Green Criminology: Crime, Justice, and the Environment 9780520964228

Table of contents :
Contents
Illustrations
Preface
Acknowledgments
1. Introduction: Green Criminology and Political Economy
2. The State of Green Criminology
3. Pollution Crimes
4. Withdrawal Crimes
5. Crimes of Ecological Additions and Illness
6. Crimes of Overproduction and Overconsumption
7. Toxic Towns and Studies of Ecologically Devastated Communities
8. Wildlife Trafficking, Smuggling, and Poaching
9. Environmental Justice and Green Criminology
10. The Treadmill of Environmental Law
11. Environmental Social Movements and Environmental Nongovernmental Organizations
12. Connecting the Dots: Explaining Green Crimes
References
Index

Citation preview

Green Criminology

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GREEN CRIMINOLOGY Crime, Justice, and the Environment Michael J. Lynch Michael A. Long Paul B. Stretesky Kimberly L. Barrett

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

University of California Press, one of the most distinguished university presses in the United States, enriches lives around the world by advancing scholarship in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Its activities are supported by the UC Press Foundation and by philanthropic contributions from individuals and institutions. For more information, visit www.ucpress.edu. University of California Press Oakland, California © 2017 by The Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Lynch, Michael J., author. | Long, Michael A., author. | Stretesky, Paul, author. | Barrett, Kimberly L., author. Title: Green criminology : crime, justice and the environment / Michael J. Lynch, Michael A. Long, Paul B. Stretesky, Kimberly L. Barrett. Description: Oakland, California : University of California Press, [2017] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: lccn 2017006844 (print) | lccn 2017011357 (ebook) | isbn 9780520289635 (pbk. : alk. paper) | isbn 9780520964228 (Epub) Subjects: lcsh: Offenses against the environment. | Criminology— Environmental aspects. Classification: lcc hv6401 .l963 2017 (print) | lcc hv6401 (ebook) | ddc 364.1/45—dc23 lc record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017006844 Manufactured in the United States of America 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To Earth: Thanks for the memories—MJL, MAL, PBS To Thomas, Barbara, and Karen—KLB

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A tree is a tree, how many more do you need to look at? ronald reagan, former US president, 1966 Any fool can destroy trees. They cannot run away. john muir, conservationist, 1897 When the last tree is cut and the last fish killed, the last river poisoned, then you will see that you can’t eat money. Native American proverb

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Contents List of Illustrations xi Preface xiii Acknowledgments xvii

8. Wildlife Trafficking, Smuggling, and Poaching 161 9. Environmental Justice and Green Criminology 189 10. The Treadmill of Environmental Law

1. Introduction: Green Criminology and Political Economy 1 2. The State of Green Criminology 3. Pollution Crimes

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48

4. Withdrawal Crimes

12. Connecting the Dots: Explaining Green Crimes 243

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5. Crimes of Ecological Additions and Illness 6. Crimes of Overproduction and Overconsumption 114 7. Toxic Towns and Studies of Ecologically Devastated Communities 139

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11. Environmental Social Movements and Environmental Nongovernmental Organizations 225

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References 277 Index 303

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Illustrations 6.2. Environmental Kuznets curve

FIGURES 1.1. Bhopal, twenty-five years of struggles

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7.1. Deforestation in Riau, Indonesia

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7.2. Fish kill

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1.2. Workers cleaning the Exxon Valdez oil spill from Rocky Beach 5

7.3. Surface coal mining, Gillette, Wyoming

1.3. Air pollution in Los Angeles

7.4. Warning sign outside Centralia, Pennsylvania 146

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1.4. NASA graphic depiction of rising sea levels 15 2.1. The growing volume of electronic waste 2.2. Air pollution, Edmonton, Canada

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2.3. John Kerry, US secretary of state, in a meeting concerning illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing 40 3.1. Smoke stack pollution

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145

7.5. Map of existing, proposed, and remediate superfund sites in the United States 157 8.1. Confiscated elephant tusks 8.2. Confiscated walrus tusks 8.3. Siberian tiger

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8.4. Chemist in the US Fish and Wildlife Service Forensics Laboratory, Ashland, Oregon 174

3.2. Waste water being dumped into a stream 64

8.5. Confiscated rhinoceros horns

3.3. Fish kill from water pollution

9.2. Robert Bullard, the father of environmental justice 197

9.1. PCB warning label

65

4.1. Fort McMurray sand tar development, Alberta, Canada 78

9.3. Electronic waste pile

4.2. Sea turtle rescued from Gulf of Mexico oil spill 86 4.3. Dead bird in oil spill

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4.4. Net covering oil skim pit to help protect wildlife 88 4.5. Hydraulic well-fracturing diagram

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10.1. Worker on a treadmill 10.2. Pile of bison skulls

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10.3. Smoke stack pollution

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11.1. March against Monsanto

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TABLES

4.6. Early evidence of a timber clear-cut, Alaska. 91

2.1. Top five most frequently used keywords/ phrases in peer-reviewed green criminology articles 23

5.1. Valley fill from mountaintop removal mining 97 5.2. Depiction of potential health effects resulting from exposure to pollution

101

5.3. Oil spill control fire after the Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Horizon oil spill 105 5.4. Map of natural gas pipeline infrastructure in the United States 107 6.1. Hummer limousine as evidence of excessive consumption 116

2.2. Top five most frequently stated specializations of IGCWG members 24 3.1. Scientific dimensions of the planetary boundaries 56 3.2. US and world carbon dioxide emissions

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3.3. US total toxic release inventory emissions, 2002–14 63

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Illustrations

6.1. Trend in US GDP as a measure of consumption, 1929–2015 118

12.2. Household consumption for the ten richest and ten poorest nations 256

6.2. US lumber production and imports for all wood types, 1965–2002 119

12.3. Sample prediction of the effect of the growth of capitalism, consumption, and pollution on the ecosystem, 1500–2400 264

6.3. Deforestation rates across 62 nations with tropical rain forests, 1990–2005 120 6.4. Approximate ecological footprints and bio-capacity for a sample of nations 128 6.5. Carbon dioxide/greenhouse gas emissions for a sample of nations, 2012 132 8.1. African wildlife hunting prices, September 2016 185 10.1. Global oil production, 1980–2014

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12.1. Proportion of global GDP by nation, 2014 255

RESOURCE BOXES 1.1. About the Bhopal Disaster

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1.2. Definitions of Green Criminology and Green Crimes 9 12.1. Key Terms in Conceptualizing Nature, Demand, and Reproduction Effects 260

Preface The global ecosystem is becoming increasingly unstable as humans are consuming natural resources and release pollution into the environment at an accelerated rate. Researchers and politicians have been addressing these kinds of environmental problems since they emerged in the 1880s, but nearly 140 years later the ecological crisis has worsened because societies have failed to adequately respond to and control the conditions leading to ecological destruction. While scientists in many fields have addressed the increasing ecological destruction, this did not begin to be a concern within criminology until 1990, when the study of green crimes and green criminology was born. These green criminologists have broken with the indoctrinated criminological tradition of explaining and controlling street crime to focus, instead, on the crimes of the powerful, and on how those crimes generate ecologically destructive outcomes. Relatively few green criminologists focus on the ecological, or what we now call green, crimes of the powerful. Among that small group, even fewer analyze green crimes from a political-economic perspective, that is, one derived from the extensive critique, and the mathematical descriptions, of capitalism found in the work of Karl Marx. Our book is a contribution to that later approach to green criminology, and to the study of green injustice. It is not simply a review of research in green criminology but also an introduction to new ideas and ways of looking at the ecological crisis, and ecological destruction and disorganization, from a political-economic per-

spective. Because few green criminologists engage in political-economic analysis of environmental problems, they will need to draw extensively on literature outside criminology to do so. They will also need to engage with what we believe is also part of the foundational literature behind green criminology—scientific studies of ecological harms and destruction. Because we pull from these outside sources, readers may sometimes forget that this book has been written from a criminological perspective. The effort to establish green criminology in general, and political-economic explanations of green crime and injustice in particular, has been a struggle against the traditions on which criminology was founded. That struggle emerged in the late 1960s as a handful of criminologists began to take up political-economic analyses of crime, law, and justice. But it took another two decades before that critique began to include green crimes, and, we would say, two more decades before political-economic analysis of green crime and injustice started to become more widespread. In the late 1990s, criminologists began to recognize that it was important to study green crimes and injustice, and a number of significant works have emerged to address those subjects. Those works were not always written from a political-economic perspective, but we nevertheless value the contributions of those criminologists. Taking a political-economic approach to green crime and injustice is no simple task, and

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it requires exploring a variety of literatures. Criminologists—who claim that their discipline is interdisciplinary—should welcome this crossdisciplinary use of literature and research. We suspect, however, that many of them will challenge the idea that criminologists should fi nd relevant research in the physical sciences on issues such as climate change—for example, empirical studies that stake out the planetary boundaries; measure pollution levels in ecosystems; determine the ecological footprint of humans; or examine how the global capitalist system, the treadmill of production, and ecologically unequal exchange affect ecological destruction and disorganization. To those individuals, we would suggest that over the past half century, and even more so over the past quarter century, the world around us has changed dramatically. For more than twenty-five years, the street crimes that criminologists have made a living studying have been in decline globally, while evidence shows that the ecologically destructive behaviors of the powerful and the capitalist system of production have escalated. It’s a new world, and it’s time for a new form of criminology—green criminology—that addresses these issues to become more widely accepted. For the new generation of students, this book’s subject matter will be challenging, not because they are unaware of what is happening to the ecosystem around them but because, like criminologists, they think of criminology as being concerned only with controlling crime— which really means street crime. These students were not, before becoming criminology students, or perhaps even as criminology students, exposed to the idea of green crimes, or the crimes of the powerful, and they certainly were not taught about data sets and sources that measure green crimes, the regulation of environmental/green crimes, or how the crimes of the powerful victimize them. For students, then,

Preface

the struggle will mean being open to the idea that there are kinds of crime and forms of injustice—green crimes and green injustices—that they have not thought about, or been exposed to, which are changing the very nature of the world around them in significant ways—sometimes in ways that are so large that they seem beyond control. If you are a student struggling with the idea of green crime, don’t give up—keep asking questions and learning, because this form of crime will have a significant impact on what criminologists like to call your “life course,” or your life’s trajectory. The world—despite what politicians will sometimes say—is getting warmer, there is extensive pollution, and ecosystems are being destroyed. All this will affect the kinds of lives you lead. Ignoring the need to get the nation’s leaders to cooperate to address these problems isn’t going to improve matters. For criminologists, this will mean thinking about environmental social control, and how that can be accomplished—which is a big issue. For those of you who think that as an individual you can’t tackle big issues like this, we will refer you to some stories about environmental activists—and there is no reason that criminologists can’t be environmental activists—such as professor and criminologist Melissa Jarrell, who has been engaged in environmental justice activism for the past decade. Those stories are also told in the book Eco-Amazons: 20 Women Who Are Transforming the World, by Dorka Keehn. In our view, two of the most motivating examples of people who have transformed the world are Lois Gibbs and Wangari Muta Maathai. Lois Gibbs was a mother and housewife in the Niagara Fall’s community of Love Canal in the late 1970s, when serious environmental problems emerged there, and her son and other children in the community were exposed to significant environmental contamination that caused them to become ill. Gibbs organized her neighbors to fight the Niagara City, New York

Preface

state and Federal governments—going so far as to kidnap two EPA officials—to force a solution to the problems her community was experiencing. Two years later, Gibbs formed the Citizens’ Clearing House for Hazardous Waste (now called the Center for Health, Environment, and Justice: CHEJ.ORG), which assists communities across the United States in addressing local environmental problems. Gibbs changed how communities respond to their environmental victimization, and she also helped create important legislation (the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980; and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986). For her part, Maathai changed the course of a nation and affected the lives of numerous women in Kenya. Maathai, born in a small village in Kenya, was the first woman in East Africa to earn a PhD (1971), and later became the fi rst woman appointed as associate professor, or chair, of a university department in Kenya. Throughout her career, Maathai was politically active. Her most widely recognized accomplishment was establishing, in 1977, the Green Belt Movement, a grassroots organization that sought to reforest Kenya through engagement with marginalized women in villages. These women, who became environmental stewards, preserving and restoring Kenya’s ecosystems, were provided with jobs and better access to water and wood fuels. From these

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humble origins, the Green Belt Movement has grown so significantly that estimates are that its members have replanted more than fifty-one million trees in Kenya. Maathai’s efforts not only changed the Kenyan ecosystem but the lives of many economically marginalized women. Her efforts were such a success, and were so widely recognized, that in 2004 she became the first African woman to receive a Noble Peace Prize, for her work in sustainable development, democratization, and peace. So when you think you can’t do anything to change the world around you, think of the courageous efforts of people like Maathai and Gibbs. In closing, part of the point of this book is that it is indeed necessary to make significant changes. Some of those changes, like changing the nature of criminology, are relatively minor. Others, like changing the global economic system to prevent continued ecological destruction, are more challenging. Without these necessar y changes, life for humans could potentially revert to the Stone Age once capitalism has, as many ecological sociologists, ecological Marists, and scientists predict, destroyed the earth’s ecosystem. October 2016 M. J. L., Tampa, FL M. A. L., North Shields, UK P. B. S., Tynemouth, UK K. L. Ypsilanti, MI

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Acknowledgments We would like to thank the staff at the University of California Press, and especially Maura Roessner, Jack Young, Sabrina Robleh and also Ann Donahue, for all their work. We would also like to thank all the UC press staff who worked behind the scenes in producing our book. Thanks also to the numerous external reviewers

who reviewed the book prospectus, the initial draft, and the final draft. These reviewers, who remain anonymous to us, provided useful comments on the manuscript. Thanks as well to the unknown, internal UC press reviewer, who also supplied us with excellent comments.

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CH A P T ER

Introduction

1

Green Criminology and Political Economy

T

he purpose of this book is first, to describe the green criminological literature, and second, to explore and illustrate how political-economic theory is useful for analyzing green crime, harm, law, and justice. Our goal is to create an overview of this field of research and add our own perspective on the study of green crime, law, and justice to that literature. Th is book, therefore, does not provide solely a review of research and theories related to green criminology for students, it also includes chapters that apply green criminological concepts to new issues and supplies unique applications for studying green criminological issues relevant to researchers. To make this work accessible to these audiences, we attempt to simplify, where appropriate, concepts and idea, but we also include additional detailed information related to more complex material for those who wish to pursue research related to green criminology. At the end of each chapter, there are “student” and “researcher” sections. The student sections outline major points students should be able to conceptualize and address, while the researcher section provides some ideas for additional research that might be worthwhile undertaking. As a result, this book can be used as a textbook and to further academic research on green criminological issues.

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Chapter 1

ORIGINS OF AN IDEA The idea of a green criminology emerged in the early 1990s (Lynch 1990; Frank and Lynch 1992), at a time when people were becoming increasingly troubled about large–scale environmental disasters that resulted from negligent and even criminal behavior. For example, in 1984, the Union Carbide gas leak disaster in Bhopal, India, instantly killed at least 2,200 people and exposed half a million people to the dangerous chemical methyl isocyanate (Lynch, Nalla, and Miller 1989; Mehta et al. 1990; Sheehan 2011). Over time, the estimated number of deaths associated with the incident was as high as 16,000 victims (Eckerman 2006). The Indian government charged several individuals with crimes related to the gas leak, including former Union Carbide CEO Warren Anderson, who was accused of homicide. Anderson, however never appeared in court in India to stand trial, and under the laws of India he remained an absconder from justice until his death (September 2014) in the United States, which, much to the frustration of the Indian government, had refused to extradite him. Several other Union Carbide employees, who worked in the Indian Union Carbide subsidiary, were convicted of lesser crimes (Pearce and Tombs 2011). Legal remedies responding to the incident took years to unfold. For example, the eight ex–Union Carbide employees convicted of crimes related to the disaster were not found guilty and sentenced until 2010—twenty-one years after the event occurred. The site of the disaster was not “fully remediated”— cleaned up—at least officially, until 1998. Research suggests, however, that the remediation was not completed, and that as late as 2005 pollutants on the site continued to contaminate groundwater supplies (Broughton 2005). Some of those contaminants remained because the site was also used to store hazardous waste unrelated to the incident. For the people of Bhopal, this long, slow path to justice was frustrating and led to various long-term social protests, which continue today (see fig. 1.1 and resource box 1.1). Other serious environmental disasters, which promoted interest in developing green criminology, also occurred just before the 1990s. In 1986, the Chernobyl power plant in Pripyat, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, suffered a nuclear meltdown (Petryna 2003). The meltdown did not immediately result in a large number of deaths, but long-term exposure to the nuclear pollutants released at Chernobyl are estimated to have caused anywhere between 4,000 and 93,000 deaths (see, e.g., Cardis et al. 2006; Ivanov et al. 2001). Workers at the facility who died from the accident received an average radiation dose of 6,000 millisieverts (mSv) on a scale in which exposure to 10,000 mSv is likely to cause death within a week, and 5,000 mSv is likely to kill half of those exposed in one month. The precise number of deaths attributable to Chernobyl is difficult to estimate because of two factors. First, the radiation contamination was widespread, and studies have detected radiation from the incident far from the

Introduction

Figure 1.1 Bhopal, twenty-five years of struggles. Residents of Bhopal, India, have long struggled to have their legal rights, and the environmental harms caused by the Bhopal disaster, addressed and have continued to engage in public protests concerning the disaster. Source: Photograph © Yann Forget. Wikimedia Commons.

site—some suggest worldwide—though in low doses. The radiation band from the incident that contained significant radiation spread as far as Sweden, Finland, and Eastern European nations, more than 750 miles away. Second, because the radiation was so widespread, and because its effects can take decades to develop, linking an individual’s disease or death directly to the incident is not always possible. Studies, however, have linked the accident to increased thyroid cancer and leukemia rates, especially among children (Cardis and Hatch 2011; Williams 2008). As a result of this meltdown, there have been calls to treat such “accidents” as corporate crime (Slapper 2009). But one could also frame this accident as an example of green harms or crimes that result from the economic organization of production, the main theme of this book. In 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker crashed in Prince William Sound in Alaska (see fig. 1.2 for an example of the consequences of this spill). Official estimates place the size of the oil spill at eleven million gallons, which were released along the Alaskan Coast, though numerous sources suggest that estimate is well below the thirty-eight million gallons that may have been spilled. The size of the spill had a devastating impact on the natural environment and on the fishing industry in Alaska. Many Alaskan citizens were impacted by the spill, and they assumed the spill was deviant, if not criminal, in nature, as “there was willful deception on the part of authorities—particularly Exxon” to cover up the extent of the problem and cleanup (Ritchie, Gill, and Farnham, 2013, 661). In the end, criminal charges were brought against Exxon and the Valdez captain, Joe Hazelwood (Mauer 2010). However, a plea deal allowed the

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Chapter 1

1.1. RESOURCES

About the Bhopal Disaster International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal. www.bhopal.net. In the view of the victims of the Bhopal disaster, an adequate legal and social response to their victimization has never been achieved. On this page click on “OUR DEMANDS” to see what the victims desire as a response to the disaster. To find out more about the disaster, click on “WHAT HAPPENED IN BHOPAL?” To access images of the disaster, click on “RESOURCES.” Toronto Star, “The Ghosts of Bhopal.” www.thestar.com/news/world /2014/11/21/the_ghosts_of_bhopal.html. This news story, published on the thirtieth anniversary of the Bhopal disaster, takes readers back in time to explore how the disaster affected individual victims of the disaster. Bhopal Offender Convictions. news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8725140.stm. This BBC World News article examines the eight criminal convictions that eventually resulted from the Bhopal disaster in June 2010. In 1991, Warren Anderson, chairman and CEO of Union Carbide when the disaster occurred in 1984, was charged by the Indian government with manslaughter and was declared a fugitive from justice when he failed to appear for trial. Later, the Indian government filed extradition papers with the United States to force Anderson to appear, which the US government ignored. Bhopal Litigation in the United States. www.bhopal.com/Bhopal-Litigationin-the-US. This site links to Union Carbide’s documents on civil suits against Union Carbide.

company to avoid a criminal label by paying a $125 million fi ne. Hazelwood was found guilty of a misdemeanor (Mauer 2010). (For more information on the Exxon Valdez and on continued monitoring of the effects of the spill, see the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council n.d.) Earlier environmental problems also influenced public and official concern with environmental harms. In the 1950s, high levels of air pollution were having serious public health consequences, and it was only much later that it became clear to public health researchers that adverse air pollution were causing numerous deaths worldwide. For example, a “killer smog” in London in 1952 resulted in an estimated 12,000 deaths (Bell and Davis, 2001); the British government places the estimate at 4,000 (Met Office 2015). Similar serious smog incidents linked to industrial pollution have occurred in several other areas of the world: Muse Valley, Belgium (1930: 60 deaths); Donora, Pennsylvania (1948: 20 deaths, 600 hospitalizations); New York City (1953: 170–260 deaths; 1963: 200 deaths; 1966: 169 deaths); and London (1991: 160 deaths). In

Introduction

Figure 1.2 Workers cleaning the Exxon Valdez oil spill from Rocky Beach. Evidence of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince Williams Sound soon after the incident. A massive cleanup effort was required to wash the oil spill from beaches and save affected marine life, mammals, and birds caught in the spill. Here workers are seen using high-pressure hoses to clean the oil from a rocky beach. In other rescue efforts, birds and sea animals coated in oil were washed by workers in an effort to save their lives. Source: Alaska Resource Library and Information Service.

the 1940s, the first smog alerts were issued in Los Angeles (Davis 2003), where they were routine throughout the 1950s and 1960s (for an example of air quality in Los Angeles, see fig. 1.3). Similar smog incidents now plague many cities in China (for examples, perform a Google image search using the phrase “smog in Chinese cities”). In March 2014, the United Nations’ World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that, globally, 7 million people die prematurely from exposure to outdoor air pollution More recently (September 27, 2016), the United Nations also indicated the seriousness of the extent of global air pollution. The WHO notes that 6.5 million people worldwide die each year from exposure to air pollution and that more than 80% of the global population lives in urban locations, where air pollution levels exceed recommended limits. The WHO observed that these impacts are unevenly distributed; of WHOmonitored cities with more than 100,000 residents, 98% in low- and middleincome nations are exposed to air quality that fails to meet WHO standards, whereas the percentage is only 56 in high-income nations. That difference, we suggest, has much to do with the nature of the global economy and the transference of polluting industries from developed to developing and underdeveloped nations. Other large-scale ecological issues also influenced the emergence of green criminology. In the late 1980s, climate change became a significant environmental and social problem, and a number of widely cited studies of climate

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Chapter 1

Figure 1.3 Air pollution in Los Angeles. Even today, the level of pollution in Los Angeles remains high. Th is photograph from 2005 shows extensive evidence of smog. Source: Photograph by David Iliff. Creative Commons license CC-BY-SA 3.0, Wikimedia Commons.

change were published (e.g., Hansen et al. 1988; Jones, Raper, and Wigley 1986; Lorius et al. 1985; Manabe and Wetherald 1987; Mitchell 1989; Mitchell, Senior, and Ingram 1989; Pastor and Post 1988; Peters and Darling 1985; Ramanathan 1988; Ramanathan et al. 1985; Roble and Dickinson 1989; E. Wilson 1989). Scientific knowledge relating to climate change was being rapidly modified, and these studies were beginning to produce social awareness concerning the problems it would present. While the science of climate change was undergoing rapid transformation, it took criminologists decades to recognize the relevance of climate change to the study of crime and justice (Agnew 2012; South 2015; Brisman and South 2015; Kramer 2013; Lynch, Burns, and Stretesky 2010; Lynch and Stretesky 2010; White 2012, 2016; White and Kramer 2015). As an example of these effects, in 2003 an extensive heat wave in France, which has been held up as an example of the consequences of climate change, was estimated to have caused nearly fi fteen thousand excess deaths (Poumadere et al. 2005), a figure that is greater than the average number of homicides that occurred annually in the United States over the past five years (2011–16). In the context of discussions focused on global environmental problems, Lynch (1990) issued a call for the development of green criminology. As noted, that call came at a time when environmental harm appeared to be increasing in intensity and scale, but also at a time when public concern for the environment was at an all-time high. In 1989, for instance, a Gallop poll reported that 72% of Americans worried “a great deal” about the pollution of rivers, lakes, and reservoirs; 63% worried “a great deal” about air pollution; and 69% worried “a great deal” about contamination of the soil by toxic waste (Jones 2010). More recently, various studies (e.g., Capstick et al. 2015) examining trends in public concern with the environment across nations have noted that concern with climate change was increasing in many nations from the 1980s through 2007. But

Introduction

in some nations, particularly in the United States and United Kingdom but in other developed nations as well, the public has more recently lost confidence in scientific evidence related to climate change, leading to a decline in public concern from about 2007 through 2010. This may be related to the fact that US and UK media more often contain skeptical commentary on climate change (Capstick et al. 2015).

GREEN CRIMINOLOGY: ORIGINAL PREMISE Lynch (1990) suggested green criminology as an extension of radical criminology and political-economic analysis (see also, Lynch et al. 2013; Frank and Lynch 1992; Ruggiero and South 2013; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013a). The greening of criminology was, above all, a call for criminologists to focus on the economic origins of crimes against the environment. When green criminology emerged, environmental crimes—even though they were the focus of public attention and concern—were largely neglected in the criminological literature. And when they were discussed, they were examined in reference to state, corporate, and organized crime, and not as important topics in their own right. For instance, Block and Scarpitti (1985) analyzed the extent of the Mafia’s participation in the illegal disposal of hazardous waste and the consequences of the movement of organized crime into the profitable toxic waste business in New York. Later, Block and Bernard (1988) examined how changes in the petroleum industry intersected with changes in environmental laws, to open up a hazardous waste market that was taken over by the Mafia and used to illegally dispose of toxic wastes in fuel sold on the free market to consumers. Criminologists and sociologists also examined violations of environmental laws in corporate crime research (e.g., Clinard and Yeager 1980; Frank and Lynch 1992). To be sure, researchers continue to study organized, state, and corporate crimes relating to toxic waste (e.g., Massari and Monzini 2004) and natural resources violations, including poaching (Hauck and Sweijd 1999). However, green criminology has also come of age and is now orienting the field of criminology around concepts related to the production of environmental/ green harms. More than twenty–five years later, the field of green criminology has expanded considerably. As a result, there are now numerous explanations of what green criminology does or is about. Not surprisingly, many of these descriptions are tied to the theoretical orientation of the researcher. Thus, references to green criminology are no longer exclusively focused on politicaleconomic explanations, as Lynch (1990) once envisioned. As a result, we are reminded of what Alvin Gouldner (1971, 490) suggested: social scientists “must—at the very least—acquire the ingrained habit of viewing [their] own beliefs as [they] view those held by others.” Consistent with that argument, we

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Chapter 1

acknowledge that this book specifically focuses on political-economic approaches to green criminology, while still attending to the kinds of issues green criminologists have drawn attention to over the past quarter of a century.

WHAT IS GREEN CRIMINOLOGY? We begin our description of green criminology by drawing on the view of Rob White (2008, 50), who proposed that “green criminology emphasizes environmental justice, with a special focus on human rights and social equity; and ecological justice, with a special focus on the biosphere generally and the rights of non–human as well as human.” Indeed, some of the earliest green criminological studies explored the problem of environmental justice or the uneven distribution of ecological harms in society as they affect humans (Lynch and Stretesky 1998, 1999; Stretesky and Lynch 1998, 1999; see also ch. 9 on environmental justice). Like White, Carrabine et al. (2009, 316) pointed out that “green criminology suggests that we reappraise more traditional notions of crimes, offences and injurious behaviours and start to examine the role that societies (including corporations and governments) play in generating environmental degradation.” Building on prior descriptions of green criminology, Lynch and Stretesky (2011, 2) stated that the purpose of green criminology is to “provide space within criminology to examine the nexus between environmental problems, the definition of harms against nature as crimes, the need to reconsider criminal justice practices and policy in relationship to the environmental harms they produce, the variety of victims environmental offenses create (for human and non–human species, as well as ecological segments such as wetlands, forests, air, and land, etc.) and the effect of environmental toxins on ecological systems and species’ health and behavior.” Finally, the defi nition of green crime tells researchers what they should explore. As Eman, Meško, and Fields (2009, 576–77) stated, “Green criminology . . . represents the branch of criminology that deals with research into criminality against the environment and associated phenomena.” Other definitions of green crime can be found in resource box 1.2. In resource box 1.2, each researcher offers a slightly different view about green crime and green criminology. Nevertheless, there is some general agreement that green criminology focuses on ecosystem harm, or what we will often refer to as ecological disorganization or ecological destruction. These latter terms are used often in political-economic analyses of environmental harms. Moreover, many descriptions of green criminology continue to emphasize the connections between environmental harm, social equity, and power relations (called environmental justice). This diversity of views is useful for promoting a wide range of studies and different interpretations of the harms caused by ecological destruction. Green criminological researchers note, however, that the

1.2. RESOURCES

Definitions of Green Criminology and Green Crimes These sources, listed from earliest to most recent, offer varying definitions of green criminology and green crimes. Lynch (1990, 4). Lynch argues green criminology should include “the study of crimes committed against humanity through environmental destruction.” Beirne and South (2007, xiii). “At the most abstract level” a green crime involves “the study of those harms against humanity, against the environment (including space) and against non-human animals committed by both the powerful institutions (e.g., governments, transnational corporations, military apparatuses) and also by ordinary people.” White (2008). White’s typology of environmental crimes is as follows: (1) brown crimes, which include environmental harms in urban landscapes; (2) white crimes, or those that develop from new technologies; and (3) green crimes, or environmental harms that relate to wildlife harm. Wyatt (2009, 145). “Wildlife trafficking or the illegal wildlife trade is the specific name of the green crime that involves the illegal trade, smuggling, poaching, capture or collection of endangered species, protected wildlife (including animals or plants that are subject to harvest quotas and regulated by permits), derivatives or products thereof.” Walters (2010, 181). Eco-crime “extends existing definitions of environmental crime to include licensed or lawful acts of ecological degradation committed by states and corporations.” White (2010). White defines the scope of green criminology research as encompassing three primary focuses: (1) environmental justice, (2) ecological justice, and (3) animal rights. Brisman and South (2013, 116). Brisman and South suggest the need to distinguish between “primary and secondary green crimes, classifying some as resulting directly from the destruction and degradation of the earth’s resources, such as pollution of the air and oceans, abuse of non-human species, and deforestation, and others as crimes or harms that are symbiotic with or dependent upon such destruction and efforts made to regulate or prevent it, such as those arising from the exploitation of conditions that follow after environmental damage or crisis (e.g., illegal markets for food, medicine, water) and/or those arising from the violation of rules that attempt to regulate environmental harm and to respond to disaster” (our emphasis). Stretesky, Long, and Lynch (2013b, 2). Define green crime as “acts that cause or have the potential to cause significant harm to ecological systems for the purpose of increasing or supporting production.” They note that, in identifying those harms, green criminologists should refer to “scientific evidence” of ecological destruction. Beirne (2014, 55). Beirne defines the specific green crime he calls “theriocide” as the “socially acceptable or unacceptable, legal or illegal” and “intentional or unintentional” killing of animals by humans.

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diversity of views about what constitutes green criminology may also present a problem for this field of study. Eman, Mesko, and Fields (2009, 577) state that because within green criminology there is a “lack of an adequate terminology and commonly accepted internationally acknowledged definition problems at all levels of discussion” are appearing. For them, this means that “the lack of an agreed definition of green criminology presents an additional problem in the field of research surrounding environmental criminality,” that is, “it is difficult to develop satisfactory theoretical frames of green criminology as a new branch of criminology.” Lynch and Stretesky (2011, 293) also lament that “the issues and problems approach that has dominated green criminology has delayed efforts to construct a conceptual framework that describes and organizes the field so that it may continue to advance.” We address that theoretical problem by taking a political-economic approach to green crimes, or human behaviors that cause ecological destruction and ecological disorganization. Such an approach draws attention to the ways in which a society’s economic and political structures generate activities that result in green crimes. Ecological disorganization is a measure, determined on the basis of scientific studies, of the disruption of ecosystems and ecosystem functions by human activity. Disruptions may be direct, as when the extraction of raw materials (e.g., mining, drilling, timber harvests) pollutes or destroys environments. Or they may be indirect, as when clearcutting a forest eventually causes a decline in species living there that play important roles in maintaining a healthy ecosystem. The following chapters explore particular kinds of ecological destruction and disorganization—such as pollution; ecological withdrawals and additions; overproduction and overconsumption; wildlife trafficking; and smuggling—and illustrate some directly and indirectly harmful outcomes in towns that have been contaminated by toxins. Green criminology is still developing, and scholars have described the field in diverse ways, since it lacks a theoretical focus and no shared definition of green crime exists. Some have adopted existing defi nitions and theoretical arguments. For example, Carrabine et al. (2009) argued for constructing typologies of green crimes from existing green criminological research (see also, Lynch and Stretesky 2011). Others have used quite different terminology. Gibbs et al. (2010), for instance, proposed that green criminology be reorganized and renamed “conservation criminology,” a multidisciplinary framework that integrates criminology, natural resource management, and risk and decision analyses. Still others (Herbig and Joubert 2006) have questioned whether merely giving the field a new name is an adequate solution. We examine green crime and harm from the perspective of politicaleconomic theory, by which we mean theoretical approaches that frame environmental problems in terms of how society’s economic organization

Introduction

influences the type and amount of ecological destruction, and how society responds, as well as the social responses to green crime.

IS GREEN CRIMINOLOGY A DISCIPLINE? Where green criminology stands in relation to criminology and sociology has yet to be addressed by researchers who consider themselves green criminologists. According to the Council of Graduate Schools, an area of study becomes a discipline when (1) there are a sufficient number of researchers working in the field, (2) journals and books regularly publish research on it, (3) there is demand for this research, and (4) the field has been defined and theorized in the literature (Minton 1983). On the basis of these criteria, green criminology is an emerging subdiscipline within criminology and sociology. Google Scholar searches on “green criminology” produce hundreds of articles, books, and book chapters (e.g., a Google Scholar search on “green criminology” [in quotation marks] in September 2016 generated over thirteen hundred reference works). Key journals have published numerous articles and devoted special issues to green criminology, including Theoretical Criminology (South 1998), the International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice (McGarrell and Stretesky 2011), CrimSoc (White 2013b), Critical Criminology (2013, vol. 21, no. 3), and the International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy (2014, vol. 3, no. 2). As White (2013b, 8) observed, “Articles on environmental crime and related topics are now featured regularly in journals such as the British Journal of Criminology, the Asian Journal of Criminology, and Crime, Law and Social Change. Specialist conferences and special issues of international journals on ‘green criminology’ and on the substantive concerns of eco–justice have also bolstered the presence and standing of green criminology worldwide.” There are also book series (e.g., the Ashgate/Routledge and Palgrave series on green criminology), numerous books on green criminology (e.g., Beirne and South 2007; Burns, Lynch, and Stretesky 2008; Clifford and Edwards 2012; Ellefsen, Sollund, and Larsen 2012; Lynch and Stretesky 2014; Nurse 2013; Situ and Emmons 2000; South and Brisman 2013; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013; Westerhuis, Walters, and Wyatt 2013; White 2009, 2010a). In short, green criminology contains sufficient publications to be considered an emerging discipline. In 2009, Rob White founded the International Green Criminology Working Group, which consists of well over a hundred members globally. In 2012, Michael J. Lynch helped create a website for the working group (www .greencriminology.org), so that green criminologists could better communicate, share their work, and provide publicly accessible information. Green criminologists have also organized conferences, and major universities across the globe have begun to advertise for green criminologists.

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Finally, theories of green criminology are beginning to develop (Lynch and Stretesky 2014; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013b). Nevertheless, much work still needs to be done. Green criminology draws in part on mainstream or traditional criminology for inspiration (e.g., Agnew 2012; Pires and Clarke 2012), and some researchers question whether it needs to be a distinct discipline and whether it contributes to an understanding of green crime that other criminologists might overlook (for a discussion, see Clarke 2013). We ourselves welcome both mainstream and more specialized studies, but we also believe that green criminology has not yet reached disciplinary status in terms of theory. Therefore, we refer to green criminology as an emerging subdiscipline within criminology and sociology, though White (2013a, 8–9) suggests that “green criminologists are no longer on the fringe insofar as a critical mass of academics and activists has now forged their place within conventional forms of criminology.” Researchers are beginning to develop theories for green criminology, and new approaches to the field are emerging.

WHAT IS GREEN CRIME? While green criminology continues to develop, researchers are debating what constitutes green crime on the bases of their own theoretical assumptions. For instance, Situ and Emmons (2000, 3) defi ned an environmental crime as “an unauthorized act or omission that violates the law and is therefore subject to criminal prosecution and criminal sanction.” This legalistic definition implies that only acts that violate the criminal law can be considered environmental crimes. Clifford and Edwards (2012, 114) support this view, suggesting that an “environmental crime is an act in violation of an environmental protection statute that applies to the area (jurisdiction) in which the act occurred and that has clearly identified criminal sanctions for the purposes of police enforcement.” They argue that this definition is preferable because it allows law enforcement to do something about these horrific problems. To be sure, some forms of ecological destruction such as poaching can be described in legalistic terms (Eliason 2012). However, a strict legal definition of green crime may be problematic for regulations that govern toxic waste and pollution, since companies can legally pollute if they obtain a pollution permit. But these acts still cause ecological destruction. As Wilson (1996, 151) suggests, “Environmental criminal law is simply a harsher sanction attached to a regulatory process in which little, if any, destruction is forbidden, and little, if any ecologically–conscious action is commanded. . . . [It is] . . . used as a tack– on to the regulatory process.” For this reason, Clifford and Edwards (2012, 115) suggest that environmental crime is distinct from environmental harm,

Introduction

pointing out that “environmental harm is an act committed with the intent to harm or with the potential to cause harm to ecological and/or biological systems,” but such acts are not necessarily unlawful. We appreciate this distinction, but our approach to green criminology is grounded in political economy. Shortly after the concept of green criminology first appeared, green crime was broadened to include not only traditional crimes against the environment (as described by Situ and Emmon) but also environmental harms that were not illegal (Frank and Lynch 1992, ch. 6). This interpretation of green criminology, which we share, maintains the focus on political economy but incorporates political and other forces that shape the formal or legal definition of green crimes. Examining how environmental policy and laws are made and enforced, and the ways these policies shape green crime, is crucial. In the current context of global capitalism, we defi ne a green crime as an act that regardless of its legality causes significant identifiable harm to ecological systems—what we call ecological destruction and disorganization—for the purposes of promoting capital accumulation. Identifying these acts and understanding the kinds and degree of harm they produce require familiarity with scientific studies. This definition is fundamental to this book, and throughout we show how scientists identify green crimes. Our broad definition is intended to enable a theory of green criminology that lays out the causes, consequences, and mechanisms of green crime. Our political-economic approach allows for input from different theoretical positions within green criminology. Consider the issue of climate change, which has garnered significant scientific attention. Until recently, most criminologists had little to say about this important contemporary social problem, even though it has implications for crime and justice (e.g., Agnew 2012; Lynch, Burns, and Streteksy 2010; Lynch and Stretesky 2010; White and Kramer 2015; White 2016). One exception is Rob White (2012), who edited an important work that allowed green criminologists to explore climate change, but much work remains. If political-economic theory, for example, is to contribute to the discussion, it will need to draw on other disciplines, and include discussions of the association between capitalism and climate change (Clark and York 2005; York, Rosa, and Dietz 2003), and empirical studies by sociologists and ecologists on the connections between capitalism, climate change, and ecological footprints (Clark, Jorgenson, and Auerbach 2012; Jorgenson 2004; Jorgenson and Clark 2011; Jorgenson and Rice 2005; Rice 2009; Rosa and Dietz 2012). Green criminologists have yet to undertake empirical studies to investigate the hypothesis that the rising temperature leads to increased crime (Agnew 2012; White 2016), as existing studies don’t go beyond measuring what is called “seasonality”—the idea that, within a year, seasonal temperature changes and crime are related (e.g., Mares 2013; Mares and Moffett 2016). Climate change is altering the

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nature of the world’s ecosystem, generating a wide variety of green harms, including specific forms of green victimization (Lynch and Stretesky 2010), that require further attention from criminologists. Later chapters include examples of how climate change fits with our political-economic analysis of green crime.

OUR VIEW Like most green criminologists, we believe the consequences of ecological crime, harm, and disorganization are so serious that they deserve significant criminological attention. Ecological destruction is perhaps the most important contemporary issue in the world today. For example, excessive harvesting of forests accelerates climate change (Ramankutty et al., 2007), while climate change in turn causes increases in sea level that will affect worldwide as many as 150 million people who live within one meter of high-tide areas (Jevrejeva, Moore, and Grinsted 2012; see fig. 1.4). Similarly, pollution is everywhere, and criminologists must pay attention to the deleterious effects of unregulated behaviors that generate pollution, cause ecological destruction, and threaten the health of human and nonhuman animals. Moreover, green crimes should not be studied in conjunction with crimes committed by corporations and other powerful actors that adversely impact people and economies but do not cause ecological destruction. Instead, they should be informed by research from the sciences (Lynch and Stretesky 2011), including careful reading of ecology, biology, medicine, epidemiology, toxicology, and ecotoxicology literatures, that provides empirical/quantitative analyses of ecological harms and their consequences. Figure 1.4 graphs NASA scientific data on the rise in sea level since 1992. Scientific studies, however, are mainly descriptive, rather than theoretical, meaning they do not attempt to answer questions such as the following: Why are ecosystems polluted in the fi rst place? Why do corporations generate so much pollution? Could corporations behave differently and generate less pollution? Scientific research can explain how ecosystem toxins cause disease, and determine the probability that certain diseases follow exposure to a toxin (e.g., Walker et al. 2012), but those studies do not explain why exposure to toxins occurs in the fi rst place. Green criminology, informed by political-economic theory, is relevant to considering whether green harms should be considered governmental crimes, and how economic interests affect the social construction of green crime; explaining capitalism’s role in producing green crimes; examining how scientific definitions of ecological harm are or are not translated into environmental regulations; and investigating the unequal distribution of ecological harms among communities according to race, ethnicity, and class.

Introduction

30

Change in mean sea level (mm)

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Figure 1.4 NASA graphic depiction of rising sea levels. This image shows the rise in sea level as measured by the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration from 1992 through 2007. Source: NASA.

POLITICAL ECONOMY Our work is based on the proposition that understanding green crimes, justice, and law requires a grasp of political-economic theory and analysis of the economic organization of capitalism. When we refer to political economy, we are speaking in particular of Karl Marx’s theoretical model of how capitalism works, and its inherent limitations, or what political economists call contradictions. That view has been extended by environmental sociologists and ecological Marxists. Political-economic analysis relies on the observation that a society’s economic organization strongly influences a society’s social structure, which includes the kinds and volume of green crime, the nature of environmental regulations, and how or whether environmental harm/green crime is labeled and controlled. Of particular importance is understanding that worldwide the predominant form of political-economic organization is capitalism, which takes different forms from nation to nation. Because capitalism depends above all on the pursuit of profit, anything that interferes with this goal, including the stability and health of the ecological system, may be sacrificed. For capitalism, the ecosystem is a warehouse of raw materials waiting to be exploited—through mining, well-drilling, deforestation, overharvesting of resources, and so on—in order to create and/or produce commodities. Because,

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as ecological Marxists note, commodities cannot be produced without consuming nature, capitalism and nature are always in confl ict with each other (J. R. O’Connor 1998; Foster 2000; Burkett 2006; Foster and Burkett 2006; Foster, Clark, and York 2010). The more capitalism expands, the more it relies on nature’s resources to sustain it, and the greater the ecological crisis becomes. To be sure, some capitalist ventures or businesses attempt to lessen ecological damage, but most pay little attention to how they promote ecological disorganization and destruction. In the chapters that follow are examples of businesses that are more or less environmentally aware. Capitalism causes ecological disorganization or nature’s contraction and increasing instability in two significant ways. Post–World War II, capitalism’s effects have been apparent, as Schnaiberg (1980) noted, as the capitalist treadmill of production (ToP) expands (for criminological applications, see Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013b; Lynch et al. 2013). The post–World War II ToP is a mechanism for expanding the extraction of raw materials, or what ToP theorists call “ecological withdrawals,” with the intention of increasing the production of commodities. The increase in withdrawals and production results in ecological destruction or disorganization in two ways. First, increasing the amount of raw materials that go into the production process effectively shrinks the volume of nature in the ecosystem. These activities compromise the ecosystem’s ability to function properly, causing, among other deleterious effects, global warming, increasing concentrations of environmental toxins, and ever-more ecological destruction. We provide an extended discussion of this process in the last chapter. This process also impedes the ecosystem’s ability to create the conditions for life, a topic we will take up in greater detail in later chapters. In effect, the expansion of ecological withdrawals generated by the ToP causes ecological disorganization by limiting the ability of nature to regenerate itself (Foster, Clark, and York 2010). The second effect occurs through ecological additions, or pollution. As the ToP consumes more of nature, production increases, along with the volume of pollution emitted into the environment. Over time, its effects extend globally. It is often difficult to see these effects if only one nation is examined because, in any given nation, pollution, for example, may be declining. The pursuit of profit often means shifting production, and hence pollution, across nations. So, for example, pollution may decline in the United Kingdom as its polluting industries move their facilities to developing nations (Lynch 2016b), which will see a rise in pollution. The emission of pollutants, or ecological additions, also impedes ecosystem functions and damages the ecosystem’s ability to reproduce itself. There are no global estimates for the volume of pollution corporations emit, and nations measure their pollution outputs in different ways and include different chemicals, which make it quite difficult to present data on global pollution emissions. Nevertheless, some green criminologists have managed to study these effects and even model them empirically across nations

Introduction

(Stretesky and Lynch 2009). As we review in a later chapter, scientists also base their estimates on data that differ significantly from what a criminologist would use, and they have estimated the global quantities of some important pollutants that affect planetary stability as part of what is called “planetary boundaries” research (see Rockström et al. 2009a, 2009b). In each of the following chapters, we will offer examples of the wide variety of green harms caused by the capitalist ToP.

CONTENT AND ORGANIZATION Green criminologists have explored a number of important issues related to a diverse array of environmental problems. We have noted that a number of books and journal articles have been written on this subject; drawn attention to green criminologists’ use of various perspectives to examine green crime, harm, law, and justice; and discussed this book’s emphasis on a politicaleconomic approach to criminological research on ecological issues. Subsequent chapters will elaborate on the general observations that follow. One of our goals was to create an accessibly written and well-documented resource for multiple audiences—from students, who would benefit from a review of green criminological research, to academic researchers, who might be inspired to follow new pathways in the study of green crime. The challenge, therefore, was to undertake simplified descriptions of complex issues without sacrificing academic rigor. We also wanted to lend our own interpretation to the green issues covered in this work, which is largely influenced by politicaleconomic theory and scientific research on the problems of green crime and justice. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the kinds of studies green criminologists have undertaken, and the scope of those studies. Next, we give our own spin on the study of green criminology by examining ecological additions or pollution as forms of green crime in chapter 3. In chapter 4, we discuss ecological withdrawals, or the kinds of green crimes that occur when raw materials are extracted from nature. In chapter 5 we explore scientific studies that demonstrate how ecological harms such as pollution cause potentially fatal disease and illness, and draw on the notion of harm that has been developed within critical criminology (Hillyard et al. 2004; Hillyard and Tombs 2007). Scientists have published important findings that can serve as the basis for green discussions of ecological crimes and injustice associated with diseases. Chapter 6 presents our ideas about green crime relative to the concepts of overproduction and overconsumption, which are key political-economic concepts. As part of that discussion, we examine studies of the ecological footprint— that is, the amount of resources humans withdraw from nature, and the harms those withdrawals can produce.

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Chapter 7 unifies the research on the green issues described in earlier chapters by exploring case studies on long-term and accidental chemical releases in communities. This includes so-called toxic towns that have been polluted and abandoned because the extent of the ecological destruction has rendered them uninhabitable. In chapter 8, we turn our attention to the well-studied area of crimes against nonhuman animals, specifically poaching and wildlife trafficking, and offer our political-economic explanation of these crimes, one that has not been widely entertained in the green criminological literature. Chapter 9 examines environmental justice—an issue that we have explored in our prior research. Environmental justice research has been undertaken largely by sociologists, but the unequal exposure to toxins by different racial, class, and ethnic groups also has important criminological implications for theories of justice (Stretesky 2008). In addition to discussing how exposure to pollutants is unevenly distributed across communities, we look at how law enforcement responses to those crimes are also unevenly distributed, and the ways political-economic forces structure these outcomes In chapters 10 and 11, we examine some formal responses to green crimes, which have not received widespread attention from green criminologists. Green criminologists have paid some attention to environmental law, but have not sufficiently explored how environmental law behaves, why it is structured in given ways, and how that structure tends to facilitate rather than limit green crime. To these ends, chapter 10 takes up state responses to green crimes while chapter 11 looks at nongovernmental responses to green crimes. Nongovernmental organizations and citizens groups have not received sufficient attention by green criminologists, nor has the development of environmental movements and their efficacy in controlling green crimes. In the final chapter, we take what we have learned in the earlier chapters to explore green crime theory (i.e., the explanation for green crimes) in the context of the political-economic forces, notably capitalism’s hegemony and the concept of accumulation, that are central to our definition of green crime. It is, perhaps, unusual for the theoretical chapter in a book of this type to appear at the end of the book, and reviewers asked us to explain this placement. In our view, such a chapter must appear at the end because significant knowledge—the knowledge delivered in the first eleven chapters—is required to enable readers to understand it. We reserve our theoretical discussion for the conclusion because we believe theory emerges from research, including one’s own observations, familiarity with the work of other scholars, and the testing of hypotheses. Often theory is treated as though it should be based on conjecture. But a researcher cannot know if his or her hypotheses are useful until they have been tested. To be sure, this understanding of how theory is constructed, posited by Sir Francis Bacon in his 1620 book Novum Organum (The New Method), is a

Introduction

more traditional, scientific one. Bacon suggests that theory is built on inductive reasoning, or generalizing from numerous specific observations of a relationship. A theory is something with probabilistic limits, that is, what is known has a probability of being “correct” but may not be in a particular instance (e.g., disease X is related to exposure to pollutant X in 83% of cases; therefore, when a new instance of disease X is discovered, exposure to chemical X is highly probable, but exposure to pollutant X is not always present where disease X is found). Theories that result from inductive investigation can produce strong or weak conclusions. In contrast, deductive reasoning, which some researchers find more conducive to their fields, is in theory a logical process, in which the conclusion is formed on the basis of the logic of the system itself. The researcher poses premises that are presumed to true, and bases the conclusion on the initial premise. Such an approach is common in mathematics, where the initial premises define the conclusion (e.g., 2 + 2 = 4). Such conclusions are not always possible outside predefined systems (e.g., mathematics, some parts of physics, or chemistry), in which the logic of the system must always generate the same outcome. The social world is messy and contains a wide range of things that might be related to each other. For example, scientists suggest processes that erode or destroy portions of an ecosystem feedback on species living in the affected ecosystem, and this damage is accelerated when the form of ecological destruction reduces the concentration of species in that ecosystem. While not all ecosystems will be affected, or affected in the same ways, scientists have found a high probability of this outcome. Some uncertainty is attached to inductive reasoning that is not present when deductive reasoning is employed. The natural world is complex, and achieving 100% certainty about an outcome is seldom possible. Testing the validity of a theory requires amassing enough evidence about the relationship between cause and effect to persuade others that a particular outcome is probable, even if not inevitable, and that the theory can be usefully applied in most of the cases. In our view, inductive reasoning is the better approach for forming theories about green crime, and researchers are responsible for collecting persuasive evidence of how things relate to one another before posing a theory.

CONCLUSION As green criminologists, we are interested in establishing the objective dimensions of the harms caused by behaviors that generate ecological disorganization, and believe doing so requires using scientific methods for measuring harm. Relying on scientific data avoids making moral judgments. Thus, for instance, when trees are harvested from nature, we are interested in the scientific evidence of the harm that behavior produces, and object to practices such

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as deforestation on scientific rather than moral grounds. We apply the same kind of scientific approach to other forms of ecological disorganization. In the criminological literature, ecological disorganization is not always, or even usually, defi ned relative to scientific measures of harm. More often, a researcher fi rst posits that a behavior causes some form of harm, and then investigates the nature of that harm. In contrast, we prefer to begin with the scientific evidence of harm and then build a case around that evidence. Green criminology offers an important alternative to studying harmful behaviors that damage ecosystems and cause widespread green victimization that goes beyond the forms of street crime criminologists ordinarily study. Today, there are a number of green criminological studies that focus on a wide variety of issues, all of which have to do with damage to ecosystems and their inhabitants. Since all species, from humans to insects, inhabit ecosystems, any species can be a victim of green crime.

S T U DY G U I D E Questions and Activities for Students 1. What are the origins of green criminology? 2. Provide examples of the kinds of environmental issues that have increased environmental concern and promoted the development of green criminology. 3. Review and demonstrate an understanding of how green crime is defined. 4. What is the definition of political economy? 5. Explain how political economy is used to discuss green harms, using such concepts as the ToP, global capitalism, ecological disorganization, ecological additions, and ecological withdrawals. Lessons for Researchers 1. For a quarter century, green criminologists have been unable to fully agree about the defi nition of green crime. Researchers need to help clarify and attempt to reconcile existing definitions. Further, green criminological research needs to address whether dividing green crimes into various types is necessary or useful, and, if so, what each divi-

sion contributes to current understanding of green crime and injustice. 2. Researchers should pay some attention to green criminology as a discipline. In part, this will involve determining whether green criminologists prefer green criminology to be a subdiscipline within criminology or a stand-alone academic discipline. Choosing the latter will mean developing specific concepts that differentiate green criminology from criminology in general. Choosing the former will require illustrating the connection between green criminology and mainstream criminology more clearly. 3. This chapter begins to draw attention to the ways in which the political economy of global capitalism affects the distribution of green harms, crime, and injustice across nations. Those observations point to the need for green criminologists to study the differential impact of pollution and the ToP across nations, using a wide range of studies to test the validity of this hypothesis.

CH A P T ER

The State of Green Criminology

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C

hapter 1 provided an introduction to and overview of green criminology and green crimes. This chapter assesses the current state of green criminology by posing two broad questions: (1) What specific environmental issues do green criminologists study, and (2) how do green criminologists produce knowledge about green crimes? To address the first question, we briefly review the kinds of research green criminologists undertake and identify key themes in green criminology scholarship. To address the second question, we describe criminologists’ use of social science methods to identify, describe, and explain numerous forms of green crime and discuss five different approaches criminologists have taken to the study of green and environmental crimes.

TOPICS OF INTEREST FOR GREEN CRIMINOLOGISTS The term green criminology was first introduced into the literature in 1990, when Michael J. Lynch (1990) argued that criminologists should study green crimes as specific examples of crimes against justice committed by the powerful. Of particular concern, Lynch argued, is the relationship between destruction of the natural environment

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and dominant political-economic structures, such as global capitalism. Lynch contended that the destruction of the natural environment by powerful political-economic institutions has caused devastating levels of violence and fiscal damage that impact humans, nonhuman animals, and entire ecosystems. These forms of green harm—especially air, land, and water pollution caused by corporations and corporate-driven ecological consumption—were widespread, and in the late 1980s had generated a second-era environmental movement in the United States and in Europe. Lynch urged for the study of corporate green crimes, including their extent, the resulting harms, and the efficacy and enforcement of environmental law. Traditionally, criminologists had studied the etiology of and responses to violent street crime, focusing nearly exclusively on interpersonal forms of violence. As corporate crime researchers and radical criminologists argued, that focus omitted violent crime committed by corporations not only against individuals but also against ecosystems and nonhuman species. As a result, criminologists had amassed relatively little knowledge about the causes and consequences of environmental crimes, and research on individual street offenders had little relevance for green crime and justice. While criminology still tends to be dominated by the study of interpersonal crimes, a number of criminologists responded to Lynch’s call (see ch. 6, “Green Crime: Corporate Violence and the Environment,” of Frank and Lynch 1992). Independent of Lynch’s argument, Piers Beirne and Nigel South organized a special issue on green criminology for the journal Theoretical Criminology (1998 2 [2]), which also stimulated interest in green criminology. In recent years, much research on green criminology has been published. A September 2016 search on Google Scholar for the term green criminology yielded over thirteen hundred books, articles, book reviews, encyclopedia entries, and book chapters. A Web of Science search (April 2016) restricted to peer-reviewed research returned 58 results, over 70% of which were articles. More than 150 unique key words or phrases were identified (in addition to green criminology), 18 of which appeared more than twice across the identified articles, generating 91 total appearances. Redundant categories (e.g., harm and social harm) were merged, and a few key words emerged as being more frequently used than the others. Criminology; crime, or crimes; environmental crime, or environmental criminology; and environmental justice were the most frequently occurring key phrases across green criminology articles (see table 2.1). The phrases “harm, social harm, or environmental harm,” “climate change or global warming,” “corporate or white collar crime,” “animals, animal welfare, or animal rights,” and “risk, environmental risk, or risk society,” each appeared 5 times across green criminology articles. Note that multiple key words can apply to one article, and therefore these categories are not mutually exclusive (e.g., an article may well encompass both corporate crime and climate change).

The State of Green Criminology Table 2.1 Top five most frequently used keywords/phrases in peer-reviewed green criminology articles Ranking

Keyword/phrase

1

Criminology, crime, crimes

F

%*

15

16.48 9.89

2

Environmental crime, environmental criminology

9

3

Environmental justice

7

7.69

4

Harm, social harm, environmental harm

6

6.59

5

Climate change, global warming

5

5.49

Corporate crime, white collar crime

5

5.49

Animals, animal welfare, animal rights

5

5.49

Risk, environmental risk, risk society

5

5.49

*Percentage of all keywords that appeared more than twice across articles; eighteen unique terms appeared ninetyone times across articles.

Scholarly search engines also indicate that the number of green criminology publications have been increasing over time. For example, a Google Scholar search for the term green criminology (in parentheses) for the year 2002 produced only one article, published by Vincenzo Ruggerio. Using the same search for 2010, 67 publication were found, while in 2015, 200 research works used that term. Topics of interest to green criminologists can also be found by examining the areas of specialization with which green criminologists identify. In 2009, the International Green Criminology Work Group (IGCWG) was established, and in 2012, it launched its official website (greencriminology.org). The member directory of IGCWG provides members the opportunity to self-identify and share their research specialties. In an assessment of IGCWG specializations, over a hundred members identified over eighty different specialties (excluding green criminology; see table 2.2 for the top 5). Ten specializations appeared more than twice, generating forty-eight appearances across IGCWG members. Note that several members have multiple specialties, the top two being animal abuse, experimentation, or harms (appearing 9 times) and environmental justice (appearing 8 times). Environmental crime, as well as wildlife crime, illegal trade in animals or animal parts, appeared with equal frequency. Specializations associated with policing accounted for about 8% of those mentioned; a range of specializations was tied for fifth among those most frequently mentioned. Clearly, green criminologists study a wide range of issues, with some areas attracting more attention from green criminologists than others. The following sections explore how criminologists have studied these and other environmental

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Chapter 2 Table 2.2 Top five most frequently stated specializations of IGCWG members Ranking

Specialization

F

%*

1

Animal abuse, experimentation, harm

9

18.75

2

Environmental justice

8

16.67

3

Environmental crime

6

12.50

Wildlife crime, illegal trade in animals/animal parts, trafficking

6

12.50

4

Policing, police malfeasance, police and natural resources

4

8.33

5

Criminology

3

6.25

State crime, state corporate crime

3

6.25

Water, water pollution, water crime

3

6.25

Social movement studies, environmental protests or movements

3

6.25

International crime, transnational environmental crime

3

6.25

*Percentage of all specializations that appeared more than twice; ten unique terms appeared forty-eight times across IGCWG members.

issues, published their research in peer-reviewed journals, books, and book chapters and presented their findings at academic conferences. Note that three of the most widely studied topics within green criminology—wildlife crime, environmental justice, and environmental movements—are elaborated on extensively in chapters 8, 9, and 11, respectively.

PRODUCING KNOWLEDGE ABOUT GREEN AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES Criminologists typically conduct research to understand the causes and effects of crime such as, for example, why an individual commits a crime. Criminologists also have studied the experiences of crime victims. Studies that examine or evaluate crime control policies can be concerned with both the causes and effects of crime. For environmental criminologists, this can mean researching why or where green crimes occur, how to prevent them, and their consequences, including developing an understanding of the experiences of green crime victims. Researchers begin by posing a question, such as one of the following: • How do carbon-trading schemes create opportunities for criminal enterprises? (Walters and Martin 2013) • Is global warming an example of state-corporate crime? (Kramer and Michalowski 2012; Lynch, Burns, and Stretesky 2010)

The State of Green Criminology

• How are the harms associated with global warming handled in the court system? (Franz 2012) • What is the nature and extent of wildlife trafficking across countries? (Wyatt 2013a) • Why do people hurt animals? (Nurse 2013) • Do people perceive environmental crime as more or less serious than other types of crime? (Shelley, Chiricos, and Gertz 2011) After criminologists identify a research question, the next step is to determine the unit of analysis, that is, the “who” or “what” that is being studied or observed (Maxfield and Babbie 2005). Criminologists studying green or environmental crime are interested in persons, groups, organizations, communities, and even nations as units of analysis. Studies that look at individuals are described as microlevel studies, one example of which is Shelley and Hogan’s (2013) research examining the relationship between economic insecurity and punitive attitudes about environmental crime. Shelley and Hogan conducted telephone interviews with 405 adults in the state of Colorado, asking respondents to answer survey questions concerning the following: (1) their economic insecurity (e.g., employment status, job security, ability to pay bills), and (2) the degree to which they would support harsh punishments for companies that illegally polluted the environment. In Shelley and Hogan’s study, because information is being collected from individuals about how attitudes and beliefs vary from one person to the next, the unit of analysis is the individual—specifically, Colorado residents. Green criminologists are also interested in studying groups, organizations, communities, and countries. Studies that use larger groups as the unit of analysis are called macrolevel studies, an example of which is Stretesky, Long, and Lynch’s (2013a) examination of the relationship between large monetary penalties and the release of toxic waste by corporations. They compared the volume of toxic releases a company emitted before and after it was assessed a heavy fine, to determine if large fines deter further pollution. They found large fi nes had no effect on the polluting behavior of corporations. In Stretesky, Long, and Lynch’s study, the unit of analysis is the corporation—specifically, those corporations that were assessed major monetary fines. After criminologists identify what they would like to study, the next step is determining how they would like to study it. To conduct a study, criminologists must observe the phenomena they are interested in exploring, that is, they must collect data, which can be either qualitative or quantitative. Simply put, quantitative data are numerical observations, while qualitative data are nonnumerical observations (Maxfield and Babbie 2005). For example, a green criminologist might participate in ride-alongs with conservation officers and take field notes in which they summarize the officer’s activities. Th is would

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generate qualitative data, or descriptions of the behaviors in which conservation officers engage, and is similar to ride-along observational studies criminologists perform with police subjects. Counting the number of citations conservation officers write over the course of their shifts would generate quantitative data. After criminologists have collected their data, they select an approach for analyzing their data and drawing conclusions. Collection and analysis of qualitative data require the use of qualitative research methods, while collection and analysis of quantitative data require the use of quantitative research methods. Analyzing data and disseminating their findings is one way criminologists produce knowledge about crime. The dissemination of their findings can, for example, take the form of publications in peer-reviewed journals, books, or book chapters, as well as of presentations at academic conferences. Contributions to the literature on green crimes and environmental harms have generally taken on five forms: (1) qualitative studies, (2) quantitative studies, (3) mixed-method approaches, (4) theoretical contributions, and (5) policy contributions. Mixed methods are studies that employ both qualitative and quantitative methods. While most studies have implications for theory and policy, some publications are expressly designed to address either a theoretical or a policy issue that is relevant to green criminology. To be sure, these areas are not mutually exclusive, and many published works in criminology blend these approaches. Much of the important background information used by green criminologists to study green crime and harm, or issues such as environmental justice, is generated by researchers in different scientific and social science fields, and might include medical and epidemiological research, as well as results from studies by climate scientists, biologists, toxicologists, and chemists. Here, we provide some examples of these types of studies from medical and epidemiological research, to explore how those studies are conducted and how those kinds of methods can also be applied by green criminologists. Epidemiology is a branch of medical research and is part of what has been labeled the field of public health. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2012) presents this definition of epidemiology on its website: “Epidemiology is the study of the distribution and determinants of health-related states or events in specified populations and the application of this study to the control of health problems.” The CDC goes on to note that epidemiological studies are generally quantitatively drive and highly statistical, and revolve around hypothesis testing. The CDC also notes that epidemiological research explores the distribution, frequency, and patterns of diseases in an effort to discover factors that produce diseases, or what the CDC calls the “determinants” of disease. To do so, epidemiologists examine disease distributions within human populations. Epidemiology has several subfields, which sometimes overlap. Epidemiologists have paid some attention to identifying the parameters of epidemiology

The State of Green Criminology

(that is, defining the scope of what epidemiologists should study), making a distinction between “traditional” epidemiology, which examines the concept of public health at the individual or microlevel, and “modern” epidemiology, which takes a macrolevel view of disease at the level of populations and society (Honjo 2004; N. Pearce 1996). Micro, or traditional, epidemiology, for example, might be interested in determining how the characteristics of individuals relate to the distribution of a disease such as cancer within a population. In this microview, epidemiologists try to discover whether individuals who contract cancer have different characteristics at the individual level than those who don’t contract cancer. Such studies might point toward an individual’s family history (e.g., did other people in the family tree have cancer) or genetic inheritance; an individual’s use of tobacco and alcohol; or other unhealthy lifestyle choices, such as consuming too few vegetables, too little exercise, eating too much meat, and being overweight. These studies may use clinical trials to assess cancer risk. There are two types of clinical trial: “action studies,” in which the goal is to find out whether activities such as exercise reduce the risk of cancer; and “agent studies,” which focus on whether an individual’s use of medicines or vitamins, or his or her diet creates a difference in cancer occurrence. Like other types of experiments, clinical trials use an experimental and a control group. Initial tests are used to establish measurements of the health of people in each group. Then the people in the experimental group get an “intervention,” such as a drug that is supposed to reduce their risk of cancer or an exercise regime, while the controls essentially do nothing. After some designated period of time, the health of the two groups is measured and the results compared to see if the intervention helped improve the health of the experimental group compared to the control group. The above focuses on differences between individuals. As N. Pearce (1999) notes, however, epidemiologists may also focus on social-structural factors (see also Honjo 2004). These population-level studies, especially those that have been undertaken across nations, have added much to epidemiological knowledge concerning the causes of disease. For example, across nations researchers might note that there are different rates of cancer. The next step is to find out why this might be. To do so, a population study uses macrolevel data about those nations and compares nations on different macrolevel measures (e.g., income, measures of pollution, health care expenditures). In a cancer study, the macrolevel measures might be the volume of different kinds of pollution across countries. If pollution and cancer rates vary across nations, and researchers have carefully designed the experiment to control for other possible causes (e.g., rate of cigarette smoking and differences in diet, levels of exercise, and even income), then they have some empirical evidence that suggests the macrolevel indicator—pollution—is related to variations in the cancer rate across nations. Both kinds of epidemiological approaches (micro and macro) may also use what are called “case-control” studies (Breslow 1995). In a case-control study people in the experimental group have a disease, while people in the control

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group do not. Using microlevel or macrolevel data, or sometimes a combination of both, the researchers attempt to discover what factors are different across the two groups that might be related to the disease outcome. Green criminologists might use these kinds of methods, but not to study the kinds of issues epidemiologists usually take up. Unfortunately, green criminologists have not undertaken a large number of quantitative studies, and while there are interesting examples in the literature of different types of quantitative research methods green criminologists could employ, the types of empirical studies and methods that have been employed are much more limited than in the general criminological literature. A good example of a case-control study is one by Petrossian and Clarke (2014), which used the case-control approach to examine factors that affected the illegal taking of fish by commercial fishers. They identified fifty-eight species of fish that were illegally caught, and matched them to a sample of fifty-eight control fish that were not illegally caught, to see whether scores for their theoretical explanation and construct (the CRAVED model, discussed further in the chapter on poaching and illegal wildlife trades) differed across these two groups. Their results suggested that the CRAVED model worked well to explain why some fish rather than others are more likely to be the targets of illegal fishing. Another example is a study by Long, Stretesky, Lynch, and Fenwick (2012), who used a method similar to a case-control study called case-crossover design. In a case-crossover design, rather than comparing subjects in an experimental group to controls, the subjects’ behaviors are studied and compared at different points over a period of time. In a case-crossover design, one of the periods when the behavior being studied is absent serves the same function as the control group. Long et al. (2012) used this technique to ascertain whether the behavior of coal companies was different at a random point in time before and after they were charged with crimes. The authors found that, just before an environmental case against a coal company concluded, the coal companies increased their political campaign contributions, indicating that these companies might have been attempting to garner political support to manipulate environmental penalties and policy. Green criminologists have tended to prefer the use of qualitative over quantitative studies, though the tenets of green criminology themselves do not favor one of these methods of analysis over the other. In the broader field of criminology, quantitative methods are strongly preferred over qualitative methods. While criminologists have debated which is preferable—quantitative or qualitative studies (DiCristina 1997, 2000; Worrall 2000)—criminological studies on this subject provide strong evidence that criminologists generally tend to prefer quantitative studies (Kleck, Tark, and Bellows 2006; Tewksbury, DeMichele, and Miller 2005). In one study, Buckler (2008) tested the preference for quantitative over qualitative methods by examining the published contents of five upper-tier (highly ranked) and three lower-tier (less wellranked) criminology and criminal justice journals from 2003 through 2007.

The State of Green Criminology

During that time, those eight journals published 948 articles. Among those studies, 90.7% used quantitative methods and data. For green criminologists the takeaway from these studies is that the field of criminology prefers quantitative studies and methods, and therefore publishing green criminological studies in criminology journals might be more difficult when they employ qualitative methods and data. In the sections that follow, we review examples of green criminological research on the five types of studies we outlined above: (1) qualitative, (2) quantitative, (3) mixed-method, (4) theoretical, and (5) policy.

QUALITATIVE STUDIES Green criminologists have extensively used qualitative methods to study a range of green/environmental issues. Qualitative approaches are especially well suited to questions intended to unpack details about how or why a particular phenomenon occurs. Often, researchers carrying out qualitative studies do not begin their studies with a particular theory in mind. In qualitative work, a theory might be derived from the data as they are being collected. This section discusses and provides examples of four types of qualitative methods that have been employed by criminologists studying green crimes: (1) case studies, (2) content analyses, (3) participatory action research, and (4) ethnography. It is important to note that, throughout one study, researchers may use these approaches in conjunction with one another (see, for example, Opsal and Shelley 2014, who employ content analyses, ethnographic work, and interviews). Case Studies Case studies represent one of the most widely used methodological approaches among green criminologists. For these, a criminologist might select a particular issue or problem and present a detailed description of the problem. As described by Creswell and Maietta (2002, 162), case studies represent, “in-depth descriptions of a process, a program, an event, or an activity.” Case studies often entail collecting data from a range of sources, which can include prior publications, newspaper or magazine articles, interviews, archival data, public records, and online sources. Case studies can be instrumental, that is, they can serve as examples in and of themselves of a particular issue or problem. For instance, Nurse (2013) conducted a series of interviews and analyzed published policy papers, media releases, and case transcripts to explore wildlife law enforcement in the United Kingdom. From this analysis, Nurse developed a typology of wildlife crime offenders. Case studies can also be collective, for which multiple cases are described and compared to shed light on a particular issue. For example, South and Wyatt (2011) used a collective case study

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approach to compare the illegal wildlife trade in Russia to the illegal drug trade in Western Europe, using parallels between these two forms of trafficking to develop typologies of categories of actors in these trade operations. Green criminologists have used the case study approach to amass a great deal of information about animal harm and abuse, and wildlife trafficking (Ngoc and Wyatt 2013; Nurse 2013; Sollund 2013; South and Wyatt 2011; Wyatt 2009, 2013a, 2013b). For example, Wyatt and colleagues examined numerous dimensions of wildlife trafficking through the case study approach. In one recent case study, Wyatt (2013b) examined the roles, functions, and activities at the Heathrow Animal Reception Centre (HARC) in London. Wyatt obtained data by interviewing HARC staff and law enforcement officers, and also by touring the HARC facility and observing how the facility operated. Wyatt saw that the HARC houses illegally trafficked wildlife that have been confiscated, houses legally traded animals awaiting their owners, issues border-crossing certificates for wildlife when appropriate, and assesses the animals’ health and welfare. A number of trafficked animals did not survive transportation, and many animals had been brought to HARC after enduring serious trauma. Wyatt noted cases of birds being trafficked in tubes, tortoises in suitcases, and crocodiles found with hooks still in them. HARC is open twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and is staffed by a very small group of approximately twenty people. In 2010, approximately 185 million animals came through HARC, with illegally seized wildlife passing through or staying at HARC almost daily (Wyatt 2013b). Criminologists have also used the case study approach to understand the transportation and regulation of hazardous waste and pollution (Bisschop 2012, 2014; Bisschop and Walle 2013; Kauzlarich and Kramer 2006; Kluin 2013; Takemura 2010; Walters 2007; White 2009). For example, Bisschop and colleagues (2012a, 2013, 2014) have extensively researched the legal and illegal transportation of electronic waste (e-waste), by exploring both legal and illegal interfaces in e-waste flows. The transportation of e-waste has been increasing over time. E-waste shipments constitute about 15% of all European Union transports, and it is estimated that somewhere between 6,000 and 47,000 tons of illegal e-waste shipments occur annually (Bisschop 2012a; see. fig. 2.1). Bisschop (2012a) studied the transportation of e-waste at the port of Antwerp in Belgium, and collected data by conducting dozens of semistructured interviews with government officials, representatives of the private sector (e.g., recyclers), and other interested parties (including, for example, representatives from not-for-profit organizations and journalists). Bisschop (2012a) also conducted field visits to the port of Antwerp, and has analyzed primary and secondary documents (e.g., Interpol and World Bank reports). Findings from these data suggest that while there are legal modalities for transporting e-waste, the current state of e-waste transport blurs the line between legal and illegal, with legal e-waste transport often prompting violations of environmental law and

The State of Green Criminology

Figure 2.1 The growing volume of electronic waste. The growing volume of e-waste (such as pictured in the stockpile shown here) is of international concern. Green criminologists and researchers in other disciplines have addressed the problems associated with e-waste and its control. Source: Allan Liefting. Wikimedia Commons.

labor standards. Criminologists have also used case studies to analyze the regulation of chemical corporations (Kluin 2013), the occurrence of toxic cities worldwide (White 2009), and disposal and regulation of radioactive waste (Kazlaurich and Kramer 2006; Takemura 2010). Content Analyses Green criminologists also have used content analysis—the close reading of written documents, which might include but would not be limited to transcripts, policy papers, legal documents, press releases, newspaper articles, and written reports. The goal is to discern key themes, terms, or ideas. Often researchers code for key data and themes and publish them in reports. Sometimes content analyses are performed on single documents, and other times on hundreds of documents, to obtain a broad range of data/information about the topic. Zilney, McGurrin, and Zahran (2006) used content analysis to examine publications on environmental justice, an important but understudied issue in criminology research that was receiving increasing attention in other disciplines

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(e.g., geography, sociology, public health). Their objective was to convey the importance of environmental justice studies to criminologists, by organizing the environmental justice literature thematically, so they could readily see the connections between environmental justice research and criminology. Zilney et al. searched three major databases, and their final sample included 425 articles published in 204 journals from 1970 to 2003. They identified eight different themes in environmental justice research: (1) the spatial distribution of hazards, (2) environmental discrimination, (3) theory and methodology, (4) social movements and concern, (5) public health and risk, (6) environmental law and policy, (7) globalization and sustainability, and (8) philosophies of justice. They found that criminological studies accounted for less than 3% (n = 6) of these publications, and most were by the same authors, notably Lynch and Stretesky. Another example is Grugan’s (2014) study of animal cruelty offenses to discover the reasons for animal cruelty. Grugan analyzed cases of companion and animal cruelty that were featured in US news media outlets during the first six months of 2013. Specifically, Grugan examined news media articles to assess the actors involved in abuse cases, the form the cruelty took, the motivation for the cruelty, and the implications of these factors. On the basis of this analysis, several different typologies of companion animal cruelty emerged (Grugan 2014). Participatory Action Research Another approach is participatory action research, for which the researcher works in conjunction with government, the private sector, or not-for-profit entities. Researchers engage in the collection of data, which are used to produce scholarship that might help community organizations work toward a particular mission or cause. Participatory action research often entails regular attendance at organizational meetings and public hearings, the use of in-depth conversations with organization staff and community members, and attendance at major events or demonstrations organized by community organizations. For over ten years, Melissa Jarrell (for a discussion, see Canales, Ozymy and Jarrell 2012) has engaged in participatory action research with the Citizens for Environmental Justice (CFEJ) in the Refinery Row community in Corpus Christi, Texas. Residents of Refinery Row live on property that borders several large oil refi neries, and have long been struggling with health and medical problems that stem from exposure to air pollution emitted by nearby oil refineries. These medical and health problems include respiratory complications, skin and eye irritation, dizziness, nausea, and cancers (Jarrell, Lynch, and Stretesky 2013). CFEJ is a grassroots, citizen-led community organization, whose mission is to promote environmental justice for residents along Refinery Row. In “Green Criminology in Action,” the authors describe how green criminologists might employ participatory action research methods to aid and assist communities victimized by green crime, as well as to generate research with

The State of Green Criminology

meaningful policy implications. Steps might involve merging activism and research to learn about environmental crimes and victims, enable collaboration with community organizations and members, and further involvement at the local level. Jarrell’s own involvement included meeting with community residents, state and federal regulators, and representatives from CFEJ, to learn about local environmental issues, attending and providing testimony at public hearings, and seeking out legal advocacy for residents of Refinery Row. Numerous publications have stemmed from collaborative efforts between CFEJ and researchers (Canales, Ozymy, and Jarrell 2012; Jarrell and Ozymy 2010, 2012). Jarrell and Ozymy (2010) have collaborated with CFEJ to study upset events, a kind of “accidental” air emission, or air pollution emissions in excess of permissible levels (i.e., those stated in the permit held by a facility) that were deemed lawful only because of loopholes in Clean Air Act standards (Jarrell and Ozymy 2010). Thirty-six states had rules allowing facilities to emit unregulated pollutants during start-up and shutdown, and in cases of malfunction at facilities (changes to the CAA’s Startup, Shutdown and Malfunction Emission rule have closed these loopholes). These emissions have important impacts on low income and minority communities. In other studies, Canales, Ozymy, and Jarrell (2012) examined public health problems associated with living near industrial sites. Jarrell and Ozymy (2012) reviewed the legal proceedings stemming from environmental crimes on Refinery Row, to illustrate how to advocate for victims of environmental injustices under provisions of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (fig. 2.2). These efforts have been associated with meaningful policy changes; for example, the work of CFEJ and similar environmental justice groups has been linked to the recent passage of the Environmental Protection Agency’s Startup, Shutdown, and Malfunction Emissions standard, designed to address Clean Air Act loopholes regarding upsets and malfunctions (Hitt 2015). Furthermore, participatory action research in green criminology, in which Melissa Jarrell was involved, played a role in a recent court ruling declaring that residents victimized by Citgo’s criminal violations of the Clean Air Act at the Corpus Christi refinery could be defined as “victims” under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2007. That case also involved the first criminal conviction of an oil company for a criminal violation of the Clean Air Act since it was passed in 1970 (Jarrell, Lynch, and Stretesky 2013; Jarrell and Ozymy 2012). The conviction was, however, overturned in September 2015 by the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Ethnography Ethnographic methods require researchers to immerse themselves in the field and engage in long-term studies of the populations and issues of interest. These studies often result in a book, and criminologists, anthropologists, and sociologists alike have written full-length ethnographies on a range of important criminological issues, including cultural and structural explanations of

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Figure 2.2 Air pollution, Edmonton, Canada. Located in the background of this picture is a portion of the petrochemical processing plants east of the city of Edmonton, the capital of Alberta, Canada. This cluster of refineries is also referred to as Refi nery Row. Source: WinterE229 WinterforceMedia. Wikimedia Commons.

violence (Anderson 1992), drug markets (Bourgois 2003), and the overpolicing and punishment of black and Latino boys (Rios 2011). Ethnographers often live in the same communities as the populations they are researching, where they conduct interviews, engage in participant observation, and maintain field notes of their conversations and observations. Kane (2013, 2014) researched the political ecology of water, including how concepts of law, crime, and justice factor into where humans situate themselves in aquatic habitats. Kane’s work poses two research questions: “How, with all our marvelous cultural diversity and technological prowess, have human beings dedicated themselves to so many elaborate endgames that tend toward large-scale planetary crises? Can the scattered, overpowered, but determined forces fighting for social and environmental justice grow enough, know enough, and be creative enough to turn the tide?” (Kane 2014, 3). To explore these matters, Kane (2013, 2014) spent a year studying the political ecology of water in South America. Specifically, she collected data across three field sites located in Brazil and Argentina, selected because those countries rank highly among nations with respect to access to large quantities of top-quality renewable water. Kane’s analysis was multifaceted, connecting individual decision-making processes to large-scale structural dynamics and culture. Kane’s data came from observing everyday operations, demonstrations, and artwork in port cities; Kane also interviewed activists, community

The State of Green Criminology

residents, engineers, administrators, and public health officials. On the utility of ethnographic methods for addressing her research questions, Kane argued that they can be used to “reveal connections between phenomena that are visible yet unconscious” (Kane 2014, 21). Kane went on to identify several examples of environmental crimes that were highly visible (e.g., a chemical factory polluting a beach with sulfuric acid), yet had become normalized or routine.

QUANTITATIVE STUDIES Quantitative methods are often used to analyze data from experimental or quasi-experimental research designs. Quantitative methods may be employed when researchers are seeking to understand a causal relationship between two or more variables, and to test hypotheses about factors that affect an outcome. In the experimental design, quantitative research is used to explore the relationship between an independent variable (quality or characteristic suspected of causing change) and a dependent variable (quality or characteristic a researcher is looking to explain). Here, the researcher is capable of manipulating the independent variable to observe changes in the dependent variable. In the quasiexperimental design, the researcher also assesses the influence of control (confounding) variables on the dependent variable to ascertain the unique impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable. In a quasi-experiment, however, the researcher does not possess the ability to change the independent variable or assumed causes of the outcome. Instead, in a quasi-experiment, natural conditions cause the independent variables to change. A few distinctions between quantitative and qualitative criminological work are noteworthy. While quantitative research can be descriptive and exploratory in nature, it usually begins with a priori assumptions (hypotheses) about what the data will reveal. That is, quantitative research in criminology often derives testable hypotheses about crime from criminological theory, and researchers employ quantitative methods to test theories about crime and criminal behavior. Unlike qualitative work, many quantitative studies in criminology expressly seek to generate findings that are generalizable. Specifically, quantitative research asks questions about a population, and tests hypotheses using a sample. Ideally, the sample is representative of the population, and it can be inferred that the relationships observed within the sample also exist in the larger population. Quantitative research uses a range of statistical analyses to determine the nature of the relationship(s) between variables. Th is section discusses three types of quantitative approaches that have been employed by criminologists studying green crimes: (1) descriptive statistics; (2) inferential statistics; and (3) geographic information system (GIS), mapping, and spatial statistics. Researchers often use these in conjunction with one another.

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Descriptive Statistics Descriptive statistics are used to organize, simplify, or describe data (Gravetter and Wallnau 2009). Often, criminologists employ descriptive statistics to describe the rate, scope, or prevalence of some crime or of a justice and enforcement problem. Specific types of descriptive statistics include measures of a central tendency like mean, median, and mode. Frequencies, percentages, and proportions also convey descriptive information. Crime rates, for example, represent a frequently used form of descriptive statistics. Criminologists also might use pie charts or bar graphs to describe quantitative data. Criminologists have used descriptive statistics to relay important information about green crimes. For example, Gibbs and Simpson (2009) employed descriptive statistics to present and apply a formula for determining corporate environmental crime rates. After a brief overview of the strengths and limitations of various US EPA data sources on environmental crimes, Gibbs and Simpson suggested counting the number of corporate environmental crime violations and dividing it by the number of reports required for facilities (opportunity), to yield an indicator for the rate of corporate environmental crimes. Next, Gibbs and Simpson applied their formula to violations of the Clean Water Act, collecting EPA data on sixty-seven firms across four different industries. They showed that the average company (which often oversaw multiple facilities) had about one violation per quarter, one inspection per quarter, and 0.5 sanctions per quarter. In their sample, the most common sanctions (accounting for almost 43% of sanctions) were a final order of the board or various letters (i.e., letters of noncompliance, warning letters, and letters of violation), or notices of violation or noncompliance. Gibbs and Simpson’s study also included interview data to contextualize their findings. They noted, for instance, that state environmental regulators tended to “suspect that small ‘mom and pop’ businesses may create more environmental risk than large companies” (103–4). That assumption likely impacts how states organize their enforcement efforts by, for example, concentrating inspections at smaller firms. In light of this finding, we would suggest that future research could also address how this focus might affect the discovery of environmental violations across firms of different sizes, and how that process might affect the labeling of corporate offenders as environmental violators. Jarrell and Ozymy (2011) employed descriptive statistics to discuss air pollution emissions from petroleum refineries that occurred during upset events, or because of unforeseen or unplanned pollution emissions. Their analysis of data from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality revealed that, since 2003, upset events alone have emitted over 75 million pounds of air pollutants in Texas. To further illustrate the consequences of these emissions, they compared the pollution released from upset events to the pollution generated

The State of Green Criminology

by passenger cars. They found, for example, that one upset event at the ExxonMobil Beaumont refinery released as much carbon monoxide pollution as over three thousand passenger cars. Inferential Statistics Additional quantitative techniques employed by criminologists include inferential statistics and multivariate regression. While descriptive statistics describe the quantitative reality of a given phenomenon, and organize, summarize, or simplify data, inferential statistics are used to analyze a sample and make generalizations about a particular population to which a study applies (Gravetter and Wallnau 2009). There are many forms of statistical-analytical techniques in inferential statistics, among them, multiple regression, encompassing, for example, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, logistic regression, negative binomial regression, and multinomial regression. Criminologists have also employed time series analyses, hierarchal linear modeling, structural equation modeling, and factor analyses to examine crime phenomena. Following are examples of ways inferential statistics have been used to examine green and environmental crimes. Enforcement of environmental law and policies has attracted interest from quantitative researchers. Long et al. (2012) used EPA data and political campaign finance data from the Center for Responsive Politics to examine the relationship between political campaign contributions and environmental enforcement actions against coal companies. Their use of a case-crossover design and results from a series of fi xed-effects logistic regression models suggests that the odds of a company donating to a political party increase by a factor of 6.36 just before the conclusion of an environmental case against a company. This might indicate that, at least in the coal sector, corporations increased political campaign contributions in an effort to influence their treatment by regulators (see also Hogan et al. 2007; Hogan, Long, and Stretesky 2010; Long et al. 2007). Lynch, Stretesky, and Burns (2004a, 2004b) examined a community’s make up with respect to race, class, and ethnicity, in relationship to penalties for petroleum refineries that violated environmental laws. Data were obtained from the EPA from the Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis database, as well as from a two-year multimedia compliance report, and the 1990 US census. According to results from a series of negative binomial regressions, every 18.9% increase in the percentage of black residents in a census tract that housed a petroleum refinery was accompanied by a 50.8% decrease in the fine amount for noncompliance by a facility. Further, when median income of census tracts housing a petroleum refinery increased by $10,950, there was a corresponding 64.9% increase in fines for noncompliance. Disparities between the percentage of the Hispanic population and noncompliance penalties fell

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outside the range of statistical significance in the multivariate models. Th is study suggests that, when corporations violate laws in black or low-income communities, they receive less punishment, an example of how enforcement of environmental laws reflects environmental injustice. Criminologists have also conducted quantitative research on the topic of not-for-profit organizations and environmental enforcement. For example, Lynch and Stretesky (2013) examined citizen-led, water-monitoring organizations as a form of community policing for environmental crimes. They used ordinary least-squares regression to examine the relationships between density of citizen-led, water-monitoring organizations, race, ethnicity, and income. Data from the EPA’s listing of citizen-led water-monitoring organizations and the US census revealed inverse relationships between the density of citizen-led, water-monitoring organizations and the percentage of a state’s population that identified as black or Hispanic. The same study also found a positive association between citizen-led, water-monitoring organizations and median income. These results also provide evidence of environmental injustice, in this case related to EPA policies designed to assist communities in monitoring local water pollution and reporting water quality problems to the EPA. Stretesky and Knight (2013) examined the global distribution of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) engaging in environmental protection. Using data compiled from a range of secondary sources (the Encyclopedia of International Organizations, the Yearbook of International Organizations, and the World Dictionary of Environmental Organizations and the World Bank), Stretesky and Knight employed negative binomial regression, observing that each $1,000 increase in per capita gross national income was associated with a corresponding 8% increase in the likelihood of the presence of an INGO headquarter. Stretesky and Knight also observed, however, that this association falls outside the range of statistical significance when the overall number of NGOs is controlled for; simultaneously, the addition of a hundred NGO’s yields an 18% increase in the likelihood of an environmental INGO headquarters. These results suggest an uneven geography of environmental INGOs. Given that environmental not-for-profit agencies can compel government agencies to generate environmental policy and enforce environmental laws, these findings have implications for environmental justice as well as criminology. In another study, Cochran et al. (2016) examined a widely stated, but infrequently tested, hypothesis that green offenders receive more lenient treatment than other offenders. In this study, Cochran et al. employed sentencing data from the state of Florida for all felonies committed by individuals for the years 1994 through 2011, which included 1,945,816 felony sentences meted out to individuals. Their sentencing data included 1,744 sentences for what they defined as “ecological crimes” (e.g., dumping, littering, and storing hazardous waste without a permit) and 1,415 “wildlife and animal” crimes (e.g., animal

The State of Green Criminology

cruelty, trapping without a permit, and poaching). Because of the large number of cases, the researchers were able to employ a technique called “precision matching,” for which each individual environmental and wildlife crime was matched to a nonenvironmental case using a number of variables (e.g., seriousness of offense, age, race, and gender). Multinomial logistical regression was then use to test for differences in sentencing across groups. They found that environmental offenders were more likely than nonenvironmental offenders to receive community-based sanctions, and less likely to receive prison or jail sentences. They also found that wildlife and other animal offenders were more likely to receive probation than jail or prison sentences. They also found, however, that wildlife and other animal offenders were more likely to receive a prison term than the matched sample of nonenvironmental offenders, but less likely to receive a jail sentence. They suggested that the sentencing differences evident for wildlife and other animal offenders were related to the nature of the crimes against which they were matched by the precision-matching technique, for which, wildlife and other animal offenders were typically matched with drug and property offenders. Cochran et al. suggested that, compared with the latter nonenvironmental offences, wildlife and other animal crimes were likely to be viewed as more violent by the courts, and that this affected the likelihood that offenders would receive a prison sentence. Mapping, Spatial Statistics, and Geographic Information Systems Criminologists have long been interested in the relationship between crime and place, and they have devoted significant attention to the distribution of crime. Many criminologists have argued that crime follows a nonrandom, skewed distribution, generating what are referred to as crime “hot spots” or “cold spots” (Lersch and Hart 2014; Eck et al. 2005). While the relationship between crime and place has long captivated the attention of criminologists (e.g., Quetelet 1984), criminologists have only recently begun to use geographic and information systems (GIS) software designed to work with spatial statistics. The availability of these software packages, as well as the recent renewed interest in communities and crime, has made crime and place a major subfield of criminology. For example, Pires and Clarke (2012) used mapping software to examine parrot poaching in Mexico. Specifically, Pires and Clarke were interested in differentiation in frequencies of poaching across different species of parrot. They hypothesized that parrots that were more accessible to humans (among other factors) might be more frequently poached. To measure accessibility, Pires and Clarke generated a map of Mexico overlaying a parrot species’ preferred habitat and human population, to obtain the human population density for each parrot species’ given range. Results from a nonparametric statistical

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Figure 2.3 John Kerry, US secretary of state, in a meeting concerning illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. John Kerry hosted an interagency meeting on the topic of IUU fishing. Source: US Department of State.

test (Kendall’s Tau-b) indicated that species that were most accessible to humans were more frequently poached. Petrossian (2015) also collected and analyzed spatial data to assess illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing across fifty-three different countries (see fig. 2.3). Petrossian analyzed data obtained from five different sources to test five different predictors of IUU fishing: number of internationally attractive species, patrol boats per 100,000 square kilometers, detectable fishing vessels, monitoring control and surveillance efforts, and access to ports of convenience. Results from OLS regression and geographically weighted regression (GWR) models indicated that IUU fishing increases significantly in regions with more internationally attractive fish species, while IUU fishing decreases significantly in areas where there are increased patrol boats, monitoring controls, and surveillance efforts. Petrossian (2015) mapped these results of the geographically weighted regression model to indicate where the predictor variables had the strongest impact on IUU fishing (for related empirical studies, see also Petrossian and Clarke 2014; Petrossian, Marteache, and Viollaz 2014; Petrossian, Weis, and Pires 2015). Finally, Lemeiux (2015) explored the utility of advances in global positioning systems and digital camera technology for criminological research and described the role of geo-tagged photos in generating maps of wildlife crime using ranger patrol data in Uganda.

The State of Green Criminology

MIXED-METHOD APPROACHES Rather than employing strictly qualitative or quantitative methods, some green criminologists choose to conduct research that employs both methodological approaches. For example, Shelley and Crow (2009) employed a mixed-methods approach in their study of conservation policing in the state of Florida. To understand what activities exactly constituted the nature and extent of fish and wildlife policing in the state, they analyzed one year’s worth of field operation reports issued weekly by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission. Shelley and Crow employed both manifest and latent coding to analyze the data. Manifest coding allowed the researchers to report quantitative counts of incidents, while latent coding allowed them to interpret meanings of specific aspects of the field reports. This methodological approach employs both content analyses and descriptive statistics. Of nearly three thousand different field events described in one year’s worth of field reports, Shelley and Crow found that 57% of events were related to boating; 26.8% of events were related to fish and wildlife; and 15% of events represented common, traditional police work. On the basis of these data, Shelley and Crow concluded that fi sh and wildlife policing in Florida appeared to be more generalist in approach than specialist (for examples of related qualitative studies, see Forsyth and Forsyth 2012; Forsyth, Grambling, and Wooddell 1998; Forsyth and Marckese 1993; Moreto and Lemieux 2015b; Moreto and Matusiak 2016). In another mixed-methods study, Wyatt (2011) conducted a case study of the illegal trade of raptors in the Russian Federation. Wyatt conducted nineteen semistructured interviews with a number of representatives from a range of government and NGOs affiliated with Russia and the United States. She also incorporated information about the wildlife trade from hundreds of online news media sources. Finally, Wyatt analyzed quantitative data that was obtained from the online database of the United Nations environmental program, the Wildlife Conservation Monitoring Center. Wyatt reported that the trafficking of falconry birds was a contributing factor to the decline of falconry populations, imposed cruelty on the trafficked birds, and threatened the diversity of the ecosystems from which they were poached. Wyatt concluded the trafficking of falconry birds was primarily carried out through smuggling, and that the illegal transport of birds moved through expansive global networks of organized criminal activities. Her study found that the sale of raptors was a lucrative underground industry that could net traffickers between $50,000 and $100,000 per bird at final sale. Analysis of the data documented hundreds of falcons seized from underground markets, which researchers believe represented a fraction of the full volume of trafficked falcons. Wyatt also proposed that solutions to wildlife trafficking should be multifaceted, addressing both supply and demand components of trafficking, an issue also addressed by Ronald V. Clarke and Gohar A. Petrossian in several of their research studies.

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POLICY CONTRIBUTIONS Criminologists often publish research about public policies and strategies that govern how government entities prevent or respond to crime. Some criminology researchers publish policy papers reviewing literature that discusses such policies, while others propose new policies or approaches to crime. Criminologists also evaluate crime policies or strategies, and publish works that speak to the efficacy of various crime control or prevention initiatives. Covering a range of subfields, criminologists have examined policies employed at the local, national, or international level. Many books, edited collections, and peerreviewed articles have been published on crime policies. A top journal, Criminology and Public Policy (Sorensen, Snell, and Rodriguez 2006), identifies its aims and scope as, “interdisciplinary in nature, devoted to policy discussions of criminology research findings. Focusing on the study of criminal justice policy and practice, the central objective of the journal is to strengthen the role of research findings in the formulation of crime and justice policy by publishing empirically based, policy focused articles” (Wiley Online Library 2016). Criminologists have conducted research that speaks to policies associated with green and environmental crime. For example, Stretesky (2006) evaluated the EPA’s audit policy, a system of self-policing, by which companies that disclose their violations to the EPA (as opposed, for example, to inspectors discovering the violations) are eligible for reduced punishments. Stretesky employed a case-control design and logistic regression to compare environmental violations of companies that participated in this self-policing policy versus nonparticipants. Results suggested that neither inspections nor enforcement significantly increased participation in the EPA’s audit policy; large companies appeared more likely to use the audit policy than small companies; and the audit policy appeared to be used more often to disclose relatively minor reporting violations, as opposed to more serious emission or permit violations. In another assessment of the audit policy, Stretesky and Lynch (2009) employed OLS regression to analyze EPA Toxic Release Inventory data, concluding that self-policing does not appear to significantly decrease emissions produced by chemical industry facilities. More recent criminological work that explores the relationship between pollution and public policy includes a special issue of Criminology and Public Policy devoted to the topic of crime and pollution, particularly to the potential for expanding market-based controls for point source pollution to act as mechanisms to fight crime (Eck and Eck 2012; Nagin 2012; for criticisms of this approach, see Lynch et al. 2015). Criminologists have also researched policies related to animal harm and wildlife trafficking. For example, Hallsworth (2011) has discussed the relationship between moral panic and the passage of the 1991 Dangerous Dogs Act in

The State of Green Criminology

Britain. Hallsworth’s examination of events leading up to and after the passage of the act showed that it resulted in approximately one thousand pit bull terriers being seized and killed. Hallsworth reviewed extant literature on the pit bull breed and argued that the Dangerous Dog Act does not protect human victims from dangerous dogs but, rather, subjects vulnerable dogs to violence at the hands of humans. Sollund (2011, 2013) has used case studies to examine the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES). CITES represents an international protocol for regulating the trafficking and transportation of wildlife. One of CITES’s aims is to regulate the animal and plant trade, not necessarily to prevent it. That is, CITES encourages trade that does not threaten the survival of a species and global sustainability. Sollund (2011, 2013) discussed the limitations of CITES from an eco-justice perspective, calling into question CITES’ ability to protect animals and noting that rule enforcement was rare and might not be efficient in protecting species from poaching or trafficking (legal or otherwise). Lemieux and Clarke (2009) used quantitative research to evaluate CITES’s impact on elephant populations in Africa. In 1989, CITES member states committed to an international ban on the ivory trade. To assess if the ban led to changes in elephant populations in Africa, Lemieux and Clarke (2009) analyzed data obtained from the African Elephant Database, and compared elephant population data pre- and post-CITES. The researchers concluded that overall the CITES ban reversed a decline in African elephant populations; however, not all countries within Africa experienced growth in elephant populations.

THEORY CONTRIBUTIONS A primary aim of criminology is to construct theories that explain why crime happens. Criminologists have derived theories from the causes (where crime serves as a dependent variable) and consequences (where crime serves as an independent variable) of crime. This can include microlevel theories that address interpersonal thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors relating to crime. One of many examples in criminology is Agnew’s (1992) general strain theory, which argues individuals commit crime to cope with the unpleasant emotions that stem from strains (e.g., loss of valued stimuli). Theories can also be at the macrolevel, speaking to criminal behavior between groups at a community, structural, national, or international level. One of the most widely tested macrotheories is Shaw and McKay’s (1942) social disorganization theory, which posits that community crime rates fluctuate with the level of organization that exists in communities. Criminologists have published empirical tests of theories, as well as books, chapters, and articles that describe the core tenets and testable hypotheses associated with theoretical positions.

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Criminologists have published a number of works theorizing about green and environmental crimes, which we address in detail in chapter 12. We briefly acknowledge such publications here, to illustrate another way that criminologists produce knowledge about green crimes. Taking stock of theoretical contributions to green criminology, Brisman (2014) developed two approaches: One relates to understanding the etiology of green crime, or theories that are focused on explaining its causes. A second theoretical approach takes up representation. Such theories are intended to elucidate “the ways in which environmental crime and harm are constructed by and represented in the media and the way those constructions and representations affect how we ascribe meaning to the environment, to nature, and to harms and crimes thereto, (28). Brisman explains that theoretical approaches can come from within (intradisciplinary theoretical engagement) or outside (extradisciplinary theoretical engagement) the discipline. This in effect creates four fundamental approaches to theoretical engagement in green criminology: (1) intradisciplinary theoretical engagement (etiology), (2) intradisciplinary theoretical engagement (representation and meaning), (3) extradisciplinary theoretical engagement (etiology), and (4) extradisciplinary theoretical engagement (representation and meaning) (Brisman 2014). To understand the etiology of green crime, criminologists have applied general theories about criminal behavior, as well as theories from outside the discipline designed to explain environmental destruction (Brisman 2014; Stretesky et al. 2013b). For example, drawing on studies of the relationship between temperature and crime, and the observation that climate change increases global temperature, Agnew (2012) has argued that global warming represents a significant strain that may lead to increases in interpersonal crime as competition over natural resources intensifies, and individuals have to cope with associated problems like scarcity. Ronald V. Clarke, Gohar A. Petrossian, Stephen F. Pires, and others (see various entries in the references for this book) have written extensively about how routine activities theory, and situational crime prevention, apply to poaching and other wildlife crimes (see ch.8). Ray and Jones (2011) have studied control theories and intent to engage in green crimes, and Sollund (2011) has discussed animal harm from a learning theory perspective. These are all considered general theories designed to explain criminal behavior (including green crimes) as a whole. Stretesky et al. (2013a, 2013b) have used Schnaiberg’s (1980) treadmill of production (ToP) theory to understand the etiology of green crimes. This theory, which originates in environmental sociology, and in work by Stretesky et al. (2013b), represents a novel application by criminologists for understanding green crimes. It emphasizes the approach that is the focus of this book—the political-economic explanation of green crime. To address issues of representation and meaning, Brisman and South (2013, 2015) have proposed a theory of green cultural criminology that merges the

The State of Green Criminology

subfields of green and cultural criminology. Cultural criminologists have long engaged in research designed to understand the social construction of, as well as the responses to, crime (Brisman and South 2013, 2015); and research by cultural criminologists bears similarities to labeling theory, symbolic interactionism, social constructionism, and subcultural criminology. For example, cultural criminologists have explored artistic expression, crime, and resistance. Green cultural criminology seeks to understand how the media do (or do not) characterize environmental threats, that is, how the media construct or depict green crimes, and, in turn, how people ascribe meaning and respond to green crimes (Brisman and South 2013, 2014). Brisman (2014) describes how Kane’s (2013, 2014) work on the political ecology of water also explores representation and meaning, drawing on works from outside the discipline, including anthropological perspectives. Finally, criminologists have called attention to new directions for, additional considerations of, and emerging perspectives on green criminology and environmental crimes. While these may not be considered theories, they inform new and ongoing theoretical advancements in green criminology. White and Heckenberg (2014) have noted that green criminology encompasses many different perspectives on green crime, including eco-global, conservation, and speciesist criminology. Each perspective has its advantages for green criminologists. For example, White (2011) introduced the term eco-global criminology to facilitate a global perspective on green crime that acknowledges green crimes transcend boundaries and encompass multiple levels of analysis. Gibbs and colleagues (2010) introduced the concept “conservation criminology” to describe a framework for examining green crimes that encompasses knowledge from natural resource management, criminal justice, and criminology, as well as from risk management and decision science. The conservation criminology framework can guide green crime theory, research methods, or both. Beirne (1992) has proposed that criminology move toward a nonspeciesist criminology, that is, one that develops theory and policy interventions extending to nonhuman animal victims of crime (see also Beirne, 2014, 2011, 2009, 2007, 1999, 1995). Expanding on ideas from other disciplines, and within traditional criminology, Lynch and Stretesky (2014) have put forward the idea of “green behaviorism,” or the study of how exposure to environmental toxins can produce crime, and proposed developing studies of toxic chemicals in the environment related to the “life course trajectories” (e.g., their concentrations, growth, and dispersion) of environmental pollutants. Other researchers have recommended a green victimology that brings together the subfields of victimology and green criminology (M. Hall 2013, 2014; Lynch and Stretesky 2014). Within this area, research has been emerging that delves into the experiences of those who are victims of green crime (Jarrell, Lynch, and Stretesky 2013; Opsal and Shelley 2014).

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CONCLUSION Compared to other subfields of criminology (e.g., juvenile delinquency, communities and crime), green criminology is a relatively new, but substantial, area of study that has been growing over the past twenty years. Subspecialties within green criminology include crimes and harms associated with nonhuman animals, environmental crime and justice, illegal trade, and policing. Methods for studying green crimes include qualitative and quantitative approaches. Green criminologists have also examined theories and policies with implications inside and outside of criminology, as well as inside and outside of academia. Th is chapter has focused on the important contributions criminologists have made to the study of green crimes and environmental harms, but other disciplines have also increased our knowledge about green crimes. While many criminologists have answered Lynch’s (1990) call to generate knowledge about green crimes from a political-economic vantage point, important questions remain. In the following chapters, we identify key findings in multiple disciplines and offer justifications for an interdisciplinary theoretical model in green criminology that encompasses political economy and explores the etiology of green crimes.

S T U DY G U I D E Questions and Activities for Students 1. Compare and contrast microlevel with macrolevel studies. Write two research questions for the study of green crimes, one for each level. 2. Explain the difference between qualitative and quantitative research. Provide an example of each method that has been used by green criminologists. 3. Propose an environmental issue that you believe should be examined qualitatively. How might you collect data to understand it? 4. Identify an environmental issue you believe should be examined quantitatively. How might you collect data to understand it? 5. Select a government policy intended to prevent, control, or respond to a green crime and design a study to evaluate its effectiveness. The policy can be one identified here, or one that you identify through additional research.

Lessons for Researchers 1. While green criminology has substantially grown over the past twenty years, it is still largely on the periphery of mainstream criminology. This is true of many corporate, white-collar, state, and statecorporate crimes. As green crimes persist, all criminologists should be encouraged to explore this problem, address why environmental issues do not occupy a more prominent space in the discipline, and explain how this might change. 2. Criminologists have employed a range of different methods to study green crimes, but there are both qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches that have not been used. Continuing to experiment with different approaches is important for green criminology research to avoid mono-method biases. 3. Green criminologists have analyzed content with clear public policy implications, but many policies

The State of Green Criminology

and practices employed by government agencies to confront or control green crimes have yet to be evaluated. This represents an important direction for green criminologists, as well as for evaluation researchers. 4. Emergent work in participatory action research and green crime illustrates the power of collabora-

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tion between green criminologists, academics in other disciplines, and community organizations, to address the environmental issues that exist worldwide. Establishing collaborative partnerships with community groups that have been fighting the problem for decades represents an important initiative for researchers studying green crimes.

CH A P T ER

Pollution Crimes

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his chapter details our approach to green criminology related to pollution and its intersection with political-economic theory. We begin with an overview of the concept of political economy and then discuss how two perspectives, the treadmill of production and ecological Marxism, integrate political economy and the study of environmental harms. Next we suggest that a political-economic approach should focus on scientifically identifiable green “harms” rather than violations of the criminal law and review our definition of green crime. We move on to a brief discussion of the current extent of pollution, highlighting the concept of planetary boundaries, and argue for a global focus on environmental issues that accounts for the impacts of the international capitalist economy on ecological destruction. We conclude by discussing how criminology in general, and green criminology in particular, should proceed now that humans have the largest impact on the natural environment.

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND GREEN CRIMINOLOGY Chapter 2 showed that green criminologists study a wide range of issues and problems, and that developing a

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Pollution Crimes

theoretical approach to explain green crime worldwide is important. We argue that a theory that focuses on political economy, which we elaborate on in chapter 12, can help fi ll this void (Lynch et al. 2013; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013b). Here, we outline some basic concepts relevant to ecological disorganization and destruction that will be applied in future chapters. Broadly speaking, political economy refers to the intersection of economics and politics, the study of which contributed significantly to the development of the social sciences. Influential theorists include Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Max Weber, who wrote about the influence of political economy on society. In contemporary social sciences, political economy often refers to economic production and trade and their impacts on other aspects of society such as government and law. A political-economic approach is grounded in Marxist analyses of class conflict and power relations, which highlight how capitalism’s organization of economic production affects society and its institutions. We draw on two ecological political-economic perspectives: (1) the treadmill of production and (2) ecological Marxism. The Treadmill of Production The treadmill of production (ToP) is an approach to environmental sociology developed by Allan Schnaiberg in his 1980 book, The Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity, which focuses on the political economy of the environment. Central to this approach is how and why humans contribute to environmental problems, particularly with respect to the organization of economic production to advance capitalism. Therefore, the ToP framework focuses on how class relations and social structure influence environmental degradation/ destruction, or to use Schnaiberg’s term, ecological disorganization: that is, the disruption of the ecosystem in a manner that prohibits its regeneration and reproduction and causes it to become increasingly unstable. The ToP approach is based on three assumptions, with the fi rst two borrowed from physics. First, according to the first law of thermodynamics, “energy cannot be created or destroyed, only transformed.” Thus, with respect to Earth’s ecosystem, it is important to discuss how energy is transformed into different states and how human behavior can cause this transformation, thereby affecting the health and organization of Earth’s ecosystem. Second, the law of entropy states that “as energy is transformed in production; it takes on less organized forms,” which means that, as stored energy is used or expended and changed into heat, the entropy of the system increases (becomes more disorganized). For example, take the case of a piece of coal. Before extraction, the energy in a piece of coal is organized, stored energy. However, when it is extracted from the earth and burned for energy, it becomes reorganized and is converted into work energy (exergy) and heat energy, which eventually disperse into space. Over time, as more stored energy is used, the entropy of the system

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increases, meaning there is less stored energy and more heat in the system. At some point, when all of the stored energy on Earth is used up (or reorganized), production will cease because all natural fuel sources will be exhausted (Schnaiberg 1980, 13). Third and finally, using stored energy for work increases the temperature of the system, which affects climate change. These laws of thermodynamics have implications for economic production, which uses energy to create commodities, and thus increases the amount of entropy in the world. As noted, this has two important long-term consequences. First, as production expands, entropy expands, and second, the quantity of heat pollution also expands. Clearly, at some point, as production and entropy expand, there will be no more stored energy to convert into work for production. As a result, the continual consumption of energy over time and its transformation into heat will threaten the continued existence of the system (e.g., by producing adverse outcomes such as climate change). Traditional economic analysis tends to overlook the entropy costs of production (which include heat pollution), suggesting this problem can be solved by technology, which is an assumption that violates the laws of physics. In contrast, the founder of ecological economics, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, argues in his seminal work, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process (1971), that economic growth and the trajectory (duration) of economic systems are limited by the volume of natural resources and the availability of energy to convert resources into commodities. In making this argument Georgescu-Roegen established that expanding economic production had natural limits, and would eventually cause ecological collapse through three processes: exhausting natural resources, which in turn increases both entropy and the pollution of the ecosystem. Georgescu-Roegen’s observations are incorporated into ToP explanations. Schnaiberg and others have argued that the organizational features of capitalism, designed for continuous economic growth and accumulation of wealth, require constant expansion of production and hence increased consumption of natural resources and energy. Capitalism therefore speeds up the entropy process. As a result, the ToP approach suggests that the ecological system is adversely impacted by the organization of the economic system, which highlights the connection between capitalism and the environment. This politicaleconomic approach helps explain how the system of capitalist production results in increased ecological disorganization over time and produces green crimes against the ecosystem. To summarize this process, we turn to the five primary criticisms and observations of capitalism from the ToP perspective. First, capitalism necessitates continuous economic growth, for producers to remain viable in the capitalist market. Second, most economic growth results from large fi rms that (a) have capital to invest back into the firm to help create future growth, and (b) supply jobs to workers, whose wages enable them to increase their

Pollution Crimes

consumption. Third, increases in economic growth from increased production need to be coupled with increases in natural resource consumption to keep the cycle going. Fourth, the cycle continues to operate because of alliances among the state, labor, and capital. Fifth, continuous economic growth will solve social and environmental problems such as poverty and scarcity, and environmental destruction (Schnaiberg 1980). The last assumption is also challenged by physical scientists; social scientists, including environmental sociologists and ecological Marxists; and the history of capitalism, which has yet to solve the ecological crisis capitalism has generated. Schnaiberg’s treadmill analogy works because economic growth and consumption need to be in constant motion for the capitalist system to operate properly. The first four objectives describe how capitalism operates, while the fifth adopts the assumption that under capitalism, economic growth will eventually rectify environmental harm through advances in technology and efficiency. Schnaiberg, and others working from a political-economic perspective, however, argue that the latter outcome does not happen, and in fact all economic growth achieved under capitalism will necessarily lead to ecological disorganization and natural resource depletion. Ecological Marxism Ecological Marxism’s focus on the relationship between capitalism and the destruction of nature is similar to that of the ToP. Classical Marxism contends that capitalism is a system of production predicated on the unequal ownership of the means of production. In this model, there are two primary social classes, the owners of the means of production (bourgeoisie) and those who sell their labor (proletariat). The owners organize production to maximize the amount of surplus value generated from the commodities or services produced by the workers’ labor. Surplus value is the amount of money that exceeds production costs. This extra money (sometimes called profit, though Marxian economists distinguish between profit and surplus value, a point we need not examine here) is kept by the owners. The owners of capital increase surplus value by altering, manipulating, or reorganizing the work process. Historically, the most important forms of reorganizing work included division of labor, mechanization, and intensified use of fossil fuel and chemical labor to increase production. In Marxian terms, these forms of reorganization or innovations that occur over time mean less human labor is needed for production, while at the same time worker productivity and the production of surplus value increase. By reorganizing production in these ways, the capitalist not only reduces the amount of human labor required, but also intensifies the productivity of workers. In Marxian economics, when workers’ labor is intensified, the quantity of production, or the value of products generated, rises while the amount of work required declines. The difference between the capital input into the system, or what the capitalist

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pays for labor, raw materials, rent, and machinery (called constant capital), and the price/value of the finished commodities is the surplus value, and that difference is due to the value of labor added during production to create a commodity. The ratio of the production value of labor (its price or monetary cost, called variable capital, or v) to the price of the commodity above the cost of production (i.e., capital invested in production) is the surplus value (variable s). From these variables we can calculate the rate of surplus value (s/v × 100), or the relative quantity of value generated by exploitation of the laborers. The rate of surplus value is, following Marx, an objective description of the extent to which labor is exploited. So, for example, if the rate of surplus value is 500%, the worker produces a product worth five times what he or she is paid. Exploitation is also defined as the difference between what the workers are paid in wages and the value of the product they produce minus the constant capital. Marx used this argument, which can be expressed as a series of mathematical equations, to demonstrate that surplus value is generated, not by the capitalist, but by the workers and how the capitalist exploits labor (Marx 1974). Marx wrote about many of the repercussions of capitalism; however, he did not analyze capitalism’s impact on nature extensively. Ecological Marxists such as James O’Connor (1973), John Bellamy Foster (2000), and Paul Burkett (2006) have expanded Marx’s work on production and argued that capitalism must destroy nature to operate correctly. Just as capitalism must exploit labor, it must also exploit nature to function. Or if surplus value is to continuously increase, so must the level of natural resources, used as raw materials, on which production depends. Further, one reason capitalism harms nature is directly linked to the owners’ desire to increase surplus value. To generate more surplus value, the capitalist must sell more commodities, and therefore make more commodities, which requires increasing the input of raw materials into the production process. As Schnaiberg (1980) argued, capitalist production processes, particularly in the United States, changed dramatically after World War II because many industries instituted chemically intensive production methods and relied more heavily on fossil fuels to increase production and intensify labor. Th is meant that fi rms could employ fewer workers and still increase production. In agriculture, for example, the widespread use of pesticides became commonplace after WWII. This allowed farmers to vastly increase the amount of crops they produced for roughly the same price and without the need for workers to battle pest infestations. While the use of chemicals helps increase production and economic growth, the increased use of pesticides and their absorption had debilitating, or ecological disorganization effects on ecosystem functions and on species exposed to pesticides in those ecosystems. In this way, nature pays the cost for that increased productivity because it has to absorb the added chemicals (pesticides), which often have detrimental impacts on the environment and generates ecological disorganization. Thus, the increased use of fossil

Pollution Crimes

fuels and the introduction of pesticides and other chemicals into the environment are two ways that advances in production result in ever-more ecological disorganization. Schnaiberg posited that there are two main types of types of activities that damage the ecosystem and produce ecological disorganization: ecological withdrawals and ecological additions. Ecological withdrawals are natural resources that are removed from nature to be used in the production process as raw materials and chemical agents, or as fossil fuels. Withdrawing these items from nature leads to harms that damage ecosystems and cause ecological disorganization. Ecological additions are by-products (i.e., pollution) of the production process and can also be generated through ecological withdrawal processes when pollutants are added to the ecosystem (through air, water, and land pollution). Our approach to green criminology is grounded in politicaleconomic explanations of ecological additions and withdrawals, which are the focus of subsequent chapters.

ECOLOGICAL DISORGANIZATION AND CRIME When should the creation of ecological disorganization be considered a crime? To answer this question, we need to briefly review debates within criminology regarding the definition of crime. In traditional criminology, a crime is defined as a violation of codified law. Laws are created through legislation, and compliance is enforced with penalties. Once in place, laws are treated as objective indicators of what a person can and cannot do in society. This process assumes that the people involved in creating a law are objective and used some objective indicator of harm to define crime (for discussion and critique of this view of crime, see Lynch, Stretesky, and Long 2015a). Some definitions of green crime rely on the traditional legal defi nition of crime. As reviewed in the previous chapter, for example, Clifford and Edwards (2012, 114) define an environmental crime as “an act in violation of an environmental protection statute that applies to the area (jurisdiction) in which the act occurred and that has clearly identified criminal sanctions for the purposes of police enforcement.” From this perspective a green crime is an act that violates a criminal law or statute and has a punishment attached to it. Some scholars have argued that laws are not objective; rather, they are a reflection of economic, social, and political interests. Richard Quinney (1970) famously argued that crime is a social construction. He suggested that whether an act or behavior is considered a crime is determined not on the basis of an objective indicator showing that an act or behavior, or the harm associated with it, is so horrible that it necessitates a societal ban but rather reflects the values of people who create and subsequently benefit from the laws. In Quinney’s view, laws do not reflect the values of all people in a society, as stated in

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many traditional approaches to criminology, but are created to ensure the powerful benefit the most. Th is is why radical criminologists have argued that criminal law is created by, and for the benefit of, the powerful, so that their behaviors remain relatively unchecked while the behaviors and actions of the working class are controlled to their further benefit (Lynch and Michalowski 2006). The laws are created to protect the interests of the dominant class, thus maintaining society’s status quo and ensuring that those in power remain so. In political-economic terms, the law reinforces and reflects the interests of the dominant class and the structure of economic production relationships within a society. Following Quinney’s lead, some criminologists have called for a greater focus on harm, rather than on the legal definition of crime. Hillyard and Tombs (2007) argued that for criminology to advance as a science, it should focus on the study of social harms. The shift away from the legal definition of crime is necessary for two reasons. First, as discussed above, laws are not objective indicators of what are and what should be labeled crimes. Defining crime according to the harm caused does not make the law the determining factor of what does and does not fall within the purview of criminological inquiry. Many serious harms occur that are not legally defined as crimes; with respect to environmental harm, the laws that apply are not typically criminal but administrative, regulatory, and civil. Second, a focus solely on illegal acts and behaviors meeting the legal definition leaves serious legally allowable harms uninvestigated (Lynch, Stretesky, and Long 2015b). For these reasons, many green criminologists employ a social harms–based approach in their research to call attention to widespread and serious environmental harms the criminal law does not address. We agree that a perspective rooted in social harms is important for green criminology. However, it is also essential that social harms be quantifiable and measurable in order to distinguish between a behavior that is in some way detrimental to the environment, but not a serious problem, and another that is serious enough to be labeled a green crime. In other words, it is necessary to use science to defi ne which environmentally harmful behaviors are serious enough to require control. The failure to draw on science to identify those environmental behaviors leads us back to one of the original dilemmas associated with the legal definition of crime: it loses its objectivity because it is defi ned by values, and not by evidence that can be employed to identify the behaviors that should or should not be defined as crimes (Lynch, Stretesky, and Long 2015b). There is a wealth of natural and physical science research that green criminologists can use to determine which behaviors harm the environment. We reference a number of these studies throughout this book. The data used in many of these studies can also help green criminologists with their own empirical analyses of green crimes.

Pollution Crimes

In sum, the approach to green criminology that we take is informed by a political-economic focus on the impacts of economic production and growth in the international capitalist economy on ecological disorganization. We suggest that a social harms perspective, which defines green crimes using scientific standards, results in a green criminology that more accurately reflects how behaviors that harm ecosystems cause ecological disorganization (Lynch et al. 2013). Th is approach, in our view, is more appropriate than one that relies solely on the law and capricious law-making behaviors, or one that relies solely on a researcher’s value system to determine whether an act is or is not a green crime. In chapter 1, we introduced a basic definition of green crime as a human behavior that causes ecological destruction and ecological disorganization. Following the above discussion, we can expand that defi nition to characterize a green crime as a human act or behavior that causes or has the potential to cause unnecessary ecological harms that generate scientific evidence of ecological disorganization, or harms that could be avoided if production were organized differently than it is under contemporary capitalism (Lynch et al. 2013; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013b). In the extended defi nition, we have added the term unnecessary to recognize that human existence will always cause some amount of ecological disorganization, no matter what mode of production is adopted. To acknowledge the position taken by social harms researchers, we have added the word harm, but qualify that term by attaching it to the idea of “causing ecological disorganization.” We do so to emphasize the fact that to identify and defi ne a harm, green criminologists should refer to evidence from scientific studies. Green criminology, therefore, should focus on those harms that result from continuous increases in production and economic growth that are necessitated by the normal operation of capitalism with its emphasis on constant expansion. Employing this definition, green criminologists will be well equipped to study many environmental issues, including the impacts of the ToP on ecological withdrawals and additions, how the interaction between law and economics influences ecological disorganization, and how government regulation and enforcement of green crimes are created and implemented. In our view, studying green crimes without framing that discussion relative to capitalism makes little sense because environmental harms and capitalism are too heavily intertwined.

THE EXTENT OF POLLUTION ON AIR, LAND, AND WATER Earlier we discussed the importance of using scientific standards to measure environmental harm. There are numerous ways to do that. As an example, we review the concept of planetary boundaries, a group of nine variables used to

55

Table 3.1 Scientific dimensions of the planetary boundaries

Earth system process Climate change

Preindustrial value

Indicator variable

Current value

Boundary value

Boundary crossed?

Atmospheric CO2 concentration (ppm* by volume)

280.00

400.00

350.00

Yes

Alternatively: increase in radiative forcing (W/m2) since the start of the industrial revolution (~1750)

0.00

1.50

1.00

Yes

Biodiversity loss

Extinction rate (no. of species per million/yr.)

0.10–1.00

>100.00

10.00

Yes

Biogeochemical

Anthropogenic nitrogen removed from the atmosphere (millions of tons/yr.)

0.00

121.00

35.00

Yes

Anthropogenic phosphorus entering the oceans (millions of tons/yr.)

−1.00

8.50–9.50

11.00

No

Ocean acidification**

Global mean saturation state of aragonite in surface seawater (omega units)

3.44

2.90

2.75

No

Land use

Land surface converted to cropland (%)

Low

11.70

15.00

No

3

Freshwater

Global human consumption of water (km /yr.)

415

2600

4000

No

Ozone depletion

Stratospheric ozone concentration (Dobson units)

290

283

276

No

Atmospheric aerosols

Overall particulate concentration in the atmosphere, on a regional basis

Not yet quantified

Chemical pollution

Concentration of toxic substances, plastics, endocrine disruptors, heavy metals, and radioactive contamination into the environment

Not yet quantified

source: Steffen, Rockström, and Costanza 2011. *Parts per million. **For aragonite, lower values indicate declining environmental quality.

Pollution Crimes

assess the state of the planet, or its heath and stability. Table 3.1 identifies each of the planetary boundaries, its indicator, and whether or not Earth has crossed it. What are the planetary boundaries? The idea of planetary boundaries was proposed in 2009 by a group of earth system and environmental scientists led by Johan Rockström and Will Steffen. They identified the nine planetary boundaries, which help to “define the safe operating space for humanity with respect to Earth’s system and are associated with the planet’s biophysical subsystems or process” (Rockström et al. 2009b, 472). The boundaries are specifically designed to explain how humans have impacted global environmental change. Rockström et al. argue that when a planetary boundary is crossed (meaning that the variable has exceeded a specific measure), serious irreversible damage to Earth’s ecosystem inevitably follows, making it less stable. The larger the number of boundaries crossed, and in some cases the further a particular boundary is crossed, the more unstable the ecosystem becomes. To illustrate the current extent of pollution and its impacts on the world, we review data on four planetary boundaries. We begin with climate change, measured by carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions; ocean acidification; and the biogeochemical flow, which consists of nitrogen and phosphorous pollution. Finally, we examine another indicator of pollution in the United States, the EPA Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), which measures the amount of toxic chemicals released in the United States, and thus the extent of toxic pollution that occurs, and is often allowable, under existing environmental regulations. The content of those environmental regulations tends to reflect conditions that assist in reinforcing production, and does not represent the best scientific standards for protecting ecosystems or the health of species living in those ecosystems. Climate Change One of the most destructive forms of air pollution comes from the release of CO2 into the atmosphere, which involves a process that helps drive climate change. This form of harm is widespread because CO2 emissions are one of the main by-products of the production of most commodities and the consumption of fossil fuels (e.g., oil, gasoline, coal, natural gas). It is also a major contributor to climate change and therefore an indicator Rockström et al. use for the climate change planetary boundary measure (see table 3.1). Table 3.2 gives the annual US and world CO2 emissions in kilotons (1 kiloton = 2,000,000 pounds) and metric tons per capita for the period 1980–2011. The first thing that you notice when looking at these figures is that during any given year the level of CO2 entering the atmosphere is enormous. For example, in 2011, 34,649,483 kilotons of CO2 were released in the atmosphere. A kiloton is 1,000 metric tons or 2,205 pounds (1,000 kilograms), so this figure translates

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Table 3.2 US and world carbon dioxide emissions World

US

Year

kt

Metric tons per capita

kt

Metric tons per capita 20.78

1980

19357759

4.36

4723210

1981

18763313

4.15

4535800

19.76

1982

18613974

4.05

4306748

18.59 18.57

1983

18538731

3.96

4341878

1984

19206620

4.03

4475192

18.97

1985

19782702

4.08

4492555

18.88

1986

20385014

4.13

4495463

18.72

1987

20892443

4.16

4688373

19.35

1988

21645465

4.24

4892526

20.01

1989

22112278

4.25

4955081

20.07

1990

22200872

4.20

4823557

19.32 19.06

1991

22476921

4.18

4822384

1992

22245298

4.07

4911103

19.14

1993

22227572

4.01

5032932

19.36

1994

22626105

4.02

5098476

19.37

1995

23114109

4.05

5138010

19.29

1996

23666825

4.08

5260697

19.52

1997

24055520

4.09

5375235

19.71

1998

24238870

4.07

5410919

19.61

1999

24191199

4.00

5510430

19.74

2000

24799921

4.05

5701829

20.20

2001

25408643

4.10

5601405

19.65

2002

25639664

4.08

5648727

19.63

2003

27154135

4.27

5679222

19.57

2004

28543928

4.43

5763457

19.68

2005

29614692

4.54

5795162

19.61

2006

30667121

4.64

5703872

19.11

2007

31286844

4.68

5794923

19.23

2008

32049580

4.74

5622464

18.48

2009

31902900

4.66

5274132

17.19

2010

33516380

4.84

5408869

17.48

2011

34649483

4.94

5305570

17.02

source: World Bank (2016).

Pollution Crimes

into about 76.4 billion pounds of CO2. This represents a massive level of worldwide ecological disorganization in the form of carbon emissions, and according to Rockström et al. has surpassed the planetary boundary for climate change. Some nations contribute more CO2 pollution than other nations. For example, the difference in the levels of emissions between the world and the United States is striking. In 2011, the average nation released 4.94 metric tons of CO2 per capita, while the United States released 17.02 metric tons per capita—or nearly 3.5 times more. In 2011, China, which produces a large aggregate amount of CO2 because of the size of its population (at that time, China had 4.3 times as many people as the United States), emitted slightly more than 9 billion metric tons of CO2, or about 6.7 metric tons per capita. By comparison, this is about 39.4% of per capita CO2 emissions produced by the United States. In the more recently released 2014 global CO2 data, China’s total or aggregate CO2 emissions (10.54 billion tons) were nearly twice the total of the United States, but on a per capita basis were still smaller (7.6 metric tons per capita in China versus 16.5 metric tons per capita in the United States). To place these emissions in a somewhat different context, in 2014, China, which contains about 18.8% of the world’s population, produced 29.6% of global CO2 emissions, while the United States, which contains about 4.4% of the world’s population, produced about 20% of global CO2 emissions (updated CO2 measures can be found on the EDGAR [Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research] webpage: edgar.jrc.europa.eu). Relative to its population, then, China produced a CO2 output of about 1.57 (i.e., 29.6 divided by 18.8), while in the United States, the same ratio was 4.55, or about 2.9 times higher than the ratio for China. In other words, the United States produces much more CO2 pollution per person, and if China were to replicate US per capita consumption and production patterns, the increase in CO2 generated would pose serious threats to the health of the global ecosystem. Elevated levels of CO2 emissions in China also reflect the expanded role China plays as a producer of goods in the global capitalist economy. China produces nearly one-half of consumer goods consumed globally; in 2011, International Business Times estimated that China produced almost 91% of all new personal computers, 80% of all air conditioners, 80% of all energy-saving lighting, 74% of global solar cells, about 71% of all cell phones, and 63% of all shoes sold in the global capitalism marketplace. Thus, with respect to the idea of political economy and the environment, we can see that China’s larger environmental effect is significantly affected by its being the world’s major producer of commodities, which are often consumed outside of China. At the other end of the scale, less developed nations produce very small amounts of CO2 pollution per capita (e.g., Somalia, Uganda, Rwanda, Central African Republic, Ethiopia each produce 0.1; and Nepal, Zambia, Liberia, Haiti each produce 0.2)—especially compared with the United States and China. Some developed nations also produce less CO2 (as measured in metric tons)

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Figure 3.1 Smoke stack pollution. A smokestack emitting hazardous pollution, including CO2, into the environment. This is a familiar sight throughout the world, and one that generates widespread pollution that may be heavy and dangerous in cities with excessive air pollution emissions. Source: Photograph by Arthur T. Palmer. Courtesy of the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division.

than average (e.g., Switzerland, 4.6), and many others produce much less CO2 per capita than the United States (France, 5.2; Sweden, 5.5; Spain, 5.8; Italy, 6.7; United Kingdom, 7.1; Denmark, 7.2; Ireland, 7.9; Germany, 8.9). These data indicate that some nations contribute more to climate change than others. Looking at these data across nations shows why it is useful to examine climate change in a global context. For example, while US CO2 emission levels have been historically high compared with other nations, they have declined about 9% since 2005 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2016a). Some would suggest that this outcome provides hope that increased economic development leads to decreased levels of CO2 emissions. However, during the same time frame, levels of CO2 emissions were increasing worldwide. Th is is occurring because in the global capitalist ToP, countries that have high levels of economic development shift some of their ecological disorganization to other countries, for example, by outsourcing production (companies moving production facilities overseas), and the associated pollution emissions, to other nations (fig. 3.1). Developed nations, therefore, may continue to consume as many or more CO2generating products while decreasing their own pollution levels, which gives the false impression that developing nations are disproportionately responsible for climate change.

Pollution Crimes

Green criminologists have examined how this latter process works with respect to what is called indirect CO2 pollution that results from the global commodity trade between the United States and other nations (Stretesky and Lynch 2009). Th is study shows, for example, that while the production of CO2 as a direct measure of CO2 pollution declined in the United States, the United States indirectly increased the global production of CO2 pollution in other nations through the consumption of goods produced in those nations. For example, since 1990, as global manufacturing/production shifted to China and China shifted toward capitalism, their CO2 emissions have increased about 535%. But most of the commodities produced by expanded production in China are consumed outside China, meaning that the increase in carbon emissions in China is being driven by consumption patterns in other nations. Unfortunately, September 2016 data on CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere from the Scripps Institute of Oceanography are disconcerting. According to Ralph Keeling, the director of the Scripps CO2 Program, atmospheric CO2 concentrations from the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii—which was established in 1956 under the direction of Charles David Keeling (the father of Ralph Keeling) to measure the atmospheric concentration of CO2 —indicate that the mean concentration of global CO2 has now surpassed 400 parts per million (ppm). As table 3.1 shows, the planetary boundary for CO2 is 350 ppm. That the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere continues to rise even as scientists call attention to the urgent need for nations to create policies to limit the production of CO2 pollution is quite troubling. Ocean Acidification A second planetary boundary, ocean acidification, is also directly affected by CO2 emissions. About 30–40% of CO2 emissions are absorbed by the world’s water bodies. When absorbed by oceans, CO2 interacts with water (H 2O) and biocarbonate ions to lower ocean pH, generating carbonic acid, which increases acidity. This reaction also decreases the amount of free carbonate atoms in waterways. This has important adverse ecological effects. For instance, marine species that use free carbonate atoms to build shells (e.g., coral, crabs, lobster, and other shelled animals species such as clams, oysters, and mollusks) have impaired ability to construct shells, which threatens their existence and the stability of the ocean food chain (see, for example, Evans et al. 2015). In short, CO2 pollution affects the health of the world’s water bodies. As noted, table 3.2 shows the increase in worldwide CO2 emissions from 1980 to 2011. This means that water bodies are also experiencing higher levels of CO2 absorption, resulting in the increased production of carbonic acid (Zeebe 2012). For example, oceanographers have found a substantial decrease

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(oceans are becoming more acidic) in north Pacific Ocean pH levels from 1990 through 2008 that mirrors increases in atmospheric CO2 levels (Doney et al. 2009; Feely, Fabry, and Guinotte 2008). Similar decreases in seawater pH have been observed throughout the world. As noted, increased ocean acidification adversely impacts sea life, causing the food chain to erode. According to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, more than one billion people rely on the world’s oceans for protein. If ocean acidification continues, the world’s food supply may be affected, which will have significant economic impacts (Narita, Rehdanz, and Tol 2012). While ocean acidification has been increasing, according to its primary indicator, the global mean saturation state of aragonite in surface water (see table 3.1), Earth has not reached the planetary boundary yet. Chemical Pollution For a third example, let’s look at chemical pollution. Although chemical pollution has been identified as one of the nine planetary boundaries, scientists have been unable to establish an adequate indicator to measure it. This is because of the sheer volume of chemicals that are emitted into the air, water, and land every day. In addition, it is difficult to measure this dimension of the planetary boundary because not all nations keep adequate records that track pollution emissions. Rockström et al. (2009a, 32) note that “by current estimates, there are 80,000 to 100,000 chemicals on the global market. . . . Some toxicity data exist for a few thousand of these chemicals, but there is virtually no knowledge of their combined effects.” Rockström et al. go on to note that chemical pollution has widespread detrimental impacts on human, animals, and plants, and consequently on the functioning of entire ecosystems. However, without empirical data it is difficult to quantify the amount of ecological disorganization that results from chemical pollution. Although a worldwide indicator of chemical pollution does not currently exist, the EPA has created the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), which provides some chemical pollution data for the United States. The EPA created the TRI to quell public outcry for data on chemical releases after the 1984 disaster in Bhopal, India, where thousands of people died from exposure to methyl isocyanate. In 1986, the US government passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, which requires some companies to report annual releases of some chemicals (only companies producing more than 25,000 pounds or receiving more than 10,000 pounds of toxic waste must report). Currently, the TRI tracks data on the release and disposal of approximately 650 chemicals (Burns, Lynch, and Stretesky 2008). Although this is a far cry from the estimates of 80,000 to 100,000 chemicals on the global market by Rockström et al. (2009a), it does provide some data on the level of releases from some of the most common chemical pollutants.

Pollution Crimes Table 3.3 US total toxic release inventory emissions, 2002–14 Year

TRI release (lbs.)

2002

4,774,130,320

2003

4,468,288,838

2004

4,231,287,236

2005

4,358,983,455

2006

4,327,118,860

2007

4,123,355,536

2008

3,875,380,211

2009

3,392,594,741

2010

3,785,152,724

2011

4,114,616,879

2012

3,629,012,385

2013

4,131,140,849

2014

3,897,228,049

Total

49,701,290,083

Mean

3,823,176,160

sources: US Environmental Protection Agency (2016d); The Right to Know Network (www.openthegovernment.org/node /1081). note: Total TRI includes total onsite and off site disposal and other releases for all chemicals and industries. EPA has released preliminary 2015 TRI data, but they are incomplete.

Table 3.3 provides data on total TRI releases for the 13-year period from 2002 to 2014. Here we report releases rather than total pounds of waste generated, since some waste is in storage or is recycled and is not released into the environment. Although there was a general decline in the TRI levels over this period, the overall amount of toxic releases reported are very large—more than 49.7 billion pounds of toxins were released into the environment in the United States in the form of ecological additions (see fig. 3.2). As with the other examples we reviewed, this translated into a tremendous amount of ecological disorganization. Again, since the TRI data only tell us about chemical releases in the United States, we cannot speculate on the scope of the problem globally with any precision. Globally, we know that six nations—the United States, China, India, Russia, Japan, and Germany—account for about 60% of carbon dioxide pollution. But there are no comparable measures for other pollutants across nations, so the full extent of this problem is currently unknown.

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Figure 3.2 Waste water being dumped into a stream. Waste water and chemicals are dumped into a nearby stream. According to TRI data, over four billion pounds of toxic waste enter into the US environment every year. One of the most common ways of disposing waste is by releasing it into bodies of water. Source: US Department of Agriculture.

Biochemical Flow For our final example, we consider a fourth dimension of the planetary boundary model—the biogeochemical flow. For this, Rockström et al. (2009a) focus attention on the global nitrogen and phosphorous cycle. Nitrogen (chemical symbol N) and phosphorous (chemical symbol P) are important fertilizers used to enhance food production. Both, however, are also widely used for other purposes such as fertilizing home lawns and gardens, public parks, golf courses, and other green spaces around public and private buildings. Their use has become widespread and now presents significant ecosystem pollution problems. Of particular concern is the manufacture and application of inorganic N and P (Galloway et al. 2008, 2003). Nitrogen and phosphorus occur in nature. In modern fertilizers, the P content is generated through the mining and processing of phosphate rock, which generates ecological disorganization through ecological withdrawals. The N content in modern fertilizers is created by combining natural gas with air, which contains N in the form of N2 (called the Haber-Bosch process). The manufacture of fertilizers initiates the process of adverse ecological impacts through ecological withdrawals. But manufacturing N and P also causes ecological additions. Th is is especially true of P, because the process requires large amounts of energy, which creates ecological

Pollution Crimes

Figure 3.3 Fish kill from water pollution. Large fish die-offs are often a result of environmental stress and ecological additions. In this photo, a number of dead fish can be seen floating across this body of water. Source: US Fish and Wildlife Service. Wikimedia Commons.

additions that add to climate change and expand global entropy. But the larger problem is the application of fertilizers. Not all fertilizers are absorbed by soil or plants, and significant fertilizer run off can occur. That run off is called nonpoint source pollution because it has no specific, identifiable source. The problem is that this nonpoint source pollution often reaches waterways, where it affects the balance of waterway ecosystems (Galloway et al. 2008). Excessive fertilizer pollution in waterways causes a problem called “eutrophication.” When fertilizer pollution becomes concentrated in waterways, water-based plant growth is excessively stimulated. When the excess plants die, they decompose, and that process uses up available waterway oxygen content (an outcome called “eutrophication”). This presents a serious problem for other waterway species, which experience oxygen deficiencies; when oxygen depletion accelerates, species such as fish can experience mass die-offs (see fig. 3.3). Commercially produced fertilizers date back to the mid-1800s, when Sir John Bennet Lawes invented a process to create “superphospates” and opened the first commercial fertilizer plant in 1846 in the United Kingdom (Gorecki 2002). While the industrial revolution increased fertilizer production, it was not until the early twentieth century, with the invention of techniques to chemically create and produce inorganic fertilizers (e.g., the Haber-Bosch process in 1913), that these fertilizers were more widely produced. The manufacture and application of inorganic fertilizers expanded greatly after World War II, a function of the rapid expansion of the capitalist ToP, increasing

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fertilizer pollution. As Rockström et al. (2009a) note, because of the rapid expansion of fertilizer use, N has already crossed its planetary boundary, while P is encroaching on its boundary. Environmental problems, such as eutrophication, that are caused by the excessive use of fertilizers were not widely known of in the early period of fertilizer production, but in recent decades their negative effects have been increasing significantly. Illustrating why this might be happening, Galloway et al. (2008) estimated that humans have increased their use of inorganic nitrogen by 1,146% since the 1860s, and in recent years there is evidence of accelerating use of N causing additional N fertilizer pollution (see also Galloway et al. 2003). In terms of political-economic analysis of ecological destruction, ecological Marxists have addressed the problem of excessive fertilizer use in relation to a concept called “metabolic rift” (Foster 1999; Foster, Clark, and York 2010). Metabolic rift is a complex idea that addresses how the organization of capitalism shifts the availability of fertilizers (and hence energy, since fertilizers are part of Earth’s natural energy system) across geographic areas. This leads to fertilizer deficits and surpluses in different locations, which from a politicaleconomic perspective is important for several reasons. First, it illustrates how capitalism disorganizes the environment by shifting available fertilizers and upsetting the natural balance of ecosystems. After the idea of fertilization was first discovered, this metabolic shift involved transporting natural fertilizers such as guano (bird and bat droppings) from underdeveloped nations to developed nations to amend soil for agricultural purposes. Second, by shifting the location of fertilizers, advanced nations that control the process of capitalist production withdraw materials needed for fertilizer production from less developed areas and transfer the natural energy across nations and ecosystems. This leads to the depletion of naturally available fertilizer resources in rural areas and in underdeveloped nations, where those materials are needed to grow food, and those materials are transferred to developed nations to enhance food production and consumption (Clark and Foster 2009). Th is may be one reason, for example, that the caloric intake of advanced nations is so much higher than the caloric intake in underdeveloped nations. Th ird, Foster (1999) argues that this process also involves shifting waste associated with the use of fertilizers in food production, which is entangled with the population dynamics of capitalism (e.g., capitalism requires a concentrated workforce, which leads to population growth in urban areas; feeding this higher populations requires expanding food production, which is facilitated by the production of inorganic fertilizers). Fourth, the expansion and concentration of the population, facilitated by the growth of capitalism, stimulated the need for the fertilizer industry, which as part of the ToP grows significantly. This need escalates the use of inorganic fertilizers, which necessitates the invention of processes for manufacturing it, rather than withdrawing fertilizer from nature. Th is, in turn, accelerates ecological disorganization

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through the production and application of fertilizers worldwide. The latter process in particular adds to global ecological disorganization and expanded ecological additions associated with the manufacture of inorganic fertilizer (see also Clark and Foster 2009; Clark and York 2008, 2005; Clausen and Clark 2005).

POLLUTION IN THE MODERN WORLD The previous section introduced the concept of planetary boundaries and discussed four examples in detail: climate change, ocean acidification, chemical pollution, and biochemical pollution. These indicators are referred to as planetary boundaries because ecological additions like pollution, and their effects, do not recognize national borders. Our frame for understanding and analyzing the effects of pollution, therefore, must work on a global level. In contemporary society, the majority of the world’s countries have adopted some form of capitalism and, importantly, almost without exception participate in the international capitalist economy (ICE). The existence of an ICE means companies can increase profits and accelerate growth by moving their facilities to countries where labor is cheaper, raw materials are more plentiful, and environmental regulations are weaker. This process has been referred to as the “transnational organization of production.” As described earlier, moving heavy-polluting manufacturing plants means that the processes that generate ecological disorganization are also moved from developed to less developed countries (LDCs). As an example, Copeland and Taylor’s (1994) model of the trade relationship between developed countries and LDCs suggests that developed countries, where incomes are higher, enhance environmental protection within their borders by shifting economic production toward providing clean goods and services, which leads to declining rates of pollution in those countries. However, their model also indicates that free trade across developed countries and LDCs increases the scale of global pollution because ecological withdrawals and production accelerate in LDCs as they manufacture more and more commodities for the developed world (see also Copeland and Taylor 1995). Indeed, other research has shown that pollution generated by the transnational shipping of commodities associated with the globalization of capitalism has a significant impact on global pollution (Stretesky and Lynch 2009), which is often unaccounted for because many studies exclude calculations of global transportation pollution (Cristea et al. 2013). The impact of the ICE on production practices, and consequently on the environment, is large. Andrew Jorgenson and colleagues (e.g., Jorgenson 2007, 2010, 2012; Jorgenson and Burns 2007a; Jorgenson and Clark 2012; Jorgenson, Dick, and Mahutga 2007; Jorgenson and Kuykendall 2008) have undertaken substantial research examining the links between foreign direct investment

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(FDI) and deleterious environmental outcomes. FDI measures how much an investor nation’s companies invest in other nations, and can be measured by using World Bank (2016) data (e.g., how many US$ are invested in a country like Brazil). While in recent decades the United States has received the largest share of global FDI by a single nation, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2015) notes that FDI in developed nations has declined dramatically in recent years, while FDI in Asian nations has expanded significantly. For example, FDI decreased by 30% in the United States and by 28% across European nations, decreased by a smaller percentage (11%) in Latin American nations, and remained stable in African nations. At the same time, FDI rose 16% across Asian nations, driven by investment in developing and LDC Asian nations. Just like capitalism on a national scale, the ICE depends on a continuous increase in production and economic growth to function properly. One source of the capital required for that process comes from capitalists in developed nations, who shift capital to foreign locations to take advantage of emerging market situations and thus increase profits. Th is includes, for example, the shift in global capital to developing and underdeveloped nations in Asia. The increase in FDIs in the smaller economies of LCDs means that production and growth decisions in LCDs are often made by individuals and businesses in the developed world, even though the citizens of LDCs pay the highest environmental costs. Research that examines the relationship between capitalism, trade, and its effects on the environment is called “ecologically unequal exchange” research (Hornborg 1998; Rice 2007). Rice notes that ecologically unequal exchange involves two conditions. First, the “disproportionate” use of ecosystems by nations, meaning that developed nations consume natural resources from LDCs in excessive amounts. Second, that over time, this disproportionate use of resources imposes ever-increasing ecological destruction on LDCs through ecological withdrawals and ecological additions. Consistent with the above, other researchers have discovered that increases in FDI are associated with a number of environmentally problematic outcomes such as increases in pesticide use (Jorgenson 2007; Jorgenson and Kuykendall 2008); emissions of nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide (Jorgenson, Dick, and Mahutga 2007); fertilizer use (Jorgenson and Kuykendall 2008); water pollution (Jorgenson 2006b); and methane emission (Jorgenson 2006a). These findings are not surprising since these increases are usually the result of increased production. Businesses headquartered in the developed world are constantly trying to increase production and surplus value, and as Schnaiberg (1980) has noted, one of the most common ways of doing that has been to rely on chemically intensive production methods such as pesticide and fertilizer use. Moving production facilities to nations where labor costs are lower and natural resources are more plentiful, and cheaper to extract and process, can also decrease production costs.

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Another way to increase surplus value is just to produce more commodities (see Marx [1974], for a detailed discussion). To do so, requires essentially the same approach, and results in the same environmental problems, that are discussed above, only at a larger scale. The ICE, therefore, increases ecological disorganization in general and shifts a disproportionate amount of ecological disorganization to LDCs. Jorgenson (2010, 459–60) summed up this pattern nicely when he noted, “The transnational organization of extraction and production in the context of foreign investment dependence partially allows for more developed countries and the transnational firms headquartered within them to treat less developed countries as supply depots as well as sinks for waste.” In other words, the environment in LDCs is heavily impacted by ecological disorganization stemming from ecological withdrawals, turning them into supply depots primarily for consumers in developed countries. LDCs are also turned into waste sinks that have to absorb the ecological additions that result from the normal operation of the ICE. In short, global capitalism promotes the development of a global ToP, which causes widespread and unequal ecological disorganization.

CRIMINOLOGY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE The perspective on the environmental issues that has been described in this chapter focuses on the impact that humans have had on the natural environment over the past century, perhaps, as some suggest, even since the industrial revolution. Some scientists also refer to this period of Earth’s history as the “Anthropocene” to signify that environmental and geological systems have been significantly impacted by human activities (Waters et al. 2016). As we have noted, capitalism has fundamentally changed the natural environment, and Earth’s ecology globally, through activities that have had major effects on, among other things, climate change and the planetary boundaries. Therefore, it will become increasingly important for green criminologists to understand how the political economy of capitalism affects life in, and drives ecological disorganization during, the Anthropocene. While lagging behind researchers in disciplines such as biology, geology, and sociology in investigating conditions during the Anthropocene, criminologists are beginning to recognize that they need to respond to the unique challenges it poses. Clifford Shearing (2015) and Nigel South (2015) recently discussed and debated what a criminology “reinvented” for the Anthropocene should look like (see also, Lynch, Long, and Stretesky 2015), suggesting that green criminology is one way the discipline has responded. This is encouraging for a discipline that has traditionally been focused on the social control of powerless people (Lynch and Michalowski 2006). However, more needs to be done. Green criminologists have argued that green crimes and harms are so

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widespread and numerous, they have many more victims compared to street crime (Jarrell, Lynch, and Stretesky 2013; Lynch 2013). This suggests that criminology needs to do more to uncover the structural conditions that cause green crimes and generate large-scale ecological disorganization. And as we have noted above, there is indeed evidence that expanded ecological disorganization has been occurring during the Anthropocene. In his book The Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism or the End of the World?, Joel Kovel (2007) submits that the citizens of the world are now “capitalism’s puppet.” In other words, capitalism dominates human existence and shapes how we live and interact with each other and nature. A politicaleconomic green criminology draws attention to the that fact, and explores how capitalism disorganizes nature. While in this chapter we have reviewed some of the effects of that intersection, the chapters that follow will provide specific examples of those problems, and how they can be addressed using a green criminological view formed on the basis of political-economic theory. In our view, doing so has enormous implications for the shape of green criminology, and will help it remain a relevant approach to understanding and addressing problems emerging during the Anthropocene. As we will argue, and as scientists have contended, research on conditions in the Anthropocene is important because they are having widespread, serious impacts on the viability of species, as is evident in the increasing rates of extinction. We suggest this is one result of the expansion of capitalist production and consumption over the past century during the period of the Anthropocene the subjects of later chapters, where we discuss the connections between the Anthropocene, species extinction rates and trends, habitat destruction, pollution, and ecological disorganization and destruction, which have not been sufficiently examined by green criminologists.

CONCLUSION In this chapter we outlined our approach to green criminology. We framed our analysis of green harms and crimes using a political-economic approach focusing on two perspectives: ToP and ecological Marxism. This allowed us to clearly link the growth imperative of capitalism to scientifically measurable environmental harms. We argued that the criminal law is inadequate for identifying green crimes; instead we suggested using measures like the nine planetary boundaries to determine when green criminological inquiry is necessary. We also highlighted the need to analyze green crime in a global context, which refers to conditions relevant to the ToP and the Anthropocene era. In chapters 4 and 5, we apply our green criminological perspective to ecological withdrawals and ecological additions, respectively.

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S T U DY G U I D E Questions and Activities for Students 1. Describe the concept of political economy. 2. Explain the theories of treadmill of production and ecological Marxism. 3. What are the benefits of an approach to green criminology that focuses on scientifically identifiable green harms rather than on violations of the criminal law? 4. What are planetary boundaries? Why do these indicators of environmental harm necessitate a global approach to the study of green crimes? 5. What is foreign direct investment? How does it encourage unequal exposure to toxic ecological additions? Lessons for Researchers 1. Much green criminological scholarship is based on case studies of particular types of harms; however, empirical studies that link green crimes and harms to larger structural factors, such as capitalism, are lacking. Green criminologists can benefit from the robust literature by environmental sociologists on the structural factors associated with environmental degradation.

2. While many green criminologists employ the concept of social harms in their work, it should be done carefully. While the criminal law is not adequate for defining the term green crime, an undefi ned social harms approach is not very helpful either. Ecological harms need to be identified with measurable indicators. 3. Many green criminologists have recommended and adopted a global approach to the study of green crimes and harms. However, little empirical green criminological research examines the impacts of global environmental harm using global indicators like the planetary boundaries. Future green criminological research needs to address this lacuna. 4. As noted, natural and social scientists have stated that the planet is now in the Anthropocene era, a time when humans have had and continue to have the greatest impact on Earth. Criminology needs to evolve to stay relevant in the Anthropocene. The field of green criminology is one response to the change, but criminologists and green criminologists still have much work to do to reconfigure criminology so that it more accurately reflects the state of the planet.

CH A P T ER

Withdrawal Crimes

A

4

s noted previously, in a political-economic view of ecological destruction, or ecological disorganization, there are two primary types of green harms: those related to ecological additions and those related to ecological withdrawals (EWs). These are extensive, and can damage ecosystems, but they can also cause both direct and indirect harm to human and nonhuman species. Crimes of ecological addition relate to pollution and its effects, important issues from a political-economic perspective that addresses how the treadmill of production (ToP) produces ecological additions and related harms (discussed in ch. 5). In this chapter we examine how the ToP generates green crimes related to EWs. EWs are vast and varied and involve the extraction of raw materials from nature for use in the system of production. They include, for example, the withdrawal of water for use in the production process, or its resale as a commodity; the harvesting of trees from natural forests and the creation of managed or planted forests that replace natural forests; the mining of minerals and metals, or even dirt, rocks, and sand, for use in a host of products related to construction, landscaping, and agriculture (e.g., fertilizers), or in the manufacturing of cement; the extraction of “raw materials,” which include food stuffs (e.g., fish, caviar, truffles), or things related to the production of food; the

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extraction of precious metals and gemstones for jewelry and other luxury items; the extraction of minerals and other elements for circuit boards and even cosmetics; or the extraction of oil, natural gas, and coal, among many other raw materials. Nature contains a wide variety of items humans use directly or remake into commodities. Removing those raw materials, and even the ways they are taken, extracted, or withdrawn, can cause serious forms of ecological harm and destruction, or ecological disorganization. Ecosystems can become impaired and unstable, limiting the survival of healthy ecosystems and the species that live in them; ecosystems can also be damaged through the waste products that resource withdrawals leave behind (e.g., “chat,” or waste piles of mined materials contaminated with heavy metals such as lead), which are forms of ecological additions associated with EW. To be sure, EWs are necessary for human life. But when they consume too much of the environment, and damage ecosystems and wildlife species in the process, human consumption and production become excessive (see ch. 6) and can promote the collapse of ecosystems. Thus, the concern is how nature is consumed. If it is done in ways that are sustainable and nondestructive of ecosystems and wildlife diversity and do not adversely impact human health and survival, then we don’t have to worry about the health of the ecosystem. Humans, however, generally consume nature in unsustainable ways. The problem, we shall argue, is not that humans must always create extensive ecological destruction but rather that the ways in which extraction and production are accomplished under capitalism promote the kind of extensive ecological destruction that facilitates ecosystem collapse. A political-economic analysis of capitalism can explain why. To begin, we examine the concept of EW. Next we provide examples of EWs and discuss some of the ecological harms they produce. Finally, we discuss those withdrawals from a political-economic perspective.

ECOLOGICAL WITHDRAWALS EWs provide the raw materials that humans use to create products they use in everyday life and thus are necessary for human survival. A problem occurs, however, when EW exceeds nature’s ability to provide those raw materials— that is, when human withdrawal of resources exceeds nature’s ability to reproduce those materials, human consumption of nature becomes unsustainable. And when humans cause too much ecological damage by the ways in which they withdraw ecological resources, or extract too high a volume of raw materials, extensive ecological problems can result and contribute to, for example, the crossing of planetary boundaries, as described in the previous chapter. Humans withdraw a wide variety of resources from nature, including water and food, materials for housing and clothing, and raw materials for cooking,

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heating homes, and operating automobiles and other transportation systems. Over the long run of human history, the quantity of raw materials extracted from nature has grown substantially, and many of those raw materials are now used to enable more luxurious styles of living or to raise the standard of living. One issue is whether there are sufficient natural resources to allow humans to consume nature for luxury purposes or to constantly increase humans’ standards of living. The answer is no. Doing so would lead to an ecological collapse. Even so, the political leaders and peoples of most nations wish to increase their levels of consumption and standards of living. Whether those desires are an innate part of human nature, or are stimulated by, for example, advertising, is one of the issues that is sometimes debated when proposals designed to limit consumption of natural resources are entertained. We will sidestep this debate for now. Nature is unable to support unconstrained human consumption of natural resources (see also chs. 6 and 12), because nature itself must fi rst be able to reproduce itself—that is, some of nature cannot be consumed but must be held in reserve to allow nature to replace the portion of raw materials that are consumed by the species that inhabit Earth. Nature uses that reserve to do reproductive labor that creates the ecosystem and replaces used up portions of it. This can be explained with a mathematical example. First, let’s say that all of nature, all of its resources, are defined by the term ALL. Some of ALL is made up of materials created when earth was formed, or those resulting from major transformations in the history of Earth’s development. The quantity of that part of ALL can, therefore, never increase and is in limited supply. Oil, coal, and metals are examples of the kinds of ecological resources that can only diminish as they get used up by humans. Nature cannot replace them, or cannot reproduce them in a short period of time. For example, it takes nature tens of millions to hundreds of millions of years to produce oil. Another part of ALL can be replenished or reproduced by nature. Earth’s ecosystem, for example, recycles water, and while there is only so much water in the ecosystem, it is reused and recycled often. Ecosystem resources like water, however, can become polluted and unusable, and must be subtracted from the ecological resources Earth can replenish. A third part of ALL is made up of replaceable ecological resources such as trees, fruits, nuts, fi sh, and other species and resources humans might consume. Each year, some portion of each of these gets consumed, through EW, by the planet’s species. And while different amounts of the different parts of ALL get consumed each year, let’s keep this example simple and just refer to ALL generally and not its parts. Mathematically, then, we can say: ALLyear × – EW = ALL year × + 1. That is, ALL in year 1 (e.g., 2016), minus EW in that year, equals the amount of ALL that is left over the next year (in this case, 2017). But here, we have yet to account for the effects of ecological reproduction, which is neces-

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sary, because during the year, nature’s reproductive activities add some raw materials to ALL. Second, we know that nature can reproduce certain parts of EW, as long as what is consumed are the kinds of raw materials that can be replaced (e.g., trees and fruits). Nature cannot replace some types of raw materials, such as metals or fossil fuels. To replenish the portion of ALL that species consume that is made up of replaceable natural materials, nature needs to keep part of ALL in reserve. The reserve cannot be consumed if nature is going to replace (i.e., reproduce itself) the part of nature that is consumed, which is necessary to maintain ecosystem stability. A stable ecosystem is one that remains in its current state, and can thus provide for the consumption needs of the species that inhabit earth. Let’s call the reserve part of nature R, and what remains the maximum possible portion of nature that is consumable, or C. In other words, ALL can be divided into its consumable and reserve portions. Thus ALL = C + R. Reproduction creates the R that replaces the part of ALL that species consume as EW. In a stable, balanced ecosystem that is neither growing nor shrinking, EW = R. As long as EW = R, nature remains in a state of equilibrium. It is, of course, entirely possible for EW to be less than R, in which case the ecosystem would be growing, but this is not the case now. Evidence supporting that contention comes from studies of the human ecological footprint (see ch. 6 on overconsumption and overproduction). In the real world, the problem is that globally, EW > R. For the global ecosystem (or what we are calling nature), this is when trouble emerges, as ALL contracts. Once ALL starts contracting, and human consumption of nature exceeds C, the reserve R can shrink as well. When that occurs, nature no longer has sufficient reserves to replenish what is consumed as EW, the ecosystem becomes unbalanced, and things can go awry. Mathematically and theoretically, we can say the following: 1. Ecological stability occurs when either (A)

EW = R

or (B)

EW < R.

2. Ecological instability occurs when EW > R. 3. Long-term ecological instability under conditions in which EW > R causes a decline in R, which can cause tremendous ecological disruption. The global ecosystem can become imbalanced, or ecologically disorganized, resulting in an inability of nature to produce conditions necessary for the life of the planet’s various species. In the long run, this condition causes ALL to shrink.

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Historically, the problem is that one species, humans, has been responsible for tremendous increases in EWs over time. Moreover, historically EWs began to increase significantly with the rise and expansion of capitalism. Why does this happen? As we illustrate below, the premise of capitalism is continuous economic expansion, which requires expanding raw material inputs or increased EWs to increase the production and consumption of commodities. As this happens, ALL and R shrink. When R shrinks too much, nature can no longer reproduce itself, or the ecosystem, sufficiently to provide adequately for all life forms. One result is that nature begins to change. Evidence of core changes in “the nature of nature” can be seen in outcomes such as climate change/global warming. This outcome is, as scientists argue, nature adjusting to new conditions in the world that force the ecosystem into a new equilibrium state (Lovelock 2000). That new equilibrium state (which may in fact begin to resemble conditions in earlier eras of earth’s history) is designed by nature to preserve the life of Earth, but it may not be sufficient to preserve the lives of the species that inhabit Earth. That argument forms the basis of the scientific theory called Gaia theory (Lenton 2000; Lenton and Lovelock 2000; Lenton and van Oijen 2002; Lovelock 2000, 2007; for the original proposition of Gaia theory, see Lovelock and Margullis 1974). An additional problem that emerges is that once EWs become so extensive that they produce an ecological instability such as climate change, it feeds back on the ecosystem, promoting further ecosystem change. These climate change feedbacks are complex and affect ecosystems and their inhabitants in many ways that are too expansive to be reviewed adequately here (e.g., on forest effects, see Dale et al. 2001; on tree life, Thuiller et al. 2011; on river basins, Palmer et al. 2008; on aquatic biota, Wrona et al. 2006; on lakes and streams, Williamson et al. 2008; on coastal wetlands, Day et al. 2008; on groundwater systems, Kløve et al. 2014; on marine fish, Roessig et al. 2004; on freshwater fish, Ficke, Myrick, and Hansen 2007; on Arctic mammals, Burek, Gulland, and O’Hara 2008; on marine mammals, Learmonth et al. 2006; on species biodiversity, Mantyka-Pringle, Martin, and Rhodes 2012; on tropical birds, Şekercioğlu, Primack, and Wormworth 2012). Some of those changes involve the ecosystem’s “effort” to repair and restore itself, which can contribute to increased plant growth (Nemani et al. 2003). While important, those changes cannot make up for lost ecological systems made up of mature trees in forested ecosystems (Haddad et al. 2015). In addition, ecosystem losses from EW that stimulate climate change also cause the decline of species populations, and in some cases can lead to species extinction (McCarty 2001), which becomes another feedback mechanism that impacts ecosystem stability, a subject that has been addressed in limited fashion by criminologists (Lynch, Long, and Stretesky 2015). EWs can, in other words, become so extensive that they disrupt how the global ecosystem (nature) functions. For example, nature must have a sufficient

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number of trees to produce the volume of oxygen species require, or is needed for other processes of ecological reproduction. Trees also aid in other important ecological functions, such as cooling the atmosphere, fi ltering and recycling water, and preventing soil erosion. If, therefore, we withdraw too many trees from nature, we disturb the organization of the ecosystem so that it cannot reproduce itself and the conditions for life. Humans must, therefore, control the volume of, the types of, and the ways in which they extract raw materials from nature. As noted above, controlling EWs is equally important because of feedback effects like climate change. As criminologists, we believe this implies increased regulation of the withdrawal of ecological resources is needed. Exactly how such a system can and should be created is open to further exploration by green criminologists, and is a subject beyond the focus of this book. For examples, see the literature on multilevel governance related to environmental social control, or the literature on what are called REDD+ policies (e.g., Angelsen and Rudel 2013; Atela et al. 2015; Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Cerbu, Swallow, and Thompson 2011; Yang, Rounsevell, and Haggett 2015). Below, we provide significant and representative examples of how EWs cause ecological damage (see also, Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013b, 43–65).

ECOLOGICAL WITHDRAWALS AND DESTRUCTION: THE EXAMPLE OF THE CANADIAN ATHABASCA OIL SANDS The method by which raw materials are extracted can cause serious ecological consequences. So the problem isn’t just that humans consume too much raw material but how ecologically destructive EW methods have become. A relevant example is the extraction of sand tars or oil sands from segments of the ecosystem where oil is distributed within large ecological deposits of “oil tars,” or oil deposits that are mixed with sand, clay, and water. One case is the extensive sand tar fields known as the Athabasca oil sands (AOS) in Alberta, Canada (other large sand tar fields withdrawals are happening in Venezuela, Brazil, China, Madagascar, and Estonia, though sand tars can be found in many nations). The Canadian sand tars are the third largest oil reserve in the world, which is one reason the oil industry has such an extensive interest in mining those reserves. The AOS contain a deposit of bitumen—a semisolid to liquid form of oil mixed with other natural elements like soil, clay, and sand. The AOS are embedded in the ecosystem, and in Alberta are found under more than 54,000 square miles of Canadian boreal forest and peat bogs—an area the size of New York state or the countries of Togo (Western Africa) and Croatia (Central Europe). To extract the sand tars, the ecosystem must be dug up and destroyed, and pumped through wells using processes we describe below (to see images of that destruction, do a Google image search for “Alberta Sand Tars”). This

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Figure 4.1 Fort McMurray sand tar development, Alberta, Canada. Extensive environmental destruction is associated with sand tar extraction in Alberta, Canada. So much of the natural environment has been removed that the image resembles a planet other than earth. Source: Photograph by Kris Krüug. British Library on Flickr Commons. Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-SA 2.0. Wikimedia.

involves destroying boreal forest, a subarctic forest populated largely with conifers, or trees that produce cones such as fir, pine, and spruce trees, along with larch, birch, and aspen trees. Large segments of the global boreal forest also contain significant quantities of fresh water in wetlands, marshes, and bogs, or specific kinds of ecosystems that play important roles in overall ecosystem health by recycling and preserving water. These forests are important breeding grounds for animals, including many bird species. The destruction of these forests changes the nature of local ecosystems in deleterious ways (Kreutzweiser, Hazlett, and Gunn 2008), and contributes to climate change when large sections of the boreal forest and peat bogs are destroyed (Frelich and Reich 2009; Rooney, Bayley, and Schindler 2012). The damage can be extensive since oils sands are often found from 150 to 650 feet below the surface, and withdrawing sand tars can require removing large segments of the earth’s surface. The process of recovering oil from sand tars involves two major withdrawal and processing techniques: surface mining and underground mining or drilling (see fig. 4.1). In surface mining, the natural ecosystem must be removed, and doing so can involve extensive deforestation and disturbance of the upper layer of the ecosystem, which can also have dramatic impacts on local waterways. In this case, the sand tars are removed through strip-mining techniques

Withdrawal Crimes

that dig into the earth to depths of 650 feet or sometimes more (for images, do a Google image search for “strip-mining sand tars”). The surface-mining technique is only used to extract the bitumen in sand tars close to the surface. Much of the bitumen in sand tars, however, occurs more than two hundred feet below the surface, or beyond the feasible or economically efficient reach of surface-mining techniques, and that bitumen is mined using a drilling method called in situ drilling. In the in situ process, wells (pipes) are drilled into areas containing the sand tars. Two types of well pipes are used in this process: the collection/recovery wells and injection wells. The injection well pipes are used to heat the bitumen, to make it recoverable by decreasing its viscosity (i.e., making it more like a liquid). After the collection and injections wells are drilled, steam, hot water, and chemicals are injected into the well, and the heated and liquid bitumen is then recovered by pumping it out through the collection well. As with conventional oil recovery (see below), this process also creates waste pits (called holding or tailings ponds and skim pits) that store ecosystem-damaging pollutants of different types that are created during this process. Those storage areas, when left unprotected, can harm wildlife that are attracted to these areas because they believe they are sources of water. These waste pits contain the contaminated water and chemicals used to extract the bitumen, but they can also contain concentrated, naturally occurring toxic substances that co-occur with bitumen, and can be harmful once extracted, collected, and concentrated in the waste pits. After extraction, the bitumen in the congealed sand tars (which can also include clay, dirt, and peat, along with naturally occurring impurities and toxins) must be separated for processing into oil. The separation techniques employ a variety of chemicals that can have adverse impacts on the ecological health of human and nonhuman species. The extracted materials can also contain contaminants such as heavy metals. An important contaminant of concern that results from this process is waste laden with mercury deposits—a neurotoxin with numerous adverse health impacts (Kirk et al. 2014). Preparing the sand tars for further processing involves the use of large quantities of hot water and steam. About three barrels of water are required to make one barrel of oil from sand tars. The water for this process must also be withdrawn from the local ecosystem. In the Canadian sand tar case, the water comes largely from the Athabasca River. Withdrawing the large quantity of water needed to separate and process the sand tars has a significant impact on local waterways (Jordaan 2011). By using water and chemicals, the sand tars are “liquefied” in separation tanks, and the bitumen that floats to the top is skimmed off. The leftover water, which is now contaminated with concentrated impurities, is piped into holding ponds, or tailing ponds (for images of tailing ponds, do a Google image search for “tailing ponds”). These holding ponds can contain millions of gallons of contaminated, unusable water. In Athabasca, sand tar producers are licensed to withdraw 15% of the water they use from the nearby

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Athabasca River to recover and process the sand tars (Mannix, Dridi, and Adamowicz 2010). The rest of the water must be imported from other locations. Nevertheless, such significant withdrawals of water locally are likely to have significant impacts on the health of the Athabasca ecosystem. As we have already noted, sand tar extraction can lead to extensive ecological destruction, and a portion of that destruction involves the consumption and pollution of large quantities of water. These outcomes. which are a consequence of “normal” sand tar oil extraction conditions, can also include effects from oil leaks associated with sand tar extraction, which may reach waterways. The tailing ponds that contain wastewater from sand tar extraction also pose risks to wildlife in the area. Wildlife use the ponds as if they were naturally occurring waterways, and they can be killed by contact with the oil fi lm in the tailing ponds, sometimes becoming coated in oil (see photos in this chapter for examples). The sand tar recovery companies are supposed to use methods (including cannons and other explosions, flare guns, and amplified sounds to keep wildlife away from the ponds) to deter wildlife from using tailing ponds. These solutions have not been successful. For example, in 2008 Syncrude agreed to pay a fine of Can$3 million for the deaths of sixteen hundred ducks in a tailing pond (CBC News 2010). There is also concern that the oil sand recovery methods that inject steam and heat into the ground for bitumen recovery can cause uncollected oil to migrate underground and impact water supplies. Another part of that ecological destruction relates to the quantity of sand tar that must be removed to produce oil. It takes about 2 tons of sand tar to produce 1 barrel of oil. In 2013, the Canadian government estimated that the sand tars generate 1.98 million barrels of oil per day. On the basis of that estimate it takes 3.96 billion tons of sand tar to produce one day’s worth of oil; in the course of a year, nearly 1.5 trillion tons of sand tars must be extracted. Clearly, withdrawing that amount of sand tar from an ecosystem is bound to cause excessive ecological damage. To place these above figures into context, we estimate that the volume of sand tar removed in one day would be equivalent to a hundred-foot-deep hole covering 151 acres. An additional part of the problem is that the withdrawal of oil from sand tars is relatively inefficient (see below), and creates a great amount of waste and ecological additions. The extensive destruction generated by this form of mining, which has been occurring since the 1970s, cannot easily be remediated, and little of the mined area has been reclaimed. Whether reconstructing and re-engineering the devastated boreal ecosystem is even possible once it has been destroyed is questionable, since it took natural processes more than ten thousand years to create it in the first place. Also important to consider is that the extraction of oil sands has significant energy and environmental costs. One measure of the energy costs of recovery is called the “energy returned on investment,” or EROI, which is an economic

Withdrawal Crimes

indicator of how much energy is returned for each dollar invested. According to Hall, Lambert, and Balogh (2014), average EROIs for some common energy sources are as follows: hydroelectric, 84; natural gas, 67; coal, 46; conventional oil and gas, 18; wind, 18; photovoltaic, 10; and Canadian sand tar, 7.5. In terms of return on investment, Canadian sand tars have the lowest economic return of any of these energy sources—and is about 2.5 times less economically efficient than conventional oil extraction and even wind energy. Thus, the price of oil on the global market also plays a role in whether sand tars are mined. But returns on investment alone should not be the sole factor considered when it comes to deciding whether a fossil fuel resource should be recovered, and the extensive ecological disorganization sand tar extraction causes is another argument against this type of extraction method. Indeed, we would suggest that reference to sand tar EROI distracts attention from the real issue—the extent of ecologically irreversible damage caused by extracting sand tars, which is not included in EROI calculations. Studies suggest that the oil sand development project in the region causes significant environmental damage. Kelly et al. (2009) found evidence of polycyclic aromatic compounds pollution, which is a by-product of burning fossil fuels such as sand tars and, in this region results from the use of those fuels to process the sand tars. Kelly et al. found that polycyclic aromatic compounds concentrations in winter snowpacks are of significant concern, and existed in sufficient concentrations to kill fish embryos. In a later study, Kelly et al. (2010) found evidence of thirteen priority pollutants in the Athabasca River and nearby snowpacks. Concentrations of seven of the thirteen priority pollutants for which they tested were in excess of government safety standards for the protection of wildlife (for other measures of pollution in wildlife, see M. Evans and Talbot 2012; Hebert et al. 2011, 2103). In addition, air pollutants generated by the mining and processing of sand tars have been found to be sufficient to cause damage to the forest ecosystem (Bytnerowicz et al. 2010). Other issues also surround the Canadian sand tars. As Smandych and Kueneman (2010) note, the development of the sand tars places those with an economic interest in withdrawing them (corporations and the Canadian government) at odds with those with a public health interest in preserving the ecosystem (e.g., Canadian First Nations peoples, groups representing wildlife, and other people worldwide affected by AOS-induced climate change). In response to claims of ecological damage, Smandych and Kueneman (2010) note developers consider the area to be largely an “empty desolate place,” and suggest that the ecological and public health impacts of sand tar development will be minimal and should not be a major concern. Such a view—one that is consistent with the interests of ToP producers of oil from sand tars—clearly overlooks the impact of such development on the health of local ecosystems and ignores their global and local effects. But such responses also overlook the effects of this type of development on First Nations peoples,

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who live traditional lifestyles and depend on the region’s ecosystem for survival. As Huseman and Short (2012) note, leaders of indigenous peoples believe that the sand tar development is a long-term act of industrial genocide directed against their way of life. Green criminological research has not devoted significant attention to how EWs or additions impact native people, and further research on this issue is required (see Lynch and Stretesky 2012; Moloney and Chambliss 2014; for further discussion of the Canadian sand tars from a green criminological perspective, see Lynch, Stretesky, and Long 2016). The story of the sand tars is not confined to Canada, and the AOS sand tar project has significant global ecological costs associated with climate change, which are facilitated on site and by the burning of tar sands oil (Charpentier, Bergerson, and MacLean 2009). As noted earlier, Canada is not the only country that produces oil from sand tars, and a number of nations also contain sand tars waiting to be developed. While the oil industry promotes sand tar development as a mechanism for providing oil security, it overlooks the extensive ecological destruction, and in particular its additional climate change impacts over other energy sources, that sand tar extraction and processing produces. The greenhouse gas emissions caused by tar sands–derived oil is estimated to be somewhere between 9% and 102% greater than that caused by conventional oil, depending on which conventional oil source is used for comparison (Lattanzio 2014). For the oil industry, the term oil security has a narrow definition that does not address the issue of ecological stability, and the deleterious ecological effects of oil sand extraction. Assessment of the detrimental ecological impacts of sand tar development must also include reference to the oil pipelines built to transport sand tar oil. An example is the Keystone pipeline, an oil pipeline that runs from Alberta, Canada, to oil refineries in Illinois and Texas, and to an oil tank and oil redistribution center in Oklahoma. Studies suggest that this pipeline has a deleterious impact on the US ecosystems from the pipeline leaks and ecological destruction associated with building it (for a discussion, see Gasser 2012). An additional, larger pipeline, the Keystone XL pipeline, which would cross into the United States, has been proposed, but was vetoed by President Obama in February 2015, but approved by President Trump the day after his inauguration. Other routes for delivering sand tar oil also have their drawbacks. In July 2013, a railcar transporting sand tar oil derailed in Lac-Megnatic, Canada. The resulting explosion killed forty-seven people, and the oil spilled is expected to cost Can$200 million to remediate (Tomesco 2013). The discussion above examines the numerous deleterious ecological impacts of one specific kind of EW. There are, as noted, many resources humans extract from nature, and many can produce extensive ecological harm from EWs. Other examples of EWs include water extraction, oil extraction and hydraulic fracturing, timber withdrawals, and mountaintop mining.

Withdrawal Crimes

Water Extraction Water scarcity has become a major global concern in the contemporary era. As water withdrawals increase and varying weather patterns caused by climate change emerge, altering water availability in different ways in different parts of the world, water access and withdrawal issues become even greater concerns. Water scarcity is a particular issue with respect to food security and food production (Schewe et al. 2014) because water is essential for growing and processing many foods. Areas acknowledged as currently facing “water stress” include central and western Asia and North Africa (Rijsberman 2006), and researchers have suggested that there is a growing potential water crisis that may lead to armed confl icts between nations over water access (Ohlsson 2000). Water scarcity is not only an issue for human populations, and in places where human water use is extensive and rainfall irregular and changing, alterations in water availability can damage local ecosystems. Th is includes loss of tree stock, a decline in aquatic biodiversity (Hoekstra et al. 2012; see also Vörösmarty et al. 2010), and harm to nonaquatic species that lack water access. One measure of water use by humans is what is called “virtual water,” that is, water used to produce a commodity, or water contained in commodities. Nations trade commodities, and those commodities have different virtual water content or embodied water—that is, the water content used to create those commodities. Importing and exporting commodities with virtual water content shift access to water from one place to another, and are part of the process related to metabolic rift described in the previous chapter. As Hoekstra and Mekonnen (2012) report, nations have different water footprints, which are impacted by the quantity of virtual water nations import and export. The largest virtual water–importing nations include, in order, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Mexico, and Japan, while the largest virtual water exporters include Brazil, Australia, the United States, Argentina, and India. Hoekstra and Mekonnen note that one-fifth of the global water footprint is contained in commodity exports, with the largest share of that water (76%) linked to the import of agricultural products. While studies of the relationship of water availability to its importation and exportation have been produced, researchers have yet to examine water imports and exports related to sociological and political explanations, such as world system theory or the ToP, and have failed to examine whether political-economic theories are useful for predicting virtual water flows across nations. Future political-economic research on green crimes related to water use and its unequal distribution, therefore, can be directed toward this issue. Within green criminology, the development of such studies would also benefit from empirical analysis of the effect of virtual water imports and exports. Water withdrawal and access are important ecological issues, and green criminologists have not directed sufficient attention to these problems as of

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this writing (Johnson, South, and Walters 2016; McClanahan 2014, 2016). Concerns that are, in our opinion, ripe for green criminological analysis include the political economy of water, the privatization of water, and how privatization of water impacts water withdrawal and access. Related issues include the relationship between water access and food, and environmental and social justice (Perreault 2014), all of which are yet to be widely explored in the green criminological literature (e.g., Walters 2006). Oil Extraction and Hydraulic Fracturing Extraction of traditional or conventional liquid oil deposits leads to extensive ecological harm and disorganization, including destruction of land. Oil well drilling can cause harms to local ecosystems that impact wildlife breeding grounds and species viability (e.g., Doherty et al. 2008), and can result in oil spills on land and in oceans that impact ecosystem and wildlife health (Burns et al. 2014; Goldsworthy et al. 2000). Such spills can kill a wide variety of animals and cause ecosystem damage that can last for decades (Ballachey, Bodkin, and Monson 2013; Santos et al. 2012). Some of the overlooked ecological effects of oil withdrawal are those that affect indigenous peoples (Suárez et al. 2013). There have been a number of instances around the world where oil drilling has caused extensive damage to local ecosystems that indigenous populations depend on for survival. Gedicks (2003, 85) argued that “native peoples are under assault on every continent because their lands contain a wide variety of valuable resources needed for industrial and military production. Advances in exploration technologies have allowed multinational mining, oil, and lumber corporations to identify resources in the most isolated and inaccessible parts of the world’s rainforests, mountains, deserts, and tundras. These are precisely the areas occupied by the world’s remaining native or indigenous peoples.” Columbia has experienced complex internal, violent political struggles for the past half century that cannot be easily summarized. Part of that struggle includes efforts by indigenous peoples to resist usurpation of their lands for oil mining (as well as for the harvesting of trees and covert appropriation of enriched-soil areas for corporate farms), to support the expansion of global capitalism. Some indigenous leaders who have opposed these efforts have been found dead in execution-style slayings. Similar problems are found throughout other South American and Latin American nations. In 2015, the Achuar tribe in Peru settled a decade-long struggle against Occidental Petroleum out of court, after filing suit against Occidental in the US court system in 2007. The suit claimed that Occidental knowingly polluted Achuar territory, causing premature deaths, birth defects, and ecological damage. Occidental drilled for oil in Achuar territory from 1971 through 2000. The terms of the settlement have not been made public. Amazon Watch (2008) notes that during that time period, Occidental emitted 9 billion gallons of

Withdrawal Crimes

untreated wastewaters containing heavy metals into Achuar territory. The oil operation was taken over in 2000 by Pluspetrol, an Argentinian oil company. Another part of this area, composed of 4 million acres, was being explored by the Canadian firm Talisman Energy. After several years of resistance by the Achuar, Tailisman withdrew from further oil exploration in 2012. In 2013, Peru’s government declared an environmental emergency in part of the Amazon rainforest (Pastaza Valley), after discovering high concentrations of lead, oil contamination, barium, and chromium, and levied millions of dollars in fines (nearly US$13 million) against Pluspetrol, which as of this writing was appealing the ruling. Yet despite problems such as the ones described above, the Peruvian government plans to auction off nearly thirty additional oil-drilling rights contracts. In addition to ecological damage and threats to the survival of indigenous people such as the Achuar, news stories and the group Global Witness have tracked the killings of indigenous environmental activists who sought to protect their land from development. Global Witness reports that in 2014, at least 116 indigenous environmental activists were murdered, with 70% of those killings occurring in Brazil (29), Columbia (25), the Philippines (15), and Honduras (12). (For related news stories, search Google under “killing indigenous environmental activists.”) These killings often go unsolved, though indigenous people claim the offenders are employees of firms, or assassins hired by, for example, oil companies. They claim killings are also orchestrated by governments. This is clearly a serious problem, one linked to the political economy of resource extraction from developing and less-developed nations, which requires additional green criminological analysis. EW also harms Native Americans in various ways, including the negative impacts associated with oil and gas drilling, coal mining, and uranium extraction (Lynch and Stretesky 2012). In some of those cases, Native American tribal leaders have played a role in allowing these types of EW processes to occur. These situations also involve visible contradictions of different types. One example is the rapid development of drilling for and refining of oil and gas on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in North Dakota. Despite those developments, and the shipping of oil from those reserves to far off locations, the nearby Native American town of Mandaree has no gas station (Brown n.d.). Oil spills have become a problem in the area from the more than a thousand wells and oil pipelines. As these representative examples show, how EWs and other green crimes, spurred on by ToP, victimize native peoples worldwide is a fruitful area of analysis for green criminologists. The kinds of ecological destruction oil extraction can produce is also exemplified by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. An explosion in the well that was being drilled from a BP-operated, water-based oil platform caused the platform to sink and opened up an underwater oil gusher that took nearly three months to plug, though it continued to leak after the official

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Figure 4.2 Sea turtle rescued from Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Huge numbers and many individuals within species can be affected by oil spills. Here Dr. Brian Stacy, a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration veterinarian, rescues a sea turtle after the 2010 Gulf of Mexico/BP Horizon oil spill of more than 210 million gallons of oil. Estimates suggest that 102 different species of birds, as many as 26,000 marine mammals, and over 6,000 sea turtles were killed by the spill. Source: Photograph by Blair Witherington, FWC. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission.

plug date. The largest in history, this spill dumped more than 210 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. The spill had wide-ranging effects on ecological, human, and nonhuman health (see figs. 4.2 and 4.3). These harms were likely so extreme that they cannot be measured monetarily, which is often how the consequences from ecological damage are described. In the aftermath of this large spill, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2010) ordered that 86,985 square miles of the Gulf of Mexico (36% of the gulf under US control) be closed to commercial and recreational fi shing to prevent public health harms. Some estimate that this caused an economic loss of US$2.5 billion to the fishing industry (Walsh 2010). Others estimate that the spill led to a US$22.7 billion loss to the tourism industry (Oxford Economics 2015). Additional studies note that the spill killed 20% of the Gulf’s juvenile bluefi n tuna population (European Space Agency 2010), and 17% of the Gulf’s dolphin population (National Wildlife Federation 2015). To our knowledge, no economic calculations of the cost of the oil spill on humans have been made. During oil extraction, a number of dangerous conditions are created on oil field sites, including construction of skim pits, used to dispose of contaminated

Withdrawal Crimes

Figure 4.3 Dead bird in oil waste pit. Liquid oil, coal, and the sand tar waste produced by processing these energy resources are often stored in open waste lagoons. To wildlife, those open waste pits appear as lakes or ponds, and birds, ducks, geese, and other waterfowl may attempt to use them and become trapped in the waste pit. Here we see a bird that landed in a shallow part of a waste pit, and became covered in oil. Source: Photograph by Pedro Ramirez Jr., US Fish and Wildlife Service, item WV-11150-CD15.

oil, and open reserve pits, where drilling chemicals are stored (see fig. 4.4). Chemicals contained in these pits include oil, solvents, benzene (a carcinogen), hydrogen sulfate, a variety of volatile organic compounds, and surfactants. In the late 1990s, the US Fish and Wildlife Service estimated that these kinds of pits resulted in the deaths of 2 million migratory birds annually (see Trail 2006). Oil drilling also creates waste or ecological additions (see ch. 5) that can cause ecological damage. Pipelines built to transport oil from oil fields can cause extensive ecological destruction (Xiao et al. 2014), and drilling oil wells can result in contamination of both groundwater and underground water supplies. Underground water supplies are threatened when oil leaking from wells that intersect with underground water resources migrates into underground water supplies. Both conventional oil and natural gas can be extracted using hydraulic fracturing techniques, which can lead to a number of ecological problems. Conventional oil or gas drilling extracts oil from pooled collections of fossil fuel underground. Hydraulic fracturing is a technique used to extract fossil fuels present underground in small or fragmented deposits distributed in an

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Figure 4.4 Net covering oil skim pit helps protect wildlife. Oil skim pits are dangerous for wildlife, which interpret the watery pit contaminated with oil as a water body they can use. Many oil skim pits are not maintained properly. Here we see a properly maintained oil skim pit covered with a net to prevent wildlife from accessing the oil-contaminated water. For additional discussion and images, see Ramirez (2009). Source: Photograph in Ramirez (n.d.).

underground area (see fig. 4.3). The concept of fracking was discovered in the mid-1800s, but it was not significantly investigated until the 1920s and was only put into use in the 1940s by Halliburton. The introduction of horizontal fracking in the 1990s expanded the ability of oil and gas companies to extract gas, increasing EWs and ecological harm. In hydraulic fracturing, a main well is sunk and then extended horizontally. In figure 4.5, you can see three main wells and five horizontal wells (this is just an illustration; there may be more or fewer vertical and horizontal wells). Sections of the horizontal wells include pipes fitted with explosives. These are set off, fracturing the surrounding underground area and creating crevices that connect small underground fossil fuel deposits for withdrawal. A mixture of water and other chemicals is then injected into the wells to expand the crevices (the fractures) and increase the quantity of oil or gas that can be recovered. The water mixture used to create the fractures is then pumped out of the wells before oil or gas is extracted. Th is creates a large quantity of contaminated wastewater (ecological additions) that must be stored, usually on site, thus

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Figure 4.5 Hydraulic well-fracturing diagram. This illustration depicts what generally happens when hydraulic fracturing is used to recover fossil fuels. Here we see the well heads (middle of diagram), the main wells (thick vertical lines in the middle of the diagram underground), and the horizontal pipework used for fracking. Notice how in this case the well is shown as being drilled through a local underground water supply, which can lead to water supply contamination with fracking chemicals and fossil fuels. Source: UK Department of Energy and Climate Change.

providing further opportunities for ecological damage when the wastewater lagoons leak. Those lagoons often include water that is referred to as TENORM or “technologically enhanced naturally occurring radioactive material” (Fair 2014). These radioactive materials are often found in underground areas near fossil fuel sites, but are dispersed throughout the site and pose no direct harm in their natural states. Fracking, however, causes the naturally occurring radioactive materials in the well wastewater to be collected in the withdrawal process and concentrated, creating waste contaminated with nuclear materials at levels that can be dangerous. The withdrawal of oil and natural gas through fracking has been associated with a variety of adverse ecological consequences. These include, as noted

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above, radioactive ecological additions; contamination of the above-ground water supply, from spills, waste lagoons, and underground gas migration (see Darrah et al. 2014; Vidic et al. 2013), and of the in-ground water supply (Haluszczak, Rose, and Kump 2013; Olmstead et al. 2013); and contamination of the water supply associated with using municipal water treatment systems to process wastewaters withdrawn from fracking (Ferrar et al. 2013). Evidence that this type of withdrawal method produces earthquakes also exists (Ellsworth 2013). On the latter point, a UK firm admitted that its fracking of shale to recover natural gas caused earthquakes (Jardine 2011), while the government in the conservative and oil rich state of Oklahoma, where fracking is extensive, recently created a website detailing how fracking can cause earthquakes (Oklahoma Secretary of Energy and Environment 2016). Our review barely touches on the widespread ecological damage caused by fossil fuel EW processes. While some green criminologists have addressed environmental justice and human rights issues in relation to oil production (Jarrell and Ozymy 2011; Ozymy and Jarrell 2011, 2012; D. Short et al. 2015), as well as ineffective oil-drilling regulations (Opsal and Shelley 2014), explorations specifically related to the ecological harms associated with the process’s ecological additions have not been extensively examined (see Lynch, Stretesky, and Long 2016). Timber Withdrawal Making a case that timber withdrawal causes extensive ecological disorganization, especially when forests are clear-cut, is easy (for representative images, Google “forest clear-cut”). Small areas of clear-cut forest have localized impacts and contribute to what is called ecosystem segmentation or fragmentation, or the dividing of large, forested ecosystems into smaller, less healthy, and more disconnected forest ecosystems (see fig. 4.6). Ecosystem segmentation has adverse impacts on animal habitats and can reduce animal ranges and breeding grounds to levels at which animal species can no longer reproduce in sufficient numbers, causing species decline and extinction (Kendrick et al. 2015; see also chs. 3 and 8 for discussions connecting forest fragmentation to Anthropocene extinction). On a broader scale, as we will note in the following chapter, deforestation has extensive deleterious ecosystem effects globally, including contributing to climate change (see ch. 5 for information on global deforestation). There are many adverse ecological consequences associated with the removal of trees, including reduced air filtration of pollutants; reduced water filtrations and water retention; and increased soil erosion. Mountaintop Removal Mining Timber clear-cutting is sometimes part of other withdrawal processes that adversely impact ecological conditions, including mountaintop removal

Withdrawal Crimes

Figure 4.6 Early evidence of a timber clear-cut, Alaska. The beginning of a clear-cut in Alaska. Some clear-cuts can be extensive. The world’s largest exists in British Columbia and covers 300 square kilometers or about 116 square miles. The British Columbia clearcut was so large that when it was fresh, it was visible on satellite images from outer space. Source: Photograph Tolka Rover. British Library on Flickr Commons Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.

mining (MRM or MTR). Extensive deforestation of the area is often done, after which explosives are used to loosen the overburden on the mountaintop—the area of soil that lies above the coal seam to be mined. These explosions can remove hundreds of feet of overburden. The overburden is pushed into an adjacent valley using large drag lines (very large cranes; drag lines may cost between $50 and $100 million dollars), producing what are called “valley fills,” which block the headwaters of streams and rivers and divert water flows. This can potentially cause flooding and impede the health of existing waterways and the health of waterway species (Pond et al. 2014). While the negative effects of preparing the land for MRM are extensive, the additional pollutants produced by MRM techniques are also a cause for concern. Ecosystems destroyed by MRM processes are unlikely to recover, since they have taken hundreds of thousands of years to form, a process that cannot be replicated by humans. Research has also linked MRM to human diseases, such as increased reporting and risk of cancer (Hendryx et al. 2012), lung and cardiovascular diseases (Kurth et al. 2014), birth defects (Ahern et al. 2011), and other health problems such as asthma and hypertension (Hendryx 2013). In the Appalachian region of the United States, where MRM EWs have destroyed more than 1,200 miles of streams and 2.7 million acres of forest, MRM’s effects have been of special concern because of the unique nature of the Appalachian forest. Researchers note that, while a number of studies have focused on MRM in relation to water resource destruction and its effect on water species, less research has addressed how MRM changes the forest ecosystem (see Griffith et al. 2012, for a review of the literature). Wickhan et al.

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(2013) note that MRM leads to a loss of forest topological complexity, soil erosion, and forest loss and fragmentation, all of which harm species diversity. Moreover, they note that MRM, by removing forests, adversely impacts the availability of carbon sinks that control climate change and absorb carbon from the atmosphere.

ECOLOGICAL WITHDRAWALS AND THE TREADMILL OF PRODUCTION Above, we have provided a number of examples of EW and the harms it causes. We turn now to a discussion of EW from a political-economic perspective, focusing particularly on ToP theory. To review, ToP theory takes a political-economic approach to explaining the relationship between ecological destruction and economic production. It draws attention to how changes in production that occurred after World War II effected ecological destruction. First, ToP theory notes that expansion of production in the post–World War II era was driven by changing production practices that relied more heavily on fossil fuels and chemical labor, which were used to accelerate the speed and scope of commodity production while lowering costs. Second, accelerating production required an increase in raw materials, fossil fuel, and chemical energy inputs. This meant inventing new methods, such as MRM and oil and gas fracking to extract raw materials, which over time were becoming increasingly reliant on fossil fuels and chemical labor. Th is led to greater ecological destruction and increased the likelihood ecosystems would be damaged. Third, expanding EWs was necessary to increase quantities of raw materials, such as trees to produce lumber and paper (see ch. 6 for a fuller discussion), which would be turned into commodities. But it was also necessary to increase the extraction and production of fossil fuels and chemicals used in the production process. Thus, for instance, in the United States, where the ToP expanded most rapidly after World War II, the number of oil wells drilled increased significantly. According to the US Energy Information Administration, there were 21,352 exploratory and developmental oil wells drilled in the United States in 1949. Peak exploratory/developmental oil well drilling occurred in 1956, when 30,528 wells were sunk. During the 1960s, exploratory/ developmental oil well production was dropping, reaching a low of 14,368 by 1969, perhaps as a result of the volume of oil already being produced. At the same time, importation of oil into the United States was increasing. Exploratory/developmental well production continued to decline through 1973, but after the oil crisis it began to rise, increasing to 43,887 wells by 1981. Exploratory/developmental wells subsequently fell into a state of decline once again,

Withdrawal Crimes

which could have been the result of several related factors (e.g., fewer places left to drill, declining economic return on newer wells, energy alternatives including coal, increased importation of foreign oil, the transfer of manufacturing overseas). In 2014, the United States imported about nine million barrels of oil per day from eighty countries, and exported four million barrels per day. It may seem odd that the United States both imports and exports oil. Because US refi neries have the capacity to refi ne low-grade crude oils, and some other nations cannot, the United States imports low-grade crude oil from countries like Canada (sand tars) and Venezuela, and exports high-grade crude oils. In doing so, the United States facilitates ecological disorganization in other nations that use ecologically destructive oil extraction techniques. Over the past three decades, the global expansion of production in general, and the ToP in particular, have helped to shape and change the distribution of ecological destruction associated with EWs (Jorgenson and Clark 2012). That is, as the ToP has expanded and become more international, and as other countries have replicated the kind of economic development that occurred in the United States after World War II, the ecological footprints of nations have become larger, and also have shifted to reflect new economic relationships between nations (Jorgenson and Clark 2011). These changes in the global ToP reflect how “import” nations (those that have increased importation of raw materials, and semifi nished and finished goods) and “export” nations (those that export raw materials and products) relate to each other through what is called “ecologically unequal exchange” (Jorgenson 2012). Ecologically unequal exchange is a complex idea related to Marxian economic propositions about how capitalism works, and how it plays out in the global economy or world capitalist system (these positions were developed from the work of Andre Gunder Frank [1966, 1967, 1975] and Arghiri Emmanuel [1972]). In Marxian economics, the value of a commodity derives from the quantity of labor required to create it. Across nations, the value of labor varies, and, commodities are thus relatively cheaper to produce in nations with low labor costs. Lower labor costs are most often found in less developed and underdeveloped nations; hence developed nations are at an economic advantage when trading with underdeveloped or less developed nations in terms of profit. These exchanges are, however, unequal since the raw materials and commodities from underdeveloped and less developed nations have greater value in the developed nations. In addition, these unequal exchanges allow developed nations to consume more, while other countries suffer from greater ecological destruction. Developed nations also benefit from the international nature of EWs. When a developed nation imports raw materials withdrawn from underdeveloped and less developed nations, the associated ecological destruction occurs in the countries exporting the raw materials. This is also true when developed nations import semifi nished and fi nished products, since they are made using raw materials from the exporting nations. In short, over time ecologically unequal

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exchange transfers the deleterious effects of EWs to less developed and underdeveloped nations, while developed nations benefit from declining EWs (Jorgenson 2012). Thus, for instance, the underdeveloped nation of Indonesia was once the world’s largest exporter of wood products, but extensive deforestation has reduced its exports of forest materials. It ranked second in the world in deforestation toward the end of the 20th century (Margono et al. 2012), but it now ranks third in the exportation of wood products (Maps of World n.d.). Of the ten countries with the highest rates of deforestation, seven can be defined as developing, underdeveloped, or less developed. The 2000–12 ranking, measured by percentage of forest loss, is as follows: Malaysia (14.4%), Paraguay (9.6%), Indonesia (8.4%), Guatemala (8.2%), Cambodia (7.1%), Nicaragua (6.9%), Finland (6.4%), Sweden (6.2%), Portugal (5.%), and Laos (5.3%). To summarize, trade relations in the capitalist world economy shape where ecological destruction associated with EWs occurs. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the political economy of ecological additions, and of overconsumption and overproduction. These chapters help round out our political-economic view by exploring how capitalism tends to increase ecological additions or pollutants and to encourage forms of overconsumption and overproduction that facilitate ecological destruction.

S T U DY G U I D E Questions and Activities for Students 1. Explain the concept of ecological withdrawals (EWs). 2. Give at least three examples of EWs and the harms they produce. 3. Explain how the political economy of capitalism is linked to EWs and why capitalism causes EWs to increase. 4. One example of EW reviewed in this chapter focused on the Athabasca sand tars. What are sand tars? Why is this form of EW ecologically destructive? 5. Several of the EW examples exacerbate climate change. What are three examples of EWs that contribute to climate change, and how do they do so? Lessons for Researchers 1. EWs are vast and varied and offer green criminologists many opportunities for qualitative and quantitative studies. Areas that remain underex-

amined are the numerous forms in which EWs occur, the kinds of harms they produce, whether such harms can be labeled crimes, and whether they pose serious ecological, social, and environmental justice concerns. 2. Of particular concern are the impacts of EWs on indigenous peoples and populations, which green criminologists have yet to explore in any depth. Such studies could entail historical analyses; legal studies of native peoples’ rights, and how granting extraction rights to corporations through government contracts infringes on those rights; health impacts of these projects on native peoples, lands, and wildlife; and assessments of how international environmental law might be employed to protect native peoples from these types of environmental harms. 3. How water access has been impaired through climate change and corporate efforts to privatize access to water is a significant concern. Water

Withdrawal Crimes

privatization, the social and environmental justice impacts of privatization, and the political economy of water rights are issues ripe for study by green criminologists. 4. Whether EWs should be regulated and, if so, how are important questions. In free market economies, it is often argued, the market itself will reg-

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ulate those withdrawals. But market mechanisms themselves are inefficient regulators, and efforts to control those markets can promote social and environmental injustice. Many issues related to the control of EWs, including international regulations efforts, would benefit from studies by green criminologists.

CH A P T ER

Crimes of Ecological Additions and Illness

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n chapter 4 we provided an overview and discussion of crimes of ecological withdrawals. Now we turn to crimes of ecological additions, focusing on pollution or the by-products of economic production. In other words, we examine pollution, its effects, and how the treadmill of production (ToP) generates excessive ecological additions that disrupt the stability of nature and cause health problems for human and nonhuman species. The many types of ecological additions include carbon dioxide (CO2) and other chemical emissions from factories and transportation (that form, or are defined as, air pollution); solid and liquid toxic waste that results from the production process; pesticides and fertilizers that are applied to crops to boost agricultural yield, and to lawns and gardens to enhance their appearance; and heavy metals and other chemicals from industrial facilities that are added to the air, water, and soil. Some of these ecological additions originate with ecological withdrawals, such as water table contamination and flooding from mountaintop removal coal mining, oil contamination from drilling, or wastewater contamination caused by fracking. Ecological additions can also occur indirectly through ecological withdrawals, as in when largescale deforestation occurs and causes the ecosystem to lose some of its ability to remove CO2 from the atmosphere.

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Figure 5.1 Valley fi ll from mountaintop removal mining. This photo shows an example of the damage done by a valley fi ll that resulted from mountaintop removal coal mining. Source: Photograph Flashdark. Wikimedia Commons.

These links between ecological withdrawals and additions demonstrate why a global political-economic perspective is necessary to study ecological disorganization. ToP withdrawals also add polluting material to the environment in the search for growth. Very often ToP-driven economic growth requires both ecological additions and withdrawals, which sometimes happen in the same location. Take as an example a mountaintop removal coal-mining site (see fig. 5.1). To withdraw the coal, workers must remove the top of the mountain to expose the coal seams. The rubble, debris, and earth removed are often pushed into nearby valleys, which can have detrimental effects on the flora and fauna and can pollute waterways that run through the valley, creating a valley fi ll. But withdrawals and additions may take place thousands of miles away from each other. For example, when oil is extracted in the Middle East and transported to the United States, the transportation methods used can create ecological additions along the way. For example, some portion of the oil might be spilled in transport. The withdrawals can also create ecological additions far from the source because after the crude oil is refined it is burned for fuel. Without a global political-economic framework for studying these links, they might go uninvestigated. The goal for this chapter, then, is to show how the natural sciences can help identify problematic ecological additions, use case studies to examine and highlight harms from particular ecological additions, and situate these harms within criminology by drawing upon a political-economic framework.

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ECOLOGICAL ADDITIONS, GREEN SCIENCE, AND “CONTESTED ILLNESS” In chapter 3 we suggested that green criminology should focus on quantifiable social harms, rather than being defi ned by criminal law or by other subjective criteria. Disciplines like biology, toxicology, and chemistry can be used to provide scientific evidence about when an action produces unnecessary ecological harm. Quantifying social harms is especially relevant in the case of ecological additions, because a great deal of scientific research has found various ecological additions to be destructive to humans, animals, plants, and the ecosystem. In the case of humans, much research has demonstrated that ecological additions can play a role in the occurrence of serious illnesses like cancer and of other negative health effects such as birth defects (see, for example, Kampa and Castanas 2008, on air pollution; Bamberger and Oswald 2012, on gas drilling and human and animal health; Grant et al. 2013, on e-waste and human health). Therefore we argue that green criminologists should engage with research from the natural sciences and epidemiology on the health consequences of exposure to environmental toxins (Lynch and Stretesky 2003, 2011, 2014). Researchers have argued that green criminology has similarities with and could benefit from a closer relationship with the green sciences (Lynch and Stretesky 2011). Lynch and Stretesky (2011, 2014) suggest that fi ndings from green science research in ecotoxicology, environmental toxicology, and green chemistry add scientific rigor to green criminology. They note, “By aligning green science and green criminology, the scientific basis of green criminology is underscored. While some may not believe this to be an important point, without scientific evidence of harm the claims staked by green criminology become little more than moral judgements that consequently can be subjected to debate and challenged by, for instance, ‘philosophical musings’ or uninformed discourse on the nature, scope, and degree of harm that environmental crimes or pollution presents” (2014, 300). From their perspective, green criminologists in general, and those studying ecological additions in particular, must incorporate the scientifically verifiable effects of pollution on humans, animals, and the natural environment if they are to be taken seriously. Epidemiology is especially relevant. Epidemiology is the study of the causes and patterns of illness and disease in human populations. It is a field of public health, a multidisciplinary area of study that seeks ways to prevent disease. We believe that green criminology and the public health and epidemiological literatures can complement each other in the investigation of environmental harms. Much green criminological scholarship is dedicated to understanding why green crimes occur. This is an easier task if green criminologists also have an understanding of how illness and disease are caused and spread.

Crimes of Ecological Additions and Illness

While green science can help identify ecological harms and the illnesses that result from exposure to toxic materials, those whose political and economic interests conflict with the research sometimes try to discredit it. They realize that acknowledging certain production practices cause environmental harm and human illness might interrupt the ToP and seriously impact a company’s or an industry’s profits. Fearing possible economic repercussions, industrialists and others resist scientific research linking detrimental health effects with production technologies and thus are directly responsible for the suffering of individuals whose illnesses were caused by exposure to toxic ecological additions. Consequently, scholars have taken to calling these health problems “contested illnesses” (e.g. P. Brown 1995, 2013; Cable, Shriver, and Mix 2008). Economic and political elites often question whether a person who suffers from a so-called contested illness is actually sick. The elite also downplay cases of potential contested illnesses so they do not reflect negatively on production technologies. Cable, Shriver, and Mix (2008) studied how authorities responded to contested illness claims by people who worked in and lived near the Oak Ridge Nuclear Reservation in Tennessee, one of the main federal nuclear weapons facilities. Workers in Oak Ridge were routinely exposed to numerous chemicals and radioactive material, which left them with a host of health problems, including chronic headaches, depression, chronic fatigue, and memory problems. However, when these workers try to get compensation for these aliments, corporate, economic, and political elites often deny the link between exposure and illness. Acknowledging that the production methods they use cause illness would require them to make changes to the production process that would cause a decrease in their profits. Cable, Shriver, and Mix (2008, 384) sum up the problem nicely: “Corporate and government authorities contest environmental illness claims because such claims fundamentally target the production technologies that generate the wealth on which institutions rely. Corporate authorities also preserve their economic hegemony by contesting illness claims. Bound by the rules of a profit-driven system, they develop and select production technologies solely for the increased capital accumulation they generate. Conceding harm and awarding compensation would reduce profits and risk increased government regulation.” Contested illnesses, if taken seriously, would certainly slow the ToP. Current chemically intensive production technologies would have to be replaced with potentially more expensive, safer methods that would most likely reduce production output (except see McDonough and Braungart 2010, who argue safe, cost-effective means of production can be found for most existing manufacturing processes). This is unacceptable for corporate treadmill actors; therefore, they often question the links between toxic exposure and illness to avoid efforts to reconfigure production and to make production safer. If ToP actors can create doubt about the association between exposure and illness, changing

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production methods and consequently reducing profits are unnecessary. This situation makes it evident that ToP actors prioritize economic production over human health concerns. This reveals two important points. First, when ToP actors prioritize profit over human health, they show disregard for how manufacturing processes generate public health harms, affect ecosystem health, or pose threats to nonhuman species through ecological additions. Such behaviors, while not illegal, fit the definition of green crime. Second, these kinds of cases illustrate how green criminology and green science intersect and can contribute to shared concerns addressing the control of ecological additions. For their part, green scientists uncover when and how serious environmental additions occur, while green criminologists attempt to explain why those additions occur (Lynch and Stretesky 2011). Pinpointing how ecological additions are created and how they affect human and nonhuman species and ecosystems is obviously important, but in order to slow additions from entering into the environment, and to reduce ecological disorganization, we need to know why they are occurring. This is where a green criminology situated in a political economic framework is important. Before we turn to an analysis of ecological additions and the ToP, we first provide examples of the impacts of large-scale ecological additions.

ECOLOGICAL ADDITIONS AND ILLNESS “Cancer Alley,” Southern Louisiana The manufacture of commodities causes waste, which enters the environment as ecological additions, or pollution, that cause widespread ecological disorganization; in many cases, exposure to the waste is linked to illness (see fig. 5.2). One example is the eighty-five-mile stretch of land in Southern Louisiana between New Orleans and Baton Rouge that has earned the nickname “Cancer Alley,” because of the high concentrations of cancer-related chemicals emitted there. A large concentration of petrochemical development and many production facilities, such as oil refineries and other chemical plants, are located in Cancer Alley, which is one of the most polluted areas in the United States (Bullard 1990). There are over 130 chemical plants, oil refineries, and landfi lls, which are responsible for over 25% of US petrochemical production (Simonsen et al. 2010). Singer (2011) has reported that there are more EPA Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) facilities in Cancer Alley than in the rest of Louisiana combined. One of the most common types of facilities in the area are those that manufacture polyvinyl chloride plastic, which is used in the production of clothing, shoes, and many other items. A by-product of polyvinyl chloride is dioxin, which makes manufacturing very dangerous, because dioxin is very harmful to humans and animals. It is a known carcinogen and hormone mimic (New Horizons 2016) that stunts human and animal fertility and has been known to

Crimes of Ecological Additions and Illness

Figure 5.2 Depiction of potential health effects resulting from exposure to pollution. This diagram highlights a number of the health effects that can result from exposure to pollution. Source: Häggström (2014).

cause hermaphrodism in humans and animals. Dioxin is a member of the “dirty dozen,” a group of harmful chemicals, that are also referred to as persistent organic pollutants, because they remain in the human body and the ecosystem for very long periods and continue to have negative impacts on human health (Adeola 2004). The citizens of this area have also argued that they have higher risks of developing cancer as a result of the high levels and density of the petrochemical facilities in the area. Cancer Alley is a designated enterprise zone, which is area of the country that combines tax incentives and reduced government regulations to attract business and economic development to the region. Th is is one reason for the large number of oil refineries and petrochemical facilities in the area. In South Louisiana’s quest for economic recovery and growth, it has afforded the benefits of low taxes and lax environmental regulations to companies that locate there. However, the citizens of Cancer Alley have paid the cost. For example, Louisiana has some of the highest rates in the country of children who are born with asthma, respiratory complications, and neurological diseases, or suffer premature death and childhood cancer (Allen 2003; Legot, London, Rosofsky, and Shandra 2012; Lerner 2004), and the rate of cancer deaths is second in the United States (Siegel, Naishadham, and Jemal 2012). Many citizens with these

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and other health problems live in Cancer Alley, suggesting that their proximity to oil and chemical facilities is partly to blame. This association has been challenged by some researchers (e.g., Billings 2005), and by a recent study conducted by employees of the Shell Oil Company (Tsai et al. 2004). The citizens of cancer alley, then, appear to be embroiled in a contested illness claim. If their illnesses could be concretely linked to toxic ecological additions emanating from nearby oil and chemical facilities, the companies could be held responsible. The companies would likely have to pay large fines and medical costs to the citizens, and might relocate or shut down their facilities. All of these things would cost the companies revenue through reduced production and a greater number of governmental regulation. It is not surprising, then, that companies conduct and sponsor research that contests the relationship between these illnesses and their polluting behavior. A useful example of how these links can be made comes from a research/ public action project in which green criminologist Melissa L. Jarrell has been engaged for almost a decade (see, for example, Jarrell 2009). The case involved the exposure of residents in a low-income, minority community in Corpus Christi, Texas, to toxins emitted by a local petroleum refi nery operated by Citgo. The area is known as “Refinery Row,” because of the presence of oil refineries there. Working with environmental activists, community members, federal investigators from the EPA and the Department of Justice, and state environmental crime enforcement agents, Jarrell helped provide evidence that the toxins affecting local residents were indeed being emitted by Citgo though the use of open air oil separators, which were operating without required emission control equipment, that allowed the toxin benzene to permeate the air in local neighborhoods. The trial that followed was the fi rst federal criminal trail to involve a petroleum company charged with violating the Clean Air Act. In 2007, Citgo was found guilty of the charges, which were overturned on appeal in 2015. While space precludes a detailed explanation of the methods researchers used to determine that Citgo’s refinery was the source of the pollution, they involved the use of scientific measurement instruments and the collection of air samples. Th is case also illustrates how green criminologists can become actively involved in addressing problems associated with ecological additions. Although the link between exposure to chemicals in Cancer Alley and the various illnesses afflicting residents has been questioned, that the vast majority of exposure victims are people who are socioeconomically disadvantaged, are ethnic minorities, or both, has received little resistance. The study of differential exposure to environmental additions and other harms is known as “environmental justice” (see Brulle and Pellow 2006; Lynch, Stretesky, and Long 2015b for overviews). This is the topic of chapter 11; however we will provide a brief discussion of environmental justice issues regarding Cancer Alley here. For his landmark book, Dumping in Dixie, sociologist Robert Bullard examined class and race with respect to environmental justice issues in the Ameri-

Crimes of Ecological Additions and Illness

can South. In the case of Cancer Alley, Bullard (1990, 103–111) noted that many facilities emitting large quantities of toxic waste (measured by TRI data—see ch. 3) were located in poor, African American neighborhoods. Public health research corroborated this claim. James, Jia, and Kedia (2012), in an analysis of census tracts, found that cancer risks from air toxins disproportionately affect poor and racial minorities living in Cancer Alley. Adeola (1995. 2000) found that poor and African American citizens in that area lived closer to toxic waste sites and were more likely to report cases of exposure-related health problems. It appears, then, that not only do powerful energy and chemical companies attempt to dispute illness claims of people who have had prolonged exposure to toxic chemicals but the patterns of exposure disproportionately affect already-marginalized members of society. The international capitalist economy has also played a role in the transformation of Southern Louisiana into Cancer Alley. Recently the Chinese have started buying land and opening chemical-manufacturing facilities in Southern Louisiana, and in 2015 announced their intention to build a $1.85-billion methanol plant in St. James Parish, which is between New Orleans and Baton Rouge (Blum 2015). The site of the plant is located near a high school, two churches, and an assisted-living home for the elderly (Hayoun 2015). Methanol is toxic to humans and causes a wide variety of problems, including nausea, vomiting, dizziness, loss of vision, and even death (Dorway 2016). Yuhuang Chemical Inc., the company that will operate the plant, is a subsidiary of the Chinese natural gas company Shandong Yuhuang. The parent company has recently come under scrutiny for ignoring environmental regulations in China, where citizens have complained about rising cancer rates and undrinkable water (Hayoun 2015). Interestingly, Shandong Yuhuang claims that the majority of the methanol that is produced in the Louisiana plant will be shipped back to China, which currently has a surplus of methanol (Hayoun 2015). This is an example of how the global capitalist ToP shifts production and the resultant ecological additions, along with the exposure-related illnesses, to another country for the purposes of economic growth. We now turn to the impacts of the chemical and oil facilities located in Cancer Alley on the surrounding natural environment. One of the most important parts of the Louisiana ecosystem is its coastal wetlands, located along the Gulf of Mexico. In addition to playing large roles in flood mitigation and reduction, “Wetlands help to counter balance the human effect on rivers by rejuvenating them and surrounding ecosystems” (Missouri Botanical Garden 2016). These wetlands also provide habitat for the Gulf of Mexico’s juvenile shrimp population and other fish species (Engle 2011), as well as habitat and breeding grounds for shore birds (Valentine, King, and Wilson 2011). The wetlands, then, are vital parts of ecosystems as they are able to recycle large amounts of nutrients. Some of their benefits include controlling water flow, halting erosion, releasing vegetation to help feed fish, and providing animals a place to reproduce. Even

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though the wetlands have all of these recognized benefits, the oil and chemical industries in Southern Louisiana have been allowed to contribute to the vast amount of wetland loss that is occurring in the area. In the 1980s, environmental scientists noted the impact of industry on the Louisiana wetlands: The wetlands themselves were being directly attacked by canal dredging and wetland reclamation activities. Canals, originally dredged primarily for drainage and navigation, now are overwhelmingly related to the petroleum industry. Oil rig access canals, pipeline canals, and deep-draft navigation channels for oil industry support vessels have left a hodgepodge of linear scars upon the formerly pristine wetlands. Although canals are estimated to comprise about 2.5% of the total coastal surface area, their destructive impact has been much greater. Spoil banks composed of the material dredged from the canals tend to smother adjacent marshes, thereby converting wetlands to functional uplands and often interrupting natural hydrologic processes. (Templet and Meyer-Arendt 1988, 183)

The Louisiana State Government (2016) reports that all areas of the state’s wetlands are experiencing losses, anywhere between 64 and 7,104 acres annually in the heavily impacted Barataria Basin in southeast Louisiana. Ecological additions and their impacts heavily affect the residents and the ecosystem of Southern Louisiana, and, in the case of Cancer Alley, the effects are long term. There are other cases, however, where the exposure occurs rapidly and in high doses, often as the result of technological disasters, an issue to which we now turn our attention. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Another case of widespread ecological additions in the Gulf of Mexico region was the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill (DHOS; see fig. 5.3). The ecological additions, and the associated ecosystem and human health issues, from technological disasters like the DHOS are acute. They begin suddenly and usually add a great deal of toxic material to the environment in a short time. This is different from the effects of the oil industry in Cancer Alley, where the additions enter the ecosystem at a slower rate but over a long, sustained period. While the overall level of additions associated with an oil spill might be less than what occurs during decades of industrial pollution from factories, the amount can still be very large. The DHOS, for example, emptied 4.9 million barrels (210 million gallons) of oil into the Gulf of Mexico (NRT 2011) over eighty-seven consecutive days (Robertson and Krauss 2010). Th is rapid, unexpected level of ecological additions is having widespread impacts on humans and the ecosystem. The oil that entered the Gulf of Mexico in the DHOS has been, and continues to be, harmful to humans, either through direct contact or indirectly through consumption of contaminated seafood. Chemical components of crude oil have been known to cause respiratory irritation, central nervous system effects, depression, and leukemia and other cancers in humans (Solomon

Crimes of Ecological Additions and Illness

Figure 5.3 Oil spill control fi re after the Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Horizon oil spill. This is one of many fires that were set in an effort to control the results from oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Source: Photograph by Petty Officer 2nd Class Justin Stumberg. US Department of Defense.

and Janssen 2010). People directly impacted by the DHOS also have had to deal with serious mental health issues associated with environmental and economic stress (Gill et al. 2014). There have been additional dangers to humans associated with the DHOS, as a result of the massive cleanup operation that took place immediately after the spill. This involved applying 1.4 million gallons of dispersant to the surface and injecting 0.8 million gallons at the wellhead (Kujawinski et al. 2011). Oil dispersants are used because they reduce the size of oil droplets and prevent oil slicks from forming on the water’s surface, which can speed up the oil degradation process (Kujawinski et al. 2011). The dispersants themselves can be harmful to humans and the ecosystem as they contain numerous dangerous chemicals, including, detergents, surfactants, 2-butoxyethanol, propylene glycol, and sulfonic acid salts (Solomon and Janssen 2010). The combination of oil and dispersants has made the DHOS a large public health and environmental emergency. Humans, of course, have not been the only victims of the DHOS. Environmental scientists and ecologists have found negative impacts on coastal salt marshes (Sillimann et al. 2012), bird habitat and species (Tangley 2010), internal organs of fish (Sahagun 2014), the populations of dolphins and sea turtles (Viegas 2013), and fish embryos (Wines 2014), among others. It is clear that technological disasters that result in large amounts of ecological additions are devastating to all life in the affected areas.

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After a large technological disaster such as the DHOS, people often ask, “How did something like this happen?” In contemporary society, governments should have stringent regulations, and oil companies should have the necessary safeguards in place to prevent an accident of this magnitude. This is clearly not the case. So the next question becomes, “What went wrong?” Is there something unique about the companies that were involved—British Petroleum, the oil rig operator Transocean, and the contractor Haliburton? Indeed, there are undoubtedly things that each of these companies could have done to help prevent the DHOS. However, in our view, the biggest problem is the international capitalist economy and ToP. The oil industry is a vital component of the international capitalist economy and ToP (e.g., B. Clark and York 2005). It provides the fuel for much worldwide production and economic growth. It is also very competitive, as large oil companies are always looking for new sources of oil while making sure to produce enough oil to satisfy their regular customers. As with all industries, the oil industry’s benchmark for success is economic growth. One way to foster economic growth is to cut down on production costs. Th is appears to have been done in the case of the DHOS. The US government panel that was created by President Obama to investigate the DHOS concluded that British Petroleum, Haliburton, and Transocean made decisions that saved those companies significant amounts of time and money, but also increased the risk of a well blowout (Reuters 2011). Cutting costs and speeding up the time it takes to bring a facility online are two ways that a company can increase economic growth and production. All ToP actors make business decisions for primarily economic reasons, leaving human and ecosystem health to pay the consequences (see fig. 5.4). Additions from Mountaintop Removal Coal Mining In chapter 4, we detailed the various environmental and health issues associated with mountaintop removal mining (MRM), specifically with respect to coal mining. While the withdrawal process itself is harmful to humans and the ecosystem, the moving of large amounts of earth and sediment that are necessary to reveal the coal seams also has human and ecosystem impacts. As discussed earlier, MRM is a surface coal-mining technique, in which vegetation and earth are removed from the top of a mountain to reveal the coal seams that lie underneath. Moving large amounts of earth for MRM coal mining has been found to be detrimental to local air quality (Palmer et al. 2010; Hitt and Hendryx 2010), while the explosives that are used to remove the tops of the mountains use ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel (Ayers et al. 2007). The debris removed is pushed into nearby valleys, which often have streams running through them. This causes ecological additions to the groundwater, including sulphate, magnesium, bicarbonate ions, and selenium (Palmer et al. 2010;

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Interstate pipeline Intrastate pipeline Compressor station

Figure 5.4 Map of natural gas pipeline infrastructure in the United States. Oil and natural gas can be moved long distances using pipelines. Those pipelines present the possibility for spills and releases of ecological additions. Wikipedia maintains a list of pipeline leaks in the twenty-first century that have occurred in the United States. As of September 1, 2016, they had listed 417 reported accidents since January 1, 2000. Th is complex system of pipelines is difficult to maintain and oversee, making it difficult to detect leaks. Illustrating the complex nature of these pipelines, this image shows the US natural gas pipeline network. Source: US Energy Information Administration, Office of Oil and Gas, Natural Gas Division.

McAuley and Kozar 2006; Lemly 2002). Studies have shown that ecological additions from MRM interfere with aquatic life and its normal functioning (e.g., Pond et al. 2008) while reducing the size of interior Appalachian forests (Wickham et al. 2007). Finally, after coal is extracted, it needs to be washed. Research has demonstrated that this process causes arsenic, barium, mercury, lead, and chromium to filter into the groundwater (Lockwood et al. 2009). All of these chemicals have been shown to be harmful to humans, animals, and the environment. MRM appears to be quite environmentally destructive, measured by both the withdrawal process and the ecological additions; as of 2009 more than five hundred mountains in Appalachia had been destroyed in the process, which translates to roughly 1.2 million acres of land that has been surfaced mined for coal (I Love Mountains 2016).

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Coal-Fired Power Plants In chapter 4 and above we described many of the harms associated with withdrawing coal from the earth. Withdrawing the coal is only the beginning in terms of coal’s creation of ecological disorganization; coal is used primarily for electricity generation, and burning coal also creates ecological additions. The ecological additions that result from burning coal for fuel have also been linked to illnesses (Kosmicki and Long 2016). Roughly 40% of the electricity used in the United States comes from the burning of coal (US Energy Information Administration 2016). Coal is a desirable fuel in the United States because it is cheap and abundant. Burning coal, however, releases greenhouse gases like CO2 into the atmosphere, as well as other harmful toxic chemicals and particulates (Kosmicki and Long 2016). In fact, coal-fi red power plants (CFPPs) produce roughly 27% of CO2 emissions in the United States (US Environmental Protection Agency 2016a). Prolonged exposure to coal particulates is associated with strokes, heart attacks, low-birth weight, sudden infant death syndrome, and premature death (Keating 2004), while exposure to nitrous oxides and sulphur dioxide, two more ecological additions that result from burning coal, has been linked to increases in cardiovascular and respiratory diseases (Samoli et al. 2006; Sunyer et al. 2003). CFPPs also produce over 40% of US mercury emissions, which are associated with impaired neurological development in babies and blood pressure and kidney disorders (Keating 2004). For these reasons, policy makers have identified CFPPS as the most harmful type of air pollution in the world, when measured by the costs to humans and the environment (Keating and Davis 2002; Schneider and Banks 2010). In a report for the US Clean Air Task Force, Schneider and Banks (2010) estimated that in 2010, CFPP emissions could be directly linked to 9,700 hospital admissions, 12,300 emergency room visits for asthma, 20,400 nonfatal heart attacks, and 13,200 deaths (see also Lynch and Barrett 2015, for a green criminological analysis of victimization from CFPPs). Although many Americans likely do not realize that coal is the nation’s number one source of energy, its use is ubiquitous. As of the end of 2012, there were 557 coal-fired power plants operating in the United States (Magill 2014), with average emissions per plant around 3.5 million tons of CO2 per year (Union of Concerned Scientists 2016). Ecological additions and health concerns associated with coal-fi red power plants will continue to be a problem for the United States for the foreseeable future.

Lead and Crime We have spent most of this chapter discussing the health impacts of toxic chemical exposure on humans, animals, and the ecosystem. Scholars have also found links between exposure to lead and other heavy metals and property and violent crime (e.g., Stretesky and Lynch 2001, 2004). Lead occurs naturally in

Crimes of Ecological Additions and Illness

small amounts in the earth’s crust. However, humans add lead to the air, water, and land through the use of fossil fuels, as a by-product of some industrial production, through the use of lead-based paint, and as a component of many products (US Environmental Protection Agency 2016d). In the recent, widely publicized case of lead exposure in Flint, Michigan (fi rst brought to public attention in 2014), exposure was and is being caused by the use of aging lead pipes to supply some communities—typically low-income and minority communities—with water. Prolonged exposure to lead can be toxic to humans (US Environmental Protection Agency 2016d). Children are particularly susceptible to lead poisoning because their bodies and brains are more sensitive to lead; exposure can lead to behavioral problems, lower school performance, lower IQ, hyperactivity, slowed growth, hearing problems, and anemia (US Environmental Protection Agency 2016d). Lead is also harmful to adults and has been linked to kidney, cardiovascular, and reproductive problems (US Environmental Protection Agency 2016d). Scholars have also demonstrated that lead exposure is associated with high levels of juvenile delinquency (Dietrich et al. 2001; Needleman et al. 2002; Nevin 2007) and crime (Stretesky and Lynch 2001, 2004). By one estimate, up to 20% of all crime can be associated with lead exposure (Needleman 1990, 87). Whether this figure is completely accurate or not, it is clear that the impacts of ecological additions on human behavior and health are widespread and varied. The Impact of Deforestation on Climate Change Our fi nal example once again links the ecological withdrawal process with ecological additions. In chapter 4, we highlighted the environmentally destructive effects of timber harvesting throughout the world. In addition to those impacts, the widespread loss of forests contributes to climate change (Bonan 2008; Tinker, Ingram, and Struwe 1996). As Shukla, Nobre, and Sellers (1990, 1322) note in their study on the Amazon rainforest, “The Amazon is also an important natural sink for ozone and plays an important role in global tropospheric chemistry.” CO2 in the atmosphere is absorbed by trees and other vegetation, and without this natural “sink” to absorb CO2, the excess CO2 will help speed up the climate change process. CO2 sinks are needed more than ever today, as worldwide CO2 emissions are extremely high and have been increasing (see table 3.2). However, the forces of the international capitalist economy and the ToP continually need timber for production and cleared forest space for animal grazing. This has resulted in a very high rate of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, where anywhere from 25,000 to 50,000 km2 is lost every year (Shukla, Nobre, and Sellers 1990). Ecological withdrawals and additions not only damage the ecosystem, they also work in tandem to remove some of the planet’s natural defenses to harmful additions. We now turn to an examination of those harms within the ToP.

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ECOLOGICAL ADDITIONS AND THE TREADMILL OF PRODUCTION Throughout our discussion of ecological additions, we have briefly linked the production and exposure of those additions back to our ToP-influenced, political-economic, green criminological perspective to illustrate that unnecessary economic production, overproduction (see ch. 6), and dangerous toxins emitted by manufacturers are linked with human, animal, and ecosystem harms and illnesses. In other words, we focus our examination on capitalism’s need to grow and in the process create toxic by-products that harm people and the planet (Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013b). The relationship between ecological additions and the ToP is clear and direct. Ecological additions are a result of production, and as we have detailed in earlier chapters, the ToP is a system that is based on economic growth that comes predominately from increased production. For the ToP to sustain economic growth, larger and larger amounts of ecological additions must enter the environment (Schnaiberg 1980). In chapter 3 we mentioned that there are three main actors in the ToP: labor, the state, and corporations. All three benefit economically if the ToP is running smoothly and expanding. Economic growth translates into more jobs for workers, increased tax revenue for the state, and greater profits for corporations (Schnaiberg 1980). The state’s relationship with the ToP is complicated because it is responsible for protecting its citizens from harm, including from illnesses that result from exposure to toxic materials. This results in tensions within the state and confrontations between the state and corporations and workers as the state tries to balance economic growth with public and environmental health concerns. It is the state’s job to craft and enforce laws that regulate toxic releases and pollution. Criminologists have argued that the law is not an objective arbiter of crime; rather it reflects the economic and political interests of members of the state who are charged with crafting laws (Lynch, Stretesky, and Long 2015a; Quinney 1970). The environmental law-making process in the United States has been legislation like the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. While these laws do help restrict some ecological additions from manufacturing and industrial plants, only marginal ecological improvements have been observed. Table 3.2 displays the annual level of CO2 emissions in the United States over the last few decades. The decrease in CO2 emissions between 1980 and 2011 was small, while worldwide CO2 emissions increased over the same period, suggesting that some of the additions associated with manufacturing and production might have been outsourced to other countries (Stretesky and Lynch 2009). We argue that, if reducing the health and environmental impact of ecological additions were the goal of regulation, laws would be created more on the basis of scientifically derived indicators of harm, such as the planetary boundary framework outlined in chapter 3. Laws could be crafted that aim to regulate ecological additions so planetary boundary indicators remain under or

Crimes of Ecological Additions and Illness

near their boundary values. This, of course, would require businesses to drastically reduce production and growth to meet the much more stringent environmental regulations required to prevent ecological destruction. After the laws are in place, it is also the state’s job to enforce them. Violations of environmental laws and regulations are usually punished with monetary fines, determined on the basis of the deterrence philosophy of punishment. That is, in theory companies will be deterred from violating environmental regulations if they have received large fines for past violations, or from just knowing that breaking the law will result in a heavy fine. Again, in theory, if the fines are large enough, they will cut into a company’s profits, giving companies a financial incentive to comply with regulations, in addition to a wish to abide by the law. Stretesky, Long, and Lynch (2013a) examined the impact of large fines levied by the US EPA on US companies according to levels of toxic releases measured by the TRI. Through an analysis of the twenty-five largest fines (the largest being $25 million) for environmental violations in the United States in 2006 and 2007, they found that TRI levels did not decrease from current levels after the fines were levied. This suggests that companies are understandably willing to pay the fines rather than to decrease production and pollution, since the fines generally pale compared to a company’s annual profit. This outcome fits with what ToP theory would predict. In the case of large companies, paying the fines is a cost of doing business that allows companies to satisfy the state while continuing to put profit first. Ecological additions continue at their current rates and so too do the exposure-related illnesses that accompany them; it is questionable whether, for example, the EPA’s rate of enforcement has any significant impact on deterring corporate polluters (Lynch et al. 2016). The ToP also shapes the global distribution of ecological additions. Earlier we mentioned that an examination of US and world CO2 emissions indicated ecological additions are apparently moving from the United States to other areas of the world. Without systematic analysis this association is anecdotal. Grimes and Kentor (2003), however, found that foreign direct investment has a significant positive effect on CO2 emissions. Recall from chapter 3 that foreign direct investment measures the level of control that a business located in one country has over a business in a second country. That is, to what extent a company can locate its polluting facilities in less developed countries to enhance its access to cheap labor, raw materials, and lax environmental regulations. Since many of the products produced in those factories are for consumption in developed countries, the developed countries have essentially outsourced the ecological additions from their commodities to other countries. Research has also linked foreign direct investment to the increased use of ecological additions like pesticides (Jorgenson 2007; Jorgenson and Kuykendall 2008) and fertilizers (Jorgenson and Kuykendall 2008), to boost production, and to increases in additions that are the result of production, such as nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, CO2 (Jorgenson, Dick, and Mahutga 2007), and methane (Jorgenson 2006a). It is

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clear that the ToP encourages ecological additions while shifting the burden of those additions to poor countries that are desperate for economic growth.

CONCLUSION This chapter has focused on interpreting the relationship between ecological additions and illnesses in the context of global capitalism and the ToP. We argue that green criminology should be informed by green science, public health, and epidemiological research. Research in these fields should be used to identify harms to humans, animals, and the environment so that green criminologists can attempt to explain why these harms occur. We argue that capitalism’s need for economic growth explains why enormous amounts of ecological additions enter the environment. This causes continuous and uneven exposure of toxic materials to humans, animals, and the ecosystem, often resulting in illnesses or other problems. Businesses and industry sometimes attempt to contest those illnesses, thereby denying the link between exposure and illness. The state attempts to regulate environmental behavior, but businesses frequently do not comply, instead choosing to pay the fi nes levied against them so they can continue to produce goods, while generating toxic waste, in desired numbers. In short, ecological additions are a necessary and very harmful part of the ToP and the capitalist mode of production. In the next chapter we continue our political-economic analysis of environmental harm and crimes, focusing on the effects of overproduction and overconsumption on the environment.

STUDENT GUIDE Questions and Activities for Students 1. Explain the concept of ecological additions. 2. Give at least three examples of ecological additions and the harms they produce. 3. How is the political economy of capitalism linked to ecological additions, and why does capitalism cause ecological additions to increase? 4. One of the examples of ecological additions reviewed in this chapter focused on Cancer Alley in Southern Louisiana. What is Cancer Alley? How have the humans, animals, and ecosystem in Louisiana been affected by ecological additions? 5. Give three examples of ecological additions that contribute to climate change and explain how they do so.

Lessons for Researchers 1. Ecological additions are serious and widespread. However, green criminologists have yet to study all the forms in which environmental additions occur, the kinds of harms they produce, whether such harms can be labeled crimes, and whether they pose serious ecological, social, and environmental justice concerns—all questions that invite quantitative and qualitative studies. 2. The impact of large-scale accidental releases of ecological additions, as happened with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, requires more study and is a topic that green criminologists have thus far overlooked.

Crimes of Ecological Additions and Illness

3. Environmental harm from ecological additions is often linked to the ecological withdrawal process. These links need more investigation by green criminologists because this is a case when the global ToP clearly creates situations that are extremely harmful to humans, animals, and the environment.

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4. As noted, the state is one of the three main actors in the ToP. The state, however, also has the job of protecting citizens, including from those harms that are linked to ecological additions. Green criminologists can and should investigate how the creation and enforcement of environmental regulations favor corporations over the public.

CH A P T ER

Crimes of Overproduction and Overconsumption

T

6

wo ecologically harmful behaviors that have yet to be analyzed by green criminologists are overconsumption and overproduction. We consider these green crimes because of the harm they cause and not because they are currently considered illegal or have been criminalized in any way. Overconsumption is to consume at levels that are not ecologically sustainable and that cause damage to ecosystem quality and health. To assess this problem we must examine how the structural tendency toward overconsumption and overproduction is driven by the capitalist treadmill of production (ToP), or by political-economic conditions, and how those political-economic conditions adversely impact ecological quality and health and the ability of the ecosystem to reproduce the conditions for life. Overconsumption and overproduction, therefore, fit with our earlier definition of green crime as behavior that causes significant harm to ecological systems for the purpose of promoting capital accumulation. These negative ecological effects can be described in terms of the global ecosystem or of specific local ecosystems; in both cases analysis should address the kinds of ecological disorganization produced by overconsumption and overproduction. Some have discussed overconsumption by stressing the role of the individual (e.g., Soron 2010; for a classic work

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Crimes of Overproduction and Overconsumption

that takes a structural view on consumption and capitalism, see Veblen 1973). Individual-level models of overconsumption stress the idea that, if individuals acted to control their consumption patterns, then significant ecological overuse and disorganization would not occur. That attributes responsibility for the problem to individuals and individual actions. We, however, take a structural view, according to which individuals overconsume because they are pushed to do so by the organization of the political-economic system of production. Overconsumption first requires mass overproduction. Thus, we view overconsumption as an economic and social trend rather than as the result of individual behavior and decisions. It is the aggregate tendency toward overconsumption produced by the expansionary goals of capitalism, and not the individual’s behavior, that produces the greatest ecological impact. In places where there is a structural tendency to overconsume, individuals will also overconsume. Contemporary ecological crises are not the result of individual behavior but of long-term, structural processes and organizational forms of capitalism that promote overconsumption. Our primary concern with overconsumption is its relationship to overproduction and to the political economy of capitalism. Overconsumption cannot occur without overproduction, which is endemic to capitalism’s goal of continually increasing profits. To generate more profits, more commodities must be made, which creates a need for more raw materials. The continual expansion of production above levels suitable for the maintenance of ecological stability creates ecological disorganization by increasing ecological withdrawals and additions. We refer to the link between overproduction and overconsumption as OP-OC. In the orthodox approach to economics, there are circumstances in which overproduction occurs because of diminished rates of consumption, which can result in economic recessions and depressions when demand for products fails to meet their supply (Keynes 2008). The growth of capitalism, therefore, is limited by people constraining their buying habits. Our discussion of OP-OC departs from the orthodox economic tradition, to describe the interrelationship between economic activity and the ecosystem from a politicaleconomic perspective. From this perspective, OP-OC is defi ned not in relationship to economic markets alone but in the context of the effect of production and consumption on the ecosystem. OP-OC defines a relationship between economic activity and the ecosystem in which economic activity damages the ability of the ecosystem to reproduce itself, and produces ecological disorganization. That is, OP-OC requires extensive and continually expanding raw material resource extraction to create commodities, causes ever-expanding pollution levels (ecological additions), and as a result generates ecological destruction and disorganization, all of which are, in our view, characteristics of green crime. As noted, we favor scientific measures of environmental harms and crimes. In the pages that follow, we look at several scientific measures showing how the

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Figure 6.1 Hummer limousine as evidence of excessive consumption. Examples of overconsumption are widespread throughout developed nations, where wealth can be spent on luxury items such as limousine services and the adaption of already ecologically destructive vehicles in new forms that are even more inefficient. Source: Photograph by Chris Waits. Wikimedia Commons.

ToP tends toward OP-OC, which in turn makes the ecosystem unstable by impeding its normal functioning. This interruption of the normal functioning of the ecosystem by economic organization and processes has serious consequences, the most important being climate change. We argue that OP-OC is a characteristic of capitalism and the global capitalist ToP; thus, solving the problem of OP-OC requires reining in capitalism. This cannot be done without undermining a basic tenet of capitalism—continual expansion of profit making. The implication is that capitalism must be replaced by a new form of political economy that will meet the needs of humans by protecting the ecosystem. To make this point, we will look at several forms of data that measure how overproduction and overconsumption affect ecosystems, beginning with the ecological footprint (see fig. 6.1). Countries exhibit a tendency toward OP-OC when their ecological footprints expand beyond the reproductive capacity of the ecosystem, which produces ecological disorganization. To illustrate, we draw attention to research on the environmental Kuznets curve, the human ecological footprint, the carbon footprint, and the human waste footprint. But first, we will briefly review the links between the political economy of capitalism and OP-OC.

CAPITALISM, OVERPRODUCTION, AND OVERCONSUMPTION The idea that capitalism is a system of economic production that necessitates a continual increase in the rate of profit is supported by modern capitalism’s

Crimes of Overproduction and Overconsumption

arch-supporters, including Milton Friedman. According to Friedman (1970), the only responsibility of the businessperson is profit: “The businessmen believe that they are defending free enterprise when they declaim that business is not concerned ‘merely’ with profit but also with promoting desirable ‘social’ ends; that business has a ‘social conscience’ and takes seriously its responsibilities for providing employment, eliminating discrimination, avoiding pollution and whatever else may be the catchwords of the contemporary crop of reformers. In fact they are—or would be if they or anyone else took them seriously— preaching pure and unadulterated socialism.” With respect to the idea of corporate social responsibility, Friedman later noted, “In my book Capitalism and Freedom, I have called it a ‘fundamentally subversive doctrine’ in a free society, and have said that in such a society, ‘there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits’ ” (Friedman 1970). Corporations are driven to increase profits by increasing production, which, in turn, increases consumption. All other things being equal, if companies can double production, they can double profit. Doubling production also means doubling the consumption of raw materials. The problem with that approach to production should be clear: if all companies boost profits by increasing production, thereby raising the volume of raw materials consumed, the consumption of natural resources will continue to escalate, producing ever-expanding ecosystem harms and ecological disorganization. The capitalist marketplace causes production to increase even more if we observe the supply-demandprice curve, whereby the greater a commodity’s availability relative to demand, the more its market price declines. Because excessive supply causes the price to decline, profits can only increase by making even more of the commodity. If, for example, a company wanted to double its profit, it would need to understand that increased productivity might deflate the price; thus multiplying the profit would require greater sales of the item or service. Table 6.1 shows the trend in US gross domestic product for the US from 1929 through 2015. Notice the long-term, upward trend after World War II, which indicates the continuous economic production and, therefore, consumption associated with American capitalism. When orthodox economists discuss overproduction and overconsumption, they are not using those terms in the same way we do here. When orthodox economists state there is a crisis of overproduction, they mean companies have produced too much of a commodity. This leads to falling prices and the need to cut back on production, which in turn may mean laying off workers (Keynes 2008). We use the term to describe how the quantity of production affects the ecosystem. In this sense, overproduction is determined not in relationship to the volume of consumption but to the harm it causes to the ecosystem. Thus, OP-OC is a characteristic of capitalism, not a special condition that sometimes emerges when segments of the capitalist system do not align properly.

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Chapter 6 Table 6.1 Trend in US GDP as a measure of consumption, 1929–2015 (US$ trillions) Year

US GDP

Year

US GDP

1929

1.06

1980

6.50

1935

0.94

1985

7.71

1940

1.27

1990

8.91

1945

2.22

1995

10.28

1950

2.27

2000

12.68

1955

2.78

2005

14.37

1960

3.08

2010

14.94

2015

16.49

1965

4.10

1970

4.71

1975

5.49

source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce, Real Dollars. Accessed July , . www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp.

Overproduction generates several forms of ecological harm. First, because it requires more raw materials, overproduction leads to increased ecological withdrawals and additions (see chs. 4 and 5). This affects natural resources like water; food—especially food like fish—and parts of the ecosystem such as forests, which play an important role in managing the world’s climate. Second, overproduction leads to more pollutants, which degrade environmental quality and expose living species to dangerous levels of toxins that impact their health and development. Taken together, the decline in resource availability and increase in pollution attenuate the ecosystem’s ability to reproduce itself and make the planet less habitable. Table 6.2 shows the ecological harms caused by overproduction and the importation of lumber. As the data indicate, the amount of lumber produced in, and imported, by the United States was for the most part increasing from 1965 to 2002. These are among the factors bringing about the decline of ecological resources and increasing ecological instability over time (Howard 2003). Table 6.2 illustrates two important points. First, while US wood production has been increasing, the volume of land the United States officially counts as “forested lands” has remained fairly stable since 1965. This is partly because of increased efforts to reforest land and government efforts to preserve existing forests, but it is also the result of the United States’ greater reliance on imported wood. The federal government assesses forest sustainability periodically under the Montreal Process Criteria and Indicators, a nonbinding forest sustainabil-

Crimes of Overproduction and Overconsumption Table 6.2 US lumber production and imports for all wood types, 1965–2002 (millions of board feet) Year

Produced in US

Imported

1965

38,700

1970

35,900

6,114

1975

34,100

5,976

1980

35,4000

9,866

1985

40,900

14,996

1990

48,100

13,107

1995

44,900

17,556

2000

48,600

20,243

2002

48,200

21,724

5,232

source: Howard (2003).

ity management treaty signed by twelve nations (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Uruguay, and the United States) in 1995. This treaty identified sixty-seven measures of forest sustainability that nations should consider when formulating environmental policies. Second, while consumption of US forests has leveled off, there has been increasing US consumption of wood products. That increase has been fed by expanding the import of wood products from other nations, which, as table 6.2 shows, increased fourfold from 1965 to 2002. The patterns seen in table 6.2 are part of the global process of overconsumption and production that occurs in the capitalist world system, in which developed or core nations continue to expand their consumption of commodities and transferring (what is commonly called “externalizing”) the ecological costs of doing so to other nations. Core nations’ increased consumption thus contributes to ecological destruction in developing and underdeveloped nations, and can be linked to other previously discussed concepts like ecologically unequal exchange. Table 6.3 illustrates the extent of deforestation among a small sample of nations (62) with tropical rainforests for 1990–2005. Part 1 shows the nine countries with the highest rates of deforestation. While Burundi lost the greatest percentage (47.4%), Indonesia lost the most total hectares. Part 2 shows the ten countries with the largest loss of forests in hectares, led by Brazil and then Indonesia, which combined lost 4.7 million hectares (11.6 million acres). Part 3 shows the six countries that made small gains in forested area during this period. These six nations gained about 515,000 hectares of forest, yet forest growth in these locations did little to offset forest losses in

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Table 6.3 Deforestation rates across 62 nations with tropical rain forests, 1990–2005 Nation

Decline/gain (%)

Hectares lost/gained (no.)

. Nations losing the fewest hectares of rain forest Burundi

–47.4

–9,133

Togo

–43.6

–19,933

Honduras

–37.1

–182,467

Nigeria

–35.7

–409,667

Philippines

–32.3

–227,467

Benin

–29.2

–64,733

Uganda

–26.3

–86,467

Ghana

–25.9

–128,733

Indonesia

–24.1

–1,871,467 (or 4,624,394 acres)

. Nations losing the most hectares of rain forest Brazil

–8.1

–2,821,933 (or 6,972,996 acres)

Indonesia

–24.1

–1,871,467

Myanmar

–17.8

–466,467

Congo, Dem. Rep.

–4.9

–461,400

Zambia

–13.6

–444,800

Tanzania

–14.9

–412,267

Nigeria

–35.7

–409,667

Mexico

–6.5

–318,533

Zimbabwe

–21.1

–312,933

Venezuela

–8.3

–287,533

. Only nations gaining rain forest Fiji

2.1

Gambia

6.6

1,933

Rwanda

50.9

10,800

Cote D’Ivoire

1.8

12,200

Viet Nam

38.1

237,867

India

5.9

250,800

source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization (2009). note: One hectare = 2.47 acres.

1,400

Crimes of Overproduction and Overconsumption

other nations. The vast majority of nations experiencing deforestation export wood products to other nations, contributing to overconsumption in core nations. In the contemporary era, overproduction has become a worldwide process as capitalism has become the dominant global economic system. World system theory provides a lens for interpreting this process, since it argues that the entire world is part of one global capitalist economic system, in which nations are categorized into three groups: the core, semiperiphery, and periphery. The core consists of advanced “developed” countries; the semiperiphery are nations with rapidly developing economies; and the periphery are poor, underdeveloped countries. At the heart of the theory is the core countries’ systematic exploitation of the semiperiphery’s and periphery’s raw materials and cheap labor (Wallerstein 2004). Wikiwand (n.s.) has put together a map of countries and their world system positions based on a list by Chase-Dunn, Brewer, and Kawana (2000). World system theory argues that the capitalist world system emerged in the 1400s with the opening of the new worlds for conquest (Wallerstein 2004); however, the most severe consequences of global capitalist overproduction have occurred since World War II, with the expansion of the capitalist ToP (Schnaiberg 1980). Acceleration of the ToP aids in overproduction through its reliance on expanding the use of fossil fuel and chemical energy, which can lead to increased CO2 pollution, a sign that fossil fuels are generating ecological disorganization (climate change and its related outcomes). Data on CO2 emissions from the US Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center data indicate CO2 emissions have been significantly increasing since 1950. The relationship between capitalism and ecological destruction has been the subject of important research that includes numerous theoretical and empirical studies (Burkett 2006; Burkett and Foster 2006; Foster 2000, 1999; Foster and Burkett 2008; Foster, Clark, and York 2010; Jorgenson 2010, 2009, 2008, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2005, 2003; Jorgenson and Burns 2007b; Jorgenson and Clark 2011; Long et al. 2012; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013b; York, Rosa, and Dietz 2003). These studies, and research by other ecologists and economists, illustrate how capitalism and the ToP influence ecological disorganization. We review these arguments below, but for now turn to an overview of research on the environmental Kuznets curve.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE Green criminologists have not often referred to the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis or employed studies of the EKC to support their arguments (for an exception, see Lynch 2016b). Thus, the discussion that follows draws largely on noncriminological literature.

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Pollution/environmental degradation

122

Peak pollution

High

Industrial economies

Pre-industrial Medium economies

Post-industrial (service) economies

Low

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Per capita income

Figure 6.2 Environmental Kuznets curve. This graph shows the general hypothetical shape of the environmental Kuznets curve. Over time, as per capita income increases (bottom axis), the level of pollution increases until it reaches a peak, and then theoretically declines with further economic development as economies become more service centered. Source: Authors.

The EKC hypothesizes the relationship between economic development and levels of pollution. Research on the EKC began in the early 1990s (e.g., Cole, Rayner, and Bates 1997; Stern, Common, and Barbier 1996), and is an application and generalization of the Kuznets curve (Kuznets 1955). The Kuznets curve hypothesizes that the relationship between economic inequality and development over time can be depicted as an inverted U shape. As development increases, inequality increases to some threshold (the top of the inverted U), at which point further economic development causes economic inequality to decline. The EKC argument extends this observation to pollution, hypothesizing that as economic development progresses, pollution increases to a point (the top of the inverted U), and then declines with further economic development (see fig. 6.2). Over the first part of the curve, economic development and pollution both increase, while over the second part of the curve economic development increases as pollution decreases. The assumption is that, once the apex of the curve is reached, further economic development slows the production of pollution. Numerous tests have been performed to examine the applicability of the EKC hypotheses to various pollutants—in different countries, at different points in time—and to different groupings of nations. It is not our goal here to review all of those studies in their entireties but rather to provide an overview of findings.

Crimes of Overproduction and Overconsumption

The empirical evidence on the applicability of the EKC is mixed. Numerous studies either support or reject the EKC hypothesis. Studies that reject the EKC show that pollution does not always decline with economic development, and that uneven development in different parts of the world can have different effects on the production of pollution. Of note, the results for EKC analysis are also affected by the use of different methods and statistical procedures to estimate the EKC relationship. Nevertheless, the point of referring to the EKC is to highlight the ways in which the progress and expansion of capitalism affect ecological disorganization. When the EKC hypothesis is supported, this implies that the expansion of capitalism reduces ecological disorganization. As will be noted below, the results of EKC research are mixed; therefore, it is not possible to conclude that the expansion of capitalism protects the environment. Studies indicate variability in the relationship between development and pollution. For example, Miah and Masum (2010) found that the EKC hypothesis was supported for some pollutant emissions in Bangladesh, but not for CO2 emissions. Similar results have been obtained for other nations (e.g., for Tunisa, see Fodha and Zaghdoud 2010). Musolesi, Mazzanti and Zoboli (2010) found that EKC effects varied depending on how countries were grouped for analysis. They found an EKC effect for European Union nations, but not for developing nations or nations tied to US trade circles. Other studies indicated that EKC effects occur only for specific kinds of pollutants. For instance, Roca, Padilla, Farré, and Galletto’s (2001) work supports an EKC relationship for sulfur dioxide emissions but not for other pollutants. Likewise, Huang, Lee, and Wu (2008) rejected the EKC hypothesis for greenhouse gas emissions for Annex II nations (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States), defined by the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. These conflicting results suggest that the EKC hypothesis is of questionable validity, and that increased production is likely to increase ecological disorganization. Studies have also found conflicting evidence in support of the EKC hypothesis on the basis of different measures of development. In a meta-analysis of EKC literature, Cavlovic et al. (2000) concluded that income turning points, one measure of economic development, cannot be generalized across all nations, and that some pollutants (i.e., CO2 and hazardous waste) do not fit the EKC hypothesis. For other studies rejecting the EKC hypothesis related to CO2 pollution, see Aldy (2005) on cross-sectional models for US states; Aldy (2005) and He and Richard (2010) on Canada CO2-emission trends; Xu and Song (2010) on variability of the EKC and CO2 emissions across Chinese provinces; Nasir and Rehman (2011) on results for Pakistan; Zhao et al. (2013) on differences in short- and long-term EKC-CO2 effects; Pao, Yu, and Yang (2011) on

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lack of EKC- CO2 effects for Russia, 1990–2007; and Kearsley and Riddel (2010) and Lieb (2004) on income tipping points. The variability in support for the EKC hypothesis indicates that economic development is not a panacea for pollution. In many places, and for different kinds of pollutants, the EKC hypothesis is not supported, indicating that pollution continues to increase along with development. These studies support our contention that capitalism generates forms of ecological disorganization that continue as capitalism expands. EKC studies have also examined the effect of development on other adverse ecological conditions. These studies produced mixed results as well. A number of studies reject the EKC effect for deforestation, noting that deforestation continues despite increases in economic development, or despite the expansion of the capitalist world system and its tendency toward overproduction (see Koop and Tole 1999; Mills and Waite 2009; Mills-Busa 2012; Puzon 2011; Nguyen and Azomahou 2007). Several other studies, however, support the EKC hypothesis’s suggestion that economic development lessens deforestation (Bhattarai and Hammig 2001; EhrhardtMartinez, Crenshaw, and Jenkins 2002; Culas 2007). While these conflicting results suggest caution is necessary in generalizing the EKC hypothesis to deforestation, considering why these divergent results occur and whether they have any implications for assessing the EKC, or the development-ecology hypothesis, is important. Speaking to that issue, MillsBusa (2012, 2013) suggested that important effects of wealthy nations on deforestation in poorer nations are overlooked in some studies supporting the EKCdeforestation hypothesis. The explanation is that, over time, wealthy nations’ deforestation rates decrease locally or internally (i.e., within developed nations, deforestation decreases), while they expand internationally (e.g., developed nations import more timber from developing nations). The demand for forestrelated products does not decline in wealthy nations, but rather continues to expand. This increased demand is met by importing wood products and raw materials from developing/underdeveloped nations, which increases deforestation in those exporting nations (see tables 6.2 and 6.3). If this effect (i.e., the core’s increased importation of wood production and raw materials) is not measured, over time it appears as if increased economic development in core nations leads to ecological protection, at least in developed nations. Rather, following Mills-Busa (2012, 2013), we can see instead that increased demand for forest products simply leads to a shift in deforestation away from core countries’ economies to the economies of periphery nations. This result is one that would be expected from a world system theoretical perspective on global capitalist economic development. Th is reinterpretation supports the contention that capitalism continues to promote overconsumption and overproduction, but that it changes the geography of overconsumption and overproduction.

Crimes of Overproduction and Overconsumption

Consistent with this latter argument, and our own view, is research by York, Rosa, and Dietz (2004) that draws on world systems theory and capitalist ToP arguments to explain the pattern of ecological disorganization seen in the global capitalist economy (see also Jorgenson 2010, 2009, 2008, 2003). That argument suggests the need to interpret global patterns of ecological destruction and disorganization in relation to the impact of developed (core) nations’ overproduction and overconsumption demands on developing (semiperiphery) and underdeveloped (periphery) nations’ ecological resources. As we have noted in different contexts, and as has been illustrated by green criminologists (Stretesky and Lynch 2009), core capitalist economies import commodities and raw materials from developing nations, and export the associated ecological strain to those nations. As Mills-Busa (2013) suggests, continual development in the core nations appears to lead to reduced ecological destruction, when in fact the core nations are promoting ecological damage in other nations. Thus, capitalism is unlikely to solve the problem of ecological disorganization, which will, as Mills-Busa illustrates, continue to expand across nations because of the dependency-development link promoted by the global ToP. Overall, the negative effects of expanding consumption of raw materials in less developed nations are greater than the positive effects of reducing raw material extraction within core nations. We need to point out an additional criticism we have of EKC research (Lynch 2016b). As our summary indicates, EKC research examines whether there is an association between economic development and ecological disorganization. It is based on the hypothesized assumption of an inverted U–shaped association between economic development and forms of ecological disorganization such as pollution and deforestation. Ignoring the inconsistent results in research testing the inverted U–shaped association described above, EKC research suffers from a major unaddressed limitation—whether the hypothesized inverted U–shaped relationship generates sufficient levels of ecological protection to promote ecological stability and sustainability. The inverted U relationship might exist. but this does not mean that development is sufficient to impede ecological destruction to the extent required to foster ecological sustainability and reproduction. Development might lead to reduced ecological destruction, but does it reduce ecological destruction sufficiently to protect the ecosystem? We would argue that evidence of the global levels of ecological destruction, and the current state of the world’s ecological system, suggests that even if development leads to environmental protection, the positive effects are insufficient to promote ecosystem stability. If they were sufficiently protective, we would not have problems such as climate change, deforestation, and so forth, at levels that challenge the ecosystem’s reproductive capacity. In the next section, we take up the issue of the ecosystem’s reproductive capacity by examining the ecological footprint of the human species.

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THE ECOLOGICAL FOOTPRINT The ecological footprint is one way to examine the relationship between overproduction and overconsumption with respect to human processes and their impact on the ecosystem. This remains an area in which green criminological theory and explanations of green crime can be expanded. Below, we review data on the ecological footprint provided by the Global Footprint Network. According to the Global Footprint Network (2013a), the ecological footprint is a measure of human demand on the ecosystem that indicates how much of nature is available for use (bio-capacity supply) and how much humans actually use (demand/consumption). There are two parts to the footprint: the demand side (consumption) and the supply side (the volume of available raw materials, land, and food). The demand side involves calculating human ecological demand, or how many resources humans consume through production and, consequently, consumption. The demand side accounts for how much water and land the human population uses for its maintenance and consumption, and how much of the waste it produces is absorbed by nature. The waste indicator measures the carbon footprint of human societies. The supply side is a measure of ecosystem bio-capacity, or how much of nature is available for consumption and absorption of the carbon footprint. The ecological footprint is a ratio of the demand side to the supply side (demand or consumption divided by resource availability). When the ratio, and thus the human ecological footprint, is less than one, human demand is less than available bio-capacity, and thus is ecologically sustainable. When the footprint ratio is one, human demand for bio-capacity is equal to bio-capacity, and is still ecologically sustainable. When the ratio is greater than one, human consumption of bio-capacity is greater than the bio-capacity nature can generate in one year, and is thus ecologically unsustainable. The footprint can be calculated for any area in which the demand and supply side data are available. One way to interpret the global ecological footprint is to view it as an outcome of human overproduction and overconsumption. In a balanced or sustainable world, the global ecological footprint should be 1.0 or less. Therefore, the quantity of resources or natural capital humans consume in a year would be equal to the quantity the global ecosystem can reproduce in the same period. When the ecological footprint exceeds 1.0, humans are eating into the ecosystem’s stored natural capital by consuming more of nature than nature can reproduce. That stored natural capital is what allows nature to reproduce a given volume of new natural capital each year. Eating into stored natural capital also slows down or impedes the annual reproduction of resources available for consumption. As of September 2016, the human global ecological footprint was 1.6 (it was previously 1.5; Global Footprint Network 2013c), meaning that humans are

Crimes of Overproduction and Overconsumption

consuming 1.6 years of global ecosystem resources in 1 year, or are overconsuming. Just as when you overdraw your bank account, we are drawing down the ecosystem’s resources faster than nature can replenish them. If we think of bio-capacity in bank account terms, nature adds 1 year of resources to its account each year. Humans, however, are withdrawing 1.6 years of resource savings each year. It doesn’t take much to imagine that over an extended period of time, then, that a human ecological footprint greater than 1 will lead to an empty bank account—or in this case a depleted ecological system. Each year, as the bio-capacity resources shrinks, so too does nature’s ability to replenish those raw materials. Humans are now withdrawing from nature’s capital reserve, which as a consequence is producing less interest, or fewer natural resources for human consumption. The problem is that nature requires a “minimum deposit” to regenerate biocapacity resources, which means the entire bio-capacity deposit is not available for human use (see ch. 3). What humans can withdraw is similar to the interest on a bank account. Once you withdraw all the interest, you begin to eat into the principal, and then the principal starts to yield less interest. When that happens, the ecosystem no longer has the necessary resources available to produce the interest (bio-capacity) that humans can use without causing the ecosystem to collapse (see Global Footprint Network 2013b for specific details on how the footprint and bio-capacity values are calculated). Some nations consume a large quantity of bio-capacity, while others have much smaller effects on the world’s bio-capacity. Table 6.4 supplies information on ecological footprints and bio-capacity availability for a sampling of nations, which were selected to show nations’ different ecological footprints and not to show average or high-impact nations alone. Footprint analysis is useful for assessing the impact of nations on their local ecosystems, and whether a nation’s ecological consumption (its footprint) is greater or less than its available bio-capacity. The nations on the left side of the table are more developed nations, and the ones on the right are less developed nations. Generally, more developed nations have larger ecological footprints than available bio-capacity, and thus overconsume natural resources. In the United States, for example, the ecological footprint is 7 and bio-capacity is 3.9, so US consumption is about 1.8 times its available bio-capacity in a given year. To cover the shortfall, the United States must import raw materials from other nations. Even though the table shows that some countries have more bio-capacity than they use, the world has an overall bio-capacity deficit because other nations use more than their bio-capacity. Because the human ecological footprint measures the amount of stress humans place on ecosystems, and the ability of the ecosystem to reproduce the conditions for life, it also measures ecological disorganization. As the

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Chapter 6 Table 6.4 Approximate ecological footprints and bio-capacity for a sample of nations Developed nations Nation US

Developing and underdeveloped nations

Footprint

Bio-capacity

Country

Footprint

Bio-capacity

7.0

4.1

Argentina

6.9

2.0 3.6

UK

4.7

1.6

Chile

2.2

China

2.3

0.9

Cuba

1.7

0.7

Australia

6.0

14.0

Hungary

2.9

2.4

Canada

6.0

15.5

India

0.9

0.5

Denmark

7.8

5.2

Nigeria

1.3

1.0

Finland

5.8

13.9

Panama

2.2

2.4

France

4.7

3.7

Peru

1.9

4.1

Germany

4.4

1.9

Qatar

10.0

1.0

Ireland

5.8

4.9

Romania

2.4

2.4

Japan

3.8

0.5

Saudi Arabia

3.9

0.5

Mexico

4.4

1.4

Singapore

6.0

0.1

Netherlands

6.0

1.1

S. Africa

2.6

1.3

Russian Fed.

3.9

6.8

Tanzania

1.3

1.1

Spain

4.2

1.8

Vietnam

1.5

1.1

source: These data are estimation points obtained from graphs supplied on the Global Footprint Network website (www.footprintnetwork.org). note: Measures are in hectares per person (1 hectare = 2.47 acres).

ecological footprint increases, ecosystem stress and ecological disorganization increase, and impede the ability of the ecosystem to reproduce itself. The impact of the human ecological footprint on ecosystem health can be seen in outcomes such as species and biodiversity loss—the shrinking number of plant and animal species in the world. On this point, Vačkář (2012) found a significant correlation between a nation’s ecological footprint and biodiversity loss. Other studies (Parmesan and Yohe 2003; Thomas et al. 2003; Thuiller 2004) have focused specific attention on the impact on biodiversity loss ofCO2 emissions (a major cause of climate change). All of these studies found a decline in biodiversity as climate change—one dimension of the ecological footprint— accelerated. Humans’ ecological footprint is also visible in the ecological damage that occurs when trees in naturally forested areas are cut down. In developed nations, there are significant quantities of trees in tree farms, which can be considered artificial forests. These are created on land that has been deforested and

Crimes of Overproduction and Overconsumption

hence has been changed dramatically from its natural state. Often the trees that replace the originals are selected because they grow more rapidly, and they are not always native to the habitat. In many cases, these artificial forests become what are known as “monocultures” because only one species of tree is grown. The replacement of natural forests with artificial, monoculture forests can also lead to biodiversity loss. The replacement of the biodiversity of a natural forest with tree farm monoculture affects not only the biodiversity of the tree stock, but the biodiversity of species living in those areas. For example, in a study of the effect of monoculture on coffee plantations and insect biodiversity, Perfecto et al. (1997) found that monocultural coffee plantations had significantly less insect biodiversity than traditional coffee plantations, where native tree stocks were maintained (for a summary of related research, see Jactel, Brockerhoff, and Duelli 2005). Zurita et al. (2006) found that the monoculture of native tree farms exhibited a 50% reduction in bird species. Research on this issue has demonstrated that species similarity is higher in mono-agricultural locations than in natural woodlands (Tscharntke et al. 2008). Monoculture agriculture often improves economic efficiency and productivity, but there is an ecological trade off here, as increased economic efficiency can lead to a reduction in species diversity (Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007). The association between economic efficiency and biodiversity loss is a key issue in the growth of monoculture agriculture. The economic benefits are significant, and those benefits are given greater weight than species diversity. While there is an economic benefit to monoculture, the loss of biodiversity remains an obstacle in establishing conditions that promote a stable, reproducible, and healthy ecosystem. The negative ecological outcomes described above have been explored from a world system perspective that addresses the role international capitalism plays in processes like global deforestation patterns (Burns et al. 1994). Recall that in the world system view, the nations of the world are organized into three classes (core, semiperiphery, and periphery). If the theory provides an accurate explanation of the organizational principles of international capitalism, then deforestation patterns should be differentially distributed across the world system position of nations. The core nations are the “advanced” capitalist nations that control trade agreements and dominate economic exchanges. Core nations seek out natural resources and cheap labor for exploitation, regardless of their location. This process creates ecologically unequal exchange between the core nations and other segments of the world market (Jorgenson and Clark 2009; Rice 2007). Th is unequal relationship is marked by the flow of trade and resources, access to capital, and the accumulation of capital to the core from other segments of the world market. The core extracts value from the semiperiphery and periphery, and because the exchange process is unequal, the ecological impacts of such exchanges are distributed unequally across nations, and have greater adverse ecological impacts for developing and underdeveloped nations.

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Consistent with world system theory, Burns et al. (1994) found important variability in deforestation according to a country’s world system position. As Burns et al. note, when semiperiphery nations grow economically, they concentrate production and population in urban spaces to carry out production more efficiently and to enhance profit making. The growth in urban space requires the conversion of forest land into urban space. In other words, forests are consumed to grow capitalism. In the core nations, a similar process takes place. The expansion of urban areas and population growth in core nations lead to continual conversion of forest land for urban development and to produce food. Converting forest land to agricultural purposes is required to feed consumers and workers, so they can continue to generate profits (a problem that is also related to the issue of metabolic or ecological rift; see Burkett and Foster 2006; Foster 1999; Foster, Clark, and York 2010). In the core nations, deforestation has already been accelerating. The declining availability of forest land for agricultural and other production purposes (e.g., tree farming) can cause core nations, driven by the marketplace of capitalism, to obtain raw materials from periphery nations where labor cost are low and raw materials are more plentiful and cheaper, as illustrated in our earlier discussion of wood production and consumption in the United States. In addition, the global system of capitalism has established a debt network to facilitate the exploitation of periphery nations’ raw materials (Cruz and Repetto 1992). In this sense, deforestation in periphery nations is driven by the demand for raw materials in the core nations, and by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) credit and development system (e.g., Rich 1995). In return for loans, the World Bank and IMF require nations to undertake severe austerity measures called structural adjustment programs, which are designed to make the nations’ economies more export oriented. The vast majority of periphery nations’ commodity exports are raw materials like wood (see the example in tables 6.2 and 6.3). The deforestation of the periphery nations, facilitated by IMF structural adjustment, interferes with those countries’ economic development and progress because of the unequal terms of trade. In nations experiencing high rates of deforestation, economic development may decline, reinforcing the unequal relationship between the core and periphery nations (Mabogunje 2002; Owusu 1998). While the scientific literature confirms the connection between deforestation and species loss (Brook, Sodhi, and Ng 2003; Allnutt et al. 2008; Pandit et al. 2007), it offers no theoretical model for explaining this process. We argue that the connection between forms of overproduction and overconsumption that generate negative ecological outcomes is the global capitalist ToP. A number of studies support this argument (Hoffmann 2004; Burns et al. 1994; Jorgenson 2010, 2006b, 2006c, 2005; Jorgenson and Burns 2007b; Jorgenson and Clark 2011).

Crimes of Overproduction and Overconsumption

THE CARBON FOOTPRINT A second way to look at the footprint effects of nations is to examine their carbon footprint, which is a measure of how much greenhouse gas they emit. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are an important part of a nation’s footprint because they contribute to climate change and impede the ecological system’s ability to reproduce the conditions for life on the planet. According to the Global Footprint Network (2013c), CO2 emissions account for 54% of the global human footprint. In recent years, CO2 emissions in some nations have been slowing, while in others they have been increasing. In the twenty-seven nations of the European Union, for example, CO2 emissions decreased from 4.32 to 3.74 billion tons from 1990 to 2012, while US CO2 emissions rose slightly during the same period (4.99 billion tons in 1990 compared with 5.19 billion tons in 2012). In contrast, China has seen explosive growth in CO2 emissions, from about 2.51 billion tons in 1990 to 9.86 billion tons in 2012 (a 293% increase). Significant increases in CO2 pollution have occurred in developing countries like India, which has seen a 523% increase in CO2 emissions from 1990 through 2012. Though there is greater concern about CO2 emissions as a cause of climate change, and efforts have been made to constrain CO2 emissions, there is little evidence of success. Importantly, the rise and decline in GHG emissions across nations is a consequence of the organization of the global political economy, the complexity of which makes these trends difficult to assess (e.g., the interaction among the world system, international capitalist economy, ToP, ecologically unequal exchange, metabolic rift). Greenhouse gas emissions, relative to among other things the consumption of fossil fuels, commodities in general, and the manufacture and transportation of goods, are one way of measuring overconsumption and overproduction. For instance, China, the current leader in total tons of GHG production, generates nearly 25% (about 8.425 billion tons) of all global greenhouse gases. The United States is second with 16.1% (5.25 billion tons) of greenhouse gas emissions. Yet while China produces the most greenhouse gases, its per capita emissions are about 6.7 tons per person, which is significantly less than per capita greenhouse gas emissions (17 tons) in the United States. Table 6.5 provides examples of greenhouse gas emissions across nations. Notice that three nations—China, the United States, and India—produced 46.8% of all greenhouse gas emissions. China and India account for 37% of the world’s population, so the fact that these nations produced about 31% of global greenhouse gas emissions would not be considered unusual. The United States, however, has about 4.5% of the world’s population and produces about 16% of greenhouse gas emissions, indicating that it overproduces and overconsumes resources relative to its population size. The eleven largest producers of greenhouse gases in this table produce about 58% of global greenhouse gas emissions.

131

Table 6.5 Carbon dioxide/greenhouse gas emissions for a sample of nations, 2012

Tons per capita* Australia

Total tons (millions)

Global greenhouse emissions (%)**

16.5

370.0

Austria

7.8

68

Bahrain

18.1

2.1

—

Canada

14.1

495.0

1.5

China

6.7

8,425.0

25.8

Cuba

3.2

37.0

—

10.4

115.0

—

Demark

7.4

41.0

—

Finland

10.2

59.0

—

France

5.2

358.0

1.1

Czech Rep.

1.1 —

Germany

8.9

740.0

2.3

Greece

7.6

86.0

—

India

1.6

2,008.0

6.2

Ireland

7.9

35.0

—

Israel

9.0

68.0

—

Italy

6.7

404.0

1.2

Japan

9.3

119.0

—

Kazakhstan

15.8

241.0

—

Kuwait

29.1

87

—

Luxembourg

20.9

10

—

Mexico

3.9

445

1.4

Netherlands

10.1

178

—

Norway

11.7

57

—

Poland

8.3

317

— ***

Qatar

43.9

73

Russia

12.6

179

—

Saudi Arab.

18.7

475

1.5

5.9

55

***

Sweden UK

7.7

490

1.5

US

17.0

5,250

16.1

note: Per capita emission and total emissions are shown for all nations; for some, the percentage indicates the total proportion of greenhouse gas emissions produced by that country. *Approximate total tons, estimated from averages from different sources. To convert figures to tons, multiply by 100,000. For example, for Australia, greenhouse gas emissions were equivalent to 370,000,000 tons. **Examples of the percentage of total greenhouse gas emissions for a nation. For countries where data are not included, the percentage of emissions less than 1 of global total.

Crimes of Overproduction and Overconsumption

THE HUMAN WASTE FOOTPRINT The relationship between overproduction, overconsumption, and ecological disorganization can be examined with respect to the waste humans generate. Simply put, OP-OC results in the production of more waste and the emission of ecological additions. A difficulty in discussing the overproduction of hazardous waste is that global data on this form of pollution are either lacking (not all nations keep records of this) or difficult to locate. The best global data are collected by the United Nations, but they have significant limitations, as few countries supply data to the United Nations on a consistent basis and the number of nations that supply data varies from year to year. Nevertheless, we begin with these data as a measure of the global problem of hazardous waste on the global ecosystem. To estimate the volume of hazardous waste produced by the nations of the world, we employed the data the United Nations collected from 1995 to 2009. Data were not available for all nations for all years. For nations for which data were unavailable, we estimated pollution emissions for 2009 from reported emissions in prior years (the missing data were estimated from the prior growth trend and extended linearly). Th is likely underestimated or overestimated the specific emission level for any given nation, since the direction of the emission trend might have reversed, increased, or declined. Still, these estimates give us some idea of how much global pollution was generated. The estimates are also limited by the fact that the UN data only include useable estimates for 80 of the 207 nations. Those nations that were included in the UN data, however, likely emitted the greatest amount of hazardous waste (from data derived from the World Input-Ouput Database website [WIOD 2013], we estimated this to be 90% of global waste). Certain nations (e.g., Australia) that emit large quantities of pollution, however, were excluded from the UN data; we estimated their pollution output from national data sources. (Emission estimates for large nations missing from the UN report were collected from each nation’s pollution-reporting system. We refer to these measures as estimates since it is likely that pollution emissions were underreported.) We estimated that each year approximately 685 billion pounds of toxic waste are emitted worldwide. To make 685 billion pounds of toxic waste easier to visualize, we used industrial data to estimate that an average dump truck holds twenty tons of dirt. Assuming that dirt and toxic waste take up the same volume of space, 34.2 billion dump trucks would be needed to hold 685 billion pounds of toxic waste. If an average dump truck is 50 feet long, 34.2 billion dump trucks lined up end to end would cover 171 billion feet, or 32.4 million miles. One year of toxic waste carried in dump trucks would, in other words, circle the globe more than 8,175 times.

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One issue with these emissions data is their accuracy. The EPA requires fi rms to self-report waste production and emission data, but the accuracy of these self-reports is questionable. De Marchi and Hamilton (2006) compared firm self-reported emissions to EPA air-monitoring data and found significant evidence of under-reporting. Bennear (2008) hypothesized that changes in environmental regulations also impact the reporting of toxic releases. Using data from Massachusetts, she found that changes in regulations accounted for 40% of the decline in emissions reported by facilities that released toxic waste. Moreover, not all polluters are required to report emissions, illegal emissions go unreported, and firms are required to report the emissions of only certain pollutants. As a result, our estimate of 685 billion pounds of toxic waste probably substantially underestimates the volume of pollution emitted into the global ecosystem annually. The more pollution the capitalist ToP produces, the more waste it generates, and those wastes limit the health of the ecosystem and make it more dangerous. As an example, consider Matzner’s (1984) study of deposit rates for polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) under two types of trees in a forest ecosystem. PAHs are carcinogenic (cause cancer), mutagenic (cause genetic mutations), and teratogenic (cause abnormalities in physical development). In short, these are quite harmful chemicals. Matzner found that the quantity of PAHs stored in the soil under trees was equivalent to between 14 and 38 years of annual deposits from PAH emissions, depending on the PAH examined. In other words, soil stores the PAHs, which are emitted as air pollutants, and because those PAHs degrade slowly (some PAHs, for example, have a half-life of 4.18 years), they can accumulate in significant amounts, as Matzner’s study suggests. Th is study is important because it illustrates that ecological additions can promote ecological and species damage for significant periods of time. Thus, the waste emitted by the modern capitalist ToP will take decades to diminish to safe levels (for an empirical example, see Lynch and Stretesky 2014, ch. 7). In the meantime, it will have the long-term ecological disorganization effects associated with pollution stemming from overproduction and overconsumption. The effects of those accumulated pollutants change the nature of ecosystems, and can expose humans and nonhuman species to pollutants that significantly affect health. We suggest that this an example of green crime and green victimization. Matzner’s study brings us back to other ecological issues related to overproduction and overconsumption. Wood is one of the raw materials that is currently overconsumed. Forest canopies play an important role in the ecosystem by removing chemical pollutants from the air (McLachlan and Hortsmann 1998). Overconsumption of forests impedes the ability of the ecosystem to remove pollutants from the air, resulting in increased exposure (see also Motelay-Massei et al. 2004; for a related study on the air–soil exchange of pollutants and their health effects, see Cousins, Beck, and Jones 1999).

Crimes of Overproduction and Overconsumption

OVERPRODUCTION/OVERCONSUMPTION AND SPECIES HARM Finally, we will address species harm, specifically the fate of nonhuman animals, associated with overproduction and overconsumption. To do so, we look at how overproduction and overconsumption contribute to the extinction of nonhuman animal species, using the harms associated with OP-OC as another example of how the capitalist ToP generates ecological disorganization (green crimes). Two forms of ecological disorganization/green crimes are apparent here. First, there is a direct effect of OP-OC on species diversity. As the ToP expands and consumes an increasing quantity of the natural world, species habitats decline and their existence becomes increasingly threatened. This can be the result of deforestation, brought about by logging entire forest sections or by forest fragmentation, in which segments of a forest are harvested leaving significant gaps in forest cover. Th is effect may also be the product of replacing natural forests with monoculture tree forests, as described earlier. While habitat loss has a significant effect on species biodiversity and survival, and can be one of the causes of extinction, we should not overlook the fact that deforestation can also cause more immediate harm to species. Species can be killed during the process of ecological withdrawal, another example of an outcome that green crime criminologists could explore. Second, there is an indirect effect of OP-OC on species biodiversity and ecological health. As just noted, ecological withdrawals can cause habitat destruction and fragmentation. The decline of species biodiversity in a given ecosystem causes additional negative ecological impacts on those ecosystems, because reducing the number of species can result in further ecological damage to an ecosystem. Let us begin this discussion with the following scientific observation: many scientists agree that we are now in the sixth wave of extinction, a period some call the Anthropocene to emphasize it is attributable primarily to human impacts on the world and local ecosystems. Scientific evidence for the sixth wave of extinction demonstrates that current rates of species extinction are unprecedented compared to what is called the “background” rate of extinction (Zalasiewicz et al. 2010; Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill 2007; Steffen at al. 2011; Lomolino et al. 2001; Barnosky et al. 2011; Stork 2010). The background rate of extinction is the rate at which species have become extinct absent the influence of humans, or the rate at which species go extinct absent some other shock to the ecosystem. That information is drawn from scientific studies examining evidence of species extinction in layers of Earth’s crust. Thus, the difference between the background rate of extinction and the extinction rate in the Anthropocene measures the human impact on the extinction of species. The causes of the sixth wave of extinction include deforestation, climate change, and accelerating consumption (Lomolino et al. 2001). As we discussed above,

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these outcomes are caused by the continual expansion of the capitalist ToP, or the political-economic structure of capitalism. In this sense, Anthropocene extinction is an example of a very large-scale green crime. The connection between the global capitalist ToP, overproduction, overconsumption, and species extinction is supported by McKinney, Kick, and Fulkerson (2010), who studied biodiversity and species loss from the world systems perspective. As these researchers note, species biodiversity plays an important role in human health and well-being, so a decline in biodiversity could have negative consequences on the ecological system, its stability, and human health. McKinney, Kick, and Fulkerson examined the effects of different factors on bird and mammal species richness and decline across 139 nations. They concluded that the structure of the global world system helps predict the volume of species loss, and where species will be most affected. An important cause of biodiversity loss is climate change, which, as we suggested above, can be associated with OP-OC. The effect of climate change on biodiversity and species loss has been well documented (Parmesan and Yohe 2003; Thomas et al. 2003; Thuiller et al. 2004; Midgley et al. 2002). As Thomas et al. (2003) noted, by midcentury, 15–37% of the species they studied will be on their way to extinction, depending on the course climate change follows in the next few decades. These studies support our contention that the capitalist ToP has dominated the post–World War II era, during which time ecological disorganization has accelerated, producing a variety of green crimes. The issue of species extinction has not been widely addressed by green criminologists (Lynch, Long, and Stretesky 2015); however they have examined processes such as deforestation (e.g., van Solinge 2010), forest and logging crimes (e.g., van Solinge 2008), and climate change (e.g., White 2012), all factors that contribute to species extinction. One reason for this omission is that green criminologists have not ordinarily conceptualized green crimes as being a consequence of the capitalist ToP, or have tended not to theorize about green crimes from a political-economic perspective (for an exception, see Stretesky, Long, and Lynch, 2013b). In our view, doing so requires using a political-economic perspective that makes sense of the global patterns of ecological harm, including species extinction. This area is a fruitful one for green criminologists.

CONCLUSION This chapter has reviewed the effects of overproduction and overconsumption on the ecosystem’s stability. We proposed that OP-OC is a consequence of how the capitalist ToP is organized. Combining our review with our theoretical explanation, we argued that the capitalist ToP’s tendency toward OP-OC contributes significantly to declining ecosystem stability. Indeed, the OP-OC tendencies of the capitalist ToP have become so extensive that consumption and

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production exceed the ecosystem’s bio-capacity. While some might argue that the real problem is the increasing population (P. Ehrlich 1968; P. Ehrlich and Holdren 1971), population worldwide has been increasing at a much slower rate than the ecological footprint. To be sure, some of the pressure on the ecosystem is caused by population pressures, a topic beyond the scope of this book (for a discussion of population pressure on species extinction within green criminology, see Lynch, Long, and Stretesky 2015). Nevertheless, inclusive of population pressure, the capitalist ToP has accelerated OP-OC to unsustainable levels. Dealing with the current level of ecologically unsustainable economic practices requires replacing the capitalist ToP with a form of production, and a new set of economic values, conducive to ecological sustainability—that is, if we want humans to survive as a species. In our view, OP-OC is by definition a green crime in that it causes ecological damage and harm to species living in ecosystems. Above, we illustrated various ways in which the ecological damage caused by overproduction and overconsumption can be measured. These data indicate that ecological damage caused by the continual expansion of capitalism is pervasive. Green criminologists, however, have tended to overlook how capitalism, and its organization and goals, drives green crimes and ecological disorganization. By considering the role of OP-OC in capitalism, we can see that many, if not most, of the green crimes in the modern era are a consequence of continually expanding capitalism. Thus, it is important for green criminologists to address the structure of capitalism and how it produces green crimes.

S T U DY G U I D E Questions and Activities for Students 1. Define the concepts of overconsumption and overproduction and how they are related. 2. Explain how overproduction and overconsumption are related to (A) political-economic theory, (B) the treadmill of production, and (C) ecological disorganization. 3. How do the environmental Kuznets curve, the human ecological footprint, the CO2 footprint, and the waste footprint provide evidence of overconsumption and overproduction? 4. Explain the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis and summarize evidence from prior research about its usefulness. 5. What is the difference between the “supply side” and the “demand side” of the ecological footprint?

6. Explain what it means when the human ecological footprint is less than 1.0, equal to 1.0, and greater than 1.0. 7. Explain how overproduction and overconsumption relate to the problem of species loss. 8. What is meant by the term Antropocene extinction? Lessons for Researchers 1. The causes of ecological disorganization are numerous and complex. Prior research in green criminology has made reference to some, but not to the full range, of the causes of ecological disorganization. Green criminologists can use political-economic theory to add a layer of nuance to prior analyses of how the global tendencies

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toward overconsumption and overproduction produced by global capitalism contribute to ecological disorganization. 2. Discussions of ecological disorganization can draw on data produced by a wide array of research. While those measures may not always be framed as measures of ecological disorganization by those who conducted the studies, it should be clear that they are useful indicators of ecological disorganization. For example, a number of studies using ecological footprint or carbon dioxide measures do not refer to these outcomes as examples of ecological disorganization, with the exception of studies discussed in this chapter that relate to ecological Marxism. In the later approach, this is accomplished through the use of political economic analysis and is consistent with the arguments presented in this book. 3. Many of the ecological harms green criminologists study can be linked to pressures exerted on

ecosystems by overconsumption and overproduction. Understanding ecological disorganization and green harm requires referencing these concepts and can be useful for situating the problem of ecological harm and disorganization within the global, capitalist marketplace. 4. By using scientific indicators to support their contentions about ecological disorganization, green criminologists can avoid being criticized for not grounding their arguments in empirical data. The use of relevant data is important to buttress arguments made by green criminologists and to increase their acceptability. The subject of green harms/crime is not one for mere philosophical debate. In our view, green criminology can play a crucial role in promoting interest in efforts to “save” the planet from ecological destruction. This means being able to support our environmental arguments with appropriate data.

CH A P T ER

Toxic Towns and Studies of Ecologically Devastated Communities

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cross the world there is significant evidence that humans produce extensive ecological harms that damage the local and global ecosystems and have deleterious effects on the species that live in those ecosystems. These ecological harms are forms of ecological disorganization that, from the perspective we have taken in earlier chapters, constitute green crimes. Further, we have argued that the extensive ecological harms humans generate are driven by the political-economic organization of capitalism, and it therefore follows that capitalism produces both ecological disorganization and green crime. Local and global harms and green crimes have serious consequences that occur through two pathways. First, green crimes, or ecological harms, can have immediate, direct effects on ecosystems and their inhabitants, depending on the type of harm being examined. For example, when a highly toxic substance is emitted into the environment, it can immediately change the very nature of the ecosystem and result in the direct death of species that come into contact with it. These immediate harms are serious. Over a short period, they can transform ecosystems, which includes the eradication of entire species. These outcomes may not affect only humans, or produce toxic towns. They can also produce toxic ecosystems that adversely impact ecosystem species. While we will

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not review this particular problem here, it is an issue green criminologists can examine further. A recent example of this kind of outcome occurred in early September 2016, after county officials in Dorchester, South Carolina, used an inappropriate pesticide to control the mosquito population, which was assumed to be responsible for spreading the Zika virus. The county officials sprayed a 15-square-mile area with the pesticide Naled, known to be toxic to honeybees. Various news reports indicate that the EPA had advised Dorchester County officials that if they were going to spray Naled they should do so after dusk and before dawn, when honeybees are asleep in their hives, to minimize its effect on the honeybee population. Instead, Dorchester officials sprayed Naled from airplanes between 6:30 and 8:30 a.m. One beekeeper estimated that she lost 2.5 million bees as a result of the application of Naled. Naled is also known to have adverse effects on aquatic ecosystems. The EPA estimates that Naled is applied to about 16 million acres of US land each year. The second kind of harm is indirect and less immediate. It can involve toxins and pollutants that, when released at low concentrations, do not cause the same kind of serious, immediate damage (e.g., death) as more toxic substances used at high concentrations. These pollutants can, however, accumulate in ecosystems and cause long-term harm. Such harms may not be immediately evident because they occur only long after a pollutant has accumulated in the environment, in a species, or in a member of a species. Some cases of green crime/harm, however, involve both long- and shortterm damage and destruction. For instance, when companies log an area, they immediately change the nature of the local environment in a number of ways, the seriousness of which depends on how long logging continues (see fig. 7.1). Logging may involve immediate harm to forest species killed by the process of logging. At early stages in the logging process, those harms are confined. But as the logging continues, its impacts accumulate. And when these kinds of processes occur in many areas of the world over long periods, immediate and longterm harms accumulate at escalating rates. Taken together, these immediate and long-term harms are altering the world around us, and the consequences can have increasingly serious consequences for ecosystems and species over time. They may, for example, interrelate with other ecological harm processes such as climate change, as is the case with logging. Indeed, as we have come to see in the past century, the accumulation of various types of harm from pollution and ecological withdrawals pose a threat to the ability of nature to reproduce the conditions for life on Earth, and have threatened nature’s very existence (see Carson 1962; Lovelock 2006; Kovel, 2007; McKibben 2011, 2006; Foster 2000; Burkett, 2006). Some indications of these accumulative ecological effects include climate change and the destruction of the world’s rainforests. These conditions are well known and a large volume of research exists on these topics, though they have not necessarily been written by criminologists in general or green criminologists in particular.

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Figure 7.1 Deforestation in Riau, Indonesia. Deforestation is a widespread, global problem that contributes to a number of adverse ecological consequences, including climate change. Deforestation can promote ecological additions through the use of heavy industrial equipment; by burning undesirable brush and tree stock remains; and by altering the ecosystem, which changes the ability of forests to retain water and minerals. Here we see an image of deforestation in Riau Province, Indonesia, and damage to the local waterways. Source: Wakx. Wikimedia Commons.

Ecological risks take on various forms. Some are easy to perceive while others have become so ordinary and acceptable that we do not even notice them. And yet many of them are significant problems. These include everyday behaviors, such as the application of pesticides and fertilizers to lawns and farms, which when carried out routinely on millions of acres of land can lead to problems such as nitrogen pollution of waterways and eutrophication (excessive nutrient enrichment of waterways that produces deficient oxygen and eventually death for aquatic species). Some of these harms are global, such as air pollution, which the United Nations recently estimated adversely impacts 90% of the human population. But just because we fail to perceive these acts as ecologically harmful does not mean they do not deserve our attention, or that they are not harmful. Take the use of pesticides and herbicides, which are dispensed all around us every day. It is difficult to obtain data on this issue, and many of the sources for the data that are available have from the pesticide industry itself. In the United States, the EPA discontinued collection of pesticide data in 2001 (Ritter 2009). In 1997, when pesticide use in the United States had leveled off, it was estimated that the United States used 1.23 billion pounds, or 22%, of the 5.7 billion pounds of pesticides used worldwide (Ritter 2009). But

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Figure 7.2 Fish kill. Fish kills have become more common as humans pollute waterways through ecological additions, sometimes resulting in massive deaths among fish populations in lakes, rivers, streams, and oceans. Source: Noomhh /Fotolia. us.fotolia.com/id/40905745.

those figures only include agricultural pesticide use, and pesticides are also applied to lawns, golf courses, public parks, and other public spaces to maintain greenways and to remove weeds, as well as in millions of homes and yards. Those other uses are estimated to lead to the application of 4.6 billion pounds of pesticides (Ritter, 2009). In the United States alone that amounts to 5.83 billion (1.23 billion plus 4.6 billion) pounds of pesticides annually. Since most pesticide and herbicide applications are not well targeted (e.g., pesticides sprayed on fields), the vast majority of the pesticides are emitted into the ecosystem. The emission of fertilizers, especially fertilizers containing nitrogen, into waterways causes ecological additions that can result in eutrophication. Eutrophication, normally a naturally occurring part of the organic cycle in waterways, involves the growth and decomposition of water-based plant life. However, the eutrophication process can be expanded and accelerated when waterways receive excessive amounts of nutrient or organic matter, particularly nitrogen and phosphorous, which stimulate waterway plant growth. Such nutrient enrichment of waterways causes excessive algae growth. When the algae bloom dies, the decomposing organic matter from the dead algae consumes water-based oxygen in the decomposition process, causing a decline in oxygen availability for aquatic species (see fig. 7.2). When that process become extensive, it can lead to outcomes such as massive fish deaths from eutrophication.

Toxic Towns

How can and should this kind of information on ecological harms be used to demonstrate the importance of green criminology, and how does existing knowledge concerning ecological harms fall under the green criminological purview? While there are a wide variety of examples and forms of data that green criminologists can employ for this purpose, here we draw attention to information about toxic towns to illustrate one of the ways in which toxic emissions affect humans. Little has been written about toxic towns in the green criminological literature, which White (2012, 2008) has argued needs to be addressed. We define “toxic towns” as locations where environmental pollution caused by ecological additions has been so severe as to cause extensive problems—usually health problems—for human populations. Pollution is now so widespread that it is ubiquitous throughout the world (e.g., Arlt et al. 2004), even where there are no polluting industries. In locations where there are polluting industries, their local impacts are sometimes so extensive that they force people to move from their homes and communities, or cause such extreme exposure to pollutants that disease clusters or rare diseases emerge (e.g., see the discussion of Minamata below). If we follow “ordinary” lines of reasoning and legal rules, there is nothing necessarily criminal or illegal about polluting the environment to such an extent that people must move, or be removed, from their homes to avoid harms. There is often also nothing illegal or criminal when a corporation causes the kind of pollution that requires the government to intervene to protect people. Certainly, in some cases, the behavior that causes extensive, localized pollution may be the result of criminal behavior. In many of the cases we will describe, however, the act of polluting the environment where people live is not a crime. On the contrary, in many cases, the government has issued permits to companies to pollute the environment. From the perspective of environmental law, then, polluting activities in these cases are not officially crimes. Of course, legally, the status of pollution has changed over time. Pollution was once largely unregulated, while today there are more but rather insufficient regulations. Taking a green criminology perspective, rather than a legal one, we can say that destroying the environment has always been and continues to be a crime, and destroying ecosystems in ways that impact the species that live in those environments is also a crime. In effect, where the environmental law sees no crime, we can say green criminology sees two forms of crime—and perhaps thousands or hundreds of thousands of individual crimes against humans and nonhuman species that inhabit harmed ecosystems. To illustrate these contentions and to show the ways in which studies in other fields are relevant to the work of green criminologists, this chapter examines toxic towns, focusing on people because there are, to our knowledge, no similar types of studies for animal populations. Toxic towns of various sizes exist all over the world (White 2008), and coping with extensive ecological problems in specific toxic towns is a large undertaking,

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though ecological additions occur in other places, of course, even if the harms caused are not as extreme and widespread. What the focus on toxic towns tends to hide, however, is that toxic ecological additions occur in many places—they simply aren’t so extreme in all places as to cause the kind of widespread harm that we see in toxic towns. Toxic towns are an example of one of the most extreme ways in which humans pollute the world through ecological additions. The difference between a habitable, though unhealthy, town and a toxic town could be the occurrence of one chemical accident, or an increase in some specific pollutant, or simply a pattern of pollution emissions occurring over a long period. Moreover, some places may be so polluted that they are, from a scientific standpoint, the victims of green crimes. This does not mean, however, that the law includes provisions that would allow those areas to be defined as toxic towns. Often, as noted below, toxic towns are identified when residents seek remedies to the health problems they are experiencing from toxic exposure (e.g., they initiate a contested-illness claim), and organize to encourage the government to protect them from further harm.

UNSEEN TOXIC TOWNS Toxic towns created by ecological additions and withdrawals exist, though they may not always be brought to public attention. They can be caused by a wide array of industrial production techniques. As an example, a significant contemporary environmental problem that has yet to be widely addressed in the green criminological literature is the effects of coal mining on local ecosystems and human and nonhuman populations (see fig. 7.3). These include the varied and serious harmful effects of activities such as mountaintop mining (e.g., Long et al. 2012; Stretesky and Lynch 2011), other forms of strip mining, underground coal fires, and coal-fired power plants (Lynch and Barrett 2015). One example of how these problems related to toxic towns emerges in James K. Mitchell’s discussion of ecological problems associated with modern industrial production. In the northeastern Czech Republic, for example, nearly seventy years of destructive coal-mining practices have ravaged the environment. As Mitchell (1996, 1) notes, “Rapacious open pit mining has stripped away top soil, gashed the topography, filled hollows with acid drainage, littered the ravaged countryside with discarded excavation equipment, killed off all but the hardest vegetation, and covered the entire region in a semi-permanent pall of noxious smoke laden with sulfur, heavy metals and radioactive elements.” Perhaps more noteworthy is Mitchell’s observation that, as a result of coal mining in this region, “close to 100 villages and towns have been swallowed up and their inhabitants displaced” (1). This is the kind of massive destruction green crimes can cause, which lead humans to abandon their homes—their toxic towns—for safer locations. Below we provide an example, and also draw

Toxic Towns

Figure 7.3 Surface coal mining, Gillette, Wyoming. Ecological withdrawals such as surface coal mining can cause extensive ecological destruction and pollution. In this image we see an open pit coal mine that is several stories deep. Source: Greg Goebel. Wikimedia Commons.

attention to other toxic towns produced by long-term ecological damage or short-term damage from chemical accidents. Again, while they are not technically illegal, these are the kinds of green crimes that draw the attention of green criminologists who are redefining the concept of crime and identifying which behaviors criminologists ought to study. In the sections that follow, we present several brief case studies to illustrate the impacts of green crimes on human populations and in particular, the effects of pollution, including disease patterns and even the abandonment of towns due to extensive levels of pollution, on human settlements.

CENTRALIA, PENNSYLVANIA—UNDERGROUND COAL FIRES Across the world, thousands of underground coal fi res rage, the majority of which are occurring in the United States, China, and India (Stracher and Taylor, 2004). Generally these result from human intervention and error related to coal mining, which can have serious ecological consequences (Stracher and Taylor 2004). There are generally two types of underground coal fires: near surface fires that obtain oxygen from near-surface open seams (e.g., a mine shaft or opening that has not been secured), and deep groundfires that obtain oxygen from

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Figure 7.4 Warning sign outside Centralia, Pennsylvania. As noted, an underground coal fire has been raging in Centralia, Pennsylvania, since 1962. Th is is an example of a sign you would see as you approach Centralia, warning of the dangers associated with entering this area. Source: Lyndi and Jason. Wikimedia Commons.

coal-mining ventilation systems. Some, such as the one in Burning Mountain, Australia (Mount Wingen), which has been on fire for six thousand years, are caused by natural conditions (e.g., a lightning strike). Some are caused by the spread of forest fires over coal regions where natural formations in the ground allow a coal seam to ignite. But many result from mining practices that lead coal deposits to catch fire (e.g., from sparks created by mining equipment). These coal fires cause extensive ecological damage and are estimated to be a significant source of environmental pollution, including climate change gases and airborne mercury emissions (O’Keefe et al. 2010). Sapient-Horizons (n.d.) estimates there are thousands of these coal fires burning in about two dozen countries. One example of this problem is the underground coal fire that has been burning for decades in Centralia, Pennsylvania (see fig. 7.4). The Centralia underground coal fire began in 1962 and has been linked to burning waste stored in an abandoned strip-mining site that was later used by the town as a municipal waste dump. One explanation for the fire is that, when the trash in the site was burned, an unsecured mine shaft was left open by the mining company, which allowed the fire to ignite near surface coal deposits,

Toxic Towns

resulting in a fire that spread through the rest of the mine shaft system (DeKok 2009). Over time, the uncontrolled fire spread in the underground mine shafts, causing numerous problems, from air pollution to cave ins. By 1984, the fire, which had burned uncontrollably underground for two decades, led the US Congress to appropriate $42 million dollars to relocate the residents. Not everyone wanted to move from their homes, but in 1992, then governor Bob Casey used the state’s eminent domain power to take control of and condemn all remaining properties in Centralia. This was a necessary step to protect the residents of Centralia, since by the 1990s, the Centralia fire had expanded and moved south to the small town of Byrnesville, which was also condemned under the governor’s order. In Byrnesville, all residences were demolished in 1996. Currently, the underground Centralia fire is estimated to cover four hundred acres. In the long run, the federal and state governments’ relocation efforts have led to the long-term reduction of Centralia’s population (Couch 1996), which as of the 2010 census, was ten individuals. (For images of the Centralia fire and area, perform a Google image search for “Centralia underground fire.”) Centralia and Byrnesville are examples of how ecological destruction from coal mining can generate large-scale ecological problems that make sizable areas uninhabitable for humans. In the excavation and abandonment of the Centralia mines, little thought was given to the long-term impact of mining on the local ecology, let alone on the potential impacts on global ecology, or to the conditions in which humans would have to live after the coal mines became unproductive and unprofitable. Generally, toxic town problems result when corporations give little attention to the consequences of their actions for the ecosystem or humans. For corporations, and from a political-economic perspective, profit matters more than nature or humans.

NORTHEASTERN OKLAHOMA—GHOST TOWNS AND THE MINING OF HEAVY METALS The mining of materials other than coal also plays a role in creating toxic towns. One example is the mining of heavy metals in the northeastern region of Oklahoma. At one point, northeastern Oklahoma had the most productive lead and zinc mines in the United States; in the mid-1920s, the region was the world’s leading source for lead and zinc (Everett 2013). For example, more than 45% of the lead and 50% of the zinc used by the United States in World War I came from this region (Everett 2013). Commercial lead and zinc mining, which had begun in the Picher, Oklahoma, area in the 1890s (Everett 2013), left large piles of “chat,” or mining waste, above ground that were contaminated with lead and zinc. Though commercial mining in the area ceased in the 1960s, the problems posed by the chat piles remained. Chat pile toxins have been blown across the

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area for decades, and have impacted the cities of Picher, Cardin, Quapaw, Commerce, and North Miami (Zota et al. 2009; Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality 2013). Th is area is susceptible to tornados, which can cause widespread distribution of the polluted chat pile waste. Lead and zinc from the chat piles have also seeped into ground and surface waters. The affected area covers approximately 25,600 acres. Even after three decades of cleanup efforts, is the remaining chat piles are estimated to contain five hundred million tons of mining waste (Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality 2013). Because of the level of pollution in these locations, the EPA designated the area a superfund site (referred to officially as the Tar Creek Superfund site) in 1983. Of particular concern in this case was the exposure of children to heavy metals and lead (Hu, Shine, and Wright 2007). Evidence indicates that children living near the site have significantly elevated blood lead levels (Neuberger, Hu, Drake, and Jim 2009), which historically (1980s) have been high in the area, with some estimates suggesting that as many as 35% of children living near the site had elevated lead levels. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry now places the estimate of those with elevated blood levels at around 3.5%, when compared to national averages from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. This lower level of exposure may have something to do with the effect of abandoning local towns where lead contamination was the highest, which removed children from more direct contact with environmental lead contamination. Lead poisoning in Native American children is a subject of special concern in this region because of the large Native American population in the area (Petersen et al. 2007). Nevertheless, high-exposure patterns to pollutants are seen across white and Native American children (Malcoe et al. 2002). Other studies have also found elevated levels of lead, zinc, and cadmium in wildlife in this region (Beyer et al. 2004; Franssen 2009). Owing to extensive underground mining, the site has also been subject to significant land collapses or cave ins. Despite efforts to remediate the problems at the Tar Creek Superfund site, and improve environmental conditions there (the state of Oklahoma estimates that two-thirds of the tailing have been remediated), the town of Picher, for example, is now more than just a toxic town, it is also a ghost town.

MINAMATA, JAPAN—CHRONIC MERCURY EXPOSURE Various forms of chemical pollution or ecological additions from industrial factories can generate toxic towns when those pollutants accumulate in the environment. One well-known example is Minamata, Japan. Minamata is a small coastal city on the western coast of Japan, with a population of about twenty-seven thousand. Minamata is home to a well-known ecological pollution problem associated with mercury poisoning, which causes

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a pattern of diseases that has come to be known as Minamata disease (Maruyama 1996). The problem of mercury poisoning in Minamata was officially discovered in 1956 (Harada 1995). But what caused the problem? From 1932 to 1968, the bay front was contaminated by pollutants released from the production of vinyl chloride, and the waste from that process was emitted as effluent into the bay (Kurland, Faro, and Siedler 1960). The effluent discharge accumulated in the bay and in fish and shellfish, which were a regular part of the diet of Minamata residents. While adults showed some minor effects from mercury contamination, the effect of mercury poisoning in children caused alarm. By the mid-1950s, children born in Minamata began to show symptoms of neurological diseases associated with mercury exposure (Harada 1978). But it was more than a decade later before epidemiological studies established that the neurological disorders seen in children were the result of methylmercury poisoning (Harada 1978). The specific pathway was high levels of mercury in the placentas of pregnant women. As Harada (1978) noted, it was believed at the time that the placenta protected the fetus from exposure to pollutants and toxins, and it took additional time to discover and demonstrate that placenta contamination was part of the biological process that threatened children. In addition, the effects of the disease are not particularly evident at birth by normal examination because they emerge over time, usually at around six months of age, at which time patients show severe neurological symptoms and mental disorders (Harada 1978). While steps were taken in the 1970s to restrict entrance of fish into the bay (net barriers, which were removed in 1997, were placed around the bay), and a long-term sludge dredging project (1977–90) was undertaken, long-term impacts of the exposure are still being felt by Minamata residents (Ekino et al. 2007; Yorifuji et al. 2011; City of Minamata 2007). The city made international headlines in 1972, at the UN Conference on the Human Environment. Concerned citizens, attempting to force the Japanese government to address the problems they were experiencing, presented a report to conference officials that contradicted the official Japanese government report that health concerns in Minamata were minimal (Ui 1992). While Minamata is an example of the dangers uncontrolled pollution presents to human populations, this small town also stands out for its efforts to put that past behind it, and to remake its image as an eco-city (for discussion of eco-city theory in criminology, see Lynch 2013; Lynch and Boggess 2015). In 1992, the Minamata City Council passed a resolution on the “Construction of a Model City for the Environment” (City of Minamata 2007). The idea behind the plan was to make Minamata into a world-class eco-city, where an environmental disaster would be unlikely to impact the health of Minamata’s citizens. After debate and revisions, the plan was approved in 1996, and includes, but is not limited to, the following: extensive waste recycling to achieve zero emissions; certification of businesses as “eco-shops,” or eco-friendly establishments;

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international certification (ISO 14001 from the International Organization for Standardization for organizations) of the town for its environmental policies and practices; and ecosystem protection and regeneration programs. This program has prevented Minamata from becoming a toxic ghost town.

LOVE CANAL—A CASE THAT CHANGED ENVIRONMENTAL LAW Perhaps one of the best-known examples of the effects of long-term exposure to toxins in a toxic town is Love Canal, in Niagara Falls, New York. The story of Love Canal begins in the early 1890s, when William T. Love devised a plan to connect the Niagara River to Lake Ontario, using a canal that would detour around Niagara Falls and promote shipping. Several circumstances, mainly bankruptcy, caused Love to give up the project after constructing only one mile of the canal. In the 1940s, Hooker Chemicals reached an agreement with Niagara Power to use the abandoned canal to dump chemical waste. The waste materials were often stored in steel fi fty-five-gallon metal drums. By 1953, it was estimated that Hooker had disposed of 21,000 tons (4.2 million pounds) of chemical waste products in the canal (Blum 2008). After a series of negotiations between Hooker and the City of Niagara School District, and after Hooker notified the potential purchasers of the presence of toxins on the site, the waste-filled canal area was sold to the school district for a dollar. The school district, knowing the potential risks, nevertheless built a school on the site. By the late 1950s, the city of Niagara Falls completed construction of low-income mixed housing around the site. During construction, the city damaged the retaining system that was containing the canal waste, causing the toxic contents from the abandoned canal to leak. By the late 1970s, health problems from exposure to the canal’s toxins began to affect local residents of Love Canal (Levine 1982; Gibbs 1982) and led to investigations of the toxic problems at the site (M. Brown 1980). Shortly thereafter, Lois Gibbs, a local mother, began to organize the community to respond to the presence of the toxins in the neighborhood (L. M. Gibbs 1982). Her initial efforts to get the city to address the problem were ignored. It took Gibbs two years to establish the health hazards at Love Canal. She performed her own community health survey, going door to door to record health complaints of local residents. Her findings contradicted official studies of residents’ health problems, and led to further studies. Gibbs and the Love Canal residents, who had created a local community organization to try and get the government to respond to their concerns, were largely ignored. Protests came to a head when Gibbs and other Love Canal residents held two EPA officials hostage to call attention to their demands. The site also made national headlines in 1980 after the release of several news articles and a book on the subject by Michael H. Brown (1980). In the meantime, President Jimmy Carter allocated funds for

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disaster relief at the site. Follow-up studies showed that residents were beginning to exhibit signs of serious illnesses and their precursors (Blum 2008). Congressional investigations of the Love Canal incident followed, with testimony concerning pollution from the canal provided by Elliot J. Lynch, who was chief chemist at the Niagara Falls water treatment plant. (Elliott J. Lynch was Michael J. Lynch’s uncle.) In August 1977, President Carter announced a disaster relief package for Love Canal. In addition, New York’s governor, Hugh Carey, announced that the state of New York would buy the homes of residents, and a total of 221 families were moved (Beck 1979). As Beck argued, this was not the end of the story (in 1979, Beck could not have known that the controversy would continue and more families would be relocated). What Beck stated was, “We suspect that there are hundreds of such chemical dumpsites across this Nation. Unlike Love Canal, few are situated close to human settlements. But without a doubt, many of these old dumpsites are time bombs with burning fuses—their contents slowly leaching out. And the next victim could be a water supply, or a sensitive wetland.” The lesson of Love Canal was that toxic towns may appear, it seems, almost anywhere, and for local residents to get their claims recognized is an uphill effort, an issue that has become the subject of significant scientific study in the area of “contested illnesses” (Brown, Morello-Frosch, and Zavestoski 2011). Toxic towns and contested illnesses are not confined to urban areas. These problems are also experienced in rural locations, as the next case study illustrates.

LIBBY, MONTANA—LONG-TERM EXPOSURE TO WITHDRAWAL POLLUTANTS Libby, Montana, with only about twenty-six hundred residents, sits in the picturesque Montana landscape, which seems ideal for those wishing to escape the constant exposure to environmental toxins associated with urban life. Hidden behind these appearances, however, is a town with a serious toxic waste problem. For more than six decades, Libby residents have suffered from exposure to asbestos, unearthed there in the excavation of vermiculite by the mine’s owner, W. R. Grace, who acquired the mine in 1963 (Schneider and McCumber 2004). In Libby, hundreds of miners and residents have died from exposure to asbestos, and members of their families and other residents of Libby, who have no connection to vermiculite mining, have been exposed to residual asbestos (Schneider and McCumber 2004). Over time, more and more residents have died of lung damage, asbestosis, lung cancer, and mesothelioma as a result of exposure to tiny fibers of tremolite asbestos (amphibole asbestos). Located five miles northeast of Libby is an open pit vermiculite mine. While the mine was closed in 1990, exposure to the asbestos that coexists in the vermiculite mined has blown through Libby for decades, causing long-term

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environmental damage. Exposure to asbestos residuals, which can be unearthed by simple activities such as gardening, mowing the lawn, digging, and raking the yard, have been shown to affect residents of the area (Ryan et al. 2013). Despite the presence of high disease rates in the area, it was 1999 before Libby’s citizens could convince the federal government to investigate the ecological and health problems they experienced (Schneider and McCumber 2004), an example of a contested-illness process. As of April 2013, however, the full study of these health problems by the EPA had not been completed, despite nearly a decade and a half of EPA involvement (P. Brown 2013). Delays in completing studies and responding to the Libby disaster have occurred for some time, as indicated in reports by the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Control (2002), which showed the asbestosis mortality rate in Libby was 40–80 times higher than would be expected, and that the mortality rates from malignant and nonmalignant respiratory diseases were 20–40 higher, while asbestosis mortality was 165 times greater than would be expected among mine workers. The contamination from vermiculite mining in Libby is not confined to Libby. W. R. Grace, for example, sold the vermiculite from the mine, and it was shipped to locations around the United States. The Center for Asbestos Related Diseases (CARD) published a web map identifying the areas to which the contaminated vermiculite was shipped for processing (libbyasbestos.org/libby /nation.cfm). As CARD notes, the vermiculite was shipped in open railway cars and trucks, and may, therefore, have exposed residents along those routes to the contaminated vermiculite. CARD also indicates that the residents around facilities where the vermiculite was processed for shipping may have been exposed as well, and notes that the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry has established a phase 1 program to address contamination in twenty-eight of the most contaminated areas near facilities where Libby vermiculite was shipped. Like Minamata, Centralia, Byrnesville, Love Canal, Picher, Cardin, Quapaw, Commerce, and north Miami, Libby may appear to the casual observer to be just another exceptional case, which need not be given extensive attention. These cases, however, are only the tip of the iceberg. When we consider, for example, that there are thousands of underground coal fires burning throughout the world, we must come to grips with the extensive forms of green crimes humans are committing that not only change ecosystems but have serious health consequences for humans. Additional evidence of these effects comes from other small toxic towns like Times Beach, Missouri.

TIMES BEACH MISSOURI—DIOXIN EXPOSURE Located seventeen miles from St. Louis is the former city of Times Beach, Missouri. Times Beach is among the toxic towns that have been abandoned owing to the presence of toxic pollution. Times Beach, once home to more than two

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thousand residents, was abandoned in 1983 because of the presence of dioxin, one of the most dangerous industrial toxins. Dioxin takes many forms and is a toxic residual of many industrial processes, especially those that involve high-temperature incineration, paper bleaching, and chemical and pesticide manufacturing. Dioxin has no known use, is considered an industrial pollutant, and is a source of serious health concerns because it is one of the most potent carcinogens known to science (Pesatori et al. 2009), and is a persistent organic pollutant—meaning it deteriorates slowly, and in the case of dioxin, has a half life of seven to eleven years. Because of the risks of dioxin exposure, dioxin has the lowest recommended safe daily intake of any known substance. Green criminologists have not often referred to the serious consequences of dioxin (e.g., Lynch and Stertesky 2001), and scientific research in this area remains an important resource for green criminologists making a case for the seriousness of green crimes. Dioxin exposure in Times Beach began in the early 1970s, when the town hired a waste hauler to spray the town’s numerous dirt roads with oil to minimize the dust (Hernan 2010). The road maintenance contractor also had a contract with a company to haul waste, including that resulting from the production of Agent Orange for the military. That waste was contaminated with dioxin. Instead of properly disposing of the dioxin waste, the contractor used the waste oils from the military facility, which contained abnormally high concentrations of dioxin, to spray the dirt roads in Times Beach. In 1971, the individual responsible for spraying the roads also used the mixture to spray around a horse stable, which several months later resulted in the deaths of sixty-two horses. Contaminated oil sprayed at two other horse stables also caused horses to die. In 1971, the horse deaths came to the attention of the CDC, which opened an investigation (Hernan 2010). After three years of testing sites, the CDC confirmed that the tested sites exhibited evidence of dioxin contamination. The investigation now turned to discovering its cause. The investigation seemed to be stalled until 1979, when an employee of the facility where the dioxin-laced waste oil was produced confessed to EPA officials that his employer was illegally disposing of dioxin waste. The EPA restudied the affected areas. By 1982, the story of Times Beach had made national headlines, and the EPA had discovered levels of dioxin in Times Beach that were a hundred times greater than exposure levels considered safe for humans (Hernan 2010). The EPA sought to clean up the site. However, that effort was resisted by EPA assistant administrator Rita Lavelle, appointed to the EPA by Ronald Reagan, who wanted further studies of the area, and insisted, contrary to scientific studies, that low-level dioxin exposure was not dangerous. Lavelle was later dismissed and convicted of perjury before Congress for submitting false statements and impeding federal investigations, an incident known as “Sewergate.” (Lavelle was later convicted in federal court of one count of wire fraud and two counts of making false statements to the FBI in an unrelated case involving efforts to obtain funds under false pretenses.) After a flood in Times Beach, the EPA established a

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buyout program for Times Beach residents. A $110 million cleanup of the area followed, to remove the estimated 240,000 tons of contaminated soil. After this remediation effort, the town of Times Beach was reopened in 2012 as a national park. In the meantime, Times Beach had become a toxic ghost town, another victim of industrial pollution and the careless handling of toxic pollutants.

INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND THEIR VARIOUS FORMS Some see industrial accidents as the price we pay for “progress”—as necessary for having modern conveniences and for “living the good life.” Another way to put it is industrial accidents are the price we pay for overconsuming and overproducing to enjoy the benefits of capitalism. In our view, however, the cost of this feature of capitalism, with its unequal distribution of goods and services and the environmental harms it produces, is too high. We believe there is no need to accept those outcomes as the necessary cost of progress. Our objection in part relates to the issue of environmental justice, or the unequal distribution of hazardous waste, the subject of a later chapter. To borrow from Jeff rey Reiman and Paul Leighton (2015), we suggest that the “rich get richer while the poor get pollution and industrial accidents.” There are numerous and widespread examples of industrial accidents to which we could point, and in this brief review, we cannot do justice to the topic. Here we restrict ourselves to industrial accidents that involve the release of toxic chemicals. We are unfortunately not able to discuss all of the twenty infamous accidents in the following list: 1972. The Buffalo Creek disaster, West Virginia. A coal slurry impoundment on a mountainside broke after torrential rains and released a tidal wave of 132 million gallons of mining waste sludge, which engulfed the towns in Buffalo Creek, killing 2.5% and injuring 22.5% of residents. The toxic flood left 80% of the population homeless. 1976. The Seveso, Italy, industrial accident. After a complex “runaway” reaction in a chemical plant, six tons of dioxin-contaminated emissions were released over a seven-square-mile area. The accident caused the deaths of 3,300 animals, led to the slaughter of 80,000 animals for health reasons, and injured a quarter of residents near the facility. Evidence of increased risk to Seveso residents of some forms of cancer has been found (for a summary, see Consonni et al. 2008). 1978. The Amoco Cadiz oil spill, Brittany, France, which was the largest oil tanker spill up to that time. More than 1.6 million barrels of oil were spilled, causing a twelve-mile oil slick in the ocean. The oil slick washed on shore, covering a hundred miles of the French coast. Heavy residual oil deposits could be found in the affected area several years later.

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1979. Three Mile Island, Middletown, Pennsylvania. The Three Mile Island nuclear release was billed as the worst nuclear accident in the United States, but it was followed only three months later by the Church Rock incident (see below). While “only” 40,000 gallons of radioactive waste were released at Three Mile Island, the area was well populated, leading to the evacuation of 140,000 residents. 1979. The Ixtoc oil spill, Bay of Camppeche, Gulf of Mexico. At the time, this was the world’s largest oil spill, but it has since been surpassed and now ranks sixth in terms of severity. The spill began when a ship, called the Ixtoc, sank during oil drilling, causing the nearby Sedco oil platform to collapse and burn. The incident began on June 3, and the well was not capped until March 1980—or ten months later. During that ten months, we estimate from various sources that somewhere between 3 and 9.2 million barrels of oil were spilled into the Gulf of Mexico. 1979. The Church Rock, New Mexico, nuclear accident. This is the largest nuclear accident in US history but it is also one of the most overlooked, perhaps because the Church Rock uranium spill largely impacted Native Americans. After the spill, the governor of New Mexico refused to recognize Navajo Indian requests that the site be declared a federal disaster area. The spill released 100 million gallons of liquid and 1,100 tons of solid nuclear waste into the environment. Radiation levels caused by the spill in the Puero River, which was used by Native American communities, were seven thousand times above legal limits. The area is now classified as the United Nuclear Corporation-Church Rock superfund site (for further information, see the EPA Superfund website). 1980. The Lake Peigneur, Louisiana, industrial accident. A Texaco oildrilling operation near the lake tapped into an underground salt deposit connected to Lake Peigneur, turning it into a salt lake. The drilling accident created a whirlpool as water from the lake rushed into the salt cave and sucked in the oil-drilling platform, eleven barges used to transport materials from the drilling, and sixty-five acres of surrounding lakefront area. 1984. The Romeoville, Illinois, oil refinery explosion. This took place at the Union Oil refinery, killing seventeen workers in the resulting fire. 1984. The Bhopal, India, industrial disaster. Cyanide gas leaked from a Union Carbine plant, killing or injuring thousands. This incident is considered the world’s worst industrial accident (see ch. 1). The incident exposed more than 1.5 million people to methyl isocyanate gas and other toxins. Death estimates for the accident range from three thousand immediately after the accident to sixteen thousand over a longer term. The resulting criminal court case took years to conclude. In 2010, however, the criminal court of India found seven former Union Carbide employees,

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including the CEO, guilty of negligent homicide. Though they were found guilty, none of the Union Carbide officials, who reside in the United States, has been extradited to India for punishment (see ch. 1). 1986. The Chernobyl, Ukraine, nuclear accident. This accident left behind a ghost town owing to the level of nuclear radiation released into the surrounding area. The death toll immediately after the incident is reported to have reached sixty-four. There is conflicting scientific evidence on the predicted death total, but some claim that as a result of the long-term and large extent of the exposure to radioactivity (as many as six hundred thousand people were exposed), it may eventually reach thirty to sixty thousand (see ch. 1). 1988. The Norco, Louisiana, gas leak. This caused seven deaths, forty-two injuries, and the evacuation of a nearby city. 1988. The Piper-Alpha platform explosion. This took place on the Occidental Petroleum oil production platform, located in the North Sea, killing 167 workers. It is considered the worst offshore oil accident in terms of lives lost. The platform, designed for oil recovery, was being used to extract natural gas, which contributed to the causes of the explosion. 1989. The Exxon Valdez tanker spill in Alaska. This infamous accident spilled from 10.8 to 32 million gallons of oil and caused permanent damage to the coast of Alaska that is still evident today. 2000. The Martin County, Kentucky, coal ash/slurry spill. This incident released 306 million gallons of coal ash sludge into the environment. The slurry impoundment, located adjacent to the Tug Fork River, also flowed into Wolf and Coldwater Fork Creeks and into the Big Sandy and Ohio Rivers and many nearby tributaries. The spill is estimated to be thirty times larger than the Exxon Valdez oil spill. 2005. The Texaco City, Texas, oil refinery explosion. The explosion killed fifteen workers. 2005. The Hemel Hempstead, UK, oil terminal fire and explosion. Also known as the Buncefield fire, this has been described as the largest nonwar explosion in Europe. It resulted in limited (43) immediate injuries considering the scope of the event, but over the course of the incident, that number expanded to 244 victims who received treatment. The first explosion occurred on December 11, 2005, and the resulting fire was not extinguished until December 13. The polluting smoke from the fire was visible up to seven hundred miles from the source and drifted as far away as Spain. The majority of the oil burned did not contaminate the local environment. The primary environmental problem resulted from fighting the oil fire, as pollutants from fire-fighting foam have been detected in groundwater near the fire site.

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Figure 7.5 Map of existing, proposed, and remediate superfund sites in the United States. The most serious known toxic locations in the United States are classified as superfund sites or national priority list (NPL) sites. Once a potential superfund site is discovered, the EPA performs chemical analyses to determine the extent of pollution on the site and whether the site affects local water, the ecosystem, and human populations. Each site receives a hazard-ranking system (HRS) score. Sites that receive a score of 28.5 and above are placed on the NPL and are eligible for cleanup. Not all NPL sites, however, have been cleaned or remediated. As of October, 2016, there were 1,337 NPL sites in the United States, and 53 newly identified sites have been proposed for addition to the list. The first ones to be included were identified in 1982. Since then, 392 sites have been cleaned and removed from the NPL. Some of these, as described in this chapter, are located in what we have described as toxic towns. Black = deleted/remediated superfund site. Dark gray = current superfund/ NPL site. White = proposed superfund/NPL site. Source: Skew-t. Wikimedia Commons.

2008. The Tennessee Valley Authority Kingston coal ash spill. This released 1.1 billion gallons of contaminated coal sludge into the environment, affecting not only land but the Clinch and Emory Rivers, tributaries of the Tennessee River. It is unlikely that the spill can ever be cleaned up because of its size (see fig. 7.5). 2010. The Middletown, Connecticut, Kleen Energy power plant explosion. This killed five people. 2010. The Gulf of Mexico, BP-Deepwater Horizon oil spill (see also ch. 5). Now considered the largest marine-based oil spill in the history of oil production, the oil spill caused an explosion that killed eleven workers. The spill continued for eighty-seven days before the well was capped, but some suggest it was still leaking oil as late as 2012, or more than two years later.

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More than 130 civil lawsuits, representing claims by more than 100,000 individuals, have been filed in response to the spill, including a suit by BP, the well’s owner, against Transocean, the platform operator, and Haliburton, a contractor on the project. Estimates of the spill were 4.9 million barrels of oil. BP was later held liable for the spill and fined $4.5 billion through civil litigation undertaken by the US Department of Justice. This was the largest environmental fine in US history. In addition, the Department of Justice fined Transocean $ 1.4 billion for its part in the spill. Halliburton, whose CEO from 1995 to 2000 was former vice-president of the United States (2001–09) Richard Cheney, was fined $200,000. 2011. The Fukushima, Japan, nuclear accident. The largest nuclear disaster since the Chernobyl accident in 1986, Fukushima became the twentieth largest industrial, nuclear accident. We could add any number of accidents and toxic towns to this short list, including ones in Gilman, Colorado (toxic town); Cheshire, Ohio (extensive pollution of a poor minority community); Jefferson County, Colorado (contamination from weapons-grade material from the Rocky Flats Plant, a former nuclear weapons production facility); Handford, Washington (contamination from a plutonium manufacturing plant); Mossville, Louisiana (see discussion of Cancer Alley in ch. 5); Pensacola, Florida (site of a dioxin-contaminated area located near a low-income, minority community); Anniston, Alabama (PCB pollution); Butte, Montana, area (pollution contamination of a 40-million gallon lake); Dzerzhinsk, Russia (identified by the Guinness Book of World Records as the world’s most chemically polluted city, where the average life expectancy is only 42 years); Bechyovinka, Russia (a city built around a former Soviet nuclear submarine facility); Wittenmoon, Australia (a now-abandoned asbestos-mining town); Charavigi and Kleitos, Greece (abandoned [toxic] towns near Agios Dimitros, one of Europe’s largest, electrical, coal-fired power plants); Kolontar, Hungary (in 2010 a ruptured waste pit retaining wall sent 185 million gallons of toxic sludge into the town). To this list, we add the names of some of the world’s most-polluted cities: Linfen, China, with 3 million residents; Sukinda, India, with 2.6 million residents; La Oroya, Peru, which experienced extreme levels of lead pollution; Kasorgod, India, with 1.3 million residents; central Kalimantan, Indonesia, estimated to have the world’s highest level of mercury pollution, with 2.4 million residents; Vapi, India, a location that National Geographic Magazine named one of the ten most polluted places in the world; Tianying, China, a much smaller city than many on this list, but with about 27,000 residents, it still makes the list of the worst-polluted cities in the world; and Norlisk, Russia, which is not only the coldest city in the world, but was named one of the world’s most-polluted cities by Worsepolluted.org. In addition to these quite serious industrial accidents, which harm ecosystems, people, and wildlife, thousands of routine chemical accidents that

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contribute to ecological and human harm have been reported. According to the EPA’s Emergency Response Notification System, there were 30,375 “lesser” chemical accidents in the United States in 2012 alone. The environmental impacts of those accidents are not tracked, but the human harms are. Those 30,375 incidents led to the evacuation of 27,915 people, 1,899 injuries, and 1,270 immediate deaths (deaths resulting from long-term exposure to chemicals released in such accidents are not estimated). In the past decade, the Emergency Response Notification System has reported nearly 320,000 chemical accidents in the United States, which caused the deaths of more than 10,000 people. Recall from our introduction to this section that some people claim these accidents and their costs are merely the price we pay for progress. The price of that progress, however, is extensive, involving not only human lives but the lives of the ecosystems impacted by these disasters. For example, areas such as the Alaskan coast line, impacted by the Exxon Valdez oil spill; the Gulf of Mexico, affected by the Deepwater Horizon incident; and the locales near Martin County and Kingston, which owing to coal ash spills will never return to their natural state. That is a serious cost for progress. At some point, the larger ecosystem will not be able to sustain the level of damage caused by capitalist societies, and it will become toxic, with detrimental effects on human health. This is already being seen in, for example, rising rates of cancer, which in 90% of cases is associated with environmental factors.

CONCLUSION Perhaps most people don’t know that the conditions and outcomes described above are the price of progress under capitalism, and if they did, they might give up some progress to avoid debilitating and deadly diseases. Perhaps because they are unaware of these costs, people seem happy to consume their way into declining states of ecological health. To be sure, people have been strongly influenced by the normal development of capitalism, which measures progress by the volume of consumption and the profit it produces. When calculating their profits, polluting corporations rarely consider how the advance of capitalism produces death and injury for humans, nonhumans, and ecosystems. One reason is the costs of such incidents are externalized, with governments (and taxpayers) often paying a major portion of the bill for responding to these events. Some suggest we can no longer afford to let capitalism determine our environmental future, however (Kovel 2007). As green criminologists, we consider making this case to be an important objective of our work, one we share with ToP theorists, environmental sociologists, and Marxist ecologists. We shall return to this in the conclusion, when we look back at the forms of green harms we have described throughout this book.

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S T U DY G U I D E Activities and Questions for Students 1. What is the difference between a serious, direct harm and a long-term indirect harm? 2. Routine, or everyday, toxic exposures and ecological harms tend to be overlooked and rarely attract social attention. Provide an example of a routine ecological harm and describe its long-term consequences. 3. What is eutrophication, how is this process affected and accelerated by humans, and what are its costs to the ecosystem? 4. What is a toxic town? Provide two examples and describe the problems seen in those locations. 5. Are toxic towns like the ones described in this chapter simply the price of progress? Or should they be viewed as green crimes and considered to be the result of unacceptable behaviors that cause significant ecological and human health effects? Discuss. Lessons for Researchers 1. Many examples of ecological harm can be used as evidence of the problems posed by green crimes. It is important that green criminologists use empirical as well as qualitative examples of those harms to describe in detail the deleterious effects of green crimes and the forms they take.

2. Toxic towns should be explored not only as examples of a specific type of green crime but also in relation to issues of green (in)justice. Currently, we know of no studies that address, for example, whether toxic towns contribute to environmental injustice. Gathering empirical evidence on this point remains to be done. 3. Not all toxic towns have problems as extreme as the ones discussed in this chapter, and there may be many more examples of toxic towns throughout the world, some of which have yet to be recognized. Further research can be undertaken to identify these towns and their problems and determine what information can be used to classify the “level of concern” needed to differentiate toxic towns from each other. 4. The struggles of residents in toxic towns to obtain some form of justice intersect with those associated with contested illnesses. In many toxic towns, contested illnesses are important examples of how people in local communities organize to seek justice for their being exposed to toxic waste. Green criminological studies of these processes can contribute to the contested-illness literature and expand the concept of and the struggle for green justice.

CH A P T ER

Wildlife Trafficking, Smuggling, and Poaching

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n contrast to the topics covered in prior chapters, the smuggling and poaching of wildlife, and other crimes and harms that affect animals (Sollund 2016), have received some attention from green criminologists. But they have not produced a wide-ranging body of research on animal crimes, nor have they studied in depth the harms to the nonhuman animals themselves. As Sue Cote Escobar (2105) has noted, along with many green criminologists, criminology does not tend to consider the harms done to animals as crimes. Green criminological discussions of crimes that impact animals have been significantly influenced by Piers Beirne’s seminal research on nonhuman animal harms, which included the fi rst green criminological analysis of animal abuse and other crimes (Beirne 1995, 1997, 1999). Beirne and Nigel South produced a special issue of Theoretical Criminology, for which Beirne was the editor, that was extremely important in the history of green criminology and created widespread exposure to these ideas. To be sure, harms against nonhuman animals are an important part of the green literature, which deals with a number of complex issues related to the human-animal nexus and interactions, including wildlife smuggling and poaching.

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In this chapter, we review literature on the causes of wildlife smuggling and poaching and on the effectiveness of law enforcement on poaching. Next we examine policies proposed for the control of wildlife smuggling and poaching. Finally, we explore these issues from a political-economic perspective, focusing on the ecological disorganization caused by the global, capitalist treadmill of production (ToP).

BACKGROUND Addressing the general issue of animal abuse and criminology, Piers Beirne (2011, 353) noted, “Although the study of animal abuse lies squarely within criminology’s moral and intellectual compass, as a discipline it has been notoriously slow to examine the human-induced plight of our fellow creatures.” Beirne also observed that criminologists rarely consider animal abuse to be a serious harm, viewing it rather as “a minor infraction to be investigated only as an afterthought and as a luxury” (353). In line with what we observed in previous chapters, we agree with Beirne that this is not a realistic approach to animal abuse. Globally, countless nonhuman animals, including pets and wildlife, are routinely harmed by humans. It is perhaps the routine nature of those harms that causes some criminologists to overlook this subject. But ignoring that nonhuman animals are the victims of crime is also a product of the history of criminology, which has traditionally focused on human victims. As Beirne (2009, 1995) has noted elsewhere, wildlife smuggling and poaching are forms of animal abuse with clear moral implications. But wildlife smuggling and poaching are not simply immoral. Animals play important roles in ecosystem maintenance, and ecosystems have collapsed when animals were harmed and eliminated. Animal poaching can lessen the efficiency, and upset the balance, of the ecosystem, diminishing it so that it no longer functions as it should. In our view, wildlife smuggling and poaching should be considered in this broad ecological context, in which the direct harm to animals, or their victimization, also victimizes the ecosystem. Th is means that crimes against wildlife such as poaching are multilevel crimes that produce multiple victims in the complex web of an ecosystem. As we review some specific studies on wildlife poaching and smuggling, we ask that the reader keep in mind that poaching is not simply a crime against one animal but also harms the entire species and the ecosystem. Moreover, animal poaching also affects other species and the global ecosystem, since transformations of smaller ecosystems can impact the health of the global ecosystem (Cardinale et al. 2012, 2011; Hooper et al. 2012).

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WILDLIFE SMUGGLING AND POACHING AS VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW When criminologists examine wildlife smuggling and poaching, they usually, though not always, do so with respect to criminal law. As noted above, Beirne (1997, 1994) laid the groundwork for placing harms against nonhuman animals within the purview of criminology, and while some of his works examine the history of animal abuse, and relevant legislation, he also proposes taking a broader philosophical view of the criminological investigation of harms against nonhuman animals. As noted in earlier chapters, green criminologists often look beyond the criminal law to justify the exploration of green crimes, but this is not necessary for the study of wildlife smuggling and poaching. Both are easily connected to existing criminal laws, and other forms of law, that defi ne the harms against nonhuman animals that occur with their poaching and illegal trafficking. While writing this book, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) announced that “the world is dealing with an unprecedented spike in illegal wildlife trade.” While that may be true, the poaching of certain species has a long history. Indeed, extensive evidence of wildlife smuggling and poaching led nations to enter into an agreement called the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which was adopted in 1973. The number of countries that are CITES members has grown to 170. The agreement was the result of a ten-year process begun at the 1963 meeting of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature. Today, the CITES agreement covers approximately twenty-eight thousand plant and five thousand animal species that are threatened by illegal wildlife trade. While CITES has led to the expansion of conservation efforts, the problem of illegal wildlife trade continues to be a significant environmental problem. One issue concerns the effectiveness of traditional law enforcement mechanisms to control illegal wildlife trade and poaching. In other words, we can ask whether making wildlife trade illegal, and creating law enforcement agencies to uphold these laws, is an effective mechanism for controlling trade in illegal wildlife. Data on this issue indicate both successes and failures. For example, in Daniel Stiles’s (2005) review of Esmond Martin and Tom Milliken’s book No Oasis: The Egyptian Ivory Trade in 2005, he presented data on changes in the ivory trade in Egypt. Though there are no elephant herds in Egypt, it has been an important ivory trade market. But Egypt had no laws pertaining to ivory trade before 1999. To examine the effect of those new laws on the ivory trade, Stiles (2005) presented data on the extent of the Egyptian ivory trade before and after 1999 for three large Egyptian cities. Stiles found that the law caused a decline in the number of ivory salespersons (from 100 to somewhere between 25 and 50) and

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a decline in retail outlets selling ivory (from 199 to 142). The decline in supply, as would be expected, led to an increase in the price for ivory items. For larger items, the price increased from $98–137 to $259–311. Overall, then, we can see some small impact of the new Egyptian law on ivory sales, but we cannot ascertain the true extent of the law’s effect, and the processes that may have led to the decline in the sale of ivory in Egypt, or whether those effects reduced elephant poaching. Speaking to the effectiveness of traditional legal interventions, Jachmann (2008) examined the effort of the government of Ghana to control wildlife poaching in ten locations. The research showed that the government’s response reduced poaching in the seven savannah sites (grassland ecosystems) to “acceptable levels,” but had no effect in the three forested sites. From his data, Jachmann concluded that the enforcement efforts in the forest sites would need to be increased by a factor of ten to have an effect, illustrating some of the limitations of an enforcement-oriented approach to protecting wildlife. Other studies reviewed below also address the effectiveness of wildlife laws.

EXPLAINING AND PREVENTING WILDLIFE SMUGGLING AND POACHING As with other studies of crime, those examining the effectiveness of laws to prevent wildlife smuggling and poaching include the use of quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. In this section, we review several of those studies. Quantitative Studies A useful methodological approach for examining the effectiveness of laws designed to curtail wildlife smuggling and poaching is to use empirical models. There are several ways such analyses can be performed, but the biggest hurdle is accessing appropriate data. Like other forms of crime data, data on poaching and smuggling are likely to underestimate the real extent of the problems. Empirical studies have relied on CITES data on wildlife poaching (for a discussion of some advantages and limitations of CITES data, see Bruckner’s 2001 study on live coral; for a study comparing CITES and US customs data, see Blundell and Mascia 2005). In their 2009 work on elephant poaching, Lemieux and Clarke asked whether the disruption of markets caused by wildlife treaties and enhanced enforcement activities could be a useful strategy for minimizing the impact of poaching on wildlife. They examined CITES data on elephant poaching in thirty-seven African nations, which represent all contemporary ranges for elephants on the African continent. Prior studies suggested that the poaching of elephants during the 1970s had led to a 50% decline in their population by the end of the 1980s (for some recent estimates, see Maisels et al. 2013). During that time, the price of

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raw ivory increased from $2.50 to $90 per pound, which perhaps served as a motivator for elephant poaching. Research notes on elephants posted by the San Diego Zoo indicate that the average weight of an African elephant’s tusk during the 1970s was twenty-six pounds. By 1990, it had declined to around 14 pounds, which was perhaps an effect of poaching larger, older elephants with bigger tusks. At $2.50 per pound, an average-sized elephant tusk was worth about $65 in 1970. Though the size of the average elephant tusk had declined significantly by 1990, the increase in its price to $90 per pound meant that it was worth about $1,260, a large sum to the poor inhabitants in rural Africa, and a potential poaching incentive to many, including those who might organize poor, local residents to carry out these tasks (for discussion of the poor and poaching, see Lynch, Stretesky and Long, forthcoming). In response to rising rates of elephant poaching, by the end of the 1980s, CITES pressed for increased enforcement of poaching regulations in African nations (see figs. 8.1 and 8.2). Th is was accomplished by altering how CITES listed elephants on their protected species list. In 1989, CITES made it illegal to trade elephant ivory in the international marketplace. Lemieux and Clarke (2009) reported that the day before CITES banned the international sale of ivory, the price for ivory was $100 per pound; the day after, the price had dropped to only $5 per pound. In our view, that drop in price could result in one of two things: either poaching would decrease owing to the poor market, or poaching would increase as poachers tried to acquire larger quantities of ivory to make up for the price drop and satisfy the accompanying increase in demand that could result from a dramatic drop in price. Thus, the more openended question is whether CITES’s relisting of elephants might cause a decline or rise in illegal poaching, a question Lemieux and Clarke’s research addresses. As Lemieux and Clarke (2009) note, because the CITES treaty does not regulate the sale of ivory within a nation, only its international sale, it gives African nations leeway in deciding whether or not to apply the CITES recommendation for elephant ivory within their borders. This was a problem with respect to the ivory market because illegally obtained ivory could still be sold in unregulated markets, so long as the sale was not international. Lemieux and Clarke (2009, 455) explain this issue as follows: Regulated markets reward countries for their continued protection of an endangered species by funding conservation efforts and giving countries a reason to enforce the international embargo. They can therefore be expected to have a positive effect on the elephant population of Africa. Unregulated markets have the opposite effect because they increase poaching incentives as well as the ability to trade ivory on a domestic and international level. The inability of CITES to control domestic markets must therefore be considered when examining the effectiveness of the 1989 ban.

Thus, Lemieux and Clarke argue that the best way to determine the impact of the 1989 ban on ivory sales is to use an empirical method to compare preban

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Figure 8.1 Confiscated elephant tusks. The international sale of elephant ivory has been banned by CITES since 1989. Since CITES is an international regulation, it does not prevent sales of elephant ivory within a nation, only its international trade. However, despite this ban, the African elephant continues to be poached for ivory. This image shows a stockpile of ivory confiscated by the US Fish and Wildlife Service. Source: US Fish and Wildlife Service.

and postban sales. The researchers looked at preban and postban elephant and ivory markets across thirty-seven African nations. The preban elephant count data showed that not all African nations had experienced a decline in elephant populations before 1989. Of the thirty-seven nations, twenty showed declines in elephant populations. The postban data showed different results for different nations, but overall they indicated an increase in the elephant population across all African nations. The loss of elephants was highest in unregulated ivory states of central Africa. Four nations

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Figure 8.2 Confiscated walrus tusks. Similar to elephants, walruses are also hunted for their ivory tusks. This image depicts walrus tusks confiscated from an investigation into the illegal trafficking of walrus ivory. Source: US Fish and Wildlife Service.

with well-regulated ivory markets showed the greatest increase in elephant populations. Despite the positive effects of the ban for some nations, the overall population of elephants in Africa remained approximately the same postban across nations (for a related study, see Heltberg 2001). Clarke and Rolf (2013) have examined the effect of poaching on the decline in parrot species. One reason they focused on parrot poaching is that parrots are among the most threatened species worldwide (336). Habitat loss is believed to be an important factor in parrot loss owing to the limited range of many parrot species. While habitat loss is widely recognized as one of the most important processes impacting species loss, few studies have examined the impact of poaching relative to that of habitat loss as an explanation for species loss. As Clarke and Rolf note, the concentration on habitat loss rather than poaching makes sense from a broader ecological perspective because habitat loss can have an impact on a wide range of species, while the effect of poaching is often a species-specific behavior. But Clarke and Rolf suggest that protecting species by protecting habitat may concentrate species in certain locations and make poaching easier when those habitats are lightly policed. As Pires and Clarke (2012) found in a related study, parrot species tend to be poached opportunistically by local peasants rather than by organized criminals, as suggested in other

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studies. Thus, with respect to parrots, species loss in the wild may be driven more by poaching than by habitat loss. Moreover, as that research indicated, police seem disinclined to take action against peasants for poaching parrots. To determine if poaching or habitat loss had a greater impact on parrots, Clarke and Rolf (2013) compared the effect of both on two different samples: threatened parrot species and a matched sample of nonthreatened birds. Since it was not possible to match all threatened parrot species with a nonthreatened parrot species, other bird species whose habitats and behavioral patterns were similar to parrots were included among the controls. As the authors acknowledge, this form of matching may have impacted the results of the study, which confirmed their hypothesis that poaching has an important impact on parrot populations when controlling for habitat loss. These results indicated the importance of law enforcement efforts to control poaching. While significant, these results cannot be generalized to other species, and the effect of poaching versus habitat loss for other species of animals remains an open question. In a related study, Pires and Clarke (2012) examined parrot poaching in Mexico. They found that species of parrots that are more widely available tend to be poached more than other species of parrots, indicating that opportunity plays a role. In addition, they found that it was easier to locate and remove chicks from poached parrot species’ nests than from the nests of other species of parrots. This finding also supported a theory of opportunity. Pires and Clarke concluded that the poaching of parrots in Mexico is largely opportunistic, and is a behavior that is somewhat widespread among the poor rural population, which has an annual average income of less than $400 per month (127). As Pires and Clarke note (127), opportunistic poaching may be much more widespread in Mexico than organized or even legal trapping of parrots, and there are perhaps twenty-five times as many opportunistic parrot poachers as legal parrot trappers in Mexico (for a related study, see Pires and Clarke 2011 on parrot poaching in Bolivia; for an extended review of the literature on parrot poaching, see Pires 2012). Other empirical studies of poaching have tended to focus on explanations for poaching on an individual level. These studies have sometimes combined qualitative and qualitative approaches, using data collected through interviews. These studies have examined, for example, the rationales that poachers offer for their offenses (Eliason 2003, 2004, 2005, 2012b; Eliason and Dodder 1999; G. Green 2002), and have applied traditional criminological theories such as techniques of neutralization (Eliason and Dodder 1999). Such studies take a very traditional approach to green crimes against wildlife, viewing wildlife crime as an individual-level problem perpetrated by individual offenders. We will review these theories below. Here it is useful to note that the works reviewed above illustrate that wildlife crimes like poaching are better explained in relationship to the structure or context surrounding those crimes. Part of that structure includes the effects of significant, modern ecological problems

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Figure 8.3 Siberian tiger. According to the World Wildlife Fund, illegal wildlife trade and habitat loss represent major threats to the survival of the Amur (or Siberian) tiger. Recent estimates suggest that the total global population of Amur tigers is 540. Source: Photograph by John Hollingsworth and Karen Hollingsworth. US Fish and Wildlife Service.

such as habitat loss, climate change, and pollution on species, which we explored in chapter 3. (A global chart assessing efforts to control elephant, rhino, and tiger poaching can be found on the World Wildlife Fund website by searching “WWF Wildlife Crime Scorecard.”) Qualitative Studies In contrast to the individual-level and empirical research approaches used by other researchers, green criminologists have tended to prefer applying qualitative methods to poaching (Wyatt 2009, 2011; Ngoc and Wyatt 2013). Ngoc and Wyatt, for example, begin their study by asserting that illegal wildlife trading is a pervasive international crime that contributes to biodiversity loss and the extinction of species. These authors provide details about the extent of illegal wildlife trade in Vietnam and the context in which it occurs. Poaching, as noted above, threatens specific species with extinction. One of those species is tigers, even though tigers make up a small number of poached species (Moyle 2009; fig. 8.3). As Moyle notes in his study of the black market for tiger parts in China, much of the demand is driven by the large economic gains to be had and the need for tiger parts for some forms of traditional Chinese medicine. Moyle also observes that one reason black markets in wildlife contribute to extinction is that such crimes have small penalties and are often

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overlooked by law enforcement. Despite the long-term efforts, dating back to 1975, of CITES to protect tigers, tiger poaching remains a serious concern. Some forms of poaching have multiple or unique causes. For example, turtles are poached by the local populations in places like the Baja, California Sur of Mexico, where they are a desirable food source. Mancini et al. (2011) suggest this remains a major threat to the recovery of sea turtle populations. To isolate the economic and social factors that lead to sea turtle poaching, Mancini et al. conducted several interviews with known sea turtle poachers. Poachers suggested that their primary motivations for poaching were economic, and their violations were facilitated by a lack of preventative law enforcement efforts. The researchers also noted that consuming sea turtles was often a family tradition. From these results, Mancini et al. suggested urging law enforcement to focus on the prevention and punishment of poachers, educating people on the importance of sea turtles for the health of sea ecosystems, and building an ecotourism industry around the sea turtle to encourage protection of the species. An important takeaway for green criminological studies of wildlife crime is, as Sollund (2011) notes, that such abuse is organized entirely around human needs, in particular human consumption. While Sollund describes these as needs, we prefer to characterize the human consumption of animals as a desire and to see that desire as one that is reinforced by and originates from the organizational principles of market economies. Nevertheless, Sollund’s point is noteworthy, and any effort to understand the illegal trade in wildlife must refer to its economic linkages. Sollund points out that these include the need to address issues of objectification, or treating living things as commodities.

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF POACHING As Pires and Clarke (2012) have shown, few criminological studies have addressed poaching, including rationales for and theories of poaching. Pires and Clarke propose that animal poaching is like other forms of theft, and thus is influenced by opportunity; poaching’s risks and difficulties, or the rational choice dimensions; and the availability of animals that are profitable targets. This idea expands on research by Ronald V. Clarke (1983, 1999), who has long studied the rationality of criminal offenders and the use of situational crime prevention strategies to deter them. Pires and Clarke (2012) drew on prior examinations and explanations of criminal thefts, recognizing that thieves target certain items. Those items, Clarke (1999) suggests, are concealable, removable, available, valuable, enjoyable, and disposable, which together form the abbreviation CRAVED. Pires and Clarke, along with a number of other researchers, examined how the CRAVED model applies to poaching, and have often proposed that opportunity plays an important role in these offenses (Clarke and Rolf 2013; Petrossian 2015; Petrossian and Clarke 2014; Pires 2015;

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Pires and Clarke 2011; Tella and Hiraldo 2014). Pires and Clarke (2012, 124) put forward the CRAVED model as potentially useful for explaining “forms of wildlife crime that to date have been little studied by criminologists including: illegal logging, overfishing, elephant and rhino poaching in Africa, theft of protected cacti in North America, tiger and leopard poaching in Asia, and poaching of sturgeon in the Caspian Sea.” Petrossian, Martheache, and Viollaz (2014) note that criminological discussions and analyses of activities, such as poaching and other illegal forms of taking wildlife (e.g., what is called “illegal, unreported, unregulated” fishing), have supported theories that posit these kinds of illegal activities can be explained by rational choice and situational crime prevention theories. They point out that pathways for distributing illegal, unreported, and unregulated fish catches involve “risky facilities,” which in this case would be shipping ports. Those ports have different levels of risk for off-loading illegal catches, and offenders prefer ports with the least risk of apprehension. Petrossian, Martheache, and Viollaz (2014, 339) refer to ports posing the least risk as “ports of convenience,” and as places with “minimal or no standards or protocols established to ensure that only legally caught fish are landed or transshipped.” (See also Petrossian, Weis, and Pires 2015 on crab and lobster fishing; for a real time map tracking illegal fishing from ships see the website of Global Fishing Watch). For their part, Moreto and Lemieux (2015a) argue that CRAVED models may not explain all types of wildlife crimes because the variables CRAVE models examine differ across time or in relationship to the type of illegal wildlife products under examination. Building on CRAVED models, Moreto and Lemieux posit what they call a CAPTURED model, that is, or an explanation that suggests trafficked wildlife products are concealable, available, processable, transferrable, useable, removable, enjoyable, and desirable. Thus they add dimensions to the CRAVED model to create the CAPTURED model. According to Moreto and Lemieux, CRAVED explanations have drawn attention to how the characteristics of criminal actors engaged in wildlife crime, the settings in which those crimes take place, and the transportation of illegal wildlife influence the illegal wildlife trade. Moreto and Lemieux suggest that it is also necessary to examine how the characteristics of “the [wildlife] products themselves” influence illegal wildlife trade (304). For example, some trafficked wildlife products have cultural and symbolic significance and durability, meaning they have a long history of being sought after in certain locations. Because of their importance, wildlife offenses related to those products may be difficult to deter in some parts of the world because they are highly desired and yield high profits. In addition, certain products also have cultural and symbolic significance, making their worth difficult to assess in the strictly monetary terms traditionally used in rational choice explanations of crime and its deterrence. The CAPTURED model attempts to include variables that measure those noneconomic values.

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In his examination of poaching, Eliason (1999) notes there are various types of poaching and poachers. For example, there is organized poaching, poaching by individuals hunting for game trophies, and poaching by those who engage in “thrill killing.” He notes that studies of deer hunting indicate that the illegal hunting and poaching of deer are opportunistic, a theme that is consistent with the CRAVED and CAPTURED models examined above. Eliason observes that prior studies (Kahler and Gore 2012) also indicate that poachers engage in poaching for different reasons, including subsistence (“cooking pot”) and profit, and may be motivated by more than one factor depending on the context. In their study of poaching in Namibia, using semi-structured interviews, Kahler and Gore found that local residents identified nine motivations for poaching. The four most prevalent were economic, food, wildlife control/ removal of threatening species, and obtaining nonmeat animal products. A less frequent, but still important, rationale was voiced by some respondents who said they engaged in poaching to protest restrictions imposed by wildlife laws. Other research has suggested that studies of poachers may be used to create poacher typologies, or related groups of poachers. Some (Brymer 1991) have found evidence for dividing poachers into commercial and noncommercial types. Others (Forsyth, Grambling, and Woodell 1998) have shown that noncommercial (individual) poachers may be further divided into subtypologies of poaching. Still others (Hampshire et al. 2004; Muth and Bowe 1998; Von Essen et al. 2014) have suggested there is a need to consider other typologies of poaching in diverse national and cultural contexts, to identify the range of factors that motivate poaching. The existence of widely varying poaching typologies makes it difficult to precisely identify factors that influence poaching behavior. Additionally, studies of poachers’ motivations suggest there may be limitations in CRAVED and CAPTURED models that do not account for poachers’ motivations. Eliason (1999) has also used more traditional criminological theories to explain poaching behavior. He has argued, for example, that poaching may be explained in relation to Sutherland’s theory of differential association, in which poachers learn motivations and justifications for poaching from their peer associations. He has suggested that poachers use techniques of neutralization to “rationalize their activities and use neutralization techniques in order to reduce cognitive dissonance associated with norm violations” (Eliason1999, 31; see also Eliason 2003; Eliason and Dodder 1999). From the above, it should be clear that there is no single agreed-on explanation for poaching. This observation is not meant as a criticism of those studies. Rather, as is the case for theories of crime more generally, there have been a variety of proposed explanations for these behaviors, and no single theory has been proved to provide the best explanation for crime. Additional studies are needed to identify the most important factors motivating poaching and to

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begin narrowing down these explanations to those that appear to be most fruitful. That is, if those studies that suggest poaching must be viewed in terms of national and cultural context are accurate, creating a single theoretical explanation becomes more difficult because of the greater number of potentially influential factors. As we suggest later in this chapter, there may be factors that cut across national and cultural boundaries; one intriguing possibility is that looking at the influence of the capitalist ToP on poaching from a world market perspective may uncover more similarities between countries. Before turning to that explanation, we examine some of the proposed methods for controlling the poaching and smuggling of wildlife.

SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF WILDLIFE POACHING AND SMUGGLING In this section, we review a few of the different strategies offered as solutions for wildlife smuggling and poaching. It is not our purpose to provide a solution here, but rather to review alternative solutions and stimulate research and thinking about their feasibility. These alternatives include traditional law and order approaches, expanded to include enforcement of wildlife laws; wildlife farming; education; and alternative eco-economies (see below for explanation). These are the four most often explored ideas for controlling wildlife smuggling and poaching. It should be noted, however, that there are other potential sources for creating policies to control poaching that we cannot review and apply here (e.g., the use of multilevel governance to control environmental harms, and perhaps extensions of what are called REDD+ policies, which are used to control deforestation). Traditional Law and Order Approaches The methods criminologists use when researching ways to control crimes like wildlife smuggling and poaching are influenced by their training. For example, they often offer solutions linked to deterrence theory. Generally, these include creating more laws that apply to poaching, increasing the number of law enforcement officers assigned to enforcement, and strengthening the penalties for poaching and smuggling. In other words, when confronted with the question of how to control wildlife crime, criminologists tend to suggest the same traditional responses that they have applied to other kinds of crime. These traditional solutions depend on the assumption that increasing the chances that offenders will be caught, prosecuting crimes aggressively, and imposing greater penalties are deterrents. Some suggest wildlife crimes like smuggling and poaching should be treated as crimes within the criminal justice process and addressed in the same way.

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Figure 8.4 Chemist in the US Fish and Wildlife Service Forensics Laboratory, Ashland, Oregon. Forensic laboratory work has become an important tool in solving wildlife crimes. Th is photo shows Laura Daugherty, forensic laboratory technician, processing evidence at the US Fish and Wildlife Services National Forensics Laboratory in Ashland, OR. Source: Brett Billings. US Fish and Wildlife Service.

To be sure, traditional criminal justice solutions have strongly influenced both national and international laws against smuggling and poaching, and in many ways, are a preferred method of control. Many agencies have developed specialized police units devoted to investigating wildlife crimes using modern, forensic science investigative techniques (fig. 8.4). Indeed, applying forensic science to investigate wildlife crimes has been one of the major advances over the past decade, and a large literature now exists on this topic. Examples include studies that use geological forensics to solve wildlife crime (Morgan et al. 2006); DNA examinations to identify rare, difficult to identify, or decomposed wildlife (Dawnay et al. 2007; Alacs et al. 2010; Ogden, Dawnay, and McEwing 2009); entomological evidence, that is, the appearance and development of bug larva, (Byrd and Castner 2009); hydrogen and oxygen isotopes to locate the origins of trafficked wildlife (Bowen, Wassenaar, and Hobson 2005); and genetic markers to identify the region from which poached or smuggled wildlife originated (Ogden 2011; for a case study applying forensic scientific methods, see Gupta et al. 2011). These are all important scientific advances in legal efforts to control wildlife crime. But there are limitations to this traditional criminological approach for reducing wildlife crimes. It is expensive and requires significant investment in law enforcement personnel and equipment. Some of the nations where these

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crimes occur also do not have the resources to expand their wildlife enforcement practices sufficiently for them to be an effective deterrent to smuggling and poaching, nor do they have the resources for top-notch wildlife forensic laboratories. Thus, cost remains a hurdle to establishing a consistent and effective, worldwide wildlife enforcement apparatus. Even the United States, where economic resources are more readily available, has only one wildlife crime laboratory—the US Fish and Wildlife Services National Forensics Laboratory in Ashland, Oregon, which currently identifies itself as the only laboratory in the world dedicated to crimes against wildlife. Another limitation of traditional enforcement relates to the effectiveness of deterrence. The assumption behind deterrence is that a rational actor can be deterred from crime by making the cost of committing a crime greater than its rewards. Reviewing the evidence on that issue with respect to street crimes, Paternoster (2010), who has engaged in related research for more than thirty years, identified several limitations of deterrence. First, he noted that empirical evidence suggests legal sanctions generally have only a small deterrent effect, and it is difficult to precisely quantify the strength of that deterrent effect, or to make a case that implementing deterrents can be justified by the reduction in crime. Second, the literature does not support deterrence theory’s assumption that criminal actors are rational actors, which may be one of the reasons that deterrence has minimal effects on reducing crime. Third, Paternoster suggests that the results from prior studies indicate that extralegal factors play a more significant role in and have a larger impact on reducing crime than legal factors (for a discussion of deterrence and environmental crimes, see Lynch et al. 2016). In sum, we can say that, while there has been a tendency to suggest that expanding the scope of wildlife laws and wildlife enforcement will lead to a reduction in wildlife crime, the evidence is mixed. To be sure, traditional criminology and states and governments have relied on this argument for quite some time, which has led to tremendous growth in the criminal justice apparatus, but there is little evidence that the tremendous growth in processes such as imprisonment results in reduced crime (Lynch 2007). Because there is reason to believe that similar efforts to increase the size of law enforcement will not reduce wildlife smuggling and poaching, other solutions must be sought. Wildlife Farming as a Solution to Poaching Another way of examining this issue is by using economic theories concerning the expected behavior of individuals and markets. Traditional economic models argue that behaviors can be replaced or eliminated through “substitution,” or the idea that a replacement commodity will reduce demand for another commodity. When applied to the idea of wildlife conservation, the idea is that if we can provide a substitute for poached or smuggled wildlife, then the demand for them will disappear. Th is sounds like a reasonable approach. The

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issue is how to find a legitimate substitute for poached and smuggled wildlife. Some have suggested that substitutes can be obtained from what some might find equally disturbing: corporate wildlife farms. Th is approach to conservation already exists in a number of countries. In China, for example, wildlife farms that raise tigers and bears for traditional Chinese medicine exist, and there is talk of bringing back seahorse farming as well. Conditions on these farms, however, are deplorable for animals, which are caged in small spaces and subjected to regular, painful methods for extracting materials from them for the marketplace. As an illustration of this controversial idea, Bulte and Damania (2005) used economic models to assess the impact of rhinoceros farming on rhinoceros poaching. It should be emphasized that these are theoretical models used only to ascertain whether creating rhinoceros farms could protect wild rhinoceros from poaching. This research does not test the effectiveness of an actual form of rhinoceros farming. Rather, this model depends on economic assumptions about different variables included in the models. One reason for using economic models to control rhinoceros poaching is the value of rhino horn, which can cost more than gold or cocaine (fig. 8.5). Rhinos live in only eight countries, and today’s population is only about 5% of the number that roamed those eight countries in 1900. It has been estimated that rhino poaching has increased by 9000% since 2007. It should also be noted there is a plan to lift a ban on domestic trade in rhinoceros horns, and commercial farming of rhinoceros is under consideration in South Africa. As Bulte and Damania (2005) note, the effect of rhinoceros farming on the rhinoceros market would be two-fold. First, there would be a substitution effect, with farmed rhinoceros replacing wild rhinoceros, thus decreasing demand for the latter. Second, farming rhinoceros would cause the price of rhino horns to decline, which should theoretically lead to a decline in demand for wild rhinoceros. These outcomes would, in theory, reduce poaching of wild rhinos. Bulte and Damania (2005) modeled several different scenarios for determining the effect of rhinoceros farming, including a number of technical details concerning market forms and functions (e.g., ones related to perfect and imperfect completion). Outcomes of those models suggest that, in certain scenarios, rhinoceros farming could either protect rhinos or increase the poaching of rhinoceros. The authors note, however, that scenarios leading to increased poaching can be managed and can lead to a reduction in poaching, if the regulations covering rhino farming address specific issues that would otherwise adversely impact rhino poaching. We raise this controversial option for three reasons. First, green criminologists are not likely to applaud substituting wildlife raised on farms for animals in the wild, because doing so also poses harms to farmed animals. There is, however, little current discussion of wildlife farming in the green criminologi-

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Figure 8.5 Confiscated rhinoceros horns. These rhino horns were confiscated by the US Fish and Wildlife Service. As the USFWS notes, “Rising global demand for rhino horn—both for alleged medicinal value and ornamental use—has led to an epidemic of poaching in Africa, as well as theft and illegal trade in rhino horns from museums and private collections. Illegal trafficking in rhino horn threatens to reverse decades of rhino conservation work in Africa and Asia, driving rhinos to the brink of extinction in the wild. Scientists have found no evidence to support its alleged medicinal power—it is made of the same stuff as fingernails—and many practitioners have stopped using it. But urban legends about its powers as an aphrodisiac or cure for cancer keep it in demand. Rhino horn’s beauty also is prized by many cultures.” Source: Photograph by Nan Rollinson. US Fish and Wildlife Service.

cal literature, and the general position green criminologists would take on this practice can be derived from reading Piers Beirne’s various discussions about harms to nonhuman animals. A second consideration is whether the cost of this substitution is sufficient to justify its use as a wildlife protection measure. While farming animals for consumption may reduce poaching and protect wild species, there is a tradeoff because farmed animals could be harmed. Exploring this issue in detail is beyond the scope of this book. We raise it merely as one that green criminologists might wish to explore. Third, despite the controversy that may exist over this alternative, it is clear that nations of the world have encouraged, and may continue to encourage, farming of rare species to sell in order to protect wild species. Again, this means there is a need to recognize that this practice has already been

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attempted, and green criminologists may wish to weigh in on this approach to protecting wildlife. One South African farmer, John Hume, has an alternative rhino farm technique in mind, which he instituted a few years ago by collecting and breeding rhinos. As of December 2016, Hume’s farm contained more than 1,300 rhinos, which have produced 160 offspring. He employs a veterinary team to care for the rhinos and ensure their humane treatment. Hume uses humane rhino horn removal techniques, and, as reported in 2015 by the Washington Post, he has stored horns that were humanely removed from rhinos, which at the current market price have an estimated value of $235 million dollars. Hume is waiting for the South African government to be convinced that his rhino farming method is feasible and noninjurious to the rhinos, and to change the laws related to the sale of rhino horns. Under the CITES treaty, rhino horn cannot be traded legally across nations. The treaty, however, does not apply to domestic sales. In May 2016, Hume won a case against the South African government’s domestic rhino horn ban, but that ruling has been referred for further legal analysis by a judicial committee, meaning the ban remains in place until the committee completes its analysis. Education and the Control of Wildlife Smuggling and Poaching Many studies suggest that education can play a role in the preservation of wild species and in limiting smuggling and poaching. The simple idea here is that, if target populations of poachers are exposed to educational messages about the importance of preserving wildlife, they will be less inclined to poach or smuggle wildlife. Th is solution was proposed, for example, in an important policy document produced by the United Nation’s Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005b). While educational policy responses are popular suggestions for controlling wildlife crimes, as Ferraro and Pattanayak (2006) point out in their muchcited study, the effectiveness of these programs has not been adequately assessed using rigorous scientific methods. Absent such assessments, education, like deterrence, to reduce wildlife smuggling and poaching might produce weak results. Does ecological education work to reduce smuggling and poaching? Frankly, we simply don’t know at this point. There is a failure to learn from past experiences and adapt educational conservation programs to make them more efficient. Take as an example the South African government’s ban on fishing in the Tsitsikamma National Park. While the public was “educated” about the new policy, widespread fishing and poaching in the park remained a problem after the ban. The locals understood the new no fishing policy, but they believed, as local peoples, they should have a right to fish in the park because it has always been a source of subsistence fishing for them. Hence, they largely ignored the ban (Fassen and Watts 2007). In this case,

Wildlife Trafficking, Smuggling, and Poaching

education was ineffective because it came up against the subsistence needs of local, indigenous people. In areas where there is extensive poverty and no alternative economy, for example, wildlife poaching and smuggling may be one of the only available means for survival. In countries with such deprived economic conditions, education alone cannot solve the problem of wildlife smuggling and poaching. Access to ecological resources is an important issue for the poor, especially those in underdeveloped nations, and it is important that proposals designed to change how the poor interact with the environment address this. Following is one example of taking the survival needs of the poor into account. Alternative Eco-economies A better approach to the preservation of wildlife than increasing law enforcement, implementing wildlife animal farms, or providing education is to develop alternative eco-economies that provide local peoples who are involved in wildlife poaching and smuggling with economically feasible alternatives. These programs can be divided into three types: those that develop alternative economies based on ecotourism; those that connect wildlife preservation to poverty reduction programs; and those that use payment for environmental services programs. Ecotourism is the idea that a location’s ecological richness can attract tourists and provide jobs for local people in the tourism and conservation industries. An example is the India Eco-Development Project, established in 1998 at the Periyar Wildlife Sanctuary in Thekkday. The preserve was established primarily as a means of protecting tigers, a species that suffers serious consequences from poaching and smuggling. One of the project’s main initiatives is to involve local people in the management and protection of the preserve, its tigers, and other wildlife and wild-plant populations (Thampi 2005). The population living in or around the park is about 0.25 million. The success of the program depends on finding many of those people alternatives to using the park to provide raw materials for their survival needs, which can cause extensive ecological damage. As of 2005, about 40,000 people were employed in park-related services. Testifying to the success of the program, when jobs were announced, 23 self-admitted smugglers and poachers of rare sandalwood came forward and became part of a new park service—providing bamboo river raft rides to park visitors (Thampi 2005). The park offers a variety of services that create employment for local residents. The tiger trail guided tour provides a unique experience for visitors to see natural tiger habitat, and perhaps glimpse a tiger in the wild. Tours are restricted to five persons at a time, who are accompanied by five guides and an armed park ranger. To protect the natural habitat, the number of weekly tours are limited, and there is great demand for them (Thampi 2005). Other

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programs on-site include the Jungle Inn, educational programs in different eco-contexts, the tribal heritage program, the wild adventures tour, visitor and cultural centers, an interpretive center, and boat tours, all staffed by local peoples. By giving local residents a stake in preserving the ecosystem and providing them with alternatives to smuggling and poaching, these programs have reduced ecological destruction (Thampi 2005). Assets from the program are deposited into community development funds that benefit local communities. Other studies also indicate that designing species protection programs so that they reduce local poverty contributes to their success (Andam et al. 2010). Such programs combine ecological conservation with social justice, an important consideration that has been overlooked in the green criminological literature dealing with ecological preservation. When government or NGO policies focus exclusively on protection of wildlife, and ignore the impacts of policies on human populations, people living in those areas are likely to feel they are of secondary concern to people in other parts of the world. This, of course, can create alienation among local populations, which is not a good way to start a conservation project or to ensure its success. Thus, conservation projects that address the needs of local populations are apparently more likely to succeed because they do not place the welfare of native peoples behind those of animal populations. Payments for Environmental/Ecosystem Services Our final example is payments for environmental or ecosystem services (PES). PES approaches have not been widely employed as mechanisms for reducing poaching and smuggling. PES programs are primarily designed to help minimize the loss of native habitat and to encourage habitat preservation. Typically seen as market-based mechanisms for the conservation and management of land, PES programs offer monetary incentives to landowners to engage in ecologically beneficial land management programs (for reviews of these programs, see Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008; Pagiola, Arcenas, and Platias 2005; Pagiola et al. 2007). The United Nations identifies twenty-four such services in its Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report (2005a). These range from food production services to management programs that improve the quality of air, land, and water, and address biodiversity maintenance and climate change (for an extended discussion of PES theory and practices, see Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008; Wunder 2007). As an extension of free market principles, PES programs are a popular mechanism for attempting to improve ecological conditions in the global capitalist marketplace. Much of the work on PES, however, is theoretical, and few studies have actually assessed the effectiveness of PES programs (Pattanayak, Wunder, and Ferraro 2010; Arrigada et al. 2012). Moreover, existing empirical studies have failed to support the effectiveness of PES programs (Arriagada

Wildlife Trafficking, Smuggling, and Poaching

et al. 2008). To address that concern, Arrigada et al. (2012) analyzed the effect of a PES in Costa Rica, an area well-known for its implementation of PES programs. They discovered that over an eight-year period, forest cover on farms participating in PES programs was 11–17% higher than on nonparticipating farms. There are several limitations to this study, however, which lead us to question these results. First and foremost, across farms in both the experimental group (those registered in a PES program) and the control group (unregistered farms), total forest cover declined. Thus, while PES farms had more forest than non-PES farms, both types of farms showed a decline in forest cover—it just occurred more slowly on PES farms than on non-PES farms. That result suggests that this application of PES was actually ineffective in protecting forests from destruction. In that these PES programs were designed to reverse deforestation, one would have to conclude that a particular program failed to the extent that it simply reduced the rate of deforestation but did not generate increased forest cover. Second, the results are limited by the exclusion of PES for which contracts were not renewed because they failed to meet PES program requirements. This, too, is a measure of the failure of the PES programs, and excluding nonrenewed farms skews the findings and results in more positive evaluations of the PES program than are justified. While these results indicate that forest cover loss slowed on PES farms, these farm still lost forested areas, indicating that these programs are unable to reverse the normal trend in deforestation. One could say that the best way to control wildlife smuggling and poaching is still an open question. But from the above it appears that alternative ecoeconomy approaches would be a worthwhile option.

SMUGGLING, POACHING, AND THE CAPITALIST TREADMILL OF PRODUCTION Green criminologists have done much to show wildlife smuggling and poaching deserve attention from criminologists, who indeed have been developing a rich literature on this issue. Green criminologists, however, have paid less attention to explaining the causes of poaching and smuggling, and as Ronald Clarke and his colleague (reviewed earlier) have suggested, more traditional criminological approaches such as the CRAVED or CAPTURE models might be useful in this endeavor. In contrast, it is also possible that a different kind of explanation is needed to understand the causes of poaching and smuggling. Here we explore a green explanation for wildlife poaching and smuggling consistent with the overall theme of this book, which is to place it in the context of a political-economic theory that explores the effects of the global capitalist ToP. Doing so reveals that the effects of smuggling and poaching on the ecosystem as a whole are rather small compared with the large effects of the capitalist

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ToP on animal welfare. Our discussion also points out some of the class contradictions of concentrating on the effects of smuggling and poaching on biodiversity. To begin, we return to a point made earlier: the modern world is dominated by capitalism. Globalization has spread the capitalist ToP across nations, uniting them in the pursuit of global capitalism and its overemphasis on profit, overproduction of commodities, and overconsumption of both commodities and raw materials. The contemporary capitalist ToP, or the continuously expanding form of production associated with contemporary capitalism, began to emerge after World War II. What differentiates the capitalist ToP from earlier forms of capitalist production are that its reliance on fossil fuel and chemical energy continually increases, and that it has extensive negative ecological impacts. The ToP generates two major forms of ecological disorganization, or ecological destruction, that impair the global ecosystem’s sustainability and ability to reproduce: ecological disorganization associated with ecological withdrawals and ecological additions. Ecological withdrawals impede ecosystem reproduction through the mass extraction of the resources the ecosystem requires for its stability. Ecological additions pollute the environment and impair ecological quality, which impede ecological reproduction. Impaired ecosystems are less efficient in reproducing themselves. These ecologically destructive consequences of capitalism have been unleashed worldwide, producing the conditions that facilitate declining species biodiversity and extinction. As Stretesky, Long, and Lynch (2013b) argue, the global capitalist ToP generates five negative consequences that impede species biodiversity and contribute to extinction: (1) long-term and widespread conversion of natural areas into human habitat; (2) damage to ecosystem sustainability, which is associated with the ecological withdrawal processes; (3) disposition of toxic waste in ways that promote ecological damage, sustainability, and health; (4) ever-more toxic waste spills; and (5) commodification of wildlife and other natural species. Evidence of these effects are reviewed briefly below. A number of studies illustrate the extensive loss in biodiversity that stems from the expansion of the ToP. For example, Brook, Sodhi, and Ng (2003) demonstrated this effect for Singapore, noting that economic development in Singapore has led to a 95% decline in vegetation and a 28% extinction rate for animal species. Extinction rates for some species, such as amphibians, were estimated to be as high as 71%. Brook, Sodhi, and Ng (2003, 423) note that this pattern of extinction was because of “rapid and large-scale habitat destruction, initially through deforestation for agriculture, and later, urban development. Habitat loss, fragmentation and modification cause extinctions by reducing breeding and feeding sites, increasing predation, soil erosion and nutrient loss, limiting dispersal, and enhancing edge effects.” In general, Southeast Asia is under significant development pressure, and estimates suggest that by 2100, these development pressures will lead to a 42% loss in biodiversity in the region

Wildlife Trafficking, Smuggling, and Poaching

(Sodhi et al. 2004). Thus, unlike behaviors such as poaching by the poor, the actions of the ToP have a far-reaching and much more significant impact on biodiversity (for additional discussion, see Lynch Stretesky, and Long, forthcoming). The above studies show the dramatic effect of deforestation on biodiversity loss and extinction. We believe deforestation is driven primarily by the capitalist ToP as it seeks out new areas to exploit, where raw materials are abundant. The ToP’s exploitation of primary, tropical, subtropical, and rainforest areas has a devastating impact on biodiversity, including threatening animals with extinction, an effect that is much greater than wildlife poaching or smuggling could ever produce. For example, studies of tiger population stability indicate that the primary concerns are deforestation and fragmentation of forests into small ecosystems that threaten the stability of tiger populations by, for example, reducing reproduction rates (Smith, Ahern, and McDougal 1998; Linkie et al. 2003; Karanth and Stith 1999). Indeed, the effect of the ToP on deforestation has been so significant that scientists believe the biodiversity loss initiated by this process may be irreversible (Brook et al. 2006). Forests that are essential for the protection of a vast majority of species have already been sufficiently disturbed so as to promote further biodiversity loss (Brook et al. 2006). Under these conditions even dramatic changes in conservation efforts would be too late to protect a large segment of species from extinction (Brook et al. 2006). Another important force in biodiversity loss and extinction is climate change, which is also accelerated by the continual expansion of the capitalist ToP (Jorgenson 2009, 2008, 2003). In an influential article, Thomas et al. (2004) used various estimation techniques to explore the impact of climate change on rates of biodiversity loss and extinction. Their research indicated that by 2050 15–37% of the species in their study will be on an irreversible path to extinction (for other estimates, see Thuiller et al. 2004; Araújo et al. 2005; Pearson et al. 2006). As noted in chapter 6, scientists are now so concerned about the trends in extinction that they have identified this period as the sixth wave of extinction and labeled it the Anthropocene to indicate that humans are the cause (Zalasiewicz et al. 2010; Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill 2007; Steffen at al. 2011; Lomolino et al. 2001; Barnosky et al. 2011; Stork 2010; for a criminological discussion of the Anthropocene, see Lynch, Long, and Stretesky 2015). As others note, it is important to keep in mind that biodiversity loss has no single driver (Brook, Sodhi, and Bradshaw 2008), and wildlife smuggling and poaching cannot be the only causes of extinction. In contrast, the multiple negative impacts of the capitalist ToP could be. For example, while poaching could drive a particular species to extinction in a given location, a driver with a worldwide scope is needed to explain the global trend toward extinctions across species and across geographic space (e.g., see Huey et al. 2009, on the link between climate change and the mass extinction of lizards). Thus the potential for the ToP to cause mass extinction should draw greater attention.

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Poaching and Organized Hunting as Drivers of Extinction As noted earlier, studies of wildlife smuggling and poaching indicate that these behaviors are prevalent among the poor and that wildlife smuggling and poaching are much less significant concerns for wildlife than are the negative ecological impacts generated by the capitalist ToP. For the vast majority of species, the threat of extinction was not produced by smuggling and poaching but rather by the loss of habitat. One could produce an extensive list of animal, plant, aquatic, and insect species threatened with extinction that are not hunted or collected, or poached or smuggled, but are still threatened by habitat loss (see examples in Lynch, Long, and Stretesky 2015). Habitat loss, in turn, is a consequence of the expansion of the capitalist ToP within developed nations and into nations where raw materials are currently more concentrated. Supporting this contention, even CITES (2012, 5), which concentrates on controlling wildlife poaching and smuggling, notes that habitat loss, environmental degradation, and forest fragmentation remain the chief concerns for the protection of species. In the past twenty-five years, for example, the Asian elephant has lost 69% of its habitat to human development. While green criminologists have explored wildlife smuggling and poaching, and focused on the poor’s role in these processes, they have ignored organized wildlife hunts, which occur throughout Africa and elsewhere. Many involve the hunting of endangered and threatened species and are arranged by hunting organizations that charge a significant fee for hunting endangered animals. In addition to tracking poaching and smuggling, CITES regulates permit systems that allow international trade in animals. Thus, at the same time that CITES discourages poaching, it legitimizes the hunting and “trafficking” of species, even endangered species, through licensed hunting of those species within nations. For example, in the United States, CITES authorized permits for the importation of endangered species (e.g., see US Wildlife and Fish Service’s endangered species permit webpage). Thus, as long as the hunting of endangered/threatened species is done with a permit, anyone who can afford the associated fees can legally hunt threatened animals without being treated as a poacher. This is a clear case of class bias in the application of law. What separates hunters from poachers, then, is a fee system that excludes the poor, who cannot afford the fee, unlike the well to do in developed nations. The poor in underdeveloped areas, therefore, are denied access to wildlife that may contribute to their survival, while the economically advantaged are allowed to frivolously hunt endangered wildlife as trophies. CITES, in effect, limits the impact of the poor but not the rich on wildlife. To illustrate this point, we searched the Internet for websites offering hunting expeditions to Africa (as of February 2017). A number of fi rms offer such trips, but not all listed their prices online. One firm that lists its prices for hunt-

Wildlife Trafficking, Smuggling, and Poaching Table 8.1 African wildlife hunting prices, September 2016 Hunts

Fees (US$)

Daily guide

450/day

Trophies Elephant*

37,602

Lion*

26,449

Lioness

14,983

Lion, buffalo, elephant package

77,675

Buffalo

14,600

Leopard

15,000

Hippo

8,667

source: African Sky (www.africanskyhunting.co.za). *Examples of companies that offer hunting packages specifically to hunt elephants, lions, or both in Africa include Nyakasanga Hunting Safaris; Sentinell Impopo Safaris; Classic Safaris with Vaughn Fulton; Hunting in Africa Safaris; Africa Hunt Lodge; Chifuti Hunting Safaris; Hartz View Hunting Safaris; Hunting in Africa; Outdoors Hunt International; Pringle’s Legendary Safaris; J. J. Van Rensburg; Charlton McCallum Safaris; Discount African Hunts; Phirima Safaris; Pawprint Safaris; Mabula Pro Safaris.

ing trips to African is African Sky (www.africanskyhunting.co.za), which offers permitted and licensed trophy-hunting, including the hunting of elephants, experiences in South Africa. Table 8.1 provides prices for hunting various species through African Sky. On their website, African Sky encourages taking additional animals during the hunt: “We always encourage taking additional animals, whether opportune like encountering a jackal, baboon or small species of antelope whilst on the hunt or if there’s an animal that you’ve been dreaming of that is not already included in the package. After all—you’ve traveled all the way to Africa. Make every second of it count!” From other web sources, we estimated that the total price for killing an elephant would be $166,000: ten-day African elephant trip ($37,602); full mount ($95,000); trip expenses, with possible scenario being New York to Johannesburg, South Africa, first class, of course ($9,886); and dry ice for shipping the elephant to the United States to be mounted ($24,000). If you have that kind of money to spend, then you are welcome to contribute to the decline of the African elephant. Various Internet sources note that, in recent years, well-known individuals have taken elephant-hunting trips, including Eric Trump and Donald Trump Jr.; GoDaddy CEO, Bob Parsons and King Juan Carlos of Spain; and Walter Palmer, the dentist who became famous for illegally killing Cecil the Lion (Loki 2015).

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The State and the Killing of Endangered Species While researchers have focused their sights on poachers, pointing to the negative effect poaching has on endangered species, some nations engage in practices that directly compromise the existence of threatened species. These statepromoted killings draw attention to the need for green criminological studies of state-sponsored green crimes related to wildlife killing. For example, some nations practice elephant herd culling—the purposeful killing of elephants to reduce their populations—even though many elephants are endangered species. States justify culling on the grounds that elephant populations have been expanding beyond reserves’ capacity to provide habitable domains. In addition, states that engage in such activities note that elephants threaten economic development. South Africa, for instance, culls herds of elephants despite the fact that the African elephant is given the highest protection under CITES, and trade in these animals is protected in order to increase their population. CITES, of course, manages international trade, focusing on the negative impacts of poaching, and does not regulate whether nations control animals through practices such as culling. But here again we see the contradictions between the focus of the law on poaching/poachers, who may consist of local poor and indigenous peoples; the selling of permits to hunt elephants; and the state-sponsored practice of culling herds that include endangered species. From a political-economic perspective, the important point is that each of these exceptions to protecting elephants is centered around controlling the access of the poor to elephants. States may cull to reduce elephant populations, and the wealthy may buy permits to hunt endangered species. But CITES restricts the poor from pursuing their traditional practices of subsistence hunting. As is usually the case with wildlife management regulations, the poor are left to struggle with subsistence issues on their own (Eliason 2013), while the rich can pay to kill even protected animals.

CONCLUSION Wildlife smuggling and poaching are serious offenses that clearly harm animals. But they have broader implications related to the damage these behaviors produce for ecosystems. As animals are poached and smuggled, the very nature of their ecosystems is transformed, to the extent that they may become weakened and unstable. Mainstream criminologists who are not green criminologists rarely study crimes such as poaching and smuggling, which are apparently considered small crimes. What the mainstream criminologist fails to appreciate, however, is that the negative treatment of wild species has important implications

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187

for human societies. That human societies widely engage in harming animals is a sign that these societies fail to appreciate the intimate connection between ecosystem health and human health. The more we disregard the health and safety of wildlife, the more we also neglect how the treatment of the ecosystem and its inhabitants feeds back on and damages human societies. The health and stability of human societies is intimately connected to the health and well-being of the ecosystem and its species. Therefore, every offense against the ecosystem and its species is also an offense against the stability of human society. It is important to link poaching and smuggling of wildlife to their politicaleconomic context, a point we have hopefully illustrated here, fi rst because poaching and smuggling are driven by the political economy, and second, because avoiding political-economic explanations fails to address the real causes of the global ecological crises. Poaching and smuggling are ecological problems and crimes, as well as indicators of such broad societal problems as the exclusion of the poor in underdeveloped countries from meaningful work that would reduce poaching and smuggling among those populations. Moreover, while it is important to study poaching and smuggling, it is also important to keep in mind that the main negative effects on animal populations—habitat loss, climate change, loss of coexisting species, deforestation—are the consequences of the way in which the global capitalist ToP operates. While poaching and smuggling have consequences for species in a state of decline, it is the capitalist ToP that produced that state of decline in the fi rst place, and we must keep this observation in mind when studying ecological crimes.

S T U DY G U I D E Activities and Questions for Students 1. What is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)? 2. Th is chapter highlights both strengths and limitations of CITES. Describe how these relate to wildlife poaching and trafficking. 3. This chapter identifies several studies that examine parrot poaching. List three observations researchers have made in these studies. 4. The authors reviewed four strategies for addressing wildlife smuggling and poaching. Identify and briefly describe each approach. 5. How is animal extinction related to the ToP?

Lessons for Researchers 1. Empirically evaluating the efficacy of crime prevention and intervention programs is an important way in which criminologists contribute to the discipline and its community. In recent years, criminologists have begun to explore the effectiveness of various strategies designed to address wildlife trafficking (e.g., Lemieux and Clarke 2009). Criminology would benefit from more research on the impact of programs and policies designed to confront wildlife trafficking, including the approaches identified in this chapter. 2. Discussions of wildlife trafficking and poaching in green criminology have been focused largely on the

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poor and working classes. However, their motivations for poaching and trafficking likely differ from those of wealthy persons (e.g., sustenance vs. acquisition of “trophies”). Because the conclusions reached by these studies inform theory and policy, it is important for green criminologists to understand the etiology of wildlife crime across classes. 3. Related to the previous point, it is important for green criminologists to examine the larger structural factors that contribute to wildlife trafficking and poaching. Stretesky, Long, and Lynch (2014) identified five different ways the ToP impacts

wildlife crime. Empirical assessments of the political-economic drivers of wildlife crime represent an important direction for green criminologists. 4. While poaching and smuggling are serious problems that affect wildlife species already in a state of decline from other anthropogenic factors such as deforestation and climate change, which limit appropriate wildlife habitats, in some locations states also engage in killing wildlife, including endangered species. Green criminologists should direct more attention to this form of statesponsored green crime.

CH A P T ER

Environmental Justice and Green Criminology

9

T

he previous chapters illustrated the variety of harms associated with ecological additions, withdrawals, and disorganization. Harms associated with ecological additions include exposure to toxic pollutants, which can cause serious health complications, including neurological dysfunction or even death. Harms associated with ecological withdrawals include depletion of natural resources, or raw materials, and dangerous extraction practices like fracking that are associated with, for example, earthquakes. Ecological disorganization is a sign of the disruption of entire ecosystems, and harms such as global warming illustrate the large-scale consequences of increasing ecological additions and withdrawals beyond global sustainability. While it is true that these matters represent a global concern and have serious consequences for everyone, it is not true that everyone is impacted equally by ecological additions, withdrawals, and disorganization. For example, US studies have found that pollution is disproportionately high in communities with higher percentages of racial and ethnic minority residents (Bullard 1990; Bullard, Mohai, Saha, and Wright 2008). Studies have also shown that communities with high rates of poverty are more likely to house pollution and environmental hazards compared with more economically advantaged areas (Evans and

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Kantrowitz 2002; Lynch and Stretesky 2012; Stretesky and Hogan1998). This is not inconsequential for residents of those neighborhoods and communities. Research has found that disproportionately high levels of toxins have resulted in increases in health complications, sickness, and diseases in residents (Brender, Maantay, and Chakraborty 2011; Brulle and Pellow 2006; Grineski, Collins, Chakraborty, and McDonald 2013). Across the globe communities where dangerous raw material extraction practices take place face serious social and ecological threats (Brugge and Goble 2002). The broad term for research that examines the inequalities relating to environmental harms is environmental justice. However, in practice, environmental justice refers more specifically to an ideal condition. For instance, the EPA defines environmental justice as, “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies” (US Environmental Protection Agency 2016e). As Pellow (2000) suggests, environmental justice is what many communities impacted by toxic emissions, including those struggling with racism and inequality, are fighting to achieve (Pellow 2000, 582). Researchers have also employed more expansive definitions of environmental justice to include gender (e.g., Wonders and Danner 2015) and ethnicity (e.g., Morello-Frosch and Jesdale 2006). In addition, the term environmental justice has often been used interchangeably with environmental racism, environmental injustice, environmental equity and inequity, and environmental equality and inequality in discussions of the disparities in the impact of environmental harms (Lynch, Burns, and Stretesky 2014). Lynch, Burns, and Stretesky found that a Web of Science citation index search for all of these terms yielded nearly two thousand studies. While it is true that the number of studies of environmental justice has grown rapidly in a number of disciplines, it has remained largely on the periphery of criminology (Zilney, McGurrin, and Zahran 2006). Still, a few green criminologists have produced works that examine environmental justice issues from a criminological perspective. These studies include, but are not limited to, assessments of not only the relationship between race, class, and exposure to environmental toxins but also of the relationship between race and class and the severity of the punishments imposed for violating environmental laws (Long et al. 2012; Lynch, Stretesky, and Burns 2004a, 2004b); the experiences of those who are victims of environmental crimes (Hall, Lambert, and Balogh 2014; Jarrell and Ozymy 2012); and the geographic locations of environmental crimes (Brisman 2008; Lynch and Stretesky 2011). In this chapter, we will explore the concept of environmental justice in detail. Because criminologists study the disparate impact of crime control policies and enforcement mechanisms, environmental justice represents an important area for criminologists. We will discuss the origins of environmental

Environmental Justice

justice research, and provide several examples of empirical studies on the topic. We also will connect political economy to environmental justice, and describe the relationship between political-economic theory and the distribution of environmental harms. Finally, we will discuss the significance of environmental justice research for green criminology, and review environmental justice studies that have been carried out by green criminologists.

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE Environmental justice studies were born of the environmental justice movement, which represented a coming together of environmental and social justice concerns (D. Taylor 2000). While these two areas are deeply intertwined, for many years social justice and environmentalism were regarded largely as separate issues. The earliest organizations that expressed concern over environmental issues were concerned predominately with environmental preservation and conservation. In the United States, several environmental organizations emerged during the Progressive movement (c. 1890–1920), including the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, and the National Parks and Conservation Association (Edwards 1998; Lynch, Burns, and Stretesky 2014). Often these organizations were concerned with protecting parks and preserving nature, including the protection of wildlife, for recreation. Members of these organizations were often upper-class, white persons, who viewed nature as recreational space (Taylor 2000). Prominent politicians affiliated with this approach to the environment include US president Theodore Roosevelt, who was an avid environmental enthusiast and a proponent of protecting natural habitats. Several artists, authors, and poets expressed their interests in environmental conservation through their work. For example, Thoreau famously wrote about the beauty of the natural environment in Walden Pond (also called Life in the Woods). These early organizations and their members, politicians, and artists largely made up what environmental justice expert Dorceta Taylor (2000) calls the “the romantic environmental paradigm.” Succinctly, this paradigm applies to organizations and individuals who value nature, demonstrate compassion for other species and future generations, support government regulation to protect the environment, acknowledge limits to growth, encourage a simple lifestyle, and call for public input in environmental decision making (D. Taylor 2000). A major paradigm shift in environmental thinking occurred with the publication of Rachel Carson’s 1962 renowned bestselling book Silent Spring, in which Carson highlighted the serious environmental consequences associated with the widespread production and use of synthetic chemicals. Carson’s work revolutionized how the public thought about and responded to the environment, by illustrating how environmental degradation impacted humans as well

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as nonhuman animals and ecosystems. Carson’s work was especially critical of the chemical agent DDT, which at the time was a widely used pesticide. In Silent Spring, Carson offered an important insight: humans are an integral part of nature, and humans should learn to live peaceably within it. Th is contradicted an emerging notion that humans should use chemicals and technology to control or dominate nature. On this point, Carson writes, “How could intelligent beings seek to control a few unwanted species by a method that contaminated the entire environment and brought the threat of disease and death even to their own kind? Yet this is precisely what we have done” (8). Carson’s message resonated, and is largely credited with propelling activists to gather for the fi rst Earth Day on April 22, 1970, when an estimated 20 million Americans demonstrated across the country. The anatomy and impact of this movement on environmental protection will be discussed in more detail in chapter 11. The momentum from Silent Spring and Earth Day, and pressure from activists, compelled politicians to publicly respond to environmental issues. Through the 1970s, several major pieces of federal environmental legislation were introduced, revised, and expanded, including the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. Substantial revisions were also made to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act in 1972. The Toxic Substances Control Act, as well as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, were both introduced in 1976. In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency was established in 1970, and was charged with the task of enforcing environmental laws and policies. In addition to promoting policy responses, activists encouraged pollution prevention and cleanups, and in many ways highlighted capitalism’s inherent incompatibility with nature (Taylor 2000). A series of large-scale, man-made environmental catastrophes also occurred during the 1960s and 70s, and drew more attention to environmentalism (see also chapter 1). For example, in 1969 a region of the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio, caught fi re when sparks from a passing train ignited oil-covered debris floating in the river (Ohio History Central 2016). It was reported that the fire was over five stories tall and cost thousands of dollars in damages. One of the most well-known environmental disasters is the Love Canal incident (Beck 1979). In the late 1970s, residents of Niagara Falls, New York, began to express concern over toxic chemicals in their communities and on their properties. Decades earlier, the Hooker Chemical Company sealed off several thousand pounds of toxic waste inside steel drums, and buried the waste at a site referred to as Love Canal. Hooker Chemical sold the property to Niagara Falls, which developed the property into a residential area, building homes, playgrounds, and a school. When the steel drums began to corrode during a period of heavy rainfall in the 1970s, toxic chemicals began leaking onto residents’ properties, including inside their homes. Residents began experiencing higher rates of cancer, birth defects, and miscarriages. Damage at the Love Canal site was so extensive that President Jimmy Carter allocated federal emergency funds to

Environmental Justice

address the problems. Eventually, more than one thousand families moved or agreed to be moved as a result of the contamination. Catastrophes associated with failure at a nuclear power plant at Th ree Mile Island in Pennsylvania, water pollution in Ohio’s Cuyahoga River, and dioxin exposure at Times Beach, Missouri, further sensitized the public to environmental issues (for other examples, see ch. 7 on toxic Towns). The popularity of Rachel Carson’s work, the celebration of Earth Day, and the strengthening of federal environmental law and policy were evidence of a growing public consciousness on environmental issues. Environmental catastrophes at Love Canal, Three Mile Island, the Cuyahoga River, and Times Beach underscored the public health and safety dimensions of environmental issues. These disasters also demonstrated that environmental harms did not have consequences only for wildlife and national parks—humans and their communities were also at risk. In the 1980s, environmentalism took on yet another paradigm, and the environmental justice movement emerged (Taylor 2000).

ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME IN WARREN COUNTY: THE EMERGENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT As noted, the environmental justice movement is the result of many different movements coming together (Cole and Foster 2001). The responses to corporate crimes that occurred in Warren County, North Carolina, between 1978 and 1982 were major contributing factors to the environmental justice movement (Lynch et al. 2014; McGurty 2000). Warren County brought national attention to the issue of environmental racism, or the idea that an environmental practice or policy differentially impacts a community because of its racial or ethnic makeup. The implementation of the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in the late 1970s caused several changes in the handling and disposal of toxic wastes, including new regulations guiding the disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs; fig. 9.1). PCB exposure has been associated with a range of adverse human health outcomes , which include increased risk of cancer; infertility; cardiovascular, neurological, and respiratory problems ( for detailed reviews, see Longnecker, Rogan, and Lucier 1997; Carpenter 2006). After these changes, the Ward Transformer and Transformer Sales Corporation needed to dispose of thirty-one thousand gallons of PCB-laced oil. Instead of lawfully disposing of the PCBs, the company opted to cut disposal costs by hiring Robert, Randall, and Timothy Burns. The Burnses illegally disposed of the oil by driving across over two hundred miles of North Carolina roadways, using a hose they had attached to the bottom of their van to spray

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Figure 9.1 PCB warning label. The PCB oil inside the power transformer requires that this warning label be attached. The oil in this transformer is similar to the PCB-laced oil that was illegally dumped by the Burnses across the state of North Carolina. Source: Sturmovik. Wikipedia Commons.

the contaminated oil onto the side of the road. The Burnses were eventually apprehended, tried, and sent to prison. Ward Transformer and Transformer Sales was also fined several million dollars to fund cleanup costs (Lynch et al. 2013). The contaminated soil was dug up by the state, and North Carolina state representatives decided that it would be disposed of by burying the contaminated soil underground in Warren County, North Carolina. The decision of where to locate the landfi ll must be seen in the context of the demographic composition of Warren County. Bullard (2000) presents data from the Warren County Economic Development Commission that illustrate that Warren County had an unemployment rate of 13.3% in 1982 and 1983, and was one of the poorest counties in the state of North Carolina. In 1982, the per capita income for Warren County was $6,984, compared to $9,283 in the state of North Carolina. With respect to racial composition, Warren County’s population was predominately black—about 34% of North Carolina’s population identified as black, compared with about 64% of Warren County’s population. Data from the 1980 census reveal that in Warren County 80% of the population living below the poverty level was black, compared with 46% at the state level (US Government Accountability Office 1983). Several independent assessments revealed that Warren County was not geographically suitable for a landfi ll (Exchange Project 2006; Geiser and Waneck 1983). When the state of North Carolina proposed Warren County as a site for the landfill, representatives from the state asked the EPA to overlook three out

Environmental Justice

of five important criteria that the EPA required: (1) that at least fi fty feet separate the landfill and the groundwater, (2) that the landfill use an artificial liner, and (3) that the landfi ll use an underliner leachate (liquid, such as rainwater, that comes into contact with the toxic waste and takes on the qualities of the toxic waste) collection system (Exchange Project 2006). Warren County residents were dependent on well water, and since the water table in Warren County was only five to ten feet below the surface, significant concern emerged over the landfill’s potential to contaminate drinking water (Geiser and Waneck 1983). Soil expert Professor Charles Mulchi was hired by Warren County residents to assess the site, and concluded that the composition of the soil in Warren County was not sufficient to contain the waste, and that the site was unsafe. In fact, Mulchi argued that soil in Chatham County, North Carolina, was more appropriate for containing a landfi ll (Exchange Project 2006). William Sanjour, chief of the EPA’s Hazardous Waste Implementation Branch, also opposed the landfill, pointing to safety and public health concerns. It was clear from the onset that residents of Warren County did not want the landfi ll in their backyard. Warren County passed a law banning PCB disposal within county limits in 1978 (Taylor 2014). When public hearings on the matter began, thousands of Warren County residents attended to express concern and resist the construction of the site. County residents concerned about the landfi ll formed a local organization called the Warren County Citizens Concerned about PCBs (Bullard 2000). In an effort to prevent the landfi ll’s construction, local landowners and the Warren County manager and Board of Commissioners fi led two different lawsuits against the state. Residents and local leaders raised the concern that the decision to locate the landfi ll in Warren County represented a major civil rights violation, and argued that Warren County was selected because a high percentage of residents were living in poverty, were black, or both. What this charge represented was the coming together of at least two major social justice movements: the Civil Rights movement, born in the 1960s and dedicated to creating equal opportunities for African Americans, and the environmental movement, concerned with preservation, conservation, and, more recently, public health, safety, and protection from environmental hazards (see above). The PCB landfi ll at Warren County became national news, and prompted responses from civil rights activists and environmentalists across the county. The governor of North Carolina denied that the decision to site the landfi ll in Warren County was racist, and ordered construction efforts to move forward. In 1982, thousands of trucks carrying tens of thousands of pounds of PCBcontaminated soil, arrived in Warren County to begin construction of the landfi ll. The trucks were met by hundreds of activists, several of whom lay down in front of the trucks blocking their paths (images of the protest can be seen at the Environmental Justice for North Carolina website: sites.duke.edu

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/docst110s_01_s2011_sb211/what-is-environmental-justice/history/). The state used the criminal justice system to advance the site’s construction. Over five hundred adults and children were arrested for protesting and attempting to block construction of the landfill. These arrests represented the first time in US history that anyone had ever been arrested for trying to stop the construction of a landfi ll (Bullard 2000). Civil rights leaders and activists from across the country joined the residents of Warren County in solidarity. For example, several members of the United Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice, as well as delegate Walter Fauntroy of the Congressional Black Caucus took action and spoke out against the location of the landfill (Bullard 2000). In 1982, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People filed a lawsuit charging that the decision to locate the PCB landfill in Warren County was race- and class-based discrimination (Taylor 2014). In spite of substantial organizing and resistance efforts, construction of the PCB landfill began in September 1982. Problems emerged immediately. Heavy rainfall associated with a hurricane caused about five hundred thousand gallons of rainwater to accumulate at the site before the landfi ll was capped in late November 1982 (Exchange Project 2006). Months after the site was capped, residents also observed and documented evidence of gas bubbles in the landfi ll’s liner. Evidence suggested leaks and contamination would continue for nearly twenty years after the construction of the landfi ll. Residents continued to pressure state and federal officials to take action and decontaminate the region. Finally, in 2003, the landfill was cleaned to meet quality standards nearly ten times above the minimum required by federal policy (Exchange Project 2006). The cleanup of the landfi ll at Warren County cost $18 million. Several responses to the PCB landfi ll at Warren County were of major significance to the environmental justice movement. In 1983, the NAACP passed its first resolution on the matter of hazardous waste and racial justice (Bullard 2000). Activism in Warren County prompted the first federal investigation of environmental justice in the United States. Spurred by Representative Walter Fauntroy’s involvement in resistance efforts in Warren County, in 1983, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) produced a report showing that three of the four off-site hazardous waste landfills in the EPA’s Region 4, which includes Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee), were housed in predominately (>50% of the population) black communities. The report also revealed that, while approximately 20% of the population in EPA’s Region 4 identified as black, no less than 38% of the population in areas surrounding the hazardous waste sites identified as black. Across all four sites, no less than 90% of the populations living below the poverty level in areas surrounding the sites were black (US Government Accountability Office 1983).

Environmental Justice

Figure 9.2 Robert Bullard, the father of environmental justice. Robert Bullard is professor and dean of the Barbara Jordan-Mickey School of Public Affairs at Texas Southern University. Dr. Bullard was one of the fi rst academics to study the problem of environmental racism; his research has helped shape national environmental policy and has been used by local communities in their struggle for equality. His pioneering work earned him the nickname “the Father of Environmental Justice.” Source: Photograph by Dave Brenner. Wikipedia.

Additional studies produced fi ndings consistent with those of the GAO report. In 1987, the United Church of Christ produced a major national study that found three out of every five black and Hispanic Americans lived in communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites. The study also found that “although socio-economic status appeared to play an important role in the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities, race still proved to be more significant” (United Church of Christ 1987, 8). Dr. Robert Bullard (fig. 9.2), who has been referred to as the father of environmental justice, published the first edition of Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality, which documented major race- and class-based disparities in choosing locations for hazardous waste facilities in the southern and southeast regions of the United States. This type of activism and research prompted President Bill Clinton’s Executive Order 12898, “Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,” signed into effect on February 11, 1994. Its aim is “to focus federal attention on the environmental and human health conditions of minority and low-income populations with the goal of achieving environmental protection for all communities,” (US Environmental Protection Agency 2016e). Activism in Warren County and research also drove the creation of environmental justice programs in universities across the country and around the world. Warren County activists also showed how environmental issues are also civil rights and social justice issues.

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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND GLOBALIZATION Matters of environmental (in)justice are certainly not restricted to the United States. After the PCB landfill was located in Warren County, researchers became interested in examining the distribution of toxic waste in relationship to race, class, and ethnicity at the community level. However, researchers also became interested in the distribution of environmental hazards and environmental degradation around the world and between countries (e.g., Pellow 2007; White 2010a). Examination of environmental issues at an international level provided evidence that environmental hazards were not equally distributed across the globe. This is true for concentrations of hazardous waste and for the extraction of raw materials. For example, Pellow (2007) reported that approximately 90% of the total volume of hazardous waste worldwide is produced in industrialized nations and the Global North (i.e., developed nations in Europe and North America); however, much of the waste produced in those nations is shipped to the Global South (i.e., less developed nations). That is, most hazardous waste is produced in Europe, the United States, and Japan, yet is disposed of in Latin America, the Caribbean, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa. Data from the US Department of Energy indicate that in 2009, while the United States accounted for approximately 4.5% of the world population, it accounted for over 17% of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions (Lynch et al. 2014), showing that environmental injustice exists on a global scale and has serious adverse consequences, including ecological disorganization. Environmental injustices on the national scale were greatly exacerbated in the years after World War II, especially through the process of globalization (White 2010a, 2010b; Michalowski and Kramer 1987). This is true for several reasons. As manufacturing jobs began to leave industrialized countries, the distribution of the environmental hazards associated with factories changed. Manufacturing facilities began closing down sites in developed nations in order to open up new operations in countries with reduced tax, labor, and environmental regulations (Michalowski and Kramer 1987). As industries realized they could increase production and surplus value, ecological additions, withdrawals, and disorganization were increasing. Exacerbating this was the passage of several major international trade agreements, such as the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, which accelerated the expansion of the treadmill of production (ToP) (Oliver 2005). In addition, transporting goods around the world, necessitated by the production of goods, also contributed to environmental harm to the environment and to public health worldwide. For example, Lwebuga-Mukasa, Oyana, Thenappan and Ayirookuzhi (2004) found that NAFTA’s passage was associated with increases in traffic volume and health care costs for asthma in the areas immediately around the Peace Bridge linking Buffalo, New York, to Ontario, Canada.

Environmental Justice

ENVIRONMENTAL (IN)JUSTICES TODAY The earliest environmental justice studies were centered largely around assessing the distribution of pollution, toxic waste, and environmental hazard sites in relation to the class, racial, and ethnic composition of communities (e.g., United Church of Christ 1987; Bullard 2000). This remains an important area of concern today, and a range of studies have continued to demonstrate that minorities are disproportionately exposed to pollution, hazardous waste sites, and other environmental hazards (Brugge and Goble 2002; Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp 2001; Pellow 2002; Wonders and Danner 2015; B. Wright 2005; Wu and Batterman 2006). For example, Mohai, Kweon, Lee, and Ard (2011) found that, across the state of Michigan, over 81% of Michigan’s African American school children and about 62% of Michigan’s Hispanic schoolchildren were enrolled in schools located in regions with the highest concentrations of air pollution. Mohai, Kweon, Lee, and Ard (2011) also found that 62% of students attending schools in regions of Michigan with the highest concentrations of air pollution were enrolled in free lunch programs, indicating high levels of poverty in those schools. A similar study was carried out in Hillsborough County, Florida, where it was observed that schools closest to environmental hazards (including superfund sites and facilities that store, produce, transport, or treat toxic waste) educated higher percentages of low-income, Hispanic, and African American students than those schools that were farther away from environmental hazards (Stretesky and Lynch 2012). Research on the distribution of uranium mines found over five hundred abandoned uranium mine claims (with many claims consisting of multiple mine sites) on Navajo Nation reservations (US Environmental Protection Agency 2014; see also Lynch and Stretesky 2012). Wonders and Danner (2015) argue that, worldwide, women suffer disproportionately from the consequences of climate change. Recently, environmental justice researchers have begun to examine not only the distribution of environmental hazards, but also environmental amenities. Examples of amenities might be public parks, trees, or urban green space. A study conducted by Heynen, Perkins, and Roy (2006) identified an uneven distribution of urban green space across the city of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. For example, they found that neighborhoods with higher median household incomes also had comparatively more tree canopy coverage. These results are consistent with Dai’s (2011) study of the distribution of green space across Atlanta, Georgia, which found that predominately African American communities, as well as economically disadvantaged communities, experienced significantly poorer access to green space. Landry and Chakraborty (2009) observed a significant reduction in public tree coverage in neighborhoods that have higher proportions of African Americans, low-income residents, and renters. It appears, then, that growing empirical evidence suggests minorities

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are more likely to suffer from proximity to environmental hazards, and less likely to benefit from proximity to environmental amenities.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE As Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg (2008) have pointed out, the ToP helps explain the reasons for environmental injustice at the local, regional, and global levels (fig. 9.3). Specifically, they suggest that “environmental injustice is a normal consequence of the way capitalist/market economies function. That is, the treadmill of production produces widespread social and environmental inequality as a matter of course” (73). Thus, Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg (2008) point out that, rather than challenge those political institutions that make (or should make) environmental policy to eliminate environmental injustice, it is more important to focus on the root causes of that inequality. As a result, activists should focus on changing economic institutions and systems that give rise to environmental problems. Stretesky and Lynch (2009) suggest that a world systems perspective (e.g., Wallerstein 1974) can help demonstrate how global environmental inequalities are produced under the ToP. Specifically, they argue that when it comes to the distribution of environmental problems, nations make up a complex system of economic and diplomatic relations (Bollen 1983). Thus, the existence of global commodity chains—the sets of relationships that link resources, products, and markets together—helps to explain shifts in international production practices, and the movement of production from wealthy core countries to poor periphery countries. That is, while core countries benefit from the current economic system, because they are supplied with cheap goods for consumption, periphery countries have become the suppliers in the global economy, and are likely to suffer from environmental burdens as a result (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008, 73; Grimes and Kentor 2003). To demonstrate how the ToP encourages global environmental injustice, Stretesky and Lynch (2009) used panel data to examine the relationship between per capita carbon dioxide emissions and product exports for 169 countries. Their regression results suggest that, when it comes to oil and gas, petroleum and coal, chemicals and reimports, US imports drive elevated per capita carbon dioxide emissions in other nations. In other words, environmental problems in economically disadvantaged countries, which are the first link in the chain, are driven by production that is targeted for consumption in wealthy countries at the end of the chain (Stretesky and Lynch 2009, 239). The result is environmental injustice. We fi nd that this model can also explain environmental injustice in local areas when, for instance, landfi lls or waste incinerators dispose of or process products at the end of their lifecycles (Pellow 2000). As noted, these types of hazards are likely to be located in disadvan-

Environmental Justice

Figure 9.3 Electronic waste pile. Electronic goods produced in the developing world are often used by consumers in rich countries and then shipped to poor countries for disposal. This photograph shows mounds of electronic waste in Ghana, where it is disassembled by workers wearing no safety equipment. Source: Photograph by Curtis Palmer. Published by British Library on Flickr Commons. Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.

taged neighborhoods where workers left unemployed by the treadmill welcome the hazardous jobs or where poverty is so high, and social, economic, and political resources so lacking, that the hazard cannot be resisted. In short, the ToP distributes extraction, production, consumption, and disposal across landscapes in ways that facilitate various forms of local, regional, and global environmental injustice.

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND CRIMINOLOGY Issues of environmental justice are central to both criminology and criminal justice studies for two primary reasons. First, exposure to some toxins may influence criminal behavior, especially violence (Lynch and Stretesky 2014; Stretesky and Lynch 2001, 2004). As a result, environmental hazards not only disproportionately harm the health of low-income and minority communities but they can also elevate crime rates in these communities through exposure to chemicals that promote some forms of criminal behavior. Second, like all laws, environmental laws may be unequally enforced. Only a few studies have examined the extent of environmental injustice that is owing to unequal

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environmental enforcement (Konisky 2009). Thus, criminologists interested in enforcement could do much more to aid the environmental justice research. Toxins and Criminality The geographic distribution of some environmental toxins has implications for some types of street crime. Th is is the case because some toxins alter brain chemistry in ways that make criminal behavior more likely (Denno 1990; Fishbein 1990; Jeffery 1990; Raine 1997). For instance, studies have documented a correlation between lead exposure and violence (Dietrich et al. 2001; Lersch and Hart 2014; Mielke and Zahran 2012; Needleman 2004; Needleman et al. 1996, 2002; Neven 2000, 2007; Reyes 2007; Stretesky and Lynch 2001, 2004; J. Wright et al. 2008). Needleman (1990) suggests that as much as 20% of all crime is associated with lead exposure. One potential reason lead and crime might be correlated is that lead is likely to reduce intelligence, possibly leading to faulty decision-making processes that enhance the likelihood of criminal behavior (Chen et al. 2005; Schwartz 1994). Thus, lead’s detrimental effects on intelligence might be the link between lead and crime (Stretesky and Lynch 2004; Barrett 2013). Moreover, there are a variety of ways that exposure to lead may interact with social factors to produce environmental injustice. For instance, lead is not equally distributed across the landscape (Stretesky 2003; Narag, Pizzaro, and Gibbs 2009; Sampson and Winter 2016). Instead, there is a political-economic reason that high concentrations of lead are often present in locations with high poverty levels that are populated primarily by particular racial and ethnic groups. In the United States, blacks, Hispanics, and the poor are likely to have higher levels of lead in their blood than whites and the more affluent (Fadrowski et al. 2010; Brody et al. 1994; Pirkle et al. 1994). In addition, the socially disadvantaged often don’t have access to health care services where they can be screened for lead (US Government Accountability Office 1999). Exposure to toxins other than lead may also make violence, aggression, and criminal behavior more likely (Diaz 2001; Haynes et al. 2011; Phil and Ervin 1990; Reidy et al. 1992). Migrant agricultural workers, for example, are often exposed to pesticides that may cause violent behavior (Arcury, Quandt, and Russell 2002). Recently, criminologists have begun to partner with medical researchers to examine the association between crime and a variety of heavy metals other than lead. For instance, a team of University of Cincinnati researchers from criminal justice, medicine, education, and environmental health fields (Haynes et al. 2011) discovered that, in Ohio, juvenile delinquency is associated with higher levels of manganese and mercury exposure. While these researchers caution against interpreting these relationships as causal, they suggest that more attention needs to be devoted to the role of neurotoxins in producing criminal behavior (Haynes et al. 2011). In short, the interaction between environmental toxins and behavior is not yet well understood, but

Environmental Justice

what is clear is that minorities and the poor come into more frequent contact with a variety of toxins that appear to be related to crime. Unequal Enforcement Another relevant criminological and environmental justice issue is the unequal enforcement of environmental laws. Criminological studies indicate that racism, classism, and sexism often arise in the enforcement of criminal laws (Gau and Brunson 2010; Merry 2003), a fi nding that has prompted environmental justice research that examines how social demographics influence the distribution of environmental enforcement. The first study examining environmental injustice in enforcement was conducted by Lavelle and Coyle (1992), who looked at sentencing disparities in monetary penalties leveled against fi rms that violated environmental laws across zip codes. Lavelle and Coyle discovered that firms with facilities located in minority zip codes were penalized an average of $105,000, while firms with facilities situated in white zip codes were penalized an average of $153,000 (about 46% more). Thus, it appears that in the United States, firms that violate environmental regulations in areas with higher populations of white residents are sentenced to greater monetary penalties than firms that violate environmental regulations in areas populated largely by minority residents. In a unique study on the federal sentencing of criminal violations in the United States, Greife (2012) discovered, after controlling for crime seriousness and company characteristics, that penalties were higher in affluent communities. Unfortunately, subsequent reanalysis suggested that when more adequate measures of crime seriousness are taken into account there is little evidence that criminal monetary penalties vary according to neighborhood demographics (Greife, Stretesky, Shelley, and Pogrebin 2015). Not all environmental justice studies of law enforcement have concluded that punishment is unequally levied. Ringquist’s (1998) reanalysis of Lavelle and Coyle’s data (1992) suggests there is little variation in penalties by race or income (see also Atlas 2001). While Lynch, Stretesky, and Burns (2004a, 2004b) found that fines against petroleum refineries situated in minority areas and zip codes with high concentrations of the poor received smaller fines than those in white and affluent zip codes, there was very little evidence of environmental injustice when census records, rather than zip codes, were studied using the same penalty data. As a result, Lynch et al.’s (2004b) study suggests that aggregation bias could be driving findings of environmental injustice in enforcement studies (but see also Lynch, Stretesky, and Burns 2004a). Konisky’s (2009) study of environmental law enforcement examined government inspections of producers, and discovered that enforcement staff conducted fewer inspections in poor counties. Specifically, Konisky reported that a 1% increase in county poverty was associated with a 2–5% decrease in

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inspections at chemical facilities within the county. The implication was that violations were not as likely to be detected in poor areas, strengthening suggestions by environmental activists that corporations target those communities in order to avoid oversight of their production practices. In a related study, Konisky and Schario (2010) found similar evidence of both income and race disparities in the enforcement of Clean Water Act violations. In a study with a different environmental justice focus, Lynch and Stretesky (2013) employed data on the distribution of EPA–led citizen initiatives that promote the formation of community water-monitoring organizations. These organizations are informal mechanisms for helping with the policing of river and stream quality within communities, and discovering when detrimental changes in community water quality require EPA action. These water-monitoring groups collect and report water test results to the EPA. The study included 1,038 citizen water-monitoring organizations across all US counties. The results indicated that communities with higher percentages of African Americans and Hispanics were significantly less likely to have a community water-monitoring organization, which also suggests an environmental justice effect. Conversely, the higher the income level in a community, the more likely it was to have a community watermonitoring organization. Lynch and Stretesky note that because the EPA encourages communities to form these groups, and provides them with educational training and testing equipment, the EPA’s policies may be playing a role in the unequal distribution of community water-monitoring organizations. (For other relevant empirical studies on environmental justice, see Stretesky and Knight 2013; Stretesky and Lynch 1999, 1998.) Qualitative research has also suggested that biases exist in environmental enforcement. Pellow’s (2004) analysis of the illegal dumping of construction waste in Chicago makes the point that many disadvantaged neighborhoods of the city were more likely to be polluted with construction debris. Pellow discovered that illegality was a product of the expanding construction market in Chicago, and was impacted by its long history of racial segregation and corruption, which fostered links between construction companies and politicians. Interviews with public officials suggested that they used connections to produce a system of illegal bribes among public officials that allowed illegal behavior to continue. Pellow’s study was the first to make the important point that the politics and history of an area must be taken into account when examining the reasons for environmental justice and crime.

CONCLUSION The harms associated with ecological additions, withdrawals, and disorganization are not distributed equally within or across nations. Environmental injustice has emerged within, and is in our view caused by, the context of the ToP

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and has intensified over the years as globalization has moved production to areas that have few resources to oppose such harmful practices. While the ecological disorganization associated with production can disrupt ecosystems, it also has a human cost that is not inconsequential for residents living near these hazards. Specifically, we have suggested that disproportionately high concentrations of toxins in communities have resulted in increases in health complications, sickness, and diseases in residents. As we discussed, the area of research that examines the fair and meaningful treatment of all people with respect to environmental burdens and benefits regardless of social status is often referred to as environmental justice studies. We noted that a number of environmental justice studies have examined criminological issues. Currently green criminologists are studying how the disproportionate exposure to some chemicals can lead to higher rates of crime because they are neurotoxins that alter behavior, making people more prone to violence and street crime. In addition, green criminologists have increasingly examined how environmental enforcement efforts such as inspections and punishment are influenced by the demographics of surrounding communities. These studies have yet to be fully developed, but they offer unique insights into issues of environmental justice that are generally ignored by environmental justice scholars and criminologists. The intersection of these issues provides interesting insights into ways that the political economy, and more specifically the ToP, can impact thinking about criminology and criminal justice. As a result, the area of environmental justice has important implications for the future of green criminology.

S T U DY G U I D E Questions and Activities for Students 1. What does the term environmental justice mean? 2. What impact did the events in Warren County have on the environmental justice movement? What can those events teach criminologists, who are interested in the study of environmental crime, about environmental justice? 3. In what ways can criminologists best contribute to the environmental justice literature? What aspects of environmental justice that are not addressed by other scholars would be of interest to criminologists? 4. Can the equal enforcement of environmental laws eliminate environmental injustice? What, if any, are the limitations of criminal enforcement in preventing environmental inequalities?

5. Th is chapter suggests that the political economy of commodity chains is the primary explanation of environmental justice. If that is the case, how could production be changed to reduce or eliminate environmental injustices? Lessons for Researchers 1. The environmental injustices that occurred in Warren County, North Carolina, were largely a response to corporate crime. Corporate crime continues to be an understudied area of criminology (compared to interpersonal acts of street crime). The relationships between corporate crime and environmental injustices, as well as the responses to and control of corporate criminality, represent important areas of criminological inquiry.

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2. State crime researchers, as well as several unions and not-for-profit organizations, have published works that are highly critical of recent international trade agreements, which highly favor wealth accumulation by major multinational corporations. Green criminologists may wish to further explore the relationship between environmental degradation and such trade agreements and undertake empirical studies to evaluate the

impact of such trade agreements from an environmental justice perspective. 3. Few studies have examined environmental justice issues with respect to criminal laws, and the studies that have been conducted have been carried out mainly in the United States. More research is needed to determine how patterns of race, ethnicity, and class impact environmental enforcement in the United States and other countries.

CH A P T ER

The Treadmill of Environmental Law

10

M

any people believe that the law ensures justice by fairly mediating disputes and preventing arbitrary and harmful behavior. That is, laws provide a measure of certainty about justice and how governments and citizens behave. Legal scholars sometimes refer to the idea that the law should indiscriminately govern all people as the “rule of law.” The rule of law means that the most powerful individuals in a given society are subject to the same set of laws as the least powerful individuals. In a democratic system of governance, the laws that govern people are created by the people (or their representatives) and are often described as a mechanism for ensuring liberty and justice for all. For example, former US Circuit Court of Appeals judge Charles Clark (1942, 393) believed in democratic lawmaking and the rule of law and warned that “if the people are not in command of their own government, but are actually subordinate to some yet more remote sovereign who upholds and justifies unsanitary conditions, poor housing, long hours of labor, and general defiance of social welfare legislation as a freedom required by some vague constitutional command or higher law of nature, then we are nearer either anarchy or the rule of the autocratic few than we are democracy.” We take the position that democratic lawmaking and the rule of law are desirable. However, in practice, the law

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is oppressive, especially when it comes to ecological destruction and when it is considered in a global context. By “oppressive” we mean that under capitalism, environmental law tends to reflect the interests of the powerful and is used as a weapon to facilitate these interests in expanding production. To be sure, we are not the first scholars to take up this alternative position to the study of law. For instance, Austin Turk (1976, 276) suggested there are “fundamental limitations of what may be termed the moral functionalist conception of law” that make it a “partisan weapon of social conflict.” In addition, Turk noted that the law is more readily understood as “a set of resources for which people contend and with which they are better able to promote their own ideas and interests against others” (280). It is Turk’s perspective, in combination with a political ecological perspective, that we adopt. As Turk noted, among the most important resources to control are “production, allocation, and/or use of material resources” (280). Turk’s focus on production, allocation, and material explains the development of environmental law as a tool in maintaining class conflict. We agree with Turk, but we maintain that the law also controls the environment by determining how ecological withdrawals and additions are viewed by the state. Thus, we begin our analysis by expanding on Turk’s notion of law by integrating it with a political economy of the environment, as recognized in the treadmill of production (ToP). That analysis leads us to examine how the law succeeds in maintaining class interests by (1) championing deterrence and modernization ideology and (2) denying ecological harm by minimizing the importance of natural production. Finally, we examine two examples of environmental laws that look like they improve the environment, but actually maintain the interests of production at the expense of the ecology because they are carried out within global capitalism.

TREADMILL OF LAW As reviewed in earlier chapters, Allan Schnaiberg described the relationship between the economy and the environment in his 1980 book, The Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity. Schnaiberg (1980, chs. 1–2) notes that the relationship between the economy and environment is complex, but that economic systems created by humans interfere with ecological systems created by nature. As we explained in chapter 3, capitalism interferes with nature because systems of natural production that organize energy are exploited in the process of production when energy is transferred from more organized to less organized forms (i.e., the production of entropy; Schnaiberg 1980). Importantly, energy extraction constantly expands to meet the demands of capitalism (Foster, Clark and York 2010a). Moreover, we noted that capitalism disorganizes ecosystems in other ways through ecological additions and withdrawals. The goal of capitalists is to expand production and accumulate more. Capitalists,

The Treadmill of Environmental Law

Figure 10.1 Worker on a treadmill. This literal treadmill was used to grind grain and increase flour production. As more grain is added to the machine, the laborer must walk faster. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

therefore, must constantly increase production or else be eliminated by the competition. This idea is known as the “treadmill of production” because it suggests that an ever-increasing treadmill-like reliance on resources is needed to support capitalism, in support of which natural resource extraction must accelerate (fig. 10.1). Unfortunately, this has implications for the planet because it moves us away from any notion of sustainability. For example, consider the daily global production of fossil fuel energy in table 10.1. As shown in table 10.1, production of petroleum has increased substantially since 1980. Th is increasing use of energy demonstrates the deep-seated conflict between the ecology and the economy: as the economy expands, greater quantities of petroleum are withdrawn from nature and then burned, generating ecological additions. In this case, harmful climate change pollutants such as carbon dioxide are produced. At this point it is also useful to note that increases in technological efficiency rarely lead to a decrease in resource use (Foster, Clark and York 2010b), a position that is often offered to suggest that as capitalism expands, it produces

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Chapter 10 Table 10.1 Global oil production, 1980–2014 Year

Barrels (thousands/day)

Change since  (%)

1980

59,558

— –9.4

1985

53,965

1990

60,497

1.6

1995

62,434

4.8

2000

68,527

15.1

2005

73,868

24.0

2010

74,653

25.4

2014

77,833

30.7

source: US Energy Information Administration.

conditions that increase environmental protection. That view, for example, was described earlier, when we examined the concept of the environmental Kuznets curve and reviewed research addressing whether or not increased development leads to enhanced environmental protection. As we noted in that discussion, the evidence is quite mixed, prompting us to suggest that there is little reason to be hopeful that the global expansion of capitalism will result in reduced ecological disorganization and destruction. This point was also addressed more than a hundred years ago by economist William Jevons (1906). Jevons predicted that, when technology increases production efficiency, it does not lead to resource conservation. Instead, efficiency increases resource demand, which leads to higher levels of resource use, an observation known as Jevons’s paradox (Foster, Clark and York 2010a). Jevons’s paradox means that the conflict between the ecology and the economy is intensified, rather than solved, by technological innovation. As noted, our view is that the law is an important instrument in maintaining this conflict. Turk (1976) observed that law is a weapon of class conflict, an observation which can be applied to environmental laws and regulations (see, for example, Lynch, Stretesky, and Long 2015a, 2015b). That is, environmental law provides producers with important legal resources that allow them access to natural resources to promote their interest over the interests of others—and over the interests of the global ecosystem, or the living-world system scientists call Gaia. Importantly, then, states tend to adopt laws or law enforcement practices that allow for more energy extraction. Criminologists have long applied this idea to the study of laws that regulate behaviors, such as Chambliss’s (1964) study of the emergence of the laws of vagrancy. More recently, Moloney and Chambliss (2014) applied this approach to study events that led to the near extinction of the American bison in the late 1800s (fig. 10.2). They note that

The Treadmill of Environmental Law

Figure 10.2 Pile of bison skulls. Photo of bison skulls that were ground into fertilizer in 1870. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

there was considerable profit tied up in the bison massacre by hunters who could sell bison parts: “The political economic context surrounding the bison slaughter produced structural conditions favoring development and progress above nearly all other concerns. . . . The clear use-value of bison hide leather to meet this need lead [sic] to the commodification, and subsequent exploitation, of the species—the bison were slaughtered ostensibly to supply leather that supported the continuing growth of American capitalism” (Moloney and Chambliss 2013, 321). As Moloney and Chambliss point out, states did, of course, adopt laws to protect the bison. However these laws largely failed because states continued to allow unregulated bison hunting and because the laws could not be effectively enforced. While bison are no longer threatened with extinction, they are an example of how the law has supported production to promote conflict between the ecology and the economy. Our argument about the role of the ToP in shaping law (e.g., the treadmill of law) is simple. First, the law maintains conflict between the environment and ecology by upholding the legitimacy of production. It does this by diverting attention away from the large-scale environmental problems that production creates (e.g., pollution), and that threaten ecological systems and the biosphere,

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and instead focusing attention on “micro” crimes, or small examples of environmental crime (e.g., hunting and fishing violations). In the case of criminology, this lead to more attention being paid to these microcrimes, and the idea is that microcrimes can be solved through better methods of deterrence, or market policies that will modernize criminal law and make it more efficient. Meanwhile, larger green crimes of greater consequence are overlooked. Second, the law helps to uphold the ToP by ignoring social harms that result from production (Pearce and Tombs 2011).The law does not, for example, respond to the large-scale ecological destruction caused by capitalism, but instead focuses on the unlawful behavior of individual producers. Many examples illustrate this point. From 2000 to 2013, the EPA completed about 51 to 143 criminal environmental cases per year nationwide. The EPA itself considers few of the major criminal cases, or cases netting large penalties. Often, the penalties are small relative to the harm that was caused (Lynch et al. 2016). Consider a case settled against Citgo, a major oil company. In 2014, Citgo was fined $2.06 million after being convicted in 2007 for operating two illegal, “massive” oil waste storage tanks that were not fitted with required pollution control equipment, in violation of the Clean Air Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. The facility in Corpus Christi, Texas, had operated the illegal waste storage tanks from 1994 through 2003. The lack of proper pollution control equipment on the tanks exposed residents of Corpus Christi to continuous illegal emissions of toxic chemicals. Given that Citgo was convicted of seven violations spanning a ten-year period that affected numerous citizens, the fine is rather small, amounting to $206,000 per year during the violation period, or only about $30,000/year per violation. Citgo had sales of $42.3 billion in 2013 alone, so such fines have a small effect on such a large company—especially in this case, since Citgo’s conviction was later overturned. We examine each of these issues further below.

THE FAILURE OF DETERRENCE The global approach, based on the concept of rationality (Ehrlich 1996), to environmental crime is enforcement oriented, focusing on the detection, apprehension, and punishment of offenders, and on deterrence (Pink 2013; Ross 1996; White 2013a). The latter stipulates that environmental crime can be deterred by punishing offenders because offenders recognize that the punishment for transgressions is not worth the costs (Zimring and Hawkins 1973). Of course, the assumption that the law structures people’s choices according to their rational interests is questionable. First, rational choice demands that people view the law as a series of incentives and disincentives (Korobkin and Ulen 2000). Some people, in some situations, may see the law as shaping how they behave, rather than as something that communicates important

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values in society. We argue, however, that in those situations in which the law is seen as shaping behavior, it is unlikely that it will impact ecological behavior on a large scale. We are not the fi rst researchers to recognize the deficiencies of the rational choice perspective. For instance, Korobkin and Ulen (2000, 1055) suggest, “Now that the [law and economics] movement has reached intellectual maturity, the rationality assumption severely limits its continued scholarly development. There is simply too much credible experimental evidence that individuals frequently act in ways that are incompatible with the assumptions of rational choice theory.” Despite these and other challenges to rational choice approaches, we recognize that some people may be deterred by punishments stipulated in the law, and that corporations can sometimes be deterred (e.g., Simpson et al. 2013). Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that environmental performance is partly determined by the government’s signals to plant managers that environmental laws will be enforced (Delmas and Toffel 2008; Doonan, Lanoie, and LaPlante 2005; May 2005). However, we suggest that deterrence and enforcement are not going to solve large-scale environmental problems such as climate change. Instead, we argue that the environmental behavior targeted by the law (especially criminal law) has a relatively small, even if visible, impact on the biosphere. Moreover, our empirical research suggests that the deterrent effect of the most serious criminal penalties imposed in the United States are ineffectual because they are so infrequently imposed (Lynch et al. 2016). Nevertheless, as the following press release shows (US Department of Justice 2016), the EPA continues to promote the idea that punishing environmental offenders deters environmental crimes: Indianapolis—Joseph Furando, 50, of Montvale, New Jersey, was sentenced yesterday in Indianapolis, Indiana, to 20 years in prison, three years of supervised release and to pay more than $56 million in restitution for his role in an elaborate scheme to defraud biodiesel buyers and United States taxpayers . . . [He] used fraud to spin biodiesel programs into a million-dollar home, high-end cars, expensive jewelry and watches and any other luxury that pleased him . . . Fraud in the renewable fuels program compromises our ability to fight climate change. Th is significant prison sentence sends the right message that such fraud will not be tolerated.

Mr. Furando’s prosecution was highly visible and creates an image that the law is able to do something about climate change by punishing offenders who contribute to excessive carbon releases. However, it is also an example of a microviolation when it comes to environmental enforcement. An examination of worldwide trends in carbon dioxide releases tell a much more serious story about environmental destruction. For example, in chapter 3, table 3.2 showed the global trend in carbon dioxide emissions, indicating that global carbon dioxide releases increase each year. Thus, even though law enforcement eventually caught up with Mr. Furando for his criminal behavior, his apprehension and punishment does little to impact these larger carbon dioxide trends. That is, while the court punished him under the law in a way that prevents him from

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committing additional crimes, and sends a strong message to other individuals contemplating similar frauds, prosecuting one individual rather than dealing with the volume of pollution emitted by the activities of the ToP does little to solve the problem We, therefore, suggest that deterrence studies must be reoriented to examine the impact of law enforcement on general levels of environmental sustainability. Moving the focus away from microbehaviors will better demonstrate how the enforcement of law fails to solve the environmental problems that threaten the biosphere. This, in turn, will create demand for more pressing solutions to stop global environmental harm. As noted, the importance societies place on microviolations tends to draw our attention away from important, and larger, macrotrends related to the effect of large-scale production on ecosystem health. As we have previously argued, the problem is the way society is organized and its reliance on the continuous expansion of the ToP. Punishing individual offenders will not prevent macrolevel problem such as climate change; laws must instead be redesigned to deal with the real culprits behind ecosystem disorganization and destruction, and must include the need to alter the capitalist ToP. Environmental laws that punish individuals or isolated corporate offenders make for nice public spectacles that encourage people to believe the government is doing something to control green/environmental crimes—but they are not solutions to ecological disorganization and destruction.

MODERNIZATION OF THE LAW The modernization of environmental law has also been touted as a mechanism through which the environment can be saved. Broadly speaking, ecological modernization refers to any innovative policy or technical solution that improves environmental performance or reduces outcomes such as pollution (Mol 2006). Spaargaren and Mol (1993, 350) point out that the process of ecological modernization is based on the idea that the “social organization of production and consumption [where corporations] can make judgments about their sustainability” are becoming more oriented toward the environment. Spaargaren and Mol rely on the concept of rationality as a basis for protecting the environment, using terminology similar to that used by deterrence theorists. In this connection, “ecological rationality” is the idea that corporations consider ecological benefits and burdens to be as relevant to making production decisions as economic rationality, which focuses on profit making. Theoretically, ecological rationality should increase the number of corporate actors willing to work to change unsustainable ecological practices (Spaargaren and Mol 1993). In addition, some modernization theorists argue, contra Jevons’s paradox, that laws can hasten the transition to ecological rationality by encouraging sustainable practices and forcing producers to implement technological

The Treadmill of Environmental Law

solutions to environmental problems. Consequently, some modernization theorists, in contradiction to Jevons paradox, believe that law can promote sustainability by forcing changes in technology that promote environmental conservation. For example, states can create laws that force companies to use a specific technology that reduces pollution (Kemp 2000). In the United States, environmental regulations include numerous examples of forcing adoption of technologies in order to protect the environment (Gerard and Lave 2005; McGarity 2003). Social scientists such as Spaargaren and Mol (1993) suggest that societies are working their way toward a modernized world where eco-efficiencies will eventually become the norm, and help solve the problem of ecological destruction. For example, Fred Pearce (2013, 1) noted that “the prophets of ecological modernism believe technology is the solution and not the problem. They say that harnessing innovation and entrepreneurship can save the planet and that if environmentalists won’t buy into that, then their Arcadian sentiments are the problem.” While modernization theorists argue over the role of the state and limitations of law in creating the technology that will save the world (e.g., Spaargaren and Mol 1993; Huber 2000), it is, nevertheless, clear that criminal laws that promote forms of modernization are increasing. In short, modernization suggests that free markets provide capitalists with the opportunity to protect the environment (for criticism of this view, see Foster 1999, 2000, 2012). Thus, with the full weight of market-based enforcement and capital accumulation policies, life on the planet will become sustainable with better technology and an enlighten understanding about the importance of the ecosystem. Within criminal law, self-policing is sometimes used as an example of modernization policy (Stretesky 2006). The idea behind self-policing is to allow manufacturers to self-monitor and self-report their violations of pollution laws to environmental enforcement agencies. Self-policing is described as an innovative, market-based approach that will improve overall levels of environmental performance because it encourages all producers to conduct environmental audits (Short and Toffel 2008). Self-policing suggests that producers value the environment and will act in its interest when the law is structured according to ecological rationality. Producers will be encouraged to implement technologies that facilitate regular environmental audits that can discover and correct environmental violations. The advantage in theory is that economic costs are minimized and the environment is protected. Companies that adopt this policy, then, will be better able to survive in the competitive marketplace and will be at less risk of costly enforcement. The key to most self-policing is the incentive. Actors must be allowed to address their own violations, and thereby maximize their economic profit while doing the right thing. One good example of self-policing is from the United States, where the US Environmental Protection Agency (2000, 19618) adopted a form of self-policing in 2000 in an attempt to modernize legislation:

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EPA today issues its revised final policy on “Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations,” commonly referred to as the “Audit Policy.” The purpose of this Policy is to enhance protection of human health and the environment by encouraging regulated entities to voluntarily discover, promptly disclose and expeditiously correct violations of Federal environmental requirements. Incentives that EPA makes available for those who meet the terms of the Audit Policy include the elimination or substantial reduction of the gravity component of civil penalties and a determination not to recommend criminal prosecution.

Today, the EPA (2015) notes that they will modernize environmental law even further by making it easier with the new e-Disclosure system that will “receive and automatically process self-disclosed civil violations of environmental law.” Under self-policing, violations are reported to regulators in exchange for immunity from prosecution and punishment. However, enforcement scholars have yet to compare the benefits of self-policing to traditional “end-of-pipe” prosecutions in promoting overall improvements in environmental performance. The myth, of course, is that self-policing will be more effective than traditional law enforcement. Self-policing is, again, focused on individual behaviors and assumes that technological improvement will be used to conserve resources. The EPA even noted that a number of companies use the policy because it is the “the right thing to do” (Stretesky 2006). Unfortunately, most of the violations that are reported under self-policing policies are “paper violations” (i.e., failure to file required documents) that have little impact on actual levels of pollution (Toffel and Short 2011). As noted, modernization policies suggest that the biosphere will be protected as companies adopt more environmentally friendly technologies. However, modernization policy and technology are not reducing global pollution. As technology has improved and self-policing has been increasingly viewed as a way to improve environmental performance, major pollution levels across the world have continued to rise. For example, consider global trends in airborne particulate matter (fig. 10.3). Air borne particle matter is made up of two kinds of pollutants: PM 2.5, or small particle matter less than 2.5 micrometers (1/10,000th of an inch), and PM 10, or large particle matter greater than 2.5 but less than 10 micrometers. These pollutants are mixed in with the air we breathe. These particles are highly dangerous and are responsible for thousands of deaths each year (Lynch and Barrett 2015). Small increases on the order of 10 micrograms of PM 2.5 per cubic meter of air are thought to increase lung cancer by nearly 36% (Raaschou-Nielsen et al. 2013). Research on trends in global concentrations of PM 2.5 suggests that, despite declining particulate concentrations in some core countries, there is a general and significant increase in particulates worldwide. Between 1998 and 2012, the estimated global concentration of PM 2.5 were increasing by 0.55 micrograms per cubic meter per year (van Donkelaar et al. 2015).

The Treadmill of Environmental Law

Figure 10.3 Smoke stack pollution. The smoke stack pollution shown here is coming from the Sault Paper Mill, Ontario, Canada. Source: Photograph by Billy Wilson. Published by British Library on Flickr Commons. Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.

In chapter 6, we also noted that the United Nations recently released an updated study of the extent of air pollution globally. That study indicated that more than 90% of the world’s population is exposed to air pollution levels the United Nations considers unsafe. If ecological modernization is occurring across nations, and the expansion of capitalism protects ecosystems, then we should expect that globally the rate of exposure to industrial toxins like air pollution would have been extensively minimized at this point in history. The results of the UN study suggest that this is not what is happening globally. In sum, while modernization arguments suggest that technological advances can help protect ecosystem health, and the law can force technological innovations that produce beneficial ecological and public health outcomes, these policies do not work quite as well as advertised, and globally pollution levels remain quite high. In short, the law as currently constructed promotes conflict between the ecology and economy by successfully maintaining class interests that promote increased production and the accumulation of wealth at the expense of the environment and human health. HIDING SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL HARM Another way that environmental law is used to maintain class interests and to contribute to the conflict between the ecology and the economy is by

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downplaying or denying many forms of ecological harm. Criminologists have largely directed their research efforts at street crimes such as robbery, theft, rape, and murder that are known to violate criminal laws. In doing so, and by ignoring green crimes and the public health and ecosystem harms they produce, criminology contributes to the assumption that street crimes must be more important than green crimes, and must also cause more harm. One could argue that by neglecting ecological harms criminologists help to maintain class interests, since most street criminals come from the lower classes. Criminology focuses attention largely on controlling the behaviors of the powerless, while ignoring how the ecological crimes of the economically powerful contribute to the accumulation of wealth through ecological destruction (Lynch and Michalowski 2006; Reiman and Leighton 2015, chapter 2). Debating which kinds of crimes criminologists should study has a long history (Lynch, Stretesky, and Long 2015a). A classic example is the debate over the study of white collar/corporate crime between Paul Tappan (1947) and Edwin H. Sutherland (1947). Tappan argued that criminologists should study only behaviors that violate the criminal law, while Sutherland argued that other acts were appropriate subjects for criminological study because of the harm they caused. This notion of social harm was later extended in the of work Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1970, 1977), who pointed out that crime definitions are rooted in social class conflicts that favor the interests of capitalists by criminalizing the behaviors of the poor and overlooking the crimes of the powerful (see also Marx 1842). Most recently, in their discussion of the social harm approach, Hillyard and Tombs (2007, 15) stressed that criminologists should study “deleterious activities of local and national states and of corporations upon peoples’ lives, whether in respect of lack of wholesome food, inadequate housing or heating, low income, exposure to various forms of danger, violations of basic human rights, and victimization to various forms of crime . . . that affect many people throughout their life cycle.” While Hillyard and Tombs emphasized the need to study a large array of social harms, Lynch (1990) focused attention on ecological harms. Specifically, Lynch (1990) argued that a new class of “green crime” should be created to account for ecological destruction being produced by capitalism.

ACCOUNTING FOR ECOLOGICAL HARM In recognition of the widespread implications of environmental harm, many green criminologists now focus on harms that adversely affect the ecosystem or biosphere (Eman, Meško, and Fields 2009; Gibbs et al. 2011; White 2011). For instance, Lynch et al. (2013, 2) argue for a definition of green crime as an “an act that causes or has the potential to cause significant harm to ecological systems for the purpose of increasing or supporting the accumulation of

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wealth” (see also Lane 1998; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013, 2). Thus, a definition of green crime that helps make the conflict between the ecology and the economy more apparent is critical if ecological destruction is to be identified and prevented over the long term. Green criminologists (Lynch and Stretesky 2011, 2014; Lynch, Stretesky, and Long 2015a) also imply that defining ecological harm should make reference to scientific research, which can objectively identify the detrimental forms of ecological harms that occur in society. Incorporating scientific research into the study of green crime is essential for identifying and eliminating laws that help maintain the conflict between the ecology and economy—or laws that protect economic expansion at the expense of ecological health. Scientists studying environmental problems and sustainability also echo the view that ecological destruction needs to be criminalized. For example, in their study of mountaintop removal Palmer et al. (2010, 149) suggested that “regulators should no longer ignore rigorous science [and that] the United States should take leadership on these issues, particularly since surface mining in many developing countries is expected to grow extensively” (emphasis added). Moreover, some hard scientists are also beginning to call for redefinitions of crime that take account of ecological sustainability. Recently, for instance, Ali Mohamed Al-Damkhi, who is a chemical engineer, and his coauthors (2009, 122) suggested that “seriously hindering efforts toward sustainability worldwide [are] environmental crimes that should be prosecuted within the framework of international law.” The argument that some green criminologists make about defining green crime according to scientific evidence, therefore, is consistent with scientific arguments that help identify the types of regulatory and legal limits that should be imposed on ecologically destructive behavior to minimize conflicts between production and the ecosystem.

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME On a global scale, environmental governance varies considerably across countries. Consistent with a political-economic analysis of law, the cross-national distribution of environmental enforcement appears to be determined partly on the basis of economic conditions. For example, the environmental Kuznets curve (see discussion in chapter 6) suggests that a country’s environmental quality deteriorates as its economy develops, but it later improves as technological modernization reduces levels of pollution (Dinda 2004; Harbaugh, Levinson, and Wilson 2002, Stern 2004). The Kuznets curve would predict that a country’s economic growth, and the associated increase in wealth, will promote changes in technology and create more public demand for environmental regulations that protect the environment. As we have noted, alternatives to that view can be found in environmental sociology, ecological Marxism, ToP theory, and world systems theory (Lynch

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2016b). Indeed, scholars studying environmental conditions cross-nationally often draw on the idea of a “world system” to explain global environmental governance (Roberts and Grimes 2002). As noted earlier, a world systems perspective suggests that countries can be divided into three groups according to a global division of labor (Wallerstein,1974): core countries, or advanced capitalist nations that control the world economy; semiperiphery countries in the process of industrializing; and periphery countries that are largely agricultural, and reliant on unskilled labor and the extraction of natural resources, and that export agricultural and natural resources to the core and semiperiphery countries. Importantly, periphery and semiperiphery countries are generally thought to contribute more to pollution and have weaker environmental laws and regulations. The idea that pollution and harmful extraction are being concentrated in semiperiphery and periphery countries is often referred to as “a race to the bottom” (Vogel, 2009). Race to the bottom means that capitalists seek out and exploit those countries that have fewer environmental regulations in order to facilitate accumulation. Thus, the race to the bottom occurs as global capitalism reorganizes production, relocating harmful production and extraction practices to countries with weaker environmental regulations. As Karl Polanyi (1944, 73) once observed, this movement of capital across the globe “would allow market mechanisms to be the sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment.” As a result, some producers exploit environmental regulations to gain an advantage in the marketplace. Moreover, the policies of the World Trade Organization that govern global financial institutions help to ensure that the race to the bottom continues and that periphery and semiperiphery nations do not disrupt production by implementing stronger environmental regulations (Conca 2000). As a result, periphery and semiperiphery countries that are striving to industrialize lower pollution standards to increase competitiveness in a global capitalist economy (Porter 1999). Thus does the global organization of capitalism influence the structure of law across nations, generating conditions that facilitate expanded ecological disorganization as production shifts from developing to lesser developed (semiperiphery and periphery) nations. Porter (1999, 135) describes this process for the environmentally harmful fertilizer industry for semi-periphery countries: “The phosphate fertilizer industry . . . has shut down many plants in European countries with high environmental requirements, whereas developing countries, particularly China and Morocco, which do not have such stringent requirements, have rapidly expanded their production of phosphate fertilizers.” Governments from periphery countries often encourage or engage in extreme amounts of extraction with little environmental governance and regulation (Bunker 1984). Green criminologists have drawn upon the idea of a race to the bottom to point out that multinational corporations and wealthy states may take advantage of

The Treadmill of Environmental Law

developing countries by directing development-related investment to those countries, in part because they tend to have weaker environmental protections (Lopez and Mitra 2000). Therefore, the environmental costs avoided by wealthier countries are displaced onto developing states (Lynch 2016b; Stretesky and Lynch 2009). This is most apparent when examining green crime on an international scale (Torras and Boyce 1998). Unfortunately, such displacement does not mitigate the impact of environmental harm on core countries because pollution is not confined by political boundaries (Brack 2002). Green criminologists often point out that international environmental enforcement is carried out through multilateral environmental agreements, or MEAs, which are legally binding agreements between multiple countries that focus on an environmental issue (Churchill and Ulfstein 2000). There are hundreds of MEAs in existence. Green criminologists who have studies MEAs focus largely on the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, or CITES; and the Basel Convention (Green, Ward, and McConnachie 2007; Wellsmith 2010; White and Heckenberg 2014; Gibbs et al. 2010; Walters 2007; White 2011). As noted earlier, CITES was drafted in 1963, as a response to the need to protect endangered species, but it was not ratified and implemented until 1975. The aim of this conservation agreement is to monitor and prevent the international trade in threatened animals and plants (Wijnstekers 2003). CITES lists species threatened with extinction; species, trade in which must be controlled to prevent them from becoming endangered; and species for which at least one country has asked for help in controlling trade (Wijnstekers 2003). Each of the 181 countries that are signatories to the convention implements CITES through their own national environmental laws and enforcement mechanisms (CITES 2012). For instance, in the United States, CITES is implemented through the Endangered Species Act, the Lacey Act, the African Elephant Conservation Act, and the Wild Bird Conservation Act. In the United States CITES related legal codes are enforced by the US Fish and Wildlife Services, and offenders may be prosecuted by the US Department of Justice. In the United Kingdom, CITES is also implemented by a variety of acts such as the Control of Trade in Endangered Species Regulations (1997–2009), the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, and the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006. These acts are enforced by the UK police and border force and supported by the National Wildlife Crime Unit. Green criminologists such as Lemieux and Clarke (2009) found that the impact of the CITES ban in the case of ivory trade has helped to prevent the poaching of elephants (see chapter 8). However, they note that countries that reside near state actors that do not implement CITES continue to face higher than average elephant poaching because, they suspect, poachers have access to nearby unregulated markets. But again, this is a global problem, and the researchers note that unregulated markets must be closed, including “all those in neighboring countries . . . otherwise the poached

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ivory will continue to be transported to where it can easily be sold” (Lemieux and Clarke 2009, 464). Thus, treaties like CITES are only effective when the problem is addressed by all countries and not just a few. The Basel Convention, another major MEA, was adopted in 1989 and entered into force in 1992, to combat the transfer of hazardous waste between nations-especially waste from developed to less developed nations. As is the case with CITES, each of the 182 signatories to the Basel Convention have agreed to reduce the toxicity of the waste they generate and to promote sound environmental management where the waste is generated. Developed countries have also agreed to aid less developed countries with best waste management practices. Moreover, the implementation of Basel is largely adapted to the enforcement practices and resources in each country. In particular, within its articles, the protocol emphasizes that (1) hazardous waste reduction should be promoted over hazardous waste disposal; (2) there should be restrictions on the “transboundary” movement of hazardous wastes; and (3) states can create and enforce a regulatory system that governs when waste can be moved between countries. Unfortunately, these goals are hard to realize because of varying definitions of hazardous waste (i.e., waste is often redefined in order to comply with Basel) and because legislation is lacking in many countries. In addition, state enforcement mechanisms concerning hazardous waste are not consistent (Rummel-Bulska 1998). As a result, enforcement is left to a variety of actors and networks that include governmental and nongovernmental organizations. For instance, organizations and networks that attempt to enforce the Basel protocol include “the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), the Transfrontier Shipments cluster of the European Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL-TFS), the International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE), the Asian Network for Prevention of Illegal Transboundary Movements of Wastes” (Voinov-Kohler 2011, 214). Moreover, other nonprofit organizations have emerged worldwide that work toward the ideals of the Basel protocol. For instance, the Basel Action Network has worked to implement its principles through environmental litigation; collecting anonymous tips concerning the shipment of hazardous waste across boarders (http://ban.org/hilights/highlights08.html); providing education about Basel principles to the public and corporations; and public whistleblowing campaigns that post leaked documents from companies and governments that violate principles of the Basel Protocol (www.ban.org/whistle-blowers-corner/). While these efforts help implement the protocol, they are, nevertheless uncoordinated and arbitrary when considered in a global context. Moreover, regulators and law enforcement in most Basel countries lack adequate training and do not have appropriate technology to identify waste (Bisschop 2015).

The Treadmill of Environmental Law

Gibbs et al. (2010, 135) note that most countries have passed legislation to regulate hazardous waste under Basel even if its implementation is highly uneven across nations. For instance, they suggest that while the European Union has banned the export of e-waste to developing nations, the United States “continues to export many forms of E-waste via an ineffective notification and consent process.” States—often influenced by powerful corporate interests—have thwarted global efforts to better define, identify, and enforce environmental crime (White 2011). For instance, not all states ratify MEAs, and those that do may not possess the resources and ability to enforce the agreements they ratify. In the end, countries that sign international environmental agreements tend to be core countries (e.g., ones that have the wealth to adhere to citizen demands about environmental laws and regulations within their borders), although there are major exceptions. For example, the United States and Canada are not parties to the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement about limiting climate change; between 1989 and 2011, US presidents have signed eleven MEAs that were not ratified by the US Congress (Bang, Hovi, and Sprinz 2012). As a result, globalization influences the development and enforcement of environmental laws across the globe.

CONCLUSION We began this chapter by suggesting that there is a general belief in the rule of law that governs the land and reduces conflict between parties across various scales of governance. We argued that this notion of the rule of law is oppressive because capitalism determines the state of environmental law, and powerful interests use those laws to promote production. That is, the law intensifies the conflict between the environment and the ecology. To demonstrate this point we draw on the work of Turk (1976) to suggest that, within a global economy, the law maintains control over the ecological withdrawals and additions as suggested by the ToP. We label this idea the treadmill of law and suggest that the law allows the conflict between the environment and the ecology to continue by giving us a false impression of the effectiveness of deterrence while maintaining that technology and deregulation will solve our ecological crises over the long run. These false promises, along with the refusal of many criminologists to study harm not defined by criminal law, have led us to a condition in which conflict between the economy and the ecology can be maintained for the foreseeable future. Only by changing the definition of crime to take sustainability into account can we begin to reduce that conflict and reshape the global capitalism to reduce environmental harm.

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S T U DY G U I D E Questions and Activities for Students 1. Explain what the rule of law means. According to the authors, why doesn’t the rule of law prevent powerful interests from increasing production? 2. What is the conflict between the economy and the ecology? Why does the law intensify that conflict? 3. Give three examples of how the law addresses microconcerns but ignores harm to the biosphere. 4. Review the idea of the treadmill of law and explain how the political economy of capitalism influences environmental law. 5. What is Jevons’s paradox and how is that different from the ecological modernization argument? 6. Some criminologists believe that corporate offenders should be more harshly punished under the law. What impact would this have on protecting the biosphere? 7. Researchers suggest that there may be a race to the bottom when it comes to pollution. Give three examples of production practices that have harmed developing countries and are now unlawful in many developing countries. Lessons for Researchers 1. Criminologists have studied the role of punishment on behavior since the beginning of the discipline. However, green criminologists have been relatively slow to study the impact of various environmental laws that are meant to punish illegal and harmful corporate behavior. As a result, there is a need to better examine the concept of corporate environmental deterrence to determine if

there are situations in which the law can protect the biosphere more generally. 2. As noted in this chapter, green criminologists have extensively referenced multilateral environmental agreements. However, the extent and impact of these agreements are rarely studied quantitatively. More information is needed to determine the actual impact, if any, that these agreements may have on preventing various types of ecological disorganization. 3. The cross-national variation in environmental laws and enforcement has significant implications for the race to the bottom development debate. However, few researchers have examined environmental laws across countries to determine how those laws relate to the global movement of harmful production and criminal corporations. It is clear that these links need additional investigation to establish if and how the movement of capital across the globe may be influenced by laws and law enforcement responses. 4. The definition of criminal law is often recognized as bias because it represents class interests. Thus, criminologists have argued that the discipline would be better were it oriented toward studying social harm. Green criminologists often rely on the social harm logic to justify studying environmental disorganization. Here, green criminologists can and should investigate the weaknesses of previous definitions of green crime in order to contribute to a widely accepted definition of crime that orients the discipline.

CH A P T ER

Environmental Social Movements and Environmental Nongovernmental Organizations

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his chapter examines environmental social movements (ESOs), also called movement organizations (MOs), which include those nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that address environmental problems. Social movements have a long history that has been traced to the mid-1700s in the United Kingdom (Tilly 2004, 1978). Social movements typically have a political orientation and seek to use public protest to agitate for social change, often through the political system. Historically, these movements have been involved in causes such as the abolition of slavery (which began in the United Kingdom in the later 1700s and early 1800), enhancing workers’ rights and wages, voting rights for women and minorities, civil rights (e.g., the ones that occurred in the United States in the 1960s), and environmental justice (see also ch. 9). Zald and Ash (1966, 329) define a social movement as “a purposive and collective attempt of a number of people to change individuals or societal institutions and structures.” Despite Zald and Ash’s longstanding defi nition of social movements, scholars find it difficult to identify and study these movements and organizations. Social movements are more than collective behaviors and attitudes— members of social movements often share some collective identity and are organized along informal lines, as Zald

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and Ash suggest. This definition of social movements leads some environmental scholars to conclude that social movements should be “broadly conceived as lying on a spectrum ranging from grassroots movements to transnational NGOs engaged in working for what they perceive to be progressive social and ecological change” (Ford 2003, 120). Despite the defi nition of social movements, organizations that are part of that movement (i.e., movement organizations or MOs) are unique because they (1) exist to change society, and (2) offer the incentive of personal fulfilment in exchange for dedicated time and loyalty to further the organization’s cause (Zald and Ash 1966). Importantly, social movements, and MOs, do not emerge in a vacuum. They are born over time from existing social conditions, and emerge through an established set of recognized stages (Dela Porta and Diani 2006; see also Blumer 1969). Social movements begin to emerge when there is a grievance among potential movement participants that is aimed at some social condition or policy (Tarrow and Tollefson 1994). In the early stages, there is little organization among potential social movement participants as MOs begin to form and bring attention to identified grievances. As social movements advance, they coalesce and generate conditions that allow participating MOs to form. When MOs emerge, they rarely rely on paid staff, but draw their power from volunteers (Zald and Ash 1966). Over time, however, these organizations become more formalized and specialized and begin to make connections to social elites and policy makers for the purposes of influencing their agenda. In many instances MOs begin to accept money and resources from various funders and foundations, and become bureaucratic or formalized (De la Porta and Diani, 2006). The environmental movement—especially the portion of that movement that focuses on environmental protection—fits neatly into this description of social movement formation, as it is made up of individuals and organizations interested in social changes that promote enhanced environmental conditions. Within ESOs, MOs have expanded considerably over time, and some of those organizations are focused on environmental protection. Th is chapter examines these MOs by looking at the rise in environmental protection organizations, their influence on environmental enforcement, the limitations of these organizations and the recent concerns that they are being captured and co-opted by corporate interests. With respect to the latter issue, as ESOs create conditions that limit or threaten the unrestrained expansion of production, a fierce and organized environmental countermovement has emerged that engages in environmental harm denial, legitimates global capitalist production and its expansion, and seeks to undermine ESOs. For their part, green criminologists have tended to overlook the study of environmental social organization movements, and this is an area ripe for additional green criminological research. Early in the history of green criminology, South (1998) and Lynch (1990) proposed that green criminologists study the importance of ESOs as a mechanism for controlling environmental

Environmental Social Movements

disorganization. In response, green criminologists have studied the growth of ESOs over time in the United States (Stretesky et al. 2011; Stretesky, Huss, and Lynch 2012), and have undertaken empirical and theoretical studies of environmental justice movements (Lynch and Stretesky 1998; Stretesky and Lynch 2002, 1999, 1998). Wyatt (2014), South and Wyatt (2011), and Nurse (2013) have drawn attention to the roles NGOs play in protecting wildlife and limiting their illegal trade (see also Daut, Brightsmith, and Peterson 2015), while Bisschop (2012b) and van Solinge (2008, 2010) have drawn attention to the role NGOs play in controlling illegal logging and timber crimes. These few examples illustrate the need for further development of a green criminological literature on the roles ESOs and NGOs play in efforts to control green crime and injustice.

THE RISE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS The rise of the environmental movement has important implications for understanding the relationship between the ecology and the economy (Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013b). For instance, we have noted that corporate actors drive production and that the state and labor align with corporate interests to maintain tax revenues and jobs. In fact, as we discussed in chapter 10, globally, states seeking to enhance production may even weaken environmental laws to attract economic development in what is sometimes described as a race to the bottom (a race, one could say, now under way in the United States with the Trump administration’s new environmental policy approach). The idea that the environmental movement and organizations can influence states and pressure them to enforce, create, or strengthen environmental laws should be of great interest to green criminologists. As Obach (2004) noted, the environmental movement can pressure labor and the state into giving more weight to the ecology when managing conflicts between it and the economy. Social movements may do this by challenging production-oriented hegemony. Hegemony is defined simply as a condition in which subordinates adopt the ideology of the elite that rules them (Bates 1975, 353). As a result, the ideology of global capitalism that has dominated economic discourse across the world suggests that economic growth is vital to social wellbeing. Dorceta Taylor (2000, 528) suggests that when capitalist ideology has been applied to the environment it has resulted in a “conceptualization of human-environmental relations” as one that is dominated by an “exploitative capitalist paradigm.” As a result, Taylor notes that throughout the nineteenth century, there was a worldview that natural resources were needed for economic growth, and that the destruction of the environment was not really a social problem because nature is renewable, or technology would eventually find a way to solve most natural resource problems.

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The dominant capitalist ideology about the environment has not been unopposed (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008), and MOs can challenge corporate decision making that has produced the environmental crisis (Mann 1993, 183). Moreover, social scientists suggest that ecological well-being science has increased opposition to global production. Specifically, Taylor and Buttel (1992) suggest that science has stimulated environmental grievances. In particular, they believe that “we have global environmental problems because, in short, science documents the existing situation and ever tightens its predictions of future changes. Accordingly, science supplies the knowledge needed to stimulate and guide social-political action” (Taylor and Buttel 1992, 406). As scientific studies have been increasingly documenting environmental problems, so too have the environmental movements and MOs that oppose environmental harms that are generated by production. Recently, scholars have suggested that these movements have expanded considerably over recent decades. For instance Brulle, Carmichael, Jenkins (2007) studied nearly 155 different data sources that document the existence of environmental MOs (or ESOs) from 1900 to 2000, finding that in the United States there were less than twenty-five environmental movement organizations founded from 1900 to 1960. However, by 1970, the number of environmental organizations had increased by nearly 100 organizations per year, and by the 1990s the number had increased to nearly 200 organizations per year (Brulle, Carmichael, Jenkins 2007, 266; see also Kline 2007, 84–85; Stretesky et al. 2011). Th is tremendous increase in environmental organizations represents an astounding rise in opposition to environmental harm occurring throughout the world. Globally, it is more difficult to estimate the number of environmental ESOs and supporting MOs, but it is considerable. For instance, NGOs, which are often considered to be a formal organizational component of social movements, probably number in the millions (Lewis and Kanji 2009, 2). It is likely that a number of these organizations are engaged in environmental protection efforts in various parts of the globe. Moreover, the amount of resources that flow through these organizations is significant. For instance, Lewis and Kanji (2009, 2) suggest that NGOs may have collected nearly US$23 billion in total aid money in 2004. These numbers and resources suggest that there could be considerable opposition to harmful production practices worldwide. Unfortunately, as will be discussed below, the modern environmental movement, while still expanding, has changed over time and become less focused on harmful aspects of production. For instance, Mol (2000, 52) notes, “Although fierce opposition against the capitalist economic system . . . can still be found in the diverse ideological spectrum of the environmental movement, these ideas have definitely moved from a core position to the periphery between the 1970s and the 1990s.” As a result, the growth in ESOs that oppose production may have decreased over time. We will explore the influence and problems associated with the environmental enforcement movement in greater detail below.

Environmental Social Movements

ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PROTECTION MOs influence levels of environmental protection at the local, national, and world levels (Cole and Foster 2001; Gould, Schnaiberg, and Weinberg 1996; Martinez-Alier 2003; B. R. Taylor 1995). As previously noted, the expansion of production and accumulation of capital are central to the conflict between the economy and the ecology, and it is the ecology that loses out in these conflicts because it is subordinate to the economy. Nevertheless, ESOs can sometimes pressure governments to protect the environment, and they therefore represent an important external force that attenuates the expansion of production by redefining crime, as well as helping to direct environmental enforcement efforts (Tarlock 1992). For instance, Tarlock (1992) provides evidence that coalitions of environmental organizations have successfully used international law to prevent US corporations from being located in Latin American countries like Honduras, by arguing that it would destroy the environment. Thus, MOs can pressure local, regional, and national governments to change or enforce environmental laws through lobbying efforts and networks (A. M. Clark 1995). Thus, the primary way that ESOs influence environmental policy is to engage in advocacy efforts with government officials (Keck and Sikkink 1999). These efforts may be focused on a variety of environmental issues and problems, but the important point is that they draw on notions of environmental protection. ESOs may also target corporations (i.e., producers) directly, and do so with or without state support. Gould, Schnaiberg, Weinberg (1996) suggest that ESOs can disrupt and shame producers in ways that cause them to behave more responsibly when it comes to their impact on the environment (see fig. 11.1). One tactic that some MOs use is “name and shame,” or making producers’ harmful environmental behaviors public, thereby leaving them open to criticism and making them potential targets for environmental activists (Hamann and Acutt 2003; Raynolds, Long, and Murray 2014; Raynolds, Murray, and Heller 2007). In some cases ESOs with considerable financial resources may try to initiate change in producers by promoting social investment through “activist shareholders” (Becht et al. 2010). These organizations invest in corporate stocks and attend company meetings to try and force environmental issues onto producers’ agendas (Clark, Salo, and Hebb 2008). One such organization is As You Sow, which “promotes environmental and social corporate responsibility through shareholder advocacy, coalition building, and innovative legal strategies“ (www.asyousow.org/about-us/). The organization notes that it has “fi led hundreds of shareholder resolutions [that have created] change in behaviour at the largest companies in the world.” Some of these shareholder efforts link to other environmental organizations that promote monitoring efforts. As You Sow, for instance, negotiated the establishment of FracFocus (http://fracfocus .org), which releases once hidden data on fracking chemicals used in wells across the United States to the public. While the membership claims no position

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Figure 11.1 March against Monsanto. Name and Shame Protest against Monsanto Corporation. This image provides an example of a how ESOs can attempt to influence the behavior of corporations and call attention to the environmental harms corporations produce. Source: Photograph by Rosealee Yagihara Wikimedia Commons.

on natural gas extraction, they suggest that organizations release their data to them voluntarily to “provide factual information concerning hydraulic fracturing and groundwater protection.” Providing information to the public about environmental performance is often contested. That is, companies must often produce information about environmental performance or lose social approval (Brown and Deegan 1998). When an operation is challenged, “The community may revoke its contract to continue . . . [by] . . . reducing or eliminating the demand for products or the business, . . . eliminating the supply of labour and financial capital to the business, or constituents lobbying the government for increased taxes, fines, or laws to prohibit those actions which do not conform with the expectations of the community” (Brown and Deegan 1998, 22). In theory, providing information on production practices, especially those that harm the environment, may allow MOs to launch campaigns that target the corporate bottom line. And companies sometimes adopt new technologies for pollution prevention when information about their performance is made public (Esty 2004). Thus, Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton (2004) believe that public information about environmental performance may push corporations to go beyond compliance to prevent MOs from launching campaigns against corporations.

Environmental Social Movements

In response to pressure for information on environmental performance, some producers have begun to participate in “party private certification” systems to demonstrate that they care about the environment (Bartley 2003). For instance, timber certification is one area in which numerous private regulatory entities (NGOs) have evolved to demonstrate that producers take environmental concerns seriously. The Forest Stewardship Council, created through a partnership between businesses and environmentalists (us.fsc.org/en-us/whowe-are/our-history), is one such organization. The certification program operates in more than eighty countries and claims to use the “marketplace to protect forests for future generations.” The certification program works when timber companies apply to become certified and then agree to show that they effectively manage their forests by showing the timber they harvest, process, distribute, or sell conforms to the rules set up by the Forest Stewardship Council. These rules are monitored by independent inspectors that are not connected to the companies being monitored by the Forest Stewardship Council. Bartley (2003, 433) notes that private certification programs are popular mechanisms for producers because of the social pressure that companies face from the environmental movement, and because they are the obvious form of regulation in a neoliberal context which state budgets are dwindling and laissezfaire economics increasingly drive environmental regulation. Some MOs use different tactics, and try and influence producers through more direct “operations” efforts (Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013b; EilstrupSangiovanni and Bondaroff 2014), for example, through bucket brigades developed as a form of “community environmental policing” to monitor manufacturers locally (O’Rourke and Macey 2003). These organizations take on state policing functions across the globe, often in countries that have high levels of pollution and little environmental regulatory staff (for a US example related to community water-monitoring organizations, see Lynch and Stretesky 2013). Global Community Monitor (www.gcmonitor.org/) helps organize community groups to monitor air quality in more than a dozen countries, including Zambia, Nigeria, South Africa, Thailand, Israel, the Philippines, India, Kazakhstan, Barbados, and Curacao. Lynch and Stretesky (2013) suggest there are a number of community organizations in the United States that verify water quality for the EPA. The World Wildlife Fund‘s crime’s technology project (www .worldwildlife.org/projects/ wildlife-crime-technology-project) currently uses drones, or unmanned aerial systems, to monitor ecological crimes, and to “give governments battling wildlife crime a vital advantage” by identifying crimes and criminals. While these organizations provide information largely to aid state law enforcement efforts, other organizations engage in law enforcement activities more directly, when government enforcement agencies and officials shows a lack of concern for the enforcement of existing environmental laws. For instance, some organizations may take producers to court after their environmental monitoring suggests an environmental violation has occurred.

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Other organizations my engage in nonviolent direct action to stop environmental harm (Epstein 1991). In other instances MOs may oppose environmental violations with tactics such as “ecotage” or “monkeywrenching” intended to destroy or sabotage production efforts and ecological threats (Gottschalk 1998). For instance, organizations such as Earth First! and the Earth Liberation Front use arson and other methods to target harmful corporate actors. Sea Shepherds actively blocks the extraction of whales from the ocean (Bondaroff, 2011), while groups such as the River Keepers, which began as a local movement among Hudson River (New York) fishermen, confront corporation pollution and destruction of waterways using a variety of tactics, including lawsuits, and has developed into a global organization, the Waterkeeper Alliance (Cronin and Kennedy 1999). The effectiveness of MOs is not well understood. However, it is believed that they represent a major force in the environmental movement. For instance, Boli and Thomas (1997, 181) comment that the most powerful and organized international MOs “make rules and expect them to be followed; they plead their views with states or transnational corporations and express moral condemnation when their pleas go unheeded.” Willitt (1996, 57) suggests that at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, NGOs “took part in preparatory work, wrote special reports, joined governmental delegations . . . and have been described by UN officials as having been ‘unprecedented’ in their influence.” For instance, some of the larger environmental organizations in the world, which have engaged in tactics ranging from monitoring to direct action, include the Environmental Defense Fund, the Sierra Club, the Wildlife Conservation Society, Greenpeace, the Human Society, the World Wildlife Federation, and Defenders of Wildlife (see Stein and Beckel 2006).

FORMALIZATION AND FAILURE While ESOs have had important effects on curbing ecological destruction and disorganization, they are not always successful. Sometimes, the success or failure of ESOs relates to the kinds of industries they attempt to control. Significant pressure by environmental organizations on governments and producers has not, for example, prevented the acceleration of fossil fuel withdraws or reduced the rate of carbon dioxide releases (McKibben 2011). In other words, despite the efforts of ESOs, the earth is approaching the ecological rift described by Foster, Clark, and York (2010b), reviewed in chapter 3 and captured by the scientific concept of planetary boundaries and the ecological footprint. This observation raises an important question: Can ESOs promote the kind of change needed to pressure and alleviate the conflict between the economy and ecology? We have already noted that environmental problems are global, and there is little hope that they can be solved in isolation. Thus, there will

Environmental Social Movements

need to be an organized effort at addressing environmental conditions across the globe, even while significant protest must also be local (Cole and Foster 2001). Nevertheless, even with significant pressure from the environmental movement to pursue global solutions, a truly organized global approach to environmental protection has yet to materialize. Georgeson (2014) suggests that one way to approach the problem of global environmental governance is to create a global environmental protection agency. To be sure, ESOs have pushed for this type of global governance. Unfortunately, as we have already suggested, the prioritization of the economy over the ecology has prevented a strong global law enforcement agency from emerging. Specifically, “A specialised [global] agency exists for industrial development, but not for sustainable development” (Georgeson 2014). The lack of a global organization has significant implications for the environmental movement. This is most apparent when we examine the role of the nongovernmental sector of the environmental movement. Tarlock (1992, 63) suggests initially, Domestic NGO activism was a way to “jump start” government agencies, which were unresponsive to environmental values because they had degenerated from progressive regulatory agencies to ossified mission agencies. Once these agencies broadened their values, it was hoped that they would once again merit the trust of the public to manage resources scientifically. The opposite happened. NGOs became permanent players in the regulatory game with the capacity to influence all phases of policy, and NGO participation in law making has now become a political theory. The existence of strong NGOs has been identified as a hallmark of democratic government and thus a necessary condition for effective environmentalism.

As a result, it is not surprising that, globally, it is MOs rather than governments that coordinate a significant amount of environmental enforcement. For example, the International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (inece.org/about/who-we-are/) coordinates more than four thousand members from international organizations, governmental agencies, and NGOs, which provide enforcement across most of the globe. Yet too much reliance on MOs can be problematic. For instance, research suggests that global environmental enforcement by NGOs is potentially unequal (Stretesky and Knight 2013). Importantly, Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu (2002, 18) suggest that peripheral/less developed countries are not adequately monitored or that environmental laws are underenforced in those locations. There are other reasons why the environmental movement may not be successful in putting the brakes on the global or local treadmill of production (ToP), in addition to the lack of a global environmental agency. Th is may be a consequence of “de-radicalization”—i.e., the unwillingness to recognize that capitalism is responsible for the acceleration of production and hence ecological destruction. Thus de-radicalization may be a major reason that ESOs have been unable to stop the ToP.

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We suggest that this de-radicalization of the environmental movement has occurred for two significant reasons. First, as the environmental movement has grown, it has expanded its focus, drawing attention to an increasing number of problems and solutions. This expanded focus can provide mixed messages about environmental problems, and promote a vast array of potential solutions, making it difficult to select the best approach. Thus it should come as no surprise that production is not viewed as central to environmental problems across ESOs and NGOs. Second, the de-radicalization has occurred as the movement has become more formalized and drawn more of its funding and resources from foundations, corporations, and governments—or as those organizations (ESOs and NGOs) have been drawn into the existing power structure. With respect to mixed messages, social scientists have suggested that the environmental movement has become less radical over time, many environmental organizations are likely to work within the system by employing market-based policies, and others have become less likely to work outside the system and challenge capitalism. Th is condition is especially true of MOs, which are more formalized and, as suggested below, draw money from entities that support production. In our view this is especially problematic because, as we have previously argued, the root of the environmental problem is situated in global capitalism and the ToP (Schnaiberg 1980). In short, the environmental movement sends mixed messages concerning the source of the problem. To combat the ToP, environmental organizations would need to frame the problem in terms of the contradictions of capitalism (Foster, Clark, and York 2010b). Unfortunately, many of the solutions recently advocated by the environmental movement are neoliberal in nature and involve a return to free market economic ideas, by which corporations protect the environment through selfinterest, or as a response to economic incentives. Speth (2008, 68) is critical of proposals by ESOs that advocate for economic incentives to promote environmental protection, and instead suggests that it is again time for radical action that challenges the forces of global capitalism. The fact that over time the environmental movement becomes more diverse and less focused on problems associated with production is not really surprising. Rootes (2005) notes that within the United Kingdom and Europe, the environmental movement has expanded its concerns and often takes on social issues that have little to do with the environment. Benford (2005) suggests that within the United States, the radical aspects of the movement have been marginalized within ESOs, and their more radical implications have given way to social issues approaches that do not see capitalism as the root of the environmental problem. Gottlieb (2005, 6) suggests that as new environmental movements have emerged they have “diluted the meaning and power of the environmental critique.” In this vein, Benford (2005) notes that ESOs are becoming similar to more conservative social justice organizations with respect to goals and strategies. As a result, the declining use of direct action tactics that have

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traditionally been used to protest unsustainable production may signal the move toward a market-based environmental movement. Consequently, ESOs are less likely to use direct action to challenge environmental behavior, instead seeking solutions that work within the system and are less likely to challenge the idea that the market itself is the source of ecological disorganization.

MOVEMENT FORMALIZATION When MOs emerge, they often bring alterative opportunities for pursuing social change. At the same time, interactions between MOs promote the creation of formal MO organizations, such as registered NGOs, that are often better at fostering coalitions that can use institutional tactics to bring about largescale change (Staggenborg, 1988). We take the position that while ESO movement formalization may be desirable, it is also problematic. This position is best summed up by Dunlap and Mertig (1991, 211) who observed that “organizations must obtain support of the media, funding sources, the public and policy-makers and as a result the movement becomes institutionalized and its organizations evolve into formalized interest groups staffed by activiststurned-bureaucrats, many of its leaders are co-opted by government staff or simply tire of the battle.” As a result, we suggest that formalized ESO organizations are likely to be less radical, and therefore less effective, at promoting the type of environmental enforcement that can challenge the ToP. This occurs because these organizations are captured by mainstream funding sources, and because organization leaders make a career out of their positions and the maintenance of their organizations at the cost of promoting more significant social change. As an example, Brulle and Pellow (2005) have suggested that the environmental justice movement has developed a heavy reliance on foundation and government funding that has changed the way the movement operates. In these cases, ESOs are often at the mercy of their funding sources. These sources, through donations and contracts, may influence the form and type of protest action that the organization can use. Brulle (2000) and Benford (2005) have proposed that the over-reliance on foundation funding may therefore decrease grassroots struggles. Few empirical studies address the issue of MO capture in the social movement literature. However, Rios (2000) has discovered that the formalized environmental justice organizations she studied were more likely to oppose grassroots organizing than the less formalized, or grass-roots organizations. She concluded that organizations that are more formalized might also be more responsive to their funders (i.e., states and corporations) than organization members. The fear that formalized ESOs may be taking money from big donors in a way that represents the interest of producers rather than the environment is not uncommon. For instance, Dauvergne and LeBaron

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(2014) have demonstrated that many of the world’s largest environmental MOs have developed corporate partnerships with companies like Wal-Mart, British Petroleum, Coca-Cola, and McDonald’s. Many times these partnerships involve significant financial backing. For instance, according to the New York Times (Barringer, 2012), Chesapeake Energy Company helped secure approximately $26 million in donations for the Sierra Club from 2007 to 2010. Bruce Hamilton, the club’s executive director, noted, “It’s difficult just because it was such a large portion of the Sierra Club’s financial backing” (cited in Barringer 2012). The flow of money from corporate donors, foundations, and governments raises the important question of who these ESOs represent. For instance, Ford (2003, 123) suggests that, even while the environmental movement has called for the world to protect the biosphere under the banner of democratization, “Global environmental governance has not actually been extended to the negotiating table [because] global civil society is a fairly exclusive club, which cuts the grass-roots off.” As a result of formalization, ESOs may be more likely to focus on education, community organizing, and lobbying public officials (i.e., operating within the system), as opposed to focusing on direct action to change the system. Social inequality may be one consequence of the formalized environmental movement. That is, formalized MOs may have a tendency to organize around resources that do not challenge but foster protection in their local areas, regions, or countries. This is particularly apparent when the “not in my back yard,” or NIMBY movement, is considered. Saha and Mohai (2005) suggest that in the United States racial inequity in the locating of hazardous waste facilities developed during the NIMBY era. That is, as people become concerned about environment hazards, they organized their available resources to keep hazards out of their communities, thereby protecting their community’s health and local environment, perhaps at the expense of another community’s environmental health. Unfortunately, communities with the least amount of power and resources to organize are also the most likely to fail in these struggles, and thus to become targets for corporate pollution. For instance, Schelly and Stretesky (2009) studied four major, and successful, environmental protests to stop hazardous waste facilities from being located in the protesters’ communities. In each case the company moved production to another, more disadvantaged, community. Thus, rather than preventing harmful production, the protests ensured that production would simply be moved to another location. The geographic location of movement organizations, therefore, is important (Schelly and Stretesky, 2009). The concept of NIMBY and its failure to challenge production in a radical way can also be extended to global environmental protection. Extant research suggests that international NGOs that contribute to the enforcement of environmental regulations are more likely to be located in high-income countries

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than in low-income ones (Stretesky and Knight 2013). McPeak (2001) points out that it is not uncommon for major global NGOs to dismiss concerns of lowincome countries (see also Jancar-Webster 1998). Thus, NGOs may have particular trouble addressing the ecological concerns of disadvantaged global citizens, and may cause conflicts between the movement’s elite and those who are adversely impacted (the poor) by the harmful consequences of production. Moreover, Gomez (2008) argues that global NGOs that are headquartered in the Global North but operate in the Global South have often been referred to as “neocolonial” organizations. In making that observation, Gomez implies that some global NGOs reinforce the historical relationships between the Global North and Global South. That historical relationship was and is based on the cultural and economic dominance and oppression of the Global South by the North. Those relationships, which emerged in the late 1500s through the 1600s, involved efforts by more economically developed northern (capitalist) countries to exploit natural resources in underdeveloped/southern nations, and included a long history of genocide against indigenous peoples in Global South nations (Crook and Short 2014; Fenelon and Hall 2008; Fenelon and Murguía 2008; Hall and Fenelon 2015, 2008). While it is clear that the environmental movement and its MOs have made significant progress in addressing ecological problems, their tendency to become less radical over time removes important challenges to capitalism and has promoted more market-based ecological solutions that are likely to prevent the environmental movement from realizing its full potential. These observations also imply that the conflict between the mainstream environmental movement and grassroots organizing is becoming increasingly apparent (Rowell 1996).

COUNTER MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND RESISTANCE At the same time that the environmental movement has become more bureaucratized and formalized and less radical, it has faced considerable resistance (Murphy 2005). This resistance is largely coming from the environmental opposition movement ,which vilifies and criminalizes environmental activists and frames environmental protection as a problem for economic development and progress (McClanahan 2014; Yates 2011). Opposition to the environmental movement is complex and has emerged in different forms, including politics, social movements, and seemingly disorganized and isolated events. For instance, today, politicians in many countries can make a career out of opposing the environmental movement and labeling themselves openly as “ antigreen.” Many conservative politicians use this platform to gain political support from their conservative base (Rowell 1996, 2). For example, in an interview on Fox News, Chris Wallace asked popular Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump about cutting state services:

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t ru m p : Environmental protection, what they do is a disgrace. Every week they come out with new regulations. They’re making it impossible . . . wa l l ac e : Who’s going to protect the environment? t ru m p : —They—we’ll be fine with the environment. We can leave a little bit, but you can’t destroy businesses (RealClear Politics 2015).

McCright, Xiao, and Dunlap (2014, 252; see also Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman 2008) suggest that the antienvironmental movement in American politics began “after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union [when the] the conservative movement replaced the ‘Red Scare’ with a new ‘Green Scare.’ ” McCright, Xiao, and Dunlap show that over time there has been an increasing gap between Republicans and Democrats in the US Congress when it comes to voting on proenvironment legislation. Using voting scores from the League of Conservation Voters, they (2014, 253) found that by 2012 the gap between scores for Democrats and Republicans had reached nearly seventy points on a hundredpoint conservation scale. This gap represents a significant divide in environmental politics when it comes to the environment and to organized efforts by the political elite aimed at undermining environmental protection in favor of economic development and the ToP. As Cabin (2011) notes, these efforts are likely fueled by the “fossil fuel/corrupt politicians/McMedia complex.” More recently, there has been an effort to frame the antienvironmental political opposition as one that also threatens Christian beliefs. As noted by Cabin (2011) these efforts consist of demonstrating how the environmental movement involves what are described as containing “anti-Christianity” sentiments. Specifically, Cabin noted that many Christian leaders associated with the right have criticized the environmental movement. For instance, the video series Resisting the Green Dragon notes that “the bible powerfully confronts environmental fears and how—in God’s wise design—people and nature can thrive together.” That video is marketed to church groups and other community organizations across the United States. The website for that series notes that “without a doubt one of the greatest threats to society and the church today is the multifaceted environmentalist movement” (www.resistingthegreendragon .com/). This form of environmental opposition is also found in political arenas among the conservative right. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, a Democrat from Rhode Island, pointed out that one of his Republican colleagues suggested to him that “God won’t allow us to ruin our planet” (speech to the US Senate, May 9, 2013). The MOs associated with the environmental countermovement are often well organized and well funded and are likely to promote market-based solutions to environmental problems. For instance, the Cornwall Alliance, which has supported the video series Resisting the Green Dragon, was founded in 2005 as the Interfaith Stewardship Alliance. It has stated that “we believe Earth and its ecosystems . . . are robust, self-regulating, and self-correcting [and] . . . deny that Earth and its ecosystems are the fragile and unstable product of

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chance, and particularly that Earth’s climate system is vulnerable to dangerous alteration because of minuscule changes in atmospheric chemistry” (cornwallalliance.org/2009/05/evangelical-declaration-on-global-warming/). The argument continues: “Recent warming was neither abnormally large nor abnormally rapid. There is no convincing scientific evidence that human contribution to greenhouse gases is causing dangerous global warming.” Th is document also notes that it opposes the scientific argument that carbon dioxide is a pollutant. The Cornwell Alliance has been accused of receiving funding from the ExxonMobil and the mining industry (ThinkProgress 2010). Across the globe, the number of antienvironmental movement organizations has been increasing (Rowell 1996). Many of these organizations and groups are situated within the self-described “wise-use” movement, which represents a loose network of MOs and corporate interest groups that protest current environmental protection and “future environmental reforms in order to benefit the economic interests of the organization’s members or funders” (Burke 1993). These organizations are often supported by various extractive industries; their mission is to promote the idea that policies protecting the environment will harm the economy and private property rights. Thus, they claim that the only way to solve environmental problems is through free market environmentalism. Austin (2002) has argued that the antienvironmental countermovement is well organized and funded by corporate think tanks, and many key players in the movement occupy significant positions of political power, or have access to key political figures. These organizations often help organize and fund what appear to be grassroots antimovement efforts, but which in reality are corporate antienvironmental groups in disguise. These organizations craft messages that appeal to mainstream environmental organizations by suggesting that capitalism can be ecologically sound, technology can be used within capitalist systems to protect the environment, and capitalism can protect the environment (Austin 2002). The level of funding devoted to these organizations is immense. Recently, Brulle (2014) found that between 2003 and 2010, ninety-one climate change countermovement organizations located in the United States had mean annual incomes of over $900 million and derived their incomes from 140 different foundations. In 2003, those organizations had total incomes of 640 million, while in 2010 their total incomes had increased to more than seven billion dollars. Brulle notes that as more scrutiny has been directed toward countermovement organizations, it has become apparent that these organization attempt to conceal the sources of their funds. For example, a Greenpeace (2013) briefing suggested that these donations are hidden from the public by employing large trusts such as Donors Trust and Donors Capital Fund who are able to make “anonymous” donations to antienvironmental causes. Greenpeace notes that Donors Trust and Donors Capital Fund have provided nearly £150 million to climate denial organizations since 2002. While it is clear that the antienvironmentalist movement is

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not as well organized or influential as the environmental movement, it is also clear that the organizations are well funded and can manipulate public perceptions about the environment. In some cases environmental movement opposition appears disorganized, random, and local. In some locations, particularly in Latin and South America, antienvironmental actions employ violence to punish and deter environmental activists. A significant number of environmental activists have been physically attacked, and many have been murdered. Perhaps the most well-known activist murder occurred in 1995, when the Nigerian government executed environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa for his opposition to oil development and its consequences in the Niger Delta (Rowell 1996). According to Rowell (1996), the Nigeria government’s justification for the execution was to portray Saro-Wiwa as a terrorist. But despite the efforts of the Nigerian government, Saro-Wiwa’s execution resulted in international protest and was even condemned by the British government as a “judicial murder.” Rowell and other scholars note that the backlash against the environmental movement suggests that the movement is making a difference. The murders of environmental activists are also becoming well documented across the globe. Recently Global Witness (2015) has suggested that “each week at least two people are killed for taking a stand against environmental destruction.” Importantly, the report suggests that these deaths are carried out by different actors, as some are shot by police while others are killed by hired assassins who represent ToP interests and actors. The Global Witness report makes the case that most of the murders are being carried out in Latin America and that most occur in rural areas because of conflict over ToP extraction associated with “hydropower, mining and agri-business,” as well as oil extraction. Global Witness estimates that 116 environmental activists were murdered in 2014 alone. As criminologists know, the true number of activist murders is likely to be much greater, since crime in jurisdictions suffering from high levels of crime is under-reported. Th is evidence also suggests a need for green criminologists to address the murder of indigenous environmental activists who are leading ESO movements against efforts of the ToP to harvest natural resources on lands inhabited by indigenous peoples.

CONCLUSION Dunlap and Mertig (1991, 216) believe that “history will judge [the environmental] movement in terms of its success in halting environmental deterioration rather than simply avoiding its own demise.” We have examined the potential for the movement to protect the environment by the defi nition of crime and law enforcement locally and across the globe. It is clear that there has been a considerable expansion of environmental MOs over time, and some

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of those organizations are focused on environmental protection and challenge the ToP directly. As we have pointed out, however, the movement to protect the environment by attempting to better regulate ecological destruction has become less radical. The movement has adopted policies that are market based. Th is departure from the movement’s radical roots coincides with the formalization of MOs within the environmental movement, as well as with the diff usion of its grievances. Moreover, this changing movement parallels a rise in the environmentalist countermovement that is well funded and often adopts policies that support ToP ideology. While more developed countries have waged a well-organized and well-funded campaign against the green threat, periphery countries have faced more direct and oppressive tactics that are organized directly by governments and corporations interested in natural resource extraction. Activists advocating for the enforcement of laws have been beaten, attacked, and murdered. In the end, the environmentalist countermovement may demonstrate the environmental movement’s success. However, we believe, ironically, that the biggest threat to the environmental movement comes not from the countermovement but from within the environmental movement itself as it has increasingly been advocating for marketbased policies that advocate for solutions that support production within a capitalist system.

S T U DY G U I D E Questions and Activities for Students 1. What is the environmental movement and when did it begin? According to the authors’ point of view, what role does science play in environmental protection? 2. Is grassroots organizing more effective at encouraging environmental enforcement than pressure from large NGOs? 3. From the authors’ point of view, why has the environmental movement become less radical? Can a less radical movement still be effective at promoting stronger environmental protection? 4. Has the environmental movement become too reliant on market-based solutions to protect the environment? What implications does this have for policing the environment? 5. Some politicians note that environmental activists are essentially ecoterrorists. Is this label accurate? How should society treat individuals who break the law to stop ecological destruction?

6. Give three examples of how the countermovement opposes the environmental movement. According to the authors’ point of view, is the countermovement the greatest threat to the effectiveness of the environmental movement? Lessons for Researchers 1. Criminologists have rarely studied the role of MOs in enforcing environmental laws, despite the fact that these organizations have increasingly undertaken law enforcement functions. As a result, there is a need to better determine how many of these organizations exist, how they operate, where they receive their funding, and whether they can provide adequate and equal protection across the globe. 2. As noted in this chapter, environmental activists have sometimes been defined as ecoterrorists. The application of criminal labels to individuals has important implications for the discipline of criminology and the social construction of deviance.

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More attention needs to be given to how these labels are constructed and applied, and to whether activists that oppose production more directly are also more likely to be labeled terrorists. 3. A significant number of environmental activists are killed across the globe each year. Currently there are no accurate estimates of these murders, and little is known about the circumstances of the offenders or victims. More research needs to be devoted to identifying where, how, and when these murders occur.

4. Countermovement organizations often draw their resources from powerful interest groups and corporations. The extent to which these funders violate environmental laws and evade state regulations has yet to be examined. Political corruption is likely to occur when corporations attempt to influence governments through secret funding. Criminologists interested in state crime could better examine and demonstrate the way these connections play out across the globe.

CH A P T ER

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Explaining Green Crimes

T

he preceding chapters drew attention to the political economy of green crime. Here we tie these arguments together, illustrating how the capitalist treadmill of production (ToP) generates ecological disorganization, or green crimes. As we noted in the introduction, we chose to place the theoretical chapter at the end of the book because we believe substantial groundwork is necessary to explain green crimes more fully. When they explain crime, researchers and theorists must make choices concerning how these behaviors are best explained. Two key words in the previous sentence are a concern: the term choice and the phrase “best explained.” What criteria do criminologists use in determining which theory offers the best explanation? Before offering an extended discussion explaining green crime, we briefly explore the process of theory building and explanation.

THEORY BUILDING AND TESTING Hypothesis Testing and Theory Building There is no easy answer to the question of how researchers choose a theory and what makes it the best choice. In principle, we agree with the view that the best explanation

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results from scientific testing of hypotheses that lay out potential relationships that affect the production of green crimes. Theory building, in this view, begins with general observations of the problem (in this case, green crimes), formulating specific hypotheses on the basis of these observations that may explain the outcome, and collecting data and testing the proposed hypotheses. Hypotheses lacking empirical support should be rejected. It is not always apparent which criteria should be used when determining whether a hypothesis does not stand up to empirical assessment. Sometimes researchers rely simply on the statistical significance test. In other cases, researchers also reflect on whether a statistically significant finding has substantive importance—which includes making what is essentially a value judgment about the results of the analysis. In still other cases, researchers consider not only whether a relationship is significant but also to whether it fits the model, or the proportion of the outcome the model explains (the explained variance associated with the model has to be high enough to be useful). In making these latter judgments, researchers may reject statistically significant relationships between specific variables if the explained variance in the outcome produced by the entire model, including the control variables, provides a poor explanation of the outcome (explained variance is low). This latter approach provides a much more stringent test of hypothesized relationships. Whichever testing method is selected, it remains important that researchers assess how strong the relationships they tested are, and whether those tests indicate that the hypothesized relationship should be retained. Doing so helps to ensure that unnecessary hypotheses are eliminated, which also helps simplify the explanation and remove unnecessary parts of the explanation. Typically, the proposed hypotheses are tested on numerous occasions to ensure that the observed relationships apply consistently. Then the researcher/ scientist turns his or her attention to connecting useful hypotheses, and in doing so produces a theoretical explanation of the process being studied. As noted in the introduction, this means that theory derives from observation and testing, and that a theory represents the best estimations of relationships and how they fit together. The explanations, in other word, need to be empirically relevant. Criminology doesn’t always (perhaps even rarely) works this way. Typically, a criminologist posits a theory, derives hypotheses from that theory, and then tests the hypotheses. While this is a somewhat different approach than that described above, it should lead to a similar outcome: the hypotheses that don’t work should be discarded and the theory should be revised. But in social science research, hypotheses and theories that don’t work well aren’t always rejected, or, if they are, not immediately. This is often the case in criminological research, which helps explain why there are so many different theories of crime. Why don’t criminologists reject hypotheses more often? Sometimes researchers cannot control for all possible alternative explanations, and there-

Connecting the Dots

fore they suggest that the hypotheses must be re-examined using a more appropriate research design. Further testing is often required to determine if social science hypotheses hold in various conditions, and numerous studies and years of research may be needed to determine if hypotheses hold up. This can create a large empirical literature where hypotheses are tested and retested. As a result, social science theories—which are different from natural science theories with respect to how they are created, as explained above—can have a long life, even when they are not very good at explaining an outcome. Disciplinary Assumptions Part of understanding why researchers select a theory has to do with the history of explanations in a particular discipline and the types of things they explain. Historically, criminologists prefer individual-level explanations of crime that suggest how an individual’s characteristics relate to criminal behavior. The assumption is that the difference in crime across individuals is important for explaining crime. Sometimes criminologists suggest that it is not one specific factor but rather a combination of factors that promotes crime. Since many of the theories that have been tested within criminology have some support, it is difficult to pinpoint “the best” criminological explanation of crime.

THINKING ABOUT THE EXPLANATION OF GREEN CRIMES Explaining green crime presents unique concerns. They may not be best explained by the kinds of individual-level theories criminologists normally employ to explain street crime. While it is certainly possible to try and identify the characteristics of, for example, individual poachers, and then to suggest how those characteristics might generate poaching behavior, whether that focus on individual-level information fully explains why poaching occurs is not clear. In our view, understanding green crimes, even ones like poaching, requires addressing how those crimes reflect their political-economic context. This is a complex problem because outcomes such as poaching may reflect the structure of both global and local political-economic contexts. While the general phenomena of poaching may have a relationship to the global politicaleconomic context of capitalism, the political-economic context of particular nations may also play a role in explaining poaching. Such explanations go well beyond looking at the characteristics of individuals who poach. We believe all green crimes are connected to a political-economic context, and it is that context, and not the characteristics of individuals, that is most important for explaining green crime. Above, we used the example of how one might assess whether the characteristics of individual poachers explain

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poaching behavior. But what would a theory of poaching that takes account of the political-economic context look like? Such a theory would need to address the following factors: fi rst, attention must be paid to how poaching behavior is distributed and to variations in different global contexts. In political-economic terms, we are interested in whether the aggregate pattern of poaching is influenced by the global economic structure of capitalism and national or local political-economic relationships. Since there are different types of poaching (e.g., trophy hunting; species trade in the world market; subsistence poaching), different reasons for poaching (e.g., trouble, excitement, toughness; see Forsyth and Marckese 1993), and different rationalizations for poaching (see Forsyth, Grambling, and Wooddell, 1998), the frequency of particular poaching types in different places may be related to variations in political-economic structures. For example, in developing nations, native peoples, who are economically marginalized, may engage in poaching for subsistence. Whether they have a tradition of subsistence hunting and gathering is also important when constructing a theory of what is legally defined as poaching. To be sure, not all economically marginalized native peoples engage in poaching, and as a result there is always interest in explaining why some poach and others do not. That view of poaching, which again focuses on individuallevel explanations, misses the larger point: that economic marginalization creates the conditions in which poaching for survival or subsistence becomes an option for people in certain global and local political-economic contexts. Those conditions create motivations to poach. Individual-level explanations of crime often suggest that controlling crime requires increased surveillance and punishment. That approach may be difficult to justify with a behavior such as poaching. If certain kinds of poachers in particular political-economic contexts are motivated by their need to survive, it is unlikely that traditional enforcement programs will provide a sufficient deterrent effect. Nevertheless, many efforts to prevent poaching focus on deterrence. For instance, Kroger National Park (South Africa), one of Africa’s biggest national parks, covers 7,500 square miles—an area slightly larger than the state of New Jersey. It is policed by an antipoaching squad of 650 officers, or about 1 officer per 12 square miles (0.083 officers per square mile), and two drones. Because such a sparse level of policing makes the odds of catching poachers relatively small, deterring poachers under these conditions may be quite difficult. By comparison, Newark, New Jersey, covers about 26.1 square miles and employs 1,400 police officers—53.6 police officers per square mile, or 646 times as many police per square mile as Kroger. The Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa reported that, in 2014, 827 rhinos were poached in Kroger, while enforcement agents arrested 174 suspected rhino poachers, that is, 1 arrest for every 4.8 poached rhinos. That arrest rate is potentially high enough to create the kinds of conditions that might be useful for deterring

Connecting the Dots

rhino poachers. Rhino poaching in the park, however, increased by 466% from 2010 (146 rhinos poached) to 2014 (827 rhinos poached), despite a 160% increase in arrests (from 67 to 174) over the same period. These data suggest that increased enforcement is not addressing the cause of rhino poaching, perhaps because arrests fail to address the political-economic factors that influence poaching rhinos. Thus, from a political-economic perspective, explanations for poaching must incorporate variations in the social control of poaching from place to place. Poaching is not a behavior that can be studied without considering how it intersects with the law and methods of law enforcement. Thus, variations in law and the social control of poaching affect how poaching is measured. As discussed in detail in chapter 8, Clarke’s CRAVED (what is concealable, removable, available, valuable, enjoyable and disposable) theory suggests that one factor affecting poaching is opportunity, which makes sense as rhino poaching obviously cannot occur where there are no rhinos. While Clarke and colleagues suggest that opportunity affects poaching, we should also consider poachers’ motivations for taking advantage of those opportunities. In our view, that requires paying attention to how political-economic conditions motivate behaviors. For other green crimes, such as the emission of toxic waste, it makes little sense to offer explanations related to the characteristics of employees working for a corporation The routine nature of toxic emissions by corporations is probably not likely to be well explained by individual level criminological theories. Corporations may have multiple headquarters in different parts of the world. Therefore it does not appear useful to suggest that the personality characteristics of a few people in those many globally dispersed corporations impact toxic emissions, or that this kind of explanation applies across corporations at the global level. Routine behaviors such as the disposal of toxic waste, we suggest, are produced by the political-economic structure of capitalism, and not by the personality structure of any individual capitalist. This point was made long ago by C. Wright Mills in his 1956 book The Power Elite, in which he analyzed the corporate power structure in the United States. Mills suggested that paying attention to the personality of corporate leaders distracts attention from how the structure of capitalism influences decision making. He also suggested that the structure of capitalism requires that the members of the power elite share a general personality type that varies little from person to person. We suggest that what is often missing in efforts to explain crimes—whether they are street crimes, corporate crimes, or green crimes—is an examination of how the structure of society influences criminal behaviors. Th is makes sense because crime has specific patterns. Crime rates, for example, vary across US states, and across nations of the world, and they also vary over time. These differences can’t be adequately explained at the individual level unless the personal characteristics of the groups who engage in criminal behavior also vary

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across time and place. Otherwise, crime must be understood in structural terms, taking account of differences in the organization of societies at different times and in different places. Moreover, even if people with different kinds of personalities were to be clustered together geographically, this would also require an explanation, and might require addressing how the politicaleconomic context affects the development of certain personality types within or across nations. As noted, our preference is for a political-economic explanation. In one sense, there would seem to be little about green crimes that requires explanation if they are produced by the political economy or organization of capitalism. Profit-seeking firms require expanded production, and expanded production requires an increase in the consumption of raw materials and an increase in pollution, which promotes the consumption and destruction of nature in unsustainable ways—outcomes we identify as green crimes. In prior chapters, we provided examples of these behaviors, and their persistence and variability across places in the world in relation to political-economic variations. Because many may not find such an explanation convincing in and of itself, in the following section, we lay out some of the considerations that a political-economic theory of green crime should address.

THINKING ABOUT POLITICAL ECONOMY AND GREEN CRIME Our position on the connection between political economy and green crime is consistent with ecological Marxism, which posits that capitalism and nature are in an antagonistic relationship with each other, and that the power capitalism wields must destroy nature as part of the production process. Without the consumption of nature’s raw materials, there can be no capitalism, and with every advance of capitalism, nature must yield up a greater portion of itself to the power of capital, shrinking with each step taken by capital. To be sure, the argument is that, over the long run of history, capitalism and nature increasingly become incompatible. Th is is certainly not an appealing suggestion to many. Some people want to lead what we defi ne in the modern era as “the good life,” filled with conveniences and access to an endless array of consumable items. But not everyone in the world capitalist system experiences these conditions, and globally many people are economically deprived and are not living what people in Western nations defi ne as the good life. In 2016, Oxfam International—a conglomerate of seventeen organizations working together to address world poverty—released a report on world inequality and poverty relevant to this issue. That report (Oxfam International n.d.) noted that as of 2015, the 62 richest people in the world owned as much wealth as the poorest half (3.6 billion people) of the world’s population. Not only do those 62 people control an excessive amount of wealth, their wealth is continuing to

Connecting the Dots

grow and is becoming more concentrated. Oxfam noted that in 2010 it took the wealth of the 388 wealthiest people to equal the wealth of the poorest half of the world’s population, whereas in its most recently released results, Oxfam (2017) notes that now the world’s richest eight people have the same amount of wealth as the poorest half. Thus, even over this short period, global wealth and power are becoming more concentrated. Moreover, Oxfam notes that the ecological footprint of the top 1% of wealth holders may be as much as 175 times greater than the ecological footprint of the poorest 10% of people in the world. Thus, not only is wealth unevenly distributed globally, ecologically destructive consumption is also unevenly distributed across income groups. This point has also been made by Herve Kempf (2008) in his book, How the Rich Are Destroying the Earth. The problem is nature has only so many resources that we can take to make commodities, and only so much pollution can be emitted into ecosystems before they become unhealthy and dysfunctional. Capitalism’s expansionary drives, especially its unregulated free-market forms, are inconsistent with ecological stability. In the sections that follow, we explain how capitalism causes the various green crimes described in the previous chapters.

IN THE BEGINNING, THERE WAS PROFIT . . . AND THE PROFIT SAID . . . MULTIPLY! Profit is effectively the beginning and end of capitalism—the be-all and end-all of capitalism, its soul—and whatever auxiliary values economists, philosophers, and others try to graft onto capitalism, it cannot escape its essential purpose—creating and expanding the pool of profit, or the accumulation of capital. Without profit, a capitalist venture is considered a failure, and there would be little reason for the existence of capitalism. As noted in chapter 6, even key conservative economists like Milton Friedman who support the logic of capitalism agree with this observation. In the capitalist system, profit is connected to growth. Growth allows capital to expand and accumulate. Thus growth and profit are the twin heads of capital. As Marx (1974, 411) noted, “The development of capitalist production makes it constantly necessary to keep increasing the amount of the capital laid out in a given industrial undertaking, and competition makes the immanent laws of capitalist production to be felt by each individual capitalist, as external coercive laws. It compels him to keep constantly extending his capital, in order to preserve it, but extend it he cannot, except by means of progressive accumulation.” Logically, for capitalists to accumulate more profit, they need to sell more commodities. To sell more commodities, they need to make more commodities. To make more commodities, they need to expand production. And to

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expand production, the capitalist must consume more raw materials, generating ecological destruction in the process. Not all capitalists make commodities. Some sell services in the form of labor, or sell fi nancial commodities, or operate banking enterprises. Today, nations that were once the primary producers of industrial goods (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany) have shifted to service economies, and many small nations are now dependent on industrial production. For example, in some small nations a significant portion of gross domestic product is generated by manufacturing: Equatorial Guinea, 89.7; Republic of the Congo, 70.7% Brunei, 66.7%; Angola, 65.8%; Azerbaijan, 62.1%; Algeria, 56.5%; Gabon, 54.4% (compared to the United States, 19.2%; United Kingdom, 21.4%; and Germany, 28.6%). Th is redistribution of production is part of the historical development of global capitalism and is how profits get reinvested to earn the highest maximum return. Yet, even nonindustrial capital is connected to the manufacture of commodities. Stock values are calculated on the basis of the wealth of companies, many of which have assets from manufacturing. Prior analysis suggests that the service sector cannot develop until there is adequate accumulation of capital from manufacturing (R. Walker 1985), and that one of the purposes of the service sector is to support the growth of capitalism, manufacturing, and commodity consumption (Wood 1991). In short, to expand and grow, capitalism must consume an increasing quantity of raw materials. Over time, as capitalism is reshaped, the distribution of raw material consumption moves across nations, redistributing ecological destruction, including its intensity and the forms it takes in different nations. This distributional structure of ecological destruction/green crime is part of how global capitalism is organized in the contemporary era.

THE EFFECT OF THE TREADMILL OF PRODUCTION ToP suggests the expansion of capitalism accelerated after World War II with the introduction of new production and material extraction technologies that used an increasing quantity of fossil fuel and chemical energy. Those ToP techniques increased not only production but also pollution and raw material extraction. In this way, the drivers of ToP accelerated ecological disorganization and destruction, behaviors we have defined as green crimes from the perspective of the ecosystem. ToP expansion is a global phenomenon. In the early 1950s, global gross domestic product (GDP or GWP) was about $2 trillion; by 2014, it had reached $107 trillion, an increase of 5,250%. The world population grew by less than 200% during this time, so population expansion alone does not explain this tremendous increase in production. During the same time, consumption was also increasing. For example, combined energy use (from oil, coal, natural gas,

Connecting the Dots

biofuels, hydroelectric, and nuclear energy) increased about 450%. Deforestation, another consumption indicator, also increased (for an interactive map of deforestation Google “Global Forest Watch interactive map”), as did global pollution from carbon dioxide emissions, which increased about 400% since 1950 (see US Department of Energy n.d.). These data indicate that over time global production, consumption, and ecological disorganization increase as capitalism expands, and that this growth is not simply the product of world population growth.

CAPITALISM AND ECOLOGICAL DISORGANIZATION Because capitalism’s expansion disorganizes nature, ecological Marxists (Foster 2000; Burkett 2006) describe this condition as a core contradiction between capitalism and nature. By contradiction, ecological Marxists mean that there is a conflict between the goals of capitalism (profit and expansion) and the goals of nature (conserving nature and the ability to reproduce the conditions for life on the planet). At the very core of their organization, therefore, capitalism and nature are in conflict. Capitalism must consume nature to create products to generate profit while nature must preserve its raw materials—what some call natural capital—to expand and reproduce. And nature cannot preserve its raw materials when they are being taken away to produce commodities. Whenever a capitalist venture expands production for the sake of profit, nature contracts. By definition, then, capitalism, with its quest for profit, must be ecologically destructive, producing, as noted, what ecological Marxists call ecological disorganization. The concept of ecological disorganization encompasses both ecological destruction and the destruction of nature’s organization, or the unraveling of the very “nature of nature,” including its entropic decline. Nature’s organization allows it to reproduce itself—that is, to replace what gets used up in the natural cycle of production and consumption. An external disruption, especially one as dynamic as capitalism, of this natural process can make the ecosystem unstable, and there are inherent limits to how much of nature can be consumed before it is unable to reproduce itself. In the current context of world capitalism, in which the ecological footprint has recently accelerated to 1.6 (see ch. 6), nature can reproduce only a portion of what is consumed by humans and must reserve part of its raw materials for this reproductive work. Thus, not all of nature is available for consumption, and once its reserves are consumed, nature’s ability to reproduce itself diminishes. If the consumption of nature by humans eclipses nature’s rate of reproduction, the ecosystem shrinks; if left unchecked, consumption will eventually threaten ecological stability, and the health of the ecosystem will decline. Climate change is one indicator of such severe changes, as are the crossing of other planetary boundaries.

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The transfer of capital and production across nations makes it difficult to track raw material consumption (and pollution), especially since not every nation keeps useful or consistent records. One measure that appears to be a promising indicator of capitalism’s ecologically destructive tendencies is deforestation. Deforestation supplies only a limited record of capitalism’s influence on ecological disorganization because this is only one of the ways in which capitalism produces ecological disorganization/green crime. The ecological harms from deforestation can last thousands of years. Duff y and Meier (1992) found that forest recovery was not possible because typical logging cycles span 40–150 years. They concluded that, even if logging cycles were eliminated, the original composition of the forest may never recover or return to its natural state. Related studies indicated that after deforestation, it takes forest soil 120– 280 years to recover (Mueller et al. 2010). That study, however, was limited to forest soil and showed that full forest recovery would take significantly longer. Some studies estimate that it may take a tropical rainforest 1,000 years to regenerate (Schauffer 2009). This is because a forest ecosystem is not just trees but also includes animals and water systems, among other things. Estimating logging recovery time is difficult. It depends on the logging method employed, forest location, and whether estimates take account of things like stream recovery, leaf litter decomposition, recovery of forest species, how stream temperatures impact recovery, disruption of forest floor composition, stream flow increases as a result of deforestation, soil loss, increased stream sediment, the effects of increases in dissolved chemicals in streams, the reduction of canopy reflection of solar energy, decreased water pH (Likens et al. 1978), soil fungal biomass (Baat 1980), declines in soil carbon and nitrogen (Olsson et al. 1996), and disturbance of seed distribution type and quantity (Dupuy and Chazdon 1998). Evidence on these issues has long been collected in the scientific literature, and the significant impacts of deforestation on ecosystem efficiency and the ability of nature to reproduce itself have long been recognized (e.g., Brown and Krygier 1970). Our point is that behind the current ecological crisis, we can identify one important driver—capitalism. Nature cannot survive under the pressure capitalism creates through its emphasis on profit and expansion, while capitalism cannot exist unless it is able to exploit nature (Kovel 2007).

PROFIT, EXPANSION, AND CONSUMPTION For capitalism to profit and expand, it must stimulate consumption, creating the desires for new forms of consumption that in no way originate in human nature. As the anthropological literature demonstrates, humans were not consumers of vast quantities of goods until the rise of capitalism (Sahlins 1972). Indeed, for most of human history, humans lived in harmony with nature, con-

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suming less than nature produced and leaving a sustainable ecological footprint. But since 1900, or in one century, under the expansionary pressure of capitalism, humans have consumed more energy than they did in the prior 100,000 years (Goudie 2013). Also, as we know from studies of the human ecological footprint, significant growth in human consumption of nature has occurred since the early 1970s with the global expansion of the capitalist ToP, which has resulted in the global ecological footprint expanding from a sustainable 1.0 to an unsustainable 1.6. Some argue that the growth in consumption and resulting ecological disorganization are a function of population growth rather than capitalism. But as Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) illustrated thirty years ago, that assumption ignores that population growth sometimes has beneficial ecological effects by improving land management practices that protect ecosystems. They also noted that the population-ecological destruction conclusion is not consistent across studies. Analysis of variations in regional and global political-economic influences has shown they can have either ecologically unsustainable or sustainable outcomes. As an example, consider Jarosz’s (1993) study of deforestation in colonial Madagascar from the late 1800s through 1940. Jarosz’s study discounts the effects of population growth on deforestation, and draws attention to conflicts between traditional and modern agricultural practices, the interests of colonial rulers, and the interests of the state in promoting industrial development as factors that influenced deforestation. In addition, other studies suggest that while population growth plays a role in effecting ecological disorganization, the growth of capitalism has a greater role in bringing about ecological disorganization and expanding the ecological footprint (Jorgenson and Clark 2009). To be sure, population growth presents a stress on ecological resources, but the effect of capitalism on nature should not be overlooked. As the ecological Marxists argue, capitalism requires increases in unsustainable ecological practices to facilitate profit making, which requires increased consumption. That outcome has been accelerated by the ToP. The point is that in the normal progress of capitalism, profit and consumption are pursued at the expense of the environment, and ecological destruction and unsustainability are driven by the pace at which capitalism expands (Jorgenson 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006c, 2009; Jorgenson and Burns 2007a, 2007b). In addition, expansion of the global capitalist ToP, which seeks out inexpensive raw materials, also keeps the price of goods artificially low, promoting increased consumption. Hidden behind those low costs are the high—and typically unmeasured—costs of ecological disorganization. Indeed, under capitalism the very idea of overconsumption becomes a measure of progress, and the progress of nations is measured by how much they consume as expressed in indicators such as the standard of living and gross domestic product. Indeed, governments regularly track the health of their societies by measuring how

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much their economy expands or contracts using these measures. When the economy contracts, governments institute policies to reverse that trend in an effort to increase consumption and production. Capitalism cannot expand unless consumers increase the volume of goods they consume (or unless there is population growth, which capitalism may seek to promote). If consumers don’t consume the quantity of goods produced, the result may be a recession, or, in the worst case, an economic depression. Historically, capitalism has overproduced or produced at a greater pace than consumers can or are willing to expand consumption. Th is is one source of recession. A response of capitalism to underconsumption is the creation of credit and the offering of low interest rates, which allow consumers to increase consumption by borrowing against future earnings. There have been numerous recessions and depressions in capitalist economies. For example, the worldwide “Great Recession,” which began in the United States in 2007, was the world’s worst global recession since World War II. Because the United States consumes a lot compared to other nations, the recession began to ripple across other nations and per capita global GDP declined. According to some, a full recovery from that recession has not yet been achieved in all nations, and while, according to the International Monetary Fund, the “official” end of the Great Recession occurred in 2009, its effects on the world economy are still being felt in terms of reduced consumption. This type of global economic slowdown is, ironically, good for nature because during a recession, capitalism essentially decelerates. As the economy slows, fewer resources are withdrawn from nature, and fewer pollutants are dumped into the environment. For example, before the Great Recession hit the United States, American manufacturers reported releasing 24.1 billion pounds of toxic pollutants into the environment in 2006. In 2009, that total had declined to 20.4 billion pounds, a 15% reduction as capitalist production stalled in the United States. But by 2010, reported emissions in the United States rose as the economy recovered from the recession and the consumption cycle expanded. This association between economic recession and improved ecological health illustrates one of the contradictions between capitalism and nature that is not widely acknowledged, and provides an example of how slowing down capitalism, or retarding capitalism’s growth, has beneficial ecological outcomes. Those beneficial effects, however, do not indicate that capitalism is not still harming nature. While a recession may lower ecological withdrawals and ecological additions, over all there are still very large withdrawals and additions occurring, and a tremendous amount of ecological disorganization is still being generated. And unfortunately for nature, such a respite from ecological destruction has only a minor impact on ecosystem health. As noted above, some of the consequences of ecological destruction can last for centuries, so a few years of decline in economic expansion and ecological destruction have little long-term impact on ecosystem health.

Connecting the Dots Table 12.1 Proportion of global GDP by nation, 2014 Nation*

GDP (US$)

Global GDP (%)

Per capita GDP (US$)

China

18,088

16.66

12,904

United States

17,345

15.95

53,358

India

7,411

6.81

5,779

Japan

4,767

4.38

37,590

Germany

3,748

3.45

45,397

Russia

3,577

3.29

25,171

Brazil

3,276

3.01

16,085

Indonesia

2,686

2.47

10,504

France

2,591

2.37

39,875

United Kingdom

2,569

2.36

40,242

note: Monetary figures are in trillions. * The top ten nations make up 60.75 of global GDP.

Across the world, countries have different rates of economic production and consumption. A small group of nations contributes significantly to global production and consumption. For example, the ten nations identified in table 12.1—about 5% of all the countries in the world—generated 61% of global GDP in 2014. It’s more difficult to present similar data for consumption. World Bank data on household consumption expenditures per capita (for 137 countries), which we combined with census data from various countries, create a measure of total household consumption expenditures (see table 12.2). Table 12.2 shows consumption expenditures for the top ten (the most expenditures per household per capita) and the bottom ten countries (the fewest expenditures per household per capita). As table 12.2 indicates, in some nations, per capita household consumption is quite high, and top-consuming nations cause more extensive ecological disorganization than those at the bottom. Switzerland (the nation with the highest per capita rate of consumption) consumes 294 times more per capita than Burundi (the nation with the smallest per capita rate of household consumption). Table 12.2 also shows the estimated total household consumption for these nations (last column). Total consumption is important to consider because of the variation in the number of households across nations. The United States, which has the most households, consumes ten thousand times more than the households in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These consumption patterns suggest at least three things: (1) consumption is unequally distributed across nations in the global capitalist system; (2) unequal consumption indicates that some nations generate significantly more ecological destruction

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PCAP ($US)

PPH (no.)

THC ($US)

HH (no.)

TNHHC ($US)

Ten richest nations Switzerland

33,254

2.2

75,159

3,362

Norway

32,165

2.2

70,763

2,350

252,684 166,293

United States

30,087

2.6

78,226

117,538

9,194,528

Iceland

29,704

2.5

74,260

320

23,780

Luxembourg

29,088

2.5

72,720

172

12,577

United Kingdom

25,340

2.3

58,282

26,473

1,542,899

Denmark

23,197

2.1

48,714

2,547

124,075

Japan

22,408

2.8

62,742

49,063

3,078,310

Canada Australia

22,168 21,782

2.5 2.5

55,420 54,445

12,438 8,500

698,314 462,783

Ten poorest nations Rwanda

334

4.5

1,503

2,400

3,607

Tajikistan

332

6.3

2,092

4,719

1,360

Uganda

320

5.0

1,600

6,200

9,920

Mali

305

5.3

1,617

2,670

4,317

Central African Republic

236

5.0

1,180

718

917

Madagascar

220

4.6

1,012

4,397

4,450

Dem. Republic Congo

209

5.3

1,107

850

941

Burkina Faso

208

6.4

1,131

2,645

2,991

Malawi

182

5.0

910

3,272

2,978

Burundi

113

5.6

633

1,814

1,148

sources: World Bank Data (2005, in US$) and country-specific census data sources. note: PCAP = per capita household consumption, PPH = persons per household, THC = total household consumption, HH =number of households, TNHC = total national household consumption. Monetary figures are in billions.

through consumption than other nations; and (3) very low levels of consumption in some nations help “balance” high consumption and the extreme adverse ecological effects of high consumption in other nations. More important from an ecological perspective, if underdeveloped nations were to follow the same trajectory that developed capitalist nations have followed (a claim that proponents of capitalism suggest is the goal of global capitalist development), and shared in the good life offered by capitalism, this would create excessive human

Connecting the Dots

ecosystem demand (the human ecological footprint would expand significantly), and the ecosystem would be even more unsustainable. From these data one could argue that the global system of capitalist production benefits from underdevelopment and underconsumption in some nations precisely because global inequality in consumption prevents the ecological system from collapsing more quickly. This situation also calls attention to a hidden contradiction of capitalism. While capitalism holds out the idea that economic growth and expanded consumption are desirable and valued ideologically, the system must maintain some level of underdevelopment and underconsumption in some nations to stall ecological collapse and to facilitate expanded growth and consumption for a privileged group of developed nations where overconsumption and high standards of living prevail. Thus, for example, if all nations consumed at the same rate as the US, the world’s ecosystem would likely instantly collapse.

CAPITAL’S PATHWAYS TO ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION: SOME PROPOSITIONS Above, we outlined a basic argument that illustrates how the expansion of capitalism generates ecological destruction and disorganization. We can think of this argument as involving the following propositions. P.1. The profit motive of capitalism drives the expansion of production. P.2. Expanded production requires increased raw material input. P.3. Increased production and consumption co-occur, and feed back to stimulate expanded production, which stimulate increased ecological withdrawals and increased ecological additions. P.4. Technological changes in the ToP increase production, and thus consumption, by making it more efficient. The additional product on the market and enhanced production efficiency lower the cost of commodities, stimulating consumption, accelerating the ecological withdrawal of resources, and setting in motion a long-term economic spiral of expansion that continually expands the level of ecological disorganization by increasing ecological withdrawals and ecological additions. P.5. Technological changes in the capitalist ToP that rely on intensified fossil fuel and chemically aided production techniques increase the efficiency of production. The increased reliance on chemical and fossil fuel labor escalates the withdrawal of fossil fuels and their use and contributes to global ecosystem instability. P.6. The increased use of fossil fuel and chemical labor creates several forms of accelerating ecological destruction. (A) It disorganizes the ecological

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system by enhancing climate change, and the world climate system becomes increasingly unstable, impacting the ability of nature to reproduce the conditions for life. (B) Massive machinery operated with the use of fossil fuels enhances the large-scale withdrawal of resources. Negative ecological effects such as deforestation, mountaintop mining removal, fracking, and water depletion, follow. These processes have negative ecological impacts that cause local and global ecosystem degradation. The accumulation of local ecosystem degradation impacts the health of the world ecosystem, decreasing its efficiency and reducing its ability to reproduce itself. (C) The massive machinery of production that is operated with the aid of fossil fuels and chemical labor increases the level of pollution, adding to ecological disorganization and reducing ecological health, public health, and species health. P.7. The impacts outlined in #6 lead to several negative ecological consequences: (A) acceleration of climate change; (B) an increase in global entropy as larger quantities of potential energy stored by Earth are used up to extract resources and convert them into consumable commodities; (C) increased levels of ecological pollution across the globe, which cause ecological pollution to become ubiquitous; (D) production of pollutants that affect ecological health, the reproduction of wild species, the ability of species to survive, and, together with the decline in natural habitat, accelerate the extinction of species; (E) expansion of pollution in human ecological spaces, which increases the likelihood of pollution-related diseases. Taken together, the processes described are ecologically unsustainable, according to scientific measures like the ecological footprint and planetary boundaries. While scientists from a variety of disciplines have produced evidence of the expanding ecological destruction and disorganization identified in the above propositions, when they examine the effects of ecological harms, they tend to be more concerned with documenting negative ecological effects than with explaining their origins. For the physical scientist, for instance, the cause of a disease in an individual may be associated with exposure to a toxin found in the environment. The scientist, however, does not seek to explain why the toxin is present in the environment, or why its concentration may have increased over time. Thus, natural scientists don’t often explain the causes of ecological disorganization but rather document its advance and consequences. The social scientist, in contrast, is more interested in explaining ecological disorganization’s causes and addressing policies designed to curb ecological disorganization. Thus, for example, ecological Marxists draw on scientific literature to support their argument that capitalism destroys nature as it expands (Burkett 2008; Burkett and Foster 2006; B. Clark and York 2008, 2005; Foster 2000,

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1999, 1997; Foster and Burkett 2008; Foster, Clark, and York 2010), while Joel Kovel (2007) depicts this contradiction between capitalism and nature in the title of his book, The Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism OR the End of Nature. While some would overlook the adverse ecological impacts of capitalism, and instead direct our attention to claims that we could not experience the quality of life we have without capitalism, such diversions ignore that this quality of life brings with it extensive and numerous ecological harms, pollution, and disease. Among other things, capitalism causes economic inequality. This has been true of capitalism historically, and the advance of capitalism has always been linked to its ability to discover and find raw materials to exploit and consume for production, speeding the rate of planetary destruction. The discovery and extraction of natural resources to enhance production, for example, was a driving force behind the beginning of the global expansion of capitalism and conquest of foreign lands in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. During that time, the dominant economic powers in Europe—England, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands—conquered foreign nations for their raw materials. This required cooperation between corporations and state/ national governments, with governments providing the necessary military power. While this system of colonial control (sometimes referred to as imperialism) has been transformed over time, and different nations have controlled global trade and economic production at different points in the history of capitalism, this process continues today. Today, instead of entire nations being captured in the true colonial sense, capitalism is more likely to take only the resources, consuming what is available and leaving behind ecological destruction and poverty (Kovel 2007). Despite the collapse of a true colonial system, some nations are still controlled by other nations (e.g., United Nations 2015 lists sixteen non-self-governing nations that are essentially the remnants of colonial empires, but does not include all foreign territories controlled by the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, China, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and Norway). Though modern governments or international organizations may not prefer to call these areas colonies, they exhibit the characteristics of colonies.

CONCEPTUALIZING NATURE, ITS REPRODUCTION, AND EXTERNAL HUMAN (CAPITALIST) DEMANDS Understanding how capitalism impedes nature’s stability requires conceptualizing nature as a system. Here we take a simple system view focused on the use of natural resources and their impacts on the ecosystem. To keep this explanation simple, we aggregate replaceable ecosystem consumption (e.g., animals, plants, timber) and ignore the effects of capitalist consumption and production

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12.1. RESOURCES

Key Terms in Conceptualizing Nature, Demand, and Reproduction Effects ECO

Ecosystem

The total ecosystem

ER

Ecosystem reproduction

Nature’s ability to reproduce the ecosystem

RESERVE

Reserved ecosystem

The portion of the ecosystem nature reserves for ecological reproduction

RHC

Replaceable human consumption

The portion of the ecosystem that can be consumed and reproduced by nature

NRCM

Nonreplaceable core materials

The portion of the ecosystem made up of raw materials, formed when Earth was created, which cannot be replaced

FFR

Fossil fuel resources

The portion of the ecosystem made up of fossil fuels, created as Earth evolved, which cannot be replaced

EWD

Ecological withdrawal destruction

Causes ECO to shrink

EAD

Ecological addition destruction

Uses up ECO to offset pollution or additions

at the species level. A summary of the key terms used in this discussion can be found in resource box 12.1. In a simple model, we can think of the ecosystem, or the whole of nature (ECO), as having two types of human consumption (C) when it comes to raw materials, or ecological withdrawals and additions: (1) replaceable human consumption (RHC), or the portion of consumed resources that nature can replace through ecological reproduction (ER); and (2) consumption of nonreplaceable ecological resources. The latter has two subtypes: nonreplaceable core materials (CORE), which were formed during the creation of the universe and Earth (around 5 billion years ago) and took several million years to form; and nonreplaceable ecological resources, which were created over millions of years during the ecological evolution of Earth. Of these, fossil fuels (FOSSIL) are of primary importance. Before continuing, it is also important to understand the concept of ER. ER is the portion of the ecosystem nature can reproduce, but to do so, part of the ecosystem (ECO) must be held in reserve (RESERVE) for this purpose. That portion of the ecosystem cannot be consumed if the part of the RHC consumed by humans is to be regenerated by nature. From the above, we can say that with respect to raw materials, the content of the ecosystem can be defined as follows:

Connecting the Dots

ECO = RESERVE + RHC + CORE + FOSSIL The utility of this description relates to understanding how using up the components of the ecosystem (RHC, CORE, and FOSSIL) through economic production and consumption causes ECO (NATURE) to contract. ECO shrinks when resources are consumed. But some portion—RHC—of consumption can be replaced by nature. RHC can be replaced so long as a sufficient RESERVE remains intact. Here we must also consider that extracting, processing, and consuming raw materials (RHC, CORE, and FOSSIL) cause the ecosystem (ECO) to be restructured. Extracting raw materials destroys portions of the ecosystem, and causes it to shrink. Let us call this ecological withdrawal destruction (EWD). In addition, some part of the ecosystem becomes unusable as a result of pollution (through ecological additions). We call this lost portion of the ecosystem EAD, or ecological addition destruction. On the basis of these observations, we can modify the original model as follows: ECO = RESERVE + RHC + CORE + FOSSIL – EWD − EAD As ecological footprint analysis suggests, problems emerge as consumption, ecological destruction, and pollution (RHC + CORE + FOSSIL + EWD + EAD) expand. That expansion reduces ECO and the ability of the ecosystem to reproduce (ER). Following the mathematical model above, then, we can say that when (RHC + CORE + FOSSIL + EWD + EAD) > ER, ecosystem instability follows. The longer this condition holds, the more unstable the system becomes, which may lead to its collapse. The tendency of capitalism to expand creates the conditions in which this is more likely to occur. In particular, the historical transformation of capitalism and the emergence of the post–World War II capitalist ToP cause an escalation in consumption (CORE and FOSSIL increase), and the expansion of ecological destruction through ecological withdrawals and additions (increased EWD and EAD). The website Future Earth (2015) provides twenty-six examples of these accelerating consumption and pollution curves over time. We don’t often think of nature and its consumption in mathematical terms. But doing so allows us to understand how capitalism increases ecological disorganization through ecological additions and withdrawals by upsetting ecosystem balance. When the ecosystem becomes imbalanced—as scientific research related to Gaia theory, the human ecological footprint, and planetary boundaries indicates—then the system becomes “misaligned,” and incapable of reproducing itself. Gaia theory, the ecological footprint, and planetary boundary analysis all rely on the use of mathematical models to depict what is happening to nature in the real world. It is not unusual in the sciences to understand the process of ecological decline mathematically. While our model is not as complex as scientific models, it provides an example of how a theoretical

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understanding of the relationships between nature and its reproduction and consumption intersect. In the next section, we use the general ideas reviewed above in an example of a mathematical model that shows how expanded production and consumption generated by capitalism can lead to extreme ecological disorganization and cause ecosystem collapse.

AN EXAMPLE MODEL OF EXPANDING ECOLOGICAL DISORGANIZATION AND ECOLOGICAL COLLAPSE On the basis of the above, and adding a few additional assumptions, it is possible to predict when the growth of capitalism causes such extensive ecological harm or disorganization that the global ecosystem collapses. Because we are going to provide an example of this process using a simplified model, our model is more of a heuristic tool—a learning tool—rather than a real analysis of what actually might happen to the global ecosystem in the near future. We will, however, after reviewing our model, describe other, more elaborate models scientist have used for similar purposes. But even creating the simplified approximation model we use here requires making some assumptions about the pace at which nature is consumed by the growth of capitalism. The model is sensitive to those assumptions, meaning that the assumptions we make affect the outcome. Our assumption are as follows. We need three estimates of capitalism’s growth. First we need a general estimate of how fast capitalism grows, which we call capitalism’s growth effect (GROWTH). Second, we need to estimate how technology impacts the growth of consumption and production, which we call the capitalist technology effect (TECH). Third, we need an estimate of the production of pollution and its growth as capitalism expands, which we call the pollution effect (POLLUTE). We assumed the following: (1) For GROWTH, we used a conservative estimate of 5% growth in capitalism over the course of a century. (2) For TECH, we measure the effect of capitalist technologies on expanding the growth of capitalism, which with certain inventions can occur rather rapidly, and may vary in different eras of capitalism, we estimated the mean effect of TECH to be 10% over a century. This effect accelerates the growth of capitalism. (3) For POLLUTION we made a conservative assumption that POLLUTION has a mean growth rate of only 5% per century. The production of pollution drains the ecosystem by using up ecological resources to nullify ecological additions. To simplify the model, we also assumed that the ecosystem is capable of consistently replacing a hundred units of the ecosystem consumed by humans, or that ecological reproduction (ER) was a hundred units for each century.

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Here we did not take into account that an expanding rate of raw material consumption and pollution can change ER efficiency, causing it to decline over time. Such a model would become significantly more complex. In any event, that we used a constant rather than an accelerating rate for ER could cause the model we estimated to predict that the ecosystem lasts longer that it might in reality (see discussion of other models found below). The model presents average growth rates over each century, thus simplifying the model by ignoring variation in the growth rate of capitalism within each century (e.g., across each decade within a century). If the average rates of growth represent variations across centuries accurately, both approaches should produce similar results. Thus, rather than estimating separate growth predictions for each decade within each century, or even for each century independently, making it more difficult to follow the effects of expanding production, consumption, and pollution (because each decade or century would have a separate equation), we assumed an average growth rate for these factors across all ten centuries. To begin, we need to make two more assumptions. Because we do not know the actual size of the ecosystem, we set its volume at a thousand units (we ran several exploratory models to find the most appropriate model assumption and took the one that best match some scientific estimates of how fast ecosystems shrink over time). Next we assumed that ecological consumption (the combined effect of GROWTH, TECH, and POLLUTION, which added together equals RHC, or human consumption of ecological units) in the century before our estimate begins was seventy units of consumption (for the 1400s)—or that RHC was less than ER and humans thus had an ecological footprint less than 1.0 (in this case, 0.70). Thus, in the fi rst entry in table 12.3 for the 1500s, the first estimated equation is as follows: RHC (1500s) = RHC(1400) + RHC(1440) × [GROWTH = (70 × 0.05)] – (TECH = 70 × 0.1)] – (POLLUTION = 70 × 0.05) = 84 Then we substituted this effect into the general equation: ECO + ER − RHCt − 1 to obtain the effect of consumption on the total volume of the ecosystem at the end of the 1500s (which is the total ecological units remaining in column E). Th is process was repeated nine more times to show the effect of consumption/production on the ecosystem over the remaining centuries as depicted in table 12.3. Table 12.3 illustrates the long-term ecological effects of even the modest growth of capitalism over time. In the 1500s, capitalism’s growth was slow enough to allow ecological expansion. Here we see that the volume of the ecosystem (units under column E in table 12.3) increased from 1,000 at the end of the 1400s, to 1,016 ecological units by the end of the 1500s. During the 1600s, capitalism’s growth equaled ecological reproduction, and the ecosystem was stable (units of E at the end of the 1500s equaled units of E at the end of the 1600s).

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Table 12.3 Sample prediction of the effect of the growth of capitalism, consumption, and pollution on the ecosystem, 1500–2400 Century

GROWTH

TECH

POLLUTION

TCE

1500

3.50

7.00

3.50

14.00

1600

4.20

8.40

4.20

16.80

1700

5.00

10.00

5.00

20.00

1800

6.00

12.00

6.00

24.00

1900

7.40

14.80

7.40

29.60

RHC + 

ER

E

100

1016.00

100.00

100

1016.00

120.00

100

984.00

148.00

100

936.00

177.60

100

858.40

84.00

2000

8.88

17.76

8.88

35.52

213.12

100

745.28

2100

10.66

20.32

10.66

40.64

253.76

100

704.78

2200

12.69

25.38

12.69

50.76

304.50

100

500.28

2300

15.23

30.36

15.23

60.72

365.20

100

235.08

2400

18.30

36.60

18.30

73.20

438.40

100

–103.00

note: GROWTH = capitalism’s growth effect, TECH = growth rate effect for technology, POLLUTION = pollution effect, TCE = total consumption effect each century (additional ecological units consumed = GROWTH + TECH + POLLUTION, RHC + 1 = total human consumption effect in a century (CEt . . . n+ GROWTHt . . . n + TECHt . . . .n+ POLLUTIONt . . . .n), ER = ecological reproduction, E = total ecosystem units remaining.

From the end of the 1600s on, capitalism’s growth caused a decline in available ecological units (column E) from one century to the next, and eventually, because growth would continue to consume nature and nature would no longer replace what was consumed, the ecosystem would collapse during the 2400s. As the model is sensitive to the growth assumptions we made, and our point is not to accurately estimate when the ecosystem will collapse but merely to illustrate how that can happen as capitalism expands. Our conservative growth assumptions did not account for accelerating economic growth effects over time, which could cause the ecosystem to collapse more quickly. For example, in the United States, GDP growth averaged 10% from 1871 through 2009— twice the growth rate we used. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, China dominated global economic growth, and GDP growth in China averaged nearly 16% from 1992 through 2012. In the section that follows, we review some of the research that scientists have conducted predicting when the global ecosystem might collapse.

RESEARCH ON THE ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY OF CAPITALISM The concept of the ecological sustainability of capitalism has been the subject of theoretical analysis (M. O’Connor 1994; Foster 1992, 2000; Burkett 2008; Foster, Clark, and York 2010; Næss 2006; Redclift 2002; Weis 2010). As early as

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the 1970s, researchers had already used statistical models to predict the effects of consumption on ecological stability. In The Limits to Growth (1972), Donella Meadow, Dennis Meadows, Jørgen Rander, and William Behrens used consumption growth rate models to predict when humans would deplete Earth’s ecological recourses. The original (1972) models suggested that ecological exhaustion would occur at the end of the twenty-first century—three centuries earlier than our example model predicted. Though the model was widely criticized when it was published, periodic updates (the last in 2008) by what is called The Club of Rome continued to show its utility because it matches what is happening in the real world over time with respect to the growth in consumption. In analyzing a related issue concerning the consumption of labor, which applies equally well to the consumption of nature, Marx (1976, 233, 243, 265) argued that capitalism is like a vampire or werewolf feasting off the living (labor and nature), and existing by appropriating the lives of other living things (labor and nature) to satisfy its quest for profit. This analogy suggests that capital can no more constrain its need to consume nature than a vampire or werewolf can control its lust for human life. And like the vampire and werewolf, a sustainable capitalism, or a form of capitalism that does not harm nature and its reproductive abilities, is a fictional concept. From the perspective of nature, and from the perspective of sustainable ecology, capitalism is a crime, a violent crime that ravages nature, destroys its life, and in the process takes the lives of various species as illustrated by the expansion of deforestation, wetland destruction, marine ecosystem contraction, and species extinction rates. But not everyone see things this way, and in the next section we review arguments by some researchers who suggest that reforming capitalism can prevent Earth’s ecosystem from becoming so disorganized that it becomes uninhabitable.

“BUT . . .”: THE “CAPITALISM CAN SAVE THE PLANET” ARGUMENT In contrast to the above arguments concerning the ecologically destructive tendencies of capitalism, many suggest that capitalism can save the ecosystem from destruction through technological innovation, meaning capitalism can grow while simultaneously saving the planet from destruction. We reviewed one example of this style of argument in an earlier chapter when we discussed the environmental Kuznets curve. The Kuznets curve argument suggests that over time, as capitalism and economic development progresses, there is an inverted U relationship between development and ecological destruction. In that view, during the early development of capitalism, its expansion caused an increase in ecological destruction. At some point, however, the peak of that

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relationship was reached (the top of the inverted U), and from that point on, further economic development led to a decline in ecological destruction and damage. As we noted in reviewing that argument, evidence of that relationship is at best mixed, with many studies refuting the Kuznets curve hypothesis. Other researchers have also taken up the idea that capitalism can promote enhanced ecological protection. One of the most widely cited is Hawken, Lovins and Lovins’ 1999 book, Natural Capitalism: The Next Industrial Revolution. The authors point out that one of the problems for capitalism is that it has no real way to take ecological health into account when it calculates the costs of doing business, and no real way of calculating what they call the value of “natural capital.” This leads to capitalism’s overconsuming nature. To protect nature, they suggest that capitalist societies and businesses develop new accounting systems that recognize natural capital, and the first step in protecting natural capital is to defi ne its existence. Doing so involves creating an accounting process capable of calculating the value of natural resources as economic resources. The authors also note that another part of this process involves reorganizing capitalism to make it more efficient and less wasteful—or getting capitalists to engage in what they call “radical resource productivity.” This argument is fairly simple: saving resources by improving capitalism saves the planet through technological innovation that reduces resource consumption and the reduction in pollution emissions. In contrast to many arguments that suggest investments in eco-friendly business infrastructure is inefficient and leads to economic losses, Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins provide numerous examples of how those kinds of investments in real world eco-friendly infrastructure generate cost savings while promoting ecological protection. They include examples showing that investing in energy-saving technology reduces long-term costs for business owners, improving efficiency and profit, while generating less pollution. Moreover, Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins estimated that generating and dealing with waste costs US businesses 22% of their profits. So reducing waste through technological improvements can also improve profit making. We are interested in this idea to the extent that this view can promote ecologically protective thinking and eco-friendly production practices that can be instituted throughout the world. But we question the extent to which these practices might be adopted within a capitalism system of production, and whether in the long run, these technologies might not promote a problem reviewed earlier—Jevon’s Paradox, which states that over time, savings from technological innovations end up promoting economic growth and consumption, leading to continuing ecological destruction. To be sure, Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins’ suggestions might reduce the ecological costs of capitalism, but the real issue is whether such practices are sufficient to save the ecosystem from capitalism. In free market capitalism, businesses must first make a choice to engage in these behaviors, but we believe the history of capitalism illustrates

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that many won’t do so unless forced to by environmental regulations. Second, even if some corporations choose this path, the question is whether the ecological savings are sufficient to support the other part of this argument—that capitalism can continue to grow. Growth means increasing resource extraction and pollution, and that growth could be more than the volume of ecological destruction business-based ecological innovations save. In other words, natural capitalism might slow ecological destruction, but it won’t reverse it, which is what needs to happen for the ecosystem to survive. In Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the Way We Make Things (2010), perhaps a more impressive work that is also cited widely, McDonough and Braungart make a similar argument. One difference between Natural Capitalism and Cradle to Cradle is that the latter’s authors run a business that shows companies how to redesign products and production facilities to reduce their effect on nature. They have done this for some major corporations (e.g., Ford Motor Company). McDonough and Braungart offer numerous impressive examples of their successes, and many of them should indeed be put into practice because they reduce the consumption of natural resources and prevent pollution and exposure to toxic waste. Still, we must not forget that these ideas are all based on the continuation of capitalism, and that the constant expansionary drives of capitalism will eat up the environmental savings of McDonough and Braungart’s inventive solutions. We have the same concern we noted above: ecological savings generated by altering capitalism are consumed by the constant expansion of capitalism, despite the invention of less destructive techniques of production. Other capitalists promote the sale of their commodities using green advertising, which is still an extension of capitalism. Pablo Solon (2012) has critiqued this argument. As Solon notes, a green economy, or green capitalism, is merely a way of marketing products and appealing to consumers’ desires to be more ecological conscious and friendly. The green economy seeks, as Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins argue, to place an economic value on nature and to create markets that trade environmental credits. This, in Solon’s view, is just one more way to expand the market influence of capitalism and extend its control over nature. As Solon notes, between 1970 and 2008, the world lost 30% of its biodiversity, up to 60% in tropical areas, while businesses were hawking the advantage of green products. Green criminologists suggest that one way to protect biodiversity is to create new economic market situations that attach economic values to biodiversity (i.e., the creation of biodiversity markets), allowing them to become part of the economic market values considered in a capitalist economy. This idea is related to the concept of “natural capital,” which incorporates markets for valuing carbon (carbon markets), according to which countries trade carbon emissions and savings from carbon reduction programs such as deforestation. This would theoretically create a rationale for capitalist markets to emerge around the promotion of those kinds of ecologically created

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economic values. But the ultimate goal of increasing those values in a capitalist economy is to transform them into accumulated capital, or to continue to transform nature into capital. A capitalist market built around “valuing” (in economic terms) nature is simply another way to get people to pay—and to pay more dearly—for using nature. What this system does not do is value nature as a necessity for human life, rather than as a commodity. It does not, in other words, establish a procedure or process that saves part of the ecosystem for reproduction, aside from the possibility that this could happen in a free market model of capitalism that is reconfigured to include accounting systems that trade, for example, raw material stocks. As a system, nature is independent of the capitalist system of production, and has a separate function and organization. Continued efforts to drag nature into capitalism, and to reconceptualize nature as part of the economic system, fail to appreciate nature as a separate, living entity whose function is to create the conditions for life. Efforts to “capitalize” nature don’t solve the inherent contradiction between capitalism and nature, and in fact create additional problems related to the ownership of nature, that is, who has the right to own and trade nature in the capitalist marketplace. In our view, the “but capitalism can save the planet” argument ignores the long-term contradiction between capitalism and nature that Marxist ecologists point out. One has to be very positively inclined or predisposed toward capitalism to suggest that more capitalism and a freer capitalist marketplace will prevent ecological destruction. Indeed, during the long history of capitalism, it was the ecologically destructive tendencies of free market capitalism that created widespread ecological problems such as pollution, which led states/governments to create laws restricting the behaviors of capitalist industries to constrain pollution (Burns and Lynch 2004). Free market capitalism did not, of its own accord, reform itself as it destroyed the ecosystems, and history should make us wary of solutions that adopt this model.

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND GREEN CRIMINOLOGY Above, we argued that capitalism must destroy nature to expand and generate profit, and thus it will continually commit green crimes. Those green crimes cause direct harms to ecosystems through ecological withdrawals and ecological additions produced by the capitalist ToP. Ecosystems, therefore, which are living entities, are the victims of green crimes. Those direct harms can also produce indirect green harms, damage to ecosystems caused when the capitalist ToP adversely impacts species living in affected ecosystems, for example, when humans or nonhuman species (plants and animals, including birds, amphibians, crustaceans, insects, mammals, mollusks, and porifera) are exposed to pollutants emitted into ecosystems or suffer habitat loss through

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ecological destruction. In these cases, the ecosystem must be victimized before indirect or secondary victimization occurs (Jarrell, Lynch, and Stretesky 2013; Lynch 2013; South 2014). Of course, it is not always true that species are indirect victims. Green crimes can also directly victimize wildlife (and other species) without causing ecosystem destruction, for example, when they are poached or hunted (especially illegally, some would suggest), and when they are killed by machinery employed to facilitate ecological withdrawals. In the latter case, we consider it necessary to interpret these green crimes within a political-economic context (see ch. 8), and not simply as a unique, individuallevel form of green crime. Once we acknowledge how the growth of capitalism and ecological destruction intersect, we can begin to realize that the number of green victims caused by these ecologically destructive behaviors is quite large—far exceeding the volume of victimization from street crimes (Jarrell, Lynch and Stretesky 2013; Lynch and Barrett 2015). These green victimization outcomes are not often recognized because we are socialized to accept capitalism and its continual expansion, destruction of ecosystems and species, and damage to health as the price of “progress.” That orientation teaches us, as both individuals and as part of the mass of global consumers, to ignore not only how the expansion of capitalism causes green victimization but our own roles in generating green crime. If more people thought about the latter point, there might be greater resistance to the constant expansion of capitalism and its deleterious ecological impacts, an issue that cultural green criminology addresses (Brisman and South 2013; Brisman, McClanahan, and South 2014; for ecological social movement analysis related to green criminology, see Stretesky, Huss, and Lynch 2012; Stretesky et al. 2011), and one that is also addressed in chapter 11 on social movements. That kind of resistance is needed to control the deleterious ecological impacts of capitalism and transform how human economies are organized. In the period of history in which we now live, some—even those who support the continuation of capitalism—increasingly recognize that the way capitalism has been practiced threatens the stability of the ecosystem. Some have gone further to suggest that capitalism has become such a threat to ecosystem stability that its continuation would mean the end of nature (Kovel 2007). While it may seem that we will have to choose between capitalism and nature, however, that is a false choice. In light of the above, we suggest that in the present era dominated by capitalism, any green criminological analysis of ecological harm must address the ways in which the political economy of capitalism generates ecological disorganization and ecological decline. The major drivers of ecological unsustainability in the modern era are produced by capitalism: mountaintop and strip mining for coal removal; deep pit and open pit mining for minerals; high pressure hydraulic mining for gold or other precious metals; deforestation; the filling and conversion of wetlands; commercial overfishing of oceans and large

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lakes; mass industry, including resource withdrawal and pollution; the creation of toxic towns; the collection and trading of wildlife; the extinction of species; the mass use and pollution of water; the use of hydrofracturing to mine natural gas and oil. These are just a few examples of the behaviors caused by capitalism that result in green crimes.

PATTERNS OF ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION AS GREEN CRIMES In studying the history of ecological destruction and green crimes, a pattern emerges. To support their extensive consumption of raw materials, early capitalist nations (1500s) conquered foreign lands, using state-sponsored armies and navies to control trade routes, and establishing overseas colonies where raw materials were plentiful. For example, by 1600, what is now known as the United Kingdom, already a leading capitalist nation, had experienced significant deforestation (according to estimates, only 17% of UK forests remained by that time [Kaplan, Krumhardt, and Zimmerman 2009]). Available evidence suggests that this process was occurring in other capitalist nations during the same period, and by 1850 had resulted in extensive deforestation across Europe (Kaplan, Krumhardt, and Zimmerman 2009). Importing raw materials was becoming increasingly important as the industrial revolution accelerated in the 1800s. Th roughout capitalism’s history, different nations have been exploited in different eras for raw materials. A detailed discussion of this complex process is beyond the scope of this work, but throughout its history, global capitalism has caused a shifting pattern of ecological exploitation of the resources of developing nations by developed nations. This pattern of exploitation has resulted in extensive ecological destruction from ecological withdrawals and additions (see ch. 6 on overproduction and overconsumption). In the late twentieth century, especially after the 1970s, the expansion of the capitalist ToP led to deindustrialization in developed countries, as the manufacture of goods was shifted to developing nations to reduce the costs of production. Key to reducing costs was access to undervalued labor in underdeveloped/developing nations and to the greater abundance of raw materials in those nations (for a green criminological example of how this works, see Lynch, 2016a, 2016b). This process (often called outsourcing), which has been accelerating over time, has also shifted manufacturing-related pollution from developed nations to developing/underdeveloped nations. For example, China’s manufacturing output, which was about US$200 million (or US$0.2 trillion) in 1990, had expanded to US$2.9 trillion by 2011—an incredible 1,350% increase. That expansion in manufacturing, and the transition of the Chinese economy to capitalism during the 1990s, brought about significant increases in ecological additions such as air pollution, and several Chinese cities now have the highest

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levels of air pollution in the world (to view real-time air pollution levels in cities around the world, see aqicn.org/map/world/. A warning: significant computer memory is required to view this real time map).

THE EXPANSION AND GROWTH OF CAPITALISM: CULTURE OR STRUCTURE? Th is brief discussion illustrates how the global capitalist ToP redistributes green crimes associated with ecological withdrawals and additions across nations worldwide. In opposition to that argument, some suggest that national culture plays a role in this global transformation in production and consumption (Greenfeld 2001). While culture may have some implications for understanding capitalist development in a given nation, we suggest it does not explain the shifting global pattern of capitalist development historically. The consumption of nature by capitalism is no cultural force, nor is it a product of variations in the cultural values assigned to nature and capital by people in different nations. It is inherent in the organizational structure of the political economy of capitalism that has been imposed globally as capitalism expands. That the forms of harm generated by the political economy of capitalism appear in different ways across societies is not a result of variations in cultures, but is, we suggest, related to the historical development of capitalism as a global force that takes different forms, which affect nations at different points in history. These structural features of capitalism impose themselves on nations, and on the cultures of people in different nations, changing those cultures. This transformation of nations is part of the development of capitalism, and capitalism must change the cultural values of people to successfully expand and promote consumption and production. This, we suggest, is evident in the fact that people seldom oppose the expansion of capitalism even when social resistance movements emerge in capitalist countries (Brisman and South 2013). With the exception of Cuba, for example, nowhere have major social movements or laws or regulations of any substantial consequence been able to resist the expansion of capitalism. And even Cuba is now becoming more open to the penetration of international capital. Nor have there been significant social movements and laws or regulations that suggest ecological disorganization is a product of capitalism, and the only solution is to dismantle it (emerging counterexamples include resistance from indigenous peoples’ organizations). Absent efforts to rebut capitalism itself, nothing will save nature from destruction. Even if somehow capitalism could be controlled, its expansionary tendencies would still cause the decline of nature. Moreover, in our view, the ecological destruction capitalism has produced is too widespread for us to look to capitalism to solve the contemporary ecological crisis. It cannot do so. The history of capitalism has shown that it must consume more and

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more of nature until nature disappears. In the early 1970s, the children’s author Dr. Seuss had already told this tale of ecological destruction in his book The Lorax, in which the capitalist, the Onceler, creates ecological destruction by harvesting truff ula trees and turning them into thneeds, which, he chants, “everyone needs.” To this end, he builds a massive factory and equipment to chop down trees more efficiently. His factory destroys the local ecosystem and sickens its wildlife. Only in hindsight does the Onceler come to recognize that his actions have destroyed the ecosystem.

THE NATURE-HUMAN INTERSECTION The importance of political-economic analysis for green criminology is captured by Foster (2000, 19) when he notes “the weakness of contemporary Green theory itself, as a result of its failure to come to terms with materialist and dialectic forms of thinking that, in a period of the revolutionary rise of capitalist society, led to the discovery of ecology (and more importantly socioecology) in the first place.” Foster points out that green theories must address how pursuing capitalism causes humans to become estranged from nature, so that they treat nature as something alien, as outside human existence. Once this happens, humans are unable to understand that they are embedded within nature, and instead privilege the “values” that drive capitalism (expansion and consumption) over those that benefit nature (conservation and reproduction). This allows the human-engineered exploitation of nature to proceed, unabated by any sense that the exploitation and destruction of nature would impact humans negatively. Indeed, just the opposite picture was painted by the architects of capitalism, who saw exploiting and mastering the natural world as a way for humanity to achieve its “true” nature. This is a story that has been told and retold across various cultures to justify the domination of nature. Capitalism is an ideology that requires the subordination of nature to human will and desire. In contrast, the ecological vision is one that appropriately acknowledges that human survival and well-being depends on the survival of nature. The productive and ideological orientation of capitalism seeks to free humans from their connection to and dependence on nature. But this can never be a reality because humans will always depend on nature, and its ability to reproduce itself, to survive. No amount of capitalist dialogue, no matter how well crafted, can overcome the reality of human dependence on nature. Capitalism’s ascendancy as an economic system required that people be socialized to accept its ideological messages—that expansion and consumption are “good,” and should be valued as indicators of a successful life; that capitalism allows people to live the good life; that capitalism’s domination of nature is necessary—thus inuring capitalism’s ecologically destructive tendencies from criticism. To survive and prosper as an economic system, capitalism must con-

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sume nature, and cannot concede that nature is vital to the continued existence of both capitalism and human society. Acknowledging this fact would mean accepting that nature is the dominant partner in the capitalism-nature relationship, and that capitalism must, if it is to survive, pay attention to the needs of nature.

GREEN CRIMES AND THE DOMINATION OF NATURE In a political-economic sense we can say that capitalism’s green crimes are also acts of domination by humans over nature to facilitate profit making. Under capitalism, the dialectic relationship between humans and nature is lost, to be replaced by a hierarchical relationship. In this capitalist hierarchical view of the human-nature intersection, capitalism’s ideology justifies the exploitation and domination of nature. This is also true for other inventions of capitalism like free markets, and their ability to regulate themselves and hence provide for the protection of nature. This, of course, cannot be true, since capitalism and the free market are mechanisms for the exploitation, control, and domination of nature. It is in the above sense that the structure and ideology of capitalism completely misinterpret the importance of nature to human existence. If capital continues to dominate nature and bends it to its will, the destruction of nature will proceed unabated until capitalism has completely disorganized nature’s ability to reproduce itself and the conditions for life. Capitalism’s only consideration is controlling nature for its own ends—profit and expansion. In this sense, the notion of the free market as a mechanism that maintains nature must also be seen as a myth constructed around the perspective of capital and its need to dominate nature. Moreover, it should be noted that the entire structural and ideological edifice of capitalism is designed around exploitation, whether it is the exploitation of labor or the exploitation of nature. Thus, there are important connections between class domination/exploitation and the exploitation/domination of nature, as Marxist ecologists note, that can become subjects for additional green criminological research.

LAW AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE We can also place environmental law and regulations and environmental injustice into this political-economic view of green crimes. Modern environmental law, having been shaped primarily by the structure of capitalism over time, reflects the interests of capital over nature and capital’s efforts to dominate nature. Under capitalism, law corresponds well with the ideological implications

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of capitalism’s vision of the relationship between capitalism and nature. The law, for example, does not speak of nature as an entity with rights. Because nature is not an entity that can speak for itself (it needs a Lorax), under the law of capitalism and its theory of property relationships, only those who own nature, or who have invested capital in its procurement, have rights when nature is threatened with harm. At best, the law reflects some effort to protect nature only when it implies that harms against nature also generate public health harms. While this is a recognition of the rights of humans not to be harmed through the creation of ecological damage, it does not constitute an independent right of nature to be protected from harm. If corporation X blows the top off a mountain, nature will not be the plaintiff in the legal suit required to stop the damage. And neither will the trees that form the destroyed forest, or the society of animals harmed by this activity. The victim must appear in human form as a rights holder damaged by the activity. If the showing of damage is sufficient, then the law can act to curtail the detrimental action. Under capitalism, nature is only directly protected in the most extreme cases of harm, and then it may be decades before those forms of protection are presented as legal arguments in the courts. The same is true with respect to environmental justice, which is an issue complicated by the political-economic relations reflecting the history of class relations of capitalism as they are played out in any given historical context within a nation. The rights of capital dominate the very definition of environmental justice as a practice, and have historically limited the ability of the law to recognize environmental justice as a value that requires extensive protection. And even when the law has recognized environmental justice in principle, it does so less often in practice, and does not impede the impact of capitalism on the unequal distribution of ecological harms across class, race, and ethnic groups sufficiently to squelch the appearance of environmental injustice as illustrated in chapter 11.

CONCLUSION Capitalism destroys nature, which we have argued is a green crime. This chapter has used political-economic theory to explain that form of destruction and to explore the ways in which the expansionary tendencies of capitalism are detrimental to ecosystem health. Throughout this chapter we have provided examples of a political-economic style of analysis useful for understanding green crimes. We provided an example of how that process plays out over time, estimating how the expansion of capitalism generates ecological collapse. We also noted, as in previous chapters, that significant scientific evidence supports those contentions. The tendency of capitalism to overproduce commodities and thus overconsume nature is inherent in the profit and expansionary orientation of capitalism, and even modified versions of capitalism will, as a

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consequence of their profit and expansionary tendencies, promote ecological destruction. Solving the contemporary ecological crisis, therefore, requires moving beyond capitalism, and anything short of transforming capitalism will simply forestall, for some short period of time, ecological catastrophe. From the perspective of nature and political economy, the profit/expansionary goals of capitalism are destructive of nature. In reference to nature itself and from the perspective of ecological production, the exploitation of nature by capitalism must be viewed as a direct green crime against nature and as an indirect crime against every species in the world that depends on nature to reproduce itself. (Lynch and Stretesky 2014; Lynch et al. 2013; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013b). Whether green criminologists follow our observations are, of course, up to them. And while we certainly do not expect that all will, since politicaleconomic theory is not a widely accepted form of analysis, especially within criminology, we hope that some of the lessons we have offered here will cause readers of this book to pause to think about the connection between capitalism and ecological destruction.

S T U DY G U I D E Questions and Activities for Students 1. Explain the concept of the capitalist ToP and how it accelerates the expansion of capitalism. 2. How do the processes of ecological withdrawal and ecological additions cause ecological destruction, and how are these things tied to the expansion of the ToP? 3. How is a theory is built and tested? 4. Explain why individual-level theories are not very useful explanations of green crime and why political-economic theories may be more useful. 5. What is the use of a mathematical model of ecological destruction, and how does it illustrate how capitalism destroys nature? 6. On what basis do some argue that capitalism can prevent the collapse of the ecosystem, and what are the limits of that argument? Lessons for Researchers 1. Part of our discussion suggests that the explanation of green crimes requires structural rather than individual-level explanations. While we propose that those explanations should draw on

political-economic theory, other types of structural explanations are also possible and deserve further attention. 2. Green criminologists have yet to explore explanations of green crimes across nations, and this remains an area ripe for both theoretical development and empirical research. 3. As noted, ecological withdrawals and additions contribute to green crimes against ecosystems and ecosystem inhabitants. Ecological withdrawals and additions interact with one another, enhancing ecological disorganization. Theoretically, this association is easily explained, but measuring those interactions are more complicated and require further analysis. 4. Following #3, the effects of ecological additions and withdrawals on ecosystem species also involve complex relationships between species and ecosystems and between species in affected ecosystems. Studies illustrating those effects would be useful for establishing how green crimes/harms intersect and multiply the harms generated by ecological disorganization.

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Index Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 148, 152 Agnew, Robert, 43, 44 Air pollution: death and exposure due to, 4, 5–6, 32–36, 57, 60, 96, 108, 141, 199, 217, 270–271; in Edmonton, Canada, 34 fig.; in Los Angeles, 6 fig.; smoke stack emissions, 60 fig., 217 fig.; upset events/accidental emissions, 33, 36–37 Amoco-Cadiz oil spill, 154 Animal cruelty, 32, 41. See also Wildlife crime Anthropocene, 90, 135–136, 183; and criminology, 69–70 Asbestos exposure, 151–152, 158 Athabasca oil sands/sand tars (Canada), 77–82, 87, 93; Fort McMurray sand tars field, 78 fig. Bacon, Francis, 18–19 Barrett, Kimberly L., cited on CFPPs, 108, 269 Basel Convention, 221, 222–223. See also Hazardous waste Beirne, Piers, 9, 22, 45, 161, 162–163, 177 Benford, Robert, 234–235 Bhopal disaster, 2–4, 62, 155–156; list of resources, 4; public protests about, 3 fig. Biochemical flows, 64–67 Biodiversity loss, 56 table, 76, 83, 128–129, 135–136, 140, 169, 180, 182–183, 267 Bison slaughter, 210–211, 211 fig. Bisschop, Lieselot, 30–31, 227 BP (British Petroleum), 85–86, 157–158 Braungart, Michael, 267 Brisman, Avi, 9, 44–45 Brulle, Robert J., 228, 235, 239 Buckler, Kevin, 28 Buffalo Creek disaster, 154 Bullard, Robert D., 102–103, 194, 197, 197 fig. Burkett, Paul, 52, 130 Burns, Ronald G., 37, 190, 199, 203 Buttel, Fredrick H., 228 Cancer, environmental causes, 3, 27, 32, 91, 98, 101–102, 103, 104, 134, 151, 154, 159, 192–193, 216 Cancer Alley, Louisiana, 100–104, 158 Capitalism, xiii, 14–16, 49, 50–52, 69–70, 76, 110, 115, 129–130, 139, 182, 220,

227, 239, 248–249, 253–254, 258–261; and carbon dioxide emissions, 59–61, 110–111, 121, 131; and climate change, 13, 61, 121; and commodity cycle, 249–250; and conflict with nature, 16, 51–53, 208, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 267–268, 273; and consumption of nature, 192, 208–209, 248, 250, 251–253, 258, 260–261, 262–264; and contradictions (ecological), 234–235, 248, 257, 259, 268, 269, 273–274; and definition of green crime, 13, 218, 250, 252, 265, 273; and deforestation, 120 table, 129, 252; and destruction of nature, 51–52; and ecological crisis, 51, 73; and ecological destruction/disorganization, 121–122, 123, 124–125, 137, 139, 233, 251–255; and ecological destruction hypotheses, 257–258, 269; and ecological disorganization and collapse model, 262–264, 264 fig.; and ecologically unequal exchange, 93–94; and ecological sustainability, 264–268; and economic inequality and poverty, 248–249, 259; and entropy, 50; and foreign direct investment, 111; and “the good life,” 248; growth and expansionary tendencies of, 55, 110, 115–116, 249; international capitalist economy (ICE), 67–69; manufacturing and service economies, 250; and metabolic rift, 66–67; organization of, 50; and overconsumption/overproduction, 115–121, 252–254; poaching, 245–248; and post-WWII treadmill of production, 250–251; and production of green crime, 14; profit as driver of, 117, 249–250; and profit-expansionconsumption cycle, 252–257; and race to the bottom, 220; and raw material consumption, 250; recessions and depressions, 254; “saving the planet” argument, 265–268; structure vs. culture, 271–272; and subordination of nature, 272–273; as vampire or werewolf, 265. See also Treadmill of production CAPTURED theoretical model, 171, 172, 181 Carbon dioxide emissions, 57–62, 63, 68, 96, 108, 110–112, 121, 123–124, 128,

131, 198, 200–201, 209, 213–214, 232, 239, 251; global and US, 58 table, 132 table. See also Climate change Carbon footprint, 131, 132 table. See also Ecological footprint; Human waste footprint Carrabine, Eamonn, 8, 10 Carson, Rachel, 191–193 Case-control studies, 27–28 Case-crossover design, 28 Case studies, 29–30 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, US, 26, 153 Centralia, Pennsylvania, 145–147; warning sign in, 146 fig. Chakraborty, Jayjit, 199–200 Chambliss, William J., 210–211 Chemical accidents, 145, 158–159. See also Toxic disasters Chernobyl nuclear accident, 2–3, 156 Church Rock nuclear spill, 155 CITES. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna Clarke, Ronald V., 28, 39–40, 41, 43, 44, 164–167, 168, 170–171, 181, 221–222, 247 Class conflict, 49, 208, 210, 218 Clifford, Mary, 12–13, 53 Climate change, xiv, 5–7, 13–14, 22, 23, 44, 50, 56, 57–61, 65, 67, 76–77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 89, 90, 92, 109, 116, 121, 128, 131, 135, 136, 140, 141, 146, 169, 180, 183, 209, 213, 214, 223, 251, 258; countermovement, 239. See also Carbon dioxide emissions Clinical trials, 27 Clinton, Bill, and Executive Order 12898 on environmental racism, 197 Coal: and carbon dioxide emissions, 200, 250–251; and coal company violations, 28, 37; and entropy, 49–50; EROIs, 81; mining, 90–91, 96, 97, 106–107, 144–145; slurry spills, 154, 156–157, 159; surface mining of, 107, 145 fig.; and underground fires, 145–147, 152 Coal-fired power plants, 108, 144, 158 Cochran, Joshua, 38–39 Conservation criminology, 10, 45

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Consumption: and gross domestic production, 117–118, 254, 264; of nature, 192, 208–209, 248, 250, 251–253, 258, 260–261, 262–264; of raw material, 250. See also Overproduction/overconsumption Content analysis, 31–32 Contested illnesses, 98–100, 102, 144, 151–152 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), 43, 163–166, 170, 178, 184–186, 221–222 Cornwall Alliance (anti-environmental group), 238–239 Corporate crime, 3, 7, 22, 23, 24, 193, 218. See also Crimes of the powerful Counter movement organizations, 237–240; religious, 238 Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the Way We Make Things (McDonough and Braungart), 267; critique, 268 CRAVED models/theory, 28, 170–171, 172, 181, 247 Crime: ecological additions, 10, 96, 113; ecological disorganization, 10; ecological withdrawals, 72–94; explaining green crime, 243–275; overproduction and overconsumption as, 114–136; pollution as, 48–70; social harm definition of, 53–54, 208, 210, 217–218; and social structure, 247–248; street crime, 20, 22; Union Carbide and, 2; victims of, 24. See also Green crime Crimes of the powerful, xiii, xiv, 218, 247 Criminology, and Anthropocene, 69–70, 136 Crow, Matthew S., 41 Culture vs. social structure, 271–272 Cuyahoga River fire (Ohio), 192 Dangerous Dogs Act, UK, 42–43 Deductive reasoning, 19 Deepwater Horizon (BP) oil spill, 85–86, 87 fig., 104–106, 157–159; controlled fire, 105 fig.; sea turtle rescue, 86 fig. Deforestation, 19–20, 78, 91, 94, 96, 109, 119–121, 124, 128–130, 135–136, 140–141, 173, 181–183, 187, 251–253, 270; global rates of, 120 table; logging cycles, 252; in Riau, Indonesia, 141 fig.; solutions to, 181; timber clear-cut, 91 fig. Descriptive statistics, 36–37 Deterrence, effectiveness of, 111, 171, 173, 175, 208, 212–214, 223, 246–247 Dioxin, 100–101, 152–153, 154, 158 Dunlap, Riley, 238, 240–241 Earth First!, 232 Earth Liberation Front, 232 Eco-economies, 179–180 Eco-global criminology, 45 Ecological additions, 10, 17, 53, 55, 62–69, 70, 72–73, 80–82, 87–89, 90–91,

96–112, 115, 118, 133–134, 141—144, 148–149, 182, 189, 198, 208, 254, 257, 260–262, 268, 270–271; defined, 16; and exposure to toxins, 189–204. See also Pollution Ecological contradictions of capitalism, 234, 248, 257, 259, 269, 273–274 Ecological destruction, xiii, xiv, xv, 8–14, 16, 19, 48, 55, 66, 68, 72–73, 80, 82, 85–87, 92, 93–94, 111, 115, 119, 121, 125, 145, 147, 182, 207–208, 212, 215, 218–219, 232, 233, 241, 251, 253–256, 261, 265–269, 270, 272, 275; hypotheses, 257–258 Ecological disorganization, 8, 10, 16, 19, 20, 49–55, 59–60, 62–64, 66–67, 69, 70, 72, 77–78, 81, 90, 93, 97, 100, 108, 114–116, 121, 123–124, 126–128, 133, 135–136, 139, 182, 189, 205, 210, 214, 220, 235, 250–254, 255, 257–258, 261– 264, 269, 271; and capitalism, 15–16; and crime, 53–55, 270; defined, 10, 49; ecological collapse model, 262–264 Ecological footprint, 13, 17, 75, 83, 93, 116, 126–130, 137, 232, 249, 251–253, 256–258, 261, 263; global, 128 table. See also Carbon footprint; Human waste footprint Ecologically devastated communities. See Toxic towns Ecologically unequal exchange, xiv, 68–69, 93–94, 119, 129, 131 Ecological Marxism/Marxists, 15–16, 48, 51–53, 66, 219–220, 248, 251–254, 258–259, 268 Ecological sustainability and capitalism, 125, 137, 219, 264–268; model, 75 Ecological withdrawals, 10, 53, 64, 66–69, 72–94, 96–97, 107–109, 115, 118, 127, 135, 140, 144–145, 151–152, 182, 189, 198, 208–209, 223, 232, 254, 257–258, 260–261, 268–271; defined, 16 Edwards, Terry, 12–13, 53 Electronic waste (e-waste), 30, 31, 31 fig., 98, 201, 201 fig., 223. See also Basel Convention Elephant(s): confiscated tusks, 166 fig.; culling, 196; hunting, 184–185; poaching, 43, 164–167, 169, 171, 221–222; trophy price, 185 table Eliason, Stephen L. 12, 168, 172 Emmons, David, 12 Endangered species, 9, 43, 165, 168, 184, 221; state killing of, 185–186. See also Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna Energy returned on investment (EROI), 80–81 Entropy, 49–50, 64–65, 208, 258 Environmental counter movement organizations, 237–240; religious, 238 Environmental crime: construction and representation in media, 44; defined, 12, 53, 98; deterrence, 175, 212–214;

global, 219–223; hotspots, 39; punitive attitudes toward, 25; rates of corporate, 36; self-reported, 42; US EPA enforcement, 102; victims of, 190; in Warren County, 193–196. See also Green crime Environmental enforcement, 12, 18, 22, 29, 30, 36–37, 40–43, 53, 55, 102, 163, 164–165, 168–170, 173–175, 203–205, 212, 215–216, 219, 221–233, 240–241; and campaign contributions; 37; informal enforcement, 38, 204, 231–233; and international nongovernmental organizations, 38, 231–233, 236–237; punishment/deterrence, 111, 212–214, 246–247; and racial/ethnic bias, 37–39, 190, 201–204; self-policing, 215–216 Environmental equity/inequity. See Environmental justice Environmental justice, 8, 31–32, 37–38, 102, 148, 189–206; and criminology, 201–202, 273–274; defined, 190; movements, 191, 193–202 Environmental Kuznets curve, 121–126, 122 fig., 219, 265–266 Environmental law, 207–223; enforcement, 203–204, 212; modernization argument, 214–217 Environmental movements, 191–192; protest of Monsanto, 230 fig. See also Environmental social movements Environmental Protection Agency, US: audit policy, 42, 134; criminal investigations, 212; data sources and studies, 37, 38, 42, 57, 62, 63 table, 100, 102, 111, 134, 140, 141, 148, 157, 159, 196, 204, 231; definition of environmental justice, 190; punishment, 215–216; troubling/ controversial cases, 152, 153, 194–195, 213–214 Environmental racism. See Environmental justice Environmental social movements, 225–232; and corporate partners, 235–236; defined, 225–226; de-radicalization, 233–234; diversification, 233–234; emergence, 226; history, 227–228; influence, 229; protest against Monsanto, 230 fig.; resistance to and counter movements, 237–240 Epidemiology, 26–28, 98–99 Escobar, Sue Carter, 161 Ethnography, 33–35 Eutrophication, 65–66, 142 Executive Order 12898 on environmental racism, 197 Explaining crime, individual level explanation critique, 245–248 ExxonMobil, 37, 239 Exxon Valdez oil spill, 3–4, 5, 156, 159; cleanup of, 5 fig. Fishing, illegal, unreported, and unregulated, 28, 40, 171, 178, 212; meeting with John Kerry about, 40 fig.

Index Fish kills, 65, 65 fig., 81, 142, 142 fig. Ford, Lucy H., 226, 236 Foreign direct investment, 67–68 Forest(s): air pollution affecting, 81; Canadian boreal, 77–78; and climate change, 14, 76, 109, 118, 134; destruction of, 91–92, 119–121, 130, 183, 274; exports, 93; and logging cycles, 251; and monoculture, 72, 128–129, 135; products, 124; protecting, xv, 173, 180–181; rainforests, 84, 85; regeneration of, 251–252; segmentation/fragmentation of, 8, 14, 90, 92, 107, 135, 183, 184, 231; soil cycle, 251; soil pollution, 134; species loss, 183; and sustainability, 118–119; volume of, UK, 270; volume of, US, 118–119. See also Deforestation Forest Stewardship Council, 231 Foster, John Bellamy, 52, 66–67, 232, 272 FracFocus (environmental organization), 229–230 Fracking. See Hydraulic fracturing Free-market and ecological destruction, 267–268 Friedman, Milton, 117, 249 Geographic analysis/mapping, 39–40 Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas, 50 Georgeson, Lucien, 233 Gibbs, Carole, 10, 36, 45, 223 Gibbs, Lois, xiv–xv, 150 Global Community Monitoring (Organization), 231 Global Footprint Network, 126–127, 128, 131 Global North/Global South and pollution, 198, 237 Global Witness (organization), 85, 240 Gore, Meredith, 172 Gould, Kenneth, 200, 229 Gouldner, Alvin, 7 Green behaviorism, 45 Green crime: in Anthropocene, 69–70, 136; areas of research, 23–24; causes/etiology, 43–45, 49–55, 70, 72, 170–173, 243–265; defined by scientific standards, 54–55, 98–99, 144, 219; definition, 8–14, 55, 70, 100, 114–115, 136, 163, 218–219, 248, 265, 270–271, 273; and domination of nature, 273; and ecological disorganization and species harm, 135–136; explaining, 243–275; NGOs, 227–232; and overproduction and overconsumption, 114–136; and poaching, 170–173; political economic view of, 136, 218–219, 243, 245–263; pollution, 55–69; researching/research areas, 26–42, 126, 134, 164–170; state killing, 186; theory of, 15-17, 44–45; thinking about, xiii–xiv, 12, 14, 98, 136, 211–212, 221; and toxic towns, 139–159; and wildlife, 163–173 Green criminology: definition, 8–14, 20; as discipline, 11–12; and ecological withdrawals, 72–94; and environmental

justice, 189–206; history and origins of, xiii, 2, 5–8, 21–24, 161, 226–227; keywords, 23 table; knowledge and methods, 24–41; policy, 42–43; and political economy, 13–14, 48–70, 268–270, 272; and pollution/ecological additions, 53–70, 96–112; scientific dimensions of, xiii, 54–55, 98–99, 144, 219; specializations, 24 table; summary/literature, 21–46; studies/state of, 21–46 Green cultural criminology, 44–45, 269 Greenhouse gas emissions, 82, 108, 123, 131, 132 table, 239. See also Carbon emissions Green offenders, sentencing, 38–39 Greenpeace, 239–240 Green victims/victimization, 14, 20, 32–33, 134, 269 Greife, Matthew, 203 Gross domestic production: and consumption, 117–118, 254, 264; top ten nations, 255 table; in US, 118 table Grugan, Susan, 32 Habitat destruction/fragmentation. See Biodiversity loss Hallsworth, Simon, 42–43 Hazardous waste, 2, 7, 123, 222–223; production/quantity, 133–134; regulation, 30, 38–39; unequal exposure to, 154, 193–199, 236 Heavy metals, 56 table, 84–85, 96, 144; exposure to, 108–109, 148–150, 158, 202–203; lead, 73, 85, 107, 108–109, 147–148, 158, 202–203; mercury, 79, 107, 108, 146, 148–150, 158, 202; mining, 73, 144, 147–148 Heckenberg, Diane, 45 Hillyard, Paddy, 17, 54, 218 Hogan, Michael J., 25 Honeybees, 140 Household consumption, 255–257; of richest and poorest nations, 256 table Human-nature intersection, 272–273 Human waste footprint, 133–134. See also Carbon footprint; Ecological footprint Hume, John (rhino farmer), 178 Hydraulic fracturing (hydro-fracking), 84–90; diagram, 89 fig. Hypothesis testing, 243–244 Indigenous environmental activists, killing of, 84–85 Indigenous peoples. See Native peoples Individual action/activism, xiv–xv Inductive reasoning, 18–19 Industrial accidents, 154–159 Inferential statistics, 37–39 Inorganic nitrogen, 64–65 International Capitalist Economy (ICE), 67–69 International Green Criminology Working Group, 11, 23, 24

305

International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 233 Ivory trade, 163–167; confiscated elephant tusks, 166 fig.; confiscated walrus tusks, 167 fig. Ixtoc oil spill, 155 Jarrell, Melissa L., xiv, 32–33, 36, 102 Jevon’s paradox, 210, 214–215, 266 Jorgenson, Andrew K., 67–69, 93, 253 Kahler, Jessica S., 172 Kane, Stephanie, 34–35, 45 Kempf, Herve, 249 Killer smog, 4–5 Kovel, Joel, 70, 259 Kroger National Park (South Africa), 246–247 Kyoto Protocol, 223 Lead exposure and crime, 108–109, 202 Lemieux, Andrew, 40, 43, 164–167, 171, 221–222 Less developed countries (LCDs), 67–69 Libby, Montana, 151–152 The Limits to Growth (study), 265 Logging/timber cycles, 252 Long, Michael A., 25, 28, 37, 44, 111, 182, 188 The Lorax (Dr. Seuss), 272 Love Canal (Niagara Falls, NY), xiv–xv, 150–151, 192 Lumber production, 118–119, 120 table; and imports, 119 table Lynch, Elliot J., 151 Lynch, Michael J., 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 21–22, 25, 28, 32, 37–38, 42, 45, 98, 111, 182, 190, 200, 203–204, 218, 226, 231 Maathai, Wangari, xiv–xv Macro-level studies, 25 Martheache, Nerea, 171 Marx, Karl, xiii, 15, 49, 249, 265 Marxist ecologist/ecology. See Ecological Marxism/Marxists McDonough, William, 267 McGurrin, Dannielle, 31–32 McPeak, Mark, 237 Mercury exposure/poisoning, 79, 107, 108, 146, 148–150, 158, 202 Metabolic (ecological) rift, 66–67, 83, 130–131, 232 Methods of research. See Research methods Migrant workers, exposure to pesticides, 202 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, United Nations, 180 Mills, C. Wright, 247 Mills-Busa, Julianne, 124–125 Minamata disease (Minamata, Japan), 148–150 Mitchell, James K., 144 Mixed-method approaches, 41

306

Index

Modernization: and law, 214–217; and pollution, 121–122, 219 Mohai, Paul, 199, 236 Mol, Arthur, 214–215, 228 Moloney, Chris, 210–211 Money-wrenching, 232 Monoculture, 72, 128–129, 135 Moreto, William, 171 Most polluted cities, 158 Mountaintop removal mining, 90–91, 97, 106–107; valley fill, 97 fig. Moyle, Brendan, 169–170 Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), 221–223 Naled (pesticide), 140 Native (indigenous) peoples: and green crime and injustice, 81–82, 84–85, 155, 178–180, 186, 199, 237, 240, 246, 271; killing of, 85 Natural Capitalism: The Next Industrial Revolution (Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins), 266–267; critique, 267–268 Nature: “capitalization” of term, 267–268; historical human harmony with, 253, 272–273; modeled, 259–262; reproduction of, 74–77, 127, 251 Needleman, Herbert, 202 Ngoc, Anh Cao, 169 NIMBY (not in my backyard), 236–237 Nitrogen pollution, 65–67, 142 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 180, 228, 231, 232–237 Nonpoint source pollution, 65 Nonspeciesist criminology, 45 Nurse, Angus, 29, 227 Oak Ridge Nuclear Reservation, health problems at, 99 Occidental Petroleum, 84–85 Ocean acidification, 56 table, 61–62 O’Connor, James, 52 Oil extraction and production, 84–90, 87 fig., 92–93, 209, 210 table; global, 201 fig. Oil pipelines, 82, 107; in US, 107 fig. Oil sands. See Sand tars Overproduction/overconsumption, 114– 136, 116 fig.; global deforestation rates, 120 table; US gross domestic product, 118 table; US lumber production and imports, 119 table Ozone depletion, 56 table Ozymy, Joshua, 33, 36 Parrot poaching, 39–40, 168 Participatory research, 32–33 Paternoster, Raymond, 175 Payments for environmental services, 180–181 Pellow, David N., 190, 198, 200, 204, 235 Periyar Wildlife Sanctuary, 179–180 Pesticide: exposure, 202; use estimate, 141–142

Petrossian, Gohar, 28, 40–41, 44, 171 Phosphorus pollution, 64–65, 220 Picher, Oklahoma, 147–148 Pires, Stephen, 39–40, 44, 168, 170–171 Planetary boundaries, 17, 55–67, 56 table Poaching. See Wildlife trafficking, smuggling, and poaching Poachers/poaching typology, 172 Polanyi, Karl, 220 Political-economic: analysis, xiii-xv, 1, 7–8, 10–11, 13–17, 21–22, 48–55, 59, 66, 69, 70, 72–73, 83–85, 92–94, 97, 110, 112, 114–116, 131, 135–136, 147, 181–183, 186–187, 188, 200–202, 208, 219–222, 224, 245–249, 268–275; and environmental justice, 200–201 Political economy, and green criminology, 48–55, 247, 248–259, 268–270 Pollution: chemical, 56 table; as crime, 48–70, 108–109, 201, 202; extent of, 55–69, 81, 132 table, 133–134, 198, 216–217; and health, 99, 100–102, 101 fig., 104–109, 134, 150–153, 190, 193, 216; and proximity to schools, 199. See also Ecological additions Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), 193–196; warning sign, 194 fig. Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, 134 Population growth and ecological consumption, 253 Qualitative studies, 29–31, 168 Qualitative vs. quantitative studies, 28–29 Quantitative studies, 35–41, 164–168 Quinney, Richard, 53–54 Race to the bottom, 220–221 Recession, beneficial ecological effect, 254 Recession, Great, 254 Research methods: case-control studies, 27–28; case-crossover design, 28; case studies, 29–30; clinical trials, 27; content analysis, 31–32; deductive reasoning, 19; descriptive statistics, 36–37; epidemiology, 26–28, 98–99; ethnography, 33–35; geographic analysis/mapping, 39–40; hypothesis testing, 243–244; inductive reasoning, 18–19; inferential statistics, 37–39; mixedmethod approaches, 41; participatory research, 32–33; qualitative vs. quantitative studies, 28–29; qualitative studies, 29–31, 168; quantitative studies, 35–41, 164–168 Resisting the Red Dragon, 238–239 Rhinoceros: farming, 176–178; poaching, 246–247 Rice, James, 68 River Keepers, 232 Rockström, Johan, 57, 62, 65, 66 Rolf, A., 167, 168 Ruggerio, Vincenzo, 23

Saha, Robin, 236 Sand tars/oil sands, 77–82, 87, 93; Fort McMurray sand tars field, 78 fig. Saro-Wiwa, Ken, 240 Schelly, David, 236 Schnaiberg, Allan, 16, 49, 51, 52–53, 68, 200, 208 Schwendinger, Herman, 218 Schwendinger, Julia, 218 Sea level, rising, 15 fig. Sea Shepherds (organization), 232 Self-policing, environmental regulations, 215–216 Seveso industrial accident, 154 Shearing, Clifford, 69 Shelley, Tara O’Connor, 25, 41 Shell Oil, 102. See also Saro-Wiwa, Ken Simpson, Sally, 36 Situ, Yingyi, 12 Smog, killer, 4–5 Sollund, Ragnhild, 43, 44, 161, 170 Solon, Pablo, 267–268 South, Nigel, 9, 22, 29–30, 44–45, 69, 161, 226 Spaargaren, Gert, 214–215 Species loss. See Biodiversity loss Steffen, Will, 57 Street crime: green criminology critique, xiii, xiv, 20, 22, 70, 175, 218, 245, 269; and toxic pollution, 202–203, 205 Stretesky, Paul B., 8, 9, 10, 25, 32, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, 45, 98, 111, 182, 188, 199, 200, 203, 204, 216, 231, 236 Superfund sites, 148, 155; map of, 157 fig.; Tar Creek, 148 Sutherland, Edwin H., 218 Tappan, Paul, 218 Tar Creek Superfund Site, 148 Tarlock, A.D., 233 Taylor, Dorceta, 227, 228 Technology forcing law/regulations, 214–215 Theory building/testing, 243–245; empirical basis, 243; hypothesis testing, 243 Thermodynamics, 49 Three Mile Island, 155 Tiger poaching, 169–170; Siberian tiger, 169 fig. Timber withdrawal, 90, 91; clear cut, 91 fig. See also Deforestation Times Beach, Missouri, 152–154 Tombs, Steve, 218 Toxic disasters/accidents: Amoco-Cadiz oil spill, 154; Bhopal disaster, 2–4, 62, 155– 156; Buffalo Creek disaster, 154; in Centralia, Pennsylvania, 145–147; Chernobyl nuclear accident, 2–3, 156; Church Rock nuclear spill, 155; Cuyahoga River fire (Ohio), 192; Deepwater Horizon

Index (BP) oil spill, 85–86, 104–106, 105 fig., 157–159; Exxon Valdez oil spill, 3–4, 5, 156, 159; Ixtoc oil spill, 155; in Libby, Montana, 151–152; Love Canal (Niagara Falls, NY), xiv–xv, 150–151, 192; in Minamata, Japan, 148–150; Naled (pesticide), 140; in Picher, Oklahoma, 147–148; Seveso industrial accident, 154; Three Mile Island, 155; in Times Beach, Missouri, 152–154; in Warren County, 193–196 Toxic release inventory (TRI), 57, 62–63, 254; in US, 63 table Toxic towns, 139–159 Treadmill of law, 207–223 Treadmill of production, 16, 49–51, 92–94, 97, 99–100, 110–111, 121, 130, 134–136, 200–201, 208–210, 253–254, 270; ancient treadmill, 209 fig.; and capitalism, 250–251; and environmental enforcement, 232–233; negative consequences of, 182; and poaching, 181–184 Tree farms, 128–129. See also Forest(s) Trump, Donald, 237–238 Tsitsikamma National Park (South Africa), 178–179

Turk, Austin, 208, 210, 223 Turtle poaching, 170 United Church of Christ study on environmental racism, 197 Unnithan, N. Prabha, 25 van Solinge, Tim Boekhout, 227 Victimization, green crimes, 268–269 Viollaz, Julie, 171 Walrus, confiscated tusks, 167 fig. Walters, Reece, 9, 84 Warren County, toxic waste site in, 193–196 Waste footprint, 133 Water: extraction, 83–84; political ecology, 34–35; virtual, 83; water pollution point-source pipe, 64 fig. Water Keeper Alliance, 232 Water monitoring, citizen-led, 38, 204 White, Rob, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 45, 143 Wildlife: farming, 175–178; protection of, using skim pits, 88 fig. Wildlife crime, 80, 86–87, 90; controlling, 170–181 Wildlife hunting: in Africa, 185 table; bison, 211 fig.

307

Wildlife law enforcement, 29, 174–175; and forensic laboratory work, 174 fig. Wildlife trafficking, smuggling, and poaching, 12, 28, 30, 39–40, 41, 43, 44, 161–187, 221–222; blaming the poor, critique of, 184–185, 246; controlling, 163–168, 170, 173–181; of elephants, 43, 164–167, 166 fig, 169, 171, 221–222; explanations for, 168–169, 170–171, 172–173, 245–248; of parrots, 39–40, 168; of rhinoceros, 177 fig.; of tigers, 169–170, 169 fig.; and treadmill of production, 181–184; of turtles, 170; of walruses, 167 fig. Wilson, Nancy, 12 Wise-Use Movement (anti-environmental), 239 World Input-Output Database, 133 World Systems Theory, 121–122, 125, 200, 220–221 World Wildlife Fund, 231 Wyatt, Tanya, 9, 30, 41, 169 You Sow (organization), 229–230 Zahran, Sammy, 31–32 Zilney, Lisa Anne, 31–32