate risk management strategies leading to ensuring food security. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the climate and climate-related risks faced by the agriculture sector of Sri Lanka and highlights the need to strengthen adaptation options to ensure national-level food security.

Keywords Climate risks; Crops and animals; Adaptation; Food security; Sri Lanka

*Email: [email protected] *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 25

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Introduction Sri Lanka is an island in the Indian Ocean located at the tip of the Indian subcontinent. The country has a total land area of 65,610 km2 including 2,905 km2 of inland water bodies. The maximum width from east to west is 240 km and the length in north-south direction is 435 km. Sri Lanka is located between 5
55–9
50 North latitudes and 79
42–81
530 East longitudes and hence has an equatorial climate. Extensive faulting and erosion over time have produced a wide range of topographical features with three distinguishable elevation zones within the island: the Central Highlands, the plains, and the coastal belt. In the south-central part of Sri Lanka, the rugged Central Highlands spans around 65 km in north-south direction with peak elevation at 2,524 m. The Central Highlands is the hydrological heart of the country as almost all major perennial rivers originate here, spreading radially from the highlands to the coast. Most of the island’s surface consists of plains between 30 and 200 m above sea level. In the southwest, ridges and valleys rise gradually to merge with the Central Highlands, giving a dissected appearance to the plain. A coastal belt about 30 m above sea level consists of scenic sandy beaches indented by bays and lagoons. Despite its relatively small extent, Sri Lankan landmass exemplifies a variety of climatic conditions. There are four important geographical and topographical features in Sri Lanka, which considerably influence the climate over the island, in particular the rainfall regime. The first is the fact that Sri Lanka is a small island situated in the warm tropical Indian Ocean with associated warm, humid air. The second is its proximity to the equator, which results in solar radiation rarely being a limitation to crop growth under general weather conditions of the island. The third is the existence of a large mass of hills at the center of the island, which is perpendicular to two approaching moistureladen monsoon wind streams (the southwest monsoon in the middle of the calendar year and the northeast monsoon towards the end of the year). The fourth factor is the presence of a vast landmass of the Indian subcontinent to the immediate north and northwest of Sri Lanka, which has a large effect in driving the monsoon. These four factors directly or indirectly influence the rainfall regime of the island. In general, the climate of Sri Lanka is considered as tropical monsoonal with a marked seasonal variation of rainfall. Of the major climatic parameters, temperature, rainfall, humidity, and evaporation are of special significance to Sri Lankan agriculture, impacting substantially on the agricultural productivity of the country. This chapter focuses on the general climate of Sri Lanka, climate-induced risk factors that influence agriculture production (considering both crop and animal production), and the relationship of these to the food security of the nation.

Rainfall Rainfall in Sri Lanka has multiple origins. Monsoonal and convectional rainfall, and the formation of synoptic weather especially in the Bay of Bengal, account for the majority of the annual rainfall. The average annual rainfall of the island (Fig. 1) varies from about 900 mm at the southeastern part of the Dry Zone (Maha Lewaya at Hambantota) to over 5,500 mm on the southwestern slopes of the Central Highlands (Kenilworth Estate at Ginigathhena) (Punyawardena et al. 2013a). The rainfall experienced during a 12-month period in Sri Lanka can be characterized into four rainfall seasons, namely, first inter-monsoon (March–April; FIM), southwest monsoon (May–September; SWM), second inter-monsoon (October–November; SIM), and northeast monsoon (December–February; NEM).

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Fig. 1 Spatial distribution of the average annual rainfall in Sri Lanka (Source: Department of Meteorology, Sri Lanka)

First Inter-monsoon Season (March–April) Warm, humid, and uncomfortable conditions, with thunderstorm-type rain, particularly during the afternoon or evening, are the typical weather conditions during the first inter-monsoon (FIM) season. The distribution of rainfall during this period shows that the entire Southwestern sector of the hill country receives 250 mm of rainfall, with some localized areas on the Southwestern slopes experiencing rainfall in excess of 700 mm (e.g., 771 mm at the Keeragala Estate). Over most part of the island, the amount of rainfall varies between 100 and 250 mm, the notable exception being the Jaffna Peninsula in the Northern Province, which has lower rainfall in the FIM season (e.g., Jaffna, 78 mm; Elephant Pass, 83 mm; Fig. 2).

Southwest Monsoon Season (May–September) Windy weather during the southwest monsoon (SWM) results in lower temperatures than those prevailed during the FIM season. The SWM rain totals vary from about 100 mm to over 3,000 mm (Fig. 3). The highest rainfall is received in the mid-elevations of the Western slopes (e.g., Ginigathhena, 3,267 mm; Watawala, 3,252 mm; Norton, 3,121 mm). Rainfall decreases rapidly from these maximum regions toward the higher elevation, as in Nuwara Eliya, it drops to 853 mm. The lowest rainfall is recorded from the Northern and Southeastern regions.

Second Inter-monsoon Season (October–November) The second inter-monsoon (SIM) season is characterized by convective weather systems that typically generate thunderstorm-type of rain, particularly during the afternoon or evening (Fig. 4). However, unlike in the FIM season, the influence of weather systems such as low-level atmospheric

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_120-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 2 Spatial distribution of the average rainfall in the first inter-monsoon in Sri Lanka (Source: Department of Meteorology, Sri Lanka)

disturbances, depressions, and cyclonic storms in the Bay of Bengal are common during this period. Under such conditions, the whole country can experience strong winds with a widespread, intense rain, which could lead to floods and landslides. The SIM period of October–November experiences the most evenly geographic distribution of rainfall in Sri Lanka. Almost the entire island receives in excess of 400 mm of rain during this season, with Southwestern slopes receiving higher rainfall in the range 750–1,200 mm (e.g., Weweltalawa, 1,219 mm).

Northeast Monsoon Season (December–February) The dry and cold wind blowing from the Indian landmass will result in a comparatively cool but dry weather over many parts of Sri Lanka during the northeast monsoon (NEM) season, creating a pleasant and comfortable weather except for some rather cold morning hours in January. Cloud-free skies in January often provide days full of sunshine and pleasant and cool nights. During the NEM period, the highest rainfall amounts are recorded in the Eastern slopes of the Knuckles Range of the central hills (Fig. 5). The maximum rainfall is experienced at the Koboneela estate (1,281 mm), and the minimum is in the Western coastal area around Puttalam (e.g., Chilaw, 177 mm) during this period. There can be high interannual variability. As depicted in Figs. 2, 3, 4, and 5, the four rainfall seasons do not bring homogeneous rainfall regimes over the whole island, thus leading to a high agroecological diversity in the country despite its relatively small extent. Out of the four rainfall seasons, two consecutive rainy seasons make up the major growing seasons of Sri Lanka, namely, Yala and Maha seasons. Generally, Yala season is the combination of FIM and SWM rains. As SWM rains are the highest over the country’s

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_120-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 3 Spatial distribution of the average rainfall in the southwest monsoon in Sri Lanka (Source: Department of Meteorology, Sri Lanka)

Southwestern sector, the length (effectiveness) of this season in the rest of the country is generally confined only to 2 months (mid-March to early May), and hence, the Yala season is considered as the minor growing season of the country. The major growing season of the island, i.e., Maha season, begins with the arrival of SIM rains in October and continues up to late January/February with the NEM rains. Being mainly convective in nature, rains during the two inter-monsoon periods are usually associated with thunder and lightning along with short-duration high-intensity rains, especially during the FIM period.

Temperature The mean annual temperature in Sri Lanka manifests largely homogeneous temperatures in the lowlands and rapidly decreasing temperatures in the highlands. In the lowlands, up to an altitude of 100–150 m, the mean annual average temperature is 27
C. In the highlands, the temperature falls quickly as the altitude increases. The mean annual temperature of Nuwara Eliya at an altitude of about 1,800 m is 15
C. However, during the period of January to mid-February, the diurnal temperature variation around Nuwara Eliya is large, and thus, ground frost can be observed for about 3–7 days early in the mornings or nights when the temperature closer to the ground falls below the freezing point. However, during the period of May to September, if the westerly winds are strong, the leeward area in the east of the Central Highlands and the relatively flat terrain extending

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_120-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 4 Spatial distribution of the average in rainfall in the second inter-monsoon in Sri Lanka (Source: Department of Meteorology, Sri Lanka)

to the east coast experience warm, dry, and gusty winds. Such foehn-like winds are locally known as the Kachchan or Yal-hulang. In foehn conditions, the relative humidity may fall to less than 50 %, causing vegetation and soil to dry out with possible bushfire disasters in Badulla and Moneragala districts. The coldest month with respect to the mean monthly temperature is January and the warmest months are April and August.

Relative Humidity The relative humidity (RH) in Sri Lanka generally ranges from 70–90 % during mornings to 55–80 % during late afternoons depending on the geographical location. Relatively low humidity values (from 40–60 %) are reported in dry lowlands during June to August where the foehn-like wind (Kachchan wind) is often prominent. Comparatively high humidity condition that prevails during winter months (December to January) is one of the predisposing factors for plant disease outbreaks during the Maha season.

Evaporation During the Yala season, pan evaporation is likely to range between 3 and 8 mm per day depending on geographical region. Higher values over 7 mm per day are often experienced in the dry lowland areas Page 6 of 25

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Fig. 5 Spatial distribution of the average rainfall in the northeast monsoon in Sri Lanka (Source: Department of Meteorology, Sri Lanka)

during this period. Meanwhile, a range of 2–5 mm per day is generally observed during the Maha season across different localities of the island.

Climatic Zones of Sri Lanka Sri Lanka has traditionally been generalized into three climatic zones, namely, “Wet Zone” in the Southwestern region including central hill country, “Dry Zone” covering predominantly the Northern and Eastern parts of the country, and “Intermediate Zone,” skirting the central hills except in the South and the West (Fig. 6). In differentiating these three climatic zones, annual rainfall, contribution of southwest monsoon rains, soil type, land use, and vegetation have been widely used (Punyawardena 2007). The Wet Zone receives a relatively high mean annual rainfall over 2,500 mm without pronounced dry periods. The Dry Zone receives a mean annual rainfall of less than 1,750 mm with a distinct dry season from May to September. The Intermediate Zone receives a mean annual rainfall between 1,750 and 2,500 mm with a short and less prominent dry season. Sri Lanka has been further divided into 46 agroecological regions (Punyawardena 2007) that take into account the monthly rainfall amount (at 75 % probability) and distribution in addition to the parameters considered for identifying climate zones.

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Wet Zone = > Annual Rainfall 2500 Intermediate Zone = Annual Rainfall 1750 - 2500 Dry Zone = < Annual Rainfall 1750

JAFFNA

KILINOCHCHI MULLATIVU

MANNAR VAVUNIYA

DRY ZONE

TRINCOMALEE

ANURADHAPURA

PUTTALAM POLONNARUWA

BATTICALOA

KURUNEGALA MEATALE

AMPARA

KANDY

KEGALLE

INTERMEDIATE ZONE

GAMPAHA

NUWARA ELIYA

COLOMBO

BADULLA MONARAGALA

WEST ZONE RATHNAPURA KALUTARA

HAMBANTOTA GALLE MATARA

Fig. 6 Climate zones of Sri Lanka (Source: Punyawardena 2007)

Climate Change in Sri Lanka Sri Lanka possesses a long series of historical climatic data, especially rainfall and temperature records, which started from the 1860s in some locations. A recent analysis of these data has shown that the country’s average temperature is significantly increasing at a rate of 0.01–0.03
C per year (Fernando and Chandrapala 1995; Nissanka et al. 2011; Premalal and Punyawardena 2013). The increase is more pronounced in nighttime minimum temperature than that of the daytime maximum temperature (Marambe et al. 2012). However, due to high interannual variability, there are no discernible significant trends in seasonal and annual rainfall (Nissanka et al. 2011; Marambe et al. 2012), except a few locations among over 400 rain gauging stations of the country as has Page 8 of 25

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_120-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

been found in many other locations across the globe. The same is true in terms of variability of cumulative and seasonal rainfall. However, it was evident that variability of seasonal rainfall during the most recent decade (2001–2010) has increased compared to the previous decade (1991–2000) in most places of the island across all three climatic zones with occurrence of more frequent drought and flood conditions. A recent study focused on the occurrence of extreme positive rainfall anomalies in the central hills of the country has shown that in contrary to common belief, there is no significant increase of “heavy and very heavy” events in the region (daily rainfall values that exceeded the 95th and 99th percentile values, respectively, in each station from 1961 to 2010), but an apparent increase of such events during the period of 2006–2010 has been evident (Punyawardena and Premalal 2013). The temperature and rainfall projections in Sri Lanka under A2 and B2 scenarios using ECHAM4 general circulation model (GCM) for downscaling have revealed that the average annual temperature of Sri Lanka will increase with a range of 2.5–4.5
C by the year 2080 under the A2 scenario and with a possible average annual temperature increase of 2.5–3.25
C under the B2 scenario (Punyawardena et al. 2013a). Both these projections are analogous with the IPCC global projections of temperature changes at the turn of the century. In terms of the future rainfall climatology of Sri Lanka, projections with A2 scenario have revealed that Dry Zone will become drier while Wet and Intermediate Zones may become wetter than at present. In recent studies carried out in Sri Lanka, Marambe et al. (2012) and Premalal and Punyawardena (2013) reported that climate change may be manifesting in changed conditions of the monsoons, with change in the date of onset and high variability, resulting in drier dry areas and wetter wet areas. Meanwhile, the B2 scenario uncovers a relatively complex situation of both Dry Zone and the Central Highlands of Sri Lanka to become drier than today as time progresses while the wetter parts of Sri Lanka to become further wet but at a lesser rate compared to the A2 scenario (Punyawardena et al. 2013b).

Vulnerability of Sri Lanka to Climate Change Climate change is a cross-cutting issue and it is increasingly recognized as a necessary component of development-oriented decision-making process. In order for development investments to become resilient to anticipated climate change, it is important to understand the nature of vulnerability from a subnational perspective and reflect this variance in development strategies that are formulated at different administrative levels such as province, district, and divisional secretariat (DS) levels. Punyawardena et al. (2013a), using 22 physical and socioeconomic parameters, which directly related to all three components of climate change vulnerability, namely, exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity, have revealed that spatial variations of vulnerability of Sri Lanka to climate change varies according to socioeconomic, environmental, and institutional conditions of respective administrative districts in ways that do not necessarily follow the most exposed and geographically sensitive districts (Fig. 7). The urban areas in the low-country Wet Zone except Ratnapura district are by far the least vulnerable to climate change in Sri Lanka, despite some exposure to climatic hazards such as floods. Communities in the Northern Province (excluding Jaffna Peninsula) and Puttalam and Ratnapura districts are confronted with very high degree of vulnerability due to high exposure, high sensitivity of livelihoods, and lower socioeconomic development. The major rice-producing districts of the island, namely, Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, Batticaloa, Hambantota, Monaragala, and Kurunegala (Trincomalee and Ampara in the Eastern Province are the exceptions), are located in the Dry and Intermediate Zones and are highly vulnerable to climate change. The mountainous districts of the Page 9 of 25

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_120-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 7 Regional vulnerability of Sri Lanka to climate change (Source: Punyawardena et al. 2013a)

Western and Eastern flanks of the central hills of Sri Lanka, namely, Kandy, Matale, Nuwara Eliya, and Badulla, along with Trincomalee and Ampara districts in the Eastern Province, show a moderate degree of vulnerability to climate change.

Food Security in Sri Lanka: Present Status Food security (FAO 2009) in Sri Lanka is determined by several factors including diverse food systems and farming systems. Food systems in Sri Lanka are affected to different degrees by natural disasters induced by the climate change with a larger spatial variation. Sri Lanka’s traditional farming systems have developed over hundreds of years with farmers managing production systems

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_120-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

in the agroecological regions to best suit local environmental conditions. This has led to a rich agrobiodiversity in the island in terms food crops such as rice, cereals, pulses, vegetables, root and tuber crops, spices, and fruits. Changes in climatic conditions may, however, change the conditions that define the agroecological regions and reduce the productivity of crops and animals that are adapted to them. Conversely, they may allow new options in some areas. Currently, more than two million hectares are under some form of agriculture in Sri Lanka. However, much of the agricultural lands are located in the water-deficient Dry Zone where increased productivity of crops (other than paddy) depends almost entirely on rainfall. In terms of food security, self-sufficiency in rice production has been the major strategy of agricultural policy since Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948. This has supported generation of employment and elimination of rural poverty. Sri Lanka reached the stated goal of self-sufficiency in rice in the year 2010 mainly due to the investments on research and development. The rice research outputs in Sri Lanka in the last half century further corroborate this contention in that on an average, for every 1 % increase in rice research investment, rice production increased by 0.37 % with an internal rate of return of 174 % in a tariff-protected regime and a benefit/cost ratio of over 2,300 (Niranjan 2004). Poverty, climate change, decreasing arable agricultural land, and increasing population pressure are the main issues that render achieving the national-level food and nutrition security more challenging in Sri Lanka (Marambe 2012; Weerakoon 2013). The World Food Programme (2011) reported that out of the total population of Sri Lanka, 12 % are severely food insecure, of which 82 % are in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Extreme climate events, such as the severe drought that prevailed over a period of 5–6 months in the year 2012, will provide its own challenges to food security in the near future. The Global Food Security Index 2013 (www.eiu.com/public/topical_ report.aspx?campaignid=FoodSecurity2013) has ranked Sri Lanka 60th out of 107 countries. This index assists to identify and compare the core issues of food affordability, availability, access, and quality across countries.

Main Climate Risks for Food Security in Sri Lanka The climate changes in recent decades in the forms of natural calamities like drought, flood, cyclone, accelerated land degradation, and sea-level rise pose serious threats to agricultural productivity and food security. Additional pressure coming from ever-increasing population, poor terms of trade, weak infrastructure, and limited access to modern technology and market restrict the options available for people to cope with the negative consequences of climate change. The main foodrelated agricultural products in Sri Lanka are crops such as rice and other field crops, fruits and vegetables, and animal products such as milk, meat, eggs, and fish. Sri Lanka has experienced frequent natural disasters in the wake of drought, flood, landslide, and cyclone events threatening its agricultural production. Coastal hazards such as coastal erosion and salinity intrusion to soils and aquifers are a common feature that affects agricultural production, especially in the drier parts along the Eastern coast of the country. Decreasing arable agricultural land, together with increasing population, renders these challenges more difficult to tackle. In Sri Lanka, most crops, e.g., coarse grains, legumes, vegetables, and potato, are likely to be adversely affected due to climate change (Titumil and Basak 2010). The varied climatic conditions in the farming systems of Sri Lanka have given rise to a wide range of crop species and land races that are suited for different conditions of soils, rainfall, and altitude as well as to diseases and insect pests. Genetic diversity is particularly high among rice, other cereals, Page 11 of 25

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_120-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

cucurbits, and vegetables such as tomato and eggplant, indicating the potential for crop improvement in the face of natural disasters such as climate change, as an adaptation measure. The genetic diversity of crop plants is the foundation for the sustainable development of new varieties for present and future challenges. Resource-poor farmers have been using genetic diversity intelligently over centuries to develop varieties adapted to their own environmental stress conditions. Systematic crop comparison programs under different agroecological regions of Sri Lanka through farmer participatory programs, strengthening the crop germplasm collection programs conducted by the Department of Agriculture with special focus on climate change, and creating access to and drawing in new genetic materials through intergovernmental programs to enhance food production would strengthen the strategic approaches for adaptation in Sri Lanka, thus minimizing the climate risk on food security. In spite of the technological advances made on improved crop management, irrigation, plant protection, and fertilization, weather and climate are still key factors in agricultural value chain in Sri Lanka. Farming systems and agronomic practices in most agricultural regions of Sri Lanka have evolved in a close harmony with the prevailing climatic conditions of respective climatic regions of the island. However, it has been evident during recent decades that heritage of farming experiences and accumulated weather lore of centuries have become ineffective in agricultural planning process at all levels. The climate of the island has undergone a change to such an extent that correct amount of rainfall does not come at the correct time of the growing season. Variability of both summer and winter monsoon rains and rains of convectional origin has increased significantly during recent decades in the world. As a result, both extremes, i.e., water scarcity and excess water, have become a recurrent problem in crop production and its entire value chain in Sri Lanka. More flexible farming approaches with water-efficient farming methods and crops to improve water productivity, construction of new reservoirs and trans-basin diversions to meet the demand, and management of water resource systems that respond to existing soil moisture and water storage levels are thus essential adaptation strategies to be used coupled with an improved climate forecast system. Increasing ambient temperature is also inflicting several direct and indirect negative impacts on the crop growth. Urgent coping-up strategies such as identification of new areas for crop production, introduction of new climate-resilient crop varieties, organic agriculture, cropping systems including agroforestry, rainwater harvesting systems, and micro-irrigation techniques would assist in overcoming the negative impacts of higher environmental temperatures. The intensively managed animal production sector is hardly vulnerable to the climate compared to impacts on the food crops sector. Nevertheless, the situation is obviously different for the extensively managed animal production sector where it is purely dependent on the rainfed pastoral systems and subjected to direct influence of climatic conditions. The animal production sector of Sri Lanka is signified mostly by smallholders spread across varying climatic regimes. The localized impacts of climate change are more visible in the areas where smallholder and subsistence farming are practiced as they are highly vulnerable to the localized trends of climate change. However, the high genetic variability that exists, especially among indigenous animal categories, and their adaptability to the diverse and localized climatic regimes in the country render a positive influence in building up resilience in smallholder sector by balancing the impacts of climate variability within the system of farming. Despite the importance of smallholder systems to the animal production sector of Sri Lanka, an understanding on the interaction of climate change and animals in the country is not effective enough to face the future development challenges of the sector. Irrespective of the sectoral characteristics, the impact of climate change on any sector depends on how and what intensity the rainfall regime in a given area is variable along with the increasing Page 12 of 25

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_120-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

environmental temperature of the same area. In addition, if the area lies in a coastal environment, the sea-level rise and the risk of increased storm surge would bring in more additive negative effects.

Impacts of Changes in Rainfall and Soil Regimes on Food Security

Increased occurrence of extreme rainfall events due to climate change, droughts, and floods has become a common feature of the climate of Sri Lanka during recent decades. It is clear until the mid-1980s that any within- or between-season variation in rainfall could be statistically accommodated within a 95 % confidence interval. However, weather aberrations that have taken place after the late 1980s could be considered as unprecedented because they fall outside even the 90 % confidence limits. Under such situations, crop losses due to decreased soil moisture and excess water, both in terms of quantitative and qualitative, are inevitable. In Sri Lanka, more than the temperature regime, the amount and distribution of seasonal rainfall have a profound impact on the productivity and food security in different agroecological environments. Out of the 46 agroecological regions of the country, 31 of them spreading across both Dry and Intermediate Zones are more delicately poised than those of the Wet Zone in relation to rainfall seasonality and variability. Aberrations or change in rainfall pattern will therefore have a major impact on food security in the Dry and Intermediate Zones. These two climatic zones have four major great soil groups of agricultural significance, namely, reddish brown earths (RBE), non-calcic brown soils (NCB), red-yellow latosols (RYL), and regosols, that will be affected at varying degrees under variable and changing climate, thus affecting food security of the country, as described below.

Reddish-Brown Earth Region Reddish-brown earth (RBE) is the most widespread great soil group of Sri Lanka, and it occupies mainly in DL1a, DL1b, DL1c, DL1d, DL1e, DL1f, DL5, and IL2 agroecological regions covering an aerial extent of 1.61 million hectares. The soil moisture relationships of this soil are characterized by a low water holding capacity with a rapid release of soil moisture at tensions lower than one atmosphere. It is also characterized by having a gravel layer in the sub-horizon. The depth to this gravel layer is quite variable, depending on the agroecological region. Due to the aforesaid soil moisture characteristics of this soil group, negative anomalies of seasonal rainfall that may arise frequently under a changing climate will manifest as drought injuries in upland crops at varying degrees. It is equally true that the positive anomalies of seasonal rains could lead to excess soil moisture conditions with drainage problems in upland crops due to impervious gravel layer in the subsoil of this soil group. About 80 % of the country’s coarse grains (i.e., maize and millet) and grain legumes (green gram, cowpea, black gram, and soybean) are grown on this soil group during the Maha season in the above-stated agroecological regions. Thus, it is likely that climate change would exacerbate the crop losses and severe instability in a year-to-year production in those farming systems due to drought and excess soil moisture conditions. The other most dominant farming system associated with this soil group is rice cultivation in irrigable lowland during the Maha season and perhaps during the Yala season depending upon the availability of water in the tank system (irrigation reservoirs). These tanks have been constructed as a cascade system by blocking the natural drainage ways in a watershed by means of earthen dams to collect the rain and runoff at appropriate places to form a series of small tanks along the drainage way. More importantly, these tanks, known as the “minor tanks” (reservoirs with an irrigable area of less than 80 ha), provide the livelihood of a large section of the rural population in the RBE region. An estimated number of 8,500 working minor tanks are reported to provide water for 43 % of the total irrigated area in the country. These estimates suggest the great importance of minor tanks in Sri Page 13 of 25

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Lanka, especially for the RBE region. Generally, the catchment of these tanks is relatively small, owing to the undulating landscape of the region. Shifting cultivation or chena cultivation is the common land use practice in these catchments for decades by the villagers, and as a result catchment yield has been declining gradually over the years. Apart from reduced inflow to the reservoirs, chena cultivation has also led to soil erosion and subsequent sedimentation of tanks, leading to reduced storage and increased surface/depth ratio. Rainfall regime in this region has become highly erratic during the recent times due to climate change, resulting in below-average storage conditions even during Maha seasons. Meanwhile, increasing ambient temperature regime, coupled with high surface/depth ratio of tanks in this region, has resulted in rapid drying out of these tanks to make the situation become worse. All these have led the farmers who find their livelihood from these tanks to look for other livelihood alternatives or migrate to urban areas for nonagricultural livelihood options.

Non-calcic Brown Region The non-calcic brown (NCB) soil group is mainly confined to DL2a and DL2b agroecological regions in Ampara and Batticaloa districts along with the IL3 region in the northern part of Kurunegala district, covering a total area of about 165,000 ha. This is a coarse-textured soil with very poor chemical properties. Due to the unimodal nature of rainfall pattern in the DL2a and DL2b agroecological regions, only a single crop is possible in those regions during the Maha seasons. During the recent times, the variability of NEM has been increased dramatically due to climate change, and as a result a significant instability in season-to-season rainfed agriculture production is inevitable in this region. Nevertheless, wetland rice cultivation in valley bottoms, where NCB occurs in a complex association with relatively fertile old alluvium soils, may manage to give good yields even under a changing climate unless extreme positive rainfall anomalies cause flood damages in these regions. The IL3 agroecological region in Kurunegala district is frequently subjected to moisture stress due to its own rainfall pattern and coarse texture of the underlying soil. Thus, negative anomalies of rainfall may aggravate the drought injuries in this region even with the dominant tree crop of coconut.

Red-Yellow Latosol Region The great soil group red-yellow latosol (RYL) mainly occurs in the DL3 agroecological region in the Northern Province with an aerial extent of 320,000 ha. It generally overlies a very porous limestone substrate, which provides a stable groundwater source throughout the year. Cultivation of high-value crops such as chili, onion, and vegetables under lift irrigation is the common cropping system in this region. Even though it was used to be a sustainable land use system with traditional lifting devices (Thula Kinnaru), the use of motor-powered lifting pumps has exponentially increased the rate of groundwater extraction, which could increase the vulnerability of the farming system to climate change.

Regosol Region

The regosol soils are located mainly on the elevated beach plains with a flat topography in the Batticaloa and Puttalam districts. Despite the dry environment that prevails in these regions, the soil supports very productive coconut plantations and cashew cultivations by underlying freshwater supplies found at a shallow depth. In some places (Kalpitiya peninsula), these soils have been widely used for intensive cultivation of high-value crops such as chili, onion, and vegetables under lift irrigation from shallow wells. However, extraction of water extensively from the shallow water supply would make the entire farming system in these regions highly vulnerable to climate change, even posing threats to drinking water supplies of the community. Page 14 of 25

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Generally, rice cultivation in the Dry and Intermediate Zones possesses a considerable resilience to climate change compared to other cropping systems in those regions due to the availability of irrigation water. The animal component of the widespread mixed (crop-animal) systems across all the above regions will have an indirect influence of the rainfall pattern and soil regime due to the changes in feed availability. A recent study has shown that even the Wet Zone of Sri Lanka is undergoing significant changes in its rainfall rhythm (Premalal and Punyawardena 2013). Some years have become “years of extremes” where within a shorter time period (i.e., 1 month), a floodstricken area of the Wet Zone could turn into a drought-affected area.

Impact of Floods and Drought on Food Security In the food crop sector, the occurrence of floods has affected paddy production in Sri Lanka significantly compared to other crops, with heavy damages being recorded during Maha season 2008/2009, resulting from a peak of flood incidences in December and March. Kilinochchi and Ampara districts in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka have reported the highest losses of paddy due to flooding during the 6-year period from 2005 to 2010 (Fig. 8). Poultry industry was highly affected by flood incidences during the period 2005–2008 when compared to the rest of the animal production sector. Losses in the animal production sector were high during the Maha season, as in the case of crops, and the month of December has recorded the peak of animal losses due to floods. Kilinochchi, Jaffna, and Ampara districts have shown higher levels of animal losses due to the occurrence of floods during the period 2005–2010 (Fig. 9). The continuous occurrence of drought over the years has resulted in a consistent pattern of crop damage, with a severe impact recorded in 2009. Crop losses were higher at the onset of the Yala season and at the end of the Maha season. The highest crop losses were observed in Kurunegala (Intermediate Zone) and Matale (Wet Zone) districts during the period 2005–2010 (Fig. 10). Drought has also affected the poultry and cattle industries over the period 2005–2010. The cattle industry was significantly affected by drought especially during 2006 and 2007, while the poultry industry was badly hit in 2009. The highest animal loss was observed in Kilinochchi and Batticaloa districts in the Dry Zone during the period 2005–2010 (Fig. 11).

Loss in other crops

Vavuniya

Trincomalee

Puttalam

Ratnapura

Polonnaruwa

Mullaitivu

Nuwara Eliya

Moneragala

Matale

Matara

Mannar

Kilinochchi

Kurunegala

Kandy

Kegalle

Jaffna

Kalutara

Hambantota

Galle

Gampaha

Colombo

Badulla

Batticaloa

Ampara

Anuradhapura

Rs. Million

Loss in Paddy 180 150 120 90 60 30 0

District

Fig. 8 Spatial distributions of crop losses due to the occurrence of floods in Sri Lanka during the period 2005–2010 (Source: www.desinventar.lk) Page 15 of 25

Vavuniya

Trincomalee

Puttalam

Ratnapura

Polonnaruwa

Mullaitivu

District

Nuwara Eliya

Moneragala

Matale

Goat

Matara

Mannar

Kilinochchi

Piggery

Kurunegala

Kandy

Kegalle

Jaffna

Kalutara

Cattle/Buffaloes

Hambantota

Galle

Colombo

Badulla

Batticaloa

Ampara

Gampaha

Poultry

12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 Anuradhapura

Number of Animals Lost

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_120-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 9 Spatial distributions of animal losses due to the occurrence of floods in Sri Lanka during the period 2005–2010 (Source: www.desinventar.lk)

Loss in other crops

Trincomalee

Ratnapura

Puttalam

Nuwara Eliya

Moneragala

Matara

Matale

Kurunegala

Kilinochchi

Kandy

Kalutara

Jaffna

Hambantota

Colombo

Batticaloa

Badulla

Anuradhapura

Ampara

Rs. Million

Loss in Paddy 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0

District

Trincomalee

Ratnapura

Puttalam

Nuwara Eliya

Matara

Moneragala

Goat

Matale

Piggery

Kurunegala

Kilinochchi

Kandy

Kalutara

Cattle/Buffaloes

Jaffna

Hambantota

Colombo

Batticaloa

Badulla

Poultry

Anuradhapura

3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0

Ampara

Number of Animals Lost

Fig. 10 Spatial distributions of crop losses due to the occurrence of drought in Sri Lanka during the period 2005–2010 (Source: www.desinventar.lk)

District

Fig. 11 Spatial distributions of animal losses due to the occurrence of drought in Sri Lanka during the period 2005–2010 (Source: www.desinventar.lk)

Impacts of Increased Temperature Regime on Food Security Being a tropical island with a uniformly high-temperature regime, most of the cultivated crops in Sri Lanka operate near the maximum of the optimum temperature range of respective crops. This phenomenon is true for animal production, too. Thus, crop injuries and animal production losses due to high temperatures are inevitable in Sri Lankan agriculture with increasing temperatures. This is of Page 16 of 25

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particular importance for the country’s major staple food, rice. It is a well-established fact that hightemperature injuries in rice are inevitable if the plant is exposed to an ambient temperature that exceeds 33
C just for 60–90 min at the anthesis stage (flowering; Punyawardena 2011). It was used to be a rare event to experience such high values of daytime temperature in major rice-growing regions of the country; however, recent agro-meteorological observations have confirmed that the frequency of such temperature events has increased significantly in both Dry and Intermediate Zones, especially during Yala seasons, resulting in high rates of unfilled grains due to increased spikelet sterility (known as Ehela Pussa). Higher temperature regimes will also increase the evapotranspiration losses, leading to frequent soil moisture stress conditions in upland crops. Recent investigations have clearly shown that the nighttime minimum temperature in many locations of the country has been increasing during recent decades, resulting in diurnal temperature range to become increasingly narrower. Even though root and tuber crops are more resilient to temporal variations of rainfall, a decreasing trend of diurnal temperature range is likely to cause negative impacts on the root and tuber crop production in the country. This will be highly reflected in potato production in the central hills as the existing environmental temperature regime is suboptimal for the crop even in the up-country region where the crop is mainly concentrated. The quality of the harvestable parts of crops is also to be affected negatively due to several reasons, which may arise due to climate change. Increased temperature, especially the nighttime minimum temperature, tends to decrease the sugar translocations to harvestable fruits and thus reduce the quality by increasing sour taste in fruit crops. Meanwhile, the fiber content of the harvestable parts of crops is also likely to increase under increased temperature regimes, thereby reducing the palatability of them. The heat stress conditions in animals under increased ambient temperature reduce the fertility and productivity of all categories of livestock and poultry, especially in high-yielding exotic breeds. This has a direct influence on production losses in the case of dairy and egg production. As the heat load accumulation inside the animal body has a profound adverse effect on the rate of growth, the meat production also gets affected significantly irrespective to the system of operation, intensive or extensive. The yield of almost all crops grown and animals reared in the country would also be negatively affected due to increased insect pest damages and infestation by all kind of pathogens such as bacteria, virus, and fungi especially under humid conditions. Even though higher yield losses due to increased weed infestation are likely to occur with increasing temperature, recent studies have shown that there is no such trend under local conditions. However, it is too early to generalize that such threats would not occur in the future. Apart from the direct impact of increased variability of rainfall and rise of ambient temperature, indirect effects of increased rainfall intensities are of special significance in terms of land degradation, which has a significant bearing on the crop production in Sri Lanka. Increased temperature is likely to enhance the local-scale convection and thereby to form more cumulonimbus clouds, giving rise to high-intensity rains (>25 mm/h). Such rains invariably will wash away the fertile top soil of arable lands and will lead to subsequent siltation and eutrophication of downstream reservoirs and any other surface water bodies. Moreover, increased temperature and frequent and negative rainfall anomalies are also likely to cause high evaporative demand of the atmosphere. This can cause salinization of agricultural lands in the semiarid parts of the country.

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Impacts of Sea-Level Rise on Food Security Being an island, Sri Lanka is highly vulnerable to sea-level rise with varying degrees of sectoral impacts. It is highly confident that seawater intrusion to agricultural lands will be an inevitable event under a changing climate, which will lead to further reduction of land available for agriculture. Increased sea-level rise will also exacerbate the coastal erosion, giving rise to some additional pressure on land available for agriculture, directly and indirectly. Also, it may reduce the quality of both drinking and irrigation water in coastal regions by disturbing the interface between freshwater and brackish water. It is highly likely that sea-level rise will disturb the Ghyben-Herzberg lens of freshwater found underneath of regosol in coastal regions. These freshwater lenses provide the irrigation water for intensive agriculture in those areas.

Adapting to Climate Change Aiming at Food Security Being cognizant of the importance of adapting to climate change, the government of Sri Lanka has taken several initiatives at the policy level by developing the National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) of 2012 (Ministry of Environment 2012) and the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) 2010–2016 (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2010). While the three main policies that deal with the agriculture sector related to food security, namely, the National Agriculture Policy of 2007 (Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Development 2007), National Livestock Development Policy of 2007 (Ministry of Livestock and Rural Community Development 2007), and the National Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Policy of 2006 (Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 2006), are in operation, the NCCP and NCCAS are expected to mainstream climate change adaptation into the national planning and development process.

Rice Rice being the major staple of Sri Lankans, more efforts have been made by the scientific community to provide suitable materials resilient to changing and variable climatic scenarios. A recent study has indicated that rice farmers in the Kurunegala district of Sri Lanka (Intermediate Zone) have lost 44 % of the agriculture income every season due to drought (Chandrasiri 2013). Chandrasiri (2013) also reported that the awareness of climate change among the farmers is high, but the adaptation is poor due to the lack of knowledge on adaptation methods, unavailability of prior information on climate change, absence of suitable cultivars, and lack of funding. A recent study (Herath and Kawasaki 2012) also reported that the variability of rice yield under the future climate conditions in the Kurunegala district of Sri Lanka shows small increasing trends, averagely 1.7 % and 2.4 % under the A2 and B2 scenarios, respectively. More yield-improving techniques are required to achieve the future rice requirement of the country under the impacts of climate change. Several successful attempts have been made in the rice production sector in the technological front to meet the challenges of climate change. The development of rice varieties, which are of short duration and suitable for short growing seasons (Harris and Shatheeswaran 2005) and high CO2 concentration (De Costa et al. 2007), is in the forefront of technological innovations. The recent release of ultrashort-duration rice varieties by the Sri Lanka Department of Agriculture such as Bg250 maturing in 75–80 days is a positive response by the government of Sri Lanka to cope up with climatic changes. Gunawardana et al. (2013) reported on the potential for adoption of aerobic growing conditions for rice varieties minimizing the water use under changing climatic conditions while assessing the competition for weeds. Page 18 of 25

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Studies carried out in Sri Lanka to identify the role of traditional paddy varieties and organic practices in adapting to climate change especially in the coastal belt have indicated that farmers have perceived climate change in rainfall patterns, intensity and timings, changes in the cloud formations, and other indicators such as the behavior of animals. As the sustainability of food production through traditional farming patterns is being challenged, farmers have been following waterconserving agronomic practices such as Kekulama or Manawari system and Nava Kekulama (dry-sowing systems; Upawansa 2013) and the System of Rice Intensification (SRI) (Somaratne 2010) and are also making informed choices in species selection by combining local knowledge on species and varieties under the guidance of several NGOs (Berger et al. 2009). Jayawardena et al. (2010) reported that paddy cultivation in the Dry and Intermediate Zones in Sri Lanka under zero-tillage condition has enabled a reduction in cost of production and enhanced water conservation without significantly affecting the yield. Breeding of salt-tolerant rice varieties is also a primary adaptation measure to maintain national rice production levels and ensure food security in the face of expanding salinity due to sea-level rise. In this regard, the salt-tolerant rice variety At354 (3½ month age class) has been developed by the Sri Lanka Department of Agriculture to meet food production challenges under saline conditions. Salinity in paddy fields could also be overcome by a combination of agronomic measures including improved field drainage, application of organic manure, rice straw and burnt paddy husk, and transplanting rice instead of direct seeding. With more frequent extreme rainfall events, the area under major irrigation reservoir schemes (reservoirs with an irrigable area of more than 200 ha) in the Wet and Intermediate Zones that practice rice + rice annual cropping pattern would not be able to claim the usual share from the transbasin diversion structures. This has forced the farming community to reduce the extent under cultivation or explore other adaptation options such as “shared cultivation” (Bethma system) but at the expense of the productivity of the system. Moreover, increased occurrence of extreme positive rainfall anomalies is likely to cause severe damages to existing irrigation infrastructure of major irrigation schemes, thus limiting the water availability for crop production systems under these reservoirs. Traditional agriculture practices coupled with endogenous paddy varieties have proven to be more successful in facing climate change events such as droughts and floods (Sharma and Rai 2010). There are many traditional paddy varieties in existence today in Sri Lanka, which have strong characteristics that help them survive climate change impacts such as droughts, heavy rains, and floods compared to newer varieties used in chemical-intensive paddy cultivation (Rathnabharathi 2009). This vigor is based on certain characteristics unique to traditional paddy varieties. The traditional varieties are capable of surviving in the nursery until the field conditions are favorable for planting. Traditional varieties are tall with a strong stem compared to the new improved varieties, thus helping them to withstand heavy rains, winds, and droughts. The husk of the paddy seed of traditional varieties can withstand waterlogged as well as drought conditions (Rathnabharathi 2009). Traditional rice varieties such as Hata da vee that survives long dry spells are being cultivated in selected areas in the Dry and Intermediate Zones of the country. Farmers are being assisted by several NGOs to identify traditional paddy varieties such as Pokkali, Kaluheenati, and Madathawalu, which can be grown in sandy and saline soils with appropriate management practices. To cope with shifting seasons due to unpredictable fluctuations in rain and temperature, long- and short-age traditional varieties such as Hata da vee (maturing in 70 days) and the Maha ma vee (maturing in 6 months) are cultivated by farming communities in different localities of Sri Lanka. Paddy farmers under the minor tank systems in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka are aligning farming activities with the recognized seasonal pattern of rainfall and managing rainwater harvested in the commonly owned village tanks (Senaratne and Wickramasinghe 2010). Amarasingha Page 19 of 25

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et al. (2014) reported that changing planting date of rice according to the onset of rainfall can reduce the irrigation water requirement and risk of rice cultivation. Early onset of rainfall coupled with early planting has resulted in higher yield and water productivity across different irrigation management options, while a higher variability has been observed in both water productivity and yield at a late onset and planting with subsistence irrigation. Dharmarathna et al. (2014) also reported that advancing the rice planting date by 1 month would be a non-cost climate change adaptation strategy for rice production in the Kurunegala district of Sri Lanka.

Coconut Analysis of coconut production data from 1971 to 2001 has shown that the foregone income to the economy due to crop shortages from unfavorable climate has varied around US$ 32–73 million (Fernando et al. 2007), and the additional income to the economy from favorable climate years producing a crop glut was US$ 42–87 million. This implies the potential for significant economic benefits from investments in adaptation that would reduce the variability in coconut production, caused by variation in climate. Some varieties such as Tall x Tall and Tall x San Ramon have been recommended for drought-prone areas in Sri Lanka to meet the challenges of climate change. Furthermore, the variety Dwarf Brown appears promising for plant breeders as an ideal parent material due to some characteristics such as nonseasonality, high-yielding capacity (higher number of nuts per bunch and higher number of inflorescences per palm per year), and relatively higher tolerance to water stress conditions compared to those of other dwarf varieties (Ministry of Environment 2010). Other Food Crops Several strategies have been adopted in the other food crops sector (excluding rice), covering many food crops at the national and household level to cope up with the changes in climate, such as (a) soil moisture conservation with mulching, soil erosion control under intensive rainy conditions to minimize surface runoff and improve the water-retention capacity of soil; (b) growing low waterdemanding crops such as mung bean (green gram), finger millet, and sesame and short-age crops for mid-season cultivation with appropriate agronomic management practices; and (c) adjusting the cropping calendar according to changes in the rainfall pattern (Howden et al. 2007). Animal Production Livestock and poultry form an important subsector in the social and economic context of the country, and hence strategies for adaptation and risk aversion to face the challenges brought by the changing and variable climatic conditions are crucial. Strategies for climate change adaptation have not been specifically highlighted in the National Livestock Development Plan – 2010 (Ministry of Livestock and Rural Community Development 2010), which is implemented at present. The animal production sector implements a strategic approach in animal breeding activities since 1994 according to the climatic regions by using different animal breeds and their crossbreds. A greater emphasis has been given for the dairy subsector in the implementation of breeding strategies as the country’s main strategy in terms of food security in relation to animal production is to bring self-sufficiency in milk and milk products. The interim target has been set to achieve 50 % self-sufficiency by the year 2015. However, there are no pasture development strategies or recommendation in place according to the climatic conditions due to various limitations that exist in the field level. Given the fact that Sri Lanka possesses a diverse climate as well as production environments, the benefit of development of climate-resilient systems for feed improvement is still pending. Page 20 of 25

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The subsectors other than dairy have breeding strategies specified for each sector, considering the adaptability of different genotypes. In addition, sustainable utilization of indigenous animals has been specifically identified in the animal breeding guidelines (Ministry of Livestock and Rural Community Development 2010). Many efforts have been taken in the past in developing locally adopted breeds suitable for different climatic regimes in the country. Kottukachchiya goat breed (Silva et al. 2010) developed as a dual-purpose breed suitable for the Dry Zone in Sri Lanka and CPRS poultry breed (Gamage et al. 2013) developed for local climatic conditions and feeding regimes are few examples of such attempts. Homegardens “Homegarden” (HG) is a complex but sustainable land use system that combines multiple farming components in the homestead and provides environmental services, household needs, employment, and income-generation opportunities to the households (Weerahewa et al. 2012). A study conducted to assess the vulnerability of HGs to climate change and its impact on household food security in Sri Lanka (Marambe et al. 2013) has identified four categories of climate change adaptation strategies adopted by homegardeners, namely, (1) changing planting date, (2) changing agronomic practices, (3) changing technology such as the use of new varieties and irrigation equipment, and (4) the use of soil and water conservation measures. Family size and perceptions on climate change have positively affected the likelihood of adoption of new technologies in Sri Lanka. Male-headed households also tend to adapt more than that of the female-headed households. The factors that negatively affect adaptation in Sri Lankan HGs included ownership of animals, HG size, age of the head of the household, and plant diversity of the HG (Marambe et al. 2012). Commercial orientation, perceptions on climate changes, years of experience of the homegardeners, and location of farming have significantly influenced the probability of adoption of adaptation strategies (Daulagala et al. 2012).

Conclusions and Way Forward The sustainable development challenge remains urgent and acute, where poverty and food insecurity impact the lives of a sizable population in developing countries including Sri Lanka. Climate change renders achieving the national-level food security more challenging, thus making sustainable development a daunting task. The United Nation’s Rio+20 summit in 2012 has thus committed governments to create six Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to be integrated to the follow-up of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) after the 2015 deadline. A new approach for long-term sustenance in food security is a necessity by effectively drawing in ecological principles to improve the productivity and efficiency of agriculture and food systems while reducing negative environmental impacts. Substantial gains in productivity in agriculture and food systems can be realized through investment, innovation, policy, and other improvements. Agriculture and food systems face many challenges, making it more difficult to achieve the primary objective of meeting the world food demand. An intimidating set of unprecedented challenges and risks including the increasing competition for land, water, and other natural resources by nonagricultural sectors affect the food security of the current and future inhabitants of the world. Food security is multidimensional, and the population growth and changes in consumption patterns associated with rising incomes drive greater demand for food and other agricultural products. Advancements in the productivity frontier, transformations in production systems, and enhanced food and environmental safety are three goals to achieve by countries, and Sri Lanka is not an exception. Page 21 of 25

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Climate change has continued to affect agricultural productivity (crops and animals) through shifts in rainfall patterns, changing temperature regimes, and increased climate variability as well as climatic extremes. Farmers in Sri Lanka have observed these changes, but their historic weather knowledge and experience are progressively becoming less useful in the agricultural planning process due to the rapid changes in the climate. The existing short-term (3–10 day) weather forecasts have provided limited assistance for planning in the agricultural sector, and hence, access to reliable intra-seasonal to seasonal climate forecasts (1 month to multi-month time frames) could provide farmers with a complementary set of response options, which can further help reduce production risks and ensure food security. Such mid-range forecasts could assist farmers and the policy makers to develop improved climate risk management strategies such as which crop to be planted and when, fertilizer application rates, and timing of irrigation activity and harvest. While seasonal climate forecasts in the tropical systems have been a challenge for modelers globally, valuing existing or even marginally improved forecasts could effectively be included in decision making in agriculture. Effective intra-seasonal to seasonal management responses to short-term climate variability are key means to progressively adapt to climate change (McKeon et al. 1993). Climate-resilient food production approaches would be the path to sustain food security for sustainable development in Sri Lanka. A research agenda closely tied to sharing of information across research, i.e., discovery, development, and deployment, is an imperative. Advancements in productivity frontier, transformations in production systems, and enhanced food and environmental safety are three priority research themes in this regard in the attempt to adapt to climate change scenarios while ensuring food security. The purpose-driven research in sustaining food security should address: (1) seasonal climate forecasting with appropriate statistical models and numerical weather predictions, crop/animal growth modeling with appropriately parameterized models, and assessment of adaptation and resilience levels of different crops and animals; (2) judicious use of wild relatives and natives for breeding/propagation for quality products and biotic and abiotic stresses, reengineering crop photosynthesis, and reverse phenology; (3) introduction and promotion of the use of precision agriculture, smart fertilizers, agroforestry, climate-smart agriculture, watershed management to minimize soil erosion and environmental contamination, and water-saving irrigation techniques; and (4) reduction in waste related to agriculture and food aiming at food safety, improved food and nutrient use efficiency, recycling and reuse, value addition, and value chain management. Realizing these goals will require an exceptional level of collaboration among stakeholders in the agriculture value chain including the government, private sector, civil society groups, academia/scientists, farmers, and consumers. Science and technological progression will make it possible for sustainable agriculture to become the new global standard, but the main factors resisting this change are political will, lack of policy coherence at many levels, financing, governance, and human behavior.

Acknowledgments The authors wish to acknowledge the financial assistance provided by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) of Australia to carry out this review through a grant agreement deed on “Improve climate forecasting to improve food security in Indian ocean rim countries” (AusAID agreement 59553) given to the Agriculture Education Unit (AEU) of the Faculty of Agriculture, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka.

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References Amarasingha RPRK, Galagedara LW, Marambe B, Silva GLLP, Punyawardena R, Nidumolu U, Howden M, Suriyagoda LDB (2014) Improving water productivity by planting rice with the onset of Maha season rain in the dry zone of Sri Lanka: a modeling approach. Trop Agric Res 25(3):277–286 Berger R, Weregoda R, Rathnabharathie V (2009) Participatory rice variety selection in Sri Lanka. Particip Learn Action 60(1):88–98 Chandrasiri WACK (2013) Farmer’s perception and adaptation to climate change: a case study in vulnerable areas of Kurunegala district. Ann Sri Lanka Dept Agric 15:13–23 Daulagala C, Weerahewa J, Marambe B, Pushpakumara G, Silva P, Punyawardena R, Premalal S, Miah G, Roy J, Jana S (2012) Socio-economic characteristics of farmers influencing adaptation to climate change: empirical results from selected homegardens in South Asia with emphasis on commercial orientation. Sri Lanka J Adv Soc Stud 2(2):71–90 De Costa WAJM, Weerakoon WMW, Chinthaka KGR, Herath HMLK, Abeywardena RMI (2007) Genotypic variation in the response of rice (Oryza sativa L.) to increased atmospheric carbon dioxide and its physiological basis. J Agron Crop Sci 193(2):117–130 Dharmarathna WRSS, Herath S, Weerakoon SB (2014) Changing the planting date as a climate change adaptation strategy for rice production in Kurunegala district, Sri Lanka. Sustain Sci 9:103–111 FAO (2009) Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security, WSFS 2009/2. Available at http:// www.fao.org/wsfs/wsfs-list-documents/en/ Fernando TK, Chandrapala L (1995) Climate variability in Sri Lanka – a study of trends of air temperature, rainfall and thunder activity. In: Proceedings of the international symposium on climate and life in Asia-Pacific, Brunei Fernando N, Zubair L, Peiris TSG, Ranasinghe CS, Ratnasiri J (2007) Economic value of climate variability impacts on coconut production in Sri Lanka. AIACC working paper no 45, START, Washington, DC Gamage de S, Silva P, Abeykoon NDF, Ibrahim MNM, Mwai O (2013) Introduction of an improved indigenous chicken to the scavenging poultry sector. In: Proceedings of the world conference of animal production, Beijing, p 113 Gunawardana WRN, Ariyarathne M, Bandaranayake P, Marambe B (2013) Control of Echinochloa colona in aerobic rice: effect of different rate of seed paddy and post-plant herbicides in the dry zone of Sri Lanka. In: Bakar B, Kurniadie D, Tjitrosoedirdjo S (eds) Proceedings of the 24th Asian Pacific Weed Science Society (APWSS) conference, Bandung, pp 432–437 Harris KD, Shatheeswaran T (2005) Performance of improved four test rice entries of short duration (2.5 months) in the eastern region of Sri Lanka. In: Proceedings of the 61st annual session of Sri Lanka Association for the Advancement of Science (SLASS), section B. Colombo, p 21 Herath S, Kawasaki J (eds) (2012) Comparative studies on development strategies considering impacts of adaptation to climate change. CECAR series no 12, UNU-ISP. Tokyo Howden SM, Soussana JF, Tubiello FN, Chhetri N, Dunlop M, Meinke HM (2007) Adapting agriculture to climate change. Proc Natl Acad Sci 104:19691–19696 http://www.desinventar.lk https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=FoodSecurity2013 Jayawardena SN, Abeysekera SW, Gunathilaka N, Herath HMJK (2010) Potential for zero tillage technique in rice and other field crop cultivation in rice based cropping systems in the dry and intermediate zones of Sri Lanka. In: Weligamage P, Godaliyadda GGA, Jinapala K (eds) Page 23 of 25

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Proceedings of the national conference on water, food security and climate change in Sri Lanka. International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Colombo. 9–11 June 2009. pp 65–74 Marambe B (2012) Current status and issues of food and nutrition security in Sri Lanka. In: National food and nutrition security conference Sri Lanka – towards a nutritious and healthy nation, Colombo, 17 Oct, p 43 Marambe B, Weerahewa J, Pushpakumara G, Silva P, Punyawardena R, Premalal S, Miah G, Roy J, Jana S (2012) Adaptation to climate change in agro-ecosystems: a case study from homegardens in South Asia. In: Proceedings of the MARCO symposium 2012 – strengthening collaboration to meet agro-environmental challenges in Monsoon Asia, National Institute for AgroEnvironmental Science, Tsukuba, pp 81–87 Marambe B, Pushpakumara G, Silva P, Weerahewa J, Punyawardena BVR (2013) Climate change and household food security in homegardens of Sri Lanka. In: HPM Gunasena, HAJ Gunathilake, JMDT Everard, CS Ranasinghe, and AD Nainanayake (eds) Proceedings of the international conference on climate change impacts and adaptation for food and environmental security, Colombo, pp 87–99 McKeon GM, Howden SM, Abel NOJ, King JM (1993) Climate change: adapting tropical and subtropical grasslands. In: Baker MJ (ed) Grasslands for our world. SIR Publishing, Wellington Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Development (2007) National agriculture policy. Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Development, Battaramulla Ministry of Environment (2010) Sri Lanka second national communication to the UNFCCC. Ministry of Environment, Battaramulla Ministry of Environment (2012) National climate change policy. Ministry of Environment, Battaramulla Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (2010) National climate change adaptation strategy for Sri Lanka 2011–2016. Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Battaramulla. Available at http://www.climatechange.lk/adaptation/Files/Strategy_Booklet-Final_for_Print_Low_ res(1).pdf Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (2006) National fisheries and aquatic resources policy. Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Colombo Ministry of Livestock and Rural Community Development (2007) National livestock development policy. Ministry of Livestock and Rural Community Development, Colombo Ministry of Livestock and Rural Community Development (2010) The national animal breeding policy – guidelines and strategies for livestock in Sri Lanka. Department of Animal Production and Health/Ministry of Livestock and Rural Community Development, Colombo Niranjan F (2004) PhD thesis, Postgraduate Institute of Agriculture, Peradeniya Nissanka SP, Punyawardena BVR, Premalal KHMS, Thattil RO (2011) Recent trends in annual and growing seasons’ rainfall of Sri Lanka. In: Proceedings of the international conference on the impact of climate change in agriculture. Faculty of Agriculture, University of Ruhuna, pp 249–263 Premalal KHMS, Punyawardena BVR (2013) Occurrence of extreme climatic events in Sri Lanka. In: Gunasena HPM, Gunathilake HAJ, Everard JMDT, Ranasinghe CS, Nainanayake AD (eds) Proceedings of the international conference on climate change impacts and adaptations for food and environment security. Hotel Renuka, Colombo, pp 49–57 Punyawardena BVR (2007) Agro-ecology (map and accompanying text), National Atlas of Sri Lanka, 2nd edn. Department of Survey, Colombo

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Punyawardena BVR (2011) Country report – Sri Lanka. Workshop on climate change and its impacts on agriculture. Seoul http://www.adbi.org/files/2011.12.13.cpp.day1.sess1.13.country. paper.sri.lanka.pdf Punyawardena R, Premalal KHMS (2013) Do trends in extreme positive rainfall anomalies in the central highlands of Sri Lanka exist? Ann Sri Lanka Dept Agric 15:1–12 Punyawardena R, Dissanaike T, Mallawathanthri A (2013a) Vulnerability of Sri Lanka to climate change – monograph. Department of Agriculture, Peradeniya Punyawardena BVR, Mehmood S, Hettiarachchi AK, Iqbal M, Silva SHSA, Goheer A (2013b) Future-climate of Sri Lanka: an approach through dynamic downscaling of ECHAM4 General Circulation Model (GCM). Trop Agric 161:35–50 Rathnabharathi V (2009) Role of traditional paddy in adaptation to climate change impacts. In: Proceedings of the role of community in adaptation to the climate change crisis workshop, Galle, pp 67–80 Senaratne A, Wickramasinghe K (2010) Climate change, local institutions and adaptation experience: the village tank farming community in dry zone Sri Lanka. In: Evans A, Jinapala K (eds) Proceedings of the national conference on water, food security and climate change in Sri Lanka, International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Colombo, 9–11 June 2009, pp 147–156 Sharma G, Rai LK (2010) Climate change and sustainability of agrodiversity in traditional farming of the Sikkim Himalaya. Mountain Institute of India, United Nations University, Tokyo and MacArthur Foundation Silva P, Dematawewa CMB, Chandrasiri N (2010) Farm animal genetic resources, Chapter 1. In: Silva P (ed) Indigenous animal genetic resources of Sri Lanka – status, potential and opportunities. GEF-UNEP-ILRI -FanGr Asia Project. University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya Somaratne WG (2010) The System of Rice Intensification (SRI) and food security among the poor: opportunities and constraints. In: Weligamage P, Godaliyadda GGA, Jinapala K (eds) Proceedings of the national conference on water, food security and climate change in Sri Lanka, 9–11 June 2009, International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Colombo, pp 81–91 Titumil RAM, Basak JK (2010) Agriculture and food security in South Asia. A historical analysis and a long run perspective. The Innovators, Dhaka Upawansa GK (2013) Nava Kekulama method for paddy cultivation. Available at http://goviya. com/nava-kekulam.htm Weerahewa J, Pushpakumara G, Silva P, Daulagala C, Punyawardena R, Premalal S, Miah G, Roy J, Jana S, Marambe B (2012) Are homegarden ecosystems resilient to climate change? An analysis of the adaptation strategies of homegardeners in Sri Lanka. APN Sci Bull 2:22–27 Weerakoon WMW (2013) Impact of climate change on food security in Sri Lanka. In: HPM Gunasena, HAJ Gunathilake, JMDT Everard, CS Ranasinghe, AD Nainanayake (eds) Proceedings of the international conference on climate change impacts and adaptation for food and environmental security, Colombo, pp 73–86 World Food Programme (2011) Sri Lanka – a food security assessment report. World Food Programme of the United Nations, Colombo

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Agricultural Extension and Adaptation Under the “New Normal” of Climate Change Brent M. Simpsona* and Gaye Burpeeb a Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA b Catholic Relief Services, Baltimore, MD, USA

Abstract Adapting to climate change is the most serious challenge facing our species. The scale is global, trajectory of onset uncertain and impacts potentially catastrophic (IPCC 2013). As further evidence emerges and as the scramble to adapt to the ‘new normal’ intensifies, persistent problems, past failures and new challenges have the potential to converge in a perfect storm. In response, extension and advisory service (EAS) providers have a key role to play as a critical link between farming populations and sources of new information and tools, so that practices can be appropriately adapted. This chapter outlines the challenge of adapting to climate change, identifies past and present points of EAS engagement, and proposes future responses, with a focus on the constraints and conditions of smallholder farmers in the tropics, and the natural resource base upon which agriculture depends.

Keywords Agriculture extension and advisory services; climate change adaptation; human capacity development; information communication technologies; policy coordination; scaling interventions; systems research; technology switching points; technology transfer/dissemination

Introduction Since the domestication of crops and the emergence of sedentary societies, adapting to climate change is the most serious challenge our species has faced. The scale is global, the potential impacts catastrophic, the time frame of onset largely unknown, and the threat of delayed action real (IPCC 2013, 2014). As further evidence emerges, we will have to continually redefine our understanding of problems and formulate responses. Extension and advisory service (EAS) providers have a key role to play as a critical link between farmers and sources of new information and tools and in aiding farming populations to anticipate and adapt their practices in response to the challenges of climate change. Public extension systems will need to improve, to change the perception that they are unimportant and outdated. Private-sector interests will need to adjust and respond to shifting opportunities, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and donors will need to join forces with others to achieve broader impact. As the scramble to adapt to the new normal intensifies, persistent problems, past failures, and new

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challenges have the potential to converge in a perfect storm. In response, all involved in agricultural adaptation will need to elevate the level and quality of their efforts. This chapter outlines the challenge of adapting to climate change, identifies past and present points of EAS engagement, and proposes future responses, with a focus on the constraints and conditions of smallholder farmers in the tropics and the natural resource base upon which their livelihoods depend. Box 1: Definitions of Key Terms Used in This Brief in the Context of Climate Change

Vulnerability: “[T]he degree to which geophysical, biological and socio-economic systems are susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse impacts of climate change” (IPCC 2007a). Resilience: “The ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner. . .” (IPCC 2012). Adaptation: “In human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, the process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects. . .” (IPCC 2012). Mitigation: The efforts undertaken to “reduce anthropogenic [greenhouse gas] emissions or to enhance natural sinks of greenhouse gases” (IPCC 2007b).

The New Normal: The Biophysical Forces Before they can prepare for and respond to global climate change, EAS providers must first understand the essential nature of climate change and the associated challenges. The rapid 20–25 % downturn in precipitation across the West African Sahel that occurred around 1970 and lasted through the 1990s provided a glimpse of what the future may hold. Global climate change, however, will be different. In the current context, and barring the onset of abrupt climate change, we are unlikely to see such a sudden shift. Climate change is a process that will continue well into the next century with impacts felt over the next millennium. Climate change is also nonlinear and highly complex, with layers of feedback loops and unknown “tipping points” that, when exceeded, offer no retreat. Moreover, changes will continue on multiple fronts – air temperature and volume and patterns of precipitation, as well as other weather features. Climate change should also be understood as permanent; there will be no return to prior conditions over the course of individual human lifetimes (IPCC 2013). Unlike challenges we have confronted in managing natural resources in the past, in the case of climate change, we have neither the means to readily affect the near-term rate or direction of change nor sufficient knowledge to anticipate the long-term synergistic effects within linked physical and natural resource systems. Climate change will exert increasing pressure on our ability to meet other major challenges, feeding the world’s growing population, which is expected to reach 9.6 billion by 2050, being paramount (UNDESA 2013). The environmental impacts of meeting rising food demand will be intensified as global warming and changes in associated climate features amplify the stressors placed on vulnerable and overburdened natural resource systems, leading to unknown interactions and feedback in the complex web of relationships among social, environmental, economic, and food systems with “uncertain consequences” (Ericksen et al. 2009). This situation is particularly troubling for people who are surviving on already degraded systems. Page 2 of 19

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Fig. 1 CO2 and global temperatures (Source: Modified from Southwest Climate Change Network, The University of Arizona (www.southwestclimatechange.org/figures/icecore_records), modified from Marian Koshland Science Museum of the National Academy of Sciences (www.koshland-science-museum.org))

EAS providers will need to contend with the effects of two dimensions of climate change: climate change trends and weather disruption.

Climate Change Trends (Slow-Onset Systemic Changes) Greenhouse gases: Increased concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) prevent solar radiation reflected from the earth’s surface from escaping the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the primary GHG emitted through human activities. The agricultural sector is a significant contributor to the problem. Taken together, the deforestation associated with agricultural expansion and direct and indirect energy use (including food transportation, processing and preparation), the agricultural sector is responsible for roughly one third of all GHG emissions (IPCC 2007b; USEPA 2006). To avoid triggering significant climate change, the upper limit of atmospheric CO2 concentration is estimated to be around 350 ppm (Hansen et al. 2008). Concentrations have been rising steadily, 2 ppm per year over the past 15 years, and reached 400 ppm in May 2013 (NOAA 2013). At this rate, CO2 levels are on track to meet the IPCC’s most pessimistic projection for 2100 (IPCC 2013). Such high levels of CO2 are expected to have a catastrophic effect on the planet’s ecosystems. One hope is that if we can reduce future GHG emissions, we can mitigate the risk of even more distant changes to the climate. But even if all additional emissions were eliminated, 15–40 % of the warming effect from past emissions will continue for the next 1,000 years (IPCC 2013). And we have barely begun the serious work of reducing emissions. Global warming: The primary outcome of rising atmospheric levels of CO2 is an increase in land and sea surface temperatures – global warming. Historical records show a close tracking of air temperatures with atmospheric CO2 levels (see Fig. 1). Over the past 60 years, average global air temperature has risen by 0.7  C; temperatures over landmasses and in the high latitudes have risen by double this amount (IPCC 2007a, 2013). Decadal warming–cooling cycles in the south Pacific, currently in a cooling phase, are thought to be responsible for the recent slowdown in the rise of global air temperatures (Kosaka and Xie 2013). When the effect subsides, more rapid warming will likely occur. Rising air temperatures trigger important secondary effects: These include (i) changes to seasonality, especially the onset and duration of warm seasons in northern latitudes; (ii) changes in the onset and duration of rainy seasons in the mono- and bimodal rainfall areas of the tropics; (iii) melting of the polar ice caps, northern latitude ice shields, and high-altitude glaciers worldwide,

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Fig. 2 Projected impact of a 3  C temperature increase on crop yields (Source: World Bank 2010)

leading to changes in the timing and volume of freshwater discharge and rising sea levels; and (iv) more water cycling through the climate system (since warmer air carries more moisture), but with nonuniform distribution – in general, wet areas are projected to get wetter and dry areas drier. Tertiary impacts of these changes on agriculture: These include (i) disruption of plant–pollinator and pest–predator relationships, altering the geography of pests and diseases, caused by rising air temperatures and changes in seasonality; (ii) higher daytime and nighttime temperatures affect plant maturation and plant respiration – the resulting yield declines (e.g., see Lobell and Asner 2003; Peng et al. 2004; Easterling and Apps 2005) will erase any positive effects on photosynthesis from higher concentrations of atmospheric CO2 (see Fig. 2); (iii) by 2100, average growing-season temperatures are projected to exceed the temperature tolerances for many crops in locations where they are now grown (see Battisti and Naylor 2009; Gourdji et al. 2013); (iv) the decline and eventual loss of glacial water sources will drastically affect the systems that depend on these for irrigation, especially in high-population areas in Asia; and (v) rising sea levels will inundate low-lying coastal areas and islands, causing increased saltwater intrusion in coastal river and groundwater systems, eventually displacing tens of millions of people in flood-prone areas and potentially affecting a tenth of the world’s population – those living within 10 m of sea level (McGranahan et al. 2007). Our understanding of when, where, and how these changes will be felt is still nascent (IPCC 2014). These general trends, however, will continue as long as we continue to emit substantial amounts of GHGs and long after. The very act of feeding the world’s population (agriculture) is a major source of emissions, and this effect will likely increase, not decrease, as we struggle to increase food production by the required 60–70 % by 2050 (FAO 2009; USAID 2013).

Weather Disruption (Extreme and Aberrant Weather Events) More frequent and severe and at unpredictable times and places: Severe weather events – droughts, floods, hurricanes/cyclones/typhoons, and heat waves – are occurring with increased frequency, duration, and severity (IPCC 2012). The additional moisture carried by warmer air and the increased energy stored in the oceans (i.e., 90 % of the solar energy trapped by GHGs) are leading to more intense and frequent storm events, as well as the systemic changes to rainfall described above (IPCC 2013). Extreme heat events in areas such as West Africa, for example, which

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Fig. 3 Numbers of extreme weather events globally, by year (Credit: Naam 2013)

typically occur once in 20 years, are predicted to occur every 2 years by the end of the century (IPCC 2012), and historically rare, once-in-50-years, once-in-100-years, and once-in-300-years events will become commonplace (see Fig. 3). EAS providers will increasingly be called on to assist with relief efforts for affected populations in the wake of these unpredictable and severe weather events (Shepherd et al. 2013). Depletion and reduced resilience: Increasingly disruptive weather patterns will wear down the resilience of human systems and lead to the ecological restructuring of natural systems. Productivity will decline in some areas; natural resources and financial reserves will be depleted and unavailable for investment in long-term welfare improvements. Countries whose economies depend on rain-fed agriculture will be especially vulnerable; for example, in the Africa region, between 1960 and 2000, gross domestic product tracked closely with the rise and fall of annual rainfall levels (Barrios et al. 2003). At the farm level, investments in agricultural enterprises, especially those that depend on vulnerable local resources (such as seasonal water sources), will become increasingly risky.

Implications for Smallholders and the Rural Poor Global climate change has sobering implications for natural resource management (NRM) and our long-term ability to feed ourselves. It also calls into question our continued ability to rely on agriculture for long-term poverty reduction and economic growth (World Bank 2008, 2010). One of the hallmarks of the vitality of rural communities and smallholders is their ability to respond and adapt to changes that affect their livelihoods. Older villagers and more experienced farmers have noted changes in local climate and weather for several decades. Changes that are compounding the effects of expanded crop production and meeting fuelwood needs, leading to soil erosion and declining fertility through reduction and abandonment of fallow periods, increased insect pressures and incidence of disease, all related to the intensification of resource extraction (Bryan et al. 2009; Ebi et al. 2011; Gbetibouo 2009). The fewer assets that rural families have – human, financial, natural, social, political, physical – the more challenging it becomes for them to cope with change and the longer it takes for them to recover from even modest shocks. Many communities and households already struggle Page 5 of 19

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to survive due to ongoing degradation of natural resources. The negative impacts of climate change trends and weather disruptions will further deplete the natural and financial assets of the rural poor, increasing their vulnerability (Barrett and McPeak 2006). Collectively, legal tenure systems in many countries also undermine farmers’ control over natural resources. Ineffective national policies and local management structures further weaken farmers’ ability to manage natural resources, increasing their vulnerability to climate-induced trends and shocks. In contrast, within the context of climate change, there is a growing need to link individual agricultural decisions with larger landscape and land-use management challenges. Individuals and communities can be slow to implement changes in NRM, especially in locations with high proportions of vulnerable households and where there are no immediately observable benefits in productivity (Marenya and Barrett 2007; Shiferaw et al. 2009). Unfortunately, the benefits of most changes in NRM take time to manifest and are easily masked by seasonal stresses. Changes in local weather patterns, including more frequent severe events, will push smallholders to take up new NRM practices more quickly. Indeed, disasters can trigger rapid, widespread behavioral change that EAS providers must be prepared to capitalize on (see Box 2).

The Challenges of Climate Change for EAS Providers The nature and range of professional challenges facing EAS providers will increase as the cumulative effects of climate change manifest themselves, including helping vulnerable farmers and rural communities to: (a) Adapt their livelihoods to current and future changes in local weather conditions and the evolving status of natural resource systems. (b) Strengthen the (bio)physical and social resilience of natural and human systems to withstand and recover quickly from increasingly frequent and severe weather events. (c) Mitigate risks of further climate change by conserving existing carbon stocks, reducing CO2 emissions from agriculture, and helping to sequester atmospheric CO2 in trees and soil organic matter.

EAS Key Challenge No. 1: Determining the Technological and Adaptive Practice Switching Points

Extension and research programs must determine what proportion of limited human and financial resources to allocate to landscape-level versus farm-level interventions and within these different scales they must help farmers and rural communities to determine the timing, nature, and location of specific adaptive changes. The challenge lies in helping farmers and rural communities transition from current to anticipated future conditions, while keeping in sight the context of location-specific problems, appropriate scale and time frame, and availability of resources. To effect landscape-level changes in NRM, EAS providers will need to work with and through multi-stakeholder decision processes, help broker agreements, strengthen management structures, and mediate conflicts. There will be some hard choices to make. Specific decisions related to climate change adaptation may include: • When to switch to varieties and crops with greater tolerance to emergent climate change stressors • When to modify or switch land-use systems (e.g., from annual crops to perennials more tolerant of droughts and intensive rainfall) Page 6 of 19

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• When to transition from rain-fed production to supplementary irrigation as the frequency and length of dry spells increase • When to augment and increase the capacity of drainage systems to handle extreme rainfall events • When to shift use of land types – for example, moving from drought-prone uplands to better watered lowlands or moving out of increasingly flood-prone riparian areas • When to diversify out of agriculture and ultimately abandon certain areas as they become untenable as zones of production Making these choices for specific locations and at different scales will be difficult. The optimal timing for adaptive responses is never obvious, as it depends on local and external resources and costs; individual, social, and institutional capabilities; evolving markets; and national policy frameworks. Individual technology and management choices offer benefits under specific ranges of conditions and are suboptimal in others. Once taken, some choices may preclude following other action pathways. Some options involve significant lead times – e.g., for irrigation system development – that must be anticipated if they are to deliver full benefits as needs arise. Different choices offer varying degrees of robustness in their ability to meet a range of possible climate futures. And in all cases, there are limits to adaptation. Box 2: The Lessons of Hurricane Mitch

The events in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998 illustrate the importance of timing and scale. Families who had previously resisted planting live contour barriers to stem runoff and erosion lost their hillside plots in the hurricane while neighboring plots were protected by well-spaced vetiver hedges and rock barriers. A large multiagency research project on farmer responses to Hurricane Mitch found that plots under conservation agriculture practices sustained 58–99 % less damage, retained 28–38 % more topsoil, and suffered two to three times less surface erosion than conventionally managed plots. Seeing the differences, households that had previously resisted changing NRM practices immediately began to demand training and the adoption of new practices and technologies soared (World Neighbors 2000). Lesson 1: Efforts to bring about behavioral change should to be targeted at the appropriate scale – in this case, hillsides within a watershed. Lesson 2: Use observable evidence of climate change to focus farmers’ attention on the importance and interrelations of NRM practices and agricultural management alternatives – i.e., capitalize on the teachable and learnable moments.

EAS Key Challenge No. 2: Enhancing Effective Technology Exchange, Adaptation, and Dissemination EAS providers must enhance and facilitate technology exchange, adaptation, and dissemination to match the need for continual climate change adjustments. For guidance, EAS providers can learn from past and present examples of how others have adapted to significant changes in under climatic conditions, including indigenous responses, as well as draw lessons from formal research efforts relating to new or best-bet responses relevant to projected conditions. The ability to skillfully identify and efficiently assess, modify, test, and exchange useful technologies and practices from around the world will be increasingly important in adapting to climate change impacts as research systems struggle to keep pace with new and evolving problems (e.g., Ramírez-Villegas et al. 2011). Page 7 of 19

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One immediate challenge is the lack of a unified global agricultural knowledge system, leaving us collectively ill-prepared to rapidly draw upon and utilize the wealth of agricultural knowledge that has been generated over the course of human history.

EAS Providers: Bringing It All Together It will be imperative for EAS providers to step more fully into a facilitating role. The EAS tools and tested practices to help farmers assess and implement climate change-related adaptations, necessary to maintain viable agriculture-based livelihoods, are early in their development. Moreover, while responding to the risks and impacts of climate change, traditional concerns for poverty reduction, economic growth, and food security cannot be abandoned. Fortunately, because of the close coupling of human and natural systems within agriculture, there are potential synergies between the various objectives; many adaptive measures can be viewed as “no risk” or “no regrets” (Heltberg et al. 2009) – i.e., changes that will strengthen overall resilience and enhance productivity regardless of when and whether anticipated climate-induced shocks materialize or not, for example, building up soil organic matter, maintaining year-round vegetative and/or residue cover, and investing in improved water-harvesting and conserving practices in dry areas. The challenges of climate change call for stronger integration of NRM and agricultural EAS (Hunt et al. 2011; Johnson et al. 2006; Swanson 2008). However, few public-sector extension systems are structured to facilitate close integration of these efforts. There are exceptions, such as Malawi, where the same public-sector extension field agents support the full range of crop, livestock, fisheries, forestry, and irrigation programs. Having a single point of entry at the community level offers the potential of coordination between various initiatives. The downside, however, is that the demands placed on individual field agents to be knowledgeable across the entire spectrum of agricultural activities far exceed their training and the programmatic support they are offered (Simpson et al. 2012); this can lead to the overloading of frontline workers and confusion at the field level. Closer functional linkages will also need to be (re)established between EAS and research programs, currently missing from most extension programs. Closer relations will allow EAS programs to benefit fully from research contributions, while research programs will benefit from a clearer understanding of the needs, challenges, and progress made by farming communities in adapting to climate change. The management of local opinion regarding adaptation to the new normal will likely also become part of the EAS portfolio. Escalating conflict, avoiding panic and destructive short-term behaviors, as well as addressing the despondency of indigenous populations losing a sense of place are real concerns. Engendering trust and credibility with local populations will be key. All in all, the levels of knowledge and skills required by frontline EAS providers to match various opportunities with site-specific needs, as well as EAS program flexibility and responsiveness, surpass any that are currently in place, yet define the path forward in preparing for life under the new normal.

The Road Ahead The approximately 2.5 billion smallholder farmers (IFAD 2013) who manage a majority of the nearly 22.2 million square kilometers of the earth’s surface under agriculture (Zomer et al. 2009) represent a tremendous force in our ability to utilize NRM practices to help mitigate the negative impacts of future climate change, and they form a large part of the target domain for EAS programming. Using agriculture as an engine for economic growth, poverty reduction, increased food security, and now also for adaptation to climate change is predicated on effecting widespread behavioral change involving the adoption of more productive, less wasteful agricultural Page 8 of 19

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technologies and management practices. But working on these themes with farmers and the rural poor under the new normal – in a context of continual and increasingly disruptive change – is a daunting new challenge. To effect behavioral change, EAS providers will first need to address the issue of helping farming populations understand that the new normal really is a departure from the past and that responding to it will require adoption of truly adaptive measures and not simply belt tightening and coping until conditions return to the way they used to be. To respond to the breadth of challenges of adapting to climate change, EAS providers will need to (i) reconsider their strategies and operational frameworks for engaging rural populations, (ii) increasingly work with groups at appropriate scales, (iii) overhaul training curricula, (iv) maximize use of advanced information and communications technology (ICT), and (v) advocate for supportive policies. The remainder of the chapter addresses each of these issues in turn.

Evolving Strategies and Frameworks The systemic nature of global climate change will require use of commensurate systems thinking to proactively engage the quadruple climate change challenge of mitigation, adaptation, decreased vulnerability, and increased resilience within the agricultural sector. The abandonment of support for the farming systems research and extension (FSR/E) paradigm by donors in the early 1990s has regrettably been accompanied by a nearly complete loss of formal systems analysis in applied agricultural research and extension practice. The payment for environmental services (PES) framework offers a conceptually rich subset of value chain development activity but has encountered stiff challenges in bringing environmental externalities into the marketplace. Watershed management and the wild west environment of the carbon-offset markets are probably the two PES action areas most relevant to EAS climate change efforts. Transaction costs and, in the case of carbon offsets, the costs of measurement, reporting, and verification systems have been barriers to widespread smallholder involvement. One can hope that we are in a transitional phase and that more holistic climate change vulnerability assessment and adaptation planning procedures will become central features in development efforts. Given the nature and breadth of changes that are taking place under the new normal, it is difficult to envision how appropriate responses will be forthcoming without engaging in systems thinking and consideration of interactions. Under the new normal, systems thinking will need to engage more broad-based system principles that hold over a wider range of conditions and recognize that the process of continuous change will not allow exhaustive investigations of individual, location-specific, system interactions. For example, precise recommendations on optimal intercropping associations (e.g., spacing, plant populations and planting patterns) will quickly become irrelevant with any significant change in rainfall or temperature, whereas basic principles relating to soil organic matter management, protection of critical water sources, and competitive and facilitative plant interactions can be applied by farmers in endless configurations across a range of climate regimes (e.g., Altieri 1987; Francis 1986; Gliessman 1990; Vandermeer 1989). Fortunately, within the domain of NRM-oriented agriculture, many land management principles confer broad-based, system-level benefits that allow farmers to contribute simultaneously to mitigation efforts while making needed adaptive responses and enhancing the resilience and profitability of their farming systems. In the context of the new normal, the greatest advantage of the formal research system is the capacity to engage in anticipatory analysis, development, and dissemination of responsive technologies – for example, the development of new heat- and drought-tolerant maize varieties and the development of submergence-tolerant rice varieties by the international agricultural research centers (Cairns et al. 2013; Septiningsih et al. 2009). In contrast, formal research and EAS processes Page 9 of 19

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will likely prove too slow in responding to the real-time and disparate needs for more nuanced management adjustments by farmers in specific contexts. Continued practice of promoting prescriptive, general recommendations focusing on short-term optimization will become increasingly ineffective. The need to rely on and feed farmers’ inherent adaptive capacities to fit tools and practices to local applications, the focus of much effort in the 1980s and 1990s in developing participatory methodologies, will need to be an integral part of EAS operational strategies.

Working with People Regardless of the source of innovations, most EAS providers will need to engage in iterative cycles of experimentation and learning as they begin to work with rural communities in testing highpotential adaptation practices, preferably while risks are low. Consistent, ongoing EAS support in NRM-centric agriculture will be critical to give communities the confidence and skills to implement effective mitigation and adaptation efforts. Most technical options will require capacity strengthening and the support of broad-based community engagement. In spite of the challenges, the nature of climate change impacts is such that strengthening social capital for collective action and strengthening the local knowledge base on local ecosystem functioning are essential parts of an adaptation strategy. In general, communities have a deep attachment to the areas where they live. Their collective history of environmental knowledge provides them with important assets for managing local natural resources. The shared knowledge and relationships of trust with one another and known points of opposition are the foundation for establishing effective comanagement structures, especially if they are fortified by strong community organizations, technical support for sustainable resource use, and policies codifying local resource rights (Brunckhorst 2010). Ferse et al. (2010) found that community involvement in environmental design for access, use, and protection of natural resources resulted in more adaptive, flexible management and more resilient ecosystems. Furthermore, when social networks included a mix of actors in the same watershed, those actors who had links to additional sources of information were able to bring new perspectives and opportunities that helped to improve management responses (Bodin et al. 2006).

EAS Education and Training To help prepare EAS practitioners for the challenges described in this chapter, preservice education programs will need a major overhaul, and a process of regular in-service updates will need to be established. Recently, the importance of investing in tertiary (college-level) agricultural education has come back on the development agenda. But given the past neglect, needs vastly exceed the available resources and must be redressed if we are to begin taking the worldwide human resource crisis in agriculture seriously. One of the common findings of recent EAS assessments is the aging population of public-sector EAS staff; on average the members are within a decade of retirement (e.g., Simpson and Dembele 2011; Simpson et al. 2012; Simpson and Singh 2013). The gaps that will be created by retirement, combined with the current gaps and weaknesses in the EAS education and training system, will exert themselves for years to come, just as the pressures for a more capable EAS workforce are making themselves felt. Though particularly acute in Africa (e.g., Eicher 2004), the neglect of human resource development is by no means an African crisis alone (BIFAD 2003). There is now an opportunity to address this underinvestment in education by revitalizing national training programs to prepare the next generation of EAS practitioners for the challenges of responding to conditions under the new normal.

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Information and Communications Technology (ICT) The potential contributions of technological innovations to support sustainable development efforts have been promoted for over a decade (NRC 2002). Outside of the research community, however, little progress has been made. In contrast, the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET), one of the longest-lived programs involving applied advanced technologies, will likely see increased use in the decades ahead. To help capture the geographic and temporal dimensions of climate change impacts, climate and crop models, remote sensing, and geographic information system (GIS) technologies all have important roles to play in assisting policy-makers and research and extension program managers in targeting their respective efforts. One example of combining the predictive capability of climate and crop modeling with soil and geographic data is the collaborative work undertaken by Catholic Relief Services, the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), and the International Center for Maize and Wheat Improvement (CIMMYT) in Central America in the “Tortillas on the Roaster” project (Eitzinger et al. 2012). Developing an integrated assessment framework led to the identification of three major types of interventions and the ability to target these to specific geographic locations (see Box 3). One of the outcomes of this project was the capability to predict the effect of climate change on Central American maize and bean production in particular locations based on soil quality. This type of information can be immensely valuable in geographic and technical targeting of EAS programming. Other ICT tools are equally valuable. Weather information and the use of radio and text messaging services have the potential to assist farmers in accessing real-time information for intra-seasonal management decisions. Early warning systems, such as FEWS NET (USAID) and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization Global Information Early Warning System, will become increasingly valuable tools for national decision-makers, donors, and emergency response agencies in gaining the lead time necessary to prepare response measures for slow-onset emergencies. For populations at risk, warning systems focused on rapid-onset emergencies, such as floods and typhoons, are in place and under development in South and Southeast Asia. In combination, the analytic power, communication reach, and immediacy of these ICT tools will become increasingly important for EAS programs. Box 3: Three Major Types of Interventions Identified by the “Tortillas on the Roaster” Project

Adaptation spots: Areas where yield reductions of the crops in the model, in this case maize and beans, are expected to be 25 % and 50 % by the 2020s and 2050s, respectively. In adaptation spots, EAS for agriculture can be used to promote locally appropriate adaptation practices. Hot spots: Areas where yield reductions of the crops in the model are expected to be >50 % by the 2050s. In hot spots, EAS would support diversification of livelihoods and transitioning out of current, vulnerable livelihood systems. Pressure spots: Areas with potential for 25 % gains in production. The problem is that most of these pressure spots are forested or protected areas at risk of incursion by agriculture. Pressure spot interventions require support from EAS for natural resource protection and sustainable management and offer potential targets for PES (payment for environmental services) interventions (Fig. 4).

Importance of Policies Few national EAS programs have launched initiatives aimed specifically at assisting farmers in adapting to climate change. The reasons for this warrant further investigation. At the policy level, Page 11 of 19

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Fig. 4 Climate change impact on bean-producing areas in Central America

however, there are growing indications of positive changes within national agricultural investment plans toward large-scale climate change adaptations. The Plan Maroc Vert (the Moroccan Green Plan) is one such example. Cast in terms of an economic growth and poverty reduction strategy, the Plan responds to a steady 30-year decline in rainfall levels by, among other things, assisting smallholder producers to transition from hillside annual crop production to higher value tree crop production, especially olives, almonds, and figs, which are tolerant of increasingly arid conditions. Accompanied by investments in structures to prevent soil erosion, these plantations will help farmers maintain and improve their livelihoods in the face of environmental change. The US$ 300 million investment under the US Millennium Challenge Corporation Moroccan compact, supporting the establishment and rehabilitation of 120,000 ha of hillside agroforestry plantations, is one of the first major investments in implementing Plan Maroc Vert, to which other donors are also contributing (Cooper et al. 2013). Another example is the Malawi Greenbelt Initiative, with an initial target of bringing one million hectares under irrigation and strategic plans for developing 228,000 ha (Government of Malawi 2010). The initiative is primarily justified as an economic development effort aimed at exploiting surface water resources to increase high-value agricultural production and strengthen food security. The initiative stands to make major strides in assisting producers to transition to systems less exposed to the immediate risks of climate change. These examples illustrate the type of policy decisions and the level of investments that governments must make in preparing for anticipated climate change impacts. Investments in EAS training programs and other support services are also needed to maximize benefits. To support implementation of Plan Maroc Vert, the Moroccan government has drafted a new national extension strategy. The Malawi Greenbelt Initiative called for the training of an additional 1,000 extension agents, with plans for hiring an additional 400 staff members over 4 years (Government of Malawi 2010). The sheer size of these undertakings and the need to mobilize resources are such that planning horizons must be lengthened to investment cycles of 10–15 years or more.

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Agricultural policies involving subsidies are designed to influence farmer behavior in securing national food security objectives. These policies, however, can work against extension efforts to assist farmers to transition to more diverse, resilient production systems, leaving farmers more vulnerable to climate change trends and shocks (e.g., Simpson et al. 2012; Chinsinga et al. 2011). Decision-makers will need to review their policy frameworks closely with an eye to climate change adaptation to eliminate inconsistencies and identify leverage points. Policy changes can also have dramatic effects in terms of facilitating farmer investments in NRM. For example, Niger’s new Forest Code in 2004 recognized customary resource rights and the right to collect and use forest products. The granting of secure tenure rights, removal of punitive fines, and addition of a new source of technical assistance resulted in one of the most dramatic transformations of land cover in the region, with five million hectares, nearly half of the country’s agricultural land, being converted to agroforestry management systems in less than a decade (Stickler 2012). In the process, farmers greatly increased their resilience to climate change impacts.

Best Prospects: Extension and Advisory Services Under the New Normal The future of agriculture under the new normal is defined by increasing risks and uncertainties. The ideas presented here are by no means exhaustive, but are intended to focus attention on key issues, stimulate thinking, identify directions, and urge action at the appropriate pace and scale. There is an urgent need to make progress in climate change mitigation, preparing for adaptation, and to decrease vulnerability and increase resilience within the agricultural sector. Recommendations for EAS providers: 1. EAS programs need to identify and be well informed about the essential nature of climate change risks and impacts, including the geographic zones of impact and likely trajectories of onset, the relative magnitude, level of certainty, likely timing, and location of slow- and rapidonset risks. 2. Within the target locations for various types of risk, EAS providers must assess the vulnerability and resilience of human populations and natural resource systems in order to prioritize the allocation of resources. Use of a systems approach to identify linkages – involving at a minimum human/social, climate/environmental, financial/food security dimensions – is critical. 3. Based on assessed needs, EAS programs must identify any available multi-win, no-regrets, and robust options and demand that research institutions begin the hard work of assessing and screening available technologies for their fit under likely future conditions and identify technology gaps now so that appropriate responses will be available when needed. Issues that need to be taken into account by EAS programs include how to: (a) Match appropriate actions at the requisite scales and locations and plan for the temporal sequencing of responses (b) Determine social and organizational requirements to support technical choices (c) Develop market and nonmarket incentives for farmers and other stakeholders to stimulate behavior change (d) Mediate potential policy distortions that may increase smallholder risk 4. To identify potential technical and social alternatives, EAS providers must establish and aggressively engage in national and subregional platforms for networking and exchange of

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5.

6. 7.

8.

9.

10.

experiences and become skilled in tapping into cross-regional and global resources. At the field level, learning from and building upon indigenous responses will be vital. Technology transfer efforts need to be accompanied by streamlined procedures for technology release combined with the freedom to actively encourage and facilitate experimentation with new technologies by farmer groups. EAS providers should participate in the identification and use of ICT applications (e.g., early warning systems) for various target audiences. EAS education and training programs must be significantly upgraded so that field and management staff members are prepared for the risks of climate change. Critical areas include a sound understanding of climate change dynamics, a broad systems orientation, technical competency, and methodological expertise. EAS program directors will need to engage more intensively in policy formation and review, with a view to incorporating plans for climate change adaptation and providing support for producer populations that may be at risk. Policy-makers must prioritize investments in EAS programs and related support services to help farmers make difficult transitions. Programmatic divides between ministries must be identified and removed, in order to capitalize on potential operational synergies among EAS programs (e.g., crops, forestry, livestock, etc.). National EAS programs must also actively seek collaboration with actors outside of government who can help to increase the scale of impacts of EAS efforts. Perhaps most challenging of all will be efforts to bring field-level coordination and coherence to public- and donor-funded initiatives and to help orient private-sector actors to emerging climate change adaptive opportunities. Design and implementation of national strategies should involve coalitions of public- and private-sector actors with donors and NGOs.

The list of needs is long and the demands are high, but the stakes are higher still. All those involved will be challenged to elevate their efforts. Our continued ability to feed the planet depends on the outcome.

Acknowledgments This chapter is based on a longer work by the authors (Simpson and Burpee 2014) produced through support of the USAID funded Modernizing Extension and Advisory Services project.

References Altieri M (1987) Agroecology: the scientific basis of alternative agriculture. Westview Press, Boulder Barrett CB, McPeak JG (2006) Poverty traps and safety nets. In: de Janvy A, Kandur R (eds) Poverty, inequality and development essays in honor of Erik Thorbecke. Springer, New York Barrios S, Bertinelli L, Strobl E (2003) Dry times in Africa, vol 03/07, CREDIT research paper. Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade, University of Nottingham, Nottingham Battisti DS, Naylor RL (2009) Historical warnings of future food insecurity with unprecedented seasonal heat. Science 233(5911):240–244 Page 14 of 19

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Board for International Food and Agriculture Development (BIFAD) (2003) Renewing USAID investment in global long-term training and capacity building in agriculture and rural development. BIFAD, Washington, DC Bodin O, Crona B, Ernstson H (2006) Social networks in natural resource management: what is there to learn from a structural perspective? Ecol Soc 11(2):r2. Retrieved from www. ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/resp2 Brunckhorst DJ (2010) Using context in novel community-based natural resource management: landscapes of property, policy and place. Environ Conserv 37(01):16–22 Bryan E, Deressa TT, Gbetibouo GA, Ringler C (2009) Adaptation to climate change in Ethiopia and South Africa: options and constraints. Environ Sci Policy 12(4):413–426 Cairns J, Crossa J, Zaidi PH, Grudloyma P, Sanchez C, Araus JL, Atlin GN et al (2013) Identification of drought, heat and combined drought and heat tolerant donors in maize. Crop Sci 52(4):1335–1346. Retrieved from https://www.crops.org/publications/cs/pdfs/53/4/1335 Chinsinga B, Mangani R, Mvula P (2011) The political economy of adaptation through crop diversification in Malawi. IDS Bull 42(3):110–117 Cooper PJM, Cappiello S, Vermeulen SJ, Campbell BM, Zougmoré R, Kinyangi J (2013) Largescale implementation of adaptation and mitigation actions in agriculture, vol 50, CCAFS working paper. CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS), CGIAR, Copenhagen Easterling W, Apps M (2005) Assessing the consequences of climate change for food and forest resources: a view from the IPCC. Clim Chang 70(1–2):165–189 Ebi KL, Padgham J, Doumbia M, Kergna A, Smith J, Butt T, McCarl B (2011) Smallholder adaptation to climate change in Mali. Clim Chang 108:423–436 Eicher CK (2004) Rebuilding Africa’s scientific capacity in food and agriculture. Department of Agricultural Economics Staff Paper 2004–12. Michigan State University, East Lansing Eitzinger A, Sonder K, Schmidt A (2012) Tortillas on the roaster summary report: central America maize-bean systems and the changing climate. Catholic Relief Services, Baltimore Ericksen PJ, Ingram JSI, Liverman DM (2009) Food security and global environmental change: emerging challenges. Environ Sci Policy 12(4):373–377 Ferse SCA, Manez Costa M, Manez KS, Adhuri DS, Glaser M (2010) Allies, not aliens: Increasing the role of local communities in marine protected area implementation. Environ Conserv 37(1):23–24 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2009) Global agriculture towards 2050. How to feed the world 2050. High-level expert forum. FAO, Rome, 12–13 Oct 2009 Francis C (1986) Multiple cropping systems. Macmillan Publishing Company, New York Gbetibouo GA (2009) Understanding farmers’ perceptions and adaptations to climate change and variability: the case of the Limpopo Basin, South Africa. IFPRI Discussion Paper 00849. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC Gliessman S (1990) Agroecology: researching the ecological basis for sustainable agriculture. Springer, New York Gourdji SM, Sibley AM, Lobell DB (2013) Global crop exposure to critical high temperatures in the reproductive period: historical trends and future projections. Environ Res Lett 8(2):024041. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/8/2/024041 Government of Malawi (2010) The agriculture sector wide approach (ASWAp) – Malawi’s prioritized and harmonized Agriculture Development Agenda. Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Republic of Malawi, Lilongwe

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Hansen J, Sato M, Kharecha P, Beerling D, Berner R, Masson-Delmotte V, Zachos JC et al (2008) Target atmosphere CO2: where should humanity aim? Open Atmos Sci J 2:217–231. Retrieved from http://benthamscience.com/open/toascj/articles/V002/217TOASCJ.pdf Heltberg R, Siegel PB, Jorgensen SL (2009) Addressing human vulnerability to climate change: toward a “no-regrets” approach. Glob Environ Change 19:89–99 Hunt W, Vanclay F, Birch C, Coutts J, Flittner N, Williams B (2011) Agricultural extension: building capacity and resilience in rural industries and communities. Rural Soc 20:112–127 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007a) In: Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Assessing Key Vulnerabilities and the Risk from Climate Change. Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York (IPCC/WGII/AR4) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007b) In: Metz B, Davidson OR, Bosch PR, Dave R, Meyer LA (eds) Agriculture. Mitigation of climate change. Contribution of Working Group III to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York (IPCC/WGIII/AR4) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2012) Summary for policymakers. In: Field CB, Barros V, Stocker TF, Qin D, Dokken DJ, Ebi KL, Mastrandrea MD, Mach KJ, Plattner G-K, Allen SK, Tignor M, Midgley PM (eds) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation. A special report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York, pp 1–19 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2013) Summary for policymakers. In: Stocker TF, Qin D, Plattner G-K, Tignor M, Allen SK, Boschung J, Nauels A, Xia Y, Bex V, Midgley PM (eds) Climate change 2013: the physical science basis. Working Group I contribution to the fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014) Summary for policymakers. Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Working Group II contribution to the fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2013) Smallholders, food security, and the environment. IFAD, Rome Johnson JE, Creighton JH, Norland ER (2006) Building a foundation for success in natural resources extension education: an international perspective. Assoc Int Agric Ext Educ J 13(3):33–45 Kosaka Y, Xie SP (2013) Recent global-warming hiatus tied to equatorial pacific surface cooling. Nature 501:403–407 Lobell DB, Asner GP (2003) Climate and management contributions to reecnt trends in US agricultural yields. Science 299:1032 Marenya PP, Barrett CB (2007) Household-level determinants of adoption of improved natural resource management practices among smallholder farmers in western Kenya. Food Policy 32(4):739–752 McGranahan G, Balk D, Anderson B (2007) The rising tide: assessing the risks of climate change and human settlements in low elevation coastal zones. Environ Urban 19(1):17–37 Naam R (2013) The infinite resource: the power of ideas on a finite planet. University Press of New England, Lebanon

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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (2013) [untitled dataset] Retrieved from ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/trends/co2_gr_mlo.txt National Research Council (NRC) (2002) Down to earth: geographic information for sustainable development. National Academies Press, Washington, DC Peng S, Huang J, Sheehy JE, Laza RC, Visperas RM, Zhong X, Cassman KG et al (2004) Rice yields decline with higher night temperature from global warming. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 101(27):9971–9975. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC454199/ Ramírez-Villegas J, Lau C, Köhler A-K, Signer J, Jarvis A, Arnell N, Osborne T, Hooke J (2011) Climate analogues: finding tomorrow’s agriculture today. Working paper no. 12. CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security, Cali. Retrieved from www.ccafs.cgiar.org Septiningsih EM, Pamplona AM, Sanchez DL, Neeraja CN, Vergara GV, Heuer S, Ismail AM, Mackill DJ (2009) Development of submergence-tolerant rice cultivars: the Sub1 locus and beyond. Ann Bot 103:151–160 Shepherd A, Mitchell T, Lewis K, Lenhardt A, Jones L, Scott L, Muir-Wood R (2013) The geography of poverty, disasters and climate extremes in 2030. Overseas Development Institute, Met Office Hadley Centre, and Risk Management Solutions, London. Retrieved from http://www. odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8633.pdf Shiferaw BA, Okello J, Reddy RV (2009) Adoption and adaptation of natural resource management innovations in smallholder agriculture: reflections on key lessons and best practices. Environ Dev Sustain 11(3):601–619 Simpson BM, Burpee G (2014) Adaptation under the new normal of climate change: the future of agricultural extension and advisory services. Modernizing Extension and Advisory Services discussion paper no. 3. USAID, Washington, DC Simpson BM, Dembélé E (2011) Modernizing extension and advisory services – rapid scoping mission Mali. Modernizing Extension and Advisory Services Project. USAID, Washington, DC Simpson BM, Singh KM (2013) Assessment of agricultural extension and advisory services. Modernizing Extension and Advisory Services Project. USAID, Washington, DC, Bihar State, 24 Sept–5 Oct 2012 Simpson BM, Heinrich G, Malindi G (2012) Strengthening pluralistic agricultural extension in Malawi – rapid scoping. Modernizing Extension and Advisory Services Project. USAID, Washington, DC, 9–27 Jan 2012 Stickler M (2012) Focus on land in Africa brief: Niger. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC Swanson BE (2008) Global review of good agricultural extension and advisory service practices. Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Population Division (2013) World population prospects: the 2012 revision. United Nations, New York United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2013) Feed the future fact sheet. Retrieved from http://feedthefuture.gov/sites/default/files/resource/files/ftf_overview_factsheet_oct2012.pdf United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) (2006) Global anthropogenic non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions: 1990–2020. Office of Atmospheric Programs, Climate Change Division. EPA 430-R-06-005. GPO, Washington, DC Vandermeer JH (1989) The ecology of intercropping. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge World Bank (2008) World development report 2008: agriculture for development. World Bank, Washington, DC

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World Bank (2010) World development report 2010: development and climate change. World Bank, Washington, DC World Neighbors (2000) Reasons for resiliency: toward a sustainable recovery after Hurricane Mitch. World Neighbors, Oklahoma City Zomer RJ, Trabucco A, Coe R, Place F (2009) Trees on farm: analysis of global extent and geographical pattern of agroforestry. ICRAF working paper no. 89. World Agroforestry Center, Nairobi

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Index Terms: Extension and advisory service (EAS) 1 Global warming 3 Greenhouse gases 3 Hurricane Mitch 7 Information and communications technology (ICT) 11 Plan Maroc Vert 12

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Financing Climate Adaptation and Mitigation in India Dhanapal Govindarajulu* UNDP-Centre for Climate Change and Environment, National Centre for Good Governance, Cozynook, Mussoorie, India

Abstract India is among the developing countries that are vulnerable to climate change, while also in need to promote economic growth to alleviate poverty. To promote sustainable, low-carbon, and climateresilient growth, India will require continuous efforts in mitigation and adaptation through Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions and National and State Adaptation Plans. This chapter analyzes the financial requirements for mitigation and adaptation in India and highlights that multilateral agencies’ support in climate mitigation and adaptation has been higher in the past than the funds received through global funds established through climate change conventions. The chapter recommends that though continuous support of multilateral agencies will be required in the future, efforts to access mitigation and adaptation funds must be made through global climate change negotiations.

Keywords India; Climate finance; Mitigation; Adaptation

Introduction Dash et al. (2007), Goswami et al. (2006) showed considerable evidence of a changing climate in India, on increase in sea surface and land temperature and changes in rainfall pattern. The Indian Network for Climate Change Adaptation (INCCA 2010) report based on PRECIS model results (Kumar et al. 2006) predicts an average temperature rise of 2.0
centigrade in India with 1.0–4.0
centigrade at extreme ranges by 2050. The model also predicts increased annual precipitation, lower frequency of rainy days, and increased rainfall intensity. Cyclonic disturbances though in lower frequency are expected to be of increased intensity, and there is increased risk of storm surges and sea-level rise of 1.3 mm/year on average. In India, climate change is likely to have severe impacts on key sectors like water (Gosain et al. 2006; Mall et al. 2006). Agriculture sector is expected to decline in production though there may be a short rise in production (Kavi Kumar 2007). The likely impacts of climate change on key sectors like agriculture and water combined with large rural population depending on a climatesensitive sector for livelihood and with a low adaptive capacity due to poor socioeconomic conditions increase the vulnerability to future climate changes (Shukla et al. 2003; Brenkert and Malone 2005). Over 21 % of population are under below poverty line; the poverty level in rural and

Note: All financial estimates of Government of India in Indian Rupee were converted to US$ at the most prevailed rate of 2014, 1US$ ¼ 60 INR *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 11

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Table 1 Emission scenario in India Years 1990 1994 2000 2007 2011

Economic growth/GDP growth 1.3 7.3 4.35 9.60 8.39

CO2 emission in billion tonnes 0.98 1.23 1.48 1.99 2.01

Per capita emission 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7

Source: NATCOM 2012

Iron & Steel, 6% Cement, 7%

Other manufacturing industry, 9% Agriculture, 18%

Waste, 3%

Industry, 12% Electricity, 38%

Transport, 7%

Fig. 1 Emission from various sectors (Source: INCCA 2010)

urban areas was estimated to be 25.7 % and 13.7 % respectively for the year 2011, and over 60 % of India’s population are still rural and dependent on agriculture (Planning Commission 2013). India is a developing country with low records of historic emissions. It is only after the economic reforms in the 1990s that the economy started to grow and the consumption of fossil fuels increased, leading to raising emissions. Despite its growth in emissions in the last two decades, India’s per capita emissions are way below the world average of about 4.5 tonnes per capita (Table 1; Fig. 1). Electricity sector alone contributes to over 38 % of total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. By October 2013, fossil fuels still contributed a large share – approximately two-thirds – of electricity production; coal constitutes about 58.75 % of India’s primary energy resources followed by natural gas (8.91 %) and oil (0.52 %), while the rest is provided by nuclear (2.11 %), hydro (17.39 %), and other renewable energy sources (12.32 %) (Source: Ministry of Power 2013). With the economic growth since the 1990s, the emissions have increased from 0.73 billion tonnes in 1994 to 1.02 billion tonnes in 2000 at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.5 % in the electricity sector, meanwhile in 2007, the energy sector emissions grew to 1.3 billion tonnes. A study on projection using different models estimates India’s GHG emissions in 2031 to vary from 4.0 billion tonnes to 7.3 billion tonnes of CO2 (Climate Modelling Forum 2009). The production of coal and power from coal is likely to be the major source of energy production in India in the coming years and shall remain the major cause of GHG emissions (NATCOM 2012). Given the impacts and vulnerability of climate change in India, adaptation is very necessary and should at least be on a no-regret and co-benefit approach (Sathaye et al. 2006). To alleviate poverty in India, the 12th 5-year plan (2012–2017) aims at a faster economic growth, which shall mean raising GHG emissions as the economic growth is driven by high energy consumption especially produced from fossil fuels. The Government of India is committed to keep its per capita emissions

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below the world average and in 2009 declared that India’s emissions on the intensity of GDP shall be aimed to be reduced by 20–25 % based on the 2005 level by year 2020. The remaining of this chapter will look at financial challenges for mitigation, adaptation, and low-carbon growth in India.

Mitigation and Adaptation Costs This section looks at financial requirements for successfully implementing Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions such as the National and State Action Plans on Climate Change and to take economic growth in a low-carbon path. The financial requirement of scaling of renewable energy is also discussed.

National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) In 2007, at the 13th Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), also known as the Bali conference, developing countries agreed to develop Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA), and subsequently, India released the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in June 2008. The financial estimates and descriptions of NAPCC’s missions are presented in the following table (Table 2). A sum of about 58 billion US$ shall be required for successful implementation of the National Action Plan on Climate Change through the 12th plan period (2012–2017).

The State Action Plan on Climate Change (SAPCC) The 16th COP to the UNFCCC held in 2010 at Cancun established the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) process as a way to facilitate effective adaptation planning in least developed and developing countries. NAPs are aimed at reducing vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, by building adaptive capacity and resilience, and to facilitate the integration of climate change adaptation in the countries’ plans for economic development. In 2010, the prime minister of India urged the states to develop the State Action Plan on Climate Change (SAPCC) to decentralize NAPCC objectives, while addressing state-specific climate change issues. The SAPCC is a set of regional action plans on climate change prepared by the state government. SAPCCs are to be prepared according to a common and generic framework while providing scope for incorporating state-specific contexts and situations and, at the same time, be integrated into state-level planning process. The SAPCC aims to mainstream climate change concerns in key sectors, although the states are free to choose their own focus sectors for the SAPCCs. Typical sector mix includes agriculture, forestry and biodiversity, water resources, energy, industries, mining, urban development, health, disaster management, and transport. The SAPCC should give targeted mitigation plans, for example, in energy sector, it should give present GHG emission scenarios, future energy needs, and how SAPCC shall address mitigation through energy efficiency or renewable energy. On the adaptation side, the SAPCC should identify vulnerable sectors and regions and develop adaptation plans. Many state governments have initiated SAPCCs, thanks to the technical and financial support from multilateral development agencies. The estimation of the costs of implementing SAPCC is cumbersome. A study has observed that existing estimates of costs, for both adaptation and mitigation, in the range of US$3–5 billion over a 5-year period for states of similar size and climate change challenges, are inconsistent mainly because of the variation in the methodologies adopted for vulnerability assessment, development of adaptation plans, and mitigation targets (Mandal et al. 2013). The total financial requirement for implementing the State Action Plans on Climate Page 3 of 11

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Table 2 National mission on climate change Mission 1 National green mission

2 National mission on energy efficiency

3 National solar mission

Brief description To reach national target of 33 % land area under forest and tree cover from the current level of 23 %. Mission to be taken up on degraded forest land through direct action by communities, organized through Joint Forest Management (JFM) Committees and guided by Department of Forests The mission aims to provide binding targets to designated consumers (DCs) to achieve energy efficiency during period 2011–2014. There are about 685 DCs mainly heavy industries and power sector that are required to specific energy consumption reduction targets. The mission works through a market mechanism of Perform, Achieve, and Trade (PAT), wherein the DCs can trade their excess credits to below achievers The mission targets include (i) deployment of 20,000 MW of grid-connected solar power by 2022, (ii) 2,000 MW of off-grid solar applications including 20 million solar lights by 2022, (iii) 20 million sq. m. solar thermal collector area, (iv) to create favorable conditions for developing solar manufacturing capability in the country, and (v) support R&D and capacitybuilding activities to achieve grid parity by 2022. The program also aims to reduce to the cost of solar power along with creating favorable conditions for solar manufacturing industry

Estimated costs/benefits for period 2012–2017 9.42 billion US$

Details of financial estimates were derived from http://moef.nic.in/download s/public-information/GIM-R eport-PMCCC.pdf

The energy efficiency benefits is http://www.moef.nic.in/dow estimated to be about 12 billion nloads/others/Mission-SAP US$ and can reduce about CC-NMEEE.pdf 98 million tonnes of CO2

16 billion US$

http://mnre.gov.in/file-mana ger/UserFiles/draft-jnnsmpd2.pdf

(continued)

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Table 2 (continued) Mission 4 National mission on sustainable agriculture

5 National water mission

6 National mission on sustainable habitat 7 National mission on sustaining Himalayan ecosystem

8 National mission on strategic knowledge of climate change

Brief description Mission aims to devise strategies to make Indian agriculture more resilient to climate change. Identify and develop new varieties of crops (thermalresistant crops, alternative cropping patterns, capable of withstanding extreme weather). Orientation of agricultural research systems to monitor and evaluate climate change and recommend changes in agricultural practices. Convergence and integration of traditional knowledge The Overall objective is “Conservation of wter, minimization of wastage, and esuring its equitable distribution both across and within states through integrated water resource management” Targets improvements in energy efficiency in buildings, management of solid waste, and accelerating modal shift to mass transport To evolve management measures for sustaining and safeguarding the Himalayan glacier and mountain ecosystem. The mission would seek to address the impacts in Himalayan region and establish community-based management of Himalayan ecosystems Mission to identify the challenges of and the responses to climate change through research. Understand the Socioeconomic impacts of climate change including impact on health, demography, mitigation patterns, and livelihoods of coastal communities. Establishment of network of dedicated climate change-related units in academic and scientific institutions

Estimated costs/benefits for period 2012–2017 18 billion US$

Details of financial estimates were derived from http://agricoop.nic.in/image default/whatsnew/nmsagide lines.pdf

4 billion US$.

http://wrmin.nic.in/writerea ddata/nwm28756944786.pdf

9 billion US$

http://www.urbanindia.nic.in/ programme/uwss/NMSH.pdf

0.2 billion US$

http://dst.gov.in/scientific-pro gramme/NMSHE_June_2010 .pdf

0.4 billion US$

http://www.dst.gov.in/scienti fic-programme/nmskcc_july_ 2010.pdf

Source: National Action Plan on Climate Change, Govt. of India

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Change for all 28 Indian states can be about 120 billion US$ for the 5-year period (2012–2017) as estimated from the budgetary provisions provided by the SAPCC of various states.

Low-Carbon and Sustainable Growth It is necessary for the country to explore all options of energy efficiency and increase renewable energy production (Parikh 2012), which are key efforts in mitigation as well as in low-carbon development. The Government of India established an expert group on low-carbon strategies for inclusive growth. The expert group submitted its final report in 2014, which notes that through appropriate strategies such as increasing share of renewable energy, energy efficiency, sustainable and low-carbon transport, improving carbon sequestration in forestry, and implementing building codes, the projected emission in 2030 can be reduced from 3.6 tonnes per capita to 2.6 tonnes per capita. However, the report estimates that around 834 billion US$ at 2011 prices shall be required over the two decades between 2010 and 2030 (Planning Commission 2014).

Renewable Energy Targets Starting with the 9th plan period (1997–2002), India accelerated the pace of renewable energy development. India’s renewable energy installed capacity has grown at an annual rate of 22 %, rising from about 3.9 gigawatt (GW) in 2002–2003 to about 28 GW in March 2013. Renewable grid power capacity contributes 12.88 % of India’s total installed power capacity and is fast becoming an increasingly important part of India’s energy mix. The Government of India has ambitious plans for renewable energy production in India. The National Solar Mission alone aims to establish about 22 GW by 2022. The consolidated funds required for grid-connected renewable energy technologies, biomass/agriculture waste, bagasse cogeneration, urban and industrial waste to energy, small hydropower, solar, and wind are about 2.2 billion US$, and off-grid renewable energy programs such as family biogas plants, biomass gasifiers from rural energy supply, decentralized solar photovoltaic system, micro-hydel water mills, and solar thermal systems for water heating and improved cook stoves are also to cost about another 3 billion US$ for a period (2012–2017) (MNRE 2011).

Adaptation and Mitigation Costs Summary The estimates of mitigation costs vary from available data, and it shall depend on future policies on energy production/consumption and economic growth. The Stern review (2007) estimates that the loss due to climate change could be about 3–5 % of GDP per annum for developing countries, and (Urvashi et al. 2011) estimates for adaptation are in ranges of 70–100 billion US$ per annum for the developing world for the period 2010–2050. Though specific estimates of adaptation costs for India are not available, the estimates provided in State and National Action Plans on Climate Change by the Government of India adds to about 185 billion US$ (2012–2017), which is in range of scientific studies. The expert group on low-carbon growth of the planning commission estimated the costs for pursuing low-carbon growth to be about 834 billion US$ for a two decade period using low-carbon growth model, which is a multi-sectoral, dynamic optimization model that maximizes present discounted value of private consumption subject to commodity supply, natural resource, and technology constraints. Though accurate estimates on adaptation and mitigation are difficult, it can be concluded that India needs billions of dollars over the next two decades to implement its adaptation programs and take in a low-carbon path for economic development. The next section will look at financing options on mitigation and adaptation.

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Financing Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation Measuring Mitigation and Adaptation Costs For investment in mitigation and adaptation, India must carefully evaluate the costs and benefits and the possible trade-offs involved in investments. Use of policy instruments like carbon tax must also be understood to know its impacts on the economic growth. About 80 % of India’s energy needs are met from fossil fuels; in this context, a number of studies have analyzed the patterns of energy usage and carbon emission and have evaluated the role of pricing and taxation policies in mitigation as well as revenue generation for investment in clean energy (such as Parikh and Gokarn 1993; Das et al. 2007; Murthy et al. 1997). Fisher-Vanden et al. (1997) assessed the option of carbon tax in India and concluded that participating in cap-and-trade (CAT) mechanism would be better for India than carbon taxes. The debate is still on for and against carbon taxes and domestic mitigation efforts that may incur GDP losses. This has led to dilemmas in fixing targeted emission reductions and estimating costs of mitigation. Measuring the costs and benefits of adaptation at regional level is even cumbersome, which is a challenge in making informed decision or prioritizing domestic investments. Nambi et al. (2010) noted that an assessment of adaptation costs for India, as well as for subregions, is required for effective resource allocation. Adaptation costs estimated by Stern (2007) for India and other developing countries are also argued to be overestimates (Yohe and Tol 2008), which is mainly due to uncertainties in projections and impacts of climate change. This knowledge gap on understanding the mitigation and adaptation costs has led to challenges in estimates on adaptation and mitigation costs in India as noted in section “Adaptation and Mitigation Costs Summary.”

Global Climate Finance for India Based on the principle of equity recognized in global conventions like the UNFCCC, the developed countries are supporting developing and least developed countries in their adaptation and mitigation efforts. The first commitment period of the Kyoto protocol (2005–2012) provided much financial benefits in renewable energy and energy efficiency in India through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). India, during the first period of the Kyoto protocol, was a leading CDM beneficiary next only to China with over 470 projects registered with certified emission reduction (CER) close to 17 million tonnes. Almost 85% of CER came from the energy sector on both renewable energy projects and on improving efficiency in nonrenewable energy sector. This not only provided financial benefits close to US$ 300 million at the peak rate of 15 US$ per tonne of emission reduction but also provided scope for energy efficiency and increasing the share of renewable energy. However, CDM projects were not useful in supporting adaptation or sustainable development or helpful in alleviating poverty (Subbarao and Lloyd 2011) (Table 3). Successful Case of CDM The Bachat Lamp Yojana (BLY) is a public-private partnership program introduced by the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) to hasten market transformation toward energy-efficient lighting in domestic households by providing compact fluorescent lamp (CFL) at subsidized rate. To reach out to 192 million households and targeted 400 million light points in India by 2011, with an electricity-saving potential of 20,000 MW (by 2011), BLY was the largest CO2-reduction “program of activity” registered till date with CDM from India. Source: Bureau of Energy Efficiency, India. http://www.beeindia.in/schemes/schemes.php?id¼1 Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation combined with conservation and sustainable management of forests is REDD+, which many developing countries, including India, have been pressing in global UNFCCC negotiations for financial incentives toward carbon mitigation Page 7 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_123-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 3 Registered CDM project in India S.I. no. Sector 1 Energy industries (renewable/nonrenewable sources) 2 Manufacturing industries 3 Energy demand 4 Waste handling and disposal 5 Metal production 6 Transport 7 Afforestation and reforestation 8 Fugitive emissions from fuel (solid, oil, and gas) 9 Chemical industries 10 Energy distribution Total

No. of projects No. of CER(annual) No. of CER(2012) 850 69,555,674 19,061,210 41 75 22 3 4 5 1 3 2 1,006

2,074,541 2,653,226 1,710,094 877,754 964,777 947,197 56,400 320,114 967,681 80,127,457

899,459 1,161,307 769,893 1,257,076 288,670 114,277 56,400 247,946 121,562 23,977,800

Source: cdmindia.gov.in

through sustainable management of forests. While the National Green Mission is itself aimed at reducing deforestation and increasing forest cover, the financial requirement to successfully implement the mission can be made available through REDD+ mechanism. Though the REDD + mechanism and the guidelines for financial incentives are not fully developed, India in the future will definitely be looking forward to financial incentives through REDD+.

Financial Support from Multilateral Institutions The review of funds provided by major multilateral institutions during the period January 2004 to 31 December, 2013, for climate change mitigation and adaptation is evaluated in the table below evaluated in Table 4.

Funding Pattern In renewable energy projects, much of the funding is on the solar energy sector; the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is supporting the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, while the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) supports projects on improving biomass as energy for rural India. In energy efficiency, UNDP is supporting projects on promoting energy efficiency in commercial buildings, Indian railways, and steel rolling mills and in selected small and medium enterprises, which are among the largest consumers of electricity in the industrial sector. On the climate mitigation side, funding is largely on sustainable and low-carbon transport such as metro rails by ADB, which supports through loan for Bangalore and Jaipur metro rail projects, and UNDP is supporting 125 million US$ sustainable transport projects for ten Indian cities through building capacities of government agencies, national/state urban transport departments, and municipal corporations, engaging transport experts in sustainable urban transport planning, and creating awareness on regulations to reduce urban transport emissions. In climate adaptation, the funding from multilateral agencies includes sustainable coastal areas management by ADB; the World Bank is funding the development of watersheds and irrigated agriculture and water-bodies restoration and management. Further, UNDP and ADB are supporting in the areas of soft adaptation such as institutional building and building capacities of stakeholders on climate change adaptation, as well as supporting the National Action Plan on Climate Change. The multilateral agencies have also been supporting environment improvement programs. The ADB is supporting environment improvement programs in a few cities and World Bank loans are sought Page 8 of 11

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Table 4 Financial support from multilateral institutions Renewable energy (million US$) 3,164

Multilateral agency Asian Development Bank World Bank 672 UNDP India 61.33 Total 3,897.33

Energy efficiency (million US$) 1,234

Climate change mitigation (million US$) 427

Climate change adaptation (million US$) 305

Disaster risk reduction (million US$) 381

Environment management (million US$) 3,106

Total in million US$ 8,617

232 66.88 1,532.88

100 131.26 658.26

1,321 6.51 1,632.51

1,431 21 1,833

3,064 41.49 6,211.49

6,820 328.47 15,765.47

Source: Compiled by author based on project sheets from respective institutes website

for major national environment programs, such as Ganga Action Plans. In recent years, there is also more funding toward disaster risk reduction. UNDP is supporting disaster risk reduction (DRR) in major cities and on DRR and climate change adaptation to extreme events like floods and drought, while the World Bank funding is largely on post-disaster recovery such as tsunami reconstruction and rehabilitation of Uttarakhand state from the flash flood disaster that occurred in June 2013, which caused damages to the infrastructure like roads and had severe impact on tourism sector and local livelihood and about 250 million US$ was made available for reconstruction. In addition, major multilateral agencies and technical and financial support from other institutions should be acknowledged. The German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) supports several climate mitigation and adaptation programs. USAID is supporting a project on low-carbon development; Department for International Development (DFID), International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD), Canada AID, Swiss Agency for International Cooperation (SDC), and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) are other institutions that are supporting climate mitigation and adaptation and environment management in India. It can be noted from Table 4 that the total financial support through major multilateral agencies has been about 16 billion US$ for a period 2004–2013, which are partly also as loans that are to be repaid, and given the estimates for adaptation and mitigation efforts such as the National and State Action Plans on Climate Change, which ranges in 100 billion US$, there is a huge challenge to meet these requirements through funding from multilateral agencies.

Conclusion India has already placed a carbon tax of INR 50 per tonne of coal produced or imported to India, which is used in National Clean Energy Fund (NCEF) since year 2011 and has collected an amount close to six billion US$ by March 2014. The NCEF is using this fund to finance renewable energy projects in India. The expert group on low-carbon strategies for inclusive growth warns that there could be a drop in GDP as a larger share of GDP may need to be diverted for renewable energy, energy efficiency, and investments in low-carbon strategies. Clearly, financing the entire mitigation and adaptation efforts through domestic funds is not feasible given the trade-offs it faces with economic growth and international financial support is required. The review of financial support in mitigation and adaptation shows that India benefited about 300 million US$ through CDM projects and received about 16 billion US$ as grants and loans from multilateral development agencies. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

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(UNFCCC) has established the Green Climate Fund, Adaptation Fund, and Fund for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to support developing countries (DCs) and LDCs in their effort to adapt to climate change. Accessing such funds by developing countries like India is far from being successful, though India has formally submitted five proposals to the Adaptation Fund Board (ABF). To successfully implement the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions and Adaptation Plans and to steer the economic growth in a low-carbon pathway, India will require continued financial and technical support from multilateral agencies by engaging in global climate change negotiations; India should actively push for continued support of developed countries in adaptation and mitigation finance. India’s commitment to low-carbon and climate-resilient economic development needs appreciation from developed world through financial and technical support. Though agencies like World Bank have supporting post-disaster rehabilitation like in Uttarakhand, future burden on domestic financial abilities to meet the loss and damage from such extreme weather may become more difficult. International aid cannot solely be depended in the future for post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation, and India and other developing countries will be actively looking forward for global support in the climate change negotiations for loss and damage compensation also that started in COP 19 at Warsaw.

References Brenkert AL, Malone EL (2005) Modeling vulnerability and resilience to climate change: a case study of India and Indian states. Clim Change 72(1):57–102 Climate Modeling Forum (2009) India’s GHG emissions profile. Results of five climate modelling studies, p 60. http://moef.nic.in/downloads/home/GHG-report.pdf Das S, Mukhopadhyay D, Pohit S (2007) Role of economic instruments in mitigating carbon emissions: an Indian perspective. Econ Pol Wkly 42(24):2284–2291 Dash SK, Jenamani RK, Kalsi SR, Panda SK (2007) Some evidence of climate change in twentiethcentury India. Clim Change 85(3):299–321 Fisher-Vanden KA, Shukla PR, Edmonds JA, Kim SH, Pitcher HM (1997) Carbon taxes and India. Energ Econ 19:289–325 Gosain AK, Rao S, Basuray D (2006) Climate change impact assessment on hydrology of Indian river basins. Curr Sci 90(3):346–353 Goswami BN, Venugopal V, Sengupta D, Madhusoodanan MS, Xavier PK (2006) Increasing trend of extreme rain events over India in a warming environment. Science 314(5804):1442–1445 INCCA (2010) Indian Network for Climate Change Assessment, climate change and India: a 44 assessment sectoral and regional analysis for 2030s. Published by Ministry of Environment and Forest, p 155 Jyoti P, Gokarn’s S (1993) Climate change and India’s energy policy options: new prospective on sectoral CO2 emissions and incremental cost. Glob Environ Chang 3(3):276–291 Kavi Kumar KS (2007) Climate change studies in Indian agriculture. Econ Polit Weekly 17:13–19 Kumar KR, Sahai AK, Kumar KK, Patwardhan SK, Mishra PK, Revadekar JV, Kamala K, Pant GB (2006) High resolution climate change scenarios for India for the 21st century. Curr Sci 90(3):334–345 Mall RK, Gupta A, Singh R, Singh RS, Rathore LS (2006) Water resources and climate change: an Indian perspective. Curr Sci 90(12):1610–1626

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Mandal Koyel, Sunanda Rathi, Vivek Venkataramani (2013) Developing financing strategies for implementing the state action plans on climate change. http://cdf.ifmr.ac.in/wp-content/uploads/ 2013/03/SAPCC-Phase-I-Report-Final_CDF_IFMR.pdf. Accessed 30 Dec 2013 Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (2011) Strategic plan for new and renewable energy sector for the period 2011–17, pp 1–85 Ministry of Power (2013) Power sector at a glance. http://powermin.nic.in/indian_electricity_scenario/introduction.htm. Accessed 17 June 2014 Murthy NS, Panda M, Parikh J (1997) Economic growth, energy demand and carbon dioxide emissions in India: 1990–2020. Environ Dev Econ 2(2):173–193 Nambi AA, Kavi Kumar KS, Priya S (2010) Economics of climate change adaptation in India. Econ Pol Wkly XLV(18):25–29 NATCOM (2012) National communication report submitted by government of India to UNFCCC. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/indnc2.pdf National Action Plan on Climate Change (2008) Government of India. http://www.moef.nic.in/ downloads/home/Pg01-52.pdf Parikh K (2012) Sustainable development and low carbon growth strategy for India. Energy 40:31–38 Planning Commission (2013) Press note on poverty estimates, 2011–12. http://planningcommission.nic.in/news/pre_pov2307.pdf Planning Commission (2014) The final report of the Expert Group on low carbon strategies for inclusive growth, p 144, http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_carbon2005.pdf Sathaye J, Shukla PR, Ravindranath NH (2006) Climate change, sustainable development and India: global and national concerns. Curr Sci 90(3):314–326 Shukla PR, Subodh Sharma NH, Ravindranath AG, Battacharya S (2003) Climate change and India: vulnerability assessment and adaptation. University Press, Hyderabad, p 462 Stern N (2007) The economics of climate change: the stern review. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York Subbarao S, Lloyd B (2011) Can the clean development mechanism (CDM) deliver? Energy Policy 39(3):1600–1611 Urvashi N, Margulis S, Essam T (2011) Estimating costs of adaptation to climate change. Climate Policy 11(3):1001–1019 Yohe GW, Tol RSJ (2008) The stern review and the economics of climate change: an editorial essay. Clim Change 89:231–240

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Climate Change Adaptation: An Overview on Challenges and Risks in Cities, Regions Affected, Costs and Benefits of Adaptation, and Finance Mechanisms Manal El-Batrana* and Mohsen Aboulnagab a Urban Planning, Housing and Building National Research Centre (HBRC), Egypt Green Building Council (EgyptGBC), Dokki-Giza, Egypt b Professor of Sustainable Built Environment, Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University & Senior Advisor - Green Building Council of Egypt (EgyptGBC), Giza, Greater Cairo, Egypt

Abstract Adaptation of climate change (CC) has been defined by many of the world’s leading institutions such as IPCC and UNFCCC in various contexts. Many studies, research, and reports on CC mitigation were reported, but less was done on adaptation. Adaptation is strategically needed to lower the impact of CC that is manifesting coupled with serious challenges and risks for cities such as high temperatures, water availability, floods and droughts, and sea-level rise damage to coastal areas. Adaptation is vital to offset CC impacts on environment challenges such as soils, biodiversity, inland water, and marine environment. By adopting effective measures and early actions for CCA, money and lives can be saved. The EU Climate Action highlighted six areas where adaptation measures should be applied and financed. Strategies for CCA are vital at all levels of government administration whether local, regional, or national to counterbalance CC. Areas with high vulnerability to CC impact and need adaptation actions, policies, and measures; are mainly in Europe, the Mediterranean, Asia-Pacific, North America, and Africa; and have been highlighted. Gaps in the assessment of the full costs of CC compared to that of CC mitigation were discussed. Many researches that have been conducted on CC policy are mainly for mitigation, but less was focusing on the assessment of cost. The EU which allocated 20 % of funding to climate, costs, and benefits of adaptation is recently focusing on the cost inclusion of adaptation in urban policies and projects and the cost of actual adaptation measures. Costs and benefits of adaptation options were reviewed by UNFCCC, mainly methodological issues for estimating the costs and benefits of adaptation options followed by the economics of adaptation in light of the review. Information and guidance for the costing of adaptation options are outlined, including many major methods and techniques for adaptation option appraisal and decision analysis in the climate change adaptation that have been recently reported such as cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), the cost–benefit analysis (CBA), and the multi-criteria analysis (MCA). It also presents a comparison between these costing and benefits and techniques. This chapter reviews and discusses five main folds: (1) why is climate change adaptation necessary; (2) the importance of climate change adaptation (CCA); (3) what are the methods of CCA; (4) the widening gap between CC impacts and required adaptation measures, including the most affected regions and case studies of CCA in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America; and (5) what is the cost of CCA including how costs of CCA are assessed and financed. It also attempts to review the CCA funding mechanisms with focus on cities and urban areas. It is clear that many actions, measures, and funds have been developed, but the gap is still widening in developing poor countries, and the robust *Email: [email protected] *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 34

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machinery to significantly execute the current funding in productive channels is highly required if facilitating adaptation to CC impacts and minimizes risks.

Keywords Climate change; Adaptation methods; Adaptation actions and measures; Risk in cities; Cost and benefits; Adaptation and finance mechanism; Vulnerable countries

Introduction Climate change impact has been widely manifested worldwide in the last 10 years. Climate change (CC) means “global warming” or the “greenhouse effect.” This is caused by the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere through enormous human activities, particularly the burning of fossil fuels. In this part, the challenge of CC, from a development perspective in terms of how can developing countries anticipate and respond to the threats and opportunities brought by CC, is considered. It is widely recognized that the climate is changing. While local, regional, central, and federal governments continue their efforts to reduce GHG emissions, it is important to prepare for CC impacts that are already underway. This includes more extreme heat and flooding, as well as increased damage to energy, water, and transportation infrastructure from extreme weather events. Also, economic development in many countries remains fundamentally based on fossil fuels. This means societies are going to experience some degree of CC and will have to implement a combination of reactive and anticipatory measures to adapt. There is still much uncertainty about how the climate is likely to change at both regional and national levels. Policy makers and planners often require information about CC at scales which have high levels of uncertainty. Responses to extreme weather and anticipatory planning for CC therefore need to be flexible and resilient to a much wider range of climate conditions than are currently experienced. They must also pursue this on the basis of limited knowledge. For various reasons, more attention in CC research and policy has been given to mitigation than adaptation. Uncertainty about the details of CC whether rainfall will increase or decrease and the timescales over which CC will occur are likely to influence decisionmaking about funding priorities and target activities. There is, however, close agreement between development agendas and the effects of CC in areas with high climate variability and extremes of weather. It is in these situations that CC will most directly affect vulnerable people, such as those living in small-island states or low-lying coastal areas, subsistence farmers, flood-prone communities, and urban dwellers exposed to extreme temperatures and potential increases in disease transmission. Development work can provide valuable insights into the context-specific and socially mediated links between vulnerability and extremes of weather. Cause and effect between hazard and disaster occurs through human agency, and it is here that development research has much to offer our understanding of climate–society interactions. This chapter reviews and discusses five main folds: (1) why is climate change adaptation necessary; (2) importance of climate change adaptation (CCA); (3) what are the methods of CCA; (4) widening gap between CC impacts and required adaptation measures, including the most affected regions and case studies of CCA in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America; and (5) what is the cost of CCA including how costs of CCA are assessed and financed. It also attempts to review the CCA funding mechanisms with focus on cities and urban areas.

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Why is Climate Change Adaptation Necessary? Climate change adaptation (CCA) has been defined by many of the world’s leading institutions in various contexts. These briefly describe adaptation as action taken, adjustments to a process, strategies, or outcomes. In a different setting, CCA consists of initiatives and measures to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems to actual or expected climate change effects. They can be spontaneous or planned responses to actual or expected conditions (Regmi et al. 2010). Adaptation is strategically needed to lower the effect of CC that is happening and poses serious challenges and risks for cities such as high temperatures (heat waves and storms), water availability, floods and droughts, and sea-level rise damage to coastal areas. Sectors that are affected encompass infrastructure and buildings, energy demand and supply for cooling and heating, agriculture production in terms of crop yields, tourism, insurance, and crosscutting business. Also, adaptation is important to offset CC impacts on environment challenges such as soils, biodiversity, inland water, and marine environment. Additionally, social dimension of CC has been manifested by health impact, population employment, and education; hence, adaptation measures are vital to reduce such impacts. By adopting effective measures and early adaptive actions for CCA, money and lives can be saved. Tompkins and Adger (2003) explain the differences between mitigation and adaptation, noting that they share the same underlying factors and are not substitutes for each other but are essentially complementary. They argued that it may be difficult to generalize about how adaptation occurs and how strategies can be exploited. Adaptation may be in response to or in anticipation of events and implemented through the actions of individuals, governments, or other groups. CCA has been defined by many of the world’s leading institutions in various contexts (GagnonLebrun and Agrawala 2007; Harley et al. 2008; UNFCCC 2010a; Brooks et al. 2011; Preston et al. 2011; Poutiainen et al. 2013; Bours et al. 2014). Adaptation refers to the ability of human and ecological systems to manage or cope with a changing climate. Adapting to these impacts must take place at all levels of the government. However, as most impacts will be felt at the local level, municipalities/governorates in particular need to respond to these local challenges. Major challenges also surround the equity issues of CC, particularly between developed and developing countries, in terms of historically unequal emissions of GHGs, constraints on future emissions, and unequal exposure and capacity to adapt to the effects of CC. These are questions to which the developing world and the development community can bring considerable insights (id21 Insights 2004). International negotiations in Bali, Indonesia (December 2007), failed to achieve consensus on targets for climate change mitigation (CCM), i.e., reducing GHGs’ emissions. However, countries have agreed to negotiate mitigation targets for after 2012 by the end of 2009, when the countries meet again in Copenhagen (id21 Insights 2008b). A vital point that had been stressed by the Copenhagen Conference Declaration (CopCD) remains a source of major differences between developed and developing countries: the principle of “common but differentiated” responsibilities. Developing countries insist that developed ones have a historical responsibility and should cut emissions and provide developing countries with finance and technology to do their part. On the other hand, they ask about the growing contribution of developing nations to global warming (Tolba 2011). If we are to save our planet there must be a real willingness to cooperate, with developing countries accepting part of the responsibility for current and future emissions and developed countries bearing the full responsibility for past emissions. This cannot be achieved without open discussions between both sides. Developing countries must realize that the total 2009 CO2 emissions by China surpassed those of the USA, the biggest emitter, and that emissions by India are similar to those of Japan or Russia. This indicates that we must immediately begin a series of nonstop informal Page 3 of 34

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consultations between the leading countries in both camps with a view to achieving compromises before UNFCCC COP20, 2014. The UN must play the role of a global body concerned about serious global problems. It should also offer a neutral forum but work to produce meaningful compromise formulations that bring together opposing views. Too much is at stake to allow such useless negotiations to continue forever. The outcomes of the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Mexico, December 2010, proved once again that governments are not serious enough about the issue. Nonstop consultations between developed and developing countries must now take place, and they should achieve tangible and effective compromises before the forthcoming UNFCCC COP20 in Lima, Peru, due on December 2014. Efforts are needed to develop more scientific evidence, it is true, but we certainly know enough (Tolba 2011). However, CC has shot to the top of the world agenda in the last 10 years. The first push came from Albert Gore’s 2006 famous film “Inconvenient Truth.” It showed in a dramatic way the ice melting in the North Pole as well as the very strong storms, hurricanes, and floods that swept through various areas of the globe. The second push came, again in the year 2006, from the Chief Economist of the World Bank, Sir Nicholas Stern’s report. When he retired at his home country, Tony Blair, former Prime Minister of the UK, requested him to convene a group of experts to prepare a report on the economics of CC. The British expert group had detailed discussions with experts from all over the globe. The Stern report made three telling points: (a) Actions today to mitigate climate change cost 1 % the global gross domestic product (GPD) while facing its impacts later will cost the world 5 % of its total GPD. (b) Any spending in the next 20 years on actions to mitigate climate change will have impact only after 2050 because of the GHGs’ life spans. (c) Increase of the average global temperature will continue for the next 20 years even if emissions are stopped today, again because of the GHGs’ life spans. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued its Fourth Assessment Report in November 2007. In the same year, the IPCC received the Nobel Prize jointly with Al Gore in recognition of their effort to bring the seriousness of the issue of CC to the attention of the world community. The first sentence in the IPCC Synthesis Report of 2007 stated that “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level.” They were so categorized far beyond the normal language used by the scientists. The IPCC report further stated that “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid of the twentieth century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations.” Climate change in Africa is manifested in many forms whether in terms of water, agriculture, aridity, energy demands, or security. The IPCC Report of 2007 also gave the following three disturbing facts about Africa: (a) “By 2020, between 75 and 250 million people in Africa are projected to be exposed to increased water stress due to climate change.” (b) “By 2020, in some African countries, including North Africa, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50 %. By the same date agriculture production, in many African countries is projected to be severely compromised. This would further exacerbate malnutrition.” (c) “An increase of 5–8 % of arid and semi-arid land in Africa is projected by 2080 under a range of climate scenarios.”

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The IPCC based its emphatic conclusions on global warming on a number of facts which it presented in its 2007 report: (a) CO2 atmospheric concentration increased from 280 PPM in 1750–379 in 2005. The average concentration for the last 365,000 years was 300 PPM. (b) Eleven out of the 12 years (1994–2005) were the hottest years on record. In the last 50 years, the number of cold days and nights, hot days and nights, and heat waves increased. (c) Average sea-level rise was 3.1 mm/year between 1993 and 2003, compared to an average of 1.8 mm/year during the period of 1961–2003. (d) There is up to 97 % confidence within the IPCC that the average global temperature will increase by 2  C by 2050. This could happen in the year 2035. (e) The IPCC had more than 50 % confidence that the average global temperature will increase in the next century by 5–6  C – a situation unfaced before by human beings. All these disturbing facts were further stressed and accentuated by the UNEP 2007 State of the Environment Report (SOE) and UNDP 2007 Human Development Report; both were devoted entirely to the issue of CC. Additionally, several reports by the World Bank, the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation for Development (OECD), the US National Science Foundation (NSF), and several others were published in 2008 and 2009 stressing the global negative impacts of CC. The same old very general statements that were adopted in tens of earlier conferences starting from the First International Conference on Climate Change convened in 1988 in Geneva by WMO and UNEP in cooperation with UNESCO, WHO, and FAO. Nevertheless, none of them went beyond stating intentions with no specific details of how and during which period any of these statements will be implemented. One of the points stressed by the Copenhagen deceleration was that of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. This point has been and still a source of huge differences between developed and developing countries. Developing countries insist that developed ones have historical responsibility and should cut emissions and provide developing countries with finances and technology. Developed countries ask and rightly so, what about the current and the future. If we want to move ahead to save our planet, there must be a real willingness to cooperate by the two groups, developing countries accepting part of the responsibility for current and future emissions and developed countries take full responsibility for past emissions. This cannot be achieved without direct and open discussions between the two sides, talking to one another rather than past one another. Developing countries must realize that the total CO2 emissions by China in 2009 surpassed that of the biggest emitter, the USA, and that emissions by India are similar to those by Japan or Russia. These disturbing facts were further stressed and accentuated by the United Nations Environmental Programme’s State of the Environment Report (SOE), the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Report and other reports by the World Bank, the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation for Development (OECD), the US National Science Foundation (NSF), and others. Yet, the outcome of the United Nations Climate Change Conferences at Copenhagen (2009), UNFCCC (2010b, 2011) proved that governments are not serious enough about the issue. If human beings want to survive, nonstop consultations between developed and developing countries must now take place, and they should achieve tangible and effective compromises before the next climate change conference at the end of 2014.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_124-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

As pointed out by Tolba (2011), “Governments have no option but to halt the dialogue of the deaf and agree on four basic points if Durban is to be a success. These are: agreement on the verification of emission reductions; agreement between developed and developing countries on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities; specific targets for the GHGs’ emissions in developed and developing countries; and finally, developing countries need to be offered a grace period before applying the reductions required by a new treaty. Advanced developing countries (China, India, Brazil, South Korea, Malaysia, etc.) may have a shorter grace period than other developing countries - certainly shorter than those for least developed countries and small-island states. As per the Copenhagen agreements, parties need to define specific figures for financing a climate change adaptation fund, and to establish the details of the technology transfer mechanism. The most affected countries should be supported urgently.”

Importance of Climate Change Adaptation The impacts of climate change are already being observed around the world, from retreating glaciers to changing seasons and rainfall patterns. Climate change (CC) is likely to be evident in the future through more frequent storms, droughts, heat waves, floods, and other extreme events. Amid ineffective local governments that provide inadequate infrastructure and services required to reduce climate change-related risks and vulnerabilities, most of the world’s urban populations are living in cities or smaller urban centers that are ill equipped for adaptation. Infrastructure and buildings are considered a key part of adaptation concerns, but much of the urban population in Africa, Asia, and Latin America has no infrastructure to adapt – no all-weather roads and piped water supplies or drains – and lives in poor-quality housing in floodplains or on slopes at risk of landslides (Satterthwaite et al. 2007). According to El-BATRAN (2010), climate change extreme events, particularly floods and droughts, have severe implications on various sectors and services, including water, energy, livelihoods, transport, and health. In spite of the very low contribution of Egypt in the global GHG’s emissions, Egypt is considered as one of five highly vulnerable countries to climate change impacts. The January 2010 floods in North Sinai left 780 homes totally destroyed, 1,076 submerged, and much other damaged. At least 3,500 persons have been affected by the floods or are homeless. The floods were of a surprise as North Sinai had not seen such floods in 30 years as shown in Figs. 1–3. Also in December 2013, the cold spell and heavy snow falls (never happened since 112 years) that totally covered most of Cairo outskirts (Altagamoah, New Cairo) are other manifestations of climate change impact as exhibited in Fig. 4. Also in May 2014, Egypt’s eastern part (Taba and Sinai) and Upper Egypt (Aswan) were stormed by torrential rain that had led to floods (Figs. 5 and 6). So, adaptation to climate change is worse in the secondary cities than in capital cities, particularly in case of Figs. 1–6. Each of these extreme events may affect the security and sustainability of development throughout the world. Developing countries, particularly least developed countries, are likely to be exposed to the greatest impacts. However, CC is caused by current and past emissions from industrialized countries that have more resources to cope with the impacts (id21 insights 2004). Climate-related risks come not only from direct exposure to natural hazards such as floods or droughts but also from the vulnerability of social and economic systems to the effects of these hazards. Responses to these risks should combine two approaches: (a) short-term measures to react to hazards when they occur and (b) structural reforms that enhance the capacities of communities to adapt. Climate change

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Fig. 1 Egypt’s flash flood, January 2010 (Source: Egyptian Red Crescent)

Fig. 2 Settlements built in the path of old stream torrents, Egypt – vulnerable area (Source: El-Batran 2010 – Image Credit: authors)

adaptation (CCA) is an adjustment in natural or human systems, which occurs in response to actual or expected climatic changes or their effects (id21 Insights 2008b). Adapting to CC means adjust and acclimatize to risks from observed or expected changes. Governments, enterprises, and households will all have to adapt. In most urban centers, community organizations and local nongovernmental organizations are also important, especially where they are influential in building homes and communities and providing services within informal or illegal settlements (Satterthwaite et al. 2007). In human systems, adaptation can reduce harm or exploit opportunities. The disaster risk reduction (DRR) is the development and application of policies and practices that minimize risks

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_124-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 3 Increased vulnerability of slum areas to flood damage, wind, and fires in rural Egypt (Source: El-Batran 2010 – Image Credit: Authors)

Fig. 4 Snow and cold spells, Al Tagamoa, New Cairo, Egypt – December 2013 (Image Credit: http://urbanmediadaily. com/cairo-gets-first-snowfall-100-years/)

Fig. 5 Torrential rain and floods Taba and Sinai, eastern Egypt – May 2014 (Image Credit: http://www.google.com)

to vulnerabilities and disasters. The DRR is an essential part of adaptation – it is the first line of defense against climate change impacts, such as increased flooding or regular droughts. The DRR is now lending its expertise and humanitarian experience to climate change adaptation programs (id21 Insights 2008b). Page 8 of 34

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_124-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 6 Torrential rain and floods in Red Sea area and Upper Egypt – May 2014 (Image Credit: http://www.google.com)

Mitigation and adaptation are the two responses to CC. Mitigation means reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, the main cause of human-induced climate change, whereas adaptation means adjusting to any new climatic conditions caused by natural and human-induced change. Many parts of the world have had to cope with previous climate variability and have developed strategies to do so. Adaptation can be undertaken in anticipation of impacts or after these have occurred. These can be initiated by individuals through market exchanges and social interactions or through coordinated measures by government or other groups. The mix of anticipatory or reactive adaptation action actually introduced will depend on the existing vulnerabilities of each community or individual, as well as institutional processes, regulatory frameworks, property rights, access to resources, and social conditions. Adaptation is place specific and context specific: there is no single plan for how adaptation should occur. However, lessons learned from responding to past hazards may be useful for planning for future CC. Investments in adaptation and mitigation are necessary, but these are not substitutes for each other. In fact, the ability of societies to reduce their emissions and to adapt is determined and constrained by the same underlying factors. The resilience of institutions and of resources sensitive to changes in the climate is central to meeting the challenge. These issues are often magnified in developing countries, which are coping with economic globalization and other challenges simultaneously (id21 Insights 2004). Adaptation is a risk-reduction strategy for ameliorating the adverse effects of CC on human and ecological communities and for capitalizing upon potential opportunities. Adaptation specifically refers to actions, policies, and measures that increase the coping capacity and resilience of systems to climate variability and CC (CSIRO 2006). Also, adaptation can be generally divided into two types of measures: vulnerability reduction and resilience enhancement (Kay and Hay 1993). The term “vulnerability” is used to describe the attributes of a system which will react adversely to the occurrence of external or internal stresses (Nitivattananon et al. 2009). The EU Climate Action highlighted six areas where adaptation measures should be applied and financed as illustrated in Fig. 7 (EEA 2012). The first two measures are highly needed for Africa and mainly Egypt since water and energy shortages are high on the government agenda. Strategies for CCA are vital at all levels of government administration whether local, regional, or national to counterbalance CC. In addition to other adaptation measures, sustainable urban design, resilient urban management, and improving infrastructure to be green would contribute toward lessening these effects. Given the limitations of impact-driven coastal vulnerability assessments in considering both physical and social aspects of vulnerability and in light of the present need for community-based approaches to adapting to climate change-related risks, Dolan and Walker (2004) proposed an “integrated” framework (Fig. 8).

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1

2

3

4

5

6

•Using scarce water resources more efficiently

•Adapting building codes to future climate conditions and extreme weather events

•Building flood defences and raising the levels of ditches

•Developing droughttolerant crops

•Choosing tree species and forestry practices less vulnerable to storms and fires

•Setting aside land corridors to help species migrate

Fig. 7 Adaptation measures (Source: EU Climate Action)

CLIMATE Variability & Change

Biophysical Environment • natural sensitivity • dynamic resilience

Vulnerability

Exposure Human Environment • socio-economic & cultural susceptibility • resilience

Adaptive capacity Response& adjustment coping strategy

Individual Age,gender, access to resources & wealth,education, risk perception, risk spreading options

Community Available technology, resources, wealth & information distribution, social capital & cohesion, critical frameworks & decision-making risk perception, property rights, risk spreading option

Regional –National –Global Resource, wealth, information & technology; critical institutions, framework & decision-making

Fig. 8 Integrated vulnerability framework (Source: Modified by Dolan and Walker 2004)

Such approach considers inherent susceptibilities and resiliencies of both biophysical and social environments as an interrelated and interdependent human environment system. Vulnerability, in this context, can be defined as “the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude and rate of climate variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity” (Watson 2001). Vulnerability to CC is considered to be high in the South due to social, economic, and environmental conditions that amplify susceptibility to negative impacts and contribute to low capacity to cope with and adapt to climate hazards. Moreover, projected impacts of climate change generally are more adverse for lower latitudes, where most countries in the South are located, than for higher latitudes. Because of the high level of vulnerability, there is an urgent need in the South to understand the threats from climate change, formulate policies that will lessen the risks, and take action (Abou-Hadid 2006). The danger is greatest, where natural systems are severely degraded and human systems are failing and therefore incapable of effective response, specifically in deprived nations.

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1

• Ensuring the availability of an appropriate and widely understood information base about climate change and its local impacts –this does not exist in most cities

2

• Land-use planning that avoids high-risk areas and shifts activities away from them, including ensuring that low-income groups can find affordable land for housing on safe sites.

3

• Revising building and infrastructure standards, in ways that do not impose unaffordable costs.

4

• Planning and public sector investment that considers climate change. For example, much infrastructure needs to be designed to cope with likely changes over 50 to 100 years.

Fig. 9 City government key roles (Source: Satterthwaite (2008))

Furthermore, land degradation and desertification may also be exacerbated in these areas, posing additional threats to human well-being and development, added by intensified human pressures on lands and poor management (Elsharkawy et al. 2009). The agriculture and food resources including livestock and fisheries of the rural poor are threatened by CC with all its impacts, and the vulnerability to adverse health impacts is greater where health-care systems are weak and programs for disease surveillance and prevention are lacking. In addition to multiple factors converging to make the people inhabiting coastal zones and small islands highly endangered from the causes of SLR (Leary and Kulkarni 2007). The coastal Zone and small islands are, therefore, particularly vulnerable to the impact of SLR in addition to impacts on water resources, agricultural productivity and human settlements. But, if no protection action is taken, the agricultural sector will be the most severely impacted, followed by the industrial sector and the tourism sector by a SLR. The term “resilience” is used in the opposite sense to vulnerability – resilient attributes of a system will typically reduce the impact of internal and external stresses. According to Dolan and Walker (2004), adaptive capacity is reflective of resiliency, such that a resilient system has the capacity to prepare for, avoid, moderate, and recover from climate-related risks and/or change. Nonetheless, Satterthwaite (2008) stated that successful adaptation is about the quality of local knowledge, local capacity, and willingness to act. City governments should have key roles, not only in changing what they do business, but also in the adaptation they encourage and support (Fig. 9). Development should increase people’s ability to act to reduce their vulnerability to climate change – due to improved local knowledge and increased income – and increase poorer groups’ ability to influence local governments’ action. Insurance can spread risks and reduce the financial hardships linked to extreme events. It can also provide incentives for adaptation and risk reduction, but only a very small proportion of urban households and enterprises have insurance. For low-income groups, supporting the measures they already employ to reduce risk and vulnerability has more relevance – for instance, through community-managed savings groups. In many countries, groups formed by people in “slums” or informal settlements engage in risk management and risk-reduction initiatives. These include upgrading slums and squatter settlements, developing new housing, and improving water supply, sanitation, and drainage. In some cities, such groups have also developed detailed maps of informal settlements and collected data on who lives there to guide new infrastructure. In Durban, South Africa, adaptation plans demonstrate the important role that local governments can and should play. Adaptation to CC has to be built into the core of all urban planning and management. It is, however, difficult to get local governments to

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_124-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

act on adaptation. There are always other priorities that seem more pressing and, at present, the information base on the likely local impacts of CC is weak. In most cities, planning for adaptation must first overcome an inadequate infrastructure base. Estimates of adaptation costs have yet to recognize this. Adaptation will need to address this deficit as well as making building improvements, strengthening of lifeline infrastructure, and hazard modification (for instance, repairing and strengthening flood, storm surge, and coastal defenses). All cities need effective disaster risk management plans, both to reduce risks and have in place appropriate responses. Good disaster preparedness is a key part of adaptation. However, adaptation means “better coping,” rather than removing risks. It does not remove or even reduce the urgency for mitigation: even for relatively low amounts of warming, there are natural and technical constraints to adaptation. Without strong and early mitigation, the difficulty and costs of adaptation will grow rapidly. While good development and adaptation to CC risks are complementary in important ways, most adaptation does entail opportunity costs (Satterthwaite 2008).

Methods of CCA Assessments and Measures Many methodologies have been set and used for CCA. These were derived and established by the World Bank, UNEP, and Mainstreaming Adaptation to CC in Agriculture and Natural Resources Management projects. Guidance notes for lessons learned, best practices, recommendations, and useful resources for integrating climate risk management and adaptation to CC in development projects program planners. As highlighted in the “Financing the Resilient City” report (ICLEI 2011), it provides a bottom-up strategy for building capacity to finance and implement resilience for development. This strategy is centered on the idea of establishing local capacity to plan, finance, execute resilient improvement, and note to raise funds (ICLEI 2011). There is always a challenge in matching the precise enabling finance with local demand for urban resilience. This highlights the importance of the right approach. A number of approaches have been developed to address the issue of mobilizing financial resources.

Widening Gap Between Climate Change Impacts and Required Adaptation Measures Despite the fact that CC impacts are manifested in many countries, particularly the poor ones, CC adaptation and enacted measures are not yet showing enough to eliminate such risks. This can be seen due to the unavailability of funds to address these impacts; besides, the current local authorities and government are not the institutes for such an adaptation, and they lack the capacity to build and invest, and current urban policies are not addressing CCA.

Climate Change Most Affected Regions Climate change adaptation (CCA) is bound by population, economic sectors, and social constraints. Areas that are highly vulnerable to climate change (CC) impacts and need adaptation actions, policies, and measures are mainly in Europe, Mediterranean, Asia-Pacific, North America, and Africa. Migration is a key issue of demography that causes stress on the national infrastructure when it comes to climate change impacts (Sheribinin 2013). The diverse linkages between climate change and security, including risks of conflict, national security concerns, critical national infrastructure, geopolitical rivalries, and threats to human security, have been recently highlighted and reviewed by Page 12 of 34

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Gemenne et al. (2014). In this study, it has been concluded that much analysis overemphasizes deterministic mechanisms between climate change and security. The importance of mapping these impacts, whether major or minor, is vital in understanding the severity, sectors, and areas. In a study by Sheribinin (2013), regions that are anticipated, based on combinations of high exposure, high sensitivity, and low adaptive capacity, to suffer significant impacts from CC have been highlighted. In the past 5 years, “hotspots” mapping on CC has helped in identifying spots that are affected by the phenomena and that will be impacted in the future. Hotspots mapping efforts underlined a range of issues and sectors such as vulnerable population, humanitarian crisis, conflict, agriculture and food security, and water resources. Many developed climate change “hotspots” have been established by researchers, advocacy groups, and NGOs (Sheribinin 2013). In Africa, “hotspots” mapping has helped in communicating areas that CC has impacts on and may require adaptation. These areas are (a) Al Wahda Dam, Morocco; (b) Cape Floral Region, South Africa; (c) Etosha National Park, Namibia; (d) Lake Tanganyika, Tanzania; (e) Salonga National Park, D.R. of Congo; (f) Western Highveld, South Africa; and (g) Yirgacheffe, Ethiopia (Union of Concerned Scientists 2011). The top impact and other impacts in these six countries are mainly freshwater (extreme dry), people (water use, food, and coasts), temperature (air and water), and ecosystems (land, lakes, and rivers). Other regions in Asia, Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), Europe, Latin America, North America, polar regions, and small islands can be found in the same reference. This tool (hotspots mapping) can be of significance in identifying the direct and appropriate measures, actions needed, and cost allocation due to these impacts and the required funds and financial mechanism for cities to counterbalance climate change. Many affected countries will be further impacted by CC across the world based on geographical location and population. Studies carried out by international organizations (UNFCCC and EC) stated that 10 places worldwide that are the highly vulnerable, in addition to Bangladesh, Serbia, Australia, Myanmar, and Sudan, are Uganda, the Alps, Northwest Passage (Arctic), Washington, D. C., Gulf Coast (Florida), Island Nations, the Great Barrier Reef, Northern Europe, Italy, and Nepal (Abou-Hadid 2006). In South Asia, CC is predicted to have drastic consequences, particularly in agriculture, which employs more than 60 % of the region’s labor force (Oxfam 2010). Predicted impacts of CC include increased variability in both monsoon and winter rainfall patterns; increase in average temperatures, with warmer winters; increased salinity in coastal areas as a result of rising seas and reduced discharge of major rivers; weakening ecosystems; the recession of glaciers in the Himalayas; and increased frequency and/or severity of extreme weather events (floods, cyclones, and droughts). Moreover, the recent IPCC report on climate change stated that Egypt is one of the nations that will be heavily affected by the impact of climate change phenomenon. The World Bank study (Dasgupta et al. 2007) stated that Vietnam is among the countries most heavily affected by the consequences of climate change: of the 84 coastal-developing countries investigated in terms of sea-level rise (SLR), Vietnam ranked first in terms of impact on population, GDP, urban extent, and wetland areas and ranked second in terms of impact on land area (behind the Bahamas) and agriculture (behind Egypt). Hence, it requires intermediate planning for adaptation (Waibel 2009). Like Egypt, almost 11 % of Vietnam’s population, mostly those people living in the two river deltas, would be impacted by an SLR of just 1 m (Dasgupta et al. 2007). The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change confirms Vietnam’s high vulnerability to climate change. Vietnam is ranked fourth behind China, India, and Bangladesh in terms of the absolute number of people living in vulnerable, low-elevation coastal zones (LECZ). This is considered the highest percentage of all countries worldwide (Waibel 2009). It has been concluded

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that “vulnerable settlements in low-income countries clearly deserve international support to adapt to climate change.” Climate Change Adaptation (CCA): Case Studies Many countries have taken steps toward climate change adaptation such as Finland, Sweden, Norway, Scotland, and Greenland. The CCA themes were centered on sustainable energy, transport, tourism, and risk management. In these cases, a number of real adaptation activities were carried out by several different communities. These cases were part of the Clim-ATIC project that attempted to identify and understand the issues relevant to stakeholders at a local level in terms of actual development and implementation (Climate Change Adaptation Resources 2014). This project undertook a number of key activities over a 3-year period, with communities and community sector stakeholders across five regions of the Northern Periphery, to build the necessary knowledge on (a) investigation, collation, and communication of relevant information on potential direct and indirect impacts of climate change to small peripheral rural communities; (b) development of adaptation strategies by these communities to avoid or reduce the negative impacts of climate change, while taking advantage of opportunities; (c) implementation of adaptation demonstration projects with a focus on transnational activities; and (d) establishment of a formal mechanism to Table 1 Developed countries case studies – Clim-ATIC project (2008–2011) Country Case studies Greenland Adaptation strategies – Ilulissat Icefjord Adapting sledge and snowmobile tracks in Sisimiut Climate change vulnerability – Greenland Biogas Breaking ice – the human face of climate change Lightweight mobile tourist huts (1) Finland GIS flood risk management system Adaptation strategies, City of Rovaniemi Climate change vulnerability –Finland Future tourism prospects for Finnish Lapland Norway Adaptation strategies – Floro Adaptation strategies – Sogn og Fjordane Climate change vulnerability – Norway Sogn og Fjordane early warning system Scotland A sustainable fuelled vehicle for a rural community Adaptation games Adaptation strategies: Cairngorms National Park, Glen Urquhart, and upper Spey catchment Climate change vulnerability – Scotland Community-led sustainable flood management Stay and play – selling alternative activities to the winter sports market Wood fuel in the Cairngorms Sweden Adapting a local woodland management plan Adaptation strategies: destination Are and Lycksele Climate change vulnerability – Sweden Destination Are Innovation competition (schools)

Themes Sustainable Energy Transport Tourism Risk Management

Source: http://www.climatechangeadaptation.info/case-studies/country/greenland.html Page 14 of 34

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1

4

3

2 What flooding problems they face?

Why these occur?

How members of the community adjust?

5 Who is responsible for reducing flood risk?

What action the community itself could take?

Box 1 CCA points of concern – ActionAid in poor communities in some African cities

disseminate knowledge for community adaptation. Table 1 shows these case studies and related themes. Nevertheless, when compared with those in poorer countries, little can be noticed; however, cases were reported in the following section about Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe. Africa’s Pioneering Countries in Climate Change Adaptation According to the ICLEI report on their members in Africa which exhibited true commitments on climate change adaptation (CCA) through the C40 group, two key countries have led by tremendous efforts in terms of CCA. These are Cape Town, South Africa, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. These cities were involved in the pioneering CCA in Africa program and are pioneering on sustainability and manifesting great leadership through participatory research actions over many years as part of the over 1,000 strong international ICLEI network of local governments and cities. For Cape Town, it is also a leading and founding city of the local action for biodiversity (LAB) program and has been engaged in various aspects of sustainability through the ICLEI network, including advocacy work linked to the UN-CBD, whereas Dar es Salaam participated in a Food–Water–Energy Urban Nexus project that is implemented by ICLEI Africa and funded by GIZ (ICLEI 2014). Nevertheless, in poor communities, CCA was noticed. In Accra (Ghana), Kampala (Uganda), Lagos (Nigeria), Maputo (Mozambique), and Nairobi (Kenya), a discussion with the residents of poor communities in cities was conducted through a program called ActionAid, including many points of concern (Box 1). Flooding had become more frequent in each of these cities; thus residents suggested that it had become less predictable. Residents emphasized that the lack of adequate drainage and poor management of existing drainage, unplanned and unregulated urban development as well as the lack of attention to the problem by the government, and changes in weather patterns are the main reason for flooding. Informal settlements in Nairobi that form approximately 50 % of the population specifically responded to the flooding by adaptation strategies. Table 2 exhibits some of these measures of CCA. In contrast, residents in Alajo, Accra, women and children, suffer when the rain and the floods occur which prevent them from moving, and they have to place their children on building roofs, and boats were brought to evacuate them – June and July floods, 2006 (Satterthwaite et al. 2007). In Kampala, similar strategies were adopted by individuals. Some of these measures are highlighted in Table 2. In Lagos, both those living in informal settlements and representatives of local government believe that clearing the drainage channel running through Iwaya/Makoko would prevent the pooling of water from other parts of the city. The CCA measures in Lagos were also highlighted in Table 2. As stated in all the cities, residents’ responses were typically ad hoc, individual short-term efforts to survive and protect properties and belongings.

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Table 2 CCA case studies – African poor communities Country Nairobi, Kenya

Accra, Ghana

Kampala, Uganda

Lagos, Nigeria

Case studies Themes Adaptation strategies include: Infrastructure (buildings) Digging holes around houses before and during floods Building temporary dikes/trenches to divert water away Securing structures with waterproof-recycled materials Relocating to the highest parts of the dwelling that residents think are secure Using sandbags to prevent the ingress of water Adaptation strategies include: Using blocks, stones, and furniture to create high places on which to put their most critical valuables during floods Putting goods on top of wardrobes and in the small spaces between ceilings and roofs Sharing high places with others who have no similar safe sites Undertook collective work to open up drainage channels Temporarily moved to lodges and public places like mosques and churches until the water level receded Barriers were built to water entry at the doorsteps and outlets at the rear of their houses to prevent any water from entering their homes and flowed out quickly Using sand to raise the entire area to a higher level Standard drainage facilities along major streets (within Iwaya/Makoko) would help to solve the flood problem

Source: Satterthwaite et al. (2007)

Asia’s Case Studies: CCA There are many case studies in Asia that exhibited attempts to climate change adaptation (CCA). The following section highlights some of these case studies mainly in Vietnam and India. Case Study of Vietnam In Asia, particularly Vietnam would face losses totaling US$17 billion per year in case of sea-level rise (SLR) of 1.00 m (VNS 2007). This will dramatically increase by 2050, if no adaptation measures are taken (Waibel 2009), but little has been taken due to financial constraints. It has been underlined that the lack of a national and local framework for CCA and coordination among ministries, agencies, and institutions in areas pertaining to CC is among the institutional constraints to implement adaptation planning in Vietnam (Waibel 2009). Limited knowledge on the relationship between CC strategies and the attainment of sustainable development objectives, as well as capacity building on climate change issues among local stakeholders, is also a key obstacle toward adaptation. Based on researches, the potentials and costs of adaptation by industry, settlement planning, and society to climate change are still at an early stage. It was highlighted that Vietnam urgently needs expertise and financial support from the international community (Waible 2008). Case Study of Indore: India In Indore, India, flooding is perceived as a natural, seasonal event; hence, many low-income communities and households had taken steps to limit the damage it does as part of CCA. This was mainly applied to households who live on land sites adjacent to small rivers that are also key storm drains and are particularly at risk (Satterthwaite et al. 2007). In this case study, temporary and permanent adaptations to flooding were made by households and small enterprises, including raising plinth levels and paving courtyards, using landfill and materials that resist flooding,

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Table 3 CCA case studies – Asia Country Indore, India

Baan Mankong, Thailand Cavite City, the Philippines

Case studies Low-income households’ adaptation to flooding Roofing may be unattached to a house, so it can be speedily removed if the structure is in danger of being swept away Raise plinth levels and paving courtyards, using landfill and materials that resist flooding Flood-prediction and protection systems and contingency plans for evacuation Improved housing conditions and infrastructure and services within low-income settlements Community-based strategies include: Accommodate sea-level rise by building houses on stilts Strengthening the physical structure of houses Moving to safer places during calamities Placing sandbags along the shorelines Borrowing money from relatives or moneylenders (at very high interest rates) Engaging in alternative income-generating activities locally or in other areas or changing occupation

Themes Infrastructure (buildings) Risk Management

Source: Satterthwaite et al. (2007)

choosing furniture that is less likely to be washed away, and ensuring that shelving and electric wiring are placed high up the walls, above expected water levels. Roofing may be unattached to a house, so it can be speedily removed if the structure is in danger of being swept away. Also, floodprediction and protection systems and contingency plans for evacuating persons and possessions have been developed by residents (Table 3). In one of the settlements (Shekha Naga), the residents’ first response in one of the settlements to the threat of severe floods is an evacuation plan to move the elderly, children, and animals to higher ground followed by (a) electrical goods, (b) other lighter valuables and cooking utensils, and (c) clothes – easily replaced and undamaged by flooding. Additionally, awareness on how to use the state system of compensation for flood damage was aired by residents to enable them to acquire a perverse incentive for them to build houses in the most vulnerable and dangerous areas. All these attempts were made by local residents not the local government (Stephens et al. 1996). Table 2 summarizes the CCA in Indore and other Asian cities. Latin America’s Case Studies: CCA Many countries in Latin America had taken steps – by several different communities – to CCA, such as El Salvador, Argentina, Peru, Nicaragua, and Colombia. In El Salvador, the difficulties of getting appropriate risk-reduction action for lowerincome groups were manifested (Table 4). However, based on interviews and discussions with people living in 15 disaster-prone “slum” communities and with local organizations, these difficulties became noticeable. It was recognized by low-income households that most serious risks to their lives and livelihoods were flooding and landslides, lack of job opportunities, and water provision as well as insecurity due to violent juvenile crimes. Despite that complex range of issues limited their effectiveness such as the individualistic nature of households’ investments and the lack of representative community organizations. However, Manizales and Colombia were facing high rates of population growth and environmental degradation. This attempt was part of a larger program that aimed to improve environmental quality and make resource use more sustainable (Satterthwaite et al. 2007). In contrast, Mexico City has given

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_124-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 4 CCA case studies – Latin America Country El Salvador

Manizales, Colombia

Ilo, Peru Santa Fe, Argentina Nicaragua

Case studies Appropriate risk-reduction action for lower-income groups Households had invested in risk reduction and on average spent 9 % of their incomes pursuing so Measures were taken to lower risks (diversifying their livelihoods or assets that were easily sold, if a disaster occurred) Remittances from family members working abroad were important for many families, especially in providing support for recovery after a disaster Local government acted on: Avoiding rapidly growing low-income populations settling on dangerous sites Households were moved off the most dangerous sites but rehoused nearby, and most of the former housing sites were converted into eco-parks with strong environmental education Improvements were made in water supply, sanitation, electricity provision, waste collection, and public space Embankments and dikes were created to encounter floods

Themes Risk Management Infrastructure (water, sanitation, electricity, buildings)

Improving houses in slum and squatters (PRODEL program)

Source: Satterthwaite et al. (2007)

more attention to climate change mitigation through control of air pollution but little toward adaptation to floods. European’s Case Studies: CCA At the European level, the overall economic impact of water scarcity and droughts in the past 30 years is estimated at EUR100 billion (EC 2007). The average annual impact doubled from 1976 to 1990 to the following 1991–2006, rising to 6.2 per year in the most recent years. Nevertheless, the exceptional drought in 2003 was amounting to the cost of EUR 8.7 (EEA 2010). However, the 2014 IPCC report indicated three key risks from climate change for Europe, but it did not focus on individual countries. These risks are the following: 1. Increased economic losses and more people affected by flooding in river basins and coasts; as urbanization continues, sea levels rise and peak river flows increase. 2. Increased water restrictions. Significant reduction in water availability from river abstraction and from groundwater resources combined with increased water demand (e.g., for irrigation, energy, and industry and domestic use). 3. Increased economic losses and people affected by extreme heat events: impacts on health and well-being, labor productivity, crop production, and air quality. These findings align well with the UK’s own Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA) published in 2012, which identified that the biggest challenges in the UK will be flooding and water shortage. Thus, high levels of adaptation can significantly reduce these risks but does not eliminate them. The Netherlands’ Case Study In the Netherlands, the findings of a project “Climate as Opportunities” that evaluated 100 large infrastructural investment projects related to spatial planning and water management (some in cities) revealed that integrating CC in planned urban renewal and upgrading Page 18 of 34

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_124-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 10 Adaptation planning in policies (Source: EEA Report 2012)

projects enhanced sustainability of these projects, hence decreasing the future costs. Figure 10 shows how this was achieved.

Cost of Climate Change Adaptation Climate change damage is now universally understood that the most significant will be felt in developing countries (Stern 2006), Africa being the continent that causes the most concern. This is mainly due to the reason that their ability to adapt may be limited because of technical, economic, and institutional limitations (Tol et al. 2004). Consequently, economic assessments – integrated assessment analysis – categorize particularly high economic costs from CC in Africa (Downing et al. 2005). As pointed out by van Aalst et al. (2007), conservative estimates are that African economies could be facing losses of at least 1–2 % of GDP or US$10–20 billion annually, though some sectors will be much more exposed. As highlighted by Watkiss et al. (2010), the potential cost of adapting to climate change in Africa will reach at least US$10 billion but will more likely be in the region of US$30 billion – every year by 2030. Adaptation funding is not a question of aid, it is an international obligation to compensate developing countries for causing damage to their environment, economies, and societies. Developed countries therefore have a responsibility to provide the required adaptation funding immediately through structured financial mechanisms. This finance should be additional to overseas development assistance (ODA). As indicated in an UNEP study by Watkiss et al. (2010), estimating the costs of adaptation involves a large number of methodological challenges, but perhaps the most significant is the necessity to recognize uncertainty and planning robust strategies to prepare for an uncertain future and not to utilize uncertainty as a reason for inaction. Key findings from the study report the summarized information from the various areas of research from global integrated assessment models (IAMs). These provide aggregated estimates, assessing costs in a single iterative framework. To ensure that this analysis is manageable, they entail simplifications and assumptions but have been

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_124-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

the subject of considerable debate. The AdaptCost project commissioned two leading global IAMs, the FUND and PAGE models, to provide results for Africa (Watkiss et al. 2010). Also, it has been stated by Parry et al. (2007) that estimate of the total attributable costs of climate proofing investment to future CC could be a factor of 2–3 higher than the UNFCCC estimates, valued as US$12–28 billion/year by 2030 for Africa. Other studies that count up the additional costs for social protection, to safeguard livelihoods and health related to climate, nevertheless a study by the Grantham Institute (2009) it approximates that an additional US$12–17 billion/year is needed for Africa currently (2015), with this number potentially increasing in future years up to 2030. From the literature, there are many gaps in the assessment of the full costs of CC compared to that of CC mitigation. Many detailed and comprehensive researches that have been conducted on CC policy are mainly for mitigation, but less was focusing on the assessment of cost. Even with the EU allocating 20 % of funding to climate, the costs and benefits of adaptation are relatively and recently focused on mainly the cost inclusion of adaptation in urban policies, projects, and the cost of actual adaptation measures. Most of the studies such as ClimateCost FP7 and PESETA have looked at the costs in damage terms related to coastal systems, human health, agriculture, tourism, and floods, whereas the cost of heat-related deaths varies according to the methods used (Watkiss 2010; Ciscar et al. 2009). When the “value of statistical life” method is utilized, estimated welfare cost averages will be EUR 30, 102, and 146 billion/year for 2011–2040, 2041–2070, and 2071–2100, respectively (Watkiss 2010). In the USA, the story is similar where little is known about the cost of adaptation. Studies suggest that adaptation cost could be as high as tens or hundreds of billions of dollars per year by the middle of this century. For Africa, the UNEP has published a report in 2010 estimating the costs of adaptation which involves a large number of methodological challenges, but most essential is the need to recognize uncertainty. It is estimated that due to high uncertainty, the integrated assessment models indicate that the central economic costs of CC could be equivalent to 1.5–3 % of the GDP each year by 2030 and expected to rise over time, with reasonable estimates of around tens of billions of dollars a year by 2030. For example, analysis of sea-level rise in Africa using the DIVA model suggests large impacts and economic costs in coastal zones, but adaptation can reduce these considerably yet has as high benefits when compared to costs; it is estimated at US$1–4 billion/year by 2050. In this respect, low level of investment in some parts of the world led to adaptation shortfall. The Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA), with the support from Christian Aid, commissioned Practical Action Consulting which developed a report in 2009 with an aim at documenting and analyzing the economic costs of climate change in Africa. It also seeks to contribute to a more detailed understanding of the costs involved for Africa in mitigating and adapting to climate change. Table 5 depicts an outline of possible CC impacts in Africa with adaptation cost ranges (Rebecca, PACJA report 2009). Costs and benefits of adaptation options were reviewed by UNFCCC, mainly methodological issues for estimating the costs and benefits of adaptation options followed by the economics of adaptation in light of the review. In general, the cost of CC estimates for 2030 which was issued by the UNFCCC has been criticized by Parry et al. (2007). In this study, they looked at the estimates from a range of viewpoints and concluded that key sectors such as ecosystems, energy, manufacturing, and retailing were not included, yet the additional costs of adaptation have sometimes been calculated as “climate markups” against low levels of assumed investment. Thus, there is a persisting need for detailed appraisals of these costs to care for residual damage. According to the European Climate Adaptation Platform (CLIMATE-ADAPT), the analysis of costs and benefits is vital for assessing feasible adaptation options. A study on the full cost of CC was published by EC-FP7 and coordinated by the Stockholm Environment Institute (2011) highlighted the costs and benefits of CCA. Page 20 of 34

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Table 5 Climate change impacts in Africa and adaptation cost ranges 

1.5 2 4 Minimum US$10 billion a year by 2030 and up to US$30 billion a year, directly in response to climate change Cost ranges without adaptation 1.7 % of Africa’s total GDP 3.4 % of total GDP 10 % of total GDP C rise Cost ranges with adaptation

Planning for urban adaptation is a key approach to reduce the cost of climate change. Improving adaptive capacity is essential in reducing vulnerability of cities to climate-related risk, hence avoids high cost. The IPCC (2007) describes adaptive capacity as “the ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take advantages of opportunities, or to cope with the consequence.” In brief, it is a set of enabling conditions. Adaptive capacity (AC) can be assessed at various spatial levels from national (Yohe and Toll 2002; Greiving et al. 2011; Haddad 2005; Westerhoff et al. 2011) to local. However, economic resources, capital assets, and financial means are vital components of AC (Smit and Pilifosova 2001). It is essential to mention that wealthy nations are in better position to bear the cost of adaptation and plan yet pay for the measures to uphold and increase their capacity when compared with poor cities. While it seems an obstacle for poor nation, little information on the cost of adaptation is available; nonetheless, a small number of options such as flood defenses were reported (EEA 2012). Making our cities and their infrastructures resilient would definably reduce the cost of CC but would require actions beyond cities borders to be more effective, including adaptation planning (AP). A number of approaches to AP have been established (Smit et al. 2000; Riberio et al. 2009; CBT 2009). Also, the UK Climate Impact Programme (UKCIP) Adaptation Wizard based on “onestep-at-a-time” approach, which is exploited in six adaptation planning steps by the European Climate Adaptation Platform, CLIMATE-ADAPT (EEA and EC 2012). By adopting these steps, as indicated in Figure 11 at earlier stage, the cost of CCA can be significantly lowered. When adaptation planning (AD) is integrated, as one of the drivers into the development of urban policies, AD does not primarily be costly and time-consuming process. Due to the relative recent focus on adaptation, less information was known on the cost of potential climate damage, the cost of inclusion of adaptation in urban policies and projects, and the cost of actual adaptation measures. According to preliminary studies, it has been indicated that benefits often surpass costs. This suggests that if the authorities take advantage of opportunities related to urban renewal, it can result in adaptation benefits surpassing the costs (EEA 2012).

Case Studies of Some European Cities: Affected Regions To date, most of the studies on adaptation cost have focused on a limited set of easily monetized measures such as floods defenses or other infrastructures. Nonetheless, costing of measures such as greening is more complex. A recent study on green space maintenance and the findings of individual case studies of green roofs in some European cities included in the urban audit database estimated an amount over EUR 7 billion for the first and EUR 100 billion annually for the second, respectively, following a initial investment of about EUR 7 billion (Altvater et al. 2011a, b). The calculations in this study were based around adaptation needs related to current rather than projected climate issues and did not consider the intangible benefits like human well-being, but likewise the estimates for green roofs reflect private and public spending and disregard the savings made. This indicates the importance of taking all costs involved as well as benefits of adaptation options available to estimate their exact economic feasibility.

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6.Monitor & evaluate Adaptation options

1.Getting started

5.Execute Adaptation options

2.Assess risk & vulnerability

4.Evaluate Adaptation options

3.Identify Adaptation options

Fig. 11 Adaptation planning steps (Source: European Climate Adaptation Platform (CLIMATE-ADAPT))

Mechanism of Financing Climate Change Adaptation Climate change adaptation funding of actions and measures is essential for development policies in cities and urban areas of vulnerable countries. Most funding in the last decade was mainly directed for CC mitigation. However, financing adaptation to lessen CC impacts varies in developed and least developed countries (LDCs). The latter needs more planning, measures, and funds to adapt to the severity impacts of CC. Several financial mechanisms exist under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to support adaptation, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. The UNFCCC Green Climate Fund (GCF) has considered the potential mechanism for mobilizing a share of the proposed international climate financing proposed in the Cancun Agreements and accepted by Parties during the December 2011 conference in Durban, South Africa. The aim of the fund is to support developing countries in their efforts to counterbalance CC via the furnishing of grants and other concessional financing for mitigation and adaptation projects, programs, policies, and activities. Contributions from donor countries and other sources, including both innovative mechanisms and the private sector, will assist in capitalizing such fund (Lattanzio 2013). The GCF supplements many of the existing multilateral CC funds, e.g., the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), and the Adaptation Fund (AF). Nonetheless, the GCF is the official financial mechanism of the UNFCCC; some parties believe that it may eventually replace or subsume the other funds. While many parties expect capitalization and operation of the GCF to begin shortly after the November 2013 conference in Warsaw, Poland, many issues remain to be clarified, and some involve long-standing and contentious debate (Lattanzio 2013). Also, the UNFCCC listed rich countries with a manifested obligation to assist poor countries to adapt to CC, particularly small-island states and LDCs (id21 Insights 2004). The CCA funds were established as early as 2001 during the UNFCCC Seventh Conference of Parties (Marrakech, Morocco). These funds are shown in Fig. 12. In terms of effectiveness, the first one (LDCs fund) is the only one that is in operation so far. Other UNFCCC funds are the “Marrakech Funds” and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) which provides funding for climate change activities (id21 Insights 2004). A special fund of US$50

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_124-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

UNFCCC Established Climate Change Funds CCA Fund A

CCA Fund B

CCA Fund C

• The Least Developed Countries Fund to support LDCs in carrying out their respective NAPAs.

• The Special Climate Change Fund to assist all developing countries in adaptation and mitigation.

• The Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol to assist all developing countries in carrying out adaptation measures.

Fig. 12 UNFCCC funds (Source: id21 (www.id21.org))

million for adaptation in developing countries over 3 years has been recently established by GEF. It has been noticed, however, that the GEF rules – they can only be used for the “incremental costs of global benefits” – are considered the barriers to use these funds. Although it is reasonably simple to calculate the costs of global benefits arising from mitigation projects, it is more difficult to do so for adaptation projects (as benefits are usually local rather than global). Nevertheless, the UNFCCC funds are forming a small portion of the financial package that is needed for CCA in the developing nations. In this respect, it is vital to differentiate between adaptation actions and international funding support. The first has to be carried out by vulnerable communities, sectors, and countries themselves, with whatever resources they can provide, whereas the UNFCCC is responsible for international funding support for adaptation in developing countries. In developing countries, most adaptation will require to be carried out as part of normal development activities. Funding could be secured through bilateral and multilateral funding agencies and through nongovernmental organizations (national and international). These funding mechanisms are shown in Diagram 1. However, it has been stated that a key challenge will be to find ways in which overseas development assistance and UNFCCC funds can be complementary, rather than repeating each other’s activities (Huq 2004). In Asian countries such as Cambodia, Thailand, Lao PDR, and Vietnam, substantial volumes of financing have been noticed. In addition to official development assistance (ODA) and numerous Climate Investment Funds (CIF), such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Trust Fund, Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), and Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF). Clean Technology Fund (CTF); Strategic Climate Fund (SCF); Asian Development Fund (ADF); the funds from multilateral development and financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), European Commission (EC), and World Bank (WB); bilateral organizations such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Deutsche Gesellschaft f€ ur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOIKA); governments of Finland and the Netherlands; the UN; and private sector have been involved in CC adaptation and mitigation efforts. The majority of financing is in the form of grants, technical assistance, and then loans. Majority of the initiatives involve two or more financing mechanisms, with a share of country participation, as well. The region will also be targeted with financing from the emerging global Green Fund and other mechanisms as well in the near future (FAO – TCID 2011). Information and guidance for the costing of adaptation options, including many major methods and techniques, for adaptation option appraisal and decision analysis in the climate change

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International Funding Sources

Recipients of funding in Developing countries

Level of benefit from adaptation activities Global Environmental Benefits

Global Environmental Faculty Trust Fund Least Developed Countries (LDC) Fund

LDC governments

Special Climate Change Fund

Non-LDC governments

Development funders (World Bank, UNDP etc.)

Sectoral agencies

Int’l Non-governmental Organisations

Multiple benefits: 1.Adaptation and Development 2.Adaptation to climate change and adaption to climate variability

Vulnerable communities

Small grants Programme

Diagram 1 Entities benefiting from international funding sources for adaptation (Source: Climate Change Programme, International Institute for Environment and Development)

1

2 United States Country Studies Programme managed by USEPA (38)

Country Studies Programme managed by UNEP, funded through Global Environment Facility (GEF)

3

4 Dutch Country Studies Programme

Pacific Islands Climate Change Assistance Programme (PICCAP)

Fig. 13 Programs for financial and technical support (Source: UESPA, GEF, PICCAP)

adaptation have been recently reported such as cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), the cost–benefit analysis (CBA), and the multi-criteria analysis (MCA). It also presents a comparison between these costing and benefits and techniques (2011). There is a role of financial mechanisms in spreading risks. As pressure increases on traditional risk-sharing strategies so too does the exploitative nature of moneylenders, particularly during disasters. How people access financial institutions for micro-credit, insurance, and financial services requires further research and documentation, including: • Micro-finance research to better understand how micro-finance can be linked to larger social support systems that strengthen livelihoods and increase disaster risk resilience rather than increase the risk and debt burden for the poor • Financial incentives research to identify how risk sharing and risk transfers can be promoted through existing institutional mechanisms in terms of CCA Climate finance is vital for adaptation and it allows nations to adapt to the severe effects of CC and reduce its impacts. The term “climate finance” simply means local, national, or transnational financing, which could be drawn from public, private, and alternative sources of financing. It is essential to handle CC due to the fact that large-scale investments are required to significantly reduce emissions, notably in sectors that emit large quantities of GHG. Finance mechanism has been reviewed many times, the latest one was at COP19. This was carried out in accordance with decision Page 24 of 34

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8/COP18, the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF). Expert input was the main focus to the fifth review of the financial mechanism, with a view to review being finalized by COP20. Several initiatives have supported assessments in developing countries. The following programs have provided financial and technical support, with a main focus on capacity building within the scientific and stakeholder communities (Fig. 13). In the review of the financial mechanism, the objective was to take appropriate measures regarding: 1. Its conformity with the provisions of Article 11 of the Convention and with the guidance of the COP. 2. The effectiveness of the activities it funds in implementing the Convention. 3. Its effectiveness in providing financial resources on a grant or concessional basis, including for the transfer of technology, for the execution of the Convention’s objective on the basis of the guidance provided by COP. 4. Its effectiveness in providing resources to developing country Parties under Article 4.3 of the Convention. A second challenge for those financing adaptations is the need to separate the additional costs of climate change adaptation from “business as usual” development activities. But this is very difficult. In addition, as emphasized above, successful development contributes much to adaptive capacity. Those who want to fund climate change adaptation may want to clarify the difference between risks and vulnerabilities related to climate change and risks and vulnerabilities related to climate variability independent of climate change. From a development perspective, the two need to be integrated. But while the separation may pose many practical challenges, it may be necessary to distinguish between the responsibility (and hence liability) of high-income countries to pay for the damage they have caused (according to the “polluter pays” principle) and funds donated under the banner of philanthropy or charity. For this reason, funding for climate change needs to be in addition to existing aid flows – even if the funding it provides needs to be strongly integrated within development investments. In practice, requirements for detailed additional costs (which are usually virtually impossible to ascertain) are being increasingly waived in favor of approximations. Another key issue to be resolved is who and what should be prioritized for receiving international funds for supporting adaptation? Should some countries receive priority over others or should some sectors and communities be prioritized? And if so, on what basis? These issues are still under discussion in the UNFCCC and the bilateral funding agencies themselves and have yet to be resolved (Satterthwaite et al. 2007).

Some Remarks on International Fund for Climate Change Adaptation Most of developing countries, particularly city local governments, ministries, and agencies, have not yet taken climate change adaptation (CCA) seriously within their urban strategies, policies, and investments. Where governments are representative and accountable to poorer segments, they generally have more pressing issues, including large backlogs in provision for infrastructure and services, and much of their population is living in informal settlements where there are little CCA measures. These countries are also under paramount pressure to improve education, health care, and security as well as searching for means of lowering high unemployment rates and eradicate poverty. Satterthwaite et al. (2007) have argued that unless adaptation to CC is seen to support and enhance the achievement of development goals, it will remain marginal within government plans and investments. Therefore, the need for CCA highlights the importance of strong, locally driven development that delivers for poorer segments and is accountable to them. Similarly, the extreme Page 25 of 34

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vulnerability of large sections of the urban population to the many aspects of climate change reveals the deficiencies in “development.” He stressed that unless these deficiencies are tackled, there is no real basis for adaptation. According to the IPCC report in 2014, it is imperative to act immediately. It was stated that actions and choices taken in the early part of this century will shape the risks we face in the latter part of the century. Nevertheless, many of the nations or cities most at risk from climate change lack the political and institutional capacity to address such requirements of adaptation. Even if we can conceive of how this might be addressed, it is difficult to see how existing international institutions, in their current structure, can pursue such tasks. However, early action will allow more time to adapt to impacts, but there are limits to adaptation. Some risks will remain so we cannot rely on adaptation alone. The report also stated that CC will affect all. Poor and rich countries, rural and urban populations alike, must plan for the future and adapt to limit future risks. Climate change has traditionally received little attention from international donor organizations. A review of 136 projects in Africa funded by the German donor GTZ found no references to climate change (Satterthwaite et al. 2007). International organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization give little consideration to climate issues in their work. A study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development revealed the magnitude of development assistance and aid in sectors potentially affected by climate risks (OECD 2003). In Egypt and Bangladesh alone, from 1998 to 2002, between US$1 billion and US$2 billion was directed to sectors affected by climate change and climate variability. As much as 50–65 % of development aid in Nepal was given to climate-sensitive sectors. Clearly, international donor agencies need to assess the extent to which their investment portfolios in low- and middle-income countries might be at risk due to climate change and take steps to reduce that risk. This is increasingly recognized, and several bilateral and multilateral development agencies and NGOs are starting to take an interest (Agrawala 2004). At least six development agencies have screened their project portfolios both to ascertain the extent to which existing development projects consider climate risks or address vulnerability to climate variability and change and to identify opportunities for incorporating climate change explicitly into future projects. Donor agencies and NGOs that have started to examine their investment and project portfolios in this way include the World Bank in India; the UK Department for International Development (DFID) in India, China, and Kenya; the Netherlands Department for Development Assistance (DGIS) in Bolivia, Bangladesh, and Ethiopia; the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD); and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Most agencies already consider climate change as a real but uncertain threat to future development, but they have given less thought to how different development patterns might affect it.

Conclusions “A global human-induced climate change has begun, acknowledging the inertia and the next to irreversibility of the climate system, and the likeliness that the response by the global community will not be quick, are strong arguments for concluding that the ongoing change of the climate might be a more serious matter for the future than so far has generally been considered to be the case. Considerably more far-reaching measures during the next commitment period after 2012 than agreed in Kyoto are likely to be necessary in order to avoid serious consequences of a change of climate” (IPCC 2007). Major challenges surround the equity issues of CC, particularly between developed and developing countries, in terms of historically unequal emissions of GHGs, Page 26 of 34

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constraints on future emissions, and unequal exposure and capacity to adapt to the effects of CC. To address the climate change issue effectively, it must be viewed as an essential part of our efforts to have a sustainable development. Rich countries, partly so, because of their access to valuable resources, must take on a particular responsibility. Also, a more equitable world is necessary and will be to the advantage of everybody, rich and poor, north and south. Otherwise a major irreversible climate change will certainly hit us all. Climate change is already having an impact on ecosystems and man on all continents and across the oceans. Evidence has grown since the last IPCC report in 2014. As sea levels rise, coastal communities worldwide will experience ever more flooding, coastal erosion, and submergence. Unmitigated climate change poses great risks to human health, global food security, and economic development. Urgent action to reduce emissions is essential to avoid dangerous climate change. The level of adaptation required is dependent on the scale of mitigation. Adaptation is essential to deal with the risks of climate change, but there are limits to what adaptation alone can achieve. It has been seen that many courtiers are affected and others will be impacted by CC. It is clear that many areas and cities are currently manifesting CC impacts and vulnerable to many risks. But due to poverty, little has been taken for CC adaptation. This left the gap between rich and poor countries widening. Unless real confined measures and policies supported by proper funding (not on paper but materialized) are enacted on the ground, more risks of CC impacts will be witnessed and manifested; by then, it will be too late to probably act. The review shows that climate change adaptation (CCA) is not at the same pace of climate change mitigation (CCM). Thus, more collective efforts are urgently needed at local, regional, and national level. These efforts must be coordinated and successful case studies in similar countries with the same risks and vulnerability should be exchanged. Despite the fact that there are a bundle of finance mechanism and funding grant to adapt to climate change, more funds are needed mainly in developing countries to lower the gap between the actions, measure, and policies and institutional structure and capacity building.

Reasons for Poor Countries Being Unable to Cope With the Required Adaptation Measures

When considering adaptation, it is easy to get lost in the details of what needs to be done – or in producing “cost–benefit” ratios for nations or regions that do not consider who bears the costs and where they are concentrated. Some examples were noted above of cost–benefit ratios suggesting that certain key cities were unviable – including cities that are central to the current and future development prospects of whole nations. Discussions of adaptation must also remember the profound unfairness globally between those who cause climate change and those who are most at risk from its effects (Huq et al. 2007). This can be seen in three aspects: first, in regard to people, it is the high-consumption lifestyles of the wealthy (and the production systems that meet their consumption demands) that drive climate change. It is mostly low-income groups in low- and middle-income nations with negligible contributions to climate change who are most at risk from its impacts. Second, in regard to nations, it is within the wealthiest nations that most greenhouse gases have been emitted, but mostly low- and middleincome nations that are bearing and will bear most of the costs. Third, in regard to cities, larger companies and corporations can easily adjust to new patterns of risk induced by climate change and move their offices and production facilities away from cities at risk. But cities cannot move. And all cities have within them the homes, cultural and financial assets, and livelihoods of their inhabitants, much of which cannot be moved (Satterthwaite et al. 2007).

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There are figures to show the dramatic differences between nations in average contributions per person to greenhouse gas emissions – for instance, the 80-fold difference between that of the USA and many low-income nations. But these actually understate the scale of these differentials. Greenhouse gas emissions in high-income nations are kept down by the fact that they import many of the energyintensive goods used or consumed by their citizens and businesses. In addition, a concentration on comparing “averages” for nations obscures just how much the problem is driven by wealthy groups. The differentials in greenhouse gas emissions per person between rich and poor groups can be much larger than the differentials between rich and poor nations. For instance, the greenhouse gas emissions generated as a result of the high-consumption lifestyle of a very wealthy person or household are likely to be hundreds of thousands or even millions of times more than that generated by many low-income households in low-income nations (Hardoy et al. 2001; Hardoy and Pandiella 2007). The key issue is how to build resilience to the many impacts of climate change in tens of thousands of urban centers in low- and middle-income nations. According to Satterthwaite et al. (2007), such measures should: • Work with the reduction of risks from other environmental hazards, including disasters (noting the strong complementarities between reducing risk from climate change, non-climate changerelated disasters, and most other environmental hazards) • Be strongly pro-poor (most of those at risk from climate change and from other environmental hazards have low incomes, which limits their autonomous adaptive capacity) • Build on the knowledge acquired of reducing risk from disasters in urban areas • Be based on and build a strong local knowledge base of climate variabilities and of the likely local impacts from climate change scenarios • Encourage and support actions that reduce risks (and vulnerabilities) now, while recognizing the importance of measures taken now to begin the long-term changes needed in urban form and the spatial distribution of urban populations to reduce vulnerability to risks that may become manifest only several decades in the future • Recognize that the core of the above is building the competence, capacity, and accountability of city and sub-city levels of government and changing their relationship with those living in informal settlements and working in the informal economy – and the importance within this of supporting civil-society groups, especially representative organizations of the urban poor (this is also to avoid the danger of “adaptation” providing opportunities for powerful groups to evict low-income residents from land they want to develop) • Acknowledge that government policies must encourage and support the contributions to adaptation of individuals, households, community organizations, and enterprises; • Recognize the key complementary roles required by higher levels of government and international agencies to support this (and that this requires major changes in policy for most international agencies that have long ignored urban issues and major changes in how adaptation is funded) • Build resilience and adaptive capacity in rural areas – given the dependence of urban centers on rural production and ecological services and the importance for many urban economies and enterprises of rural demand for (producer and consumer) goods and services • Build into the above a mitigation framework too (if successful cities in low- and middle-income nations develop without this, global greenhouse gas emissions cannot be reduced) The very survival of some small-island and some low-income nations (or their main cities) is in doubt as much of their land area is at risk from sea-level rise, yet their contributions to global greenhouse emissions have been very small. There are also tens of millions of people in low- and Page 28 of 34

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_124-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

middle-income nations whose homes and livelihoods are at risk from sea-level rise and storms, although they have made very little contribution to global warming. The economic cost of losing certain cities for which adaptation costs is too high may be relatively small for national economies. But what will happen to international relations as increasing numbers of people lose their homes, assets, livelihoods, and cultural heritages to climate change-related impacts – especially when the main causes of this are strongly associated with the lifestyles of high-income groups in high-income nations – and the reason for their loss is the failure of high-income nations to cut back their emissions? The current Kyoto Protocol requires only industrial countries to cut their greenhouse gas emissions. But, since 1992, governments have been negotiating a new treaty which will ask all countries in the World, industrial and developing countries, to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by 2015. Adaptation plans must not in any way slow progress toward mitigation. It is obvious that adaptation will be easier and cheaper if greenhouse gas emissions are reduced – so both the amount of adaptation and the rate at which it must be implemented are lessened. Adaptation plans must also bring benefits to the billion urban dwellers currently living in very poor-quality housing, in tenements, cheap boarding houses, and illegal or informal settlements. These billion people include a large part of the population whose homes and livelihoods are most at risk from climate change. A technology-driven, market-led response to climate change does little for them.

References Abou-Hadid A (2006) Assessment of impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability to climate change in North Africa: food production and water resources. Project no AF 90. Assessments of Impacts and Adaptations to Climate Change (AIACC), Washington, DC. http://www.forestrynepal.org/ images/publications/Final%20CC-Tools.pdf. Accessed 28 Feb 2014 Agrawala S (2004) Adaptation, development assistance and planning: challenges and opportunities, IDS Bull Clim Change Dev 35(3):50–53; Klein (2001) op. cit. Altvater S, van de Sandt K, Marinova N, de Block D, Klostermann J, Swart R, Bouwma I, McCallum S, Dworak T, Osberghaus D (2011a) Assessment of the most significant threats to the EU posed by the changing climate in the short, medium, and long term - task 1 report. Ecologic, Berlin Altvater S, van de Sandt K, Marinova N, de Block D, Klostermann J, Swart R, Bouwma I, McCallum S, Dworak T, Osberghaus D (2011b) Recommendations on prioirty meaures for EU policy mainstreaming on adaptation - task 2 report. Ecologic, Berlin Bours D, McGinn C, Pringle P (2014) Guidance note 2: selecting indicators for climate change adaptation programming. Sea Change & UKCIP Brooks N, Anderson S, Ayers J, Burton I, Tellam I (2011) Tracking adaptation and measuring development. IIED climate change working paper no 1. Climate Change Group, International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), London Ciscar JC et el (2009) Climate change impacts in Europe. Final report of the PESETA research project, JRC/IPTS, Sevilla, JRC55391. ISBN:978-92-79-14272-7. http://publications.jrc.ec. europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC55391/jrc55391.pdf CBT (2009) Factsheet planning for climate change. Culombia Basin Trust. http://www.cbt.org/ upoads/pdf/factSheetPlanningforClimateChangeFINALweb.pdf. Accessed 18 July 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Resources (2014) Northern Periphery Programme 2007–2013, European Union. Available at http://www.climatechangeadaptation.info/case-studies/ CSIRO (2006) Climate change in the Asia/Pacific region, VIC, Australia

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Darsh G (2006) The impact of climate change on London’s transport systems, CIWEM met branch conference 22 Feb 2006, ATKINS. Available at www.ciwem.org/branches/metropolitan/ ClimateChange_Met_3.pdf Dasgupta S et al (2007) The impact of sea level rise on developing countries. A comparative analysis. World bank policy research working paper 4136, Feb 2007 DEFRA (2008) Funding for management of flood and coastal erosion risk in England between 2004–05 and 2010–11. Aavailable at www.defra.gov.uk/environ/fcd/policy/funding.htm Development Bank, Tunis (2007), Waibel M (2008) Implications and challenges of climate change for Vietnam, Pacific news, Nr., vol 29, pp 26–27. http://www.pacific-eographies.org/pn29/pn29_ waibel.pdf. Accessed 27 Feb 2014 Devereux S, Edwards J (2004) Climate change and food security. IDS Bull 35(3):22–30 Dolan, Walker IJ (2004) Understanding vulnerability of coastal communities to climate change related risks. Journal of Coastal Research, Special Issue 39, (Proceedings of the 8th International Coastal Symposium), pg–pg. Itajaí, SC – Brazil, ISSN 0749-0208 Downing T, Anthoff D, Butterfield R, Ceronsky M, Grubb M, Guo J, Hepburn C, Hope C, Hunt A, Li A, Markandya A, Moss S, Nyong A, Tol R, Watkiss P (2005). Scoping uncertainty in the social cost of carbon, final project report: social cost of carbon: a closer look at uncertainty (SCCU). July 2005. Report to Defra. http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/carboncost/aeat-scc. htm EC (2007) Water scarcity and droughts - In-depth assessment – second interim report. http://www. klimatilpasning.dk/media/5367/eea-report-2-2012.pdf EEA (2010) The European environment – state and outlook 2010: thematic assessment – water scarcity and droughts, floods and hydromorphology. European Environment Agency. http://www. klimatilpasning.dk/media/5367/eea-report-2-2012.pdf EEA and EC (2012) Climate-adapt. http://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/. Accessed 18 July 2014 El-BATRAN M (2010) Vulnerability and resilience of coastal cities to climate change hazards in Egypt, published paper in Resilient Cities 2000: 1st World Congress on Cities and Adaptation to Climate Change, Bonn, Germany Elsharkawy H, Rashed H, Rached I (2009) The impacts of SLR on Egypt. In: 45th ISOCARP congress- Partnership between TAP Portugal and Isocarp Association, 18–22 Oct Oporto European Environmental Agency Report (2012) Urban adaptation to climate change in Europe, challenges and opportunities for cities together with supportive national and European policies, no 2, p 76 Ford JD, Berrang-Ford L, Lesnikowski A, Barrera M, Heymann SJ (2013) How to track adaptation to climate change: a typology of approaches for national-level application. Ecol Soc 18(3):40. doi:10.5751/ES-05732-180340. Accessed 2014 Frankel-Reed J (2006) Emerging approaches in climate change adaptation from theory and practice, Unpublished master’s thesis, cited in Burton I, Diringer E, Smith J (2006) Adaptation to climate change: international policy options. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change, p 28 Gagnon-Lebrun F, Agrawala S (2007) Implementing adaptation in developed countries: an analysis of progress and trends. Climate Policy 7:392–408 Gemenne F, Barnett J, Adger WN, Dabelko GD (2014) Climate and security: evidence, emerging risks, and a new agenda. Climate Change 123(1):1–9 Greiving S et al. (2011) ESPON climate. Climate change and territorial effects on regions and local economics. Dortmund Haddad BM (2005) Ranking the adaptation capacity of nations to climate change when sociopolitical goals are explicit. Global Environ Change A 15(2):165–176 Page 30 of 34

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Hardoy J, Pandiella G (2007) Background paper on climate change and cities in Argentina, paper prepared for the Rockefeller Foundation‘s meeting on Building for Climate Change Resilience Hardoy JE, Mitlin D, Satterthwaite D (2001) Environmental problems in an urbanizing world: finding solutions for cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Earthscan, London, p 448 Harley M, Horrocks L, Hodgson N, Van Minnen J (2008) Climate change vulnerability and adaptation indicators. ETC/ACC Technical Paper 2008/9. European Topic Centre on Air and Climate Change, European Environmental Agency, Bilthoven. http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/ cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=65. Accessed 24 Feb 2014 Huq S (2004) Insights Development Research, international policy in supporting adaptation by the Climate Change Programme, International Institute for Environment and Development, id21 Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Insights 53:3 Huq S, Kovats S, Reid H, Satterthwaite D (2007) Editorial: reducing risks to cities from disasters and climate change. Environ Urban 19(1):3–15 ICLEI (2011) Financing the resilient city: a demand driven approach to development, disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation – an ICLEI white paper, ICLEI global report ICLEI (2014) Local Government for Sustainability. Accessed 17 Feb 2014. http://www.iclei.org; http://archive.iclei.org/index.php?id=13516&utm_source=GraphicMail&utm_medium=email& utmterm=NewsletterLink&utm_campaign=ICLEI+February+2014+eNews&utm_content. Accessed 18 Feb 2014 id21 insights, Dec (2008a) www.id21.org. Accessed 27 Feb 2014 id21 insights, Jan (2008b) www.id21.org. Accessed 27 Feb 2014 id21 insights53 (2004) www.id21.org. Accessed 26 Feb 2014 IPCC (2007) Summary for policymakers In: Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 7–22 Kay RC, Hay JE (1993) Possible future directions for integrated coastal zone management in the Eastern hemisphere: a discussion paper. In: Proceedings of the eastern hemisphere workshop on vulnerability assessment of sea level rise and Coastal Zone Management Klein RJT (2001) Adaptation to climate change in German official development: an inventory of activities and opportunities, with a special focus on Africa, Deutsche Gesellschaft f€ ur Technische Zusammenarbeit, Eschborn Lattanzio KR (2013) International climate change financing: The Green Climate Fund (GCF), CRS report for congress prepared for members and committees, congressional research service, 7–5700. 16 Apr 2013, pp 2–16. www.crs.gov Leary N, Kulkarni J (2007) Climate change vulnerability and adaptation in developing country regions, draft final report of the AIACC project. The International START Secretariat, Washington, DC McKenzie Hedger M, Corfee-Morlot J (2006) Adaptation to climate change: what needs to happen next? Report of a workshop in the UK, EU Presidency, Environment Agency and Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, London McKenzie Hedger M, Brown I, Connell R, Gawith M (2000) Climate change: assessing the impacts – indentifying responses, Department of the Environment, Transport and Regions, UK Climate Impacts Programme, London Nitivattananon V, TuT, Rattanapan A, Asavanant J (2009) Vulnerability and resilience of urban communities under coastal hazard condition in South Asia. In: Fifth urban research symposium 2009, Marseille Page 31 of 34

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OECD (2003) Special issue on climate change: climate change policies: recent developments and long-term issues, OECD papers, vol 4, no 2. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) publications, Paris OECD (2006) Development cooperation report 2006. Accessed at http://www.oecd.org/ statisticsdata/0,2643,en_2649_33721_1_119656_1_1_1,00.html Oxfam (2007) Adapting to climate change: what’s needed in poor countries, and who should pay, Oxfam briefing paper 104, Oxfam, Banbury, p 47 Oxfam (2010) Oxfam annual report 2010–2011. Living Our Values, pp 50. http://www.oxfam.org/ sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/story/oxfam-annual-report-2010-11_1.pdf Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) (2007) Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp 433–467 Poutiainen C, Berrang-Ford L, Ford J, Lesnikowski A, Heymann J (2013) Civil society organizations and adaptation to the health effects of climate change in Canada. Public Health 127(5):403–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.puhe.2013.02.004. Accessed 25 Feb 2014 Preston BL, Westaway RM, Yuen EJ (2011) Climate adaptation planning in practice: an evaluation of adaptation plans from three developed nations. Mitigation and adaptation strategies for global change 16:407–438. doi:10.1007/s11027-010-9270-x. Accessed 26 Feb 2014 Rebecca C (2009) The economic cost of climate change in Africa, Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA), with support from Christian Aid, commissioned Practical Action Consulting, pp 3–7 Regmi BR, Morcrette A, Paudyal A, Bastakoti R, Pradhan S (2010) Participatory tools and techniques for assessing climate change impacts and exploring adaptation options, a community based tool kit for practitioners, livelihoods and forestry programme, pp 1–58 Riberio M, Losenno C, Dworak T, Massey E, Swart R, Benzie M, Laaser C (2009) Design of guidelines for the elaboration of regional climate change adaptations’ strategies. Study for European Commission, Ecologic Institute, Belin Satterthwaite D (2001) Environmental governance: a comparative analysis of nine city case studies, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/jid.824 Satterthwaite D, Huq S, Pelling M, Reid H, Romero Lankao P (2007) Adapting to climate change in urban areas: the possibilities and constraints in low- and middle-income nations, human settlements discussion paper series, theme: climate change and cities – 1. International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), pp 48. ISBN:978-1-84369-669-8. http://pubs.iied.org/ pdfs/10549IIED.pdf Satterthwaite D (2008) Climate change and urbanization: effects and implications for urban governance Sheribinin A (2013) Climate change hotspots mapping: what have we learned? Climate Change 123(1):23–37 Smit B, Burton I, Klein RJT, Wandel J (2000) An anatomy of adaptation to climate change and variability. Climate Change (45):223–251 Smit B, Pilifosova O (2001) Adaptation to climate change in the context of sustainable development and equaity. Contribution of working group to the third assessment report of the interngovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Stephens C, Patnaik R, Lewin S (1996) This is my beautiful home: risk perceptions towards flooding and environment in low-income urban communities: a case study in Indore, India, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, p 51 Stern N (2006) The stern review on the economics of climate change. HM Treasury, London

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FAO – TCID (2011) Overview of climate change financing mechanisms in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam, GRIP. http://www.gripweb.org/gripweb/?q=countries-risk-information/ documents-publications/overview-climate-change-financing-mechanisms. Accessed 1 Mar 2014 Tol RSJ, Downing T, Kuik OJ, Smith JB (2004) Distributional aspects of climate change impacts. Global Environ Change 14(3):259–272 Tolba M (2011) The climate change challenge, the Cairo review of global affairs, The American University in Cairo, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy Tolba M, Saab N (2009) Arab environment: climate change, impact of climate change on Arab countries, 2009 report of the Arab forum for environment and development Tompkins EL, Adger WN (2003) Defining response capacity to enhance climate change policy, Tyndall Centre working paper 39 UNCCCF (2014) Review of the financial mechanism. Available at https://unfccc.int/cooperation_ support/financial_mechanism/review/items/3658.php. Accessed 1 Mar 2014 United Nations expert group meeting on population distribution, urbanization, internal migration and development, population division, department of economic and social affairs, United Nations Secretariat, New York, pp 21–23 Union of Concerned Scientists (2011) Climate hop map: global warming effects around the world. Climate hot spots - Africa. http://www.climatehotmap.org/global-warming-locations/. Accessed 30 June 2014, last accessed 18 Dec 2014 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2009) Report of the ad hoc working group on long-term cooperative action under the convention on its eighth session. Copenhagen, 7–15 Dec 2009, FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/17, issued on 5 February 2010. http://unfccc.int/meet ings/copenhagen_dec_2009/meeting/6295/php/view/reports.php United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] (2010a) Synthesis report on efforts undertaken to monitor and evaluate the implementation of adaptation projects, policies and programmes and the costs and effectiveness of completed projects, policies and programmes, and views on lessons learned, good practices, gaps and needs, Secretariat, United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2010b) Report of the conference of the parties on its sixteenth session. Cancun, 29 Nov–10 Dec 2010, Part 2, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, issued on 15 March 2011. http://unfccc.int/adaptation/items/5852.php United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2011) Report of the conference of the parties on its seventeenth session. Durban, 28 Nov–11 Dec 2011, Part 1 & 2, FCCC/CP/2011/9, issued on 15 March 2012. http://unfccc.int/meetings/durban_nov_2011/meeting/6245/php/view/ reports.php Van Aalst M, Hellmuth M, Ponzi D (2007) Come rain or shine: integrating climate risk management into African development bank operations, working paper no 89, African Verner D (ed) (2012) Adaptation to a changing climate in the Arab countries: a case for adaptation governance and leadership in building climate resilience MENA development report 2012, World Bank VNS (2007) Nation may lose 12 % of land to rising sea levels. http://vietnamnews.vnagency.com. vn/showarticle.php?num=02MIS060607 Waible M (2008) Implications and challenges of climate change for Vietnam. Pacific News Nr. 29, Jan/Feb 2008, p 27. http://www.pacific-news.de/pn29/pn29_waibel.pdf Waibel H (2009) Collecting data to measure vulnerabilty to poverty: some initial findings from Thailand and Vietnam. Seminar at the Faculty of the Economics and Rural Development,

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Hanoi University of Agriculture, Sept 30, Hanoi, Vietnam. http://www.ifgb.uni-hannover.de/ 2735.html?&L=1 Watkiss P (2011) Technical policy briefing note 5: health, the impacts and eeconiomic costs of climate change on health in Europe. Climate Cost, European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013). http://www.climatecost.cc/images/Policy_Brief_5_Climatecost_ Health_Summary_Results_vs_5_draft_final_web.pdf Watkiss P, Downing T, Dyszynski J (2010) Adapt cost project: analysis of the economic costs of climate change adaptation in Africa. UNEP, Nairobi, pp 8–12 Watson RT (2001) Climate change 2001: synthesis report, third assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Westerhoff L, Keskitalo ECH, Juhola S (2011) Capacities across scales: local to national adaptation policy in four European counries. Climate Policy 11(4):1071–1085 WHO (2003) France caught cold by heat wave. Bull World Health Organ 81(10):773–774 Yohe G, Tol RSJ (2002) Indicaors for social and economic coping capacity – moving toward a working defintion of adaptative capacity. Globle Environ Change (12):25–40

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

A Socioeconomic Evaluation of Community-Based Adaptation: A Case Study from Dakoro, Niger Olivier Vardakoulias* and Natalie Nicholles NEF consulting, London, UK

Abstract Community-based adaptation (CBA) is gaining popularity as an approach to supporting vulnerable communities to adapt to the impacts of climate change, but in an environment of competing financial demands, to what extent is CBA economically efficient? Empirical research from NEF Consulting (New Economics Foundation) using an extended social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) of qualitative and quantitative data gathered from four communities compares and contrasts the benefits and investment in CBA initiatives carried out by the Adaptation Learning Programme (ALP), implemented by CARE International in Dakoro, Niger. The results suggest a high return on investment on ALP’s CBA activities in Dakoro and an increase in the economic capital of communities (revenue and savings) as well as social and environmental capitals. Even only taking into account the benefits ALP has generated to date (over 4 years), findings suggest that for every £1 invested in communities, there has been a return of more than £4. In order to capture the future value of community-based adaptation, the evaluative model was extended further to forecast evolutions to 2020 using three core climate scenarios to evaluate the impact on the different forms of communities’ capital under a no intervention scenario, compared to an intervention scenario. Even under a high discount rate, results remain positive and returns are high, proving that CBA is both an economic and socially effective approach to adaptation.

Keywords Climate change; Community-based adaptation; Social cost-benefit analysis

Introduction Climate change is one of the greatest threats facing poor and marginalized communities (Parry et al. 2007). As the possibility of keeping global temperature increase to 2  C looks increasingly unlikely under current projections (IPCC 2013), societies will be faced with the challenge of adapting to the imminent impacts of climate change. The impacts of climate change will exacerbate existing challenges such as economic crises, natural disasters, environmental degradation, and conflict (Buhaug et al. 2008). This poses new challenges for development practitioners, policymakers, and national and local governments, who will increasingly need to take into account future impacts of climate change. This will require building resilience and capabilities within communities to respond to the impact of climate change. With this in mind, new research conducted by NEF *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 29

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Consulting (New Economics Foundation) sought to answer the question of which adaptation strategies are the most effective and would therefore benefit from most investment. Community-based adaptation (CBA) has been growing in popularity as an approach to supporting communities to adapt to the impacts of climate change (IIED 2009). The key aspects of the approach are a focus on both “hard” and “soft” adaptation strategies, the importance of action at all levels (community, regional, and national), embedding adaptation practices and actions into community life by codesigning approaches to adaptation, and stressing the importance of both quick win activities (such as disaster risk reduction measures) as well as building longer-term adaptive capacity (Ensor and Berger 2008). In short, CBA provides an effective, practical, and integrated approach which strengthens adaptive capacity and supports planning and implementation of DRR and climate-resilient development, informed by knowledge of climate information and risks. It seeks to address broader underlying causes of vulnerability which, if left unchallenged, would prevent the achievement of resilient outcomes (Ensor and Berger 2008). There are a range of research methods which are suitable for testing the efficiency and effectiveness of adaptation strategies promoted as part of CBA, including both quantitative and qualitative methods (GIZ 2013). Social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA), including its variants like social return on investment (SROI), is widely regarded as one of the most appropriate methods for assessing effectiveness and efficiency from a socioeconomic perspective. By comparing the wider benefits (economic, social, and environmental) generated by an intervention against the costs, SCBA determines whether available resources are used in an efficient and effective way (Dreze and Stern 1987). This enables an analysis of which strategies are most effective in delivering intended change when compared against others. This chapter presents the research conducted by NEF Consulting using a SCBA approach to evaluate and appraise the adaptation strategies promoted as part of the CBA approach by the Adaptation Learning Programme for Africa (ALP), implemented by CARE International in Niger. CARE International launched ALP in 2010 with the aim of identifying the problems faced by communities in the context of climate change, determining potential current and future solutions both for communities and the wider region, and building a robust community-based adaptation approach, which takes into account broader macro-institutional conditions and strategies, both regional and national. The ALP is carried out in four countries in Africa – Kenya, Niger, Mozambique, and Ghana. The program aims to generate learning on community-based adaptation to climate change in order to inform best practice for adaptation and development practitioners as well as local, national, and regional policy- and decision-makers (Fig. 1).

Purpose of the Evaluation In 2011, NEF Consulting carried out a socioeconomic analysis of community-based adaptation interventions carried out by ALP in Kenya. This created much interest and discussion in the efficiency and effectiveness of investing in community-based adaptation (Nicholles and Vardakoulias 2012) although the methodology used remained entirely forecastive. It was therefore agreed that a follow-up study using an evaluative approach to analyze ALP was needed to deepen understanding in this area. ALP started work in Niger in 2010 which meant that it was a good location for the study due to the longevity of the project. The objectives for the research were as follows:

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Climate change knowledge Climateresilient livelihoods

Local adaptive & organisational capacity

Influencing enabling policy environment

COMMUNITYBASED ADAPTATION

Disaster risk reduction

Addressing underlying causes of vulnerability Risk and uncertainty

Fig. 1 Scope of Adaptation Learning Programme

• To use extended cost-benefit analysis methodology to conduct a socioeconomic analysis of community-based adaptation • To analyze the results against the “broader” picture, i.e., comparing community based to no adaptation and/or to other development interventions that do not take adaptation into account In addition to this, the assignment aimed to simplify the original cost-benefit model used in Kenya so that the approach, learning, and results could be used by ALP and local government stakeholders to make decisions about the allocation of funds for activities which support climate change adaptation.

Climate Change in Niger Niger is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world and is highly dependent on climate conditions due to the nature of its geographical location and socioeconomic characteristics (Republique du Niger 2006). Niger’s economy and the livelihoods of its population are highly sensitive to the impact of climate changes due to 40 % of its GDP being based on agriculture and 80 % of the population being dependant on agriculture for their livelihoods (World Bank 2013). Over the years Niger has been consistently affected by droughts which are one of the drivers of vulnerability in terms of food crises, with no less than seven severe droughts since 1980 (World Bank 2013). This has resulted in successively undermining agricultural and livestock production on which most of the population depend. This is exacerbated by a number of other factors and risks including recurrent locust outbreaks, floods, desertification, land degradation, and poor resources and infrastructure to deal with these shocks. Figure 2 presents the economic impacts of these shocks from 1980 to 2010. Climate vulnerability is therefore just one of many interrelated pressures – climatic, socioeconomic, institutional, and ecological – that Niger’s agricultural sector experiences (World Food Programme 2010). It is also important to note that while agricultural production has increased as shown in Fig. 2, production per capita has been decreasing since the 1960s (Ozer 2007). Page 3 of 29

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production index (2004–2006 = 100)

180

cereals crops livestock

160 140 120 100 80 drought floods

60

drought locusts

40 20 0

drought locusts

locusts

drought locusts

drought locusts

drought floods pests

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 years

Fig. 2 Impacts of shocks on agricultural and livestock production in Niger (1980–2010)

Fig. 3 Historical and projected rainfall patterns in the Sahel

Therefore, agricultural production is not keeping up with population increase, which means that an increasing number of households are at risk of malnutrition. In the Sahelian zone, there is broad agreement that there is a decreasing trend in rainfall since the mid-twentieth century (Held et al. 2005). However, after a dry period lasting until the 1980s, rainfall has been increasing ever since. It is important however that these average conditions do not hide the increase in extreme rainfall events, anomalies in rainy seasons, and the fact that due to the chaotic nature of the climate system, the current wetter period might not last. In fact some downscaled global models predict that there will be a slow but sure decrease in rainfall across the Sahel rather than an increase as well as changes in the seasonality of precipitations (Held et al. 2005; Yayé et al. 2013; Fig. 3). Even if, as some downscaled models predict, overall precipitation will slightly increase or remain stable, all models agree on significant increases in mean temperature for the region. The impact of this increase in mean temperature on soil fertility and moisture is unlikely to be balanced out by the increase in precipitation. Furthermore, most models forecast a decrease in the length of growing Page 4 of 29

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

CNRM-CM3 GCM

ECHAM 5 GCM

CSIRO Mark 3 GCM

MIROC 3.2 medium-resolution GCM

2000 old area lost

Yield gain 5–25%

Yield loss > 25% of 2000

Yield gain > 25%

Yield loss 5–25%

2050 new area gained

Yield change within 5%

Fig. 4 Projected yields of rain-fed sorghum under different precipitation and temperature scenarios

period (LGP) and therefore a decrease in agricultural production as a consequence of temperature increase (Yayé et al. 2013). Looking at the overall picture, the climate projections for the Sahel region, coupled with population growth, are likely to increase existing vulnerability in Niger (Fig. 4). The department of Dakoro, where the ALP is operational, experiences precipitation anomalies typical of the Sahelian zone. The study was unable to find climate model forecasting for the region of Dakoro, but by looking at past historical records, it is clear to see just how vulnerable the region is. The province has been hit by six severe or catastrophic droughts between 1981 and 2000, this is equivalent to one severe or catastrophic drought happening every 4.8 years (World Bank 2013). The study took raw data from the weather station in Maradi (120 km south of Dakoro) and analyzed it revealing that precipitation patterns in the region are chaotic, demonstrating high vulnerability on a year-on-year basis (INS Niger 2010) (see Box 1). This presents a major challenge for rural communities who are dependent on rain-fed agriculture, as demonstrated by the economic analysis conducted by the World Bank which suggests that output of major crops is correlated to rainfall by a factor of 0.60 (World Bank 2013).

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Box 1: Rainfall Evolution in the Region of Maradi (1965–2013)

The sample communities which are the focus of this research are therefore situated in a particularly vulnerable environment where the predominant form of agriculture is rain-fed and water resources are limited – particularly during the dry season of October to May.

Methodology: Understanding Change and Impact This study takes a socioeconomic perspective of community-based adaption, which is not only useful in understanding the impact of CBA but also provides an effective framework for evaluation. The three factors are interrelated; if people have enough access to resources and also have the skills and knowledge to use them in the most effective way possible, then they are less likely to need or deplete their resources when a shock occurs. It is this assumption that is tested in this evaluation (Fig. 5). Following on from the study which was conducted in Kenya in 2011, this research combines a traditional cost-benefit analysis approach with the underlying principles of SROI (Lawlor et al. 2008). This results in a three-pronged approach to the methodology: • Developing theories of change (ToC) through engagement with primary stakeholders and the ALP team • Measuring quantitative social and economic capital evolutions using empirical research with primary stakeholders • Assessing quantitative environmental capital evolutions and climate variability through extensive literature reviews and secondary desk-based research in order to fill gaps identified in empirical analysis

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Community-based adaptation supports communities to: 1. Have access to resoureces – physical, social and financial captial.

2. Acquire knowledge and skills to manage, adapt and use resources.

Reduce the need for communities to deplete their economic capital to finance their needs when responding to an exogenous shock.

Fig. 5 ALP’s framework for community-based adaptation

The evaluation is composed of two main components, modeling the resilience of communities to shocks relative to a business-as-usual scenario and then modeling how this resilience impacts on the long-term prospects of communities – relative to a business-as-usual scenario. In short, the evaluation analyzes the value created by ALP’s interventions in economic, social, and environmental capital in comparison to investment. ALP works in 20 communities across four communes in Dakoro; therefore, the study was undertaken in a representative sample of communities chosen for the ALP. The communities chosen for the sample were Maiwassa, Dan Ijaw, Gomozo, and Kouggou. This was based on three key selection criteria, ethnic group, level of vulnerability, and proximity to the Tarka valley, as these factors are considered to have the most impact on the effectiveness of community-based adaptation. There are three main ethnic groups in the communities, Hausa, Fulani, and Toureg, with Hausa being the dominant group among the 20 communities. In order to ensure this distribution, two Hausa, one Fulani, and one Toureg community were selected. It was decided that the most feasible sample size would be 5 % of households within the communities, broken down by vulnerability levels. The levels of vulnerability were defined by taking into account household income and assets, and the vulnerability categories were defined by communities themselves. Communities were asked to collectively determine and identify which households were to be classified as “extremely vulnerable” through to “moderately vulnerable” based on a number of criteria including amount of assets (land, livestock, tools, etc), agricultural production output, social position within the community, quality of housing, and nutritional coverage. Vulnerability was assessed and weighted across the levels, this was to account for the fact that in some cases, 5 % resulted in less than a whole household (see Table 1 below).

Theory of Change Qualitative data on how the four communities selected for this research experienced the impacts of climate change prior to the start of ALP in 2010 and in 2013 when this research was conducted was collected via stakeholder engagement. Communities were asked to retell their stories across a range of parameters including social and economic impacts. A counterfactual scenario was also explored to find out how communities felt they would have experienced climate change in the absence of ALP. This can be illustrated through a theory of change diagram which presents the need for ALP as expressed by the challenges induced by climate change (Fig. 6). Page 7 of 29

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Sample construction based on level of vulnerability Total households Maiwassa 230 Dan Ijaw 124 Kouggou 49 Gomozo 81 Total 484

D = extremely vulnerable 6 1 0 2 9

Prevailing conditions

C = very vulnerable 5 4 1 2 12

Immediate outcomes

A = moderately B = vulnerable vulnerable 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 6 4

Medium term outcomes

Long term societal outcomes

Dissolution of community infrastructure

Reduction in water/irrigation (quantity and/or duration) Climate variability

Lack of local information about climate change

Lack of economic diversification & women economically inactive

C L I M A T E

Total 13 8 4 6 31

Pressure of resources: rural areas Pressure of resources: urban areas

Increasing vulnerability

Crop failure/ weak livestock

S H O C K

Poor planning

Insufficient agricultural production

Lack of pastures for livestock

Increased emigration

Diminished or inexistent savings

Lack of endowment (initial capital)

Weak ecosystems

Interruption in children’s education

Negative health impacts: mental & physical

Weak governance

Fig. 6 Theory of change for business as usual

The prevailing conditions are the reasons why ALP intervenes in the communities because collectively they increase vulnerability to a climate shock. When a climate shock does occur, this often results in weakened economic capital (crop failure or weak livestock), and a vicious cycle of not being able to plan and develop strategies for forthcoming shocks ensues. These, alongside the prevailing conditions, increase communities’ vulnerability from an economic perspective. According to the communities, one of the longer-term impacts of increased vulnerability is rural to urban and peri-urban migration which can lead to a number of impacts including breakdown in community infrastructure, increased resource pressure on both urban and rural areas, interruption in children’s education, and a detrimental impact on both physical and mental health. ALP has clear strategies to prevent these longer-term outcomes from occurring: to increase communities’ resilience to the uncertainty and impacts of climate change. Denoted by the green stars in Fig. 6, ALP intervenes to address the lack of local information about climate change, the lack of economic diversification, and women’s economic role within communities. It then works to address weakened economic capital and poor planning, which is about focusing on the core needs of the community to build their resilience. This is where ALP is aiming to influence, as denoted by the line of accountability. The line of accountability is a tool that allows for understanding of ALP’s sphere of influence and for better measurement of impact. Page 8 of 29

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Adaptation strategies

Economic outcomes

Introduction of improved crop species e.g. drought resistant Pesticides & fungicide

Tree plantations Restoration of degraded land Access to climate information

Hedging

Social outcomes

Increase in agricultural productivity / avoided losses How does change happen?

ALP addressees the heart of vulnerability: lack of access to information and lack of capacity to resit shocks (assets & endowments). Communities determine and own their strategies: they select the recipients, manage the activities, and make the decisions.

Small scale rearing Women’s savings groups & collective management

Increase in agricultural land / avoided losses Increase in value of sales of agricultural production

Reduced livestock vulnerability

Economic diversification

Better land management New skills & knowledge acquired

Environmental outcomes

Increase in production Improved economic resilience : savings Improved social cohesion Decision-making role for women Improved sense of competence & self worth Better family health Better eductional outcomes for children Strengthening of ecosystem services

Fig. 7 Theory of change for community-based adaptation

Once communities articulated the need for ALP’s intervention, they then shared the social, economic, and environmental outcomes they had seen following the adoption and integration of adaptation strategies. Figure 7 presents the theory of change as captured through the stakeholder engagement. ALP supports the process of action planning for community-based adaptation, which enables communities to decide on relevant and locally appropriate adaptation strategies. Each community applies a mixture of adaptation strategies selected by them. Indeed, this point is crucial to understanding the theory of change: communities determine their own strategies, select the recipients, and make the decisions about who is responsible and how resources are allocated. These decisionmaking processes are informed by climate vulnerability and capacity analysis, and climate information in some form. Adaptation strategies are multiple and usually involve activities related to livelihoods, risk reduction, or advocacy initiatives. These aim to reduce vulnerability and risk and result in climate-resilient and more equitable livelihoods, which are adapted over time. Example strategies range from improving crops (such as drought-resistant crops), community-based hedging mechanisms (known as warranting), small-scale rearing (one or two goats), and women’s collective savings structures. The qualitative information to create the theories of change provided a guide for which hypotheses needed to be tested and evidenced through quantitative data collection. These hypotheses are that: • Economic capital improves through increasing production (either agricultural productivity or land; increasing the value of sales or reducing livestock vulnerability), economic diversification (mostly where women undertake economic activities), and improving savings. All contribute to greater resilience from an economic perspective. • Social capital improves through learning new skills and acquiring knowledge and making collective decisions. Communities reported having better relationships and a sense of cohesion, improved sense of self-worth as a result of feeling more in control of their future, and better Page 9 of 29

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

general educational and health outcomes for families and children. The decision-making role of women changed through ALP’s work, as many of the strategies are run by women, and they reported enjoying their newfound role within their families. Interestingly, while the men showed support for the women’s active participation and management of economic resources, women’s increased independence (such as allowing women to go to the market) was not experienced in the same way across all the communities. • Environmental capital improves through strategies that encourage better land management and the strengthening of ecosystem services. Tree plantations and the restoration of degraded land support the maintenance of critical ecosystem services in fragile ecosystems of the Sahel. The hypothesis is equally that these three forms of capital interact in various ways. An improvement of ecosystem services, for example, underpins the economic sustainability of communities by preventing land degradation, which could reduce incomes from agriculture. Similarly, economic capital impacts on social capital, for instance, by preventing the breakdown of communities and/or emigration of youngsters from the communities. Finally, institutional empowerment can be a critical economic driver, by ensuring that communities are able to adapt and build resilience strategies in the future.

Environmental, Economic, and Social Outcomes The research used a questionnaire to measure the quantitative change in economic, social, and environmental variables. The aim was to see whether the interventions carried out by ALP have affected broad economic, social, and environmental outcomes. These include communities’ income from agricultural activities, education, health, social capital, and the key ecosystems on which communities rely. This required data collection which evidenced change in adaptive capacity and change in typical development outcomes. Change was measured using a retrospective approach to assess the level of capital before the start of the ALP (2009) to provide a baseline and then post intervention in 2013. This approach gives a measurement of “gross” change, in other words a level of change which does not take into account the counterfactual (what would have happened anyway) or the attribution of other actors/factors in influencing this change. Below is a summary of the key results for each type of capital.

Key Economic Outcomes The communities in which ALP works in Niger are highly dependent on agriculture and livestock for their livelihoods as described earlier. The economic data collected therefore focused on the evolution of agricultural and livestock returns since the beginning of the ALP. In addition to this, savings and degree of diversification were also assessed. The data collected in relation to agricultural activities shows three main findings: there has been an increase in productivity of all major crops, there has been an extension of agricultural productivity, and there has been an increase in agricultural revenue since the start of the program. Sorghum was the only major crop where a decrease in productivity was experienced, but it is difficult to ascertain why this might be. One possible reason might be that the increase in agricultural land might represent an extension into more marginal (less productive) land which can have an influence on overall productivity. Furthermore this slight decrease must be considered alongside a business-asusual scenario (see section on additionally) (Figs. 8 and 9). Page 10 of 29

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

MILLET

COWPEAS

Yield/hec/yr 2010

SORGHUM

Yield/hec/yr 2013

Fig. 8 Evolution of agricultural productivity (kg/ha/year)

4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 MILLET

COWPEAS hec/capita 2010

SORGHUM

hec/capita 2013

Fig. 9 Evolution of land tenancy

In addition to this, there has been an increase in agricultural returns across all crops during the same period, as represented in Fig. 10. It is important to note that agricultural returns are different to agricultural yields. One of the reasons why agricultural yields per hectare may have increased more than actual agricultural productivity could be due to the impact of the warrantage system in Niger, an adaptation strategy which involves storing excess produce at the end of the rainy season and selling it on the market when prices are higher although this theory would need to be tested. The combination of intensification, extensification, and warranting has resulted in a 41.8 % average increase in agricultural revenue between 2009 and 2013, as shown in Fig. 11. This figure is net of debt repayment and costs of production inputs.

Page 11 of 29

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 100000 90000 80000 70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 MILLET

COWPEAS

CFA/hec/yr 2010

SORGHUM

CFA/hec/yr 2013

Fig. 10 Average returns per hectare

TOTAL

Manioc

Moringa

Sorghum

Cowpeas

Millet

0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 100.00%

Fig. 11 Change in net revenue from crops

Crop diversification is another factor which has an impact on economic assets and therefore should be considered alongside intensification and extensification. Based on the data collected, only a very modest diversification of crops has taken place in the communities during the period under investigation (2009–2013), as presented in Box 2.

Page 12 of 29

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Box 2: Structure of Agricultural Production % of production 2010 0%

1%

Millet 26%

Cowpeas Sorghum 56% Moringa

17%

Manioc

% of production 2013 0%

4% Millet

22%

Cowpeas 51%

Sorghum Moringa

23%

Manioc

8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 Cattle

Sheep

Goats 2010

Donkeys

Camels

Poultry

2013

Fig. 12 Total livestock and poultry expressed in headcounts

The development of livestock activities is a more complicated picture. While there seems to have been a slight decrease in total ownership of livestock – as determined by headcounts of cattle, goat, sheep, donkeys, camels, and poultry (see Fig. 12) – the total value of and revenue derived from livestock and poultry have increased (see Box 3). Page 13 of 29

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Furthermore, a decrease in livestock headcounts can also be indicative of communities placing more emphasis on and investing more resources in agriculture. The two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Box 3: Average Income from Livestock and Evolution of Value per Type of Animal (FCFA, 2013) Evolution of value of livestock (FCFA) 2010–2013 40,000,000.00 30,000,000.00 20,000,000.00 10,000,000.00 –

Cattle

Sheep

Goats

Donkeys

Camels

Poultry

Total

–10,000,000.00 –20,000,000.00 –30,000,000.00 –40,000,000.00 –50,000,000.00

Income from livestock (FCFA) 300,000.00 250,000.00 200,000.00 150,000.00 100,000.00 50,000.00 – 2010

2013

Just like with agricultural production, the evolution of livestock headcount and livestock revenue needs to be compared against the counterfactual. A decrease of livestock headcount could be considered as a negative evolution only if the counterfactual scenario is a stable or increasing number of livestock. However, in many circumstances, a business-as-usual trend might actually consist of a greater decrease of the stock. In this case, anything over and above this decrease could be considered a positive impact. The main economic findings are presented in Table 2. On average, the empirical data suggests that there has been a positive evolution of yearly household budget as well as yearly savings, albeit to a lesser extent. These findings are in line with existing development literature which suggests that the ability of the poorest households to save is very low. This is due to the fact that a household with a low income is more likely to spend extra income rather than save it, so although savings do increase with income, they do not do so proportionally.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 2 Main economic findings

Average yearly household budget (FCFA 2013) Average yearly savings, including in-kind savings (FCFA 2013) Average time required to replenish lost income and assets after a drought

2009 (pre-ALP) 266,449 63,083 4.6 years

2013 (postALP) 399,353 86,056 2.5 years

% change +49.8 +36.4 44.7

Table 3 Evolution of key social variables Type of outcome Health Education Social capital Gender (and institutional capital) Adaptive capacity

Indicator Quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) Number of children attending school >6 months per year Number of persons in the “solidarity network” of the household Five-point scale on the extent to which women have an influence in community and household decision-making Five-point scale on the extent to which community members believe in their capacity and knowledge to establish resilience strategies in the future

% evolution (2009–2013) +128 +33 +23 +112 +258

Finally, households were asked to estimate how much time they would need to replace lost income and assets following a significant drought event pre- and post-ALP intervention. This was done by asking communities how much time it took them to replenish their stocks after the last drought event and how much time they thought this would have required if ALP had been operating during the last drought event. Responses suggest a faster recovery rate of nearly half the time following ALP.

Social Outcomes The main focus of ALP’s work is on generating social outcomes. The empirical work was therefore aimed at capturing these social outcomes based on the theory of change which had been developed with the community. When measuring social outcomes, some are easy to quantify based on established academic methods – such as health and education – while other softer social outcomes such as social capital, institutional capital, or changes in gender dynamics are harder to quantify. However, such soft indictors should not be overlooked due to the difficulty in quantifying them as they are no less important in building resilience or in enhancing development more broadly. Institutional strengthening, for example, can create positive externalities such as community members’ participation in decision-making as well as broader economic outcomes. Another example is women’s economic empowerment which is known to drive socioeconomic change. Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that building resilience is not just about creating changes in material conditions but is a multidimensional process which involves the flexibility of institutions, of social structures, and of collective knowledge and skills in communities. The changes in social outcomes are presented in Table 3 below. The indicators which have been used for health and education are the ones which are well established in the respective fields of health and education economics. Quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) were calculated by asking sample households to rank their health condition both on

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 Adaptive capacity perception 2010 (0-4 scale)

Decision-making capacity 2013 (0-4 scale)

Fig. 13 Change in perception of adaptive capacity for men and women and decision-making for women only

physical and mental health grounds (see Box 4). To capture a change in education, the number of children attending school was combined with the average school attendance in order to obtain the extra school years gained (Fig. 13). Box 4: Quality-Adjusted Life Years The QALY is a measure of the value of health outcomes. Since health is a function of length of life and quality of life, the QALY was developed as an attempt to combine the value of these attributes into a single index number. The basic idea underlying the QALY is simple: it assumes that a year of life lived in perfect health is worth 1 QALY (1 year of life  1 utility value = 1 QALY) and that a year of life lived in a state of less than this perfect health is worth less than 1. QALYs are therefore expressed in terms of “years lived in perfect health”: half a year lived in perfect health is equivalent to 0.5 QALYs (0.5 years  1 utility), the same as 1 year of life lived in a situation with utility 0.5 (e.g., bedridden) (1 year  0.5 utility). QALYs combine subjective data (e.g., self-stated physical and mental health conditions) with objective data (e.g., life expectancy) to measure the disease burden associated with different health conditions. It can also be used for measuring the value of different health conditions – notably in cost-benefit analysis – through a combination of the empirical data obtained and measurement of the “statistical value of life.” Social capital was measured by assessing the evolution of solidarity circles of households, i.e., the number of other households directly supporting the livelihoods of the sample households. An enlargement of this circle is used as a proxy indicator for social capital within communities. Subjective indicators were also used to capture the community perceptions of changes in the evolution of women’s role on decision-making structures and the evolution of trust in household and community adaptive capacity.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Key Environmental Outcomes The two environmental outcomes which were measured in this research both relate to desertification which is the greatest ecological threat facing Sahel ecosystems. ALP has tried to address this challenge through building the capacity of households to implement sustainable land management techniques, providing resources for reforestation, avoiding further deforestation, and restoring of degraded lands. The environmental outcomes are intricately linked to the ecosystem services that are directly supporting the socioeconomic livelihoods of the communities. For example, reforestation and deforestation can directly provide resources such as timber and fodder to communities. Equally, sustainable land management and the restoration of degraded lands can avoid a further extension of agricultural land to less productive spots. Finally, both can affect microclimate patterns in the communities. The results of the environmental outcomes are presented in Table 4 below. According to the data, the number of trees maintained (not deforested) or planted since the start of the program amounts to approximately 64, 165 in the four communities. This equates to an average of 75 trees per household. A total of 1,575 ha of degraded lands have been restored. This represents an average of 1.85 ha per household.

Measuring Additionality The outcome data presented so far is only representative of “gross impact,” i.e., the total impact across different forms of capital before you take into account what would have happened in the “counterfactual” or if a business-as-usual approach had been followed and ALP had not implemented CBA approaches in Dakoro. Determining the counterfactual makes it possible to estimate the role of the ALP in creating outcomes. This allows for calculation of the “net” or “additional” impact. Due to the nature of the number of active stakeholders in Dakoro, this study asked communities to list the organizations and actors that contributed to the changes observed and to estimate the proportion of contribution from these different actors to the outcomes. The results are presented in Table 5 below. Table 4 Evolution of key environmental indicators Outcome Avoided deforestation and reforestation Improved land management

Indicator Number of trees planted or maintained Hectares of degraded lands restored

Evolution (2009–2013) +64,165 +1,575.6

Table 5 Proportion of contribution of different organizations operating in the area Local government ALP Other NGOs State programs Community actions Total

Economic impacts 9 53 15 15 8 100

Social impacts 7 55 14 18 6 100

Environmental impacts 8 60 11 14 7 100

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

It is interesting to note that communities perceive the impact of ALP differently for each outcome. ALP is perceived to have had the most impact in creating positive environmental outcomes rather than social or economic ones. It is also important to note that there is a risk of social desirability of answers in this sort of exercise, meaning that respondents answer according to what they think the interviewer wants to hear, and it is possible that respondents in this research provided socially desirable answers. However, it is also worth noting the value of subjective questions which provide an opportunity for communities to share their perspective and perception. These answers therefore are assumed to be indicative and they are fed into the analysis of the counterfactual. While these results are important and a useful exercise, they do not capture evolution due to climate variability. 2009 was a bad year overall for average rainfall and duration of the rainy season. The four following years were relatively good which might explain in part the increase in agricultural and livestock revenue and, by extension, the improvement in social and environmental conditions in the communities (see Box 5). Box 5: 2009 Versus Post-2010 Rainfall Patterns Rainfall evolution (2009–2013) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

mm of rain 409 539 479 571 448

Days of rainfall (events with >5 mm) 44 59 44 52 43

Rainfall pattern and variability

Therefore it is important to capture the counterfactual; in order to do this, two methodological approaches were considered:

Page 18 of 29

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Option one: using national-level data on the evolution of agriculture and livestock production and productivity and comparing this data to observed changes in ALP communities However this approach could involve substantial biases. Firstly, national (or even regional) data can mask substantial disparities in production and productivity among different sites and locations, for example, comparisons between production in marginalized communities and production in areas with relatively intensive/modern practices. This means that aggregate averages might be poor proxies for understanding what would have happened in marginalized communities in Dakoro in the absence of ALP. Secondly, as articulated earlier, despite an increase in total agricultural production throughout the past three decades, the existing evidence suggests that production per capita has been decreasing (Ozer 2007). Given that the data gathered by this research is for household-level agricultural production, it is neither comparable to per capital production nor aggregate production figures. Therefore, benchmarking the change in agricultural production, relative to national-level data, was excluded due to a lack of directly comparable data. Option two: using regression analysis to understand the extent to which evolving climate patterns might have determined the increase in production and productivity This method can be used to estimate the extent to which the observed increase in production can be explained by weather patterns across different years and therefore provide an estimation of the production that should have been expected had the intervention not taken place. Despite this approach being more robust, it is important to stress that regression analysis is dependent to a great extent on the quantity and quality of available data. For instance, although climate patterns are sufficiently documented, the occurrence of other external shocks, such as locusts, is poorly reported – beyond whether they occurred or not. However, this approach was considered less imprecise than option one. Due to the limits of the first option, this study used regression analysis to determine the contribution of climate evolutions to agricultural production and livestock. This was done by using a historical data series for the region of Maradi, the closest possible to Dakoro (see Figs. 14 and 15). The results suggest that for each extra mm of rainfall, 120 additional units of agricultural output are generated. Conversely, a decrease of 1 mm in rainfall induces a loss of 120 units of output. By using this coefficient for the period 2009–2013 in the sample communities, it was determined that agricultural production for the three major crops (millet, sorghum, and cowpeas) should have been Rainfall pattern (1932-2013) 1200 1000 800 600 400 200

1932 1935 1938 1941 1944 1947 1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013

0

Rainfall (mm)

Linear (Rainfall(mm))

Fig. 14 Rainfall pattern Maradi (1932–2013)

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Days of rainfall events (1932-2013) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

2012

2008

2004

2000

1996

1992

1988

1984

1980

1976

1972

1968

1964

1960

1956

1952

1948

1944

1940

1936

1932

0

Days of rainfall events (1932-2013) Linear (Days of rainfall events (1932-2013))

Fig. 15 Days of rainfall events Maradi (1932–2013) Table 6 Measurement of the counterfactual for major crop production (expressed in kg) Production Crop 2009 Millet 267,053.88 Cowpeas 81,993.42 Sorghum 123,304.26

Estimated 2013 production under BAU 271,733.88 86,673.42 127,984.26

Actual production 2013 (ALP) 307,584.03 141,207.48 129,470

Gross impact of ALP +40,530.16 +59,214.06 +6,165.74

Net impact of ALP +35,850.16 +54,534.06 +1,485.74

expected to increase by 3.75 % throughout the period 2009–2013, compared to 30.80 % as the findings suggest. As such, the net increase (impact due to ALP) is of the order of 27 %. Taking into account the contribution of other actors to the program, ALP has directly contributed to a 13.8 % increase of agricultural production. Table 6 presents the counterfactual for all major crops and the net impact of ALP. A similar approach was replicated to determine the quantitative link between livestock returns and rainfall patterns. The coefficients determined for economic capital were then transposed to social and environmental capital to calculate net impact. Although not a precise approach, this was deemed to be the most robust way of assessing the business-as-usual scenario and environmental capital evolution. The net economic, social, and environmental impacts of ALP, factoring for counterfactual and attribution, are presented in Table 7 below.

Approach to Social Cost-Benefit Analysis Determining what is included and excluded from a socioeconomic analysis is of critical importance in order to understand the results of a social cost-benefit analysis. The approach taken in this analysis can be summarized as follows:

Page 20 of 29

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 7 Net outcome incidence per indicator per form of capital Outcome Economic Agricultural benefits revenue Livestock revenue Total savings (stock) Social benefits Health

Indicator Net evolution of revenue

Outcome Net outcome incidence Deadweight Attribution incidence £153,273.72 0.27 0.53 £21,857.25

Net evolution of revenue

£74,397.87

0.27

0.53

£10,609.34

£30,312.49

0.27

0.53

£4,322.64

70.80337673 0.27

0.53

10.10

93.08 £60,013.52

0.27 0.27

0.53 0.55

13.27 £8,912.67

0.384615385 0.27

0.55

0.057119665

0.323076923 0.27

0.55

0.047980519

1,576

0.27

0.60

255.6992197

34,649

0.27

0.60

5,622.853735

Stock of savings (money and nature/livestock) Quality-adjusted life years gained Education School years gained Social capital Additional funds provided to other community members Empowerment Increased confidence in making adaptation decisions Gender Decision-making capacity empowerment within household Environmental Avoided land Hectares under improved benefits degradation land management Avoided Number of trees planted or deforestation maintained

• To include not only strict economic outcomes but also broader social and environmental outcomes. Such an approach therefore considers three forms of capital (economic, social, and environmental) rather than just one. This requires the monetization of social and environmental outcomes in order to be compared like-for-like with economic outcomes and with investment in the program. Although monetization of nonmarket goods entails uncertainties, excluding these from the analysis means that an entire range of benefits become automatically invisible. In short, while accepting the shortcomings of “pricing the priceless,” this analysis takes the stance that an imprecise number is better than excluding outcomes which matter to communities. • To focus on a restrictive set of outcomes that can reflect broad aggregates or the “big picture” for communities and decision-makers rather than an exhaustive list. This means not focusing on the turnover of hedging schemes or the impacts of micro-lending within the community, for example, investigating instead whether and to what extent this set of microinterventions have influenced broad aggregates such as revenue, health, or education. This responds to a need to replicate the analysis in different contexts, which is made possible by establishing a common set of outcomes that can be used in other contexts. • To consider not only strict typical disaster risk reduction outcomes but equally more classic development outcomes. Indeed, the frontiers between an adaptation intervention and a development one are blurred and often artificial. As such, it is sensible to consider whether and to what extent adaptation enhances human development and vice versa. • To create the framework for the analysis in the spirit of community-based adaptation. The outcomes and impacts have been co-determined through a bottom-up process, and only then complemented with objective indicators, in order to measure what matters.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_125-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 8 outlines the variables used in the SCBA, as well as valuation approaches and sources. An overview of the process is presented in Fig. 16 below. As outlined earlier, this analysis considers both the counterfactual and the potential contribution of other actors, including the autonomous strategies of communities, to the outcomes identified. The benefits generated by the intervention are then compared to the financial investment of ALP in the communities. Financial costs include both programmatic expenditure and management costs associated with these.

Table 8 Description of variables used in the social cost-benefit analysis Category Economic

Variable Agricultural revenue

Livestock revenue

Savings

Social

Health

Education

Indicator Net returns to agriculture (market and subsistence) Net returns to livestock (market and subsistence) Monetary and in-kind stock of savings Quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) Extra years of schooling

Social capital Number of individuals in the solidarity circle Women’s Increased participation participation of women in decision-making Community Increased empowerment confidence in implementing adaptation strategies Number of trees Environmental Avoided deforestation planted/ maintained and reforestation

Data collection method Monetary valuation proxy Empirical Market value

Source for valuation proxy Empirical

Empirical

Market value

Empirical

Empirical

Market value

Empirical

Empirical

Statistical value of life approach Miller (2000) (average GDP per capita of Niger for a full QALY, i.e., year in perfect health) Returns to primary education for Psacharopoulos an extra year of schooling and Patrinos (2002) Value of goods donated to other Empirical households within the (questionnaire community per year application) Willingness-to-accept Empirical compensation exercise (focus groups)

Empirical

Empirical

Empirical

Empirical

Opportunity cost of time (hourly Empirical minimum wage) for participation in community actions and decision-making

Empirical

Value of timber Value of fodder Value of tCO2eq emissions sequestrated Value of land per hectare (market price)

Restoration of Hectares of land Empirical degraded/ restored desertified lands

World Bank (2009)

Empirical

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Fig. 16 Flow diagram illustrating the social cost-benefit analysis process

Time Delineation The study involved running two distinct modeling simulations: • A strict evaluative simulation that focuses only on the costs borne and benefits generated throughout the period 2010–2013. • An analysis combining evaluative data with a forecast to 2020. While the results of the former can be considered more reliable and the latter more hypothetical, there is a clear rationale for forecasting potential impacts into the future. Firstly, benefits do not suddenly cease to occur as a consequence of artificial time delimitations. For instance, the impacts of the introduction of improved crop varieties are unlikely to stop happening this year. As such, analyzing up to 2013 only may considerably underestimate the benefits generated by community-based adaptation. Indeed, one of its key characteristics is the focus on sustainability: by embedding new practices, knowledge, and skills into community structures, community-based adaptation aims precisely to ensure the sustainability of adaptation beyond the time span of ALP’s intervention. In short, although an evaluative model may be perceived to be “safer” in terms of deriving conclusions on strategies that are already in place, forecasting into the future can, despite complexities, depict a better representation of the magnitude of benefits.

Forecasting and Uncertainty Forecasting into the future requires a consideration of likely climatic evolutions over the next 7 years. Indeed, the evolution of economic capital (and, by extension, social and environmental capital) is critically dependent on climate variables – most importantly rainfall patterns. As evidenced earlier, however, the rainfall and temperature patterns in Dakoro are far from linear and do not point to a clear trend. Similarly, the available data does not show clear trends in the Page 23 of 29

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Table 9 Different scenarios for a forecastive analysis Scenario Replicating the 1980s scenario (worst case) Replicating the 1990s scenario (moderate case) Replicating the 2000s scenario (best case)

Description An average rainfall of 411.5 mm per year throughout the period and four major drought events – three of which consecutive An average rainfall of 489 mm per year throughout the decade and one major drought event An average rainfall of 495.2 mm throughout the decade and one major drought event

distribution of rainfall during the rainy season as well as demonstrates potential interruptions to the start/end dates of the rainy season. Numerous scenarios are therefore required in order to forecast uncertainty and the evolution of capital, and these need to be based on historical data. These scenarios are outlined in Table 9. A “no drought” scenario was excluded from the analysis. This is because Dakoro has experienced six severe or catastrophic droughts in the past 29 years. This represents a frequency of one drought every 4.8 years, on average. It is also synonymous with a 20 % probability of drought occurrence per year. Through datasets of the Nigerien climate center Agrhymet, the study was able to determine the impacts of shocks on agricultural production for the region of Maradi. Through an econometric analysis, the impact of the level of rainfall on agricultural production and livestock was estimated. The coefficients derived allowed for forecasting the evolution of production under a business-asusual scenario (what would have happened without ALP) compared to the evolution of production post-ALP. While, evidently, community-based adaptation does not shield nor exempt communities from shocks, a higher level of savings and other initial conditions prior to the shock mean that the reduction can be less dramatic and that communities are apt to bounce back more rapidly, as evidenced earlier.

Findings Table 10 presents the results of the evaluative analysis for the four communities combined. The results suggest that under any discounted rate, the intervention yields highly positive returns even if not taking into account further impacts beyond 2013. More importantly, even if accounting only for economic returns, cost-benefit ratios range from 1.9 to 2.06. That is, even when social and environmental impacts are left out of the equation, the intervention still yields between £1.9 and £2.06 per pound invested. Further, returns are still positive at the highest discount rate of 12 %, with economic capital representing most of the value (see Fig. 17). When forecasting over a longer time span, the benefits of the program increase even further (see Table 11) and this is due to a combination of two factors: 1. The investment period of ALP ends in 2014, while benefits continue to accrue to communities. The net benefits therefore increase compared to costs, which remain stable after 2014. 2. A critical assumption in the model is that the time required to recover from a drought post-ALP is approximately half that required in a no intervention scenario (2.5 years vs. 4.6 years). This substantially increases the output gap between the business-as-usual and the intervention scenario. It also means that the worse the climate scenario, the higher the returns generated by Page 24 of 29

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Table 10 Results of evaluative analysis (time span: 2010–2013) in £2013 0 % discount rate 5 % discount rate 12 % discount rate

Net present value (net discounted benefits) £184,129.84 £158,044.91 £129,330.39

Cost-benefit ratio 4.45 4.34 4.19

Fig. 17 Net present value of different capitals under a 12 % discount rate Table 11 Results of combined evaluative and forecastive analysis (time span: 2010–2020) in £2013

The 1980s scenario (worse) The 1990s scenario (moderate) The 2000s scenario (best)

0 % discount rate 5 % discount rate 12 % discount rate 0 % discount rate 5 % discount rate 12 % discount rate 0 % discount rate 5 % discount rate 12 % discount rate

Net present value (net discounted benefits) £399,413.48 £340,751.38 £230,426.50 £321,080.23 £273,922.99 £185,235.10 £286,934.97 £244,792.66 £165,536.28

Cost-benefit ratio 9.8 8.5 6.1 7.9 6.8 4.9 7.06 6.1 4.4

Economic C-B ratio only 4.5 3.9 2.8 3.6 3.1 2.3 3.2 2.8 2.06

community-based adaptation (see Table 11). When relaxing this assumption, by assuming that the same time is required to recover regardless of the intervention, then returns are still positive, albeit lower. These results need to be put into perspective. Table 12 compiles the results of a sample of previous cost-benefit analyses on adaptation and DRR programs. The results from this analysis suggest that ratios ranging from approximately £4 to almost £10 per pound invested are indicative of a highly socially profitable investment. Indicatively, the ratios found in this study are indeed higher than the ratios of all previous analyses except for one, which suggests an extremely high result $37.3 per $1 invested. However, this analysis does not consider explicitly the counterfactual and attribution, which means that results might overestimate the benefits of the program compared to costs. Further, this comparison is only indicative. Indeed, these studies are not comparable like-for-like: first and foremost because the outcomes they consider are different and second because the time frames considered are highly variable among different analyses. Page 25 of 29

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Table 12 Indicative cost-benefit ratios of a sample of DRR and climate adaptation interventions Country Nepal Nepal India Sudan Malawi Belarus, Georgia, and Kazakhstan Kenya

Type of intervention Adaptation DRR DRR Adaptation Adaptation DRR Adaptation

Cost-benefit ratios 1.13–2.04 1.55–5.81 3.17–4.58 2.4 37.3 3.1–5.7 0.93–3.13

Source Willenbockel (2011) White and Rorick (2010) Venton (2004) Khogali and Zewdu (2009) Tearfund (2010) World Bank (2008) Nicholles and Vardakoulias (2012)

Source: NEF Consulting compilation

Conclusion This research aimed to answer the question: is community-based adaptation an efficient and effective approach to climate change adaptation? While previous research conducted by NEF Consulting, published in the report Counting on Uncertainty (Nicholles and Vardakoulias 2011), was based on a solely forecastive approach (the impacts of strategies which had not yet taken place), this research is based on solid, evaluative data. The findings from this suggest that returns are considerably higher than the ones which were previously predicted. Returns on investment range from £4 to almost £10 per £1 invested, which is high by any standard. There is a high level of confidence in these results for two main reasons: 1. The sensitivity analysis conducted suggests that even if considering strict quantitative economic benefits only, returns are still positive. As such, even for those skeptical of monetization (i.e., those who do not place confidence in nonmarket valuation), the fact that economic returns are positive on their own is sufficient to consider community-based adaptation as cost-effective. 2. This analysis has taken into extensive consideration both the counterfactual and the contribution of other actors in achieving the outcomes identified in the field. It is therefore highly unlikely that impacts are overestimated or inflated. Considering the breath of positive outcomes presented in this analysis, community-based adaptation approaches appear to present multiple dividends: not only does a community-based approach enhance the decision-making capacities of communities at a local scale but equally impacts considerably on “hard” outcomes, such as increase of agricultural production. This means that a community-based approach seems to increase the “uptake” of adaptation and development activities, e.g., the introduction of improved seed varieties. Similarly, community-based adaptation impacts on overall development of communities. Indeed the benefits considered in this analysis are based on typical development outcomes such as health and education. The findings suggest that community-based adaptation responds both to short-run disaster mitigation measures and long-run development needs. Finally, the approach and findings from this study have led to a number of recommendations for future upscaling of the analysis and design of adaptation strategies: • Replicate the analysis to appraise and evaluate different adaptation strategies. Comparing results across different adaptation interventions could indicate the most cost-effective adaptation strategies. Page 26 of 29

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• Determine a common set of outcomes which should be considered when evaluating adaptation interventions. Only this would allow a robust comparison of different socioeconomic appraisals. • Take note that wide uncertainties regarding climate variables, such as future rainfall and temperatures patterns, mean that different scenarios need to be considered when forecasting the impacts of adaptation interventions into the future. This especially holds for analyses at a local level, where climate uncertainties are considerably high.

References Buhaug H, Gleditsch NP, Theisen OM (2008) Implications of climate change for armed conflict. Paper presented to the World Bank workshop on Social Dimensions of Climate Change The World Bank, Washington DC. Available at: http://www.hbuhaug.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/ 02/SDCCWorkingPaper_Conflict.pdf Dreze J, Stern N (1987) The theory of cost-benefit analysis. In: Auerbach A, Feldstein M (eds) Handbook of Public Economics, vol II. Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam Ensor J, Berger R (2008) Understanding climate change adaptation: lessons from community-based approaches. Practical Action Publishing (Paperback) GIZ (2013) Economic approaches for assessing climate change adaptation options under uncertainty. Deutsche Gesellschaft f€ ur Internationale Zusammenarbeit, Bonn Held IM, Delworth TL, Lu J, Findell KJ, Knutson TR (2005) Simulation of Sahel drought in the 20th and 21st centuries. PNAS 102(50). Available at: http://www.pnas.org/content/102/50/17891.full. pdf+html IIED (2009) Community-based adaptation to climate change. Participatory Learning and Action, no 60. Available at: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/14573IIED.pdf INS Niger (2010) Annuaire Statistique des Cinquante Ans d’Indépendance du Niger. Ministère de l’Economie et de la Finance & Institut National de la Statistique, République du Niger. Available at: http://www.stat-niger.org/statistique/file/Annuaires_Statistiques/Annuaire_ins_2010/serie_ longue.pdf IPCC (2013) Summary for policymakers. In: Climate change 2013: the physical science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Available at: http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ SPM_FINAL.pdf Khogali H, Zewdu D (2009) Impact and cost benefit analysis: a case study of disaster risk reduction programming in Red Sea State Sudan. Sudanese Red Crescent Society, Khartoum. Available at: http://www.preventionweb.net/files/globalplatform/entry_bg_paper ~ sudanredseaimpactandcostbenefitanalysis2009.pdf Lawlor E, Nichols J, Neitzert E (2008) Seven Principles of measuring what matters. NEF (The New Economics Foundation), London Miller TR (2000) Variations between countries in values of statistical life. J Transp Econo Pol 32(2) Nicholles N, Vardakoulias O (2012) Counting on uncertainty: the economic case for community based adaptation in North-East Kenya. NEF (New Economics Foundation), London. Available at: http://www.careclimatechange.org/files/adaptation/Counting_on_Uncertainty_July12.pdf Ozer (2007) Analyse pluviométrique au Niger: récentes modifications et impacts environnementaux. University of Liège. Available at: http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/bitstream/2268/

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16133/1/OZER_NIAMEY1.pdf and, République du Niger (2010) Chocs et vulnérabilités au Nier: analyse des données secondaires Parry ML., Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) (2007) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Psacharopoulos G, Patrinos HA (2002) Returns to investment in education: a further update. World Bank Policy Research, working paper no 2881 Republique du Niger (2006) Programme d’Action National pour l’Adaptation aux Changements Climatiques. Republic of Niger, UNDP and GEF. Available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ napa/ner01f.pdf République du Niger (2010) Chocs et vulnérabilités au Niger: Analyse des données secondaires. World Food Programme. Available at: http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/docu ments/ena/wfp228158.pdf Tearfund (2010) Investing in communities: the benefits and costs for building resilience for food security in Malawi. Available at: http://www.e-alliance.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/docs/Publica tions/Food/2012/Investing_in_communities_web.pdf UNFCCC (2011) Assessing the costs and benefits of adaptation options: an overview of approaches. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change. Available at: http://unfccc.int/ resource/docs/publications/pub_nwp_costs_benefits_adaptation.pdf Venton C (2004) Disaster preparedness programmes in India: a cost-benefit analysis. Network paper 49. Available at: http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-38/justifyingthe-cost-of-disaster-risk-reduction-a-summary-of-cost%E2%80%93benefit-analysis White BA, Rorick M (2010) Cost-benefit analysis for community-based disaster risk reduction in Kailali, Nepal. Mercy Corps, Nepal. Available at: http://www.mercycorps.org.uk/sites/default/ files/mc-cba_report-final-2010-2.pdf Willenbockel D (2011) A cost-benefit analysis of practical action’s livelihood-centred disaster risk reduction project in Nepal. IDS, Brighton. Available at http://community.eldis.org/?233@@. 59ecc208!enclosure=.59ecc20e&ad=1 World Bank (2008) Weather and climate services in Europe and Central Asia: a regional review. working paper 151. The World Bank, Washington, DC. Available at: http://elibrary.worldbank. org/doi/pdf/10.1596/978-0-8213-7585-3 World Bank (2009) Impacts des Programmes de Gestion Durable des Terres sur la Pauvreté au Niger. Unité Environnement et Gestion des Ressources Naturelles, Département du Développement Durable, Région Afrique. World Bank Report No 48230-NE World Bank (2012) Turn down the heat: why a 4 C warmer world must be avoided. A Report for the World Bank by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics. Available at: http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_ Why_a_4_degree_centrigrade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf World Bank (2013) Agricultural sector risk assessment in Niger: moving from crisis response to long-term risk management. Agriculture and Environment Services (AES) Department and Agriculture, Rural Development, and Irrigation (AFTAI) Unit in the Africa Region. Report No. 74322-NE. Available at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/ default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/01/31/000333037_20130131141714/Rendered/PDF/ 743220ESW0P12900Box374318B00PUBLIC0.pdf

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Yayé H, Danguioua A, Jalloh A, Zougmoré R, Nelson GC, Thomas TS (2013) Niger. In: Jalloh A, Nelson GC, Thomas TS, Zougmoré R, Roy-Macauley H (2013) (eds) West African agriculture and climate change a comprehensive analysis. International Food Policy Research Institute. Available at: http://www.ifpri.org/publication/west-african-agriculture-and-climate-change

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Climate Change and Gender: Study of Adaptation Expenditure in Select States of India Gyana Ranjan Pandaa*, Saumya Shrivastavab and Aditi Kapoorc a Department of Public Policy, Law and Governance, Central University of Rajasthan (India), Kishangarh, Bandersindri, Rajasthan, India b Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability, New Delhi, India c Alternative Futures-Development Research and Communication Group, New Delhi, India

Abstract India is currently executing the National Action Plan on Climate Change (GoI. National Action Plan on Climate Change. Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change, New Delhi, 2008), and subsequently the states have been asked to formulate the state-specific action plans to integrate the national objectives and to implement specific climate change measures. Several questions arise on the impact of mission-mode adaptation policy interventions on enhancing the capacities of women to cope with climate vulnerabilities. Gender is a crosscutting issue, and it is well established that climate change affects women disproportionately more than men due to inequities in accessing resources and opportunities to enable them to adapt to the inevitable impacts of climate change, as well as due to the roles that they play and the responsibilities that they shoulder. Addressing gender concerns in the context of climate change requires engendering the government-led adaptation strategies, supported by requisite budgetary outlays. So far the gender budgeting framework has not looked into the aspect of climate change impacts on women. In order to fill the research gaps, the paper attempts to bring forth the analytical interlinkage between gender and climate change by analyzing critically the budgets of select states of India – Uttarakhand (UK), Uttar Pradesh (UP), Madhya Pradesh (MP), and West Bengal (WB). The paper attempts to quantify the public expenditure on adaptation to climate change for the select states and the priority accorded to addressing gender concerns in the various sectors within the overall adaptation framework.

Keywords Climate change; Adaptation expenditure; Gender-responsive budgeting

Introduction It is now “unequivocally” established through global scientific assessment (IPCC 2007) that climate change is happening and it is happening at a rapid pace. In congruence with the global-level monitoring and assessment, India carried out a country-specific scientific assessment of climate change impacts on India (GoI 2009). The results point to the need for formulating a national level policy to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change (GoI 2008). The first ever country-level

*Email: [email protected] *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 17

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policy document, National Action Plan on Climate Change, was a result of this process, which maintains categorically that “climate change may alter the distribution and quality of India’s natural resources and adversely affect the livelihood of its people. With an economy closely tied to its natural resources base and climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture, water and forestry, it may face a major threat.” As India is an agrarian economy with 70 % of its population residing in rural areas and dependent on agriculture and allied activities for livelihood (GoI 2012, p. ii), addressing the impacts of climate change is necessary to ensure food security and viable livelihood options for the vast majority of its population. Also important is to note that women form larger stakeholders in this sector due to increasing feminization of agriculture and their specific needs and vulnerabilities need to be taken into account when formulating the concerned policies. The degree of climate vulnerability on large segment of society makes a stronger case for “planned adaptation” interventions. It is because reversal of the wheel of carbon accumulation through mitigation measures takes considerable period of time. Adaptation hence is a natural choice of coping with the irreversible changes (Panda 2011). “Adaptation,” as a multidimensional concept (IPCC 2007; Bosello et al. 2009; Lim Bo and Spanger-Siegfred 2005; Smit and Pilifosova 2001; Smithers and Smit 1997), refers to coping strategies at the national and local levels such as modifications in the behavior and responses of individuals to adapt to changes in their immediate natural and socioeconomic systems induced by climatic variability. As per the IPCC (2007), adaptation is a well-thought-out effective tool to address various impacts resulting from global warming, already unavoidable due to past emissions and future emissions that might go unchecked. Stern Review (2006) further confirmed the proposition that the benefits of strong, early action on climate change outweigh the costs. Effective “planned” adaptation actions are contingent upon the development and optimal utilization of the resources and developmental programs earmarked for building human and adaptive capacities of the poor and marginalized communities, considered as frontline vulnerable groups to the effects of climate change.

Gender in Adaptation Framework The process of climate change and the policies and programs in place to deal with it have gendered impact. It is widely acknowledged that the process of climate change would affect women more adversely than men. Women suffer more from the potential impacts of climate change due to limited resources that they possess, the differential role that they play, and the responsibilities that they shoulder within the household as well as in the society (IUCN 2007; Terry 2009a). Women are seen as primary caregivers in the society. They are responsible for the provision of basic needs of the family like health; collection of water, firewood, and other natural resources; food provision; subsistence farming; etc. (Rodenberg 2009; Brody et al. 2008; Masika 2002). Since these are inherently linked with the process of climate change and are bound to be adversely affected in the process, they have a direct bearing on the responsibilities carried out by the women. Moreover, in the wake of climate change-induced hardships, men often migrate to urban areas in search of better livelihood opportunities, leaving women behind to cater to not just the household needs but also to look after farming for livelihood at home (Roy and Venema 2002; Masika 2002; Terry 2009b). Lambrou and Piana (2006) have stressed on the gendered nature of climate change and its impacts. Women bear the burden of caring for the sick, and because increased levels of sickness are expected to result from climate change, women will bear the costs of climate change disproportionately. Kapoor (2011) has also shown that the process of climate change affects women more adversely than men. In a detailed analysis on the potential impacts of climate change on men and Page 2 of 17

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women, she has outlined how climate change has a gendered impact, leading to an increase in the hardships faced by women in terms of an increase in their work burden, drudgery, worsening of their nutritional status, increase in the incidence of trafficking and violence against them, a rise in indebtedness, as well as deteriorating their livelihood opportunities. Nellemann et al. (2011) note that “the process of climate change is the most likely to increase the existing inequalities in the society due to socially constructed gender role.” Ahmed and Fajber (2009, p. 35), in the case study of drought-prone villages in Gujarat (India), identified various systems which enable poor women and men to adapt to climate change in autonomous and planned ways like the “social and power relations that facilitate access for different socio-economic groups, men and women, including rights and entitlements to productive resources or assets (land, water, labour, credit), social networks, capacity-building, and the transfer of new knowledge to support livelihood diversification. Governance considerations, such as accountability, transparency, and the informed participation of vulnerable women and men in community decisionmaking on disaster management, are equally important to ensure that those directly affected can negotiate access to discussions and decisions, and ultimately build their capacity to adapt.” In the case study of Andhra Pradesh, Lambrou and Neson (2010) observed that there were changes in key aspects of farming activities over the last past 30 years with the changes in climate variability. Further, the changes had led to increased workloads, but in different areas of work according to gender. The study also found that the climate change has led to an increased pressure on women to provide food, workload at home, health problems, as well as fights or arguments among the family members. The above analytical framework calls for certain gender-responsive adaptive policy actions. There are only a handful of studies which have focused on the fact that women, with their intrinsic knowledge about the environment, can contribute more to the process of adaptation (Lambrou and Piana 2006; Denton 2004, 2010; Alber 2011). Lambrou and Piana (2006) argue that “focusing solely on vulnerability may be misleading since women often have untapped skills, coping strategies and knowledge that could be used to minimize the impacts of crisis, environmental change and disasters.” In reality, “women have a key role in development, and any potential environmental policy should take cognizance of women as key players particularly given their role as natural resource managers.” Brody et al. (2008, p. 13) have highlighted that “women have a great deal of knowledge and experience in coping with the impacts of climate change and understand their own needs and the types of interventions required for ensuring more sustainable agricultural processes in the face of these changes.” Citing a participatory research project on the role of women in rural communities in adapting practices in the Ganga river basin in Bangladesh, India, and Nepal to secure their livelihoods in the face of changes in the frequency, intensity, and duration of floods, Brody et al. (p. 13) concluded that the women were not only clear about what they needed in order to adapt better to the floods, crop diversification, and agricultural practices but also about the skills and knowledge training required to learn about flood- and drought-resistant crops and the proper use of manure, pesticides, irrigation, and so on. Denton (2004, 2010) also observed that there is a need to go beyond highlighting the vulnerability aspect where the women are concerned. There is a need to recognize women as agents of change in adaptation strategies and involve them in the process of planning at all levels. Engendering of the planning process requires recognition of the importance of women in the adaptation and planning and dedication toward incorporating some basic principles of equity in our processes. Alber (2011) has put forward two arguments as to why gender issues need special attention in the climate policies. To quote him, “Firstly, both women and men need to be equally and meaningfully involved in Page 3 of 17

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planning and decision-making. Secondly, gender mainstreaming as a tool to assess the different implications for women and men of planned legislation, policies and programmes is required in all areas and at all levels, including climate policy. Thus working toward gender equity as an issue in its own right needs to be taken into consideration in all policies, and thus also in climate policy.” Mainstreaming “gender” in the climate discourse asks for specific policy efforts to enhance the adaptive capacities of poor and marginalized sections of women to cope with the uncertain climate vulnerabilities. An important policy instrument available with policy planners is gender-responsive budgeting (GRB). Globally GRB has come to light as an important tool in the ongoing struggle to make the government budgets and policies more gender responsive. The current profile of gender budget statement (GBS) in India (see Box 1) is yet to address the effects of climate vulnerabilities on women. Gender budgeting, as being carried out at the level of the Union Government of India as well as certain states which have adopted GRB, remains a limited exercise, whereby it has become an ex post reporting exercise rather than a process of engendered planning (Parvati et al. 2012; Mishra and Sinha 2012; Jhamb et al. 2013; GoI 2007). This does pose serious limitations in using it as an effective tool to address the gender-based challenges in the face of climate change.

Explaining Adaptation Expenditures in Indian Context Since 2008, to mainstream the national policy measures in national planning and development, all the states were urged to make their prospective State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCCs) to integrate the national goals into their planning measures. At the Conference of State Environment Ministers held on August 18, 2009, the Prime Minister of the country requested all the state governments to prepare their respective SAPCCs. Many states are currently in the process of preparing their respective SAPCCs. “The State Action Plans include strategies and a list of possible sectoral actions that would help the states to achieve their adaptation and mitigation objectives. The common thread that binds all the state actions plan together is the principles of territorial approach to climate change, sub-national planning, building capacities for vulnerability assessment and identifying investment opportunities based on state priorities. This framework provides a broad, systematic, and step-wise process for the preparation of the SAPCCs and advocates for a participatory approach so that the states have ownership of the process and final plan. The major sectors for which adaptation strategies envisaged are agriculture, water, forests, coastal zone and health” (GoI 2013, p. 256). According to the constitutional agenda of the country, states and centers are collaborators and partners in quasi-federal framework. Pertaining to the resource mobilization and expenditure, while the capacities of both the stakeholders are comparatively similar, the position of the states in effective policy and program implementation is stronger than the central government. Besides implementing central government programs, states implement a range of programs under the state plans to meet the developmental deficits, which are specific to the respective states. For the adaptation measures, hence, the role of the states is significantly paramount as it requires a multipronged targeted and locally contextualized approach to address the specific vulnerabilities prevalent in each state. Since the adaptation measures need to be implemented at the local level within the states, the states themselves can best decide on the prioritization between the various sectors to build the adaptation capacity of the poor and marginalized groups. The adaptation interventions in India are placed within the broad developmental paradigm. The character of public expenditure till date is to support national policies pertaining to poverty eradication, accelerating the socioeconomic development to meet developmental deficits, and Page 4 of 17

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helping the country to build institutional and economic capital. However, mere fulfilling economic growth and poverty reduction are not sufficient to raise the living standards of people to help them adapt to climate change and transforming their lives to adapt to low-carbon lifestyles. Public expenditure for adaptation strategies requires a new definition. It explains as that expenditure which builds human capacity of the poor, marginalized, and vulnerable groups to meet/cope with the effects of climate change. Developmental budgets are not adaptation budget by itself; it may not be necessarily targeted to build the resilience of the communities. Adaptation expenditure can be viewed as pro-climate developmental interventions at different levels of the economy. It entails improving human conditions and capabilities, enhancing the standard of living for the poor and marginalized groups to prepare themselves to cope with the adverse impacts of climate change. Further it has components of improving sustainability of ecosystem which intends to manage the human dependence on nature and environment, focusing on sustainable use of natural resources, conservation of common property resources and ecosystems, reduction in human-animal conflicts, and creation of buffers against potential natural calamities. It further requires recognizing the multidimensional nature and complexity of the issues involved and necessitates differentiation between programs/schemes that address adaptation to climate change on the lines of their intended outcomes, particularly those that address and augment human capabilities and schemes, which focus on better management of natural resources. Explaining adaptation expenditure in the overall public expenditure is methodologically a challenging exercise. No such systematic accounting exercise was initiated by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) or Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF) to try and assess the public expenditure being spent on addressing the environmental concerns. However, the Union Government for the first time claimed in NAPCC that it spends nearly 2.6 % of GDP toward adaptation expenditure (GoI 2008, p. 19). The basis of such accounting exercise is yet to come in the public domain. But what the policy document NAPCC unveiled was the adaptation policy framework for the country, underlining the focus areas of interventions, viz., crop improvement, drought proofing, forestry, water, coastal region, health, risk financing, and disaster management. In order to demystify the puzzle of adaptation spending in the country, the study by Ganguly and Panda (2010, p. 11) attempted to provide certain classifications of adaptation expenditure in India which was further put into context on the following indicators by Kapoor and Panda (2014) in the analysis of state funding: • Land development, drought proofing, irrigation, and flood control including programs like the Drought-Prone Areas Program and the Integrated Watershed Management Program • Agriculture and allied activities including programs like the National Food Security Mission and Macro Management of Agriculture (MMA), ATMA, National Horticulture Mission, and Dairy Development programs • Water resources including programs like the Desalination Project and Artificial Recharge of Groundwater Through Dug Wells • Forestry, wildlife, and biodiversity including programs like the Integrated Forest Protection Scheme and the Integrated Development of Wildlife Habitats • Poverty alleviation, livelihood promotions, and food security including programs like the food subsidy, Antyodaya Anna Yojana and Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (now changed to National Rural Livelihoods Mission) • Risk management including programs like the National Agriculture Insurance Scheme (NAIS) and Weather-Based Crop Insurance • Disaster management including programs like the National Disaster Management Program and the Tsunami and Storm Surge Warning System Page 5 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_127-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Methodological Boundary The study of adaptation expenditure necessitates the process of identification of the schemes and programs oriented and enabled with building the resilience of the people and the state against the adverse impacts of climate change. This premise is based on the primary assumption that the certain initiatives undertaken by the government for general development also build resilience of the communities to deal with the adverse impacts of climate change and also induce behavioral changes in use of and access to natural resources. The study of adaptation expenditure of the state budgets through gender lens requires the analysis of financial data that are reported on many levels. Funds for adaptation expenditures are flowing through centrally sponsored schemes (CSS), central sector schemes, state plan schemes, and district sector plans. The study has attempted to capture the funds flowing to these categorizations of programs. The time period for analysis for estimating expenditure is 4 years from 2009–2010 (actuals) to 2012–2013 (budget estimates). The states identified for the study are Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and West Bengal. For the identification of the schemes/programs pertinent to adaptation to climate change, authors have relied extensively upon the SAPCCs, annual reports of the departments, plan documents, and policy guidelines of the ministries and departments to cull out the relevant information about various components within each scheme that aims to build/increase the adaptive capacities of the people and the state. In addition to, for expenditure tracking, extensive and meticulous research of state budgets and plan budget documents of the states has been undertaken to arrive at the quantum of expenditure that state government is spending for adaptation to climate change. Field studies in the study states have become significant instruments to elicit the perspectives of the government officials on adaptation interventions and expenditures, the SAPCCs, impacts of climate change on women, and finally knowing the prospective plan for the future. Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability (CBGA) with the collaboration of Alternative Futures has been part of a series of Interdepartmental Round Table 1 Discussions on climate change, which has been a forum of immense help to capture insights from the multi-stakeholders participation.

Analysis of the Budgets of Select States Following the abovementioned categorization of adaptation program framework, it is observed that there are marked variations in adaptation spending among the four study states due to the extent of developmental interventions. However taking into account the differences in the size of the states and their corresponding economies and total budgetary outlays, it would be misleading to suggest that UP is doing better than the other three states (on the basis of absolute numbers). To make the analysis comparative, the study has computed the total adaptation expenditure (TAE) for each state as a proportion of the gross state domestic product (GSDP), as a proportion of the total budgetary expenditure (TBE), as well as the per capita adaptation expenditure (PCAE). India is a federal country having 29 states. UP has one of the largest budgets in comparison to any state in India. Its total budget was nearly two crore in 2012–2013 (BE) in which the proportion of developmental and nondevelopmental expenditure was 67 % and 37 %, respectively (RBI 2013). The analysis of adaptation budget for UP revealed that it spent approximately 4.2 % of GSDP (at current prices with 2004–2005 base year) in 2012–2013 (BE) and around 16.2 % as proportion of total budgetary expenditure (TBE),for the same year. MP budget shows similar trend while estimating adaptation expenditure. Its developmental and nondevelopmental compositions of expenditures turned out to be 68 % and 32 %, respectively, during the same year (RBI 2013). Page 6 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_127-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Estimations of adaptation expenditures of select states in India State Public expenditure on adaptation to climate change Madhya Pradesh Total adaptation expenditure (million in US $) (MP) Total adaptation expenditure as % of total budgetary expenditures (TBE) Total adaptation expenditure as % of GSDP at current prices Uttar Pradesh Total adaptation expenditure (million in US $) (UP) Total adaptation expenditure as % of TBE Total adaptation expenditure as % of GSDP at current prices Uttarakhand Total adaptation expenditure (million in US $) (UK) Total adaptation expenditure as % of TBE Total adaptation expenditure as % of GSDP at current prices West Bengal Total adaptation expenditure (million in US $) (WB)d Total adaptation expenditure as % of TBE Total adaptation expenditure as % of GSDP at current prices

2010–2011a 14,848.00 (32.82) 22.55

2011–2012b 16,822.00 (35.10) 20.86

2012–2013c 17,884.00 (32.88) 22.35

5.7

5.33

4.36

24,188.00 (53.47) 17.75 4.03

23,307.00 (48.64) 14.1 3.43

32,335.00 (59.44) 17.36 4.2

1,158.49 (2.56) 7.87 1.38

1,402.64 (2.93) 8.03 1.49

1,489.92 (2.74) 6.42 1.38

8,137.15 (17.99) 11.15 1.76

11,032.51 (23.02) 12.54 2.07

13,454.17 (24.73) 13.4 2.16

Source: Authors’ calculation of adaptation expenditures from State Budget Documents (various years); Annual Plans Documents of study states (various years) a Annual average of exchange rate of INR to US $ in FY 2010–2011 (45.24) b Annual average of exchange rate of INR to US $ in FY 2011–2012 (47.92) c Annual average of exchange rate of INR to US $ in FY 2012–2013 (54.40) d The adaptation estimation for West Bengal includes both plan and non-plan expenditures. On the other hand, the adaptation expenditure of other three states includes only plan expenditure components

However, its share for the adaptation budget was much higher than UP as it constituted nearly 4.8 % of the GSDP (at current prices with 2004–2005 base year) and nearly 22.35 % of its TBE in 2012–2013 (BE). In absolute number, MP spent nearly Rs. 17,000 crore for adaptation-oriented interventions in the FY 2012–2013 (Fig. 1). West Bengal (WB) and Uttarakhand (UK), as compared to UP and MP, have a small size of adaptation budget. The UK has the smallest state budget under study having a budget of approximately Rs.21,931.77 crore in 2012–2013 (BE), in which the adaptation expenditure is estimated to be merely Rs 1,489 crore in FY 2012–2013. This constitutes nearly 6.8 % of the TBE, and as proportion of GSDP (at current prices with 2004–2005 base year), it is merely 1.38 % (Fig. 1). This reflects the fact that the budget of the UK has placed priority on adaptation measures in the state. The UK is highly vulnerable to climate change impacts due to its geophysical location and because of its almost complete dependence on climate-sensitive natural resources. About 65 % of its area is under forests, and more than half of its population is dependent on agriculture, horticulture, and livestock for their living. Most of the agriculture is rain-fed and so very sensitive to climate vagaries. A whopping 73 % of women workers are engaged in farm-related activities, compared to 40 % of all male workers (Census 2011), but only 10 % of all landholders are women. The analysis of WB state budget suggests that out of the total budget of approximately Rs. 1 lakh crore, the adaptation budget is nearly 13.40 % of TBE and 2.2 % of the GSDP (at current prices with Page 7 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_127-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

MP

UP

WB

UK

22.55

22.35 20.86

18.84 17.36

17.75 17.45

14.1 11.15

6.66

7.87

2009-10

2010-11

13.4

12.54 8.03

6.42

2011-12

2012-13

Fig. 1 Adaptation expenditure as proportion to total budget of selected study states

MP

UP

WB

UK

5.7 5.33

4.36

4.75 4.1

4.2

4.03 3.43

1.34

2009-10

1.76 1.38

2010-11

2.16

2.07 1.49

2011-12

1.38

2012-13

Fig. 2 Adaptation expenditure as proportion to GSDP of selected study states

2004–2005 base year) in FY 2012–2013 (Figs. 1 and 2). The figure suggests an increasing trend over the years. WB being the world’s ninth most populated state, with a fifth of its people living below the poverty line (GoI 2013,) has a long history of recurring cyclones and floods. Climate change brings with it the threat of sea-level rise and related disasters. Primary sector workers comprise only 44 % of total workers, but they are extremely resource poor with women comprising only 3.5 % of total land owners. The total adaptation expenditure by the states has also been computed as per capita adaptation expenditure (PCAE). When one looks at the per capita expenditure on adaptation to climate change (Fig. 3), yet again MP emerges as a better performer as compared to the other three states under analysis. However what is surprising is that in per capita terms, the UK fares better than WB, which is surprising as the outlays for WB are inclusive of the non-plan component as well.

Assessing the Sectoral Prioritization Within the Adaptation Expenditure While looking into sectoral composition within the adaptation expenditure framework for each state, the study tries to gauge the priority within the adaptation framework and whether adaptation initiatives by the states are more pro-developmental or more pro-adaptation in nature. Analysis reveals that in all the four states, poverty alleviation, livelihood, and food security have the highest quantum of allocations, indicative of the high priority accorded to this sector in the states’ plan

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2454

1618

1477

1474

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_127-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

MP

UP

UK

WB

Fig. 3 Per capita state budget expenditure on adaptation to climate change (in Rs.) in 2012–2013 (BE)

schemes. Also, the allocations under this sector surpass the allocations under other sectors by a huge margin. This is probably owing to the fact that this is one area which is more in the nature of developmental initiative rather than purely adaptation strategies, with many developmental schemes already in place in these states. The adaptation benefits that accrue from this sector are more in the nature of incidental benefits, which nevertheless go a long way in building up the resilience of the people and the state against any adverse condition. In fact, sectoral distribution of adaptation budget in the UK shows that components such as poverty alleviation, livelihood and food security, land development, drought proofing, irrigation and flood control, and agriculture and allied services constitute nearly 80 % of the total adaptation expenditure in the state. Two areas that need maximum attention are disaster management and risk management. Considering the kinds of threat that climate change portrays, it is important to have adequate mechanisms in place to deal with any natural calamity that may result due to changing climate patterns. The states also need to focus on putting in more effort and thought into how best it can work to alleviate the risk factor that increases with the threat of climate change. Hence both form an important focus area to be given high priority in the overall policy framework for adaptation. Unfortunately, both suffer from lack of adequate prioritization by the government in terms of actual allocations. For example, in Uttar Pradesh, there is no expenditure whatsoever on disaster management, and the forestry sector has been accorded a low priority. Agriculture and allied activities also need greater prioritization, especially in view of the fact that a majority of the population depends on this sector for livelihood as well as for food security. Study reveals that in all the states most of the schemes and programs that make up the adaptation budget in the state are primarily developmental in nature, with adaptation being a secondary incidental benefit. The entire planning approach is focused on “development,” and prioritization toward adaptation is missing in all the states. It is quite clear from the analysis that adaptation is yet to be recognized as a policy priority by the government and that most of the adaptation measures are side-along benefits from the mainstream developmental measures (Figs. 4, 5, 6, and 7).

Engendering Adaptation Budget in Select States It is important to recognize the fact that in all the categories of adaptation interventions, women are major actors; hence no sector can be viewed as gender neutral. Mainstream developmental programs need to be engendered, taking into account the numerous developmental deficits faced by women and girl children in the various sectors. Given the scenario with respect to the status of the women in these four states, it is imperative that the gendered concerns in all spheres of development, and particularly with respect to the process of climate change, are recognized by the policy makers and

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_127-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Land Development Drought Proofing, Irrigation & Flood Control (9%)

Water Resources (17%) Disaster Management (0%)

Forest, Biodiversity Risk & Wild life Financing Conservation (1%) (2%)

Agri. & Allied Activities (8%)

Poverty Alleviation, Livelihood & Food Security (63%)

Fig. 4 Adaptation expenditure in FY 2012–2013 in MP

Water Resources (12%)

Forestry, Biodiversity & Wildlife Conservation (7%)

Disaster Management (1%)

Agriculture & Allied Activities 25%

Poverty Alleviation, Livelihood & Food Security Land Development (29%) Drought Proofing, Irrigation & Flood Control (26%)

Fig. 5 Adaptation expenditure in FY 2012–2013 in the UK

the same addressed in the policies that promote adaptation or mitigation to climate change. To assess the state’s endeavors in this regard, the study looked at the gender budget statements/women component plans being compiled in the respective states. Gender budgeting refers to a method of looking at the budget formulation process, budgetary policies, and budget outlays from the gender lens (Das and Mishra 2006). “Gender Budget, with regard to the Government at any level, does not refer to a separate budget for women; rather it is an analytical tool which scrutinizes the government budget to reveal its gender-differentiated impact and advocate for greater priorities for programmes and schemes to address the gender-based disadvantages faced by women” (Parvati et al. 2012). In order to evaluate the priority accorded to women and girl children in the schemes specific to adaptation to climate change, an analysis was carried out of the gender budget statement (GBS)/ women component plan (WCP) of the respective states. Schemes reported in the GBS/WCP were identified as adaptation specific or pro-adaptation based on their respective guidelines and policy objectives. The states of MP and the UK have institutionalized gender budgeting and present a

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_127-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Agriculture & Allied Activites (8%)

Risk Financing (9%)

Irrigation & Flood Control (15%)

Land Development 1%

Forestry & Wildlife (1%)

Poverty Allieviation, Livelihood & Food Security (59%)

Water Supply 7%

Fig. 6 Adaptation expenditure in FY 2012–2013 in UB

Water Resources (7%)

Risk Financing (1%)

Land Development, Drought Proofing, Irrigation and Flood Control, (20%)

Agriculture & Allied Forest, Activities Biodivrsity & (8%) Wildlife Conservation (1%) Disaster Management (3%)

Poverty Alleviation Livelihood & Food Security (60%)

Fig. 7 Adaptation expenditure in FY 2012–2013 in WB

gender budget statement as a part of their respective state budgets. However, both the statements suffer from some critical shortcomings which dilute the efforts of the states in this domain. The methodologies followed by both the states are flawed; while MP has been reporting 100 % allocations under various schemes under Part B of the GBS (which is meant to capture at least 30 %, but not entire allocations meant for women/girl children under a scheme), in the UK it is the Finance Department which is single-handedly preparing the GBS without any inputs or consultations with the line departments. Merely reporting higher allocations (the way departments are doing in MP) in the statement has been seen as the final objective by most departments. There also exist issues with regard to the quality of interventions being reported under the GBS in both the states. Recognizing that the purpose of gender budgeting is to address the concerns being faced by women and girl children, not just in their socioeconomic status but also for their overall empowerment, in most cases, there remain doubts regarding the pertinence of including these interventions under the GBS in both the states. Most of the schemes and programs being reported do not aim to address gender inequity in any way or only continue to reinforce gender stereotypes Page 11 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_127-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

6000

Land development, Drought Proofing, Irrigation and Flood Control

Rs. in Crore

5000 4000

Agriculture and Allied Activities

3000 2000

Poverty Alleviation, Livelihood and Food security

1000 0

Rsik Financing

2009- 2010- 2011- 201210 AE 11 AE 12 RE 13 BE

Fig. 8 Adaptation to climate change under the GB statement in MP

(Parvati et al. 2012). Moreover, the so-called indivisible sectors remain outside the ambit of the GB statements. In the sectors identified as crucial for adaptation, departments such as Agriculture and Watershed Management hardly report any schemes under Part A of the GBS in the UK where 100 % of the allocation is for women. Where such schemes are reported, the budgetary allocations under these are miniscule. Moreover, there are some schemes specifically for women that have well-defined guidelines for their benefit, which are not listed in the GBS in the UK. For example, schemes like Mahila Dairy Vikas Yojana and Mahila Dairy schemes being implemented by Dairy Development Department, though exclusively for women, do not find mention in the GB statement. Again, under the GBS, allocations under food security get maximum priority mainly on the account of the centrally sponsored scheme for nutrition. Several key climate change-sensitive sectors like disaster management and risk financing do not report even under Part B of the GBS, where at least 30 % of the total allocation must be for women. In cases where some interventions are reported under the GBS, the allocations under these are fairly low. Above all, interventions being reported under the GBS in these five categories are mainly welfare oriented; they do not empower people by building their capacities and resilience to various shocks, including climate change (see Figs. 8, 9, 10, and 11). The analysis of the GBS in MP reveals that very few departments have all-women schemes, and these too have miniscule allocations. Most sectors remain outside the ambit of gender budgeting. In the sectors which do have a component of gender, the bulk of the allocations are concentrated in the poverty alleviation category. Sectors like disaster management and forestry do not report under GBS. Allocations under agriculture sector remain low and have witnessed a falling trend over the last few years. This is a concern, especially in view of increased feminization of agriculture. Planning for gender concerns in the budget process is missing with most interventions remaining an ex post exercise by the relevant departments (see Figs. 8, 9, 10, and 11). The states of UP and WB are still carrying forward the WCP, presented as an annex in their state annual plans. WCP is restricted to the plan budget of the government. Moreover, only select departments, which are considered as women specific and beneficiary oriented, have been reporting under the WCP. Further, even the reporting under this seems more like an ad hoc exercise, rather than a planned, deliberated task. The states in formulating the WCP, have not adopted an “engendering” approach to planning. Many schemes, which have clear policy guidelines benefitting women and are being implemented in the states, do not find mention in the WCP. Uttar Pradesh has still not moved

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_127-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

700 Agriculture and Allied Activitites

600

Rural Development

Rs. in Crore

500 400

Housing

300 Urban Development

200 Labour& Employment

100 0 2010-11 (Actual 2011-12 Expenditure) (Anticipated Outlay)

2012-13 (Budgeted Outlay)

Social Security & Social Welfare

Fig. 9 Adaptation to climate change under the women component plan in WB

Forestry 0%

Agriculture and Allied Activities 7%

Watershed Management 5%

Rural Development 17% Food Security 71%

Fig. 10 Adaptation to climate change under GB statement in the UK for 2012–2013 (%)

on to adopting gender budgeting as a tool for women’s empowerment. The state has in place, since 2005–2006, a WCP which, under plan allocations, reported an outlay of Rs. 2,253.09 crore during 2012–2013 (see Figs. 8, 9, 10, and 11). The WCP witnessed an increase in the quantum of funds being reported over the recent years. However, no schemes under agriculture and allied activities, which are a core sector with respect to both climate change and the participation of women in the sector, are reported under WCP. In fact the coverage of sectors under the WCP is very restricted, leaving out a bulk of the core sectors that have a direct bearing on the welfare of women. The entire approach poses a question on the seriousness with which the exercise of WCP is being carried out by the planning department. Nutrition and women welfare, critical to cushion the impact of low food production in the wake of climate Page 13 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_127-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

1200

Rural Development

Rs. in Crore

1000 800

Khadi and Village Industry

600

Urban Development

400

Social Welfare

200 Women Welfare

0 2010-11 Actual Expnediture

2011-12 Anticipated Expenditure

2012-13 Proposed Outlay

Nutrition

Fig. 11 Adaptation to climate change under WCP in UP

vagaries, witnessed a sharp fall in 2012–2013 compared to 2011–2012. A reverse trend was witnessed in the allocations under social welfare. In fact, most schemes reported do not address specific gender concerns but seem a procedural ex post accounting exercise. Again, reported schemes are welfare oriented, not empowering. Also, any adaptation benefits that accrue from these are merely side-along benefits. West Bengal too has not adopted gender budgeting yet. The state presents a WCP which has witnessed a marginal increase in allocations over the last 3 last years (2010–2011 to 2012–2013). Very few departments report under the WCP, and key adaptation-centric sectors remain outside the ambit of the WCP. Reporting under the WCP is not robust with many interventions that benefit women are not being included under the WCP. One disturbing observation that emerges from this analysis is that none of the schemes can be termed as purely adaptation schemes. All of them fall under the head of developmental interventions. Even allowing for the fact that all interventions are not being captured in the WCP, it is quite disconcerting that the mainstream adaptation strategies of the state have not found a place for women and their needs in their planning and budgets. Finally, it is observed from the field that the whole approach of integrating the gender concerns in the entire planning and budgeting process is missing. There has not been an attempt to think through the challenges that women and girl children face in the context of climate change and the adaptation framework and thereby address them. The recognition of the interlinkage between process of climate change, adaptation to climate change, and the inherent gender concerns is absent. Thus both GBS and WCP have remained fairly limited exercises in these states, each fraught with its own set of anomalies. Moreover, as observed earlier, the interlinkage of gender, climate change, and hence adaptation to climate change is yet to be recognized in the planning framework by all the states. Most of the adaptation benefits remain mainly a spillover from the main developmental initiatives of the states, and at the same time prevalent gender concerns within it have not been integrated in the overall planning in the states. Box 1: Gender Budgeting in India Gender responsive budgeting (GRB) has been endorsed as an important tool for advancing gender equity. The latest count shows that around 90 countries have integrated GRB practices and processes. Gender budgeting is based on the premise that there are specific gender-based disadvantages confronting women and girls due to which they are able to derive much less (continued)

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_127-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

benefit from a given policy as compared to men and boys. A gender-responsive budget thus ensures that such disadvantages are recognized and special measures are taken to address the gender-based disadvantages. Diane Elson has proposed a set of six tools of GRB: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Gender-aware policy appraisal Beneficiary assessments Gender-disaggregated public expenditure incidence analysis Gender-disaggregated analysis of the impact of the budget on time use Gender-aware medium-term economic policy framework Gender-responsive budget statement

In India, the first attempt to ensure a definite flow of funds to women was with the introduction of Women’s Component Plan (WCP) in the Ninth Five-Year Plan. However, noting its sluggish growth and given fundamental shortcomings in its approach, the government discontinued WCP and adopted gender budgeting. Since 2005–2006, a separate statement “gender budget” (Statement 20, Expenditure Budget Volume I) is presented every year as part of the union budget that tries to capture all those budgetary resources, which, according to the Union Ministries/Departments, are earmarked for women and girls. The schemes with 100 % funds meant for women and girls are reported in Part A of the GB statement, while those with at least 30 % funds but not the entire sum are slated under Part B. A total of 33 demands for grants under 27 ministries/departments and five union territories are covered in the GB statement of 2012–2013. Source: Parvati et al. (2012) and GoI (2007)

Conclusion The chapter focuses on the “priority accorded to gender” in adaptation-responsive programs and public budgeting in select states. The developmental planning and policies pursued by the study states fail to empower women to meet the vulnerabilities emanating from climate change. Policies followed by these states are largely gender blind and gender neutral. State-specific action plans on climate change were formulated to integrate that climate change concerns also do not address gender concerns in climate change policies and developmental interventions. The character of public expenditure in study states is largely developmental and not oriented toward adaptation to climate change. Even within the framework of adaptation expenditure, the focus is largely on interventions toward poverty alleviation, livelihood, and food security. Huge gaps are observed between expenditure for the abovementioned area and climate-sensitive sectors like agriculture and allied activities, water resources, disaster management, forestry, etc. These gaps reveal that India has consistently neglected investing in natural resources which are now vulnerable to climate change impacts. Women, poor and marginalized, are disproportionately dependent on natural resources for their livelihood sustenance. In sum, the gender status quo should be reversed in local planning and budgeting.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_127-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

For effective assimilation of gender concerns in climate change discourse, policy departure should focus on integrating gender concerns policy planning itself. Mere bringing out of a gender budget statement is hardly effective unless gender budgeting is implemented in its true spirit at all levels of governance, especially in the wake of climate change threats. Further, all states are at the nascent stage of implementing gender budgeting, and often this is an eyewash. It is mostly a mere reporting exercise. The implementation of NAPCC and state action plans is yet to happen. However without putting gender and poor and marginalized (vulnerable) people at the center of inclusive economic development and adaptation, the challenges of climate change and economic growth can never be addressed.

References Ahmed S, Fajber E (2009) Engendering adaptation to climate variability in Gujarat, India. Gend Dev 17(1):33–50 Alber G (2011) Gender, Cities and Climate Change: Thematic report prepared for cities and climate change, Global Report on Human Settlements, UN-Habitat, Nairobi. Available from http://www.unhabitat.org/grhs/2011 Bosello F et al (2009) An analysis of adaptation as a response to climate change. Copenhagen Consensus Centre, Denmark Brody A, Demetriades J, Esplen E (2008) Gender and climate change: mapping the linkages, BRIDGE (development-gender). Institute of Development studies, University of Sussex, Brighton Das S, Mishra Y (2006) Gender budget statement: misleading and patriarchal assumptions. Econ Pol Wkly 41(30):3285–3288 Denton F (2004) Gender and climate change: giving the “latecomer” a head start. IDS Bull 35(3):42–49 Denton F (2010) Climate Change vulnerability, impacts adaptation: why does gender matter. Gend Dev 10(2):11–20 Ganguly K, Panda GR (2010) Adaptation to climate change in India: a study of union budgets, Oxfam India working paper series. Oxfam India, New Delhi GoI (2007) Gender budgeting handbook for Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development. New Delhi GoI (2008) National action plan on climate change. Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change, New Delhi GoI (2009) India’s emissions profile: results of five climate modeling studies, climate modeling forum. Ministry of Environment and Forests, New Delhi, pp 1–56 GoI (2011) Census 2011 – provisional population totals – India. Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi. Available at: http://www.censusindia.gov.in GoI (2012) India: second national communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Ministry of Environment and Forests, New Delhi GoI (2013) Economic survey 2013–2014. Ministry of Finance, New Delhi IPCC (2007) Synthesis report: contribution of Working Groups I, II, III to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. IPCC, Geneva

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IUCN (2007) Gender and climate change: women as agents of change, climate change briefing, The World Conservation Union, Switzerland, Available from http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/ climate_change_gender.pdf Jhamb B et al (2013) The paradox of gender responsive budgeting. Econ Pol Wkly XLVIII (20):35–38 Kapoor A (2011) Engendering the climate for change: policies and practices for gender-just adaptation. Alternative Futures, New Delhi Kapoor SS, Panda GR (2014) Climate change adaptation in four Indian States: the missing gender budgets. Alternative Futures, Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability, New Delhi Lambrou Y, Neson S (2010) Farmers in a changing climate: does gender matter? Food security in Andhra Pradesh. FAO, Rome Lambrou Y, Piana G (2006) Gender: the missing component of the response to climate change. Food and Agriculture Organization, Gender and Population Division, Sustainable Development Department, Rome Lim Bo, Spanger-Siegfred E (eds) (2005) Adaptation policy framework for climate change: developing policies, strategies and measures. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Masika R (ed) (2002) Gender, development and climate change. Oxfam GB, Oxford Mishra Y, Sinha N (2012) Gender responsive budgeting in India: what has gone wrong. Econ Pol Wkly XLVII(17):50–57 Nellemann C, Verma R, Hislop L (eds) (2011) Women at the frontline of climate change: gender risks and hopes: a rapid response assessment. United Nations Environment Programme, GRIDArendal, Arendal Nelson V (2010) Climate change and gender: what role for agricultural research among small holder farmers in Africa? CIAT Working Document No.222, Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, UK Panda GR (2011) Budgeting for adaptation to climate change: expectations from the union budget 2011–12. Ind Econ Rev VIII:46–56, Quarterly Issue, 15th Feb–15th May 2011 Parvati P, Jhamb B, Shrivastava S, Mobeen Ur Rehman K (2012) Recognising gender biases, rethinking budgets: review of gender responsive budgeting in the union government and select states. Centre for Budget and Government Accountability, New Delhi RBI (2013) State finances-a study of budgets of 2013–2014. Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi Rodenberg B (2009) Climate Change adaptation from a gender perspective: a cross-cutting analysis of a development-policy instruments, discussion paper 24/2009. German Development Institute, Bonn Roy M, Venema HD (2002) Reducing risks and vulnerability to climate change in India: the capability approach. In: Masika R (ed) Gender, development and climate change. Oxfam GB, Oxford Smit B, Pilifosova O (2001) Adaptation to climate change in the context of sustainable development and equity. In: Climate change 2001, contribution of Working Group II to the third assessment report of the IPCC. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Smithers J, Smit B (1997) Human adaptation to climatic variability and change. Glob Environ Chang 7(2):129–146 Terry G (ed) (2009a) Climate change and gender justice, Warwickshire. Practical Action Publishing, Oxfam GB, Warwickshire Terry G (2009b) No climate justice without gender justice: an overview of the issues. Gend Dev 17(1):5–17

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_128-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Universal Metrics to Compare the Effectiveness of Climate Change Adaptation Projects Martin Stadelmanna, Axel Michaelowab,c, Sonja Butzengeiger-Geyerc and Michel Köhlerc,d* a Climate Policy Initiative, Venezia, Italy b Center for Comparative and International Studies, University of Zurich, Z€urich, Switzerland c Perspectives GmbH, Hamburg, Germany d Climate Advisory Network the Greenwerk, Hamburg, Germany

Abstract Adaptation to climate change is increasingly supported through international financing. In contrast to mitigation, where the effectiveness of policy action can be measured through the metric “tonnes of CO2 equivalent reduced,” no universally accepted metric for assessment of adaptation effectiveness exists. Without such a metric, adaptation finance vehicles such as the Adaptation Fund or the Green Climate Fund encounter challenges when trying to compare the adaptive effect of projects in order to achieve an efficient allocation of their funds. First experiences with adaptation funding show a tendency to avoid final impact metrics. This might lead to a backlash against adaptation funding by electorates in industrialized countries if adaptation funding cannot show clear results. This report assesses two possible candidates for generic adaptation effectiveness metrics: (1) wealth saved from climate change impacts and (2) disability-adjusted life years saved (DALYs), which are widely used in public health policy analysis. Apart it is proposed to use no-harm assessments to evaluate environmental and cultural impacts of adaptation projects. The authors discuss uncertainties encountered in applying these metrics, including the uncertain link between commonly reported intermediate indicators and our metrics and ideas to handle such, e.g., the use of regularly updated methodologies and agreed climate and economic models.

Keywords Adaptation; Climate change; Effectiveness; Metrics; DALYs; Adaptation Fund; Green Climate Fund

Introduction: Climate Change and the Emergence of Adaptation Policies Burning of fossil fuels and other human activities have led to an increase of atmospheric CO2 concentrations from around 280 parts per million (ppm) in the preindustrial era to more than 400 ppm in 2014. Global temperature increase from preindustrial levels has already reached more than 0.7
C, and temperatures are expected to further rise 1.1–6.4
C until 2100 leading to sea-level rise, melting of ice, and changes in wind and precipitation patterns (Solomon et al. 2007).

*Email: [email protected] *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_128-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Due to these alarming trends, anthropogenic climate change has been on the agenda of the international community for the last two decades. A series of multilateral treaties tries to address the problem. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has the ultimate objective to achieve a “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner” (Art. 2, UNFCCC 1992). The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, agreed in 1997, has introduced legally binding emission targets for industrialized countries and an array of market mechanisms to reduce the costs of reaching those targets, including the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which allows the generation of greenhouse gas emission credits through emission reduction projects in developing countries. While adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change has generally taken a backseat to mitigation in international climate policy, parties to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol have increasingly realized that adaptation is vital in order to reduce the impacts of climate change that has already taken place or to which they are committed. Therefore, in 2001 the UNFCCC has set up two funds for adaptation financed by voluntary contributions of industrialized countries – the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), which are managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). In 2007, parties of the Kyoto Protocol established the Adaptation Fund (AF) with a creative system of financing. The AF receives 2 % of all emission credits (CERs) issued under the CDM, i.e., an in-kind tax on emission credit transactions. The CERs are then sold by the Trustee of the AF (i.e., the World Bank) in tranches. However, attempts to extend this tax to other market mechanisms have failed due to the resistance of Russia and other countries in transition. The unexpected success of the CDM has led to a substantial inflow of finance to the AF. By 2014, 1.5 billion CERs had been issued, and the AF thus received 30 million CERs. Revenues from sales of CERs have reached about 190 million USD (Adaptation Fund 2013). This is a large sum raised in only 5 years compared to the 270 million USD the LDCF and the SCCF have raised together in 10 years (HBS/ODI 2011). Besides these existing funds, the negotiations about a post-2012 climate policy regime have led to the commitment of industrialized countries to provide 30 billion USD of “fast start” financing to developing countries within the period 2010–2012. Around 20 % of these funds are allocated toward adaptation (analysis according to Nakhooda et al. 2013; UNFCCC 2011; VROM 2011). Additionally the Green Climate Fund (GCF) has been established as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, also being responsible for the funding of adaptation activities. It is in the implementation phase, and the GCF Board has been developing modalities and procedures since 2012. Currently, projects financed with international adaptation funding are not assessed according to comparable metrics. The guidelines used by the AF’s Project and Programme Review Committee (PPRC) entail many criteria for the assessment of projects, such as economic, social, and environmental benefits, meeting national standards, cost-effectiveness, and arrangements for management and monitoring (AFB 2010). These criteria are very general and do not allow to compare the concrete adaptation effect of project proposals. As another example, the GEF neither uses efficiency indicators nor global targets for adaptation projects (GEF 2008). From an economic point of view, it would be desirable to maximize the adaptive benefit achieved with the available financial resources for adaptation. The limited level of these resources compared with the adaptation needs, which are three orders of magnitude higher – as calculated by Parry Page 2 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_128-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

et al. (2009) – makes this even more urgent. This implies that funds need to be allocated to those projects/programs that bring the highest benefits to economies, people, and the environment. Clear metrics of the “adaptive benefit” and an evaluation of proposals with regard to these metrics are required. This paper tries to identify universal metrics for adaptation benefits and test them by assessing existing adaptation projects. First attempts in the literature to use universal indicators are analyzed, and two universal metrics are proposed, which synthesize three existing approaches: saved wealth and saved health. As these metrics depend on long-term results of the projects, it is discussed how (measurable) outcome indicators can be linked with them. To illustrate and test this approach, it is applied to specific examples and conclude.

Lack of Universally Accepted Metrics: Opportunities and Challenges For projects mitigating GHG emissions, a universal consensus has emerged that their effectiveness is to be measured in terms of tonnes of CO2 equivalent reduced. This metric is used for all projectbased mechanisms and allows calculating the efficiency of projects in terms of currency units spent to achieve 1 t CO2 equivalent reduced. Regarding adaptation, the situation is much more diffuse as adaptation policies just start to emerge and even basic concepts of adaptation are still contested. The 4th IPCC assessment report (Adger et al. 2007) is lamenting the lack of globally accepted and agreed indicators for vulnerability and adaptive capacity, while also noting that there is no consensus on the usefulness of such generic indicators. A 2008 workshop on adaptation metrics has not managed to identify universal metrics but only stated that good adaptation metrics should be comparable but also context specific and developed in participatory processes (IGES and World Bank 2008). The lack of universal metrics has continued until today (UNFCCC 2010b). The skepticism against global indicators and the call for bottom-up approaches may be linked to the disciplinary background of many adaptation researchers and stakeholders: qualitative, case study-based social science. In this vein, e.g., Klein (2009) argues that vulnerability cannot just be defined by technical experts as any definitions involve value judgments. In his view, a definition rather has to evolve through a “consultative, stakeholder-driven process.” Economists have not managed to clearly specify adaptation metrics either. While there have been several influential studies on the economics of adaptation (Agrawala and Fankhauser 2008; World Bank 2010), they have concentrated on highly aggregated adaptation costs and did not assess how effectiveness of projects could be measured. In parallel to the elaboration of this study, further literature has been published that aims at universal metrification of adaptation benefits. Schultz (2012) has developed a concept on how to finance adaptation with a vulnerability reduction credit mechanism. Based on the polluter’s pay principle, Schultz derived the idea of a universal compliance scheme that either leads to mitigation or adaptation activities. This fungible structure works with credits that quantify the vulnerability reduction through adaptation projects. These credits get monetized by annual calculation of the costs of climate change impacts per tonne of CO2. Finally the polluter chooses if he complies through mitigation or adaptation credits. However the rudimentary model still lacks a detailed description on how both the climate change impacts and the vulnerability reduction can be quantified properly. Baca (2010) discusses a market-based adaptation approach through a CDM-like system that allows polluters to generate emission allowances through adaptation activities. Hereby National Adaptation Plan of Actions (NAPAs) deliver a prioritization of required projects, and the mechanism Page 3 of 15

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Table 1 Opportunities and challenges of universal metrics for adaptation Challenges Choosing indicators will make some nations better off than others; agreement is therefore difficult (Hinkel 2008) Ethical Transparent criteria for projects Value judgments are needed (Hinkel 2008; Klein view 2009) Economic Ex ante identification of promising projects (Noble Measurement of indicators is uncertain (Hallegatte view 2008), ex post monitoring (Noble 2008), ex post et al. 2011; Hinkel 2008); important metrics are adjustment (Hallegatte et al. 2011), potentially qualitative (IGES and World Bank 2008) allocation of funds (Butzengeiger et al. 2011)

Political view

Opportunities Shared vision of adaptation goals

tenders these projects through reverse auctioning. As reward the project developer receives emission rights (see Baca 2010, p. 10ff). However, a detailed description of the metrics to allocate emission rights to adaptation projects is missing. A UNFCCC (2010a) review of approaches for assessing costs and benefits of adaptation options clearly shows that most approaches focus on either adaptation costs or vulnerability/risk management. Only two options clearly compare costs and impacts: cost-benefit analysis (see, e.g., ECAWG 2009; Moench et al. 2009) and cost-effectiveness analysis. This situation can be compared to the early days of assessing effectiveness of emission reduction, where the metrics to compare the effect of different greenhouse gases were contested. What may be the reasons for the lack of global indicators, apart from disciplinary backgrounds? Table 1 shows that universal metrics bring both opportunities and challenges. On the political side, agreed adaptation metrics may help to improve the shared vision in the climate change regime. However, political agreement may be difficult as some metrics leave some nations better off than others. Ethically, universal indicators may bring transparency in assessing adaptation projects, but some scholars argue that defining universal adaptation metrics will include value judgments, which raises the question which stakeholders are involved in defining the metrics (Hinkel 2008; Klein 2009). The largest advantages of universal indicators are on the economic side. Promising projects and programs may be identified ex ante, and monitoring may allow for ex post adjustments of projects (Hallegatte et al. 2011; Noble 2008). The main challenge here is that the prediction and measurement of indicators for adaptation is highly uncertain (Hallegatte et al. 2011; Hinkel 2008) given the missing knowledge on climate change and its impacts, as well as the development and influence of other socioeconomic variables. Hinkel (2008) argues that this makes outcome indicators for adaptation non-promising and calls for using process indicators. Hallegatte et al. (2011) are more optimistic by saying that cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool as long as uncertainty is satisfactorily addressed. Concluding, the opportunities of universal adaptation metrics justify a closer look at possible metrics. However, the challenges should not be forgotten: while the political and ethical issues are not part of this chapter, it is explored how uncertainty could be addressed.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_128-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Synthesizing Three Approaches for the Effectiveness of Adaptation Projects When searching for a universal metric for the effectiveness of adaptation projects, three existing approaches are particularly relevant: vulnerability assessment, cost-benefit assessment, and costeffectiveness assessment. Reducing vulnerability is the shared goal of many adaptation programs and is anchored in several UNFCCC documents. However, vulnerability is not universally defined, and many different vulnerability indicators and assessment exist: the Disaster Risk Index, the impact vulnerability index, the Disaster Deficit Index, UNDP’s Vulnerability Reduction Assessment scorecard, and further vulnerability indicators (GEF 2008). Politically, it has never been possible to agree on a specific indicator. Therefore, vulnerability has to be incorporated in any adaptation metric system, but developing a new vulnerability (benefit) index will not solve the problem. Another starting point for universal effectiveness metrics is cost-benefit analysis simply looking at economic benefits of adaptation projects. For example, Moench et al. (2009) discuss the appropriateness of cost-benefit analysis coupled with intense stakeholder participation and apply cost-benefit analysis for a series of case studies in India and Pakistan. In a bold study, the Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group (ECAWG 2009) criticized the lack of a systematic way of estimating climate risks and the absence of an overarching methodology to facilitate comparisons between the risks posed by different hazards and in different geographies. It developed a methodology that gave rise to adaptation benefit-cost curves and applied it to China, Guyana, India, Mali, Samoa, Tanzania, the UK, and the USA. Such cost-benefit analysis can be criticized for neglecting nonmonetary benefits such as health, which is recognized by Moench et al. (2009). Cost-effectiveness analysis, as the third approach, includes nonmonetary or difficult-to-monetize benefits as well: it identifies the least-cost method of reaching a prescribed target or risk reduction level. For instant, it is widely used in the literature on public health (see, e.g., Detsky and Naglie 1990). On the downside, cost-effectiveness analysis for adaptation was only applied in a sectoral context until now. Universal metrics are missing, which blocks comparison of effects between different areas. With the indicators to be proposed, the intention is to synthesize the three approaches: while aiming to avoid the monetary-only approach of cost-benefit analysis, global comparability shall be guaranteed, currently missing in cost-effectiveness studies focusing on. Furthermore, vulnerability should be captured by the metrics as well.

Reasons for Moving Beyond a Pure Economic Approach Theoretically, the effects of adaptation projects could be measured in monetary terms. This theoretical approach underlies the cost-benefit analysis approach of ECAWG (2009) which leads to a “benefit-cost curve” for adaptation projects. However, a substantial share of the benefits of adaptation projects is the avoidance of direct impacts on human life and health. Then the challenge arises on how to value human life and human health. Fankhauser and Tol (1998) argue that “values of a statistical life” embodying people’s attitude to mortality risks should be used for that valuation. These values strongly depend on the income of the person and thus are substantially lower for a poor person than that of a rich person, varying by a factor of 15 between China and OECD countries (Fankhauser and Tol 1998). Other studies show a range of value of a statistical life of up to over 20 million USD (Viscusi and Gayer 2003; Viscusi and Aldy 2003), and the valuation is country, income, and age dependent (Aldy and Viscusi 2008; Viscusi and Aldy 2003). This approach thus became heavily contested in the elaboration of the 2nd Assessment Report of the IPCC, when Page 5 of 15

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_128-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 2 Approaches to measure saved wealth Concept Absolute wealth saved Relative wealth saved (assessed on an aggregate level) Relative wealth saved (assessed on an individual level)

Description Wealth benefit in absolute terms Wealth benefit relative to overall assets of a nation, multiplied with population Wealth % saved per person; individual percentages are summed up

Advantages Relatively easy to measure

Disadvantages Benefits richer countries, does not reflect vulnerability Allocates (adaptation) funds to Benefits not necessarily poorest countries (or regions, poorest or most vulnerable cities, communities) persons within a country Close to vulnerability Data access difficult in case of individualized approach

developing country authors and policymakers strongly attacked what was seen as “Northern arrogance” (described condescendingly by Tol 1997). As a response to the controversy, Fearnside (1998) suggested to separate human lives and property values. In our view, Fearnside’s approach should be followed to avoid endless political debates about an equitable valuation of human life and health. This is also in line with UNFCCC (2010a) which stresses that pure cost-benefit analysis “fails to account for those costs and benefits that cannot be reflected in monetary terms, such as ecological impacts and impacts on health.” Thus it is differentiated between monetary and human life-/healthrelated benefits, in the form of two indicators.

Saved Wealth (SW) Accumulated income not spent for consumption gives rise to wealth; this can include productive assets and other forms of property (e.g., real estate and precious metals). The indicator specifies wealth protected by an adaptation project against destruction by climate change impacts. For crosscountry comparisons, purchasing power parity should be used. When assessing the wealth benefit of an adaptation project/program, one can use two different concepts: absolute wealth and relative wealth (assessed on an aggregate or individual level). “Absolute wealth saved” is similar to the approach of cost-benefit analysis as it measures the absolute wealth saved. The concept is straightforward but does not take into account differences of wealth, which might be crucial for overall resilience: regions with a higher wealth level would be favored. The indicator would be currency units. In the concept of “relative wealth saved (aggregated assessment),” the absolute wealth saved by the project is divided by the total wealth of the region, city, or community. This allows accounting for differences in average wealth but does not yet cover the distribution of wealth within the project region. The indicator would be percent wealth saved times population. In an alternative specification, “relative wealth saved (individual-level assessment),” the affected number of people and their individual wealth shares protected by the adaptation project are calculated. In contrast to the aggregate assessment of relative wealth, the relative wealth is assessed on an individual level and then summed up. Data challenges are massive as every person has to be accounted individually. This might only be possible in countries with a highly efficient tax administration and no data confidentiality restrictions regarding personal fortunes. Given data constraints, the concept is more realistic, when using a city or community as individual unit: in this case, the total relative wealth saved consists of the sum of the relative wealth saved in each city or community, rather the sum of the relative wealth saved per individual. Advantages and disadvantages of the different approaches are described in Table 2. The relative wealth concept (on an aggregated basis) seems to be most adequate from a vulnerability perspective, taking data availability into account. The more local the geographical scale of

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_128-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 Change of wealth over time and discounting

this relative wealth concept is, the better the concept addresses vulnerability. However, from an economic perspective, the absolute wealth concept is most appropriate as it measures the overall wealth savings. It is thus proposed to include both relative and absolute wealth savings in the saved wealth indicator in order to balance vulnerability and economic benefits. For determining the potential of an adaptation activity to save wealth, one needs to consider autonomous developments of the wealth of the relevant region during the project duration. Demographic and/or economic developments over time will lead to changes of property and therefore wealth under a baseline scenario. A time-related discounting of wealth in the region impacted by an adaptation activity should take place in order to reflect inflation as well as autonomous decrease of the economic value of infrastructure and hardware over time (capital consumption, standard accruals). Discounting is also important to achieve comparability of adaptation projects with different lifetimes. Figure 1 below visualizes the effects of autonomous development of wealth in the region over time and of discounting on saved wealth. The total wealth that can theoretically be saved by an adaptation activity is the discounted wealth that would be lost by climate change-induced events during the technical lifetime of the adaptation project/program. To calculate this, one needs a frequency distribution function of climate change impacts for the duration of the project (see Moench et al. 2009 for the first conceptualization of such frequency functions, here shown in Fig. 2). Using the approach of the frequency distribution function, saved wealth (SWp),1 for a disaster risk reduction adaptation project, can then be calculated as SWp ¼

i X MDPi   DSi  pocc, n, i ð1 þ rÞi 0

(1)

where 0. . .i: years of duration of adaptation project MDPi: maximum damage potential from climate change in year i DSi: share of discounted MDP damaged by event forecast in year i pocc, n,i: probability of occurrence of a certain damage event n (increase of risk due to climate change) in year i r: discount rate to be applied to the project 1

Here, for simplicity just the absolute and not the relative wealth savings are calculated. Page 7 of 15

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Fig. 2 Frequency distribution function of expected damage

From a purely economic perspective, total damage should be assessed and differentiated by whether it is due to baseline climatic variability or due to events that can be linked to climate change. For projects financed by third parties, only the differential damage due to climate change should be covered. However, differentiation of impacts from baseline climate variability, climate change, and autonomous adaptation is likely to be extremely difficult.

Saved Health (SH) As discussed above, valuation of human life is fraught with ethical challenges and thus should be avoided, especially if comparing industrialized and developing countries. This section explores the concept of disability-adjusted life years saved (DALYs), which was introduced in 1993 by the World Bank (1993), and has since then been systematically utilized – inter alia by the World Health Organization (WHO) in the “Global Burden of Disease Concept” (GBD), which provides a comprehensive and comparable assessment of mortality and loss of health due to diseases, injuries, and risk factors for all regions of the world (WHO 2010a). It is a concept to quantify the burden of disability and death, expressed as the number of years lost due to disability and early death: X I i  DWi  Di (2) DALY ¼ N  L þ i

where N: numbers of deaths L: standard life expectancy at age of death (in years). Here, an ethical issue is the choice of the region. From an equity viewpoint, the average global life expectancy should be chosen, whereas from a comparative economic view, the locally applicable life expectancy would be preferred: Ii: cases of disease/injury i DWi: disability weight of disease/injury i Di: average duration of disease/injury i (years) The weight factor DW reflects the severity of the disease or injury on a scale from 0 (perfect health) to 1 (dead) and has been estimated by WHO (2010b) for a wide range of diseases. Taking the frequency distribution function approach described above (see Fig. 2), for assessing the saved health for a particular adaptation activity, one needs to define a health damage frequency distribution function that quantifies the typical health damages of a given event and its frequency.

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Fig. 3 Linking adaptation project outcomes with impacts (own graph)

Environmental and Cultural Benefits The valuation of nonmonetary environmental and cultural benefits is fraught with conceptual difficulties (see, e.g., Bockstael and Freeman 2005). Fankhauser et al. (1998) describe the differences in willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept valuation approaches for such benefits. In our view, the challenges of this approach are so high that a simple “no-harm” rule should be followed for the evaluation of adaptation projects. For projects of certain minimum sizes, a qualitative evaluation system comparable, e.g., to standard environmental impact assessments (EIA) could be applied to check whether an adaptation project has negative impacts regarding biodiversity and soil, air, and water pollution. Likewise, projects should check whether cultural heritage, be it material or immaterial, would be jeopardized. Generally, an approach could be imagined where the host country of foreign-funded adaptation projects approves the ecologic and cultural sustainability, in a procedure akin to today’s approval of CDM projects.

Dealing with Uncertainty Obviously, introduction of the impact indicators requires highly challenging data collection exercises. Given the uncertainties of future climate change and economic development, coordinated approaches are required to prevent ad hoc choices of data that are favorable for the project developer. At first, a political agreement on the downscaled climate models used for derivation of the frequency curves of climate impacts is required. In a similar vein, forecasts for economic development need to be made consistent to allow a comparable wealth forecast. While the use of such indicators is certainly a non-perfect solution given data constraint, it is preferable to a situation where projects are evaluated according to a heterogeneous set of (often project-specific) indicators.

Links Between Intermediate and Final Indicators

As final metrics, such as saved wealth and health, are difficult to measure, multilateral institutions such as the GEF (2008) and the AFB (2010) use intermediate (so-called output and outcome) indicators for climate change adaptation projects, e.g., institutional capacity or awareness (see Fig. 3). How are they linked to our proposed metrics? Adger et al. (2007) emphasized the relevance of all outcomes shown in Fig. 3 for adaptation and reducing vulnerability. The only one not explicitly mentioned as factor contributing to adaptation is ecosystem resilience. Generally, the literature is not very explicit about the size of the effects, while it becomes clear that only few effects are direct such as the use of new dam technology on saving wealth. Most links are rather indirect and require an intermediate action (e.g., the climate change information provided by an early warning system has to be put into use via disaster response actions). Furthermore, several intervening factors may reduce the strength of the theoretical link, e.g., change in socioeconomic circumstances.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_128-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

A key issue for output-outcome-impact links is the time horizon. The longer an adaptation intervention lasts, the higher is the risk that an adaptation, appropriate in the short and maybe medium term, turns into maladaptation. Maladaptation may be defined as “action taken ostensibly to avoid or reduce vulnerability to climate change that impacts adversely on, or increases the vulnerability of other systems, sectors or social groups” (Barnett and O’Neill 2010). For example, an adaptation project may change the design level of water supply for an irrigation system based on the estimate of the increased river flow due to glacial melting in the catchment area. As long as the glacial melting continues, the project contributes to adaptation, but once the glaciers have vanished, the irrigation system will be oversized and a water supply crisis will erupt. So in the long term, the link between outcome and impact indicators will be weakened. A response to the risk of maladaptation could be to introduce an indicator that defines the risk of long-term maladaptation and to check this indicator periodically, triggering an adjustment in the adaptation project design. In the context of the irrigation project case, the indicator would be glacier volume in the catchment area and the probable date of glacier disappearance. If, for example, the glacier disappearance would be less than a decade in the future, a downsizing of the irrigation system would be started combined with an economic diversification strategy.

Dealing with Causal Links in the Future The assessment of the existing knowledge and the use in practice has shown that outcome-impact links are highly uncertain and prone to risks. Furthermore, new scientific evidence may change the intensity or even direction of the expected effects. Therefore, any approach to estimate effectiveness of adaptation projects with global indicators has to apply a flexible approach allowing for permanent adaptation, as also called for by Hallegatte et al. (2011). A four-pronged approach is proposed to guarantee flexibility. First, as start, the intermediate steps between outcome and impact indicators have to be elaborated more in detail. This idea is similar to the concept of secondary outcomes as proposed by the AFB (2010). Secondly, the intervening variables that enable or prevent an effect from taking place have to be identified and potentially measured or estimated. Third, all links and assumptions are to be seen as best assumption for the time being. As soon as new scientific evidence is available, the assumptions have to be changed. Fourth, the intermediate indicators as set out here are to be complemented or replaced by other indicators, if scientific studies show the importance of further indicators. In the end, various approaches and ways may lead to the desired results. Certainly, the current eight or nine indicators used by the GEF and the AFB are too broad if applied to specific sectors. An example of refined indicators per sector is given by Schönthaler et al. (2010). How can this encompassing and flexible approach be achieved institutionally? One idea is to elaborate specific causal-chain methodologies for each sector or even better for each project type, similar to the methodologies in the CDM (see Michaelowa 2005). Methodologies could be elaborated by the AF itself, country program managers, international organizations, or academic experts. Each methodology would have to be approved by the AFB, and revisions can be proposed by stakeholders or the AFB itself at any time, as long as they are based on the newest scientific findings.

Application of Framework to Concrete Projects In order to illustrate and test the applicability of the proposed impact metrics, five adaptation projects are assessed. For the assessment, information in the official project proposals downloaded from the

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_128-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 3 Assessment of five adaptation projects against proposed metrics (own assessment, using project documents from AFB (2011)) Metric Beneficiary intensity Wealth saved – absolute Wealth saved – relative Health saved

Unit Persons with improved livelihoods/million USD of adaptation funding USD saved per annum/USD

Environmental benefits

[Qualitative scale]

# of personal wealth saved/million USD DALYs/million USD

Project A 22,600

Project B Not reported 6 Not reported 5,000 Not reported Not Not reported reported Positive Positive

Project C 950

Project D 50

0.3

0.7

700

75

Not Not reported reported Positive Slightly positive

Project E 26,850 Not reported [530] 120,000 Positive

Adaptation Fund website (AFB 2011) is used. No external sources were used to verify the information, which means that the following results are illustrative. Table 3 shows the predicted benefits of the five projects when assessed against our metrics. Relating to absolute saved wealth (measured in annual USD saved per USD of requested grant), project A has the highest score, followed by D and C. The other two projects did not give any information on absolute saved wealth. Where absolute wealth benefits were given, justification was mostly scarce and the assumptions were not fully specified. Projects report saved wealth not over the total project lifetime but only per year, which raises the question how long a project will last. Relative wealth saved is measured here in number of persons whose personal income is saved per million USD of requested grant. This relative wealth number was calculated as share of average income saved multiplied with the number of beneficiaries. Therefore, aggregate wealth numbers were used, as individual wealth numbers are not available. Average income was assumed to equal the national GDP per capita using data from the World Bank (2011). Project A scored highest before projects C, E, and D. For project B the factor could not be calculated as numbers of beneficiaries and absolute saved wealth are missing. Interestingly, project C is performing better on this relative wealth indicator than project D, whereas it is the other way round in case of absolute wealth saved. The reason is both higher number of beneficiaries and lower income in case of project C. Finally, when assessing health saved, measured in DALYs saved per million USD of requested grant, no data has been identified in the project documents. For project E the number of beneficiaries with malnutrition is known, and assuming a disability weight of malnutrition of 0.3, one can estimate the number of DALYs saved. The numbers given here would indicate that projects A and E perform highest on the adaptive benefit, before projects C and D. Deciding on the exact rating for the adaptive benefit will depend on the political weighting of different indicators. Environmental no-harm is never a critical issue, as all projects show significant positive environmental benefits. This illustrative analysis of five adaptation projects has revealed two major problems: missing data on impact indicators and unclear assumptions. For making global metrics feasible, AF projects would have to be obliged to report on how they perform on promising impact indicators to assess their feasibility before introduction.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_128-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Conclusion In contrast to climate change mitigation, the effectiveness of adaptation projects so far is not evaluated according to universally accepted metrics. As adaptation so far was the “step child” of the climate regime, it was mainly treated as a by-product of development assistance, and thus the evaluation procedures of development assistance projects have traditionally been used. These procedures are based on a “results chain,” with a series of indicators from input to project impacts. To avoid a situation where adaptation funding is essentially distributed in a “first come, first serve” mode, it is imperative to agree on one or a set of indicators that allow a choice of adaptation projects according to their effectiveness per unit of money invested. A single, universal indicator is not possible due to the challenges in valuating protection of human lives and health. Therefore two main indicators are proposed: one assessing economic assets saved from destruction by climate change impacts (saved wealth) and one calculating human lives and health protected (saved health). The former indicator is a combination of two values, one of which is the absolute value of wealth saved, while the other looks at the relative wealth saved. This is done in order to better take into account vulnerability. The health indicator uses the concept of disability-adjusted life-years saved (DALYs). The wealth indicator is calculated in a procedure that first estimates the expected wealth existing in the project area over time. Subsequently, the expected climate change damages during the lifetime of the adaptation project are calculated to set the baseline. A frequency distribution of damaging events is used for this purpose. Finally, the remaining damages after implementation or the project are assessed. To reduce uncertainties that may make the indicator calculation irrelevant, coordinated approaches for the determination of wealth forecasts and damage frequency curves are required. A political agreement on the climate and economic models used would help. Here, the regulatory structure for the evaluation of emission mitigation projects in the context of the Clean Development Mechanism could serve as example. As an initial step, the indicator systems of adaptation funds should be oriented versus outcome indicators. Moreover, indicators should periodically assess the risk of maladaptation, especially for projects with a very long lifetime. The links between outcome and impact indicators should be studied in more detail.

Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation for funding and participants of the Colorado Conference on Earth System Governance and the 2011 Climate Economics and Law Conference in Berne for comments and suggestions. This paper represents the views of the authors but not necessarily the ones of the institutions and persons acknowledged here.

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_128-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York, pp 717–743 AFB (2010) Operational policies and guidelines for parties to access resources from the Adaptation Fund. Annex I: strategic priorities, policies and guidelines of the Adaptation Fund adopted by the CMP. Adaptation Fund Board Secretariat, Washington, DC AFB (2011) Project and programme proposals. Adaptation Fund Board secretariat. http:// adaptation-fund.org/projectprogrammeproposals. Accessed 25 Feb 2011 Agrawala S, Fankhauser S (2008) Economic aspects of adaption to climate change. Costs, benefits and policy instruments. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris Aldy JE, Viscusi WK (2008) Adjusting the value of a statistical life for age and cohort effects. Rev Econ Stat 90(3):573–581 Baca M (2010) Call for a pilot program for market-based adaptation funding. N Y Univ J Int Law Polit 42:1337–1381 Barnett J, O’Neill S (2010) Maladaptation. Glob Environ Chang 20(2):211–213 Bockstael NE, Freeman AM (2005) Welfare theory and evaluation. In: M€aler K-G, Vincent JR (eds) Handbook of environmental economics, vol 2, 1st edn. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 517–570 Butzengeiger S, Michaelowa A, Köhler M, Stadelmann M (2011) Policy instruments for climate change adaptation – lessons from mitigation and preconditions for introduction of market mechanisms for adaptation. Paper presented at the Colorado conference on earth system governance: crossing boundaries and building bridges, Colorado State University, 17–20 May 2011 Detsky A, Naglie G (1990) A clinician’s guide to cost-effectiveness analysis. Ann Intern Med 113:147–154 ECAWG (2009) Shaping climate resilient development. A framework for decision making. A report of the Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group. ClimateWorks Foundation, Global Environment Facility, European Commission, McKinsey & Company, The Rockefeller Foundation, Standard Chartered Bank and Swiss Re, San Francisco/Washington, DC/Brussels Fankhauser S, Tol R (1998) The value of human life in global warming impacts – a comment. Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Chang 3:87–88 Fankhauser S, Tol R, Pearce D (1998) Extensions and alternatives to climate change impact valuation: on the critique of IPCC Working Group III’s impact estimates. Environ Dev Econ 3:59–81 Fearnside P (1998) The value of human life in global warming impacts. Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Chang 3:83–85 GEF (2008) Background and elements for a GEF monitoring and evaluation framework on adaptation. Lessons from GEF Climate Change Adaptation projects. GEF Evaluation Office in Cooperation with the GEF Adaptation Task Force. LDCF/SCCF council meeting, 25 Apr 2008. Global Environment Facility, Washington, DC Hallegatte S, Lecocq F, de Perthuis C (2011) Designing climate change adaptation policies. An economic framework, vol 5568, Policy research working paper series. World Bank, Washington, DC HBS/ODI (2011) Climate funds. Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America/Oversea Development Institute. http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing. Accessed 26 Feb 2011 Hinkel J (2008) Comparing possible outcomes or describing social learning? Presentation hold at the “expert consultation on adaptation metrics”, 17–18 Apr 2008, Tokyo IGES, World Bank (2008) Expert consultation on adaptation metrics. Tokyo, 17–18 Apr 2008. Institute for Global Environmental Strategies & World Bank, Hayama/Washington, DC Page 13 of 15

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VROM (2011) Fast start finance. Contributing countries. Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM). http://www.faststartfinance.org/content/contributingcountries. Accessed 1 June 2011 WHO (2010a) Disability weights, discounting and age weighting of DALYs. World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/daly_disability_weight/en/ index.html. Accessed 16 Oct 2010 WHO (2010b) Global burden of disease. World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/ healthinfo/global_burden_disease/en/. Accessed 16 Oct 2010 World Bank (1993) World development report 1993: investing in health. Oxford University Press, Oxford World Bank (2010) Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change Study (EACC). A synthesis report. Final consultation draft. World Bank, Washington, DC World Bank (2011) GDP per capita (current US$). World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. Accessed 28 Apr 2011

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Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_131-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Exploring the Status of Public Participation in Climate Change Adaptation Governance in Coastal Region of Bangladesh Using the Social Ecological Inventory Tool Khalid Bahauddina, Nasibul Rahmanb and Tanvir Hasninec a Hope for Humanity, Dhaka, Bangladesh b University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh c Jahangirnagar University, Savar, Bangladesh

The Editor-in-Chief has decided to retract this entry from the Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation (DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9). Upon investigation carried out according to the Committee on Publication Ethics guidelines, it has been found that substantial parts were duplicated from the following entry: Baird, J., R. Plummer, and K. Pickering. 2014. Priming the governance system for climate change adaptation: the application of a social-ecological inventory to engage actors in Niagara, Canada. Ecology and Society 19(1): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-06152-190103

The Editor-in-Chief has decided to retract this entry from the Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation (DOI 10.1007/ 978-3-642-40455-9). Upon investigation carried out according to the Committee on Publication Ethics guidelines, it has been found that substantial parts were duplicated from the following entry: Baird, J., R. Plummer, and K. Pickering. 2014. Priming the governance system for climate change adaptation: the application of a social-ecological inventory to engage actors in Niagara, Canada. Ecology and Society 19(1): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-06152-190103 Page 1 of 1