Greek Orators VII: Demosthenes 8: On the Chersonese 9781789622447, 9781789628159, 9781800858824, 1789622441

Table of contents :
Cover
CONTENTS
PREFACE
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE EDITION
INTRODUCTION
Historical Background
Context of Demosthenes 8, On the Chersonese
Demosthenes’ Life and Career
Demosthenes’ Style
The Structure of On the Chersonese
The Relationship Between On the Chersonese (Or. 8) and the‘Fourth Philippic’ (Or. 10) and the Dating of On the Chersonese
Scholarship on the Text
Notes on the Manuscripts, Papyri and Scholia
DEMOSTHENES 8:ON THE CHERSONESE
COMMENTARY
APPENDIX 1: THE USE OF RINGS TOSTRUCTURE DEMOSTHENES’S SPEECHES
APPENDIX 2: OUTLINE OF PRIMARYRING STRUCTURES IN DEMOSTHENIC DELIBERATIVE ORATORY
APPENDIX 3: ATHENS AND THE NORTHAEGEAN DOWN TO THE END OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX

Citation preview

GREEK ORATORS VII Demosthenes 8, On the Chersonese Demosthenes’ oration On the Chersonese is a masterpiece of rhetorical brilliance and contains some of the best examples of his skill as a political orator, coming as one of his final surviving speeches in the corpus. It was delivered to the Athenians in 341 BC, at a time of turbulent events when Athens was coming under increasing pressure resulting from the actions of Philip of Macedon. The Chersonese was a region of great importance for Athens. At the time of the speech, Philip was in the middle of an extensive military and diplomatic campaign in Thrace that would threaten the security of the Athenian grain trade from the Black Sea. The resulting pressure in the Chersonese, however, was seen by Demosthenes as an attempt by Philip to weaken Athens as a prelude to taking the whole of Greece. In this context he argued in the speech that the general Diopeithes, who had been sent out to the Chersonese in 346 with a naval force, be supported in the face of protest from Philip regarding Diopeithes’ actions in the wider area. He focuses on Athenian relations with Philip in this crucial northern region and why Philip was a threat to Athenian interests in the area. This edition with Greek text, translation and commentary contains the first detailed commentary on this speech. The introduction explains the historical background in some detail, as well as examining Demosthenes’ deliberative oratory, the structure and style of the speech, and relationship to the speeches that followed, including the famous Third Philippic. The commentary focuses on all political, military, social and religious references presented by Demosthenes, as well as oratorical aspects. Stephen Clarke is an experienced history teacher and lecturer; he has taught History and Languages in schools, History Method at the University of Western Sydney and taught Ancient History at The University of Sydney.

www.liverpooluniversitypress.co.uk

A&P Clarke cover chosen SB 12_1.indd 1

GREEK ORATORS VII Demosthenes 8, On the Chersonese Stephen Clarke

ARIS & PHILLIPS CLASSICAL TEXTS

ARIS & PHILLIPS CLASSICAL TEXTS

GREEK ORATORS VII Demosthenes 8, On the Chersonese

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY BY

Stephen Clarke 5/14/2021 8:26:54 AM

Aris and Phillips Classical Texts

Greek Orators VII Demosthenes 8: On the Chersonese

Edited with an Introduction, Translation and Notes by

Stephen Clarke

LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY PRESS

First published 2021 by Liverpool University Press 4 Cambridge Street Liverpool L69 7ZU www.liverpooluniversitypress.co.uk Copyright © 2021 Stephen Clarke The right of Stephen Clarke to be identified as the author of this book has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication data A British Library CIP record is available ISBN 978-1-789622-44-7 cased ISBN 978-1-789628-15-9 paperback eISBN 978-1-800858-82-4 Typeset by Tara Evans Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY. Cover image: Grave stele with Hoplite Battle Scene c. 390 BC. Fletcher Fund, 1940. Reproduced under a CC0 1.0 Universal (CC0 1.0) Public Domain license from the Metropolitan Museum of Art collections.

For my children, Eli and Aaliyah, with love, both born while in the process of writing this book.

CONTENTS Preface Abbreviations used in the edition

vii ix

Introduction

1 1 6 14 26 33

Historical Background Context of Demosthenes 8, On the Chersonese Demosthenes’ Life and Career Demosthenes’ Style The Structure of On the Chersonese The Relationship between On the Chersonese (Or. 8) and the Fourth Philippic (Or. 10) and the dating of On the Chersonese Scholarship on the text Notes on the Manuscript and Scholia

45 50 53

Demosthenes 8, On the Chersonese (Or. 8)

57

Commentary

91

Appendix 1: The use of rings to structure Demosthenes’ speeches Appendix 2: Outline of primary ring structures in Demosthenic deliberative oratory Appendix 3: Athens and the north Aegean down to the end of the Peloponnesian War Bibliography Index

179 186 190 193 211

PREFACE The study of Demosthenes is a rich and rewarding experience for both historians and linguists. His rich variety of rhetorical techniques ensures a continual supply of wonderful classical Greek to ponder, while his use of history, and the very context in which the texts were written, provide so much content for history. Demosthenes wrote these texts in a time which was so very different, yet so similar to ours. Politics is a constant in our lives, and the study of Demosthenes’ deliberative oratory continues to demonstrate the dangers of accepting uncritically the words and ideas of our political leaders. That is not to say that Demosthenes was wrong in his opposition to Philip: maintaining autonomy, to the Greek mind, was worth gambling all to preserve. Yet, we cannot but consider the counter-factual idea of what the Greek world would have looked like without Demosthenes’ opposition to Philip. The speech On the Chersonese is a critical speech to consider in this light. It could easily be seen as one of the Philippics; indeed, in many ways it is superior to the First and Second Philippics. It is powerful and consistent, possesses great clarity of thought and planning, and in conjunction with the Third Philippic, is the best example of antiPhilip rhetoric in the Demosthenic corpus. This makes the lack of extensive commentary on the speech more surprising. This edition has been written to provide the historical background to the speech. It incorporates the context for deliberative rhetoric, focusing on the way Demosthenes uses rhetorical devices and structures his arguments to enhance the text. Importantly, this edition treats the text as a written piece rather than a speech; this is not simply because we have the written form in front of us. It seems likely that the text was circulated as a written pamphlet at some point, hence the rhetorical techniques, grammar and syntax are more akin to a written, rather than a spoken, text. I acknowledge that this is far from certain, and I hope that the scholar who disagrees with this proposition will forgive the assumption and still find much of value in this edition.

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This edition has grown from a PhD thesis submitted at the University of Sydney in 2018. It is more substantial than the original thesis, incorporating far more detail on rhetorical features in particular, expanding and cutting back where necessary to make it an appropriate volume for this important series. In writing the thesis, there are many thanks to give, but none less than my PhD supervisors Professor Alastair Blanshard and Professor Peter Wilson. In particular, Professor Blanshard has worked with me closely for over a decade over two research degrees and I owe much to his guidance and remarkable knowledge. I would like to thank my PhD examiners who provided helpful feedback; a special debt of gratitude is owed to one of them, Professor Ian Worthington, who encouraged and supported me in ensuring that the PhD, the only extensive commentary ever written on this speech, was published. While they have read through drafts and finished products, any errors of fact and interpretation remain mine. Finally, to my family, who have allowed me the indulgence of completing a PhD and writing a book while working full-time, I owe an immense debt of gratitude and love. Without their support, I would not be able to have made what I hope to be a worthwhile contribution to Demosthenic studies. Stephen Clarke Sydney, 2021

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE EDITION Ael. VH Aelian, Varia Historia Aesch. Aeschines Andoc. Andocides Ant. Antiphon [Ar.] Ath. Pol. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution Ar. Rhet. Aristotle, Rhetoric Ar. Oec. Aristotle, Economics Ar. Pol. Aristotle, Politics Ar. Ach. Aristophanes, Acharnians Ar. Knights Aristophanes, Knights Arr. Anab. Arrian, Anabasis Athen. Deip. Athenaus, Deipnophistae BNJ Androt. Brill’s New Jacoby (ed. I. Worthington), Androtion BNJ Hell. Brill’s New Jacoby (ed. I. Worthington), Hellanicus BNJ Philoch. Brill’s New Jacoby (ed. I. Worthington), Philochorus BNJ Theopomp. Brill’s New Jacoby (ed. I. Worthington), Theopompus Dem. Ex. Demosthenes, Exordia Din. Dinarchus Dion. Hal. Amm. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, To Ammaeus DS Diodorus of Sicily Front. Strat. Frontinus, Stratagems Harp. Harpocration Hom. Il. Homer, Iliad Hdt. Herodotus Hyp. Hyperides IG Inscriptiones Graecae Isoc. Isocrates Jord. Get. Jordanes, Getica

x

Just. Lib. Hypoth. Lyc. Lys. Nep. Tim. PA PAA Paus. Phil. de op. mun. Plat. Protag. Plut, Ages. Plut. Alc. Plut. Cim. Plut. Mor. Plut. Pel. Plut. Per. Plut. Phoc. Plut. de gl. Ath. Polyaen. Polyb. schol. Ar. Cl. schol. Aesch. schol. Dem SEG Steph. Byz. Str. Thuc. Xen. Anab Xen. eq. mag. Xen. Cyr. Xen. Hell. Xen. Mem. Xen. Oec. [Xen.] Ath. Pol.

Abbreviations

Justin, Epitome of Pompeius Trogus Libanius, Hypotheses Lycurgus Lysias Cornelius Nepos, Life of Timotheus Prosopographia Attica J. Traill (ed.), Persons of Ancient Athens Pausanius Philo, de opificio mundi Plato, Protagoras Plutarch, Life of Agesilaus Plutarch, Life of Alcibiades Plutarch, Life of Cimon Plutarch, Moralia Plutarch, Life of Pelopidas Plutarch, Life of Pericles Plutarch, Life of Phocion Plutarch, On the Glory of Athens Polyaenus Polybius Scholia on Aristophanes, Clouds Scholia on Aeschines Scholia on Demosthenes Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum Stephanus of Byzantium Strabo Thucydides Xenophon, Anabasis Xenophon, On the Cavalry Commander Xenophon, The Education of Cyrus Xenophon, Hellenica Xenophon, Memorabilia Xenophon, Economics Xenophon, The Athenian Constitution

INTRODUCTION Historical Background Athens and the north Aegean after the Peloponnesian War After the Spartans’ victory in the Peloponnesian War, they must have felt justified in claiming the Athenian mantle of hegemony in the north. In 398, the Spartan Dercylidas was informed that the Thracian Chersonese (the thin peninsula on the European side of the Hellespont, now the Dardanelles) was under constant attack from the Thracians and he probably saw an opportunity to create a more significant Spartan presence in the region. He rebuilt Miltiades’ wall (Xen. Hell. 3.2.8–10) and settled people in the cities (Xen. Hell. 4.8.5), possibly to replace the Athenian populations that were removed by Lysander at the end of the Peloponnesian War (Xen. Hell. 2.2.2).   The Spartan presence was the stimulus for a Persian naval expedition, led by the Athenian Conon (DS 14.39.1). Conon led a revolt of the cities in the Chersonese on behalf of the Great King (Hell. Ox. 18.1.1–2; Androt. BNJ 324 F46; DS 14.79.5–8). This led to the defeat of Spartan forces at the Battle of Cnidus in 394 (Xen. Hell. 4.3.11–12; DS 14.83.4–7; Nep., Con. 4.4; Plut. Ages. 17.2; Just. 6.4.5–6, 13; Buckler, 2003: 73; Hamilton, 1991: 109). The Spartan defeat at Cnidus was the stimulus for an alliance of four major states – Athens, Thebes, Corinth and Argos – opposing the Spartans who acted in cooperation with the Persians in opposing the Spartans. Conon, leading the Persian forces, defeated the Spartans in a series of engagements and was even able to recapture the islands of Lemnos, Imbrus and Scyrus (Andoc. 3.12; IG II2 30, naming Lemnos in a later decree as under Athenian control; Lys. 2.57; Asmonti, 2015: 164; Buckler, 2003: 138; Pascual, 2016). Dercylidas, confined to Abydus and Sestus, was unwelcome in Thrace (Xen. Hell. 4.8.31; Buckler, 2003: 153–54). Thrasybulus, in command of 40 Athenian triremes, was able to sail past the Spartan forces and settle a dispute between Amadocus

2

Introduction

I and Seuthes II (Xen. Anab. 7.2.32–33, 3.16, 7.3), enrolling them as Athenian allies and re-establishing an Athenian presence in Thrace (Xen. Hell. 4.8.32; Lys. 28.5; DS 14.94.2; IG II2 21–22; Archibald, 1998: 122–25). Thrasybulus then regained for Athens Thasos (IG II2 24–25; Dem. 20.59), Samothrace (Xen. Hell. 1.1.22; Dem. 20.59) and Byzantium (Xen. Hell. 4.8.28–30; Dem. 20.60). By the early 380s, Iphicrates was able to collect contributions for the war against Sparta from cities in the region (Xen. Hell. 4.8.35). The defeat of the Athenians at the Battle of Abydus threatened their successes to date (Xen. Hell. 5.1.25–29; Polyaen. 2.24), so they willingly participated in the King’s Peace of 387, which allowed Athens to retain Lemnos, Imbros and Scyrus (Xen. Hell., 5.1.31; cf. schol. Dem. 20.54, which claims that it was a disgraceful peace). The Athenians used the opportunities presented in the anti-Spartan climate after the King’s Peace to rebuild their influence while, at the same time adhering to the letter of the treaty, forbidding military aggression. Cleruchs were settled at Lemnos, while their existing settlements at Imbros and Scyrus remained (IG II2 30; Cargill, 1995: 12–15, 84–86). Significantly, they awarded honours to Hebryzelmis, King of the Thracians, in 386 (IG II2 31), again indicating their good relationship with the Thracians. This Athenian activity must have concerned the Spartans, who attacked Olynthus when they found out that the Olynthians had entered diplomatic negotiations with Athens in 383/82 (Xen. Hell. 5.2.15). This may have placed Athens on notice, concern which was only heightened by the Spartan capture of Thebes as part of the same campaign (Xen. Hell. 5.2.24–31; Androt. BNJ 324 F50; Plut. Ages. 23.3–7, Pel. 5.1–3; DS 15.20.1–3). When, in 379, the Spartan Sphodrias led a raid into Attica (Xen. Hell. 5.4.25–33; Plut. Ages. 24–25), Athens responded by refitting the Piraeus with gates (Xen. Hell. 5.4.34), accelerating their ship-building to give them 100 triremes in 376 (IG II2 1604) and sending embassies around the Aegean to build an anti-Spartan alliance (DS 15.28.2), which we call the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy. At the same time as Athens was rebuilding its power, the Odrysian King of Thrace, Cotys, was establishing a powerful kingdom (see

Introduction

3

Heskel, 1997: 171 for an account). He came to power in 384 and soon became a formidable force in the region. The growth of Athenian power would have threatened Cotys, as some cities that joined the Naval Confederacy were located in the Thracian Chersonese.   The Spartan response to the growth of Athenian alliances was to send out a considerable navy, which was successful as Athens was soon short of food (Xen. Hell. 5.4.61; Dem. 22.15). After a number of years of desultory warfare, the Great King had need of Greek mercenaries to quell a revolt in Egypt, leading him to enforce the King’s Peace in 375 (Xen. Hell. 6.2.1; DS 15.38.1–2). Warfare soon flared up again between Athens and Sparta, which eventually led to peace negotiations being opened in 373 (Xen. Hell. 6.3.1–2; Plut. Ages. 27.3). The Spartan King Agesilaus’ refusal to allow Thebes to sign the peace on behalf of all of Boeotia led to the Battle of Leuctra and the defeat of Sparta (Plut. Ages. 28.2; Xen. Hell. 6.3.19–20; DS 15.50.4–6), changing the dynamics of Greek politics forever.   Athens and Greece after Leuctra After the Theban victory at Leuctra, Athens called a meeting of the Greeks (Xen. Hell. 6.5.1–2). At the meeting, Amyntas of Macedonia is alleged to have given up his claims to the former Athenian jewel, Amphipolis (Aesch. 2.32–33). This led to a decade of warfare in the north to reacquire the city that the Athenians felt should be theirs. Iphicrates was the first general sent out to reconquer Amphipolis, probably in 369 (Aesch. 2.27; Heskel, 1997: 26). He was only given command of a small number of triremes (Aesch. 2.28), hence he employed Charidemus, a mercenary general (Dem. 23.149). In response to this, Amphipolis made an alliance with Olynthus (Dem. 23.150), probably becoming aware of the Athenians’ intent to reconquer the city. Soon after arriving, Iphicrates was asked to assist the Macedonian King Ptolemy in defeating the pretender Pausanias (Aesch. 2.26–27). Not only was he successful, Iphicrates also negotiated a peace treaty with Ptolemy (Aesch. 2.27) to enhance Athenian power in the north, though Thebes soon marched into Macedonia and reversed the treaty (Plut. Pel. 27.2–3). This was of great consequence as Ptolemy then felt free

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to make an alliance with Amphipolis when the Olynthians decided to abandon the city to its fate (Heskel, 1997: 28). This probably led to the replacement of Iphicrates with Timotheus. Just before Iphicrates was replaced, however, he captured some Amphipolitan hostages destined for Macedonia as part of their treaty (Dem. 23.149). When Iphicrates was recalled, he left the hostages with Charidemus. Iphicrates decided that his fate would not be positive should he return to Athens, so he instead sailed for the court of his father-in-law, Cotys (Dem. 23.150). Charidemus seems to have decided to follow his former paymaster Iphicrates, so he sold the hostages back to Amphipolis and also sailed to Cotys (Dem. 23.150). When Timotheus arrived in 365, Olynthus had replaced Macedonia as the guarantor of Amphipolitan autonomy and again occupied the city (Dem. 23.150). Timotheus then attacked Olynthian territory and took a number of poleis for Athens, including Torone and Potidaea. He also assisted the siege of Cyzicus, under attack as part of a revolt from the Great King (DS 15.8.6; Isoc. 15.108; Polyaen. 3.10.15) and possibly took cities in the Chalcidice (Isoc. 15.113; Heskel, 1997: 48). Timotheus was now supported by the Macedonian King Perdiccas, who felt that his best interests were served in supporting Athens (Dem. 2.14; Polyaen. 3.10.14).   While Timotheus was in the Chalcidice campaigning against the Olynthians, a succession of strategoi were sent out to the Chersonese and Amphipolis, who campaigned so unsuccessfully that they were recalled; one, Callisthenes, was put to death for his failure (Aesch. 2.29–30; Arist. Rhet. 1380 b13). The only glimmer of hope Athens experienced was when one of Cotys’ generals, Miltocythes, rebelled in Thrace in 362 (Dem. 23.104, 50.12, 5). The Athenian response was lukewarm and the revolt failed; Miltocythes was eventually captured and put to death by Charidemus on behalf of Cotys (Dem. 23.169, 175). Soon after this, Cotys combined with the tyrant Mausolus to attack the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes at Sestus (Xen. Ages. 2.26). Ariobarzanes was in revolt from the Great King at this time, so he appealed to Athens and Sparta for assistance (Nepos, Tim. 1.3) and Timotheus was sent by Athens (Dem. 15.9). He successfully broke

Introduction

5

the siege of Sestus and extended the Athenian presence in the region (Isoc. 5.111; Nep. Tim. 1.3), allowing the Athenian fleets to sail down the straits unmolested.   Cotys had been a significant thorn in the side of the Athenians in the north Aegean. Not only had he assisted Mausolus, Cotys had taken Athenian-controlled cities, including Sestus, Crithote and Elaeus (Dem. 23.158). His death must have given the Athenians hope (Dem. 23.163), as his kingdom was divided between his three sons, Cersobleptes, Amadocus and Berisades. Cersobleptes, the most powerful of the three Thracian rulers, soon showed that he was to follow his father’s anti-Athenian policies by taking Athenian possessions in 359 after tricking an Athenian strategos (Dem. 23.115). A peace treaty signed soon after this by Amadocus and Berisades also invited Athens to be a signatory (against the will of Cersobleptes), which limited Cersobleptes’ capacity to act against Athens (Dem. 23.170; IG II2 126). Part of this treaty required the Thracian kings to collect money for Athens, indicating that Athens still possessed influence in Thrace.   It was at this time (359), that Athens had their first experience of Philip II and his canny military mind. Philip, now King of Macedonia, removed the Macedonian garrison from Amphipolis in exchange for Athens dropping their support for a pretender to the Macedonian throne, Argaeus (DS 16.3.3). Philip also proposed an alliance with Athens (DS 16.4.1). The next year, an embassy was sent to Athens from Amphipolis, probably from the pro-Athenian faction (Dem. 1.8), asking the Athenians to take the city. Philip could not allow Athens to regain Amphipolis, so he besieged it, informing the Athenians that he intended to give it to them in exchange for Pydna ([Dem.] 7.27; Dem. 23.116). This may have been the alleged secret deal recorded by Demosthenes (2.6, 23.116). As soon as Philip took Amphipolis, he marched on Pydna and took that also (DS 16.8.3; Theopomp. BNJ 115 F30a). Philip then made an alliance with Olynthus in 357 (Dem. 1.2, 6.20; DS 16.8.4–5) to further remove Athenian influence from the Chalcidice.   The outbreak of the Social War in 357 between Athens and her

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Introduction

leading allies (Byzantium, Rhodes and Chius), assisted by Mausolus, led to enormous financial concern and pressure on military resources. When Athens was forced to make peace with her leading allies and allow them to leave the Naval Confederacy, it reduced Athenian financial resources significantly, limiting their ability either to take positive action in the Chersonese to safeguard their interests against Cersobleptes, or to seek recompense or revenge in any form against Philip. It was not until 353 that the Athenians again started to spread their influence in the Chersonese. They retook Sestus, butchering the population (DS 16.34.3–4), re-established cleruchies in the region (IG II2 1613.297–98; DS 16.34.4) and came to terms with both Cersobleptes (DS 16.34.4) and Olynthus (Dem. 2.6, 3.7; schol. Dem. 1.2–3).   Context of Demosthenes 8, On the Chersonese Ever since 358, there had been much angst in Athens caused by the Macedonian monarch, Philip. By the time Demosthenes delivered this speech, Philip had not only consolidated his own power as king in Macedonia and strengthened the borders of the country in the north and east, he had also managed to create for himself a position whereby he was called on as the saviour of the Greeks in various mainland states. This owed much to his reorganisation of the Macedonian phalanx and the military focus of his administration (see Hammond, 1989: 100–106 for an outline of the reforms of the Macedonian phalanx; Ellis, 1977: 104–109 also outlines the military reforms as an important aspect of the social and political cohesion created by Philip). Philip’s success should primarily be seen as the result of two factors, however: good fortune and the successful exploitation of this good fortune. One could follow Demosthenes and see Philip as an aggressor, whose ultimate goal was to subdue Greece and put down the Athenian-style democracies which were bound to oppose him. Far greater emphasis should be placed on his ability to exploit situations successfully for his benefit rather than his long-term plans for the expansion of Macedonia. Philip did provide Athens with

Introduction

7

opportunities to reach an understanding. The Athenians, however, led by Demosthenes, refused to believe Philip’s professions of good will, with some good reasons (Cawkwell, 1963b: 120–21). This led to the policies determined by the ecclesia which allowed the aggressive, anti-Macedonian Diopeithes, the focus of the speech, to act not only in what he saw as Athenian interests, but to provoke Philip into the response desired by Demosthenes and his fellow agitators. On first glance, Athens had much to be frightened of in 341 BC. Philip had consolidated his kingdom against the northern tribes and Thracian dynasts (DS 16.8.1; Ellis, 1976: 58). Moreover, he had taken Amphipolis (Dem. 1.5, 7.27, 23.116; Theopomp. BNJ, 115, F30a; Ellis, 1976: 63–67; Cawkwell, 1978b: 73–75; Ryder, 1994: 256– 57), defeated Phocis and gained control of Thermopylae, allowing access to central Greece (Dem. 19.61; DS 16.60.1–4; Paus. 10.3.1–3; Buckler, 1989: 138–42; Worthington, 2008: 100–02). He had also taken Olynthus and the Chalcidice (Dem. 9.26; DS 16.53.2–3; Justin 8.3.6; Worthington, 2008: 79), overwhelmed the Thracian kingdoms in two separate campaigns in 352 (Dem. 1.13, 3.4–6; Theopomp. BNJ 115 F101) and 346/45 (Dem. 8.2, 8.35, 12.8), gained control of Thessaly and defined (in his favour, of course) his relationships with two significant towns, Larisa (Athenaeus 13.557c; Justin 7.6.10–12; Griffith, 1970; Ehrhardt, 1967) and Pherae (DS 16.37.3, 16.38.1; see Buckler, 2003: 415–16, Worthington, 2008: 58 and Hermann, 2019: 4 for a detailed discussion of the importance of a pacified Pherae to guarantee the security of Philip’s southern border), and won outposts in Euboea (for discussion, see Commentary, 8.18, pp. 124–26; cf. Buckler, 2003: 457). What would have concerned the more discerning of the Athenians is that his actions appeared to be inconsistent; Philip probably appeared to them to follow no overall policies, acting only through opportunism. Philip’s actions did follow a simple policy, however, in that he did what was of the greatest benefit at the time to ensure his kingdom’s stability and success. In doing this, Philip was building up a network that would insulate him from any disturbance in mainland Greece. After Philip took Olynthus and killed many of its inhabitants (DS

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16.53.3; Dem. 9.26), word reached Athens in 348 BC through an intermediary that Philip wanted peace and regretted that a state of war existed between them (Aesch. 2.12, cf. Dem. 19.10, 19.303–4; DS 16.54.1–2). The politician Philocrates proposed that an embassy be sent to Philip to discuss terms, for which he was indicted and successfully defended by Demosthenes (Aesch. 2.13, 14, 109). The fall of Olynthus changed the minds of the Athenians, which led to the embassies of Eubulus and Aeschines around Greece to solicit support for a war against Philip. These embassies failed to gain substantial support (Dem. 19.10–11, 303–6; Aesch. 2.79, 164, 3.58, 64). In 346 BC, a second embassy was sent around Greece and an embassy was sent to Pella to request the release of Athenian captives held by Philip after the fall of Olynthus (Aesch. 2.15, 100, 2.57–58; Dem. 19.12, 315). The ambassador, Aristodemus, returned not with information about the hostages, but with an expression of Philip’s desire for peace and an alliance with Athens (Aesch. 2.15–17). The first embassy of 346 BC included some of the most prominent politicians at the time, the youngest being Aeschines and Demosthenes (Aesch. 2.18; for an outline, see Harris, 1995: 195). When it returned, the Athenians were clearly happy with the result, concerned as they must have been with the grain supply. Demosthenes proposed the usual honours for the embassy (Aesch. 2.45–46) and worked hard to ensure that the peace was adopted.1 He was, at this time, clearly an avid supporter of the peace, no matter how he attempted to depict himself as an opponent of it (see esp. Dem. 19.8, contra Aeschines’ account in 3.58–75; Efstathiou, 2004). It was decided that the discussion and vote would take place on two separate days, 18th and 19th Elaphebolion. Clearly Demosthenes had a falling-out with his colleagues after the embassy (Aesch. 2.97; Dem. 19.23–24, 46). In particular, he later disagreed about the deliberation process of the first and second days regarding the issue of peace with Philip and the characterisation of his role in the exclusion of Phocis, Halus and Cersobleptes from the treaty. Philip must have been emphatic that these states and Cersobleptes were to be excluded from the treaty (Buckler, 2003: 444); in particular, he 1  See Worthington (2013: 167–171) for details of the events.

Introduction

9

was already at war with Phocis. Moreover, as soon as the Athenians left Pella, Philip levied an expedition against Cersobleptes, which was not in violation of the peace as Cersobleptes was not to be a signatory to it (Dem. 19. 174, 181; Cawkwell, 1963c: 201). The first day of deliberations witnessed the proposal of Philocrates that peace and alliance be made, excluding the Halians and Phocians, which was shouted down by the ecclesia (Dem. 19.159; MacDowell, 2000: 270). It was eventually decided that the peace treaty with Philip would be a common peace, allowing any state who wished to join within the first three months; also, it was to be a peace and not an alliance (Aesch. 3.69–70; Efstathiou, 2004: 391; Sealey, 1993: 146–47; Worthington, 2013: 168-69). This was proposed by the allies and accepted by the ecclesia (Aesch. 2.61). Both Aeschines and Demosthenes allowed Philocrates to propose terms that were acceptable to Philip and did not contribute meaningfully to the debate at this point (Efstathiou, 2004: 395). Overnight, the Macedonian ambassadors seem to have made it clear to Demosthenes and other prominent Athenians that a common peace would not be acceptable to Philip. The next day, Demosthenes supported the proposal of Philocrates to agree to the original terms proposed by Philip, which only recognised the existing allies of both states (Aesch. 2.82). Demosthenes (19.14–16) later claimed that he argued against this, but Aeschines’ account (3.71–73), though written some years later, indicates that he did not. It makes better sense if Demosthenes did not argue against it – he would have known that the Peace would not have been accepted by Philip if the Macedonian’s proposal was not ratified as proposed by him. Aeschines’ account shows that Demosthenes led the discussion to ensure that the peace was passed in accordance with Philip’s original proposal, along with an alliance. Eubulus (Dem. 19.291) also supported the peace as proposed by Philip, saying that either the Athenians vote for it and abandon the Phocians, Halians and Cersobleptes or immediately prepare for war and turn the Theoric Fund into a war chest.2 The second embassy left a week after the ecclesia voted for the peace 2  For Eubulus’ financial concerns, see Commentary, 8.24, p. 130; for a detailed account of the two days, see Efstathiou, 2004; Harris, 1995: 70–77.

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Introduction

(Aesch. 2.91–92; Dem. 18.25, 19.154). It was necessary to obtain the oath from Philip personally as only he, not his ambassadors, could swear on behalf of the Macedonian kingdom (Errington, 1990: 221–22 emphasises the personal role that seems to have been played by the Macedonian monarch in this respect). It took 23 days to reach Pella, but it was some time after the embassy arrived before Philip returned to his capital – he had been subduing Thrace (Aesch. 2.82, 90, 3.65, 73–74; Dem. 19.155–56; Worthington, 2013: 171–72). True to his word, he had not attacked Thrace while Athens was deliberating, as he had promised, but had moved immediately after it was agreed in Athens (Harris, 1995: 80). During their stay in Pella, Demosthenes took the lead and questioned Philip about the Athenian captives from his conquest of Olynthus (Dem. 19.166; Aesch. 2.99–100), while Aeschines claims to have spoken about the need to limit Theban power (Aesch. 2.104, 116–17; Dem. 19.35, 39) and to settle the Sacred War by diplomacy rather than by warfare with the Amphictyonic Council taking the lead (Aesch. 2.114, 117; Dem. 19.39). Demosthenes alleges that Aeschines reported to the ecclesia that Philip would not act contrary to Athenian interests and would humble Thebes and preserve Phocis (Dem. 19.37, 41, 44, 6.29; Cawkwell, 1978b: 101–04; cf. Markle, 1974; Harris, 1995: 88), among other benefits. Philip swore to the peace in Pella (Dem. 18.32), but it was in Pherae that his allies swore to the peace (Dem. 19.158), as his army would have been massing there for his march south to end the Sacred War (Mosley, 1972: 146). The Athenian embassy then returned to Athens while Philip, according to Demosthenes (19.158), was marching to attack Athens. Whether it was a result of personal animosity or a disagreement over the scope of the peace, upon the second embassy’s return, Demosthenes attacked Aeschines immediately (even though the trial did not take place until 343/42) and led the attack on the peace (Dem. 19.8). He was probably successful in convincing the Athenians that a miscarriage of their safety had occurred as the boule did not pass the usual honours for the embassy (Dem. 19.31–32). At a subsequent meeting of the ecclesia, delegates from Phocis attended and requested Athenian assistance – Dem. 19.58–59

Introduction

11

claims that Philip was already at Thermopylae, making promises to the Phocians that they were not believing. It was at this meeting that Aeschines allegedly reported Philip’s promise to bestow ‘great benefits’ on the Athenians (Dem. 19.19–21, 34–35). At the urging of Aeschines and Philocrates, against the advice of Demosthenes, a motion was moved that if the Phocians did not surrender the temple they had seized, the Athenians would make war on them (Dem. 19.49).3 A third embassy was sent out to communicate this decision to Philip, but in the meantime, Philip had taken Thermopylae from the Phocian troops through negotiation and ended the Sacred War (DS 16.59.3; Dem. 19.53–66, Justin 8.6.1), which strengthened his position in central Greece and the Peloponnese (Hermann, 2019: 7). In spite of a request from Philip for Athenian assistance in the war against Phocis to finish the last Phocian resistance (Aesch. 2.137), Demosthenes convinced the ecclesia to pass a decree that required the people to evacuate Attica and hold the festival of Heracles in the city (Dem. 19.86, 18.37; Aesch. 2.139, 3.80), restore the frontier fortresses and fortify Piraeus (Dem. 19.125). A fourth embassy was sent out when it had become clear that Athens had nothing immediate to fear from Philip (Aesch. 2.94, 139; Dem. 19.126–27). The purpose of the embassy was to meet with Philip and attend the meeting to decide the Phocian punishment (Aesch, 2.142–43), at which Aeschines claims that he urged Philip to spare the Phocians’ lives. After several years of stand-off between Athens and Philip, where neither party wanted to break the treaty, Philip sent an embassy to Athens, led by Python of Byzantium, in spring 343 (Sealey, 1993: 172), to renegotiate the Peace.4 He did this while he was busy in Illyria and Thessaly, indicating that he may have had some cause for concern with potential Athenian actions in support of his enemies. Philip was tired of Athenian aggression towards him ([Dem.] 7.20– 25; 18.136) and Python outlined the King’s desire to have a Common Peace, as initially proposed by Athens. The opposition to Philip was led by Demosthenes (Harris, 1995: 111–14) and Hegesippus 3  Worthington (2013: 175–76) associates Isocrates’ To Philip with the mood in Athens at the time. 4  See Harris, 1995: 111–14 for details of the events.

12

Introduction

(Traill, 2003: 105–07, no. 637270; Gallo, 2018: 359; 2019: 357–58), a close associate (see Commentary 8.2, pp. 96–97 for evidence of the association). Hegesippus was an anti-Macedonian Athenian keen to push for war with Philip. He had been an active opponent of Philip ([Dem.] 7.23–25) and led an embassy with Demosthenes to raise allies against Philip (Dem. 9.72). Hegesippus’ claims against Philip’s proposal were substantial, asserting that, should the peace be renegotiated, each should retain what belonged to it (a not-sosubtle allusion to Potidaea and Amphipolis) and that any signatory state to the peace should receive support if they were attacked by another party, limiting Philip’s influence and hegemony ([Dem.] 7.18). The Athenian embassy sent to confirm the aggressive Athenian response was headed by Hegesippus; a clearer statement of intent by the Athenian people could not have been communicated. Philip was angered by this embassy, which he summarily dismissed (Dem. 19.331). The negative Athenian attitude towards Philip at this time also extended to Philip’s proposed arbitration of ownership of the Chersonese, which Athens refused as they believed that it should be in their graces to compel the Cardians to submit to arbitration, not as a result of a favour from Philip ([Dem.] 7.44). The quibbling over the nature of the gifting of Halonnesus to Athens by Philip ([Dem.] 7.2, 4–6) is further proof that Athens was being led by those who wanted a war with Macedon and were not prepared to accept anything that Philip claimed or offered. This tension manifested itself in Euboea, where Athens supported the creation of a Euboean League under the tyranny of Callias of Chalcis, whereas Philip installed garrisons in support of Philistides and Cleitarchus at Oreus and Eretria respectively (see Commentary, 8.18, pp. 124–26; 8.36, pp. 141–45). Though Athens managed to gain control of the island of Euboea over a period of time, these events assisted Demosthenes in the creation of a negative image of Philip as grasping at Athenian possessions. The threat of Philip was possibly made to seem more immediate when an Athenian, Antiphon, was accused and found guilty of being bribed by Philip to burn down the Athenian dockyards (Dem. 18.132). Philip’s gifting of Halos to

Introduction

13

the Pharsalians (he had taken it in 346 – Dem. 19.36–39; [Dem.] 11.1) was likely seen as a calculated insult by some in Athens, but Philip’s support of Cardian independence must have continued to cause the Athenians a degree of chagrin. The Macedonian control of Amphipolis was also a continual sore point for Athens and indicated to the Athenians that they did not control the north. In 342, Philip attacked and subdued Thrace, eliminating Cersobleptes as a rival for power in the region, placing key cities under Macedonian control and creating the position of strategos to administer Thrace directly ([Dem.] 7.37, 12.8; Dem. 8.64, 9.15, 10.8, 18.27, 19.334; DS 16.71.1–2). Even though he systematically moved through and subdued Thrace, he did not attack Athenian possessions in this region (Buckler, 2003: 466). In response to this perceived northern crisis, Athens dispatched a group of cleruchs to resettle the Chersonese supported by the strategos Diopeithes (see Commentary, 8.2, p. 97). Possibly to supplement his finances, Diopeithes attacked and took Crobyle and Tiristasis ([Dem.] 12.3), which were allied to Philip, encroached on Cardian territory (Cardia was an ally of Philip according to the terms of the Peace of Philocrates), and attacked and plundered Macedonian vessels. This was all done in flagrant disregard of the Peace of Philocrates. When Philip sent an ambassador to Diopeithes, the Athenian had the ambassador tortured and held him to ransom with other Macedonian hostages ([Dem.] 12.3). A Cardian embassy to Philip complaining of Diopeithes’ behaviour resulted in a Macedonian embassy to Athens to complain about the entire situation. Diopeithes was clearly in breach not only of the Peace of Philocrates, but also of Greek diplomatic traditions, which held ambassadors as inviolable. Diopeithes should probably have been recalled, but Demosthenes and Hegesippus, dominating Athenian policy making at the time, convinced the ecclesia that since Philip was operating against Athenian interests inside Thrace (which he was not), then Diopeithes had every right to act as he had since Philip had clearly already broken the Peace. Demosthenes 8 seems to be the written version of a speech delivered to assert these ideas.

14

Introduction

Demosthenes’ life and career Demosthenes’ family background Demosthenes was born in the deme of Paeania (Plut. Moralia 844a).5 He came from a family that was considered noble (Plut. Dem. 4.1) and his father’s name was also Demosthenes. The family may have been connected to the priestly genos of the Bouzygae (Badian, 2000: 12).6 It is certain that the family was very wealthy, with his father owning a business that made knives and couches, giving him the nickname ‘The Swordmaker’ (Plut. Dem. 4.1). He employed 53 slaves in total in his business, a significant number (Plut. Dem. 4.1). In the 380s, Demosthenes senior married Cleobule, whose father, Gylon, had been a garrison commander in Nymphaeum in the Black Sea during the Peloponnesian War. After being accused of treasonous activities that led to Nymphaeum making an alliance with the Spartocid dynasty in the region, Gylon fled to Scythia, where he married the daughter of a local chieftain (Dem. 28.1–3; Aesch. 3.171–72; Davies, 1971: 121). Demosthenes acknowledged that his grandfather was a state-debtor as a result of this (Dem. 28.1–2). This gave rise to the accusation in Athens that Demosthenes was not a true Athenian citizen (Aesch. 3.172; Din. 1.15) but due to the changes to Pericles’ citizenship law prior to its reinstatement in 403/02 (Dem. 57.30) it was never given much oxygen in Athens. The marriage between Demosthenes senior and Cleobule may well have been a marriage to allow the noble Demosthenes to attain the wealth he needed, while simultaneously giving Gylon’s family the status they possibly desired (Badian, 2000: 14). Early Life Demosthenes was born around 384 BC.7 It seems that there was plenty of money for Demosthenes’ education, as according to his 5  For a recent outline of Demosthenes heritage, see Brun (2015: 75–80). 6  It is possible that all men in the deme Paeania whose name began with the prefix Demo- were related (MacKendrick, 1969: 69), contra Davies (1971: 114), who emphasises how common the prefix was. 7  See Davies (1971: 123–26) for discussion.

Introduction

15

scathing attack on Aeschines’ background, Demosthenes attended school and participated in religious ceremonies befitting his rank and status (Dem. 18.265; 27.46). When his son was about seven, Demosthenes senior died (Dem. 27.4, 6). He left assets and interests worth around fourteen talents (Dem. 27.9–11). The will he left gave guardianship of the younger Demosthenes to relatives, Aphobus and Demophon, and a family friend, Therippides (Dem. 27.4). It was arranged for Aphobus to marry Cleobule; the elder Demosthenes must have felt death approaching, as the anecdote preserved by Demosthenes (28.15–16), which has him sitting on Aphobus’ knee while his father informed everyone of his will, probably indicates the fact that Demosthenes the Elder’s death was not a surprise. Aphobus was given 8000 drachmae in the will and allowed to live in the family home until Demosthenes the younger came of age. It also arranged 12000 drachmae immediately as a dowry. Therippides was also given a sum of money as an interest-free loan for his role in the protection of the interests of Demosthenes the elder’s family, 7000 drachmae (Dem. 27.4–5, 46, 29.43, 45). Thus, with his family suitably caredfor, the elder Demosthenes must have died confident they were in good hands. As Demosthenes later tells us in his first court speeches, this was very much not the case, however, and the three guardians proceeded to rob the estate of Demosthenes, almost bankrupting the family.8 Aphobus and Demophon did not marry Demosthenes’ mother and sister, possibly bringing the family into such a state that they moved in with Demochares, Cleobule’s brother-in-law. By the time that Demosthenes came of age, the fourteen talents had allegedly been reduced to one (Dem. 27.4).9 Aphobus returned the family house to him and Therippides returned 3100 of the 7000 drachmae loan, while Demophon did not return any of the dowry he was paid in advance for a marriage that never took place (Dem. 27.6, 30.15; Plut. Dem. 6.1). To remedy this, Demosthenes pursued the men in court as soon as he legally came of age (Dem. 30.15, 17; Plut. Dem. 6.1). He 8  This may have led to his mother not allowing him to attend the gymnasium (Dem. 4.4–5; see Badian, 2000: 15). 9  For an account of why the men did this, see Burke (1998).

16

Introduction

indicted Aphobus and managed to have him found guilty.10 This was despite Aphobus being able to have the case put off and almost abandoned through Demosthenes’ bankruptcy after being submitted to an antidosis procedure by Thrasylochus (Dem. 28.17–18, 77–80; Roisman, 2006: 45–47),11 a friend of Onetor, Aphobus’ brother-inlaw. The jury ordered Aphobus to pay ten talents in restitution to Demosthenes (Dem. 29.1, 8, 59–60; [Plut.] Mor. 844d). To have the finding overturned, Aphobus, through Onetor, brought one of Demosthenes’ witnesses to court for false testimony (Or. 29), though it seems the case was won by Demosthenes (Worthington, 2013: 25). In order to prevent Demosthenes from receiving his property (as he did not have the money ordered as restitution), Aphobus gave his property to Onetor, thus Demosthenes also brought Onetor to court with an order of eviction (Orr. 30 and 31). The outcome of the case is unknown, but Demosthenes’ enemies would have made something out of an early loss in such a situation had Demosthenes lost the case. Demosthenes’ early career Demosthenes won all of the cases against his guardians, though we do not have the speeches made against Demophon and Therippides. After the cases, he had control of his father’s business, his house, Aphobus’ house and property and, possibly, Onetor’s farmstead. It does seem as though the up and coming Demosthenes had made a name for himself in court. Even though it is possible he did not write the speeches himself, Demosthenes found the career of speech-writing attractive and profitable (Badian, 2000: 18–19 for discussion). Logographoi (speech-writers) were an essential element in Athenian public life. The litigious Athenian society required men who could write speeches for others as many would have lacked the skill themselves (Worthington, 2013: 27; see also Wolff, 2007: 91–115; Sickinger, 2006: 286–302). It is possible that his first speeches concerned family property disputes as a result of his own experiences in court and his likely reputation 10  For the political enemies that these trials earned him, see Sealey (1993: 97–98); Brun (2015: 79–80). 11  On antidosis, see Gabrielsen (1987) and Christ (1990).

Introduction

17

(MacDowell, 2009: 60). It is also possible that he taught public speaking (Aesch. 3.173), though the claim, made by Aeschines in court, should be accepted only cautiously (see MacDowell, 2009: 60). He seems to have made good political use of his money.12 In both 364/63 and 360/59 he undertook trierarchies,13 and was awarded the Trierarchic Crown, an honour bestowed on the man who funded and trained the best trireme and its crew. This was challenged, though, and he defended the award of the Trierarchic Crown in Or. 51, On the Trierarchic Crown.14 Apart from those speeches he made to recover his inheritance, his early works include speeches 51 (noted above) and Against Aristocrates (Or. 23 – though this is a public speech in prosecution of an illegal law rather than a private speech; MacDowell, 2009: 60; Worthington, 2013: 28–29). We should not think by any means that these were the only speeches he made in this period; it could possibly mean that these were circulated to encourage business for Demosthenes (Worthington, 1991b). Most of Demosthenes’ early speeches were private in nature, composed for clients in private suits across a range of topics. Other speeches delivered in this early period, though forensic speeches, may have been composed with an eye to larger political considerations of Demosthenes: Against Androtion (Or. 22, in 355/54 BC), Against Leptines (Or. 20, in 355/54 BC), and Against Timocrates (Or. 24, in 353/52 BC).15 Androtion was a famous figure in Athens at the time (Davies, 1971: 34),16 and though we are unable to reconstruct his political policies with certainty, it is quite possible that Demosthenes found it helpful to his career to bring such a famous man to trial – in court, crowds came to see famous men.17 It 12  For the use of liturgies for political gain, see Davies (1967: 33–40); Rhodes (1986: 137). 13  See Sealey (1993: 100–101) for an account of his trierarchy in 360/59. 14  See Worthington (2013: 70) for an outline of the aftermath of his trierarchy in 360/59 BC. 15  See Sealey (1955) for an outline of the generally accepted principles of Athenian democracy in the mid-fourth century BC. 16  See Harding (1976: 186–200) for an outline of his career. 17  See Dover, 1968: 161–63, who argues that such speeches were the result of a collaboration between logographer and client; cf. Worthington, 1993: 71, who

18

Introduction

is likely that the case against Androtion was lost (MacDowell, 2009: 181), but it would have thrown Demosthenes into a more prominent light if he was considering making a move into the Athenian political sphere. Similarly, Against Leptines was possibly delivered to gain some sort of a following from the recently deceased Chabrias,18 who died fighting in the Social War in 357 BC (Dem. 20.1). This is far from certain, however; the further attack on Androtion, through his friend Timocrates (Sealey, 1995: 119–20), is more certainly targeted towards gaining a name for himself, though again we do not know the outcome. In 354/53, Demosthenes delivered his first speech that we possess in the ecclesia, On the Symmories (Or. 14), when some speakers in the ecclesia thought it a good idea to wage war against Persia.19 It proposes changes to the symmories,20 the method by which 1200 men were organised into syndicates to finance triremes. He would have been approximately 30 years old, and the lack of fire in comparison to his later speeches is understandable, though we can see the stage is set for this development with clever phrases and clarity of thought. It is also possible that his ideas reflected the policies of Eubulus (see Commentary 8.1, p. 93), whose policies kept Athens out of wars in order to rebuild the public purse (Cawkwell, 1963d: 54–61, 63–64; cf. Badian, 2000: 30).21 In For the Megalopolitans (Or. 16), delivered in 353/52, he focuses on the morality of supporting one State, Megalopolis, against another, Sparta, demonstrating a development in the maturity of his speeches (Sealey, 1995: 130). Like On the Symmories, it stays away from criticising the demos as later speeches specifically analyses Dem. 22 and 24 in this respect as does MacDowell, 2009: 195–96. 18  For the possibility of Leptines as an orator of some note, see Davies (1971: 340); see also Ar. Rhet. 1411a5. For the importance of this as a political speech, see Badian (2000: 28). 19  See Worthington (2013: 84) for a sensible critique of this notion. 20  On symmories, see MacDowell (1986); Ruschenbusch (1978); Gabrielsen (1994: 145–59; 1990). 21  Hermann (2019: 2–3) believes that Demosthenes’ effort to provide sound guidance was sincere, he was likely not one of the leaders of debate in the ecclesia, and his arguments were not convincing.

Introduction

19

do, but it does show a keen understanding of foreign policy and the wider Greek world, particularly if he deliberately did not mention the long shadow of Philip for fear his opponents might argue that no commitment should be made in the Peloponnese (Ryder, 2000: 48). It was also an excellent opportunity for the young Demosthenes to make a point in political debates about a significant issue (Worthington, 2013: 85). Demosthenes lost the debate to Eubulus. In contrast to his policies being aligned with Eubulus earlier, Demosthenes argued that Athens should support Sparta to provide a counter to Theban power, whereas Eubulus probably argued that expenditure at this time might prove later to be a waste when it was needed more urgently for another purpose (Dem. 18.162; Theopomp. BNJ 115 F166; Din. 1.98; Worthington, 2013: 90, 102). It should also be noted that Androtion and Timocrates were also close associates of Eubulus, and the speeches delivered at about this time would have further alienated the young Demosthenes from one of the main leaders of the ecclesia. Again, we see in Against Aristocrates that his policies of forward defense would have been opposed by Eubulus and his allies, whose polices were non-interventionist. The speech, though ostensibly a speech for a graphe paranomon indictment (see Commentary, 8.64, p. 169), is largely a discussion of foreign policy in the north in response to Philip (see esp. Dem. 23.107–09, 111–113). His speeches seem to have been effective, with a fleet voted though never sent in 352, and a smaller fleet sent in 351. The First Philippic, delivered in 351, is a telling development in the style and character of Demosthenic oratory. It is powerful in its characterisation of Philip, assertive in the way Demosthenes addresses the assembly, and shows an understanding of sophisticated aspects of rhetoric, even if he is a little vague on the details of his proposals (Sealey, 1995: 132–33). While these elements could be later insertions in the process of rewriting the speech,22 it seems that Demosthenes was developing a name for himself in Athenian political circles. By quickly moving on to focus on the Rhodians in 351, after the First 22  See Tuplin (1998: 299–300) for a discussion of the nature of the deliberative speeches of the corpus.

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Introduction

Philippic (Dion. Hal. Amm. 1.4, supported by Radicke, 1995: 33–43, and Karvounis, 2002: 175–92), it has been proposed that Demosthenes may not have thought Philip was the threat he turned out to be after 351 (MacDowell, 2009: 219; Worthington, 2013: 97; Ryder, 2000: 45–46; Badian, 2000: 36–37), but it should be remembered that Demosthenes may well have delivered any number of speeches on the topic that simply do not survive; indeed, it would be highly unusual if he did not, given the threat that Philip posed and Demosthenes’ later position towards him. By again focusing on what was of benefit to the city at the time in On the Freedom of the Rhodians (Or. 15),23 Demosthenes supported providing assistance to Rhodes, even though they had just fought in the Social War against Athens and seceded; this would no doubt have made him unpopular, hence he likely believed that this was an important idea to propose for the benefit of the city (contra Worthington, 2013: 123). It could also be pointed out that Rhodes later made an alliance with Philip (Theopomp. BNJ 115 F164). On Organisation (Or. 13), probably delivered in approximately 350 (see MacDowell, 2009: 227–30 for discussion), similarly can be used to indicate a development of Demosthenic topoi, with a focus on his ethos, the role of democracy, the past generations of Athens and a clear critique of the demos. At this point, Worthington (2013: 131) believes that his career was all but over until Philip came along to rescue his soon-to-be enemy, but this ignores the fact that Demosthenes likely made many speeches that we no longer have, and his career continued on as it had for some five years (cf. Sealey, 1995: 134). Worthington (2013: 154) is right to point out that Demosthenes did indeed use Philip to enhance his standing, depicting him in an untruthful light, distorting facts and using his significant rhetorical skill to use Philip as a political platform for his own advancement in Athens.24 23  See Badian (2000: 31–32) for an account of the speech as realepolitik. 24  Cf. Badian (2000: 33), who decided that it was the world of foreign policy that he decided to use as his political platform, implying that Philip just happened to be the most significant foreign policy challenge that Demosthenes could use. Ryder (2000: 49–50, 52) does point out that the Athenians do seem to have viewed Philip as a threat at times, justifying Demosthenes’ political stance.

Introduction

21

Demosthenes and Philip With Philip’s invasion of the Chalcidice, Demosthenes was given the chance to develop his characterisation of Philip further in the three Olynthiacs (Or. 1–3; see Introduction, p. 21). In urging the Athenians to send troops to assist Olynthus, Demosthenes no doubt was opposed by Eubulus and his associates, but Demosthenes, in a sign that his policies were beginning to gain traction in Athens, was successful in urging a force to be sent (two were sent: the first missed Philip and returned home, while the second arrived too late as the city had already been destroyed – Philoch. BNJ 328 F49, 51; DS16.52.9; cf. Ar. Rhet. 3.1411a). The speeches, together, represent a consistency of policy and ideas in opposition to the non-interventionist ideas of the status quo politicians led by Eubulus. They are rhetorically charged and depict Philip in a highly negative light, placing Athenian foreign policy centre-stage. His success indicates that his political star was on the rise. Between 350 and the Peace of Philocrates in 346 we can date seven forensic speeches with relative certainty: For Phormion (Or. 36), Against Stephanus (Or. 45 and 46), Against Boeotus (Or. 39 and 40), Against Pantaenetus (Or. 37), and Against Meidias (Or. 21), indicating a continuation of his career as a logographos. Following 346, we have an increase in direct actions between Athens and Macedonia, (see Introduction, pp. 8–13). This period saw On the Peace (Or. 5) and the Second Philippic (Or. 6) delivered in the ecclesia. While On the Peace was a necessary speech for Demosthenes to make in support of Philocrates’ peace to ensure that Athens did not end up at war with the Amphictyonic Council (Dem. 5.13–14, 17–19, 24–25), it is not his best example of rhetoric. It is even possible that this was written to guide his speech in the ecclesia, similar to Demosthenes 10 (see Introduction, pp. 47–48). In contrast, the Second Philippic, delivered in 344/43, is another masterful attack on Philip and his policies. Not long after this, Demosthenes attacked Aeschines in court about the Second Embassy to Philip (see Introduction, p. 10). Though this was a forensic speech, it continued the attacks on Philip and his policies, criticising Aeschines for passively accepting Philip’s control of the

22

Introduction

situation in the north and in regard to the end of the Sacred War, even going so far as accusing him of being bribed (Dem. 19.4–8, 65–66, 119–20). The years immediately following this led to the speech On the Chersonese (see Introduction, p. 13). They represent a time when Demosthenes was at the height of his political influence. Macedonian involvement in Thrace, central Greece and Euboea must all have indicated to the Athenians that Demosthenes’ arguments about Philip were right all along.25 Increasingly, Demosthenes seems to have led debate around foreign policy in the 340s, particularly from 346 after the Peace of Philocrates (see Introduction, pp. 9–13 for discussion of the events of this period).26 In opposition to Demosthenes, the former actor and public official Aeschines came to the fore. He was a successful speaker, likely a result of his acting (Carey, 2000: 10), and he came to be a leading voice against Demosthenes on all issues. In particular, Aeschines supported a policy of greater alignment with Philip, believing that Philip would allow Athens to continue on much as it always had, in contrast to Demosthenes’ more hawkish stance towards the Macedonian (see Introduction, pp. 9–11). It was clear that Demosthenes was leading a change in mood towards Philip; in 343, Hyperides, an associate of Demosthenes, charged Philocrates with treason for proposing the peace in 346 after being bribed by Philip (Dem. 19.116–19; Aesch. 2.6; Hyp. 4.29–30). Instead of remaining in Athens, Philocrates went into self-imposed exile (Dem. 19.119). This mood towards Demosthenes appears to have solidified when he prosecuted Aeschines in 343 for bribery during the second embassy to Philip in 346. Though Aeschines was acquitted, it was only by 30 votes (we do not know the size of the jury, but Athenian juries could range in size from between 501 and 1501).27 The most hawkish speeches delivered by Demosthenes followed 25  For Philip’s attributes as those of a stereotyped tyrant, see Harris (2018). 26  Ryder (2000: 58–83) provides an excellent account of the period with a focus on Demosthenes and his role as the most prominent leader in Athens. 27  Hansen (1999: 187). Worthington (2013: 209) claims that it is “most likely” that Demosthenes lost the case because he could not prove convincingly without hard evidence that Aeschines had indeed been bribed.

Introduction

23

in 341: On the Chersonese, and the Third and Fourth Philippics. Not only was Diopeithes kept in the field with his army, it was reinforced and funded more extensively, and embassies were sent around Greece and to Persia (18.80, 90, 301–02). The Athenians also managed to end Macedonian influence on Euboea at this time (DS 16.74.1; Dem. 18.79; Plut. Dem. 17.1; cf. Aesch. 3.100), leading to Demosthenes being considered the most influential orator at a critical juncture in Greek history (cf. Cawkwell, 1963c: 206–09). He was crowned at the Dionysia in 340 with a wreath of gold, the highlight of his career (Dem. 18.223–24). Allies were found against Philip around central Greece (Aesch. 3.71, 95–97; Dem. 18.237, 244; Hyp. fr. 5, 6; DS 16.77.2; Cawkwell, 1963c: 202–03, 210–13) and it seemed clear war was inevitable, the war propelled to near certainty by Demosthenes’ policies: Philip attacked Perinthus (DS 16.74.2; Plut. Dem. 17), threatening the grain route, then moved against Byzantium (DS 16.76.3), though he was forced to withdraw (DS 16.77.2). Athens destroyed the stela on which the Peace of Philocrates had been inscribed (Theopomp. BNJ 115 F292; Philoch. BNJ 328 F55; Dem. 18.72, 87–94, 139, 240–43; DS 16.77.2). Philip seized the grain shipments bound for Athens in 340 (Dem. 8.14, 18.80, 88–92, 244; DS 16.77.2; Plut. Phoc. 14.3–7; Philoch. BNJ 328 F162). When Philip began his march towards Greece in 339, Thebes also made an alliance with Athens (Dem. 18.168–88; 211–17; Aesch. 3.137–151; DS 16.85.1–4; Plut. Dem. 18.1–2, Phoc. 16.3). Of course, Demosthenes’ policies led to disaster for Greece.28 When the dust settled on the battlefield at Chaeronea, Philip was the master of Greece. Aftermath of Chaeronea Unlike his harsh treatment of Thebes, Philip announced his intention to treat Athens leniently, even though they were preparing to fight Philip again (Lyc. 1.37–41).29 Demosthenes had been sent (or possibly 28  For an account of Philip’s campaign, see Worthington (2013: 245–51). 29  Worthington (2008: 154–63; 2013: 255–265) and Hammond and Griffith (1979: 604–23) provide accounts of the events surrounding the peace that was established by Philip.

24

Introduction

had escaped) to find the grain that Athens needed to withstand a Macedonian siege (Aesch. 3.159, 259; Dem. 18.248; Lyc. 1.42). The Athenian orator Demades, captured at the battle, was sent by Philip to arrange the so-called Peace of Demades (Dem. 18.285; DS 16.87). The Peace was remarkably lenient, which may indicate that Demosthenes had been wrong about Philip: the treaty allowed Athens to maintain possession of Lemnos, Imbrus and Scyrus, it affirmed their control of Delos and Salamis, and did not demand the destruction of the navy or fortifications. It simply required the Athenians to recall their cleruchs from the Chersonese and end the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy (DS 16.87.3, 18.56.7; Plut. Alex. 28.2). Demosthenes delivered the eulogy of the war dead (Dem. 60).30 Demosthenes continued to hold offices in Athens after 338, even though he was constantly attacked in court in 338 and 337 (for example, see Dem. 18.249, Plut. Dem. 21.1, Aesch. 3.159; see Carey et al, 2008: 2–3 and Harris, 1994 for discussions of post-Chaeronea politics). He was Commissioner for Walls and a Commissioner of the Theoric Fund (Dem. 18.113; Aesch. 3.24, 27). The assassination of Philip in 336 may have seemed like an end to Macedonian control of Greece before it had really solidified (16.93.3–95.1; Justin 6.9.4), though the quick accession of Alexander showed that nothing had changed (DS 17.4.4). Demosthenes took the lead in bringing about an alliance that would shake off the Macedonian yoke. He left the embassy that was on the way to greet Alexander on his campaign to quell Greece (DS 17.4; Aesch. 3.161; Din. 1.82; Plut. Dem. 23.3), and in conjunction with Hyperides, Demosthenes convinced the ecclesia not to send Alexander the support he requested for his campaign against the Triballi ([Plut.] Mor. 847c, 848e; Plut. Phoc. 21.1). After initially supporting the Theban revolt from Alexander in 335, he then convinced the Athenians not to rebel (DS 17.8.6; Arr. 2.15; Din. 1.19; Plut. Dem. 23.1). As a result, Alexander demanded that certain leaders be handed over to him, including Demosthenes (DS 17.115; Arr. 1.10.4–6; Plut. Dem. 23.4, Phoc. 17.2; [Plut.] Mor. 841e, 847c, 848e; Justin 11.4.10–11), but Demades was able to convince 30  See Worthington (2013: 259–62) for discussion.

Introduction

25

Alexander that this was not necessary.31 This led to Demosthenes’ near withdrawal from Athenian political life (Worthington, 2000: 92; Sealey, 1995: 208), though he may have sent letters to Persian generals urging them to defeat Alexander (Plut. Dem. 23.2, cf. Aesch. 3.164). He spent much of the next decade returning to his activities as a logographer in the Athenian courts,32 though we do know he spoke out against the Macedonian request for ships to support Alexander in Persia ([Plut.] Mor. 847c; cf. Plut. Phoc. 21.1). Again, when Sparta decided to revolt from Macedonian control under Agis III in 331, Demosthenes at first urged action on behalf of Sparta, then changed course and urged Athens to avoid involvement in the conflict (Aesch. 3.165–66; Din. 1.34–35; cf. Plut. Dem. 24.1; see Worthington, 2013: 287–90), much as he had done when Thebes had revolted. 33 In 330, he delivered one of his greatest forensic speeches, On the Crown (Or. 18), defending his award of a second Golden Crown that Ctesiphon had proposed he be awarded in 336.34 Aeschines indicted Ctesiphon for proposing the award, claiming it was illegal. The jury voted heavily in Demosthenes’ favour, so much so that Aeschines failed to achieve one-fifth of the vote (Plut. Dem. 24.2). This meant that, according to Athenian law, Aeschines was fined and barred from bringing similar cases. Aeschines decided to leave Athens, giving the final victory in their personal contest to Demosthenes (Plut. Dem. 24.3; [Plut.] Mor. 840c–e). However, Demosthenes’ role in the Harpalus Affair (Din. 2.21; Hyp. 5.6; Dem. Ep. 2.1, 15, 3.42),35 when he was accused of accepting 20 talents from Alexander’s treasurer Harpalus, led to his self-imposed exile from Athens in 324. With Alexander’s death in 323, Demosthenes tried to effect an anti-Macedonian league under Athens, which led to his recall (Plut. Dem. 27), but when Athens 31  For an outline of events leading up to this, see Brun (2000: 71–83). 32  For discussion, see Worthington, (2013: 285–87); Sealey (1995: 208) focuses on the possible eclipse of Demosthenes by others. 33  See Worthington (2000: 98–99) for reasons why Demosthenes did not advocate support for Sparta. 34  For a discussion of the reasons for Aeschines’ attack at this point, see Worthington (2000: 97). 35  For an account of the Harpalus Affair and Demosthenes’ role in it, see Worthington (1992: 41–77) and Sealey (1995: 213–15).

26

Introduction

was defeated in the subsequent Lamian War, Antipater demanded the surrender of Demosthenes. He fled Athens, but when he was found in 321 he committed suicide, possibly by drinking poison from a pen (Plut. Dem. 29.7; [Plut.] Mor. 847b; [Lucian], Encomium on Dem. 28, 43–49). Demosthenes’ Style Demosthenes and history Demosthenes is an important source for the study of fourth century Greece, but his text is far from historical. Orators used history for their own purposes, providing highly biased accounts of current and past events; Demosthenes was a master of this.36 History was recognised as a means of achieving persuasion in oratory (Isoc. 4.9–10) and there was an array of topoi (commonplaces) that were regularly used by orators in all contexts (Worthington, 1994: 110). These provided a bedrock for many orators, stock examples from the past that were imagined rather than real. Demosthenes particularly uses the Athenian ancestors through his oratory as a common topos, comparing the Athenians of his day to the Athenians of the past (see Commentary, 8.49, pp. 151–52). He also references Athenian power in the fifth century, going so far as to make the comment that Athenians are not used to grasping for power (8.42); a more imaginary Athenian past could not be drawn up!37 But the recent past, even events that were almost contemporaneous with the speech, were also utilised by Demosthenes. Events in the lifetime of his audience were regularly used as historical examples of what he was arguing, but his version of them was far from faithful, and the colour he added rendered them highly problematic at times. This does tend to indicate that even for events in the recent past, orators could embellish, and even lie, to suit their purpose, without the audience worrying too much. The lack of historical knowledge is recognised by Pearson (1941), but the lack of understanding of current affairs is even more striking. Even if we 36  For the most recent study of this, see Westwood (2020), esp. chapter 3. 37  See Westwood (2020: 167–68) for discussion. See also Brun (2015: 111–13) for the view that Demosthenes depicted Athenian control of the fifth-century arche as being a voluntary association.

Introduction

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accept that the versions of most speeches we have preserved were designed to be circulated versions, this lack of knowledge of current affairs should not be surprising. In an age when there was no news service, when it sometimes took months for information of events to get back to Athens, and when people were often unable to access multiple sources to verify accounts, this lack of detailed or specific knowledge of what was happening should be taken into account.38 Moreover, when the main source of information for events was the people who were making the events happen, such as generals in the field, or even soldiers who fought (Kapellos, 2014: 105–07; cf. Xen. Hell. 1.7.5–7), we should expect versions that were friendly to them to become the main narrative of history. Most of the audience of Demosthenes 8 would, no doubt, have had some understanding of what was referenced, but the extent of this understanding was likely limited (cf. Worthington, 1994: 114), though, as Steinbock (2013: 74) indicates, the audience must have had some knowledge of events, or the references would have been no use at all. They would have known about the fall of Olynthus in 349, and many of them would have been at the meetings of the ecclesia where it was voted to send forces to support them, but they might not have known the identity of Euthycrates and Lasthenes, the Olynthians who Demosthenes alleges were betrayed by Philip (8.40); if they had a knowledge of them, for many of the audience it would only have been through the eyes of another orator anyway, who may also have presented a biased narrative. The very brief nature of historical references also tends to limit the ability of an audience to dwell on the veracity of the remarks before the speech has moved on (for example, the places that Philip took from Athens, listed at 8.64, of highly dubious veracity). The only extended historical reference in On the Chersonese is to Timotheus (8.74–75), and the narrative provided is used to prove the importance of good advice rather than as historical precedents about Macedonian expansion. Indeed, he seems to prefer using historical examples rather than logical argument to prove his 38  Cf. Harding, 1987; Pearson, 1941: 216; Westwood, 2020: 12–26; Steinbock, 2013: 73 points out that perhaps the orators’ knowledge of history was not perfect either, leading to the presentation of inaccurate information.

28

Introduction

points (Efstathiou, 2013: 183; cf. Kremmydas, 2007: 19–34). This, then, can point the way for using Demosthenes’ deliberative rhetoric as history – we can acknowledge that events happened or individuals existed, but we must always be aware that the reference may be biased or out of context, or used in a context to skew its original significance. Demosthenic deliberative oratory Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches have traditionally been divided into early and later speeches. According to this schema, his earlier speeches are marked by rhetorical complexity, akin to Thucydides (Pearson, 1976: 24–29), while his later speeches, beginning with the Olynthiacs in 349BC, pursue clarity of thought and simpler structures.39 From the First Philippic onwards, Demosthenes’ speeches tend to exhibit a consistent sense of urgency and forcefulness (Kennedy, 1994: 73–74). The catalyst of this sense of vigour was the rise of Philip of Macedonia who Demosthenes perceived as a direct threat to Athens. Aristotle is our most influential critic of what oratory looked like in his own time, though it should be noted that Demosthenes’ oratory does not mirror Aristotle’s ideas of rhetoric (Dion. Hal. ep. ad Amm. 1.2). This demonstrates the personal style and development of Demosthenes’ deliberative oratory. The typical division of a deliberative speech is prooemium (an introduction), diegesis (the narrative of events), pistis (proof) and epilogos (conclusion; Ar. Rhet. 3.13.4, cf. 3.13.1). Demosthenes is clearly familiar with this division, but as a more mature orator, he seems to have composed his speech according to his own ideas of what constituted effective rhetoric. Demosthenes is remarkably consistent in his prooemia. He almost always uses them to make an introductory statement to capture the attention of the audience, and enhance his ethos. He also outlines key arguments, which provide a focus for the speech, indicating how the pisteis support his overall position in regards to the issue. His epilogoi also possess similar features across his speeches, restating his 39  Milns (2000: 210–11) discusses the limitations of the division into earlier and later speeches.

Introduction

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arguments and highlighting key issues. The epilogos of Demosthenes’ deliberative oratory also aims to enhance his ethos, indicating why it is of importance that the audience heed his advice. The diegesis and pisteis sections are masterfully combined in his deliberative rhetoric. Instead of discrete diegesis and pistis sections, Demosthenes creates what are best described as logoi, arguments that contain both narration and proof. Aristotle claimed that if a diegesis appeared in deliberative oratory, it should be used to show examples of what has previously happened to lead the audience to decide what should happen in the future (Rhet. 3.16.11); this is particularly focused in Demosthenes’ deliberative oratory, and his arguments are heavy with paradeigmata, or historical examples, used to prove his point. His key arguments, outlined in the prooemium, are explored fully and utilise a range of rhetorical techniques to enhance their credibility. The most effective types of pisteis in deliberative oratory, according to Aristotle (Rhet. 3.17.4–5, 10), are those that incorporate examples to prove the veracity of what is being claimed, and Demosthenes mastered this aspect of oratory. In this speech, Demosthenes does not appeal to pathos, as suggested in the Rhetoric to Alexander, generally believed to have been written by Anaximenes (see Chiron, 2007: 101–04). Instead, the speech relies on two other types of persuasion that Aristotle (Rhet. 1.2.3–4) mentions should be introduced in the prooemium: ethos (using the moral authority and standing of the speaker to enhance the argument) and logos (the truth, apparent or real, inherent in the speech). Throughout the speech, it is notable that Demosthenes focuses not on pathos, but on the ethos and logos of Aristotle’s types of artistic proof, the method by which an orator relies on his ability to create rhetorically charged arguments rather than rely on unartistic proof (e.g. witnesses), which is largely unavailable in deliberative oratory. Much of what Demosthenes uses can be characterised as ethos, depicting himself as the ‘good orator’ (8.23, 32, 69, 70–71, 73), in contrast to the poor counsellors who the audience is now habituated to follow (8.1, 23, 29, 33–34, 52–53, 57, 67). The idea of ethos as a form of pistis in Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches is first

30

Introduction

used by Demosthenes in his speech On the Peace, delivered in 346, where he also utilises ethos in an extended logos, utilising a number of rhetorical techniques, including narrative, inductive reasoning and paradeigmata (examples), to show why the Athenians should listen to his advice (5.5–11). There is a similar section in the First Philippic outlining how his advice had been correct after returning from the second embassy (6.29–31; see Introduction, p. 10). The Rhetoric to Alexander (14.8) indicates that a speaker should outline their experience in public affairs to enhance their standing in the eyes of the audience. Both of these sections utilise numerous examples of Demosthenes’ experience. This technique is also outlined in the Rhetoric to Alexander (8.1–10.3), where the author explains that the use of many paradeigmata in succession can be used to show clearly why the speaker should be believed. Demosthenes is also innovative in this speech in his manner of deployment of these logoi, organising them in rings. This was a common feature of Demosthenes’ deliberative oratory (see Appendices 1 and 2); of Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches, only speech 5, On the Peace, and speech 2, the Second Olynthiac, vary significantly from Demosthenes’ pattern of ring structure for the overall logos structure of the speech, indicating that, over time, Demosthenes’ deliberative oratory demonstrates a high degree of structural continuity.40 Demosthenes was a master of rhetoric, using a range of techniques consistently throughout his oratory.41 On the Chersonese contains a full range of techniques. Firstly, Demosthenic deliberative oratory can be characterised as possessing, in its more developed speeches, clarity of thought and precision of expression. Demosthenes is very exact and detailed when he has a point to be made. For example, at 8.21– 23, Demosthenes outlines exactly what he sees the problem to be in Athens that has led the people to be in the state they are in; similarly, to justify Diopeithes’ depredations in the Aegean, Demosthenes outlines precisely the situation with regard to the ‘benevolences’ that 40  Particularly compare this to Wooten’s exploration of rings structure in the Philippics (2019: 52, 66, 94, 128, 129–30, 143, 151, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162). 41  For a detailed exploration of techniques in other Demosthenic deliberative oratory, see Hermann (2019: 14–20).

Introduction

31

have always been collected by the Athenians (8.25–26). To add to the clarity of his arguments, Demosthenes utilises historical examples to hammer his points home: to prove that Philip is indeed at war with Athens, Demosthenes provides a range of alleged examples of Philip’s duplicitous dealings with other cities (8.59). Later, at 8.63–66, he uses a range of examples to emphasise further that Philip is at war with Athens, even though he first beguiled his other victims with generosity. He often uses other rhetorical techniques to enhance his narrative, for example in 8.64, he uses asyndeton (leaving out connecting particles) to create rapidity in his narrative. At the same point in his narrative, Demosthenes asks a hypothetical questions, then answers it himself (hypophora), allowing him to refute arguments that might arise from what he is saying (for example, 8.38, 68). Demosthenes is also able to control the flow of his narrative through the use of a range of techniques. He often alternates long and short sentences (for example, 8.7–8, 56), ensuring that the focus of the audience is not lost while he explores complex ideas, while utilising quotes to allow him to change the trajectory of an argument (8.23). He also uses quotations to make it seem as though Demosthenes’ is not the only voice suggesting his policies or to critique the audience (such as at chapter 31, and an extended example at 8.35–37). One of Demosthenes’ great strengths is his ability to hold the attention of his audience. He does this through a number of techniques. By asking a series of short questions, Demosthenes focuses the audience’s attention, helping to bring their minds back to the issues at hand (cf. Brus, 2012: 320–22, 330–31), as he does at 8.17, 50 and 74. He is also a master of emphasis, being able to make his point known through a variety of means. Firstly, Demosthenes’ most obvious technique is pleonasm (see Commentary 8.13, p. 118; 8.28, p. 140), using two words that mean the same thing in relatively quick succession. Examples are scattered through the work, for example in 8.3 (plans and preparations), and at 8.29 (right and necessary). Demosthenes even uses more than one pleonasm in short order to add significant emphasis; for example, in 8.13, he uses talk and pretence, scheming and conniving, while in 8.32, he uses threatening

32

Introduction

and intractable, careless and contemptible, and agree and assent. His repetition of words in successive phrases adds emphasis to a narrative; for example, the repetition of a connective such as ‘and’ (for example, 8.9, 29, 47) or ‘nor’ (such as 8.21, 33, 59), while a repetition of the phrase “would not have been safe to speak” in 8.65 in a list of historical examples, followed up by the same phrase using different word order in Greek soon after (8.66), emphasises the point being made in the narrative effectively. Demosthenes also uses anadiplosis (the repetition of a single word) to great effect, particularly in 8.28 (“a little, men of Athens, a little note”), or in 8.77 (“Perhaps, just perhaps”). Hyperbaton (the separating of a key word and its cognates by other words) is employed to add emphasis, such as in 8.24, where the Greek text separates the words “All” and “strategoi” with five words of an adjectival clause (“who have ever sailed from your lands”). Finally, Demosthenes juxtaposes ideas to create added emphasis through being so unusually associated (such as 8.66, when he juxtaposes the idea of the bad politicians prospering and becoming well-known, while the good people of Athens are becoming poor and contemptible). It should be noted that it is likely that On the Chersonese is a written speech designed for circulation after the fact. The ideas and sentences are long and complex, far too much so for the average Athenian to follow in the ecclesia, whereas the Fourth Philippic, likely written as speech notes to assist oral delivery in the ecclesia (see Introduction, pp. 47–48) contains far more direct ideas and simpler grammatical constructions, making it easier to follow when listening. As a result, Demosthenes has added rhetorical features designed to make it seem as though the speech was delivered ex tempore. His use of parathesis (the adding of an idea in the middle of a speech to make it seem like an afterthought while speaking) is extensive and consistently used throughout the speech (8.18, 24, 25, 32, 35, 36, 39, 40, 44, 49, 60, 62). Demosthenes also utilises paraleipsis, a technique where an idea is raised, but then dismissed as being inappropriate, often used to suppress information while, at the same time, sharing the information (8.20, 51).

Introduction

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The Structure of On the Chersonese In many ways, Demosthenes 8 is one of his greatest speeches. It is powerful, well structured and utilises all of Demosthenes’ rhetorical skills to create a speech that displays the abilities of the orator at his height. What follows is an explanation of the speech’s structure, including the key methods Demosthenes used to persuade his audience. It also examines the context of the speech in relation to the corpus of Demosthenes’ deliberative oratory and how this fitted into the ideas about the structure of rhetoric at the time. Prooemium Chapters one to thirteen introduce the main logoi, delineating several key features of each. After focusing on his ethos as a public figure by deprecating those who he claims are not acting in the best interest of the State, Demosthenes outlines the first logos briefly: namely that there are those in Athens who are not to be trusted (8.1). Though this is the shortest outline of a logos in the prooemium, Demosthenes devotes the most time to developing this logos later in the speech. Demosthenes then outlines his second logos, that, even though there have been no open declarations of war, Philip is very much at war with Athens (8.4–8), thus there is a need to ensure that the north is protected. Finally, he outlines the third logos, that the standing force of Diopeithes is needed because Philip has demonstrated that he is able to mobilise quickly and is always ready to extract maximum advantage from any change in circumstances (8.9–12). In this logos, Demosthenes successfully characterises Philip as an enemy of the city; he creates the image of a particularly dangerous Philip whom the Athenians do not perceive as untrustworthy and duplicitous and posing an immediate threat (8.12). Amongst the ancient writers on rhetoric there was debate about how one should begin a speech. Aristotle claimed that there is not always the need for a long prooemium. However, the Rhetoric to Alexander regarded it as an important section and lists a number of tricks to capture the listeners’ attention and win their goodwill (29.3–

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Introduction

26). Aristotle was openly dismissive of these gambits saying that such appeals are a waste of time, as they make the speaker act like a slave (Rhet. 3.14.8–10). In writing and structuring his prooemium, Demosthenes tends to share Aristotle’s sensibilities. His prooemia generally resemble the one given in On the Chersonese in structure and length. They traditionally provide a clear and succinct introduction to the main arguments, usually three or four in number. The prooemium also introduces a number of important ‘commonplaces’ (topoi). A topos is a general argument or theme, characterised later by Aristotle as a general idea leading to the use of enthymemes (Rhet. 2.25.1–7), an argument in which one of the components (usually the conclusion) is left unstated to allow the audience to draw their own meaning from the argument. Blass (1893: 206–07) noted that Demosthenes tended to use historical paradeigmata in his enthymemes as it strengthened his arguments, making them seem as though they were more valid and correct. The first topos Demosthenes expresses in the prooemium of this speech is the idea that speakers should not be driven by the pursuit of charis, or to ‘curry favour’, in presenting policies to the ecclesia. This first topos is presented in the form of an enthymeme: all speakers should present the advice that is in the best interest of the city, other men do not, hence Demosthenes implies that he is the one speaker who puts the interests of the city ahead of his own personal political benefit. The appeal to ethos in the prooemium is a common feature of Demosthenic rhetoric (also seen in 3.3, 4.1, 6.6, 9.3, 13.1–2, 12–13, 15.1, 16.2– 3). The desire of other speakers to ingratiate themselves with the audience causes them to be guilty of dereliction of duty, a tradition that can be traced as far back as Plato’s Gorgias (502E–503A), where Socrates points out that there are two types of rhetoricians, one who is base and panders to the mob for his own personal motives, while the other is driven by a desire to do good for the city. There is a striking similarity in vocabulary. Plato also uses the term “pros to charizesthai tois politais”, indicating the similar appeal for charis (favour or goodwill) to the type of orator indicated at the outset of Demosthenes’ speech. This self-creation as the type of sumboulos (advisor) who is

Introduction

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like Plato’s ‘good orator’ is an important aspect of Demosthenes’ oratory (see especially 3.3, expanded at 3.21–26). This ideal of the morally good orator to which Demosthenes aspired is paralleled in Isocrates’ work where he argues that rhetoric is an important tool to lead to the morally right choices being taken (4.4–5; Poulakos, 1997: 80–86). This is clearly what Demosthenes tried to do when he made his arguments from ethos (especially at 8.68–75), claiming through induction (where the audience makes the connection between the good citizen and Demosthenes) that he is the good citizen he describes (8.71–72; on this rhetorical trick, see Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 22.1). In discussing the topoi that frequent the prooemia, it is worthwhile to observe (following Usher 1999: 210–11) that Demosthenes has a tendency to blend the three basic topoi of justice/honour, expediency and possibility rather than treating each one separately. Always the aim is to help bolster the main logoi. So, for example, at 8.3, Demosthenes talks about the enemy of the polis (Philip) acting aggressively in their regions (the Chersonese) and associates it with acting profitably for themselves (sumpherein). The language of moral outrage blends with the considerations of what lies in Athens’ best self-interest. He also combines the topoi of expediency, honour and possibility at 8.10– 11, where he claims that the city is losing all of the advantages as it does not have a standing force available to take charge of situations as they arise (expediency), which leaves Athens trying to prepare after the fact as they are not ready (and so are stripped of honour). Similarly, the topos of justice, the notion that Philip is not acting in a just manner, giving those who resist him moral superiority, is outlined in the prooemium (8.7–8), again a theme utilised elsewhere in Demosthenes’ deliberative prooemia (1.5, 2.9–10). Hence, while Demosthenes does not always use the same topoi in his prooemia, they all serve the same function – to introduce the logoi and try to place himself in the best possible light as a speaker. First logos Demosthenes begins the body of his speech with the logos introduced last in his prooemium. He outlines the state of affairs for the audience,

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showing that Philip is a threat to Athens in the north and is acting aggressively towards Byzantium and the Chersonese (8.13–16). The simple solution is to leave Diopeithes in the north (8.17). As a result of the Athenians’ lack of desire to provide money or serve in person (8.21, 23), Diopeithes must be allowed to continue what Athenian generals have always done: ‘raise’ money from allies and vessels on the sea (8.21–22). Demosthenes argues that this is not only precedented (8.24–26) but safe, as Diopeithes can always be recalled if necessary (8.28). To recall him now, when he has done nothing improper or unprecedented, would be dangerous to Athenian interests in the region (8.28–29). Demosthenes links this argument to one of the main themes of the speech (8.31–37), showing that there is a group of self-interested orators, on the payroll of Philip, who have brought Athens low in this regard (8.32–34). These orators have taught the demos to listen only to pretty speeches (8.34). This is proven using an extensive section imagining what other Greeks might say (8.35–37) to show that Athens has done nothing as a result of poor advice while Philip has been campaigning productively. The first section of the logos features a number of rhetorical questions and direct speech to frame ideas and put them to the audience, for example, “ne Dia, kakodaimonosi gar hanthropoi kai huperballousin anoiai” (“By Zeus, it is because they are possessed men and excel in lacking understanding”) when talking about Byzantium and its continuing belief that Philip is their friend (8.16). Demosthenes also uses successive direct speech in question and answer (8.18) when talking about Diopeithes being brought to trial and how that would be a boon to Philip. This technique adds variety to the way he is delivering his message and distances his own voice from his suggestions. Demosthenes also uses an extended rhetorical quotation (8.35–37) to put words into the allies’ mouths to show his audience how ridiculous the Athenians must look to other Greeks through their inaction. The use of another’s voice to communicate Demosthenes’ ideas or to address specific issues that might be raised against his arguments is significantly more present in this speech than others (8.16, 17, 20, 23, 27, 31, 35–37, 38, 51, 68, 70, 74–75); in contrast, the speech with the

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next highest number of instances of this is the Second Philippic (6.11, 25, 44). The increased use of direct speech in this manner dramatises the situation (Usher, 1999: 232), creating a far more aggressive and vigorous speech than previously delivered, simultaneously making it seem that it is not just Demosthenes suggesting these ideas. Bers (1997: 214) indicates that this use of oratio recta (speech ‘directly’ reported in another speech) is written to “enliven the speech” and draw the audience into Demosthenes’ arguments on his terms. At 8.52, Demosthenes uses oratio rectia to bring rapidity to the movement of the speech by moving from oratio obliqua (speech implied in another speech) to oratio recta (underlined): “Therefore, while I would gladly talk about other things and demonstrate how certain persons are promoting a policy designed to harm you, I will leave most of it aside. But whenever anyone attacks Philip, someone immediately stands up and says how good it is to preserve the peace and how difficult it is to maintain a large force, and that some people want to despoil your finances, and those sorts of arguments.”

Demosthenes’ use of paradeigmata (e.g. 8.18, 30, 36–37), eikos (probability – eg. 1.8, 1.11, 3.8, 9.33–35) and semeia (likely actions or outcomes based on previous instances – e.g. 8.15, 20) are outlined as typical features of rhetoric by Aristotle.42 According to Aristotle (Rhet. 1.2.8–10), logical argument has two forms. Firstly, induction, by using paradeigmata, is used to show how one event can be paralleled by other occasions. Demosthenes particularly uses paradeigmata to illustrate points in his arguments, but he is sparing of them, as were all orators, lest they be considered ‘know-it-alls’ (Milns, 2000: 214). The second method uses arguments based not on previous examples, but on likelihood (8.15, 20). This second method is discussed by Aristotle (Rhet. 1.2.14–17), where he implies that eikos and semeia are necessary as all human actions possess a degree of similarity and predictability. For example, Demosthenes uses induction to show 42  See Grimaldi (1980: 389–97) for a discussion of Aristotle’s views of eikos and semeia.

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that Philip cannot be trusted at any time (8.59) as he has previously professed friendship towards Oreos and Pherae then turned on them. He uses an enthymeme to show that it is logical for Athens to be Philip’s target (8.44–45) as a result of his willingness to spend time in horrible, unpleasant locations to strengthen his chances of taking Athens. This is a well-used method in Demosthenic rhetoric, with similar enthymemes used by Demosthenes in 4.4, 6.16, 6.24 and 9.73 (Wooten, 2008: 52, 132, 134, 165). Second logos Demosthenes devotes more time to developing this logos, that Philip is already at war with Athens and, by extension, democracy itself – he states this explicitly at the start of the logos (8.39, 40–42). Demosthenes uses paradeigmata to show how Philip is crafty and not to be believed when he says he is not at war. The fate of Euthycrates and Lasthenes of Olynthus (8.40) is offered up as paradeigma of Philip’s duplicity. Moreover, Demosthenes asserts that all of Philip’s actions have been undertaken with the aim of bringing Athens under his control (8.40). The reason for this is simple; while the Athenians have not actively sought power and arche (8.42), they have traditionally been the protector of Greece (8.48–51). This is the reason that Athens must be the target of his activities (8.60). They alone are likely to spring to the defence of the other Greek states. Demosthenes uses an argument from eikos to show that it is logical to think that Philip is aiming at control of Athens; he pursues undesirable locations, so therefore he would obviously want to take the desirable Attica much more (8.44– 45). As a result of this desire to attack Athens, Demosthenes claims that the city must be in a state of preparedness (8.46–47). He argues that Athens must shake off this slothfulness, raise money, call upon the allies to support them and send out a permanent force that is properly maintained and supervised, otherwise Athens will be shamed (8.51). Demosthenes frequently argues that Philip is not to be trusted, a key topos in this logos. 8.38–40 demonstrates this clearly through induction: Demosthenes starts with the premise that Philip is at war with the city and is bent on the destruction of everyone, including

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those who consider themselves his friends. Demosthenes then uses paradeigmata to show that Philip should not be taken at his word by anyone, even those who actively support Macedonia. Demosthenes leaves the conclusion unstated, implying that everyone will suffer the same fate as those who trust him. We then see Demosthenes creating a connection between the second and third logoi at 8.53–69. He takes this theme and enlarges it, fully explaining all of the events in a narrative of questionable veracity, leaving the conclusion similarly unsaid: Philip is untrustworthy and, if he is taken at his word, Athens will suffer the same fate as other states. This is an example of semeia as outlined in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (12.1–3). Demosthenes talks about what usually happens prior to, or as a result of, similar incidents. Analogous attacks on Philip’s character are associated with promoting a deep mistrust of Philip and are also a common topos in Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches (for example, 1.12–13, 2.15–21, 4.49, 6.20–25, 9.10, 56–62). Elsewhere, Demosthenes emphasises that Philip has grown great as a direct result of Athenian inactivity and indolence (1.9; 2.3–4, 23; 3.28; 4.9, 11, 31; 6.4) whereas in this speech, Demosthenes does not attack Athenian inactivity so directly, talking more in terms of poor policy decisions (see especially 8.49, 53, but also 8.12, 13, 21), possibly because he did not want his audience to feel directly implicated in poor decision-making as it may turn them away from supporting his proposals. The Rhetoric to Alexander pointed out that to use maxims to prove your logoi enhanced the credibility of a speech and made it sound witty or urbane (asteios – 22.1–2). Demosthenes used maxims to good effect. For example, he says at 8.25, “Those who have one or two ships take less, while those who have a greater force take more. Moreover, those who pay don’t pay either a little or a lot in exchange for nothing (for they aren’t mad)…”, an example of the Rhetoric to Alexander’s maxim from specific situations (11.3–4), while his maxim at 8.42 – “For you yourselves are not well disposed by nature to grasp and possess leadership, but you are clever at hindering another who is seizing possessions and taking away what he holds, and give utter

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trouble to those who want to rule and deliver all men to freedom zealously” – is an example of a maxim based on exaggeration, taking a general principle (untrue though this example may be considered by many) and amplifying it. A particular skill demonstrated in this speech is Demosthenes’ ability to tie together multiple topoi that lead to a logical recommendation. We can see this with regards to the trustworthiness of Philip. 8.34–48 is a single argument within the second logos consisting of three separate topoi: bribery and corruption in Athenian politics that has led to Athenian honour being tarnished; the danger in which Athens is now placed as a result of this bribery and dishonour; and the opportunities presented for the resurgence of Athens if they adequately prepare to meet Philip by following Demosthenes’ advice. These topoi are thematically linked (the danger of Philip), which leads to Demosthenes’ recommendations for what should be done against this dangerous enemy. 8.34–37 begins with the premise that Philip is at war with Athens and it is the fault of corrupt Athenian citizens (also seen in Dem. 15.31–33, suggesting that this topos was more of a rhetorical flourish than a reality). Demosthenes uses an imaginary speech of a potential ally and leaves the conclusion unstated that the potential allies of Athens perceive the Athenians as inactive. 8.38–40 asserts that Philip is at war with Athens and is bent on the destruction of everyone, including those who actively support Philip. He uses the paradeigma of the Olynthians who had supported Philip then suffered at his hands, again leaving the conclusion unstated that everyone would suffer at the hands of Philip, an example of induction. 8.40– 43 explicitly states that Philip is bent on the complete destruction of Athens and is an enemy of democracy. This topos is developed across Demosthenes’ oratory, beginning with 1.5, then progressing through his speeches (4.48, 6.20–25; Milns, 2000: 216–17; MacDowell, 2009: 221); 8.41–43 is the clearest and most eloquent expression of this idea. Demosthenes indicates that Philip, as a King, must be opposed to democracy as a result of the very nature of kingship. To cap off the string of topoi, 8.43–47 starts with the explicit statement that Philip is aiming all of his efforts towards his ultimate goal, the destruction of

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Athens. He has spent an inordinate amount of time and personal effort capturing desolate outposts in Thrace, leaving the conclusion unstated that if Philip would spend so much time taking these locations, he would surely be very keen to take Athens also. This leads to the recommendations proposed by Demosthenes – shake off the inaction, contribute funds, call in allies and provide a permanent army in the north. The finale to this remarkable piece of rhetoric is the appeal to ethos, where Demosthenes says that he would rather die than let other Greek states be captured by this man as a result of Athenian inaction; such an act would be unworthy of their noble forebears. Demosthenic oratory abounds with these techniques, but some of the examples in this speech are the most complete and well-executed in the deliberative corpus, again possibly indicating that the speech underwent a rigorous editing and re-writing process. Indeed, this logos is one of the most technically sophisticated in the Demosthenic corpus, utilising most of the rhetorical techniques at his disposal. Third logos Demosthenes dedicates the most time in the speech to developing his main logos, the first outlined in the introduction, thus completing an overall ring structure of the speech. He starts by outlining that the current repose in Athens is being bought dearly by the loss of Athenian territory in the north. The only beneficiaries are those who propose such policies of inactivity while the city suffers (8.52–55). He then enlarges the topos (8.56–72) that Philip is a genuine threat to Athens, while the speakers who advise the Athenians not to go to war with Philip receive many benefits. While these men who propose peace are benefitting, Athens is being denuded of money and allies and those who receive the blame are the “best counsellors” (8.56–58). He urges the Athenians to make a decision (diadikasia) about whom they should trust (see Commentary 8.57, p. 157). Demosthenes claims that there is no doubt in his mind that Philip is a threat to Athenian interests, and he uses Oreos, Pherae and Olynthus as paradeigmata to show that Philip does not declare war until the city in his sights is unable to defend itself (8.58–59). The inevitable slavery that results from this policy of inaction goes against

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the natural instincts of a city that is used to ruling others (8.60). He again references those who are operating in Philip’s interests within Athens, urging the Athenians to punish them (8.61). Demosthenes uses paradeigmata to show how Philip’s agents are being beguiled and that all Athenians will suffer if Philip succeeds, referencing the experience of the Thessalians, the Olynthians and the Thebans (8.62–63) then amplifying this by outlining instances where Athens has already been beguiled by Philip (8.64). He then expands on this logos by outlining that in the regions first fooled by Philip it would not have been safe to talk about alliance with him unless Philip had first done a benevolent act, whereas the Athenians have never received the benevolence but have only suffered at the hands of Philip, yet still remain reluctant to criticise him (8.65–66). Demosthenes argues that this suffering has happened as a direct result of the politicians who argue against a war with Philip; all of these men have mysteriously grown wealthy and influential (8.66), a clear attack on their true loyalties. Demosthenes then criticises these allegedly corrupt, pro-Macedonian politicians by saying that they want Athens to remain passive while they are active in achieving Philip’s goals (8.67 – this is given an expanded section in the Fourth Philippic, 10.70–74). Demosthenes himself does not speak from a desire to receive such personal gain, but for what he considers the best for the State, regardless of how the audience will react to him (8.68–69). He believes that this is the purpose of a “useful citizen” (8.70) and states that his policy has never been the same as these men (8.71). Demosthenes then ends this logos with the claim that the duty of a good citizen is to instruct and guide citizens in the pursuit of the best policies for the city (8.72). He invokes an extended paradeigma of a useful citizen, Timotheus (8.73–75), providing an example of how useful advice can lead to good action by reminding the Athenians of Timotheus’ advice about assisting the Euboeans against the Thebans in 357 (DS 16.7.2; Aesch. 3.85, for the campaign; Plut. de gl. Ath. 8, 350f; see Commentary 8.74, pp. 175–78), then linking it to his own actions (8.74–75), using the moral authority of Timotheus to enhance his own ethos.43 43  See Bers (1997: 150–51) for an explanation of this phenomenon.

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An important aspect of Demosthenes’ ethos is that he is a citizen who advises what is best for the city, not simply delivering speeches full of ideas that pander to the people. The role of a useful citizen is, as he states at 8.68–75 and in the prooemium, to present a practical policy, free from partisan politics, which may not always be to the liking of the ecclesia. It is interesting that this is the only time in his deliberative oratory that Demosthenes presents this theme in detail. While we have the idea presented by Demosthenes that the people are listening to poor advice from wilfully misleading or incompetent speakers (for example, 3.30–32, 6.29–36, 9.53–70), Demosthenes does not until this point in his recorded speeches make this claim. This could be a result of the emphasis on ethos in the speech, which stems from the fact that this is the period of his greatest dominance in the ecclesia. Epilogos Demosthenes uses a simple epilogos, restating the main arguments of the speech: pay contributions and keep Diopeithes’ force in the Chersonese, ensuring that it remains in existence regardless of any negative actions and punish those politicians who advocate policies that are going to lead to the ruin of the State (8.76). He also adds that Athens should send out ambassadors to instruct, exhort and act, which can be tied to the arguments about ensuring allies are maintained (see especially 8.66–67). Demosthenes finishes the speech by stating that if this is not done, nothing will be able to save the State (8.77). Aristotle (Rhet. 3.19.1) says that the purpose of the epilogos is to dispose the audience favourably to the speaker, stirring the audience’s emotions and recapitulating the main points of the speech. He claimed that it could be omitted with a simple recapitulation of points in a shorter speech (Rhet. 3.13.3). Aristotle’s notion of the epilogos stands in contrast to the ideas of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who believed that the epilogos was important because of the pathos it could raise in the audience. The epilogoi of Demosthenes’ deliberative oratory are very much in line with Aristotle’s ideas. It is interesting that Demosthenes does not appeal to pathos in this

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speech, as Dionysius suggests. While it is not a common feature of Demosthenes’ deliberative oratory, he does occasionally excite pathos in his audience, pointing out the poor situation in which the Athenians find themselves in an effort to convince them to act in the manner he is proposing (2.1–2; 3.1–2, 9; 4.2–3; 5.1; 6.8). He does this through topoi that are relevant to what he is saying in each particular situation, enhancing the ethos and logos. This lack of pathos is possibly because the speech was written as a pamphlet for distribution rather than a speech to be delivered in the ecclesia (see below, pp. 45–52), which removes the need to evoke pathos in this manner. Hence it focuses on the use of logical argument and sophisticated rhetorical techniques to achieve its end. Kennedy (2007: 72) points to a well-known feature of Demosthenic oratory known as ‘psychological planning’, where there are a small number of logoi (three in this instance), but they are linked by the continual revival of a theme. In this speech, though Demosthenes seeks to demonstrate that Philip is at war with Athens and they need a standing army in the field, the continual theme that links the entire speech (including a large proof devoted to it exclusively) is the idea that Athens is brought low by poor and corrupt political leadership. The links back to this theme occur throughout the speech and serve to show that while Philip is indeed at war with Athens, the poor leaders are to blame (also the main theme of the First Philippic; see Usher, 1999: 224). By ending the speech with a demonstration of how he is not one of those leaders, Demosthenes has created a continual impression that poor leaders are to blame through this psychological planning, while he is simultaneously showing himself as the advisor to whom they should now pay attention in order to lead them out of danger. This significantly enhances the impact of the speech as a whole and would have led to the audience of this speech judging him to be worthy of giving advice. The frequent use of the connective toinun is crucial in this respect. It is a word that Demosthenes uses to start all sections of the speech to create clear divisions, while still creating a flowing narrative by the revival of this theme. It also helps to show that Demosthenes is simply a concerned citizen proposing what

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needs to be done (Kennedy, 2007: 73). Demosthenes’ self-fashioning in this manner is noted as a key aspect of the performance culture of democratic Athens (Goldhill, 1999: 5, 7–8), where a politician creates the image he desires through the assertion of a set of values in his text, whether performed in the ecclesia or read in a circulated work The Relationship Between On the Chersonese (Or. 8) and the ‘Fourth Philippic’ (Or. 10) and the Dating of On the Chersonese Scholars have long debated the connection between Demosthenes’ speeches 8 and 10. The main connection is two long passages that are almost identical, taken from 10.11–27 and 10.55–70 and inserted in 8.38–67.44 Sealey (1993: 233–35) suggested, on the basis of the common sections, that Demosthenes 8 consisted originally of chapters 1–37 only, with later insertions by interpolators from Dem. 10. An important aspect in this debate is the fact that, when compared to Demosthenes’ other deliberative speeches, the so-called Fourth Philippic is of a comparatively poor standard.45 This led to questions being raised about the Demosthenic authorship of the Fourth Philippic. While there may be good reason for such doubts, the matter is complicated by the fact that a fragment of Didymos (Diels and Schubart, 1904) clearly indicated that speech 10 was believed in antiquity to be Demosthenic.46 In contrast to the usual polish of Demosthenes’ speeches, the quality of the Fourth Philippic has been questioned stridently. Pearson (1976: 157) goes so far as to say that the speech’s main quality is to show how good the other Philippic speeches are by the lack of quality shown in speech 10. While he does indicate that the Fourth Philippic contains Demosthenic elements, indicating that it was indeed written by Demosthenes, Pearson concluded that it is most likely an unfinished work (1976: 155). This assessment does not take into consideration the oral nature of the speech. Of particular 44  See Daitz (1957: 152–158) for a complete and detailed discussion of these passages. 45  For a discussion of the issues, see also Worthington (1991a). 46  See Adams (1938: 129–32) and Daitz (1957) for a full discussion.

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relevance here is Aristotle’s note that an oral speech is fundamentally different from a written one (Rhet. 3.12.1–2). Hermann (2019: 24–25) suggests that Demosthenic oratory displays signs of both the more ‘literary’ rhetoric of Thucydides while utilising stylistic features of a more ‘oral’, performative style of rhetoric. MacDowell (1962: 21) also pointed out that short, simple and uncomplicated sentences (such as those in The Fourth Philippic) were best suited to the listening audience in a courtroom. This is no different to the ecclesia, where passions could have been even more inflamed than in the courtroom. Daitz (1957: 158–59) explains that On the Chersonese is a far more literary composition than the more oral nature of speech 10. Daitz (1957: 150–51) also indicates that, based on stylistic grounds, the common sections were lifted from the Fourth Philippic and inserted into On the Chersonese as they fit into the flow of the narrative better in speech 10, whereas there is somewhat of a disconnect when the sections are inserted into speech 8, indicating the chronological priority of speech 10. It had generally been assumed that Demosthenes produced published versions of his speeches; indeed, Plutarch (Dem. 9.4) reported an ancient tradition, where it was indicated that Demosthenes was bolder in his spoken speeches than his written ones. Plutarch (Dem. 11.4) also says that, when read out, Demosthenes’ speeches seemed well-arranged (11.4).47 This could imply that Demosthenes wrote more polished versions of speeches for dissemination, and Harris (1995: 10–11) compares Demosthenes’ (19) and Aeschines’ (2) speeches against each other, indicating that there is indeed evidence of the speeches being changed after delivery. We know that speeches of a political nature by other authors were written out and distributed (for example, Isocrates’ Areopagiticus, On the Peace and Plataicus; Hansen, 1984: 67). Indeed, Too (1995: 127–29) claims that Isocrates used the written word and its publication as a tool to become the sumboulos of other states, indicating that the verb diadidonai implies that the longer speeches were likely published and possibly 47  See Hermann (2019: 21–22) for a more detailed exposition of the evidence of publication from the fourth century.

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disseminated (cf. Sandys, 1872: xlii; Matthieu, 1926: 66). Aside from the more ‘written’ qualities inherent in speech 8 (Daitz, 1957: 159), the speech would have made excellent political propaganda at a time when Demosthenes was urging Athens to find allies around Greece in 340, or at some point after the defeat of Athens in 338 BC to justify his opposition to Philip at the time. One way of resolving the problem of the identical passages is to assume that we have two versions of essentially the same speech. The Fourth Philippic represents a set of ‘speech notes’ written and delivered for a speech in a debate in the ecclesia, and that On the Chersonese represents the published version of this speech, distributed in 340 at an unknown point, most likely by spring, 340, as the Etesians were blowing (see Commentary 8.14, p. 121). There is some suggestion that ‘speech note’ versions of a speech could circulate as well as more polished versions. There is a possible parallel for the state of the Fourth Philippic speech. For example, MacDowell (2000: 23–27) suggests that speech 19, On the False Embassy, was not delivered as we have it but represents a speech with extensive notes at the end to assist with extemporaneous speaking. We can see similarities to the Fourth Philippic. The lack of polish to the speech, the inclusion of what appears to be a random suggestion about Persian support that seems out of place (10.31–34) and the inclusion of a section on the highly topical Theoric Fund (10.35–42) suggest that this was not a published speech, rather it may indicate that it was designed for Demosthenes’ use in the ecclesia. There are other elements that suggest the Fourth Philippic is a collection of speech notes. Take, for example, the unusual attack on Aristodemus (10.70–71), a politician of the time (accused by Demosthenes in 18.21 as being in the pay of Philip). It is the only mention of an Athenian politician by name in the whole corpus of symbouleutic speeches written by Demosthenes. If we assume that the Fourth Philippic is a different type of speech, not one for dissemination to a reading audience, the speech takes on a different character. It would be perfectly proper for Demosthenes to attack another politician by name in the ecclesia (Adams, 1938: 136), but conventions seem

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to have rendered it improper to mention an individual by name in the surviving ‘written’ speeches (Worthington, 2004: 140–42; cf. Kapellos, 2019: 206, who emphasises that it was the lack of personal rivalry that may have discouraged mentioning people by name). The mention of the Great King (10.32–34), the abrupt transition from this to a discussion regarding the Theoric Fund (10.36–37) and the nature of conflict between the poor and the rich at the time (10.38–45) is also seen as a problem in speech 10 as they are raised abruptly with little connection, then dropped by Demosthenes rapidly and without exploration and connection to the other ideas raised in the speech. Again, this could be solved if we assume that Demosthenes wrote these sections as preparation notes for speaking extemporaneously about topical issues. The issue of Philip’s man, Hermias, being captured by the Great King would have been extremely topical and may well have given some cause for believing that Persian funds may become available for Athens (10.31–34).48 The abrupt change of subject with little connection at 10.35 tends to suggest that Demosthenes wrote it as notes for himself rather than as a final version of a speech designed for circulation. Internal evidence within the two speeches also suggests that the Fourth Philippic predates On the Chersonese. Some evidence for the dating of the speeches is provided by the change of language with regards to the strongholds in Thrace. At 10.15 Philip is only “said” to be holding them (“… for what else might anyone call Drongilus, Cabyle and Mastira and the other places he is now said to be holding”), with the Greek making it clear that this is not certain, whereas the wording is slightly changed at 8.44, where it is clear that Philip has taken these strongholds and is actively getting them ready for action (“… for what else would you call Drongilus, Cabyle, Mastira, which he is now taking and equipping”). Other evidence includes the lack of reference to Diopeithes in the Fourth Philippic which strongly suggests that the speech predates the action of Diopeithes that caused Philip to send an embassy to Athens in spring 341. It is also likely 48  See Chroust (1972: 171–72) for discussion about the nature of the role Hermias played in conjunction with Aristotle.

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that the Fourth Phillippic was written before it was realised that Philip had made a move into Euboea (possibly by the end of 342) as Demosthenes would have made mention of it in a speech designed to raise anger against Philip (cf. 9.33, 58). Finally, the siege of Byzantium (8.14–15) is referenced prophetically – more than likely a reference to Philip’s failed siege after the fact rather than Demosthenes’ accurate prognostication. Had Byzantium been attacked at the time Demosthenes wrote and delivered the Fourth Philippic, he would have been sure to mention it as it endangered the grain supply. The impact of these chronological considerations is that the order of the speeches would be speech 10, followed by speech 8, then speech 9 (the Third Philippic). Adams (1938) believed that Demosthenes made an unpublished speech in spring 341 regarding affairs in the Chersonese, then before June 341 he delivered the Fourth Philippic to the ecclesia. Demosthenes then combined both of these speeches at some point after 338 to create On the Chersonese to justify his unsuccessful opposition to Philip. The Fourth Philippic was later published after Demosthenes’ death. Daitz (1957: 160) concludes that On the Chersonese is a published version of the Fourth Philippic that was written sometime before the final outbreak of war with Philip, possibly around 340, which incorporated elements of a June 341 speech in the ecclesia. Also, Daitz (1957: 155) points out that 8.46 seems to be appealing to allies, which would best fit the speech into some point during 340, probably when war had been declared as a result of Philip’s seizure of the grain ships (18.73). A revised publication of On the Chersonese fits best in 340 as a result of the move towards finding allies to fight Philip. Trevett (1996) argues that the evidence for Demosthenes publishing his speeches is problematic. For example, Trevett argues that politicians had to be able to think on their feet and written speeches would have been a significant hindrance to this; moreover, that it would also mean that should Demosthenes wish to change his mind on an issue, he would have been at the mercy of his enemies’ ridicule for doing so when he had circulated opposite views (1996: 434; cf. Montgomery, 1983: 40–50). While these are certainly considerations, they are not insurmountable

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problems – modern politicians seem to manage this issue in a time of even greater scrutiny and recorded evidence. Hermann (2019: 26) observes that the three Olynthiac speeches, taken individually, are not as powerful as when read in conjunction with each other, where themes are explored, inter-connected and bound by thematic features. This is a another strong argument for later revision and publication. Another argument that Trevett (1996: 441) has advanced is that Demosthenes did not publish his speeches as so few of them survive. It is more likely that Demosthenes wrote speeches in extended note form, using them to prepare him for extemporaneous speaking. Dorjahn, in a series of articles (1947, 1950, 1952, 1955), indicates strongly that, with regard to forensic oratory, there is evidence in the speeches we have to suggest that Demosthenes could speak extemporaneously. It is likely that he extensively prepared for his speeches – Plutarch (Dem. 8.3) tells us that he was accused of labouring so long over his speeches that they “smelled of the lamp”, while Demosthenes himself allegedly said that his speeches were not completely written nor unwritten (Plutarch, Dem. 8.4). It is unlikely that Demosthenes published all of his speeches, rather he published revised versions of those he felt best represented ‘policy positions’ with regards to certain important issues of the time while preparing thoroughly for all speeches. Also, as noted in Appendix 1, the ring structure of the speech tends to indicate that the speech was written for dissemination rather than for delivery in the ecclesia. Thus, it is more likely that the Fourth Philippic was a set of ‘speech notes’ written and delivered for a speech in a debate in the ecclesia. Also, it could be that On the Chersonese represents the published version of this speech, distributed in 340 at an unknown point (most likely by spring, 340, as the Etesians were blowing – see commentary 8.14, p. 121). Scholarship on the Text On the Chersonese is remarkable for the lack of detailed scholarship it has produced. The speech is studied only in conjunction with other

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speeches, usually the Philippics or as part of a study of Demosthenes’ deliberative oratory. As far back as 1597, an edition was published by Pauli of On the Chersonese, along with the Libanian Hypotheses. The speech was published with other deliberative speeches but lacked any commentary or apparatus. It is not until 1838 that there is any serious study of the speech, when Lord Brougham translated the speech as part of a number of examples of Greek oratory that show how to use ancient wisdom to inform modern decision making. Brougham (1839: 186) claims that ‘in point … of argument and conciseness, and when judged by the severest rules of criticism, it has no superior.” He translates the speech as an attempt to use Saxon idiom to make it more accessible to the readers of his own day. The translation has an apparatus to assist his readers in understanding his choice of words for the translation. The criticism of this translation of the speech was scathing: “[Aspects of the translation show] that his Lordship either has not felt the beauties of Demosthenes, or has not the power to express them” (Dublin Review, 1839 (4): 484). Brougham’s attempt (1838: 106–117) to associate On the Chersonese and The Fourth Philippic directly also spawned some ridicule, as the author of the same article claimed, “…every scholar knows that it [The Fourth Philippic] is made up of scraps of others and is wholly without a masterly and luminous arrangement which distinguishes Demosthenes” (Dublin Review, 1839 (4): 484). The attempt allegedly excited ridicule both in England and Germany at what was perceived as a simple error at the time: “Even his Lordship’s schoolboy acquaintance with the Grecian literature might have guarded him against such a fatal mistake” (Dublin Review, 1839 (4): 485). The article does make a cogent point – in a list of Demosthenic works that are read in England, On the Chersonese does not make the list (Dublin Review, 1839 (4): 484), indicating the lack of academic interest in the speech at this point. The Rev. R. Whiston published an edition of Demosthenes with a detailed historical introduction and linguistic apparatus in 1859. The introduction to the work as a whole depicts Demosthenes as energetically leading the good fight against Philip, who had shown himself to be aggressive towards Athens (Whiston, 1859: xxiii–xxiv).

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The introduction to the speech (Whiston, 1859: 164–172) provides an admirable, if brief, outline of the history of the region, identifying aspects that had not been identified in previous translations. For example, it discusses Pisistratus’ interest in the region and Miltiades’ foundation of a settlement; it provides an account of the area in the fourth century after the Peloponnesian War, outlining the role played by Cotys and the revolt of Miltocythes; it discusses Iphicrates’ and Timotheus’ commands in the region; it outlines the growth of Cersobleptes’ power and the Athenian involvement in the region in the 360s in response to him. It completes the introduction by explaining the role played by Diopeithes in the outbreak of hostilities. The commentary is primarily linguistic in nature, but some excellent (if, again, brief) glosses of some key terms of the speech exist to provide a more meaningful context. For example, he glosses katagein (Dem. 8.9) by explaining the nature of what Diopeithes was probably doing (seizing ships and taking them to port for tolls or “blackmail” – Whiston, 1859: 177). He also glosses key locations such as Chalcidice (179), Megara and Oreus (180), and identifies key ideas of historical interest (for example, Dem. 8.28: mikron pinakion – 183) and events of significance (for example, the revolt of Euboea – 185). All of these historical notes are brief and lack depth of explanation as to their relevance. The linguistic commentary written by Weil in 1912 is similarly constructed, as is that by Sandys in his two-volume collection of deliberative speeches (1897, 1900). This is the nature of the reception of the speech throughout much of the 20th century also, with no major work dedicated to a study of the speech. Recent work on the text has been summative in form, identifying the main arguments in a chronological context of Demosthenes’ speeches. For example, the most recent works of this type are those of Worthington (2013: 216–20), Trevett (2011) and MacDowell (2009: 346–349), but as they use the speech for various other considerations, they do not focus on the speech for its own sake.

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Notes on the Manuscripts, Papyri and Scholia The speech is contained in its entirety in the following manuscripts: S (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, ms. gr. 2934); A (Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 485); F (Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Marc. gr. 416); Y (Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale de France, ms. gr. 2935).

The following papyri also contain excerpts of the text: P.CtYBR inv. 1348 (Dem. 8.6); P.Oxy. 62.4326 (Dem. 8.14–18, 18–21); P.Oxy. 62.4327 (Dem. 8.18–20); PSI 16.1600 (PSI inv. 1860 – Dem. 8.31–32); P.Oxy. 64.4328 (Dem. 8.33–36); PSI 16.1601 (Dem. 8.51); P.Oxy. 62.4329 (Dem. 53, 57); P. Oxy. 62.4330 (Dem. 8.54–57, 59–61); BKT 9.190 (P.Berol. inv. 21284 + P. Berol. inv. 16895 – Dem. 8.60–67); P. Laur. inv. III/269C (Dem. 8.67); P.Oxy. 62.4331 (Dem. 68–69); P.Oxy. 62.4332 (Dem. 75–76).

Although A was regarded by Reiske (1770–71) as the most authoritative text, since Bekker (1823) the consensus of academic opinion is that the best text is contained in S. This is the oldest of the Demosthenic manuscripts, dating to the late ninth or early tenth century AD and formed the basis for Bekker’s edition in 1823. The first edition of the Demosthenic corpus in toto was prepared in 1504 by Scipio Carteromachus and Aldus Manutius, and was subsequently revised between 1520 and 1527 (Dilts, 2002: xii). This edition was based on A and was generally regarded as the most authoritative until 1823, when Bekker published his edition. This edition displaced A in favour of S. By reading S as the primary text in conjunction with supplements derived from F and Y, Bekker made more than 3000 changes to the text (Dilts, 2002: xiv). The most

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important edition after Bekker’s was Blass’s 1885–89 edition which emended almost all instances of more than two short syllables (Blass’s Law) and tended to avoid hiatus (Dilts, 2002: xv). More recently, Dilts has used S as the basis for his text as it contains a more original text, using fewer words than A, F and Y, which added words to provide clarity; A, F and Y were used as correctives where required (for example, the extended sections of the Third Philippic in A, F and Y; see Dilts, 2002: xvi). In particular, as the evidence presented in the best texts indicate Demosthenes used hiatus, Dilts has allowed for hiatus except where the evidence from A, F and Y indicate that hiatus should be avoided and Blass’s Law should be followed (Dilts, 2002: xvii). This is a marked departure from previous practices when dealing with Demosthenic texts and serves to emphasise the virtuosity of Demosthenes’ use of language. There are 84 scholia in the texts, primarily contained in Y (68 scholia in total). Both F (in a second hand) and Y contain a summary of the speech, emphasising that it was a defence of Diopeithes and an accusation against Philip. These codices comment on rhetorical style and historical aspects. For example, scholia 5, 7, 9 and 10b discuss aspects of the prooemium, whereas 43 (labelling eisangelia as a disclosure and laying of information), 51 (naming the tyrants of Eretria and Oreos as Cleitarchus and Philistides respectively), 52 (naming Sciathus as an island off Euboea controlled by Athens) and 59 (telling us that the term ‘silver-mines’ was the name for Laurium) contain what appears to be sound historical information. The main codex used by Dilts, S, contains few scholia. Significantly, S claims in its brief summary of the speech that it set in motion the war between Athens and Philip. Comments in other codices are of only little relevance, except for scholium 4, recorded in the more problematic codices vp, pr, R and WD (Dilts, 1983: xiii for discussion), that tells us that cleruchs were farmers who had been sent out to land that had been divided up for them. This is possibly of some significance, as Libanius’ hypothesis also discusses this aspect in detail, indicating a possible tradition that highlighted their importance in events. In addition to the scholia, all of the manuscripts include a hypothesis,

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or introduction used for teaching purposes, written by Libanius. Libanius was a teacher of rhetoric in the Roman East in the fourth century AD. He wrote hypotheses of all of Demosthenes’ speeches. Libanius’ purpose in creating the Hypotheses was as a brief guide to students to indicate the main points of the speech and provide a context to assist in understanding it (Gibson, 1999: 193). Libanius also mentions the prominent role played by cleruchs in the outbreak of hostilities (8.24). That two texts have commented on the importance of the cleruchs in setting-off a train of events that led to Chaeronea could indicate the existence of a tradition that the cleruchs were the central issue to which Philip objected. It could also be a result of the author of the scholium referring to Libanius’ suggestion. A number of editions of the speech exist. The main editions are: Bekker, I. (1823), Oratores Attici (Oxford). Blass, F. (1885–89), Demosthenis Orationes, Leipnitz. Butcher, S. H. (1903), Demosthenis Orationes. Tomus I. Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit, Oxford. Croiset, M. (1968), Harangues, Paris. Dindorf, W. (1846–51), Demosthenes, Oxford. Schaefer, G. H. (1822), Demosthenes quae supersunt ex editione Ioa. Iac. Reiskii accedunt versio latina, apparatus criticus & exegeticus aliorum et suis annotationibus auctus cum indicibus in Demosthenem, London. Felicianus, I. (1543), Demosthenis Orationes, Venice. Pauli, D. (1597), Demosthenous. Logoi, London. Sandys, J. E. (1897–1900), Philippics. Olynthiacs, Peace, Chersonese (2 Volumes), London. Voemel, J. T. (1857), Demosthenis Contiones Quae Circumferuntur Vol. I: Cum Libanii Vita Dem. Et Argumentis Graece Et Latine, Halle. Weil, H. (1912), Les Harangues de Démosthène, Paris. Wolf, H. (1549), Demosthenis et Aeschinis quae exstant omnia, Volume II, London.

This volume uses the text of Dilts (2002), and the text has not been altered. Significant departures from other editions are noted in the text.

DEMOSTHENES 8: ON THE CHERSONESE

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1. ἔδει μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς λέγοντας ἅπαντας μήτε πρὸς ἔχθραν ποιεῖσθαι λόγον μηδένα μήτε πρὸς χάριν, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ βέλτιστον ἕκαστος ἡγεῖτο, τοῦτ᾽ ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ κοινῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μεγάλων ὑμῶν βουλευομένων· ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔνιοι τὰ μὲν φιλονικίᾳ, τὰ δ᾽ ᾑτινιδήποτ᾽ αἰτίᾳ προάγονται λέγειν, ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς πολλοὺς δεῖ πάντα τἄλλ᾽ ἀφελόντας, ἃ τῇ πόλει νομίζετε συμφέρειν, ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν. 2. ἡ μὲν οὖν σπουδὴ περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ πραγμάτων ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς στρατείας, ἣν ἑνδέκατον μῆνα τουτονὶ Φίλιππος ἐν Θρᾴκῃ ποιεῖται· τῶν δὲ λόγων οἱ πλεῖστοι περὶ ὧν Διοπείθης πράττει καὶ μέλλει ποιεῖν εἴρηνται. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὅσα μέν τις αἰτιᾶταί τινα τούτων, οὓς κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐφ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐστιν, ὅταν βούλησθε, κολάζειν, κἂν ἤδη δοκῇ κἂν ἐπισχοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν σκοπεῖν ἐγχωρεῖν ἡγοῦμαι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ δεῖ περὶ τούτων οὔτ᾽ ἔμὲ οὔτ᾽ ἄλλον οὐδένα ἰσχυρίζεσθαι· 3. ὅσα δ᾽ ἐχθρὸς ὑπάρχων τῇ πόλει καὶ δυνάμει πολλῇ περὶ Ἑλλήσποντον ὢν πειρᾶται προλαβεῖν, κἂν ἅπαξ ὑστερήσωμεν, οὐκέθ᾽ ἕξομεν σῶσαι, περὶ τούτων δ᾽ οἴομαι τὴν ταχίστην συμφέρειν καὶ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ παρεσκευάσθαι, καὶ μὴ τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἄλλων θορύβοις καὶ ταῖς κατηγορίαις ἀπὸ τούτων ἀποδρᾶναι. 4. πολλὰ δὲ θαυμάζων τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι παρ᾽ ὑμῖν, οὐδενὸς ἧττον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τεθαύμακα, ὃ καὶ πρώην τινὸς ἤκουσα εἰπόντος ἐν τῇ βουλῇ, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ τὸν συμβουλεύοντα ἢ πολεμεῖν ἁπλῶς ἢ τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν συμβουλεύειν. 5. ἔστι δὲ, εἰ μὲν ἡσυχίαν Φίλιππος ἄγει καὶ μήτε τῶν ἡμετέρων ἔχει παρὰ τὴν εἰρήνην μηδὲν μήτε συσκευάζεται πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς, οὐκέτι δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς εἰρήνην ἀκτέον, καὶ τά γ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὑμῶν ἕτοιμα ὑπάρχονθ᾽ ὁρῶ· εἰ δ᾽ ἃ μὲν ὠμόσαμεν καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιησάμεθα, ἔστιν ἰδεῖν καὶ γεγραμμένα κεῖται,

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1. It is appropriate, men of Athens, for all speakers to give a speech neither out of enmity nor for popularity, but from what they each consider is best, especially when you are discussing important public affairs. But since a few come before you to talk, some out of partisanship, some for other reasons, you all, men of Athens, need to be setting aside everything that you don’t think to be expedient for the city, and vote and act accordingly. 2. The real object of attention is the affairs of the Chersonese and the campaign Philip is leading in Thrace, now in its eleventh month, but the majority of speeches are about what Diopeithes is doing and what he is likely to do. When someone charges another with anything which is against your laws, to be punished whenever you want, I for one believe that you are either free consider it immediately or hold off, and it is not necessary at all for me or anyone to obstinately take sides on this. 3. But when the enemy of the whole city, with a strong army, is trying to seize the region of the Hellespont, and if we should arrive late only once, we will never be able to keep it safe, then I think it to be advantageous to both have deliberated and prepared quickly and not be distracted by the noise of other things and accusations. 4. Many times, I wonder at the things that are often said in your presence, but never more, men of Athens, than at the thing I heard said in the boule the other day: that it is necessary for your advisors simply to recommend either going to war or staying at peace. 5. But the reality is this: if Philip remains quiet and neither takes any of our land contrary to the Peace, nor organises everyone against us, there is no need to say anything at all and we must simply keep the Peace, and I see in you a sense of readiness for this already. But if, while the terms to which we swore, the terms on which we made peace, remain inscribed for all to see,

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6. φαίνεται δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς ὁ Φίλιππος, πρὶν Διοπείθην ἐκπλεῦσαι καὶ τοὺς κληρούχους, οὓς νῦν αἰτιῶνται πεποιηκέναι τὸν πόλεμον, πολλὰ μὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀδίκως εἰληφώς, ὑπὲρ ὧν ψηφίσμαθ᾽ ὑμέτερα ἐγκαλοῦντα κύρια ταυτί, πάντα δὲ τὸν χρόνον συνεχῶς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων λαμβάνων καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς συσκευαζόμενος, τί τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὡς πολεμεῖν ἢ ἄγειν εἰρήνην δεῖ; 7. οὐ γὰρ αἵρεσίς ἐστιν ἡμῖν τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπολείπεται τὸ δικαιότατον καὶ ἀναγκαιότατον τῶν ἔργων, ὃ ὑπερβαίνουσιν ἑκόντες οὗτοι. τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο; ἀμύνεσθαι τὸν πρότερον πολεμοῦνθ᾽ ἡμῖν. πλὴν εἰ τοῦτο λέγουσι νὴ Δί᾽, ὡς, ἂν ἀπέχηται τῆς Ἀττικῆς καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς Φίλιππος, οὔτ᾽ ἀδικεῖ τὴν πόλιν οὔτε ποιεῖ πόλεμον. 8. εἰ δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων τὰ δίκαια τίθενται καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ταύτην ὁρίζονται, ὅτι μὲν δήπουθεν οὔθ᾽ ὅσια οὔτ᾽ ἀνεκτὰ λέγουσιν οὔθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἀσφαλῆ, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἅπασιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἐναντία συμβαίνει ταῖς κατηγορίαις ἃς Διοπείθους κατηγοροῦσι καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτούς. τί γὰρ δήποτε τῷ μὲν Φιλίππῳ πάντα τἄλλα ποιεῖν ἐξουσίαν δώσομεν, ἂν τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀπέχηται, τῷ Διοπείθει δ᾽ οὐδὲ βοηθεῖν τοῖς Θρᾳξὶν ἐξέσται, ἢ πόλεμον ποιεῖν αὐτὸν φήσομεν; 9. ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία, ταῦτα μὲν ἐξελέγχονται, δεινὰ ποιοῦσι δ᾽ οἱ ξένοι περικόπτοντες τὰ ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ, καὶ Διοπείθης ἀδικεῖ κατάγων τὰ πλοῖα, καὶ δεῖ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτῷ. ἔστω, γιγνέσθω ταῦτα, οὐδὲν ἀντιλέγω. 10. οἶμαι μέντοι δεῖν, εἴπερ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπὶ πᾶσι δικαίοις ταῦτα συμβουλεύουσιν, ὥσπερ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῇ πόλει δύναμιν καταλῦσαι ζητοῦσιν, τὸν ἐφεστηκότα καὶ πορίζοντα χρήματα ταύτῃ διαβάλλοντες ἐν ὑμῖν, οὕτω τὴν Φιλίππου δύναμιν δεῖξαι διαλυθησομένην, ἂν ὑμεῖς ταῦτα πεισθῆτε. εἰ δὲ μή, σκοπεῖτε ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιοῦσιν ἢ καθιστᾶσι τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δι᾽ οὗ τὰ παρόντα πράγμαθ᾽ ἅπαντ᾽ ἀπολώλεκεν.

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6. it has been obvious from the start that Philip has taken many of your possessions unjustly, even before Diopeithes sailed with the cleruchs, whom they have now accused of having started the war. Your resolutions about this are still binding, but he is all the time continually taking the possessions of other Greeks and barbarians and is getting ready to go against us. So, what are they saying that we need either to make war or keep the Peace. 7. There is no choice in the matter for us; rather, the only courses still open is the most just and necessary of deeds, which they knowingly pass over. What is this deed? To defend ourselves against the man who is already making war on us. By Zeus, maybe they say that should Philip keep away from Attica and Piraeus he is neither harming the city nor making war. 8. If they ground their arguments on this, and define the Peace in this way, then it is clear to everyone that their speech is impious, unbearable and unsafe for us, but besides this, they contradict with their own words the accusation they are laying against Diopeithes. Why are we giving Philip the power to do anything and everything, as long as he leaves Attica alone, while Diopeithes is not allowed to help the Thracians unless we admit he is making war? 9. But when they are refuted on that, ‘But, by Zeus’, they say, ‘the mercenaries are behaving dreadfully, ravaging the Hellespont and Diopeithes is wrong in detaining the trade ships, and we must not permit it’. Well then, let it be so, I won’t object. 10. In good faith, then, if they are truly advising this they ought also, at the same time as they desire to disband the force belonging to the city, bringing before you the commander providing money for it, to prove that Philip’s force will also be disbanded, should you follow their advice. If they fail to do this, it is obvious that they are doing nothing other than bringing down the city to the same point whereby it lost all of its former advantages.

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11. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθ᾽ ὅτι οὐδενὶ τῶν πάντων πλέον κεκράτηκε Φίλιππος, ἢ τῷ πρότερος πρὸς τοῖς πράγμασι γίγνεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔχων δύναμιν συνεστηκυῖαν ἀεὶ περὶ αὑτὸν καὶ προειδὼς ἃ βούλεται πρᾶξαι, ἐξαίφνης ἐφ᾽ οὓς ἂν αὐτῷ δόξῃ πάρεστιν· ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐπειδὰν πυθώμεθά τι γιγνόμενον, τηνικαῦτα θορυβούμεθα καὶ παρασκευαζόμεθα. 12. εἶτ᾽, οἶμαι, συμβαίνει τῷ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ἃ ἃν ἔλθῃ, ταῦτ᾽ ἔχειν κατὰ πολλὴν ἡσυχίαν, ἡμῖν δ᾽ ὑστερίζειν, καὶ ὅσα ἂν δαπανήσωμεν, ἅπαντα μάτην ἀνηλωκέναι, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἔχθραν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι κωλύειν ἐνδεδεῖχθαι, ὑστερίζοντας δὲ τῶν ἔργων αἰσχύνην προσοφλισκάνειν. 13. μὴ τοίνυν ἀγνοεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι καὶ τὰ νῦν τἄλλα μέν ἐστι λόγοι ταῦτα καὶ προφάσεις, πράττεται δὲ καὶ κατασκευάζεται τοῦτο, ὅπως ὑμῶν μὲν οἴκοι μενόντων, ἔξω δὲ μηδεμιᾶς οὔσης τῇ πόλει δυνάμεως, μετὰ πλείστης ἡσυχίας ἅπανθ᾽ ὅσα βούλεται Φίλιππος διοικήσεται. θεωρεῖτε γὰρ τὸ παρὸν πρῶτον, ὃ γίγνεται. 14. νυνὶ δύναμιν μεγάλην ἐκεῖνος ἔχων ἐν Θρᾴκῃ διατρίβει, καὶ μεταπέμπεται πολλήν, ὥς φασιν οἱ παρόντες, ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας καὶ Θετταλίας. ἐὰν οὖν περιμείνας τοὺς ἐτησίας ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον ἐλθὼν πολιορκῇ, πρῶτον μὲν οἴεσθε τοὺς Βυζαντίους μενεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνοίας τῆς αὐτῆς ὥσπερ νῦν, καὶ οὔτε παρακαλέσειν ὑμᾶς οὔτε βοηθεῖν αὑτοῖς ἀξιώσειν; 15. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἴομαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἴ τισι μᾶλλον ἀπιστοῦσιν ἢ ἡμῖν, καὶ τούτους εἰσφρήσεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ‘κείνῳ παραδώσειν τὴν πόλιν, ἄν περ μὴ φθάσῃ λαβὼν αὐτούς. οὐκοῦν ἡμῶν μὲν μὴ δυναμένων ἐνθένδ᾽ ἀναπλεῦσαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ μηδεμιᾶς ὑπαρχούσης ἑτοίμου βοηθείας, οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἀπολωλέναι κωλύσει. 16. νὴ Δία, κακοδαιμονῶσι γὰρ ἅνθρωποι καὶ ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἀνοίᾳ. πάνυ γε, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως αὐτοὺς δεῖ σῶς εἶναι· συμφέρει γὰρ τῇ πόλει. καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνό γε δῆλόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν, ὡς ἐπὶ Χερρόνησον οὐχ ἥξει· ἀλλ᾽ εἴγ᾽ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς δεῖ σκοπεῖν ἧς ἔπεμψε πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἀμυνεῖσθαί φησι τοὺς ἐν Χερρονήσῳ.

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11. You all, I suppose, know this: that Philip, more than anything else, is powerful by being first to anything that happens. The man who has an organised army always with him, and knows what he wants to do, is immediately ready for whatever he might choose, whereas for us whenever we learn of something happening, only then do we get worked up and get things ready. 12. So, I think as a result, he keeps whatever he chooses to attack at his leisure, while we always arrive late, and as much as we might spend is all spent in vain. Thus, we have demonstrated our enmity and our desire to hinder him, but in being too late we incur disgrace for the deed. 13. Therefore, don’t fail to realise, men of Athens, that other things now are just words and excuses, and this planning and preparing is so that you will remain at home, with no force at all out there for the city, while Philip manages everything just as he wishes with the greatest of ease. You should firstly consider the current state of affairs and what is happening. 14. He is now keeping himself busy in Thrace with a large army and is sending for more from Macedonia and Thessaly, according to the people that are there. Now, should he wait for the Etesian Winds to set out to besiege Byzantium, do you think the Byzantines will remain of the same mind as now and not call on you and expect you to help? 15. I, for one, do not think that, even if they mistrust someone else more than us they would let them in rather than hand over the city to Philip, unless he indeed arrives first and takes it. So, if we aren’t able to sail out from here, and if no-one is ready to help them there, then we can’t prevent their utter destruction. 16. “By Zeus, it is because they are possessed men and excel in lacking understanding.” Well yes, but nevertheless we should preserve their safety: it is in the interests of the city. Moreover, another thing is not at all certain to us, that he will not march against the Chersonese. For if we need to judge from the letter that he sent you, he says he will retaliate against those in the Chersonese.

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17. ἂν μὲν τοίνυν ᾖ τὸ συνεστηκὸς στράτευμα, καὶ τῇ χώρᾳ βοηθῆσαι δυνήσεται καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου τι κακῶς ποιῆσαι· εἰ δ᾽ ἅπαξ διαλυθήσεται, τί ποιήσομεν, ἂν ἐπὶ Χερρόνησον ἴῃ; ‘κρινοῦμεν Διοπείθη νὴ Δία.’ καὶ τί τὰ πράγματ᾽ ἔσται βελτίω; ‘ἀλλ᾽ ἐνθένδ᾽ ἂν βοηθήσαιμεν αὐτοί.’ ἂν δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν πνευμάτων μὴ δυνώμεθα; ‘ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί᾽ οὐχ ἥξει.’καὶ τίς ἐγγυητής ἐστι τούτου; 18. ἆρ᾽ ὁρᾶτε καὶ λογίζεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ὥραν τοῦ ἔτους, εἰς ἣν ἔρημόν τινες οἴονται δεῖν τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ὑμῶν ποιῆσαι καὶ παραδοῦναι Φιλίππῳ; τί δέ, ἂν ἀπελθὼν ἐκ Θρᾴκης καὶ μηδὲ προσελθὼν Χερρονήσῳ μηδὲ Βυζαντίῳ ⟨ καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα λογίζεσθε ⟩ ἐπὶ Χαλκίδα καὶ Μέγαρα ἥκῃ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὅνπερ ἐπ᾽ Ὠρεὸν πρώην, πότερον κρεῖττον ἐνθάδ᾽ αὐτὸν ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ προσελθεῖν τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐᾶσαι, ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐκεῖ τινα ἀσχολίαν αὐτῷ; ἐγὼ μὲν οἴομαι τοῦτο. 19. ταῦτα τοίνυν ἅπαντας εἰδότας καὶ λογιζομένους χρή, οὐ μὰ Δί᾽ οὐχ ἣν Διοπείθης πειρᾶται τῇ πόλει δύναμιν παρασκευάζειν, ταύτην βασκαίνειν καὶ διαλῦσαι πειρᾶσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέραν αὐτοὺς προσπαρασκευάζειν καὶ συνευποροῦντας ἐκείνῳ χρημάτων καὶ τἄλλα οἰκείως συναγωνιζομένους. 20. εἰ γάρ τις ἔροιτο Φίλιππον, ‘εἰπέ μοι, πότερ᾽ ἂν βούλοιο τούτους τοὺς στρατιώτας οὓς Διοπείθης νῦν ἔχει, τοὺς ὁποιουστινασοῦν ⟨ οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀντιλέγω ⟩ εὐθενεῖν καὶ παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις εὐδοξεῖν καὶ πλείους γίγνεσθαι τῆς πόλεως συναγωνιζομένης, ἢ διαβαλλόντων τινῶν καὶ κατηγορούντων διασπασθῆναι καὶ διαφθαρῆναι;’ ταῦτ᾽ ἂν οἶμαι φήσειεν. εἶθ᾽ ἃ Φίλιππος ἂν εὔξαιτο τοῖς θεοῖς, ταῦθ᾽ ἡμῶν τινες ἐνθάδε πράττουσιν; εἶτα ἔτι ζητεῖτε πόθεν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἀπόλωλεν ἅπαντα;

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17. If, therefore, our force should remain together, it will be able to save that territory and inflict some harm on his, but if it is altogether disbanded, what are we to do if Philip goes to the Chersonese? “Prosecute Diopeithes, by Zeus.” And how will that make improve matters? “But what if we were to send help from here?” What if we are not able to on account of the winds? “But surely these things won’t happen, by Zeus.” And who will be guarantor of that? 18. Do you observe and consider, men of Athens, the time of year it is, the season in which certain people desire to keep the Hellespont undefended by you and hand it over the Philip? What if he leaves Thrace and doesn’t turn up at either the Chersonese or Byzantium (for it is necessary to consider this), but appears at Chalcis and Megara, in the same way he did at Oreus so recently. Of these two options, is it better to defend ourselves here and allow the war to spread to Attica, or to keep him busy there? I prefer to do that. 19. Therefore, knowing and considering this, it is necessary for all of you, by Zeus, not to malign and attempt to disband the army with which Diopeithes is trying to benefit the city, but to prepare another force yourselves and contribute money to him, and share his burden as kinsmen. 20. For if anyone might ask Philip, “Tell me, which you would want: the soldiers that Diopeithes now commands, whatever their quality (for I am not discussing that) should thrive and win renown at Athens and become greater, through the cooperation of the city, or that a few malcontents and people bringing lawsuits scatter and completely destroy it?” I think that he would choose the latter. Then what Philip would pray from the Gods some of you here are trying to achieve? Yet you still wonder in what way are the interests of the city completely ruined everywhere?

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21. βούλομαι τοίνυν ὑμᾶς μετὰ παρρησίας ἐξετάσαι τὰ παρόντα πράγματα τῇ πόλει, καὶ σκέψασθαι τί ποιοῦμεν αὐτοὶ νῦν καὶ ὅπως χρώμεθ᾽ αὐτοῖς. ἡμεῖς οὔτε χρήματα εἰσφέρειν βουλόμεθα, οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ στρατεύεσθαι, οὔτε τῶν κοινῶν ἀπέχεσθαι δυνάμεθα, οὔτε τὰς συντάξεις Διοπείθει δίδομεν, 22. οὔθ᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἂν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ πορίσηται ἐπαινοῦμεν,ἀλλὰ βασκαίνομεν καὶ σκοποῦμεν πόθεν, καὶ τί μέλλει ποιεῖν, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαυτί, οὔτ᾽, ἐπειδήπερ οὕτως ἔχομεν, τὰ ἡμέτερ᾽ αὐτῶν πράττειν ἐθέλομεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν μὲν τοῖς λόγοις τοὺς τῆς πόλεως λέγοντας ἄξια ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔργοις τοῖς ἐναντιουμένοις τούτοις συναγωνιζόμεθα. 23. ὑμεῖς μὲν τοίνυν εἰώθατε ἑκάστοτε τὸν παριόντα ἐρωτᾶν, τί οὖν χρὴ ποιεῖν; ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἐρωτῆσαι βούλομαι, τί οὖν χρὴ λέγειν; εἰ γὰρ μήτε εἰσοίσετε, μήτ᾽ αὐτοὶ στρατεύσεσθε, μήτε τῶν κοινῶν ἀφέξεσθε, μήτε τὰς συντάξεις δώσετε, μήτε᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἂν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ πορίσηται ἐάσετε, μήτε τὰ ὑμέτερ᾽ αὐτῶν πράττειν ἐθελήσετε, οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω. οἱ γὰρ ἤδη τοσαύτην ἐξουσίαν τοῖς αἰτιᾶσθαι καὶ διαβάλλειν βουλομένοις διδόντες, ὥστε καὶ περὶ ὧν φασι μέλλειν αὐτὸν ποιεῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτων προκατηγορούντων ἀκροᾶσθαι, —τί ἄν τις λέγοι; 24. ὅ τι τοίνυν δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἐνίους μαθεῖν ὑμῶν δεῖ. λέξω δὲ μετὰ παρρησίας· καὶ γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἄλλως δυναίμην. πάντες ὅσοι ποτ᾽ ἐκπεπλεύκασι παρ᾽ ὑμῶν στρατηγοί (ἢ ἐγὼ πάσχειν ὁτιοῦν τιμῶμαι) καὶ παρὰ Χίων καὶ παρ᾽ Ἐρυθραίων καὶ παρ᾽ ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι δύνωνται, τούτων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν οἰκούντων λέγω, χρήματα λαμβάνουσιν. 25. λαμβάνουσι δὲ οἱ μὲν ἔχοντες μίαν ἢ δύο ναῦς ἐλάττονα, οἱ δὲ μείζω δύναμιν πλείονα. καὶ διδόασιν οἱ διδόντες οὔτε τὰ μικρὰ οὔτε τὰ πολλὰ ἀντ᾽ οὐδενός ⟨ οὐ γὰρ οὕτω μαίνονται ⟩, ἀλλ᾽ ὠνούμενοι μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι τοὺς παρ᾽ αὑτῶν ἐκπλέοντας ἐμπόρους, μὴ συλᾶσθαι, παραπέμπεσθαι τὰ πλοῖα τὰ αὑτῶν, τὰ τοιαῦτα· φασὶ δ᾽ εὐνοίας διδόναι, καὶ τοῦτο τοὔνομ᾽ ἔχει τὰ λήμματα ταῦτα.

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21. Therefore, I would like to examine with liberty the current affairs of the city and consider thoroughly what we are doing now and how we are dealing with it ourselves. We don’t want to pay an eisphora or serve ourselves, nor are we able to keep our hands off public money, nor will we grant military pay to Diopeithes, nor will we approve that which he himself has raised. 22. But we malign and overly analyse from where he gets it and what he intends to do and all other sorts of things like that, yet while we are like this, we aren’t willing to undertake our own duties. Instead, we praise with speeches those who speak worthily of the city but by our actions we support their opponents. 23. Now, you are accustomed to ask the man in front of you, “What should we do?” But I want to ask you, “What, then, must be said?” For if you won’t pay the eisphora, nor serve in person, nor keep your hands off public money, nor grant military pay, nor approve the money which he has raised himself, nor want to undertake your own duties, I don’t have anything to say. Those who have already given such licence to the men who want to lay blame and discredit, even about what they say he is about to do and about which they bring accusations before time, and you listen to them – what is anyone able to say? 24. Some of you need to understand what doing these things signifies. I will speak freely, for I am unable to do anything else. All generals that have ever sailed from your lands (or I will suffer any penalty whatever) take money from the Chians, and the Erythraeans or from whomever they are able. I am talking about those who live in Asia. 25. Those who have one or two ships take less, while those who have a greater force take more. Moreover, those who pay don’t pay either a little or a lot in exchange for nothing (for they aren’t mad), but are purchasing a guarantee of no harm coming to merchants sailing from their lands, or that their own ships sailing past won’t be raided, and that sort of thing. They say that they are giving ‘benevolences,’ and that is the name given to these exactions.

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26. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τῷ Διοπείθει στράτευμα ἔχοντι σαφῶς ἐστι τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι δώσουσι χρήματα πάντες οὗτοι· πόθεν γὰρ οἴεσθε ἄλλοθεν τὸν μήτε λαβόντα παρ᾽ ὑμῶν μηδὲν μήτ᾽ αὐτὸν ἔχοντα ὁπόθεν μισθοδοτήσει, στρατιώτας τρέφειν; ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ; οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἀγείρει καὶ προσαιτεῖ καὶ δανείζεται, ἀπὸ τούτων διάγει. 27. οὐδὲν οὖν ἄλλο ποιοῦσιν οἱ κατηγοροῦντες ἐν ὑμῖν ἢ προλέγουσιν ἅπασι μηδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἐκείνῳ διδόναι, ὡς καὶ τοῦ μελλῆσαι δώσοντι δίκην, μή τι ποιήσαντί γε ἢ καταπραξαμένῳ. τοῦτ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ λόγοι· ‘μέλλει πολιορκεῖν,’ ‘τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκδίδωσιν.’ μέλει γάρ τινι τούτων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν οἰκούντων Ἑλλήνων; ἀμείνους μέντἂν εἶεν τῶν ἄλλων ἢ τῆς πατρίδος κήδεσθαι. 28. καὶ τό γ᾽ εἰς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον εἰσπέμπειν ἕτερον στρατηγὸν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ δεινὰ ποιεῖ Διοπείθης καὶ κατάγει τὰ πλοῖα, μικρόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μικρὸν πινάκιον ταῦτα πάντα κωλῦσαι δύναιτ᾽ ἄν, καὶ λέγουσιν οἱ νόμοι, ταῦτα τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας εἰσαγγέλλειν, οὐ μὰ Δί᾽ οὐ δαπάναις καὶ τριήρεσιν τοσαύταις ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς φυλάττειν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γ᾽ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ μανίας· 29. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ μὲν τοὺς ἐχθρούς, οὓς οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν ὑπὸ τοῖς νόμοις, καὶ στρατιώτας τρέφειν καὶ τριήρεις ἐκπέμπειν καὶ χρήματα εἰσφέρειν δεῖ καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ἐπὶ δ᾽ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ψήφισμα, εἰσαγγελία, πάραλος ταῦτ᾽ ἔστιν. ταῦτ᾽ ἦν εὖ φρονούντων ἀνθρώπων, ἐπηρεαζόντων δὲ καὶ διαφθειρόντων τὰ πράγματα ἃ νῦν οὗτοι ποιοῦσιν. 30. καὶ τὸ μὲν τούτων τινὰς εἶναι τοιούτους, δεινὸν ὂν οὐ δεινόν ἐστιν· ἀλλ᾽ ὑμεῖς οἱ καθήμενοι οὕτως ἤδη διάκεισθε, ὥστ᾽, ἂν μέν τις εἴπῃ παρελθὼν ὅτι Διοπείθης ἐστὶ τῶν κακῶν πάντων αἴτιος, ἢ Χάρης ἢ Ἀριστοφῶν ἢ ὃν ἂν τῶν πολιτῶν εἴπῃ τις, εὐθέως φατὲ καὶ θορυβεῖτε ὡς ὀρθῶς λέγει·

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26. And precisely in this instance, while Diopeithes clearly has an army with him, it is clear that these people will pay him money, for from what place do you think he is to provide for his army if you won’t give him anything and if he has no money himself whatsoever to pay the wages? From heaven? This is impossible, but it is from what he can collect, beg or borrow that he keeps going by which he continues. 27. So, the men who make accusations before you are doing nothing other than warning everyone to give him nothing whatsoever because he will be punished for what he intends, not for anything he has done or has achieved. The arguments of this are, “He intends to besiege towns.” “He betrays the Greeks.” Do any of them care about the Greeks living in Asia? However, they really would care more for other cities than their own homeland. 28. That is also the meaning of the sending of another general to the Hellespont. For if Diopeithes really is doing terrible things and detaining merchant vessels, a little notice, men of Athens, a little notice could stop all of this. The laws also say to impeach such wrong-doers but not, by Zeus, to maintain guard over ourselves with so much expense and such a large fleet, since that is beyond madness. 29. But against our enemies, who are not bound by laws, it is needful and necessary to maintain troops, send boats and raise war-taxes. But against ourselves, we have these: decree, impeachment and the Paralus. This is what people in their right mind would do; what these men are doing now are the actions of men who are trying to damage and ruin our interests. 30. The fact that some of these men are of that sort is terrible, but not that terrible; but you people sitting here now are disposed in such a way that any person should come forward and claim that the cause of all of problems is Diopeithes, or Chares, or Aristophon, or any other citizen he might say, you concur and applaud that he said it rightly.

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31. ἂν δὲ παρελθὼν λέγῃ τις τἀληθῆ, ὅτι ‘ληρεῖτ᾽, Ἀθηναῖοι· πάντων τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τούτων Φίλιππός ἐστ᾽ αἴτιος· εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἦγεν ἡσυχίαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν πρᾶγμα τῇ πόλει,’ ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἀληθῆ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἔχετ᾽ ἀντιλέγειν, ἄχθεσθαι δέ μοι δοκεῖτε καὶ ὥσπερ ἀπολλύναι τι νομίζειν. 32. αἴτιον δὲ τούτων (καί μοι πρὸς θεῶν, ὅταν ἕνεκα τοῦ βελτίστου λέγω, ἔστω παρρησί)· παρεσκευάκασιν ὑμᾶς τῶν πολιτευομένων ἔνιοι ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις φοβεροὺς καὶ χαλεπούς, ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς ταῖς τοῦ πολέμου ῥαθύμους καὶ εὐκαταφρονήτους. ἂν μὲν οὖν τὸν αἴτιον εἴπῃ τις ὃν ἴσθε ὅτι λήψεσθε παρ᾽ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, φατὲ καὶ βούλεσθε· ἂν δὲ τοιοῦτον λέγῃ τις, ὃν κρατήσαντας τοῖς ὅπλοις, ἄλλως δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν κολάσαι, οὐκ ἔχετ᾽, οἶμαι, τί ποιήσετε, ἐξελεγχόμενοι δ᾽ ἄχθεσθε. 33. ἐχρῆν γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὐναντίον ἢ νῦν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολιτευομένους ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις πράους καὶ φιλανθρώπους ὑμᾶς ἐθίζειν εἶναι ⟨ πρὸς γὰρ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους ἐν ταύταις ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ⟩, ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς ταῖς τοῦ πολέμου φοβεροὺς καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐπιδεικνύναι· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀντιπάλους ἐκεῖνός ἐσθ᾽ ὁ ἁγών. 34. νῦν δὲ δημαγωγοῦντες ὑμᾶς καὶ χαριζόμενοι καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν οὕτω διατεθήκασιν, ὥστ᾽ ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τρυφᾶν καὶ κολακεύεσθαι πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀκούοντας, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τοῖς γιγνομένοις περὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἤδη κινδυνεύειν. φέρε γὰρ πρὸς Διός, εἰ λόγον ὑμᾶς ἀπαιτήσειαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ὧν νυνὶ παρείκατε καιρῶν διὰ ῥαθυμίαν, 35. καὶ ἔροινθ᾽ ὑμᾶς, ‘ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πέμπετε ὡς ἡμᾶς ἑκάστοτε πρέσβεις, καὶ λέγεθ᾽ ὡς ἐπιβουλεύει Φίλιππος ἡμῖν καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι, καὶ ὡς φυλάττεσθαι δεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαυτί;’ (ἀνάγκη φάσκειν καὶ ὁμολογεῖν· ποιοῦμεν γὰρ ταῦτα). ‘εἶτ᾽, ὦ πάντων ἀνθρώπων φαυλότατοι, δέκα μῆνας ἀπογενομένου τἀνθρώπου καὶ νόσῳ καὶ χειμῶνι καὶ πολέμοις ἀποληφθέντος ὥστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἐπανελθεῖν οἴκαδε, ’

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31. But should any step up and speak the truth, saying, “Nonsense, Athenians: the cause of all of these evils and problems is Philip for if he had kept quiet, there would be no problem for the city,” you are not able to argue that it is not true, you seem to me to be vexed, just as if you felt you were losing out. 32. The reason for it is this (and, by the Gods, whenever I speak on behalf of your best interests, allow me to speak freely): a few politicians have been training you to be dangerous and an unforgiving enemy in the ecclesia, but in your preparations for war, contemptible and lazy. So, should someone say the problem is someone who you know you can capture here, you agree and are willing, but should someone say it is the sort of person that you cannot punish other than by overpowering them by arms, you have nothing you can do, I think, and to be proven so vexes you. 33. For it should be the opposite of this, men of Athens: all the politicians should have accustomed you to be gentle and humane in the ecclesia (for there, it is about rights of you yourselves and the allies), but in the preparations for war, they should be making you dangerous and unforgiving, because then it is a contest against your enemies and rivals. 34. But now, demagoguery and unlimited pandering have brought you to such a state of mind that in the ecclesia, flattered by their soft touch, you are hearing everything for your pleasure but in the real world of events you are in the most extreme peril. Tell me, by Zeus, what if the Greeks demand a response from you about how you have completely squandered your advantage through laziness, and ask you, 35. “Men of Athens, do you send us ambassadors every time to tell us how Philip is plotting against us and all of the Greeks, and how it is necessary be on our guard against this man, and all other sorts of things (and it is necessary to affirm and agree, because we do this)? And yet, o most simple of men, while the man has been away for ten months, cut-off by sickness, winter and war, so that he has been unable to return home,

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36. οὔτε τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἠλευθερώσατε, οὔτε τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἐκομίσασθε, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὑμῶν οἴκοι μενόντων, σχολὴν ἀγόντων, ὑγιαινόντων (εἰ δὴ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῦντας ὑγιαίνειν φήσαιεν), δύ᾽ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ κατέστησε τυράννους, τὸν μὲν ἀπαντικρὺ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐπιτειχίσας, τὸν δ᾽ ἐπὶ Σκίαθον, ’ 37. ὑμεῖς δ᾽ οὐδὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἀπελύσασθε, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐβούλεσθε, ἀλλ᾽ εἰάκατε; ἀφέστατε δῆλον ὅτι αὐτῷ, καὶ φανερὸν πεποιήκατε ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἂν δεκάκις ἀποθάνῃ, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον κινήσεσθε. τί οὖν πρεσβεύετε καὶ κατηγορεῖτε καὶ πράγμαθ᾽ ἡμῖν παρέχετε;’ ἂν ταῦτα λέγωσιν, τί ἐροῦμεν ἢ τί φήσομεν, Ἀθηναῖοι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ. 38. εἰσὶ τοίνυν τινὲς οἳ τότ᾽ ἐξελέγχειν τὸν παριόντα οἴονται, ἐπειδὰν ἐρωτήσωσι ‘τί οὖν χρὴ ποιεῖν;’ οἷς ἐγὼ μὲν τὸ δικαιότατον καὶ ἀληθέστατον τοῦτ᾽ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ταῦτα μὴ ποιεῖν ἃ νυνὶ ποιεῖτε, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀκριβῶς ἐρῶ. καὶ ὅπως, ὥσπερ ἐρωτῶσι προθύμως, οὕτω καὶ ποιεῖν ἐθελήσουσι. 39. πρῶτον μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο παρ᾽ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς βεβαίως γνῶναι, ὅτι τῇ πόλει Φίλιππος πολεμεῖ καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην λέλυκεν ⟨ καὶ παύσασθε περὶ τούτου κατηγοροῦντες ἀλλήλων ⟩ καὶ κακόνους μέν ἐστι καὶ ἐχθρὸς ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει καὶ τῷ τῆς πόλεως ἐδάφει, 40. προσθήσω δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τοῖς μάλιστ᾽ οἰομένοις αὐτῷ χαρίζεσθαι ⟨ εἰ δὲ μή, σκεψάσθων Εὐθυκράτη καὶ Λασθένη τοὺς Ὀλυνθίους, οἳ δοκοῦντες οἰκειότατ᾽ αὐτῷ διακεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ τὴν πόλιν προὔδοσαν, πάντων κάκιστ᾽ ἀπολώλασιν ⟩, οὐδενὶ μέντοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πολεμεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιβουλεύει καὶ σκοπεῖ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἓν τῶν πάντων, ἢ πῶς ταύτην καταλύσει.

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36. you have not liberated Euboea, nor have you recovered any of your possessions. But while you stay at home enjoying leisure, maintaining your health (if indeed they could say that people doing this sort of thing are healthy!), he has set up two tyrants in Euboea, one directly opposite Attica, the other near Sciathus, 37. but if you didn’t want to do anything else, didn’t you even get rid of those threats? You have abandoned these places to him it is clear, and you have made it obvious that if he was to die ten times, you still wouldn’t even stir. Why then do you continually send embassies, complain and give us trouble?” Should they say this, what are we to say and respond, Athenians? For me, I can’t think. 38. There are some who now and then think to refute the man up in front of them when they ask, “What do we need to do?” To them, I would respond in the most just and true manner to them, we start doing things not as we do them now. I won’t, however, avoid talking precisely about each detail, and just as those people ask questions willingly, they should be just as willing to carry out the answer. 39. Firstly, men of Athens, you should know this with certainty, that Philip makes war upon the city and has broken the peace (and you should stop arguing with one another about this), and he acts with malice towards, and is an enemy to, the whole city and to the very foundation of it, 40. and I might also add, to every man in the city, even those who really think they court his favour (if they don’t know this, consider Euthycrates and Lasthenes of Olynthus, who thought they were such close friends, but when they betrayed the city, they were utterly destroyed in the worst way of all). On nothing, however, does he plot to wage war more than our constitution, and on nothing in the world does he ponder more than how to dissolve it.

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41. καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εἰκότως τρόπον τινὰ πράττει· οἶδεν γὰρ ἀκριβῶς ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἂν πάντων τῶν ἄλλων γένηται κύριος, οὐδὲν ἔστ᾽ αὐτῷ βεβαίως ἔχειν, ἕως ἂν ὑμεῖς δημοκρατῆσθε, ἀλλ᾽ ἐάν ποτε συμβῇ τι πταῖσμα, ἃ πολλὰ γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἥξει πάντα τὰ νῦν συμβεβιασμένα καὶ καταφεύξεται πρὸς ὑμᾶς· 42. ἐστὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς οὐκ αὐτοὶ πλεονεκτῆσαι καὶ κατασχεῖν ἀρχὴν εὖ πεφυκότες, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον λαβεῖν κωλῦσαι καὶ ἔχοντ᾽ ἀφελέσθαι δεινοί, καὶ ὅλως ἐνοχλῆσαι τοῖς ἄρχειν βουλομένοις καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἐξελέσθαι ἕτοιμοι. οὔκουν βούλεται τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ καιροῖς τὴν παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐλευθερίαν ἐφεδρεύειν, οὐδὲ πολλοῦ δεῖ, οὐ κακῶς οὐδ᾽ ἀργῶς ταῦτα λογιζόμενος. 43. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τοῦτο δεῖ, ἐχθρὸν ὑπειληφέναι τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας ἀδιάλλακτον ἐκεῖνον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο πεισθήσεσθε ταῖς ψυχαῖς, οὐκ ἐθελήσετε ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων σπουδάζειν· δεύτερον δ᾽ εἰδέναι σαφῶς ὅτι πάνθ᾽ ὅσα πραγματεύεται καὶ κατασκευάζεται νῦν, ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν παρασκευάζεται, καὶ ὅπου τις ἐκεῖνον ἀμύνεται, ἐνταῦθ᾽ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀμύνεται. 44. οὐ γὰρ οὕτω γ᾽ εὐήθης οὐδεὶς ὃς ὑπολαμβάνει τὸν Φίλιππον τῶν μὲν ἐν Θρᾴκῃ κακῶν (τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τις εἴποι Δρογγίλον καὶ Καβύλην καὶ Μάστειραν καὶ ἃ νῦν ἐξαιρεῖ καὶ κατασκευάζεται;) τούτων μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ταῦτα λαβεῖν καὶ πόνους καὶ χειμῶνας καὶ τοὺς ἐσχάτους κινδύνους ὑπομένειν, 45. τῶν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τριήρων καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀργυρείων καὶ τοσούτων προσόδων οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὑμᾶς ἐάσειν ἔχειν, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν μελινῶν καὶ τῶν ὀλυρῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς Θρᾳκίοις σιροῖς ἐν τῷ βαράθρῳ χειμάζειν. οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνα ὑπὲρ τοῦ τούτων γενέσθαι κύριος καὶ τἄλλα πάντα πραγματεύεται.

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41. And it is appropriate that he should act in this sort of way, for he knows well that even if he should become master of everything else, nothing will be certain for him while you have a democratic constitution, but should he ever suffer some sort of failure, which can befall men, all of those who have been forced into a union with him will return to you and flee for protection to you. 42. For you yourselves are not well disposed by nature to grasp and possess leadership, but you are clever at hindering another who is seizing possessions and taking away what he holds, and give utter trouble to those who want to rule and deliver all men to freedom zealously. Therefore, he certainly does not want your freedom to wait for the right time to act against himself; surely not! His thinking here is not bad or idle. 43. Firstly, this is necessary, it must be understood he is an enemy of the city and the man is irreconcilable with democracy, and if you are not persuaded of this to your core, you will not be willing to take public affairs seriously. Secondly, you need to understand clearly that all of his current activities and preparations are him getting ready against our city, and wherever anyone defends themselves against him, they defend that place on our behalf. 44. For no one is so simple to think that Philip would seize terrible places in Thrace (for what else would you call Drongilus, Cabyle, Mastira, which he is now taking and equipping?) because he desires these places, and that it is for the sake of taking them that he endures hard work, winters and extreme dangers, 45. but that he does not desire the Athenian harbours, the dockyards, the triremes, the produce of the silver mines, and the other sources of wealth, but will allow you to keep them while he winters in perdition for the millet and rice-wheat in Thracian pits. This is not the way it is, but he engages in these and all his other activities with the aim of becoming master of our assets.

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46. τί οὖν εὖ φρονούντων ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν; εἰδότας ταῦτα καὶ ἐγνωκότας τὴν μὲν ὑπερβάλλουσαν καὶ ἀνήκεστον ταύτην ῥαθυμίαν ἀποθέσθαι, χρήματα δ᾽ εἰσφέρειν καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους ἀξιοῦν, καὶ ὅπως τὸ συνεστηκὸς τοῦτο συμμενεῖ στράτευμα ὁρᾶν καὶ πράττειν, ἵν᾽ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος ἕτοιμον ἔχει δύναμιν τὴν ἀδικήσουσαν καὶ καταδουλωσομένην ἅπαντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας, οὕτω τὴν σώσουσαν ὑμεῖς καὶ βοηθήσουσαν ἅπασιν ἕτοιμον ἔχητε. 47. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι βοηθείαις χρωμένους οὐδέποτ᾽ οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων πρᾶξαι, ἀλλὰ κατασκευάσαντας δεῖ δύναμιν, καὶ τροφὴν ταύτῃ πορίσαντας καὶ ταμίας καὶ δημοσίους, καὶ ὅπως ἔνι τὴν τῶν χρημάτων φυλακὴν ἀκριβεστάτην γενέσθαι, οὕτω ποιήσαντας, τὸν μὲν τῶν χρημάτων λόγον παρὰ τούτων λαμβάνειν, τὸν δὲ τῶν ἔργων παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ. κἂν οὕτω ποιήσητε καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐθελήσητε ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἄγειν εἰρήνην δικαίαν καὶ μένειν ἐπὶ τῆς αὑτοῦ Φίλιππον ἀναγκάσετε, οὗ μεῖζον οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτ᾽ ἀγαθόν, ἢ πολεμήσετ᾽ ἐξ ἴσου. 48. εἰ δέ τῳ δοκεῖ ταῦτα καὶ δαπάνης μεγάλης καὶ πόνων πολλῶν καὶ πραγματείας εἶναι, καὶ μάλα ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ· ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν λογίσηται τὰ τῇ πόλει μετὰ ταῦτα γενησόμενα, ἂν ταῦτα μὴ ‘θέλῃ, εὑρήσει λυσιτελοῦν τὸ ἑκόντας ποιεῖν τὰ δέοντα. 49. εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐστί τις ἐγγυητὴς θεῶν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων γ᾽ οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο ἀξιόχρεως τηλικούτου πράγματος) ὡς, ἐὰν ἄγηθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν καὶ ἅπαντα προῆσθε, οὐκ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς τελευτῶν ἐκεῖνος ἥξει, αἰσχρὸν μὲν νὴ τὸν Δία καὶ πάντας θεοὺς καὶ ἀνάξιον ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ πόλει καὶ πεπραγμένων τοῖς προγόνοις, τῆς ἰδίας ἕνεκα ῥαθυμίας τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας Ἕλληνας εἰς δουλείαν προέσθαι, καὶ ἔγωγ᾽ αὐτὸς μὲν τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ἂν ἢ ταῦτ᾽ εἰρηκέναι βουλοίμην· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τις ἄλλος λέγει καὶ ὑμᾶς πείθει, ἔστω, μὴ ἀμύνεσθε, ἅπαντα πρόεσθε. 50. εἰ δὲ μηδενὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖ, τοὐναντίον δὲ πρόϊσμεν ἅπαντες, ὅτι ὅσῳ ἂν πλειόνων ἐάσωμεν ἐκεῖνον γενέσθαι κύριον, τοσούτῳ χαλεπωτέρῳ καὶ ἰσχυροτέρῳ χρησόμεθα ἐχθρῷ, ποῖ ἀναδυόμεθα; ἢ τί μέλλομεν; ἢ πότε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ἐθελήσομεν;

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46. What, then, is there for right minded men? To know and realise this, to overcome this fatal laziness, to pay our eisphora, to demand contributions from our allies and to provide and manage the existence of the standing army, so that just as he has a force at hand to harm and enslave all of the Greeks, you may have one for saving and helping everyone. 47. For if it is only mercenaries furnished, you will never achieve your goals, so you must prepare a force, and provide it provisions, a board of treasurers and a staff of public slaves, and having the strictest guard over the money, then having done this, demand an account of all of the money from the treasurers and an account of the actions from the general. If you do this, and are truly willing to do it, you will either force Philip to maintain the peace justly and remain in his own lands, and that would be the greatest good, or you will fight him on equal terms. 48. Now, if people think that this will mean great expenditure, suffering and exertion, they are very correct, but if they calculate what will happen to the city should they not be willing to do this, they will discover it profits to do what is necessary willingly. 49. For if there is a God acting as guarantor (for no man could for an affairs of such magnitude), that if you remain passive and neglect everything, Philip will not advance against you in the end, by Zeus and all the Gods it would be disgraceful and unworthy of you and the past record of the city and the achievements of your ancestors for the sake of your personal laziness to abandon the other Greeks to slavery, and I at least would rather die than proclaim something like this. However, if someone proposes it and you agree, so be it – don’t defend yourself, give everything up. 50. But, if no-one agrees with this, and if, conversely, we all foresee that the more we permit him to grow his power, the more difficult and powerful we will find him as an enemy, to where do we withdraw? Or why do we delay? Or when, men of Athens, will we do what is necessary?

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51. ὅταν νὴ Δί᾽ ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ. ἀλλ᾽ ἣν μὲν ἄν τις ἐλευθέρων ἀνθρώπων ἀνάγκην εἴποι, οὐ μόνον ἤδη πάρεστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι παρελήλυθε, τὴν δὲ τῶν δούλων ἀπεύχεσθαι δήπου μὴ γενέσθαι δεῖ. διαφέρει δὲ τί; ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐλευθέρῳ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ μεγίστη ἀνάγκη ἡ ὑπὲρ τῶν γιγνομένων αἰσχύνη, καὶ μείζω ταύτης οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ἥντιν᾽ ἂν εἴποιμεν· δούλῳ δὲ πληγαὶ καὶ ὁ τοῦ σώματος αἰκισμός, ἃ μήτε γένοιτ’ οὔτε λέγειν ἄξιον. 52. πάντα τοίνυν τἄλλ᾽ εἰπὼν ἂν ἡδέως, καὶ δείξας ὃν τρόπον ὑμᾶς ἔνιοι καταπολιτεύονται, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐάσω· ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδάν τι τῶν πρὸς Φίλιππον ἐμπέσῃ, εὐθὺς ἀναστάς τις λέγει τὸ τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τρέφειν δύναμιν μεγάλην ὡς χαλεπόν, καὶ ‘διαρπάζειν τινὲς τὰ χρήματα βούλονται,’ καὶ τοιούτους λόγους, ἐξ ὧν ἀναβάλλουσι μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἡσυχίαν δὲ ποιοῦσιν ἐκείνῳ πράττειν ὅ τι βούλεται. 53. ἐκ δὲ τούτων περιγίγνεται, ὑμῖν μὲν ἡ σχολὴ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἤδη ποιεῖν, ἃ δέδοιχ᾽ ὅπως μή ποθ᾽ ἡγήσεσθε ἐπὶ πολλῷ γεγενῆσθαι, τούτοις δ᾽ αἱ χάριτες καὶ ὁ μισθὸς ὁ τούτων. ἐγὼ δ᾽ οἴομαι τὴν μὲν εἰρήνην ἄγειν οὐχ ὑμᾶς δεῖν πείθειν, οἳ πεπεισμένοι κάθησθε, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὰ τοῦ πολέμου πράττοντα· ἂν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος πεισθῇ, τά γ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὑμῶν ὑπάρχει· 54. νομίζειν δ᾽ εἶναι χαλεπὰ οὐχ ὅσ᾽ ἂν εἰς σωτηρίαν δαπανῶμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἃ πεισόμεθα, ἂν ταῦτα μὴ ‘θέλωμεν ποιεῖν· καὶ τὸ ‘διαρπασθήσεσθαι τὰ χρήματα’ τῷ φυλακὴν εἰπεῖν δι᾽ ἧς σωθήσεται κωλύειν, οὐχὶ τῷ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀφεστάναι. 55. καίτοι ἔγωγ᾽ ἀγανακτῶ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ τὰ μὲν χρήματα λυπεῖ τινὰς ὑμῶν εἰ διαρπασθήσεται, ἃ καὶ φυλάττειν καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἐφ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐστι, τὴν δ᾽ Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν οὑτωσὶ Φίλιππος ἐφεξῆς ἁρπάζων οὐ λυπεῖ, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἁρπάζων.

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51. ‘Whenever it is necessary, by Zeus’. But what any free man would call necessity is not only already here, but has been for a long time, and as for what necessity means to a slave we need to pray it does not come to pass. What does this differ? That the greatest necessity for a free man is shame for how he came to be in his situation, and I do not know if we might name a stronger one than that; but for a slave it is violence and physical abuse, which God forbid should happen and which is not fit to be spoken of. 52. Therefore, while I would gladly talk about other things and demonstrate how certain persons are promoting a policy designed to harm you, I will leave most of it aside. But whenever anyone attacks Philip, someone immediately stands up and says how good it is to preserve the peace and how difficult it is to maintain a large force, and that some people want to despoil your finances, and those sorts of arguments. By this they put you off and provide Philip the leisure to do whatever he wants. 53. But the consequence of this for you is indeed ease and doing nothing in the present, which I fear you will from this point think have been bought too dearly, but for them the consequence is popularity and the reward for those speeches. But, for me, I think it is not to you that the they are obliged to recommend maintaining peace, for you have been persuaded and sit quietly, rather it is to he who is waging war, for if he can be persuaded, the original peace is at hand for you. 54. And that you should consider that the terrible thing is not to continually spend money for our safety, but what we will suffer if we are not willing to do it. And as for the “despoiling the finances”, they should prevent it by proposing a guardianship by which it will be kept safe and not desert what is advantageous to you. 55. And yet it is this that vexes me greatly, men of Athens: that some of you are distressed if your treasury is plundered, which you can guard and punish the offenders, but you are not concerned when Philip plunders all Greek states one after the other, and he is plundering them in this way to harm you.

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56. τί ποτ᾽ οὖν ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ τὸν μὲν οὕτω φανερῶς στρατεύοντα, ἀδικοῦντα, πόλεις καταλαμβάνοντα, μηδένα τούτων πώποτ᾽ εἰπεῖν ὡς πόλεμον ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν μηδὲ προΐεσθαι ταῦτα συμβουλεύοντας, τούτους τὸν πόλεμον ποιήσειν αἰτιᾶσθαι; ἐγὼ διδάξω· 57. ὅτι τὴν ὀργὴν ἣν εἰκός ἐστι γενέσθαι παρ᾽ ὑμῶν, ἄν τι λυπῆσθε τῷ πολέμῳ, εἰς τοὺς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν λέγοντας τὰ βέλτιστα τρέψαι βούλονται, ἵνα τούτους κρίνητε, μὴ Φίλιππον ἀμύνησθε, καὶ κατηγορῶσιν αὐτοί, μὴ δίκην δῶσιν ὧν ποιοῦσι νῦν. τοῦτ᾽ αὐτοῖς δύναται τὸ λέγειν ὡς ἄρα βούλονται πόλεμόν τινες ποιῆσαι παρ᾽ ὑμῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτου ἡ διαδικασία αὕτη ἐστίν. 58. ἐγὼ δ᾽ οἶδ᾽ ἀκριβῶς ὅτι οὐ γράψαντος Ἀθηναίων οὐδενός πω πόλεμον, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ Φίλιππος ἔχει τῶν τῆς πόλεως καὶ νῦν εἰς Καρδίαν πέπομφε βοήθειαν. εἰ μέντοι βουλόμεθ᾽ ἡμεῖς μὴ προσποιεῖσθαι πολεμεῖν αὐτὸν ἡμῖν, ἀνοητότατος πάντων ἂν εἴη τῶν ὄντων ἀνθρώπων, εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐξελέγχοι. 59. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὰν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς ἴῃ, τί φήσομεν; ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ οὐ πολεμεῖν, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ Ὠρείταις, τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὄντων ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, οὐδὲ Φεραίοις πρότερον, πρὸς τὰ τείχη προσβάλλων αὐτῶν, οὐδ᾽ Ὀλυνθίοις ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἕως ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ τὸ στράτευμα παρῆν ἔχων. ἢ καὶ τότε τοὺς ἀμύνεσθαι κελεύοντας πόλεμον ποιεῖν φήσομεν; οὐκοῦν ὑπόλοιπον δουλεύειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο γ᾽ οὐδέν ἐστι μεταξὺ τοῦ μήτ᾽ ἀμύνεσθαι μήτ᾽ ἄγειν ἡσυχίαν ἐᾶσθαι. 60. καὶ μὴν οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἴσων ὑμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔσθ᾽ ὁ κίνδυνος· οὐ γὰρ ὑφ᾽ αὑτῷ τὴν πόλιν ποιήσασθαι βούλεται Φίλιππος, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως ἀνελεῖν. οἶδεν γὰρ ἀκριβῶς ὅτι δουλεύειν μὲν ὑμεῖς οὔτ᾽ ἐθελήσετε, οὔτε, ἂν ἐθελήσητε, ἐπιστήσεσθε 〈ἄρχειν γὰρ εἰώθατε〉, πράγματα δ᾽ αὐτῷ παρασχεῖν, ἂν καιρὸν λάβητε, πλείω τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων δυνήσεσθε.

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56. What is the reason, then, men of Athens, that when he is clearly advancing with an army, doing wrong, seizing cities, not one of them ever says he is waging war, but while others are urging you not to turn away and disregard this, they accuse these men of warmongering. 57. I will explain. It is because they would want the reasonable anger that would come from you should any suffer in war to be directed to those proposing the wisest counsel for you so that you will bring them to trial and not be on the guard against Philip, and so that they are the accusers and not pay the penalty for what they are doing now. This is the meaning of what they said, that there are some among you wanting war and this is the question to be decided before you. 58. But I know precisely that with no Athenian proposing war at all, Philip still holds many other places which belong to our city and is now sending help to Cardia. If, however, we want to pretend to the contrary that he is not at war against us, he would be the biggest idiot of all if he tried to refute that. 59. But when he attacks us, what should we say? He will say he is not at war, just as he wasn’t with Oreus, when he was leading an army in their territory, nor Pherae earlier, when he was attacking their walls, nor with Olynthus, at the start, until his army was in their territory. Or should we say that urging resistance is making war? If that is so, nothing remains but to be a slave, for there is no other option between that and not defending ourselves and not being left in peace. 60. Also, the danger is not the same for you and the others, for Philip does not want to take your city for himself, but to destroy it entirely. He is certain that you will not want to be slaves, nor should you want to, will you be stood over (for you are used to leading), but you will be able to give him more problems than any other people, should you seize the opportunity.

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61. ὡς οὖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐσχάτων ὄντος τοῦ ἀγῶνος, οὕτω προσήκει γιγνώσκειν, καὶ τοὺς πεπρακότας αὑτοὺς ἐκείνῳ μισεῖν κἀποτυμπανίσαι· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐχθρῶν κρατῆσαι, πρὶν ἂν τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει κολάσητ᾽ ἐχθρούς1. 62. πόθεν οἴεσθε νῦν αὐτὸν ὑβρίζειν ὑμᾶς ⟨ οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλ᾽ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ τοῦτο ⟩ καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, ἐξαπατᾶν, ὑμῖν δ᾽ ἀπειλεῖν ἤδη; οἷον Θετταλοὺς πολλὰ δοὺς ὑπηγάγετο εἰς τὴν νῦν παροῦσαν δουλείαν· οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἰπεῖν δύναιτ᾽ οὐδεὶς ὅσα τοὺς ταλαιπώρους Ὀλυνθίους πρότερον δοὺς Ποτείδαιαν ἐξηπάτησε καὶ πόλλ᾽ ἕτερα· 63. Θηβαίους νῦν ὑπάγει τὴν Βοιωτίαν αὐτοῖς παραδοὺς καὶ ἀπαλλάξας πολέμου πολλοῦ καὶ χαλεποῦ· ὥστε καρπωσάμενοί τινα ἕκαστοι τούτων πλεονεξίαν οἱ μὲν ἤδη πεπόνθασιν ἃ δὴ πάντες ἴσασιν, οἱ δ᾽ ὅταν ποτὲ συμβῇ πείσονται. ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ὧν μὲν ἀπεστέρησθε τεώς, σιωπῶ· ἀλλ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τὴν εἰρήνην ποιήσασθαι, πόσα ἐξηπάτησθε, πόσων ἀπεστέρησθε. 64. οὐχὶ Φωκέας, οὐ Πύλας, οὐχὶ τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, Δορίσκον, Σέρριον, τὸν Κερσοβλέπτην αὐτόν; οὐ νῦν τὴν πόλιν τὴν Καρδιανῶν ἔχει καὶ ὁμολογεῖ; τί ποτ᾽ οὖν ἐκείνως τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑμῖν προσφέρεται; ὅτι ἐν μόνῃ τῶν πασῶν πόλεων τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ ἄδεια ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν λέγειν δέδοται, καὶ λαβόντα χρήματ᾽ αὐτὸν ἀσφαλές ἐστι λέγειν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν, κἂν ἀφῃρημένοι τὰ ὑμέτερ᾽ αὐτῶν ἦτε. οὐκ ἦν ἀσφαλὲς λέγειν ἐν Ὀλύνθῳ τὰ Φιλίππου μὴ σὺν εὖ πεπονθότων τῶν πολλῶν Ὀλυνθίων τῷ Ποτείδαιαν καρποῦσθαι· 65. οὐκ ἦν ἀσφαλὲς λέγειν ἐν Θετταλίᾳ τὰ Φιλίππου μηδὲν εὖ πεπονθότος τοῦ πλήθους τοῦ Θετταλῶν τῷ τοὺς τυράννους ἐκβαλεῖν Φίλιππον αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν Πυλαίαν ἀποδοῦναι· οὐκ ἦν ἐν Θήβαις ἀσφαλές, πρὶν τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἀπέδωκε καὶ τοὺς Φωκέας ἀνεῖλεν.

1  ἐχθρούς, ὑπερετοῦντας ἐκείνῳ ἀλλʹ ἀνάγκη τούτοις ὥσπερ προβόλοις

προσπταίοντας ὑστερίζειν ἐκείνων (SAFY).

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61. So, it is fitting to bear in mind that this is a life-and-death struggle, and those who have sold themselves to that man should be hated and put to a criminal’s death, for it is not possible to best the enemies outside the city unless those enemies in your own city have been checked. 62. Why do you think he commits outrages against you now (for nothing seems better to me to call it other than that), and why does he do good for others, to deceive them if nothing else, but to you he is already threatening? So it was with the Thessalians – he led them into their present state of slavery after giving them much; nor is it possible to talk at about the miserable Olynthians he deceived in first giving them Potidaea and many other things. 63. He is now misleading the Thebans, having given them Boeotia and relieving them of a long and difficult war. While each of them has enjoyed some advantage from these, some of them already suffered, just as everyone knows, while some will pay the penalty whenever that befalls them. But for you, I will not speak of that which you had lost previously, but in your very acceptance of the peace, of how you were deceived, of how much you were robbed. 64. Was it not the same with Phocis, Thermopylae, the cities in Thrace, Doriscus, Serrium, and Cersobleptes himself? Does he not hold the city of the Cardians and say as much? Why then does he deal with the others like this and not do the same with you? Because in our city alone of all cities indemnity is given to speak on behalf of our enemies, and it is safe for men who accept bribes to speak before you, even when you are being robbed of your own possessions. It would not have been safe to speak for Philip in Olynthus without everyone in Olynthus receiving the benefits from profits in Potidaea. 65. It would not have been safe in Thessaly to speak for Philip without the masses of Thessaly receiving the benefits of Philip expelling the tyrants and returning the meeting to them. It would not have been safe in Thebes until he gave them back Boeotia and destroyed the Phocians.

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66. ἀλλ᾽ Ἀθήνησιν, οὐ μόνον Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ τὴν Καρδιανῶν χώραν ἀπεστερηκότος Φιλίππου, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατασκευάζοντος ὑμῖν ἐπιτείχισμα τὴν Εὔβοιαν καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον παριόντος, ἀσφαλές ἐστι λέγειν ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου. καὶ γάρ τοι τούτων μὲν ἐκ πτωχῶν ἔνιοι ταχὺ πλούσιοι γίγνονται, καὶ ἐξ ἀνωνύμων καὶ ἀδόξων ἔνδοξοι καὶ γνώριμοι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἐκ μὲν ἐνδόξων ἄδοξοι, ἐκ δ᾽ εὐπόρων ἄποροι· πόλεως γὰρ ἔγωγε πλοῦτον ἡγοῦμαι συμμάχους, πίστιν, εὔνοιαν, ὧν πάντων ἔσθ᾽ ὑμεῖς ἄποροι. 67. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τούτων ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ ἐᾶν ταῦτα φέρεσθαι ὁ μὲν εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ φοβερὸς πᾶσιν Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις, ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ἔρημοι καὶ ταπεινοί, τῇ τῶν ὠνίων ἀφθονίᾳ λαμπροί, τῇ δ᾽ ὧν προσῆκε παρασκευῇ καταγέλαστοι. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον περί θ᾽ ὑμῶν καὶ περὶ αὑτῶν ἐνίους τῶν λεγόντων ὁρῶ βουλευομένους· ὑμᾶς μὲν γὰρ ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν φασὶ δεῖν, κἄν τις ὑμᾶς ἀδικῇ, αὐτοὶ δ᾽ οὐ δύνανται παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν οὐδενὸς αὐτοὺς ἀδικοῦντος. 68. εἶτα φησὶν ὃς ἂν τύχῃ παρελθών ‘οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις γράφειν, οὐδὲ κινδυνεύειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄτολμος εἶ καὶ μαλακός.’ ἐγὼ δὲ θρασὺς μὲν καὶ βδελυρὸς καὶ ἀναιδὴς οὔτ᾽ εἰμὶ μήτε γενοίμην, ἀνδρειότερον μέντοι πολλῶν πάνυ τῶν ἰταμῶς πολιτευομένων παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐμαυτὸν ἡγοῦμαι. 69. ὅστις μὲν γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παριδὼν ἃ συνοίσει τῇ πόλει, κρίνει, δημεύει, δίδωσι, κατηγορεῖ, οὐδεμιᾷ ταῦτ᾽ ἀνδρείᾳ ποιεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχων ἐνέχυρον τῆς αὑτοῦ σωτηρίας τὸ πρὸς χάριν ὑμῖν λέγειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι, ἀσφαλῶς θρασύς ἐστιν· ὅστις δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τοῦ βελτίστου πολλὰ τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἐναντιοῦται βουλήμασι, καὶ μηδὲν λέγει πρὸς χάριν ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεί, καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν προαιρεῖται ἐν ᾗ πλειόνων ἡ τύχη κυρία γίγνεται ἢ οἱ λογισμοί, τούτων δ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων ἑαυτὸν ὑπεύθυνον ὑμῖν παρέχει,

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66. While at Athens, though Philip has not only robbed you of Amphipolis and the lands of Cardia, and is also preparing Euboea as a fort against you, and is now present near Byzantium, it is safe to talk on behalf of Philip. Now, of these men, from poverty some have swiftly become wealthy, and from being nameless and without reputation, held in esteem and well-known, but on the other hand you have gone from esteem to ill-repute, from wealthy to broke; for I consider the wealth of a city to be allies, trust, good-will, of which you are poor in everything. 67. Because you are uncaring about these and permit them to be taken away as a prize, he is fortunate, powerful and regarded with fear by all the Greeks and barbarians, while you are abandoned and humbled, wellknown for plentiful markets , but laughable in regard to appropriate preparations. But I see that some of these speakers aren’t counselling for you in the same way as for themselves. For you, they say it is necessary to stay quiet, even if you are wronged in some way, but they are not able to stay quiet amongst you, though no-one wrongs them. 68. Then someone who happens to come forward says, “You don’t want to make a proposal or endanger yourself, and are a coward and soft.” Rash, loathsome and shameless I am not, nor do I wish to be, however I consider myself more courageous than many of those who are bold in political speech. 69. For anyone, men of Athens, disregarding what will be profitable to the city, brings people to trial, confiscates property, accepts money and makes accusations, this shows not bravery at all, but in bringing about his own safety through speeches and proposals that are popular with you, he is being bold at no risk. But whoever, in your best interest, often opposes your will, and never speaks for favour but always does their best, and prefers this type of city policy in which chance becomes the greater determinant than calculations, and takes responsibility himself for either, he is brave,

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70. οὗτός ἐστ᾽ ἀνδρεῖος, καὶ χρήσιμός πολίτης ὁ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οὐχ οἱ τῆς παρ᾽ ἡμέραν χάριτος τὰ μέγιστα τῆς πόλεως ἀπολωλεκότες, οὓς ἐγὼ τοσούτου δέω ζηλοῦν ἢ νομίζειν ἀξίους πολίτας τῆς πόλεως εἶναι, ὥστ᾽ εἴ τις ἔροιτό με, ‘εἰπέ μοι, σὺ δὲ δὴ τί τὴν πόλιν ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸν πεποίηκας;’ ἔχων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τριηραρχίας εἰπεῖν καὶ χορηγίας καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφορὰς καὶ λύσεις αἰχμαλώτων καὶ τοιαύτας ἄλλας φιλανθρωπίας, οὐδὲν ἂν τούτων εἴποιμι, 71. ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων πολιτευμάτων οὐδὲν πολιτεύομαι, ἀλλὰ δυνάμενος ἂν ἴσως, ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροι, καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δημεύειν καὶ τἄλλ᾽ ἃ ποιοῦσιν οὗτοι ποιεῖν, οὐδ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἓν τούτων πώποτ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν ἔταξα, οὐδὲ προήχθην οὔθ᾽ ὑπὸ κέρδους οὔθ᾽ ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας, ἀλλὰ διαμένω λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ μὲν πολλῶν ἐλάττων εἰμὶ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν, ὑμεῖς δε, εἰ πείσεσθέ μοι, μείζους ἂν εἴητε· οὕτω γὰρ ἴσως ἀνεπίφθονον εἰπεῖν. 72. οὐδ᾽ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ δικαίου τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι πολίτου, τοιαῦτα πολιτεύμαθ᾽ εὑρίσκειν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ μὲν πρῶτος ὑμῶν ἔσομαι εὐθέως, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὕστατοι· ἀλλὰ συναυξάνεσθαι δεῖ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν πολιτῶν πολιτεύμασι, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεί, μὴ τὸ ῥᾷστον ἅπαντας λέγειν· ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ βαδιεῖται, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὲ τῷ λόγῳ δεῖ προάγεσθαι διδάσκοντα τὸν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην. 73. ἤδη τοίνυν τινὸς ἤκουσα τοιοῦτόν τι λέγοντος, ὡς ἄρα ἐγὼ λέγω μὲν ἀεὶ τὰ βέλτιστα, ἔστιν δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ λόγοι τὰ παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ, δεῖ δ᾽ ἔργων τῇ πόλει καὶ πράξεώς τινος. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὡς ἔχω περὶ τούτων, λέξω πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρύψομαι. οὐδ᾽ εἶναι νομίζω τοῦ συμβουλεύοντος ὑμῖν ἔργον οὐδὲν πλὴν εἰπεῖν τὰ βέλτιστα. καὶ τοῦθ᾽ ὅτι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον ῥᾳδίως οἶμαι δείξειν.

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70. and it is he who is the useful citizen, not those bringing down the strength of the city for a day’s popularity. I am so lacking in envy and esteem for these men in thinking of them as worthy citizens of the city that if anyone might say to me, “Tell me, what good have you done for the city?” Men of Athens, though I am able to speak of trierarchies, choruses, payment of eisphora, the ransom of prisoners and many other philanthropies, 71. I would say nothing of them, but that I have never practised politics as these men have, but though just like those others, I am equally able to accuse, flatter, confiscate property and the other things that these men do, I have never undertaken a task myself in that way, nor been induced either by the desire for profit or honour. But I continue speaking in a way that makes me rank low in your estimation, but which, if you will follow my advice, could make you rank higher in the world’s (if that’s not an invidious way of putting it). 72. It doesn’t seem to me the role of an honest citizen to invent such political machinations through which I will immediately become first amongst you, but for you to be the lowest of everyone. Rather, it is necessary to improve the city through the counsel of good citizens, and always to propose the best policy, not the easiest, for towards the latter nature herself will proceed, but it is necessary for a good citizen as a guide to lead towards the former with words. 73. I have already heard some saying something like this, that of course I always propose the best policies, but it is nothing but words from me, while it is necessary for action and some military activity for the city. I will tell you my position on the matter, and I will not be cryptic. I don’t think the job of speakers is to propose anything but the best to you, and I think I can easily show that this is so.

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74. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθ᾽ ὅτι Τιμόθεός ποτε ἐκεῖνος ἐν ὑμῖν ἐδημηγόρησεν ὡς δεῖ βοηθεῖν καὶ τοὺς Εὐβοέας σῴζειν, ὅτε Θηβαῖοι κατεδουλοῦντ᾽ αὐτούς, καὶ λέγων εἶπεν οὕτω πως· ‘εἰπέ μοι, βουλεύεσθε,’ ἔφη, ‘Θηβαίους ἔχοντες ἐν νήσῳ, τί χρήσεσθε καὶ τί δεῖ ποιεῖν; οὐκ ἐμπλήσετε τὴν θάλατταν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τριήρων; οὐκ ἀναστάντες ἤδη πορεύσεσθε εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ; ’ 75. οὐ καθέλξετε τὰς ναῦς;’ οὐκοῦν εἶπε μὲν ταῦτα ὁ Τιμόθεος, ἐποιήσατε δ᾽ ὑμεῖς· ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐπράχθη. εἰ δ᾽ ὁ μὲν εἶπεν ὡς οἷόν τε τὰ ἄριστα, ὥσπερ εἶπεν, ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ἀπερρᾳθυμήσατε καὶ μηδὲν ὑπηκούσατε, ἆρ᾽ ἂν ἦν γεγονός τι τῶν τότε συμβάντων τῇ πόλει; οὐχ οἷόν τε. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐγὼ λέγω, τὰ μὲν ἔργα παρ᾽ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ζητεῖτε, †τὰ δὲ βέλτιστα ἐπιστήμῃ†2 λέγειν παρὰ τοῦ παριόντος. 76. ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δ᾽ ἃ λέγω φράσας καταβῆναι βούλομαι. χρήματα εἰσφέρειν φημὶ δεῖν· τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δύναμιν συνέχειν, ἐπανορθοῦντας εἴ τι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν, μὴ ὅσοις ἄν τις αἰτιάσηται τὸ ὅλον καταλύοντας· πρέσβεις ἐκπέμπειν πανταχοῖ τοὺς διδάξοντας, νουθετήσοντας, πράξοντας· παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι δωροδοκοῦντας κολάζειν καὶ μισεῖν πανταχοῦ, ἵν᾽ οἱ μέτριοι καὶ δικαίους αὑτοὺς παρέχοντες εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι δοκῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἑαυτοῖς. 77. ἂν οὕτω τοῖς πράγμασι χρῆσθε καὶ παύσησθε ὀλιγωροῦντες ἁπάντων, ἴσως ἄν, ἴσως καὶ νῦν ἔτι βελτίω γένοιτο. εἰ μέντοι καθεδεῖσθε, ἄχρι τοῦ θορυβῆσαι καὶ ἐπαινέσαι σπουδάζοντες, ἐὰν δὲ δέῃ τι ποιεῖν ἀναδυόμενοι, οὐχ ὁρῶ λόγον ὅστις ἄνευ τοῦ ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς ἃ προσήκει δυνήσεται τὴν πόλιν σῶσαι.

2  ἃ βού[λομ]αι βέλτιστʹ ἔνεστι (Sandys); τὰ βέλτιστʹ ἃν ἐπιστηθῇ (Weil); τὰ

βέλτιστʹ ἃν (Wolf).

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74. Of course, you know about when that man Timotheus advised you in the assembly that it was necessary to help and save the Euboeans when the Thebans were trying to reduce them to slavery, and speaking in this way, he said, “Tell me,” he said, “with the Thebans on the island, are you deciding how to deal with them and what is it necessary to do? Will you not fill the sea to the brim full of triremes, men of Athens? Won’t you get up immediately and march to the Piraeus? 75. Won’t you launch the ships?” Timotheus indeed said just this, you did it, and from these two different things you achieved the goal. But, had he said what was the best advice possible, just as he said, but you had stopped in laziness and not listened, would any of the benefits have happened to the city? There would have been nothing of the sort. Thus it is the same for what I might say, while for action you might look to yourselves, but for the best understanding, to the person in front of you speaking. 76. In summary, I will say what I am advising before I come down. I say that it is necessary to pay the eisphora, maintain our existing force, amending anything if we think it isn’t right, to not dismiss the whole lot should anyone criticise it, to send embassies everywhere for explaining, warning and negotiating. During this time, it is necessary to punish those who are accepting bribes and despise them wherever they might be, so that those showing themselves moderate and just should consider their counsel good for others and themselves. 77. if you treat matters in this way and stop neglecting everything, just maybe, maybe better things might yet happen, even now. If you remain seated, though, and are serious only about cheering and applauding, hesitating to do what might be necessary, I see that no words whatsoever, without you doing what is necessary, will be able to save the city.

COMMENTARY Chapters 1–12: Prooemium The prooemium of the speech is typically Demosthenic. It introduces the arguments while enhancing the ethos and logos aspects of the speech. It is succinct and clearly defined, and introduces the main topoi of the speech. Chapter 1 Firstly, Demosthenes begins the speech by introducing the problem of speakers who do not give advice in the best interest if the city, but in their own interests (1). By starting with the role of speakers, he anticipates several topoi in the speech, that such speakers are a danger to Athens and that the role of the speaker is an important one for the city. This matches with the third logos of the speech (52–75), that there are speakers in Athens who are either in the pay of Philip or only give advice if it suits their political purposes, implying that Demosthenes is not one of those speakers. 1 speakers: There were no ‘politicians’ in classical Athens in the modern sense of the word. Anyone who desired could stand and address the citizens present when invited by the President of the ecclesia. It would have been normal, however, for only a small group of people, who can best be described as rhetores (speakers) to have addressed the ecclesia regularly (see Hansen, 1983: 37–42 about the terms used to describe ‘politicians’). When they were invited to do so, the speaker would stand on the bema, the speakers’ platform (a large rock) and suggest policies, advise the ecclesia or propose legislation. They would lead the debate and propose actions to be voted on by those present. There was accountability for all proposals, and anyone could indict someone who proposed an illegal, inexpedient or unsuccessful course of action. For a detailed discussion, see Hansen (1987: 49–61; 1991: 143–45, 268–71). neither out of enmity nor for popularity: One of the key themes Demosthenes addresses throughout the speech, but most particularly in the third logos, is the role of a good speaker. Demosthenes highlights this early in the speech to begin creating the image of himself as one of the speakers who does not engage in this type of politicking. important public affairs: Demosthenes is pointing out early in the

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speech that those who were trying to indict Diopeithes are, in fact, acting from motives that are not in the interests of the city. He cleverly frames the debate on his own terms from the beginning of the speech. a few come before you … out of partisanship … for other reasons: Demosthenes again differentiates between himself and the others that are not like him. He highlights those who use the ecclesia for personal political gain, while leaving unclear who he means by those who speak “…for other reasons.” It is clear later that he is particularly targeting those who he indicates have been bribed by Philip. partisanship: The word philonikia is laden with political contentiousness and is the very motivation for the speech, even though Demosthenes claims that it is other speakers who address the ecclesia from this motivation. Demosthenes makes a similar appeal in the prooemium of 16.1, where he says that the speaker’s role is to advise without any partisanship. He also uses the term in a number of the Exordia (8.1, 12.2, 30.2, 31.2, 53.1) to talk about the need for the speaker to be removed from factionalism for the interests of the State to be served. In this opening, Demosthenes sketches a picture of a politically factionalised Athens. This developed through the Greek dictum of helping friends and harming enemies and it was particularly prevalent in the nature of Athenian politics in the fourth century (for a detailed discussion, see Mitchell & Rhodes, 1996: 13–20; Alwine, 2015: 155–56). Demosthenes made this speech to protect the man with whom he had formed an alliance to further his aims, Diopeithes, after cutting political ties with his former ally, Chares. Plutarch (Mor. 486d) claims that Demosthenes and Chares formed the most effective symmoria in the 340s. By this period, however, their relationship had broken down; Demosthenes’ support of Phocion in 340 over the command at Byzantium has been cited as evidence of a breach between the two (Salmond, 1996: 50). While Demosthenes may indeed have been outlining selfless policies in the best interests of the city, he was also no doubt driven by the desire to best his political opponents at this time (led by Aeschines), who were also likely working against him and his policies (see Harris, 1995: 119; Worthington, 2013: 216 claims that Aeschines was specifically included in the speakers that were demanding the recall of Diopeithes, cf. 8.30). This is indicative of the institution of philia (political friendship or alliance), important to politics in the fourth century, and how it was utilised to consolidate support on particular issues (Mitchell & Rhodes, 1996: 18). For example, Diopeithes assisted

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Hegesander in a legal dispute regarding ownership of a slave as a result of a former association with him (Aesch. 1.62–66). Such alliances were often temporary and for specific purposes: Demosthenes was originally a supporter of Eubulus, but broke away from him to gain prominence. Worthington (2013: 91) notes the similarities in Demosthenes’ early speeches between Demosthenes’ and Eubulus’ policies, claiming that Demosthenes was trying to gain a name for himself through association with Eubulus (Burke, 2002: 175–76, 180–83 suggests that this was only to support the values of the elite against Aristophon and Androtion). It was probably not until 353 that Demosthenes began to create independent policies in his speech ‘On behalf of the Megalopolitans’, against which Eubulus successfully argued (Dem. 18.162). Demosthenes and Philocrates were then part of an alliance, evidenced by Demosthenes’ support of Philocrates’ peace proposal and defence of him in the resulting graphe paranomon (Aesch. 2.15–20; see Introduction, p. 21). This alliance was broken by Demosthenes when he saw that he could gain more political mileage by distancing himself from Philocrates’ involvement in the Peace. expedient for the city: The use of sumpheron in defining Greek interstate relations is discussed by various contemporary sources. Both the Rhetoric to Alexander (1425a10–16) and Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1358b20–25, 1417b34– 36) indicate that the deliberative orator should furnish advice that leads to the most expedient outcome for the city. Demosthenes (15.29), harking back to the Thucydidean tradition outlined in the Melian Dialogue (5.89), outlines that it is the strong who define the rights of Greek states for the weak. Demosthenes is a highly pragmatic politician focused on expedient outcomes for his city (see discussion in Christ, 2012: 165–71). See Low (2007: 160–173) for discussion of the nature of expediency in Greek interstate relations. Demosthenes uses the nominalised participle sumpheron, or its verbal equivalent sumphero, four times in this speech to indicate expediency for Athens. Here, it is used to indicate that the people need to vote on what is most expedient, putting all other considerations aside. He is trying to show that, while Diopeithes may be doing something that is not acceptable to some, his actions are nevertheless in the interests of the city. This is in contrast to his earlier appeal for the Athenians to do not only what is expedient, but also what is just (Dem. 16.10; cf. Ex., 18.1). The three other uses of the word are associated with advice (8.3: making an expeditious decision is in the best

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interests of the city; 8.16: the Athenians have a vested interest in assisting the Byzantines, even though they might not want to do so; 8.54: Diopeithes’ actions are expedient, so the Athenians should find a way to check them and make them acceptable, rather than remove him as punishment). This is in line with his use of the word throughout his symbouleutic oratory, where he recommends policies that he feels are in the interests of the city (for example. 3.11, 14.3, 14.28). It is also worth noting that in the Exordia, the collection of Demosthenes’ prooemia, he uses the word in 33 of the extracts. Demosthenes does this for the same reason as in the current speech, to enhance his ethos in the eyes of the audience. Often, he uses the term in a general sense to say that he will recommend the most expedient course of action (for example, Ex. 3.1, 4.1). He also uses it to demonstrate how the demos should act to achieve the most expedient outcome (for example, Ex. 20.1, 40.1). Demosthenes similarly uses the word to indicate that he does not speak to flatter his audience, telling them what they want to hear – he only tells the ecclesia what is in their best interests (for example, Ex. 6.2, 28.1). The use of the word sumphero in the prooemium allows Demosthenes to enhance his ethos and show that he should be the speaker whose advice the people follow. See Introduction, pp. 28–30, for Demosthenes’ use of ethos in his speeches. vote and act: Demosthenes often augments the verb psephizomai (vote) with the verb pratto (act) or other similar verbs of action to point out that Athens often fails to act upon its pronouncements in the ecclesia. He claims that ‘doing’, though temporally posterior to ‘speaking’ and ‘voting’, is more important (cf. 3.15 – he uses kheirotoneo rather than psephizomai in this instance). Also, eipoite logous Athenian words and actions. Aitiomenon and krinonton (2.25), bouleuesthai (2.30), diapraxasthai (3.14), graphein (9.8) and peisai (15.1) associate political actions in Athens to the lack of action abroad. Pratto and psephizomai are used together on two other occasions by Demosthenes (4.20, 15.1), both talking about how the Athenians pass decrees with great competence but then fail to carry them out. See Mader (2006, esp. 369–71) for discussion of the tension between words and deeds in this respect in Demosthenes’ oratory. Chapters 2–7 Demosthenes introduces a key topos of the speech, that Philip is the enemy of Athens, and it is essential for all preparations to be made for war with

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Philip to save the city. He also briefly discusses Diopeithes, probably the reason the speech was delivered, minimising his role in affairs. This matches with the second logos of the speech, namely that Philip is at war with Athens, and the Athenians cannot afford to ignore that fact. 2  the real object: Demosthenes is deflecting the attention of the probable reason for the speech, discussion of Diopeithes, by claiming that the strategos should not be the focus of Athenian attention. Rather, the ecclesia should be focused on the alleged more serious threat, Philip. the affairs of the Chersonese and the campaign Philip is leading in Thrace, now in its eleventh month: The Chersonese was a region of great importance for Athens. The region had been controlled by Athens since its settlement by Miltiades at Pisistratus’ request (see Appendix 3). Philip was now placing greater pressure on the region than ever before. At the time of the speech, Philip was in the middle of an extensive military and diplomatic campaign in Thrace that would take almost three years to complete (see Commentary 8.14, pp. 119–20). Philip was to take this region entirely (Dem. 12.8; Arr. Anab. 7.9.3), which threatened the security of the Athenian grain trade from the Black Sea. Worthington (2008: 124–25) therefore claims that this activity in Thrace, in conjunction with his intrigues in Euboea (see Commentary, 8.36, pp. 141–45) was a major impetus for Athens to act against Philip. Buckler (1989: 146–47) suggests that after the Sacred War, Philip had designs on Thrace. The resulting pressure in the Chersonese, however, was depicted by Demosthenes as an attempt by Philip to weaken Athens as a prelude to taking the whole of Greece. This was probably not the case, as Philip was more interested in securing his eastern borders than he was in limiting Athenian power in the Chersonese as a goal in itself. Philip’s campaign of 342/41 was different to previous campaigns on account of the thorough nature of the reduction of Thrace and the network of alliances that Philip established to secure his power in the region (Just. 9.1.9–3.3; DS 16.71.2; Jordanes, Get. 10.65; Theopomp., BNJ 115 F217). It indicated a policy of territorial consolidation and security, and a desire to establish a permanent Macedonian presence in the region. Diodorus (16.71.2) claims that Philip established cities “at strategic locations” (tois epikairois topois) in Thrace to prevent further attacks. Philip must have known it would cause significant concern in Athens. He may have had greater concern for a more powerful potential foe, Persia (see Heskel, 1997: 184), but this seems to be an overstatement for this period. Philip simply secured the area to

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strengthen his borders and awaited any reactions, as he had done countless times before (contra Hammond and Griffith, 1979: 557, who believe that Thrace was a problem in and of itself, not acknowledging the importance of a secure eastern border for Philip). We have no way of knowing the exact length of time for which Philip had been in Thrace when the speech was delivered, but due to the comprehensive nature of the subjugation Philip was imposing (see Commentary, 8.14, pp. 119–20), eleven months is not a surprising length of time. See Introduction, p. 12, for a detailed discussion of events. the majority of speeches: This comment seems to indicate that there had been some debate already about Diopeithes, indicating that there was probably some divergence in opinion about what should happen about Diopeithes’ actions. Diopeithes: The subject of this speech, Diopeithes (PAA 363665) was an Athenian strategos sent out with a naval force and cleruchy in approximately 346 (Dem. 8.6; Phil. BNJ 328 F158; Lib. Hypoth. 8.1; see Introduction, p. 13). He had close political ties to Demosthenes and was likely a prominent member of the anti-Philip coalition of which Demosthenes was a leading member. Demosthenes had concerns about the security of the Chersonese, so to defend Athenian interests in the region, he must have argued in favour of the policy that Diopeithes be voted the command of a naval force to sail there. Part of the mandate of Diopeithes must have been to defend Athenian possessions in any way he saw fit. Few strategoi would have been so brazen without some authorisation from the ecclesia (Hamel, 1998: 118). Probably the son of Diophilus of Sunium (Ferguson, 1938: 14), Diopeithes’ family had owned land in the mining district of Maronea (Lalonde, Langdon & Walbank, 1991: pg. 77, lines 59–60; Crosby & Young, 1941: 27). It is possible, therefore, that he was appointed to this command as he had connections in the region which may have resulted in local support (see Hamel, 1998: 16–17, 18–19 for a discussion of this policy in general). Moreover, a political alliance with both Demosthenes and Hegesippus (PAA 481555) may also have played a part in his appointment to the command, though Hegesippus’ opposition to the Peace of Philocrates renders an early association between the two men difficult to prove with certainty (Gallo, 2018: 11–13). We have some direct evidence for the later association. The case against Pittalacus by Hegesander (PAA 480930/480892), as outlined by Aeschines (1.54–69), was submitted to Diopeithes for arbitration (Aesch.

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1.63–64). Hegesander was the brother of Hegesippus, the associate of Demosthenes (Harris, 1995: 103–04). Along with Timarchus, against whom Aeschines 1 is directed, they formed a strong political bloc against Aeschines and his associates. This is the first known connection between Diopeithes and this anti-Philip group, his appointment to this command is the second. Athens also sent cleruchs with Diopeithes (see especially Lib., Hypoth. to Dem. 8), possibly to bolster a population of existing cleruchs. Part of the mandate of the ecclesia was likely to have been to settle the cleruchs in a location that would provide a safeguard for Athenian interests. It is most likely that they were to be settled in the Chersonese. Concerned by Philip’s annexation of Thrace, a Byzantine fleet also sailed to join the Athenians at Thasos, Diopeithes’ probable base (cf. [Dem.] 12.2; Buckler, 2003: 466). This may well have prompted Philip to summon the reinforcements from Macedonia and Thessaly that Demosthenes mentions (8.14; for Philip’s army, see Harris, 2018: 172–74). When someone charges another with anything which is against your laws: Demosthenes refers here to an eisangelia trial of Diopeithes that was probably discussed at some point. This explains why the speech is such a strong defence of Diopeithes, because had the strategos been recalled from duty after an eisangelia eis ton demon, Demosthenes’ policy in the north against Philip would have come to nought and Demosthenes himself may well have faced prosecution for being the lead proponent of this policy. Eisangelia was a charge laid by any citizen, either to the boule (for magistrates and other public officials) or to the ecclesia (for charges of treason or corruption – Hyp. 3.7–8). If the case came to the boule, it was heard and a vote was taken on guilt or innocence. If the individual was found guilty, a second vote was taken to determine if the fine should be more or less than 500 drachmae. If it was more, a court of the thesmothetae was convened; if less, the individual was fined but could appeal to the thesmothetae. An eisangelia taken to the ecclesia (eisangelia eis ton demon) was primarily reserved for generals and politicians and was often used as a political weapon (see discussion in Hansen, 1991: 215–18). The denunciation was made without notice to the boule at a kuria ecclesia (the first meeting of the month), or at any other meeting of the ecclesia (but was then required to be added to the agenda by the boule). Once the accusation had been made, debate followed (Dem. 19.116), which led to a proposal for a decree if the accusation was deemed worthy of a trial (Hyp. 3.29–30). In

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the first half of the fourth century, the ecclesia would often hear the case (Dem. 49.10; Hansen, 1975: 51, n.1), but in the time of this speech, cases were referred to the thesmothetae who referred it to a heliaea (popular court) if they deemed it necessary (Hansen, 1991: 215). The heliaea heard the case and determined the outcome (Dem. 24.63). See Hansen (1991: 212–218) for discussion. See also Rhodes (1979: 108–14) for disagreement with Hansen about the nature of referral of eisangelia to the boule and ecclesia. Punishment of a general after an eisangelia was generally severe. Of the 46 trials for which we know the outcome down to 322, 38 ended in conviction. We do not know the penalty in six cases, but 23 were sentenced to death and nine were fined (Hamel, 1998: 132–35). Demosthenes (4.47) laments this state of affairs that purged Athens of experienced leadership in dire times. The fines levied were also considerable. Pericles was fined either 15, 50 (Plut. Per. 35.4) or 80 talents (DS 12.45.4) in 430/29; Phormio was fined 100 mnai in 429/28 (Androt., BNJ 324 F8), causing his atimia; Melanopus was fined 3 T in 355/54 (though he may not have been a strategos – see Hansen, 1975 cat. no. 59 for discussion). Also in the same period, Timotheus was fined 100 T, the largest fine ever imposed by the ecclesia. He was clearly unable to pay this exorbitant sum and went into exile (Din. 3.17; Isoc. 15.129; Nep. Tim. 3.5; Plut. Mor. 605f). See Hansen (1975: 33–36) for a full discussion of the process. to be punished whenever you want: Any alleged breach of the laws brought to the ecclesia, and any decision about referral to the thesmothetae for trial, was determined by the ecclesia (see above). It seems that Demosthenes is trying to obfuscate the issue around Diopeithes’ conduct by raising the possibility of it being sidelined for as long as possible. either consider it immediately or hold off: Demosthenes makes several references that suggest this speech was in the context of a debate around whether to bring a charge of eisangello against Diopeithes (8.28–29) with other more general references indicating the legal focus of the debate (8.8, 8.10. 8.17, 8.27). If a formal vote ever eventuated, it was clearly defeated – Demosthenes’ reference to Diopeithes in command at the time of the Third Philippic is evidence of this (9.15, 20, 73). Demosthenes twice talks about the charges against Diopeithes (8.8, 10) and the use of the verbs kategoreo (8.8, 8.27), krino (8.17) and eisangello (8.28, 29), highly technical in Athenian law, further suggests the context of this speech as connected to an eisangelia eis ton demon. In particular, Demosthenes only uses the term eisangello one

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other time in his deliberative oratory, in a direct reference to an eisangelia. It is unlikely that Demosthenes himself would have introduced these technical legal terms to the debate unless he was defending Diopeithes against such a proposal. Immediately after this comment, Demosthenes attacks Philip, then advises the people not to be taken off course and distracted “by noise of other things and accusations” (8.3). This is a clever attempt to deflect the debate away from the potential impeachment of the instrument of his policy to the menacing figure cut by Philip. Another interpretation is possible: since this was probably published after the death of Diopeithes, it may have been a defence of Demosthenes who might then later claim that he had suggested recalling Diopeithes, thus deflecting the guilt of the eventual failure against Philip from himself. obstinately take sides: Demosthenes is indicating that the ecclesia should have a more open mind on the subject of Diopeithes in light of the actions of Philip. 3  the enemy of the whole city: In the five other deliberative speeches written by Demosthenes where Philip is the focus, he is only once named explicitly as an enemy (3.16). Demosthenes similarly named Cotys, the predecessor of Cersobleptes, as “your enemy” (ekhthrotath’ humin – 23.149; see Introduction, pp. 2–5) in a passage where Demosthenes is also attacking an enemy of Athens. Though Demosthenes has consistently criticised Philip, this is a shift away from his previous characterisations. Philip is always depicted as a threat to Athenian interests, but this is the first time that Demosthenes uses the direct and immediate threat of Philip to the Athenian way of life as a topos (for example, 8.43, 60); note also the final three words of the speech, “save the city” (ten polin sosai), indicating that action against this echthros is needed to save the very existence of Athens. Hence, he is more than a polemios, as described by Alwine (2015: 28), as this was seen by Demosthenes as a personal hatred that resulted in not only Philip’s attitude but in certain actions (see Alwine, 2015: 26–28 for discussion of the distinction between polemios and echthros). a strong army: We have no exact numbers for the size of Philip’s invasion force, but it must have been considerable. It was required not only to fight, but also to garrison the Thracian lands. See Commentary, 8.14, p. 120 for discussion. Hellespont: The Hellespont was the name for the strait, now called the Dardanelles, that separates Asia Minor from Europe. It led from the Aegean

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Sea into the Black Sea through what is now named the Sea of Marmara, then into the Bosporus. It is approximately 61km long and ranges in width between 1.2 and 6 km. The Hellespont was a crucial stretch of water through which all trade from the Black Sea was required to sail. It was particularly important to Athens as it was through this passage that most of the Athenian grain trade sailed from the Black Sea into the Aegean. In conjunction with the Chersonese, the land on the west of the Hellespont, it was crucial to Athenian existence. For the geography of the Hellespont, see Bommelaer (1981: esp. 111–13). deliberated: The word used by Demosthenes, bebouleusthai, in the context of a meeting of the Athenian ecclesia, implies debate and decisions. It means more than simply ‘plans’, as it requires the assembled citizens to take part in the process of the ecclesia, with speakers proposing the ideas and citizens voting on them after considered debate. In relation to political contexts, it generally implies a group taking part in decision-making, and Demosthenes is urging the citizens to take part in the process expeditiously. The perfect tense is used to emphasise the importance of the need already to have deliberated and not still be discussing it (cf. Plato, Crito 46a). For a detailed discussion of the word, see Cammack (2012: 108–117). See also the philosophical discussion of Timmerman (2002), noting the connection between citizenship and political deliberation. noise of other things: Demosthenes is being literal here. It is a direct reference to the practice in the Athenian ecclesia of a political group standing together and heckling the speaker to distract them and the audience as much as possible (see Hansen, 1987: 69–72; 1991: 146–47 for the role played by the audience). He uses this phrase in the prooemia of other symbouleutic speeches (for example, 5.3, 13.3), and the Demosthenic Exordia contain numerous examples (4.1, 5.1, 21.4, 26.1, 56.3). With up to 6000 or more people attending the ecclesia, when issues riled the attendees it would have become very loud and unruly. Cf. Tacon (2001: 174–75) who notes that the inclusion of this term in speeches is more of a reflection of the political purpose of the author. 4  I wonder: Demosthenes uses the word thaumazo in three of the Exordia in the same way as it is used here. He uses the phrase ‘I wonder’, or ‘I am amazed’ (the same word in Greek) to lead the discussion in the desired direction in a casual manner. In one instance (Ex. 14.1), Demosthenes “wonders” why it is that people attending the ecclesia are full of ideas about what could be done, yet nothing ever actually happens (cf. Commentary,

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8.1, p. 94). He also “wonders” (Ex. 32.2) why it is that advisors deliver a speech in the ecclesia to garner political support for themselves rather than to give advice in the best interests of the city (cf. Commentary, 8.24, p. 129 and Introduction, p. 34–35). Demosthenes is also “amazed” at the people in the ecclesia who do not wish to propose anything, but criticise any proposals put forward by other people. Demosthenes uses the word in this speech to allude to advisors who do not deliver speeches or proposals in the ecclesia in the interests of the city, but from self-serving motivations. It is not making a reference to any speeches delivered as part of this specific debate (though cf. Commentary, 8.2, p. 96). the thing I heard said in the boule: This may be evidence supporting Rhodes (1972: 40, 80), who claims that the public were able to hear the proceedings of the boule (see especially Dem. 19.17, where his speech was witnessed by many, according to his own testimony; cf. Dem. 25.23), except when it was specified that the business was to be kept secret (for example, DS 11.39.5; DS 13.2.6, though this is difficult to believe, as foreign policy would not be made in secret without the ecclesia authorising such a meeting; Andoc. 1.45; Lys. 13.21; Aesch. 3.125; see also the brief modern discussions: de Ste Croix, 1963: 114–15, cf. Hornblower, 2009: 251–64; Flower, 1997: 197). Rhodes is right to add that there is not enough evidence as to whether or not the public were allowed inside the bouleuterium during a meeting or whether they were able to “hear with difficulty” from without, though he uses Antiphon (6.40) to indicate it may have been possible for private citizens to be in a session of the boule under certain circumstances. On the balance of evidence, it seems that people were not usually allowed inside, even though it may still have been possible to hear proceedings, thus Dem. 19.17 may well indicate that the crowd was outside the doors listening rather than actually inside in the limited standing space (Johnstone and Graff, 2018: 23–24). This may have been the case in this instance also. The physical size of the building likely made it necessary for a speaker to project his voice to be heard by his colleagues (Johnstone and Graff, 2018: 22), thus also making it possible to be heard outside. recommend … staying at peace: The peace referred to is that sponsored primarily by Philocrates the Athenian, hence the name ‘The Peace of Philocrates’. At the time the peace was made, the Athenians were tired of a long war (Dem. 18.20), and the desire for peace was seen in the unanimous vote of the ecclesia on the motion of Philocrates to send an embassy to treat

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with Philip (Aesch. 2.13). Thus, the desire for peace was overwhelming, as it was across much of Greece (see Buckler & Beck, 2008: 236). The Peace of Philocrates ended the war that had been waged for approximately five years, making an alliance and allowing both sides to maintain their territory. By the time of the speech, Demosthenes was trying to argue that the terms of the Peace of Philocrates had been broken by Philip and, therefore, Athens was not beholden to them. See Introduction, pp. 8–11, for a detailed discussion of the context. 5  contrary to the Peace: The terms of the peace were simple. Philip proposed that both parties recognise the areas they each held at that time (Dem. 7.26; Lib. Hypoth. 7.23) and that a permanent defensive alliance be agreed (Dem. 19.143). In addition, neither party was to support piracy or pirates ([Dem.] 12.2, 7.14). Importantly, the negotiations gave Athens limited recognition of their possession of the Chersonese: Philip agreed to stay out of the area until negotiations were completed (Aesch. 2.82). Demosthenes (19.78) claimed that after the negotiations, the Chersonese was secure, but this deliberately overstated the reality of the situation to allow Demosthenes to mischaracterise Philip later. Philip also promised to release the Athenian prisoners from his conquest of Olynthus, probably making a vague promise to allow Phocis to remain prominent and independent after the Sacred War (as a counter to Theban influence – Dem. 19.78). Demosthenes (19.318; Lib. Hypoth. 5.1–2) says that Philip could not have been genuine about this, as he would automatically perjure his oath to the Thessalians and Thebans regarding the punishment of the Phocians. The punishment of Phocis, however, could have been kept mild and he could have focused his anger on the leading men only (thus Aesch. 2.117). That he chose not to was possibly a result of the anti-Macedonian posturing of Demosthenes gaining support in Athens. He also vowed to strengthen Athenian influence in Euboea, return the border town of Oropus to Athens and cut a channel across the Chersonese, making it easier to defend. This was a boon for Athens. Philip may have been genuine in these proposals (or at least the sentiment) as Philip did not invade Athenian territory until after Diopeithes’ depredations six years later (see Hammond & Griffith, 1979: 332–335; Buckler, 1989: 133–34, 136–140 for a complete outline of events). nor organises everyone against us: Philip had made many alliances by which Athens might seem threatened (for an outline, see Introduction, p. 7). Demosthenes is preparing the ecclesia for the narrative that he will deliver

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that shows Philip is both taking Athenian land and organising others against Athens. terms to which we swore: In April, 346 the Athenians sent an embassy (now called the ‘Second Embassy’) to Pella to swear the oath on the terms agreed (Aesch. 2.91–92; Dem. 18.25, 19.154). They travelled to Pella, only to be forced to wait for Philip to return from his campaign against Thrace (Aesch. 2.82, 90, 3.65, 73–74; Dem. 19.155–56; see Worthington, 2013: 171– 72 for discussion). Philip swore the peace when he returned (Dem. 18.32), but his allies were also required to swear independently. They were gathering at Pherae to prepare for the Macedonian campaign against Phocis that was to end the Second Sacred War (Dem. 19.158). See Introduction, p. 10, for context. inscribed for all to see: Not all laws and decrees were inscribed once voted by the boule or decided by the nomothetai (Meyer, 2013: 455). Also, the notion that even if laws were inscribed, everyone would be able to read them is problematic as ancient levels of literacy are difficult to determine (Meyer, 2013: 455; for a more dogmatic, alternative view, see Missiou, 2011: 143–49). In fact, compared to the number of decrees and laws probably moved in the fifth and fourth century, we have a very small specimen (for an example of this, see Sickinger, 1999: 65–66). The fourth century saw a move towards greater stability in the laws of the State (Hansen, 1991: 174) which also entailed even less inscription of laws on stone, except where directed by the decree (for example, IG II2 240 = Tod 181). When an inscription of the decree or law was directed, it was the responsibility of the secretary of the boule to have the inscribing in stone carried out (see Sickinger, 1999: 117–18 and n. 13 for outline and examples). Rhodes (2001: 37) points out the need for the text to have been negotiated with the proposer and funds were provided to ensure that it was done appropriately. A wealthy secretary, as a result of the potential political benefit to be derived by association with a decree, might contribute his own money to make it even more elaborate, even creating a space to give their name greater prominence (Blanshard, 2004: 3, 4). This remark is interesting, as Philochorus (BNJ 328 F55a) tells us that the Athenians voted to take down the stela outlining the terms of the peace and treaty with Philip. It seems unlikely that Demosthenes would have made this comment if it was inscribed, so Demosthenes is to be preferred over Philochorus in this instance. 6  Philip has taken many of your possessions unjustly: Contrary to what Demosthenes says, Philip had not taken any Athenian land or possessions

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unlawfully. In fact, he appears to have adhered to the treaty as much as could reasonably be expected in the face of Diopeithes’ aggression. He painstakingly avoided any breach with Athens after the Peace of Philocrates, refusing to fight in the Chersonese. Philip did not even support Cardia against Diopeithes; instead, he sent a letter to Athens complaining of the strategos’ actions ([Dem.] 12.11, 17), requesting an arbitration. This letter is recognised as problematic, with Hammond and Griffith (1979: 714–15) stating that it is most likely a forgery. MacDowell (2009: 366) suggests that the letter should tentatively be accepted as genuine, and the text of the letter tends to indicate that the events could indeed be genuine as they fit with the narrative and mood of the time. Diopeithes’ actions would have been a casus belli should Philip have chosen to take it, but he seems not to have wanted war with Athens, preferring to persuade them away from war if possible to focus on matters closer to home. before Diopeithes sailed with the cleruchs … accused of having started the war: Demosthenes is referring to the cleruchy that was sent out as a part of the force under the command of Diopeithes. Demosthenes makes another explicit reference to the cleruchy at 8.16, saying that Philip has made a direct threat against them. Philip later made a counter-claim against the Athenians regarding the region of the Chersonese, saying that when he wanted to convey his fleet to the Hellespont, he was forced to use his army to protect it ([Dem.] 12.16). Demosthenes had used the Chersonese to scare the Athenians into action against Philip, convincing them of the necessity of sending colonists to the region to increase Athenian control. It was clearly a successful tactic, as it forced Philip to send a larger land force than he would normally have sent when marching east. Demosthenes’ description of Diopeithes’ strategia and ‘those now in the Chersonese’ indicate that they were probably not together (9.15, cf. 8.14: “those present”, i.e. the cleruchy). Libanius (Hypoth. 8.3–4) implies that Diopeithes was based with the cleruchy, but this is not the case (see Commentary 8.2, p. 97). Thus, while the strategos was based opposite the island of Thasos on the coast of Thrace, a significant military garrison must have been left with the colonists at their settlement(s) in the Chersonese. Since these cleruchs were probably sent out to maintain a vigil on Philip’s activities, they were likely settled at a strategic location. As Philip did not transgress Athenian territory, and because he also says that they were making his advance to the Hellespont difficult (12.16), the cleruchs were probably located at one of the existing

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settlements at the top of the Chersonese near Cardian territory, probably Agora or Pactye, cities about which we know little (our references for them are minimal: Ps. Skylax, 670; Ps. Skymnos, 711–12; Hdt. 6.36; Hell. BNJ 4, F127; Agora is named as a suburb of Cardia and Pactye by Casson, 1926: 218–19, but there is little evidence to support this). In 340, Athens made an alliance with Elaeus (on the southern tip of the Chersonese), indicating that they may not have had complete control of the Chersonese and the city was independent. Cersobleptes had held most of the Chersonese up to 352 (cf. Dem. 23.158, 161, 162), with the exception of Crithote and Elaeus, both southern cities of the Chersonese (see Isaac, 1986: 191–93 for discussion). It is also interesting to note that Pactye does not appear in either the first or second Athenian alliances (Cargill, 1981: 197), suggesting that it was wholly Athenian. Given that it was also crucially located along the neck of the Chersonese at an access point to the wall, in addition to being situated on the coast, it presents the most likely place to send a cleruchy in 342. A cleruchy was a method of control traditionally associated with the Athenian arche of the fifth century (for a discussion of cleruchies in the fifth century, see Meiggs, 1972: 260–62, 402; Jones, 1957: 175). It can be defined as “…a community of Athenian citizens living abroad, enrolled in Athenian tribes and demes, who had to serve in the Athenian armed forces and pay Athenian taxes but who enjoyed some municipal self-government” (Brunt, 1967: 73; see also Graham, 1964: 167; Hunt, 2010: 29). Upon the creation of the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy, it was made explicit in the Decree of Aristoteles (lines 35–41) that there were to be no Athenian cleruchies established in allied territories (DS 15.29.8). Any existing land owned by Athens or Athenians was to be renounced immediately upon an alliance with the League (lines 25–31). While many historians have attempted to saddle fourth-century Athens with the guilt of the fifth century, Cargill (1981: 146–50, 159–60) attempts to demonstrate that Athens remained true to the Decree of Aristoteles. Athens did send out cleruchs for self-aggrandising reasons to areas in the fourth century, but not to the territory of allied states, thus remaining true to the letter of the law while breaching the spirit of it. Libanius (Hypoth. 8) claims that when Diopeithes’ cleruchs were received in the Chersonese to protect them from Philip, they were celebrated, similar to those sent to protect Andros in the Social War (see below). We do, however, have definitive evidence that several garrisons were established in allied territory during the Second Naval League. In 375, a garrison was

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established to assist Abdera against Sparta (DS 15.36.4; cf. Cargill, 1981: 153). This makes sense, however, as Athens did occasionally quarter a garrison in allied states for military assistance and protection when they were requested (for the adherence of Abdera to the Second Naval League, see Rhodes and Osborne, 2003: no. 22, line 99). It was likely withdrawn in accordance with the peace of 371 when it was no longer required. We also have evidence that during the Social War, Andros (IG II2 123) and Amorgos (IG XII5 24–26) were garrisoned by Athens as a part of the war effort. Such blatant breaches of the Decree of Aristoteles must have been approved by the allied synod as necessary expedients for the Social War (Cargill, 1981: 155). Moreover, Potidaea requested cleruchs to assist in the protection of their city (IG II2 114, lines 9–11). Cargill (1981: 155–158) suggests that this was considered appropriate by both Athens and the allied synod; Burnett and Edmondson (1961: 85), based on a vote of thanks from “The demos of Mytilene” inscribed on the statue of Chabrias, suggest that the Decree of Aristoteles did not guarantee an absence of Athenian involvement in an allied city, only that the city had the right to refuse that help. Therefore, considering that Athens was authorised to settle cleruchies in areas where there was a military threat (after a request and with the support of the allied synod if it was an allied state), it is logical that Diopeithes settled the cleruchs near the Chersonese with a significant military garrison specifically to act as a watchdog on Philip’s actions in the Chersonese. This was a significant move, as there is no evidence for cleruchies being sent out after the Athenian defeat in the Social War prior to this. Graham (1964: 189–90) agrees that the use of cleruchs to act in this capacity is attested (cf. Plut. Per. 19.1), but Jones (1957: 174) argues that the evidence is far from conclusive in this respect. This appears to be an example of such a cleruchy. Philip is at pains to point out that these types of actions are unnecessary, as he never took action against Athenian possessions in the region contrary to the peace ([Dem.] 12.16). It is also interesting that Athens had the power over the cleruchy in issues of war (cf. the Decree of Polycrates, [Dem.] 12.16; see below). Graham (1964: 189–90) posits that their military service would have been in the region of their city (based on the fifth century example of Hdt. 6.100.1). Graham does not examine the particular instance of Diopeithes’ cleruchs at all in his discussions of this issue. The Decree of Polycrates is an excellent example of Athenian cleruchs being ordered to undertake military service

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in their own region – indeed, they seem to have been sent for that very purpose. Such an action by the cleruchy would then be a de facto declaration of war with Philip, thus it is more likely that they were ordered to defend the Chersonese from Philip if he made an attempt to take it. This further strengthens the likelihood of settlement at Pactye or, at least, another northern town near the Thracian wall. Your resolutions about this are still binding: We know of only one decree relevant to this topic, that passed by Polycrates in 342 that seems to have declared that the cleruchs in the Chersonese were at war with Philip ([Dem.] 12.16 – the use of the word dogma rather than decree does make an accurate interpretation of this event difficult). It is possible that Polycrates was an Athenian and the decree was made in the ecclesia, but there is not enough explicit evidence for this. If we are to believe the text of [Dem.] 12, however, a decree authorising the cleruchs to attack Philip would probably have been moved in the Athenian ecclesia, otherwise the actions would have lacked support in Athens (on [Dem.] 12, see Commentary 8.6, p. 104). This decree probably also refers to the cleruchs who had been sent in 352 when Cersobleptes ceded the Chersonese to them (see Commentary 8.8, pp. 110–11). The decree was probably not passed before 342 in connection with the earlier establishment of cleruchies, however, as the events described by Philip ([Dem.] 12.16) would not make sense otherwise. There would have been a cessation of hostilities between Philip and the Athenian cleruchy as a part of the Peace of Philocrates. Also, the Greek use of the genitive participle tends to indicate events following on or closely related to each other temporally. Thus, the decree was probably passed in connection to the strategia of Diopeithes, who was also supposedly ordered to make war on Philip if the opportunity was right ([Dem.] 12.16) as the cleruchs would not have been able to wage war on Philip’s army without Athenian support. According to the chronology of what Philip says in his letter, he must have already started campaigning in Thrace when Diopeithes was sent with the cleruchy to reinforce the existing Athenian presence in the Chersonese. The decree of Polycrates was therefore likely passed soon after Philip started marching east. he is all the time continually taking the possessions of other Greeks and barbarians: Philip had indeed taken possession of a number of nonAthenian cities, both through just means and warfare, in an attempt to ensure the safety of his kingdom. This included control of the south of Thrace

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and the Thracian Chalcidice, territory partially controlled by Athens and a crucial region for the grain trade. Philip had expanded his kingdom one area at a time and he had taken these regions in an effort to consolidate his own position and strengthen Macedonian interests in both the east and south (see Introduction, p. 7, for an outline of his expansion). Such extensive conquests must have involved many losers; his territorial expansion was obviously accomplished at the expense of both the Greek and barbarian cities and leagues in these areas. 7  There is no choice in the matter for us: Demosthenes is making the very simple point that Philip had taken the choice of war or peace away from the Athenians. This could be another reference to Philip’s constant activity in comparison to the Athenians’ lack of action. To defend ourselves against the man who is already making war on us: Demosthenes is trying to argue that this state of war already existed as a result of Philip’s actions that threatened Athenian interests (cf. Dem. 8.8, 43, 55). Athens, therefore, had the right to fight to protect itself. His implicit appeal to the audience for a war in self-defence is an important part of the discussion on war with Philip. A war without any justification was a violation of the principles of Greek morality (see Alonso, 2007: 218; Klose, 1972: 148–49 on the declaration of war in Classical Greece). Philip had adhered to the treaty, hence Demosthenes is manufacturing a justification for war since Philip had not provided the Athenians with one himself. There are many references to self-defence as a justification for war. Even pre-emptive attacks in self-defence go back as far as Herodotus (1.46) and are evident in the fifth and fourth centuries (Thuc. 1.33.3–4, 120.2, 124.2, 6.91.4, 92.5; Ar. Rhet. 1393 a20). One of the most basic premises of warfare was that every Greek state had the right to defend itself (Hunt, 2010: 134). As a result of the importance to Athens of the grain trade, the security of the north would also have been seen as securing Athenian possessions in almost the same way as securing Attica (cf. Plato, Protag. 354b; Ober, 1985: 13– 31 for a discussion of the Athenian chora in this context, though Harding, 1998, esp. 67–68 disagrees with the “defensive mentality” ascribed to the Athenians by Ober – for a defence of Ober’s position, see Ober, 1989). Abandoning the fatherland, abandoning the ancestral temples and ancestral tombs, and allowing the land to be subjected to the enemy were the acts of a traitor (Hunt, 2010: 140–41; Lyc. 1.8; Aesch. 3.156; Dem. 14.32), not a citizen. Thus, defending the Chersonese and making pre-emptive strikes to

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do so could have been seen by the Athenians as protecting the security of Athens, the act of a true patriot, particularly if the Athenians conceived of cleruchic land as Athenian territory. By Zeus: An appeal to Zeus or the Gods was one of the techniques used by Demosthenes to provide emphasis for what was being said. This vocabulary is common in rhetoric of the time, prevalent in both the symbouleutic and forensic oratory of Demosthenes and his contemporaries, though Demosthenes uses it more in forensic oratory (for example 18.141, 19.299, 21.73, 25.31; see Serafim, 2021: 83–95 for discussion). Demosthenes uses this technique a number of times in the Exordia (24.3, 25.3, 31.2, 35.1, 35.4, 45.1, 48.2) but then does not invoke the Gods in supplication in the prooemia of any extent symbouleutic speech, using it to emphasise points made throughout the logoi (1.10, 1.11, 2.22, 2.23, 3.17, 4.45, 8.49, 14.39). It is interesting to note that of the surviving corpus of Attic oratory, there are surprisingly few appeals to Gods prior to Demosthenes and Aeschines (particularly invoking the Gods in the vocative vase – Edwards, 2008: 108). Speeches in the Lysiac corpus appeal to the Gods a number of times (4.20, 13.95, 19.34, 54), but it appears to have been a rhetorical technique that developed later in the fourth century. Sommerstein and Torrance (2014: 235–39) emphasise its importance in creating a sense of irony or emphasis. This is particularly interesting, as it was clearly in use in conversational language in the fifth century (see, for example, Aristophanes’ frequent use: Birds, 24, 269; Ecclesiazusae, 79; Frogs, 788) and, no doubt, the fourth. should Philip keep away from Attica and Piraeus: Demosthenes is making the point that the north is just as crucial as Attica and Piraeus when considering the threat of Philip to Athenian security. To fight a war in Attica would have been devastating to the Athenian economy and society, as was seen during the Spartan invasions of the Peloponnesian War. Ober (1985: 87–100, 191–207) claims that it even affected the Athenian psyche to the extent that defence of Attica was overhauled and reprioritised (see above, p. 108 for discussion). Demosthenes employed the word chora (6.35) in a similar manner to emphasise in real terms the loss of crops that this would entail, possibly trying to play on this changed Athenian psyche. Hunt (2010: 139) discusses the significance of the audience listening to debates on warfare, highlighting the fact that those who would be voting on war would also be fighting it and incurring the losses. The audience would undoubtedly have held a strong view about Philip marching on Attica.

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Though it is a “modern myth” that hoplites marched out every year to fight battles (Krentz, 2007: 168–70), the audience of Demosthenes would still have paid close attention to any argument he might make, as it would have had a significant impact on the life of citizens. Chapters 8–12 In the final section of the introduction, matching with the logos that follows the central point in the ring structure of the speech (14–37), Demosthenes indicates that it is crucial for Athens to maintain a standing force in the field if they are to successfully combat Philip. Diopeithes is again mentioned, justifying his actions in the light of Philip’s activities. 8  If they ground their arguments on this: Demosthenes is equating the north Aegean for Philip to Athenian Attica and Piraeus, a clever but disingenuous ploy. Philip had not contravened the Peace of Philocrates, a point that Demosthenes is at pains to ignore, while making it seem as if Philip is running rampant through Greece with no checks against him except for Diopeithes. Diopeithes is not allowed to help the Thracians: Cersobleptes was excluded from the Peace of Philocrates and Philip did have the right to march against him (see Introduction, pp. 8–9). Philip accurately observed that the Athenians despised Cersobleptes when it suited their purpose, but as soon as they wanted to cause problems for Philip they called him a ‘fellow citizen’ ([Dem.] 12.8–9). To assist Cersobleptes against Philip would have been yet another of Diopeithes’ breaches of the Peace. Thus, had the Athenians admitted that they were actually assisting Cersobleptes they would indeed have to admit that they were starting a war, contrary to what Demosthenes implies here. In 352, Cersobleptes allied with Athens in an effort to protect himself from Philip’s expansion towards his territory (Aesch. 3.74; [Dem.] 12.8; Buckler, 2003: 431–32). He already had some control of the two western Thracian kingdoms and a strong Odrysian Thrace could threaten Macedonian interests in the east. The wealth of eastern Thrace probably also attracted Philip to the region (he had already taken Crenides/Philippi – Dem. 1.13, 4.4; DS 16.3.7; Just. 8.3.6; Steph. Byz. s.v. Krenides). Even though the two monarchs had co-operated as late as 355 (Dem. 23.183; Hammond and Griffith, 1972: 264–67; Archibald, 1998: 233), Cersobleptes sided with Athens in an attempt to protect himself. In return for land ceded to Athens,

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an alliance was signed between Cersobleptes and Athens. As a part of this alliance, a fleet was eventually sent under Charidemus (the mercenary who had previously worked for both Athens and Cersobleptes; see Introduction, pp. 3–4). Charidemus returned to Athens when it was rumoured that Philip was dead (Dem. 3.5). The alliance between Athens and Cersobleptes probably contained terms about mutual assistance during an attack. During the debate on the Peace of Philocrates, however, Cersobleptes made an appeal to Athens to include him as an ally in the peace treaty with Philip, providing him protection should Philip attack. Athens’ refusal to do so (Demosthenes himself, as epistates, refused to allow a debate on the subject; see Introduction, p. 9) was recognition of Philip’s terms, which required the unaligned status of Odrysian Thrace. This allowed him to attack it legally later. 9  the mercenaries: Xenoi was a term that could be used to denote a mercenary army. We do not know about the nature of the army employed by Diopeithes. Demosthenes’ comment at 8.20 about not discussing the character of the force being employed is infuriatingly unhelpful, but does tend to suggest it was mercenary in nature. Parke (1970: 150, following Schaefer, 1856: 452) believes that Diopeithes was sent to establish the cleruchy in the same way as Democlides was sent to Brea (IG i3 46), hiring a mercenary force on his own initiative once he arrived to settle a dispute between the Cardians and Philip’s territories, empowered to do so by the decree of Polycrates (see Commentary, 8.6, p. 107). This would have been highly unusual, as a strategos rarely exceeded his mandate from the ecclesia (see Commentary 8.9 below, p. 116). It is far more likely that Diopeithes was authorised by the ecclesia to raise a mercenary army, most likely lightlyarmed troops (see below), not just to protect the Chersonese but to raid Philip’s, and his allies’, territory where possible. Various terms were used to describe a mercenary army in the Classical period, such as epikouros, stratiotes and misthophoros (for a discussion of the terminology of mercenaries and the changing use, see Trundle, 1998). Xenoi was used by Xenophon to imply a sense of ritualism and reciprocity, whereas misthophoroi was often used in a pejorative sense for a mercenary army (Trundle, 1998: 5–6). The hiring of a mercenary army was a standard act in warfare in the fourth century, with most states and rulers hiring such armies. Parke (1970: 38, 143) points out that, in the case of Athens, it was far more typical for a mercenary army to be lightly-armed troops. It was only

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in exceptional times that Athens sent a citizen hoplite force into the field, for example the protection of the pass of Thermopylae in 352 (Dem. 4.17). The use of mercenary forces was far cheaper than utilising the citizenry, who were forced to leave their land for an extended period of time, which had a significant social, political and economic impact on the functioning of the State. Thus, throughout the fourth century, the Athenians hired large mercenary armies, primarily of lightly-armed troops, to undertake many of their wars. This was sometimes decried and, at other times, supported by the orators (as seen in Dem. 4.24–25, contra Dem. 8.20). See Trundle (2004: 40–46) for a discussion of the increase in mercenary armies in this period. The exact pay for mercenaries is a topic for which there will never be a definitive answer (for possibilities, see Parke, 1970: 231–33; Griffith, 1935: 273–98; McKechnie, 1989: 89; Krasilnikoff, 1993: 95). Mercenary soldiers seem to have been paid less than a skilled labourer and much less than a citizen soldier (though Trundle, 2004: 88–89 argues that when paid for all activities, including rations, their pay would have been considerably more). Miller (1984: 155) has the more useful approach, examining the concept of formal wages as opposed to pay for provisions also, suggesting that pay was relatively low. Demosthenes (4.28–29) proposed that the mercenaries in 351 be paid for provisions at a rate of two obols a day, with this pay to be made up from plunder. The act of looting as forming part of mercenary pay became an institutionalised and accepted practice by mercenaries. Indeed, in periods of unemployment for mercenaries (which appear to have been extensive at times), small bands of mercenaries seem to have lived from the proceeds of plunder (for example, the Cyraeans – Xen. Anab. 6.5.7; see McKechnie, 1989: 91 for discussion). It is not dissimilar to the Athenian strategos being required to pay his naval forces through eunoiai, except that regular pay for rowers was also a feature of Athenian naval warfare (Gabrielsen, 1994: 124). Even though McKechnie (1989: 89) agrees with Parke (1970: 232) in dismissing Dem. 4.21–29 as of little value in the study of pay for mercenaries (primarily because the plan was not actually carried out), the concept is significant – it was possible for a mercenary army to be paid ration money by the employer while focusing on the depredations of enemy territory as the primary source of remuneration. See Trundle (2004: 82–90) for a complete discussion of the components of payment: misthos, trophe, sitos, siteresion and ephodia, though there is no conclusion drawn; as he points out, there was no consistent approach to mercenary payment.

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See also Pritchett (1974, vol. 2: 102–03), who indicates that it would not be unreasonable to suspect that mercenary troops joined a commander knowing that the majority of their pay would come from booty. That Philip claims he was forced to bring his army with him when marching east (Dem. 10.16) tends to suggest that the Athenian mercenary force was of a significant size. A large mercenary force would require a significant amount of booty to ensure they remained paid and, therefore, loyal. This could have been the cause of Diopeithes’ depredations. See Trundle (2004: 81–90) on the various methods of raising funds for mercenary armies. behaving dreadfully, ravaging the Hellespont: If Diopeithes was ravaging the Hellespontine shores, Philip had already taken possession of the region, limiting Athenian influence to the Chersonese only. Athens controlled the north of the Chersonese directly, but possibly not all of the south (Rhodes and Osborne, 2003, no.71; see Commentary 8.6, p. 105). Though Philip was in a position to take the Chersonese if he desired through his alliance with Cardia ([Dem.] 12.11), which provided easy access to the region, he was still willing to arbitrate affairs and negotiate ([Dem.] 12.11, 16– 17). Demosthenes (8.24–26) claims that to plunder enemy cities and vessels to finance operations was standard naval procedure, which would partly explain Diopeithes’ actions. Naval campaigns were notoriously expensive (Commentary 8.26, p. 134; see Pritchard, 2015: 99–113 for discussion) and Athens could ill-afford such expeditions without these actions taken by a commander. Demosthenes is obviously trying to hide the fact that in attacking such cities and vessels, Diopeithes’ actions were as if Athens was in fact at war with Philip. Philip claimed that Diopeithes attacked Crobyle and Tiristasis ([Dem.] 12.3). Tiristasis/Tyrodiza was a town of Perinthus that Herodotus (7.25.2) claimed was used as a supply base by Xerxes. Given the context of Herodotus’ discussion, it would be more logically located on the Propontis. It appears that a cleruchy was sent there in 447/46 (IG I3 417) and it paid tribute to Athens after 451 (for a discussion, see Isaac, 1986: 201–04), probably making it a city of some importance and wealth. It is logical that Diopeithes would attack a city that was advantageously situated as a supply base, as it would also act as a significant trade port; it would thus increase his revenue from piracy. Philip ([Dem.] 12.3) also says that Diopeithes “plundered the area adjacent to Thrace” (ten de prosekhe Thraiken eporthese). Diopeithes would no doubt have wanted to secure the border along the wall at the neck of the Chersonese, but not the more

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difficult to protect areas outside of it. Thus, Crobyle was most likely a city also located outside the Chersonese but near the wall. The enslavement of the people in these cities, however repugnant to modern readers, was within the scope of international relations (Xen. Cyr. 4.2.26, 7.5.73; Mem. 4.2.15; Ar. Pol. 1255a6–7; van Wees, 2004: 27). Philip’s qualms with the Athenians lay in the attack on these cities rather than the actions taken towards their citizens afterwards. These specifically named cities must have been under Macedonian control. Demosthenes said soon after this speech that Philip was off to the Hellespont (9.27), possibly marching east from central Thrace in a direct response to Diopeithes’ actions. detaining the trade-ships: Diopeithes was attacking the trading vessels of the cities allied to Philip, probably to raise revenue to support his campaign. Demosthenes admits this later in the speech (8.24–25), saying that all strategoi do this; the larger the fleet with the strategos, the more money he can raise. Demosthenes does stop short of admitting that it is being directed against Philip, even though Philip’s complaint states as much ([Dem.] 12.5). Also, it appears that it was not just Diopeithes who was taking such actions. In his letter of complaint, Philip claims that the Athenians were allowing pirates to dock at Thasos ([Dem.] 12.2), also saying that the Athenians were sending out pirates that took the vessels trading with him as they used to when they were “clearly at odds” (phaneros diepherometha) ([Dem.] 12.5). This was expressly against the terms of the Peace of Philocrates, whereby both Athens and Philip agreed to stop piracy ([Dem.] 12.2). Athens seems to have been allowing any pirate who had taken booty from vessels trading with Philip to dock at Thasos, essentially sanctioning piracy against Philip. A formal decree traditionally forbade all Athenian harbours from accepting leistai into them, and the Melians were fined 50 T for doing so (Dem. 58.56; de Souza, 1999: 38–39; Gabrielsen, 2001: 232). Diopeithes’ actions were a clear violation of the Peace of Philocrates. Such piracy was common practice and undertaken to acquire funds. As commanders were usually sent out underfunded by Athens, they were forced to acquire funds in a number of ways (for contemporaneous ideas, see Isoc. 8.29, 36; IG II2 111.12–14; van Wees, 2004: 268), particularly on extended campaigns. For example, Thrasybulus and Ergocles in 389/88 sailed on an argyrologia (fund-raising expedition) in the Hellespont and Pamphylia (Xen. Hell. 4.8.25–30; Lys. 28.5; Pritchett, 1971: 50–51, 1975:101–02), and Chares plundered Corcyra and Sestus in 360 and 353 (DS 15.95.3, 16.34.3).

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Timotheus must have paid his men from booty when he had not received pay for ten months (Xen. Hell. 5.4.63–66; DS 15.47.7; Isoc. 15.111; Dem. 20.77), while Iphicrates sold statues ‘acquired’ through piracy (DS 16.57.2–3) and had his crews work on the lands of the Corcyraeans (Xen. Hell. 6.2.37) then ‘raised money’ from the coast of Cephallenia (Xen. Hell. 6.2.38). Isocrates (15.123) talks about Timotheus cultivating the goodwill of the Greeks by ensuring that his intent was known prior to his arrival at an allied port. This indicates that the allies may have accepted this action to a certain extent, providing that they were properly informed. It was a practice that found much currency in the fifth century, primarily during the Peloponnesian War and was a standard modus operandi after 411. For example, as early as 428 a squadron was sent by Athens on an argyrologia (Thuc. 3.19.1; see, for discussion Kallet-Marx, 1993: 136–38, 16–64, 200– 201; Meiggs, 1972: 254; Hornblower, 1996: 94–95). Another example can be seen when Nicias raided Hyccara in 415 to raise money through the sale of captives (Thuc. 6.62.3–4). There are numerous other examples of this throughout the Peloponnesian War. Even at the start of the fifth century, early naval raids to supplement pay are found in Herodotus (3.57–58, 8.112) with Samos attacking Siphnus and Themistocles attacking medisers (for a detailed outline and discussion, see de Ste Croix, 1953: 50–51; Pritchett, 1991: 81, 385–87). Plundering was such a recognised method of raising funds that Xenophon (eq. mag. 7.7) outlined the formal use of hippeis in the raiding of cities for plunder. Even Demosthenes’ system of military finance, proposed in 351, required funds “from the war” to finance a fleet (4.29). Privateering was sanctioned by the State only when the proceeds went to the State and not individuals (Pritchett, 1981: 398–438; Gabrielsen, 2001: 78–79; van Wees, 2004: 255). For example, the privateering by two navarchs in 355 of vessels from Naucratis led to 57,000 drachmae of loot which was then sanctioned by the State and commandeered by the ecclesia (Dem. 24.11). In 388, Diotimus did not hand over all his payments in a similar action, keeping 40 T for himself (Lys. 19.50; for other examples, see Dem. 51.13–14; Is. 11.48). Thus, surely Demosthenes is also speaking to convince the ecclesia to sanction Diopeithes’ plundering as necessary to supplement his pay, arguing that it was an accepted practice in Athenian naval warfare that could be extended to vessels trading with the enemy. and we must not permit it: Any action undertaken by a strategos in the field could be repudiated by the home government. The responsible party,

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in this case Diopeithes, could then be impeached (eisangelia), a vote to recall him passed in the ecclesia (apokheirotoneia) and the general tried by a court (for discussion of this, see Hamel, 1998: 122–26; see Commentary, 8.2, pp. 97–98). The demos often recalled strategoi who did not follow their mandate precisely and strategoi were usually scrupulous in following instructions for fear of recall and prosecution (Hamel, 1998: 116–17). Hamel (1998: 132–34) discusses the frequency of prosecution of strategoi, agreeing with Hansen’s (1975) conclusions that the prosecution of strategoi was quite common, assuming that the statistics we have are truly representative (Hamel, 1998: 132–33). Demosthenes makes an argument against Diopeithes’ recall (8.10), saying that if Diopeithes is to be disavowed by the government and the forces he controls disbanded, Philip should also be required to withdraw his army from the region. This is obviously a misleading analogy as Philip had not broken any terms of the Peace whereas Diopeithes seems to have violated the terms repeatedly. By not disavowing Diopeithes’ actions, the Athenians implicitly approved of them and Philip could well have considered them an act of war, which he eventually did (cf. [Dem.] 12.23). 10  the commander providing money for it: We only know the name of one strategos leading this campaign, Diopeithes. It was, therefore, the responsibility of Diopeithes to provide for his forces, which could include pay, rations and any other requirements (see Commentary, 8.9, pp. 112–13). If there was another strategos, the command and burden of leadership would have been shared (see Hamel, 1998: 94–99 for the division of command when more than one strategos was present on a campaign). Philip’s force will also be disbanded: Again, Demosthenes is making an unreasonable point. Unlike Diopeithes’ army, who had committed a number of serious offences, Philip had not committed acts that were against the Peace. Demosthenes’ claim that Philip’s army should be disbanded is unreasonable, but allows him to depict the speakers opposing it as traitors. 11  Philip … is powerful by being the first to anything that happens: This is a common topos about Philip in Demosthenes’ rhetoric. Philip is always on the move (1.4, 14, 4.9) and quick to exploit opportunities because he is on the scene (1.3, 4.5). This comparison between the action of Philip and the military inaction of Athens is also seen in Demosthenes’ speeches (for example, 2.23, 6.4). Demosthenes is trying to use this topos to convince the Athenians to maintain a standing force in the north to counter Philip, primarily by continuing Diopeithes’ command.

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only then do we get worked up and get things ready: The preparation referred to by Demosthenes must primarily be readying the fleet for departure. Preparing a naval expedition in Athens was a time-consuming process. First, the initial debate was held in the ecclesia, which could take several days to summon, debate and vote. Once an expedition was voted, a strategos or strategoi were voted to the command. Strategoi then appointed trierarchs (Gabrielsen, 1994: 73–78, 91–95) which was also time-consuming. This process was streamlined in 358/7 by the implementation of a register of 1200 liable estates (Dem. 14.17, 20.23, 21.15455; 47.21; Isoc. 15.145; Isaeus 7.38; Harp. s.v. summoria; Gabrielsen, 1994: 173–213; MacDowell, 1986). Equipment was then purchased and wooden gear distributed by the State (IG II2 1615, lines 8–104; Gabrielsen, 1994: 161–62; for problems of gear distribution, hiring a crew and taking over an existing trierarchy, see Dem. 47.21–44, 50.7, 26–28, 33–36, 42; Gabrielsen, 1994: 153–55). After this process of appointing captains and equipping vessels, crews were levied and pay made available from either the State or, exceptionally, from taxes raised to fund a specific fleet ([Dem.] 50.8). Demosthenes (50.7) makes it clear that demarchs made a report of available citizens for service, who were then required to report to the pier for duty. Demosthenes (14.23) claims that this process was somewhat cumbersome, and the need for Polycles to hire a crew as a result of the poor turnout of able sailors ([Dem.] 50.7) is probably a testament to the ineffectiveness of the system. By the middle of the fourth century, citizen mobilisations for crews had become the norm for large operations (van Wees, 2004: 218). For smaller actions, however, crews would have been hired from the semi-professional rowers who usually lived in and around Piraeus – the crew hired by Polycles ([Dem.] 50.7) is an example of this. With 200 men to a vessel (170 rowers, twenty auxiliary staff and usually ten marines), a small fleet of ten triremes still required a full staff of 2000 men (van Wees, 2004: 215–18), and it was unusual for a fleet to sail without a full crew. Van Wees (2004: 218) submits that the whole process would have taken several weeks, including another week for training to ensure an acceptable standard of competence. The cost of a fleet was exorbitant, hence the need for piracy to supplement maintenance (see Commentary 8.9, pp. 114–15). Demosthenes (50.11) also indicates that a mercenary crew could cost even more, with the possibility of desertion of sailors requiring a trierarch to pay further sailors to take their place.

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12  arrive late: the word used by Demosthenes (husterizein) is also used five other times in symbouleutic speeches (4.32, 35, 10.20, 21, 63). Each time it is used to characterise the Athenians as unable to match Philip’s preparations through the lack of a standing force and seems to allow Demosthenes to contrast Athenian inaction with Philip’s activity and energy. The word has a relatively contemporary usage in Xenophon (Anab. 6.1.18; Cyr. 5.3.53, 7.5.46, 8.5.7), where it is also used to indicate a late arrival leading to a military setback, defeat or disadvantage. Chapter 13 This is the key point in the speech and the central argument of the ring structure. Those who are providing “words and excuses” are only ensuring the Athenians remain passive. This allows Philip the luxury of being able to do whatever he wants. Moreover, Philip knows this and is orchestrating it to be like this. 13  words and excuses … Planning and preparing: Demosthenes regularly uses two words to express the same idea, known as pleonasm, which was done to dwell upon the idea and ensure that he fully expresses the issue. This highlights problems or negative issues relevant to the argument being made (see 8.29: needful and necessary; 8.32: dangerous and unforgiving, careless and lazy; 8.35: affirm and agree; 8.36: respond and answer). Demosthenes is emphasising that the Athenians talk about what is happening, but rarely act appropriately. firstly consider the current state of affairs: What follows is a brief outline of Philip’s activities woven throughout the logos (e.g. Philip is in Thrace awaiting reinforcements – 8.14, as he has been for ten months – 8.35; Philip recently attacked Oreus – 8.18). It allows Demosthenes to tell the narrative in a way that enhances his arguments by making them more immediate to the situation. Worthington (2020: 18–21) points out that Demosthenes twists the truth to suit his purposes, when it was not possible for Demosthenes to know Philip’s plans (cf. Psoma, 2014: 141–44).

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First Logos (14–37) The first logos focuses on the importance of a standing army in fighting Philip, justifying Diopeithes’ actions as strategos by outlining the danger of Philip. Chapters 14–18 Concerns about the danger posed by Philip are outlined in the first section of the logos. Philip is presented as an imminent threat, and he cannot be trusted to act in anything but an aggressive manner. Demosthenes finishes the section about the need for ‘forward defence,’ meeting the threat of Philip away from Attica before it moves closer to home. 14  He is now keeping himself busy in Thrace … and is sending for more: Philip’s activities at this time in Thrace would have required a substantial initial military force. By the time of this speech, Philip had conquered Thrace and the shores of the Hellespont (see Commentary 8.2, pp. 95–96). It is probable that his southern border now extended up to Hieron Teichus (see Commentary, 8.64, p. 167). Moreover, he also controlled central Thrace, securing forts at Mastira, Drongilus, Cabyle, Binae and Beroe, crucial areas for the control of trade in Thrace, allowing Philip to dominate the access of both the east-west and north-south trade routes (Archibald, 1998: 235–36; Ellis, 1976, 170–71). Philip already controlled Serreium Teichus (Fort Serreium) and Hieron Oros in the east (Dem. 9.15), important settlements for the control of Thrace (Archibald, 1998: 234). The name of a city, Philipoppolis (Str. 7, fr. 36) betrays the possibility of other Macedonian cities from this period. He also controlled Doriscus, probably an important location (cf. Xerxes’ use of it in 481 – Hdt. 7.25; see also discussion of the wall found there in Triantaphyllos, 1971: 439–40; for its possible fortification during Darius’ Scythian campaign, see Isaac, 1986: 137–38). This activity in Thrace was by far Philip’s most significant and comprehensive undertaking to date. The region was inhabited by war-like tribes who fought predominantly guerrilla warfare against the Macedonians, who were tried and proven primarily in set battles and sieges (Archibald, 1998: 235). The campaign must have taken its toll, with losses of men on a scale unpredicted by Philip, who himself fell ill on the campaign (Dem. 1.13 and Lib. Hypoth. 3.4–5). In contrast with previous conquests, Philip established a permanent presence there, controlled by a commander who answered directly to the king

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(Arr. Anab. 1.25.1). Philip likely required a significant amount of manpower, and though Thracian troops were required to serve in the Macedonian army (DS 17.17.4; Ar. Anab. 1.14.3), it is unlikely that they were used immediately as garrison troops in Thrace. The force that Philip took with him, after a year of campaigning, had suffered defeats in his extension of the Thracian campaign across the straits (e.g. against Byzantium and Perinthus – DS 16.76.1–4; Plut. Dem. 17.2; Justin, 9.1.5–6; against the Triballi – Justin. 9.3.1–3). In addition to the requirements of garrisoning Thrace, Byzantium had started to demonstrate some hesitation towards Macedonia (see Commentary 8.14, p. 121), which was likely shared by Perinthus. Philip required significant reinforcements to man the forts throughout Thrace and to bolster his forces in preparation for possible attacks on Perinthus and Byzantium, both heavily fortified and difficult to attack. from Macedonia and Thessaly: This remark may be indicative of Philip’s policies in Thrace. While Philip would have requested troops from Macedonia as a matter of course, the only reason Philip would have sent to Thessaly for troops would have been to bolster his cavalry. Cavalry were the most effective military forces in Thessaly as a result of the open plains of the region. It could be a recognition of the need to change the manner of warfare in central Thrace, which was geographically similar to that of Thessaly – large open plains (cf. the archaeological remains of Thracian warrior burials with cavalry equipment; see Archibald, 1998: 247–51 for an outline of the evidence). The request for reinforcements from Thessaly may be an indication that Philip recognised a deficiency in cavalry now that he was fighting in the Thracian plains. The cavalry that Philip probably had with him already were the ‘companions,’ the somatophylakes (see DS 16.93.3–6 for their role under Philip in warfare) and a small number of his lightly armed cavalry (armed with ‘lances’ – see Arr. Anab. 1.15.6). The need for more cavalry is also indicative of how Philip intended to control the region. As he had made a marriage alliance with the Getae in late 342 (Jord., Get. 10.65; Theopomp. BNJ 115 F126; Tronson, 1984: 120–23; Ellis 1976: 166, n. 37, cf. Momigliano, 1933: 341), he already controlled the plains regions of Thrace, where cavalry are the most effective. Philip would have consolidated central Thrace, made the alliance with the Getae to secure the north, then moved against Perinthus and Byzantium in the east. Thessalian cavalry would have been a far more effective garrison force than the less mobile Macedonian hoplites on the Thracian plains.

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should he wait for the Etesian Winds: The Etesian Winds blow from north to south annually from May to September. They featured significantly in Athenian strategic thinking in the fifth and fourth centuries, and this partially explains why Athens based fleets in the north Aegean for extended periods of time. The Etesians made travel to the north Aegean particularly slow, thus Philip, by waiting for the Etesians to blow, could attack Athenian territory and make good the attack before the Athenians were able respond. Demosthenes makes the same argument in an earlier speech (4.31). It also assists in dating the speech (see Introduction, pp. 47, 50). do you think the Byzantines will remain of the same mind as now: Byzantium had been defensively allied with Philip, but had sent their fleet to Thasos, probably at the urging of Diopeithes. The strategos was attempting to turn cities such as Byzantium against Philip and build a coalition of allies against Macedonia in the north. The Byzantine volte face regarding Philip must have happened towards the end of Philip’s expansion east; they probably became increasingly concerned by Philip’s growing power and dominion. This reference by Demosthenes is likely an indication of the later rewriting of the speech to make himself appear prophetic in his understanding of the foreign policy of other states (see Introduction, p. 49). 15  Even if they mistrust someone else more than us they would let them in: Demosthenes is well aware of the tensions that have existed between Athens and Byzantium. He is saying that even if a people existed that the Byzantines distrusted more than Athens that promised to guarantee their safety against Philip, they would rather admit them to the city than an Athenian force. Byzantium, along with Sestus, was an important city for Athenian control of the grain trade (Isaac, 1986: 229–30), crucial in the fourth century for the very survival of Athens as it was situated along the grain route from the Black Sea. 400,000 medimni of wheat came from the Spartocid dynasty alone (Dem. 20.32), dwarfing the supply of grain from Euboea (Moreno, 2007: 162–63; see also the huge convoy of wheat under the supervision of Chares – Moreno, 2007: 207–208). The Byzantines had been Athenian allies from 390 (Xen. Hell. 4.8.25–28; IG II2 41), but had fallen-out with the Athenians in approximately 364 (DS 15.78.4–79.1 claims Theban interference, cf. Cargill, 1981: 169, who asserts a Byzantine desire for autonomy drove the separation). The Byzantines also interfered with the Athenian grain ships in 357 (Isoc. 5.53; [Dem.] 50.6; Nep., Tim. 1.2; IG VII

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2418, lines 11, 20–25). While it had seen a recent period of independence (between 364 and 341 – see below), if the city had fallen to Philip it could have posed a significant threat to Athens. Yet again, Demosthenes plays on the Athenian fears of the loss of the grain trade to persuade his audience that Diopeithes must remain in the north with his naval force for the security of the region. A Macedonian-controlled Byzantium was a major problem for the Athenian grain trade and any ship that did not have a significant military escort would be vulnerable. The Byzantine alliance with Philip, probably in 352 (Dem. 18.87; DS 16.74.4–75.2), would have concerned the Athenians greatly, but they lacked the funds to put such a city to siege. Philip would surely have come to the aid of Byzantium also. Should Byzantium be attacked, Demosthenes asserts that they would surely rather seek Athenian assistance than fall subject to Philip, even though they were allied to him. When they were able to convince Byzantium to return to the Athenian fold, the Byzantines were given a bilateral treaty of alliance. A mission sent to Byzantium in 340 (DS 16.77.2; Plut. Phoc. 14.2.5) was probably a ‘relief’ mission, not an imperial claim of Athens that would allow them to assert control over the city afterwards (Cargill, 1981: 233). It is interesting to note, however, that Demosthenes (18.91) cites a decree of Perinthus and Byzantium that granted part of their land to the Athenians for the assistance given against Philip in 340/39 (see Cargill, 1981: 148 for questions of the document’s authenticity). This alliance with Byzantium after Philip seized the grain ships in 340 was so important to Athens that, as a result of Byzantine mistrust of Chares, the Athenians were willing to replace him with Phocion to appease them (Plut. Phoc. 14.2–4). unless he indeed arrives first and takes it: Demosthenes had no way of knowing that Philip was on the point of marching on Byzantium to besiege both it and its neighbour, Perinthus. It stands to reason, however, that having taken the region, he would then look to the most significant cities on the eastern fringes of his conquest and consider their independence unfavourably. 16  “By Zeus … lacking understanding”: This is the first time in the speech that Demosthenes uses this technique to provide direction in his speech. Demosthenes uses the voice of another person to make a suggestion or provide a critique while distancing himself from it. This can be compared to suggestions such as using the Theoric Fund for military purposes (Dem. 1.19, cf. 3.18–19) or comments on Philip’s health on campaign (Dem. 4.10–1).

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preserve their safety: Demosthenes points out that regardless of the attitude of the Byzantines towards Athens, it is important for Byzantium to be protected. Without Byzantium, Athens would lose secure access to the grain supply. another thing is not at all certain to us, that he will not march against the Chersonese: While Philip may eventually have decided to annex the Thracian Chersonese, it was probably not on his mind at the time. Philip had indeed marched against allies, but they were on his immediate border, evidence of Philip’s continual desire to ensure his borders were secure. Athenian power was located further south and still focused on the Aegean. Philip probably would have been content to let Athens be at this point, providing they did not encroach on his territory; thus, Philip would possibly even have allowed the Chersonese to remain Athenian (Psoma, 2014: 143). if we are to judge from the letter that he sent you, he says he will retaliate against those in the Chersonese: The letter to which Demosthenes refers is not the letter that is included in the Demosthenic corpus as [Demosthenes] 12. The letter was probably received after Diopeithes’ cleruchs had been settled and had started to encroach on Cardian territory. Cargill (1995: 28) claims that Diopeithes must have led attacks on Cardia directly. Nowhere in [Demosthenes] 12 does Philip list such an attack, which would have been equal in outrage to the other listed incidents. It is more likely that the Athenian cleruchs claimed some Cardian territory as their own and the Cardians disputed this (for Cardia’s disputation of the borders of their land, see Dem. 5.25, 6.30, 9.35, 10.60, 65, 68, [Dem.] 7.39–44; Lib. hypoth. 8.2). 17  save the territory: The words Demosthenes uses to denote Athenian territory in the north is chora, a word with heavy connotations with the countryside. It emphasises the rural nature of the region and its productive potential which would have been important for Athens and the cleruchs living in the region. Cf. Dem. 3.27 – “We have been robbed of our own lands (choras oikeias)”. See also Commentary, 8.7, pp. 108–109. inflict some harm on his: Demosthenes may deliberately be ignoring Diopeithes’ actions, as he may already have attacked Philip’s territory. Philip’s letter to the ecclesia mentions that Diopeithes kidnapped Nicias, a Macedonian herald, from his territory ([Dem.] 12.2). While the veracity of this statement is not beyond doubt, it could indicate a raid by Diopeithes on Macedonian territory in which Nicias was captured. At the very least, Diopeithes’ actions had been so clearly those of a war-monger that little

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distinction needed to be made in the eyes of Philip. This is also the first time Demosthenes uses the deictic ekeinos to indicate Philip. Demosthenes only uses Philip’s name in the introduction to establish the Macedonian as the enemy, then he regularly uses ekeinos without a reflexive reference to the name Philip throughout the speech (8.17, 27, 36, 43, 49, 50, 54, 61, 64). This almost creates a combative position towards Philip, as if Demosthenes were trying him in a court case, enhancing the negative image of Philip that Demosthenes was trying to create. “Prosecute Diopeithes, by Zeus”: This is a ridiculous suggestion, and one that Demosthenes does not wish to pursue. He uses the imagined words of another to make a suggestion that he can easily dismiss. It is the first of a series of three questions that Demosthenes is able to wave away: by having an imagined person suggest that help could be sent to the Chersonese from Athens, Demosthenes is able to point out that the Etesian Winds may prevent this, reinforcing his argument that a standing army needs to be maintained in the north. Similarly, by having a suggestion made that this might not all happen, he can point out that Athens has no control over Philip, again reinforcing the idea that a standing army would be the best option. guarantor: The word used is egguetes, which can be associated with the idea of providing a surety to be paid in case of a failure. This emphasises the fact that no-one would ever make themselves liable for the suggestion that Philip would not attack Athenian possessions in the north, making a final reinforcement of the suggestion that a standing army is the best solution to the problem of Philip. 18  What if he leaves Thrace … but appears at Chalcis and Megara, in the same way he did at Oreus: Demosthenes is referencing the theme of Philip’s speed of action to take advantage of Athenian inaction and sloth, used regularly in his rhetoric (for example, 1.14, 3.14–16, 9.50–52, 9.75). Demosthenes argues that as a result of the Etesian Winds, Philip has greater latitude for military action in the north Aegean and he could easily arrive in force at locations that are closer to home, thus bringing the war to Attica, highlighted by the examples of Chalcis, Megara and Oreus. Not long before the speech was delivered, Philip had dispatched a mercenary army led by Hipponicus to stop the creation of a Euboean League headed by Callias of Chalcis (Dem. 9.33, 58). Callias had requested Philip’s support in this venture the year before (Aesch. 3.89–90), but Philip had refused. Now that Callias was receiving support from Athens (Aesch.

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3.90), Philip possibly sought to end this agreement (Worthington, 2013: 215). Supported by Eurylochus and Parmenion (Dem. 9.58), Hipponicus established tyrannies in Eretria, Porthmus and Oreus (the incident specifically mentioned by Demosthenes; see Commentary 8.36, pp. 144–45 for discussion of events involving Oreus; see Commentary 8.59, pp. 156–57 for an outline of the city’s history), simultaneously expelling anti-Macedonian garrisons (Dem. 9.33, 18.71; see also the support for Philistides in Oreus, evidence of some anti-Athenian sentiment – Dem. 9.60–62; Cawkwell, 1963c: 213; Buckler, 2003: 457). These actions may have been a response to Diopeithes’ activities in the Chersonese, forcing Athens to reconsider despatching reinforcements north (Worthington, 2013: 45). See Buckler (2003: 458) for the argument that this was perceived as a threat to the grain supply. In 340, Callias travelled through the Peloponnese, garnering support for an alliance against Philip led by Athens (Aesch. 3.95). It was alleged by Philip ([Dem.] 12.5) that Callias was Athens’ general and he cleared Euboea of Macedonian garrisons, falsely alleging that they were protected by the terms of the Peace. This move would have secured Callias’ own position as tyrant of Chalcis. Demosthenes claims that, amongst other states, the Megarians (in conjunction with the Achaeans) were willing to contribute 60 talents to a war fund totalling 100 talents (Aesch. 3.95–99), indicating their importance in the struggle against Philip and demonstrating a wellconceived policy of Demosthenes (Cawkwell, 1963c: 213; Worthington, 2013: 229). Aeschines alleged that Demosthenes was bribed by Callias to bring it before the ecclesia, but Aeschines deliberately sold Demosthenes short in this affair as a result of the court-room dramas involved in this speech. This proactive policy led to Athens forcing the Macedonians out of Euboea (Philoch. BNJ 328 F 159–60; Worthington, 2013: 29). In 343, Athens had ended a potential coup in Megara led by two men who would support Philip in return for control of Megara. Phocion was sent there and, to safeguard Athenian interests, he had ‘long walls’ built to protect the city from land attacks, in much the same way Athens was protected (Plut. Phoc. 15; Dem. 19.295; Tritle, 1988: 90–91; Hammond and Griffith, 1979: 497–99; Sealey, 1993: 175). Many of the allies garnered by Callias in 340 were from the Peloponnese, which could be cut off by control of Megara. A pro-Macedonia Megara would therefore have been disastrous for Athens as it prepared for war with Philip. Macedonian control of Chalcis and Megara,

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however, was highly unlikely, as Philip was occupied with war preparations in the north against Byzantium, Perinthus and Selymbria (Theopomp., BNJ 115, F217). so recently: Proen, which has the idiomatic meaning of ‘the other day’, indicates how recent the event was, bringing the actions of Philip closer to the Athenians. Chapters 19–20 Demosthenes contrasts the justifiable, even honourable, actions of Diopeithes, fighting a difficult war against Philip with limited support from the home government, with the self-interested actions at home of those who are trying to detract from his noble efforts. He claims that such individuals are only working to further the interests of Philip. 19  the army with which Diopeithes is trying to benefit the city: This is the logical progression of Demosthenes’ logos to this point, that to remove Diopeithes’ army would not be an advantage to the city, but would present Philip with opportunities he would not otherwise have. See Commentary 8.1, pp. 93–94 for the notion of ‘benefit’. 20  the soldiers that Diopeithes now commands, whatever their quality: Demosthenes regularly urges the ecclesia not to continue the trend of sending mercenary forces to fight important battles for the State, but to send citizens as the bulk of the force (for example, 1.6, 1.24, 2.24, 2.27, 3.34, 4.7, 4.19–22, 4.24–25). Demosthenes is again urging citizens to serve in person. He is not saying that a force of Athenian citizens only be sent out. The city, in Demosthenes’ opinion, should allow Diopeithes to increase the force, utilising local forces against Philip. This had already started to happen, with Diopeithes allowing the Byzantines to harbour their navy at Thasos. It is also likely that the Athenian cleruchs in the Chersonese would be requested to serve in Diopeithes’ force. malcontents and people bringing lawsuits: A reference to those ‘fifth columnists’ within Athens who are trying to further Philip’s agenda, possibly not a spurious claim (cf. DS 16.53.3). This is an important and accurate point that Demosthenes makes since Philip would have found Diopeithes’ presence in the region problematic, hence his support of the tyrants in Euboea to distract the Athenians closer to home. Thus, for Philip’s agents in Athens to call for the disbanding and destruction of Diopeithes’ force would have been an excellent outcome for Philip.

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Yet you still wonder in what way are the interests of the city completely ruined: Demosthenes almost seems exasperated with this question, indicating that even though the ecclesia seem to want to stop Philip they are incapable of understanding the connection between their actions and Philip’s apparent surge in fortune. Chapters 21–25 Demosthenes justifies Diopeithes’ actions by references to Athenian history. His methods of raising funds are precedented and accepted practice for Athenian strategoi, yet people still criticise him. The key elements to Demosthenes’ counsel are presented here (21–22): pay the eisphora, serve in person and provide adequate funds for the maintenance of the army in the field. 21  We don’t want to … nor are we able … nor will we: The use of oute repeatedly in this passage emphasises the continuing nature of Athenian unwillingness to do what is necessary. Pay an eisphora: In this context, khremata eispherein means to pay the eisphora, an irregular special tax that is usually levied in times of need, particularly in war. See Christ (2007: 54) for a discussion of the evidence of the first possible instance of an eisphora in 428 (Thuc. 3.19.1), with a discussion of who paid eisphora (cf. Ar. Knights 925–26). The process of antidosis was used to ensure that those who felt they were being unfairly asked to contribute had a method by which they might refer the tax to a more appropriate member of the wealthy class (Gabrielsen, 1987; Christ, 1990), supporting Finley’s claim (1951: 14) that there was no regularised collection method in the fifth century. A reform in 378/7 changed the ad hoc nature of the levying of an eisphora (Philoch. BNJ 328, F41; Dem. 22.44; Polyb. 2.62.6–7; see Christ, 2007: 64 for a discussion of the first aggregate timema at this time, 5,750 talents – Polyb. 2.62.6–7). The reforms instituted summoriai, 100 groups of approximately 15 members each (Harp. s.v. summoria; Hansen, 1991: 113; MacDowell, 1986: 444–46, 449; for arguments for the earlier existence of symmories, see Thomsen, 1964: 133–37; for arguments against, see de Ste Croix, 1953: 58–62). Each symmory was required to pay a 100th part of the regular and irregular levies of the required amount. Between the mid and late-fourth century, the eisphora consisted of a regular payment of ten talents (IG II2 244, lines 19–20; 505, lines 14–17) as well as irregular payments as

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required, probably for specific military campaigns (Din. 1.69). Within each symmory, each member was probably required to pay an amount depending on a submission of his own wealth, a timema (Thomsen, 1964: 84, contra de Ste Croix, 1953: 58, 1966: 91, and Wallace, 1989: 489). Demosthenes (14.16) proposed to increase the aggregate timema to 6000 talents in 354 (Philoch., BNJ 328, F 46). The Athenians recognised the potential abuse for this system, so it is likely that one member in each symmory was required to act as a watch-dog for his own symmory, a diagrapheus (Christ, 2007: 66–67; Harp. s.v. diagramma), ensuring that each members’ timema was an accurate reflection of their wealth. At some point after the initial reforms in 378/77, there was a further reform of the system, with the three wealthiest members of the symmory being designated as proeispherontes and paying the entire eisphora themselves then recouping the money according to each member’s timema. The speaker of [Dem.] 50 talks about himself as one of these men ([Dem.] 50.5–9; Wallace, 1989: 484–85). This was probably reformed as a result of tardy payment from the symmories (Christ, 2007: 68). De Ste Croix (1953: 58–62) says it was in place since 378 but not used until 362, but this is unlikely. The proeispherontes only numbered 300 (Is. 6.60); to collect tax from 300 as opposed to collecting from all those liable (up to 1500) is far easier and less time consuming. Had the system existed prior to 362 it would have been utilised as it would have furnished the money far more quickly and easily. serve ourselves: The fourth century saw an explosion of mercenary forces at the expense of citizen armies, which Demosthenes abhorred. Athens had previously utilised mercenary armies, having been deceived several times at their hands (a fact acknowledged by Demosthenes himself at 4.24–25, reinforced by his acknowledgement of their poor pay at 4.46). For example, Demosthenes could point to the perfidious Charidemus as an example of what can happen with mercenary armies (see Introduction, p. 4). It is clear that Demosthenes believed that a citizen army would have been both more loyal (as a result of not being tempted to fight for the enemy for more money) and steadfast (as the citizens have far more at stake than simply money – their homes, families and temples). This regular topos in Demosthenes’ deliberative rhetoric against Philip is often coupled, as it is here, with the payment of the eisphora. Demosthenes’ use of the verb strateuo implies strongly that direct military activity was required in this dire situation. The combination of paying taxes and fighting

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themselves is a topos in the First and Second Olynthiacs (for example, 1.6, 28, 2.13, 24, 27) and is also used in the First Philippic (for example, 4.7). It is also patently clear that Demosthenes believes everyone has a role to play in the war against Philip, with the wealthy paying the eisphora (Demosthenes urging them to do so with a happy heart, 1.6), and the men in the prime of life serving in person, urging the citizens to act according to their means (2.31). The clear understanding must be that those who have money contribute it to avoid military service (see Dem. 10.35–45 for an expanded argument of this issue of a class divide). military pay: Demosthenes criticises the fact that the Athenians do not actually pay the troops any sort of wage, a misthos, rather than simply provide the grain necessary for the troops. See Commentary 8.24, pp. 129–30, for discussion. 22  support their opponents: This is the third time the verb sunagonizomai is used in a short space (8.19, 20); it is then not used in the speech again. Demosthenes often does this, using a word repetitively to emphasise points, for example using the word “robbed” (apesteresthe) twice in quick succession when talking about what Athens has lost to Philip (twice in 8.63, then again in 8.66). 23  the man in front of you: The speaker at the time in the ecclesia. Pay the eisphora, nor serve in person, not keep your hands off public money: This mirrors the comments made in 8.21 to emphasise what the Athenians are not doing. Even about what they say he is about to do: Demosthenes is playing up the supposedly ridiculous nature of the accusations against Diopeithes, claiming that they are indicting him for what he is about to do rather than what he has done. 24  I will speak freely, for I am unable to do anything else: Demosthenes commonly claims that he is one of the only speakers to address the people from an altruistic motive (see Introduction, pp. 29–30). He often criticises the ecclesia, as he has just done (8.23), examining affairs ‘meta parrhesias’ (8.21). The bold nature of Demosthenes in speaking the unvarnished truth, an essential aspect of Demosthenes’ ethos (see Introduction, pp. 34–35), is designed to impress the audience. All generals that have ever sailed from your lands: During the fifth century, it was normal practice for a strategos to be given pay for the maintenance (siteresia/trophe) of their troops. It was the norm in the

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fourth century for this to be a minimal amount; the strategos was expected to raise the money himself. This privatisation of Athenian naval financing had become regularised in this period through lack of funds and resulted in the Athenian strategoi engaging in the same piratical activities of which Diopeithes is accused (see Commentary 8.9, pp. 114–15). or I will suffer any penalty whatever: In both forensic and deliberative oratory, speakers occasionally stated that if they were speaking untruthfully, the people should punish them. Demosthenes does this here to enhance his ethos as a speaker, emphasising the parrhesia (free and honest speech) he claims always to provide. For similar examples, see also Dem. 59.82; Andoc. 1.11, 26; Isoc. 15.51 (cf. 4.14), 99, 106. take money: The word used, lambano, is a very direct word emphasising the direct nature of the action. Demosthenes could have used another word to make the actions of Diopeithes seem less aggressive, but Demosthenes was trying to emphasise the fact that this was essentially a time-honoured tradition (see Commentary 8.9, pp. 113–16). It was indeed commonplace for Athenian generals to raise money from states in the manner explicitly stated here while on campaigns; it was organised, state-sanctioned revenue raising at a time when Athens could ill-afford to maintain a fleet of any significance. There was a well-established tradition of Athens funding for a naval campaign (see, for example, DS 13.69.5; Plut. Alc. 29.3; Aesch. 2.71; see Badian, 1995 98–99 for a discussion of similar actions by Chares in starting the Social War, cf. Cargill, 1981: 171). With the establishment of the Second Naval Confederacy, the Athenians preferred to receive suntaxeis than naval contributions (Badian, 1992: 91–92; Mitchell, 1984: 23; Tod, 1948: no. 142). Demosthenes (4.23) goes as far as to suggest that since it was too expensive to provide funds for a full naval force they should ‘leisteuein’ to conduct naval warfare against Philip. This revenue-raising was not limited to cities, however, and included attacking an enemy’s triremes (for example, Xen. Hell. 5.1.21; Thuc. 2.67.4; or, more recently, [Dem.] 12.3–4). Also see de Souza (1995: 180) for a discussion of the fine line between war and piracy; cf. Timocrates’ seizure of booty in 355 (Dem. 24.11–12) which threatened naval traders. These types of actions were seen in Athens as necessary, as they had decided that by the mid-350s, under the guidance of Eubulus, there were not the funds to pay for extensive campaigns (Badian, 1992: 104; Cawkwell, 1963d: 50–51). It must have been acceptable to both the demos and their leaders that Athens raised funds in this manner through the use of

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superior force rather than any legal obligation to pay as allies (Badian, 1992: 104). That strategoi were forced to conduct such fund-raising campaigns was a result of poor policies by the demos and their leaders (Cawkwell, 1984: 339). In this respect, Demosthenes is right to protect Diopeithes in his actions, as the demos had indeed effectively decided that this was an acceptable way to fund campaigns. That Diopeithes was not charged as a result of his actions is indicative of the tacit approval of this modus operandi of strategoi. from the Chians and Erythraeans: The explicit naming of Chius and Erythrae in this context has been explained by Badian (1995: 104) as Diopeithes raising money from these two cities. This is possible; Chius is noted as a wealthy city (Sarikakis, 1986). The Phaselite naukleros discussed elsewhere by Demosthenes (35.52–54), disembarked Apollodoros, sailing to the Thieves Harbour then Chius (see Isager and Hansen, 1975: 172), indicating its location on the eastern trade route. Funds would have been easier to extract at a wealthy city. Similarly, Erythrae, located on the shores of Ionia opposite the island of Chius, was probably also a significant trading port, hence the harsh Athenian treatment of both cities during the fifth century. Erythrae was probably influenced at this time (as may Chius have been) by the Carian dynasts, evidenced by the alliance of Erythrae and Hermias in the 350s (Rhodes and Osborne, 2003: no. 56, 68) and this was continued through the decade, as witnessed by an inscription for his son (SEG xxxi.969). The lack of reference to the demos tends to suggest that the government was oligarchic (Rhodes and Osborne, 2003: 266). Possible Athenian interference in this region (for which we have no evidence except for this comment), may indicate that Athens became involved to weaken the influence of the Carian dynasty over these two cities. ‘Contributions’ to the Athenian war effort in the north may have been made by Chius and Erythrae in an effort to gain Athenian favour, but Badian’s explanation is unlikely. However, there were equally wealthy cities from which Diopeithes could raise money closer to his specified destination. It is also possible that this is evidence for later Demosthenic editorialising as part of the rewriting and publication process. The two states, particularly Chius, were at odds with Athens after the Social War but Demosthenes recognised the need to gain support from Chius in fighting Philip at Byzantium. This reference may simply be an attempt to revive Athenian considerations of the wealthy states in an attempt to gain allies for the war with Philip.

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Chius and Erythrae were both cities with a long-standing history with Athens. In 394, Conon was honoured by Erythrae with ateleia, citizenship and a bronze statue after he successfully detached the city from the control of Sparta, Chius joining the Athenians in rebuffing the Spartans at this time (Rhodes and Osborne, 2003: no. 8; DS 14.84.3–4). In the period leading up to 386, Athens made an agreement with the city not to return exiles forcibly or turn the city over to Persia should a peace be made (Rhodes and Osborne, 2003: 74–77). In 384, the Chians proposed an alliance with Athens (Tod, 1948: no. 118), probably concerned about the war between Persia and Evagoras and its potential impact on them (see DS 15.2.3). This pro-Athenian attitude changed as early as 364. Thebes discussed revolt from Athens with Chius, Rhodes and Byzantium, probably indicating disaffection with these major allies as early as this point (DS 15.78.4–79.1; Isoc. 5.53). Byzantium left the Athenian confederacy at this time, attacking Athenian grain vessels soon after ([Dem.] 50.6). By 357, Chius was allied with Rhodes and Byzantium against Athens, successfully throwing off Athenian control (for the narrative of events, see DS 16.7.3–4, 21.1–22.2). 25  one or two ships: For a notable exception to this principle, see Plutarch’s description of Phocion successfully raising money with only one ship (Plut. Phoc. 7.1–2). Demosthenes means that in order to raise money successfully, it was necessary to blockade the harbour rather than persuade through negotiation as a blockade would have been far more effective with a “larger force”. merchants: The exact nature of the term emporos is unclear. An emporos carried out interstate trade and relied on this interstate trade as the basis for his subsistence. In this context, Philo’s description of an emporos as an enudros (de. op. mun. 147) is correct as emporoi conducted most of their trade by water. The Aegean would have forced emporoi to work only for six to nine months ([Dem.] 56.30; Casson, 1971: 270–73). Since most were not wealthy, in contrast to naukleroi (Reed, 2003: 34–36), the type of revenueraising action by Athens, outlined above, must have made life difficult for traders, who already had to deal with ‘true’ piracy (Plut. Cim. 8.3–4; Thuc. 2.67.4; Andoc. 1.138), and may even be sold into slavery ([Dem.] 12.5). Moreover, the ship taken in 355 by Athenians to the value of nine and a half talents (Dem. 24.11–12) as a result of Egypt being in a state of revolt from Persia, with whom Athens was allied, indicates the political nature that this type of activity could possess. It would also have served to assert

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Athenian dominance over weaker states while simultaneously depriving a city of goods needed to survive, such as grain (see Tandy, 2015: 64 for the importance of grain trade to cities who were not self-sufficient). To blockade and confiscate the goods from emporoi from a particular state must have been politically sensitive. The emporoi, already poor, would have been prevented from making money from trade because of the blockade. They could have persuaded their government to pay the ‘contribution’ by placing political pressure on the government. This action would simultaneously have made the port appear to other emporoi less reliable as a docking port, therefore creating a double reason for the state to ‘contribute’ to the blockading fleet. their own ships: Finley (1953: 329, 333–34) uses this phrase to prove that emporoi did sometimes own their own vessels. He associates the possessive genitive with “tous … emporous”, but it is more logical in this context to associate the possessive genitive with “par’ auton ekpleontas”, indicating the vessels belong to the owners of the ports. Hence the phrase refers to the vessels of emporoi from the state being blockaded by Athens. While no Greek city gave preferential treatment to its own citizens for trade as it was a free market (de Ste Croix, 1972: 393–96; Austin, 1994: 161; Cartledge, 1998: 15), many traders would likely have come from the state in whose port they dock. raided: Again, the word used implies a very aggressive action, almost pillaging, as if an act of war. For a similar description from Demosthenes, see 2.28, 18.139. ‘benevolences’: ‘Eunoiai’ is the term used for the money given by allied states to Athens as an irregular payment, or contribution. When used in this context, it is very rare, with only one other instance (Isoc. 12.116). Demosthenes also uses the term in his oration against Aeschines (19.282), where he attacks associates of Aeschines as never having given an eunoia. In this context, it is an acceptable aspect of private life in Athens, used to build a reciprocal relationship. This specific usage, however, is a euphemism for what could be termed ‘protection money’. Whiston (1859: 177) translated the term as “blackmail”, not inaccurately.

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Chapter 26 This is the central point in the logos, the key point that Demosthenes is arguing. Diopeithes needs funds; he has been forced to act in a way for which he is criticised by his enemies, but without doing this, Diopeithes will be unable to maintain his army. 26  if he has no money himself whatsoever: We have no example from the fourth century of a strategos using his own money to finance this aspect of the fleet. Demosthenes is likely saying this to allay any suspicion of Diopeithes as being financially able to do so but refusing to, just in case this was raised at a later time. Demosthenes is not using this phrase to refer to the money raised by blockading ports and merchants. He says that a strategos is required to collect funds to maintain his crews (8.25), showing that benevolences were necessary. Borrowing is therefore not meant either, though this was previously done. For example, in 374/73, Timotheus was forced to borrow 1351 drachmae from Pasion and 700 drachmae from each of his trierarchs ([Dem.] 49.6–8, 11–12, 44; the incompleteness of his crews is noted by Xen. Hell. 6.2.11–12). He then had to borrow a further 1000 drachmae from an unnamed source to furnish pay for the Boeotians ([Dem.] 49.15). If this was standard practice, however, Demosthenes would have to make an argument to show why Diopeithes did not borrow at this time. While it was expected of the trierarchs to contribute to this aspect of warfare as part of their trierarchy, the state usually provided enough funds to cover the cost of daily maintenance (Gabrielsen, 1994: 110–14; see, for example, Apollodoros claims at [Dem.] 50.10). Again, siteresia was provided for the crew in Demosthenes’ plan in the First Philippic (4.22, 28). Moreover, Thrasybulus was sent out in 389/88, but it is clear that he was not lacking in money for siteresia, even though the extra money he raised from both the Hellespont and Thrace, then the coast of Asia Minor, would have been extra incentive for his fleet to stay with him. Therefore, it is the payment of troops that is lacking in these instances, possibly leading to the rowers abandoning the fleet (Cawkwell, 1984: 339; Dem. 2.28, 4.24; schol. Dem. 3.31; de Ste Croix, 1972: 293, 607 n.37). When a strategos was forced to remain in a region for a particularly long period of time, larger amounts of money would have been necessary (for example, Chares in 353: DS 16.22.1). In 373/72, Iphicrates raided Syracusan ships and exacted money from allies in the region of Corcyra, but billeted out his rowers as farmers to the Corcyraeans; this seems to have been an exceptional instance. Thus, Diopeithes was

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exacting money from harbours and merchants to ensure that extra money was raised to provide the misthos (separate from trophe/siteresia– Pritchett, 1971: 3–6). Chapters 27–30 Demosthenes argues in this section that Diopeithes should be allowed to act as he is doing because if his actions go beyond what he should do, the Athenians can recall him through legal procedures; hence, all of the talk about impeaching him for what he is about to do is irrelevant. The real threat to Athens is those men who are trying to recall Diopeithes. 27  doing nothing other than warning everyone: By downplaying what the people accusing Diopeithes are saying, he is trying to minimise their argument. In conjunction with the comment at the end of the chapter, claiming that these men really do care about other cities more than Athens, he is damning them twice in quick succession in two different ways, enhancing his own standing. he will be punished … not for anything he … has achieved: Athenians were aware that to deny self-interest was not in human nature, hence it was expected that individuals in office would enhance the State by ensuring that whatever they were trying to achieve for themselves also coincided with the benefit of the city (Christ, 2006: 16–24) and not be to the detriment of Athens. Had it been thought that Diopeithes had been acting in a way that benefitted himself at the expense of the State, this would have been an easy charge to lay against him in court after being summoned back to Athens. See Christ (2006: 40–44) for a discussion of the role of the individual, rather than the State, in moderating the public behaviour of individuals in Athens. “He betrays the Greeks”: Demosthenes would have been compelled to discuss the argument that, even though these cities were indeed Greek by the standards of his day, defined as such through autonomy and independence, it was such a standard practice to raise money from them that any such act by Diopeithes should be looked upon as necessary and paralleled through history and in contemporary practice. ‘Besieging the Greeks’ was probably offensive to some of the Athenians in the ecclesia so Demosthenes felt the need to defend against the accusation. the Greeks living in Asia: Any Greeks who lived in Asia and followed Greek customs, a standard term of reference in this period (incorporating many communities, Hall, 2002: 122; see, for example, Isoc. 4.162, 5.111,

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120; cf. Aesch. 3.163, 238). This is indicative of a more Panhellenic notion of ‘Greekness’ (Said, 2001: 277), though Herodotus (8.144.2) indicates this much earlier. This distinction of ‘Hellenic’ has been drawn in opposition to barbarians, those fit to be slaves (Ar. Pol. 1285a21). Early examples of this notion of Panhellenism can be seen in Xenophon (1.6.7; Cartledge, 1992: 59–60) and can later be seen in Isocrates (ep. 9.8, 4.43, 5.126). The regions referred to by Demosthenes were more independent regions than in previous times, with the increasing decentralisation of Persian authority in the 360s leading to a renewed focus on the individual city (Cook, 1962: 140). 28  sending of another general: Should Diopeithes be recalled and tried for his actions while abroad as strategos, another general would have been sent to replace him. The process by which this would happen is outlined in three brief words (8.29: “…decree, impeachment, Paralus”). a little notice: A pinakion was an important piece of legal and judicial paraphernalia. This reference is an ideological connection, however, to the people’s right to judge a strategos should his conduct be deemed inappropriate or outside his mandate. It was used in a range of democratic settings (for discussion, see Kroll, 1972: 61–62; see Dow, 1963: 658 for the pinakion as a tradeable item at this time). In this instance, it was the tablet on which the name of the person charged with eisangelia was inscribed, along with the name of the person charging and the details of the charge (Ar. Ath. Pol. 48.4; there is no reason for the detail here not to be similar for all uses of the pinakion in this legal context). This was then taken to the individual being charged and likely read out by a kleter (see Commentary, 8.29, p. 137). We have no existing pinakia with a summons for an eisangelia and, therefore, we do not know if the summons was written onto a wooden/ bronze tablet of the same fashion as judicial pinakia (see Kroll, 1972: 7 and Dow, 1963: 657 for discussion). 29  decree, impeachment: It would be logical for Demosthenes here to order the series of events that would take place in the event of a strategos being recalled. The psephisma was the initial decree formulated after a majority of citizens in the ecclesia voted in favour of the proposal for a summons (for a discussion of the various types of eisangelia, see Hansen, 1975: 21–28). It could be a reference to the law that has been broken, or a law formulated in response to the situation, but this is unlikely as Demosthenes seems to be talking about a specific sequence of events. After the legal reforms of 403, nomoi were of a more general and permanent nature

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whereas psephismata were specific and of short duration (Todd, 1993: 57; Hansen, 1978; 1979). Also, psephismata could be enacted by the ecclesia without a quorum, whereas nomoi were enacted only by the nomothetai and required a quorum in the ecclesia for their ratification (Hansen, 1987: 112– 13; Todd, 1993: 295). Once a majority voted in favour, an eisangelia was formally made and inscribed on a pinakion (see Commentary 8.28, p. 136) which was then sent out to the individual. We have several examples of this procedure (see Hansen, 1975: cat. 80, 90, 96 for examples). Apocheirotonia is the distinguishing mark for these types of procedures as it appears to be the preliminary step for the deposition of a strategos on active service ([Ar.] Ath. Pol. 61.2; Hansen, 1975: 41–44; Harrison, 1971: 59). The pinakion containing the eisangelia was then sent out on one of the vessels of state, the Paralus, and read to the individual by kleteres (Harrison, 1971: 85–86). It is also important to note that the verb from which the word eisangelia stems (eisangello) also carries a sense of taking a message (Eur. Bacc. 173; Thuc. 1.116.3, 3.3.3), as the pinakion outlining the details needed to be taken to the person being charged on the state-vessel. Paralus: The Paralus was one of two vessels reserved for special stateservice (Aesch. 3.162; Ar. Birds 1204). For example, the Paralus was sent by the Athenian fleet at Samos to the 400 in Athens (Thuc. 8.74.1). Service on the Paralus was considered a significant honour in Athens (Dem. 21.172– 74, regardless of Demosthenes’ invective against Meidias). The other state vessel, the Salaminia, was also used for State service, and in the case of Alcibiades in 416 the Salaminia was sent to recall him for his eisangelia (Thuc. 6.53.1, 61.4–7). The reason for specifically naming the Paralus here and not the Salaminia is unclear; perhaps in this period the Paralus was used for the recall of such strategoi in these instances. For a detailed account of the Paralus, see Hale (2009: 123–25). men … trying to damage and ruin our interests: The point being made is that people who have the best interests of the State at heart would follow the process outlined (decree, impeachment, Paralus), while those who are not interested in the welfare of the State would make accusations (cf. 8.27), which only takes the focus away from what needs to happen while bringing unnecessary attention on the person who is able to solve the crisis on the spot, Diopeithes. 30  You people sitting here: Demosthenes is bringing the crux of the problem to the Athenian people themselves, who listen to speakers proposing

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measures that are not in the interest of the State. This puts forward the notion that while these speakers are bad, the people are almost willingly being misled. Diopeithes, or Chares, or Aristophon: The association of Chares, Aristophon and Diopeithes here is significant for political reasons. Aristophon probably led the political support for Chares in the mid-350s through the prosecution of Timotheus and Iphicrates after the Battle of Embata. Demosthenes, in the 340s, began to associate himself with Chares in order to further his own ideas about war with Philip, having Diopeithes elected strategos to continue to place pressure on Philip in the north. Aristophon was an anomaly for his age, being both a general and a politician (for discussion, see Hansen, 1983: 49–55). His recorded career began in 404/03 when he was awarded ateleia for his assistance in restoring the democracy (Dem. 20.148). In the years that immediately follow, he proposed the reintroduction of Solon’s law regarding the payment of the metoikion for metics trading in the Agora. He then proposed that a certain Gelarchus be repaid the five talents he lent to the counter-revolutionaries in the Piraeus (Dem. 20.149). After this, there appears a significant lacuna in his career (for discussion, see Oost, 1977), but this should not necessarily lead us to believe that he was not active in this period (Whitehead, 1986: 317–18). His appointment as strategos in 363/62, where he saw active service in the Aegean, is the next recorded instance of Aristophon’s activity (schol. Aesch. 1.64; Sealey, 1993: 91–92) and this is accompanied with a flurry of political and legislative activity (IG II2 111 of 363/62; [Dem.] 50.6 of 362/61; IG II2 118 of 361/60; IG II2 121 of 357/56; IG II2 130 of 355/54; Dem. 24.11 of 354/54; Dem. 18.70, 75 of 346–40; IG II2 224 of 343/42; see also Sealey, 1993: 72–73); he may also have been a bouletes at this time (Whitehead, 1986: 314). Aeschines (3.139) talks about prominent supporters of Boeotia/Thebes, of which Aristophon is named as a man who “for a long time had been accused of going over to the Boeotians”, which is also supported by Demosthenes (18.162, 219). Aeschines (3.194) also says that Aristophon once boasted of being accused through graphe paranomonon on 75 occasions; this is an exaggeration, but still indicative of his prominence over an extended period of time (see Oost, 1977: 240). Moreover, Demosthenes’ list of great orators of Athens suggests that Aristophon had been politically significant for an extended period of time. Aristophon’s inclusion here with Chares and Diopeithes also suggests that he may have had military experience. The only known strategia of Aristophon is in 363/62, hardly a distinguished

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military career. It is therefore likely that Aristophon had been both militarily and politically active in the period between 403 and 362 (see Whitehead, 1986: 317–18 for discussion). This unfortunate lacuna in his career has been created by the dearth of source material for the period between the 390s and 370s, while the prominence of other generals in this time would take the focus away from his activities. His association with Chares and Diopeithes seems political, with all three supporting a more vigorous policy in the north against the opposition of Eubulus and his supporters. It is clear that Aristophon was a supporter of Chares against the political faction led by Timotheus and Iphicrates as he prosecuted them (Din. 1.14, 3.17; Ael. VH 14.3; Ar. Rhet. 1398 a5; Sealey, 1993: 84). The apparent resurgence in the career of Aristophon in 364/3 may have been a direct consequence of a political alliance with Chares and it is tempting to see the result of this working both for Aristophon (in this appointment and the flurry of legislative activity at this time) and for Chares (Aristophon was the proposer of Chares’ appointment to replace Leosthenes in Thessaly: Dem. 51.8–9; DS 15.95.2–3). This alliance may have been the reason for Eubulus’ opposition to Aristophon (Dem. 18.162, 19.291, 21.218 and schol. 21.218); both Aristophon and Chares were in support of actively prosecuting the wars in the north, whereas Eubulus favoured being selective in where and when Athens fought after the Social War for financial reasons (Sealey, 1955: 76). While Chares probably saw a hiatus in his career as a result of Eubulus’ political dominance, it was soon resurgent (schol. Dem. 3.31; Cawkwell, 1963d: 58–59 sees his prosecution of Timotheus at this time as a possible indication of his resurgence). Chares was to follow a more ‘imperialist’ policy with the support of the other ‘imperialist’ political grouping led by Aristophon. Demosthenes had probably decided in the early 340s that Chares was an appropriate military ally to further his own political aims of prosecuting war with Philip (Salmond, 1996: 45), bringing him into a tacit agreement with Aristophon’s policies also. Therefore, Aristophon and Chares, supporters of active warfare to defend Athenian interests, were associated with Diopeithes in the speech to give validity to his actions. to be vexed: Demosthenes uses this word twice in relatively quick succession (also in 8.32), and it is a word that he rarely uses in his corpus (only fourteen times). It seems to imply a frustration that the ecclesia is able to feel but not control, subtly removing the blame from them in a small way as they are being constrained by things out of their control.

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Chapters 32–34 Demosthenes lays some of the blame for the current situation on the Athenian people – they have been trained to be almost submissive in the ecclesia by speakers who only provide advice that they want to hear. 32  speak freely: The notion of parrhesia is tied up with the ethos of Demosthenes (see Introduction, pp. 29–30, 34–35). By begging the ecclesia the indulgence to speak freely, a speaker appears more honest and genuine, concerned that his ‘free speech’ might lead to repercussions for him, but in doing it anyway he seems willing to risk the punishment as it is in the best interest of the city to sacrifice his own safety to give them the best possible advice. Cf. Dem. Ex. 27.1; 10.54, 3.3; see also Isoc. 15.179; see also Commentary, 8.24, pp. 129, 130. dangerous and … unforgiving … contemptible and lazy: A pleonasm, again making the point that the ecclesia need to shoulder some of the blame for the situation in which Athens continually finds itself against Philip. 33  gentle and humane … dangerous and unforgiving: Demosthenes uses one of the pair of words from above (dangerous and unforgiving) as the ecclesia would have expected to be described, again in another pleonasm to emphasise his point. Chapters 35–37 In the final section of the first logos, Demosthenes points out that the Athenians have been idle in their approach to Philip at a time when they could have benefitted from his absence. Instead, as a result of their inactivity, the Athenians now face a threat in Euboea also. He uses extensive imagined speech from other Greeks to ask difficult questions of the Athenians, to make his own criticism of the Athenians seem like the words of other people. 35  do you send us ambassadors: Athens had sent a series of embassies to states around Greece to warn the Greeks about the dangers of Philip, yet Demosthenes makes the point that Athens, when they had an excellent chance to make ground against Philip, did not take the opportunity. The last of this series of embassies was sent only in 343, but since 348 Athens had been sending out embassies to raise allies against Philip unsuccessfully. The embassy sent in 348 should be seen as a result of the Macedonian capture of Olynthus (for this dating and its problems, see Harris, 1995: 158–61). Proposed by Eubulus (Dem. 19.304), it had been led by Aeschines and

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attempted to initiate a conference of Greeks to form a long-term alliance against the Macedonians (Dem. 19.10–11). Aeschines was sent out to the Arcadians but, after initial promise, was unsuccessful, leading him to support the peace with Philip in 346 (Aesch. 2.79). Eubulus’ support of the embassies must have been recognition of the need to build an alliance-system close to home to fight Philip if he came south, rather than the later expansive (and expensive) proposals of Demosthenes to fight Philip in the north away from Attica (see Cawkwell, 1963d: 61–66 for an outline of Eubulus’ policies). The lack of success was continued in 344, when Demosthenes successfully had himself appointed ambassador to the Peloponnese with similar results (Lib. Hypoth. Dem. 6.3); indeed, the Argives and Messenians sent embassies back to Athens to complain of their hypocrisy of claiming to fight for all of Greece while supporting Sparta in their attempt to re-subjugate the Peloponnese. It was not until the embassy in 343/42 (Dem. 9.72), when Athens clearly cut ties with Sparta that some of the Peloponnesian states (though many were allied to Philip at the time – see Ellis, 1986: 158), Argos, Messene, Megalopolis, Mantinea and Achaea, made an alliance with Athens (Dem. 9.72; IG II2 225; schol. Aesch. 3.83; Harris, 1995: 119), possibly as a result of Demosthenes’ scare-mongering, recorded by Isocrates (5.73–75). It is of note that of the Peloponnesian states, only the Achaeans fought with Athens in 338 (Ryder, 2000: 88, n.55). away for ten months: Similar to 8.2, Demosthenes is referencing the fact that Philip has been away for ten months and the Athenians are still unable to make any headway against him, even close to home in Euboea. 36 Euboea: At the time of the speech, Athens felt threatened by the loss of Euboea, leading to an alliance with Chalcis with whom they were soon to fight anti-Athenian Euboean cities that had been supported by Macedonian forces. Demosthenes (19.87, 204, 219, 326) alleged that Philip was in the process of establishing bases around Euboea to ensure pro-Macedonian support against Athens in key cities. This is demonstrably false; Philip was very pleased to be able to intervene at this time to his advantage to support an anti-Athenian movement and to cause discomfort for Athens so close to home, even though he did not initiate the situation. It is more likely that an anti-Athenian element in Euboea was the primary driver of these events. Teegarden (2014: 58) supports Demosthenes’ concerns about Philip, claiming that this would have placed the grain supply under pressure. It is worth noting, however, that Demosthenes, who never misses an opportunity

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to raise concerns about Philip’s ascendancy, does not mention this here. Demosthenes was clever in his use of scare tactics in his speeches and would surely have used this fear if there was a plausible concern. It is more likely that Demosthenes used these instances of Philip’s involvement in Euboea and the geographical proximity to Attica to push the Athenians to declare war with him as a result of fear of Macedonian involvement with a state closer to home (see Commentary 8.18, pp. 124–25). Euboea had always been important to Athens, particularly for grain. Thucydides (8.96.1) claims that there was greater terror at the thought of losing Euboea in revolt in 411 than there was felt at the loss of the Sicilian expedition. The island of Atalante was fortified as a naval base in 431 to enhance Athenian control over the island (Thuc. 2.32.1; DS 12.44.1; IG I3 41, line 39 indicates the threat to the Euboean grain route posed by piracy). Pericles’ siege of Euboea (schol. Ar. Cl. 213a) and the naval resources used to guard this important Athenian granary (Thuc. 3.17.2, 8.74.2, 86.9) serves to underline the value placed on Euboea by the Athenians during the fifth century (for discussion about the nature of Athenian defences of Euboea as the main grain supply, see Moreno, 2007: 118–40). Many of the major cities of the island were allies of Athens through much of the fourth century (see Cawkwell, 1978a: 43–45 and Brunt, 1969: 247– 51 for an outline of the major events; for Timotheus’ involvement in 357, see Commentary 8.74, pp. 175–76). This changed dramatically in the 340s when a pan-Euboean movement arose. This movement was neither proMacedonian nor anti-Athenian, but rather was a continuation of the policies that saw the four major cities (Chalcis, Eretria, Carystus and Histiaea/Oreus) continue to push for greater autonomy both for themselves and for Euboea as a whole (see Larsen, 1968: 97–103). In 352, Eretria was a firm ally of Athens. It was ruled by a tyrant, Menestratus. Plutarchus succeeded him and he was noted by Demosthenes (21.110, 200) as a friend of Meidias (a prominent Athenian politician, associate of Hegesippus and political enemy of Demosthenes – see PA no. 9719; PAA, no. 637270; for a discussion of Meidias’ enmity towards Demosthenes, see Worthington, 2013: 21–22, 146–47, 156–62; Wilson, 2004). It could be conjectured that Plutarchus may have been seen in Eretria as too pro-Athenian; in 348, Cleitarchus, an opponent of Plutarchus, obtained support from Phocis and opposed the pro-Athenian tyrant. Plutarchus appealed to the Athenians for help (Dem. 5.5 with schol.; Aesch. 3.86 with

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schol.). Phocion was sent to the island (Plut. Phoc. 12.1), finally defeating Cleitarchus’ Euboean forces at the Battle of Tamynae. Plutarchus may have demonstrated poor judgment in some way in this conflict, as Phocion decided to expel Plutarchus and restore Eretria to the demos (Plut. Phoc. 13.4; Dem. 9.57). It seems that Eretria remained in the Athenian confederacy at this time (Cawkwell, 1978b: 46). This Athenian involvement seems somehow to have caused a stirring of Euboean nationalist sentiments around the island. At some point between 348 and 346, Callias of Chalcis and his brother, Taurosthenes, used this dislike of Athenian interference in Euboean affairs to assemble an army from all of Euboea, supported by Phalaecus of Phocis (Aesch. 3.87). At some point, Phocion’s successor, Molossus, was captured (Plut. Phoc. 14.1), thus fighting must have continued between 348 and 346. It is likely that Chalcis was the focus of fighting, not Eretria (Dem. 5.5 – hence the alliance with Plutarchus). Athens seems to have retained some control of the island during this time (Cawkwell, 1978b; Dem. 19.52 says that the strategos Proxenus was based at Oreus). Fighting continued until 346, when an embassy arrived from Callias with terms for peace. Philip also asked his Chalcidian friends to inform the Athenians that he also wished to make peace with them (Aesch. 2.12; Dem. 19.52, 155), demonstrating a close relationship between Callias and Philip, rather than Macedonian control of Euboea. Aeschines (2.120) and Demosthenes (19.22) both allege that Philip vowed “to hand Euboea over”, but this must mean that Philip would be willing to step back from his obvious friendship with Chalcis and a budding Euboean League to allow firmer Athenian control of the whole island. Also, Demosthenes (19.326) makes it clear that this may have been part of a ploy to ensure his control of Amphipolis in exchange for his withdrawal of support for the Euboean cities. Soon after the peace was made between Athens and Chalcis (possibly as early as 345), Callias started to desire complete independence for Euboea. To ensure wider support of their pan-Euboean sentiments, he first enlisted the support of Philip (Aesch. 3.89). This was an important action only if he saw a threat from Athens in the future. Athens always desired the seaward protection of Attica provided by Euboea (Dem. 18.301), so it is likely that, even though Chalcis was at peace with Athens, the creation of an independent Euboean League could be perceived as a threat to Athens. Soon after this, Callias and

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Philip had a falling-out for unknown reasons (Aesch. 3.90). Callias then tried to enlist Theban support but he was also rebuffed by them. At some point soon after 343 (at the time of Dem. 19, the Euboeans were clearly not in good Athenian graces – cf. Dem. 19.75, 334), Callias made an appeal to Athens out of fear of a Macedonian invasion. This appeal to Athens may again have initiated an anti-Athenian movement in Euboea, as the pro-Macedonian party established control in Eretria and expelled the pro-Athenian democrats at some point in 342 (Dem. 9.60). A fear of Chalcidian dominance was also likely a concern for the Euboeans. Eretria then appears to have invited the Macedonians to support their regime and spread their influence through Euboea. It is interesting that Demosthenes clearly shows that the people of Oreus, the centre of these actions, were keen supporters of the anti-Athenians (Dem. 9.61–62), indicating an undercurrent of anti-Athenian sentiment. Philip sent Hipponicus to secure the anti-Athenian movement in power in Eretria, led by Cleitarchus, Hipparchus and Automedon. Hipponicus destroyed the fortifications at Porthmus and removed the democrats holed-up there to ensure that the Athenians did not make a landing on the island (Dem. 9.33, 57–58; Ellis, 1976: 164). There must have been push-back from proAthenians in the city as Philip then had to send Eurylochus then Parmenion to support the tyrants (Dem. 9.57–58). It was probably the third Macedonian invasion that took Oreus in support of the pro-Macedonian government there (see also Commentary, 8.18, pp. 124–26). When the Macedonians approached Oreus proclaiming friendship, the pro-Macedonian party may have betrayed the city (Dem. 9.58–62). Euphraeus, a pro-Athenian democrat in Oreus, had been taken prisoner; at this point, he appears to have committed suicide (Dem. 9.62), but a variant tradition says he was killed by Parmenion (Athen. Deip., 508e). Five men, led by Philistides, were then put into power in Oreus. This Macedonian involvement is further reported by Diodorus (16.74.1), who says that in the archon year 341/40, Philistides, who had been put in power by Philip, was defeated by Phocion. See also Aeschines (3.90–95) for his narrative of events of the campaign. The dating is particularly difficult and insecure; the speeches of both Demosthenes and Aeschines compress events, misrepresent facts and leave dates out to create rhetorical effects. The mention in Demosthenes (9.58) about Eurylochus and Parmenion may be later insertions, but may preserve a tradition that is correct and supported by the historian Carystius (Brunt,

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1969: 253). This would mean that there were three Macedonian invasions in a two-year period, a distinct possibility considering that Philip would have seen the benefits of keeping the Athenians occupied while he consolidated his power in the north. Athens soon regained dominance over the island. Philochorus (BNJ 328 F159) claims that in Scirophorion of 342/41, Athens made an alliance with Chalcis and the Chalcidians then freed Oreus. At the time that On the Chersonese was written, Athens may have made the alliance with Chalcis (Dem. 8.18; Brunt, 1969: 255) but it is unlikely that they had won back control of Oreus. Demosthenes asserts that the Eretrians refused the appeals of an embassy and chose to support Cleitarchus instead (mid-342). He then claimed to have had embassies sent out to the Peloponnese and Euboea (18.79). This embassy to Euboea could have led to the embassies from Cleitarchus and Philistides that stayed with Aeschines (Dem. 18.82), possibly in late 342. Forces were then sent out at Demosthenes’ persuasion once Philip had sent troops to secure pro-Macedonian forces in the Euboean cities. The embassy mentioned by Aeschines (3.100–01) is likely after Oreus and Eretria had been brought back into the Athenian fold (as Brunt, 1969: 257 also outlines). See Teegarden (2014: 68–70 and n.1–2), Sealey (1993: 260) and Ellis (1976: 162–166, 279, n.109) for discussions of various chronological possibilities. See also Hermann (2019: 251–58) for another account of events. near Sciathus: Sciathus was an important naval base for the Athenian forces in the Aegean. Due to its prime location for intercepting naval traffic down the east coast of Greece, it was well-situated as a naval base (see Hdt. 8.92.1 for its use by Persia in 479). Demosthenes (4.32) also equates the island’s importance with that of Lemnos and Thasos as Athenian bases that could be used to provision and prepare for naval war with Philip. An anti-Athenian Oreus could indeed cause a problem for the Athenian navy on Sciathus as it would limit Athenian contact with the navy based there. Also, should the Athenians lose their influence in Eretria they would have no way of navigating easily off the east coast of Attica. This was, indeed, a genuine threat to Athens and the grain route, particularly if the Chalcidians were to continue with their belligerent manner, as the long way around Euboea had proven to be unsafe throughout history (see, for example, Hdt. 8.13.1). It is not, however, evidence in itself that Philip was trying to cause these specific problems for Athens, though he clearly benefitted from this Athenian discomfort.

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Second Logos (38–51) Demosthenes begins his second logos with a clear change in tone, moving from attacking Philip directly to a more focused approach explaining how Athens should approach the problem. Philip remains the focus of the logos, but it is in conjunction with reasons for Athenian actions that he is discussed. Chapter 38 The first section of the logos states that Athenian actions to date have been ineffective, and Demosthenes is about to propose what would be of benefit for the city, providing the Athenians are willing to act. 38  I won’t … avoid talking precisely about each detail: Demosthenes often enumerates actions that should be taken in response to a particular crisis, doing so right from the very first deliberative speech for which we have a record (On the symmories, 14.14–30; cf. 1.17–20, 2.11–13, 3.10–20, 4.16–29). Demosthenes regularly delves into detail about the proposals, as he does here, but not nearly as much as he has previously done, possibly because the central arguments (provide funds for Diopeithes, send ambassadors around Greece and punish dangerous politicians in Athens) do not require detailed planning. those people: Referencing the politicians who speak for their own reasons, asking questions to trip up a speaker such as Demosthenes who is endeavouring to speak only for the benefit of the city. Chapters 39–40 The second section of this logos makes the bold statement that Philip is at war with Athens, claiming that he is trying to destroy the city. Demosthenes provides examples to show what happens to those who place too much trust in Philip. 39  Philip makes war upon the city and has broken the peace: Demosthenes makes this point first as it is probably the issue that was most hotly debated at the time. In point of fact, Philip had carefully avoided breaking the peace and Demosthenes is at such pains to argue this because it is simply untrue. See Introduction, pp. 6–13 for discussion. 40  Euthycrates and Lasthenes of Olynthus: In 349, Philip reduced the city of Olynthus after a long siege (DS 16.53–2–3; for discussion of the campaign, see Cawkwell, 1978b: 82–90; Buckler, 2003: 436–39; Ellis, 1976:

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93–95, 98–99). Euthycrates and Lasthenes were Olynthians who favoured a close relationship with Macedonia. Demosthenes (19.265) alleged that they were given payment in kind for service to Philip (timber for housing and livestock – see DS 16.53.3 for Philip’s boast about his effective use of bribery) When Euthycrates and Lasthenes had gained enough political support, they secured the exile of the pro-Athenian leader, Apollonides, who escaped to Athens and was eventually given Athenian citizenship (Dem. 59.91), though this was later rescinded through graphe paranomon (see Osborne, 1983: 62–64). When Philip marched against Olynthus, Demosthenes alleged that Philip bought the allegiance of the Olynthian cavalry, who, led by Euthycrates, went over to him at the outset of the attack on the city (Dem. 9.56, 19.265–67), thus ensuring the defeat of Olynthus. Hyperides (fr. 76) even claimed that Euthycrates was involved in assessing the worth of his fellow citizens for ransom after the sack of the city. Olynthus was destroyed to remove the power of the Chalcidian League from Philip’s southern border. He claimed that the war was over the Olynthian support of contenders for his throne (Aesch. 2.27; Just. 8.3.10), but his expansion seems comparable to his later motivation of securing safe borders for his kingdom. Philip used deception to ensure a strong position before his initial attack on Olynthus – Demosthenes (9.11) lists examples of the times where Philip used this tactic to gain an advantage. The city had previously been allied with Philip, the Macedonian securing their good will by capturing Potidaea (an Athenian colony at the time) and giving it to Olynthus as a gift (DS 16.8.3–5). There were two major groupings in Olynthus at this point, however, those who looked to Macedonia to secure their independence and those who sought Athenian protection of their independence. In about 352, the pro-Athenian camp had the upper hand and Olynthus actively started to seek Athenian insurance against growing Macedonian power (Dem. 3.7, 23.109). This forced Philip to secure his southern border against Athenian involvement. After three appeals to Athens, who vacillated and were unable to man a significant force at this time, Philip managed to take the city through the assistance of the pro-Macedonian leaders Euthycrates and Lasthenes, but Philip may have wanted to make an example of those who turned away from his alliances. Philip thus destroyed the city and sold the inhabitants into slavery (DS 16.53.2–3; Dem. 19.194, 306, 9.26). our constitution: The politeia of Athens had been a debated issue for generations, leading to a number of works written about the democracy

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in the late fifth and fourth centuries (for discussion of the criticism of the politeia of Athens, see Ober, 1998: 27–36, 39–43). The nature of Athenian democracy, that anyone had the power to speak as they wished, is framed by Demosthenes as the antithesis of, and feared by, Philip and his tyranny. Chapters 41–42 Demosthenes explains in this section that Philip’s fear of Athens is justified as the Athenians present the most considerable threat to him. This is a result of the Athenian capacity for leadership and the democracy, which is anathema to Philip and monarchic government. 41  while you have a democratic constitution: lit. “…for as long as you practise democracy”. those who have been forced into a union with him: While there were some states that were brought forcibly under Macedonian control, the reason that Athenian embassies were not successfully bringing an alliance against Philip was because he made alliances with states, bringing them benefits (see Introduction, pp. 10, 11, 12–13 for an outline of his actions in this respect). Perhaps this is again evidence of later rewriting, as some of Philip’s allies did indeed desert him, but it is probably more of a rhetorical flourish designed to further impugn Philip’s standing to the Athenian people. 42  not well disposed by nature to grasp and possess leadership: Perhaps Demosthenes is not a student of his own city’s history, but the arche (the word used here for leadership) of the fifth century indicated a clear disposition towards seizing leadership (e.g. Thuc. 3.37–1–5), and the Social War of 357–55 could also be evidence of a certain willingness on the part of the Athenian people to assume the mantle of leadership of the Greeks, often for their own benefit. he certainly does not want your freedom to wait for the right time to act: Demosthenes is suggesting that the Athenians, with their tradition of freedom of speech and action, would seize upon any opportunity to throw of Philip’s oppression; hence, Philip would not want the democracy to continue to exist should he conquer Athens. Chapter 43 The central point of the logos is made here, that Philip is the absolute enemy of democracy and he is bent on destroying Athens as a result. This matches up with the second section of the prooemium and, in many ways, provides

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a central point of the entire speech. The first logos focuses on the actions of Diopeithes in relation to Philip, while the third logos explores the threat that Athenians in the pay of Philip pose to the city; both of them are linked conceptually to the notion that Philip wants the city destroyed. This unifies the entire speech, creating an argument that moves through different ideas but always returns to the key point, the threat posed by Philip. 43  his current activities and preparations: Philip was on campaign in Thrace, and while this could be depicted as deliberately planning against Athens, it was done to consolidate his eastern borders. See Introduction, pp. 6–7 for Philip’s desire for strong borders at all costs. For Demosthenes’ description of Philip’s motivations as a stereotype of thoughts on tyranny in Athens, see Harris, 2018: 176–77). Chapters 44–45 This section points to Philip’s activities in Thrace. Though he is currently attacking virtually unknown locations in the north, Demosthenes explains that it is to take Athens that he is willing to suffer hardship in besieging these remote outposts. 44  Drongilus, Cabyle and Mastira: Nothing is known of Drongilus or Mastira, but Cabyle is an attested site of significance well into the late Classical period (see von Bredow, 2006, for a brief outline of its later history). Cabyle is the modern Bulgarian city of Kabile, located on the major highway to Bulgaria’s largest port, Burgas, and on a river, the Tundja. The ancient city was located in the northern plains and, as such, was possibly a key city for controlling access between the Thracian plains and the areas to the north of Thrace, and between the mountain passes and the Thracian coastline. It could be assumed that Drongilos and Mastira were similarly significant sites on the Thracian plains and possession of them may indicate Philip’s desire to control Thrace more directly, in contrast to his previous policy. The reorganisation of the cities may have included the repopulation of these cities with Macedonians (Hammond, 1994: 139); Philip did occasionally do this, but only in response to military pressures. This practice seems to have been used to strengthen borders against invaders (Ellis, 1976: 136, 167–68) and this may also have occurred here. Diodorus (16.71.2) simply says that he founded strong cities at key locations. It is possible that these cities were garrisoned with Macedonian troops and augmented with a Macedonian civilian population.

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45  the Athenian harbours, the dockyards, the triremes: There were three harbours in Piraeus: Zea, the largest of the naval ports, with 196 shipsheds, Cantharus, with 94, and Munychia with 82 (IG II21628.552–59; IG II2 1629.1030–36). Cantharus was the largest port, however, and was surrounded on land by five stoas (schol. Ar. Peace, 145). The harbours were also fortified, making them reliable centres of naval power and commerce. For a detailed account of Piraeus and its geography in the fourth century, see Garland (2001: 37–45). the silver mines: The primary silver mines of Athens were the mines of Laurium and Maroneia, though we do know details about various others. It is possible that Laurium was mined from as early as 515 (Aperghis, 2013: 12). The famous silver strike of 483/82 was from the mine at Maronea ([Ar]. Ath. Pol. 22.7), and it provided the boom for Athens that was used to construct Themistocles’ triremes. Similarly, a boom in mining from 345–40 may also have contributed to a financial windfall outlined by Demosthenes, leading to Athenian revenues growing from 130 talents to 400 talents (Dem. 10.37– 38; Aperghis, 2013: 12). Hence it would have been a desirable addition to Philip’s growing list of possessions and, should Athens be defeated in a war with Philip, this would have been a significant loss to the city. Chapters 46–49 The penultimate section of the logos is important, as it emphasises the point that Athens needs to act immediately. Moreover, it is clearer about the sort of actions that Athens needs to take to prepare successfully to counter Philip’s movements. Demosthenes also acknowledges that the cost of these activities will be substantial, incurring losses of all types, but without this, the losses would be far more severe later on. Also, Demosthenes points out that not to act would be unworthy of the Athenians’ ancestors and their tradition of defending Greece. 47  a board of treasurers and a staff of public slaves … demand … an account of the actions from the general: There were a number of checks on magistrates in Athens. In addition to those outlined above (Commentary 8.2, pp. 97–99), which checked the power and actions of a strategos during his campaigns in the field, they were also required to undergo the euthynai at the end of their tenure in office. Their account, including financial records, were submitted to the board of logistai ([Ar.] Ath. Pol 54.2), and they were examined within 30 days of the end of their tenure of office (Harp.

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s.v. logistai). After analysis of the accounts, any person who wanted could come forward with an accusation of the official (Dem. 18.117). For a period of three days after this, officials sat next to the Monument of Eponymous Heroes and took any complaints that members of the public might wish to level about the conduct of officials in the course of their tenure and the case was brought before a court, with the man lodging the complaint required to act as chief accuser ([Ar.] Ath. Pol. 54.2). We only know the name of 15 instances of euthynai in court (see Hansen, 1989: 10, n.32 for discussion). There also existed a board of ten logistai (not to be confused with the board of logistai who conducted proceedings after the official’s term in office), who were elected from the boule to conduct financial audits of the officials each prytany ([Ar.] Ath. Pol. 48.3; Lys. 30.5), though this would have been impractical, hence Demosthenes’ suggestion for a tamias (treasurer) to be sent on campaign to guarantee that public money was not being handled inappropriately. Strategoi would have received money from a tamias in Athens prior to departure, and he was required to account for all of the money he was given (Davies, 1994: 207–208). Part of this process would have been an account of the money that was raised through ‘benevolences’ in the fashion of which Diopeithes was being accused (see Commentary 8.9, pp. 114–15; Dem. 20.77–80; Lys. 28.5). Concerns about a strategos in the field may have been discussed at a kuria ecclesia, the time when officials in office were discussed ([Ar.] Ath. Pol. 43.4). As Hamel (1998: 128), points out, we do not know if the euthynai of a strategos was in any way different or more intense than any other magistrate, though it does seem as though strategoi were not audited throughout their term in office as it would have been impractical to recall a strategos from the field (Hamel, 1998: 129). 48  great expenditure: This may be directed at those whose policies were more concerned with protecting Athenian finances and who advocated a more conservative foreign policy. For a discussion of this type of thinking, see Commentary 8.30, pp. 139. 49  unworthy of … the achievements of your ancestors: Demosthenes regularly makes comparisons between the willingness of the Athenians to fight and contribute meaningfully in his time and in times gone by of Athenian greatness. He does this not to attack the Athenians, but to encourage them to emulate their forebears. Demosthenes depicts Athens as the city who ensured that other Greeks could enjoy freedom (2.24; 9.36), selfless in every possible way (3.23–26). This is in contrast to the selfish interest of

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some Athenians who seem to be leading the people away from their heroic past and allowing Philip to enslave the Greeks without the Athenians lifting a finger for the sake of their own ease and repose. For a detailed discussion of this topos, see Westwood (2020: 17–26), who talks about the way that the audience’s basic historical knowledge was shaped by the orator. Chapters 50–51 Demosthenes finishes the logos with an explanation that without action, Philip will grow stronger. By waiting for Philip to act, Demosthenes claims that the Athenians are acting like slaves and will suffer the fate of a slave. 51  as for what necessity means to a slave: Demosthenes claims that the people of Athens are acting like slaves – unable to act or react of their own accord, being bound by the actions of their master. Like a slave, the Athenians now have a master, Philip, and they are waiting to be guided by his actions rather than act independently to counter his movements. This would have been a powerful comparison for the Athenians, and it appears nowhere in extant deliberative oratory. Slavery is a topos that is used in the speech a number of times to show the result of Athenian inaction, the enslavement of everyone of Athens to Philip. Cf. Isoc. 4.96, where the Athenian ancestors are used to show that they do not allow the Greeks to fall into slavery. for a slave it is violence and physical abuse: Demosthenes makes a clear comparison between the citizens of Athens and slaves; if the Athenians do not act appropriately and check their actions, they could feel the same whip that a slave does. Though slaves in Athens were treated relatively well in comparison to other cities and cultures of the time, slaves still suffered corporal punishment (e.g. Ar. Knights 64; Lys. 1.18; Xen. Oec. 3.4; schol. Aesch. 2.79; SEG 26 72.30–32; IG II 2 333.7); indeed, the only testimony from a slave that could be presented to an Athenian court was testimony extracted through torture (Is. 8.12; Dem. 49.55, though it was not always accepted: Gagarin, 1996: 5–8, who also points out the ideological implication that this procedure served to remind slaves of their position in society). However, slaves could not legally be put to death by their master (Ant. 5.48). Moreover, the physical scarring that could be left on a slave had an impact on the Greeks, where the looks of a person told the Greeks a lot about the sort of person they were (for discussion, see Wrenhaven, 2012: 44–48), thus creating a particularly powerful impact on Demosthenes’ audience.

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Third Logos (52–75) The final logos of the speech concentrates on the role of a speaker in Athens. Much of the focus is on the actions of the speakers who are advocating policies that will lead to the destruction of Athens. In contrast, Demosthenes depicts himself as one of the speakers to whom the people should listen. If this does not happen, and the speakers motivated by greed or personal malice are followed, Athens will be destroyed by Philip. Chapters 52–54 Demosthenes begins the logos by explaining that the result of following bad advice is short-term repose but long-term suffering. He claims that the expense of fighting Philip effectively is far outweighed by the cost of doing nothing. 52  certain persons are promoting a policy designed to harm you: A reference back to the men in Athens who are Philip’s supporters, last talked about in 8.40. Demosthenes spent much of the previous logos exploring points that stemmed from his discussion of the fate of people such as Euthycrates and Lasthenes, and this links his current logos back to the previous one and pointing forward to the current one where this is a focus. This creates a remarkable flow in the arguments, allowing Demosthenes to move seamlessly through a range of ideas and connect the central ideas of the logoi. 53  for them the consequence is popularity: This points towards the key idea of Demosthenes’ third logos, moving from the theme of the second logos, the threat to the city, to the threat of individuals within the city posing a serious problem. Instead of being punished, these men are rewarded with fame and honour. Moreover, it is not that they have necessarily been bribed by Philip; the men that Demosthenes is talking about are just as likely to be proposing such ideas because they know the people of Athens want to hear them, while Demosthenes is urging them not to put their heads in the sand and ignore the harsh realities of their time. he who is waging war: The Athenians do not need to be persuaded not to wage war, according to Demosthenes, as the Athenians are already unwilling. The challenge for speakers is to convince Philip not to wage war, and if this can be done, peace will be possible. However, as Demosthenes has continually pointed out, this is not possible as Philip is unable to make peace with Athens in Demosthenes’ opinion.

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54  continually spend money: A reference to the cost of maintaining an army that is appropriately provisioned for a substantial period of time in the north Aegean. “despoiling the finances”: This could be a reference to a previous speech that Demosthenes is rebutting, with a suggestion as to how this could be overcome. The “They” to whom he refers would be the people arguing that spending so much money in defence of Athenian-held territory in the north Aegean is not profitable. If this is an imagined argument, such as those earlier in the speech (e.g. 8.16, 17, 27), the people who would make this sort of argument are the people about whom Demosthenes is talking, above (8.53). If indeed it is an imagined argument, it was likely something being discussed broadly in the public domain as Demosthenes would not want to introduce ideas that could be used against him. Chapters 55–57 Demosthenes claims that the Athenians’ wealth is being plundered by Philip, their wealth being the good-will and friendship of the Greek states that Philip is attacking. The reason the Athenians are allowing this to happen, he claims, is that the ecclesia is listening to the advice of the wrong sort of people, who are managing to deflect attention from Philip to speakers, like himself, who are advocating a policy that the Athenians might not want to hear. 55  he is plundering them in this way to harm you: Demosthenes is characterising the Greeks as assets of Athens, similar to his point at 8.66 (“…I consider the wealth of a city to be allies…”). 56  clearly advancing with an army: This is probably not a reference to Philip’s current activities in Thrace, but to Philip’s march into Thessaly when he ended the Sacred War and took possession of Thermopylae. In response to this, Demosthenes successfully urged a resolution to be passed declaring a ‘state of emergency’ in Attica. See Introduction, p. 11. they accuse these men: Demosthenes is one of the men being accused of warmongering by his political opponents. While the actions against Byzantium and Perinthus would have posed a threat to the grain supply of Athens, Philip’s actions had always been to consolidate the borders of his kingdom, not to threaten Athens. Hence, the accusation of warmongering is probably not inaccurate. 57  the reasonable anger that would come from you … to be directed

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to those proposing the wisest counsel: If Athens were to go to war with Philip, there would no doubt be losses of life, land and money, even if Athens prosecuted such a war successfully. According to Demosthenes, those people bribed by Philip are trying to keep Athens out of the war, but if Athens entered war, Philip’s men would be able to say during a war that warmongers such as Demosthenes started the war and they should be blamed. This would have the double effect of removing Philip’s enemies and assisting in ending the war more expeditiously to achieve a peace favourable to Philip. This is the meaning of what they said: A reference back to 8.4, the comment Demosthenes “… heard said in the boule the other day …”. to be decided: The word used is diadikasia, a word used to denote legal disputes. For example, Demosthenes uses the term in a number of his forensic speeches (e.g. 28.17, 44.7, 47.26). For its use more broadly in forensic oratory, see Aesch. 3.146; Lys. 17.1. For its similar use in nonforensic texts, see Plato, Laws 11.916c, 937d, 12.952d; Xen. Cyr. 8.1.18. Chapters 58–59 This section begins to move towards a focus on Philip again, with Demosthenes saying that Philip’s protestations of not being at war with Athens are false. He provides examples of Philip’s perfidy to show that Philip cannot be trusted in his claims. 58  now sending help to Cardia: The issue at hand here is that Diopeithes has decided to attack the Cardians. This was a flagrantly provocative act, as the Cardians were allies of Philip under the terms of the Peace (Dem. 19.174, 23.181; Lib. Hypoth. 8.3–4). Soon after this speech, Demosthenes (9.16) tries to justify this act by saying that the King of Persia and all of the Greeks recognised the Thracian Chersonese as Athenian, an outright deception to justify Diopeithes’ actions. In response to these attacks, Philip chose to act through diplomacy, again demonstrating restraint at the unreasonable attacks by Athens on his allies. He sent an embassy to Athens to renegotiate the peace, proposing a symbole ([Dem.] 7.9) and demonstrating a desire to make a common cause against the pirates in the Aegean ([Dem.] 7.14–15). It is clear that in this embassy, Philip rejected Athenian claims to Cardia ([Dem.] 7.29), asking Athens to submit the dispute to an arbitration ([Dem.] 7.41). The letter Philip sent with this embassy is that referred to by Demosthenes (9.16) and it is clear that Athens rejected Philip’s proposals, including the suggestion of arbitration with Cardia (Dem. 9.71–72).

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Cardia was a crucial city in the region, a coastal city located on the ‘neck’ of the Thracian Chersonese. Founded as a joint colony of Miletus and Clazomenae in the seventh century BC (Str. 7, fr. 51), it was one of the key cities by which Miltiades was able to strengthen Athenian control in the region in the mid-sixth century (see Appendix 3, pp. 190–91). Since that time, it had been variously Persian (Hdt. 6.41.1, 9.115.1) and Athenian again (Plut., Cim. 14.1) but had been independent since Lysander’s expulsion of Athenians from the region in 404 (Xen. Hell. 2.2.2, 2.3.8–10; Andok. 3.15). Athens continually desired complete control over the Chersonese and this was formalised in the Common Peace in 371, where Athenian control of the region was allegedly recognised (Dem. 9.16). The reality was quite different, however, and it is clear that Cardia continued to maintain a firm independence from Athens. This independence was recognised in 353 when Cersobleptes, fearing a Macedonian invasion, made an alliance with Athens in 353 (see Introduction, p. 6; Commentary 8.8, pp. 110–11). The Chersonese was gifted to Athens with the noted exception of Cardia (DS 16.34.4; Dem. 9.16), an independent state over which Cersobleptes must have had no control. Before the Peace of Philocrates, Philip entered an alliance with Cardia, the most likely time being after Philip’s defeat of Cersobleptes in 352 (contra Ellis, 1976: 280, n.117). The only way that such a strategicallylocated city would have been allowed to maintain its independence from direct Macedonian control was by making an alliance at this point. It seems to have been a site that Philip wished to protect, as he may have made clear in his alleged letter ([Dem.] 12.11) and Demosthenes (5.25, 23.181– 82) expressed displeasure at that the fact that Athens did not control this important city. if he tried to refute that: Demosthenes is arguing that Philip is at war with Athens, but Philip has little interest in sending any embassy to refute this fact as Athens is in a state of denial. If Philip was to send an embassy to Athens explaining why he is helping Cardia and the other locations, it might only serve to bring attention to the fact and work against Macedonian policy. 59  Oreus, when he was leading an army in their territory: Demosthenes appears to be misleading the ecclesia deliberately when he claims that Philip led a surprise attack on Oreus. A pro-Macedonian faction gained control of the city in the face of the pro-Athenian democracy and established a tyranny. They then gained the support of Philip and invited his involvement, rather than Philip misleading the Oreitai. See Commentary 8.36, p. 144.

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Oreus was the name more frequently used in this period for the city also known as Histiaea (Str. 10.1.3). The city was the most important in the region as it looked directly over the narrows of the north Euboean Gulf and controlled fertile land in the region. It had already been a significant Bronze Age site (Homer, Il. 2.537, notes it as a vine-growing region) and it continued its strategic importance down into the classical period (Stillwell, et al., 1976: s.v. Histiaea). The area was taken by the Persians after the Battle of Artemisium (Hdt. 8.23.1). After the expulsion of the Persians, it was then made a tributary member of the Athenian arche (see Meritt, McGregor and Wade-Gery, 1950: 197–99 for discussion), but after a revolt in 446, the Athenians made an example of them and had their land confiscated with cleruchs settled in their place (Thuc. 1.114.3; DS 12.22.2; Str. 10.1.3; Pl. Per. 23.2). From this point on, it was known as Oreus, leading Stillwell et al. (1976, s.v. Histiaea) to suggest that the cleruchs settled at the port town Oreus. After the Peloponnesian War, the city is not mentioned in any significant context until it joined the Second Athenian League in 376/75 (DS 15.30.3–5; listed as Histiaea at IG II2 43, line 114), when supporters of Jason of Pherae were expelled in favour of local control, closely allying themselves with Sparta. Chabrias brought it into the League by force, evidenced by the garrison he left at Histiaea (DS 15.30.5). As a result of its strategic location, the Athenians used the port as a base (Dem. 19.155, cf. Dem. 19.52, Aesch. 2.133). There was also a strong pro-Athenian presence in the city (Dem. 9.58–62), possibly the cause of the anti-Athenian reactions in the late 340s (see Commentary 8.36, p. 144). Strabo (10.1.3) claims that the tyrant Philistides (see Commentary 8.36, p. 144) enlarged the population of the town with other Euboeans after the Battle of Leuctra; while the chronology may be incorrect, it possibly reflects a genuine tradition. The town was a significant strategic site and Philistides may have wanted to increase the population to ensure that he was able to hold it against a likely Athenian invasion. nor Pherae earlier, when he was attacking their walls: It is alleged by Demosthenes that Philip attacked cities after he had denied that it was his intention to do so. Demosthenes is probably alluding to events in 352 when Philip returned to Thessaly and took Pherae. Pherae was one of the two main cities of Thessaly, the other being Larisa. Pherae controlled the port of Pagasae, the most significant port of Thessaly (Ellis, 1976: 84) and it was through control of this port’s tax duties that

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Pherae derived a significant portion of its income and its power (Dem. 1.22; IG IV 617, though from a later period). It has also been suggested that a significant proportion of its wealth was raised by acting as middlemen for Larisan merchants (Westlake, 1935: 49). Pherae seceded from the coinage-based confederacy of Thessaly, led by Larisa, in the middle of the fifth century (Westlake, 1935: 34) and by 404 Lycophron, tyrant of Pherae, defeated the Larisans and was in control of all Thessaly (Xen. Hell. 2.3.4). It may be at this point that Larisa was also forcibly democratised by Lycophron (Ar. Pol. 1275 b20–30, 1305 b29–30). He would have done this to break the power of the Larisan nobility to remove resistance to Pheraean control of Thessaly. We have limited knowledge of events concerning Lycophron’s tyranny except to say that it was successful. Though he was successful, he also seems to have been used as a pawn by other powers to achieve their own ends (Westlake, 1935: 68). In contrast, his probable son and successor, Jason, actively dictated the direction of Thessaly under his control (there may have been another ruler between Jason and his father, see Sprawski, 1999: 49–51, 58–62; Westlake, 1935: 68–69). Jason continued the friendships with the major powers established by his father. Xenophon (Hell. 6.4.24) has Jason claim that he valued the relationship with Sparta that his father established; Sparta also had a garrison in Pharsalus in 395, which must have had the blessing of Lycophron (DS 14.82.3–5). Jason, through Alcetas of Epirus, also supplied grain to Thebes (Xen. Hell. 5.4.56– 57), indicating a strong relationship, though Jason did not support Theban power to his own disadvantage (Sprawski, 1999: 92–93). He was also on good terms with Athens for a time (Xen. Hell. 6.2.10, referring to events in 374, again through Alcetas). At a time of upheaval in central Greece, Jason was able to use a consolidated position in Thessaly to expand Thessalian influence in a way never done before. In order to strengthen his position in Thessaly, Jason endeavored to have himself elected tagos, an ancient position of pre-eminence in Thessaly, unused for generations. He required the support of the city of Pharsalus, his main rival for power in Thessaly. Unable to resist Jason without support, the Pharsalians sought the assistance of Sparta. When the Spartans were unable to help, Pharsalus acquiesced and Jason was elected tagos in late 374 (Xen. Hell. 6.1.2–19). Diodorus (15.60.5) claimed that his rule was mild, but also alleged that the Thessalians were suspicious of him (15.57.2), probably indicating that there was an increase in the consolidated power of

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the new tagos in Thessaly. Jason successfully expanded his control of the outer regions of Thessaly, reducing Trachinian Heraclea, Oetaea and Malia in 371 after the Battle of Leuctra, indicating a desire to maintain easy access to central Greece, while his reduction of Perrhaebia and the north early in his reign (DS 15.57.2; Xen. Hell. 6.4.27) probably indicates a desire to protect his northern borders from Macedonia. His treaty with Macedonia soon after his election as tagos (DS 15.60.1–2; Isoc. 5.20) may have indicated his growing ambition. Jason’s involvement in the events immediately after the Battle of Leuctra indicate that he possessed considerable standing in the wider Greek world (Xen. Hell. 6.4.20–26; DS 15.54.5 places Jason’s intervention before the Battle of Leuctra – Xenophon, as a contemporary with the events, should be preferred over Diodorus’ account in this instance). Shortly before his death in 370, he was planning to take the leading role in the Pythian festival, possibly ordering the preparation of his army at the same time, allegedly to take control of Delphi (Xen. Hell. 6.4.29–31). This cannot have been true, as he had assiduously cultivated a position of pre-eminence amongst the Greeks through his conduct after Leuctra and this would have done nothing but turn all of Greece against him. His murder stopped this phase of Thessalian growth and those of his murderers who escaped were honoured in the Greek cities (Xen. Hell. 6.4.32). After a period of internal dispute over the succession to Jason (Xen. Hell. 6.4.32–34; DS 15.60.5), Alexander succeeded to the tyranny of Pherae. His rule of eleven years (DS 15.61.2) was allegedly marred by cruelty (DS 15.61.2–3; Plut. Pel. 29.4), probably an indication of an aggressive attitude towards his neighbours. His success was also limited by a newly invigorated Thebes. Early in his tyranny (369), Larisa invited Macedonia to assist in their resistance to Pherae. The Macedonian king took Larisa and fortified it (DS 15.61.3–5), leading to an appeal from Larisa to Thebes to restore their independence from Macedonian control. This led to Pheraean fighting against Thebes (Polyaen. 2.4.2, cf. Front. Strat. 4.7.28); Athens supported Alexander of Pherae against the Thessalian League (IG II2 116, lines 39–40; Dem. 23.120; DS 15.71.4; Athens even cast a bronze statue of him – Plut. Pel. 31.4). This League was created to resist Pheraean attempts to encroach on Thessalian power (most likely created in 369; see Westlake, 1935: 134–35 for discussion of possible dates). After initial successes against both Thebes (DS 15.71.5; Plut. Pel. 29.1–3; Paus. 9.15.2) and the Thessalian League (DS 15.75.1, 15.80.1; Plut. Pel. 29.4, 31.1; Paus. 6.5.2), Alexander was defeated by the Thebans in 363 (Plut. Pel.

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32.1, 35.2; DS 15.80.1–6; Polyaen. 2.3.13). Enrolled as an ally of Thebes (DS 15.80.6), he was forced into piracy to fund his mercenary army ([Dem.] 50.4; DS 15.95.1–2; Polyaen. 6.2.1–2), raising the ire of the Athenians who made an alliance with the Thessalian League against him (IG II2 116, esp. lines 31–48), though no action appears to have been taken (Westlake, 1935: 155). After Alexander’s murder in 358 (DS 16.14.1; Plut. Pel. 35.2–7; Xen. Hell. 6.4.35), his wife’s brothers, his assassins, succeeded him. The final phase of Thessalian history commences with the appeal of the Aleuadae of Larisa to Philip to protect Thessaly from the tyrannical brothers-in-law of Alexander (Theopomp. BNJ 115 F34–35; Harp. s.v. Kineas; DS 16.14.1–2). Ehrhardt (1967: 298) tries to argue that this invasion is a duplicate of 353, arguing that there is a lack of specific evidence for it, but his overall arguments, that it took longer to intervene in 353 when he was stronger and that this was too difficult to do without holding Pydna or Methone, are simply incorrect. His allies in Thessaly, led by Larisa, would have facilitated this invasion. A corruption in the text of Diodorus (16.14.2) leaves it uncertain whether a key word should be read as epanelthon (ἐπανελθών) or parelthon (παρελθών). This transforms the meaning of the sentence dramatically (Griffith, 1970: 68), indicating either that he came to Thessaly (i.e. for the first time) or he returned to Thessaly (after an earlier visit). Philip likely contributed troops to the Thessalian cause at this time (Ellis, 1976: 61); Griffith (1970: 72–73) points out that he did not have much time to devote to this in the early part of his reign, but indicates the importance of ensuring that a unified Thessaly under Pherae did not eventuate again. There is no mention of Philip’s campaign in Thessaly in 357 in Diodorus (16.8.1), possibly further evidence that the King was not present in person. The protectorate established by Philip over Thessaly and his first removal of tyrants from Pherae (Athen. 13.557; Satyros, fr. 5; Just. 9.8.2 – indicating Philip’s son by his Larisan wife) indicates a new stage of Pheraean power. After a return to tyranny at Pherae soon after this, the tyrant Lycophron (brother of Alexander) was again placing pressure on Thessaly, causing the Thessalians again to appeal to Philip in 353, who invaded Thessaly. In response, Lycophron appealed to Phocis, embroiled in the Third Sacred War. After an initial setback, the Phocian army defeated Philip comprehensively, forcing him to retreat from Thessaly (DS 16.35.1–2; Polyaen. 2.38.2). He returned the next year, first forcing Lycophron to desert his Phocian allies

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by taking the port of Pagasae before the Phocians could arrive (DS 16.31.6, 35.4; Erhardt, 1967: 298–300). Philip then defeated the Phocians at the Battle of Crocus Field (DS 16.35.5–6; Just. 8.2.4–7; Paus. 10.2.5). Ehrhardt (1967: 299) and Griffith (1970: 67) both believe that the fall of Pagasae belongs to the period immediately after the capture of Pherae. By cutting off the port before taking Pherae, though, as Diodorus implies in his order of events, Philip denied any possibility of naval support, as almost eventuated from Athens. Demosthenes (4.35) pointed out it was too late to help in any case. It is likely that Lycophron was waiting for the Phocians before he led an attack on the Macedonians – Ellis (1976: 79) points out that there is no mention of the Pheraean forces at Crocus Field. It is also significant that when returning to Thessaly in 352, he had his soldiers wear laurel wreaths to indicate his fidelity to Apollo, though Philip was also at pains to point out his loyalty to his Thessalian allies (Ellis, 1976: 82; Pownall, 1998: 45 suggests that it was done to boost morale). During his subsequent reorganisation of Thessaly, Philip married a Pheraean named Nicesipolis, who was renamed Thessalonice (Athen. 13.557; Steph. Byz. s.v. Thessalonike). Agitation must have continued in Pherae after this, however, with Pitholaus reviving the power of tyrant and possibly causing a disturbance in Thessaly that was quelled by local Macedonian garrisons in 349 (DS 16.52.9; Poly. 9.28.3, 33.2; Just. 8.3.12 reports Philip taking the mines in Thessaly, probably indicating that this was the time that it occurred). There may have been another incident in 348 that caused Larisa to appeal to Philip to limit Pheraean power again (Ellis, 1976: 79), but as part of a final reorganisation of Thessaly in 344, Philip stormed and took Pherae and established a garrison there, an action undertaken in other key cities around Thessaly (DS 16.69.8; Dem. 9.12, 19.260; [Dem.] 7.32). He also set up a decadarchia at Pherae (Dem. 6.22, 9.26), finally ending any independent power of the city. His policy in Thessaly at this time was a continuation of his policy of using force to quell problems on the borders of his kingdom; he also required the support of, and peace in, Thessaly to end the Sacred War (Hammond, 1989: 371–72). nor with Olynthus, at the start, until his army was in their territory: Of the three examples of trickery cited here, this appears to have been the only instance of deliberate deception on the part of Philip. He did indeed use trickery to gain an advantage, not declaring war against the Olynthians until he was in their territory (for discussion of the campaign, see Commentary 8.40, pp. 146–47).

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As an original signatory to the Delian League in 479/78 (Thuc. 5.18.5; Meritt, McGregor and Wade-Gery, 1950: 221, n.125), Olynthus had a long history with Athens and had experienced the full vicissitudes in Athenian imperial practices from the fifth century down to the present period. By the end of the fifth century, like so many cities in the Aegean, they began to determine their own future, establishing a local power-base of some significance in the region (Xen. Hell. 5.2.12–20 – though rhetorical and Spartan-centric, correct in the essential growth of Olynthus at this time; Gude, 1933: 28–29; Buckler, 2003: 159–60). Olynthus made an alliance with Sparta during the Corinthian War but decided to remain a neutral observer during the conflict. None of the cities incorporated into the Olynthian sphere involved themselves in the Corinthian War either. In 393, Amyntas, King of Macedonia, made concessions to Olynthus under the threat of force (DS 15.19–2–3; Xen. Hell. 5.2.12–13) that extended Olynthian territory and gave them highly prized trading concessions (allowing them access to Macedonian timber and pitch). This furthered their power so significantly that Sparta felt the need to humble this burgeoning State in the north, sending two campaigns against Olynthus (Xen. Hell. 5.2.24–25; 5.2.38–39, 5.3.18–20; Buckler, 2003: 159–60; Gude, 1933: 29). Though they were able to defeat the first force sent out against them, Olynthus was not able to repel a second invasion that was much more determined and well directed. Athens had been discussing a treaty with Olynthus at this time (DS 5.2.15) but the Athenians must have decided to remain out of this dangerous conflict, probably deciding that they lacked the resources to face Sparta. By 375, however, the situation had changed and Athens ‘liberated’ the Chalcidice from Sparta and negotiated another treaty with them (IG II2 43, lines 99– 105; Chabrias monument, fr. D-E, Schweigert, 1940: 315–319; Burnett and Edmondson, 1961). By 365, Olynthus must have noted the growing Athenian determination in the region, manifesting itself in their war with Amphipolis. To strengthen their own position in the region, Olynthus assented to garrison Amphipolis (Aesch. 2.27), probably of their own initiative. Timotheus led unsuccessful campaigns against Amphipolis, and possibly Olynthus (see Introduction, p. 4) but by taking Potidaea in approximately 364/63, he managed to create an Athenian presence and re-establish a foothold in the region (DS 15.81.6; Isoc. 15.108, 112–113; Dem. 2.14), the cornerstone of Spartan success earlier in 382. With the rise of Philip in the north, Olynthus must have been a valuable

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buffer state to acquire for both Philip and Athens, and both the Macedonian and the Athenians vied for an alliance in 357/56 (DS 16.8.4). To tempt the Olynthians, Philip offered to give them Potidaea, which he proceeded to take by force, leading to open war with Athens (Dem. 2.7, 6.20; DS 16.8.3, 8.5; IG II2 127, line 42: “[…ton polemon t]on pros Philippon”; see Introduction, p. 5). This immediately strengthened Philip’s position by removing the Athenian presence in the region and enabling him to make the alliance with the Olynthians (Dem. 2.14, 6.20; DS 16.8.4–5; Hammond and Griffith, 1979: 298–99; Hammond, 1994: 33). Spurned, the Athenians then decided to make an alliance with other local powers against Philip (Tod, 1948: no. 157; see discussion in Archibald, 1998: 232; Badian, 1983: 55–57). This was a blow to Athenian policy in the north; they had established Potidaea as a cleruchy (Dem. 4.4, 2.7; Isoc. 15.108, 113; DS 15.81.6) and taken Torone (DS 15.81.6; Isoc. 15.108; Polyaen. 3.10.15) to further their interests in the region. This now removed a significant Athenian presence in the Chalcidice. The alliance between Philip and Olynthus was very advantageous to the Olynthians. Besides gifting them Potidaea after taking it from Athens, Philip also gave them access to the Anthemous River (Dem. 6.20; DS 16.8.5; Lib. Hypoth. 1.3; Steph. Byz. s.v. Anthemous) allowing them to expand their trade. The alliance was published at Olympus, Dium and Delphi after consultation with the Delphic Oracle to advertise the treaty, probably to show Philip’s generous nature to potential allies (Rhodes and Osborne, 2003: no. 50). The growth of Philip’s power in Thessaly and Thrace, however, must have created a certain amount of concern for the Olynthians about the future of their independence. A faction developed within the city as a result and successfully turned popular support away from Philip and towards Athens (Rhodes and Osborne, 2002: no. 50; Dem. 23.108; Lib. Hypoth. 2.4; Steph. Byz. s.v. Anthemous). The Olynthians decided to make a break from Philip while he was abroad and his attention was elsewhere (Lib., Hypoth. 1.4), which was likely welcomed by the Athenians (Hermann, 2019: 82). Considering the significant advantages that Philip had given them, the Olynthians must have harbored strong concerns over Philip’s growth in power. While they may have been swayed by concerns of the nature of Philip as a barbarian (Hammond and Griffith, 1979: 303), the fear of losing their ability to act independently, as had recently happened in Thessaly, was likely the driving concern for these people who had consistently shown a desire for autonomy.

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nothing remains but to be a slave: A reference back to 8.51, where Demosthenes made the point that slaves await what their master will inflict upon them. By not acting, and urging others to act in their place, Athens is taking the role of a slave, unable to act independently or without the guidance or help of others. Chapter 60 The central point of the logos outlines that Athens has more at stake than other cities in Greece. Unlike other cities, Philip knows that the Athenians will not be content with being slaves, hence Philip knows that he must destroy the city entirely. Moreover, should he not destroy the city completely, Philip would be aware that the Athenians will cause problems for him in the future. This makes the point quite powerful, as the Athenians face a choice: acknowledge Philip is at war with Athens and prepare to fight, or be utterly destroyed. He has skillfully used examples to illustrate the likelihood of his argument, making it seem as though anyone who has been deceived by Philip has suffered a severe fate. 60  for you are used to leading: Cf. 8.42, where Demosthenes claims that the Athenians are “not well-disposed by nature to grasp and possess leadership”. This is not a contradiction; Demosthenes claims that the Athenians do not seek to impose their rule on others (8.42), but when leadership is thrust upon them, they are firm leaders who will not allow Philip to lord his power over Greece. Cf. Dem. 3.24, “leading the Greeks”; 6.11, “the leader of Greece”. Chapters 61–66 To tie the ideas in this argument together, Demosthenes indicates that the people who are in the pay of Philip should be treated as enemies and killed. Philip does not need to do favours to Athens to lull them into a false sense of security, as he has done previously, as he has these men speaking on his behalf in the ecclesia. Demosthenes then provides examples of Philip’s treachery towards his friends, continually building an intensely negative image of Philip. 61  those who have sold themselves: A continuation of the topos of slavery, but indicating that those who are advocating a policy of repose towards Philip are the true slaves.

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62  and why does he do good for others: Demosthenes launches here a long topos of the deceptive Philip, who at first befriends cities by giving them what they desire to lull them into a false sense of security, before finally conquering them, using the paradeigmata of Thessaly, Olynthus, Thebes, and others (8.62–65). Athens is unique among Philip’s enemies, he claims, because while he acted generously to other cities prior to their final conquest, Philip has been aggressive to Athens from the outset. Demosthenes claims above that Philip would never allow the Athenians the same latitude and freedoms because of their refusal to bow to his power as slaves (8.60) because the Athenians are used to ruling, not being ruled. the miserable Olynthians he deceived in first giving them Potidaea: Demosthenes claims that Philip deceived the Olynthians by gifting them Potidaea in 356, but this is an exaggeration (for the stereotyped trickery of a tyrant like Philip, see Harris, 2018: 175–76). The gift of Potidaea was a genuine indication of friendship; Philip was forced to act against Olynthus when they made the alliance with Athens, threatening his control of his southern borders. As Diodorus (16.8.4–5) indicates, Olynthus was too important to be allowed to remain independent should the Olynthians break their treaty with Philip and decide an alliance with Athens presented them with greater opportunity. Potidaea was a similarly important city, located on the neck of the Pallene peninsula of the Chalcidice. Demosthenes (2.7) indicates that the gifting of Potidaea to Olynthus was a key aspect of his obtaining the friendship of Olynthus (possibly discussed as part of the terms of a treaty – cf. DS 16.8.3). 63  misleading the Thebans: According to Demosthenes, the Thebans have been misled by Philip’s apparent support for Thebes as leader of the Boeotian Confederacy. Like the other examples cited, they will also be humbled by Philip when he turns on his Theban allies at his leisure. Philip’s support of the Theban leadership of the Boeotian Confederacy stems from their alliance concluded during the Sacred War, when Thebes seemed unable to win the war without the aid of Philip, who entered in a way that made him seem to be the ‘saviour’ of Greece (see Introduction, pp. 9–10, 11; the naming of it as ‘Sacred’ may have held significance as propaganda for this reason; see Pownall, 1998: 39–44). In 357, Thebes brought charges of impiety against Sparta on behalf of the Amphictyonic Council, while other charges were also laid against Phocis (DS 16.23.2–3, 29.2; Justin 8.1.5; Paus. 10.2.1, 15.1). Thebes had been

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brought in by Delphi to support their claim against the Phocians (Buckler, 1989: 18). When Sparta and Phocis had their fines doubled (DS. 16.23.3– 4; Paus. 10.2.2), Phocis went to war with the Amphictyonic League with Spartan support (DS 16.23.4–24.2; Paus. 3.10.3; Justin 8.1.11). After ten years of desultory fighting, Thebes, as head of the Boeotian Confederacy, sent an embassy to Philip to request an alliance with a view to invite his support to end the war with Phocis, which Philip did to win the glory of ending the Sacred War (Dem. 5.22–23, 19.139, 318–325; DS 16.59.2). After Philip successfully intervened in the war, Thebes was given control of the cities in Boeotia taken by Phocis, thus strengthening their control of Boeotia. For a discussion of the issues of the start of the Sacred War and the alliance between Philip and the Boeotian Confederacy, see Buckler, 1989: 15–21, 120–22, 144–45). 64  the cities in Thrace, Doriscus, Serrium: Demosthenes is again trying to make it seem as if Philip is the aggressor, deceiving states and ensuring that he is in the prime position to rob Athens of all its important possessions. The locations listed, Doriscus and Serrium, were indeed crucially strategic locations taken by Philip, but it was not through deception, as Demosthenes implies. Since Thrace was not noted on the Peace of Philocrates (Aesch. 2.81–84, 3.73–74), Philip was entitled to take this region to strengthen his eastern border. Demosthenes (19.150–51) describes the events in such a way as to make it seem as though Philip was not entitled to do this (see Archibald, 1998: 234–37 for discussion of the campaign). Demosthenes (10.8) claims that the Athenians may not have known much about these cities, a fact supported by Aeschines (3.82), where he makes fun of the place names, making them rhyme and jingle in Greek. The loss of these cities led to the defeat of Cersobleptes, the Thracian King and Athenian ally (though not in the Peace of Philocrates; see Commentary 8.2, pp. 95–96). Demosthenes says that he was striving to avoid this (18.27). He claimed that Philip moved against these locations as soon as the peace was signed (9.15), which is probably correct, and he was entitled to do so. This formed part of his campaign against Cersobleptes before he returned to Pella to swear the oaths for peace (Hermann, 2019: 216–17). Ergisce, another strategic location otherwise unknown, is also named as being taken by Philip in this campaign for control in Thrace ([Dem.] 7.37), as is Hieron Oros (Dem. 9.15). Doriscus was an important town located on the eastern Thracian plains near the Hebrus River. During Darius’ invasion of Scythia, he placed a

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garrison in the town (Hdt. 7.59.1), which he also appears to have fortified as it was at a key location on the route north from the coast and situated near the Hebrus to control trade. When Xerxes invaded Greece in 480, Doriscus was the location of the famous enumeration of the army and navy held by Xerxes (Hdt. 7.60–100). Regardless of whether or not the famous inspection of the army and navy happened as retold by Herodotus, it is clear that the fortress was an important staging point – it was one of the key supply depots established prior to the invasion (Hdt. 7.25.2). When Xerxes led his troops away from the fortress, he left Mascames as its garrison commander. Mascames was held in such high esteem that he was sent annual presents from Xerxes, and Artaxerxes gave his descendants high honour (Hdt. 7.105.1–106.3). The invulnerability of Doriscus was demonstrated when he was able to hold the fortress against Greek forces into Herodotus’ own day, indicating its strategic importance. This was indeed an important location for Philip to possess so he could control Thrace. Serrium was another critical access point into Thrace, without which Philip would not have accessed Thrace easily. Strabo (Book 7, fr.47) says one sails on a rough voyage after Maronea to Orthagoria then on to Serrium. It is located on a narrow strip of land between the coast and Mount Serrium. Demosthenes (9.15) talks about Philip taking Serrium and Serreium Teichus (Fort Serreium – different locations), along with Doriscus and Hieron Oros. Serreium Teichus was a fortified town on the eastern coast of Thrace. Athens had a garrison in Serreium Teichus, possibly placed there by the strategos Chares in 352/51 when Cersobleptes made his alliance and treaty with Athens to protect himself against Philip (see Introduction, p. 6; Commentary 8.8, pp. 110–11). They also occupied Hieron Oros; they must have felt that garrisoning these two locations would protect their interests in Thrace against Philip. Hieron Oros was an acropolis, according to Strabo (book 7, fr. 55). Casson (1926: 12–13, 213, 215) identifies the location as a plain, modern Tekfur Dagh. However, a plain is far too expansive to be the single, welldefined point to which ancient sources appear to refer. Hieron Oros has been previously located just south of Miltiades’ wall, at a strategic location on the Hellespont (Ballin, 1978: 67–68). This is a likely location, as it would have been close to the wall to control access to it in some manner, hence the important role it played in controlling the Chersonese. It was also likely that Hieron Oros was located near the coast, as in 362 Miltocythes, in revolt from

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the Thracian King Cotys, was expecting the Athenians to support him with their strongest asset, their fleet (and hence Miltocythes’ alarm when such a small fleet was eventually sent from Athens – Dem. 23.104). An inland location would make little sense in this context, thus the placing of it just south of Miltiades’ wall near the coast would seem to be the most plausible suggestion. Cersobleptes himself: Cersobleptes was the king of eastern Thrace who came to power in 359 with his three brothers on the assassination of their father, Cotys, a highly successful ruler and dangerous to Athens (Ar. Pol. 5.1311 b21–22; Dem. 23.119, 163; Harp. s.v. Kotus). At the time of the speech, Cersobleptes was an Athenian ally, having made a peace treaty in 352. In return for a treaty with his former enemies, Cersobleptes gave Athens the whole of the Chersonese except Cardia to cement the friendship (DS 16.34.4; IG II2 1613, lines 297–300; Archibald, 1998: 233; Buckler, 2003: 431). Through Cersobleptes’ prominent Athenian ambassador, Aristomachus of Alopece (trierarch in approximately 370 – Dem. 23.13– 14; Schaefer, 1885: 421), his general, the mercenary Charidemus (who had fought against Athens many times) was appointed to a northern strategia for Athens (Dem. 3.4–5, 23.13–14). He had already been granted citizenship as part of the peace agreement between Athens and Cersobleptes in 357 (Dem. 23.141, 187–88; see also Parke, 1928; Davies, 1971: 570–72; and Parke, 1970: 125–32, 146 for discussion). Osborne (1982: 77–78) tries to put the grant of citizenship to Charidemus back to 364. This is not likely, due to the fact that Athens would not have trusted Cotys in 363 or 361 and would not likely give the demonstrably hostile Charidemus citizenship to remain on good terms with Cersobleptes. Furthermore, they would not have awarded him the crowns which Demosthenes claims after his refusal to aid Timotheus in 364 (see Introduction, p. 4). Between the years of 357 (the final settlement of the Thracian monarchs and Athens) and 352, Philip had begun to control affairs of Thrace. He had started negotiating for his security with Thracian monarchs as early as 359 by ensuring that a Thracian king, most likely Berisades as the westernmost Thracian kingdom (Archibald, 1998: 216), did not offer sanctuary to the Macedonian usurper Pausanias (DS 16.2.6, 3.4). In response to Philip taking a series of cities in Thrace, an alliance was made against him, which included Athens (see Introduction, p. 5). This alliance did not achieve its purpose. Philip eventually managed to replace two of the Thracians Kings,

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Cetriporis and Amadocus, with Macedonian puppet kings who owed their rule to Philip personally (Archibald, 1998: 232–34). In 355, it appeared that Philip was also working in concert with Cersobleptes to place pressure on Athens (Dem. 23.183; DS 16.34.1; Polyaen. 4.2.22; Archibald, 1998: 233; Buckler, 2003: 412–413). By 353, however, after Philip’s defeat of Phocis at the Crocus Field (see Introduction, p. 11; Commentary 8.59, pp. 160–61), and continual Macedonian growth of power and encroachment into Thrace, Cersobleptes probably felt it was time to make stronger overtures to Athens at the expense of his relations with Philip, changing his alliances yet again. This decision may have been forced on Cersobleptes by Philip’s entry into Thrace as the saviour of the other Thracian kings with whom Cersobleptes had been at war. Archibald (1998: 233) believes that Philip invaded Thrace as a result of the realignment of Athens and Cersobleptes; Philip could also have justified the invasion by painting himself as a saviour, as he had done in Thessaly (see Commentary 8.59, p. 161). Cersobleptes’ attacks on the other Thracian kingdoms (Dem. 23.9–15) allowed him to play this role. The usual rapidity of Philip’s movements would have precluded the ability of Cersobleptes to appeal to Athens for an alliance after an invasion so the alliance must have happened before the invasion of Philip, providing Philip with the necessary impetus to invade Thrace. indemnity is given to speak on behalf of our enemies: Technically, this is correct, as anyone can give whatever advice they wish to give on the topic being discussed. However, a speaker who was suspected of being bribed or treacherous could be tried under eisangelia (see Commentary 8.2, pp. 97–98), while a graphe paranomon procedure could be introduced to prosecute men who put forward proposals that were against the law. For discussion, see Hansen, 1999: 206–210, 212–218. 65  expelling the tyrants: This is a reference to Philip’s expulsion of the tyrants of Pherae, Pitholaus and Lycophron, in 353. See Commentary, 8.59, p. 161, for an outline of events. safe in Thebes until he … destroyed the Phocians: In destroying Phocis, Philip removed a block to Theban power in Boeotia. The Athenians feared that in allowing Phocis to be humbled, it would present Thebes with an opportunity to press Athens along the northern borders of Attica. For an account of these concerns, see Introduction, pp. 10–11. 66  not only robbed you of Amphipolis: Demosthenes is probably correct

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here; it is quite likely that Philip did indeed gain control of Amphipolis through deception. Amphipolis, the jewel in the fifth-century Athenian crown, was a symbol of former Athenian power (for an account of its foundation and the history of Athenian involvement in the region, see Appendix 3, pp. 191–92). The desire to control this region was probably driven by the need to secure further access to timber in the region (see Meiggs, 1982: 126–30, 212, also indicating that there is no evidence for wood shortages in the fourth century – grain had become the main focus of the north for Athens; for an account of the importance of timber from the region, see Psoma, 2015: 2–7, 8–9). Amphipolis was lost in the fifth century during Brasidas’ attack on Athenian possessions in the north (Thuc. 4.102–04) and it was never recovered; the Athenians expended enormous resources on trying to recapture it. For the history of Athenian relations with Amphipolis in the fifth and fourth century in the context of the north Aegean, see Introduction, pp. 3–5, and Appendix 3. In 358, Athens negotiated a settlement with Philip whereby Athenian control of Amphipolis was recognised (Dem. 2.6; [Dem.] 7.10; Theopomp. BNJ 115 F30a; Hammond and Griffith, 1979: 238, 240). This was the ‘secret’ agreement (‘the well-known secret’ in Dem. 2.6), whereby Philip would gain Pydna from Athens and, in return, the Macedonian king would abandon his claims to Amphipolis. Philip’s defeat of the pretender Argaeus and his consolidation of territory around Macedonia soon after this, must have concerned some Amphipolitans as a pro-Athenian group sent an embassy to Athens offering the city to them. The Athenians rejected this, putting their faith in Philip to succeed where they had not (Dem. 1.8, 2.6; [Dem.] 7.27). The Olynthians also must have grown increasingly concerned with Philip’s actions at this time; they also sent an embassy to Athens (Dem. 2.6), possibly to negotiate the treaty that Athens had sought for so long, but again the Athenians placed their faith in Philip. Philip moved against the city soon afterwards (DS 16.8.2), probably a result of the embassy sent to Athens. Once he took the city, the Macedonian king did not hand it over to the Athenians (DS 16.8.3, not mentioning the intrigues used; Dem. 1.5). Athens could do nothing about these events as they were by this point embroiled in the Social War (Ellis, 1976: 65–67). It is unsurprising that the Olynthians, rebuffed by Athens, chose to make their alliance with Philip the next year when he offered them access to the Anthemous River and control

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of Potidaea. He then expanded his control in the region by seizing the gold mines of Mt Pangaeum. In the space of approximately two years, Philip had gained control of the northern Aegean seaboard, all at the expense of Athens and through deception. De Ste Croix (1963: 111–12) argues that the secret agreement discussed above was, at most, a story created by Demosthenes based on a misunderstanding of Philip’s intentions expressed through a letter. He dismisses the event and argues that a democracy cannot make such a deal without the express permission of the ecclesia (de Ste Croix, 1963: 114–17). There must have been a significant reason for Athens to reject overtures from both Amphipolis and Olynthus. Athens had an opportunity to take Amphipolis with support from at least a faction within Amphipolis. Ellis (1976: 63–64) points out that the language used by Demosthenes (paralambanein ten polin) was vague and could imply that the envoys were not officially appointed and were asking for Athens to take the city by force; thus the envoys represented a faction within Amphipolis and not the government. Athens had been trying in vain to recapture Amphipolis since it was lost in 425 and it is inconceivable to think of Athens not taking this opportunity, regardless of who was presenting it. Even if the envoys from Amphipolis represented a small faction within the city, it gave the opportunity for Athens to take the city through intrigue, as Philip was soon to do at Pydna. It is, therefore, likely that there was an agreement between Philip and the Athenian demos, not a formal treaty which required the ratification in the ecclesia, which does indeed paint Philip as deceitful and playing on the opportunities that arose through Athens being unable to do anything during the Social War. Chapters 67–72 Demosthenes points out that the men arguing that Athens has nothing to fear from Philip have, all of a sudden, become rich and well-known. This enthymeme obviously invites the audience to draw the conclusion that they have been bribed by Philip. This topos is used by Demosthenes to put forward his own personal history, showing how useful to the State he has been. This dive into his personal ethos is important as he establishes himself as one of the ‘good’ speakers to whom the people should listen for the benefit of the city, positioned towards the end to ensure that his audience remembers it clearly.

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68  you … are a coward and soft: Demosthenes is imagining someone saying this to himself for not proposing a definite plan of action, rather than putting forward general principles of action such as maintain an army in the field, pay the eisphora and not hire mercenary armies. For more on this rhetorical strategy, see Introduction, pp. 36–37. 69  he is being bold at no risk: Demosthenes believes that it is braver to be honest with the ecclesia and put forward ideas that they might not like rather than seem to speak aggressively while putting forward ideas that appeal to the people, thus not running the risk of being rebuked. He goes on to link this to the nature of the good and useful citizen. See Introduction, pp. 29–30 for this topos. 70  trierarchies, choruses, payment of eisphora … and many other philanthropies: Following on from the idea of the good citizen, above, Demosthenes is demonstrating the marks of a good citizen, one who actively contributes to the State as a wealthy individual was required. Demosthenes is depicting himself as someone who serves the State, enlarging the theme he is expounding in this section of the speech, that there are those in Athens who do not serve the State, using this topos to emphasise that he is not one of them. For the payment of eisphora, see Commentary 8.21, pp. 127–28. The trierarchy and choregia were liturgies, taxes paid by those who generally owned property worth more than four talents (Davies, 1971: xxiii–xxiv). Liturgies could require payments of between 300 drachmae (Lys. 21.2) and 6000 drachmae (Dem. 21.155), hence this could be quite an expense to the approximately 1000 to 1200 men liable for such duties, though there was a core of approximately 300 of the wealthiest men who contributed significantly more (Hansen, 1991: 113–15; Davies, 1971: 133– 50; Rhodes, 1982: 11–13). This led to rare and exceptional exemptions being granted to honour individuals, such as Conon, who, along with his relatives in perpetuity, were granted exemptions from liturgies (Aesch. 1.27; Dem. 20.69–72, 75). Similarly, Demosthenes casts aspersions on his enemy, Meidias, by claiming that he had only undertaken one liturgy by the age of 50, hence the notion that funding liturgies was tied up with Athenian time (Wilson, 1991: 166–67, 174–75, asserting that Demosthenes creates a generalised ‘type’ of a hubristes by describing the aspects of Meidias’ life that are socially and politically destructive in a theatrical manner to his audience). In one speech (Lys. 21.1–5), the speaker claims to have funded eleven liturgies in just six years, which he probably believed entitled him

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to special treatment in the court-room (cf. Kapellos, 2014: 61–79; Sinclair, 1987: 60; Lyc. 1.139–40 is explicit about his revulsion regarding these very types of people, indicating the increasing democratisation over the fourth century which limited the effectiveness of this appeal – see Christ, 2006: 182–83). Hansen (1991: 110–15) discusses liturgies in relation to wealth and social classes in Athens; Christ (2006:155–71) provides a survey of the institution through the fifth and fourth centuries. See Davies (1967: 33–40) for a discussion on Demosthenes’ deceptive minimisation of liturgies (Dem. 20.21). Trierarchies were particularly expensive, so much so that during the Peloponnesian War, the trierarchy began to be shared (syntrierarchia– Thuc. 2.13.8, 3.17.2, [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 3.4; Lys. 32.24; see Gabrielsen, 1990: 89– 118 for an outline). This trend continued into the fourth century and could even include paying a captain to relieve the trierarch of their personal need to command the ship (Dem. 21.80, 154, 51.7–8, 21.163), thus weakening the personal honour that had previously been felt at having served as trierarch on behalf of the State. Also, parallel to the military service of the trierarch, the service of the choregus to the State was no less important. To fund the chorus at a dramatic festival could be seen as both a secular and a sacred duty (Wilson, 1997: 89; Scullion, 2012: 217). We know that the burden could be quite expensive and demanding (Xen. Eq. Mag. 1.26), cf. Aesch. 3.240, claiming that a choregus could act through self-indulgence). Liturgies were part of a larger culture of local leadership, not only of the asty of Athens but of demes and smaller units within Attica, but they were also used for selfrepresentation, particularly in contrast to one’s political opponents (Wilson, 2000: 21, 175–178). It is in this context that we should see Demosthenes’ comments. For a discussion of appointment to the choregia, see Wilson (2000: 51–61); for appointment to the trierarchy, see Gabrielsen (2010: 43–77). Liturgies were a mark of service to the State and, in the fourth century, were utilised regularly in court-room rhetoric to indicate the sense of charis the jury should have towards the man who had done such service to State (see especially Christ, 2006: 176–184, emphasising the very visible nature of the choregia, making it the more desirable of the liturgies, cf. Liddel, 2007: 269, who questions its value of the courtroom in comparison with military liturgies). Demosthenes boasts about his liturgical record in his speech Against Meidias. According to Demosthenes, he was a trierarch at

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the minimum age (21.154), paying for all aspects of the trierarchy and not relying on the State to assist in the provision of his trireme. He voluntarily funded a male dithyrambic chorus (21.156; see MacDowell for textual discussions of an error in the text talking about a “flute chorus”), claiming that they are far more expensive than a regular tragic chorus; he also funded a chorus for the Panathenaea (21.157). Moreover, he was chairman of his symmory, which required him to make substantial payments in line with the wealthiest citizens of Athens (21.157), also making a voluntary contribution to the expedition to Euboea (see Commentary, 8.36, pp. 141–42). He draws this portrait of himself in contrast to the way he describes Meidias, summing up his allegedly miserly attitude by saying that the State receives no benefit from the private use of his substantial fortune (21.159). By tapping into a well-used topos of the ‘good Athenian’ serving the State through liturgies, Demosthenes is utilising a theme that harks backs to Antiphon’s Tetralogies (2.2.12), where the speaker constructs his identity by using references to his generosity to define his good character (his payments of eisphora and his choregia), which is argued against in the paired speech at 2.3.8. Antiphon (5.77) also has his client claim that his father regularly furnished choruses as evidence of his contribution to the State. The speaker in Lysias 19 claims that his father had been a choregus, a trierarch seven times and paid eisphora regularly, to a combined total of over 9 talents (Lys. 19.9, 42–43, 57–59). Isocrates (16.35) also speaks of his father’s contributions as a liturgist. This demonstrates that not only can a speaker be shown to be a good person through their fulfilment of liturgies, but by claiming descent from a similarly beneficent liturgist it can also reflect positively on the speaker making the claim. Contrastingly, the bad citizen is deceptive about his contribution to the State as a liturgist, for example, Demosthenes’ criticism of Meidias (21.155), and particularly deceptive citizens lie outright about their completion of liturgies (Dem. 38.25). A truly generous citizen pays over and above his requirement as a liturgist (Dem. 47.23, 50.11; Lys. 21.5; Kapellos, 2014: 77–79), though we should always be aware that the construction of an individual’s identity in this regard is fraught with difficulties as there were no ready records of service available to a serving jury and claims would, no doubt, have been spurious. ransom of prisoners: When Philip captured Olynthus, he also captured a number of Athenians who were likely living there at the time. During the second embassy to Philip, Demosthenes made it a priority of his to have these

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prisoners released (Aesch. 2.100). After demanding to speak first (Aesch. 2.108), he made it one the main arguments to Philip. He asked Philip to use the traditional gift money to the ambassadors to pay for the release of the prisoners (Dem. 19.166; Worthington, 2013: 172 seems to imply doubt over this aspect of the story, but Aeschines does not contradict it and it seems calculated to have embarrassed his colleagues, which it probably did). He also, quite dramatically, seems to have produced ransom money to pay for their release (Aesch. 2.100; Dem. 19.169–70). Philip claimed he would release the prisoners to be home in time for the Panathenaea (Dem. 19.168). The claims about using private money are tied up with a list of his public benevolences, again emphasising the nature of the good citizen who uses his wealth for public good, as opposed to the bad citizens who take money from the enemy (Dem. 19.166–168) and celebrates his victories with him (Dem. 19.128–130). Millett (1991: 61, 268, n.15) points out that Demosthenes may have been “manipulating the terminology of credit” when describing events here to depict himself in a better light. 72  towards the latter, nature herself will proceed: Demosthenes indicates that good citizens will always incline to proposing the best policies, not the easiest, as that is their nature. This is an enthymeme, allowing the audience to draw the conclusion that because this is not an easy policy to follow, Demosthenes must be a good citizen, again enhancing his ethos. See Introduction, pp. 29–30, for discussion of this strategy. Chapters 73–75 Demosthenes finishes the logos by explaining that the role of the speaker is an important one, using the example of Timotheus to prove his point. He finishes with the telling point, however, that words are what they should expect of him as a symboulos, whereas they need to act themselves rather than expect someone else to act on their behalf. 73  but it is nothing but words from me: This refers back to 8.68, where Demosthenes claims that he is attacked for proposing ideas rather than leading the army into battle or proposing a specific plan of attack. He argues that the job of a good citizen is to present the best advice, whatever that might be, and in this case it is advice of a more general nature. 74  Timotheus advised you: In 357, Timotheus allegedly urged the ecclesia to assist the Euboeans against a Theban invasion of the island. The Euboeans had previously been long-standing allies of Thebes, fighting with

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them in 370/69 (Xen. Hell. 6.5.23; 7.5.4) and also at the Battle of Mantinea in 363 (DS 15.85.2, 87.3). This relationship must have changed significantly and now Thebes desired control of the island. The Theban invasion prompted an appeal from the main cities, possibly led by Themison of Eretria and Mnesarchus of Chalcis (Aesch. 3.85) named prominently by Aeschines and implying their leadership of the island. It was obviously seen as a significant threat to Athenian interests as within five days, Athens had sent out assistance to Euboea (Aesch. 3.85) under the strategia of Diocles (Dem. 21.174; IG II2 1953). Diodorus (16.7.2) claims that the fighting on the island was particularly exacting with no pitched battle fought. Diodorus may well be correct in his description of the nature of the warfare with the Euboeans, assisted by Athenians, engaging in guerrilla warfare so successfully that the Theban army came to terms with the Athenians after just 30 days of fighting. Athens also came to terms with the four main Euboean cities, Carystus, Eretria, Chalcis, Histiaea (IG II2 124, 125, 149). As Brunt (1969: 248) points out, the same men who probably led their cities to Thebes, Themison (of Eretria) and Mnesarchus (of Chalcis) also led them back to alliance with Athens (Aesch., 3.85). This strengthens the notion that the main cities of Euboea were always motivated by the desire to remain autonomous and free from the outside influence of the major powers. It is unsurprising that Demosthenes used Timotheus to enhance his appeal to the ecclesia (see Introduction, p. 42, for a discussion of the rhetorical nature of such appeals). Timotheus, the son of Conon, was one of the leading politicians and generals in the second quarter of the fourth century. He was, for most of his career, a successful strategos, but in this instance Demosthenes is making a reference to the dual nature of Athenian public life, that of the rhetor. Demosthenes reports that Timotheus made an appeal in the ecclesia to assist the Euboeans in repelling the Theban invaders. This may be one of the few times Timotheus spoke; as a result of his service in Euboea in 378/77, he may have been seen as a voice of experience when affairs of Euboea were being discussed. There was something of a divergence in the roles of rhetor and strategos in the fourth century (Sealey, 1956: 178– 79), whereas in the fifth century the two invariably went hand-in-hand (see above, Commentary, 8.1, p. 91). The appellation rhetor kai strategos is the best label we have for the professional public servant in Athens (Hansen, 1983: 37–39), with laws in place specifically addressing this group. His well-known address of the ecclesia, as Demosthenes points out, seems to

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have been memorable not for being the only time that Timotheus mounted the bema, but more for the fact that it was sound policy advice matched with action, a constant theme in Demosthenes (for example, 3.4–5, 3.24–26, 5.4–10). We do not have the evidence to know to a certainty the level of Timotheus’ political activity as a rhetor, but perhaps Demosthenes gives us a clue here to his minimal involvement. Timotheus’ first command in 378/77 (DS 15.29.7, naming him as a prominent strategos, the first reference to a strategia of Timotheus) included the liberation of Euboea (Plut. Mor. 350f). Other significant commands that increased his prestige included his victories in the waters around the Peloponnese in 376/75, increasing the Athenian alliances (Xen. Hell. 5.4.64–64; Isoc. 15.109; Dem. 23.198; Nepos, Tim. 2.1; DS 15.36.5) and his victory over Sparta at the Battle of Alyzia in 375 (Xen. Hell. 5.4.65; DS 15.36.5). As a result of his victories, a statue of Timotheus was set up in the agora (Nepos, Tim. 2.3; Aesch. 3.243). The statue’s base is also evidence for the adherence of the allies at the time. He was accused by his enemies, Callistratus and Iphicrates, of wasting time in not setting sail to aid Corcyra in 373, but was acquitted of this charge (Xen. Hell. 6.2.11–13; DS 15.47.3; [Dem.] 49.6, 9, 22, 23). In order to avoid paying debts he left Athens in the service of the Great King in his war against Egypt in 372 ([Dem.] 49.25, 28, 60). The Athenians still clearly valued his service as he was sent to assist Ariobarzanes in the Satraps’ Revolt in 367/66 (Dem. 15.9), capturing Samos in 366/65 for Athens (Dem. 15.9–10; Polyaen. 3.10.9; Isoc. 15.111; Ar. Oec. 2 1350 b5). Such success led to his replacement of Iphicrates as strategos against Amphipolis in 364 and, though he failed to take the city, he captured Torone and Potidaea and brought Methone, Pydna and some twenty other cities into alliance with Athens, and relieved the siege of the city of Cyzicus (DS 15.81.6; Isoc. 15.113; Polyaen. 3.10.7, 15; Ar. Oec. 2 1350 a23; Din. 1.14; Aesch. 2.70; see Introduction, pp. 4–5). Soon after this appeal to assist the Euboeans, Timotheus was sent out with Iphicrates (his new political ally, see Clarke, 2018: 102) as strategoi to operate with Chares. At the Battle of Embata, they refused to fight, deeming it inappropriate weather, at which point they were indicted by Chares, deposed from their strategia and subsequently charged with having accepted bribes (DS 16.21.2–4; Din. 1.14; Isoc. 15.129; Plut. Mor. 605e, 836d). Timotheus withdrew from Athens, unable to pay the fine and died in exile soon afterwards but was reburied just outside Athens with his father near a precinct of Artemis (Nepos, Tim. 3.5; Paus. 1.29.15).

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75  for action you might look to yourselves, but for … understanding, to the person in front of you speaking: Again, as at 8.73, Demosthenes argues that his role in advising the ecclesia is critical, comparable to the role played by Timotheus at an important time in Athenian history, while if the people of Athens want action, they should look to their own initiative. Cf. 8.22, where Demosthenes accuses the Athenians of not performing the tasks necessary to defeat Philip. Epilogos (76–77) The epilogos is typically Demosthenic. He simply restates the key points of the speech, that Athens needs to maintain the force in the field appropriately, send ambassadors to build an alliance against Philip, and punish speakers who have taken bribes from Philip. He finishes by saying that if they are willing to act, rather than sit and wait, things might change for the better, but if not, no words at all will be able to save the city. 76  I will say what I am advising: Demosthenes starts his brief epilogos with a summary of his key pieces of advice for the Athenians: pay the eisphora, maintain the force in the north Aegean, send embassies around Greece to build alliance against Philip and punish those in the city who are trying to stop these actions. Interestingly, he makes no mention of Diopeithes, in defence of whom this speech was likely made. His speech focuses on the necessity of the policy while minimising Diopeithes role in bringing on the situation facing Athens now. come down: In the ecclesia, the person speaking to the people mounted a large stone called the bema. From this stone, the speaker stood higher than the rest of the meeting, enabling him to be heard, particularly as it was positioned on an escarpment, which would have assisted with projection (Hansen, 1999: 128). Thus, to dismount the bema required the speaker literally to come down after the speech. See Hyp. 5.9, with commentary from Worthington (1999: 189). 77  cheering and applauding: Demosthenes ends the speech with a striking point that if the Athenians are only able and willing to applaud speakers who put forward proposals that are designed to win favour, rather than benefit the city, Athens will not be safe. See Commentary 8.3, p. 100, for discussion of noise in the ecclesia.

APPENDIX 1: THE USE OF RINGS TO STRUCTURE DEMOSTHENES’S SPEECHES Worthington (1991b: 58–63; 1992: 27–39) postulates that the best evidence that we have of the publication of speeches in the fourth century is the use of rings to structure the logoi. Ring theory (the idea that a structure, theme or issue raised first is addressed last, then the theme or issue raised second is addressed second last, and so on) is found in a number of classical works, and the scholarship regarding the use of ring theory goes back as far as Blass (1893: 222). Keaney (1969: 406–23) explores the presence of ring composition in [Aristotle’s] Athenaion Politeia, the closest parallel to Demosthenes in time, examining and discussing a number of instances where a more limited ring structure was used (for example, AP 2.1–5.1, discussed by Keaney, 1969: 416–17). Ellis (1991: 344–76) identified a ring structure in Thucydides’ Archaeology in Book 1 (1–23) of his history, citing evidence of primary rings (identified in the general structure of the book – 1.1–21, with the central point of the ring at 23.1), then identifying secondary and tertiary rings (i.e. rings within rings) throughout the Archaeology (identified in tables 1–4 of his work, demonstrating that this stood beside a linear argument describing the development of Greece (Ellis, 1991: 364–75). More recently, Wooten (2008: 128, 129–30, 143, 147, 157, 158, 162–63) explores the use of rings in the overall structure of the Philippics, while Hermann (2019: 17, 92, 100) indicates Demosthenes’ use of ring structures, though in smaller units of his work, such as the prooemium or specific arguments. Worthington (1991b: 58; 2020, 24–25) discusses the significance of this in Demosthenes’ work and points to this as evidence of a significant stage of revision and publication. In particular, Worthington (1992: 27–39) also finds in Dinarchus’ oratory secondary and tertiary rings (though scepticism has been expressed – Tuplin, 2001: 389; Harris, 1994a). If orators

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did indeed use ring theory to structure what we have of their oratory, it does indicate that great care was taken in the creation of a written version of the speech, possibly in preparation for publication, similar to that of Thucydides’ work. Ring structure has been identified in Homer, where the purpose was to enhance the unity of various aspects of the story by interweaving several units into a single whole (see esp. Stanley, 1993: 6–13; Most, 1989: 20–21). This serves a similar purpose to the ring structure utilised by Demosthenes, whereby he creates a more powerful argument by creating a common aspect to interweave the arguments, possibly demonstrating development in the use of ring theory over time. Similarly, Ellis (1991: 361–64; 372–75) highlights Thucydides’ use of this technique to assist in organising the complex thoughts used to ‘frame’ key ideas. We do find such complex rings in On the Chersonese and, while Worthington points out that simple ring structures on a primary level are an effective ‘aide-memoire’ for the orator or an effective tactic for maintaining the attention of the audience (1990: 62), the evidence of different levels of complex rings used to structure the speech (for a complete outline of the rings used in Demosthenes’ speeches, see Appendix 2) tends to suggest care is taken to address the work to a reading audience. Primary rings exist in On the Chersonese in connection with the three overarching arguments used by Demosthenes. His first logos stated in the prooemium, that there exists in Athens a Macedonian ‘fifth column (1)’ within Athens, is mirrored by the last argument in the speech (52–75). His second argument of the prooemium, that Philip is at war with Athens (8–12) is detailed in between the other two arguments (38–51). The final argument of the prooemium, that a standing force is required to deal with the crisis in the north (9–12), is the first argument expanded in the speech (14–37). The central point of the speech, that Philip is actively trying to keep the Athenians restive while he organises the north as he wants, sits at chapter 13, between the prooemium and the detailing of the first argument.

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1 – There are those in Athens who are not advising in the city’s best interests 8–12– Philip is at war with Athens 12 – Athens needs a standing force to deal with Philip 13 – Philip is actively trying to keep the Athenians at home while he does what he wants 14–37 – Diopeithes’ army should be allowed to remain in force, regardless of the complaints made by Philip 38–51 – Philip is at war with Athens and is not to be trusted, even if he claims otherwise 52–75– There are those in Athens who are in the pay of Philip and are leading the demos astray – Demosthenes is not one of those people who do this

Fig. 1. Structure of On the primary Figure 1: Structure of On theChersonese, Chersonese, primary level level

Rings at a secondary level also exist. For example, in the first logos 14–17 – Philip has taken the Chersonese at a time when Athens cannot respond (14–37), there are three rings surrounding the central point of the 18–20Diopeithes – Certain peopleisinforced Athens are stop Athenian action, whereas Diopeithes logos, that totrying raiseto money in ways that some feel is acting in Athenian interests inappropriate. In the first ring, chapters 14–17 match the last section 21–25 – Diopeithes raising money to fight Philip through methods, yet he is of the logos, chaptersis 35–37, addressing the fact traditional that Philip is taking being attacked politically land from Athens in crucial areas, hemming Athens in. The second ring is 26 started in chapters 18–20 and complemented by stop chapters 30– – Diopeithes will not be able to fund his army if corrupt Athenians him in the ecclesia 34, addressing the issue of the ‘fifth column’ inside Athens that is crippling Diopeithes’ ability to fight The series is completed 27–30 – Diopeithes should be allowed to actPhilip. in Athenian interests as there are safeguards but there are no safeguards against those injuringand the citycompleted in the ecclesia by by theagainst thirdhim,ring, initiated in chapters 21–25 chapters 27–30, which outlines the political problems in Athens – People are to training the against ecclesia to Philip. be unwarlike through their oratory facing 30–34 anyone whoin Athens wishes stand The central point, in chapter 26, explains that Diopeithes will need to look to heaven for 35–37 – Philip is plotting to take more Athenian land, namely Euboea, and Athens has his funds Athens cannot doneif nothing to combat him supply then. Therefore, it can be argued that Demosthenes utilised rings to structure this composition, which could demonstrate a rigorous process of revision before publication. Figure 2: Secondary rings, first logos, On the Chersonese It does tend to suggest that the speech was constructed carefully for a reading audience as this level of care taken with the construction of a

38–51 – Philip is at war with Athens and is not to be trusted, even if he claims otherwise

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52–75– There are those in Athens who are in the pay of Philip and are leading the demos astray – Demosthenes is not one of those people who do this

rhetorically charged piece of literature constructed in rings would be lost in the ecclesia. Such a structure can be found in each of the logoi 1: Structure of On the Chersonese, primary level of the Figure speech, as follows in Figures 2–4, below. 14–17 – Philip has taken the Chersonese at a time when Athens cannot respond 18–20 – Certain people in Athens are trying to stop Athenian action, whereas Diopeithes is acting in Athenian interests 21–25 – Diopeithes is raising money to fight Philip through traditional methods, yet he is being attacked politically 26 – Diopeithes will not be able to fund his army if corrupt Athenians stop him in the ecclesia 27–30 – Diopeithes should be allowed to act in Athenian interests as there are safeguards against him, but there are no safeguards against those injuring the city in the ecclesia 30–34 – People in Athens are training the ecclesia to be unwarlike through their oratory 35–37 – Philip is plotting to take more Athenian land, namely Euboea, and Athens has done nothing to combat him 2: Secondary rings, firstlogos, logos, On Chersonese Fig. 2.Figure Secondary rings, first Onthethe Chersonese.

38 – It is necessary to act against Philip now 39–40 – Philip is at war with Athens; he hates the city. There are examples that show Philip is at war when he says he is not. 41–43 – Athens is a natural defender of Greece and is a democracy, hence Philip cannot afford to leave Athens unconquered 43 – All of Philip’s preparations are to attack and take Athens 44–45 – It is to win the prizes of Athens that he winters in Thrace 46–49 – Athens needs to act now; not to act would be unworthy of their ancestors 50–51 – Philip will grow stronger if nothing is done now Figure 3: Secondary rings, second logos, On the Chersonese

Fig. 3. Secondary rings, second logos, On the Chersonese. 52–54 – To go to war is not a palatable option, but the result of not doing so is disastrous 55–57 – People are worried about the cost of war with Philip, but other states are being

Figure 3: Secondary rings, second logos, On the Chersonese

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52–54 – To go to war is not a palatable option, but the result of not doing so is disastrous 55–57 – People are worried about the cost of war with Philip, but other states are being plundered to attack Athens and the people are being led astray in this by crooked politicians who are only interested in themselves 58–60 – Philip is incredibly deceptive, and he has a record of saying that he is not at war with people, then invading and taking states after this lie 60 – Athens has more at stake than other cities; Philip wants Athens destroyed 61–66 – Philip initially deceived other states into thinking he was their friend by doing them favours, but in Athens he has friends inside the gates to help him out, thus Philip does not need to do favours for Athens 66–72 – Athens is losing the ability to fight as a result of Philip’s politicians. Demosthenes is not one of these men – he is a brave politician as he proposes what is only in the interests of the state and not just what the people want to hear, the action of a truly selfless politician 73–75 – Sound policy and advice to go to war has led to great benefits, as Timotheus’ actions with Euboea demonstrated Figure 4: Secondary rings, third logos, On the Chersonese

Fig. 4. Secondary rings, third logos, On the Chersonese.

It can be seen in the secondary ring structure of each argument that there is a central point around which the rings are formed. In each case, it is a point about war with Philip and the need to carry out that war. This creates a remarkable consistency of message throughout the speech and would have made a striking impression on a reading audience familiar with, and indeed searching for, such structures. The majority of Demosthenic symbouleutic oratory demonstrate ring structures (see Appendix 2). All of the Olynthiacs and Philippics possess rings to the structure, as do On the Symmories, On the Liberty of the Rhodians, and For the Megalopolitans. It is more remarkable that, of symbouleutic speeches positively attributed to Demosthenes, only one, On the Peace, does not possess a ring structure. The Olynthiacs possess the clearest ring structure. For example, though it is significantly shorter than On the Chersonese, the First Olynthiac possesses four distinct arguments arranged in rings. Firstly, Demosthenes outlines that Athens is not doing what is should to protect its interests (1.2), which is paralleled with the last logos

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demonstrating why Athens needs to act (1.27). The second argument in the prooemium (1.3–6), that Philip is crafty and has advantages over Athens, is matched by the logos that Philip is showing himself to be beatable in war (1.21–27), demonstrating the complimentary nature of the ring structure. Thirdly, the prooemium argues that Athens needs to fight wholeheartedly (1.6–7), matched by details about how Athens can actually fight Philip (1.17–20). Finally, Demosthenes claims in the prooemium that Athens has an opportunity it cannot afford to miss (1.8–9), which is immediately followed by reasons why Athens needs to take the opportunities presented (1.10–16). Of a similar length, the Third Philippic demonstrates similar rings. The prooemium begins by outlining that Athens is in a poor position regarding Philip (9.1), which is matched by the final logos that outlines how Athens can save the situation (9.70–76). Secondly, Demosthenes explains in the prooemium that the people are listening to the wrong people for advice (9.2–4), which is matched by an extensive logos, similar to that in the third logos of On the Chersonese, that there are enemies within Athens and they will all suffer a grim fate if they support Philip at the expense of their city (9.53–70). The third logos outlined in the prooemium, that the Athenians need to do their duty (9.4–5), is matched by the logos that their traditional duty, protecting Greece, is not being met (9.36–52). Finally, the ring structure is rounded-out by the fourth logos, that Philip is at war with Athens (9.6–8), which is immediately followed by a narrative of events that shows Philip is at war with Athens in Demosthenes’ eyes (9.10–35). Similarly, we can see rings at the secondary level through the corpus. An excellent example of secondary rings can be seen in the Second Philippic. The overall structure of this speech is unusual in that it possesses only two logoi, arranged in rings. The first logos outlined in the prooemium, that the source of the problems faced now is the corrupt group of speakers in Athens who mislead the people (6.1–5), is matched by the logos outlining the source of the problems as the ambassadors to Philip (6.29–36). The second logos outlined in the prooemium, that Athens must be Philip’s eventual target, hence Philip prefers to make alliances with other states as he knows he will not find

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13–14 – It is asserted by some that Philip was acting through judgement at the time about expediency when he favoured the Thebans and now is working against Sparta, Thebes’ last remaining enemy 14–15 – Philip is not ‘waiting’ to act against against Thebes but really is acting against Sparta 16 – Philip is acting with great deliberation in all instances 17 – Philip is acting against Athens because he perceives them as a threat 17–18 – Philip is acting against Athens and he knows that the Athenians are aware of it 20–25 – Philip will become the master of the Peloponnese if people such as the Messenians do not oppose him 26–28 –It is not surprising that Peloponnesians cannot use good judgement, but Athens needs to use theirs and adjudge Philip’s actions correctly

Figure 5: Secondary rings, first logos, Second Philippic

Fig. 5. Secondary rings, first logos, Second Philipic.

a willing audience in Athens (6.6–12), is matched by the explanation that Philip’s activities are all directed against Athens (6.14–28). Both of these logoi possess rings at a secondary level, demonstrated in the first logos of the Second Philippic (Fig. 5). Thus, ring structures abound throughout Demosthenic deliberative oratory and the structure of On the Chersonese is not unique but possesses typically Demosthenic structural elements and qualities that would have particularly enhanced the speech for an educated reading audience looking for such structures.

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APPENDIX 2: OUTLINE OF PRIMARY RING STRUCTURES IN DEMOSTHENIC DELIBERATIVE ORATORY Appendix 2 – Outline of primary ring structures in Demosthenic deliberative oratory Appendix 2 – Outline of primary ring structures in Demosthenic deliberative oratory 1–2 – Athens is not doing what is should to protect its interests 1–2 – Athens is not doing what is should to protect its interests 3–6 – Philip is crafty and has advantages over Athens in war. As a result, Olynthus 3–6 – Philip is crafty andfor has advantages knows they are fighting their survival over Athens in war. As a result, Olynthus knows they are fighting for their survival 6–7 – Athens needs to fight wholeheartedly 6–7 – Athens needs to fight wholeheartedly 8–9 – Athens has an opportunity that it cannot afford to miss, unlike other times 8–9 – Athens has an opportunity that it cannot afford to miss, unlike other times 9 – Athens is responsible for the heights to which Philip has risen 9 – Athens is responsible for the heights to which Philip has risen 10–16 – Reasons why Athens needs to take the opportunity presented 10–16 – Reasons why Athens needs to take the opportunity presented 17–20 – Suggestions as to how Athens can fight wholeheartedly 17–20 – Suggestions as to how Athens can fight wholeheartedly 21–27 – How Philip is showing himself to be beatable in war 21–27 – How Philip is showing himself to be beatable in war 27 – Why all Athenians need to act 27 – Why all Athenians need to act Figure 1: Structure of The First Olynthiac, primary level

1: Structure of The First Olynthiac, primary level Fig. 1.Figure Structure of The First Olynthiac, primary level. 1–4 – Philip has grown great as a result of Athens 1–4 – Philip has grown great as a result of Athens 5–8 – Philip is faithless and untrustworthy 5–8 – Philip is faithless and untrustworthy 9–12 – There is a need for Athens to make alliances 9–12 – There is a need for Athens to make alliances 13 – Athenian policies about warfare need to change to defeat Philip 13 – Athenian policies about warfare need to change to defeat Philip 14–18 – Macedonia is powerful, but it is not as strong as it seems 14–18 – Macedonia is powerful, but it is not as strong as it seems 19–21 – Philip is a corrupt man 19–21 – Philip is a corrupt man 22–30 – Athens needs to act and stop talking 22–30 – Athens needs to act and stop talking 2: Structure of The SecondOlynthiac, Olynthiac, primary levellevel. Fig. 2.Figure Structure of The Second primary Figure 2: Structure of The Second Olynthiac, primary level

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1–5 – There is a need for Athens to start acting and stop talking 1–5 – There is a need for Athens to start acting and stop talking 6–9 – Philip has become powerful as a result of Athens 6–9 – Philip has become powerful as a result of Athens 10–13 – There is a need to change the laws so that the war can be fought properly 14 – Decrees unless they are supported action 10–13 – Thereare is worthless a need to change the laws so that theby war can be fought properly

14 – Decrees are worthless unless they are supported by action 15–29 – Athenian talk has led to the myriad of problems faced now with Philip and it is not worthy of the ancestors 15–29 – Athenian talk has led to the myriad of problems faced now with Philip and it is not worthy of the ancestors 30–32 – Corrupt politicians are the cause of the situation now

30–32 – Corrupt politicians are the cause of the situation now 33–36 – Athens needs to change the military system to combat Philip 33–36 – Athens needs to change the military system to combat Philip Figure 3: Structure of The Third Olynthiac, primary level

Fig. 3. Structure of The Third Olynthiac, primary Figure 3: Structure of The Third Olynthiac, primary level level. 1–4 – Athenians are not doing their duty 1–4 – Athenians are not doing their duty 4–12 – Philip is now strong but Athens once held the same places Philip has won; Philip–isPhilip always on the move, butAthens he is not invincible 4–12 is now strong but once held the same places Philip has won; Philip is always on the move, but he is not invincible 13–14 – The nature of the force/response needs to be discussed 15 – The onlynature way toofavoid future troubleneeds is to keep force in the field 13–14 – The the force/response to beadiscussed 15 – The only way to avoid future trouble is to keep a force in the field 16–31 – The force and how it should be used 16–31 – The force and how it should be used 31–37 – Philip is crafty, but he is not invincible 31–37 – Philip is crafty, but he is not invincible 38–50 – Athens needs to act in a timely and appropriate manner 38–50 – Athens needs to act in a timely and appropriate manner Figure 4: Structure of The First Philippic, primary levellevel. Fig. 4. Structure of The First Philippic, primary Figure 4: Structure of The First Philippic, primary level

1–5 – The source of the problems faced now is to be found on the bema 6–12 – Athens must be Philip’s eventual target, hence Philip prefers to make alliances with other states as he will not find a willing audience in Athens 13 – It is a false argument to claim that Philip prefers Thebes to Athens on grounds of superior Theban scruples 14–28 – Philip’s activities are all directed against Athens 29–36 – The root of the problems go back to people like the ambassadors who misled the people Figure 5: Structure of The Second Philippic, primary level

Fig. 5. Structure of The Second Philippic, primary level.

Figure 5: Structure of The Second Philippic, primary level

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Appendices 1 – Athens is in a poor position regarding Philip 2–4 – The people are listening to the wrong people for advice 4–5 – Athenians need to do their duty 6–8 – Philip is at war with Athens and has committed acts of war 9 – Philip is at war with Athens, and the Athenians do not even realise it 10–35 – Narrative of events to show that Philip is at war with Athens 36–52 – Athenians are not living up to their ancestors in protecting Greece, their traditional duty 53–70 – There are enemies within Athens and there are many examples of what happens to people like this with Philip 70–76 – Proposals about how to save the situation

Figure 6: Structure of TheThird Third Philippic, primary level level. Fig. 6. Structure of The Philippic, primary

1–2 – Speakers eulogise the great men of the past, but Demosthenes will stick to the present 3–7 – Athens must go to war in alliance with all of the Greeks 8–12 – Athens must be fully prepared before going to war 13 – A fully armed and prepared Athens will attract allies 14–29 – Athens needs to reform the symmories thoroughly 30–40 – Greece must be united against the Great King, led by Athens 41 – The Athenians need to be “worthy of the ancestors” Figure 7: Structure On the Symmories, primary level level. Fig. 7. Structure of Onof the Symmories, primary

1–2 – Some men are giving bad advice to the people; to defend Rhodes will bring honour to Athens 3–4 – Mausolus, Chius and Byzantium are not helping Rhodes, but the people they went to war against are. This is a good advertisement for new allies. 5–9 – Athens is on the moral high ground here, defending a state against unjust aggression 10 – People are more inclined to fight for what is rightfully theirs, not theirs by conquest 11–13 – Athens does not interfere with the King, but this war of his is unjust and he won’t be upset if Athens acts against him as it is not his territory to begin with 14–24 – It is in Athens’ interests to help democracies, who are their natural allies

41 – The Athenians need to be “worthy of the ancestors” Figure 7: Structure of On the Symmories, primary level

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1–2 – Some men are giving bad advice to the people; to defend Rhodes will bring honour to Athens 3–4 – Mausolus, Chius and Byzantium are not helping Rhodes, but the people they went to war against are. This is a good advertisement for new allies. 5–9 – Athens is on the moral high ground here, defending a state against unjust aggression 10 – People are more inclined to fight for what is rightfully theirs, not theirs by conquest 11–13 – Athens does not interfere with the King, but this war of his is unjust and he won’t be upset if Athens acts against him as it is not his territory to begin with 14–24 – It is in Athens’ interests to help democracies, who are their natural allies 25–33 – There are people giving bad advice, even though it is the right thing to do Figure 8: Structure On the liberty ofof thethe Rhodians, primary primary level Fig. 8. Structure of Onof the Liberty Rhodians, level.

1–5 – Previous speakers are offering poor advice and do not sound Athenian (ie. nonpartisan). It is important to keep both Sparta and Thebes weak. 6–9 – Athens is in a difficult moral position 9–10 – If Athens abandons Megalopolis to Sparta, at what point will they stop Sparta? What if they attack Messene? 10 – The proper course is to find out what is right, then carry it out regardless 11–13 – By gaining Oropus and allying with Arcadia, it may upset Sparta, but they haven’t got that right – Athens saved them. 14–18 – Athens is correct to stand against injustice and Sparta is acting unjustly. Athens is following the morally correct policy. 19–31 – By allying with Megalopolis, it will ensure that Sparta is weakened. By ensuring the rebuilding of Thespiae, Orchomenus and Plataea it will keep Thebes at bay. It is possible to keep both Sparta and Thebes weak and those that urge one side or the other are not advising in Athens’ best interests.

Fig. 9. Structure of Forof the Megalopolitans, primary Figure 9: Structure For the Megalopolitians, primary level level.

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APPENDIX 3: ATHENS AND THE NORTH AEGEAN DOWN TO THE END OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR Athenian interest in the north began with the attempt of Phrynon, an Olympic pancratiast, to seize Sigeium, located on the coast of Asia Minor. Strabo (13.1.38) preserves the tradition that he was sent out in an official capacity as archon, which possibly provided the basis for the Suda’s claim (s.v. Pittakos) that Phrynon was sent out as a strategos. It is unlikely that he was sent out in an official capacity (Graham, 1999: 33), but it may indicate that there was an early interest shown by Athens in the region of the Chersonese. The presence of an Attic inscription, dated to 575–550 (Jeffrey, 1990: 72, 366–67), attests to a definite Athenian interest in the north Aegean from at least the first half of the sixth century BC. Pisistratus continued the Athenian exploration of the possibilities in the north by taking Sigeium (which was controlled at the time by Mytilene) and giving it to his son to control, in approximately 530 (Hdt. 5.94.1). The expedition of Miltiades to the Thracian Chersonese is our first detailed evidence for direct Athenian activity in the region. Generally believed to be a private endeavour by Miltiades to escape the tyranny of Pisistratus in Athens (Hdt. 6.35–36.1; cf. Clarke, 2018 and Samons, 2017 for other possibilities), the settlement of Athenians in the region is significant as they seem to have exploited the land for their own benefit; the wall built by Miltiades the Elder when he arrived (Hdt. 6.36) would have served to protect Athenian interests and mark their territory. This is further suggested by the military support sent with Miltiades the Younger by the Pisistratids later in the fifth century and the need to take hostages to secure his rule as tyrant. The death of Miltiades the Younger’s uncle, which led to his despatch from Athens, was violent, again suggesting unpopular Athenian exploitation. Xenophon (Hell. 3.2.10) indicates at a later time that the region provided plentiful resources for grain and fruit, but control of the trade

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routes (which existed when Xerxes invaded Greece in 481 and surely existed before this – Hdt. 7.36.2) would have provided much-needed monetary wealth for the Pisistratid regime to fund their control of Athens (Hdt. 1.64.1; Sancisi-Weerdenburg, 2000: 10). Athenian possession of the Thracian Chersonese continued until Miltiades the Younger was forced to abandon it in the face of a Persian invasion in 493 (Hdt. 6.40.1–41.2). After the successful defence of Greece against the Persian invasion of 481–79, the Athenians sailed the navy of the Hellenic League to Sestus, a key location opposite the Thracian Chersonese on the Asian side of the straits (Hdt. 9.114.2; Thuc. 1.89.2; DS 11.37.4–5). Cimon also led naval forces in 476 to retake a key location at Eion, which provided access to Thrace by the River Strymon and was also located on the coastal trade route to the Thracian Chersonese. In the coming years, Athens was to invest significant resources in attempting to create a settlement in this region, making several attempts to plant a colony at Ennea Hodoi (in 476 – schol. Aesch. 2.34; Plut. Cim. 8.2; 465 – Thuc. 1.100.3, 4.102.3; DS 11.70–.5) and Drabescus (in 465 – DS 11.70.5; Hdt. 9.75.1; Thuc. 1.100.3, 4.102.2). It was not until 437–36 that Athens successfully managed to found Amphipolis (Thuc. 4.102.2–3). It is likely that the region was required by Athens to supply timber and pitch for the growing Athenian navy (see Psoma, 2015: 2–7, 8–9); moreover, of the total of over 498 talents recorded in the first Athenian Tribute List, over 107 talents was contributed by the cities in the north Aegean and the Chersonese. This is fundamental to our understanding of the north in the fifth century; while there is some evidence of the import of grain through the straits adjacent to the Chersonese, the cash provided by this region was also necessary to fund the expensive navy. At the outset of the Peloponnesian War, Athens made an alliance with the King of the Odrysian Thracians, Sitalces (Thuc. 2.9.4; Hdt. 7.137.3) to protect these regional interests. Sitalces’ son was also given Athenian citizenship at the same time (Thuc. 2.29.5; Ar. Ach. 141–44).The Odomantian peltasts sent to Cleon in 424 in response to Brasidas’ attack on Athenian possessions in the north Aegean (Thuc. 5.6.2) indicates that a strong Athenian presence in the Thracian

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Chersonese continued through this period. With the loss of Amphipolis in 424, there was a break in direct Athenian involvement in the north Aegean. In 417, Nicias reminded the Athenians of the importance of the region (Thuc. 6.10.5), but the assembly were swayed by the allure of Sicily. This attempt of Nicias may have been in response to the growing influence of the Odrysian Thracians in both Thrace and the Chersonese – many cities paid tribute both to Athens and the Thracian King Seuthes (Thuc. 2.97.3), and a coin of Maronea (a tributary Athenian polis) indicates a friendly relationship being developed between the coastal cities and Thracian dynasts (Isaac, 1986: 119; West, 1929: 120–21). The gift of troops in 413 to Athenian forces in Sicily indicate, however, a continuation of good relations between the Thracians and Athens (Thuc. 7.27.1–2).  After the Athenian defeat in Sicily in 412, Athens endeavoured over the coming years to ensure that the cities of the north Aegean and Thracian Chersonese remained loyal. Thrasybulus was able to utilise Thracian troops (Plut. Alc. 30.4), yet again at a critical time for Athens, indicating lingering support for Athens in Thrace (Xen. Hell. 1.1.12). Thrasybulus and Alcibiades continued to rebuild Athenian control in the region down to 407/06, which was bolstered by an alliance with the Bithynian Thracians (Xen. Hell. 1.3.4), until the Athenian defeat at Aegospotami. It is interesting to note that, when the exiled Alcibiades offered assistance to the Athenians at Aegospotami, he not only offered his personal army but the troops of the Thracian monarchs, Medocus and Seuthes (DS 13.105.3–4; Nep. Alc. 7.4–9.3; Plut. Alc. 36.3, 37.2; see Kapellos, 2017: 307–12 for a discussion of this curious incident). The connections between Athens and the north Aegean continued to the bitter end of the Peloponnesian War and, after a brief interlude, resumed in the fourth century as soon as it was possible (see Introduction, p. 1).

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INDEX Abdera 106 Abydus 106 Abydus Battle of, 2 Achaea 141 Aegospotami, Battle of 191 Aeschines 8, 9, 10, 21, 22, 25, 92, 125, 132, 140–41, 143, 144, 145, 166, 176 Agesilaus 3 Agis III, Revolt of 25 Alcetus of Epirus 158 Alcibiades 137, 192 Alexander the Great 24, 25 Alexander, tyrant of Pherae 159–60 Amadocus I, King of Thrace 1 Amadocus, Odrysian King 5, 169 Amorgos 106 Amphictyonic Council 10, 21, 165–66 Amphipolis 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 143, 162, 169–71, 177, 192 Amyntas, King of Macedonia 3, 162 Anaximenes, Rhetoric to Alexander, comparisons to Dem. 8 29, 34, 39, 93 Andros 105, 106 Androtion 17, 18, 19 Anthemous River 163, 170 Antipater 26 Antiphon 12 Apollodorus 131

Apollonides 147 Arcadia 141 Argaeus 170 Argos 1, 141 Ariobarzanes 4, 177 Aristodemus 8, 47 Aristomachus of Alopece 168 Aristophon 93, 138–39 Aristoteles, Decree of 105, 106 Aristotle, Rhetoric, comparisons to Dem. 8 28, 29, 43, 45–46 Artaxerxes I, King of Persia 167 Artemisium, Battle of 157 Asia Minor 134 Atalante 142 Athens/Attica agreement with Philip to stop piracy 114 Attica as equivalent to cleruchic land 109, 110, 123 calls meeting of Greeks, 373/72 BC 3 Corinthian War 1 discussions around Peace of Philocrates 8–9 early interest in Chersonese 190 expels Macedonians from Euboea, 341/40 BC 23 fifth-century empire and tribute 113, 162, 191 growth of revenues after 345 BC 150

212

Index

Athens/Attica contd. makes secret agreement with Philip, 358 BC 5, 170–71 makes treaty with Cersobleptes in 352 BC 168 passing of psephismata/nomoi 136–37 prepare to continue fighting after Chaeronea 23–24 preparing a fleet 117–18 response to raid of Sphodrias 2 retains possessions in 387 BC 2 Second Naval Confederacy 2, 24, 106, 130, 157 sends embassy around Greece, 346 BC 8 sends embassies around Greece, 343 BC 140 sends embassies around Greece, 341 BC 23 sends embassy to Philip, 346 BC 8 short of food after Spartan raids, 370s BC 3 Social War 5–6 Bema 91, 178 Berisades 5, 168 Beroe 119 Binae 119 Black Sea 100, 121 Boule 101, 155 Brasidas 170 Byzantium 2, 5, 23, 49, 92, 93, 97, 120, 121–22, 123, 126, 131, 154 Cabyle 48, 119, 149 Callias of Chalcis 124–25, 143–44

Callisthenes 4 Callistratus 177 Cantharus 150 Cardia 12, 12, 104, 105, 113, 123, 155–56, 168 Carystus 142, 176 Cersobleptes 5, 6, 8–9, 13, 99, 105, 107, 110, 111, 156, 166, 168–69 Cetriporis 169 Chabrias 18, 106, 157 Chaeronea, Battle of 23 Chalcidice 4, 7, 21, 162, 163, 165 Chalcis 124, 141–45, 147, 176 Chares 92, 115, 121, 130, 134, 138–39, 167, 177 Charidemus 3, 4, 111, 128, 168 Chersonese (Thracian) 1, 12, 100, 102, 104, 105, 107, 109, 113, 114, 123, 125, 155–56, 167, 168, 190, 191, 192 Chius 5, 131, 132 Cimon 191 Cleitarchus 12, 54, 142–45 Cleon 191 Cleruchs history of 105–107 after Social War 6 at Lemnos 2 in Chersonese 13, 97, 104, 106, 107, 123, 126 in Oreus 157 in Potidaea 163 in Tiristasis 113 Cnidus, Battle of 1 Common Peace of 373 BC 3 Conon 1, 132, 172, 176 Corcyra 115, 134, 177

Index Corinthian War 1, 162 Cotys 2, 3, 5, 99, 168 Crenides/Philippi 110 Crithote 5, 105 Crobyle 13, 113 Crocus Field, Battle of 161, 169 Ctesiphon 25 Cyzicus 4, 177 Darius, King of Persia 119, 166 Deliberative oratory, Demosthenes’ techniques anadiposis 32 appeal to the Gods 109 asteios 39 asyndeton 31 direct speech 36, 40, 124 doubtful veracity 27 eikos 37, 38 enthymemes 34, 38, 41, 175 hyperbaton 32 hypophora 31 indirect speech 37 juxtaposition of ideas 32 maxims 39, 40, paradeigmata 34, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 124, 147, 161, 164, 165 paraleipsis 32 parathesis 32 pathos 43–44 pleonasm 31, 118, 140 psychological planning 44 semeia 37, 39 series of short questions 31 Deliberative oratory, Demosthenic structures 28– 32, 149

213

logoi 29, 179–85 structure of Dem. 8 33–45 use of rings 30, 41, 179–89 Demosthenic oratory, topoi Athenian ancestors 26, 41, 150, 151 Athenian past 20 corrupt speakers in Athens 36, 40, 42, 91, 126, 153, 155, 164, 171, 178 criticism of demos 20 democracy 20 ethos of Demosthenes 20, 33, 35, 41, 42, 43, 44, 91, 92, 94, 129, 140, 153, 171–72, 174, 175 events of the recent past 26 expediency 35 honour 35 justice 35 past Athenian greatness 26 pay taxes and Athenians fight themselves 128 Philip action/Athenian inaction 39, 94, 108, 116, 118, 124 Philip is at war with Athens 108, 124, 146 Philip is untrustworthy 38, 165 Philip wants to destroy Athens and democracy 40, 41, 94, 99, 148, 164 possibility 35 slavery 152, 164 speakers driven by self-interest 34, 36, 101, 146, 151–52, 172 speaking for the interests of the city 94 sumpherein 35, 93, 178

214

Index

Delos 24 Delphi 159, 163, 166 Demades 24 Demosthenes actions after death of Philip 24 activities after 336 BC 25 alliance with Philocrates, 348 BC 8, 93 and First Embassy, 346 BC 8 and Second Embassy 10 attacked in court, 338–37 BC 24 attacks on Aeschines, 346 BC 10, 21 attacks Peace of Philocrates 10 awarded wreath of gold 23 chairman of his symmory174 characterisation of Philip 6–7, 19, 20, 28, 99, 119, 149, 153 Commissioner for Theoric Fund 24 Commissioner for Walls 24 death of father and guardianship 15 delivers funeral oration after Chaeronea 24 early career as logographos 16–17 early life and family 14–15 follows Eubulus’ policies in early career 93 Harpalus affair 25 has state of emergency passed, 346 BC 154 leads embassy around Greece, 343 BC 12 leads opposition to Philip in Athens, 342 BC 13

liturgies 17, 173–74 opposes Peace with Philip, 343 BC 11 prosecutes Aeschines 10 prosecutes guardians 15–16 publication of speeches 19, 27, 46–48, 49–50, 121, 148 ransom of prisoners from Olynthus 174 sent to find grain after Chaeronea 24 suicide, 321 BC 26 supports Peace of Philocrates 9 Trierarchic Crown 17 Dercylidas 1 Diocles 176 Dionysius of Halicarnassus 43 Diopeithes 92, 95, 96, 98–99, 104, 106, 107, 113, 114, 115, 116, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138–39, 146, 151, 155, 178 Diotimus 115 Dium 163 Doriscus 119, 166–67 Drongilus 48, 119, 149 Egypt 3, 132, 177 Eion 191 eisangelia 54, 97–98, 116, 136, 169 eisphora 127, 128–29, 172, 174 Elaeus 5, 105 Embata, Battle of 138, 177 Ennea Hodoi 191 Eretria 12, 54, 125, 142–45, 176 Ergisce 166 Ergocles 114

Index Erythrae 131, 132 Etesian winds 47, 121, 124 Euboea 7, 12, 21, 23, 49, 95, 121, 124–26, 141, 142–45, 157, 174, 175, 177 Eubulus 8, 9, 18, 19, 20, 93, 130, 139, 140–41 Euphraeus 144 Eurylochus 125, 144 Euthycrates 27, 38, 146–47, 153 Evagoras 132 First Embassy, 346 BC 8–9, 101–02 Fourth Embassy to Philip 11 Fourth Phillipic, relationship to Dem. 8 45–50 Getae 120 graphe paranomon 19, 93, 138, 147, 169 Halonnesus 12 Halos 8–9, 12 Harpalus Affair 25 Hebrus River 166–67 Hebryzelmis 2 Hegesander 93, 97 Hegesippus 11–12, 13, 96–97, 142 Hellenic League 191 Hellespont 99, 104, 113, 114, 119, 134, 167 Hermias of Aterneus 48, 131 Hieron Oros 119, 167 Hieron Teichus 119 Hipponicus 124–25, 144 Hyperides 22, 24

215

Illyria 11 Imbrus 1, 2, 24 Iphicrates 2, 3, 4, 52, 115, 134, 138, 139, 177 Isocrates 46, 174 Jason of Pherae 157–59 King’s Peace 2, 3 Lamian War 26 Larisa 7, 158–61 Lasthenes 27, 38, 146–47, 153 Laurium, mines of 54, 150 Lemnos 2, 24, 145 Leosthenes 139 Leuctra, Battle of 3, 157, 159 Libanius 55 Liturgies 172–74 Lycophron, tyrant of Pherae 160–61 Lysander 1, 156 Malia 159 Mantinea 141 Mantinea, Battle of 176 Maronea, city in Thrace 167 Maronea, mines of 150 Mascames 167 Mastira 48, 119, 149 Mausolus 4, 5 Medocus 192 Megalopolis 18, 141 Megara 52, 124, 125 Meidias 137, 142, 172, 174 Melanopus 98 Melian Dialogue (Thucydides) 93 Menestratus 142

216

Index

Mercenary forces 3, 111–13, 117, 126, 128, 160, 172 Methone 160, 177 Miletus 156 Miltiades the Elder 1, 95, 167, 168, 190 Miltiades the Younger 190–91 Miltocythes, Revolt of 4, 167 Mnesarchus 176 Molossus 143 Munychia 150 Mytilene 106 Naucratis 15 Nicias, 5th century Athenian strategos 115, 192 Nicias, Macedonian herald 123 Oetaea 159 Olympus 163 Olynthus 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 21, 27, 102, 140, 146–47, 161, 162–63, 165, 170–71 Oreus/Histiaea 2, 52, 54, 118, 124– 25, 142–45, 156–57, 176 Orthagoria 167 Pactye 105, 107 Pagasae 157, 161 Pamphylia 114 Pangaeum Mt, 171 Paralus 136, 137 Parmenion 125, 144 Pasion 134 Pausanius, Macedonian pretender 3, 168 Peace of Philocrates 8–11, 13, 21,

22, 23, 96, 101, 102, 104, 110, 111, 114, 116, 155, 156, 166 Pella 10 Peloponnese 11, 19, 125, 141, 177 Pericles 98, 142 Perinthus 23, 120, 122, 126, 154 Perrhaebia 159 Persia 1, 47, 95, 132, 134, 155, 156, 157, 177 Persian Wars 191 Phalaecus 143 Pharsalus 12 Phaselis 131 Pherae 7, 10, 41, 103, 104, 157–61, 169 Philip actions securing borders 6, 7, 95, 96, 123, 147, 149, 166 agreement with Athens to stop piracy 114 alliance with Byzantium 121 alliance with Rhodes 20 and Olynthus 163, 170 assassinated, 339 BC 24 attacks Perinthus 23 campaigns against Thrace, 342/41 BC 95–96, 119–20 ends Sacred War 10, 11, 102, 103, 154, 161, 165–66 establishes decadarchia in Thessaly, 344 BC 161 establishes protectorate in Thessaly, 357 BC 160 expedition against Cersobleptes, 346 BC 9 growth of power 7, 102 has soldiers wear laurel wreaths in Thessaly, 352 BC 161

Index in alliance with Cersobleptes 169 invovement in Euboea 124–26, 141–45, 156 letter to Athens ([Dem.] 12) 104, 123 military reforms 6 promises benefits to Athens 11 proposal for peace with Athens, 348 BC 7 replaces Thracian kings 168 seizes grain shipments 23 send embassy to Athens, 344/43 BC 11, 155 subdues Thrace 13 supports Cardian independence 13 swears to Peace of Philocrates 10 takes Amphipolis 170 threatens grain trade, 341 BC 95 treats Athens leniently after Chaeronea 23 Philipoppolis 119 Philistides 12, 54, 125, 144–45, 157 Philocrates 8, 21, 93, 101 Phocion 92, 122, 125, 132, 143–4 Phocis 7, 8–9, 10–11, 102, 142, 161, 166, 169 Phormio 98 Phrynon, Olympic pancratiast 190 pinakion 136–37 piracy/pirates 113–14, 130, 155, 160 Piraeus 109, 110, 150 Pisistratid dynasty 95, 190 Pitholaus 169 Plato 34 Plutarchus 142–43

217

Polycrates Decree of, 106–107 Porthmus 125, 144 Potidaea 4, 12, 106, 147, 162–63, 165, 171, 177 Ptolemy, King of Macedonia 3 Pydna 5, 160, 170–71, 177 Python of Byzantium 11 rhetor kai strategos 176 Rhodes 5, 19, 20, 132 Salaminia 137 Salamis 24 Samos 115, 137, 177 Samothrace 2 Satrap’s Revolt 4, 177 Sciathus 145 Scyrus 1, 2, 24 Scythia 14, 119, 166 Second Embassy to Philip 9–10, 103, 174 Selymbria 125 Serrium 166–67 Serrium Teichus 119, 167 Sestus 1, 4, 5, 6, 115, 121 Seuthes II 1, 191 Seuthes III 192 Sicily 142, 192 Sigeum 190 Sitalces 191 Social War 5, 18, 19, 105, 106, 130, 131, 139, 148, 170, 171 Socrates 34 Sparta 1–3, 4, 18, 19, 25, 106, 109, 132, 141, 157, 158, 165, 166, 177 Spartocid dynasty 121

218 Sphodrias 2 symmories 18, 127 Syracuse 134 Tamynae, Battle of 143 Taurosthenes 143 Thasos 2, 104, 114, 121, 145 Thebes/Boeotia 1, 2, 3, 19, 23, 24, 102, 132, 134, 138, 158–60, 165–66, 169, 175–76 Themison 176 Themistocles, 115, 150 Theoric fund 47, 48, 122 Thermopylae 7, 11, 112, 154 Thessaly 7, 11, 97, 102, 120, 139, 154, 157–61, 163, 169 Thieves’ Harbour 131

Index Third Embassy to Philip 11 Thrace 5, 7, 9, 13, 21, 95, 96, 97, 99, 191, 192, 104, 107–108, 110, 111, 113, 119–21, 134, 149, 154, 163, 166–68, 169, 191–92 Thrasybulus 1, 2, 114, 134, 192 Timocrates 18, 19, 130 Timotheus 3, 4, 27, 98, 115, 134, 138–39, 142, 162, 168, 175–78 Tiristasis 13, 113 Torone 4, 163, 177 Trachinian Heraclea 159 Xerxes I, King of Persia 113, 167, 191 Zea 150