Grassroots of Democracy: Field Studies of Indian Elections 8178243199, 9788178243191

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The Grassrootsof Democracy FieldStudiesof IndianElections

The Grassroots of ~ Democracy Field Studies of Indian Elections

Concnwdby

M.N. Srinivas and AM. Shah

Editedby

A.M. Shah .,,,J will,.,.

Epilopeby

YogcndraYadav

p., r rn a n e n t I>1.~, ~



z

~

Congmssvpportm Top families Manufactu~n and industrialists Muslims fan 5""gl,n,pportm Traders White-collar workers Other occupational groups &p,J,lic11n 111pportm Labourersand other petty occupations Hllrij1111 svpportm Swccpcn____ .

Yaish,Brahmin,Jain Yaish

\4,tn r,mdid

AsP" cmt

oftowni ~l«t.rdle

3 5

1200 1200

48.0 48.0

Muslim

17

1200

48.0

Yaish Brahmin,Other Hindu castes OtherHindu astes

20 15

1400 1200

56.0 48.0

20

1150

46.0

Jatava

15

1200

48.0

Harijan

5

1200

48.0

86

THE GRASSROOTS OF DEMO C RACY

of the local Jan Sanghsupponers 'who alsohappen to be our men in times of need.' The suppon of the top families for Deshmukh was, however, more explicit because of their long-standing connections with the Congress, their personal knowledge of Dcshmukh, and the severalfavours they had receivedfrom him. As one of them pointed out, 'Dcshmukh alwaysmaintainshis contactswith us and hdps us in securingrube-well connectionsand in forwardingbusinessapplications.' The shopkttpcrsand busin~en ~ the most vocalsupponcrs of the Jan Sangh.They gaveseveralreasons:one, a growingdiscndiantmcnt with the economic policies of the Congress government; two, that the Congress seemed more concerned about agriculturists than the businesscommunity; and three, the high local taxes.Not all sections of the business community, however, thought that the Jan Sangh would radicallychange the situation. But, as the owner of a tea shop who hadbeenan ardent supporter of the Congressuntil 1962 pointed out, 'I am supponing Jan Sangh because the country needs some change. Even ifJan Sangh cannot replacethe Congress it can become the major opposition pany to check the misdeeds of the ruling pany.' A trader belonging to the lower-income group expressedthe feeling that Jan Sangh was the only party 'which can take up our cause'. The younger and more articulate supporters of the pany, however, went funher and claimed that once voted to power the Sangh would 'lower taxes, lift the ban on movement of foodgrains, abolish monopolistic tendencies in commerce, and hdp in making business free and competitive.' While the suppon of high-caste Hindus and rich families was divided between Congress and Jan Sangh, the members of SCs were interested in their own candidates. The support for the Republican Partycame mainlyfrom Jatavaswho bdieved that it was the only pany which could protect and advance their interests. At a group meeting the Jatavas told me, :.\I.Iother panics arc dominated by people who considerus low.The RepublicanPartyis our caste pany and wc cannot think of going against it.' When I pointed out that Dcshmukh also belonged to their caste, the reply was, 'Even though this is true, he is not of our pany. How can wc vote for him?' Some gavevent to their personal fcdings against Dcshmukh: 'He is a man of the big people; he is too important to come to us.' Deshmukh's alienation from his own caste was thus due to the commonly shared fcding that in spite of being a Jatava he had gone over to the higher and richer section of Hindus. His allegiance to Congress, which was considered to be 'a

A SMALL TOWN IN SASNI ASSEMBLY CON STITUE NCY

87

party of rich people who .practised untouchability', only hdpcd to funhcr isolate him. The hostility of the Jatavas towards the Jan Sanghwas even more pronounced. They considered it a Bania party which stood in favour of untouchability. When asked about the chances of their own candidate, they admined that while he would get the Jatava votes m bloc,it was difficult for him to get many votes in the town since the majority of the voters were high-caste Hindus. The attitude of Harijans, on the other hand, was different. They thought the Republican Party bdonged to the Jatavas and, therefore, had nothing to do with · them. One of them described the rivalry betweenthe twO castesas follows:'The Jatavastreat us as untouchables and refuseto render us any service.In turn, we alsodo not serve them. We shall not vote for their candidate.' The Harijans were not panicularly opposed to the policies of the Congress. In fact, some of them recalled the efforts made by the Congress and Mahatma Gandhi to improve their lot. They even said that they would havevoted for Congressm blochad it accededto their request of nominating a Harijan instead of a Jatava as its candidate. Their suppon to the Harijan candidate stemmed mainly from their conflict with local Jatavas and the popularity of the candidate from theirown caste,a man they had known for a long time.Their opposition to the Republican candidate also had similar grounds. Interviews with the Muslims revealeddifferent reasons for their suppon to the Congress. First, since they had alwaysvoted for the Congress they were reluctant to switch. Second, they did not bdievc there was any alternative to the Congress, for, as some said, the Jan Sangh was even worse. A Muslim clerk remarked, 'For us there is no alternative but to vote for Congress. It is due to this party that we have been allowedto Stayin the country. How can we take a suicidal policyof voting Jan Sangh?'Third, among the Muslim workersin the factoriesthere was a general feeling that since the rich factory owners supponed Congress, they too should do so. They said, 'The Congress is the party to which our Babuji bdongs and we arc so much obliged to him that we cannot possibly take any independent stand.'

The mu/ts

Pollingtook placein Sasnion February17.There were 2,515registered voters.The variousmohallasin the town were groupedinto threepolling

88

T H£ GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

Table 3.3: Distribution of Votersby Religionand Major Castes Booth

1 2 3

All Booths

Pn-rm• Distri/nujq,r of Votmby&lip,, tmtiMlljorC.SU BraJ,,,,j,r Vaish Other ~ M11,1/ims Tottd Permu Number Cutes Hi""' CAStn 13.1 15.7 7.5 21.1

41.2 12.0 21.5 24.3

32.2 33.8 26.4 29.5

0.8 34.5 17.8 10.7

12.7 4.0 26.8 14.4

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

799 863 853 2,515

Table3.4: Votes Polledby Candidates

u,,u/i,'4"

Party Affilil#ion

VotnPolld

BootlnuiH Pert:ml of VotnPo/Id

Number Percmt (I) R.P.Deshmukh Co~ 534 SantoshSingh 546 JanSangh RaghubirSingh Republican 114 GhanshyamDass Independent 87 Others 75 Total 1,356

39.7 40.0 8.3 6.3 5.7 100.0

46.3 47.5 0.8 0.8 4.6 100.0

(2)

(3)

28.l 45.2 39.2 35.2 14.0 9.3 13.2 4.4 5.5 5.9 100.0 100.0

booths.The distributionof votersat theseboothsbyreligionand major castesis shownin Table3.3. Only 54 per cent of the votersturned out to vote.Of the total votespolled,the Congresscandidatesecured543, the Jan Sangh 546, the Independent Harijan 87, and the Republican 114.The remaining75 votesweredividedbctwccnfivecandidatesnot discussedin this paper fur reasonsgivenearlier. The percentagebreakup of votes polled by the candidatesis given in Table 3.4. The voters in the town aligned themselvesmore or less according to their caste. Although this is difficult to prove statistically,caste alignmentscan be estimatedfrom Table3.5 showingthe relationship of caste-voteto votes polled by the candidates in the three booths. While the Congress and Jan Sangh candidates securedthe bulk of the Muslimand the upper-casteHindu votesrespectively, the SC votes weredistributedmainlybctwccnthe Republicanand the Independent Harijan candidates.At Booth 2 where the concentrationof SC voters was the highest(34.5 percent), the Republicanand Harijancandidates

A SMALL TOWN IN SASNI ASSEMBLY CONSTITUENCY

89

Table 3.5: Booth-wiseAnalysisof Voters by Religion and Votes Polled by Candidates Booth Pmmu,r Bmdt--, ofVotm l'nmr14f,tBrrllk-#pof Vousl'rJ/kJ byRdigumtmJ0w byundiutes U,/>" Musum]lllArltlHlll"ifa,,]11110mirm&p,,hliu,, lndq,mJn,I Hirul# Sllllgh 1 86.5 12.7 0.8 ... 47.5 46.3 0.8 0.8 2 61.5 4.0 22.4 12.1 39.2 28.1 14.0 13.2 3 55.5 26.7 I 5.4 2.4 35.2 45.2 9.3 4.4

together polled over 27.2 per cent of the total votes cast, whereas at Booth I where the SC vote was 0.8 per cent, they obtained just 1.6 per cent of the votes cast. The bulk of Muslim votes went to Congress. This was clear from the larger margin of votes in favour of Congress in Booth 3 where the percentageof Muslimvoterswas highest(26.7 per cent). Similarly, in Booth 2 where Muslim votes constituted only 4 per cent, it sc:cms that upper-caste Hindu voters heavily favoured the Jan Sangh. Analysing the SC votes in Table 3.5 throws up some interesting features. Despite the claim of the Republican supporters that their candidate would get all the Jatava votes, the results were different. While Jatavascomprised 13.5 per cent of the total number of voters in the town, the Republican candidate got only 8.3 per cent of the votes polled. In contrast the proportion of votes that the Harijan candidate polled (6.3 per cent) was greater than the proportion of Harijan voters (4.8 per cent) in the town. The Harijans thus appear to havevoted m bl« for their castecandidate.The factthat the Harijan. candidate got 0.8 per cent of the votes cast in Booth I where there were no Harijan voters further suggeststhat some non-Harijan voters must have voted for him too. It is possible,as mentioned earlier, that some uncommitted upper-casteHindus were attracted by the humble approach of the Harijan candidate. It is alsopossible that some votes we.recast in hisfavourbecauseof confusionarisingout of the allotment of the same dcction symbol (lion) to him as to another candidate contesting for the parliamentary scat. Quite a few women voterswho came to vote for Congresswere heard saying that they had voted for two animals (bullock and lion) as they were told to. Probably some votes went in favour of the Harijan candidate in this manner.

90

TH£ GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

Conclusion Some general observation follow, even at the risk of repetition. In the first place, voting was influenced by caste as well as economic considerations.The caste Hindus voted in favour of the Congress and Jan Sangh candidates becausethey c:xpcctedone of the two parties to win the election. They wanted to be on the winner's side in -0rder to retain their influence and powers of patronage. There could have been another reason:though the Co~ andJan Sanghcandidatesbelonged to the SCs, the parties themselves were not considered SC panics. Locally,the Jan Sangh was considered to be a party representing the business class which, as far as the town was concerned , was mainly Yaish.Llkcwisc, the Congresswas considered to be a party representing generallythe upper-caste and richer sections of the town'spopulation. The Harijan and Republican candidates were identified clearly as the candidates of Harijans and Jatavas rcspcctivdy. Perhaps the two SCs did not contest the elections as a single group because Sasni was part of a reserved constituency and the election of a SC member was therefore assured. There was thus no compulsion to suppress intra- . caste tensions prevailing among the two SCs. They could freely assen their separate identities and·have no apprehension that splitting their votes would get a non-SC member elected. Muslims seem to have supponed the Congress not because of any political commitment but because they thought they had no choice. The Jan Sangh was suspect because they associated it with Hindu communalism, while the Harijan and Republican candidates were of no hdp in ensuringtheir security.From their point of view the Congress alone was the protector of their interests. . The caste rivalries between Jatavas and Harijans-which the elections in this constituency aggravated funher-highlight the fact that reserved constituencies tend to intensify caste tensions among that very section of the depressed population for whose benefit the reservationof constituencieshas beenprovided for in the Constitution. This may sound a sweeping generalization, but the study supports it amply, however inadequate the representativenessof the town studied might be.

4 A NEIGHBOURHOOD JULLUNDUR CONSTITUENCY

IN SOUTH ASSEMBLY IN PUNJAB

VEENA DUA

Introduction This essay is concerned with the general dcctions of 1967 in BG Camp, 1 one of the fifteen wards in the South Jullundur assembly constituencyin Punjab.The Camp was populated mainlyby Harijans who were also members of the Arya Samaj. An understanding of the political climate of Punjab at the time of the 1967 dcctions is necessaryfor understanding the dcaoral process in BG Camp. Hindu-Sikh rivalry,which had been at the centre of political life in Punjab since 1947, assumed a new dimension a few months before these dcaions. The reorganization of the composite state of Punjab into Punjabi-speaking Punjab and Hindi-speaking Haryana in 1966 changed the status of the Hindus in Punjab from that of the dominant group to that of the largestminority.While they had formed about 70 per cent of the population in composite Punjab, their strength was reduced to 45 per cent in reorganizedPunjab. This sudden change in their relative numerical strength, combined with their apprehension about the treatment they would get from the dominant Sikhs,intensifiedcommunal conflict.A bitter contest ensued bctwccnthe two communities to gain politicalsupremacyin the state. The Hindu opposition to the Sikhs dcvdopcd into opposition to

fflus essay was

originally published as 'FJcctions in a Scheduled Caste Neighbowhood: A PunjabTown' in &o,_.;e,mJPr,/itietdWttltly, November1971.] 11studiedthe ekctionsin the placewhereI did fieldwork formy Ph.D.dissenarion.

92

THE GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRA CY

the Congress,becausethey felt chat the ruling Congresshad conceded the demand for a Punjabi Suba, thereby reducing the Hindus to a minority.Some Hindusevensuspecteda link-up betweenthe Congress and the Akali Dal. The association between Sikhs and the Congress was so strong in the minds of Hindus that some of them even went so far as to say chat all Congressmenin Punjab wereAkalisin disguise, the only differencebeingthe colour of their turbans: the white turbans of Congressmen and the blue of the Akalis.The Congress Party's choice of candidates for the dcctions intensified this feeling. Of the 117 candidates it chose to contest the parliamentary and assembly dcctions, only 24 were Hindus. Enraged by this discrimination, representativesof a number of Hindu organizations,such as the Arya Sarnaj, Sanatan Dhararn, Jan Sangh, Ram Rajya Parishad, Hindu Maha Sabha, and Jain Dharam,2 issuedan appealto Punjabi Hindus to boycottthe Congressin the dcctions.This was followedby a directive from the SarvadeshikSabha-the highest body of Arya Samaj-to its constituent Arya centres and Samajists in Punjab, to boycott the Congress. Although the Sabha did not commit itself to any party, it was widdy known chat its leaders favoured Jan Sangh.

The constituencyand the neighbourhood The South Jullundur assemblyconstituency consisted of overa dozen denselypopulated mohallas within the walled city, a few old bastis on its outskirts, about half a dozen post-partition colonies, and BG Camp, the focus of this essay.The localities in the constituency had a mixture of Hindus and Sikhs, Hindus constituting about 60 per cent and Sikhs 40 per cent. There were Harijans in all the localities, except the walled city where all the Hindus belonged to the twiceborn castes.There were no low-caste Sikhs in the walled city. In the constituencyas a whole,the proportion of low-casteSikhswas negligible compared to the Harijans. The largest concentration ofHarijans was in BG Camp. Almost 90 per cent of its estimated 30,000 population belonged to two Harijan castes , namdy Mcgh and Barwala.There was a rough correlation between the caste composition of a locality, its economic status, and Its politicalaffiliation. The walledcity,inhabited 21n Punjab, the Jains

generallyaligned themselveswith Hindw against Sikhs.

This identificationwas funher intensifiedat the cimcof the 1967 clcctionsbecause they supported the anci-cowslaughtermovement.

A SCHE D UL ED CAST E N EIG HBOURH O OD IN JULL U ND UR

93

by the 'clean' castes, was prosperous and strongly inclined towards the Jan Sangh. .Azeaslike BG Camp, poor and predominantlyHarijan, were Congressstrongholds. A fcarurcof the Arya Sarnajin Jullundur was that almostall of the powerfulArya Samaj centres were located in the walled city and controlled by the Jan Sangh. BG Camp had been set up in 1948 to rehabilitatercfugccsfrom West Pakistan.It was named after Gopi Chand Bhargava,then chief minister of Punjab. Although it had a hctcrogcncouspopulation, it was identifiedwith the Mcghs, who constituted about 70 per cent of its populationof 30,000.The 8arwalas,comprising20 per cent of the population,were the secondlargestcommunityin the Camp.Although both Mcghsand 8arwalaswere regarded as untouchableHarijancastes, onlyMcghswcte accordedSC status bygovernmentand enjoyedvarious SC benefits. This anomaly existed even though the Barwalaswere educationallyand economicallymore backwardthan the Mcghs.Some educated Barwalaswere trying to get themselvescatcgoriud as SC. Most Mcghs claimed to be Arya Sarnajistsin terms of their rites ofpmagc. However, manyof them alsovisitednon-AryaSamajplaces of worship.One Mcgh householdpractisedSikh ritesand considered itself Sikh by religion.The Arya Sarnaj had practicallyno following among the other castes. Upper-caste Hindus in the Camp did not like to be associatedwith the Arya Samaj, since they identified it with Mcghs. The Arya Sarnajistswere the most important religious group in the Camp because,besidesbeing numericallypreponderant, they constituted the only religiousgroup which openly participated in politics. There were two local Arya Samaj centres in BG Camp which I referto as Neta and V uodhi. Neither of them had a largemembership: Virodhi had just 110 registeredmembers, and Neta had none. The number of rcgistfred members was, however, no indication of the popularity of an Arya centre. Both the centres were regularlyvisited by a largenumberof people,and both weredeeplyinvolvedin politics. Their platformswerewiddy usedby politicalpartiesfor campaigning in the variousdcctions.3 While Neta was associated,sinceits inception in 1948, with the Congress,V uodhi changed loyaltiesfrom one party to another. In the 1967 dcctions, it supponed the Jan Sangh. The Mcghswere convened to the Arya Samaj around 1910 with 3For an

analysi,of the relationship between local Arya ccnacs and political panics, sec my paper 1970b.

94

THE GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

promises of the status and privilegesof twice-born Hindus. The Arya Samaj gave them the right to wear the sacred thread and to read the sacred Vedas, which were earlier forbidden to them. Like other low castes, the Mcghs saw this religious conversion as an opportunity to rise socially.They hoped it would mitigate the stigma attached to their birth. This had not materialii.cd,however. Although Mcghs now wore the sacred thread and performed the same rituals as the higher-casteArya Samajists, they were not able to attain equal status. Uppcr-aste Hindus, whether Sanatan Dharmists or Arya Samajists, looked down upon Mcghs and treated them as a low caste. The Mcghs felt frustrated, becauseeven the most educated and wellemployedamong them were unable to get brides from outside their caste. It was not surprising that the Mcghsfdt closerto other SCs,whether Arya Samajist or not, rather than to caste _Hindus , including Arya Samajists.The Mcghs' status as Arya Samajists and their status as a SC were not alwayscompatible; there was often a conflict of loyalties. Consequently, the Mcghs stressedone status in one situation and the other in another. For instance, they acted as Arya Samajists when they activelyparticiparcd in the agitation against cow slaughter; but during the ckctions theyacted as a SC and did not hesitate to disregard the dictates of Arya Samaj. In the past, the AryaSamajists, high as well as low caste, had been by and largepro-Congress. The Mcghs' support for the Congresswas reinforcedby their status as a SC. During the 1967 dcctions, however, they were in a difficult predicament because of the Arya Samajists' decisionto boycott the Congress;they had to choosebctwccnthe Arya Samajand the Congress. Their interests as a SC demanded that they should continue to support the Congress, but their interests as Arya Samajistsdemanded that they should support Jan ~angh.

Meghcastt: Unityand diversity The Mcghswere differentiated internally in terms of educational qualifications,occupationalstatus , politicalaffiliation, and commiancnt to various leaders, both in the Camp and outside. Neta and Virodhi reflectedthese differencesdearly. While most of the members of Neta were illiterateand unskilledlabo=, most of the membersofVirodhi were educated and worked as skilled and semi-skilled workers, and

A SCHEDULED CASTE NEIGHBOURHOOD

IN JULLUNDUR

95

someevenowned6ourishingbusinessconcerns.While Neta supponed Congress,V-uodhisupponed the Jan Sangh. The diffcrcnces in the political1~ of the twO centres originated mainlyfrom rivalrybctwccnBudhaMal and SardariLal,the sccrctaries of Neta and Virodhl respectively.The two were sworn enemies and had alwaysopposed one another in elections. Lal was the leader of the young and educated section of Mcghs.Although he did not have much education himself, he was a great champion of the cause of education for the SCs and OBCs. On his insistence,a primaryschool was staned in Virodhi a little before the elections. He was widely acclaimed for his 'wisdom', 'organizational capacity', and 'largchcartcdncss'.All the young Mcghs in Jullundur (and for that matter, most of the SC people there) regardedhim as their leader and looked up to him for counsel.In spite of his popularity,however,he had not beena successin the dcaions. He had made twO unsucccssful artcmpts to defeat Budha Mal in the municipal elections, but Budha Mal was 'municipal commissioner"'for three consecutiveterms before he was dcfcatcdby a CPI candidate in 1964. SardariLal rejoiced over his defeat,although he was not happy about the CPI victory.Budha Mal continued to enjoy an imponant position in the Camp despite his defeatbecausebe was associatedwith YashPal,who wasFood Minister of Punjab. Moreover,he wielded great influenceon the older section of Mcghs who regarded him as their leader. Notwithstanding their personal rivalry and different political commitments, Mal and Lalagreedto unite for the 1967 elections-providedthe Congtcu nominatedtwO Mcghsto the ugislarivcCouncil. The demand for Mcgh representationin the LegislativeCouncil was made throughthe Mcgh Sudhar Sabha (McghWelfareAssociation).5 Freshelectionswereheld at the Sabhato chooseofficebearers.Budha Mal,the seactary of the Sabhaforovertwo decades,ag;:ecd to the elections on condition that he would be recommended for representation to the LegislativeCouncil. Sardari Lal was elected the secretaryof the Sabha, and one of his close associates,the president. Mal was elected one of the directors. The Sabha decided to send a five-member 4Municipal councillors in

Punjab wen: known as municipal commissioners. 5ThcMegh Sudhar Sabha was formed specially to look after the education and welfareof Meghs. It was formed soon after their conversion to the Arya Samaj in 1910.

96

THE GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

deputationto the chiefministerto p~ their demandfor representation in the LegislativeCouncil. It was resolvedthat, if the chief mi.nister conceded to their demand, the Mcghs would suppon the Congress candidatein SouthJullundur.The resolutionwassigned,amongothers, by Mal and Lal. On 18 January 1967, the deputation consisting of Lal, Mal, and three other prominent Mcghs from BG Camp went to meet the chief minister. Yash Pal, the Congress candidate from South Jullundur, informed the deputation that the government could not consider their demandbeforethe dcctions.He promisedto do his best,however, once the elections were over. Lal, disbelievingYashPal, demanded a written assurance,whichwas refused.The deputation returnedwithout meeting the chief minister.With this, the dissensionbetweenLal and Mal beganafresh.Lal, dis.urisfiedwith the Congressand its candidate, persuadedthe Megh Sudhar Sabha to fidd Milkhi Ram, a Mcgh from the Camp, againstYashPal. Budha Mal, arguing that votescould not be cashed againstany gains,announced his suppon for the Congress. Lal committedVirodhi to the Jan Sangh becauseof hisopposition to Mal, not from any ideologicalconsiderations. Lal's decision was also influencedby Virender, an imponant Arya Samajleader and an influential politician from Jullundur who had pledged himself to the Jan Sangh.Much ofLal's popularity rosefrom his intimate association with Virender.

ThtCandida~s There were sevencandidatcSfor the assemblyscat fromSouthJullundur, two of whom belongedto BG Camp. The realcontest, however,was between the Congressand Jan Sangh candidates.Table 4.1 showsthe caste, religion, and party affiliation of the candidates. YashPal, the sitting Congress member from this constituency,was a prominent AryaSamajleader.He owneda printing pressand publishedtwo daily newspapers,one in Hindi and the other in Urdu. His HindiMi/apwas the firstHindi dailyto be publishedfromJullundurafterindependence. This was greatlypublicizedduring the dcctions as proof ofYash Pal's love for Hi.ndi. He had started his politicalcareervery young, during the freedom struggle.His student life was marked by frequent terms in prison. He joined the Congressafrer obtaining his Master'sdcgrcc, and was proud of hisunquestioningloyaltyto the party.He was Food Minister of Punjab at the time of the elections.

A SCHE D ULED CASTE NE IGHBOURHOOD

I N JU LLU NDUR

97

Table4.1: Caste, Religion and Party Affiliation of Candidates in South Jullundur AssemblyConstituency Nameo/Czndidau YashPal Man MohanKaliya Milkbi Ram MdaSingb }aswant Singh Jaswant Singh Kbambra HecraSingh

Caste Khaui Khatri Megh Megh Adbanni .Adbanni Jat

Religion Arya Samaj Sam.tanDbararn Arya Samaj Sikh Sikh Sikh Sam.tanDbaram

Party Congress

Jan Sangh Independent Independent SSP Independent Independent

Kaliya,theJan Sanghcandidate,had been associatedwith his pany for almost a decade.Beforethat he had been a member of the RSS. A lawyerby profession,he came from a middle-classfamilyin Jullundur city. At the time of elections, he was president of the Jan Sangh in Jullundur and a municipal commissioner. The localJan Sangh leaders were unhappy about their party's choice of candidate for opposing YashPal, who was a seasonedpolitician with considerableexperience in contesting elections. Kaliyagot his nomination because he was a native of Jullundur.The leadershipof the Jan Sanghin Punjab was in the handsof people indigenousto Ea.stPunjab, and rcfugccs from West Punjabrarelygot a chanceto risein the pany.Many Congresssupponcrs claimed that the Jan Sangh had agreed to field a weak candidate in South Jullundur to help the Congressto win in e:xcbangc for Congress suppon in Nonh Jullundur. Milkhi Ramwas supponed by the Megh Sudhar Sabha, because he was the leastcontroversialfigurein BG Camp. He was not associated with either of the two Arya centres in the Camp and was therefore acceptableto Meghs generally. Moreover,he was an influentialperson and a sitting municipal commissionerfrom BG Camp. Khambra, the SSP candidate, was promised suppon by the CPI as wdl as by the Sant Fatch Singh and Master Tara Singh factions of the Akali Dal. Mela Singh, the Mcgh candidate from BG Camp, and Hccra Singh contested as Independents.

The campaign Both Yash Pal and KaJiyahad two offices each in the Camp. These officesworked intensivelyfor about a month beforethe elections. Yash

98

T HE GRASSROOTS OF DE MOCR ACY

Pal, in pania1lar attached great imponance to the Camp as it was considereda Congressstronghold. Budha Mal was manager of one of the Congress offices at the Camp. He arranged for Yash Pal to meet smallgroupsof peoplewho were persuadedto speakout their problems to him. Budha Mal had a band of workers who went from howc to howc to assess the reactions of the voters to Congress and to Yash Pal. These howc-calls helped to establish the strategics for winning over different categories of voters. It appeared as if many who were apparentlyanti-Congresscould be induced to croM over.Some nccdcd only persuasion, others money, and still others jobs and licences to sell some scarce commodity. These people were then individually contacted by Yash Pal who tried to satisfy their demands. YashPal attempted great familiaritywith the people of BG Camp. He ate with them, milked their cows, and joked with them, as if he was one of them. His informal manner helped him to project himself as a friend of the poor and the depressed_In addition to door-to-door canvassing,he organizedtwo public meetingsin the Camp. Prominent Congress leaders, who addressed the meetings, praised Yash Pal for his commitment to the idealsof democracyand socialism,and stressed that the Congress was the only party which stood for the interest of the poor. YashPal asked the voters not to listen to the propaganda of some fanatics in the name of Arya Samaj. If at all anyone deserved the votes of Arya Samajists, it was he himself, an Arya Samajist. Budha Mal cautioned voters to beware ofLal's clever propaganda in the name of the Arya Samaj. He claimed Lal had amassedwealth by unlawful means and was now ttying to pose as a suvaran, a 'clcancaste' man. It was therefore not at all surprising that he should join forces with caste Hindus and support the Jan Sangh, a party which stood for the interests of caste Hindus. He added that it was only the Khatris,Aroras,and Rajputsin the Camp who supported the Jan Sangh. Even the Barwalashad pledged their support to the Congress. The Jan Sangh, whose expectationswere low,adopted the strategy of splitting Congressvotes. The party financed the campaignsof both Milkhi Ram and Mela Singh, hoping that these two candidates, both Mcgh, would cut into the Mcgh support for Congress. The Jan Sangh campaign in BG Camp was organized by Lal. He went from door to door, urging people to vote for l(aliya. Voters who were against the Jan Sangh, or against Kaliya,were asked to vote for Milkhi Ram, the candidate sponsored by the Mcgh Sudhar Sabha.

A SCHEDULED CASTE NEIGHBOURHOOD

IN JULLUNDUR

99

He organiu:d a number of meetingsin V uodhiwhich wereaddressed byprominentAryaSamajleader,,.The Congt~, theysaid,had~ the Punjabi Hindus by conceding the Sikhs' demand for a Punjabi Suba and by relegatingHindi, the sacredlanguageof the Aryas, to a secondary position.They also condemned the Congressgovernment for its failureto ban cow slaughter. Lal made ample usc of the resourcesofVuodhi to campaign for Kaliya.MembersofYirodhi were deployedto stick posters,distribute handouts,and make announcementsabout Kaliya'svisitsto the Camp. Virodhi was thrown open to Kaliya.He addressedmeetingswhenever he visitedthe Camp. Lalhimselfaddressedseveralmeetingsat Virodhi. He mocked YashPal'sclaims to being an Arya Samajist. 'How could he, a friend of the Sikhs and a beef-cater,be an Arya Samajist?'he asked. Lal warned the people against Mal's propaganda in the name of SCs and depressed cla.ueswhich, he alleged, was a mere votecatchingdevice.In f.ict,he pointed out, it was the SC labelwhich had made it impossiblefor the Mcghs to move up in the socialhierarchy. He challengedthe people to name even one Congressmanwho was prepared to marry a Mcgh girl. No goodhad come out of the Mcghs' loyalryto Congress over the previous eighteen years. Only the Arya Samajcould help Mcghs to move up socially.He warned that Mcghs would go down as an ungrateful people in the history of the Arya Samajif they failedto usc their discretionat this crucialmoment. They must prove that they were worthy of the honour accordedto them by the Arya Samaj. A prominent Arya Samajleader and a localjournalist poured out editorials highlighting YashPal's misdeeds.These related mostly to his refusalto support causeswhich were dear to the Arya Samaj,such as the ban on cow slaughter,the demand for Hindi, and the Hindus' rightful place in the state. A significantaspectof the dcctions at BG Camp was that neither Kaliya nor Yash Pal committed themselves openly to any of the parliamentarycandidates.Kaliyahad been assuredsupport by Lal on the understanding that Kaliyawould in tum support the Republican candidate for parliament. Kaliyacould not do this, however,without disrcgan:ling his party'scommitmentto support the Swatantracandidate. While Lal campaignedfor the Republicancandidate, Kaliyahimself maintained a discreet silence. YashPal's campaign was silent about SardarSwaranSingh, the Congresscandidatefor parliament:Palcould

100

T HE GRASSROOTS OF DEMOC RACY

not have claimed to be an Arya Samajistand asked for Arya Samaj support while campaigningfor a Sikh. The other fivecandidatesappealedfor votesmainlyin the name of casteand kinship.As aln:adymentioned, Laldid not directlycampaign for Milkhi Ram. His name was suggested only as a substitute for Kaliya.Lal had proposed Milkhi Ram as the candidate of the Mcgh Sudhar Sabha,just to prevent all anti-Jan Sanghvotes from going to the Congress.Milkhi Ramdid not mind this arrangement,becausehe expectedthat contestingfor the assemblywould help him at.the time of the municipal elections.

The results Of the 53,335 voters in South Jullundur constituency,41,399 (78 per cent) exercisedtheir franchise.The invalidvotesaggregated2,699, leaving38,700 validvotes.Kaliya, securing19,138votes,was dcdarcd elected. Yash Pal, with 14,222 votes, was the only other serious contender. All the other candidates forfeited their deposits. In BG Camp, 4,941 out of 6,042 (82 per cent) votersexercisedtheir franchise. There were4,439 valid votes and 502 invalid. Although YashPal lost the electionsto Kaliya,he secured 1, 186 more votes than Kaliyain BG Camp. Table4.2 shows the distribution of validvotes among the variouscandidates. Most ofKailya's881 votescame from Khattis,Acorasand Rajputs. In spite of Lal's efforts, he was able to get only a few Mcgh votes. In

Table4.2: Votes Polled by Candidates in AssemblyConstituency and BG Camp Oz,,,Ji,lat, Man Mohan Kaliya

YashPal JaswantSingh Khambra Mela Singh Milkhi Ram Hccra Singh JaswantSingh Total

Numb" ofVotn Polkd in

Constituency 19,138 14,222 3,260 1,013 778 149 140 38,700

BG Ozmp

881 2,067 441 622 386 19 23 4,439

A SCH EDU LED CAST E N EI G H BO UR HO OD IN JUL LUNDU R

101

the city, most of Kaliya's votes came from caste Hindus . Yash Pal polled substantially among Mcgbs, besidessecuring both Hindu and Sikh votes. No Sikh candidate was able to win an appreciablenumber of votes. The Congress got most of the Sikh votes in the constituency because the Akali patty had not put up a candidate of its own. Its support to Khambra was only nominal and made no serious effort to campaign for him.

Conclusion The dcction rcsuhsindicated the Mcghs'dear prcfcrcnccfur Congrea . This happened despite the decision of Arya Samajists and the Mcgh Sudhar Sabha to boycottthe Congress,and despite Lal'sopen support to the Jan Sangh.A crucial influence on the dcctoral behaviour of the Mcgbs was their status as a SC. They were acutely aware of the distinctions which separated them from caste Hindus. They fdt they were structurallytoo fu removedfrom the latter to share any common economic and political interests. They were proud of their association with the Arya Samaj, but also felt that their social position rather than sectarian affiliationshould decide their choice of political party. Budha Mal had reiteratedthe samepoint when he dcdarcdthat religion had nothing to do with politicalcommitments. Moreover,the Mcghs, likeother SCs, associatedthe Jan Sangh with caste Hindus, bdicving thatit representedonly caste Hindu interests. It was natural, therefore, thattheir attitude to the Jan Sanghcaried over the resentment they felt towards caste Hindus. Added to this was their apprehension that the Jan Sangh,if it came to power,woulddo awaywith the specialprivileges of the SCs. It was the image of Congrea as friend and well-wisherof the SCs which alsohdpcd YashPal to poll Mcgh votes. The Mcghs' eighteenyear association with the Congress, and the marked improvement in their socio-economic position since 1947, had reinforced this impression. It was generally felt that the Meghs owed their improved social position to Congress.This is not to suggest, however,that the Mcgbs were complacent about their social position. On the contrary, their improved social status and their increased awarenessof rights and privilegesmade them impatient and disgruntled. They strongly resented the wide gap between the promises made to them at the time of elections and the lack of implementation later. Yet they did

102

THE GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

not want to dissociate themselves from the Congress which, they expected, would continue to help them rise in the socio-economic hierarchy. Closely associated with this hope was uncertainty about the programmes of other parties. As one of my informants put it, '.At leastwe arc familiarwith the policiesand programmesof the Congress government. Who knowswhat the other parties will do once they arc in power?'

REFERENCES Dua, Vccna. 1970a. 'Social Organisation of Arya Samaj:A Study ofTwo LocalAryaCenacs in Jullunder',S«iologiclllBu/lnin, XIX(l): 31-50. __ 1970b.~ Samajand PunjabPolitics',&,,wmic and PoliticalW«i-~. V(43, 44): 1787-91.

5 TWO METROPOLITAN COUNCIL CONSTITUENCIES IN NEW DELHI. I. A CANDIDATE IN PRITHVIRAJ ROAD CONSTITUENCY MOH INI ANJUM

The constitumcyand the candidates

.

This paper deals with a candidate and her campaign in the Prithviraj Road Metropolitan Council constituency, one of the twdve council constituencieswithin the New Delhi parliamentaryconstituency. The names and party affiliations of the seven parliamentary candidates and of the six council candidates arc shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The focus of my study is Pushpa Gupta , the Congress candidate for the council scat.1 She and Gurudas, her Jan Sangh rival, were the most prominent of the council candidates. Among the parliamentary candidates, Khanna and Sondhi wcte the most prominent. The council constituency had 30 polling booths and about 30,000 voters. Polling took place in the constituency on 19 February1967 and the results were announced a few days later. My fieldwork was focused on ten of the thirty polling booths. A striking feature of the Prithviraj Road constituency was its diversity in terms of the occupation, education, language, religion, caste, and socialstarus of the voters. The houses varied from hutments ' [Pt I of this paper is by Mohini Anjum; pt II by Achla Mittal.] 1

1 got acquainted with Pu.shpaGupta duting my fieldworkin 1964-5 on elite women in Delhi, particularlymembersof the All India Women'sConference, leading to my doctoral dissertation at the University of Delhi in 1981.

104

THE GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

Table5.1. Candidates in New Delhi Parliamentary Constituency Ca,uud4,e M.C. Khanna M .L Sondhi Jaswant Singh Mahan Raghuvir Das Ram Singh Durlabh Singh Sital A.K. Dar

Party

Congress Jan Sangh Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent

Table5.2. Candidates in Prithviraj Road Metropolitan Council Constituency Candidate Pushpa Devi Gurudas Diwan Chand S.D. Mathw Santosh Kumar Sham Singh Pawar

Party Congress Jan Sangh Independent Independent Independent Independent

to large bungalows;there were high government and non-government servantsas wellas petty clerksand domesticservants;the voters ranged &ompostgraduatesto illiteratepeople.The people belongedto several different linguistic regions and to all the major religious groups. All social, economic, religious and political relationshipswere exploited to the fullest extent for election purposes and reached a climax with Pushpa'svictory.The anti-climax was Khanna'sdefeat. Considering that Khanna and Gupta belongedto the same party, one would have expected either that both would win or that both would lose. But in a constituencywith a largelyliterate dcctorate, the capabilities,resourcesand personality of the candidates were factors at least as important as their party. Results proved that when the electorate was conscious of its responsibilities, it tended to select candidateson criteria other than mere party affiliation.The party was important, but occupied only a secondary place in the minds of the people. Most people believedthat while Khanna was defeatedbecause

TWO METROPOLITAN COUNCIL CONSTITUENCIES

IN NEW DELHI 105

of hisown weaknesses,Pushpawon becauseof her personalcapabilities and merits. The roleof the other candidattScannotbe minimizedin thiscontc:Xt. Pushpa'smain rival, Gurudas of the Jan Sangh, lost becausehe was uneducatedand was a humble tailor.Nc:vcrthdess, sincethe influential Jan Sanghsupportedhim he was ableto secureas manyas 6,627 votes, only 324 less than Pushpa's.The other candidates in the council constituencytrailedf.u behind Pushpaand Gurudas.Their voteswere as fullows:Chand: 69; Mathur: 609; Pawar: 56; and Kumar: 584. It is notcWorthythat Mathur came third: he obtained most of his votes from the Mathurs of his locality. In the case of the parliamentaryconstituency,of the forty-seven candidates for the seven parliamentaryscats in the Union Territory of Delhi, sixof the winning candidateswere from the Jan Sangh and only one from the Congress.This reflectedthe Jan Sangh'sstrength in Delhi.As I havealreadypointed out, however,the personalqualities of the candidatewere alsosignificant.There was generaldissatisfaction in rdation to Khanna. Most voters thought he was too old to be a minister;besides,theyhadhada taste of hisministcrshipalready.They wanted to try a new and younger person, and Sondhi became their firstchoicx.Apartfromhispersonalcapabilitiessuchas a goodeducation and his ability to make impressivespeeches,Sondhi hadthe resources of a strong party at hisdisposal,of which he made good use.Against Sondhi's82,173 votes,Khannagot only 53,313. As in the caseof the council constituency,in the parliamentaryconstituencytoo the other candidates fared badly. Pushpa Gupta's victory was significant, considering that the 1967 elections reflected not only a 'Jan Sangh wave' but also took place in an anti-Congressatmosphere.

The candidate'sbackground Pushpawas popularlyknown as Pushpa Bchenji(bthmji: respectable sister)or Badi Bchenji(elder~ister).She was the founder principalof a higher secondaryschool in the constituency.She had lived in the localityfur seventeenyears. At the time of the elections,she and her familyoccupieda flat on the first floor of the schoolbuilding.Shewas familiar to a large number of people in and around the locality for these reasons.

106

THE GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

Pushpa cmphasiud that her politicalcarttr was an offshoot of her interest in socialwork. Describingher life as a socialworker,she said: Whilein Peshawar[herplaa of birth, nowin Palcisun]I wasgreatlyimpressed by the tcachini? of MahatmaGandhi and RamcshwariNehru. I came into oonl3Ctwith themduringthe fi=om struggle.I wasveryparrioticand wanted to devote my life to my oountry.I asked Gandhiji and RamcshwariNehru as to how I could bestservemy oountry.lneir advicewas that I shouldwork for the children of our country. So, after my graduation I opened a school in Peshawar,of which I was the principal.Then the communalriots started and my familyhad to migrate to Delhi. In Delhi, once again, I started my life as a socialworker. I realisedthe acute problems of the rcfugccsfrom Pakistanand I did my best to help them.

Pushpa talkedenthusiasticallyabout her political career.She said the roots of her political career lay in her participation in social work. Her social services in general and the rehabilitation work among rcfugccsin particular brought her into contact with prominent leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Mrs John Mathai and Suchcta Kriplani. These contacts deepened her interest in politics. Though her political career had started much earlier, it was not until the 1952 general elections that she contested an dcction. It was on her eighteenth birthday, she recalled, that she became a member of the Congress Party in Peshawar.She took pan in processionsand such other political demonstrations and did a lot of propaganda for the use ofkhadi. She helped in the collection of party funds. She said her father was a sessionsjudge at Peshawar,and could not therefore join the party, but encouraged his daughter to join it. Pushpa said that her father had contributed a great deal to her political career. 'The real enthusiasm came,' Pushpa recollected, 'after I heard a lecture by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1952. This had a great impact on my life. Nehru stressed that women should come forward and play an active role in the politics of the country. The government would give equalrights to women, he added.This gaveme a lot of encouragement and incentive. I contested and was elected in 1952 as a Congress candidate. This in turn increasedmy confidence.' Pushpa was elected as an MLA in the 1952 general dcctions from the Purana Qila-Vinay Nagar constituency. Although she did not contest the 1957 general elections, she worked for a Congress

TWO METROPOLITAN

COUNCIL

CONSTITUENCIES

IN NEW DELHI 107

candidate.In 1962 she contestedfrom the SewaNagar- MalviyaNagar constituency,but lost She said the reason ff~

Ji'~.,

••""'"""flf',;.41ol:.. ,..•rnllidlr ~ft!'.ilin'IU\.-

.,o9,••p•:1 111disa-rn the relationship between caste and voting pattern on the basis of this voting. Beforegoing into the booth voters took their registrationcards from tents set up by political parties which recorded the names of the voters in their copy of the dccrion rolls. I obtained the names of all the voters who had exercisedtheir franchisefrom these dcction rollsand then found out the casteor religiousaffiliationof eachvoter from the villageto which he bdongcd. I had the data on the castesof

2 18

T HE GRASSROOTS O P DEMO CRACY

Table 9.2: Caste of Voters at Makhdumpur PollingStation Cute Arur Bania

Brahmin Kurmi Lodha Murao Mwlim SC Thakur

Othen Not known Total Votaw

No. ofVotn1

140 63 6 59 40 10 169 151 28 75 41 782

the voters from two of the thrte villagesincludedat this pollingstation, and I subsequently collected the information for the thud vill2gc from the Pradhan of that vill2gc. If the total number of votespolled byeachcandidateat this polling station is seen in relation to the castesof the voters, it is found that there was a remarkably close relationship betweenthe castes of the voters and the candidate whom they voted. I have presented tbis relationship in Table 9.3. Table 9.3 givesthe total number of votes polled byeachandidate and the number of votes cast by eachof the main caste or communal groups from whom he was expected to receivehis major suppon. It is seen that IND l secured only 147 of the 185 votes belonging to the groups expected to suppon him, 38 votes being polled by other can

z

~

15,246 16,985 20,069 18,336 150,233

219,054 -

Abung Gonfagin Mnjingling P111Jll (SSP) (Ind.) (Ind.) H111Jlt (Ind.) (Contrm ) (4) (6) (2) (3) (5) 146 4,670 935 1,468 15,084 22.8 28,859 24.0

59 876 2,490 802 5,610 8.5 18,321 15.3

210 2,405 4,393 4,239 13,838 21.0 19,702 16.4

638 1,355 924 921 6,747 10.2 13,158 10.9

186 2,249 3,833 5,270 19,299 29.2 30,402 25.3

Table 14.5: Breakdown ofVotes Polled in Outer Mani 0

.;;· ;.

;a·

"

a.

Assmrbly constitunuy

El«toJ'YlU

"

(Omgms) (2)

'


z

~

16,671 19,456 22,693 22,977 185,673

257,419

-

Paoluzi Gougin Rishang New (Old (NIC) (Congress) Congress) (2) (4) (3)

Yangmm (Ind.)

994 5,085 2,452 4,396 24,605 25.5 37,033 30.1

947 1,548 2,493 2,269 22,099 22.9 32,335 26.3

185 1,005 3,795 5,801 14,212 14.7 15,699 12.8

5,101 399 785 1,220 33,173 34.3 34,997 28.4

(5)

292

THE GRASSROOT S OF DEMO C RAC Y

the dcaorate in the valleytowanlstheir inclusionin a constituency reservedfor Sfs. The dcction results in 1967 and 1971 cannot be _ comparedin greaterdetailbecausethe dcctoratc in the hillshadmore or less boycotted the 1967 dcctions.5 The Old Congresscandidatewas the only one to lose hisdeposit in 1971. However,he polled more votes than his rivalsin Thanglon and Churachandpur (in the hills). This was becausehe belonged to Churachandpur and hadsome influencein neighbouringThanglon. Paokai, the New Congress candidate, defeated his nearest rival Rishangby an overwhelmingnumber of votes in the valley,but he did not fareso wellin the hills.This reflectedthe main politicaltrends in Outer Manipur. The people of the valley supported the New Congress becauseit echoed their sentiments about maintaining the integrityof Manipur, whereasthose of the hillsby and largesupported the NIC because they sought integration with Nagaland. This conclusion can be corroborated by comparing the 1971 and 1967 dcctoral performancesof Paokai and Rishang. In 1967 Paokai had contestedthe dcaion as an Independent,and Rishang as a Congress candidate. At that time, Rishanghad polled the most votes in the valley (13,n5 ), but trailed behind Paokai in the hills. The relative performanceof the two candidateswas rcvcrscdin 1971when Rishang was a NIC candidate, while his rival hadjoined the New Congress. Afterjoiningthe NIC. Rishang substantiallyimprovedhisperformance in the hills because of the attitude of the electorate towards the integration of the hill areaswith Nagaland. Though Yangmashorankedthird in the contest, the percentage of votes polled by him was not substantiallyless than that polled by Paokai.His performancecouldbe attributedbothto hispast cxpcricncc as a governmentofficialand hisvigorouscampaigning.He was f.uniliar to many people becausehe had·servedin variousparts of Manipur as an official.Some people were impressed by his resignation from a governmentjob for hispoliticalconvictions. Besides, he was reported to have spent more money on his campaign than any of his rivals. The ethnic identity of the candidates also affi:ctcddcctoral behaviour.Therewasan implicitsnugglefor dominance bctwccnNagu 5In

the 1967 generaldectlons the Nagas of Manipur decided to boycott the electionsm in pursuance of their demand for a peacefulsettlement of the Naga problem by the central government.

TWO VILLAGE S IN OU TE R MANIP U R

293

and Kukis.In the firstthree generalelectionsthe Outer Manipur seat had been won by Naga candidates, and subscquendyby Kulcis. By and large,the numberof votespolledby the candidatesin the diffumt areas in the hills was influenced by the ethnic composition of the population. For example,in Ukhrul, whereNagaspredominated,the twO Nagacandidatessecuredan OY'Cl'Wbdming numberof votes,~ the Kuki candidatesfareddismally(secTable 14.5). The situationwas quite different in Churachandpur, a prcdominandy Kuki area. The roleplayedbythe dcctoratc in thevalleyareasof Outer Manipur was thus crucial . The New Congressvictorywas in no smallmcaswc attributable to Paokai's decisivelead in the valleyover Rishang,his nearest rival.

I 5 A VILLAGE IN DAUSA PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCY IN RAJASTHAN ANAND CHAKRAVARTI

Introduction The present study of the parliamentary dcctions of 1971 in Dcvisar, a village in Rajasthan, is a continuation of my study of the general elections here in 1967 (Chapter 1). The village was included in the Dausaparliamentaryconstituency in Jaipur district . This constituency comprised eight assemblyconstituencies, Dcvisar beinga part of the Chomu assembly constituency. Dcvisarwas the headquarters of a statutory villagepanchayat, whichincluded one other village,Shivpur, in its jurisdiction.The population of Dcvisar, according to a census taken in 1964, was 1,637. Shivpur had a population of 634 according to the 1961 census. Dcvisarwas a multi-caste village,altogether thirty ca.ucsbeingrep.resented in its population. The major castes were Rajput, Brahmin,Jae,Kumavar,Balai(Untouchable)and Racgar(Untouchable). Eleven castes were represented in the population of Shivpur; of these, Rajputs and Jats were numerically significant. In my studyof the 1967 dcctions I had analysedthe influenceof the suucrurc of local politicson electoralbehaviour. A brief recapitulation isncccswy to understand the situation in Dcvisarin the 1971 dcctions. Before the abolition of jagirs in Rajasthan it was ruled by members of the dominant Rajput caste. The abolition of jagirs in 1954 ended their formal status as rulers of the village, but they continued to be [This paper was originally published as 'The Mid-Tenn Poll in a Rajasthan Village', in S«uJAaion , April-June1976.J

A VILLAG E IN DAUSA PARLIAMENTARY CONSTIT UENCY

295

influential in its affiairs; mainly through their leader Sher Singh who had been both respectedand fearedfor nearlythree decades.However, by 1962, the non-Rajputs were able to emancipate themselvesfrom Sher'scontrol, largelythrough the effortsof Bhim Singh, a nephew of his. Though a Rajput himself, Bhim was activelyassociatedwith the attempts of various non-Rajputs, including Untouchables, to rid themselvesof the numerous disabilitiessuffered by them during the Rajput phase. The differences bctwccn Sher and Bhim largdy explained their wider politicalaffiliations,and alsothose of their respectivefollowers. Sher hdd the Congress Party responsible for terminating the rule of the Rajputs, and therefore became a supporter of the Swatantra Party which, he fdt was working to undermine the supremacy of the C.Ongrcss in Rajasthan. Bhim, on the other hand, felt that the Congress Partyechoed many of his own sentiments regarding the cause of the common man. He demonstrated his loyalty to the Congress during the 1967 dcctions to the Rajasthanassembly.The two main candidates in the Chomu assembly constituency were Ram Kishore Vyas of the Congress and Rajeshwar Singh, an Independent supported by the Swatantraparty . Although Vyaslost the dcction, the voting figures by polling booths revealedthat in Dcvisar, where a polling booth for the panchayat area was located, he had obtained more votes than his opponent. (Of the 791 valid votes polled, Vyas obtained 414 votes and Rajcshwar 341; 36 votes were polled by Independents.) The polling booth in Dcvisar was among the 16, out of a total of 72 booths in the constituency, where he had polled the majority of the votes. His performance in Dcvisar was largdy attributable to Bhim's leadership. Vyascomplimented the villageby calling it a garh (fort) of the Congress Party. Dcvisar's pro-C.Ongrcss reputationwas further enhancedwhen fresh elections were hdd in 1968, followingRajeshwar's resignation from the Chomu scat. Vyas,who stood again, was opposed by Tile.aRam Paliwal(Swatantra), a one-time Congress chiefminister ofRajasthan. Vyaswas confident that his deaoral prospects in Dcvisar were good because of Bhim's presence there. Vyaswon the by-election and was subsequently appointed minister of revenue in Sukhadia's cabinet. (Of the 746 valid votes polled in the Dcvisar panchayat area, Vyas obtained 446 and Paliwal222; 81 voteswere polled by Independents.) Bhim'sdirect link with a minister was a landmarkin hispoliticalcareer,

296

T HE GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRA CY

and is one of the factsto b,, taken into account in undemanding the 1971 dcction.

The issues The split in the Congressin November 1969was followedby certain developmentswhichprompted a large number of people in Devisar to takean active intcn:st in national political events. These events brought the Congress led by Indira Gandhi into promincnc.c,and the sentiments in the village,either in its favouror agaimr it, were in many casesan outcome of the pre-existingsentiments regardingthe undivided Congress. After the nationalization of ban.la, six cultivators from Devisar obwned loans from the local brancha of the Bank of Barodaand Punjab National Bank to in.craUpump sets in their irrigation wdls. Officials from these bankshad earlier visited the village to inform the people that they could get loans for agricultural purposes. The nationalizationofbanb thus bccarn~meaningful in the village.This dcvdopment also enabled ordinary villagersto understand the significanc.cof the split in Congressand to decidewhichwing served their interestsmost. To many in Devisarthis was the Congressled by Indira Gandhi, popularlyrcfencd to as ruzyi(new) Congress, in order to distinguishit from the other wing,knownaspur,mj(old)Congress. Thus, those who had installed the pump sets felt that this would never have been possible unless banks had beennationaliud . This cnhanc.cd the image of the New Congress. While the nationalizationof banksrcinforc.cd the resolveof many peopleto support the New Congress, the move to abolishprivypurses antagoniud others who had earlier beenmerely lukewarm towuds the undivided Congress. For example, Bhim's ddcr brother Bw,an, who had supported the Congressin the past, was sevcrdy critical of the New Congress in general and Indira Gandhi in particular. He felt it was unethical to abolish purses sinc.cthis violatedan aisting agreement betweenthe princes and the government. Althoughthe moveto abolishprivypursesantagoniud the Rajputs, it won the support of those who had become disillusionedwith the undivided Congress becauseof its failure to live up to its promises. For example. there were about eight young college-educatedmen in Devisarwho hadopposed the Congressin 1967.This time, however,

A VILLAGE IN DAUSA PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCY

297

theywcrc inclinedto suppon theNewCongiessbecausethey thought Indira Gandhi would usher in a socialistera. The New Congressbad generatedhiglt cxprt:tationsewn among the ordinary people of Devisarwho were illiterate,preoccupiedwith the cultivation of their land.and with little time or leisure for involvementin politics. I quote a few of them here. RamdevMcena~ thewxlividcd Congresscreditfor emancipating the j"""'4 (common man) from the rule of the Rajputs;be thought it was only the New Congresswhich would continue to hdp the common man by reducing inequalities: 'Old Congress, being allied to the Swatantra Party-a party of rajas, mabarajas,and punjipt,tis (capitalists}-is not concernedwith thewdf.ue of the common man .' ManguGujar interpreted the split in the Congressas evidenceof the polarizationbetweenthe rich and the poor. He had beard opponents of the New Congressworry that if it came to power, all forms of propcrt>wuc liableto be natil"naliscdThis threatdid not bother him. 'land and cpaitalwill I,,- taken only from therich', betold one person. He went to the extent of sayingthat cvcn if be were to lose his land. the land would still runain within the villageand that someonemore needy than bewould acquire it. 'What we want is the bhtda(wdf.ue) of everyone', h,, ancncd. MahadcvAhir bdicYcdthat the nationalrrario11 ofbanks hadbcnditcd the farmer.He approvedof the moveto abolish privy pursesand saw no threat to the property of the common man; be too fdt only the wealthywould be affi:acd. These opinions, which were widely shared, suggestedthat the people of the villagebad beenaffi:acd by the split in Congress.the nationalizationof banks, and the moveto abolish privypurses.These developmentsenhancedtheir politicalawareness,and later,when the Lok Sabha was dissolvedand the mid-term poll announced, they were drawn into dcction politics becausethey had alreadyinvolved thcmsdvcsin CVUlts which badprecipitatedthe poll.

Electoral p,eft,mca It ispcrrincnttr> caminc bac whctbcrclec:toral loyaltieswereinfluenced by issueswhich were consideredimportant within the village.In the 1967 dcctions the affiliationsof the voters in Devisar to the two main candidatesfor the Cbomu assemblyscat badbeensignificandy, though not entirely,influencedby loyaltiesto particular leaders.In

298

THE GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRA CY

the present dcctions, however, such considerations were of little importance.Thus, the diifu-cnccsthat arosebetweenBhim and SC'YCl'al of his supporters did not intcrfcn:with their common preferencefor the New Congress.These ditfcrcnccsarc mentioned here only bricffy in order to highlight the fact that this time they were unimportant in shaping electoral loyalties. Sometime in 1965, Bhim entered into a partnership with Prabhu Dayal Mahajan, Gopal Mahajan, and Nathu Brahmin to purchase a tractor. However, soon after an initial sum of money had been depositedwith a dcalcrin Jaipur, Bhim withdrew from the parmcrship because he thought his involvement in village politics would not enablehim to devotehis shareof time to the nmning and maintenance of the tractor. His sudden decisionsh~ the other three and created a rift bctwccn them and him. At the time of the by-dcctions to the Chomu assembly scat in 1968 the tbrcc resented Bhim's effortsto influence people to vote for the candidate of his choice and dcclarcd that they would independently decide on whom to suppon. Bhim took offence at this, and later, when he was urged by Prabhu and others to raise funds for the extension of the villageprimary school building, he did not take any action. Matters came to a head in the middle of May 1968 when, in the course of an argument bctwccn Bhim and Gopal, the latter asked Bhim to resign from the office of sarpanch (which he had held since 1960) as he was indilttrent to public work. Bhim submitted hisresignationto the District Collector soon afterwards. In the meantime Prabhu collectedmoney from variousindividuals in the villageto ex.tendthe primaryschoolbuilding.Afttt two additional rooms had been built it became possibleto upgrade the school to an upper primary school which would admit students up to class~ight. The school was sanctioned on 1 August 1968, but the inauguration ceremony was postponed till Dcccrnbcr 13 in order to suit the convenience of Vyas, who had been invited to be the chief guest. The ceremony was held as scheduled. Towards the end, Bhim was called upon to propose a vote of thanks, whereupon he highlighted the fact that though therewerepersonaldifferencesbctwecnvariousindividuals, these had not come in the way of extending the school building. The differencesbetweenBhim and hisparmcrs did not affecttheir electoral loyalties in the 1971 elections. On one occasion Prabhu provided his tractor for an election tour which had been organized by Bhim, and drove it himscl£

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The same point is borne out by another issue in which Bhim was involved.Devisar,like most villagesin the area, hada main settlement and several subsidiary settlements (rih4n,) around it. One of these settlements, Badavali,was inhabited by approximately 45 Jat households. Shcoram,the acknowledged leaderQftheseJats, hadbeen among Bhim's closest supporters since 1955. The majority of Shcoram'sfollowershad alsosupported Bhim during his campaign to wrest power from Sher. In the 1967 dections, although there was a wave of antiCongress sentiment in the Chomu assemblyconstituency as a whole, most of the Jats of Devisar hadvoted for the Congress mainlybecause of Bhim and Sheoram. Later events, however,greatlyshook the confidence of the Jats in Bhim's leadership.From about 1965 the members ofBadavali had wanted a proper building for a primary school which was being run in a temple near the settlement. In the 1967 elections, some Jats were said to have been willing to vote for Vyas's opponent, Rajeshwar, because he had promised to provide the money needed for the building. Early in 1969, Rs 1250 was sanctioned by the Panchayat Samiti for the school. (A Panchayat Samiti was the second tier of the threetiered structure of panchayati raj in Rajasthan.) Of this, an initial amount of Rs 625 was withdrawn by Bhim and, together with contributions from the members of the settlement, utilized for the school. Sometime in June 1969, Bhim, accompanied by Bhairu, an educated young man of Badavali, withdrew another Rs500 from the Panchayat Samiti for the school. From this amount he gave Bhairu Rs400 and said that he would hand over the rest later.The following morning Bhim asked for Rs 200 out of the amount he had handed to Bhairu the previous day; he gave it to Goma, a member of the neighbouring panchayat of Chandabas. Goma claimedthat he needed the money to buy fertilizerfor the cooperativesociety of hispanchayat, and promised to return the money within a fewdays. He did not keep hispromise, and at the rime of the 1971 dections the money had still not been recurned. The matter considerably embarrassed Sheoram because of his close ties with Bhim, and also puzzled several of his caste men. The plans for completing the school building had come to a standstillsince the residentsof the settlement refusedto make further contributions until Bhim returned the money. This issue did not, however,affect the electoral preferencesof the Badavui Jats in the 1971 dections: all of them were said to have voted for the New Congressdespite the Jae-dominated BKD contesting the

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Dausaseat. Shcoramvehementlyrejectedthesuggestion that the BKD might have many supponcrs among his caste brethren. Seriousdilfcrcncc:s also arose between Bhim and many of his supponcrs over the way he managedthe funds of the villagecooperative society. Many members who had taken loans from the society paid backthe borrowedamount to either Bhim or Nathu Brahmin, its scctcWy, but neither of them i.aued any rcccipts.In 1966, the institution to which the villagecooperativewas affiliated beganprocccdinp to ru:ovcr the loans. The official concerned insisted that all those who claimed that they had paid back their dues should produce receipts. As receiptshad not been issued, those who merely claimed that they bad paid backtheir dues WCtt askedto make freshpayments.This was a great shock to them, and they directed their wrath at Bhim. In spite of the heavy odds against him, he tried with his associatesto restore theconfidenceof the villagers. All those who hadbeen forcedto make fresh payments were asswcd that their money would be rcrurncd. The cooperativeissue, like the other issuesoutlinedearlier,did not affectthe pattern of voting in the mid-term poll. Thus, to give only one illustration, Jccvan Khati (carpenter), one of the severalpersons who had been adverselyaffcctcd, said, '.AlthoughI have lost faith in Bhim Singh, we arc all united as fu as supponing the New C.Ongrcss is concerned'.

Thecandidaus There were sevenc:andidatcs furthe Dausaseat, but only three of them were imponant in the constituency as a whole. The New C.Ongrcss candidate was Nawal Kishorc Shanna, a lawyerby profession anda sining member of the dissolvedLok Sabha. He was dcctcd in a bydcaion in 1968, followingtb~death of R.C. Ganpat of the Swatantra Pany, who hadbeen dccted in 1967. After the announcement of the mid-term poll, the Jan Sangh, Swatantra Pany, Old C.Ongrcss,and SSPformed an alliancein order to defeat the New C.Ongrcss.The alliance allotted the Dausaseat to the Swatantra Pany, whose candidate Hira Lal Somani was a wellknownindustriali.tt.The third candidate,RamKaranJoshi of the BKD, was consideredfairlyimportant in the constituencyas a whole,though not in the Chomu area.In the1952generaldcctionshebadsucccJully contestedtheJaipur-SawaiMadhopur LokSabhaseat on the C.Ougtess

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ticket. Four other candidates contested as Independents. None of them was important, and all sulMequendylost their deposits.

Thecampaign The main candidates ucated the variow assembly constituencies comprising th.isparliamentary constituency as separate units for the purpose of organizing their respectivecampaigns.The campaigns of the New Congress and Swatantra candidates in Dcvisar were thw part o_ftheir d~onccring in the area coveredby the Chomu ~bly consutuency. During the third week of February, Indira Gandhi toured various constituencies in Rajasthan. On 17 February, in the course of her visit to Dausa, she alsoaddresseda public meeting at Chomu, which was attended by a largenumber of people from Dcvisar.Her speech, as reponed by informants in Dcvisar, was a reiteration of the stand taken by the New Congress in relation to the common man. She said that the natio11ali:utionof banks was justified bcca~ it would extend credit facilitiesto those with limited capital, such as the small farmer; and that the intended abolition of privy purses was one step towards the reduction of disparities. The last issue, in particular, enabled her to criticizethe alliance:their opposition to the abolition of privy purses was a clear indication of their commitment to the maintenanceof vestedinterests.SIYadded that the allianoewasrnistakm for suggesting that the abolition of privy purses would be a prelude to ending the right to propcny. She stressedthat her party sought to socialize the propcny of the wealthy, but not that of the common man. Fmally,she counteredth\kalialliana:. In the four years between the 1967 dcaions, when the Akali Dal emergedas the ruling party, and the 1971 dcaions, when it suffcmi a debacle, its appealseemed to have become greatly rcsuicrcd. Until 1966 it was a party of the Sikh maw-s whowere fightingfor a swc of their own. But now it had emerged as the party of rich peasants,and thishad narurallyalienatedit &omsmallf.umcrsand landlesslabouras. The elcaion resultsshowedthat the communal appeal of theAkalis for Sikhs and of the Jan Sangh for Hindus had been diluted. It docs not, however, mean that it no longer existedor that a secularplatform hademerged. Paradoxicalthough it may seem, the voting in the 1971 electionswasalsoon communal linesc:othe extent dw V umdcrpolled only the Hindu vores and Dhillon only those of the Sikhs.

REFERENCES Dua, Vccna, 1970, 'SocialOrganisationof the Arya Samaj:A Study ofTwo LocalArya Centres in Jullundur', Sociol,ogical Bulktin, 19: 32-50. _ _ 1970b.~ Samaj and PunjabPolitics',fumtnnic mrJPolitiad~ . 5(43-4), 24 Octobcr:1787- 91. __ 1971,'Elections in a ScheduledCasteNeighbourhood', fumtnnic 1111d Po/i~a/W«ldy, 6(46), 13 November:2323-7 (Chaptcr8 in thisbook).

18 A WORKING CLASS AREA IN SINGANALLUR ASSEMBLY CONSTITUENCY IN TAMIL NADU

E. A. RAMAswAMY

Introduction The present study of the 1971 elections in the Singanallur assembly constituency in Tamil Nadu is essentiallya continuation of my study of the elections here in 1967 (Chapter 6). My main task then was to show that voting behaviour in this constituency,consisting primarily of highly unionized textile workers and their dependants, was significantly influenced by the union and political affiliationsof the workers.Electionswerejust one more arenawherethe leadersof bitterly hostile unions, leadingequallyhostile politicalpanics, could test their strength. Traditionalallegiances,such as to one's cast~.village,and kin group, seemedto haveno more than marginalrelevancein thiscontext. The Singanallur assembly constituency comprised the highly industrialized municipal area of Singanallur and the villages in the firca of Circar Samakulam, a primarily agricultural region. Nearly 70 per cent of the 100,939 voters in the constituencywere residentsof the municipality.Singanallurwas part of the Coimbatoreparliamentary constituency.As in the previousdcctions, my primary focusof interest was the dcaoral processamongthe industrialworkersin the Singanallur municipal area. The trade union scenein Singanallurhad not undergoneany radical change between 1967 and 1971. The balance of power between the [This paper was originallypublished a.s 'Mid-Term Poll in a Working Cb.is

Constituencyin Tamil Nadu'. in EamomicllllliPr,liticlliW~.

May 1972.)

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unions remained unaltmd The Coimbatore Distria Tcttilc Worms' Union (TWU), which owedallegianceto the PSP, continued to be

the most powerfulunion with about 10,000 members. The faction fight within the 'I'WU hadca11scd the supportersof the SSP to establish their own union. The members of this union, however,came mo.my from millsoutside Singanallur.The NationalWorkers'Union (NWU), which owedallegiance to the Congress, also managed to retain its identity, in spite of the split in the Congress. It was now identified with the Old Congress. Some disgruntled leaders of the NWU had crossedover to the New Congress with a handful of members and started a rival union. The commuraistscontinued to be divided into two camps each with its union. The Dravida PanchalaiThozhilalar Munncua Sangam(DPM), controlled by the DMK, continued to be a weakunion in spiteof four yearsof DMK rule and sustainedattempts by the party to bolster it. The politicalalignmentsin the constituencyhad, however,changed considerably.The DMK-lcd alliance,whichhad routed the Congress in 1967, turned out to be just an dcctoral pact. Once the dcctions were over, the DMK with its massivemajority in th~ asscmhly,had no need for the suppon of its allies. Disillusioned with the DMK, the Swatantra Party and CPI(M) formallyquit th"'alliance.With the announcement of the mid-term poll, the DMK once again needed an dcaoral pact. The major panics in the new alliance,now called the ProgressiveFront, were the DMK, CPI, PSP,and New Congrcss.The Old Congress, still a major forcein Tamil Nadu, joined hands with the Swatantra Party and SSP to forn:i the Democratic Front The midterm poll was essentiallya contest between these two fronts. In Coimbatore district an additional force in these dcctions was the Coimbatore Agriculturists'Association,an interest group formed in 1970 to resista proposed raise in agriculruralpowerrates. Ledby a formerCongressminister,and dearlyanti-DMK, the association6ddcd ten candidates for the assembly and supponcd Democratic Front candidates in constituencieswhere it did not contest.

The candidatn In Singanallurthe main contest, as in 1967, was betweentop-ranking tradeunion leaders.The PSP,representingthe Progres.uveFront, 6clded Subramaniam,sccrctary of the TWU. A Brahmin from Kcrala. he had

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takm overthe leadershipof the 'IWU in 1963when theold guardwas expelledfor lack of commitment to the PSP (sec Ramaswamy1969). Subramaniamwas a powerfulPSP leader and his loyaltyto the party was beyond question. The choice of a Brahminto lead the largest union in an industry were Brahminswere hard to find was emcmdy significant.It undcrscoml the dose links bctwccn trade unions and politicalparties,as well as the indcvanccof traditionalloyaltiesin the trade union context. The Old Congrcss, n:prcscntingthe DemocraticFront, nominated Subbaiyan, scacwy of the NWU, as irscandidate.A soft-spokenman opposed to fire-brand unionism, Subbaiyanhad risen in the union hierarchybecauseof the patronagehe m:eivcdfrom a prominent millowncr.There waswidespreadpessimismin the union as wdl asdistrict party organizationabout hisvote-catchingability. His nominationwas C2loilatcdto preventtheNewCongn:.ssfromgaininga footholdamong organizedlabour in the district. Never in the past had the Congrcs., nominated a trade unionist to contest from this constituency.NWU leaders,sore at their claimsbeing ignored, hadbeenlukewarmin their suppon for the Congresscandidates.The Old Congiesshoped to retain its hold over the NWU by nominating a leaderof the union. Further, in the past the Congrcs.,candidates in this constituencyhad always been from the indigenousTamil-speakingcaste of.Goundcrs, which controlledthe distti.c:t party organization.Tdugu-spcakingNaidus,who pmlominatcd in the region and constituted a substantialproponion of the leadership and rank and file of the NWU, had tried for the Congressnomination in vain. Subbaiyanwas a Naidu and thiscould hdp the party retain the loyaltyof his caste men and seekvoa:sfor him on the grounds of caste unity. Although the contest was primarilybctwccn the candidatesof the two Fronts, there were two other candidates. One was a former mill worker contestingon the CPI(M) ticket.The other wasa disgruntled DMK member who, resenting the allocationof the constituencyto the PSP,filedhisnomination asan Independent.He wassubsequently expelled from the party for opposing the official ProgressiveFront candidate. The mainstayof Subramaniam,a rank outsiderto the constituency, was hisposition as secretaryof the TWU. His appeal was as a staunch unionist and prominent PSP leader. The TWU members,with their deep union and political commitments, could ccnainly be expected

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to stand by him. His campaign was run by the stalwartsamong the second-levelleadership and rank and file of the union. Subramaniam'srelations with his allieswere lesshappy. Ever since the resounding victory of the DMK in 1967, its relations with the TWU had been fraught. TWU leaders had never made a secret of what they thought of the DMK: to them it was the very embodiment of vulgarity in politics. While it was necessaryto alignwith the DMK for the sake of political gain, this was no more than a marriage of convenience.The DMK, now headywith dccroral success,was scdcing to strengthen the DPM, its trade union wing. The TWU could not take kindly to this. Funher, the DMK in its new role as the ruling party, had an interest in production and industrial peace which the militant1WU fuund inconvenient.What sparkedoff thiswmt tcnSion was the controversy over the naming of the prestigious Employees' State Insurance Hospital in Singanallur.The DMK government made known its intention to name it after the late C. N. Annadurai, fuunder of the party. The TWU, incensed by this, contended that the DMK leader counted fur nothing among mill workers. It demanded that the hospital be named after N. G. lwnaswamy, founder of the TWU and doyen of trade unionism in the district. The DMK, willing for a compromise, offered to name the building after Ramaswamy and the hospital after Annadurai, and installstatues of both at state c:x:pcnsc. Unable to accept this, the TWU called an industrywide strike. TWU leaders (including Subramaniam) and about a thousand workerswere arrested by the police. They were subsequently released, and the hospital remained nameless for the moment. Rdations bctwccnthe1WU and DMK were furtherestrangedwhen the SSP extended its support to an agitation by agriculturists in Coimbatore district againsta proposedhikein powerrates. The DMK's refusalto concedethisdemand triggeredoff violenceall over the district. The police opened fire at a number of places and several agitators, including Subramaniam, were arrested. Subramaniam'srelationswith theNew Congrm were al,o somewhat strained. Sometime in 1969, elections were hdd to the Singanallur municipality. The undivided Congress annexed 18 of the 32 scats, while the PSP secured8, DMK 5, and CPI(M) 1. One of the Congress councillorswas elected chairman of the municipality.Later,six of the Congress councillors, including chairman, crossed over to the New Congress, and the rest remained with the Old Congrc.. Following

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this, the PSP attempted, although without success, to unseat the

chairman. Subbaiyan,like Subramaniam,counted primarily on the suppon of his unionists. He could alsodepend on the organizationalstrength of the Old Congresswhose councillorshad don(' cxcccdinglywell in the Singanallurmunicipaldcctions. The SSPpromisedhim complete suppon. Manyleadersof the SSP-ledunion were.aaivcin hiscampaign, more to spiteSubramaniam and the PSP than out of any loyaltyto the Old Congress.This suppon, however, did not mean much since the union had little followingin the area. Nor could Subbaiyan benefit from the support of the Swatantra Pany or of the Agriculturists' Association.

The campaign Much of the expenseand dfon in campaigningwas incurred to build up a favourableimage of the candidate. The dcctorate did not take seriouslythe candidatewhose~ and bannerstheydid not sec, whose speechesthey did not hear, and whose dcction offic.cswere dcscncd. The ingredients which went to make up a favourable image were wellknown. Lavishdisplayof~ ·and banners, frequentstrcct-comer mcctin~ , and at leastoccasionalvisitsby the candidateto eachvillage and wardin his constituencywere essential.The number of campaign vehiclesplying for a candidate was of great significance.For several weeksbefore the poll, conversationfrequentlycentred on the siu: of the fleets of rival candidates. The drivers of campaign cars were carefullychosen.Theydistributedlcaffets,tied bannersand, in a remote village,even addressedthe audiencewhen the main speakerdid not tum up. It was the ambition of every candidate to coax panchayat presidents,fashionleaders, big landowners,and such other prominent men to board his campaign car. This was consideredto be symbolic of their suppon for the candidate. People talked derisivelyof those who boarded the campaign cars of more than one candidate. On the day of polling, urchins, with pany symbols pinned on their shirts, blocked all approaches to polling booths and mobbed every voter who turned up to exercise his franchise. Nobody believedthat a voter could be influencedat this late stage;yet the absenceof a candidate's supponers in front of the booths was taken to mean that he did not . expect to win.

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In the caseof both the major candidatesthe campaignat this level was run mostly by prominent members and local-levelleadersof the rcspcctivetrade unions. Unionistswith deep political commitments were partirularlyactive.Often they had little immediategain in mind. On the contrary, campaigningimplied, at the very least, loss of pay for days spent awayfrom work. · Another important link in campaigningwere the readingrooms and clubs which mushroomed in the constituency. Usually named after Tamil matinee idols, and occasionallypoliticians,they were to be seen almostin everystreet. The memberswere usuallyyoung men who wereout of schoolor collegeand did not have very much to do. They generallyspent their time playingcarom, readingmagazioesand party journals, or gossiping. It was the DMK which initiallybuilt its organizational network around such reading rooms. The Congress, having learnt its lesson from its defeat in the last election, had also taken to this form of organization. The reading rooms of the DMK and Congress,named after rival matinee idols, could be seen fu:ing each other on the opposite sidesof the meet. During elections these reading rooms organizedcampaigning in their respectivelocalities. A striking feature of campaigning at this levelwas the near total avoidanceby the candidates and their supporters of personal anacks on rivals.In conuast to the earlierelections,personalanimosities,inu:runion hostilities, and discrediting rivals by raking up the problems of textile workerswere relegatedto the background. Current issues, such as bank nationalization and abolition of privy purses, figured prominently.Attention was focusedon the professedpoliciesof the two rival fronts and the pronouncements of their leaders. Invectives were directed against Karunanidhi, chief minister of Tamil Nadu, and Kamaraj and Rajagopalachari, the Democratic Front leaders, rather than against the candidatescontesting in Singanallur. Words such as 'progressive'and 'reactionary' were freely used. The DMK and PSP,representingthe ProgressiveFront, sought to convince the electoratethat the choicewas bctwccnprogressivesocialistpoliciesand reactionaryconservatismwhich would perpetuate the privilegesof a minority.The Old Congress,however,saw the choiceas one between a cleanand responsiblegovernmenton the one hand and perpetuating the powerof the corrupt DMK in the state on the other.Although, as we shallpresentlysec, the candidatesusedall the establishedand rim~

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worn channels of gaining suppon, the dcctions were not fought primarilyon local issues. There was another, more personal, dimension to campaigning becauseit was not enough to cxhon votersfrom party platforms.They hadto be won over through channelswhichwere meaningfulto them. The point of departure for this kind of campaigningwas the detailed figuresof votingin the previousgcncra1 clcctions,and anyother clcction which might have taken place in the interveningperiod. Since these figureswere availableindividuallyfor each polling booth, comprising about 1,000 voters on the average,it was rclativdyeasy to figureout howdiffcrcntaggregatesof the dcctorate voted.These aggregateswere factions,castes, localgroups,groupsof unionists,groupsof mill workers, supponcrs of a politicalparty, or kin groups.The differentaggregates hadto be approacheddifferentlyif the candidatewas to havea chance of winning them over. · The individualvoter was at the same time a member of more than one aggtcgatc and was exposedto competingpressures.Which of these proved more compelling was not a matter of individual choice. At least in the case of Singanallurit was possible to work out a rough hierarchyof loyaltieswhich influencedvoting behaviour. lWU members were normally c:xpcctcdto vote, along with the membersof their families,for Subramaniam.If, in addition to beinga 1WU memberhe wasalsoa PSPsupponcr,his loyaltyto the candidate was funher reinforced.He was then expectedto take leavefrom the mill for a weekor so and engagein campaigning.Factionswithin the union and rivalriesbetween the leaders were generallyrdcgated to the backgroundfor a time. Politicalcleavageswithin a union cenainly surfacedduring dcctions. But such cleavageswere rare since political differencesgenerally led to a form.alsplit and the emergenceof a rival union. Some 1WU members certainly voted against Subrarnaniam becauseof a personalgrudge, or becausetheir sympathieswere with a rivalpoliticalparty. Their numberswcrc, however,seldomverylarge. The lWU, or any other union for that matter, was not homogeneous in terms of the caste composition of its membership. Subrarnaniamwas a Brahmin and the number of Brahmins in the 'l"WUa>uldbe countedon one'sfingertips . Moresignificant, Subbaiyan was a Naidu and tbcrc were many Naidus in the 'l"WU, among the leadershipas wdl as the rank and file. Nobody expected that the

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dcctoral behaviour of the TWU members, with minor exceptions, would be guided by their caste. Making a serious dent into a riV21 union's membership byappealingto caste loyaltieswas quite unthink- · able. Kinship, unlikecaste,was widdy regardedas an overridingloyalty which might cut across union and even political affiliation. It was believed that voters who were not amenable to any other influence could be prcssuriud throughtheir kin. The support of dose kin was apcctcd almostas a matter of course.A dose kinsmanworkingagainst a candidate was considered sufficient to damn him. One could hear frequent referencesto this or that candidate in a particular dcction who was not supported even by his own mother's brother. Several prominent campaigners of both the major candidates claimed that even Rajagopalachari, the dder statesman and Swatantra leader, believedin the supremacy of kinship tics. During the 1967 dcctions Rajagopalachariwas a sworn enemy of the Congress. His son was, however,contestingas a Congresscandidate.When askedwhy he did not oppose his son, Rajagopalachariis reportedto havesaid, 'In Indian cultureit is not dharmato work againstone's son. I did only what our culture required of me.' Both Subramaniam and Subbaiyan activated their own and their supporters' kinship networks.They arrangedleave for severalof their unionistsso that they could visitkin in other villages and try to win them over. Money was bdicvcd to be an important attraction for many voters. Fearswere frequently aprcsscd that a well-to-do rival might upset all calculations by purchasing votes on the night before the poll. In Singanallur both the major candidates had collected donations from workers and mill-owners to finance their campaign. Their resources did not permit any large-scalepurchaseof votes. Nor could everyone's vote be bought. Only some categories of voters were susceptible to such incentives.An almostuniversalbdicfwas that Harijan scavengers in the employment of the municipality responded only to direct inducements. Feedingthem the night before the poll was bdicvcd to be the only way of baggingtheir votes. This was apcnsive since entire streets, including those who did not have a vote, had to be fed. On the eve of the poll, milling crowds ofHarijans could be seen near the PSP dcction offices in Singanallur, waiting to be fed. The feeding continued till the small hours of the morning. The Harijam wen: then herded straight to the polling booths and lined up for voting.The Old

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Congress, realizingthat the Harijan votes were slipping out of its hands, made a desperateattempt to win overat leasta sectionof them. Lacking the resourcesto start rival feeding centres, Old Congress supporterssummonedmunicipalemployeeswho supervisedscavengers and offered them bribes. Many Old Congress and SSP leaders expressedthe view that Harijans would not see sense unless given a good beating.

The resultand conclusion Of a total of 100,939 votersin the Singanallurconsriruency, 72,468 (71.8per cent) c:xacisedtheir franchise.Subramaniam,polling35,888 (49.5percent)votes, scoreda dear victoryover Subbaiyanwho claimed 20,848 (28.8 per cent) votes. The CPI(M) candidate polled 8,209 (I 1.3percent)'IOtCS, and the Independentcandidate,1,653.The invalid votes amounted to 5,870. In the absenceof booth-wisepollingfigures,ptt:cisc: fflimatcs of how different categoriesof voters voted were impossible.Subramaniam's victorywas attributableto the strengthof theTWU in the constituency. However,he could not havesecuredsuch a massivemajoritywithout DMK support. This becomesevident if we take into consideration the votespolled by the DMK and PSP in the dections to Singanallur municipality.Although the DMK got only five seats it had polled 9,622 votes out of a total of 45,657. As against this the PSP,which claimed eight seats, had polled only 7,676 votes. Although the DMK leaders were initially hesitant to support Subramaniam, they supported him vigorouslyin the later stagesof the campaign. The expulsion of the Independent from the DMK certainlyhdped, since his positionin the party was now in question. The PSP,for its part, had warned the DMK of withdrawalof support in a neighbouringconstituencyfrom which a DMK minister was contesting.All the same, it appearedthat the bulk ofDMK supporters sided with Subramaniam, setting aside local squabbles. The poor performance of the Independent candidate also lends credence to this view.It wasallegedthat he had been bribed by the Old Congress in order to split DMK voteswhich might otherwisehave been polled m blocfor Subramaniam. If this was so, his performance highlights the risks inherent in propping up candidatesin the hope of splitting votes. Vote splitters could easilybe spotted as the poll approached.

TH £ GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

They tended to drasticallyslow down the tempo of campaigning in the hope of cuning down expenditure and savingsome money.This substantially damagedtheir position in the eyes of the dcctoratc. and few voters took them seriously.The Independent candidate did not organizea single meetingand his dection symbolwas rarelyseen near any polling booth. If he had been a serious contender claiming the loyaltyofDMK supponcrs, there was no doubt that Subramaniam would have lost many votes, although he might have still won. In conclusion, it docs not seem that the bulk of the voters in Singanallur perceived the situation any differently than in 1967. Although the candidatespresentedthcirandidatwc in terms of wider issues,many voters cast their vote in favour of a particularcandidate for much the same reasonsas before.The TWU and NWU members still voted for their leaders.Some were influenced by their kin, and food was an important factor in baggingthe votes of scavengers. In spite of all this, unlike in 1967, there certainly was an attempt to momentarily set aside local frictions, serious as they were, for the sakeof largerpoliticalgain.This appliedparticularlyto the DMK and its trade union wing,as wdl as the New Congressand CPI. The voters on whom they had control did extend their suppon to Subramaniam notwithstanding their personal hostility to him and the ·rwu. REFERENCES Ramaswamy, E. A 1969. 'Trade Union and Politics', S«iologiad BuJ/mn, XVIII(2): 137--47. - -· 1971. 'Trade Unions and the FJectoralProcess: General FJectionsin a Working Class Area, IndianJo,rn41of lndustrild&"'1ions,VII(2): 205-27 . Chapter 6 in this book.

EPILOGUE: INVITATION TO A DIALOGUEWHAT WORK DOES 'FIELDWORK' DO IN THE FIELD OF ELECTIONS? YOGENDRA YADAV

Interesting answers,but what exactlywas the question?That was my first reaction on reading the rich collectionof anthropologicalsrudics of Indian dcctions put together in this book. There is something refreshingabout shifting our gazein terms of time and space, in going back from the present to a different era in the past, and in moving from aggregatecountrywide electoralstatistics to the nuances of how the game was played out in a village or an urban neighbourhood. As I tried to formulatewhat I had learnt from encountering a radically different way of looking at elections in a very different time, I kept coming back to some basic questions: Arc these essaysabout what electoral politics docs to society?Or arc they about how local social dynamicsshape dcctions?Do theseseekto sketch the contc:xtof voter's choices?Or do these offer an explanationof the dectoral outcome?It klnwwktftm,n,tr. The dialoguethat this paper advocaresfirstbeganas a dialogue with D.L. Sheth, one of the fewIndian socialscientistsat case within the multiple methodologiesof socialscience.I am grateful to him fur his insightsinto the context of methodologicaldispures of the 1960s. I am also grateful ro A.M. Shah fur his exemplarypatience and perseverancein putting up with this criticismfrom outside, not to mention the inordinate delay in ddivcring him this epilogue.I would like to thank AnindyaSaha for his criticalreadingwhich cautioned me againstoverdrawing the contrast between the two disciplines,and fur drawing my attention to many refettnca. Thanks are due to KanchanMalhotra fur hdping me with data on some of the constituenciesstudied in this volume.

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soon became dear that the various authors in this volume were not only studying varied locations, they were also asking different kinds of questions. It was not going to be easyto tease a common question or a set of questions that informed the answers offered here. What cxacdythen was I to respond to? The second reaction was of course more personal: what was my qualification for writing an epilogue to this book? The studies in this book arc about the 1967 and 1971 dcctions, a period and events on which I have done no primary research.More importantly, much of my researchabout India's elections since 1989 has used quantitative data and survey researchrcchniques, something I should beashamed of if the Introduction to this volume is right. Perhaps the decision of the editor and the publisher to invite a younger colleague from a different tradition to comment on the book was generous to a fault. Or so it seemedon my firstreading of these ~ys. It took another reading (and I am afraid many more months) to realizethat my double handicap in reading thiscollectionmight not in the end be a sourceof weakness.I had unwittingly placed myself in the classicalsiruation of an anthropologist who seeks to lcvcragchis starus as an 'outsider' to gain insights into unfamiliar territory. 'A Political Scientist Among the Anthropologists' may not be as exciting as 'An Anthropologist Among the Historians', 1 but it is not a bad position to be in if one wants to askquestions about the nature and limitsof a fiddwork-bascd study of dcctions. Ever since the Study of dcctions became a serious socialscientificpursuit, there has been a professionalconsensusamong its students that it is essential to study elections by the fiddwork method. The various disciplines have, of course, varying understandings of what fieldwork means. Which field should one choose?Once in the fidd, what kind of work docs one do? And how docs one make sense of what one gets through fieldwork?These questions have divided the various disciplines and schools of thought. So, the invitation to contribute this epilogue looked like a perfectoppommity to reflect on an old methodological dispute. It was also a good occasion to map continuities and changesin Indian dcctions and thus revisit some of the substantive debates on the subject. refermccis to BemanlCohn'sself-descriptionof his professionallocation, in his essayM AnthropologistAmong the Historians' (Cohn 1987). 1The

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This is pretty much what I do in this epilogue, and I do it by coming to terms with both my handicaps one by one. First, I engage with the substantive question by mapping the distance betweenthe dections that theseessaysdescribefrom dections today.I discoverthat the continuitiesarc much stronger than we imagined,and that a range of attributes that we suspect to be of recent origin arc aaually much older.These studies thus enableus to go beyond the familiarcommon sense on Indian dections. Recognition of the immense value of the material presented in these essaysprompts a question: do these insights originate from the methodology deployed by the authors? This bring.1me faceto face with the radical methodologicaldi.ffermcethat lies at the hcan of the disciplinaryagenda that informsmany of theseessays. It appc-ars to me that the methodological claims implicit in the editorial introduction may have overstated the case. I argue that much of the missionary ual of believerssituated in the different methodological rdigions of the 1960s was rather misplaced.What we need is a dialogue among variousmethodologicalpursuits for srudyingdections. Drawing these thoughts together, I conclude by offering some remarks on a future agendafor electionstudiesthat may perhapsemergefrom the dialogue proposed here.

Elections : Pastand Pmmt The case studies in this book focus on a period that was a turning point in the history of Indian elections. Students of Indian politics rememberthe periodup to 1967 as the epitomeof 'thc Congress$)'StClli , the phrasecoined by Rajni Kotharito describethe unique party $)'StCID that evolvedin post-independenceIndia.2 The point about callingthe politicsof that period 'the Congresssystem' was not that the Congress was strong then and weak thereafter. In f.act , in dcctoral terms the Congressscoredsome of its most impressivevictori~ the dcctoral 2Kothari's ideawasimplicitin

'Form and Subst:lna: in IndianPolitics'(1961) but

in 'The Congras "System' in India" (1964). It is surprisingdw thett islink attempt in theessaysin the presentbook to cng,age with thisformulation, for it subsequentlyddined so much of the common sense on Indianpolitics.Kodwi revisedhisformulationin 'The Congras SysrrmRevisited: A DeoennialRmew' (1974). was fully~

THE GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

wavesof 1971, 1980,and 1984 for aampl~in the periodafter 1967. The realpoint about callingit 'theCongresssystem'was that in that periodthe Cougtessoca1piedthe roleof therulingas wellthe opposition party. The f.acrions within Congtess~ to ania1larcpoliticaldiuc:nt. Initially seen as yet another example of Indian cxceptionalism, this type of intra-party competition is best interpreted as characteristicof the transitionalphase from a national movementto a full-blownmultiparty competition within a polity characterized byelite-drivenpolitics and a low levelof politicalconsciousnessand participation byordinary citizens.Elcaions in the pre-1967era carriedthe stamp of thisphase of Indian politics; this was to undergoa significantchangeby the 1971 elections. The GaribiHataocampaign led by Indira Gandhi's 'rn Congress, the plebiscitary nature of the elections, the leader's direct appealto voters-bypassing political middlemen-and the arrivalof countrywideelectoralwavesinaugurateda new era in Indian elections. The studies in this book happen to have captured this critical moment of transition in Indian politics.Although they do not seekto berepresentativein a simplesense,the story of the Congresscandidate challenged for the firsttime by an oppositioncandidateor by a Congress rebel, told in many essaysof this book, is typical of its time. These essays enable us to recognize the larger story behind the changing fortunes of political parties during this period. The change bctwccn 1967 and 1971 was also a transition from the elite-dominated first phase to the secondphase of masspolitics,correspondingto the change from the firstto the second electoralsystem.3 By combining evidence from other sourcesand with the help of hindsight, the essayscollected here help us understand the keyclements in this uansition. First, there is a gradual disappearance of the middleman from elections. The study of Chomu and Thanjavur in this volume brings out how political middlemen, who could be UUStedin earlier times to get bulk votes for parties and candidates, were losing their role in thisnew era when politicalleaderswere establishingdirectconw:t with the electorate. In the remote hill area of Bagcshwar,the practice of paying money to middlemen continued into the 1967 election, but it was not dear ifthemiddlemenwcrc able to deliver votes.IndiraGandhi's plebiscitary politics was to put a decisiveend to this practice. More 'The fim and the second deaoral system rcfu to the coofiguntioas of panyclectoral competitions. For elaboration, sec Yadav and Palshibr (2003).

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than one essayin the secondhalf of this book registerthe presenceof hawa---thegeneralnationalmood sharedby an imaginedcommunity of voters-which translatesinto a similarpattern of voting behaviour unmcdiated by localbrokers;that made all the difference,overriding all the local factors. This is related to a second crucialchange. The period coveredby thesesrudiesrecordsa shiftof electoralcontcstationfrom microissues specificto localityto macro, nationalissues.'Dcvdopmcnt' was already becoming the trope of election campaigns. Jayaramanreports from Thanjavur that 'people had come to look upon a member of the assemblyas a kind of "broker" in theirdcalinp with the c:xtcmalworld, particularlywith the state government'.Variow srudiesof the 1971 electionsrecordhow national issuessuch as bank nationalizationand the elimination of the privy purses, and slogans like GaribiHatao, travelledto variouslocalitiesand changedlocal politicalalignments. Third , these studies reffect the changing narure of political mobilization and campaigning. One of the considerationsfor Ram KishoreVyasgetting the Congressticket in Chomu in Rajasthanwas that he was 'a man of meanswho would be in a position to meet the high financialdemands of an election campaign'.This is echoed in many studies in this volume. Clearly, electionswere no longer just about popularity and issues. The election machinewas beginning to become very important. Both the articlesfrom Tamil Nadu caprurc the emergenceof the DMK'spowerfulclcctionmachine, which was to ensure many victories.Dua'sanalysisof Jullundur South reminds us of a forgottenfactor in the famousvictoryof 1971, namely, the role of the CPI in givingIndira Gandhi's Congressan organizationalnetwork in many parts of the country. The researchreported in this book showsthat many of the illsof electoral democracy that we think of as being of recent origin can be uaccd back to the 1960s. We find many instances here of the role of money and lineage,and of the correspondingdeclineof party organization. Dua's srudyof how the Congress' vote bank among the Dalits was dented in South Jullundur shows that all the routine ills associatedwith electoralpolitics had come into operation by then: wheelingand dealingin micro-level ~building, the roleof money, the appealto religionfor voting,and the uscof dummy candidatesto damage rivals. We have also the report of the usc of liquor by the SwatantraParty candidate in Chomu in Rajasthanin 1971.

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0( course, the scaleof thinp has changedradically.Anjum reports that each CongtC5.\candidate was paid by the party a sum of Rs 1000 to Rs 2000, a tiny amount going by pricesprevailingat that time. The instance of 'inducement in kind' noticed byJayaraman in Thanjavur

in 1967-'a small tray filled with a small tin of vermilion powder, flowers,and a coconut' -rnakcs for amusing reading today. The role of money in the more prosperous areas of Maharashtra was already reachingseriousproportions. Baviskardiscovcrcdthat both the leading candidates had spent around Rs 50,000 in their dcction campaigns at a time when the legal ceiling of expenditure was only Rs 8000. The fourth dimension of change, namdy, the changingprofile of leaders, is best captured by the story of Pushpa Bchenji, the Congrcss candidate from the Prithvir.ijRoadMetropolitan Council constirucncy in New Delhi. Her personality is a fascinating mix of the generation that was passingout andthe one that wascoming into dcaoral politics. Hers is a typical story-of what the entry into electoral politics did to Congrcss workers of the national movement, a change cxtensivdy noted and commented upon by the litcrarurc in Indianlanguagesbut rarely captured on the radarof social sciences. Pushpa Gupta brought impeccable credentials to public life: an Arya Samaji by orientation, she was active in the nationalist movement, engaged in constructive work, wore khadi,anddid not marry. H~. participationin dcctoral politics drew her back into her upper-caste and upper-classorigins as she ended up makinguse of her f.unily and caste connections as well as the resourcesof a public institution for her victory in the dcctions. Fifth, we doo:m an incipient trend suggestingthe rise of political consciousnessand activismamong the subaltem clmcs. 1bc study by Sanwal and Sanwal identifies a very interesting pattern of political participation that foreshadows patterns established in the l 990s: 'FJcctionsprovide the members of numericallysmall and economically dependent castes with an opponunity to feel the glory of being associated,howeverindirccdy,with the societal powerapparatus .' This was to lead to a democratic upsurge among the lowerorders of society in the 1990s. More than one essay in this book comments on the changing political starus of the Harijans of that period.The study ofBagcshwar constituency in Unar Pradesh (now in Urtaranchal) demonstrates the coexistenceof threegenerationsof politicsamong the ex-untouchables. The Congress candidate Das was a typical 'Harijan\ politician: bailing

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from a traditional drummer community, he had 'not allowedhis education or economic independence to tum his head' and coulproduce even basic tcxtboolcson the specificitiesof the method in the Indian contcxt.9 No wonder methodologicaldisputes took curious forms: differencesover sites and techniques of information collectionwere prcscnrcdin a grand way, as though they constituted methodological debates. Very often these disputes were merely a shadow of battles being fought elsewhere.One could argue that the dispute bcrwcc.. the ethnographic1/ff'JW the surveymethod was largelya reflectionof a dispute internal to the empiricaltradition ofWcstcm socialscience; it mirrored to a great extent the dispute betweenmairuttcam ·British anthropologyand politicalscienceon the one hand and the dominant tradition in Americansociologyor politicalscienceon the other. In manyways,the methodologicaldispute in Indiansocialscience was a debate that neverwas. It was carriedout by the cxcrciscof the authority of disciplinaryestablishmentsrather than through an open and written exchangeacrossdisciplinesthat could have allowedfree and equalparticipation by a largergroup. This was responsiblefor a vinua1non-a>mmunicationamongthe variousdisciplines something that can be seen in this book as well.While the editor is justified in complainingof ladeof attentionto anthropologicalmcarchon dcctions by politicalscientists,most of the authors in this volume reciprocate the lacuna by taking little note of the politicalscienceliterature on the area they arc writing about. phenomenology,aitical school,and post-empiricistphilosophy of science. For an overviewof thesedebates, see Ddanty and Suydam (2003). 1Indian anthropologists went a step ahead of others in rdleaing on the methodologyof their aaft. SecSrinivu, Shah and Ramaswamy(1979), Bereille and Madan (1975), Panini (1991), Nita Kumar (1992), and Thapan (2002). There are fewequivalentsof thac reflectionsin the srudyof politics.Narain n IIL (1978) did 110( gobeyonda lorma1 reviewof thevariousstudies.Hebsur(2000)is maboclologicall more self-consciousbut yet to see the light of day. 9For one of thefewa.ceprionsto this, seeHunh-Cesarand Roy (1976).Howewr, there is very little in thisbook on NM)'S of politicalopinions and attitudes and on the specificchallengafacedin this regardin the Indiancont:cxt.

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This absence of a meaningful dialogue leads to misakcn or simplistic representations. For instance, the 'political science' that anthropologists wished to resist simply did not have a significant presence in the Indian context. Far from being the dominant and overbearingstyleof srudyingpolitical phenomena, dection study and voting behaviour analysis was acrually the least sought after subdiscipline in political science(sec Hcbsur 1992). A trenchant critique of quantification was out of place here, for Indian political science never achieved any degreeof quantitativesophistication, let alone any o~ion with quantification.10 Farfrom being a ptisoner of models of voters' rationalitydevoid of socialcontext, politicalsciencein India could in factbe accusedof dissolvingvoters in their socialcontexts of caste and community. In fact, the idea that rcscarchdone by political scientistsfollowedthe surycy method, in contrast to the ethnographic method adopted by anthropologists, is simply not borne out by a look at the history of the discipline. An ovcrwhdming majority of the early rcscarchon Indiandcctionsdeployedthe casesrudymethod. If anything, Indian politicalscientistscould be accusedof ignoringsurycyrcscarch and over-relianceon the case study method. But let us put these forms of misunderstanding asideand examine the methodologicalclaims made on behalf of anthropology in terms of the threecomponentsof the approachidentifiedby the editor:choice of small community as unit of analysis; participant observation as the technique of data collection; and non-quantitative technique of data analysis. The methodological claim made here can have a weak or strong version. The weak version would merdy suggest that the non-quantitative srudy of a small community, by using the participant observation technique, is a useful, or even a necessary, supplement to the study of dcctions . The strong version would suggest that it is not merely usefuland necessarybut also in some way better than other waysof studyingdcctions.The editorialintroduction vacillatesbetween these two claims.But let me focuson the stronger claim, for it informs much of the common sense of the discipline. Take the question of unit of analysisfirst. There is no doubt that srudicsof how dcctionsaJC playmout in the contextof localcommunity oSceKodwi (1967). This includes the famous srudy of Modasa constiruency

1

by Glwuhyam Shah and Rajni Kothari.The wne is true of early workson Indian politia by PaulBrus and Myron Weina .

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can bea very uscfuJsupplement to studies of dcctoral politics at the constituency and state levels.These studies arc no doubt essential to a fuller undemanding of dections. The difficultyariseswhen any one lcvd is considerednot only ncccssarybut alsosufficient,or when strong methodological claims arc made on behalf of any study of local community.The editorialintroduction docsnot quite makethisclaim, but it is worth discussinghere since a version of this claim is implicit both in the introduction and in many anthropological srudies. The difficultywith a casestudyof a small community is that wc do not know what to do with it unless we know why that particular case was selected. This problem is particularly severe in studying a macro phenomenon likedcctions. In an event that takrs placesimultaneously all over the country, it is possible to come up with all kinds of cases at different lcvds of what would beconsideredlocal-village , mql,al/4, constituency, diwrict,andso on. We do not knowwhetherthe conclusiom from such a study can have wider application unless wc know how typical the case is of larger trends and patterns. That docs not render case studies irrelevant or useless.But it docs requirethat a case srudy must offer carefuljustification of the choice of the case, or at leastgive sufficient post-fu:to information allowinganyone to sec how that case was plac.cdin the entire universeof analym-just as any surveyrcscarch must offer a rigorous defence of its sample selection. In this respect. many of the studies in this volume do not make a case for the case study method. Most authors have srudied elections in a community merely because they happen to have studied that community earlier, for some other purpose. We arc not told enough about what makrs these cases illuminating for a study of dcctoral politics. This is not to say that these studies arc not illuminating-I have argued exactly the opposite in the previoussection-but simply to insist that thisquestion cannot beaddressedwithout placingthe caseunder examinationwithin a broader matrix. Related to the question of unit of analysisis the issue of the nature of causality.A focus on local community that docsnot take note of its linkages with the world outside it is unlikely to offer a robust causal understanding of a process such as dcctions. There is no doubt that the macro phenomenon called dections is lived in its micro setting, and that we cannot understand dections without making sense of the act of voting in its miao contctt. In the typicalsituationwherenational political parties do not control local lcvd politics, there is a kind of

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autonomy of local politics that uansforms the chancter of electoral competition, something that any macro analysis cannot begin to comprehend.Hence the needfor and relevanceof ethnographicrac:arch on dcctions. Yettheexplanatoryenterpriseremainsincompletewithout ta.kinginto account what Rao, writing in this book, calls'interaction · between the wider political processes and local-levelpolitics'. Many studies in thisvolume end up misreadingtheir own material in the absence of an understanding of how their case was related to wider political processes. The study of Chomu in Rajasthan in the 1967dcaions actuallydemonstratesthat macro levelrcscnrmentagainst the CongressPartyproveddccisMin cmuring the defeatof the Congtcss candidate in that constituency.The local factors and socialequations that the author cmphasi7.csactually favoured the losing candidate. Similarly,Dua's narration of the dcction campaign in Jullundur South missesthe point of thestory: of how the Congress' Harijan vote bank wasdented by a protest of young.educatedpersons (emergingDalits?) in that community at a moment of overall dissatisfaction with the CongressParty.Ironically, the one casewherethe candidate's personality and localcampaigndid makea diffcrcnce-Prithviraj Roadconstituency in New Delhi, where the Congress candidate won despite an antiCongress wave-is seen by Anjum as a casewherethe candidate won 'because of her parry'. It could be argued that it is not the anthropologist's task to offer a causal explanation of electoral outcomes. But that defence docs not workin reallife, for most anthropologicalsrudicsdo get into the blJSUlC9 of offering explanations and thereby invite scrutiny regarding their causal claims. Ramaswamy'smeticulous account of the complexities of trade union and parry politics in Singanallur docs not hdp us understand dcctoral outcome, for the outcome in this constituency was a function of the state-levelmacro alliance rather than of the local rivalriesand hostilitiesso carefullysketchedin hispaper. Mishra'sstudy of the defeat of Charan Singh in Muzaffarnagar concludes that the 'national issuesraisedby the candidatesand parties in thisconstituency had a rather limited impact on the people of Jatpura', but the evidence presented by the author points to the role of the macro context in the absenceof whichlocal issuescould not have become decisive.Similarly, V1Shwanathemphasi7.csthe role of local factors in the victory of the Old Congress in Gujarat, but his narrative provides enough evidence of how the national context was transforming the nature of Gujarat

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politics. Chakravarti presents the shift from 1967 to 1971 in Chomu constituency as a shift from local issuesto national issues.A modd of interaction between the macro and the micro would allowus to read the same material differently:in both these dcctions we have national issues filtered through the local context.11 The only difference is that in the previouselection both these sets of issueswere workingat crosspurposcs, while in 1971 they were aligned. The second~ of the methodological claimconcmu the tcchniquc of data collection,specificallythe choice of a structured questionnaire administered by an outsider vemu participant observation by an outsider-insider. Perhaps no one would deny the superiority of the ethnographic technique in gathering som~kinds of information: those pertainingto bclicfsand~ and thecomplexwebof socialrclariom. The real question is whether participant observation is necessaryfor understanding the act of voting. Now, it is not necessary for every study of dcctions to get into a study of voting behaviour, but a large majority of them do-including most casestudies in this book.And if that is one of the rcscarchfoci,the valueof a samplesurveyisundeniable. Often, the disadvantagesof gleaning surfaceinformation through a structured survey questionnaire arc outweighed by the largenumber of observations that survey research offers. Arguably,even mediocre hit-and-run surveys arc not bad at offering an insight into patterns of voting behaviour, something that cannot be said of all participant observations. Many participant observers in this book fumble when it comes to describing or anticipating patterns of voting behaviour. If ethnographers substitute survey rcscarchon voting behaviour by simply recyclingprevailing notions about who voted for whom (as in Dua's essayon the 1967 dcction), their analysisdocs not contribute to the ethnographic method. Part of the difficultyhere may be the cthnographcr'sunfamiliarity with the nature of surycymethodology.Gupta's 'prc-dcction opinion poll' and Mittal's use of a sample surveyof the voters in her constitu111 am

not suggming dw a wealcnasin undemandingthe micro-macroiniaaction

is intrinsic to the fieldworkmethod or is bound to the disciplineof anduopology. Bailey'sstudy of politics in Orissa(1970) consciouslymovedfrom the villageto the districtand then to the state. Cohn's work (1987) is a good instana of integrating not just the micro with the macro but also the be=and-oow with a long-u:nn historical view.

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ency arc examplesof the risksinherent in deploying unfamiliarmethodological tools. It also shows that structured questioning done by a panicipant observerbrings no specialinsights that a casualinvestigator will not pick up. Both these experiments may provide a clue as to why surveysmay not have been popular among anthropologists. If the yield of panicipant observation has to be compared to that of survey research, perhaps a more fair comparison would be to look at the findin~ of the National FJection Study carried out by CSDS immediately following the mid-term poll in 197 l. This survey of a national representativesampleof 3800 clcctors,both men and women, carried out in 19 states and union territories, provides a mine of still under-utilized information on the mind of the Indian voter at that point. This survey found that even after the famous victory of Indira Gandhi at the height of her popularity, 43 per cent of adult cimens did not know who the prime minister was. This first 'wave election' in post-Independence India had asmany as72 per cent of the electors completely uninterested in the elcctions.12 Herc was survey research providing something of a 'worm's-eye view' of the ordinary routine of elections. Unfortunately, we have no signs of any interaction between these two forms of inquiries in the existing literature, nor in the present book. In this respect, the problem is not the method but how it is deployed. Many essaysin this book tend to read off election issues by surfac.canalysis of the content of electionspeeches, hardlya method the anthropologistwould recommend in the study of any other ritual. Thisis almostlike trying to understandthe socialmeaningof an Indian weddingby rcstriaing one's attention to the priest's utterances. In that sense we do not alwaysget here the promised 'worm's-eyeview'of how issues get shaped in the arena of electoral competition. There arc some exceptions. lmtiaz Ahmad's distinction bctwccn the formal and the informal campaignbeginsto take this into account, but his description of the informal campaign limits it to appeals to the caste, community, and religiousbackground of voters. Attention must be drawn here to a methodological innovation little noticed in the srudy of Bagcshwar bySanwaland Sanwal. They use villagegossip, informationslipsissuedbypollingagents,and a formalpost-pollsurvey 12

See al,o in this coatext unweighted

1971, CSDS Om. Unit

da12 set

of the National FJection Stud y

362

TH E GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

to reinforce information about voting behaviour. Herc is an example of utilintion of the participant observer's skills r.o furcground the distinct methodological advantage of ethnographic fiddwork over survey fiddwork in a way that could provide lessons for political research. Finally, let us turn to the question of quantification as a method of analysis. Disciplinary disputcS of the 1%Os presented the use of numerals as an epistemic choice; accordingly, the world was divided into the quantitative camp and the qualitative camp. Many authors in this book share this consciousness,though some of them do make astute use of dcction statistics. Perhaps one can use simple common senseagainst the advocacyof non-quantitative techniques in this book. C.Ommonsensewould suggestthat resistingquantification can scarc:dy bea virtuewhen studyinga phenomenon to whichnumbersare intrinsic and quite fundamental (e.g. market prices, lotteries, calendars, etc.). As long as votes are counted, those who study the act of voting have no option c:xceptto take counting seriously. Many of the essays in this book prove this point. Iwnaswamy's carefulanalysisof village-wise voting figuresin Singanallurconstituency, Baviskar'sanalysisof results of all the booths in Shirdi constituency, R.ao'suse of intdligcnt local guesswork,and ImriazAhmad's approach of puttingvotingdata side bysidewith the dataon the caste composition of the dectorate are examplesof quantitative analysisthat do not take away from the depth of ethnographic analysis. Gupta's essayon Sasni is also something of an exception for its dfon to gather caste-wise voting data at the booth levd; though there is a hiatus between her data and her argument. Her data actually shows the absence of castebasedvoting blocs, contrary to her interpretation. These attempts can be contrasted with the almost casual attention paid by some of the authors to the statisticsof dcctoral outcome in that constituencywhich introduce disconnection between the explanation and what is sought to be explained. Thus, on all three counts-unit of analysis, technique of data collection, and data analysis-the strong versionof the methodological claim, namely of the exclusivityand superiority of anthropology, arc far from convincing. This is not to say that similar claims by another discipline say, survey research in political science--are any more secure. Barring a few honourable exceptions, the first generation of election studies based on survey research in the Indian discipline of

EPILOGUE

363

political scienc.cwas something of an embarrassment,yidding neither theoreticalinsightsnor even robust empiricalmeasures.Some of these problemshavecontinued to persist:surveyrcscarchin politicalscience-including, I must hasten to add, my own work-continues to be ddicient in relating to the larger theoretical developments in social sciences. Rich discussions in philosophy of social sciences over the lastthreedecadeshave suggestedthe need to move beyond discipline-based methodologies in favour of problem-oriented methods. Such a pcrspccrivcwould recommendthat srudicsof dcctions combinercscarch on local communities with study of the macro context, participant observation with formal surveys, and quantitative with qualitative analysis.The methodological toolkit of the socialanthropologist thus needs to be reinforced with those of surveyl'C'SCalCh, political history, and political economy of the context of elections.

Proposal for a Diak,gw The substantive and methodological reviewsof the rich material in this book both point to the need for a dialogue bctwccn the different disciplines, especially between political science and anthropology. Let me conclude thisepilogueby making a concrete proposalon such a dialogue. In my opinion the constituencies covered in this book provide a wonderful site for such a dialogue, should a group of anthropologists and political scientists choose to revisit them after three and a half decades. I have already said that these constituencies provide a good glimpseof politicalchangefrom 1967 to 1971. I should add that, seen in a longer time frame too, the constituencies selected in this volume stand the test of time. The changesin these constituenciesreflectlarger changesin the political landscapeover the last three decades. A quiclc look at where some of the constituencies discussedin this volume stand in 2006 may be a convenient starring point to registerhow much the world has changedsinc.c1967. Some of these constituencies have simply disappeared.Both the constituencies of the Metropolitan Council in Delhi have disappeared, along with the Mctroplitan Council itself.and beensubmerged in the new and large assemblyconstituenciesin the NationalCapitalTerritory.The assembly constituencyofBannur in Kamatakaalsodisappeared in the redrawing of the dcctoral map in the mid l 970s: the areas in that constituency

364

THE GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRA CY

now f..illunder Puttur,a new constituency.But most

ocheroonstituencics

have survived and illustrate very wcll the changes in party political competition . Some of theseconstituenciesarc very usefulsites to in~ the riseof political Hindutva in the last two decades or so. The Swatantra Party has disappeared from the political homon, giving way to the BJP in Chomu assemblyconstituency in Rajasthan and in Bannur in Karnataka, though as it happens the Jan Sangh was not a force in eitherof the two placesduring 1967-71. In Chomu, the demise of the Swuantra Partywas followed by the shortlived presence of the Janata Dal, which gave way in that entire region of Rajasthan to the BJP in the 1990s; the BJP won this scat from the Congress in 2004. The Puttur constituency in Karnataka, where a Congress candidate could beopposed only by a rebelCongress candidate in 1967, is now a BJP stronghold, returning that party's Ml.A since 1994. This area has thus become one of the early entry ports for the BJP in South India. It is a sign of the expansion of the BJP in recent times that it now registers its presence even in the Outer Manipur parliamentary constituency, something unthinkable in 1971. Both the constituencies ofUttar Pradesh discussedin thisvolume have seen the decline of the Congress and the rise of new political actors in state politics. New actors havemade their presencefdt in some of these constituencies. Given the history of Jan Sanghorganization in Sasnirown, it is hardly surprising that Sasniconstituency has turned into a BJPstronghold, a se1t the party hasheld for the lastduce a.\1lclnbly dcctions. At the same time, the Bahujan Samaj Partyhas been able to build upon the marginal presence of the RPI there and is the major rival of the BJP. Similarly, given the presence of socialist parties in the 1960s and a significant share of Muslims, it is not surprising that the Rudauli scat in Uttar Pradesh is currendy held by the Samajwadi Party. The Thanjavur assembly constituency in Tamil Nadu, where Congress managedto defy a DMK wave in the state in 1967, is now just another place that witnessesa Straight contest bctwccn the DMK and the AIADMK, and where Congress gets a space only when it is in alliance with one of these two. Only a fewof these constituencies present a picture of continuity, though not without subde changes.Shirdi in Maharashtra, a Congtcss ba.uionthen,continuesto bea Co~ bastion-the Congress....md.idale got nearly 80 per cent votes in the 2004 elections. It was breached

EPILOGUE

365

once, in the 1999 assemblydections, when the split bctwccnthe Congressmd the NationalistCongressPartyof SharadPawarenabled the ShivSenato win thisseat.The hill constituencyof Bagcshwar may have changedits state (it is now a part ofUttaranchal) but the nature of politicalcontesthasnot changed:it continuesto bea Congressl>tmlS BJPcontest,'moreso with the eliminationof the then SSP. The same is the case with the Jullundur South constituencyin Punjab.Herc, the religiouscomposition of the dcctorate has ensured that the earlier support for the Jan Sanghhas now shiftedto the BJP,in alliancewith the AkaliDal.The Singanallurconstituencyin TamilNadu continues to n:ftcct the influence of the trade union movement on dcctoral politics.The CPl(M), and not the original CPI, main~ a strong presencehere and holds the seat in the current assembly. These constituenciesdo not cover all the dimensionsof politia.l changesince l 'Yl l worthanalysing. Forexample,thereisnochingin this book from West Bengaland Keralathat could allowus to undentand the presenceof the Left in those parts of the world. One would also wish for a greaternumber of case studies from the geographicaland socialperiphery: studies from the Adivasiregions of middle India and the north-cast, for example.These gaps can be filledby linking up with some ongoing studies and some case studies undertaken by politia.l scientists.13 Notwithstandingtheselimitations,an attempt to revisitthe constituenciescoveredin the pracnt collectioncan offera rich unpacking of politicaldwiges acrosstime. I believesuch a collaborativercscarch by a group of socialscientistscutting acros.cdisciplinescan push the frontiersof our undemandingof democraticpolitics.Suchan attempt needs to begin by recognizingthat the current state of knowledgeon the subjectis very inconclusive.At leastin India, both surveyrcscarchcrs and ethnographersarc far from securing the insights associated eitherwith surveyresearchor ethnography.Therefore,a beginninghas to bemade by learningfrom the rcspcctivedisciplinaryorthodoxies. The traditionof votingbehaviourresearchin the disciplineof politia.l sciencecan offer many insightsfor dcvdoping a ..,odd of the Indian 131 am thinkinghere of Mukulib

Banerjee'• ongoingracardi on Wat Bengal, and that of Lucia Michduni'1 and Craig Jdferq'1 on Utw Pndah. For some recent case studia by politicalscientists,see &.-k 11114 Politiul ~. 13-20 January 1996.

366

T HE GRASSROOTS OP DEMO CRACY

voter.Advancesin the disciplineof anthropologycan hdp us attend to shifting political identities, the construction of mcaninp, and, of course, the impact of social suatification on politics. While it is important to begin by mining what the c:xistingdisciplines have to offer, a dialogue must go beyond that. Socialscientists from varyingdisciplinesmust come togtthcr to combinetheir insighu in order to explore a common set of questions.These questions will includebut not be limittd to the damevotingbehaviourquestion:Why do voters vote the way they do?There is a need to ask questions that go beyond routine political behaviour and ethnographic enquiries. These must include some largerquestions about the politicalcontext of dcctoral choice,the nature of dcctoral choiceitself,and the process of agendasetting.These questionscannot beanswered eitherbysuney rcscarchor by ethnographic fiddwork alone.14 Such a dialoguewill be premisedon methodologicalpluralism.It will not and cannot eschewquantitative analys~including analysis of availableofficialstatistics,such as the resultsof panchayatdcctions, membership of political parties and pressure groups, and above all booth-wise voting figuresthat arc availableonce again thanksto the introduction of dcctronic voting machincs.15 This will include a component of survey-basedanalysisthat maps the basic profile of voting behaviourand its relationshipwith demographicattributes, as wdl as politicalopinions and atrinidc,. Surveydata analysisneeds to be linbd to analysisof participationpanrms, legitimacyof dcmoaacy, socialbasisof leadership,and issue cleavage.Ethnographicstudieswill be an essentialcomponentof such an attempt to understanddcctions. But, for this to becomemeaningful,we need to knowwhat function 14Fora good recentexampleof researchon deaions

that oombinesedinognphic field workwith carduJquantitatM analysisand rational choicetheory, see Chandra (2004).

:l'fhefirst g,enerationof srudiesof Indian electionsmade a lot of use of boothwise voting data to circumvent the problem of dai. io■dequacy. After 1971 the 1

Election Commission of India made it a policynot to rdeue booth-Im data.·The practice of mixing balloa from. all booths before oounting the vota made this infunnatiol' i'la«eaiblc . The inaoduction of dearonic votingmachinessince 1999 hu madethe booth-wisedatapublicinformation, thoughit isstill not euy to aa:m it. This opensa gold mine of informationfor scbolanin1aestedin studyingdcaio111 in their local oontcn.

EPILOGUE

367

ethnographic fiddwork performs in the fidd of dcctions. If the argumentofferedaboveis useful,ethnographicfiddwork is uniquely placedto fill three slicesin this big picture:a study of politicalbeliefs of ordinary citizens; a study of the making and unmaking of social blocsoperatingin politics; and a thick descriptionof the localcontext of dcctoral choice. An integrated approach to the study of dcctions can not onlyprovideinsights into the functioningof Indiandemocracy , it can alsorescuethe disciplineof dcction studiesfrom the intdlcctual exhaustionthat it facescurrently.16 REFERENCES Ahmed, Bashiruddin . 1970. 'C-asteand Elcaoral.Politics'. AsitmSum:,(10:11), November.

Bailey, F.G . 1970. Pouticsarui SocialChantt: Orissain 1959. Berkeley: Universityof California Press. Bctcillc, Andre and T.N . Madan (eds). 1975. E11C011111n' aruJF.xpmmct: PmonalAmi11msof Fitldworlt. Delhi: Vikas. Chandra, Kanchan.2004. WhyEdmic Partin S11«ud:PatrtmattaruiEthnic Htllli un,nts in JnJia. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. Cohn, BernardS. 1987. An Andm,polof;ist Among 11NHistoriansarui Other Essays.Delhi: Oxford UniversityPress. Dclanty,Gerard and Pict Strydom (eds). 2003. Philosophyof SocialScimca: Tht ClassicaruiContnnporr,ry &adingI. Maidenhead:Open University Press. Franklin, Mark M. and ChristopherWlczien(eds) . 2002. Nllllrt of E/«tion Stiuiies.Elsevier: Pergamon. Hcbsur,R.K.2000. Studieson IndianPolitics:RcscarchDesignsand Sttatcgics . Unpublishedmanuscriptsubmittedro IndianCouncilof SocialScience Research,New Delhi. Hursh-Cesar,Gerald and Pradipto Roy (eds). 1976. Third Wor/JS11,wys : Slll"WJRnttmh in Dew/oping Na1UJns . Delhi: Macmillan. Kothari, Rajni. 1961. 'Form and Substance in Indian Politics.' Economic ~'*9'•vol.XII, 3 June. __ 1964. 'The Congress"System" in India'. AsitmSum:,(4:12), December. _ _ 1974. 'The CongressSystemRevisited: A Decennial Review'. Asian S11rvey (24:12), December. 16

Stt Franklin and Wlezim (2002).

368

THE GRASSROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

d ttl. 1967. P11nySystm, ll1UiE/mwn Sudia.

Bombay:Allied. On behalf of Ccnuc for the Study of DevelopingSocieties,Dclhi. Kumar, Nita. 1992. Frimds, Brothm, I,iform1111ts: FiddworltMmwin of &NUrU.Berkeley:Universityof California Press. Narain, Iqbal rt td. 1978. E/mwn Studiesin !NUii. Delhi:Allied. On behalf of Indian Council of SocialScience Racarch. Panini,M.N. (ed.). 1991.F,11111 IINFmulkEye:.A«o,,,us ofFmulk~ Stwiyint Thar Own Communities.Delhi: Hindustan. Sheth,D.L (ed.). 1975. Cilir.msaNi Pllrtia:Asp«tsof Co,,,petdiwPoulicsin [NUii.Delhi:Allied. Srinivas,M.N.,AM. Shah,and EA Ramaswamy(cds).1979. TbeReltiworl«r ll1Ui tlN~Id: ProMmrs ll1Ui ChtJlmia ;,.S«iologiaJIn~ Dclhi: OxfordUniversityPress. Second edition, 2002. Thapan, Mccnakshi (ed.). 2002. Andm,poUJficlll fou'MJ: Rrjl«tio,u on Fieldwork.Delhi: Orient Longman. Yadav,Yogcndra.1999. 'ElectoralPoliticsin a T1meof Change: India'sThird Electoral System, 1989-99.' Economic11,uJPoliticlllWttk9 (34:35), 21-28 August. __ and Suhash Palshilw. 2003. 'From Hegemony to Convergence:Party Systemand ElectoralPoliticsin the Indian States,1952-2002.' Joumlll of INU1111 Schoolof PoliticlllEco"'""](15: 1&2), January-June. __

CONTRIBUTORS

IMTIAZ AHMAD was born in 1940 and is M.A. (Lucknow). Formerly Professor of Political Sociology,Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, he has publishedextensivelyon Muslim communities in India, Islam, and communalism. MottlNl ANJUMwas born in 1942. M.A. and Ph.D. (Delhi), she was Professor of Sociology, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. Her publications include Muslim m,,nmin Induz,Delhi: Radiant, 1992. B.S. BAVI SKAR was born in 1931 and is M.A. and Ph.D. (Delhi). A Senior Fellow, Institute of SocialSciences, New Delhi, he was furmcrly Professorof Sociology,Universityof Delhi. His publications include ThePoliticsof ~IL,pmmt: SugarCoopmztivesin RuralMaha1¥ZShtrrz, Delhi: Oxford University~. 1980;and, with D.W. Attwood,Finding theMitfdk Path:~ PoliticaJ &onomyof Coo~n in RuralInduz, Boulder, Colorado: Wcstvicw,1995. · ANAND CHAKRAVARTI was born in

1941 and is M.A. and Ph.D. (Delhi) . He was Professorof Sociology,Universityof Delhi. His publications include: Contradictionand Changt:Emnging PlllttmSof Dmwmtcy in a RitjasthanVillagt, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1975; and Soda/, POWtr and EvtrydayClass Relations:AgrarianTransformation in North Bihar, Delhi: Sage, 2001. VF.ENA DuA(1941- 92) was M.A. (Delhi). She was Readerin Sociology, Universityof Delhi. Some of her papers and a few chapters from her

370

CONTRIBUTORS

incomplete Ph.D. dissertation arc published in The Arya Sa1nlljin PunjabPoliti.s,Delhi: Picus, 1999. KHADIJA A. GUPTA was born in 1932. An M.A. (Lucknow)and Ph.D. (Delhi), she was Reader in Sociology,Miranda House, Universityof Delhi. Her publicationsincludePoliticsofa Sma/JTown:A Sociological Study, Delhi: lmpcx, 1976. R. JAYARAMAN was born in 1935. He is M.A., LL.B. (Nagpur) and Ph.D. (Delhi), and is Professorof Sociology,Universityof Western Sydney.His publicationsinclude:Czm Continuitiesin Ceylon,Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1975; Ouu anti C/.asr. Dynamicsof Inequalityin Indian Society, Delhi: Hindustan, 1981.

MAoHuS. MISHRA was born in 1946. He is M.A., M.Litt., and Ph.D. (Delhi). He is Professor,SociologyGroup, Indian Instirutcof Management, Kolkata,and has published extensivelyon rural dcvdopmcnt and management. AcHu. MmAL was born in 1940 and is M.A. (Delhi). Formerly ResearchFdlow in Sociology,Universityof Delhi, she carried out a field srudy of a governmentemployees'colony in New Delhi. M.N. PANINI was born in 1944. He is M.A. and Ph.D. (Delhi). Professorof Sociology,JawaharlalNehru University,New Delhi, his publicationsinclude,with M.N. Srinivasand T.S. Epstein,BasicN«ds in India-.A ViewfromAbow antifrom <,w, Paris:OECD, 1983,and papers on agricultural and industrial development. E.A.RMwwAMY was born in 1938and is M.A.,Ph.D. (Delhi). He has been Readerin Sociology,Universityof Delhi; Professorof Industrial Relations,AdministrativeStaffCollegeof India, Hyderabad;VJSiting Professor,lnstirute of Social Srudics,The Hague. He is currendy a management consultant. His publications include The Workeranti His Union: A Studyin South India, Delhi: Allied, 19n; Poweranti .fustier.TheStatein IndustrialRelations,Delhi:Oxford UniversityPress, 1984; WorkerConsciousness anti TradeUnionResponse , Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988; Rayon Spinnen: SlrtltegicManagemmtof lntiwtrial Relations,Delhi: Oxford UniversityPress, 1994;Managing Human Resourr:es, Delhi: Oxford UniversityPress, 2000.

CONTRIBUTORS

371

M.S.A. RAo (1926-85) was M.A. and Ph.D. (Bombay). He was Professor of Sociology,Universityof Delhi. His publications include SocialChangein Malabar,Bombay:Popular, 1957; Urbanisationand SocialChange:A Studyof a RuralCommunityon a Mttrr,p,,litanFringe, Delhi:Orient Longman, 1970; T1lltUlion, &zsiqnalily andSocialChange: Essays in Socwlogy of&nomic DtvtlopmmtandSocialChange,Bombay: Popular, 1972; SocialMovnnmt1 and SocialTransformation: A Study of TwoBacltwardClassesMtnltfflfflt1,Delhi: Macmillan, 1979. RD. SANWAL (1935-1970) was M.Sc. (Delhi) and Ph.D. (London). He was Reader in Sociology,University of Delhi. His publications include SocialStratification in RMraJ Kimuwn,Delhi:Oxford University Press, 1976. SuSHIUSANWAL was born in 1931 and is M.Sc. (Delhi).She has carried out fieldwork in Kumaon. A.M. SHAHwas born in 1931. An M.A and Ph.D. (Baroda), he was Professorof Sociology,Universityof Delhi. His publications include The HousehoklDimmsion of tht Familyin Indus:A Fiekl Studyin a GujaratVillageand a Revinuof OthtrStuaitt, Delhi: Orient Longman, 1973, and Berkeley:University of California Press, 1974; with LP. Desai, Diviswnand Hitrarr:hy: An Ovtrvitw of uzstt in Gujarat,Delhi: Hindustan, 1988; TheFamilyin India: CriticalEssays,Delhi: Orient Longman, 1998; ExploringIndia'sRMraiPast:A GujaratVillagein the EarlyNinetttnth Cmtu,y. Delhi: Oxford University Press,2002. N. Rottrr SINGH (19~73) wasM.A (Poona).He was ResearchFdlow at Deccan College Post-Graduate Research Institute, Poona, and at the Department of Sociology,Universityof Delhi. He publishedseveral papers on the physical and social anthropology of Manipur. L.S. VISHWANATH was born in 1943. An M.A, M.Litt. and Ph.D. (Delhi), He was Professor of History, Pondicherry University. His publications include Fnnak Infanticidtand Soda/ Structu":A SocioHistorical Studyin Wtrtt,nandNorthernIndia,Delhi:Hindustan,2000. was born in 1963. With M.A QNU) and M. Phil. (Panjab Universiry), he is Senior Fellow, Cenue for the Study of DevelopingSocieties,Delhi. He has publishedextensivelyon elections and politics in India.

YOGENORA YADAV

INDEX

Af,e factor 8, 24, 228, 231- 3, 244, 250-1,265 , 352 . Ahmad,lmtiaz5, 13-14, 16, 19, 352, 361-2 AIADMK364 AkaliDal 92, 97, 101, 319-20, 3267,331,334,365 All IndiaWomen'sConference103n Ambcdkar,Dr B.R. 175, 181, 193 Anjum, Mohini 5, 16, 19, 21-3, 350,359 Annadurai, C. 64, 338 Anthropologicalmethod. Set Fiddwork method Anthropology,social 1- 3, 26, 346, 353-4,357,362-3,366 Arya Sabha 329 Arya Sarnaj 14-15, 83, 91-4 , 96, 98-101 , 107, 157,319-22,326, · 328-9,332.350 Assemblyvr parliamentarydcction 4. 7-8, 24, 47. 65, 99, 111-13, 118, 183, 197,207,223-4,2867,301,315-17,321,326 Atal,Yogcsh6 Bahujan SamajParty 364 Bailey, F.G. 6, 360

Banerjee,Mukulika 365n Baviskar,B.S. xii, 5, 10, 16,. 18, 23, 174n, 237n,279n , 350,362 Btteille, Andn! In, 50n, 5 ln, 74n, 172n,223n , 356n, BJP 364-5 BKD 239, 241- 2, 244, 251, 2559, 261--o,299-300, 302-3, 31213,315,315-16 Brass,Paul 151, 357n Buddhism 175, 189 Burger,AngelaS. 200n Buder, David 3n Campaigns4. 19-22, 35--6.41-4, 48, 59-72, 82-4, 97- 100, 104-5. 107-18, 121-4, 139-47, 15762, 183-8,209-16 , 244--6,25960, 261-2, 273-4. 283, 285, 301-5, 314-15, 326-31, 33944, 349,361 Candidate-constituencyrelationship 19, 21, 46, 61, 104, 115-18, 202-3 Case study method 357-58 , 360 Caste 8, 10, 11, 13-19, 21- 5, 32, 46,48-50, 58, 73, 80, 84, 8690,92-3, 100-1, 146,148,154,

374

INDEX

157. 168. 170-5, 186,190,203, 205,211-13,216-22,232,237, 244,250, 252-5, 264-5, 267n, 269, 271, 274, 308-10, 335, 341-2,350.351,353-4,361 Caste association 16, 153-4, 1601, 167,212,216,257n,259 Caste bloc 14, 48-53, 56-7, 65-7, 69-71,352 Caste groups (major): Ahir 196-7, 207,212,215-18,238-42,2456, 250; Arora 98, 100; Bania(s« Yaish);Bhangi 77-8, 82, 84, 8793, 242n, 243, 246, 261, 309, 317;Brahminl5,39-40,44,6265,70,73,76,79-81, 129, 1514, 162-3, 166, 168-9, 175. 178, 183, 196,208,213,215,238-9, 254, 461, 269. 308, 336. 341; Charnar 77-8. 80, 83-4, 86-7, 89-90, 196, 200, 207, 242-3, 253-4,260-1,267-8,270,272; Gounder 137, 143, 146; Gujjar 238-39, 254; Gupta (stt Yaish); Harijan (stt Bhangi); Jat 32, 39, 43,46,77,238-41,253-4,2567. 259, 260, 265-6, 294, 299, 303; Jatav (s« Charnar); Kamma 50n; Khatri 98, 100; Koli 269, 272;Kunnil96-7,207,212,21S18; Kuruba 228, 233; Lingayat 18, 232; Lodha 208, 212, 21617, 220; Mali 18, 174,..Q,186, 190; Mahar175, 181; Maratha 18; Mathur 16, 105, 113, 1747; Mcgh 15-16, 321-2, 329-30, 332-3; Mcitei 280-2, 286-7, 352; Naidu 143, 145-6, 148,341; Okkaliga18, 224-Q, 228; Paridar 268-9, 272; Rajput 17, 32, 36-8, 45-6,98, 100, 151-5. 158,162, 164, 166, 196, 206, 215, 254, 268-9, 271-2, 274, 276, 294,

296-7; Rl:ddi50n; Silapkar 155, 157, 160, 162, 165-6, 168-9; Yaish 16, 76-7, 79-80, 152, 1989,207,218,238,243,246,254, 269,271,308,317 Centre fur the Study of Dcvcloping Societies, studies of elections by 353,354n,361 Chakravarti, Anand xii, 3, 5, 9, 13, 14, 17,20,24,251,261,360 Chandra,Kanchan366n Oiavan,Y.8. 177, 180, 184, 185, 188, 281 Christians 56, 62, 69, 72-3 City neighbourhood 2, 5, 8, 9-10, 13, 16-19,24-5 ,91--4, 118-19, 129,321--4,345,352 Cohn, BernardS. 346n, 360n Congress Party ptusim Congress system 7, 347-8 Constituencies, assembly: Almora 156; Bagcshwar150-62, 348, 350,361,365;8annur223,36.>4; Chomu 31-5, 38, 44, 295, 298-302, 304, 348, 349, 352, 359, 360, 364; Danpur 156; Jullundur South 13, 15, 24, 913, 96, 100,349,359,365;Pumu 364; Rudauli 13, 194-5, 364; Sasnil7,77,87,362,364;Shirdi 172, 174. 188, 191, 362. 364; Singanallur 9, 24, 130-31, 137, 147, 335-6, 343-4, 352, 359. 362, 365; Sulur 138; Thanjavur 47,58-65,348,352,364 Constituencies,Metropolitan Council of Delhi: Prithviraj Road 10.>-5, 350, 359, 363; Sarojini Nagar 118, 352, 363 Constirucncics,parliamentary: Anand 267, 271; Chamrajnagar 223; Coimbatore 335; Coimbatore Rural 140; Dausa 294, 300-1,

375

INDEX

305; Delhi Sadar 238; Hathras 308,312; InnerManipur279,281; Jullundur 319, 321, 324, 3302; Kopargaon 182; Lakhi.sarai 19n; Lucknow-Banbanki 197; Monghyr 19n; Muzaffa.magar 253-5, 359; New Delhi 103-5; Outer Delhi 237-42; Outer Manipur 279-85, 287-93, 352, 364;Ramsanehighat 197 Constituency, as unit of study l, 45, 9, 16,25,31,47-8 Cooperative society 10-12, 16, 56, 128, 174-5, 178,183,187,230,

300 Cow slaughter, ban on 14, 35, 83, 92n, 114,200,201,245,330 CPI 50n, 59, 82, 95, 97, 130, 132, 137, 139-40, 143-8, 182, 204, 238, 250, 255-9, 261~. 283, 319-20,327-8,330,33 4,3367,344,365 CPl(M) 63, 130, 137-48 , 336, 338, 343,365

daCosta, E.P.W. 194 Dahl, RobertA 173,185 Dalit. S« ScheduledCaste Delanty, Gerard356n Delhi University, Depanment of Sociology xi, 2, 354 Democracy12, 25-6 Desai, I.P 14n DK 60--3, 65, 68, 73, 129-30 DMK 48, 50, 59-70, 72-4, 12930, 132-3 , 138, 140-2 , 148, 336,338,340,343-4,349,364 Dua,Veenaxii, 3, 5, 13, 15, 21, 234,349,359,360,364 Economicissues7-8, 12-13,24,412, 48, 63, 86, 90, 125-6, 130, 141,210,245,256,301-3,305,

327. S« alsoGaribi Hatao; local IIS nationalissues;privy purses FJection Commission 1, 4, 19, 23, 109, 211, 366n FJection fundsand expenses22-4, 35,48,63,73,84,108,155,157, 161, 170,2 10,240-1,286 ,331, 342-4,349-50 FJections of 1952 7, 50, 58-9, 106, 130, 137, 197-8,238,255,300 FJections of 1957 xi, 6, 7, 50, 59, 106,140,195, 198,200-2,206, 238,255 FJections of 1%1-2 10, 14, 21, 313, 46, 50, 59, 72,137,139,143, 147, 156, 167, 1n , 195, 199, 200,201-2,206,224,230,238, 241,255 FJections of 1967 xi, l n, 2-4, 7-8, l 0, 18, 20-1, 24, 32, 72, 242, 255, 280, 295~. 299- 300, 306--7, 311-12, 319, 321-2, 335-6, 344, 346-48, 350, 352, 359-60,363 FJectionsofl968-97 , 256,261,322 FJections of 1971 xi, 3-4, 6-8, 1314, 20-1, 24, 346-49, 360-1,

363-5 Elections of 1977 6 FJite, political 22S-7, 234, 348 Ethnographic research.Seefieldwork method Factions 8, 11, 16--19, 21-4, 48-9 , 54-8,73, 93, 137-8, 151-2, 156, 162-5,169,17 1-3,176--93, 195, 221,233,237,243-4,246,250, 252-3,2~.322-4,348,353 Family.S« kinship Fiddwork method xi, l, 2, 6, 12, 2S6, 48,119,346,351, 354-8, 360, 362, 36S-7. S« alsoparticipant observation

376

INDEX

Forwaro Bloc 130, I 40, 223, 225 Gandhi, Indira 7, 8, 24, 160, 239, 249-50, 257-8, 283, 296-7, 301-2, 305-6. 313, 315-18, 348, 349,361 Gandhi, Mahatma63, 80, 87, 106, I 59, 224, 351 GaribiHatao8, 245, 258, 272, 278, 302,327,348-9 Gough, Kathleen2, 47n, 51n, 55n, 250 Gupta, C.B. 151-2, 158,207 Gupta, Khadija A. 3, 5, 13, I 4, 15, 17,352,360,362 Harijan. &t Scheduled Caste Harrison, Selig 50n Hauser, Walter 19n Hebsur, R.K. 356n, 357 Hindu Maha Sabha 92, 238, Hindus 13-15, 56, 86, 91-2, 98, IOI, I 98-200, 202--0, 205-6, 254, 269, 317, 319-20, 325-6, 329,334 Hursh-Cesar, Gerald 356n Independent candidate 9, l 6, 22, 42-3,59,79,82-4,88,97, 1201, 127, 139, 172, 182-3, 195, 198-99,200,204,207-9,21213,215-18,220,223,238,256, 258,271,282,287,326 Individual vs Group 8, 12-13, 245,203, 232-4, 244, 250-3, 265 Jains79,92,310,312,314 Jan Sangh 14, 33, 60, 79, 81, 83-4, 86,88-9,90,92-8, IOI, 103-4, I 14-15, 120, 122, 124-5, 128, 150-3, 155-62,164,167-9, 176, 181,195, 197-203,205-6,210,

215-16,218,238-9,241-3,2456, 248, 250-1, 278, 300, 31415, 319-20, 323, 325-6, 328, 351, 364 Janata Dal 364 Janata Pa.ksha224, 230 Janata Party 32,.33 Jayararnan, R. 5, IO, 14, 20, 21, 349-50,352 Jefferey,Craig 365n Kamaraj 63, 340 Karunanidhi, M. 21, 59, 62, 64,340 Kinship 8, 13, 17-18, 21, 24, 49, 54, 73, 100, 148, 162-3, 186, 195, 205, 207, 21 I, 213, 221-2, ·226, 232,244,265,335,342,344,350 Kothari, Rajni 6, 7, 347, 357n Kriplani, Sucheta l 06 Kuki 282, 293 Kumar, Nita In, 356n Kumbapettai village 2 Lahiri, Ashok 3n

'

Leadership IO, 16, I 9-21, 24, 45, 61-2, 79, 95-6, 151, 174, 176, I 78, I 91-2, 266, 273-4, 307, 310-12,322-5,328,331,3~ 37, 350. &t alsoelite Localvs national issues4, 7-12, 19, 24-5, 40, 45, 49, 73-4, 78-9, 83, 128, 131, 162-9, 173, 183, 185, 193, 226, 237, 249-52, 265, 267, 271-4, 276-7, 294, 297-8, 300, 303, 306-7, 31012, 317-18, 322-4, 344-5, 349, 359. S«a.&,nniao w maao snidics; municipality, panchayat Madan, T.N. In, 356n Malhoua, Kanchan345n Marriott, McKim 195n

377

INDEX '

Mathai, Mrs John 106 Mayer,Adrian 7n, 233 Mehta, Asoka 135, 224 Methodology of deaion research346-7, 354-63, 366.S«aisofiddwork method;surveyresearchmethod MetropolitanCouncil of Delhi 4, 5, 19, 103,107,241 Michelutti, Lucia 365n Micro 111macro srudies 1-2, 16, 49, 131,349,358-9,360n,363 Mishra, M.S. .5, 8, 21, 359 Mitra, Subrata 6, 11 Mittal,Achla5, 16, 19,23,352,360 Municipality 10, 12, 60-1, 77-9, 95. 100, 154, 186, 190, 241, 245--6,251-2,280,302,322 Muslim League63, 130, 140, 196, 201,246,317 Muslim Majlis-c-Mushawarat2035, 213-15, 221.~8 Muslims 13, 62, 76-8, 84, 87-90, 152,174,186, 196-201,203-4, 206-8, 213-18, 221, 224, 233, 246, 254-5, 258. 308, 310-11, 316,364 Naickcr,Ramaswamy64 Narain, Iqbal 6, 7n, 12, 356n Narayanswamy,S. 49n NationalistCongressParty 365 Nationalization of banks 13, 245, 296,297,315,340,349 Nehru, Jawaharlal7, 106, 224 Nehru, Rameshwari106 New Congressp11SSim Nicholas,Ralph 54n OBC95 Old CongressP11SSim Palmer,Norman D. 7

Palshikar,Suhash 348n Panchayats7n, 10-11, 16, 21, 25, 31,34-40,43-5. 50, 53. 55-8. 66-7, 70-1, 73-4, 161, 174-5. 226-31, 237. 244, 250, 251-2, 259--62,286,299,366 Panini, M.N. In, 5, 8, 10, l ln , 12, 17,352,35 6n Pant, Pandit Govind Ballabh 151 Participantobservation1,253,354, 357, 360-1, 362, 363. S« aiso fieldworkmethod Patron-clientrdationship 11, 17,73, 157,212,229,231-4,352,260 Pawar,Sharad 365 Politicalideology72, 129, 170, 194, 217,221-2,272 Politicalparty 7-9, 12, 14, 16-18, 22-5,48-9,67. 72-3, 81,102, 104, 115-17,132-54, 170, 1723, 176, 180, 184-94, 237-41, 250,252,266,306,347-9,358,

366 Politicalscience 1, 6, 11, 26, 346, 354,355-7,362-3,365 Pollingrate220-1, 287, 305--6,332, 343 Pre-and post-pollsurvey84-7, 2478, 253,262, 315-17, 360-1 Primordial loyalties 11-13, 19, 21, 24-5, 104, 148, 203, 211, 221, 232, 351-52. S« alsocaste;caste association;caste bloc; kinship; region;religion;ScheduledCaste; ScheduledTribe; tribe Privy purses, abolition of 13, 245, 287,296,315,340,349 Psephologist1, 3n, 19 PSP 24, 60, 63,130, 132-3, 1358, 140-9, 176-7, 181,183,187, 192, 199,224,278,28 4,336-7, 339-40,342-3

378

PWP 16, 173, 176-7, 180, 182

INDEX

202, 206-7, 215-16, 224,226. 228,232,238,245-6,250,257, Quanrirarive dal2 1, 6, 253, 346, 267, 270, 274, 294, 308-10, 354,357,360-2,366 314,316-17,321, 332-3. 342. Quationnairc 1-3, 6, 12 349,350-1,359 Sc:heduledTribc(SO14-15,22,25, Rajagopaladwi.C. 18, 64,340,342 279-80,283,292 Schooloommirtee 10, 12, 163 RamRajyaParishad39, 92 Ranwwa.my, E.A. xii, ln, 3-5, 9- Selection of candidara22, 179 12, 16, 18, 20, 24, 132,337,352, Shah, A.M. ln, 14n, 47ri, 267n, 356n,359,362 345n,356n Rampura village 2, 10-12, 17,223, Shah, Ghanshyam357n 225n,226-32,352 Sheth, D.L xii, 345n Rao,M.S.A. xii, 5, 8, 10, 13, 172n, ShivSena 365 242n,253n,266,359,362 Siddharthan, N.S. 49n Region8, 19, 119-20, 127, 129-30, Sikhs 13, 15, 91, 93, 99, 100-t, 170 319,325-7,329,334 Rdigion 8, 11, 13-14, 21-2, 24, 25, Singer, Wendy 19n 48-9, 64, 73, 101, 194, 211, Singh, Charan21,239, 256-9, 261216-17,353,361 2, 264,316,359 Roervedc.onstiruency.S« Scheduled Singh, Rohit xii, 5, 15, 23 Caste; ScheduledTribe Singh, SardarSwaran99, 324, 326, Rizvi, Akram237n 333 Roy,Pradipto 356n Singh; V.P.256-7, 259, 262 Roy,Prannoy 3n Sivcnsen, Digfin 51n RPl79,81-4,86-90,99, 176,178, Small c.ommunity 1-4, l 1, 22,354, 181-2, 187, 204, 257n, 313, 357-58. S« alsolocal vs national 326,333,352,364 issues;micro vs macro st11dics RSS81, 97 Small town 2, 5-6, 7n, 12, 15, 17Rudolph, Uoyd I. 195n 18, 25, 76,308 Sociology.S« anthropology, social Saha,Anindya345n Somjcc, A.H. 3n Srinivas, M.N. ix,xii, l n, 2, 11, 14n, Samajwadi Pmy 364 Samyukt Maharashtra Samiti 177, 47n, 175--6, 223, 225n, 228, 182,183 352,354,3560 Sanwal,R.D. and Sushila xii, 5, 14- SSP 79, 97, 130, 136-40, 142-48, 18, 20, 150n,350,361 150-2, 156, 159-61, 164, 168ScheduledCaste(SC) 10, 14-16, 21, 9,182, 197-200,204,207,212, 24,32,42,46, 76-9,82-4,86215-18, 220, 278, 282, 284, 90, 92-5, 99, 101, 140, 152, 300,320,336,338-9,343,351, 155--6, 160, 181, 196-8, 200, 365

INDEX

Scttcs:AndhraPradesh50n,72n, 129; Assam 119; Bihar 7, 19n, 119; Delhi 5, 8, 10, 13, 19, 22-3, 63, 119-20, 350, 352, 359, 363; Gujarat xi, 10, 271, 276--8,359; Haryana91,119,329; Kamataka 2, 8, 11, 18, 363, 364; Kerala 127, 129, 365; Madhya Pradesh 7n, 119; Maharashtra 172, 182, 350,364; Manipur 15, 24, 27981, 283, 285;Nagaland285, 2923; Orissa 4, 6, 11; Punjab 91-2, 99, 119-20, 319-20, 33-4,365; Rajasthan 13, 17, 31-4, 36-7, 119, 251, 294, 3-49, 359, 364; Tamil Nadu 4-5, 10, 14, 20-1, 47-50,59,61,63, 129-30,335, 3-49,365; Uttar Pradesh5--8, 13, 21,119,128, 150,195,198,2034, 206, 210, 253, 256-7, 308, 350,352,364,365n;Un:aranchal 5, 7, 150n,350,365; WestBengal 4, 119-22, 127, 365 , Strydom, Pict 356n Sukhadia,Mohanlal33-5, 295,302 Surveyresearchmethod 1-3, 6, 12, 84, 16~. 346, 353, 355--8, 360-3, 36~ SYD 255,260 Swam.,M.J. 249 Swawura Party 18, 20, 32-3, 39, 46, 50, 60, 63, 66, 68, 79, 99, 130,140,199, 205n, 207,223, 225,245,278,295,297,300-l, 304-5, 307,320,336,3-49,364

Thapan,McenakshiIn, 356n TownArcaCommittee. Stt municipality

Tradeunions 8-10, 12, 16, 18, 24-

379

5, 131-49, 187, 344, 335-9, 3-41-4 Tribe 8. &t alsoScheduledTribe Tribes:Kuki 282, 284, 292-3, 352; Naga 281-5, 287,292, 352 Turner, Victor 19n Untouchables.Stt ScheduledCaste Urbanrommunity. S«city neighbourhood,municipality, smalltown Urs, Dcvraj 18 Vajpayce,Atal Bchari 198,328 Vclscn,Van 47n Venkataramaiya,M. 144 Venkataraman,R. 62, 65 VHP 239 Villag-ccouncil. Stt panchayats Villag-cheadman 10, 53-58, 71. 73, 163,228-9 Villages2, 5, 6, 9-12, 18, 22, 25, 31, 47, 162-9, 217-20, 267, 279, 294, 3-45.&t alsoRampura VISbwanath,LS. 5, 10, 359 Votebank 11, 17-18, 153,311,316, 3-48-9, 351-4, 359 Voter turnout 14-15, 19, 22, 124, 165, 191, 263, 305 Voting behaviour8, 10, 12, 19, 25, 70n, 165-71, 194-5,248,2625,274,286,360 Weiner, Myron 6, 25, 72n, 357n Women voters 8, 23, 89, 119, 125, 166,170,220,276,323 Worm's111bird's eye view 2, 354-5, 361 Yadav,Yogcndraxi, 6, 348n Yalman,Nur 195n