Guatemalan Politics: The Popular Struggle for Democracy 9781685856496

Table of contents :
Contents
Tables
Preface
Acronyms & Abbreviations
1 Democracy and Violence
2 Economic and Political Development to 1980
3 Elections and the State Crisis of the 1980s
4 The Military as Democratizers
5 Economic Policy During the Cerezo Administration
6 Popular Sectors During the Cerezo Administration
7 Human Rights During the Cerezo Administration
8 Power and Participation: The Late Cerezo Administration
9 The Serrano Presidency, 1991-1992
10 The Popular Struggle for Democracy
Bibliography
Index
About the Book and Author

Citation preview

Guatemalan Politics

Guatemalan Politics The Popular Struggle for Democracy

Robert H. Trudeau

Lynne Rienner Publishers

•

Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London W C 2 E 8LU © 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Trudeau, Robert H., 1 9 4 0 Guatemalan politics : the popular struggle for democracy / Robert H. Trudeau, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-415-0 (alk. paper) I. Guatemala—Politics and g o v e r n m e n t — 1 9 8 5 - . 2. Guatemala— Politics and government—1945—1985. 3. Political participation— Guatemala. 4. Democracy—Guatemala. 5. Elections—Guatemala. I. Title. JL1496.T78 1993 323'.042'097281—dc20 93-15354 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America ^^ (oo)

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Contents

List of Tables Preface List of Acronyms

vi vii x

and Abbreviations

1

Democracy and Violence

1

2

Economic and Political Development to 1980

15

3

Elections and the State Crisis of the 1980s

35

4

The Military as D e m o c r a t i z e s

53

5

Economic Policy During the Cerezo Administration

79

6

Popular Sectors During the Cerezo Administration

95

7

Human Rights During the Cerezo Administration

113

8

Power and Participation: The Late Cerezo Administration

129

9

The Serrano Presidency, 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2

159

10 The Popular Struggle for Democracy

187

Bibliography Index About the Book and Author

197 209 220

v

Tables

3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 6.1 6.2 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5

Presidential Election Results, 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 7 8 P r e s i d e n t i a l E l e c t i o n R e s u l t s by P a r t y , 1 9 5 7 - 1 9 7 8 Registered Party Committees, 1984 Election R e g i s t e r e d P a r t i e s a n d Party L e a d e r s , 1984 Constituent Assembly Election Constituent Assembly Election Results, 1984 Presidential Elections, First-Round Results, 1985 Congressional Election Results, 1985 M u n i c i p a l E l e c t i o n R e s u l t s , 1985, 1 9 8 8 M i n i m u m and Real Wages, 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 8 Annual Real Wages, 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 6 National Dialogue Participants, 1988 Registered Parties and Candidates, 1990 Elections Parties a n d I d e o l o g i c a l T e n d e n c i e s , 1 9 9 0 E l e c t i o n s Presidential Election, First-Round Results, 1990 Congressional and Municipal Election Results, 1990

vi

37 37 62 67 69 70 71 73 104 104 137 143 144 148 148

Preface

Guatemala, From Where the Rainbow ical, Colorful, Picturesque, Modern.

Takes Its Colors: Ancient,

Histor-

— J o a q u i n Munoz [Guatemala:] . . . one of the most cruel, corrupt, and evil places on earth. — E d w a r d Abbey C a n a n y s i n g l e n a t i o n p o s s i b l y b e d e s c r i b e d b y t w o s t a t e m e n t s as e x t r e m e a n d o p p o s i t e as t h e s e ? G u a t e m a l a is a n a t i o n b l e s s e d w i t h e x t r a o r d i n a r y physical

beauty

and

abundant

natural

resources,

but

cursed

with

a

w r e t c h e d social history. E x t r e m i s m has been the norm, socially, e c o n o m i cally, and certainly politically. G u a t e m a l a ' s highland

climate—"eternal

s p r i n g " in t h e t o u r i s t l i t e r a t u r e — i s a s p l e a s a n t a s a n y w h e r e , t h e s c e n i c v i s tas as spectacular, and the residents as f a s c i n a t i n g , but the poverty a n d p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e a r e t e r r i b l e . In a w o n d e r f u l p h y s i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l s e t t i n g , t h e s o c i a l c o n s e q u e n c e s of p o l i t i c a l e x t r e m i s m a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s p i r i t i n g . T h e c o n t r a s t s in G u a t e m a l a a r e c o m p e l l i n g . T h i s b o o k is a n a t t e m p t t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e n a t u r e o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e in a s o c i a l s e t t i n g of s t a r k c o n t r a s t s , g r o s s i n e q u a l i t y , a n d c o n t i n u i n g v i o l e n c e . T h e e v e n t s of M a y a n d J u n e 1 9 9 3 m a k e t h i s e f f o r t m o r e i m p o r t a n t . O n M a y 25, President Jorge Serrano dissolved C o n g r e s s and the courts and s u s p e n d e d s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , in e f f e c t p r o c l a i m i n g a n a u t o - c o u p d ' é t a t . S c a r c e l y a w e e k l a t e r , in t h e f a c e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s sure and increasing opposition f r o m G u a t e m a l a ' s business elite, the milit a r y f i r s t w i t h d r e w its s u p p o r t f o r S e r r a n o a n d t h e n f o r c e d h i m t o r e s i g n . A l t h o u g h t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l o u t c o m e s w e r e c o n f u s i n g as of e a r l y J u n e , f o u r p o i n t s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n s of t h i s b o o k s e e m c l e a r : ( 1 ) t h e m i l i t a r y r e m a i n s t h e c e n t r a l p o w e r in t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s ; ( 2 ) t h e m i l i t a r y ' s a c t i o n s i n d i c a t e a c a r e f u l l y p l a n n e d a n d at least i n i t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l a t t e m p t t o p o r t r a y i t s e l f as t h e d e f e n d e r of d e m o c r a c y ; ( 3 ) t h e p o l i t i c a l

vii

parties,

Vili

Preface

w h i c h p u b l i c l y r e q u e s t e d that the military i n t e r v e n e , c o n t i n u e to play an a n t i d e m o c r a c t i c r o l e in G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c s ; a n d ( 4 ) t h e 1 9 9 3 c o u p w a s a n a t t e m p t t o r e d u c e t h e a b i l i t y of t h e p o p u l a r s e c t o r s t o m o v e G u a t e m a l a toward democracy. A l t h o u g h m y f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n s of G u a t e m a l a r e s u l t e d f r o m t r a v e l t h e r e in t h e m i d - 1 9 6 0 s , r e s e a r c h f o r t h i s b o o k b e g a n d u r i n g a F u l b r i g h t l e c t u r e s h i p in 1 9 8 0 a n d h a s c o n t i n u e d s i n c e t h e n . D u r i n g t h i s l e n g t h y p r o c e s s , I h a v e a c q u i r e d m a n y d e b t s of g r a t i t u d e . In 1 9 8 0 I l e a r n e d to r e c o g n i z e t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y c o u r a g e of

many

G u a t e m a l a n s w h o , less p r o t e c t e d than a N o r t h A m e r i c a n visitor, n e v e r t h e l e s s c o n t i n u e d to a t t e m p t t o r e f o r m t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a n d s o c i a l s y s t e m . O v e r a n d o v e r , I h e a r d t h e m s p e a k of t h e i r l o v e f o r t h e i r c o u n t r y , t h e i r s a d n e s s o v e r its d o m i n a t i o n b y t h u g s a n d m u r d e r e r s , a n d t h e i r d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o c o n t i n u e t h e s t r u g g l e in s p i t e of t h e d a n g e r s . M a n y of t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s w e r e v e r y h e l p f u l to m e d u r i n g m y s t a y t h a t y e a r ; I w a n t to a c k n o w l e d g e m y d e b t to t h e m , b u t it w o u l d still b e r i s k y , in 1 9 9 3 , to n a m e t h e m in a b o o k t h a t is u l t i m a t e l y c r i t i c a l of t h e G u a t e m a l a n e l i t e . S i n c e 1 9 8 0 , m a n y o t h e r G u a t e m a l a n s h a v e b e e n c e n t r a l to m y w o r k o n this b o o k . B u t a g a i n , t h e p r e v a i l i n g p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e in G u a t e m a l a

makes

it i m p o s s i b l e

to

a c k n o w l e d g e this a s s i s t a n c e p u b l i c l y . Fortunately, I can name many others w h o were helpful, especially once this b o o k b e g a n t o t a k e s h a p e . E n r i q u e B a l o y r a a n d L a r s S c h o u l t z p r o v i d e d i n s i g h t f u l c o m m e n t s on e a r l i e r v e r s i o n s of t h e m a n u s c r i p t , a n d Bill H u d s o n h e l p e d o n an e a r l y v e r s i o n of m a t e r i a l that a p p e a r s in C h a p t e r 1. I a m g r a t e f u l t o s e v e r a l a n o n y m o u s r e a d e r s as w e l l ; t h e i r e f f o r t s m a d e t h i s a m u c h better study. M o s s B l a c h m a n , Ken C o l e m a n , and Ken Mijeski w e r e helpful at v a r i o u s t i m e s , c o i n c i d e n t a l l y w h e n I m o s t n e e d e d h e l p . I a m e s p e c i a l l y in d e b t f o r all t h e r e a s o n s a b o v e , a n d o t h e r s , to K e n S h a r p e . It is s a f e to s a y t h a t w i t h o u t h i s h e l p at m a n y s t a g e s , t h i s b o o k probably w o u l d not h a v e b e e n f i n i s h e d . Chris Krueger, Marilyn Moors, Brinton Lykes, Elizabeth Kuznesof, Milton Jamail, Carol Smith, Margarita Melville, J a m e s Loucky, Susanne Jonas, Charles Brockett, Beatriz Manz, Gary Elbow, Chris Lutz, Sally Lutz, D a v i d Dent, and m a n y other m e m b e r s of the G u a t e m a l a

Scholars

Network shared insights, information, connections, and data with m e over the past ten years. S i m i l a r l y , F r a n k L a R u e , of the G u a t e m a l a n

United

O p p o s i t i o n , w a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l p f u l , in s p i t e o f h i s b u s y s c h e d u l e . B o n n i e T e n n e r i e l l o a n d o t h e r s at t h e W a s h i n g t o n O f f i c e o n L a t i n A m e r i c a w e r e a l w a y s w i l l i n g to s h a r e t h e i r i n s i g h t s . I a l s o w i s h to a c k n o w l e d g e P r o v i d e n c e C o l l e g e ' s C o m m i t t e e to A i d F a c u l t y R e s e a r c h , w h i c h s u p p o r t e d r e s e a r c h t r i p s t o G u a t e m a l a in t h e late 1 9 8 0 s . J a m e s M c G o v e r n h a s b e e n s u p p o r t i v e of t h i s e f f o r t f o r m a n y y e a r s ,

Preface

ix

i n c l u d i n g l o a n i n g m e the L a p t o p at c r i t i c a l m o m e n t s . I a m g r a t e f u l f o r his support. T h a n k s a l s o to C h r i s L u t z a n d the P l u m s o c k M e s o a m e r i c a F o u n d a t i o n f o r a c c e s s to their V e r m o n t a r c h i v e s a n d f o r r e g u l a r l y p r o v i d i n g m e d o c u m e n t s a n d p u b l i c a t i o n s not o t h e r w i s e e a s i l y a v a i l a b l e . I a l s o w i s h to t h a n k m y s t u d e n t a s s i s t a n t s , T r i c i a O ' H a r e a n d M a t t C a r l o s , f o r h e l p in p r e p a r i n g the m a n u s c r i p t . T h a n k s a l s o to M i c h e l l e W e l s h o f L y n n e R i e n n e r P u b l i s h e r s a n d S a r a h W h a l e n , c o p y e d i t o r , f o r their e d i t o r i a l a s s i s t a n c e . All

of

these

individuals,

and

others

whom

I am

unintentionally

n e g l e c t i n g to m e n t i o n , h e l p e d m a k e this b o o k p o s s i b l e , a n d I t h a n k t h e m . M y w i f e , Patricia T r u d e a u , d e s e r v e s m u c h credit for t o l e r a t i n g this project for so long and for b e i n g so supportive, despite b e i n g left alone m a n y t i m e s d u r i n g b o t h the r e s e a r c h a n d the w r i t i n g s t a g e s . T h a n k s , P a t . F i n a l l y , I d e d i c a t e t h i s b o o k to m y p a r e n t s , C l a i r e a n d T e d T r u d e a u , w i t h l o v e and in g r a t e f u l a c k n o w l e d g m e n t o f their c o n s t a n t s u p p o r t f o r the h a l f c e n t u r y or s o w e ' v e k n o w n e a c h o t h e r .

Robert H. Trudeau

Acronyms & Abbreviations

AEU ANACAFE ANC

A s s o c i a t i o n of U n i v e r s i t y S t u d e n t s ( A s o c i a c i ó n d e E s t u d i antes Universitarios) N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of C o f f e e P r o d u c e r s ( A s o c i a c i ó n N a cional de C a f i c u l t o r e s ) National Campesino Association (Pro-Land M o v e m e n t )

CLAT

(Asociación Nacional Campesina) C o u n c i l of C o m m e r c i a l , I n d u s t r i a l , a n d F i n a n c i a l A s s o c i a t i o n s ( C á m a r a de A s o c i a c i o n e s C o m e r c i a l e s , I n d u s t r i a l e s , y Financieras) National Authentic Center (Central Auténtico Nacional) C o u n c i l f o r F r e e C o m m e r c e ( C o n s e j o de C o m e r c i o L i b r e ) Permanent Commissions (Comisiones Permanentes) Civilian Sector Coordinating Committee (Comité Coordin a d o r del S e c t o r C i v i l ) S p e c i a l C o m m i s s i o n f o r A t t e n t i o n to R e f u g e e s ( C o m i s i ó n E s p e c i a l p a r a A t e n c i ó n a los R e f u g i a d o s ) R u n u j e l J u n a m C o u n c i l of E t h n i c U n i t y ( C o n s e j o de C o m u nidades Etnicas Runujel Junam) G e n e r a l C o o r d i n a t o r of G u a t e m a l a n W o r k e r s ( C o o r d i n a c i ó n G e n e r a l de T r a b a j a d o r e s de G u a t e m a l a ) National Interinstitutional Coordinator committees (Coordinadora Interinstitucional Nacional) Latin A m e r i c a n C o n f e d e r a t i o n of W o r k e r s ( C o n f e d e r a c i ó n

CNC

L a t i n o a m e r i c a n a de T r a b a j a d o r e s ) National Peasant Confederation (Confederación

CACIF

CAN CCL CCPP CCSC CEAR CERJ CGTG CIN

CNR

Nacional

Campesina) National Reconciliation Commission (Comisión Nacional de Reconciliación)

Acronyms & Abbreviations

CNT CONAVIGUA CPR CUC CUSG DCG EGP FAR FASGUA FDP FNO FRG FUN FUR GAM GHRC IGE INDE INTA MAS MDN MLN NISGUA ORPA PAC

xi

N a t i o n a l C o n f e d e r a t i o n of W o r k e r s ( C o n f e d e r a c i ó n Nacional de T r a b a j a d o r e s ) N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l of G u a t e m a l a n W i d o w s ( C o n s e j o N a cional de V i u d a s G u a t e m a l t e c a s ) C o m m u n i t i e s of P e o p l e in R e s i s t a n c e ( C o m u n i d a d e s del P u e b l o en R e s i s t e n c i a ) C o m m i t t e e f o r P e a s a n t U n i t y ( C o m i t é de U n i d a d Campesina) G u a t e m a l a n C o n f e d e r a t i o n of L a b o r U n i t y ( C o n f e d e r a ción de U n i d a d Sindical G u a t e m a l t e c a ) Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party (Democracia Cristiana G u a t e m a l t e c a ) G u e r r i l l a A r m y of the P o o r ( E j é r c i t o G u e r r i l l e r o de los Pobres) Rebel A r m e d F o r c e s ( F u e r z a s A r m a d a s R e b e l d e s ) G u a t e m a l a n F e d e r a t i o n of L a b o r A s s o c i a t i o n s ( F e d e r a ción d e A s o c i a c i o n e s S i n d i c a l e s G u a t e m a l t e c a s ) D e m o c r a t i c P o p u l a r Front ( F r e n t e D e m o c r á t i c o P o p u l a r ) National Opposition Front (Frente Nacional de O p o s i c i ó n ) Guatemalan Republican Front (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco) National Front f o r Unity ( F r e n t e de U n i d a d N a c i o n a l ) United Front of the R e v o l u t i o n (Frente Unido Revolucionario) M u t u a l S u p p o r t G r o u p ( G r u p o de A p o y o M u t u o ) Guatemalan Human Rights Commission G u a t e m a l a n C h u r c h in E x i l e ( I g l e s i a G u a t e m a l t e c a en Exilio) N a t i o n a l E l e c t r i c i t y I n d u s t r y ( I n d u s t r i a N a c i o n a l de Electricidad) National Institute for A g r a r i a n T r a n s f o r m a t i o n (Instituto N a c i o n a l de T r a n s f o r m a c i ó n A g r a r i a ) S o l i d a r i s t A c t i o n M o v e m e n t ( M o v i m i e n t o de A c c i ó n Solidarista) National Democratic Movement (Movimiento Nacional Democrático) N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n M o v e m e n t ( M o v i m i e n t o de L i b e r a ción N a c i o n a l ) N e t w o r k in Solidarity with G u a t e m a l a O r g a n i z a t i o n of P e o p l e in A r m s ( O r g a n i z a c i ó n del P u e b l o en A r m a s ) Civilian S e l f - D e f e n s e P a t r o l s ( P a t r u l l a s de A u t o - D e f e n s a Civil)

xii

PAN

Acronyms

National

&

Abbreviations

Advancement

Party

(Partido

de

Avanzada

Nacional) PGT

Guatemalan Communist Party (Partido

Guatemalteco

del T r a b a j o ) PID

Democratic

Institutional

Party

(Partido

Institucional

Democrático) PMA

Mobile Military Police (Policía Militar A m b u l a n t e )

PN

Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista)

PNR

National

Renovation

Party

(Partido

de

Renovación

Nacional) PR

Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario)

PRI

Revolutionary

Institutional

Party

(Mexico)

(Partido

Institucional Revolucionario) PSC

Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano)

PSD

Democratic

Socialist

Party

(Partido

Socialista

Democrático) PUA

P a r t y of A n t i c o m m u n i s t U n i t y ( P a r t i d o d e U n i d a d A n t i comunista)

RND

National

Democratic

Redemption

Party

(Redención

Nacional D e m o c r á t i c a , or La R e d e n c i ó n ) RUOG

United R e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the G u a t e m a l a n

Opposition

( R e p r e s e n t a c i ó n U n i d a d e la O p o s i c i ó n G u a t e m a l t e c a ) STINDE

U n i o n of W o r k e r s of the N a t i o n a l Electricity Industry ( S i n d i c a t o d e T r a b a j a d o r e s d e la I n d u s t r i a E l é c t r i c a )

TSE

Supreme

Electoral

Tribunal

(Tribunal

Supremo

Electoral) UASP

U n i t y of L a b o r a n d P o p u l a r A c t i o n C o a l i t i o n ( U n i d a d de A c c i ó n Sindical y P o p u l a r )

UNAGRO

National Agricultural Union (Unión Nacional de Agroexportadores)

UNO

United National Opposition (Unidad Nacional Opositora) Guatemalan Workers Labor Unity (Unidad Sindical de

UNSITRAGUA

Trabajadores Guatemaltecos) Revolutionary Democratic Unity (Unidad Revolucion-

URD

aria D e m o c r á t i c a )

URNG

Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca)

National

Guatemalan

Guatemalan USG

Solidarist

Revolutionary Union

Unity

(Unión

(Unidad

Solidarista

Guatemalteca) Quetzaltenango Workers Union (Unión de Trabajadores

UTQ

Quetzaltecos)

1

Democracy and Violence

J a n u a r y 31, 1980, d a w n e d a t y p i c a l l y b e a u t i f u l d a y in G u a t e m a l a C i t y , a s p r a w l i n g m e t r o p o l i s w i t h m o r e t h a n 2 m i l l i o n of G u a t e m a l a ' s 9 . 2 m i l l i o n i n h a b i t a n t s . B e f o r e t h e s u n w o u l d set d r a m a t i c a l l y o v e r the t o w e r i n g volc a n o e s that fill the s o u t h w e s t s k y l i n e , that d a y w o u l d e n t e r h i s t o r y as an i n f a m o u s s y m b o l of G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c s . G u a t e m a l a ' s p o p u l a t i o n is at least 6 0 p e r c e n t i n d i g e n o u s . 1 T h e M a y a live t h r o u g h o u t the n a t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y , b u t t h e m a j o r i t y , a n d m o s t i d e n t i f i able a n d culturally s t r o n g e s t c o m m u n i t i e s , are in t h e h i g h l a n d r e g i o n north a n d w e s t of G u a t e m a l a C i t y . F o r m o s t M a y a , s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y c o n s i s t e n t with their culture is e c o n o m i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e : l a n d h o l d i n g s are s m a l l a n d the l a n d o v e r u s e d . M a n y f a m i l i e s hire o u t as d a y l a b o r e r s ; f o r t h o u s a n d s this i n c l u d e s s e a s o n - l o n g m i g r a t i o n s to G u a t e m a l a ' s P a c i f i c - or s o u t h e r n c o a s t p l a n t a t i o n s or to c o f f e e p l a n t a t i o n s . In the late 1970s, m a n y M a y a n c o m m u n i t i e s b e c a m e m o r e m i l i t a n t in d e m a n d i n g an e n d to c e n t u r i e s of o p p r e s s i o n , p e t i t i o n i n g f o r r e l i e f f r o m l a n d o w n e r s s e i z i n g their l a n d s a n d f r o m the m i l i t a r y w h o p r o t e c t e d t h o s e l a n d o w n e r s by r e p r e s s i n g I n d i a n s w h o s p o k e o u t . A f t e r s e v e r a l f r u s t r a t i n g r o u n d s of such a c t i v i t y , in J a n u a r y 1 9 8 0 , a d e l e g a t i o n of a b o u t o n e h u n d r e d I n d i a n s f r o m s e v e r a l c o m m u n i t i e s in the D e p a r t m e n t ( p r o v i n c e ) of El Q u i c h e w e n t to G u a t e m a l a C i t y to s e e k r e d r e s s f r o m t h e g o v e r n m e n t of General Fernando R o m e o Lucas Garcia. T h e d e l e g a t i o n ' s e f f o r t s w e r e f r u s t r a t e d at e v e r y t u r n ; 2 t h e y w e r e r e b u f f e d in every a t t e m p t to m e e t w i t h o f f i c i a l s . O n J a n u a r y 28, a g r o u p of the delegates seized two radio stations, b r o a d c a s t their m e s s a g e and d e m a n d s , and left p e a c e f u l l y , h o p i n g to g a i n an a u d i e n c e w i t h the g o v e r n m e n t . B u t the g o v e r n m e n t ' s r e s p o n s e in t h e m o r n i n g n e w s p a p e r s o n J a n u ary 31 w a s that it w o u l d not t o l e r a t e f u r t h e r d i s t u r b a n c e s by s u b v e r s i v e s o r by rural g r o u p s b e i n g t r i c k e d by " s u b v e r s i v e e l e m e n t s . "

1

2

Guatemalan

Politics

The Spanish Embassy O n t h e 3 1 s t , still h o p i n g to g a i n a n a u d i e n c e w i t h t h e g o v e r n m e n t , a g r o u p of t h i r t y p e o p l e , i n c l u d i n g a b o u t t w e n t y of t h e I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n f r o m El Quiché, entered and occupied the Spanish e m b a s s y . 3 A r m e d with m a c h e t e s a n d M o l o t o v c o c k t a i l s , the g r o u p t o o k s o m e ten h o s t a g e s , i n c l u d i n g the a m b a s s a d o r and other embassy personnel and several f o r m e r high-ranking m e m b e r s of t h e G u a t e m a l a n g o v e r n m e n t , a m o n g t h e m a f o r m e r

vice-

p r e s i d e n t a n d a f o r m e r f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r . S y m p a t h e t i c to t h e I n d i a n s ' p l i g h t a n d w i l l i n g to i n t e r c e d e w i t h t h e g o v e r n m e n t o n t h e i r b e h a l f , D r . M á x i m o C a j a l y L ó p e z , t h e S p a n i s h a m b a s s a d o r , n e g o t i a t e d a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n to t h e i n t r u s i o n , a g r e e i n g to c o m m u n i c a t e t h e I n d i a n s ' d e m a n d s to t h e g o v e r n m e n t in e x c h a n g e f o r t h e g r o u p ' s p e a c e f u l w i t h d r a w a l . I n f o r m e d of t h e s e e v e n t s , h o w e v e r , t h e g o v e r n m e n t o r d e r e d p o l i c e to s u r r o u n d t h e e m b a s s y a n d c u t t e l e p h o n e l i n e s to p r e v e n t f u r t h e r c o m m u n i cation with the outside. Fearing the worst, since the police w e r e threatening t h e e m b a s s y i t s e l f , t h e a m b a s s a d o r w e n t t o t h e d o o r w a y a n d d e m a n d e d that the b u i l d i n g ' s sanctuary be respected, especially since a solution to the crisis h a d b e e n negotiated. T h e police r e s p o n d e d by o p e n i n g fire on

the

e m b a s s y . T h i r t y - n i n e p e o p l e , i n c l u d i n g t h e h o s t a g e s , 4 w e r e b u r n e d to d e a t h in t h e e x p l o s i o n s a n d a l l - c o n s u m i n g f i r e s , a p p a r e n t l y i g n i t e d by i n c e n d i a r y materials tossed into the building by the police.5 T h e r e w e r e t w o survivors, both b a d l y b u r n e d . T h e S p a n i s h a m b a s s a d o r e s c a p e d b e c a u s e he had b e e n s t a n d i n g in t h e b u i l d i n g ' s d o o r w a y w h e n t h e f i r e s b r o k e o u t . W i t n e s s e s s a w the police m a n h a n d l i n g him after he ran f r o m the building, b e f o r e they reco g n i z e d w h o h e w a s . G r e g o r i o Y u j a X o n a , o n e of t h e i n t r u d e r s , s u r v i v e d b e c a u s e h e h a d b e e n b u r i e d u n d e r a p i l e of b o d i e s . 6

Aftermath

of the

Massacre

In t h e w e e k s a n d m o n t h s t h a t f o l l o w e d , t h e e f f e c t s of t h e S p a n i s h e m b a s s y m a s s a c r e r i p p l e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y , c a t a l y z i n g o n g o i n g p r o c e s s e s of s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e . A r m e d w i t h a n e w a w a r e n e s s of n a t i o n a l p o l i tics a n d e c o n o m i c s , Indian c o m m u n i t i e s b e g a n o r g a n i z i n g to d e f e n d t h e m s e l v e s a g a i n s t t h e A r m y . T h e e v e n t s at t h e S p a n i s h e m b a s s y m a r k e d t h e end of p e a c e f u l attempts by m a n y p o p u l a r g r o u p s to i n f l u e n c e the g o v e r n m e n t . I n d i a n a n d ladino1

c o m m u n i t i e s a l i k e b e g a n to i n t e g r a t e t h e m s e l v e s

i n t o t h e r e s i s t a n c e m o v e m e n t led b y G u a t e m a l a ' s a r m e d g u e r r i l l a g r o u p s . R e c o g n i z i n g the depths to w h i c h the G u a t e m a l a n g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d sink to e r a d i c a t e p o l i t i c a l d i s s e n t o f a n y k i n d , m a n y p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e i n d i v i d u als w e n t i n t o h i d i n g o r l e f t t h e c o u n t r y . L i n e s h a r d e n e d as well a m o n g the elite m i n o r i t y w h o controlled the c o u n t r y . In t h e w e e k s f o l l o w i n g t h e e m b a s s y m a s s a c r e ,

progovernment

Democracy & Violence

3

g r o u p s took clear s t e p s to u n d e r m i n e s o c i a l o r g a n i z i n g . B u s i n e s s a n d agric u l t u r a l a s s o c i a t i o n s , f o r e x a m p l e , p l a c e d l a r g e a n n o u n c e m e n t s in t h e p r e s s e x p r e s s i n g s u p p o r t f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s p o l i c i e s to e l i m i n a t e " s u b versives." The press campaign included innuendoes against the Spanish a m b a s s a d o r , s u g g e s t i n g he h a d h e l p e d p l a n t h e e m b a s s y s e i z u r e a n d w a s t h e r e f o r e not e n t i t l e d to any p r o t e c t i o n b e y o n d that of a c o m m o n c r i m i n a l . I n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i t i c s of t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s h a n d l i n g of t h e a f f a i r w e r e l a b e l e d part of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c a b a l , p r o b a b l y c o m m u n i s t , s e e k i n g to d e s t r o y G u a t e m a l a n s o c i e t y . O f f i c i a l s of t h e U . S . D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e w h o c r i t i c i z e d the c o u n t r y ' s h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s w e r e r o u t i n e l y d e s c r i b e d as p a i d c o l l a b o r a t o r s of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i s t plot. B u t the p r e s s c a m p a i g n p a l e d in c o m p a r i s o n to m i l i t a r y a n d p o l i c e r e p r e s s i o n . I m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r the e m b a s s y e v e n t s , the A r m y i n t e n s i f i e d its p a t r o l s of city s t r e e t s , r a i s i n g t h e level of p o l i t i c a l t e n s i o n . In t h e f o l l o w ing m o n t h s the m i l i t a r y g o v e r n m e n t e s c a l a t e d its v i o l e n c e , u n l e a s h i n g a w a v e of r e p r e s s i o n a g a i n s t p r o f e s s i o n a l s ( e s p e c i a l l y l a w y e r s ) , p r i e s t s , university professors, reporters, and students w h o had shown s y m p a t h y for p e a s a n t or labor o r g a n i z a t i o n s . B e f o r e 1 9 8 0 , t h e v i o l e n c e had b e e n d i r e c t e d m o s t l y a g a i n s t v i s i b l e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s . N o w it s p r e a d to l e a d e r s and activists of the s m a l l e s t p o p u l a r g r o u p s a n d e v e n to the m a s s e s of the p o p ulation t h e m s e l v e s . D e a t h s q u a d s r o u t i n e l y a n d o p e n l y p a t r o l l e d t h e streets. T h o u g h s h o c k i n g , the S p a n i s h e m b a s s y m a s s a c r e r e p r e s e n t e d o n l y a small p r o p o r t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e in G u a t e m a l a in 1 9 8 0 , w h e n , by c o n servative estimates, s o m e three thousand persons were killed for political r e a s o n s . H u n d r e d s d i s a p p e a r e d a n d o t h e r s w e r e t o r t u r e d b e f o r e their b o d i e s w e r e d u m p e d in v a r i o u s l o c a t i o n s a r o u n d the n a t i o n . D o z e n s w e r e m a c h i n e g u n n e d in public, o f t e n on city s t r e e t s d u r i n g d a y l i g h t h o u r s . 8 A s g r i m as the 1 9 8 0 d a t a a r e , a f t e r that y e a r c o n d i t i o n s d e t e r i o r a t e d e v e n f u r t h e r . S y s t e m a t i c w a r f a r e c a m e to I n d i a n r e g i o n s , as t h e A r m y e x p a n d e d its c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t c o m m u n i t i e s s u s p e c t e d of s y m p a t h i z i n g with g u e r r i l l a s . B e t w e e n 1 9 8 0 a n d late 1983, h u n d r e d s of v i l l a g e s w e r e d e s t r o y e d a n d t h o u s a n d s of I n d i a n s m a s s a c r e d o r f o r c e d to f l e e , s o m e to r e f u g e e c a m p s in M e x i c o a n d e l s e w h e r e , s o m e to t h e r e l a t i v e s a f e t y of u r b a n s l u m s , a n d s o m e to a n o m a d i c e x i s t e n c e in the m o u n t a i n s . H u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of I n d i a n s w e r e f o r c e d i n t o civil d e f e n s e p a t r o l s a n d / o r " m o d e l v i l l a g e s . " B y 1 9 8 4 , l a r g e a r e a s in r u r a l G u a t e m a l a h a d b e c o m e w a s t e l a n d s . T h e c o u n t r y h a d f a l l e n into t h e a b y s s . J a n u a r y 31, 1980, has c o m e to s y m b o l i z e the b r u t a l i t y of t h e G u a t e m a lan g o v e r n m e n t , at least of its p o l i c e a n d m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s . F r o m this m o r a s s t h e n a t i o n s o m e h o w e m e r g e d in 1 9 8 4 w i t h n e w p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u tions. E l e c t i o n s f o r a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a s s e m b l y w e r e h e l d , a n d a n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o c l a i m e d . T h e m i l i t a r y r u l e r s a g r e e d to " r e t u r n to t h e b a r r a c k s . " P r e s i d e n t i a l , c o n g r e s s i o n a l , a n d m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s w e r e h e l d in t h e fall

4

Guatemalan

Politics

of 1 9 8 5 , r e s u l t i n g in t h e i n a u g u r a t i o n of a c i v i l i a n p r e s i d e n t , t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t M a r c o V i n i c i o C e r e z o A r e v a l o , in J a n u a r y 1 9 8 6 .

Municipal

e l e c t i o n s w e r e h e l d a g a i n in 1 9 8 8 , a n d in 1 9 9 0 , a s e c o n d c i v i l i a n p r e s i d e n t , Jorge Serrano Elias, w a s elected. G u a t e m a l a has apparently w i t n e s s e d a dramatic transition f r o m repressive authoritarianism, illustrated by the S p a n i s h e m b a s s y m a s s a c r e , t h r o u g h t h e d e m o c r a t i c c i v i l i t y of t h e 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 8 5 e l e c t i o n s , t o a s e c o n d e l e c t i o n in 1 9 9 0 . T h i s p e r i o d m e r i t s s e r i o u s s t u d y : h o w d i d s u c h a t r a n s i t i o n h a p p e n , a n d w h a t d o e s it m e a n in t e r m s of d e m o c r a t i c d e v e l o p m e n t ?

Democracy in Guatemala: Posing the Questions D e s c r i p t i o n s of s u c h v i o l e n c e as d e s c r i b e d a b o v e a r e r e l e v a n t to t h e a n a l y sis of an e m e r g e n t d e m o c r a c y , b e c a u s e i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e — s u c h a s t h e c r e a t i o n of f r e e e l e c t i o n s — m u s t b e s t u d i e d in a b r o a d e r s o c i o p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t . T h e e v e n t s a n d r e p e r c u s s i o n s of t h e e m b a s s y m a s s a c r e a r e m o r e d r a m a t i c t h a n m o s t , b u t t h e y i l l u s t r a t e t h e n a t u r e of G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c s a n d the e x t r e m i s m that s o o f t e n c h a r a c t e r i z e s p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n t h e r e . M o s t i m p o r t a n t , t h e y b e c o m e p a r t of t h e real h i s t o r y of G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c s t h a t all s u b s e q u e n t p a r t i c i p a n t s l e a r n f r o m o r i n t e g r a t e i n t o t h e i r p l a n n i n g . T h e e l e c t i o n s in 1 9 8 5 s e e m e d t o r e c o n s t i t u t e t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s in Guatemala, giving rise to several h y p o t h e s e s about the status of d e m o c r a c y in G u a t e m a l a . T h e f i r s t p o s i t i o n , e x p r e s s e d b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s e m b a s s y at t h e t i m e of t h e e l e c t i o n , w a s t h a t d e m o c r a c y h a d b e e n a c h i e v e d in G u a t e m a l a ; it w a s d e c l a r e d a " p o s t - t r a n s i t i o n a l " c a s e . 9 A s e c o n d t h e s i s — " W h o e v e r is e l e c t e d in G u a t e m a l a , t h e a r m y w i n s " ( G o e p f e r t : 3 6 ) — s u g g e s t s that G u a t e m a l a n " d e m o c r a c y " is a f a c a d e , c o n s i s t i n g o f s u p e r f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e s w i t h n o m e a n i n g f u l c h a n g e f o r s o c i e t y . In t h i s v i e w t h e o v e r t h r o w o f t h e c a p i t a l i s t s y s t e m is a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r m e a n i n g f u l s o c i a l c h a n g e a n d h e n c e f o r real m o v e m e n t t o w a r d d e m o c r a c y . in 1 9 8 5

was

rebutted by the n e w l y e l e c t e d p r e s i d e n t , V i n i c i o C e r e z o A r e v a l o ,

T h e thesis that G u a t e m a l a

achieved true d e m o c r a c y

who

s a w t h e e l e c t i o n s t h a t y e a r a s b u t a f i r s t s t e p in t h e d i f f i c u l t p r o c e s s of c r e ating a democratic society and political system. He a c k n o w l e d g e d

the

w e a k n e s s of t h e c i v i l i a n g o v e r n m e n t b u t v i e w e d t h e f u t u r e w i t h c a u t i o u s optimism because democratic procedures had been strengthened. These s t r e n g t h e n e d institutions w o u l d e v e n t u a l l y lead to real c i v i l i a n

power,

e s p e c i a l l y if " d e m o c r a t i c v a l u e s " c o u l d b e a c q u i r e d b y t h e c i t i z e n r y . A t that t i m e r e f o r m p r o g r a m s w o u l d b e i m p l e m e n t e d . 1 " T h e second thesis, that achieving d e m o c r a c y depends on a revolutionary t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of s o c i e t y ' s e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s , a p p e a l s to m a n y s t u d e n t s of G u a t e m a l a n h i s t o r y , w h i c h is o n e of a l m o s t u n b r o k e n

Democracy & Violence

5

r a p a c i t y a n d g r e e d i m p l e m e n t e d at t h e e x p e n s e of t h e n a t i o n ' s w o r k i n g c l a s s and i n d i g e n o u s c o m m u n i t i e s . B u t t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r a t e g y is u n a p p e a l i n g to m a n y G u a t e m a l a n s w h o p a i d an e x t r a o r d i n a r y p r i c e d u r i n g the c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y v i o l e n c e of the early 1 9 8 0 s . M a n y M a y a n c o m m u n i t i e s , in p a r t i c u l a r , are d e t e r m i n e d not to b e u s e d as c a n n o n f o d d e r . F i n a l l y , the s t a t e is s t r o n g b e c a u s e of m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i d p r o g r a m s , s u g g e s t i n g that t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y m o d e l f o r a c h i e v i n g d e m o c r a c y c o u l d be e v e n m o r e c o s t l y in the f u t u r e . M o r e o v e r , r e f o r m i s t p o l i t i c i a n s a n d p o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a v e a h i s t o r y of c o u r a g e o u s a n d s o m e t i m e s e f f e c t i v e political a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e p r e v a i l i n g political e c o n o m y , a n d their e f f o r t s s h o u l d b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o any s y s t e m a t i c s t u d y of d e m o c r a c y in G u a t e m a l a . A third thesis a b o u t G u a t e m a l a n d e m o c r a c y , l o o s e l y d e r i v e d f r o m the " t r a n s i t i o n to d e m o c r a c y " s c h o o l , r e f l e c t s P r e s i d e n t C e r e z o ' s s t a t e m e n t s . T h i s a p p r o a c h in part a r g u e s that c r e a t i n g e l e c t o r a l s t r u c t u r e s is a f i r s t s t e p in a transition to a m o r e d e m o c r a t i z e d p o l i t y . E l e c t i o n s d o not n e c e s s a r i l y e s t a b l i s h a d e m o c r a c y b u t a r e o p p o r t u n i t i e s to c r e a t e o n e f r o m t h e c r i s i s that p r o d u c e d the political o p e n i n g . 1 1 In s u m , e l e c t i o n s m a t t e r a n d n e e d to b e s t u d i e d in t e r m s of b o t h their p r o c e d u r a l d i m e n s i o n s a n d their a f t e r m a t h s . T h e y m a t t e r b e c a u s e t h e y can lead p r e s u m a b l y to p u b l i c p o l i c i e s that r e s p o n d to t h e m a j o r i t y of v o t e r s a n d their p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s . A l t h o u g h G u a t e m a l a a p p e a r s to b e q u i t e d e m o c r a t i c f r o m the f o r m a l - l e g a l d a t a , a d d i t i o n a l d a t a a r e n e e d e d a b o u t the p r o c e d u r a l q u a l i t y of the f o r m a l l y d e m o c r a t i c s t r u c t u r e s , i n c l u d i n g data a b o u t h u m a n rights, p u b l i c p o l i c i e s , a n d their s o c i e t a l i m p a c t .

Measuring

Democracy

P o l i t i c s is t h e e x e r c i s e of p o w e r in t h e s o c i a l p u r s u i t of c e r t a i n v a l u e s . 1 2 Politics in d i c t a t o r s h i p s or d e m o c r a c i e s is the s a m e in this r e g a r d , b u t t h e a r c h i t e c t u r e of p o w e r d i f f e r s w i d e l y . " D e m o c r a c y " i m p l i e s a w i d e s p r e a d d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s in a n y s p e c i f i c t i m e a n d p l a c e . W i d e l y d i s t r i b u t e d p o w e r in a n y s o c i e t y m e a n s p u b l i c c o n t r o l of t h e s t a t e : c i t i z e n s h a v e the p o w e r t o c o m pel o f f i c e h o l d e r s to act in c e r t a i n w a y s . T o m e a s u r e t h e e x t e n t of this p o w e r , w e n e e d to look c l o s e l y at p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Political participation. D e m o c r a c y d e p e n d s as m u c h o n e f f i c a c i o u s political p a r t i c i p a t i o n as o n the t y p e s of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s or social o u t c o m e s p r e s c r i b e d . P a r t i c i p a t i o n , w h a t e v e r t h e l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , i n c l u d e s not o n l y h o w c i t i z e n s i n f l u e n c e s o c i e t y ' s d i s t r i b u t i o n of g o o d s , but also h o w t h o s e in p o w e r , i n c l u d i n g e l i t e s a n d g o v e r n m e n t s , i n f l u e n c e s u c c e s s f u l p a r t i c i p a t i o n by t h e p u b l i c . G o v e r n m e n t a l a c t o r s , l i k e o t h e r

Guatemalan

6

Politics

p a r t i c i p a n t s , m a y try t o i n h i b i t t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of o t h e r s , a n d in e x t r e m e c a s e s , " g o v e r n m e n t s [ m a y b e ] l o c k e d in s o m e k i n d o f s t r u g g l e w i t h t h e i r o w n p e o p l e " ( A d a m s 1 9 7 9 : 1 3 ) . 1 3 T h u s , p a t t e r n s of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n a r e e x c e l l e n t i n d i c a t o r s of t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r in a s o c i e t y , w h i c h in t u r n c a n m e a s u r e t h e e x t e n t of its d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n . P a r t i c i p a t i o n t h e r e f o r e is a c o n c e p t t h a t i m p l i e s t h e s t u d y n o t o n l y of p o l i t i c a l p r o c e d u r e s b u t of p u b l i c p o l i c y a s w e l l . T h e p r o c e d u r a l d i m e n s i o n c a n b e s t u d i e d u s i n g t h e " l i b e r a l - r e p r e s e n t a t i v e " m o d e l of d e m o c r a c y , which focuses on: 1. R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s , i n c l u d i n g e l e c t i o n s , t h a t r e s t r i c t t h e u n f e t t e r e d p o w e r of g o v e r n i n g elites. E l e c t i o n s also r e d u c e

the

d i r e c t p o w e r of c i t i z e n s . 1 4 V e s t i n g p o w e r in e l e c t e d a n d a p p o i n t e d l e a d e r s i n h i b i t s t y r a n n y by b o t h e l i t e s a n d m a s s e s . A t a m i n i m u m , t h e r e m u s t b e f a i r , p e r i o d i c , a n d f r e e e l e c t i o n s , b y w h i c h g r o u p s of p e o p l e r e p r e s e n t i n g m a j o r i t i e s , o r at l e a s t p l u r a l i t i e s , c a n r e g u l a t e t h e f l o w of p o l i t i c a l p o w e r a n d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g in s o c i e t y . 1 5 2. C i v i l l i b e r t i e s a n d c i v i l r i g h t s t h a t p r o v i d e c i t i z e n s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to o r g a n i z e t o w i n o f f i c e t h r o u g h e l e c t i o n s a n d t o i n f l u e n c e g o v e r n m e n t b e t w e e n e l e c t i o n s . A t a m i n i m u m c i t i z e n s m u s t b e a b l e to participate politically w i t h o u t b e i n g unduly restricted by the state. M o r e o v e r , the state s h o u l d p r o t e c t p a r t i c i p a t i n g c i t i z e n s f r o m othe r s w h o w o u l d s e e k to p r e v e n t t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 3. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s a n d p u b l i c p o l i c i e s t h a t p r o t e c t " i n a l i e n a b l e " r i g h t s , f o r e x a m p l e , " t o l i f e , l i b e r t y , a n d t h e p u r s u i t of h a p p i n e s s . " In t h e o r y , at l e a s t , t h e s e r i g h t s p r o v i d e all c i t i z e n s

with

o p p o r t u n i t i e s to f l o u r i s h i n d i v i d u a l l y . A s s e s s i n g t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y of e l e c t i o n s a s d e m o c r a t i c e v e n t s m u s t t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e c o n t e x t in w h i c h t h e y o c c u r . H e r m a n a n d B r o d h e a d i d e n t i f y six c o n t e x t u a l d i m e n s i o n s as c r i t e r i a that m u s t b e m e t f o r an e l e c t i o n to b e c o n s i d e r e d an a u t h e n t i c e l e c t o r a l e v e n t : ( 1 ) f r e e d o m of s p e e c h — i n c l u d i n g t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to o p e n l y c r i t i c i z e g o v e r n m e n t a l a n d o t h e r l e a d e r s ; ( 2 ) f r e e d o m of m e d i a — i n c l u d i n g t h e a b s e n c e of c e n s o r s h i p a n d i n t i m i d a t i o n ; ( 3 ) f r e e d o m to o r g a n i z e i n t e r e s t g r o u p s t h a t s e r v e as a m e d i u m f o r a l l o w i n g " o r g a n i z e d pressure on the state" and also serve to "restrain state p o w e r " ; ( 4 ) t h e " a b s e n c e of h i g h l y d e v e l o p e d a n d p e r v a s i v e i n s t r u m e n t s o f s t a t e s p o n s o r e d t e r r o r " ; ( 5 ) f r e e d o m to o r g a n i z e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a n d to f i e l d c a n d i d a t e s ; a n d ( 6 ) t h e a b s e n c e of c o e r c i o n a n d f e a r o n t h e p a r t of t h e g e n e r a l p o p u l a t i o n ( H e r m a n a n d B r o d h e a d : 1 1 - 1 4 ) . 1 6 T a k e n as m e a s u r e s of p r o c e d u r e s , e a c h of t h e s e f i t s t h e l i b e r a l - r e p r e s e n t a t i v e m o d e l of d e m o c r a c y , b u t each moves beyond a narrow focus on electoral procedures and incorpor a t e s a d d i t i o n a l s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l e l e m e n t s that r e f l e c t t h e q u a l i t y of o t h e r l i n k a g e s , s u c h as civil l i b e r t i e s , b e t w e e n r u l e r s a n d c i t i z e n s .

Democracy & Violence

7

E v e n in a d e m o c r a t i c c o n t e x t , h o w e v e r , t h e p r o c e d u r a l d i m e n s i o n s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n a r e not e n o u g h to m e e t t h e d e m o c r a t i c s t a n d a r d . I m p o v e r i s h e d m a j o r i t i e s m a y h a v e little p o w e r b e y o n d t h a t of c o n s e n t i n g to t h e overall s y s t e m and c h o o s i n g a m o n g elites w h o d i f f e r in p e r s o n a l a m b i t i o n s f o r h o l d i n g o f f i c e b u t p u r s u e e s s e n t i a l l y t h e s a m e social o u t c o m e s f r o m it. T h e c o n c e p t of d e m o c r a c y s h o u l d g o b e y o n d p r o c e d u r a l a s p e c t s of p o l i t i cal life. Political p a r t i c i p a t i o n m e a n s t h e e x e r c i s e of p o w e r , b u t " p o w e r " m u s t m e a n m o r e than m e r e l y s e l e c t i n g l e a d e r s t h r o u g h v o t i n g . Public policy. Effective participation should include influencing public p o l i c y t h r o u g h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s o r m o r e d i r e c t f o r m s of d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n that are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by m a s s m o b i l i z a t i o n . P a r t i c i p a t i o n , to b e e f f e c t i v e , s h o u l d c o n t r i b u t e to t h e d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of s o c i e t y . T o m e a s u r e this, f o l l o w i n g G r e e n b e r g , w e f o c u s on q u e s t i o n s of a c c o u n t ability a n d the policy i m p a c t of e l e c t i o n s , s e e k i n g e v i d e n c e that links v o t e r s w i t h p o l i c i e s p r e f e r r e d by m a j o r i t i e s . G r e e n b e r g s e e s a " d e m o c r a t i c " e l e c t i o n if: ( 1 ) c a n d i d a t e s and parties . . . present clear p o l i c y c h o i c e s . . . [ o n ] . . . important issues. E l e c t i o n s . . . s h o u l d be competitive and nontrivial; (2) O n c e e l e c t e d , o f f i c i a l s s h o u l d try to carry out what they p r o m i s e d during their c a m p a i g n ; ( 3 ) O n c e e l e c t e d , o f f i c i a l s s h o u l d be c a p a b l e o f transf o r m i n g c a m p a i g n p r o m i s e s into b i n d i n g p u b l i c p o l i c y ; and ( 4 ) E l e c t i o n s should generally i n f l u e n c e the b e h a v i o r of t h o s e e l i t e s w h o are r e s p o n s i ble for m a k i n g public p o l i c y ( G r e e n b e r g 1 9 8 9 : 1 7 7 , italics in original).

G r e e n b e r g w r i t e s f r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e of a " s o c i a l d e m o c r a c y " m o d e l . A n d a l t h o u g h his criteria relate to p u b l i c p o l i c y , b e h i n d t h e m is a c o n c e p t of the s t a t e ' s role in g u a r a n t e e i n g c i t i z e n s a g e n u i n e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r s e l f d e v e l o p m e n t , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l i s m in W e s t e r n t h o u g h t . D e m o c r a c y t h e n b e c o m e s a m e a n s of h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t , not m e r e l y a set of p r o c e d u r e s that " a l l o w s t h e c i t i z e n o n l y a p a s s i v e role as an o b j e c t of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y " ( W a l k e r : 2 3 3 ) . A l t h o u g h political p r o c e d u r e s are c e n t r a l to t h e s o c i a l d e m o c r a c y p e r s p e c t i v e , their o u t c o m e s are e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t . S o c i a l d e m o c r a c y f o c u s e s on e l e c t i o n s , political p a r t i e s , a n d t h e r i g h t s that g u a r a n t e e a c c e s s to t h e s e p r o c e d u r e s , but a l s o on the m a j o r i t y ' s p o w e r to r e s t r u c t u r e s o c i e t y , w i t h a c o r r e s p o n d i n g r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of w e a l t h in f a v o r of t h e w o r k i n g c l a s s e s . D e m o c r a c y is " m o r e than a set of r u l e s of t h e g a m e ; it a l s o e n c o m p a s s e s a set of h u m a n p u r p o s e s , e m b r a c i n g a b r o a d v i s i o n of h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t as its g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e " ( B o w l e s a n d G i n t i s : 1 7 8 ) . A s s u m i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n is e f f e c t i v e in c o n v i n c i n g l e a d e r s to act in the m a j o r i t y ' s interest, d e m o c r a c y then m u s t also i n c l u d e state control over socie t y ' s resources, lest there be no s u b s t a n c e to p u b l i c c o n t r o l of g o v e r n m e n t : p u b l i c institutions m u s t h a v e the p o w e r to c o n t r o l the political e c o n o m y . 1 7

8

Guatemalan

Politics

C o m p l e m e n t i n g the m a c r o s o c i a l p e r s p e c t i v e , B o w l e s a n d Gintis also look at t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p at t h e l e v e l of i n d i v i d u a l s . D e m o c r a c i e s , t h e y a s s e r t , s h o u l d reduce the e c o n o m i c d e p e n d e n c y of n o n w e a l t h y citizens, for s u c h dependency means m o r e political p o w e r for those w h o control e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s , w h i c h r e d u c e s c i t i z e n c a p a c i t y f o r d e m o c r a c y . T h i s is c l e a r l y p r o b l e m a t i c in a d e m o c r a c y , if n o t " a n t i t h e t i c a l to b o t h l i b e r t y a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty."18 If w e a l t h

accumulations

and social

inequality

produce

economic

d e p e n d e n c y f o r s o m e i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e n it is t h e d u t y of c i t i z e n s , t h r o u g h g o v e r n m e n t , to intervene. Social d e m o c r a c y v a l u e s the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r i n d i v i d u a l d e v e l o p m e n t m o r e t h a n t h e p r o t e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l

tangible

p r o p e r t y — i n d e e d , t h a t p r o p e r t y i t s e l f , o r at l e a s t t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f i t s control a m o n g a few, can be the problem. Thus, social democracy a f f i r m s t h e s o c i a l utility of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y b u t o n l y in t h e l i b e r a l s e n s e : t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n lies in t h e b e n e f i t s t h a t a c c r u e t o i n d i v i d u a l s . A s with the d i m e n s i o n s of p r o c e d u r a l d e m o c r a c y d i s c u s s e d earlier, a p p r o p r i a t e e m p i r i c a l i n d i c a t o r s e x i s t f o r m e a s u r i n g t h e q u a l i t y of s o c i a l d e m o c r a c y . G a m e r , f o r e x a m p l e , u s e s t h e c o n c e p t of a " S t a b l e P e r s o n a l E n v i r o n m e n t , " defined as enough food to eat; health care; h o u s i n g that is affordable and s a t i s f y i n g to live in; neighbors and cultural facilities w i t h w h i c h individuals feel c o m f o r t a b l e ; a j o b o f f e r i n g a m o d i c u m of s a t i s f a c t i o n , continuity, and a b o v e - s u b s i s t e n c e i n c o m e ; and an e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m that can p r o m i s e children the s a m e a d v a n t a g e s . A person with no monetary i n c o m e can have this as well as one with high income: the key lies in the balance of the parts (Gamer: 8 - 9 , italics in o r i g i n a l ) . 1 9

In t h i s m o d e l , t h e r e f o r e , g o v e r n m e n t p r o g r a m s f o r s o c i a l r e f o r m a r e i m p o r t a n t indicators of d e m o c r a c y

in G u a t e m a l a , a n d t h e s e

programs

s h o u l d p r o d u c e m e a s u r a b l e r e s u l t s in t h e q u a l i t y of l i f e f o r t h e c o u n t r y ' s i m p o v e r i s h e d m a j o r i t y . In s h o r t , in o r d e r f o r a s o c i e t y t o b e d e m o c r a t i c a n d its p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s t o b e a s t a b l e a n d d e m o c r a t i c o n e , g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d h a v e a r o l e in i m p r o v i n g t h e q u a l i t y o f l i f e of its c i t i z e n s . In G u a t e m a l a t h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e " p o p u l a r " s e c t o r s s h o u l d s h o w s i g n s of p r o g r e s s . G a m e r ' s i n d i c a t o r s , b r o a d l y r e f l e c t i n g t h e q u a l i t y of l i f e f o r

poverty-

s t r i c k e n c i t i z e n s , o f f e r a g o o d s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t w h i c h to m e a s u r e p r o g r e s s between 1980 and 1992. B e y o n d e t h i c a l c o n c e r n s a b o u t t h e o u t c o m e s of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n lie e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n s as w e l l : d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y not o n l y a s s u m e s c e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d o u t c o m e s , it a l s o a s s u m e s s t a b i l i t y . It is q u e s tionable

whether

democratic

procedures

and

institutions

can

survive

in g r o s s l y i n e g a l i t a r i a n s i t u a t i o n s in w h i c h m a n y c i t i z e n s m a y f i n d t h e i r s u p p o r t f o r l i b e r a l s y s t e m s w e a k e n e d b y t h e r e a l i t i e s of e c o n o m i c n e c e s s i t y . In L a t i n A m e r i c a l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m s h a v e s h o w n a d e g r e e of

Democracy & Violence

9

i m m o b i l i s m that is quite acceptable to elites s e e k i n g to prevent c h a n g e but intolerable to others w h o are p u r s u i n g social j u s t i c e ( P e e l e r : 1 5 2 - 1 5 3 ) . T h e resulting high potential f o r social instability is a threat to liberal-representative political institutions and, i r o n i c a l l y , to t h e e c o n o m i c w e a l t h that liberal d e m o c r a c y is designed to protect. 2 0 W h a t this means, in e f f e c t , is that i n s t i t u t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r partici p a t i o n a r e n e c e s s a r y b u t not s u f f i c i e n t . P a r t i c i p a t i o n a l s o s h o u l d h a v e a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t and lead to the d e s i r e d r e s u l t s . U l t i m a t e l y , the test of liberal d e m o c r a c y lies in the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n by all a c t o r s . T h e " r e s u l t s " of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , h o w e v e r , m u s t be e v i d e n t in s u b s t a n t i v e as w e l l as m o r e theoretical or p r o c e d u r a l w a y s : t h o s e t h a t i n c r e a s e s o c i a l j u s t i c e , f o r e x a m p l e , are m o r e i m p o r t a n t f o r a t r a n s i t i o n to d e m o c r a c y than t h o s e that t h w a r t r e f o r m . U l t i m a t e l y , t h e n , a t r a n s i t i o n to d e m o c r a c y d e p e n d s not only on h o n e s t e l e c t i o n s b u t a l s o on h u m a n r i g h t s a n d m o v e m e n t t o w a r d social j u s t i c e . T h e q u e s t i o n s of h u m a n r i g h t s a n d s o c i a l j u s t i c e a r e p e r h a p s the m o s t critical f a c i n g c o n t e m p o r a r y G u a t e m a l a , g i v e n not o n l y e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l ity a n d its e f f e c t s on political s t a b i l i t y b u t s t r a i n s o n t h e g l o b a l e c o s y s t e m as w e l l . T h e country has a l o n g h i s t o r y of s t r u g g l e a r o u n d i s s u e s of social justice. At various m o m e n t s , d e m o c r a t i c f o r m s h a v e been created, but d e m o c r a t i c f o r m s w i t h o u t social j u s t i c e h a v e not p r o d u c e d a s t a b l e s o c i e t y . A m a j o r q u e s t i o n here is w h e t h e r n e w f o r m s of p r o c e d u r a l d e m o c r a c y in p l a c e s i n c e 1 9 8 4 h a v e d e l i v e r e d , o r c a n d e l i v e r , n e e d e d social r e f o r m s f o r Guatemala's impoverished masses within a reasonable time frame.

Conclusion In t h e o r y , in a d e m o c r a c y the p e o p l e a r e t h e g o v e r n m e n t and g o v e r n m e n t is " o f , by, a n d f o r the p e o p l e . " T h e ideal of i n c r e a s e d a n d e f f e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n r e m a i n s critical to d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y . B u t d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t o r y p o l i t i c s in large, c o m p l e x s o c i e t i e s is illusory in t o d a y ' s w o r l d . In p r a c t i c e , t h e r e f o r e , d e m o c r a c y h a s c o m e t o i m p l y an e g a l i t a r i a n r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e people and their c h o s e n g o v e r n o r s , a k i n to a b a l a n c e of p o w e r or d é t e n t e b e t w e e n rulers a n d r u l e d . In t u r n , c i t i z e n s s u p p o r t r e g i m e s w h e n the s t a t e p r o v i d e s f o r t h e c o m m o n w e l f a r e , as d e s i r e d b y c i t i z e n s a n d as e x p r e s s e d in electoral b e h a v i o r w h e n this is p o s s i b l e . G u a t e m a l a r e t u r n e d to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t in 1 9 8 5 , u n d e r t h e l e a d e r s h i p of P r e s i d e n t V i n i c i o C e r e z o a n d t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y . H a s t h e q u a l i t y of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i m p r o v e d in G u a t e m a l a s i n c e t h e n ? H a v e political p a r t i c i p a n t s e n j o y e d the p r o t e c t i o n s i m p l i e d by the p h r a s e " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t , " o r is the political a r e n a c h a r a c t e r ized by an a t m o s p h e r e of c o e r c i o n a n d f e a r ? H a s t h e c i v i l i a n g o v e r n m e n t g a i n e d a p p r e c i a b l e p o w e r o v e r s o c i e t y ' s r e s o u r c e s , r e l a t i v e to t h e m i l i t a r y ,

10

Guatemalan

Politics

f o r e x a m p l e ? Is p o l i t i c a l p o w e r m o r e w i d e l y d i s t r i b u t e d in 1 9 9 2 t h a n it w a s in 1 9 8 0 ? H o w h a s t h e " S t a b l e P e r s o n a l E n v i r o n m e n t " of p o o r c i t i z e n s f a r e d ? Is G u a t e m a l a m a k i n g p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s o c i a l j u s t i c e ? T o a n s w e r t h e s e q u e s t i o n s , it is n e c e s s a r y t o e x a m i n e c a r e f u l l y t h e b e g i n n i n g of G u a t e m a l a ' s t r a n s i t i o n t o d e m o c r a c y in t h e 1 9 8 0 s a n d e a r l y 1 9 9 0 s . W h i l e t h e c o n c e p t s in t h i s c h a p t e r e s t a b l i s h a g e n e r a l c o n t e x t f o r t h e Guatemalan data, understanding G u a t e m a l a ' s transition process after 1985 r e q u i r e s s o m e k n o w l e d g e of t h e p a r t i c u l a r s e t t i n g in w h i c h t h e s e e v e n t s o c c u r r e d . T h e e v e n t s of J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1 9 8 0 , f o r e x a m p l e , b o t h r e f l e c t t h e past and help illuminate the f u t u r e . C h a p t e r 2 provides a general b a c k g r o u n d of h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t s a n d p a t t e r n s t h a t e s t a b l i s h a r e l e v a n t c o n t e x t f o r w h a t h a s h a p p e n e d in t h e 1 9 8 0 s a n d e a r l y 1 9 9 0 s . In t h e f i r s t p a r t o f t h i s p e r i o d , G u a t e m a l a l i v e d t h r o u g h a n u n p r e c e d e n t e d w a v e of t e r r o r a n d v i o l e n c e b e t w e e n 1 9 8 0 a n d 1 9 8 5 . C h a p t e r 3 s t u d i e s e l e c t i o n s in t h e c o u n t r y in t h e c o n t e x t o f t h i s p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e , c u l m i n a t i n g in t h e c r i s i s t h a t f o r c e d a c o u p d ' é t a t b y t h e G u a t e m a l a n m i l i t a r y in 1 9 8 2 . C h a p t e r 4 c o n t i n u e s t h e n a r r a t i v e a f t e r 1 9 8 2 , a n d p r o v i d e s b a c k g r o u n d o n t h e G u a t e m a l a n a r m e d f o r c e s , s i n c e it is t h e y w h o e n g i neered the f o r m a l transition to d e m o c r a c y . Part of the military c o u n t e r insurgency strategy included elections, and this c h a p t e r studies that aspect of t h e m i l i t a r y p l a n , t h e C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y e l e c t i o n of 1 9 8 4 , a n d t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n of 1 9 8 5 . C h a p t e r s 5 through 8 e x a m i n e the presidential administration of Vinicio Cerezo and the Christian D e m o c r a t i c Party ( D e m o c r a c i a

Cristiana

G u a t e m a l t e c a — D C G ) , focusing on e c o n o m i c and fiscal policy (Chapter 5) a n d t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e p o p u l a r s e c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g n o t o n l y t h e i r d e m a n d s b u t t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s r e s p o n s e s ( C h a p t e r 6 ) . C h a p t e r 7 r e t u r n s to t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e q u a l i t y of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n b y e x a m i n i n g h u m a n r i g h t s under Cerezo. C h a p t e r 8 l o o k s at all t h e s e t h e m e s d u r i n g t h e late C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , s u m m a r i z i n g its s u c c e s s e s a n d f a i l u r e s , t h e n f o c u s e s o n t h e

1990

c a m p a i g n t h a t e l e c t e d a s p r e s i d e n t J o r g e S e r r a n o E l i a s of t h e S o l i d a r i s t Action M o v e m e n t ( M o v i m i e n t o de Acciôn S o l i d a r i s t a — M A S ) . T h e first t w o y e a r s o f h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a r e c o v e r e d in C h a p t e r 9 w i t h t h e m u l t i thematic approach used for the C e r e z o period. C o m b i n i n g these findings with the c o n c e p t s here, C h a p t e r 10 c o n c l u d e s with thoughts on the continu i n g s t r u g g l e , a n d p r o g n o s i s , f o r d e m o c r a c y in G u a t e m a l a .

Notes 1. N a m i n g this g r o u p is a sensitive question for outsiders. The aboriginal pre-Columbian peoples of the region have been called primitivos, naturales,

Democracy

&

Violence

11

" i n d i g e n o u s , " "native A m e r i c a n s , " and of c o u r s e " I n d i a n s . " This last appellation is consistent with the p r e f e r e n c e of R i g o b e r t a M e n c h u (as r e p o r t e d in Frank and W h e a t o n : 21, note 1). M o r e recently, the w o r d Maya is used to d e s c r i b e these groups. In this text, I will use several terms, trying to avoid u n n e c e s s a r y repetition while remaining mindful of the sensitivities of the people under study. For an essay focusing on the epistemological and political i m p l i c a t i o n s of " n a m i n g " in G u a t e mala, see Shapiro. 2. For e x a m p l e , when they met with a s y m p a t h e t i c attorney in G u a t e m a l a City, police kidnapped the attorney w h i l e the m e e t i n g w a s g o i n g on. Still alive, he w a s thrown out of a s p e e d i n g car that s a m e a f t e r n o o n on a busy d o w n t o w n street. He had been tortured and died soon after. 3. The account of events leading up to and including the events at the Spanish embassy on January 31, 1980, is based on accounts in the G u a t e m a l a n press, interviews with associates of one of the victims, and personal observation. Useful published summaries can be found in Green Revolution 37, no. 5 (Sept. 1981): 2 0 - 2 8 ; Burgos-Debray: 1 8 3 - 1 8 7 ; and Davis and H o d s o n : 49. For a detailed description of the d a y ' s events, including especially the activities of the various police and security organizations involved, see " M a s s a c r e . " For details on b a c k g r o u n d leading up to the incursion into the Spanish e m b a s s y by the Indian d e l e g a t i o n and their supporters, see lsmaelillo: 4 - 5 . For a description f o c u s i n g on the m a s s a c r e ' s impact on alliances a m o n g rural and urban opposition groups, see Frank and W h e a t o n : 57. 4. A m o n g the victims was Vicente M e n c h u , f r o m the municipality of Uspantan. M e n c h u w a s the father of R i g o b e r t a M e n c h u Turn, w h o w a s a w a r d e d the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1992 (discussed in Chapter 9). 5. Filmed by television n e w s teams, these events were s h o w n on national television later that afternoon. G u a t e m a l a n s viewed grisly scenes of roaring f l a m e s and charred b o d i e s . It is worth noting in p a s s i n g that one aspect of v i o l e n c e is terror. Political v i o l e n c e in G u a t e m a l a is rarely s u b t l e : it is o p e n and c o m m i t t e d with impunity. 6. T h e fate of the two s u r v i v o r s of the e m b a s s y m a s s a c r e is as s y m b o l i c of G u a t e m a l a in the early 1980s as the main e v e n t s t h e m s e l v e s . Initially, both were taken to a leading private hospital for treatment, A m b a s s a d o r C a j a l Lopez because of his status and Y u j a Xona b e c a u s e the a m b a s s a d o r insisted u p o n it to protect Y u j a ' s life. Although the hospital w a s heavily g u a r d e d by police, Y u j a Xona w a s kidnapped and dragged from the hospital the f o l l o w i n g m o r n i n g . Within days, his tortured body w a s thrown on the c a m p u s of the University of San C a r l o s , the national university, with a m e s s a g e t h r e a t e n i n g similar t r e a t m e n t for the S p a n i s h ambassador himself. As for Cajal Lopez, a rotating g r o u p of a m b a s s a d o r s and other international o f f i c i a l s kept a vigil at his hospital r o o m to p r e v e n t his k i d n a p p i n g . After a few days, in spite of his injuries, Cajal Lopez left the hospital to convalesce at the U.S. a m b a s s a d o r ' s residence. W h e n he left the hospital, the a m b a s s a d o r w a s a c c o m p a n i e d by several other d i p l o m a t s w h o s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u e s t e d that there be no police protection. 7. The word ladino is used to describe G u a t e m a l a n s of mixed Indian and C a u casian origin and even Indians w h o h a v e left their c o m m u n i t i e s and adopted " W e s t e r n " dress and the Spanish language. 8. T h r o u g h o u t 1980, the G u a t e m a l a n p r e s s routinely p u b l i s h e d p i c t u r e s of corpses and i n d i v i d u a l s w h o had d i s a p p e a r e d , o f t e n a c c o m p a n i e d by e m o t i o n a l pleas from families seeking information about their relatives. 9. T h e e m b a s s y position is f r o m a s t a t e m e n t issued to the G u a t e m a l a n press. The posttransitional c l a s s i f i c a t i o n w a s m a d e by Carl G e r s h m a n , p r e s i d e n t of the

12

Guatemalan

Politics

N a t i o n a l E n d o w m e n t for D e m o c r a c y , in a s p e e c h at the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s of the Latin A m e r i c a n S t u d i e s A s s o c i a t i o n . 10. F o r a f u l l - l e n g t h t r e a t m e n t of G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c s that r e f l e c t s t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , s e e F a u r i o l and L o s e r ( 1 9 8 8 ) . A g r o u p of s c h o l a r s r e p r e s e n t i n g the L a t i n A m e r i c a n S t u d i e s A s s o c i a t i o n i n c l u d e s this p e r s p e c t i v e : W i t h t h e 1985 e l e c t i o n , G u a t e m a l a b e g a n w h a t P r e s i d e n t V i n i c i o C e r e z o c a l l s a " t r a n s i t i o n to d e m o c r a c y , " a p r o c e s s of b u i l d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d p r o c e s s e s of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i t h i n a t r a d i t i o n a l liberal, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k ( L A S A : 16). 11. T h e p u r p o s e h e r e is not to r e v i e w or d i s c u s s the e x t e n s i v e l i t e r a t u r e that h a s e m e r g e d s i n c e t h e 1 9 8 0 s on t h e " t r a n s i t i o n to d e m o c r a c y . " F o r e x a m p l e s of this l i t e r a t u r e , see B o o t h a n d S e l i g s o n , e d s . ( 1 9 8 9 ) ; T u l c h i n , ed.; C a v i e d e s ; D r a k e and J a k s i c , eds.; G o n z á l e z ; D i a m o n d , Linz, a n d L i p s e t , e d s . ; and the s e r i e s of v o l u m e s e d i t e d by O ' D o n n e l l , S c h m i t t e r , and o t h e r s . F o r an e s s a y that s e e s U . S . f o r e i g n a s s i s t a n c e and p r o g r a m s s u c h as the N a t i o n a l E n d o w m e n t f o r D e m o c r a c y as e s s e n t i a l to the p r o m o t i o n of t r a n s i t i o n s to d e m o c r a c y , s e e D i a m o n d . 12. 1 a m i n d e b t e d to m y c o l l e a g u e Bill H u d s o n for his h e l p w i t h this d i s c u s sion of d e m o c r a c y . 13. A d a m s f u r t h e r s e e s p a r t i c i p a t i o n as a c t i o n s that m a y be d e s i g n e d to r e a l i z e the best i n t e r e s t s of the a c t o r s t h r o u g h i m m o b i l i z i n g the e f f o r t s of t h o s e w h o h a v e i n t e r e s t s p u t a t i v e l y c o n t r a r y . P a r t i c i p a t i o n m u s t then be s e e n not o n l y as a p o s i t i v e e f f o r t by c i t i z e n s or t h e g o v e r n m e n t to realize their o w n interests, but a l s o as e q u a l l y p o s i t i v e e f f o r t s to i n h i b i t or o b s t r u c t t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e c o n t r a r y i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r s ( A d a m s 1979: 14). 14. J e a n e K i r k p a t r i c k , f o r m e r U . S . a m b a s s a d o r to t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s a n d a d v i s o r to P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n , p r o v i d e s an e x c e l l e n t p e r s p e c t i v e on e l e c t i o n s : E l e c t i o n s . . . a r e t h e c e n t r a l i n s t i t u t i o n of d e m o c r a c y . . . . D e m o c r a t i c e l e c t i o n s are c o m p e t i t i v e , p e r i o d i c , i n c l u s i v e , and d e f i n i t i v e . . . . D e m o c r a t i c e l e c t i o n s p r o d u c e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s that are c h o s e n by t h e i r p e o p l e w h o m they a r e to r e p r e s e n t . D e m o c r a t i c e l e c t i o n s g u a r a n t e e t h a t l a w s will not be m a d e s i m p l y in the n a m e of a c o m m u n i t y b u t with the c o n s e n t of the c o m m u n i t y . N o s u b s t i t u t e s a r e a c c e p t a b l e . . . . D e m o c r a t i c e l e c t i o n s e n s u r e that the g o a l s of g o v e r n m e n t a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h o s e of a m a j o r i t y of c i t i z e n s ( K i r k p a t r i c k : 2 - 3 ) . 15. D r a k e and S i l v a p r o v i d e a p r o p e r l y s k e p t i c a l a p p r o a c h a b o u t b o t h the origin of e l e c t i o n s in a u t h o r i t a r i a n s y s t e m s a n d t h e r o l e e l e c t i o n s p l a y in p r o d u c i n g m o r e d e m o c r a c y in s u c h s e t t i n g s : T h e d i c t a t o r ' s d i l e m m a of s t a g i n g a n d m a n i p u l a t i n g a c r e d i b l e e l e c t i o n bedevils most authoritarian regimes. Elections concocted for legitimation may unintentionally become instruments for expanding liberalization— and e v e n t u a l l y i n i t i a t i n g d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n . . . . T h e y p r o v i d e a p o w e r f u l (if m i n i m a l ) v e h i c l e f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s a d v e r s a r i e s to v o i c e d e m a n d s ( D r a k e and S i l v a : 3, 5).

Democracy & Violence

13

16. H e r m a n a n d B r o d h e a d s e e k to s h o w t h a t s o m e e l e c t i o n s a r e h e l d to " d e m o n s t r a t e , " to the A m e r i c a n p u b l i c in t h i s c a s e , t h a t c e r t a i n f o r e i g n r e g i m e s a r e w o r t h y of U . S . e c o n o m i c a n d m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . In t h e i r v i e w t h e s e " d e m o n s t r a tion e l e c t i o n s " often disguise the most u n d e m o c r a t i c r e g i m e s i m a g i n a b l e . T h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s a s p e c t of t h e i r a r g u m e n t is n o t r e l e v a n t t o m y d e s c r i p t i o n of G u a t e m a l a n e l e c t i o n s . R a t h e r , I u s e t h e i r set of i n d i c a t o r s to m e a s u r e t h e i m m e d i a t e c o n t e x t of e l e c t o r a l e v e n t s , s o t h a t w e c a n d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n a u t h e n t i c e l e c t o r a l c o n t e s t s and e v e n t s d e s i g n e d p r i m a r i l y t o s w a y p u b l i c o p i n i o n . T h e p o i n t is not to a p p l y i m p o s s i b l e s t a n d a r d s to G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c a l l i f e b u t to p r o v i d e e m p i r ical i n d i c a t o r s that c a n s e r v e a s a b a s i s f o r c o m p a r i s o n s a n d a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o r . 17. B o w l e s and G i n t i s , s t r e s s i n g i n d i v i d u a l d e v e l o p m e n t a s t h e g o a l o f s t a t e a c t i v i t y , s u g g e s t that p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y s h o u l d b e c o n t r o l l e d b y c o l l e c t i v e d e m o c r a tic p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n : i n a s m u c h a s c a p i t a l i s t e c o n o m i c p r o c e s s e s a r e s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s , t h e e c o n o m y s h o u l d b e c o n t r o l l e d d e m o c r a t i c a l l y . P u b l i c c o n t r o l o v e r w e a l t h is d e s i r a b l e , a n d the r o l e of t h e s t a t e in c o n t r o l l i n g e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y s h o u l d b e e x p a n d e d . W h e t h e r t h i s h a s o c c u r r e d in G u a t e m a l a in r e c e n t y e a r s is of c o u r s e a m a j o r question here. 18. B o w l e s and G i n t i s e s c h e w " s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e s c r i p t i o n s , " b u t t h e y a r g u e that t h e i r f o u r p r o p o s i t i o n s p o i n t u n m i s t a k a b l y t o w a r d t h e d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of t h e e c o n o m y , t h e a t t e n u a t i o n of e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t y , t h e d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of t h e l e a r n i n g p r o c e s s , a n d t h e p r o m o t i o n of w h a t H a n n a h A r e n d t c a l l s " n e w p u b l i c s p a c e s for f r e e d o m " ( B o w l e s a n d G i n t i s : 2 0 5 ) . 19. T h e p u r p o s e of i n t r o d u c i n g t h i s c o n c e p t is n o t to i n s i s t t h a t G u a t e m a l a a c h i e v e t h i s s t a n d a r d b e f o r e it c a n b e j u d g e d " d e m o c r a t i c . " F e w c o u n t r i e s w o u l d p a s s s o s t r i n g e n t a test. R a t h e r it is to p r o v i d e a r e f e r e n t a g a i n s t w h i c h to m e a s u r e m o v e m e n t . T h e questions are w h e t h e r G u a t e m a l a has m a d e significant p r o g r e s s toward a c h i e v i n g this standard and the c o n s e q u e n t i m p l i c a t i o n s for d e m o c r a c y . 2 0 . T h i s is not a n e w v i e w in C e n t r a l A m e r i c a n p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s ; M a r t z c o n c l u d e s h i s e a r l y s u r v e y of t h e r e g i o n : U n l e s s the w i d e s p r e a d c a u s e s of s u f f e r i n g a r e r e m e d i e d , . . . n o o n e c a n p r o p h e s y the m a g n i t u d e of t h e i n e v i t a b l e d i s a s t e r . T h e c r i t i c a l m o m e n t s a r e a r r i v i n g — t h e tide of C e n t r a l A m e r i c a n h i s t o r y is s w e e p i n g t o w a r d d e s o l a t i o n if not c o m p l e t e d e s t r u c t i o n ( M a r t z : 2 6 ) . More recently, Seligson (1987) asserts: C e n t r a l A m e r i c a n n a t i o n s s e e m bent on a v o i d i n g the m a j o r s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s that a r e n e e d e d to r e d u c e i n e q u a l i t y . . . . It is a s a f e b e t t h a t u n l e s s the e x i s t i n g p o l i c i e s are r e v e r s e d , o n e c a n e x p e c t c o n t i n u i n g u n r e s t and political violence (Seligson: 187).

2

Economic and Political Development to 1980 Is it i l l u s o r y to i m a g i n e that a t r a n s i t i o n to d e m o c r a c y c a n o c c u r in G u a t e m a l a ? Are there d e m o c r a t i c e l e m e n t s in G u a t e m a l a n history that are relevant to its reality in the 1 9 9 0 s ? Historical e v i d e n c e about the quality o f political participation and l e v e l s o f s o c i a l j u s t i c e illustrate the c o n t e x t c o n fronted by political actors at the b e g i n n i n g o f the 1 9 8 0 s .

Pre-Columbian Period R e a s o n s for admiring the a c h i e v e m e n t s o f the M a y a , G u a t e m a l a ' s e a r l i e s t k n o w n i n h a b i t a n t s , are a b u n d a n t . 1 F a r f r o m b e i n g a p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t y , e x c e p t in s o m e d i m e n s i o n s o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l k n o w l e d g e , the M a y a w e r e c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e a d v a n c e d in m a n y w a y s than the S p a n i s h w h o c o n q u e r e d t h e m . T h e y are k n o w n f o r t h e i r a r c h i t e c t u r a l m o n u m e n t s , t h e i r e x t r a o r d i n a r y k n o w l e d g e o f a s t r o n o m y and m a t h e m a t i c s , their p r e o c c u p a tion with t i m e , and their agricultural p r o w e s s . 2 An important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f M a y a n s o c i a l life w a s the r e l a t i v e l y e g a l i t a r i a n distribution o f s o c i a l p r o d u c t i o n , at least as r e f l e c t e d in nutritional c o n d i t i o n s . A l t h o u g h not i d y l l i c , life f o r the m a j o r i t y w a s not desperate either. T h e r u r a l - s u b s i s t e n c e s e c t o r o f the e c o n o m y , c o m p r i s i n g the vast m a j o r i t y o f the p e o p l e , had r e a s o n a b l e a c c e s s to p r o d u c t i v e

land

( J o n a s 1 9 7 4 a : 9 5 ) . E v e n t h o u g h s o m e p r o d u c t i o n w a s taken by e l i t e s through t a x e s and tributes, e n o u g h r e m a i n e d s o that a d e q u a t e nutrition with a varied diet was the norm ( J o n a s 1 9 7 4 a : 9 5 - 9 6 ; B e h a r : 1 1 4 — 1 1 9 ) . 3 T h e r e is little e x t a n t i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t M a y a n p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , but their p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y must b e i n c l u d e d a m o n g t h e i r a c h i e v e m e n t s . T h e a v a i l a b l e information about their p o l i t i c s s u g g e s t s that their p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y r e f l e c t e d a b a l a n c e o f p o w e r b e t w e e n rulers and ruled, although procedures

for

selecting

leaders

may

15

not

have

conformed

to

what

16

Guatemalan

Politics

o b s e r v e r s w o u l d today call pluralist d e m o c r a c y . M a y a n society w a s not d e v o i d of e l i t e d o m i n a t i o n , b u t t h e r u l e r s ' d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e i r c o m m u n i ties f o r s u s t e n a n c e p r o d u c e d a s o c i e t y c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y c o n s i d e r a b l e s o c i a l justice. Their realm e n d u r e d for centuries, and their social and intellectual achievements were based on a productive and reasonably efficient politic a l e c o n o m y . 4 U l t i m a t e l y , t h e M a y a d i d n o t s u r v i v e as a n

independent

p o p u l a t i o n b e c a u s e of e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s a n d f o r e i g n c o n q u e s t .

The Spanish

Conquest

T h e S p a n i s h C o n q u e s t d e c i m a t e d M a y a n s o c i e t y t h r o u g h at least t h r e e w a y s : t h e v i o l e n c e of w a r f a r e , d i s e a s e , a n d c u l t u r a l d i s r u p t i o n . W a r f a r e m a y h a v e led d i r e c t l y to t h e d e a t h of as m a n y as f o u r to f i v e m i l l i o n I n d i a n s . 5 T h e v i o l e n c e of w a r f a r e , t h o u g h b a d e n o u g h , w a s t h e l e a s t s e v e r e of t h e t h r e e a s p e c t s of t h e c o n q u e s t in its i m p a c t ( V e b l e n : 8 8 ) . D i s e a s e a n d c u l t u r a l d i s ruption were more serious.6 Forced migrations during the early colonial p e r i o d c a u s e d b o t h h i g h m o r t a l i t y a n d d e c l i n e s in n u t r i t i o n . T h e t r e m e n d o u s p o p u l a t i o n d e c l i n e in t h e h i g h l a n d r e g i o n s 7 of G u a t e m a l a m e a n t a s h o r t a g e of l a b o r to e x p l o i t t h e n e w l y a c q u i r e d g r a n t s of l a n d a n d r e s o u r c e s a w a r d e d S p a n i s h c o n q u e r o r s . A c o n s e q u e n c e of l a b o r s c a r c i t y w a s t h e c r e a t i o n of h u g e l a n d e d e s t a t e s a n d d e b t - p e o n a g e s t r u c t u r e s to r e g u l a t e I n d i a n l a b o r f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e c o n q u e r o r s ( L o v e l l 1 9 8 2 : 1 0 3 ; M o o r s : 6 7 - 6 8 ) . T h e S p a n ish s u p e r i m p o s e d a n e w e l i t e o n M a y a n s o c i e t y , o n e that u s e d G u a t e m a l a ' s land a n d l a b o r to p r o d u c e w e a l t h n o t o n l y f o r itself b u t a l s o f o r S p a i n . A l t h o u g h there w e r e e l e m e n t s of f e u d a l c u l t u r e d u r i n g this p e r i o d , f e u d a l i s m w a s n o t t h e b a s i c e c o n o m i c m o d e of p r o d u c t i o n . F r o m b e g i n n i n g of t h e c o l o n i a l p e r i o d c a p i t a l i s t i c e n t r e p r e n e u r s e n g a g e d

the in

export agriculture ( W o o d w a r d : 6 0 - 6 1 ) . By the 1700s, the Spanish (Bourb o n ) rulers w e r e s t r e s s i n g e x p o r t s and the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of the c o l o n i e s , e s p e c i a l l y in r e l a t i v e l y l e s s w e l l d e v e l o p e d C e n t r a l A m e r i c a . S p a i n v i e w e d t h e c o l o n y as a s o u r c e of w e a l t h f o r i t s e l f , a n d S p a n i s h c o l o n i s t s , t h e C r e oles, w e r e c o n c e r n e d with their o w n profit, not with the overall d e v e l o p m e n t of G u a t e m a l a ( J o n a s 1 9 7 4 a : 1 0 7 ) . T h e c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n t h e n e e d s of S p a i n a n d t h o s e of t h e c o l o n i s t s — b e t w e e n t h e m e r c a n t i l i s t c a p i t a l i s t s a n d t h e " l i b e r a l " c a p i t a l i s t s , a s it w e r e — e v e n t u a l l y h e l p e d c r e a t e t w o p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t s a m o n g t h e e l i t e in G u a t e m a l a : L i b e r a l s , w h o g e n e r a l l y f a v o r e d c o m m e r c i a l d e v e l o p m e n t , and C o n s e r v a t i v e s , w h o w i s h e d to r e m a i n m o r e "feudal" (Woodward: 60-61). T h e s p e c i f i c s of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n S p a n i s h a n d C r e o l e r u l e r s and the Indian population varied during the colonial period, but o p p r e s s i o n w a s a c o n s t a n t ( J o n a s 1 9 7 4 a : 1 0 8 - 1 1 4 ) . T h e r o l e of l a b o r t h r o u g h o u t t h e colonial period w a s b a s e d on e c o n o m i c utility, not on legal status. Given t h e d e m o g r a p h i c r e a l i t i e s of t h e p e r i o d a n d t h e f a c t that e c o n o m i c c o n d i -

Economic

& Political Development

to 1980

17

tions determined the need for labor, elites of both political tendencies used public policy to help meet their needs, since market incentives were not adequate (Morner: 8 3 - 8 4 ) . Administrative and religious "reforms" increased the numbers of ladinos in Indian regions of G u a t e m a l a , c o n t r i b u t i n g to widespread rebellions by the native population until after independence in the 1820s (Carmack: 1 4 7 - 1 4 8 ) . In sum, Spanish colonization produced a systematic and largely uninterrupted decline of the quality of life for most indigenous people. Guatemala still has not regained some of the qualities of social development that were the norm for the Maya.

Independence

Period

I n d e p e n d e n c e for Central A m e r i c a was part of M e x i c o ' s i n d e p e n d e n c e e f f o r t s in the early 1820s. 8 G u a t e m a l a w a s part of the Central A m e r i c a n Republic that broke away from Mexico later in the decade. At the outset, the republic was governed by the Liberals, and the brief history of the federation reflected tensions between Liberals and Conservatives, as well as regional tensions among the five provinces (today separate nations), whose boundaries had been inherited f r o m colonial times. In Guatemala Conservatives seized power from the Liberals in the 1840s, using Rafael Carr e r a ' s army, largely made up of Indians f i g h t i n g b e c a u s e of previous encroachments by Liberals (Jonas 1974a: 126). T h e m a j o r agricultural export until the early nineteenth century had been indigo. After this crop f a d e d in c o m m e r c i a l i m p o r t a n c e , it w a s replaced by cochineal, another natural dye. A f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e in the 1820s, cochineal grew in importance until, by the 1850s, it accounted for "roughly 79 percent of the total value of G u a t e m a l a n exports b e t w e e n 1851 and 1855, with indigo a c c o u n t i n g for another 15 p e r c e n t " ( W o o d ward: 64). The invention of c h e m i c a l l y based dyes in the m i d d l e 1850s meant the end of G u a t e m a l a ' s reliance on these two agricultural products. C o f f e e had been cultivated since the 1840s, but its measurable impact on exports emerged in the early 1860s, under Conservative administrations ( W o o d w a r d : 6 5 - 6 7 ) . It became the leading export crop in the second half of the nineteenth century. By the 1860s, o w n e r s h i p of c o f f e e - p r o d u c i n g land had already b e c o m e more concentrated in Guatemala than anywhere else in Central A m e r i c a . In spite of the fact that smaller p r o d u c e r s were more efficient (in terms of p r o d u c t i o n per hectare), overall production totals showed more statistical concentration in Guatemala than elsewhere in the region (Paige: 157-158). T h e key to this concentration of wealth lay in the monopolistic control of the c o f f e e industry by a small n u m b e r of processing plants ( b e n e f i c i o s ) and licensed exporting houses. In short, the political economy continued to show signs of d e p e n d e n c e on international markets in spite of, or because of, independence. 9

18

Guatemalan

Politics

T h r o u g h o u t t h e f i r s t f i f t y y e a r s of i n d e p e n d e n c e , G u a t e m a l a ' s e c o n o m y r e f l e c t e d c h a n g e s in t h e e x t e r n a l m a r k e t s f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l

exports

m o r e t h a n it r e f l e c t e d i d e o l o g i c a l a n d p o l i t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e t w o oligarchic political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, w h o shared an elite c o n s e n s u s on the e x p o r t o r i e n t a t i o n of the e c o n o m y .

Although

L i b e r a l s of t h e d a y w e r e p e r h a p s m o r e i d e o l o g i c a l l y i n c l i n e d to m o u t h t h e r h e t o r i c of f r e e - m a r k e t c a p i t a l i s m , t h e o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y r e f l e c t e d t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d l i m i t a t i o n s of G u a t e m a l a ' s d e p e n d e n c e o n e x t e r n a l m a r k e t s a n d its d o m e s t i c l a b o r s u p p l y , r e g a r d l e s s of i d e o l o g i c a l and cultural differences between Liberals and Conservatives. I n d e p e n d e n c e in t h e 1 8 2 0 s r e m o v e d t h e p o l i t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s t h a t t h e Spanish C r o w n had i m p o s e d on the local elite, o p e n i n g up new

trade

o p p o r t u n i t i e s . C o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n L i b e r a l s a n d C o n s e r v a t i v e s in t h e p e r i o d w e r e political, h o w e v e r , not e c o n o m i c . At least until 1871, a n d p e r h a p s later, the e c o n o m i c s y s t e m and class structure s h o w e d r e m a r k a b l e contin u i t y . D e s p i t e f l u c t u a t i o n s in e x p o r t c r o p s a n d d i f f e r e n c e s in e l i t e i d e o l o g i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n s , t h e o v e r a l l s t r u c t u r e of t h e p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y c h a n g e d little f r o m t h a t i n h e r i t e d f r o m t h e c o l o n i a l p e r i o d . F r o m e a r l y o n , t h e e c o n o m y was a "capitalist" system that s h o w e d m a n y n o n m a r k e t characteristics. T h i s m e r c a n t i l i s t s , s t a t e - r e g u l a t e d style of c a p i t a l i s m

dominated

G u a t e m a l a until t h e 1 9 4 4 O c t o b e r R e v o l u t i o n ( A l v a r a d o : 137). 1 ( 1

Liberal

Reforms

By 1870, coffee had b e c o m e a m a j o r international c o m m o d i t y . Guatemala w a s e x p o r t i n g c o f f e e s u c c e s s f u l l y , but m a n y of the potentially best c o f f e e l a n d s w e r e i n a c c e s s i b l e — t h e y w e r e o w n e d b y I n d i a n c o m m u n i t i e s or c o n trolled by the Catholic c h u r c h . M o r e o v e r , b e c a u s e Indians lived successfully on their c o m m u n a l lands, or o f t e n w e r e p r o t e c t e d on c h u r c h lands, the labor supply w a s inadequate for the f a s t - g r o w i n g c o f f e e export indust r y . In t h e late 1 8 7 0 s , L i b e r a l s u n d e r t h e l e a d e r s h i p of J u s t i n o R u f i n o B a r r i o s l e g i s l a t e d c h a n g e s to o v e r c o m e t h e s e l i m i t a t i o n s . T h e s e p o l i c i e s , c o l l e c t i v e l y c a l l e d t h e L i b e r a l R e f o r m s , s o u g h t to c o n t r o l l a n d a n d l a b o r a n d to d e v e l o p export agriculture, e s p e c i a l l y

c o f f e e , by r e o r g a n i z i n g

the

nation's resources. T h e first m a j o r c h a n g e s w e r e laws that eliminated c o m m u n a l holdings a n d c r e a t e d m e c h a n i s m s b y w h i c h t h e n e w " p r i v a t e l a n d " of t h e I n d i a n s could be " a c q u i r e d . " T o i m p l e m e n t this, the Liberals did not expropriate t h e i d l e l a n d s of C o n s e r v a t i v e o l i g a r c h s , e v e n in c a s e s w h e n t h i s l a n d h a d been seized illegally during earlier C o n s e r v a t i v e r e g i m e s

(Cambranes

1985: 242). Nor did they i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y seize lands held idle by the church, although the church w a s traditionally allied with the Conservatives a n d a p o l i t i c a l a n d i d e o l o g i c a l r i v a l of t h e g e n e r a l l y a n t i c l e r i c a l L i b e r a l s .

Economic & Political Development

19

to 1980

T h e y a l s o d i d n o t r e d i s t r i b u t e l a n d s a l r e a d y o w n e d by t h e s t a t e , w h i c h w o u l d h a v e m a d e t h e r e f o r m m e a s u r e s less o p p r e s s i v e s o c i a l l y a n d p o l i t i c a l l y . Instead, they seized the c o m m u n a l p r o p e r t y of the I n d i a n s . By disp l a c i n g potential w o r k e r s f r o m their s e c u r e e n v i r o n m e n t s on c o m m u n a l lands, the Liberal g o v e r n m e n t created c o n d i t i o n s — r e i n f o r c e d by other l a w s — t h a t e n s u r e d an a d e q u a t e labor s u p p l y . A s a result, the L i b e r a l s g a i n e d t h e s u p p o r t of o t h e r e l i t e s e c t o r s , w h i c h w a s v i t a l if t h e I n d i a n c o m m u n i t i e s w e r e t o b e s u c c e s s f u l l y s u b j u g a t e d to t h e s e " r e f o r m s " ( C a m b r a n e s 1 9 8 5 : 2 4 2 - 2 4 7 ) . E l i t e c o n s e n s u s m a d e d o m i n a t i o n of t h e w o r k i n g classes a less d i f f i c u l t p r o c e s s . A s e c o n d m a j o r c h a n g e w a s a s e r i e s of n e w l a w s that i n c r e a s e d the s u p ply of c h e a p , r e l i a b l e labor f o r t h e c o f f e e g r o w e r s ( J o n a s 1 9 7 4 a : 137—138). 1 1 V a g r a n c y laws, f o r e x a m p l e , m a d e w o r k e r s a v a i l a b l e as c h e a p or f r e e labor f o r p l a n t a t i o n o w n e r s . A third m a j o r c o m p o n e n t of t h e L i b e r a l R e f o r m s i n v o l v e d c o n c e s s i o n s to f o r e i g n e r s , e s p e c i a l l y G e r m a n n a t i o n a l s a n d i m m i g r a n t s , w h o eventually d o m i n a t e d the c o f f e e industry ( W o o d w a r d : 71). W h e n price fluct u a t i o n s f o r c e d s o m e c o f f e e g r o w e r s to sell their land t o c r e d i t o r s , o n e result w a s i n c r e a s e d G e r m a n o w n e r s h i p of land ( F r a n k a n d W h e a t o n : 18). T h e state p r o v i d e d f i s c a l i n c e n t i v e s a n d c r e d i t f o r m o d e r n i z i n g p r o d u c t i o n , as w e l l as b a s i c i n f r a s t r u c t u r e f o r t r a n s p o r t i n g p r o d u c t s ( J o n a s 1 9 7 4 a : 132). In s u m , t h e L i b e r a l R e f o r m s a s s u r e d t h a t m o r e o f G u a t e m a l a ' s l a n d w o u l d b e a c c e s s i b l e f o r c o f f e e c u l t i v a t i o n , t h a t an a d e q u a t e s u p p l y of l a b o r w o u l d b e a v a i l a b l e , a n d that f i s c a l a n d o t h e r s t a t e p o l i c i e s w o u l d s u p p o r t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t m o d e l . T h e s u c c e s s of t h e s e p o l i c i e s m e a n t that w i t h i n a f e w y e a r s , G u a t e m a l a ' s c o f f e e o l i g a r c h y h a d c o n s o l i d a t e d its e c o n o m i c p o w e r . L a n d and labor institutions had b e e n r e o r g a n i z e d to s t i m u l a t e export p r o d u c t i o n , and the result w a s b o t h g r e a t e r e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and greater social inequity.12 D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d i n t e r n a l d y n a m i c s w e r e s e t in m o t i o n t h a t r e m a i n the key to u n d e r s t a n d i n g politics a f t e r 1980: first, an e c o n o m y

producing

wealth for a small minority through d e p e n d e n c e on exports and foreign c a p i t a l ; s e c o n d , a p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m r e l y i n g h e a v i l y o n t h e r h e t o r i c of c l a s sical l i b e r a l i s m , h e n c e o n e t h a t m i g h t b e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e f o r m s of liberal d e m o c r a c y ; a n d t h i r d , a c o n t i n u i n g r e l i a n c e o n t h e m i l i t a r y t o s u p p r e s s r e s i s t a n c e b y g r o u p s that s u f f e r e d as a r e s u l t of c h a n g e . 1 3 B e s i d e s c h a n g e s in t h e d y n a m i c s o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d t h e c o n t i n u i n g p a u p e r i z a t i o n of G u a t e m a l a n w o r k e r s , t h e L i b e r a l R e f o r m s p r o d u c e d o t h e r c h a n g e s with l o n g - l a s t i n g legacies. O n e result of s u c c e s s f u l

economic

d e v e l o p m e n t , f o r e x a m p l e , w a s t h e g r o w t h of a m i d d l e c l a s s t h a t d e m a n d e d i n c r e a s e d a c c e s s to p o l i t i c a l p o w e r , w h i c h n e i t h e r t h e L i b e r a l n o r the C o n s e r v a t i v e oligarchy f a v o r e d ( W o o d w a r d : 72). T h e resulting tensions w e r e r e s o l v e d t e m p o r a r i l y a f t e r the O c t o b e r R e v o l u t i o n of 1944, w h i c h u s h e r e d in a d e c a d e of c h a n g e s f a v o r i n g t h e m i d d l e c l a s s e s .

20

Guatemalan

Politics

The Decade of Spring: Unsuccessful Reform S i n c e t h e S p a n i s h C o n q u e s t in t h e s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y , G u a t e m a l a ' s h i s t o r y h a s s h o w n an i n c r e a s i n g c o n c e n t r a t i o n of w e a l t h a n d of s o c i a l c o n t r o l o v e r l a b o r in t h e h a n d s of a s m a l l e l i t e , a s w e l l as c o n s i s t e n t d e c l i n e s in q u a l i t y of l i f e f o r t h e I n d i a n as w e l l as n o n - I n d i a n w o r k i n g s e c t o r s . 1 4 B y t h e e a r l y twentieth century North A m e r i c a n investors had b e c o m e m a j o r particip a n t s in G u a t e m a l a ' s e x p o r t - o r i e n t e d e c o n o m y a n d in t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m n e e d e d to m a i n t a i n t h a t e c o n o m i c o r i e n t a t i o n . T h e U n i t e d F r u i t C o m p a n y , for example, d o m i n a t e d transportation and the banana industry, helping to create the stereotype of the " b a n a n a r e p u b l i c s " for Central A m e r i c a n politics.15 W h e n market fluctuations m a d e e c o n o m i c g r o w t h difficult during t h e d e p r e s s i o n of t h e l a t e 1 9 2 0 s , t h e d i c t a t o r J o r g e U b i c o i n c r e a s e d t h e native oppression by reinstituting v a g r a n c y laws and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y creating the National Police to e n f o r c e t h e m ( F r a n k and W h e a t o n : 19). In s p i t e of s u c h e f f o r t s , b y t h e 1 9 4 0 s t h e c h a n g e s t h a t h a d p r o d u c e d e c o n o m i c g r o w t h a f t e r t h e L i b e r a l R e f o r m s h a d run t h e i r c o u r s e a n d w e r e n o w p r o d u c i n g e c o n o m i c s t a g n a t i o n . O w n e r s of c o f f e e - p r o d u c i n g l a n d s r e s i s t e d f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e s in t h e e c o n o m i c a r r a n g e m e n t s , n e v e r t h e l e s s . M i d d l e - c l a s s r e f o r m e r s , r e l y i n g o n t h e r h e t o r i c of b o t h d e m o c r a c y

and

n a t i o n a l i s m , o v e r c a m e this r e s i s t a n c e and instituted a n o t h e r series of r e f o r m s t h a t r e - o r i e n t e d t h e u s e of G u a t e m a l a ' s e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s . T h e 1944 revolution, sometimes called the October Revolution, produced a s e r i e s of c h a n g e s t h a t l a s t e d u n t i l t h e U . S . C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e

Agency

h e l p e d e n g i n e e r t h e o v e r t h r o w of t h e G u a t e m a l a n g o v e r n m e n t in 1 9 5 4 . 1 6 T h e r o o t s of t h e O c t o b e r R e v o l u t i o n l a y f i r s t in t h e m i d d l e c l a s s e s ' g r o w i n g d e s i r e f o r a c c e s s t o t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s a n d s e c o n d in t h e e c o n o m i c s t a g n a t i o n t h a t h a d c h a r a c t e r i z e d G u a t e m a l a s i n c e its e x p o r t e c o n o m y c o l l a p s e d at t h e o n s e t of t h e G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n in 1 9 2 9 . S t a g n a t i o n d u r i n g W o r l d W a r II led to i n c r e a s i n g f r u s t r a t i o n a m o n g t h e m i d d l e c l a s s . A l t h o u g h s o m e e l e m e n t s of the military

resisted the rebellion,

many

y o u n g e r o f f i c e r s lent t h e i r s u p p o r t : t h e t h r e e - p e r s o n j u n t a t h a t e m e r g e d in O c t o b e r 1 9 4 4 i n c l u d e d t w o c o l o n e l s , F r a n c i s c o A r a n a , w h o t e n d e d to r e p resent the p r e - 1 9 4 4 traditional A r m y , a n d J a c o b o A r b e n z , w h o r e p r e s e n t e d the reformist, m o d e r n i z i n g ,

nationalist

movement

within

the

military

(Poitevin: 5 1 - 5 2 ) . T h e n e w l e a d e r s b a s e d t h e i r m o v e m e n t o n t h e i d e a s of f r e e d o m a n d d e m o c r a c y e s p o u s e d b y F r a n k l i n D e l a n o R o o s e v e l t a n d o n t h e e x a m p l e of s o c i a l r e f o r m s p r o m u l g a t e d d u r i n g t h e p r e s i d e n c y of L á z a r o C á r d e n a s in M e x i c o f r o m 1 9 3 4 to 1 9 4 0 ( G o r d o n : 50). Juan J o s é A r é v a l o , a s c h o o l t e a c h e r w h o h a d s p e n t y e a r s in e x i l e in A r g e n t i n a , w a s e l e c t e d p r e s i d e n t a n d t o o k o f f i c e in 1 9 4 5 . E v e n t h o u g h h i s " s p i r i t u a l s o c i a l i s m " i n c l u d e d political, social, and e c o n o m i c a g e n d a s ( J o n a s 1974a: 1 5 1 - 1 5 5 ) , he did not

Economic & Political Development

21

to 1980

r a d i c a l l y d e p a r t f r o m t h e n o r m s of W e s t e r n d e v e l o p m e n t . T o t h e c o n t r a r y , he s o u g h t to build d e m o c r a c y

a n d d i s m a n t l e y e a r s o f d i c t a t o r s h i p by

e n f r a n c h i s i n g c i t i z e n s a n d w o r k i n g t o w a r d s o c i a l l i b e r a t i o n of t h e p o o r , especially the Indians.17 The

Arevalo

government

created

structures

and

institutions

that

e n c o u r a g e d t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n of " p o p u l a r " g r o u p s . 1 8 F o r e x a m p l e , it g a v e l e g a l s u p p o r t to c o o p e r a t i v e s a n d l a b o r u n i o n s as w e l l as o r g a n i z a t i o n s of p r o f e s s i o n a l s a n d b u s i n e s s p e o p l e . R u r a l w o r k e r s

and

p e a s a n t s w e r e g i v e n legal p r o t e c t i o n : t h e r i g h t s of w o r k i n g - c l a s s p e o p l e to vote, unionize, bargain, and strike marked

their first participation

in

national political life. By 1950, the g o v e r n m e n t had e s t a b l i s h e d a social s e c u r i t y s y s t e m f o r h e a l t h c a r e . In r u r a l a r e a s t h e g o v e r n m e n t a i m e d at integ r a t i n g t h e I n d i a n c o m m u n i t i e s i n t o n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l l i f e as p a r t i c i p a n t s f o r the first time. A r e v a l o e l i m i n a t e d the s e m i f e u d a l s y s t e m s of p e o n a g e and f o r c e d l a b o r a n d e s t a b l i s h e d j u d i c i a l p r o c e d u r e s to e n s u r e p r o t e c t i o n o f w o r k e r s ' r i g h t s . T h e L a w of F o r c e d R e n t a l , f o r e x a m p l e , o b l i g e d

large

l a n d o w n e r s to l e a s e u n c u l t i v a t e d l a n d at l o w r a t e s to l a n d l e s s c a m p e s i n o s . T h i s w a s n o t an i d y l l i c , u n b l e m i s h e d t r a n s i t i o n t o d e m o c r a c y , h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e o f h o s t i l i t y f r o m e l i t e g r o u p s a n d s o m e s e c t o r s of t h e A r m y . T h e A r e v a l o g o v e r n m e n t itself w a s n o t t o t a l l y c o m m i t t e d t o p a r t i c i p a t i o n by t h e p e o p l e a n d u s e d t h e s p e c t e r o f r i g h t - w i n g r e a c t i o n t o u r g e m o d e r a t i o n in p a r t i c i p a t i o n . G o v e r n m e n t p r e s s u r e , a n d in s o m e c a s e s r e p r e s s i o n , w a s b r o u g h t a g a i n s t i n d e p e n d e n t l a b o r o r g a n i z i n g in t h e e a r l y d a y s a f t e r the October Revolution (Dalton: 4 5 0 - 4 5 7 ) . Y e t o n t h e w h o l e , A r e v a l o ' s p r o g r a m w a s G u a t e m a l a ' s e q u i v a l e n t of the New Deal. Perhaps mild by current U.S. standards, his p r o g r a m s w e r e m o r e s e r i o u s in t h e G u a t e m a l a n c o n t e x t , a n d t h e y t h r e a t e n e d e l e m e n t s in t h e o l i g a r c h y a n d t h e m i l i t a r y ' s c o n s e r v a t i v e w i n g . In s p i t e of t h e t e n s i o n s c a u s e d by t h e s e m o d e r n i z i n g r e f o r m s a n d t h e m a n y c o u p a t t e m p t s a g a i n s t h i m , A r e v a l o w a s t h e f i r s t G u a t e m a l a n p r e s i d e n t to f i n i s h a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p e r i o d of g o v e r n m e n t . H i s s u c c e s s o r w a s C o l o n e l J a c o b o A r b e n z G u z m a n , w h o t o o k o f f i c e a f t e r t h e e l e c t i o n of 1 9 5 1 . A l t h o u g h t h e b a l l o t i n g w a s quite honest by G u a t e m a l a n standards, the victory w a s tainted because A r b e n z ' s principal opponent, Colonel Arana from the 1944 junta, was assassinated under suspicious circumstances. President A r b e n z s o u g h t to build u p o n earlier r e f o r m s by f u r t h e r m o b i l i z i n g t h e still l a r g e l y e x c l u d e d I n d i a n s a n d r u r a l w o r k i n g c l a s s i n t o the national political c o m m u n i t y . A r b e n z b a s e d his political r e f o r m s on e c o n o m i c o n e s , a s d i d J o h n K e n n e d y in h i s A l l i a n c e f o r P r o g r e s s t h a t w o u l d f o l l o w in l e s s t h a n a d e c a d e ( J o n a s

1974a:

156-158).

Arbenz

b e l i e v e d , a s K e n n e d y l a t e r e x p r e s s e d , t h a t d e m o c r a c y c o u l d w o r k o n l y if e c o n o m i c j u s t i c e provided land for destitute rural w o r k e r s and social and e c o n o m i c justice for urban workers.

22

Guatemalan

Politics

T h e c e n t e r p i e c e of A r b e n z ' s p r o g r a m w a s h i s a g r a r i a n r e f o r m , t h e f a m o u s D e c r e e 900, which expropriated unused land and c o m p e n s a t e d the l a n d o w n e r s . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s later e n c o u r a g e d p r e c i s e l y this t y p e of agrarian r e f o r m throughout Latin A m e r i c a under the A l l i a n c e for P r o g r e s s in t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 s . B u t in t h e 1 9 5 0 s , l a n d r e f o r m s e e m e d r a d i c a l , a n d t h i s one touched U.S. corporate interests: a m a j o r target w a s the United Fruit C o m p a n y , w h i c h h e l d v a s t a r e a s of u n u s e d l a n d . In G u a t e m a l a in 1 9 5 2 , n o a g r a r i a n r e f o r m c o u l d h a v e b e e n s u c c e s s f u l w i t h o u t a f f e c t i n g s o m e of t h e company's property.19 A r b e n z p r o m o t e d e c o n o m i c g r o w t h that w a s primarily capitalist but n a t i o n a l l y c o n t r o l l e d ( J o n a s 1 9 7 4 b : 4 7 - 5 0 ) . D u r i n g t h e D e c a d e of S p r i n g t h e n u m b e r o f i n d i v i d u a l s w h o e n j o y e d a n " i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t to p r o p e r t y " w a s e x p a n d e d to i n c l u d e at f i r s t t h e n e w c o m m e r c i a l a n d u r b a n g r o u p s , and later, u n d e r A r b e n z , rural s m a l l h o l d e r s . T h e r e g i m e w a s m o r e d e m o c r a t i c a n d n a t i o n a l i s t i c in o r i e n t a t i o n t h a n e a r l i e r g o v e r n m e n t s , b u t o n l y w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s of t h e d i a l e c t i c w i t h t h e a g r o - e x p o r t i n g t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s e c t o r . N o r e v o l u t i o n in t h e M a r x i s t s e n s e t o o k p l a c e , t h a t is, n o h i n t o f c h a n g e s in t h e m o d e of p r o d u c t i o n o r o f t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of o n e s o c i a l c l a s s by a n o t h e r . T h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y d e c a d e barely altered the b a s i c capitalist nature of the G u a t e m a l a n e c o n o m y , w h i c h o n c e again revealed r e m a r k a b l e continuity, the pattern since the S p a n i s h C o n q u e s t . 2 " T h e p e r i o d f r o m 1 9 4 4 to 1 9 5 4 s e e m s r e v o l u t i o n a r y b e c a u s e G u a t e m a l a m o v e d t o w a r d p o l i t i c a l d e m o c r a c y a n d s o c i o e c o n o m i c r e f o r m . A s in e a r l i e r p e r i o d s , t h e s t a t e w a s t h e p r i m e i n s t r u m e n t in p r o d u c i n g s o c i a l a n d economic changes. New institutions allowed many citizens

previously

e x c l u d e d f r o m p o l i t i c s to p a r t i c i p a t e e f f i c a c i o u s l y f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e . T h e nation m a d e great strides toward achieving a democratic society and political s y s t e m , m o v i n g " f u r t h e r in t h e d i r e c t i o n of l i b e r a l d e m o c r a c y

than

many other Latin American countries" (Blasier: 63). A r b e n z ' s e f f o r t s to m o v e G u a t e m a l a t o w a r d a m o r e n a t i o n a l i s t e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t w e r e s u p p o r t e d b y t h e n a t i o n a l i s t s e c t o r in t h e m i l i t a r y but o p p o s e d by the traditional s e c t o r , w h i c h s a w itself as g u a r d i a n of the e x i s t i n g o r d e r . P a r t of t h e u r b a n b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i t y f a v o r e d t h e r e f o r m s that w o u l d e x p a n d d o m e s t i c m a r k e t s and diversify the e c o n o m y , but the t r a d i t i o n a l c o f f e e o l i g a r c h y p r e f e r r e d t h e e x p o r t o r i e n t a t i o n of e a r l i e r p e r i ods. Not u n e x p e c t e d l y , the traditional oligarchy particularly o p p o s e d any p o l i c y t h a t i n c r e a s e d t h e p o l i t i c a l or e c o n o m i c p o w e r of n e w l y m o b i l i z e d r u r a l g r o u p s . T h e o l i g a r c h y t h u s f o u g h t b o t h t h e i n c r e a s e d p o w e r of u r b a n l a b o r a n d t h e m i l d l a n d r e f o r m — a n d its h i s t o r i c a l c o n t r o l o v e r l a n d a n d l a b o r m a d e it a f o r m i d a b l e o p p o s i t i o n . W h a t w o u l d h a v e b e e n t h e u l t i m a t e r e s u l t s of t h e A r e v a l o - A r b e n z e x p e r i m e n t w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of c a p i t a l i s t s t r u c t u r e s is n o t c e r t a i n , f o r it e n d e d w i t h t h e of 1 9 5 4 .

counterrevolution

Economic & Political Development

23

to 1980

Counterrevolution T h e c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n of 1 9 5 4 had both i n t e r n a t i o n a l and d o m e s t i c elem e n t s . T h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p i c t u r e is d e s c r i b e d w e l l e l s e w h e r e : a f t e r a l o n g , sustained c a m p a i g n by the United States g o v e r n m e n t and the United Fruit C o m p a n y t o d e s t a b i l i z e a n d i s o l a t e t h e g o v e r n m e n t of G u a t e m a l a , a C I A t r a i n e d g r o u p led by e x i l e d C o l o n e l C a r l o s C a s t i l l o A r m a s i n v a d e d e a s t e r n G u a t e m a l a , and the A r b e n z g o v e r n m e n t fell s o m e d a y s later.21 T h e g o a l s of U . S . p o l i c y a r e f a i r l y c l e a r a n d w e l l d o c u m e n t e d . N o n e t h e l e s s , it is i m p o r t a n t not to o v e r e s t i m a t e t h e e f f e c t of U . S . e f f o r t s at t h e t i m e , n o r t o u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e r o l e of d o m e s t i c f o r c e s in t h i s s i t u a t i o n . T h e O c t o b e r R e v o l u t i o n of 1 9 4 4 h a d b e e n s u p p o r t e d b y u r b a n m i d d l e - c l a s s c a p i t a l i s t s w h o w a n t e d m o r e p o w e r o v e r the e c o n o m y . P o l i c i e s that a c h i e v e d this goal, and hence improved e c o n o m i c opportunities for G u a t e m a l a ' s urban, middle sectors within a capitalist framework, produced substantial d o m e s tic s u p p o r t . R e f o r m s a i m e d at d o m e s t i c o w n e r s of i n d u s t r i a l

and

agricultural

wealth, however, diminished middle-class support for the reformist m o v e m e n t . C o n f l i c t s a r o s e w h e n n e w l y i n t e g r a t e d g r o u p s at t h e t o p o f t h e reform m o v e m e n t — t h e middle classes and military officers—felt threate n e d e c o n o m i c a l l y b y r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y a n d p o l i t i c a l l y b y

the

d e m o c r a t i c p r e s s u r e s of m a s s m o b i l i z a t i o n . 2 2 T h e s e s e c t o r s b e g a n f o r m i n g n e w a l l i a n c e s w i t h s e c t o r s of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l o l i g a r c h y , as w e l l as w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , to s e a r c h f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e p a t h to e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t ( A l v a r a d o : 1 3 7 ) . T h e s u c c e s s of t h e c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n is p r o b a b l y d u e f a r m o r e to t h e s e d o m e s t i c d y n a m i c s t h a n to i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s .

Political

and Economic

Change

After

1954

T h e c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n of 1 9 5 4 p r o d u c e d m a n y e c o n o m i c a n d

political

changes. Before 1954, J a c o b o A r b e n z had m o v e d G u a t e m a l a ' s e c o n o m y a w a y f r o m its e x p o r t o r i e n t a t i o n a n d d o m i n a n c e b y f o r e i g n c o m p a n i e s , specifically the United Fruit C o m p a n y . His p r o g r a m helped create a busin e s s s e c t o r t h a t w o u l d , in e f f e c t , c o m p e t e w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l o l i g a r c h y . A r b e n z e s p o u s e d a p r o g r a m of e c o n o m i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n w i t h s t a t e a s s i s t a n c e , in t h i s s e n s e n o t u n l i k e t h e p r o g r a m s of t h e L i b e r a l R e f o r m s o f t h e 1870s. T h e model was capitalist but, unlike the Liberal R e f o r m s , i n c l u d e d s o c i o e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s as p a r t o f b u i l d i n g a s t r o n g

also

economy.

Arbenz's approach was " e c o n o m i c modernization with social r e f o r m . " By 1 9 5 4 , t h e r e f o r e , the d o m i n a n t sector of society w a s m o r e h e t e r o g e n e o u s e c o n o m i c a l l y t h a n t h e c o f f e e - b a s e d o l i g a r c h y of t h e p r e - 1 9 4 4 e r a h a d b e e n . T h i s d i v e r s i t y i n c r e a s e d as g o v e r n m e n t s a f t e r 1 9 5 4 e n c o u r a g e d industrialization and agricultural diversification into cotton, sugar, and cattle,

24

Guatemalan

Politics

and opened Guatemala to foreign investment in such diverse industries as banking, mining, food processing, pharmaceuticals, oil refining, paper, and steel tubing. A m o n g these upper-sector groups, not surprisingly, conflicts arose over g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c i e s , for e x a m p l e tax p o l i c y , infrastructure expenditures, and tariff protection. Powerful private associations formed to protect the e c o n o m i c interests o f their m e m b e r s . T h e 1 9 5 4 counterrevolution was designed to reorient the Guatemalan e c o n o m y toward exports, but at the same time it had no intention o f abandoning the goals o f e c o n o m i c modernization and d e v e l o p m e n t . D e s p i t e the c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n new and old e c o n o m i c elites, all were w i l l i n g to agree on one crucial point: land reform was out o f the question. A f t e r 1 9 5 4 , the " G u a t e m a l a n b e c a m e " e c o n o m i c modernization without

model"

social r e f o r m . "

P o l i t i c a l l y , G u a t e m a l a regressed into w a v e s o f repressive v i o l e n c e . B e c a u s e o f the social and political progress that had been achieved in the previous decade, restoring the political status quo meant both

major

changes and high levels o f v i o l e n c e to e n f o r c e them. V i o l e n c e was necessary, ironically, precisely b e c a u s e the previous decade had seen the development o f d e m o c r a t i c p r a c t i c e s : m e m b e r s o f p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e

labor

unions, peasant cooperatives, and s o m e o f the political parties now had to be e x c l u d e d . C a s t i l l o A r m a s led G u a t e m a l a into a period o f repression more intense than any other p r e c e d i n g it, e x c e p t the S p a n i s h C o n q u e s t . Perhaps no other historical period illustrates so clearly the idea that state repression is political participation by elites intent on eradicating or preventing d e m o c r a c y . T h e " a n t i r e f o r m s " o f the Castillo A r m a s government included repeal o f universal suffrage, c a n c e l l a t i o n o f the registrations o f 5 3 3 unions, and revision o f the n a t i o n ' s labor laws to m a k e e f f e c t i v e labor o r g a n i z i n g i m p o s s i b l e ( W O L A 1 9 8 3 : 8; J o n a s 1 9 7 4 e : 7 4 - 7 5 ; and S c h l e s i n g e r and K i n z e r : 2 2 1 ) . T h e number o f o r g a n i z e d w o r k e r s dropped from

over

1 0 0 , 0 0 0 in 1 9 5 4 to f e w e r than 2 7 , 0 0 0 in 1 9 5 5 ( J o n a s 1 9 7 4 e : 7 5 ) . Land reform was reversed: peasant b e n e f i c i a r i e s were d i s p o s s e s s e d and their land returned to previous o w n e r s . L e s s than .5 percent o f the approximately 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 b e n e f i c i a r i e s under A r b e n z remained on their lands by the end o f 1956 ( A d a m s 1 9 7 0 : 4 0 0 ) . During the first few years o f the period, e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e was disappointing ( A d a m s 1 9 7 0 : 1 4 9 - 1 5 5 ; J o n a s 1 9 7 4 a : 1 7 7 - 1 8 4 ; and J o n a s 1 9 7 4 e : 8 1 ) . B e f o r e 1 9 6 1 , U . S . e c o n o m i c a s s i s t a n c e programs in Latin A m e r i c a were e x t r e m e l y modest, but after the Cuban Revolution John Kennedy proposed the A l l i a n c e for P r o g r e s s , which shifted U . S . policy toward direct governmental a s s i s t a n c e for Latin A m e r i c a . In Guatemala new capital was used to promote a strong export orientation, to push for e c o n o m i c integration throughout Central A m e r i c a , to stress agricultural and industrial diversification, and to fund the development o f infrastructure

Economic & Political Development

25

to 1980

( B r o c k e t t 1 9 8 4 b : 3 7 2 ) . 2 3 T h i s m a j o r c h a n g e in U . S . p o l i c y h e l p e d s p u r i m p r o v e d m a c r o e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e . T h e d e c a d e of t h e 1 9 6 0 s w a s a p e r i o d of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h : r e a l G N P g r e w at a b o u t t w i c e t h e r a t e of p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h until t h e late 1 9 7 0 s ( W O L A 1 9 8 3 : 2; a n d W o r l d B a n k : 2 7 ) . New export commodities flourished.24 Sustained e c o n o m i c growth did not m e a n similar progress social reform, however. D u r i n g the s a m e period, productive

toward

resources

were becoming more concentrated and social indicators declined.

The

G u a t e m a l a n g o v e r n m e n t m a d e little e f f o r t to r e v e r s e e i t h e r t r e n d ; i n d e e d , state policy abetted both t e n d e n c i e s . T h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n on e x p o r t c r o p s a l s o l e d to a d e c l i n e in t h e p r o d u c t i o n of b a s i c f o o d s t u f f s a n d a n e e d t o i m p o r t rice, beans, and c o r n . 2 5 T h e loss of p e a s a n t l a n d h o l d i n g s

was

m a t c h e d o n l y in p a r t b y i n c r e a s e d d e m a n d f o r w a g e l a b o r o n c o t t o n a n d o t h e r p l a n t a t i o n s . B y t h e l a t e 1970s, h u n d r e d s o f t h o u s a n d s of p e a s a n t s w e r e m i g r a t i n g a n n u a l l y to f i n d l o w - p a y i n g t e m p o r a r y w o r k u n d e r h a r s h a n d o f t e n d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n s ( W O L A 1983: 3 ) . T h e w a g e s of t h o s e w i t h w o r k w e r e m e a g e r , and rural u n e m p l o y m e n t r e a c h e d 4 2 percent by the 1970s (Brockett 1984a: 492).26 W i t h p u b l i c p o l i c y g e n e r a l l y r e d i s t r i b u t i n g r e s o u r c e s in f a v o r o f t h e w e a l t h i e s t s e c t o r s , v e r y little of t h e p r o s p e r i t y g e n e r a t e d b y r e n e w e d e c o n o m i c g r o w t h trickled d o w n to the n o n b u s i n e s s and nonelite sectors of s o c i e t y . 2 7 B y t h e m i d - to l a t e 1 9 7 0 s , G u a t e m a l a h a d t h e s e c o n d w o r s t i n d e x of m a l n u t r i t i o n f o r c h i l d r e n u n d e r t h e a g e of f i v e y e a r s : 8 1 . 4 p e r c e n t of all p e r s o n s in t h i s c a t e g o r y s u f f e r e d f r o m m a l n o u r i s h m e n t in G u a t e m a l a . 2 8 T h e r e w e r e e q u a l l y d i s t r e s s i n g d a t a o n m a n y o t h e r i n d i c a t o r s as w e l l . Illite r a c y r a t e s w e r e h i g h : 6 9 p e r c e n t of t h e r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n — 8 2 p e r c e n t of t h e Indian rural p o p u l a t i o n — w a s illiterate. But school e n r o l l m e n t s w e r e low: 4 4 p e r c e n t of all c h i l d r e n — 7 6 p e r c e n t of r u r a l c h i l d r e n — w e r e not e n r o l l e d in s c h o o l ( D a v i s a n d H o d s o n : 2 1 ) . H e a l t h c a r e s t a t i s t i c s w e r e t h e w o r s t in C e n t r a l A m e r i c a . 2 9 O v e r a l l , t h e n , t h e s i t u a t i o n f o r t h e p o o r s e c t o r s of G u a t e m a l a n s o c i e t y w a s d e p l o r a b l e in t e r m s of s o c i a l j u s t i c e . 3 " F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e p e r i o d f r o m 1 9 5 4 to t h e l a t e 1 9 7 0 s s h o w e d c o n t i n u ing decline, not e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o g r e s s or e v e n s t a g n a t i o n . T h r o u g h o u t this time, public policy m a d e the social situation w o r s e , not better.31 At vario u s t i m e s d u r i n g this p e r i o d , a n d w i t h v a r y i n g d e g r e e s of e f f o r t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a t t e m p t e d to p r o m o t e r e f o r m s in G u a t e m a l a , i n c l u d i n g t a x

and

agrarian r e f o r m s and support for cooperatives, but these reform efforts routinely failed. Agrarian reform w a s scarcely mentioned, perhaps because of i t s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e A r b e n z r e g i m e , d e s p i t e U . S . s u g g e s t i o n s t h a t agrarian

reform was

necessary.

Agro-exporting

landowners

not

only

resisted land reform, they actually dispossessed peasants f r o m their existing holdings. Tax reform proposals, w h i c h initially received w i d e publicity, w e r e a b a n d o n e d w h e n t h e e l i t e s p r o t e s t e d . In s p i t e o f t h e a b s e n c e o f

26

Guatemalan

Politics

r e f o r m s , U.S. assistance w a s never curtailed, and by the m i d - 1 9 6 0 s the U n i t e d S t a t e s c e a s e d u s i n g f o r e i g n a i d to p u s h f o r s o c i a l r e f o r m ( J o n a s 1 9 7 4 c : 1 0 5 - 1 0 6 ) . W i t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e of t h e A l l i a n c e f o r P r o g r e s s , a l a r g e l y self-sufficient rural peasantry had been c o n v e r t e d into a rural proletariat, s u b j e c t to t h e v i c i s s i t u d e s of w o r l d d e m a n d f o r G u a t e m a l a ' s e x p o r t c o m m o d i t i e s a n d to t h e v a g a r i e s of local e l i t e s c o n t r o l l i n g t h e p l a n t a t i o n s .

Communal Activism: The Tradition of Participation T h i s b r i e f h i s t o r i c a l s u m m a r y h a s t o u c h e d o n m a n y of t h e m a j o r e v e n t s that s h a p e d G u a t e m a l a ' s political and e c o n o m i c d y n a m i c s b e f o r e 1980. O n e additional cultural tradition must be highlighted and a d d e d to the c o n text. T h e tradition of d e m o c r a t i c c o m m u n a l activism has i m m e n s e signific a n c e in a n y a t t e m p t to u n d e r s t a n d t h e q u a l i t y of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n in G u a t e m a l a in t h e 1 9 8 0 s . G u a t e m a l a n s , e s p e c i a l l y in rural areas, h a v e a l o n g history of c o m m u n i t y l e v e l p a r t i c i p a t i o n in d e v e l o p m e n t a l a c t i v i t i e s . C o m m u n a l a c t i v i s m , p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g a c t i v i t i e s in w h i c h p o o r e r g r o u p s w o r k in t h e i r o w n c o m m u n i t i e s to i m p r o v e s t a n d a r d s of l i v i n g in s p e c i f i c w a y s , h a s l o n g

been

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of r u r a l G u a t e m a l a . C o m m u n i t y - l e v e l p a r t i c i p a t i o n h a s b e e n e s p e c i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l in t h e i n d i g e n o u s r e g i o n s , f o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s . F i r s t , the cultural w o r l d v i e w ( i n c l u d i n g resistance to outsiders) and the M a y a n t r a d i t i o n of d e c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l o v e r l o c a l a f f a i r s r e i n f o r c e d t h e i d e a of c o m m u n i t y action to s o l v e local-level d e v e l o p m e n t a l p r o b l e m s . S e c o n d , t h e C a t h o l i c c h u r c h , t h r o u g h its C a t h o l i c A c t i o n p r o g r a m ( a n o r g a n i z e d m o v e m e n t that is u s u a l l y c o n s e r v a t i v e ) , h a s f o s t e r e d l o c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r s e l f - h e l p s i n c e at l e a s t t h e 1 9 4 0 s , o f t e n c a u s i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h t r a d i tional Indian leaders, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the r e p r e s s i o n of the late

1950s

( A d a m s 1970: 2 7 8 - 2 8 6 ; IGE 1987: 8 - 1 1 ; and Arias). T h i r d , a f t e r t h e 1 9 5 4 c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n , w i t h its a n t i c o m m u n i s t i d e o l o g y , r e l i g i o u s g r o u p s w e r e i n v i t e d t o s e n d m i s s i o n a r i e s t o G u a t e m a l a to help institutionalize this a n t i c o m m u n i s t process. T h e s e mostly c o n s e r v a tive g r o u p s s u c c e s s f u l l y integrated both the rural and urban p o o r — i n c l u d ing Indian c o m m u n i t i e s — i n t o cooperatives, religious organizations, neighb o r h o o d organizations, literacy classes, and other activities that p r o m o t e d e f f e c t i v e local-level p a r t i c i p a t i o n . F r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e of the

United

S t a t e s , G u a t e m a l a h a d b e e n r e c l a i m e d f r o m c o m m u n i s m in 1 9 5 4 , s o t h e A l l i a n c e f o r P r o g r e s s p r o g r a m s of t h e 1 9 6 0 s i n c l u d e d a s s i s t a n c e f o r r u r a l cooperatives. Finally, communication with outsiders through missionaries a n d P e a c e C o r p s v o l u n t e e r s , e d u c a t i o n in u r b a n c e n t e r s , a n d d i r e c t e l e c tronic c o n n e c t i o n s with the o u t s i d e — t h e a g e of the transistor r a d i o — a l l led

to d e m a n d s

for social

modernization

activism (Frank and Wheaton: 29-36).

and

stimulated

communal

Economic & Political Development

27

to 1980

A f t e r t h e e a r t h q u a k e of 1 9 7 6 , w h e n it b e c a m e c l e a r t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t w a s u n w i l l i n g or u n a b l e to c o p e w i t h t h e s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c r e s u l t s of t h e d i s a s t e r e f f e c t i v e l y , l o c a l c i t i z e n s s o u g h t a s s i s t a n c e o n t h e i r o w n , b y o r g a n i z i n g reconstruction c o m m i t t e e s t h r o u g h o u t the nation. T h e s e locall e v e l c o m m i t t e e s s u c c e s s f u l l y d e a l t w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s d i r e c t l y to obtain supplies and m a n a g e relief and reconstruction e f f o r t s (Davis and H o d s o n : 15). T h e s e s u c c e s s e s , plus the relatively n o n v i o l e n t g o v e r n m e n t of G e n e r a l L a u g e r u d in t h e 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 7 6 p e r i o d , r e s u l t e d in a g r o w i n g s e c tor of rural and urban p o o r w h o w e r e well o r g a n i z e d a n d

participant,

a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y at t h e l o c a l l e v e l a n d a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y in " n o n p o l i t i c a l " w a y s : t h a t is, t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n h a d l i t t l e o r n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h e e l e c t o r a l or p a r t y p r o c e s s . S i n c e at least t h e p e r i o d b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e 1 9 4 4 r e v o l u t i o n , t h e n , o u t s i d e a g e n c i e s a n d l o c a l c o m m u n i t i e s h a v e w o r k e d t o g e t h e r in h u n d r e d s , p e r h a p s t h o u s a n d s of l o c a l - l e v e l p r o j e c t s t o i m p r o v e t h e I n d i a n ' s q u a l i t y of l i f e in a r e a s s u c h as h e a l t h , e d u c a t i o n , a g r i c u l t u r e , a n d c o o p e r a t i v e s . Outside agencies included religious missionaries and various nongovernmental private voluntary organizations ( P V O s ) , as well as the m a j o r U.S. c o m m i t m e n t of P e a c e C o r p s a n d U S A I D p r o g r a m s b e g i n n i n g in t h e 1 9 6 0 s ( D a v i s a n d H o d s o n : 1, 14). W i t h i n G u a t e m a l a ' s h i s t o r y , t h e r e f o r e , is a v i b r a n t l e g a c y o f c o m m u n a l a c t i v i s m : c i t i z e n s d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g at t h e l o c a l l e v e l in m a k i n g d e c i s i o n s a b o u t i s s u e s t h a t a f f e c t t h e i r l i v e s . S o l v i n g l o c a l p r o b l e m s is o b v i o u s l y i m p o r t a n t to t h e i n d i v i d u a l s a n d c o m m u n i t i e s involved, but these activities take on a d d i t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e for political participation and for democratic d e v e l o p m e n t . 3 2

Communal

a c t i v i s m is a l o n g - s t a n d i n g a n d s u c c e s s f u l t r a d i t i o n in G u a t e m a l a ,

and

u n d e r s t a n d i n g c u r r e n t a t t e m p t s t o b u i l d d e m o c r a c y r e q u i r e s a w a r e n e s s of t h i s i m p o r t a n t d i m e n s i o n . T h e t r a d i t i o n of c o m m u n a l a c t i v i s m

suggests

t h a t if t h e r e is a g e n u i n e p o l i t i c a l o p e n i n g , t h e c o u n t r y w i l l m o v e t o w a r d d e m o c r a c y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , G u a t e m a l a n h i s t o r y r e v e a l s a s e c o n d p a t t e r n of p a r t i c i p a t o r y b e h a v i o r that is a n t i d e m o c r a t i c : v i o l e n c e to p r e v e n t or d e s t r o y o r g a n i z i n g w i t h i n the p o p u l a r s e c t o r .

Conclusion E v e n t h e m o s t c a s u a l o b s e r v e r of L a t i n A m e r i c a n h i s t o r y a n d p o l i t i c s c a n r e c o g n i z e that G u a t e m a l a has been an e x t r e m e l y violent nation for several decades.33 A l t h o u g h many Latin A m e r i c a n societies h a v e s u f f e r e d repressive v i o l e n c e , usually u n d er the g u i s e of " n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , " no o t h e r A m e r i c a n nation has s u f f e r e d so intensely nor for so long as has G u a t e mala. Political violence there has been c o m m o n , pervasive,

sometimes

a p p e a r i n g to b e e n d e m i c , a n d a l w a y s s i n i s t e r . 3 4 T o b e u n d e r s t o o d p r o p e r l y , t h i s v i o l e n c e m u s t b e s t u d i e d in t h e c o n t e x t of e c o n o m i c c h a n g e , as a f o r m

28

Guatemalan

Politics

of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n ; it is t h e p r o d u c t n e i t h e r of t h e

psychological

a b e r r a t i o n s o f m a d m e n n o r of a g e n e r a l i z e d c u l t u r e o f v i o l e n c e . It is, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , o f t e n a r a t i o n a l r e s p o n s e to t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h political actors find themselves. G u a t e m a l a n history clearly s h o w s such c i r c u m s t a n c e s . E c o n o m i c a l l y , the historical d y n a m i c s are clear: the n a t i o n ' s p r e v a i l i n g e c o n o m i c m o d e l is o l i g a r c h i c c a p i t a l i s m s t r o n g l y d e p e n d e n t o n r e s o u r c e s t h a t t h e s t a t e c o m m a n d s . G o v e r n m e n t is a m a j o r a c t o r b e c a u s e t h e e c o n o m i c m o d e l r e q u i r e s it to b e s o , n o t b e c a u s e t h e s t a t e is r e s p o n d i n g to t h e c i t i z e n s ' d e m a n d s a s a w h o l e . T h e s o c i a l c o n t e x t is e q u a l l y c l e a r . A s t h e d e c a d e of t h e 1 9 8 0 s o p e n e d , s o c i o e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s in G u a t e m a l a w e r e a b o m i n a b l e f o r at least t h r e e - f o u r t h s of its i n h a b i t a n t s . M o d e r n i z a t i o n in t h e e c o n o m i c s e c t o r h a d led t o t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of c o m m u n i t i e s as w e l l as t h e i m p o v e r i s h m e n t of m o s t w o r k e r s . T h e i n c r e a s i n g o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e e c o n o m y t o e x p o r t s b e g a n to r e n d e r m o s t c i t i z e n s u n i m p o r t a n t , e x c e p t as c h e a p l a b o r : g i v e n w i d e spread poverty, people b e c o m e increasingly irrelevant. Politically, G u a t e m a l a ' s history shows a continuing struggle around these issues. Given poor socioeconomic conditions and a penchant

for

d e m o c r a t i c a c t i o n in t h e p o p u l a c e , e v e n s l i g h t p o l i t i c a l o p e n i n g s p r o d u c e a s u r g e in p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n by p o p u l a r g r o u p s a t t e m p t i n g to p l a c e t h e i r needs on

the social

agenda.

With

few exceptions,

the

government's

r e s p o n s e s to t h e s e s u r g e s h a v e n o t i n c l u d e d a p u b l i c p o l i c y of r e d i s t r i b u t i o n b u t u s u a l l y , i n s t e a d , o n e of r e p r e s s i o n , s o m e t i m e s v i o l e n t . W i t h little r o o m for r e f o r m within the s y s t e m , rebellion and i n s u r g e n c y h a v e f r e q u e n t l y b e e n c h o s e n as r a t i o n a l o p t i o n s b y p r o g r e s s i v e c i t i z e n s . C o n v e r s e l y , w i t h little r o o m to m a n e u v e r o n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c s c e n e , G u a t e m a l a ' s elites have s h o w n no tolerance for social r e f o r m d o m e s t i c a l l y and have frequently used violent repression as a rational strategy for survival. As the p o t e n t i a l f o r r e b e l l i o n h a s i n c r e a s e d , s o h a s t h e e l i t e ' s n e e d to r e l y o n v i o l e n c e , r a t h e r t h a n s y s t e m i c l e g i t i m a c y , to m a i n t a i n d o m i n a n c e . T h e r e s u l t is c h r o n i c i n s t a b i l i t y : p o p u l a r r e s i s t a n c e t o s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e m e a n s that e l i t e d o m i n a n c e h a s b e e n a n d w i l l r e m a i n p r e c a r i o u s . T h r o u g h out G u a t e m a l a n history and especially since 1954, w o r s e n i n g situations g e n e r a t e d b y t h e m o d e l of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h w i t h o u t r e f o r m h a v e g e n e r ated popular pressures for c h a n g e . T h e very e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e s that have provided wealth for elites have also p r o d u c e d opposition: social injustice h a s led t o a s t e a d y f l o w of d e m a n d s f o r t h e r e d r e s s of g r i e v a n c e s , n o t t o apathy. But historically, the g o v e r n m e n t has not b e e n a b l e or w i l l i n g to stabilize the political system through public policies that g e n e r a t e legitim a c y f o r t h e s y s t e m — t h e o r e t i c a l l y t h e n o r m a l p a t t e r n in l i b e r a l s o c i e t i e s . M a n y s t a t e p o l i c i e s h a v e h a d an i m p a c t o n p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d t h e d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i c i p a t o r y p o t e n t i a l of n o n e l i t e s e c t o r s o f s o c i e t y . E l i t e p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s a n d b e h a v i o r a f f e c t i n g t h e q u a l i t y of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n

Economic

& Political Development

to 1980

29

are important e l e m e n t s , but a c o m p l e t e a n a l y s i s o f the q u a l i t y o f d e m o c r a t i c p o l i t i c s m u s t i n c l u d e the n o n e l i t e s e g m e n t s . In G u a t e m a l a ,

the

p o t e n t i a l for d e m o c r a c y has b e e n s t r o n g e s t in the p o p u l a r s e c t o r s . T h e m o s t d i s c o n t i n u o u s p e r i o d in m o d e r n G u a t e m a l a n h i s t o r y , the D e c a d e of S p r i n g f o l l o w i n g the 1 9 4 4 r e v o l u t i o n , illustrated the d e m o c r a t i c potential o f the majority o f G u a t e m a l a ' s c i t i z e n s . T h e n e e d for c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n and v i o l e n c e d e m o n s t r a t e d h o w c o m p e l l i n g the p r e s s u r e f r o m b e l o w f o r d e m o c r a c y has b e e n . With this d i f f i c u l t and c o m p l e x historical c o n t e x t in m i n d , the s t a g e is n o w set for an in-depth a n a l y s i s o f G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c s s i n c e 1 9 8 0 . In this a n a l y s i s w e w i l l l o o k for h o p e f u l s i g n s that i n d i c a t e i m p r o v e m e n t in the quality o f political participation and c i v i l and h u m a n rights for m o r e citizens, positive m o v e m e n t on s o c i o e c o n o m i c questions and social justice i s s u e s , and other i n d i c a t i o n s that the state is b e c o m i n g m o r e r e s p o n s i v e in its p u b l i c p o l i c i e s to the m a j o r i t y ' s w i s h e s and n e e d s . G i v e n the dual traditions of c o m m u n a l a c t i v i s m and political v i o l e n c e , the critical q u e s t i o n is to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h o f t h e s e p r e v a i l e d during the terms o f G u a t e m a l a ' s c i v i l ian presidents, M a r c o V i n i c i o C e r e z o A r e v a l o and Jorge Serrano Elias.

Notes 1. P o r t i o n s of this c h a p t e r a p p e a r in s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t f o r m a t in T r u d e a u and Schoultz. 2. For a f a s c i n a t i n g s e r i e s of e s s a y s a b o u t the M a y a n o r i e n t a t i o n to t i m e , see B r o n k . O n the o v e r a l l a c h i e v e m e n t s of the M a y a , G i r a r d w r i t e s the f o l l o w i n g : T h e M a y a n c a p a c i t y for a b s t r a c t i o n p r o d u c e s u n i v e r s a l a d m i r a t i o n , f o r they o u t d i d all o t h e r p e o p l e s of the N e w W o r l d , as w e l l as t h e E g y p t i a n s , B a b y l o n i a n s , C h i n e s e , P e r s i a n s , G r e e k s , and R o m a n s . . . . T h e y had a d j u s t e d their a n n u a l c a l e n d a r to the r h y t h m of the s e a s o n s b e f o r e J u l i u s C a e s a r . . . . T h e y w e r e the best a s t r o n o m e r s of b o t h w o r l d s until the e n d of the M i d d l e A g e s ( q u o t e d in C a m b r a n e s 1 9 8 6 b : 6 2 ) . 3. T h e r e w a s n o w o r d f o r i n f a n t m a l n u t r i t i o n in t h e d e t a i l e d M a y a n m e d i c a l lexicon (Tejada Valenzuela: 1 0 3 - 1 0 8 ) . 4. F o r m o r e d e t a i l e d t r e a t m e n t s , s e e G a r c i a B a u e r : 1 9 - 5 4 ; C a m b r a n e s 1 9 8 6 : 6 1 - 7 7 ; and J o n a s 1 9 7 4 a : 9 4 - 1 0 0 . 5. T h e f i g u r e s are a t t r i b u t e d to B a r t o l o m e d e las C a s a s , t h e D o m i n i c a n k n o w n as the " D e f e n d e r of the I n d i a n s . " T h e y p e r h a p s e x a g g e r a t e t h e e x t e n t of the direct i m p a c t of w a r f a r e , but a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t t h e o v e r a l l p o p u l a t i o n d e c l i n e in t h i s p e r i o d ( V e b l e n : 9 2 ; L o v e l l 1982: 110). T h e S p a n i s h c o n q u i s t a d o r A l v a r a d o w r o t e that " h u g e n u m b e r s of I n d i a n s w e r e killed d u r i n g this e x t e n d e d p e r i o d of c o n q u e s t " (Veblen: 90). 6. T h e first g r e a t p l a g u e to i n v a d e t h e r e g i o n a c t u a l l y p r e c e d e d the p h y s i c a l a r r i v a l of t h e S p a n i s h in G u a t e m a l a a n d m a y h a v e r e d u c e d t h e I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n by u p to o n e half ( V e b l e n : 8 9 ; L o v e l l 1 9 8 2 : 1 0 8 - 1 1 7 ) .

30

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7. A s o n e e x a m p l e of d e p o p u l a t i o n , o n e G u a t e m a l a n r e g i o n , c o n s i d e r e d typical in its d e m o g r a p h i c h i s t o r y , t o o k until 1950 to r e t u r n to the p o p u l a t i o n l e v e l s that had i n h a b i t e d the area b e f o r e the S p a n i s h C o n q u e s t . T h e p o p u l a t i o n d e c l i n e d for o v e r 150 y e a r s a f t e r the c o n q u e s t , b o t t o m i n g out in the late s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y a f t e r a d e c l i n e of a b o u t 9 0 p e r c e n t ( L o v e l l 1 9 8 2 : 108, 1 1 7 - 1 1 8 ) . V e b l e n r e p o r t s that h i g h l a n d G u a t e m a l a r e t u r n e d to its p r e - c o n q u e s t p o p u l a t i o n levels s o m e t i m e in the m i d d l e of the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , w h i c h w o u l d i n d i c a t e an I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n of a b o u t 3 m i l l i o n at t h e t i m e of the c o n q u e s t ( V e b l e n : 9 8 ) . 8. For m o r e d e t a i l e d s t u d i e s of this p e r i o d , see P i n t o S o r i a ; and J o n a s 1 9 7 4 a : 115-127. 9. O t h e r c r o p s illustrate these d y n a m i c s as w e l l . For e x a m p l e , g i v e n the d r o p in t h e v a l u e of n a t u r a l d y e s t u f f s in the 1 8 5 0 s , a n d the g a p until the r a p i d g r o w t h of c o f f e e p r o d u c t i o n in t h e 1860s, o n e w o u l d e x p e c t s o m e e c o n o m i c a n d political d i s l o c a t i o n s in G u a t e m a l a in this p e r i o d . T h e p o t e n t i a l n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s of this lag w e r e a v o i d e d b e c a u s e of t h e Civil W a r in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h i c h i n c r e a s e d d e m a n d f o r G u a t e m a l a n c o t t o n in t h e m i d - 1 8 6 0 s . In 1865, c o t t o n p r o d u c e d 19.2 p e r c e n t of the total v a l u e of G u a t e m a l a ' s e x p o r t s ( W o o d w a r d : 6 4 , 6 8 ) . A f e w y e a r s l a t e r c o t t o n w a s a g a i n i n s i g n i f i c a n t as an e x p o r t , not to r e v i v e a g a i n until a f t e r W o r l d W a r II. 10. For a m o r e d e t a i l e d s u r v e y of t h i s p e r i o d and t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , see J o n a s 1 9 7 4 a : 1 2 6 - 1 2 7 . Her s u m m a r y : Ultimately, " d e v e l o p m e n t " under the highly educated, " p r o g r e s s i v e " c r i o l l o , [ L i b e r a l ] G a l v e z , w a s not s t r i k i n g l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m the " r e a c t i o n " u n d e r the illiterate, proletarian " c a u d i l l o , " [ C o n s e r v a t i v e ] C a r r e r a . . . . By t h e 1 8 6 0 ' s p o l i t i c a l i n d e p e n d e n c e had m a d e very little s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e in G u a t e m a l a . T h e c o l o n i a l e c o n o m y a n d c l a s s s t r u c t u r e h a d t a k e n n e w f o r m s , but in e s s e n c e r e m a i n e d intact ( J o n a s 1 9 7 4 a : 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 ) . 11. P a i g e p r o v i d e s this o v e r a l l p e r s p e c t i v e : G u a t e m a l a . . . is u n i q u e in the e l a b o r a t i o n of an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d s y s t e m of l a b o r p o w e r b a c k e d by b o t h the i n f o r m a l a r m e d p o w e r of the c o f f e e p l a n t e r s and t h e f o r m a l a r m e d p o w e r of the state ( P a i g e : 168). 12. For an e x t r e m e l y detailed and w e l l - d o c u m e n t e d a n a l y s i s of the p e r i o d and its h i s t o r i c a l a n t e c e d e n t s , see C a m b r a n e s 1985. A l s o see J o n a s 1 9 7 4 a : 133 ff.; and M c C r e e r y . F o r a b r i e f e r a n a l y s i s see F r a n k and W h e a t o n : 1 8 - 1 9 , w h o s u m m a r i z e the p e r i o d t h u s : T h e L i b e r a l p e r i o d t h e r e f o r e e s t a b l i s h e d the b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s of m o d e r n G u a t e m a l a : a s m a l l o l i g a r c h y and a m a s s of l a n d l e s s or l a n d - p o o r l a b o r e r s ; a s t r o n g , c e n t r a l i z e d state w h i c h p r o v i d e d the e l i t e w i t h t h e n e e d e d s e r v i c e s and l a b o r ; and e c o n o m i c d e p e n d e n c e on f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t s and interests ( F r a n k and W h e a t o n : 18). 13. W o o d w a r d ' s s u m m a r y of t h e l e g a c y of t h e L i b e r a l R e f o r m s is that they " p r o d u c e d w e a l t h f o r the f e w and p o v e r t y f o r the m a s s e s in the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , m a k i n g i n e v i t a b l e the c o n f l i c t s that o u r o w n t i m e s h a v e i n h e r i t e d " ( W o o d w a r d : 7 3 ) . T h o u g h c e r t a i n l y not the only f a c t o r in e x p l a i n i n g r e b e l l i o n , i m p o v e r i s h m e n t is a m a j o r f a c t o r . S e e B o o t h and W a l k e r , e s p e c i a l l y c h a p t e r 5, f o r a m o d e l b a s e d on this f a c t o r .

Economic

6- Political Development

to 1980

31

14. Increasing p o v e r t y for the m a s s e s b e c a m e the n o r m . For e x a m p l e , daily w a g e s , expressed as c o r n prices, s h o w e d that the e a r n i n g p o w e r of w o r k e r s dropped by one-third b e t w e e n the d e c a d e of the 1880s and the period from 1920 to 1939, from about 7.5 p o u n d s of corn per day of work to b e t w e e n 4 and 4.5 pounds ( W o o d w a r d : 73). 15. In c o f f e e , G e r m a n i n v e s t o r s c o n t i n u e d to e x p a n d : "by 1914, G e r m a n s o w n e d nearly half of the land on w h i c h c o f f e e w a s g r o w n " ( F r a n k and W h e a t o n : 18). By 1926, only 7.3 percent of G u a t e m a l a n s owned land. T h e d o m i n a n c e of foreign investors and the high c o n c e n t r a t i o n of land r e i n f o r c e d the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between land and labor that had been refined by the Liberals in the 1870s (Frank and W h e a t o n : 18). 16. There are excellent studies of this period in Handy; Blasier; Jonas 1974a; I m m e r m a n ; and S c h l e s i n g e r and Kinzer. 17. For more detailed descriptions of these efforts, see Blasier: 5 4 - 6 4 ; I m m e r m a n : 4 4 - 5 7 ; S c h l e s i n g e r and Kinzer: 2 5 - 4 2 ; Melville and M e l v i l l e : 2 7 - 3 9 ; and Poitevin: 5 1 - 5 3 . 18. T h e p h r a s e s " p o p u l a r s e c t o r s " and " p o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s " c o m m o n l y refer to those sectors of Latin A m e r i c a n society that are neither elites nor part of the middle sectors, loosely d e f i n e d . T h e w o r d " p o p u l a r " is taken directly f r o m the Spanish w o r d used to d e s c r i b e these g r o u p s and has no s e n s e of " p o p u l a r i t y , " unlike the English c o g n a t e . B e c a u s e such large portions of the lower c l a s s e s are chronically u n e m p l o y e d or f u n c t i o n i n g at the margin of the capitalist, cash e c o n omy, it makes sense to refer to these g r o u p s as popular, rather than to call them the w o r k i n g class. M o r e o v e r , this is the a p p e l l a t i o n most c o m m o n l y used in Latin America. 19. In 1953, Arbenz announced that his government would redistribute 234,000 acres of United Fruit C o m p a n y land, none of which w a s b e i n g cultivated. At the time, the c o m p a n y w a s c u l t i v a t i n g only 1 3 9 , 0 0 0 of its m o r e than 3 million acres, which constituted 42 percent of the n a t i o n ' s arable land (LaFeber: 118; Schlesinger and Kinzer: 7 5 - 7 7 ; Melville and Melville: 6 1 - 6 3 ; and Jonas 1974a: 1 5 8 - 1 6 0 ) . For more c o m p l e t e t r e a t m e n t s of this critical e p i s o d e , see L a F e b e r ; S c h l e s i n g e r and Kinzer; Melville and Melville; Jonas 1974a; Blasier; and I m m e r m a n . 20. J o n a s 1974a: 1 6 6 - 1 6 9 o f f e r s a similar a r g u m e n t . E l s e w h e r e she c o n cludes: "The e c o n o m i c m e a s u r e s of the revolution did more to spread private property than to abolish it" ( J o n a s 1974b: 52, italics added). A c c o r d i n g to G a l e a n o : 51: " T h e agrarian r e f o r m law laid d o w n as its basic objective the development of the peasant capitalist economy and the capitalist agricultural economy in general" (italics in original). 21. For detailed versions of these events, see I m m e r m a n ; and S c h l e s i n g e r and Kinzer. For shorter versions, see Blasier: 1 5 9 - 1 7 7 ; and Jonas 1974f: 5 7 - 7 3 . 22. E x t e n s i v e mass m o b i l i z a t i o n in rural areas d u r i n g the early 1950s may have d e v e l o p e d into a threat to p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , i.e., may h a v e become r e v o l u tionary in an e c o n o m i c sense. Certainly this potential threat w a s part of the basis of o p p o s i t i o n by o p p o n e n t s of the A r b e n z r e g i m e , s o m e of w h o m p r o b a b l y perceived rural organization as threats ipso f a c t o . 23. For a detailed a c c o u n t of this process, see Jonas 1974d: 8 6 - 1 0 3 . 24. Between 1961 and 1973, arable land devoted to export crops increased by 6.5 percent annually, but for f o o d crops by only 1.7 to 2 percent. Exports increased dramatically; this was a period of sustained, successful e c o n o m i c g r o w t h : B e t w e e n 1960 and 1974, . . . the v a l u e of G u a t e m a l a ' s five m a j o r agricultural export crops increased from $ 1 0 5 . 3 to $367.5 million D u r i n g this

32

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p e r i o d , G u a t e m a l a ' s a g r i c u l t u r a l - e x p o r t e c o n o m y , as m e a s u r e d by a v e r a g e a n n u a l i n c r e a s e s in p r o d u c t i o n , o u t p e r f o r m e d 2 2 o t h e r c o u n t r i e s in Latin A m e r i c a , i n c l u d i n g M e x i c o , C o l o m b i a , and B r a z i l ( D a v i s and H o d son: 46). 2 5 . G u a t e m a l a w a s a l m o s t s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t in p r o d u c t i o n of c o r n d u r i n g t h e 1 9 5 0 to 1 9 5 4 p e r i o d , b u t t h e c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n t h a t r e v e r s e d the A r b e n z l a n d r e f o r m also d i s r u p t e d p r o d u c t i o n to the e x t e n t that m a j o r i m p o r t i n g of c o r n b e g a n in 1955 and c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h at least the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s ( V i l l a c o r t a E s c o b a r : 7 8 ) . 2 6 . In 1980, U S A I D i d e n t i f i e d the " v e r y low w a g e r a t e s paid by c o m m e r c i a l a g r i c u l t u r e and an e x t r e m e l y low m i n i m u m w a g e e s t a b l i s h e d by the g o v e r n m e n t " as the p r i n c i p a l c a u s e s of G u a t e m a l a n p o v e r t y ( U S A I D , cited in W O L A 1 9 8 3 : 6 ) . 2 7 . In 1970, an A I D - s p o n s o r e d s t u d y c o n c l u d e d that: all the d a t a that h a v e b e e n r e v i e w e d o n p r o d u c t i o n , y i e l d s , f a r m s i z e , i n c o m e and e m p l o y m e n t i n d i c a t e that the i n c o m e p o s i t i o n of s m a l l f a r m ers has d e t e r i o r a t e d c o n s i d e r a b l y s i n c e 1950. . . . O v e r large a r e a s of the c e n t r a l r e g i o n , per c a p i t a p r o d u c t i o n is s u r e l y f a l l i n g , a n d total p r o d u c tion m a y be f a l l i n g as w e l l ( F l e t c h e r et al.: 196). A n o t h e r s t u d y c o n c l u d e d that g r o w t h " h a s not r e s u l t e d in any s u b s t a n t i v e i n c r e a s e in t h e i n t e r n a l m a r k e t or in the e c o n o m y ' s c a p a c i t y to a b s o r b a v a i l a b l e l a b o r " ( C S U C S : 121). 2 8 O f t h e s e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 c h i l d r e n , s o m e 5 6 , 0 0 0 w e r e listed as G o m e z I l l - l e v e l m a l n o u r i s h e d , i n d i c a t i n g s e v e r e m a l n u t r i t i o n . T h e p r o p o r t i o n of G u a t e m a l a ' s m a l n o u r i s h e d c h i l d r e n in t h i s " s e v e r e " g r o u p w a s third h i g h e s t in Latin A m e r i c a : 5.9 p e r c e n t of G u a t e m a l a ' s c h i l d r e n f r o m z e r o to f o u r y e a r s of a g e w e r e severely m a l n o u r i s h e d , a l m o s t t w i c e t h e p r o p o r t i o n f o r El S a l v a d o r , f o r e x a m p l e ( I A D B : 19). S e e r e f e r e n c e to T e j a d a V a l e n z u e l a , n o t e 3 a b o v e , f o r an ironic c o n t r a s t . 29. B a s e d on s u c h f i g u r e s as n u m b e r of p h y s i c i a n s p e r 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 i n h a b i t a n t s , n u m b e r s of licensed a n d a u x i l i a r y n u r s e s , d e n t i s t s , and hospital b e d s , and p e r c e n t of g o v e r n m e n t h e a l t h e x p e n d i t u r e s p e r c a p i t a , G u a t e m a l a r a n k s b e l o w all o t h e r C e n t r a l A m e r i c a n c o u n t r i e s ( D a v i s and H o d s o n : 21). 3 0 . In the late 1 9 7 0 s , life e x p e c t a n c y w a s l o w a n d s k e w e d : l a d i n o life e x p e c t a n c y w a s 6 0 . 7 y e a r s , b u t I n d i a n life e x p e c t a n c y w a s 4 4 . 5 y e a r s ( R u i z de B a r r i o s Klee: 5). In t e r m s of i n c o m e , for e x a m p l e , d i v i d i n g the rural p o p u l a t i o n of G u a t e m a l a into q u a r t i l e s r e v e a l s t h a t t h e c o s t of t h e minimum a d e q u a t e d i e t — $ 2 7 8 . 7 5 in 1 9 7 5 — e x c e e d e d the per c a p i t a i n c o m e of all four q u a r t i l e s . T h e m i n i m u m diet in this p e r i o d cost m o r e t h a n t h e per c a p i t a i n c o m e of a b o u t 7 0 p e r c e n t of all G u a t e m a l a n s , rural and u r b a n ( A m i g o : 125). 31. S t a t e p o l i c i e s h a v e t e n d e d to e x a c e r b a t e t h e h i s t o r i c a l i n e q u i t i e s of t h e G u a t e m a l a n a g r a r i a n s y s t e m a n d h a v e d o n e a l m o s t n o t h i n g to a l l e v i a t e the c o n d i t i o n s of h u n g e r a n d m i s e r y of the p o o r ( D a v i s and H o d s o n : 4 6 ) .

Economic & Political Development

to 1980

33

32. The

very

acts

of

planning,

resource

development,

and

cooperation

r e q u i r e d to c a r r y out s u c h p r o j e c t s c a n l e a v e r e s i d u e s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n , i n t e r a c t i o n p a t t e r n s , p a r t i c i p a t o r y s k i l l s , and p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g m o d e l s that further p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t ( S e l i g s o n and B o o t h 1 9 7 9 : 7 ) . 3 3 . G u a t e m a l a ' s u n f o r t u n a t e p l a c e in the h i s t o r y o f p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e in the h e m i s p h e r e has had e v e n l i n g u i s t i c c o n s e q u e n c e s . G u a t e m a l a is g e n e r a l l y held to b e the s o u r c e o f the S p a n i s h w o r d s f o r " d i s a p p e a r e d " and " t o d i s a p p e a r " a p e r s o n . G u a t e m a l a has a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d t h e S p a n i s h w o r d rematar,

w h i c h t r a n s l a t e s liter-

a l l y as " t o r e - k i l l . " T h e w o r d is u s e d to d e s c r i b e s i t u a t i o n s in w h i c h v i c t i m s o f failed a s s a s s i n a t i o n a t t e m p t s are v i s i t e d a s e c o n d t i m e , in h o s p i t a l s , f o r e x a m p l e , s o that the a s s a s s i n a t i o n c a n b e f i n i s h e d s u c c e s s f u l l y . 3 4 . T h a t t h i s pattern is a m o d a l r e s p o n s e is r e f l e c t e d in P r e s i d e n t J o r g e S e r r a n o ' s r e f e r e n c e to a " c u l t u r e o f v i o l e n c e " as an i m p e d i m e n t to s u c c e s s f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s with the U R N G i n s u r g e n t s in 1 9 9 2 , d i s c u s s e d m o r e f u l l y in C h a p t e r 9 . S e e L A T i m e s 9/19/91: 1A for a s i m i l a r c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n .

3

Elections and the State Crisis of the 1980s D e m o c r a c y in t e r m s of the quality of p a r t i c i p a t i o n is r e f l e c t e d in electoral b e h a v i o r as well as in civil liberties and h u m a n rights. C o n v e n t i o n a l indicators for the procedural aspects of d e m o c r a c y , then, are data on elections and v o t i n g , political parties a n d party s y s t e m s , civil liberties and h u m a n rights, and f o r m a l - l e g a l d a t a . T h e s e last include i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t legal s t r u c t u r e s and the f o r m a l status of voters and political parties, w h i c h are important indicators of the structural limits on, and o p p o r t u n i t i e s for, political participation. At the f o r m a l - l e g a l level G u a t e m a l a has b e e n a " d e m o c r a c y " since at least 1945, with regular elections held since then, as well as several f u n c t i o n ing political parties and other a c c o u t r e m e n t s of p r o c e d u r a l d e m o c r a c y . G u a t e m a l a ' s party s y s t e m has been a m u l t i p a r t y o n e f o r m o s t of the s a m e period. Constitutional provisions f r o m the d o c u m e n t s of 1945, 1965, and 1985 all p r o v i d e g u a r a n t e e s f o r electoral a n d party b e h a v i o r . T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1965, for e x a m p l e , guarantees the existence of o p p o s i t i o n parties and contains detailed p r o v i s i o n s to protect civil rights and liberties that p e r m i t g r o u p s to o r g a n i z e and participate in electing o f f i c i a l s . T h e constitution a c k n o w l e d g e s the existence of h u m a n rights and provides p r o c e d u r e s to d e f e n d them. 1 B e y o n d t h e f o r m a l - l e g a l l e v e l , h o w e v e r , t h e p i c t u r e is not s o c l e a r . K e e p i n g in m i n d c r i t e r i a b o r r o w e d f r o m H e r m a n a n d B r o d h e a d a n d f r o m G r e e n b e r g (see C h a p t e r 1), this c h a p t e r e x a m i n e s G u a t e m a l a n e l e c t i o n s u p to t h e e l e c t i o n of M a r c h 1 9 8 2 , w h i c h p r e c i p i t a t e d t h e m i l i t a r y c o u p that led to G u a t e m a l a ' s f o r m a l t r a n s i t i o n to d e m o c r a c y in 1 9 8 5 , a n d r e v e a l s the i m p o r t a n c e of a b r o a d c o n t e x t u a l a p p r o a c h to t h e s t u d y of e l e c t i o n s a n d political p a r t i c i p a t i o n .

Elections: 1954-1982 T h e first e l e c t o r a l e v e n t a f t e r t h e s u c c e s s f u l 1 9 5 4 c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y invasion was a validating plebiscite organized shortly after Colonel Carlos

35

36

Guatemalan

Politics

Castillo A r m a s took power. In this r e f e r e n d u m , held d u r i n g the w a v e of repression associated with his regime, citizens voted orally in the presence of security personnel. Given the procedural qualities of the r e f e r e n d u m , the absence of alternative candidates, and the general climate of fear in Guatemala at the time, it is not surprising that Castillo Armas received 95 percent of the vote. It is also fairly clear that this "election" does not indicate any movement toward democracy. Subsequent elections, however, are much more complex in their results. The first contested elections after 1954, in effect two rounds of struggle, took place in 1958 and 1959, after the assassination of Castillo A r m a s in 1957. (See tables 3.1 and 3.2 for results of several e l e c t i o n s b e f o r e 1982.) Both c a m p a i g n s featured only groups that had opposed the A r b e n z g o v e r n m e n t . T h e " o f f i c i a l " party, the National D e m o c r a t i c M o v e m e n t (Movimiento Nacional D e m o c r á t i c o — M D N ) , later the National Liberation M o v e m e n t ( M o v i m i e n t o de Liberación N a c i o n a l — M L N ) , n o m i n a t e d Miguel Ortiz Pasarelli. His opponent, General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, was a staunch anticommunist who had lived in exile during the A r b e n z administration but w h o had been rejected by the United States as a suitable leader for its 1954 invasion. The 1958 voting returns were fraudulent: Ortiz and the M D N claimed victory, but Ydígoras urged public marches and demonstrations to prevent the fraud (Handy: 1 5 1 - 1 5 3 ) . The chaos prompted a c o m p r o m i s e , a second round of elections. In this round the M D N c h a n g e d its c a n d i d a t e , nominating José Luis Cruz Salazar, a military o f f i c e r during the A r b e n z g o v ernment w h o had served briefly in the first junta after the 1954 golpe and then had been G u a t e m a l a n a m b a s s a d o r to the U.S. Y d í g o r a s carried the election in this second round but not without renewed accusations of fraud, this time on the part of the defeated M D N . Miguel Ydígoras F u e n t e s ' s party, the National D e m o c r a t i c R e d e m p tion Party (Redención Nacional D e m o c r á t i c a — R N D , or simply La Redención) was a l m o s t purely a p a t r o n a g e structure and had no p r o g r a m m a t i c line other than vocal anticommunism; this was also the line of the defeated M D N . His government was extremely corrupt and ineffective: " Y d í g o r a s ' ineptness succeeded only in exacerbating the frustrations of progressives and conservatives alike" (Weaver: 72). T h e corruption contributed to factionalization and frustration in the military. O n e faction, led by p r o g r e s sive, nationalist officers, attempted a c o u p d ' é t a t in 1960, which eventually developed into an insurgency campaign in the middle and late 1960s. Tensions also built within the military over the use of Guatemalan territory to train the forces that eventually invaded Cuba in the Playa Girón (Bays of Pigs) operation. Eventually, in 1963, these tensions culminated in a successful military coup led by Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia and his " m o d e r a t e " faction of

Elections

T a b l e 3.1

& the State Crisis of the 1980s

37

Presidential Election Results, 1945-1978

Year

Registered Voters

1945 1951 1958 1966 1970 1974 1978

310,000 583,300 736,400 944,170 1,190,449 1,568,724 1,785,764

Votes Cast

296,214 407,663 492,274 531,270 640,684 727,174 652,073

Percentage Abstaining

Winner's Ballots

Winner's Percentage

4.5 31.1 32.1 43.7 46.2 53.6 63.5

255,700 266,800 191,000 209,400 251,100 299,000 262,900

82.5 45.7 25.9 22.2 21.1 19.1 14.7

Sources: "Elections in Guatemala": 5; lnforpress 1985: 26

T a b l e 3.2

Presidential Election R e s u l t s b y Party, 1957-1978 Candidates

Year

1957

Miguel Ortiz Pasarelli Col. Miguel Ydígoras Col. Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes Col. José Luis Cruz Salazar Mario Méndez Montenegro Julio Méndez Montenegro Col. Juan de Dios Aguilar Col. Miguel Angel Ponciano Col. Carlos Arana Osorio Mario Fuentes Peruccini Maj. Jorge Lucas Caballeros Gen. Kjell Laugerud García Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt Col. Paíz Novales Gen. Romeo Lucas García Gen. Enrique Peralta Azurdia Gen. Ricardo Peralta Méndez

1958

1966

1970

1974

1978

Key to Party CAN DCG FNO

FUN MDN MLN P1D PR RND UNO

Party

MDN RND RND MDN PR PR PID MLN MLN/PID PR DCG PID/MLN FNO PR P1D/CAN/PR MLN DCG

Percentage of Vote 62.0 38.0 38.8 28.1 27.0 44.4 31.7 23.9 42.9 35.7 21.4 41.0 36.0 23.0 41.0 33.0 26.0

Acronyms

National Authentic Center (Central Auténtico Nacional), originally the Central Aranista Organization (Central Aranista Organizado—CAO) Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party (Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca) National Opposition Front, including DCG, United Front of the Revolution (Frente Unido Revolucionario—FUR), and Revolutionary Democratic Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Democrática—URD) National Front for Unity (Frente de Unidad Nacional) National Democratic Movement (Movimiento Nacional Democrático) National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional) Democratic Institutional Party (Partido Institucional Democrático) Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario) National Democratic Redemption Party (Redención Nacional Democrática) United National Opposition (Unidad Nacional Opositora), includes DCG and a moderate faction of the MLN (PNR).

Source: Adapted from Handy: 283-284.

38

Guatemalan

Politics

t h e A r m y ( H a n d y : 1 5 2 - 1 5 5 ; W e a v e r : 6 6 - 6 7 ) . T h e c o u p p u t an e n d t o t h e c h a o t i c p e r i o d a f t e r 1 9 5 4 , a n d P e r a l t a A z u r d i a , a s c h i e f of s t a t e , r u l e d b y decree for the next two years. Holding himself aloof f r o m partisan politics, he led t h e c o u n t r y t h r o u g h a p r o c e s s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m a n d e l e c t i o n s , u s i n g t h e s p e c t e r of g u e r r i l l a i n s u r g e n c y t o e x t r a c t U . S . m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , w h i c h w a s l a r g e l y u s e d to r e o r g a n i z e a n d m o d e r n i z e t h e a r m e d f o r c e s . In 1965, a new constitution was p r o m u l g a t e d and a new electoral process created, with elections scheduled for 1966.

A Civilian

President

By the 1966 election G u a t e m a l a n elections had been widely discredited,2 y e t t h a t e l e c t i o n w a s t h e f i r s t p r o c e d u r a l l y h o n e s t o n e in G u a t e m a l a a f t e r t h e 1954 c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n . A r e f o r m i s t c i v i l i a n , J u l i o C é s a r M é n d e z M o n tenegro, w a s the c a n d i d a t e of the R e v o l u t i o n a r y Party ( P a r t i d o R e v o l u c i o n a r i o — P R ) , a p a r t y t h a t s o u g h t to i d e n t i f y itself w i t h t h e A r é v a l o a n d A r b e n z g o v e r n m e n t s b y c h a r a c t e r i z i n g i t s e l f as t h e " t h i r d g o v e r n m e n t " of the 1944 revolution. T h e United States b a c k e d M é n d e z ' s bid against t w o military c a n d i d a t e s , a n d o n c e t h e b a l l o t i n g w a s o v e r , W a s h i n g t o n a n n o u n c e d it w o u l d n o t s u p p o r t a n y a t t e m p t to a n n u l t h e e l e c t i o n

(Melville

and

M e l v i l l e : 1 8 9 ) . T h e M é n d e z v i c t o r y o f f e r e d t h e U . S . t h e p o s s i b i l i t y that t h e r e f o r m i s t d e v e l o p m e n t s t r a t e g y e n v i s i o n e d in the A l l i a n c e f o r P r o g r e s s c o u l d b e i m p l e m e n t e d in G u a t e m a l a . T h e m i l i t a r y , at least on p a p e r , w o u l d r e t u r n to t h e b a r r a c k s a f t e r t h e e l e c t i o n . But although a civilian r e f o r m e r taking o f f i c e after a fair counting of the ballots s e e m e d a positive step after military rule, a closer look reveals t h e real l i m i t s of c i v i l i a n p o w e r in r e l a t i o n to t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e m i l i t a r y . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e 1965 C o n s t i t u t i o n h a d r e s t r i c t e d p a r t i e s w i t h " e x o t i c i d e o l o g i e s " — s u c h as social d e m o c r a c y a n d the Christian

Democrats—and

outlawed left-wing opposition, which limited effective political participation b y g r o u p s a n d p a r t i e s s u p p o r t i n g s e r i o u s r e f o r m s ( B l a c k : 2 1 ) . 3 M o r e o v e r , t h e o n l y p a r t i e s a l l o w e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e in a d d i t i o n t o t h e P R w e r e the M L N , the rightist o l i g a r c h i c party that e m e r g e d a f t e r 1954, and the D e m o c r a t i c Institutional Party ( P a r t i d o Institucional

Democrático—

P I D ) , t h e p a r t y of t h e a r m e d f o r c e s . E v e n t h e P R itself h a d s h i f t e d t o t h e r i g h t in t h e l a t e 1950s w h e n its l e a d e r at t h e t i m e , M a r i o M é n d e z

Mon-

tenegro, " p u r g e d the entire left w i n g of the p a r t y " ( J o n a s 1 9 7 4 a : 196). Julio M é n d e z M o n t e n e g r o b e c a m e the c a n d i d a t e only after his brother Mario had been assassinated. F r o m the b e g i n n i n g , then, the electorate's c h o i c e s w e r e n a r r o w l y c o n s t r a i n e d a n d t h e " r e f o r m i s t " c r e d e n t i a l s of t h e P R o p e n to q u e s t i o n . Once elected, the M é n d e z g o v e r n m e n t was severely limited. First, M é n d e z was not a l l o w e d to t a k e o f f i c e until he agreed to g u a r a n t e e the

Elections & the State Crisis of the 2 980s

39

m i l i t a r y " a f r e e h a n d in c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y , a u t o n o m y in s u c h m a t t e r s a s s e l e c t i o n of t h e D e f e n s e M i n i s t e r , C h i e f of S t a f f , b u d g e t s , e t c . " M é n d e z a l s o h a d to p r o m i s e " t o e x c l u d e ' r a d i c a l s ' f r o m t h e g o v e r n m e n t , b u t n o t to retire too many generals" (Jonas 1974a: 195). Second, threats f r o m the oligarchy prevented him f r o m carrying out even relatively mild,

U n -

s u p p o r t e d t a x r e f o r m s , let a l o n e t a k e t h e i n i t i a t i v e o n m o r e s e r i o u s l a n d r e f o r m s ( J o n a s 1 9 7 4 c : 104—108). P e r h a p s m o s t s e r i o u s , M é n d e z w a s p o w e r l e s s to s t o p a n e w w a v e of r e p r e s s i o n u n l e a s h e d b y an a n x i o u s m i l i t a r y and the paramilitary death s q u a d s controlled by the oligarchy. In s h o r t , an h o n e s t e l e c t i o n in 1 9 6 6 d i d n o t g u a r a n t e e e v e n p r o c e d u r a l d e m o c r a c y , let a l o n e s o c i a l j u s t i c e , r e g a r d l e s s of w h a t e v e r r e f o r m i s t i n t e n t i o n s M é n d e z M o n t e n e g r o p r o f e s s e d . In f a c t , t h e n e t i m p a c t of t h e M é n d e z p e r i o d w a s a d e c l i n e in t h e q u a l i t y of l i f e f o r G u a t e m a l a ' s m a j o r i t y , e v e n as m a c r o e c o n o m i c growth created n e w wealth for the middle class and the elite. T h e overall structural situation r e m a i n e d intact, while social indicat o r s s h i f t e d in t h e d i r e c t i o n o f m o r e i n e q u a l i t y . T h o u g h t h e p r e s i d e n c y of M é n d e z M o n t e n e g r o w a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an a u t o n o m o u s ,

reorganized

m i l i t a r y in p o w e r , t h e e x a m p l e of t h e r e l a t i v e l y o p e n c a m p a i g n b y t h e P R i n s p i r e d p r o g r e s s i v e m e m b e r s of t h e m i d d l e c l a s s to o r g a n i z e r e f o r m i s t parties, i n c l u d i n g the early C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s , the U n i t e d Front of the Revolution (Frente U n i d o R e v o l u c i o n a r i o — F U R ) , and the

Democratic

Socialists (Partido Socialista D e m o c r á t i c o — P S D ) . T h e e l e c t i o n s of 1 9 7 0 , 1 9 7 4 , a n d 1 9 7 8 , w h i c h w i t h o n l y o n e e x c e p t i o n w e r e contested solely by military candidates, represented contests b e t w e e n m i l i t a r y f a c t i o n s a n d t h e i r c i v i l i a n a l l i e s , s o m e t i m e s i n c l u d i n g m e m b e r s of progressive

parties like the Christian

Democrats

and others

(Handy:

166-180). T h e 1970 election was rife with fraudulent procedures, including b u y i n g votes; issuing false identification d o c u m e n t s ; social pressure, especially on the large h a c i e n d a s ; ballot r e c o u n t i n g and r e - m a r k i n g ; and p r e e l e c t i o n f r a u d c e n t e r i n g o n i l l e g a l r e g i s t r a t i o n a n d h a r a s s m e n t of o p p o sition candidates (Thesing: 2 0 - 2 2 ) . 4 In 1974, G e n e r a l K j e l l L a u g e r u d G a r c i a w a s i m p o s e d a s p r e s i d e n t in a f r a u d u l e n t e l e c t i o n g e n e r a l l y t h o u g h t to h a v e b e e n w o n b y t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c candidate, G e n e r a l E f r a í n Ríos M o n t t . A f t e r that election R í o s M o n t t b e c a m e G u a t e m a l a ' s a m b a s s a d o r to S p a i n . 5 O n e D C G l e a d e r a d m i t t e d that " i n G u a t e m a l a , it is u s e l e s s t o t h i n k o f g o v e r n i n g , e x c e p t a s t h e r e s u l t of a p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n b y t h e A r m y " ( B l a c k : 3 1 ) . 6 T h e 1 9 7 8 e l e c t i o n w a s s u b j e c t t o s i m i l a r s o r t s of m a n i p u l a t i o n . A s t h e r e t u r n s w e r e t e l e v i s e d o n e l e c t i o n d a y , G e n e r a l L u c a s G a r c i a a p p e a r e d to b e f i n i s h i n g t h i r d of t h e t h r e e m a j o r c a n d i d a t e s , w i t h t h e w i n n e r t h e f o r m e r dictator General Peralta Azurdia, w h o s e candidacy w a s supported by the M L N party. T h e televised vote count was interrupted, and after several d a y s of m e e t i n g s it w a s a n n o u n c e d t h a t L u c a s G a r c i a h a d b e e n c e r t i f i e d

40

Guatemalan

Politics

as the winner (Aguilera Peralta 1978). The MLN party " w o n " the largest bloc of seats in the Congress, however.

The Crisis of the 1980s It is difficult to overstate the severity of the crisis facing Guatemala in the early 1980s. As the 1 9 7 0 s came to a close, economic growth slowed. Squeezed by international financial and investment pressures and by petroleum prices, beset by declining commodity prices for its exports, and burdened by the costs of waging war on its own citizens, Guatemala faced a severe economic crisis. Warfare had erupted in rural areas by 1980, largely as a reaction to the military's violence after the 1976 earthquake. Tourism, a major source of foreign exchange, declined precipitously after 1 9 7 9 because of the political violence. In the late 1970s, the Army found itself competing not only with the bulk of the population that was living in economic and social misery but also with other sectors o f the e c o n o m i c elite and the civilian middle class. The cleavages became especially contentious by 1 9 8 0 because of the combination of a prolonged economic crisis and the drying up of foreign sources of capital, plus the fact that many Army o f f i c e r s had become major economic players themselves during the 1 9 7 0 s (see Chapter 4). Rural

Insurgency

By 1980 or 1981, the military's campaign of violence in the Mayan highlands had produced some ironic repercussions. In its rural operations the Army justified its acts as a campaign against a communist insurgency inspired by Soviets and/or Cubans. In fact, the guerrillas were few in number when the wave of repression began around 1976. The guerrilla activity that had emerged in 1 9 7 5 — l e d by some of the survivors of the movement in the 1 9 6 0 s — w a s at first confined to Indian highland areas of northern El Quiche Department, notably in the Ixcan and Ixil regions. Military repression of reformist efforts and community organization, however, led to widespread mobilization: to protect themselves from the landowners and the military, the Mayan communities began to organize for self-defense. One result of government violence in Indian regions, therefore, was the politicization of indigenous communities, which often led to their incorporation into the armed insurgency. Victimized by the military and lacking alternatives for economic self-improvement, Indians increasingly turned to armed opposition, swelling the ranks of the guerrilla movement. This process almost always occurred after government repression and

Elections & the State Crisis of the 1980s

41

a t t e m p t s to e l i m i n a t e s u c c e s s f u l p r o g r a m s of c o m m u n a l

activism,

not

b e f o r e . In t h i s s e n s e , t h e A r m y ' s c a m p a i g n w a s a c a u s e of t h e i n s u r g e n c y , n o t a r e s p o n s e t o it; t h e i n s u r g e n t s w e r e r e c r u i t e d b e c a u s e of m i l i t a r y r e p r e s s i o n , not by ideological c o n v i c t i o n . O n the w h o l e , native resistance w a s a c r e a t u r e of state r e p r e s s i o n , not its c a u s e ( C o n c e r n e d

Guatemala

Scholars: 47-54).7 T h r e e i m p o r t a n t i n s u r g e n c y g r o u p s e m e r g e d at t h i s t i m e . T h e l a r g e s t , t h e G u e r r i l l a A r m y of t h e P o o r ( E j é r c i t o G u e r r i l l e r o d e los P o b r e s — E G P ) , h a d f o r m e d in 1 9 7 2 , a n d b y 1 9 7 5 it b e g a n t o a t t r a c t p e a s a n t I n d i a n s u p p o r t in t h e I x c á n r e g i o n ( P a y e r a s ; a n d B l a c k : 7 2 - 7 8 ) . B y 1 9 8 0 , t h e E G P w a s o p e r a t i n g in s e v e r a l d e p a r t m e n t s a n d w a s a b l e t o f i e l d f i g h t i n g u n i t s c o m p o s e d o f s i g n i f i c a n t n u m b e r s o f I n d i a n s . T h e O r g a n i z a t i o n of P e o p l e in A r m s ( O r g a n i z a c i ó n del P u e b l o e n A r m a s — O R P A ) f i r s t a p p e a r e d p u b l i c l y in t h e late 1 9 7 0 s , a f t e r it h a d a l r e a d y b e c o m e a m a j o r f a c t o r in t h e r e g i o n a r o u n d L a k e A t i t l á n as w e l l as in o t h e r a r e a s . T h e t h i r d m a j o r g r o u p in t h e early 1 9 8 0 s w a s a r e g e n e r a t i o n of o n e of the 1 9 6 0 s ' g r o u p s , the Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas R e b e l d e s — F A R ) , which for a time was a l l i e d w i t h a f a c t i o n of t h e G u a t e m a l a n C o m m u n i s t P a r t y ( P a r t i d o G u a t e m a l t e c o del T r a b a j o — P G T ) . E a c h of t h e s e g r o u p s b l e n d e d s o m e f o r m of M a r x i s t a n a l y s i s w i t h d e m a n d s f o r t h e e n d of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b a s e d o n r a c e . E a c h c l a i m e d to s u p p o r t d e m o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s a n d p l e d g e d t o respect religious preferences. In t h e e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s , g u e r r i l l a u n i t s w e r e s t r o n g in t h e n o r t h w e s t a n d w e s t , a n d on the plantation lands of the s o u t h e r n c o a s t . T h e E G P and O R P A g u e r r i l l a u n i t s w e r e l a r g e l y c o m p o s e d of I n d i a n s . N e a r l y all t h e c o m b a t a n t s had originally been m o b i l i z e d into political action d u r i n g the 1975-1980

period

as m e m b e r s

of t h e

popular

organizations

(Black:

1 0 2 - 1 0 7 ) . In 1 9 8 2 , t h e s e g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n s p r o c l a i m e d t h e i r u n i t y in a s t a t e m e n t i s s u e d u n d e r t h e b a n n e r of a n e w c o o r d i n a t i n g g r o u p , t h e National

Guatemalan

Revolutionary

Unity

(Unidad

Revolucionaria

Nacional G u a t e m a l t e c a — U R N G ) . * B e f o r e the escalation of the m i l i t a r y ' s c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y c a m p a i g n a r o u n d 1980 and 1981, the insurgency pres e n t e d a s e r i o u s t h r e a t to t h e G u a t e m a l a n s t a t e .

Urban

Confrontation

In t h e c i t i e s a n e w g e n e r a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h a d m a t u r e d b y t h e m i d 1 9 7 0 s , a n d m o d e r a t e l y r e f o r m i s t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s b e g a n to o r g a n i z e . F r o m 1 9 7 6 t o 1 9 8 0 m a r k e d g r o w t h o c c u r r e d in s e v e r a l p o l i t i c a l

movements.

Besides the labor unions two major political parties, both

representing

c e n t e r - l e f t p e r s p e c t i v e s , b e g a n t o o r g a n i z e in e a r n e s t . T h e

Democratic

S o c i a l i s t P a r t y a n d t h e U n i t e d F r o n t of t h e R e v o l u t i o n e a c h s o u g h t r e f o r m s t h a t r e f l e c t e d p r o g r a m s b e g u n d u r i n g t h e 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 4 D e c a d e of S p r i n g .

42

Guatemalan

Politics

During the Laugerud administration, both parties worked to gain legal status, but they achieved this only after General L u c a s ' s election in 1978. T h e relatively peaceful interlude during the Laugerud administration revealed the possibilities, even if limited, for democratic political participation. When elite policies of violence and repression were relaxed, popular organization was f o r t h c o m i n g . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , their r e s u r g e n c e was not enduring. Even during the Laugerud administration, and certainly with the beginning of the Lucas Garcia r e g i m e in 1978, G u a t e m a l a again returned to the d a r k n e s s of systematic r e p r e s s i o n , as an a r m e d , hostile minority imposed its will on the nation. A wave of urban and rural v i o l e n c e reached f e v e r pitch during the Lucas Garcia administration, with violence directed at three sets of individuals. 9 The first t w o included national political figures and leaders of intermediate o r g a n i z a t i o n s , such as labor, student, and peasant g r o u p s . Although both sets were selectively targeted, the second e x p e r i e n c e d an expanded scope and scale of violence. In addition, violence was directed at the rural populace generally, as in village massacres. Each of these types of violence is examined below. 111 In urban areas violence against political party and labor union leaders increased dramatically after the f r a u d u l e n t election of General R o m e o Lucas Garcia in 1978. G u a t e m a l a ' s two centrist-reformist political parties, the P S D and the FUR, were crushed f o l l o w i n g the 1979 assassinations of their leaders, f o r m e r Foreign Minister A l b e r t o Fuentes Mohr and f o r m e r G u a t e m a l a City M a y o r Manuel C o l o m A r g u e t a , respectively. T h e grassroots leadership of the center-right Christian D e m o c r a t s was d e c i m a t e d : 150 murders of party organizers in 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 1 silenced all but a handful of party a c t i v i s t s . " Perhaps b e c a u s e of its visibility and central role in urging social change and e c o n o m i c reform, organized labor suffered greatly f r o m political violence during this period. For e x a m p l e , 110 "regional and national trade union l e a d e r s " and 311 peasant leaders were assassinated in 1980 alone (WRH, 2/24/81: 1). T w o specific incidents illustrate the dynamics of state terrorism during this time. T h e 1980 May Day labor parade w a s c o n d u c t e d p e a c e f u l l y , amidst antigovernment chants and the spraying of graffiti slogans on walls along the parade route (Guatemala News 5/9/80: 7). Moreover, the parade was legal: although the government had delayed the permit procedures, labor groups were able to secure them. Military security was high, especially in the vicinity of the National Palace, the p a r a d e ' s final destination. In spite of the public security p r e s e n c e — o r p e r h a p s because of i t — t h i r t y - o n e deaths were reported in connection with the parade, and almost all the victims were students or workers, including one man killed by armed men in civilian clothes, at a rally in the park f a c i n g the Palace. 1 2

Elections & the State Crisis of the 1980s

43

T h e second and similar incident illustrates more clearly the role o f public s e c u r i t y f o r c e s in political v i o l e n c e . In J u n e 1 9 8 0 , s o m e sixty armed " u n k n o w n s " led an assault on the national headquarters o f a legal, registered labor f e d e r a t i o n , the National C o n f e d e r a t i o n o f W o r k e r s ( C o n f e d e r a c i ó n N a c i o n a l de T r a b a j a d o r e s — C N T ) , l o c a t e d on a main a v e n u e in downtown G u a t e m a l a City near the National P a l a c e . T h e invaders b l o c k e d the avenue, redirected traffic, and then used a v e h i c l e to break in the b u i l d i n g ' s door, all o f this during daylight hours. T w e n t y - s e v e n union leaders, a s s e m b l e d for a m e e t i n g in the building, disappeared in this mass kidnapping. 1 3 In rural areas the A r m y and l a n d o w n e r s reacted even m o r e v i o l e n t l y . 1 4 A f t e r the 1 9 7 6 e a r t h q u a k e l a n d o w n e r s c l e a r l y b e g a n to v i e w o r g a n i z e d p o p u l a r g r o u p s as threats to their d o m a i n . T h e s t r u c t u r e o f r e p r e s s i o n in rural G u a t e m a l a passed from local landlords to the direct p r e s e n c e o f the m i l i t a r y at about the t i m e o f the 1 9 7 6 e a r t h q u a k e . A t that t i m e , using " s o c i a l c o n f u s i o n " and the need f o r law and o r d e r during r e c o n s t r u c t i o n e f f o r t s as pretexts, the military b e g a n to m o v e f o r c e f u l l y into areas o f rural c o n f l i c t , r e g i o n s in w h i c h landlords had not been a b l e to root out d e v e l o p ment p r o g r a m s or in w h i c h r e s i s t a n c e to landlords c o u l d not b e e l i m i n a t e d . B e g i n n i n g then, and with i n c r e a s i n g fury after 1 9 7 8 , the G u a t e m a l a n A r m y unleashed a w a v e o f v i o l e n c e directed at popular groups o f all types. R e p r e s s i o n l e v e l s grew d r a m a t i c a l l y , e s p e c i a l l y in the Indian highlands o f w e s t e r n G u a t e m a l a and in the plantation areas o f the southern c o a s t , c u l m i n a t i n g in the m a s s i v e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y p r o g r a m o f the e a r l y

1980s.

T h o u s a n d s o f rural p o o r w e r e v i c t i m s . In the y e a r s b e t w e e n 1 9 7 5 and 1 9 8 5 , v i o l e n c e far e x c e e d e d the r e p r e s s i o n c a m p a i g n s a f t e r 1 9 5 4 and during M é n d e z M o n t e n e g r o ' s term in the late 1 9 6 0 s .

The State

Crisis

B y 1 9 8 0 , repression had r e a c h e d u n p r e c e d e n t e d levels in urban a r e a s , both statistically and in terms o f a g e n e r a l i z e d c l i m a t e o f terror. F e w r e f o r m i s t s w e r e participating o p e n l y in G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c s . M a j o r parties that might have b e e n c o n s i d e r e d p r o g r e s s i v e , m o d e r a t e , or c e n t r i s t s u f f e r e d c r u c i a l s e t b a c k s during the first y e a r s o f G e n e r a l L u c a s G a r c i a ' s p r e s i d e n c y . In addition to the a s s a s s i n a t i o n s o f primary leaders such as F u e n t e s M o h r o f the P S D and C o l o m A r g u e t a o f the F U R , the Christian D e m o c r a t i c Party ( D C G ) lost d o z e n s o f its l o c a l and n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s during this p e r i o d . L a b o r , p r o f e s s i o n a l , and e d u c a t i o n a l g r o u p s w e r e b r u t a l l y

repressed.15

G u a t e m a l a w a s b e c o m i n g an i n t e r n a t i o n a l pariah b e c a u s e o f its t e r r i b l e human rights record. Besides

its r e p r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r ,

the L u c a s

Garcia

administration

( 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 8 2 ) w a s corrupt and p r o v e d u n a b l e to sustain the l e v e l s o f e c o n o m i c g r o w t h and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y that the nation n e e d e d .

Although

44

Guatemalan

Politics

it s h a r e d t h o s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w i t h e a r l i e r r e g i m e s — Y d i g o r a s h a d b e e n corrupt and economically ineffectual and Arana had certainly been repress i v e — P r e s i d e n t L u c a s t o o k G u a t e m a l a to n e w e x t r e m e s in s t a t e v i o l e n c e , i n c l u d i n g not o n l y the a s s a s s i n a t i o n s n o t e d but also w i d e s p r e a d m a s s a c r e s of I n d i a n v i l l a g e s s u s p e c t e d of s u p p o r t i n g t h e a r m e d i n s u r g e n c y . U n d e r L u c a s G a r c i a , t h e s t a t e f a c e d a t r i p l e c r i s i s . In a d d i t i o n t o t h e e c o n o m i c c r i s i s , t h e r e w a s o n e of l e g i t i m a c y at t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l

level.

E v e n t h e p r o m i l i t a r y R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s f i n d i n g it d i f f i c u l t to p r o v i d e m i l i t a r y a i d to t h e L u c a s G a r c i a g r o u p , in l a r g e p a r t b e c a u s e of t h e e x t r e m e h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s a n d t h e r e a c t i o n s to t h e s e in t h e U . S . , i n c l u d i n g C o n g r e s s . T h i r d , an i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s h a d d e v e l o p e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e g r o w i n g g u e r r i l l a i n s u r g e n c y , w h i c h w a s a s i g n i f i c a n t m i l i t a r y t h r e a t b y 1 9 8 1 . In s o c i e t y at l a r g e , i n c r e a s i n g l e v e l s of h a r d s h i p f o r t h e m a j o r i t y m e a n t e v e n l o w e r l e v e l s of l e g i t i m a c y or g e n e r a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e s y s t e m . L u c a s ' s r e s p o n s e to all s y m p t o m s o f t h i s c r i s i s w a s t o e s c a l a t e state terrorism.16 T h e l e a d e r s of t h e r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n f r o m 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 8 2 , G e n e r a l

Lucas

G a r c i a , J o r g e G a r c i a G r a n a d o s of t h e P R , a n d M i n i s t e r of t h e I n t e r i o r D o n a l d o A l v a r e z R u i z of t h e P I D , w e r e a l s o p a r t n e r s in f i n a n c i a l d e a l s , i n c l u d i n g m a j o r l a n d h o l d i n g in t h e N o r t h e r n T r a n s v e r s a l S t r i p , G u a t e m a l a ' s p r i m a r y c o l o n i z a t i o n a r e a d u r i n g t h e 1 9 7 0 s ( P i n z o n : 14). L u c a s a n d A l v a r e z reportedly coordinated the g o v e r n m e n t ' s political repression

apparatus

( A m n e s t y 1 9 8 1 ) . T h i s m e l d i n g of s t a t e — t h e " l e g i t i m a t e " u s e o f c o e r c i v e force—with personal economic ambitions exacerbated tensions. C o m b i n e d , these d y n a m i c s i n c r e a s e d p r e s s u r e f r o m o t h e r f a c t i o n s of o f f i c e r s w i t h i n t h e m i l i t a r y a n d led to m o r e f a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n w i t h i n t h e e l i t e o u t s i d e of t h e m i l i t a r y i t s e l f . T h e g u e r r i l l a i n s u r g e n c y c a u s e d y o u n g e r m i l itary o f f i c e r s t o b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y d i s s a t i s f i e d b o t h w i t h t h e c o r r u p t i o n of t h e u p p e r e c h e l o n s a n d w i t h t h e f a c t that t h e y , t h e y o u n g e r o f f i c e r s , w e r e b e a r i n g t h e c o s t s of t h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y c a m p a i g n , t h e e x c u s e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e f o r e i g n aid t h e g e n e r a l s — a n d s o m e c i v i l i a n s — w e r e s t e a l i n g .

Crisis and the 1982 Election T h e p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n o f 1 9 8 2 c a n o n l y b e u n d e r s t o o d in t h e c o n t e x t of t h i s m u l t i f a c e t e d c r i s i s . T h e f i r s t p h e n o m e n o n to n o t e is t h a t in t h e f a c e of this crisis, the L u c a s Garcia g r o u p d e c i d e d not to a b a n d o n the presidential palace. T h e g o v e r n i n g group f o r m e d a coalition, the D e m o c r a t i c Popular F r o n t ( F r e n t e D e m o c r á t i c o P o p u l a r — F D P ) , c o n s i s t i n g of t h e P I D a n d t h e P R , t h e v e h i c l e s of A l v a r e z R u i z a n d G a r c i a G r a n a d o s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h e c o a l i t i o n n o m i n a t e d o n e of t h e c l i q u e ' s m e m b e r s , G e n e r a l A n í b a l G u e v a r a , a f o r m e r m i n i s t e r of d e f e n s e , to r u n f o r t h e p r e s i d e n c y .

Elections & the State Crisis of the 1980s

45

T h e 1 9 8 2 e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n , l i k e m a n y o t h e r s t h a t p r e c e d e d it, g a v e t h e a p p e a r a n c e of p l u r a l i s t i c c o m p e t i t i o n in a m u l t i p a r t y s y s t e m . 1 7 In f a c t , s u p e r f i c i a l l y , the 1 9 8 2 c a m p a i g n s e e m e d e v e n m o r e d e m o c r a t i c than earl i e r e v e n t s , f o r o n l y o n e of t h e f o u r m a j o r c a n d i d a t e s w a s a m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r . In a d d i t i o n t o G e n e r a l G u e v a r a , t h e o t h e r c a n d i d a t e s w e r e A l e j a n d r o M a l d o n a d o , of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n a l O p p o s i t i o n ( U n i d a d

Nacional

O p o s i t o r a — U N O ) , M a r i o S a n d o v a l A l a r c o n , of the M L N , and G u s t a v o A n z u e t o V i e l m a n , of t h e N a t i o n a l A u t h e n t i c C e n t e r ( C e n t r a l

Autentico

Nacional—CAN). T h e M L N w a s a p a r t y of t h e e x t r e m e r i g h t , a n d w h i l e f o r m a l l y in t h e o p p o s i t i o n , it w a s p a r t of t h e d o m i n a n t c o a l i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s , at l e a s t i d e o l o g i c a l l y . T h e p a r t y h a d a l a r g e b l o c o f s e a t s in t h e C o n g r e s s a n d s e v e r a l of its m e m b e r s s e r v e d on g o v e r n m e n t c o m m i t t e e s a n d c o m m i s s i o n s . In a d d i t i o n , p r o b a b l y n o t b y c o i n c i d e n c e , its l e a d e r s h i p w a s r e l a t i v e l y f r e e f r o m c o n s t a n t a s s a s s i n a t i o n a t t e m p t s . F o r 1 9 8 2 , t h e M L N n o m i n a t e d its perennial leader, Mario Sandoval Alarcon. T h e C A N , t h e p a r t y of G e n e r a l C a r l o s A r a n a O s o r i o , a f o r m e r p r e s i dent, nominated a civilian candidate, G u s t a v o A n z u e t o Vielman. C A N had a l l i e d i t s e l f w i t h t h e o f f i c i a l g o v e r n m e n t c o a l i t i o n in t h e 1 9 7 8 n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s a n d h a d b e e n r e w a r d e d w i t h o n e of t h e b e t t e r " p e r k s " in G u a t e m a l a : c o n t r o l of the h i g h w a y d e p a r t m e n t . T h i s control h e l p e d C A N

do

w e l l in t h e l o c a l - l e v e l e l e c t i o n s o f 1 9 8 0 , a n d h a v i n g t h i s b a s e o f p u b l i c s u p p o r t w a s p a r t of t h e r a t i o n a l e f o r o f f e r i n g its o w n c a n d i d a t e in 1 9 8 2 . A s e p a r a t e c a n d i d a c y f o r t h e C A N s u g g e s t e d p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n in t h e m i l i t a r y but did not indicate serious ideological opposition. T h e " i d e o l o g i c a l o p p o s i t i o n " in t h e 1 9 8 2 c a m p a i g n c a m e f r o m a c o a l i tion of s e v e r a l g r o u p s . T h e U N O ' s c a n d i d a t e w a s A l e j a n d r o M a l d o n a d o of the National Renovation Party (Partido de R e n o v a c o n

Nacional—PNR).

L i k e t h e C A N , t h e P N R h a d s u p p o r t e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s c o a l i t i o n in 1 9 7 8 . M a l d o n a d o , a l t h o u g h p e r h a p s g e n u i n e l y o f f e n d e d at t h e e x c e s s e s of t h e Lucas administration, had represented G u a t e m a l a internationally

during

e a r l i e r p e r i o d s of r e p r e s s i o n a n d t h e r e f o r e c o u l d h a r d l y b e s e e n as an i d e o l o g i c a l o p p o n e n t of t h e e l i t e . H i s p a r t y , in f a c t , w a s o r i g i n a l l y a " m o d e r a t e " o f f s h o o t of t h e e x t r e m e r i g h t - w i n g M L N . T h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s w e r e in an a w k w a r d p o s i t i o n b e f o r e t h e 1 9 8 2 election. On the one hand, the party had a " r e f o r m i s t " agenda, advocated c e r t a i n s o c i a l r e f o r m s , a n d p e r s i s t e n t l y a t t a c k e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s r o l e in p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e . B u t o n t h e o t h e r , d i s s e n t w a s a c o s t l y p a t h to f o l l o w . T h e D C G has long been a victim of g o v e r n m e n t and r i g h t - w i n g violence, a n d its p a r t i c i p a t i o n in e l e c t o r a l e v e n t s h a s b e e n r e l a t e d t o its r a t e of v i c t i m i z a t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , a f t e r t h e p a r t y ' s s u c c e s s in t h e 1 9 8 0 m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y in r u r a l I n d i a n a r e a s in w h i c h t h e m i l i t a r y g o v e r n m e n t h a d r e l a t i v e l y l e s s s u p p o r t , d o z e n s of its l o c a l - l e v e l l e a d e r s w e r e k i l l e d . 1 8

46

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In s h o r t , t h e D C G f o u n d itself o n t h e h o r n s of a d i l e m m a . B y p a r t i c i p a t i n g in t h e e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n , t h e p a r t y r a n t h e r i s k of p o l i t i c a l a s s a s s i n a t i o n as d i s s i d e n t s . N o t p a r t i c i p a t i n g , h o w e v e r , w o u l d h a v e b e e n s e e n as an a t t e m p t to d e - l e g i t i m i z e the g o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h w o u l d p r o d u c e e v e n g r e a t e r r i s k s , e s p e c i a l l y f o r l o c a l - l e v e l p a r t y l e a d e r s . T h e p a r t y c h o s e to participate and joined the U N O coalition, delivering major voter support. O p p o n e n t s of t h e r e g i m e w e r e c r i t i c a l . C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s w e r e a c c u s e d of b e i n g an i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e of s u p p o r t f o r t h e r e g i m e , s i n c e t h e i r p a r t i c i pation within the s y s t e m w o u l d significantly legitimize the r e g i m e while generating few reforms (Solorzano Martinez 1980: 3 2 - 3 3 ) . Other opposition parties played minor roles. The FUR and the PSD w e r e p a r t i e s that f a v o r e d r e f o r m s , s u c h a s h o n e s t e l e c t i o n s in a v i o l e n c e f r e e a t m o s p h e r e , a n d f r e e d o m f o r l a b o r to o r g a n i z e . F U R w a s a l e g a l , r e g istered entity and w a s t h e r e f o r e g u a r a n t e e d certain civil rights, but the p a r t y h a d p a i d a h i g h p r i c e f o r its p a r t i c i p a t i o n : b e s i d e s t h e a s s a s s i n a t i o n s d i s c u s s e d earlier, F r a n c i s c o V i l l a g r a n K r a m e r , v i c e - p r e s i d e n t of G u a t e m a l a a n d a f o r m e r F U R m e m b e r , h a d b e e n f o r c e d to r e s i g n a n d g o i n t o e x i l e in 1 9 8 0 , a f t e r c r i t i c i z i n g t h e m i l i t a r y a n d G u a t e m a l a ' s h u m a n r i g h t s record. T h e P S D w a s technically a party "in formation," m e a n i n g the gove r n m e n t h a d n o t y e t r u l e d o n t h e P S D ' s r e q u e s t f o r l e g a l r e c o g n i t i o n as a p a r t y . T h e P S D a l s o h a d b e e n s e v e r e l y r e p r e s s e d , w i t h its l e a d e r s k i l l e d or in e x i l e . N e i t h e r p a r t y w a s a b l e to p a r t i c i p a t e o p e n l y in t h e 1 9 8 2 e l e c t i o n b e c a u s e of t h e v i o l e n t a t m o s p h e r e , b u t b o t h i s s u e d f r e q u e n t d e n u n c i a t i o n s at h o m e a n d a b r o a d . By election time, nearly a dozen parties had a s s u m e d a direct role, e i t h e r n o m i n a t i n g a c a n d i d a t e or j o i n i n g a c o a l i t i o n to s u p p o r t o n e of t h e m a j o r c a n d i d a t e s . P r o s p e c t s f o r t h e c e n t r i s t or p r o c h a n g e p a r t i e s w e r e v e r y dim, however, for their leadership resources had been decimated during the Lucas Garcia administration and their participation proscribed by viol e n c e . T h e c a m p a i g n h a d a d i s t i n c t r i g h t - w i n g f l a v o r , in s p i t e of t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s , t h e l e a s t r i g h t i s t of t h e m a j o r p a r t i e s N o n e of t h e s e o p p o s i t i o n g r o u p s , t a k e n i n d i v i d u a l l y , p r e s e n t e d a p a r t i c u l a r l y s e r i o u s o b s t a c l e to t h e g o v e r n m e n t . S o m e w e r e

ideologically

a l i g n e d , o t h e r s h a d d o w n p l a y e d t h e i r p o l i c y a g e n d a s in f a v o r of p r a g m a t i c considerations,

still

others

had

been

successfully

repressed.

Taken

together, however, the opposition w a s a d o u b l e - e d g e d s w o r d for the ruling f a c t i o n . T h e a p p e a r a n c e of p l u r a l i s m w a s i m p o r t a n t f o r r e g i m e l e g i t i m a c y , b u t t h e p r o s p e c t of l o s i n g an e l e c t i o n w a s a n a t h e m a to t h e r u l i n g c l i q u e ' s a g e n d a of p e r s o n a l a m b i t i o n s . It w a s d i f f i c u l t to d e t e r m i n e t h e r e a l e l e c t o r a l p o w e r of t h e m a j o r p a r t i e s . In a s t r a w p o l l of s e v e r a l t h o u s a n d v o t e r s , c o n d u c t e d b e f o r e t h e e l e c t i o n a n d p u b l i s h e d in t h e G u a t e m a l a n p r e s s , A l e j a n d r o M a l d o n a d o , t h e U N O c a n d i d a t e , w o n a l m o s t t e n t h o u s a n d v o t e s , c o m p a r e d to e i g h t t h o u s a n d p l u s f o r A n z u e t o V i e l m a n of t h e C A N . M o r e d r a m a t i c , t h e " o f f i c i a l "

Elections & the State Crisis of the 1980s

47

c a n d i d a t e , G e n e r a l G u e v a r a , a n d t h e e x t r e m e r i g h t - w i n g c a n d i d a t e of t h e M L N , M a r i o S a n d o v a l A l a r c ô n , t r a i l e d f a r b e h i n d . R e g a r d l e s s of t h e p r e c i s e a c c u r a c y of the s t r a w p o l l , t h e s e f i g u r e s s h o w e d t h a t t h e r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n w o u l d h a v e f a r e d r e l a t i v e l y p o o r l y in a f r e e , h o n e s t e l e c t i o n . C l e a r l y , s i g n s of d e f e a t w e r e in t h e air f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t . In t h e e n d c o r r u p t i o n w o n o u t . G i v e n t h e c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n a n d t h e p e r s o n a l c o r r u p t i o n of t h e L u c a s g r o u p , t h e o f f i c i a l e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s w e r e n o t s u r p r i s i n g : the S u p r e m e Electoral T r i b u n a l ( T r i b u n a l S u p r e m o E l e c t o r a l — T S E ) declared General Guevara the winner. The tabulation was generally considered fraudulent. The losing parties protested the event, and Guatem a l a w i t n e s s e d t h e u n u s u a l s p e c t a c l e of a j o i n t p r o t e s t m a r c h b y p a r t i e s a s d i s p a r a t e as t h e e x t r e m e r i g h t - w i n g M L N a n d t h e m o d e r a t e s a n d p r o g r e s s i v e s of t h e D C G . C o n t i n u i n g e c o n o m i c d e c l i n e , t h e r e a l t h r e a t of t h e i n s u r g e n c y , a n d w i d e s p r e a d d i s g u s t o v e r h u m a n r i g h t s a b u s e s all e x a c e r b a t e d s o c i a l t e n s i o n s , w h i c h w e r e not r e s o l v e d by a f r a u d u l e n t e l e c t i o n , a tactic that had b e e n s u c c e s s f u l s i n c e at l e a s t 1 9 5 6 . P u b l i c o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n G u a t e m a l a , c o m b i n e d w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i t i c i s m of t h e e l e c t i o n ' s p r o c e d u r a l a s p e c t s , q u i c k l y m a d e t h e s i t u a t i o n u n t e n a b l e f o r t h e m i l i t a r y as a w h o l e . T h e s p e c ter of a m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y b y t h e g u e r r i l l a i n s u r g e n c y a d d e d f u e l to t h e e s c a lating conflagration within the political s y s t e m . B y M a r c h 1 9 8 2 , t h e n , t h e G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m w a s f a c i n g its most serious crisis ever. O p e n dissension existed e v e n within the military. I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , t h e R e a g a n S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t h a d r e f e r r e d to t h e g o v e r n m e n t a s " a b u n c h of t h u g s . " G u a t e m a l a w a s a p a r i a h n a t i o n .

President

L u c a s G a r c i a h a d b e e n i n t r a n s i g e n t in t h e f a c e of m o s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s , p e r h a p s f o l l o w i n g t h e l o n g t r a d i t i o n of n a t i o n a l i s m in t h e A r m y , b u t the e c o n o m i c crisis and the i n s u r g e n c y led other f a c t i o n s to fear for the s y s t e m ' s s u r v i v a l . L u c a s G a r c i a ' s m a n i p u l a t i o n of t h e 1 9 8 2 e l e c t i o n w a s m e r e l y t h e f i n a l s t r a w a n d d i d n o t h i n g t o i m p r o v e t h e s i t u a t i o n . I n d e e d , it a c c e l e r a t e d t h e d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f t h e p r o c e s s : h a v i n g a d o p t e d a s t r a t e g y of r e p r e s s i o n a n d l a c k i n g t h e c o - o p t i n g c a p a c i t y of a s t r u c t u r e s u c h a s t h e M e x i c a n R e v o l u t i o n a r y Institutional Party ( P R I ) to pay off d i s s i d e n t s , G e n e r a l L u c a s w a s u n a b l e to s u s t a i n t h e f r a u d . Just t w o w e e k s after the 1982 election, on M a r c h 23, a military c o u p led b y a c o a l i t i o n of y o u n g m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s a n d s o m e e l e m e n t s o f t h e M L N p a r t y s e i z e d p o w e r , i n s t a l l i n g r e t i r e d G e n e r a l E f r a i n R i o s M o n t t at t h e h e a d of a t h r e e - p e r s o n j u n t a .

Conclusion G u a t e m a l a ' s r e c e n t h i s t o r y i n c l u d e s s e v e r a l e x a m p l e s of e l e c t i o n s a n d of v i g o r o u s party activity. S o m e of t h e s e e l e c t i o n s w e r e f r a u d u l e n t , s o m e

48

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w e r e r e l a t i v e l y h o n e s t in a narrow p r o c e d u r a l s e n s e , i n c l u d i n g the 1 9 6 6 e l e c t i o n o f M é n d e z M o n t e n e g r o . 1 9 B e h i n d these i n d i c a t o r s o f d e m o c r a c y — e l e c t i o n s , a m u l t i p a r t y s y s t e m , and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a u s e s g u a r a n t e e i n g d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s — t h e reality w a s m o r e c o m p l e x . T h e fraud that has b e e n

characteristic

of most

presidential

elections

in

recent

G u a t e m a l a n history is o n l y o n e e l e m e n t o f the p i c t u r e . E v e n during the r e f o r m i s t c i v i l i a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f M é n d e z M o n t e n e g r o , the c o n s i s t e n t d y n a m i c w a s growth o f the military o f f i c e r c o r p s ' political and e c o n o m i c power relative to other o r g a n i z e d s e c t o r s o f s o c i e t y . M o r e o v e r , although political parties f u n c t i o n e d throughout the period, their role was c i r c u m s c r i b e d in important w a y s . First, e l e c t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s were often primarily struggles among elite factions, including military o f f i c e r s at t i m e s , r e n d e r i n g the popular m o b i l i z a t i o n r o l e o f parties relatively useless. W h e n opposition parties acted as if they were not mere trapp i n g s o f a f r a u d u l e n t d e m o c r a c y , by i n t i m a t i n g that e l e c t i o n s b e m e c h a nisms o f popular s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r the p u b l i c - p o l i c y p r o c e s s , for e x a m p l e , dominant groups usually took steps b e y o n d e l e c t o r a l fraud, including state v i o l e n c e , to e n s u r e their position in s o c i e t y . P o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e has been an i n e v i t a b l e part o f an e l e c t o r a l s y s t e m d e s i g n e d p r i m a r i l y to l e g i t i m a t e a n o n d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y w h i l e h e l p i n g e l i t e s r e s o l v e c o n f l i c t s within their own s e c t o r s o f s o c i e t y . Except

in the s e n s e

of formal-legal

requirements,

then,

most

of

G u a t e m a l a ' s e l e c t i o n s up to 1 9 8 2 did not m o v e the polity toward the d e m o c r a t i c ideal. T h e c l a i m is e a s y to sustain when there is o b v i o u s fraud and intimidation o f voter; few o b j e c t i v e o b s e r v e r s w o u l d s e e much d e m o c r a c y , no matter how they w e r e to define the term, in such c i r c u m s t a n c e s . But the quality o f d e m o c r a c y is harder to a s s e s s when f o r m a l - l e g a l standards are met, arguably the c a s e in the 1 9 6 6 e l e c t i o n , for e x a m p l e . In this c a s e , the w e i g h t o f p r o c e d u r a l h o n e s t y on e l e c t i o n day i t s e l f is o u t w e i g h e d by the c o n t e x t . C o n c e r n i n g the D e c a d e o f S p r i n g described earlier, observers label Juan J o s é A r é v a l o ' s term in o f f i c e as " d e m o c r a t i c " not b e c a u s e o f an honest election ipso f a c t o , but b e c a u s e o f the political and social reforms that took p l a c e after the e l e c t i o n . T h e s a m e standards a p p l i e d to the M é n d e z administration after 1 9 6 6 , however, s h o w d e m o c r a c y w a n t i n g . In 1 9 8 2 , by drawing as much p o l i t i c a l p o w e r to its inner c i r c l e as poss i b l e , the ruling c l i q u e not o n l y had w e a k e n e d the state but had e r o d e d w h a t e v e r d e m o c r a t i c p o s s i b i l i t i e s m i g h t h a v e b e e n a v a i l a b l e to political a c t o r s . F r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , e l e c t i o n s in this period w e r e c l e a r l y a n t i d e m o c r a t i c e v e n t s . T h e s e c a s e s are e s p e c i a l l y important in v i e w o f the 1 9 8 5 e l e c t i o n , w h i c h was scrupulously honest in the e y e s o f m o s t international o b s e r v e r s ( s e e C h a p t e r 4 ) . T h e m i l i t a r y c o u p o f M a r c h 1 9 8 2 , s y m b o l i z e s the nadir in the r e c e n t d e v e l o p m e n t o f the G u a t e m a l a n state. W i t h o u t l e g i t i m a c y , internationally

Elections

& the State Crisis of the

49

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and d o m e s t i c a l l y , the g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d o n l y rely o n c o e r c i o n to s h o r e u p its c o r r u p t r e g i m e . B u t t h e g u e r r i l l a s o f t h e U R N G h a d

demonopolized

a r m e d p o w e r in t h e c o u n t r y . W i t h t h e e c o n o m y in g r e a t t r o u b l e a n d t h e very structure o f the state threatened, the ruling c l i q u e led by

General

L u c a s Garcia n e v e r t h e l e s s s o u g h t to u s e the m e c h a n i s m s o f e l e c t o r a l fraud to r e m a i n in p o w e r , f u r t h e r w e a k e n i n g t h e n a t i o n . A f t e r the c o u p t h e A r m y ' s a g e n d a w a s c o m p l e x , e n c o m p a s s i n g

mili-

tary a c t i o n a s w e l l a s r e n e w e d e c o n o m i c i n v o l v e m e n t , b u t m u c h o f t h e p u b l i c persona o f the military c e n t e r e d on the "tutelary" role o f the a r m e d forces, w h o s e stated m i s s i o n w a s to create g e n u i n e d e m o c r a c y . T h e tutelary, p r o d e m o c r a c y r o l e p l a y e d b y t h e A r m y is t h e p r i n c i p a l t o p i c o f C h a p ter 4 .

Notes 1. For an a n a l y s i s of the 1985 C o n s t i t u t i o n , s e e L i n a r e s M o r a l e s . 2. In 1966, o n e s t u d y ' s s u m m a r y s a i d : " G u a t e m a l a n e l e c t i o n s a r e c h a r a c t e r ized by v a r y i n g d e g r e e s of f r a u d and v i o l e n c e " ( I C O P S : 12). 3. T h e 1965 C o n s t i t u t i o n laid the g r o u n d w o r k f o r a " l i m i t e d d e m o c r a c y " w i t h c l o s e l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d political party activity and an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d ritual of e l e c t i o n s . A n y t h r e a t e n i n g o p p o s i t i o n o u t s i d e an A r m y - d e c r e e d s p e c t r u m w a s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b a n n e d . . . . [It] restricted s u c h " e x o t i c i d e o l o g i e s " as s o c i a l d e m o c r a c y and C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a c y ( B l a c k : 21). 4. T h e s i n g ' s s t u d y r e v e a l e d that s o m e 6 0 , 0 0 0 f a l s e d o c u m e n t s w e r e i n v o l v e d in the p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n of 1970, w h i c h e q u a l s a l m o s t 10 p e r c e n t of the actual votes deposited. 5. R u m o r , a l w a y s a critical part of d a y - t o - d a y politics in G u a t e m a l a , has it that the g e n e r a l w a s g i v e n a h a n d s o m e c a s h s e t t l e m e n t in e x c h a n g e for his quiet retreat f r o m the d o m e s t i c s c e n e . O n e still h e a r s s t o r i e s of his t r e a c h e r y to the parties that s u p p o r t e d him in the 1974 e l e c t i o n . 6. T h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c leader, D a n i e l B a r i l l a s , w a s a s s a s s i n a t e d in 1989. 7. A typical r e a c t i o n : I n i t i a l l y , m a n y p e o p l e [in S a n F e l i p e ] s i m p l y w a n t e d to r e m a i n u n i n v o l v e d . T h e a c t i o n s of the g o v e r n m e n t , h o w e v e r , p e r s u a d e d t h e m that this is no l o n g e r p o s s i b l e . P e o p l e . . . n o w r e c o g n i z e the e x t r e m e n e e d for c h a n g e . T h i s , c o m b i n e d w i t h their i n c r e a s i n g l y d e s p e r a t e e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s , m a k e s t h e m feel that the g u e r r i l l a s m a y o f f e r s o m e h o p e . W h e r e e l s e are they to t u r n ? G o v e r n m e n t b o m b s d r o p p i n g on Indian h o m e s , or Indian f a m i l i e s set on fire by G u a t e m a l a n s o l d i e r s , c r e a t e q u i c k c o n v e r t s to the g u e r r i l l a s ' c a u s e ( q u o t e d in D a v i s and H o d s o n : 12). 8. T h e " U n i t y S t a t e m e n t , " w h i c h calls for an e n d to the " e c o n o m i c and political d o m i n a t i o n of the r e p r e s s i v e w e a l t h y , b o t h n a t i o n a l and f o r e i g n , w h o r u l e

50

Guatemalan

Politics

G u a t e m a l a , " can be f o u n d in B l a c k : 1 8 3 - 1 8 5 ; a n d in U R N G : Guatemala:

ple

The

Peo-

United.

9 . T h i s t y p o l o g y is b a s e d o n t h e a n a l y s i s of a t t o r n e y F r a n k R . L a R u e , a G u a t e m a l a n l a b o r l a w y e r a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e U n i t e d R e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e G u a t e m a l a n O p p o s i t i o n ( R e p r e s e n t a c i ó n U n i d a d e la O p o s i c i ó n G u a t e m a l t e c a — RUOG). 10. A c o m p l e t e c h r o n o l o g y of G u a t e m a l a ' s p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e is not w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of t h i s s t u d y . R e p o r t s a n d s t a t i s t i c s o n p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e a r e p u b l i s h e d in a v a r i e t y of s o u r c e s , i n c l u d i n g p u b l i c a t i o n s of C e r i - G u a a n d A g e n - S I A G , a n d n e w s l e t t e r s f r o m s u c h g r o u p s as t h e W a s h i n g t o n o f f i c e o n L a t i n A m e r i c a , t h e Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Amnesty International, N I S G U A (The Network in S o l i d a r i t y w i t h G u a t e m a l a ) , t h e G u a t e m a l a n C h u r c h in E x i l e ( I G E ) , A m e r i c a s W a t c h , a n d o t h e r s . F o r r e g u l a r p e r i o d i c a l c h r o n o l o g i e s of p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e in t h e 1 9 6 0 s u p to t h e late 1 9 7 0 s , s e e t h e m a g a z i n e Panorama Político (primera época), p u b l i s h e d u n t i l its e d i t o r , R i c a r d o G a l i n d o , d i s a p p e a r e d in 1 9 8 0 . F o r an o v e r v i e w of t h e h u m a n r i g h t s s i t u a t i o n in t h e e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s , s e e K a r p ; a n d T r u d e a u 1 9 8 2 a n d 1 9 8 3 . F o r f a i r l y d e t a i l e d c h r o n o l o g i e s of v i o l e n c e in t h e p e r i o d f r o m 1 9 7 6 t h r o u g h a b o u t 1 9 8 5 , s e e D a v i s a n d H o d s o n : 4 7 - 5 2 ; a n d B e n t o n et al. S e e B l a c k f o r a d e t a i l e d s t u d y of t h i s p e r i o d u p to a b o u t 1 9 8 3 . S e e S i m o n f o r a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of m o r e r e c e n t p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e a n d its a f t e r m a t h , a n d s e e W O L A 1 9 8 8 , 1 9 8 9 a , a n d 1 9 8 9 b f o r m o r e u p - t o - d a t e e x a m i n a t i o n s . I n f o r m a t i o n in t h e f o l l o w i n g p a g e s r e l a t ing to p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e is c o m p i l e d f r o m t h e s e a n d o t h e r s o u r c e s . I n f o r m a t i o n s p e c i f i c to 1 9 8 0 is c o m p i l e d f r o m s i m i l a r s o u r c e s , p l u s t h e a u t h o r ' s e y e w i t n e s s e x p e r i e n c e s and i n t e r v i e w s . 11. A m o n g p r o m i n e n t p o l i t i c a l p a r t y e x i l e s w a s F r a n c i s c o V i l l a g r á n K r a m e r , a r e f o r m i s t c i v i l i a n w h o h a d b e e n e l e c t e d v i c e - p r e s i d e n t of G u a t e m a l a in 1 9 7 8 . V i l l a g r á n r e s i g n e d h i s p o s i t i o n in 1 9 8 0 , a f t e r h e h a d d i s s e n t e d p u b l i c l y f r o m a p o l icy d e c i s i o n to c o n s t r u c t a h i g h w a y s y s t e m c l e a r l y d e s i g n e d t o b e n e f i t A r m y g e n e r a l s at t a x p a y e r e x p e n s e . H e r e s i g n e d w h i l e h e w a s in W a s h i n g t o n , n o t in Guatemala. 12. O n e r e p o r t o n t h e p a r a d e d e s c r i b e s v i o l e n c e t h a t w a s t y p i c a l at t h i s t i m e : A t least n i n e m e m b e r s of the n e w l y - f o r m e d u n i o n at t h e R a y - O - V a c b a t t e r y p l a n t w e r e a l s o k i d n a p p e d — s o m e r i g h t o u t o f t h e r a n k s of the p a r a d e , a n d o t h e r s o n t h e i r w a y h o m e a f t e r t h e m a r c h . T h r e e of t h e y o u t h s w e r e f o u n d w i t h s i g n s of t o r t u r e o n t h e i r b o d i e s , all s h o t to d e a t h (•Guatemala News 5 / 9 / 8 0 : 7 ) . 13. N o l e s s t h a n t h r e e s e p a r a t e b r a n c h e s of t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s s e c u r i t y f o r c e s , s t a f f e d b y at least s e v e r a l h u n d r e d p o l i c e , d e t e c t i v e s , a n d m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l , h a d h e a d q u a r t e r s w i t h i n f o u r b l o c k s of the C N T h e a d q u a r t e r s . O n e of the t h r e e , the h e a d q u a r t e r s of C o m a n d o S i x , t h e N a t i o n a l P o l i c e n o n u n i f o r m e d d e t e c t i v e s and n a r c o t i c s d i v i s i o n s , w a s a l m o s t d i r e c t l y a c r o s s t h e s t r e e t f r o m t h e s c e n e of the e v e n t s . S e v e r a l hundred soldiers were barracked behind the National Palace, about two blocks away. T h e f u r t h e s t of t h e s e t h r e e h e a d q u a r t e r s , a m a j o r p o l i c e s t a t i o n , w a s n o m o r e t h a n f o u r or f i v e m i n u t e s ' w a l k i n g d i s t a n c e f r o m t h e s c e n e of t h e c r i m e . A l t h o u g h t h e m a s s k i d n a p p i n g t o o k a b o u t t w e n t y m i n u t e s to e x e c u t e , n o p u b l i c s e c u r i t y f o r c e r e s p o n d e d to a p p e a l s f o r a s s i s t a n c e . N o n e of t h e t w e n t y - s e v e n p e r s o n s k i d n a p p e d h a s e v e r r e a p p e a r e d . A m n e s t y I n t e r n a t i o n a l ( 1 9 8 1 : 12) p r o v i d e s a n o t h e r d e s c r i p t i o n of this m a s s k i d n a p p i n g , i n c l u d i n g p e r s o n a l d a t a o n o n e of t h e v i c t i m s .

Elections & the State Crisis of the 1980s

51

1 4 . F o r d e t a i l e d s u m m a r i e s and a n a l y s e s o f this v i o l e n t r e a c t i o n b y the g o v e r n m e n t and e l i t e s , s e e D a v i s and H o d s o n ; for d e t a i l s f r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f the Indian c o m m u n i t i e s t h e m s e l v e s , s e e R a r i h o k w a t s ; and F r a n k and W h e a t o n : 6 9 - 8 2 , 92. For a systematic analysis of earlier political

violence, especially

in rural

G u a t e m a l a , s e e A g u i l e r a P e r a l t a et al. 1 9 8 1 . B l a c k p r e s e n t s the b e s t o v e r a l l s u m m a r y o f the i n c r e a s i n g m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f rural G u a t e m a l a b e g i n n i n g in t h e e a r l y 1970s. 1 5 . P a r t i e s o f the r i g h t , a l t h o u g h not i m m u n e , t y p i c a l l y w e r e a f f e c t e d m u c h l e s s s e r i o u s l y by this r e p r e s s i v e v i o l e n c e . O n e e x c e p t i o n i n v o l v e d J o r g e T o r r e s O c a m p o , a leading m e m b e r o f the e x t r e m e r i g h t M L N p a r t y , w h o w a s a s s a s s i n a t e d in a h a i l o f m a c h i n e - g u n fire n e a r d o w n t o w n G u a t e m a l a C i t y in 1 9 8 0 , s h o r t l y a f t e r he p u b l i s h e d a b o o k l e t that c r i t i c i z e d t h e m i l i t a r y g o v e r n m e n t and the

United

S t a t e s for not d o i n g m o r e to e r a d i c a t e p o v e r t y and i n j u s t i c e , w h i c h T o r r e s O c a m p o s a w as the f u n d a m e n t a l c a u s e s o f r e b e l l i o u s i n s u r g e n c y in G u a t e m a l a . B u t g e n e r ally, assassinations of right-wing

politicians

were

much

less frequent

during

the 1 9 8 0 s . 1 6 . F o r a d e t a i l e d l o o k at this p a t t e r n o f u s i n g v i o l e n c e to s o w f e a r ,

see

F i g u e r o a I b a r r a ( 1 9 9 1 ) , both o f w h o s e p a r e n t s w e r e a s s a s s i n a t e d in 1 9 8 0 . 1 7 . T h i s a c c o u n t o f the 1 9 8 2 e l e c t o r a l p e r i o d is b a s e d on i n t e r v i e w s and p r e s s and n e w s l e t t e r a c c o u n t s f r o m a v a r i e t y o f s o u r c e s . 1 8 . It has long b e e n c o n v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m a b o u t G u a t e m a l a n party p o l i t i c s that a p r i c e is paid for the right to d i s s e n t o p e n l y , e v e n w i t h i n t h e party s y s t e m — w i t n e s s the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the r e g i s t r a t i o n o f the D e m o c r a t i c S o c i a l i s t P a r t y and the a s s a s s i n a t i o n o f its l e a d e r , F u e n t e s M o h r , and b e t w e e n the r e g i s t r a t i o n o f the F U R and the s u b s e q u e n t a s s a s s i n a t i o n o f its l e a d e r , C o l o m A r g u e t a . I n d e e d , d u r i n g the 1 9 8 2 c a m p a i g n i t s e l f , r i g h t - w i n g / g o v e r n m e n t t e r r o r i s t s at o n e p o i n t a s s a u l t e d the D C G ' s

party h e a d q u a r t e r s

in t h e c e n t e r o f G u a t e m a l a C i t y , in a d a y t i m e

m a c h i n e - g u n attack ( G u a t e m a l a News

2 / 2 0 / 8 1 : 1, 7 ) .

1 9 . A n o t h e r e x a m p l e is t h e m u n i c i p a l - l e v e l e l e c t i o n s h e l d in A p r i l

1980.

S p a c e limitations prevent a longer analysis o f these e l e c t i o n s , which were fascin a t i n g if o n l y b e c a u s e o f t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f p a r t y c o a l i t i o n s a m o n g s t r a n g e b e d f e l l o w s . T h e larger d i m e n s i o n , h o w e v e r , w a s the f a c t o f t h e h o r r i f i c v i o l e n c e then e n g u l f i n g G u a t e m a l a n s o c i e t y , a d i m e n s i o n that c l e a r l y o u t w e i g h e d the r e l a t i v e purity o f the v o t i n g p r o c e s s i t s e l f .

4

The Military as Democratizers

Our goal

has been

Clausewitz,

to r e v e r s e

the

t h a t i s , in G u a t e m a l a ,

logic

o f the

military

politics s h o u l d be the

strategist

von

continuation

of war. —Hector

Gramajo

T h e G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y c o n t i n u e d t o d e c a y in t h e e a r l y

1980s,

a n d t h e 1 9 8 2 e l e c t i o n , w h i c h s y m b o l i z e d t h a t d e c a y , f i n a l l y l e d to a n a b r u p t c h a n g e in p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p . T h e m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s G e n e r a l s R í o s Montt and M e j í a V í c t o r e s , w h o f o l l o w e d L u c a s , pursued restorative m e a s u r e s , a n d t h e e l e c t i o n s o f 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 8 5 c u l m i n a t e d in t h e i n a u g u r a t i o n o f a c i v i l i a n C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c p r e s i d e n t , V i n i c i o C e r e z o A r é v a l o , in J a n u a r y 1 9 8 6 . A s these e l e c t i o n s w e r e o n e part o f an e x p l i c i t

counterin-

s u r g e n c y s t r a t e g y , it s e e m s a p p r o p r i a t e to s t u d y t h e m in t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d r e c e n t a c t i v i t i e s o f the G u a t e m a l a n a r m e d f o r c e s . A m o n g m a n y i m a g i n a b l e i m p e d i m e n t s to d e m o c r a c y in

Guatemala,

t h e m i l i t a r y is c o n v e n t i o n a l l y s i n g l e d o u t a s a m a j o r " p r o b l e m . " T h e o v e r w h e l m i n g p h y s i c a l p r e s e n c e o f the A r m y , the h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d , and the c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n o f " H i s p a n i c a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m " all s e e m t o i m p l y w e a k d e m o c r a t i c structures. On the other hand, apologists cite many c o n t r i b u t i o n s b y the m i l i t a r y : p r o t e c t i o n o f n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a n d " l a w a n d o r d e r , " s u p p r e s s i o n o f s u b v e r s i o n , a n d e v e n its i m p a c t a s a m o d e r n i z i n g

agency.

S u p p o r t e r s n o t e that t h e A r m y h a s p r o v i d e d s k i l l e d p e r s o n n e l in

many

administrative areas and has c o n s i s t e n t l y provided entrepreneurial

talent

that has h e l p e d the state d e v e l o p e c o n o m i c a l l y w h i l e a l l o w i n g

middle-

class o f f i c e r s to prosper individually.1 The

principal

argument,

though,

is t h a t t h e

military's

impact

on

d e m o c r a c y is an i n d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n . A l t h o u g h t h e m i l i t a r y m a y n o t b e d e m o c r a t i c in its i n t e r n a l v a l u e s , it is a m o d e r n i z i n g i n s t i t u t i o n , p e r h a p s t h e o n l y s u c h i n s t i t u t i o n that c a n g u a r a n t e e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f d e m o c r a c y .

53

54

Guatemalan

Politics

Moreover, in societies characterized by widespread disorder such as Guatemala, the military may be the only institution c a p a b l e o f restoring order. This modernized version o f the Hobbesian argument suggests that the military's intervention allows d e m o c r a c y to flourish by creating social order. This is a key factor in the study o f Guatemalan d e m o c r a c y , for at no time in recent decades have the armed forces been far from the presidential palace. W h a t e v e r the initial assumptions, the military is a key institution. T h e concentration o f political power in one small sector o f society s e e m s to be the antithesis o f d e m o c r a c y . Indeed, liberal notions o f popular sovereignty and representation demand as widespread a distribution o f at least electoral power as p o s s i b l e . Has the tutelary activity o f the A r m y had such a prodemocratic impact? E x a m i n i n g salient events from its history establishes a c o n t e x t to f o c u s on the activity o f the military b e t w e e n 1 9 8 2 and 1 9 8 5 , during w h i c h the o f f i c e r c o r p s led two s u c c e s s f u l military coups and r e e s t a b l i s h e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t . In addition, data on the

1984

national elections for a constituent a s s e m b l y , and those o f 1 9 8 5 , for president and C o n g r e s s , are included.

Early Development of the Guatemalan Military Liberal

Reforms

T h e use o f armed f o r c e to i m p l e m e n t disruptive s o c i a l and e c o n o m i c c h a n g e and inhibit r e s i s t a n c e to those c h a n g e s is not a new d y n a m i c in G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c s . T h e elite minority has c o n s i s t e n t l y used v i o l e n c e both to e n f o r c e c h a n g e and to prevent reforms aimed at reducing its privileged status. T h e institutional development o f the military parallels many o f the e c o n o m i c and political developments previously described. T h e period o f the L i b e r a l R e f o r m s , f o r e x a m p l e , s y m b o l i z e s in one respect the triumph o f export capitalism in G u a t e m a l a , but it also s y m b o l izes the c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f state power over the national e c o n o m y . T h e reforms were as much a process o f reorganizing the elite as one o f seizing property to increase c o f f e e production. T h e growth o f the military was a major part o f the reform process as a necessary c o n c o m i t a n t o f increased state disruption o f Indian c o m m u n i t i e s on b e h a l f o f " f r e e - m a r k e t l i b e r a l s " who wished to export c o f f e e . T h r e e primary aspects o f the Liberal R e f o r m period were redistribution o f land, regulation o f labor, and incorporation o f foreign investors. T h e fourth m a j o r c o m p o n e n t was professionalization o f the G u a t e m a l a n A r m y , w h i c h for the first time b e c a m e an arm o f the state rather than o f individual landowners or political groups. T h e disruptive c h a n g e s o f the Liberal R e f o r m s led to political tensions, and i n c r e a s e d poverty o f the landless peasants, most o f whom

The Military as

Dcmocratizers

55

b e c a m e part o f a forced-labor system, led to unrest. Indian resistance was widespread and c o n s t a n t , but the s y m b i o t i c l i n k a g e s between e c o n o m i c elites and w o r k i n g m a s s e s were structural, not personal, and h e n c e very stratified. 2 A s a result, repression o f dissidents was e c o n o m i c a l l y b e n e f i cial in the short run. Numerous c o e r c i v e t a c t i c s — d i s s o l u t i o n o f v i l l a g e s , f o r c e d r e l o c a t i o n o f groups, seizure o f land, and s y s t e m a t i c v i o l e n c e — were e f f e c t i v e in crushing and then d i s c o u r a g i n g peasant revolts. For example, the newly professionalized A r m y , now loyal to the national government rather than to regional caudillos,

r e p r e s s e d a m a j o r rebellion in

the m u n i c i p a l i t y o f M o m o s t e n a n g o ( D e p a r t m e n t o f El Q u i c h é ) in 1 8 7 5 (Handy: 6 9 - 7 1 ) . In spite o f short-run s u c c e s s e s in suppressing r e s i s t a n c e , a c o m m o n pattern in Guatemalan history, the Liberal R e f o r m s revealed the long-term need for a m a j o r military organization. E x a c e r b a t i n g oppressive conditions while leaving the poor no political r e c o u r s e resulted in the long run in social m o v e m e n t s that could not be controlled by individual landowners. Although the A r m y went through different stages o f development after the 1 8 7 0 s , its main function remained relatively c o n s i s t e n t from the c o l o n i a l period through 1 9 4 4 : to regulate society so that labor and capital resources would remain primarily available to the powerful agricultural elites. A s the political e c o n o m y b e c a m e more centrally coordinated, the military b e c a m e a national, p r o f e s s i o n a l institution. A s with other a s p e c t s o f the Liberal R e f o r m s , the legacy o f these c h a n g e s survives as a m a j o r institutional obstacle to d e m o c r a c y in the 1 9 9 0 s .

The October

Revolution:

1944

T h e military clearly dominated during the U b i c o period before 1 9 4 4 , as a personalist arm o f the dictator himself. After the O c t o b e r Revolution, Juan J o s é A r é v a l o ' s presidency had profound implications for the armed f o r c e s . Nationalistic pride, competition with entrenched military leaders from the earlier U b i c o period, and the opportunity to b e n e f i t from a r e j u v e n a t e d e c o n o m y led to solid military support for the reformist m o v e m e n t a m o n g much o f the o f f i c e r corps: the Army participated actively in developing the new political institutions. A m o n g its early reforms, the new civilian g o v e r n m e n t in 1 9 4 5 took steps to " r a t i o n a l i z e , " in the Weberian sense, the relationships between the military and civilian regimes. T h e goal o f civilian reformers was to distance the military from active interference in civil political matters, especially the politics o f presidential selection. Their aim was to avoid more dictators like Ubico, who perpetuated themselves in o f f i c e through control o f the A r m y . T o achieve this separation, the civilian government paid a price: the autonomy o f the Army as an internally self-governing institution.

56

Guatemalan

Politics

As part of the a r r a n g e m e n t s after 1945, the A r m y high c o m m a n d selected its own chief of staff from a list of three nominees submitted by the president. Moreover, only the Congress, not the president, could remove the chief of staff, although the president continued constitutionally to be c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f of the armed f o r c e s . Finally, and ultimately most important, the Army was given authority to act as the interpreter of national values and to evaluate other political actors' conformity to these values (Cruz Salazar: 11). The Army ostensibly exchanged an active dayto-day role in politics and public administration for a role as final arbiter of national politics. In e f f e c t , the A r m y w a s given an independent existence, built into the new constitution. 3 E c o n o m i c modernization and expansion in urban areas provided new opportunities for o f f i c e r s , a process that was f u n c t i o n a l l y similar to the " o p e n i n g " of rural Guatemala during the Liberal R e f o r m s of the previous century. While some o f f i c e r s profited f r o m new access to both e c o n o m i c wealth and political control of the state, others b e c a m e increasingly disgruntled allies of the traditional oligarchy, which had been w e a k e n e d by the g o v e r n m e n t ' s relative de-emphasis of exports in its model of economic growth. T h e rivalry between the two military m e m b e r s of the 1944 j u n t a , Colonels Jacobo A r b e n z and Francisco Arana, led each to build separate power bases. On the one hand, factional divisions in the A r m y helped President Arevalo survive the many attempted golpes during his administration. But the same divisions meant a continuing major role for the military in social and political life (Handy: 1 1 1 - 1 1 3 ) . Civilian ascendancy in presidential politics was short-lived: the two c o l o n e l s b e c a m e the m a j o r candidates in the early stages of the next presidential c a m p a i g n . Colonel A r a n a ' s assassination in 1949 d e e p e n e d the factional d i f f e r e n c e s within the A r m y and exacerbated tendencies toward polarization in the political system. A f t e r 1950, the quickened pace of social and e c o n o m i c reform under Jacobo A r b e n z aroused stiff resistance f r o m vested interests. During this period the military was divided a m o n g several disparate but not necessarily mutually exclusive tendencies: (1) opposition to reforms that seemed to threaten the dominance of the oligarchy; (2) reformism of the Arbenz faction; (3) nationalism, arising in the f a c e of increasing pressure f r o m the United States; (4) a n t i c o m m u n i s m ; and (5) putschist impulses f r o m disgruntled o f f i c e r s removed f r o m their traditional and customary access to wealth and power ( W e a v e r : 64; H a n d y : 2 7 2 - 2 7 3 ) . It was this f i f t h tendency, wrapped in the ideology of the fourth, that the United States used as the basis for the 1954 c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y invasion led by Carlos Castillo A r m a s . Factionalism helped u n d e r m i n e G u a t e m a l a ' s d e m o c r a t i c experiment by contributing to the success of the 1954 counterrevolution.

The Military

Developments

After

as

Democratizers

57

1954

W h e n the Castillo A r m a s invasion t r i u m p h e d , the A r m y w a s rife with divis i o n , an e f f e c t of t h e f a c t i o n a l t e n d e n c i e s d e s c r i b e d a b o v e . Y e t t h i s w a s precisely the m o m e n t w h e n the elite n e e d e d a s t r o n g military to m o v e G u a t e m a l a b a c k to t h e p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s q u o a n t e . A s a r e s u l t of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l w e a k n e s s of t h e m i l i t a r y , c o e r c i o n b e c a m e l e s s c e n t r a l i z e d ;

the

c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n s a w t h e r e e m e r g e n c e of p r i v a t e , p a r a m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a tions. M o r e o v e r , the m i d d l e c l a s s e s a n d urban g r o u p s had m a d e m a j o r s t r i d e s in p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t b e f o r e 1 9 5 4 , c o n t r i b u t i n g to a m o r e o p e n a n d c o m p e t i t i v e s y s t e m . In s h o r t , t h e a f t e r m a t h of t h e o v e r t h r o w of P r e s i d e n t A r b e n z w a s p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y , m a r k e d b y e l i t e f a c t i o n s s e e k i n g to r e o r i e n t t h e e c o n o m y a n d c o n s o l i d a t e t h e i r o w n p o s i t i o n in t h e n e w o r d e r . N o t i m m u n e t o t h e s e p r e s s u r e s , t h e m i l i t a r y

clearly

d e c l i n e d in s t a t u s r e l a t i v e to its p o s i t i o n b e f o r e 1 9 4 4 . W i t h t h e r e s u r g e n c e of t h e e x p o r t - d r i v e n , s t a t e - a s s i s t e d m o d e l

of

" g r o w t h w i t h o u t r e f o r m " a f t e r 1 9 5 4 , p o p u l a r r e s i s t a n c e b e c a m e an i n c r e a s i n g l y c o m m o n i r r i t a n t to e c o n o m i c e l i t e s , l e a d i n g to o p p o r t u n i t i e s to r e n e w t h e c e n t r a l r o l e of t h e a r m e d f o r c e s . A f t e r 1 9 5 4 a n d e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r 1 9 6 0 , in r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e d y n a m i c s t h e m i l i t a r y u n d e r w e n t m a j o r c h a n g e s in three areas: institutional unity and c o h e s i o n , military e f f i c i e n c y , and the e c o n o m y , w h e r e it e m e r g e d a s a p r i n c i p a l e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l a c t o r . F o r e i g n m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e w a s a m a j o r i n g r e d i e n t in all t h r e e of t h e s e . T h e United States had provided military assistance to G u a t e m a l a since 1954, but a f t e r the a t t e m p t e d c o u p of 1960, aid i n c r e a s e d d r a m a t i c a l l y . By 1 9 6 1 , t h e A l l i a n c e f o r P r o g r e s s , d e s i g n e d to e n c o u r a g e s o c i a l r e f o r m w h i l e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y p r o v i d i n g c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y a s s i s t a n c e to p r e v e n t " a n o t h e r C u b a , " o f f e r e d i n c r e a s e d m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e to G u a t e m a l a . A m a j o r c i v i c a c t i o n p r o g r a m w a s b e g u n t h e r e , t h e f i r s t s u c h p r o g r a m in L a t i n A m e r i c a ( S h a r c k m a n : 1 9 4 ) . 4 B u t d i s u n i t y a n d c o r r u p t i o n in t h e A r m y r e n d e r e d U . S . military

assistance

relatively

ineffective. The more "professional"

or

" m o d e r n " s e c t o r s of t h e a r m e d f o r c e s , led b y C o l o n e l E n r i q u e P e r a l t a A z u r d i a , h a r b o r e d a g e n e r a l f e e l i n g of d i s g u s t f o r c o r r u p t i o n in g o v e r n m e n t a n d in p a r t i c u l a r w i t h i n t h e A r m y . P e r a l t a s e i z e d p o w e r in a c o u p in 1 9 6 3 . A l t h o u g h the catalyst f o r the c o u p that o u s t e d President Y d i g o r a s may well h a v e b e e n the i m m i n e n t return to G u a t e m a l a of f o r m e r P r e s i d e n t A r e v a l o , 5 t h e s t a t e d g o a l s of t h e c o u p l e a d e r s i n c l u d e d , n o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e s u p p r e s s i o n of c o m m u n i s m a n d t h e p r e v e n t i o n of c i v i l w a r ( B l a c k : 2 0 ) . But f r o m the A r m y ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , the c o u p w a s p r i m a r i l y an a t t e m p t to r e s c u e t h e m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n f r o m its o w n d e c a y a n d d i s s e n s i o n a n d t o r e s o l v e f a c t i o n a l p r o b l e m s a m o n g t h e e l i t e . W h i l e h e a d of s t a t e , C o l o n e l Peralta A z u r d i a s o u g h t to u n i f y the military by s t r e s s i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e

58

Guatemalan

Politics

r e f o r m s . T h i s c o i n c i d e d w i t h t h e o f f i c i a l U . S . p o s i t i o n at t h e t i m e , w h i c h w a s t o m a k e m i l i t a r i e s m o r e p r o f e s s i o n a l a n d h e n c e l e s s l i k e l y to b e c o m e i n v o l v e d in p o l i t i c s ( S e r e s e r e s : 1 9 9 ) . T h e b u l k of U . S . m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e before 1965 was oriented toward these technical and administrative goals (Sereseres: 238-239). Although

his a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e f o r m s m a d e

him

a c c e p t a b l e to t h e U . S . , P e r a l t a A z u r d i a d i d n o t p u r s u e t h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t g u e r r i l l a s in e a s t e r n G u a t e m a l a w i t h m u c h e n t h u siasm (Black: 2 0 - 2 2 , 69). G i v e n t h e r e c e n t s u c c e s s of t h e C u b a n R e v o l u t i o n in 1 9 5 9 a n d t h e m o r e r e c e n t f a i l u r e of t h e B a y of P i g s i n v a s i o n of C u b a in 1 9 6 1 , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y g o a l s a l o n g w i t h its d e s i r e t o p r o fessionalize the G u a t e m a l a n a r m e d forces. Peralta's c o n s e r v a t i v e a p p r o a c h t o w a r d the guerrillas did not meet with U.S. a p p r o v a l . Military a s s i s t a n c e for c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y training had increased over the p r e - 1 9 5 9 levels, perh a p s b e c a u s e of t h e 1 9 6 3 c o u p , b u t m a j o r m i l i t a r y a i d d i d n o t f l o w to G u a t e m a l a until about 1965, w h e n p l a n s f o r a n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n and e l e c tion of a civilian

government

had been

put into effect

(Sharckman:

1 9 5 - 1 9 6 ) . T h e s e i n c l u d e d e l e c t i n g a c i v i l i a n p r e s i d e n t w h o w o u l d h a v e little c o n t r o l e i t h e r o v e r t h e m i l i t a r y o r o v e r a p l a n n e d m a j o r c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y e f f o r t a i m e d at g u e r r i l l a s in e a s t e r n G u a t e m a l a , t h e e f f o r t P e r a l t a had p u r s u e d without e n t h u s i a s m . P r e s i d e n t J u l i o C é s a r M é n d e z M o n t e n e g r o , e l e c t e d in 1 9 6 6 , i n d e e d h a d v e r y little c o n t r o l o v e r t h e a r m e d f o r c e s . A f t e r C o l o n e l C a r l o s A r a n a O s o r i o w a s p l a c e d in c h a r g e of t h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y p r o g r a m in 1 9 6 6 , U . S . m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e r e a c h e d its h i g h e s t l e v e l s ( S h a r c k m a n :

194-195).

At the s a m e time, the United States f i n a n c e d and s u p e r v i s e d the " m o d e r n i z a t i o n " of G u a t e m a l a ' s p o l i c e , m o s t b r a n c h e s of w h i c h w e r e d i r e c t e d by t h e m i l i t a r y ( W O L A 1 9 8 3 : 9). A B o t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h e G u a t e m a l a n o f f i c e r corps w e r e pleased with the o u t c o m e s : W i t h one s i m p l e tool, a c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y c a m p a i g n , the c i v i l i a n

gov-

e r n m e n t w a s a b l e to m a i n t a i n its p r e c a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n f o r t h e entire four year term by p r o v i d i n g the military institution with a p r o f e s s i o n a l task and b y s e c u r i n g o u t s i d e r e s o u r c e s that w o u l d b e u s e d to m a i n tain the l o y a l t y o f the t w o m o s t i m p o r t a n t s u p p o r t e r s o f the

Méndez

regime (Sereseres: 71).

In s u m , t h e n e t e f f e c t of m i l i t a r y m o d e r n i z a t i o n , o f i n c r e a s e d p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m , a n d of c o p i o u s U . S . a s s i s t a n c e , w a s i n s t i t u t i o n a l u n i t y a n d m i l i tary e f f i c i e n c y . G r e a t l y h e l p e d b y U . S . a s s i s t a n c e , " t h e A r m y w a s f a s t b e c o m i n g . . . t h e o n l y c r e d i b l e p o l i t i c a l f o r c e in t h e c o u n t r y " ( B l a c k : 2 3 ) . A f t e r h a v i n g d e g e n e r a t e d i n t o f a c t i o n a l i s m a n d d i s a r r a y in t h e y e a r s a f t e r t h e 1 9 5 4 C I A c o u p , t h e m i l i t a r y r e c o v e r e d its u n i t y a n d e f f i c i e n c y a f t e r 1 9 6 2 , in t h e p r o c e s s b e c o m i n g a f o r m i d a b l e f i g h t i n g f o r c e , a b l e a n d w i l l i n g

The Militari/ as Democratizers

59

to w a g e w a r on its o w n p e o p l e in the n a m e of national security. It quickly b e c a m e clear that the A r m y v i e w e d political o p p o n e n t s with d e m o c r a t i c or r e f o r m i s t t e n d e n c i e s as threats to its o w n s e c u r i t y . T h e m i l i t a r y ' s aggress i v e e x p a n s i o n i s m had p r o f o u n d c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r G u a t e m a l a ' s political e c o n o m y in the next d e c a d e s .

The Military

and the Political

Economy

T h e m o d e r n political a s c e n d a n c y of the m i l i t a r y h a d b e g u n as early as 1950, d u r i n g the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of C o l o n e l J a c o b o A r b e n z . But c o n t r o l o v e r the political s y s t e m b e c a m e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d only a f t e r the 1963 Peralta c o u p . By 1965, the m i l i t a r y h a d g e n e r a t e d a n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d o v e r s e e n e l e c t i o n s . B e t w e e n the 1 9 6 3 c o u p a n d the 1 9 7 0 e l e c t i o n , the G u a t e m a l a n military o f f i c e r c o r p s b e n e f i t e d as m u c h as any single institution in G u a t e m a l a f r o m the e c o n o m i c g r o w t h of the 1960s, as o f f i c e r s g a i n e d a c c e s s to r e s o u r c e s f r o m the A l l i a n c e f o r P r o g r e s s a n d b e c a m e e n t r e p r e n e u r s . T h e A r m y b e c a m e a m a j o r s u p p o r t e r a n d b e n e f i c i a r y of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , but it a l s o b e c a m e an i m p e d i m e n t to the d e v e l o p m e n t of d e m o c r a t i c institutions. T h e interplay b e t w e e n this r e j u v e n a t e d military f o r c e a n d c o n t i n u i n g p r e s s u r e s for social c h a n g e and political r e f o r m prod u c e d a d e c a d e of o s c i l l a t i n g w a v e s of v i o l e n c e and relative tranquility. D u r i n g the 1960s, the A r m y c o n s o l i d a t e d its political position in the Guatemalan spectrum, and during Colonel Carlos A r a n a ' s presidency, a f t e r 1970, the military c o n s o l i d a t e d its position e c o n o m i c a l l y . A l t h o u g h c o r r u p t i o n had a l w a y s b e e n rife in the A r m y , in the early 1970s military o f f i c e r s b e c a m e b u s i n e s s e n t r e p r e n e u r s as well. Military policy m e l d e d the state with the e c o n o m i c interests of individual military o f f i c e r s , using the threat and a p p l i c a t i o n of f o r c e to a c q u i r e w e a l t h . A s the military w a s taking a d v a n t a g e of U.S. m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e to turn itself into a f o r m i d a b l e internal security f o r c e , it w a s also u s i n g its political control of the g o v e r n ment and of U . S . e c o n o m i c aid to b e c o m e an e c o n o m i c elite. A s long as e c o n o m i c g r o w t h c o n t i n u e d , n o s i g n i f i c a n t o p p o s i t i o n by c i v i l i a n e c o n o m i c elites to the m i l i t a r y ' s e n c r o a c h m e n t a r o s e , nor any s i g n i f i c a n t internal f a c t i o n a l strife within the A r m y itself ( B l a c k : 2 6 - 2 7 ) . In spite of occasional reverses, the d e v e l o p m e n t of the military reveals fairly steady, unilinear m o v e m e n t : the a r m e d f o r c e s h a v e g r o w n more and m o r e p o w e r f u l as a political o r g a n i z a t i o n o v e r the d e c a d e s . T h e c o n t i n u ity in the p r o c e s s by w h i c h the A r m y h a s a g g r a n d i z e d its p o s i t i o n s i n c e the 1944 m i d d l e - c l a s s O c t o b e r R e v o l u t i o n is m u c h m o r e a p p a r e n t than the occasional b a c k s l i d i n g . V e r y little in recent history s u g g e s t s that the military had r e l i n q u i s h e d any s i g n i f i c a n t political p o w e r by 1980. On the c o n trary, it had c o n s o l i d a t e d itself e c o n o m i c a l l y , first by p r o t e c t i n g the wealth of the o l i g a r c h y , then by t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h to b e c o m e

60

Guatemalan

Politics

an e c o n o m i c elite itself, both rural and urban, and finally by taking steps to weaken the social and political power of the nonmilitary economic elites.

Making Guatemala Safe for Democracy—Part I The period between 1979 and 1982 revealed the d e v e l o p m e n t of a m a j o r crisis for the G u a t e m a l a n state. T h r o u g h o u t this period one m a j o r o b s t a cle to the success of the A r m y ' s c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y c a m p a i g n w a s the venality of the military faction in power under General R o m e o L u c a s Garcia. This was resolved by the military c o u p that installed retired G e n eral Efraín Ríos Montt. T h e messianic Ríos Montt had been the c a n d i d a t e of the Christian Democrats in 1974. 7 T h e c o u p shifted power within the military and, as a result, p r o d u c e d c h a n g e in the m i l i t a r y ' s political strategy. T h e f o r e i g n assistance needed to sustain the national economy, and the military's economic position within it, could be obtained only if lip service, at least, were paid to international p r e s s u r e s on protecting human rights, e n d i n g corruption in g o v e r n m e n t , and f a s h i o n i n g a transition to d e m o c r a c y by holding honest elections. T h e new junta immediately pledged to guarantee all three. After the c o u p b e c a m e a fait accompli, all the m a j o r political parties, w h o of course had resented the f r a u d in the 1982 election, endorsed the change in political leadership. Ríos Montt w a s installed as chief of a three-person junta but soon became sole head of state. Power rested with an Army faction representing younger officers opposed to military and civilian corruption, even though generally antidemocratic. T h i s g r o u p grudgingly recognized the need for formal democracy, if only to tranquilize international and domestic opponents of the regime. Ríos portrayed himself and the A r m y variously as avenging angels, as concerned parents who, perhaps reluctantly, felt c o m pelled to discipline and punish their children, or as winners in the struggle against c o m m u n i s m . Messianism was characteristic not merely in the c o n j o i n i n g of Christian morality with a c k n o w l e d g e d mass violence, but even in requests, for e x a m p l e , that bureaucrats openly pledge to end corruption and to wear buttons c o n f i r m i n g their pledge. The state terrorism that had prevailed during the Lucas Garcia regime soon declined in G u a t e m a l a City and other urban areas, a w e l c o m e i m p r o v e m e n t . But Ríos M o n t t established " t r i b u n a l s of special j u r i s d i c tion," which held secret, s u m m a r y military trials. Executions of suspected " e n e m i e s " c o n t i n u e d . R e p r e s s i o n in rural areas rose to a f e v e r pitch, including massacres of w h o l e villages. Popular o r g a n i z a t i o n s were practically eliminated. Under the A r m y ' s fusiles y frijoles (guns and K eans) campaign, its c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y plan e x p a n d e d f r o m c o n c e n t r a t i n g on the

The Military as

61

Democratizers

military c a m p a i g n against the insurgency to e s t a b l i s h i n g a series o f c o n trols over the rural civilian population.* Indians were r e m o v e d by f o r c e from some villages, and others were reorganized into " d e v e l o p m e n t p o l e s " similar to the " s t r a t e g i c h a m l e t s " program in V i e t n a m , where the military provided food in e x c h a n g e for q u i e s c e n c e . T h e Indians were virtually imprisoned, their m o v e m e n t s carefully restricted, and independent organization forbidden. During this period s o m e four hundred v i l l a g e s were destroyed, an estimated h a l f - m i l l i o n people were f o r c e d to live in d e v e l opment p o l e s , and all m a l e s in the highland c o n f l i c t z o n e s were c o n scripted into civil defense patrols ( K r u e g e r and E n g e : v i - v i i ) . 9 As this scenario o f repression was escalating, the formal political system was c h a n g i n g as well. T o R í o s Montt, preparing G u a t e m a l a for new elections meant purging the system. T h e government announced several new conditions

that

effectively

reduced

the

formal

level

of

democratic

participation in the system. T h e changes quickly alienated much o f the political party spectrum. T h e honeymoon between political parties and new military rulers ended quickly, because o f electoral politics, not rural repression. First, R í o s M o n t t ' s new law o f political parties sought to weaken the established political parties, using the half-true rationale that the party system had to be opened up to all political persuasions. All parties were o f f i cially disbanded. Any group could form a new political party by m e e t i n g new organizational and signature provisions, according to a set timetable. A group could b e c o m e registered as a "party in f o r m a t i o n " or as a " c i v i c committee,"

with only

f i v e hundred signatures. T h e new

provisions

reduced the number o f signatures needed for final legalization f r o m fifty thousand to four thousand. T h e resulting proliferation o f registered groups c a m e as no surprise, much to the c h a g r i n o f the e s t a b l i s h e d parties ( s e e T a b l e 4 . 1 ) . T h e A r m y portrayed its party r e o r g a n i z a t i o n as a return to d e m o c r a c y , even as it w e a k e n e d o r g a n i z e d s e c t o r s that c o u l d m o b i l i z e public opinion within the electoral process. S e c o n d , the new e l e c t i o n c a l e n d a r q u i c k l y b e c a m e a b o n e o f c o n tention, for most n e w e r groups wanted to postpone e l e c t i o n s in order to establish t h e m s e l v e s . T h e e s t a b l i s h e d parties, e s p e c i a l l y the

well-

organized M L N , wanted e l e c t i o n s as quickly as possible, to capitalize on their m o m e n t u m after the failed electoral fraud o f M a r c h 1 9 8 2 , and their successful participation in the R í o s coup. T h e Christian D e m o c r a t s again found t h e m s e l v e s torn b e t w e e n two rationales, as they had b e e n in the 1 9 8 2 election c a m p a i g n . T h e party needed time to rebuild after the repression o f the previous few years but at the same time feared the proliferation o f parties. A " l a w o f spectrum l o c a t i o n " had been helping the D C G b e f o r e this period. With no true leftist organizations surviving within the party system during the Lucas Garcia regime, the D C G had found it easy to be moderate

62

Guatemalan

Table 4.1

Registered Party Committees, 1984 Election P?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

Politics

N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y N N Y Y N N N Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N Y Y Y

4%?

N Y N Y N N

N N N Y

N Y

Y N Y

N Y

N N N

Party C o m m i t t e e ACR AD CAN CND DCG FCD FDP FN FPO FUN FUR MDN MEC MIDEH MLN PAR PC PDCN PID PIN PJS PLO PNR PP PR PSC PSD PUA UCN UNE UPN URD ANP OCAS COZAUN

Revolutionary Civic Action Democratic Action Authentic Nationalist Center National D e m o c r a t i c Coordinator Guatemalan Christian D e m o c r a c y Democratic Civic Front Popular D e m o c r a t i c Force New Force Organized Popular Force Front for National Unity United Front of the Revolution Nationalist D e m o c r a t i c M o v e m e n t Emerging M o v e m e n t for C o n c o r d a n c e Indigenous H u m a n i s t D e m o c r a t i c M o v e m e n t National Liberation M o v e m e n t Party of Revolutionary Action Catholic Party Democratic Party of National Cooperation Institutional D e m o c r a t i c Party Party of National Integration Socialist Justice Party Orthodox Liberal Party National R e n o v a t i n g Party Populist Party Revolutionary Party Social Christian Party Democratic Socialist Party Party of A n t i c o m m u n i s t Unification Union of the National Center Party of National Equicratic Unity National Patriotic Union Democratic Revolutionary Unity Progressive National Alliance Peasant Organization for Social Action United Zacapa C o m m i t t e e

Notes: P?: Did the registered party committee actually participate in the 1984 election? (Yes or No); 4%?: If the party participated, did it receive a minimum of 4 percent of the vote—the minimum if its status as a registered party was not to be cancelled? (Yes or No) Source: Adapted from Rosada Granados 1985: 37-38.

and still w e a r the p r o g r e s s i v e m a n t l e . N e w party-registration l a w s m e a n t that the v a c u u m to the l e f t f i l l e d rather q u i c k l y , and s o m e o f the n e w g r o u p s w e r e d e f e c t o r s f r o m the D C G — t h e S o c i a l Christian Party (Partido S o c i a l C r i s t i a n o — P S C ) , l e d by Dr. Carlos G e h l e r t Mata, for e x a m p l e . T h e P S D , w h o s e leader M a r i o S o l o r z a n o Martinez returned f r o m e x i l e , o f f e r e d another l e f t - o f - c e n t e r alternative. Third, R i o s M o n t t p u r s u e d his c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t p o l i t i c a l parties in other d i r e c t i o n s as w e l l . U s i n g corruption as the e x c u s e , he e l i m i n a t e d all

The Military

as

Democratizers

63

c i v i l i a n s f r o m e x e c u t i v e g o v e r n m e n t p o s i t i o n s . H e r e m o v e d all e l e c t e d m a y o r s , m o s t of w h o m h a d b e e n e l e c t e d in t h e r e l a t i v e l y h o n e s t m u n i c i pal e l e c t i o n s o f 1 9 8 0 , a n d r e p l a c e d t h e m w i t h m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . A n o t h e r d e c r e e p e r m i t t e d t h e h e a d of s t a t e t o act as l e g i s l a t i v e a s w e l l a s e x e c u t i v e p o w e r , r e m o v i n g t h e m a j o r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s f r o m t h i s a v e n u e of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n as w e l l . F o r p a r t i e s , t h e a t m o s p h e r e w a s u n c e r t a i n to s a y t h e l e a s t : R í o s M o n t t f r e q u e n t l y h a r a n g u e d t h e p a r t i e s as h i s t o r i c a l l y c o r r u p t i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t w e r e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e i t h e r of t h e w i s h e s n o r t h e n e e d s of t h e c i t i z e n r y . C i v i l i a n p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h a d little l e f t e x c e p t t h e s o m e w h a t d u b i o u s p r o s p e c t of f u t u r e e l e c t i o n s . Not surprisingly, the civilian middle-class elites, w h o originally had s e e n t h e 1 9 8 2 c o u p a s a w a y to r e t u r n t o p o w e r u n d e r a n e w

regime

p r o m i s i n g h o n e s t y , o p p o s e d m u c h of R i o s ' s p o l i t i c a l p l a t f o r m . A f t e r a y e a r a n d a h a l f in p o w e r , R í o s M o n t t ' s e x o t i c m e s s i a n i s m h a d a l i e n a t e d m o s t s e c t o r s of t h e r u l i n g c l a s s . T h e h i e r a r c h y of t h e C a t h o l i c c h u r c h h a d b e c o m e a l i e n a t e d by his s t r i d e n t p r o s e l y t i z i n g o n b e h a l f of t h e P r o t e s t a n t , b o r n - a g a i n evangelical sects. M o r e o v e r , R í o s M o n t t ' s legitimacy as a g u a r a n t o r of f o r e i g n e c o n o m i c a s s i s t a n c e h a d b e c o m e j e o p a r d i z e d b y b o t h his e c c e n t r i c i t i e s a n d t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y l e v e l s of v i o l e n c e in r u r a l a r e a s . Like his p r e d e c e s s o r G e n e r a l L u c a s , R í o s had b e c o m e an e m b a r r a s s m e n t to t h e r u l i n g c l a s s , a p p a r e n t l y u n a b l e to s u s t a i n t h e s y s t e m . O n A u g u s t 8, 1 9 8 3 , G e n e r a l R í o s M o n t t d e p a r t e d as h e h a d a r r i v e d , in a m i l i t a r y c o u p , this o n e led by G e n e r a l H u m b e r t o M e j í a V í c t o r e s . 1 "

Making Guatemala Safe for Democracy—Part II T h e 1 9 8 3 c o u p led to a d e c r e a s e in b o r n - a g a i n e v a n g e l i s m a s a p o l i t i c a l s t y l e b u t h a d little o r n o i m p a c t o n t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s p o l i c y of r e s p o n d i n g to p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e w i t h b r u t e f o r c e . M e j í a c o n t i n u e d to a p p l y t h e s a m e brutal c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y t e c h n i q u e s as his p r e d e c e s s o r — c r o p

burning,

m a s s a c r e s in v i l l a g e s s u s p e c t e d of g u e r r i l l a s y m p a t h i e s , f o r c e d r e s e t t l e m e n t i n t o c a m p s , a n d f o r c e d s e r v i c e in p a r a m i l i t a r y c i v i l p a t r o l s . D u r i n g the Lucas Garcia administration and the t w o military dictators h i p s t h a t f o l l o w e d it, r e p r e s s i o n in r u r a l a r e a s w a s t r u l y a s t o n i s h i n g . B y 1984, mass killings had b e c o m e a regular occurrence. Vast areas w e r e virtual w a s t e l a n d s . 1 1 P e r h a p s m o r e t h a n 5 0 p e r c e n t of t h e 2 . 5 8 m i l l i o n I n d i a n r e s i d e n t s o f t h e h i g h l a n d s w e r e s e v e r e l y d i s r u p t e d b y t h e v i o l e n c e , t h a t is, they d i s a p p e a r e d , w e r e m u r d e r e d , f o r c e d to relocate into m o d e l v i l l a g e s a n d / o r f o r c e d t o w o r k a n d p a r t i c i p a t e in c i v i l p a t r o l s , o r f l e d a s r e f u g e e s ( F r a n k a n d W h e a t o n : 9 2 ) . T h e j u v e n i l e d i v i s i o n of t h e S u p r e m e

Court

e s t i m a t e d that o n e to t w o h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d o r p h a n s and f o r t y - f i v e thousand parents were killed b e t w e e n

1978 and 1985 (Simon: 86).12

The

64

Guatemalan

Politics

v i o l e n c e i n c l u d e d e x p l i c i t d i s r u p t i o n s of t h e c u l t u r a l i n t e g r i t y of t h e I n d i a n communities. T h e A r m y shut d o w n i n d i g e n o u s - l a n g u a g e radio stations and isolated high school and university s t u d e n t s and other urban p r o f e s s i o n a l s f r o m the rural p o p u l a t i o n , especially

in I n d i a n a r e a s . A

government-

s p o n s o r e d " l i t e r a c y c a m p a i g n " h a s b e e n d e s c r i b e d as " a f a r c e a n d a s a m e a n s of i d e n t i f y i n g r u r a l l e a d e r s f o r k i d n a p p i n g s a n d

assassinations"

(Davis and Hodson: 21). Additional political and e c o n o m i c impacts resulted f r o m d e v e l o p m e n t agencies that w e r e either c l o s e d or d i s r u p t e d — l e a v i n g local m e m b e r s cut o f f f r o m r e s o u r c e s a n d p r o t e c t i o n — a s w e l l as l a n d o w n e r s h i p p a t t e r n s a n d f o o d p r o d u c t i o n that w e r e s e v e r e l y d i s r u p t e d w h e n i n d i v i d u a l s f l e d , l o s i n g their land, perhaps

never

to g e t a n o t h e r

chance

to o w n

land

again.

R e f u g e e s f l o w e d to c i t i e s t o l i v e in v o l a t i l e s l u m s , o r t h e y f l e d t h e c o u n t r y . Cooperatives stopped functioning because leaders were killed and monies r o u t i n e l y r o b b e d . C u r f e w s in r u r a l a r e a s p r o h i b i t e d p u b l i c

gatherings,

w h i c h m e a n t t h a t t h e t o t a l f a b r i c of o p p o r t u n i t y f o r d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n w a s d i s r u p t e d ( D a v i s a n d H o d s o n : 11, 1 9 - 2 7 ; W O L A 1 9 8 8 : t a b l e s , 9 3 - 9 8 ) . In t e r m s of d e v e l o p m e n t e f f o r t s , t h e v i o l e n c e s h o w e d a n u n m i s t a k a b l y c l e a r p a t t e r n of i n c r e a s e d i n e q u i t y a n d a g o n y in r u r a l s o c i e t y . R e p r e s s i o n in t h e h i g h l a n d s in r e s p o n s e to c o m m u n a l a c t i v i s m

had

b e e n a c o n s t a n t a f t e r 1 9 5 4 , b u t l e v e l s h a d f l u c t u a t e d in r e s p o n s e to s u r g e s in s u c c e s s f u l c o m m u n a l a c t i v i s m . S t a t e t e r r o r i s m a n d e l i t e v i o l e n c e in g e n e r a l i n t e n s i f i e d if g r o u p s r e p r e s e n t e d a t h r e a t to e l i t e e c o n o m i c p r i v i l e g e . V i o l e n c e w a s p a r t of a n e c o n o m i c s t r u g g l e , n o t t h e r e s u l t of a " c u l t u r e of v i o l e n c e . " R e p r e s s i o n w a s d e s i g n e d to s u p p r e s s a n e m e r g e n t

citizenry,

t h e r e b y r e d u c i n g t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r d e m o c r a c y . T h e w a v e o f r u r a l v i o l e n c e in this p e r i o d , d i r e c t e d l a r g e l y a g a i n s t c o m m u n a l a c t i v i s m e f f o r t s , p r o d u c e d a s e r i e s of t e r r i b l e i m p a c t s o n all d i m e n s i o n s of r u r a l G u a t e m a l a n s o c i e t y , including religion, family, and the e c o n o m y (Davis and H o d s o n : 1 9 - 2 7 ) . 1 3

Creating

Electoral

Procedures

T h e f i r s t t w o p h a s e s of t h e m i l i t a r y ' s c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y p l a n — t h e m i l i t a r y c a m p a i g n s of t h e e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s a n d t h e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f t h e c o u n t r y s i d e b y 1 9 8 4 — h a d s u c c e s s f u l l y w e a k e n e d t h e i n s u r g e n c y . T h e t h i r d p h a s e of t h e p l a n w a s to i n c r e a s e l e g i t i m a c y f o r t h e r e g i m e in t h e f a c e o f h u m a n r i g h t s violations and e c o n o m i c failures, and the vehicle for a c h i e v i n g this w a s the re-establishment of constitutional g o v e r n m e n t with f r e e elections. P a r t of t h e g o a l o f t h e s t r a t e g y w a s i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g i t i m a c y , a m a j o r p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r f o r e i g n a i d a n d in t u r n a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p ment. International legitimacy could be e n h a n c e d not only by holding elect i o n s b u t by g u a r a n t e e i n g p r o c e d u r a l p u r i t y . M o r e o v e r , g i v e n t h e n o t o r i e t y e a r n e d by t h e A r m y ' s a c t i v i t i e s t h r o u g h 1 9 8 4 , l e g i t i m a c y c o u l d a l s o b e

The Military

as

Democratizers

65

i n c r e a s e d if a c i v i l i a n w e r e e l e c t e d , o n e s e e n a s a r e f o r m e r o r , b e t t e r still, a s a n a n t a g o n i s t of t h e A r m y . In t h e p o l i t i c a l a r e n a p u b l i c d e b a t e o v e r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d s c h e d u l i n g o f e l e c t i o n s r e s u m e d w i t h t h e M e j i a V i c t o r e s c o u p in 1 9 8 3 , b u t in general, the s t r u c t u r e s and c a l e n d a r inherited f r o m R i o s M o n t t r e m a i n e d i n t a c t , w i t h s o m e m o d i f i c a t i o n s . A f t e r " c o n s u l t i n g " w i t h p a r t y l e a d e r s in l a t e 1 9 8 3 , G e n e r a l M e j i a d e c r e e d n e w e l e c t o r a l l a w s , t o t a k e e f f e c t in J a n uary 1984. T h e new election procedures included the following: 1. A d e a d l i n e of A p r i l 3 0 , 1 9 8 4 , w a s i m p o s e d , b y w h i c h t i m e p o l i t i c a l parties w o u l d

h a v e to m e e t t h e n e w r e g i s t r a t i o n

requirements,

including the signature rules described a b o v e as well as other prov i s i o n s , s u c h a s e s t a b l i s h i n g a m i n i m u m of f i f t y l o c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s in at l e a s t t w e l v e of G u a t e m a l a ' s t w e n t y - t h r e e d e p a r t m e n t s . P a r t i e s w e r e a l s o r e q u i r e d t o h o l d d e p a r t m e n t a l a n d n a t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n s to select c a n d i d a t e s for the Constituent A s s e m b l y . 2. T h e e l e c t i o n f o r t h e C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y w a s s c h e d u l e d f o r J u l y 1, 1 9 8 4 ; t h e a s s e m b l y w o u l d t a k e o f f i c e o n S e p t e m b e r 1 5 , 1 9 8 4 . 3. W h i l e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r c r e a t i n g a n e w p a r t y w e r e

considerably

m o r e lax t h a n p r e v i o u s rules, p a r t i e s w e r e f a c e d w i t h the

new

r e q u i r e m e n t of o b t a i n i n g at l e a s t 4 p e r c e n t o f t h e v o t e in t h e 1 9 8 4 Constituent A s s e m b l y election or a u t o m a t i c a l l y h a v i n g their registration rescinded. 4. T h e C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y w o u l d c o n s i s t of e i g h t y - e i g h t seats. Of these, twenty-three were considered "national" seats. Parties were e x p e c t e d to n o m i n a t e s l a t e s of n a t i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s , f o r w h o m v o t e s w o u l d b e c a s t in all e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t s of t h e c o u n t r y . T h e r e m a i n ing s i x t y - f i v e seats w e r e to be elected f r o m d e p a r t m e n t s , with the n u m b e r of s e a t s v a r y i n g with the p o p u l a t i o n of the d e p a r t m e n t . 5. O n l y p a r t i e s s t i l l r e g i s t e r e d a f t e r t h e 1 9 8 4 e l e c t i o n s c o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e 1 9 8 5 e l e c t i o n s f o r p r e s i d e n t , C o n g r e s s , a n d m u n i c i p a l offices.14 T h e f u t u r e C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y ' s legal m i s s i o n a n d real p o w e r had b e e n d e b a t e d f o r s e v e r a l m o n t h s b e f o r e t h e p r o m u l g a t i o n of t h e s e e l e c t o r a l l a w s . M a n y of t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s s a w t h e a s s e m b l y a s a s o v e r e i g n b o d y , w i t h a u t h o r i t y t o t a k e a n y a c t i o n it d e e m e d p r o p e r , i n c l u d i n g n a m i n g a p r o v i s i o n a l p r e s i d e n t . T h e r e g i m e ' s p o s i t i o n w a s t h a t t h e e x c l u s i v e d u t y of the a s s e m b l y w a s to p r e p a r e a n e w constitution a n d that no legal p o w e r existed for any o t h e r activity b e y o n d e l a b o r a t i n g a law of h a b e a s c o r p u s . The military's position prevailed. O n c e the e l e c t o r a l l a w s had b e e n p r o c l a i m e d and put into e f f e c t , part i e s t u r n e d to t h e t a s k of m e e t i n g t h e n e w r e g i s t r a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t s . B y

66

Guatemalan

Politici;

May 1, 1984, nineteen groups had met the requirements for the 1984 Constituent Assembly election (see Table 4.2). Of the nineteen, only five as of May 1, 1984, had s u c c e e d e d in o f f e r i n g a full slate of candidates in all d e p a r t m e n t s of the c o u n t r y . O n e slate was an alliance between the C A N and the MLN. The other four parties were the PR, the DCG, the PNR, and the U C N . The PID and the P U A also ran at the national level but without full slates. T h e UCN had recently been f o r m e d by Jorge Carpió Nicolle, p u b lisher of the daily newspaper El Gráfico, and was the only national party that had not existed as a m a j o r party in the 1982 presidential election. In other words, the lineup of m a j o r parties in Guatemala shifted only slightly as a result of the new rules imposed by the military. Generally, the traditional parties had survived, in spite of factionalization. Legalized

Repression

Changes in electoral procedures were one response to the lack of international legitimacy; another w a s the A r m y ' s strategy to legitimate its military activities by legalizing, in e f f e c t , three of its de facto c o u n t e r i n s u r gency structures and tactics. Each of these c h a n g e s reduced the need for open military repression, while at the same time providing the appearance of new levels of popular participation and democracy. T h e first was the Civilian S e l f - D e f e n s e Patrols (Patrullas de AutoD e f e n s a C i v i l — P A C ) . In most rural areas w h e r e the Army was active, m e m b e r s h i p and rotating tours of duty in the P A C s were mandatory for all males. T h e civil patrols, w h o s e m e m b e r s h i p was estimated at b e t w e e n 750,000 and 850,000 by 1984, ostensibly served the purpose of protecting local villages from guerrilla attacks. But the real purpose of these illequipped patrols was social control; they were a means to account for and regulate the whereabouts of villagers. 1 5 T h e second institutional m e c h a n i s m , which c o m p l e m e n t e d the first, was the creation of model villages as part of the poles of development prog r a m . 1 6 T h e military d e s c r i b e d this plan as o n e of coordinated d e v e l o p ment aimed at bringing social progress and basic quality-of-life improvements to highland areas m a r k e d by isolation and extreme poverty. In fact, in addition to o f f e r i n g military o f f i c e r s control over adjacent agricultural lands and individuals desperate for work, the basic intent of these villages was counterinsurgency by means of population control. The third mechanism for maintaining military control over rural Guatemala was a structure to regulate political affairs and development assistance, the National Interinstitutional Coordinator committees (Coordinadora Inter—institucional N a c i o n a l — C I N ) , e s t a b l i s h e d in each department and presided over by military-zone c o m m a n d e r s . T h e CIN coordinated and regulated all

The Military

Table 4.2

Parties

as Democratizes

67

Registered Parties and Party Leaders, 1984 Constituent Assembly Election

of the "Moderate

Left":

1. U n i t e d Front of the R e v o l u t i o n ( F r e n t e U n i d o de la R e v o l u c i ó n — F U R ) , C é s a r T o l e d o Peate. 2. G u a t e m a l a n C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c Party ( D e m o c r a c i a C r i s t i a n a G u a t e m a l t e c a — DCG), Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo. 3. D e m o c r a t i c A c t i o n Party ( A c c i ó n D e m o c r á t i c a — A D ) , L e o p o l d o Urrutia B e l t r á n . 4. P o p u l a r D e m o c r a t i c F o r c e ( F u e r z a D e m ó c r a t a P o p u l a r — F D P ) , F r a n c i s c o R e y e s Ixcamey. 5. R e v o l u t i o n a r y Party ( P a r t i d o R e v o l u c i o n a r i o — P R ) , N a p o l e ó n A l f a r o . Parties

of the "Moderate 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Parlies

Populist Party ( P a r t i d o P o p u l i s t a — P P ) , A c i s c l o V a l l a d a r e s M o l i n a . N a t i o n a l R e n o v a t i o n Party ( P a r t i d o N a c i o n a l R e n o v a d o r — P N R ) , A l e j a n d r o Maldonado Aguirre. N a t i o n a l C e n t e r U n i o n ( U n i ó n del C e n t r o N a c i o n a l — U C N ) , J o r g e C a r p i ó Nicolle. N a t i o n a l Unity Front ( F r e n t e de U n i d a d N a c i o n a l — F U N ) , G a b r i e l G i r ó n O r t i z . E m e r g i n g C o n c o r d a n c e M o v e m e n t ( M o v i m i e n t o E m e r g e n t de C o n c o r d a n c i a — M E C ) , Colonel Luis F r a n c i s c o G o r d i l l o .

of the "Extreme 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Other

Right":

Right":

National Democratic Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional D e m o c r á t i c a — C N D ) , General Aníbal Guevara Rodríguez. Institutional D e m o c r a t i c Party ( P a r t i d o Institucional D e m o c r á t i c o — P I D ) , O s c a r H u m b e r t o Rivas. A u t h e n t i c National C e n t e r ( C e n t r o A u t é n t i c o N a c i o n a l — C A N ) , M a r i o A g u i l a r Arroyo. A n t i c o m m u n i s t U n i f i c a t i o n Party ( P a r t i d o de U n i f i c a c i ó n A n t i c o m u n i s t a — P U A ) , L e o n e l Sisniega O t e r o . N a t i o n a l Liberation M o v e m e n t ( M o v i m i e n t o de L i b e r a c i ó n N a c i o n a l — M L N ) , Mario Sandoval Alarcón. Parties:

16. 17. 18. 19.

D e m o c r a t i c Party of N a t i o n a l C o o p e r a t i o n ( P a r t i d o D e m o c r á t i c o de C o o p e r a c i ó n N a c i o n a l — P D C N ) , N e r y Noel M o r a l e s G a v a r r e t e . National Progressive Alliance (Alianza Nacional Progresista—ANP), Mario C a s t e j ó n García. P e a s a n t O r g a n i z a t i o n for Social A c t i o n ( O r g a n i z a c i ó n C a m p e s i n a de A c c i ó n Social—OCAS), Mauricio Quixtán. N a t i o n a l Integration Party ( P a r t i d o de Integración N a c i o n a l — P I N ) , J o r g e A n t o n i o C a s t i l l o C.

Sources: Parties 1 - 1 5 , including the typology and classification: Guatenoticias 6; Parties 1 6 - 1 9 : P D C N : Prensa Libre 5/1/84; A N P , O C A S , a n d P I N : El Grdfico Inforpress 5/4/84: 5 4 - 5 5 .

4/1/84: 5/1/84;

normal c i v i l g o v e r n m e n t a l f u n c t i o n s under direct military s u p e r v i s i o n , to "reduce c o r r u p t i o n and i n c r e a s e e f f i c i e n c y . " T h e C I N b e c a m e in e s s e n c e a parallel g o v e r n m e n t , a l l o w i n g the military to c o n t i n u e to d o m i n a t e e v e n

68

Guatemalan

Politics

though G u a t e m a l a would return to " c i v i l i a n r u l e " ( K r u e g e r and E n g e : 5 3 - 5 9 ; V M 1 / 7 - 1 3 / 8 5 : 6; and GNN 4 / 8 5 : 5 , 8 ) . L i k e civil patrols and model v i l l a g e s , the C I N inhibited independent c o m m u n i t y organization and local control over local political affairs. T h e military c l e a r l y perceived local s e l f - h e l p o r g a n i z a t i o n s and c o m m u n a l activism as threats and sought to ensure that the " d e m o c r a t i c o p e n i n g " o f 1 9 8 5 and the civilian government inaugurated in 1 9 8 6 would not threaten military d o m i n a n c e . In short, the A r m y was able to create structures that would allow itself a fairly unfettered hold on the rural areas it felt w e r e threatening. B y 1 9 8 4 , the m i l i t a r y ' s three m e c h a n i s m s for social c o n t r o l had created an environment in which fear, terror, and totalitarian control replaced murder as the primary mechanism for social domination. In 1 9 8 5 , these m e c h a n i s m s were integrated into the new constitution by m i l i t a r y decree, in e f f e c t legalizing the repression. B e y o n d the general c l i m a t e e n g e n d e r e d by this o v e r w h e l m i n g prese n c e o f the Army, several specific e x a m p l e s o f military involvement in the period before the elections further c o m p r o m i s e d the quality o f the process. T h e first followed from the civil defense patrols. T h e government announced that the patrols were not military institutions and that therefore the m e m bers would vote. S i n c e , in May 1 9 8 4 , the total number o f voting c i t i z e n s was about 2 . 3 million, this meant that a body o f voters as large as the patrols could affect the o u t c o m e o f the e l e c t i o n , if those votes were to be e x c l u d e d , c o n t r o l l e d , or m i s c o u n t e d . In r e s p o n s e to public c o n c e r n , the Army pledged not to interfere in this aspect o f the voting. Second, all mayors were now military appointees, meaning that military officers would preside over ballot counts in their localities. This issue, inherited from the Ríos Montt period, led to concern that the Army could manipulate vote counts in situ. T h e military responded by announcing a nonmilitarized counting of the ballots. A third issue arose from the A r m y ' s obvious physical superiority and infrastructural sophistication, especially in isolated, rural areas: the possibility o f fraud o c c u r r i n g during the transportation o f ballots. In March 1 9 8 4 , the Army responded that the military would provide security at polling places but would not transport any ballots. Although the military was taking steps to guarantee an honest election p r o c e s s , it clearly had no intention o f diluting its control o v e r the z o n e s o f c o n f l i c t . T h e electoral p r o c e s s " c l e a n s i n g " under the R í o s M o n t t and M e j i a regimes had a c l e a r goal o f international l e g i t i m a c y , 1 7 not the creation o f any mechanism reflecting popular s o v e r e i g n t y . S o c i a l d e m o c r a c y , based on social j u s t i c e considerations, was not part o f the o f f i c i a l agenda, and repression continued to stymie political action outside o f the limited e l e c t o r a l structures. In sum, the general c o n t e x t setting the s t a g e for the 1 9 8 4 and 1 9 8 5 elections was violent and uncertain.

The Military

as

69

Democratizers

Elections: 1984 and 1985 The c a m p a i g n period for the Constituent A s s e m b l y election w a s

very

v o c i f e r o u s , b u t n o n e of t h e p r i n c i p a l p a r t i e s t o o k c l e a r p o s i t i o n s o n c o n c r e t e i s s u e s ( R o s a d a G r a n a d o s 1 9 8 5 : 2 4 ) . G i v e n t h e h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t of h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s a n d t h e p r e s e n c e of a v e r y p o w e r f u l m i l i t a r y , it is p e r h a p s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e t h a t o n l y a v e r y t a m e o p p o s i t i o n s u r f a c e d at t h i s t i m e . Y e t , t h e a b s e n c e of s e r i o u s d i s c u s s i o n s in a n e l e c t i o n

campaign

m e a n t v o t e r s h a d f e w e r s u b s t a n t i v e c h o i c e s a n d , in e f f e c t , l e s s p o t e n t i a l power over decisionmakers.

In J u l y

1984, voters elected

eighty-eight

m e m b e r s to t h e n e w C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y . T h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s w o n t w e n t y s e a t s , c o m p a r e d to t w e n t y - o n e f o r t h e U C N , t h e n e w l y o r g a n i z e d c e n t r i s t p a r t y , a n d t w e n t y - t h r e e f o r an a l l i a n c e of t h e M L N a n d its f e l l o w p a r t y of t h e r i g h t , t h e C A N . T h e r e m a i n i n g s e a t s w e r e d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g seven other parties (see T a b l e 4.3). Table 4.3 Party

DCG UCN MLN/CAN PR PNR PID PUA FUR MEC FUN Other Valid Votes Null Votes Blank Votes

Constituent Assembly Election Results, 1984 National Votes

% Votes

N

326,064 273,744 249,712 146,092 133,680 106,188 61,116 45,677 42,764 40,488 110,029 1,535,554 300,513 158,866

16.4 13.7 12.5 7.3 6.7 5.3 3.1 2.3 2.2 2.0 5.5 77.0 15.0 8.0

6 5 5 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0

%

Departmental Votes

Votes

261,207 278,740 260,466 179,199 126,021 109,905 53,385 45,490 43,753 47,366 147,762 1,553,274 296,076 143,044

13.1 14.0 13.1 9.0 6.3 5.5 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.4 7.6 78.0 15.0 7.0

D

T

14 16 18 8 3 3 0 0 0 1 2

20 21 23 10 5 5 1 0 0 1 2

Notes: "Other" combines totals for seven minor parties and two party coalitions. OCAS and the DCG/PNR coalition won the two seats in that category. "N" signifies number of assembly seats won at the national level; "D" signifies the number at the departmental level; and "T" is the total number of seats won. Party acronyms are spelled out in Table 4.1. Source: Based on Rosada Granados 1985: 39, which is based on data from Guatemalan Supreme Electoral Tribunal.

F o u r t e e n p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s p a r t i c i p a t e d at t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l l e v e l in t h e 1985 e l e c t i o n ( E m b a s s y of G u a t e m a l a :

1; S t i x e t a l . ) , s u p p o r t i n g

one

of t h e e i g h t c a n d i d a t e s ( s e e T a b l e 4 . 4 ) . In a d d i t i o n to t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l election, o r g a n i z e d on a plurality and r u n o f f basis, a n e w C o n g r e s s of one

70

Guatemalan

Table 4.4

Politics

Presidential Elections, First-Round Results, 1985

Party

Candidate

CAN MLN/P1D/FDP PNR PUA/FUN/MEC DCG/FDC-5 PDCN/PR PSD UCN

Mario David Garcia Mario Sandoval A l a r c ó n Alejandro M a l d o n a d o Aguirre Leonel Sisniega O t e r o Vinicio Cerezo A r é v a l o Jorge Serrano Elias Mario Solórzano M a r t i n e z Jorge Carpio Nicolle

% Votes 6.29 12.52 3.15 1.90 38.59 13.80 3.42 20.28

Notes: Number of potential voters: 3.95 million (est.); number of registered voters: 2,753,572; total ballots cast: 1,887,232; nullified ballots: 144,392 (7.65% of total votes); blank ballots: 81,535 (4.32% of total votes); valid ballots: 1,661,305 (88.03% of total votes; 42.06% of total number of potential voters). FDC-5 is a coalition of small progressive parties that formed for this election only. Percentages in C o l u m n 3 are based on valid votes. Party acronyms are spelled out in Table 4.1. Source: Compiled from data in Embassy of Guatemala.

h u n d r e d m e m b e r s w a s e l e c t e d , s e v e n t y - f i v e of t h e s e by e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to G u a t e m a l a ' s t w e n t y - t h r e e d e p a r t m e n t s , a n d t w e n t y - f i v e elected at-large on a national basis. At the local level 3 2 8 m u n i c i p a l i t i e s held elections for m a y o r s and municipal councils. D u r i n g the presidential c a m p a i g n of 1985, again n o n e of the c a n d i d a t e s b r o a c h e d i s s u e s of c o r r u p t i o n o r o f h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s b y t h e m i l i t a r y . N o n e s u g g e s t e d that s u c h v i o l a t o r s b e p u n i s h e d f o r p a s t c r i m e s o r p r o p o s e d a d i a l o g u e with the i n s u r g e n t s . All c o n t e n d e r s p l e d g e d not to p u r s u e m a j o r s o c i o e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s , a n d all a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e s p e c i a l s t a t u s of t h e m i l i t a r y . D i f f e r e n c e s of s t y l e a n d r h e t o r i c a p p e a r e d , b u t f e w m a j o r p r o g r a m m a t i c d i f f e r e n c e s o n n o n t r i v i a l i s s u e s of p o l i c y . T h e c a m paign resembled a "beauty contest" (Gleijeses: 22-23).1K In t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n i t s e l f , n o c a n d i d a t e g a i n e d a m a j o r i t y o f t h e v o t e , b u t V i n i c i o C e r e z o of t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s o u t d i s t a n c e d J o r g e C a r p i o N i c o l l e of t h e U C N , w i t h a l m o s t 3 9 p e r c e n t of t h e v o t e to C a r p i o ' s 2 0 percent (see T a b l e 4.4). A s no c a n d i d a t e had a majority, a runoff b e t w e e n t h o s e t o p t w o c a n d i d a t e s w a s s c h e d u l e d f o r D e c e m b e r 8, 1 9 8 5 . In the congressional elections, the Christian D e m o c r a t s w o n a slim majority of s e a t s ( C A R 1 1 / 8 / 8 5 : 1 - 2 ) ( s e e T a b l e 4 . 5 ) . B e t w e e n the t w o r o u n d s of the p r e s i d e n t i a l election, political d e b a t e c e n t e r e d o n t w o i s s u e s . T h e f i r s t w a s a n a l l e g a t i o n by t h e M L N t h a t t h e f i r s t r o u n d of v o t i n g h a d b e e n f r a u d u l e n t . T h i s c o n t e n t i o n w a s r e j e c t e d b y the S u p r e m e Election Tribunal. T h e s e c o n d centered on the r u n o f f instruct i o n s f o r t h e l o s i n g p a r t i e s to g i v e t h e i r a d h e r e n t s . T h e P S D , P R , a n d P N R a n n o u n c e d their support for the Christian D e m o c r a t s . Except for the M L N , t h e p a r t i e s of t h e r i g h t r e l e a s e d t h e i r v o t e r s , s u g g e s t i n g that t h e y v o t e f o r

The Military

Table 4.5

as Democratizers

71

Congressional Election Results, 1985 % Votes

Party DCG UCN PDCN/PR MLN/PID CAN PSD PNR PUA/MEC/FUN FCD Totals

N-Seats

34.58 20.58 13.53 15.27 6.26 3.66 4.23 1.43 0.21 99.95

11 5 4 3 1 1 0 0 0 25

D-Seats

T-Seats

40 17 7 9 0 1 1 0 0 75

51 22 11 12 1 2 1 0 0 100

Notes: Total percentage is not 100 due to rounding. P e r c e n t a g e s are based on valid votes. Party a c r o n y m s are spelled out in T a b l e 4.1. Source: Based on data in R o s a d a G r a n a d o s 1986: 14, 18.

t h e c a n d i d a t e of t h e i r c h o o s i n g . A f t e r t h e M L N ' s a l l e g a t i o n s o f f r a u d h a d b e e n r e j e c t e d , its l e a d e r s h i p u r g e d its v o t e r s t o c a s t b l a n k o r n u l l b a l l o t s ( V M 11/6/85: 3 - 4 ; and 11/12/85: 3 - 5 ) . D u r i n g the runoff period the U C N c a m p a i g n w a s e s s e n t i a l l y that t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s w e r e l i k e l y to try to establish a one-party dictatorship and that the D C G w a s part of the "international Left" ( V M 11/12/85: 3 - 4 ) . V i n i c i o C e r e z o and the Christian D e m o c r a t s w o n the r u n o f f election h a n d i l y , w i n n i n g 6 8 p e r c e n t of t h e v o t e . W i t h C e r e z o ' s i n a u g u r a t i o n in J a n u a r y 1 9 8 6 , G u a t e m a l a r e t u r n e d to c i v i l i a n g o v e r n m e n t f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e s i n c e 1 9 7 0 , w h e n P r e s i d e n t M é n d e z M o n t e n e g r o l e f t o f f i c e . A c c o r d i n g to an international d e l e g a t i o n o b s e r v i n g the p r o c e s s , the election c a m p a i g n , b a l l o t i n g , a n d v o t e c o u n t i n g a p p e a r e d to h a v e b e e n in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h Guatemalan electoral law. T h e election was "procedurally correct" (Booth et al.: v i i - x v i ) b u t o p e n l y a n t i r e f o r m i s t : b e s i d e s c a m p a i g n s d e v o i d of s e r i o u s s u b s t a n t i v e issues, both the A r m y

and business

leaders from

the

p r i v a t e s e c t o r — s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e C o u n c i l of C o m m e r c i a l , I n d u s t r i a l , a n d F i nancial Associations (Cámara de A s o c i a c i o n e s Comerciales, Industriales, y F i n a n c i e r a s — C A C I F ) — m a d e clear that they w o u l d not tolerate r e f o r m p r o p o s a l s after the i n a u g u r a t i o n . 1 9 In t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s it is d i f f i c u l t t o m e a s u r e t h e s u c c e s s of t h e e l e c toral p r o c e s s w i t h i n the a t m o s p h e r e of c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y . V o t e totals w e r e h i g h e r t h a n in e l e c t i o n s f r o m p r e v i o u s d e c a d e s . 2 " T h e h i g h t u r n o u t and the party results c o i n c i d e with the m i l i t a r y ' s political

program,

d e s i g n e d to r e d u c e the p o w e r of traditional r i g h t - w i n g parties and m a i n tain a r e l a t i o n s h i p with a m o d e r a t e but n o n t h r e a t e n i n g civilian

sector

( R o s a d a G r a n a d o s 1986: 1 0 - 1 1 ) . By these indicators the election w a s a success for the military.

72

Guatemalan

Politics

T h e s a m e results, however, can be interpreted as a negative p u b l i c reaction to the military. T h e results, including the turnout, did not indicate support for the D C G or UCN platforms and programs, which were not particularly clear to begin with, so much as votes against the traditional right and the violence and authoritarianism of the A r m y . There was a clear coincidence of preferences between much of the voting public and the dominant faction of the military to the extent that both desired to r e d u c e the political influence of traditional right-wing parties and oligarchy. T h r e e years later, in April 1988, municipal-level elections p r o v i d e d more data (see Table 4.6). Participation was low, and perhaps more politically expressive than the g o v e r n m e n t and the A r m y w o u l d have h o p e d for. Direct absenteeism w a s high: 57 percent of the registered voters did not vote. T h i s " a p a t h y " w a s described by both the right and the left as s y m p t o m a t i c of the p u b l i c ' s displeasure with u n f u l f i l l e d p r o m i s e s of the government, that is of the ruling Christian Democrats. T h e guerrilla insurgency leadership ( U R N G ) had urged that citizens either vote for progressive candidates or, in situations w h e r e there w e r e no p r o g r e s s i v e c a n d i dates, not to vote or to deliberately invalidate their ballots. In fact, of the 1,251,517 votes cast, 743,997 (59.45 percent) were subsequently declared invalid (VM 5/88: 5 - 6 ) . In spite of these figures, it is difficult to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between anger directed at the D C G itself and expressions of discontent with the overall nature of the political e c o n o m y . Voting results show a mixed degree of support for the government and the D C G (see Table 4.6). All of the major political parties lost ground in the 1988 elections, winning control of fewer municipal governments than they had won in the 1985 elections, although the declines were not substantial. The D C G had won control of 54 percent of the municipalities in 1985, and 51 percent in 1988, for example, and the U C N ' s percentage declined from 21.3 to 20.6 percent, suggesting that for those voters w h o participated in a " c o n v e n t i o n a l " way, party loyalty r e m a i n e d relatively consistent. For the parties of the far right, h o w e v e r , results were less e n c o u r a g i n g : the M L N - P I D coalition had won in thirtynine municipalities in 1985, but prevailed in only twelve in 1988. Civic c o m m i t t e e s , local-level g r o u p s of n o n a f f i l i a t e d citizens, won control of twelve mayoralties in 1988 (VM 5/88: 5 - 6 ) .

Conclusion The 1984 and 1985 elections look quite democratic by many conventional indicators. There were no military candidates, and several political parties participated, including even the Democratic Socialist Party. T h e Christian Democrats, w h o won, were widely considered to be reformists. All three

The Military

Table 4.6

as Democratizers

73

Municipal Election Results, 1985, 1988

Party

% of V a l i d V o t e 1988

DCG UCN MLN/PID (1985) MLN PID PDCN/PR (1985) PDCN PR MAS PSD CAN PNR UNO MEC FUN Totals

36.7 24.0 —

1988 Victories

1985 Victories

140 56 —

5.1 0.3 —

2.0 6.9 1.7 1.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 79.8

12 1 —

3 9 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 226

148 58 39 — —

13 — — —

1 4 4 0 0 0 267

Notes: Total n u m b e r of contests is 272. Valid votes d o not total 100 percent because locallevel civic c o m m i t t e e s and several coalitions of rightist parties have been excluded. Civic c o m m i t t e e s w o n 12 mayoralties and rightist coalitions won 34. Source: Based on data in Vistazo Mensual, 5/88: 5 - 6 .

r o u n d s of v o t i n g w e r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p r o c e d u r a l h o n e s t y . T h i s a n a l y s i s w o u l d b e m o r e o r l e s s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t at t h e t i m e : t h e 1 9 8 5 e l e c t i o n , if n o t t h e f i n a l s t e p in e s t a b l i s h i n g d e m o c r a c y in G u a t e m a l a , w a s c e r t a i n l y a m a j o r a n d i m p o r t a n t s t e p in t h a t d i r e c t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y in c o m p a r i s o n w i t h e a r l i e r e l e c t o r a l e p i s o d e s . P r e s i d e n t C e r e z o h i m s e l f w a s m o r e c a r e f u l , n o t i n g t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y w a s still v e r y p o w e r f u l , b u t h e n e v e r t h e l e s s p o r t r a y e d h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as a d e m o c r a t i c r e g i m e b e g i n n i n g to h a v e a n i m p a c t in t h e c o u n t r y . A p r o c e d u r a l l y correct election, with open participation of o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , is a k e y c o m p o n e n t of t h e l i b e r a l - r e p r e s e n t a t i v e m o d e l of d e m o c r a c y , b u t t h e c o n t e x t of e l e c t i o n s in t h e 1 9 8 0 s r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s whether

liberal-representational

criteria were met. State violence

about had

a b a t e d d u r i n g t h e c a m p a i g n f o r t h e C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y in 1 9 8 4 , b u t i n c r e a s e d d u r i n g t h e 1 9 8 5 e l e c t o r a l c a m p a i g n . In a d d i t i o n ,

continuing

r u m o r s of p o s s i b l e c o u p s , t h e w e a k e n e d s t a t e o f s e v e r a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , the general disregard for h u m a n rights, a violent A r m y intervention on the c a m p u s of the national university, and the c o n t i n u i n g e c o n o m i c and social crisis together produced a less-enthusiastic c a m p a i g n than might have b e e n e x p e c t e d for a country r e t u r n i n g to d e m o c r a c y . M o r e o v e r , the institutional r o l e of t h e A r m y in r u r a l a r e a s , n o t t o m e n t i o n in o t h e r w a l k s of e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l l i f e , s e r v e d t o r e d u c e p u b l i c c o n f i d e n c e in t h e h o n e s t y o f t h e u p c o m i n g elections. Finally, s k e p t i c i s m w a s w i d e s p r e a d a b o u t the real

Guatemalan

74

strength

of

whatever

government

Politics

would

emerge

from

the

elections

( R o s a d a G r a n a d o s 1 9 8 6 : 5). In s u m , t h e i m m e d i a t e c o n t e x t of t h e e l e c t o r a l e v e n t s w a s p r o b l e m a t i c at b e s t a n d t h o r o u g h l y a n t i d e m o c r a t i c at w o r s t . G u a t e m a l a ' s h u m a n rights record b e t w e e n 1975 and 1985 w a s as bad as a n y in t h e h e m i s p h e r e , n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t i n g p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . E l e c t o r a l a n d p a r t y s t r u c t u r e s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , t h e c l i m a t e of t h e

election

p e r i o d w a s o n e of v i o l e n c e a n d f e a r , t h o u g h p e r h a p s m i x e d w i t h h o p e . T h e net i m p a c t of y e a r s of r e p r e s s i o n w a s t h a t t h e q u a l i t y o f e l e c t i o n s in 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 8 5 w a s s e r i o u s l y d i l u t e d . In o n e v i e w , in f a c t , h o l d i n g a n e l e c t i o n u n d e r t h e e x i s t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s in 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 8 5 w a s a " d e c e p t i o n " that h a d t h e e f f e c t , p e r h a p s u n i n t e n d e d , of i n h i b i t i n g G u a t e m a l a ' s t r a n s i t i o n to d e m o c r a c y ( S t i x et a l . ) . T h e q u e s t i o n , t h e n , is n o t w h e t h e r e l e c t i o n s i p s o f a c t o m e a n d e m o c r a c y e x i s t s b u t w h e t h e r p o l i c i e s that c r e a t e e l e c t i o n s as p a r t of a c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y p l a n c a n l e a d to a m o r e d e m o c r a t i c e n v i r o n m e n t . I n s i s t i n g that n o c h a n g e r e s u l t e d f r o m t h e s e e l e c t i o n s is as i n a p p r o p r i a t e as i n s i s t i n g that t h e h i s t o r i c a l p a t t e r n w a s b r o k e n by t h e C e r e z o e l e c t i o n . G u a t e m a l a ' s 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 8 5 e l e c t i o n s m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h e p u b l i c p o l i c y o f e l i t e s w i t h f a l t e r i n g p o w e r w h o w e r e s e e k i n g to r e e s t a b l i s h a s t a t e r e s p o n s i v e to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . P e r h a p s in s p i t e of t h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y a s p e c t of t h e e l e c t i o n s , d e m o c r a t i c g r o w t h w a s p o s s i b l e a f t e r t h e s e e l e c t i o n s a s a d i r e c t r e s u l t of them and the return to constitutional rule. E v i d e n c e f o r v e r i f y i n g t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y is n o t m e r e l y in t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e d u r e s t h e m s e l v e s b u t in t h e q u a l i t y of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d t h e policy p e r f o r m a n c e of the C e r e z o g o v e r n m e n t f o l l o w i n g the e l e c t i o n s . F i n a l l y , t h e A r m y ' s d e m o c r a t i z i n g r o l e is a q u e s t i o n t h a t c a n b e a n s w e r e d only partially w i t h o u t additional data on the p e r f o r m a n c e of the C e r e z o administration after 1985 and the S e r r a n o administration after 1990.

Notes 1. S o m e even point to the direct positive impact of the military on Guatemalan d e m o c r a c y . One perhaps whimsical e x a m p l e is the c o l o n e l w h o remarked during the municipal-election campaign in 1980 that the Army should reduce each field to single candidates in order to prevent the dissent that w e a k e n s d e m o c r a c y . Another e x a m p l e is the statement by a U.S. State Department o f f i c i a l , w h o a c k n o w l e d g e d that the military had fraudulently intervened in G u a t e m a l a ' s 1 9 7 8 e l e c t i o n to i m p o s e General R o m e o Lucas Garcia but w e n t on to assert that this intervention had prevented the electoral victory of Mario Sandoval Alarcön of the National Liberation M o v e m e n t , a proviolence leader of the extreme right and e n e m y of liberal democracy. 2. Every landless peasant needed the nearby landowner, because of vagrancy laws and debt-peonage arrangements instituted by the Liberals. But although every landowner needed labor, he did not need any s p e c i f i c individual peasant.

The Military

as

Democratizes

75

3. A l t h o u g h many d i m e n s i o n s of s o c i o p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e are central to the D e c a d e of Spring, C r u z Salazar sees the c h a n g e s in the m i l i t a r y ' s role as the m a j o r d i s c o n t i n u i t y with earlier periods, the o n e indicator that the 1944 m o v e m e n t w a s revolutionary and not merely a continuation of business as usual: " I t ' s p e r h a p s in the q u e s t i o n of the a r m e d f o r c e s w h e r e the p r o c e s s of c h a n g e is most e v i d e n t " ( C r u z Salazar: 11). 4. " C i v i c action" is the use of the military in projects aimed at social and econ o m i c infrastructure projects, such as road building. Part of the rationale for civic action w a s political: p r o j e c t s s o u g h t to gain public s u p p o r t for the m i l i t a r y , a l t h o u g h their long-run impact w a s to create e c o n o m i c o p p o r t u n i t i e s for military o f f i c e r s and to facilitate subsequent militarization of rural areas. 5. F o r m e r President A r é v a l o w a s s c h e d u l e d to run in the 1963 e l e c t i o n s . Secret U.S. " p e r m i s s i o n " for the c o u p apparently w a s based on fear of A r é v a l o : it w a s assumed he would win a free election (Black: 20). 6. In 1957 the A I D O f f i c e of Public Safety began a training program for the G u a t e m a l a n National Police. T w e n t y - f o u r A m e r i c a n s began p a t r o l l i n g with the National Police and the j u d i c i a l e s — t h e political p o l i c e — o n a daily basis. From 1957 until C o n g r e s s a b o l i s h e d it in 1974, the p r o g r a m p u m p e d $4.4 million into the G u a t e m a l a n p o l i c e , trained 425 a g e n t s in the U.S., and provided e x t e n s i v e s u p p l i e s of a r m s , anti-riot e q u i p m e n t , and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and transportation technology. . . . A m o n g other services, A I D set up the police t r a i n i n g c e n t e r . . . [and] o r g a n i z e d and equipped the P M A ( [ A m b u l a t o r y Military P o l i c e — P o l i c í a Militar A m b u lante] the units hired out to landlords and to suppress c a m p e s i n o unrest) ( W O L A 1983: 9). 7. Between the 1974 election and the 1982 coup, Ríos had b e c o m e an active, b o r n - a g a i n Christian e v a n g e l i s t and b r o u g h t this style of politics to g o v e r n m e n t , including w e e k l y s e r m o n s on national television. See the video When The Mountains Tremble for s o m e e x a m p l e s of this style. T h e same video includes an interview with a second m e m b e r of Ríos M o n t t ' s j u n t a , Colonel M a l d o n a d o Shaad, w h o is dressed completely in white d u r i n g his interview. M a l d o n a d o ' s r e s p o n s e s illustrate another dimension of the m i l i t a r y ' s style. 8. Rabine describes the three phases of the counterinsurgency plan d e v e l o p e d in the early 1980s: (1) the forcible s e p a r a t i o n of the guerrilla i n s u r g e n c y f r o m its base a m o n g the rural indigenous population through m a s s a c r i n g and terrorizing that civilian population (Victory ' 8 2 ) ; (2) the creation of social, political, and e c o n o m i c institutions to replace the shattered fabric of indigen o u s life (Stability ' 8 3 ) ; and (3) the l e g i t i m a t i o n of these institutions through a return to civilian f o r m s of g o v e r n m e n t (Institutional R e n e w a l ' 8 4 ) (Rabine: 61). For a detailed study of all three p h a s e s of the c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y plan, see " C o n trainsurgencia": 5 - 2 3 . In an interview in 1987, an official of the U.S. e m b a s s y in G u a t e m a l a a c k n o w l e d g e d that the e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s w a s part of a c o u n t e r i n s u r gency orientation, inasmuch as the A r m y now recognized that it could not maintain o r d e r in G u a t e m a l a by itself and n e e d e d civilian assistance. For a c o n t r a r y v i e w

76

Guatemalan

Politics

a s s e r t i n g that the recent e l e c t i o n s are not part of a c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y strategy but a n e w b e g i n n i n g for G u a t e m a l a , s e e F a u r i o l and L o s e r 1985 a n d 1988. 9. T h e patrols, d e v e l o p m e n t p o l e s , and o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s that w e r e part of the c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y p l a n are d i s c u s s e d m o r e fully later in this c h a p t e r . 10. R í o s had b e e n q u i c k to d e s c r i b e his a s c e n s i o n to p o w e r in 1982 as " a n act of G o d , " but he w a s c u r i o u s l y silent a b o u t his r e m o v a l f r o m o f f i c e . 11. S e e K r u e g e r a n d E n g e ; a n d W O L A 1 9 8 8 . O n e f a i r l y t y p i c a l r e p o r t of A r m y v i o l e n c e illustrates the t y p e of r e p r e s s i o n a i m e d at I n d i a n c o m m u n i t i e s : O n July 19, [1981,] a r m y t r o o p s m a r c h e d on a tiny San M i g u e l A c a t á n village, C o y á , and o p e n e d fire on the p e o p l e . T h e v i l l a g e r s tried to d e f e n d t h e m s e l v e s w i t h s t i c k s a n d s t o n e s , b u t , by t h e n , a r m y t r u c k s had a l r e a d y b r o u g h t 2 0 0 soldiers into S a n M i g u e l and the original t r o o p s in C o y á w e r e b a c k e d by h e l i c o p t e r s u p p o r t . At n o o n , a c o m b a t p l a n e j o i n e d the helic o p t e r in m a c h i n e - g u n n i n g and b o m b i n g the r e s i d e n t s . O n e s u r v i v o r testified that the a r m y killed 150 to 3 0 0 p e o p l e in C o y á . A c c o r d i n g to the g o v e r n m e n t , the A r m y had d i s c o v e r e d " a s c h o o l f o r c o m m u n i s t indoctrination" in the village and 25 " s u b v e r s i v e s " had b e e n killed ( D a v i s a n d H o d s o n : 3). 12. M a n y o b s e r v e r s h a v e used the w o r d " g e n o c i d a l " to d e s c r i b e this rural w a v e of v i o l e n c e b e c a u s e the c o m b i n e d p h y s i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l d i s r u p t i o n has c e n t e r e d on Indian areas. T h e c a l l o u s n e s s of the g o v e r n m e n t d u r i n g the p e r i o d is reflected in the w o r d s of a N o r t h A m e r i c a n o b s e r v e r , an early s u p p o r t e r of the R í o s M o n t t military c o u p , w h o t e s t i f i e d in C o n g r e s s in s u p p o r t of a bill to s e n d military aid to G u a t e m a l a d u r i n g this t i m e . In his r e m a r k s he s t a t e d that the use of the w o r d " g e n o c i d e " to d e s c r i b e the a n t i s u b v e r s i o n c a m p a i g n w a s not a c c u r a t e , s i n c e (to p a r a p h r a s e his r e m a r k s ) m o r e I n d i a n c h i l d r e n w e r e b e i n g b o r n e a c h m o n t h than w e r e b e i n g killed. T h i s s t a t e m e n t did not a p p e a r in the printed r e c o r d of the hearing. 13. F o r c e d to l e a v e b e c a u s e of t h e r e p r e s s i o n , o n e d e p a r t i n g d e v e l o p m e n t w o r k e r d e s c r i b e d the c h a n g e s : W h e n 1 f i r s t a r r i v e d , t h e r e w a s no k i l l i n g . J u s t a c o h e s i v e c o m m u n i t y s t r u c t u r e b a s e d on t r a d e and i m p r o v e d c o o p e r a t i v e a c t i o n , w i t h r e g u l a r f e s t i v a l s a n d p u b l i c g a t h e r i n g s to e n j o y life and to w o r s h i p . T h e i r d e s i r e to m e e t A m e r i c a n s and t r a v e l to s e e t h e i r o w n n a t i o n , e v e n if o n f o o t , w a s g r e a t . T h e y w a n t e d to l e a r n to r e a d a n d to o b t a i n n e w s k i l l s in the s c h o o l s s o as to i m p r o v e their w e l l b e i n g . N o w , no o n e w a n t s to talk to s t r a n g e r s , t r a v e l , g a t h e r to p r a y , l e a r n n e w s k i l l s or to r e a d . E v e r y o n e g r o u p s their f a m i l i e s i n d o o r s as m u c h as p o s s i b l e and a s k s not " W i l l I be killed by the a r m y ? , " but " W h e n will I be k i l l e d by the a r m y ? " ( q u o t e d in D a v i s and H o d s o n : viii). Another description: P e o p l e a r e f e a r f u l of h o l d i n g m e e t i n g s , p a r t i c u l a r l y of c o o p e r a t i v e s , w h i c h P r e s i d e n t L a u g e r u d G a r c i a ( 1 9 7 4 to 1 9 7 8 ) a p p e a r e d to p r o m o t e . M a n y l e a d e r s b e c a m e k n o w n a n d v e r y v i s i b l e , and m a n y of t h e m are d e a d t o d a y . In t h e I x c á n a r e a . . . , t h e a r m y h a s n o w d e s t r o y e d m o s t of the c o o p e r a t i v e s and killed m a n y of t h e i r l e a d e r s . In o t h e r areas, there h a s b e e n a c o n s c i o u s e f f o r t by the g o v e r n m e n t a n d the a r m y to d i s m a n tle c o o p e r a t i v e s and to e l i m i n a t e t h e i r l e a d e r s ( q u o t e d in D a v i s a n d H o d s o n : 17).

The Military

as

Democratizes

77

14. T h e b e s t s i n g l e s o u r c e s u m m a r i z i n g f o r m a l - l e g a l as w e l l as c o n t e x t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y e l e c t i o n in 1 9 8 4 is t h e w o r k of H é c tor R o s a d a G r a n a d o s . M u c h of the data h e r e c o m e s f r o m his p u b l i c a t i o n s . 15. F o r d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t s of t h e P A C s , s e e A m e r i c a s W a t c h 1 9 8 3 ; and K r u e g e r and E n g e : 2 3 - 2 6 . For an e x a m p l e of h o w t h e s t a t e d p u r p o s e of P A C s w a s t a k e n as t h e r e a l p u r p o s e , e v e n in t h e " r e s p o n s i b l e " m e d i a , s e e C S M o n i t o r 1 2 / 1 3 / 8 3 : 5. For an e s p e c i a l l y p o i g n a n t d e s c r i p t i o n of civil p a t r o l s as a m e c h a n i s m of s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n , s e e P a u l and D e m a r e s t . A s w e s h a l l s e e in C h a p t e r 9, the P A C s r e m a i n a m a j o r part of G u a t e m a l a n life a n d a m a j o r and d i f f i c u l t issue on the political a g e n d a in 1 9 9 2 . 16. F o r a t h o r o u g h a n a l y s i s and d e s c r i p t i o n of this p r o g r a m , s e e I G E 1984 and 1 9 8 6 ; and K r u e g e r a n d E n g e : 1 7 - 5 2 . F o r e v i d e n c e of U . S . f i s c a l a n d i d e o l o g i c a l s u p p o r t f o r the p r o g r a m , see G N N 1 2 / 8 4 : 7; and E n f o p r e n s a 1 2 / 7 / 8 4 : 4. F o r d o c u m e n t a t i o n of the c h u r c h ' s o p p o s i t i o n , s e e V M 3 / 1 8 - 2 4 / 8 5 : 3. 17. O n e i n d i c a t o r of t h i s w a s t h e m i l i t a r y ' s f r e q u e n t c l a i m that an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c a m p a i g n to d i s c r e d i t G u a t e m a l a w a s c o n t i n u i n g , i g n o r i n g the p r o g r e s s m a d e in h o l d i n g e l e c t i o n s and r e t u r n i n g to d e m o c r a c y . 18. R o s a d a G r a n a d o s p r o v i d e s a c o n c i s e s u m m a r y of t h e s i t u a t i o n at the t i m e of the e l e c t i o n s : T h e e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n d r e w to a c l o s e w i t h p o l i t i c a l p a r t y p r o n o u n c e m e n t s that had no o r g a n i c r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e n a t u r e of the internal cris i s G u a t e m a l a w a s s u f f e r i n g . T h e r e b e i n g n o d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n the p o s i t i o n s of t h e [ m a j o r ] p a r t i e s , c i t i z e n s d e a l t w i t h p r o p o s a l s that w e r e a m b i g u o u s a n d a b s t r a c t , and that w e r e of little s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r an e l e c torate that n e e d e d s p e c i f i c r e s p o n s e s a n d c l e a r o r i e n t a t i o n s . I m m e r s e d in this c o n f u s i o n a n d s k e p t i c a l a b o u t the e l e c t i o n s in the f a c e of p r e d i c t i o n s that there w o u l d be m a s s i v e a b s t e n t i o n i s m , G u a t e m a l a n s w e n t to the polls ( R o s a d a G r a n a d o s 1986: 5). 19. S p o k e s m e n f o r b o t h the A r m y a n d t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r m a d e it c l e a r . . . that f u n d a m e n t a l r e f o r m s w o u l d not be t o l e r a t e d , a n d that t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t ' s e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s w o u l d h a v e to fit w i t h i n s t r i c t l i m i t s . T h e h e a d of C A C 1 F , the political arm of G u a t e m a l a ' s p r i v a t e s e c t o r , m a d e it c l e a r . . . that a n y m o v e by the n e w c i v i l i a n g o v e r n m e n t to initiate land r e f o r m w o u l d be i n t o l e r a b l e ( R a b i n e : 6 2 - 6 3 ) . 20. R o s a d a G r a n a d o s ' s data are s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t than t h o s e in T a b l e 4.4, but t h e pattern is s i m i l a r . He r e p o r t s that of the total n u m b e r of v o t e s c a s t ( 1 , 9 0 7 , 7 7 1 ) , 12 p e r c e n t of the v o t e r s ( 2 2 8 , 7 7 1 ) d e p o s i t e d a null or b l a n k b a l l o t . Of the 3 . 8 m i l lion e l i g i b l e to r e g i s t e r to v o t e , 2 7 . 5 p e r c e n t ( 1 , 0 4 5 , 3 9 9 ) did not r e g i s t e r . Of t h o s e r e g i s t e r e d ( 2 , 7 5 4 , 6 0 1 ) , 3 9 p e r c e n t did not s u b m i t a v a l i d v o t e : e i t h e r they did not v o t e at all or they v o t e d with a b l a n k ballot or their b a l l o t s w e r e n u l l i f i e d . T h e total n u m b e r of valid v o t e s ( 1 , 6 7 9 , 0 0 0 ) c o m e s to 4 4 p e r c e n t of the e l i g i b l e p o p u l a t i o n of 3.8 m i l l i o n ( R o s a d a G r a n a d o s 1986: 9).

5

Economic Policy During the Cerezo Administration V i n i c i o C e r e z o ' s Christian D e m o c r a t i c Party had several p r o f e s s e d g o a l s w h e n he took o f f i c e in January 1986, including g e n e r a t i n g r e n e w e d e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , m o v i n g the nation t o w a r d d e m o c r a c y , a n d s t a y i n g in o f f i c e t h r o u g h the term. D C G goals also i n c l u d e d social r e f o r m , as seen both in their o v e r all ideology and in many public s t a t e m e n t s that c o m m i t t e d the g o v e r n m e n t to a i d i n g the p o o r e s t s e c t o r s of s o c i e t y . T h i s c h a p t e r c e n t e r s on t w o m a j o r t h e m e s : (1) the e c o n o m i c and social context in G u a t e m a l a at the time of President C e r e z o ' s i n a u g u r a t i o n ; a n d ( 2 ) the g o v e r n m e n t ' s fiscal a n d e c o n o m i c g r o w t h policies and their impact on m e a s u r e s of s o c i o e c o n o m i c progress. If e c o n o m i c growth is the p r i m a r y goal f o r e c o n o m i c elites, social r e f o r m is an important goal for popular-sector groups. O n e test of d e m o c r a c y , then, is in t e r m s of political conflict a r o u n d the mix of policies that led to the accumulation of capital for e c o n o m i c g r o w t h versus policies that led to the distribution of wealth via social r e f o r m . If w e view policy outputs as a competition between the traditional minority h o l d i n g power and the p o p u l a r organizations s e e k i n g to use the political access p r o m i s e d by the new d e m o c r a t i c f o r m s of g o v e r n m e n t , w e can evaluate the strength of G u a t e m a l a n d e m o c r a c y . P o l i c i e s to p r o d u c e g r o w t h a n d g e n e r a t e i n v e s t m e n t c a p i t a l d u r i n g the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n c l u d e d a r e n e w e d o r i e n t a t i o n to an e x p o r t m o d e l of g r o w t h , a t t e m p t s at tax r e f o r m a n d b u d g e t a r y c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n , a n d p u r s u i t of n e o l i b e r a l m e a s u r e s in g e n e r a l . T h i s c h a p t e r f o c u s e s o n t h e s e p o l i c y a r e a s a n d C h a p t e r 6 will f o c u s on d e m a n d s f o r s o c i a l r e f o r m f r o m the p o p u l a r s e c t o r s a n d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s policy r e s p o n s e s .

Economic Conditions and Policy Responses Stable economic development has eluded Guatemala for decades, although e c o n o m i c g r o w t h t o o k p l a c e d u r i n g m u c h of t h e p e r i o d . In t h e p a s t t h r e e

79

80

Guatemalan

Politics

decades the e c o n o m y has s u f f e r e d f r o m an oscillating cycle of b u r s t s of prosperity and periods of stagnation or decline, s o m e t i m e s as a result of d o m e s t i c public policy but often as a result of the vagaries of the international e c o n o m y . The country has traditionally depended on outside markets both as a destination for its c o m m o d i t i e s and as a source of capital and other necessary imports. Guatemala has long had an e c o n o m y driven by exports, particularly agricultural c o m m o d i t i e s such as c o f f e e , cotton, sugar, bananas, meat, and c a r d a m o n . In the 1980s, it b e c a m e an exporter of crude oil as well. Since the early 1980s, achieving any growth at all, let alone sustained development, has been the main challenge for economic policymakers. Economic growth averaged 7 percent per year from 1970 to 1980, but between 1981 and 1984, G N P per capita declined by 15.5 percent. T h e growth rate was zero in 1984 (Guatemala! 5/85: 3).' One consequence was the lack of revenue for government programs, from counterinsurgency to subsidies for development to social services. Equilibrium among contending factions has been maintained over the decades, but the insurgency of the 1980s drove costs of government upward at a time when economic growth was declining. The result was a serious crisis in the political economy. 2 After 1981, the Quetzal began to lose its value relative to the dollar, with which it had been on equal par value for several decades. By 1985, it had declined to $.50, a 100 percent devaluation. Exports increased 5 percent in 1984 over 1983, but still the growth rate was zero. 3 Deficits forced the government to sell some 20 percent of G u a t e m a l a ' s gold reserves during this period, in spite of f o r e i g n assistance f r o m the United States and several European institutions. T h e foreign debt had grown f r o m $ 2 3 9 million in 1976 to $2.4 billion in 1984 and $2.9 billion in m i d - 1 9 8 5 (Guatemala.' 5/85: 10). International financial pressures, including suggestions f r o m the International Monetary Fund, led the military regimes of Ríos Montt and Mejia Víctores to attempt a tax increase f o r civilian elites to help pay f o r the counterinsurgency war. Until then, the Army and the government had been diverting much of the international assistance received to military spending, leaving fewer resources for customary expenditures, including social spending and subsidies for the s y s t e m ' s e c o n o m i c growth. Because of the deficits, the IMF had s o m e input in this decision. Although I M F strategy usually involves cutting social s p e n d i n g in order to shift r e v e n u e s to growth activities, in G u a t e m a l a social s p e n d i n g was so low, and social needs so high, that the I M F solution essentially consisted of increasing government r e v e n u e s — a l t h o u g h the s o c i a l - s p e n d i n g policy w a s assailed publicly. T h e pressures on G u a t e m a l a n leaders were real; the I M F had withheld f u n d s f r o m an earlier a g r e e m e n t with G u a t e m a l a b e c a u s e the government was not meeting I M F ' s guidelines (Guatemala! 5/85: 3).

Economic Policy & the Cerezo

Taxation

81

Administration

Policy

T a x e s l o n g h a v e b e e n an i n f l a m m a t o r y i s s u e in G u a t e m a l a . F o r d e c a d e s , t h e e l i t e s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s i s t e d all s e r i o u s a t t e m p t s to t a x t h e i r a s s e t s . A s o f the early 1960s, for e x a m p l e , i n c o m e tax a p p l i e d only to p r o f i t s f r o m business activities, with no tax on " p u r e l y p e r s o n a l i n c o m e " ( S o m m e r f i e l d : 6 8 ) . A p r o g r e s s i v e p e r s o n a l i n c o m e t a x w a s e n a c t e d in 1 9 6 3 , " a f t e r n i n e u n s u c c e s s f u l a t t e m p t s in t h e p r e v i o u s t e n y e a r s " ( S o m m e r f i e l d : 1 8 3 ) . In 1 9 8 3 , R í o s M o n t t p r o p o s e d a 1 0 p e r c e n t v a l u e - a d d e d t a x ( I V A ) o n all c o m m e r c i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s . O p p o s i t i o n to this p r o p o s a l f r o m t h e c i v i l i a n e l i t e w a s p a r t of t h e r e a s o n R í o s w a s o v e r t h r o w n in A u g u s t 1 9 8 3 . G e n e r a l M e j í a V í c t o r e s , his s u c c e s s o r , i m p o s e d t h e I V A , b u t at 7 p e r c e n t , r e s u l t i n g in f u r t h e r d e c l i n e s in q u a l i t y of l i f e as i n c r e a s e d c o s t s w e r e p a s s e d o n t o c o n s u m e r s e v e n w h i l e u n e m p l o y m e n t i n c r e a s e d ( G u a t e m a l a ! 5 / 8 5 : 9). Mejía Víctores also proposed other fiscal policies, including

addi-

tional t a r i f f s on s o m e i m p o r t e d g o o d s , n e w t a x e s o n e x p o r t s , a n d a 3 0 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e in i n t e r e s t r a t e s . E l i t e r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e s e p r o p o s a l s w a s s w i f t and successful. General s t r i k e s — l o c k o u t s — w e r e threatened. Mejía withdrew the m e a s u r e s and fired his f i n a n c e minister, C o l o n e l F i g u e r o a Villarte ( G u a t e m a l a ! 5 / 8 5 : 3). B e c a u s e t h e d o m e s t i c m a r k e t c o n t i n u e d to b e d e v a s t a t e d b y t h e e c o n omy and c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y v i o l e n c e d u r i n g this period, G u a t e m a l a w a s f o r c e d to r e l y o n e x p o r t s , e v e n m o r e t h a n in t h e p a s t , to s o l v e its d e v e l o p m e n t p r o b l e m s . O f t h e $ 4 8 2 m i l l i o n r e c e i v e d in l o a n s in 1 9 8 5 , half w e n t to the a g r o - e x p o r t i n g s e c t o r , a n d this, c o u p l e d w i t h the low w a g e s paid by l a n d o w n e r s , a l l o w e d t h e m to c o m p e t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y in s p i t e of w e a k m a r kets in t h a t a r e n a . I n d u s t r i a l o w n e r s f a r e d l e s s w e l l , g e t t i n g o n l y s u b s i d i e s f o r c h e a p e l e c t r i c i t y a n d f o r f u e l s , w h i c h d i d n o t o f f s e t t h e h i g h c o s t s of i m p o r t e d r a w m a t e r i a l s ( G u a t e m a l a ! 5 / 8 5 : 10). I n c r e a s i n g f o r e i g n d e b t , t h e continuing fiscal deficit, weak currency, and poverty and u n e m p l o y m e n t c o m b i n e d to m a k e d e v e l o p m e n t of an i n t e r n a l m a r k e t as t h e b a s i s f o r s u s tained e c o n o m i c growth difficult.4 The

tax

program

implemented

in N o v e m b e r

1987, for

example,

included a p r o p o s e d property tax, with the a m o u n t to be a s s e s s e d on the b a s i s of s e l f - v a l u a t i o n ( " a u t o - a v a l ú o " ) . 5 T h e r e w e r e p r o t e s t s f r o m t h e right, i n c l u d i n g t h e M L N p a r t y a n d C A C I F , w h i c h s a w t h i s m e a s u r e as a p r e c u r s o r to l a n d r e f o r m . N o r m a l l y p r o - D C G

I n d i a n s in t h e

highland

m u n i c i p a l i t y of T o t o n i c a p á n a l s o p r o t e s t e d ( G N I B 1 - 2 / 8 8 : 12). M i n i s t e r of D e f e n s e G e n e r a l H é c t o r G r a m a j o a p p e a r e d b e f o r e an a s s e m b l y of l e a d i n g c i v i l i a n e l i t e s to s e e k a p p r o v a l f o r t h e c o n c e p t of t h e e n t i r e s o c i e t y s u p p o r t i n g t h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y , a n d s p e c i f i c a l l y to a s k t h e m t o a p p r o v e n e w taxes and n e w m i n i m u m w a g e s b e i n g p r o p o s e d by the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e leader of the m i l i t a r y ' s " r e f o r m i s t " w i n g s o u g h t elite s u p p o r t for steps to

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pay what the Christian D e m o c r a t s were calling at the time the "social debt." In response, private leaders rejected the plan and continued r e f u s i n g to pay higher wages (VM 6/88: 3). As of early 1987, the Christian Democrats felt that the tax reform situation had been resolved to the detriment of the business elite; the party believed the r e f o r m s w e r e progressive and that elite sectors had been defeated in their attempts to prevent them. An o p p o s i n g point of v i e w , however, suggested that in fact the military w a s acting to weaken the economic position of its chief rival for control of wealth, the business elite. 6 In other words, resolving the tax reform situation had little to do with the needs or d e m a n d s of popular organizations pressing for relief, and everything to do with competition a m o n g elite sectors of society. The Christian D e m o c r a t i c Party profited f r o m the d e n o u e m e n t to the extent that the political strength of its rivals in the intransigent business community could be defeated by the p a r t y ' s allies in the military. Later d e v e l o p m e n t s suggested that in fact the business elites were more s u c c e s s f u l in this round than the visible evidence on taxation reveals. The Cerezo Administration

at

Mid-Term

Results of policy decisions in the first half of the C e r e z o administration were mixed. T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s position was that the e c o n o m y had shown signs of progress since 1980: the gross domestic product had grown by 2.5 percent ( P C R P 1/88: 4). 7 S e c o n d , the inflation rate was only 9.6 percent for 1987, while private investment increased 14 percent. Third, exports of nontraditional products increased over 60 percent, and fourth, the u n e m ployment rate decreased 25 percent. The Quetzal was said to be exchanging at a rate very near the official rate of Q2.50 to the dollar. 8 The government claimed success in stabilizing inflation and exchange rates and therefore would m o v e , in 1988, to reactivate the e c o n o m y on a larger scale, using credit to assist small- and medium-size producers and to distribute f u n d s to municipalities (8 percent of the national budget, per the constitution) ( P C R P 1/88: 4). But the ratio of the value of exports to the servicing of foreign debt, which had dropped f r o m 16.5 percent in 1970 to 11.7 percent in 1979, increased dramatically in the 1980s, to 35.8 percent in 1987 ( M o m e n t o 2/89: tables, 5 - 6 ) . A variety of social conditions reflected the e c o n o m i c crisis and at the same time augured poorly for the future. The number of people employed in the industrial sector in 1987 had increased by 2.49 percent since 1985, but the 1987 figure was still 5.9 percent less than the figure for 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 1 (Momento 4/89: table, 5). Based on data from the Guatemalan ministry of labor, " 7 2 percent of the population cannot meet their basic needs, c o m pared to 50 percent in 1 9 8 6 " ( U O G 7/8/89: 4). T h e agrarian p r o b l e m s

Economic

Policy & the Cerezo

Administration

83

a d d r e s s e d by the R e v e r e n d A n d r é s G i r ó n ' s P r o - L a n d M o v e m e n t ( s e e C h a p t e r 6) r e m a i n e d u n s o l v e d . 9 Overall health a n d health s e r v i c e s indicators w e r e d i s m a l . Infant m o r tality rates p e r s i s t e d at a s t r o n o m i c a l levels, 7 3 . 7 per t h o u s a n d , a rate that d i s g u i s e s the e v e n h i g h e r rate in rural a r e a s ( 1 6 0 d e a t h s per t h o u s a n d births). Each of the ten principal c a u s e s of infant mortality c o n t i n u e d to be a c o n d i t i o n or d i s e a s e p r e v e n t a b l e by p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s ( G u a t e m a l a n H u m a n R i g h t s C o m m i s s i o n — G H R C ) . H e a l t h c a r e s e r v i c e s c o n t i n u e d to be b a d l y s k e w e d in f a v o r of u r b a n a r e a s , e s p e c i a l l y G u a t e m a l a City. T h e health care situation w a s c o m p l i c a t e d f u r t h e r by r e p r e s s i o n of health c a r e p r o m o t e r s , the s p e n d i n g policy of the health ministry ( w h i c h d i s b u r s e d 8 0 p e r c e n t of its r e s o u r c e s in G u a t e m a l a City), a n d the r e q u i r e m e n t that m e d ical f a c i l i t i e s report s u s p i c i o u s i n j u r i e s to the military ( R O G 1/88: 12). 1 0 F i n a l l y , y o u t h g a n g s b e g a n to p r o l i f e r a t e in G u a t e m a l a City (On Their Own). Social e q u i t y c o n t i n u e d to be a m a j o r p r o b l e m . " In short, h a l f w a y through the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n the e c o n o m y did not h a v e the c a p a c i t y to p r o d u c e capital f o r e i t h e r m a j o r s o c i a l - s p e n d i n g p r o g r a m s to r e d u c e s o m e of s o c i e t y ' s i n e q u i t i e s or for the m a s s i v e capital a c c u m u l a t i o n s u s t a i n e d d e v e l o p m e n t i m p l i e s . 1 2 F r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e of the p o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s , the m a c r o i n d i c a t o r s w e r e u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . 1 3 Economic

Policy,

1987-1989

In 1986, the n e w Christian D e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t had e l a b o r a t e d an econ o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t plan to s t i m u l a t e g r o w t h . At the o u t s e t G u a t e m a l a relied h e a v i l y on e x t e r n a l e c o n o m i c aid. F r o m 1 9 8 6 to S e p t e m b e r 1989, e c o n o m i c a n d military a s s i s t a n c e f r o m the U n i t e d States totaled $ 8 7 8 million, of w h i c h a b o u t half w a s l o a n s . An a d d i t i o n a l billion d o l l a r s c a m e f r o m i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e n d e r s in w h i c h the U n i t e d S t a t e s had v o t i n g p o w e r , of w h i c h less than $ 1 0 million w e r e d o n a t i o n s and the rest loans. 1 4 In 1988 a n d 1989, the g o v e r n m e n t initiated a s h i f t t o w a r d a n e o l i b e r a l , e x p o r t d r i v e n m o d e l of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , w h a t P r e s i d e n t C e r e z o r e f e r r e d to as the " m o d e r n i z a t i o n " of the e c o n o m y , s u m m a r i z e d in t w o e c o n o m i c plans, the " P l a n for 5 0 0 D a y s , " a n d " G u a t e m a l a 2 0 0 0 . " 1 5 T h e nation b e g a n 1989 with fairly d i s m a l e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s a r o u n d s o m e p o s i t i v e s i g n s of r e c o v e r y . A p r e c i p i t o u s d r o p in c o f f e e prices, a n d h e n c e s t a t e r e v e n u e , p o s e d a n e w e c o n o m i c threat and again r e v e a l e d G u a t e m a l a ' s d e p e n d e n c e on international m a r k e t s b e y o n d its control. D u r ing 1989, policy d e c i s i o n s r e v e a l e d a r e n e w e d e m p h a s i s on e x p o r t s as the b a s i s of the c o u n t r y ' s e c o n o m i c g r o w t h m o d e l . A l t h o u g h e x p o r t - d r i v e n g r o w t h m o d e l s are not a new a l t e r n a t i v e in G u a t e m a l a n history, the n e w plan e m p h a s i z e d nontraditional exports, d e f i n e d as a n y t h i n g except the traditional a g r i c u l t u r a l c o m m o d i t i e s a n d c r u d e oil. T h e i n s p i r a t i o n f o r this

84

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model was the successful East Asian examples such as Taiwan and Korea (.Momento 2/89: 10). In June, to stimulate exports and reintegrate the country more tightly into international markets, the government passed a law creating opportunities for assembly industries (maquila) and new incentives for nontraditional exports; it predicted the new program would generate more than a half billion dollars in foreign exchange annually and would create some seventy thousand jobs annually. These incentives, which reduced the cost of production for exported goods, were essentially tax vacations for from two to ten years on all import taxes and tariffs, income generated from exports, and export taxes on assembled products (PCRP 6/89: 3). The immediate results of these policies were mixed. The government projected about 4 percent growth in G D P for both 1989 and 1990, which would mark the first sustained departure "from the economic stagnation of the past decade"—no small achievement. Based on data from the first half of 1989, the projected annual growth rates for sugar, bananas, and basic grains were positive (uncorrected for population growth), but coffee and cotton projected declines. Inasmuch as coffee revenues produce about 35 percent of G u a t e m a l a ' s export earnings, the 4.9 percent decline in output implies a significant revenue shortfall for the government. In fact, the data suggested a 6.9 percent increase in earnings from exports, but a 7.1 increase in imports. The size of the budget deficit for 1989 was projected to be 370.7 percent of the 1988 deficit (which in turn was 138.3 percent greater than the 1987 deficit) {Momento 8/89: 11-12). In August 1989, the government announced its "500-Day Program," the blueprint for Guatemalan development for the remainder of the Cerezo administration, and part of the D C G ' s overall master plan for Guatemalan development, "Guatemala 2000." Essentially neoliberal, the program centered on privatization and nontraditional exports, combined with a trickledown approach to social justice. 1 6 Policy aims included reducing state expenditures by 10 percent, creating free-trade zones, and reviewing minimum wages and ways to control inflation. The first concrete steps, however, were devaluation of the Quetzal to Q2.78 to the dollar and deregulation of interest rates (PCRP 9/89: 3 - 4 ) . 1 7 The government subsequently let the Quetzal float, permitting the market to determine the actual value of the currency. The Quetzal immediately dropped in value to Q3.60 to the dollar but appeared to be averaging about Q3.25 by the end of 1989. Although this clearly meant a drop in purchasing power for the impoverished majority, the president of the Bank of Guatemala described the new policy as properly neoliberal, adding that "the stability of the Quetzal will now depend on the strength of the economy and not on subsidies that lead only to more international indebtedness" (PCRP 11/89: 5). 1 8

Economic Policy & the Cerezo

Administration

85

T h e p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r of G u a t e m a l a n s w a s f u r t h e r r e d u c e d b y i n f l a t i o n a r y p r e s s u r e s . I n f l a t i o n w a s 1 2 . 3 p e r c e n t a n d 11.1 p e r c e n t f o r 1 9 8 7 a n d 1 9 8 8 , r e s p e c t i v e l y , f a i r l y s i g n i f i c a n t in t h e c o n t e x t of c u r r e n c y d e v a l u a t i o n , t h e l a c k of i n c r e a s e s in s a l a r i e s a n d w a g e s , a n d i n c r e a s e s in c o s t s of basic services and c o n s u m e r goods. Inflation for the period from D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 8 t o J u n e 1 9 8 9 w a s 4 . 7 p e r c e n t . T h e d e v a l u a t i o n of t h e Q u e t z a l to 2 . 7 8 to t h e d o l l a r h a d i m m e d i a t e e f f e c t s : t h e G u a t e m a l a n d a i l y El

Grafico

r e p o r t e d t h a t c o n s u m e r p r i c e s i n c r e a s e d b y 9 p e r c e n t in t h e t w e n t y - f o u r hours after the devaluation a n n o u n c e m e n t . 1 9 T h e C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a d t a k e n s e v e r a l c o n c r e t e s t e p s to s p u r e c o n o m i c g r o w t h a n d to h e l p a c c u m u l a t e i n v e s t m e n t c a p i t a l , b u t o n t h e q u e s t i o n of m i n i m u m w a g e s , t h e g o v e r n m e n t h a d p r o m i s e d o n l y a q u i c k r e v i e w , a " r a p i d p r o c e s s of c o n s e n s u s - b u i l d i n g ( c o n c e r t a c i o n ) " f o r n e w s a l a r y l e v e l s ( P C R P 1 1 / 8 9 : 5 ) . T h e c o n c r e t e s t e p s t a k e n in 1 9 8 9 r e s u l t e d in n e w d e c l i n e s in t h e w o r k i n g s e c t o r s ' q u a l i t y of life. 2 ' 1 E c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e s h o w e d s o m e s u c c e s s e s . In 1 9 8 9 , t h e

GNP

r o s e 4 p e r c e n t ( n o t c o r r e c t e d f o r p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h , itself a b o u t 3 p e r c e n t ) . T h e t h r e e m a j o r p r o d u c t i v e s e c t o r s of t h e e c o n o m y , a g r i c u l t u r e ,

com-

m e r c e , a n d industry, e a c h s h o w e d p o s i t i v e g r o w t h rates that w e r e l o w e r t h a n t h e 4 p e r c e n t o v e r a l l g r o w t h , s u g g e s t i n g s l o w e r g r o w t h in t h e s e m a j o r sectors. C o n s t r u c t i o n , electricity p r o d u c t i o n , and transportation w e r e the most d y n a m i c growth sectors and accounted for the overall growth rate {Momento

3 / 9 0 : 2).

T h e e x p o r t - d r i v e n n a t u r e of t h e m o d e l c o n t i n u e d to b e t h e o f f i c i a l p o l i c y . B u t c o f f e e p r i c e s d r o p p e d d r a s t i c a l l y in 1 9 8 9 ( f r o m $ 1 3 0 t o $ 7 0 a s a c k ) , s o t h a t a l t h o u g h p r o d u c t i o n h a d d o u b l e d in 1 9 8 9 o v e r 1 9 8 8 , " t h e foreign exchange generated was similar ($251 million and $288 million, respectively)." Nontraditional exports, mostly vegetables, generated $20.3 m i l l i o n in f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e b y t h e e n d of 1 9 8 9 , still r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l c o m p a r e d t o c o f f e e . T h e m a q u i l a p r o g r a m o r g a n i z e d in 1 9 8 9 , to a s s e m b l e s e m i f i n i s h e d i m p o r t s a n d t h e n r e - e x p o r t t h e m , w i t h tax b r e a k s , led to d i s a p p o i n t i n g r e s u l t s in t h e f i r s t q u a r t e r of 1 9 9 0 , w i t h o n l y f o u r h u n d r e d n e w jobs and $20.5 million output generated ( R O G Sp/90: 6 - 7 ) . G o v e r n m e n t d e f i c i t s c o n t i n u e d to p o s e a c h a l l e n g e f o r p o l i c y m a k e r s , r i s i n g 1 4 1 . 3 p e r c e n t f r o m 1 9 8 8 to 1 9 8 9 , f r o m Q 2 8 4 . 9 m i l l i o n t o Q 6 8 7 . 4 m i l l i o n

(Momento

3 / 9 0 : 13, t a b l e ) . N o n t r a d i t i o n a l e x p o r t s w e r e a m a j o r f a c t o r in t h e p o s i t i v e

growth

n o t e d in 1 9 8 9 . T r a d i t i o n a l e x p o r t s d e c l i n e d in v a l u e f r o m 1 9 8 8 to 1 9 8 9 b y 4.5 p e r c e n t , but nontraditional o n e s i n c r e a s e d their p e r f o r m a n c e by 77.7 percent, p r o d u c i n g 29.8 p e r c e n t of the total value of exports ( P C R P 2/90: 8). A s of t h e e n d of 1 9 8 9 , t o u r i s m h a d b e c o m e t h e s e c o n d l a r g e s t e a r n e r of foreign e x c h a n g e , producing about $ 1 5 0 million d u r i n g the year ( P C R P 2/90: 7 - 8 ) .

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T h e growth pattern was not without problems. Total foreign debt as o f the end o f 1 9 8 8 , based on data from the B a n k o f G u a t e m a l a , was $ 2 , 6 4 8 billion, 1 5 0 percent o f the debt as o f 1 9 8 0 ( M o m e n t o 2 / 9 0 : 5 ) . 2 1 In 1 9 8 8 , debt service equaled 3 6 . 5 percent o f the value o f exports and cost Guatemala 4 0 percent o f the f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e earned. L a r g e l y b e c a u s e o f the decline in the value o f the Quetzal, s e r v i c e on this debt rose from 5 . 6 percent o f tax revenues in 1 9 8 7 to 1 4 . 9 percent in 1 9 8 9 ; and from 3 . 8 percent o f public spending in 1 9 8 7 to 10.1 percent in 1 9 8 8 , even with tax reform measures taken into account ( M o m e n t o 2 / 9 0 : 10). T h e overall growth rate in 1 9 8 9 , m o r e o v e r , owed much o f its performance " t o an influx o f international l o a n s . " Although the G N P grew 4 percent in 1 9 8 9 , the foreign debt rose $ 1 5 0 million to nearly $ 3 billion. Inflation was 13 percent for the year. U n e m p l o y m e n t and u n d e r e m p l o y m e n t averaged 4 7 percent. " T h e b u y i n g p o w e r o f 1 9 8 9 s a l a r i e s was l e s s than one fifth o f its 1 9 8 0 e q u i v a l e n t " ( G M G 5 / 9 0 : 3 ) . 2 2 In addition to these m a c r o e c o n o m i c problems, e c o n o m i c policies o f the Cerezo administration s o m e t i m e s resulted in hardship for the working poor, which meant resistance from popular organizations. In late 1 9 8 9 , for example, the government was c o n s i d e r i n g privatizing its e l e c t r i c i t y - g e n e r a t i n g industry (Industria Nacional de E l e c t r i c i d a d — I N D E ) , and the proposed layo f f s o f s o m e two thousand I N D E w o r k e r s had produced a very militant union in the utility. T h e e c o n o m i c plan also called for ending tariff barriers, which would force Guatemalan industry to compete internationally with its antiquated and inefficient equipment, forcing yet another hardship on workers who were likely to be squeezed in order to maintain competitiveness. Floating the Quetzal in N o v e m b e r 1 9 8 9 had led to a de facto currency devaluation o f 3 0 percent, the Quetzal falling from Q 2 . 7 0 to the dollar to Q 3 . 4 0 . This led to higher fuel prices, which in turn led, in late 1 9 8 9 , to bus fares doubling and e l e c t r i c and water rates being raised substantially. Currency fluctuations continued in 1 9 9 0 . D e c i s i o n s in early April resulted in the Quetzal dropping from Q 3 . 2 2 to the dollar to Q 4 . 9 0 . Although the government described these as h o m e g r o w n decisions aimed at improving the e c o n o m y for the next administration, e v i d e n c e suggests that international lenders were conditioning future credit on the policies ( G M G 5 / 9 0 : 2 ) . 2 3 Presumably responding to these c o n d i t i o n s and other isthmus events, the presidents o f Central A m e r i c a met in an e c o n o m i c summit in Antigua, G u a t e m a l a , in J u n e . T h e resulting " P l a n o f A c t i o n " and " D e c l a r a t i o n o f A n t i g u a " set out s p e c i f i c p o l i c y a c c o r d s , including a t i m e t a b l e , to help achieve a Central A m e r i c a n E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y . In the two documents the presidents " a g r e e d to a c o o r d i n a t e d regional approach to p r o m o t e industrial and agricultural production and attract new i n v e s t m e n t . " B u t neither document m e n t i o n s either agrarian reform or new s o c i a l w e l f a r e programs. In short, the presidents p r o p o s e d a f r e e - m a r k e t , t r i c k l e - d o w n

Economic

Policy b the Cerezo

Administration

87

approach at the regional level, an attempt to re-create and surpass the Central American C o m m o n Market in new and more difficult e c o n o m i c circumstances (WPost 6/20/90: 35A). 2 4 U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker appeared at the closing of the three-day economic s u m m i t at Antigua. Though the role of the United States was vague at this point, Washington apparently planned to act as coordinator of international assistance to the region. Yet at the same time, overall U.S. assistance to Central America was declining and f u n d s were shifting to Nicaragua and Panama (NYTimes 6/19/90: 3A). The real value of U.S. participation remained unclear, except for symbolic support for the economic model endorsed by the presidents. Fiscal and Budgetary

Politics

The problematic aspects of economic growth were reflected in fiscal policy as well. The Christian Democrats had publicly embraced reduced government spending early in their administration, but in fact the budget increased by 24 percent in 1989, with a projected additional increase of 5.2 percent in 1990 (ROG Sp/90: 7). 2 5 Little or none of these new funds were programmed for productive capacity or social programs. In the 1990 budget the combined expenditure for the military and internal security ministries was 32 percent, and 21 percent was foreign debt service and repayment, totaling 53 percent in these types of expenditures (GMG 5/90: 5). The 1990 budget was not approved by the National Congress, however, so the 1989 budget remained in effect, at least at the beginning of the year. This budget applied to about half of the state's activities, since municipallevel government, certain autonomous agencies, and the national university had separate budget processes ( M o m e n t o 1/90: 2). Considerable legal confusion surrounded this event: on the one hand, Guatemalan law appeared to give the president carte blanche, since he has the authority to make adjustments in the budget when there is no formal budget approval. On the other hand, the law also says that in the absence of a budget, the previous year's budget remains in effect {Momento 1/90: 2 - 4 ) . In a compromise President Cerezo accepted the 1989 budget for 1990, but received authority to make internal adjustments in the budget received. The government had projected an increase, from 1989 to 1990, of Q 1 8 9 million, two-thirds of which was destined for increased salaries. The government then (1) assigned all ministries the same percentage that had been proposed in the 1990 unapproved budget; (2) dropped the salary increases from the new plan of action; and (3) allowed the previously proposed cuts in two ministries to stand. According to D C G figures, these actions resulted in a budget document that actually saved Q17.7 million, which was then redistributed amongst various ministries. This meant, in effect,

88

Guatemalan

Politics

that there would be no salary increases for state employees affected by this measure. This, added to the impact of inflation and the decline of the Quetzal, meant a 35 percent decline in purchasing power for Guatemalans (Momento 1/90: 5). Revenue projections in the budget included anticipated foreign assistance. Loans included a large increase in funds from European nations but a decline, from $80 million in 1989 to $56.5 million in 1990, f r o m the United States. Most of this revenue went to shore up the budget in the face of declining foreign exchange, to service the debt, and to prevent further currency devaluation. Again, relatively little even of foreign aid was for productive investment or for social programs (ROG Sp/90: 7). In terms of revenue projections, 85 percent would be generated by taxes on goods and services, and only 15 percent would come from property and income taxes. 2 6 Very little in the total budget process suggested a policy commitment toward redistributing resources or providing opportunities for Guatemala's impoverished majority. The overall conclusion by 1990 was mixed economic performance, in spite of reasonable economic indicators over the first six months of the year. The construction sector was a leader in generating growth in 1989, but it suffered major setbacks in 1990. Agricultural production maintained or increased production levels, especially in domestic food products, responding to scarcities caused by earlier crop failures ( M o m e n t o 8/90: 1 - 3 , 20). The projected rate of the government's deficit for the year, as of mid-1990, was only slightly (1.6 percent) worse than the 1989 deficit, an improvement over previous performances. The balance of payments remained negative. C o f f e e exports rose dramatically in volume, after the international quota system was dismantled, but the price dropped by 50 percent in 1990, showing a net gain of about 3 percent over the corresponding first semester of 1989. Overall, traditional and nontraditional exports both showed significant growth in production and value of exports for the period. But two factors countered the positive impact of exports on general growth. First, imports soared to $715.8 million, up 33.1 percent compared to 1989's first semester. Second, there was a significant negative flow of capital, including capital flight and amortization as well as declines in foreign investment and international credit ( M o m e n t o 8/90: 1, 5 - 6 , 7 - 9 , 21-table). 2 7 The principal fiscal problems, as of mid-1990, included the governm e n t ' s lack of liquid assets; excessive liquidity in the private financial market; deepening of the negative balance of payments; the pressures of foreign debt; a general recession in economic activity; and the effects of these last two on employment levels and on price inflation ( M o m e n t o , 8/90: 19). Thus, there was scant overall success for the neoliberal economic plan, in spite of several years of concerted and well-financed policy efforts to maintain an export-driven growth model.

Economic Policy & the Cerezo

Developments

in

Administration

89

1990

S u b s e q u e n t w o r l d e v e n t s put greater strains on G u a t e m a l a ' s e c o n o m y later in 1 9 9 0 . T h e I r a q i i n v a s i o n of K u w a i t a n d s u b s e q u e n t G u l f W a r led t o s h a r p l y i n c r e a s e d f u e l p r i c e s f o r G u a t e m a l a , p r o d u c i n g a n e w w a v e of i n f l a t i o n w h e n t h e C e r e z o g o v e r n m e n t i n c r e a s e d oil p r i c e s b y 4 5 p e r c e n t f o r c o n s u m e r s ( N Y T i m e s 1 1 / 7 / 9 0 : A l l ; T O A 1 0 / 1 7 / 9 0 : 8). F o r c o n s u m e r s the direct impact w a s o b v i o u s , but e v e n the indirect impact, on debt and d e v e l o p m e n t programs, for example, suggested continuing long-term probl e m s . A s a n oil p r o d u c e r , G u a t e m a l a , if n o t t h e m a j o r i t y o f its c i t i z e n s , s t o o d to b e n e f i t f r o m these i n c r e a s e d prices, w h i c h m a d e exploitation of t h e e s t i m a t e d t w e n t y - s i x m i l l i o n b a r r e l s of r e s e r v e s e c o n o m i c a l l y f e a s i b l e . O u t p u t in late 1 9 9 0 w a s f o u r t h o u s a n d b a r r e l s d a i l y , " l e s s t h a n 15 p e r c e n t of c o n s u m p t i o n " ( T O A 1 0 / 1 7 / 9 0 : 8 ) . O t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t s d u r i n g t h e y e a r s u g g e s t e d s h i f t s b o t h in p o l i c y a n d in t h e n a t u r e of t h e e c o n o m y . In J u l y t h e w o r l d m a r k e t f o r c a r d a m o n , a s p i c e t h a t is o n e of G u a t e m a l a ' s m a i n e x p o r t s , c o l l a p s e d , a n d t h e g o v e r n m e n t s u s p e n d e d all e x p o r t s in o r d e r t o p r o t e c t t h e p r i c e f o r its p r o d u c ers ( C e n t r o a m e r i c a Hoy

7 / 3 0 / 9 0 : 11). F i n a l l y , m o r e r e s o u r c e s w e r e a p p a r -

e n t l y t u r n i n g to d r u g - r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s : " G u a t e m a l a n o w t i e s f o r f i f t h p l a c e in w o r l d p r o d u c t i o n of o p i u m " ( R O G S p / 9 0 : 7 ) . In s h o r t , t h e g o v e r n m e n t s e e m e d less able to w e a t h e r the e c o n o m i c s t o r m s c r e a t e d by international developments.

Conclusion T h i s o v e r v i e w of m a c r o e c o n o m i c and fiscal policy r e v e a l s a m i x e d patt e r n . T h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t w a s c o m m i t t e d to e c o n o m i c p l a n s t o i n c r e a s e t h e e x p o r t - d r i v e n n a t u r e of t h e e c o n o m y , t h e r e b y h o p i n g to s t i m u l a t e g r o w t h . T h i s p o l i c y s t y l e m e s h e d n i c e l y w i t h t h e n e o l i b e r a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c v i s i o n s p r e v a i l i n g in t h e W e s t . A s a r e s u l t , a g o o d d e a l of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a s s i s t a n c e f l o w e d t o G u a t e m a l a . S e c u r i n g t h i s a s s i s t a n c e w a s a v i c t o r y f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e m i l i t a r y t h a t s u p p o r t e d it, i n a s m u c h a s i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g i t i m a c y as a r e s u l t of e l e c t i o n s w a s a g o a l of t h e m i l i t a r y ' s c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y p l a n in t h e e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s . 2 X T h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f p o l i c y c h o i c e s a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i d r e s u l t e d in e c o n o m i c g r o w t h i n d i c a t o r s f o r at l e a s t s o m e p e r i o d s of t h e C e r e z o p r e s i dency, but g r o w t h w a s inconsistent. T o s o m e extent, this can be b l a m e d on policy inefficiency and excessive state spending, the argument raised by c o n s e r v a t i v e o p p o n e n t s o f t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s . B u t p r o b a b l y to a greater d e g r e e , the e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s of the g o v e r n m e n t resulted f r o m international market factors over which President Cerezo had no control. F i n a l l y , of c o u r s e , p o l i c y c h o i c e s w e r e t h e m s e l v e s l i m i t e d by t h e r e a l ity o f t h e d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l s c e n e . A l t h o u g h f o c u s i n g h e r e p r i m a r i l y o n

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m a c r o e c o n o m i c p o l i c y p r o v i d e d an i n c o m p l e t e p i c t u r e o f t h e

relative

s t r e n g t h of d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l s e c t o r s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e s o c i a l i m p a c t of t h e D C G ' s p o l i c i e s w a s a p p a r e n t : i n f l a t i o n a n d o t h e r r e s u l t s p o i n t e d to h a r d e r t i m e s f o r G u a t e m a l a ' s c i t i z e n s . T h e o v e r a l l p a t t e r n of p o l i c y o u t p u t s s u g g e s t e d c o n t i n u i n g d e c l i n e s in t h e a b i l i t y of p o p u l a r s e c t o r s t o m e e t t h e i r b a s i c n e e d s a s w e l l a s t h e c o n t i n u i n g d o m i n a n c e of e l i t e s e c t o r s . Of particular c o n c e r n w a s the impact of m a c r o e c o n o m i c policies a n d p r o g r a m s o n b a s i c q u a l i t y of life, w h i c h in G u a t e m a l a m e a n s f o o d s e c u r i t y , g i v e n t h e p r e c a r i o u s n a t u r e of m a r g i n a l e c o n o m i c l i f e . In f a c t , t h e n a t i o n w a s f a c e d w i t h a c o n t i n u i n g c r i s i s in f o o d s e c u r i t y f o r a v a r i e t y of r e a s o n s . I n f l a t i o n a n d a d e c l i n i n g c u r r e n c y m a d e t h e c o s t s of a g r i c u l t u r a l i n p u t s f o r p r o d u c i n g b a s i c g r a i n s v e r y p r o b l e m a t i c , c a u s i n g d e c l i n e s in f o o d a v a i l ability. Replenishing food supplies with international donations, a sometimes necessary humanitarian gesture, also drives production

downward

since they increase supply without reducing the costs for d o m e s t i c p r o d u c ers. On the c o n s u m e r side, inflation and c o r r e s p o n d i n g l o w e r

salaries

r e d u c e d d e m a n d , as o p p o s e d to n e e d , f o r f o o d a n d b a s i c g r a i n p r o d u c t s . In s h o r t , m a c r o e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s a i m e d at i m p r o v i n g t h e b a l a n c e o f payments and increasing foreign exchange earnings may have made sense at t h e m a c r o l e v e l : t h e c o m b i n a t i o n s o f f a c t o r s m a d e it m o r e r a t i o n a l f o r s m a l l p r o d u c e r s , t r a d i t i o n a l l y t h e s o u r c e of t h e b u l k of d o m e s t i c f o o d s u p p l y , t o t u r n to n o n t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s . B u t p o l i c y m a k e r s s e e m to h a v e i g n o r e d t h e s e c t o r a l c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r s m a l l p r o d u c e r s , as w e l l a s t h e n e g a t i v e i m p a c t o n f o o d s e c u r i t y f o r m o s t of t h e p o p u l a c e ( M o m e n t o 4/90: 7 - 9 ) . Both international and domestic incentives are thereby reducing the d o m e s t i c f o o d supply. C o n t i n u i n g i m p o v e r i s h m e n t h a s an i m p a c t o n p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , especially since such c h a n g e s lead to i n c r e a s e d o r g a n i z a t i o n by g r o u p s r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e p o o r e s t s e c t o r s of s o c i e t y . S i n c e t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s w e r e o f f i c i a l l y c o m m i t t e d to d e m o c r a c y a n d at l e a s t s o m e m e a s u r e of s o c i a l r e f o r m , t h e y n e e d e d to r e s p o n d to t h e s e p r e s s u r e s .

Notes 1. The overall g r o w t h rate has d e c l i n e d almost every year s i n c e the early 1 9 8 0 s , i n c l u d i n g drops of 3.5 percent in 1982, 2.6 percent in 1 9 8 3 , and 1.0 percent in 1985, with a p o s i t i v e growth rate of .5 percent in 1 9 8 4 and a zero rate of increase in 1 9 8 6 (Millett: B 3 1 2 ) . Based on data from the Bank of Guatemala, from 1 9 7 8 to 1988, the a c c u m u l a t e d g r o w t h rate in the industrial sector w a s 4 . 9 7 percent, an average annual rate of 0 . 4 5 percent (Momento 4 / 8 9 : table, 4). 2. A Christian D e m o c r a t i c analysis of the roots of this crisis states: G u a t e m a l a has passed through a profound s o c i o - e c o n o m i c crisis in the early 1980s, due to a recession in the international e c o n o m y , d i f f i c u l t i e s

Economic

Policy & the Cerezo

Administration

91

in o b t a i n i n g e x t e r n a l f i n a n c i n g , a d r o p in p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t , c a p i t a l flight, and the b r e a k d o w n of the C e n t r a l A m e r i c a n C o m m o n M a r k e t . T h i s crisis is s t r u c t u r a l in o r i g i n , and c a n be s e e n in t h e fact that the m a j o r i t y of G u a t e m a l a ' s i n h a b i t a n t s d o not h a v e their b a s i c n e e d s m e t . T h e crisis is i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d to t h e l o w l e v e l of n a t i o n a l i n c o m e and its ine q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n , to a high rate of u n e m p l o y m e n t , to t h e i n a d e q u a t e integration of the G u a t e m a l a n e c o n o m y in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y , and to the i n a d e q u a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r in n a t i o n a l d e v e l o p ment (Maldonado Ruiz: 42). 3. A c c e s s i b i l i t y to the U.S. m a r k e t has b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r t a n t to the G u a t e m a l a n e c o n o m y . T h e v a l u e of e x p o r t s to the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n c r e a s e d f r o m 2 8 . 2 p e r c e n t in 1970, to 2 9 . 7 p e r c e n t in 1979, to 4 0 . 4 p e r c e n t in 1987. 4. T h e s e q u e s t i o n s s h o w t h a t t h e r e w e r e s e v e r a l key e c o n o m i c i s s u e s that m i g h t h a v e b e e n d i s c u s s e d and d e b a t e d in the e l e c t o r a l c a m p a i g n s of 1984 a n d 1985. T h e a b s e n c e of s e r i o u s d e b a t e on n o n t r i v i a l i s s u e s in t h o s e c a m p a i g n s c a n not b e a s c r i b e d to the lack of s e r i o u s p r o b l e m s in G u a t e m a l a . 5. T h a t is, o w n e r s t h e m s e l v e s set the d e c l a r e d v a l u e of their p r o p e r t y . T h i s t i m e - t e s t e d a p p r o a c h to t a x a t i o n w a s used in the e a r l y part of the c e n t u r y on rural l a n d s , a l l o w i n g the U n i t e d Fruit C o m p a n y to g r o s s l y u n d e r a s s e s s its p r o d u c t i v e lands, for e x a m p l e . T h e a t t e m p t by the A r b e n z land r e f o r m p r o g r a m to c o m p e n s a t e the c o m p a n y for e x p r o p r i a t i o n s a c c o r d i n g to t h e v a l u e s the c o m p a n y itself h a d d e c l a r e d w a s part of the b a s i s for the c o m p a n y ' s v e n d e t t a a g a i n s t the g o v e r n m e n t in the 1950s. 6. T h e s e a n a l y s e s w e r e e x p r e s s e d in i n t e r v i e w s held in G u a t e m a l a City and in M e x i c o City in J a n u a r y 1987. 7. T h i s s o u r c e d o e s not e x p l a i n w h e t h e r this f i g u r e t a k e s into a c c o u n t p o p u lation g r o w t h or if it is m e r e l y a n o n a d j u s t e d m e a s u r e of g r o w t h . 8. T h e Q u e t z a l ( Q ) is G u a t e m a l a ' s unit of c u r r e n c y . S i n c e the end of W o r l d W a r II, t h e Q u e t z a l had b e e n on p a r w i t h t h e U . S . d o l l a r , but a f t e r 1 9 8 0 it w a s i m p o s s i b l e for G u a t e m a l a to s u s t a i n that r e l a t i o n s h i p , as t h e c u r r e n c y b e g a n to d e v a l u e on the b l a c k m a r k e t . A m a j o r d i m e n s i o n of the s o c i a l j u s t i c e q u e s t i o n in the 1 9 8 0 s is the i m p a c t of d e v a l u a t i o n p o l i c y , w h i c h m a k e s e x p o r t s f e a s i b l e b u t r e d u c e s q u a l i t y of life d o m e s t i c a l l y . 9. A r e p o r t f r o m the G u a t e m a l a n C h u r c h in E x i l e c l a i m s that: T h e a g r a r i a n crisis g r o w s w o r s e e a c h day in e c o n o m i c , social and p o l i t i cal t e r m s . T h e large and m e d i u m sized f a r m s , w h i c h r e p r e s e n t 2.2 p e r c e n t of total f a r m s , a b s o r b 65 p e r c e n t of c u l t i v a b l e l a n d , w h i l e the r e m a i n i n g 9 7 p e r c e n t h a v e only 35 p e r c e n t of the c u l t i v a b l e land. O f f i c i a l l y , t h e r e are 4 1 9 , 6 2 0 l a n d l e s s p e a s a n t s , and of t h e s e 3 0 9 , 1 1 9 are w i t h o u t any p e r m a n e n t w o r k . M e a n w h i l e , 1 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 h e c t a r e s of p r i v a t e land lie idle ( I G E 1988: 5). 10. R O G e s t i m a t e s that 9 0 p e r c e n t of t h e d e n t i s t s , 8 0 p e r c e n t of t h e p h y s i c i a n s , and 5 0 p e r c e n t of the n u r s e s are in G u a t e m a l a C i t y , w h i c h has no m o r e t h a n 3 0 p e r c e n t of the n a t i o n a l p o p u l a t i o n . S e e v o n H o e g e n for an a n a l y s i s of the g e o g r a p h i c c o n c e n t r a t i o n of d e v e l o p m e n t , r e f l e c t e d in e d u c a t i o n a l and i n v e s t m e n t i n d i c a t o r s . R O G ' s o v e r v i e w of h e a l t h c o n d i t i o n s in late 1987: E v e n the m o s t b a s i c h u m a n n e e d s of the m a j o r i t y of G u a t e m a l a n s are not m e t . A n e s t i m a t e d t h r e e o u t of e v e r y f o u r s u f f e r f r o m s o m e d e g r e e of

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Politics

m a l n u t r i t i o n , and only 2 0 p e r c e n t of the p o p u l a t i o n has a c c e s s to p o t a b l e w a t e r or to latrines. T h e m a j o r c a u s e s of illness and d e a t h in the c o u n t r y stem from malnutrition, gastrointestinal problems, including parasites, a n d r e s p i r a t i o n p r o b l e m s , s u c h as p n e u m o n i a . S u c h i l l n e s s e s c o u l d b e e a s i l y p r e v e n t e d or t r e a t e d if the p o p u l a t i o n w a s a d e q u a t e l y n o u r i s h e d , i m m u n i z e d , and a b l e to a f f o r d e v e n m i n i m a l c u r a t i v e (as d i s t i n c t f r o m p r e v e n t i v e ) h e a l t h s e r v i c e s . T h e r e is e v i d e n c e that the r e c e n t [ m i l i t a r y ] v i o l e n c e in t h e c o u n t r y has w o r s e n e d the a l r e a d y bad h e a l t h c o n d i t i o n s ( R O G 1/88: 12). 11. A c c o r d i n g to C o c k b u r n , o v e r a l l s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s w e r e in s e r i o u s d e c l i n e in 1988: T h e s t a g g e r i n g s o c i a l p o v e r t y h a s b e e n u n t o u c h e d by C e r e z o . . . . F o r t y p e r c e n t of all G u a t e m a l a n s live in e x t r e m e p o v e r t y , w i t h this f i g u r e r e a c h i n g 8 3 p e r c e n t in rural a r e a s . Half of all c h i l d r e n die b e f o r e r e a c h ing the a g e of n i n e , a n d 81 p e r c e n t [of t h e s e ] d i e f r o m m a l n u t r i t i o n . F i n a l l y , half t h e p o p u l a t i o n c a n ' t r e a d or w r i t e and 7 0 p e r c e n t of all d e a t h s in G u a t e m a l a r e s u l t f r o m r e a d i l y c u r a b l e d i s e a s e s , s u c h as t u b e r c u l o s i s and p n e u m o n i a ( C o c k b u r n : 2). 12. For an o v e r v i e w of 1 9 8 8 w i t h s i m i l a r f i g u r e s but w i t h a m o r e p o s i t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , see P C R P 4 / 8 9 : 3 - 4 . In this s o u r c e , f o r e x a m p l e , s u b s t a n t i a l p r i c e i n c r e a s e s in b a s i c c o m m o d i t i e s — s u c h as e l e c t r i c i t y for c o n s u m e r s , u p 25 p e r c e n t ; d i e s e l f u e l , u p 3 8 p e r c e n t ; a n d g a s o l i n e , u p 8 p e r c e n t — a r e d e s c r i b e d as a p p r o p r i ate " a d j u s t m e n t s in d i s t o r t e d p r i c e s f o r b a s i c s e r v i c e s . " For t h e E c o n o m i c C o m m i s s i o n on Latin A m e r i c a ' s r e v i e w of t h e 1 9 8 8 G u a t e m a l a n e c o n o m y , s e e "CEPAL." 13. O n e s u m m a r y of t h e first t w o y e a r s of t h e C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c l a i m s that p o p u l a r d e m a n d s h a v e g e n e r a l l y b e e n i g n o r e d as the g o v e r n m e n t w o r k e d to r e i n f o r c e its r e l a t i o n s with the t r a d i t i o n a l p i l l a r s of m i l i t a r y and e c o n o m i c p o w e r . . . . T h e r e are f e w i n d i c a t i o n s of a s i g n i f i c a n t s h i f t in policy to a d d r e s s the c o u n t r y ' s s e r i o u s s o c i a l and e c o n o m i c i n e q u i t i e s . G o v e r n m e n t m e a s u r e s to p r o m o t e e c o n o m i c g r o w t h h a v e i n s t e a d b e e n o r i e n t e d a r o u n d the " t r i c k l e d o w n " a p p r o a c h r e m i n i s c e n t of p r e v i o u s r e g i m e s ( C A R 1/29/88: 2 6 ) . 14. For a d e t a i l e d l i s t i n g of all f o r e i g n e c o n o m i c a n d m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e to G u a t e m a l a d u r i n g the C e r e z o r e g i m e , i n c l u d i n g b o t h l o a n s and d o n a t i o n s , see Special Service 10/89: 4 - 6 . 15. T h e c o m p l e t e text of t h e s e t w o e c o n o m i c p l a n s can be f o u n d in " P a r t i d o s demócrata." 16. T h e twin e m p h a s e s of t h e s e p l a n s in their v a r i o u s c o n f i g u r a t i o n s w e r e " t o s t i m u l a t e e x p o r t s w h i l e not i g n o r i n g d o m e s t i c n e e d s , t h e r e b y p r o d u c i n g a m o r e e q u i t a b l e and r e d i s t r i b u t i v e s t y l e of d e v e l o p m e n t , w h i c h in turn will p r o d u c e a m o r e stable and a u t o n o m o u s n a t i o n " ( P C R P 11/89: 5 - 6 ) . 17. Until 1980, t h e v a l u e of the Q u e t z a l w a s o n e U.S. d o l l a r . In the m i d 1980s, the Q u e t z a l w a s p e g g e d at Q 2 . 5 0 to the d o l l a r . B e f o r e the 1989 d e v a l u a t i o n , the Q u e t z a l had b e e n d e v a l u e d to Q 2 . 7 0 to the d o l l a r in 1988. At the s a m e time as

Economic Policy & the Cerezo

Administration

93

t h e A u g u s t 1 9 8 9 d e v a l u a t i o n to Q 2 . 7 8 , i n t e r e s t r a t e s w e r e f r e e d f r o m r e g u l a t i o n a n d a l l o w e d to f i n d t h e i r l e v e l s in t h e m a r k e t ( M o m e n t o 8 / 8 9 : 1). 18. In s p i t e of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s r h e t o r i c a b o u t its d e s i r e s to p u r s u e f r e e - m a r ket m o d e l s , t h e d e v a l u a t i o n p o l i c i e s a p p a r e n t l y w e r e c o n d i t i o n s of an A g e n c y f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t ( U S A I D ) l o a n of $ 7 5 m i l l i o n , d e s i g n e d as a s h o r t - t e r m s o l u t i o n to t h e c o m b i n a t i o n of a lack of f o r e i g n r e s e r v e s a n d a n e g a t i v e b a l a n c e of p a y m e n t s ( G M G 9 / 8 9 : 4). 19. G M G 9 / 8 9 : 4; d a t a o n e a r l i e r y e a r s f r o m Momento f r o m Momento 8 / 8 9 : 4.

3 / 8 9 : 1; d a t a f r o m 1 9 8 9

2 0 . B e c a u s e of i n f l a t i o n e v e n t h e m i n i m u m w a g e , o f t e n n o t p a i d , p r o d u c e d " l e s s t h a n half the c o s t of t h e d a i l y m i n i m u m d i e t . . . . E i g h t y - t w o p e r c e n t of r u r a l f a m i l i e s live in c o m p l e t e p o v e r t y , w i t h i n s u f f i c i e n t i n c o m e to m e e t t h e i r m o s t b a s i c n e e d s . . . . G u a t e m a l a , a l o n g w i t h H a i t i , h a s t h e w o r s t s o c i a l i n d i c a t o r s in all of Latin A m e r i c a " ( I G E 1988: 5). 2 1 . T h i s i s s u e of Momento p r o v i d e s a t h o r o u g h a n d d e t a i l e d b r e a k d o w n of d a t a on G u a t e m a l a ' s f o r e i g n d e b t . 2 2 . A s of e a r l y 1990, " G u a t e m a l a ' s f o r e i g n d e b t [ w a s ] 6 0 p e r c e n t of the c o u n t r y ' s total G N P and 4 2 p e r c e n t of e x p o r t e a r n i n g s " ( R O G S p / 9 0 : 7 ) . T h e i n f l a t i o n r a t e for all of G u a t e m a l a , f r o m 1 9 8 8 to 1 9 8 9 , h a d b e e n 1 7 . 9 p e r c e n t ( f o r G u a t e m a l a C i t y , 2 0 . 2 p e r c e n t ) (Momento 3/90: 6). 23. T h e Q u e t z a l is q u o t e d at Q 4 . 7 0 to t h e d o l l a r in Excelsior 4/27/90: 2A. For m e a s u r e s t a k e n to s h o r e u p t h e c u r r e n c y a f t e r t h e f l o a t i n g p r o c e s s f a i l e d to s t o p i n f l a t i o n a r y p r e s s u r e s , s e e R O G S u / 9 0 : 15. 2 4 . F o r d e t a i l s o n the C e n t r a l A m e r i c a n E c o n o m i c S u m m i t a n d t h e d e c i s i o n to p u r s u e the e l a b o r a t i o n of t h e C e n t r a l A m e r i c a n E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y , s e e P C R P 6 / 9 0 : 2 6 - 2 7 . F o r the t e x t s of d o c u m e n t s e m a n a t i n g f r o m t h e A n t i g u a s u m m i t m e e t -

ing, see Panorama

Centroamericana:

Temas y documentos

de debate

9/90.

25. T h i s s o u r c e a s c r i b e s t h i s s p e n d i n g to D C G p a t r o n a g e a n d c o r r u p t i o n . 26. " G u a t e m a l a n b i g b u s i n e s s o n l y c o n t r i b u t e s 7 p e r c e n t of t h e s e i n c o m e a n d p r o p e r t y t a x e s " ( G M G 5 / 9 0 : 3 - 4 ) . T a x p o l i c y h a s c e n t e r e d o n s a l e s t a x e s , an e x t r e m e l y r e g r e s s i v e p r o g r a m u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ( R O G S p / 9 0 : 8). 2 7 . F o r an a n a l y s i s of C e n t r a l A m e r i c a ' s r o l e in i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e , s e e

Momento

7/90: 2 - 1 2 .

28. T h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s a c k n o w l e d g e d f r o m the start that d e m o c r a c y w a s still in the f u t u r e , not the p r e s e n t . B e f o r e t h e 1 9 8 5 e l e c t i o n s t h e y w e r e s a n g u i n e in a s s e s s i n g t h e o v e r a l l s i t u a t i o n a n d u n d e r s t o o d that in t h e m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s m e a n t t h a t t h e d o m i n a n t g r o u p s in G u a t e m a l a n e e d e d a p u r e r f o r m of "electionism." As candidate C e r e z o remarked during his c a m p a i g n , "They need a President w h o can obtain m o n e y for the c o u n t r y " ( N Y T i m e s 4 / 2 1 / 8 5 : A8).

6

Popular Sectors During the Cerezo Administration In his 1985 campaign for the presidency, Vinicio C e r e z o had m a d e at least vague promises on behalf of the poor, but quick and easy e c o n o m i c solutions were impossible once he took office. Consistent with the spirit of a democratic opening, many popular-sector groups mobilized after the inauguration with the goal of influencing g o v e r n m e n t to improve the lot of the poor and working classes. Chapter 5 charted the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s policy attempts to raise investment capital and spur g r o w t h , and this o n e m e a s u r e s its responses to demands by the popular sectors for distribution of social wealth. One measure of d e m o c r a c y is the relative s u c c e s s of those g r o u p s f a v o r i n g social r e f o r m versus those w h o oppose r e f o r m s in favor of pursuing e c o n o m i c growth. Poverty w a s c o m m o n p l a c e in G u a t e m a l a d u r i n g the 1980s. A c c o r d i n g to data f r o m the United N a t i o n s E c o n o m i c C o m m i s s i o n on Latin A m e r i c a , the p e r c e n t a g e of G u a t e m a l a n s in poverty rose f r o m 7 9 percent in 1 9 8 0 to 8 7 p e r c e n t in 1987, a n d m e d i a n m o n t h l y w a g e s d e c l i n e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y b e t w e e n 1 9 8 4 a n d 1988 in rural a r e a s , i n d u s t r y , a n d e v e n g o v e r n m e n t j o b s . 1 As a result of these c o n d i t i o n s , p o p u l a r g r o u p s e x p r e s s e d their dem a n d s in m a r c h e s , d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , and other m o d e s of direct participation t h r o u g h o u t the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h e s e g r o u p s , s o m e with long trad i t i o n s a n d most with e n d u r i n g u n m e t d e m a n d s , i m m e d i a t e l y b e g a n to o r g a n i z e , or r e s u r f a c e , and a r t i c u l a t e their d e m a n d s . T h i s c h a p t e r s t u d i e s the activities and d e m a n d s of p o p u l a r sector g r o u p s in both rural and urban areas, as well as the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s r e s p o n s e s to t h e m . 2

Popular Groups and Policy Responses The Land

Movement

Land reform must be the issue in Guatemala. If we don't have it, we are going to continue to have blood and violence. 3 95

96

Guatemalan

Politics

T h e l a n d t e n u r e q u e s t i o n is p e r h a p s t h e k e y i s s u e in G u a t e m a l a n p o l i tics, b o t h as an h i s t o r i c a l l e g a c y a n d as t h e b a s i s f o r a d e c e n t q u a l i t y of l i f e f o r a l a r g e s e g m e n t of s o c i e t y . I n c r e a s i n g l a n d l e s s n e s s h a s b e e n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h c y c l e s , e s p e c i a l l y o n t h e S o u t h C o a s t , s i n c e at l e a s t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a g r i c u l t u r a l m o d e r n i z a t i o n in t h a t r e g i o n in t h e 1 9 5 0 s , w h i c h p r o d u c e d b o t h e c o n o m i c g r o w t h a n d m o r e s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e . In 1 9 8 0 , a m a s s i v e s t r i k e o c c u r r e d in t h e r e g i o n , at f i r s t a m o n g s u g a r c a n e w o r k e r s b u t l a t e r s p r e a d i n g t o o t h e r s e c t o r s as w e l l . 4 L e d by t h e C o m m i t tee for P e a s a n t Unity ( C o m i t é de U n i d a d C a m p e s i n a — C U C ) , the strike involved

t h o u s a n d s of w o r k e r s

including both migrants and

southern

c o a s t a l r e s i d e n t w o r k e r s as w e l l a s b o t h I n d i a n a n d l a d i n o w o r k e r s . A t f i r s t g l a n c e , t h e 1 9 8 0 s t r i k e a p p e a r e d to h a v e b e e n s u c c e s s f u l : t h a t it h a p p e n e d at all in t h e f a c e of t e r r i b l e a n d o p p r e s s i v e w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s was no small a c h i e v e m e n t . M o r e o v e r , agricultural production was interrupted, and the military g o v e r n m e n t raised the official daily

minimum

w a g e f r o m Q 1 . 9 0 to Q 3 . 2 0 . 5 T h e a f t e r m a t h , h o w e v e r , w a s a w a v e o f repression that targeted p r o g r e s s i v e clergy as well as peasant

leaders.

R e p r e s s i o n hit C U C l e a d e r s b o t h o n t h e S o u t h C o a s t a n d in t h e h i g h l a n d h o m e v i l l a g e s of m i g r a n t w o r k e r s . A f t e r 1 9 8 0 , t h e C U C w a s f o r c e d u n d e r g r o u n d , its l e a d e r s m u r d e r e d o r e x i l e d . The strikers had won the policy r e s p o n s e they had d e m a n d e d , a new official m i n i m u m w a g e , but constraints on open m a s s politics limited the s u b s t a n t i v e s u c c e s s of t h e s t r i k e . T h e g o v e r n m e n t d i d n o t e n f o r c e its n e w w a g e p o l i c y , a n d in m o s t c a s e s t h e m i n i m u m w a g e w a s n o t p a i d . In e f f e c t , t h e l a n d o w n e r s g o t w h a t t h e y w a n t e d : little e c o n o m i c c h a n g e p l u s t h e r e m o v a l o f " s u b v e r s i v e s . " In t h e s h o r t r u n , t h e s t r i k e ' s v i c t o r i e s w e r e Pyrrhic. S h o r t l y a f t e r P r e s i d e n t C e r e z o ' s i n a u g u r a t i o n in 1 9 8 6 , an o r g a n i z e d , articulated d e m a n d for land distribution b e g a n f u n c t i o n i n g : the P r o - L a n d M o v e m e n t , o r A N C , led b y t h e R e v e r e n d A n d r é s G i r ó n , a C a t h o l i c p r i e s t . 6 A m a j o r c a t a l y s t in t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e A N C w a s t h e d e c i s i o n by m a n y landowners around

1 9 8 5 to s h i f t t h e i r l a n d f r o m c o t t o n t o

sorghum,

b e c a u s e o f m a r k e t f a c t o r s . T h e r e s u l t w a s a m a j o r d e c r e a s e in t h e d e m a n d f o r r u r a l l a b o r at a t i m e w h e n r i s i n g p r i c e s a n d a w e a k e n i n g c u r r e n c y m a d e t h e n e e d f o r w o r k m o r e u r g e n t t h a n n o r m a l . R u r a l u n e m p l o y m e n t in t h e coastal

region

increased

dramatically.

The

marginal

progress

gained

through earlier organizing and even a poorly enforced m i n i m u m wage law had b e e n r e v e r s e d by the d e c i s i o n s of a f e w p l a n t a t i o n o w n e r s . T h e f o r mation of the A N C w a s t h e r e f o r e neither ideological nor d e m a g o g i c , nor e v e n t i e d s o l e l y to t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s . It b e g a n a s a s o c i a l m o v e m e n t r e f l e c t i n g b o t h t h e h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t a n d t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c r e a l i t y of t h e s o u t h - c o a s t r e g i o n . E c o n o m i c f a c t o r s w e r e t h e k e y i n g r e d i e n t s in t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s of t h e A N C ( C a m b r a n e s 1 9 8 6 a : 2 1 3 ) .

Popular Sectors & the Cerezo

Administration

97

T h e first public meeting led by R e v e r e n d Girón took place in February 1986, when the priest delivered a speech to about five thousand peasants outside his parish church in south coastal G u a t e m a l a ( C a m b r a n e s 1986a: 215). 7 In April and May 1986, Girón led a nonviolent march of s o m e sixteen thousand peasants f r o m Nueva C o n c e p c i ó n on the southcoast agricultural plains to G u a t e m a l a City, f i n i s h i n g with a rally at the National Palace. During the march and at the rally, the Christian D e m o c ratic g o v e r n m e n t e x p r e s s e d at least indirect support, inasmuch as G u a t e m a l a ' s first lady, Raquel Blandón de C e r e z o , appeared with the marchers. By late 1986, 100,000 persons were registered m e m b e r s of the association (Cambranes 1986a: 10). T h e A N C d e m a n d s w e r e not i n c o n s i s t e n t with a capitalist m a r k e t s y s t e m . T h e a s s o c i a t i o n d e m a n d e d land, but not e x p r o p r i a t i o n of land b e i n g used e f f i c i e n t l y . T h e land to be taken w o u l d be p u r c h a s e d f r o m o w n e r s w h o had a b a n d o n e d it or that was for sale and therefore already a v a i l a b l e . P u r c h a s e f u n d s w o u l d be a d v a n c e d by the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e new owners, the m e m b e r s of A N C , would o r g a n i z e into c o o p e r a t i v e s so that parcels would not b e c o m e tiny minifundios but w o u l d remain structurally u n c h a n g e d , e x c e p t that they w o u l d now be o w n e d by c o o p e r a tives. T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s loans w o u l d be repaid f r o m the p r o d u c t i o n of the c o o p e r a t i v e . T h e A N C exerted pressure through o r g a n i z a t i o n and public d e m o n strations; it was c o m m i t t e d to the nonviolent p h i l o s o p h y of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., with w h o m Girón had been involved in the United States (Cambranes 1986a: 7 8 - 7 9 ) . But its demands were urgent. Girón was e f f e c tive in using the media, his organization, and his legitimacy as a m e m b e r of the clergy. T h e A N C ' s adherents, probably b e c a u s e of e c o n o m i c desperation and the climate of fear, were very c o m m i t t e d to both the goals and methods of the organization. The m o v e m e n t was nonviolent, nonconfiscatory, and capitalist, that is, within the p r e v a i l i n g norms of Western private property relationships, although it was politically direct and insistent, and hence disruptive. From the b e g i n n i n g the private sector v o c i f e r o u s l y o p p o s e d the A N C ' s activities. CACIF, the coordinating organization of the private sector in Guatemala, published an open letter to President C e r e z o in July 1986, characterizing the m o v e m e n t as d e m a g o g i c ( C a m b r a n e s 1986a: 2 3 7 - 2 3 9 ) . T h e National Agricultural Union ( U n i ó n Nacional de A g r o e x p o r t a d o r e s — U N A G R O ) , the organization of the export-agriculture sector, accused Girón of b e i n g a " s e l f - a p p o i n t e d " and irresponsible agitator w h o was f o m e n t i n g class struggle. U N A G R O again expressed its opposition to any f o r m of agrarian reform in February 1987 ( G N I B 2/87: 9). Later, it instituted criminal proceedings against Girón for allegedly inciting criminal behavior (Boletín 3/26/87: 5).

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Guatemalan

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Early government r e s p o n s e s to the A N C included both s y m b o l i c and substantive actions. T h e A N C g a i n e d its legal status as an i n c o r p o r a t e d g r o u p early in the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and the g o v e r n m e n t publicly expressed support for its a i m s and methods. T h e government also repeatedly insisted on respect for the law and expressed dismay and alarm w h e n Girón allegedly made statements in early 1987 to the effect that impatient peasants might begin s e i z i n g land if g o v e r n m e n t did not respond m o r e quickly to their demands. In response to the e l i t e ' s public opposition to the A N C ' s d e m a n d s and to G i r ó n ' s style, the g o v e r n m e n t continued to reject the notion of "agrarian r e f o r m . " 8 Instead, it developed a market-based program of land acquisition. A b a n d o n e d land or land that owners were willing to sell w o u l d be purchased and then redistributed to peasant groups, with long-term m o r t gages. T h e first transfer of land to the A N C , in N o v e m b e r 1986, was the Monte Llano farm in Yepocapa, consisting of about 1,450 acres, for three hundred families. T h e farm w a s purchased by the Guatemalan g o v e r n m e n t for approximately $600,000. In December 1986, the minister of agriculture announced that the government would transfer three more farms to the A N C . In January 1987, the director of INTA (National Institute for Agrarian Transformation) revealed plans to purchase five additional f a r m s for transfer to peasant o r g a n i z a tions. At the same time, he strongly cautioned Reverend Girón and others against using illegal m e t h o d s to seize land ( G N I B 12/86: 1 3 - 1 4 ) . Four state-owned f a r m s (fincas nacionales) were transferred to peasant cooperatives in late March in the m u n i c i p a l i t y of San Pedro J o c o p i l a s ( B o l e t í n 4/10/87: 6). G o v e r n m e n t land policy also included attempts to increase taxes on idle land, efforts to adjudicate o n g o i n g land-title cases, credit and technical assistance to increase agricultural productivity, and subsidies for agricultural inputs. Expropriation continued to be rejected, because of the threat to the democratization process that would result, according to President Cerezo (Boletín 1/29/87: 4). By April 1987, the government was urging that new measures be taken—within constitutional limits, h o w e v e r — t o obtain land for redistribution, and the situation was growing more tense. Clearly, the most positive direct response to the A N C ' s d e m a n d s was the market-based program and g o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d property transfers. T h e A N C received only two fincas in its first two years of work, however, and the second only after the land had already been invaded by peasants. T h e A N C ' s public position was that President C e r e z o had "neither the p o w e r nor the will" to implement the plan to buy plantation land on the market and then resell it ( R O G 1/88: 7). Dissatisfied with the pace of distribution, Girón increased his calls f o r s w i f t e r g o v e r n m e n t action and apparently developed plans for the " p e a c e f u l o c c u p a t i o n " of lands if the g o v e r n m e n t ' s responses were not satisfactory. At the same time, he called for Congress

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99

to pass "a Law of Agrarian R e f o r m " ( G N I B 12/86: 1 3 - 1 4 ) . One result of the relative success of Reverend G i r ó n ' s movement was a surge of peasant groups seeking land. Several additional groups announced marches ( G N I B 12/86: 14; and Boletín 4/10/87: 6). Besides marches, there were land occupations by peasants and dispossession of some of the squatters. In December 1987, more than one hundred peasant organizations met and f o r m e d the National Peasant C o n f e d e r a t i o n ( C o n f e d e r a c i ó n Nacional C a m p e s i n a — C N C ) under the leadership of Andrés Girón. C N C "claims to represent 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 landless p e a s a n t s " ( R O G 1/88: 5). Faced with these pressures, Cerezo found himself in a difficult situation. T h e early success of the A N C in attracting media attention and gaining adherents worsened the political problem: the increasing spiral of d e m a n d s for land led to intensifying opposition f r o m the agricultural elite. By mid-1988, the Catholic church hierarchy had b e c o m e involved in the land issue. The Guatemalan bishops had frequently written pastoral letters attacking the c o u n t r y ' s horrid social and e c o n o m i c conditions, including political violence, but had never directly c o n f r o n t e d the cause of these s y m p t o m s b e f o r e the 1988 pastoral letter on land reform ( R O G 1/88: 8). Referring to land tenure, they urged the power structure to "accept the idea that a change in the sinful and obsolete social structures in our country is necessary and urgent" (Guatemalan Bishops Conference: 17). T h e bishops further s u g g e s t e d that the g o v e r n m e n t "legislate with a view t o w a r d s an equitable distribution of the land, b e g i n n i n g with the vast S t a t e - o w n e d lands" and that " i n s u f f i c i e n t l y cultivated estates should be distributed to those w h o can make them f r u i t f u l " ( G B C : 17). U N A G R O responded that the problem of land tenure was beyond the competency of the church and assailed the bishops for creating conflict in Guatemalan society, s u g g e s t i n g that the pastoral letter " a p p e a r e d like a proposal f r o m the Nicaraguan clergy." U N A G R O further noted that in fact land redistribution was taking place continually under the auspices of the free market, as seen in purchases and sales of property ( R O G 1/88: 11). 9 President C e r e z o ' s response w a s that landowners should acknowledge the land problem and that the b i s h o p s ' letter c o u l d help bring about this recognition, but that the pastoral letter's r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s were not necessarily solutions. In short, the president c o n t i n u e d to o p p o s e agrarian reform as a concept, while f a v o r i n g increased e f f i c i e n c y of land use and improvements in peasant living conditions and access to land. He proposed to continue the market-based p r o g r a m and to use s t a t e - o w n e d land for development projects (ROG 1/88: 9). In his report to C o n g r e s s in J a n u a r y 1988, President C e r e z o announced that the government had distributed nine parcels by the end of 1987, a total distribution of 77.5 caballerías, benefiting over two thousand families. T h e first two of these had been distributed to the A N C and the

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Guatemalan

Politics

third to another peasant organization led by Carlos A. Dubón. T h e s e three parcels totaled f o r t y - o n e caballerías, b e n e f i t i n g s o m e 1,550 f a m i l i e s . Of the total of nine distributions, four were a n n o u n c e d only two w e e k s before C e r e z o ' s report to Congress. These four totaled only 20.5 caballerías, benefiting an additional 160 families ( P C R P 1/88: 5). While the number of total transfers more than doubled in the second half of 1987, the amount of land transferred had been reduced by about 50 percent and the n u m b e r of b e n e f i t e d f a m i l i e s w a s even lower. T h e government also a n n o u n c e d plans to triple the n u m b e r of transfers in 1988, turning over some three hundred caballerías to benefit five to six thousand families (PCRP 1/88: 6). T h e data show a c o n t i n u i n g s y m b o l i c c o m m i t m e n t to t r a n s f e r r i n g available land to peasant o r g a n i z a t i o n s , but realistic analysis s h o w s a s l o w i n g down of the p r o g r a m ' s s u b s t a n t i v e impact on the quality of life of the several hundred t h o u s a n d landless f a m i l i e s seeking land. Overall, g o v e r n m e n t ' s responses to the A N C were supportive symbolically, but the government was unsuccessful in resolving the problem. The market-based program was p r a g m a t i c but not r e f o r m i s t , f o r no policy proposals addressed any of the conditions causing land problems in the first place. Consistent with its ideology, the Christian Democratic Party sought to respond to all sides in the land issue by acquiring enough resources to at least begin meeting d e m a n d s of g r o u p s like the A N C without o f f e n d i n g the intransigent sectors of the elite, a difficult prospect at best. T h e D C G ' s policies were assailed by the elite, which v i e w e d any concession as support for leftists. For their part popular groups described the first year of the Cerezo administration as o n e in which the g o v e r n m e n t r e f u s e d to pursue social reform in order to avoid p r o v o k i n g a military coup, and hence of d e f r a u d i n g the people in order to protect the d e m o c r a t i c process (Boletín 1/29/87: 3). Both sides r e s p o n d e d to the g o v e r n m e n t ' s actions with increased pressure. Besides political pressure f r o m various sectors, e c o n o m i c conditions may have doomed the D C G strategy f r o m the outset. Given scarce public resources, for example, the necessary f u n d s were simply not available for large-scale purchases of land on the open market to satisfy even the first w a v e of several thousand f a m i l i e s , let alone the needs of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 400,000 landless and u n e m p l o y e d rural w o r k e r s and their families. Moreover, not enough land was available on the market to begin to cover current needs or to meet the d e m a n d s that w o u l d e m e r g e if initial e f f o r t s at obtaining land were s u c c e s s f u l . 1 " State lands could fill s o m e of these needs, but even if inefficiently used land were included, less than half the needs of the landless sectors could be m e t . "

Popular Sectors & the Cerezo

The Labor

Administration

101

Movement

G u a t e m a l a ' s 1965 Constitution and subsequent labor code guaranteed labor the right to organize: Articles 111 through 116, for example, guaranteed a variety of rights and explicitly stated that the constitutional guarantees were to be considered "non-renounceable minimum guarantees" that could not be ignored by contracts or other agreements. The provisions affecting labor in the 1985 Constitution are generally similar to those of earlier documents, 1 2 although the constitution oscillates between liberal economic philosophy and conservative or corporatist political principles. It acknowledges labor's inalienable right to organize, but subject to the laws and regulations of the government (Linares Morales: 2 4 - 2 8 ) . The emphasis on individual rights is consistent with the needs of property owners and the business sectors, but the precarious position of economic elites requires that the state have the legal resources to prevent any unregulated mobilization of working groups. 1 3 One promising dimension of G u a t e m a l a ' s political apertura after 1985 was the opportunity for groups to reorganize. In the mid-1980s, the context affecting urban political m o v e m e n t s was similar to the rural atmosphere, including willingness of popular sectors to take advantage of the new political opening after the 1985 election. Mainstream political parties had been as timid in adopting the political agenda of urban popular groups as they had been in the rural context. Labor faced memories of repression, ongoing legal struggles for recognition of unions and strikes, and continuing repression ( G N I B 6/87: 15-16). But the problems of social injustice were extremely acute. Timidity notwithstanding, the need for improvement in the quality of life for the popular sectors was more than obvious. Labor had been well organized and visible, at least historically, but not a major urban political force before the 1970s. 1 4 As rural groups, moreover, repressive violence is a key dimension in labor's history. The legacy of violence was apparent in 1985, inhibiting attempts to mobilize, the apertura notwithstanding. In spite of the obstacles, however, labor again organized to make demands, largely within prevailing political and economic structures. By 1987, several major labor federations had been organized, including: 1. The Guatemalan Confederation of Labor Unity (Confederación de Unidad Sindical G u a t e m a l t e c a — C U S G ) , founded in 1983 during the Ríos Montt government. C U S G received funding from the National Endowment for Democracy via the AFL/CIO and its affiliate, the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). 1 5

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Guatemalan

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2. T h e G e n e r a l C o o r d i n a t o r of G u a t e m a l a n W o r k e r s General

de T r a b a j a d o r e s

de

Guatemala—CGTG),

(Coordinación founded

by

Christian D e m o c r a t s and supported by C L A T , the Latin A m e r i c a n Workers' Confederation. 3. G u a t e m a l a n

Workers

Labor Unity

(Unidad

Sindical

de

Traba-

j a d o r e s G u a t e m a l t e c o s — U N S I T R A G U A ) , an i n d e p e n d e n t o r g a n i zation c o n s i d e r e d to be the l e a s t - c o m p r o m i s e d f e d e r a t i o n . U N S I T R A G U A w a s f o u n d e d in 1 9 8 5 b y s u r v i v o r s of e a r l i e r f e d e r a t i o n s t h a t h a d b e e n d e c i m a t e d by r e p r e s s i o n in t h e e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s , i n c l u d i n g t h e C N T a n d t h e G u a t e m a l a n F e d e r a t i o n of L a b o r

Associations

(Federación de Asociaciones Sindicales G u a t e m a l t e c a s — F A S G U A ) ( R O G 3/88: 6 - 7 , 13).16 In a d d i t i o n to t h e t h r e e m a i n f e d e r a t i o n s , t h e r e w a s a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i zation, the Q u e t z a l t e n a n g o W o r k e r s Union ( U n i ó n de T r a b a j a d o r e s Quetzaltecos—UTQ), with sixteen affiliates, and several independent unions, i n c l u d i n g t h e U n i o n of W o r k e r s of t h e N a t i o n a l E l e c t r i c i t y I n d u s t r y ( S i n d i c a t o d e T r a b a j a d o r e s d e la I n d u s t r i a E l é c t r i c a — S T I N D E ) , w h i c h r e p r e s e n t e d w o r k e r s at t h e s t a t e - o w n e d e l e c t r i c p l a n t a n d w a s t h e l a r g e s t s i n g l e u n i o n in G u a t e m a l a ( R O G 3 / 8 8 : 6 ) . W h i l e t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t a s i z e a b l e p r o p o r t i o n of G u a t e m a l a ' s w o r k i n g class, another labor m o v e m e n t , solidarism, reflected the o r g a n i z a t i o n of l a b o r b y m a n a g e m e n t . B a s e d o n c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n o w n ers and labor, solidarism generally involves prohibitions against collective b a r g a i n i n g a n d s t r i k e s in e x c h a n g e f o r c o m p a n y - o r g a n i z e d b u t e m p l o y e e f u n d e d social services.17 I m p o r t e d f r o m C o s t a R i c a , s o l i d a r i s m w a s f i r s t i n t r o d u c e d to G u a t e m a l a in 1 9 5 4 , a f t e r t h e C I A - l e d c o u p . A s of m i d - 1 9 8 7 , t h e r e w e r e

110

G u a t e m a l a n solidarist associations, c o n s i s t i n g of forty thousand m e m b e r s . A s s o c i a t i o n s a r e o r g a n i z e d in b o t h r u r a l p l a n t a t i o n s a n d u r b a n w o r k p l a c e s , i n c l u d i n g b o t h i n d u s t r i a l a n d s e r v i c e i n s t i t u t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g to t h e G S U , a s s o c i a t i o n s e x i s t in 3 8 p e r c e n t of t h e b u s i n e s s e s in G u a t e m a l a C i t y , in 2 2 p e r c e n t of t h o s e o u t s i d e t h e c a p i t a l c i t y , a n d o n 4 0 p e r c e n t of t h e p l a n t a tions ( R O G 5/88: 5). S o l i d a r i s m r e p r e s e n t s t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h e d e m a n d s of b u s i n e s s o w n ers, not o r g a n i z e d labor. S i n c e w o r k e r s voluntarily r e n o u n c e the right to strike, collective b a r g a i n i n g c e a s e s to exist as a r e s o u r c e for labor and w e a k e n s l a b o r as a m o v e m e n t . S o l i d a r i s m r e p r e s e n t s t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of labor e n e r g y f r o m social a n d political t h i n k i n g to p u r e b r e a d - a n d - b u t t e r issues, reducing c h a n c e s for any long-range perspective on social change. Yet given the e c o n o m i c crisis a n d poverty, not to m e n t i o n the repression o f w o r k e r s in t h e l a t e 1 9 7 0 s a n d e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s , s o l i d a r i s m w a s a f a i r l y r a t i o nal s t r a t e g y f o r w o r k e r s t o f o l l o w ( R O G 5 / 8 8 : 4 - 5 ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , e c o -

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103

n o m i c p r o g r e s s for w o r k e r s b e c a m e a f u n c t i o n of the o w n e r s ' g o o d will. I r o n i c a l l y , e v e n t h i s f o r m of u n i o n i z i n g w a s o p p o s e d b y m a j o r s e c t o r s of G u a t e m a l a ' s business elite ( R O G 5/88: 15).'* O r g a n i z e d labor c o n t i n u e d t o s t r u g g l e in 1 9 9 0 o n a n o t h e r , m o r e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f r o n t , a s it s o u g h t to avoid b e i n g replaced by unions representing the solidarist labor m o v e m e n t (ROG Su/90: 4-5, l l ) . 1 9 W i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e s o l i d a r i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n s , l a b o r c o n t i n u e d t o f e d e r a t e a f t e r 1 9 8 6 . T h e U n i t y of L a b o r a n d P o p u l a r A c t i o n

coalition

( U n i d a d d e A c c i ô n S i n d i c a l y P o p u l a r — U A S P ) w a s f o r m e d in l a t e 1 9 8 7 and early 1988, initially by U N S I T R A G U A and the electrical

workers'

union, S T I N D E , but w a s then j o i n e d by the other t w o m a j o r f e d e r a t i o n s , C U S G a n d C G T G . U A S P w a s n o t e w o r t h y f i r s t b e c a u s e it u n i t e d d i s p a r a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n s that had d i f f e r e d ideologically and had b e e n divided

by

political party and f u n d i n g affiliations. S e c o n d , the leadership c a m e f r o m U N S I T R A G U A , g e n e r a l l y p e r c e i v e d to b e t h e l e a s t a c c o m m o d a t i v e a n d most activist of the labor f e d e r a t i o n s ( R O G 3/88: 6 - 7 ) . T h e C U C , disc u s s e d e a r l i e r in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h r u r a l s t r i k e s in 1 9 8 0 , r e - e m e r g e d p u b l i c l y after y e a r s of r e p r e s s i o n , exile, and c l a n d e s t i n e o p e r a t i o n , to b e c o m e an a f f i l i a t e of U A S P ( R O G 3 / 8 8 : 12). 2 ( )

Labor

Policies

A l t h o u g h l e g a l m i n i m u m w a g e s h a d i n c r e a s e d , real w a g e s f o r w o r k e r s h a d d e c l i n e d o v e r a l l a n d in e v e r y c a t e g o r y b e t w e e n 1 9 8 0 a n d 1 9 8 6 ( s e e t a b l e s 6.1 a n d 6 . 2 ) . Real a n n u a l Guatemalan

w a g e s f o r all w o r k e r s r e g i s t e r e d w i t h

Institute for Social Security ( I G S S ) went f r o m Q l , 3 8 9

the to

Q l , 1 2 7 , a d e c l i n e in p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r of Q 2 6 2 , o r 19 p e r c e n t , f r o m 1 9 8 0 to 1 9 8 8 . D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d , h o w e v e r , r e a l w a g e s f o r m o s t c a t e g o r i e s of w o r k e r s g e n e r a l l y i n c r e a s e d f r o m 1 9 8 0 to h i g h s a r o u n d 1 9 8 3 ( d u r i n g a p e r i o d of m a c r o - l e v e l d e c l i n e s in t h e e c o n o m y ) , a n d t h e n d e c l i n e d a b r u p t l y in 1 9 8 5 a n d 1 9 8 6 ( d u r i n g a p e r i o d of m a c r o g r o w t h ) . T h e p e r c e p t i o n o f decline, therefore, was even more acute than the six-year s u m m a r y statistics s u g g e s t . 2 1 T h e p o l i c y s t r a t e g y of t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t v i s - à - v i s l a b o r a n d m a n a g e m e n t s t r e s s e d c o l l a b o r a t i o n a n d c o n s u l t a t i o n , t h a t is, c o n c e r t a c i o n , w i t h o r g a n i z e d g r o u p s . T h e g o a l in e f f e c t w a s t o i n t e g r a t e o r g a n i z e d l a b o r a n d c a p i t a l i n t o e c o n o m i c p o l i c y m a k i n g s o as to i m p r o v e e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e and social justice while regulating social conflict. A l t h o u g h t h i s s u g g e s t s a m a j o r r o l e f o r t h e s t a t e in e c o n o m i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , t h i s w o u l d b e c o u n t e r e d , a c c o r d i n g to t h e p a r t y , b y t h e e f f e c t i v e p l u r a l i s m of c o m p e t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( M a l d o n a d o R u i z : 4 3 - 4 4 ) . T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s e c o n o m i c plans for 1987 and 1988 included steps to increase r e v e n u e s s o that a c c u m u l a t e d f u n d s c o u l d b e u s e d f o r a m i x t u r e of p u r p o s e s ,

104

Guatemalan

T a b l e 6.1

Politics

M i n i m u m and Real Wages, 1980-1988

Sector

Minimum Wage 1980

Agriculture Mining Industry Services Construction

Minimum Wage 1988

3.20 3.72 3.84 3.63

1.30 1.28 1.96 3.03

3.48 3.57

4.50 5.00 5.80 6.66 16.00 10.00 8.00 7.04 5.80

3.57

2.64

-0.93

— — —

Commerce Average Wages Real Wages (1980 base)

Increase (Decline)

— — —

3.56 2.23

Notes: All data in Quetzales per day; calculations based on cumulative inflation rate of 219%. Wages in Industry and Services are averages of subcategories included in those categories. Wages in Construction reflect new categories created in 1988. Source: Based on CAR 1/29/88: 31.

Table 6.2

A n n u a l Real Wages, 1980-1986

Sector

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

Agriculture Mining Industry Construction Essential Services Commerce Transportation Services All Workers

619 4006 2108 1889 1889 2870 1788 1974 1389

833 3966 2348 2308 2853 2788 1700 1825 1636

844 4047 2415 2299 1585 3026 1891 1937 1734

894 4193 2349 2142 1948 2844 2430 1898 1754

773 4086 2479 1478 1840 2799 1675 1727 1596

717 3142 2232 1277 1604 2590 1567 1413 1377

611 1942 1815 996 1301 2073 1233 1157 1127

Notes: Data are average annual real wages for workers registered with the Guatemalan Institute for Social Security (IGSS). Data are in adjusted Quetzales, with 1980 as the base and an accumulated inflation of 219%. The figures for All Workers are averages for all workers registered with IGSS, not averages of the figures in the other categories. Source: Based on IGSS data, reproduced in CAR 1/29/88: 32.

i n c l u d i n g p a y i n g for the military c o s t s o f c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y ,

promoting

d e v e l o p m e n t , and supporting social p r o g r a m s to pay the "social S p e c i f i c s i n c l u d e d a reform p a c k a g e w i t h a property tax, n e w

wage."

minimum

w a g e s , r e m o v a l o f p r i c e c o n t r o l s o n b a s i c f o o d s t u f f s , a n d i n c r e a s e s in e l e c tric r a t e s ( R O G 3 / 8 8 : 2 ) . T h e D C G a l s o c a l l e d f o r t h e c r e a t i o n o f n e w j o b s , coordination of salary scales, and support for w o r k e r s ' o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( M a l donado Ruiz: 44). In D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 7 , t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n n o u n c e d a 4 0 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e in e l e c t r i c i t y r a t e s , o s t e n s i b l y t o p a y t h e f o r e i g n d e b t i n c u r r e d b e c a u s e o f

Popular Sectors & the Cerezo

Administration

105

m i l i t a r y c o r r u p t i o n in b u i l d i n g t h e h u g e h y d r o e l e c t r i c p o w e r p r o j e c t at C h i x o y . O p p o s i t i o n s u r f a c e d not o n l y a m o n g c o n s u m e r a n d p o p u l a r g r o u p s b u t o n t h e r i g h t as w e l l , w h i c h c l a i m e d t h e n e w r a t e s d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s inability to m a n a g e t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r . E v e n t h e h u m a n r i g h t s o m b u d s m a n e n t e r e d the f r a y , c l a i m i n g that i n c r e a s i n g t h e r a t e s w o u l d be t a n t a m o u n t to v i o l a t i n g h u m a n r i g h t s ( R O G 1/88: 11). In J a n u a r y 1 9 8 8 , U A S P led the l a r g e s t d e m o n s t r a t i o n s in G u a t e m a l a s i n c e 1 9 8 0 . A s a result, the g o v e r n m e n t e n t e r e d into n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e U A S P o n s e v e r a l o n g o i n g i s s u e s : e l e c t r i c i t y rates, m i n i m u m w a g e s , p r i c e c o n t r o l s on b a s i c f o o d s t u f f s , legal a n d p o l i t i c a l v a l i d a t i o n f o r C U C a n d t h e Mutual Support Group (Grupo de A p o y o M u t u o — G A M ) — t h e organization that h a d b e e n d e m a n d i n g i n v e s t i g a t i o n s into h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s since the M e j í a Víctores g o v e r n m e n t — a n d safety for r e t u r n i n g r e f u g e e s and exiles ( U O G 3/88: 2 - 3 ) . A f t e r the d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a n d n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e g o v e r n m e n t r e s c i n d e d the rate i n c r e a s e s , r e s u l t i n g in a f i n a l s c h e d u l e of i n c r e a s e s that a v e r a g e d 2 5 p e r c e n t o v e r a l l a n d " p e r h a p s less f o r l o w - i n c o m e h o u s e h o l d s " ( R O G 3 / 8 8 : 6 - 7 ) . T h e g o v e r n m e n t i n c r e a s e d t h e m i n i m u m w a g e in e a r l y 1 9 8 8 , t h e first t i m e it had b e e n a d j u s t e d s i n c e 1 9 8 0 ( s e e T a b l e 6 . 1 ) . 2 2 C A C I F c a l l e d the a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n the g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e U A S P " s o c i a l i s t i c " e v e n t h o u g h m o s t of the p r o v i s i o n s of the p a c t w e r e a b s t r a c t a n d n o n s p e c i f i c , a w a i t i n g later i m p l e m e n t a t i o n to b e c o m e c o n c r e t e ( U O G 3 / 8 8 : 3 ) . Although the pact was largely symbolic and would i m p r o v e social tranquility w h i l e p r o v i d i n g little f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e , C A C I F i n t e r p r e t e d it as a threat. In s h o r t , a l t h o u g h the political a r e n a w a s b e i n g m o r e u t i l i z e d by popular-sector organizations, business groups also escalated their public p r o t e s t s a g a i n s t w a g e and tax i n c r e a s e s , the a c t i v i t i e s of t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s h u m a n r i g h t s o m b u d s m a n , a n d i n c r e a s e s in e l e c t r i c i t y r a t e s ( C A R 1 / 2 9 / 8 8 : 26-27).

Other

Rural

Organizations

B e s i d e s t h e A N C , the R e v e r e n d G i r ó n ' s l a n d m o v e m e n t , o t h e r o r g a n i z a tions b e c a m e a c t i v e in rural a r e a s a f t e r the 1 9 8 6 e l e c t i o n . T h e C U C , w h i c h had h e l p e d lead the 1 9 8 0 a g r i c u l t u r a l strike a g a i n s t s o u t h - c o a s t p l a n t a t i o n s , r e s u m e d f u n c t i o n i n g on behalf of rural w o r k e r s . In J a n u a r y 1989, C U C supp o r t e d a n o t h e r f a r m w o r k e r s ' s t r i k e on the s o u t h e r n c o a s t , d e m a n d i n g a daily m i n i m u m w a g e of Q 1 0 ( $ 3 . 7 0 ) . T h e s t r i k e w a s s u p p o r t e d b y U A S P , w h i c h h a d b e c o m e the c o u n t r y ' s l a r g e s t p o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n in t h e late 1980s. 2 - 1 T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s initial reaction to the strike w a s to militarize the zone, an a t t e m p t to threaten the w o r k e r g r o u p s into s u b m i s s i o n . B u t in F e b r u a r y , f o r the first t i m e in G u a t e m a l a n history, f a c e - t o - f a c e n e g o t i a t i o n s b e g a n b e t w e e n o w n e r s , r e p r e s e n t e d by U N A G R O , a n d a l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f r o m

106

Guatemalan

Politics

U A S P . Neither side trusted the g o v e r n m e n t in these negotiations: U A S P b e c a u s e the g o v e r n m e n t had ignored earlier a g r e e m e n t s and had militarized the south-coast zone, and U N A G R O because of the u p c o m i n g electoral campaign and not wanting to appear to lend support to the Christian Democrats ( G M G 3/89: 9 - 1 0 ) . By late 1989, h o w e v e r , the negotiations between U A S P and U N A G R O had come to naught: U N A G R O proposed wages of Q5.10 per day, an increase over the Q 3 . 2 0 minimum wage won by workers in a 1980 strike but significantly less in terms of p u r c h a s i n g power, given the decline of the Quetzal and inflation. Ironically, even the U A S P proposal for a daily m i n i m u m w a g e of Q 8 . 0 0 w a s less than the 1980 w a g e . T h e two sides could not agree on this or other proposals, and the negotiations stalled. With the continually deteriorating w o r k i n g and living conditions on the main plantations of the South Coast, C U C called for new labor action in late 1989 ( G M G 11/89: 3 - 4 ) . 2 4 In response to this call, in late January 1990, " s o m e 60,000 workers at dozens of . . . plantations and sugar processing plants stopped work to d e m a n d higher salaries." T h e strike was organized by the C U C and other peasant groups and s u p p o r t e d by the U A S P ( R O G Sp/90: 15). In public, landowners responded with a customary hard-line approach, but behind the scenes, as in 1989, there were negotiations b e t w e e n U N A G R O and the U A S P (ROG Su/90: 11). U A S P and the peasant groups demanded initially a m i n i m u m wage of Q20, the m i n i m u m required for f o o d purchases, but later reduced their d e m a n d to Q15. U N A G R O ' s final o f f e r w a s a daily wage of Q7.20. T h e negotiations were not successful in resolving the gap {Excelsior 4/10/91: 1A). The Christian Democratic government b e c a m e involved in the process again. Early in the year, because of the continuing recession the government a n n o u n c e d an austerity program that raised prices, including a " 3 0 percent increase in gasoline, 50 percent increase in propane, and similar increases in electricity and w a t e r . " U A S P and the C G T protested the decree, and both called for peaceful resistance. A series of demonstration m a r c h e s took place in the capital in late April 1990 ( E x c e l s i o r 4/27/90: 2A). T h e Council f o r Free C o m m e r c e ( C o n s e j o de C o m e r c i o Libre— CCL), a neoliberal organization representing elite interests, also protested these policies, arguing that they would produce social upheaval and blaming the problems on the D C G ' s spending policies (Excelsior 4/11/90: 2A). With pressures and tensions intensified in both urban and rural areas, the g o v e r n m e n t d e c r e e d a new rural m i n i m u m w a g e of Q 1 0 (approximately $1.60 at the current exchange rates). U N A G R O claimed this was a c a m p a i g n ploy by the faltering Christian D e m o c r a t s , while U A S P supported the g o v e r n m e n t ' s resolution of the impasse, claiming a significant

Popular Sectors & the Cerezo

Administration

107

victory (Excelsior 4/10/90: 1A). Although successful by Guatemalan standards, these "victories" seemed to produce scant gains for laborers. Other

Organizations

Other organizations began to e m e r g e during this period, at least partly in response to public policy. For e x a m p l e , the University of San Carlos student association (Asociación de Estudiantes U n i v e r s i t a r i o s — A E U ) , inactive in 1984 and 1985 because of repression during previous years, began to reorganize, albeit with some d i f f i c u l t y and under a virtual siege mentality. T h e A E U participated in a march s u p p o r t i n g labor groups in December 1987, publicly o p p o s e d increases in electricity prices, and supported d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n the g o v e r n m e n t and the insurgent f o r c e s of the U R N G (ROG 1/88: 6). At the lowest end of the popular-sector income scale are the residents of El Mezquita!, a crowded, Guatemala City slum that is a well-organized settlement, perhaps partly because of international private volunteer organizations as well as official social agencies. Because no urban services or facilities existed there, El Mezquital petitioned the g o v e r n m e n t for assistance in 198 7. 2 5 Tainted water c a u s e d the deaths of several children in 1987, w h e r e u p o n residents d e m o n s t r a t e d at the National Palace b e c a u s e the government had ignored their requests for piped water. In response, the g o v e r n m e n t provided water and p r o m i s e d to buy the land the settlement had invaded, then resell it to residents with low mortgage financing, provided some of the residents resettled elsewhere (ROG 1/88: 7).

Conclusion The extent to which national elections in 1984 and 1985 had a democratic impact on the distribution of political power has been m e a s u r e d in this overview of g o v e r n m e n t and o t h e r elite r e s p o n s e s to p o p u l a r - s e c t o r d e m a n d s . As our ultimate c o n c e r n is the question of d e m o c r a c y and the impact of policy upon it, the public-policy decisions of the Cerezo administration reveal much about the democratic character of the regime. By the standard of the level of political participation itself, for example, the fact that o r g a n i z a t i o n s s u r f a c e d , m a d e d e m a n d s , and d e m o n s t r a t e d s p e a k s to the real quality of the procedural o p e n i n g in G u a t e m a l a n politics. Given the historical context, this is no small a c h i e v e m e n t . As with the holding of honest elections, popular participation is a positive sign. But though the system w a s m o r e open for mobilization and public expression of d e m a n d s , both rural and urban w o r k e r s typically received

108

Guatemalan

Politics

little p o s i t i v e r e s p o n s e to u r g e n t w a g e a n d w o r k - c o n d i t i o n d e m a n d s , e i t h e r f r o m b u s i n e s s o w n e r s o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t . B y t h e s t a n d a r d of j u d g i n g t h e i m p a c t of p o l i c y o n q u a l i t y of l i f e f o r t h e n e e d i e s t c i t i z e n s , t h e net i m p a c t of p u b l i c p o l i c y d u r i n g t h e C e r e z o g o v e r n m e n t s e e m s to h a v e b e e n n e g a t i v e . T h i s s t a n d a r d of j u d g m e n t n e e d n o t b e o v e r l y r i g i d . B u t n o i m p r o v e m e n t at all in t h e p o o r ' s l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s — i n d e e d , d e c l i n e s i n s t e a d — i n s p i t e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a s s i s t a n c e a n d a g o v e r n m e n t w i t h a r e f o r m i s t i d e o l o g y , s u g g e s t s that p o w e r in s o c i e t y d o e s n o t lie w i t h r e f o r m e r s or p o p u l a r organizations demanding change. E c o n o m i c a l l y , the d a t a s h o w that p u b l i c p o l i c y did not i m p r o v e the s i t u a t i o n in a n y d r a m a t i c f a s h i o n . If t h e s u c c e s s o f m a c r o - l e v e l p o l i c i e s a i m e d at e c o n o m i c g r o w t h s e e m e d m i x e d u n d e r P r e s i d e n t C e r e z o , w h a t w a s c o n s i s t e n t w a s t h e s t e a d y d e c l i n e o f t h e q u a l i t y of l i f e f o r m o s t G u a t e m a l a n s , in s p i t e of r e p e a t e d a n d w e l l - o r g a n i z e d d e m a n d s of p o p u l a r s e c t o r g r o u p s . O n e s t u d y c o n c l u d e d t h a t as of 1 9 8 8 , Q 9 d a i l y w a s n e c e s s a r y t o f e e d a f a m i l y of f i v e a m i n i m a l d i e t , a n d Q 1 8 d a i l y to m e e t f o o d and other basic needs. T h e Nutritional Institute for Central America and P a n a m a ( I N C A P ) c a l c u l a t e d t h a t a s of J a n u a r y 1 9 8 9 , m e e t i n g m i n i m a l n u t r i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a n o r m a l f a m i l y r e q u i r e d a d a i l y i n c o m e of at l e a s t t e n Q u e t z a l e s , 2 6 b u t t h e a v e r a g e d a i l y w a g e in 1 9 8 8 w a s

Q5.60.

A l t h o u g h G u a t e m a l a n s t h e r e f o r e received less per day than the hourly m i n i m u m w a g e in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ( Q 5 . 6 0 e q u a l e d s l i g h t l y m o r e t h a n $ 2 at t h e 1 9 8 8 e x c h a n g e r a t e ) , p r i c e s f o r b a s i c f o o d s s u c h a s b e a n s a n d e g g s w e r e o n l y s l i g h t l y l o w e r t h a n in t h e U . S . ( R O G S p / 9 0 : 8). T h e m o s t p o s i t i v e s i g n in t h e s t u d y w a s t h e w a v e of p o p u l a r p a r t i c i pation that o c c u r r e d a f t e r 1985, political activity that indicates a s t r o n g democratic tendency a m o n g popular groups and their leaders. Observers w h o f e a r that G u a t e m a l a n s m a y n o t b e r e a d y c u l t u r a l l y f o r d e m o c r a c y m a y t a k e s o m e c o n s o l a t i o n f r o m t h i s p a t t e r n of b e h a v i o r . O n t h e n e g a t i v e s i d e t h e p o p u l a r g r o u p s e x a m i n e d r e p r e s e n t a m i n o r i t y of t h e c o u n t r y ' s p o o r ; f o r m a n y of t h e m o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n m a y b e t o o c o s t l y . T h i s c h a p t e r h a s l o o k e d at t h e s u c c e s s e s a n d f a i l u r e s of t h e m o s t w e l l o r g a n i z e d of G u a t e m a l a ' s

impoverished

m a j o r i t y ; if e v e n

these relatively

well-

organized g r o u p s cannot i n f l u e n c e policy, then the overall prospects for social progress, and hence for liberal d e m o c r a c y , are problematic. In y e t a n o t h e r d i m e n s i o n

of political life, the elite minority

has

r e s p o n d e d h i s t o r i c a l l y t o i n c r e a s e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n b y p o p u l a r g r o u p s in a v a r i e t y of w a y s , s o m e t i m e s a c c o m m o d a t i n g t h e d e m a n d s of g r a s s r o o t s o r g a n i z a t i o n s but m o r e o f t e n i g n o r i n g or r e p r e s s i n g t h e m . D u r i n g the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e g o v e r n m e n t w a s i n c r e a s i n g l y r e l u c t a n t to e n t e r into the dialogues requested by the popular o r g a n i z a t i o n s . T h e D C G strategy of c o n c e r t a c i o n b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t a n d the p o p u l a r sectors fell by the w a y s i d e . 2 7

Popular

Sectors

& the Cerezo

Administration

109

Notes 1. T h e f i g u r e s : in r u r a l a r e a s , f r o m Q 8 0 to Q 6 0 ( $ 3 0 to $ 2 2 ) ; in i n d u s t r y , f r o m Q 2 7 6 to Q 2 3 1 ( $ 1 0 2 to $ 8 6 ) ; a n d in g o v e r n m e n t j o b s , f r o m Q 1 4 5 to Q 1 2 9 ( $ 5 4 to $ 4 8 ) . " M o r e t h a n h a l f t h e w o r k i n g p o p u l a t i o n l a c k s a f u l l t i m e j o b , and s u b s i s t s largely t h r o u g h the i n f o r m a l e c o n o m y " ( R O G S p / 9 0 : 11). 2. For o t h e r d e s c r i p t i o n s and a n a l y s e s of this topic, see B a r r y : c h a p t e r 4; and J o n a s 1991: c h a p t e r 12. For c o m p a r a t i v e p u r p o s e s , see F o w e r a k e r and C r a i g ' s edited v o l u m e on p o p u l a r m o v e m e n t s in M e x i c o , w h i c h c o v e r s r o u g h l y the s a m e p e r i o d . 3. R e v e r e n d A n d r é s G i r ó n , q u o t e d in G o u d v i s and R i c h t e r : 5. 4. T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of the 1 9 8 0 s t r i k e is b a s e d on the G u a t e m a l a n p r e s s and on i n t e r v i e w s . For a d d i t i o n a l d e t a i l s , s e e F r a n k and W h e a t o n : 5 8 ; a n d C o n c e r n e d Guatemalan Scholars: 34. 5. In 1980, the Q u e t z a l w a s on p a r with the U . S . d o l l a r . 6. T h e c o l l o q u i a l n a m e f o r t h e m o v e m e n t w a s the M o v i m i e n t o P r o - T i e r r a ( M P T ) . A f t e r the m o v e m e n t g a i n e d legal status, its o f f i c i a l n a m e b e c a m e t h e A s o c i a c i ó n N a c i o n a l C a m p e s i n a P r o - T i e r r a ( A N C ) . For the s a k e of c o n s i s t e n c y , 1 will r e f e r to the m o v e m e n t u s i n g t h e s e c o n d a c r o n y m , A N C . 7. A l t h o u g h t h e A N C b e c a m e a p u b l i c o r g a n i z a t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s a p p a r e n t l y s o u g h t a n o n y m i t y b e c a u s e of t h e political c l i m a t e of f e a r and i n t i m i d a tion. O n e r e s e a r c h e r r e p o r t s that all his i n t e r v i e w s and c o n t a c t s — a n d e v e n his o w n p a r t i c i p a t i o n as a r e s e a r c h e r — h a d to be i d e n t i f i e d by p s e u d o n y m s b e c a u s e of " t h e c l i m a t e of f e a r " ( S i l v e r : 193). 8. In his b i o g r a p h y of the R e v e r e n d G i r ó n , C a m b r a n e s w r i t e s : O n A u g u s t 4, 1 9 8 6 , P r e s i d e n t C e r e z o m e t w i t h the D i r e c t o r s of U N A G R O in his o f f i c e . In the p r e s e n c e of t h e M i n i s t e r s of D e f e n s e a n d of A g r i c u l t u r e , he a s s u r e d t h e D i r e c t o r s that his g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d n o t d e c r e e any a g r a r i a n r e f o r m law ( C a m b r a n e s 1986a: 2 3 2 ) . 9. In f a c t , t h o u g h t h e a s s e r t i o n a b o u t the m a r k e t is c o r r e c t t e c h n i c a l l y , h i s torically m o s t land in G u a t e m a l a h a s b e c o m e p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y b e c a u s e of v i o l e n t s e i z u r e s (e.g., t h e S p a n i s h C o n q u e s t ) , at t i m e s s a n c t i o n e d by t h e s t a t e ( e . g . , t h e L i b e r a l R e f o r m s ) a n d e n f o r c e d by a v i o l e n t l y r e p r e s s i v e m i l i t a r y a p p a r a t u s t h r o u g h o u t . C a l l i n g this a " f r e e - m a r k e t s y s t e m " is c y n i c a l . 10. G i v e n the n u m b e r of t h o s e n e e d i n g land and the a m o u n t of a v a i l a b l e idle land, a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e m i l l i o n h e c t a r e s w o u l d s o m e h o w need to be o b t a i n e d f r o m the p r i v a t e s e c t o r , in a nation w h o s e n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o h i b i t s t a k i n g p r i v a t e land for p u r p o s e s of a g r a r i a n r e f o r m ( S a n d o v a l V.: 3 6 - 3 7 ) . 11. A s the G u a t e m a l a n C h u r c h in E x i l e c o m m e n t e d : At the p r e s e n t t i m e , the " v a s t S t a t e - o w n e d l a n d s " to w h i c h the b i s h o p s r e f e r total 3 6 9 , 4 6 7 h e c t a r e s , w h i c h w o u l d s a t i s f y 12.5 p e r c e n t of t h e l a n d l e s s p e a s a n t s . I n s u f f i c i e n t l y c u l t i v a t e d lands total 1 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 h e c t a r e s , w h i c h w o u l d b e n e f i t 41 p e r c e n t of t h e l a n d l e s s ( I G E 1988: 5). 12. For an i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c u s s i o n c o m p a r i n g a n d c o n t r a s t i n g the n e w 1 9 8 5 C o n s t i t u t i o n with s e v e r a l earlier d o c u m e n t s , on the q u e s t i o n of l a b o r and on o t h e r d i m e n s i o n s as w e l l , s e e L i n a r e s M o r a l e s . 13. L i n a r e s M o r a l e s ' s a n a l y s i s , in f a c t , g o e s f u r t h e r : he s u g g e s t s t h a t s o m e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s s e e m to l e g a l i z e the f o r c e d , u n p a i d l a b o r of G u a t e m a l a n s

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in civil defense patrols and in m o d e l v i l l a g e s / d e v e l o p m e n t poles, which I described earlier in more detail (Linares M o r a l e s : 2 4 - 2 5 ) . 14. Historically, although labor has been active and visible, m e m b e r s h i p has been relatively low. A c c o r d i n g to f i g u r e s c a l c u l a t e d on the basis of g o v e r n m e n t statistics, 1.62 p e r c e n t of the e c o n o m i c a l l y active p o p u l a t i o n w e r e m e m b e r s of unions in the early 1970s, the lowest rate in Central A m e r i c a ( L o p e z Larrave: 119). G u a t e m a l a is the most highly industrialized nation in Central A m e r i c a but r a n k s last in union m e m b e r s h i p . 15. T h e National E n d o w m e n t for D e m o c r a c y is a North A m e r i c a n " p r i v a t e " f o u n d a t i o n that r e c e i v e s all of its f u n d s f r o m the U.S. C o n g r e s s , then d i s b u r s e s them t h r o u g h other f o u n d a t i o n s a f f i l i a t e d with either the R e p u b l i c a n Party, the D e m o c r a t i c Party, the A m e r i c a n C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e , or the A F L / C I O . In 1987, C U S G e x p e c t e d to r e c e i v e $ 1 4 7 , 6 0 0 f r o m A I F L D in 1988. "In 1986, A 1 F L D received $ 2 8 0 , 0 0 0 f r o m U S A I D for its work in G u a t e m a l a " ( R O G 3/88: 6). 16. On February 2, 1980, I witnessed the murder of two F A S G U A leaders outside the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s h e a d q u a r t e r s in G u a t e m a l a City. A f t e r the d a y t i m e assassination, the death squad calmly d r o v e a w a y . 17. T h e G u a t e m a l a n S o l i d a r i s t Union ( U S G ) d e f i n e s solidarism as "a m o v e ment for achieving h a r m o n y and w e l l - b e i n g for w o r k e r s and o w n e r s through c o o p eration and solidarity b e t w e e n a b u s i n e s s and its labor f o r c e " ( q u o t e d in R O G 5/88: 4). 18. The solidarist approach to labor o r g a n i z i n g has been strongly e n d o r s e d by U.S. g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s , i n c l u d i n g f o r m e r U.S. A m b a s s a d o r A l b e r t o M a r t i n e z Piedra (Special Service 1 1 - 1 2 / 8 7 : 7 - 8 ) . 19. For a m o r e c o m p l e t e perspective on this struggle, including a c h r o n i c l e of e f f o r t s from 1983 into 1988, to replace existing unions with solidarist associations, see The Trade Union. 20. In a surprising twist, Interior Minister Juan José Rodil, a Christian D e m o crat, responded to C U C ' s e m e r g e n c e by r e f e r r i n g to it as one of the g r o u p s r e s p o n sible for the 1980 m a s s a c r e at the S p a n i s h e m b a s s y . Rodil threatened C U C leaders with arrest and prosecution should they s u r f a c e . Ironically police o f f i c i a l s later r e f u t e d R o d i l ' s accusation against C U C , s a y i n g that although the case has n e v e r been fully investigated, available e v i d e n c e suggests that police a g e n t s w e r e r e s p o n s i b l e for the fire ( C A R 1/29/88: 27). 21. For c o n s t r u c t i o n w o r k e r s , for e x a m p l e , the high salary of Q 2 , 3 0 8 h a p pened in 1981. From that point o n , real a n n u a l w a g e s declined by 57 p e r c e n t through 1986, an annual average decline of over 11 percent for five years r u n n i n g . Yet the c o n s t r u c t i o n w o r k e r s f a r e d better than o t h e r s . For all w o r k e r s taken together, the decline after 1983 w a s Q 6 2 7 ( f r o m Q l , 7 5 4 to Q l , 1 2 7 ) , a decline of 36 percent and an average annual decline of 12 percent in purchasing p o w e r . 22. This legislation also added twelve new j o b classifications to the list covered by m i n i m u m wage legislation, for a total of thirty-eight regulated occupations. 23. In addition to a w a g e increase, w o r k e r s also d e m a n d e d three daily meals, w o r k tools, m e d i c a l s e r v i c e for the f a r m w o r k e r s and controls on the exact weight of the harvested product, given past f r a u d u lent practices by the o w n e r s ( G M G 2/89: 6).

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24. W o r k e r s also d e m a n d e d three m e a l s a day, free tools, and medicines when n e e d e d , a d e q u a t e transportation to work l o c a t i o n s , living s p a c e with w a t e r and electric light, an end to ethnic and age discrimination, and an end to overnight collection, by o w n e r s , of crops harvested but not turned in by h a r v e s t e r s . Usually w o r k i n g s e v e n d a y s a week but r e c e i v i n g pay o n l y for six, they also d e m a n d e d p a y m e n t for the seventh day. 25. El M e z q u i t a l w a s settled by a land i n v a s i o n , or s q u a t t e r s e t t l e m e n t , in 1983, w h e n G u a t e m a l a City w a s f l o o d e d by a w a v e of r e f u g e e s f l e e i n g military violence in rural areas, it s y m b o l i z e s the unanticipated costs of rural counterinsurgency. For a description of more recent activities in this s e t t l e m e n t , see Jensen. 26. Momento 8/90: 5. T h e s e f i g u r e s p r e - d a t e the c u r r e n c y d e v a l u a t i o n s that occurred in 1989 and early 1990. 27. A c c o r d i n g to one report: In virtually all of the recent conflicts, the g o v e r n m e n t has imposed policy w i t h o u t prior consultation with the a f f e c t e d g r o u p s . D i a l o g u e has only taken place after a period of c o n f r o n t a t i o n and has c o m e to be seen more as a c o n c e s s i o n than a policy ( C A R 1/29/88: 27).

7

Human Rights During the Cerezo Administration

B e t w e e n 1 9 8 0 a n d 1 9 8 4 , G u a t e m a l a f a i l e d to m e e t m i n i m a l s t a n d a r d s of respect for h u m a n rights. Indeed, the country ranked a m o n g the w o r l d ' s w o r s t v i o l a t o r s of h u m a n r i g h t s d u r i n g that p e r i o d . 1 T h e m i l i t a r y ' s interv e n t i o n in p o l i t i c a l life b e t w e e n 1 9 8 2 a n d 1 9 8 5 p r o m i s e d not o n l y to reestablish security and law a n d o r d e r b u t civil p o l i t i c s as w e l l . In t h e e y e s of m a n y o b s e r v e r s , the 1 9 8 5 e l e c t i o n m a r k e d the b e g i n n i n g of a n e w era in G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c s : the m i l i t a r y p r o m i s e d to r e t u r n to its b a r r a c k s , a n d V i n i c i o C e r e z o , a m a n c o m m i t t e d to p r o t e c t i n g b a s i c h u m a n r i g h t s , w h o had himself survived attempted assassinations and had seen many coll e a g u e s in the C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y m u r d e r e d by d e a t h s q u a d s , a s s u m e d the p r e s i d e n c y . L i b e r a l - r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d e m o c r a c y r e q u i r e s m o r e than a p r e s c r i b e d set of i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s c e n t e r i n g o n e l e c t i o n s a n d p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . T h e p r i n c i p a l a d d i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t is e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Effective citizen participation ultimately m e a n s successfully influencing p u b l i c p o l i c y . In this c h a p t e r , h o w e v e r , e f f e c t i v e c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n m e a n s only the o p p o r t u n i t y to p a r t i c i p a t e politically w i t h o u t s e r i o u s r e c r i m inations or s a n c t i o n s , a c o n d i t i o n taken f o r g r a n t e d by m o s t c i t i z e n s in the United States, f o r e x a m p l e . In G u a t e m a l a , w h e r e a p a r t i c i p a n t ' s s a f e t y c a n not be taken f o r g r a n t e d , this m e a n s a s t u d y of the h u m a n r i g h t s e n v i r o n m e n t . W i t h o u t a r e a s o n a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y to p a r t i c i p a t e e f f e c t i v e l y , d e m o c racy can h a r d l y be said to e x i s t in any s o c i e t y . A f a v o r a b l e h u m a n r i g h t s a t m o s p h e r e is a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r p o p u l a r g r o u p s to i n f l u e n c e p u b l i c p o l i c y . T h i s c h a p t e r f o c u s e s o n t h e i d e o l o g y of t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s a n d their p r o g r a m m a t i c a p p r o a c h to t h e m o s t b a s i c of p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s in a liberal d e m o c r a c y — t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to p a r t i c i p a t e w i t h o u t i n c u r r i n g a t h r e a t to o n e ' s l i f e — a n d a l s o o n t h e q u a l i t y of t h e h u m a n r i g h t s e n v i r o n m e n t during President Cerezo's tenure.

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Guatemalan Christian Democracy perceived

S i n c e at l e a s t t h e 1 9 6 0 s , t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s h a v e b e e n

b y t h e i r r i g h t - w i n g o p p o n e n t s as d a n g e r o u s r e f o r m e r s at b e s t a n d c r y p t o c o m m u n i s t s at w o r s t . Y e t f r o m t h e l e f t , t h e p a r t y h a s b e e n

considered

merely a reformist organization representing a conservative middle class a n d o f f e r i n g i n a p p r o p r i a t e s o l u t i o n s to p r o b l e m s r e q u i r i n g m o r e p r o f o u n d c h a n g e s . T h e D C G g e n e r a l l y f a r e d p o o r l y in t h e d e c a d e s b e f o r e 1 9 8 4 . T h e 1 9 6 5 C o n s t i t u t i o n i n i t i a l l y o u t l a w e d p a r t i e s l i k e t h e D C G b e c a u s e of t h e i r f o r e i g n c o n n e c t i o n s a n d " e x o t i c i d e o l o g y . " T h e p a r t y ' s c a n d i d a t e in 1 9 7 4 , General Rios Montt, probably won that election but was prevented f r o m t a k i n g o f f i c e by a n o t h e r f a c t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y . O v e r t h e y e a r s t h e D C G h a s o f t e n lost its m o r e p r o g r e s s i v e m e m b e r s , usually

because

the

party

leadership

was choosing

a more

cautious

a p p r o a c h at a g i v e n m o m e n t . A s a r e s u l t , w i t h t i m e t h e p a r t y h a s b e c o m e m o r e c o n s e r v a t i v e in its r e f o r m i s m a n d h a s s u r v i v e d p r o b a b l y b e c a u s e of t h i s p r a g m a t i s m . N o n e t h e l e s s , d u r i n g t h e L u c a s G a r c i a r e g i m e (1978— 1 9 8 2 ) , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r 1 9 8 0 , d o z e n s of p a r t y a c t i v i s t s w e r e a s s a s s i n a t e d , including both national- and municipal-level leaders, and several attempts w e r e m a d e to a s s a s s i n a t e V i n i c i o C e r e z o . A f t e r t h e s y s t e m i c c r i s i s of 1 9 8 2 and the s u b s e q u e n t military c o u p s a n d e l e c t i o n s , the party o p p o r t u n i s t i c a l l y t o o k a d v a n t a g e of t h e s i t u a t i o n , f u r t h e r r e d u c i n g its r e f o r m i s m in order to gain legitimacy with the ruling military hierarchy. T h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s d e s c r i b e t h e m s e l v e s as a " t h i r d w a y , " a n a l t e r n a t i v e to b o t h t h e m a t e r i a l i s m of t h e s o c i a l i s t l e f t a n d t h e i n t r a n s i g e n c e a n d i m m o r a l i t y of t h e c a p i t a l i s t r i g h t . 2 C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a c y ' s e p i s t e m o l o g y is i d e a l i s t , n o t m a t e r i a l i s t , in c o n t r a s t w i t h M a r x i s t s , a n d its i d e a l i s t i c c o n c e p t s i n c l u d e " t h e d i g n i t y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l , " " t h e p r i m a c y of t h e c o m m o n g o o d , " and " t h e perfectibility of s o c i e t y " ( S o b e r a n i s R e y e s : 5). T h e s o c i a l b a s i s f o r a c t i o n is c o m m u n i t y ; it is n e i t h e r s o c i a l c l a s s , a s it is f o r M a r x i s t s , n o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l p u r s u i n g w e a l t h in an a t m o s p h e r e of f o r m a l c i v i c a n d e c o n o m i c e q u a l i t y , as it is f o r c l a s s i c l i b e r a l s . C o m m u n i t i e s b e g i n w i t h f a m i l i e s a n d c o n t i n u e c o n c e p t u a l l y u p to t h e international c o m m u n i t y . For Christian D e m o c r a t s development

occurs

w i t h i n t h e s e s t r u c t u r e s , in w h i c h " s o l i d a r i t y " p r o d u c e s o n t h e o n e h a n d respect for individuals and their dignity, and on the other cooperation that c a n l e a d to p r o g r e s s ( S o b e r a n i s R e y e s : 5 ) . T h e e c o n o m i c p r o g r a m p r o v i d e s for a regulated market, but the state should have a much more restricted r o l e t h a n that e n v i s i o n e d b y s o c i a l d e m o c r a t s , f o r e x a m p l e , f o r w h o m t h e s t a t e is t h e p r i n c i p a l r e g u l a t o r a n d g u i d e f o r t h e w h o l e e c o n o m y . 3 T h i s a p p r o a c h in e f f e c t r e s t r i c t s t h e g o v e r n m e n t t o a r e a c t i v e r o l e . M a r x i s t a n a l y s t s f r e q u e n t l y a s s a i l s u c h a r o l e f o r g o v e r n m e n t in c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t i e s , i n a s m u c h as t h e " s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t i e s " a n d t h e " e x t e r n a l f o r c e s " C h r i s t i a n

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D e m o c r a t s s e e k t o r e g u l a t e h a v e o f t e n b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o real p o l i t i c a l p o w e r b e f o r e t h e s t a t e c a n r e a c t to p r e v e n t t h e n e g a t i v e s o c i a l

conse-

quences implied. F o r C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s t h e s o c i a l m o d e l is p l u r a l i s t . T h e r e c a n a n d will b e m a n y c o m m u n i t i e s in a n y s o c i e t y , e a c h w i t h d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s a n d g o a l s . F a c e d w i t h t h i s , t h e s t r a t e g y is n o t to h o m o g e n i z e s o c i e t y b y e l i m i n a t i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e s , n o r e v e n to c o n c e p t u a l l y r e d u c e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s to s i m p l e r q u e s t i o n s of s o c i a l c l a s s , a n d r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o p r o d u c t i o n f a c t o r s . In f a c t , t h e t e n d e n c y is t o c e l e b r a t e t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s as

symbolizing

h u m a n d i g n i t y , a n d t h e s t r a t e g y is t o c o n t r o l t h e p o t e n t i a l n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s of s o c i a l h e t e r o g e n e i t y by p r o m o t i n g s o l i d a r i t y a m o n g t h e v a r i o u s g r o u p s . T h e g o a l is s o l i d a r i t y in u p p e r - l e v e l c o m m u n i t i e s ( n a t i o n s ) , w h i c h w i l l allow for steady progress t o w a r d the c o m m o n g o o d even w h e n there are d i f f e r e n c e s at t h e l o w e r l e v e l s . Christian D e m o c r a t s distinguish their a p p r o a c h f r o m social d e m o c r a c y , w h i c h is a l s o p l u r a l i s t b u t w h i c h s e e s t h e w o r k i n g c l a s s as t h e p r e d o m i n a n t g r o u p . A l t h o u g h they a c k n o w l e d g e that w o r k e r s are the m a j o r ity, C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s d o n o t s e e t h e w o r k e r s a s a s i n g l e c l a s s b u t as s e v e r a l c o m m u n i t i e s . F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of c l a s s m o d e l s , u s i n g c o m m u n i t i e s as t h e b a s i c a n a l y t i c a l u n i t u n d e r m i n e s c l a s s u n i t y a n d a n a l y s i s . I d e o l o g i c a l l y , it a l s o m e a n s t h a t C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y p r o labor, but rather, pro c o m m o n g o o d , w h i c h m e a n s e q u a l participation f o r any c o m m u n i t y , i n c l u d i n g t h e w e a l t h y . Christian

Democrats favor participatory

d e m o c r a c y , but within

a

s t r u c t u r e o f g r o u p s . " G r o u p s " i n c l u d e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a s w e l l as o r g a n i z a t i o n s s u c h as " c o o p e r a t i v e s , n e i g h b o r h o o d o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,

community

o r g a n i z a t i o n s , l a b o r u n i o n s , e t c . " ( S o b e r a n i s R e y e s : 7). T h e p o l i t i c a l v e h i cle f o r a c h i e v i n g t h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n

is a s t y l e o f d i a l o g u e c a l l e d

con-

c e r t a c i o n . T h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c s t r a t e g y of c o n c e r t a c i o n is t h e p u r s u i t of s o c i a l c o n s e n s u s t h r o u g h d i a l o g u e , b a s e d o n a s s u m p t i o n s of g o o d f a i t h . T h e r o l e of t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t y in g o v e r n m e n t is t h e r e f o r e a d u a l o n e . First, C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s s e e t h e i r r o l e as o n e of f a c i l i t a t i n g a n d c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e p r o c e s s of c o n c e r t a c i o n . S e c o n d , t h e m a j o r t a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y is s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of c o m m u n i t i e s at all l e v e l s of s o c i e t y , s o that e a c h h a s a r e a l b a s i s f o r p a r t i c i p a t i n g in t h e p r o c e s s of p l u r a l i s t i c d i a l o g u e ( S o b e r a n i s R e y e s : 8). T h e c a r d i n a l sin in p o l i t i c s is r e f u s a l to e n t e r into d i a l o g u e w i t h t h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s . In s h o r t , c o n f r o n t a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t a n d o t h e r s o c i a l o r p o l i t i c a l g r o u p s is not t h e r e s u l t of i d e o l o g i c a l o r p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h t h e s e g r o u p s , b u t a result o f u n w i l l i n g n e s s o n t h e i r p a r t t o d i a l o g u e ( C e r e z o 1 9 8 7 : 4 9 - 5 0 ) . In t h i s , C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s a g a i n c o n t r a s t t h e i r a p p r o a c h w i t h t h a t of social d e m o c r a c y as well as M a r x i s t a n d c l a s s i c liberal a p p r o a c h e s . T o C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s , s o c i a l d e m o c r a t s o v e r e m p h a s i z e t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of

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political parties within representative g o v e r n m e n t structures and h e n c e place too much weight on the party itself, as the v e h i c l e , and on workers as a class ( S o b e r a n i s R e y e s : 7). Liberalism stresses the politics o f wealth o r g a n i z e d into pressure groups, p r o s c r i b i n g m e a n i n g f u l participation by w e a k e r groups. Marxist a p p r o a c h e s e m p h a s i z e resolution o f the c l a s s struggle in favor o f the w o r k i n g c l a s s ; Christian D e m o c r a t s a s s u m e this will be violent and fear it may represent neither the c o m m o n good nor adequate respect for individual dignity or pluralism in s o c i e t y

(Soberanis

Reyes: 48). Although the 1 9 8 4 and 1 9 8 5 election campaigns perhaps had no seriousissue c o n t e n t , the D C G does hold to a p r o g r a m e n c o m p a s s i n g c h a n g e s . T h e party is reformist and s e e k s to i m p l e m e n t

major

meaningful

r e f o r m s at the earliest opportunity, within its strategy o f respect for pluralist d i f f e r e n c e s and participatory d i a l o g u e . T h e Christian

Democrats

promised to begin building a solid b a s i s f o r future d e m o c r a c y . B e s i d e s influencing public policy, political participation a f f e c t s the ability o f others to participate. Guided by the D C G ' s criteria on d i a l o g u e and participation, a review o f human rights conditions during the C e r e z o administration is g e r m a n e to the study o f the quality o f procedural

democracy

in G u a t e m a l a .

Human Rights—1986 to 1989 T h e history o f Guatemalan human rights reveals a portrait as grim as that o f any nation o f the Western Hemisphere. B e s i d e s the history o f atrocities since the 1 9 5 0 s , the immediate legacy inherited by the C e r e z o government was dark and bitter: estimates are that over four hundred villages and hamlets were eradicated and several thousand people killed during the c o u n terinsurgency campaign o f the early 1 9 8 0 s . 4 T h e Christian D e m o c r a t s ' ideology and their victimization in the past make human rights a key question in the d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n o f G u a t e m a l a ' s political s y s t e m . Shortly after c o m i n g to o f f i c e , after a period o f public debate, the C e r e z o administration began its tenure by refusing to overturn a military decree from the M e j i a dictatorship that established an amnesty for individuals who had violated human rights; these included insurgents and also g o v e r n m e n t security

f o r c e s . M e m b e r s o f the military

were

exempted from future prosecution for past human rights violations. 5 T h e o f f i c i a l attitude, in other words, was to let b y g o n e s be b y g o n e s . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , the Christian D e m o c r a t s pledged to improve the future climate for human rights, including creating institutions to investigate violations that might occur after January 1 9 8 6 . As a beginning the party created a new ministry o f development and sought to establish development

Human Rights & the Cerezo

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117

c o u n c i l s , with s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l s as " p r o m o t e r s of d e v e l o p m e n t , " in e v e r y m u n i c i p a l i t y . T h e party p r e s e n t e d t h i s as e v i d e n c e of its g o o d f a i t h in a t t e m p t i n g to i m p r o v e h u m a n r i g h t s , c a l l i n g t h e p o v e r t y a n d m a r g i n a l i z a tion of t h e p o p u l a t i o n a " s o c i a l d e b t , t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s t h e f i r s t o b j e c t i v e of o u r g o v e r n m e n t " ( C a b r e r a H i d a l g o : 6 1 ) . W i t h i n a m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s , t h e g o v e r n m e n t t o o k s e v e r a l s t e p s . First, in k e e p i n g w i t h p r o v i s i o n s in the C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1 9 8 5 , t h e g o v e r n m e n t c r e a t e d t h e o f f i c e of h u m a n r i g h t s o m b u d s m a n . It a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d a p r e s i d e n t i a l c o m m i s s i o n to i n v e s t i g a t e h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s , set u p a f u n d to a s s i s t w i d o w s a n d o r p h a n s , s i g n e d t h e I n t e r A m e r i c a n C o n v e n t i o n to P r e v e n t T o r t u r e , a n d c r e a t e d p r o g r a m s to r e p a t r i a t e a n d r e l o c a t e r e f u g e e s . A s e v i d e n c e of t h e o v e r a l l s u c c e s s of t h e i r e f f o r t s , the party c i t e d the r e t u r n of m a n y e x i l e d i n t e l l e c t u a l s a n d p r o f e s sionals (Cabrera Hidalgo: 5 9 - 6 0 ) . T h e s u c c e s s of the Christian D e m o c r a t i c p r o g r a m is d i s p u t e d by m a n y o b s e r v e r s . In g e n e r a l , h u m a n rights v i o l a t i o n s w e r e at l o w e r levels overall than in earlier r e g i m e s , but v i o l a t i o n s c o n t i n u e d — a n d c o n t i n u e d not to be investigated. M e a n w h i l e , the position of h u m a n rights o m b u d s m a n r e m a i n e d unfilled for s o m e time and w a s severely u n d e r f u n d e d . G o n z a l o M e n e n d e z , the first o m b u d s m a n , w a s criticized by the right b e c a u s e of his attention to d e m a n d s of the G A M , the M u t u a l S u p p o r t G r o u p o r g a n i z e d by relatives of persons w h o had disappeared; they c o n t i n u e d to d e m a n d information f r o m the authorities. M o r e o v e r , M e n e n d e z w a s attacked f o r his w i l l i n g n e s s to investigate any h u m a n rights issues, f o r e x a m p l e , the existence of clandestine c e m e teries. At o n e point, M e n e n d e z a c c u s e d the D C G of a t t e m p t i n g to prevent foreign delegations f r o m consulting with him, to " p r e v e n t the o u t s i d e w o r l d f r o m learning the truth about the situation inside G u a t e m a l a " ( V M 5/88: 9). 6 A f t e r a r e l a t i v e l y quiet y e a r in 1986, political v i o l e n c e s h o w e d a d r a m a t i c u p s u r g e in 1 9 8 7 a n d 1 9 8 8 . In t e r m s of a s s a s s i n a t i o n s a n d k i d n a p p i n g s , t h e s t a t i s t i c s f o r t h e p e r i o d a r e d i s p u t e d . In g e n e r a l , t h e U . S . e m b a s s y a n d t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s s a w an i m p r o v i n g s i t u a t i o n . O t h e r o b s e r v e r s saw patterns largely u n c h a n g e d f r o m the period after the Rios M o n t t c o u p , w h e n G u a t e m a l a s a w an a b r u p t d e c l i n e in total levels of u r b a n r e p r e s s i v e v i o l e n c e . In s p i t e of t h e d e c l i n e , t h e n u m b e r of v i o l e n t d e a t h s still r e a c h e d s e v e r a l h u n d r e d e a c h y e a r d u r i n g the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 7 The U.S. State D e p a r t m e n t ' s report for 1987 differs markedly from most o t h e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b s e r v e r s . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c l a i m e d that " p o l i t i c a l k i l l i n g s d e c l i n e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y f o r the f i f t h c o n s e c u t i v e y e a r " a n d r e p o r t e d only e i g h t y - e i g h t "politically m o t i v a t e d k i l l i n g s " in 1987, c o m p a r e d to 131 in 1 9 8 6 . 8 By c o m p a r i s o n , d a t a f r o m t h e G u a t e m a l a n p r e s s s h o w e d t h e r e w e r e 1,021 s u c h c a s e s in 1 9 8 7 ( G N I B 1 / 1 / 8 8 : 8). R e f e r e n c e s to s p e c i f i c e v e n t s p r o v i d e a c l e a r e r p e r s p e c t i v e . In l a t e 1 9 8 7 , a s m a l l g r o u p of e x i l e d l e a d e r s of p o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s r e t u r n e d

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openly to Guatemala from Mexico, to test the level of f r e e d o m of expression. T h e y were allowed to hold press c o n f e r e n c e s and meet with local groups, but they were threatened by the right. President C e r e z o characterized the group as espousing "radical positions." T h e exiles responded that all of their activities were c o n d u c t e d within the law. T h e g r o u p left after one week because of fears for their safety (Caceres: 13). 9 T h e Christian D e m o c r a t s saw an improved situation. In his report to the Guatemalan Congress in January 1988, President Cerezo described his g o v e r n m e n t ' s progress on civil liberties and human rights: For the first t i m e in y e a r s , . . . G u a t e m a l a n s c a n e x p r e s s t h e m s e l v e s w i t h out restriction through political g r o u p s , u n i o n s , or i n d i v i d u a l l y , on any m e a s u r e or area in w h i c h t h e y f e e l the g o v e r n m e n t is a f f e c t i n g t h e i r intere s t s . F r e e d o m o f t h e p r e s s is e x e r c i s e d w i t h n o r e s t r i c t i o n s , a n d

basic

h u m a n r i g h t s are r e s p e c t e d b y the g o v e r n m e n t and s t r e n g t h e n e d b y j u d i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d and r e g u l a t e d b y a C o n s t i t u t i o n ( P C R P 1 / 8 8 : 3).

In contrast, in mid-1988, a p p r o x i m a t e l y h a l f w a y through President C e r e z o ' s term, the G u a t e m a l a n H u m a n Rights C o m m i s s i o n asserted that the government had n e g l e c t e d its r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s v i s - a - v i s t h e f a c t s , [ a n d h a d ] a s s u m e d an attitude of p a s s i v e tolerance, c o v e r i n g up political v i o l e n c e c o m m i t t e d by the g o v e r n m e n t ' s a r m y , v a r i o u s p o l i c e u n i t s , a n d t h e c l a n d e s t i n e a p p a r a t u s f o r r e p r e s s i o n that is c o n t r o l l e d b y t h e h i g h m i l i t a r y

commanders

( V M 5/88: 9).

By late 1988, d o m e s t i c criticism included an indictment f r o m E d m u n d o V a s q u e z , president of the G u a t e m a l a n S u p r e m e Court: " T h e situation in Guatemala is in a state of collapse in terms of human rights, meaningless legislation and d e m a g o g y . " 1 0 Clearly, the situation regarding human rights was in dispute throughout the first half of President C e r e z o ' s regime. 1 1 T h e country began 1989 already under attack by several major, international organizations because of the human rights climate ( G M G 2/89: 5 - 6 ; Special Service 2/89). Yet the Christian D e m o c r a t s ' position remained optimistic and quite positive: according to President Cerezo, G u a t e m a l a e n j o y e d "a c l i m a t e of total respect for human rights as well as other individual rights" (in El Grafico, quoted in G M G 2/89: 2). T h e apparent contradictions in these v i e w s are partly because the Christian D e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t has tended to use legal a n d constitutional provisions as the basis for their position, w h e r e a s o t h e r observers point to the statistics of actual violations. As evidence of consolidating the democratization process and protecting human rights, for e x a m p l e , Cerezo

Human

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cited the creation of the office of the human rights ombudsman, new judicial procedures, laws protecting the rights of labor to organize, the practice of dialogue (concertacion) between government and organized interest groups, including labor, legal registration of several new labor organizations, and the law establishing development councils in G u a t e m a l a ' s municipalities (GMG 2/89: 2). These legal provisions were the basis of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s position in its first major international test in early 1989, the Geneva meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. In Geneva human rights advocates urged, and the government opposed, that G u a t e m a l a be listed among nations in which "grave and systematic" violations of human rights have occurred. Although Guatemala was discussed under this agenda item (#8), as well as under other agenda items on ethnic questions (#10) and the need for a United Nations expert advisor (#21), the commission agreed that Guatemala was subject only to the last item and assigned an expert advisor with expanded responsibilities (GMG 4/89: 4). Although human rights advocates saw the extensive and acrimonious debate in Geneva as evidence of serious problems in Guatemala, the government saw the outcome as a political victory, inasmuch as Guatemala avoided the most serious rulings from the commission (PCRP 3/89: 3). In addition to criticisms from human rights activists, however, the conservative press attacked the g o v e r n m e n t ' s position as well, although partisan political reasons may partly explain this criticism. Prensa Libre, for example, editorialized that t h e truth is that in t h i s c o u n t r y — a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s — d i s a p p e a r a n c e s , a s s a s s i n a t i o n s and a n o n y m o u s n o t e s t h r e a t e n i n g the l i v e s o f c i t i z e n s o f d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l t e n d e n c i e s c o n t i n u e , n o t to m e n t i o n t h e b l a c k l i s t s that are in the h a n d s o f the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y b r a n c h e s ( q u o t e d in G M G 4 / 8 9 : 4-5).

Despite the government's diplomatic victory in Geneva and its formallegal provisions supporting human rights, the combination of the f a r m workers' strike on the South Coast in January, a major t e a c h e r ' s strike from May to August, and the open participation of opposition groups in the National Dialogue process (see Chapter 8) led to a dramatic increase in human rights violations in the second half of 1989. As in 1988, the surge of violence closely followed an attempted military coup in May 1989. In addition to threats and violence toward popular organizations, other groups s u f f e r e d repression. In August b o m b s exploded at the o f f i c e s of GAM and of Peace Brigades International, a group providing "witnesses" for threatened individuals. A m o n g the most serious atrocities were renewed attacks on the university community. Beginning in August at least

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a dozen student leaders disappeared or were murdered during i n c u r s i o n s o n t o u n i v e r s i t y c a m p u s e s in G u a t e m a l a C i t y a n d

several

Quetzalte-

nango. Other student activists quickly fled into exile.12 In S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 9 , t h e r e n e w e d v i o l e n c e p r o m p t e d t h e U . S . S t a t e Department

to i s s u e a t r a v e l e r ' s a d v i s o r y

for Guatemala, a reluctant

a c k n o w l e d g m e n t that h i g h l e v e l s of p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e e x i s t e d e v e n in a r e a s f r e q u e n t e d by t o u r i s t s ( P C R P 9 / 8 9 : 5 ) . A t a b o u t t h e s a m e t i m e ,

GAM

a n n o u n c e d its p l a n s to s u e t h e g o v e r n m e n t f o r h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s in a c a s e to b e b r o u g h t t o t h e I n t e r - A m e r i c a n

Human Rights Court.

GAM

p l a c e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a t r o c i t i e s it h a s e x p e r i e n c e d — m u r d e r a n d t h e d i s a p p e a r a n c e of m a n y of its l e a d e r s — o n t h e s e c u r i t y f o r c e s ( P C R P 11/ 89: 6). T h e g o v e r n m e n t h a d a r g u e d at t h e b e g i n n i n g of 1 9 8 9 that t h e s i t u a t i o n in G u a t e m a l a w a s m u c h i m p r o v e d o v e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s i n h e r i t e d b y t h e g o v e r n m e n t in 1 9 8 6 , s i n c e t h e v i o l a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s w a s n o l o n g e r a s t a t e p o l i c y . D u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h e y e a r , in t h e f a c e of

mounting

e v i d e n c e implicating public security forces, the g o v e r n m e n t

continued

t o i n s i s t t h a t it w a s n o t g u i l t y o f h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s b u t w a s t o t a l l y committed

to

protecting

and

improving

the

human

rights

situation

in G u a t e m a l a , a n d t h a t e x t r e m i s t s of t h e l e f t a n d t h e r i g h t , a n d / o r " c o m m o n c r i m i n a l s , " w e r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the atrocities that did o c c u r ( P C R P 10/89: 4). Complicating

the

picture,

two

UN

observers

offered

conflicting

a s s e s s m e n t s after visiting G u a t e m a l a . H é c t o r G r o s Espiell, the o b s e r v e r on G u a t e m a l a n h u m a n r i g h t s u n d e r a g e n d a i t e m 2 1 , r e p o r t e d in N o v e m b e r t h a t t h e c l i m a t e of h u m a n r i g h t s h a d n o t in f a c t d e c l i n e d in p a s t m o n t h s , in s p i t e of t e r r o r i s t a c t i o n s b y e x t r e m i s t f a c t i o n s , a n d that t h e r e w a s n o o f f i c i a l p o l i c y of r e p r e s s i o n in G u a t e m a l a , as h a d b e e n t h e c a s e in t h e p a s t ( P C R P 11/89: 6). A n o t h e r U N o b s e r v e r , h o w e v e r , reported that:

In a c o u n t r y w h e r e part o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n d o e s n ' t k n o w at n i g h t w h e t h e r it w i l l l i v e to s e e t h e l i g h t o f d a y , w h e r e f a m i l i e s h a v e n o s a f e t y , o n e c o u l d s a y the s i t u a t i o n is o f g r a v e c o n c e r n ( G M G 1 0 / 8 9 : 4 ) .

Although G u a t e m a l a had e m e r g e d relatively unscathed f r o m the early 1 9 8 9 G e n e v a m e e t i n g of t h e C o m m i s s i o n o n H u m a n R i g h t s , by l a t e 1 9 8 9 , t h e g o v e r n m e n t s u f f e r e d a d i p l o m a t i c d e f e a t in t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . In s p i t e of P r e s i d e n t C e r e z o ' s s p e e c h t o t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y in S e p t e m b e r a n d A m b a s s a d o r V i l l a g r á n ' s v i g o r o u s d e f e n s e of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s

human

rights p e r f o r m a n c e , G u a t e m a l a w a s d e n i e d a seat on the UN Social and E c o n o m i c C o u n c i l . T h e d e b a t e i n c l u d e d w i d e s p r e a d c o n d e m n a t i o n of t h e G u a t e m a l a n g o v e r n m e n t f r o m the E u r o p e a n c o m m u n i t y ( G M G 3-5).

12/89:

Human Rights 6* the Cerezo

Administration

121

Human Rights—1990 G u a t e m a l a ' s d o m i n a n t elites have long p e r c e i v e d g e n u i n e democratization as a s i g n i f i c a n t t h r e a t to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . T h e i r c o n s i s t e n t r e s p o n s e to p o l i t ical p a r t i c i p a t i o n b y p o p u l a r g r o u p s o r r e f o r m i s t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s h a s b e e n p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e a i m e d at d e t e r r i n g s u c h p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h e s e d y n a m i c s r e e m e r g e d in 1 9 9 0 , in s y s t e m a t i c v i o l a t i o n s of h u m a n r i g h t s . A s in e a r l i e r y e a r s , o b s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t h u m a n r i g h t s s h o w e d e x t r e m e c o n t r a s t s . T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s p o s i t i o n at t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e y e a r w a s t h a t the h u m a n rights climate had significantly i m p r o v e d , although m o r e w a s n e e d e d to e l i m i n a t e t e r r o r i s m of b o t h t h e r i g h t a n d l e f t . 1 3 O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , C a t h o l i c b i s h o p s m e e t i n g in Q u e t z a l t e n a n g o in J a n u a r y a s s e r t e d t h a t " h u m a n r i g h t s , s u c h as t h e r i g h t t o d i g n i t y a n d e q u a l i t y , d o n o t e x i s t " ( q u o t e d in L o v e l l 1 9 9 0 ) . D u r i n g 1 9 9 0 , t h e s a m e p a t t e r n f r o m t h e p a s t e m e r g e d w i t h , if a n y t h i n g , i n t e n s i f i e d l e v e l s o f h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s , concurrent with the election c a m p a i g n and the d i a l o g u e process.14

The Judicial

Process

A k e y p i l l a r of t h e C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s a p p r o a c h t o h u m a n r i g h t s h a s b e e n its i n s i s t e n c e o n i m p r o v i n g t h e q u a l i t y of t h e j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s in o r d e r to s t r e n g t h e n i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s . B u t as of l a t e 1989, the o n l y convictions ever o b t a i n e d for h u m a n rights violations w e r e t h o s e of s i x m e m b e r s of t h e G u a t e m a l a n N a t i o n a l P o l i c e a r r e s t e d f o r k i d n a p p i n g a n d k i l l i n g t w o a g r o n o m i s t s in 1 9 8 7 . A s e v i d e n c e of t h e d e t e r i o r a t i n g h u m a n r i g h t s c l i m a t e in 1 9 9 0 , t h e s e s i x w e r e r e l e a s e d a f t e r an a p p e l late c o u r t o v e r t u r n e d t h e c o n v i c t i o n s . S i n c e t h e y w e r e b a s e d o n e v i d e n c e p r o d u c e d a f t e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f u n d e d a t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e p r o j e c t to i n c r e a s e G u a t e m a l a ' s c a p a c i t y to c o l l e c t e v i d e n c e in c r i m e s , t h e k e y f a c t o r s s e e m e d l e s s a q u e s t i o n of t e c h n i c a l c o m p e t e n c e a n d m o r e t h o s e of t h e political will of j u d g e s and the overall a t m o s p h e r e c r e a t e d by state terrorism ( N F A W 8/90). In f a c t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s s p o n s o r e d s e v e r a l p r o g r a m s to i m p r o v e h u m a n rights by i n c r e a s i n g the technical c o m p e t e n c e of j u d i c i a l institutions, i n c l u d i n g p r o g r a m s s u p p o r t e d and/or a d m i n i s t e r e d

by the

U.S.

A g e n c y for International D e v e l o p m e n t , the Latin A m e r i c a n Institute for C r i m e P r e v e n t i o n a n d t h e T r e a t m e n t of O f f e n d e r s , a n d t h e C e n t e r f o r C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e of H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y ' s L a w S c h o o l . B u t n o n e of t h e s e p r o j e c t s a i m at a r r e s t i n g o r p r o s e c u t i n g t h o s e g u i l t y of v i o l a t i o n s . P o l i t i c a l b a r r i e r s s e e m to p r e v e n t e v e n i n c r e a s e s in t e c h n i c a l c a p a b i l i t y f r o m h a v i n g a positive i m p a c t on the h u m a n rights climate.15 P e r h a p s t h e best illustration lies in t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e o f f i c e of t h e h u m a n r i g h t s o m b u d s m a n , a p o s i t i o n c r e a t e d early in t h e C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n

122

Guatemalan

Politics

to show its support for human rights. T h e first o m b u d s m a n , G o n z a l o Menéndez de la Riva, had resigned in October 1989, and was replaced by Ramiro de León Carpió. Early in 1990, de León publicly decried the existence of clandestine prisons in Guatemala, but no investigation f o l l o w e d . Later in the year, the o m b u d s m a n "claimed that 163 extrajudicial e x e c u tions were carried out in the first six months of 1990, with the ' m a j o r i t y (of the victims) s u f f e r i n g bullet wounds, torture, knifing, or i n c i n e r a t i o n ' " (quoted in T O A 10/31/90: 3). Without g a i n s a y i n g the s y m b o l i c import of these revelations, the o f f i c e of the o m b u d s m a n did little else to improve the human rights climate, and the question of technical capacity versus political will is again salient. Although initially u n d e r f u n d e d when it w a s created in 1986, and understandably cautious at that time, by 1990 the o m b u d s m a n o f f i c e had a staff of 150 persons. In addition to other programs, West German assistance was being used to increase the forensic capability of the o f f i c e , so that it could collect its own evidence on human rights violations, reducing d e p e n d e n c e on the police. Still, "not a single m e m b e r of G u a t e m a l a ' s security forces has been jailed in connection with more than 100,000 political killings over the past three decades" (Excelsior 3/25/90: 2A; MHerald 9/15/90: 19A). Geneva Again in 1990, the question of the n a t i o n ' s human rights climate was the subject of intense d e b a t e at the G e n e v a m e e t i n g of the H u m a n Rights C o m m i s s i o n . Both the g o v e r n m e n t and its critics were able to point to " v i c t o r y " in this process, f o r although the report to the c o m m i s s i o n by Héctor Gros Espiell, the U N ' s special observer for Guatemala, asserted that "the government has neither the power nor the authority necessary to guarantee the exercise of human rights," Gros Espiell essentially reinforced the Christian D e m o c r a t i c perspective as well: There have c o n t i n u e d to be increasing l e v e l s of v i o l a t i o n s of civil and political rights of c i t i z e n s , especially assassinations and disappearances. Apparently, these have not resulted from any official policy nor from any governmental order, but from d e c i s i o n s taken by other power sectors and from the persistent c l i m a t e of v i o l e n c e , factors that have escaped e f f e c tive government c o n t r o l . 1 6

T h e Geneva m e e t i n g , as before, s u g g e s t e d cautious approval of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s activities while offering continued assistance to improve the human rights c l i m a t e — b y calling, for example, for more effective educational programs to create proper cultural appreciation for human rights and

Human Rights & the Cerezo

Administration

123

d e m o c r a c y . An additional report w a s r e q u e s t e d for 1991, with an o b s e r v e r again a s s i g n e d . 1 7

Popular

and Middle-Class

Groups

In both u r b a n a n d rural a r e a s , h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s , as in past y e a r s , r e f l e c t e d a t t e m p t s of p o p u l a r and m i d d l e - c l a s s o r g a n i z a t i o n s to participate o p e n l y in the political p r o c e s s . For labor, 1 9 9 0 w a s a d i f f i c u l t y e a r , m a r k e d by s o m e s u c c e s s e s (see C h a p t e r 8) but a l s o by i n c r e a s i n g r e p r e s sion and a w e a k e n i n g of the political party s y s t e m a n d e l e c t o r a l institutions as potential allies in its struggle. N o n e t h e l e s s , the p r o s p e c t of o r g a nized w o r k e r s u c c e s s led to i n t e n s i f i e d r e p r e s s i o n d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t b o t h w o r k i n g - c l a s s g r o u p s a n d m i d d l e - c l a s s p r o f e s s i o n a l s p e r c e i v e d as their allies. D o z e n s of labor activists w e r e m u r d e r e d or f o r c e d into exile in 1989 and in the first half of 1 9 9 0 . 1 8 P r o f e s s i o n a l s , too, paid a heavy price. R e l i g i o u s w o r k e r s , social scientists, and j o u r n a l i s t s w e r e all s i n g l e d out for r e p r e s s i o n . A n A m e r i c a n nun, Diana Ortiz, w a s a b d u c t e d and tortured, then a l l o w e d to e s c a p e w h e n her c a p t o r s realized she w a s a U.S. citizen. In S e p t e m b e r , M y r n a M a c k , a leading G u a t e m a l a n a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , w a s m u r d e r e d as s h e left her research institute in d o w n t o w n G u a t e m a l a City ( M a n z ) . 1 9 B y r o n B a r r e r a , president of the A s s o c i a t i o n of G u a t e m a l a n Journalists, w h o had c o m e back d u r i n g the political o p e n i n g i m p l i e d by the return to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y a f t e r 1984, a n d w h o s e n e w s p a p e r , La Epoca, had b e e n d e s t r o y e d in the w a v e of terrorism f o l l o w i n g the a t t e m p t e d military c o u p of May 1989, w a s w o u n d e d in a c a r - b o m b e x p l o s i o n that killed his w i f e ( R o d r i g u e z ; T e n n e r iello 11/11/90).

Human

Rights

Activists

H u m a n r i g h t s a c t i v i s t s , i n c l u d i n g m e m b e r s of G A M a n d the R u n u j e l J u n a m C o u n c i l of Ethnic Unity ( C o n s e j o de C o m u n i d a d e s E t n i c a s R u n u j e l J u n a m — C E R J ) 2 " also f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s t a r g e t e d . C E R J w a s c r e a t e d in 1988 to d e m a n d e n f o r c e m e n t of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n ( A r t i c l e 3 4 ) that s e r v i c e in civil p a t r o l s ( P A C S ) be v o l u n t a r y . P A C s w e r e first e s t a b lished as part of the A r m y ' s c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y e f f o r t s in the Indian highland r e g i o n s in the early 1980s; at the time, all Indian m a l e s w e r e o b l i g e d to serve tours of duty on a regular basis. In spite of Article 34, " h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of Indian men c o n t i n u e to s e r v e as i n v o l u n t a r y , u n p a i d labor at the s e r v i c e of the A r m y . " C E R J d e d i c a t e d itself to i n f o r m i n g I n d i a n c o m m u n i t i e s that s e r v i c e w a s v o l u n t a r y and to d e f e n d i n g I n d i a n s w h o ran a f o u l of military a n d civil a u t h o r i t i e s w h o r e f u s e d to a b i d e by the

Guatemalan

124

Politics

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s . C E R J a c t e d , in e s s e n c e , a s a " r u r a l l e g a l a i d o f f i c e " ( A m e r i c a s W a t c h 1 9 8 9 : 2). T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s r e a c t i o n to C E R J has b e e n m i x e d . S o m e s e c t o r s , s u c h as t h e h u m a n r i g h t s o m b u d s m a n a n d a f e w m e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s , h a v e b e e n s y m p a t h e t i c . But P r e s i d e n t C e r e z o and the military high c o m m a n d

on

o c c a s i o n h a v e e v a d e d C E R J ' s d e m a n d s or h a v e r e s o r t e d t o l e g a l i t i e s , f o r e x a m p l e , r e s t a t i n g t h e c o n t e n t s of A r t i c l e 3 4 a n d p u b l i c l y i n s i s t i n g t h a t s e r v i c e is a l r e a d y v o l u n t a r y . A t l e a s t o n c e , t h e g o v e r n m e n t w e n t s o f a r as to d i s c r e d i t C E R J p u b l i c l y . 2 1 But the most serious response has been repression. T h e m o r e prominent leaders of these o r g a n i z a t i o n s w e r e s o m e t i m e s able to m o v e m o r e f r e e l y b e c a u s e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n f o c u s e d on t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . C E R J f o u n d e r A m í l c a r M é n d e z w a s a w a r d e d t h e R o b e r t F. K e n n e d y

Memorial

H u m a n R i g h t s A w a r d in N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 0 . B u t l e s s p r o m i n e n t

members

w e r e eliminated: several C E R J leaders and m e m b e r s w e r e threatened duri n g 1 9 8 9 . In s p i t e of t h e U . S . S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t ' s r e c a l l o f A m b a s s a d o r S t r o o c k in M a r c h 1 9 9 0 , a s i g n a l of W a s h i n g t o n ' s d i s p l e a s u r e w i t h t h e l e v e l of v i o l e n c e in G u a t e m a l a , G A M c o n t i n u e d to b e h a r a s s e d . A t l e a s t f i v e a s s o c i a t e s of C E R J w e r e m u r d e r e d a n d f i v e o t h e r s d i s a p p e a r e d . 2 2 Just a f e w m o n t h s after b e c o m i n g v i s i b l e , the o r g a n i z a t i o n f i n d s itself battling as m u c h for its o w n survival and the p h y s i c a l s a f e t y o f its m e m bers as for the c a u s e it originally undertook ( A m e r i c a s W a t c h 1 9 8 9 : 1).

Children O n e p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s t r e s s i n g a s p e c t of t h e h u m a n r i g h t s a t m o s p h e r e is a s e r i e s of b a r b a r i c i n c i d e n t s i n v o l v i n g h o m e l e s s c h i l d r e n l i v i n g o n the s t r e e t s of G u a t e m a l a C i t y . W i t h t h e c i t y ' s p o p u l a t i o n s w e l l i n g b e c a u s e of e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s a n d rural v i o l e n c e a n d e c o n o m i c o p p o r t u n i t y w a n i n g e v e n in t h e c a p i t a l , t h e i n c r e a s e in t h e n u m b e r of street c h i l d r e n in G u a t e m a l a h a s b e e n noteworthy; cautious estimates placed some five thousand children aged five to e i g h t e e n in this c a t e g o r y at t h e t i m e ( T O A 9 / 5 / 9 0 : 4; Z i n n e r ) . In e a r l y 1 9 9 0 , t h e G u a t e m a l a n p o l i c e a p p a r e n t l y b e g a n t o e n g a g e in a " d i r t y w a r " a g a i n s t t h e s e c h i l d r e n : " a t least 4 5 c h i l d r e n . . . d i e d b e t w e e n J a n u a r y and J u n e this year by strangulation, bullets t h r o u g h the head, or other m e a n s . " Social s e r v i c e w o r k e r s , even lawyers, w h o a t t e m p t e d to i n v e s t i g a t e a l l e g a t i o n s of p o l i c e i n v o l v e m e n t r e c e i v e d d e a t h t h r e a t s . A n d A m n e s t y I n t e r n a t i o n a l " i s s u e d a report s i g n a l i n g a l a r m at

'escalating'

abuses including extrajudicial executions against the c i t y ' s . . . street child r e n " ( T O A 9/5/90: 4).23 Ironically, G u a t e m a l a was a m o n g the earliest s i g n e r s of t h e 1 9 8 9 U n i t e d N a t i o n s I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n v e n t i o n of C h i l d r e n ' s Rights ( P C R P 3/90: 4).

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Rights

& the Cerezo

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Conclusion T h i s e x a m i n a t i o n of the h u m a n rights a t m o s p h e r e d u r i n g the C e r e z o a d m i n istration p r o v i d e s f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e that t h e p o s i t i o n of d o m i n a n t g r o u p s in G u a t e m a l a n politics basically remains intact. President C e r e z o ' s governm e n t c o n t i n u e d to p r e s e n t as positive a f a c e as p o s s i b l e g i v e n these d e v e l o p m e n t s , f r e q u e n t l y c i t i n g its s u p p o r t at t h e G e n e v a m e e t i n g of the U N H u m a n R i g h t s C o m m i s s i o n . T h e G u a t e m a l a n g o v e r n m e n t generally d e c r i e d h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s a n d i n s i s t e d that t h e s e w e r e t h e a c t i o n s of n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l a c t o r s of b o t h e x t r e m e s , l e f t a n d r i g h t . T h e D C G t h e r e f o r e s a w t h e s o l u t i o n to the h u m a n rights d i l e m m a in t h e i n c r e a s i n g c o n s o l i d a tion of the d e m o c r a t i c r e g i m e , as well as c o n t i n u i n g e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e r a d i c a t i o n of e x t r e m i s t s s e e k i n g to s a b o t a g e t h e s y s t e m . 2 4 T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s a n a l y s i s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , b y the e n d of 1 9 9 0 , h u m a n r i g h t s c o n d i t i o n s c o n t i n u e d to d e c l i n e s t e a d i l y , as e v i d e n c e d s i n c e s h o r t l y a f t e r C e r e z o took o f f i c e in 1986. C r i t i c s n o t e d a historical p a t t e r n r e c u r r i n g : s m a l l v i c t o r i e s by p o p u l a r g r o u p s f o l l o w e d by r e p r e s s i o n of their l e a d e r s . T h i s pattern w a s s i m i l a r to the e v e n t s of 1 9 7 9 a n d 1 9 8 0 that m a r k e d t h e b e g i n n i n g of G u a t e m a l a ' s w o r s t p e r i o d of v i o l e n c e to d a t e . P l a c i n g this r e c o r d in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e p r o g r a m m a t i c i d e o l o g y of the C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c Party a d d s an e l e m e n t of i r o n y , if not t r a g e d y . R e g a r d l e s s of the p r e s i d e n t ' s a n d p a r t y ' s l e v e l of s i n c e r i t y , the d a t a s u g g e s t that p o w e r d o e s not f a v o r s o c i a l r e f o r m o r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n f r e e of r e c r i m i n a t i o n . T h i s in turn c r e a t e s a p p r e h e n s i o n c o n c e r n i n g the f u t u r e of d e m o c r a t i c d e v e l o p m e n t in G u a t e m a l a . T h e h u m a n r i g h t s e v i d e n c e f r o m the C e r e z o p e r i o d s u g g e s t s that n e w p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e c o u n t e r r e f o r m i s t as well as c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t a n d , e x c e p t f o r e l e c t o r a l p r o cedures themselves, antidemocratic.25 A c c e s s to the p u b l i c - p o l i c y p r o c e s s , t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to p a r t i c i p a t e p o l i t i c a l l y , is a key p r o c e d u r a l c o m p o n e n t of any d e m o c r a t i c s y s t e m , but it d o e s not n e c e s s a r i l y g u a r a n t e e s u b s t a n t i a l i n f l u e n c e . B u t g u a r a n t e e d a c c e s s is c l e a r l y a n e c e s s a r y c o m p o n e n t of a n y d e m o c r a c y : n o s y s t e m c a n b e c a l l e d s u c h if it c a n n o t e n s u r e its c i t i z e n s the o p p o r t u n i t y to p a r t i c i p a t e o p e n l y . W i t h o u t this, e v e n t h e p u r i t y of b a l l o t i n g p r o c e d u r e s b e c o m e s insignificant.

Notes 1. U s i n g careful data c o l l e c t i o n and a s y s t e m a t i c c o m p a r i s o n , P o e ranks G u a t e m a l a as e a s i l y the m o s t s e r i o u s abuser o f h u m a n rights in the h e m i s p h e r e during this period. In a world s a m p l e , based on c o n d i t i o n s as of 1 9 8 2 , G u a t e m a l a ranks s e c o n d o n l y to A f g h a n i s t a n . 2. T h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i p t i o n of the D C G ' s i d e o l o g y is b a s e d on S o b e r a n i s R e y e s and on c o n v e r s a t i o n s with party leaders b e t w e e n 1 9 8 0 and 1 9 8 7 .

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3. In Christian D e m o c r a c y , the state intervenes like a set of valves, d e p e n d i n g on the n e e d s of society, a l w a y s with the f u n d a m e n t a l goal of the c o m m o n good, [and] intervening . . . [in a] subsidiary role, when the laws of the market are altered by social inequalities or by external f o r c e s beyond the local e c o n o m y (Soberanis Reyes: 6). 4. Writing in 1987, D C G leader A l f o n s o Cabrera e m p h a s i z e d this inheritance: " F r o m 1978 to 1981, G u a t e m a l a reached the h i g h e s t levels of politically related a s s a s s i n a t i o n s ever r e c o r d e d in world history in c o u n t r i e s not at w a r " ( C a b r e r a Hidalgo: 60). C a b r e r a ' s s e c o n d date is 1981, although the years between 1980 and 1984 include the worst repression in G u a t e m a l a n history to date in rural areas. By ignoring this violence, C a b r e r a was either r e d e f i n i n g h u m a n rights violations to not include generalized w a r f a r e , or selectively r e m a i n i n g silent about the practices of the military faction in p o w e r since the 1982 c h a n g e of g o v e r n m e n t , or both. 5. In the period a f t e r 1983, when the civil d e f e n s e patrols had b e c o m e well established in rural areas, they were s o m e t i m e s used in forced w a r f a r e , with P A C m e m b e r s of one village f o r c e d to c o m m i t atrocities in other villages. D u r i n g the Cerezo period D e f e n s e Minister G r a m a j o a n n o u n c e d , w i t h o u t t a k i n g into a c c o u n t [ G u a t e m a l a ' s ] j u d i c i a l institutions, that the m e m b e r s of P A C s w o u l d be included in a new a m n e s t y , decreed as part of the Central A m e r i c a n P e a c e A c c o r d s ( E s q u i p u l a s II) ( V M 5/88: 9). 6. For a m o r e detailed discussion of this o f f i c e and its activities, see W O L A 1989b: 4 2 - 4 6 . 7. For 1987, see C A R 1/29/88: 2 8 - 2 9 . O v e r a l l , a c a r e f u l , regular source for these data is G N I B . For a point of view reflecting the views of the Christian Democratic Party, see P C R P . A s an e x a m p l e of d i f f e r i n g perspectives, one report claims that: " D e c e m b e r 1987, signaled the highest rate of v i o l e n c e in G u a t e m a l a since President C e r e z o took o f f i c e in January, 1986" ( G N I B 12/1/87: 1). But at the same time, President C e r e z o ' s position was that "violence has diminished in G u a t e m a l a " and that the v i o l e n c e that has taken place is " c o m m o n c r i m e " (quoted in G N I B 12/1/87: 1). 8. With this c l a i m , based on a c o m p a r i s o n of 1987 data with 1986 data, the State Department in e f f e c t asserted that there were continual declines in this type of human rights violations since 1982. This claim appears to contradict evidence of violence against civilians d u r i n g the c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y c a m p a i g n after 1982. Earlier, d u r i n g the Lucas G a r c i a r e g i m e , the State D e p a r t m e n t d o w n p l a y e d human rights violations, although after the c o u p of 1982, g o v e r n m e n t violence before that c o u p w a s a c k n o w l e d g e d . T h e State D e p a r t m e n t routinely denied that there were serious violations under Ríos until after he w a s d e p o s e d by Mejía Víctores in 1983. Given this pattern of r e v i s i o n i s m , o b s e r v e r s s h o u l d be skeptical of State Department c l a i m s about G u a t e m a l a after 1983, e s p e c i a l l y in view of the contrasting reports by most other international observers of G u a t e m a l a n h u m a n rights. 9. T h e A r m y p a r t i c i p a t e d indirectly in this incident w h e n it issued a press statement, entitled " T h e A r m y O b e y s the L a w , " in w h i c h it a n n o u n c e d : " W e will continue fighting the radicals," a puzzling position, since there w a s no law defining what is meant by " r a d i c a l s " nor w a s there any law that claims that b e i n g radical is a crime ( C á c e r e s : 13).

Human

Rights & the Cerezo

Administration

12 7

10. Excelsior 12/12/88, quoted in V M 5/88: 11. Even the c o n s e r v a t i v e Guatemalan daily, Prensa Libre, described G u a t e m a l a as " o n e of the places on the face of the earth w h e r e the spirit of the Universal D e c l a r a t i o n on H u m a n R i g h t s has been the most brutally and consistently v i o l a t e d " (although it may have d o n e so for partisan political r e a s o n s rather than b e c a u s e of a m o r a l c o m m i t m e n t to h u m a n rights) (10/11/88, quoted in V M 5/88: 2). 11. A n o t h e r s u m m a r y of the situation after the first half of the C e r e z o r e g i m e : M e a n w h i l e , human rights violations continue at rates similar to those prevailing in the years of military rule. . . . T h e situation in the c o u n t r y s i d e is just as bad as it w a s under military rule ( C o c k b u r n : 2). 12. For m o r e details on the threats and terrorist a c t i o n s aimed at p a r t i c i p a n t s in the National D i a l o g u e , see P C R P 8/89: 3; and 9 / 8 9 : 3 - 4 . For m o r e d e t a i l s on the v i o l e n c e d i r e c t e d against the p o p u l a r s e c t o r s , see U O G 7 / 8 9 : 1 - 2 ; Centroamerica Hoy 10/8/89: 1 3 - 1 4 . For details of killings and d i s a p p e a r a n c e s of stud e n t s in late 1989, see G M G 10/89: 2 - 3 ; and N F A W 10/89: 2 - 3 . T h e 1 9 8 9 attacks on U S A C student leaders were only the most recent in a long series that includes s e v e r a l earlier a t r o c i t i e s d u r i n g the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; for d e t a i l s of atrocities in 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 8 8 , see N F A W 10/89: 1 0 - 1 2 . For o t h e r d e s c r i p t i o n s of recent v i o l e n c e , see M c C o n a h a y : 8; W P o s t 9 / 2 9 / 8 9 : A l , A 5 0 ; T e n n e r i e l l o 1989; and J o n a s 1989. 13. For a c o m p l e t e exposition of this position, see " D e r e c h o s h u m a n o s . " As in earlier years, the D C G a p p r o a c h w a s to l u m p t o g e t h e r b o t h the left and the right as terrorists s e e k i n g to destabilize the g o v e r n m e n t and the e c o n o m y , and, as such, " a l l i e s " against the g o v e r n m e n t . See P C R P 1/90: 5 - 6 ; and 2/90: 5 - 6 . 14. For a table s u m m a r i z i n g human rights violations in the first ten m o n t h s of 1990, which totaled over 1,700, see G M G 11/90: 7. M a n y s o u r c e s d e s c r i b e human rights c o n d i t i o n s in G u a t e m a l a . A m o n g them, see e s p e c i a l l y W O L A 1 9 9 0 . G M G 8/90: 1 - 6 r e p o r t s several e x a m p l e s of President C e r e z o publicly d e n y i n g any h u m a n rights v i o l a t i o n s in G u a t e m a l a . A l s o see L A T i m e s 4 / 1 4 / 9 0 : 1; Excelsior 5/9/90: 2A and 8/28/90: 2A; N Y T i m e s 6/28/90: 3A; and N F A W 8/90. 15. W O L A 1990: 5. For a good s u m m a r y of the legal and judicial p r o c e d u r e s for investigating and p r o s e c u t i n g crime in G u a t e m a l a , see pages 9 - 2 2 . 16. T h e first passage is quoted in R O G Sp/90: 4, the s e c o n d in G r o s Espiell. For more details of the G e n e v a meeting, see G M G 3/90: 4 - 6 . 17. For the Christian D e m o c r a t i c interpretation, see G r o s Espiell; and P C R P 3/90: 4. For an o p p o s i n g point of view, see R O G S u / 9 0 : 15. 18. For d e t a i l s of h u m a n rights v i o l a t i o n s a g a i n s t labor, see R O G S u / 9 0 ; Excelsior 1 / 3 1 / 9 0 : 2A and 8 / 1 7 / 9 0 : 2 A . For a detailed e x a m p l e of o n e c a s e , see R O G Fa/90: 2 - 3 . 19. For d e t a i l s on h u m a n rights v i o l a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g the i n c i d e n t i n v o l v i n g Diana Ortiz, see A A S 3/25/90: 1C. 20. T h e w o r d s Runujel Junam m e a n " e v e r y o n e is e q u a l " in Q u i c h e , o n e of G u a t e m a l a ' s t w e n t y - t w o Indian languages ( A m e r i c a s W a t c h 1989: 1). 21. For details and illustrations, see A m e r i c a s W a t c h 1989: 3 7 - 4 0 . 22. N & A 6 / 2 6 / 9 0 ; T e n n e r i e l l o 1990 r e p o r t s that at least e l e v e n m e m b e r s of C E R J have b e e n killed or have disappeared since the g r o u p f o r m e d in 1988. Also see MHerald 11/22/90: 20B. For a detailed look at o n e v i l l a g e ' s v i c t i m i z a t i o n in a c o m m u n i t y that resisted illegal forced induction into civil patrols, see R O G Su/90: 6-8.

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2 3 . F o r o t h e r d e s c r i p t i o n s o f this t r a g i c s i t u a t i o n , s e e S F C h r o n i c l e 8 / 2 2 / 9 0 : 2 ; N Y T i m e s 1 0 / 1 4 / 9 0 : 3 ; and Z i n n e r . 2 4 . F o r the b e s t e x a m p l e o f this p o s i t i o n , s e e " D e r e c h o s h u m a n o s . " T h e c h a l l e n g e for C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s , in this v i e w , is to c o n s o l i d a t e the d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n p r o c e s s and to f o m e n t a u t h e n t i c e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , in o r d e r to r e d u c e the g a p b e t w e e n the m i n o r i t y that p o s s e s s e s so m u c h w e a l t h and the m a j o r i t y that h a s f e w o p p o r t u n i t i e s to m e e t its m i n i m u m b a s i c n e e d s ( " D e r e c h o s h u m a n o s " : 6 3 ) . 2 5 . T h e r e is little e v i d e n c e , f o r e x a m p l e , that j u d i c i a l p r o c e d u r e s w e r e used to p r o s e c u t e h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t o r s : " A s s t r i k i n g as t h e d e a t h r a t e is t h e w i t h w h i c h the k i l l e r s o p e r a t e " ( L A T i m e s 4 / 1 4 / 9 0 : 1).

impunity

8

Power and Participation: The Late Cerezo Administration It c o u l d b e a r g u e d t h a t , in 1 9 8 6 , n o c i v i l i a n p r e s i d e n t c o u l d h a v e a c c o m p l i s h e d m u c h u p o n t a k i n g o f f i c e in G u a t e m a l a a n d t h a t s o m e t i m e w o u l d h a v e t o p a s s b e f o r e the l a s t i n g i m p a c t o f d e m o c r a t i c c i v i l i a n r u l e c o u l d b e perceived. By

f o c u s i n g o n e v e n t s in t h e l a s t t w o y e a r s o f t h e

administration

in t h i s c h a p t e r a n d t h e f i r s t

two

years o f the

A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ( C h a p t e r 9 ) , w e g i v e the protagonists m a x i m u m

Cerezo Serrano opportu-

nity t o e s t a b l i s h t h e d e m o c r a t i c c r e d e n t i a l s o f t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s . C o m p l e m e n t i n g earlier a n a l y s e s o f public p o l i c y and the quality

of

p a r t i c i p a t i o n , this c h a p t e r s t u d i e s t h e r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h o f m i l i t a r y a n d c i v i l ian p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s — i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s t h e m o s t s a l i e n t q u e s t i o n a b o u t G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c s a n d a m a j o r i s s u e in d e m o c r a t i c p o l i t i c s in g e n e r a l . T h r e e topics are c o v e r e d : ( 1 ) the activities o f the a r m e d f o r c e s t h e m s e l v e s during the C e r e z o administration, especially

in t h e l a t e r y e a r s ; ( 2 )

the

p r o c e s s o f n a t i o n a l d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n s u r g e n t s a n d the g o v e r n m e n t o f G u a t e m a l a ; a n d ( 3 ) t h e n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s o f 1 9 9 0 . In a d d i t i o n , these b a s i c questions are a s k e d about the G u a t e m a l a n political

process:

w h o s e e m s to control that p r o c e s s , w h o sets the a g e n d a , and w h o has the veto power?

The Military During the Cerezo Administration S i n c e at l e a s t t h e late 1 8 0 0 s , t h e A r m y h a s b e e n a n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n w i t h b o t h t h e c o e r c i v e p o w e r to a c h i e v e its g o a l s a n d t h e w i l l i n g n e s s t o u s e its p o w e r . In m o r e r e c e n t t i m e s t h e a r m e d f o r c e s h a v e p e n e t r a t e d the e c o n o m y a n d e n c r o a c h e d u p o n t h e s t a t e , d o m i n a t i n g it in p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c ,

and

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a r e n a s , a n d l e g a l i z i n g t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s in r e w r i t t e n c o n s t i t u t i o n s . M i l i t a r y d o m i n a n c e is not t o t a l i t a r i a n , h o w e v e r , a n d v a r i e s h i s t o r i c a l l y

129

130

Guatemalan

Politics

u n d e r c e r t a i n e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . E s p e c i a l l y in p e r i o d s of e c o n o m i c decline, conflicts e m e r g e a m o n g elite g r o u p s , and

military

g r o u p s s o m e t i m e s b e c o m e i n v o l v e d in t h e s e c o n f l i c t s : t h e u n i t y of t h e o f f i c e r c o r p s h a s o f t e n b e e n an i s s u e a f f e c t i n g m i l i t a r y d o m i n a n c e . A t t i m e s , f a c t i o n a l i s m w i t h i n t h e a r m e d f o r c e s h a s m e a n t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of c i v i l i a n a s c e n d a n c y w i t h n o m e a n i n g f u l t h r e a t to m i l i t a r y d o m i n a t i o n . A f t e r t h e R í o s M o n t t c o u p of 1 9 8 2 , a n d e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r t h e M e j í a V i c t o r e s c o u p o f 1 9 8 3 , t h e m i l i t a r y f o c u s e d o n r e e s t a b l i s h i n g its t r a d i t i o n a l h i e r a r c h y w h i l e c r e a t i n g a c i v i l i a n r e g i m e w i t h e l e c t i o n s . A l l f a c t i o n s of t h e a r m e d f o r c e s s u p p o r t e d t h e b a s i c c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y p l a n a d o p t e d in 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 2 , b u t n o t all a c c e p t e d t h e i d e a of a c i v i l i a n r e g i m e , w i t h t h e p a r t y p o l i t i c s a n d m o d e r a t e r e f o r m s that it m i g h t i m p l y . D u r i n g t h e C e r e z o presidency, therefore, the military w a s split into two factions: "reformist c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t s a n d n o n - r e f o r m i s t c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t s " ( G N I B 6 / 8 7 : 8). In this context, the a r m e d forces c o n t i n u e d their active role d u r i n g the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in t h r e e p o l i c y a r e a s : c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y a c t i v i t i e s , d o m e s tic p o l i t i c a l m a t t e r s ( i n c l u d i n g a t t e m p t e d m i l i t a r y c o u p s ) , a n d f o r e i g n a n d regional policy.

Military

Counterinsurgency

T h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y c a m p a i g n of t h e e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s , d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r , h a s b e e n l a b e l e d g e n o c i d a l in its i n t e n s i t y a n d v i c i o u s n e s s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l p u b lic a t t e n t i o n s h i f t e d f r o m m i l i t a r y v i o l e n c e by 1 9 8 4 , h o w e v e r : t h e m i l i t a r y in e f f e c t d e c l a r e d v i c t o r y o v e r t h e i n s u r g e n t s , a n d t h e p r e s s b e g a n e m p h a sizing u p c o m i n g elections for the Constituent A s s e m b l y .

Counterinsur-

g e n c y c o n t i n u e d a f t e r t h e 1 9 8 5 e l e c t i o n s , in t h e m o d e l v i l l a g e s a n d c i v i l d e f e n s e p a t r o l s in s o m e a r e a s a n d as a c t i v e w a r f a r e in z o n e s e i t h e r not p a c i f i e d e a r l i e r o r left f o r later f o r t a c t i c a l r e a s o n s . T h e " v o l u n t a r y " (per the 1985 C o n s t i t u t i o n ) P A C s c o n t i n u e d to be a s a l i e n t f e a t u r e o f G u a t e m a l a n l i f e . In 1 9 8 5 , an e s t i m a t e d o n e m i l l i o n m e n w e r e in c i v i l d e f e n s e p a t r o l s , a n d t h e A r m y r e p o r t e d a t o t a l m e m b e r s h i p of 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 as of l a t e 1 9 8 7 . I n c r e a s e d m i l i t a r y o f f e n s i v e s m e a n t i n c r e a s e s in f o r c e d P A C m e m b e r s h i p as w e l l , as in t h e f o r c e d r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of P A C s in S a n t i a g o A t i t l á n in 1 9 8 7 , f o r e x a m p l e . G e n e r a l H é c t o r G r a m a j o , t h e m i n i s t e r o f d e f e n s e , s t a t e d in 1 9 8 7 t h a t 1 9 8 8 w o u l d s e e v o l u n t a r y c i v i l d e f e n s e p a t r o l s in G u a t e m a l a C i t y a n d A m a t i t l á n , j u s t s o u t h of t h e n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l . E v e n P r e s i d e n t C e r e z o s a i d t h a t " a t m o s t , o n e t h i r d of all P A C m e m b e r s s e r v e v o l u n t a r i l y " ( G N I B 1 2 / 1 / 8 7 : 12). T h e A r m y p u b l i c i z e d its m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s in late 1 9 8 6 a n d 1 9 8 7 , b u t later w a s m u c h less o p e n about t h e m , s e n s i t i v e p e r h a p s to international p u b l i c o p i n i o n . It a n n o u n c e d a m a j o r o f f e n s i v e f o r late 1 9 8 7 , f o r e x a m p l e , to f i n i s h t h e i n s u r g e n c y o n c e a n d f o r all, b u t t h i s o f f e n s i v e c o n t i n u e d until

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at least March 1988. A l t h o u g h it w a s s u p p o r t e d by air a t t a c k s and c a u s e d m a j o r d a m a g e , it all took p l a c e in an a t m o s p h e r e of s i l e n c e . T h e p o l i c y d e c i s i o n was not to s t o p m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s but to s t o p p u b l i c i z i n g t h e m . In 1988, the A r m y e m b a r k e d on a m i l i t a r y o f f e n s i v e in the n o r t h e r n D e p a r t m e n t of Peten, again in relative silence. 1

The Military

and Domestic

Politics

In M a y 1988, d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the c o n d u c t of c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y w a r fare a n d f a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n in the a r m e d f o r c e s c o n t r i b u t e d to an a t t e m p t e d military c o u p , o n e of " n u m e r o u s c o u p p l o t s a g a i n s t [ C e r e z o ] in recent m o n t h s " ( N & A 4 / 2 1 / 8 8 : 1). T h e c o u p w a s the c o m b i n e d w o r k of a c l a n d e s t i n e o f f i c e r g r o u p c a l l e d the O f f i c e r s of the M o u n t a i n s a n d rightist civilian politicians, including two f o r m e r presidential candidates ( W R H 6 / 2 2 / 8 8 : 1, 6). T h e M o u n t a i n O f f i c e r s g e n e r a l l y w e r e j u n i o r military o f f i cers f i g h t i n g the insurgency in the field; they first a p p e a r e d publicly in late 1987 to protest the i n f o r m a l m e e t i n g s in M a d r i d b e t w e e n the g o v e r n m e n t and U R N G and the dissolution of t w o l e a d i n g c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y b r i g a d e s after the failure of the "final o f f e n s i v e against the i n s u r g e n c y " in late 1987 (which c o n t i n u e d into 1988). T h e g r o u p also c o m p l a i n e d it w a s u n d e r s u p plied in the w a r a g a i n s t the g u e r r i l l a s . Finally, c o n c e r n a b o u t military casualties may a l s o have been part of the c o n s p i r a t o r s ' a g e n d a . 2 T h e civilians involved in the c o u p a t t e m p t included G u s t a v o A n z u e t o V i e l m a n , the 1 9 8 2 C A N p r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e ; M a r i o D a v i d G a r c i a , C A N ' s 1985 c a n d i d a t e ; and M a r i o C a s t e j o n , leader of the Nationalist Party (Partido N a c i o n a l i s t a — P N ) , w h o apparently w o u l d have been n a m e d president had the c o u p s u c c e e d e d (Centroamerica Hoy 6 / 9 / 8 8 : 13), as well as several r i g h t - w i n g n e w s p a p e r c o l u m n i s t s ( N & A 6 / 2 / 8 8 : 2 - 3 ) . T h e p u t s c h failed in the f o r m a l sense, b e c a u s e M i n i s t e r of D e f e n s e G r a m a j o threw his s u p p o r t b e h i n d the g o v e r n m e n t ; it w a s t h w a r t e d by the m i l i t a r y ' s high c o m m a n d , not by the president ( N & A 6/2/88: 1 - 2 ) . G e n e r a l G r a m a j o c a l l e d the d e f e a t of the c o u p a v i c t o r y f o r d e m o c racy, a l t h o u g h it w a s his action as military chief that d e f e a t e d it. But the c o u p w a s in f a c t an a n t i d e m o c r a t i c e v e n t that f o r c e d the g o v e r n m e n t to a c c o m m o d a t e the w i s h e s of the right. T h e f a i l u r e of the c o u p m e a n t that the faction of the A r m y s u p p o r t i n g civilian g o v e r n m e n t w a s s t r o n g e r than other f a c t i o n s , not that d e m o c r a c y had s u r v i v e d a m i l i t a r y a t t a c k . Prospects for p r o c e d u r a l d e m o c r a c y w e r e w e a k e n e d by their s u c c e s s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , as of early 1 9 8 9 , P r e s i d e n t C e r e z o c o n t i n u e d to s p e a k c o n f i dently of his g o v e r n m e n t ' s capacity to rule. 3 A s a political event and a " d e m a n d " on the s y s t e m , the a b o r t e d 1988 coup was quite successful. 4 First, it crystallized and brought to the surface the factionalization within the A r m y and the civilian elites, pressure apparently

132

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due to C e r e z o ' s tolerance of a more open political system than the right was willing to tolerate. The public perception of dissent from the right led to an abrupt change in the political atmosphere, which saw increased stridency after that date. Second, the c o u p s u c c e e d e d in forcing President Cerezo to acknowledge and attend to certain military demands; for e x a m ple, he appropriated f u n d s for six helicopters that the Mountain O f f i c e r s needed for the counterinsurgency ( W R H 6/22/88: 1). Third, right-wing terrorism increased: the o f f i c e of Mexicana, the airline that had flown four exiled opposition leaders into Guatemala for the National Dialogue (see below), w a s b o m b e d . T A S S , the Soviet n e w s agency, and Prensa Latina closed their o f f i c e s b e c a u s e the g o v e r n m e n t could not guarantee the lives of the c o r r e s p o n d e n t s after their residences and o f f i c e s were bombed. 5 Activist clergy and the Nicaraguan ambassador received death threats ( W R H 6/22/88: 1, 6), and the d o w n t o w n o f f i c e of La Epoca, a newspaper that had e m e r g e d as a result of the political opening, was firebombed (Centroamérica Hoy 6/9/88: 13). Fourth, the Christian D e m o c r a t i c government felt compelled to adopt a hard line against public disorder, apparently to satisfy the rightists in the Army and the civilian elite. Shortly after the c o u p attempt, police violently attacked Lunafil workers, w h o s e strike had been tolerated for several months before the May 11 c o u p ( U O G 6/88: l ) . 6 T h e political climate did not yet precisely duplicate but certainly reflected the intense violence of the Lucas Garcia regime. A second coup attempt in May 1989 occurred two days before the first anniversary of the one in 1988. Again led by younger military officers, it followed much the same pattern and resulted in many similar outcomes. It did not overthrow the g o v e r n m e n t or r e m o v e D e f e n s e Minister Héctor G r a m a j o , the attempted c o u p ' s purported target. But like the "unsuccessf u l " one in 1988, this attack aimed to reduce the political sphere of influence of popular organizations. 7 This second confrontation between factions of the Army was likewise not a failure for the golpistas. Indeed, s u b s e q u e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s suggest that the attempted c o u p may have been a staged event designed to strengthen the military's hand in general. First, the wave of violence that followed it indicated a growing c o n s e n s u s within the Army, as in the early 1980s, that popular organizations w o u l d not be allowed to threaten military d o m i n a n c e and that a hard-line response to competing organizations was appropriate. 8 Second, there was increasing agreement in Washington that more aid be sent to the supposedly m o d e r a t e faction of the Guatemalan Army, led by Minister of Defense G r a m a j o , in order to protect democracy against the antidemocratic golpistas. General G r a m a j o ' s visit there in late 1989 helped solidify this version of Guatemalan reality. In retrospect, it is clear that the

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a t t e m p t e d c o u p w a s not a i m e d at r e m o v i n g C e r e z o but w a s d e s i g n e d to i n f l u e n c e U.S. policy. Just as G u a t e m a l a n g e n e r a l s o n c e used a n t i c o m m u nism as a lever to s e c u r e aid a u t o m a t i c a l l y , they n o w a p p e a r e d to use antid e m o c r a t i c t h r e a t s as their p r e t e x t , a n d they w e r e w i l l i n g to use g r o u p s f r o m e i t h e r the left or the right, w h i c h e v e r e l i c i t e d the d e s i r e d r e s p o n s e in W a s h i n g t o n . A l t h o u g h e v i d e n c e suggests factionalization in the G u a t e m a l a n A r m y , 9 the u n d e r l y i n g c o n s e n s u s is m o r e i m p o r t a n t in u n d e r s t a n d i n g politics there. C o n f l i c t w i t h i n the A r m y is not a b o u t w h e t h e r the m i l i t a r y s h o u l d control society but o v e r what steps s h o u l d be taken to e n s u r e that control and d o m i n a n c e ( S c h i r m e r 1989a: 13). 111 A l t h o u g h no legal or constitutional steps w e r e taken to i m p l e m e n t m o r e direct c o n t r o l , the w a v e of v i o l e n c e a f t e r May 1989 clearly r e f l e c t s the " c e n t r a l s o p h i s t r y of national security d o c t r i n e , . . . that o n e must w a g e w a r in o r d e r to p r e v e n t w a r " ( S c h i r m e r 1989b: 479). W h i l e the q u e s t i o n of f a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n v e r s u s c o n s e n s u s is still not a n s w e r e d with total clarity, either possibility t h r e a t e n e d d e m o c r a c y . Factionalization meant attempted coups and confrontations a m o n g factions, w h i c h w e a k e n e d the n e w r e g i m e ' s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r e n g t h . B u t c o n s e n s u s could c e m e n t the national security d o c t r i n e a p p r o a c h to G u a t e m a l a n politics, o n e with little r o o m for d e m o c r a c y . In late 1989, the tide s e e m e d to turn in f a v o r of the g o l p i s t a f a c t i o n , w h i c h w a s c o m m i t t e d to a t o t a l - w a r r e s p o n s e to p o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( R O G 10/89: 4). The Military

and Foreign

Policy

One obstacle to military dominance in recent times has been the periodic lack of access to foreign r e s o u r c e s needed to maintain military s u p r e m a c y . Just as the G u a t e m a l a n e c o n o m y is export oriented and derives its profits f r o m foreign sales of commodities, the armed forces depend on foreign sources of technology, and s o m e t i m e s cash, to counter possible threats f r o m other organized g r o u p s in society. W h e n d o m e s t i c political and e c o n o m i c e v e n t s threaten the m i l i t a r y ' s access to these foreign resources, A r m y leaders have taken steps to reestablish both its military and financial supply lines. T h e principal f o r e i g n policy issues d u r i n g the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s later stages w e r e its r a p p r o c h e m e n t with the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t and the c o n tinuing erosion of President C e r e z o ' s policy of active neutrality r e g a r d i n g Central A m e r i c a n r e g i o n a l q u e s t i o n s . T h e s e issues w e r e a q u e s t i o n of civil-military relations, in e f f e c t , as they t o u c h e d on traditional nationalist t h e m e s in the a r m e d f o r c e s as well as i d e o l o g i c a l c o n c e r n s of r i g h t - w i n g o f f i c e r s . T h e s e t w o a s p e c t s of G u a t e m a l a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y w e r e not u n r e lated, as e v i d e n c e d by both increases in U.S e c o n o m i c and military assistance and in other policies of the C e r e z o r e g i m e . "

134

Guatemalan

Politics

T h e D C G policy of active neutrality toward Nicaragua and U.S. policy in the region s e e m e d d e f e a t e d at even the s y m b o l i c level by 1989. Increasing evidence pointed to closer links between the U.S. and Guatemalan g o v e r n m e n t s than neutrality w o u l d allow. Published d o c u m e n t s suggested a quid pro quo with the United States existing since 1986, by which G u a t e m a l a would support the N i c a r a g u a n contras in exchange for increased U.S. aid ( G M G 5/89: 5). In February and early March 1989, President C e r e z o ' s visit to Washington resulted in more assistance, including military aid ( P C R P 3/89: 4). Between 1986 and 1990, the military aid totaled approximately $30 million; nonmilitary developmental aid, including the August 1989 grant of nearly $ 7 0 million to counter the negative balance of payments, totaled a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 7 0 0 million, 90 percent of which was grants ( P C R P 9/89: 8). 1 2 Military assistance f r o m the United States in 1989 totaled $9.5 million. 1 3 It also donated $3.4 million to improve the justice system, and U S A I D donated $30 million to strengthen the basic level of primary education in Guatemala (PCRP 7/89: 4 - 5 ) . American assistance totaled about $ 1 5 0 million for 1989, placing G u a t e m a l a in tenth place w o r l d w i d e for American assistance ( W e e k l y Briefs 8/28/89: 1). For fiscal year 1990/91, the Bush administration requested a total of $157.5 million, including $9.5 million in direct military aid (foreign military s a l e s — F M S — a n d international military education and t r a i n i n g — I M E T ) ; $87 million in e c o n o m i c support f u n d s — E S F (often characterized as indirect military assistance); $35 million of d e v e l o p m e n t aid; and $ 3 6 million in Title I and Title II food aid ( L U O G 4/89: 2). In addition to this financial c o m m i t m e n t , use of U.S. military troops increased in 1989, including direct c o m b a t support activities with the A r m y . 1 4 In 1987, the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t , through its Drug E n f o r c e m e n t Agency, had become involved in the warfare, through aerial spraying over large areas where, perhaps c o i n c i d e n t a l l y , insurgents were considered most active. According to the U.S. e m b a s s y , aerial spraying was entirely and totally aimed at e l i m i n a t i n g d r u g cultivation (interview at the U.S. embassy in Guatemala, 1987). U.S. officials continued to j u s t i f y the military aid in terms of gaining leverage with the G u a t e m a l a n a r m e d f o r c e s , even though increasing amounts of support had prevented neither two major coup attempts in 1988 and 1989 nor increasing human rights violations during the Cerezo administration (Tenneriello 1989; G M G 3/89: 6). Nor did the Christian Democratic policy of active neutrality in the region prevent G u a t e m a l a ' s direct military assistance to El S a l v a d o r in late 1989, apparently including soldiers transported in a U.S. Air Force plane ( G M G 12/89: 2 - 3 ) . In sum, in the active p r o s e c u t i o n of the war in rural Guatemala and the overall balance of power between civilian authorities and the military

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Participation

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h i e r a r c h y , the pattern w a s m u c h m o r e s i m i l a r than d i s s i m i l a r to earlier p e r i o d s , in s p i t e of c o n t e x t u a l e l e m e n t s that a f f e c t e d s o m e f i n e p o i n t s in that r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h o u g h t h e s c a l e of m i l i t a r y v i o l e n c e w a s r e d u c e d f r o m t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y l e v e l s o f t h e e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s , t h e a r m e d f o r c e s c o n t i n u e d to d o m i n a t e in m a n y r e g i o n s a n d t o e s t a b l i s h i n v o l u n t a r y P A C s a n d d e v e l o p m e n t p o l e s , in s p i t e of t h e r e t u r n t o c i v i l i a n r u l e a n d a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e g i m e . T h e m i l i t a r y h a d n o t r e d u c e d its c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y o p t i o n s , a s d e m o n s t r a t e d b y m a j o r m i l i t a r y o f f e n s i v e s in s e l e c t e d r u r a l a r e a s , i n c l u d i n g t h e f a r n o r t h e r n r e g i o n s o f H u e h u e t e n a n g o a n d El Q u i c h e p r o v i n c e s a n d t h e a r e a a r o u n d S a n t i a g o A t i t l a n in S o l o l a . 1 5 Y e t t h e m i l i t a r y

was

b e g i n n i n g to feel p o p u l a r p r e s s u r e , largely b e c a u s e of the National D i a logue process.

National Dialogue: The Main Event Stage

1: Opening

Round

T h e Central American Peace A c c o r d s (the Arias Peace Plan) included prov i s i o n s f o r d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n i n s u r g e n t s a n d g o v e r n m e n t s in t h o s e n a t i o n s w i t h c i v i l c o n f l i c t . In l a t e 1 9 8 7 , to o p e n u p a p o s s i b l e d i a l o g u e w i t h t h e g o v e r n m e n t , a g r o u p o f e x i l e d l e a d e r s of G u a t e m a l a n p o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s o p e n l y r e t u r n e d f r o m M e x i c o , t e s t i n g t h e l e v e l of f r e e d o m of e x p r e s s i o n . A s d i s c u s s e d in C h a p t e r 7, t h e g r o u p l e f t a f t e r o n e w e e k b e c a u s e of fears for their safety. S u b s e q u e n t l y , the U R N G formally requested dial o g u e w i t h t h e g o v e r n m e n t in D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 7 . 1 6 T h e U R N G s a w d i a l o g u e a s p a r t of a s e r i e s of p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s t o r e s o l v e t h e n a t i o n ' s m a i n s o c i a l p r o b l e m s , its h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s , a n d t h e m i l i t a r y ' s c o n t i n u i n g d o m i n a n c e of s o c i e t y . 1 7 W i t h o u t d i a l o g u e a s t h e first s t e p to p e a c e , civil s t r i f e w o u l d not e n d : " w i t h o u t d e m o c r a c y ,

the

p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e will w o r s e n , t h e p o l a r i z a t i o n of f o r c e s w i l l c o n t i n u e , a n d t h e w a r w i l l h a v e to c o n t i n u e " ( M o n s a n t o : 4 ) . T h e g o v e r n m e n t r e s p o n d e d c o n d i t i o n a l l y w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t that t h e g u e r r i l l a s lay d o w n t h e i r a r m s p r i o r t o a n y m e e t i n g s ; it r e f u s e d t o r e c o g n i z e an a r m e d g r o u p w i t h i n t h e s t a t e o t h e r t h a n t h e o f f i c i a l s e c u r i t y f o r c e s , w h i c h it w o u l d b e d o i n g if it e n t e r e d i n t o f o r m a l d i a l o g u e w i t h t h e U R N G . T h e A r m y ' s position w a s that the constitution p e r m i t t e d only state security forces a n d no others, and that the Arias Peace Plan s p e c i f i e d d i a l o g u e only a f t e r " a r m e d g r o u p s lay d o w n t h e i r a r m s . " 1 8 M e e t i n g s b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t a n d U R N G r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w e r e h e l d in M a d r i d in 1 9 8 8 , in t h e p r e s e n c e of o b s e r v e r s f r o m t h e G u a t e m a l a n A r m y . G u a t e m a l a n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h i s d i m e n s i o n of t h e P e a c e P l a n w a s s y m bolic, however, and the m e e t i n g s w e r e quickly discontinued. A c c o r d i n g to

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Cerezo, the decision to suspend further contacts was made by the president, not the Army. 1 9 Stage 2: National

Dialogue

The process continued nonetheless, after a hiatus of several months. The government authorized establishing a structure to be called the National Dialogue, organized as a nongovernmental entity under the aegis of the National Reconciliation Commission (Comisión Nacional de R e c o n c i l iación—CNR). The president of the CNR, which had been created as part of the Central American Peace Plan, was the Most Reverend Rodolfo Quezada Toruno, bishop of Quetzaltenango. The National Dialogue was to be inaugurated (and terminated at some undetermined point in the future) with a plenary session of its participants, but the bulk of the dialogue would take place in fifteen working commissions, which were to deal with substantive economic, social, and political issues. Agrarian reform issues were conspicuously absent from the agenda. Each participating sector was expected to send delegates to the working commissions with which it was concerned (see Table 8.1). The inaugural plenary session of the National Dialogue took place on March 1, 1989, in the National Theater in Guatemala City, after several weeks of delays. President Cerezo did not attend. The event was boycotted by the Army and by major sectors of the right, including U N A G R O , C A C I F , and two right-wing political parties, the MLN and the PID ( R O G 4/89: 4). 2 , 1 Although the traditional right simply chose not to participate, participation by the left was more complicated. The URNG was denied permission to participate, but Bishop Quezada agreed to read URNG documents into the record. R U O G , the exiled opposition group, did participate but with reduced participatory rights: voice but no vote until the final session of the Dialogue. Representatives of R U O G , who had been harassed in the 1987 visit to Guatemala (see Chapter 7), were allowed to move about freely, albeit in a generally deteriorating atmosphere. 2 1 The major domestic popular representative was UASP, the umbrella organization of several popular groups representing urban and rural workers, human rights activists, ethnic organizations, and academic groups. After the ceremonial opening of the National Dialogue, however, accomplishments were slow in coming. By late April, none of the working commissions were functioning, and several of the participating groups had not appointed their representatives to the commissions. The first working committee to begin discussions focused on democratization and political issues. The ultimate success of the Dialogue was called into question by early debates about whether to discuss continuing human rights violations

Power &

Table 8.1

Participation

137

National Dialogue Participants, 1988

A. Sectors participating as full delegations: 1. The government 2. Political parties 3. The press 4. The churches 5. Refugees 6. The cooperatives 7. Unity of Popular and Labor Action (UASP) 8. The Council of Labor Unity 9. The Guatemalan Human Rights Commission (CDGH) 10. The University Student Association (AEU) 11. The Worker/Owner Solidarity Movement 12. The Federation of Small Businessmen and Producers 13. Education Federations 14. National University of San Carlos (USAC) B. Sectors participating as "Special Guests": 15. United Representation of the Guatemalan Opposition (RUOG) 16. Democratic Forum of Guatemalan Exiles (FDEG) C. Excluded from participating by government decision: 17. Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) D. Voluntarily choosing not to participate: 18. Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Industrial, Commercial, and Financial Associations (CACIF) 19. National Liberation Movement (MLN) 20. Institutional Democratic Party (PID) Source: GMG 3/89: 8.

a g a i n s t p a r t i c i p a t i n g d e l e g a t i o n s ; r e f u s a l to d i s c u s s t h i s t o p i c r e d u c e d t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n by t h e l a b o r g r o u p s b e i n g t h r e a t e n e d ( G M G 5 / 8 9 : 6). A s e c o n d w o r k i n g c o m m i s s i o n , o n h u m a n r i g h t s , p r e s e n t e d its c o n c l u s i o n s to t h e C N R f o r d i s c u s s i o n in t h e p l e n a r y s e s s i o n s t o b e h e l d at t h e e n d of 1 9 8 9 . A t t e m p t i n g to b u i l d n a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s , t h i s c o m m i t t e e r e c o m m e n d e d " t h e a b o l i t i o n of t h e p a r a m i l i t a r y C i v i l D e f e n s e P a t r o l s a n d D e v e l o p m e n t P o l e s , " a s w e l l a s " a s s i s t a n c e to w o m e n w i d o w e d b y t h e p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e , a n d t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e p r o b l e m o f l a n d w h i c h b e l o n g s to t h e m o r e t h a n f o r t y t h o u s a n d G u a t e m a l a n r e f u g e e s in M e x i c o " ( G M G 1 1 / 8 9 : 6). B e c a u s e of t h e c o n t r o v e r s i a l n a t u r e of s u c h r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s a n d t h e e a r l y p u b l i c i t y g a r n e r e d b y o p p o n e n t s of t h e r e g i m e , p a r t i c i p a n t s f r o m p o p u l a r s e c t o r s a n d o p p o s i t i o n g r o u p s b e g a n to r e c e i v e n u m e r o u s d e a t h t h r e a t s , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r t h e a t t e m p t e d m i l i t a r y c o u p in M a y 1 9 8 9 . B y late 1 9 8 9 , t h e N a t i o n a l D i a l o g u e h a d l o s t m u c h of its m o m e n t u m b e c a u s e o f t h e t h r e a t s a n d b e c a u s e of " t h e m u r d e r in A u g u s t o f a m a n r e p r e s e n t i n g

138

Guatemalan

Politics

r e f u g e e s in the D i a l o g u e " ( T e n n e r i e l l o 1989). 2 2 By the end of 1989, the National Dialogue process showed few signs of viability.

Stage

3: 1990—The

Main

Event

During 1990, as a f o l l o w - u p to the failed National Dialogue, the C N R agreed to meet with the U R N G l e a d e r s h i p to set up a series of meetings outside of Guatemala. 2 3 Several factors c o m b i n e d to support this new dialogue process in 1990, including the persistent strength of the insurg e n c y , 2 4 w i d e s p r e a d disgust with c o n t i n u i n g paramilitary violence and military atrocities, and the recognized negative impact of an ongoing civil war on international legitimacy and e c o n o m i c development. T h e first meeting was held in Oslo, N o r w a y , in March 1990, and included observers f r o m the G u a t e m a l a n g o v e r n m e n t and the A r m y . T h e participants successfully set up a timetable for several proposed meetings between U R N G and various sectors of the political and economic c o m m u nities, to c u l m i n a t e with a meeting b e t w e e n U R N G and the g o v e r n m e n t , including the A r m y . 2 5 Meeting outside of Guatemala throughout 1990, the dialogue continued to build m o m e n t u m and capture the imagination of the Guatemalan public. T h e first of the p o s t - O s l o m e e t i n g s w a s held in May 1990 in Spain between U R N G and representatives of nine political parties. T h e meeting was successful, at least to the extent of keeping the dialogue process alive and establishing rapport between the U R N G and even some of the extreme right. As part of the agreement reached in Spain, the U R N G agreed not to sabotage the election process in 1990, and the political parties agreed to help get the U R N G legalized as a political force so that they could participate in a new constituent assembly process, originally proposed for 1991 (ROG Fa/90: 10). 2 6 T h e second of the d i a l o g u e m e e t i n g s w a s held in August in Ottawa, Canada, between U R N G and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the business sector. Debates over participation in this meeting underscored the nature of political divisions within the business elite, which was divided over the need to dialogue with the insurgency versus an intransigent position of staying the current course of c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y . T h e C A C I F , perhaps the c o u n t r y ' s most powerful business interest group, f a v o r e d the dialogue and the meeting, but a g r o - e x p o r t e r s in the U N A G R O did not. T h e president of the National Association of C o f f e e P r o d u c e r s (Asociación Nacional de Cafic u l t o r e s — A N A C A F E ) did urge dialogue with the URNG (ROG Fa/90: 10; Centroamérica Hoy 7/30/90: 11). Not only the list of participants but the outcomes of the Ottawa meeting clearly reflected the difficulties f a c i n g any proposed solutions to Guate m a l a ' s social and economic problems. T h o u g h cordiality was maintained,

Power &

Participation

139

the substantive differences between the business c o m m u n i t y and the insurgency remained clear: C A C I F proposed p e a c e within " t h e existing political s y s t e m , " while U R N G proposed to " o v e r c o m e the historical causes o f the c o n f l i c t and the c i r c u m s t a n c e s that m a k e it continue to be n e c e s s a r y . " A s a result the major positive o u t c o m e s o f the meeting were s y m b o l i c : as the final document showed, each side " put forth its ideological p o s i t i o n , " and " t h e parties demonstrated mutual r e s p e c t " ( G M G 9/90: 1 - 4 ) . In spite o f these serious substantive d i f f e r e n c e s , the dialogue process c o n t i n u e d , with an O c t o b e r m e e t i n g in E c u a d o r b e t w e e n the U R N G and G u a t e m a l a n religious leaders ( G M G 10/90: 1 - 4 ) . T h e final m e e t i n g s in 1 9 9 0 took place in M e x i c o , also in O c t o b e r . In the first, at M e t e p e c , the U R N G met with representatives o f the popular sectors, including labor, student, human rights, and r e f u g e e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . T h e s e c o n d m e e t i n g , several days later at A t l i x c o , included a diverse group o f business leaders, professionals, university o f f i c i a l s , and m e m b e r s o f the popular sectors not at the M e t e p e c meeting. A s with all earlier ones (after O s l o ) , no delegate from the Guatemalan g o v e r n m e n t attended these m e e t i n g s , which lasted five days. T h e y resulted in urgent requests for continued dialogue among the insurgents, the armed f o r c e s , and the g o v e r n m e n t . C N R ' s president, B i s h o p Quezada, agreed to try to set up the next round o f talks. 2 7 T h r o u g h o u t 1 9 9 0 , the National D i a l o g u e p r o c e s s s u c c e e d e d in publicly c o m m i t t i n g several sectors o f society to the idea o f negotiating with the insurgency leadership, a process that gradually created more pressure on the A r m y . General Héctor G r a m a j o , minister o f d e f e n s e at the beginning o f 1 9 9 0 , s e e m e d willing at least to tolerate the p r o c e s s for a w h i l e , as witnessed by the presence o f military o b s e r v e r s at the O s l o meeting in M a r c h . B u t he was r e p l a c e d in M a y by G e n e r a l Juan L e o n e l

Bolaños,

widely perceived as representing a harder line on c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y and the m i l i t a r y ' s role in political life. Indeed, General B o l a ñ o s stated by the August meeting in Ottawa that the Army would negotiate with the U R N G only after the insurgency had disarmed itself. T h e impasse was quite explicit, s i n c e U R N G C o m m a n d e r Pablo M o n s a n t o stated that the U R N G would lay down arms only if " c o n ditions for true democracy and peace exist in G u a t e m a l a " ( R O G Fa/90: 10; R o d r i g u e z ; and Centroamérica

Hoy

7/30/90: 1 1 ) . M o r e o v e r , as had hap-

pened during the dialogue efforts in 1 9 8 9 , the s u c c e s s e s o f these meetings were a c c o m p a n i e d by an increase in repression against popular sectors, to the extent that the U R N G c l a i m e d to be r e c o n s i d e r i n g its a g r e e m e n t to reduce its armed activities ( R O G Fa/90: 1 0 - 1 1 ) . B e f o r e the two m e e t i n g s held in M e x i c o in O c t o b e r , m o r e o v e r , the Army took the extraordinary step o f meeting with the popular-sector delegates to those m e e t i n g s , threatening them with reprisals if there was " a g r e e m e n t with the insurgency on too many p o i n t s . " U . S . A m b a s s a d o r

140

Guatemalan

Politics

Stroock also met with the delegates to e x p r e s s his opposition to any a c c o r d s that would f a v o r "demilitarizing G u a t e m a l a n society." A f t e r the m e e t i n g s the Army cautioned the C N R and B i s h o p Q u e z a d a not to push for dialogue independent of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s timetable and conditions for dialogue ( G M G 11/90: 2 - 3 , 5). For its part, the U R N G announced it was not willing to continue dialogue with the Cerezo government but was anxious to talk with the new president after the inauguration in January 1991 ( T O A 11/28/90: 4).

Dialogue

and Pressure

on the Armed

Forces

As late as D e c e m b e r 1989, the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had s u c c e s s f u l l y kept dialogue with the U R N G off the public agenda at the regional level, even though dialogue was an explicit part of the Central American Peace A c c o r d s . At the s u m m i t m e e t i n g of isthmus presidents in Costa Rica in D e c e m b e r 1989, f o r e x a m p l e , the G u a t e m a l a n g o v e r n m e n t signed documents legitimating its a p p r o a c h e s to civil w a r . Guatemala pledged to respect human rights, but the summit did not c o n d e m n human rights violations in the region, though it c o n d e m n e d insurgent revolutionary organizations. T h e presidents called for dialogue in Nicaragua and El Salvador but did not mention dialogue or negotiation in Guatemala (Centroamerica Hoy 4/1/90: 3 - 4 ) . By mid-1990, however, public pressure on the A r m y was becoming a factor. The dialogue meetings had caught the national imagination. Moreover, an official representative f r o m the U n i t e d Nations attended these meetings; although Francesc Vendrell acted as a personal represenative of the UN Secretary General rather than as an official emissary, his presence nevertheless lent international legitimacy to the dialogue process. A r m y officials had attended the original meeting in Oslo and agreed that the ultimate goal of the process was to hold m e e t i n g s b e t w e e n U R N G and the military, but new Minister of D e f e n s e Bolanos refused to participate. Luis Gordillo, a retired colonel w h o was a j u n t a m e m b e r early in the Rios Montt government and subsequent founder of a minor political party, did participate as a representative of o p p o s i t i o n political parties in the National Dialogue structure. T h o u g h it may have been illusory to see Gordillo as a liaison with the A r m y (a U R N G claim), observers nevertheless saw the dialogue process as a " m o r a l f o r c e " acting on the Army (CSMonitor 10/29/90: 6). T h e pressure grew in part because of both the U R N G positions and the changing international climate. T h e U R N G stated that an end to the insurgency would c o m e only with the creation of a truly d e m o c r a t i c political structure. T o be realized, this w o u l d require a constituent assembly to implement four basic changes:

Power &

( 1 ) C h a n g e the c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y

Participation

141

nature o f the G u a t e m a l a n state.

(2)

. . . c h a n g e the r o l e w h i c h the c u r r e n t C o n s t i t u t i o n a t t r i b u t e s to t h e a r m y , w h i c h is d e s i g n e d f o r r e p r e s s i n g t h e p e o p l e . ( 3 ) R e c o g n i z e t h e r i g h t to p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , but n o t in a b s o l u t e t e r m s , b e c a u s e p r o p e r t y m u s t h a v e a b a s i c a l l y s o c i a l f u n c t i o n . ( 4 ) S p e c i a l r e s p e c t f o r t h e h u m a n , p o l i t i c a l , and all o t h e r r i g h t s o f the I n d i a n s o f G u a t e m a l a ( O r a m a s L e o n ) .

W i t h t h e i n s u r g e n t s n o l o n g e r i n s i s t i n g o n a r e v o l u t i o n a r y c h a n g e in p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s o r a n o v e r t u r n of t h e p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c s y s t e m , " f u n damental

incompatibility"

with

the d o m e s t i c

elite no

longer

existed

( P a d i l l a : 10) e x c e p t f o r t h e A r m y , i n c r e a s i n g l y i s o l a t e d in its i n t r a n s i g e n c e as 1990 p r o g r e s s e d . M o r e G u a t e m a l a n s a p p a r e n t l y c a m e to r e g a r d

the

i n s u r g e n c y not as a c a u s e b u t a s y m p t o m o f b a s i c s o c i a l p r o b l e m s , t a k i n g t h e p o s i t i o n that e v e n a v o l u n t a r y d e m o b i l i z a t i o n by t h e U R N G as p a r t of a n e w p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e w o u l d n o t e n d t h e w a r if b a s i c s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s r e m a i n e d u n c h a n g e d . I n c r e a s i n g l y , t h e m i l i t a r y w a s b e i n g p e r c e i v e d as p a r t of t h e p r o b l e m , n o t t h e s o l u t i o n . In t h i s c o n t e x t , G u a t e m a l a h e l d its national elections.

National Elections: The Sideshow T h e f i r s t r o u n d of t h e 1 9 9 0 n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s t o o k p l a c e o n N o v e m b e r 11, a n d t h e r u n - o f f b e t w e e n t h e t o p t w o f i n i s h e r s o n J a n u a r y 6, 1 9 9 1 . A t s t a k e w e r e t h e p r e s i d e n c y as w e l l as m o s t o f G u a t e m a l a ' s e l e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s . 2 S B e s i d e s the presidency, 116 d e p u t i e s w e r e e l e c t e d to the National

Con-

gress (eighty-seven from G u a t e m a l a ' s t w e n t y - t w o d e p a r t m e n t s and the Central D i s t r i c t — G u a t e m a l a C i t y — a n d t w e n t y - n i n e on national slates).29 M u n i c i p a l - l e v e l e l e c t i o n s w e r e h e l d in t h r e e h u n d r e d l o c a l i t i e s , a n d v o t ers elected twenty d e p u t i e s to the n e w Central

American

Parliament

( P C R P 5 / 9 0 : 3; " G u a t e m a l a : E l e c c i o n e s " : 2 3 , 2 7 ) . T h e r e w e r e 4 . 4 m i l l i o n p e o p l e e l i g i b l e to r e g i s t e r to v o t e ( i . e . , e i g h t e e n y e a r s o r o l d e r ) , o f w h o m 3.2

million

were

registered.

Approximately

50

percent

of

younger

G u a t e m a l a n s ( a g e s 18 to 3 0 ) d i d n o t r e g i s t e r . G u a t e m a l a C i t y a c c o u n t e d f o r a l m o s t 2 0 p e r c e n t of t h o s e r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r s , b u t o v e r a l l , 6 5 p e r c e n t of t h o s e r e g i s t e r e d l i v e d in r u r a l a r e a s .

The

Campaign

T h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s c o n t i n u e d to b e w e a k o r g a n i z a t i o n s in t e r m s of m a s s m o b i l i z a t i o n . O n l y 5 . 8 p e r c e n t of t h e r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r s listed t h e m s e l v e s as a f f i l i a t e d w i t h a political party, a n d of t h e s e , 4 9 p e r c e n t i d e n t i f i e d t h e m s e l v e s as m e m b e r s of the D C G ( " G u a t e m a l a : E l e c c i o n e s " : 2 9 ) , t h e p a r t y g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d to h a v e the best g r a s s r o o t s o r g a n i z a t i o n . P a r t i e s t y p i c a l l y r e f l e c t

142

Guatemalan

Politics

narrow or personalistic interests. 3 0 These two factors suggest that campaigns would stress personal image issues rather than programmatic platforms reflecting coherent approaches on nontrivial issues, even in a campaign with thirteen candidates—later twelve, for the candidacy of General Efraín Ríos Montt was declared invalid late in the campaign (see tables 8.2 and 8.3). The governing Christian Democrats began the campaign in an optimistic tone, in spite of a divisive primary campaign during 1989, but their campaign shifted through at least three phases. Unlike many other parties in Guatemala, the DCG professes a clear ideological position that it refers to regularly in speeches and statements. Yet their candidates did not take clear positions during the early stages of the campaign. In the middle stages of the campaign, Reverend Andrés Girón, the activist priest who had mobilized thousands of landless peasants in 1988 and 1989, left the priesthood and announced his support for the DCG (MHerald 3/15/90: 27A). Luis Zurita, president of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), expressed his support for the D C G ' s candidate, Alfonso Cabrera. During this stage the United States began to criticize the DCG heavily. Perhaps coincidentally, the party embraced populist campaign positions, adopted an anti-U.S. stand, and invited Daniel Ortega, the Sandinista president of Nicaragua, to visit Guatemala (Excelsior 8/18/90: 37A). But the DCG campaign suffered from persistent accusations of fraud and corruption aimed at the president and the party hierarchy, including accusations of drug trafficking. Failing badly in the polls, the party's problems were compounded in the final stage of the campaign with the sudden, serious illness of its candidate. 3 1 The lack of programmatic content was noteworthy in the campaign of the supposedly left-of-center Democratic Socialist Party. Mario Solórzano, its leader and its presidential candidate in 1985, was a candidate for deputy in the National Congress in 1990. The P S D ' s presidential candidate was a dissident Christian Democrat, René de León Schlotter, who helped found the DCG but who split with the party after the nomination of Cabrera to form an alliance with the PSD (ROG Sp/90: 3). The PSD claimed to be the only party with any significant role for women in the election, but it generally offered no specific policy proposals on any serious issue. The coalit i o n ' s vice-presidential candidate was Aracely Conde de Paiz, the only woman running for national-level office. The PSD campaign was generally an exercise in image building, with frequent accusations about other parties' campaign spending. The most positive aspects were the attempts to increase voting turnout and encourage women to participate more fully in the electoral process ("La victoria"). With even the Social Democrats running a Christian Democrat, the party spectrum was less programmatic and more narrowly right-of-center than it had been even in 1985, 3 2 so that although the right seemed factionalized,

Power & Participation

143

Table 8.2 Registered Parties and Candidates, 1990 Elections Party

Presidential C a n d i d a t e (Running Mate)

Alianza N O - V E N T A (FRG, PID, FUN) ( c a n d i d a c y later ruled invalid)

General Efraín Ríos Montt (Harris Whitbeck)

Union of the National C e n t e r ( U C N )

Jorge Carpió Nicolle (Manuel Ayau)

Party of National A d v a n c e m e n t ( P A N )

A l v a r o Arzú ( F r a t e r n o Vila)

Christian D e m o c r a t i c Party ( D C G )

Alfonso Cabrera Hidalgo (Marco Antonio Villamar Contreras)

N a t i o n a l Liberation M o v e m e n t ( M L N and F A N )

C o l o n e l Luis E r n e s t o Sosa A v i l a (David Eskenasy Cruz)

Social D e m o c r a t i c Party ( P S D ) and P o p u l a r A l l i a n c e - 5 ( A P - 5 )

R e n é de L e ó n S c h l o t t e r ( A r a c e l y C o n d e de P a i z )

M o v e m e n t of Solidarity A c t i o n ( M A S )

J o r g e S e r r a n o Elias (Gustavo Adolfo Espina)

E m e r g i n g M o v e m e n t for H a r m o n y ( M E C )

General Benedicto Lucas García (Héctor A. Guerra Pedroza)

R e v o l u t i o n a r y Party ( P R )

J o s é A n g e l Lee D u a r t e (Carlos Gallardo Flores)

D e m o c r a t i c Party ( P D )

Jorge Reyna Castillo (Carlos Torres)

United Front of the R e v o l u t i o n ( F U R )

Leonel H e r n á n d e z G o n z á l e z (Raúl M o n t e n e g r o )

D e m o c r a t i c Party of National C o o p e r a t i o n ( P D C N )

José F e r n á n d e z G o n z á l e z (Adolfo Putzeys)

National R e n o v a t i o n Party ( P N R )

F e r n a n d o Leal E s t é v e z (Kurt M i l l e r )

Note: Parlies listed in a p p r o x i m a t e order of popularity in S e p t e m b e r 1990, per " W h o ' s W h o . " Sources: " W h o ' s W h o " ; G M G 9/90: 6 and 10/90: 6; and " G u a t e m a l a : Elecciones": 22.

g i v e n the large number of parties and candidates, "[o]n the left, repression has prevented any party from e m e r g i n g from [the] array o f popular organizations that struggle to s u r v i v e . " 3 3 R e p r e s s i o n and v i o l e n c e i n d e e d w e r e part of the electoral campaign, w h i c h b e c a m e quite violent by the end of July

{Excelsior

7 / 2 8 / 9 0 : 2A). In the final accounting, "at least nine local candidates and party activists died violently during the c a m p a i g n " ( T O A 1 1 / 2 8 / 9 0 : 4 ) . 3 4

General

Efraín

Ríos

Montt

Perhaps the m o s t interesting d e v e l o p m e n t during the e l e c t i o n w a s the presidential c a m p a i g n o f retired General Efraín R í o s M o n t t , n o m i n a t e d by the G u a t e m a l a n R e p u b l i c a n Front (Frente R e p u b l i c a n o G u a t e m a l t e c o — F R G ) , a c o a l i t i o n created for the o c c a s i o n , w h i c h i n c l u d e d the P I D , l o n g identif i e d as a v e h i c l e for the A r m y ' s m o r e v i o l e n t and corrupt e l e m e n t s , and a

144

Table 8.3

Guatemalan

Politics

Parties and Ideological Tendencies, 1990 Elections

Ideology

Party

E x t r e m e right

M o v i m i e n t o de L i b e r a c i ó n N a c i o n a l — M L N ( N a t i o n a l Liberation M o v e m e n t )

E x t r e m e right

P a r t i d o Institucional D e m o c r á t i c o — P I D (Institutional Democratic Party)

E x t r e m e right

F r e n t e de U n i d a d N a c i o n a l — F U N ( N a t i o n a l Unity Front)

E x t r e m e right

F r e n t e de A v a n c e N a c i o n a l — F A N ( N a t i o n a l A d v a n c e m e n t Front)

E x t r e m e right

Frente Republicano G u a t e m a l t e c o — F R G (Guatemalan Republican Front)

E x t r e m e right C o n s e r v a t i v e right C o n s e r v a t i v e right C o n s e r v a t i v e right C o n s e r v a t i v e right C o n s e r v a t i v e right Neoliberal right N e o l i b e r a l right N e o l i b e r a l right Neoliberal right Christian democracy Social c h r i s t i a n Social d e m o c r a c y Social d e m o c r a c y Social d e m o c r a c y

Partido Reformador Guatemalteco—PREG (Guatemalan Reformist Party) Partido Nacional R e n o v a d o r — P N R (National Renovation Party) M o v i m i e n t o E m e r g e n t e de C o n c o r d a n c i a — M E C (Emerging Consensus Movement) Unidad Nacionalista O r g a n i z a d a — U N O ( O r g a n i z e d Nationalist U n i t y ) Partido Democrático—PD ( D e m o c r a t i c Party) M o v i m i e n t o de A c c i ó n S o l i d a r i a — M A S (Solidarity Action M o v e m e n t ) Partido de Avanzada Nacional—PAN ( P a r t y of N a t i o n a l A d v a n c e m e n t ) U n i ó n del C e n t r o N a c i o n a l — U C N ( U n i o n of the N a t i o n a l C e n t e r ) Central Auténtica N a c i o n a l — C A N ( A u t h e n t i c National C e n t e r ) P a r t i d o D e m o c r á t i c o de C o o p e r a c i ó n N a c i o n a l — P D C N ( D e m o c r a t i c Party of N a t i o n a l C o o p e r a t i o n ) Democracia Cristiana G u a t e m a l t e c a — D C G (Guatemalan Christian Democracy) Alianza Popular Cinco—AP-5 (Popular Alliance-Five) Partido Revolucionario—PR (Revolutionary Party) Partido Socialista D e m o c r á t i c o — P S D (Democratic Socialist Party) F r e n t e U n i d o de la R e v o l u c i ó n — F U R ( U n i t e d Front of the R e v o l u t i o n )

Notes: Parties listed by a p p r o x i m a t e ideological line, f r o m right to left, as m e a s u r e d by formal party d o c u m e n t s , not necessarily by political behavior. T h e P R E G did not participate in the 1990 elections. Source: Based on " G u a t e m a l a : E l e c c i o n e s " : 34.

Power &

Participation

145

s m a l l e r party, the N a t i o n a l Front for U n i t y ( F r e n t e de U n i d a d N a c i o n a l — FUN). Ríos's vice-presidential candidate, Harris Whitbeck, was a busin e s s m a n with close ties to the United States and a f o r m e r U . S . M a r i n e . T h e R í o s c a m p a i g n s t r e s s e d t h e n e e d to t a k e t o u g h a c t i o n in r e s p o n s e t o c r i m e a n d c o r r u p t i o n , t h e m e s e c h o i n g his s t y l e of g o v e r n m e n t in 1 9 8 2 a n d 1983. On civilian rule, f o r e x a m p l e , his p o s i t i o n w a s that c i v i l i a n s had a l l o w e d t h e c o u n t r y to b e d i r t i e d a g a i n : " W e e l i m i n a t e d t h e g a r b a g e o n c e a n d w e c a n d o it a g a i n " ( M H e r a l d 7 / 4 / 9 0 : 1 2 A ) . T h e u n i q u e n e s s o f t h e R í o s c a m p a i g n lay in t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s it f o r c e d t h e c o u n t r y ' s i n s t i t u t i o n s t o r e s o l v e . T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1985 clearly excludes f r o m the presidency any individual w h o b e c a m e c h i e f of s t a t e as a r e s u l t of a m i l i t a r y c o u p d ' é t a t , as R í o s d i d in 1 9 8 2 . B u t R í o s c l a i m e d that " i t is a h u m a n r i g h t t o e l e c t a n d b e e l e c t e d " a n d s o u g h t to h a v e his c a n d i d a c y r e c o g n i z e d b y s t a t e a u t h o r i t i e s ( T O A 9 / 5 / 9 0 : 4 ) . R e a c t i o n s w e r e v a r i e d . P o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s w e r e c o n c e r n e d that a R í o s v i c t o r y w o u l d m e a n r e n e w e d d e v a s t a t i o n of t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n s , as h a d happened

in t h e m i d - 1 9 8 0 s . R í o s r e p o r t e d l y r e c e i v e d m a j o r

campaign

f i n a n c i n g f r o m a f o r m e r m i n i s t e r of t h e i n t e r i o r w i d e l y k n o w n f o r h u m a n rights violations d u r i n g the Lucas Garcia r e g i m e that w a s o u s t e d by Ríos M o n t t ' s c o u p in 1 9 8 2 . 3 5 T h e C a t h o l i c c h u r c h o p p o s e d R í o s , a P r o t e s t a n t f u n d a m e n t a l i s t , as w e l l ( N Y T i m e s 1 0 / 1 7 / 9 0 : A 1 5 ) . In t h e U . S . a s p o k e s m a n f o r t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t w a s n e u t r a l : ' " R í o s M o n t t ' s g o t s o m e w h a t of a b u m r a p . ' " 3 6 A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of U . S . t e l e v i s i o n e v a n g e l i s t P a t R o b e r t s o n called Ríos ' " a valued and respected f r i e n d ' " (MHerald 7/4/90: 12A). Ríos Montt w a s denied a place on the ballot by election officials w h e n h e t r i e d t o r e g i s t e r a s a c a n d i d a t e in A u g u s t . H e a p p e a l e d b u t h i s a p p e a l s w e r e r e j e c t e d in t u r n b y t h e S u p r e m e E l e c t o r a l T r i b u n a l , t h e G u a t e m a l a n S u p r e m e C o u r t , a n d f i n a l l y , t h e C o u r t of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . T h e r u l i n g a l s o e x t e n d e d to t h e c o a l i t i o n ' s c a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e C e n t r a l A m e r i c a n

Parlia-

ment, since these were national-level contests and the c a n d i d a c i e s had b e e n l i n k e d t o t h e R i o s - W h i t b e c k t a n d e m f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e r e g i s tration and appeals processes ( N Y T i m e s 10/21/90: 20).37 T h r o u g h o u t the c a m p a i g n , while Ríos M o n t t w a s b e i n g declared ineligible, then a p p e a l i n g each decision to a h i g h e r authority, his c a n d i d a c y g a i n e d in o v e r a l l p o p u l a r i t y . In a m i d - O c t o b e r p o l l , f o r e x a m p l e , h e w a s t h e l e a d i n g c a n d i d a t e , r e c e i v i n g 3 3 p e r c e n t , w h i l e J o r g e C a r p i ó of t h e U C N r e c e i v e d 21 p e r c e n t , A l v a r o A r z ú of t h e P A N 1 3 p e r c e n t , J o r g e S e r r a n o of t h e M A S 11 p e r c e n t , a n d t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s l e s s t h a n 11 p e r c e n t . In t h e s a m e p o l l , w h e n a s k e d w h a t t h e y w o u l d d o if R í o s w e r e n o t a l l o w e d to run, r e s p o n d e n t s most o f t e n s u p p o r t e d Ríos M o n t t ' s associate in t h e e a r l y a n d m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , J o r g e S e r r a n o ( T O A 1 0 / 3 1 / 9 0 : 3 ) . A s a r e s u l t of t h e c o u r t r u l i n g s o n R í o s M o n t t , G u a t e m a l a a p p r o a c h e d the c a m p a i g n ' s final w e e k s without the most popular candidate (although

146

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he never garnered more than one-third of the support in any poll). All candidates were generally disliked, perhaps because of "the sameness of their platforms and the violence-choked political debate" (WPost 11/11/90: 26). The atmosphere of fear was attributable both to possible threats from Ríos Montt supporters as well as the general climate of human rights violations and political violence. Apathy about the presidential race was high in Indian communities because "none of the candidates will do anything for us." 3 8 As of August, the campaign was described as "tainted by violence and mudslinging between the candidates" (Excelsior 8/18/90: 37A). None of the major candidates pledged "significant tax and land reform." None pledged "to purge the army of extremist elements" (TOA 10/31/90: 3). By election time in November, the campaign was described as "not programs addressing the c o u n t r y ' s problems, but smear campaigns and a scramble for the ' w i n n i n g ' i m a g e . " 3 9 At least half the electorate expressed themselves in polls as voting for none of the listed candidates or as undecided (ROG Fa/90: 9). Finally, during the campaign, none of the main candidates has addressed Guatem a l a ' s fundamental p r o b l e m s , such as the a r m y ' s a u t o n o m y , a poverty rate of more than 8 0 percent and the most s k e w e d distribution of land and wealth in Latin A m e r i c a . T o d i s c u s s such topics, analysts agree, is to invite v i o l e n c e and assassination ( W P o s t 1 1 / 1 1 / 9 0 : 26).

Though the campaign essentially was devoid of serious policy issues, there nonetheless was a concomitant rise in political violence as the election approached (Ceníroamérica Hoy 8/22/90). Even Christian Democratic associates saw the campaign as devoid of programmatic content and characterized by character assassination and dirty politics. This, plus the high number of candidacies, the climate of violence, the Ríos Montt situation, the sudden illness of the D C G ' s candidate just weeks before the election, and the precipitous economic decline in the first half of 1990, all combined to create an atmosphere of uncertainty and skepticism in the voting public ("Guatemala: Elecciones": 45). In sum, the campaign generally reflected few or no firm positions on nontrivial issues, especially on topics reflecting ongoing civil-military relations or social justice questions. 4 " Election

Results

In spite of the potential for violence and instability and in spite of calls for boycotts by some of Ríos M o n t t ' s supporters and also the URNG leadership, by most accounts the election itself was held in an atmosphere of "absolute tranquility," with over four hundred international observers, all of whom reported the process to be f r e e and honest ("Guatemala:

Power & Participation

14 7

Elecciones": 50). Results f r o m the S u p r e m e Electoral Tribunal showed that 4 3 . 9 p e r c e n t of the r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r s d i d not v o t e a n d that 9.1 p e r c e n t of t h e v o t e s c a s t w e r e invalid, w h i c h m e a n s 4 8 . 5 p e r c e n t of the r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r s cast v a l i d v o t e s . T u r n o u t w a s 5 3 p e r c e n t , " d i s a p p o i n t i n g l y low b y G u a t e m a l a n s t a n d a r d s " ( T O A 1 1 / 1 4 / 9 0 : 2). J o r g e C a r p i ó N i c o l l e ( U C N ) and J o r g e S e r r a n o Elias ( M A S ) e a c h r e c e i v e d a b o u t 2 5 p e r c e n t of the v o t e , t h e r e b y b e c o m i n g c a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e r u n - o f f e l e c t i o n on J a n u a r y 6, 1991 ( 'Guatemala: Elecciones": 5 0 - 5 1 ) . (See Table 8.4.) In o t h e r e l e c t i o n s t h e U C N w a s t h e b i g g e s t w i n n e r in the N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s , t h e C e n t r a l A m e r i c a n P a r l i a m e n t e l e c t i o n s , a n d in m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s ( s e e T a b l e 8.5). N o n e t h e l e s s , C a r p i o ' s party r e m a i n e d a m i n o r i t y in C o n g r e s s , w i t h o n l y f o r t y - o n e of t h e 1 1 6 s e a t s . T h e r e m a i n i n g s e a t s were mainly distributed a m o n g four other parties, and three others gained at least o n e s e a t . T h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s , w h o h a d p o l l e d o n l y a b o u t 6 p e r c e n t b e f o r e the e l e c t i o n , r e c e i v e d 17 p e r c e n t o n e l e c t i o n day a n d r e m a i n e d a m a j o r p l a y e r in t h e C o n g r e s s ( N Y T i m e s 1 1 / 1 3 / 9 0 : A l l ) . R e g i o n a l l y , t h e D C G r e c e i v e d m o s t of its s u p p o r t in f o u r d e p a r t m e n t s of the w e s t e r n h i g h l a n d s , all w i t h I n d i a n m a j o r i t i e s , s u g g e s t i n g that the party r e m a i n e d the o n l y v o i c e in C o n g r e s s not r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e far right ( P C R P 11/90: 6). In m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s the U C N w o n 132 m a y o r a l t i e s in the three h u n dred c o n t e s t e d localities, w h i l e t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s w e r e s e c o n d w i t h e i g h t y - s i x v i c t o r i e s . In G u a t e m a l a City t h e w i n n i n g c a n d i d a t e f o r the m a y oralty, w i t h 3 3 . 6 p e r c e n t , w a s O s c a r B e r g e r of the P A N , a party p r e s e n t i n g itself as a g r o u p of t e c h n o c r a t s a n d b u s i n e s s p e o p l e w i t h n o ties to the traditional party s t r u c t u r e s . T h e P A N a l s o w o n the m a j o r i t y of c o n g r e s s i o n a l s e a t s f r o m t h e n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l a n d c a r r i e d t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l v o t e in G u a t e m a l a C i t y as well. O v e r a l l , the U C N a n d the D C G t o g e t h e r w o n o v e r 72 p e r c e n t of t h e c o u n t r y ' s m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s , b u t t h e P A N , w i t h f o u r v i c t o r i e s (of its sixteen o v e r a l l v i c t o r i e s ) in m e t r o p o l i t a n G u a t e m a l a C i t y , held the m u n i c i p a l i t i e s in w h i c h m o r e t h a n o n e - t h i r d of t h e national p o p u lation r e s i d e ( P C R P 11/90: 4 - 6 ) . 4 1

Second

Round:

The

Run-off

T h e c a m p a i g n f o r the p r e s i d e n t i a l r u n - o f f e l e c t i o n b e g a n in e a r n e s t i m m e diately a f t e r t h e first r o u n d , p i t t i n g J o r g e C a r p i ó N i c o l l e of t h e U C N a g a i n s t J o r g e S e r r a n o E l i a s of t h e M A S . W i t h i n d a y s of t h e f i r s t r o u n d , S e r r a n o w a s e n d o r s e d by s e v e r a l r i g h t - w i n g parties, i n c l u d i n g the P I D , the P N R , t h e R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y , the e x t r e m e r i g h t - w i n g M L N , a n d the M E C . S e r r a n o a l s o w a s e n d o r s e d by o n e of t h e l o s i n g c a n d i d a t e s f o r m a y o r of Guatemala City, Oscar Clemente Marroquín ( P C R P 11/90: 4 - 5 ) . Carpió N i c o l l e a p p a r e n t l y h o p e d to a p p e a r t h e m o r e m o d e r a t e of the t w o b y

148

Guatemalan

Table 8.4

Presidential Election, First-Round Results, 1990 Candidate

Party 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Politics

UCN MAS DCG PAN MLN-FAN PSD-AP5 PR PDCN MEC PNR FUR PD

Jorge Carpio Nicolle Jorge Serrano Elias Alfonso Cabrera Hidalgo Alvaro Arzú Irigoyen Luis Ernesto Sosa Avila René de León Schlotter José Angel Lee Duarte José Fernández González Benedicto Lucas García Fernando Leal Estévez Leonel Hernández González Jorge Reyna Castillo

Votes

%

399,777 375,165 271,933 268,796 74,825 55,819 33,429 32,325 16,894 11,052 7,957 6,341

25.72 24.14 17.50 17.29 4.81 3.59 2.15 2.08 1.09 0.71 0.51 0.41

Note: Total valid votes cast: 1,554,313; nullified ballots: 164,267; blank ballots: 90,221; total ballots cast: 1,808,801; total that did not vote: 1,401,476; total registered voters: 3,204,955. Source: "Guatemala: Elecciones": 53. Reprinted with permission. T a b l e 8.5

C o n g r e s s i o n a l and M u n i c i p a l Election Results, 1990 Congress Seats

Party

1. UCN 2. MAS 3. DCG 4. PAN 5. MLN-FAN 6. PSD-AP5 7. PR 8. PDCN 9. MEC 10. PNR 11. FUR 12. PD 13. FRG a 14. PID-FUN-FRG 3 15. Civic Com. b TOTALS

41 18 27 12 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 —

116

PARLACEN Seats

Municipal Victories

6 5 4 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

—

132 13 86 16 10 9 4 1 0 2 0 1 16 2 8

20

300

— —

Notes: a These parties did not participate at the presidential level because their candidate, Efrain Rios Montt, was ruled ineligible. ^ Civic Committees are nonpartisan coalitions formed for municipal-level elections. "Congress Seats" refers to the Guatemalan National Congress; "PARLACEN Seats" are Guatemala's seats in the Central American Parliament. Source: "Guatemala: Elecciones": 54. Reprinted with permission.

p i c k i n g u p s u p p o r t f r o m the D C G ( L A T i m e s 1 1 / 1 3 / 9 0 : 9 A ) . C a r p i o a l r e a d y had e n l i s t e d the support of the C U S G , a major, centrist, labor federation ( P C R P 11/90: 6). Both candidates w e r e d e s c r i b e d as moderate c o n s e r v a tives by m o s t

press observers.42

Y e t the far-right credentials of

both

Power &

Participation

149

candidates seem to belie this observation. Carpio's running mate, for example, was Manuel Ayau, who earlier in the campaign had been the MLN's presidential candidate. One of Carpio's public supporters was Carlos Acevedo, alleged to have been a participant in the attempted military coup of May 1989 (NYTimes 11/11/90: 9). Serrano Elias had been an important functionary during the repressive Ríos Montt regime and had profited from his association with the Ríos campaign throughout 1990. Indeed, Serrano averred that he had entered the campaign in case his "mentor," General Ríos Montt, were to be disqualified (NYTimes 1/8/91: A3). Because of this association, Serrano was installed as the early favorite in the run-off even though he had finished a close second in the first round. A poll after the first round showed Serrano with 67 percent of the vote (Colina). As in the first-round campaign, Carpió and Serrano offered little to choose between in terms of issues and campaign positions (TOA 11/28/90: 4). As mentioned above, both were identified as wealthy conservatives, although supporters of their economic plans saw both as champions of the free market. One observer noted: "Neither candidate has proposed fundamental changes in what is one of the most unbalanced economic systems in Central America—one that has left more than half the country underemployed or unemployed" (LATimes 11/13/90: 9A). 4 3 If in terms of economic policy there was little choice between the two candidates, that was not the case on religious issues, a politically sensitive aspect of Guatemalan life since at least the late 1970s, when catechists and progressive Catholic clergy were victimized by military repression, and especially because of Ríos Montt's born-again, messianic style while he was head of state in the 1980s. With Carpió Nicolle a Catholic and Serrano Elias a Protestant evangelical, the religious dimension became a central issue in the campaign. Serrano profited from his association with General Ríos Montt in this sense as well. At least one observer thought Serrano had a clear advantage in this situation, in spite of Carpio's access to greater campaign funding, because of the ability to mobilize small evangelical groups all over the country—the "Fujimori effect" (TOA 11/28/90: 4). 44 The early and consistent response of the Catholic church hierarchy during the run-off campaign was to ask its faithful to ignore the candidates' religious affiliation and concentrate on other issues. Though the church might well have pointed out that Carpio's economic platform was at odds with its frequent messages about social justice, in fact the bishops explicitly focused on the national dialogue process, asking voters to support candidates who would participate in dialogue aimed at ending the civil war {Excelsior 12/3/90: 2A). In fact, both candidates pledged to continue the dialogue structure process. Serrano was perceived as more willing to dialogue, since he had been an active member of the National Dialogue structure in 1989, and had participated in the 1990 meeting in Spain. Serrano announced his willingness

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to dialogue informally b e f o r e the J a n u a r y 6 r u n - o f f e l e c t i o n . S o m e suspected that this was a campaign ploy, h o w e v e r — a n opportunistic attempt to take advantage o f widespread popular support for the dialogue process, given S e r r a n o ' s active role during the rural v i o l e n c e o f the R í o s Montt administration ( T O A 1 1 / 2 8 / 9 0 : 4 ) . On J a n u a r y 6 , 1 9 9 1 , c o n s i s t e n t with poll p r e d i c t i o n s , voters e l e c t e d J o r g e S e r r a n o Elias to the presidency for a f i v e - y e a r term beginning January 13, 1 9 9 1 ; he received a majority o f s o m e 6 7 percent. Serrano thereby b e c a m e the first Protestant to be e l e c t e d president o f a predominantly R o m a n C a t h o l i c , Latin A m e r i c a n country ( N Y T i m e s 1 / 8 / 9 1 : A 3 ) .

Elections, Dialogue, and the Military Reconsidered National e l e c t i o n s took up much o f G u a t e m a l a ' s c o v e r a g e in the international press in 1 9 9 0 . T h o u g h honest in terms o f legal provisions and ballot counting, these elections nonetheless reflected the process designed to protect the dominant position o f the A r m y and c o n s e r v a t i v e elites. Conservative o b s e r v e r s w e r e c o r r e c t in pointing out that the big loser in the election was the left: no candidates o f f e r e d solutions for social problems other than neoliberal e c o n o m i c s , and v i o l e n c e a i m e d at popular sectors was a characteristic o f the campaign atmosphere ( T h o m a s ) . 4 5 T h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f v i o l e n c e and a c a m p a i g n largely devoid o f progressive solutions to nontrivial social and e c o n o m i c problems led to a discrediting o f the traditional parties and electoral p r o c e s s e s . Large numbers o f voters expressed discontent with both the party in o f f i c e , the Christian Democrats, and with the c h i e f opposition party for five years, the Union o f the National Center, whose candidate Carpió N i c o l l e was swamped in the run-off e l e c t i o n in January 1 9 9 1 . Noting this d i s c o n t e n t , s o m e observers attributed voter apathy and disgust to a general historical disdain for democracy in Guatemala. C o m b i n i n g this with the popularity o f the e l e c tion c a m p a i g n waged by G e n e r a l Efraín R í o s Montt b e f o r e he was ruled ineligible, s o m e reached the c o n c l u s i o n that " G u a t e m a l a n s s e e m to be willing to trade away freedom for s e c u r i t y " ( N Y T i m e s 1 1 / 1 2 / 9 0 : A 7 ) . In the G u a t e m a l a n c o n t e x t , h o w e v e r , to argue that popular support for G e n e r a l R í o s Montt during the c a m p a i g n meant a general desire for authoritarian rule ignores many important d i m e n s i o n s . 4 6 It is fallacious to c o n c l u d e that distaste for the traditional parties and military hierarchy equals distaste for d e m o c r a c y . S u c h reasoning ignores the significance o f the a c t i v i t i e s o f the c o u n t r y ' s popular o r g a n i z a t i o n s and o f the National D i a l o g u e process. In 1 9 9 0 , responding to their history and taking advantage o f the opportunity, even if limited, directly provided by e l e c t i o n s , G u a t e m a l a n s voted to s w e e p out the traditional parties and e l e c t e d the

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c a n d i d a t e l e a s t i n v o l v e d in a c o n v e n t i o n a l p a r t y , J o r g e S e r r a n o E l i a s . A n d t h e y v o t e d f o r c a n d i d a t e s w h o at l e a s t a p p a r e n t l y s u p p o r t e d t h e N a t i o n a l D i a l o g u e , a p r o c e s s f r a u g h t w i t h a n t i m i l i t a r y i m p l i c a t i o n s . T h e h i s t o r y of n o n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b y p a r t i e s a n d t h e b r u t a l i t y of t h e m i l i t a r y

provides

a m p l e e v i d e n c e of v o t e r r a t i o n a l i t y . W h i l e t h e h o n e s t y of v o t e c o u n t i n g d u r i n g t h e 1 9 9 0 e l e c t i o n s h a s not b e e n q u e s t i o n e d , o t h e r c o m p o n e n t s of t h e p r o c e s s a r e m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d to e v a l u a t e , e s p e c i a l l y t h e c l i m a t e of v i o l e n c e a n d t h e a b s e n c e of s e r i o u s c h o i c e s b e y o n d the right and the c e n t e r right. T h e lack of direct or e v e n indirect p o p u l a r i n f l u e n c e on p u b l i c policy b e t w e e n 1 9 8 5 and 1990 had r e d u c e d t h e p u b l i c ' s f a i t h in e l e c t i o n s ( o r at l e a s t in t h e r e f o r m i s m o f t h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s ) b y 1 9 9 0 . F i n a l l y , a g o o d d e a l of p o l i t i c a l e n e r g y w a s devoted to the National Dialogue process during 1989 and 1990, causing e l e c t i o n s t o s e e m l e s s r e l e v a n t to t h e n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n . Although several parties were competing for office and clear differences w e r e a p p a r e n t a m o n g the parties, the u n d e r l y i n g a n d consistent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c d i s p l a y e d w a s e x t r e m e t i m i d i t y in t e r m s of m a j o r r e f o r m , if n o t o u t r i g h t o p p o s i t i o n t o e v e n e v o l u t i o n a r y c h a n g e in t h e d i r e c t i o n of s o c i a l j u s t i c e . E l e c t o r a l p l u r a l i s m w a s r e a l in a n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s e n s e , b u t t h e s c o p e of t h e s u b s t a n t i v e p o l i t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s m e a n t t h a t t h i s e l e c t i o n , like o t h e r s in t h e p a s t , o f f e r e d r e l a t i v e l y little to t h e p o p u l a r s e c t o r s . I n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s e e l e c t i o n s a s w a t e r s h e d s of d e m o c r a t i c t r a n s i t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e , is to m i s s e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t s of t h e o v e r a l l p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t . F o r e x a m p l e , e l e c t o r a l r e s u l t s h a v e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e r o l e of t h e a r m e d f o r c e s . In t h e 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 8 5 e l e c t i o n s t h e b e s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of v o t i n g b e h a v i o r w a s that it w a s a r e p u d i a t i o n o f t h e m i l i t a r y ' s r o l e in s o c i e t y ( R o s a d a G r a n a d o s 1 9 8 5 ) . In 1 9 9 0 , a s i m i l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is r e a s o n a b l e . B o t h w i n n e r s in t h e f i r s t r o u n d " s u c c e e d e d a s b u s i n e s s m e n b e f o r e t u r n i n g to p o l i t i c s , l a c k t i e s to t h e c o u n t r y ' s p o l i t i c a l p a s t a n d o w e n o p o w e r d e b t s to t h e m i l i t a r y " ( T h o m a s ) . M o r e o v e r , t h e e v e n t u a l v i c t o r y of J o r g e S e r r a n o is s i g n i f i c a n t b e c a u s e of h i s l i n k s to G e n e r a l R í o s M o n t t : R í o s h a s b e e n at o d d s with the r u l i n g military hierarchy since 1974, w h e n he w o n the presidential election but w a s p r e v e n t e d f r o m taking o f f i c e by a military clique t h a t s u b s e q u e n t l y s e n t h i m t o S p a i n a s a m b a s s a d o r . In 1 9 8 2 , t h e c o u p d ' é t a t t h a t i n s t a l l e d h i m in p o w e r o v e r t u r n e d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l m i l i t a r y h i e r a r c h y , a n d in 1 9 9 0 , his c a m p a i g n w a s o p p o s e d b y t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h ment. T o s o m e extent a vote for S e r r a n o w a s a vote against the military.

Conclusion H i s t o r i c a l l y , t h e A r m y ' s m a n a g e m e n t of s o c i e t y h a s i n v o l v e d p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s t h a t w o u l d n o t t h r e a t e n its c o n t i n u i n g d o m i n a n t p o s i t i o n . In t h e

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m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , it w a s p o w e r f u l e n o u g h e v e n t o i n c l u d e r e l a t i v e l y o p e n , h o n e s t e l e c t i o n s as p a r t o f its s t r a t e g y , t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s b e i n g n o t a n e n d in itself but part of a c o h e r e n t and, u n d e r the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , rational plan. T h e s t r u c t u r e s of l i b e r a l d e m o c r a c y s i n c e 1 9 8 4 a r e p a r t o f t h i s p r o c e s s , at l e a s t in t h e e y e s of t h e m i l i t a r y ' s d o m i n a n t f a c t i o n . T o s o m e d e g r e e , m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l o v e r p o l i t i c s w a s t h r e a t e n e d by s e v eral f a c t o r s d u r i n g the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n — t h o u g h not by C e r e z o and the Christian Democrats t h e m s e l v e s — i n c l u d i n g internal

factionalizing.

M o r e important, the National D i a l o g u e p r o c e s s not only mobilized public opinion but e v e n brought elite e s t a b l i s h m e n t g r o u p s into discussions with t h e g u e r r i l l a i n s u r g e n c y ' s l e a d e r s h i p . I r o n i c a l l y , a l t h o u g h e l e c t i o n s involved many m o r e participants, the m a j o r political questions facing G u a t e m a l a a n d its t r a n s i t i o n t o d e m o c r a c y w e r e d e b a t e d in t h e N a t i o n a l D i a l o g u e p r o c e s s , t h e m a i n e v e n t , a n d n o t in t h e e l e c t i o n s , t h e s i d e s h o w . B u t e v e n t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s , in s p i t e of its c o n t e x t u a l f l a w s , r e f l e c t e d p r e s s u r e e x e r t e d o n t h e m i l i t a r y as w e l l as e l i t e a c t o r s w i t h i n t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t ical p a r t i e s . A l t h o u g h the 1990 election m a y have been less than a perfect d e m o cratic i n s t r u m e n t , the o p p o r t u n i t y had o p e n e d to d e b a t e s o c i e t y ' s

key

i s s u e s as a r e s u l t of t h e c r i s i s of t h e e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s a n d t h e m i l i t a r y ' s r e b u i l d ing of constitutional g o v e r n m e n t . T a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of this opening, popular o r g a n i z a t i o n s p u s h e d G u a t e m a l a t o w a r d d e m o c r a c y

from 1985 on,

a l t h o u g h at g r e a t p e r s o n a l c o s t , as d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r . B u t it is in t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f p o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d in t h e m o r e r e c e n t N a t i o n a l D i a l o g u e p r o c e s s t h a t s i g n s of a t r u e t r a n s i t i o n t o d e m o c r a c y a r e s e e n , n o t in t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s . I n d e e d , b e c a u s e o f s u c c e s s e s in t h o s e a r e n a s in 1 9 9 0 , t h e r e is r o o m f o r c a u t i o u s o p t i m i s m a b o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r d e m o c r a c y , a l m o s t in s p i t e of t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s . In 1 9 9 0 , G u a t e m a l a n s e n e r g e t i c a l l y p u r s u e d t h e N a t i o n a l

Dialogue

p r o c e s s , p e r c e i v i n g it a n d n o t t h e e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n a s t h e m e a n s

to

d o m e s t i c p e a c e b e c a u s e it f o c u s e d o n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l i s s u e of r e d u c i n g the m i l i t a r y ' s p o w e r . T h e d i a l o g u e p r o c e s s held out the best prospect for d e m o c r a t i z i n g s o c i e t y , a n d e v e n p o i n t e d t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of c r e a t i n g a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s to f o c u s o n s o c i a l c o n c e r n s r a t h e r t h a n to l e g i t i m i z e m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l o f s o c i e t y . 4 7 A m a j o r i s s u e f o r t h e 1 9 9 0 s is h o w f a r t h e N a t i o n a l D i a l o g u e p r o c e s s c a n g o to m e l d d i s p a r a t e s o c i a l s e c t o r s i n t o a p r e s s u r e g r o u p c a p a b l e of f o r c i n g a d i m i n i s h e d r o l e f o r t h e m i l i t a r y . At the s a m e time, the political conditions for increased repression also t h r e a t e n , if h i s t o r y is a n y g u i d e . C a u t i o u s o p t i m i s m a b o u t p r e s s u r e on t h e m i l i t a r y m u s t b e t e m p e r e d b y t h e o v e r a l l w e i g h t of a c c u m u l a t e d d a t a o n Guatemalan politics, which point toward continuing military domination. Factions within the A r m y , for e x a m p l e , generally d i f f e r only on the tactics to f o l l o w : c o n s e n s u s c o n t i n u e s on the g o a l of m a i n t a i n i n g

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d o m i n a n c e a n d e c o n o m i c o p p o r t u n i t y f o r m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . 4 8 If i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y a l o n g w i t h r e p r e s s i o n c a n n o t a c h i e v e that g o a l , t h e n t h e constitutional order may crumble, limiting opportunity for political action. In t h e l o n g run, h o w e v e r , t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e m i l i t a r y ' s d o m i n a n t p o s i t i o n is s t i l l t h e m a j o r o b s t a c l e t o a n y m a j o r m o v e m e n t t o w a r d d e m o c r a c y . 4 9 T h e w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e h e r e a n d f r o m e a r l i e r c h a p t e r s i s that G u a t e m a l a c o n t i n u e s to b e d o m i n a t e d by a s i n g l e institution, its a r m e d f o r c e s , in s p i t e o f t h e o c c a s i o n a l e x c e p t i o n s t h a t m e a n t h i s d o m i n a n c e is not total. T h e t w o key p o l e s of power, the military and the civilian state, appear to have essentially the s a m e relationship they h a v e had s i n c e 1 9 5 4 , if n o t e a r l i e r , e v e n t h o u g h t h e g o v e r n m e n t h a s a s s u m e d a d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i tutional form since 1984.

Notes 1. T h e A r m y b u i l t a wall of silence a r o u n d the d i s a s t r o u s e f f e c t s of the m i l i t a r y c a m p a i g n w a g e d against the rural civilian p o p u l a t i o n , d u r i n g w h i c h they h a v e killed n o n c o m b a t a n t c i v i l i a n s and d e s t r o y e d c r o p s , h o u s e s and d o m e s t i c a n i m a l s ( " T h e A c t o r s " : 8). 2. A c c o r d i n g to the U R N G l e a d e r s h i p , t h e A r m y s u f f e r e d 2 , 7 2 0 c a s u a l t i e s , i n c l u d i n g both d e a d and w o u n d e d , b e t w e e n J a n u a r y 1 9 8 6 and M a y 1 9 8 8 ( V M 6 / 8 8 : 2, 7). 3. " O f c o u r s e the a r m y h a s a role in this c o u n t r y , but it i s n ' t r u n n i n g t h e g o v e r n m e n t the w a y it used to. . . . T h e s o c i e t y is s t e a d i l y b e c o m i n g less m i l i t a r i z e d , and that c a n only h a p p e n if the a r m y l e a d e r s h a v e c o n f i d e n c e in the g o v e r n m e n t . W e ' r e b u i l d i n g that c o n f i d e n c e " ( q u o t e d in K i n z e r 1989: 5 0 ) . 4. T h e a f t e r m a t h of the a t t e m p t e d c o u p of M a y 1 1, 1988, is b e s t u n d e r s t o o d in a f r a m e w o r k of p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e , or i n t e r e s t g r o u p p o l i t i c s . U n a b l e to i n c r e a s e their i n f l u e n c e t h r o u g h e l e c t i o n s in 1982, 1984, 1 9 8 5 , and the m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s of 1988, the parties of the r i g h t r e s o r t e d to p u t s c h i s t t a c t i c s . L i k e p o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s , r i g h t - w i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f t e n use u n c o n v e n t i o n a l m o d e s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n in o r d e r to i n f l u e n c e r u l i n g g r o u p s , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n g o v e r n m e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s are u n r e s p o n s i v e to their d e m a n d s . W h e r e a s f o r the left this m e a n s p u b l i c d e m o n s t r a tions b a s e d on their m a j o r r e s o u r c e — t h e n u m b e r s t h e y c a n m o b i l i z e — f o r t h e right this m e a n s r u m o r s of c o u p s , p l o t t i n g , and a t t e m p t e d c o u p s , b a s e d on t h e i r m a j o r r e s o u r c e — a c c e s s to w e a p o n s a n d , on o c c a s i o n , d i s s i d e n t m i l i t a r y f a c t i o n s . 5. T h e day a f t e r the c o r r e s p o n d e n t s h a d l e f t G u a t e m a l a , P r e s i d e n t C e r e z o a n n o u n c e d their " t e m p o r a r y e x p u l s i o n " ( W R H 6 / 2 2 / 8 8 : 1, 6). 6. A t t e m p t s to m o d e r n i z e the p o l i c e h a v e b e e n a p r o m i n e n t part of the C h r i s tian D e m o c r a t i c a g e n d a , o s t e n s i b l y to i n c r e a s e r e s p e c t f o r h u m a n r i g h t s a n d to d e c r e a s e i n c i d e n c e of c o m m o n c r i m e , e s p e c i a l l y in G u a t e m a l a C i t y , w h e r e r o v i n g street g a n g s had b e c o m e a f a i r l y s e r i o u s social p r o b l e m by t h e m i d - 1 9 8 0 s . In 1987, Spain p r o m i s e d patrol cars and motorcycles, a f o r e n s i c laboratory, and w e a p o n s ( G N I B 6 / 8 7 : 10). M a y o r A n d r e w Y o u n g had t e n t a t i v e l y a c c e p t e d an i n v i t a t i o n to

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h a v e the Atlanta, G e o r g i a , police help train G u a t e m a l a n police, but he reversed that decision in 1988, after a m a j o r p u b l i c c a m p a i g n w a s m o u n t e d in the U.S. against aiding the Guatemalan police. See also Special Service 2/88: 6. 7. This c o u p w a s described as a way of a c h i e v i n g political c o n c e s s i o n s through military m e a n s that can not be a c h i e v e d through political m e a n s . In e f f e c t , political s p a c e s are reduced, the C e r e z o administration c o m e s under tighter military control, and repression increases (ROG 5/89: 9). 8. For a similar analysis, see N & A 1 0 / 2 6 / 8 9 : 1 - 2 ; and S c h i r m e r 1989b: 478-479. 9. For a f a s c i n a t i n g account of the ideological position of the O f f i c e r s of the M o u n t a i n s , see S c h i r m e r 1989a. A m o n g the o p i n i o n s e x p r e s s e d by the o f f i c e r s P r o f e s s o r S c h i r m e r interviewed are these: the C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s are c o m m u nists, m a n y m e m b e r s of the civilian g o v e r n m e n t are d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s , the leading e c o n o m i c actors h a v e sold out to foreign interests, the military high c o m m a n d is c o r r u p t , and the m i n i s t e r of d e f e n s e , H é c t o r G r a m a j o , is a " c o m m u n i s t w i t h o u t balls." 10. W r i t i n g b e f o r e the attempted May 1989 c o u p , for e x a m p l e , S c h i r m e r noted that the G u a t e m a l a n A r m y ' s a p p r o a c h to the d o c t r i n e of national security, as well as its n e r v o u s n e s s over the possible replication of the civil war situation in El Salvador, could lead to a "preemptive state of s i e g e " ( S c h i r m e r 1989b: 479). 11. In this text I have concentrated on d o m e s t i c politics in G u a t e m a l a . For a m o r e c o m p l e t e discussion of the foreign policy issues f a c i n g President Cerezo, see Barry: chapter 5; and Jonas 1991: chapter 13. 12. Amidst these grants the United States w a s c o n s p i c u o u s in its absence f r o m the list of W e s t e r n d e m o c r a c i e s that had c o n t r i b u t e d f u n d s needed to hold the National D i a l o g u e in 1989, discussed later in this c h a p t e r . G u a t e m a l a received $ 1 3 2 , 0 0 0 f r o m European nations and C a n a d a for this p r o c e s s but nothing from the United States ( P C R P 9/89: 8). 13. The aid f i g u r e s for the period were: "In 1987, G u a t e m a l a received nearly $5.5 million in military aid, and $ 1 7 7 . 3 in e c o n o m i c a i d , " and in the first three m o n t h s of 1988 G u a t e m a l a had "been allocated $ 8 0 million in E c o n o m i c Support Funds [ESF]" ( N & A 4/21/88: 3). 14. For details see G M G 3/89: 6 - 7 , 4 / 8 9 , 5 - 6 , and 5/89: 4, in which the U R N G asserts e v i d e n c e of "at least 37 c a s e s of U S military p r e s e n c e in G u a t e m a l a " in the preceding six months. Also see W P o s t 8/18/89: 26. 15. For details of these particular actions, see newsletters of the G u a t e m a l a n Church in Exile (Iglesia Guatemalteca en E x i l i o — I G E ) and timely issues of U O G and V M . 16. This section on the National D i a l o g u e is based on several issues of P C R P , R O G , U O G , G M G , and other newsletters and interviews. 17. The i n s u r g e n c y ' s position w a s that the militarized regime imposed in 1954 w a s still in place d e s p i t e the 1985 elections: " W h a t w e have in G u a t e m a l a today is a g o v e r n m e n t w h o s e purpose is to cover up this r e g i m e . But in reality the structures and c o m p o n e n t s of this regime c o n t i n u e to exist" ( M o n s a n t o : 3). 18. The A r m y ' s position was that it w a s "not possible for one thousand armed terrorists to set c o n d i t i o n s for a country with eight million i n h a b i t a n t s w h o have opted for d e m o c r a c y " (El Gráfico 12/30/87, quoted in G N I B 12/1/87: 9). 19. "The army is not in charge of political d i a l o g u e . The g o v e r n m e n t and the president have that responsibility" ( S p e c i a l Service 3/88: 8).

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2 0 . F o r m o r e d e t a i l s on the N a t i o n a l D i a l o g u e as i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , see U O G 5 / 8 9 : 1 - 2 ; and P C R P 3 / 8 9 : 5. 21. One R U O G delegate c o m m e n t e d : W e , as e x i l e s w h o w e r e p e r s e c u t e d in t h e past, a r e n o w p r i v i l e g e d by the f a c t that w e can g o b a c k and m o v e w i t h m o r e f r e e d o m t h a n p e o p l e w h o n o r m a l l y live in G u a t e m a l a h a v e at this t i m e ( q u o t e d in R O G 4 / 8 9 : 5). 22. For m o r e d e t a i l s on t h r e a t s a i m e d at p a r t i c i p a n t s , see G M G 4 / 8 9 : 2 - 3 ; and N F A W 7/89: 7 - 8 . 2 3 . For good d i s c u s s i o n s a b o u t the b a c k g r o u n d f o r the 1 9 9 0 r o u n d of d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n U R N G and v a r i o u s G u a t e m a l a n a c t o r s , s e e R O G F a / 9 0 : 10—11; C S M o n i tor 9 / 2 6 / 9 0 : 5; and N & A 2 6 / 6 / 9 0 . 2 4 . T h e m i l i t a r y a n d the D C G h e l d t w o p o s i t i o n s o n this: that the g u e r r i l l a s had c e a s e d to be a s e r i o u s m i l i t a r y f o r c e , and that b e c a u s e d e m o c r a c y had e x i s t e d s i n c e C e r e z o ' s i n a u g u r a t i o n , t h e n e e d to c o n t i n u e f i g h t i n g t h e g o v e r n m e n t w a s over (PCRP 4/90: 6 - 7 ) . 2 5 . For a m o r e t h o r o u g h d i s c u s s i o n of t h e O s l o a g r e e m e n t , see N & A 6 / 2 6 / 9 0 ; G M G 4 / 9 0 : 2 - 3 ; and, for the D C G v i e w , P C R P 4 / 9 0 : 6 - 7 . 2 6 . For m o r e d e t a i l s o n the m e e t i n g in S p a i n , s e e P C R P 6 / 9 0 : 5 - 6 ; and G M G 6 / 9 0 : 1 - 5 ; for the U R N G r e a c t i o n see the i n t e r v i e w w i t h U R N G C o m m a n d e r P a b l o M o n s a n t o in O r a m a s L e ó n . 2 7 . For m o r e d e t a i l s of t h e O c t o b e r d i a l o g u e m e e t i n g at M e t e p e c ( P u e b l a ) , M e x i c o , see G M G 11/90: 1 - 5 ; a n d R o d r i g u e z . 28. T h i s section is b a s e d on s e v e r a l s o u r c e s , i n c l u d i n g v a r i o u s i s s u e s of P C R P a n d R O G , in a d d i t i o n to the text r e f e r e n c e s . T h e m o s t c o m p r e h e n s i v e s o u r c e of the e l e c t i o n ' s f o r m a l - l e g a l p r o v i s i o n s and o t h e r b a s i c i n f o r m a t i o n is " G u a t e m a l a : E l e c c i o n e s G e n e r a l e s . " T h i s s o u r c e and P C R P ' s a n a l y s i s , in g e n e r a l , a r e u p b e a t a n d s u p p o r t i v e of the C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s . F o r m o r e c r i t i c a l o v e r v i e w s w i t h a g o o d d e a l of b a s i c i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t the e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s , see " E l e c t i o n s in G u a t e m a l a 1 9 9 0 - 9 1 " ; " W h o ' s W h o " ; and N & A 6/26/90. 29. B e t w e e n 1986 and 1990, C o n g r e s s had l e g i s l a t e d an i n c r e a s e in its size, f r o m 100 to 116, b e c a u s e of i n c r e a s e d p o p u l a t i o n in s o m e of G u a t e m a l a ' s d e p a r t m e n t s . O n e seat w a s added for each increase of 8 0 , 0 0 0 people o v e r the 1985 f i g u r e s . 3 0 . A New York Times a n a l y s t c o m m e n t e d : G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c i a n s and W e s t e r n d i p l o m a t s s a y the p l e t h o r a of political parties r e m a i n little m o r e t h a n a c o l l e c t i o n of tiny f a c t i o n s and e s t a b l i s h e d interest g r o u p s , u s u a l l y u n d e r a c a u d i l l o , or a s t r o n g m a n . I n s t e a d of b a t t l i n g for their p a r t y ' s n o m i n a t i o n , p o l i t i c i a n s o f t e n s h o p f o r a s u i t a b l e party ( N Y T i m e s 1 0 / 1 1 / 9 0 : A l l ) . T h e s a m e s o u r c e also q u o t e s A l v a r o A r z ú , f o r m e r m a y o r of G u a t e m a l a C i t y a n d t h e P A N p r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e : ' " T h e r e ' s no real d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n any of u s . ' " 3 1 . F o r a c c u s a t i o n s of c o r r u p t i o n w i t h i n t h e D C G a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g a c c u s a t i o n s a g a i n s t its c a n d i d a t e C a b r e r a , see Excelsior 3 / 1 6 / 9 0 : 2 A . F o r d e t a i l s of C a b r e r a ' s illness, see " G u a t e m a l a : E l e c c i o n e s " : 4 5 . 32. For a s i m i l a r a n a l y s i s , see R O G S u / 9 0 : 3. 3 3 . " T h e S o c i a l D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y , w h i c h is G u a t e m a l a ' s o n l y l e f t of c e n t e r p a r t y , is on the v e r g e of e x t i n c t i o n " ( R O G F a / 9 0 : 2 ) . A n d : " T h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m r e m a i n e d c l o s e d to the left. T h e 12 p r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e s w h o ran in N o v e m b e r ' s first r o u n d r a n g e d f r o m the right to the e x t r e m e r i g h t " ( N Y T i m e s 1 / 8 / 9 1 : A 3 ) .

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34. For details on v i o l e n c e directed against the M u t u a l S u p p o r t G r o u p ( G A M ) , the h u m a n rights o r g a n i z a t i o n , see Excelsior 2 5 / 7 / 9 0 : 9. See N Y T i m e s 10/9/90, for a n o t h e r s o u r c e that details political v i o l e n c e directed against c a n d i dates but w h i c h ascribes violence to local-level rivalries. 35. The Guatemalan paper Siglo XXI claimed that D o n a l d o Alvarez Ruiz, minister of the interior under Lucas Garcia, had contributed $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 to the Ríos c a m paign ( E x c e l s i o r 7/18/90: 2A). 36. This statement e c h o e s the f a m o u s c o m m e n t by President Reagan in early 1983, w h e n u n d e r R í o s Montt the most v i c i o u s w a v e of state t e r r o r i s m in G u a t e m a l a n history w a s underway in rural regions. 37. For other s u m m a r i e s of the Ríos Montt candidacy and its rejection by legal authorities, see " G u a t e m a l a : Elecciones": 4 0 - 4 3 ; T O A 9/5/90: 4 and 10/31/90: 3. 38. MHerald 9/30/90: 2 2 A , q u o t i n g a local Indian leader. T h i s is not an antidemocratic or anti-voting stance, h o w e v e r : "In the last presidential elections, f e w e r than half of the t o w n ' s voters went to the polls. Votes in the t o w n ' s mayoral race far s u r p a s s e d the n u m b e r cast for presidential c a n d i d a t e s . " It is p e r h a p s in this spirit that a long-time North A m e r i c a n resident of G u a t e m a l a c o m m e n t e d , p e r h a p s with tongue in cheek, that G u a t e m a l a n s "will not vote for s o m e o n e stupid e n o u g h to want to be P r e s i d e n t " (personal c o m m u n i c a t i o n , April 1991). 39. T o review the positions of several candidates on issues of primary importance to,the M a y a c o m m u n i t i e s , see Esquit C h o y , ed., which d o c u m e n t s both statem e n t s of the c a n d i d a t e s as well as q u e s t i o n s and a n s w e r s by a panel of M a y a n scholars and activists. 40. C a n d i d a t e s " a n n o u n c e d a m b i t i o u s p r o g r a m s to s t a b i l i z e the f o u n d e r i n g e c o n o m y . But they have not dared to do m o r e than hint at plans for d e m i l i t a r i z a tion, agrarian r e f o r m , p o p u l a t i o n control or land r e d i s t r i b u t i o n " ( N Y T i m e s 11/11/90: A9). 41. Mayoralty c a n d i d a t e s included: (1) O s c a r C l e m e n t e M a r r o q u í n G o d o y , a n e w s p a p e r publisher, nominated by a civic c o m m i t t e e , U N I D A D , who had finished second in the 1985 m u n i c i p a l election; (2) Rafael Escobar Donis, w h o resigned his position as president of the National B a n k for H o u s i n g in order to run for m a y o r ; (3) Oscar Berger of the P A N , the party that won the mayoralty in 1985 with A l v a r o A r z ú , its presidential c a n d i d a t e in 1990; (4) P e d r o A s t u r i a s of the U C N ; and (5) three minor candidates, Oscar R a f a e l Prem, Enrique M o n t a n o Vela, and the perennial (and perennially u n s u c c e s s f u l ) candidate, José María Ruiz Furlán, a C a t h o l i c priest ( P C R P 4/90: 3). 42. In a d d i t i o n to g e n e r a l s o u r c e s listed earlier, this section on the r u n - o f f c a m p a i g n is based on T O A 11/14/90: 2; N Y T i m e s 11/13/90: A l l ; P C R P 11/90: 3, 6; and L A T i m e s 11/13/90: 9A. 43. This s a m e n e s s w a s c o m f o r t i n g f r o m the c o n s e r v a t i v e side of the s p e c t r u m . M a n u e l A y a u , C a r p i o ' s v i c e - p r e s i d e n t i a l r u n n i n g m a t e , w a s praised b e c a u s e his " c o m m i t m e n t to and support for f r e e - m a r k e t philosophy t h r o u g h o u t Central A m e r ica is l e g e n d a r y . " A n d were Serrano to win the r u n - o f f , the s a m e observer saw no p r o b l e m , for "it is unlikely that his c o m m i t m e n t s to f r e e - m a r k e t e c o n o m i c policy c h a n g e s will be any less d r a m a t i c that those of Mr. C a r p i o ' s " ( T h o m a s ) . T h o m a s , dean of the F r a n c i s c o M a r r o q u í n University in G u a t e m a l a City, notes that A y a u has been praised by Nobel laureate Milton F r i e d m a n for his e c o n o m i c philosophy of f r e e - m a r k e t capitalism. 44. President F u j i m o r i ' s e l e c t o r a l victory in Peru, earlier in 1990, is s o m e times attributed to the role of evangelical g r a s s r o o t s ' g r o u p s .

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15 7

45. For this source, the " l e f t " m e a n s the C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s as well as the M a r x i s t s , w h o are lumped t o g e t h e r as " s t a t i s t s . " T h o m a s n o t e s that the victory, h o w e v e r , b e l o n g s to the " n e w r i g h t , " not the old r i g h t of v i o l e n c e and military ruination. T h e " n e w right" is a y o u n g and e d u c a t e d private s e c t o r c o m m i t t e d to the p r i n c i p l e s of an open s o c i e t y and u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the m a r k e t e c o n o m y as a tool for progress. T h e y know that d y n a m i c growth and foreign investment are no m o r e than fantasies as long as unstable rules, shaky currency and c o n f i s catory t a x a t i o n are in place. Hard w o r k in a f r e e society can o v e r c o m e poverty ( T h o m a s ) . 46. This a r g u m e n t w a s clearly presented in several articles by Lindsey Gruson of the New York Times. In addition to articles cited earlier, see 10/9/90, 10/11/90, and 11/12/90. 47. For similar arguments, see " E l e c t i o n s in G u a t e m a l a . " 48. " H i g h - r a n k i n g m e m b e r s of the national a r m e d f o r c e s are a s t u b b o r n , repugnant breed w h o still see c o m m u n i s m behind legitimate d e m a n d s for a c o u n try as rich in r e s o u r c e s as G u a t e m a l a to avail these r e s o u r c e s m o r e e q u i t a b l y " (Lovell 1990). 49. For a c o m p a r a t i v e a n a l y s i s of the q u e s t i o n of the m i l i t a r y - c i v i l i a n relationship in five South American countries, see Z a g o r s k i .

9

The Serrano Presidency, 1991-1992

At t h e t i m e of J o r g e S e r r a n o ' s i n a u g u r a t i o n in J a n u a r y 1 9 9 1 , G u a t e m a l a w a s beset by s u c h m a j o r p r o b l e m s as c h r o n i c p o v e r t y , m a s s i v e u n e m p l o y m e n t , an u n c e r t a i n p a t t e r n of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , a m i l i t a r y s t r u g g l e b e t w e e n the U R N G i n s u r g e n c y a n d t h e A r m y , h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s , a n d p r e s s u r e f r o m the M a y a n c o m m u n i t i e s to a c k n o w l e d g e their n a t i o n a l identity. T h e d o m e s t i c social s i t u a t i o n s h o w e d m a r k e d c o n t i n u i t y f r o m the C e r e z o p e r i o d , but i n t e r n a t i o n a l e v e n t s p r o d u c e d a d i f f e r e n t m a c r o p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e . T h e C o l d W a r w a s e n d i n g v e r y q u i c k l y . T h e S a n d i n i s t a party lost an election in N i c a r a g u a , r e l i n q u i s h i n g its h o l d on the p r e s i d e n c y . El S a l v a d o r w a s i n v o l v e d in s e r i o u s n e g o t i a t i o n s to e n d its civil w a r , w i t h t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s as a m a j o r p a r t i c i p a n t . S o m e s e m b l a n c e of p e a c e a n d n o r m a l c y s e e m e d to be r e t u r n i n g to t h e r e g i o n . Inside G u a t e m a l a , " n o r m a l " political a c t i v i t y w a s b e g i n n i n g to be less a c c e p t a b l e . T h e c o n t i n u i n g civil w a r had put all o t h e r i s s u e s o n h o l d , but by 1 9 9 1 , the w a r w a s s e e n as a d r a i n o n r e s o u r c e s a n d a b u r d e n o n e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . C i v i l i a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d a l i e n a t e d the p o p u l a r s e c t o r s a n d r e m a i n e d w e a k b e c a u s e of its c o n t i n u i n g r e l i a n c e o n the m i l i t a r y . T h e social and p o l i t i c a l i n t r a n s i g e n c e of t h e r i g h t a n d of s o m e f a c t i o n s of the A r m y w a s b e g i n n i n g to a p p e a r less a b u l w a r k a g a i n s t c o m m u n i s m a n d m o r e a part of t h e p r o b l e m . T h e p o l i t i c s of t h e C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , w h i c h p a p e r e d o v e r m a j o r s o c i a l p r o b l e m s to a v o i d a m i l i t a r y c o u p , h a d produced widespread cynicism about political parties and civilian governm e n t . In s h o r t , P r e s i d e n t S e r r a n o h a d m o r e o p p o r t u n i t y to d e l i v e r , b u t m o r e p r e s s u r e to d o so as w e l l . S e r r a n o h i m s e l f b r o u g h t s t r e n g t h s a n d w e a k n e s s e s to t h e p r e s i d e n c y . H a v i n g w o r k e d c l o s e l y with t h e m i l i t a r y d u r i n g the R í o s M o n t t a n d M e j i a Víctores periods in the early a n d m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , he w a s on the w h o l e an a c c e p t able c a n d i d a t e to the m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t . A s a c o n s e r v a t i v e , S e r r a n o

159

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Guatemalan

Politics

could be expected to m a k e relatively few m o v e s toward serious social r e f o r m . This s a m e quality might earn initial support f r o m elites, but it made him quite suspect in the popular sectors. His born-again evangelism made Serrano less palatable to the Catholic church. As his term began, Serrano expressed four goals: social and economic justice; an end to the guerrilla war; the "end [to] military and g o v e r n m e n t sponsored human rights abuses; and [an] i m p r o v e m e n t in the d e m o c r a t i c s y s t e m . " His program included a plan to tax l a n d o w n e r s and p r o p o s a l s to alter the m a k e u p of the military high c o m m a n d , a particularly hardline g r o u p of o f f i c e r s at the time of S e r r a n o ' s inauguration ( L A T i m e s 9/24/91: 2H). In the e c o n o m i c sphere, Serrano inherited f r o m the Christian D e m o crats the model of relying on nontraditional exports, with few, if any, discontinuities. In 1990, traditional exports totaled $ 6 0 0 million and nontraditional exports $300 million, while apparel was the second most valuable export to the U.S., second only to c o f f e e ( R O G Wi/91: 8 - 9 ) . Social conditions were also c o n t i n u o u s : most of the population of 9.2 million w a s mired in poverty. 1 Politically, Serrano began with a model similar to C e r e z o ' s , based on concertación and an organized pacto social, designed to maximize communication a m o n g organized groups, including the popular ones. This chapter f o c u s e s on the first t w o years of S e r r a n o ' s p r e s i d e n c y . Bringing the analysis to the end of 1992 means data on G u a t e m a l a ' s transition has been provided for a full decade, from the time of the Ríos Montt c o u p in 1982 through the beginning of 1993. As before, we study the quality of political participation through an o v e r v i e w of selected issue areas f a c i n g the president: d e m a n d s of the popular sectors, policy responses of the government, and some of the social outcomes, including h u m a n rights and other key indicators of democratic transitions. The principal questions remain the same: does the quality of political participation indicate development of a democratic political process? Does public policy and its social impact reveal m o v e m e n t toward a democratic society and social justice?

Economic Issues and the Popular Sectors Tax

Policy

Tax reform has been a major issue in Guatemala since at least the 1960s. In 1991, as part of the conditions for a proposed agreement with the World Bank, the country again faced the question, as the bank p r e s s e d f o r tax modernization. 2 T h e tax reform plan included extending the IVA, Guatem a l a ' s value added tax; c h a n g i n g income tax brackets for m o d e r a t e - and

The Serrano Presidency,

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u p p e r - i n c o m e citizens; and tax s i m p l i f i c a t i o n f o r b u s i n e s s e s . T h e extens i o n of t h e I V A , e s s e n t i a l l y a s a l e s t a x , c o u l d b e s e e n as h u r t i n g t h e l o w e r i n c o m e sectors. With the current i n c o m e - t a x - b r a c k e t p e r c e n t a g e s r a n g i n g f r o m 4 to 3 0 p e r c e n t , t h e p r o p o s e d r e f o r m m e a n t a d e c r e a s e in i n c o m e t a x f o r the w e a l t h i e s t G u a t e m a l a n s but a s q u e e z e on m i d d l e - i n c o m e g r o u p s . Finally, the business tax r e f o r m s involved a flat tax rate, w h i c h

would

m e a n i n c r e a s e s f o r t h e s m a l l e r b u s i n e s s e s a n d d e c r e a s e s f o r t h e l a r g e s t , as c o m p a r e d to t h e c u r r e n t tax s t r u c t u r e ( R O G S p / 9 2 : 1 0 - 1 1 ) . T h e popular-sector groups o p p o s e d the I V A reforms. By eliminating all p r o d u c t a n d s e r v i c e e x e m p t i o n s , t h e r e f o r m w o u l d m e a n i n c r e a s e s in prices for food and medicines, a m o n g the p r o d u c t s previously

excluded

f r o m the IVA. C A C I F neither c o n d e m n e d nor e n d o r s e d the plan, stating f i r m l y its o p p o s i t i o n in p r i n c i p l e to a n y d i v e r s i o n o f c a p i t a l to t h e s t a t e . C A C I F s a w the r e f o r m s as p e r h a p s a n e c e s s a r y r e s p o n s e to the W o r l d B a n k , but not necessarily a g o o d idea for G u a t e m a l a ( R O G S p / 9 2 : 1 0 - 1 1 ) . T h e t a x m o d e r n i z a t i o n p l a n w a s o r i g i n a l l y p r o p o s e d in C o n g r e s s in August 1991. T w o m a j o r opposition parties, the Christian D e m o c r a t s and t h e U n i o n of t h e N a t i o n a l C e n t e r ( U C N ) , p u b l i c l y o p p o s e d t h e p l a n . W i t h his o w n party, the Solidarist Action M o v e m e n t ( M A S ) , holding only eight e e n s e a t s in C o n g r e s s , S e r r a n o w a s u n a b l e t o f o r c e t h e i s s u e in 1 9 9 1 , a n d C o n g r e s s s i m p l y p o s t p o n e d d e a l i n g w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , in e a r l y 1 9 9 2 t h e r e f o r m s w e r e a p p r o v e d . T h e t h r e e r e f o r m s of t h e F i s c a l M o d e r n i z a t i o n P r o g r a m a i m e d to increase g o v e r n m e n t r e v e n u e by nearly $ 2 0 0 m i l l i o n , a 19 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e in a n n u a l r e v e n u e s ( P C R P 7 / 9 2 : 4—5). 3 P a s s a g e of t h e t a x p a c k a g e m e t t h e W o r l d B a n k r e q u i r e m e n t s b u t d i d n o t r e s o l v e t h e p r o b l e m of h o w to i n v e s t i n c r e a s e d r e v e n u e s f o r m o r e s o c i a l p r o g r e s s . W i t h l i t t l e b u r e a u c r a t i c i n f r a s t r u c t u r e in p l a c e t o i m p l e m e n t s o c i a l p r o g r a m s , t h e g o v e r n m e n t w a s n o t e q u i p p e d to d o s o f o r s o c i a l r e f o r m p a c k a g e s . M o r e o v e r , t h e g e n e r a l l y r e g r e s s i v e n a t u r e of t h e s e t a x r e f o r m s w o u l d p r o d u c e m o r e need for social p r o g r a m s , not less ( P C R P 7/92: 4 - 5 ) . H o u s i n g , f o r e x a m p l e , c o n t i n u e d to a p r o b l e m a r e a f o r s o c i e t y , if n o t a t a r g e t of p u b l i c p o l i c y . T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s o w n s t a t i s t i c s s h o w e d a h o u s i n g d e f i c i t o f 6 5 0 , 0 0 0 u n i t s in 1 9 8 6 (in t h e c a p i t a l it w a s 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 ) a n d , in 1 9 9 1 , of 8 4 0 , 0 0 0 u n i t s . T h e g e n e s i s of t h i s i n c r e a s e w a s a c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e 1 9 7 6 e a r t h q u a k e , p e o p l e f l e e i n g v i o l e n c e in r u r a l a r e a s , a n d l a c k of g o v e r n m e n t a c t i o n . A s of m i d - 1 9 9 2 , t h e S e r r a n o g o v e r n m e n t h a d s p e n t n o f u n d s to resolve the h o u s i n g d i l e m m a . O n e result w a s land

invasions:

s o m e s i x t h o u s a n d f a m i l i e s i n v a d e d l a n d s in v a r i o u s p l a c e s in G u a t e m a l a C i t y in e a r l y 1 9 9 2 , i n c l u d i n g o v e r t h r e e t h o u s a n d f a m i l i e s in o n e s e t t l e m e n t o n t h e s o u t h s i d e o f t h e c i t y . In l a t e M a r c h p o l i c e i n v a d e d t h i s s e t t l e m e n t a n d d e s t r o y e d it, l e a v i n g f i f t e e n t h o u s a n d p e o p l e h o m e l e s s ( R O G Su/92: 8 - 9 , 14).

162

Guatemalan

The M a q u i l a

Politics

Question

T h e maquila sector illustrates the b a s i c d y n a m i c s o f Guatemalan p o l i t i c s very well. T h e maquila is a strategy for e c o n o m i c development, a deliberate decision to " p e r m i t exploitation o f its c h e a p , abundant labor f o r c e in e x c h a n g e for foreign c u r r e n c y , e m p l o y m e n t , and hoped-for long term industrialization" ( P e t e r s e n : 5 ) . 4 T h i s is potentially an e x c e l l e n t strategy because it is a labor-intensive model that could r e c o n c i l e an export-driven model with s o c i a l j u s t i c e . T h e maquila strategy can generate growth in internal aggregate demand, precisely what is needed for sustained development and social d e m o c r a c y . T h e m a q u i l a s e c t o r is the fastest g r o w i n g s e c t o r in the e c o n o m y : as o f 1 9 9 1 , at least f o r t y - f i v e thousand w o r k e r s , mostly w o m e n , were producing c l o t h i n g , primarily for the United S t a t e s . T h e exported products were a m a j o r portion o f G u a t e m a l a ' s nontraditional exports ( R O G Wi/91: 8 ) . B e c a u s e no labor unions were f u n c t i o n i n g in the maquila sector, this resulted in poor work c o n d i t i o n s ,

lack o f security f o r workers,

and

extremely low w a g e s . Both organized labor and workers in general found themselves in dire straits in 1991 and 1 9 9 2 . B e s i d e s high levels o f unemployment and u n d e r e m p l o y m e n t , w o r k e r s were f a c e d with high inflation rates in the late 1 9 8 0 s and 1 9 9 0 , w h i c h led to a d e c l i n e in purchasing power o f about 8 0 percent s i n c e 1 9 8 0 ( I P S 10/31/92). At the level o f individual w o r k e r s and unions, labor was caught in a bind. Workers could legally bring c o m p l a i n t s against employers, but there were far too few labor courts to hear the c o m p l a i n t s and far too many cases, hence a huge b a c k l o g . M o r e o v e r , procedures allow owners to appeal rulings, delaying final action f o r y e a r s , even if they lost an initial j u d g ment. Finally, w o r k e r s feared dismissal if they filed a c o m p l a i n t ; s i n c e roughly two were u n e m p l o y e d for each person w o r k i n g , the i n c e n t i v e s were against filing c o m p l a i n t s . 5 T h e s e c o n d i t i o n s led to international pressure on the g o v e r n m e n t in 1 9 9 2 , with a renewed campaign in the United States to c o n v i n c e the U . S . T r a d e O f f i c e to review G u a t e m a l a ' s labor c o n d i t i o n s . 6 T h e review could have led to a reassessment o f G u a t e m a l a ' s preferential trade status in the Caribbean B a s i n Initiative, w h i c h in turn would be a m a j o r blow to the apparel industry, by far the largest c o m p o n e n t o f the maquila s e c t o r and heavily dependent on e x p o r t i n g to the United S t a t e s . T h i s

campaign

b e c a m e a m a j o r c o n c e r n for G u a t e m a l a . In 1 9 9 1 , the T r a d e O f f i c e r e j e c t e d the review requests b e c a u s e S e r rano promised to reform the labor c o d e , hire inspectors, and raise the minimum wage. T h e U . S . position was that G u a t e m a l a was making substantial progress. B u t as o f early 1 9 9 2 , the labor c o d e had not been reformed, no new inspectors were hired, and the m i n i m u m wage was still insufficient,

The Serrano Presidency,

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w h e n it w a s p a i d at a l l . R e p o r t s c i r c u l a t e d o f f o r m a l r e q u e s t s f o r l a b o r u n i o n c e r t i f i c a t i o n s i t t i n g in t h e p r e s i d e n t ' s o f f i c e f o r t w o y e a r s , in s p i t e of constitutional provisions s u p p o r t i n g labor. M o r e o v e r , the State D e p a r t m e n t ' s h u m a n rights report on G u a t e m a l a n o t e d that twenty union leaders r e c e i v e d d e a t h t h r e a t s in 1 9 9 1 a n d h a d t o f l e e t h e c o u n t r y , a n d t h a t f o r t y f i v e t h o u s a n d G u a t e m a l a n children b e t w e e n a g e s six and fifteen w e r e employed

illegally, m e a n i n g , a m o n g other things, that they w e r e

not

r e c e i v i n g social benefits m a n d a t e d by law ( W P o s t 8/1/92: 18A). Throughout

1992, a c o a l i t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l g r o u p s and

popular

o r g a n i z a t i o n s supported the c a m p a i g n to h a v e c o n d i t i o n s investigated by t h e T r a d e O f f i c e . B u s i n e s s l e a d e r s a d o p t e d t w o t a c t i c s in r e s p o n s e : f i r s t , t h e y c l a i m e d to b e a w a r e of s o m e a b u s e s b u t s a i d t h e y w e r e d o i n g t h e i r b e s t to c o r r e c t t h e m in o r d e r to a v o i d l o s i n g t h e j o b s p u t at risk b y t h e p e t i tions calling for investigations.7 T h e s e c o n d tactic w a s to label the labor unions communist organizations (IPS 10/18/92). R e f o r m s in w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s w e r e p r o p o s e d in C o n g r e s s a n d w e r e f o u g h t by C A C I F ( I P S 1 0 / 2 2 / 9 2 ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , in late 1 9 9 2 , t h e N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s d i d p a s s c h a n g e s in t h e l a b o r c o d e , i n c l u d i n g s t i f f e r f i n e s f o r e m p l o y e r s w h o violate the c o d e and n e w p r o t e c t i o n for w o m e n . T h e ref o r m w a s " a p r o d u c t of U . S . p r e s s u r e , " a c c o r d i n g to C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c c o n g r e s s w o m a n , C a t a l i n a R e y e s S o b e r a n i s . In t h e p o p u l a r s e c t o r s m a n y l e a d e r s a p p r o v e d the m e a s u r e , b u t o n l y as a f i r s t s t e p , w h i l e o t h e r s s a w it as m o r e p r o p a g a n d a , b e c a u s e c o n d i t i o n s w i l l d e p e n d o n f u t u r e g o v e r n m e n t policy actions (CSMonitor 12/14/92: 8). T h e m a q u i l a s e c t o r ' s g r o w t h , as w e l l as its p l a c e in t h e p o l i t i c a l a r e n a , i l l u s t r a t e m a n y of t h e m a j o r s t r u c t u r a l i s s u e s f a c i n g t h e n a t i o n . T o m a k e the e c o n o m i c strategy successful b e y o n d the short term requires governm e n t i n v e s t m e n t in i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , i n c l u d i n g e d u c a t i o n a n d h e a l t h . W i t h o u t this, the m a q u i l a sector will quickly e x h a u s t the h u m a n r e s o u r c e s

now

a v a i l a b l e . T h e s h o r t - r u n r e s u l t s m a y b e a c c e p t a b l e to n e w p r o f i t e e r s , b u t long-term d e v e l o p m e n t will not m a t e r i a l i z e . T h i s public i n v e s t m e n t l a c k i n g , h o w e v e r ; t h e l a c k of s o c i a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e p r o g r a m s e v e n the g o v e r n m e n t ' s o w n p r o g r a m to f a i l u r e . T h e resulting

is

condemns situation

l e a v e s G u a t e m a l a ' s m a j o r i t y w i t h l i t t l e i m p r o v e m e n t , if a n y , in t h e o v e r all q u a l i t y of l i f e , in s p i t e of t h e e m p l o y m e n t g e n e r a t e d in t h e s h o r t r u n . x C o n s i s t e n t with that h y p o t h e s i s , actual c o n d i t i o n s h a v e not r e f l e c t e d s i g n i f i c a n t p r o g r e s s f o r w o r k e r s , in s p i t e o f g r o w t h in t h e m a q u i l a a r e a . U A S P e s t i m a t e d that 7 5 p e r c e n t of t h e p e o p l e w o r k i n g in t h i s p e r i o d w e r e not r e c e i v i n g the m i n i m u m w a g e g u a r a n t e e d by l a w . 9 S o m e f i r m s w e r e not r e g i s t e r i n g t h e i r e m p l o y e e s w i t h t h e n a t i o n a l h e a l t h s e r v i c e , as r e q u i r e d b y l a w , a n d w o r s e , s o m e o f t h e s e f i r m s d e d u c t e d t h e c o s t of h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e f r o m e m p l o y e e w a g e s a n y w a y . In 1 9 9 1 , a c c o r d i n g to t h e m i n i s t r y of l a b o r , w a g e s w e n t u p 9 0 to 1 5 0 p e r c e n t , b u t p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r d e c l i n e d b y 2 8

164

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Politics

percent b e c a u s e o f inflation ( I P S 1 0 / 3 1 / 9 2 ) . O n e result o f these d y n a m i c s w a s a large M a y D a y l a b o r p a r a d e , with f i f t y t h o u s a n d p a r t i c i p a n t s , the largest s i n c e the 1 9 8 0 p a r a d e , d u r i n g w h i c h d o z e n s o f participants w e r e m u r d e r e d or d i s a p p e a r e d ( G M G 3 / 9 2 : 6 ) . In s h o r t , as these few illustrations s u g g e s t , labor issues r e m a i n e d e x p l o s i v e in late 1 9 9 2 .

Rural

Land

Issues

In rural areas a c c e s s to land r e m a i n s the p r i m a r y issue. T h e i m m i n e n t return o f p o s s i b l y thousands o f r e f u g e e s f r o m M e x i c o increased p r e s s u r e on land during this period. O n e e x a m p l e will illustrate most o f the c o m mon d y n a m i c s . In early 1 9 9 2 , s o m e t w o t h o u s a n d peasants invaded and s e i z e d a farm in San J o r g e la L a g u n a , on L a k e A t i t l á n , that had been taken f r o m the M a y a during the L i b e r a l R e f o r m s in the 1 8 7 0 s . S i n c e the f a r m lies b e t w e e n the v i l l a g e and the l a k e , a c c e s s to the lake via the land has been a necessary part o f S a n J o r g e ' s life. B u t the current owners announced plans to build a tourist resort on the p r o p e r t y , e n d i n g public a c c e s s and transit rights. T h i s p r o m p t e d the i n v a s i o n and s e i z u r e o f the farm by the c o m m u n i t y , on the b a s i s o f t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l right to it, w h i c h predates the " l e g a l " c l a i m o f the current o w n e r s . T h e g o v e r n m e n t response to this action w a s to e v i c t the c o m m u n i t y v i o l e n t l y , with s i x t y - s e v e n arrests, d o z e n s o f injuries, and two individuals k i l l e d . 1 0

Environmental

Issues

E n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s and p o l i c y r e s p o n s e s — i n this c a s e c o n c e r n i n g oil p r o d u c t i o n — a l s o illustrate the d y n a m i c s o f d o m e s t i c versus international e c o n o m i c needs. E x p l o r a t i o n and drilling f o r oil b e g a n in the Petén region in the m i d - to late 1 9 7 0 s . A c t i v i t y has b e e n s p o r a d i c , r e f l e c t i n g international m a r k e t s as well as s e c u r i t y p r o b l e m s c a u s e d by the g u e r r i l l a i n s u r g e n c y . New leases w e r e b e i n g d e v e l o p e d in 1 9 9 1 and 1 9 9 2 . It is c l e a r that the oil industry c a u s e s e c o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m s in the Petén, and the oil leases are located within the legally p r o t e c t e d B i o s p h e r e R e s e r v e s . T h e oil industry e m p l o y s few p e o p l e , but the j o b s are p e r c e i v e d as g o o d o n e s and land p r e s s u r e s are s t r o n g in the h i g h l a n d s . E v e r y new oil well

means

b u i l d i n g a road, and this b r i n g s m i g r a n t s f l o o d i n g into the region to burn the rain f o r e s t and plant c o r n — a n e s c a l a t i n g , indirect impact o f the oil industry. B u t G u a t e m a l a needs o i l : oil imports currently equal 1 0 percent o f all imports ( C S M o n i t o r 4 / 2 9 / 9 2 : 8 ) . F a c e d with these d e m o g r a p h i c , e c o n o m i c , and e c o l o g i c a l realities, the g o v e r n m e n t has been a b l e to do r e l a t i v e l y little: laws and g o v e r n m e n t prog r a m s to p r e s e r v e b i o s p h e r e s

and o t h e r e n v i r o n m e n t a l

measures

fail

b e c a u s e the state is w e a k ( " i t ' s the W i l d W e s t " ) , a corrupt military permits

The Serrano

Presidency,

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165

exploitation, immigrants flood into the area, and the poor are unlikely to preserve a resource if they are starving and u n e m p l o y e d ( C S M o n i t o r 4 / 2 9 / 9 2 : 10). R e p o r t s indicate that toxic waste, including nuclear waste, is being d u m p e d in the Petén region of Guatemala. This is of course illegal, but o n e report, attributed to the chair of the Guatemalan congressional c o m m i t t e e on the e n v i r o n m e n t , was that " m o n e y has p r o v e d p o w e r f u l " (IPS 8/13/92). On the positive side, Guatemala entered its first environment-for-debt s w a p in 1992: Conservation International gave the government U.S. bonds to cancel $1.3 million of its foreign d e b t — G u a t e m a l a ' s total debt is estimated at over $3 b i l l i o n 1 1 — i n e x c h a n g e for title to land in the M a y a n B i o s p h e r e Reserve in the P e t é n . T h e g o v e r n m e n t a g r e e d to f i n a n c e and administer a b i o s p h e r e preservation project in the area with the interest from the bonds (IPS 5/30/92). There were also several " e c o - t o u r i s m " projects in the rainforest area. 1 2 Foreign

Policy

Most of the issues facing Guatemala have international as well as domestic implications. T w o areas more international in scope were the Belize question and the ambitious foreign campaign waged by Serrano to attract aid and investment to the country. Both had political and economic implications. On the question of Belize, G u a t e m a l a ' s l o n g - s t a n d i n g position has been that Belize is legally an integral part of its national territory, and this has caused conflict with M e x i c o and Great Britain at various times. T h e Belize question typically has been a nationalistic rallying cry in G u a t e malan politics. T r e a d i n g w h e r e few G u a t e m a l a n leaders have dared to step, Serrano recognized Belize as an independent state in September 1991 (Excelsior 9/7/91: 2A), a calculated risk aimed at improving prospects for international foreign assistance and trade access to Caribbean markets. In the agreement Belize agreed to accept maritime boundaries giving Guatemala guaranteed shipping access to the Caribbean. Belize further g u a r a n teed to build a road to a deep-water port in Belize, again ensuring Guatemalan access. In turn, G u a t e m a l a agreed to accept the existing territorial boundaries of Belize (IPS 11/16/92). An immediate storm of nationalistic protest erupted in G u a t e m a l a . A formal c o m p l a i n t was initiated, c l a i m i n g that S e r r a n o ' s actions had violated the constitution and that he should therefore be impeached. Serrano insisted that r e c o g n i z i n g existing boundaries w a s not the s a m e as giving up G u a t e m a l a ' s claim to Belize, which is f o r b i d d e n by the constitution (IPS 11/16/92). 1 3 In N o v e m b e r 1992, more than a year later, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled in S e r r a n o ' s favor, by a vote of four to three. Under the constitution S e r r a n o ' s action still needed approval f r o m the National

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Politics

C o n g r e s s and from a popular p l e b i s c i t e ( I P S 1 1 / 1 6 / 9 2 ) ; C o n g r e s s ratified S e r r a n o ' s recognition o f B e l i z e ' s sovereignty in N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 2 ( S F C h r o n icle 1 1 / 2 6 / 9 2 : 1 6 A ) . B e f o r e the B e l i z e a n n o u n c e m e n t S e r r a n o had undertaken an e x t e n s i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g e n d a . He visited H o n d u r a s , V e n e z u e l a , and C o l o m b i a to s e c u r e f i n a n c i a l support and e n t e r into trade a g r e e m e n t s , and in A u g u s t 1 9 9 1 , G u a t e m a l a j o i n e d the M o v e m e n t o f the N o n - A l i g n e d Countries as an o b s e r v e r ( P C R P 9 / 9 1 : 7 - 9 ) . T h e initial m o v e to r e c o g n i z e B e l i z e c a n b e seen as a s u c c e s s f u l item on this international a g e n d a , s i n c e it resulted in v o c a l support f r o m the g o v e r n m e n t s o f H o n d u r a s , El S a l v a d o r , M e x i c o , and the U n i t e d S t a t e s , and from the E u r o p e a n E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y ( I P S 11/16/92). In late 1 9 9 1 , on a visit to the U n i t e d S t a t e s , S e r r a n o met with P r e s i dent B u s h and c o n g r e s s i o n a l leaders and m a d e f o r m a l a p p e a r a n c e s at both the O r g a n i z a t i o n o f A m e r i c a n S t a t e s and the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c a l l e d the visit a w o r k i n g visit rather than a state visit, thus reducing the p r e s t i g e o f the e n c o u n t e r , a m o v e b a s e d on U . S . d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with human rights c o n d i t i o n s in G u a t e m a l a . N e v e r t h e l e s s , at the substantive level S e r r a n o was s u c c e s s f u l . President B u s h a c c e p t e d G u a t e m a l a into the

Initiative

for the A m e r i c a s

programs,

increasing

trade

relations.

G u a t e m a l a a l s o o b t a i n e d $ 5 0 m i l l i o n in e m e r g e n c y s t a b i l i z a t i o n

funds

( E S F ) f r o m the U . S . and a new $ 4 3 1 m i l l i o n line o f credit from the InterA m e r i c a n D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k ( P C R P 1 0 / 9 1 : 7; R O G W i / 9 1 : 1 0 ) . In F e b r u a r y 1 9 9 2 , S e r r a n o r e c e i v e d a f o r m a l visit f r o m M e x i c a n president C a r l o s S a l i n a s de Gortari. T h i s m e e t i n g c o m m i t t e d the two nations to i n c r e a s i n g their international c o m m e r c i a l ties as well as to o t h e r bilateral a g r e e m e n t s on c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and health ( P C R P 3 / 9 2 : 7 ) . A n o f f i c i a l visit by the president o f El S a l v a d o r , A l f r e d o C r i s t i a n i , in M a r c h

1992,

p r o d u c e d an a g r e e m e n t to e s t a b l i s h a f r e e - t r a d e a r e a , a step t o w a r d inc r e a s e d e c o n o m i c integration o f the i s t h m u s ( P C R P 4 / 9 2 : 4 ) . T h e legitim a c y p r o d u c e d through these s u c c e s s f u l visits w a s i n c r e a s i n g l y c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d , h o w e v e r , e s p e c i a l l y in the U n i t e d S t a t e s and E u r o p e , by the h u m a n rights s i t u a t i o n , the i m p u n i t y o f the m i l i t a r y , and e v e n t u a l l y , the lack o f substantial progress in n e g o t i a t i o n s with the guerrilla i n s u r g e n c y .

Summary E c o n o m i c a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y , 1 9 9 1 and 1 9 9 2 w e r e m i x e d y e a r s f o r both the g o v e r n m e n t and the popular s e c t o r s . E c o n o m i c a l l y , the g o v e r n m e n t c l e a r l y e n j o y e d s o m e s u c c e s s : i n f l a t i o n w a s h e l d to 8 p e r c e n t f o r 1 9 9 1 , c o m p a r e d to 6 0 percent in 1 9 9 0 , and the Quetzal w a s s t a b i l i z e d at f i v e to the U . S . d o l l a r , c o m p a r e d to the f r e q u e n t f l u c t u a t i o n s that c h a r a c t e r i z e d the s e c o n d h a l f o f the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . A s S e r r a n o r e p o r t e d in his

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State of the Union address in 1992, the deficit in spending had been reduced, foreign reserves increased, and foreign debt reduced. In spite of this cooling down in the economy, the G D P rose by 3.2 percent ( R O G Sp/92: 1 0 - 1 1 , 14). 14 The g o v e r n m e n t ' s analysis was that because 1991 produced stability in the economy, 1992 would reflect more genuine progress. The Central Bank of Guatemala predicted a 4.5 percent growth rate in 1992 (Excelsior 12/20/91: 2A and 1/2/92: 2A). The government outlook was not universally accepted. CACIF, for example, appreciated the stabilization of the economy but noted that exports were down in 1991 while imports were up, suggesting a problem with the deficit. 1 5 The church expressed its opposition to the government's economic analysis by stressing that the economic growth was not benefiting the nation's poor (Excelsior 1/2/92: 2A). The Christian Democratic Party, now in the opposition and holding a major bloc of seats in the National Congress, had remained silent for several months after Serrano's inauguration. But after public protests over electricity rate increases, the DCG ended the honeymoon, claiming that the government lacked any coherent economic policy plan. To the DCG Serrano was living off the democratic infrastructure created during Cerezo's term (PCRP 7/91: 11). In the Christian Democrats' view some stabilization of the national economy in 1991 could be attributed not to S e r r a n o ' s efforts but to the legacy of policies pursued by President Cerezo late in his term ( P C R P 1/92: 4—5). Finally, the DCG accused Serrano of doing nothing to continue developing democratic institutions, seeing this inaction as the cause of a definite decline of those institutions ( P C R P 7/91: iii). The popular sectors were critical and pessimistic. The UASP criticized the extension of the IVA tax, predicting a downturn in the economy as a result of higher prices, lower sales, and more unemployment. UASP predicted more actions by popular organizations to express their demands in 1992, and voiced its concern that an increase in popular participation might lead to a wave of repression directed at popular-sector leaders (Excelsior 12/27/91: 2A). According to the C U S G labor federation, the government had enacted no public policies to improve the purchasing power of the internal market, and hence no growth had occurred in this area of the economy (Excelsior 1/2/92: 2A). S o c i o e c o n o m i c data seemed to bear out the pessimistic view. A United Nations' ECLA (CEPAL) study claimed that the percentage living in poverty rose from 83 to 87 percent in 1991 (ROG Sp/92: 11). A study produced by UNICEF and the UN Development Program, submitted as a report to the Guatemalan Congress, noted a continuing breakdown in social services, including health and education services, as well as continuing poverty: 86 percent of all families fell below the poverty line. 1 6 UNICEF reported approximately 700,000 people living in fairly new slum

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settlements in and around Guatemala City, and five thousand street children living in the capital {Excelsior 2/29/92: 2A). By mid-1992, e c o n o m i c and social conditions were still abominable, including a malnutrition rate alleged to be w o r s e than Haiti's (Excelsior 6/20/92: 2A). In sum, progress in macroeconomic conditions meant little in terms of s o c i o e c o n o m i c progress in the early years of the Serrano administration. Indeed, growth may have imperiled already poor conditions. Popularopinion polls reacted accordingly: S e r r a n o ' s approval rating fell f r o m 71 percent in January 1991 to 36 percent by October ( R O G Wi/91: 10); and from 51 percent in December 1991 to 31 percent in late June 1992 {Excelsior 6/20/92: 2 A ) . Even the c o n s e r v a t i v e National A d v a n c e m e n t Party (Partido de A v a n z a d a N a c i o n a l — P A N ) , s u p p o r t e r s of the g o v e r n m e n t , d e m a n d e d more social reform to prevent a "social e x p l o s i o n " {Excelsior 6/20/92: i v - 2 ) . These d e v e l o p m e n t s and the trends in S e r r a n o ' s approval ratings are symptomatic of what may be the literally impossible tasks facing constitutional d e m o c r a c i e s like Guatemala, beset by difficult international economic conditions and unrelenting political pressures from both the established elite, including the military, and the popular sectors.

Peace Negotiations T h e National D i a l o g u e process (see Chapter 8), not the 1990 electoral campaign, w a s the " m a i n e v e n t " at that time. In fact, President Serrano owed his electoral victory at least in part to his c o m m i t m e n t to securing a negotiated end to the civil war, as well as to the perception that he would be able to f u l f i l l that c o m m i t m e n t because of his earlier participation in military g o v e r n m e n t s between 1982 and 1985. Negotiating an end to the war was also important economically, and—at least to the g o v e r n m e n t — ending it was a prerequisite to improving the human rights climate. 1 7 Under C e r e z o , General Héctor G r a m a j o , minister of d e f e n s e , was identified with a modernizing tendency within the Army. C o u p attempts in the late 1980s reflected the restlessness of a more hard-line attitude in military circles. With G r a m a j o out of the country near the end of C e r e z o ' s term, c h a n g e s in the military hierarchy s u g g e s t e d that it was swinging toward a more hard-line position, even as the nation headed in the direction of negotiations."* After his election S e r r a n o m o v e d military people who supported the negotiations into key positions, appointing General José Garcia S a m o y o a as minister of d e f e n s e to replace General M e n d o z a and General Jorge Perussina as new military chief of staff, replacing General G o d o y . Both w e r e relatively moderate and had participated in the peace talks (MHerald 12/8/91: 27A).

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T w o m a j o r s e t s of talks took p l a c e b e t w e e n the g o v e r n m e n t and the U R N G in 1 9 9 1 , c e n t e r i n g on the q u e s t i o n of d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n in G u a t e m a l a . 1 9 U n d e r the l e a d e r s h i p of the o f f i c i a l m e d i a t o r , B i s h o p Q u e z a d a of the National R e c o n c i l i a t i o n C o m m i t t e e , the first set of talks, b e t w e e n April and July 1991, c u l m i n a t e d in the Q u e r e t a r o A c c o r d s a n d e s t a b l i s h e d an a g e n d a for f u t u r e talks. T h e Q u e r e t a r o A c c o r d s on D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n w e r e signed in M e x i c o on July 25, 1991, c o m m i t t i n g both sides to a set of general p r i n c i p l e s c o n c e r n i n g the p r e e m i n e n c e of c i v i l i a n rule, an e n d o r s e m e n t of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t as a n e c e s s a r y c o m p o n e n t of d e m o c racy, and u n c o n d i t i o n a l respect for h u m a n rights. 2 " T h e d o c u m e n t , h o w e v e r , did not i n c l u d e details for i m p l e m e n t i n g any of t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s not a l r e a d y in p l a c e , nor did it p r o p o s e a c o n c r e t e t i m e t a b l e f o r d o i n g so. T h e a c c o r d s w e r e a s y m b o l i c , t h o u g h p e r h a p s necessary, d o c u m e n t , not a concrete s t e p t o w a r d d e m o c r a c y . On the o n e hand, the g o v e r n m e n t m e r e l y a c k n o w l e d g e d what it insisted w a s already the c a s e in G u a t e m a l a : f o r e x a m p l e , the r e a l i t i e s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t , civilian a s c e n d a n c y over the A r m y , and respect for h u m a n rights. T h e g o v e r n m e n t g a i n e d international legitimacy, and S e r r a n o b e g a n to deliver on a campaign promise. For the U R N G a bilateral accord r e c o g n i z e d their e x i s t e n c e as a formal part of the G u a t e m a l a n political p r o c e s s , a n d they in turn a g r e e d to w o r k within the c u r r e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k , a c h a n g e f r o m earlier, m o r e revolutionary p o s i t i o n s ( R O G Fa/91: 3). T h e U R N G w a s d e s c r i b i n g itself, in effect, as a constitutional, liberal-democrat m o v e m e n t , a c c e p t i n g the f u n damental structure of the r e g i m e w h i l e acting as an a r m e d pressure g r o u p . T h e s u c c e s s in the Q u e r e t a r o r o u n d w a s f o l l o w e d by f a i l u r e ; in S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r 1991 a s e c o n d set of talks f o c u s i n g on h u m a n rights resulted in a v a g u e e n d o r s e m e n t of h u m a n rights but f a i l e d to reach a g r e e ment a b o u t p o s s i b l e c o n c r e t e steps or their t i m i n g . I m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the Q u e r e t a r o A c c o r d s had been left f o r a f t e r a c e a s e - f i r e , but f o r the U R N G the t i m i n g on h u m a n rights w a s m o r e critical. T h e U R N G w a n t e d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n i m m e d i a t e l y , but the g o v e r n m e n t insisted that h u m a n r i g h t s could be g u a r a n t e e d only a f t e r a p e r m a n e n t c e a s e - f i r e . T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s could a g r e e only to meet again in J a n u a r y , with B i s h o p Q u e z a d a a g r e e i n g to m e e t w i t h e a c h s i d e separately until then. B u t the J a n u a r y m e e t i n g s in M e x i c o p r o d u c e d n o a g r e e m e n t , and in the h i g h l a n d s a r m e d c o n f r o n t a t i o n s began to i n c r e a s e ( E x c e l s i o r 12/7/91: 2 A and 1 / 2 8 / 9 2 : 2A). I s s u e p o s i t i o n s s e e m e d p o l a r i z e d at this p o i n t . 2 1 T h e U R N G s a w i m m e d i a t e h u m a n rights protection as a sine q u a non for c o n t i n u i n g n e g o tiations, a n d they insisted on investigation of past v i o l a t i o n s , the d i s m a n tling of the civil d e f e n s e patrols, a n d an e n d to i m p u n i t y f o r v i o l a t o r s of h u m a n rights. T h e U R N G p r o p o s e d a truth c o m m i s s i o n u n d e r U N s u p e r vision, a k i n to the m o d e l in El S a l v a d o r ' s n e g o t i a t i o n s p r o c e s s ( R O G

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Sp/92: 4 - 5 ) . The government position at this point was its "Plan for Total P e a c e , " which to the U R N G appeared to be a d e m a n d for unconditional surrender. This plan implied that the military was strong enough, relative to the civilian government, to prevent serious negotiations. T h e P A C issue e x e m p l i f i e s many of the d i f f i c u l t positions to be resolved in the negotiation process. Originally created after the Rios Montt c o u p in 1982, P A C s have remained a salient f e a t u r e of rural life in the Indian highlands ever since. The Constitution of 1985 makes participation in the P A C s voluntary for all citizens, but n u m e r o u s investigations have shown that patrols are compulsory in many localities and that they s o m e times violate human rights. 2 2 Although PACs may have had reason to exist in the early and mid-1980s, if, as the Army says, in 1992 there were only eight hundred ill-trained combatants in the U R N G , P A C s seemed less necessary. Yet in spite of the human rights c o m p l a i n t s and c h a n g i n g conditions in conflict zones, P A C s were as w i d e s p r e a d in 1992 as in earlier years, apparently part of a continuing, low-level c a m p a i g n of " c l e a n s i n g " in the highlands. 2 3 The question of the P A C s c o n t i n u e d to reverberate in the public arena into late 1992. Besides the principals, the U R N G and the g o v e r n m e n t , other g r o u p s raised issues relevant to the negotiation process. T h e business g r o u p C A C I F asserted that no aspects of the S a l v a d o r a n peace plan w o u l d be acceptable in Guatemala (ROG Sp/92: 4—5). Popular-sector groups, including the church and Mayan groups, feared that U R N G and the government were negotiating a secret agreement that would exclude them. T h e Mayan groups specifically requested the right to participate as separate entities when the negotiations discussed indigenous rights ( C S M o n i t o r 11/26/91: 4). These groups essentially wanted to restructure the negotiations' process to resemble the National Dialogue process described in Chapter 8 (Excelsior 12/7/91: 2A). Negotiations

in 1992

Progress in 1991 had been met by impediments in 1992, however. Serrano had some success in c o n v i n c i n g the A r m y to support the negotiation process, but each positive step b e c a m e a new obstacle as lines hardened. By late 1991, he had e n c o u n t e r e d serious military o p p o s i t i o n , p e r h a p s because the process was raising issues that greatly concerned the military, where the extreme, hard-line group, O f f i c e r s of the Mountains, began to issue position statements o p p o s i n g the negotiation process. B e s i d e s the example f r o m El S a l v a d o r ' s p r o c e s s — w h i c h s h o w e d what might happen in G u a t e m a l a — e v i d e n c e of military involvement in high-level corruption and drug trafficking made the possibility of genuine civilian control threatening to sectors of the A r m y . 2 4

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Moreover, the military's hard-line position assumed that victory over the insurgency had already occurred, not because the Army had eradicated the U R N G but because the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Nicaraguan Sandinistas meant the URNG would wither away from lack of the international support that fueled it (ROG Sp/92: 2-5,14). 2 5 Business elites were willing to tolerate the negotiations' process to placate international public opinion but were loath to accept any reforms that would affect them (ROG Sp/92: 4). As of spring 1992, fundamental disagreements still existed over not only the previous questions but on the U R N G demand that an independent "truth and justice commission" be created to investigate past human rights violations (ROG Sp/92: 14). In spite of the apparent collapse of the process in early 1992, negotiators could point to the government's agreement to "end forced recruitment, the elimination of paramilitary groups 'if there are any,' protection for human rights monitors, and compensation for the victims of human rights violations" (ROG Sp/92: 14). Moreover, the United Nations was accepted as the future monitor when final accords are reached. Bishop Quezada attempted to initiate new talks by his continuing efforts to meet privately with each side. But a wave of bombings of government and other buildings took place in April and May 1992. Although first indications were that the U R N G might be reopening an urban front in its insurgency, evidence quickly pointed to the right {Excelsior 4/16/92: 2A). 2A The goal of the violence was to destabilize the government to such an extent that, first, Serrano would back down on social reform and negotiations, and, second, the popular sectors would stop making the kinds of demands seen in 1991. This terror campaign was clearly an antidemocratic form of political participation. Increased public and international pressure was applied to the government to bring peace to Guatemala, especially in view of the successful negotiations in El Salvador, but the military's opposition to the process hardened as well. To resolve the impasse, Bishop Quezada offered a proposal on the human rights issue, calling for respect for human rights, voluntary civil defense patrols with no human rights violations by them, and a domestic truth commission called the Commission for Peace and Reconciliation to investigate past human rights abuses. The commission would include the ombudsman, Ramiro de León, a representative of the public universities, and an observer from the United Nations (Excelsior 6/19/ 92: 2A). The government tried public pressure on the U R N G to resume negotiations in early s u m m e r as the nation awaited responses to Bishop Q u e z a d a ' s proposals on human rights. It proposed meeting every two weeks without fail until the peace accords were signed (Excelsior 7/4/92:

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2A). Meanwhile, Bishop Quezada threatened to resign as mediator, announcing he would not participate again until a human rights agreement between the government and the U R N G was forged. UN observer Francesc Vendrell also left the process, at the request of the government {Excelsior 7/8/92: 2A). Part of the public pressure in favor of these kinds of proposals included a coalition of groups seeking to participate in the negotiations, which represented the church and the popular sectors. The Civilian Sector Coordinating Committee (Comité Coordinador del Sector C i v i l — C C S C ) brought together over one hundred organizations from Catholic and Protestant churches, organized labor, the Mayan sectors, human rights organizations, and others. Against this evidence of democratic participation from society was arrayed a newly intransigent military and an antireformist economic elite trying to hold fast (LAP 6/18/92: 6). In this difficult atmosphere negotiations resumed. In response to Serrano's call for a broader agenda, 2 7 the U R N G offered new proposals: first, full representation for the Mayans "at all levels of society"; and, second, a package of economic reforms centered on developing an internal market within a social-democracy model that acknowledged private property as the basis for development. G u a t e m a l a ' s two major parties, the UCN and the DCG, both endorsed the plan (Tico Times 5/29/92: 5). Some progress occurred in mid-1992. Mexico City meetings produced a partial agreement on human rights. Focusing on the thorny issue of the PACs, both sides agreed to two points. First, the Army agreed not to arm any civil defense patrol unless there were a specific military threat: if there were no guerrilla attacks, then there would be no armed PACS. Second, the human rights ombudsman was given (1) the right to investigate existing PACs for evidence of forced recruitment or human rights violations, and (2) the power to bring charges. The U R N G position saw two major weaknesses in this proposal: first, the military could still organize and arm PACs, and, second, the accord would not be implemented until a total agreement on human rights occurred (NYTimes 8/9/92: 7). By late 1992, signs of progress were in evidence as well as ominous obstacles. Both sides agreed to create the " C o m m i s s i o n on the Past" to investigate past human rights violations and assess the extent of civilian suffering during the guerrilla war, without necessarily assigning responsibility for violations. To be chaired by the human rights ombudsman, the full composition of the commission, however, was still in dispute. 2 8 The Refugee

Question

Perhaps the most positive area was the question of repatriation of Guatemalan refugees in Mexico. During the counterinsurgency campaign in the

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early 1980s, t h o u s a n d s of highland Indians had fled to Mexico, but f e w refugees had c o m e back during the Cerezo administration in spite of government attempts to have them return. In 1991, at least forty-three thousand Guatemalan refugees were in Mexico in camps near the border under the supervision of the UN High C o m m i s s i o n for R e f u g e e s . Both the UN and Mexico had long agreed that r e f u g e e s could return to Guatemala on a voluntary basis and would not be forced out of Mexico. In 1989, the Permanent C o m m i s s i o n s ( C o m i s i o n e s P e r m a n e n t e s — C C P P ) , the representatives of the refugees in the camps, had announced that the refugees wished to return but only as a collective group, with international witnesses and other guarantees from the g o v e r n m e n t . Discussions continued in 1991, but few persons returned. 2 9 Anxious to go back and f e e l i n g s o m e pressure f r o m Mexico to leave the camps, the r e f u g e e s f o r m u l a t e d a tentative plan to repatriate s o m e thirty thousand people between 1992 and 1995. In late 1991, the g o v e r n ment recognized the C C P P as the legitimate representatives of the refugees in Mexico, agreed in principle to a collective return, but did not agree with the r e f u g e e s ' requests for guarantees. Key issues of timing and procedure remained unresolved in early 1992, not to mention several substantive issues that included land and f r e e d o m of movement. T h e C C P P continued to d e m a n d an end to the civil d e f e n s e patrols, f o r e x a m p l e , and c o n d i tioned the r e f u g e e s ' return on c o n t i n u i n g success in the negotiations between URNG and the government {Excelsior 2/28/92: 2A). Serrano signed a six-point accord creating guarantees for the r e f u g e e s in mid-1992, but it set no timetable for the massive influx of refugees the agreement was supposed to e n g e n d e r (Excelsior 10/9/92: 2A). Perhaps to test the waters, an initial g r o u p of fifty-three people came back in August 1992. They were met at the border by the Guatemalan vice-president, G u s tavo Espina, and by representatives of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s Special C o m m i s sion for Attention to R e f u g e e s ( C o m i s i o n Especial para Atencion a los R e f u g i a d o s — C E A R ) . By then, the government had agreed to the six conditions demanded in Mexico by the C C P P . 3 0 With the negotiations resolved, at least in principle, a larger group of five thousand refugees organized to return in late 1992, even though "the conditions are not p r o p i t i o u s " (IPS 9/4/92). As the time c a m e closer, in spite of the a g r e e m e n t s b e t w e e n C E A R and the C C P P , the g o v e r n m e n t began to ask for delays and tried to impose conditions on routes r e f u g e e s would take and on how many people could travel together (IPS 11/21/92). This seemed to contradict the g o v e r n m e n t ' s own agreement and illustrates the style of the policy process on many issues. R e f u g e e s did m a k e a widely publicized return in early 1993. 3 1 M e a n w h i l e , in spite of the r e f u g e e a g r e e m e n t s , or p e r h a p s b e c a u s e of them, the military escalated its o w n campaign in m o u n t a i n o u s areas

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inhabited by internal refugees, the so-called Communities of People in Resistance (Comunidades del Pueblo en Resistencia—CPR). 3 2 In a revealing announcement D e f e n s e Minister José García Samoyoa asserted in December that captured URNG documents indicated the CPRs were an arm of the guerrillas and that the issue of returning refugees was being manipulated by the URNG (IPS 12/19/92). Elsewhere, combat between the U R N G and the military intensified at the end of 1992, with land mines being used in Huehuetenango department (Excelsior 12/20/92: 2A). In spite of occasional steps forward, then, the government's negotiation strategy at the end of 1992 seemed to be a military victory over the U R N G , accomplished by escalating counterinsurgency warfare, as in the early 1980s, in areas still considered conflict zones. At the same time, the government was anxious to maintain the negotiations process in place, partly for public opinion reasons and partly to provide the URNG with an acceptable forum for its effective surrender. For example, Serrano proposed that the URNG simply stop fighting and become a political party. Consequently, progress was agonizingly slow compared to El Salvador, for several reasons. First, the Army was less dependent on Washington in particular and on international sources in general. Second, the U R N G had far fewer combatants than the FMLN in El Salvador, which meant the military could consider itself victorious and avoid concessions. Third, the U R N G had less popular support than the FMLN. As of late 1992, Bishop Quezada was continuing his shuttle diplomacy with little success. In early 1993, President Serrano was blaming the URNG for the stalemate, and the level of warfare between the insurgents and the military intensified (NYTimes 1/16/93: 5; Excelsior 1/2/93: 1, Mundial section).

Human Rights The Cerezo administration ended with higher rates of human rights violations than when it began, leaving plenty of room for improvement when President Serrano was inaugurated. But conditions generally worsened in 1991 and 1992, and overall, statistics on human rights violations show no improvement, varying only in the waves and lulls that occurred during these two years. 3 3 For example, a wave of violence in mid-1991 targeted leaders of progressive popular organizations, leaving some twenty people dead. 3 4 For the first eight months of 1991, 548 people were killed and 114 kidnapped (LATimes 9/19/91: 1A). The Mutual Assistance Group ( G A M ) reported that 730 people were assassinated and one hundred had disappeared in the first eight months of 1991 ( E x c e l s i o r 10/15/91: 2A). The Catholic church reported that human rights violations in 1991 were worse than in 1990, with over a thousand serious violations in the first ten months

The Serrano Presidency,

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175

of the year, over half of these extrajudicial killings—a rate of two per day. Typical of many government responses to such claims, Vice-President Gustavo Espina denied these figures, and Serrano called the report speculative and rejected its conclusions (Excelsior 12/2/91: 2A). The archbishop immediately insisted that the report was accurate (GMG 1/92: 7). 35 The c h u r c h ' s human rights office reported 399 assassinations in the first six months of 1992 (Excelsior 7/21/92: 2A). The Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, a private organization, reported 427 summary executions in 1992, sixty-two disappearances (including fifteen children), 102 cases of torture, and 253 attempted murders. In order to increase international pressure, the commission presented its report to the United Nations (IPS 12/5/92). Throughout the period, there was a constant pattern of threats against church and popular leaders and the press (Excelsior 9/1/91: 2A). Yet one of the positive steps in the human rights situation was the vocal protests of the human rights ombudsman, Ramiro de Leon Carpio. For example, de Leon reported data on forced recruitment into the Army, documenting 267 cases in 1992, compared to 234 in the last six months of 1991. He assailed the government as well, noting that both state and nonstate human rights violators continued to act with impunity (IPS 8/16/92). When releasing figures on human rights violations for 1991, he placed part of the blame on the U R N G but cited the state and the security forces as well. He was critical of the government, specifically because of the persistent state of impunity for recent human rights violations, while remaining critical of violence by the left (Excelsior 1/29/92: 2A). And he asserted that Serrano's attention to human rights was at the level of speeches only and that total impunity still prevailed (Excelsior 11/15/91: 2A). In addition to denying the accuracy of human rights statistics, the government's main response was to place the blame for them on lack of progress in negotiations to end the civil war. 3 6 Yet here too, by acknowledging that human rights violations are a serious problem, the president did take a step forward in the human rights situation (LATimes 9/19/91: 1A). In G u a t e m a l a ' s favor, the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva refused to condemn the country as in previous years, in spite of the continuing violations and impunity and the lack of investigations: Guatemala was not listed under agenda item 12, which would have meant a UN Special Rapporteur's investigation (IPS 3/29/92). Support for adding Guatemala to the list came from Canada and the European Community but was opposed by most of Latin America. 3 7 The committee c o m p r o m i s e d and decided to send an "expert" with advisory powers only. As had been the case during the Cerezo years, the human rights situation was not condemned outright by the United Nations because the government had taken enough symbolic steps in the right direction. 3 8 Nevertheless, with the UN

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observer in place, international pressure increased on the g o v e r n m e n t . Later in 1992, pressure came from the Organization of American States as well, when a delegation from the OAS Human Rights Commission urged speedier action on the human rights portion of the negotiations between government and the guerrillas (IPS 11/9/92). The O A S was also involved in the case of CERJ, the indigenous human rights group organized against compulsory military service. CERJ continued to be harassed by "unknown assailants" in 1991 and 1992. After the murder of one of its human rights monitors, however, a survivor identified an assailant and warrants were issued, but the government failed to arrest the accused assassin. CERJ appealed to the O A S Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which issued a nonbinding " i n j u n c t i o n " against the government of Guatemala, requiring the president to protect CERJ members (CSMonitor 8/6/91: 5). Subsequently, C E R J ' s founder, Amilcar Méndez, who had received the Robert Kennedy Human Rights Center award and the Carter Human Rights Award, was arrested for allegedly distributing explosives (IPS 11/28/92). Impunity

and "Demonstration

Justice"?*9

In addition to high levels of violations, a second aspect of the human rights situation is the question of impunity: the lack of investigations or punishment of violators. Impunity means that the apparatus of human rights violations remains intact, in spite of the human rights o m b u d s m a n ' s efforts. As a result, the quality of political participation by progressive citizens remained problematic. This can be seen best in four notable individual cases that became public during 1991 and 1992, for if even in these notorious cases little is accomplished in uncovering and punishing human rights violators, one must assume that still less is possible in cases involving ordinary people. In the first case, the government announced the arrest in August 1991 of a high-ranking naval c o m m a n d e r and several other military personnel, in connection with death-squad activities allegedly involving smuggling. Swift public reaction praising the action came from the president, the human rights o m b u d s m a n , the archbishop, and the president of the National Congress, who stated that these arrests showed "that impunity is nearing an end" (Excelsior 8/17/91: 2A). The fact that the naval commander's group was involved in smuggling rather than in more direct political activities appeared to make it easier to arrest and prosecute. Yet the commander was released within w e e k s of the incident, and the rest of the group subsequently were found not guilty by a military court (CSMonitor 11/5/91: 4; Excelsior 8/13/92: 2A).

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T h r e e o t h e r c a s e s i l l u s t r a t e t h e r e l u c t a n t f u n c t i o n i n g of t h e j u d i c i a l s y s t e m ; all d r e w i n t e r n a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n : t h e m u r d e r s of M y r n a M a c k a n d W i l l i a m D e v i n e a n d t h e k i d n a p p i n g a n d t o r t u r e of D i a n a O r t i z , an A m e r i c a n n u n . In e a c h of t h e s e c a s e s , i n v e s t i g a t i o n s w e r e u n d e r t a k e n b e c a u s e f a m i l y m e m b e r s or c l o s e associates, s t r o n g l y assisted by

international

pressure, w e r e able to c o n v i n c e the G u a t e m a l a n g o v e r n m e n t to look into t h e c r i m e s . In all t h r e e c a s e s , c l e a r e v i d e n c e s e e m e d to i m p l i c a t e s t a t e s e c u r i t y f o r c e s , y e t little h a s h a p p e n e d , e v e n w h e n s h o w t r i a l s w e r e h e l d , to b r i n g c r i m i n a l s to j u s t i c e . In t h e c a s e of M y r n a

Mack

Chang,

an

internationally

respected

G u a t e m a l a n a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , J o s é M i g u e l M é r i d a , t h e p o l i c e c h i e f in c h a r g e of i n v e s t i g a t i n g h e r 1 9 9 0 a s s a s s i n a t i o n , h a d p r e v i o u s l y m a d e a f o r m a l accusation r e g a r d i n g her m u r d e r and had d i s c o v e r e d that her

accused

assassin had been an e m p l o y e e of G - 2 , the i n t e l l i g e n c e section of the A r m y . He had f u r t h e r d i s c o v e r e d that " h i g h - r a n k i n g military o f f i c e r s w e r e behind the 1990 s t a b b i n g death." But Mérida was assassinated

outside

n a t i o n a l p o l i c e h e a d q u a r t e r s in d o w n t o w n G u a t e m a l a C i t y in m i d - 1 9 9 1 (Excelsior

8 / 5 / 9 1 : 2 A ) . H i s m u r d e r i l l u s t r a t e s t h e l a c k of c o n t r o l P r e s i d e n t

Serrano had over the military and police apparatus. M y r n a M a c k ' s accused murderer was subsequently

arrested

in L o s A n g e l e s ( E x c e l s i o r

MIAI

91: 2A).4" In t h e c a s e of W i l l i a m D e v i n e , an A m e r i c a n l i v i n g in G u a t e m a l a , h i s m u r d e r led t o a t e m p o r a r y s u s p e n s i o n o f U . S . m i l i t a r y a i d , a s t r o n g m e s s a g e to t h e a r m e d f o r c e s a n d t h e g o v e r n m e n t . In S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 1 , a n a r m y c o l o n e l , G u i l l e r m o P o r t i l l o G ó m e z , w a s o r d e r e d t o s t a n d trial a l o n g w i t h ten s o l d i e r s f o r t h e c r i m e ( M H e r a l d 9 / 4 / 9 1 : 7 A ) . F i v e s o l d i e r s w e r e f o u n d guilty and s e n t e n c e d to thirty years, but the o f f i c e r w h o o r d e r e d the killing w a s f o u n d n o t g u i l t y ( S F C h r o n i c l e 9 / 3 0 / 9 2 : 1 0 ) . 4 1 S u b s e q u e n t l y , t h r e e of the g r o u p b e i n g held w e r e r e l e a s e d ( C S M o n i t o r 11/5/91: 4). D i a n a O r t i z , a n A m e r i c a n n u n w h o w a s k i d n a p p e d a n d t o r t u r e d in 1 9 8 9 , r e t u r n e d to G u a t e m a l a in 1 9 9 2 f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e s i n c e h e r a b d u c t i o n . G u a t e m a l a n p r o s e c u t o r s h a d f r e q u e n t l y c l a i m e d t h e y w a n t e d to i n v e s t i g a t e t h e c a s e b u t c o u l d n o t b e c a u s e of O r t i z ' s s i l e n c e . O r t i z g a v e t e s t i m o n y b e f o r e a j u d g e , p r o v i d i n g e v i d e n c e so that the investigation c o u l d p r o c e e d with her cooperation. A f t e r O r t i z ' s testimony, h o w e v e r , the p r o s e c u t o r s c l a i m e d that her e v i d e n c e w a s relatively w o r t h l e s s b e c a u s e of the d e l a y s . Moreover, because she had now m a d e her charges inside the country, the A r m y t h r e a t e n e d to p r o s e c u t e h e r f o r d e f a m i n g t h e m i l i t a r y . 4 2 T h a t a n y of t h e s e c a s e s e v e n c o u l d b e i n v e s t i g a t e d is a s t e p f o r w a r d in t h e h u m a n r i g h t s c l i m a t e , b u t t h e r e s u l t s are still q u i t e m e a g e r . A n d t h o u g h c o u r a g e o u s G u a t e m a l a n s p r e s s f o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , it is c l e a r that t h e g o v e r n m e n t r e s p o n d s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e in t h e s e c a s e s , n o t to its c i t i z e n s ' d e s i r e s .

178 Street

Guatemalan

Politics

Children

Less well k n o w n than the v i c t i m s just d i s c u s s e d , a b a n d o n e d c h i l d r e n living on the streets of G u a t e m a l a City c o n t i n u e d to be a serious p r o b l e m , not only as an i n d i c a t o r of s o c i o e c o n o m i c d e c a y but as v i c t i m s of h u m a n rights abuses. B e t w e e n M a r c h 1 9 9 0 and O c t o b e r 1991, twelve street children w e r e m u r d e r e d , with the police i m p l i c a t e d in m a n y , perhaps m o s t , of the b e a t i n g s . In o n e i n c i d e n t in late 1991, s e v e n street c h i l d r e n w e r e severely b e a t e n ( E x c e l s i o r 11/15/91: 2 A ) . C o v e n a n t H o u s e of N e w York has e s t a b l i s h e d p r o g r a m s in G u a t e m a l a City to aid street children, including a legal aid o f f i c e that has pressured the g o v e r n m e n t to investigate h u m a n rights abuses against children. In one case four p o l i c e m e n w e r e s u c c e s s f u l l y p r o s e c u t e d for the m u r d e r of a thirteenyear-old boy. A f t e r the convictions, h o w e v e r , the sentences were o v e r t u r n e d by a higher court. T h e C o v e n a n t H o u s e legal aid o f f i c e was a t t a c k e d by m a c h i n e - g u n fire in July 1991, a n d in A u g u s t the g o v e r n m e n t o r d e r e d the o f f i c e closed, allegedly f o r i n t e r f e r i n g in the attorney g e n e r a l ' s e f f o r t s to protect children ( A A S 9/8/91: 7A). T h e pattern of lengthy, reluctant investigations, light or no s e n t e n c e s , and s u b s e q u e n t attacks on persons p u s h i n g for h u m a n rights i n v e s t i g a t i o n s is an a l l - t o o - f a m i l i a r one. By late 1992, ninety-two cases of child brutality w e r e still unresolved ( R O G Wi/92: 6 - 7 ) . In sum, then, not m u c h h a d i m p r o v e d in the h u m a n rights a t m o s p h e r e by 1992. P u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s by P r e s i d e n t S e r r a n o and s o m e of his a p p o i n t e e s w e r e i m p o r t a n t s y m b o l i c a l l y but did little to reduce the levels of impunity a n d h e n c e to i m p r o v e the quality of political participation. Far m o r e p r o g r e s s c a m e f r o m the e f f o r t s of the C a t h o l i c c h u r c h , the h u m a n rights o m b u d s m a n , the p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s as a w h o l e , a n d the e f f o r t s of p o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s , s o m e t i m e s allied with i n t e r n a t i o n a l g r o u p s that s u p p o r t e d their e f f o r t s . A g a i n , even in t e r m s of p r o c e d u r a l d e m o c r a c y , the i m p r o v e m e n t s o r i g i n a t e d largely f r o m o u t s i d e the e s t a b lishment, and the g o v e r n m e n t , e s p e c i a l l y the military, bent only s l i g h t l y — and reluctantly at that.

The Maya Question: The Nobel Committee's Answer T h e q u i n c e n t e n n i a l of C o l u m b u s ' s arrival in the W e s t e r n H e m i s p h e r e w a s not c a u s e f o r c e l e b r a t i o n a m o n g the M a y a n c o m m u n i t i e s of G u a t e m a l a . F r o m their p e r s p e c t i v e the h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w a s e s t a b l i s h e d in the Spanish C o n q u e s t , or i n v a s i o n , as the M a y a call it, and current politics is m o r e of the s a m e s t r u g g l e . In the early 1980s, w h e n the M a y a s o u g h t to r e c o v e r s o m e of w h a t they lost in the c o n q u e s t , most of their leaders w e r e killed, and m a s s i v e r e p r e s s i o n s m o t h e r e d their e f f o r t s . 4 3

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Out o f that process different tendencies emerged in the Mayan c o m m u nity. W h i l e many Maya remain integrated into popular-sector m o v e m e n t s as well as the U R N G insurgency, others have formed a P r o - M a y a n movement, s e e k i n g to recover traditional s o c i a l structures in order to rebuild their c o m m u n i t i e s . From this p e r s p e c t i v e the i n d i g e n o u s are c o n q u e r e d nations, not e t h n i c minorities. T h e m o v e m e n t s e e s the need f o r at least s e m i s o v e r e i g n arrangements with the state, and it regards maintaining at least a separate identity from p o p u l a r - s e c t o r and U R N G m o v e m e n t s as a necessary c o m p o n e n t o f its approach. T h e nationalists fear that integration will mean s a c r i f i c i n g Mayan values to more W e s t e r n , alien traditions, and they fear that non-Indian popular and revolutionary sectors o f the left may have political agendas not necessarily consistent with their o w n . Indigenous groups throughout the hemisphere began to organize panhemispheric meetings, and the second " E n c o u n t e r o f the Continental C a m paign o f 5 0 0 Y e a r s o f Indigenous and P o p u l a r R e s i s t a n c e " was held in Quetzaltenango ( X e l a ) , Guatemala, in O c t o b e r 1 9 9 1 . T h e Encounter o c c a sioned a large m o b i l i z a t i o n by the M a y a n c o m m u n i t i e s , perhaps taking advantage o f the international attention to act more freely than they might have o t h e r w i s e . T h e event also r e v e a l e d c o n f l i c t within the indigenous c o m m u n i t i e s b e t w e e n the two p e r s p e c t i v e s d e s c r i b e d a b o v e . A m o n g the participants was R i g o b e r t a M e n c h u , w h o had been n o m i n a t e d for the Nobel P e a c e Prize. In spite o f her international a c c l a i m and involvement with non-Indian movement groups, or perhaps partly b e c a u s e o f these f a c tors, the P r o - M a y a n representatives e x p r e s s e d s o m e c o n c e r n over M e n c h u ' s presence and participation. 4 4 T e n s i o n s a m o n g the groups m a n i f e s t e d in a variety o f w a y s . S o m e nationalistic M a y a resented the p r e s e n c e o f Indians involved in the integrated political m o v e m e n t s . 4 5 In early 1 9 9 2 , other Indian groups demanded separate participation in the p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s , and they, along with other popular-sector groups, were allowed to submit demands and be consulted after February 1 9 9 2 . L a t e r in 1 9 9 2 , a group o f M a y a n s filed a lawsuit for Q1 million against the U R N G for pain and s u f f e r i n g , stolen crops, and kidnapping ( M H e r a l d 6 / 1 7 / 9 2 : 1 4 A ) .

The Nobel Peace Prize R i g o b e r t a M e n c h u ' s nomination f o r the Nobel P e a c e P r i z e was a m a j o r issue in G u a t e m a l a in 1 9 9 2 . From Uspantan, in Q u i c h e p r o v i n c e , M e n c h u ' s life was not atypical o f her region: she and her family had worked as seasonal laborers on c o f f e e plantations, and she had been a maid in Guatemala City, w h e r e she learned Spanish. A c t i v e as a c o m m u n i t y leader, her father was a v i c t i m o f the S p a n i s h e m b a s s y m a s s a c r e , and M e n c h u lost almost all her family in subsequent repression in the early 1 9 8 0 s . S h e fled

180

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the country at that time and spent the decade organizing support for Indian c o m m u n i t i e s f r o m her base in M e x i c o . 4 6 She b e c a m e very popular in Guatemala, at least among the popular sectors, as demonstrated during visits for the National Dialogue p r o c e s s in the late 1980s and the S e c o n d Encounter in 1991. T h e s e same visits revealed elite antipathy as well, as evidenced by threats and arrests. In early 1992, the elite were gaining in their struggle with the popular sectors, as discussed earlier. T h e peace negotiations had been stalled, the g o v e r n m e n t had overturned a law that provided c o m p e n s a t i o n for fired workers, and the state had faced d o w n a potential strike by its employees. The IMF had approved G u a t e m a l a ' s economic modernization plan, leading to a loan f r o m the World B a n k . As M e n c h u ' s nomination began to gain m o m e n t u m , h o w e v e r , the g o v e r n m e n t a w a r d e d its Order of the Quetzal, the nation's highest award, to a wealthy Caucasian w o m a n known for her charitable work, Elisa Molina de Stahl. This was widely seen as part of a campaign to discredit Menchu, a c a m p a i g n that s q u a n d e r e d an excellent opportunity to build legitimacy for the government in the Mayan c o m m u nities (MHerald 9/28/92: 12A). 4 7 In October 1992, five hundred years after the Spanish Conquest began, the Nobel C o m m i t t e e awarded its Peace Prize to the Mayan leader Rigoberta Menchu, thereby taking sides in the Guatemalan struggle. 4 8 Reactions to M e n c h u ' s award are good symbolic indicators of the c o u n t r y ' s progress toward democracy. Serrano o f f e r e d a "terse statement of congratulations," but Foreign Minister Gonzalo M e n e n d e z Park decried the decision because of M e n c h u ' s alleged ties to subversive groups. The military reacted in similar fashion, saying she "has only d e f a m e d the f a t h e r l a n d " ( N Y T i m e s 10/17/92: 1). When Menchu w a s c h e e r e d by crowds in five cities, a new wave of assaults and threats against people associated with her began (Excelsior 10/21/92: 2A). 4 9 And in late 1992, the military increased its aerial bombardments of Mayan areas in the highlands (IPS 12/12/92). The Peace Prize can and should be interpreted as another sign of international condemnation of the G u a t e m a l a n government. It indicates support for the popular sectors and their use of direct pressure and mass mobilization to achieve social progress and democratization. Moreover, the award is likely to help fuel the Mayan m o v e m e n t , e n g e n d e r e d by G u a t e m a l a ' s tragic history and catalyzed by the quincentennial events.

Conclusion The first two years of President Jorge S e r r a n o ' s five-year term are noteworthy in their overall similarity to the patterns of the Cerezo administration that preceded it. Moderate s u c c e s s e s occurred at the m a c r o e c o n o m i c

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l e v e l , but m a s s i v e s o c i a l and e c o n o m i c u p h e a v a l s d i s r u p t e d the daily l i v e s of the majority. From the p e r s p e c t i v e o f s o c i a l d e m o c r a c y , the nation m a d e little if any p r o g r e s s d u r i n g the b i e n n i u m and w a s t e d n u m e r o u s o p p o r t u n i t i e s — i n the m a q u i l a and tax r e f o r m i s s u e s , for e x a m p l e — t o enact p o l i c i e s that m i g h t h a v e b e n e f i t e d the m a s s e s . A s far as procedural, liberal d e m o c r a c y is c o n c e r n e d , the key i n d i c a tor during this period w a s the quality o f the h u m a n rights c l i m a t e . S i g n s o f p r o g r e s s e m e r g e d , e s p e c i a l l y the o u t s p o k e n e f f o r t s o f the h u m a n rights o m b u d s m a n and s o m e o f t h e s t e p s t a k e n d u r i n g the p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n s p r o c e s s . On the w h o l e , h o w e v e r , p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n c o n t i n u e s to b e very p r o b l e m a t i c for m o s t G u a t e m a l a n s : h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s did not d e c l i n e , and s o m e s t a t i s t i c s s h o w e d i n c r e a s e s . C r i m i n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f v i o l a t i o n s , in s p i t e of g o v e r n m e n t rhetoric to the contrary, c o n t i n u e d to be s p o r a d i c at b e s t : v i o l e n c e to e l i m i n a t e a n d i n t i m i d a t e o t h e r p o l i t i c a l participants e s s e n t i a l l y w e n t u n p u n i s h e d . Stagnation

in h u m a n rights e n f o r c e m e n t c a n n o t b e a c c e p t a b l e

to

d e m o c r a t s , b e c a u s e l e g i t i m a c y c a n w e a k e n o v e r t i m e if there is no p r o g ress, h e n c e the c o n c l u s i o n that the S e r r a n o p e r i o d h a s b e e n m a r k e d thus far by d e c l i n e s in the quality of d e m o c r a t i c participation, in spite o f p o p u lar pressures to i m p r o v e the a t m o s p h e r e .

Notes 1. "Guatemala holds one of the lowest positions in Latin America in terms of the quality of life," with 76 percent in poverty, 42.6 percent unemployed, 76 percent of the children malnourished and half of these acute, and 62 percent of the w o m e n without prenatal care. Almost half of the total earnings of society were earned by the upper 10 percent of the population ( E x c e l s i o r 11/26/91: 2A). 2. G u a t e m a l a ' s tax revenue to gross domestic product ratio is 7.8 percent, second lowest in the hemisphere; only Haiti's is lower. By comparison, the ratio in the United States is 20 percent. The World Bank request w a s that the ratio reach at least 10 percent in Guatemala. 3. The Fiscal Modernization Program included: 1. The IVA rate stabilized at 7 percent, but all exempt goods and services eliminated. Originally created by the military government in 1983 with a tax rate of 10 percent, the IVA was reduced to 7 percent in 1984, but applied only to certain products; 2. Income tax; about 2 percent of G u a t e m a l a n s had paid income tax before the reforms, and the goal was to increase this by changing the tax brackets and by tax simplification, as discussed in the text; and 3. S t a m p taxes—taxes and fees on official transactions. The reform simplified the bureaucratic process by e l i m i n a t i n g fees on most transactions, retaining them on m a j o r c o m m e r c i a l contracts, and raising the rates ( P C R P 7/92: 4 - 5 ) .

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4. Q u o t i n g an official of the U S A I D , Petersen further d e f i n e s the strategy as ' " t h e exportation of labor without sending w o r k e r s a b r o a d ' " (Petersen: 5). T h e best source on the m a q u i l a sector in G u a t e m a l a is Petersen. 5. T h e labor code in 1992 provided twenty inspectors for 12,000 b u s i n e s s e s in the c a p i t a l and sixty o t h e r s for 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 b u s i n e s s e s in the rest of the c o u n t r y . M o r e o v e r , there w e r e essentially no j u d i c i a l s a n c t i o n s against e m p l o y e r s ; only a court o r d e r c o u l d result from a formal c o m p l a i n t by a w o r k e r ( I P S 10/22/92). 6. For details on the petition to the U.S. T r a d e O f f i c e , see R O G , and C S M o n itor 7/7/92, f r o m w h i c h many of the details in the f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h s are taken. A c a m p a i g n also was organized to pressure P h i l l i p s - V a n Heusen to permit the certification of u n i o n s in its G u a t e m a l a n m a q u i l a f a c t o r i e s . For a good s u m m a r y of the issues i n v o l v e d in a t t e m p t i n g to u n i o n i z e at P h i l l i p s - V a n H e u s e n ' s t w o m a q u i l a f a c t o r i e s in G u a t e m a l a , see R O G W i / 9 1 : 8 - 9 , and the v a r i o u s r e p o r t s of the P h i l l i p s - V a n Heusen c a m p a i g n o r g a n i z e d by the U . S . / G u a t e m a l a Labor Education P r o j e c t . 7. B u s i n e s s leaders in the apparel field c l a i m e d a U.S. investigation c o u l d mean the "initial loss of 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 j o b s " ( W P o s t 8/1/92: 18A). 8. For a similar a r g u m e n t , see Petersen: 1 7 5 - 1 7 6 . Petersen adds that, moreover, even a h u m a n e maquila sector cannot solve the p r o b l e m s f a c i n g the country if it d o e s not distribute land so that its people can begin to feed the nation and stop f l o c k i n g to the cities. 9. T h e w a g e in late 1 9 9 2 w a s $84 m o n t h l y ; it w a s $2 a day in rural a r e a s . T h e cost of a m i n i m u m rural e x i s t e n c e w a s about $ 1 2 0 per m o n t h in rural a r e a s and $ 1 6 0 per m o n t h in urban areas, a c c o r d i n g to the G u a t e m a l a n National Statistical Institute. 10. For a d d i t i o n a l details on the San J o r g e la L a g u n a o c c u p a t i o n and e v i c tions, see Excelsior 4/7/92: 2 A ; C S M o n i t o r 4/7/92: 4; and R O G S u / 9 2 : 8 - 9 , 1 4 . 11. By c o m p a r i s o n , Costa Rica has settled over $ 1 0 0 million of its debt in this way. 12. For d e t a i l s on m a n y d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of d e v e l o p m e n t projects, s o m e very labor-intensive, see C S M o n i t o r 4/29/92: 10. O n e of the critical issues stressed here is time: the r a i n f o r e s t is b e i n g destroyed at an a l a r m i n g rate. 13. For a d d i t i o n a l details on S e r r a n o ' s r e c o g n i t i o n of Belize and the s u b s e quent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e s to his action, see P C R P 11/91: 6 - 7 , 3 / 9 2 : 8, and 11/92: 2 - 3 . 14. By c o m p a r i s o n , the growth rate w a s 2.5 percent for the U.S. in the s a m e period ( R O G W i / 9 1 : 10). 15. E x p o r t s w e r e d o w n 1.5 p e r c e n t , f r o m Q 9 2 5 million to Q 9 1 1 , w h i l e i m p o r t s w e r e up 11 percent, f r o m Q 1 . 2 billion to Q 1 . 3 billion {Excelsior 1/2/92: 2A). 16. U N I C E F reported 6 million p e o p l e , t w o - t h i r d s of the total population of 9.2 million, with no access to health services and 3.6 million lacking potable water. 17. A s of late 1991, thirty-five years of w a r f a r e in G u a t e m a l a had p r o d u c e d 150,000 dead, 5 0 , 0 0 0 detained or d i s a p p e a r e d , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 orphans, 100,000 w i d o w s , 100,000 p e a s a n t s internally displaced in the m o u n t a i n s , at least 5 0 , 0 0 0 r e f u g e e s in Mexican c a m p s , and h u n d r e d s of political exiles ( E x c e l s i o r 1/16/92: 2A). 18. For a good s u m m a r y of c h a n g e s in the ideological and political tendencies within the A r m y d u r i n g this period, see R O G Fa/91: 13. 19. T h e r o u n d of talks that began after S e r r a n o ' s election were called the second round of t a l k s — t h e Oslo round (see Chapter 8) being the first round. For additional d e t a i l s on the t r a j e c t o r y of the n e g o t i a t i o n s through 1991 and 1992, see

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m o n t h l y issues of P C R P , many of w h i c h include e x t e n s i v e sets of d o c u m e n t s r e f l e c t i n g the positions of the p a r t i c i p a n t s and other o r g a n i z e d sectors of G u a t e m a l a n society. For e x a m p l e , see " G u a t e m a l a : P r o c e s o de P a z " ( P C R P 7/92: S u p l e m e n t o Especial); and the d o c u m e n t section of P C R P 8 / 9 2 . For an excellent, c o m p l e t e collection of d o c u m e n t s on the peace n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s e s in both G u a t e m a l a and El Salvador, see Cronologías. 20. For the full text of the d o c u m e n t , see P C R P 8/91, S u p l e m e n t o Especial: i-ii. 21. For a detailed look at the issues b e h i n d the n e g o t i a t i o n s i m p a s s e in late 1991 and early 1992, including good expositions of the p a r t i c i p a n t s ' positions, see G M G 3/92: 2 - 4 ; and R O G Sp/92: 2 - 5 , 14. For a v i e w of the U R N G positions on various issues, including ethnic q u e s t i o n s a f f e c t i n g the popular m o v e m e n t s at this time, see the interview with Pablo M o n s a n t o , a leader of the U R N G c o m m a n d , in R O G Fa/91: 2 - 3 , 10. 22. T h r e e municipalities had f o r m a l l y petitioned that the military leave their c o m m u n i t y and the P A C s be d i s b a n d e d . S a n t i a g o Atitlán w a s first, after the massacre there in late 1989, and J o y a b a j in El Q u i c h é requested this in February 1992. San Lucas T o l i m á n on Lake Atitlán b e c a m e the third town to request military and police w i t h d r a w a l after an incident i n v o l v i n g v i o l e n c e against local citizens, but the town did ask for the police to return after several incidents of c o m m o n crime o c c u r r e d . D e f e n s e Minister Garcia c l a i m e d these r e q u e s t s w e r e a U R N G ploy ( C S M o n i t o r 3/11/92: 3). 23. For details on how the military has forced civil patrols to m u r d e r s o m e t i m e s i n n o c e n t victims, especially in the early 1 9 8 0 s ' c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y , see S F C h r o n i c l e 11/12/91: 10A. S p e a k i n g against the P A C s , the a d j u n c t human rights o m b u d s m a n , César Alvarez G u a d a m u z , said ' " t h e impunity c o n t i n u e s , as does the v i o l e n c e . ' " The military position on the question of h u m a n rights is that the P A C s n e v e r violate h u m a n rights and that g u e r r i l l a s are the o n e s r e s p o n s i b l e for the deaths that occur (MHerald 10/4/92: 3 5 A ) . 24. On the issues of human rights immunity and past violations, see S F C h r o n icle 12/16/91: 12A. On corruption, the issues included i n v o l v e m e n t in f r a u d u l e n t deals to help the antigovernment contras in N i c a r a g u a ; see L A T i m e s 9 / 1 9 / 9 1 : 2 2 A . On d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g , e v i d e n c e s h o w e d m a j o r t r a n s s h i p m e n t s of c o c a i n e through G u a t e m a l a , with its hundreds of rural airstrips and lack of aviation radar control. Given the m i l i t a r y ' s capacities in rural areas, this implies that high-level officials are c o n d o n i n g the drug trade. See Excelsior 9/9/91: 3A; and N Y T i m e s 12/16/91: 6 A for m o r e details. 25. As an ironic indicator of the m i l i t a r y ' s attitude, on the s a m e day that negotiators were agreeing in Mexico City to end forced military recruitment practices in Guatemala, the Army staged a recruitment raid in poor barrios near G u a t e m a l a City and kidnapped several dozen y o u n g men for military service. W h e r e a s in the past this would probably have been met with public silence, in 1992 there were outcries from the church and popular organizations ( R O G Sp/92: 14). For details of a forced recruitment experience from a v i c t i m ' s perspective, see R O G Su/92: 6 - 7 , 1 4 . 26. For m o r e details on the w a v e of violence in April and M a y and its rightw i n g g e n e s i s , see L A P 6 / 1 8 / 9 2 : 6; Excelsior 5 / 1 1 / 9 2 : 2A; and M H e r a l d 5 / 2 1 / 9 2 : 27A. 27. T h e narrow agenda w a s the U R N G ' s insistence on its d e m a n d s for dissolution of the P A C s , international supervision of h u m a n rights, and a truth c o m m i s sion to d e t e r m i n e responsibility for past h u m a n rights v i o l a t i o n s ( W P o s t 5 / 2 6 / 9 2 : 13 A).

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28. For details on these and o t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t s in late 1992, see Excelsior 1/2/93: 1 (Mundial section); G M G 10/92: 5 - 7 ; R O G Wi/92: 4 - 5 , 13-14; N Y T i m e s 1/15/93 and 1/28/93; and Resumen Noticioso, 1992. 29. S o m e thirteen h u n d r e d r e f u g e e s were repatriated in 1991, and half that n u m b e r in 1990, C e r e z o ' s final year in o f f i c e . For b a c k g r o u n d on the refugee situation, i n c l u d i n g a t t e m p t s to n e g o t i a t e a return d u r i n g the C e r e z o administration, see W O L A 1989a. For a s u m m a r y of the situation d u r i n g the Serrano administration, see R O G Wi/91: 6 - 8 . For an o u t s t a n d i n g account of the reintegration process for earlier r e f u g e e s and displaced rural groups, see Dónde Està, a project originally coordinated by Myrna Mack. It is generally agreed that Ms. Mack was assassinated because of her work on this study. 30. With the p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n of a p r o v i s i o n g u a r a n t e e i n g them access to land, the r e f u g e e s ' d e m a n d s w e r e so b a s i c that a casual o b s e r v e r would be nonplussed at the need for such p r o t r a c t e d n e g o t i a t i o n s to s e c u r e the g o v e r n m e n t ' s reluctant agreement to these six provisions: (1) the return is voluntary; (2) r e f u g e e s would have the right of free o r g a n i z a t i o n and association; (3) r e f u g e e s would have the right of free mobility; (4) international w i t n e s s e s would be present during the return and resettlement periods; (5) land would be m a d e available in the r e f u g e e s ' original p l a c e s of origin; and (6) " t h e i r lives [ w o u l d ] be r e s p e c t e d " ( E x c e l s i o r 9/27/92: 2A). 31. See N Y T i m e s 1/15/93: A 3 and 1/25/93: A 6 ; and M H e r a l d 1/21/93: 16A for descriptions of the first g r o u p ' s return in early 1993. 32. In one incident the military is alleged to have b o m b e d two towns ( A n g e les and Pueblo N u e v o II) in the Ixil area, one s u p p o s e d l y inhabited by C P R p e o ple o u t s i d e of military control. T h e A r m y d e n i e d b o m b i n g any towns, alleging there were no towns in the area. But a h u m a n rights lawyer w o r k i n g with the CPR groups claimed s o m e t w e n t y - f o u r t h o u s a n d people were living in these two towns and invited President Serrano to go with him to view the area (IPS 8/28/92). 33. For detailed and fairly w e l l - b a l a n c e d a c c o u n t s of the human rights situation t h r o u g h o u t this period, see the m o n t h l y issues of P C R P . For an excellent set of d o c u m e n t s related to the h u m a n rights situation in 1991 and early 1992, including the text of a s p e e c h by P r e s i d e n t S e r r a n o , UN o b s e r v e r T o m u s c h a t ' s report, and the resolution of the U N ' s H u m a n Rights C o m m i s s i o n ( G e n e v a ) , see P C R P 3/92: Dossier Especial. 34. The g o v e r n m e n t claimed that the death s q u a d s were not connected to the Army or g o v e r n m e n t and attributed v i o l e n c e to d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g . In fact, s o m e of the victims were r e p e a t - o f f e n d e r c r i m i n a l s ( E x c e l s i o r 8/5/91: 2A). 35. The A r c h b i s h o p ' s o f f i c e a l s o c o n d e m n e d f o r c e d r e c r u i t m e n t of children into the Army and asked the d e f e n s e ministry to "respect the Constitution and stop the k i d n a p p i n g of y o u n g m e n " ( G M G 1/92: 7). 36. A key g o v e r n m e n t negotiator, M a n u e l C o n d e , said: " W h e n Guatemala no longer has an internal confrontation, the human rights situation will improve immed i a t e l y " ( M H e r a l d 8 / 2 3 / 9 1 : 12A). For an additional e x a m p l e of this position, see L A T i m e s 9/19/91: 1A, which points out that one of the difficulties all sides face in e n d i n g the violence are the r i g h t - w i n g g r o u p s , even civil d e f e n s e patrol leaders, with vested interests in keeping violence levels high so negotiations will fail. 37. T h e United States initially s u p p o r t e d the m o v e to put G u a t e m a l a on the item 12 list but c o m p r o m i s e d with Latin A m e r i c a : the U.S. dropped its Guatemalan e f f o r t in order to obtain Latin s u p p o r t for putting C u b a on the s a m e list (IPS 3/29/92).

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38. More typical, h o w e v e r , is P r e s i d e n t S e r r a n o ' s r e s p o n s e to a c c u s a t i o n s at a c o n f e r e n c e at C a t h o l i c U n i v e r s i t y in W a s h i n g t o n that torture c o n t i n u e d to be used in Guatemala. Serrano in e f f e c t threatened the lives of c o n f e r e n c e participants A m í l c a r M é n d e z of CERJ and Ronald O c h o e t a of the A r c h b i s h o p of G u a t e m a l a ' s h u m a n rights o f f i c e : ' " W e are g o i n g to begin putting a stop to these various accusations being made. T h e A r m y d o e s not torture; the g o v e r n m e n t d o e s not t o r t u r e ' " said Serrano ( E x c e l s i o r 11/13/92: 2A), but Ochoeta ' " f o l l o w s the insurgents' l i n e ' " (IPS 11 /23/92). 39. This is a paraphrasing of H e r m a n n and B r o d h e a d ' s " D e m o n s t r a t i o n Elections," or elections held in a foreign land to assure U.S. patrons that d e m o c r a c y is f u n c t i o n i n g smoothly and that foreign assistance is thereby d e s e r v e d . 40. In late 1992, M a c k ' s sister, Helen M a c k C h a n g , w a s a w a r d e d the Right Livelihood Prize ( $ 1 8 5 , 0 0 0 ) by the S w e d i s h Parliament. T h e prize, considered to be the alternative Nobel Prize, w a s given for her e f f o r t s to instigate an investigation into her s i s t e r ' s murder ( T i c o Times 11/13/92: 7). 41. G u a t e m a l a n Attorney General Acisclo Valladares publicly disagreed with the verdict on the officer, Captain H u g o Contreras ( S F C h r o n i c l e 9/30/92: 10). Providing a different twist to this case, and a d d i n g further e v i d e n c e to the case against Captain Contreras, the G u a t e m a l a n daily El Gráfico reported that D e v i n e had been selling w e a p o n s to the guerrillas, w e a p o n s he first b o u g h t f r o m the A r m y , w h i c h would then report them as m i s s i n g in action. The p a p e r ' s own investigation clearly implicated the exonerated H u g o C o n t r e r a s ( E x c e l s i o r 10/5/92: 2A). 42. Ortiz had brought one of two lawsuits in U.S. courts against retired General G r a m a j o , suing him for violating her h u m a n rights during his tenure as defense minister. R e f u s i n g to respond to the c h a r g e s or to s u b p o e n a s , G r a m a j o w a s found guilty by default in N o v e m b e r 1991, and assessed $10 million in d a m a g e s (WPost 1/6/92: 13A and 4/8/92: 16A). 43. For an excellent study of the historical relationship between the Maya and the state (and elites) in G u a t e m a l a , see S m i t h . For particularly p o i g n a n t and distressing testimonies about recent e x p e r i e n c e s of Mayan individuals and c o m m u n i ties, see M o n t e j o and A k a b ' . 44. For additional details on the E n c o u n t e r and on s o m e of these q u e s t i o n s , see R O G Wi/91: 2 - 5 , 15; S F C h r o n i c l e 4 / 1 3 / 9 2 : 10A. 45. T h e P r o - M a y a n s r e f e r r e d to integrated g r o u p s as " c e r t a i n interests w h o want us to be cannon f o d d e r for their political fights, but w e ' v e already s u f f e r e d that" (MHerald 10/16/91: 6 A ) . 46. For details, see M e n c h ú ' s a u t o b i o g r a p h y , edited by B u r g o s - D e b r a y . 47. T h i s s o u r c e r e p o r t s that a G u a t e m a l a n political c a r t o o n at the time of Molina de S t a h l ' s award showed M e n c h ú being asked her opinion of the event. She replies that the only order she had ever received from the G u a t e m a l a n g o v e r n m e n t w a s "an arrest o r d e r . " 48. T h i s is not a new position for the c o m m i t t e e , which in the past decade has awarded the P e a c e Prize to such g a d f l i e s as Martin L u t h e r King, Jr., the Dalai Lama, Lech W a l e s a of Poland, D a w A u n g San Suu Kyi of M y a n m a r ( B u r m a ) , B i s h o p D e s m o n d T u t u of South A f r i c a , M a i r e a d M a g u i r e and Betty W i l l i a m s of Northern Ireland, and A d o l f o Pérez Esquivel of Argentina. 49. For m o r e details on the reaction to the award, see R O G W i / 9 2 : 2 - 3 , 1 4 ; Special Service 10/92; and M a u r o v i c h .

10

The Popular Struggle for Democracy T h e r e is a w a y to p e a c e . T h e r e is e v i d e n c e of h o p e that G u a t e m a l a can be a country o f plurality and r i c h n e s s , or r e - e n c o u n t e r s b e t w e e n our communities. —Rigoberta Menchu

T h e 1980s b e g a n with a t r a g e d y , the m a s s a c r e of t h i r t y - n i n e p e o p l e at the S p a n i s h e m b a s s y . In the a f t e r m a t h G u a t e m a l a d e s c e n d e d i n t o its d a r k e s t h o u r of v i o l e n c e a n d i s o l a t i o n . F o r t h e G u a t e m a l a n m i l i t a r y the c r i s i s of t h e early 1980s s h o w e d the n e e d , a n d p r o v i d e d the o p p o r t u n i t y , to d e f e a t t h e g u e r r i l l a i n s u r g e n c y in a n o - h o l d s - b a r r e d w a r , to e s t a b l i s h direct m i l i tary c o n t r o l o v e r n e w r e g i o n s a n d r e s o u r c e s , a n d to r e e n t e r the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y by p r o c l a i m i n g a r e t u r n to c i v i l i a n g o v e r n m e n t a n d d e m o c r a c y . T h e s t r a t e g y s u c c e e d e d : b e t w e e n 1982 a n d 1985, the g u e r r i l l a i n s u r g e n c y w a s d r a m a t i c a l l y w e a k e n e d , rural a r e a s m i l i t a r i z e d a n d largely p a c i f i e d , and a n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n w r i t t e n a n d e l e c t i o n s held. In this text a p r i m a r y f o c u s on e i t h e r e l e c t i o n s and political p a r t i e s o r t h e military a c t i v i t i e s j u s t s u m m a r i z e d c o u l d h a v e led to e i t h e r of t w o diam e t r i c a l l y o p p o s e d , but e q u a l l y e r r o n e o u s , c o n c l u s i o n s : f i r s t , that G u a t e m a l a has a c h i e v e d d e m o c r a c y , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e t w o p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s h a v e n o w b e e n h e l d ; o r , s e c o n d , that t h e c o u n t r y e x p e r i e n c e d n o m o v e m e n t t o w a r d d e m o c r a c y at all, its e l e c t i o n s b e i n g a s h a m a n d its c i v i l i a n g o v e r n m e n t a f a c a d e f o r the A r m y a n d its a l l i e s . I n s t e a d , this s t u d y s t a r t e d f r o m a t h i r d t h e s i s , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h o u g h e l e c t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s d o not s i g n i f y d e m o c r a c y , t h e y o c c a s i o n an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r d e m o c r a c y to be c r e a t e d . L o o s e l y b a s e d on t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o - d e m o c r a c y s c h o o l , t h i s t h e s i s a r g u e s t h a t a t t e m p t i n g to u n d e r s t a n d G u a t e m a l a n d e m o c r a c y b y f o c u s i n g on s u p e r f i c i a l f o r m a l - l e g a l c h a n g e s a l o n e , s u c h as e l e c t i o n s , is to m i s s i m p o r t a n t d a t a . B u t d i s m i s s i n g t h e s e e v e n t s c o m p l e t e l y , b e c a u s e d a t a s u g g e s t total m i l i t a r y d o m i n a n c e , is a l s o

187

Guatemalan

188

Politics

p r o b l e m a t i c . T h i s text has treated G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c s as an opportunity to create democracy. W h a t is m o r e i m p o r t a n t here is the q u a l i t y o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and the p u b l i c - p o l i c y r e c o r d . W h i l e r e c o g n i z i n g that m a n y key n e v e r i n t e n d e d to c r e a t e a n y t h i n g o t h e r than s u p e r f i c i a l l y

actors

democratic

a r r a n g e m e n t s , o t h e r s did in f a c t try to m o v e the nation t o w a r d g e n u i n e d e m o c r a t i c procedures and social a r r a n g e m e n t s . T h e question is t h e r e f o r e not w h e t h e r G u a t e m a l a is or is not a d e m o c r a c y , but to what e x t e n t it m o v e d in d e m o c r a t i c d i r e c t i o n s during the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the first two years o f the S e r r a n o term. 1 T o u n d e r s t a n d the transition r e q u i r e d s e v e r a l t y p e s o f data. F o r m a l constitutional and legal a r r a n g e m e n t s r e g u l a t i n g the political participation o f c i t i z e n s are important data but not in a c o n t e x t u a l v a c u u m . T h e c o n t e x t in w h i c h p a r t i c i p a t i o n o c c u r s is a c r i t i c a l c o m p o n e n t . E l e c t i o n s m a y or may not b e d e m o c r a t i z i n g events, d e p e n d i n g on the c o n t e n t o f c a m p a i g n s and the g e n e r a l p o l i t i c a l a t m o s p h e r e . In G u a t e m a l a , a m o n g the

most

important e l e m e n t s is the human rights a t m o s p h e r e , that is, w h e t h e r citiz e n s can participate f r e e l y and o p e n l y . In s o c i e t i e s w h e r e daily l i v i n g is p r e c a r i o u s , w h e r e q u a l i t y o f life is very low and s t a b l e personal e n v i r o n m e n t s are rare for large s e g m e n t s o f the p o p u l a c e , s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s imply an additional test for d e m o c r a c y . An e l e c t e d g o v e r n m e n t must b e able to i m p l e m e n t p u b l i c p o l i c i e s with positive s o c i o e c o n o m i c results. G o v e r n m e n t must be not only " b y the p e o p l e , " but " f o r the p e o p l e " as w e l l . T h e r e f o r e , it is not e n o u g h that c i t i z e n s b e able to o r g a n i z e and participate, although that a l o n e w o u l d be a m a j o r step in G u a t e m a l a , w h e r e p o l i t i c a l participation has not often taken p l a c e in a c i v i l a t m o s p h e r e . P u b l i c p o l i c y must a l s o be r e s p o n s i v e to the needs and d e m a n d s o f its c i t i z e n s , and on the w h o l e , the quality o f life should i m p r o v e for the m a s s e s . T h i s c h a p t e r s u m m a r i z e s G u a t e m a l a ' s

perfor-

m a n c e on these indicators and d i s c u s s e s the quality o f d e m o c r a c y that has resulted from that p e r f o r m a n c e .

Democratization: Cerezo and Serrano Elections

and Effective

Participation

H i s t o r i c a l l y , G u a t e m a l a n e l e c t i o n s s h o w a pattern o f fraud, i n t i m i d a t i o n , s e l f - c e n s o r s h i p , and a b o v e all, little t a n g i b l e i m p a c t on s o c i a l

justice

issues. In fact, the e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s s o m e t i m e s has led to i n c r e a s e d repress i o n o f popular leaders w h o e m e r g e d f r o m e l e c t o r a l c a m p a i g n s . F e w o b s e r v e r s disputed the procedural quality o f the 1 9 8 4 C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y

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189

e l e c t i o n , w h i c h led to a new c o n s t i t u t i o n , the 1 9 8 5 e l e c t i o n s that g a v e Christian D e m o c r a t s the p r e s i d e n c y , or the 1 9 9 0 e l e c t i o n s that resulted in Serrano's victory. T h e c o n t e x t in which these e l e c t i o n s w e r e held, h o w e v e r , included the intimidating p r e s e n c e o f the military and the e f f e c t s o f years o f state terror aimed at political dissidents. L i t t l e or no public d e b a t e addressed the s e r i o u s e c o n o m i c and s o c i a l i s s u e s during the c a m p a i g n s , f o r e x a m p l e , and political parties largely ignored the needs o f the m a s s e s . N o n e o f the parties participating in these e l e c t i o n s c h a l l e n g e d the m i l i t a r y ' s dominant role in s o c i e t y . R e f o r m i s t parties a b a n d o n e d their i d e o l o g i e s in f a v o r o f pers o n a l i s t i c , m e d i a - o r i e n t e d c a m p a i g n s . T h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f v i o l e n c e and c a m p a i g n s w i t h no p r o g r e s s i v e s o l u t i o n s to urgent s o c i a l and e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s p r o d u c e d w i d e s p r e a d disgust with the traditional parties and even with e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , a p o l i t i c a l o p e n i n g did o c c u r in G u a t e m a l a after 1 9 8 5 . T h e c o u n t r y ' s poorest c i t i z e n s , with their pressing needs and long tradition o f c o m m u n a l a c t i v i s m , m o v e d into the new arena c r e a t e d by constitutional g o v e r n m e n t to e x p r e s s their d e m a n d s and to d e m a n d r e s p o n s e s . P o p u l a r groups stepped up their a c t i v i t i e s , pressuring the g o v e r n m e n t with various m o d e s o f direct p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I r o n i c a l l y , t h o u g h e l e c t i o n c a m paigns f a i l e d to i n c l u d e m a j o r i s s u e s on their a g e n d a s , p a r t i c i p a t i o n by popular g r o u p s b r o u g h t these i s s u e s into the p u b l i c a r e n a and f o r c e d the g o v e r n m e n t to r e s p o n d , m a k i n g G u a t e m a l a a m o r e d e m o c r a t i c nation in the p r o c e s s . T o the extent that these groups w e r e a b l e to participate m o r e freely b e c a u s e o f the o p e n i n g c r e a t e d by r e c e n t e l e c t i o n s , G u a t e m a l a has m o v e d toward d e m o c r a c y .

Public Policy and Social

Justice

B e y o n d e l e c t i o n s and direct participation, the test o f d e m o c r a c y lies in the nature o f p u b l i c p o l i c y and the s o c i o e c o n o m i c r e s u l t s o f p o l i c y . S o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s h a v e b e e n a b o m i n a b l e in G u a t e m a l a f o r c e n t u r i e s , with a dec l i n i n g q u a l i t y o f life, i n c r e a s i n g s o c i a l n e e d s and d e m a n d s , s e e m i n g l y f e w e r r e s o u r c e s , and an e l i t e usually u n w i l l i n g to r e s p o n d to popular d e m a n d s . On this d i m e n s i o n , the data s h o w a m i x e d b a l a n c e sheet for the C e r e z o and S e r r a n o g o v e r n m e n t s . M a c r o e c o n o m i c p o l i c y , aided by foreign a s s i s t a n c e , spurred e c o n o m i c growth, and tourism increased. B u t for the m a j o r i t y o f c i t i z e n s , growth did not translate into s o c i a l r e f o r m to any s i g n i f i c a n t d e g r e e . P o p u l a r g r o u p s m o b i l i z e d f r e q u e n t l y during the p e r i o d , but their e f f o r t s r e s u l t e d in f e w s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i c y p r o g r a m s , as the poverty i n d i c a t o r s s h o w . E n v i r o n m e n tal d e g r a d a t i o n is a key i s s u e , as a s y m p t o m o f both c o n t i n u i n g p o v e r t y

190

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a n d of elite i m p u n i t y . A s n o m e a s u r a b l e m o v e m e n t o c c u r r e d t o w a r d a m o r e w i d e s p r e a d d i s t r i b u t i o n of s t a b l e p e r s o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t s a m o n g the g e n e r a l p o p u l a t i o n , the g e n e r a l p i c t u r e r e m a i n s b l e a k .

Human

Rights

T h e quality of h u m a n r i g h t s is an e s s e n t i a l part of m e a s u r i n g d e m o c r a c y in a p o l i t y , b e c a u s e it is a c e n t r a l d i m e n s i o n of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . G u a t e m a l a ' s a b h o r r e n t h u m a n r i g h t s r e c o r d s i n c e at least 1 9 5 4 m a k e s this a c r i t i c a l m e a s u r e of t h e t r a n s i t i o n to d e m o c r a c y a f t e r 1 9 8 5 . A g a i n , t h e data are m i x e d . T h e h u m a n r i g h t s s i t u a t i o n i m p r o v e d l e g a l l y in G u a t e m a l a after 1985. T h e C e r e z o administration made strides toward increasing legal p a r t i c i p a t i o n f o r m a n y h i t h e r t o e x c l u d e d s e c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g e x i l e d o p p o s i t i o n g r o u p s a l l o w e d to p a r t i c i p a t e in the N a t i o n a l D i a l o g u e p r o c e s s . But w i t h e a c h f o r m a l - l e g a l a d v a n c e , t h r e a t s a n d r e p r e s s i o n f o l l o w e d w h e n p o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s a v a i l e d t h e m s e l v e s of the n e w legal o p p o r t u n i t i e s . A f t e r a b o u t t h e m i d p o i n t of P r e s i d e n t C e r e z o ' s t e r m , i n c i d e n t s of h u m a n r i g h t s a b u s e s i n c r e a s e d s t e a d i l y , to t h e e x t e n t that t h e p e r i o d w a s b e g i n n i n g to be c o m p a r e d w i t h t h e late 1 9 7 0 s in t e r m s of r e p r e s s i o n a i m e d at l e a d e r s of p o p u l a r - s e c t o r g r o u p s . A g a i n , m o r e than j u s t t h e a b s e n c e of p r o g r e s s , the c o u n t r y s h o w e d a m a r k e d d e c l i n e in the q u a l i t y of the h u m a n r i g h t s c l i m a t e a f t e r 1 9 8 8 , a l t h o u g h c o n d i t i o n s w e r e still b e t t e r t h a n t h e y had b e e n in the early 1 9 8 0 s .

The Armed

Forces

T h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l p o w e r in a n y s i n g l e s e c t o r of t h e p o l i t i c a l s p e c t r u m is an o b s t a c l e to d e m o c r a c y , w h e t h e r that s e c t o r be a m o n o p o listic political p a r t y , a m a s s m o v e m e n t o r g a n i z e d by a r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o v e r n m e n t , or a w e l l - a r m e d m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n . G u a t e m a l a ' s h i s t o r y s h o w s a p a t t e r n of i n c r e a s i n g c o n s o l i d a t i o n of p o w e r in the a r m e d f o r c e s . T h e pattern r e v e a l s itself in t w o a r e n a s . T h e first, m o r e o b v i o u s , i n c l u d e s c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y w a r a n d v a r i o u s o t h e r t y p e s of s t a t e t e r r o r i s m and p a r a m i l i t a r y d e a t h - s q u a d a c t i v i t y , h i s t o r i c a l l y a f u n d a m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of G u a t e m a l a n p o l i t i c s . T h e s e c o n d i n v o l v e s t h e s k i l l f u l u s e of c i v i l p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s . H e r e , the g o a l is not to e s t a b l i s h a t o t a l i t a r i a n s t a t e o r a r e s p o n s i v e d e m o c r a t i c s y s t e m b u t r a t h e r to m e l d b o t h f a c e t s into a s t a t e best d e s c r i b e d as a u t h o r i t a r i a n p o l i t i c s w i t h e l e c t o r a l s t r u c t u r e s , i n c l u d i n g s e v eral f u n c t i o n i n g p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . 2 In the early 1 9 8 0 s , f a c e d w i t h a p o w e r f u l i n s u r g e n c y , i n t e r n a t i o n a l isolation, a n d d e c l i n i n g e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s , the A r m y a c k n o w l e d g e d that b u s i n e s s as usual c o u l d not s u c c e e d w i t h o u t r e n e w i n g a c t i v e c i v i l i a n p a r ticipation in g o v e r n m e n t , if o n l y to s e c u r e a g a i n the international a s s i s t a n c e

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Democracy

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needed to return to s o m e s e m b l a n c e o f e c o n o m i c n o r m a l c y . E l e c t i o n s in 1 9 8 4 , 1 9 8 5 , and 1 9 9 0 were therefore an e x p l i c i t part o f a military plan. T h e crisis o f the early 1 9 8 0 s led to a more, not less, intensive role for the Army in the process o f civil rule. T h e strategy has been s u c c e s s f u l , at least in the short run. E l e c t i o n s enhanced international l e g i t i m a c y and resulted in increased resources for the state. T h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y plan was s u c c e s s f u l in d e m o b i l i z i n g political parties as v e h i c l e s for s o c i a l c h a n g e , w h i l e retaining parties as f u n c t i o n i n g , c o o p e r a t i v e c o m p o n e n t s o f a procedural d e m o c r a c y that posed little threat to the political and s o c i a l d o m i n a n c e o f the armed forces, even as both Cerezo and S e r r a n o spoke o f civilian ascendancy over the military.- 1 M o s t e v i d e n c e suggests, however, that the military continues to dominate. T h e policy preferences o f the armed f o r c e s remain central, not peripheral, to the public agenda. Attempted coups in 1 9 8 8 and 1 9 8 9 noticeably altered the political style o f the civilian g o v e r n m e n t , a w a y from respons i v e n e s s to p o p u l a r - s e c t o r groups and toward a c c o m m o d a t i o n with elite c o n c e r n s , e s p e c i a l l y antireformist ones. T h e human rights violations that developed after President C e r e z o ' s inauguration, and intensified after 1 9 8 8 , contrast dramatically with the ideology and public pronouncements o f both Cerezo and Serrano, suggesting the military is controlling the institutions o f civil government, not the opposite. A s o f 1 9 9 3 , c o n t i n u e d impunity, slow n e g o t i a t i o n s with the insurgency, and hard-line military posturing over the return o f refugees all suggest that very little progress has been achieved. T h e armed f o r c e s continue to b e l i e v e they are the final arbiters o f r e g i m e c o n f i g u r a t i o n . 4 A s o c i e t y governed by an " a r m e d m i n o r i t y " 5 is hardly a d e m o c r a c y , even when that armed minority shows c o n s p i c u o u s support for electoral structures.

Movements

and

Groups

Political institutions may have been tamed by the military plan, but other e l e m e n t s were m o r e resilient. A s d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r , o p p o s i t i o n

groups

began to function in the new political opening after 1 9 8 5 . S o m e o f these were profoundly antireformist, s h o w i n g a c o n s p i c u o u s w i l l i n g n e s s to use v i o l e n c e against other citizens and even to try to overthrow state institutions when these began responding to popular demands. Although rightist e x t r e m i s t s have lost power during the rise o f the new militarized state, extremist solutions to social and political problems remain m a j o r c o m p o nents o f the political process. T h e " o l d r i g h t , " 6 which refuses even the slightest a c c o m m o d a t i o n with popular o r g a n i z a t i o n s or the w e l f a r e state, remains v o c a l and aggressive. Although the e x t r e m e right has b e c o m e increasingly impotent within the

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n e w f o r m a l p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s , it h a s n o t lost its c a p a c i t y f o r d i r e c t a n d s o m e t i m e s v i o l e n t p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n , as s e e n in a t t e m p t e d m i l i t a r y c o u p s a n d t h e r e t u r n of d e a t h - s q u a d v i o l e n c e in t h e late 1 9 8 0 s . T h e r e is n o r e a s o n to a s s u m e t h a t t h i s s e c t o r of t h e p o l i t i c a l s p e c t r u m w i l l s o f t e n its c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l s t y l e in t h e n e a r f u t u r e . T h e e x t r e m e right may w e a k e n

the A r m y ' s hold on the

political

p r o c e s s , b u t its i m p a c t h a s b e e n r e d u c e d b y i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e military, b a s e d on the p r o f e s s e d belief that d e m o c r a c y

in

Guatemala

d e p e n d s on support for the m o d e r a t e right and the military faction supp o r t i n g t h e n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . M i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , a t h r e a t to g e n u i n e d e m o c r a c y b e c a u s e it t e n d s t o c o n c e n t r a t e p o w e r in o n e s i n g l e i n s t i t u t i o n , is t h e r e b y t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o d e m o c r a t i c a s s i s t a n c e . If in d e c a d e s past a p o l o g i s t s d e s c r i b e d the a r m e d f o r c e s as " m o d e r n i z e r s , " n o w

the

a r g u m e n t is t h e " m i l i t a r y as d e m o c r a t i z e r s . " T h a n k s in p a r t t o t h i s i n t e r national pressure, the military has maintained the upper hand, even vis-àv i s t h e r i g h t , w h i c h i n c l u d e s f a c t i o n s of t h e m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r c o r p s itself a n d is h a r d l y d e m o c r a t i c . If t h e r i g h t is o n e p r o b l e m f o r t h e A r m y , a s e c o n d is t h e p o p u l a r s e c t o r s . G u a t e m a l a h a s a l o n g h i s t o r y of s t r u g g l e a r o u n d i s s u e s of s o c i a l j u s tice. Institutional c h a n g e s after 1984 w e r e w e l c o m e d by the n a t i o n ' s progressive

sectors.

Political

parties

had

become

merely

electioneering

o r g a n i z a t i o n s , u n a b l e o r u n w i l l i n g to l e a d s o c i e t y t o w a r d p r o g r e s s i v e p o l i c i e s , l e a v i n g that t a s k to t h e p o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s . A s a r e s u l t , t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of t h e p o p u l a r c l a s s e s w a s l e d b y o r g a n i z a t i o n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d direct and disruptive political action. L a r g e l y b e c a u s e of t h i s p r e s s u r e , m a j o r s o c i a l p r o b l e m s w e r e p l a c e d on the p u b l i c a g e n d a d u r i n g the p e r i o d u n d e r study. T h e p o p u l a r g r o u p s s t i m u l a t e d t h e m o d e r a t e s u c c e s s of t h e N a t i o n a l D i a l o g u e p r o c e s s in 1 9 9 0 a n d p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n s in 1 9 9 2 , f o r e x a m p l e , a n d h a v e c o n t i n u a l l y e x p o s e d a n t i d e m o c r a t i c social and e c o n o m i c conditions and h u m a n rights violat i o n s . M o b i l i z a t i o n will c o n t i n u e , s i n c e t h e s o c i a l i n e q u i t i e s t h a t s t i m u l a t e p o p u l a r o r g a n i z i n g w i l l c o n t i n u e to e x i s t f o r t h e f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . E l i t e s m a y h a v e i n t e n d e d n e w d e m o c r a t i c f o r m s to b e s y m b o l i c . N e v ertheless, t h e s e structures p r o v i d e d an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r p o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s to p a r t i c i p a t e o p e n l y , to h a v e t h e i r a g e n d a s b e c o m e p a r t of t h e p u b lic r e c o r d , t o g a i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n , a n d to u s e t h e m e d i a a n d o f f i c i a l institutions to further their interests. F o r m a l - l e g a l political o p e n i n g s crea t e d as p a r t of a c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y p l a n g a v e p o p u l a r m o v e m e n t s o p p o r tunity to mobilize. On the w h o l e , the popular organizations w e r e the only sector f o r c i n g any m e a n i n g f u l m o v e m e n t toward d e m o c r a c y , but

this

t h r e a t e n s t h e s u c c e s s of t h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y s t r a t e g y . W e l l - o r g a n i z e d o p p o s i t i o n is t h e h i s t o r i c a l b ê t e n o i r e f o r t h e m i l i t a r y , t h u s it b e c o m e s r a t i o n a l f o r e l i t e s t o s e e k t o r e t a i n t h e s t r u c t u r e w h i l e

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eliminating the opposition. 7 S i n c e popular mobilization remains the key to democratization, it is logical to e x p e c t more repression and state terrorism in G u a t e m a l a in the 1 9 9 0 s .

Conclusion: The Popular Struggle for Democracy Diagnosis T h e political apertura o f 1 9 8 5 was not a reformist project threatened by the A r m y , although there were and are military factions opposing it. T h e proj e c t was protected by the Army from antireformist sectors o f the e x t r e m e right in a sophisticated strategy replacing the " p r i m i t i v e a n t i c o m m u n i s m blindly pursued by the R i g h t in G u a t e m a l a s i n c e 1 9 5 4 " ( F i g u e r o a Ibarra 1 9 8 8 : 1 0 ) . 8 T h e strategy was designed to resist shifts in power, not grant them. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the new political structures after 1 9 8 4 are e v i d e n c e o f weakness in the ruling coalition, and they provide therefore an opportunity for d e m o c r a t i c groups to begin to participate and influence public policy. A transition to d e m o c r a c y in G u a t e m a l a w o u l d then mean at least the beginning o f a shift in political power toward the c o u n t r y ' s nonelite voters. T h i s shift in power should be v i s i b l e both in the quality o f political participation and in resulting public policy, not merely in the scheduling o f e l e c t i o n s . On the w h o l e , with the c o n s p i c u o u s e x c e p t i o n o f the w o r k o f activist popular groups, G u a t e m a l a did not m o v e c l o s e r to d e m o c r a c y in the 1 9 8 0 s , in spite o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f institutional c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f democratic government. T h e armed f o r c e s and death squads continued to be a m a j o r impediment to a real transition to d e m o c r a c y . I m p o v e r i s h e d and o r g a n i z e d citizens have resisted continuing oppression and new disruptions. If institutions are f o r m a l l y d e m o c r a t i c — a n d that is the c l a i m made by e l i t e s and their a p o l o g i s t s — r e p r e s s i o n is needed to keep the popular sectors out o f power. T h e key to understanding recent Guatemalan politics is recognizing that elite v i o l e n c e and e l e c t i o n s are a c o m b i n e d strategy geared to avoiding threats to d o m i n a n c e . T h e s i m u l t a n e o u s p r a c t i c e o f d e m o c r a t i c e l e c tions and human rights violations is perfectly consistent under the c i r c u m stances, precisely because the popular groups tend to be the force behind d e m o c r a c y and social reform. T h e period between 1 9 8 2 and 1 9 9 2 s h o w s an attempt by e l i t e s to impose a narrow form o f d e m o c r a c y from a b o v e . T h o u g h the nation returned to constitutional g o v e r n m e n t in 1 9 8 5 , the s o c i a l c o n t e x t s h o w s the p e r s i s t e n c e , indeed w o r s e n i n g , o f e c o n o m i c inequality and p o v e r t y . S o c i a l p r o b l e m s that lead to m o b i l i z a t i o n remain unsolved, and the new

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political institutions h a v e not p r o v i d e d the p o l i c y n e e d e d f o r social r e f o r m . T h e s t r a t e g y has p r o d u c e d n e i t h e r s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y n o r d e m o c r a c y . 9

Prognosis G u a t e m a l a ' s new d e m o c r a t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s h a v e a d u b i o u s f u t u r e , f o r d e m o c r a t i c f o r m s w i t h o u t s o c i a l j u s t i c e will not p r o d u c e a s t a b l e s o c i e t y . T h e nation c o n t i n u e s to h a v e great p o t e n t i a l f o r i n s t a b i l i t y , w i t h w o r s e n i n g leve l s of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l i n j u s t i c e b u t f e w e r i n s t i t u t i o n s to r e s o l v e t h e r e s u l t i n g t e n s i o n s . P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , t h o u g h p a r t i c i p a t i n g at o n e level in an a p p a r e n t l y pluralistic political p r o c e s s , h a v e a b d i c a t e d their potential leade r s h i p p o s i t i o n in t h e m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l s t r u g g l e f o r j u s t i c e a n d d e m o c r a c y . B y not p l a y i n g a v i g o r o u s r o l e in m o b i l i z i n g p u b l i c s u p p o r t f o r ref o r m , t h e p a r t i e s h a v e a b e t t e d t h e civil s i d e , as o p p o s e d to the m i l i t a r y a s p e c t , of the c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y p r o c e s s . T h e y a r e a c c e s s o r i e s to the p e r sistent d o m i n a n c e of the m i l i t a r y . P a t t e r n s of m o b i l i z a t i o n m a y b e c h a n g i n g , h o w e v e r . N e w l e a d e r s h i p is e m e r g i n g in the M a y a n c o m m u n i t i e s , and f u t u r e p o p u l a r s t r u g g l e m a y well reflect ethnic tensions m o r e than political issues. W e l l - o r g a n i z e d and experienced w o m e n ' s groups have e m e r g e d f r o m the h u m a n rights struggles and are likely to i n c r e a s e p r e s s u r e on t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m . W i t h m a n y of t h e g l o b a l a s p e c t s of t h e C o l d W a r n o l o n g e r a d i s t r a c t i o n f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l p u b l i c o p i n i o n , m o r e a t t e n t i o n w i l l b e g i v e n to s p e c i f i c c a s e s like G u a t e m a l a , with more scrutiny of, and p e r h a p s pressure on, the g o v e r n m e n t a n d military to d e l i v e r at least a m i n i m u m of w h a t is c o n s i s t e n t with prevailing Western values. In the past elites h a v e s h o w n w i l l i n g n e s s to alter their p u b l i c p o l i c i e s in f a v o r of the n a t i o n ' s i m p o v e r i s h e d i n h a b i t a n t s o n l y w h e n p r e s s u r e d by the p o p u l a r s e c t o r s . If G u a t e m a l a m o v e s t o w a r d d e m o c r a c y in the 1990s, it will b e b e c a u s e of p o p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s , not r e f o r m i s t elites, a n d their skill in m o b i l i z i n g p r e s s u r e o n t h e p o l i c y p r o c e s s . T h e p o p u l a r s e c t o r s h a v e s h o w n they can take a d v a n t a g e of o p p o r t u n i t i e s to m o v e the c o u n t r y c l o s e r to d e m o c r a c y , b u t v i o l e n c e h a s t h w a r t e d m o s t of their e f f o r t s , at least in t h e s h o r t r u n . C l e a r l y , i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e in s u p p o r t of b e t t e r h u m a n r i g h t s c o n d i t i o n s is n e c e s s a r y f o r a t r a n s i t i o n to d e m o c r a c y in G u a t e m a l a . E l i t e s d i d not m o v e t h e n a t i o n c l o s e r to d e m o c r a c y in the 1 9 8 0 s and early 1990s, a l t h o u g h t h e y m a y h a v e , p e r h a p s u n w i t t i n g l y , prov i d e d an o p p o r t u n i t y . M o v e m e n t t o w a r d d e m o c r a c y c a m e f r o m the s t r u g g l e of the p e o p l e , not f r o m a g r e e m e n t s or p a c t s a m o n g m o d e r a t e elites. T h e c o u n t r y ' s elites will c o n t i n u e to try to use t h e f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e s of liberal d e m o c r a c y , not to m e n t i o n v i o l e n c e , to a v o i d d e m o c r a t i z i n g socie t y . T h e p r o b l e m f o r t h e f u t u r e , t h e n , is t h e a n t i d e m o c r a t i c e l i t e s e c t o r , i n c l u d i n g " r e f o r m i s t s " in t h e m i l i t a r y , not t h e b u l k of t h e p o p u l a c e . U n l e s s

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the p o w e r o f the v i c i o u s and p a r a s i t i c military c a n b e c u r t a i l e d t h r o u g h d i a l o g u e , popular pressure, and/or international pressure, the p r o g n o s i s for further m o v e m e n t

toward d e m o c r a c y

is poor, d e s p i t e the

courageous

e f f o r t s o f s o m a n y "ordinary" c i t i z e n s . T h o u g h i n s p i r e d b y their e f f o r t s , any t h o u g h t f u l s t u d e n t o f G u a t e m a l a is h a r d - p r e s s e d to f e e l o p t i m i s t i c about the future.

Notes 1. For a d d i t i o n a l s t u d i e s of t h e t r a n s i t i o n p r o c e s s in G u a t e m a l a , see R o s a d a G r a n a d o s 1 9 8 9 and 1990. 2. For a c o m p l e m e n t a r y a n a l y s i s , see J o n a s 1991: e s p e c i a l l y c h a p t e r 11. J o n a s s e e s this p r o c e s s of e s t a b l i s h i n g d o m i n a t i o n as a p r o j e c t of a b r o a d e r e l i t e , not m e r e l y a goal of t h e m i l i t a r y . B a s i c a l l y , s h e is c o r r e c t : u n d e r n e a t h the c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g v a r i o u s m i l i t a r y and n o n m i l i t a r y f a c t i o n s o v e r s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s a n d / o r p e r s o n a l i t i e s lies a s u b s t r u c t u r e of c o n s i s t e n t u n i t y that a i m s to k e e p e l i t e s d o m i n a n t . G i v e n this " p a n - e l i t e " h y p o t h e s i s , t h e p h r a s e " c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y s t a t e , " w h i c h c o n n o t e s c o n s t a n t , a c t i v e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s , m a y be a l e s s - t h a n - a d e q u a t e p h r a s e for d e s c r i b i n g t h e G u a t e m a l a n p r o c e s s , f o r t h e c i v i l a c t i v i t i e s of t h e s t a t e w o r k t o w a r d the s a m e , a n t i d e m o c r a t i c e n d s . S e e A n d e r s o n and S i m o n f o r an a p p r o a c h that d o e s use the c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y state m e t a p h o r . 3. In r e s p o n s e to the q u e s t i o n of w h e r e r e a l p o w e r lies in G u a t e m a l a , f o r example, Cerezo said: T h e A r m y h a s c h a n g e d . It is in an i m p o r t a n t p r o c e s s of r e c o g n i z i n g its s p e c i f i c , p r o f e s s i o n a l r o l e of p r o v i d i n g s e c u r i t y , w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s an i n t i m a t e part of the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e o n e w h o m a k e s the p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s in G u a t e m a l a is the p r e s i d e n t of G u a t e m a l a . A s any political leader, he d o e s so w i t h the d i s c u s s i o n and p a r t i c i p a t i o n of p o p u l a r , e c o n o m i c , and political s e c t o r s and the state s e c u r i t y f o r c e s , but the u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n is m a d e by (he p r e s i d e n t and you can be s u r e of that ( C e r e z o 1988: 9). 4. For e x a m p l e , C o l o n e l F r a n c i s c o Luis G o r d i l l o , a j u n t a m e m b e r in the R í o s M o n t t c o u p in 1982, f o u n d e r of his o w n p o l i t i c a l party f o r the 1 9 8 4 and 1985 e l e c t i o n s ( t h e E m e r g e n t C o n c o r d a n c e M o v e m e n t — M E C ) , a n d a m e m b e r of t h e Guatemalan National Reconciliation C o m m i s s i o n , states: I b e l i e v e that an a r m y s h o u l d not rule; u n f o r t u n a t e l y if the c i v i l i a n s d o n ' t h a v e t h e n o r m s and v a l u e s to r u l e w e l l , s o m e t i m e s the a r m y h a s to d o it. I a m n o t j u s t i f y i n g [ m i l i t a r y r u l e ] . . . but s o m e t i m e s i t ' s the lesser evil ( q u o t e d in L A S A : 16). 5. U . S . g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s o f t e n h a v e used this p h r a s e to c h a r a c t e r i z e rebel i n s u r g e n c i e s as a m e a n s of d e l e g i t i m i z i n g t h e m . 6. T h e old r i g h t , r e a c t i o n a r i e s w h o m i g h t b e d e s c r i b e d ( u s i n g a p h r a s e attributed to F r a n k l i n R o o s e v e l t ) as " s o m n a m b u l i s t s w a l k i n g b a c k w a r d s , " s h o u l d be dist i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e n e w r i g h t in G u a t e m a l a , w h o r e f l e c t a n e o l i b e r a l e c o n o m i c m o d e l a n d a w i l l i n g n e s s to a c c o m m o d a t e a s t r o n g m i l i t a r y t a k i n g its s h a r e of

196

Guatemalan

Politics

e c o n o m i c w e a l t h . T h e n e w right is o f t e n w i l l i n g to a c c o m m o d a t e popular g r o u p s as w e l l : if the o l d - r i g h t a p p r o a c h to l a b o r o r g a n i z i n g w a s to m o b i l i z e a death s q u a d to e l i m i n a t e o r g a n i z e r s , the n e w - r i g h t a p p r o a c h m i g h t at least b e g i n with f o r m i n g a solidarist labor group (see Chapter 6 ) . T h e n e w right often reflects e v a n g e l i c a l P r o t e s t a n t i s m ' s v i e w s on s e l f - i n i t i a t i v e and r e s p e c t f o r a u t h o r i t y , a m o n g o t h e r s . S e e T h o m a s for an e x a m p l e . 7 . S c h i r m e r d e s c r i b e s it: D e m o c r a c y , w i t h i n this n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y l o g i c , is not a b e l i e f in a s y s t e m o f r i g h t s ; it is an i n s t r u m e n t for the military to p r o s c r i b e o p p o s i t i o n a l poli t i c s in w h i c h d e m o c r a t i c r i g h t s a r e , at b e s t , c o n d i t i o n a l , and at w o r s t , nonexistent (Schirmer 1989a: 13). 8 . F i g u e r o a ' s v i e w is that in G u a t e m a l a d e m o c r a c y d o e s n ' t e x i s t ; w h a t e x i s t s is a r e s t r i c t e d p o l i t i cal s p a c e w h i c h has b e e n o p e n e d b y p o p u l a r and r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e , with a high p r i c e in b l o o d and s u f f e r i n g . . . . D e m o c r a c y that c o m e s f r o m a b o v e — t h e kind G r a m a j o , C e r e z o and their k i n d w i s h f o r — i s in e s s e n c e a s m a l l c o n c e s s i o n d e s i g n e d to a v o i d l o s i n g m o r e . D e m o c r a c y that c o m e s f r o m b e l o w . . . w o u l d i m p l y c o n c e s s i o n s b y all s o c i a l s e c t o r s , e s p e c i a l l y f r o m t h o s e w h o a l w a y s h a v e held m o r e w e a l t h and p o w e r

(Figueroa

Ibarra 1 9 8 8 : 7, 10). 9 . B u t e v e n w i t h o u t r e p r e s s i o n , the d e m o c r a t i c state has little l e g i t i m a c y , and its c o m p o n e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s e v e n l e s s . T h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n n o t d e l i v e r the r e f o r m s the p o p u l a r s e c t o r s n e e d , and m a n y f o r m a l l e a d e r s w i l l not e v e n a t t e m p t r e f o r m b e c a u s e o f the p e r c e i v e d futility o f d o i n g so and the f e a r o f r e p r e s s i o n . C r u z S a l a z a r ( 1 9 9 0 ) n o t e s that in s e v e r a l e l e c t i o n s in C e n t r a l A m e r i c a in 1 9 8 9 and 1 9 9 0 , g o v e r n i n g p a r t i e s lost e v e r y t i m e , w h i c h he a t t r i b u t e s to a s i m i l a r set o f d o m e s t i c and institutional f a c t o r s . F o r a b r i e f c o m p a r a t i v e d i s c u s s i o n o f t r a n s i t i o n s to d e m o c r a c y in C e n t r a l A m e r i c a that t o u c h e s on m a n y s i m i l a r d o m e s t i c q u e s t i o n s , s e e L i n d e n b e r g . His e s s a y , adapted f r o m a f o r t h c o m i n g b o o k edited by J o r g e D o m í n g u e z and L i n d e n b e r g , s c a r c e l y m e n t i o n s the m i l i t a r y in t h e t r a n s i t i o n p r o c e s s ; the t w e n t y third o f t w e n t y - f o u r r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , in its e n t i r e t y , is " s t r e n g t h e n c i v i l i a n c o n t r o l o f the m i l i t a r y . " T h i s a p p r o a c h to a study o f o b s t a c l e s to transitions is not surprising, i n a s m u c h as the c h a p t e r on G u a t e m a l a in t h e f o r t h c o m i n g v o l u m e is authored b y G e n e r a l H é c t o r G r a m a j o , m i n i s t e r o f d e f e n s e d u r i n g the m i l i t a r y ' s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f " d e m o c r a t i c " i n s t i t u t i o n s d u r i n g the C e r e z o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .

Bibliography

Most textual r e f e r e n c e s to p e r i o d i c a l s use a b b r e v i a t i o n s . T h e second part of this b i b l i o g r a p h y lists periodicals alphabetically by the abbreviations used in the text.

Books, Articles, and Manuscripts A d a m s , Richard N. " T h e Structure of Participation: A C o m m e n t a r y , " in Mitchell S e l i g s o n and John A. B o o t h , eds., Political Participation in Latin America: Volume II—Politics and the Poor ( N e w York: H o l m e s and Meier, 1979). A d a m s , Richard N. Crucifixion By Power: Essays on Guatemalan National Social Structure, 1944-1966 (Austin: University of T e x a s Press, 1970). A g u i l e r a Peralta, Gabriel, et al. Dialéctica del Terror en Guatemala (San José, C o s t a Rica: Editorial Universitaria C e n t r o a m e r i c a n a , 1981). Aguilera Peralta, Gabriel. "La T r a g i c o m e d i a Electoral de la Burguesía: Un Análisis S o c i o l ó g i c o del P r o c e s o Electoral del 5 de m a r z o de 1978," Política y Sociedad ( G u a t e m a l a : U n i v e r s i d a d R a f a e l L a n d í v a r ) , s e g u n d a época, No. 5 ( J a n u a r y - J u n e 1978): 1 5 9 - 1 7 1 . A l v a r a d o , Luis. "El D e s a r r o l l o C a p i t a l i s t a de G u a t e m a l a y la C u e s t i ó n U r b a n a , " Cuadernos Universitarios ( G u a t e m a l a : University of San Carlos), No. 4 ( S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r 1979): 1 3 6 - 1 4 9 . A m e r i c a s Watch. Guatemala: A Nation of Prisoners ( N e w York: A m e r i c a s W a t c h C o m m i t t e e , 1983). A m e r i c a s W a t c h . Persecuting Human Rights Monitors: The CERJ in Guatemala ( N e w York: A m e r i c a s Watch C o m m i t t e e , 1989). A m i g o , H u g o . " C a r a c t e r í s t i c a s de la a l i m e n t a c i ó n y nutrición del g u a t e m a l t e c o , " Alero, tercera época, No. 29 ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1978): 1 2 4 - 1 2 6 . A m n e s t y International. A Government Program of Political Murder (London: A m n e s t y International Publications, 1981). A m n e s t y International. Massive Extrajudicial Executions in Rural Areas Under the Government of General Efraín Ríos Montt (New York: A m n e s t y International, 1982); reprinted in U.S. C o n g r e s s , House C o m m i t t e e on Banking, Finance and U r b a n A f f a i r s , S u b c o m m i t t e e on International D e v e l o p m e n t and F i n a n c e . Inter-American Development Bank Loan to Guatemala (Washington, D.C.: 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 1982): 4 6 - 7 6 .

197

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A n d e r s o n , Ken, and J e a n - M a r i e S i m o n . " P e r m a n e n t C o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y in G u a t e mala," Telos 73 (Fall 1987): 9 - 4 6 . Arias, A r t u r o . " C h a n g i n g Indian Identity: G u a t e m a l a ' s Violent T r a n s i t i o n to M o d e r n i t y , " in Carol A. Smith, ed. (with the assistance of Marilyn M. M o o r s ) Guatemalan Indians and the State: 1540 to 1988 (Austin: University of T e x a s Press, 1990). Barry, T o m . Guatemala: A Country Profile, 2nd ed. ( A l b u q u e r q u e : InterHemispheric Education R e s o u r c e Center, 1990). Behar, M o i s é s . " F o o d and N u t r i t i o n of the M a y a B e f o r e the C o n q u e s t and at the Present T i m e , " in Biomedical Challenges Presented by the American Indian (Washington, D.C.: Pan A m e r i c a n Health Organization, 1968): 1 1 4 - 1 1 9 . Benton, Beth, with Betsy C o h n , Charles Roberts, and Nathan D u d l e y . On the Road to Democracy? A Chronology of Human Rights and U.S.-Guatemalan Relations, January, 1978-April, 1985 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: G e o r g e t o w n University Central A m e r i c a n Historical I n s t i t u t e — C A H I — I n t e r c u l t u r a l Center, 1985). Black, George, with Milton Jamail and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla. Garrison Guatemala (New York: M o n t h l y R e v i e w Press, 1984). Blasier, Cole. The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976). Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds. Elections and Democracy in Central America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989). B o o t h , John A., and T h o m a s W a l k e r . Understanding Central America (Boulder: W e s t v i e w Press, 1990). Booth, John A., et al. The 1985 Guatemalan Elections: Will the Military Relinquish Power? ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: International Human Rights Law G r o u p and the W a s h i n g t o n O f f i c e on Latin A m e r i c a , 1985). Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis. Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought ( N e w York: Basic Books, 1986). Brockett, Charles D. (1984a). " M a l n u t r i t i o n , P u b l i c Policy, and Agrarian C h a n g e in G u a t e m a l a , " Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 26 ( N o v e m b e r 1984): 4 7 7 - 4 9 7 . B r o c k e t t , C h a r l e s D. ( 1 9 8 4 b ) . " T h e Right to F o o d and United S t a t e s Policy in G u a t e m a l a , " Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 6., No. 3: 3 6 6 - 3 8 0 . Bronk, William, The New World ( N e w Rochelle, N.Y.: The Elizabeth Press, 1974). B u r g o s - D e b r a y , E l i s a b e t h , ed. / Rigoberla Menchú: An Indian Woman in Guatemala, English ed. trans, by Ann Wright (London: Verso Editions, 1984). Cabrera Hidalgo, A l f o n s o . " L a nueva etapa histórica que vivimos impone un nuevo estilo de s o l i d a r i d a d . " S p e e c h d e l i v e r e d to the S e v e n t e e n t h G e n e r a l A s s e m bly of the O r g a n i z a t i o n of A m e r i c a n States, W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., 11 N o v e m b e r 1987; reprinted in Panorama Centroamericana: Pensamiento y Acción (Guatemala: I N C E P ) , n u e v a época, Nos. 7 - 8 ( J u l y / D e c e m b e r 1987): 5 8 - 6 3 . Cáceres, Carlos. "El g o b i e r n o d u d a , la ultraderecha actúa," Otra Guatemala (Mexico), Vol. 1, No. 2 (February 1988): 1 1 - 1 3 . C a m b r a n e s , Julio C a s t e l l a n o s . Coffee and Peasants in Guatemala: The Origins of the Modern Plantation Economy in Guatemala, 1853-1897, English ed. (South W o o d s t o c k , Vt.: C I R M A / P l u m s o c k M e s o a m e r i c a n Studies, 1985). C a m b r a n e s , Julio C a s t e l l a n o s ( 1 9 8 6 a ) . Agrarismo en Guatemala (Guatemala/ Madrid: C e n t r o de E s t u d i o s Rurales C e n t r o a m e r i c a n o s — C E R C A , 1986). C a m b r a n e s , Julio C a s t e l l a n o s ( 1 9 8 6 b ) . Introducción a la Historia Agraria de Guatemala, 1500-1900, 2nd ed. ( G u a t e m a l a : S e r v i p r e n s a C e n t r o a m e r i c a n a , 1986).

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Index

Acevedo, Carlos, 149 AEU. See Asociación de Estudiantes Universitarios AFL/CIO, funding from, 101, 110(nl5) Agrarian reform, 31(n20), 86, 109(nl0), 136; description of, 22, 23, 25; opposition to, 98, 99; UNAGRO and, 97. See also Land reform Agriculture, 88, 96; diversification of, 24; inequities in, 32(n31); problems in, 82-83; wages paid by, 32(n26), 96 AIFLD. See American Institute for Free Labor Development Alliance for Progress, 21, 22, 26, 38, 59; Kennedy and, 24; social reform and, 57 Alvarez Ruiz, Donaldo, 44; Ríos Montt campaign and, 156(n35) American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), 101, 110(nl5) ANACAFE. See National Association of Coffee Growers ANC. See Asociación Nacional Campesina Pro-Tierra Anticommunism, 26, 36, 40, 56, 57, 132-133, 163, 193 Anzueto Vielman, Gustavo, 45, 46, 131 Arana, Francisco, 20, 21; assassination of, 56 Arana Osorio, Carlos, 45, 59; counterinsurgency and, 58 Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo, 20, 21, 31 (ni9), 57; assassination of, 56; economic modernization and, 23 Arbenz government, 25; economic development and, 22; opposition to,

31(n22); reforms of, 22, 24, 32(n25), 91(n5) Arévalo, Juan José, 55-57, 75(n5); reform by, 21; spiritual socialism and, 20-21

Arias Peace Plan. See Central American Peace Accords Armas, Carlos Castillo: counterrevolution by, 23, 56-57 Armed forces. See Military Arzú, Alvaro, 145, 155(n30) Asociación de Estudiantes Universitarios (AEU), 107 Asociación Nacional Campesina ProTierra (ANC), 105, 109(nn6, 7); demands of, 98-99, 100; mobilization of, 96; opposition to, 98 Assassinations, 44, 60, 64, 110(nl6), 113, 114, 117, 119, 120, 122, 124, 126(n4), 127(nl2); controversy over, 175; investigation of, 177; number of, 42 Ayau, Manuel, 149, 156(n43) Baker, James A.: Antigua summit and, 87 Barrera, Byron: attack on, 123 Bay of Pigs operation, 36, 58 Belize question, national protest over, 165-166 Berger, Oscar, 147, 156(n41) Blandón de Cerezo, Raquel, 97 Bolaños, Juan Leonel: National Dialogue and, 139, 140 Bombings, 119, 132, 171, 184(n32)

209

210

Index

Born-again evangelism, 75(n7), 149, 160; decrease in, 63. See also Messianism Bush, George, 166 Cabrera, Alfonso: on human rights violations, 126(n4); support for, 142 CACIF. See Council of Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations Cajal y López, Máximo, 2, 1 l(n6) CAN. See National Authentic Center Candidates: list of, 143 (table); military, 39-40 Cárdenas, Lázaro, 20 Caribbean Basin Initiative, 162 Carpió Nicolle, Jorge, 70, 150, 156(n43); campaign of, 147-149; UCN and, 66; vote for, 145, 147 Carrera, Rafael, 17, 3 0 ( n l 0 ) Castejón, Mario, 131 Castillo Armas, Carlos: antireforms of, 24; assassination of, 36; vote for, 35-36 Catholic Action program, 26 Catholic church: on economic analysis, 167; human rights and, 121, 174-175; land issue and, 99; Ríos Montt and, 145; street children and, 178 CCL. See Council for Free Commerce CCPP. See Permanent Commissions CEAR. See Special Commission for Attention to Refugees Center for Criminal Justice (Harvard University Law School), 121 Central American Common Market, 87, 91(n2) Central American Economic Community, 86, 93(n24) Central American Parliament, 141, 145, 147 Central American Peace Accords (Arias Peace Plan), 126(n5), 135-136, 140 Central Bank of Guatemala, economic growth and, 167 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 20, 58 Cerezo Arévalo, Marco Vinicio, 9, 10, 29, 70, 93(n28), 153(n5), 196(n8); agrarian reform and, 109(n8); A N C and, 98; armed forces and, 131-132, 191; attempted coup against, 114, 133; CERJ and, 124; democracy and, 5, 73;

economic growth and, 83, 87, 89, 95; election of, 4, 12(nl0), 53, 71; human rights and, 113, 118, 120, 127(nl4), 175, 190, 191; land reform and, 96, 98-100; National Dialogue and, 136; public policy and, 107; Washington visit of, 134 Cerezo government: active neutrality, 133, 134; counterinsurgency and, 130; democracy and, 188-189; economic growth during, 85; foreign policy of, 133-134; human rights and, 116-121, 125, 127(nl 1), 174-175; military and, 129-130, 152, 154(n7); National Dialogue and, 140; policy decisions of, 74, 8 2 - 8 3 , 92(nl3); refugees and, 173, 184(n29) CERJ. See Runujel Junam Council of Ethnic Unity CGTG. See General Coordinator of Guatemalan Workers Children: disappearance of, 175; forced recruitment of, 184(n35); human rights abuses against, 124, 168, 178 Christian Democratic Party (Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca, DCG), 9, 10, 51(nl8), 6 1 - 6 2 , 66, 125(n2); active neutrality and, 134; assassinations and, 43; concertación and, 108; discontent with, 62, 72; economic reform and, 167, 172; fraud and corruption and, 142; human rights and, 117; job creation and, 104; land issue and, 100; master plan of, 84; membership in, 141; outlawing, 114; policy impact of, 89; protest march by, 47; support for, 72, 142, 148; UNO coalition and, 46. See also Christian Democrats Christian Democrats, 39, 150; assassination of, 113, 114; campaign of, 42, 79, 142, 146; CGTG and, 102; concertación and, 115; democracy and, 90, 93(n28), 116, 128(n24); economic policy of, 87, 106, 114-115; human rights and, 116-119; labor strategy of, 103; land issue and, 100; participation and, 115, 125; pluralism and, 116; programmatic approach of, 113; public disorder and, 132; reformism of, 90, 114, 125, 151; social debt and, 82; social democracy and, 115-116; social model of, 115; tax reform and, 82, 161;

Index

U A S P and, 106; UCN campaign versus, 71; vote for, 69, 70, 72, 145, 147, 155(n28); working class and, 115. See also Christian Democratic Party C I A . See Central Intelligence Agency C I N . See National Interinstitutional Coordinator C i v i c committees, 61 Civilian Sector Coordinating Committee (Comité Coordinador del Sector Civil, C C S C ) , 172 Civilian Self-Defense Patrols (Patrullas de Auto-Defensa Civil, PACs), 61, 66, 68, 1 7 0 - 1 7 3 ; dissolving, 137, 183(n27); establishing, 1 2 3 - 1 2 4 , 135; forced participation in, 6 3 ; human rights and, 170; service in, 123, 1 3 0 ; U R N G and, 170 Civil rights, 6, 29, 35, 46, 118 Civil war, 168; impact of, 138, 159 C L A T . See Latin American Workers' Confederation CNC. See National Peasant Confederation C N R . See National Reconciliation Commission C N T . See National Confederation o f Workers Coercion, 55, 57; freedom from, 6; state, 44 Coffee, 17, 22; decline of, 84, 85; export of, 18, 54, 88, 160 Colom Argueta, Manuel: assassination of, 42, 43, 51 (n 18) Commission for Peace and Reconciliation, 171 Committee for Peasant Unity (Comité de Unidad Campesina, C U C ) , 103; strikes and, 96, 1 0 5 - 1 0 6 Communal activism, 41, 68, 189; description of, 2 6 - 2 7 , 29; repression of, 6 4 Communism. See Anticommunism Communities o f People in Resistance (Comunidades del Pueblo en Resistencia, CPR), 174 Concertación, 108, 115, 119, 160 Conde de Paiz, Aracely, 142 Congressional elections, 7 0 ; results of, 71 (table), 148 (table) Consensus, 8 5 ; factionalization and, 133 Conservation International, 165 Conservatives, 16, 17, 18

211

Constituent Assembly: election to, 10, 65, 6 9 , 6 9 (table); national seats for, 6 5 Constitutional Tribunal, Belize question and, 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 Constitution o f 1965: guarantees in, 35; on limited democracy, 4 9 ( n 3 ) Constitution o f 1985, 1 0 9 ( n l 2 ) ; on PACs, 170; Ríos Montt and, 145 Cooperatives, 97; disruption of, 64; support for, 115 Corruption, 4 3 ^ 1 4 , 47, 70, 142, 170; reducing, 60, 67 Council for Free Commerce (Consejo de Comercio Libre, C C L ) , 106 Council o f Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations (Cámara de Asociaciones Comerciales, Industriales, y Financieras, C A C I F ) , 7 1 , 8 1 , 9 7 , 105, 139, 163, 170; National Dialogue and, 136, 138; tax reform and, 161 Counterinsurgency, 5, 10, 43, 58, 6 0 - 6 1 , 64, 74, 8 9 , 103, l l l ( n 2 5 ) , 125, 141, 194, 195(n2); costs of, 4 4 ; deaths during, 116; description of, 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 ; military and, 126(nn8, 9), 130, 135; non-reformist, 130; PACs and, 123; parties and, 191; popular organizations and, 192; reformist, 130; refugees and, 1 7 2 - 1 7 3 ; support for, 3, 57, 8 1 ; tax increases for, 80. See also Insurgency Counterrevolution ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 32(n25), 5 6 - 5 7 ; international and domestic elements of, 22, 23, 29; political and economic change after, 2 3 - 2 6 Court o f Constitutionality, Ríos Montt campaign and, 145 Covenant House (New York), street children and, 178 C P R . See Communities of People in Resistance Cristiani, Alfredo, 166 Cruz Salazar, José Luis, 36, 7 5 ( n 3 ) Cuban Revolution, 5 8 C U C . See Committee for Peasant Unity Cultural disruption, 16, 6 4 Culture o f violence, 33(n34), 64 C U S G . See Guatemalan Confederation o f Labor Unity D C G . See Christian Democratic Party

212

Index

Death squads, 3, 110(nl6), 176, 184(n34), 190, 192, 193, 196(n6); assassinations by, 113 Debt. See Foreign debt Debt peonage, 16, 74(n2); elimination of, 21 Decade of Spring, 22, 29, 42, 48, 75(n3) Declaration of Antigua, 86 Decree 900, 22 de León Carpio, Ramiro: as human rights ombudsman, 122, 175; peace commission and, 171 de León Schlotter, René, 142 Democracy: from above, 193, 196(n8); from below, 196(n8); development of, 4 - 9 , 12(nl5), 29, 35, 53-54, 73, 116; elections and, 12(nl5), 39, 48, 72-73, 187; future of, 194; human rights and, 116, 118-119, 121, 190; ideal of, 9; land reform and, 100; Liberal Reforms and, 55; liberal-representative model of, 6; military and, 49, 53-54, 66, 74, 74(nl), 152, 153, 190-193, 196(n9); popular organizations and, 193-195; procedural aspects of, 7; quality of, 48, 116, 188; social reform and, 8; transition to, 10, 12(nnl0, 11), 13(nl8), 15, 21, 22, 35, 60, 74, 79, 151, 152, 160, 169, 187-190, 193-195, 196(n9). See also Social Democracy Democratic Institutional Party (Partido Institucional Democrático, PID), 38, 66; FDP and, 44; National Dialogue and, 136; seats for, 72; support from, 147 Democratic Popular Front (Frente Democrático Popular, FDP), 44 Democratic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Democrático, PSD), 39, 41, 51 (ni8), 62, 72; Christian Democrats and, 70, 142; defeat of, 42; description of, 46; elections and, 61 Development poles, 61, 66, 75(n9), 110 (n 13); ending, 137; establishing, 135 Devine, William, 185(n41); murder of, 177 Dialogue. See National Dialogue Disappearances, 33(n33), 119, 120, 122, 124, 127(nnl2, 22), 175 Drug Enforcement Agency, 134 Drug trafficking, 89, 142, 170, 183(n24), 184(n34); eliminating, 134

Dubon, Carlos A., 100 Dyes, export of, 17, 30(n9) Earthquake (1976): communal activism following, 27; housing shortage from, 161 Economic aid. See Foreign aid Economic crisis, 40, 47, 82; responses to, 7 9 - 8 0 , 150 Economic growth, 25, 28, 56, 79, 83, 85, 88, 92(nl3), 95, 166-167; decline of, 64, 80, 87, 89, 90(nl), 159; improving, 103; middle class and, 57; military and, 59; social reform and, 19, 2 3 - 2 4 , 96, 189 Economic issues, 79, 80, 87-89, 149, 172, 189; popular sectors and, 160-168 Economic support funds (ESF), 134, 154(nl3) EGP. See Guerrilla Army of the Poor Elections, 35^10; crisis and, 44-47; democracy and, 12(nl5), 39, 48, 72-73, 187; demonstration, 13(nl6); fraudulent, 47^18, 49(n2), 70, 7 4 ( n l ) ; honest, 6, 73-74, 107, 151, 152; military and, 68, 151, 191; municipal, 4, 51(nl9); participation and, 188-189; policy impact of, 7; scheduling, 4, 193; social justice and, 39; state violence and, 73. See also Congressional elections; Municipal elections; Presidential elections Electoral process, 46-47, 152, 188; cleansing, 68; creating, 64—66; success of, 7 1 - 7 2 ; women and, 142 Electric rates, increase in, 104-105, 107, 167 EI Gräfico, 85 Emergent Concordance Movement (MEC), 195(n4); support from, 147 Encounter of the Continental Campaign of 500 Years of Indigenous and Popular Resistance: Mayans and, 179; Menchü and, 180 Environmental issues, 9, 164-165, 189-190 ESF. See Economic support funds Espina, Gustavo: on assassinations, 175; refugees and, 173 European Community: condemnation by, 120; support from, 166

Index

E x p o r t e c o n o m y , 20, 24, 54, 85; agricultural, 8 0 ; d e p e n d e n c e on, 18; m o d e l s of, 8 3 - 8 4 , 162; p r o b l e m s w i t h , 88-89 E x p o r t s , 19, 2 5 , 84; agricultural, 16, 1 7 - 1 8 , 3 1 - 3 2 ( n 2 4 ) , 81; d e c l i n e in, 167, 1 8 2 ( n l 5 ) ; d e m a n d for, 26; e a r n i n g s f r o m , 84; n o n t r a d i t i o n a l , 85, 88, 160, 162; t a x e s on, 8 1 , 8 4 ; traditional, 8 8 F a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n , 6 6 , 130; c o n s e n s u s a n d , 133 F A R . See R e b e l A r m e d F o r c e s Farms, state-owned, 98 F a r m w o r k e r s ' strike, d e s c r i p t i o n of, 105-106 F A S G U A . See G u a t e m a l a n F e d e r a t i o n of Labor A s s o c i a t i o n s F D P . See D e m o c r a t i c P o p u l a r Front F i g u e r o a Villarte, C o l o n e l , 81 Fiscal M o d e r n i z a t i o n P r o g r a m , 161, 181(n3) Fiscal politics, 8 1 , 8 7 - 8 9 500-Day Program, 84 F o r c e d labor, 2 1 , 1 1 0 ( n l 3 ) F o r c e d r e c r u i t m e n t , 171, 172, 175 F o r c e d r e l o c a t i o n , 55, 61, 7 5 ( n 8 ) Foreign aid, 1 5 4 ( n l 3 ) , 189; reliance on, 83; for social p r o g r a m s , 8 8 Foreign d e b t , 8 1 , 9 3 ( n 2 1 ) , 165; g r o w t h of, 80, 8 8 ; r e d u c i n g , 167; s e r v i c i n g , 82, 86, 8 7 , 8 8 , 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 Foreign e x c h a n g e , 24, 167; e a r n i n g , 8 5 , 90 Foreign p o l i c y , 1 3 3 - 1 3 5 , 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 Free-trade z o n e s , e s t a b l i s h i n g , 84, 166 F R G . See G u a t e m a l a n R e p u b l i c a n Front F u e n t e s M o h r , A l b e r t o : a s s a s s i n a t i o n of, 42, 4 3 , 51 (n 18) F U N . See N a t i o n a l Front for Unity F U R . See U n i t e d Front of the R e v o l u t i o n G A M . See M u t u a l S u p p o r t G r o u p Garcia, M a r i o D a v i d , 131 García G r a n a d o s , J o r g e , 4 4 G a r c i a S a m o y o a , J o s é , 168, 174, 183(n22) Gehlert M a t a , C a r l o s , 6 2 General C o o r d i n a t o r of G u a t e m a l a n Workers (Coordinación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala, C G T G ) ,

213

103; austerity p r o g r a m and, 106; f o u n d i n g of, 102 G H R C . See G u a t e m a l a n H u m a n R i g h t s Commission G i r ó n , A n d r é s , 105, 142; C N C and, 99; land r e f o r m a n d , 9 7 , 9 8 , 99; P r o - L a n d M o v e m e n t and, 83, 96 G o r d i l l o , F r a n c i s c o Luis: on A r m y , 195(n4); N a t i o n a l D i a l o g u e and, 140 G r a m a j o , H é c t o r , 8 1 , 132, 154(n9), 168, 1 9 6 ( n n 8 , 9); civil d e f e n s e patrols a n d , 130; on c o u p a t t e m p t , 131; h u m a n rights suit a g a i n s t , 1 8 5 ( n 4 2 ) ; N a t i o n a l D i a l o g u e and, 139; P A C s and, 126(n5); q u o t e o f , 5 3 G r a s s r o o t s o r g a n i z a t i o n s : m e m b e r s h i p in, 1 4 1 - 1 4 2 ; p a r t i c i p a t i o n b y , 108 G r o s Espiell, H é c t o r : o n h u m a n rights, 120, 122 G S U , s o l i d a r i s m a n d , 102 Guatemala 2000, 84 G u a t e m a l a n C o m m u n i s t Party ( P a r t i d o G u a t a m a l t e c o d e l T r a b a j o , P G T ) , 41 G u a t e m a l a n C o n f e d e r a t i o n of L a b o r Unity ( C o n f e d e r a c i ó n de U n i d a d Sindical G u a t e m a l t e c a , C U S G ) , 101, 103; e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s a n d , 167; support from, 148 G u a t e m a l a n F e d e r a t i o n of Labor Associations (Federación de Asociaciones Sindicales G u a t e m a l t e c a s , F A S G U A ) , 102 Guatemalan Human Rights Commission ( G H R C ) , 8 3 ; on a s s a s s i n a t i o n s , 175; criticism f r o m , 118 G u a t e m a l a n Institute for Social S e c u r i t y (1GSS), 103 G u a t e m a l a n N a t i o n a l Police: creation of, 20; h u m a n rights v i o l a t i o n s by, 121; modernization of, 58, 75(n6), 153(n6) G u a t e m a l a n R e p u b l i c a n Front (Frente R e p u b l i c a n o G u a t e m a l t e c o , F R G ) , 143 Guatemalan Supreme Court, Ríos Montt c a m p a i g n a n d , 145 G u a t e m a l a n W o r k e r s L a b o r Unity (Unidad Sindical de Trabajadores G u a t e m a l t e c o s , U N S I T R A G U A ) , 103; founding of, 102 G u e r r i l l a A r m y of the P o o r ( E j é r c i t o G u e r r i l l e r o d e los P o b r e s , E G P ) , 41, 4 9 Guevara, Aníbal, 44, 45, 47

214

Index

Health care, 25, 9 1 - 9 2 ( n l 0 ) , 163; access to, 182(n 16); problems with, 83; social security system for, 21 Housing, shortage of, 161 Human rights, 5, 10, 29, 46, 70; democracy and, 116, 118-121, 190; discussing, 118, 136-137; improvement in, 60, 117, 122-123, 125, 160, 168, 175, 177, 181; investigation of, 121, 172, 176; participation and, 74, 121, 188; quality of, 190; respect for, 35, 119, 140, 141, 169, 171; social justice and, 9; street children and, 178; UN and, 119, 120; violation of, 3, 47, 64, 69, 73, 105, 113, 119-122, 125(nl), 134, 135, 146, 159, 171, 174-176, 181 Human rights activists: criticism from, 119; work of, 123-124 Human Rights Commission (OAS), 176 Human rights ombudsman, 176; activities of, 117, 119, 121-122, 124; power of, 172; street children and, 178 Ideological tendencies, list of, 144 (table) IGSS. See Guatemalan Institute for Social Security Illiteracy, 25, 64, 9 2 ( n l l ) IMF. See International Monetary Fund Impunity, 176, 178 INCAP. See Nutritional Institute for Central America and Panama Indians: life expectancy of, 32(n30); oppression of, 3, 16-17, 61, 76(nl 1); resistance by, 55. See also Mayans Industry: diversification of, 24; reform of, 23; subsidies for, 81 Infant mortality, 83 Inflation, 82, 85, 88, 89, 106, 162; controlling, 84, 166 Initiative for the Americas programs, 166 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), 47 Insurgency: dialog with, 129; rural, 40—44; weakening of, 187. See also Counterinsurgency INTA. See National Institute for Agrarian Transformation Inter-American Court of Human Rights (OAS), 120, 176 Inter-American Development Bank, 166 International American Convention to Prevent Torture, 117

International legitimacy, 64—65, 66 International Monetary Fund (IMF): economic modernization and, 180; pressures from, 80 IVA. See Value-added tax Kennedy, John, 21; Alliance for Progress and, 24 Kidnapping, 64, 117; arrests for, 121; mass, 43, 5 0 ( n l 3 ) King, Martin Luther, Jr., 97, 185(n48) Labor, 19; export of, 182(n4); organization of, 21,46, 101-102, 119. See also Labor unions Labor code, 101, 103, 182(n5); reform of, 162, 163; women and, 163 Labor unions, 101-103, 162; certifying, 163, 182(n6); support for, 101, 107, 115 La Epoca, 123; closing of, 132 Land: access to, 164; redistribution of, 98, 9 9 - 1 0 0 Land reform, 95-96, 146, 173; democracy and, 100. See also Agrarian reform La Redención. See National Democratic Redemption Party Latin American Institute for Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders, 121 Latin American Workers' Confederation (Confederación Latinoamericana de Trabajadores, CLAT), 102 Laugerud García, Kjell, 27, 39, 42, 76(nl3) Law of Forced Rental, 21 Liberal Reforms: coffee cultivation and, 19; democracy and, 55; description of, 18-19, 23, 54-55; land and, 164; military and, 55, 56 Liberals, 16, 17, 18, 54; reform by, 19 Lucas Garcia, Fernando Romeo, 1, 39-40, 43, 53, 63; counterinsurgency and, 60; election of, 42, 47; electoral fraud and, 49; international pressures on, 47; state violence and, 44 Lucas Garcia government, 42, 46; corruption of, 43; parties and, 61; rural repression by, 63; state terrorism of, 60, 132 Mack Chang, Myrna: assassination of, 123, 177, 184(n29), 185(n40)

Index Macroeconomic policies, 189; impact of, 8 9 - 9 0 , 168 Maldonado Shaad, Alejandro, 45, 46, 75(n7) Malnutrition, 25, 108, 168 Maquila sector, 84, 181, 182(nn6, 8); growth of, 162-164; organization of, 85 Marroquin Godoy, Oscar Clemente, 147, 156(n41), 168 MAS. See Solidarist Action Movement Mayans, 178-180; achievements of, 15-16; conquest of, 16, 17, 178; resistance by, 1, 5; time orientation of, 29(n2). See also Indians May Day labor parade (1980), 42, 164 Mayors: military appointment of, 68; removal of, 63; voting for, 72 MDN. See National Democratic Movement MEC. See Emergent Concordance Movement Mejía Víctores, Humberto, 53, 159; counterinsurgency and, 63; electoral laws and, 6 5 - 6 6 , 68; fiscal policies of, 81 Menchú Tum, Rigoberta: Nobel Prize for, 179-180; quote of, 187 Méndez, Amílcar, 124, 185(n38); arrest of, 176 Méndez Montenegro, Julio César, 39, 48, 71; counterinsurgency and, 58; U.S. support for, 38 Méndez Montenegro, Mario: purge by, 38 Méndez Montenegro government, limitations on, 39, 43 Menéndez de la Riva, Gonzalo: as human rights ombudsman, 117, 122 Menéndez Park, Gonzalo, 180 Mérida, José Miguel, 177 Messianism, 75(n7), 149; Ríos Montt and, 60, 63. See also Born-again evangelism Middle class: changes for, 19; counterrevolution and, 57; human rights and, 123; reform by, 20; Ríos Montt and, 63; suppression of, 123 Military: counterinsurgency and, 60, 130-131; criticism of, 47, 72; democracy and, 49, 5 3 - 5 4 , 66, 74, 74(nl), 152, 153, 190-193, 196(n9);

215

dominance of, 5 5 - 5 6 , 68, 76(nl 1), 129-130, 133, 135, 1 5 1 - 1 5 3 , 187, 189-191, 193, 194; e c o n o m i c growth and, 59; elections and, 68, 151, 191; factionalization of, 47, 133; forced recruitment in, 175, 184(n35); modernization of, 54—60, 66, 168; National Dialogue and, 136, 140, 152; parties and, 61, 132, 192; political economy and, 5 9 - 6 0 ; support for, 192, 196(n6) Military assistance, 154(nl3), 192; foreign, 57; indirect, 134 Minimum wage, 104, 104 (table), 110(n22), 162, 163; demand for, 96; increasing, 105, 106 MLN. See National Liberation Movement Model villages, 3, 66, 68, 130 Molina de Stahl, Elisa, 180, 185(n47) Monsanto, Pablo: National Dialogue and, 139 Monte Llano farm, land transfer at, 98 Mountain Officers. See Officers of the Mountains Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries, 166 Municipal elections, 5 1 ( n l 9 ) , 72, 141; results of, 7 3 (table), 148 (table) Mutual Support Group (Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo, G A M ) , 105, 123, 174; harassment of, 119, 124, 156(n34); on human rights violations, 120; organization of, 117 National Advancement Party (Partido de Avanzada Nacional, P A N ) : social reform and, 168; vote for, 147 National Agricultural Union (Unión Nacional de Agro-exportadores, U N A G R O ) , 99; agrarian reform and, 97; National Dialogue and, 136, 138; UASP and, 106 National Association of C o f f e e Growers (Asociación Nacional de Caficultores, A N A C A F E ) , National Dialogue and, 138 National Authentic Center (Central Auténtico Nacional, CAN), 45; MLN and, 66; seats for, 6 9 National Confederation of W o r k e r s (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores, CNT), 43, 102

216

Index

National Democratic Movement (Movimiento Nacional Democrático, MDN), 36 National Democratic Redemption Party (Redención Nacional Democrática, RND), 36 National Dialogue, 119, 132, 170; military and, 152; participants in, 137 (table); political energy for, 151; popular organizations and, 192; review of, 135-141 National Endowment for Democracy, 110(nl5); funding from, 101 National Front for Unity (Frente de Unidad Nacional, FUN), 145 National Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG), formation of, 41, 33(n34), 49, 107, 139; counterinsurgency and, 131, 141, 159, 174; democracy and, 138, 169; human rights and, 169, 172; international support for, 171; Maya and, 179; National Dialogue and, 138-140; negotiations by, 135, 169, 171, 172, 174; PACs and, 170; progressive candidates and, 72; Querétaro Accords and, 169 National Institute for Agrarian Transformation (INTA), 98 National Interinstitutional Coordinator (Coordinadora lnterinstitucional Nacional, CIN), 6 6 - 6 8 National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, MLN), 26, 36, 38, 40, 81; CAN and, 66; description of, 45; elections and, 61; fraud allegation by, 70, 71; National Dialogue and, 136; protest march by, 47; seats for, 69, 72; support from, 147 National Peasant Confederation (Confederación Nacional Campesina, CNC), Girón and, 99 National Reconciliation Commission (Comisión Nacional de Reconciliación, CNR), 136, 137, 169; National Dialogue and, 138, 139, 140 National Renovation Party (Partido de Renovación Nacional, PNR), 66, 70; description of, 45; support from, 147

Northern Transversal Strip, 44 Nutritional Institute for Central America and Panama (INCAP), 108 OAS. See Organization of American States October Revolution (1944), 29, 5 5 - 5 6 , 59; importance of, 23; roots of, 18,

19, 20 Officer corps, political and economic power of, 40, 48, 56, 59, 153, 192 Officers of the Mountains: coup by, 131-132; negotiation process and, 170 Oil, 89; exploring for, 164 Opposition parties, 45, 46, 69; guarantees for, 35; participation of, 119. See also Parties Organization of American States (OAS), 166, 175 Organization of the People in Arms (Organización del Pueblo en Armas, ORPA), 41 Organized labor. See Labor unions ORPA. See Organization of the People in Arms Ortega, Daniel, 142 Ortiz, Diana: human rights suit by, 185(n42); kidnap and torture of, 123, 177 Ortiz Pasarelli, Miguel, 36 PACs. See Civilian Self-Defense Patrols PAN. See National Advancement Party Paramilitary groups, elimination of, 171 Participation, 21, 28, 29, 48, 73, 107, 125, 167; antidemocratic, 27, 171; civilian, 190; community-level, 26; effective, 7 - 8 , 9, 113, 115, 137; elections and, 188-190; human rights and, 74, 121, 188; increased, 9, 108, 115, 116; inhibiting, 6 , 3 8 , 64, 121, 188; military and, 66; patterns of, 5 - 7 ; poverty and, 90; quality of, 15, 35, 74, 129, 160, 176, 178, 181, 188, 193 Parties: acronyms for, 38 (table); circumscribing, 48, 192; conventions for, 65; counterinsurgency and, 191; ideological tendencies of, 144 (table); leaders of, 67 (table); list of, 143 (table); media-oriented campaigns of, 189; membership in, 141; proliferation of,

Index

61-62; registered, 62 (table), 65, 67 (table); support for, 115. See also Opposition parties Party of Anticommunist Unity (Partido de Unidad Anticomunista, PUA), 66 Peace Brigades International, 119 Peace Corps, 26, 27 Peonage. See Debt peonage Peralta Azurdia, Enrique, 39; counterinsurgency and, 58; coup by, 36-37, 57-58 Permanent Commissions (Comisiones Permanentes, CCPP), 173 Perussina, Jorge, 168 PGT. See Guatemalan Communist Party PID. See Democratic Institutional Party Plan for Total Peace, URNG and, 170 Plan of Action, 86 Pluralism, 16, 46, 103, 115, 116, 151 PNR. See National Renovation Party Poles of development. See Development poles Police. See Guatemalan National Police Political economy: crisis in, 80; military and, 5 9 - 6 0 Political justice, struggle for, 194 Political reforms, 48, 129; military and, 59 Popular organizations, 133, 141, 163, 179; counterinsurgency and, 192; democracy and, 193; human rights violations and, 123; landowners and, 43; military and, 132; National Dialogue and, 192; participation by, 21, 108, 189; policy responses and, 95-97; social reform and, 193; support for, 115, 191; violence against, 119, 174 Popular sectors: Army and, 192; economic issues and, 160-168 Portillo Gomez, Guillermo, 177 Poverty, 81, 159, 193; increase in, 95; participation and, 90; struggling with, 28 Power: distribution of, 107; meaning of, 7 PR. See Revolutionary Party Prensa Latina, 132 Prensa Libre, on human rights, 119 Presidential elections, 10, 141; fraudulent, 48, 49(n4); participants in, 65,

217

6 9 - 7 0 ; results of, 37 (table), 70 (table), 148 (table); run-off, 147-148 PRI. See Institutional Revolutionary Party Private property, 109(n9); right to, 141, 172 Private voluntary organizations (PVOs), 27 Pro-Land Movement, 83, 96 Pro-Mayan movement, 179 Property: protection of, 8, 22; social utility of, 8 PSC. See Social Christian Party PSD. See Democratic Socialist Party PUA. See Party of Anticommunist Unity Public policy: influencing, 7; net impact of, 107; social justice and, 189-190 PVOs. See Private voluntary organizations Querétaro Accords, 169 Quetzal (Q), 82; devaluation of, 80, 84, 85, 86, 88, 106; stabilization of, 84, 166 Quetzaltenango Workers Union (Unión de Trabajadores Quetzaltecos, UTQ), 102 Quezada Toruno, Rodolfo: mediation by, 169, 171, 172, 174; National Dialogue and, 136, 139, 140 Reagan, Ronald: Lucas Garcia and, 44 Real wages, 103, 104 (table), 110(n21) Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, FAR), 41 Reforms, 55; administrative, 17; Indians and, 19; industrial, 23; middle-class, 20; opposition to, 56; religious, 17. See also various reforms by type Refugees, 3, 64; repatriating, 105, 117, 172-174, 191 Repression, 43, 152, 193; legalized, 66-68; rural, 63 Republican Party, 147 Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario, PR), 38; Christian Democrats and, 70; FDP and, 44 Reyes Soberanis, Catalina, 163 Ríos Montt, Efraín, 39, 53, 114, 159; campaign of, 62-63, 142-146, 150; coup by, 47, 60; electoral laws and, 61,

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Index

65; electoral process and, 68; financing for, 145; human rights and, 146; IVA and, 81; junta of, 60; messianism of, 60, 63, 75(n7), 149; participation and, 63; Serrano and, 149, 150, 151 R N D . See National Democratic Redemption Party Robertson, Pat: Ríos Montt and, 145 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 20, 195(n6) Rufino Barrios, Justino, 18 Runujel Junam Council of Ethnic Unity (Consejo de Comunidades Etnicas Runujel Junam, CERJ), 123; harassment of, 124, 176 R U O G , National Dialogue and, 136 Salinas de Gortari, Carlos, 166 Sandinistas, 159, 171 Sandoval Alarcón, Mario, 45, 47, 7 4 ( n l ) Self-development, 68, 196(n6); opportunity for, 7, 8 Serrano Elias, Jorge, 4, 10, 29; approval rating of, 168; on assassinations, 175; Belize question and, 165-166; bornagain evangelism of, 160; D C G on, 167; economic growth and, 166-167; foreign aid and, 165-166; human rights and, 169, 175; labor code reform and, 162; military and, 170, 191; National Dialogue and, 149-150, 168; problems for, 159-160; refugees and, 173; Ríos Montt and, 149, 150, 151; run-off election for, 147-150; social reform and, 171; street children and, 178; successes of, 160, 180-181; tax reform and, 161; URNG and, 174; vote for, 145, 147, 149, 151 Serrano government: democracy and, 188-189; housing shortage and, 161; military and, 129; performance of, 74, 159; socioeconomic progress by, 168 Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica (STINDE), 102, 103 Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano, PSC), 62 Social democracy, 7, 68; individual development and, 8; maquila issue and, 181; tax reform issue and, 181. See also Democracy Social justice, 25, 29, 83, 146, 160, 162; economic growth and, 19, 21, 96; elections and, 39; human rights and, 9,

10; improving, 15, 103, 194; public policy and, 188-190; quality of, 15; resistance to, 28; threat of, 8 - 9 ; trickledown, 84 Social programs, 87; foreign aid for, 88; support for, 80, 104; tax reform and, 161 Social reform, 48, 57, 95, 125, 168, 193-194; decline of, 25; democracy and, 8, 9; economic growth and, 19, 2 3 - 2 4 , 96, 189; repression of, 28; support for, 22, 70, 160 Solidarism, introduction of, 102-103 Solidarist Action Movement (Movimiento de Acción Solidarista, MAS), 10, 161 Solórzano Martínez, Mario, 62, 142 Spanish Conquest: Maya and, 16, 17, 178 Spanish embassy massacre, 2 - 4 , 187; Menchú and, 179 Special Commission for Attention to Refugees (Comisión Especial para Atención a los Refugiados, CEAR), 173 Spiritual socialism, 2 0 - 2 1 State terror, 42, 44, 48, 60, 64, 73, 121, 189, 190, 193 S T I N D E . See Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica Strikes: farmworkers', 105-106; recognition of, 101; sugarcane, 96 Stroock, Ambassador, 124; National Dialogue and, 140 Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo Electoral, TSE), 47, 70; election results from, 147; Ríos Montt campaign and, 145 Tariffs, 81, 86 T A S S , 132 Taxation, 8 0 - 8 2 , 104, 105 Tax reform, 2 5 - 2 6 , 39, 79, 8 4 - 8 6 , 146, 181; Christian Democrats and, 82; social programs and, 160-161 Terror, 10, 171; eliminating, 6, 121; increase in, 132; state, 42, 44, 48, 60, 64, 73, 121, 189, 190, 193 Tourism, 165; decline in, 40; growth of, 189 Truth commission, calls for, 169, 171, 172

219

Index

TSE. See Supreme Electoral Tribunal UASP. See Unity of Labor and Popular Action Ubico, Jorge, 20; military and, 55 UCN. See Union of the National Center UN. See United Nations entries UNAGRO. See National Agricultural Union Unemployment, 86, 159, 162, 167; increase in, 81; rural, 25, 96 UNICEF, study by, 167-168 Union of the National Center (UCN), 66, 150; Christian Democrats and, 71; economic reform and, 172; tax reform and, 161; vote for, 69, 72, 147 Unions. See Labor unions United Front of the Revolution (Frente Unido Revolucionario, FUR), 39, 41, 51(nl8); defeat of, 42; description of, 46 United Fruit Company, 22; domination by, 20, 23 United National Opposition (Unidad Nacional Opositora, UNO), 45, 46 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 119, 120, 122-123, 125, 175 United Nations Development Program, 167 United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America, 95, 167 United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 173 United Nations International Convention of Children's Rights, 124 United Nations Social and Economic Council, 120 United Nations Special Rapporteur, 175 United States: economic assistance from, 26, 83, 133, 166; human rights and, 121, 166; military assistance from, 57, 58, 59, 133, 134; reform promotion by, 25 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 27, 121; support from, 134 United States State Department: human rights report by, 163; on political

killings, 117; on Ríos Montt, 145; Spanish embassy massacre and, 3; traveler's advisory from, 120 United States Trade Office: investigation by, 163; labor conditions and, 162 Unity of Labor and Popular Action (Unidad de Acción Sindical y Popular, UASP), 103; criticism of, 167; maquila sector and, 163; National Dialogue and, 136; strike by, 105, 106; U N A G R O and, 106 UNO. See United National Opposition UNSITRAGUA. See Guatemalan Workers Labor Unity URNG. See National Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity USAID. See United States Agency for International Development UTQ. See Quetzaltenango Workers Union Vagrancy laws, 19, 20, 74(n2) Value-added tax (IVA), 81, 181(n3); extending, 160, 161, 167 Vásquez, Edmundo, 118 Vendrell, Francesc, 140, 172 Villagrán Kramer, Francisco, 46; human rights and, 120 Violence, 10, 24, 28, 29, 48, 55, 150, 174, 187; elite, 64; national security and, 27, 4 2 ^ 3 ; reduction of, 135; tourism and, 40 Wealth: concentration of, 20; distribution of, 95; public control of, 13(nl7) Whitbeck, Harris, 145 W o m e n ' s groups, growth of, 194 Working class: Christian Democrats and, 115; domination of, 19, 123; right for, 21 World Bank: loan from, 180; tax reform and, 161 Ydígoras Fuentes, Miguel, 36; corruption of, 43-44; ouster of, 57 Youth gangs, growth of, 83 Yuja Xona, Gregorio, 2, 1 l(n6) Zurita, Luis, 142

About the Book and Author

Guatemala, though unique in many respects, has been part of the recent movement toward constitutional regimes and democracy in Latin America. By 1986, a consitutional and an elected civilian government were in place; in 1990, a second round of elections culminated in the country's first transfer of the presidency from one elected civilian to another; and as of the end of 1992, many of the formal ingredients for a transition to democracy were in place. But might this be a misleading picture? Trudeau expands the discussion of the formal transition to democracy in Guatemala to focus on popular political participation between elections and on the public policy of recent governments. He concludes that the new political space created by the constitutional regime has come about not as a result of government or elite-reformist efforts, but because of pressure from popular-sector organizations. Persistent social injustice and concentrated power—still in the hands of the military—provide both an explosive mixture and a constant threat to the democratic movement nurtured by the popular sector. Robert H. Trudeau is professor and chair of the Department of Political Science and director of the Latin American Studies Program at Providence College. He has contributed to several major volumes on Central America, including Confronting Revolution, Elections and Democracy in Central America and Handbook of Political Science Research on Latin America.

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