Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation 9783642404559

Citation preview

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Principles of Emissions Trading Julien Chevallier* IPAG Lab, IPAG Business School, Paris, France

Abstract International emissions trading schemes include the Kyoto Protocol and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. This chapter documents the main principles behind the functioning of such permits markets, which represent popular environmental regulation tools. Among other design issues, this chapter discusses the various allocation mechanisms available to the regulator. Besides, this chapter underlines the role played by intertemporal flexibility mechanisms (e.g., banking and borrowing) which allow reducing overall compliance costs. Overall, the goal of this chapter is to present in standard textbook reference terms the construction of an emissions trading program, be it at the regional, national, or international level. The interested reader can gain valuable insights by referring to this core text, which contains a descriptive analysis of the main provisions that need to be taken care of when creating such an environmental market.

Keywords Emissions trading; Allocation; Banking; Borrowing; Offset

Introduction Emissions trading, or cap-and-trade program, consists in setting a quantitative limit for the emission of a given pollutant and to let the market decide on its price. How do emissions trading schemes work in practice? This chapter aims at answering this question, by casting light on the functioning mechanisms of tradable permits markets. Such markets have been created in order to be able to trade polluted assets, as if they were standard production goods. By diminishing the circulation of pollutants, environmental benefits can be awaited from such schemes. The first issue raised by the creation of a tradable permits market is linked to the distortions which can occur as a consequence of the initial allocation. Initial allocation is the amount of pollutant that is distributed to preexisting agents to start with. Whereas Hahn (1984) contributed first to this debate by demonstrating the non-neutrality of permits allocation for an agent able to exert market power1 in a static context and concerning the spatial exchange of permits only, this chapter explicitly addresses the critical aspect of initial permits allocation in a dynamic context and concerning intertemporal emissions trading. It is important to bear in mind indeed that a permit can be exchanged across various geographical locations (e.g., from one country to another) but also through time (e.g., one firm transfers permits to the future or from the future). These different kinds of uses of permits are called, respectively, spatial exchange and intertemporal trading.

*Email: [email protected] 1 For an exhaustive literature review on permits trading and market power, see Petrakis et al. (1999). Page 1 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

On tradable permits markets, banking refers to the possibility for agents to save unused permits for future use, while borrowing represents the possibility to borrow permits from future allocations for use in current period. Agents are a very generic term in economics which can represent individuals (e.g., consumers), firms, or governments. In our context, agents are mostly understood here as polluting firms. By allowing agents to arbitrate between actual and expected abatement costs over specific periods, banking and borrowing permits form another dimension of flexibility where agents can trade permits not only spatially but also through time. Abatement cost represents the cost to diminish the quantity of pollution by one unit. In a continuous time model under certainty, Rubin (1996) shows that an intertemporal equilibrium exists on a permits market from the viewpoint of the regulator and the firm and that banking and borrowing allow firms to smooth emissions. Indeed, it is the role of the government (or the environmental agency) to manage the tradable permits market, which is an artificial construction coming from environmental policy. Regulator can therefore refer to the State or the environmental agency. Under uncertainty, Schennach (2000) shows the permits price may rise at a rate less than the discount rate and new public information may cause jumps in the price and emissions paths. Such provisions enabled agents to smooth their emissions stream and played a key role in the success2 of the US SO2 or Acid Rain Program. Surprisingly, the inclusion of banking and borrowing does not appear as a cornerstone of new “grand policy experiments”3 dealing with climate change. We bridge this gap by analyzing the various effects of banking and borrowing that need to be accounted for when designing tradable permits markets. This instrument is described indeed as a double-edged sword in the literature. On the one hand, banking provides incentives to over-comply and leads to an intertemporal reallocation of emissions so as to reach lower social damages. On the other hand, borrowing may give agents with high abatement costs an incentive to delay costly investments in clean technologies by borrowing allowances from future periods and to concentrate emissions in early periods. For example, if it is costly to diminish pollution when extracting coal, firms will pollute on a business-as-usual basis at the beginning of the scheme (by borrowing future permits), and they will wait for technological innovations to diminish their quantity of pollution in the future (and the associated use of pollutants). However, more pollution has occurred in the present time, which is not the objective of the tradable permits market. That is why the provisions on banking and borrowing need to be carefully designed. While the total allocation of permits sets the present value of discounted permits prices, we will see that other effects on the permits price may arise when introducing an intertemporal trading ratio for banked and borrowed allowances. Discounted permits prices can be defined as the total value of a permit discounted through time (by applying discounting as it would apply to any savings account for individual banks). We therefore address the following two key questions: What are the effects of the initial allocation mechanisms in emissions trading systems? What insights can we get from the existing literature concerning the use of banking and borrowing in tradable permits markets? To detail the impacts of banking and borrowing on environmental damages will also be a priority throughout our analysis. The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section “Initial Allocation Mechanics” provides a background discussion on the initial allocation mechanics. Section “Banking and Borrowing Provisions” deals with banking and borrowing provisions. Section “Additional Flexibility Mechanisms” introduces additional flexibility mechanisms. Section “Conclusion” concludes. 2

The notion of success may be approximated by various effects (preexisting regulatory environment, technology innovation and diffusion, reduction of regulatory uncertainty, aggregate cost savings, etc.), but we will focus on the efficiency of the permits price, i.e., its ability to reflect current information on spot and future prices. 3 This expression was coined by Stavins (1998). Page 2 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Initial Allocation Mechanics This section addresses allocation design issues of existing international emissions trading schemes, namely, the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS.

The Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto protocol is the first of its kind at the international level to introduce carbon trading, i.e., the exchange of carbon dioxide units worldwide. The question of the Kyoto Protocol as an “unfinished business” is often evoked. Very heterogenous sectors were included under the same regulation, which could be detrimental to find the right method to allocate permits depending on price elasticities between sectors. Since there exists no historical data for carbon emission reduction cost, it may prove particularly difficult to induce a cost-effective allocation of the initial quotas to participating countries. In the context of the Kyoto Protocol, the case of countries supplied with allocations in excess of their actual needs has been coined as hot air in the literature.4 The distribution of a large number of permits to Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern Europe countries (Russia, the Ukraine forming two thirds) may be seen indeed as an imperfection of the Kyoto Protocol, as those countries were given generous allocations to foster agreement during the first phase (2008–2012). Market power concerns arise as industrial firms may benefit from the gap between their initial permits allocation (based on 1990 production levels) and their real emission needs in 2008 (after a period of recession), and the use of these permits surpluses remains unclear. This situation emerged as a conflict between the internal and the external consistency of the permits market: • The internal consistency refers to the situation where agents freely receive or bid for permits according to their real needs. The regulator may be interested however in distributing more permits to a country than strictly needed (according to business-as-usual emissions or a benchmark for instance) in order to ensure participation to the permits market.5 As a consequence, one agent may achieve a dominant position which in turns threatens the efficiency of the permits market itself. • The external consistency of the permits market is linked to the broader debate of climate change as the purchase of a “global public good.”6 This altruistic view embodies the notions of “burden sharing” or “common but differentiated responsibilities”7 attached to the Kyoto Protocol, whereby developed countries agree to spend a higher income share on fighting climate change than developing countries.8 Those conflicting views undermine the negotiation of the cap, which is fixed at a suboptimal level compared to what would be needed to minimize the total damage to the environment. The cap can be defined as the overall quantitative limit of pollutants that can be emitted. The regulator sets the cap, 4

See Baron (1999), Burniaux (1999), Bernard et al. (2003), Bohringer et al. (2006), Holtsmark (2003). Such negotiation with Russia was determinant for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force on February 16, 2005. 6 See Guesnerie (2006). 7 See Muller (2002). 8 Note that the implicit assumptions of the existence of such an environmental Kuznets curve (the environment is a superior good and environmental regulation becomes stricter through time at higher levels of GDP per capita) are left out of the debate. 5

Page 3 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

and the market defines the price of the permit. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol represent a mere 5 % reduction below 1990 levels. Now if early movers like EU countries are willing to ratchet down the cap, little progress can be achieved without luring in major players like the USA, India, and China. Thus, many difficulties arise to pierce the “veil of uncertainty” around international negotiation.9 The fact that the creation of a permits market gives some countries the opportunity to draw a financial advantage without a direct environmental gain (i.e., in the absence of effective emissions abatement) may be puzzling. Yet as stated by Maeda (2003),10 “[this debate] seems misguided because it focuses on the political importance of the issue, rather than addressing it from an economic perspective.” Overall, the hypothesis that generous allocations that broaden the scope of a cap-and-trade program might also give birth to dominant positions shall not be neglected. Recall that in a cap-and-trade program, the regulator sets the cap, and agents freely exchange permits to define their price.

The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme

This section deals with possible design flaws in the allocation of permits on the European carbon market. The EU ETS Design: An Overview The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has been established by the European directive 2003–7: this regional trading system for CO2 emissions covers, across the EU-27 member states, around 11,000 installations11 representing close to 46 % of Europe’s CO2 emissions. In order to help EU member states to achieve their Kyoto target of reducing emissions by 8 % from those of 1990 level in 2008–2012, the European Union began this commitment in a pilot period from 2005 to 2008. The third European commitment period has started in 2013. Since 2005, the ETS operates independently of the Kyoto Protocol but has been linked to International Emissions Trading (IET) and other flexibility mechanisms in 2007. In this framework, the “Linking Directive” provides the recognition of Kyoto projects credits, Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation credits from the second period in 2008, known as Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), respectively, for compliance use within the EU ETS.12 CERs are traded worldwide and not only in Europe as for the EU ETS. Therefore, they can be understood as world proxy for the carbon price. The EU ETS draws on the US sulfur dioxide (SO2)13 trading system for much of its inspiration but relies much more heavily on decentralized decision-making for the allocation of emissions allowances and for the monitoring and management of sources (Kruger et al. 2007). Within the EU-wide

9

See Kolstad (2005). p. 295 11 The definition of an installation effected in the EU ETS is the same as for Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) that is a principal environmental regulatory directive in the EU. Installations are defined as a stationary technical unit where one or more activities covered by the EU ETS are carried out and any other directly associated activities, which have a technical connection with the activities carried out on that site and which could have an effect on emissions and pollution. 12 See Table 2 for a quick review of Kyoto units. 13 The EU CO2 emissions trading scheme was inspired by successful cap-and-trade programs for SO2 and NOx in the USA (Ellerman and Montero 2007). 10

Page 4 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Kyoto target, each member state has its own national emissions target as determined under the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement that defines each member state’s emissions reduction obligation. Each country is required to develop a National Allocation Plan (NAP), which, among other design features, addresses the national emissions target. A NAP contains the amount of permits allocated to each firm for each country. Each member state has its own registry where changes in the portfolio of its companies are recorded. Furthermore, there is a European Central Administrator, the Community Independent Transaction Log, to oversee the registry systems that will be standardized under European legislation. In that registry, allocations are reflected along with the purchases and sales for each company of the country (Mansanet-Bataller et al. 2007). The EU ETS is expected to allow for cheaper compliance with the targets under the Kyoto Protocol by letting participating companies buy/sell their emission allowances. In this institutional framework, an amount of two billion allowances has been created each year during phases I and II (before the shift to auctioning in phase III). The EU ETS has started during 2005–2007 with the phase I, followed by phase II during 2008–2012, and phase III during 2013–2020. The price of the allowance is established by the supply and demand of market participants and the level of the scarcity created by the initial allocation. Over-allocation or Relative Success? The EU ETS gently constrains emissions (8 % reduction for EU-27) so as to enforce a low carbon price. Yet the debate has shifted toward a possible over-allocation of permits. The production decisions of private actors are under scrutiny: do permits surpluses constitute a relative success (i.e., firms have reduced their emissions above projected levels) or an imperfection in the design of the system? As long as governments continue to allocate allowances to existing facilities based on historic emissions, the scheme is flawed by a perverse “updating” incentive. Firms have indeed an incentive to delay early action in abatement technologies since higher emissions today will be rewarded with bigger allocations in future periods. Buchner and Ellerman (2008) provide a first empirical assessment of the EU ETS allocation process based on 2005 emissions data. They estimate a slight over-allocation of 4 % during the first period of allocation, while there are strong signs that some emissions abatement measures have occurred. But the analysis is not straightforward since “a long position is not per se evidence of overallocation.”14 The difference between 2005 allocation and verified emissions suggests too many allowances were allocated, but the benchmark against which this conclusion is reached may be biased by insufficient data reporting on emissions before 2005 and by a lack of comparability at the EU-wide level. Firms may also be long because of differences in marginal abatement costs or in expectations (regarding economic activity, energy prices, etc.) under uncertainty. This section has provided an overview of two major tradable permits market along with their allocation methodology. It revealed a wide range of opportunities for strategic behavior in the design of international permit trading regimes. The presence of countries with large permits holdings increases the probability of price manipulation and the risk of efficiency loss in the allocation of abatement efforts between countries.

14

p. 2 Page 5 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Banking and Borrowing Provisions This section develops three kinds of issues surrounding banking and borrowing: (i) the environmental and economic effects, (ii) the distribution of the emissions stream through time, and (iii) the focus on the EU ETS experience (see also the paper by Chevallier (2012)).

Environmental and Economic Effects of Banking and Borrowing We review the main effects of banking and borrowing provisions from the theoretical literature and empirical experiences on the environmental performance and economic efficiency. When abatement together with endowment of emission allowances is above emissions levels, then regulated industrials bank surplus allowances for potential later use. Thus, an allowance issued for one compliance period may be used by an affected unit for a later compliance period. In the same way, if regulated industrials do not abate enough to cover their emissions level with their allowances endowment, they may borrow allowances from the future allocation. We already know as Haites (2006) noted,15 “allowance banking provisions affect basically environmental performance, economic efficiency and market participants’ behaviour.” Hence, the regulator’s decision of allowing banking creates the significant effects listed below: Environmental effects: • Allowance banking and borrowing change the temporal pattern of emissions and may change aggregate emissions and can have environmental, including public health, effects. Allowance banking and borrowing should facilitate adjustment to changes in the emissions cap. • Banking provisions could also affect the rate of noncompliance and the resulting excess emissions. Evidence suggesting that allowance banking increases the rate of noncompliance is limited. In their experiments, (Cason and Gangadharan 2006) found that allowance banking increases noncompliance and total emissions in a hypothetical scheme with weak enforcement. Economic effects: • Allowance banking links future allowance prices to the current (“spot”) market price as stated by Maeda (2004). • Allowance banking and borrowing should improve liquidity16 in the allowance market. Allowance banking tends to increase the quantity of allowances available to the market and increase the volume of allowances traded. In their experiments, Godby et al. (2000) and Cason and Gangadharan (2006) find that allowance banking increases trading activity. • Allowance banking and borrowing should improve price stability. If banking is not allowed, allowance prices are likely to be unstable at the end of each compliance period. With no banking, if actual emissions are lower than the cap for the compliance period, the price of allowances should fall to zero at the end of the period since any remaining allowances have no value. With no banking, if actual emissions are higher than the cap for the compliance period, the price of allowances should rise sharply at the end of the period. Allowance banking should dampen such end-of-period price fluctuations and improve price stability.

15

p. 7 The liquidity market is defined as a market where a large volume of trades can be immediately executed with minimum effect on price (Kyle 1985).

16

Page 6 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Summary of banking provisions and liquidity data for different emissions trading schemes Allowances traded Bank as % of annual amount emissions

Scheme Gas Banking and related provisions Current emissions trading schemes Acid Rain Program SO2 No limit on allowance banking 11.62 75–180 % for electric utilities million RECLAIM NOx No allowance banking; can sell surplus allowances to a 0 20–125 % (Greater Los buyer with a later compliance deadline and buy Angeles Area) allowances with a later vintage SOx idem 0 10–105 % Future emissions trading scheme Kyoto mechanisms GHGs Banking of different units from 2008–2012 period to the subsequent commitment period is restricted as follows: RMUs may not be carried over ERUs, which have not been converted from RMUs, may be carried over up to a maximum of 2.5 % of the party’s assigned amount CERs may be carried over up to a maximum of 2.5 % of the party’s assigned amount CERs and lCERs may not be carried over AAUs may be carried over without restriction The quantities of RMUs, ERUs, CERs, tCERs, and lCERs are likely to be small relative to the quantity of AAUs, so the banking restrictions can effectively be avoided by using units other than AAUs first for compliance and then banking surplus AAUs

These theoretical considerations on the banking provisions are also supported by Ellerman et al. (2000) on the US Acid Rain Program and by the results of a business simulation game and controlled experiments (Schleich et al. 2006) on the EU ETS. The US Acid Rain Program has been one of the most successful attempts to introduce tradable permits markets in environmental policy. That is why the EU ETS draws mostly on it. The US Acid Rain Program provided empirical support to the view that market-based instruments may be more environmentally efficient than command and control regulation. SO2 emissions fell, and the program was characterized by a quick implementation, a positive role of banking (twice as much as required), a good compliance, and no hot spots.17 These optimistic results may be limited to flow pollutants since for stock pollutants like CO2, the incentive to abate is less temporally and spatially constraining. As documented by Ellerman and Montero (2007)18 for the US SO2 Program, “banking of allowances remains the predominant form of emissions trading in Phase I (. . .) nearly threequarters of the 9.5 million allowances freed up for emissions trading in the first three years of Phase I were banked for later use in Phase II.” This citation confirms the view of banking and borrowing as a key determinant for the success of a program. In fact, the salient example is the US Acid Rain Program, where banking has been a major form of emissions trading (Ellerman and Montero 2007; Ellerman et al. 2000). During the first 5 years of the program constituting phase I, 1995–1999, only 26.4 million of the 38.1 million permits distributed were used to cover emissions. The remaining 11.65 million allowances (30 % of all the distributed allowances) were banked and have been gradually consumed during phase II (2000 and beyond). As 17 18

Typically, the cheapest abatement source is found where the larger sources are located. p. 161 Page 7 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

a result, the phase II cap was expected to be reached sometime between 2008 and 2010. Ellerman et al. (2000) analyze in depth the efficiency of this banking behavior in the Acid Rain SO2 program. The economically optimal level of banking depends first on the SO2 emissions in the absence of the trading scheme, second on the SO2 emission reduction cost function, and third on the discount rate. Using ranges of reasonable values for the discount rate and the rate of growth of SO2 emissions in the absence of the trading scheme, Ellerman et al. (2008) find that banking behavior has been reasonably efficient during phase I and the first few years of phase II. We report in Table 1 the main features of banking provisions in existing trading schemes. In a game simulation of the EU ETS, Ehrhart et al. (2005) find that a ban on banking pre-2008 allowances into 2008–2012 leads to an inefficient adjustment to the more stringent cap assumed for the latter period. In their simulation of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the ban on banking leads to a low price for allowances during 2005–2007 and underinvestment in emission reduction measures. The more stringent cap triggers a price spike during 2008 and 2009. The higher allowance prices induce overinvestment in emission reduction measures, which causes the price to fall back to the optimal level by 2012. The comparison of the banking case with the banning banking case is based on the assumption that prices will develop differently in the two cases (Ehrhart et al. 2005): • If banking is allowed, it is reasonable (under some assumptions like participants having complete information and emission targets being known) to expect that the price development does not exceed Hotelling’s rule (i.e., prices develop according to the interest rate or more slowly). Otherwise, arbitrage between periods is possible (Kling and Rubin 1997). In practice, excess emissions permits can be saved for future use or present emissions can be extended for future abatement. As a result, the permit price becomes arbitraged over time. • In the banning banking case, a lower price is assumed in the first period than in the free banking period case because first period allowances cover only one period instead of two. Analogously, the price in the second period is assumed to be higher due to increasing scarcity of allowances in comparison to the banking case.

Distribution of the Emissions Stream Through Time Another question needs to be addressed when assessing the relative merits of allowing banking and borrowing in tradable permits systems: how do firms adjust their emissions stream when they benefit from the possibility to freely bank and borrow permits? A key issue lies in the discount rate picked by firms. Higher or lower discount rates imply respectively more or less borrowing, while a zero discount rate leads to the same level of pollution at each period. Our analysis therefore highlights potential negative consequences of the use of unrestricted borrowing: the concentration of emissions on early periods by delaying abatement decisions and borrowing may aggravate environmental harm. The positive effects of banking on total present environmental damages are reversed, and the level of global pollution is higher than in a situation without borrowing. Concerning banking, firms invest in abatement technologies and bank allowances when they anticipate an increase in abatement costs superior to the discount rate; otherwise they would not bear additional abatement costs in the current period. This mechanism corresponds to a situation where standards are stricter through time, which is often the case. In the presence of a convex damage function coming from emissions and stricter future standards, the decision to allow banking reduces social damages. Page 8 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

This positive effect of banking counterbalances the negative aspects of borrowing detailed above and gives us a more precise picture of the task of the regulator when tailoring regulation for permit trading systems. When social damages are an increasing function of the pollution level at time t, our policy recommendation consists in authorizing banking and enforcing stricter pollution standards through time. When the cap is constant or becomes less constraining, the decision to allow borrowing leads to either increasing social damages or decreasing costs for firms. We have seen how permits alter the timing and the magnitude of marginal damages. We address in the next paragraph the question of introducing a non-unitary Intertemporal Trading Ratio (ITR) including interests on banking and discouraging borrowing to correct these unwanted permits path. On the Use of the Intertemporal Trading Ratio In this section, we evaluate the merits of a modified model of banking and borrowing that explicitly takes into account the distribution of the emissions stream through time. Using the interest rate on allowance balances, the regulator may change the time profile and cumulative quantity to approximate more nearly the social optimum. There are two sources of inefficiencies that might affect the social optimum: 1. The discount rate used by firms 2. The fact that total damages depend on the distribution of the emissions stream through time A modified banking system may correct the first type of inefficiency highlighted above, but not necessarily the second type. Due to the effect of discounting future abatement costs, we need to penalize borrowing by an ITR exogenously chosen by the regulator19 so that if firms borrow a lot of allowances in early periods, they will reimburse more allowances than actually used in the next period. This “banking and restricted borrowing” according to Kling and Rubin’s (1997) contribution yields the following comments: • Setting ITR < 1 provides an efficient incentive to banking, since firms need to reimburse more allowances in second period than were borrowed in first period. • The weight of debt is greater under a modified banking system than under the original system. • Such a modified banking and borrowing system allows the private and social solutions to converge, assuming constant and linear social damages. Assuming both banking and borrowing are allowed and there is a positive private discount rate, the introduction of an ITR yields: • Concerning banking, the opportunity cost of not using the permit is compensated by the ITR payment. • Concerning borrowing, for each ton of CO2 non-abated, the gain from agents’ private interest rate is reduced by the ITR. • The primary effect of a nonzero ITR is on time profile, not quantities: there is a change in marginal stock damages over time (more banking and less borrowing relative to a permit system without ITR) and a small effect on quantities intertemporally exchanged. 19

Kling and Rubin (1997) suggest the implementation of a discount rate equal to the industry average rate of interest used to finance medium-term capital expenditures (p. 112). Page 9 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

For greenhouse gases, the optimal rate of intertemporal substitution has been suggested by Leiby and Rubin (2001) as being “the ratio of current marginal stock damages to the discounted future value of marginal stock damages less the decay rate of emissions in the atmosphere20,” increased by the difference between the firm’s discount rate and the social planner’s discount rate. This result is obtained in a different setting since they distinguish between flow (emissions flow) and stock (accumulated) pollutants. Typically, CO2 emissions are characterized by stock damages that do not stop at the end of the program. We have seen in this section that the correct determination of the intertemporal discount rate may yield greater efficiency gains. With reference to the discussion on the intertemporal trading ratio above, we may cite several time devices used in tradable permits programs: the Progressive Flow Control in the US Northeastern NOx Budget Program, changed redemption ratios in US Clean Air Interstate Rule (2:1 from 2010; 3:1 from 2015), and growth indexed caps. To sum up, characteristic features of intertemporal emissions trading include the fact that at the equilibrium abatement costs are equalized among sources and that the distribution of emissions through time need not yield to a concentration in early periods. The decision to allow or not borrowing depends on the arbitrage between the firm’s cost efficiency and a higher pressure on the environment. Firms tend to use borrowing if the environmental constraint is constant or does not become a lot stricter over time. That is why it is recommended to introduce a discount rate specific to borrowed allowances. Prospective Use of Banking and Borrowing in the Kyoto Protocol This section offers a description of the possible use of banking and borrowing in the Kyoto Protocol. On the one hand, provisions on banking are cited by Klepper and Peterson (2005)21: “Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) resulting from the Kyoto commitment can be banked without a time constraint. Credits from Joint Implementation (JI) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) can be banked up to a limit of, respectively, 2.5 % and 5 % of a Party’s initial assigned amount. Sink credits can not be banked.” On the other hand, implicit provisions on borrowing may be found in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or UNFCCC (2000) report.22 As explained by Newell et al. (2005)23: “International climate policy discussions have implicitly included borrowing within possible consequences for noncompliance under the Kyoto Protocol, through the payback of excess tons with a penalty (i.e., interest).” This penalty could be fixed to 40 % of additional emissions reduction for the next period of the Kyoto Protocol despite uncertainties regarding the enforcement of this particular provision. This question is addressed in depth by Alberola and Chevallier (2009). In the next section, we discuss the efficiency of the EU ETS intertemporal market. We also question the presence of institutional learning in the EU ETS.

A Focus on the EU ETS Experience The EUA price path reflected the evolution of market participants’ expectations about the scarcity of allowances. Beginning at 8€ on January 1, 2005, EUA prices increased to around 30€ in July 2005, fluctuated during the six following months in the range from 20€ to 25€, then to 30€ until the end of April. This price development surprised most experts and market participants. According to Sijm 20

p. 251 p. 295 22 Paragraph II.XV 23 p. 149 21

Page 10 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

et al. (2005), the increase was largely due to political decisions on unpredictably strict national allocation plans, but the market reaction was to some extent exaggerated. Behind the price increase there were also high fuel prices, cold weather, the absence of suppliers in the market, and uncertainty about the political environment (Lecocq and Kapoor 2005). The price fell suddenly at the end of June because of weaker UK gas price and the entrance of Czech Republic into the market. The price fluctuated around 21–23€ for the rest of the year. At the beginning of 2006, the price increased to way above 25€ in consequence of cold weather and high fuel prices. For a couple of months the price stabilized, and then it reached a maximum of over 30€ in April driven by fuel prices. Around April 25, 2006, first rumors occurred about contents of the national emissions reports for the first year of compliance by the EU member states. The official publication of these emissions reports on May 15 verified the rumors. It became apparent that the market was not as short as expected; especially the power producer needed less EUAs than anticipated (Seifert et al. 2008). The release of the emissions data had a market effect on EUA prices, causing a sharp break in the price of all maturities of EUAs. There were further less severe price fluctuations until the complete data were released on May 15; however, the essential adjustment was made in these 4 days, and after May 15, the spot price remained close to 15€ until late September when a further less-pronounced adjustment occurred. As noted by Buchner and Ellerman (2008), “this price “collapse” demonstrated a readily observable characteristic of markets of reacting quickly (and from the standpoint of some, brutally) to relevant information.” This is a significant sign of the informational efficiency of the EU ETS. The EUA market can be considered as efficient if prices fully reflect all available relevant information divulged. And there should be no doubt that the release of reliable information concerning emissions covered by a cap-and-trade program is highly relevant. According always to Buchner and Ellerman (2008),24 “one plausible explanation is that market observers had over-estimated the level of CO2 emissions and the demand for allowances caused by rising real output, the adverse weather in 2005, and the higher prices for natural gas relative to coal. But, another more intriguing possibility is that market observers under-estimated the amount of abatement that would occur in the first year of the EU ETS (. . .).” The cap is always known, but until the release of aggregate emission data, no one has a really good idea of either the level of aggregate emissions or how much emission reduction/ abatement is required to comply with the cap. The same phenomenon was observed in the US SO2 emissions trading program when the first auction revealed emissions and the implied demand for allowances to be much less than expected (Ellerman et al. 2000). Each year, the European Commission will disclose the verified emissions, playing the role of a “banker.” After a new increase to 20€ in June, EUA prices stabilized in a range from 15€ to 17€ and then, in consequence of a less cold winter, they have been declining these last 3 months. Recall that European Union Allowances are the carbon trading unit that is exchanged under the EU carbon permit scheme for each ton of carbon dioxide emitted in the atmosphere. With two trading periods, EU ETS futures markets are divided in two segments which respond to two distinct fundamentals. As it approached the end of 2007, the EU ETS was characterized by two price signals responding to different dynamics, because of the very limited opportunity to carry over unused EUAs from phase I to phase II. While the prices of spot and futures contracts for the first period were down sharply, the prices of futures contracts for the second period surpassed 18€/t. This increase of the second period allowance price is primarily due to institutional factors: the European Commission issued its opinion on ten National Allowances Plans for the second period since the end of November 2006. In doing so, it established the basis for the institutional framework for 24

p. 33 Page 11 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

2008–2012 and gave indications regarding three factors that will have a decisive effect on the allowance price: • The Commission has requested that the allowances awarded to installations be reduced. The Commission also reaffirmed its rejection of ex post allowances based on adjusted projections of growth and emissions. Brussels has therefore sent a clear signal of the scarcity of the allowances that will be available in 2008–2012. • The possible carryover of unused allowances from the first to the second period (“banking”) is now subject to conditions that are so restrictive as to make it practically impossible. Nevertheless, banking between the second and subsequent periods is still permitted, which could further increase the scarcity of allowances in 2008–2012. • The use of credits originating from project mechanisms created by the Kyoto Protocol (JI and CDM) has been significantly restricted. Ireland has thus been forced to reduce its ceiling from 50 % to 21 %, which corresponds to 35 MtCO2 less over the period; Sweden will have to reduce its own ceiling from 20 % to 10 %, i.e., 11 Mt CO2 less than planned. As Ellerman and Parsons (2006) noted,25 “it is virtually certain that the EU ETS will then be either long or short; the likelihood of a perfect match between 1st period EUAs and emissions are extremely small. This binary outcome places a limit on 1st period prices that, when coupled with the constraint on inter-period banking, allows a probability of shortage to be calculated taking into account all the uncertainties weather, economic growth, energy prices, and the abatement response to carbon prices.” Without banking between the two trading periods, they measure the probability of shortage at any point in time by the ratio of the first period price to the second period price plus 40€, which represents the penalty. The penalty will be 100€ thereafter and companies will also have to surrender a compensating amount of allowances. To wrap up, during the first 3 years, banking and borrowing of allowances are allowed. Therefore, we can expect that first period CO2 prices follow Hotelling’s rule which in its simplest model predicts that, under perfect information, the price of an exhaustible resource will rise at the rate of interest r. However, in the case of the ban of banking between the two periods 2005–2007 and 2008–2012, we highlighted a total disconnection between each exchange market and a decline of the first period prices. Evidence of Institutional Learning Within the EU ETS The previous discussion suggests that EUA prices are affected by institutional events such as the simultaneous release in April 2006 of 2005 verified emissions by the Walloon Region of Belgium, France, and Spain. Trading based on information before this price adjustment may be characterized as hazardous or speculative, and only these 2005 verified emissions could give a hint about the long and short positions at the installation level. Most of the verified emissions were reported by mid-May. The fact that the EUA price responded quickly to such relevant information may be interpreted as a strong sign of the efficiency of the intertemporal market in the EU ETS. The EU Commission has greatly learned from the 2005–2007 warm-up period. Namely, most of the issues regarding banking and borrowing have been fixed between 2007 and 2008. The transition from phase II to phase III has mostly been characterized by a change in the allocation methodology, going from free allocation (i.e., grandfathering) to actually having to bid for permits (i.e., auctioning).

25

p. 1 Page 12 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 2 Glossary of Kyoto units Assigned Amount Unit AAU means a unit derived from an Annex 1 Party’s assigned amount. They are tradable units that Annex 1 Parties may count toward compliance with their emissions target. Each AAU is equal to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent gases Certified Emission CER means a unit issued pursuant to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. These are tradable units Reduction generated by projects in non-Annex 1 Parties under the Clean Development Mechanism. They may be counted by Annex 1 Parties toward compliance with their UN and EU emissions target and are equal to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent gases Emission Reduction ERU is a unit issued pursuant to Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol. These are tradable units Unit generated by projects in Annex 1 Parties under Joint Implementation. Annex 1 Parties may count them toward compliance with their emissions target. Each ERU is equal to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent gases Removal Unit RMU is a tradable unit issued on the basis of removals of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere through LULUCF activities under Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol. Annex 1 Parties may count them toward compliance with their emissions target. Each RMU is equal to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent gases. Note: These are units derived from Annex 1 Party’s emissions target under the Kyoto Protocol. They may be counted by Annex 1 Parties toward compliance with their emissions target and are equal to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent gases. AAUs, RMUs, ERUs, and CERs are Kyoto units

Additional Flexibility Mechanisms In this section, we highlight the possibility for firms to achieve their abatement targets not only by intertemporal emissions trading but also by getting credits from projects (Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation, Domestic Offset). Firms may also take advantage of other tradable permits markets options designed to stabilize prices, such as a safety valve or minimumprice auctioning. Table 2 provides a useful glossary of Kyoto units.

Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation

Projects provide more flexibility to operators to fulfill their obligations and increase market liquidity. The use of credits generated by projects, additionally to the number of allowances distributed, may reduce EUA prices even in the presence of high transaction costs for early projects. It also enlarges the range of abatement opportunities for firms and may lower the compliance costs if it is cheaper to invest in JI or CDM projects than trading. But this hypothesis crucially depends on the relative price of credits, the possibility to access project credits at a lower cost than through trading on the market, and the size of the firm (due to informational and administrative requirements). If banking allows to reduce uncertainty on the delivery of CDM or JI projects, those two instruments may be complementary. From the viewpoint of economic rationality, carbon assets delivered by projects (be it AAUs, EUAs, CERs, or ERUs) should be fungible. This question implies creating gateways between different frameworks. As the second period of the EU ETS coincides with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, every transaction of EUA is simultaneously backed by a transfer of AAU between the registries of the different countries concerned. The Linking Directive recognizes JI/CDM credits as equivalent to EU ETS allowances. To maintain a single currency within the EU ETS, the participant delivers project credit to the national authority and gets issued an allowance in exchange for it. Since credits from the CDM projects can be used for compliance during both phases of the EU ETS,26 they should cap the price of 2008 allowances and provide a better long-term price signal than

Page 13 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

the price of 2005–2007 allowances to guide decisions as to which emission reduction measures are cost-effective during 2005–2007. No JI credits are available before 2008. In this context of interlinked schemes at the regional and international levels, the price stabilization properties of banking and borrowing may prove to be useful to convey a unique carbon price. Next, let us discuss innovative schemes at the domestic level.

Domestic Offset Projects

According to Egenhofer and Fujiwara (2007), “domestic offset projects (DOPs) mirror the concept of project mechanisms articulated in the Kyoto Protocol, but are used within the home country to reduce emissions in the non trading sectors.” Those voluntary agreements may incentivize low cost reductions in non-ETS sectors that were not identified previously due to the diffuse nature of polluters, provided the reductions are additional. In return, installations get credits in their respective carbon market. To overcome the potential complexities of administrative requirements for small units and to keep transaction costs at low levels, there is a need for pilot schemes with simplified rules for additionality, baselines, and discounting and that allow pooling. Some examples may already be found in New Zealand, New South Wales (NSW 2006), and proposals have emerged in Canada (Bramley 2003) and in the USA at the regional level.27 An experimental scheme is currently being implemented in France by the CDC Climat. Eligible projects have a concentration on waste, renewable energies, agriculture, and forestry but also concern the sectors of transport and energy efficiency. Within the JI framework, the CDC Climat selects for each project a foreign partner and will buy at a predetermined price ERUs that will be granted by the French government. The upper limit is set to five million ton equivalent CO2 between 2008 and 2012. Those emission reduction projects will impact the Kyoto target by an equivalent reduction in the national inventory. Such an innovative scheme is designed to foster the discovery of new low-cost emission reduction sources at the national level. However, its development may be hampered by the EUA price volatility that we commented above. That is why we recommend the adoption of a clear EU-wide institutional framework where a careful use of banking and borrowing may contribute to dampen allowance price fluctuations. Next, we discuss another flexibility mechanism to limit price volatility called a safety valve.

Safety Valve

Some propositions to cope with the EUA price volatility deal with the inclusion of a “safety valve” in the EU ETS. A safety valve is a hybrid instrument to limit the cost of capping emissions at some target level whereby the regulator offers to sell permits in whatever quantity at a predetermined price. If prices are greater than expected, the marginal cost of abatement would be limited to the safety valve price. The regulator tries to set the emissions cap at a level where the expected marginal cost of meeting the constraint will match the beliefs about marginal benefits. To avoid being too far away on the highcost side, the regulator includes a provision to sell emissions permits at some price near that expected cost level.

26

As soon as they are connected by the International Transaction Log See for instance the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative at http://www.rggi.org/ and a review of regional initiatives by Roy (2007).

27

Page 14 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Jacoby and Ellerman (2004) report this idea emerged out of discussions in the USA around the costs related to the Kyoto Protocol as a way of raising the likelihood of Protocol’s ratification by blunting criticism that the cost of meeting the Kyoto targets would be too high. The best example to date of a system that would have required a safety valve is the RECLAIM Program in California.28 The inclusion of a safety valve to a tradable permits market is not new, despite strong criticisms about this instrument: • If the safety valve price is too high, it will have no effect. • If the safety valve is too low, the quantity constraint is not binding anymore and may be associated with a permanent tax. • There is a potential loss of “environmental integrity,” i.e., a fear of relaxing toward target reduction instead of supporting economically efficient implementation. These negative effects lead us to be skeptical about the inclusion of a safety valve as a policy recommendation for the EU ETS. Finally, we discuss another flexibility mechanism linked to the allocation process.

Minimum-Price Auctioning To improve the stability of EUA pricing during 2005–2012 (before the shift to auctioning), the National Allocation Plans may have included a provision to allocate permits not only by grandfathering, whose “updating” effects based on past emissions may be detrimental to the efficiency of the scheme, but also by auctioning. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with auctioning mechanisms in detail, it is worth emphasizing the benefits of a specific technique called “minimum-price auction” whereby governments could fix a minimum bid level that would serve as a price floor. Such an allocation process requires a certain degree of coordination between member states on basic auction rules, while the Commission supervises its enforcement as for each NAP. This device guarantees that prices will not drop below a predetermined level and helps restoring confidence in the efficiency of the EU ETS for market participants. But it needs to be configured in accordance to the quantitative limit on projects that might enter the EU ETS for instance. In this section, we stressed that the banking and borrowing mechanisms should not be seen in isolation of other flexibility mechanisms that firms could use to achieve compliance at a lower cost. Those include mainly projects (JI, CDM, DOP), whose efficiency may be increased by a careful use of banking and borrowing. We discard the use of a safety valve as a useful flexibility mechanism, but we recommend political savvy in auctioning permits using a minimum price.

28

According to Harrison (2003), this multisource program regulating SO2 and NOx emissions had overlapping control cycles and trading between control groups, so de facto 6-month banking and borrowing. But the temporal flexibility was not enough for such a limited geographic scope, and as unusual weather conditions and lack of new capacity placed high demand on existing units, the permit price rose from $5,000 to $90,000 per ton, i.e., multiplied by 18. The disconnection of electricity and environmental markets associated with other program design failures led the State to eventually take over and provide adequate electricity supply. At the same time, prices of future vintages (borrowing) revealed the shortterm nature of the crisis and recognized that it was an unusual case. This experience raises the question of adding several sectors in the same permit market like the EU ETS: wouldn’t it be preferable to have different prices for different markets? Page 15 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Conclusion This chapter summarizes the main functioning principles of tradable permits markets for use in environmental regulation along two dimensions: initial allocation and intertemporal trading. Among the international emissions trading schemes, we may cite the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS. From a political economy perspective, this chapter highlights the difficulties encountered by the European Commission during the validation of the EU ETS Second National Allocation Plans where each national regulator needs to arbitrate between various interests at stakes and reveals the necessary compromise that needs to be found between various conceptions on the role of environmental regulation. The negotiation process of each NAP at the member state level is typically an example of a manipulable rule whereby industries may conduct lobbying activities to extract more permits as a monopoly rent. With reference to the debate “rules versus discretion” in monetary economics, this unhealthy lobbying by major industries calls for further research to ascertain the conditions under which it would be optimal to delegate the determination of the cap and the distribution of permits to an independent agency (Helm et al. 2003). Regarding intertemporal flexibility, the theoretical studies agreed on the fact that when it is effective, banking and borrowing allow a reduction of climate policies costs. The incentive to bank emerges more especially with more stringent future environmental targets. Our review of the main theoretical results on the use of banking and borrowing for tradable permits markets provides a balanced picture of the pros and the cons of this instrument: while banking provides incentives for early compliance, unrestricted borrowing may aggravate the environmental harm by a concentration of the emissions stream over specific periods. Combined with generous and free permits endowments, this situation confirms the view that the EU ETS is only “warming up” in its first phase at the expense of suboptimal abatement choices. The regulator could adopt an intertemporal trading ratio specific to borrowing as discussed by Kling and Rubin (1997), allowing for a better grasp of the possibilities offered by intertemporal emissions trading. Indeed, a greater reliance on banking and limited borrowing (i.e., with a specific discounting factor) should be promoted to allow firms to smooth their emissions and take investment decisions in abatement technologies with a better capacity to react to the evolution of the carbon constraint over time.

References Alberola E, Chevallier J (2009) European carbon prices and banking restrictions: evidence from phase I (2005–2007). Energy J 30(3):51–80 Baron R (1999) Market Power and Market Access in International GHG Emission Trading, IEA information paper. International Energy Agency, Energy and Environment Division, Paris Bernard A, Paltsev S, Reilly JM, Vielle M, Viguier L (2003) Russia’s role in the Kyoto protocol. MIT Joint Program on the Science of Policy and Global Change, WP98, Boston, MA Bohringer C, Moslener U, Sturm B (2006) Hot air for sale: a quantitative assessment of Russia’s near term climate policy options. Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg and Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim Bramley M (2003) Doing their bit: ensuring large industrial emitters contribute adequately to Canada’s implementation of the Kyoto protocol. The Pembina Institute, Canada, Ottawa Page 16 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Buchner BK, Ellerman AD (2008) Over-allocation or abatement? A preliminary analysis of the EU ETS based on the 2005–06 emissions data. Environ Res Econ 41(2):267–287 Burniaux JM (1999) How important is market power in achieving Kyoto?: an assessment based on the GREEN model, OECD workshop on the economic modelling of climate change, WP13. OECD, Paris Cason TN, Gangadharan L (2006) Emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking. J Econ Behav Organ 61(2):199–216 Chevallier J (2012) Banking and borrowing in the EU ETS: a review of economic modelling, current provisions and prospects for future design. J Econ Surv 26(1):157–176 Egenhofer C, Fujiwara N (2007) Shaping the global arena: preparing the EU emissions trading scheme for the post-2012 period. Centre for European Policy Studies Task Force Reports, Brussels Ehrhart KM, Hoppe C, Schleich J, Seifert S (2005) The role of auctions and forward markets in the EU ETS: counterbalancing the cost-inefficiencies of combining generous allocation with a ban on banking. Clim Policy 5:31–46 Ellerman AD, Montero JP (2007) The efficiency and robustness of allowance banking in the U.S. acid rain program. Energy J 28(4):47–72 Ellerman AD, Parsons J (2006) Shortage, inter-period pricing, and banking. In: Tendances carbone, vol 5. CDC Climat, Paris Ellerman AD, Joskow PL, Schmalensee R, Montero JP, Bailey E (2000) Markets for clean air: the US acid rain program, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Ellerman AD, Buchner BK, Carraro C (2008) Allocation in the European emissions trading scheme: rights, rents and fairness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Godby RW, Mestelman S, Muller RA, Welland JD (2000) Emissions trading with shares and coupons when control of discharges is uncertain. J Environ Econ Manag 32:359–381 Guesnerie R (2006) The design of post-Kyoto climate schemes: an introductory analytical assessment. Working paper PSE number 2006–11, Paris School of Economics, Paris Hahn RW (1984) Market power and transferable property rights. Q J Econ 99:753–765 Haites E (2006) Allowance banking in emissions trading schemes: theory and practice. Margaree Consultants, Toronto Harrison D (2003) Ex post evaluation of the RECLAIM emissions trading program for the Los Angeles air basin. OECD workshop on ex post evaluation of tradable permits: methodological and policy issues, Paris Helm D, Hepburn C, Mash R (2003) Credible carbon policy. Oxf Rev Econ Policy 19(3):438–450 Holtsmark B (2003) Russian behaviour in the market for permits under the Kyoto protocol. Clim Policy 3:399–415 Jacoby HD, Ellerman AD (2004) The safety valve and climate policy. Energy Policy 32:481–491 Klepper G, Peterson S (2005) Trading hot air. The influence of permit allocation rules, market power and the US withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol. Environ Res Econ 32:205–227 Kling C, Rubin J (1997) Bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution. J Public Econ 64:101–115 Kolstad CD (2005) Piercing the veil of uncertainty in transboundary pollution agreements. Environ Res Econ 31:21–34 Kruger J, Oates WE, Pizer WA (2007) Decentralization in the EU emissions trading scheme and lessons for global policy. Resources for the future discussion paper 07-02, Washington, DC Kyle AS (1985) Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53:1315–1335

Page 17 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_1-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Lecocq F, Capoor K (2005) State and trends of the carbon market. World Bank and International Emissions Trading Association, Washington, DC Leiby P, Rubin J (2001) Intertemporal permit trading for the control of greenhouse gas emissions. Environ Res Econ 19:229–256 Maeda A (2003) The emergence of market power in emission rights markets: the role of initial permit distribution. J Regul Econ 24(3):293–314 Maeda A (2004) Impact of banking and forward contracts on tradable permit markets. Environ Econ Policy Stud 6(2):81–102 Mansanet-Bataller M, Pardo A, Valor E (2007) CO2 prices, energy and weather. Energy J 28(3):67–86 Muller B (2002) Equity in climate change: the great divide, Working paper number EV31. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, UK Newell R, Pizer W, Zhang J (2005) Managing permit markets to stabilize prices. Environ Res Econ 31:133–157 NSW (2006) Greenhouse gas abatement scheme (GGAS), New Zealand. Available at http://www. greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au Petrakis E, Sartzetakis ES, Xepapadeas A (1999) Environmental regulation and market power: competition, time consistency and international trade. Edward Elgar, London Roy M (2007) US climate policy: where to from here? Conference on cap and trade: design and implementation, University of California, Berkeley Rubin J (1996) A model of intertemporal emission trading, banking, and borrowing. J Environ Econ Manag 31:269–286 Schennach SM (2000) The economics of pollution permit banking in the context of title IV of the 1990 clean air act amendments. J Environ Econ Manag 40:189–210 Schleich J, Ehrhart KM, Hoppe C, Hoppe C, Seifert S (2006) Banning banking in EU emissions trading? Energy Policy 34:112–120 Seifert J, Uhrig-Homburg M, Wagner M (2008) Dynamic behavior of CO2 spot prices. J Environ Econ Manag 56(2):180–194 Sijm JPM, Bakker SJA, Chen Y, Harmsen HW, Lise W (2005) CO2 price dynamics: the implications of EU emissions trading for the price of electricity. Working paper ECN-C-05-061, the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore Stavins RN (1998) What can we learn from the grand policy experiment? Lessons from SO2 allowance trading. J Econ Perspect 12(3):69–88 UNFCCC (2000) Procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto protocol: note by the co-Chairmen of the Joint Working Group on Compliance, Bonn

Page 18 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Climate Change: Safeguarding Indigenous Peoples Through “Land-Sensitive” Adaptation Policy in Africa Ademola Oluborode Jegede* Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa

Abstract While, generally, climate change affects Africa negatively, indigenous peoples will suffer more, considering their lifestyle which is intricately attached to land. On three grounds, this chapter argues the importance of safeguarding indigenous peoples through “land-sensitive” adaptation policy at the national level in Africa. First, this is based on the evidence of existing forms of “land-sensitive” adaptation practices among indigenous peoples in the face of climate variability over time in Africa. Second, the current emerging range of climatic variation in Africa, however, challenges these “landsensitive” adaptation practices of indigenous peoples. Finally, although international climate adaptation policy requires the protection of indigenous peoples in its processes, states in Africa hardly comply with this prescription while engaging with these processes at the domestic level. The chapter concludes by suggesting what a “land-sensitive” adaptation policy at national level should embody for indigenous peoples in Africa.

Keywords Africa; Climate change; Adaptation policy; Adaptation practices; Indigenous peoples’ land use and tenure

Introduction The contributions of Working Group 1 to the Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990 (Watson et al. 1990), 1995 (Houghton et al. 1995), 2001 (Baede et al. 2001), 2007 (Le Treut et al. 2007), and 2013 (Stocker et al. 2013) have overwhelmingly explained the scientific and factual basis of climate change. According to these contributions, human activities are substantially increasing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, thus enhancing greenhouse effect, which has in turn led to increased warming of the earth’s surface resulting in climate change (Le Treut et al. 2007; Baede et al. 2001; Houghton et al. 1995; Watson et al. 1990). With an economy largely agrarian and limited adaptation capacity, populations in Africa are and will be seriously affected by climate change (Toulmin 2009; Wold et al. 2009, pp. 1–47; Collier et al. 2008, p. 337; Boko et al. 2007). Although, there is no Africa-wide climate homogenous effect (Collier et al. 2008, p. 338), in general terms, climate change’s negative impacts for Africa, actual and projected, is expected on areas such as water resources, food security, natural resource

*Email: [email protected] *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

management and biodiversity, human health, settlements and infrastructure, and desertification (Toulmin 2009, pp. 15–87; Boko et al. 2007, pp. 10.2–10.6). Even though indigenous peoples have contributed least to climate change, according to the United Nations Development Group’s Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues (UNGGIPI 2008, p. 8), “they are the first to face its impact.” Indeed, indigenous peoples will be disproportionately affected by climate change (Crippa 2013, p. 124; UNHRC 2009 Resolution 10/4; Salick and Byg 2007, p. 4; Stern 2006, p. 95). Through a review of literature, using a descriptive and analytical approach, this chapter contends that safeguarding indigenous peoples through “land-sensitive” adaptation policy is important at the national level in Africa for three reasons. First, there are existing forms of “landsensitive” adaptation practices among indigenous peoples in Africa based on their experience of climate variability. Second, given the emerging range of climatic variation in Africa, these “landsensitive” adaptation practices of indigenous peoples are under threat. Finally, despite the requirement in international climate adaptation policy for the protection of indigenous peoples in its processes, states in Africa do not specifically attend to the adaptive concerns and practices of indigenous peoples while engaging with international adaptation policy requirement.

Understanding Terms: “Indigenous Peoples” in Africa, “Land- Sensitivity,” and “Adaptation” In the interest of clarity, there are key terms which are employed in this chapter that merit brief explanation. It is the foregoing worldview about land that supports several forms of adaptive practices among indigenous peoples in different parts of Africa in the face of adverse impacts of climate change over time. While these adaptive practices vary, a common trend is that these practices portray indigenous peoples’ resilient adjustment to the use of land, despite the harsh reality of climate change. This pattern of adjustment, as it is illustrated in the next section, cuts across different scenarios of climate impacts including prediction of weather, water scarcity, drought, land degradation, and food insecurity.

Prediction of Weather Indigenous peoples in Africa have devised diverse means of predicting the weather. Environmental conditions, such as rainfall, thunderstorms, windstorms, and dusty winds, have been reportedly used by indigenous peoples in preparing for future use of land and weather forecast in West Africa (Ajani et al. 2013; Ajibade and Shokemi 2003). More particularly, the Maasai in the eastern part of Africa do predict droughts by observing the movement of celestial bodies and combining such with watching the development of certain plants. This has been reported as useful in serving as an early warning signal of an approaching environmental disaster as well as an early indication of “the condition of the range of land and its likely changes” (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013a). Other forecasting approaches, according to Roncoli et al. (2001), include the timing of fruiting by certain local trees, the water level in streams and ponds, the nesting behavior of small quail-like birds, and the insect behavior in rubbish heaps outside compound walls. The foregoing has adaptive utility. Outcome of weather prediction enables indigenous peoples in Kenya to understand storm routes and wind patterns and, hence, to design local disaster management practices in advance. This is achieved by constructing appropriate shelters, windbreak structures, walls, and homestead fences (UNU-IAS-TKI 2009, p. 55). Also, as a result of prediction of weather, indigenous peoples are able to plan daily economic life and social activities with foresight. This Page 2 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

possibility further results in adaptive strategy such as planting appropriate crops that suit a particular season (UNU-IAS-TKI 2009, p. 55). Generally in East Africa, knowledge about weather condition enables the pastoral Maasai to prepare for drought and make decisions about where to graze and which grasses recover faster than others (UNU-IAS-TKI 2009, p. 55).

Water Scarcity Coping Approach A range of adaptive measures is also being taken by indigenous peoples in conditions of scarcity of water. The Maasai accurately assess the water-holding capacity of distant pastures to plan transhumance activities. Generally, pastoral communities living in the water-deficient areas engage in rainwater harvesting which is conserved for all their needs. Other approaches include the construction of “sand dams” which slows down flash floods and holds the water in the sand of the riverbed (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013b). Shallow wells may also be provided with sanitary seals to protect them from contamination and unnecessary siltation after floods. This, in essence, helps in reducing the caving in of wells during the floods thus making water available for a longer period and reducing human stress (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013b).

Drought and Land Degradation Management Skills Among the Tuaregs in North Africa as well as in the south of the Sahara, adaptive practices of coping with drought and land degradation have been documented. “Fixation sites” are constructed since 1990 to assist in coping with spread of desertification (Woodke 2007, pp. 10–11; Harris 2007). Also, during drought periods, the pastoralists in this region change from cattle to sheep and goat husbandry (Seo and Mendelsohn 2006) or move from the dry northern areas to the wetter southern areas of the Sahel (McLean 2010, p. 60). Additionally, the Sukuma people of the north of Tanzania engage in soil conservation through which animal fodders are prepared and made available to very young, old, or sick animals unable to follow other animals to grazing lands. The process encourages the conservation of grazing and fodder lands by encouraging vegetation regeneration and tree planting (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013c).

Food Preservation To cope with loss of crops and food insecurity, fodder is of huge importance to nomadic people whose livestock is often the only source of income. Among the Tuaregs, there is evidence of enclosures designed to protect and safeguard pastures (Woodke 2007). Preservation of items such as fruits, vegetables, and edible insects is demonstrated in two ways: for vegetables, it is usually to immerse the fresh vegetables in salty boiling water and spread for drying after boiling for a few minutes to avoid loss of nutrient, and for drying caterpillars, termites, white ants, and other edible insects, this may be directly spread in the sun (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013d). The practice of sun drying among indigenous peoples is a coping mechanism found in several states in Africa including Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Tanzania, Senegal, and Democratic Republic of the Congo (FAO 1985). Notwithstanding these existing forms of adaptation among indigenous peoples, the “landsensitive” adaptation practices of indigenous peoples in Africa are threatened by a new emerging range of climatic variations requiring urgent policy attention by states in Africa.

Page 3 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Increasing Climate Variation as a Threat Climate variation is increasing with peculiar adverse impacts on indigenous peoples’ land in different regions of Africa (IPACC 2012; IWGIA 2011; Mclean 2010; Tebtebba 2010). This arguably threatens the existing adaptive capacity of indigenous peoples in Africa. Although the experiences of indigenous peoples throughout Africa are not the same, they share common experience of vulnerability to climate change, notwithstanding adaptive practices. According to the ACHPR and IWGIA (2005, p. 18), among indigenous peoples in West Africa are the Baka, Mbororo, and Tuareg. In the territories of these groups, there is reported evidence that the consequence of climate change is typified by destruction of grazing lands, drought, reduced access to safe water, and destruction of plants and animals (IPACC 2012; Mclean 2010, p. 42; Woodke 2007, pp. 10–11). In East Africa, there are several indigenous peoples’ groups, among which are the Maasai, Ogiek, Endorois, and Yaaku in Kenya (CHARAPA et al. 2012, pp. 29–39; Tebtebba Foundation 2010, p. 440). These peoples experience several negative conditions as a result of a changing climate, including land degradation, drought, flood, famine, and displacement (UNFCCC 2013; CHARAPA et al. 2012, pp. 35–37; IWGIA 2011, p. 410). The Batwas in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), also known as Baka in Central African Republic (CAR) and Gabon, Baka, and Bagyeli in Cameroon, are in the Central Africa and Great Lakes region (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 16). The recent experiences of these peoples include a lengthy dry season and unpredictable weather conditions, which are affecting the agricultural calendar and bringing scarcity of forest products such as fruits and tubers, thereby disturbing their cultural lifestyle (Baka People Video 2013; Tebtebba 2010, p. 481; Mclean 2010, p. 44; CWE 2009, p. 2). More frequently, to the Mbororo and other pastoralists in the same region, transhumance calendars are being altered from January to late October due to a shift in the start of the dry season (Tebtebba 2010, p. 481; Mclean 2010, p. 44). In the north of Africa are indigenous peoples known as the Amazigh (or Imazighen), also referred to as the Berbers or Tuaregs (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, pp. 18–19). Evidence of climate impacts on their land includes scarcity of water, degradation, desertification, overgrazing, and salinization, in a changing climate (McLean 2010, p. 42; IISD 2001). In the southern part of Africa, the San, or Basarwa, peoples of the Kalahari (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17) face increasing dune expansion and increased wind speeds which have resulted in a loss of vegetation and negatively impacted traditional cattle and goat farming practices (UNPFII 2008). In the Horn of Africa, the Doko, Ezo, Zozo, and Daro Malo in the Gamo Highlands experience increasing pressures on local resources and great hardship through increase in temperature, scarcity of water, dying animals, and fewer grazing land (Gamo Video Report 2013). The “Outsa” leaf which is used for shelter, animal grazing, and food and hence crucial to the survival of these peoples is fast disappearing (Gamo Video Report 2013). The situation is not different with the Afar people to the northeast of Ethiopia. Living in an extremely fragile environment worsened by climate change, the Afar suffer damage of flash flooding, change in river courses, increased desertification, herd loss, hunger, thirst, and famine (Gardo 2008). In sum, across Africa, the foregoing emerging and increasing impacts of climate change are overwhelming and beyond the capability of existing adaptive measures being used by indigenous peoples in the face of droughts, flooding, famine, and loss of grazing land and livestock. This is largely because increasing variations of climate impact disrupt the land use and result into displacement of indigenous peoples from the land which is crucial to their adaptive practices. Generally, land degradation reduces the availability of ecosystem goods to these populations for adaptation purposes (Nkem et al. 2010; Tobey et al. 2010). More specifically, insecurity of land Page 4 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

tenure and use has been found to constrain adaptation practices among indigenous peoples in states including Mali (Ebi et al. 2011) and Uganda (Hisali et al. 2011) and generally in the Congo Basin region (Nkem et al. 2010). Even where partial communal tenure is recognized as in Kenya, Namibia, and DRC, discrimination against traditional land use and livelihood strategies, logging concessions, commercial farms, and large-scale development projects (dams, oil exploitation, floriculture) are major constraint to local adaptation practices (CHARAPA et al. 2012, p. 87). Insecurity of land tenure and use and the resultant changing livelihood are a driver of declining traditional relationship with the land, a major source of adaptation information and knowledge (Pearce et al. 2011, 16.3.2.1; CHARAPA et al. 2012, p. 88). Besides, the emerging range of climate variation requires long-term adaptation strategies, which the existing adaptive practices of indigenous peoples cannot achieve on their own without nontraditional technology and resources as complements (CHARAPA et al. 2012, p. 87). The nontraditional measures refer to the transfer of modern technology and resources that most indigenous peoples do not possess. The need for technology and resources cannot be overemphasized considering that indigenous populations live in remote places of a country, characterized by poor infrastructure, limited basic services, and poor government presence (Macchi et al. 2008, pp. 49–50). Technology can help in complementing or improving existing adaptive strategies linked with their land in coping with increasing impacts of climate change resulting from the emerging range of climate variation (Fleischer et al. 2011). Also, availability of funds is a good resource that may improve traditional or indigenous adaptation practices (Peters et al. 2013, p. 16.6; Nakhooda et al. 2011, p. 7). Yet, while the existing climate variability challenges the adaptive capacities of indigenous peoples, the approach by states in Africa to this reality does not show an effective implementation of international processes for adaptation measures in such manner that addresses the adaptive challenges of indigenous peoples.

Weak States’ Role in Engaging Adaptive Processes Although the pillar instruments of climate change at the international level, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and a range of decisions by the Conference of the Parties (COP) and Meeting of the Parties (MOP) under the Kyoto Protocol, require states to follow certain processes in responding to adaptation concerns, indigenous peoples’ adaptive concerns and capacities are hardly specifically addressed in the framing of adaptive challenges by states in Africa.

International Climate Change Adaptation Processes The pillar instruments of the climate change, the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and a range of decisions by the COP under the UNFCCC and the MOP under the Kyoto Protocol, set out the standard processes for international adaptation measures. Article 4 (1) (b) of the UNFCCC enjoins all parties to “formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national. . .programmes containing measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change. . ..” Also, article 4 (1) (e) requires parties to the UNFCCC to cooperate “in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change” as well as plan for “coastal zone management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and Page 5 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

desertification, as well as floods.” Under the Kyoto Protocol, it is similarly evident that the national level has the directing policy role to play in documenting and implementing adaptation measures. Article 10 (b) (ii) of the Kyoto Protocol enjoins parties to “include in their national communications as appropriate, information on programmes which contain measures. . .” which may be helpful in “addressing climate change and its adverse impacts, including. . .adaptation measures.” In the decisions of the COP or the MOP under the Kyoto Protocol, there is equally a requirement on the state government for the facilitation of adaptation process. This began to feature prominently since the COP 7 held in 2001, which acknowledged the specific needs and concerns of developing countries, including the least developing countries (LDC), and emphasized the unique role of states in addressing adaptation issues. It insisted that adaptation actions should follow a review process based on national communications and/or other relevant information (Decision 5/CP.7/2001, p. 2). It was equally stressed that support be given to the states in the preparation of the national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs) (Decision 5/CP.7/2001, p. 15). Furthermore, the decision acknowledges the importance of indigenous resources and urges parties to take these resources into consideration as part of options for addressing the impacts of climate change (Decision 5/CP.72002, p. 24). It also formulates guidelines to facilitate preparation for NAPA (Decision 28/CP.7/2001). The NAPA guidelines in its paragraphs 6 (a) and (c) affirm that it will be “action oriented.” Paragraph 7 (f) of the NAPA guidelines reiterates that it is “a country-driven approach.” While no specific mention is made of indigenous peoples, in paragraph 7 (a), it is pointed out that NAPA is “a participatory process involving stakeholders, particularly local communities,” while paragraph 7 (j) assures that the process will ensure “flexibility of procedures based on individual country circumstances.” The use of the term “local populations” arguably involves the indigenous peoples particularly when it is read together with paragraphs 16 (a), (f), and (h) which, respectively, require “loss of life and livelihood,” “cultural heritage,” and “land use management and forestry” as part of the criteria for prioritizing adaptation activities at the national level. These required items are core issues to the adaptive practices of indigenous peoples in Africa. Guidelines in relation to national adaptation plan of action were subsequently endorsed at COP 8 (Decision 9/CP.8/2002, p. 1), COP 9 (Decision 8/CP.9/2003, p. 1), and COP 10 (Decision 1/CP.10/2004, p. 4), for the developing countries in the LDC and non-LDC to document their adaptive concerns and need for funds. Furthermore, the COP 12 in Nairobi indicates that activities to be funded under climate funds may consider national communications or national adaptation programs of action and other relevant information from the applicant party (Decision 1/CP.12/2006). At COP 13 held at Bali, an “enhanced action on adaptation” was conceived as consisting of elements including international cooperation in order to support developing states in their vulnerability assessment and integration of actions into “national planning, specific projects and programmes” (Decision 1/CP.13/2007). This was also reinforced at the Cancun meeting of COP 16 (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, pp. 11–14) which highlighted the human rights implications for adverse impacts of climate change and the need to engage with stakeholders including indigenous peoples when developing and implementing their national action plans (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 12). At a subsequent meeting in Durban, parties were urged to include in their national communications and other channels the steps they have taken in actualizing NAPA (Decision 5/CP.17/2011, p. 33), as well as indigenous and traditional knowledge and practices in adaptation strategies (Decision 6/CP.172011, p. 4). These requirements are also evident in the key decisions dealing with the access of the state to adaptation funds (Decision 28/CP.7/2001, p. 4; Decision 8/CP.5/1999). Different categories of funds in relation to adaptation are mainly the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) established at COP 7, respectively, Page 6 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

under Decisions 5/CP.7/2001 (p. 12) and 7/CP.7/2001 (p. 6) and Decision 7/CP.7/2001 (p. 2). Adaptation Fund (AF) was established pursuant to article 12 (8) of the Kyoto Protocol at COP 7 (Decision 10/CP.7/2001, p. 1), while a Green Climate Fund (GCF) was established pursuant to article 11 of the UNFCCC at COP16 held at Cancun (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 102). The funds under the LDCF and SCCF are voluntary contributions from developed country parties to the UNFCCC (Muyungi 2013; O’Sullivan et al. 2011, p. 15) and managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) (Decision 7/CP.7/2001, p. 6). The GCF is managed by the GCF Board (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 103), while the AF is managed by the Adaptation Fund Board (Decision 1/CMP.3/ 2007, p. 3). All of these funds, namely, AF (Decision 1/CMP.4/2008, p. 11), GCF (Decision 3/CP.17/ 2011, p. 31), LDCF, and SCCF (Xing and Fröde 2012; Bird et al. 2011), support direct access. The guidelines relating to the operationalization of these decisions at the national level emphasize the need to safeguard indigenous peoples’ adaptive concerns and experiences in national adaptation programs. For instance, GEF Principles and Guidelines for Engagement with Indigenous Peoples set out a minimum standard relating to indigenous peoples which is expected to be complied with by partner agencies seeking to implement projects under GEF auspices in response to NAPA proposal (GEF 2012, pp. 22–29). Also the negotiation around the GCF indicates that the participation of indigenous peoples from “the local to the national to the Board level” and inclusion of their knowledge are critical to the implementation of the GCF (Martone and Rubis 2012). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the effectiveness of the approach by states in Africa in engaging with these international adaptation processes to strengthen indigenous peoples’ adaptive practices and concerns is doubtful.

Weak Approach by States In order to comply with the requirement for adaptation funds, each of the 33 African states belonging to LDC has filed a NAPA (UNFCCC 2013b), while the developing states in Africa which are non-LDC have at least filed a national communication. The ensuing subsection demonstrates that the concerns of indigenous peoples in relation to their adaptive experiences are obscured in the official processes for capturing adaptation needs and funds. This is achieved by examining processes from Uganda, Tanzania, and Nigeria. Uganda The Uganda National Adaptation Programmes of Action (Uganda NAPA) was compiled in 2007. The formulation of Uganda’s NAPA claims to have been guided by the principle of participatory approach and benefited from the views of the vulnerable communities and their knowledge on coping mechanisms (Uganda NAPA 2007, VII). It describes the impacts of climate change on sample districts as destruction of infrastructure, deforestation, loss of lives, famine, poverty, water shortage and drying up, erratic seasons and rains, destruction of biodiversity, and epidemics of pests and diseases (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 27). It notes that indigenous knowledge has been employed by communities in Uganda to cope with climate events. As part of its adaptive strategies for funding, it suggests projects such as “Community Tree Growing Project” (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 51), “Land Degradation Management” (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 53), and “Indigenous Knowledge (IK) and Natural Resources Management Project” (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 63). In the document, however, impact scenarios of climate change in Uganda are discussed as though it is proportionately borne by all. It neither discloses the identity of the communities it identifies as “vulnerable” nor profiles as adaptation challenge the lack of protection of the land use and tenure of communities, such as the Batwas, who are indigenous and forest dependent in Uganda (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17). While it uses the word “indigenous” in describing “indigenous knowledge,” it Page 7 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

is used to refer to every citizen of Uganda. This is the logical inference that can be drawn when the term “indigenous” is examined in the sense that it is used in the Uganda 2005 Constitution. According to article 10 (a) of the constitution of Uganda, all the communities found in Uganda as on February 1, 1926, are indigenous. The NAPA employs the concept of “vulnerability” and “indigenous” in referring to all the communities in Uganda without paying attention to the peculiar situations or circumstances of specific groups such as the Batwas who are understood under international human rights law as “indigenous” in Uganda (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17). Tanzania There is a similar trend in the NAPA of Tanzania, which was submitted in 2007 (Tanzania NAPA). The document indicates the adaptation concerns in Tanzania as including “loss of human, natural, financial, social and physical capital, caused by the adverse impacts of climate change.” It also documents “severe droughts and floods, among many other disasters” (Tanzania NAPA 2007, VI). It is further mentioned in the NAPA that climate change is expected to further shrink the rangelands which are significant for livestock-keeping communities in Tanzania (Tanzania NAPA 2007, p. 7). While this may be argued as embodying some of the concerns of indigenous peoples in Tanzania such as the Maasai and Barabaig (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17), it is not certain. This is because it proposes as adaptation measures the inclusion of some activities such as relocation of people living in wildlife corridors, zero grazing, and development of alternative means of income for communities in tourist areas (Tanzania NAPA 2007, pp. 29–31). These activities will disrupt the culture and lead to the displacement of indigenous peoples such as the Maasai and Barabaig in Tanzania and hence threaten their land use and local adaptive practices. Nigeria Nigeria is a non-LDC state and has shown no interest yet in filing a NAPA as a non-LDC. It has, however, filed a national communication which devotes a substantial attention to issues of adaptation in the country. In the communication which is the first and only national communication it has so far lodged under the UNFCCC, peculiar consequences resulting from climate change, and which require adaptive measures, include soil erosion and flooding in the southeastern part of the country. The impacts of climate change on agriculture are assessed as including the effects of changes in temperature and rainfall on plants and animals as well as sea level rise on agricultural land (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 73). Livestock production also suffers due to a decrease in rainfall which has led to a decline of pastureland and water resources (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 75). Sea level rise is also cited as an event likely to lead to considerable losses in the oil investments and developments in the Niger Delta zone. General reference is made to “the people in the coastal areas” as being impacted by challenges such as flooding and erosion in the Niger Delta and leading to the emergence of “environmental refugees” (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 82). Nonetheless, the Nigeria’s national communication largely focuses on the environmental impacts of climate change, relying “heavily on. . .existing records and documentation in various forms including socio-economic statistics, photographs, satellite imageries, geologic and oceanographic data, biological and fisheries data. . .” (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 70). Generally, communities affected by these impacts are not mentioned nor are the pertinent issues such as land use, land tenure, and resource rights relating to these communities discussed. For instance, a decline in pastureland as a result of climate change will not only affect the production of livestock, but it will negatively impact the peoples such as the Mbororo whose lifestyle is traditionally connected to the use of land for cattle rearing. Also, the passing reference to the people living in Page 8 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

coastal areas as likely to experience flooding and erosion does not capture the larger problems which the peoples of this region, particularly the Ogoni, have for long faced and fought in terms of oil spillage, environmental protection, and compensation for environmental losses and land degradation on their land (Nzeadibe et al. 2011). It is difficult to anticipate that a national communication which fails to reflect key issues peculiar to these indigenous peoples will, even if allocated, apply adaptation funds for the purpose of supporting their adaptive practices and concerns. What emerges from the foregoing discussion are therefore the reasons why states in Africa neglect indigenous peoples’ concerns and land-based experiences in framing adaptation processes at national level. Basis for State’s Exclusion The approach by states of Africa in engaging adaptive processes in a way that strengthens adaptive practices and addresses the adaptive concerns of indigenous peoples is arguably shaped by two factors. These are the state-centered nature of the processes and the overriding claim to ownership of land and disposition to use same in accordance with its priority. State-Centered Process The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and indeed decisions of the COP and MOP, respectively, are state centered. In line with article 2 (1) (a) of the Vienna Convention which describes a treaty as an agreement concluded between states (UN 2005), the parties to the international negotiation of climate change instruments such as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are states and not community or group of people. Also, the Conference of the Parties (COP) which is the key decision-making body under the UNFCCC or the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol which makes the ultimate decisions in respect of climate change and response mechanisms is state based representing the interest of different negotiation blocs and states. The decisions of these bodies emphasize the “country-driven” nature of adaptation measures. For instance, the Cancun Agreement which serves as the basis for enhanced action on adaptation involving the developing country parties endorses this approach. It urges parties to strengthen and, in applicable circumstances, establish centers and networks to facilitate and enhance national and regional adaptation actions, in a manner that is country driven and with support from developed countries (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 30). This state-centered nature of adaptation processes also applies to funds relating to adaptation. For instance, the AF (Decision 1/CMP.4/2008, p. 11), GCF (Decision 3/CP.17/2011, p. 31), LDCF, and SCCF (Xing and Fröde 2012; Bird et al. 2011) support direct access to adaptation funds. By “direct access,” it is meant that these funds allow recipient countries to access financial resources, unlike the indirect access, where funding is channeled through a third-party implementing agency (Xing and Fröde 2012). However, this challenges the adaptation potentials of land use by the indigenous peoples in Africa. This is because the notion of direct access is understood in terms of the ownership of these funds by the state. This is clear, for instance, in the recommendations made by the African Development Bank (AfDB) on GCF where it employs the term “direct access” to fund largely as accessibility by national governments (AfDB 2012, p. 3). Also, according to the Operational Policies and Guidelines for Parties to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund (AF Guidelines 2013), projects may only be submitted and funds received directly by the national implementing entity (NIE) which may consist of government ministries and government cooperation agencies (AF Guidelines 2013, p. 27). The implication of state-centered focus of adaptation process is that it is coordinated by the states as has been shown and thus compromises ownership of process by indigenous peoples in Africa. Also, the lack of direct access to funds is that it undermines the utility of indigenous peoples’ Page 9 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

adaptive practices and may, as climate change worsens, compromise their opportunity to strengthen capacity. Yet, an arrangement enabling indigenous peoples a direct access to funds is not unknown to the operation of some financial institutions. For instance, models on direct access to funds for indigenous peoples exist under the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility (IPAF), a former World Bank Facility for Indigenous Peoples; and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) which has a Capacity Building Program for Forest-Dependent People, all of which are dedicated indigenous funds (Martone and Rubis 2012). National Legal Framework In addition to the above, in Africa, key legal and policy framework relating to land use and tenure of indigenous peoples generally vests ownership of land in the state. For instance, article 44 of the Uganda Land Act (1998), articles 1 and 2 of Nigeria Land Use Act (1990), article 3 of Zambia Lands Act (1995), and Tanzania Land Act (1999) vest in the state the power to own and use land in accordance with its priority. This is similarly the case with the Forest Act of states in Africa which assumes the forests as “common goods.” Accordingly, articles 3, 10, and 11 of the Forests Act of Zambia (1999), respectively, vest the ownership of every tree and its produce in the presidency, which enjoys the power to compulsorily acquire any land for the purpose of national forests and restricts the activities of peoples dependent on land such as fishing and hunting from compensation. Article 26 of the Tanzania Forest Act prohibits every action of indigenous peoples that can be regarded as of adaptation relevance such as grazing, hunting and fishing, and erection of any buildings or other structures except with the permission of the minister or a local authority. According to article 5 (1) of the Uganda’s National Forestry and Tree Planting Act (2003), the state at different levels of governance is empowered to hold the forests in trust for the common good of Uganda. Also, according to the National Forest Policy of Nigeria (2006, p. 68), the government is empowered to hold in trust the forest set aside as reserve lands. While there are few exceptions within the legal framework on state ownership and control of land, this is often rendered redundant in the face of overriding public interest. Hence, the general implication of this land and forest regime is that government can legally own and use land for different priorities other than the strengthening of adaptive practices of indigenous peoples. For instance, this enables the state to pursue interests such as large-scale agricultural plantations, mining and logging, construction of roads and dams, as well as conservation which are often at crosspurposes with indigenous peoples’ adaptive practices. In addition to land degradation, the consequence of these activities for indigenous peoples is displacement from the land or territories to which they are culturally attached. This can be buttressed by the presence and consequences of such projects on indigenous peoples’ land in Africa. Large-scale agricultural plantations in several states of Africa including Benin, Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Namibia, and Ethiopia do not only disrupt the land use of indigenous peoples but also compromise their tenure rights (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). In particular, according to Laltaika (2009), massive Jatropha plantations are a new threat to the survival and livelihood of the Maasai in Tanzania. Through concession to private or public business, including logging and mining companies, the land regime also allows mining and logging activities on indigenous peoples’ lands (Barume 2010, p. 70). In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, which is rich in crude oil, oil exploration on the land of indigenous peoples such as the Ogoni, Efik, and Ijaw (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 18) has occasioned environmental degradation resulting from activities including gas flaring and deforestation (Oruonye 2012). Kidd and Kenrick (2009, p. 21) found that the Exxon’s World Bank oil pipeline project backed by the government in Chad and

Page 10 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Cameroon which crossed Bagyéli land at least five times in the Bipindi area has severe impacts on these communities. These include their displacement and destruction of sacred sites and way of life. Roads and dam constructions have all played a part in the destruction of forests (rainforest deforestation), which are crucial to the shelter, survival, and livelihood of some indigenous peoples. In Namibia, the construction of dam at Epupa was considered environmentally and socially attractive but would displace 1,100 Himba and affect 5,000 occasional users of the grazing areas on the river bank, in addition to the loss of their cultural and religious sites (World Rainforest Movement 2013, p. 28). Conservation efforts in Central Africa have equally led to the dispossession and poverty of indigenous peoples such as the Batwas in that part of Africa. According to Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau (2006), the trend in this regard has been ongoing for long, taking place without due regard for consultation and compensation for forced removal. Essentially, this land regime allows the states in Africa to deflate their responsibilities toward indigenous peoples’ immediate adaptation concerns in the guise of accessing, using, and controlling land for public good. It is thus no surprise that, at international climate forum, indigenous peoples have made the claim for protection of land as key in climate change responses including adaptation. At Nakuru, Kenya, indigenous peoples, particularly of Africa, urge intergovernmental organizations, UN agencies, and international organizations and foundations to ensure that the principles of the UNDRIP are mainstreamed in the design and implementation of any program or project in their land (Nakuru Declaration 2009). At Anchorage, in addition to emphasizing the need for security of land of indigenous peoples as critical to climate programs, indigenous peoples call for adequate and direct funding to enable them to participate effectively in all projects or programs including adaptation (The Anchorage Declaration 2009, pp. 5–7). Also, the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC) in its closing statement before the 2012 SBSTA Working Group meeting calls for the strengthening of the adaptive strategies of indigenous peoples with appropriate policy framework which respect their rights to land and traditional practices (UNFCCC 2012).

Conclusions This chapter makes a case for the necessity for states to have in place adaptation policy in Africa. It bases this proposition on three premises. The first foundation is that there are existent adaptive practices of indigenous peoples which had been useful in coping with adverse range of climate conditions. These adaptive practices which are closely linked to the cultural relationship of indigenous peoples with their land include approaches in form of prediction of weather, water security, drought and land degradation management skills, and food preservation. The second premise is that indigenous peoples in Africa now face a new range of climatic variations beyond their coping adaptive capability. As the final basis of the argument, the chapter demonstrates that rather than addressing this situation, in engaging with international adaptation processes, states in Africa do not facilitate the profiling of indigenous peoples’ adaptive challenges and the development of their landrelated adaptive practices. Thus, the foregoing premises justify the necessity of formulating appropriate policy to safeguard indigenous peoples through “land-sensitive” adaptation policy in different states in Africa. Basic policy framework should include the recognition of indigenous peoples’ identity, land use, and land tenure as critical to adaptation approach. In line with UNDRIP principles of participation and benefit sharing and protection of land rights (UNDRIP 2007, art 26), it should reflect the vulnerability of indigenous peoples while engaging with international adaptation processes. Along similar line, it should include indigenous peoples in the framework for implementation of adaptation Page 11 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

policy, grant them direct access to funds and culturally acceptable technology, address climate threats to their land, and commit funds for successful design and/or implementation of programs and projects under NAPA and national communications. Adaptation policy measure at the national level should include the recognition of indigenous peoples’ traditional institution structure in accessing funds for the implementation of adaptation projects and secure their land access and tenure. All this is important, not only for the purpose of giving hope to indigenous peoples who may yet face a somber future of difficult climate variability but because it will help states in Africa in investing time and resources into where they are needed most.

References ACHPR, IWGIA (2005) Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of experts on indigenous populations and communities (Working group report) Adeloye AA, Okukpe KM (2011) Climate change and sustainable development: the case of animal agriculture. In: Egbewole WO, Etudaiye MA, Olatunji OA (eds) Climate change in Nigeria. University of Ilorin, Nigeria AF Guidelines (2013) Operational policies and guidelines for parties to access resources from the adaptation fund (As amended in Nov 2013) African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (African Charter) adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) African Development Bank (AfDB) (2012) Operationalising the green climate fund: enabling African access. AfBD Ajani EN, Mgbenka RN, Okeke MN (2013) Indigenous knowledge as a strategy for climate change adaptation among farmers in sub-Saharan Africa: implications for policy. Asian J Agric Ext Econ Sociol 2(1):23–40 Ajibade LT, Shokemi O (2003) Indigenous approaches to weather forecasting in Asa L.G.A., Kwara State, Nigeria. Indilinga Afr J Indig Knowl Syst 2:37–44 Anaya SJ (2000) Environmentalism, human rights and indigenous peoples: a tale of converging and diverging Interests. Buffalo Environ Law J 7:1–3 Anaya SJ (2010) The evolution of the concept of indigenous peoples and its contemporary dimensions. In: Dersso SA (ed) Perspectives on the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples in Africa. Pretoria University Law Press (PULP), South Africa Asiemat JK, Situmatt FDP (1994) Indigenous peoples and the environment: the case of the pastoral Maasai of Kenya. Colo J Int Environ Law Policy 5:149–171 AU, ACHPR (2007) Advisory opinion of the African Commission on human and peoples’ rights on the United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (advisory opinion) Baede APM et al (2001) Climate change: the scientific basis. In: Houghton JT et al (eds) Contribution of working group I to IPCC TAR. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Baka People Video- Baka People: facing changes in African forests. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=AgerTDO4r6M. Accessed 14 Oct 2013 Barume AK (2010) Land rights of indigenous peoples in Africa: with special focus on central, eastern, and southern Africa IWGIA, Copenhagen, Denmark Berkes F, Colding J, Folke C (2005) Rediscovery of traditional ecological knowledge as adaptive management. Ecol Appl 10(5):1251–1262 Bird N, Billett S, Cristina C (2011) Direct access to climate finance: experiences and lessons. UNDP discussion paper Page 12 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Bojosi KN (2010) The African Commission Working Group of Experts on the Rights of the Indigenous Communities/Populations: some reflections on its work so far. In: Dersso S (ed) Perspectives on the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples in Africa. Pretoria University Law Press, Pretoria, pp 95–137 Boko M et al (2007) Africa: climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. In: Parry LM et al (eds) Contribution of working group II to IPCC (AR4). Cambridge University, Cambridge Burket V, Davidson M (eds) (2012) Coastal impacts, adaptation, and vulnerabilities: a technical input to the 2013 national climate assessment. Island Press, Washington, DC Burney JA, Kennel CF, Victor DG (2013) Getting serious about the new realities of global climate change. Bull At Sci 69(4):52 Caney S (2009) Climate change and the duties of the advantaged. Crit Rev Int Soc Polit Philos 13:203–228 Cernea MM, Schmidt-Soltau K (2006) Poverty risks and national parks: policy issues in conservation and development. World Dev 34(10):1808–1830 CHARAPA et al (2012) Indigenous peoples and climate change in Africa: traditional knowledge and adaptation strategies (Draft Report). World Bank Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Chennells R (2003) The Khomani San of South Africa. Forest peoples. In: Nelson J, Hossack L (eds) Forest peoples programme. pp 269–289 Cohen AP (1993) Culture as identity: an anthropologist’s view. New Lit Hist 24(1):195–209 Collier P, Conway G, Venables T (2008) Climate change and Africa. Oxf Rev Econ Policy 24(2):337–353 Conversations with the Earth (CWE) (2009) Hub Newsletter Crippa LA (2013) REDD+: its potential to melt glacial resistance to recognise human rights and indigenous peoples’ rights at the World Bank. In: Abate RS, Kronk EA (eds) Climate change and indigenous peoples: the search for legal remedies. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Daes E-I (2011) Principal problems regarding indigenous land rights and recent endeavours to resolve them. In: Eide A et al (eds) Making peoples heard- essay on human rights in honour of Gudmundur Alfredsson. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden D’Amato A, Chopra SK (1991) Whales: their emerging right to life. Am J Int Law 85:21–62 Desmet E (2011) Indigenous rights entwined in nature conservation. Intersentia, Cambridge Doubleday NC (1989) Aboriginal subsistence whaling: the right of Inuit to hunt whales and implications for international environmental law. Denver J Int Law Policy 17(373):374 Durning AT (1992) Guardians of the land: indigenous peoples and the health of the earth. World watcher paper 112 Ebi KL et al (2011) Smallholders adaptation to climate change in Mali. Clim Change 108(3):423–436 FAO (1985) Expert consultation on planning the development of sun drying. http://maindb.unfccc. int/public/adaptation/adaptation_casestudy.pl?id_project=133%26id_hazard=%26id_impact= %26id_strategy=%26id_region=techniques in Africa Fleischer A, Mendelsohn R, Dinar A (2011) Bundling agricultural technologies to adapt to climate change. Technol Forecast Soc Chang 78(6):982–990 Gamo Video Report (2013) Ethiopia: the changing climate in Gamo highlands, Gamo Video Report. http://indigenouspeoplesissues.com/index.php?option=com_content%26view=article%26id= 11105:ethiopia-the-changing-climate-in-gamo-highlands-video-report%26catid=37% 26Itemid=77 Page 13 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Gardo IA (2008) Effect of climatic change on indigenous peoples – the Afar experience in Ethiopia, AFARFRIENDS Web Global Environmental Facility (GEF) (2012) Principles and guidelines for engagement with indigenous peoples. The Global Environmental Facility, Washington, DC Goklany IM (2005) A climate policy for the short and medium term: stabilization or adaptation? Energy Environ 16:667–680 Harris R (2007) Drought forces desert nomads to settle down. NPR Web Hein€am€aki L (2010) The right to be a part of nature: indigenous peoples and the environment. Academic dissertation presented with the permission of the Faculty of Law of the University of Lapland. Unpublished Dissertation, University of Lapland, Finland Hisali E, Birungi P, Buyinza F (2011) Adaptation to climate change in Uganda: evidence from micro level data. Glob Environ Chang 21(4):1245–1261 Houghton JT et al (1995) Contribution of WGI to IPCC SAR. IPCC Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee (IPACC) ‘West Africa’ IPACC Web International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) (2001) Climate change in three Maghreb countries Special Report on Selected Side Events at UNFCCC COP-7, IISD IWGIA (2011) The world indigenous report Jaska MF (2006) Putting the “sustainable” back in sustainable development: recognizing and enforcing’ indigenous property rights as a pathway to global environmental sustainability. J Environ Law Litig 21(157):199 Johannes RE (2002) Did indigenous conservation ethics exist? SPC Tradit Mar Resour Manag Knowl Inf Bull 14:3–7 Kidd C, Kenrick J (2009) The forest peoples of Africa: land rights in context. In: Forests peoples programme land rights and the forest peoples of Africa. Forests Peoples, UK Kurukulasuriya P, Mendelsohn R (2008) A Ricardian analysis of the impact of climate change on African cropland. Afr J Agric Resour Econ 2(1):1–23 Laltaika E (2009) Biofuels in Tanzania: legal challenges and recommendations for change. Inst Secur Stud Monogr 167:117–128 Le Treut H et al (2007) Historical overview of climate change. In: Solomon S et al (eds) The physical science basis: contribution of Working Group I to IPCC AR4. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Lee R (2000) Indigenism and its discontents: anthropology and the small peoples at the millennium. Paper presented as the keynote address at the annual meeting of the American Ethnological Society, Tampa Lewis L (2001) Forest people or village people: whose voice will be heard? In: Barnard A, Kenrick J (eds) African Indigenous peoples: first peoples’ or marginalised minorities. Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh Lobell DB et al (2008) Prioritizing climate change adaptation needs for food security in 2030. Science 319:6–10 L€udert J (2009) Nature(s) revisited: identities and indigenous peoples. ANTH.UBC.CA Web Macchi M et al (2008) Indigenous and traditional peoples and climate change: vulnerability and adaptation. IUCN, Gland Maragia B (2006) The indigenous sustainability paradox and the quest for sustainability in postcolonial societies: is indigenous knowledge all that is needed? Georget Int Environ Law Rev 18:197 Martone F, Rubis J (2012) Indigenous peoples and the green climate fund. A technical briefing for indigenous peoples, policymakers and support groups, Forest Peoples Programme and JOAS Page 14 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

McLean K (2010) Advance guard: climate change impacts, adaptation, mitigation and indigenous peoples – a compendium of case studies. United Nations University, Darwin Muyungi R (2013) Climate change adaptation fund: a unique and key financing mechanism for adaptation needs in developing countries. UNFCCC Web Nakhooda S, Caravani A, Bird N (2011) Climate finance in Sub-Saharan Africa climate finance policy brief. http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/ 7480.pdf. Accessed 13 Oct 2013 Nakuru Declaration- Declaration of the Indigenous Peoples Summit on Climate Change (2009) MOSOP Web National Forest Policy of Nigeria (2006) Ndahinda FM (2011) Indigenousness in Africa: a contested legal framework for empowerment of marginalized communities. Asser Press, The Hague Neely C, Bunning S, Wilkes A (2009) Review of evidence on dryland pastoral systems and climate change: implications and opportunities for mitigation and adaptation. Land and water discussion paper 8. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome Nelson F (ed) (2010) Community conservation and contested land: the politics of national resource governance in Africa. Earthscan, London Nhemachena C, Hassan R (2007) Micro-level analysis of farmers’ adaptation to climate change in Southern Africa. IFPRI discussion paper no. 00714. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC Nigeria First National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2003) Nigeria Land Use Act (1990) Nkem J, Kalame FB, Idinoba M, Somorin OA, Ndoye O, Awono A (2010) Shaping forest safety nets with markets: adaptation to climate change under changing roles of tropical forests in Congo Basin. Environ Sci Policy 13:498–508 Nzeadibe TC et al (2011) Farmers’ perception of climate change governance and adaptation constraints in Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, ATPS research paper 7. African Technology Policy Studies Network, Nairobi, p 11 O’Connor TS (1994) We are part of nature: indigenous peoples’ rights as a basis for environmental protection in the Amazon Basin. Colo J Int Environ Law 5:193–212 O’Sullivan R et al (2011) Creation and evolution of adaptation funds. WWF, Washington, DC Oruonye ED (2012) Multinational oil corporations in Sub Sahara Africa: an assessment of the impacts of globalisation. Int J Hum Soc Sci 2(4):152–156 Paavola J, Adger WN (2006) Fair adaptation to climate change. Ecol Econ 56(4):594–609 Pearce T et al (2011) Transmission of environmental knowledge and land skills among Inuit men in Ulukhaktok. Northwest Territories, Canada. Hum Ecol 39(3):271–288 Peters GP et al (2013) The challenge to keep global warming below 2C. Nat Clim Chang 3:4–6 Pielke R, Prins G, Rayner S (2007) Climate change 2007: lifting the taboo on adaptation. Nature 445:597–598 Rain Forest Deforestation available http://factsanddetails.com/world.php?itemid=1299%26catid= 52%26subcatid=329. Accessed 28 Mar 2013 Raygorodetsky G (2013) The Skolt Sámi’s path to climate change resilience. http://ourworld.unu. edu/en/the-skolt-sami-path-to-climate-change-resilience/ Roncoli C, Ingram K, Kirshen P (2001) The costs and risks of coping with drought: livelihood impacts and farmers’ responses in Burkina Faso. Climate Res 19:119–132 Salick J, Byg A (2007) Indigenous peoples and climate change. TYNDALL Web Page 15 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Seo SN, Mendelsohn R (2006) Climate change adaptation in Africa: a microeconomic analysis of livestock choice. Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa (CEEPA). Discussion paper no. 19. University of Pretoria, Pretoria Solomon S et al (2009) Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions. Proc Natl Acad Sci 106(6):1704–1709 Stern N (2006) The economics of climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Stocker TF et al (eds) (2013) The physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC summary for policy makers). Cambridge University, Cambridge Suagee DB (1999) Human rights and the cultural heritage of Indian Tribes in the United States. Int J Cult Prop 8(1):48–76 Tanzania Land Act (1999) Tanzania NAPA (National Adaptation Programme of Action) (2007) Tebtebba Foundation (2010) Indigenous peoples, forests & REDD plus: state of forests, policy environment and ways forward. Tebtebba Foundation, Baguio City The Economist (2012) Whales are people, too The World Indigenous Report (2011) IWGIA Tobey J et al (2010) Practicing coastal adaptation to climate change: lessons from integrated coastal management. Coast Manag 38(3):317–335 Toulmin C (2009) Climate change in Africa. Zed Books, London Tsosie RA (1996) Tribal environmental policy in an era of self-determination: the role of ethics, economics, and traditional ecological knowledge. Vt Law Rev 21:225 Uganda Land Act (1998) Uganda NAPA (National Adaptation Programmes of Action) (2007) Uganda National Forestry and Tree Planting Act (2003) UN (2005) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. Entered into force on 27 January 1980. United Nations, treaty series, vol 1155. p 331 UNDRIP- United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the UN General Assembly 13 Sept 2007 of the General Assembly UNFCCC (2012) Closing statement SBSTA working group On REDD + – international indigenous peoples’ forum on climate change (IIPFCC). UNFCCC, 25th May 2012, Bonn UNHRC (2009) Human rights and climate change. Resolution 10/4. http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/ E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_10_4.pdf. Accessed 24 Oct 2013 United Nations Development Group Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples Issues (UNGGIPI) (2008) United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) Seventh Session 2008 ‘Climate change and indigenous peoples’. http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/backgrounder %20climate%20change_FINAL.pdf UNU-IAS TKI (2009) Climate change, adaptations and indigenous peoples: compendium of case studies. Ver 0.7 Vermeulen S, Cotula L (2010) Over the heads of local people: consultation, consent, and recompense in large-scale land deals for biofuels projects in Africa. J Peasant Stud 37(4):899–916 Viljoen F (2012) International human rights law in Africa. Oxford University Press, Oxford Wachira GM (2010) ‘Indigenous peoples’ rights to land and natural resources. In: Dersso S (ed) Perspectives on the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples in Africa. PULP, Pretoria Watson RT et al (1990) Greenhouse gases and aerosols. In: Houghton JT et al (eds) Scientific assessment of climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Page 16 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

West P, Brockington D (2006) An anthropological perspective on some unexpected consequences of protected areas. Conserv Biol 20(3):609–616 Wold C et al (2009) Climate change and the law. LexisNexis, Newark Woodke J (2007) The impact of climate change on nomadic people. TILZ Web Woodliffe J (1996) Biodiversity and indigenous peoples. In: Bowman MJ, Redgwell C (eds) International law and conservation of biological diversity. Kluwer Law International, London World Rainforest Movement (WFM) (2013) Dams struggles against the modern dinosaurs. pp 16–17. Available at http://www.wrm.org.uy/deforestation/dams/texten.pdf. Accessed 27 Mar 2013 Xing F-B, Fröde A (2012) It’s not just the money: institutional strengthening of national climate funds: lessons learned from GIZ’s work on the ground. Deutsche Gesellschaft f€ ur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) Zambia Forests Act (1999) Zambia Lands Act (1995)

UNFCCC Web Decision 1/CMP.3 Adaptation Fund. FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1 Decision 1/CMP.4 Adaptation Fund. CCC/KP/CMP/2008/11/Add.2 Decision 1/CP.8 Delhi Ministerial Declaration on climate change and sustainable development. FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.10 Buenos Aires programme of work on adaptation and response measures. FCCC/ CP/2004/10/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.12 Further guidance to an entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention, for the operation of the Special Climate Change Fund. FCCC/ CP/2006/5/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.13 Bali Action Plan. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.16 The Cancun Agreements: outcome of the work of the AdHoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 Decision 3/CP.17 Governing instrument for the Green Climate Fund. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 Decision 5/CP.7 Implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention (decision 3/CP.3 and Article 2, paragraph 3, and Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol). FCCC/CP/ 2001/13/Add.1 Decision 5/CP.17 National adaptation plan. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 Decision 7/CP.7 Funding under the Convention. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 Decision 8/CP.5 Other matters related to communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention. FCCC/CP/1999/6/Add.1 Decision 8/CP.8 Guidance to an entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention, for the operation of the Least Developed Countries Fund. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 Decision 8/CP.9 Review of the guidelines for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of action. FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1 Decision 9/CP.8 Review of the guidelines for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of action. FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1 Decision 10/CP.7 Funding under the Kyoto Protocol. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 Decision 11/CP.9 Global observing systems for climate. FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1 Decision 28/CP.7 Guidelines for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of action. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.4 The Anchorage Declaration 24 Apr 2009 Page 17 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

UNFCCC (2013) List of LDCs Countries http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/national_adapta tion_programmes_of_action/items/4585.php. Accessed 18 Nov 2013 UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013a) Predicting drought and weather related diseases UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013b) Water harvesting structures in northern Kenya UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013c) Ngitili in Shinyanga UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013d) Sun drying food in Africa

Adaptation Fund Web Adaptation Fund Website Funded Projects Operational Policies and Guidelines for Parties to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund (Amended in July 2013)

Page 18 of 18

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Climate Change: Safeguarding Indigenous Peoples Through “Land-Sensitive” Adaptation Policy in Africa Ademola Oluborode Jegede* Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa

Abstract While, generally, climate change affects Africa negatively, indigenous peoples will suffer more, considering their lifestyle which is intricately attached to land. On three grounds, this chapter argues the importance of safeguarding indigenous peoples through “land-sensitive” adaptation policy at the national level in Africa. First, this is based on the evidence of existing forms of “land-sensitive” adaptation practices among indigenous peoples in the face of climate variability over time in Africa. Second, the current emerging range of climatic variation in Africa, however, challenges these “landsensitive” adaptation practices of indigenous peoples. Finally, although international climate adaptation policy requires the protection of indigenous peoples in its processes, states in Africa hardly comply with this prescription while engaging with these processes at the domestic level. The chapter concludes by suggesting what a “land-sensitive” adaptation policy at national level should embody for indigenous peoples in Africa.

Keywords Africa; Climate change; Adaptation policy; Adaptation practices; Indigenous peoples’ land use and tenure

Introduction The contributions of Working Group 1 to the Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990 (Watson et al. 1990), 1995 (Houghton et al. 1995), 2001 (Baede et al. 2001), 2007 (Le Treut et al. 2007), and 2013 (Stocker et al. 2013) have overwhelmingly explained the scientific and factual basis of climate change. According to these contributions, human activities are substantially increasing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, thus enhancing greenhouse effect, which has in turn led to increased warming of the earth’s surface resulting in climate change (Le Treut et al. 2007; Baede et al. 2001; Houghton et al. 1995; Watson et al. 1990). With an economy largely agrarian and limited adaptation capacity, populations in Africa are and will be seriously affected by climate change (Toulmin 2009; Wold et al. 2009, pp. 1–47; Collier et al. 2008, p. 337; Boko et al. 2007). Although, there is no Africa-wide climate homogenous effect (Collier et al. 2008, p. 338), in general terms, climate change’s negative impacts for Africa, actual and projected, is expected on areas such as water resources, food security, natural resource

*Email: [email protected] *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

management and biodiversity, human health, settlements and infrastructure, and desertification (Toulmin 2009, pp. 15–87; Boko et al. 2007, pp. 10.2–10.6). Even though indigenous peoples have contributed least to climate change, according to the United Nations Development Group’s Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues (UNGGIPI 2008, p. 8), “they are the first to face its impact.” Indeed, indigenous peoples will be disproportionately affected by climate change (Crippa 2013, p. 124; UNHRC 2009 Resolution 10/4; Salick and Byg 2007, p. 4; Stern 2006, p. 95). Through a review of literature, using a descriptive and analytical approach, this chapter contends that safeguarding indigenous peoples through “land-sensitive” adaptation policy is important at the national level in Africa for three reasons. First, there are existing forms of “landsensitive” adaptation practices among indigenous peoples in Africa based on their experience of climate variability. Second, given the emerging range of climatic variation in Africa, these “landsensitive” adaptation practices of indigenous peoples are under threat. Finally, despite the requirement in international climate adaptation policy for the protection of indigenous peoples in its processes, states in Africa do not specifically attend to the adaptive concerns and practices of indigenous peoples while engaging with international adaptation policy requirement.

Understanding Terms: “Indigenous Peoples” in Africa, “Land-Sensitive” and “Adaptation” In the interest of clarity, there are key terms which are employed in this chapter that merit brief explanation.

“Indigenous Peoples” in Africa Although the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was adopted in 2007 with the participation of states in Africa, the concept of indigenous peoples is disputed in Africa (Viljoen 2012, p. 230; Ndahinda 2011, pp. 1–13; Bojosi 2010; ACHPR and IWGIA 2005). The argument questioning their status stems from the difference in historical encounter with colonialism which, unlike in the Americas and Australasia, did not come with significant displacement of any population in Africa. In those parts of the world, the concept of indigenous peoples is understood as describing the identity of people who were the first to settle on the land from which they were displaced by European colonizers (Anaya 2010, pp. 23–42). In this context of displacement by colonialism, political leadership in Africa has generally argued that every “African is indigenous to Africa” (Viljoen 2012, p. 230; Barume 2010, p. 20; ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, pp. 86–89). However, this position, as it has been validly argued, ignores the situations of hunters and gatherers as well as pastoralists whose peculiar nature of land tenure and use had been disrupted due to internal suppression by dominant groups which existed in pre-colonial Africa and thereafter (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 92). Hence, scholarly writings, including Kidd and Kenrick (2009, pp. 8–9) and Wachira (2010, p. 313), and indeed the regional commissioned reports such as the Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005) and the Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (AU and ACHPR 2007), recognize the presence of indigenous peoples in Africa. According to the ACHPR and IWGIA (2005), the report of the Working Group prescribes the criteria for identifying indigenous peoples/populations in Africa and argues that the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) protects their collective rights. These are, namely, (1) the occupation and use of a specific land; (2) voluntary Page 2 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness; (3) self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, as a distinct collectivity; and (4) an experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion, or discrimination (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 93). While there is no requirement that all the four elements should be present for a given population to constitute indigenous peoples in Africa (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 93), the literature has stressed the importance of these criteria. Kidd and Kenrick (2009), Wachira (2010, p. 313), and ACHPR and IWGIA (2005, p. 93) emphasize the peculiar cultural lifestyle of indigenous peoples which is evidenced in a number of ways including language, social organization, religion and spiritual values, modes of production, laws, and institutions. Also, the writings of Daes (2011, p. 465, 2010, p. 18) and Anaya (2010, pp. 23–42) identify self-identification, marginalization, and collective cultural and physical dependence on land as some of the markers of their identity. More importantly, the report of the Working Group offers extensive examples of these groups in Africa, noting however that the list is not exhaustive (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, pp. 15–19). According to the report of the Working Group, those whose lifestyle defines these criteria in Africa are the hunters and gatherers as well as the pastoralists (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, pp. 14–61).

“Land-Sensitive”

Generally, considered from the lens of “indigenous peoples’ knowledge” or “indigenous peoples’ land ethics,” the worldview of indigenous peoples toward the environment has been robustly debated (Raygorodetsky 2013; CHARAPA et al. 2012; Desmet 2011; Hein€am€aki 2010; Nelson 2010; Jaska 2006; Berkes et al. 2005; Johannes 2002; O’Connor 1994; Tsosie 1996; Asiemat and Situmatt 1994; Durning 1992; Doubleday 1989). Particularly, in the context of climate change, the centrality of indigenous knowledge about their environment as a resource for adaptation has been well explored in climate-related literature (Raygorodetsky 2013; Burket and Davidson 2012; Macchi et al. 2008; Salick and Byg 2007). However, while this approach is useful, it should be embraced with caution in discussing climate change impacts on indigenous peoples in Africa. The exercise of caution is necessary because such an approach can potentially obscure the reality that adaptive challenges and practices of indigenous peoples are not isolated but dependent on a unique attachment to land. Also, while the focus on indigenous peoples’ knowledge may be helpful in addressing the scourge of climate change, this may be overrated and counterproductive. This is in the sense that the focus on indigenous peoples’ knowledge by policy makers may divert attention from the urgent need to address more fundamental issues such as land tenure and access that are central to the strengthening of indigenous peoples’ adaptive practices. Additionally, the land of indigenous peoples forms part of their worldview and so they are culturally dependent on the land (Asiemat and Situmatt 1994, p. 151). Hence, any change within the environment of indigenous peoples is best discussed in the context of changes “to and in the community’s right to land” (Asiemat and Situmatt 1994, p. 159). More importantly, a focus on land is crucial considering that the UNDRIP holds land as central in the protection of indigenous peoples (UNDRIP 2007, arts 25 and 26). Accordingly, “land-sensitive” connotes an adaptation policy approach that includes respects and enhances the land use and tenure of indigenous peoples in the light of climate change challenge in Africa.

Adaptation Adaptation has been a central part of international climate negotiation. Initially, it was thought of as a “taboo” to discuss adaptation in the climate change negotiation as advocates for climate mitigation feared that politicians were likely to lose interest in mitigation if adaptation options become the focus of discussion (Pielke et al. 2007, p. 598). However, for developing states and vulnerable Page 3 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

populations, it has been argued that it will amount to playacting to imagine that adaptation is not urgent (Burney et al. 2013, p. 52). Adaptation is understood as measures that can be used in coping with the “ill-effects of climate change” (Caney 2009, p. 203) or activities geared toward the prevention of impacts of climate change from being harmful (Paavola and Adger 2006, pp. 594–609). The IPCC defines adaptation as an alteration in the natural or human systems in response to actual or expected impacts of climate change with the aim of moderating the harm in climate change or exploiting its beneficial opportunities (Watson et al. 1990, p. 398). Adaptation also connotes the adjustments to reduce vulnerability or improve flexibility to the observed or expected changes in climate, involving a range of options such as processes, perceptions, practices, and functions (Boko et al. 2007). The potentials and options for adapting to climate change at the domestic and regional levels have been given considerable attention in climate change literature. Adaptation, explains Goklany (2005, p. 675), can take advantage of positive impacts and reduce negative impacts of climate change. According to Solomon et al. (2009, p. 1708), some impacts of climate change, such as sea level rise, can be addressed by constructing sea walls. Also, as it has been generally shown, in some regions, an appropriate adaptive strategy might entail swapping from negatively impacted products to less impacted crops (Lobell et al. 2008, p. 610) or the use of new crop varieties and livestock species better suited for drier conditions, as well as the use of irrigation, crop diversification, adoption of mixed-crop and livestock farming systems, and alternating planting dates (Kurukulasuriya and Mendelsohn 2008, p. 6; Nhemachena and Hassan 2007). Having described the key concepts used in this chapter, three arguments proposed in favor of safeguarding indigenous peoples through “land-sensitive” adaptation policy in Africa are discussed in the next sections.

Indigenous Peoples’ Existing “Land-Sensitive” Adaptive Practices From the outset, it should be stated that there are arguments suggesting that indigenous peoples’ relationship with land is not harmonious or any different from the approach by mainstream society. For instance, L€ udert (2009, pp. 7, 20), citing the economic benefits derived by the Bayei in Northern Botswana from ecotourism projects in their territory, is of the view that indigenous peoples are involved in the commodification of nature. Also, attempting to show that the relationship of indigenous peoples’ with their land is not necessarily harmonious, The Economist (2012) and D’Amato and Chopra (1991) note that the activities of the Inuit, indigenous peoples of arctic Canada, Alaska, Greenland, and Siberia, are injurious to whales and should not be exempted if an international norm should emerge granting the whale a right to life. Maragia (2006, p. 219), Berkes et al. (2005, p. 1252), and Tsosie (1996, p. 268) equally demonstrate that not all traditional perception of the indigenous peoples in relation to their land is ecologically adaptive. According to Neely et al. (2009, pp. 9–10), herding of cattle may result in overgrazing and, in effect, land degradation, a major factor in climate change. As explained by Adeloye and Okukpe (2011, p. 56), the manure of herds, except if properly handled, is a major source of greenhouse gas emission which brings about global warming. However, the validity of these arguments is disputed. Although the activities of indigenous peoples may negatively impact their land, this is only minimal. More than any other populations, the indigenous peoples have reasons to be friendly with their land. Foremost, and according to West and Brockington (2006, pp. 609–616), indigenous peoples view their land as a divine gift or heritage and themselves as its guardian or protectors. Having lived in this land for long, indigenous Page 4 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

peoples hold their land in great respect (Woodliffe 1996, p. 256, Durning 1992, p. 112). Sensitivity to land is evidenced in the understanding that land is significant for their cultural preservation (Woodliffe 1996; Cohen 1993, p. 195). The land of indigenous peoples is a site of several items they hold dear to culture and spirituality such as sacred mountains, rivers, lakes, caves, single trees or forest groves, and coastal waters (McLean 2010). As Anaya (2000, p. 2) observes, indigenous peoples living in forested areas consider the survival of the forest as essential to the survival of human life. This is in fact generally the case with indigenous peoples in Africa. Among the San peoples of the Kalahari in Southern Africa, according to Lee (2000), land represents a “sense of place” and the means through which they display a sense of harmony with nature. The San peoples, as Chennells (2003, pp. 278–279) reports, “know what to do with the land” and “every plant, beetle, animal” in the Kalahari. Generally, the protection of the indigenous peoples’ land and its biological communities are therefore viewed as a prerequisite for survival (Suagee 1999, pp. 48–50). Findings also show that among the Mbendjele (pygmies) of Congo-Brazzaville, forests fulfill the cultural role including serving as places where pregnant women give birth to children, for finding indigenous foods, and for sharing stories relating to traditional practices such as “past hunting, fishing, or gathering trips” and eternal abode after death (Lewis 2001, p. 7). According to Asiemat and Situmatt (1994, p. 149), the Maasai of eastern Africa, particularly Kenya, conceive land as an important host not only of themselves as a people but of the plants, animals, trees, and fish which, among other things, all constitute their cultural and environmental universe. It is the foregoing worldview about land that supports several forms of adaptive practices among indigenous peoples in different parts of Africa in the face of adverse impacts of climate change over time. While these adaptive practices vary, a common trend is that these practices portray indigenous peoples’ resilient adjustment to the use of land, despite the harsh reality of climate change. This pattern of adjustment, as it is illustrated in the next section, cuts across different scenarios of climate impacts including prediction of weather, water scarcity, drought, land degradation, and food insecurity.

Prediction of Weather Indigenous peoples in Africa have devised diverse means of predicting the weather. Environmental conditions, such as rainfall, thunderstorms, windstorms, and dusty winds, have been reportedly used by indigenous peoples in preparing for future use of land and weather forecast in West Africa (Ajani et al. 2013; Ajibade and Shokemi 2003). More particularly, the Maasai in the eastern part of Africa do predict droughts by observing the movement of celestial bodies and combining such with watching the development of certain plants. This has been reported as useful in serving as an early warning signal of an approaching environmental disaster as well as an early indication of “the condition of the range of land and its likely changes” (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013a). Other forecasting approaches, according to Roncoli et al. (2001), include the timing of fruiting by certain local trees, the water level in streams and ponds, the nesting behavior of small quail-like birds, and the insect behavior in rubbish heaps outside compound walls. The foregoing has adaptive utility. Outcome of weather prediction enables indigenous peoples in Kenya to understand storm routes and wind patterns and, hence, to design local disaster management practices in advance. This is achieved by constructing appropriate shelters, windbreak structures, walls, and homestead fences (UNU-IAS-TKI 2009, p. 55). Also, as a result of prediction of weather, indigenous peoples are able to plan daily economic life and social activities with foresight. This possibility further results in adaptive strategy such as planting appropriate crops that suit a particular season (UNU-IAS-TKI 2009, p. 55). Generally in East Africa, knowledge about weather condition Page 5 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

enables the pastoral Maasai to prepare for drought and make decisions about where to graze and which grasses recover faster than others (UNU-IAS-TKI 2009, p. 55).

Water Scarcity Coping Approach A range of adaptive measures is also being taken by indigenous peoples in conditions of scarcity of water. The Maasai accurately assess the water-holding capacity of distant pastures to plan transhumance activities. Generally, pastoral communities living in the water-deficient areas engage in rainwater harvesting which is conserved for all their needs. Other approaches include the construction of “sand dams” which slows down flash floods and holds the water in the sand of the riverbed (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013b). Shallow wells may also be provided with sanitary seals to protect them from contamination and unnecessary siltation after floods. This, in essence, helps in reducing the caving in of wells during the floods thus making water available for a longer period and reducing human stress (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013b).

Drought and Land Degradation Management Skills Among the Tuaregs in North Africa as well as in the south of the Sahara, adaptive practices of coping with drought and land degradation have been documented. “Fixation sites” are constructed since 1990 to assist in coping with spread of desertification (Woodke 2007, pp. 10–11; Harris 2007). Also, during drought periods, the pastoralists in this region change from cattle to sheep and goat husbandry (Seo and Mendelsohn 2006) or move from the dry northern areas to the wetter southern areas of the Sahel (McLean 2010, p. 60). Additionally, the Sukuma people of the north of Tanzania engage in soil conservation through which animal fodders are prepared and made available to very young, old, or sick animals unable to follow other animals to grazing lands. The process encourages the conservation of grazing and fodder lands by encouraging vegetation regeneration and tree planting (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013c).

Food Preservation To cope with loss of crops and food insecurity, fodder is of huge importance to nomadic people whose livestock is often the only source of income. Among the Tuaregs, there is evidence of enclosures designed to protect and safeguard pastures (Woodke 2007). Preservation of items such as fruits, vegetables, and edible insects is demonstrated in two ways: for vegetables, it is usually to immerse the fresh vegetables in salty boiling water and spread for drying after boiling for a few minutes to avoid loss of nutrient, and for drying caterpillars, termites, white ants, and other edible insects, this may be directly spread in the sun (UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study 2013d). The practice of sun drying among indigenous peoples is a coping mechanism found in several states in Africa including Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Tanzania, Senegal, and Democratic Republic of the Congo (FAO 1985). Notwithstanding these existing forms of adaptation among indigenous peoples, the “landsensitive” adaptation practices of indigenous peoples in Africa are threatened by a new emerging range of climatic variations requiring urgent policy attention by states in Africa.

Increasing Climate Variation as a Threat Climate variation is increasing with peculiar adverse impacts on indigenous peoples’ land in different regions of Africa (IPACC Web; IWGIA 2011; Mclean 2010; Tebtebba 2010). This arguably threatens the existing adaptive capacity of indigenous peoples in Africa. Although the Page 6 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

experiences of indigenous peoples throughout Africa are not the same, they share common experience of vulnerability to climate change, notwithstanding adaptive practices. According to the ACHPR and IWGIA (2005, p. 18), among indigenous peoples in West Africa are the Baka, Mbororo, and Tuareg. In the territories of these groups, there is reported evidence that the consequence of climate change is typified by destruction of grazing lands, drought, reduced access to safe water, and destruction of plants and animals (IPACC Web; Mclean 2010, p. 42; Woodke 2007, pp. 10–11). In East Africa, there are several indigenous peoples’ groups, among which are the Maasai, Ogiek, Endorois, and Yaaku in Kenya (CHARAPA et al. 2012, pp. 29–39; Tebtebba Foundation 2010, p. 440). These peoples experience several negative conditions as a result of a changing climate, including land degradation, drought, flood, famine, and displacement (UNFCCC 2013; CHARAPA et al. 2012, pp. 35–37; IWGIA 2011, p. 410). The Batwas in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), also known as Baka in Central African Republic (CAR) and Gabon, Baka, and Bagyeli in Cameroon, are in the Central Africa and Great Lakes region (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 16). The recent experiences of these peoples include a lengthy dry season and unpredictable weather conditions, which are affecting the agricultural calendar and bringing scarcity of forest products such as fruits and tubers, thereby disturbing their cultural lifestyle (Baka People Video 2013; Tebtebba 2010, p. 481; Mclean 2010, p. 44; CWE 2009, p. 2). More frequently, to the Mbororo and other pastoralists in the same region, transhumance calendars are being altered from January to late October due to a shift in the start of the dry season (Tebtebba 2010, p. 481; Mclean 2010, p. 44). In the north of Africa are indigenous peoples known as the Amazigh (or Imazighen), also referred to as the Berbers or Tuaregs (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, pp. 18–19). Evidence of climate impacts on their land includes scarcity of water, degradation, desertification, overgrazing, and salinization, in a changing climate (McLean 2010, p. 42; IISD 2001). In the southern part of Africa, the San, or Basarwa, peoples of the Kalahari (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17) face increasing dune expansion and increased wind speeds which have resulted in a loss of vegetation and negatively impacted traditional cattle and goat farming practices (UNPFII 2008). In the Horn of Africa, the Doko, Ezo, Zozo, and Daro Malo in the Gamo Highlands experience increasing pressures on local resources and great hardship through increase in temperature, scarcity of water, dying animals, and fewer grazing land (Gamo Video Report 2013). The “Outsa” leaf which is used for shelter, animal grazing, and food and hence crucial to the survival of these peoples is fast disappearing (Gamo Video Report 2013). The situation is not different with the Afar people to the northeast of Ethiopia. Living in an extremely fragile environment worsened by climate change, the Afar suffer damage of flash flooding, change in river courses, increased desertification, herd loss, hunger, thirst, and famine (Gardo 2008). In sum, across Africa, the foregoing emerging and increasing impacts of climate change are overwhelming and beyond the capability of existing adaptive measures being used by indigenous peoples in the face of droughts, flooding, famine, and loss of grazing land and livestock. This is largely because increasing variations of climate impact disrupt the land use and result into displacement of indigenous peoples from the land which is crucial to their adaptive practices. Generally, land degradation reduces the availability of ecosystem goods to these populations for adaptation purposes (Nkem et al. 2010; Tobey et al. 2010). More specifically, insecurity of land tenure and use has been found to constrain adaptation practices among indigenous peoples in states including Mali (Ebi et al. 2011) and Uganda (Hisali et al. 2011) and generally in the Congo Basin region (Nkem et al. 2010). Even where partial communal tenure is recognized as in Kenya, Namibia, and DRC, discrimination against traditional land use and livelihood strategies, logging concessions, commercial farms, and large-scale development projects (dams, oil exploitation, floriculture) are Page 7 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

major constraint to local adaptation practices (CHARAPA et al. 2012, p. 87). Insecurity of land tenure and use and the resultant changing livelihood are a driver of declining traditional relationship with the land, a major source of adaptation information and knowledge (Pearce et al. 2011, 16.3.2.1; CHARAPA et al. 2012, p. 88). Besides, the emerging range of climate variation requires long-term adaptation strategies, which the existing adaptive practices of indigenous peoples cannot achieve on their own without nontraditional technology and resources as complements (CHARAPA et al. 2012, p. 87). The nontraditional measures refer to the transfer of modern technology and resources that most indigenous peoples do not possess. The need for technology and resources cannot be overemphasized considering that indigenous populations live in remote places of a country, characterized by poor infrastructure, limited basic services, and poor government presence (Macchi et al. 2008, pp. 49–50). Technology can help in complementing or improving existing adaptive strategies linked with their land in coping with increasing impacts of climate change resulting from the emerging range of climate variation (Fleischer et al. 2011). Also, availability of funds is a good resource that may improve traditional or indigenous adaptation practices (Peters et al. 2013, p. 16.6; Nakhooda et al. 2011, p. 7). Yet, while the existing climate variability challenges the adaptive capacities of indigenous peoples, the approach by states in Africa to this reality does not show an effective implementation of international processes for adaptation measures in such manner that addresses the adaptive challenges of indigenous peoples.

Weak States’ Role in Engaging Adaptive Processes Although the pillar instruments of climate change at the international level, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and a range of decisions by the Conference of the Parties (COP) and Meeting of the Parties (MOP) under the Kyoto Protocol, require states to follow certain processes in responding to adaptation concerns, indigenous peoples’ adaptive concerns and capacities are hardly specifically addressed in the framing of adaptive challenges by states in Africa.

International Climate Change Adaptation Processes The pillar instruments of the climate change, the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and a range of decisions by the COP under the UNFCCC and the MOP under the Kyoto Protocol, set out the standard processes for international adaptation measures. Article 4 (1) (b) of the UNFCCC enjoins all parties to “formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national. . .programmes containing measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change. . ..” Also, article 4 (1) (e) requires parties to the UNFCCC to cooperate “in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change” as well as plan for “coastal zone management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and desertification, as well as floods.” Under the Kyoto Protocol, it is similarly evident that the national level has the directing policy role to play in documenting and implementing adaptation measures. Article 10 (b) (ii) of the Kyoto Protocol enjoins parties to “include in their national communications as appropriate, information on programmes which contain measures. . .” which may be helpful in “addressing climate change and its adverse impacts, including. . .adaptation measures.” Page 8 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

In the decisions of the COP or the MOP under the Kyoto Protocol, there is equally a requirement on the state government for the facilitation of adaptation process. This began to feature prominently since the COP 7 held in 2001, which acknowledged the specific needs and concerns of developing countries, including the least developing countries (LDC), and emphasized the unique role of states in addressing adaptation issues. It insisted that adaptation actions should follow a review process based on national communications and/or other relevant information (Decision 5/CP.7/2001, p. 2). It was equally stressed that support be given to the states in the preparation of the national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs) (Decision 5/CP.7/2001, p. 15). Furthermore, the decision acknowledges the importance of indigenous resources and urges parties to take these resources into consideration as part of options for addressing the impacts of climate change (Decision 5/CP.72002, p. 24). It also formulates guidelines to facilitate preparation for NAPA (Decision 28/CP.7/2001). The NAPA guidelines in its paragraphs 6 (a) and (c) affirm that it will be “action oriented.” Paragraph 7 (f) of the NAPA guidelines reiterates that it is “a country-driven approach.” While no specific mention is made of indigenous peoples, in paragraph 7 (a), it is pointed out that NAPA is “a participatory process involving stakeholders, particularly local communities,” while paragraph 7 (j) assures that the process will ensure “flexibility of procedures based on individual country circumstances.” The use of the term “local populations” arguably involves the indigenous peoples particularly when it is read together with paragraphs 16 (a), (f), and (h) which, respectively, require “loss of life and livelihood,” “cultural heritage,” and “land use management and forestry” as part of the criteria for prioritizing adaptation activities at the national level. These required items are core issues to the adaptive practices of indigenous peoples in Africa. Guidelines in relation to national adaptation plan of action were subsequently endorsed at COP 8 (Decision 9/CP.8/2002, p. 1), COP 9 (Decision 8/CP.9/2003, p. 1), and COP 10 (Decision 1/CP.10/2004, p. 4), for the developing countries in the LDC and non-LDC to document their adaptive concerns and need for funds. Furthermore, the COP 12 in Nairobi indicates that activities to be funded under climate funds may consider national communications or national adaptation programs of action and other relevant information from the applicant party (Decision 1/CP.12/2006). At COP 13 held at Bali, an “enhanced action on adaptation” was conceived as consisting of elements including international cooperation in order to support developing states in their vulnerability assessment and integration of actions into “national planning, specific projects and programmes” (Decision 1/CP.13/2007). This was also reinforced at the Cancun meeting of COP 16 (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, pp. 11–14) which highlighted the human rights implications for adverse impacts of climate change and the need to engage with stakeholders including indigenous peoples when developing and implementing their national action plans (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 12). At a subsequent meeting in Durban, parties were urged to include in their national communications and other channels the steps they have taken in actualizing NAPA (Decision 5/CP.17/2011, p. 33), as well as indigenous and traditional knowledge and practices in adaptation strategies (Decision 6/CP.172011, p. 4). These requirements are also evident in the key decisions dealing with the access of the state to adaptation funds (Decision 28/CP.7/2001, p. 4; Decision 8/CP.5/1999). Different categories of funds in relation to adaptation are mainly the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) established at COP 7, respectively, under Decisions 5/CP.7/2001 (p. 12) and 7/CP.7/2001 (p. 6) and Decision 7/CP.7/2001 (p. 2). Adaptation Fund (AF) was established pursuant to article 12 (8) of the Kyoto Protocol at COP 7 (Decision 10/CP.7/2001, p. 1), while a Green Climate Fund (GCF) was established pursuant to article 11 of the UNFCCC at COP16 held at Cancun (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 102). The funds under the LDCF and SCCF are voluntary contributions from developed country parties to the Page 9 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

UNFCCC (Muyungi 2013; O’Sullivan et al. 2011, p. 15) and managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) (Decision 7/CP.7/2001, p. 6). The GCF is managed by the GCF Board (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 103), while the AF is managed by the Adaptation Fund Board (Decision 1/CMP.3/ 2007, p. 3). All of these funds, namely, AF (Decision 1/CMP.4/2008, p. 11), GCF (Decision 3/CP.17/ 2011, p. 31), LDCF, and SCCF (Xing and Fröde 2012; Bird et al. 2011), support direct access. The guidelines relating to the operationalization of these decisions at the national level emphasize the need to safeguard indigenous peoples’ adaptive concerns and experiences in national adaptation programs. For instance, GEF Principles and Guidelines for Engagement with Indigenous Peoples set out a minimum standard relating to indigenous peoples which is expected to be complied with by partner agencies seeking to implement projects under GEF auspices in response to NAPA proposal (GEF 2012, pp. 22–29). Also the negotiation around the GCF indicates that the participation of indigenous peoples from “the local to the national to the Board level” and inclusion of their knowledge are critical to the implementation of the GCF (Martone and Rubis 2012). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the effectiveness of the approach by states in Africa in engaging with these international adaptation processes to strengthen indigenous peoples’ adaptive practices and concerns is doubtful.

Weak Approach by States In order to comply with the requirement for adaptation funds, each of the 33 African states belonging to LDC has filed a NAPA (UNFCCC 2013b), while the developing states in Africa which are non-LDC have at least filed a national communication. The ensuing subsection demonstrates that the concerns of indigenous peoples in relation to their adaptive experiences are obscured in the official processes for capturing adaptation needs and funds. This is achieved by examining processes from Uganda, Tanzania, and Nigeria. Uganda The Uganda National Adaptation Programmes of Action (Uganda NAPA) was compiled in 2007. The formulation of Uganda’s NAPA claims to have been guided by the principle of participatory approach and benefited from the views of the vulnerable communities and their knowledge on coping mechanisms (Uganda NAPA 2007, VII). It describes the impacts of climate change on sample districts as destruction of infrastructure, deforestation, loss of lives, famine, poverty, water shortage and drying up, erratic seasons and rains, destruction of biodiversity, and epidemics of pests and diseases (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 27). It notes that indigenous knowledge has been employed by communities in Uganda to cope with climate events. As part of its adaptive strategies for funding, it suggests projects such as “Community Tree Growing Project” (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 51), “Land Degradation Management” (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 53), and “Indigenous Knowledge (IK) and Natural Resources Management Project” (Uganda NAPA 2007, p. 63). In the document, however, impact scenarios of climate change in Uganda are discussed as though it is proportionately borne by all. It neither discloses the identity of the communities it identifies as “vulnerable” nor profiles as adaptation challenge the lack of protection of the land use and tenure of communities, such as the Batwas, who are indigenous and forest dependent in Uganda (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17). While it uses the word “indigenous” in describing “indigenous knowledge,” it is used to refer to every citizen of Uganda. This is the logical inference that can be drawn when the term “indigenous” is examined in the sense that it is used in the Uganda 2005 Constitution. According to article 10 (a) of the constitution of Uganda, all the communities found in Uganda as on February 1, 1926, are indigenous. The NAPA employs the concept of “vulnerability” and “indigenous” in referring to all the communities in Uganda without paying attention to the peculiar Page 10 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

situations or circumstances of specific groups such as the Batwas who are understood under international human rights law as “indigenous” in Uganda (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17). Tanzania There is a similar trend in the NAPA of Tanzania, which was submitted in 2007 (Tanzania NAPA). The document indicates the adaptation concerns in Tanzania as including “loss of human, natural, financial, social and physical capital, caused by the adverse impacts of climate change.” It also documents “severe droughts and floods, among many other disasters” (Tanzania NAPA 2007, VI). It is further mentioned in the NAPA that climate change is expected to further shrink the rangelands which are significant for livestock-keeping communities in Tanzania (Tanzania NAPA 2007, p. 7). While this may be argued as embodying some of the concerns of indigenous peoples in Tanzania such as the Maasai and Barabaig (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 17), it is not certain. This is because it proposes as adaptation measures the inclusion of some activities such as relocation of people living in wildlife corridors, zero grazing, and development of alternative means of income for communities in tourist areas (Tanzania NAPA 2007, pp. 29–31). These activities will disrupt the culture and lead to the displacement of indigenous peoples such as the Maasai and Barabaig in Tanzania and hence threaten their land use and local adaptive practices. Nigeria Nigeria is a non-LDC state and has shown no interest yet in filing a NAPA as a non-LDC. It has, however, filed a national communication which devotes a substantial attention to issues of adaptation in the country. In the communication which is the first and only national communication it has so far lodged under the UNFCCC, peculiar consequences resulting from climate change, and which require adaptive measures, include soil erosion and flooding in the southeastern part of the country. The impacts of climate change on agriculture are assessed as including the effects of changes in temperature and rainfall on plants and animals as well as sea level rise on agricultural land (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 73). Livestock production also suffers due to a decrease in rainfall which has led to a decline of pastureland and water resources (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 75). Sea level rise is also cited as an event likely to lead to considerable losses in the oil investments and developments in the Niger Delta zone. General reference is made to “the people in the coastal areas” as being impacted by challenges such as flooding and erosion in the Niger Delta and leading to the emergence of “environmental refugees” (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 82). Nonetheless, the Nigeria’s national communication largely focuses on the environmental impacts of climate change, relying “heavily on. . .existing records and documentation in various forms including socio-economic statistics, photographs, satellite imageries, geologic and oceanographic data, biological and fisheries data. . .” (Nigeria First National Communication 2003, p. 70). Generally, communities affected by these impacts are not mentioned nor are the pertinent issues such as land use, land tenure, and resource rights relating to these communities discussed. For instance, a decline in pastureland as a result of climate change will not only affect the production of livestock, but it will negatively impact the peoples such as the Mbororo whose lifestyle is traditionally connected to the use of land for cattle rearing. Also, the passing reference to the people living in coastal areas as likely to experience flooding and erosion does not capture the larger problems which the peoples of this region, particularly the Ogoni, have for long faced and fought in terms of oil spillage, environmental protection, and compensation for environmental losses and land degradation on their land (Nzeadibe et al. 2011). It is difficult to anticipate that a national communication

Page 11 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

which fails to reflect key issues peculiar to these indigenous peoples will, even if allocated, apply adaptation funds for the purpose of supporting their adaptive practices and concerns. What emerges from the foregoing discussion are therefore the reasons why states in Africa neglect indigenous peoples’ concerns and land-based experiences in framing adaptation processes at national level. Basis for State’s Exclusion The approach by states of Africa in engaging adaptive processes in a way that strengthens adaptive practices and addresses the adaptive concerns of indigenous peoples is arguably shaped by two factors. These are the state-centered nature of the processes and the overriding claim to ownership of land and disposition to use same in accordance with its priority. State-Centered Process The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and indeed decisions of the COP and MOP, respectively, are state centered. In line with article 2 (1) (a) of the Vienna Convention which describes a treaty as an agreement concluded between states (UN 2005), the parties to the international negotiation of climate change instruments such as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are states and not community or group of people. Also, the Conference of the Parties (COP) which is the key decision-making body under the UNFCCC or the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol which makes the ultimate decisions in respect of climate change and response mechanisms is state based representing the interest of different negotiation blocs and states. The decisions of these bodies emphasize the “country-driven” nature of adaptation measures. For instance, the Cancun Agreement which serves as the basis for enhanced action on adaptation involving the developing country parties endorses this approach. It urges parties to strengthen and, in applicable circumstances, establish centers and networks to facilitate and enhance national and regional adaptation actions, in a manner that is country driven and with support from developed countries (Decision 1/CP.16/2010, p. 30). This state-centered nature of adaptation processes also applies to funds relating to adaptation. For instance, the AF (Decision 1/CMP.4/2008, p. 11), GCF (Decision 3/CP.17/2011, p. 31), LDCF, and SCCF (Xing and Fröde 2012; Bird et al. 2011) support direct access to adaptation funds. By “direct access,” it is meant that these funds allow recipient countries to access financial resources, unlike the indirect access, where funding is channeled through a third-party implementing agency (Xing and Fröde 2012). However, this challenges the adaptation potentials of land use by the indigenous peoples in Africa. This is because the notion of direct access is understood in terms of the ownership of these funds by the state. This is clear, for instance, in the recommendations made by the African Development Bank (AfDB) on GCF where it employs the term “direct access” to fund largely as accessibility by national governments (AfDB 2012, p. 3). Also, according to the Operational Policies and Guidelines for Parties to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund (AF Guidelines 2013), projects may only be submitted and funds received directly by the national implementing entity (NIE) which may consist of government ministries and government cooperation agencies (AF Guidelines 2013, para 27). The implication of state-centered focus of adaptation process is that it is coordinated by the states as has been shown and thus compromises ownership of process by indigenous peoples in Africa. Also, the lack of direct access to funds is that it undermines the utility of indigenous peoples’ adaptive practices and may, as climate change worsens, compromise their opportunity to strengthen capacity. Yet, an arrangement enabling indigenous peoples a direct access to funds is not unknown to the operation of some financial institutions. For instance, models on direct access to funds for indigenous peoples exist under the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); Page 12 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility (IPAF), a former World Bank Facility for Indigenous Peoples; and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) which has a Capacity Building Program for Forest-Dependent People, all of which are dedicated indigenous funds (Martone and Rubis 2012). National Legal Framework In addition to the above, in Africa, key legal and policy framework relating to land use and tenure of indigenous peoples generally vests ownership of land in the state. For instance, article 44 of the Uganda Land Act (1998), articles 1 and 2 of Nigeria Land Use Act (1990), article 3 of Zambia Lands Act (1995), and Tanzania Land Act (1999) vest in the state the power to own and use land in accordance with its priority. This is similarly the case with the Forest Act of states in Africa which assumes the forests as “common goods.” Accordingly, articles 3, 10, and 11 of the Forests Act of Zambia (1999), respectively, vest the ownership of every tree and its produce in the presidency, which enjoys the power to compulsorily acquire any land for the purpose of national forests and restricts the activities of peoples dependent on land such as fishing and hunting from compensation. Article 26 of the Tanzania Forest Act prohibits every action of indigenous peoples that can be regarded as of adaptation relevance such as grazing, hunting and fishing, and erection of any buildings or other structures except with the permission of the minister or a local authority. According to article 5 (1) of the Uganda’s National Forestry and Tree Planting Act (2003), the state at different levels of governance is empowered to hold the forests in trust for the common good of Uganda. Also, according to the National Forest Policy of Nigeria (2006, p. 68), the government is empowered to hold in trust the forest set aside as reserve lands. While there are few exceptions within the legal framework on state ownership and control of land, this is often rendered redundant in the face of overriding public interest. Hence, the general implication of this land and forest regime is that government can legally own and use land for different priorities other than the strengthening of adaptive practices of indigenous peoples. For instance, this enables the state to pursue interests such as large-scale agricultural plantations, mining and logging, construction of roads and dams, as well as conservation which are often at crosspurposes with indigenous peoples’ adaptive practices. In addition to land degradation, the consequence of these activities for indigenous peoples is displacement from the land or territories to which they are culturally attached. This can be buttressed by the presence and consequences of such projects on indigenous peoples’ land in Africa. Large-scale agricultural plantations in several states of Africa including Benin, Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Namibia, and Ethiopia do not only disrupt the land use of indigenous peoples but also compromise their tenure rights (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). In particular, according to Laltaika (2009), massive Jatropha plantations are a new threat to the survival and livelihood of the Maasai in Tanzania. Through concession to private or public business, including logging and mining companies, the land regime also allows mining and logging activities on indigenous peoples’ lands (Barume 2010, p. 70). In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, which is rich in crude oil, oil exploration on the land of indigenous peoples such as the Ogoni, Efik, and Ijaw (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005, p. 18) has occasioned environmental degradation resulting from activities including gas flaring and deforestation (Oruonye 2012). Kidd and Kenrick (2009, p. 21) found that the Exxon’s World Bank oil pipeline project backed by the government in Chad and Cameroon which crossed Bagyéli land at least five times in the Bipindi area has severe impacts on these communities. These include their displacement and destruction of sacred sites and way of life. Roads and dam constructions have all played a part in the destruction of forests (rainforest deforestation), which are crucial to the shelter, survival, and livelihood of some indigenous peoples. In Namibia, the construction of dam at Epupa was considered environmentally and socially Page 13 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

attractive but would displace 1,100 Himba and affect 5,000 occasional users of the grazing areas on the river bank, in addition to the loss of their cultural and religious sites (World Rainforest Movement 2013, p. 28). Conservation efforts in Central Africa have equally led to the dispossession and poverty of indigenous peoples such as the Batwas in that part of Africa. According to Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau (2006), the trend in this regard has been ongoing for long, taking place without due regard for consultation and compensation for forced removal. Essentially, this land regime allows the states in Africa to deflate their responsibilities toward indigenous peoples’ immediate adaptation concerns in the guise of accessing, using, and controlling land for public good. It is thus no surprise that, at international climate forum, indigenous peoples have made the claim for protection of land as key in climate change responses including adaptation. At Nakuru, Kenya, indigenous peoples, particularly of Africa, urge intergovernmental organizations, UN agencies, and international organizations and foundations to ensure that the principles of the UNDRIP are mainstreamed in the design and implementation of any program or project in their land (Nakuru Declaration 2009). At Anchorage, in addition to emphasizing the need for security of land of indigenous peoples as critical to climate programs, indigenous peoples call for adequate and direct funding to enable them to participate effectively in all projects or programs including adaptation (The Anchorage Declaration 2009, pp. 5–7). Also, the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC) in its closing statement before the 2012 SBSTA Working Group meeting calls for the strengthening of the adaptive strategies of indigenous peoples with appropriate policy framework which respect their rights to land and traditional practices (UNFCCC 2012).

Conclusions This chapter makes a case for the necessity for states to have in place adaptation policy in Africa. It bases this proposition on three premises. The first foundation is that there are existent adaptive practices of indigenous peoples which had been useful in coping with adverse range of climate conditions. These adaptive practices which are closely linked to the cultural relationship of indigenous peoples with their land include approaches in form of prediction of weather, water security, drought and land degradation management skills, and food preservation. The second premise is that indigenous peoples in Africa now face a new range of climatic variations beyond their coping adaptive capability. As the final basis of the argument, the chapter demonstrates that rather than addressing this situation, in engaging with international adaptation processes, states in Africa do not facilitate the profiling of indigenous peoples’ adaptive challenges and the development of their landrelated adaptive practices. Thus, the foregoing premises justify the necessity of formulating appropriate policy to safeguard indigenous peoples through “land-sensitive” adaptation policy in different states in Africa. Basic policy framework should include the recognition of indigenous peoples’ identity, land use, and land tenure as critical to adaptation approach. In line with UNDRIP principles of participation and benefit sharing and protection of land rights (UNDRIP 2007, art 26), it should reflect the vulnerability of indigenous peoples while engaging with international adaptation processes. Along similar line, it should include indigenous peoples in the framework for implementation of adaptation policy, grant them direct access to funds and culturally acceptable technology, address climate threats to their land, and commit funds for successful design and/or implementation of programs and projects under NAPA and national communications. Adaptation policy measure at the national level should include the recognition of indigenous peoples’ traditional institution structure in accessing funds for the implementation of adaptation projects and secure their land access and tenure. All this Page 14 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

is important, not only for the purpose of giving hope to indigenous peoples who may yet face a somber future of difficult climate variability but because it will help states in Africa in investing time and resources into where they are needed most.

References ACHPR, IWGIA (2005) Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of experts on indigenous populations and communities (Working group report) Adeloye AA, Okukpe KM (2011) Climate change and sustainable development: the case of animal agriculture. In: Egbewole WO, Etudaiye MA, Olatunji OA (eds) Climate change in Nigeria. University of Ilorin, Nigeria AF Guidelines (2013) Operational policies and guidelines for parties to access resources from the adaptation fund (As amended in Nov 2013) African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (African Charter) adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) African Development Bank (AfDB) (2012) Operationalising the green climate fund: enabling African access. AfBD Ajani EN, Mgbenka RN, Okeke MN (2013) Indigenous knowledge as a strategy for climate change adaptation among farmers in sub-Saharan Africa: implications for policy. Asian J Agric Ext Econ Sociol 2(1):23–40 Ajibade LT, Shokemi O (2003) Indigenous approaches to weather forecasting in Asa L.G.A., Kwara State, Nigeria. Indilinga Afr J Indig Knowl Syst 2:37–44 Anaya SJ (2000) Environmentalism, human rights and indigenous peoples: a tale of converging and diverging Interests. Buffalo Environ Law J 7:1–13 Anaya SJ (2010) The evolution of the concept of indigenous peoples and its contemporary dimensions. In: Dersso SA (ed) Perspectives on the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples in Africa. Pretoria University Law Press (PULP), South Africa Asiemat JK, Situmatt FDP (1994) Indigenous peoples and the environment: the case of the pastoral Maasai of Kenya. Colo J Int Environ Law Policy 5:149–171 AU, ACHPR (2007) Advisory opinion of the African Commission on human and peoples’ rights on the United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (advisory opinion) Baede APM et al (2001) Climate change: the scientific basis. In: Houghton JT et al (eds) Contribution of working group I to IPCC TAR. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Baka People Video- Baka People: facing changes in African forests. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=AgerTDO4r6M. Accessed 14 Oct 2013 Barume AK (2010) Land rights of indigenous peoples in Africa: with special focus on central, eastern, and southern Africa. IWGIA, Copenhagen, Denmark Berkes F, Colding J, Folke C (2005) Rediscovery of traditional ecological knowledge as adaptive management. Ecol Appl 10(5):1251–1262 Bird N, Billett S, Cristina C (2011) Direct access to climate finance: experiences and lessons. UNDP discussion paper Bojosi KN (2010) The African Commission Working Group of Experts on the Rights of the Indigenous Communities/Populations: some reflections on its work so far. In: Dersso S (ed) Perspectives on the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples in Africa. Pretoria University Law Press, Pretoria, pp 95–137

Page 15 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Boko M et al (2007) Africa: climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. In: Parry LM et al (eds) Contribution of working group II to IPCC (AR4). Cambridge University, Cambridge Burket V, Davidson M (eds) (2012) Coastal impacts, adaptation, and vulnerabilities: a technical input to the 2013 national climate assessment. Island Press, Washington, DC Burney JA, Kennel CF, Victor DG (2013) Getting serious about the new realities of global climate change. Bull At Sci 69(4):52 Caney S (2009) Climate change and the duties of the advantaged. Crit Rev Int Soc Polit Philos 13:203–228 Cernea MM, Schmidt-Soltau K (2006) Poverty risks and national parks: policy issues in conservation and development. World Dev 34(10):1808–1830 CHARAPA et al (2012) Indigenous peoples and climate change in Africa: traditional knowledge and adaptation strategies (Draft Report). World Bank Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Chennells R (2003) The Khomani San of South Africa. Forest peoples. In: Nelson J, Hossack L (eds) Forest peoples programme. pp 269–289 Cohen AP (1993) Culture as identity: an anthropologist’s view. New Lit Hist 24(1):195–209 Collier P, Conway G, Venables T (2008) Climate change and Africa. Oxf Rev Econ Policy 24(2):337–353 Conversations with the Earth (CWE) (2009) Hub Newsletter Crippa LA (2013) REDD+: its potential to melt glacial resistance to recognise human rights and indigenous peoples’ rights at the World Bank. In: Abate RS, Kronk EA (eds) Climate change and indigenous peoples: the search for legal remedies. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Daes E-I (2011) Principal problems regarding indigenous land rights and recent endeavours to resolve them. In: Eide A et al (eds) Making peoples heard- essay on human rights in honour of Gudmundur Alfredsson. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden D’Amato A, Chopra SK (1991) Whales: their emerging right to life. Am J Int Law 85:21–62 Desmet E (2011) Indigenous rights entwined in nature conservation. Intersentia, Cambridge Doubleday NC (1989) Aboriginal subsistence whaling: the right of Inuit to hunt whales and implications for international environmental law. Denver J Int Law Policy 17(373):374 Durning AT (1992) Guardians of the land: indigenous peoples and the health of the earth. World watcher paper 112 Ebi KL et al (2011) Smallholders adaptation to climate change in Mali. Clim Change 108(3):423–436 FAO (1985) Expert consultation on planning the development of sun drying. http://maindb.unfccc. int/public/adaptation/adaptation_casestudy.pl?id_project=133%26id_hazard=%26id_impact= %26id_strategy=%26id_region=techniques in Africa Fleischer A, Mendelsohn R, Dinar A (2011) Bundling agricultural technologies to adapt to climate change. Technol Forecast Soc Chang 78(6):982–990 Gamo Video Report (2013) Ethiopia: the changing climate in Gamo highlands, Gamo Video Report. http://indigenouspeoplesissues.com/index.php?option=com_content%26view=article%26id= 11105:ethiopia-the-changing-climate-in-gamo-highlands-video-report%26catid=37%26Itemid=77 Gardo IA (2008) Effect of climatic change on indigenous peoples – the Afar experience in Ethiopia, AFARFRIENDS Web Global Environmental Facility (GEF) (2012) Principles and guidelines for engagement with indigenous peoples. The Global Environmental Facility, Washington, DC

Page 16 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Goklany IM (2005) A climate policy for the short and medium term: stabilization or adaptation? Energy Environ 16:667–680 Harris R (2007) Drought forces desert nomads to settle down. NPR Web Hein€am€aki L (2010) The right to be a part of nature: indigenous peoples and the environment. Academic dissertation presented with the permission of the Faculty of Law of the University of Lapland. Unpublished Dissertation, University of Lapland, Finland Hisali E, Birungi P, Buyinza F (2011) Adaptation to climate change in Uganda: evidence from micro level data. Glob Environ Chang 21(4):1245–1261 Houghton JT et al (1995) Contribution of WGI to IPCC SAR. IPCC Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee (IPACC) ‘West Africa’ IPACC Web International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) (2001) Climate change in three Maghreb countries Special Report on Selected Side Events at UNFCCC COP-7, IISD IWGIA (2011) The world indigenous report Jaska MF (2006) Putting the “sustainable” back in sustainable development: recognizing and enforcing’ indigenous property rights as a pathway to global environmental sustainability. J Environ Law Litig 21(157):199 Johannes RE (2002) Did indigenous conservation ethics exist? SPC Tradit Mar Resour Manag Knowl Inf Bull 14:3–7 Kidd C, Kenrick J (2009) The forest peoples of Africa: land rights in context. In: Forests peoples programme land rights and the forest peoples of Africa. Forests Peoples, UK Kurukulasuriya P, Mendelsohn R (2008) A Ricardian analysis of the impact of climate change on African cropland. Afr J Agric Resour Econ 2(1):1–23 Laltaika E (2009) Biofuels in Tanzania: legal challenges and recommendations for change. Inst Secur Stud Monogr 167:117–128 Le Treut H et al (2007) Historical overview of climate change. In: Solomon S et al (eds) The physical science basis: contribution of Working Group I to IPCC AR4. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Lee R (2000) Indigenism and its discontents: anthropology and the small peoples at the millennium. Paper presented as the keynote address at the annual meeting of the American Ethnological Society, Tampa Lewis L (2001) Forest people or village people: whose voice will be heard? In: Barnard A, Kenrick J (eds) African Indigenous peoples: first peoples’ or marginalised minorities. Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh Lobell DB et al (2008) Prioritizing climate change adaptation needs for food security in 2030. Science 319:6–10 L€udert J (2009) Nature(s) revisited: identities and indigenous peoples. ANTH.UBC.CA Web Macchi M et al (2008) Indigenous and traditional peoples and climate change: vulnerability and adaptation. IUCN, Gland Maragia B (2006) The indigenous sustainability paradox and the quest for sustainability in postcolonial societies: is indigenous knowledge all that is needed? Georget Int Environ Law Rev 18:197 Martone F, Rubis J (2012) Indigenous peoples and the green climate fund. A technical briefing for indigenous peoples, policymakers and support groups, Forest Peoples Programme and JOAS McLean K (2010) Advance guard: climate change impacts, adaptation, mitigation and indigenous peoples – a compendium of case studies. United Nations University, Darwin Muyungi R (2013) Climate change adaptation fund: a unique and key financing mechanism for adaptation needs in developing countries. UNFCCC Web Page 17 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Nakhooda S, Caravani A, Bird N (2011) Climate finance in Sub-Saharan Africa climate finance policy brief. http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/ 7480.pdf. Accessed 13 Oct 2013 Nakuru Declaration- Declaration of the Indigenous Peoples Summit on Climate Change (2009) MOSOP Web National Forest Policy of Nigeria (2006) Ndahinda FM (2011) Indigenousness in Africa: a contested legal framework for empowerment of marginalized communities. Asser Press, The Hague Neely C, Bunning S, Wilkes A (2009) Review of evidence on dryland pastoral systems and climate change: implications and opportunities for mitigation and adaptation. Land and water discussion paper 8. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome Nelson F (ed) (2010) Community conservation and contested land: the politics of national resource governance in Africa. Earthscan, London Nhemachena C, Hassan R (2007) Micro-level analysis of farmers’ adaptation to climate change in Southern Africa. IFPRI discussion paper no. 00714. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC Nigeria First National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2003) Nigeria Land Use Act (1990) Nkem J, Kalame FB, Idinoba M, Somorin OA, Ndoye O, Awono A (2010) Shaping forest safety nets with markets: adaptation to climate change under changing roles of tropical forests in Congo Basin. Environ Sci Policy 13:498–508 Nzeadibe TC et al (2011) Farmers’ perception of climate change governance and adaptation constraints in Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, ATPS research paper 7. African Technology Policy Studies Network, Nairobi, p 11 O’Connor TS (1994) We are part of nature: indigenous peoples’ rights as a basis for environmental protection in the Amazon Basin. Colo J Int Environ Law 5:193–212 O’Sullivan R et al (2011) Creation and evolution of adaptation funds. WWF, Washington, DC Oruonye ED (2012) Multinational oil corporations in Sub Sahara Africa: an assessment of the impacts of globalisation. Int J Hum Soc Sci 2(4):152–156 Paavola J, Adger WN (2006) Fair adaptation to climate change. Ecol Econ 56(4):594–609 Pearce T et al (2011) Transmission of environmental knowledge and land skills among Inuit men in Ulukhaktok. Northwest Territories, Canada. Hum Ecol 39(3):271–288 Peters GP et al (2013) The challenge to keep global warming below 2C. Nat Clim Chang 3:4–6 Pielke R, Prins G, Rayner S (2007) Climate change 2007: lifting the taboo on adaptation. Nature 445:597–598 Rain Forest Deforestation available http://factsanddetails.com/world.php?itemid=1299%26catid= 52%26subcatid=329. Accessed 28 Mar 2013 Raygorodetsky G (2013) The Skolt Sámi’s path to climate change resilience. http://ourworld.unu. edu/en/the-skolt-sami-path-to-climate-change-resilience/ Roncoli C, Ingram K, Kirshen P (2001) The costs and risks of coping with drought: livelihood impacts and farmers’ responses in Burkina Faso. Climate Res 19:119–132 Salick J, Byg A (2007) Indigenous peoples and climate change. TYNDALL Web Seo SN, Mendelsohn R (2006) Climate change adaptation in Africa: a microeconomic analysis of livestock choice. Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa (CEEPA). Discussion paper no. 19. University of Pretoria, Pretoria

Page 18 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Solomon S et al (2009) Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions. Proc Natl Acad Sci 106(6):1704–1709 Stern N (2006) The economics of climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Stocker TF et al (eds) (2013) The physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC summary for policy makers). Cambridge University, Cambridge Suagee DB (1999) Human rights and the cultural heritage of Indian Tribes in the United States. Int J Cult Prop 8(1):48–76 Tanzania Land Act (1999) Tanzania NAPA (National Adaptation Programme of Action) (2007) Tebtebba Foundation (2010) Indigenous peoples, forests & REDD plus: state of forests, policy environment and ways forward. Tebtebba Foundation, Baguio City The Economist (2012) Whales are people, too The World Indigenous Report (2011) IWGIA Tobey J et al (2010) Practicing coastal adaptation to climate change: lessons from integrated coastal management. Coast Manag 38(3):317–335 Toulmin C (2009) Climate change in Africa. Zed Books, London Tsosie RA (1996) Tribal environmental policy in an era of self-determination: the role of ethics, economics, and traditional ecological knowledge. Vt Law Rev 21:225 Uganda Land Act (1998) Uganda NAPA (National Adaptation Programmes of Action) (2007) Uganda National Forestry and Tree Planting Act (2003) UN (2005) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. Entered into force on 27 January 1980. United Nations, treaty series, vol 1155. p 331 UNDRIP- United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the UN General Assembly 13 Sept 2007 of the General Assembly UNFCCC (2012) Closing statement SBSTA working group On REDD + – international indigenous peoples’ forum on climate change (IIPFCC). UNFCCC, 25th May 2012, Bonn UNHRC (2009) Human rights and climate change. Resolution 10/4. http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/ E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_10_4.pdf. Accessed 24 Oct 2013 United Nations Development Group Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples Issues (UNGGIPI) (2008) United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) Seventh Session 2008 ‘Climate change and indigenous peoples’. http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/backgrounder %20climate%20change_FINAL.pdf UNU-IAS TKI (2009) Climate change, adaptations and indigenous peoples: compendium of case studies. Ver 0.7 Vermeulen S, Cotula L (2010) Over the heads of local people: consultation, consent, and recompense in large-scale land deals for biofuels projects in Africa. J Peasant Stud 37(4):899–916 Viljoen F (2012) International human rights law in Africa. Oxford University Press, Oxford Wachira GM (2010) ‘Indigenous peoples’ rights to land and natural resources. In: Dersso S (ed) Perspectives on the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples in Africa. PULP, South Africa Watson RT et al (1990) Greenhouse gases and aerosols. In: Houghton JT et al (eds) Scientific assessment of climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge West P, Brockington D (2006) An anthropological perspective on some unexpected consequences of protected areas. Conserv Biol 20(3):609–616 Wold C et al (2009) Climate change and the law. LexisNexis, Newark Woodke J (2007) The impact of climate change on nomadic people. TILZ Web Page 19 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Woodliffe J (1996) Biodiversity and indigenous peoples. In: Bowman MJ, Redgwell C (eds) International law and conservation of biological diversity. Kluwer Law International, London World Rainforest Movement (WFM) (2013) Dams struggles against the modern dinosaurs. pp 16–17. Available at http://www.wrm.org.uy/deforestation/dams/texten.pdf. Accessed 27 Mar 2013 Xing F-B, Fröde A (2012) It’s not just the money: institutional strengthening of national climate funds: lessons learned from GIZ’s work on the ground. Deutsche Gesellschaft f€ ur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) Zambia Forests Act (1999) Zambia Lands Act (1995)

UNFCCC Web Decision 1/CMP.3 Adaptation Fund. FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1 Decision 1/CMP.4 Adaptation Fund. CCC/KP/CMP/2008/11/Add.2 Decision 1/CP.8 Delhi Ministerial Declaration on climate change and sustainable development. FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.10 Buenos Aires programme of work on adaptation and response measures. FCCC/ CP/2004/10/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.12 Further guidance to an entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention, for the operation of the Special Climate Change Fund. FCCC/ CP/2006/5/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.13 Bali Action Plan. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.16 The Cancun Agreements: outcome of the work of the AdHoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 Decision 3/CP.17 Governing instrument for the Green Climate Fund. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 Decision 5/CP.7 Implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention (decision 3/CP.3 and Article 2, paragraph 3, and Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol). FCCC/CP/ 2001/13/Add.1 Decision 5/CP.17 National adaptation plan. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 Decision 7/CP.7 Funding under the Convention. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 Decision 8/CP.5 Other matters related to communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention. FCCC/CP/1999/6/Add.1 Decision 8/CP.8 Guidance to an entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention, for the operation of the Least Developed Countries Fund. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 Decision 8/CP.9 Review of the guidelines for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of action. FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1 Decision 9/CP.8 Review of the guidelines for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of action. FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1 Decision 10/CP.7 Funding under the Kyoto Protocol. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 Decision 11/CP.9 Global observing systems for climate. FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1 Decision 28/CP.7 Guidelines for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of action. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.4 The Anchorage Declaration 24 Apr 2009 UNFCCC (2013) List of LDCs Countries http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/national_adapta tion_programmes_of_action/items/4585.php. Accessed 18 Nov 2013 UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013a) Predicting drought and weather related diseases UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013b) Water harvesting structures in northern Kenya Page 20 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_2-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013c) Ngitili in Shinyanga UNFCCC Adaptation Case Study (2013d) Sun drying food in Africa

Adaptation Fund Web Adaptation Fund Website Funded Projects Operational Policies and Guidelines for Parties to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund (Amended in July 2013)

Page 21 of 21

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_3-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Climate Change and Water Issues in Mesopotamia: A Framework for Fostering Transboundary Cooperation in Euphrates-Tigris Basin Vakur S€ umer* Department of International Relations, Selcuk University, Konya, Turkey

Abstract This chapter starts with presenting an overview of the current situation in Mesopotamia in terms of both water resources and increasing impacts of climate change over water resources. The existing literature on potential problems of climate change in Euphrates-Tigris region will also be discussed. Then the chapter turns to the question of how countries of the region may come together around the theme of water and increase their adaptive capacities in the face of climate-related threats.

Keywords Mesopotamia; Euphrates; Tigris; Iraq; Syria; Turkey; Climate change; Water resources; Macroregion

Introduction The two significant rivers in the Middle East, Euphrates and Tigris (ET), characterize the area which was historically known as Mesopotamia. The Mesopotamia region constitutes a single basin ending in the Persian Gulf. The area witnessed the earliest urban civilization in Sumerian times and is called as the “Cradle of Civilization.” It also historically is part of the greater “Fertile Crescent” stretching from the Nile Delta through Jordan River and through Euphrates-Tigris into the Persian Gulf. Food production in the region continues to be vital not only for the population living in the basin but for the entire populations of the riparians. The water-dependent area of Mesopotamia now faces with the threats of climate change which could turn out to be disastrous if adaptation strategies are not implemented in timely manner. There is a growing literature on the possible impacts of climate change on Mesopotamia.1 However, little has been done in order to improve the adaptive capacity in the face of climate change in the region. Moreover, despite this recent literature, there is a lack of reliable historical data which renders it difficult to develop robust models of changes in time (Rifai 2008; Voss et al. 2013). Adaptation to climate change, certainly, entails a wide range of issues (Moser and Dilling 2004). One significant part of climate change adaptation is to develop the transboundary cooperation since the basin is shared by a number of countries, and as it is already known, climate change knows no boundaries.

*Email: [email protected] 1 See, for instance, Voss et al. (2013), Yilmaz and Imteaz (2011), Topcu et al. (2010), Sowers et al. (2011), Kitoh et al. (2008). Page 1 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_3-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Within this framework, this chapter aims to present a model for transboundary cooperation, particularly with regard to transboundary water resources in the region. Building upon a recent EU model and taking water as a common ground for action, this chapter tries to propose a coherent and holistic perspective for an ever climate-adaptive Mesopotamia. The chapter starts with presenting an overview of the current situation in Mesopotamia in terms of both water resources and increasing impacts of climate change over water resources. The existing literature on potential problems of climate change in Euphrates-Tigris region will also be discussed. Then the chapter turns to the question of how countries of the region may come together around the theme of water and increase their adaptive capacities in the face of climate-related threats.

Climate Change Impacts on Water Resources in Mesopotamia Euphrates and Tigris are two significant rivers in the southwest Asia. They are important not only because of their length which makes them “transboundary” rivers but also because of their water volume which makes the region of Mesopotamia as one of the most fertile agricultural regions in the world as well as their potential in terms of hydroelectricity. Euphrates is the longest river of the region (approx. 2,700 km). The Kara Su and the Murat are two main tributaries of Euphrates in the headwaters. These two tributaries, along with the Balikh and Khabur tributaries which join Euphrates downstream, drain the heavy winter/spring precipitation in the form of runoff from the southeastern Taurus Mountains. The Tigris River, the second longest river in southwest Asia (1,840 km), originates in eastern Turkey near Lake Hazar and flows southeast where it forms the border with Syria for approximately 40 km and then enters into Iraq. Several tributaries contribute to the Tigris including the Greater Zab, the Lesser Zab, the Adhaim, and the Diyala. The Tigris and Euphrates converge near the Iraqi city of Qurna and continue as the Shatt al Arab, and finally, they drain into the Persian Gulf (Kolars and Mitchell 1991). There are three major riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris River basin: Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.2 Euphrates annual mean flow is 32 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/year). Ninety percent of the mean annual flow of the Euphrates originates from Turkey, and the 10 % originates from Syria. Tigris, on the other hand, has 52 bcm/year of annual average flow. While 40 % of the total discharge originates from Turkey, 51 % originates from Iraq and 9 % from Iran (Kibaroglu) (Fig. 1). There was not a serious water issue in the region – at least in the political arena – until the second half of the twentieth century. Until then rivers were utilized by the populations living nearby. The water question emerged as a significant political – as well as a societal – issue when the three riparians initiated major water development projects in 1960s. The main reason for this was the decreasing sufficiency of water resources of the basin for the local communities in the basin and, more importantly, the need for supplying water and energy (hydroelectricity) for the rapidly increasing populations of urban agglomerations whether close by or distant from the source (Elhance 1999). Therefore, the rapid demographic changes in Mesopotamia could be seen as one of the reasons for making water resources more critical. The increase in Turkey’s population could be a good example. The total population of Turkey was 13.5 million in 1927. It increased to 31.2 million by 1965. This means a 2.5-fold increase in less than 40 years. Syria’s and Iraq’s populations demonstrate similar trends during these times.

2

It should be noted, however, that some territories of Iran and Saudi Arabia belong to the ET basin geographically and that Iran contbitutes 5–8 % of the river flow of Tigris. Page 2 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_3-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 Map of Mesopotamia (Source: Heston et al. (2012))

And despite the decreasing rates of population increase in Turkey, Syria and Iraq continued to increase at higher percentages.3 Iraq’s population, for instance, grew from 6 to 32 million in the last six decades. Syria’s population, likewise, grew from 3.5 to 22.5 million during the last 60 years. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi and Oskar Svadkovsky summarize the official population policy in Syria in the last 60 years: The seeds of the current disaster were planted as far back as 1956, when Youssef Helbaoui – head of economic analysis in Syria's Planning Department – famously declared: “A birth control policy has no reason for being in this country. Malthus could not find any followers among us.” Since then Syria has been living in a state of one uninterrupted demographic cataclysm. The regime was so obsessively pro-natalist that in the early 1970s, the trade and use of contraceptives in Syria were officially banned. By 1975, the birth rate reached 50 live births per 1,000 people, with Hafez al-Assad asserting that a “high population growth rate and internal migration” were responsible for stimulating “proper socio-economic improvements” within the development framework. Even when other nations in the Middle East began to take measures to curb their population growth as the danger of demographic collapse started to loom over the region, the regime in Syria was struggling to make up its mind on the issue.” (Al-Tamimi and Svadkovsky 2012)

Now, there are more than 100 million additional people living in these three basin countries when compared with 1950 numbers. This huge increase in the basin countries’ population largely remained dependent to water resources of Euphrates and Tigris and, when taken in conjunction

3

Note that the population of Turkey increased less than four times of its 1950 number, while Syria grew more than six times, and Iraq grew nearly six times during the last six decades. Page 3 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_3-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Population for Turkey (POPTTLTRA173NUPN) Source: University of Pennsylvania 80,000

70,000

(Thousands)

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000 1950

1960

FRED

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2000

2010

2013 research.stlouisfed.org

Fig. 2 Population of Turkey (Source: Heston et al. (2012))

Population for Iraq (POPTTLIQA173NUPN) Source: University of Pennsylvania 32,000 28,000

(Thousands)

24,000 20,000 16,000 12,000 8,000 4,000 1950

FRED

1960

1970

1980

1990

2013 research.stlouisfed.org

Fig. 3 Population of Iraq (Source: Heston et al. (2012)) Page 4 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_3-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Population for Syria (POPTTLSYA173NUPN) Source: University of Pennsylvania 24,000 22,000 20,000 18,000

(Thousands)

16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 1950

FRED

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2013 research.stlouisfed.org

Fig. 4 Population of Syria (Source: Heston et al. (2012))

with climate change-induced decreasing levels of available water in the rivers, resulted in a water crisis, which is still surmounting (see Figs. 2, 3, and 4). Combinations of these push factors with a pull factor, i.e., the advent of new construction technologies enabling huge dams to be built which characterized the “hydraulic mission”4 era, resulted in huge infrastructure plannings throughout the region countries (see Table 1). In other words, countries of the region hitherto dealt with these decreasing levels of per capita water with supply-side measures. They constructed a considerable number of reservoirs in order to continue to supply water for irrigation during dry seasons. Among these, Southeastern Anatolia Project (Turkish acronym GAP) of Turkey appears to be the biggest water-related infrastructure project undertaken in the basin.5 Construction of additional water supplies did contribute to the water management in the basin in several aspects. Built reservoirs provide water supply guarantee throughout the year. They also appeared to be useful when recurring floods are considered. Since they regulated the water flow, floods became unusual events. However, despite these contributions, huge reservoirs in the basin bear a number of potential harms, particularly in the face of climate change. For instance, huge surface area of these man-made lakes (or canals) has a problem of evaporation. Evaporation losses amount to be huge in shallow water bodies in downstream like Thartar canal in Iraq. Therefore, countries in the region might need to focus also on better management of reservoirs in the basin. If countries could agree, in accordance with the topographic and climatic imperatives, reserving much of the water in upstream could be a solution. Thus, since the 1960s, not only Turkey and Syria began developing the potential of EuphratesTigris River system for basically energy production and irrigation, but also Iraq initiated new schemes for irrigation. The culmination of all these unaligned efforts was an increased water imbalance in the region and, not to mention, a patchwork approach to climate change-related threats. Hydraulic mission is a concept within a modernist world view, meaning “the strong conviction that every drop of water flowing to the ocean is a waste and that the state should develop hydraulic infrastructure to capture as much water as possible for human uses” (Wester et al. (2009). The hydraulic mission and the Mexican hydrocracy: Regulating and reforming the flows of water and power. Water Alternatives 2(3): 395–415). 5 GAP consisted of 22 big dams and 19 hydropower plants in Turkish parts of Euphrates and Tigris basin. 4

Page 5 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_3-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Dams in the Tigris–Euphrates watershed Name Dokan Derbendikhan Keban Tabaqa Hamrin Mosul

Completion 1961 1962 1975 1975 1980 1985

Haditha

1984

Karakaya Ataturk

1987 1992

Kralkizi Batman

1997 1998

Tishreen

1999

Usea IRR IRR HP HP IRR HP, IRR HP, IRR HP HP, IRR HP HP, IRR HP

Prin. vol (109 m3)c 4.6 2 21.6 9.6 2.15 8

Max. SA (km2)d 270 121 675 610 440 371

Prin. SAe 200 78 458 447 195 285

Res. Kf 1 1 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5

Euphrates 8.2

7

500

415

4

Turkey Turkey

Euphrates 9.6 Euphrates 48.7

7.1 38.7

268 817

198 707

1 2

Turkey Turkey

Tigris Tigris

1.1 0.745

57.5 49.3

39.2 37.3

2 2

Syria

Euphrates 1.9

1.8

166

142

2

Country Iraq Iraq Turkey Syria Iraq Iraq

Basin Tigris Tigris Euphrates Euphrates Tigris Tigris

Iraq

Max. vol (109 m3)b 6.8 3 31 11.7 3.95 11.1

1.9 1.175

Source: Jones et al. (2008) a IRR irrigation, HP hydroelectric power b Maximum volume in billion cubic meters c Principal volume in billion cubic meters d Maximum surface area in km2 e Principal surface area in km2 f Reservoir hydraulic conductivity in mm/h

As FAO noted, it is clear that water resources in the semiarid or arid zones like the Middle East are already stressed, independent of climate change, and any additional stress from climate change or increased variability will only intensify the competition for water resources. The Middle East, being the world’s most water-stressed region, climate change – which is projected to cause sea-level rise, more extreme weather events such as droughts and floods, and less precipitation – will contribute to even greater water stress in the region (Freimuth et al. 2007). Within this context, “future vulnerability depends not only on climate change but also on development plans, so that appropriate strategies followed for sustainable development can reduce vulnerability to climate change” (Topcu et al. 2010). To date, most governments in the wider Middle East have concentrated largely on large-scale supply-side measure including desalination, dam construction, interbasin water transfers, tapping fossil groundwater aquifers, and importing virtual water. According to Sowers et al. (2011), societal involvement is one of the keys in a successful climate adaption strategy, where it lacks in the Middle East region. Sowers et al. (2011) conclude that “the key capacities for adaptive governance to water scarcity in MENA remains to be underdeveloped.” What is more, all intended solutions remain to be uncoordinated and single-country solutions, lacking the transboundary dimension which needs to be taken seriously for a working climate adaptation strategy.

Page 6 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_3-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Climate Change and Increasing Pressures on Water Resources The Mediterranean basin and its surrounding area, which includes Mesopotamia, are regarded as among the most climate-vulnerable regions in the world. Climate change is already underway in the ET region. The increasing impacts of climate change in the Euphrates-Tigris region have been experienced by a number of indications. Voss et al. (2013) analyzed the changes in overall freshwater storage in the Euphrates-Tigris basin from January 2003 to December 2009. Their study indicated alarming rate of decrease in total water storage of approximately 27.2  0.6 mm yr 1 equivalent water height, equal to a volume of 143.6 km3 during the course of the study period. The Euphrates also has been widely reported to have become very narrow and shallow.6 Indeed, a decreasing trend in lower Euphrates streamflows based on historical flow data analysis has already been demonstrated (Yilmaz and Imteaz 2011, p. 1277). Moreover, despite the decrease in overall precipitation, flood intensity and frequency have a tendency to rise (IPCC 2007). Shifts in rain patterns have led to prolonged droughts all around the Middle East in recent years. As pointed out by Shetty (2006), for instance, “dramatic changes in climatic and hydrologic features in recent years have affected the economies of the region and specifically those of the dry areas where rainfed agriculture is the dominant activity and the only source of income for a majority of the rural population.” The drought in Iraq in 2008, a case in point, was one of the harshest ones in the country’s history which forced the country to enter into new negotiations which then culminated in signing of a memorandum of understanding in September 2009. Climate change-induced impact was particularly devastating in Syria, as al-Tamimi and Svadkovsky (2012) note, “agriculture remains a major part of the economy and the lifestyle of a large section of the population, some 20 % of Syria’s GDP being generated by this sector.” It was reported that “aggravation of water scarcity led to the abandonment of around 160 villages in northern Syria in the period 2007–2008. In eastern Syria, the Inezi tribe saw some 85 % of its livestock killed between 2005 and 2010 because of prolonged drought. In 2010 the United Nations estimated that more than a million people have left the northeast of the country” (Al-Tamimi and Svadkovsky 2012). Apart from these experienced changes, recent scientific studies also warn about the expected magnitude and threats of future climate change. Therefore, the recent trends of climate change seem to continue in the upcoming years and decades. In a widely cited paper, Chenoweth et al. (2011), on the other hand, found that the average annual Euphrates-Tigris River discharge could decline by 9.5 % by 2040–2069 with the greatest decline (12 %) in Turkey.7 Another study suggests that climate change has the potential to severely reduce (between 10 % and 60 %) the amount of this water source and place increased stress on the water-dependent societies of the region8. The decrease in the Euphrates basin, in particular, appears to be more alarming: “Discharge of the Euphrates River is projected to decrease between 29–73 percent by the end of the 21st century” (Kitoh et al. 2008; Granit and Joyce 2012). Dai (2011), reviewing recent literature on drought of the last millennium, concludes that most of the Middle East will experience an increased aridity in the twenty-first century. In light of the above, 6

Faisal Rifai, Impact of Collaboration in the Euphrates Tigris Region, http://www.inbo-news.org/IMG/pdf/rifai.pdf It should be noted at this point that both Euphrates and Tigris are largely snow-fed rivers which are dependent on winter precipitation, particularly in Turkey. The Taurus Mountains and the Anatolian Highlands of eastern Turkey are the headwater regions for the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, whose waters are shared primarily between Turkey and, downstream riparians, Syria and Iraq. In other words, the runoff from the Taurus Mountains of Turkey supplies water to 2/3 of the Arabic-speaking population of the Middle East (Cullen and deMenocal 2000). 8 Ozdogan (2011). 7

Page 7 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_3-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

although there is a remarkable variance in study findings, nearly all of studies agree on the prospect that there will be less water in the Euphrates-Tigris basin in the future. Bozkurt and Şen provide a synopsis of what could be expected in the twenty-first century in the Euphrates basin which is worth quoting: Temperature: All scenario simulations indicate surface temperature increases across the entire Euphrates-Tigris bsin. Projected increase in annual surface temperature in the highlands ranges between 2.1  C and 4.1  C for 2041–2070, and between 2.6  C and 6.1  C for 2071–2099. Precipitation: Projected precipitation decrease in the highlands by the end of the present century in 33 % under the higher emissions scenario (A1F1) and 6–24 % under the A2 scenario. Snow water equivalent precipitation in the highlands is projected to decrease by 55 % for B1 scenario, 77–85 % for A2 scenario and 87 % for A1F1 scenario. River discharge: The territory of Turkey will likely experience more adverse direct effects of the climate change compared to the territories of the other countries in the basin. The annual surface runoff is projected to decrease by 26–57 % in the territory of Turkey by the end of the present century. (Bozkurt and Şen)

Then, the question, is not whether or how the climate will change in Mesopotamia, but the questions that experts and decision-makers should be dealing with are, first, what these adaptive strategies are and, perhaps more importantly, how these adaptive strategies that are necessary for mitigating climate change could be implemented in the region as a whole, because climate change is such a phenomenon that renders national or regional boundaries obsolete and that necessitates a holistic approach, including spatial integration among other “integrations.” In other words, in order to succeed in designing and implementing basin-wide measures aiming a successful climate adaptation, we need to transcend national boundaries and integrate the climate-vulnerable zones of the region into a unified whole. Within this context, a successful climate adaptation strategy necessarily means a transboundary cooperation. A number of measures are hitherto taken from the supply-side thinking. One key element of adaptation is diversification of water management strategies; another is ensuring equitable access for vulnerable populations. Most MENA countries already employ a variety of supply-side measures, including dams, water transfer schemes, desalination, reuse of treated wastewater, and procuring “virtual water” (Allan 2001) through imports. Water experts in the region, in concert with international institutions, increasingly advocate demand management to promote conservation and increase efficiency. Any cooperation attempt in the Euphrates-Tigris basin should aim at improving the water use in agriculture, because the greatest consumer of water, by far, in the Middle East is irrigation/ agriculture. On average, more than 70 % of water in the region is used in agriculture. As pointed out by Shetty (2006), countries in the region now face with “increasing pressure to allocate water away from agricultural to industrial and municipal uses, as well as to increase water efficiency within the agricultural sector.” On the other hand, rapid population increases put the region in a difficult dilemma. Improving agricultural water use appears to be difficult with the continuing trends of population increases in the basin. Recent climatic models for eastern Mediterranean and Turkey predict a significant reduction in precipitation (Gao and Giorgi 2008) that would require additional water withdrawals from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to meet agricultural demand throughout the basin. This “could have devastating effects on the water availability” in the whole basin. As Voss et al. (2013) conclude, “the decline in agricultural output significantly influences economic stability in the region and will continue to be a threat owing to perennial limitations on water availability and the emerging threats of climate change, including more prolonged drought.” Thus, whereas better climate mitigation requires water savings particularly in agriculture (this means countries of the region must focus their

Page 8 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_3-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

efforts in reallocating water towards nonagricultural water uses and use water more efficiently in agriculture9), this is not straightforward because of the fact that water is an indispensable element in food production in these countries and also farmers comprise big constituencies in all three countries. One possible way out of this deadlock seems to be utilization of “virtual water,” which is already in place to some extent. Both Iraq and Syria are increasingly importing foods. This is partly because of the recent warlike situation in these countries. In other words, if opportunity appears, these countries will opt for growing their own food instead. Therefore, there is a limit for virtual water: “food security.” Countries of the region do not want to rely on foods from international market.

Adaptation to Climate Change in Mesopotamia Through Transboundary Water Cooperation Steps necessary for climate adaptation need a holistic perspective in terms of national or regional boundaries. Therefore, intrastate solutions may not yield optimum outcomes when the question is about a phenomenon that does not know borders (Solomon et al. 2007). However, it appears to be quite difficult to realize a “transboundary” approach to climate change-related threats, particularly since it is mostly interconnected with the sensitive issue of water. A number of studies have long focused on methods of how to foster the cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris region.10 Nevertheless, given a number of factors limiting the construction of trust among countries, a workable solution for cooperation in this region of the world could not be easily implemented. Any attempt towards cooperation needs to take into account of the past experiences and long-lasting clashes of views and try not to cause additional problems instead of resolving them. In the past, several concepts and proposals were found “hegemonic” or “biased” and did not find ways of implementation.11 Therefore, there is the need for a neutral approach which would not create antagonisms. The “macro-region strategy” could be treated such an unbiased concept. Instead of facing the multifaceted and complex “water sharing” problem bluntly and as a single case for solution, the macro-region concept proposes an “issue-based” and “project-oriented” cooperation with an aim of making cooperation a habit in the region through working together around the priorities of all. Deconstructing the bigger problem of “lack of water cooperation” into smaller projects for attainable goals could work better. Within this context, climate change-related threats could be more easily dealt with.

This strategy is also known as “more crop per every drop.” For discussions on ET cooperation, inter alia, see Asit Biswas (ed.), International waters of the Middle East from Euphrates-Tigris to Nile, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994; Ayşeg€ul Kibaroğlu, Building a regime for the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river system. Kluwer Law International, London, The Hague, New York; Naff and Matson, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation. Westview Press, Boulder, 1984; Scheumann W, Schiffler M (eds) Water in the Middle East: potential for conflicts and prospects for cooperation. Springer, Berlin; G€un Kut Burning Waters: Hydropolitics of the Euphrates and the Tigris. In New Perspectives on Turkey, (9) (Fall), 1993. 11 See Warner (2008). 9

10

Page 9 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_3-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Box 1. The EU Model of Macro-Region: Lessons from Neighborhood (Excerpts from INTERACT 2009)

Definition of macro-region: “an area including territory from a number of different countries or regions associated with one or more common features or challenges.” “An area covering a number of administrative regions but with sufficient issues in common to justify a single strategic approach.” “Its borders are not delimited once and for all, but their ‘extent depends on the topic: for example, on economic issues it would involve all the countries in the region, on water quality issues it would involve the whole catchment area’. The macro-region is thus presented as a functional region, sharing challenges, opportunities and solutions. The antecedents of the EU’s currently-promoted macro-regional conceptualization can be traced back to the Brussels European Council of 14 December 2007, with the Council’s ‘invitation to the Commission to present an EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region’. “Macro-regional strategy requires no new ad hoc legislation. The main content is the preparation and implementation of a Plan of Action that derives from a strategic paper mostly drafted by national governments and the European Commission through a consultative approach. It is an endogenous ‘bottom up’ process: contrary to policies that descend from a communitarian strategic approach, the macro-region establishes its strategy through the involvement of local actors. Furthermore, the Plan of Action is concrete and contains tangible effects thanks to the identification of flagship projects.” “In all cases, the principle will be to add value to interventions, whether by the EU, national or regional authorities or the third or private sectors, in a way that significantly strengthens the functioning of the macro-region. Moreover, by resolving issues in a relatively small group of countries and regions the way may be cleared for better cohesion at the level of the Union.” “Working together can become a habit and a skill. In addition, overall coordination of actions across policy areas will very likely result in better results than individual initiatives.” “Concreteness: The one indispensable element in a macro-regional strategy is the resulting action. Strategies that consist of words in documents, and nothing more, will not achieve their objectives. An action plan, or something comparable, is therefore the sine qua non of an effective strategy. However, an action plan that stands alone risks being little more than a wish list. There is a need for an organising approach that explains and justifies the selection, prioritisation and sequencing of selected actions.”

Risks and Opportunities for the Mesopotamia EU’s functional model of macro-regions (Dubois et al. 2009; Stocchiero 2010) is a relatively novel approach which needs to be carefully studied and adapted to the conditions of the Middle East. When the Euphrates-Tigris basin is concerned, there are a number of certain risks and opportunities associated with this proposed scheme. It could be summarized as follows: Opportunities: (a) New and neutral concept (it is easier to build trust in the region with an unbiased concept). (b) Possible EU support and possible UN support (as well as other donors may contribute funding for establishing a secretariat, educational aid, training aid for relevant personnel). (c) The issue of water is common to many problems of all three countries of the region (gathering around common conflicts).

Page 10 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_3-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

(d) Establishment of a governing commission could be a starting point for further cooperation. (e) There are a clear model (EU) and a clear timetable to follow. Challenges: (a) Lack of political will for such a framework of action (two countries of the region, Iraq and Syria, are presumably in flux, and water cooperation has not been given due attention). (b) Lack of accountability and the problem of democratic deficit. (c) Capacity (technical, personnel) and funding is problematic in war-torn countries of Syria and Iraq. (d) There is no EU Commission-like body for acting as a guardian of the agreed projects. Building upon the opportunities and challenges listed above, the third stage would be composed of drawing up a “roadmap” for initializing and sustaining the cooperative framework of macroregion. One of the most significant parts of this roadmap would be the discussion of different scenarios of the institutional setup. For instance, creating a working commission (like the one in the EU) would be conducive to cooperation, but it could be easily abused and become a way of limiting the cooperation. Therefore, the institutional design of the new cooperative scheme should be meticulously analyzed with its far-reaching implications. In the fourth stage, designation of a number of flagship projects will be designed. These will be the beacons of cooperation for particularly the initial phases of the macro-region strategy. Anchoring in these flagship projects would have a likelihood to create a path-dependent attitude towards cooperation. The success of such a cooperative action framework will largely depend on the level of political commitment of the countries concerned rather than the foreign support. Therefore, the bulk of the needed investments are to be covered by the countries of the region, which renders this project difficult since both Iraq and Syria would not like to initiate and financially contribute to this framework. And Turkey, on the other hand, has not much to gain with this cooperative scheme given its dominant position in terms of geographic position (upstream) and water resources utilization.

Conclusions This chapter aims to analyze water-related implications of climate change in Euphrates-Tigris (ET) transboundary river basin and create a framework for advancing the international level of cooperation in order to better deal with common challenges that countries of the region began to face. The chapter began with a discussion of the possible undesirable water-related implications of climate change in ET basin countries (namely, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey) through utilization of existing scientific literature, then presents the current level of cooperation among three riparians and the gap between these challenges and existing transboundary water cooperation, and finally proposes a framework and an action plan for deepening water-based cooperation in the basin in order to tackle with the climate change-related challenges. Reports originating from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) conclude that freshwater systems are among the most vulnerable to climate change. In snow-dominated basins (such as the ET), hydrologic studies have long agreed that warming will result in earlier peak flows, greater winter flows, and lower summer flows. Also, climate models suggest that warmer temperatures will very likely lead to greater climate variability and an increase in the risk of extreme hydrologic events such as floods and droughts. The existing level of cooperation among three Page 11 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_3-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

riparians does not allow for successful management of the impacts of climate change, because there is hitherto no multilateral and comprehensive agreement involving all three riparians and all waterrelevant issues. The chapter attempts to provide a detailed framework for addressing the water-related risks of climate change in ET basin and discuss the applicability and effectiveness of possible solutions. Climate change-related impacts of desertification and water scarcity which could worsen the prevailing poverty in vast areas of the region necessitate systematic action by all countries of the region. In order to open up underexplored venues for target-oriented cooperation, the neutral concept of “macro-region” – which would be a project-driven process (Bialasiewicz et al. 2012; Medeiros 2011) – has been presented. Successful implementation of flagship projects in priority areas would become a basic trust-building measure for strengthening the development of a common understanding for regional problems, which appears to be one of the prerequisites for mitigating climate change-related problems. According to various scenarios, the climate change will be one of the most challenging phenomena in the Middle East, including the ET basin. Common challenges of this magnitude could only be dealt with collaborative action. To this end, this chapter proposed a neutral concept not only for advancing the practical cooperation among basin countries in the face of climate change but for also promoting the trust between three countries, which appears to be one of the prerequisites for strengthening cooperative ties. The chapter adopted a novel approach and focused on issue-based and attainable targets and project-driven solutions for lessening the adverse impacts of climate change in the region.

References Allan JA (2001) The Middle East water question: hydropolitics and the global economy. I.B Tauris, London/New York Al-Tamimi AJ, Svadkovsky O (2012) Demography is destiny in Syria: the “peripheralism” and Malthusian underpinnings of an unexpected uprising. The American Spectator. Retrieved from http://spectator.org/archives/2012/02/06/demography-is-destiny-in-syria. Accessed 27 Aug 2013 Bialasiewicz L et al (2012) Re-scaling ‘EU’rope: EU macro-regional fantasies in the Mediterranean. Eur Urban Reg Stud 20(1):59–76 Chenoweth J et al (2011) Impact of climate change on the water resources of the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East region: modeled 21st century changes and implications. Water Resour Res 47(6):1–18. doi:10.1029/2010WR010269 Cullen HM, deMenocal PB (2000) North Atlantic influence on Tigris-Euphrates streamflow. Int J Climatol 20:853–863 Dai A (2011) Drought under global warming: a review. WIREs Clim Change 2(1):45–65. doi:10.1002/wcc.81 Dubois et al (2009) EU macro-regions and macro-regional strategies – a scoping study. Nordregio Electronic working paper 2009, vol 4, Nordregio, Stockholm, Sweden Elhance AP (1999) Hydropolitics in the 3rd world: conflict and cooperation in international river basins. US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC Freimuth L, Bromberg G, Mehyar M, Al Khateeb N (2007) Climate change: a new threat to Middle East security. EcoPeace/Friends of the Earth Middle East, Amman/Bethlehem/Tel Aviv Gao X, Giorgi F (2008) Increased aridity in the Mediterranean region under greenhouse gas forcing estimated from high resolution simulations with a regional climate model. Global Planet Change 62(3–4):195–209 Page 12 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_3-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Granit J, Joyce J (2012) Options for cooperative action in the Euphrates and Tigris Region. Stockholm International Water Institute paper 20, Stockholm International Water Institute, Stockholm Heston A, Summers R, Aten B (2012) Penn world table version 7.1, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, November 2012 Interact (2009) Macro-regional strategies in the European Union. Retrieved from http://www.interacteu.net/downloads/1682/Macro-regional_strategies_in_the_European_Union.pdf. Accessed 28 Aug 2013 IPCC (2007), The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Jones C et al (2008) Hydrologic impacts of engineering projects on the Tigris–Euphrates system and its marshlands. J Hydrol 353(1–2):59–75 Kitoh A, Yatagai A, Alpert P (2008) First super-high-resolution model projection that the ancient “Fertile Crescent” will disappear in this century. Hydrol Res Lett 2:1–4 Kolars JF, Mitchell WA (1991) The Euphrates river and the Southeast Anatolia development project. Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale Medeiros E (2011) Euro–Meso–Macro: the new regions in Iberian and European space. Reg Stud 1–18 Moser SC, Dilling L (2004) Making climate hot. Communicating the urgency and challenge of global climate change. Environment 46(10):32–46 Ozdogan M (2011) Climate change impacts on snow water availability in the Euphrates-Tigris basin, Hydrology and Earth System Science, Vol. 15, pp. 2789–2803 Rifai F (2008) Impact of Collaboration in the Euphrates Tigris Region, http://www.inbo-news.org/ IMG/pdf/rifai.pdf Shetty S (2006) Water, food security and agricultural policy in the Middle East and North Africa Region. World Bank working paper series, vol 47, Office of the Chief Economist, Washington, DC Solomon S et al (eds) (2007) The physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York, p 996 Sowers J, Vengosh A, Weinthal E (2011) Climate change, water resources, and the politics of adaptation in the Middle East and North Africa. Clim Change 104:599–627 Stocchiero A (2010) Macro-regions of Europe: old wine in a new bottle? CeSPI, Background Paper, CeSPI, Rome, Italy Topcu et al (2010) Vulnerability of water resources under changing climate conditions in Upper Mesopotamia. In: BHS third international symposium, managing consequences of a changing global environment, Newcastle, UK Voss KA et al (2013) Groundwater depletion in the Middle East from GRACE with implications for transboundary water management in the Tigris-Euphrates-Western Iran region. Water Resour Res 49(2):904–914. doi:10.1002/wrcr.20078 Warner J (2008) Contested hydrohegemony: hydraulic control and security in Turkey. Water Altern 1(2):271–288 Wester P, Rap E, Vargas-Velázquez S (2009) The hydraulic mission and the Mexican hydrocracy: regulating and reforming the flows of water and power. Water Altern 2(3):395–415 Yilmaz AG, Imteaz MA (2011) Impact of climate change on runoff in the upper part of the Euphrates basin. Hydrol Sci J 56(7):1265–1279

Page 13 of 13

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Climate Change and Displacement in Bangladesh: Issues and Challenges Nour Mohammad* Assistant Professor of Law, Premier University, Chittagong, Bangladesh

Abstract The purpose of this chapter is to explain and come to understanding of causes of forced migration and climate displacement due to the climate change in the present era of globalization. Environmental crisis along with the increasing impacts of climate change in Bangladesh has become an important cause of cross-border migration to South Asian countries. This chapter attempts to focus on migration and climate displacement in Bangladesh. The research is based upon theoretical sources and empirical data. The consequences of such movement of population in South Asian context will generate a range of destabilizing sociopolitical, economic, and climate change impacts in the future. Bangladesh is commonly recognized as one of the most climate-vulnerable countries on earth and is set to become even more so as a result of climate change. This chapter underlines that climate displacement is not just a phenomenon to be addressed at some point in the future; it is a crisis that is unfolding across Bangladesh now. Sea-level rise and tropical cyclones in coastal areas as well as flooding and riverbank erosion in mainland areas, combined with the socioeconomic situation of the country, are already resulting in the loss of homes, land and property which are common phenomenon in Bangladesh. Among the many causes of vulnerability of people, crossborder migration due to climate change might increase the susceptibility of people to climate change in South Asian countries. This chapter examines the details of legal framework of current and future causes of climate displacement in Bangladesh. It further analyzes existing government policies and programs intended to provide solutions to climate displacement and relief to climate displaced persons and emphasizes that rights-based solutions must be utilized as the basis for solving this crisis.

Keywords Climate change; Displacement; Environmental migrants; Vulnerability; Policy; Bangladesh

Introduction Climate change is one of the most serious threats in the present world. It will affect all of us but will have a disproportionate impact on millions of poor rural people of developing countries. It puts more people at risk of hunger and makes it more difficult to reduce the proportion of people living in extreme poverty. For development work to be effective, we must help poor rural people cope with and mitigate the impact of climate change. The concept of climate and displacement is not a new phenomenon and can be traced back to earlier deliberations on environmental displacement, which *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

were particularly prominent during the 1990s. Climate change has emerged as the greatest threat faced by human beings in the modern world (Clime Asia 2009). The adverse effects of climate change destabilize the human displacement, economic development, human security, and people’s fundamental right (UNDP 2007). Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration are among the key topics that dominate the international and national political arena today. Environmental migration is a reality that can no longer be overlooked. Millions of people have already been displaced as a result of climate change and climate-related natural disasters like Alia and Sidr in Bangladesh. The affected people are also moving from one place to another because of environmental disaster and not able to continue their livelihood anymore. The Red Cross research shows that more people are now displaced by environmental disasters than by war. The United Nations University predicts that 50 million people globally will be displaced by environmental crises by the year 2010. According to other experts in the relevant field, there could be as many as 200 million displaced worldwide by 2050. Although these numbers are expertly researched estimates, even the predictions on the lowest end of the scale are immense. The concept of migration is not a new one; it has been developed for thousands of years ago. This phenomenon is new because there are more and more people that are forced to flee their homes due to environmental factors and natural disaster related to climate change. The complex interdependence between these phenomenon and the potential consequences of the failure to tackle them in time are beginning to attract increasing public and scientific attention. The manifested political commitments to the pursuit of sustainable development, environmental protection, and the respect, protection, and fulfillment of human rights and even more so to their interlinkages are often limited by narrow geopolitical interests when action becomes necessary. Bangladesh is widely recognized to be one of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world. It is found that in every year, natural disaster frequently happens, which causes loss of life and damage to infrastructure and economic assets and adversely impacts on lives and livelihoods, especially of poor people (BCCSAP 2008). Climate change is considered to be a critical global challenge and recent events have demonstrated the world’s growing vulnerability to climate change. The impacts of climate change range from affecting agriculture to further endangering food security, to rising sea levels and the accelerated erosion of coastal zones, and to increasing intensity of natural disasters, species extinction, and the spread of vector-borne diseases (United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 2007). Bangladesh has developed some facility for dealing with the impacts of climate change at the national level and policy response options has been mobilized that deal with vulnerability reduction to environmental variability and most recently to climate change in particular (Saleemul Haq. Ayers 2007).

Climate Change and Bangladesh Bangladesh is one of the largest deltas in the world which is highly vulnerable to natural disasters because of its geographical location, flat and low-lying landscape, population density, poverty, illiteracy, lack of institutional system, etc. In other words, the physical, social, as well as economic conditions of Bangladesh are very typical to any of the most vulnerable countries to natural disasters in the world. The total land area is 147,570 km2 and consists mostly of floodplains (almost 80 %) leaving major part of the country (with the exception of the northwestern highlands) prone to flooding during the rainy season. Moreover, the adverse affects of climate change especially high temperature, sea-level rise, cyclones and storm surges, salinity intrusion, heavy monsoon downpours, etc. has aggravated the overall economic development scenario of the country to a great extent Page 2 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

(Anne Katrien 2012). Climate change is an important issue in the effort for global peace. The global temperatures and sea levels are changing day by day. The whole world is apprehended about the unnatural changes occurring in global climate. The issue of global climate change that we are facing is more pressing than ever (BCCSAP 2009). In Bangladesh the climate change is affecting the human life and economical development and causing displacement of human being. Due to global warming, the country has experienced unusual changes in seasons and faces unexpected rains, dry spells, temperatures, and other symptoms of changes in global weather patterns. Bangladesh’s vulnerability to climate change lies mainly in its density of population and that a large part of its area consists of low-lying coastal areas and expansive floodplains. Now Bangladesh has a population of 163 million people (Bangladesh Demographic Report 2013). While the country’s population has been increasing, on the one hand, its forests are being depleted on the other (Jahangir Alam 2009). An increasing world population and harmful industrialization by the developed countries are the main causes of climate change. The severity of storms, droughts, rainfall, floods, and other natural disasters has been increasing in developing countries like Bangladesh in particular, due to climate change. Global warming threatens our agriculture also, which is the backbone of a country. Every year, natural disasters occur like Sidr and Alia causing havoc effects on Bangladesh agriculture, touching every corner of the country. Due to lack of resources and other causes, Bangladesh does not have the capacity to ensure that appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the damage (Ahamed 2008). The coastal areas of Bangladesh and the coastal people are mostly affected by the climate change and they are losing ponds, lakes, dams, and forestry due to natural disaster. National and regional varieties of fish are being lost due to such climate disaster. Specialists have consensus that 54 varieties of fish in Bangladesh have already been lost due to climate change and natural disaster, and forest and animals are also being lost. Most of the people in Bangladesh are living in rural areas and lead a very poor life. According to the Water Development Board, there is a total of 11,000 km of embankment that the Water Development Board developed, of which around 250 km were damaged by water surges during cyclones Sidr and Alia. The existing embankment at Moheshkhali under Cox’s Bazar District requires a 4.5 m height increase to protect against storm surges and sea-level rises due to the effects of climate change. Any future embankments should be designed to be 2–4 m higher than the existing ones. Due to climate change, the weather in Bangladesh has changed. Water levels have fallen, temperatures have risen, and the incidence of floods, dry spells, and cyclones have all increased, affecting both people’s lifestyle and the crops. At least 30 rivers, including the Padma, the Gomti, and the Teesta, have dried up. And most of the other rivers in Bangladesh are being lost because they are being filled with soil. Parts of northern Bangladesh are becoming desert. Geological and biological changes in the area are threatening normal life (Shamsudoha and Chy 2009). Bangladesh needs technological and economic support to survive the effects of a changing climate. Just as important is the proper handling of any foreign funds Bangladesh may get, since we know that corruption is another large barrier to our prosperity.

Causes of Climate Change and Displacement: The Present Scenario The main causes of environmental deterioration or devastation forcing people to move from their natural habitat are many and varied. The primary causes of climate displacement in Bangladesh tidal height increases in the coastal areas and riverbank erosion in the mainland areas. The secondary causes of displacement are tropical cyclones and storm surges in the coastal regions and river flooding in the mainland. The main scenario sites of displacement have been in the coastal areas and Page 3 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

in the river delta regions in the mainland. Bangladesh has 64 districts of them 24 coastal and mainland districts have already producing climate displaced peoples (Climate displacement Report 2012). Impacts related to climate change could be divided into two distinct drivers of migration: (a) Long-term climate processes (for instance, sea-level rise, salinization of agricultural land, desertification, soil erosion, water scarcity) (b) Short-term extreme climate events and extreme weather events (for instance, flooding, hurricanes, storms) According to International Organization for Migration (IOM), climate change is likely to affect the movement of people in at least four ways: (i) the intensification of natural disasters like both sudden and slow onset leading to increased displacement and migration; (ii) the adverse consequences of increased warming, climate variability and of other effects of climate change for livelihoods, public health, food security, and water availability; (iii) rising sea levels that make coastal areas tumble down; and (iv) competition over scarce natural resources potentially leading to growing tensions and even conflict and, in turn, displacement. The consequences of climate change (including its effects on migration) will be most severe for the developing world like Bangladesh. Particular areas including the Asian mega deltas have been identified as “hotspots” where greater revelation and sensitivity to climate change combine with limited adaptive capacity to suggest that impacts will be most significant (IOM 2008). The proposed working definition of migrant by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is that environmentally induced migration or environmental migrants to encompass people who move as a result of natural or human-made disasters as well as those who migrate because of deteriorating environmental conditions. According to this definition, environmental migrants are those “Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to have to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their territory or abroad.” This definition is inclusive of all persons who have an environmental factor as the major cause of migration and acknowledges that environmentally induced migration can be internal as well as international and a short- or long-term phenomenon, due to sudden or gradual environmental change, without ignoring other intervening political, economic, and social factors. One of the most basic issues in climate change and environmentally induced migration is that it is an international issue or process, but not a regional or local issue. The international community has the responsibility to provide adequate measures for prevention, adaptation policy, and mitigation community in order for the mostly affected countries to reduce their vulnerability to the impacts of environmental disasters and manage the development of environmental processes. The local and national authorities have no power to engage in proactive intervention to reduce the crisis of climate change. Environmentally induced migration is rarely mono-causal. The cause-consequence relations are increasingly complex and multifactorial (Myers et al. 1995). A growing number of people flee because of multiple causes of injustice, exclusion, environmental degradation, competition for scarce resources, and economic hardship caused by dysfunctional states. Some people leave voluntarily, some flee because there is no other choice, and some may make the decision to move before they have no other choice but to flee. The different degrees of force and the complex set of influencing factors blurs the traditional concepts of migration and displacement, creating confusion

Page 4 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

among the academia and the international community about whether to talk about migration or displacement in the case of people fleeing disasters and environmental degradation (Tina 2008). There is a scientific perception that the effects of the climate change are frustrating; many of the natural environmental hazards already faced by Bangladesh in every year (McAdam and Saul 2010) are sudden-onset events including floods, cyclones, storm surges, waterlogging, salinity intrusion, and riverbank erosion and slow-onset events such as coastal erosion, sea-level rise, saltwater intrusion, etc. Bangladesh’s vulnerability to natural hazards leads to climate displacement – the forced displacement of individuals and communities from their homes and lands. This is as a result of both “suddenonset events” such as floods, cyclones, and riverbank erosion as well as “slow-onset processes” such as coastal erosion, seal-level rise, saltwater intrusion, changing rainfall pattern and drought, etc. (Siddiqui 2011). Alarmist prediction is that some 30 million people will be displaced from Bangladesh by 2050 as a result of climate change (McAdam and Saul 2010). It is projected that six million people have already been displaced by the effects of climate hazards in Bangladesh. However, human displacement and migration is a multi-causal phenomenon even in cases where climate change is a predominant driver of migration; it is usually compounded by social, economic, political, and other factors. Resource, social network, cultural ability to cope with change, individual’s attitude, position in family decision making, and gender contribute to decision to migrate or not (Matthew 2010). It is estimated that 60,000 deaths from climate-related natural disasters occur every year (UN News Service 2007) and that 30 million people worldwide are being displaced because of serious degradation of environmental conditions, natural disasters, and depletion of natural resources. This figure is expected to soar by the middle of this century. While there are no authoritative global figures on the number of people who will move for environmental reasons in the future, the Stern Review provides an estimate of 150–200 million becoming permanently displaced due to the effects of climate change by the year 2050 (Stern 2006). However, the international community is largely ignoring the issue that may potentially become one of the greatest global demographic and humanitarian challenges for the twenty-first century (Myers and Kent 1995).

Climate Displacement in Bangladesh: Future Situation Bangladesh has total 64 districts, of which 24 districts are coastal and mainland from which people are displaced. Bangladesh having 160 million people is highly vulnerable to climate change and displacement due to sea-level rise (Rabbani 2009). Twenty-eight percent of the population of Bangladesh lives in the coastal regions of the country (Rafiqul Islam 2007). Climate change is one of the greatest challenges for the world today. The effects of climate change will aggravate many of the natural hazards faced by Bangladesh in every year, including all of the natural hazards currently leading to climate displacement: flooding, tropical cyclones, storm surges, salinity intrusion, and riverbank and coastal erosion and SLR. The Intergovernmental Penal of Climate Change (IPCC) has provided that climate change and global warming are likely to lead to an increase of rainfall, rise in the frequency of flash floods and large-area floods, earlier melting of snowpacks and melting of glaciers, frequent and intense droughts, intense tropical cyclones, rising sea levels, frequent and intense storm surges, and intense inland rainfall and stronger winds

Page 5 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

(IPCC 2007). Sea-level rise from climate change is anticipated to worsen many of these processes and to subsume up to 13 % of Bangladesh’s coastal land by 2080 (Pender 2008). Heavier and more erratic rainfall in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna system is likely to lead to further riverbank erosion resulting in mass displacement in the mainland areas of Bangladesh. Besides, erratic rainfall is also likely to lead to overtopping and breaching of embankments resulting in widespread flooding in both urban and rural areas. In addition, it is likely to lead to increasing droughts, especially in the drier northern and western regions of Bangladesh which record significantly less rainfall causing the destruction of crop yields and severe disruption to livelihoods (IPCC Third Assessment Report 2001). Erratic rainfall is likely to lead to increasingly frequent and severe landslides in the hill regions of Bangladesh triggering human exodus. As the Himalayan glaciers continue to melt, it is likely that there will be higher river flows in the warmer months of the year, followed by lower river flows and increased saline intrusion after the glaciers have shrunk or disappeared (Displacement Solution Report in Bangladesh 2012). The difficulty inherent in predicting the future impact of climate change on displacement in Bangladesh means that any attempt to quantify the exact number of climate displaces should be treated with some caution. However, as all of the key current drivers of displacement are expected to increase in both frequency and intensity due to climate change, it is highly likely that the number of climate displaced due to existing factors will continue to increase in the future in Bangladesh. In addition, the number of climate displaced is likely to rise even higher due to secondary and as yet unforeseen effects of climate change (Haque 1996).

Existing Potential Policies and Institutional Frameworks in Bangladesh Bangladesh, being one of the most vulnerable countries, has adopted a number of policies and institutional frameworks over the recent years. These measures have been undertaken to combat frequent natural disasters and the adverse effects of climate change.

Policies and Institutional Framework on Environment in National Level The Government of Bangladesh has adopted a number of national policy and framework for the protection of environment and natural disaster. National Environmental Policy 1992 and the Coastal Zone Policy 2005 deal with the adverse effects of disasters and environmental problems (Roy 2012). But there is no clear indication about the problems of population displacement. In terms of guiding strategies on the environment, among the key documents is the National Environmental Management Action Plan 1996, the more recent National Capacity Self-Assessment (NCSA) for Global Environmental Management 2007, and the sector-specific environmental policies such as the National Water Policy 1999 and the Guidelines for Participatory Water Management. All of these documents are understandably focused on meeting Bangladesh’s current environmental challenges and make few specific references to the migration effects of environmental change and degradation (although the NSCA refers to the problems of displacement by riverbank erosion, rural-urban migration, and the potential for out-migration from coastal zones). In contrast, policies on disaster management such as the Draft National Plan for Disaster Management 2008 do make reference to displacement and specific vulnerabilities related to migration, such as problems faced by families who are left behind when men out-migrate following an event (Walsham et al. 2012). The institutional framework of Bangladesh consists of different disaster management committees at different levels comprising government, nongovernment, voluntary, and other relevant stakeholders. The National Disaster Management Council (NDMC), headed by the Prime Minister, is Page 6 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

established to provide guidance towards disaster risk reduction and emergency response management in Bangladesh and is the highest-level forum for the formulation and review of disaster management policies. The Inter-Ministerial Disaster Management Coordination Committee is responsible for implementing disaster management policies and the decisions of the NDMC and is assisted by the National Disaster Management Advisory Committee (Roy 2011). The Ministry of Food and Disaster Management is the focal ministry for disaster management in Bangladesh. Its Disaster Management Bureau (DMB) is mainly responsible for coordinating national disaster management interventions across all agencies. In 2000 the government published “Standing Orders on Disaster” which provides a detailed institutional framework for disaster risk reduction and emergency management and defines the roles and responsibilities of different agencies and committees (BCCSAP 2008).

Existing Policies and Institutional Mechanisms on Climate Change in Bangladesh The Government of Bangladesh has taken many steps to address adaptation to climate change including the establishment of a 45-million-dollar Climate Change Fund, the development of the Bangladesh National Adaptation Programme of Action in 2005 (NAPA), and the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009 (Fatima and Anita 2010). The National Adaptation Programme of Action in 2005 (NAPA) The Government of Bangladesh has adopted the National Adaptation Programme of Action in 2005 (NAPA) prepared by the Ministry of Environment and Forests. The NAPA aimed to accumulate the understanding of the current state of affairs from discussions with appropriate stakeholders from four subnational workshops and one national workshop (MOEF 2005). The NAPA was prepared keeping in mind the sustainable development goals and objectives of Bangladesh where the importance of addressing environmental issues and natural resource management with the participation of stakeholder in bargaining over resource use, allocation, and distribution was recognized (BCAS 2008). The NAPA recognizes that Bangladesh will be one of the most adversely affected countries due to climate change especially because of Bangladesh’s “low economic strength, inadequate infrastructure, low level of social development, lack of institutional capacity and a higher dependency on the natural resource base.” The NAPA suggested adopting the following measures for Bangladesh to adverse effect of climate change including variability and extreme events based on coping mechanisms and practices. The suggested future adaptations are (MOEF 2005): (i) Reduction of climate change hazards through coastal afforestation with community participation (ii) Providing drinking water to coastal communities to combat enhanced salinity due to sea-level rise (iii) Capacity building for integrating climate change in planning, designing of infrastructure, conflict management, and land-water zoning for water management institutions (iv) Climate change and adaptation information dissemination to vulnerable community for emergency preparedness measures and awareness rising on enhanced climatic disasters (v) Construction of flood shelter and information and assistance center to cope with enhanced recurrent floods in major floodplains (vi) Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change into policies and programs in different sectors (focusing on disaster management, water, agriculture, health, and industry)

Page 7 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

(vii) Inclusion of climate change issues in curriculum at secondary and tertiary educational institution (viii) Enhancing resilience of urban infrastructure and industries to impacts of climate change (ix) Development of eco-specific adaptive knowledge (including indigenous knowledge) on adaptation to climate variability to enhance adaptive capacity for future climate change (x) Promotion of research on drought-, flood-, and saline-tolerant varieties of crops to facilitate adaptation in the future (xi) Promoting adaptation to coastal crop agriculture to combat increased salinity (xii) Adaptation to agriculture systems in areas prone to enhanced flash flooding in North East and Central Region (xiii) Adaptation to fisheries in areas prone to enhanced flooding in North East and Central Region through adaptive and diversified fish culture practices (xiv) Promoting adaptation to coastal fisheries through culture of salt-tolerant fish special in coastal areas of Bangladesh (xv) Exploring options for insurance and other emergency preparedness measures to cope with enhanced climatic disasters In 2005 NAPA identified some adverse impacts of climate change, many of which link with climate displacement such as scarcity of freshwater due to less rain and higher evapotranspiration in dry seasons, drainages congestion due to higher water level in the confluence of the rise of sea level, riverbank erosion, frequent flood and widespread drought, and salinity in the surface, ground, and soil in the coastal zone due to migration; however, these links were not expressed in concrete terms. The document also stated that a potential long-term consequence of the “adaptation to agriculture systems in areas prone to enhanced flash flooding” project would be that “people might get a means to continue with farming, instead of migrating to cities after the flood.” Bangladesh NAPA has moved from the urgent needs to wider adaptation requirement to address medium- and long-term climate issues. It gave emphasis on four basic national security issues of Bangladesh, i.e., (a) food security, (b) energy security, (c) water security, and (d) livelihood security (including right to health) and respect for local community on resource management (Haque 2011). The Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan in 2009 (BCCSAP) Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan is the most recent document formulated by the government aiming to address the adaptation and mitigation to build the capacity and reliance of the country to climate change for a period of decade 2009–2018. The plan was prepared in 2009 focusing on a 10-year program to encounter the potential challenges and variation condition (BCCSAP 2009). BCCSAP identifies all the climate-induced hazards, including flood, drought, salinity intrusion, cyclone and storm surge variations in temperature and rainfall, etc., and their associated impacts on different sectors. BCCSAP identifies a set of activities/measures under the following six major themes: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)

Food security, social protection, and health Comprehensive disaster management Infrastructure Research and knowledge management Mitigation and low carbon development Capacity building and institutional strengthening Page 8 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

The BCCSAP recognizes that “Bangladesh is one of the most climate vulnerable countries on earth and will become even more so as a result of climate change” (IPCC Third Assessment Report 2001) and highlights the many risks of the effects of climate change that have led to displacement, including floods, tropical cyclones, storm surges, and droughts. It states that increased riverbank erosion and saline water intrusion in coastal areas “are likely to displace hundreds of thousands of people” and that if sea-level rise is higher than currently expected and coastal polders are not strengthened and/or new ones built, “six to eight million people could be displaced by 2050 and would have to be resettled.” The BCCSAP provides that “it is now evident that population in many parts of the country will be so adversely affected [by climate change] that they will have to move out. . .The process of migration of climate change-affected people, both inside and outside the country, need[s] to be monitored closely. . .and adequate institutional support should be provided for their proper resettlement.” In addition to these two mechanisms, there are some existing traditional climate change-related fund mechanisms in Bangladesh to address the issue of climate change. Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF) based on revenue from the national budget, within a legal mandate by the Climate Change Trust Act passed in Parliament in 2010. At the same time, an alternate Bangladesh Climate Change Resilient Fund (BCCRF), which was formerly known as the Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF), was created to pool funds from the country’s development partners. Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF) The Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund is a “block budgetary allocation” of US$ 100 million each year for 3 years (2009–2012). The Climate Change Act provides that an amount equivalent to 66 % of the total fund is being spent for the implementation of BCCSAP while 34 % will be maintained as a “fixed deposit” for emergencies. The interest accrued on the 34 % fixed deposit will also be spent on project implementation. Funds from the BCCTF can be used to finance public sector and 10 % for nongovernment projects, and it is not mandatory to spend the total grant within a given financial year (Munjurul et al. 2006). Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF) Bangladesh Climate Resilience Fund (BCRF) has also been created by the government for supporting actions to address climate change. Mainly international development partners of Bangladesh are contributing to create this fund. In April 2008, a UK-Bangladesh Climate Change Conference was held in Dhaka. The development partners expressed their view for the urgency of establishing a “financial mechanism” to assist Bangladesh in combating the impacts of climate change. Subsequently, the London Climate Change Conference was organized jointly by Bangladesh and the UK in September 2008. However, finally in May 2010, DPs in Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) agreed the establishment of BCCRF which would be managed by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB). World Bank is providing “fiduciary” support to the BCCRF with an objective of handing it over to the GoB in the next 3 years. By this time the BCCRF has received an approximate amount of 200 million USD from different DPs including UK, EU, Denmark, Sweden, and Australia. An amount of 90 % of the total amount would be spent by different ministries while the rest 10 % would be managed by PKSF to support initiatives taken by NGOs and Bilateral Development Partners (Hoque 2007). Sectoral Adaptation Policies Bangladesh has developed a good number of sectoral adaptation policies since 1990. Considering the fact that Bangladesh is highly susceptible to climate change, only one sectoral policy on the coastal zone has considered climate change (BCAS 2010). The National Water Policy (NWP) was Page 9 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

formulated in 1999, considered firstly short-, medium-, and long-term perspectives for water resources in Bangladesh. The NWP was followed by the National Water Management Plan (NWMP) in 2001. Though there is a huge effect of climate change on water resources in Bangladesh, the NWP does not mention the climate change issue at all. However, the NWMP identifies climate change as one of the future elements affecting supply and demand of water. The National Environmental Management Action Plan (NEMAP), which was published in 1995, does not illuminate climate change. Similar to NEMAP, the National Land Use Policy (NLUP) and the National Forest Policy (NFoP) do not make direct reference to climate change. Climate change was not also addressed in the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) papers until recently. The present PRS recognizes the threat of climate change and its adverse impacts on the development process. It understands the need for integration/mainstreaming. Integration/mainstreaming of adaptation measures into other policy areas and the implementation of the adaptation projects were identified in the NAPA (BCAS 2010). Institutional Mechanisms There are many departments in Bangladesh working for institutional mechanisms for climate change. The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) is mainly responsible for policy formulation on climate change and its adaptation while the Climate Change Unit (CCU) and Department of Environment (DOE) implement projects and programs under NAPA and BCCSAP at the community level. The National Steering Committee on Climate Change (NSCCC), chaired by the Minister of MOEF, is composed by secretaries of all climate-affected ministries, divisions, and representatives of civil society and business community. The National Environment Committee under the ministry is expected to mainstream climate change into national development planning. Climate Change Focal Points (CCFP) in various ministries are expected to provide collaboration. Five technical working groups have been constituted for adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer, financing, and public awareness (Country Summary Report 2010).

Climate Change and Internal Displacement: International Legal Framework Bangladesh ranks as the country most at risk of natural disaster. The displacement occurs in the immediate, sudden onset such as flood, cyclones, and riverbank erosion, etc.; the people move from one place to another place and seek to return to their homes as soon as they can, but sometimes it is quite impossible to return to their homes when the areas are repeatedly inundated. Displacements due to sudden onset are predominantly localized in Bangladesh. The people living in the vulnerable areas are very poor and lack resources; they do not move to a long-distance place and do not have any support from the networks of other countries. They remain in their home country and qualify as an internal displacement.

Guiding Principles in Internal Displacement (1998) The guiding principle on internal displacement is one of the promising initiatives at the international level to promote and provide protection and assistance for internally displaced person (IDPs). These principles fill a major gap in the international protection system for the rights of IDPs and the obligation of governments and insurgent forces in all phases of displacement. They offer protection before internal displacement occurs (i.e., protection against arbitrary displacement), during situations of displacement, and in postconflict return and reintegration. Page 10 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

The United Nations officially first dealt with internally displaced persons in 1972, but did not define who exactly would be considered to be internally displaced. ECOSOC res. 1705 (LIII), 27 Jul. 1972. Para. 1 of resolution 1705 provides that “The Economic and Social Council urges Governments, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, specialized agencies and other organizations associated with the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations concerned, to provide the assistance required for the voluntary repatriation, rehabilitation and resettlement of the refugees returning from abroad, as well as persons displaced within the country.” Francis Deng, nominated as Special Representative of Secretary-General on the human rights issues related to internally displaced persons by Commission on Human Rights in 1992, further refined the existing definitions. In 1998, he submitted a set of “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” to the Human Rights Commission. The needs of the IDPs stem from twofold danger (Geissler 1999): (a) Whenever persons are forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, multiple human rights violations, such as acts of violence, armed attack, torture, disappearances, or rape, are committed on them. (b) There is no clearly defined institutional protection for IDPs and have only little coordinated ad hoc responses. Several initiatives have been taken to address the plight of internally displaced persons more efficiently. In the quest for a more effective response, the international community has concentrated its efforts along two main lines, that of identifying an appropriate normative framework and that of developing effective institutional arrangements. The Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis Deng, has been catalytic to these initiatives and, more generally, to stimulating a better understanding of the numerous complex issues associated with internal displacement. A number of international bodies, guidelines, and standards also exist which specifically protect the rights of displaced persons. These include the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the Pinheiro Principles, the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters, the Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 and 10/4 on Human Rights and Climate Change, the 1951 Geneva Convention, the Code of Conduct for the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes, the Responsibility to Protect of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, and the Humanitarian Charter of the Sphere Project. The United Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (the Pinheiro Principles) (UN Sub-Commission 2005). There are 23 principles recognizing the right to be protected from displacement, right to housing and property restitution, right to nondiscrimination, right to equality between men and women, right to privacy and respect for the home, right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, right to voluntary return and safety, right to freedom of movement, etc. The United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters (IASC 2006) ensures that displaced persons or those otherwise affected by natural disasters do not lose the rights of the population at large, and at the same time, they have particular needs which call for greater protection and assistance measures. It also states that protection is not only limited to securing survival and physical security but also encompasses all aspects of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights as afforded by international standards.

Page 11 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

The Human Rights Council Resolution on 28 March 2008 adopted its first resolution 7/23 (HRCU 2008) and on 25 March 2009 adopted another resolution 10/4 on Human Rights and Climate Change, recognize the relationship between human rights and climate change, and also climate change-induced displacement. It also recognizes that climate change is a global problem and that it requires global solution. The Human Rights Council has taken the decision to hold panel discussions on the relationship between climate change and human rights in order to contribute to the realization of the goals set out in the Bali Action Plan. The 1951 Refugee Convention while not providing protection for persons fleeing environmentally harm and natural disaster could be useful in narrow circumstances whereby victims are entitled to protection under the principle of non-refoulement. This would prevent a government’s return of a person from their country regardless of legal status, where the person’s life or integrity are at risk or where return would subject the person to cruel, unusual, or degrading treatment. The Code of Conduct for the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and NGOs in Disaster Response Programme affirms that the humanitarian imperative comes first and without any discrimination and that disaster-affected victims will be recognized and treated as dignified humans. The doctrine of responsibility to protect was first established in 2001 by a group of prominent human rights leader comprising the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty on the Responsibility to Protect which aims to develop “global political consensus about how and when the international community should respond to emerging crises involving the potential for large-scale loss of life and other widespread crimes against humanity.” The said doctrine reaffirms that the primary responsibility for the protection of its displaced people, but that in situations where this is not possible or not being done, the international community will intervene which includes scenarios of overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes. The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards of the Sphere Project is structured around the three core principles of the right to life with dignity, the right to protection and security, and the right to receive humanitarian assistance. The minimum standards ensure that affected persons have access to at least the minimum requirements of water, sanitation, food, nutrition, shelter, and healthcare in order to satisfy their basic right to life with dignity. Although these guidelines and instruments are not legally binding, they provide a soft law approach to dealing with the issue of displaced persons. It should be mention here that most of these instruments only cover displacement caused by natural disasters and do not take into account displacement caused by environmental degradation such as desertification or movement caused indirectly by climate change. It is predicted that the majority of climate change-induced displacement be caused indirectly, and therefore, there is an urgent need to formulate a framework for the protection of their rights (Fitma et al. 2010).

Conclusion Climate change poses a dreadful challenge for all countries, but its major impact will be on developing countries like Bangladesh. Climate displacement in Bangladesh, which is increasing day by day due to climate change, increases the frequency and intensity of the natural hazards that are already leading to displacement in Bangladesh. It is very essential to take effective and appropriate arrangement to make a durable solution to this growing issue. However, migration policy should be better integrated into the national development agendas as well as development cooperation. Development cooperation can help vulnerable communities living in absolute poverty Page 12 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

to mitigate the impacts of environmental degradation and climate change and to reduce their vulnerability to the effects of such phenomena. Development strategies must in the future also pay more heed to the sustainability of development plans in the light of foreseeable climate impacts at local level. For example, the agricultural development of a region likely to be strongly affected by drought in the future should be reevaluated (Committee on migration, refugee and population 2008). Climate change and climate change-related effects have a horrific impact not only on the environment but also on the human inhabitants. The number of natural disaster is growing together with the number of people who are migrating from one place to another place due to climate change. If the process is continued, between 50 million and 350 million climate migrant will be expected by 2050. The existing policies and institutional mechanism should be reviewed for better disaster responses. The primary responsibility goes to the government to address the immediate and future displacement crisis in Bangladesh. The capacity of the government and other national and international concerned authority has to plan and implement adaptive program to meet the challenge of climate change. Proper training, education, and awareness program has to be undertaken for the capacity building. Additionally proper implementation of the policies and guidelines needs to be ensured for better displacement of the person. Every attempt should be taken by the concern authority to find domestic solution to displacement, in the event that domestic solution is no longer viable. The international environmental law as well as international human rights law can play a vital role as appropriate mechanisms are crafted to support developing countries in their response to the adverse impacts of climate change. The international community has also taken the matter as an urgent and calls for political will to make it happen.

References Association for Climate Refugees (2012) Climate “refugees” in Bangladesh – answering the basics: the where, how, who and how many? Available at http://displacementsolutions.org/?p¼547. Accessed 20 Aug 2012 Climate Change (IPCC Third Assessment Report) (2001) Available at http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/. Accessed 20 Aug 2012 Climate Displacement in Bangladesh (2012) The need for urgent housing, land and property rights solutions, displacement solutions climate displacement in Bangladesh report, May 2012, p 4. Available at http://displacementsolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/DS-Climate-Displacementin-Bangladesh-Report-LOW-RES-FOR-WEB.pdf. Accessed 20 Aug 2012 Clime Asia (2009) Editorial: Clime Asia, a Climate Action Network-South Asia (CANSA) Newsletter. BCAS, Dhaka CSR (2010) Country Summary Report, Bangladesh (2010) Project for increasing stakeholder utilization of GAR 11, Preparation Study for Asia, Compiled by Practical Action for UNISDR, p 12. Available at http://www.undp.org.bd/info/pub/Country%20Summary%20Report.pdf Fatima R, Anita JW (2010) Human rights, climate change, environmental degradation and displacement: a new paradigm. In: Rahman M (ed) Human rights and sovereignty over natural resources. Empowerment Through Law of the Common People (ELCOP) & Palal Prokashoni, Dhaka, p 192 Geissler N (1999) The international protection of internally displaced person’s. Int J Refug Law 11(3):452 Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and Forests (2008) Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Dhaka, p 4 Page 13 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Haque M (1996) Climate change: issues for the policy makers of Bangladesh. Environment and Development Alliance, Dhaka, pp 13–14 IASC (2006) The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and natural disaster. Available at http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx? page¼content-products-products&sel¼1. Accessed 30 Aug 2012 IOM (2009) International Organization of Migration Compendium of IMO’s activities in migration, climate change and environment. International Organization for Migration, Geneva IPCC (2001) Climate Change (IPCC Third Assessment Report), 2001. Available at http://www. grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/. Accessed 20 Aug 2012 IPCC (2007) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group II: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, fourth assessment report: Climate Change 2007. Genava, Switzerland McAdam J and Saul B (2010) Displacement with dignity: international law and policy responses to climate change migration and security in Bangladesh, University of New South Wales, and Faculty of law research series, Paper 63 Myers N, Kent J (1995) Environmental exodus: an emergent crisis in the global arena. Climate Institute, Washington, DC Pender J (2008) Community-led adaptation in Bangladesh. Forced Migration Review 31, p 54, citing research by the UK Institute of Development Studies. Available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/ climatechange/orchid Rabbani MG (2009) Climate forced migration: a massive threat to coastal people in Bangladesh, clime Asia: Climate Action Network-South Asia Newsletter. BCAS, Dhaka Roy D (2011) Chandra vulnerability and population displacements due to climate-induced disasters in coastal Bangladesh. In: Leighton M, Shen X, Warner K (eds) Climate change and migration: rethinking policies for adaptation and disaster risk reduction, Studies of the University: Research, Counsel, Education (SOURCE), no. 15/2011, publication series of UNU-EHS, p 30. Available at http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/8468. Accessed 30 Aug 2012 Siddiqui T (2011) Climate change induced displacement: migration as an adaptation strategy, The Daily Star. Available http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid¼210113. Accessed 20 Aug 2012 Stern N (2006) The economics of climate change – the Stern review. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 77 The Code of Conduct for the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and NGOs (2012). Available at http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/code-of-conduct/. Accessed 30 Aug 2012 The Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 on Human Rights and Climate Change (2012). Available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_7_23.pdf. Accessed 30 Aug 2012 Tina A (2008) Sweden, alliance of liberals and democrats for Europe, 23 Dec 2008 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (2008) Principles on housing and property restitution for refugees and displaced persons, 28 June 2005, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17 UNA (2007) United Nations Agency, highlight climate change’s impact on human security, health, UN News service, 5 June 2007 UNDP (2007) Climate change and the MDGs, United Nations Development programme. http:// www.undp.org/gef/adaptation/dev/o2a.htm. Accessed 3 Apr 2007

Page 14 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

UNFCC (2007) Climate change: impacts vulnerabilities and adaptation in developing countries, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publication/impacts.pdf. Accessed 15 May 2010 Walsham M (2010) Assessing the evidence: environment, climate change and migration in Bangladesh, International Organization for Migration. Available at http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/environment_climate_change_bangladesh.pdf. p 3

Page 15 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_4-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Index Terms: Bangladesh 1 Climate change 1 Displacement 1 Environmental migrants 4 Policy 6, 9–10 Vulnerability 3, 5

Page 16 of 16

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Designing an Adaptation Strategy in a Complex Socioecosystem: Case of Territorial Climate and Energy Plans in France Stéphane La Branche* Institute of Political Studies at Grenoble, Pierre-Mendes-France University, Grenoble, Cedex 9, France

Abstract Adaptation has become an obligatory part of larger Territorial Climate and Energy Plans, mandatory by law for all communities over 50,000 in France. This chapter first described these TCEPs and then analyzes the elaboration process of two different approaches for an adaptation strategy. The first one is incremental, sector specific in an urban setting, and tightly associated to urban planning in the city of Dijon. The other is holistic, multisectorial, and multi-issue, in a semi-urbanized area that includes agriculture, very high-tech production, valleys, and high mountain areas. We then offer an evaluation of both approaches, with respective strengths, weaknesses, and potentials.

Keywords Adaptation policies; Strategy; Design; Formulation construction Limits of survival are set by climate, those long drifts of change which a generation may fail to notice. And it is the extremes of climate which set the pattern. Lonely finite humans may observe climatic provinces, fluctuations of annual weather and occasionally may observe such things as ‘this is a colder year than I’ve ever known’. Such things are sensible. But humans are seldom alerted to the shifting average through a great span of years. And it is precisely in this alerting that humans learn how to survive. . .They must learn climate. (Frank Herbert 1976: 350)

For the first time in human history, even since the first great human revolution, the Neolithic, and then the sedentarization of the human species, not only are we facing a truly global crisis due to climate change (CC) and its impacts, but more importantly, for the first time, we are aware of this crisis and are trying consciously to create planned solutions and apply them. This can be termed climate energy governance, or even meta-governance. But we have never attempted such an effort and thus have no real past experience to draw from. In the past few years, efforts at decreasing greenhouse gases – mitigation – have increased and improved in terms of efficiency and diversity. While much work remains to be done on mitigation measures, adaptation strategies to climate change are far from being as well understood and developed. Different countries have different methods, but to our knowledge, France remains unique in that adaptation is part of a legally binding territorial-level climate and energy package called Territorial Climate and Energy Territorial Plans (TCEPs). Indeed, in 2012, the French central government imposed TCEPs on all communities or “community of communities” with over 50,000 people, attempting to implement national climate and

The material from case studies comes from projects undertaken with Patricia Dubois and the Equineo team (www. equineo.com). I deeply thank her for her as-always pertinent comments. *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

energy governance measures at the territorial level, including both mitigation and adaptation measures. This followed several years of voluntary experimentations on the part of a few cities (Lyon, Grenoble, and Paris were leaders among them) starting in 2006 with Grenoble launching the country’s first territorial climate plan (a medium-size city of about 300,000 pop). Then, a nationalwide multi-actor participatory procedure was conducted (the Grenelle de l’environnement), whose purpose was to design a national strategy related to energy, the environment, water, climate, and other related issues(?). The general conclusions of this multi-stakeholder process then led to a law project, linked to the Environmental Code. Several laws were indeed passed, but we focus on the now legally mandatory TCEP. Three fundamental differences can be noted between the previous Plans and the new, binding, ones. First, previous ones were strictly voluntary. Efforts, experimentations, and measures were entirely left to the will of collectivities, with some state financial and expertise support. Second, these plans focused very strongly on the climate question and worked on the energy issue as a corollary of climate change. The new Plans put energy on the same level. And indeed, 2013 has seen a real turn with a strong focus on the energy dimension. Finally, the previously great ignored child of climate governance, adaptation, has become the third pillar of the new TCEPs. One of the issues in this process is that the national-level efforts at designing a new national climate and energy governance remain on the level of a general strategy. Some actual exemplary measures and methods are proposed by the national administration, but these apply better to mitigation measures than to adaptation ones. While mitigation policies are beginning to be well understood and tried, the “real,” operational, adaptation policies still need to be designed and implemented, and even sometimes invented, at the territorial level. More than mitigation, adaptation is indeed a territorial-level, local, issue. As such, it is difficult to offer exemplary measures that would work on all territories. This explains in part why the national adaptation strategy guidelines and measures are so little consulted by local policy makers. They do not feel that these recommendations apply well to their territory and their local situation (both natural and socioeconomic and political). The first part of this paper will quickly present some of the common points and differences between mitigation and adaptation policies in general. Then, we will analyze two case studies, focusing on adaptation: one city (Dijon) and a semi-urbanized rural and mountainous territory, the Gresivaudan Valley. Ambition and breadth vary but it is on the construction process of the adaptation strategy that we will focus on. Lessons for the operational dimensions of designing adaptation policy will then be drawn out. One of the difficulties is that neither mitigation nor adaptation is sector specific: they are multiand cross-sectorial. In addition, in France, TCEPs are supposed to give direction and a framework for other territorial planning documents: urban planning, mobility, housing, and other planning documents have to conform to TCEPs. This has direct consequences on agenda setting, institutional arrangement, and policy design, since traditionally separated sectors must now be harmonized toward general climate and energy goals. But adaptation presents additional challenges which I will expand on later.

Differences Between Mitigation and Adaptation for Policy Design Mitigation aims at reducing GHG emitted on a territory and TCEPs give a clear numbered mitigation objective, the EU’s 20 % reduction in GHG emissions, 20 % reduction in overall energy consumption, and 20 % renewable energy in the territorial energy structure, by 2020. Territorial policy design Page 2 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

in the case of mitigation does not require anything really revolutionary. First, a carbon evaluation is undertaken – akin to the work and analyses preceding any type of policy. While the ADEME (a state energy and environmental agency) offers a method (which needs to be paid for), territorial collectivities may use any method deemed appropriate. The carbon analysis offers numbered data on emissions by sector, and thereby, a baseline from which to reach the 20/20/20 objective. In an urban setting, we find the same three main sources in France, but in different proportion, depending on the territory: transports, housing, and industry. In rural areas, of course, the agricultural sector takes more importance. There is no need to expand on mitigation measures here aside from a few precisions. In France (and this is akin to the rest of the world), mitigation measures are rather well known and well developed in the transport and housing sector (and by extension but to a lesser extent, urban management and land use) and do not represent much of an issue in terms of policy design. While the translation phase from policy formulation to implementation (e.g., the reduction of the share of car mobility and urban management – multifunctional polycentric, semi-dense urban development seems to be the general direction) still represents challenges (types of incitement, control, constraints, social acceptability, costs, training, etc.), the design phase of mitigation policies is “classical.” Finally, while mitigation measures can be implemented immediately and be evaluated in the very short term (diminution of CO2 emissions due to personal vehicles, number of buildings respecting energy consumption targets, etc.), adaptation requires a different approach. But before touching on this at the territorial level, it is important to remind why and how adaptation has been emerging in the last few years as an inescapable issue in climate governance.

Adaptation and Climate Change as Meta-risk Climate change is now seen by the international scientific and institutional community as both the number one accelerator and amplifier of natural risks and the single most important obstacle to development efforts in the third world. In wealthy countries, it raises issues about the deep economic structure of our society and discussions about post-carbon or non-carbon-based production and consumption – or the green economy – emerging. In fact, the impacts of climate change and its origins linked to the very fundamental energy structure of our society mean that CC is slowly inserting themselves into every aspect of our societies. This also raises issues regarding the impacts of mitigation and adaptation efforts on other policies and on policy design itself. The underlying hypothesis that climate governance is emerging as a new type of total governance through four different means (La Branche 2013): (i) It is inserting itself in the issue-specific or sector-specific governance (water, energy, security, housing, transports, research, development, public policies, health, economic development), as well as individual values and legal international, national, and local norms. (ii) It tends to redefine these types of governance, from above, as an overarching framework. (iii) It is also diffusing through sectors in a transversal (and multidisciplinary) manner. (iv) It is emerging from below, from local actors, territorial communities, etc. As such, climate and energy governance is emerging as a meta-governance that tends to restructure and redefine other forms and types of governance. In other words, it is increasingly offering a general framework and even a regime of truth in Foucault’s sense (1980), in which policy design and implementation are taking place. Indeed, the challenge is total and global in the sense that

Page 3 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

it involves all human activities. In this sense, climate change is not only a phenomenon; it is an epiphenomenon (Olivier 2005), affecting the way we think and perceive the world as a globality. Indeed, since 2006, climate and energy issues have been explicitly and increasingly integrated in different international programs and norms, such as the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, water management and risks, insurance policies, construction norms, agriculture, local urbanism, etc. These are all slowly being redefined, reworked, reconceptualized, re-practiced, and even retaught in our teaching institutions with climate and energy objectives in mind. All these issues are both affected by the “objective” reality of CC and by the “subjective” efforts at dealing with it and managing it – i.e., governance. Our different field researches explore the impacts of efforts at climate governance on our institutions’ structures, identities, strategies, policy formulation, and daily operations. This change does not occur without obstacles linked to a carbon-based path dependency (Pierson 2000) or to Young’s arguments (2002a) regarding how an institution’s structure and identity may prevent it from reaching its own environmental objectives. Developing efficient and cogent adaptation strategies is thus framed by this emerging understanding of CC as a “meta-risk” (notion derived from Braithwaite and Williams 2001). My argument, derived from a social science framework of CC, puts forward that CC does not only amplify and modify existing risk, it also tends to modify our classical ways to manage and understand it. Not only does CC change the physical aspects of a risk, it also tends to redefine what is deemed to be a significant risk or not, “a risk that is worth trying to manage or not” because it may or may not increase vulnerability or decrease resilience. The objective of a climate adaptation strategy is not to adapt once the impact has taken place: it is to predict what the potential natural impacts might be in order then, to prepare for them before they happen, so as to reduce vulnerability and increase climate change resilience. But this depends greatly on social, organizational, cultural, and economic factors. Indeed, most recent studies on adaptation put forward the idea that the most important factors playing a role in resilience (the capacity of a society to adapt to change) are not natural but rather, those that play a role in a society’s capacity at preparing for climate-induced changes.1 In the case of adaptation, policy building needs to take a new form because of adaptation’s very nature. First, because climate as risk is redefining the perception of risk as such, from punctual and extreme events to recurrent, permanent pressure. Secondly, this is why the approach to adaptation policy design must change: it requires self-adjusting policies to constant yet uncertain change uncovered by science, territorialized observations. This needs to be combined with analyses at different and changing probability and uncertainty levels and thus varying (and uncertain) levels of success. These all meet at the intersection between vulnerability and more importantly, capacities. But how is this perceived and practiced at the local level by local administrations?

Adaptation in French TCEPs Adaptation became, in 2012, an obligatory sector of the new French TCEPs, but its application and the diffusion of this issue through different administrative levels differs from mitigation in several ways. First, adaptation has yet to enter most actors’ awareness, aside from specialists. Its necessity is At last, the international scientific community has recognized the importance of social issues: the fifth IPCC Assessment Report will specifically focus on the social dimensions of climate change for both mitigation and adaptation. Hence, the idea now largely recognized that climate change is only secondarily a hard science issue: it is far more a social science one.

1

Page 4 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

not perceived in large part because CC’s impacts are not being felt nor experienced by actors living in developed countries. Second, adaptation is much less well scientifically understood. Indeed, projection and computer simulations of present and future impacts rarely go below a 100 km2 area. Thus, the level of scientific and political uncertainty is much greater than with mitigation policies and makes both decision making and policy design more difficult. Third, adaptation is a far more complex issue than mitigation: understanding the natural impacts is only the first part of the process. Indeed, these impacts are not limited to the “objective,” natural, biological, and morphological levels – whose frontiers do not often coincide with political-territorial boundaries but also require an understanding of the natural impacts’ effects on human activities at the territorial level. Thus, natural sciences link to specific interests, administrative services, and economic activities come into contact with human activity and the social sciences. A third phase is thus required: evaluating a society’s capacity at organizing itself to impacts, i.e., its resilience. Only then can we have a relatively good idea of a territory’s vulnerability in the full sense of the word and only then can potentially cogent adaptation strategies be developed. For political scientists, policy design extends to both the mechanisms through which policy goals are given effect, and to the goals themselves, since goal articulation involves considerations of feasibility (what is practical or possible to achieve in given circumstances given the means at hand). Adaptation thus represents a real challenge, far greater than mitigation in part because designing adaptation policies requires steps that include a high level of uncertainty and unknowns and thus lower potential of feasibility. How is one to about then? The following steps proposed here are “ideal” and rarely to be found in actual policy settings and framing, but they seem to be the goal to be attained: (i) Identify what the probable increase in temperature might be at a chosen time frame (2030, 2050). (ii) Identify the probability level of natural impacts (rainfall, heat, cold, avalanche, landslides, as well as impacts on living beings – plants and animals – such as reproduction cycles, migration, feeding areas, and growth rate). (iii) Identify the impacts of these changes on human activities and population. (iv) This is where resilience, both collective and individual, plays a key role: a younger population (aside from newborns) suffers less from a heat wave than an aging one; a ski-dependent local economy will be more vulnerable to a decline in snowfall, a semiarid-based agriculture will have to face even more arid conditions, etc. Generally, poorer, less educated populations are more vulnerable to climate change than wealthier, more educated ones. Designing an adaptation strategy thus requires not only a relatively high level of natural scientific input but also an association with social sciences and economic territorialized analyses of what these impacts may mean in the future. But it also requires a different view of what the foundation for policy design and decision are: a backward management approach is necessary with, for example, a prediction for what these impacts might be in 2050 and then backtracking to what should be done in the short term in order to reduce the social and economic effects of future climate change. Adaptation is not a reaction; it is preparation to a specific, given, constraint based on as yet uncertain impacts in the future. The problem is that this constraint remains often uncertain. In order to reduce the high level of uncertainty of these impacts, a significant input of scientific expertise is often asked in the development of climate adaptation policy. But this expertise meets policy and institutional logics that may or may not favor its development (Young 2002a, b). As an example, hydroelectric dams will be directly affected by variations in water quantity (either not enough or too much) as well as regularity. Indeed, in France, dams are in many regions used as Page 5 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

equalizers of peaks in electricity demand, but they may start to fail filling this role if water is insufficient. As for water temperature, which has increased by a couple of degrees on average in most European countries in the last decade, it cannot go beyond 28 to cool nuclear power plants. Over this limit, a plant has to be shut down. In 2011, an energy crisis in France was very closely averted, when after over 2 months of high temperature and little rainfall, it finally started raining, avoiding the shutdown of a nuclear power plant. This raises the following very hard question: how is one to design a policy or a set of policies that can take these types of effects into account? Is a new approach to policy design necessary? The next section develops this section through two case studies: Dijon and the Gresivaudan. We will see that while the Gresivaudan offers a real example of our argument that adaptation necessitates a different model of designing policy, the Dijon case is more classical. This points to the importance of political decision framed by institutional constraints and experience. We then draw conclusions on the weaknesses and strengths of each.

Adaptation in the City of Dijon: Integration in Urban Planning Dijon is a large city, with an extensive, mineralized historical center. Already vulnerable to urban heat island effects, the population suffered during the 2003 heat waves. Recent local studies show an important disparity in terms of heat vulnerability between the center (with little vegetation and parks) and the periphery. The city of Dijon launched its Climate Plan 2 years before the 2012 deadline. Dijon had been, several years before, well known for its environmental approaches in an urban setting but had lost this image in the last few years, surpassed by a few cities ambitious on climate and energy objectives. Dijon wanted to “catch up” and go beyond by implementing an ambitious climate plan, to coincide with a new tram network. Indeed, there is a strong multiparty political program called “Dijon ville écologiste” (Dijon, an ecological city) that aims at giving an ecological direction to all urban policies. At the institutional level, the city’s urbanism service is quite active and important in the political and budgetary landscape of the city’s administration. It is also highly sensitive to ecological questions and, more specifically, to climate change issues. The work aimed at developing an adaptation strategy was headed by the urban ecology service, in coordination with the urbanism department. This department is closely linked to the city’s urban developer agency which developed an ecodistrict standard (with several criteria taken into account such as water, energy, vegetation, energy standards, etc.). Urban projects had to follow these standards in order to be accepted by the city urban planning council. But the adaptation issue was largely unknown. More at issue, while there were individuals who knew about CC’s potential impacts and adaptation, measures to address these impacts were not integrated in the services as practices or norms. To be noted: while the urbanism department was very present in the adaptation strategy development process, the elected official in charge of urbanism was not in charge of the TCEP. They did not share the same vision of urbanism nor of climate adaptation nor of its urban aspects. Indeed, economic arguments were more important to the first: What would be the impacts of costs of integrating adaptation measures in urban projects? What would be the benefits and for whom and when? Nevertheless, they agreed on the importance of developing an ecological urbanism. Indeed, the city implemented an ambitious ecodistrict development policy, strong on energy efficiency – and mitigation – but weaker on other climate issues. Our task was to develop an adaptation framework and criteria for these new projects. Indeed, while planning and integration of mitigation measures in urban projects was well under way, adaptation appeared far more difficult, less well-known issue, filled with uncertainties in terms of likelihood of occurrence and impacts as Page 6 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

well as time frame. In addition, an earlier multisectorial strategy had been proposed but had failed for several reasons, among which, it was judged to be too general, nonoperational, and not tied enough to its territorial setting and issues. While territorial data did exist on urban climate change vulnerability, those had not been translated into an operational approach. Thus, the decision was, first, to address urban adaptation issues. But the question was: Which ones? The weakness of the previous approach, coupled with the political project (Dijon, an ecological city), and the desire to develop an operational adaptation strategy led to the adoption of a new approach: less ambitious, but more cautious and more gradual, and more sectorial, over a 3-year period, with two or three specific adaptation issues per year to be co-defined with elected officials and appropriate administrative services. In order to select the issues to be worked on, we first organized a series of multi-stakeholders’ meetings (with semi-directive interviews, either individually or in small groups) in order to: 1. Understand administrative actors’ level of knowledge of the adaptation issue in general. 2. Understand the level of knowledge of the adaptation issue on Dijon’s territory specifically. This also allowed us to: 3. Identify key actors and resources that could produce or offer already produced knowledge and data. To be noted: the information produced was not always recognized by those who produced it as useful for adaptation, yet it was. Key actors were University of Bourgogne, Alterre Bourgogne – an ecological association – Météo France, the Regional authorities, and two national government regionalized bodies. 4. Identify potential issues to be developed in the first phase of the adaptation strategy. 5. Develop operational adaptation indicators and measures in urban projects. But again, this raises the question: Which ones specifically? We then met again with these different actors in order to select the issues to be dealt with in priority. Several selection criteria were applied: political (the public image an issue would get, including the Dijon’s ecological vision); a previous vulnerability study confirmed the risk of urban floods due to water overflow and very insufficient infrastructure; and the emergence of a new issue in the different discussions, and proposed by the project team – urban heat effects and measures to counteract it, including district and building conception approaches and vegetalization. This concurred with a previous study on CC’s potential impacts on average rainfall and average urban temperature (associated with an aging population, also important to the actors involved). But even once identified, these issues can only remain nonoperational if a temperature increase scenario is not chosen. Indeed, an increase of +2 would have only small effects, but climate studies’ impacts on vegetation and rainfall and temperature show that an increase of +3 would, probably, have a significant impact. This raised a real debate among some of the actors: Why a +3 scenario rather than a +2 ? National mitigation targets were defined (in 2010) according to a +2 scenario. And national climate change mitigation information campaigns were entirely based on a +2 scenario. The discussion mainly revolved around scientific arguments being thrown against institutional ones. Finally, the +3 scenario was politically chosen, the elected official in charge of the TCEPs using his decision power to resolve the issue, as he felt that the scientific arguments but also the precautionary (if one is ready for a +3 , then one is also ready for a +2 , but the opposite does not hold) one were valid. The scenario chosen led to a few specific adaptation issues emerging, deemed to be both more important in terms of impacts and more likely to occur. Two of these could be associated closely under the same general theme – and associated to the importance of the urban setting: the fight Page 7 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

against urban heat effects. Indeed, IPCC +3 projections show that before 2050, 2 years out of 3 would have the same mean temperature as the European 2003 heat waves (which killed 50,000 people), with the additional issue of an even older population by 2050. Two different approaches were co-defined in part because our benchmark of international studies showed that two main sources of the urban heat effect were bad spatial planning and lack of vegetation. In addition to this, another factor was interesting to the responsible elected officials: it would improve citizens’ urban daily quality of life. In other words, improving spatial planning and increasing vegetation cover in an urban setting were no regret measures and were relatively certain to produce the effects expected. A second benchmark of good urban adaptation and vegetalization practices in cities was undertaken. Results and evaluation of these measures for the Dijon contact were produced and diffused in different services and applied to a new urban construction project. A method by which these issues could be integrated in urban planning documents, in services’ practices, and in the first phases of urban projects was also developed. Special attention was paid to the different phases of urban projects: measures to be integrated in the conception phase, those that could be integrated during construction, and finally, those that could be added to an already built project. For example, building orientation (north-south) and height need to be included in the conception phase (Is the aim to increase or to decrease exposure to the sun? Where can one integrate a pond for runoff water, which can also be used to increase cooling in the summer?), while planting specific species of trees (high and narrow or short but wide, and where? Is vegetalization on walls or rooftops possible?) can be done in the construction phase. Another issue emerged, strongly in this context: national historical building protection legislation narrows very much the scope of measures possible in the historical center and may even, in some cases, forbid vegetalization. This issue was still not entirely resolved at time of writing. While interesting, the final result falls outside the scope of this paper. More to the point, there are the lessons to be learned from the Dijon case for reflections on policy designs, and we develop those in the last section. It is now interesting to turn, as a counterpoint to the strategy developed in Dion, to the Gresivaudan case.

The Gresivaudan Case The Gresivaudan is a semi-urban, complex geographic territory, with three main economic activities partly linked to its geographical diversity: the territory is made of a wide valley encased in high mountains. The third economic activity, in terms of economic revenue generated, is high mountain winter tourism – skiing and thus, highly dependent on snow fall. Low-altitude ski stations are already negatively affected by CC, with reactive “adaptive” actions such as artificial snow and attempts at diversifying activities toward summer tourism only being slowly put into place. The second economic activity lies in the valley, with the production of high-yield, very high-quality, low inputs, high revenue generating corn production for oil dedicated to high-tech processes. The first activity is nanomicrotechnologies, with the world’s third most important research site, also in the valley. CC impacts on these different sectors (as well as others, such as forest exploitation and pastoralism) and urban areas were thus highly complex and potentially key to wealth generation, employment, choice of housing, quality of life, and modes of living. It thus raised very sensitive issues for the majority of the population as well as for elected officials and heads of services. The adaptation strategy proposed was both experimental and ambitious: an integrated, holistic, multi-actors multiissue adaptation comprehensive strategy. The method with which this strategy was designed was Page 8 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

thus deeply different from the one used in Dijon. So were the results. Our choice of approach in assisting the territorial administration in designing its adaptation strategy was due to several factors, both natural and human. The natural set of factors was the geomorphological diversity, with a valley between two mountain chains with different rock formation, one retaining water more than the other, with different vegetal species associated. These three geographical zones were linked to each other by a fourth, the mountain slopes flanking the valley on both sides, with different levels of access and economic activity, and peopled with sparse small villages, on the way to ski stations. The adaptation strategy development team and the administration were very keen on understanding the impacts of CC on these different natural (and human) zones, associated to different economic activities (especially winter sports on one mountain chain), corn production, and nanomicrotechnologies. Note as well that the valley is far more urbanized than the other zones and at risk of flood, due to a river running through it. Note that in this phase of the process, we use notions and terms that are very close to social geography. The second set of factors was institutional. The Gresivaudan administration had decided to be ambitious and experimental in their adaptation approach but also insisted on being operational. They also possess a rather strong territorial identity that they wish to put forward. Thus, they felt that operational recommendations on our part had to be based on a clear understanding of their territory’s specific issues and form. Territorial-based data needs to be accumulated, to which the team could only concur since adaptation is first and foremost a local issue that needs to be developed from that level. But the Gresivaudan administration was also more ambitious on another level: the development of a holistic adaptation strategy was to be the first step in the development of a permanent program that had to include the development of territorial multi-issue multi-stakeholder knowledge for CC adaptation, made possible by the permanent integration of scientists and studies in the adaptation process. Thus, knowledge development was seen as an essential part of a successful adaptation strategy. This is important: usually, public policy is seen as a closed process, where the implementation of a policy is seen as the last phase. Sometimes, an evaluation is undertaken but this is more the exception than the rule. Not in the Gresivaudan’s case: evaluation and reformulation of issues, their importance, and impact evaluation are seen to be as a continuous process, to be adjusted according to new knowledge, real and predicted temperature increases. Thus, the administration saw its adaptation strategy not only as an end (be adapted to future climate change impacts) but also as a means, an experimental laboratory by which understanding of all phases of adaptation would be improved. This was greatly helped by the fact that the elected official in charge of the emerging TCEP was a climatologist working for a national agency (Météo France). As a scientist, he was thus very well informed and up to date on climate issues (as well as aware of the uncertainties linked to adaptation). And, as an elected official, he was also “politically savvy” and sensitive to both internal political dynamics and to the population. He was also very insistent that the recommendations be understandable, operational, and potentially (he was also aware that one could not ask hard results from an adaptation strategy) effective for his territory. But faced with such a complexity, how were we to proceed? This is where a third set of factors needs to be taken into account: the role of science. Indeed, one may wish to develop scientific knowledge but there has to be the means to do this. The Gresivaudan territory is located near Grenoble, a midsize university city, with a highly active scientific, and very diverse in terms of disciplines, community working on climate change. This represented a real opportunity: use this scientific community to gather information and data on the potential impacts of a +3 scenario on the territory. Rather than overlooking the uncertainty issue, and pretend to offer hard answers, we opted for the following approach: identify with these scientists Page 9 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

through collective work what the impacts of a +3 scenario would be on that territory according to a 4-level scale: high, mid, low, and unknown probability. This was then coupled with a 4-scale potential severity of CC impacts on, first, the “natural” world. Our diagnostic of the territorial vulnerability, through multipartenarial working sessions, included the following sectors, with a map that offered a visualization of the areas and their vulnerability: – – – – – –

Water resources: impacts on water quality and availability Natural risk: floods, storm flashfloods, etc. Biodiversity Agricultural and forest activities Mountain tourism: especially snow levels for ski stations and CC’s economic impacts Energy and economic activity energy production for dams and impacts on tertiary activities and industrial zones (including water management and runoff) – Urban planning and buildings, including impact on behaviors and uses (i.e., air-conditioning in the summer and its impacts on energy demands)

Local nonscientific and nonadministrative actors were also involved, such as forest managers, owners and exploiters, industrialists, farmers, etc. The second phase of working sessions aimed at building an integrated adaptation strategy, composed of different policy sectors. It included both scientific actors and institutional actors (forestry, agriculture, industries, urbanism, mobility, and others) working together on the probable effects these impacts could have on activities. The goal was to move from natural vulnerability to socioeconomic vulnerability of natural impacts, with two other, policy-oriented, goals in mind. First, we were able to define levels of priorities to the different issues in the short, middle, and long term. Then, discussions and policy-setting, policy-building, and actions were co-constructed between the adaptation team and the different heads of the territorial administration. This was also used to improve knowledge of administrative actors, so that they would start integrating the adaptation issue in their specific areas of competence and actions.

Conclusion: Lessons from Both Case Studies Different lessons can be learned from these two case studies, in terms of internal and external factors in how adaptation policies were constructed. Note that while population density or urbanization levels played a role on specific actions and policies that are to be built, this did not play a role in how the strategies were built, and only a minor role on the issues chosen: organizational framework and local scientific resources were clearly more important. In both cases, probable and high-impact territorial natural vulnerabilities were first identified, and then, “social” vulnerabilities were declined. In both cases, a collective (institutional) decision was made regarding which issue was to receive priority, based on the previous more scientific and technical assessments. In Dijon’s urban setting, the urban heat island phenomenon and vegetalization were chosen, whereas in the Gresivaudan, an identification of all possible impacts was made, and then priorities defined. The urban heat effect was not a priority, in large part due to the fact that it is a semi-urban setting. But more significant differences, in terms of policy design, can be identified. In Dijon, the adaptation strategy is being built piece by piece, two issues per year over several years, whereas in the Gresivaudan, the aim was to build in about 1 year an integrated, multisectorial Page 10 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

adaptation strategy from the very first phase of the TCEP’s construction. The aim to create a permanent scientific knowledge development was also decided from the onset. The differences between the two cases were due to several reasons. In Dijon, a previous “failure” in building the adaptation strategy had led to an attitude of precaution on the part of the administration, who wanted to avoid another failure, so close to the legislative 2012 December 31st deadline. But also, and perhaps more importantly, this failure ran against the city’s political vision “Dijon, an ecological city.” Dijon’s step-by-step strategy offers clear advantages: each step is more likely to succeed in terms of integration by services and operational measures, since it requires less change at once and less human power. It also is less disrupting of everyday work habits, skills, and networks. It is also much easier to correct if need be. Another factor was internal, in the administration itself, which offers a few reflections on Young’s work regarding internal institutional obstacles (2002a, b). The different visions between Dijon’s elected official in charge of the climate plan and the official in charge of urbanism meant that issues interesting to both had to be defined. The debates did not prevent the development of a strategy, on which both essentially agreed. In the Gresivaudan, the elected official was a climatologist who not only understood the scientific aspects of climate change but also the potential risks and social and economic and political impacts. He had an integrated and holistic conception and expected, explicitly and from the start, a corresponding adaptation strategy, which had to be operational, on which both cases agreed. Another difference was the territorial scientific resource. As pointed out earlier, the Gresivaudan Valley is located near a Grenoble where, by a series of historical coincidence and scientific laboratories’ strategies, research on climate change and its impacts has been developed for several years and in many disciplines, and this is important, including in the social sciences: technologies, urbanism, sociology, political science, natural and social geography, economics, etc. This is coupled with a high level of interest, knowledge, and policy development in the field of energy and climate change on the part of the territorial administration. Hence, it was relatively easy for the team to gather different resources to help identify the natural and social impacts, their probability of occurrence as well of probable level of severity. The social and institutional resilience aspects were explored through a social science and economics perspective. Both methods for building an adaptation strategy have pros and cons. The Dijon strategy requires less effort during the initial phases and may well be easier to internalize and apply by services, as well as conditions in urban projects imposed on constructors or architects. Initial successes in specific sectors then help diffuse the approach to other services, even though this may take more time. In the second phase, the project is to take the previous year’s work and integrate the recommendations in daily work routines and institutional texts, in the urban development services, by integrating new adaptation (urban heat effects and vegetalization, as well as the use of water) norms and methods in urban projects. The risk is that the strategy could remain sectorial and not be integrated transversally in the different structures and services. It could eventually lose in efficiency and, or even, face contradictions and tensions between services that could slow down or even block adaptation strategy’s diffusion to other departments. As for the Gresivaudan, it is too early yet to say whether its integrated holistic strategy will not be too complex and heavy to handle for a rather small administration. But if the transversal work is done, it fares a better chance at being efficient and cost effective in more areas at the same time. Its drawback is its potential (un)replicability to other territories. Indeed, not all elected officials (who give the political leadership and general direction and level of ambition of the TCEP) in charge are climatologists and thus understand as well the climate change issue and its link to impacts and social vulnerability. Nor do most territories have such a wealth of scientific expertise on adaptation at its Page 11 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_5-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

disposal. Taken together, the opportunities for scientific input to the territorial agenda setting, policy objectives, and design were quite specific to the Gresivaudan. Perhaps, too specific for replicability? Our adaptation strategy development approach was indeed developed so as to be replicable: evaluation of potential impacts on the natural milieu, then on the social one, and finally, evaluation of the territorial vulnerability and resilience. Efforts at improving resilience are an integral part of the Gresivaudan’s strategy at developing scientific knowledge on a permanent basis. A last point needs to be addressed here. Organizational framework and local scientific resources were identified as being clearly significant factors in the elaboration of the adaptation strategies. But one can wonder whether the natural factors did not also play a role, even if indirect. Dijon is a “typical” city with typical functions and services associated to urbanization. It is located in a homogeneous geomorphological (flat, with a few rivers) and climate milieu. But the Gresivaudan territory is made up of two different mountain chains and a valley, with different significant economic activities associated to each, to which we can add high-tech research and development, with different milieus, interconnected by population movements and activities, with related social and economic issues. It may be that these natural characteristics are more conducive to a multisectorial and holistic approach, i.e., a more complex socioeconomic system requires a more complex and holistic adaptation strategy. Further research, comparative as well, is necessary on this point. This also raises a more anthropological and ecopolitical theory question: How much does natural territory affects policy, its design, and its implementation?

References Braithwaite J, Williams R (2001) Meta risk management and tax system integrity. Centre for Tax System Integrity/Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Sydney Foucault M (1980) Power/knowledge. Harvester, Brighton Herbert F (1976) Children of Dune. Orion, p 350 La Branche S (2013) Paradoxes and harmony in the energy-climate governance nexus. In: Dyer H, Trombetta J (eds) The international handbook of energy. Edward Elgar, Northampton Olivier L (2005) Le savoir vain. Relativisme et désespérance politique. Liber, Montreal Pierson P (2000) Increasing returns, path dependency, and the study of politics. Am Polit Sci Rev 94:251–267 Young OR (2002a) The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and Scale, Cambridge and Massachusetts: MIT Press Young OR (2002b) ‘Why Is There No Unified Theory of Environmental Governance?’, PDF document: dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00000943/00/youngo020402.pdf. p.23–24

Page 12 of 12

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_6-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Security Implication of Climate Change Between Farmers and Cattle Rearers in Northern Nigeria: A Case Study of Three Communities in Kura Local Government of Kano State Salisu Lawal Halliru* Geography Department, Federal College of Education Kano, Kano, Nigeria

Abstract This study focused on the implication of climate change between cattle rearers and farmers in the desert-prone line in northern Nigeria which led to unavoidable crisis and insecurity in Nigeria and Africa in general. The consequence of climate change has untold security implications on the life of Nigerians; attacks in the country have been traced to the doorsteps of two strange groups that are forced to live together as a result of unfavorable climatic conditions in the Northern part of the country. The conflict between Fulani and farming communities linked to disputes over grazing land has become frequent in parts of central and northern Nigeria in recent years. The method of purposive random sampling was employed to select the local government and communities where data was collected for this study. The measures for selecting the communities include the following: community with a sizable number of cattle rearers with at least ten (10) heads of cattle and above, community with more than one communal clash which involves the farmers and the Fulani, community with both permanent cattle rearers’ settlement and transit Fulani that are always on the move, and agricultural economy-based community. Interviews were also conducted, and 60 respondents were purposively selected: fifteen (15) Fulani, six (6) traditional rulers, and 39 farmers. A qualitative method of data collection was used to gather information, and in-depth interviews were chosen as an appropriate data collection tool; the interview was drafted in Fulfulde language and was later translated into English and the Hausa language was translated into English as well. Multiple data were collected from February to April 2010 and July to September 2010. The study revealed population increase also takes over grazing land as a result of development, paths of animals (Burtali) in the past are now taken over by farmers, desert encroachment has taken over vast farmland, and the quest for a greener pasture usually brings the Fulani crisis among others. These researches also join others before it to call for more research on climate change and insecurity in Africa generally. Finally, this paper recommended ways on how to address immense challenges of adaptation, through educating farmers and the Fulani on the implication of climate change, and reduce human activities which further aggravate and cause climate change – planting of Jatropha plants to prevent animals from going into farms to destroy crops and creating grazing land.

Keywords Climate change; Security; Fulani; Farmers; Conflicts

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_6-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Introduction A clash over land ownership and grazing land for animals has continued to grow in the few years. The growing pressure for land these past few years has been described by many experts and onlookers as a clear manifestation of the impact of climate change across Nigeria with most states in the far North being the worst affected by these changes. Security has been a major issue in Nigeria’s development crisis. Climate change is one of such problems that are globally identified but the effects of which are more pronounced in developing countries. Recurrent droughts, in conjunction with other social and economic factors, have led to conflicts among farmers and cattle rearers. These conflicts are a constant threat to the security of those in the community affected. Sudano-Sahelian zones of northern Nigeria have suffered environmental degradation caused by successive years of poor rainfall and recurrent droughts, exacerbated by the combined effects of natural population growth and in-migration with the growing population; more land is being cultivated and less is available for pasture and traditional land use systems that rely on mobility. As average rainfall decreases, pastoralists have migrated south into land occupied by sedentary farmers (Nyong 2009). It is predicted that the majority of Nigerian and all African countries inclusive will have novel climates over at least half of their current crop year by 2050 (IPCC 2007). Already climate change rate is gradually exceeding the adaptive capacity of a broad range of crop and forage varieties, animal breeds, and tree populations in Nigeria, ten years earlier than the IPCC climate model prediction of 2020 (IPCC 2007). The descriptions of the climate of Nigeria and northwest Nigeria have been rather simplistic due to paucity of data, but with the availability of data manipulation techniques, it is possible to discuss more fundamental features of the climate. Such is necessary at this point in time as recent droughts, water shortages, and fauna and flora depletion have highlighted how important it is to understand weather phenomena (Oguntoyimbo, 1982 in Obioha 2005) and how they affect human security. Nigeria is one of the countries in the West African subregion; it has an estimated population of 140,003,542 people (NPC 2006) spread over a land area of 932,768 km2 (Fig. 1). Disasters such as cyclone Nargis and the China earthquake claimed thousands of lives, ruined millions of livelihoods, and caused billions of pounds worth of damage. Disasters have always been with us, but they are becoming more frequent and more severe. As global warming increases the frequency and severity of climate extremes, there are more weather-related disasters. It can leave people without access to food and water, without incomes as crops fail, and displaced from home by flooding or drought (DFID 2009). Climate changes have forced some cattle rearers (Fulani) to leave their region and migrate to the southwest where the effects of climate change have not been so severe. If the harmattan is not well pronounced in a particular month/season, the hot condition often takes over, creating a strong heat stress in the atmosphere. The stress so created is highest in the region of convergence between the two air masses often referred to as ITD (Inter Tropical Discontinuenity) – the zone of meeting between the dry northeast harmattan wind and wet southwest wind (Michael 2010). The intercommunal crises have been traced to the aftermath of the effects of climate change in Nigeria. People that have been affected by the consequences of climate change move to other communities where the effects of climate change are less severe or that have not experienced disaster occasioned by the effects of climate change. The rate at which intercommunal clashes occur between the Fulani herdsmen and their host communities is recurrent event in Nigeria. Most of these crises have been traced to pressure on land and destruction of farmland by the Fulani herdsmen during cattle grazing (Michael 2010).

Page 2 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_6-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig 1 Map of Nigeria

Aim and Objective The main aim of the study is to examine the security implication of climate change between farmers and cattle rearers that led to communal conflicts in Kura, Kano state (Fig. 2). From which the following objectives were derived: 1. To examine the communal conflicts resulting from climate change and agriculture 2. To observe the physical exposure and the immense challenges of adaptation in northern Nigeria where the study area falls 3. To highlight the potential impacts of climate change on security and the strategies for addressing these challenges

Statement of the Research Problem Conflicts between cattle rearers and farming communities linked to disputes over grazing land have become frequent in parts of central and northern Nigeria in recent years. Some analysts have blamed the trend on increasing desertification which is pushing cattle rearers southward in their search for pasture, often putting them in conflict with farmers (Olabode and Ajibade 2010). In view of the above, there is a serious need to answer the regular question “what have been the causes of the conflict?” so that we can draw a line and come up with a solution.

Page 3 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_6-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Justification and Importance of the Study In the world, generally, conflicts have led to grave consequences like starvation, death, social unrest, poverty, and unquantifiable losses among the citizens of different nations. There is therefore a need to study and understand the causes and processes of conflict and find appropriate strategies for addressing these challenges. The intensity of the conflict between cattle rearers known as BAKWALOGI or BORO, herdsmen with red cows and sheep migrating from Niger every year to enter Kano state, where the study location is, call for timely mitigation and adaptation measures of reducing the frequent conflict occurrence that displaces local farmers and claims lives and crops as well.

Study Area This study was carried out in Kura local government area of Kano state, Nigeria. The area was selected because agriculture is the bedrock of its economy and it has been victim of the Bakwalogi–farmer conflict for a long time. The study area is located at the southern part of Kano state with a population of 144,601 million people (NPC 2006) with a land mass of 206 km2, located between 11
460 12.8400 N and longitude 8
350 29.0200 E; it is about 900 km from the edge of the Sahara desert and 1,140 km away from the Atlantic Ocean approximately. The study area shares a boundary in the north and the east with Kumbotso local government; west to south, it boarders with Madobi and Garun Malan local government areas, respectively, and extreme south to east, it boarders with Bunkure local government area (Fig. 2). The area has three marked temperature regimes (warm, hot, and cold) with mean annual temperature of 26
C and 21
C main monthly range of maximum temperature in December/January and over 35
C which is hottest (April/May); wet season starts in May and ends in October, while November to February is a dry

Fig 2 Map of Kano state showing the study area

Page 4 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_6-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig 3 Climate of Kano state (Source: Field study 2010)

cool season with harmattan haze. Vegetation is savanna (grassland) of Sahel–Sudan Guinea type (Salisu 2009; Fig. 3).

Methodology Three communities were selected from this local government; purposive random sampling was employed to select the local government and communities where data was collected for this study. Three communities were chosen to represent the local government purposively selected. The measures for selecting the communities include the following: 1. Community with a sizable number of cattle rearers with at least ten (10) heads of cattle 2. Community with more than one communal clash which involves the farmers and cattle rearers 3. Community with permanent cattle rearers’ settlement and transit Fulani that are always on the move 4. Agricultural economy-based community On the above criteria, Karfi, Dukawa, and rigar-gundutse were selected as the study location. Sixty respondents were also purposively selected (twenty from each community). The following distribution of respondents was obtained: cattle rearers (5), traditional rulers (2), and farmers (13) from each of the three communities selected for this study (Table 1). A qualitative method of data collection was used to gather information from the respondents, because majority of the respondents are not formally educated and cannot fill in questionnaires Page 5 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_6-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Totality of the respondents S/no 1 2 3 Total

Respondent Cattle rearers Traditional rulers Farmers Respondent

Number 15 06 39 60

Source: Field study 2010

adequately. In-depth interviews were chosen as an appropriate data collection tool. The interview guide was wholly structured but also contained open-ended questions to allow a free-flow discussion and unedited information from respondents. The cattle rearers’ interview was drafted in Fulfulde; the data collected was later translated into English for the purpose of analysis. Also, the traditional rulers’ and farmers’ interviews were prepared in Hausa language for data collection. The data collected was also translated into English language for data interpretation.

Data Collection Multiple data were collected over six months, three months during the dry season (February to April 2010) and the three months during the rainy season (July to September 2010). Data were collected during the dry season since this is the critical period when there is no pasture for grazing and farmers are busy during irrigation activities.

Findings and Discussion The study revealed that in the past, people were very few and there was enough land for grazing, but now the population has increased so there are fewer lands to farm on. Desert encroachment has not eaten deeper to the southern Kano. Cattle rearers are nomads who move from one location to another to find pasture for their cattle. Changing climate forces them to move where they can get a greener pasture, water, and a friendly environment for their cattle and families. Variability in climate has altered the environment with unbearable effects which are significant in severe desert encroachment, drought, etc. The place with high cattle population lament for the highest cases of conflict between cattle rearers and farmers due to limited dry season grazing resources (Table 2). Another observable and major thing that brings clashes between the Fulani and farmers in the study area is paths for animals in the past (Burtali) are now taken over by the farmers and other developments; hence, the paths are taken over in the process of searching their way to available grazing land and they end up destroying crops in the farmland that is why there are always clashes between the cattle herders and farmers. The cattle come in droves, invading most farmlands in search of better grazing land as desert encroachment seems to have taken over vast farmlands in the far north, while the farmers who are already feeling the impact of the changes, especially delayed and interrupted rainfall, are protesting the invasion of their farms by the cattle rearers.

Page 6 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_6-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 2 Observed number of cows kept by cattle rearers Location Rigar-gundutse Dukawa Karfi Total

1 200 250 100 550

2

3

4

20 200 60 280

50 300 100 450

30 200 200 430

5 150 200 50 400

6 100 200 150 450

7 30 150 70 250

8 300 50 100 450

9

10 150 60 30 240

50 80 100 280

11 100 150 30 280

12 30 150 20 200

13 40 60 100 100

14 50 20 80 150

Source: Field study (2010)

Table 3 Typologies of climatically induced violent conflict over land resources in northeast Nigeria Types Level TP1 Interethnic

Actors Indigene/ settler TP2 Interethnic Indigene/ settler TP3 Interethnic Indigene/ settler TP4 Interethnic Indigene/ settler TP5 Interethnic Indigene/ indigene TP6 Interethnic Indigene/ indigene TP7 Interethnic Settler/ settler TP8 Interethnic Settler/ settler TP9 Interpersonal Settler/ settler TP10 Interpersonal Settler/ indigene TP11 Interpersonal Indigene/ indigene

Occupation Cultivators/ herdsmen Cultivator/ cultivators Herdsmen/ herdsmen Cultivator/ cultivators Cultivator/ cultivators Herdsmen/ herdsmen Herdsmen/ herdsmen Cultivator/ cultivators Cultivator/ cultivators Cultivator/ cultivators Cultivator/ cultivators

Stake Vegetation and land Arable land

Dimension Domestic/ international Domestic

Grazing land Domestic/ international Arable land Domestic Arable land

Domestic

Objective sort Relief from scarcity/reinforcement of group identity Relief from scarcity/reinforcement of group identity Relief from scarcity/reinforcement of group identity Relief from scarcity/reinforcement of group identity Distributive justice

Grazing land Domestic

Relief from scarcity

Grazing land Domestic

Relief from scarcity

Arable land

Domestic

Distributive justice

Arable land

Domestic

Distributive justice

Arable land

Domestic

Distributive justice

Arable land

Domestic

Distributive justice

Source: Adopted after Obioha 2005, classifications of conflict in North East Nigeria

The above are conflicts where actors rationally calculated their interest in a zero-sum or negativesum situation such as might arise from resource scarcity. Table 3 shows that there is a positive feedback relationship between the northwest as it is in the northeastern Nigeria and quest by competing interests to control the available scarce resource in the area (Obioha 2005). The need for more food has led to a serious conflict over land. Violent conflicts involving different typologies that were identified in the study area are very recurrent. Another agent of conflict which we identified arises from large-scale movements of (Bakwalogi/Baroroji) Fulani herdsmen from neighboring countries (Niger and Chad axis) as a result of environmental change.

Page 7 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_6-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Security Implications of Violent Conflict Human security involves the protection of individuals from a sudden violent attack on one person or property, the security being described as having two principal aspects: the freedom from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression, coupled with the protection from sudden calamities, and a number of significant harms that go unmitigated. The seven components of human security are economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security (United Nations Development Programme 1994). In a more analytically useful manner, Owens (2004) and Obioha (2005) defined human security as protection of the “vital core” of all human lives from “critical and pervasive” environmental, economic, food, health, and personal threats due to climate change. A drop in agricultural output may weaken rural communities.

Identified Security Implication at the Study Area • • • • • • •

Decreased agricultural production Hunger, disease, and malnutrition Destruction of farmland/farm crops Killing of livestock owned by the herdsmen Economic decline Population displacement Fighting between cattle rearers and farmers which results in loss of lives and injuries every year

The consequence of climate change has untold security implications on the life of Nigerians. A series of interethnic, interreligious, and reprisal attacks in the country have been traced to the doorsteps of two strange groups that are forced to live together as a result of unfavorable climatic conditions in the northern part of the country (Adediran 2010; Table 4). The above are pushes and pull factors that attracted the cattle rearers which eventually led to unavoidable crisis, conflict, and insecurity. The following are the extracts from the interview conducted with the cattle rearers and farmers in the three communities selected for this study: We travel from far away to find grass for our cows to feed on and how ever we get a Small area to graze on, the farmers come and tell us to go away, where do they want Us to go and feed our cows. (Musa/cattle rearer) We travel to far away state close to the border of Niger Republic to feed our cows but Now the weather has changed and the place is full of dry ground and sand which why We came here as we used to do before but now we are always fighting with the Farmers Before we can feed our animals we are not allowed to let our animals drink even water In the river. (Bello/cattle rearer) Farm lands are no longer as fertile as they use to be in the past so it is really painful For farmers to struggle and spend so much money buying fertilizer and then watch As cattle herders drive their animals to feed on the crops. (Yawale/farmer) It is difficult to avoid confrontation with cattle rearers these days because more of them are coming into our farms more especially in the night to destroyed our crops their animals and runaway. (Abdulmumini/farmer)

Page 8 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_6-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 4 Factors that attract the cattle rearers Push factors Drought and desert storm Poor weather condition Strange diseases No water for animals Lake Chad is dried up

Pull factors Green vegetation Moderate weather Hope and aspiration Market opportunity Forage

Source: Field study 2010

Conclusion The devastating impact of climate change is expected to force more people into the north central except if mitigation and adaptation strategies are put in place immediately; most farmers interviewed in Kura local government were not aware of the impacts of climate change, but they said they noticed the gradual changes in the weather and the environment but are not aware of what is causing the changes. The quests for greener pasture by the (Fulani) herdsmen usually bring them in contact with farmers involved in crop production. In most cases, this contact results to invasion of the cropland of the farmers by the livestock of the migratory group. Conflicts that usually arise in this process are usually violent and long lasting, which may have some internal repercussion around neighboring states and borders. From all observations, the human security implication of the conflict is enormous, because other areas of human needs are usually in danger wherever there is conflict. This study also found that climate change has and still is affecting farmers and the people in northern Nigeria economically, socially, and otherwise.

Recommendation • People must be educated on the need to reduce human activities such as tree felling, burning of carbon fuel and biomass, as well as gas flaring which further aggravate and cause climate change. • Farmers are to demarcate areas of the farms by planting Jatropha plants around it to prevent animals from going into the farms to destroy crops. Animals do not feed on Jatropha nor do they go near the plant because it emits an odor that repels animals. • Reforestation in the drought-prone areas of northern Nigeria needs to be boosted. • Nigeria as a country should invest more in combating climate change; agricultural and climatological research should be enhanced to combat desert encroachment. • Creation of grazing land in each state, local government and communities with standard ranching method that can bring reduction of seasonal in- regional movement of the Fulani, periodic orientation for the Fulani at the grazing point, viable economic value both on the animals and herdsmen.

Page 9 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_6-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Acknowledgments I am very grateful to Dr. (Mrs.) R. J. Muhammad (provost FCE, Kano) for her support and encouragements all the time directly or indirectly; Mohammed A. Mohammed; Sani Danladi; Musa Sule; Haruna Abdulhamid; all academic staff of the Department of Geography, FCE, Kano; and the entire management and staff of the Federal College of Education, Kano, who have in one way or the other contributed to the success I have achieved nationally and internationally. I am greatly indebted to the Education Trust Fund (ETF) for funding my attendance at an international conference in Cairo and FCE, Kano, in Nairobi to mention but a few. Thanks also to Associate Professor A. I. Tanko, Department of Geography, Bayero University Kano, Nigeria; Professor S. U. Abdullahi (former VC ABU, Zaria), Brig. Gen. Ibrahim Attahiru, General H. M. Lai, Ibrahim Ahmad Gundutse, and Dr. M. L. Mayanchi. All errors and omissions, and all views expressed, remain solely my responsibility.

References Adediran DI (2010) The socio- economic implication of climate change, Desert Encroachment and communal conflicts in Northern Nigeria. Being a research paper presented at conference on climate change and security organized by the Norwegian academic of science and letters on the occasion of 250 years anniversary in Trondien Department for Foreign and International Development (2009) Climate change issue 49 Intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC) (2007) Special report on regional impacts of climate change; an assessment of vulnerability. Summary for policy makers Michael FO (2010) Climate change and inter-ethnic conflict between Fulani herdsmen and host communities in Nigeria. Being a paper presented at conference on climate change and security organized by the Norwegian academic of science and letters on the occasion of 250 years. Anniversary in Trondien, Norway National Population Commission (2006): Federal Republic Of Nigeria 2006. Population Census; Official Gazatte (FGP 71/52007/25000(0L24); Legal, Notice on publication of the details of the Breakdown of the national and state provisional totals 2006 census. National Bureau of statistics. www.nigerianstat.gov.ng Nyong A (2009) Climate- related conflicts in west Africa Report from Africa, population health, environment and conflict ECSP report issue 12 Obioha EE (2005) Climate change, population drift and violent in North Eastern Nigeria. Being a paper presented at an International workshop; Human security and climate change. Holman Fjord Hotel, Asker, Oslo Olabode AD, Ajibade LT (2010) Environmental induced conflict and sustainable development. A case of Fulani, farmers conflict in Oke- Ero L.G.A, Kwara state, Nigeria. J Sustain Dev Africa 12(5):259–273 Owens T (2004) Challenges and opportunities for defining and measuring human security in human rights. Hum Secur Disarmament: 6:pp 15–23

Page 10 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_6-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Salisu LH (2009) Infrastructure and rural development a panacea for achieving food security in Kura, Kano state. Being a paper presented at the 51st annual national conference of the Association of Nigerian Geographers at the Department of Geography and planning, Kogi state University Anyingba, Kogi state United Nations Development Programme (1994) New dimensions of human security. Human development report, 1994. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 22–25

Page 11 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_8-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Climate Change and Urban Development in Africa Asfaw Kumssaa*, Aloysius C. Moshab, Isaac M. Mbechec and Enos H. N. Njerud a United Nations Centre for Regional Development, Africa Office, Nairobi, Kenya b University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana c University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya d College of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya

Abstract Climate change poses a major threat to sustainable urban development in Africa. Changes in the frequency, intensity, and duration of climate extremes (droughts, floods, and heat waves, among others) will affect the livelihoods of the urban population, particularly the poor and other vulnerable communities who live in slums and marginalized settlements. Extreme changes in weather patterns will increase incidences of natural disasters and impact on all key sectors of the economy, including the urban economy, agriculture and forestry, water resources, coastal areas and settlements, and health. In Africa, where livelihoods are mainly based on climate-dependent resources and environment, the effect of climate change will be disproportionate and severe. Moreover, Africa’s capacity to adapt to and cope with the adverse effects of climate variability is generally weak. This Chapter examines the relations between climate change and urban development in Africa and looks at the role and effect of climate change on urban development. It also assesses the available policy options for adaptation and mitigating climate change effects in urban Africa.

Keywords Africa; Climate change; Urban development; Adaptation and mitigation policies

Introduction Climate change is one of today’s emerging threats and challenges to humanity. The signs are visible, while its adverse effects are felt across both the developed and developing nations. The high incidences of flooding and intense rainfall (Trapp et al. 2007), drought and heat waves, cyclones, hurricanes, and the frequent erratic weather patterns, which have exacerbated poverty, displacement, and hunger among millions of people, are partly attributable to climate change (Pall et al. 2011). The term climate change has been defined as a statistically significant variation in either the mean state of climate or in its variability, persisting for an extended period (WMO 2012). The major causes of climate change include natural variations in sunlight intensity and human activities, which have led to an increase in greenhouse gases and a steady rise of the earth’s temperatures.

The views expressed here are the authors’ own and not necessarily those of the United Nations Centre for Regional Development. *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_8-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Global warming, which entails a rise in the earth’s temperature, is caused by the use of fossil fuels such as wood, coal, oil, and petrol, among other industrial processes that have led to a buildup of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons (IPCC 2007). Human activities that are related to biomass burning during shifting cultivation and domestic fuel are responsible for increasing greenhouse gases in Africa. Besides rendering traditional agriculture across African countries less profitable, climate change has driven an unprecedented number of people into cities as they search for alternative livelihoods (Barrios et al. 2006). The resultant urban population increase has exerted pressure on urban services and resources such as urban space, urban water supply and infrastructure, and sanitation systems. Apart from posing a daunting challenge to urban planners and policymakers (Thynell 2007; Choguill 1999), climate change has become a major national, regional, and international problem and has limited human capabilities and undermined the international communities’ efforts to attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Consequently, UNDP has declared climate change “the defining human development issue of our generation” (UNDP 2007, p. 1). This Chapter looks at the relationship between climate change and urban development and examines the impact of climate change on urban development in Africa. It also assesses available policy options for adaptation and mitigating climate change effects in urban Africa.

Climate Change and Its Impacts The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has declared that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increase in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level” (IPCC 2007, p. 30). Consequently, warming of the climate will not only hinder the achievements of MDGs and sustainable development, but it will also increase the risk of violent conflicts and therefore adversely affect human security (Barnett and Adger 2007). Therefore, concerted efforts are required to tackle climate change since failure to address this challenge will result in diminished future prospects for humanity. UNDP (2007) reports that average annual global temperatures have been rising by 0.7  C (1.3  F) since the industrial revolution. The report also notes the rapid rate at which CO2 concentrations are increasing, leading to rising air temperatures. It is expected that with the rise in temperatures, droughts will be frequent as rainfall patterns change. In the next 100 years, climate-induced temperatures in Africa could increase by between 2  C and 6  C (Hulme et al. 2001). This will have adverse effects on agricultural productivity and food security. It will also mean less water for poor people, increased floods, and a rise in sea level, thereby posing a great threat to coastal regions and small island nations (Tacoli 2009). The rise in temperatures will also increase incidences of diseases such as malaria (in areas that were originally malaria free) and other communicable diseases. Unfortunately, climate change disproportionately affects the poor and poor countries since it impacts on the very resources that the poor depend on, e.g., agriculture, forests, rivers, and lakes. Most importantly, poor countries are extremely vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change due to their low physical and financial capacity to withstand the economic shocks triggered by climate change (Ward and Shively 2012). Worsening climatic conditions, coupled with other factors such as political and ethnic conflicts, erosion of traditional safety nets, and the deteriorating physical infrastructure, besides the absence of general security in rural areas, have forced some people to migrate to urban areas, exerting further Page 2 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_8-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Percentage of African population residing in urban areas by subregion, 1980–2030 Region Africa Eastern Africa Northern Africa Southern Africa Western Africa

1980 27.9 14.4 44.4 31.5 29.2

1990 32.0 17.7 48.5 36.7 33.0

2000 35.9 21.1 51.1 42.1 38.4

2010 39.9 24.6 53.5 47.1 44.1

2020 44.6 29.0 56.8 52.3 50.1

2030 50.0 34.8 61.3 57.9 56.1

Source: UN-HABITAT 2008

pressure on cities and compounding their socioeconomic problems (Choguill 1999). As centers of innovation, cities have the capacity and the technical know-how of dealing with climate change. Unfortunately, they are also the major contributors to greenhouse gases. City-based commercial, industrial, and domestic refrigeration facilities, for instance, discharge large amounts of gaseous emissions (Mosha 2011). There is therefore a need to critically examine the role of cities vis-à-vis the process of climate change and its impacts.

Urbanization and Urban Development in Africa As people migrate from the rural areas to urban regions, global settlement patterns are gradually changing. For instance, in 2008, 3.3 billion people lived in urban areas, a number that is expected to reach 4.9 billion by 2030. Despite being the least urbanized continent in the world, Africa has the highest urbanization rate of 3 % per annum. In 2007, the African urban population was 373.4 million, a figure that is projected to reach 759.4 million by the year 2030. It is further projected that more than 1.2 billion Africans will be living in urban areas by the year 2050 (UN-HABITAT 2008). Table 1 profiles the past, current, and projected urban population by subregion between 1980 and 2030. From the data, northern Africa and southern Africa are the most urbanized regions in Africa, while East Africa is the least urbanized (but nevertheless the most rapidly urbanizing region). This rapid urbanization can be explained by both the natural growth of the urban population (the net excess of births over deaths in urban areas) and the rural–urban migration. On the other hand, Potter (2012) argues that rapid urbanization in Africa is due to the reclassification of small rural settlements as urban areas, while others (Zachariah and Conde 1981; Kelley 1991) argue that rural–urban migration is the main contributor to urbanization in Africa. Rural–urban migration has been triggered mainly by both the pull-and-push factors (Barrios et al. 2006) as well as past development strategies adopted by African countries, including socialistleaning development policies and structural adjustment programs, which are biased against rural and agricultural development (Hope 2009). A dismal consequence of these policies is that the nonagricultural population now exceeds the available nonagricultural employment, leading to over-urbanization (Hope 1998). African urban economies (weakened by institutional problems such as extreme centralization, rampant corruption external factors, and unfair global trade practices) have failed to absorb the growing urban populations. As a result, in most cities of Africa, shanty towns and squatter settlements have developed along the periphery of the major cities (Mosha 2011). The poor who live in these areas face tremendous economic and social hardships since they do not have access to basic human services such as shelter, land, water, safe cooking fuel and electricity, heating, sanitation, garbage collection, drainage, paved roads, footpaths, street lighting, etc. (Tacoli 2009; World Bank 2009). Page 3 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_8-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Urban areas in Africa host major government agencies and the private sector. These sectors contribute significantly to economic growth and create much-needed employment. According to the UN-HABITAT (2008), urban areas account for about 55 % of Africa’s GDP. They therefore play a pivotal role in the production of goods and services, besides generating employment for the growing urban populations. Unfortunately urbanization in Africa is not accompanied with an increase in economic growth or improved living standards. This is a unique phenomenon, which the World Bank has called “urbanization without growth” (Fay and Opal 2000; Barrios et al. 2006). This pattern of “urbanization without growth” is the result of inappropriate policies that could not cater for properly managed and planned urban development. In developed countries, urbanization took root during the industrial revolution. At a time when there was “redundant” labor in the rural areas, there was an increase in demand for labor in urban areas (Potter 1995). The same cannot be said about the process of urbanization in Africa. The process of urbanization in Africa is usually highly influenced by the movement of people displaced by drought, famine, ethnic conflicts, civil strife, and war. Acute levels of urban poverty and haphazard urban settlements are also common characteristics of urbanization in Africa. The poor live in poor neighborhoods where they face dire economic and social hardships. Most are uneducated and unskilled workers who have migrated to urban areas, encouraged by the push-andpull factors associated with rural–urban migration. Women and children are most affected according to Bartlett (2008), who says that children under the age of 14 are 44 % more likely to die due to urban environmental problems compared to the rest of the population. Bartlett further argues that “globally children under five are the victims of 80 % of sanitation-related illnesses and diarrhoeal diseases, primarily because of their less-developed immunity and because their play behaviour puts them into contact with pathogens” (2008, p. 505). The immediate challenges facing slums could be addressed through provision of basic services such as water, sanitation, and affordable housing. However, the long-term policy response should focus on economic growth, poverty reduction policies, and institutional capacity building, as well as on improved governance. If properly managed and planned for, urbanization could be an engine of economic growth and industrialization. However, without a proper policy in place, urbanization will contribute to the rising urban poverty, proliferation of slums, regional inequalities, and degradation of urban infrastructure and environment. As a result, some African cities could become centers of crime and slum settlements rather than being engines of industrialization and economic growth.

The Impact of Climate Change on Urban Development in Africa With erratic rainfall and frequent drought, rural dwellers in the continent find it very difficult to work on their farms. Therefore, they abandon their rural settlements and migrate to urban areas in search of better opportunities. Unfortunately, the urban economy is weak and cannot absorb these environmental refugees (Barrios et al. 2006). It is estimated that by the year 2050, there may be as many as 200 million environmental refugees, people who are forced to move due to environmental degradation (Myers quoted in Tacoli 2009). The migrants are generally younger, landless men with few dependants (Tacoli 2009). Unfortunately, most of these migrants are lowly farmers with limited skills and education. They therefore cannot secure employment in the urban economic sector. Consequently, they almost always end up in slums and shanty towns.

Page 4 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_8-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Besides being the most marginalized, these settlements are also prone to flooding and landslides and have very limited or no social amenities such as running water, electricity, proper health care, and infrastructure. The largest slum in East Africa, Kibera, is located about 5 km southwest of Nairobi. It has about 250,000 people but has no proper sanitation and garbage collection systems, toilet, and infrastructure. Kibera is heavily polluted by human refuse, garbage, and other wastes, including human and animal feces, courtesy of the open sewage system and the frequent use of “flying toilets.” This poor sanitation, combined with poor nutrition among residents, accounts for the many illnesses and diseases in Kibera. Climate change will eventually lead to a rise in sea level and threaten small island nations and coastal areas, especially those located near the sea. With nine of the world’s ten most populated cities located in the coastal zones, the effect of a rise in sea level on the population and ecosystem of these cities will be enormous (UNEP 2005). The major and direct impact of sea-level rise on coastal ecosystems will be erosion, submergence, and increase in salinity (Armah et al. 2005). It is estimated that more than 600 million people (10 % of the world’s population) live in coastal regions that have an elevation of up to 10 m (about 2 % of the world’s land area) above the seal level. Out of this, 360 million live in urban areas (13 % of the world’s urban population) and about 247 million live in low-income countries (McGranhan et al. 2007). With the rise in sea level, coastal towns will be susceptible to cyclones, typhoons, hurricanes, and floods. It is projected that a 3–4  C rise in temperature will expose between 134 and 332 million people to coastal flooding (UNDP 2007). Desertification due to drought and man’s actions, especially in the Saharan and Sahelian environment, results in sand and dust storms that could affect urban communities in many ways. Apart from the inconvenience and the disruption of transport and communications infrastructure, the increased risk of health-related problems such as respiratory diseases will continue to plague the continent. Many African cities will experience severe water shortages as the ravages of climate change, especially due to persistent droughts, continue to deepen. Large cities such as Lagos, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and others have a permanent water crisis. Unfortunately, women and children have to bear the burden of walking long distances in search of water. Assuming that current levels of investment in the sub-Saharan African urban water supply and sanitation continue over the next 20 years, as many as 300 million people in African cities will be without proper sanitation; and 225 million will be without potable water supply by 2020 (World Bank 1996). Besides the physical hazards from floods, droughts, and hurricanes, health-related risks will be on the rise as impacts of climate change bite deeper. Heat stress and respiratory distress from extreme temperatures might combine with air quality decreases to create higher mortality in urban areas. Changes in temperature, precipitation, and/or humidity will result in water- and vector-borne diseases. Less direct risks are expected as well; these include negative effects on livelihoods, food supplies, the psychological state of people, or access to water and other natural resources. The urban populations exposed to disease, such as dengue fever and malaria, already killing people in sub-Saharan Africa, are spreading to urban centers located in previously safe higher latitudes and altitudes (Wilbanks et al. 2007). The highland cities of Nairobi and Harare are a case in point (IPCC 2007). The geographical distribution of some infectious diseases will be altered, as warmer average temperatures permit an expansion of the area in which malaria, dengue fever, filariasis, and other tropical diseases are likely to occur. It should be noted that many of these health risks are already evident among most urban populations of Africa, even in the absence of full-blown effects of climate change, and are related to such factors as age, gender, socioeconomic status, and access to health

Page 5 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_8-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

services. Extreme weather events will likely create new health hazards and disrupt public health services, thereby leading to increased disease incidences. Infrastructure in urban areas is already showing evidence of destruction due to climate impacts such as flooding and sea-level rise. Some of the most vulnerable infrastructures include industrial plants; equipment for producing and distributing energy; roads, ports, and other transportation facilities; residential, institutional, and commercial properties; and coastal embankments. The economic consequences of these impacts are severe. For instance, in Uganda, the record-breaking rains of 1997 destroyed 40 % of the country’s 9,600 km feeder road network. Similarly, between 1997 and 1998, a prolonged drought in the Seychelles led to the closure of the Seychelles Breweries and the Indian Ocean Tuna Company (Mosha 2011). Rather than alter existing infrastructure, cities would probably choose to abandon it and relocate in upland areas at a cost of billions of dollars. People and jobs will be forced to relocate, and land use will change dramatically.

Adaptation and Mitigation Policies: Implications for Urban Development in Africa Urban governments play a critical role in climate change adaptation and in mitigating (reducing) greenhouse gas emissions. They however need a supportive institutional, regulatory, and financial framework, backed by their highest decision-making organs. In addition, low- and middle-income nations need the backing and full support of international agencies (Satterthwaite 2007). Emission of GHGs is one of the major policy issues that need to be addressed (APF 2007). Urban authorities in Africa should have in place policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions, but this should be reciprocated by a commitment to the reduction of global greenhouse emissions. For these policies to be effective, there must be incentives that recognize the development needs of urban authorities. Africa has legitimate energy needs, hence the problem of carbon emission in her urban centers. Policies encouraging clean energy technologies should be formulated and encouraged through capacity building and financial support from national governments. International partnership should also be established in a bid to bolster these efforts. Most African urban centers are located within the tropics or subtropic regions where solar energy and hydropower are abundant. Policies encouraging development of Africa’s vast solar energy potential and hydropower should be enacted. The World Bank and the African Development Bank Clean Energy and Development Investment Framework should be fully implemented as a mitigation measure. To mainstream adaptation to climate change in urban areas, the strategy should be a continuous process, which addresses both current climate variability and extremes and future climate risks. Africa’s urban authorities should take actions that link climate change adaptation to disaster risk management. A number of African countries such as Botswana, South Africa, Uganda, and Kenya have put in place national policies for disaster management that address issues such as prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery, and development (Mosha 2011). In Uganda, for instance, the government has created a climate change unit within the Ministry of Water and Environment to coordinate all climate change concerns and spearhead policy formulation in the country (Magezi 2011). At the local and urban authority levels, cities such as Cape Town have developed a municipal adaptation policy (MAP) that includes proper management and control of water supplies, storm management, bushfires, and coastal zones (Hope 2009). Similarly, the city of Durban has also came Page 6 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_8-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

up with a climate change adaptation strategy that includes human health, water and sanitation, coastal zones, food security and agriculture, infrastructure, and cross-sectoral activities. Many African countries have now recognized that policies on climate change adaptation and mitigation need to shift from a purely environmental concern to addressing a growing threat to sustainable development. Managing both current and future climate risks should be an integral part of development processes at both the national and regional levels and should involve a cross-sectoral approach that is reflected in the budget, thus the need for greater attention by ministries of finance and national planning. Urban authorities in Africa should adapt to climate change impacts through: • Increased efforts to improve access to climate data • Investment and transfer of technologies for adaptation in key sectors • Developing and implementing best practices for screening and assessing climate change risks in development projects and programs • Mainstreaming climate factors into development planning and implementation • Providing significant additional investment for disaster prevention For Africa to adapt to the impacts of climate change, it will need development partners to deliver on their commitments. Assisting Africa’s development through its largely unexploited hydropower potential will help to meet her objective of increasing energy access while limiting GHG emissions. Compensation for avoiding deforestation could also be introduced so as to limit GHG emissions, but this will require an understanding of the factors that encourage deforestation. Incentives to landholders could also be considered in a bid to discourage deforestation. Policies that build on existing strategies to support adaptation to climate change are among the most likely to succeed. Growing evidence suggests that mobility, in conjunction with income diversification, is an important strategy for reducing vulnerability to environmental and non-environmental risks (Tacoli 2009). Some of the climate change problems envisaged include drought, desertification, land degradation, floods and the rise of sea level. It is projected that between 75 and 250 million people in Africa will not have access to freshwater by 2030 (IPCC 2007). Climate stress usually overlaps with other factors in determining migration duration and composition. It is therefore important that socioeconomic, political, and cultural factors are integrated into the adaptation policies. The high vulnerability of urban systems and their impact on climate can be reduced through adaptation and mitigation measures based on known technology and design methodology. To counter climate change disasters, African urban authorities must have preparedness programs and plans, ingredients often lacking in most African cities (WMO 1994). African urban centers located along the coast and river deltas (or estuaries) are highly exposed to flooding due to their proximity to the sea (e.g., Free Town, Alexandria, Cairo, Beira). In this regard, mitigation measures required include designing and building appropriate flood shelters, improving and expanding sewerage and drainage systems, and putting in place an information system on climate change effects and responses (WMO 1994). Governance is an important element in climate change risk exposure. Urban authorities with limited incomes or assets are the most exposed. This is because they lack quality infrastructure and have poor disaster-preparedness provisions for planning and coordinating disaster response. Besides, the extent to which the poor can buy, build, or rent “safe” housing in “safe” sites and the degree to which the local government creates an enabling environment for local civil-society action

Page 7 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_8-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

to address these issues are limited (Satterthwaite 2007). Most urban authorities in Africa cannot afford the requisite cost of reducing the impact of climate change. Climate change health adaptation and mitigation measures required in African urban centers include putting in place an information system that profiles air conditions, observation networks and programs, and impact assessments and predictions. Bioclimatic GIS can be a useful tool in urban planning and design and can be used in predicting climate change impact on mortality. In terms of the impact of climate change on planning and architecture, there is need to take into account proper use of materials and architectural detailing, as well as drafting plans that maximize on outdoor spaces. Climate-sensitive designs should be done in a way that protects the environment from pollution. Architects and planners should use widely available knowledge and information on climate, while urban climatologists need to simplify the language in which climatic data is availed to planners and architects. Planning and building codes should be made public and their objectives clearly set out. A specific design guide that incorporates climate information is required. In a nutshell, the key to adaptation is competent, capable, and accountable urban governments that understand how to incorporate adaptation measures into aspects of their work and departments (Satterthwaite 2007).

Conclusion Climate change is both a threat and a challenge to Africa. Climate variability affects agricultural production and influences hunger, health, access to water, and consequently food security and poverty in the continent. Prolonged droughts and floods, which are associated with climate change, impact negatively on the livelihoods of farmers, making traditional agriculture across Africa less profitable. This in turn results in a number of people from rural areas migrating to cities in search of better livelihoods. The increased urban population in turn exerts pressure on urban services and natural resources such as urban space, urban water supplies, infrastructure, and sanitation systems, creating a challenge for urban planners and policymakers. The effects of climate change must therefore be factored into African countries’ urban policies and unequivocally address the current and emerging urban challenges, especially the rapid urbanization, poverty, informality, and safety. While Africa is the most vulnerable and most affected by climate change, it has the weakest coping mechanism and less financial and human resources. The support of the international community to help Africa build the requisite capacity to adapt to climate change is therefore very crucial. Municipal governments and urban authorities should design policies that are sensitive to energy saving, fewer sprawls, and climate-resilient infrastructure, especially with respect to drainage, flood control, housing, sanitation, transport, and water distribution systems. In the USA, for example, the 2005 Energy Policy Act creates policies and incentives for developing renewable energy. The Act aims to enhance and expand domestic energy production. Brazil’s government instituted the Incentives for Small Hydro Facilities policy to exempt small hydro facilities (those which produce less than 30 MW) from paying financial compensation for the use of water resources. To encounter the expected climate change disasters, urban authorities must also have preparedness programs and plans. Urban policies in Africa should also emphasize and focus on new techniques and methods of seasonal prediction, early warning systems, monitoring, and risk management.

Page 8 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_8-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

References APF (African Partnership Forum) (2007) Climate change and Africa. Document prepared jointly by the African Partnership Forum (APF) and the secretariat of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) for the 8th APF Meeting in Berlin, 22-23 May, 2007 Armah AK, Wiafe G, Kpelle DG (2005) Sea-level rise and coastal biodiversity in West Africa: a case study from Ghana. In: Low PS (ed) Climate change and Africa. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York, pp 204–217 Barnett J, Adger WN (2007) Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict. Political Geography 26:639–655 Barrios S, Bertinelli L, Strobl E (2006) Climate change and rural–urban migration: the case of sub-Saharan Africa. J Urban Econ 60(3):357–371 Bartlett S (2008) Climate change and urban children: impacts and implications for adaptation in low-and middle-income countries. Environ Urban 20(2):501–519 Choguill CL (1999) Sustainable human settlements: some second thoughts. In: Foo AF, Yuen B (eds) Sustainable cities in the 21st century. Singapore University Press, Singapore, pp 131–143 Fay M, Opal C (2000) Urbanisation without growth: a not so uncommon phenomenon. Policy research working paper 2412, August 2000. World Bank, Washington, DC Hope KR (1998) Urbanisation and urban growth in Africa. J Asian Afr Stud 33(4):345–357 Hope KR (2009) Climate change and urban development. Int J Environ Stud 66(5):643–658 Hulme M, Doherty R, Ngara T, New M, Lister D (2001) Africa climate change1900–2100. Clim Res 17:145–168 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2007) Summary for policymakers. In: Metz B, Davidson OR, Bosch PR, Dave R, Meyer LA (eds) Climate change 2007: mitigation. Contribution of working group III to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York Kelley A (1991) African urbanisation and city growth: perspective, problems, and policies. Duke University (Unpublished manuscript), Durham NC, USA Magezi SA (2011) Climate change and sustainable housing in Uganda. In: Yuen B, Kumssa A (eds) Climate change and sustainable urban development in Africa and Asia. Springer, London/New York, pp 153–166 McGranhan G, Balk D, Anderson B (2007) The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks of Climate Change and Human Settlements in Low Elevation, Coastal Zones. Environment & Urbanization 19(1):17–37 Mosha AC (2011) The effects of climate change on urban human settlements in Africa. In: Yuen B, Kumssa A (eds) Climate change and sustainable urban development in Africa and Asia. Springer, London/New York, pp 69–100 Pall P, Aina T, Stone D, Stott P, Nozawa T, Hilberts A et al (2011) Anthropogenic greenhouse gas contribution to flood risk in England and Wales in autumn 2000. Nature 470(7334):382–385 Potter R (1995) Urbanisation in the third world. Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York Potter D (2012) Challenging the myths of urban dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa: the evidence from Nigeria. World Dev 40(7):1382–1393 Satterthwaite D (2007) Climate change and urbanisation: effects and implications for urban governance. United Nations expert group meeting on population distribution, urbanisation, internal migration and development. UN/POP/EGM-URB/2008/16, 27 Dec 2007, United Nations, New York

Page 9 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_8-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Tacoli C (2009) Crisis or adaptation? Migration and climate change in a context of high mobility. Environ Urban 21(2):513–525 Thynell M (2007) Political actors and urban development. Reg Dev Stud 11:127–153 Trapp RJM, Diffenbaugh NS, Brooks HE, Baldwin ME, Robinson ED, Pal JS (2007) Changes in severe thunderstorm environment frequency during the 21st century caused by anthropogenically enhanced global radiative forcing. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 104(5):19719–19723 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2007) Human development report 2007/2008: fighting climate change, human solidarity in a divided world. Palgrave Macmillan, New York UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) (2005) Assessing coastal vulnerability: developing a global index for measuring risk. UNEP, Nairobi UN-HABITAT (United Nations Human Settlement Programme) (2008) The state of African cities 2008: a framework for addressing urban challenges in Africa. UN-HABITAT, Nairobi Ward P, Shively G (2012) Vulnerability, income growth and climate change. World Dev 40(5):916–927 Wilbanks TJ, Romero-Lankao P, Bao M, Berkhout F, Cairncross S, Ceron JP, Kapshe M, Muir-Wood R, Zapata-Marti R (2007) Industry, Settlement, and Society. IPCC WGII Fourth Assessment Report (pp. 357–391). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press WMO (World Metrological Organization) (1994) Report of the Technical Conference on Tropical Urban Climates. 28 March to 2 April 1993, Dhaka, Bangladesh. WCASP-30, WMO/TD-No. 647, Geneva WMO (2012) What is climate change? http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/wcp/ccl/faqs.htmln Accessed 29 Oct 2012 World Bank (1996) African Water Resources: Technical Paper No. 331.World Bank, Washington, DC World Bank (2009) ECO2 Cities: Ecological Cities as Economic Cities. World Bank, Washington, DC Zachariah KC, Conde J (1981) Migration in West Africa: demographic aspects. Oxford University Press, New York

Page 10 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_8-3 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Index Terms: Adaptation and mitigation policies 8 Africa 2 Climate change 2 Urban development 8

Page 11 of 11

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Climate Change Governance: Emerging Legal and Institutional Frameworks for Developing Countries Martin Oulu* Environment, Energy and Climate Change Consultant, Inscape Research and Consulting, Nairobi, Kenya

Abstract Climate change is a relatively new governance area in which policy and practice tend to precede theory or advance simultaneously. Establishing effective legal and institutional frameworks is crucial to its management. This chapter conducts a comparative analysis of the climate change governance frameworks of four developing countries, namely, the Philippines, Mexico, South Africa, and Kenya, all of which have enacted or propose climate change legislations, strategies, and related institutional structures and have decentralized governments. These are contrasted with the UK, the first to globally enact a framework climate change law. The results indicate that despite being time- and resource consuming, enactment of stand-alone framework climate change legislation is preferred over piecemeal amendments to relevant laws. Another key finding is the overwhelming adoption of mainstreaming as an important approach to managing climate change. Moreover, both adaptation and mitigation are considered equally important, mitigation being seen as a function of adaptation. This disabuses the notion that developing countries do not or should not focus much on mitigation. Institutionally, establishment of (often) a new high-level cross-sectoral climate change coordinating institution domiciled in the office of and/or chaired by the head of state is common. Such institutions offer general policy guidance and are supported at lower levels by an advisory panel of experts and a technical administrative secretariat. Procedures to ensure clear coordination between the central and devolved governments are in many instances outlined. Climate finance sources and management strategies are mixed. Sharing of experiences and strong support for national climate change legislations under ongoing post-Kyoto negotiations are recommended.

Keywords Climate change; Governance; Policy; Legal and institutional frameworks; Developing countries

Introduction Warming of the climate system is unequivocal as per the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007). Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration recently hit the 400 parts-per-million mark. While developing countries’ contribution to the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is negligible, they suffer most from the impacts of climate change because they lack the necessary institutional, economic, and financial capacity to cope (Huq et al. 2003). The vulnerability, coupled with the pressing need to grow their economies in order to reduce poverty levels, has traditionally underlined many developing countries’ focus on adaptation *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

efforts at the expense of mitigation. The situation is however steadily changing as many now strive to reduce their emissions by integrating emission reduction strategies into regular socioeconomic policies in pursuit of low-carbon development paths (cf. Reid and Goldemberg 1998). Their motivations are myriad: (i) mitigation is seen as a function of adaptation, that is, it offers opportunities for enhancing development and boosting adaptive capacity, (ii) opportunity to leapfrog into newer low-carbon technologies, (iii) promise of access to international climate finance, and (iv) the ideological commitment to show leadership. The crosscutting nature of climate change has seen mainstreaming being widely advocated as an important approach to its management (cf. Oulu 2011). Mainstreaming is the integration of climate change vulnerabilities or adaptation into some aspect of related government policy (IPCC 2007). Its potential benefits, dimensions, and assessment criteria have been extensively discussed (cf. Huq et al. 2003; Klein et al. 2007; Lasco et al. 2009; Mickwitz et al. 2009) and implementation guidelines published (cf. UNDP-UNEP 2011). It can be operationalized horizontally by different policy sectors or departments, vertically at different hierarchical administrative levels, and internationally by embodying multilateral cooperation (Persson and Klein 2008). The three dimensions highlight the multilevel and complexity of climate change governance. Nevertheless, addressing climate change is ultimately a local-scale affair. While international efforts are crucial, it is individual countries which determine relevant policy by translating both local and global goals into either adaptation or mitigation actions. Doing so requires effective national climate change policies, legislations, and institutions. In fact, advancing domestic climate legislations can help create the necessary conditions for an international deal (Townshend and Mathews 2013). Some even consider creation of durable regulatory frameworks and institutions as more important than the choice of particular programs (Stavins 1997). Yet, even as literature places governance at the center of future adaptation and mitigation efforts, many national governments have paid little attention to legislations and institutions (Agrawal and Perrin 2009). This chapter conducts a comparative analysis of the climate change governance structures of four developing countries with decentralized government systems, namely, the Philippines, Mexico, South Africa, and Kenya. In particular, it focuses on the legal and institutional frameworks with the aim of identifying emerging best practice. These are contrasted against the UK, a developed country and first globally to enact a framework climate change law. The UK is often touted as having both the “hardware” (institutions) and “software” (necessary knowledge) (Persson 2004), key ingredients in dealing with climate change. The chapter is organized into five sections. After the Introduction, section “Climate Change Governance: Role of Law and Institutions” examines the role of law and institutions in climate change governance. The individual country governance structures are analyzed in section “Individual Country Governance Frameworks,” while section “Synthesis of Emerging Climate Governance Best Practice” provides a synthesis of the emerging legal and institutional frameworks. Section “Concluding Remarks” makes some concluding remarks.

Climate Change Governance: Role of Law and Institutions Governance is a fuzzy concept with many definitions but no consensus. Some view governance as a political process of setting explicit societal goals and intervening in their achievement, translating into a generic term for the coordination of social actions rather than an antonym for government (Fröhlich and Knieling 2013). Three dimensions of governance are distinguished (Homeyer 2006; Herodes et al. 2007): policy (the nature and implementation of policy instruments), politics (actor constellations), and polity (institutional properties), each with a continuum of possible Page 2 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

subdimensions. The vagueness of the term nonetheless allows for its use in a variety of disciplines and contexts. In climate change, it encompasses a broad range of forms of coordination of adaptation and mitigation characterized by cross-boundary, multilevel, multi-sector, and multiagency settings as well as long-term challenges and uncertainty (Fröhlich and Knieling 2013). Climate change is, essentially, a “wicked” problem (Balint et al 2011) or “super wicked problem” (Lazarus 2008). Its enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, and conflicting stakeholders lack a single problem formulation or solution. Moreover, the longer it takes to address it, the harder it becomes, while those best positioned to do so have the least immediate incentive to act, making its governance a complex reality. The field is also still a relatively new area in which policy and practice tend to precede theory or advance simultaneously. Lack of middle-range adaptation theories to help frame policy debates and absence of comparative empirical studies to support policy interventions are glaring challenges (Agrawal 2008). Domestic climate change legislation has traditionally been viewed as something for governments to enact after an international agreement has been reached to support implementation. However, there is a growing global trend in which individual countries, states, or even cities are unilaterally implementing their own climate change regulations. While this could be attributed to frustrations with stalled United Nations (UN) climate agreements, it is also indicative of a growing recognition of the crucial role of domestic legislations and measures (Stavins 1997). By disregarding the so-called matching principle (cf. Butler and Mecey 1996), these countries are rebutting the skeptics’ claim that it is self-defeating for a country to act alone on climate change. Apart from the possibility of regulation at lower jurisdictional level triggering regulation at a higher (international) level (Engel and Saleska 2005), the inclination toward domestic climate change legislations also signal a “portfolio” approach in which a suite of different plans spread risks across individual countries (Vance 2012). Many developing countries are beginning to implement national emission reduction actions, fully aware that it is in their self-interest to do so and make their economies climate resilient even in the absence of a global deal or sufficient action by developed countries (Townshend and Mathews 2013). Some have even suggested that combined emission savings from such national actions may be greater than those attained by industrialized countries (Reid and Goldemberg 1998). Clearly, the ongoing Durban Platform negotiations should involve a formal recognition of and active support for the advancement of national climate legislation. Modes of environmental governance are variously categorized. Regulation or command and control is the most common approach. Literature is also awash with many types of “new” or “newer” policy instruments (NEPIs) which include market-based instruments, eco-labels, and voluntary agreements (Jordan et al. 2005). They have been hailed as able to offer cost-effective alternatives, provide dynamic incentives for technological change, address distributional equity concerns, and raise revenue (Stavins 1997; EEA 2005). Despite the “frenzy” surrounding the apparent popularity of NEPIs, regulation still dominates. Barring noncompliance may be the only means of ensuring environmental integrity. Importantly, many of the NEPIs require legislation to be effective (EEA 2005; Jordan et al. 2005; Herodes et al. 2007). But legislation also has its challenges and the nature varies greatly. Subsequent amendments, limited budgets, financial conditionality, delays in operationalizing regulations, vested interests, and simple nonenforcement can render a seemingly strong legal mandate mere symbolic aspirational statement. Successful climate change legislations must therefore be simultaneously flexible in certain respects and steadfast in others (Lazarus 2008). They should incorporate institutional design features that significantly insulate implementation from vested political and economic interests. Such design features should include precommitment strategies which deliberately make it hard, though not impossible, to change the law in response to emerging concerns and insights, as well as those intended to keep the statute on course over time. Page 3 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Examples include requirements for consultation with other agencies, scientific advisory committees, and stakeholders; judicial review provisions; and preemption triggers that accommodate competing interests while exploiting the resulting tension to further climate change policy. Institutions are systems of rules and decision-making procedures that give rise to social practices, assign roles, and guide interactions (Gupta et al. 2010). Categorized into public, civil society, or private sector, institutions are humanly created formal and informal mechanisms which shape social and individual expectations, interactions, and behavior initiatives (Agrawal and Perrin 2009). They play a major role in assisting countries anticipate and respond to climate change by structuring the distribution of risks, constituting and organizing incentive structures, and mediating external interventions into local contexts. Effective adaptation-enhancing institutions encourage the involvement of a variety of perspectives and actors, allow continuous learning and behavior change, and can mobilize resources (Gupta et al. 2010). Fragmentation, conflicting mandates, and capacity challenges plague many developing country institutions.

Individual Country Governance Frameworks The Philippines Climate Change Vulnerability and Government Structure The Philippines is an archipelagic country in Southeast Asia classified as lower middle income by the World Bank. Due to its location in the Pacific Ring of Fire, it is prone to earthquakes and active volcanoes and is ranked highest in the world in terms of vulnerability to tropical cyclone occurrence (Yumul et al. 2011; RoP 2011). The country lies within the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), a source of heavy rains and storms. Its geography and location therefore puts it at a high risk from sea level rise (Lofts and Kenny 2012). The Philippines and similar small island developing states are particularly vulnerable to global environmental change (Pelling and Uitto 2001; IPCC 2007; Yumul et al. 2011; Guillotreau et al. 2012). Their disproportionate natural resource dependency and extensive coastlines expose them to high climate change risks. The country’s GHG emission in 2000 was 21,767.41GgCO2e (RoP 2011). The 1987 Philippine Constitution provides for a unitary multitiered government (Diokno 2009; Manasan 2009). The country is divided into 15 administrative regions and two additional autonomous regions, Mindanao and Cordillera. The president is the head of state and government, and the bicameral legislature is made up of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Devolved local government units (LGUs) consist of provinces each subdivided into cities, municipalities, and barangays – the smallest political unit. They have authority over natural resource management, pollution control, and environmental protection but are under considerable supervision by higherlevel government in areas like budgeting and legislation. Legislative Framework Well aware of its particular vulnerability to climate change, the Philippines developed the comprehensive Climate Change Act of 2009, the first in the developing world and second globally after the UK. The Act aims to “mainstream(ing) climate change into government policy formulations, establish(ing) the framework strategy and program on climate change, creating for this purpose the Climate Change Commission” (RoP 2009, p. 1). The unequivocal intent to systematically mainstream climate change is noteworthy, suggesting that the mainstreaming mantra is slowly finding its way from academia into policy and, hopefully, practice. Both adaptation and mitigation measures have since been implemented through formulation of a Framework Strategy and Program Page 4 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

on Climate Change (2010–2022) and the National Climate Change Action Plan (2011–2028), but with no emission reduction targets. Interestingly, the Framework Strategy “treats mitigation as a function of adaptation” (RoP 2010, p. 17). That is, it recognizes the mutually beneficial relationship in which mitigation strategies offer opportunities for enhancing adaptive capacity. The close interrelation between climate change and disaster risk reduction (DRR) is particularly evident in the Philippines. As such, the Climate Change Act integrates DRR into climate change initiatives, while the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act 2010 considers disasters as inclusive of climate change impacts (RoP 2010). Institutional Framework Climate Change Commission The Climate Change Act (2009) establishes the Climate Change Commission (CCC) as the sole policy-making body charged with coordinating, monitoring, and evaluating climate change-related programs and action plans. It is chaired by the president of the republic and is administratively located in the Office of the President, making it very high level. This arrangement has several potential advantages. First, it enhances the profile of and puts climate change firmly and high up on the national agenda. Second, it is a way of procuring and maintaining the political will and commitment to implement climate change actions by the executive. From a political ecology perspective, climate change is inherently political (cf. Eriksen and Lind 2009). Making the president by law the head of the premier climate change outfit does not automatically translate into political will. Rather, political competition potentially does the trick. That is, the incumbent will be motivated to bring to bear his or her political and executive powers on climate change programs as a way of endearing oneself to the electorate. The Act can, therefore, by design or default, create climate change champions out of the president, the executive, and the ruling political party or coalition. Champions play a critical role in rallying necessary support and educating the public on climate change (cf. Roberts 2008). Third, although enhancing mainstreaming, listed as the first function of the Commission, should essentially happen at all levels, the higher the better as this allows greater possibility of integration at lower political and administrative levels. The high-level status of the Commission gives the convening powers necessary to integrate climate change horizontally and vertically across all levels of governance. The Commission is made up of three other Commissioners who must be climate change experts. It is supported by a broad-based, cross-sectoral, and cross-departmental advisory board with representatives from relevant government ministries, local government, academia, the private sector, and civil society. Involvement of key stakeholders enhances the quality of climate change policies and their implementation but could also pose a challenge as it might prove difficult to reconcile the myriad of interests at play. Nevertheless, the Commission is mandated to meet once every 3 months or as often as deemed necessary, an arrangement which could help resolve any deadlocks in good time. Infrequency of meetings can impede the functioning and effectiveness of institutions. The day-to-day running of the Commission is assigned to a secretariat, the Climate Change Office headed by the Commission’s vice chairperson. In addition, a Panel of Technical Experts provides technical advice to the Commission in climate science, technologies, and best practices for risk assessment and enhancement of adaptive capacity. Surprisingly, the experts are to be permanently employed by the Commission. Without a clear definition of what particular “technical advice” they are to provide and for how long, it would be cost-effective to make the panel ad hoc. Nevertheless, the panel of experts incorporates a science- and evidence-based approach to climate change management.

Page 5 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Other Institutions Government ministries and agencies are assigned specific roles based on their core mandates in the Climate Change Act. For example, the Department of Education is to integrate climate change into the primary and secondary education curricula, while government financial institutions are required to give preferential financial packages for climate change-related projects. Some of the specified roles and responsibilities are, however, quite restrictive and do not allow for an innovative interpretation of their mandates with regard to climate change. Local government units (LGUs) are at the forefront in formulating, planning, and implementing local climate change action plans. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is to monitor implementation of provisions of the Act and recommend any necessary legislation. Climate Finance Climate finance is crucial to addressing climate change. All relevant government agencies and local government units are to allocate adequate funds from their annual budgets for the implementation of their respective climate change programs and plans. No special fund is set up although the Commission is authorized to accept financial support from local and international sources. No carbon trading schemes are to be set up or funding expected from such, a cautious move given that they have not benefitted the intended developing countries and their underlying logic for net emission reductions has been questioned (cf. Mulugetta 2011; Reddy 2011; Bond et al. 2012). International funds, though often necessary, should complement, not replace, domestic resource mobilization.

Mexico Climate Change Vulnerability and Government Structure Mexico, a Latin American country bordering the United States of America (USA), is categorized as upper-middle-income economy by the World Bank (2013). Its GHG emissions are quite high, about 616 Mt CO2e in 2010 excluding land-use change (Höhne et al. 2012) and ranked eleventh globally (Vance 2012). Its climate is projected to become drier and warmer, with several hydrological regions highly vulnerable to decreased precipitation and higher temperatures (IPCC 2007). This makes major economic support sectors vulnerable to climate change (Liverman and O’Brien 1991). For example, the agricultural sector employs more than a third of its growing population, yet only one-fifth of the country’s cropland is irrigated. Rainfed agriculture supports subsistence farmers and provides most of the domestic food supply. Frequent droughts already reduce harvests and jeopardize food and energy security. About one-fifth of Mexico’s electricity is hydroelectric, hence susceptible to reduced water levels. Significant mismatch between water supply and population will see increased problems for cities and industrial production. Mexico is a three-tier federal government with 31 relatively autonomous states and a federal district which encompass Mexico City (Rodríguez and Ward 1994; Lankao 2007; Höhne et al. 2012). The president is the head of the federation and government, the bicameral legislature (Congress) is made up of the upper and lower chambers, while the judiciary is divided into federal and state systems. Unlike other Latin American countries, the president is directly elected for a single 6-year term. From the state, lower levels of devolution include the municipality (municipio) and municipal council (ayuntamiento). Although the devolved units are supposedly autonomous, the hegemonic nature of the ruling party often muzzles such autonomy, for example, in financial resources (cf. Höhne et al. 2012).

Page 6 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Legislative Framework The General Law on Climate Change (Ley General de Cambio Climático) was enacted in 2012, making Mexico the most recent country and third globally to enact a framework climate change law. The law seeks to facilitate the transition to a competitive low-carbon emission economy by consolidating the institutional framework across the three levels of government, regulation of adaptation and mitigation actions, and promotion of research, innovation, and technology transfer. It fulfills Mexico’s Cancún pledge to voluntarily reduce its emissions to 30 % by 2020 and 50 % by 2050 (based on 2000 baseline), conditional on international financial support. This is in addition to generating 35 % of the country’s electricity from renewable sources by 2024. The 2020 target is considered the most stringent for a developing country, and Mexico is the only developing country so far to set itself an absolute reduction target by 2050 (Höhne et al. 2012). Mechanisms for gradual establishment of market-based instruments and emission trading are included (IDLO 2012). The General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection (LGEEPA), Mexico’s framework environmental law, was amended in 2011 to incorporate some climate change provisions, including the authority of environmental agencies to formulate and execute mitigation actions (Ruffo and Vega 2011). However, the enactment of the comprehensive General Law on Climate Change has incorporated and harmonized many such provisions. Institutional Framework The General Law on Climate Change establishes an institutional framework that emphasizes the need for a transversal, cross-sectoral approach to climate change and the critical importance of wide stakeholder participation (IDLO 2012). They include the following. Intersecretarial Commission on Climate Change (Comisión Intersecretarial de Cambio Climático, CICC) Originally administratively established in 2005 (Höhne et al. 2012), the CICC became embedded in the 2012 climate change law. Charged with formulating national climate change policies, coordinating actions across the federal government, and ensuring mainstreaming and participation of key stakeholders, the CICC is composed of several relevant government ministries. Similar to the Philippines’ Climate Change Commission, the CICC is chaired by the president of the federation who may delegate this function to the minister responsible for environmental matters. It could not be established if the CICC is administratively located in the Office of the President. As already discussed under section “Institutional Framework” of the Philippines, making the president by law the chairperson and therefore directly the head of the premier, the climate change coordinating institution has positive ramifications for climate change management. Again, mainstreaming is clearly stated as one of the key objectives of the Commission and the law. The CICC is to have several permanent Working Groups, including one on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). Deforestation is a major source of GHG emissions in Mexico and therefore an appropriate target area. Linked to the CICC is the Council on Climate Change (Consejo de Cambio Climático, CCC), a permanent consultative body comprised of representatives from the private sector, civil society, and academia. Its objective is to foster broad stakeholder participation, collaboration, and support for climate change policies and actions (IDLO 2012). It can be equated to the Philippine’s Climate Change Commission’s Advisory Board. National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change (Instituto Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático (INECC)) INECC is the main public agency responsible for climate change policy development and evaluation (IDLO 2012). Specifically, it is to prepare, conduct, and evaluate the national climate change policy; design market-based instruments; prepare an emissions inventory; Page 7 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

and build scientific and research capacity. Its management is under a governing board comprised of heads of several ministries and chaired by the sectoral minister responsible for environmental matters. It has a director general appointed by the president and chairperson of the CICC. The INECC’s functions and composition are similar to the Philippine’s Climate Change Office (CCO). However, the similarity of its functions to and unclear relation to the CICC might create institutional conflict if clear coordination and communication mechanisms are not put in place. Other Institutions The National System for Climate Change (Sistema Nacional de Cambio Climático, SNCC) is a permanent communication and coordination mechanism between the federal government and devolved governments. Made up of the CICC, CCC, INECC, state governments, LGU representatives, and the Congress, it is aimed at promoting the cross implementation of the national climate change policy (IDLO 2012). In a decentralized system such as in Mexico, clear coordination and communication between different governance levels are very crucial for the effective implementation of a crosscutting policy issue like climate change. The Evaluation Committee (Coordinación de Evaluación, CE) reports to the SNCC and is an expert body made up of the head of INECC and representatives from the scientific, academic, and technical communities charged with periodically and systematically evaluating progress on implementation of aspects of the climate change law. Climate Finance The General Law on Climate Change establishes a Climate Change Fund (Fondo Para el Cambio Climático) aimed at sourcing and channeling funds from public and private sectors, at both national and international levels (IDLO 2012). This is in addition to annual budgetary allocation and proceeds from carbon trading. The CICC is legally mandated to establish an emission market, including a regulating agency (Höhne et al. 2012).

South Africa Climate Change Vulnerability and Government Structure South Africa is the only African country whose contribution to global warming is significant (Chevallier 2010) due to its energy-intensive, fossil-fuel-powered economy. The 2000 estimate was 435 million tons of CO2 (Letete et al. 2009). A greater warming trend has been observed throughout the continent since the 1960s (IPCC 2007). Even under very conservative emission scenarios, it is predicted that by mid-century the South African coast will warm by around 1–2
C and the interior by around 2–3
C (RSA 2011). Declining rainfall patterns and increased frequency of extreme climate events such as droughts and floods are projected (Maponya and Mpandeli 2012; IFRC 2011). These changes will significantly affect human health, agriculture, and other waterintensive economic sectors such as mining and electricity generation. Moreover, a large number of South Africans live in conditions of chronic disaster vulnerability such as fragile ecologies or marginal areas (RSA 2005). The severe June 1994 floods in Cape Town’s historically disadvantaged Cape Flats exposed the country’s disaster soft underbelly. South Africa is a federal government comprised of a three-tier devolved system: national, provincial, and local. The president is the head of state and government. The Parliament is made up of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. Each of the nine provincial governments is allowed to make provincial laws and may adopt their own constitution. Three categories of local governments (or municipalities) exist (Pasquini et al. 2013): metropolitan, local municipalities, and district. Many of their responsibilities have important implications for climate change management. The constitution also recognizes the role of traditional leadership. Page 8 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

All the three levels of government must observe and adhere to the principles of cooperative government. As is expected, the country’s decentralization has its challenges (cf. Koelble and Andrew 2013). Legislative Framework South Africa does not have a framework climate change law. The National Climate Change Response White Paper (2011) is the key policy document guiding climate change management. It sets mitigation targets that should collectively result in a 34 % and a 42 % deviation below its “business as usual” emission growth trajectory by 2020 and 2025, respectively, conditional on international financial and technological support (RSA 2011). It also outlines the institutional and other planning frameworks. Existing legislations, especially those dealing with disaster risk reduction and general environmental regulation, e.g., the Air Quality Act 2004, are also relevant to adaptation and mitigation efforts. To ensure that climate change is fully mainstreamed into the work of all three spheres of government, all government departments and state-owned enterprises are to regularly review their policies and plans (RSA 2011). The Disaster Management Act of 2002 definition of “disaster” as a progressive or sudden, widespread or localized, and natural- or human-caused occurrence (RSA 2003) can be interpreted as inclusive of climate change. The White Paper also considers DRR as short-term adaptations to climate change and acknowledges the existence and crucial role played by the Disaster Management Act. Overall, South Africa seems to have no immediate intention of enacting a stand-alone framework climate change law. Implementation of the actions stipulated in the White Paper will, where necessary, be implemented through piecemeal changes to relevant existing legislations and regulations. This is at variance with all the other countries analyzed. Mainstreaming is however at the core of its climate change management efforts. Institutional Framework Unlike the Philippines and Mexico, South Africa’s climate change institutional framework is fragmented. Several institutions are responsible for various aspects of climate change, many of which overlap, thus creating possibilities of conflict. Most are also not anchored in any law and lack administrative capabilities or budgetary allocation. Interministerial Committee on Climate Change (IMCCC) Established in 2009, the IMCCC is to oversee all aspects of the implementation of the climate change policy. In justifying the need for the IMCCC, the White Paper states that “the strategic, multi-faceted and crosscutting nature of climateresilient development requires a coordination committee at executive (Cabinet) level that will coordinate and align climate change response actions with national policies and legislation” (RSA 2011, p. 36). This illustrates the necessity of a high-level cross-sectoral institution with convening powers as is similarly applied by the countries analyzed so far. However, contrary to the above statement and at variance with the other developing countries, the IMCCC is to be chaired by the minister responsible for the environment rather than the president or Cabinet secretary. Additionally, technical, analytical, and administrative capacity to the IMCCC will be provided by a secretariat based in the sectoral Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA). Though interministerial, the arrangement makes the IMCCC less high level relative to the rest of the countries analyzed. The net effect is a lowering of the profile of climate change in the national agenda and potential challenges in integrating climate change across government. In many governments the world over, ministries of environment are rarely viewed as “powerful” based not only on their perennial paltry annual budgetary allocation but also because of the late entry of environmental issues on the national Page 9 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

agenda, many countries having only established environmental ministries after the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Environmental ministries thus lack the political clout, financial muscle, and convening powers necessary to effectively coordinate and mainstream a crosscutting issue such as climate change across government. Moreover, Giordano et al. (2011) view the IMCCC as merely an information platform which does not include all relevant ministries, especially that of finance. Forum of South African Directors-General Clusters Forum of South African Directors-General (FOSAD) was established in 1998 to enhance integration of crosscutting issues within the overall policy and implementation framework and address identified coordination weaknesses such as lack of alignment between different governmental planning cycles and between the central and devolved units (RSA n.d.). Mirroring the main Cabinet committees, they are to provide strategic leadership for the national climate change response actions. However, their structure and functioning has been criticized as potentially inappropriate for the prioritization of climate change issues (Giordano et al. 2011). Intergovernmental Committee on Climate Change (IGCCC) Established in 2008, the IGCCC’s role is to operationalize cooperative governance in the area of climate change by bringing together the relevant national, provincial, and municipal departments under the principle of cooperative government. It fosters information exchange and consultation. However, lack of representation of the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), inability to provide practical assistance in policy development or implementation, and lack of an administrative budget or structure (Giordano et al. 2011) potentially weaken its effectiveness. Other Institutions The National Committee on Climate Change (NCCC), which is to be formalized into an advisory council with statutory powers and extended responsibilities beyond the current communication function, is one of two mechanisms set up to coordinate activities and consult with key stakeholders (RSA 2011). Its upgrade could remedy its current lack of legal backing, a secretariat, and regular budget and lack of executive power (Giordano et al. 2011). The second stakeholder coordination mechanism is the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) which brings together the government, business, and labor unions. The environment, including climate change, is a concurrent function between the provincial and national government. Each province is to develop its own climate response strategy, and municipalities are to integrate climate change considerations and constraints into their development plans and programs. To make clear local governments’ mandate and assign them specific climate change-related powers, COGTA is to review relevant policies and legislations. Parliament is to review legislation and determine the legal requirements to support the existing or proposed institutional and regulatory arrangements, while line ministries and agencies are to integrate climate change into their policies and programs. Climate Finance By necessity, South Africa’s climate finance strategy comprises a comprehensive suite of measures, including market-based ones, to create and maintain a long-term funding framework for mitigation and adaptation actions. In the short- and medium-term period, a transitional climate finance system and interim climate finance coordination mechanism are to be established, the nature of which is not outlined. In the long term, however, climate change actions will be integrated into the fiscal budgetary process of all the three tiers of government.

Page 10 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Kenya Climate Change Vulnerability and Government Structure Kenya has experienced increasing temperature trends over most parts of the country for the past 60 years (GoK 2010a). The time series of annual and seasonal rainfall for the standard seasons of December–January–February, March–April–May, June–July–August, and September–October–November indicates a neutral to slightly decreasing trends. The effects of the observed climatic changes include a reduction in the glacier on Mt. Kenya, variability in weather patterns, and frequent, prolonged, and severe drought and flood conditions (NEMA 2008). Kenya’s natural resource-based economy makes it particularly vulnerable to climate change. Agriculture is mainly rainfed, while tourism largely depends on wildlife and the ecosystem, both highly susceptible to climate change (cf. GoK 2010a; Kameri-Mbote and Odote 2011; NEMA 2008; Mutimba et al. 2010). Some estimates put the future net economic costs of climate change at 2.6 % of GDP per year by 2030 and doubling by 2050 (SEI 2009). The new (2010) constitution makes Kenya a presidential republic with a two-tier decentralized system of distinct and interdependent central and 47 county governments (GoK 2010b). The president is the head of state and government and together with the deputy president, attorney general, and several Cabinet secretaries form the Cabinet. The bicameral Parliament is made up of the National Assembly and Senate. The Senate represents the interests of the counties, while county assemblies have legislative powers. County governments’ functions have a bearing on climate change management and include county planning, controlling air pollution, natural resource and environmental conservation, agriculture, health, transport, and trade. Legislative Framework Kenya, like South Africa, is yet to enact a framework climate legislation. However, Kenya has made strong indications of its intention to do so in the near future. The country’s climate change governance scope is encompassed in various policy and regulatory frameworks interrelated to its natural resources (Mutimba and Wanyoike 2013). This analysis will focus primarily on the National Climate Change Response Strategy 2010 (NCCRS), National Climate Change Action Plan 2013–2017 (NCCAP), and, briefly, the Climate Change Authority Bill 2012. The NCCRS was developed in 2010 with the aim of achieving a prosperous and climate change-resilient Kenya. It admits that “the integration of climate information into Government policies is important. . . (but) the same has not been adequately factored into most of the sectors of the country’s economy including government development policies and plans” (GoK 2010a, p. 6), an endorsement of mainstreaming. It outlines an enabling policy, legal, and institutional framework. It recommends the development of a comprehensive climate change policy which should be translated into a climate change law by either strengthening existing legislations or developing a new stand-alone law (GoK 2010a). Despite being time-consuming and expensive, the NCCRS prefers an entirely new climate change law. Launched in March 2013, the NCCAP operationalizes the NCCRS. It covers, among others, low-carbon development strategies; adaptation and mitigation options; climate finance; and an enabling policy, legislative, and institutional framework intended to enhance mainstreaming. The actions are premised on their contribution toward achieving Kenya’s long-term development goals in addition to intermediate benefits such as improved livelihoods, attracting international climate finance, as well as demonstrating global leadership (GoK 2013). It further commits all government ministries, departments, and agencies to play a role in mainstreaming climate change across their functions and processes. No emission reduction target is set. Rather, priority low-carbon development areas and options are outlined. In keeping with the NCCRS, the NCCAP recommends Page 11 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

development of a coherent stand-alone climate change policy to, among others, provide guidance on (i) the envisaged legislative framework to be established through a climate change law and (ii) the specific sectoral legislative amendments that will enable full implementation of the NCCAP’s priorities. It reaffirms “the need to enact a stand-alone framework climate change law to facilitate the necessary direction, coordination, policy setting and high-level political prioritization in order to mainstream climate change across government functions” (GoK 2013, p. 100). The stand-alone climate law is to be accompanied by a series of sectoral legislative and regulatory amendments through either an omnibus bill or a number of separate legislative amendments in order to bring sectoral legislation in harmony with the framework climate change law. The Kenya Climate Change Authority Bill, 2012, is a private member’s bill presented to the Parliament in April 2012. Some of its proposals are at variance with those of the government which consider it a parallel effort (GoK 2013). Developed mainly by the civil society under the aegis of the Kenya Climate Change Working Group, the Bill seeks to establish a Climate Change Authority and provide a framework for mitigation and adaptation (GoK 2012). A Climate Change Trust Fund is also proposed. The Bill is, however, not comprehensive since beyond the proposed institutional framework, it covers very little else. It is evident from the NCCAP that the government has sidestepped the Bill and is focused on enacting an entirely new stand-alone framework climate change law. It seems that the proposals in the NCCRS and more specifically the NCCAP are the official Government of Kenya position on climate change. Consequently, the proposals in the Bill will not be considered any further. Institutional Framework The NCCRS considers a dedicated climate change institution as important in establishing a coordination instrument to ensure that all cross-sectoral activities match the overall vision of a prosperous and climate change-resilient Kenya (GoK 2010a). But its proposed institutional structure gives the sectoral ministry responsible for the environment a dominant role, with all the key institutions placed under it. The potential lack of effectiveness of such a sectoral and non-highlevel institutional arrangement is already discussed under section “Institutional Framework” of South Africa. In summary, the National Climate Change Secretariat (NCCS), which was instrumental in developing the NCCAP, was established. In addition, the National Climate Change Steering Committee (NCCSC) was charged with gathering and collating information from various stakeholders, while the existing cross-sectoral National Climate Change Activities Coordination Committee (NCCACC) continued in its advisory capacity. Perhaps recognizing the potential weaknesses of the NCCRS proposal, the NCCAP proposes a radically different institutional framework intended to achieve high-level oversight and policy guidance, mainstream climate change, involve county governments and stakeholders, and enhance technical and scientific analysis capabilities (GoK 2013). The following institutions proposed in the NCCAP will most likely receive the necessary legal backing with the eventual enactment of a stand-alone climate change legislation. National Climate Change Council (NCCC) The proposed NCCC will be responsible for policy direction, coordination, and oversight across government. Consistent with similar institutions in the Philippines and Mexico, it will be located in the Office of the President and, therefore, high level. Although initial proposals (in which the author was involved as a consultant) involved making the president of the republic the chairperson of NCCC, the government eventually settled on the secretary to the Cabinet. Reporting annually to the Parliament, it has representatives of both the national and county governments as in the UK’s Committee on Climate Change (see section “Institutional Framework” of the UK). Interministerial and interagency, the NCCC represents a wide Page 12 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

cross section of stakeholder interests from public, private, academia, research, and civil society. The mandate, location, and composition of the NCCC accord it the necessary political clout, convening, and resource mobilization powers necessary to adequately champion and effectively mainstream climate change across government, both national and devolved. The NCCC will be supported by a technical National Climate Change Secretariat located within the sectoral ministry responsible for climate affairs. Its functions will include continuous revision of climate policy, proposal of relevant legislation, and program implementation. It may have decentralized structures at the county level to collect and collate climate change data. Other Institutions The ministry in charge of national planning is to spearhead integration of climate change into planning processes. One way will be through installation of climate change desk officers in all line ministries. The National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) remains the Designated National Authority (DNA) on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the National Implementing Entity (NIE) for the Adaptation Fund. County governments will have climate change functions coordinated and supported by the National Climate Change Secretariat (NCCS). A Climate Change Resource Center hosted by the NCCS is to become the one-stop shop for Kenya’s climate change information and knowledge. Climate Finance A Kenya Climate Fund (KCF) located within the ministry responsible for finance intended as a vehicle for mobilizing and allocating both international and domestic financial resources toward climate change activities is proposed. The public sector’s capacity to efficiently and effectively absorb the expected funding, scaling up access to international carbon markets and possible establishment of a carbon trading platform, as well as improving the “investment climate for climate investment” are some of the proposed climate finance strategies. Climate change funding will also be prioritized in the annual budget by creating climate change line items and coding them for ease of tracking.

The UK Climate Change Vulnerability and Government Structure The UK was the first country globally to enact a framework stand-alone climate change legislation in 2008. A developed country, the UK has a long, even intimate, history with GHG emissions based on its role in igniting the industrial revolution and the transition to the current fossil-fuel economy, the “anthropocene” (cf. Crutzen 2000). The warming trend throughout Europe is well established (IPCC 2007). The UK’s first Climate Change Risk Assessment indicates both positive and negative impacts of climate change on production systems such as agriculture, forestry, and fisheries and key economic sectors such as tourism and energy (DEFRA 2012). The UK is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarch. While the prime minister is the head of government, the queen is the head of state. The Cabinet is made up of the prime minister and several secretaries of state. Some power is devolved to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland which are in charge of local environment, health, education, and transport. Legislative Framework Response to climate change in the UK has been varied (cf. Hulme and Turnpenny 2004). The first attempt to enact legislation aimed at reducing GHG emissions was through the Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Act 2006 which sought to promote renewable energy and compliance with GHG emission-related building regulations (UK Govt. 2006). The Act was not comprehensive, lacking in Page 13 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

areas such as adaptation, emission trading, and enabling institutional structures. A new comprehensive Climate Change Act 2008 was therefore enacted. It sets a legally binding 2050 emission target of at least 80 % lower than the 1990 baseline, establishes an institutional framework and emission trading schemes, and makes provisions for adaptation (UK Govt. 2008). It also amends and harmonizes relevant existing legislations and regulations. While the legally binding emission reduction target is an obligation under the UNFCCC, the attention given to adaptation illustrates the need to plan for and build adaptive capacity even by developed countries. Institutional Framework Committee on Climate Change The Committee on Climate Change is to give advice to the government and its agencies, including the devolved units. It is composed of a chairperson and five to eight members jointly appointed by the national authorities, i.e., the secretary of state and Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Ireland ministers responsible for climate change affairs. Cumulatively, the Commission must have experience in or knowledge of a set of expertise or knowledge areas crucial to a holistic understanding and management of climate change. The Committee appoints a chief executive and may establish several subcommittees, but with a mandatory adaptation subcommittee. It makes regular progress reports to the Parliament. Other Institutions Implementation of the advice and recommendations of the Committee on Climate Change are entirely left to the central and devolved governments. The Parliament plays its oversight role by receiving regular progress reports, while the Committee is required to involve the public and other stakeholders in carrying out its functions. Unlike the developing countries analyzed, the Climate Change Act 2008 does not provide for any resource mobilization strategy since requisite resources are to be included in the relevant implementing agencies’ annual budgets. Relation to Developing Countries’ Frameworks The UK’s enactment of a stand-alone climate change law is in tandem with that of most of the developing countries analyzed. Institutionally, the UK adopts a lean structure. Relative to the developing countries, the composition, appointing authority, and apparent administrative independence give the impression that the Committee is not high level. However, this might not necessarily be the case given the UK’s unique system where the executive, just like the Committee, is accountable to the Parliament. That all government agencies must seek and consider its advice further raises its profile and potential buy-in for its recommendations. However, the Committee’s role is limited to advice, and its membership is expert led rather than stakeholder based. Such a scientific approach potentially depoliticizes and reduces conflicts within the Committee but can be criticized for ignoring the positive aspects of stakeholder participation. Its success is thus contingent on a high degree of public faith in science for policy. The direct inclusion of representatives of devolved units in the premier climate change institution is shared by the UK and Kenya. This could be attributed to their unique devolved systems which wield significant powers and autonomy. The arrangement enhances interpretation and smooth implementation of climate change goals at the local levels and is worth emulating. Overall, despite being the pioneer in enacting framework climate change legislation, it is hard to tell to what degree the UK has influenced the legal and institutional structures of the other developing countries.

Page 14 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Synthesis of Emerging Climate Governance Best Practice Climate change governance frameworks are still evolving. The few but growing number of countries that have proposed legal and institutional structures provide insight which can guide other countries. The foregoing comparative analysis has revealed certain emerging best practice, summarized below, which forms elements of a climate change governance structure developing countries can reproduce, expand, or tailor to their domestic sociopolitical situations.

Enactment of New Stand-Alone Framework Climate Change Legislation Except South Africa which has no immediate intention of enacting a stand-alone framework climate change law, all the rest either have done so or have unequivocally demonstrated their intention to do so. Two key factors seem to favor such a framework law: (i) the “wicked” nature of climate change requires strategies and policy instruments that go beyond what existing sectoral legislations might have been conceived to deal with, and (ii) the nature and degree of potential amendments to existing sectoral laws are so extensive that they are best captured in a comprehensive stand-alone legislation. The UK’s experience of initially opting for the limited Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Act, 2006, before settling on the more comprehensive Climate Change Act, 2008, illustrates this point.

Mainstreaming Is Key to Climate Change Management Mainstreaming of climate change into policies, legislations, and programs is widely advocated in literature as a more effective approach to tackling climate change. Yet, its uptake and application in laws and institutions are yet to be fully assessed. This comparative analysis provides some empirical evidence that mainstreaming is finding its way into policy and planning instruments from academia. All the countries assessed embrace mainstreaming and commit to integrating climate change through various strategies. This calls for early targeted training on how to mainstream climate change at different levels and constant monitoring and evaluation of applied strategies.

Mitigation Actions Are as Domestically Beneficial as Adaptation The need to grow their economies in order to lift their growing populations out of poverty has traditionally been used to explain a seeming focus on adaptation at the expense of mitigation by many developing countries. However, empirical evidence from this analysis indicates that most of these countries now view mitigation as a function of adaptation, basing their emission reduction actions on envisaged benefits or “win-win” outcomes. These are generally packaged as low-carbon development strategies or pathways. Apart from the urge to demonstrate global leadership, a possible frustration with international efforts, and jab at the developed countries for perceived lack of commitment, such benefits include job creation and access to new technology and international finance. The distinction between mitigation and adaptation actions is increasingly becoming blurred. Many mitigation actions have adaptation benefits and vice versa.

High-Level Climate Change Institution The dominant trend across the countries analyzed is the establishment of a new high-level crosssectoral climate change institution with representation from a wide cross section of stakeholders. Charged with overall advice, policy guidance, coordination, and oversight, its high-level status emanates from being chaired by the country’s president, or secretary to the Cabinet, and location in the Office of the President (OP) or Cabinet Office, or both. Remember most of the countries are presidential systems. The UK and Kenya go a notch higher by including representatives of the devolved units in this premier climate change institution. Such an arrangement puts climate change Page 15 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

high up on the national agenda, enhances political commitment, and promotes mainstreaming. Complementing the climate change institution is an advisory board made up of academia, private sector, civil society, and other special interests. A dedicated secretariat to oversee the technical aspects of the climate change policy and handle day-to-day affairs completes the institutional structure.

Clear Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination Mechanisms Clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of institutions with regard to climate change reduces conflicts and leads to effective resource use. However, in doing so, the ability to innovatively interpret such roles and responsibilities should be allowed by not being so prescriptive. For institutions, it is especially important to harmonize their roles and responsibilities if any meaningful results are to be achieved, a situation South Africa currently faces. Clear coordination and communication within and between central government, devolved units, and other governance levels are critical for effective implementation of planned climate change actions. Various mechanisms of doing so are highlighted in the case studies, including oversight, financial and other capacitybuilding assistance, and regular progress reporting.

Mixed Climate Finance Strategies

The climate finance mobilization and management strategies are mixed. While expected sources of finance include public and private funds from both local and international sources, some countries opt to align climate-related actions to regular budgetary process and/or establish climate change funds along the lines of the UNFCCC’s Adaptation Fund. Setting up and/or trading in the carbon market is still popular with many countries. Other proposals include improving the capacity of the public sector to efficiently and effectively absorb the expected climate finances and improving the general investment climate.

Concluding Remarks Responding to the threat posed by climate change requires establishment of effective and efficient governance structures. For many developing countries, this process is already underway. The comparative analysis of the climate change legislative and institutional frameworks of the four developing and one developed country presented in this chapter reveals several emerging best practices which can constitute elements of a broad governance framework developing countries could reproduce or tailor to their domestic situations. However, the results also raise broader issues that need closer attention and focus. One such concern is the need to incorporate and actively support the development of national climate change governance structures in discussions leading to the achievement of the outcomes of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. The “Durban Platform” is tasked with developing “a protocol, another legal instrument or a legal outcome” under the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) applicable to all member countries by 2015. Such consideration would ensure synergy between national- and global-level efforts while appreciating the multilevel nature of climate change governance. The lack of an international enforcement body for UNFCCC-related proposed actions should reinforce the need to support national-level actions. It is hard to tell whether the seeming enthusiasm by the developing countries sampled in this study to prepare national climate change legislations will spread significantly to other countries. However, success in their implementation will more likely inspire confidence in others to follow suit. Yet, such Page 16 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

a successful implementation requires a range of other conditions to be met, resources or otherwise. There are many potential challenges which could derail the achievement of the intended outcomes of the so established climate change legal and institutional frameworks. Targeted capacity building in various areas is thus necessary. More important, however, is the need for sharing experiences by the different countries. The apparent significance which developing countries attach to mitigation represents an important paradigm shift in the way mitigation is viewed. For a long time, mitigation and adaptation have been separated in both the academic and policy fields. The view that mitigation is a function of adaptation and that the two complement rather than antagonize each other, adopted by most of the developing countries analyzed in this study, is the closest to reality. What this reveals is that reducing emissions does not necessarily lead to a reduction in socioeconomic development. Such a revelation should inspire developed countries to cut their emissions not only as a way of slowing and hopefully reversing the current rate of global warming but also as a way of increasing welfare in those very countries and beyond. Genuine efforts at tackling climate change are linked to sustainable consumption and production. Dematerialization, decoupling, degrowth, and such sustainability buzzwords should not be mere rhetoric.

References Agrawal A (2008) The role of local institutions in adaptation to climate change. http://www.icarus. info/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/agrawal-adaptation-institutions-livelihoods.pdf Agrawal A, Perrin N (2009) Climate adaptation, local institutions and rural livelihoods. In: Adger W, Lorenzoni I, O’Brien K (eds) Adapting to climate change: thresholds, values, governance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Balint P, Stewart R, Desai A, Walters L (2011) Wicked environmental problems: managing uncertainty and conflict. Island Press, Washington, DC Bond P, Sharife K, Allen F, Amisi B, Brunner K, Castel-Branco R, Dorsey D, Gambirazzio G, Hathaway T, Nel A, Nham W (2012) The CDM cannot deliver the money to Africa: why the clean development mechanism won’t save the planet from climate change, and how African civil society is resisting. EJOLT report no 2. http://www.ejolt.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ 2013/01/121221_EJOLT_2_Low.pdf Butler H, Mecey J (1996) Externalities and the matching principle: the case for reallocating environmental regulatory authority. Yale Law Policy Rev 23:23–66 Chevallier R (2010) Integrating adaptation into development strategies: the Southern African perspective. Clim Dev 2:191–200 Crutzen P (2000) Have we entered the “Anthropocene”? IGBP. http://www.igbp.net/5. d8b4c3c12bf3be638a8000578.html DEFRA (2012) UK climate change risk assessment: government report. The Stationery Office, London Diokno B (2009) Decentralization in the Philippines after ten years – what have we learned? In: Ichimura S, Bahl R (eds) Decentralization policies in Asian development. World Scientific, Singapore Engel K, Saleska S (2005) Subglobal regulation of the global commons: the case of climate change. Ecol Law Rev 32:183–233 Eriksen S, Lind J (2009) Adaptation as a political process: adjusting to drought and conflict in Kenya’s drylands. Environ Manage 43:817–835 Page 17 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

European Environment Agency (EEA) (2005) Market-based instruments for environmental policy in Europe. EEA, Copenhagen Fröhlich J, Knieling J (2013) Conceptualizing climate change governance. In: Knieling J, Filho W (eds) Climate change governance. Springer, Berlin Giordano T, Hall L, Gilder A, Parramon M (2011) Governance of climate change in South Africa. South Africa Department of Environmental Affairs, Pretoria GoK (2010a) National climate change response strategy. GoK, Nairobi GoK (2010b) The constitution of Kenya 2010. National Council for Law Reporting, Nairobi GoK (2012) The climate change authority bill 2012. Kenya Gazette supplement no 61 (Bills no 29) 18 June 2012. Government Printer, Nairobi GoK (Government of Kenya) (2013) National climate change action plan 2013–2017. GoK, Nairobi. http://www.kccap.info/ Guillotreau P, Campling L, Robinson J (2012) Vulnerability of small island fishery economies to climate and institutional changes. Curr Opin Environ Sustain 4:287–291 Gupta J, Termeer C, Klostermann J, Meijerink S, van den Brink M, Jong P, Nooteboom S, Bergsma E (2010) The adaptive capacity wheel: a method to assess the inherent characteristics of institutions to enable the adaptive capacity of society. Environ Sci Policy 13:459–471 Herodes M, Adelle C, Pallemaerts M (2007) Environmental policy integration and modes of governance – a literature review. Ecologic Institute, Berlin Höhne N, Moltmann S, Hagemann M, Fekete H, Grözinger J, Sch€ uler V, Vieweg M, Hare B, Schaeffer M, Rocha M (2012) Assessment of Mexico’s policies impacting its greenhouse gas emissions profile. Climate Action Tracker, Mexico Homeyer I (2006) EPIGOV common framework. Ecologic Institute, Berlin Hulme M, Turnpenny J (2004) Understanding and managing climate change: the UK experience. Geogr J 170(2):105–115 Huq S, Rahman A, Konate M, Sokona Y, Reid H (2003) Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change in least developed countries (LDCs). Russell Press, Nottingham IDLO (2012) The new general law of climate change in Mexico: leading national action to transition to a green economy. IDLO, Rome. http://www.idlo.int/Publications/MexicoClimateChangeLWB.pdf IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) (2011) Analysis of legislation related to disaster risk reduction in South Africa. IFRC, Geneva. http://www.ifrc. org/PageFiles/86599/1213900-IDRL_Analysis_South%20Africa-EN-LR.pdf IPCC (2007) IPCC fourth assessment report: climate change 2007. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#1 Jordan A, Wurzel R, Zito A (2005) The rise of ‘new’ policy instruments in comparative perspective: has governance eclipsed government? Polit Stud 53:477–496 Kameri-Mbote P, Odote C (2011) Kenya. In: Lord QC, Goldberg S, Rajamani L, Brunnee J (eds) Climate change liability: transnational law and practice. Cambridge University Press, New York Klein R, Eriksen S, Næss L, Hammill A, Tanner T, Robledo C, O’Brien K (2007) Portfolio screening to support the mainstreaming of adaptation to climate change into development assistance. Clim Change 84(1):23–44 Koelble T, Andrew S (2013) Why decentralization in South Africa has failed. Gov Int J Policy Adm Inst 26(3):343–346 Lankao P (2007) How do local governments in Mexico City manage global warming? Local Environ 12(5):519–535

Page 18 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Lasco R, Pulhin F, Jaranilla-Sanchez P, Delfino R, Gerpacio R, Garcia K (2009) Mainstreaming adaptation in developing countries: the case of the Philippines. Clim Dev 1:130–146 Lazarus R (2008) Super wicked problems and climate change: restraining the present to liberate the future. Cornell Law Rev 94:1153–1243 Letete T, Guma M, Marquard A (2009) Information on climate change in South Africa: greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation options. http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/Information/Climate%20change/ Climate_change_info-complete.pdf Liverman D, O’Brien K (1991) Global warming and climate change in Mexico. Glob Environ Chang 1(5):351–364 Lofts K, Kenny A (2012) Mainstreaming climate resilience into government: the Philippines Climate Change Act. CDKN Inside Stories, London Manasan R (2009) Local public finance in the Philippines – balancing autonomy and accountability. In: Ichimura S, Bahl R (eds) Decentralization policies in Asian development. World Scientific, Singapore Maponya P, Mpandeli S (2012) Climate change and agricultural production in South Africa: impacts and adaptation options. J Agric Sci 4(10):48–60 Mickwitz P, Aix F, Beck S, Carss D, Ferrand N, Görg C, Jensen A, Kivimaa P, Kuhlicke C, Kuindersma W, Máñez M, Melanen M, Monni S, Pedersen A, Reinert H, van Bommel S (2009) Climate policy integration, coherence and governance. PEER, Helsinki Mulugetta Y (2011) Climate change and carbon trading in Africa. In: Reddy T (ed) Carbon trading in Africa: a critical review. Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria Mutimba S, Wanyoike R (2013) Towards a coherent and cost-effective policy response to climate change in Kenya: country report. Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Nairobi Mutimba S, Mayieko S, Olum P, Wanyama K (2010) Climate change vulnerability and adaptation preparedness in Kenya. Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Nairobi National Environment Management Authority Kenya (NEMA) (2008) Effects of climate change and coping mechanisms in Kenya. NEMA, Nairobi Oulu M (2011) Mainstreaming climate adaptation in Kenya. Clim Law 2(3):375–394 Pasquini L, Cowling R, Ziervogel G (2013) Facing the heat: barriers to mainstreaming climate change adaptation in local government in the Western Cape Province, South Africa. Habitat Int 40:225–232 Pelling M, Uitto J (2001) Small island developing states: natural disaster vulnerability and global change. Environ Hazard 3:49–62 Persson A (2004) Environmental policy integration: an introduction. SEI, Stockholm Persson A, Klein R (2008) Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change into official development assistance: integration of long-term climate concerns and short-term development needs. http:// userpage.fu-berlin.de/ffu/akumwelt/bc2008/papers/bc2008_71_Person-Klein.pdf Reddy T (2011) Climate change, carbon trading and the purpose of this study. In: Reddy T (ed) Carbon trading in Africa: a critical review. Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria Reid W, Goldemberg J (1998) Developing countries are combating climate change: actions in developing countries that slow growth in carbon emissions. Energy Policy 26(3):233–237 Republic of the Philippines (RoP) (2010) National framework strategy on climate change 2010–2022. Climate Change Commission, Manila Roberts D (2008) Thinking globally, acting locally: institutionalizing climate change at the local government level in Durban, South Africa. Environ Urban 20(2):521–537 Rodríguez V, Ward P (1994) Disentangling the PRI from the government in Mexico. Mex Stud 10(1):163–186 Page 19 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_9-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

RoP (2009) Philippines Climate Change Act 2009. RoP, Manila RoP (2010) Philippines Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010. RoP, Manila RoP (2011) National climate change action plan 2011–2028. Climate Change Commission, Manila RSA (2003) Disaster Management Act. 2002. Government gazette no 24252 RSA (2005) Introduction: a policy framework for disaster risk management in South Africa. http:// www.capetown.gov.za/en/DRM/Documents/SA_National_Disaster_Man_Framework_2005.pdf RSA (2011) National climate change response white paper. RSA, Pretoria RSA (n.d.) A guide to the national planning framework. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/ pcsa/general/npf1.pdf Ruffo J, Vega M (2011) Mexico. In: The international comparative legal guide to environment & climate law: a practical cross-border insight into environment and climate change law. Global Legal Group, London Stavins R (1997) Policy instruments for climate change: how can national governments address a global problem? Univ Chic Legal Forum 2:93–329. http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage? collection¼journals%26handle¼hein.journals/uchclf1997%26div¼12%26id¼%26page¼ Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) (2009) The economics of climate change in Kenya. SEI, Stockholm Townshend T, Mathews A (2013) National climate change legislation: the key to more ambitious international agreements. CDKN, London UK Govt. (2006) Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Act 2006. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/2006/19/pdfs/ukpga_20060019_en.pdf UK Govt. (2008) Climate Change Act 2008. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/pdfs/ ukpga_20080027_en.pdf UNDP-UNEP (2011) Mainstreaming climate change adaptation into development planning: a guide for practitioners. Poverty-Environment Facility, Nairobi Vance E (2012) Mexico passes climate change law. Nature, 20 Apr. http://www.nature.com/news/ mexico-passes-climate-change-law-1.10496 World Bank (2013) Country and lending groups. http://data.worldbank.org/about/countryclassifications/country-and-lending-groups#Low_income Yumul G Jr, Cruz N, Servando N, Dimalanta C (2011) Extreme weather events and related disasters in the Philippines 2004–08: a sign of what climate change will mean? Disasters 35(2):362–382

Page 20 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Conservation of Urban Biodiversity Under Climate Change: ClimateInformed Management for Chicago Green Spaces Abigail Derby Lewisa,b*, Robert K. Moseleyc, Kimberly R. Halld and Jessica J. Hellmanne a The Field Museum, Chicago, IL, USA b Chicago Wilderness, Chicago, IL, USA c The Nature Conservancy, Peoria, IL, USA d The Nature Conservancy, Lansing, MI, USA e Department of Biological Sciences and Environmental Change Initiative, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA

Abstract Chicago Wilderness, a multistate alliance of more than 300 organizations dedicated to restoring biodiversity, is leading the effort to bridge the gap between climate science and biodiversity adaptation practices in urban natural areas and green spaces. In 2010, Chicago Wilderness completed the Climate Action Plan for Nature (CAPN), which describes potential climate change impacts within the 221,000 ha of protected areas in the region, and actions managers can take to help species and ecosystems adapt to climate change. The CAPN represents the first Climate Action Plan to address issues of biodiversity conservation in the Great Lakes region and is the only known example of place-based adaptation strategies for urban biodiversity. This chapter depicts the creation of the Chicago Wilderness Climate Action Initiative and the ensuing work to implement the CAPN, highlighting the challenges and importance of creating landscape level conservation approaches that integrate climate science information into best management practices. This collaborative effort can serve as a model for use in other urban centers.

Keywords Biodiversity; Urban; Climate change; Adaptation strategies

Introduction Recognizing the potential for changes in climate to disrupt their social and economic fabric, cities around the world are developing strategies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, modifying programs to adapt to a warmer future, and engaging civil society in this effort. In addition to individual actions, cities have banded together to collectively advance local climate actions through the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, a network of 58 of the world’s largest cities, and the World Mayors Council on Climate Change, with more than 80 members (Rosenzweig et al. 2010). In North America, more than 1,000 mayors signed the US Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (Hamin and Gurran 2009). Because urban areas are responsible for nearly three-quarters of global energy-related carbon emissions (Rosenzweig et al. 2010), the early emphasis of individual cities and these collaborations understandably was on reducing greenhouse emissions (Wheeler 2008).

*Email: aderby@fieldmuseum.org Page 1 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Only recently, as the inevitability of a rapidly changing climate has become apparent, have cities begun to focus on approaches to reduce risks in the face of climate change as being of equal importance (Bulkeley and Betsill 2013). However, urban adaptation efforts focus on protecting values like public health, livelihoods, and infrastructure, with little or no attention paid to protection of urban nature and the benefits nature provides to urban residents. At the same time, cities and associated metropolitan areas are becoming increasingly important to global biodiversity conservation. Most cities have been founded in places that are biodiverse and functionally valuable to society, such as in floodplains, along coasts, on islands, or near wetlands. Today, urbanization continues to expand into these valuable habitats and into the hinterland where society most often placed its biological reserves (McDonald et al. 2008). Species previously outside city limits may need to migrate through urban areas as they adjust to a changing climate (Hellmann et al. 2010). Some metropolitan areas now contain important populations of rare species (e.g., Blanding’s turtle and the prairie white-fringed orchid occur in the greater Chicago region), made more vulnerable to extirpation by their typically small population sizes and fragmented distribution patterns (McDonald 2013). Terrestrial natural areas in urban settings provide critical habitat for resident and migratory native species but tend to be small and isolated remnants of formerly widespread habitats that are increasingly vulnerable to loss and degradation from a host of urban-centric stressors (Kowarik 2011; Cook et al. 2013). Often termed “green” or “natural infrastructure” by urban planners, the ecological functions of these natural areas and other undeveloped or formerly developed spaces provide increasingly important, but highly threatened, benefits to biodiversity and human communities of metropolitan regions (Goddard et al. 2011; Hostetler et al. 2011; Kattwinkel et al. 2011). Likewise, freshwater biodiversity is threatened by both water withdrawal for urban consumption (McDonald et al. 2011) and the addition of pollutants from urban stormwater, industrial, and residential sources (Alberti 2005; Blanco et al. 2011). These biodiversity impacts are all projected to accelerate as global urbanization trends continue to increase (McDonald 2013). Despite the regional and global importance of urban biodiversity, its conservation has rarely been addressed directly in urban climate change planning. As stated earlier, most of the focus of urban climate planning is on the reduction of greenhouse gases and on protecting public health and safety. If natural areas are addressed in a city-focused plan, it is typically in the context of green infrastructure, such as wetlands or plantings that help absorb stormwater, or as an adaptation strategy for reducing risks to people, for example, by helping to reduce the urban heat island effect (Enarsson 2011; Gill et al. 2007). Urban climate plans have not addressed the adaptation needs of open spaces, remnant natural areas, and populations of native species to help them to become resilient, persist, and continue to contribute to a biodiverse urban ecosystem and provide benefits to the human community. A considerable gap therefore exists in most municipalities between conservation planning for nature and natural remnants and adaptation of urban environments for people. Hamin and Gurran (2009) point out that uncoordinated planning for biodiversity and ecosystem processes, on the one hand, and the built environment, on the other, can put the two in conflict. Turner and his coauthors go even further: “At present, climate change is seen as one problem for nature and another for people” (Turner et al. 2009, p. 278). This chapter is a case study in metropolitan Chicago (population 9.5 million) where a conservation alliance is reconciling this dichotomy by taking a comprehensive regional approach to climate planning and action that incorporates the full range of assets, from social capital (human communities and the built environment) to natural capital (native species and ecosystems). The aim of describing this case study is to help advance such efforts in other cities around the world. Page 2 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

In the sections that follow, efforts by the Chicago Wilderness alliance to develop climate change planning for urban nature and actions taken to develop and share adaptation strategies for natural areas in Chicago will be presented. It is the hope that lessons learned from the Chicago experience can be applied elsewhere.

Climate Change Planning for Urban Nature Chicago Wilderness In the early 1990s, conservation leaders in the Chicago metropolitan area recognized that a unified vision for biodiversity conservation was needed among their organizations in order to achieve sustained results (Ross 1997). The Chicago Wilderness alliance was launched in 1996 and has grown to include over 300 member organizations and corporations working toward common goals to restore nature and improve the quality of life for native biodiversity and human communities (Moskovits et al. 2004; Miller 2005). The Chicago Wilderness area includes parts of four states at the southern end of Lake Michigan (Fig. 1: Chicago Wilderness map; Caption: The Chicago Wilderness region), one of the Laurentian Great Lakes, and encompasses 221,000 ha of protected natural land

Fig. 1 Chicago Wilderness map. The Chicago Wilderness region

Page 3 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

that harbors rare natural habitats for resident and migratory species, including nearly 200 species threatened with extirpation either regionally or throughout their range (Brawn and Stotz 2001; Wang and Moskovits 2001; Miller 2005). The Chicago Wilderness alliance accomplishes its work through four interrelated initiatives: (1) protect and restore nature and the ecological health of the region’s land and waters; (2) advance a 567,000-ha natural infrastructure network that contributes to the quality of life of all residents; (3) provide places and programs for generations of families to connect with nature; and (4) develop and deploy actions through the alliance in the areas of climate change mitigation, adaptation, and education. The Chicago Wilderness Climate Change Initiative began in 2007 with establishment of a Climate Change Task Force comprised of individuals from a wide range of organizations, including federal, state and local governments, NGOs, research institutions, zoos, museums, and an aquarium. Its first undertaking was to prepare the alliance for action by reviewing potential climate change impacts to regional biodiversity (Sullivan and Clark 2007; Chicago Wilderness 2008; Riddell 2009). Following this foundational review, the Task Force embarked on two phases that are described in the following sections: climate planning for urban nature, followed by the implementation of planned actions. During the start-up period for the Chicago Wilderness climate initiative, the City of Chicago was well on its way toward preparing a Climate Action Plan. Released in 2008, it is the first such plan to be based on a thorough climate change impact assessment exploring the implications of a range of future scenarios on city life during the next century (Wuebbles et al. 2010). The City of Evanston, abutting Chicago to the north, also released a Climate Action Plan that year, and other municipal and university campus plans were being developed in metro Chicago at the same time. As is typical, all these plans have an overwhelming emphasis on mitigation; collectively they propose significant actions that would lower greenhouse gas emissions from metropolitan Chicago. Actions to reduce risks related to climate change through adaptation were addressed only in the Chicago Climate Action Plan and only in relation to human communities, city services, and the built environment (Coffee et al. 2010). While the effect of climate change on ecosystems was part of the science assessment that informed the Chicago plan (Hellmann et al. 2010) and the city has passed ordinances to reduce impacts on natural resources, the Climate Action Plan did not include any actions to reduce risks to native species or ecosystems in its adaptation strategy (City of Chicago 2008). Following the release of the Chicago Climate Action Plan in 2008, it became clear to both the Chicago Wilderness and the City of Chicago that complementary climate strategies were needed for the natural capital of metropolitan Chicago. Goals for such strategies would balance the municipal plans that emphasized mitigation and adaptation for the built environment by focusing on the persistence of native species and ecosystems, provisioning of services to citizens provided by natural infrastructure, as well as the “adaptation services” that open space provides in creating communities more resilient to climate change (Fig. 2: Chicago Climate Action Plan and Climate Action Plan for Nature; Caption: The complementary relationship between the City of Chicago Climate Action Plan and Chicago Wilderness Climate Action Plan for Nature). Chicago Wilderness also recognized that, done in isolation, the human response to climate change could compromise biodiversity, thereby accelerating climate change and reducing the planet’s capacity to accommodate climate impacts (Turner et al. 2009). But there were no models for coupled human-nature climate planning in urban settings. Guidance for Climate Action Plans available at the time stressed reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, for example, with model plans for states (US Environmental Protection Agency 2012), cities (ICLEI no date), and even university campuses (Egan et al. 2008). Through a collaborative process, the Climate Change Task Force created a new

Page 4 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 2 Chicago Climate Action Plan and Climate Action Plan for Nature. The complementary relationship between the City of Chicago Climate Action Plan and Chicago Wilderness Climate Action Plan for Nature

template that became the Chicago Wilderness Climate Action Plan for Nature (Chicago Wilderness 2010). Climate Action Plan for Nature The Climate Action Plan for Nature was completed in 2010 with the primary goal of creating momentum across the diversity of organizations in the Chicago Wilderness alliance. Recognizing the rapidly evolving nature of climate change knowledge and practices, it was also meant to be the first iteration of planning for a dynamic climate action program for urban biodiversity in metropolitan Chicago. The plan includes three major components, engagement, mitigation, and adaptation. All three are tightly linked to the other Chicago Wilderness strategic initiatives mentioned above and mirror the three components of the Chicago Climate Action Plan. Engagement – The primary engagement objective is for Chicago Wilderness members to become fluent in the vocabulary, concepts, and programs of a new era for urban conservation that includes climate change mitigation and, especially, adaptation. Ultimately, it is envisioned that well-informed members of the alliance will go on to influence decision-makers and their fellow citizens more broadly. Three sets of actions are outlined to achieve this. The first focuses on adaptation by establishing a Climate Clinic program within Chicago Wilderness (described in the next section). The second set of actions build the capacity of informal educators at the region’s many environmental education centers to communicate the science and solutions of climate change to the public, especially young audiences and families. The third, more explicitly external, set of actions is to incorporate key climate messages into the general Chicago Wilderness public communications effort. Adaptation – In this initial version of the Climate Action Plan for Nature, the emphasis is on catching up, that is, taking action to make current conservation strategies “climate informed.” While most current protection and management activities in the Chicago region will help make nature more resilient to climate change to some degree, actions in this section of the CAPN focus on evaluating and modifying existing programs that were designed prior to knowledge of climate-induced challenges to enhance the ability of these practices to reduce climate-related risks and help resource

Page 5 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

managers avoid poor investments. The next sections of this chapter review progress toward meeting these adaptation goals since the 2010 release of the plan. Mitigation – As a relatively small part of the plan, the CAPN mitigation actions focus on the role that protection and restoration of natural areas play in sequestering atmospheric carbon and the parallel risk of carbon release when habitats are destroyed. The primary mitigation objective is to create recognition of the need for land conservation in climate change decision-making. The plan also recognizes that protected areas play a dual role in climate programs by mitigating emissions as well as increasing the adaptive capacity for biodiversity and human communities. Climate Change Update to Biodiversity Recovery Plan The Chicago Wilderness Biodiversity Recovery Plan was collaboratively developed in the late 1990s to be the unifying driver of conservation strategies across the alliance. It was intentionally produced as a living plan that would continue to evolve as new information and new ideas arose. Not surprisingly, the focal biodiversity targets and critical threats that the plan identified 15 years ago were never evaluated with climate change impacts in mind. Since its formation in 2007, the role of the Climate Change Task Force has been to help the Chicago Wilderness alliance incorporate climate change into best management practices for restoring and managing natural communities. Much of what natural resource managers, and certainly restoration ecologists, are already doing to restore the health and functionality of natural areas “counts” as adaptation because it is making these areas more resilient to whatever changes may occur. Thus, the Task Force focused on what, if anything, is needed to be altered, included, or re-prioritized in the context of best management practices given the projected changes and likely impacts both to the region’s biodiversity and to the threats species and natural systems were already facing (e.g., pollution, habitat degradation, fragmentation, etc.). This focus guided development of the CAPN, described above, and subsequent activities that include updating the Biodiversity Recovery Plan from a climate change perspective. Over the past decade, it has become clear that climate change is one of the top threats facing Chicago’s environment and its biodiversity (Wuebbles et al. 2010). Projections from climate models suggest that temperatures in the central USA, where Chicago lies, will rise from 2.1 to 2.7  C by the mid-century compared with the recent past (Pryor and Scavia 2013). Beyond average temperature trends, summer heat waves in the city and extreme precipitation events during winter and spring are expected to increase (Hayhoe et al. 2010; Vavrus and Van Dorn 2010). These changes are predicted to affect human quality of life through public health, flooding, and water security impacts, as well as affecting aquatic and terrestrial biodiversity in myriad ways (Francl et al. 2010; Hellmann et al. 2010; Pryor and Scavia 2013). Many locations in the Chicago region will be climatically and ecologically unrecognizable by historic standards. In the absence of actions that adapt protection and management practices, climate change has the potential to jeopardize many biodiversity conservation investments made in the Chicago Wilderness region during the past 30 years. Hence, the importance is given to adaptation in the CAPN and, the first priority in its implementation, to prepare a climate change update of the Biodiversity Recovery Plan. With this in mind, the Task Force initiated an in-depth effort to assess how a changing climate may impact the region’s natural communities and compound existing threats to their ecological integrity (i.e., fragmentation, pollution, habitat degradation, and invasive species). This process involved translating downscaled climate change projections developed for the Chicago Climate Action Plan (Hayhoe and Wuebbles 2008) into an understanding of how a warmer, drier, and more extreme environment could affect regional biodiversity and, importantly, what management actions could be taken to reduce the impacts.

Page 6 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 3 Chicago Wilderness Climate Clinic. Resource managers and scientists discussing climate impacts to natural resources at the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore

A great challenge to this endeavor is that understanding the vulnerability of species and systems to climate change is inherently interdisciplinary, requiring integration of information on climate science and modeling, theoretical knowledge of community, behavioral and restoration ecology, and on-the-ground knowledge of best management practices for natural resources in urban landscapes. As observed more broadly among resource managers in the Great Lakes region (Petersen et al. in press), managers within the Chicago Wilderness alliance were found to be often very aware of and interested in planning for climate change but felt they lacked the information and expertise needed to make updates in their management or restoration practices. This challenge of integrating available information to inform adaptation, however, is one Chicago Wilderness has been well positioned to address because the alliance can tap into the collective knowledge of a vast intellectual network, ranging from research scientists in many academic fields to natural resource managers. Between 2009 and 2012, the Task Force deployed Climate Clinics to marshal this knowledge network in beginning the process of ensuring resilient natural areas and open space in metropolitan Chicago. The Climate Clinic approach developed by The Nature Conservancy, whereby climate adaptation strategies are incorporated into ongoing conservation projects through an iterative, peerlearning process (Poiani et al. 2011), served as a model for these clinics. Beyond the important task of informing updates to the Biodiversity Recovery Plan, Climate Clinics also provide peer-to-peer interactions across several sectors of conservation science and practice and are useful for general capacity building of Chicago Wilderness members (Fig. 3: Chicago Wilderness Climate Clinic; Caption: Resource managers and scientists discussing climate impacts to natural resources at the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore). Along with some individual interviews and topic-focused content reviews, the Task Force was able to solicit relevant expert opinion from over 100 regional conservation researchers and practitioners through two Climate Clinics. The clinics were full-day events that included a mixture of presentations and breakout group discussions, ending with an informal social setting and activity to promote networking and reinforce peer-to-peer learning. Often, simply presenting data and information is not sufficient to encourage dialog about how or

Page 7 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

whether concepts are meaningful and resonate with people, let alone persuade them to share their opinions based on personal observations of managing the landscape. The clinic format creates a comfortable and relaxed atmosphere, an important element in achieving critical idea sharing. After two and half years of collaborative work, the Chicago Wilderness Executive Council approved the Biodiversity Recovery Plan Climate Change Update final document in the spring of 2012. This place-based climate change tool for the Chicago region now exists as a web-based resource (climate.chicagowilderness.org), where it continues to be updated as new information becomes available.

Place-Based Actions for Climate Adaptation The CAPN created momentum for climate action across the Chicago Wilderness alliance, and the Biodiversity Recovery Plan Climate Change Update framed key risks to nature from climate change and linked those to possible adaptation strategies. From these plans, several projects naturally emerged to help the alliance take the next steps of connecting species and systems at risk in particular locations to actions that can be taken to help promote adaptation. Accelerating the Pace of Adaptation: “Climate Considerations” for Urban Open Space Building on the development of adaptation strategies for natural areas in the Chicago Wilderness region, the Chicago Department of Environment requested a partnership with The Field Museum, The Nature Conservancy, and University of Notre Dame to create a Climate Considerations Guidebook for natural areas and greens spaces in the urban landscape. The project was originally designed to develop an adaptation “checklist” that would assist City departments in implementing adaptation strategies. However, discussion with stakeholders quickly indicated that a universal checklist for all departments would not provide the kind of specific and useful information that was desired because sites have distinctly different goals and purposes (e.g., forest preserve conservation site versus a multiuse park district site), thus requiring different types of adaptation approaches. Instead, the concept of a guidebook that could help managers identify which of their management decisions may be sensitive to warmer, drier, and more extreme weather and provide resources to help them develop relevant adaptation strategies was the preferred path to follow. The intended audience of the guidebook is mid-level managers of natural areas and green spaces in a highly urban setting. The first section of the guidebook is intended to convey the relevant information needed to begin the process of developing site-specific adaptation strategies. It begins with an overview of local climate change impacts and an explanation of why adaptation is important, followed by a seven step “workflow” that helps to walk the reader through the process of how to ask the “climate question” of urban natural area and green space projects. The next section poses probing questions in five categories (I. Getting started, II. Safeguarding species and systems, III. Climateinformed land management decisions, IV. Operations and maintenance, and V. Rethinking goals) to help managers think through which management aspects may be affected by climate change. Following the questions in each category, specific tools and resources are suggested to help managers answer the questions and design their own approaches to reduce the vulnerability of a site to climate change. There are 63 tools and resources available in the guidebook, many of which connect managers to the place-based resources developed by the Chicago Wilderness, such as the Biodiversity Recovery Plan Climate Change Update and the Green Infrastructure Vision, but tools such as Climate Wizard and reports from other urban centers struggling with the same questions (e.g., Climate Change Adaptation Options for Toronto’s Urban Forest) are included as well. The last

Page 8 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

section includes appendices intended to give additional background information (e.g., General adaptation principles, What does adaptation look like?) and an annotated list of all the tools and resources included in the guidebook. A unique feature of this guidance is that it was developed with the intention of being deployed in an interactive format within the Collaboratory for Adaptation to Climate Change (www.adapt.nd. edu), in addition to being available as a stand-alone document. Funded by the US National Science Foundation and developed at the University of Notre Dame, the Collaboratory is a virtual community that is accessible to the public worldwide and can be used as a collaborative workspace and repository of documents and other information relevant to adaptation planning. The idea behind the Collaboratory is that by promoting more rapid sharing of information and ideas, networks can collectively speed up the pace and effectiveness of adaptation actions. The connection between the Collaboratory and adaptation efforts in the Chicago Wilderness again shows the importance of strong networks: the Collaboratory project leads were attracted to testing out novel technologies with the Chicago Wilderness alliance because of the strong history of collaboration, and several Collaboratory project team members have contributed to the Chicago Wilderness Climate Change Projects, as well as the City of Chicago Climate Action Plan. Climate Clinics were again used as a mechanism to facilitate the collaborative effort between Chicago City departments and the Field Museum-Nature Conservancy-Notre Dame adaptation team. Participants in the clinics were named “Climate Adaptation Fellows,” and their advice was gathered in regular meetings and through a private workgroup on the Collaboratory. Whereas the Biodiversity Recovery Plan Climate Change Update focused mainly on climate impacts to the region’s larger natural areas (e.g., wetlands, woodlands, prairies, etc. in the Cook County forest preserves), this project was intended to help facilitate climate-ready decision-making by individuals working on smaller-scale urban natural areas and green spaces (street trees, park districts, boulevards, parkways, university campuses, etc.). This guidebook was crafted from a combination of stakeholder engagement and a literature survey, creating a tool that is both useful and informative. The guidebook now lives in both a static and interactive format on the Collaboratory for Adaptation to Climate Change (available at, adapt.nd.edu/resources/1019/). The interactive format, or “workflow,” walks users through the climate clinic process, with links to useful tools and resources. At every step, users are also prompted to contribute to discussions within a public workgroup and to provide feedback on the guidance that will inform updates (The workflow based on the guidance can be accessed at https://adapt.nd.edu/adaptationworkflows.). As of July, 2013, a simple search of “Chicago” in the Collaboratory yields 50 hits to documents, events, or other resources used or generated in the adaptation planning process, most of which are connected to the Chicago-focused workspace. Over time, the Notre Dame team will study and implement improvements to the workspace and workflow, allowing lessons learned from Chicago to be shared with and benefit the broader adaptation community. To test the utility of the guidebook, project leaders recruited four undergraduate interns to work with urban natural resource managers to evaluate the recommendations at five Chicago sites during the summer of 2013. Sites were selected based on interest from organizations that were involved in the development of the guidebook as well as a desire to represent a broad range of urban sites (e.g., park district sites with multiuse grounds, museum and university campuses, nature preserves, and natural area restoration sites). Each organization was required to designate one of their natural resource managers to be a mentor to the team of interns who collectively assessed each site. Mentors worked with interns to go through each section of the guidebook and answer as many of the questions as were relevant to a site and provided assistance in developing recommendations for incorporating adaptation into different aspects of their management and planning process. The Page 9 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

mentors were also asked to provide feedback on how relevant and/or helpful the guidebook content was to them, including language and concepts used, extent of background information, questions posed, and resources provided. This feedback will be summarized for posting in the collaboratory and used to revise the guidebook in hopes of making it as useful as possible. Additional sites will continue to be piloted in 2014, and a comparative review of all the sites will be completed in order to gain an understanding of the different ways the guidebook can be used and the types of adaptation recommendations urban natural resource managers are developing. Community Action Strategies In order to empower and encourage Chicago communities to take action, social scientists from the Field Museum developed a set of Community Action Strategies designed to engage residents of the Chicago region in the goals of the CAPN in their own community through climate-friendly gardens and lawns, water conservation, monitoring, open space stewardship, and climate change education (Climate Action Plan for Nature, Community Action Strategies, www.climatechicago.fieldmuseum. org/sites/default/files/Climate-Action-Plan-for-Nature.pdf). To implement this set of strategies, the Museum led a coalition of over 40 partner organizations in Chicago neighborhoods to develop a bilingual Chicago Community Climate Action Toolkit (climatechicago.fieldmuseum.org). An interdisciplinary team from the Museum facilitated a research-to-action process for involving Chicago communities in implementing city (Chicago Climate Action Plan) and regional (Chicago Wilderness Climate Action Plan for Nature) strategies for climate action, in ways that simultaneously advance their local agendas for social change. This work built upon previous ethnographic research the Museum conducted to understand sociocultural viewpoints on climate change in Chicago’s diverse neighborhoods (Hirsch et al. 2011). The toolkit comprises 60+ multimedia tools that communities can use to nurture local efforts tailored to their unique cultures that support city and regional climate action strategies. Chicago Wilderness Green Infrastructure Vision The Chicago Wilderness Climate Change Task Force was also moving forward during this time to integrate climate change impacts to biodiversity into another Chicago Wilderness effort, the Green Infrastructure Vision project (http://www.chicagowilderness.org/what-we-do/protecting-greeninfrastructure/epdd-resources/biodiversity-and-natural-habitats/green-infrastructure-vision/). This project provides a visionary, regional-scale map of the Chicago Wilderness region that reflects both existing green infrastructure – forest preserve holdings, natural area sites, streams, wetlands, prairies, and woodlands – and opportunities for expansion, restoration, and increasing the connectivity of natural areas. The broader goal of this effort is to bring the Chicago Wilderness Biodiversity Recovery Plan to life in a more meaningful, visual, and accessible way for Chicago Wilderness members and outside audiences. In order to bring an explicit climate perspective to the project, the Task Force created a GIS layer to assess the pattern and magnitude of regional carbon storage, information that can be used to help quantify the climate-related co-benefit of keeping natural areas healthy and intact, and to assess where the biggest storage areas were located. This preliminary map, based on aboveground carbon storage associated with habitat types defined from 2006 National Land Cover Data, revealed the region stores more than 77 million tons of carbon, but only 5.4 % occurs on protected land. This illustrates the critical need to engage public and private landowners in conservation management issues. In addition to assessing the role natural areas and green spaces play in storing carbon, the Task Force initiated a working group to evaluate how well the conceptual corridor models of the Green Infrastructure Vision work in reality for particular species, especially those that are climate-sensitive, Page 10 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

at a particular site. As is the case with all Chicago Wilderness working groups, the individuals involved are self-selected and interested in contributing to the collaborative effort because the topic or project is specifically tied to either their own interest or that of their organization; in other words, their involvement helps to forward their own work as well as that of the Chicago Wilderness. The Green Infrastructure Vision conceptual models for corridors, developed by The Conservation Fund (http://www.conservationfund.org/projects/refinement-of-the-chicago-wilderness-greeninfrastructure-vision), were created for individual habitat types (woodlands, wetlands, prairies, etc.) using GIS Terrestrial Movement Analysis software (Norman 2012). This analysis tool uses the average dispersal distance for several habitat-specific species to create minimum movement pathways and corridors between landscape features [e.g., the average dispersal distance for the common muskrat (Ondatra zibethicus) and Blanding’s turtle (Emydoidea blandingii) was used to create the wetland corridor] (CMAP 2012). The Task Force selected the federally endangered Hine’s emerald dragonfly (Somatochlora hineana) to pilot this work and found corridors generally reflected the real biological conditions of the dragonfly at the site scale (Hasle unpublished data). Work is currently underway to test the model’s validity for additional climate-sensitive species, with a goal of helping identify site-scale management implications. Other related projects that are in progress include working with municipalities on climateinformed stormwater management and developing a regional urban forest adaptation guide. Overall, the Biodiversity Recovery Plan Climate Change Update resource has enabled Chicago Wilderness to effectively integrate both a climate and a biodiversity perspective into work being done at the site, neighborhood, community, and regional scale. These efforts are not only useful for the Chicago Wilderness region but can be scaled up to help inform similar work in other urban centers.

Lessons Learned As stated earlier in this chapter, there were no models to follow that incorporated biodiversity conservation into urban climate change adaptation programs. Not surprisingly then, important lessons regarding helpful ways to frame the climate conversation and how to respond to challenges and barriers were learned along the way. Below are seven lessons learned, all arising from adaptation planning activities that were pursued in the Chicago region. These might benefit others contemplating similar efforts in their organizations or communities.

Frame the Climate Question in a Local Context Mid-latitude regions, such as the Midwestern USA, are not yet experiencing the magnitude of temperature change occurring at high latitudes, or highly visible impacts like sea-level rise. While many climate change outreach efforts focus on threats to polar bears or coastal cities, framing this global issue in terms of how climate change is affecting (or expected to affect) species and habitats in the Chicago Wilderness region, as these are what local conservationists really care about was found to be very important. This was a particularly important way to connect with resource managers at Climate Clinics. Thus, Chicago Wilderness Climate Action efforts highlighted strong local impacts and worked with resource managers to connect these impacts to potentially vulnerable species and systems. For example, over the past several decades, the Great Lakes have seen dramatic changes in average ice cover, and the upper Great Lakes (Michigan, Huron, and Superior) have shown rapid increases in summer surface water temperatures, two changes that tend to act in a positive feedback as open water absorbs more heat, and warmer water takes longer to cool and freeze. Specifically, Lake Michigan has shown a 77 % decrease in ice cover (1973–2010; Wang et al. 2012), and summer Page 11 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

surface water temperatures in southern Lake Michigan have increased by 1.4  C, and the rate of increase is about 30 % higher than increases in air temperature during the same time period (1979–2006; Austin and Colman 2007). While it is not clear how these strong changes in local conditions will impact regional biodiversity, focusing on local changes provides both a sense of urgency and a place to start the dialog on how to respond.

There Are No “Experts” There was a near universal reticence among conservation practitioners, especially resource managers, to participate in climate planning or adaptation clinics because they are not “climate change experts.” Apparently there was an expectation that there were climate adaptation experts who already knew what to do and how to do it. These experts do not exist, however, because adapting to such rapid rates of climate change is a new challenge, and as of yet, there are few examples of adaptation implementation and learning from experience. Further, adaptation at the scale of a natural area requires integrating regional changes in climate drivers with information on local ecosystems, management practices, and constraints. Thus, it is always “local,” and the most appropriate strategies will vary from site to site such that expertise from one location or habitat will not apply exactly in another. Finally, while many managers look to university partners to find “experts” on relevant topics, experts on adaptation theory do not fully understand the constraints and opportunities of applications in a particular place, as each place has a unique history, set of stakeholders, and priorities. This issue was addressed head-on in Climate Clinics and other engagement actions, telling people that advice about climate change abounds, but that no expert would be able to tell a manager what to do, because they did not know the specific system, decision context, and suite of (often competing) values to be considered. Partners were encouraged to develop their own expertise through helping us to write the Climate Considerations Guidebook and discussing ideas and adaptation options with their peers in the “Climate Fellows” meetings. It is not yet known if this strategy was effective, but there was a sense of increasing confidence among clinic participants that they have the knowledge and institutional capacity to implement adaptation and craft their own climate-informed conservation actions. The Collaboratory for Adaptation to Climate Change has a similar goal in the online universe – to remove institutional, temporal, and geographic barriers to information and knowledge sharing about climate change so that new expertise can grow in diverse places and at a pace that helps us keep up with the changing climate. Uncertainty Is No Excuse for Inaction Uncertainty about climate change has been used in political arenas to stall mitigation activities and that the same uncertainty can plague adaptation activities (Morton et al. 2011; Gifford 2011). Uncertainty about the future climate implies uncertainty about the specific stresses that adaptation actions should address. In some cases, for example, the potential for increases or decreases in future Lake Michigan water levels (Gronewald et al. 2013) in the context of a coastal wetland restoration and adaptation actions designed for one scenario could represent a waste of resources under the alternate scenario. Sometimes these conflicts and trade-offs cannot be avoided, and choices will need to be made. But a better starting point is identifying robust strategies that are likely to be beneficial under a range of possible futures (Hallegatte 2009). For example, designing wetland restoration efforts with a landward buffer that permits inland shifts and with native species that can tolerate drying. The existence of these robust strategies is the best argument for taking adaptation action today and avoiding the uncertainty trap. It also is critical to recognize that inaction is a policy choice as well. Climate change presents a unique challenge because we cannot go back to the way things

Page 12 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

used to be, and leaving this as is could represent steady erosion in environmental quality and ecosystem services (Schwartz et al. 2009).

Personal Interaction Is Important and Stakeholder Engagement Is Critical In an era where people increasingly interact via email, listservs, wikis, blogs, webinars, conference calls, and online social networks, the importance of in-person meetings and interactions should be recognized, particularly when a socializing component can be integrated into the experience. Sharing personal opinions and ideas about climate change impacts among professional colleagues, particularly if not everyone is well acquainted, can require a great deal of confidence and/or trust. Important qualitative information (e.g., how extremely low river levels due to changes in precipitation patterns resulted in increased predation on exposed mussel populations) tended to arise organically in an informal conversation. This information is often more forthcoming when personal relationships have been formed to create an atmosphere of trust and confidence for two-way dialog and iterative learning. It is critical to include stakeholder input from the onset so that useful products can be created. Natural resource managers are busy people; providing them with information that they have reason to consult/include is key if their participation is desired.

Adaptation Will Most Likely Occur in Places Where There Is a History of Collaboration It is perhaps no accident that Chicago Wilderness is in the forefront of advancing ideas on how to design adaptation actions to benefit nature and people. The significant, long-term investment in support for collaboration across organizations to benefit nature is a major factor facilitating integration of information across disciplines and provides a network for sharing observations of climate impacts and critical support for creative problem solving. This bottom-up collaboration also includes the business sector, in addition to the government agencies, research institutions, and NGOs that typically dominate climate-planning processes in the USA. More than 40 enterprises are members on the Chicago Wilderness Corporate Council, ranging in size from multinational corporations to local businesses. Harnessing strategic partnerships among organizations with differing talents and differing capacity for research and outreach has been found to be very effective. These organizations can come together to develop useful products for adaptation action. Our collaboration between a museum, a university, and a nongovernmental organization is one such example. Most major cities or regions will have each of these institutions.

Consider Multiple Audiences An important lesson learned as part of the climate clinic process, and in developing the Climate Considerations Guidebook, was that adaptation needs to be defined and illustrated with examples in ways that are accessible to multiple audiences within the resource management sector. Outreach efforts targeted the practitioners, but a message heard repeatedly from this audience was that they needed clear information, and when possible, estimates of likely costs savings, so that these messages could be relayed to higher level managers and policy makers that have the decisionmaking authority to promote changes in key protocols or practices. Similarly, decisions to participate in collaborative management efforts that extend across ownership boundaries are often not within the control of individual site managers.

Ecosystem Services Have Their Limits, Especially in Urban Settings A common approach in helping build support for investments in nature conservation under climate change is to highlight nature-based services that can help reduce climate-related risks to people. As Page 13 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

we discussed this idea with resource managers, their response was that services, like retention or slowing of stormwater, could come with clear costs in this human-dominated landscape – fragile plants can be uprooted, and wetlands can be contaminated with road salt and other pollutants. Highlighting the service, an idea that we thought would help gain financial support for management and restoration could instead lead to a risk of additional stormwater being diverted to an ecological reserve, reducing its viability. As with other strategies for protecting the nature, all climate adaptation strategies need to be tested with those that know the system, stressors on that system, and the sociopolitical context for management.

Conclusion Most greenhouse gases emanate from urban areas of the world, and it is critical that cities continue on the path of mitigating their impacts on the global climate by reducing emissions and creating more climatically sustainable energy policies and practices. In terms of recognizing that some level of climate change is inevitable in the coming century, some cities, such as Chicago, have begun implementing robust adaptation programs (Wheeler 2008; Stone et al. 2012). Cities, however, need to look beyond just their built environment to include natural capital in their adaptation efforts. Native species, remnant natural areas, and urban open space, along with a city’s built infrastructure, must be included in climate adaptation programs to assure that cities reduce their vulnerability and increase their resilience to rapid climate change. Urban biodiversity is becoming increasingly important globally, and natural assets provide many ecological benefits and climate adaptation services that urban residents count on. There is no assurance that native species and ecosystem services will persist on their own in urbanized landscapes under fast-changing climate regimes. This chapter has described a regional approach to climate change adaptation for urban biodiversity and ecosystem services that is transferrable to other metropolitan areas. This model complements the current strengths of cities in the climate change arena that primarily focus on mitigation and adaptation for the human community and the built environment. The approach is built around the power and success of the Chicago Wilderness alliance in metropolitan Chicago (Miller 2005), where a long-standing collaborative history was used to marshal a diverse range of resources and knowledge. Our model is best emulated in other areas with collaborative processes that can channel the knowledge of natural resource managers and research scientists into practical place-based adaptation solutions for urban nature.

Acknowledgments We want to acknowledge the generous funding organizations that made this work possible, including Boeing Corporation, Chicago Department of Environment, National Science Foundation, Gaylord and Dorothy Donnelley Foundation, and Kresge Foundation. We would also like to sincerely thank Chris Mulvaney from the Chicago Wilderness for his continued support and assistance in helping to organize the Climate Change Task Force, Doug Stotz from the Field Museum for his leadership of the Climate Change Task Force, and former Deputy Commissioner for Chicago Department of Environment Aaron Durnbaugh for leading the charge to develop the Climate Considerations Guidebook. None of this work would be possible without the participation and support from Chicago Wilderness members and City of Chicago natural resource managers.

Page 14 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Finally, we would like to thank Joyce Coffee, Rob McDonald, Laurel Ross, and Doug Stotz for their thoughtful reviews and insightful comments in helping to develop this chapter.

References Alberti M (2005) The effects of urban patterns on ecosystem function. Int Reg Sci Rev 28:168–192 Austin JA, Colman SM (2007) Lake Superior summer water temperatures are increasing more rapidly than regional air temperatures: a positive ice-albedo feedback. Geophys Res Lett 34, L06604 Blanco H, McCarney P, Parnell S et al (2011) The role of urban land in climate change. In: Rosenzweig C, Solecki WD, Hammer SA, Mehrotra S (eds) Climate change and cities: first assessment report of the Urban Climate Change Research Network. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Brawn JD, Stotz DF (2001) The importance of the Chicago region and the “Chicago Wilderness” initiative for avian conservation. In: Marzluff JM, Bowman R, Donnelly R (eds) Avian ecology and conservation in an urbanizing world. Kluwer, Norwell Bulkeley H, Betsill MM (2013) Revisiting the urban politics of climate change. Environ Policy 22:136–154 Chicago Wilderness (2010) Climate action plan for nature. Version 1.0. Chicago Wilderness, Chicago Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP) (2012) Refinement of the Chicago Wilderness Green Infrastructure Vision, Final Report. http://www.cmap.illinois.gov/documents/20583/ 371540/GIV20_FinalReport_2012-06.pdf/1fc75524-cba3-4115-935e-812023fefc66 Chicago Wilderness (2008) Climate change and regional biodiversity: a preliminary assessment and recommendations to Chicago Wilderness member organizations. Chicago Wilderness, Chicago City of Chicago (2008) Chicago climate action plan. City of Chicago, Chicago Coffee JE, Parzen J, Wagstaff M, Lewis RS (2010) Preparing for a changing climate: the Chicago climate action plan’s adaptation strategy. J Gt Lakes Res 36(Suppl 2):115–117 Cook EM, Hale RL, Kinzig AP, Grove MJ (2013) Urban–suburban biodiversity. Encyclopedia Biodivers 7:304–313 Egan DJ, Calhoun T, Schott J, Dayananda P (2008) Guide to climate action planning: pathways to a low-carbon campus. National Wildlife Federation, Reston Enarsson L (2011) Climate change adaptation in Stockholm, Sweden. In: Rosenzweig C, Solecki WD, Hammer SA, Mehrotra S (eds) Climate change and cities: first assessment report of the Urban Climate Change Research Network. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Francl KE, Hayhoe K, Saunders M, Mauer EP (2010) Ecosystem adaptation to climate change: small mammal pathways in the Great Lakes states. J Gt Lakes Res 36(Suppl 2):86–93 Gifford R (2011) The dragons of inaction: psychological barriers that limit climate change mitigation and adaptation. Am Psychol 66:290–302 Gill S, Handley JF, Ennos AR, Paulet S (2007) Adapting cities for climate change: the role of green infrastructure. Built Environ 33:115–133 Goddard MA, Dougill AJ, Brown TG (2011) Scaling up from gardens: biodiversity conservation in urban environments. Trends Ecol Evol 25:90–98 Gronewald AD, Fortin V, Lofgren B, Clites A, Stow CA, Quinn F (2013) Coasts, water levels, and climate change: a Great Lakes perspective. Climatic Change 120:697–711

Page 15 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Hallegatte S (2009) Strategies to adapt to an uncertain climate change. Glob Environ Chang 19:240–247 Hamin EM, Gurran N (2009) Urban form and climate change: balancing adaptation and mitigation in the U.S. and Australia. Habitat Int 33:238–245 Hayhoe K, Wuebbles D (2008) Climate change and Chicago: projections and potential impacts. City of Chicago, Chicago, http://www.chicagoclimateaction.org/filebin/pdf/report/Chicago_climate_ impacts_report_Executive_Summary.pdf Hayhoe K, Sheridan S, Kalkstein L, Greene S (2010) Climate change, heat waves, and mortality projections for Chicago. J Gt Lakes Res 36:65–73 Hellmann JJ, Nadelhoffer KJ, Iverson LR et al (2010) Climate change impacts on terrestrial ecosystems in metropolitan Chicago and its surrounding, multi-state region. J Gt Lakes Res 36(Suppl 2):74–85 Hirsch J, Van Deusen PS, Labenski E, Dunford C, Peters T (2011) Linking climate action to local knowledge and practice: a case study of diverse Chicago neighborhoods. In: Kopnina H, Shoreman-Ouimet E (eds) Environmental anthropology today. Routledge, New York Hostetler M, Allen W, Meurk C (2011) Conserving urban biodiversity? Creating green infrastructure is only the first step. Landsc Urban Plann 100:369–371 ICLEI (No date) U.S. Mayors’ Climate protection agreement: climate action handbook. ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability, Oakland Kattwinkel M, Biedermann R, Kleyer M (2011) Temporary conservation for urban biodiversity. Biol Conserv 144:2335–2343 Kowarik I (2011) Novel urban ecosystems, biodiversity, and conservation. Environ Pollut 159:1974–1983 McDonald RI (2013) Implications of urbanization for conservation and biodiversity protection. Encyclopedia Biodivers 7:304–313 McDonald RI, Kareiva P, Forman RTT (2008) The implications of current and future urbanization for global protected areas and biodiversity conservation. Biol Conserv 141:1695–1703 McDonald RI, Green P, Balk D et al (2011) Urban growth, climate change, and freshwater availability. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 108:6312–6317 Miller JR (2005) Biodiversity conservation and the extinction of experience. Trends Ecol Evol 20:430–434 Morton TA, Robinovich A, Marshall D, Bretschneider R (2011) The future that may (or may not) come: how framing changes responses to uncertainty in climate change communications. Glob Environ Chang 21:103–109 Moskovits DK, Fialkowski CJ, Mueller GM et al (2004) Chicago Wilderness: a new force for conservation. Ann N Y Acad Sci 1023:215–236 Norman JB (2012) Terrestrial Movement Analysis for ArcGIS 10 sp4. Colorado State University (unpublished) Petersen, B, Hall KR, Doran PJ, Kahl KJ In their own words: perceptions of climate change adaptation from the Great Lakes region’s resource management community. Environ Practice (in press) Poiani KA, Goldman RL, Hobson J, Hoekstra JM, Nelson KS (2011) Redesigning biodiversity conservation projects for climate change: examples from the field. Biodivers Conserv 20:185–201 Pryor SC, Scavia D (2013) Midwest. In: National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory Committee (eds) Third National Climate Assessment (Draft). US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington, DC Page 16 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_11-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Riddell J (2009) Our climate challenge. Chicago Wilderness Magazine, Winter 2009 Rosenzweig C, Solecki W, Hammer SA, Mehrotra S (2010) Cities lead the way in climate-change action. Nature 467:909–911 Ross L (1997) The Chicago Wilderness and its critics I. The Chicago Wilderness: a coalition for urban conservation. Restor Manag Notes 15:17–24 Schwartz MW, Hellmann JJ, McLachlan JS (2009) The precautionary principle in managed relocation is misguided advice. Trends Ecol Evol 24:474 Stone B, Vargo J, Habeeb D (2012) Managing climate change in cities: will climate action plans work? Landsc Urban Plann 107:263–271 Sullivan RG, Clark M (2007) Can biodiversity survive global warming? Chicago Wilderness J 5:2–13 Turner WR, Oppenheimer M, Wilcove D (2009) A force to fight global warming. Nature 462:278–279 US Environmental Protection Agency (2012) Developing a plan. http://epa.gov/statelocalclimate/ state/activities/action-plan.html Vavrus S, Van Dorn J (2010) Projected future temperature and precipitation extremes in Chicago. J Gt Lakes Res 36(Suppl 2):22–32 Wang Y, Moskovits DK (2001) Tracking fragmentation of natural communities and changes in land cover: applications of Landsat data for conservation of urban landscapes (Chicago Wilderness). Conserv Biol 15:835–843 Wang J, Bai X, Hu H, Clites A, Colton M, Lofgren B (2012) Temporal and spatial variability of Great Lakes ice cover, 1973–2010. J Climate 25:1318–1329, http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/ 2011JCLI4066.1 Wheeler SM (2008) State and municipal climate change plans: the first generation. J Am Plann Assoc 74:481–496 Wuebbles D, Hayhoe K, Parzen J (2010) Introduction: assessing the effects of climate change on Chicago and the Great Lakes. J Gt Lakes Res 36(Suppl 2):1–6

Page 17 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Climate Change Knowledge Platforms Targeted at West Africa: A Review and a Focus on the New CILSS Platform T. Ourbak* and A. Bilgo Centre Régional AGRHYMET/CILSS, Niamey, Niger

Abstract Climate change in West Africa has important impacts due to the low resilience capacity of the majority of the population in these territories. However, on the contrary, in most regions of the world, data and informations on climate change and particularly adaptation are sparse and sometimes difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, scientific state of the arts, policies, as well as tools and funding opportunities and agenda on climate change initiatives are a great challenge for West African stakeholders. To fill the gap, in November 2012, CILSS/AGRHYMET launched their climate change and sustainable land management platform to allow for easy access to informations targeted at West Africa. The goal of this chapter is to propose an overview of existing platforms, analyzing assets and differences, and to present CILSS/AGRHYMET platform in this context. Details are given on the platform structure, the “opportunity,” “agenda,” and “news” parts. A rapid focus on CILSS past and present projects is also presented. Thematic articles concerning essentially agriculture and water, the heart of AGRHYMET’s actions, are presented then in the resources part: documents, tolls (to challenge vulnerability), and database (AGRHYMET master’s students, institutional and individuals, etc.). A presentation of different tools available for download or access on the Web, adapted to a West African use to study vulnerability to climate change and other aspects like mitigation, is made.

Keywords Platform; Climate change; Sustainable land management; Africa; CILSS; ECOWAS

Introduction Sahel is often designated as the territory in the south of the Saharan border. It is characterized by low precipitation rates, sparse vegetation, and a rain-fed agriculture mainly based on crops and livestock breeding. Although indigenous knowledge has proved to facilitate adaptation (e.g., Waha et al. 2013), Sahelian countries, among the poorest of the world and also the ones that are the most vulnerable (Niasse et al. 2004), are subjected to drought periods such as the 1973–1974 one or more recently in 1983 (Sarr 2007). Recently, flooding events have been recorded, with important societal impacts (thousands of deaths, Sarr 2010). After the 1973 drought, a few governments decided to create an institution to fight against drought: the Interstate Committee for Drought *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 8

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Control in the Sahel (CILSS). This organization is working to lower the vulnerability of Sahelian countries, this vulnerability being exacerbated by climate change-related phenomena such as temperature increase (Sarr 2012), precipitation variability (Ali and Lebel 2009), and sea level rise. More and more focus is given to climate change impacts: sea level rise, temperature warming, droughts, extreme events, etc. (IPCC 2007). However, there is a gap between scientific data, research activities, operational needs on the ground, and political action. It has been reckoned that capacity building was necessary to help stakeholders to tackle climate change issues: the way the information is transmitted, popularization processes, and stakeholder empowerment need to be reinforced. The webscape is growing in West Africa, and a lot of UN organizations, NGOs, and institutions are willing to make the information available; but if a myriad opportunities exist for Web users, most of the websites are very specific or, on the contrary, with a large geographical scale with a proliferation of “global” websites not specifically adapted to local West African needs. In the context of raising attention toward climate change and sustainable development, Africa has around 14 % of the population, but release less than 4 % of greenhouse gases. Thus, although mitigation (i.e., emission reduction with renewable energy or forestry practices), is receiving more and more attention, the main concern for the African population is to be able to be resilient to climate changes (adaptation). The following text will focus on adaptation, specifically to West Africa, where 13 out 17 of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)/CILSS countries are part of the 49 least developed countries according to UN classification (see http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/). It is important to note that adaptation, especially in West Africa, is a transversal topic covering both climate change and desertification under the United Nations negotiations. The CILSS/AGRHYMET website presented here is unique in the sense that it addresses topics related to both UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) and UNCCD (United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification).

The Climate Information Knowledge Gap Since 1992 and the Rio conferences, environmental issues have raised more and more attention. In particular, climate change has drawn a lot of attention, notably because of IPCC’s successive reports, alerting the world on the potential impacts and effects of a changing climate on various sectors (health, economy, environment, etc.). Most attention has been recently focused on the lack of information available for both policymakers and nonspecialists (media, civil society). The latter is particularly effective when looking at Sahel and West Africa. For instance, the 1970s and 1980s presented noticeable drought periods, which had impacts on the population (food security, livestock issues, water shortages, etc.). Sahelian governments (up to 13 countries are part of the CILSS in 2013) joined efforts in order to work for food security and sustainable environment. Although data do exist on climate and also on land management, there is a gap between stakeholders and data users.

Overview of Existing Informations The World Wide Web had been a revolution for the diffusion and access to information. Nowadays, a lot of websites are focused on climate change and particularly, in the context of this chapter, climate change adaptation. Page 2 of 8

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Snapshot of existing platforms Name and website link WASCAL (West African science service center on climate change and adapted land use) https://icg4wascal. icg.kfa-juelich.de/

Principal organization/ institution/program Federal Ministry of Education and research. Center for Development research (Univ. Bonn)

Réseau AfricaAdapt (consortium) http://www.africaadapt.net/

ENDA (Environnement et Développement du Tiers-Monde), FARA (Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa), ICPAC (IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre), IISD (Institute of Development Studies) UNEP (consortium of 9 partners)

AAKNet: Africa adaptation knowledge network (UN) www.africa. ganadapt.org

Geography Ten West African countries

Africa

Africa

Thematic Climate and weather, landscape dynamics, agricultural systems, markets and livelihoods, risk management Adaptation (thematic or geographical entries)

Plus Minus Focus on research Site under construction, English only

Thematic, geographic, projects, knowledge base entries

Dynamic, lot of documents

Research, policy, good practices, indigenous knowledge, finance and geographical entries blogs

Filtered parts, practical (e.g., financing guidebook)

A real network of Portal could be people, sharing more dynamic ideas

Difficulties to download in African places, mix of languages (mainly English but sometimes in French) Program will end in 2014, not specific to Africa

AfriCAN climate (EU) http://www. africanclimate.net/

Africa Funded by UE, coordinated by WIP Renewable Energies (Germany) with 5 European and 5 African organizations

ACCRA (African climate change resilience alliance) http://community. eldis.org/.59d66929/ Climate change knowledge portal http://sdwebx. worldbank.org/ climateportal/index. cfm WEADAPT http://weadapt.org/

Consortium of NGOs

Africa

World Bank

Global

For development practitioners and policymakers

Easy to use, data and maps accessible

Not focused on a specific region: general approach

Community (less than Global 2,000 in May 2013), define as an “open space”

Collaborating on climate change

Innovation such as Adx (climate adaptation options explorer Adx, adaptation layer)

Easy design to get lost for firsttime user

Files not regularly Growing updated community (less than 600 members in May 2013)

(continued) Page 3 of 8

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 (continued) Name and website link CDKN (climate and development knowledge network) http://cdkn.org/ regions/africa/

Principal organization/ institution/program Geography Thematic Alliance of organizations (leader: PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC))

http://www.undpaap.org/

UNDP and other UN agencies

Africa

Adaptation learning Joint effort from main Global mechanism UN agencies + UNFCCC http://www. adaptationlearning. net/ Community adaptation based adaptation exchange http://community. eldis.org/cbax/ The knowledge resources page of UNFCCC adaptation http://unfccc.int/ adaptation/ knowledge_resources/ items/6994.php

Community (more than 1,000 in May 2013), launched by NGOs

Countries, resources, work areas entries (+newsletter) Based on communities

Plus Technical advices, build partnerships (climate compatible development strategies and plan). 3 languages User friendly with a lot of technical and political informations Interactive map, very diverse entries (from agriculture to workshop materials)

Minus Only 4 countries in Africa

A complete website from the international climate change negotiations

Portal could be more dynamic and focus on user needs and user friendliness

Program finished in 2012

Difficulties in accessing the website (download elements from the map)

Global

UNFCCC (different work Global streams: Nairobi Work Programme, NAPs, NAPAs, loss and damages)

Databases, publications, LDC portal, newsletters

Table 1 summarizes some of the major available websites. The main feature concerning Table 1, which is not an exhaustive and complete panel of existing efforts available, is that a lot of websites have a global approach. The first website is the only one targeted at West Africa. The West African Science Service Center on Climate Change and Adapted Land Use (WASCAL) is very specific, as it is dedicated to training and research, with PhD and master’s programs. The next 5 first platforms presented in Table 1 are dedicated to the whole African continent, and the Web user could find a lot of very useful informations such as updated newsletters and detailed documentation on specific topics. The other websites presented have a worldwide view and, again, bring to the table several crucial informations (the World Bank website presents climate situation nationally, for instance); many specific tools are presented that could be used by policymakers as well as development practitioners on the ground (e.g., methods to mainstream climate change into policies to climate proofing tools). Most of the websites are user friendly and easy to discover for the nonspecialist while containing targeted documents or informations.

Page 4 of 8

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 Snapshot of CILSS/AGRHYMET platform (July 14, 2013)

One notes that most of the websites are from international organizations, such as United Nations websites, or NGOs (nongovernmental organizations). It is important to note the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change website, very complete, which addresses the outcomes and presents the material of the negotiations. Some websites are project related, such as the Africa Adaptation Programme, which could lead to a potential problem of durability and dynamism once the funding is over. Most of them contain a lot of informations that are user friendly. A lot of different languages are used in Africa. In Table 1, all the websites are accessible in English and 7 out of 12 in French, and other languages such as Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, or Deutsch are also available. It is to note that two websites propose translation in numerous languages such as Afrikaans or Swahili. However, some websites propose only the translations of titles and rubrics. Most of the sites are aimed at disseminating information to professionals and not to producers and politicies makers. The forum is a way for users to ask specific questions. The CILSS/AGRHYMET website is doing an effort to adapt the knowledge and science presented, for instance, thematic pages, with simple figures helping the reader to have a better understanding of complex topics. However, not a lot of governmental websites such as the ones you could find in most of the developed countries exist in Africa. This could bring the issue of the validity of information found for policymakers and governmental stakeholders. For instance, a politician working in health issues could be interested to have access to several informations such as climatology of flooding events or heat waves. This specific example could be translated to many sectors where the information could be very difficult to obtain. We already have had feedbacks from local and national West African agricultural organizations using technical informations provided on the platform. Moreover, although the number of platforms is important, most of them are not specifically targeted at West

Page 5 of 8

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Africa, although recognized as a very vulnerable region, and bring a large amount of general considerations on climate change.

Presentation of the CILSS Platform When creating the CILSS climate change and sustainable land management platform, the idea was to create a unique site where one can find diverse informations targeted at West African needs. Figure 1 presents a snapshot of the CILSS/AGRHYMET platform (www.agrhymet.ne/portailCC). Six parts have been created: • The NEWS part is the most consulted one so far. It is regularly an updated source for opportunities of training and funding, for example, but also news and agenda. For instance, call for grants and application for projects or programs are recorded. Any stakeholder could find a peculiar call for grants and a researcher could have information on a specialized workshop as well as general conference and could find an updated intergovernmental negotiations process; the three rubrics are the unique entry to keep up with what is ongoing for the West Africa Adaptation world. • The MENU part is a more classical package, with a presentation, informations on teaching activities from the AGRHYMET Regional Center, useful links to navigate the Web, and a presentation of the platform, contact, and a research tool. • The PROJECTS part presents emblematic ongoing or achieved CILSS projects. This is a unique way to capitalize a multi-project database and to make sure the information is still available even after the end of funding (e.g., the “Projet d’appui aux capacités d’adaptation des pays du CILSS au changement climatique” project was a pioneer and innovative project tackling climate change issues in West Africa, and some of the most important documents produced are made available). • The THEMATICAL part presents popularized, easy-to-understand access to the following areas of CILSS expertise: climate science, adaptation, mitigation, climate governance, and water management. The climate science part describes West African climatology, monsoon system, and hydrology regimes and presents the climate change context. The adaptation part describes some generalities that focus on agricultural practices adapted to climate change in a rain-fed context, an irrigated context, and finally a pastoral context. The mitigation part presents several aspects of the mitigation issues for West African countries, such as financing processes and CILSS actions. The climate governance presents the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change process, as well as the negotiations under UNFCCC, and focuses on the regional as well as national level of political documents. Finally, the water sector is presented with a special attention drawn on impacts of climate change on water and a few adaptation strategies. • The RESOURCES part presents several documents such as CILSS documents, national and regional documents (National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) (under UNFCCC) but also national action programs (under UNCCD) as well as West African organizations such as ECOWAS policy papers), synthesis documents and also tools and products (mitigation, impacts and vulnerability, sustainable land management, etc.), database on CILSS students, and finally scientific publications. It is sometimes a unique way to have access to such documents. • The FORUM part is a very new part and is trying to bring experts to discuss various topics. As an example, the first topic is the cost of adaptation in rain-fed West African agricultural systems. This site has been launched at the end of 2012. So far, 7 months after launching the report, it has received more than 30,000 views. The question of language is crucial to reach a maximum of users. Page 6 of 8

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

At the beginning, we have produced only a French version. However, noting that around 15 % of our users are connected from English-speaking countries, we have added an English translation to reach more users. However, CILSS is willing to translate the website in Portuguese to cover the official languages of the CILSS/ECOWAS region. It is important to note that a mean of 5 min is spent by every user and that around 40 % are regular users (i.e., which come back regularly to the website) visiting 3 pages on average. Concerning the geographical origin of the Web users, the vast majority are connected from African countries, namely, Niger, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast, and Mali, whereas less than 15 % originated from developed countries (France and the United States).

Conclusions While climate change impacts are widespread all over the planet, a lot of attention has been given in order to make information accessible to Web users. However, although very vulnerable, the West African region has not received a lot of attention specifically focused on West African regional circumstances. After reviewing the existing platform, the chapter has presented detailed informations related to the CILSS climate change and sustainable land management platform. The next step to improve the platform is to work with more focus on user needs. The CILSS is willing to start a dialogue with different types of stakeholders in order to publish informations useful for the most part. A fine analysis of the utility actual users are making of individual pages is in progress and should flourish the development of new informations. It is expected to produce a questionnaire and to send it to Web users, to produce more demand-driven information. The forum part should be more active, and a work is also under progress by CILSS experts in order to determine the most effective way to make experts react to posted articles. Finally, the network should be strengthened inside and outside West Africa in order to transfer knowledge and to spread out good practices and tools, for example, by presenting the platform to international fora, such as the Conferences of the Parties of the United Nations Framework on Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) or other relevant fora, but also by having a communication strategy to “spread the word,” by e-mail lists, newsletters, and interaction with other platforms. The lesson learned is that the strong demand for information posted on the platform is a real challenge. While climate change issues are getting more and more attention, there is room for information sharing and dissemination of all kinds of informations to those who need it; however, there is a lot of overlapping and much attention is done to specific topics or areas. Although not directly linked to it, this website is part of a broader Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation to climate change ongoing under UNFCCC. An incoming challenge will be to make this platform more interactive, with a discussion forum, and the possibility for the Web users to ask for specific questions to the community and for specific topics to be treated in the website. The first feedbacks we had are encouraging, and counting methods teach us that the vast majority of users are coming back regularly. The next step is to better understand their needs (so far, the majority looks for opportunity) as well as attracting new users. This website is one of the milestones in building a common response to climate change and building a more resilient Africa.

Page 7 of 8

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_13-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Acknowledgment This work is funded by the Fonds Français pour l’Environnement Mondial and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

References Ali A, Lebel T (2009) The Sahelian standardized rainfall index revisited. Int J Climatol 29:1705–1714 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007) The IPCC fourth assessment report (AR4). In: Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 976 pp Niasse M, Afouda A, Amani A (eds) (2004) Reducing West Africa’s vulnerability to climte impacts on water resources, wetlands and desertification. IUCN, Gland/Cambridge, UK, xviii + 66 pp Sarr B (2007) Le climat Ouest Africain et son évolution depuis les années 1950. Centre Régional AGRHYMET CRA/CILSS, Niamey Sarr B (2010) Recrudescence des fortes pluies et des inondations dans un contexte de changement climatique 9–11 in Le Sahel face aux changements climatiques, bulletin mensuel spécial du Centre Régional AGRHYMET Sarr B (2012) Present and future climate change in the semi-arid region of West Africa: a crucial input for practical adaptation in agriculture. Atmos Sci Lett 13:108–112 Waha K, M€ uller C, Bondeau A, Dietrich JP, Kurukulasuriya P, Heinke J, Lotze-Campen H (2013) Adaptation to climate change through the choice of cropping system and sowing date in sub-Saharan Africa. Glob Environ Change 23(1):130–143, ISSN 0959–3780

Page 8 of 8

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Strategic Environmental Assessment as a Tool to Integrate Climate Change Adaptation: A Perspective for Nigeria Chika Ubaldus Ogbonna* and Eike Albrecht* Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus - Senftenberg Germany, Senftenberg, Germany

Abstract Nigeria is one of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa vulnerable to current and future climate variability and change. The effects of climatic changes in Nigeria would vary significantly and set to occur in several regions of the country and all sectors of the economy. Climate change is a great challenge to the sustainable development and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Nigeria. The main purpose of this chapter is to highlight the challenges associated with the current and projected impacts of climate change on the human environment in Nigeria, to review and explore the potentials of Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), and to propose its use in making informed decisions relevant to the implementation of the newly established adaptation programs in the country. Current measures on how Nigeria is responding to recent impacts of climate change are presented. It is imperative that an appropriate environmental assessment tool such as SEA be employed in making rational decisions regarding adaptation options. SEA offers a structured and proactive environmental tool for integration of climate change adaptation into formulating policies, plans, and programs (PPPs) across relevant sectors.

Keywords Nigeria; Climate Change; Adaptation; Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA); Decisionmaking

Introduction Climate change is occurring and may have more consequences on the human environment in the future. The fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published in 2007, fully confirmed the occurrence of global climate change particularly in developing countries. This report also categorically emphasized that human activities are the main cause of observed changes in climate today (IPCC 2007a). This fact was also restated by the recent published 5th assessment report of the IPCC in 2014 (IPCC, 2014, p. 5). Such anthropogenic influences that contribute to climate change include the burning of fossil fuels, the combustion of biomass, agriculture, and deforestation. According to a German Watch Report, more than 710,000 people have lost their lives as a result of direct effects of over 14,000 recorded extreme weather and climate events which resulted in some damages worth above USD 2.3 trillion (in Purchasing Power Parity) observed globally between 1991 and 2010 (Harmelling 2011, p. 4). *Email: [email protected] *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

The UNFCCC has already identified adaptation as an option to address climate change. Adaptation in the context of climate change refers to any adjustments that take place in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects or impacts, aimed at moderating harm or exploiting beneficial opportunities (Klein 2004; IPCC 2007b; IPCC 2014). “Adaptation, therefore, includes several types of actions (direct protection of people and assets, actions to support this protection, reactions with respect to impacts, etc.), which can be implemented in several sectors such as (agriculture, water, energy, transportation, infrastructural development etc.), associated with different climatic challenges depending on geographic scales and zones (coastal, mountains, urban areas, etc.) and using widely diversified instruments (standards, information, tax measures, transfers, investment choices in infrastructure, etc.)” (IPCC 2007b cited in Hallegatte et al. 2011, p. 3). To deal with the impacts of climate variability and change in Nigeria, there is a need for robust adaptation measures to be implemented. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which entered into force on 21 March 1994 provides the basis to adapt to climate change impacts. Nigeria signed the convention on 13 June 1992; its ratification took place on 29 August 1994 which entered into force from 27 November 1994. Article 4(1)(f) of the UNFCCC urges all members to “take climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in the relevant social, environmental, economic and environmental policies and actions, and employ appropriate methods, for example, impact assessments [such as Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA)], formulated and determined nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on public health and on the quality of the environment, of projects, programs or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate change” (See full text of the Convention).

The Effects of Climate Variability and Change in Nigeria Climate change is the latest challenge to achieving sustainable human development targets such as the Millennium Development Goals and objectives set out in the Nigerian development agenda termed “Vision 2020” (NASPA-CCN 2011, p. 1). “Nigeria has a long history of changing weather and environmental conditions this is due to its many climatic zones, ranging from the long coastal zone in the South and the large arid area in the North” (NEST and Woodley 2012). Such changes in climate and weather patterns are now on the increase in several parts of the country. Such trends are validated by recent research, for instance, Nwajiuba and Onyeneke (2010) applied regression model and trend analysis of climate data for a period of 30 years (1978–2007) in the Southeast Rainforest Zone of Nigeria. The outcome of this research shows that decreasing trends for rainfall and relative humidity and increasing trends in temperature and sunshine hours pose severe effects on major crop yields such as maize, cassava, and yam which serve as major food crops in the region. The impact of climate change can already be seen across the country starting from the Sahel in the North to the rainforest and coastal zone in the South (BNRCC 2011). A study carried out by Odjugo (2010) shows that air temperature is constantly on the increase, especially since the 1970s. Despite the relative increase in temperature across Nigeria, observational trends in temperature indicate higher temperature anomalies in the semiarid region of the country than the coastal regions (Odjugo 2010, p. 1). In fact, urban areas and cities are facing new challenges of the so-called urban heat islands. The changing climatic conditions are apparent and have become a big challenge in Nigeria today, posing severe effects on social infrastructure and people’s livelihoods. Some of the potential effects of climate change and variability in the country include extreme weather events, temperature increase, increase in flooding, coastal erosion, sea-level rise, and long periods of droughts in the North and Page 2 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Highest per capita displacement worldwide, 2012 (4.2% of population displaced)

The Sahel Senegal 30.000

Niger 531,000

Mali 10.000 Benin 10.000

Gambia 8,000

Nigeria 6.1 million

Sudan 84.000 Chad 500,000 CAR 13.000

Largest displacement event in Africa: second largest worldwide, 2012. 33/35 states affected.

Flood-affected areas The Sahel Countries with conflict-induced displacement

South Sudan 340,000

Cameroon 30.000

Gabon 2.000

DRC 2.000

Nigeria Niger Chad S Sudan Sudan 0

1

2 3 4 5 6 People displaced (millions)

7

Sources: CRED/EM-DAT,IFRC, Nigeria-NCFRMI/IOM, IOM, OCHA, UNICEF.

Fig. 1 Map of West and Central Africa flood displacement, June to October 2012 (Source: IDMC/NRC (2013, p. 20))

variability of rainfall in the South. The expected climate impacts in urban areas in the country are likely to include extreme flooding due to heavy storms, heat waves, freshwater scarcity, and extreme weather events. Furthermore, such climate impacts may add more stress to public infrastructures and on urban sectors such as tourism, transportation, energy generation, and agricultural production. For example, flooding is one of the most pressing environmental challenges in Nigeria today. There are three major ways in which flooding occurs in Nigeria, namely, river flooding, urban flooding, and coastal flooding (Gwary 2008; Adeoti et al. 2010; Bashir et al. 2012). The impacts of flooding have been observed in Nigeria for decades. However, increase in flooding as a result of storm surge and variation in sea levels may become more frequent in the country in the future considering global and regional predictions. There are several projections, which point to increase in sea-level rise in the Nigerian coastal waters. For instance, a rise in sea level of 0.462 m (above sea level) was recorded in the coastal areas between the year 1960 and 1970 (Udofa and Fajemirokun 1978, Boateng (2010, p.13). It is projected by Awosika et al. (1992) that the Niger Delta area of the country could lose more than 15,000 km2 of land by 2100 with only a one meter rise in sea level. Lagos and the low-lying coastal areas of the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria are predicted to be equally affected by such events (Awosika et al. 1992). Nwajiuba (2008) foresees that important coastal cities in Nigeria such as Lagos, Port Harcourt, Calabar, and Warri are potential areas for inundation exposure as a result of the projected sea-level rise and storm surge events. Moreover, urban flooding has become one of the greatest environmental challenges in most of the Nigerian cities nowadays (Etuonovbe 2011). Settlements in the coastal region of Nigeria are being seriously affected due to severe flooding (Uyigue and Agho 2007). Similarly, the International Displacement Monitoring Centre Report (2013) mapped and documented the severe heavy rainfall that affected about 18 countries in Africa from June to November 2012 as can be seen in Fig. 1. The map shows that heavy rainfall event caused flash flooding, inundation, and displacement of vulnerable communities in the region including about 6.1 million people in Nigeria alone.

Page 3 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Factors Increasing Nigeria’s Vulnerability to Climate Change There are several factors that exacerbate the vulnerability of Nigeria to climate change. For example, the rapid shift in Nigeria’s demography poses own challenges in the face of climate change. Nigeria’s current population is estimated to be about 160 million people and a population density of 138 people per km2 is growing tremendously (BNRCC 2011, p. 1; Ndujihe 2013). According to a report from the “Building Nigeria’s Response to Climate Change project” (BNRCC 2011), increasing population density in the country is an additional pressure on scarce natural resources and food security (BNRCC 2011, p. 1; Nest and Woodley 2011, p. 5). This further increases the vulnerability of the most particularly exposed communities. The rate of population growth and urbanization may also increase vulnerability through inappropriate land-use and land fragmentation. Furthermore, rapid population growth (2.9 % per year) and urbanization with nearly 50 % of the population now living in the urban area has added demand for public infrastructural services (NASPA-CCN 2011, p. 3). This present situation reduces the resilience to a range of climate risks in the country (NASPA-CCN 2011, p. 3). Furthermore, some fast-growing cities and urban areas in Nigeria are mostly situated along the coast and therefore highly vulnerable to the impact of sea-level rise. For instance, the urban and suburban areas of Lagos and the Niger Delta could be adversely affected considering the predictions. The ever-growing coastal slum population living in floating slums and flood-prone wetlands in and around Lagos suburban area is a challenge to urban planning and development. In addition to slum development, the city of Lagos faces a problem of coastal erosion and flooding (Mehrotra et al. 2011, p. 30). Such areas may be drastically affected by climate hazards if the projected climate events would occur (Awosika et al. 1992; Mehrotra et al. 2011, p. 32). Another factor is land degradation as a result of deforestation and overgrazing in Nigeria (Abiodun et al. 2011, p. 1). This accumulates to large environmental challenges, which have been seen in various parts of the country, in recent times. Climate change would intensify such environmental problems. The incessant oil spillage and gas flaring in the Niger Delta had contributed immensely to the environmental degradation of the region (Ugochukwu and Ertel 2011). Climate change will add to such challenges, as a result will increase the region’s vulnerability. Indeed, both physical and socioeconomic factors dispose Nigeria to the adverse effects of climate change (BNRCC 2010). According to the Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team Report (NEST) (2010), some of these factors include (1) Nigeria’s long coastline (800 km), prone to impacts from the rise in sea level; (2) Nigeria’s North prone to drought and desertification; (3) threatened water and energy resources; (4) more than 60 % of the population depends on threatened agricultural and fishing resources; (5) increasing population; and (6) inadequate policies and programs, especially among vulnerable communities and in vulnerable regions. Nigeria is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change largely because approximately 70 % of Nigerians are engaged in smallholder rain-fed agricultural production (NEST and Woodley 2011, p. 10). In this respect, however, the current and potential impacts of climate change are likely to be different in several parts of the country. For instance, Nigeria’s long coastline to the South situated in the coastal/rainforest region implies that a huge number of people living close to the coast are vulnerable to sea-level rise and storm surges, while several communities residing in the Northern part of the country particularly in the Sahel region could experience increased effects of cyclical drought (BNRCC 2011). Current observations in the Sahel region show that the area is susceptible to aridity as a result of increasing high temperatures and reduced frequency of rainfall (BNRCC 2011). Furthermore, biodiversity, coastal settlements, water, agriculture, and land use are expected to be affected by the fast-increasing trend of climate variability in the country. Page 4 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Policy Response to Climate Change Adaptation There are several new challenging issues associated with changes in weather and climate deserving adaptation considerations in Nigeria today, perhaps more than the several impacts highlighted as the increase in extreme climatic events pose an enormous challenge to the Nigerian economic growth (DFID/ERM 2009; Sayne 2011). As such, many parts of the country have recorded different kinds of climatic changes, which have led to increase in flooding, heat waves, erosion, and droughts. Erratic increase in rainfall, flooding, and drought, for instance, can reduce efforts being made to achieve sustainable development and the Millennium Development Goal (MDGs) in Nigeria, especially as future vulnerability may not only depend on climate change but also on several other factors such as development pathways (UNFCCC 2010). In this regard, adaptation is essential to reduce the present and future impacts of climate change in Nigeria in order to rescue vulnerable communities, agricultural sectors, ecosystems, and at the same time increase the adaptive capacity of the population. Globally, awareness on climate change in recent times has been on the increase as well as vulnerability research. As a result, there are several actions from many stakeholders in the public and private sectors especially at the national and local levels that focus on understanding the challenges that besiege climate change issues and what they can do to reduce the associated effects (Hallegatte et al. 2011, p. 3). Such trend is peculiar to Nigeria today although more effort is needed from individuals, nongovernmental organizations, institutions, and particularly from the government, for increasing awareness and public education with respect to climate change adaptation and even on Clean Development Mechanism that targets climate change mitigation in the country. As climate policy objectives are partly formulated at the international level, policies need to be implemented on a national, subnational, or even on the local scale (NEAA 2009, p. 81). The UNFCCC obliges all parties to prepare for adaptation to the impacts of climate change. In recent times adaptation policy has become a focus of researchers and stakeholders as an option to tackle climate change in addition to mitigation. Adaptation in contrast to mitigation is more feasible on a local scale as it addresses specific local impacts of climate change. Moreover, there is not yet an international guideline or perhaps a fit for all approach to adaptation on global scale. This is due to the different levels of vulnerability of social, economic, and ecological systems to myriad consequences of the impact of climate variability and change, and even the cross-sectoral challenges arising from different institutional systems (UNFCCC 2012, p. 4). Recognizing these challenges, increasing number of developing countries has initiated independent adaptation plans and strategies. The coherent approach being taken by these countries aimed to “contribute to efforts towards climate-resilient development, suggesting a long-term continuous process and most importantly periodic revisions” (UNFCCC 2012, p. 4).

Climate Change Adaptation Policy Response in Nigeria In addition to the drafting of the National Climate Change Policy in Nigeria, the country has also developed adaptation plans that will enable the country to address the emerging challenging issues associated with climate change. The Nigerian national adaptation plan was initiated after accessing the risk and vulnerability of the entire country on current and potential impacts of climate change (UNFCCC 2012, p. 5; Abiodun et al. 2011; NASPA-CCN 2011). The national adaptation plan also considered lessons and knowledge generated from the several project components, such as a research pilot project (e.g., future climate scenario studies, policy development, communication, Page 5 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

and outreach as well as youth and gender initiatives (Abiodun et al. 2011). The National Adaptation Plan and Strategy of Action on Climate Change for Nigeria was developed in partnership with the Special Climate Change Unit (SCCU) of the Federal Ministry of Environment of Nigeria and other relevant stakeholders such as the Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team (NEST) with a financial support from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The Nigerian National Adaptation Plan has, therefore, been developed in a coherent manner, thereby serving as an exemplary document and a case study on the national adaptation plan for other developing countries that aim to initiate adaptation plans or strategies (UNFCCC 2012). Laudable as the Nigerian adaptation plan could be, there is a need for adequate decision-making during the implementation. Reminiscence that climate change may lead to loss of between 2 % and 11 % of Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Products (GDP) by 2020 and between 6 % and 30 % by the year 2050 as pointed out in the National Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action on Climate Change for Nigeria. To reduce such potential loss the Nigerian National Adaptation Strategy shows that adaptation planning will take a strategic approach in addressing climate change impacts in the country. Adaptation measures shall focus on all the affected sectors including agriculture (crops and livestock), livelihoods, education, freshwater resources, coastal water resources, fisheries, forest, biodiversity, energy, transportation, communication, industry and commerce, emergency and disaster response, vulnerable groups, migration and security, human settlement and housing, health, and sanitation.

Initiatives for Climate Change Adaptation Nigeria as a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) plays a key role in developing Climate Change Adaptation Strategies that can help reduce the impacts and consequences of climate change in the region. ECOWAS is making strong efforts to integrate climate issues into economic planning and management at the regional and national scales. The West African Climate Change Adaptation Program initiative is a milestone towards the formulation of the “Regional Plan of Action for reducing vulnerability as climate change impact increases in the West African States” (OECD 2009). Another important step, is a recent establishment of Graduate Programs in two Nigerian Universities under the German initiative on the “West African Science Service Centre on Climate Change and Adaptive Land Use (WASCAL)” which aims to enhance the capacity building in Nigeria and across the West African States. Furthermore, in order to address the impacts of climate change and global warming in Nigeria and to respond to international obligations, the former president of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, endorsed the creation of a new unit – “Special Climate Change Unit (SCCU)” – under the Federal Ministry of Environment, Housing, and Urban Development. The unit is established to ensure that the UN conventions and the Kyoto Protocol activities such as the implementation of Clean Development Mechanism and other related issues are effectively addressed. The department has the mandate, to oversee initiatives geared towards reducing climate change impacts on the Nigerian environment and coordinate sectoral measures that can help achieve its goals. The Special Climate Change Unit was commissioned in 2006. Recently it has been established as a full department within the Ministry of Environment. The department is exclusively responsible for coordination of matters relating to mainstreaming climate change adaptation into the national policies. Also, efforts are being made by the Nigerian government, to create a National Climate Change Trust Fund that could help finance strategic actions so as to curb the impacts of climate change (M€ uller 2013, p. 5).

Page 6 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

The Need for Integrated Assessment of Adaptation Options In order to minimize the impacts of climate change on the most vulnerable communities, integrated assessment of adaptation options is imperative. In this regard, implementation of adaptation measures should be supported by adequate environmental assessment procedures. This is very essential in order to make robust decisions regarding adaptation to the impact of climate change hence such decisions remain complex. However, to reach this target, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) are the two unique environmental assessment tools that are used internationally for wide-ranging environmental assessment such as prediction and evaluation of social, economic, health, and environmental impacts of a proposed plan (UNEP et al. 2004, p. 6). According to Sadler et al. (2011) “the introduction of SEA has an integral part of the development of EIA.” SEA was developed together with EIA in 1969 with the United States National Environmental Policy Act (João 2005, p. 5). Nigeria does not yet have a legal requirement and a framework for SEA, but EIA is well established. For instance, Adebanji (2010) pointed out that neither policies, plans, nor programs (PPPs) have been regulated under SEA at the national, regional, or sectoral/industrial level in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria considering several social and environmental challenges that need to be addressed in the area (Adebanji 2010, p. 5). Now, the question is how can the environmental impact of adaptation programs be reduced and positive effects enhanced in order to avoid decisions that may lead to maladaptation. To address this issue, it is important to first identify the kind of adaptation programs that could help reduce the risks posed by a particular climate hazard and at the same time being environmentally conscious. This challenging task could be possibly addressed through the application of appropriate environmental assessment and decision aiding tool such as SEA. Such assessment procedures can also help phase out programs that may pose a risk to the environment while pursuing the win-win option characterized by overarching benefits of climate change mitigation and adaptation. Therefore, SEA is an important tool to be considered in making informed and robust decisions at the early stage before such policies, plans, or programs can be implemented (OECD 2008a, p. 21). EIA can then be used at a later phase with the aim of improving a particular proposed project. The Implementation of the Nigerian Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action should be considered in this context. EIA is very relevant in assessing the possible impact that proposed projects particularly infrastructural related adaptation may pose on the environment (Agrawala et al. 2010). On the other hand, “the integration of climate change into strategic planning through the application of SEA should lead to better informed, evidence-based PPPs that are more sustainable in the context of changing climate and more capable of delivering progress on human development” (OECD 2010, p. 4). The authors will not go into details on EIA process in Nigeria, and the overall basic principles of SEA; however; it is assumed that the reader is familiar with EIA. In addition, appropriate citations and links will be provided.

Evolution of EIA There are many driving forces for the use of EIA worldwide. Firstly, EIA serves as an instrument for sustainable development in developed and developing countries though it has its limits, which are sometimes covered through early assessment of three levels of SEA linked to EIA (see Fig. 2). According to Albrecht (2011) one of the reasons for assimilation of EIA by several developing countries is due to the World Bank policy in 1988 which adopted EIA for major development Page 7 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 2 Links between EIA and SEA (Source: Adapted from Albrecht (2011, p. 156))

projects. This World Bank operational directive entails that any country seeking development assistance carries out an EIA especially under the World Bank supervision. Henceforth, “EIA of World Bank became mandatory for all projects that may potentially have a significant influence on the environment” (Albrecht 2011, p. 152). The target of the World Bank EIA recommendation is to make sure that projects on funding considerations by the institution are environmentally friendly and sustainable.

A Brief Overview of EIA Administration in Nigeria Nigeria recognizes the achievement of environmental protection as an integrated policy issue rather than standalone policy targets. The country also seeks to achieve sustainable development through enforcement of adequate environmental policies, laws, and regulations. The EIA Decree No. 86 of 1992 was established under the defunct Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA). The FEPA Act and Regulations were replaced in 2007 by the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) Act which established the NESREA, giving it the mandate to oversee the protection of the Nigeria’s environment through enforcement of these environmental laws in collaboration with the Federal and State Ministry of Environment. Nigeria runs a federal system of government – today the Federal Ministry of Environment is the central environmental authority as it contains the legal requirements to carry out EIA and evaluate the consequences of proposed projects on the environment. The Nigerian Federal Ministry of Environment is therefore bestowed with the mandate of EIA administration in Nigeria. On the other hand, the NESREA is responsible for the enforcement of environmental regulations, rules, laws, policies, and guidelines. NESREA has the entire competence for enforcement of environmental control measures through registration, licensing, and permitting system other than in the oil and gas sector. However, the EIA law and the Urban and Regional Planning Decree No. 88 of 1992 provided principles guiding development of major projects that may likely affect the environment significantly (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1992a, b; Agwu et al. 2000; Ladan 2012b; Ugochukwu and Ertel 2011; Olokesusi 1998). The Nigerian EIA decree contains the procedure to be followed. In addition, it provides a checklist, for the categorization of projects subject to EIA (Echefu and Akpofure 2003; Ugochukwu and Ertel 2011, p. 18). EIA is mandatory for all major projects that may likely pose significant impacts on the Nigerian environment considering location or size of the project. An example of such projects may include major road construction, industrial and infrastructural

Page 8 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

development, mining, housing development and projects located in environmental sensitive areas. It is worthy to note that EIA in Nigeria is a licensing tool for proponents, especially those in the oil industry and other mining development to carry out before going ahead with their operations. EIA must be carried out with the input of all the stakeholders and the Ministry of Environment and all other competent authorities. An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is usually produced at the end of this process.

Institutional and Legal Challenges of EIA in Nigeria The Nigerian EIA practices and legal and institutional frameworks have for several years been attributed to several problems and challenges. These include low public access to final EIA reports, insufficient interagency coordination (overlapping of competencies; federal system’s challenges), and inadequate stakeholder consultations and public participation. Even though access to environmental information is given by the Decrees No. 86/1992, information dissemination is difficult in practice. Furthermore, full public participation is given but only for 21 days (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1992a; Ugochukwu and Ertel 2011, p. 169; Nwoko 2013, p. 26), and Environmental Impact Statements are not published online. However, it is expected that the Federal Ministry of Environment and the young NESREA will through their good practices and monitoring responsibilities enhance the EIA practice and address such pitfalls recorded in enforcing the provision therein in the past years. More especially as NESREA allows for the collaboration of local and international agencies and nongovernmental organizations including international regulatory bodies such as the UN Agencies, World Bank, Partners for Water and Sanitation (PAWS-UK), United Kingdom Environment Agency (Ladan 2012a), and other interested corporate bodies around the world. Such local and international cooperation could reduce these shortcomings; such cooperation is in the right direction as environmental challenges become more global. However, climate change was not considered during establishment and formal requirement of EIA decree No. 86/1992 procedures; yet, the integration of climate change into the stages of SEA/EIA could be an important step to be realized under the new NESREA enforcement responsibilities and the good practices of the Federal Ministry of Environment in collaboration with relevant environmental departments in the country. Having in mind that climate change is a crosscutting issue, the Federal and State Ministry of Environment, the National and State Urban and Regional Planning Authorities, and other relevant Environmental Agencies can play a key role that could help enhance adaptation decision-making and reduce climate-induced risks.

Aims of SEA The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) established in the United States in 1969 promulgated the first Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) regime. SEA is a tool designed to achieve the overarching target of sustainable development, for example, the national targets for the implementation of Agenda 21 and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development known as the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. The tool being flexible also applies to new environmental challenges such as climate change. The major aim of SEA is to incorporate environmental concerns into strategic decisions which may include policies, plans, programs, regulatory frameworks, and legislations depending on the respective area of application in the SEA provisions. For example, policies and legislations are not included in the area of application Page 9 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

of the EU SEA Directive. SEA helps to protect the environment by improving decisions that lead to sustainability targets. The uniqueness of SEA lies in the consideration of environmental concerns from the onset of decision-making in relation to development of proposed plans and subsequent projects such as public infrastructures. Considering the characteristics, “it can be argued that EIA procedure is at times analogous to that of SEA” (João 2005, p. 5). It is worthy to note that countries or nations having an effective EIA procedure as an environmental assessment tool can easily apply SEA using existing EIA institutional structures. This way SEA framework can easily be incorporated within the planning and institutional decision-making procedures. This is possible in the case of Nigeria EIA institutional framework and planning system. There are two key principles of SEA (João 2005, p. 7). According to João (2005) one of the major principles of SEA is to explicitly identify potential PPPs (or alternatives) and evaluate these alternatives in an assessment context. She emphasized that SEA likewise EIA should not be employed to mitigate environmental impacts of actions that have already been decided upon. Rather the environmental assessment process should be used to inform the decision of what action should take place, i.e., what alternative should be chosen (João 2005, p. 7). The second principle of SEA relates to the improvement of proposals. João (2005) posits that SEA must improve, instead of just analyze policy or programs, meaning that SEA should be effectively used in the formulation of strategic actions: “looking at evolving strategic action afresh and being willing to change and improve such strategies in the light of the SEA findings.” Furthermore, the SEA should explicitly contribute to the decision-making process (João 2005). SEA procedure should, therefore, fit more elegantly in the strategic decision-making process (Therivel 2004, p. 61). There is no common definition of SEA; however, Sadler and Verheem (1996) provides a very well-cited definition; thus SEA is “a systematic process for evaluating the environmental consequences of proposed policy, plan or program initiatives in order to ensure they are fully included and appropriately addressed at the earliest appropriate stage of decision making on par with economic and social considerations.” Similarly, João (2005) provides a brief definition thus SEA is “the process of evaluating the environmental impacts of proposed PPPs, in order to inform decision making.” One of the main differences between EIA and SEA is that the scope and processes of the latter are characterized by greater diversity (UNEP 2002 p. 493). Furthermore, the SEA “process extends the aim and principles of EIA upstream in the decision-making process, beyond the project level and when major alternatives are still open” (UNEP 2002, p. 493). SEA represents a proactive approach to integrate environmental considerations into the highest level of decision-making, consistent with the principles outlined in Agenda 21 (UNEP 2002, p. 493). Both SEA and EIA have common elements, although increasing modifications to the procedure and methodology are necessary when moving from the project to the policy level (UNEP 2002, p. 493). While EIA is widely practiced, SEA is increasingly being recognized in several developed and developing countries and international and local organizations as a better tool to make informed decisions and improve developmental programs. Table 1 shows a comparison of the key characteristics of both processes as is given by UNEP (2002, p. 493). The link between SEA and EIA is established in a tiered manner. According to João (2005) SEA deals with a hierarchy of strategic actions, which ultimately affects what projects are built on the ground (Oxford Brooks University 2004 cited in João 2005). “This hierarchy might differ in detail from country to country but it is usually there, and it is a key aspect of what SEA is all about” (João 2005, p. 5). According to Albrecht (2011) the hierarchical order is ideal as plans and programs usually set a framework for the subsequent project realization (Albrecht 2011, p. 155). The tiered concept helps in sustainable decision-making regarding the implementation of PPPs and any project under such developmental process. SEA is, therefore, largely linked to EIA (Albrecht 2011, p. 155). Page 10 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Some Comparisons between EIA and SEA EIA of projects* Takes place at end of decision-making cycle Reactive approach to development proposal Identifies specific impacts on the environment Considers a limited number of feasible alternatives A limited review of cumulative effects Emphasis on mitigating and minimizing impacts Narrow perspective, high level of details Well-defined process, clear beginning and end Focus on standard agenda, treats symptoms of environmental deterioration

SEA of policy, plans, and programs** Takes place at earliest stages of decision-making cycle Proactive approach to development proposals and programs Identifies environmental implications, issues of sustainable development Considers a broad range of potential alternatives Early warning of cumulative effects and synergistic impacts Emphasis on meeting, environmental objectives, maintaining natural systems Broad perspective, lower level of details to provide a vision and overall framework Multistage process overlapping components, policy level is continuing iterative Focuses on sustainability targets, get at source of environmental deterioration

Source: CSIR (1996) cited in UNEP (2002, p. 495) *EIA usually assesses only negative effects on the environment **SEA (for example the SEA-Directive of the EU) assesses positive and negative effects of plans and programs

Figure 2 shows the linkage between policy, plan, and program of SEA and project-specific EIA. It is to be noted that the words policies, plans, and programs are used differently in countries considering the best-suited terminology (Sadler et al. 2011, p. 2; Albrecht 2011, p. 156). However, it is important to define the meaning of policy, plan, and program (PPP) as used in this context. A policy is an inspiration and guidance for action; a plan is a set of linked proposed action with a specific time frame that will implement the policy, while a program can be regarded as a set of proposed projects in a particular area that will implement the plan (João 2005 p. 4; Schmidt et al. 2010).

The Need to Integrate Climate Change Adaptation into SEA in Nigeria Nigeria has no legal or formal requirement for SEA; however, several developing countries and international organizations are rapidly adopting SEA as a decision-making support tool (Schmidt et al. 2005; OECD 2010; Sadler et al. 2011, p. 2). To better address the numerous environmental challenges such as climate change and environmental degradation in Nigeria, there is a need to supplement EIA with SEA. As climate change becomes a new challenge in planning, incorporating appropriate environmental assessment tool that can aid decision-making has become urgent. SEA is a very relevant tool in this context. “SEA provides a methodology not only for evaluating the impact of policies, plans and programs on the environment, but also for addressing the impact of environmental change on PPPs” (OECD 2009, p. 80). Practical examples documented by the OECD suggest that SEA is an appropriate and more rational environmental assessment tool for climate change adaptation. In order to fulfill the adaptation initiatives effectively, it is imperative to follow good practices. For example, the OECD has produced guidance for practitioners on how to apply and incorporate climate change adaptation within the SEA process (OECD 2006). Furthermore, SEA being a flexible tool can be tailored to the local context or the specific strategic decision-making or planning process that it seeks to support. SEA can, therefore, serve as an assessment tool for both adaptation and mitigation purposes. In terms of mitigation SEA assesses

Page 11 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

the environmental effects of the plan in terms of potential emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) that could be released from the plan and how to reduce them (Larsen and Kørnøv 2009; Larsen et al. 2012, p. 33). For example, any SEA of a development plan for a new urban area can include assessments of GHG emissions generated from traffic (Larsen et al. 2012, p. 33). On the other hand, Larsen and Kørnøv (2009) cited in Larsen et al. (2012) envisage that adaptation considers climate change as an environmental problem of relevance to plan and if and how it is expedient to adapt the plan for future climate change. For example, the SEA of an overall spatial plan can include assessment of appropriate building sites in the light of future sea-level rise (Larsen et al. 2012, p. 33). As stated earlier, countries and organizations are increasingly undertaking SEA, using formal or informal procedures (Sadler et al. 2011, p. 2). To the present authors’ perspective, there are several reasons why SEA is increasingly adopted. Perhaps, the first reason is that SEA is widely recognized as being effective in integrating environmental protection measures in strategic decision-making. Secondly, several countries are creating activities geared towards sustainable development. SEA is an effective instrument for sustainable development (Albrecht 2011, p. 152). As pointed out earlier in the chapter, the purpose of SEA is to ensure that environmental considerations are taken into account and in order to inform high levels of decision-making, which facilitates assessments of policies, plans, and programs. Furthermore, SEA has the potential of improving PPPs, making sure that they take climate change issues into consideration, especially in countries with the legal provision for SEA (OECD 2009, p. 94). Another reason pointed out by Sadler et al. (2011) is that SEA serves as a lending and aid instrument used by donor agencies. SEA is a multistage process that encompasses a spectrum of approaches and diverse arrangements, procedures, and methods (UNEP 2002, p. 493). Considering the diverse nature of climaterelated impacts and adaptation issues in Nigeria, SEA is a structured planning tool to grind such hydra-headed challenges. An ideal SEA focuses on potential interrelations between concrete plans and programs and environmental changes by looking at the projected future of key socioeconomic variables, like trade patterns, commodity prices, population growth, migration flows while considering climate factors (OECD 2009, p. 80). The Nigerian national adaptation plan is geared towards strategic objectives comprising several sectors and ministries. SEA is better positioned to help improve relevant decisions towards achieving such integrated adaptation targets. According to the OECD (2009), an institution centered SEA approach may be best suited for mainstreaming climate change adaptation into national-level policy-making. Moreover, in order to enhance national adaptive capacity, important environmental assessment tools should be in place as this will enable mainstreaming of climate change adaptation into sectoral policies. According to the IPCC “one way of increasing adaptive capacity is by introducing the consideration of climate change impacts in development planning, for example, by including adaptation measures in land-use planning, and infrastructure design or by including measures to reduce vulnerability in existing disaster risk reduction strategies” (IPCC 2007, p. 20; IPCC 2014, p.27). Furthermore, considering SEA in a regional land use development plan can enhance potentials for adaptation and make adaptation constraining decisions transparent (Helbron et al. 2011). In this light, quality of the regional plan-making weighting process is potentially improved (Helbron 2008). Climate change adaptation through SEA in Nigeria can be realized by following the existing relevant institutional arrangement and decision-making structures; however, therefore, the tiered approach is pertinent in order to avoid overlap with the existing EIA process. The definition of policy, plan, and program is given nevertheless. To be precise in relation to climate change adaptation in Nigeria, an example of a policy is the proposed National Policy on Climate Change while a plan is the National Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action on Climate Change for Nigeria

Page 12 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

(NASPA-CCN). On the other hand, a program could be, for example, Climate Change Migration and Security Initiatives for Nigeria introduced within the Nigerian National Adaptation Plan.

New Strategic Programs That Need to be Integrated into SEA Hence adaptation to climate change has become very necessary. Nigeria has established new strategic actions to be considered when implementing the national adaptation plan. This gesture is a milestone towards addressing the impacts of climate change ravaging several communities in the country. However, the national adaptation plan must be implemented in a sustainable manner. Adopting a guidance framework relevant for assessing environmental risk that may occur through adaptation actions is imperative. Such a framework would help in improving the integration of climate change consideration into PPPs relevant to carrying out robust adaptation strategies (OECD 2008a). Even though the proposed strategic programs are designed to reduce the impact of climate change on vulnerable communities in Nigeria and enhance adaptive capacity of the affected communities, SEA can be employed as an environmental assessment tool. In this context, SEA could help to make informed decisions so as to ensure that communities are not adversely affected after implementation of such strategic actions, at the same time, improving such adaptation strategies. It is worthwhile to keep in mind that “any adaptation action can create unintended impacts on other natural and social systems” (Adger et al. 2005, p. 81). Some of these new strategic programs for adaptation to climate change provided in the National Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action for climate change in Nigeria (NASPA-CCN 2011) include: • • • • •

Agricultural Extension Programs Services Integrated Water Resource Management Program (watershed and coastal) Community-based Natural Resources Management Program (forest sectors) Comprehensive Emergency Management Program Climate Change, Migration, and Security Initiative (e.g. Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy).

Furthermore, implementation of the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) is a relevant aspect that needs to be considered in SEA. Hence, the need for action on climate change and biodiversity loss is firmly acknowledged as one of the new environmental challenges in Nigeria (NASPA-CCN 2011, p. 49; NEST 2011, p. 127). SEA is also required by Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Biodiversity Convention.

Benefits and Potential of SEA Within the Context of Climate Change Adaptation Integration of climate change adaptation into SEA is relatively new particularly in those developing countries without formal requirement for SEA. However, in developing countries where SEA has become part of environmental assessment tool, it provides a ready entry point for climate change consideration in strategic decision-making at the sector level (OECD 2009, p. 101). “SEA as a decision-aiding instrument can contribute to the prevention of conflicts with a policy for adapting to climate change” (Helbron et al. 2011). According to OECD (2009) building climate change consideration into an SEA can help: Page 13 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

• To identify whether sectoral strategies are viable and sustainable under different climate scenarios. For example, in areas facing increasing water stress, SEA can help to assess different strategies for the reform of the agricultural sector with different water requirements to identify which strategy is most sustainable under different climate scenarios. • To analyze whether a sectoral strategy might lead to increased vulnerability of the sector where natural and human systems are affected by climate change and thus prevent maladaptation. • To identify which adaptation intervention can enhance the resilience of the sector in the face of climate change (OECD 2009, p. 101).

Potentials of SEA for Climate Change Adaptation in Nigeria There are several benefits that could be associated with considering climate change adaptation in SEA. Most importantly, SEA application is imperative in meeting relevant policy commitments related to climate change in Nigeria. For example, SEA can help improve decision-making related to proposed adaptation programs of the Nigerian Ministry of Environment to achieve the objectives of NASPA-CCN by: • • • • • • • •

Identifying policy, plans, and programs that are sensitive to climate change Incorporating stakeholders and public views at an early stage of planning Providing environmental-based evidence to support informed decisions Improving strategic actions (e.g., national and sectoral adaptation programs) and avoiding the risk of maladaptation Determining communities and socioeconomic groups that are increasingly vulnerable to climate change impacts Integrating environmental aspects that are often disregarded in sectoral plans, e.g., vulnerability to climate variability and change Evaluating the environmental impacts of adaptation strategies as well as possible conflicts with other existing regional or national plans and programs Addressing cumulative and synergistic effects which may lead to decisions that could prevent adverse consequences on urban and rural communities.

Conclusion The present and future climatic changes in Nigeria could be very detrimental to ecosystems and vulnerable communities. Hence, the impacts of such climatic events have become inevitable. Climate change considerations should become part of policy-making and planning process in Nigeria. Adaptation is widely recognized by decision-makers as one of the effective measures to reduce the unavoidable impacts of the changing climate on the human environment. Given that Nigeria has initiated and designed a national adaptation plan with the aim of addressing the emerging climate change impacts across the country, it is also indispensable for a robust implementation of the national adaptation plan. While some progress has been made especially through establishing a National Adaptation Plan for Nigeria, a lot more remains to be done. It is, therefore, imperative to adopt a guidance framework for assessing several environmental risks which may improve the integration of climate change consideration into PPPs in order to make informed decisions and carry out robust

Page 14 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

adaptation strategies (OECD 2008b). SEA provides a structural approach to incorporating environmental considerations into PPPs at different levels, including sector level (OECD 2009, p. 185). SEA can help to improve the adaptation programs laid in the national adaptation plan by bringing transparency in their implementation from the early stage of decision-making. SEA can help in improving adaptation programs as it allows for the participation of the public and relevant stakeholders, particularly at the early stage of the overall decision-making putting their suggestions into consideration and even strengthening the subsequent project-specific EIA. Flexibility is one of the characteristics of SEA. This assessment tool is not only a useful tool for climate change adaptation decision-making but also for making decisions related to climate change mitigation and poverty reduction strategies (PRS). However, following good practice climate change adaptation could be considered in the SEA/EIA framework. Adaptation to climate change is a crosscutting issue that needs to be addressed through integrated decision-making. SEA allows for a better cooperation between crosscutting environmental sectors. In this respect, regional environmental authorities have a key role to play in carrying out robust adaptation strategies. There is, therefore, a need for capacity building and training of relevant staff in SEA, EIA, and climate forecast. Training is very essential and crucial to take full advantage and to promote new skills. This would enable stakeholders and policy-makers to envisage the alternatives of future development and to apply the precautionary principle when necessary, so as to reduce climate risks. Therefore, an appropriate environmental assessment tool such as SEA can help spur robust decision-making regarding adaptation options in Nigeria.

References Abiodun BJ, Salami AT, Tadross M (2011) Climate change scenarios for Nigeria: understanding biophysical impacts. Climate systems analysis group, Cape Town, for building Nigeria’s response to climate change project. Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team (NEST), Ibadan, p 35 Adebanji A (2010) Environmental and resource conflicts in The Niger Delta: an impediment for Nigeria’s transition to the green economy. In: IAIA conference proceedings. The role of impact assessment in transition to the green economy 30th annual meeting of the International Association for Impact Assessment, 6–11 April 2010. International Conference Center, Geneva, pp 1–6 Adeoti A, Olayide O, Coater A (2010) Flooding and welfare of Fisher’s household in Lagos State, Nigeria. J Hum Ecol 32(3):161–167 Adger WN, Arnell NW, Tompkins EL (2005) Successful adaptation to climate change across scales. Glob Environ Chang 15(2):77–86 Agrawala S, Kramer AM, Prudent-Richard G, Sainsbury M (2010) Incorporating climate change impacts and adaptation in environmental impact assessments: opportunities and challenges. OECD Environmental Working Paper No. 24. OECD, Paris, pp 1–29 Agwu EIC, Ezedike CE, Egbu AU (eds) (2000) The concept and procedure of environmental impact assessment. Crystal Publishers, Owerri, pp 93–97 Albrecht E (2011) EIA and SEA in International Environmental Law: In: Albrecht E, Egute TO, Forbid GT (eds) Risk assessment and management for environmental protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. Lexxion, Berlin, pp 151–159 Awosika LF, French GT, Nicholls RJ, Ibe CE (1992) The impact of sea level rise on the coastline of Nigeria. In: Proceedings of IPCC symposium on the rising challenges of the sea, Magaritta, 14–19 Mar 1992

Page 15 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Bashir O, Oludare AH, Johnson O, Aloyius B (2012) Floods of fury in Nigerian cities. Can Cent Sci Educ J Sustain Dev 5(7):69–79 Boateng I (2010) Spatial planning in coastal regions: facing the impact of climate change. The International Federation of Surveyors (FIG), Frederiksberg, pp 13–14 Building Nigeria Response to Climate Change – BNRCC (2010) Local action on climate change: BNRCC’s quarterly news letter October 2010. BNRCC, Ibadan, pp 1–12 Building Nigeria’s Response to Climate Change (BNRCC) (2011) National adaptation strategy and plan of action on climate change for Nigeria (NASPA – CCN). Nigeria. [Online]. http:// nigeriaclimatechange.org/naspa.pdf. Accessed 20 May 2013 CSIR (1996) Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). A primer, CSIR report ENV/S-RR 96001, Stellenbosch Department for International Development (DFID)/Environmental Resource Management (ERM) (2009) Impact of climate change on Nigeria’s economy, DFID/ERM report, Abuja Echefu N, Akpofure E (2003) Environmental impact assessment in Nigeria: regulatory background and procedural framework. In: McCabe M, Sadler B (eds) UNEP: studies of EIA practice in developing countries. UNEP Division of Technology, Industry and Economics and Trade Branch, Geneva pp 63–74 Etuonovbe AK (2011) The devastating effect of flooding in Nigeria. FIG working week 2011 bridging the gap between cultures Marrakech, Morocco 18–22 May 2011 Federal Republic of Nigeria (1992a) Environmental impact assessment decree (No. 86), Gazette 79 (73) Federal Republic of Nigeria (1992b) Nigerian urban and regional planning decree (No.88) 1992, Gazette 79 (75) Gwary D (2008) Climate change, food security and Nigeria agriculture. In: Workshop on the challenges. Climate change in Nigeria, 19–20 May 2008. NISER Hallegatte S, Lecocq F, Hallegatte S, Perthuis C (2011) Designing climate change adaptation policies: an economic framework. The World Bank, Washington, DC, pp 1–39 Harmelling S (2011) Global climate risk index 2012 : who suffers most from extreme weather events? Weather – related loss events in 2010 and 1991 to 2010, pp 28. [Online]. http://www. germanwatch.org/klima/cri.pdf. Accessed 17 May 2013 Helbron H (2008) Strategic environmental assessment in regional land use planning: indicator system for the assessment of degradation of natural resources and land uses with environmental potential for adaptation to global climate change (LUCCA). Doctoral thesis at the Faculty of Environmental Sciences and Process Engineering at the Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus, Germany [Online]. http://opus.kobv.de/btu/volltexte/2008/584/. Accessed 16 Aug 2014 Helbron H, Schmidt M, Glasson J, Downes N (2011) Indicators for strategic environmental assessment in regional land use planning to assess conflicts with adaptation to global climate change. Ecol Indicat 11:90–95 International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)/Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Yonetani M, Morris T, Flyktningeråd (eds) (2013) Global estimates 2012: people displaced by disasters. IDMC/NRC Norway, Geneva, p 40 IPCC (2007a) Climate change 2007: synthesis report. In: Core Writing Team, Pachauri RK, Reisinger A (eds) Contribution of working groups I, II and III to the fourth assessment report of the international panel on climate change. IPCC, Geneva, p 104 IPCC (2007b) Summary for policymakers. In: Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of

Page 16 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

working group II to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, p 20 IPCC (2014) Summary for policymakers. In: Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects. In: Field CB, Barros VR, Dokken DJ, Mach KJ, Mastrandrea MD, Bilir TE, Chatterjee M, Ebi KL, Estrada YO, Genova RC, Girma B, Kissel ES, Levy AN, MacCracken S, Mastrandrea PR, White LL (eds) Contribution of Working Group II to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK/New York, pp 1–32 João E (2005) Key principles of SEA. In: Schmidt M, João E, Albrecht E (eds) Implementing strategic environmental assessment. Environmental protection in the European Union, vol 2. Springer, Heidelberg, pp 1–13 Klein R (2004) Approaches, methods and tools for climate change impact, vulnerability and adaptation assessment. Keynote lecture to the in-session workshop on impacts of, and vulnerability and adaptation to, climate change. Twenty-first session of the UNFCCC subsidiary body for scientific and technical advice, Buenos Aires, 8 Dec 2004 [Online]. http://unfccc.int/files/ meetings/COP_10/in_session_workshops/adaptation/pdf/081204_Klein_adaptation_abstract.pdf. Accessed 22 May 2013 Ladan MT (2012a) Review of NESREA act 2007 and regulations 2009–2011: a new dawn in environmental compliance and enforcement in Nigeria’. Law Environ Dev J 8/1:116. [Online]. http://www.lead-journal.org/content/12116.pdf. Accessed 28 May 2013 Ladan MT (2012b) Trends in environmental law and access to justice in Nigeria. Recent trends in environmental law and access to justice in Nigeria. Lambert Academic, Saarbr€ ucken Larsen S, Kørnøv L (2009) SEA of river basin management plans: incorporating climate change. Impact Assess Proj Apprais 27(4):291–299 Larsen S, Kørnøv L, Wejs A (2012) Mind the gap in SEA: an institutional perspective on why assessment of synergies among climate change mitigation, adaptation and other policy areas are missing. EIA Rev 33:32–40 Mehrotra S, Rosenzweig C, Solecki WD, Natenzon CE, Omojola A, Folorunsho R, Gilbride J (2011) Cities, disasters and climate risk. In: Rosenzweig C, Solecki WD, Hammer SA, Mehrotra S (eds) Climate change and cities: first assessment report of the urban climate change research network. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 15–42 M€ uller1 B (2013) ‘Enhanced (direct) access’ through ‘(national) funding entities’ etymology and examples: information note on the green climate fund business model framework. The Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, Oxford University Press, London, pp 1–10 NASPA-CCN (2011) National adaptation strategy and plan of action on climate change for Nigeria (NASPA-CCN), Ibadan NEST (2011) Reports of research projects on impacts and adaptation. Building Nigeria’s response to climate change (BNRCC). Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team (NEST), Ibadan NEST, Woodley E (2011) Reports of research projects on impacts and adaptation. Building Nigeria’s response to climate change (BNRCC). Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team (NEST), Ibadan, pp 122 NEST, Woodley E (2012) Learning from experience- community-based adaptation to climate change in Nigeria. (Building Nigeria’s response to climate change Project). Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team (NEST), Ibadan Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (NEAA), Vuuren DP, Hof A, Elzen MGJ (2009) Meeting the 2 C target: from climate objective to emission reduction measures. Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Bilthoven Page 17 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Ndujihe C (2013) Population: how many are we in Nigeria? Vanguard Newspaper, 28 Sept 2013 [Online]. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/09/population-many-nigeria/. Accessed 15 Aug 2014 Nigeria Environmental Study Action Team (NEST) (2010) Local action on climate change: BNRCC’s Q Newsl 1–15 Nwajiuba C (2008) Adapting to climate change: challenges and opportunities. In: Nwajiuba C (ed) Climate change and adaptation in Nigeria. Margraf, Weikersheim, pp 1–6 Nwajiuba C, Onyeneke R (2010) Effects of climate on the agriculture of sub-Saharan Africa: lessons from Southeast rainforest of Nigeria, Oxford business and economic conference program. ISBN 978-0-9742114-1-9 Nwoko CO (2013) Evaluation of environmental impact assessment systems in Nigeria. Greener J Environ Manag Public Safety 2(1):22–31 Odjugo PAO (2010) The impact of climate change on water resources: global and Nigerian analysis. Paraclete Publishers, Yola, Nigeria. FUTY J Environ 4(1):59–77 Olokesusi F (1998) Legal and institutional framework of environmental impact assessment in Nigeria: an initial assessment. Environ Impact Assess Rev 18(2):159–174 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2006) Applying strategic environmental assessment: good practice guidance for development co-operation, DAC guidelines and reference series. OECD, Paris Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2008a) Strategic environmental assessment and adaptation to climate change: DAC network on environment and development co-operation (ENVIRONET). OECD, Paris. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2008b) Strategic environmental assessment and adaptation to climate change 8th meeting of environment & development co-operation 30 Oct 2008, pp 5–15 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2009) Integrating climate change adaptation into development co-operation: policy guidance. OECD, Paris, pp 1–193 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2010) Strategic environmental assessment and adaptation to climate change. OECD, Paris, pp 1–30 Sadler B, Verheem R (1996) Strategic environmental assessment: status, challenges and future directions, Report No. 53. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, The Hague, p 27 Sadler B, Aschemann R, Dusik J, Fisher TM, Partidario MR, Verheem R (eds) (2011) Handbook of strategic environmental assessment. Earthscan, London Sayne A (2011) Climate change adaptation and conflict in Nigeria: United States Institute of Peace Special Report 274, June, p 16 Schmidt M, João E, Albrecht E (eds) (2005) Implementing strategic environmental assessment. Environmental protection in the European Union. Springer, Heidelberg Schmidt M, Palekhov D, Atkinson R (2010) Environmental impact assessment and strategic environmental assessment. Learning materials. BTU Eigenverlag, Cottbus, pp 93–113 Therivel R (2004) Strategic environmental assessment in action, vol 5. Earthscan, London, p 61 Udofa IM, Fajemirokun FA (1978) On a height datum for Nigeria. In: Proceedings of the international symposium on geodetic measurements and computations. Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria Ugochukwu CNC, Ertel J (2011) The state of the art application of environmental sustainability tool: environmental impact assessment (EIA) practice in Nigeria. In: Albrecht, E, Egute TO, Forbid GT (eds) Risk assessment and management for environmental protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. Brandenburgische Technische Universität Cottbus. Lexxion, Berlin, pp 160–170 Page 18 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_14-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

UNEP (2002) Environmental impact assessment training resource manual, 2nd edn. UNEP, Geneva, pp 491–525 UNEP, Abaza H, Bisset R, Sadler B (2004) Economics and trade branch. Environmental impact assessment and strategic environmental assessment: towards an integrated approach. UNEP, Geneva UNFCCC (2010) Adaptation assessment, planning and practice. An overview from The Nairobi work program on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change. UNFCCC Secretariat, Bonn, p 73 UNFCCC (2012) Compilation of case studies on natural adaptation planning process. Subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice. Thirty-seventh session Doha, 26th Nov to 1st Dec 2012. Nairobi work program on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to Climate Change. Note by the secretariat, Bonn Uyigue E, Agho M (2007) Coping with climate change and environmental degradation in the Niger Delta Southern Nigeria. Community Research Development Center (CREDC), Edo State, pp 1–31

Page 19 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Climate Change Aspects of International Knowledge Exchange About Water: Experiences from Mozambique and Ecuador Christoph Rappa* and Andreas Zeiselmairb a Director of the Verein zur Förderung des internationalen Wissensaustauschs e.V., Munich, Germany b Commissioner of the Verein zur Förderung des internationalen Wissensaustauschs e.V., Munich, Germany

Abstract By outlining the central role of water in the global warming process, the necessity of international collaboration in terms of tertiary education in hydraulics and hydrology is being derived. In this chapter an integrated approach of knowledge exchange in the framework of a descriptive education concept and applied university research projects is being elaborated. The focus is placed on descriptive teaching of fundamental flow physics, the application of a sophisticated but opensource software tool for the prediction of flood areas, and a small hydropower project plant which was designed to enhance the living quality of indigenous people in the middle of Ecuador’s rainforest. These projects were mutually realized with committed and open-minded local partners.

Keywords Water; International knowledge exchange; Descriptive education concept; Hands-on projects; Flood prediction; Small-scale decentralized renewable energy systems

Introduction Over the past and the current century, the so-called developed part of the world has almost entirely exploited the Earth’s resources which have been built up over billions of years. And it was only in 1972 when the so-called civilized part of the world realized “the limits to growth” which were formulated by the Club of Rome. The irreversible consumption of fossil fuels satisfies the quenchless hunger of an exponentially increasing living standard. This process goes in line with (a) a rapidly growing world population and (b) a continuously growing percentage of people benefitting from technical progress. The latter fact is truly a great achievement but nevertheless still a few percent of the people live on the cost of the majority. With the UN millennium goals (United Nations 2013), the gap between the rich and the poor should be reduced which means to significantly enhance the living quality in developing and emerging countries. However, one has to learn from the mistakes mankind has made and support the erection of a sustainable infrastructure in such regions. Therefore, one does not only have to set an example but also to put effort in developing smart and peripheral renewable energy supply units and to implement them in collaboration with the local people. It is needless to mention the imperative of curtailing the impact of global warming on the Earth’s ecosystems.

*Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Climate Change: Greenhouse Effect Global warming is a highly complex physical phenomenon; it is a consequence of solar energy entering the Earth’s atmosphere as shortwave radiation, whereas its longwave reflection is captured to a certain percentage by the so-called greenhouse gases. Without the natural greenhouse effect, the world would look differently – and a lot (32
C) colder (Roedel 2000). However, there is a quite instable equilibrium between the planet’s temperature and the greenhouse gas content of the atmosphere. When the shortwave radiation from the sun enters the atmosphere, only a negligible fraction is being reflected at the outer atmosphere and the rest reaches to the ground. There, dependent on the material, parts of the rays are directly (same wavelength) reflected. This process is called albedo effect; glaciers, e.g., directly reflect 30–75 % of the sun’s radiation, whereas liquid water only mirrors 5–22 % and clouds 60–90 %. The rest of the energy is absorbed by the Earth’s surface which radiates heat waves back to the atmosphere. So-called greenhouse gases act membrane-like and reflect these longwaves back to the Earth whereupon a gradual temperature rise ensues. Greenhouse gases are mainly water vapor (H2O, CO2 equivalent due to strong temperature dependency not allocated), carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4, 25 times CO2 equivalent), and nitrous oxide (N2O, 298 times CO2 equivalent), which is produced by nitrification and denitrification (Sloss 1992). Water vapor in the atmosphere contributes, for instance, 36–66 % to the natural greenhouse effect; carbon dioxide and methane come up to 9–26 % and 4–9 %, respectively. While the CO2 content increased from the preindustrial era from 280 ppm to 390 ppm in 2011, it is responsible for 60 % of the anthropogenic greenhouse effect. Methane increased from 730 ppbV in 1750 to 1,741 ppbV in 1998. Nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions arise mainly from cropland (69 %) and grew from about 270 to 323 ppbV and account for 6 % of anthropogenic global warming (Blasing 2013). It can be concluded that 50 % of the anthropogenic impact on climate change can be traced back to the energy sector where mainly CO2 is being emitted (Schabbach and Wesselak 2012). The cement industry, deforestation, and mainly agriculture, particularly livestock farming and rice cultivation, add up to the other half (IPCC 2007). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the anthropogenic impact on global warming is in all probability. Between 1906 and 2006, the spatial average close-to-ground air temperature has risen globally for about 0.74 K  0.18 K (IPCC 2007). The oceans, with a much greater specific heat capacity, heated up by 0.037 K from 1955 (surface temperatures increased by 0.6 K) which corresponds to an atmospheric temperature rise of 11
C (NOAA 2007). The risky issue is that ocean streams are density driven so that they react very sensitively on changes in temperature or salt contents. The Gulf Stream, e.g., carries northwards twice the heat every day that is produced annually by all the thermal power plants worldwide at a velocity of 1.8 m/s at Florida’s coast (Ball 2001). However, according to the IPCC (2007), there is a probability smaller than 10 % that a transition of the streams takes place before 2100. Depending on the future emissions, the IPCC predicts an atmospheric temperature rise with respect to the preindustrial era (1750 CE) of 1.1–6.4 K in 2100 (IPCC 2007). For comparison, the greatest warming after the last ice age was 1
C within a millennium (Leggett 2005). It is important to mention that local impacts show greater amplitudes than global mean values do. A global 4
warming means, for instance, a temperature rise of 8
C in the Mediterranean (Wicke 2013).

Water: Global Warming’s Central Element Water as life’s central element plays an important role in the global warming context. Water in its three phases – gaseous (0.001 % water vapor), liquid (97 % saltwater and 0.7 % freshwater), and solid (2.3 % ice) – has got a significant impact on the Earth’s climate. The oceans absorb CO2, water Page 2 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

vapor is the number one greenhouse gas, and the ice-albedo is the most substantial rebound effect (see below). Even more important rising temperatures affect the hydrologic circle immensely. On the one hand, greater water vapor contents will lead to a greater probability and more severe thunderstorms with subsequently following flood events, and on the other hand, water shortage will increase dramatically. According to Hare, a temperature rise of 1
C with respect to the preindustrial era will imply 400–800 million people living in water-shortage areas by the 2020s; at 1–2
C rise, a peak risk of 1.5 billion by the 2050s follows and a rise of 2.5
C makes 2.4–3.5 billion people suffer from water shortage (Hare 2005). Katrina 2005, Rita 2005, Ike 2008, 243 hurricanes only in April 2011 in the USA, Irene 2011, Sandy 2012, and the latest striking storm in Oklahoma in 2013 underline that the recurrence interval of such events becomes shorter and shorter. In Germany, for instance, historical floods were recorded in the years 1342, 1501, 1787, 1899, and 1954. Devastating floods then occurred in 1991, 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2013 which makes global warming effects obvious, while there are regions on Earth much more prone to flood fortification. Hydrology and hydraulics are therefore the basis of climate change adaptation.

Attenuating and Cumulative Effects on Global Warming Aerosols in higher layers, e.g., reduce the planet’s temperature; in lower layers or even on snow or ice, they increase global warming immensely. Particles in the atmosphere reflect the incident sunlight back to outer space, whereas on snow, for instance, they absorb the energy and warm the planet’s surface. Especially sulfate aerosols are said to have a cooling effect as the particles in the atmosphere shield the sun’s radiation. It seems bizarre that sulfate filters of coal-fired power plants have a negative effect on the climate. The reduction of the ozone layer actually cools the planet, too. The radiation is not absorbed by the ozone in the stratosphere anymore yet in the troposphere as it reaches there more likely (0.15  0.10 W/m2). However, the outer layer, the stratosphere, is cooler and therefore cools the troposphere more pronounced than the absorption takes place. The so-called ice-albedo rebound effect, in contrary, enhances warming. While glaciers melt their surfaces shrink which leads to less reflection and therefore more absorption of sun radiation. The hydrogen-vapor feedback is yet another self-reinforcing factor which, however, cannot be traced back to industrialization. At greater temperatures air can hold more hydrogen vapor, which is yet another greenhouse gas that boosts global warming (Rahmstorf and Schellnhuber 2007). Taking the impact of water vapor on the natural greenhouse effect into account a not negligible fraction of global warming will result from its rebound effect. Greenhouse gas molecules do have different life spans. In average CO2 is being dissolved in the oceans after 5 years, although it is released again so that 30 % of the anthropogenic CO2 will stay in the atmosphere for a couple of centuries and 20 % for a couple of millennia. Methane has a life span of 12 years (IPCC 2007) and nitrous oxide even 114 years.

Consequences of Global Warming The consequences of global warming are versatile. Melting glaciers lead to a greater sea level (0.19–0.58 m (IPCC 2007)); the vegetation will change; deserts will grow. These issues will have a direct impact on habitats of flora and fauna. Regionally, an increase of 1–2
C carries substantial, above 2
C serious dangers (Hare 2005), whereas the total collapse of ecosystems is feared at 3
C ascent. But it has also got a crucial impact on mankind, mainly through food production (although plant growth increased by 6 % between 1982 and 1999 due to a greater CO2 content (Nemani et al. 2003), the agricultural production will develop locally different; however, a global reduction of 3–16 % is assumed by the World Health Organization). Higher temperatures lead to greater Page 3 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

evaporation which enhances the probability of hurricanes or massive floods threatening animals and people, destroying the harvest. Geopolitical problems, e.g., due to lack of water or food impend and lead to more environmental migration. The financial damage of global warming was assessed by the German Institute for Economic Research to sum up to US$200 billion; the Stern review emanates from 5 % to 20 % loss of the global economic performance. Every region of the world will be affected by global warming, but the poorest that are not able to protect themselves against extreme conditions will be hit hardest (PICIRCA 2012). According to Hare “Africa seems to be consistently amongst the regions with high to very high projected damages” (Hare 2005). Global warming is the first man-made global threat; however, the ones suffering most from it are not its major contributors.

Adaptation to Global Warming People had to adapt to their environment ever since. All over the place, they suffered from thunderstorms and the subsequently following flood events. Our ancestors had to learn how to cope with extreme climate or weather conditions and drought periods. The major step of mankind to civilization was the control of natural runoff that in some areas even made settlements possible. Freshwater needed to be held back in times of over capacities and released when the crops required it. That process marked the end of the Neolithic Age which took place in the so-called Fertile Crescent (Pleticha 1995). Although a bit later, one of the most impressive monuments that document the effort that has been made to protect people from floods has been erected in Egypt during the Cheops dynasty (approx. 2620–2580 BCE, when hydrologists were worshipped as high priests): Sadd-El-Kafara, a 10 m high, 45–82 m wide and 61–112 m long dam. There are numerous examples for adaptation technologies in terms of protection from natural hazards worldwide. Flood control became even more important during the industrial revolution when the risk potential grew enormously as almost all crafts needed water and settled close to rivers. And nowadays, imagine the economic threat of a flooded subway network. As elaborated above, the risk of such hazardous floods increases dramatically due to global warming. Even in Central Europe which is a region not prone to an enhanced thunderstorm probability, extreme flood events occurred more often in recent times. To cope with the challenge, Bavaria’s (Germany) adaptation method is a 15 % supplement on the previous design discharge which induces an extensive enlargement of retention potential and embankment strengthening (KLIWA 2012).

International Knowledge Exchange About Water Academic Education In this heavily interconnected world knowledge can be exchanged easily (e.g., through wikipedia. org). And it is evident that knowledge exchange has always been the base of development. The permanent gains of cognition and perception, however, convey complexity which requires specialists to handle certain responsible duties. The word exchange means mutual give and take. Thus, international and intercultural knowledge exchange is essential for the solving of regional and global current and future troubles. Primary education, which is aimed to be made accessible to every child (United Nations 2013), is the first step only. Fundamental tertiary education for an appropriate fraction of people (for the smartest not for the richest) is essential for the sustainment and development of good living conditions. The universities and academies have to make sure that knowledge which is accessible at all hours all over the world is being prepared, shared, explained, and set into the right context. Enthusiastic knowledge imparting which is important for the learning success can be handled by passionate pedagogues only. At Technische Universität M€ unchen (TUM), Page 4 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

a concept for fundamental hydraulic education has been developed and conducted over several years. It is based on the train of thought that education has to follow the same path research does (Rapp 2012): Observe ! comprehend ! deduce ! challenge ! apply This descriptive method has been quite successfully implemented in conjunction with the von Humboldt principle (bond between research and education) and hands-on projects. To share the knowledge and the lecturing experiences internationally, the “Association for International Knowledge Exchange” (German: Verein zur Förderung des internationalen Wissensaustauschs e.V.) has been founded in Munich. In the following some of the experiences gathered in Mozambique are being described. A hands-on project where students from Ecuador and Germany applied their knowledge will be described in Chapter “▶ Renewable Energies in Developing and Emerging Countries”.

Experiences from Mozambique: Flood Protection Collaboration TUM-UEM In developing and emerging countries, the protection standard is still very poor. Ever since, Mozambicans, e.g., have suffered from disastrous floods. A tragic example is the year 2000 Limpopo flood which caused some hundred deaths and hundreds of thousands who have lost their homes (650,000 according to GIZ). Only 1 year later, a flood devastated the Zambezi banks. The reasons are on the one hand geographical and topographical and on the other political and socioeconomic. The great African streams Zambezi and Limpopo flow through Mozambique before they discharge into the Indian Ocean at Africa’s east coast. After centuries of colonial suppression, Mozambique gained independence only in the mid-1970s. A bloody civil war followed which was aggravated by the Cold War claiming approx. 5 % of the population dead and countless injured. Africa typical threats, e.g., poor educational standard or diseases like malaria or AIDS, contribute to prevent Mozambique from developing. Since the end of the militant actions in the mid-1990s, a gradual improvement, especially in the education sector, can be noticed. Academic structures are being established in the framework of ambitious policies, although the country depends on massive support from international institutions. To enhance the education of Mozambican engineers, collaboration has been established between Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) in Maputo and TUM, Germany, and is based on a Memorandum of Understanding between the two federal states. Several courses have been given so far by German lecturers and the hydraulic laboratory of UEM has been assessed and improved through provision of measuring techniques as well as training of the staff (see Fig. 1). Special software has been developed to evaluate these experiments but also to predict, e.g., transient flow phenomena such as water hammer in penstocks. The codes have been written in Octave – a MatLAB substitution which is free to use and to modify (www.octave.org). Hydrodynamical Approach of Flood Area Prediction Fluid flows are generally three dimensional and time dependent what makes the partial differential equations that were derived independently by Claude Navier and Gabriel Stokes almost 200 years ago solvable for a handful laminar problems only (e.g., very low velocities like in veins or groundwater flow). The default flow condition, however, is turbulent where a chaotic behavior can be noticed. To predict such flows, the so-called Navier–Stokes Equations have to be solved at discrete points in space and at certain time steps. The more turbulent a flow is, the finer the Page 5 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Fig. 1 Practical courses and digital transient pressure measurements in the Laboratório Hydraulico of Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, Mozambique

computational grid has to be and the time step shorter which makes the solution of a relevant industrial or environmental problem computationally unaffordable or even physically impossible. Therefore, different strategies have been developed to cope with this challenge. For the prediction of flood areas, the state-of-the-art method is to solve the 2D shallow water equations numerically. Deriving the shallow water equations from the three-dimensional Navier–Stokes Equations, the vertical momentum is being neglected and the velocity in the horizontal direction is depth-averaged (Beffa 1994). The momentum balance in the z direction becomes the description of hydrostatic pressure distribution. Integration of mass conservation over the flow depth leads to a transport equation of the flow depth. For these reasons, the Navier–Stokes Equations can be simplified in such way that they can be applied to solve even great domains, though the preconditions, hydrostatic pressure distribution, and a comparatively small vertical velocity component have to be met. These assumptions generally hold very nicely in natural waters where exact specifications of the bounding geometry are lacking so that the simulation strategy provides significant information. At TUM’s Chair for Hydromechanics, a shallow water equation solver based on the open-source software package OpenFOAM (www.openfoam.org) has been developed to approach such problems efficiently. The solver called shallowFoam and the underlying software package OpenFOAM have been developed under the GNU license agreement so that it is free to use and to customize for any purpose. For the post-processing step, the freely available software ParaView is applied. Especially in developing countries, this approach has got manifold advantages. Firstly, opensource code licenses are free of charge and the code can be adapted to whichever problem. Secondly, there is comprehensive support available on the Internet because of countless OpenFOAM users worldwide. Thirdly, this software package belongs to the most powerful tools for the solving of partial differential equations like the shallow water equations. Fourthly, the program is massively parallelized and with the solver shallowFoam flood scenarios of even great computational domains can be simulated on servers all over the world in an acceptable timespan. Finally, a link has been programmed to convert GIS data to be OpenFOAM standard (e.g., Jud et al. 2011). A crucial drawback of the method is that – except for ParaView – graphical user interfaces (GUIs) are lacking which makes the application not easy to handle or even inconvenient for beginners. However, additional university courses on numerical river hydraulics form the integrated approach that the Association for International Knowledge Exchange follows.

Page 6 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Fig. 2 Risk potential: example for a design flood in an arbitrary domain (From Schäffler et al. 2011)

Flood Area Prediction Simulation of flood events requires input data such as the topography (underlying the computational grid, roughness, and discharge). Worldwide topographical data can be downloaded for free – at least at a resolution of 25 m  25 m – from http://eoweb.dlr.de:8080. Depending on the assignment, finer resolutions are available at different websites. Roughness of the ground depends mainly on the land use and can be gained from aerial photos (e.g., Google Earth). As profound hydrologic data are mostly not available in developing or emerging countries, extreme flood event discharges can be reconstructed by so-called inverse simulations (Motzet 2003) or they can be reconstructed from the Global Runoff Data Centre (German Federal Institute of Hydrology 2013). By modifying the inflow into and rainfall onto the surveyed region, the different simulation results are being compared with observed data. At the best match, the required parameters can be identified. The procedure has to be done for different events which will help to derive flood probabilities. Future events with certain occurrence probabilities can be subsequently investigated. Safety margins to account for increasing precipitation intensities due to global warming can be considered in the computations (KLIWA 2012). Figure 2 exemplarily depicts a flood risk plan gathered through shallowFoam simulations and illustrated in ParaView (blue ¼ low risk, red ¼ high risk). The consideration of global warming effects, thus increasing peak discharges, in these numerical simulations leads to appropriate flood risk plans which are the basis for adaptation means.

Remarks on the Academic Concept

This integrated approach – fundamental and depictive hydraulic education, provision of free-to-use software, computer training, and enabling of discrete modification and application – helps to cope with the water-based challenges arising from climate change. The fundamentals in hydraulics are needed for the planning of drinking water supply, wastewater discharge, flood protection, irrigation, and many more. In the example in the section “Flood Area Prediction,” a certain approach to identify areas prone to damage and to ascertain the protection of the people has been elaborated.

Page 7 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Renewable Energies in Developing and Emerging Countries Energy has become an essential livelihood. What energy means to people can best be assessed where it is not accessible to everyone. William Kamkwamba, an uneducated engineer from Malawi, is a renowned genius. He has built a wind turbine from scrap supplying his family shack with electric light and even being able to charge other people’s mobile phones (Kamkwamba and Mealer 2009). Access to power changes life completely and makes development possible. However, providing the global population with Western European standard will soon lead to a total environmental collapse which thwarts Millennium Goal 7 (ensure environmental sustainability). Despite the additional warming effects and general availability of resources (even for uranium which is by far no alternative), their accessibility is limited (Schabbach and Wesselak 2012). The so-called energy turnaround implies renunciation from a centralized and grand-scale electricity generation to communal renewable energy plants with high harvesting factors (energy gain over energy need for erection and operation). Conventional plants receive the fuel from remote point sources mainly in Asia, America, Australia, or Africa. The plants are not where the sources are. The combustion of fuels in grand plants and the ensuing delivery to the end user are physically and economically more efficient rather than the resource distribution to the end user with local generation. Renewable energy sources are being used where they appear. For example, it is hardly imaginable that wind is taken from all over the world to a central spot where one huge turbine generates power for a whole city. Hence, where development takes place, the focus has to be placed on small-scale decentralized renewable energy systems. Hands-on projects based on these principles collaboratively realized with the local population create acceptance enable them to understand the technique and maintain the facilities on their own while rural areas are ecologically friendly empowered (Rapp et al. 2012). And a not negligible side effect is that the added value stays local. One project that has been realized in a smaller scale only is being presented in the following.

Overview of the Project In 2010 a group of students of Technische Universität M€ unchen had the opportunity to conduct their final theses within a hands-on project in the Ecuadorian rainforest. Focus was put on fresh and wastewater as well as electricity supply. The latter will be specified by a feasibility study on micro hydropower that was done during a 2-week stay in the village of Yuwientsa. The results were presented and discussed with students from Quito in the framework of a “seminario transatlántico” at Ecuador’s oldest and greatest University – Universidad Central del Ecuador. Yuwientsa is situated in the rainforest about 1 h distance by small aircraft to the nearest town of Puyo in east Ecuador. Up to now, it only had sparse access to electricity although there is an urgent need, i.e., for medication cooling, education, and lighting. There are some PV cells installed and diesel (has to be flown in) generators but by far not enough to cover all basic needs. The region with an almost closed rainforest area possesses an overwhelming biodiversity and a vivid culture of local indigenous tribes who struggle to preserve their identity and livelihood for their future generations. As this region is also blessed with different kinds of natural resources, there are various commercial ambitions for exploitation. International companies try to get access to believed oil fields or the huge potential of precious tropical wood. UNESCO declared the region a biosphere reserve to support the sustainable development of the indigenous population. As energy forms the basis for it, a special focus needs to be placed on renewable supply. The goal is to share simple but effective technical solutions in order to enable Page 8 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

locals to implement and spread the technology on their own. This can also form an appeal for the young indigenous generation not to leave for the cities but to stay in their communities to protect their forest and therefore play an essential role in global climate preservation. With the implementation of rainforest academies, designed by German artist Markus Heinsdorff, UNESCO provides secondary and tertiary education for the indígenas of the Shuar tribe.

Electricity in the Middle of the Rainforest

The assignment was to find a solution in collaboration with the indígenas to provide sustainable energy supply that is exactly customized to the local needs and on-site conditions. This demands special requirements as robustness and low-maintenance effort of the technology as well as minor ecological impact. External dependencies regarding technical support or fuel supply should be abstained from and low construction and operation cost guaranteed.

Scope of the Project In order to assess the impact on the local society of the 250 inhabitants of Yuwientsa but also further upcoming project regions, a “social impact assessment” has been conducted according to the suggestions of the UN Centre for Good Governance (2006). The result of the assessed electrification was in overall positive under the constraint of close cooperation and involvement of the local population. The provided electricity demand of approx. 10 kW is mainly needed to illuminate the classrooms and housings. Furthermore, a computer with satellite-based Internet access and a refrigerator for medication need to be supplied. The abundant and reliable availability of water in this region proves the reasonable application of micro hydropower. During a 2-week stay in the village of Yuwientsa, appropriate installation sites were searched for. It turned out that several layout possibilities are conceivable. A fundamentally important factor was the assurance of flood protection of the installed technical appliances. Several sites were excluded because of spiritual relevance. Finally two preferred sites were identified and surveyed in detail. The first one gave the opportunity of installing an overshot water wheel. The second would use a conventional, i.e., Pelton or crossflow turbine. Close cooperation and information exchange with the local decision makers as well as with surrounding residents formed the basis of a successful joint project.

Hydrology The conditions in Yuwientsa are determined by tropical daytime climate with an almost constant mean temperature of more than 20
C. There is daily cloud cover with convective precipitation. Furthermore, there are distinguished dry (August until November) and rainy seasons (December, January, and May to July). Surveillance of the hydrological conditions was the first step to assess the feasibility. As there was almost no information on the characteristic water discharges in and around Yuwientsa, the most important fact sources were the experiences and observations of the locals. Nevertheless, some short-term measurements were conducted to get a first impression. After a number of interrogations with people living in the surroundings of the streams, a first insight over long-term hydrological discharges could be gained. Important to mention are the very quick discharge reactions after heavy rainfall as a result of the hilly topography and rather small catchment areas. In order to assess the seasonal deviations, a measuring gauge was installed at a close river together with the indígenas who check the level daily. But even with all the collected data, the hydrology can only be estimated basically. Through constructional measures, a minimization of negative impact was aspired. Page 9 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

On-Site Approach

The equipment was rather basic and aimed to be flexibly applied in rough terrain. GPS, altimeter, and measuring tape were used for spatial localization; bucket and stopwatch or yardstick for the cross section and leaves as tracers for the flow velocity were the low-tech but sufficient discharge measuring gears. Clear documentation with photos and sketches made later assessment and construction planning possible. Installation potentials were approximated by Eq. 1 with discharge Q and geodetic head Hgeo: PTurbine ¼ 8  Q  H geo ½kW

(1)

Using a water wheel, the result will be reduced due to lower efficiency. Eleven potential installation sites were identified around the village with a power range of 5–35 kW. After a detailed evaluation regarding energy demand, ecological impact, and flood safety, two preferred options were finally chosen. Water Wheel First option considered the use of an overshot water wheel at the river Yuwints close to the settlement. A small river drop with a head difference of 2.2 m ends in a bigger basin. The constant (according to the indígenas) discharge of 1.2 m3/s (measured with tracer yardstick and stopwatch) will therefore offer a permanent hydropower potential of approx. 18 kW. The water wheel with 3.5 m width and 2 m of diameter can be constructed using mainly locally available material (Nuernbergk 2007). The foundation needs to be handled with special caution as it was not possible to further examine the underground conditions. Flood protection forms the most important challenge as an open water wheel is very prone to floating refuse. Therefore, the wheel will be installed in a protected

Fig. 3 Plot of the water wheel layout

Page 10 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

recess with a separately controllable channel inlet. The powerhouse will be placed on an elevated position and driven by a V-belt (see Fig. 3). Conventional Turbine The second installation option uses a conventional water turbine with penstock. Best choices are constant pressure turbines like Pelton or crossflow. The latter are especially beneficial with unknown discharge changes and unknown water quality conditions. They possess a sturdy design and low maintenance effort in combination with flexible operation. The considered site is located at the small river Río Yangunts close to the village center. With a penstock length of approx. 600 m a head of 82 m can be used. The water discharge of around 25 l/s would result in 10–13 kW of electrical power. According to the residents, the water yield is a little fluctuating but constantly available. The penstock alignment is best done along the brook – also in order to avoid air entrapments. The natural water reservoir with a volume of approx. 20 m3 can easily be used as inlet structure. Due to logistic but also economic reasons, a PVC penstock is the preferred option. The use of a pipe with 0.125 m diameter – as it is available in Ecuador – will result in a usable net head of Hn ¼ 58.3 m and therefore 11 kW of electrical output. The maximum pressure according to hydraulic hammer calculations (Joukowsky equation) is pmax ¼ 15.3 bar (Giesecke and Mosonyi 2009). Electrical Installation For both installation options, the electricity is distributed through an island grid. For economic reasons as well as the lower freight weight, an asynchronous generator is recommended – even though it has a higher control demand (Williams and Simpson 2009). Basically the produced electrical energy needs to be stored and buffered in batteries.

Outlook

The choice between the suggested options will finally be done by the community of Yuwientsa – also with regard to financing options. Therefore, the results of this study were translated to Spanish and handed over to the village elders. It forms the basis for financial aid requests. Costs are approximated at 30,000 € for the water wheel option and around 50,000 € for the conventional turbine layout (not including labor). The central concern of the project was and still is knowledge exchange. This is accompanied by the training of hydropower specialists. Close cooperation during the whole stay, permanent consultation, and inclusion of the indígenas made a vivid exchange of experience and knowledge possible for both sites. This formed the foundation of a better understanding of the other’s lives (Fig. 4).

Fig. 4 Indigenous hydropower specialist Tibi with water wheel model (left) and in operation (right) Page 11 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Conclusion Climate change happens. A mean temperature rise of 2
C is said to be severe but somehow controllable. So if mankind succeeds to limit warming to acceptable temperatures, still any effort has to be taken to adapt to the changing conditions. Any effort means to integrally collaborate worldwide. Here, a fairly minor approach has been presented. From the reflections that (a) water is global warming’s central element, (b) the poorest will be hit hardest, and (c) higher education is the basis of development, an integrated concept of hydraulic knowledge exchange with emerging and developing countries has been elaborated. The importance of the bond between research and higher education – the von Humboldt ideal – has been noticed, and a teaching concept from descriptive fundamental hydraulics to state-of-the-art open-source research and application software for the hydrodynamic determination of flood risk areas has been illustrated. Finally, the electrification of a village and a rainforest academy in Ecuador using hydropower has been shown. With UNESCO’s support the living quality of the indigenous people is improved by satisfying their basic needs and offering higher education; they abstain from moving to cities and protecting their precious land from international timber and mineral oil enterprises. Unfortunately, the hydropower project was only realized in a much smaller scale.

References Ball P (2001) Biographie des Wassers. Piper, Munich Beffa C (1994) Praktische Lösung der tiefengemittelten Flachwassergleichungen. ETH Z€ urich, Z€urich Blasing TJ (2013) Carbon dioxide information analysis center; recent greenhouse gas concentrations. http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/current_ghg.html. Accessed 26 May 2013 German Federal Institute of Hydrology (2013) Global runoff data center. http://www.bafg.de/ GRDC/EN/Home/homepage_node.html. Accessed 9 May 2013 Giesecke J, Mosonyi E (2009) Wasserkraftanlagen, vol 5. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg Hare B (2005) Global mean temperature and impacts. In: UK Met Office conference: avoiding dangerous climate change, Exeter IPCC (2007) Fourth assessment report – working group 1; report on physical science. Intergovernmental panel on climate change Jud M, Schäffler U, Bierhance D, Schilcher M, Schwertfirm F, Rapp C (2011) Coupling of ArcGIS with a CFD-based hydrodynamic model. ESRI International User Conference, San Diego Kamkwamba W, Mealer B (2009) The boy who harnessed the wind. HarperCollins, New York KLIWA (2012) Klimawandel im S€ uden Deutschlands Ausmaß–Auswirkungen–Anpassung, Landesanstalt f€ ur Umwelt, Messungen und Naturschutz Baden-W€ urttemberg, Karlsruhe Leggett J (2005) Dangerous fiction, review of michael Crichton’s state of fear. New Sci 2489:50 Motzet K (2003) Bestimmung des Extremabflusses € uber Inverse Numerische Simulation. Forum Hydrol Wasserbewirtsch Fachgemeinschaft ATV-DVWK 4:111–114 Nemani R et al (2003) Climate-driven increases in global terrestrial net primary production from 1982 to 1999. Science 300:1560–1563 NOAA (2007) NOAA celebrates 200 years of science, service and stewardship, top 10: breakthroughs: warming of the world ocean. http://celebrating200years.noaa.gov/. Accessed 24 May 2013 Page 12 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Nuernbergk DM (2007) Wasserräder mit Freihang: Entwurfs- und Berechnungsgrundlagen. Moritz Schäfer GmbH & Co. KG, Detmold PICIRCA (2012) Turn down the heat. Why a 4
C warmer world must be avoided. A report for the world bank. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics Pleticha H (1995) Weltgeschichte – Morgen der Menschheit – Vorgeschichte und fr€uhe Hochkulturen. Bertelsmann, Bielefeld Rahmstorf S, Schellnhuber HJ (2007) Der Klimawandel, vol 6. C.H. Beck, Munich Rapp C (2012) Forschung und Lehre im Hydromechanik-Labor der Technischen Universität M€ unchen. 2. € uberarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. Vol. Mitteilungen. Fachgebiet Hydromechanik, TUM, M€ unchen Rapp C, Zeiselmair A, Lando E, Moungnutou M (2012) Knowledge exchange and application of hydro power in developing countries. In: International conference on technology transfer and renewable energies, Small Developing Island Renewable Energy Knowledge and Technology Transfer Network, Mauritius Roedel W (2000) Physik unserer Umwelt: Die Atmosphäre, vol 3. Springer, Berlin Schabbach T, Wesselak V (2012) Energie: Die Zukunft Wird Erneuerbar. Springer Vieweg, Berlin Schäffler U, Jud M, Bierhance D, Schilcher M, Schwertfirm F, Rapp C (2011) Gis-gest€ utztes Preprocessing zur Generierung der Inputdatensätze f€ ur ein Computational Fluid Dynamicsbasiertes hydrodynamisches Modell. In: DWA-Tagung Kassel: GIS und GDI in der Wasserwirtschaft. DWA, Kassel Sloss L (1992) Nitrogen oxides control technology fact book. Noyes Data Corporation, Park Ridge UN, Centre for Good Governance (2006) A comprehensive guide for social impact assessment. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cgg/unpan026197.pdf. Accessed 12 June 2013 United Nations (2013) UN millennium goals. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. Accessed 19 June 2013 Wicke L, interview by Markus Schulte von Drach (2013) Die nachfolgenden Generationen werden uns Klimaforscher verfluchen, S€ uddeutsche Zeitung, M€ unchen. Accessed 9 May 2013 Williams A, Simpson R (2009) Pico hydro – reducing technical risks for rural electrification. Renew Energy 34:1986–1991

Page 13 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_15-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Index Terms: Descriptive education concept 5 Flood prediction 5 Hands on projects 8 International knowledge exchange 4 Small decentral renewable electricity supply 8 Water 2, 4

Page 14 of 14

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Climate Change Adaptation Through Grassroots Responses: Learning from the “Aila” Affected Coastal Settlement of Gabura, Bangladesh A. F. M. Ashraful Alam*, Rumana Asad and Afroza Parvin Khulna University, Khulna, Bangladesh

Abstract The southwestern coastal region of Bangladesh has faced thirty large- and moderate-scale natural disasters since the last two decades. Aila, the extreme disaster event, has unveiled major shortfall in the approach of conventional disaster preparedness. Gap between planned intervention and the way coastal inhabitants respond to climatic exposures has widened due to lack of understanding of the grassroots risk perception and effectiveness of associated responses from them. The research examines locally adopted measures taken for disaster risk mitigation in the coastal settlements of Gabura, Bangladesh, and recommends future directions for climate change adaptation. As grassroots responses, firstly, the age-old spontaneous coping mechanisms of the individual households with particular emphasis on their baseline vulnerability were explored. Secondly, the nonphysical and physical responses before, during, and after disaster were categorized. Finally, with a strength and weakness matrix, the effectiveness and limitations of grassroots responses related to typical exposures and extremes were pinpointed. The study concludes that grassroots responses are mostly effective as adaptive measures during typical hazards; however, they have limitations in extreme events. Most importantly, adequate recognition of grassroots responses will not only inform better adaptation but also contribute to broader regional development planning and climate change policy context.

Keywords Climate change adaptation; Grassroots responses; Baseline vulnerability; Coastal settlements

Introduction Bangladesh is globally considered one of the most vulnerable countries to sea level rise.1 This is obvious for its very low elevation geographical setting with a flat deltaic topography exposed to extreme climate variability. The coastal settlements comprise 32 % of the country’s total area.2 Nearly seven million households are exposed to frequent storm surge and cyclones.3 According to *Email: [email protected] *Email: [email protected] 1 World Bank (2010, 2013) recognizes Bangladesh the third most vulnerable country to sea level rise and it will be worsening with an expected 2  C rise in the world’s average temperature in the next decades. 2 The coastal settlements cover an area of 47,211 km2. 3 Coastal settlements in Bangladesh receive 40 % of the impact of total storm surges in the world (Dasgupta et al. 2010). Page 1 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

(Parry et al. 2007), with a one meter sea level rise, about 20 % of the country will be not only inundated with saline water but also the poor and marginal groups will be critically affected (Rahman et al. 2007). Apart from the anticipations concerning climate change, the region remains vulnerable due to large population size, low economic strength, inadequate infrastructure, and chronic inefficiency with institutional capacity (MoEF 2005, 2009 World Bank 2010). Post-disaster experience4 in recent years unveiled shortfalls in the approach of government-led disaster preparedness. NAPA (MoEF 2005) and BCCSAP (MoEF 2009) have been criticized as top-down and unable to recognize the role of community in the process. Gap between the conventionally advocated adaptation strategies and the way coastal grassroots respond to hazard consequences has widened due to inadequate knowledge of associated risks and vulnerability. To date, attempts to recognize the role of grassroots responses in climate change adaptation of coastal settlements are scanty and, therefore, could not be effectively included in government’s policy responses, except Parvin and Cassidy (2012), who recently examined the role of indigenous knowledge towards resilient coastal settlement planning. This chapter investigates in Gabura, one of the most disaster-prone settlements in the southwestern coastal region of Bangladesh that was hit by the deadly cyclone “Aila” in 2009. The research explores the individuals’ survival responses inherent in grassroots lifestyle before, during, and after disaster. Underpinned with an analytical framework for vulnerability, grassroots responses, and adaptation, it examines the effectiveness of individuals’ responses during typical and extreme hazard events. Finally, insights on how to mainstream grassroots responses into the process of climate change adaptation have been given.

Analytical Framework for Vulnerability, Grassroots Responses, and Adaptation During exposure to a given hazard, individual responds in various degrees. Based on the severity of disaster, the effectiveness of responses is quantified. As the human being’s responses to a hazard are based on his social, political, and economic conditions, there is an increasing recognition that disasters including the components of vulnerability, adaptation, and resilience are socially constructed (Cannon and M€ uller-Mahn 2010). To understand the effectiveness of grassroots responses in the coastal settlements of Gabura, which is the aim of this chapter, an analytical framework has been proposed. The framework defines baseline vulnerability of the coastal grassroots instigating responses.

Climatic and Non-climatic Vulnerability of the Coastal Settlement The coastal settlements of Bangladesh are witnessing a number of climatic impacts, i.e., frequent flood, erosion of the coastline, rising water tables, long-term inundation, saltwater intrusion, and other biophysical effects.5 These are proxy for social vulnerability in sectors concerning water resources, agriculture, human health, fisheries, tourism, and above all the human settlements of the Category-1 cyclone “Sidr” in 2007 and “Aila” in 2009 In Bangladesh, the floodplains of the lower Ganges and the Surma basins became exceedingly vulnerable (Alam et al. 1999). Elevated riverbeds due to continued sedimentation induced backwater effect, which eventually increased both the frequency and severity of floods (Huq et al. 1996). Increased magnitude of cyclonic storm surges inundated the coastal unprotected lands with saline water (Islam et al. 1998). The forest ecosystem of the resourceful Sundarbans has been disturbed by floods in monsoon and moisture stress in winter (Ahmed et al. 1999). 4 5

Page 2 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

coast itself (Klein and Nicholls 1999). On top of the anticipated and observed climate changeinduced risks, the settlements face high level of threats caused by various non-climatic factors. The coastal grassroots suffer from unequal distribution of resources and welfare incentives compared to those in the rest of the country. Even the existing institutional structures are not favorable to ease the hardship of people through providing minimum level of support, which translates into accelerated economic difficulties and social deprivation. Interestingly, the coastal settlements contain twofold characteristics in themselves, because, at one hand, they possess visible disparities triggered by the formal institutional channel coupled with climatic impacts and, all at once, are affluent in natural resources and biodiversity to offer varying livelihood opportunities, which assist people to adapt and retain there for centuries. Scholars claim that deprivation of resources induces non-climatic vulnerability to individuals and societies in the form of poverty and marginalization (Adger and Kelly 1999; Hewitt 1983, 1997; Watts and Bohle 1993). These may refer to economic resources, technology, information, skills, infrastructure, institutions, and equity. They are often termed “generic determinants” of adaptive capacity of the social system (Brooks et al. 2005, p. 153), often specified by the political economy of the context that determine the sensitivity of the system to climate change. They constrain endogenous factors (i.e., the characteristics and behavior of the community) of coping responses (Cannon 1994). In this sense, vulnerability of the grassroots in coastal settlements is likely to have climatic and non-climatic differentiations and they are mutually inclusive. Irrespective of hazard circumstances, individual’s accessibility and reliance on resources determine the first layer of vulnerability. In fact, the degree of accessibility determines the baseline status of the individual.

Baseline Vulnerability

The most widely accepted meaning of vulnerability has been defined as the “susceptibility of exposure to harmful stresses” and “the ability to respond” to those stresses (Adger 2006; Adger et al. 2007; Bohle et al. 1994; Kelman and Lewis 2005; Lewis 1999). Vulnerability, according to the IPCC definition (Houghton et al. 2001; McCarthy et al. 2001), includes “exposure” of a system as an external dimension to climate variations (Few 2003), as well as an internal dimension of its “sensitivity” and its “adaptive capacity.” The two sets of definitions have some commonality within them – where “susceptibility” counterparts “sensitivity” of the later definition and “the ability to respond” resembles to the “adaptive capacity.” It is to be noted that sensitivity is reliant on the baseline characteristics (climatic and non-climatic) induced by the whole (natural and social) system as discussed in the preceding segment, whereas adaptive capacity links more to the individual’s willingness, understanding of priorities, and ability to perform in the system. As exposure and climatic variability vary across contexts, vulnerability has geographical dimension (Lewis and Kelman 2010) and links to specific hazards and the likely exposure to hazard impacts (Brooks et al. 2005). A settlement having shelters made of permanent materials may not be that much susceptible to windstorm compared to those with temporary structures. Along this line, Lewis (1999) and Wisner et al. (2004) suggested that any kind of vulnerability assessment would focus on the susceptibility of concerned variables that characterize the well-being of people and, in other words, the root causes of sensitivity to a specific disaster and setting. While the social interpretations of disaster are not new (Burton 1993; O’Keefe et al. 1976), whatever their cause, their effects are perpetually rooted in societal processes that render certain groups or individuals particularly vulnerable to the impacts (Wisner et al. 2004) and over time (Uitto 1998). However, the term vulnerability has become highly contested due to lack of precision (Cannon 2008b). It is often confused with poverty, marginalization, or any other conceptualizations that recognize sections of the disadvantaged population (Wisner et al. 2004). In order to comprehend Page 3 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

vulnerability, it is clearly not adequate to understand only the types of hazards and the natural system themselves, but the hazard impacts on groups of people who are at different level of preparedness with varying capacities to recover. Therefore, the research employed a simple working definition from Wisner et al. (2004, p. 11), where vulnerability was meant as the “characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard.” The definition implies that in order to understand the grassroots responses, it is important to identify the characteristics and condition of individuals in the community. Cannon demonstrated conditions of social vulnerability as root causes of an individual that include one’s initial well-being, livelihood and resilience, self-protection, social protection, and social and political networks including institutions (Cannon 2008a; Cannon et al. 2003). Others identify factors that hinder capacity of individuals as economic imbalances, disparity in power and knowledge among social groups, and inequality in welfare and social protection (Adger and Kelly 1999; Blaikie et al. 1994; Dow 1992). However, individuals’ vulnerabilities change over time through changes in one’s institutional and economic position (direct) and condition of shelter, food, and health (indirect); and these changes are affected by environmental changes (Adger 1999). In the present research, they have been termed as baseline parameters of vulnerability. Together they determine individual’s instinct, relying on which one starts to respond to a given disaster event either normal or extreme. These parameters have been further illustrated as livelihood, food and health, education, kinship, and shelter as being considered the basic survival tectonics for an individual to constitute his/her household. Among the five parameters, livelihood (diversity of jobs, income and savings, assets), education (access to knowledge), and kinship (at neighborhood level, family and community) are independent although some may defy that livelihood and education depend on each other. It is true that certain livelihood opportunities are quasi-independent due to educational qualification remains as prerequisite to access them. However, in an underdeveloped and natural resource-based setting, livelihood opportunities are naturally in place. The component of access to education may not only rely on income than willingness and awareness to be literate based on the level of subsidy from government, whereas livelihood opportunity is central to establish individual’s command over economic performances and resources to satisfy fundamental needs. Security of food and health (sources and supply of basic nutrients including safe drinking water) and decision of shelter (settlement, built environment, build form, natural resources/vegetation) are dependent variables as they are highly relied on individual’s income, educational attainment, and network of kinship. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the parameters of baseline vulnerability do not necessarily constitute resilience, but determine the capacity to some extent to adapt to climate change scenarios. An important point also to be noted is that the main difference between baseline vulnerability and vulnerability definition is therefore the first one is a more intimate assessment of individual’s ability than the society as a whole. Therefore, the parameters remain as the first-stage manual to assist individual households to analyze risk and prioritize allocation of resources to reduce immediate vulnerability arising from the household core.

Grassroots Responses in Climate Change Adaptation Process Recognition of grassroots responses, the aim of this research, requires a clear understanding of the grassroots first. The verbatim “grassroots” encompasses the common and ordinary people at a local level rather than at the center of any major political affiliation or social organizations. Grassroots responses in this chapter limit themselves to those simple individual household-level coping strategies in face of continuing hazard exposures and are not subject to any planned intervention Page 4 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

except from the grassroots community itself. Obviously, the grassroots coping strategies are hereditary in nature and central to the assumption that “an event will follow a familiar pattern and that previous coping actions are a reasonable guide for similar events” (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 320). It is the “learning by doing” evolution which makes use of indigenous knowledge gained over centuries. The indigenous knowledge is constituted through gathering of social memory of past weather extremes (Harley 2003). Strauss and Orlove (2003) refer to such practices as use of “intuitive data” derived from individual perception of recent experience of weather guided by historical weather data. Since data are always context specific, grassroots responses are highly localized, generating community-wide ownership and commitment (Jabeen et al. 2010, p. 418). Parvin and Johnson (2012) identified that indigenous knowledge-based responses occur through stages of anticipation, coping, adaptation, and recovery. Based on their timing, grassroots responses can also be referred to craft passive (concurrent), reactive (responsive or ex post), and anticipatory (proactive or ex ante) (Fankhauser et al. 1999; Smit et al. 2000) “adjustments” (Brooks 2003; Carter 1996; Smit 1993; Stakhiv 1993; Watson et al. 1996), in response to the expected or real-time climatic consequences. Such adjustments take place in the social, economic, and ecological spheres (Smit et al. 2000). According to Cannon (2008b), people, when faced with crisis, would behave “culturally” to respond in ways so unique that sometimes they seem to be quite irrational from outside. However, by virtue of the very notion of culture as unique to a system, grassroots responses as processes of cultural adjustments are spontaneous; hence, the grassroots own full autonomy on their actions (Carter et al. 1994). As Smithers and Smit (1997) claim that spontaneous adaptation is the activity of an individual, his decision making of autonomous responses is embedded in social processes that reflect the relationship with other individuals, his networks, capabilities, and social capital where unmanaged natural systems often are hotbed to stimulate them.

The Analytical Framework To develop the analytical framework of this chapter, vulnerability has been scaled down to baseline vulnerability. Exposure is the key stimulus against which vulnerability can be traced. Scale of analysis is highly important to understand the layers of changes in the vulnerability condition against a given exposure. When exposed to a hazard, individual responds selectively according to the level of basic vulnerability one withstands and sets the priority areas of response. The ability of one to control the parameters that determine vulnerability might be translated into one’s capacity to adapt. As for a fisherman, his livelihood depends on the workable condition of a fishing boat. Therefore, during disaster securing the boat is his first priority than saving his own life. It is the spontaneous responses of that particular individual the framework of this present research identifies as “grassroots.” In contrast, a poor day laborer who lives in a comparatively unsafe shelter in a risky location and has nothing much to lose materially would migrate to a safer place at the first instance leaving everything behind. Although the fisherman is wealthier than the poor day laborer in terms of their respective asset share, the first one is more vulnerable according to the differences in the priorities. In these sense, the scope of this analytical framework has tended to consider baseline vulnerability of individuals as the most important aspect to examine the effectiveness of grassroots responses. Figure 1 shows the range of climate variability and on the eve of exposure how sensitivity of the individual is determined based on his access to resources. Priorities of responses are set depending on the baseline vulnerability. The individual then starts to respond in the adaptation process through bringing changes to the physical and nonphysical attributes of vulnerability parameters. This is the boundary of autonomous adaptation as long as there is no external intervention involved (such as planned government intervention). The baseline condition and associated responses together constitute residual impact towards the next layer of vulnerability. This is the point where planned Page 5 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Fig. 1 Analytical framework for vulnerability, adaptation, and grassroots responses

adaptation starts to operate and determines total vulnerability of the system to climate change. It further trickles back and suggests change of state to the sensitivity of individual. Future alteration in planned intervention also takes place based on the changed situation.

Climate Change Adaptation and Grassroots Responses: The Case of Gabura Profile of Gabura Gabura6 is in the eastern part of Shyamnagar Upazila in Satkhira district of Khulna division in Bangladesh. It is a small island, bounded by Kholpetua and Kopotakhsa rivers, which are subject to year-round strong wind and tidal interactions. It was once part of the Sundarbans.7 More than a century ago, people cleared this part of the forest for shelter and livelihood opportunities. However, in recent period, excessive reliance on forests is being controlled by restrictions to protect loss of biodiversity.8 Recently, during the aftermath of extreme disaster, significant portion of inhabitants was forced to retreat from their hereditary occupations of agriculture. At present, 80 % of the economically active population is involved in fishing or activities related to marketing and processing of fish. Most inhabitants, particularly the fishermen, now live along the embankment9 and on the highlands near the water interface, while farmers live in the middle part.

6

Gabura union covers an area of 10,195 acres, with an estimated population of more than 31,115. Most inhabitants (about 96 %) are Muslim. The male–female ratio is 49:51 and literacy rate of this region is 35.9 %. The union consists of 9 wards and 15 villages. 75 % people are involved in fisheries and 20 % rely on crop farming. The rest lives on occupations like industrial labors, rickshaw, and boat puller. The average income is 4000 BDT (BBS 2012). 7 Sundarbans, the largest mangrove forest in the world, was declared UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1999. 8 The forest department introduced a “pass” system to restrict the abuse of forest resources. 9 In early 1960 the then East Pakistan Power and Water Development Authority (after independence it is named WAPDA) surrounded the coastal cropland with embankment to protect it from saline water flooding. Apparently, it ensured good cropping in the coastal area, however, from the ecosystem perspective; it has badly altered the natural water–coast interaction, barring the natural siltation process. Consequently the area has gone lower than the sea level and has become subject to water logging and saline water intrusion (Parvin and Johnson 2012). Page 6 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

The way people of Gabura perceive disaster is unique. They are used to typical climate-induced hazards of heat, storm, cyclone, heavy rainfall, and flood. Disaster is part of their daily life as normal as seasonal variation. They are skilled to predict the timing and type of disaster by applying indigenous techniques of observing the weather condition. According to the inhabitants, Gabura is relatively protected, firstly, by the vast natural barrier of the Sundarbans and, secondly, by the embankment. However, “Aila” was the most sudden catastrophe of an unprecedented scale. Within less than an hour, the tidal waves leaped up as high as it could overflow the embankment and rolled into inland washing out every man-made and natural element along its path.10 Seawater, once entered the inland, could not return to the river and retained for 3 months. The whole island went “green to gray.” In addition to physical impacts, vulnerability increased through disrupted livelihoods, long-term displacement of people from their homesteads, and increased health risks due to shortage of drinking water and food supply. Schools remained closed for as long as 2 years. Although the massive momentary shock of Aila had exhausted every possible means to cope with the event at that time, significance of the grassroots responses started to show its upshot at a more profound pace during the 4 years’ recovery stage.

Study Approach and Methodology of Field Investigation An interpretive analysis was done to explain the everyday life in Gabura in relation to climate variability. Qualitative survey was conducted in depth among 20 households to identify their demographic characteristics and perception of hazards, risks, and responses to disaster. Family history of households and their tenure of association with Gabura were critical for selection of interviewees. Afterwards, the unique grassroots responses attributed to their baseline vulnerability were explored through semi-structured interviews. Sample households were selected based on their dwelling location and occupation. Ten households were fishermen with few having business stakes relating to fish marketing and processing, eight were involved in multiple jobs as available and suitable across different season, and the rest two were farmers. Except the fact that the farmers only lived in the middle part of the island, where farmlands got sizeable recovery during last 4 years after Aila, the rest lived in clusters within proximity of the water edge along the peripheral high embankment. Households with firsthand experience in Aila incident were only included in the sample. In addition, physical features of homesteads including landscape elements, organization, and distribution of homesteads were observed carefully. It helped to understand the spatial manifestation of grassroots responses. Focus group discussion was conducted primarily to unveil the history of community in general and the nature of collective responses. Moreover, cross-checking the authenticity of the household interviews was a secondary concern. Based on the analytical framework, grassroots responses were analyzed in terms of physical and nonphysical key attributes. An effectiveness matrix of grassroots responses was built to understand the level of resilience.

Priority Setting for Grassroots Responses in the Adaptation Process

Neither the buzzword “climate change” nor the issue of “sea level rise” is familiar among the inhabitants of Gabura, except those who received formal education. Nevertheless, they were found highly sensitive to those climate-created stimuli, which would influence to identify their adaptation 10

According to Upazila Nirbahi office, Shyamnagar (local authority) around 41.11 km2 area of Gabura union was undulated where 4324.97 ha of shrimp land was destroyed, 12,280 households were destroyed, 28 people were dead, 467 people were injured, and more than 30,034 people were affected. More than 3,000 people took shelter in nearby cyclone center and 13,000 people on embankments (Kumar et al. 2010). Page 7 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 1 Perceived climate change impacts by households in Gabura Climate change stimulus Climate variability Sea level rise Untimely rainfall Less rainfall Less seasonal variation Frequent cyclone

Increased heat Cold wave during summer nights Annual flooding

Disaster impact Disturbed cropping pattern Disturbed fish farming Scarcity of natural fish in rivers and canals Loss of working days Temporary interruption of communication Temporary interruption of schooling Heat stress Chronic fever Pneumonia to children Short-term displacement Medium-term interruption of schooling Damage to homestead

Heavy rainfall for short time period Storm surge that crossed over Medium- and long-term the embankment displacement Prolonged water logging Damage to household assets Damage to water supply system Scarcity of food and drinking water Increased waterborne diseases Damage to livelihood assets Damage to fish ponds Long-term interruption of schooling Increased salinity of soil and water Scarcity of drinking water Salt in air during summer

Effects Loss of livelihood Insecurity of food

Level of perceived risk Medium

Loss of livelihood Interrupted education

Low

Deterioration of health

Low

Loss of kinship Interrupted education

Medium

Loss of life

High

Loss of farmland Loss of traditional and other livelihood

Insecurity of food and water Interrupted education Loss of kinship Loss of shelter Deterioration of health

Source: Field Survey, 2013

responses. However, responses vary not only for climatic stimuli but also for the non-climatic conditions (Smit et al. 2000, p. 235). Together they determine the sensitivity of the social system and assist in setting priority towards adjustments. Table 1 depicts a relationship among climate variability, disaster, their impacts, and perception of risk by the grassroots. Most respondents feel that after the year 2000, nature has been extreme and frequency of disaster intensified. They recognized changes in seasonal variations including increased heat, cold wave in summer nights, untimely rainfall, or no rain however, they impose low to moderate risk on livelihood, food, and health status. There has been increased frequency of cyclones during monsoon, Page 8 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

however, they impose low risk on the livelihood and education sectors and cause minor damage to shelter. Typical annual flooding causes short-term displacement and sometimes interruption in education. Increased water logging condition due to heavy rainfall and storm surge including saline retention in the subsoil pose high risk and destabilize most of the baseline vulnerability parameters. These are caused by extreme climatic hazards and eventually they push grassroots responses to the thresholds of limit.

Grassroots Responses Before, During, and After the Disaster Given the fact that Gabura is incessantly exposed to different degree of climatic hazards, grassroots responses are the inbuilt elements of the daily life of the islanders. It is hard to differentiate from one another as they are overlapping. The interview unveiled the nonphysical and physical grassroots responses before, during, and after disaster that have been categorized in Tables 2 and 3. Aila is the major disaster event in recent years. Therefore, responses after Aila have been considered ex post responses. The key findings are as follows: Before Disaster Historically, the geographical setting of Gabura has provided spontaneous choices of cropping, fishing, and other livelihood opportunities. While the fishermen have inherited unique time-bound fishing techniques11 from the river system of the Sundarbans, farmers held intimate knowledge of soil, water, and seeds that are resistant to flood and saline water. It is the harsh reality that, throughout the year, all have to maintain rationing of drinking water through rainwater harvesting system. The bountiful forest and water system has ensured supply of high-carbohydrate and high-protein daily food.12 Previous experiences have taught them to store dry food, matchbox, cooker, and cooking fuel (enough for couple of days) on a relatively higher place – a preparedness strategy based on anticipation. They usually maintain extended family networks inside and outside of village through marriage and kinship to secure assistance (usually in monetary form with unconditional loan) during disaster. Timing of schools is scheduled based on the changing time of high tide and low tide. Children take plastic bags to carry books for protection from unwanted rain. They chose higher land for homesteads along the embankment or internal high-water edges in proximity to their working place. Plantation of mangrove trees13 along the embankment as well as the periphery of homesteads helps to withstand soil erosion, gusty wind, and wave. Supply of food, fuel, and building materials comes as by-product. Families within blood relation build house around courtyard and share services (e.g., toilet, vegetable gardens, and animal rearing spaces) except cooking. Houses are built on raised earthen plinth.14 Height of the plinth is determined based on previous mean level of flooding observed. Mud for the plinth is collected through excavating ponds. These ponds are used to retain rainwater15 for cooking and fish culture. False ceiling with local materials is used to store valuables and insulation from heat. To protect the roof from hauling, they tie bamboo frame or net on the roof and maintain the roof slope less than 40 . Anticipating storm, they tie the roof with nearby trees or ground with strong rope, so that it may not waft away. They follow a cycle of three “Gone”– “Omabossha,” “Purnima,” and “Bosa” – according to the behavioral pattern of fishes with tidal variation. 12 The Sundarbans and its streams are source of honey, fruits, edible shoots of trees, fishes, and crabs. 13 “Keora,” “Goran,” “Golpata,” “Geoa,” “Sundari,” Coconut, Tal, etc. 14 Locally called “vita” 15 Salinity of pond water reduces if the ponds can be retained for at least two seasons, as the salt sediments. The rainwater also helps to reduce the salt content. Water with reduced saline in this way is called “Dudh–Pani” (milk–water). 11

Page 9 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 2 Nonphysical responses of the grassroots in Gabura Island Attributes of responses Ex ante (before) Concurrent (during) Livelihood Majority involved in crop farming Occupation sectors, i.e., farming, and fishing, few in fish farming fishing, boat-pulling practices are disrupted a Time-bound fishing strategies based on the lunar calendar Cropping pattern based on the quality and classification of soil

Ex post (after) Adoption of alternative sources of income gets priority during recovery stage Fishing from the river becomes predominant occupation Male members from poorest families travel to nearby towns for jobs Forced to enter into the Sundarbans and narrow canals for collection of honey, wood, and fishes Food and Sufficient consumption of locally Less consumption as norms Less consumption as norms Health available foods with high impeded by food shortage impeded by food shortage during carbohydrate and protein on daily Consumption of wild fruits (i.e., recovery stage basis across all classes Keora) and seeds from the Sundarbans during extreme events Education Setting up school hours according Receipt of education disrupted An increased number of children to the timing of high tide and low receive education with the belief tide that they may change family hardship in the future through jobs in government sector Kinship Extended family structure for Immediate assistance comes from Financial assistance from relatives shared assistance family members and neighbors living in town in the reconstruction within village level during phase Safeguarding strong kinship disaster networks within the same community Female children of the family receive early marriage and usually sent out of the island as long-term strategy of extending kinship beyond Gabura Increased interest in saving money Shelter Few literate people save money for Immediate response during for shelter repairing and shelter extreme condition includes securing educational certificates, construction legal documents of land ownership than the physical shelter itself Source: Field Survey, 2013 Locally called “Gone”

a

Page 10 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 3 Physical responses of the grassroots in Gabura Island Attributes of responses Livelihood

Ex ante (before) Selection of agricultural land in relatively higher part of island Shrimp farming in the lower part Narrow canals to control saline water for fish farming Food and Health Storage of dry food, matchbox, cooker, cooking fuel in relatively higher place Rainwater harvesting through use of plastic sheet on roof surface to collect water and preservation in clay pots Homestead ponds for sweet water fish culture and water with reduced saline contenta for cooking Education Use of plastic shopping bag to protect dry clothes and books during extreme weather Kinship

Shelter

Concurrent (during) Relocating livelihood assets (i.e., poultry, livestock, fish net, boat) in higher place near roadside/ embankment or temporary elevated structure or even on the rooftop

Ex post (after) Increased engagement in shrimp farming due to salinity intrusion during Aila

Clay pots sealed to secure drinking water during storm surge Temporary latrine on stilt above water closed to embankment

Underground storage of foods, matchbox, cooker, cooking fuel after experience from Aila Increased protection measures for homestead ponds

Temporary cooking facilities on Homestead/kitchen garden as top of bed or any higher place source of vegetable for daily available consumption

Primary schools and mosques used for cyclone shelters during disaster Use of temporary boats either made of banana tree or large cooking pots to maintain connection with relatives and rescue effort Appropriate mix of mangrove Children moved to elevated Compact and organic plants to withstand soil erosion structure or even on the rooftop distribution of homesteads in river banks during the four years’ recovery phase after Aila Raised earthen mound for Construction of makeshift Selection of high land to build plinth of house or use of stilt shelter along the roadside and shelter along both sides of the embankment embankment Use of locally available Bracings made with chords and Homestead forest in the materials for construction of bamboo to avoid upward hauling periphery to protect from gusty shelter of the roof during cyclone wind and source of wood for shelter repair/construction Construction of smaller false Increased height of the plinth ceiling for storage and shelter based on the flooding experience in Aila Roof slope less than 40 , use of Roofing material changed from bamboo frame bracing and thatched roof to CI sheet and preferably asbestos fishing net on roof surface to protect from gusty wind Annual maintenance of weaker parts of built structure

Source: Field Survey, 2013 Water with reduced saline content is locally called “Dudh-Pani.” The literal translation in English should be “milk–water” a

Page 11 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

During Disaster During disaster, the most preferable option is to stay at homestead as long as possible. During regular flooding and storm surge, people keep on waiting in the house observing how high the water gets in and build elevated structures16 for storing foods, valuables, and livestock. The flood hinders livelihood activity and they pass lazy time on furniture above flood level, and use moveable cooker for food preparation. Children move to a higher place, such as on false ceiling and sometimes even on rooftop. During long-standing inundation, people move to makeshift shelters on embankments or nearby cyclone shelter, usually schools. However, such makeshift shelters are inadequate in numbers. Temporary shelter consists of one single room to accommodate the whole family. Shortage of food supply leads to consumption of wild fruits and seeds. Immediate assistance comes from family members and neighbors within village level during disaster. Handmade boats17 or large water pots as substitute of boats are used for communication. Interestingly, both the higher- and lowerincome population travel to nearby city centers for social safety by choice and livelihood by need, respectively. It is hard for the middle class to opt for migration. Neither the job opportunity in cities suits their class, nor can they risk on their last piece of land to be illegally grabbed. After “Aila” By nature, the people of Gabura did not learn to save money for the future; rather, they followed a day-to-day livelihood path. Therefore, during recovery stage after a major disaster like Aila, search for alternative sources of income gets priority as the regular job options are disturbed. As farmland goes under long-term inundation, fishing from rivers becomes a predominant response. Shift to large-scale shrimp farming was limited to powerful elites as it was never a labor-intensive sector. Consequently, some male members from poorer families migrated to town centers for jobs. Many (including females) were forced to enter into the Sundarbans to collect honey, wood, and fishes. Less consumption was established as norms impeded by food shortage after Aila. Nevertheless, during the 4 years’ recovery period after Aila, the grayed landscape is showing signs to get greener. Homestead level ponds, vegetable gardens, and forests are being reinstated with cautions (increased plinth level, high trees in the windward direction of homestead, raised embankment for the pond to withstand flood, roofing materials changed from CI sheet to asbestos, etc.) that are learned from Aila experience. The number of children receiving education has increased with the belief that they may change family hardship in the future through better jobs. Financial assistance in the form of unconditional loan from relatives living in town has contributed immensely in the reconstruction phase. However, it is limited to the well-off families only. Increasing awareness to save money for future survival responses is evident. More dense and organic distribution of homesteads is taking place along the embankment. Briefly, with many creative interventions, grassroots responses are being evident as ex post measures after Aila. However, confusion remains among them, whether these adaptations, although improved from the past, would withstand a next disaster as extreme as Aila.

Effectiveness of Grassroots Responses Analysis of grassroots responses in relation to the effects of disaster reveals their effectiveness, which has been presented in Table 4. The evaluation in terms of strengths and weaknesses suggests that most responses are quite effective in relation to the typical hazard condition including minor weaknesses. However, the analysis also reveals that some of the grassroots responses did not 16 17

Locally termed “Matcha” Locally called “Vela,” made of bamboo or banana trunk Page 12 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 4 Effectiveness of grassroots responses Typical hazard Grassroots responses Strength Nonphysical responses Adoption of new livelihood strategies Multiple livelihood options and income opportunities Adaptation to changed environment Male–female equal participation Increased interest in receiving New job opportunity education Increased self-dependency and awareness Increased tendency of savings Indigenous knowledge-based Better adaptation with mother nature weather forecasting Productive cropping and fishing pattern Optimum utilization of time Better preparedness to fight with disaster Short-, medium-, and long-term Alternative skill for livelihood displacement New networks

High level of kinship and social capital

Physical response Life safety measures and protection of livelihood asset Increased dependency on natural resources from surroundings and the Sundarbans

Rainwater harvesting in homestead

Strong social ties irrespective of occupation, religion, ethnicity, or economic status Mutual trust Cooperating attitude High human value Initial preparedness for the recovery stage Alternative source of income Source of local and organic construction material Source of high-nutrient food supply Protection from cyclone and storm surge Source of potable water Source of basic nutrient from sweet water fishes Reduced salinity Contribution to the homestead morphology

Weakness

Extreme event

Loss of traditional occupation  New land use distribution detrimental to ecology Loss of labor force in traditional occupations Displacement





Displaced from the hereditary √ land Declination of community bondage Destruction of traditional lifestyle and settlement Increased social liabilities √

 Detrimental to natural biodiversity

○

Probability of waterborne health hazard

○

(continued)

Page 13 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 4 (continued) Grassroots responses Plantation in homesteads

Use of community infrastructure

Typical hazard Strength Reduced heat Source of food and fuel Source of building construction material Protection from gusty wind and storm surge and soil erosion Contribution to the homestead morphology Optimum use of homestead leftover space Adaptive reuse of embankment Safe shelter during disaster

Recycling and reuse of natural and man-made resources

Protection of shelter based on indigenous knowledge

Efficient use of resources Sustainable use of resource Cost efficiency in shelter reconstruction Preservation of traditional homestead and settlement morphology

Extreme event 

Weakness Damage to shelter due to fallen big branches of trees during storms

Deterioration in longevity of infrastructure Unhygienic physical environment due to adaptive reuse Depletion of resource due to repeated use

√

√



Source: Field Survey, 2013 √ effective, ○ effective with limitations,  failed with limited effectiveness

succeed during extreme event of Aila, which was too unpredictable in nature. During typical hazards, the indigenous knowledge base helps better adaptation through decisions to change cropping and fishing pattern and optimum utilization of time in different livelihood sectors. Usually, the natural weather indicators help better preparedness on the eve of any exposure. Yet during extreme event, it failed to anticipate the severity and timing of hazard. Field survey revealed that most interviewees could hardly perceive the extremity of “Aila.” Although the resourceful natural system has offered an array of livelihood opportunities, traditional occupations could not sustain the aftermath of the extreme event. The settlement has undergone a slow process of deterioration in ecology. Growing literacy among the inhabitants has been opening new avenues for livelihood and enhanced preparedness. In contrast, the traditional skills are diminishing and stimulating displacement to make way for the formal scientific knowledge. However, after extreme event like Aila, education system terminated as long as 2 years. Most interestingly, the nonphysical responses of migration and safeguarding kinship were powerful coping strategies during extremes. Among the physical responses, the typical life safety measures have been proven useful during both the normal and extreme hazard conditions. However, they lost their usefulness as the impact of “Aila” had lasted for a longer period. Even after extreme events, the natural system of the Sundarbans requires time to get back to its earlier state. Yet excessive dependency on the Sundarbans for livelihood and food supply is exhausting the natural setting. Cyclone shelters and schools, although very limited in number, play positive role through providing alternative shelter during all events including extremes. Physical responses like rainwater harvesting and homestead vegetable

Page 14 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

gardens are critical to meet requirement of safe drinking water, supply of nutrition, and other costsaving household income during and after disaster. They are highly vulnerable during extreme events as whichever falls in the direction of storm surge gets wiped out. Terminologies such as “community-based adaptation,” “participatory adaptation,” “climate change adaptation from below,” and even “grassroots responses” bear romanticism within them because of their inherent “people-centered” notion. There is a wider belief in theory and practice that grassroots can solve everything. However, in reality, during disasters in coastal settlements, grassroots remain handicapped due to limitation of adequate resources and institutional support. In extreme event, livelihood options and education system are severely disrupted. As it is an independent parameter of baseline vulnerability, the command on other dependent parameters like food, health, and shelter naturally are invalidated. During the aftershock of extreme events, even the bountiful resource base of the Sundarbans enters into a crisis state and fails to meet the demand side with its disrupted supply side for a while. Recalling from the history, people know that there has been an extreme event in every 5–10 years or so. The gap between extreme events has been decreasing over last two decades. Nevertheless, successive improvements in grassroots responses are pushed to the “critical thresholds” (Adger et al. 2003) as every time new hazards hit with higher extremities.

Climate Change Adaptation Through Grassroots Responses: Future Direction It is somewhat unanticipated that people often become vulnerable because they are excluded from safer places due to their structural inequality and forced to choose locations that are exposed to extreme events; at the same time, the vulnerable locations have provided them with livelihood options (Kelman and Mather 2008; Lewis and Kelman 2010). In this sense, the natural system of the coastal settlements is not to be blamed but the governance system that has set up unequal access to resources resulting into deprivation. Cannon (2008b) argued that culture plays a powerful role for people willing to live in peril where livelihood is able to connect to well-being. Hence, willingness for self-protection comes naturally with livelihood and well-being. This is the limit of an individual’s response without any external intervention (Cannon 2008a). Beyond this point, external incentives should be required either in the form of societal protection or through a favorable government that would facilitate grassroots responses more effectively through optimum allocation of resources. The empirical findings of this chapter have an important implication suggesting insights to facilitate grassroots responses in the process of climate change adaptation. Evidence from this study suggests that the first step to reduce the baseline vulnerability is to facilitate livelihood options and ensure their long-term sustenance. The study undoubtedly revealed storm surges that overflowed the embankment causing long-term inundation of inland pose highest level of risk through disrupting livelihood and other parameters of baseline vulnerability. It is of extreme necessity to scrutinize the existing settlement morphology and identify what is problematic towards long-term inundation. Therefore, more sustainable settlement-planning strategies have to be formulated which would not only reduce the risk but also offer scope to nurture traditional livelihood practices. One of the major challenges should be to upkeep the delivery of education, which can be an escape route for many in the future through better livelihood opportunity and scientific knowledge base. Therefore, disaster adaptive schooling system (physical design or policy support) has to be ensured, so that delivery of education may not be stopped under any circumstances. The number of schools has to be increased in strategic locations, so that they may cater adaptive utilization during disasters and overcome the present supply shortage of cyclone shelters. Page 15 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Contrary to the expectations, as the indigenous way of anticipating weather events fails to predict extreme event, awareness should be created among the grassroots, which would result in increased reliance on scientific warning systems. Individual’s life safety measures are not that useful in the end until one’s livelihood assets are secured during disaster. New policy and planning responses are needed towards a comprehensive safety net. Biodiversity of the Sundarbans should be protected at any cost. However, an equitable policy support is necessary to establish a sustainable baseline supply chain of food and fuel for the indigenous people. Strong social ties of mutual trust and kinship have to be properly utilized for both individual and collective disaster responses. In this regard, some of the individual level responses (i.e., rainwater harvesting and gardening in homesteads) can be scaled up to community-level practice to build on collective resilience. Responses to the improvement of shelter are piecemeal. Research-led design interventions are needed to combine traditional building technologies and science of building to cater resilience and shelter’s sustainability. Nevertheless, strength–weakness matrix of grassroots responses demonstrated that “displacement” either temporary or permanent has been a common phenomenon during all disasters. Gabura is a disaster-prone island and disaster extremities will increase year on year due to unavoidable consequences of sea level rise. Long-term strategies may be adopted through creating diversified job opportunities in nearby safer locations, so that people may respond through trading off their risky living place with better livelihood options. The process of planned gradual relocation over a decade or so would eventually leave less people exposed to future extremes in places like Gabura. The resulting settlement initiative would provide reasonable setback for both the Sundarbans and Gabura Island to recover back to their earlier state of resourcefulness. This strategic intervention should be integrated into the regional planning strategy for the central government to redistribute and decentralize resource base. As a result, it would ensure equitable scope of resource share for the vulnerable communities of the coastal settlements to build up nationwide resilience.

Conclusion Climate change is a reality and cannot be denied. Living with disaster is part of everyday life for millions of people dwelling in the disaster-prone areas of Bangladesh and in other places of the world. However, the baseline vulnerability arisen from the root causes of this large population’s socioeconomic strata is yet intimately embedded in the mainstream understanding of disaster preparedness through either risk reduction or adaptation. This is probably because preparedness has been still enclosed around the dimensions of broader hazard-centric paradigm than considering as an active socioeconomic development process (Gaillard 2010; Kelman and Gaillard 2008). Neither has been many attempts visible to place adaptation scholarship within the paradigm of disaster risk reduction (Kelman and Gaillard 2010). The present study confirms that adaptation starts at local level as part of the individual’s fundamental urge for survival. Grassroots responses are spontaneous and they facilitate community to adapt to climate variability respective of their socioeconomic status. Yet the responses are inadequate during extreme event. Mismatch is evident among the increasing level of extremities in disasters from climatic hazards and the improvement of grassroots responses over time. Integration of grassroots response with relevant policies and development mechanisms of the existing developmental programs to cater the needs of climate variability can be a first step. Integrated policy to address the baseline vulnerability of the community is important. Interventions compatible to the coastal settlements system itself may significantly reduce its vulnerabilities and create opportunities for the country’s large coastal population. Experiences from the category one cyclone “Aila” Page 16 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

revealed weakness of existing grassroots responses. However, the importance of community-led adaptation can never be ignored. Rather, they need to be adequately equipped with reasonable climate change adaptation planning and policy responses. Failure in doing so may pose a threat to extinction of indigenous knowledge base climate change responses and lead the large coastal population to an uncertain future.

References Adger WN (1999) Social vulnerability to climate change and extremes in coastal Vietnam. World Dev 27:249–269 Adger WN (2006) Vulnerability. Glob Environ Chang 16:268–281 Adger WN, Kelly PM (1999) Social vulnerability to climate change and the architecture of entitlements. Mitig Adapt Strat Glob Chang 4:253–266 Adger WN, Huq S, Brown K, Conway D, Hulme M (2003) Adaptation to climate change in the developing world. Prog Dev Stud 3:179–195 Adger WN, Agrawala S, Mirza MMQ, Conde C, O’Brien K, Pulhin J, Pulwarty R, Smit B, Takahashi K (2007) Assessment of adaptation practices, options, constraints and capacity. In: Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of IPCC the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp 717–743 Ahmed AU, Alam M, Rahman AA (1999) Adaptation to climate change in Bangladesh: future outlook. In: Huq S, Karim Z, Asaduzzaman M, Mahtab F (eds) Vulnerability and adaptation to climate change for Bangladesh. Springer, Netherlands, pp 125–143 Alam M, Nishat A-U, Siddiqui SM (1999) Water resources vulnerability to climate change with special reference to inundation. In: Huq S, Karim Z, Asaduzzaman M, Mahtab F (eds) Vulnerability and adaptation to climate change for Bangladesh. Springer Netherlands, pp 21–38 BBS (2012) Bangladesh population and housing census 2011: socio-economic and demographic report. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, National Report. Statistics and informatics division (SID), Ministry of Planning, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Blaikie P, Cannon T, Davis I, Wisner B (eds) (1994) At risk: natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters. Routledge, London Bohle HG, Downing TE, Watts MJ (1994) Climate change and social vulnerability: toward a sociology and geography of food insecurity. Glob Environ Chang 4:37–48 Brooks N (2003) Vulnerability, risk and adaptation: A conceptual framework. Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Working Paper 38:1–16 Brooks N, Adger WN, Kelly PM (2005) The determinants of vulnerability and adaptive capacity at the national level and the implications for adaptation. Glob Environ Chang 15:151–163 Burton I (1993) The environment as hazard. Guilford Press, New York Cannon T (1994) Vulnerability analysis and the explanation of ‘natural’ disasters. In: Varley A (ed) Disasters, development and the environment. Wiley, New York/Brisbane/Toronto/Singapore, pp 13–30 Cannon T (2008a) Reducing people’s vulnerability to natural hazards communities and resilience. Research paper/UNU-WIDER, No. 2008.34, ISBN 978-92-9230-080-7 Cannon T (2008b) Vulnerability, “innocent” disasters and the imperative of cultural understanding. Disaster Prev Manag 17:350–357 Page 17 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Cannon T, M€ uller-Mahn D (2010) Vulnerability, resilience and development discourses in context of climate change. Nat Hazards 55:621–635 Cannon T, Twigg J, Rowell J (2003) Social vulnerability, sustainable livelihoods and disasters. Report to DFID Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department (CHAD) and Sustainable Livelihoods Support Office DFID, London Carter TR (1996) Assessing climate change adaptations: The IPCC guidelines. In: Smith JB, Bhatti N, Menzhulin GV, Benioff R, Campos M, Jallow B, Rijsberman F, Budyko MI, Dixon RK (eds) Adapting to climate change: an international perspective. Springer, New York, pp 27–43 Carter TR, Parry ML, Harasawa H, Nishioka N (1994) IPCC technical guidelines for assessing climate change impacts and adaptations. University College London, London Dasgupta S, Huq M, Khan ZH, Ahmed MMZ, Mukherjee N, Khan M, Pandey K (2010) Vulnerability of Bangladesh to cyclones in a changing climate: potential damages and adaptation cost. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5280 Dow K (1992) Exploring differences in our common future (s): the meaning of vulnerability to global environmental change. Geoforum 23:417–436 Fankhauser S, Smith JB, Tol RSJ (1999) Weathering climate change: some simple rules to guide adaptation decisions. Ecol Econ 30:67–78 Few R (2003) Flooding, vulnerability and coping strategies: local responses to a global threat. Prog Dev Stud 3:43–58 Gaillard J-C (2010) Vulnerability, capacity and resilience: perspectives for climate and development policy. J Int Dev 22:218–232 Harley TA (2003) Nice weather for the time of year: the British obsession with the weather. In: Strauss S, Orlove BS (eds) Weather, climate, culture. Berg, Oxford, pp 103–120 Hewitt K (1983) Interpretations of calamity: from the viewpoint of human ecology. Unwin Hyman, Boston Hewitt K (1997) Regions of risk: a geographical introduction to disasters. Longman, London Houghton JT, Ding YDJG, Griggs DJ, Noguer M, van der Linden PJ, Dai X, Maskell K, Johnson CA (2001) Climate change 2001: the scientific basis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Huq S, Ahmed AU, Koudstaal R (1996) Vulnerability to Bangladesh to climate change and sea level rise. In: Downing TE (ed) Climate change and world food security. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, pp 347–379 Islam SMR, Huq S, Ali A (1998) Beach erosion in the Eastern Coastline of Bangladesh. In: Huq S, Karim Z, Asaduzzaman M, Mahtab F (eds) Vulnerability and adaptation to climate change for Bangladesh. Springer, Netherlands, pp 71–92 Jabeen H, Johnson C, Allen A (2010) Built-in resilience: learning from grassroots coping strategies for climate variability. Environ Urban 22:415–431 Kelman I, Gaillard J (2008) Placing climate change within disaster risk reduction. Disaster Adv 1(3):3–5 Kelman I, Gaillard J (2010) Embedding climate change adaptation within disaster risk reduction. Community Environ Disaster Risk Manag 4:23–46 Kelman I, Lewis J (2005) Ecology and vulnerability: islands and sustainable risk management. Insula Int J Island Aff 14:4–12 Kelman I, Mather TA (2008) Living with volcanoes: the sustainable livelihoods approach for volcano-related opportunities. J Volcanol Geotherm Res 172:189–198 Klein RJT, Nicholls RJ (1999) Assessment of coastal vulnerability to climate change. Ambio 28:182–187

Page 18 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Kumar U, Baten MA, Masud A, Osman KS, Rahman MM (2010) Cyclone Aila: One Year on Natural Disaster to Human Sufferings. Unnayan Onneshan, Dhaka, Bangladesh Lewis J (1999) Development in disaster-prone places: studies of vulnerability. Intermediate Technology Publications, London Lewis J, Kelman I (2010) Places, people and perpetuity: community capacities in ecologies of catastrophe. ACME 9:191–220 McCarthy JJ, Canziani OF, Leary NA, Dokken DJ, White KS (2001) Climate change 2001: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability: contribution of working group II to the third assessment report of the IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK MoEF (2005) National adaptation programme of action (NAPA). In: MoEF (ed) Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Ministry of Environment and Forests, Dhaka MoEF (2009) Bangladesh climate change strategy and action plan (BCCSAP). In: MoEF (ed) Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Ministry of Environment and Forests, Dhaka O’Keefe P, Westgate K, Wisner B (1976) Taking the naturalness out of natural disasters. Nature 260:566–567 Parry ML, Canziani OF, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (2007) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability: working group II contribution to the fourth assessment report of the IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York Parvin A, Johnson C (2012) Learning from local knowledge: towards disaster-adaptive costal settlements in Bangladesh. In: 1st international conference on urban sustainability and resilience, University College London Rahman AA, Alam M, Alam SS, Uzzaman MR, Rashid M, Rabbani G (2007) Risks, vulnerability and adaptation in Bangladesh. Human Development Report 8. UNDP Smit B (1993) Adaptation to climate variability and change. Report of the task force on climate adaptation. Canadian Climate Program Board, Department of Geography, University of Guelph, Occasional paper no. 19. Environment Canada, Downsview Smit B, Burton I, Klein RJT, Wandel J (2000) An anatomy of adaptation to climate change and variability. Clim Change 45:223–251 Smithers J, Smit B (1997) Agricultural system response to environmental stress. In: Ilbery B, Chiotti Q, Rickard T (eds) Agricultural restructuring and sustainability: a geographical perspective. CAB International, Wallingford, pp 167–183 Stakhiv E (1993) Evaluation of IPCC adaptation strategies. Institute for Water Resources, US Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Belvoir, VA, draft report Strauss S, Orlove BS (2003) Up in the air: the anthropology of weather and climate. In: Strauss S, Orlove BS (eds) Weather, climate, culture. Berg, Oxford, pp 3–16 Uitto JI (1998) The geography of disaster vulnerability in megacities: a theoretical framework. Appl Geogr 18:7–16 Watson RT, Zinyowera MC, Moss RH, Dokken DJ (1996) Climate change 1995: impacts, adaptations and mitigation of climate change: scientific-technical analyses. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Watts MJ, Bohle HG (1993) The space of vulnerability: the causal structure of hunger and famine. Prog Hum Geogr 17:43–67 Wisner B, Blaikie P, Cannon T, Davis I (2004) At risk: natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters. Routledge, London Page 19 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_16-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

World Bank (2010) The social dimensions of adaptation to climate change in Bangladesh. Discussion paper number 12, Washington, DC World Bank (2013) Turn down the heat- climate extremes, regional impacts, and the case for resilience, Washington, DC

Page 20 of 20

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Changes of South Baltic Region Climate: Agroecological Challenges and Responses Galina M. Barinovaa*, Evgeny Krasnovb and Dara V. Gaevab a Department of Geoecology, Baltic Federal University of Immanuel Kant, Kaliningrad, Russia b Department of Geoecology, Kaliningrad, Russia

Abstract In this chapter, the regional dynamics of climate change and the subsequent agricultural challenges and responses are discussed by referring to the Kaliningrad region of the Baltic coast and some neighboring areas. The impacts of temperature and fluctuations in precipitation are discussed in relation to grain-crop harvesting and yields and other green crop productions. Furthermore, we observe the connection between pests and diseases and climate change, which affects livestock breeding, arable farming, and human living conditions. Some forms of adaptation to climate-related events (flooding, soil erosion, selection of appropriate crops) are also presented. In the past, during the Soviet era, new uncertainties and consequently deplorable ecological changes for the investigation area were caused by excessive use of pesticides, deforestation, and expansion of monoculture. Mathematical modeling and system approaches are thus becoming important tools for the creation of forecasting procedures and solution strategies and measures for feasible future development of agriculture. Special attention is given to a decreasing number of pollinators (domestic and wild). Finally, new forms of agricultural management (landscape planning, balanced and environmentally friendly agriculture practices) are stressed.

Keywords Regional climate aspects; ecosystem impacts; strategies of adaptation

Methodology and Methods The selection of materials for this study is based on annual and monthly averages of surface air temperature and precipitation at meteorological stations in the southern Baltic region from 1949 to 2011. A set of statistics referring to the period of time from 1960 to 2011 was collated relating to the agrarian structure in the Kaliningrad region (Russia) and the dynamics of crop yields and, more particularly, the total yield of grain and honey production from 1990 to 2011. Anomalies in average values of air temperature and precipitation were measured and recognized as deviations from the reference value recommended by the World Meteorological Organization for the period between 1961 and 1990. In order to analyze the variability of extreme air temperatures, minimum and maximum temperatures were each selected for every month in the period from 1949 to 2011. These data serve to determine the ratio between climatic aridity and humidity and, therefore, in concrete terms, the index of aridity (understood here as the ratio between air temperature and *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

precipitation values). The analysis reveals a significant interannual variability. The calculation of the atmospheric aridity index (S) (Frolov and Strashnaja 2011), using the values of temperature and precipitation for a certain period of time, reveals an increase in air temperature and a destabilization of hydrothermal conditions for the period 1949 to 2011: S¼

DT DP þ sT sP

DT, DP = air temperature and precipitation deviations from monthly mean values, respectively. sT, sP = air temperature and precipitation from mean monthly values, respectively. The atmospheric aridity index (S) is evaluated using the following scale: – “Norm” = 1  S 1. – “Humid” = S 1. – “Arid” = S 1.

History This chapter focuses on the analysis of regional climate changes based on published studies, but also from different sources of information such as ancient chronicles, traditional knowledge and folklore, and natural scientific items such as the speed of lake sedimentation, analysis of annual rings, and measurements of land near-surface air temperature. Three climate periods can be distinguished over the last thousand one hundred years: (a) The warming during the first period, the Medieval Warm Period (from the end of the ninth to the beginning of the twelfth century), which began in the Baltic Sea area, resulted in shifts of vegetation zones and changes in vegetation. Thus, grapes were cultivated in northern Germany and even in Latvia. The increase in temperature during the early middle ages led to a corresponding increase in the numbers and concentration of different sections of the ancient population. (b) The second main period (from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century), known as the “Little Ice Age,” followed, during which the sea level lowered considerably, with extremely cold winters occurring over the ensuing centuries and the Baltic Sea being completely frozen. People could move over the ice-bound sea from Sweden to Denmark and could cover even longer distances by sledge, conquering new frontiers in the true sense of the word by traveling hundreds of kilometers, for instance, from Latvia to Sweden. (c) It was only at the end of the nineteenth century that a new warming of the climate started to introduce the current climate conditions we live under and which are still going on, leading to the rise of the average global temperature and earth warming. Reliable climate observations concerning climatic historical temperature variations are accessible at numerous meteorological stations that have existed for some centuries and deserve to be mentioned, such as St. Petersburg (beginning observations in 1725), Vilnius (1777), Warsaw (1779), Riga (1796), Tallinn (1806), Konigsberg-Kaliningrad (1848), and Tartu (1876). Analysis

Page 2 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

of the long-term data allows some conclusions to be drawn about the variation of air temperatures in the last two centuries: • The second half of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries are characterized by distinctive oscillations and low values of annual air temperature. For example, the average annual temperature in the period between 1781 and 1790 in St. Petersburg was 2.8  C. • The lowest average annual air temperature of 4.7  C was registered in both Warsaw in 1829 and in Königsberg/Kaliningrad in 1871. The coldest annual temperature (1.2–1.3  C) was measured in St. Petersburg in 1809 and 1810. • A new warming of the climate began at the end of the nineteenth century, leading to an average annual temperature of 7.5  C in Kaliningrad and 8.4  C in Warsaw.

Climate Change Dynamics In the Kaliningrad region there are three main types of climate that, on the whole, can be subdivided into ten types of microclimates (Barinova et al. 2012): 1. Marine type: (a) A long period without freeze (190–200 days), a large number of serene days (30–32 days), normal humidity (750 mm) with strong winds and possible fog (b) The longest period without freezing (over 200 days), high recurrence of winds, annual rainfall of 600–650 mm 2. Transitional type: (a) Sufficient amounts of heat, strong winds, high temperature differences, and microclimatic difference in soil moisture (b) The lowest amounts of heat or a short period without freezing (5.0  C was 2,200  C, and the duration of the period was 201 days. For the period 1980–2010, there was a markedly significant fluctuation in the duration of the growing season and the amount of heat. Combined with the moisture regimen, this is reflected in the varying yields of cereals (wheat) and perennial grasses. The index of aridity of the atmosphere (S) (the ratio between air temperature and precipitation) showed a significant interannual variability. Therefore, 2002 was characterized by an aridity index in May of 3.7, with the amount of heat during the growing season being 2,940  C, and low yields of wheat and perennial grasses: 23 and 15.3 hwt/ha, respectively (Table 2). The highest wheat yield in a single year was in 2008, when the total accumulated air temperature was 3,029  C and the growing season was the longest. The highest wheat yield was observed from 2005 to 2009, with accumulated temperatures from 2,900  C to 3,055  C (Figs. 3 and 4). At the same time, the areas of perennial grasses were reduced due to the high temperatures and high aridity index. Long-term dynamics of crop yields reveal that, with the intense warming from 2000 to 2009, a substantial growth in wheat yields was achieved compared with the previous decade. In contrast, the growth of perennial grasses was abundant in cool and wet years (Figs. 1 and 3). Analysis of hay yields on the floodplain meadows (Romanenkova 2008) also shows that the temperature has a significant cumulative effect. In connection with climate change (Roger and Pielke 2005; Fedoroff et al. 2010; Eckersten et al. 2012; Fedorov and Krasnov 2012) and rising accumulated temperatures in the Kaliningrad region, there is the possibility of introducing thermophile plants (in particular soya), both as rotation elements and as crops used for the expansion of production areas. At the same time, considerable interannual air temperature fluctuations and snowless winters pose a risk for the cultivation of winter crops. In winter 2010, for example, the average January temperature reached 8.10  C, the lowest average in the preceding 20 years, causing a loss of about 70 % of the winter rapeseed crop, which has been actively introduced in the rotation since 2000 and covered about 20 % of arable land in 2009. Page 6 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 3 y = 0.0233x - 0.4084

2.5

R2 = 0.1904

2 1.5

2009

2006

2003

2000

1997

1994

1991

1988

1985

1982

1979

1976

1973

1970

1967

1964

1961

1958

–0.5

1955

0

1952

0.5 1949

Δt, °c

1

–1 –1.5 –2

Year

Fig. 5 Deviation from the norm in air temperature in Kaliningrad

Therefore, a prerequisite for increasing the profitability of agriculture in the current climate conditions in the South Baltic area should be conversion to other crops such as perennial legumes and grasses that are resistant to temperature changes. This could increase the duration of the grazing season and reduce the nutrient load of the water by reducing the doses of organic fertilizers required for annual crops. Meanwhile, one can say for certain that the increasing negative impacts of climate change enhance the frequency of extreme and unpredictable situations (Lobell et al. 2011). Official statistics show that the frequency of freak weather (such as heavy cloudbursts accompanied by floods, frequent heavy storms, etc.) has increased in the Kaliningrad region. This of course raises the question of what to do given the effects of climate change. The first approach could be to examine the features of natural resources in the Kaliningrad region taking into consideration the current phenomena of climate change (Chistyakov 1997; Drozdov and Smirnov 2011). The materials for the study are based on data relating to the near-surface air temperature and precipitation in the Kaliningrad station for the period from 1949 to 2010 and the anomalies of temperature and precipitation calculated as deviations from the long-term average for the period from 1961 to 1990, recommended by the World Meteorological Organization as the basis for such calculations. The main air temperature trends in the southeastern Baltic coast are comparable with trends observed in the average temperature of the Northern Hemisphere (temperature rise in the last quarter of the nineteenth century; rapid temperature rise in the last decades of the twentieth century). Globally, there are an increasing number of natural disasters involving hazardous meteorological or, more precisely, hydrometeorological processes (storms, strong winds, very intense rainfall, floods, glaze effects, etc.) as well as rigors of temperature (extremely high temperature values, increasing forest fires, higher incidence of heat waves and droughts, etc.). Linear trends in air temperature reveal a sharp rise in temperature and a rise in its variability from year to year. Climate warming in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century exceeds the rate of increase during the rest of the twentieth century by far (Jacob 2005; Kyslov et al. 2008; Getzlaff et al. 2011). Analysis of changes in annual precipitation values during the study period also reveals a significant positive trend, namely, an average growth rate of 20 mm within 50 years, an additional symptom of global warming. An essential feature is the increase in the amplitude range of precipitation beginning in the late 1970s. Of considerable interest is a large asymmetry in the number of positive and negative deviations of air temperature during the study period: the number of positive deviations is two times

Page 7 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 500

y = 2.6337x - 87.786 R2 =0.1191

400 300

2009

2006

2003

2000

1997

1994

1991

1988

1985

1982

1979

1976

1973

1970

1967

1964

1961

1958

–100

1955

0

1952

100

1949

Δ r, mm

200

–200 –300 –400

Year

Fig. 6 Deviation from the norm in precipitation in Kaliningrad

higher than negative deviations. The largest positive deviations, exceeding the value of 1.5  C, were observed in 1975, 1989 (the warmest year of the twentieth century), 1990, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2000, and 2008. The largest negative deviations were observed in 1956 and 1987 (the coldest years). Air temperature anomalies, calculated as deviations from the average for the 1961–1990 period, ranged from 1.5  C to 1.5  C. The highest average annual temperature abnormality of 2.5  C was seen in 1989. In the past decade there have been several record temperatures that had not previously been observed in the history of meteorological observations (Fig. 5). The annual air temperature in 1989, 1998, 2007, and 2008 exceeded the normal values by 9  C. The maximum air temperature was 12.6  C in January and 34.6  C in July 2007. In July 2010 a maximum value of 33.8  C was reached. The average air temperature (the norm), defined for the period 1961–1990 in Kaliningrad, was 7.2  C. However, the last quarter of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century are characterized by a significant increase in the surface air temperature (Fig. 5). For example, the average annual air temperature measured over the decade from 1991 to 2000 increased by 0.9  C compared with an average of 7.8  C in the decade from 1961 to 1970. In 1989, there was a maximum average annual air temperature of +9.7  C. A high average annual temperature exceeding the “norm” by 1.5–2  C was observed in 1990, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2007. This very strong warming is typical for the autumn–winter period; the speed of summer temperatures rising is lower. The beginning of the study period is characterized by negative deviations from the long-term average precipitation level. In the late 1970s there was a change in the rise of precipitation values (Fig. 6). In general, noticeable sharp fluctuations could be observed from year to year for the period of investigation. In 2006, for example, rainfall levels were almost two times lower than in 2007, which was characterized by wet weather during the entire study period with 1,214 mm of precipitation. This can be compared with the rates of deviation in rainfall for the two 30-year intervals, namely, from 1949 to 1979 and from 1980 to 2009. In the first period, especially at the beginning of the period, there were more frequently observed adverse deviations, whereas in the second period there were years in which the rainfall exceeded the normal rate by threefold. The graphs in Figs. 5 and 6 show clearly visible sharp short-period fluctuations that characterize the interannual variability of temperature and precipitation. Seasonal variability of temperature is

Page 8 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 40.0

min max

30.0 20.0

°C

10.0 0.0 I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

X

XI

XII

–10.0 –20.0 –30.0 –40.0 months

Fig. 7 Extreme maximum and minimum air temperatures for the period from 1949 to 2011 in Kaliningrad

also quite evident. Comparing the monthly average and the annual air temperature for the two 30-year periods observed, we can record the following fact: the average annual temperature for the last 30 years (1981–2010) is higher by 0.8  C than for the period with normal values (1961–2010). As can be seen, the speed of the trend differs in some months: the most intense warming occurs during the winter and spring months, and the most significant warming is evident for January and February. The average temperature in the last 30 years has increased by 1.7  C to a value of 1.4  C in February. In summer and autumn, the rate of warming is reduced, especially in June, September, and October. In the last 30 years of abnormally warm winter seasons, mild spring temperatures have become more frequent than cold ones in Kaliningrad. As a result, a comprehensive statistical analysis of long-term climate indicators makes it clear that during the study period there were sharp fluctuations in both temperature and precipitation. Variability of extreme temperature indices for the period 1949–2011 is shown in Fig. 7. As can be seen, the maximum amplitude of the oscillations of air temperature is characteristic of the winter months. In January, the lowest temperature was observed in 1956 (32.5  C) and the highest in 2007 (12.7  C); the range of variation was 45.2  C. During the summer, the oscillation amplitude of extreme values of air temperature is significantly reduced and is about 32  C. It is noticeable that the lowest temperature in all seasons of the year can be observed until 2000, whereas the highest temperature could be fixed to three times, namely, in January 2007, April 2000, and December 2006. In recent decades, there have been some maximum values that had not occurred in the previous history of the observations, with comparable positive annual temperature anomalies. In Kaliningrad, the mean annual air temperature amounted to 9.2  C in 1989 and 9.3  C in 1998. The growth of weather variability: • The number of severe weather events and associated risks: strong winds, very heavy rainfall, and rising of water levels in the rivers above alarming marks. • Since most precipitation falls as rain rather than as snow and water seeps faster, the soil absorbs less moisture than with a melting snow cover. This has a negative effect on the moisture balance, leading to more erosional activity. • In western Russia, dramatically higher river flow rates are expected up to 2015. This will lead to lower soil freezing due to a rise of groundwater levels and poor drainage capacity.

Page 9 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 3 Regional specificity of the morbidity of tick-borne encephalitis and Lyme disease during the period from 1999 to 2008

Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Annual mean

Morbidity (per 100,000 population) Tick-borne encephalitis Kaliningrad region Karelia region 1.3 4.4 1.2 5.6 1.2 6 1.2 7.2 3.8 15.2 1.3 11.6 1 9.2 0.9 7.6 0.8 8.8 0.8 – 1.4 8.4

Belarus 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.5

Lyme disease Kaliningrad region 8.2 19.9 7.8 7.2 22.7 13.3 13.2 20.9 20.8 12.5 14.6

Belarus 1 1.9 1.8 1.8 5.1 5.2 5.4 9.1 6.7 6.6 4.5

As the region of Kaliningrad is situated in the west wind belt, westerly, southwesterly, and southerly winds predominate in various meteorological manifestations with diverse effects. Above all, in autumn and winter intense low-pressure systems can sweep across the Baltic Sea in the form of heavy storms causing floods and other damages. Environmentally negative impacts can also occur such as transboundary contamination (sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, heavy metals, etc.). The most frequently measured speeds during storms are 12.5–15.2 m/s (52.9 %) and 15.3–18.2 m/s (21.4 %). Winds with a speed of more than 8 m/s occur in 13 % of all cases. This is a problem as unfavorable conditions for treating agricultural crops with pesticides occur.

Analysis of the Impacts of Climate Change In connection with climate change, there are also negative effects affecting human and animal health. For example, infections such as Lyme borreliosis (Lyme disease) that have been by no means unusual in the Kaliningrad region spread more and more like an epidemic. Thus, the increase of ticks creates a critical situation when cattle are kept in outdoor husbandry systems in the Kaliningrad region. Human infection may occur through tick bites as well as by drinking the milk of infected animals. Table 3 provides an overview of tick-borne morbidity. Long-term analysis of natural focal infections of the population (1999–2008) detects different trends in the number of victims in some regions of Russia and the world, including the Kaliningrad region (Barinova and Kochanowskaja 2011). Also, the morbidity of tick-borne encephalitis in the Kaliningrad region for the period under review decreased from 1.3 per 100,000 population in 1999 to 0.8 in 2008. A similar trend is observed in Karelia. In Belarus, the spread of tick-borne encephalitis as well as Lyme disease also has a tendency to increase (Table 3). This may be associated with an increase in winter air temperatures and, at the same time, an increased frequency of extreme weather conditions. Growth in the number of insect pests increased pesticide use. A longterm analysis of natural focal infections among the population provides evidence that there is a connection between the high frequency of morbidity, particularly in encephalitis, and high temperatures. Thus, in 2003 and in 2010, the morbidity values were clearly higher than in previous years,

Page 10 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 4 Adaptation of land use management to climate change in the Kaliningrad region Type of nature management Challenge Adaptation Agricultural Increased frequency and variability from year to year of severe Restore drainage weather events (storms, frosts, droughts, storms) The danger of erosion processes Regulation of the soil water regimen (including bilateral) on the polder lands Loss of humus, soil salinity increased Selection of thermophile crops Increased risk of infectious and parasitic diseases of plants and Increase the area of meadows animals Forestry The loss of forests Increase forest area up to 25–30 % with the introduction of broad-leaved Water logging, changes in groundwater levels trees Growth pathology of tree crops Expansion of distribution ranges of tick-borne encephalitis

Pathology monitoring

and it was that summer in which the temperatures were the highest measured since the beginning of weather records. Growth in the number of insect pests and diseases of plants depends on the following factors: • Measures need to be improved to keep pests in the soil during the winter. • High humidity, high frequency of surface inversions, weakening of the wind in the second half of the growing season, and air stagnation cause the growth of fungal diseases of plants. • Cultivation is sensitive to weather variability in monocultures (corn, rape).

New Uncertainties and Needs In the context of climate warming, a relatively large impact is expected on the productivity and structure of agroecosystems; forest biotic communities; the quality of agricultural, pastoral, and forest land; the spread of diseases; and the survival of some wild plants, domestic animals, and cultivated plants. For the Kaliningrad region, one has to face up to major challenges relating to climate change and measures that are suited to mitigate at least the most dangerous effects need to be proposed (Table 4). The structure of rural landscapes has changed when viewed in the context of natural and agricultural factors that, unfortunately, have not necessarily had desirable effects. The invisible chemical changes in connection with pesticide use, the continuing urbanization process, and even the military activities are the negative and yet dramatic consequences. Total forest coverage is now no more than 17–18 %. Deforestation is probably the biggest environmental problem for the Kaliningrad region. However, to stop cutting the forests down is nearly impossible without the political will of regional and federal decision makers. Another environmentally harmful example is the planting of crops without using rotation to avoid soil degradation. Thus, rapeseed is sowed over several years. The abovementioned negative processes occur because of a lack of collaboration for various reasons. Being ready to start dialogue with different groups of society is a prerequisite to generate an institutional and social consensus to preserve the natural foundations for both humans and animals.

Page 11 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Pollinator’s Drama The almost complete anthropogenic transformation of nature in the Kaliningrad region – like in most countries of the Baltic region (Palang and Ryden 2003) – has resulted in only a small remnant (not more than 18 % nowadays) of an originally widespread forest area, thus creating one of the major problems in agriculture and forestry, namely, a small number of pollinators, in particular bees. In addition, the increase in precipitation and intraday fluctuations in temperature during the winter also cause a decrease in the bee population (Gaeva and Barinova 2013). Documentary sources in East Prussia mention beekeepers for the first time in 1367. From this year on, free hunting, fishing, and beekeeping were allowed. Everything that was found in the forests or that could be caught in the rivers was allowed to be sold, but the authorities set stringent prices for honey. Furthermore, each beekeeper could possess part of the forest. On the trunk of a tree inhabited by bees, the beekeeper (or “bee hunter”) marked a sign by cutting a square, cross, crescent, etc. As the parts of the forest with good honey yield were mostly to be found on the edges, within clearings, and burnt areas, beekeepers often set fire to the young forest. Beforehand, the hives were gathered up and put in a suitable place with a ditch dug around it. Later, in the fifteenth century, due to frequent uncontrolled fires, a law prohibited forest burning after 8 April, when the dry season began. From the mid-fifteenth century onward, anyone who lived in the forests of Prussia had to obey the laws and pay taxes – apiaries in the gardens around the houses, however, were exempt from taxation and, thus, from that time on, hives were moved from the forests into the villages. The “rules for bee hunters” stipulated penalties for those persons who damaged hives and who failed to act in case of fire. By law, beekeepers had to keep forest areas in order, and in case they did not know how to cut down or burn wood in their territory, they had to repair any possible damage. In the middle of the nineteenth century, there was quite high productivity in beekeeping in East Prussia. In 1773, in the area around Schlohauer, a beekeeper was given 507 thalers for the production of honey in comparison with 14 thalers given as profit from the sale of timber harvested in the same piece of forest. However, as early as the nineteenth century, a decline of beekeeping took place because of the war in 1812 and adverse weather conditions in later years (cold winters in 1824/1825, 1844/1845, and 1848/1849). Moreover, in the middle of the nineteenth century, active deforestation began. All trees with hollows were allowed to be cut down. Yet, according to estimates, at the end of the nineteenth century, one single hive yielded 13–20 kg of honey per year. Over the 48 years from 1864 to 1912, the number of bee colonies in East Prussia increased from 85,168 to 186,644. The distribution of bee colonies in East Prussia (with distribution in the Kaliningrad region after 1945 in brackets) was as follows: in 1907, 4.3 beehives existed on 1 km2 (5.9 beehives on 1 km2 of farmland), and in 2010, 5.9 beehives existed on 1 km2 (2.5 on 1 km2). In 1938, there were 244,024 beehives in the whole of Prussia and 96,757 in East Prussia (in 1943, there were 88,000 bee colonies); the average productivity of bee colonies was 30 kg of gross honey and up to 10–15 kg of salable honey (Hansen 1916; Bloech 1932). During the Second World War, honey production almost came to a stop, but in the first years after the war, in the newly established collective farms, specialists began to restore beekeeping. Before the Second World War, the European dark forest bee (Apis mellifera mellifera) was prevalent. This bee species was well adapted to the cold and wet climate: their natural habitat extended from the tundra to the steppes. In the postwar period, a new bee species, the gray Mountain Caucasian bee Apis m. caucasica, was introduced, and the Carpathian bee Apis m. carpatica, bred in Maykop, was imported to the Kaliningrad region. These breeds of bees did not tolerate long winter Page 12 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 1.8 1.6 1.4

kg/ha

1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1996

1997

1999

2000

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

year

Fig. 8 Pesticide use on arable land in the Kaliningrad region (kg/hа)

periods (over 4 months) or high humidity, and crossbreeds with local bees were often susceptible to infectious diseases and proved unproductive. Uncontrolled importation of unadapted species of bees to the Kaliningrad region led to the loss of local bee populations, which were more adapted to the habitat, especially to the cool climate. Finally, 50 or 60 years later, more than 5,000 bee colonies were killed through fungal infections and the first reports of the tick-borne disease varroa appeared. In the 1990s, beekeeping in the Kaliningrad region fell into decay. Apiaries were destroyed or subdivided among private owners. According to the National Agricultural Census held in 2006, the number of bee colonies totaled 14,000 in the Kaliningrad region, but by 2008 there were only 6,588 registered bee colonies left. According to our data, approximately 20,000 beehives show no more than an average productivity of 15–20 kg of honey per family. Thus, beekeeping can be classified as an informal sector in agriculture. A significant problem lies in the fact that there is a lack of annual records of bee colonies, especially of the morbidity of bees and their intoxication by pesticides in different areas of the Kaliningrad region. The increase in the use of high doses of pesticides (Fig. 8) is a threat to wild pollinators (wild bees, bumblebees) and to populations of honeybees (Apis mellifera) in agro-geosystems. In order to control pests, farmers now use registered insecticides that are toxic to bees from the class of neonicotinoids. According to environmental restrictions on the use of this kind of substance, regulations on temperature and spatial isolation within 5 km of the honeybee (Apis mellifera L.) have been established, but solitary bees are not covered (Dixon 2003; Tyliniakis 2013; Burke et al. 2013). Evidence of a negative impact from the use of neonicotinoids on entomophilous crops has been found. Processing of wheat crops in a farm leads to the death of solitary bees and to a lack of pollinators, even in neighboring farms, and to a ten times higher reduction of yields of sunflower and alfalfa (Artohin et al. 2013). Under such conditions, controlled pollination of cultures is only possible with the help of honeybees. Modern beekeeping is an agricultural branch, engaged in breeding honeybees for beeswax and other bee products as well as for the pollination of crops in order to increase their productivity. The main challenge for beekeeping is based on its environmental and economic efficiency for specific regions. As the demand for environmentally friendly products is still high, beekeeping requires suitable regions to be found for honey production, as well as exploring the possibility of combining

Page 13 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

crops, livestock, and beekeeping in the same area without any of these inflicting damage on any of the others.

Modeling of Climate-Dependent Events in Agriculture Mathematical models and system analysis of data play a more and more decisive role in the environmental sciences against the background of regional climate change and its consequences for agricultural development. Methods of mathematical simulation describing the Pregel river basin (the main drainage basin in the Kaliningrad region) were presented as a balance system of differential equations where a variety of variables relating to the different components of a climate system such as temperature and precipitation and elements of vegetation such as forested area and cultural phytomass, soil humus, etc. (Zotov 1997) are put in. Retrospective experiments were conducted using data from the years 1960 to 1989 (showed the sufficient exactness). Scenarios in a model with climate warming [average annual temperature (T) = 9  C] show a significant increase in the forest and agricultural phytomass (10–15 %) with the level of underground water going down. In scenarios with a colder climate (T = 5  C), the variable quantities showed the opposite trends. By generating development models we have the possibility to calculate the quantitative character of changes in agroecosystems. So, for a change in forest phytomass, humus, and nitrogen content in the soil dependent on climate change, more than 100 years will be needed, and for the regeneration of soil humus, more than 1,000 years will be needed, whereas for 1-year crop phytomass, production under new climatic conditions only 1 year of data will be required. Nitrogen content in river water reacts to climate change (increase of precipitation) in a similarly sudden rapid way (i.e., a sudden leap). The use of mineral fertilizers is the main cause of water nitrogen pollution. If we increase the normal level of fertilizers by two to four times, the nitrogen content in underground water grows at a rate of between 1.3 and 1.5 times and in river water at a rate of between 2.0 and 2.5 compared to the norm. It is evident that the eutrophication of Baltic coastal bays and lagoons will continue without changes in the management of agriculture. In scenarios with an increasing forested area (and other equal conditions), the content of nitrogen in waters is decreased, whereas the level of underground water grows in such a negative way that the Kaliningrad region registers a historical excess of moisture. Increased drainage of farmland is leading to a decrease in the groundwater level, but the surface nitrogen flow is growing. So, in order to reduce the complex negative environmental consequences, it is necessary to use the right complex method for modeling climate-dependent parameters. For example, a scenario with a four- or fivefold increase in the application of organic and mineral (nitrogen) fertilizers compared to the former level, an increase in land drainage by 10 %, and an increase in woodland to a level 1.5 times higher than before ended with the best results, namely, an increase of cultural phytomass production and soil fertility on the one hand and a decrease in the nitrogen content of surface water and in the groundwater level on the other hand. The most significant aspect of balanced land use in agriculture is the creation of natural space differentiation in accordance with environmental (including meso-climatic) conditions. To achieve this, it is important to consider the landscape–basin approach, in which the area model is described in relation to elementary landscape–basin systems. The model also has to include the space changes in local climate caused by rivers, lakes, the coastal zone, etc. (Orlenok et al. 2000).

Page 14 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

To define the causes of excessive moistening of sandy soil in the Curonian Spit, the “meteofactorlevel regime of subterranean waters” model was used. The following parameters play a significant role: the coefficient of filtration, the average viscosity of underground waters, the duration of filtration of the soil horizon, the initial level of underground water, and the position of these levels on the borders between the sea and the lagoon. On the basis of the model calculation, there was a fixed time for water coming to the surface on the low parts of the sand spit in connection with the intensity of filtration and its position to the earth surface. Such a forecast can help to organize protection against erosion and destruction of the spit by the outcropping of subterranean waters in a timely fashion (Korneevets 1998). These scenarios are based on the knowledge of modern natural processes and the mechanisms of their effects that are possible under the current system of wildlife management in the Kaliningrad region. For example, in the next 15 years, along with a continued growth of the mean annual air temperature and annual precipitation, the waterlogged area of the farmland could grow by 15–20 %. On the flat plains with poorly drained soil, the moraine ridge on upland plains along with the current trend of deforestation will exacerbate the risk of erosion, the rise of groundwater levels, and the flooding of low landforms. Adverse climate conditions, especially in the form of an increase of precipitation in the South Baltic area as described in the REMO is regional climate model with horisontal resolution 50 50 km scenario for the period between 2020 and 2029, could lead to an expected increase by 15–20 % compared with the norm of 800 m. According to the model that HIRHAM projected for the South Baltic, winter temperatures will range between 4  C and 5  C during the period from 2071 to 2100. In the Gwardejsk District (Kaliningrad region), the area of waterlogging and flooding of arable land had increased by 43 %, hayfields by up to 46 %, and pastures by up to 40 % by 2008. If current trends continue for 15 years from 2008, i.e., by 2023, the flooded area and waterlogged arable land will increase by up to 47 % (corresponding to 10,800 ha), hayfields by up to 48 % (4,625 ha), and pastures by up to 48 % (6,620 ha). It should be noted that there is a current increase in flooded agricultural land, especially arable land. The results of a survey of overgrown farmland show that by 2009, the Kaliningrad region had undergone an increase of scrubby parts of arable land by 5.2 %, of grasslands by 15.8 %, and of pastures by 17.6 %.

Geoinformational Databases: A New Strategy in Agricultural Management A geoinformational database is a necessary aspect of regional environmental management. It is an ecological cartography and regionalization, modeling and prognosis. The cartography may be complex and branch out in different directions and reflects spatial temporal coherence (maps and atlases characterize the areas and estimate the state and reproduction of bioresources). The relationship between the climate, biosphere, and environment and the increasing adverse human influence on the ecosystem require a systematic and methodical approach. It is necessary to estimate the conditions of natural and economic activities and their effects. To provide the composition and quality of geoinformation, models and expert values are needed to build a system that is best adapted to changing environmental conditions.

Conclusion With the current state of knowledge, we cannot exhaustively estimate the negative impacts of climate change from a quantitative and qualitative point of view; however, we can assume some Page 15 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

of the possible consequences. Regarding the Kaliningrad region, we should consider the following factors of climate change: • • • • •

An increase in the average air temperature Changes in the amount and patterns of precipitation A shift of agroclimatic zones to the north An increased atmospheric aridity An increased frequency of severe weather events (storms, hail, floods) occurring more or less frequently over the years

The rational use of agricultural landscapes under conditions of climate warming is a combination of arable land with seminatural areas (Tishkov 2006). The use of waterlogged and flooded areas as meadows will reduce the leaching of the soil. Reducing the crops that are sensitive to fluctuations in temperature and humidity and that require multiple treatments with pesticides will help to stabilize the size of pollinator populations.

References Artohin KS, Ignatova PK et al (2013) Changes in fauna of Hymenoptera insects of the Rostov area and forecast of environmental effects. Living Bio-inert Syst 2:1–10 Barinova GM, Kochanowskaja MI (2011) Climate change and the dynamics of the natural focal disease of the population in the Kaliningrad region. Bull Baltic Fed Univ I Kant Nat Sci 7:36–44 Barinova G, Koroleva Y, Krasnov E (2012) Indicative modeling and spatial evaluation of air pollution risk. In: Kremers H (ed) Risk models and applications. CODATA, Berlin Bloech H (1932) Ostpreussens. Landwirtschaft, Koenigsberg Burke L et al (2013) Plant-pollinator interaction over 120 years: loss of species, co-occurrence, and function. Science 339:161–162 Chistyakov V (1997) Solar cycles and climate fluctuations. Dalnauka, Vladivostok Deutsche Wetter Dienst http://www.dwd.de Dixon K (2003) Pollination and restoration. Science 325:571–572 Drozdov VV, Smirnov NP (2011) Long-term dynamics of climate and hydrological conditions in the Baltic Sea and her causes. Meteorol Hydrol 5:77–87 Eckersten H, Andersson L, Holstein F et al (2012) An evaluation of climate change effects on crop production. In: Jakobsson C (ed) Ecosystem health and sustainable agriculture, vol 1. Sustainable Agriculture, Uppsala Fedoroff NV et al (2010) Radically rethinking agriculture for the 21st century. Science 327:833–834 Fedorov G, Krasnov E (2012) Agriculture in Kaliningrad. In: Jakobsson C (ed) Ecosystem health and sustainable agriculture, vol 1. Sustainable Agriculture, Uppsala Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring http://meteo.ru Frolov AV, Strashnaja AP (2011) About the drought of 2010 and its impact on crop yields. In: Analysis of abnormal weather conditions on the territory of Russia in the summer of 2010: Sun. Reports GU “Hydrometeorological Center of Russia”, Moscow Gaeva D, Barinova G (2013) The geoecological conditions of apiculture product manufacturing in the Kaliningrad region. Vestn Immanuel Kant Baltic Fed Univ Russ 1:13–20 Getzlaff K, Lehman A et al (2011) The response of the general circulation of the Baltic Sea to climate variability. BALTEX Newsl 14:13–16 Page 16 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_17-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Hansen F (1916) Die Landwirtschaft in Ostpreussen, Jena Jacob D (2005) A short note on the role of the atmospheric circulations apart of the hydrological cycle. BALTEX Phase I, 1993–2003 State of the Art Report 31:8–14 Korneevets LV (1998) Hydrogeological conditions and the main features of the groundwater regime of the Curonian Spit. In: The study and conservation of the Curonian Spit, Kaliningrad Kyslov AVet al (2008) Forecast of climatic resource supply in the East European Plain under climate warming in the XXI century, Moscow Lobell D et al (2011) Climate trends and global crop production since 1980. Science 333:616–620 Orlenok V, Krasnov E, Barinova G (2000) Geoecological base on nature management in the Baltic Sea coastal zone. Geography and Environment, Moscow Palang H, Ryden L (2003) Society and landscape: space intrusion and habitat destruction. In: Lars Rydén, Pawel Migula,Magnus Andersson (ed). Environmental science. The Baltic University Press, Uppsala Roger A, Pielke S (2005) Land use and climate change. Science 310:1625–1626 Romanenkova SA (2008) Environmental aspects of the yields formation water meadows of the river Deima. Successes of agriculture: interuniversity collection of scientific papers KSTU, Kaliningrad Tishkov A (2006) Ecosystems services of Russia in the assessments of “Millennium Goals” and in the system of indicators of its sustainable development. In: Environmental management and sustainable development. World ecosystems and Problems of Russia, Moscow Tyliniakis J (2013) The global plight of pollinators. Science 339:1532–1533 Zotov S (1997) Modeling adaptation of basin-landscape systems to climate change and economic activity. Adaptive strategies of nature (ecological and geographical aspects), Kaliningrad

Page 17 of 17

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

An Analytical Framework for Investigating Complex Institutions in Climate Change Adaptation: The Institutional Environment Matrix Sining C. Cuevas*, Ann Peterson and Tiffany Morrison School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Management, The University of Queensland, St. Lucia, Australia

Abstract This chapter introduces the institutional environment matrix (IEM), a diagnostic and planning framework designed to analyze complex institutional environments and determine the institutional fit of climate change adaptation responses. The framework argues that the institutional environment is comprised of rules, social structures, and organizations. It establishes the vital role of institutional arrangements in characterizing the functions and functional interdependencies of institutions. The IEM framework has a dual layer design that allows complex institutional relationships to be examined across scales. The institutional environment layer is a comprehensive inventory of institutions that outlines institutional complexities. The institutional matrix layer is the system of institutional arrangements that determines the functional interdependencies of institutions. The matrix explores institutional interplay in relation to several general institutional functions: reducing uncertainty, connecting individuals to society, fostering adaptive capacity, and mobilizing resource utilization. By providing a structure to examine complex institutional relationships, the IEM is a significant innovation for assessing the institutional fit of and interplay between existing and planned climate change adaptation responses. This framework may also be used as an analytical tool in adaptation planning and evaluation.

Keywords Institutions; Institutional environment; Climate change adaptation; Analytical framework

Introduction Urban and rural systems are increasingly subject to complex and uncertain problems such as climate change, biodiversity loss, land-use conflict, pandemic disease, and rapid market fluctuations. These problems challenge the abilities of societies to manage change in traditional ways. Subjective perceptions, cross-sectoral misunderstandings, and technological contingencies only increase this challenge (Gunderson and Holling 2002; Crowder et al. 2006). Institutions play a critical role in ensuring successful adaptation to rapid and unpredictable change yet are one of the least examined and ambiguous aspects of climate change adaptation (O’Riordan and Jordan 1999; Adger 2000; Adger et al. 2005a, b). Following the works of North (1990) and Ostrom (1990), several facets of institutions have been examined in the literature (Young 2002; Sabatier 2007; Oberth€ ur and Stokke 2011). Recently, of particular interest to scholars are the linkages between institutions, climate change, and adaptation *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

with studies addressing the effects of institutional barriers and constraints on adaptation (Inderberg and Eikeland 2009), the fundamental functions of institutions in facilitating climate change adaptation (Rodima-Taylor 2012), and the institutional requirements for adaptation (Adger et al. 2005a). Yet, despite these works, the research area is still in its infancy, as evidenced by a number of competing frameworks. To analyze these institutional concerns more effectively, scholars have developed a variety of frameworks to examine the role of institutions in the context of climate change adaptation. These analytical frameworks are differentiated by how they define institutions – in essence, whether they consider institutions as rules, social patterns of behaviors, or organizations. In other words, the types of analysis that can be performed using these frameworks are bound by the frameworks’ institutional perceptions. For example, one framework that focuses on organizational institutions examines the institutional linkages between and among public, private, and civil society institutions and the significance of institutional partnerships in enabling adaptation. It provides a tool to analyze organizational partnerships and the impacts of these associations on the access of vulnerable social groups to resources (Agrawal 2008). Another framework that defines institutions in terms of rules, customs, and norms concentrates on the intrinsic characteristics of institutions in influencing the behaviors of individuals and in fostering collective action. Essentially, this framework deals with understanding and assessing the ability of institutions to raise the adaptive capacity of society (Gupta et al. 2010). This raises two significant issues. First is the disharmony in defining institutions in the context of climate change. Research has focused on institutions as rules and social structures (O’Riordan and Jordan 1999; Eriksen and Selboe 2012) and also as organizations (Agrawal et al. 2008; Vallejo 2011). Therefore, as climate change research advances, there is a discrepancy on how the concept of institutions is founded. Second is the inability of the frameworks to simultaneously analyze the various facets of institutions. If these gaps are not addressed, it can lead to a divergence in institutional concepts and the direction of research. To address the first concern, a conceptual framework was developed that defines institutions as a triad of rules, social structures, and organizations in the context of climate change adaptation. Thus, institutions are the commonly known and acknowledged rules, social structures, and organizations founded on common belief systems that transform individual acts and expectations into collective actions; convert personal values into social norms and shared beliefs; and define the formal and informal behavioral systems of human existence. As an extension of this endeavor, this chapter develops an analytical framework that helps to examine the complexity of the triad institutions in climate change adaptation responses. Institutional interventions formulated and implemented to adapt to climate change bring either conflict or harmony into existing institutions and arrangements (Young 2002; Nilsson et al. 2012). A framework that can be utilized to examine the relationships between and among rule-based, social structure-based, and organizational institutions is useful in planning for and evaluating the effects of these institutional changes. Moreover, the efficiency and success of adaptation responses rest on how they fit in the institutional environment and institutional arrangements that are in place (Theesfeld et al. 2010). Every case has a unique institutional environment or array of institutions that influence and affect climate change adaptation behaviors and decisions. Therefore, the institutional fit of the adaptation measures, i.e., whether adaptive institutional interventions are synchronized or in harmony with the existing institutions, is vital to effectively implement an adaptation response. The more fitting the adaptive institutions are with the other institutions in the system, the better each institution performs and, thus, the more relevant each one becomes.

Page 2 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 1 Definition of key terms Term Rule-based institutions

Social structure-based institutions

Organizational institutions

Institutional arrangements Institutional fit Institutional interplay Functional interdependencies Institutional environment (IE) Institutional matrix (IM) Institutional environment matrix (IEM) framework

Definition Constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions and determine decisions, actions, information, payoffs, and actors in various conditions and situations (North 1990; Ostrom 1990) Self-sustaining, salient patterns of social interactions (Aoki 2007) that form individual and social expectations, relations, conduct, interactions, and behavior (Agrawal 2008) Structures of power that form the social, economic, legal, and political organizations of a society (O’Riordan and Jordan 1999; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005) Structures of the rules that govern human decisions (Tang 1991) or the specific guidelines designed to facilitate social interactions (Klein 2000) State where the adaptive institutional interventions are synchronized or in harmony with the existing triad of institutions – rules, social structures, and organizations Interactions and reactions between and among institutions that build institutional linkages, relationships, and interdependencies Relationships built resulting from the interactions among the arrangements that allow institutions to perform their functions Comprehensive inventory of the differing institutions – rules, social structures, and organizations – that may influence adaptation responses System of institutional arrangements that determines the functional interdependencies of institutions A planning and diagnostic framework designed to analyze institutional environments and determine the institutional fit of climate change adaptation responses

Sources: North (1990), Ostrom (1990), Tang (1991), O’Riordan and Jordan (1999), Klein (2000), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Aoki (2007), and Agrawal (2008)

This chapter is divided into two major parts. The first establishes the theoretical foundations of the framework by presenting the concept of institutions as rules, social structures, and organizations in the context of climate change adaptation (Institutions in Climate Change Adaptation Planning); examining the concepts of institutional arrangements (Institutional Analysis and Institutional Arrangements); and classifying institutional functions (Institutional Functions). The second part synthesizes these concepts (Institutional Environment Matrix Framework) to form a framework termed as the institutional environment matrix (IEM). In developing the IEM, this paper adopts the definitions established by other authors and develops some new definitions befitting the context in which they are used (Table 1).

Institutions in Climate Change Adaptation Planning There are varying notions of what constitutes an institution. Institutions are rules, procedures, conventions, and protocols in rational choice, economics, and game theory; moral templates, cognitive scripts, and frames of meaning in sociology and anthropology; and organizations in comparative politics and state theory (North 1990; Jordan and O’Riordan 1997; O’Riordan and Jordan 1999; Markvart 2009). In climate change adaptation, institutions should have a synthesis of definition that has crossdisciplinary relevance. Therefore, institutions are the commonly known and acknowledged rules, Page 3 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 1 A conceptual framework for institutions in the context of climate change adaptation (Source: Authors)

social structures, and organizations founded on common belief systems that transform individual acts and expectations into collective actions; convert personal values into social norms and shared beliefs; and define the formal and informal behavioral systems of human existence. Hence, rules, social structures, and organizations are all institutions. The core relationships among the three forms of institutions are illustrated in the Venn diagram (Fig. 1). Rules, social structures, and organizations are linked through a system of beliefs that allow them to exist and continue to persist as institutions. The beliefs associated with rules and organizations are significant components shaping the self-enforcing expectations, which consequently affect behavior and motivate individual actions (Greif and Kingston 2011). The belief system itself is a part of what constitutes social structure-based institutions (Nelson and Sampat 2001; Nelson and Nelson 2002). Rule-based and social structure-based institutions are further linked through informal rules. This linkage is shown in the overlap between the spheres representing rule-based and social structurebased institutions (Fig. 1). Together with formal rules, informal rules such as practices, norms, and traditions comprise part of the rule-based institutions. Formal rules define the hierarchical structure, decision-making powers, contracts, and property rights allocation in the political and economic systems (Pejovich 1995). Meanwhile, informal rules determine individual interactions and are engraved in society’s culture and heritage (North 1990; Hasan 2000; Hodgson 2006). These same social patterns of behaviors are the elements that form social structure-based institutions (Nelson and Sampat 2001; Aoki 2007). The conceptual framework considers organizations as an assembly of rules and contracts that operate through some type of relationship among individuals. This perception interlaces organizations – perceived as a “collection of rules” (March et al. 2011, p. 239) – with the rulebased institutions. Organizations rely on the norms and patterns of behaviors to be implemented (Hodgson 2006), which tie organizations to the social structure-based institutions.

Page 4 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

The formal and informal structures of organizational institutions are rationalized by the formal rules and social customs, values, and beliefs, respectively (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Shafritz et al. 2005). Formal rules are the written and legally sanctioned rules, whereas informal rules are represented by the unwritten social patterns of interactions and behaviors (Nabli and Nugent 1989). Formal rules are usually applied, managed, observed, and monitored by formal political, legal, and government institutions. Conversely, informal institutions fall under the private realm (Williamson 2009). Formal structures have a special relationship with informal rules (illustrated by the broken arrow linking the two factors) (Fig. 1). Formal organizations are created and legitimized by formal rules, whereas the relationships among the members of formal organizations are typically governed by informal rules. Hence, “in every formal organization, there arise informal organizations” (Shafritz et al. 2005, p. 205), thereby forming an additional linkage between formal and informal organizations (indicated by the broken arrow between the two entities). This relationship denotes that informal organizations do not directly affect the structure, composition, or creation of formal organizations. However, informal organizations are defined as collective behaviors (in the form of organized groups of people) that influence the choices and decisions of the formal organizations’ members. Meanwhile, formal organizations directly affect informal organizations through the formal rules they implement or the actions they perform (solid arrow in Fig. 1). In essence, “the root of informal systems are imbedded in the formal organization itself and nurtured by the very formality of its arrangements” (Shafritz et al. 2005, p. 205). For example, a formal organization that funds the activities of an informal organization may influence the latter to become formal itself, especially if formality is a requirement to gain further financial assistance. Alternatively, the funds provided may have allowed the informal organization to expand its operations, with the transition to a formal structure being essential to continue these new activities. This unified definition of institutions is vital in analyzing linkages among climate-adaptive institutions. Climate change impacts include extensive aspects of human existence (i.e., social, economic, political, ecological, and environmental). Hence an amalgam of ideas from various disciplines befits the concept of institution in the climate change adaptation context. This synthesized definition should be further investigated, particularly in relation to how rules, social structures, and organizational institutions function together in systems where adaptation responses are applied.

Institutional Analysis and Institutional Arrangements Institutional arrangements are critical to address the climate change challenge as adaptation “never occurs in an institutional vacuum” (Agrawal et al. 2008, p. 2). The success of adaptation practices rests on specific institutional arrangements, such as well-defined property rights that address resource access and risk exposure (Agrawal 2008). For example, building a seawall would not depend only on the physical construction of the structure itself, the costs associated with it, or the science that projects the rate of sea level rise. It also would be affected by the rules governing property (Caldwell and Segall 2007), including the agreements on the allowable height, thickness, and length of the structure; the social norms of the communities affected by the predicted sea level rise and storm surge; and the rights of private property owners. Therefore, developing suitable adaptation responses entails institutional arrangements that enable these measures to be implemented (Rodima-Taylor 2012, p. 12).

Page 5 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Arrangements in Rule-Based and Social Structure-Based Institutions Institutional analysis assumes that institutional change will affect some areas of reality that already are exposed to existing institutions. Therefore, the environment where the institutional changes (e.g., the creation of new policies or amendments in prevailing regulations) are to be implemented must be understood first before the possible consequences of such changes can be determined (Theesfeld et al. 2010). More importantly, intensive institutional analysis involves understanding the detailed working rules and norms that influence people’s decisions (Ostrom 2011). In rule-based and social structure-based institutions, these rules exist at three levels, namely, operational rules, collective-choice rules, and constitutional-choice rules (Ostrom 1990). Among the three, constitutional-choice rules are the most extensive. They are the basis of all rules – the set which determines who and what (specific rules) are authorized to create the other levels of rules. Next in the hierarchy are the collective-choice rules – the rules created to resolve conflicts, impose decisions, and formulate or transform operational rules (Ostrom 1990). Essentially, they are the rules which underpin operational rules (Tang 1991). Lastly, operational rules are those that directly influence the daily decisions about who oversees the actions of others and how or who takes part in which situation, what information must be given, what are the participants allowed to do, and what rewards or penalties will be designated to various sets of acts and consequences. Operational rules are typically known as policies (Ostrom 1990). Ostrom’s (1990) classic text, “Governing the Commons,” identified specific processes at each level of rules. Operational rules cover appropriation, provision, monitoring, and enforcement; the collective-choice level encompasses policy-making, management, and mediation of policy decisions; and the constitutional level includes formulation, governance, adjudication, and modification of constitutional decisions. Through these rules, institutions are able to affect and influence individual and collective actions. For instance, operational rules, such as those that specify fishing technologies permitted at a particular fishing ground, constrain and predict operational actions. Similarly, collective-choice rules are translated into collective-choice actions and constitutional rules into constitutional-choice actions (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). These levels of rules form the categories of institutions (Feder and Feeny 1991). The constitutional-choice rules comprise the

Fig. 2 Institutions and institutional arrangements (Source: Authors)

Page 6 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

constitutional order, whereas the collective-choice rules and operational rules constitute institutional arrangements (Fig. 2) (Feder and Feeny 1991; Tang 1991). Institutional arrangements are the structure of rules governing human decisions (Tang 1991) or the specific guidelines which facilitate social interactions (Klein 2000). Institutional arrangements are also sets of rules or agreements with a common objective (e.g., contract) that preside over the activities of people. For instance, a group of farmers may enter into an agreement to jointly purchase agricultural inputs or supply products to buyers, thus forming a producer’s organization (Eaton et al. 2008). Institutional arrangements likewise identify an individual in relation to others within the group that she/he belongs to, as well as with those outside the group. For example, in property regimes, the property relation between individuals is defined by the interest of one that is protected by virtue of the right and the duty of others to follow the arrangement (Bromley and Cernea 1989). Institutional arrangements, therefore, guide individual behaviors toward collective actions.

Arrangements in Organizational Institutions In terms of institutional organizations, institutional arrangements involve the system of (organizational) units that plan, support, and/or implement programs, practices, and actions. These arrangements include the linkages between and among organizations at different administrative scales (national, regional, state, provincial, and local) or sectors (economic, political, legal, social). They also represent relationships between government and nongovernment units such as households, communities, and civic organizations (Mattingly 2002). As institutions, organizations are governing structures that motivate collective behaviors and actions (Nelson and Sampat 2001; Williamson 2009), while institutional arrangements are the governance arrangements (Klein 2000; Kooiman 2008). Institutional arrangements oversee the relationships and interactions between, among, and within groups of individuals and, thus, influence the variability of commitments of institutions to governance (Klein 2000; Andersson and Ostrom 2008). These ideas are significant because they link organizational arrangements to the rule-based and social structurebased arrangements (Fig. 2). To illustrate, policy goals depend on the set of dominant actors and ideas in the area and when these policy debates and decision-making occur. Governance arrangements then determine the aims and the general implementation preferences of policies, regulations, and state-society interactions (Howlett 2009). Institutional arrangements allow multiple types of linkages between and among institutions (Heikkila et al. 2011). As guidelines, they are the means by which institutional interplay (i.e., in the form of functional interdependencies or consequences of institutional design and management) is implemented (Young 2002). Accordingly, institutional interplay refers to the interactions among institutions that build institutional relationships (Young 2002). Institutional interaction is determined by the impact of one institution on another, thereby exhibiting causation (Gehring and Oberthur 2009; Oberth€ ur and Stokke 2011). Thus, the effect or interaction will not be observed without a stimulus and a receiver. The stimulus is the source institution (independent variable), and the receiver is the target institution or system (dependent variable) (Gehring and Oberthur 2009). For example, an introduced institutional adaptive measure (the independent variable) will interact with the existing institutions in the system (the dependent variable). Institutional interplay, however, is not one directional. Interplay involves functional interdependencies (Young 2002; Linnér 2006) and thus includes mutual influences or effects. Although the interaction may be triggered by a stimulus, the outcomes or institutional linkages are the result of the institutional integration. Therefore, the interplay exists in the institutional environment comprised of the adaptive institution and the other existing institutions. Page 7 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Institutional interactions may be complementary, neutral or coexisting, counterproductive, conflicting, or overlapping (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Young 2002; Nilsson et al. 2012). In relation to the triad institutional concept introduced in this chapter, institutional linkages encompass relationships within, between, and among laws, policies, regulations, traditions, norms, practices, government units, civic organizations, and community groups, among others. Institutional linkages must be understood to determine how institutions influence adaptation practices and responses (Agrawal 2008). Consequently, institutional functions in the context of this institutional definition should be determined to understand the institutional fit of adaptation responses.

Institutional Functions Institutions are crucial in promoting successful adaptation to climate change. They influence key decisions in the system, shape the direction of adaptation efforts, frame the adaptive capacities of systems, and enable collective action toward attaining the adaptation goals (Næss et al. 2005; Agrawal et al. 2008; Eriksen and Selboe 2012). Institutions accomplish these tasks through their innate characteristics and the functions they perform. Institutions, as rules, social structures, and organizations serve the same functions, thus they are interdependent. These institutional functions can be classified into four main types, namely, reducing uncertainty (by forming individual and social expectations), connecting individuals to society, fostering adaptive capacity, and mobilizing resource utilization. These functions are performed by all institutional types, thereby, strengthening the interconnections among these institutions (Fig. 3).

Converts personal values into social norms Influences individual acts into collective actions

Coordinates collective behavior

Creates (dis)incentives

CONNECTS INDIVIDUALS TO SOCIETY Delivers external resources

MOBILIZES RESOURCE UTILIZATION

Social structurebased institutions

Rule-based institutions Determines transaction costs

Defines information systems

FOSTERS ADAPTIVE CAPACITY Mediates external interventions

Organizational institutions

REDUCES UNCERTAINTY Identifies Establishes systems inclusions and of power and exclusions authority Creates rights and entitlements

Fig. 3 Functions of institutions (Source: Authors)

Page 8 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 2 Institutional functions by type of institution Types of institutions Features/descriptions Rules Organizations Social Formal Informal structures Formal Informal

Functions of an institution Reduces uncertainty Establishes systems of power ✓ and authority

✓

✓

✓

✓

Actors and actions involved in decision-making; who has the authority and what kind of authority Scope and jurisdiction of actors (who) and actions (what) allowed and constrained Claims, privileges, etc. to resources, i.e., access rights, management rights

Identifies inclusions and exclusions

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Creates rights and entitlements

✓

✓

✓

✕

✕

✓

✓

✓

✓

Social principles, beliefs, and philosophies

✓

✓

✓

✓

Plans and programs for collective efforts and actions

✓

✓

✓

✓

Rewards and penalties; payoffs on actions

Connects individuals to society Converts personal values ✓ into social norms and shared beliefs Influences and transforms ✓ individual acts and expectations into collective actions Creates (dis)incentives for ✓ individual and collective actions Coordinates individual or ✓ collective behaviors Fosters adaptive capacity Defines information systems ✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Management of multiple efforts

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Provision of information (who, what, when, where, and for whom) Access to and management of outside resources (how, what, when, where)

✕

✕

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Mediates external interventions

Mobilizes resource utilization Means of delivery of external ✕ resources Determines transaction costs ✓ of activities and decisions

Actors facilitating access to outside resources (who and for whom) Integration of multiple efforts; internal costs (financial or otherwise)

Sources: North (1990, 1994), Ostrom (1990), O’Riordan and Jordan (1999), Jentoft (2004), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Pfahl (2005), Agrawal (2008), Adkisson (2009), Dorward and Omamo (2009), Kirsten et al. (2009), Gupta et al. (2010), Greif and Kingston (2011), and Berman et al. (2012)

The different characteristics of rules, social structures, and organizations limit their respective capabilities to perform some of these functions. For example, organizations (as a collection of rules and bundles of relationships and interactions) can establish systems of power and authority and identify the people included and excluded from the organization. However, the entirety of

Page 9 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

organizations, including their characteristic as “actors” (Gupta et al. 2010), constrains the organizations’ ability to create rights and entitlements but promotes their capacity to deliver external resources into the system (Table 2).

Reduces Uncertainty Institutions reduce uncertainty by forming individual and collective expectations and by developing a constant structure of social interactions (North 1990; Ostrom 1990; Kirsten et al. 2009; Brousseau et al. 2011). They also provide stability and predictability by establishing the power and authority systems (O’Riordan and Jordan 1999; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Berman et al. 2012) and creating rights and entitlements (Ostrom 1990). Institutions also identify inclusions and exclusions by determining which actions are permissible and the conditions by which to undertake certain activities (North 1990; Ostrom 1990; Klein 2000). By outlining constraints, institutions set up the boundaries for each individual and society as a whole (Ostrom 1990). For example, as an institution, property rights form expectations that the claims to the property would be respected and be abided by all, thereby reducing the uncertainty associated to these claims (Bromley and Cernea 1989).

Connects Individuals to Society Institutions connect individuals to society by giving everyone a shared identity (Jentoft 2004). They convert personal values into social norms and shared beliefs as individuals get emotionally attached and identify with the institutions. This function is specifically attributed to social structures, informal rules, and informal organizations. Thus, institutions become the social standard for understanding and reacting to circumstances, which accordingly become the source of people’s compliance and submission to institutions. As such, institutions influence and transform individual acts and expectations into collective actions (Kirsten et al. 2009). Institutions also create the incentive structure that determines the actions of people as individuals and as a society (Agrawal 2008). Incentive structures incorporate behavioral patterns that encourage actors to change norms and practices, implement the changes, uphold the changes, and stand by the decisions to change (Biermann 2007; Gupta et al. 2010). Thus, incentive mechanisms enable individuals to choose how to respond efficiently to goals and objectives such as those of climate change adaptation (Young 2002). Conversely, institutions also influence behaviors by providing disincentives or penalties to various actions and consequences (Ostrom 1990). Thus, choosing to conform to institutional arrangements becomes attractive. Institutions are also the means by which people coordinate their beliefs, interactions, and activities, thereby affecting how individuals and society make decisions (Pfahl 2005; Adkisson 2009; Greif and Kingston 2011). For instance, the local governing body in the Carteret Island in Papua New Guinea (i.e., the Council of Elders) organized the voluntary relocation of community households to the main island of Bougainville (Rakova 2009). Labeled as one of the first climate change refugees, the Carteret people were forced to leave their homes due to the accelerated sea level rise and the worsening extreme coastal events in the area (Boano et al. 2008). The Council formed a nongovernment organization, named Tulele Peisa, which designed and administered the Carterets Integrated Relocation Programme (CIRP) (Rakova 2009; Boege 2011). In this case, the organizational institutions such as the Council of Elders and the Tulele Peisa were vital in planning and mobilizing the relocation efforts. The community’s norms and traditions authorized the organizations (specifically the Council of Elders) to make decisions for the whole community. Meanwhile, the CIRP guided the people on how to follow through with the community resettlement. Thus,

Page 10 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

the social and cultural norms, organizations, and formal policies all affect how an individual, a household, and/or a community responds to climatic and other stressors (Young 2002).

Fosters Adaptive Capacity Institutions are critical in building the adaptive capacities of systems (Berman et al. 2012; Pradhan et al. 2012). They affect information systems (Dorward and Omamo 2009) and strengthen the ability of vulnerable communities to prepare for the impacts of climate change. They influence the flow of information, the types of studies undertaken, and the interpretations made from the research results (March and Olsen 1996). Moreover, they influence the kind of information to be disseminated (Ostrom 1990) and how this knowledge is disseminated (Agrawal 2008). Institutions are mediators of external interventions that affect how individuals, communities, and social groups utilize assets and resources (Agrawal 2008). Institutions provide leadership, facilitate negotiations, and create networks with other institutions such that external interventions can be systematically filtered, effectively absorbed, accepted, or refused (Agrawal 2008; Rodima-Taylor 2012). For example, a culture of solid community ties suggests an accommodating attitude for external interventions promoting community-based management; but the reverse can be expected if individualism is the norm.

Mobilizes Resource Utilization In mediating external interventions, organizational institutions are the means by which the external resources that facilitate adaptation are delivered, and they accordingly administer access to such resources. These resources may be information, technical inputs, and/or financial support. Institutions “mediate the extent to which climate change affects communities” (Pradhan et al. 2012, p. 9); therefore, they are crucial to the successful implementation of externally facilitated adaptation strategies (Agrawal 2008). Institutions matter because they determine the cost of transacting activities (North 1994) and are comprised of “transaction-cost–reducing arrangements” (Kirsten et al. 2009, p. 43). Transaction costs pertain to the costs incurred from the activities that lessen the risk of transaction failure such as planning, negotiating, creating, monitoring, and enforcement of an agreement. These also include the costs of maladaptation, bargaining, and other operations related to governance and securing the commitment of actors to the contracts (Kirsten et al. 2009). Institutions will fail to reduce transaction costs if the institutional context where the transactions take place is in disarray (Theesfeld et al. 2010). Similarly, a weak institutional environment, specifically in terms of legal frameworks, makes it difficult to enforce contracts and agreements that exchange goods and services and to coordinate activities (Eaton et al. 2008). The norms and practices existing in the system also affect the cost of transactions. For example, if bribery is the custom, then people may bribe corrupt law enforcers to accomplish their goals. Costs would include resources (e.g., money, time, and people) in bribing transactions plus the regular expenses incurred in undertaking such tasks. If the rule of law is upheld, then bribing will be useless and the associated costs will not exist. Likewise, if cheating is the norm, then there will be additional costs to prevent other parties from cheating. The effectiveness and efficiency of actions and activities depend on the institutional environment and arrangements in place. Interdependencies and linkages among institutions occur through these functions. These associations are the product of the interactions between and among institutional arrangements (Young 2002). In this sense, functional interdependencies can be defined as the relationships between institutions resulting from the interactions among arrangements that allow institutions to perform Page 11 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

their functions. These linkages are explored in the IEM framework that analyzes the institutional environment in adaptation responses.

Institutional Environment Matrix Framework The proposed framework incorporates two layers, the institutional environment (IE) and institutional matrix (IM) (Fig. 4). The institutional environment focuses on a specific type of system, a particular adaptation goal, or a type of adaptation strategy. It is a comprehensive inventory of the differing institutions – rules, social structures, and organizations – that may influence adaptation responses. This layer assumes that examining the institutional environment in assessing and planning for climate change adaptation responses is a significant feat. For instance, the coastal management and governance arrangements in the East of England showed that there exist: three central government departments, four regional bodies, five statutory agencies, four ad-hoc groupings, seventeen local authorities, and four forums with an interest in coastal planning, but not necessarily working together. . .. five sets of overlapping plans, fourteen designations of coastal sites and landscapes, a mix of

Fig. 4 Institutional environment matrix (IEM) framework (Source: Authors) Page 12 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

management bodies, many organizational cultures, un-coordinated organizational activity at different scales, and overlapping jurisdictions, responsibilities and functions. (Nicholson-Cole and O’Riordan 2009, p. 373)

Analyzing or planning for adaptation responses incorporates an exhaustive assessment of the institutional environment in which these responses have been or will be applied. This is important in institutional analysis because the number of institutions in a given system is directly related to the rate and complexity of the institutional linkages (Young 2002). The institutional matrix (IM) can analyze the interactions among the arrangements. It is defined as the system of institutional arrangements – including operational and collective-choice rules and governance arrangements – that determines the functional interdependencies of institutions. This layer examines the various relationships among the institutions and assumes that institutions affect an adaptation response via the institutional arrangements that enable institutions to perform their functions. The IE and the IM stages are closely linked, such that the IM is dependent on the information provided by the IE. This relationship, however, is one directional. Significant IE analyses can be done even without proceeding to the IM level, but the reverse is not possible. Various institutional interactions, like complementary, neutral, and counterproductive relationships, are realized from the IM layer. Complementary interaction indicates beneficial associations such that institutions perform better because of the creation or existence of the other (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). Conversely, counterproductive interactions result when institutional arrangements either destabilize or weaken one another, thus impeding the ability of institutions to perform their functions effectively. Neutral interaction suggests that institutions just simultaneously exist in the institutional environment without interacting with each other. The institutions neither improve nor worsen each other. Contradicting relationships arise when institutions are mismatched, thereby creating situations in which institutional arrangements are not attuned with each other. This institutional linkage forms tensions and conflicts among institutions and the corresponding elements that function within these institutions (Nicholson-Cole and O’Riordan 2009). Overlapping associations involve disputes in jurisdictions (Davis 2006), especially when institutions have similar mandates (Aggarwal 2005). Institutional overlaps are common and more significant in a high-frequency institutional environment where there is a high density of institutional arrangements operating in a single system (Young 2002). Lastly, redundancy signifies complete duplication of all institutional functions (Fig. 3). All the relationships, except redundancy, may exist in a single or multiple types of institutional functions. Policy 1 may be counterproductive with Policy 2 in establishing systems of power and authority but may be complementary in creating incentives for individual and collective actions. Likewise, there might not be any connection (neutral) between the two on defining information systems on climate change and adaptation. These linkages can be thoroughly examined using the institutional matrix analysis, which is further explained in the succeeding sections.

Institutional Environment (IE) The IE layer (Table 3) is comprised of formal rules (FR), social structures (SS), formal organization (FO), and informal organization (IO). Formal rules represent the written laws, policies, and regulations, whereas social structures are the traditions, norms, and practices affecting social collective behaviors. This framework incorporates informal rules in the social structure-based institutions, following the notion that they are linked. Formal organizations are the groups legitimized by the formal rules, whereas the informal organizations are those sanctioned by informal

Page 13 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 3 Institutional environment framework layout Institutional systems: complex system/ adaptation response

Institutional environment Formal rules Social (FR) structures (SS) FR1 SS1 FR2 SS2 FR3 SS3 FR4

Formal organizations (FO) FO1 FO2 FO3

Informal organizations (IO) IO1 IO2

Source: Authors

rules. The institutions comprising the IE may have been created to address a variety of issues, some of which may not be related to climate change. These rules, social structures, and organizations have particular arrangements that can affect climate change adaptation decisions, hence their inclusion in the IE. Take the case of Carteret climate change refugees.1 The adaptation response – community relocation – involves property institution and property right arrangements, both of which have been existing and working in the systems long before climate change concerns emerged. In this hypothetical case (Table 3), the institutional framework identifies four formal rules (FR1, FR2, FR3, FR4); three social structures (SS1, SS2, SS3); three formal organizations (FO1, FO2, FO3); and two informal organizations (IO1, IO2) that affect the adaptation response. All types of institutions are included in this layer regardless of scale. For example, FR1 may be a national program, FR2 a regional regulation, and FR3 and FR4 local policies. This is possible because the IE layer assumes that the institutions existing in various scales may simultaneously affect (or be affected) by the same adaptation response(s) through their arrangements. These institutional arrangements cut across differing scales, and they structure the relationships and functional interdependencies of institutions. The arrangements associated with each institution are critical in determining the extent of the institution’s influence in the decision-making process (Fig. 5). For instance, the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (EP Act) – an act primarily concerned with environmental pollution in the state of Queensland, Australia – can influence local authorities’ responsibilities and decisions. Though a state law, the EP Act specifies the responsibilities of local governments in notifying administering authorities of violations at the local level (EP Act, Part 8 [2]). (Commonwealth of Australia 1994). Thus, the IE layer is composed of all institutions that may affect climate change adaptation, regardless of the scale at which the institution primarily operates. In contrast, the institutional matrix layer is limited to a single scale analysis – only those institutional arrangements that cover the scale (federal/national, state/regional/territory, provincial/local) being analyzed will be examined. In the previous hypothetical case (Table 3), while FR1 is a national program and FR2 is a regional regulation, only those arrangements affecting the local scale will be included in the matrix if the scale of analysis is local. These notions are further elaborated below.

Institutional Matrix (IM) From the IE, the analysis progresses to the individual institutional arrangements in the institutional matrix (IM). The IM is dependent on the set of information provided by the IE stage, and those institutions identified in the environment are incorporated in the matrix (Table 4). In this hypothetical case, the IM analysis focuses on the local scale.

1

People were forced to leave their homes and resettle elsewhere because of climate change-related events. Page 14 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Fig. 5 Multilayered institutional linkages (Source: Authors)

The functions are the source of interdependencies among institutions, which are vital elements of the IM layer. Institutional interplay is observed by analyzing the institutional arrangements that shape these functions. With this, the institutional functions compose the row headings, and they are the categories by which the institutional arrangements are organized in the IM cells.

Framework Analyses: Vertical and Horizontal

The framework offers two types of analyses – vertical and horizontal. Vertical analysis (Table 5) shows the influence of individual institutions on the adaptation response by examining each institution’s function. As the hypothetical case has a local scale, only local arrangements will be included in the matrix. The vertical analysis of the formal rules indicates that the national program (FR1) incorporates local arrangements that establish systems of power and authority, identifies inclusions and exclusions, influences and transforms individual acts and expectations into collective actions, coordinates individual or collective behaviors, and defines information systems. The regional regulation (FR2) performs the same tasks in addition to determining transaction costs of activities and decisions. The IM vertical analysis also outlines the dominant institution in the institutional environment. In the example, the local policy FR3 is the most influential among all four formal rules (Table 5). An empty cell signifies that the institution does not perform the associated function at the specific scale in question. However, this does not imply that the institution does not implement the function at all. For example, FR1 may not create rights and entitlements at the local scale but may have such arrangements in either the national or regional scales. This aspect is the major difference between the IE and IM layers. Although cross-scale investigation is possible in the IE, this cannot be done in the IM. Overall, the vertical analysis shows the extent of the institution’s influence on the adaptation response. It also compares its functions across institutions in a specific scale.

Page 15 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 4 Institutional matrix (IM): an institutional framework for adaptation analysis TYPES OF INSTITUTIONS FUNCTIONS OF AN

Formal Rules (FR)

INSTITUTION

Social Structures (SS)

Formal Informal Organizations Organizations (FO) (IO)

FR1 FR2 FR3 FR4 SS1 SS2 SS3FO1 FO2 FO3

IO1

IO2

Reduces uncertainty Establishes systems of power and authority Identifies inclusions and exclusions Creates rights and entitlements Connects individuals to society Converts personal values into social norms and shared beliefs Influence and transforms individual acts and expectations into collective actions Creates (dis)incentives for individual and collective actions Coordinates individual or collective behaviors Fosters adaptive capacity Defines information systems Mediates influence of external interventions Mobilizes resource utilization Means of delivery of external resources Determines transaction costs of activities and decisions

Notes: The function “creates rights and entitlements” does not apply to organizations, while the function “means of delivery of external resources” does not relate to formal rules and social structures. The cells are shaded accordingly Source: Authors

The horizontal analysis is more complicated as it studies the functional interdependencies of institutions and assesses the relationships across various institutions based on their functions. In the hypothetical case (Table 6), the institutional linkages of all 12 institutions are illustrated in relation to the function “establishes systems of power and authority.” The cells in red are negative relationships, specifically counterproductive and contradicting. Conversely, the green cells are positive associations, particularly the complementary type. Neutral and overlapping relationships are white and

Page 16 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Table 5 Vertical analysis for formal rules

Functions of an institution Reduces uncertainty Establishes systems of power and authority Identifies inclusions and exclusions Creates rights and entitlements Connects individuals to society Converts personal values into social norms and shared beliefs Influences and transforms individual acts and expectations into collective actions Creates (dis)incentives for individual and collective actions Coordinates individual or collective behaviors Fosters adaptive capacity Defines information systems Mediates external interventions Mobilizes resource utilization Means of delivery of external resources Determines transaction costs of activities and decisions

Type of institution Formal rules FR1 FR2 FR3

FR4

✓ ✓

✓ ✓

✓ ✓ ✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓ ✓ ✓

✓ ✓ ✓

✓

✓

✓ ✓

✓

✓

✓

Source: Authors

yellow, respectively. With regard to structuring power and authority systems, some of the possible interpretations of the matrix are as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10.

Formal rules generally have negative relationships with informal organizations. Informal organizations are in harmony with the social structures. Formal organizations typically have overlapping jurisdictions with one another. Informal organizations typically have overlapping jurisdictions with one another. Formal rules are generally counterproductive or contradictory to social structures. The national program, FR1, has relationships only with social structures and other formal rules. It does not affect organizations, whether formal or informal. The national program, FR1, contradicts with the regional regulation, FR2. The national program, FR1, complements the local policy, FR3. As the national program and the regional regulation have a negative relationship, it is consistent that FR2 and FR3 are also contradicting each other. Thus, the regional regulation has a negative linkage with all other formal rules. Local policies FR3 and FR4 overlap. Both local policies are not attuned with the existing local norms, SS2, but are neutral to the local practices, SS1 and SS3.

Other assessments can be gleaned from this example. This type of analysis can be duplicated to the other functional classifications, thereby creating the overall assessment of the linkages between and among institutions. The matrix, thus, enables a planner or analyst to structurally examine complex institutional relationships, thus, possibly effectively evaluate and plan adaptation responses to climate change.

Page 17 of 22

Source: Authors

Informal Organizations

Formal Organizations

Social Structures

Formal Rules

Neutral

Neutral

Neutral

IO1

IO2

Neutral

Complementary Complementary Complementary

Neutral

Neutral

SS1 Complementary Complementary

Contradicting

Contradicting

Complementary

Counterproductive Contradicting Complementary

Contradicting

Complementary Complementary

Neutral

Neutral

Neutral

Neutral Complementary Complementary

Neutral

Neutral

Social Structures SS2 SS3 CounterCounterproductive productive

CompleCompleNeutral Contradicting Contradicting mentary mentary CounterCounterCompleCompleContradicting productive productive mentary mentary CounterCompleCompleContradicting Contradicting productive mentary mentary

Formal Rules FR2 FR3 FR4 CompleContradicting Neutral mentary CounterContradicting Contradicting productive CompleCounterOverlapping mentary productive Contradicting Overlapping Neutral CompleCompleNeutral Neutral mentary mentary CounterCounterContradicting Contradicting productive productive CounterNeutral Neutral Neutral productive CompleCompleContradicting Neutral mentary mentary CompleContradicting Contradicting Neutral mentary

FR1

FO3

FO2

FO1

SS3

SS2

SS1

FR4

FR3

FR2

FR1

Establishes Systems of Power and Authority

Table 6 Horizontal analysis for structure power and authority system function

Neutral

Neutral

Formal Organizations FO2 FO3

Neutral

Neutral

Informal Organizations IO1 IO2

CompleCounterCounterCompleContradicting mentary productive productive mentary CompleCompleCompleCounterContradicting mentary mentary mentary productive Contradicting Contradicting Contradicting Contradicting Neutral CompleCompleCompleContradicting Neutral mentary mentary mentary CompleCompleContradicting Contradicting Contradicting mentary mentary CompleCompleNeutral Neutral Neutral mentary mentary CounterCompleOverlapping Overlapping productive mentary CompleOverlapping Overlapping Neutral mentary CounterCounterOverlapping Overlapping productive productive CounterCompleCounterOverlapping productive mentary productive CompleCounterNeutral Overlapping mentary productive

Neutral

FO1

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Page 18 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Conclusion Institutions in climate change encompass rules, social structures, and organizations. The institutional dimension of climate change adaptation involves an intricate web of relationships between and among these institutions. In analyzing the complexity of institutions, a number of factors need to be considered such as institutional functions and interplay, as well as issues of scale (national, state, regional, and local) and jurisdiction. Thus, a purpose-built framework that can perform these kinds of analysis, such as the institutional environment matrix (IEM) framework, is needed. The IEM adopts a dual-layered approach in examining the various institutions that directly or indirectly influence adaptation decisions and responses in a particular system. Institutions are intrinsically complex; hence a single layer analysis cannot cover the intricacies involved in an institutional analysis. Furthermore, this design allows institutions to be examined across scales and provides an easy transition toward a single scale analysis. The dual layer design of the IEM allows the institutional environment and arrangements to be extensively studied. The IE layer includes all kinds of institutions in the environment regardless of scale, identifies the dominant institutions in the system affecting adaptation responses, and outlines the complexity of institutions in the institutional environment. Meanwhile, the IM layer enables a scale-focused analysis by dealing with particular institutional arrangements. The matrix allows for complex analysis of institutional linkages and interactions through the vertical and horizontal analytical approaches. By using these techniques, the functional interdependencies of institutions can be identified and institutional interplay can be explored. The institutional dimension of climate change adaptation is motivated by the need to design or redesign arrangements to address the risks and impacts of climate change (Young 2002). Accordingly, the IEM framework helps identify whether the existing institutions hinder effective adaptation, especially when there are negative relationships among the institutional arrangements. This condition may warrant modifying or replacing the arrangements such that institutions will fit more effectively in the institutional environment. When new institutions need to be introduced into the system, the IEM framework may be useful in developing arrangements that will be compatible with the existing ones. This will help avoid mismatches among institutions and thus minimize conflicts. This chapter has outlined a theoretical tool that can be used in adaptation planning and evaluation. However, the real value of the framework lies in its applicability in empirical cases. The need for further research in this area is vital.

References Acemoglu D, Johnson S (2005) Unbundling institutions. J Pol Econ 113(5):949–995 Adger WN (2000) Social and ecological resilience: are they related? Prog Human Geog 24:347–364 Adger WN, Arnell NW, Tompkins EL (2005) Successful adaptation to climate change across scales. Global Environ Change 15(2):77–86 Adger WN, Hughes TP, Folke C, Carpenter SR, Rockström J (2005b) Social-ecological resilience to coastal disasters. Science 309(5737):1036–1039 Adkisson RV (2009) The economy as an open system: an institutionalist framework for economic development. In: Natarajan T (ed) Institutional analysis and praxis. Springer, New York Aggarwal VK (2005) Reconciling institutions: nested, horizontal, overlapping, and independent institutions. Working paper. University of California at Berkeley, California

Page 19 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Agrawal A (2008) The role of local institutions in adaptation to climate change, a paper prepared for the Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Social Development Department, Washington, DC Agrawal A, McSweeney C, Perrin N (2008) Local institutions and climate change adaptation. In: Social development notes: the social dimensions of climate change, vol 113. The World Bank, Washington, DC Andersson KP, Ostrom E (2008) Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective. Pol Sci 41(1):71–93 Aoki M (2007) Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes. J Inst Econom 3(1):1–31 Berman R, Quinn C, Paavola J (2012) The role of institutions in the transformation of coping capacity to sustainable adaptive capacity. Environ Develop 2(2):86–100 Biermann F (2007) “Earth system governance” as a crosscutting theme of global change research. Glob Environ Change 17(3):326–337 Boano C, Zetter R, Morris T (2008) Environmentally displaced people: understanding the linkages between environmental change, livelihoods and forced migration. Forced Migration Policy briefing no. 1. Refugee Studies Center, Oxford Boege V (2011) Challenges and pitfalls of resettlement measures: experiences in the Pacific Region. Working papers no. 102. Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development, Bielefeld Bromley DW, Cernea MM (1989) The management of common property natural resources: some conceptual and operational fallacies. In: The World Bank Discussion Papers, vol 57. The World Bank, Washington, DC Brousseau E, Garrouste P, Raynaud E (2011) Institutional changes: alternative theories and consequences for institutional design. J Econom Behav Org 79(1):3–19 Caldwell M, Segall CH (2007) No day at the beach: sea level rise, ecosystem loss, and public access along the California Coast. Ecol LQ 34(2):533–578 Commonwealth of Australia (1994) Environmental Protection Act 1994. Queensland, Australia Crowder LB, Osherenko G, Young OR, Airamé S, Norse EA, Baron N, Day JC, Wilson JA (2006) Resolving mismatches in US ocean governance. Science 313(5787):617–618 Davis CL (2006) The choice of institutions for trade disputes, a memo prepared for the Princeton Conference on Nested and Overlapping Institutions, Princeton University Dorward AR, Omamo SW (2009) A framework for analyzing institutions. In: Kirsten JF, Dorward AR, Poulton C, Vink N (eds) Institutional economics perspectives on African agricultural development. IFPRI, Washington, DC Eaton D, Meijerink G, Bijman J (2008) Understanding institutional arrangements: fresh fruit and vegetable value chains in East Africa. Markets, chains and sustainable development strategy and policy paper, Wageningen Eriksen S, Selboe E (2012) The social organisation of adaptation to climate variability and global change: the case of a mountain farming community in Norway. Appl Geo 33(9):159–167 Feder G, Feeny D (1991) Land tenure and property rights: theory and implications for development policy. WB Econ Rev 5(1):135–153 Gehring T, Oberthur S (2009) The causal mechanisms of interaction between international institutions. Eur J Int Rel 15(1):125–156 Greif A, Kingston C (2011) Institutions: rules or equilibria? In: Schofield N, Caballero G (eds) Political economy of institutions, democracy and voting. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg Gunderson LH, Holling CS (eds) (2002) Panarchy: understanding transformations in human and natural systems. Island Press, Washington, DC Gunningham N, Grabosky P (1998) Smart regulation: designing environmental policy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK Page 20 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Gupta J, Termeer C, Klostermann J, Meijerink S, van den Brink M, Jong P, Nooteboom S, Bergsma E (2010) The adaptive capacity wheel: a method to assess the inherent characteristics of institutions to enable the adaptive capacity of society. Environ Sci Policy 13(6):459–471 Hasan L (2000) Property regimes in resource conservation- a framework for analysis. MPRA paper no. 7430. University Library of Munich, Munich Heikkila T, Schlager E, Davis MW (2011) The role of cross-scale institutional linkages in common pool resource management: assessing interstate river compacts. Policy Stud J 39(1):121–145 Hodgson GM (2006) What are institutions? J Inst Econ 40(1):1–25 Howlett M (2009) Governance modes, policy regimes and operational plans: a multi-level nested model of policy instrument choice and policy design. Pol Sci 42(1):71–89 Inderberg TH, Eikeland PO (2009) Limits to adaptation: analysing institutional constraints. In: Adger WN, Lorenzoni I, O'Brien KL (eds) Adapting to climate change: thresholds, values, governance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Jentoft S (2004) Institutions in fisheries: what they are, what they do, and how they change. Marine Policy 28(2):137–149 Jordan A, O’Riordan T (1997) Social institutions and climate change: applying cultural theory to practice. CSERGE working paper GEC 97–15. CSERGE, UK Kirsten JF, Karaan ASM, Dorward AR (2009) Introduction to the economics of institutions. In: Kirsten JF, Dorward AR, Poulton C, Vink N (eds) Institutional economics perspectives on African agricultural development. IFPRI, Washington, DC Klein PG (2000) New institutional economics. In: Bouckeart B, de Geest G (eds) Encyclopedia of law and economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK Kooiman J (2008) Exploring the concept of governability. J Comp Pol Anal Res Pract 10(2):171–190 Linnér B-O (2006) Authority through synergism: the roles of climate change linkages. Eur Env 16(5):278–289 March J, Friedberg E, Arellano D (2011) Institutions and organizations: differences and linkages from organization theory. Gest Pol Púb 20(2):235–246 March JG, Olsen JP (1996) Institutional perspectives on political institutions. Gov An Intl J Pol Admin 9(3):247–264 Markvart TI (2009) Understanding institutional change and resistance to change towards sustainability: an interdisciplinary theoretical framework and illustrative application to provincialmunicipal aggregates policy. University of Waterloo, Canada Mattingly S (2002) Policy, legal and institutional arrangements, proceedings of the regional workshop on best practices in disaster mitigation. Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, Bangkok Meyer JW, Rowan B (1977) Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony. Am J Soc 83(2):340–363 Nabli MK, Nugent JB (1989) The new institutional economics and its applicability to development. World Dev 17(9):1333–1347 Næss LO, Bang G, Eriksen S, Vevatne J (2005) Institutional adaptation to climate change: flood responses at the municipal level in Norway. Glob Environ Change 15(2):125–138 Nelson RR, Nelson K (2002) Technology, institutions, and innovation systems. Res Pol 31(2):265–272 Nelson RR, Sampat BN (2001) Making sense of institutions as a factor shaping economic performance. J Econ Behav Org 44(1):31–54 Nicholson-Cole S, O'Riordan T (2009) Adaptive governance for a changing coastline: science, policy and publics in search of a sustainable future. In: Adger WN, Lorenzoni I, O'Brien KL (eds) Page 21 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_18-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Adapting to climate change: thresholds, values, governance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Nilsson M, Zamparutti T, Petersen JE, Nykvist B, Rudberg P, McGuinn J (2012) Understanding policy coherence: analytical framework and examples of sector-environment policy interactions in the EU. Environ Pol Gov 22(6):395–423 North DC (1990) Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK North DC (1994) Economic performance through time. Am Econ Rev 84(3):359–368 O’Riordan T, Jordan A (1999) Institutions, climate change and cultural theory: towards a common analytical framework. Glob Environ Chang 9(2):81–93 Oberth€ur S, Stokke OS (2011) Decentralized interplay management in an evolving interinstitutional order. In: Oberth€ ur S, Stokke OS (eds) Managing institutional complexity: regime interplay and global environmental change. MIT Press, London Ostrom E (1990) Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, New York Ostrom E (2011) Background on the institutional analysis and development framework. Policy Stud J 39(1):7–27 Pejovich S (1995) Economic analysis of institutions and systems. Kluwer, Dordrecht Pfahl S (2005) Institutional sustainability. Int J Sustain Dev 8(1):80–96 Pradhan NS, Khadgi VR, Schipper L, Kaur N, Geoghegan T (2012) Role of policy and institutions in local adaptation to climate change: case studies on responses to too much and too little water in the Hindu Kush Himalayas. ICIMOD, Kathmandu, Nepal Preston BL, Westaway R, Dessai S, Smith TF (2009) Are we adapting to climate change? Research and methods for evaluating progress, a paper presented at the Greenhouse 2009: climate change and resources, Perth Rakova U (2009) How-to guide for environmental refugees. United Nations University, Tokyo Rodima-Taylor D (2012) Social innovation and climate adaptation: local collective action in diversifying Tanzania. Appl Geogr 33(1):128–134 Sabatier PA (ed) (2007) Theories of the policy process, 2nd edn. Westview Press, Boulder Schlager E, Ostrom E (1992) Property-rights regimes and natural resources: a conceptual analysis. Land Econ 68(3):249–262 Shafritz JM, Ott JS, Jang YS (eds) (2005) Classics of organization theory. Thomson Wadsworth, Belmont Tang SY (1991) Institutional arrangements and the management of common-pool resources. Pub Admin Rev 51(1):42–51 Theesfeld I, Schleyer C, Hagedorn K, Callois J-M, Aznar O, Olsson JA (2010) The institutional dimension in policy assessment. In: Brouwer FM, Ittersum M (eds) Environmental and agricultural modelling: integrated approaches for policy impact assessment. Springer, New York Vallejo L (2011) From international to local: the role of coordination across institutions working on adaptation to climate change. ICARUS II conference – climate vulnerability and adaptation, Ann Arbor Williamson CR (2009) Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance. Publ Choice 139(3–4):371–387 Young OR (2002) The institutional dimensions of environmental change: fit, interplay, and scale. MIT, London

Page 22 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Smart Metering and Sustainable Behavior in Low-Income Households in the Mediterranean Ales Podgornik*, Boris Sucic and Damir Stanicic Energy Efficiency Centre, Jozef Stefan Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Abstract Comparison between the EU’s 2020 energy efficiency targets and the forecasted energy savings clearly indicates a gap for expected energy savings in 2020. One of the reasons lies in the lack of specific policies for low-income households, which represent about 40 % of Mediterranean households and are considered as far to reach through traditional public policies. Due to their complexity, low-income households require innovative financial approaches for implementation of energy efficiency measures. Smart metering has been identified as one of the climate change adaptation technologies which can be used to encourage people in low-income households to become more aware of their energy consumption and stimulate them to change their energy-related behavior. Activities presented in this paper have been evaluated within the EU-funded project ELIH-Med with the objective to identify innovative energy efficiency measures and financial instruments for low-income households in the Mediterranean area. Also, this paper evaluates the impact of customized and adaptive consumption feedback on energy behavior patterns and energy savings in low-income households. Energy and cost saving prediction and verification flowchart are outlined to yield different combinations of suggested smart metering services, which would enable the minimization of households’ environmental impacts.

Keywords Energy efficiency; Smart metering; Consumption feedback; Behavior; Low-income housing; Mediterranean

Introduction The European Union (EU) has set a primary energy saving target of 20 % below the 2007 projections for 2020 (European Commission 2007). The success in achieving this goal will largely depend on promoting efficient energy end use in households. Many studies have confirmed that decisions and concrete actions of individuals have greater power and effects than capability of municipal administration to interfere in their actions. End-user’s (consumer) behavior is a very important parameter for the success of each national energy efficiency policy and related programs. It is necessary that the government efforts on the state level address not only what state or city can do directly to improve energy efficiency but also how the state can promote greater adoption of new and efficient technologies by consumers. According to (Birnera and Martinot 2005), this can come through changes in regulation, taxes, subsidies, access to capital, and provision of trusted information, as *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

well as marketing and campaigning to raise the awareness and encourage consumers to make choices that are both economically and environmentally sustainable. In the present moment in the framework of sustainable and climate-friendly development of urban areas, the most often highlighted problems are efficient spatial planning, efficient and secure energy supply, and efficient public transport. Energy efficiency is a red line, which connects all abovementioned areas. However, many contemporary policies and instruments for reaching energy saving potential are mainly oriented on technical systems (building envelope, heating systems, electrical appliances), while behavioral changes are addressed only by improved information availability through awareness campaigns. As presented by Gram-Hanssen (2013), user behavior is at least equally important as building physics when it comes to energy consumption for heating, while electricity consumption for lighting and appliances is more dependent on the user behavior than on energy-efficient appliances. Interactions between different parameters that have the effect on households’ energy consumption are presented in (Haas 1997). In general, energy consumption in households depends on many different parameters, namely, household structure (dwelling area, number of occupants, etc.), occupant’s behavior, technical efficiency of the installed equipment, and climate variables. In the present economic and financial crisis, the costs for energy and related challenges become even more important, and new and innovative approaches need to be considered in the residential sector where low-income households (LIH) must be specially targeted. Energy efficiency in low-income housing in the Mediterranean (ELIH-Med) project (strategic project within the MED Program, started in 2011) focuses on energy efficiency in the context of EU climate and energy targets for 2020. The LIH represent about 40 % of Mediterranean households and are considered as far to reach through traditional public policies (ELIH-Med 2010). Smart metering and its consumption feedback approach can be used for encouraging improvement of end-use energy efficiency and environmentally sustainable behavior in the targeted sector. As pointed out by European Smart Metering Alliance (2010), smart metering adds value to the ordinary utility service, giving better information to consumers and optimizing the use of the demanded power and consumed energy. Smart metering is widely used as a synonym for a system that records energy consumption and other parameters with bidirectional communication between utility and its clients. It implies a new relation model between the utility and its clients, using Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to interchange information between the utility and the devices installed at consumer’s premises. The majority of people tend not to see or feel the link between their actions (behavior) and the households’ energy performance and impact on the environment. Households’ behavior has been of great interest to social and psychological scientists as presented in (Abrahamse et al. 2005; McCaley 2006; Faiers et al. 2007; Steg 2008). Also, in many empirical studies, it can be found that individualized energy use information in the form of more informative bills, periodic feedback, and continuous feedback can lead to reductions in energy use. However, from the scientific point of view, it is not clear whether feedback needs to be more frequent to be effective and the sophisticated real-time monitors are more effective than simpler versions (Allen and Janda 2006). On the other hand, as pointed out by Fischer (2008), relevant features of consumption feedback that may determine its effectiveness are frequency, duration, content, breakdown, medium and way of presentation, comparisons, and combination with other instruments. In spite of considerable data restraints and research gaps, there are some indications that the most successful feedback combines the following features: it is given frequently and over a long time, it provides an appliance-specific consumption breakdown, it is presented in a clear and appealing way, and it uses computerized and interactive tools (Fischer 2008). Considering the socioeconomic factors, household income has been found to be a significant determinant of baseline energy use, but not of energy conservation behavior in reaction to feedback (Heslop et al. 1981; Brandon and Lewis 1999; Matsukawa 2004). Page 2 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

On the other hand, it is undeniable that human behavior impacts energy consumption and varies from culture to culture (Wang 2011). To evaluate the social dimensions of energy use, initiatives that combine society, energy, and technology in various permutations are needed (Janda 2009). This paper evaluates the impact of customized and adaptive consumption feedback on energy behavior patterns and energy savings in LIH. Activities presented in this paper have been evaluated within the EU-funded project, ELIH-Med. Several pilot project locations were selected for the installation of different smart metering and advanced consumption monitoring systems with the objective to identify innovative energy efficiency measures and financial instruments for low-income households in the Mediterranean area. Participating Mediterranean countries are Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia. Besides analysis of consumption feedback, supported by different smart metering solutions, the ELIH-Med project also focuses on identifying and demonstrating the feasibility of other innovative energy efficiency measures and financial instruments with the deployment potential relevant to Mediterranean territories and supported by European Regional Development Funds (ERDF).

Reaching EU 2020 Objectives in the Mediterranean Area In 2008, the share of energy consumption in households was 25.3 % of the total EU final energy consumption (European Environment Agency 2011). While space heating and cooling remains the most significant component of households’ energy consumption in EU, electricity consumption associated with the use of electrical appliances increased the most rapidly in percentage terms during the recent years – increase of more than 21 % per dwelling comparing with 1990 (European Environment Agency 2011). According to the requirements of directive on energy end-use efficiency and energy services (Directive 2006/32/ΕC), each EU Member State had to adopt and achieve an indicative energy saving target of 9 % by 2016 in the framework of the first National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP). Despite the commitment and huge policy efforts to boost energy efficiency improvements by EU Member States, the EU is far from reaching its 2020 energy saving target as shown in Fig. 1 (European Commission 2009). In 2010, after a large and long-lasting consultation with the public, the European Commission presented the Energy 2020 – A strategy for competitive, sustainable, and secure energy (European Commission 2010). Within the strategy for competitive, sustainable, and secure energy, the

Fig. 1 Energy saving policy gap in the EU countries: development and projection of gross inland energy consumption for EU by 2020 (European Commission 2009) Page 3 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

European Commission defines the energy priorities for the next 10 years and sets the actions to be taken in order to tackle the challenges of saving energy, achieve a market with competitive prizes and secure supplies, boost technological leadership, and effectively negotiate with EU’s international partners. The objectives presented in the European Commission (2010) are part of the EU’s 2020 strategy and in 2011 posted Resource-Efficient Europe initiative (European Commission 2011a). The aim of both documents is to make far-reaching changes to the way in which Europe produces and consumes energy, while building on what has already been achieved in the area of energy policy. Also, the European Commission recognizes the importance of the energy cooperation in the Mediterranean region and suggests improvements to the regulatory framework and stresses that an integrated regional market in the Maghreb would facilitate large-scale investments in the region and enable Europe to import renewable electricity. According to the European Commission (2011b), the EU needs to act immediately to get on track to achieve its targets, and a two-step approach was proposed for energy efficiency target setting. In the first step, Member States should set their own national efficiency targets, and in the second step, if the review of the set targets and programs shows that EU is not on track to reach 20 % target, the European Commission will propose legally binding national targets. This is formally laid down in the Energy Efficiency Directive from 2012 (Directive 2012/27/EU). Unfortunately, forecasted energy savings may be rather optimistic if the measures (according to the first and second NEEAPs) will not be implemented successfully and in that case, the expected gap by 2020 will be even larger. Unfortunately, there are many causes for the projected gap in the residential sector by 2020, and the most of them are associated with symptomatic unbalance between efforts for preparing polices and preparations for policy implementation. A major policy barrier is the absence of the implementation program follow-up and the clear definition of responsibilities of the management bodies on the state, regional, and local level. Almost all Mediterranean countries have defined long-term objectives in their energy strategies, but lack of clear definition of responsibilities with deadlines for the implementation was the crucial reason why many goals have not been achieved. As long as there is no clear definition of responsibilities of the management on the state, regional, and local level and consequences in the case of not fulfilling its obligations, there is no basis for involvement of other stakeholders. This reveals another key barrier for the successful implementation of the energy efficiency programs: lack of implementation capacity! Current situation is characterized by the fact that more people are working on planning of the energy efficiency measures than on its actual implementation. With the aim to make any energy efficiency action plan or strategy alive in the real terms, comprehensive and adaptive implementation and follow-up mechanisms have to be developed. The vast majority of policymakers are focused on transposition of common EU energy policies and requirements into national strategic and legislative framework, without in-depth evaluation of the energy efficiency developments in their countries. Unfortunately, in many Mediterranean countries, energy efficiency is not perceived as the most proper instrument for the future sustainable growth. Proper energy and growth policy can play an important role in overcoming these transition challenges, especially by providing financial incentives that lead to accelerated energy efficiency technology development and deployment. Having in mind high percentage of LIH in residential sector and scarce financing resources hardly accessible to LIH, each Mediterranean country will have to revise its energy policy and introduce effective and innovative energy saving mechanisms available for LIH. In the majority of cases, the private-public financing sources are not enough for all the LIH end users. Even the scheme of tax incentives for energy efficiency investment is not followed by the most of LIH due to lack of information and awareness of economic and environmental benefits in terms of the energy and money savings. Therefore, energy-efficient end-user behavior can be an important parameter for the success of national energy policy and Page 4 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

programs, especially in LIH residential sector. Correctly navigating the interface between policymaking and human behavior is the key for achieving sustainable energy consumption (European Environment Agency 2013). As demand for electricity from appliances is increasing, one of the effective and innovative measures includes installation of smart metering. Smart metering can provide desired and necessary link between end-user behavior and energy consumption. Introduction of smart metering, besides the benefits for the utilities, suppliers, and distributions, in its essence has the goal to help consumers to understand their energy consumption. Only a consumer who understands its energy consumption is capable to systematically and sustainably decrease it. On the other hand, utilities are already well aware of their total energy balancing, but with the additional amount of consumption information provided by smart metering, they will be able to better understand and anticipate the end-user behavior and explore this knowledge in synergy of utility measures for optimizing its overall energy performance.

Consumption Feedback Influence on Behavior According to (Darby 2006), improved feedback may help consumer to reduce its energy consumption by up to 20 %. However, to properly understand the consumption feedback influence on behavioral change, it is necessary to define and understand what is the relation between environmentally and energy-relevant behavior. According to Markowitz and Malle (2012), the environmentally relevant behavior refers to any behavior that can be identified as having a significant direct or indirect impact, negative or positive, on the health and stability of natural (eco)systems. Energyrelevant behavior refers to any behavior that can be identified as having a significant direct or indirect impact, negative or positive, on the energy consumption in selected object or energy system. Since there is a direct link between energy consumption and environmental impact of that consumption, it can be concluded that the energy-relevant behavior is the subset of the environmentally relevant behavior. Integrative influence model of environmentally relevant behavior (influence model) has been introduced by Matthies (2005) (see Fig. 2). These kinds of models are necessary to understand what

Fig. 2 Integrative influence model of environmentally relevant behavior Page 5 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

consumers do and why they do so. Also, a model proposed by Matthies (2005) can be used for explaining why and how feedback on electricity consumption can reduce consumption (Fischer 2008). According to (Fischer 2008), the influence model distinguishes between two types of environmentally relevant behavior. The first is habitual behavior or routine, called environmentally detrimental habits. The second and above the habits are conscious decisions. Habitual behavior or routine is the behavior performed regularly in the same way, and it is not reflected upon. Day-to-day household activities can be classified as such, and many of them are related to household’s environmental footprint, mostly through energy consumption activities (such as cooking, washing, turning on the lights, etc.). Once the routine is established, it may spiral into suboptimal way of doing things because majority of people never really think about an optimum way of doing it anymore. In the field of environmentally relevant behavior, many habits are environmentally detrimental because the environment or energy was not a relevant issue to consider at the time the habit was formed, or because beliefs about environmental effects held at that time have been shown to be wrong, or because the situation has changed so that a once beneficial behavior is not useful anymore (Fischer 2008). On the other hand, a conscious decision needs to be taken for new norms and considerations to enter the established behavior patterns and break the habits. To do this, a person has to be aware of various options to choose from and to establish proper norms and criteria to evaluate his/her own decisions. The influence model describes this process as norm activation and includes three stages of awareness: • Awareness of an environmental issue which is not solved or tackled by established habits • Awareness of relevance of one’s behavior to the environmental issue • Awareness of one’s possibilities to influence personal behavior to have sense of control. This process can be illustrated by correlating electricity consumption and electricity bill. One can improperly attribute the high electricity bill to electricity prices and not to one’s consumption behavior; therefore, no decision on behavior change will be made. If consumption costs are correctly linked to one’s behavior, a person has to realize how to control it. This can only be achieved if a person has sufficient information (i.e., consumption feedback on appliance-specific consumption). After successful norm activation, a person faces different motives (motivation) in order to reach a decision on how to act. Firstly, one is confronted with his/her personal norms and evaluates his/her personal ideas of how to act. Secondly, one is confronted with social norms and what one may consider as socially appropriate or desired behavior. People may sometimes make decisions based on the beliefs and values they perceive to be prevalent in their culture instead of their personal beliefs and values (Chiu et al. 2010). Lastly, there are also other motives not specifically defined in the influence model. In the case of energy consumption in households, these motives may comprise the need or desire for the services associated with electricity consumption on one side and a desire for comfort on the other. When norms and motives conflict with each other, a person has to go through evaluation or decision-making process, where moral, social, and other costs and benefits are weighed. During the decision-making process, the persons’ norms and motives may be influenced and redefined by available information. According to the model, the final stage is a decision for an environmentally friendly action. Under specific conditions, such an action may be performed regularly and develop into a new habit or routine (Fischer 2008). Four processes described in this model (norm activation, motivation, evaluation, and action) can be used for detecting the ways on how consumption feedback can be used to stimulate the conscious Page 6 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

decision and development of new energy-efficient habits. In general, consumption feedback gives clear and comprehensive information about energy consumption and can direct consumers’ attention toward energy consumption of everyday household activities. Concerning the energy consumption, feedback may focus on two consumption-related problems, problem of consumption costs and problem of pollution (environmental or sustainability issue). With the help of consumption feedback, these issues can influence reasoning process and motivate the consumer for cost savings or for minimizing environmental footprint. Past studies have shown that combining real-time consumption feedback with competition can additionally motivate consumers to reduce their energy consumption and stimulate behavioral change (Petersen et al. 2005). According to Fischer (2008), consumption feedback is most effective if it: • Successfully captures the consumers’ attention • Draws a close link between specific actions and their effects • Activates various motives that may appeal to different consumer groups, such as cost savings, resource conservation, emissions reduction, competition, and others.

Smart Metering in LIH In the light of EU energy saving efforts, the ELIH-Med pilot projects try to identify the most effective smart metering functionalities and services to increase energy efficiency in LIH and achieve measurable energy savings. Within the ELIH-Med project, analysis of twelve multi-energy smart metering projects in the Mediterranean area was performed. Performed analysis confirms that electricity has the leading role in the smart metering projects. Also, electricity smart grids are foreseen to be the backbone of the future energy grids, and smart electricity meters are expected to have the data concentrator role for other sources (heat, cold, natural gas, and water). EU Member States are obliged to roll out smart electricity meters for at least 80 % of their end consumers by 2020 and to achieve full coverage by 2022 (European Commission 2011b). In spite of this, smart grid concept cannot be taken for granted as the universal solution for all problems. It is a powerful framework which can assure that the full potential of concrete energy efficiency measure is systematically utilized and verified. Evaluated smart metering projects were sorted according to nine topics representing different benefits of smart metering for the end consumers on one side and suppliers and utilities on the other, as shown in Table 1. Evaluation confirms that the majority of benefits are at the supply side, Table 1 Benefits allocation of evaluated smart metering projects Topic

No. of projects

1

Customer feedback / change of behavior

8

2

Advanced tariff systems Other / new customer services (energy service companies)

3

3

Final beneficiary Consumer

4

4

Demand response / demand side management

5

5

Utilization of reusable energy sources

6

6

Standardization

1

7

Interoperability

7

8

Equipment testing

11

9

System services (distribution, supplier)

8

Suppliers utilities

Page 7 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

indicating the need to put bigger emphasis on exploring consumer benefits in upcoming smart electricity meter rollout. Unfortunately, in the current situation of economic crisis and cheap electricity available on the market, there is little interest in demand side management, and each Member State is facing the problem of funding the smart metering implementation. Rollout of smart electricity meters should be set in the development plans of individual distribution network operator(s) in each Member State. It is assumed that the necessary funds for implementation would be allocated from the grid fee and distribution network operator(s) would be the equipment owners. In many states, the current practice is that costs of implementing additional services and additional smart metering equipment (i.e., in-home display or individual appliance consumption metering) are charged separately and directly to the consumer. Such practice limits the availability of these services. In the case of LIH, it is crucial that electricity suppliers offer innovative ways of funding for additional services and the equipment. Due to the specific structure of this customer group, one of the options is to stimulate the implementation of additional energy services for energy efficiency by awarding the achieved energy savings in LIH and all in the framework of energy efficiency obligation scheme (Directive 2012/27/ EU) where the energy suppliers are obliged to report about achieved energy savings at the end consumers. In this way, suppliers will be more interested in the preparation of suitable energy efficiency programs for the LIH.

Smart Metering and Energy Efficiency Benefits The use of electrical appliances within households varies significantly in time. The most common measurement interval for load profile analysis in today’s electricity grids is 15-min interval. This resolution is satisfactory to show variations in electricity consumption, and it is used for billing purposes. Considering the climate change mitigation activities, smart metering represents technology with the potential for encouraging sustainable change toward the energy-efficient behavior. Smart metering introduces real-time automated meter reading, enables two-way communication, and is suitable for dynamic pricing. Also, the availability of accurate and almost online data for the evaluation of energy consumption has the potential to transform demand forecasting and detection of consumption patterns from a passive historical data-based activity to an active real-time datadriven process. However, smart metering without consumer participation and additional services will, by itself, do nothing to change behavioral pattern and save energy since the meter is simply an enabler. Energy savings will be achieved only if the installation of meters is connected with the comprehensive informational campaign which will help consumers to actually understand their energy consumption and stimulate them to move toward sustainable behavioral changes (European Smart Metering Alliance 2010). Also, traditional approaches that focus just on instrumentation and tend to ignore social characteristic of the target group are not suitable for the LIH. In order for energy savings to be realized, problem-oriented approach and customized financial incentives have to be introduced to make energy saving measures more attractive to LIH in economic terms (European Smart Metering Alliance 2010). According to the analysis performed within the ELIH-Med project, these incentives are usually in the form of demand response services and dynamic pricing, introduced by energy utilities.

Demand Response The target of demand response is to enable active participation of consumers in the market through the provision of consumption flexibility services to different players in the power system. Page 8 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Particularly challenging is the integration of households in the demand response programs due to almost stochastic nature of domestic electricity consumption and available load flexibilities. Therefore, the typical demand response of household consumers is a voluntary reaction to a price signal (Joint Research Centre 2011). Typical response is load shifting where electricity demand is delayed. Although the deployment of smart meters can enable active participation of consumers in the market (i.e., purchase of home energy sources), it is the energy savings and cost reduction which are of interest to LIH consumers and can potentially range up to 15 % (Joint Research Centre 2011). Understanding the relationship between consumption feedback measures, demand response measures, and energy efficiency programs is important to avoid potential conflicts and ultimately failure to capture the full energy saving potential available (European Environment Agency 2013).

Dynamic Pricing Dynamic pricing encourages consumers to shift consumption away from the peak consumption periods to lower consumption periods, lowering distribution and supply costs. This is achieved through dynamic pricing mechanisms which reflect the cost of supplying electricity. Dynamic pricing is suitable for LIH as it reflects immediately in the lower consumption costs. This mechanism can also utilize the characteristics of Mediterranean environment with high potential for solar electricity generation within certain time of day. In practice, there are several methods and degrees of dynamic pricing, but due to its simplicity Time-Of-Use (TOU), pricing scheme was recognized as the most appropriate for the LIH consumers. TOU tariffs stimulate people to switch their electricity consumption from peak to off-peak hours. The peak hours are known in advance and properly communicated to consumers. The prices may also vary according to the season. Potential for consumer financial savings using TOU tariffs is estimated up to 5 % (Stromback et al. 2011). Dynamic pricing enables energy savings only on the supply side by comprising intelligent integration of centralized and distributed energy generation resources and lowering transmission and distribution losses during peak hours.

Tariff Use Planning and Home Automation Advanced tariffs are pointless if consumers do not have a proper understanding of its time frames, possible money savings, and environmental benefits due to energy savings on the supply side. For this reason, the consumption feedback introduced in ELIH-Med project (through informative billing and interactive web page) includes additional explanation of implemented tariff systems and proposed the use of home appliances with high intensity of consumption (space heating and cooling systems, electrical boilers for domestic hot water preparation, appliances with adjustable time of operation) according to the implemented tariff system. The home automation in LIH concentrates on installation of electronic plug timers for demand shifting of energy-intensive appliances according to optimal tariffs and programming appliances with integrated time controllers for use in low or off-peak tariff. Proposed concept follows the rules of the simple home automation since the advanced home automation with remote load controllers is out of scope for LIH.

Consumption Feedback Services The role of consumption feedback is to make the consumption of energy/electricity visible. Feedback can also provide a more direct, detailed, comparable, and comprehensive information about households’ energy consumption pattern. Indirect or direct consumption feedback can be provided to consumers utilizing smart metering and its services. Page 9 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Indirect Feedback According to (Darby 2006), the indirect feedback is more suitable for demonstrating longer term effects on the energy consumption as the consequence of behavioral changes and applied energy efficiency measures. Through indirect feedback, the consumer has no direct access to the real-time consumption data and is therefore responding to previous consumption behavior and has to rely on processed information. Examples of indirect feedback appropriate for use in LIH are through informative billing and interactive web page. These types of feedback are based on smart meter readings with a combination of appropriate and tailor-made energy efficiency indicators, disaggregated consumption data, detailed energy reports, and other forms of presenting the energy consumption patterns. Informative Billing and Interactive Web Page As indicated by Saving Energy in Social Housing with ICT project (eSESH deliverable 2010), from the consumers’ point of view, one of the biggest advantages of the smart metering implementation is accurate and informative billing. Informative billing includes explanations of the energy saving options regarding the received monthly bill, and it is the favorable feedback option for tenants in social housings (eSESH deliverable 2010). Even though that informative billing provides real and accurate energy consumption data to domestic consumer, the biggest challenge is making this data understandable to all consumers including tenants in LIH. From the ELIH-Med perspective, the informative billing should have the following features: • Monthly billing based on actual consumption • Interpretation of monthly consumption in kWh and local currency (EUR) • Graphic representation of monthly consumption (load profile) with appliance-specific consumption breakdown (where utility provides individual appliance metering). Additionally, a graphic representation must include monthly consumption for at least past 3 months or more (up to 12 months) • Comparative and normative feedback (efficiency indicators) – e.g., graphic representation of billing consumption compared to consumption in comparable past periods, to average consumption in the past year, correlated to inside and outside temperature difference, etc. • Common bill for all on-site utility meters (electricity, natural gas, heat, cold, and water). Interactive web page with the secured personal access can also be utilized as indirect consumption feedback service in LIH. Similar to online banking, energy utilities should provide an option of e-billing (same characteristics as for the classical informative billing) and some degree of energy management (e.g., planning the use of home appliances with high intensity of consumption according to implemented tariff system). As indicated by eSESH project (2010), web services can reach a wider group of tenants also in social housings, and according to eSESH project survey, 85 % of tenants own a PC, and 77 % have access to the Internet.

Direct Feedback The main characteristic of the direct feedback is that consumers have an immediate and easily accessible display either directly on the smart meter or associated to the smart meter. The primary role of the smart meter is to provide a clear, concise, and understandable information or point of reference for improved feedback, preferably in combination with a separate in-house display (IHD) and individual appliance consumption metering. Using only smart meters, display for direct

Page 10 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

consumption feedback has its advantages in LIH as it does not bring additional costs for separate IHD. According to the ELIH-Med project, the direct feedback provided to LIH should include: • Appropriate indication that allows consumers to easily distinguish between high and low levels of electricity consumption (intensity of consumption) • Appropriate indication that allows consumers to easily distinguish between peak and off-peak times (indication and price of active tariff) and clear overview of billing consumption (in kWh and currency), broken down by tariff. Besides meter’s display and potential use of IHD, direct feedback allows alarm notification of tenants in the events when abnormal or extensive electricity consumption occurs. Such alarms may prove to be the most influential on behavior changes. Due to already available communication channels (SMS or smartphone applications, e-mail), this way of communication is very simple to implement in LIH. According to ELIH-Med, possible triggering events are: • Tariff switch. • Steep deviation from average hourly consumption. • Monthly threshold (average monthly consumption) has been reached.

Pilot Households Selection of ELIH-Med pilot households, participating in ELIH-Med smart metering experimentation, was based on the household matrix according to which each participating household was categorized. Required data was gathered with the comprehensive survey which was also used to establish the baseline energy consumption for each observed household/tenants and energy-related behavior. One of the purposes for thorough household categorization was to enable long-term comparisons with an average normalized or benchmarked consumer in the same user category. The need for this comparison is specified in the new Energy Efficiency Directive (Directive 2012/27/EU). Economic characteristics define the dwellings in LIH category where low income refers to households who usually do not have sufficient resources to have an easy access to credit or capital in order to invest in energy efficiency. Social characteristics define the target groups by social and behavior aspects. They are further divided into three subgroups: • Dwellings size and typology • Social structure of tenants in household • Usage of social media. Technical characteristics define the technical features of LIH. They are further divided into five subgroups: • • • •

Type of appliances used and their typical usage Use of home automation Use of lightning Heating, cooling, and domestic hot water (DHW) Page 11 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 2 Groups of representative cases Category Mediterranean space Tenants income

Household

Dwelling typology

Ownership

Included cases Cyprus and Malta; Mediterranean region of France, Greece, and Spain Retired Employed Unemployed Scholarship Family with children Family without children Single occupant Students Single house Semidetached house Apartment in multiple dwelling building Student dorm Private property Rent Social housing

• Historical data on energy consumption (past energy consumption). During the pilot households’ selection, a special care has been taken to include all envisioned use cases, as defined in groups of representative cases (Table 2). Surveys of pilot households have highlighted some of the LIH and Mediterranean characteristics which were considered during the use cases development. LIH characteristics: • • • •

Moderate electricity consumption (reaching national average or below average). Energy costs present significant part of household income. Use of old and inefficient household appliances. Use of passive ventilation is more common than use of advanced cooling or air-conditioning systems. • Frequently suboptimal living conditions due to inadequate maintenance of living quarters. Mediterranean: • Higher demand for cooling Cooling degree days (CDD) exceed heating degree days (HDD) as show in Fig. 3 for one of the pilot locations (Larnaca, Cyprus) in years 2010 through 2012 • Low penetration of efficient heating systems (i.e., central heating) • Low penetration of natural gas grids and district heating • Electricity as main energy source for cooking It was noticed that even in cases where natural gas is used for DHW, electricity is usually used for cooking. Also, there is a noticeable rise of electricity consumption during summer months (direct consequence of higher cooling than heading demand) as shown in the case of pilot dwellings in Larnaca, Cyprus (Fig. 4). Page 12 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Fig. 3 Cooling and heating degree days for Larnaca, Cyprus

Fig. 4 Sample household electricity consumption

Implementation of Consumption Feedback Services Different types and forms of consumption feedback can be used to influence the reasoning process as described in integrative influence model of environmentally relevant behavior. Three types of consumption feedback presentation were used in selected pilots to target the desired action of the consumer: • Presentation as environment/pollution problem – equivalent of energy used in CO2 emissions • Presentation as family budget problem – costs of energy consumption • Presentation as consumption problem – consumption in kWh. To maximize the consumption feedback impact on the consumer’s behavior, ELIH-Med project follows the previously suggested feedback types and include four forms of implementation as shown in Table 3. The first three forms are targeting the behavior of single households, and the last one is targeting the change of behavior on a group of residents. All forms can use several types of presentation. The focus can be either on environment (CO2 emissions) or energy (consumption in kWh) or on the costs related to consumption. Reduction of costs is particularly important for LIH as even small energy cost savings can have significant impact on the household budget.

Page 13 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 3 Forms of smart metering implementation

1.

2.

3.

4.

Form Appliance-specific consumption breakdown with simple kWh, CO2, and costs presentation of energy consumption on IHD. Web access with additional consumption breakdown is also available. The pilot projects without web access or in cases where tenants are not customized or willing to use the Internet and monthly reports provided by installed metering equipment are printed by equipment maintainers and distributed to tenants. The form of report is suited to the tenant’s needs in each case Sophisticated environmental feedback including consumption and environmental parameters in the form of advanced consumption and environment monitoring system, where energy consumption, temperature, humidity, and other parameters are monitored and presented in individualized web page Utility smart meters are used as main focus point of consumption monitoring, and informative billing is used as main consumption feedback medium. Installation of smart meters is coupled with installation of photovoltaic system as complementary utilizing Mediterranean-specific climate conditions Comparative consumption feedback between several buildings (student dorms) in the form of public dashboards to initiate and stimulate the competition

Type of presentation (in the order of focus) Consumption Budget Environment

Target Behavior of single household

Number of cases 60 households

Environment Consumption Budget

Behavior of single household

40 households

Budget Consumption Environment

Behavior of single household

60 households

Environment Consumption

Behavior of a group of residents

5 buildings 144 rooms

Smart Metering Experimentation Plan Smart metering experimentation plan of the ELIH-Med project was divided into four phases, preinstallation, installation, monitoring, and evaluation (Fig. 5). Phases were designed to follow the integrative influence model of environmentally relevant behavior. Also, the first three phases had an important role in helping LIH consumers to understand how they can use the information provided by smart metering to manage their energy consumption effectively and to save energy.

Preinstallation Main purpose of preinstallation phase was to assure that selected dwellings comply with LIH criteria and to additionally motivate households participating in experiment (norm activation). Awareness campaign included information concerning all renovation (other ELIH-Med project initiatives) and installation works which were carried out through the experiment. Within the preinstallation phase, the baseline consumption data and past behavioral patterns through survey of participating LIH were obtained. Figure 6 shows the main activities and scope of preinstallation phase. Experiences from this phase clearly confirm that people welcome the works and changes in their premises when actions are previously well explained. Following a presentation of the project objectives, tenants were in favor of installing smart metering systems into their premises. The second and equally important finding from this phase was related with the importance of community involvement. The best way of motivating households for installation works and other initial activities is to designate the local representative who coordinates the building activities Page 14 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Fig. 5 Four phases of interactions in smart metering experimentation

Fig. 6 Preinstallation phase

(organization of education and awareness sessions, coordination of installation process between installers and tenants, etc.). Including the representatives of the local community (neighborhood or building representative) in the preparations and awareness campaigns has proved to be a crucial point in the transfer of sustainable ideas. Initial skepticism, which was particularly present in LIH, has turned into enthusiasm and a desire to cooperate.

Installation of Smart Metering Equipment During equipment installation phase, it was essential to assure that all LIH participating in the experiment are familiar with installed smart metering equipment. Figure 7 shows the main inputs of the installation phase. This phase has highlighted the poor condition of LIH living premises. In several cases, due to safety reasons, old wiring needs to be replaced before the installation of new equipment.

Monitoring Main purpose of this phase was to monitor the effects of implemented consumption feedback services on behavior of the LIH and adjustment of individual smart metering services according to the survey feedback from households, facilitating the living lab approach to fine-tune different smart metering services to different households (impact of social, cultural, and regional differences). Survey feedback from the tenants on their experience regarding available services was collected and evaluated. Based on these results, the additional adjustment of consumption feedback was done during the monitoring phase: • Adjustment of monthly report with consumption indicators (printed report or interactive web page). • In the cases of individual appliance monitoring, it was enabled that the monitored appliances might be changed.

Page 15 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Fig. 7 Smart metering equipment installation phase

Fig. 8 Monitoring phase

During this phase, three main findings of recognizable benefits have been recorded: • Tenants have become aware of individual appliance consumption and expressed the surprise of their effects on the monthly electricity bill. In some cases, tenants turn down the heating/cooling when prompted on excess consumption. • Awareness of current consumption and households’ environmental footprint has initiated clear interest about additional energy efficiency measures to be implemented in the households. • Multiplying the effect of complementary energy efficiency measures. When other energy efficiency measures are implemented (i.e., thermal insulation, double-glazed windows, etc.), the consumption feedback additionally motivates the tenants to adapt behavior to implemented technical updates and modifications. Figure 8 shows the main characteristics of the monitoring phase.

Page 16 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Evaluation Within this phase, household consumptions as a result of smart metering experiment and induced behavioral changes are to be analyzed. Monitoring and review of the experimentation progress include the consumer experience of the process, new smart metering functionalities, and identified services. Results of the analysis will be used as input in the process of the development of the Energy Savings Verification Model. The preliminary analysis of LIH electricity consumption within the ELIH-Med project has clearly confirmed electricity saving potential with employment of smart meters and described functionalities. In all cases, principles of demand response and sustainable behavior changes have provided up to 5 % of electricity savings. In the cases where LIH consumers have applied additional load optimization techniques (economical usage of household appliances) stimulated by consumption feedback, up to 7 % savings have been achieved.

Future Research Challenges Smart metering is primarily intended as an active element of utilities’ energy distribution operations in smart grid infrastructure, but it has also shown potential as climate change mitigation tool through two additional side effects. The first is a support for the energy efficiency services and measures as an independent and customizable tool providing a more direct, comparable, and comprehensive information about households’ energy consumption pattern. Secondly, smart metering infrastructure enables proper energy saving verification and validation. Based on the preliminary results from the ELIH-Med project, electricity utilities have the vital role in the smart metering implementation and must be involved in providing LIH with new customized services. Also, multi-energy metering must be established when other energy utilities are present (water, natural gas, district heating, and cooling), and the advantage of existing electricity grid infrastructure has to be explored. If smart meters are used for all utilities on-site, communication with these meters can be done via a smart electricity meter since the electricity meter can always provide the power supply for the communication. Sharing the remote communication channel can also greatly reduce the combined costs of communication and therefore costs for the consumer, which is vitally important for LIH. Even though that electricity is the most dominant energy carrier in the Mediterranean area, only a complete overview of household energy balance from all utilities (electricity, water, natural gas, district heating, and cooling) can induce proper consumer behavior changes as savings in one energy form may be replaced by increased consumption in the others.

Energy Saving Verification Results of the ELIH-Med smart metering experimentation process will be used to build an algorithm for the verification of energy savings considering different functionalities of smart meters in combination with the behavioral changes, implemented energy efficiency measures, and other influential factors. The experimental results enabled contextualization of the energy consumption where the notion of context refers to (actual) characteristics of the household and its environment, typology, social status, appliances, and devices. Database of performance results will also enable energy performance benchmarking, where a selected and comparable LIH can be benchmarked based on the input data gathered by household survey. Finally, the prediction algorithm based on the results of smart metering experiment will enable the forecast of energy savings and energy consumption cost reductions as shown in Fig. 9.

Page 17 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Fig. 9 Energy and cost saving prediction and verification flowchart

The outcome of validation model should also help Member States to decide which energy efficiency objectives and which benefits to the end consumers are taken into account when obliging market participants and setting minimum functionalities for smart meters. This obligation is established in the new directive on energy efficiency (Directive 2012/27/EU), which in Article 9(2)(a) states that Member States must ensure that “objectives of energy efficiency and benefits for final customers are fully taken into account when establishing the minimum functionalities of the meters and the obligations imposed on market participants.”

Conclusion Successful energy efficiency policy must be adaptive and must rely on the empirical data. Smart metering is a powerful tool for monitoring and verification and must be part of the comprehensive energy efficiency and climate change mitigation policy. Implementation of energy efficiency measures and utilization of the smart metering and its consumption feedback services in LIH may prove to be quite challenging introduction of changes in a very complex environment. However, energy-efficient behavior is a critical parameter for the success of each national energy policy and programs. The ELIH-Med project clearly confirmed the importance of community involvement before and during the smart metering implementation. Also, in the case of LIH, it has been confirmed that proper and tailor-made consumption feedback has a potential to influence on the established behavioral patterns, break the habits, and initiate environmentally friendly actions. To make such feedback available, energy suppliers should offer innovative ways of covering the costs of additional smart metering services and equipment in LIH. Although individual consumption registration of energy-intensive household appliances may prove to have big influence on consumer behavior, it is

Page 18 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

the notification about relevant and extraordinary events in energy consumption that proved to have the biggest impact to behavioral changes in LIH. Also, it has been noticed that the awareness about energy consumption and households’ environmental footprint has raised the interest for additional energy efficiency measures. In cases where other energy efficiency measures were implemented, the consumption feedback additionally motivated the tenants to adapt their behavior and achieve even bigger savings. Internet access has proved to be available for the majority of LIH and should be used for enriched consumption feedback. As consumption feedback will be specific to LIH, this is also an opportunity for different social programs to act through energy efficiency awareness campaigns in providing additional information and programs utilizing smart metering communication channels.

References Abrahamse W, Steg L, Vlek C, Rothengatter T (2005) A review of intervention studies aimed at household energy conservation. J Environ Psychol 25(3):273–291 Allen D, Janda K (2006) The effects of household characteristics and energy use consciousness on the effectiveness of real-time energy use feedback: a pilot study. 2006 ACEEE summer study on energy efficiency in buildings [Online]. Available: http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/publications/downloads/janda06aceee.pdf Birnera S, Martinot E (2005) Promoting energy-efficient products: GEF experience and lessons for market transformation in developing countries. Energy Policy 33:1765–1779 Brandon G, Lewis A (1999) Reducing household energy consumption: a qualitative and quantitative field study. J Environ Psychol 19:75–85 Chiu CY, Gelfand MJ, Yamagishi T, Shteynberg G, Wan C (2010) Intersubjective culture: the role of intersubjective perceptions in cross-cultural research. Perspect Psychol Sci 5(4):482–493 Darby S (2006) The effectiveness of feedback on energy consumption. A review for DEFRA of the literature on metering, billing and direct displays [Online]. Available: http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/ research/energy/downloads/smart-metering-report.pdf Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on energy end-use efficiency and energy services (2006) Off J 114:64–85 Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency (2012) Off J L 315:1–56 ELIH-Med Energy Efficiency in Low-income Housing in the Mediterranean, MED (2007–2013) Ref: 3677, Submitted project, September 2010. Available: http://www.elih-med.eu eSESH deliverable (2010) eSESH D1.1 Requirements for eSESH services and systems [Online]. Available: http://esesh.eu/outputs/ European Commission (2007) Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament: an energy policy for Europe, COM (2007) 1 final [Online]. Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri¼COM:2007:0001:FIN:EN:PDF European Commission (2009) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 7 measures for 2 Million new EU Jobs: low carbon eco efficient & cleaner economy for European citizens, COM (2009), draft European Commission (2010) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – energy 2020 a strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy, COM (2010) 639 final, [Online]. Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? uri¼CELEX:52010DC0639:EN:NOT Page 19 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

European Commission (2011a) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – a resource-efficient Europe – flagship initiative under the Europe 2020 Strategy, COM (2011) 21 final, [Online]. Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? uri¼COM:2011:0021:FIN:EN:PDF European Commission (2011b) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: energy efficiency plan 2011, COM(2011) 109 final [Online]. Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri¼COM:2011:0109:FIN:EN:PDF European Environment Agency (2011) Final energy consumption by sector (CSI 027/ENER 016) [Online]. Available: http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/final-energyconsumption-by-sector-1/final-energy-consumption-by-sector-6 European Environment Agency (2013) Achieving energy efficiency through behaviour change: what does it take? (Technical report No 5/2013) [Online]. Available: http://www.eea.europa.eu/ publications/achieving-energy-efficiency-through-behaviour European Smart Metering Alliance (2010) Annual report on the progress in Smart Metering 2009 [Online]. Available: http://www.eaci-projects.eu/iee/fileshow.jsp?att_id¼13064&place¼pa&url¼ESMA_Annual_Report_2009.pdf&prid¼1564 Faiers A, Cook M, Neame C (2007) Towards a contemporary approach for understanding consumer behaviour in the context of domestic energy use. Energy Policy 35(8):4381–4390 Fischer C (2008) Feedback on household electricity consumption: a tool for saving energy? Energy Effic 1(1):79–104 Gram-Hanssen K (2013) Efficient technologies or user behaviour, which is the more important when reducing households’ energy consumption? Energy Effic 6:447–457 Haas R (1997) Energy efficiency indicators in the residential sector: what do we know and what has to be ensured? Energy Policy 25(7–8):789–802 Heslop LA, Moran L, Cousineau A (1981) “Consciousness” in energy conservation behavior: an exploratory study. J Consum Res 8:299–305 Janda K. (2009) Exploring the social dimensions of energy use: a review of recent research initiatives. ECEEE 2009 summer study. pp 1841–1852. Available: http://www.eceee.org/ library/conference_proceedings/eceee_Summer_Studies/2009/Panel_8/8.300 Joint Research Centre – Institute for Energy (2011) Smart grid projects in Europe: lessons learned and current development, Reference Report [Online]. Available: http://ses.jrc.ec.europa.eu/sites/ses/ files/documents/smart_grid_projects_in_europe_lessons_learned_and_current_developments.pdf Markowitz EM, Malle BF (2012) Did you see that? Making sense of environmentally relevant behavior. Ecopsychology 4:37–50 Matsukawa I (2004) The effects of information on residential demand for electricity. Energy J 25(1):1–17 Matthies E (2005) Wie können PsychologInnen ihr Wissen besser an die PraktikerIn bringen? Vorschlag eines neuen, integrativen Einflussschemas umweltgerechten Alltagshandelns. Umweltpsychologie 9(1):62–81 McCaley LT (2006) From motivation and cognition theories to everyday applications and back again: the case of product-integrated information and feedback. Energy Policy 34(2):129–137 Petersen J, Shunturov V, Janda K, Platt G, Weinberger K, Murray ME (2005) Does providing dormitory residents with feedback on energy and water use lead to reduced consumption?. Greening the campus VI, 15–17, Ball State University, Muncie Steg L (2008) Promoting household energy conservation. Energy Policy 36(12):4449–4453 Page 20 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Stromback J, Dromacque C, Yassin MH (2011) The potential of smart meter enabled programs to increase energy and systems efficiency: mass pilot comparison [Online]. VaasaETT, Available: http://www.esmig.eu/press/filestor/empower-demand-report.pdf Wang JH (2011) Behavioral policy modelling: consumer behavior impacts on residential energy consumption [Online]. Available: http://www.spp.gatech.edu/faculty/WOPRpapers/Wang. WOPR11.pdf

Page 21 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_19-1 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Index Terms: Behavior 2, 4–5, 11, 13, 15 Consumption feedback 3, 5, 9, 15 Energy efficiency 2, 4, 7–11, 17 Low-income housing 2–3, 11 Mediterranean 2–4, 7, 9, 12, 17 Smart Metering 2, 5, 7–8, 10, 14

Page 22 of 22

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Development and Application of Good Practice Criteria for Evaluating Adaptation Measures Christian Kinda*, Andreas Vetterb and Rupert Wronskic a adelphi, Berlin, Germany b Federal Environment Agency (UBA), Dessau-Rosslau, Germany c Green Budget Germany, Berlin, Germany

Abstract Decision-makers on different levels face an information deficit with regard to choosing promising adaptation measures. While the ever present concept of good practice may prove helpful in closing this gap, the term is often poorly defined. Therefore, this article attempts to substantiate the concept of good practice in climate change adaptation by developing a set of key criteria for evaluating adaptation measures. This potentially leads to sounder decision-making and a better transfer of experiences. By way of an extensive literature review, a variety of definitions and criteria for good practice in adaptation is revealed. Using predefined selection rules like non-redundancy, applicability, comprehensibility, completeness, and measurability, the identified criteria are condensed and then ranked by experts. This way, the article identifies six key evaluation criteria that should be considered when deciding whether an adaptation measure can be deemed good practice example or not. These are effectiveness, robustness, sustainability, financial feasibility, positive side effects, and flexibility. Subsequently, the set of criteria is illustrated by evaluating several good practice examples on the local level in Germany. Eventually, limits of the derived good practice criteria are discussed.

Keywords Climate change; Adaptation; Good practice; Set of criteria; Decision support; Adaptation measure

Introduction For many stakeholders involved, the development and implementation of climate change adaptation measures is a new challenge. It implies, inter alia, the necessity to react to already occurred climatic changes and to yet uncertain future changes (Bedsworth and Hanak 2010). In the face of this uncertainty, public and private stakeholders may find it difficult to develop suitable measures to adapt to climate change impacts or determine which of the potentially available measures are the most appropriate options (Hecht 2009). Learning from good examples for climate change adaptation is a promising approach to support stakeholders with the planning and implementation of measures. Today, the concept of good or best practice is already used frequently in the communication of experience gained in the context of climate change adaptation (Land Use Consultants et al. 2006; Islington Government n.d.). However, *Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

at the same time, it has to be noted that the use of the concept of good practice is often vague and unspecific (Jennings 2007) requiring further research to specify the concept of good practice in the context of climate change adaptation (Foster et al. 2011). For an effective and inspiring communication of a good adaptation practice, it seems necessary to substantiate the concept of good practice. A transparent approach to this lies in the development of a set of criteria, which can be applied to evaluating adaptation measures to determine whether respective actions constitute a good practice. Thus, the objective of this article is to identify good practice criteria for climate change adaptation measures in the context of industrialized countries, such as Germany. Relevant publications and websites are analyzed for that purpose. The research is based on preparatory work on the prioritization of adaptation measures carried out by the Federal Environment Agency (Tröltzsch et al. 2011, 2012; Kind et al. 2011). A consistent and compact set of criteria for good practice is derived on the basis of literature research and inputs from an expert survey. The focus is not so much the analysis of individual examples of good practice as such, but rather the highlighting of general criteria of good practice that help identify measures as good practice. The particular measure and its nature or effects are more at the center of attention than the process of identifying or implementing the measures (as opposed to, e.g., the guiding principles for adaptation by Prutsch et al. 2010). Measures for the application of the set of criteria are primarily spatially and temporally defined activities that directly reduce risks of climate change and often have a more technical or structural nature. Informatory or regulatory measures are, however, not in the focus.

Pervasiveness and Challenges of the Good Practice Concept Good practice usually describes a procedure that is considered exemplary and worthy of imitation because it has proven to be suitable and extremely successful in certain situations (UNESCAP 2012). The term practice refers to a measure, a strategy, a specific procedure, an approach, a methodology, a technique, a system, or a process (UNESCAP 2012). The good practice concept is an extenuated form of the best practice concept (Krems 2012). The identification and communication of good or best practice is carried out with the aim of using these initiatives as inspirational guidelines for the decision-making process in similar contexts. Due to the fact that it is often difficult or virtually impossible to determine a solution that is the only and best solution in terms of all objectives and all criteria, the good practice concept meets factual restrictions and demands better than the best practice concept. Therefore, the following remarks refer to good practice. Although there are a variety of publications such as scientific articles or practical manuals and guidelines for adaptation measures, there are only few approaches for a systematization and evaluation of good practice in the context of adaptation measures (Abegg 2008; Laaser et al. 2009; de França Doria et al. 2009; Eriksen et al. 2011). However, in the field of climate change adaptation, it can be useful for decision-makers to review or develop envisaged activities with the help of concise criteria in order to ensure that the plans follow recognized standards for good adaptation. The development of a set of criteria to assess good adaptation practices is meant to provide private and public stakeholders with some guidance for climate change adaptation. In the following, set of criteria refers to a group of defined criteria, which an adaptation activity should meet in order to be deemed good practice, i.e., exemplary and worthy of imitation. This plan is, however, subject to four key challenges. First, the explicit consideration of climate change in different activities constitutes a very recent practice. For that reason, there is only little data available when it comes to defining successful adaptation and establishing why certain Page 2 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

activities taken were particularly successful. Second, good practice criteria must ensure a balance between abstractness and concreteness in order to cover as many different areas of activity as possible and provide a sufficient guidance function for the planning or evaluation of measures. Third, experience with successful adaptation gained in other contexts, e.g., agriculture in a developing country, cannot be transferred unconditionally to the aforementioned scope of this article, which concentrates on industrialized countries. Fourth, the good practice criteria should be defined in a way that ensures that their implementation can be verified without an unreasonable effort. At the same time, however, the definitions must be sufficiently specific in order to avert unwarranted and objectively unfounded positive reviews of good practice. In order to address these challenges, the identification of criteria within this research included manifold sources from industrialized countries. In addition, the subsequent choice of criteria was also based on interviews with experts from different subject areas to ensure a broad thematic validation of the selected criteria. Furthermore, the test application of the criteria toward the end of the article also discusses the risks that transferring good practice involves.

Methodology In general, there are different potential approaches to identify a set of good practice criteria. One can roughly distinguish between three general approaches (Jennings 2007): the consideration of expert opinions, the analysis of theoretical literature, and the analysis of empirical evidence. In the first approach, a number of experts in the field of climate change adaptation are asked to name criteria that they think an adaptation measure has to fulfill to be considered a good practice. In the second approach, good practice criteria are derived from an analysis of relevant literature and the criteria that are mentioned in these publications. The last approach requires the analysis of successful adaptation measures for deducing common characteristics that were essential for their success. To make use of the strengths of each of the approaches, the development of a set of good practice criteria in this article is based on the combination of an analysis of theoretical literature and the incorporation of judgments of experts from the field of climate change adaptation. The derived criteria set is then applied to a number of implemented measures to test for their applicability. This particular path has been adopted since there are only very few empirical studies concerning the success of adaptation measures. The derivation of a set of practical criteria for the identification of good practices in climate change adaptation is based on seven consecutive steps. A large number of criteria that are deemed to define good practice are identified through a comprehensive literature search in relevant journals, monographs, and websites (1). Subsequently, these criteria are divided into thematic categories (2) and preselected according to predefined selection principles (3). The subsequent expert evaluation is used to prioritize and reduce the discussed criteria (4). An argumentative analysis then compiles a draft set of criteria (5). In order to test the applicability of the set, a number of adaptation measures will be evaluated tentatively considering the criteria developed (6). Following this test, the paper will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the good practice approach in general and the set of criteria in particular (7).

Page 3 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Identified Categories and Criteria of Good Practice As a basis for the identification of good practice criteria in the context of adaptation, 48 documents that touch on the characteristics of good adaptation in industrialized countries were identified with the help of a keyword search in a bibliographic database and evaluated subsequently. The majority of the identified sources are research papers or guidelines that have been funded by public bodies with a slight focus on publications stemming from Germany. Table 1 provides an overview of the 31 identified good practice criteria for the evaluation of adaptation measures or strategies. Because of duplications in terms of the mentioned criteria, only 21 of the 48 analyzed documents are specified in this table. For reasons of clarity, the table lists only that particular definition which the authors found to provide the most relevant explanation, regardless of the fact that some of the criteria have several descriptions. This overall view reflects the broad scope of the identified good practice criteria. The criteria have been sorted thematically in Table 1. The identified criteria were divided into the following categories: goals, goal achievement, costs and incentives, dealing with uncertainty, consideration of side effects and other objectives, consideration of stakeholders, as well as the collective category miscellaneous. This method was chosen in order to structure the variety of criteria used in the literature and thus establish key issues, which can be evaluated subsequently by experts. Table 1 does not only reflect the large range of potential criteria. It also indicates that these criteria or principles address different stakeholders: some authors refer to practitioners who deal with the implementation of measures, and others address policymakers who shape the strategic framework for adaptation measures. Furthermore, also the analyzed subject matter varies: to some extent, the analyses address rather comprehensive adaptation strategies, while others address more concrete measures. Linguistically, it can be noted that some sources adopt an evaluation perspective (“Was the adaptation strategy developed with the participation of all stakeholders concerned?”) or provide practical guidelines (“Adaptation strategies should take concerned stakeholders into account”). Other sources, however, specify particular characteristics (“flexible”) or effects of adaptation measures (“effective”). An evaluation of the 48 sources analyzed throughout the project shows that 25 sources (approximately 52 %) do not provide any information as to how the authors actually derived the criteria. In 16 (33 %) of the analyzed publications, the criteria are exclusively derived from literature searches and evaluations. Considering expert consultations (6 cases) or carrying out own investigations or resorting to own experiences with climate impacts and adaptation (2 cases) – however, only played a minor role – in total, this only amounts to approximately 15 % of the analyzed sources. Overall, the analysis shows that in spite of several guidelines and brochures found throughout the research, practical experiences or expert interviews are only scarcely used for the purpose of establishing evaluation criteria for good practice in the area of adaptation. In many sources, the plausibility and thus the validity of the results is relatively small due to the lack of information on the methodology of deriving the criteria. Although the limited experience with climate change adaptation measures justifies such an approach to some extent, it does not explain why expert assessments are not increasingly taken into account. Against this background, expert opinions on the criteria of good practice seem to be of particular importance.

Page 4 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 1 Evaluation criteria for good practice of climate change adaptation Criterion GOALS Clear objectives Verifiable indicators

Description Develop and communicate verifiable goals for the adaptation project (UBA 2010) Qualitative or quantitative evaluation of the different adaptation options is available (F€ unfgeld and Mc Evoy 2011)

GOAL ACHIEVEMENT Effectiveness The degree of goal achievement or the likelihood that goals are achieved (UNECE 2009) Feasibility The measure is practical, i.e., the adaptation is not limited significantly by institutional, social, cultural, financial, or technological barriers (Smit and Pilifosova 2001) Strategic importance The course of action especially addresses seriously affected and endangered regions or areas of activity; the option has a reliable and long-term, goal-oriented effect (risk reduction); the option averts irreversible and dramatic damages (Vetter and Schauser 2013) COSTS AND INCENTIVES Efficiency Do the benefits of the adaptation’s effects outweigh the costs and the expenditures of the measure (UBA 2010)? Dynamic incentive Does the measure entail a dynamic incentive toward a better adaptability or does it merely have a one-time effect (Tröltzsch et al. 2011)? UNCERTAINTIES Flexibility The measure can be modified or further developed; in case of a change of circumstances, the measure can be reversed (Vetter and Schauser 2013) Dealing with uncertainties The scope of potential future climate changes is taken into account (UBA 2010) Reversibility The measure can be reversed without causing unreasonable costs (definition following Prutsch et al. 2010) No regret measures The implementation of the measure is recommendable, irrespective of the climatic developments (De Bruin et al. 2009) Robustness The measure is effective not only in the context of one scenario but also under the different future climatic conditions (Hallegatte 2009) Resilience Measures that broaden the possibilities to prevent climate change and recover from its impacts (Land Use Consultants, Oxford Brookes University, CAG Consultants, Gardiner and Theobald 2006) SIDE EFFECTS AND INTEGRATION Sustainability Risks and measures are assessed by taking into account the interactions between economic capacity, social responsibility, and environmental protection; actions are aligned accordingly (following Bundesregierung 2011) Positive side effects The measure supports or does not conflict with goals of other federal strategies (sustainability, biodiversity, climate protection, etc.); it has positive side effects in different areas of action (Vetter and Schauser 2013) Win-win effects Apart from their immediate effects, adaptation measures can entail further benefits also in other areas (Smit and Pilifosova 2001); win-win effects are often mentioned in the context of adaptation and climate protection measures (IFOK 2009) Avoiding negative side Adaptation measures can have unintentional negative effects on humans and the effects environment; these should be avoided by following sustainable adaptation strategies and measures (Eriksen et al. 2011) Integration If possible, measures should be integrated into an adaptation strategy and a multi-sectoral policy (Doswald and Osti 2011) Mainstreaming Integration of climate change adaptation into all relevant planning processes and development strategies (IFOK 2009) (continued)

Page 5 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 1 (continued) Criterion PARTICIPATION Participation Cooperation Informative supervision Political and cultural acceptability

Equity

MISCELLANEOUS Innovativeness Priorities Long-term perspective Evidence-based adaptation Transferability Subsidiarity

Urgency

Description Systematic involvement of all relevant stakeholders (IFOK 2009) The capacity to establish good relations with other stakeholders; capacity to cooperate; capacity to deal with and resolve conflicts (Grothmann and Siebenh€uner 2012) Develop an understanding and knowledge of climate changes, define climate risks and critical thresholds (UBA 2010) Social acceptance: to what extent do the affected social spheres accept the respective measure? Political acceptance: which degree of support can the measure expect at the political level? In that context, it has to be taken into consideration that the political acceptance is often closely linked to the social acceptance (Tröltzsch et al. 2012) The effect (regarding costs and benefits) the adaptation activity has on various sectors, socioeconomic groups, and countries/regions and its temporal dimension should be taken into account (Feenstra et al. 1998) Climate adaptation measures are particularly effective when they are innovative – technologically as well as institutionally (Rodima-Taylor et al. 2012) Measures should address particularly important climate risks and chances (UKCIP 2005) Continuity in terms of planning and implementation and regular goal verification (following IFOK 2009) Use of the most recent research results, data, and practical experience in order to guarantee well-founded and informed decisions (DEFRA 2010) The measure can be applied also to other regions (cp. Prutsch et al. 2010) Required adaptation measures have to consider regional differences; in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, they should be adopted and implemented at the most appropriate decision-making level. Strengthening the individual responsibility is an important guiding principle. Precautionary measures taken by other adaptation stakeholders ought to be promoted (Bundesregierung 2011) Urgency of the options refers to the need implementing the adaptation option immediately or whether it is possible to defer action to a later point in time (van Ierland et al. 2007, p. 258)

Applying Selection Principles All of the seven established categories (goals, goal achievement, costs and incentives, dealing with uncertainty, consideration of side effects and other objectives, consideration of stakeholders, and the collective category miscellaneous) can be considered of relevance for the identification of good practice because each category covers several criteria mentioned a number of times in the literature. However, within the respective categories, there are considerable overlaps between some of the criteria. Some of the 31 identified criteria are rather different in nature. Due to their variety and scope, they would hardly have a useful guiding effect when compiled as a set. Such an effect can only emerge if duplications are reduced, inapplicable criteria are sorted out, and definitions are specified. In order to identify particularly central criteria of good practice, selection principles will be used in the following to determine which criterion from one category can be deemed the most relevant. In three of seven cases, several criteria from the same category will be chosen (within the categories dealing with uncertainty, consideration of side effects and further objectives, and miscellaneous), since their respective content differs sufficiently from the other criteria’s content (e.g., flexibility and Page 6 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

robustness, sustainability, positive side effects and integrated approach/integration or innovativeness, and evidence-based adaptation). In the remaining four cases (the categories goals, goal achievement, costs and incentives, and consideration of stakeholders), it was possible to identify just one criterion that is representative of the other criteria of that respective category. In line with Abegg (2008), selection criteria for a preselection are: • Applicability/feasibility – the criterion can be applied to as many measures as possible. • Clarity/comprehensibility – the criterion’s intention is clear and distinct. • Assessability/measurability – the quality and quantitative scope of the measure’s effect can be verified. • Non-redundancy – no criterion overlaps with other criteria so that duplications and overvaluations of individual aspects are avoided. • Completeness – the set of criteria covers all important aspects; at the same time, it is concise and manageable. The arguments for and against each of the criteria can be found in Table 2. To begin with, a large number of criteria were sorted out due to a violation of the requirement of non-redundancy in favor of other, superior, or broader criteria. In fact, 12 of the 20 criteria were sorted out because of a violation of this principle. The most important categories within which it was possible to integrate and thereby sort out several of the identified criteria are the following: dealing with uncertainty (4 criteria), consideration of side effects and other objectives (3 criteria), and consideration of stakeholders (3 criteria). In the abovementioned cases, the contents of the different criteria are so closely related (e.g., dealing with uncertainties, reversibility, no regret measures, and resilience) that it seemed reasonable to integrate them into the most comprehensive concept (which in this case was flexibility). The same applies to the category consideration of side effects and other objectives within which different criteria (win-win effects, negative side effects, mainstreaming) were summarized in the category either positive side effects or sustainability. The criteria cooperation, informative supervision, and political and cultural acceptability were summarized within the category consideration of stakeholders (covered by the criterion of participation). Furthermore, two criteria (verifiable indicators and strategic importance) were sorted out within the categories goals and goal achievement. Additionally, several other criteria were sorted out due to a violation of the selection principle applicability/feasibility. Thus, five of the 20 criteria were sorted out because of a violation of this principle: within the category miscellaneous, the criteria subsidiarity and urgency were discarded. Furthermore, the criteria feasibility, dynamic incentives, and equity were sorted out from different categories. The remaining three criteria that were sorted out entailed violations of the following selection criteria: assessability/measurability (the criteria priorities and transferability) and clarity/ comprehensibility (the criterion of long-term perspective). The 31 identified criteria have already been assigned to seven categories (goals, goal achievement, costs and incentives, dealing with uncertainties, consideration of side effects and other objectives, consideration of stakeholders, miscellaneous). The number of identified criteria was reduced from 31 to 11 with the help of the selection criteria. Table 2 summarizes the selection process for the reduction of the identified criteria which were then presented to adaptation experts for further evaluation.

Page 7 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 2 Overview of the selection process to select a reduced set of criteria Criterion Compatibility with selection principles GOALS Clear objectives Yes Verifiable No: (1) non-redundancy principle is not met; indicators for significant overlaps with the criterion “clear goal achievement objectives” GOAL ACHIEVEMENT Effectiveness Yes Feasibility No: (1) applicability/feasibility (unnecessary in the context of evaluating already implemented measures); (2) clarity/comprehensibility (before the actual implementation, it is slightly unclear under which circumstances a measure can be held to be realizable); (3) non-redundancy (feasibility and transferability are closely connected) Strategic No: (1) applicability/feasibility (the criterion importance focuses on a prioritization of measures rather than an identification of good practice) COSTS AND INCENTIVES Efficiency Yes Dynamic No: (1) applicability/feasibility (suitable for incentive comprehensive policy instruments but not for implementation measures) UNCERTAINTIES Flexibility Yes Dealing with No: (1) non-redundancy (content overlaps with the uncertainties criteria “flexibility,” “reversibility,” “no regret measures,” “robustness,” and “resilience”); (2) clarity/comprehensibility (very general, procedural criterion) Reversibility No: (1) non-redundancy (content overlaps significantly with the criteria “flexibility,” “no regret measures,” “robustness,” and “resilience”) No regret No: (1) non-redundancy (content overlaps measures significantly with the criteria “flexibility,” “dealing with uncertainties,” “positive side effects,” and “robustness”); (2) applicability/feasibility (not a criterion but rather a type of measure) Robustness Yes Resilience No: (1) clarity/comprehensibility or (2) non-redundancy (difficult to distinguish from the criterion “robustness”); (3) assessability/ measurability (does not actually describe a feature of adaptation measures but rather a complex and specific effect) SIDE EFFECTS AND INTEGRATION Sustainability Yes, even though the measurability is questionable

Conclusions Adoption for expert consultation Sort out in favor of the criterion “clear objectives” because that criterion has a better applicability Adoption for expert consultation Sort out because several selection criteria are not met

Sort out because the selection criterion applicability/feasibility is not met

Adoption for expert consultation Sort out in favor of the criterion “efficiency” because the latter is more exhaustive and comprehensive Adoption for expert consultation Sort out in favor of the criterion “flexibility” because that criterion is more precise and descriptive

Sort out in favor of the criterion “flexibility” because that criterion is comprehensive and also covers reversibility Sort out in favor of the criteria “flexibility” and “positive side effects” because both can be held to constitute features of measures, whereas no regret refers to a number of measures Adoption for expert consultation Sort out in favor of the criterion “robustness”

Adoption for expert consultation (continued)

Page 8 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 2 (continued) Criterion Positive side effects Win-win effects

Compatibility with selection principles Yes

No: (1) non-redundancy (content overlaps significantly with the criteria “positive side effects” and “robustness”); (2) applicability/ feasibility (not a criterion but rather a type of measure) Avoiding negative No: (1) non-redundancy (overlaps with the criteria side effects “positive side effects” and “sustainability”) Integration Yes Mainstreaming No: (1) non-redundancy; clarity/comprehensibility (overlaps significantly with the criterion “integration”) PARTICIPATION Participation Yes Cooperation No: (1) non-redundancy (overlaps with the criterion “participation”) Informative No: (1) applicability/feasibility (not relevant for supervision every measure) Political and No: (1) non-redundancy (overlaps with the cultural criterion “participation”); (2) applicability/ acceptability feasibility (“good practice” should be evaluated regardless of the political will for implementation) Equity No: (1) non-redundancy (overlaps with the criterion “participation”) MISCELLANEOUS Innovativeness Yes Priorities No: (1) assessability/measurability (much contextual knowledge is required in order to be able to assess the fulfillment of the criterion – which regions? which temporal scope?); (2) applicability/feasibility (more suitable for a prioritization of measures); (3) non-redundancy (closely linked to the criterion “evidence-based adaptation”) Long-term No: (1) clarity/comprehensibility (criterion is perspective unclear)

Evidence-based adaptation Transferability

Yes No: (1) assessability/measurability (much contextual knowledge is required in order to be able to assess the fulfillment of the criterion – applicable to whom? with what effort?); (2) clarity/comprehensibility

Conclusions Adoption for expert consultation Sort out in favor of the criterion “positive side effects”

Sort out in favor of the criteria “sustainability” and “positive side effects” Adoption for expert consultation Sort out in favor of the criterion “integration”

Adoption for expert consultation Sort out in favor of the criterion “participation” Sort out in favor of the criterion “participation” Sort out in favor of the criterion “participation”

Sort out in favor of the criterion “participation” Adoption for expert consultation Sort out because the criterion focuses on a prioritization of measures rather than an identification of good practice

Sort out due to the fact that it is unclear whether the criterion refers to (a) the longevity of a measure or (b) the long-term effects of climate change Adoption for expert consultation Sort out due to the fact that too much contextual knowledge regarding the circumstances to which the criterion should be transferred is required (continued)

Page 9 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 2 (continued) Criterion Subsidiarity

Urgency

Compatibility with selection principles No: (1) applicability/feasibility (the criterion is irrelevant for local/regional measures); (2) non-redundancy (participation) No: (1) applicability/feasibility (the criterion focuses on a prioritization of measures rather than an identification of good practice); (2) assessability/measurability (much contextual knowledge is required in order to be able to assess the fulfillment of the criterion)

Conclusions Sort out because it is irrelevant for local/ regional measures and is closely linked to participation Sort out because the criterion focuses on a prioritization of measures rather than an identification of good practice

Results A compact set of criteria is developed on the basis of the preselection of good practice criteria in the previous section and under consideration of experts from different scientific and practical fields. The expert opinions were determined with the help of questionnaires. For that purpose, eight climate change experts from German-speaking regions and with different professional backgrounds were asked to assess the preselection of eleven criteria in view of the following specifications: 1 point ¼ less important (an adaptation measure can be deemed to be exemplary without meeting this criterion), 2 points ¼ important (meeting this criterion is important for the measure’s exemplary nature), 3 points ¼ of crucial importance (a measure does not have an exemplary nature unless it meets this criterion), and further option (I do not understand this criterion). In addition to evaluating the criteria, the experts were also asked to answer a few questions. The objective was to establish the appropriate scope of the set of criteria, optimize the comprehensibility of the respective criteria, and examine whether important criteria are missing and whether the content of individual criteria overlaps. Table 3 shows how the experts rated the individual criteria. The criteria are ranked according to their average rating. The differently colored sections reflect the evaluations of the expert consultations. Because there were differing evaluations of some criteria, the table also indicates the standard deviation: the closer the figure is to the number 1, the stronger the expert assessments varied. However, if the figure is zero, there was a consensus among the experts. Additionally, the table indicates also the median and mode in order to meet the frequently rather high standard deviation. Especially where the results are particularly scattered, these parameters have a greater significance than the arithmetic mean. Table 3 is divided into four areas differentiated by color: (1) Out of the eleven criteria the experts evaluated, the three criteria marked in red received the lowest ratings. The respective criteria are integration, innovativeness, and evidence-based adaptation. Their average rating is much lower than the medium answer category awarding two points. In all three cases, also the median and the mode were awarded with less than or exactly two points. (2) The four following categories marked in orange received an average, median, and mode close to two points. These criteria are positive side effects, efficiency, participation, and flexibility. (3) The criterion clear objectives that is marked in yellow approximates the leading group. While its average is in the upper middle range, its median and mode are already in the leading group. However, the standard deviation is relatively high. (4) The leading group is marked in green. It includes the criteria effectiveness, robustness, and sustainability. These criteria received positive ratings for the categories average, median, and mode.

Page 10 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 3 Results of the expert consultations, sorted according to the arithmetic mean Criterion

Evaluation Average

Median

Mode

Standard deviation

Effectiveness

2,63

3

3

0,74

Robustness

2,50

3

3

0,76

Sustainability

2,50

2,5*

2,5*

0,53

Clear objectives

2,25

2,5*

3

0,89

Positive side effects

2,25

2

2

0,71

Efficiency

2,13

2

2

0,64

Participation

2,09

2

2

0,59

Flexibility

2,00

2

2

0,76

Integration

1,66

1,65**

1

0,72

Innovativeness

1,54

1,5*

1,5*

0,58

Evidencebased adaptation

1,50

2

2

0,76

* These evaluations indicate decimal places because it was impossible to determine a distinct value if, for example, the number of times the ratings “2” and “3” were given is the same (“Most frequent rating” therefore “2,5”). ** This rating came up because an expert extended the given scale and used decimal places himself/herself.

In addition to the evaluation of the criteria, the results of the expert consultations also provided information on the designation and definition of some criteria. Against this background, some of the criteria were renamed and provided with amended definitions. For the further identification of the set of criteria, the following criteria were renamed: • Evidence-based adaptation ¼ > climate knowledge-based adaptation • Participation ¼ > legitimacy • Efficiency ¼ > financial feasibility To ensure a transparent renaming, the criteria are referred to both with their previous and with their new denotation (e.g., “efficiency/financial feasibility”). In view of the definition of flexibility, it was noted by an expert that the definition’s focus on costs is too narrow because transaction and opportunity costs should be taken into account, too (e.g., the period of time required to agree on the readjustment of a measure). The definition of sustainability was partially held to be linked too closely to the economic development. Therefore, the definition was broadened accordingly. The notion of efficiency/financial feasibility should also be accentuated differently because two elements of the original definition were repeatedly addressed: firstly, it was noted that it is usually not easy to determine the relationship between costs and benefits due to insufficient data, and secondly, those who implement a measure may find that the costs and benefits relation is often less relevant than the absolute costs and the related question of whether it is

Page 11 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 4 Expert answers concerning the optimal number of criteria Number of criteria Number of times mentioned

3 1

4 1

5 5

6 3

7 4

8 2

9 1

10 1

affordable at all. Therefore, a stronger focus on the overall financial viability and the benefits of financially comparable measures seems appropriate. In view of the criterion positive side effects, it was noted that its narrow focus neglects positive effects on the environment. Accordingly, the definition has been broadened. The definition of effectiveness was amended so as to focus less on the terminology “probability”; the aspect of entailed opportunities has been explicitly included in order to contribute to a broader understanding of the criterion. Furthermore, the experts were asked about what number of criteria for the set of criteria they assume to be manageable (Table 4). The values given range between three and ten criteria; the two smallest and the two highest values appear only once. Only the numbers five to eight were mentioned more than once. The most frequently mentioned value is five. The average of all answers is 6.28, and the median that amounted to six criteria has a similar dimension. Based on this survey, six criteria seem like a reasonable size for the set. Due to the relatively unanimous below-average rating of the criteria in the red group (integration, innovativeness, and evidence-based adaptation), they were excluded from the final set of criteria immediately. Therefore, eight potential candidates for the final set of criteria remain.

Final Set of Criteria Based on the expert survey, it was possible to define the criteria and the scope of the criteria set. The evaluation of each criterion enabled the rejection of three other criteria. Proceeding from here, a simple definition of the set of criteria based on the mean values of the evaluations does not seem sensible due to the relatively small number of consulted experts, the proximity of the evaluations, and the continued overlapping of contents. In order to ensure the objective of establishing a compact set of criteria, it is necessary to further reduce the number of criteria. In that regard, it is reasonable to consider the number of times the criteria were mentioned in the initial search and the standard deviations of the ratings. Although the clear objectives criterion has received an above-average rating, it also has the highest standard deviation, i.e., the consulted experts held differing views in that regard. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the distinct (or clear) objectives criterion was mentioned less often in the analyzed sources than the other eight criteria. For these two reasons, the clear objectives criterion seems the least relevant and will therefore not be included in the final set of criteria. The experts gave the criterion participation/legitimacy an average rating. Also, the number of times it was mentioned in the sources was average. The category consideration of stakeholders covers a relatively large number of criteria, which suggests that it generally constitutes a muchdiscussed aspect with great importance for the model nature of measures. Feedback given within the course of the expert survey emphasized, however, that participation is not an end in itself but rather a means to achieve legitimacy. Provided that legitimacy is ensured by other means, participation is therefore not always crucial for the model character of a measure. Thus, in comparison with the other criteria, this criterion appears to be less significant because it can be assumed that the majority of actions have sufficient legitimacy. Accordingly, the criterion participation/legitimacy will not be included in the final set of criteria.

Page 12 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Table 5 Final set of criteria for good practice in the field of adaptation Criterion Effectiveness

Robustness

Definition The measure reduces the risks of climate change and contributes to the permanent use of opportunities. The measure has positive effects under different climate scenarios.

Sustainability

The measure is well suited in terms of meeting all interests (economy, environment, society) and enables an environmentally and socially equitable development of society.

Financial feasibility

The adaptation measure is affordable for those who implement it, and alternative measures that cost the same do not yield higher benefits.

Positive side effects

In addition to the adaptation to climate change, the measure has further positive effects on the environment, the society, or the implementing organization and the achievement of its objectives. These take effect even without occurring climatic changes.

Flexibility

The measure can be modified with relatively low costs.

Example A logistics warehouse in a region that is highly prone to floods is moved to a higher location in the context of a restructuring of the company. A chemical company that uses cooling water from a watercourse sets up an alternative cooling process, which does not require water and can replace the water cooling system if necessary. This measure can ensure a smooth operation also in high summer, regardless of how the summer water levels are affected by climate change. On the occasion of renewing the road surface, an administrative district chooses heat-resistant asphalt with vegetable oil in the bitumen content. Although it is slightly more expensive, its production and overall longevity is more environmentally friendly than conventional asphalt. The installation of percolation basins in a development area as a precautionary measure to avert the effects of heavy precipitation was easily financed due to low investment costs and hardly any maintenance costs. Comparatively low-priced measures could not be identified. When selecting new suppliers, a tool manufacturer decides to choose companies that are closer to the production location than before. The shorter delivery routes reduce the risk of damages to the supply chain occurring due to extreme events. The lower absolute fuel consumption also contributes to climate protection. An organization that has been increasingly affected by extreme weather events in recent years insures itself against natural hazards. The selected insurance package can be terminated, reduced, or expanded annually.

Therefore, the remaining six criteria are included in the set of criteria for good practice in the field of adaptation (Table 5). Thus, the criteria in the set represent four of the seven categories of criteria – the categories goals, consideration of stakeholders, and miscellaneous are not taken into account. The categories dealing with uncertainties and consideration of side effects and other objectives are represented by two criteria. Although their respective contents contain some overlap, it seems reasonable in the light of the challenges of adapting to climate change to emphasize these two categories. At this stage, it still remains open how the set of criteria should be applied, i.e., whether a measure should, for example, meet all criteria or only a minimum number of criteria in order to be considered good practice. Furthermore, it was not investigated whether particular criteria have greater significance than others in terms of evaluating good practice for individual sectors or measures.

Page 13 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Application of Set of Criteria In 2010, the German Federal Environment Agency established a database for measures to adapt to climate change in Germany. By now, this database has about 110 entries. It documents measures whose implementation phase has begun or been completed already. To select the best examples among the entries, the Federal Environment Agency started a competition in 2011. The selection of the award-worthy measures was based on the criteria effectiveness and cost-benefit ratio, further benefits, participation and acceptance, feasibility, and transferability. It had, however, not yet been systematically investigated whether this set of criteria suffices when it comes to identifying a good practice in climate change adaptation. Based on the expanded, consolidated set of criteria outlined above, the adaptation measures in the database were then evaluated to test the applicability of these criteria. The specific conditions of the Federal Environment Agency’s database have to be taken into consideration. Adaptation measures included by external actors are the starting point for the evaluation. The entry of a measure follows a data entry form which has been provided by the Federal Environment Agency and addresses, for example, the following aspects: title, goal, and description of the measure, addressed climate impacts and fields of action, trade-offs and obstacles to implementation, participation, and financing. The evaluation had to deal with the following practical challenges: • The data entry form was not drafted in line with the subsequently identified set of criteria. • It does not require that all entry fields are filled in. • There are no requirements in terms of how detailed the description of the measure has to be, i.e., there is no guidance as to how to answer the individual questions of the form. • The type of measures vary; often, there are conceptual preparatory works or strategic inventory analyses which in fact only prepare the actual implementation of the measure. • Different stakeholders fill in the form. • The self-portrayal by the measure’s guarantor implicates that positive aspects are emphasized, while adverse effects may not be mentioned at all. After screening the database entries, 25 measures were found to be suitable for an application of the criteria set. Furthermore, the screening found that 27 measures could be evaluated by the good practice criteria at least to some extent. In general, the application of the criteria shows that they are primarily suited for spatial and structural implementation measures, i.e., approaches for adapting so-called “gray” and “green” infrastructure. This includes, for example, flood polders and renaturation of water meadows for preventive flood protection, climate-adapted forest conversion, urban fresh air corridors, and adaptation measures in buildings. In contrast, the application of the criteria to regulatory, informational, communicative, and decision support measures is not useful. While applying the criteria, the following aspects became apparent: • The criteria effectiveness, positive side effects, and flexibility could overall be evaluated reliably. • In many cases, it was not possible to apply robustness usefully; other cases only allowed for very general evaluations; however, in exceptional cases, the criterion was very relevant, for example, in the context of cooling through evaporation (cisterns) if potentially decreasing precipitation is not considered.

Page 14 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

• Often, it was not possible to evaluate the financial feasibility because the total costs of the project were unclear or not communicated; in addition, it was difficult and time-consuming to determine the respective benefit and to compare the benefit with the benefit of other measures. • The sustainability of several measures could not be portrayed in detail due to the fact that the term rather comprehensive and because its definition is relatively broad. • Overlaps between sustainability and positive side effects were identified. The main challenges when applying the criteria uncover the obvious methodological uncertainties. In view of several criteria, it is still unclear with which methodology they should be assessed. To this end, further research is required. Considering all criteria, a good practice measure was identified when all criteria were rated positively. In some cases, however, a practice can also be held to be good although individual criteria were not met. Robustness, for example, is an important criterion when it comes to long-term, costly infrastructure decisions. However, if a measure is flexible and its implementation is cost-efficient, its implementation may remain useful even if the measure cannot meet all potentially possible climate developments. In general, the set of criteria is suitable for the purpose of identifying good practice measures within the database of the Federal Environment Agency and to substantiate the preparation of the selection process. It contributes to the transparency of the evaluation process and covers important aspects that a suitable adaptation measure should fulfill. In order to provide an overall judgment on the basis of the individual evaluations of the criteria, a further consultation of experts considering the respective field of action seems appropriate to further consolidate the results.

Conclusion In addition to suggesting a set of criteria, the derivation of good practice criteria entailed further conclusions. The research of criteria used in the literature in view of good adaptation has shown that the sources only very rarely relied on practical observations or opinions of other experts in order to justify the adopted criteria. So far, very limited experience with the effect of adaptation measures can be deemed to constitute a reason for the limited consideration of empirical data. Another reason can be seen in the fact that the majority of the criteria are very general in nature and are important for the selection and implementation of appropriate measures also in other topical areas (e.g., efficiency, effectiveness, and participation). Their general desirability then might not call for elaborate definitions and justification in the literature on climate change adaptation. The challenge that arises when deriving a compact and easily applicable set of criteria is to justify which combination of the fewest number of criteria has the greatest relevance for the identification of good practice. The approach adopted here is based on a thematic grouping of the criteria followed by a selection of certain criteria on the basis of selection principles, which, for example, ruled out redundancies. Subsequently, experts evaluated the preselected criteria. In all three steps (grouping, preselection, and especially the evaluation by experts), the tension between the comprehensiveness of the respective definition and the comprehensibility of the criterion became apparent: the shorter and more abstract the description, the more difficult the evaluation within the preselection and the more frequent the different interpretations by the experts. It was not possible to dispel this tension in the final set of criteria. The application of the set of criteria to adaptation measures from the database of the German Federal Environment Agency has shown that the problem with briefly formulated criteria can often Page 15 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

not be resolved and the ratings thus forfeit their objectivity. In many cases, it was, for example, not possible to verify in detail the fulfillment of the rather abstract criterion “sustainability.” This is due to both the lack of detailed information about the measure and the less concrete definition of the criterion itself. The problem with criteria which do not have a sufficiently precise formulation or for which there is no transparent methodology to examine their implementation entails the risk of window dressing, i.e., the whitewashing of suboptimal adaptation measures by decorating them with the criteria. If, however, one would reformulate the criteria in terms of maximum precision, the original purpose of this set of criteria – practical assessment of good practice – could no longer be met. Due to the existing uncertainties, the set of criteria cannot provide final judgments in terms of the evaluation of good adaptation practice. It can, however, prepare the according decisions through the structure of the criteria. The set of criteria achieves this with its special focus on the two issues that play a significant role in the context of adaptation: dealing with uncertainties and consideration of side effects.

References Abegg B (2008) Developing evaluation scheme. cc.alps working paper. http://www.cipra.org/de/ klimaprojekte/cc.alps/090519eEvalSystemOnlineBa.pdf. Accessed 14 Feb 2013 Bedsworth LW, Hanak E (2010) Adaptation to climate change. A review of challenges and tradeoffs in six areas. J Am Plann Assoc 76:477–495 Bundesregierung (2011) Aktionsplan Anpassung der Deutschen Anpassungsstrategie an den Klimawandel, adopted by the parliament on 31. August 2011. http://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/ bmu-import/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/aktionsplan_anpassung_klimawandel_bf.pdf. Accessed 23 Mar 2013 De Bruin K, Dellink RB, Ruijs A, Bolwidt L, van Buuren A, Graveland J, de Groot RS, Kuikman PJ, Reinhard S, Roetter RP, Tassone VC (2009) Adapting to climate change in The Netherlands: an inventory of climate adaptation options and ranking of alternatives. Clim Change 95:23–45 De França Doria M, Boyd E, Tompkins EL, Adger WN (2009) Using expert elicitation to define successful adaptation to climate change. Environ Sci Policy 12:810–819 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, DEFRA (2010) Measuring adaptation to climate change – a proposed approach. http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/climate/documents/100219-measuring-adapt.pdf. Accessed 23 Mar 2013 Doswald N, Osti M (2011) Ecosystem-based approaches to adaptation and mitigation – good practice examples and lessons learned in Europe. BfN-Skripten 306. http://www.bfn.de/ fileadmin/MDB/documents/service/Skript_306.pdf. Accessed 31 Mar 2013 Eriksen S, Aldunce P, Bahinipati CS, D’Almeida Martins R, Molefe JI, Nhemachena C, O’Brien K, Olorunfemi F, Park J, Sygna L, Ulsrud K (2011) When not every response to climate change is a good one: identifying principles for sustainable adaptation. Climate Dev 3:7–20 Feenstra JF, Burton I, Smith JB, Tol RSJ (1998) Handbook on methods for climate change impact assessment and adaptation strategies. UNEP/Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam Foster J, Winkelman S, Lowe A (2011) Lessons learned on local climate adaptation from the urban leaders initiative. http://ccap.org/assets/LESSONS-LEARNED-ON-LOCAL-CLIMATE-

Page 16 of 19

Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_20-2 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

ADAPTATION-FROM-THE-URBAN-LEADERS-ADAPTATION-INITIATIVE_CCAPFebruary-2011.pdf. Accessed 11 Aug 2013 F€unfgeld H, Mc Evoy D (2011) Framing climate change adaptation in policy and practice. VCCAR project: framing adaptation in the Victorian context. Working paper 1. http://www.climateaccess. org/sites/default/files/Funfgeld_Framing%20Climate%20Adaptation%20in%20Policy%20and %20Practice.pdf. Accessed 22 Jan 2013