Governing the Fragmented Metropolis: Planning for Regional Sustainability 9780812293258

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Abbreviations
Chapter 1. Planning for a Metropolitan Future
Chapter 2. Planning Without Authority in Boston
Chapter 3. Becoming a Regional Player in Denver
Chapter 4. A Nested System in Transition in Portland
Chapter 5. Lessons for Metropolitan Planning
Chapter 6. Governing More Effective Regions
Notes
Bibliography
Index
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Acknowledgments

Citation preview

Governing the Fragmented Metropolis

THE CIT Y IN THE T WENT Y- FIR ST CENTURY Eugenie L. Birch and Susan M. Wachter, Series Editors

Governing the Fragmented Metropolis Planning for Regional Sustainability

Christina D. Rosan

U N I V E R S I T Y O F P E N N S Y LVA N I A P R E S S PHIL ADELPHIA

Copyright © 2016 University of Pennsylvania Press All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher. Published by University of Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112 www.upenn.edu/pennpress Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 1

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A Cataloging-in-Publication record is available from the Library of Congress ISBN 978-0-8122-4855-5

To Mom and Dad, Karl, Owen, Anya, and Eli In loving memory of Judy Layzer

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. Hodgson

CON TEN T S

List of Abbreviations

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Chapter 1. Planning for a Metropolitan Future

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Chapter 2. Planning Without Authority in Boston

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Chapter 3. Becoming a Regional Player in Denver

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Chapter 4. A Nested System in Transition in Portland

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Chapter 5. Lessons for Metropolitan Planning

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Chapter 6. Governing More Effective Regions

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Notes

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Bibliography

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Index

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Acknowledgments

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. Hodgson

ABBR E V IAT IONS

COG COPIRG DLCD DIA DOT DRCOG EFU EIR EOT EPA GHG GIS HUD ISTEA JPACT LCDC LEED LRTP MAP-21 MAPC MBTA MEPA MHC MMC MPAC MPO NAHB RTD

Council of Governments Colorado Public Interest Research Group Department of Land Conservation and Development Denver International Airport Department of Transportation Denver Regional Council of Governments Exclusive farming use Environmental Impact Reports Executive Office of Transportation Environmental Protection Agency Greenhouse gases Geographic information system Department of Housing and Urban Development Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation Land Conservation and Development Commission Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Long Range Transportation Program Moving Ahead Towards Progress in the 21st Century Act Metropolitan Area Planning Council Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Mile High Compact Metro Mayors Caucus Metropolitan Policy Advisory Committee Metropolitan planning organization National Association of Home Builders Regional Transportation District

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SAFETEA–LU 2005 SOV SCRP SMART TEA-21 TIP TPAC TriMet UGB UGB/A

Abbreviations

Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users Single-occupant vehicle Sustainable Communities Regional Planning South Metro Area Rapid Transit Transportation Efficiency Act of the 21st Century Transportation Improvement Program Transportation Policy Alternatives Committee Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District Urban growth boundary Urban growth boundary/area

PB

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CHAPTER 1

Planning for a Metropolitan Future

There are estimates that the population of the United States could increase to 438 million by 2050. Where will we house these new residents? What kind of metropolitan regions will they live in? Will these regions be sustainable or equitable or even livable? If past sprawling land use patterns are any indication, we should be concerned about protecting our nation’s farmland, forests, water resources, and open spaces. With the prospect of climate change, we should be actively rethinking the way we manage our metropolitan areas to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and make our cities more resilient. By 2050, will we have a more sustainable metropolitan approach that promotes density, develops regional public transit systems, and equitably redevelops the city and inner-ring suburbs? Or will we continue to sprawl? A lot depends on our ability to develop more effective metropolitan governance that encourages local governments to plan sustainably. While other countries have consolidated power at the metropolitan scale through annexation and the creation of metropolitan government, the United States has a hybrid metropolitan governance approach that is limited by a lack of authority and depends primarily on collaboration. Metropolitan governance in the United States is typically made in a two-tiered system in which local governments still maintain ultimate control over their land use decisions, but also work in a collaborative manner to plan for and make regional decisions. Most metropolitan regions have made some attempt to develop institutions responsible for planning and governance—whether through a metropolitan planning organization (MPO) that coordinates state and federal transportation funding, a council of governments (COG), a regional planning authority, a metropolitan transportation authority, or a combination of these; metropolitan agencies serve primarily as advisors to

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local governments. One exception stands out. Portland, Oregon, has been granted more authority by state government to insist on coordination of land use planning and development. However, Portland is largely viewed as an anomaly—not replicable and not reflective of broader trends in U.S. politics. If we want to govern our metropolitan regions more effectively, we first need to understand how our current hybrid system of land use planning and metropolitan governance either supports or hinders cooperation and the development of more sustainable regions (environmentally, economically, and socially). This book is a start. It tells the story of metropolitan governance in three  U.S. metropolitan areas (Boston, Massachusetts, Portland, Oregon, and Denver, Colorado) that vary in their use of collaboration and authority. By comparing metropolitan planning processes in Boston, Denver, and Portland, the book critiques how having more authority (moving from capacity building to providing financial incentives to mandating local land use) changes decision making and whether agencies with more authority are more effective at getting local land use planning to take account of the spillover effects of development within their borders. The hope is that by understanding the impact that various metropolitan governance arrangements have on regional land use decisions, we can start to think more critically about what political arrangements and tools are necessary to govern more sustainable metropolitan regions. U.S. metropolitan regions grow because of thousands of incremental development decisions made by people deciding where they want to live, work, and/or invest. Individual land use choices made by millions of people in separate municipalities have a cumulative effect of creating serious local and metropolitan problems: little affordable housing, insufficient open space, stress on water supplies, unhealthy levels of air pollution, increased greenhouse gas emissions, severe traffic congestion, a loss of mobility and economic opportunity, traffic fatalities, poor health, crumbling regional infrastructure, and questions about regional equity and sustainability. These social, economic, and environmental costs of our current metropolitan development patterns are often ignored, but when they are quantified we see how serious they are. Unfortunately, local governments do not have the capacity to respond to the interlocking set of problems facing metropolitan regions, and future challenges such as population growth and climate change will not make it

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easier. Just when we need to be reducing our ecological footprints and carbon dioxide emissions to mitigate climate change, our sprawling metropolitan development patterns continue to drive them up. However, there is reason to be optimistic about the future of America’s metropolitan regions. First, most regions in the United States already have a system of metropolitan governance in place, albeit weak, that could be strengthened. Second, as a nation, we are starting to appreciate a choice in how we develop land: there is a recognition that sprawl is inefficient and causes a number of environmental, social, and economic problems. Millennials and empty-nesters are also demanding more compact and urban living. Even people who prefer a suburban lifestyle are recognizing that walkable streets, public transit, smart growth, and mixed-use development are beneficial. Under the Obama administration, we have also seen an interest in sustainability and regional planning. We can be hopeful that this sea change in the way we think about urban and suburban space may carry over into how we govern the region; however, making metropolitan governance work better will require us to first better understand our current approach and then to make necessary reforms.

Living in Fragmented and Sprawling Regions Today American regions are governed by hundreds of individual jurisdictions, but many people may be surprised by just how fragmented metropolitan governance is. According to the Committee on Improving the Future of U.S. Cities Through Improved Metropolitan Area Governance, “The average metropolitan area consisted of 114 local governments: 2 counties, 42 municipalities or towns, and 70 special districts, of which 21 were school districts. There were 18 local governments for every 100,000 people in metropolitan areas.”  In a typical U.S. metropolitan region, local governments will make independent decisions about land use without much regard for how it impacts neighboring communities or what the externalities are. The resulting trend has been urban sprawl—low-density development on greenfields in the outer fringes of metropolitan regions. Without metropolitan planning, one town approves a subdivision on a greenfield. Then another town does the same. Soon we have a sprawling development pattern in the metropolitan region and cities and towns are scrambling to fi nd the revenue to

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support the new infrastructure to maintain these unsustainable planning decisions. We have known about the consequences of suburban sprawl development for decades, but  U.S. land use and fiscal policy and weak forms of metropolitan governance continue to promote it nonetheless. Writing in 1972, David Mckee and Gerald Smith describe urban sprawl as “an inefficient allocation of resources for society.”  They argue that “sprawl suggests urban areas which are larger than necessary which may mean that transportation, communication, utility ser vices, and local public ser vices all become ‘unnecessarily inefficient and uneconomical.’ ”  The Real Estate Research Corporation’s 1974 “Costs of Sprawl” study describes the phenomenon as “the most expensive form of residential development in terms of economic costs, environmental costs, natu ral resource consumption and many types of personal costs.” Lower density development exacts more per person to ser vice than higher density development. As Arthur C. Nelson writes, “It costs twice as much per unit of development to fully service two homes per acre as it does to serve four homes per acre.” According to the American Farmland Trust, “For every tax dollar collected from newly developed suburban residential property, about $1.25  in ser vices must be paid—a loss of 25 cents.” Robert Burchell’s studies on the cost of sprawl in Florida, New Jersey, Kentucky, South Carolina, and the Delaware Estuary find the duplication of public ser vices. In order to accommodate new development, each municipality is forced to provide new infrastructure investment: schools, roads, sewer, police, fi re protection, and so on. However, many of these smaller and previously rural jurisdictions are not prepared fi nancially or structurally to provide the type of suburban services necessary. Some of the ser vices would also be best offered at a metropolitan scale, but because of jurisdictional boundaries and current systems of municipal fi nance, they are provided at the local level without economies of scale. Two towns right next to each other have to fi nance their own school systems, planning directors, fi re departments, and police officers. Since new suburban development does not pay for the infrastructure that it requires, in order to generate more income, municipalities compete with each other to attract taxable development (retail development in sales tax states and industrial or commercial development that is taxed at a higher rate than residential development in non-sales tax states). Drier, Mollenkopf, and

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Swanstrom argue that communities compete for “favored residents and investments,” and “each jurisdiction has a strong incentive to adopt zoning and development policies that exclude potential residents with incomes below the median for their jurisdiction or who require more costly ser vices.” Their research raises important questions about how equitable our metropolitan development patterns are, particularly those that are designed to attract high-tax and low-service residents and facilities. In addition, this taxdependent approach to planning may not be sustainable in the long term, even for bringing in more revenue. Tax deals offered by municipalities to attract commercial and industrial development may serve as a temporary response to revenue shortfalls, but these developments can change the character of the area (e.g., creating a car-oriented environment that undercuts existing downtown economies). Developers who have learned how to game the system can leapfrog to a new location just when their last tax break runs out and the commercial development finally produces a positive cash flow for the municipality. Unfortunately, our institutional and political arrangements prevent us from recognizing the problems of metropolitan fragmentation or taking action to reform it. Paul Lewis argues that “political fragmentation gives suburbanites the institutional ammunition to preserve land-use advantages, and provides little incentive for local politicians to consider the externality costs of their land-use decisions.” Municipalities may prevent affordable housing from being built because they do not want to pay for the construction of new schools when more children move to the community. One way to do this is to zone out certain types of developments or to require large lot zoning. Fulton et al. found evidence of this practice: regions with more fragmented governance are more likely to have less dense development. Zoning out people and certain “unfavorable uses” also has negative environmental implications. When lot sizes increase, the amount of land converted from open space to residential use increases. The effect is dramatic. Between 1982 and  2007, the  U.S. population increased by 30  percent while land consumption increased 57 percent. The Sierra Club estimates that we lose 400,000 acres of open space to development every year (about 1,100 acres per day). According to the 2012 USDA’s Natural Resources Inventory, “44 million acres of land were newly developed between 1982 and 2012.” As Robert Burchell and Sahan Mukherji highlight, the costs are real: “Sprawl produces a 21% increase in amount of undeveloped land converted to developed land

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(2.4 million acres) and approximately a 10% increase in local road lane-miles (188 300). Furthermore, sprawl causes about 10% more annual public ser vice (fiscal) deficits ($4.2 billion) and 8% higher housing occupancy costs ($13 000 per dwelling unit).” Suburban lifestyles can also impose negative externalities on individual communities and an entire region because of a significant increase in resource consumption. Matthew Kahn found that suburban residents “drive 31  percent more and consume twice as much land as their urban counterparts.” This is troubling considering that the average American spends the equivalent of fi ft y-five eight-hour workdays driving every year. According to the Texas Transportation Institute, traffic congestion in 439 U.S. urban regions in 2010 resulted in 4.8 billion hours spent in traffic, an added cost of 1.9 billion gallons of fuel, and associated air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Many Americans (about 138.5 million of them) might also be unpleasantly surprised to learn that that they live in metropolitan regions with unacceptable levels of air pollution and long-term health impacts. Scholars and planners have long argued that planning at the metropolitan scale is the answer to the inefficiency, inequity, and unsustainability of our past development patterns. According to Myron Orfield, in the United States there is a pressing need for metropolitan reforms because “outdated metropolitan political structures are an impor tant part of the problem. Highly fragmented governance systems contribute to increasing sprawl and congestion, growing racial and economic segregation, and deepening disparities in the quality of local ser vices. Reforming metropolitan governance is essential for fair and sustainable national growth.” The logic is that effective metropolitan governance will lead to communities working together to develop more compact regions that reduce urban sprawl, improve our regional quality of life, protect open space, promote regional equity, reduce our carbon dioxide emissions, and help us plan for more resilient regions. Reid Ewing and Shima Hamidi argue that promoting more “compact and connected” metropolitan regions will greatly improve people’s quality of life because “people have greater economic opportunity in compact and connected metro areas, . . . spend less of their household income on the combined cost of housing and transportation in  these areas, . . . have a greater number of transportation options available to them, . . . [and] in compact, connected metro areas tend to be

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safer, healthier and live longer than their peers in more sprawling metro areas.” While the benefits outlined by Ewing and Hamidi are desirable, changing our current planning processes to promote density and connectedness is another story. Scholars have tried to explain the resistance to metropolitan planning and governance. First, homeowners want to keep their home values high and perceive that local control is critical to this goal. Anthony Downs writes that many homeowners “believe that their economic interest in their home must be protected by preventing or limiting the construction of lower-cost housing in their community, and homeowners dominate suburban politics.” Homeowners defend the autonomy of their jurisdictions as an important mechanism to “influence who their neighbors are.” They feel threatened by attempts to remove decision making about planning and zoning from local control. Metropolitan coordination and planning are often viewed as efforts to limit property rights. Also, since schools are primarily financed locally in many parts of the country, residents want to make sure that they maintain the highest quality school systems. Efforts at metropolitan governance are often perceived as threats to local autonomy and control over the local school districts. Citizens feel that if ser vices are centralized they will not have the same type of influence over them. And localities that are doing well financially view efforts at metropolitanization as attempts to redistribute funding to poorer communities, which is not a welcome prospect. Initiatives to create more regional institutions threaten the order that exists in metropolitan America, which can only be characterized as segregation and inequity. In Cities Without Suburbs, David Rusk argues that “this is the toughest issue in American society. It goes right to the heart of Americans’ fears about race and class. There will be no short-term, politically comfortable solutions.” Rusk points out that traditional efforts at regional cooperation have focused on ser vice delivery: trash, water, transportation planning, sewage treatment, and air quality. “Regional arrangements,” according to Rusk, “usually avoid policies and programs that share the burden of inner-city residents.” At the same time, it should be noted that not all city dwellers are supportive of metropolitan consolidation and control. John Powell finds that inner-city communities have also been reluctant to adopt more regional approaches “for fear of losing cultural control, cultural identity, and political power within their communities.” When both residents of suburban and urban areas view metropolitan

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governance as giving up their autonomy, it is no wonder that regional approaches are viewed with skepticism. Unsurprisingly, there is no mass movement for metropolitan governance.

The Historical Debate About Metropolitan Solutions While the average person may not be too worried about designing effective metropolitan governance, American planners and scholars have been debating it for decades. They agree that jurisdictional boundaries in metropolitan regions serve more as historical artifacts than as a representation of current environmental, social, economic, and political conditions. What they disagree about is the best strategy to promote coordination. According to early reformers, the problems that metropolitan areas were facing were really “inescapable housekeeping problems”; as Scott Greer put it: “The metropolitan household is in many respects one; but its housekeeping is organized in dozens or hundreds of families, each different (if not hostile) to the neighbors.” Robert Wood’s 1961 book 1,400 Governments argues that the political fragmentation of metropolitan regions makes governing them untenable as each of the 1,400 governments makes its own decisions. In 1964, Matthew Holden described the “metropolitan problem” as a diplomacy problem in which each municipality is maximizing its own “interest.” Writing in 1957, Luther Gulick stated, “When it comes to zoning, land use regulation, and the system for circulation and traffic, the underlying problem becomes impossible of rational attack unless there is a single center for coordinated analysis, planning, and action.” Gulick advocated the creation of a new model of governance that takes into account the metropolitan nature of the problems and their solutions, but also respects local autonomy. His bottom-up and top-down model represents an idealized approach. Unfortunately, creating a model that is both coordinated at the metropolitan level and respects local autonomy turns out to be exceptionally difficult. Today scholars and policy makers still grapple with finding the right balance. In 1959, Arthur Maass and his colleagues argued that the “systematic functions of government” could be metropolitanized. In Area and Power, Maass recommends that power be divided according to the process of governing, the functions of government, or constituency. Maass’s approach is consistent with the progressive reformers’ rational approach to metropolitan problems. To make metropolitan coordination work, the “assignment of

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power” must simply be “spelled out carefully.” Raymond Vernon sums up the challenge of metropolitan governance, arguing that the familiar problem in government structure is “that of creating a body of authority that is bigger than a breadbox but smaller than an elephant—more extensive in its scope than the localities but less extensive than the state.” To solve the metropolitan problem, Greer argues that functional areas that could address specific problems on a metropolitan level would take the “garbage collection out of politics,” and he was optimistic that metropolitan administration could create a highly rationalized system run by a “perfected bureaucracy operated by professionally trained managers and judged as a business concern.” These proposed approaches would be highly rational and politically acceptable and might be modeled on examples of air and water boards that manage resources across jurisdictional lines. Although rationalization and efficiency were held up as goals by scholars and policy makers, they also worried that new metropolitan governments would lack the political accountability of local jurisdictions. In addition, the division into different functions might produce a metropolitan area that was fractured in yet another way, according to function rather than accountability. Writing in 1961, Anthony Downs warned against coordination by function, arguing that “sooner or later the problem of coordinating the coordinators will also become acute.”  Downs highlighted the challenge of how to coordinate across various jurisdictions and sectors and levels of government. Decades later, after numerous policy experiments and metropolitan reforms, scholars are still trying to sort out the most effective arrangement for metropolitan governance. They recognize that the current method of managing urban regions has led to urban sprawl, environmental degradation, and regional inequity. Peter Drier, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom argue that fragmented planning at the local level—without regional cooperation—“has encouraged unplanned, costly sprawl on the urban fringe.” Bruce Katz agrees, writing that America’s metropolitan areas are experiencing remarkably similar development patterns—explosive growth at the exurban fringe coupled with decline and disinvestment in older established communities. Throughout the country, upper-income, residentially exclusive suburbs are capturing a disproportionate share of regional infrastructure spending and economic growth. At the same time, trends

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generally associated with inner-city neighborhoods—concentrated poverty, pervasive joblessness, failing schools, racial and social isolation—are becoming the norm in older suburbs surrounding the urban core. Scholars interested in regional equity increasingly point to the need for metropolitan solutions. Myron Orfield suggests that “regional governance reflects the reality of modern metropolitan challenges—challenges that are too large for any one government to address alone and that are often exacerbated by excessive fragmentation.”  He argues that cities and suburbs need to learn to work together because the problems they each face are the same: his study of twenty-five metropolitan regions in the United States fi nds that “more than half of suburban residents reside in suburbs with social or fiscal challenges severe enough to be considered ‘at risk.’ ”  Since increasingly it is not just the central cities that are suffering, he argues that “coalition-building efforts that emphasize the links between core cities and suburbs can bring about reforms to increase equity for an entire region.”  The notion that coalitions could be built across metropolitan areas has been a focus of the “new regionalists” who, according to Allan Wallis, advocate for “cooperation versus coordination,” “governance versus government,” “multisector versus public sector,” and “multiple versus single boundaries.”  The “new regionalists” realize the limitations of top-down planning focusing on government reform and instead see more voluntary cooperation and governance rather than government as the way forward.

Arguments for Why Voluntary Regionalism Is Politically Feasible (and Better) Although the conversation about the need for a metropolitan approach spans decades, the structure of local planning in the United States makes it difficult to create metropolitan institutions with any power. Early experiments with annexation and special districts demonstrated that it was possible to scale up to a higher level for urban ser vice provision and administration. However, while special districts for water and transportation have worked relatively well, political integration at the metropolitan scale has been more complicated. Local municipalities are not accustomed to thinking of themselves as a part of a community of communities, and in many cases local

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officials view efforts at metropolitan coordination as a threat to their autonomy. Most efforts at metropolitan government through consolidation have been abandoned in the United States in favor of more cooperative and often voluntary models of metropolitan governance. Scholars and policy makers argue that creating metropolitan governance with more authority is politically infeasible. Instead, they recommend focusing efforts on voluntary regionalism that relies on capacity building, consensus building, deliberative democracy, social capital formation, and networking. According to Richard Feoick, Jill Tao, and Linda Johnson, “Top-down solutions have been replaced by voluntary cooperation among governments and through public-private ‘intercommunity partnerships.’ ” In the new model of governance, communities work together because it is in their collective interest to do so instead of being compelled by city-county consolidation or other forms of top-down metropolitan government. Metropolitan planning agencies that operate in this context have a limited role and are often careful not to overstep their mandates. The focus on voluntary approaches to metropolitan governance in the United States is not entirely surprising. Planners and scholars argue that they are just being realistic: a property-rights backlash throughout the country is one of the main reasons that a more collaborative approach to regional governance will be required in the future. According to Harvey Jacobs, “Since 1991 every state has considered state-based legislation in support of the property rights movement’s position.” As property rights advocates gain political strength, the prospect of creating regional planning agencies with teeth diminishes because this would mean stricter controls over land use. Scholars are skeptical that citizens and local officials will support state-mandated regulatory approaches that take authority away from localities and restrict development on private property. They also question the effectiveness of regulatory models. Ronald Oakerson argues that “the actual use of coercion through command and control is a highly ineffective instrument for undertaking many of the activities on which governance depends.” Instead, he recommends developing governance structures based on “willing consent” that “provide regularized means for identifying and diagnosing problems, elucidating information, arraying and assessing alternatives, and craft ing rulebased solutions, as well as for monitoring those arrangements for both implementation and possible alteration.” He concludes that the absence of a local metropoliswide governmental jurisdiction with powers over subordinate units of government allows citizens and

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officials to create a metropolitan governance structure within civil society. . . . Metropolitan governance structures governed in this manner can be expected to be more participatory, to feature stronger representation, to engage in more effective problem solving related to the care of common goods (the maintenance of the public realm), to allow for more vigorous public entrepreneurship, and to strengthen the accountability of officials to the citizens they serve. Oakerson is primarily arguing against city-suburban consolidation; however, metropolitan planning agencies that can veto decisions made by local jurisdictions (the case in Portland, Oregon) are also antithetical to the more cooperative, polycentric metropolitan governance model he describes (in which communities work together but maintain their authority). The metropolitan governance debate in the United States takes place in the context of serious questions about using regulation as a means of dealing with collective action problems. Elinor Ostrom’s famous studies of the management of common pool resources (CPR)—shared resources such as fisheries and forests that can be damaged by misuse and overuse—find that voluntary, cooperative management by stakeholders can be more effective than top-down command-and-control models. Ostrom posits that “by consistently taking the power to make decisions about the ways to innovate, adapt, and coordinate efforts away from those who are directly affected, policy-makers have created institutions that are less able to respond to the problems they were created to address.” Instead, collective action problems could be overcome (without an outside enforcer) when stakeholders understand that it is in their best interest to preserve a shared resource. For Ostrom, participation in governing by people who are affected is critical because they understand what is at stake. This is antithetical to a more top-down metropolitan approach where decisions are centralized and imposed on stakeholders. The sense that regulatory models of metropolitan and regional governance are both undesirable and infeasible has led to what Allan Wallis describes as a “third wave” in metropolitan studies. Proponents of this new approach argue that many of the goals of getting communities to work together can be accomplished through consensus building. According to Judith Innes and David Booher, collaboration can help to break down the institutional barriers to productive problem solving: “Such a process can be more quickly responsive and ‘intelligent’ than top-down guidance or highly

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structured action and more suitable to our near-chaotic times of rapid change and multiple conflicting goals and perspectives.” Rather than evaluating only the measurable outcomes of a process, Innes and Booher are also interested in the process itself and how participation changes the way that participants perceive and act in the world: “While collaboration does produce tangible outcomes like agreements or actions, it has many other consequences that the more traditional rational/technical or bureaucratic approach to planning, program design, and implementation does not.” Innes suggests that collaborative approaches can produce other forms of social, political, and intellectual capital such as “new relationships and trust, new partnerships and organizations, and joint learning”; that “it is not enough to evaluate consensus building solely on the basis of outcomes; the process itself matters.” For Innes and Booher, “there must be networks and information flows throughout the system.” In fact, the relationships among stakeholders are critical. Effective metropolitan institutions are those that build trust, share information, and promote interaction. Deliberative democracy theorists also contribute to the argument that the most effective form of metropolitan governance may, in fact, be voluntary. Deliberative democrats like Benjamin Barber argue that coming together to discuss common problems transforms the stakeholders themselves. It is only through dialogue that people come to understand their true interests in relation to other people. “With talk,” states Barber, “we can invent alternative futures, create mutual purposes, and construct competing visions of community.”  Jane Mansbridge argues that “deliberations should be as likely as possible to make the participants 1) aware of the implications of their own preferences and interests, the preferences and interests of others, and the interests of the polity as a whole, and 2) capable of transforming their interests in ways that they themselves, looking back on that transformation from a state of reflection and awareness, would approve.”  The idea that through deliberative democracy local officials might recognize the regional implications of their planning decisions is a key rationale behind arguments that voluntary metropolitan approaches can be just as (and perhaps more) effective than more regulatory approaches. Patsy Healey argues that deliberative democracy can be a powerful tool for helping stakeholders overcome differences: “The power of dominant discourses can be challenged at the level of dialogue, through the power of knowledgeable, reflective discourse, through good arguments, through the transformations which come as people learn to understand and respect each other

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across their differences and conflicts, and as we learn to build consensus that respects difference.”  According to the logic put forth by scholars such as Healey, Mansbridge, Barber, Innes, and Booher, deliberative metropolitan processes rather than institutional reorganization and centralization might be enough to change the behav ior of local officials who participate in metropolitan planning processes, and this ultimately can lead to more thoughtful local planning. According to this logic, metropolitan planning agencies that bring stakeholders together, provide them a forum for thoughtful dialogue, and help them with capacity building could be just as or more effective than agencies that have regulatory authority and/or control over fiscal resources. Given the difficulty of changing the structure of metropolitan planning institutions, the United States has increasingly served as a test case for voluntary metropolitan approaches. A number of multi-million-dollar visioning exercises—notably Envision Utah, Boston MetroFuture, Portland’s 2040 Growth Concept, Denver Metro Vision, and Chicago 2020—have been initiated in metropolitan areas across America to address problems of uncoordinated growth. Metropolitan visioning exercises are essentially exercises in deliberative democracy. They all have familiar themes and are often impressive in their goals, scale, and scope. They promise to help create a “new way forward” for the region. They engage citizens, businesspeople, politicians, and planners in a careful analysis of the current trends in the region. They project what will happen to the region if current development patterns continue. They ask stakeholders to define what type of region they would like to live in, and they propose policy changes that would be necessary to reach the desired scenario. The final outcome is usually a plan that advocates for a more compact, equitable, sustainable, efficient, and healthy region. Metropolitan planning agencies often initiate these visioning exercises since they have the ability to convene stakeholders and the capacity to conduct modeling of alternate futures. When the visioning is complete, metropolitan planning agencies use their expertise in capacity building as a means of implementing these plans. Although the process of regional visioning can be an important educational tool for the stakeholders involved, the theory of change behind visioning exercises is that it can be made in spite of political and institutional hurdles. In an effort to remain politically uncontroversial (and hence feasible), visioning statements often do not recommend radical changes to the political institutions that shape land use planning. They stop short of restructuring the dynamics of metropolitan institutions. They often shy away

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from tough questions about regional equity or regional tax sharing. Instead, they focus on building coalitions (often ad hoc) of stakeholders who together will speak for the region. Since voluntary institutions convene the majority of these visioning exercises, they depend on the will of local officials for implementation. As a result, implementation remains a challenge. Under the Obama administration, federal funding has strengthened some regional visioning efforts. The Partnership for Sustainable Communities, a joint initiative of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Transportation (DOT), attempts to coordinate housing, transportation, and environmental impacts. The Partnership aims to strengthen metropolitan planning through the Sustainable Communities Regional Planning (SCRP) Grants, which provide funding to regional initiatives that promote the Partnership’s six livability principles: “1. provide more transportation choices, 2. promote equitable, affordable housing, 3. enhance economic competitiveness, 4. support existing communities, 5. coordinate and leverage federal policies and investment, and 6. value communities and neighborhoods.”  SCRP funding has helped support some of the ongoing metropolitan initiatives and has created opportunities for metropolitan planning agencies to partner with other stakeholders on regional projects. In addition, SCRP grants have made promoting equity a key goal of regional planning efforts. The SCRP grants recognize the importance of regional solutions; however, they serve primarily as pilot projects where the task of reforming metropolitan governance in the United States is much larger.

The Current State of Metropolitan Governance While federal interest in strengthening metropolitan solutions is promising, one of the challenges of reforming metropolitan institutions in the United States is that metropolitan governance tends to happen in several ways and every region is slightly different. As a result, it is difficult to make one-sizefits-all suggestions for how to improve it. Councils of governments (COGs), membership organizations of local governments that meet to address common goals, are the weakest but most prevalent form of metropolitan governance in the United States. In general, these organizations rely primarily on capacity building as a strategy for ensuring metropolitan coordination and promoting various regional initiatives. COGs can offer planning support to

16

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local municipalities and can help them learn from one another by providing access to data, geographic information systems (GIS), model bylaws, and a convening forum, such as a visioning exercise. Communities can also jointly create a new metropolitan or area-wide planning agency with sufficient resources to gather information, undertake professional assessments, prepare regional plans, and help build local planning capacity. Sometimes COGs can play the part of regional planning agencies in developing regional plans. In other instances, entirely new regional entities are created. But what makes regional and metropolitan planning difficult is that agencies that claim to plan for the region often lack regulatory authority or control over fiscal incentives. Instead, even regional planning agencies that produce elaborate plans and visions rely on consensus-based capacity-building strategies, which encourage stakeholders to come together to discuss regional goals. In most metropolitan areas in the United States, regional planning agencies produce impor tant planning documents that outline the path to promoting more sustainable regions; however, implementation of area-wide goals and objectives is essentially at the mercy of local governments. The unwillingness to give up local control means that regional and metropolitan planning agencies exist in an awkward space where they depend on localities to implement their vision. Implementation can depend on the extent to which a community identifies with the regional vision. In some cases, where the vision for the region matches the local vision, this is an easy relationship. However, in cases where these visions conflict, local visions typically trump the regional one. One means of encouraging metropolitan coordination is to provide local governments an incentive to participate in regional efforts. Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) provide that incentive through their control over the allocation of transportation funds. The first MPOs were created as a result of the Federal Highway Act of 1962, which required that regions of more than 50,000 people have a dedicated organization for decision making about transportation investments that would use a planning process known as the 3Cs (“continuing, cooperative, and comprehensive”). In 1991, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) and the 1998 Transportation Efficiency Act of the 21st Century (TEA-21) strengthened the role of MPOs and their connection to land use and transportation planning. MPOs are responsible for developing the Long Range Transportation Program (LRTP) and the Transportation Improvement

A Metropolitan Future

17

Program (TIP). The 2005 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU) and  2012 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) granted additional funding and responsibility to MPOs. There are currently 420 MPOs in the United States, and about half of them are also the regional councils for the area. When a metropolitan planning agency is also the MPO, theoretically the agency should transform from being a consensus-based organization that localities join because they are “good citizens” to one with impor tant influence over scarce (and much needed) transportation dollars. In addition, being the MPO for the region should allow for greater integration of transportation and land use planning. Planners and scholars who hope to see more regional influence on local land use planning point to Metro in Portland, Oregon, where in addition to being the MPO for the region, the state grants Metro sufficient authority to veto certain local land use decisions and require plan consistency. That means Metro can require localities to redo their master plans to ensure that zoning and other local land development regulations are consistent with regional goals and objectives. If a metropolitan planning agency has this level of authority, threats of vetoes over local decisions can be used to require more extensive consideration of each community’s responsibility to the larger region. The theoretical effect should be that local land use planning reflects regional goals rather than an amalgamation of many, often conflicting, local decisions that fail to take into consideration the spillover effects of local decisions. However, as this book highlights, even in the case of Portland, having authority is complicated and requires complex mechanisms for collaboration.

Central Questions of the Book Given the importance of metropolitan planning for the future growth of U.S. regions and the ongoing debate about the best form of governance, we need to understand how the various institutional arrangements of metropolitan areas outlined above affect outcomes. What is the best balance for metropolitan planning agencies between collaboration and authority? Is a locality less likely to be influenced by offers of technical assistance if a metropolitan planning agency lacks real financial incentives or the legal authority to override local decision making? If, in addition to capacity-building assistance, a

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metropolitan planning agency is also the MPO and can offer substantial financial incentives, will it be more effective at influencing local planning decisions? And, fi nally, if a metropolitan planning agency has a full toolbox available to it, with capacity building, fi nancial incentives, and authority over local land use decisions, would these institutional arrangements guarantee that local planning will conform to regional goals and objectives? To address these and other questions, this book compares metropolitan planning agencies in Boston, Denver, and Portland, three regions with different metropolitan institutional arrangements with varying levels of authority (see Table 1). By categorizing the metropolitan planning and governance arrangements according to their capacity, status as MPO, funding sources, statutory authority, and relationship to the electorate at large, the book explores the relationship between the powers that the metropolitan planning agency wields and its ability to influence local implementation of area-wide planning goals. Boston, Denver, and Portland represent three approaches to metropolitan governance, ranging from primarily voluntary (relying on capacity building in Boston) to including MPO powers (Denver), to adding a layer of state-mandated authority (Portland). Although there are other examples of innovative metropolitan planning in the country, such as Minneapolis–St.  Paul, these three cases were chosen because each represented a metropolitan planning agency with a par ticu lar type of authority. Specifically, Boston, Denver, and Portland vary in the amount of authority they have been granted by the state and the ability of each agency to deploy capacity building, fi nancial incentives, and regulatory authority. Taken together, the case studies demonstrate how metropolitan planning institutions with varying degrees of authority are able to influence development decisions of regional significance, promote inter-municipal cooperation, coordinate with state and federal authorities, connect land use planning to transportation investments, and encourage local planning that conforms with and is guided by a regional vision. Although Boston, Denver, and Portland vary in size, physical form, demographic composition, and growth rates, all three have invested considerable resources in metropolitan visioning exercises with the goal of creating a regional plan that will be implemented locally. These cases are comparable because they are matched in many ways—all three are metropolitan planning agencies in the United States that engage in capacity building and have similar goals of influencing local planning. They also differ in impor tant

Table 1. Varying Authority of Metropolitan Planning Agency Measure of Authority

Boston

Denver

Portland

Does the metropolitan planning agency rely primarily on capacity building and voluntary measures to accomplish its goals?

Yes

No (it uses MPO powers)

No ( it uses MPO and land use authority)

Does the state mandate consistency between regional and local plans?

No

No

Yes

Does the regional planning agency have the authority and the political wherewithal to veto local planning decisions?

No

Mile High Compact relies primarily on peer pressure

Yes

Does the metropolitan entity have statutory authority to influence local land use planning?

No

Mile High Compact is an intergovernmental agreement

Yes

Is the metropolitan planning agency the MPO for the region?

No, but it is a member of it

Yes

Yes

Does the state rely on the metropolitan planning agency to implement or amplify certain state land use policies?

Yes

Yes

Yes

What capacity does the metropolitan entity have to raise, allocate, and spend money?

State charges localities a fee that supports MAPC. MAPC seeks out grant funding

MPO and other regional responsibilities

MPO and other regional responsibilities

Are elected officials involved with the metropolitan planning agency?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Are the officials directly elected at the metropolitan level?

No

No

Yes

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Chapter 1

ways—they have different authority given to them by the state and the federal government and they have different tools available to them to influence local planning.

Measuring the Effectiveness of Metropolitan Governance Scholars are also reluctant to quantify the effectiveness of different metropolitan governance systems or to explain how different systems work to influence local land use decisions. Part of the difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of metropolitan intervention is developing the causal link: there are many other variables besides metropolitan governance that may be equally or more important in explaining changes that occur. For example, rapid development of land in one area may be a result of a strong economy, specific to that region, rather than the failure of metropolitan policy. Similarly, housing trends may be different in each area as a result of historical development patterns rather than specific policies initiated by a metropolitan agency. The age of the housing stock and infrastructure may play a significant role in dictating the physical form of the region, so the Boston region may have a better regional transportation system as a result of its history rather than because of metropolitan policy or governance. Since it is difficult to disaggregate these variables and say with certainty that par ticu lar outcomes are a direct result of metropolitan policies, the book’s strategy is to look at the planning process itself to assess how local land use decisions and large-scale planning projects of regional significance were shaped or changed by the metropolitan agency’s intervention or lack thereof. Since the effectiveness of a metropolitan planning agency is dependent on the extent to which it can influence local land use choices, the book uses a set of criteria or “observable implications”  to test whether and how metropolitan planning agencies promote changes in local behav ior. Thus, if an agency is effective at influencing local planning, we should expect that: • localities will adopt regional policies, • local plans will be consistent with the regional plan, • the language used to talk about policy at the local level will match the regional language, • local officials will talk about how they have changed their planning behav ior as a result of the regional plan,

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21

• local officials will talk about the importance of metropolitan coordination, • local elected officials will see the metropolitan planning agency as relevant to the work, • local elected officials and planners will attend the meetings of the metropolitan planning agency and will be actively involved with policy making, • projects of regional significance will be consistent with the regional plan or goals, • changes in metropolitan land use patterns will reflect the goals of the metropolitan plan (i.e., denser development; transit-oriented development [TOD]; communities following the urban growth boundary; communities changing zoning to match regional plan goals), • transportation investments will support the regional plan, and • local communities will work together to address problems that they share. The book relies on firsthand reports of the individuals most involved (both local and regional planners and elected officials) to evaluate the policy effectiveness of various approaches to metropolitan planning and governance. Their insights are triangulated against an analysis of local and regional plans and policies.

Plan for the Book Since the current trend in metropolitan governance is to rely on “voluntary” regionalism rather than top-down, command-and-control models of metropolitan government, this book questions what happens as metropolitan governance moves from depending on collaboration to authority. Although the lessons from Boston, Denver, and Portland will not apply to all cases, they offer us a window into the challenges and opportunities facing metropolitan planning in the United States. The book consists of three cases of U.S. efforts at metropolitan planning and governance, told from the bottom up between 2005 and 2015. In each region, interviews with local and regional stakeholders about policies provide a window into the policy-making process itself and the outcomes of

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various approaches. Taken together, they tell the story of local and regional planning successes and failures through the voices of the planners and policy makers themselves and an analysis of their plans and policies. Insights from these cases highlight ways in which metropolitan planning is working and where work needs to be done (Chapters 5 and 6). The book demonstrates how metropolitan planning institutions with varying degrees of authority are able to influence development decisions of regional significance, promote inter-municipal cooperation, and encourage local planning that conforms with and is guided by a regional vision. The cases also highlight the complex and hybrid nature of metropolitan planning and governance in America. In each case, I search for evidence of land use decisions that take into account regional concerns and ways in which the metropolitan planning agencies are able to influence or alter local land use decisions. In addition to evaluating the plans and planning process in each region, the book examines regionally significant projects, such as the South Weymouth Naval Air Station redevelopment in the Boston region, the forty-square-mile Lowry Range in the Denver region, and the development of 12,000 acres in the Damascus/Boring Area in the Portland region. These examples provide insight into how the metropolitan planning agency deals with large-scale development projects that will affect the whole region and which may or may not match the metropolitan planning agencies’ plans and goals for the region. The book also looks at the implementation of regional policies, such as the urban growth boundary in Denver and Portland. Chapter 2 presents a case study of the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) in Boston, a planning agency representing 101 cities and towns that relies primarily on capacity building. The Boston region has a relatively weak system of metropolitan governance in part because of a strong tradition of home rule in Massachusetts. MAPC tries to convince the cities and towns in the region that there are economic and environmental reasons to think beyond their borders. MAPC does its metropolitan planning work in the context of a weak state-planning system. It is a voting member of the Boston MPO, but it does not have full control over the Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) funding. Without control over the TIP budget as a carrot or a strong state land use planning system as a stick, MAPC staff members have to be extremely creative to make their policies economically and politically relevant to their member cities and towns. MAPC uses capac-

A Metropolitan Future

23

ity building tools to work with member municipalities to promote smart growth development goals that are consistent with a regional vision that the agency developed. Given the fiscal and political constraints that local governments face, implementing regional policies at the local level is often difficult. However, MAPC has become a much more relevant agency under the leadership of its current executive director, Marc Draisen (who was formerly a member of the state legislature). Th rough MAPC’s MetroFuture regional visioning process, the agency has revived an interest in regional planning. The MAPC story highlights the challenge of planning without authority but demonstrates how under new leadership a metropolitan planning agency can use capacity building as a means of influencing public opinion and state policy. By comparison to Boston, regional planning agencies in Denver (Chapter 3) and Portland (Chapter 4), the second and third case studies in the book, have more authority through their control over the allocation of federal and state transportation funding (because the metropolitan planning agency is also the MPO). The Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG), a voluntary association of fift y-six local governments, is the metropolitan planning agency and the MPO. As the MPO, DRCOG controls federal transportation funds. DRCOG uses its TIP funding as a mechanism to promote the adoption of regional policies, as transportation projects that implement the goals of Denver’s regional plan, known as Metro Vision 2035, are rated higher in the TIP process. DRCOG (in collaboration with the Metro Mayors Caucus) also created a voluntary agreement among counties and municipalities known as the Mile High Compact (MHC). The Mile High Compact, signed in 2000, obliges signatory counties and cities to abide by the planning and development principles put forward in the Metro Vision plan. The signatories also agree to plan within the framework of the voluntary Urban Growth Boundary/Area (UGB/A) that limits the location of new development. As a result of the MHC and its UGB/A, DRCOG has been cited as a leader in making voluntary regionalism work. However, a key question remains: does the success of Denver’s collaborative effort primarily reflect the voluntary nature of its approach, or has DRCOG been strategic in leveraging its MPO authority over transportation funds to promote local conformance with regional goals? Chapter 4 focuses on Portland Metro, which is considered by many to be the “poster child” of U.S. metropolitan planning because of its state-mandated

24

Chapter 1

authority over land use and regionally elected council. Although Portland Metro is often discussed as the premier example of metropolitan governance in America, some practitioners and academics doubt the viability and replicability of the Portland model. Portland Metro is the metropolitan planning agency as well as the MPO for the twenty-five cities and three counties in the Portland metropolitan area. It also administers the UGB for the region and controls a number of land use planning functions under Oregon state law. Metro’s authority comes from Oregon’s strong state land use planning regulations; however, even in Portland, there is an important role for capacity building. Portland is the only metropolitan area in the United States with a seven-member elected metropolitan council, authority over federal transportation money (because it is the MPO), and control over the region’s UGB. In the 2006–2009 TIP cycle, Metro allocated $385 million of state and federal revenue. About $240.4 million went to Tri-Met, the regional public transportation system, but $114 million was earmarked for “regionally flexible funds” that Metro allocates to the region. The money Metro controls as the MPO is needed by localities to maintain and improve their transportation infrastructure. As a result, local officials pay attention to Metro and participate in its planning efforts. State growth management regulation also gives Metro the authority to determine the UGB for the region and constrain local land use planning. Under Oregon state law every city must have a UGB that determines which land is urban and which will remain agricultural. Metro ensures that there is a twenty-year supply of available land for urban development within the UGB, and Metro Council reviews the land supply every five years and decides whether to expand the UGB. The state legislature has also granted Metro specific “land-use planning powers including: coordinating between regional and local comprehensive plans in adopting a regional urban growth boundary; requiring consistency of local comprehensive plans with statewide and regional planning goals; planning for activities of metropolitan significance including (but not limited to) transportation, water quality, air quality and solid waste.” Portland Metro’s combination of capacity building tools, control over financial incentives, and ability to wield regulatory authority make it an interest ing case of metropolitan governance with authority. Taken together, the three case studies demonstrate that in some cases authority creates cooperation and in others cooperation can lead to authority. The findings from these cases (Chapters 5 and 6) challenge trends in regional planning in the United States that privilege more cooperative and voluntary

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25

approaches and dismiss more regulatory models as out of step with American politics. Instead, these stories of metropolitan planning and governance highlight how complicated the process of metropolitan scale coordination is and the need for a more hybrid approach that consists of formal authority over land use and fiscal resources as well as capacity building, citizen education and engagement, and good old-fashioned politics. We start with Boston.

CHAPTER 2

Planning Without Authority in Boston We didn’t have authority, but we built power. —MAPC official, 2015

The task of planning for the greater Boston region falls to the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC). Since 1963, the state government has designated MAPC, which comprises representatives from 101 cities and towns, as the planning agency for the region. MAPC’s planning area covers 1,422 square miles, 22 cities, 79 towns, and a population of 3.2 million in 2013. MAPC has worked strategically to develop mechanisms to influence land use planning in a region where land use decisions have remained primarily a local prerogative. This chapter explores land use decision making in the Boston region and evaluates MAPC’s efforts at influencing regional decision making. Although the agency lacks the formal authority to mandate that the regional plan be adopted at the local level or the ability to use full MPO status as a means of fostering inter-municipal cooperation, it has played an important indirect role and has increasingly helped frame regional decision making. In a state that has traditionally had strong home rule and a weak planning framework, where planning is a response to local needs rather than a reflection of regional concerns, MAPC has used capacity building to influence local land use decisions. It has also worked to strengthen state land use policies, in part by highlighting the need for more state intervention, and has dedicated state resources to funding smart growth, affordable housing, and transportation investments. Acting as a convener, MAPC has been able to help communities identify areas where a regional approach would be beneficial. Using sophisticated data analysis and scenario modeling tools, MAPC raises public awareness of the challenges facing the region with its current planning paradigm and demographic forecasts. MAPC is also successful at leveraging federal investment in regional planning and developing partnerships with state agencies with regulatory authority. Through a combination

Boston

27

Ipswich

Rockport Topsfield Hamilton Middleton

Essex Gloucester

Wenham Manchester

North Reading

Danvers

Beverly

Wilmington

Boxborough

Bedford Acton

Lynnfield

Woburn

ad

Peabody

Wakefield

Burlington

Salem

leh e

Reading

Carlisle

Ma rb

Littleton

Stoneham

Saugus

Lynn

Swampscott

Concord Bolton

Stow

Maynard

Melrose

Winchester

Lexington

Medford

Lincoln

Malden

Arlington Everett Belmont Waltham

Somerville

rop

Sudbury

th

Cambridge

Win

Hudson

Nahant

Revere

Chelsea

Watertown Weston

Marlborough

Wayland Newton Brookline

Southborough

Framingham

Wellesley Boston

Natick

ll Hu

Needham Ashland

Dedham

Milton

Dover

Sherborn

Hopkinton

Quincy Cohasset

Westwood Hingham

Braintree Holliston

Medfield Norwood Canton

Millis Milford

Scituate

Weymouth Randolph Norwell

Medway

Walpole

Holbrook Rockland

Marshfield

Hanover Bellingham

Sharon

Norfolk

Stoughton

Franklin Pembroke Wrentham

Foxborough

Miles

Duxbury

0

2.5

Dover is in Three Rivers and South West Subregions Milton and Needham are in Inner Core and Three Rivers Subregions

Figure 1. MAPC Region and Sub-region Map. Courtesy of the Metropolitan Area Planning Council.

of tools, MAPC has “built power” even though they are primarily a collaborative, voluntary agency. Although the MAPC story provides a model for how other agencies without authority can work to “build” power, it should be noted that there are serious limitations to this model of metropolitan governance. The previous chapter highlighted a growing reliance on voluntary models of regional collaboration that work through consensus building, deliberative democracy, social capital formation, and networking. Scholars and practitioners have observed that coming together to discuss common problems can transform the participants and create social networks that are bound together by increasing trust in collaborative processes. The Boston

5

28

Chapter 2

case shows how MAPC as an organization has fostered such collaborative networks, using its staff capacity to help town and city governments analyze development issues and identify opportunities for cooperation. In that way, the Boston example supports the case for voluntary models. However, this chapter also shows the substantial influence that MAPC has wielded by exploiting its linkages to other institutions whose tools are not limited to voluntary appeals for cooperation. Although MAPC lacks its own regulatory and budgetary power, it has reached upward to state and federal agencies that can secure local cooperation for regional planning priorities. At the regional level, MAPC has influenced spending by the MPO that distributes federal and state transportation funds for projects throughout greater Boston. Indirectly, therefore, MAPC has been able to leverage government funds and regulatory power to advance the regional agenda. In other words, regional coordination in the Greater Boston region results from a mixture of voluntary cooperation and local capacity building as well as connecting the regionally agreed upon goals to formal institutional power and funding. MAPC is like many COGs in the United States. To coordinate regional efforts, these agencies help bring together local officials, planners, and citizens in ongoing discussions about the future of their region, prepare quasiregional plans, and provide technical assistance aimed at upgrading local planning. Originally established in 1963, in 1971 under MGL (Massachusetts General Law) Chapter 40B MAPC became an independent district. Its role was primarily to conduct research and advise communities: MAPC is empowered to conduct research and/or studies and to compile information necessary for identifying problems and needs of the district, and for the formulation of goals, objectives, policies, plans and programs in relation to the development and redevelopment of the district’s resources and facilities. While the MAPC is empowered to approve or disapprove plans for the development or redevelopment of the district or portions thereof, such powers are largely advisory. Today, MAPC’s mission statement has expanded to include more explicit goals, which it sees as supporting the interests of local communities and the region: Our mission is to promote smart growth and regional collaboration. We work toward sound municipal management, sustainable land use,

Boston

29

protection of natural resources, efficient and affordable transportation, a diverse housing stock, public safety, economic development, an informed public, and equity and opportunity among people of all backgrounds. MAPC pays for this work through a combination of per capita assessments on member communities as well as foundation and government grants. Local officials from 101 cities and towns, along with twenty-one gubernatorial appointees, ten state, and three city of Boston officials, sit on the MAPC. They meet at least three times a year. Motions are adopted when a majority of the members present approve them. Officers (president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer) are elected by a majority of the council. A smaller group of twenty-five representatives make up an executive committee that meets once a month, appoints the executive director, and oversees the agency’s operations. Although MAPC is charged with planning for the Boston region in an advisory capacity, it is not the federally designated MPO for the Boston area. MAPC cannot use direct control over TIP funding as an incentive for active local participation in regional governance. It also cannot directly target transportation improvement investments toward implementing the plan. However, this does not mean that MAPC is not influential. It has a complicated and evolving relationship with the Boston MPO. MAPC is one of fourteen permanent voting members on the MPO. Along with the Central Transportation Planning Staff (CTPS), which conducts modeling and provides other technical assistance to the MPO board, MAPC supports the MPO with research connecting land use and transportation planning. According to the Central Transportation Planning Staff, “The MPO relies on MAPC for developing the region’s population and employment projections for use in the travel-demand modeling conducted by the MPO. MAPC also provides a coordination and consultation function with the region’s municipalities regarding these projections and the review and evaluation of land use and economic development plans and their relationship to the MPO’s planning.” One MAPC staff member described the authority that comes from being an active member of the MPO as follows: “When a group is willing to convene the meeting and do staff work, it is able to influence the conversation.” The officials at MAPC also understand the importance of capitalizing on political openings: “MAPC takes advantage of opportunities provided by

30

Chapter 2

others whether it is the federal government saying pay attention to the TIP criteria or a new administration interested in land use and transportation.” Like most of the work that MAPC does, since its influence is not direct, it has to use creative means, the power of good ideas, access to data, and technical expertise to influence decision makers who have the final authority. MAPC lobbied the MPO to adopt the TIP funding criteria that take into account the goals of MAPC and other organizations. Connecting MAPC goals to TIP funding is impor tant because the TIP determines which local transportation projects will receive federal and state funds each year. TIP investments that are in line with the regional land use plan can help implement the voluntary plan. The incorporation of land use goals into the TIP criteria also offers a chance to integrate land use planning and transportation funding, even if MAPC does not directly control TIP funding. The 2015 TIP Project Evaluation Criteria took into account how proposed transportation investments support the vision of MetroFuture, MAPC’s most recent regional land use vision, by offering five points for projects that specifically support MetroFuture goals. In addition, many of the other TIP criteria such as focusing development in urban centers, promoting biking, and seeking environmental justice are in line with the goals of MetroFuture and count positively toward the TIP selection process. Since getting TIP money is so impor tant for localities and the funding is competitive, local communities have an incentive (in the form of points on their TIP application) to pay attention to the regional plan. Also, the fact that the Boston MPO used the MetroFuture alternative land use scenario as the basis for planning rather than the status quo projections demonstrates a commitment to promoting the MetroFuture vision through transportation investments. MAPC’s ability to connect its regional goals with agencies that have implementing authority will be highlighted throughout this chapter.

MAPC: Regional Planning with Your Hands Tied Like all other metropolitan planning agencies, MAPC does not work in a political vacuum. Instead, city, state, and federal politics can create both opportunities for and limitations on regional planning. To understand how MAPC works to coordinate land use planning at the metropolitan level in the Boston region, it helps to understand that Massachusetts has a long tradition of home rule where local governments control their plans and implement

Boston

31

them. A key challenge for land use planning in Massachusetts is that there is no state requirement for consistency between the master plan and local zoning, so a plan for a mixed-use downtown that is outlined in a community’s master plan may, in fact, not be possible under local zoning regulations. Having no requirement for zoning consistency means that regional or area-wide planning is entirely advisory. Planning in a highly fragmented, home-rule environment like Massachusetts often means that ad hoc groups form quickly in the face of any serious threat to community character. Some argue that local control allows communities with rich histories to maintain self-determination and control in a democratic manner. However, others point out the detrimental regional impacts of this approach. In fact, researchers attribute the large lot zoning and lack of affordable housing in the Boston region primarily to restrictive local zoning policies. MAPC conducts its regional planning work in a region where the lack of housing affordability has been an ongoing problem and is getting worse. In 1990, the “median priced house required an annual income of $75,000, almost twice the regional median of $38,555”; Boston MetroPlan 2000, MAPC’s 1990 regional plan, identified 214,000 households that needed some sort of housing assistance. The plan also identified a concentration of affordable units in certain communities in the region and a lack in others. The result was that people with low incomes and people of color were concentrated in particular areas. Seventy percent of all minorities were located in only five communities, while sixty-one of the region’s communities had minority populations of less than 5 percent. According to the Boston Indicators Project, the Boston region is “one of the least affordable metropolitan areas in the US for both renters and homebuyers.” For renters, the situation is especially challenging. “The Greater Boston Housing Report Card for 2014–2015” found that 38  percent of households in the Boston region were spending more than 30  percent of their income on housing (up from 27  percent in 2000). Families who are priced out of Boston and the close-in suburbs are increasingly forced to move farther out of the city to find housing. This is putting new pressures on suburban communities which is exacerbated by the changing demographic dynamics of the region. The Boston Globe describes the demographic mismatch in the Boston region: “Young workers drawn to Boston for its graduate programs and jobs in life sciences and technology are spending a greater share of their incomes to afford rents that are only climbing. In the suburbs, aging baby boomers who want to move to small homes requiring less maintenance but who want to stay in their communities

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are having a hard time finding alternatives to their Colonials with big yards.” A main reason that housing has become less affordable in the Boston metropolitan area is that lot sizes increased rather than decreased, despite the recommendations MAPC made in Boston MetroPlan 2000. In fact, according to a study done by researchers at MIT’s Center for Real Estate, in the late 1990s, in 62 communities outside of Route 128, average lot sizes for new houses had more than doubled. Of the forty-two communities in the I-495 region, where the majority of the Boston region’s development happened since 1990, twenty-eight had median single-family lot sizes of more than 0.9 acres. Edward Moscovitch and Courtney Koslow’s study of development patterns in the Boston region found that of “the 23,000 single-family homes built in the 128/495 corridor over these years [1998–2002], only 2,055—9 percent—are built on lots of a quarter-acre or less, while 3/4 of all new singlefamily homes are on lots of at least half an acre. Almost half the homes are built on lots of at least an acre.” Moscovitch and Koslow’s research attributed the high cost of housing prices in the Boston region to these large lot sizes. They argued that if the average lot size in the Boston region were reduced from 1.08 to 0.25 acres, it would be possible to double the number of new units constructed, drive home prices down from an average price of $400,000 to $293,000, and cut land consumption by half. A study by Edward Glaeser, Jenny Schuetz, and Bryce Ward found that large lot zoning and other local regulations such as wetlands and regular lot requirements drive up the prices of homes in the Boston region by reducing supply. Their analysis of 187 towns and cities located in Eastern Massachusetts (not counting Boston) found that the average lot size was 1.4 acres, a size that limits supply and helps promote urban sprawl. Aviva Rothman-Shore and Kara E. Hubbard’s research on fair housing showed that “more than half (95) of the municipalities in Greater Boston zone over 50% of their land for lot sizes of 1 acre or greater. 4 municipalities within 50 miles of Boston zone more than 90% of their land for 2-acre lot sizes, and 27 municipalities zone more than 90% of their land for at least 1-acre lot sizes.” While studies consistently emphasize the negative regional impacts of large-lot zoning, getting local communities to change their zoning to promote density is a challenge because each of the region’s 101 cities and towns has to decide independently whether to increase or decrease its density. Without a mandate to force compliance or incentives that reward density, MAPC relies on state policies and other

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capacity strategies to promote the local adoption of denser development, smaller lot sizes, and more affordable housing. This can be a difficult sell at the local level, particularly since fift y-five municipalities in the MAPC region have a town form of government, where decisions are made by a twothirds vote of an open town meeting. Citizens who are mobilized against zoning change can pack the open town meeting in order to thwart changes that may allow for multifamily units or smaller lot size. MAPC describes the challenges of planning in an Open Town meeting context in its 2012 annual report: Open Town Meeting (where any registered voter may attend and vote) is found in 55 towns ranging from Nahant (3,400 residents) to Marshfield and Wakefield (25,000 residents). Open Town Meeting is often considered the purest form of representative democracy, but levels of participation vary widely. In Wakefield, only 241 residents attended the 2011 Annual Town Meeting to vote on a $60 million municipal budget. Meanwhile, 1,200 Marshfield residents attended the April 2011 Town Meeting which rejected a proposal to lift a 30-year old ban on coin-operated video games. Inconsistency in Town Meeting participation may impede a town’s ability to plan and act strategically. Also many people may find it difficult to attend nighttime meetings, such as the elderly, single-parent households, the parents of young children, or people with disabilities. At Open Town meetings, zoning changes (particularly those that promote density) can be nearly impossible to achieve. However, MAPC notes that Representative Town Meeting (twenty-one towns), where representatives are elected, also present governance challenges, “making it difficult for citizens to communicate their preferences.” One of the key challenges facing MAPC as it tries to promote smart growth policies is that in many communities in the Boston region the word “density” can be extremely polarizing: those against density argue that it will have a negative impact on the community’s character and fiscal health. Part of the resistance to more density in communities is based on finances, since each local government struggles to maintain a strong tax base. Particularly in the face of cuts in state funding, the need to accommodate growing school populations (and the fact that taxes from many residential developments do

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not cover the costs of educating the children who live in those houses) and escalating demands for other high-quality public ser vices means that there is an incentive to zone out uses that generate more costs than tax revenue, such as multifamily housing. With local tax revenue-raising abilities strictly limited by Proposition 2 1/2, a Massachusetts law limiting the annual increase in property taxes to 2.5 percent, it has been increasingly difficult for localities to pay for schools, employee health care, snow removal, police and fire protection, road repair, and other infrastructure improvements. One of the only ways that communities can raise more revenue is by attracting new commercial development. As a result, communities tend to “overzone” for commercial development and compete with one another to offer better tax abatement packages to lure businesses. Municipal officials often respond negatively to large-scale developments in neighboring towns. Towns have sued each other for a share of tax revenue from development projects, especially when development has negative externalities, particularly traffic. In 2004, Framingham sued Natick, arguing that Natick had not consulted with Framingham over plans to expand the Natick Mall. This was despite an earlier agreement that the towns would consult with each other over developments in the area where the mall is located, which is known as the Golden Triangle. While Natick would receive $1.7 million a year in additional tax revenue from the mall expansion, Framingham officials worried that they would be stuck with more traffic, an estimated 9,000 additional trips, and no additional revenue. The Town of Framingham sued the mall developer, General Growth Properties, to pay for traffic improvements in Framingham. General Growth agreed to pay Framingham $1 million to withdraw its lawsuit against the expansion. There are numerous other cases of communities in the region suing each other over development projects. Ashland sued Framingham over a development near the intersection of Routes 9 and 90. Wayland appealed Framingham’s approval of a Planned Unit Development by National Development that bordered the two communities; the case was dropped when the developer agreed to give the town $1.45 million to make traffic-related improvements. Recently, Boston sued the State Gaming Commission over a proposed $1.6 billion Wynn Casino to be located in Everett, arguing that it would cause major traffic impacts in Charlestown (a part of Boston) and so the City of Boston should be considered a “host community” and receive compensation. These lawsuits highlight the challenge that comes from not sharing regional tax revenue or adequately coordinating development decisions.

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While MAPC encourages local officials to think regionally, they continue to be primarily concerned with the fiscal impacts of land use decisions on their communities.

Traditional Regional Planning: Boston MetroPlan 2000 When most people think about the effectiveness of regional planning agencies, they think about the implementation of the plans they make. To understand how MAPC has evolved as a regional planning agency, we start by examining Boston MetroPlan 2000 and compare the difference between it and the more recent plan, MetroFuture (2007). Adopted in 1990, Boston MetroPlan 2000 called for more concentrated development in the region, particularly in the I-495 area where one- and two-acre lots were the norm. According to MAPC staff, at the time, Boston MetroPlan 2000 was innovative because it “contained smart growth principles. It was one of the first of its kind. It talked about density, mixed use, not developing on critical wetlands. This was a plan that was written years ago. It was basically a smart growth plan before that concept was really around.” Boston MetroPlan 2000 demonstrated that the smart growth planning techniques of building denser communities could help reduce infrastructure development costs. Estimating that future infrastructure costs would be $1.5 billion, Boston MetroPlan 2000 encouraged “more efficient use of existing infrastructure capacity.” Drawing the connection between development type and cost was important; however, the extent to which communities changed their development patterns as a result of Boston MetroPlan 2000 was minimal. As mentioned previously, most communities in suburban Boston continued to develop according to traditional land use patterns, using one- and two-acre lots. MAPC’s Boston MetroPlan 2000 primarily left implementation of the regional plan up to localities. Regarding density, it said, “Boundaries and other detailed information would be covered in local comprehensive plans, written with consideration of the regional development plan. Any major inconsistencies between Boston MetroPlan 2000 and local comprehensive plans should be addressed.” However, Boston MetroPlan 2000 did not mention how these inconsistencies “should be addressed.” Without the authority to turn “should” into “shall,” or at least to offer financial incentives for the adoption of these policies, it was not surprising that many of the goals outlined in Boston MetroPlan 2000 were not adopted.

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According to Boston MetroPlan 2000, MAPC could support the implementation of the plan’s goals by local governments by (1) reviewing local and sub-regional plans, (2) reviewing infrastructure impacts, (3) analyzing regional benefits of proposed developments, (4) reviewing compliance of proposed developments with master plan goals and zoning, (5) reviewing regional projects that may be controversial to determine the costs and benefits of these projects, (6) improving the regional database, (7) working with communities to review and update the regional development plan, (8) developing infrastructure priorities based on the plan, (9) recommending to state and federal agencies that infrastructure projects should be funded that match priorities, (10) reviewing plans for adjacent regions to promote consistency of regional and state policies, (11) promoting community urban design plans that support transit, pedestrians, and biking, (12) acting as a facilitator for projects with regional impact reviews, (13) recommending that state and federal agencies fund infrastructure that promotes concentrated development, (14) developing a land resources protection plan, and (15) encouraging state and federal agencies to spend discretionary funds on projects that support concentrated development and economic vitality. MAPC could influence development by capacity building: providing data, working with communities, making comments on development projects, and lobbying the state. However, MAPC lacked the authority to demand consistency between local zoning and master plans and MAPC’s regional plan. Furthermore, since master plans in Massachusetts do not have to be consistent with local zoning, even ensuring compliance with a community’s master plan would not necessarily translate into local implementation. After the adoption of Boston MetroPlan 2000, MAPC reviewed local plans, but typically only when asked. As a result, MAPC had the most influence in communities that were already leaning toward smart growth concepts and were interested in MAPC’s feedback. The adoption of the smart growth principles in Boston MetroPlan 2000 was in many ways dependent on the political and planning orientation of each locality. Since MAPC did not have the authority to tell each of the 101 communities what to do, its primary leverage came from offering capacity building assistance. The result was haphazard implementation; one local official described it as “hit or miss. If it suits a community, fine. If it doesn’t, fine.” A 2007 examination of comprehensive plans for communities in the MAPC region demonstrates that they often mentioned being members of MAPC, and in some cases they referenced Boston MetroPlan 2000. The

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Town of Lexington’s Comprehensive plan acknowledged: “At the regional level, the Metropolitan Area Planning Council has worked for decades to promote better-structured regional development, including efforts through its Minuteman sub-area planning group known as MAGIC. However, like most other Massachusetts regional planning agencies, the MAPC lacks sufficient authority to have had as much impact as many would hope.” Although the Lexington plan mentioned MAPC, it did so in the context of recognizing the limits to MAPC’s authority. Despite the voluntary nature of Boston MetroPlan 2000, some of its components made their way into local plans. For instance, the Open Space and Recreation Plan for the towns of Bellingham, Blackstone, and Franklin mentions it is “compatible with MetroGreen” (a part of Boston MetroPlan 2000). The fact that the local plan recognized Boston MetroPlan 2000 demonstrates that some communities used MAPC’s regional plan as a guide despite its voluntary nature. This seemed to be the fate of Boston MetroPlan 2000. It was a regional plan that introduced the idea of smart growth, and parts of the plan were adopted by communities, but it did not have the kind of transformative political power that the later plan, MetroFuture, has had.

New Leadership and a New Plan Since the adoption of Boston MetroPlan 2000 in 1990, MAPC has evolved as an organization and worked to become more relevant by influencing state policy. In 2002, MAPC underwent a change in leadership, with Marc Draisen becoming MAPC’s new executive director, resulting in more active engagement with state political leaders and local officials. Draisen had previous experience as a state legislator, the executive director of the Massachusetts Association of Community Development Corporations, and the executive director of the Citizens Housing and Planning Association. Under his leadership, MAPC became a more politically relevant organization and a leader on regional issues. An executive committee member said, “MAPC has been getting far more influential and powerful in the past couple of years. The focus has shifted to legislative advocacy and greater emphasis on public relations with the current executive director. It is impor tant to raise the image of MAPC to have it taken seriously and it is important for moving the agenda forward.” Another MAPC official, recognizing MAPC’s limited authority, echoed the importance of having a stronger public profile:

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We are not policy leaders, but we are opinion leaders. We do well by changing opinion of the legislators. We can’t make policy and have it turn into law tomorrow, but smart growth advocacy is where MAPC has been a leader. Technical assistance has become more secondary. Governor Romney instituted good smart growth policies like 40R and Commonwealth Capital that were significant in getting communities to think about smart growth. We have had a role in bringing the idea of smart growth to the public. Marc has been active with an outreach effort to get MAPC into the press so when people are talking about these issues, they hear about MAPC. . . . MAPC has done a lot to get smart growth concepts into the popular press. Another MAPC executive committee member emphasized the importance of building connections: “MAPC has been focusing on the power of relationships. MAPC has been trying to be more effective at building coalition and relationships. Through this work, they have developed trust and credibility and they have been able to have more effect. Good relationships are important to politics.” However, changing the perception that MAPC is a voluntary, powerless, and ineffectual organization has taken time. MAPC suffered for many years from a lack of participation by local elected officials in its governance (and in many way still does). In 2005, despite new executive leadership, it was difficult to get elected local officials actively involved with the work of the council. According to surveys done for MAPC’s 2005– 2010 strategic plan, there were two reasons why the council is not effective at bringing officials to the table: “First, appointing authorities often appoint council members who are not particularly interested in MAPC’s work, or who do not see it as very important. Some appointing officials see the MAPC appointment as a ‘throw-away,’ often given to someone who has little authority or influence in the community. Secondly, MAPC has done a poor job of communicating with council members, soliciting their advice and involvement, and making the council meetings interesting.”  As a result, MAPC had (and continues to have) vacancies, and “MAPC doesn’t have the power brokers it needs to be taken seriously.”  A hypothesis put forward for why serving on the MAPC Council was not considered an impor tant position was because the dues were so low and the state paid them directly to MAPC. Since communities never saw the money, local officials might forget that they were paying for it. MAPC suffered from a chicken-or-egg dilemma because people did not want to be part of an organization that they perceived as having

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no influence, particularly when they are serving as volunteers; however, in order to be influential, MAPC needed influential people to participate in its work. MAPC’s strategy was to make itself more relevant by engaging in state politics, raising public awareness about the importance of smart growth, and helping communities gain access to scarce fiscal resources. A series of activities outlined below helped MAPC build momentum.

MetroFuture: A New Plan with 4,000 Voices On May 1, 2007, MAPC ratified a new regional plan for the Boston region called MetroFuture. Much like regional visioning processes that have taken place in other parts of the country, MetroFuture was a multi-year, multistakeholder process that involved more than 4,000 citizens, elected officials, planners, and representatives from other state agencies. MetroFuture asked participants to say how they would like the Boston metropolitan region to look in the future. MAPC staff members constructed models of how the region might look if it continued to develop as usual or if certain policy measures were adopted. Participants chose among “Let it Be,” continuing the current regional trends out to 2020; “Little by Little,” a plan that demands some changes in the way land use is planned; “Winds of Change,” a slightly more aggressive plan; and “Imagine,” a more dramatic change in regional land use patterns. The participants chose “Winds of Change,” with the goal of changing the current development patterns to promote smart growth. MetroFuture then outlined sixty-five ambitious goals across six priority areas: “Sustainable Growth Patterns, Housing Choices, Community Vitality, Prosperity, Getting Around, and Energy, Air, Water, and Wildlife.”  The process of producing the MetroFuture plan was itself a critical political strategy. Bringing the stakeholders together was the first step. By engaging regional stakeholders in a discussion about what they want their future to be, participants make the connection between local and regional planning. Much of the power of the MetroFuture process is the ability to demonstrate spatially, through GIS and modeling, what will happen if land use patterns continue to follow existing trends. The MetroFuture process helped people visualize the impact of their land use planning decisions by showing what the region will look like if every community continues to develop without regard for regional implications.

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At the time of the adoption of MetroFuture, even MAPC’s executive director, Marc Draisen, acknowledged the challenge of planning without authority. At the May 1, 2007, ratification of the MetroFuture plan, Draisen said, “Implementation will be hard. It is a bold plan with big ideas that requires change from the way we’ve been doing things. It’s going to take time, and it’s going to take effort.”  The task of differentiating the MetroFuture plan from MAPC’s previous plans, like the Boston MetroPlan 2000, was a difficult one, but MAPC officials recognized that part of the challenge was gaining public buy-in and acceptance. When asked about the difference between MetroPlan 2000 and MetroFuture, Draisen said that this time the plan was created “with input from 4,000 residents and public figures before publicly floating it.”  A member of the MAPC executive committee recognized the challenge of making a regional plan “stick”: MetroFuture will feel initially like nothing happened. The business of moving public opinion is complicated. At early stages this drove me nuts. Most people in the room were already converted. We had public meetings so we can say that thousands of people participated to give the planning process credibility. Most of what goes into the plan will be ignored until it becomes advantageous. We can use MetroFuture to lobby. But it is hard to make implementation concrete. You can scare people when you make it too concrete. So you end up with broad-brush recommendations. It is a frustrating process. An implementation task force worked to connect MetroFuture to state funding sources and create incentives for local communities to adopt components of the plan. An impor tant win for MetroFuture came shortly after MetroFuture was ratified: the Massachusetts Executive Office of Transportation (EOT) adopted the demographic predictions of MetroFuture as the basis of its statewide transportation forecasting. The impact of EOT using the projections from MetroFuture was important for reviews and the approval of large-scale regional transportation projects. In addition, the fact that the state asked the Boston MPO to make its numbers consistent with MAPC’s MetroFuture models is an indication that MetroFuture is taken seriously at the state level. It also helps connect MAPC’s land use planning with the MPO’s financing. If the MPO incorporates concepts from MetroFuture into its regional transportation plan and its modeling, the MetroFuture plan will influence the allocation of TIP funds and development of large-scale

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transportation projects that support more compact development. One method of connecting TIP funding to MetroFuture is the TIP Evaluation Criteria, mentioned previously, which allocates additional points for projects that meet the goals of MetroFuture. Here it is important to note MAPC’s evolving strategy to overcome its lack of formal authority. Without other direct implementation mechanisms, MAPC has to make MetroFuture central to the work of other state agencies. This can be accomplished by demonstrating that MetroFuture is technically sound and accurately models regional employment, transportation, land use, and demographics. When state agencies start to use MAPC’s data and refer to MetroFuture as the accepted plan for the region, then it can influence development decisions. Here expertise is impor tant. The EOT would not have adopted MAPC’s projections if EOT staff did not think MAPC’s numbers were credible. Another example of this type of influence can be seen in the 2012 adoption of the Stronger Region scenarios (which came out of MetroFuture) as the “basis for the Commonwealth’s multifamily housing production goal, and [the Commonwealth] is now working to coordinate local and state policies to support the achievement of that goal.”  Based on MAPC’s numbers, Governor Deval Patrick set a goal of the annual creation of 10,000 units of multifamily housing to meet the region’s housing needs. This is critical to meeting MetroFuture’s Housing Choices goal of “a diverse array of housing choices [that] will meet the needs of the region’s residents.”

Taking Implementation to the Next Level Although MetroFuture might have ended up as yet another regional plan on the shelf, since 2007, much has changed in support of regional approaches. MAPC has become a more effective organization with more political clout and state support. In addition, the Obama administration’s emphasis on regional planning and associated funding through the Sustainable Communities Regional Planning (SCRP) grant was critical for implementing MetroFuture. In 2010, MAPC capitalized on its ability to convene diverse stakeholders to apply for and win a $4 million SCRP grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. MAPC’s proposal was the creation of a consortium of stakeholders, the Metro Boston Sustainable Communities Consortium, which brings together 170 members (including 66 municipalities) and works to implement the MetroFuture plan. As a

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result of the grant, MAPC has been able to improve its capacity building functions by strengthening its regional indicators project, providing local planning assistance to help localities implement the plan, and providing more opportunities for regional dialogue. The grant has been an important mechanism for translating the broad-brush ideas of sustainability from the MetroFuture plan down to implementation at the local level. According to the 2014 report of accomplishments, as a result of the funding MAPC was able to promote transit-oriented development (TOD) planning by leading planning for “five station area and corridor plans” and also “supported our Community Development Corporation (CDC) partners in four additional plans.” In addition, MAPC worked with partners to lobby for state transportation reform and an additional $600 million for transportation infrastructure. A study by MAPC also identified gaps in TOD funding that needed to be resolved, and two new funds were created by the state to help finance TODs. To promote smart growth development in suburban communities, MAPC worked with the towns of Sherborn and Dover to develop “smart sewer” programs that provide for sewers only in designated growth areas and promote more compact and mixed-use development. They also helped Millis and Bolton develop mixed-use zoning plans that allow for affordable housing. MAPC worked with four other communities on master planning and visioning. The SCRP grant supported MAPC’s efforts to reach out to thousands of citizens in workshops and planning processes and to expand its mission to include equity. MAPC also produced the Regional Fair Housing and Equity Assessment, the Regional Analyses of Impediments (with the South Shore HOME Consortium), and the Fair Housing Toolkit. According to MAPC, this funding was critical to expanding its mission to include equity: This focus on equity is also transforming MAPC. Our governing board endorsed the State of Equity Policy Agenda, which includes recommended actions on a range of issues that have not historically been in MAPC’s wheelhouse (e.g., income inequality and youth jobs). We now include sections on equity and engagement in our scoping documents and project products. And we are evaluating our projects on their outcomes, including the extent to which equity goals were advanced. As we move forward, we intend to continue working with our allies on these issues—through policy and legislative work, as well as through place-based project work.

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As the money for the federal Sustainable Communities grant ran out, MAPC was able to convince the governor and the state legislature to increase the state budget for technical assistance for Regional Planning Agencies (RPAs) and increase the assessments that communities pay to MAPC. In addition, with growing concern about the impact of climate change in the Greater Boston region, MAPC worked with communities to develop the Metro-Boston Regional Climate Change Adaptation Strategy. The recommendations from this report have been incorporated into the MetroFuture plan implementation strategy. This report builds on some of MAPC’s previous work such as the South Shore Coastal Hazards Adaptation study (funded by the District Local Technical Assistance program) they conducted in 2011 that helped the towns of Scituate, Marshfield, and Duxbury identify the potential challenges arising from climate change. What MAPC is calling “Long Range Planning for Sea Level Rise” is a growing area of concern and may serve to incentivize communities to work together. Whereas the Boston MetroPlan 2000 was essentially a regional plan that guided MAPC’s work and was hit-or-miss in terms of local implementation, MetroFuture has taken on a life of its own. Since its ratification in 2007, MetroFuture has become a part of the ongoing conversation about the future of the region. MAPC has done this by strategically reaching out to a broad range of stakeholders in its planning process and working to ensure that MetroFuture is at the core of local, state, and regional decision making. This does not mean that all communities have adopted MetroFuture’s recommendations. To be clear, local communities still make their own planning decisions primarily based on community values and concerns about local finances. However, MAPC is becoming a more politically relevant organization with an expanding mission and increasing influence at the state level. MAPC has moved beyond land use planning and is now working with a diverse group of stakeholders to think about the components that go into creating a more sustainable region. MAPC is also increasingly interested in questions of equity and social justice.

Impact of State Policy on Local and Regional Planning MAPC’s influence in the region has been strengthened by state regulations that promote planning. Executive Order (EO) 418, a state policy passed in 2000, helped raise MAPC’s profile by providing $30,000 to communities that

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could be used toward community development and housing certification plans that outlined strategies for affordable housing production. As a result of this order, localities were encouraged to prepare buildout analyses to better understand where their existing zoning was taking them. MAPC worked with about 25 communities in 2006 to help strengthen their planning to meet smart growth goals. MAPC helped more than fi ft y communities in the region hire planning consultants to meet the planning requirements of EO 418. In doing so, communities recognized that MAPC could help them plan in ways they could not on their own. According to MAPC staff, they worked “with municipalities to show them how it would be beneficial to grow smart. We went to every municipality and showed our PowerPoint and met with the mayors and planning staff.” Communities started to think of MAPC as the “folks who helped them on 418.”  For many communities, the EO 418 process was the first time that they turned to MAPC for technical planning expertise. MAPC officials recognized that the EO 418 process was instrumental in that it encouraged communities to develop mini-community master plans and engage in a short visioning session. Since it is difficult to change zoning in the town form of government, zoning might be changed to match the comprehensive plan slowly over the course of many years. In the case of the Town of Stoughton, a suburban community located outside the I-495 beltway, the EO 418 process identified a community interest in buying up open space. Years later, when a ninety-acre parcel came up for purchase, town officials used money from the Community Preservation Act to purchase the parcel for open space preservation. This was an example of how a community identifying a goal through a planning process like EO 418 helped guide development and investment decisions years later. Although MAPC cannot claim direct responsibility for the purchase of open space in Stoughton, its planning process helped the community identify community priorities that guided future investment. Chapter 40B, a state regulation that allows the state to overrule local land use regulations for projects in communities where less than 10 percent of the housing stock is affordable, has also influenced the willingness of communities to plan for affordable housing. According to Chapter 40B, if a community does not meet the 10  percent affordable threshold, a developer can propose projects with 20–25  percent affordable units on lots where zoning would preclude residential development. Using Chapter 40B developers can also propose projects with higher densities than would normally be allowed. Many local planners and officials feel that Chapter 40B has thwarted local

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efforts to plan for growth. However, despite criticism of the program, it is clear that Chapter 40B has been essential for the development of affordable housing in the Greater Boston Region. According to the Fair Housing and Equity Assessment for Metro Boston, “of the 15,000 affordable housing units constructed outside Boston between 2001 and 2012, more than half were permitted under Chapter 40B.”  The regulation has also led to more proactive planning for affordable housing production since communities can protect themselves against Chapter 40B development if they develop a Housing Production Plan (HPP). The need for HHPs has raised MAPC’s profi le because MAPC has the expertise communities need to prepare these plans. As a part of the Sustainable Communities grant, MAPC made the data from their Regional Housing Production plan accessible on the web (Housing MA) for communities to use to prepare their HPPs. Other state policies have also impacted the residential sector at the local level and worked to promote smart growth. In 2004, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts passed Chapter 40R to promote smart growth and affordable housing. Under Chapter  40R, communities that developed smart growth overlay districts would be eligible to receive a density bonus payment of $3,000 per unit of housing built in the overlay district. The overlay district had to be near transit or commercial centers and use existing sewer infrastructure. Density in the overlay has to be between 8 to 20 units per acre (depending on type) and  20  percent of the housing has to be affordable. Communities with approved 40R districts can maintain design control over the new developments, and if the new developments threaten to overburden the local school systems, these communities are eligible for “school cost insurance” through the 40S legislation. Communities that adopt the 40R overlay districts are also protected from the Chapter  40B comprehensive permit (where a developer could override local zoning if the community did not meet the 10  percent affordable housing provision). As of October 2009, twentyseven communities adopted the 40R overlay districts and about twenty more were considering the overlays. According to a 2009 report, “The existence of Chapter 40B has positioned Chapter 40R as an attractive alternative for municipalities and developers, with its promise of greater local control over siting and design, cash payments for cities and towns, a less contentious approval process and the removal of certain financial restrictions on developers.” Like the stick of Chapter  40B, the carrot of Chapter 40R has also helped raise MAPC’s profi le and promote the goals outlined in its regional plan. As a part of MAPC’s Sustainable Communities grant,

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MAPC helped lobby to change the Chapter 40R “smart growth housing location criteria.” Governor Patrick’s 2012 Statewide Housing Production goal of building 10,000 multifamily units a year until 2020 has also changed some communities’ willingness to site multifamily units, in part because there is funding to support investments in affordable housing. MAPC’s legislative work has also helped increase funding for smart growth and transportation planning. MAPC worked in conjunction with the Massachusetts Smart Growth Alliance to create the Transportation Investment Coalition to lobby for more state transportation funds. Through advocacy efforts, they were able to increase Massachusetts’s Bond Cap to promote more investment in infrastructure. According to MAPC’s list of legislative accomplishments from one year (2013–14), they helped increase MAPC’s assessment by $560,000, restored the minimum wage and offered unemployment insurance, increased funding for transportation (including the South Coast Rail and the extension of the Green Line), supported funding for low and moderate income housing, and raised taxes to fund transportation.

The Power of Advocating at the State Level As shown above, part of the success of MetroFuture comes from MAPC’s efforts to engage in statewide policy making. MAPC’s Metro Mayors Coalition (MMC) has been critical because it has demonstrated to local mayors the importance of speaking with one regional voice. Established in 2001, the coalition, which is staffed by MAPC, brings together fourteen regional mayors to discuss common concerns and lobby at the state level. Early on, the MMC focused on a municipal relief agenda (helping to improve the financial situation of local cities). Their work on municipal finance influenced the passage of the municipal relief law of 2003, which helped communities manage their finances through capped costs and easier financing. In addition, the MMC lobbied to increase state transportation funding by $500 million per year over a five-year period. The success of the MMC is attributed to the political clout of the mayors and the involvement of the mayor of Boston. One MAPC official said, “Boston is involved and we can use their political capital . . . we make it to the newspaper.” The MMC lobbied for statewide anti-gang legislation known as the Senator Charles E. Shannon Jr. Community Safety Initiative. As a result, in 2006,

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$1.2 million was allocated to ten communities in the Metro Boston region and ten in Essex County to improve public safety through the Shannon Grant Community Safety Initiative. The funding for the Shannon Grant has varied over the years, with a $7 million dollar budget in FY 2015. In addition, the MMC worked on a joint application to Homeland Security that resulted in a $1.96 million grant for public safety equipment. Under a Homeland Security contract through the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety, MAPC also works with local communities to help plan and prepare for emergencies. Through the Metro Boston Climate Change Preparedness Commitment, the MMC has been developing a strategy to help localities prepare for climate change challenges. The winter of 2014–2015’s immobilizing snow highlighted the critical need for cooperation in climate change adaptation measures. These examples of regional coordination may not be specifically tied to the implementation of MetroFuture, but they increase MAPC’s influence in the region. The more helpful MAPC can be to local elected officials, the more relevant MAPC is as an organization. The more connected MAPC is to local elected officials, the more willing state officials are to listen.

Cooperative Purchasing Another area where MAPC has demonstrated its usefulness to local governments is through the Municipal Collaboration Department. Sharing the costs for certain ser vices, such as a regional dispatch system for police and fire departments, has started to make more sense for communities in a fiscally constrained environment. MAPC’s Collective Procurement program helps communities join together to buy equipment, such as police and fire vehicles and parking meters, and provide highway maintenance ser vices. MAPC facilitates intermunicipal partnerships for emergency management, police, and fire ser vices. As the Greater Boston Police Council’s purchasing and administrative agent, MAPC helps three hundred units of government purchase public safety supplies and police vehicles. Being helpful in procuring police cars and coordinating ser vices may not seem like a way to build power, but it can translate into being a trusted agency and can spill over into areas such as land use planning. In 2006, MAPC helped thirty-one municipalities buy $18 million worth of office supplies and highway maintenance equipment. In 2007, MAPC was able to save communities over $2 million

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through joint purchasing of more than $50 million of equipment and services. On July 25, 2007, Governor Patrick signed legislation that allowed cities and towns to join the Group Insurance Commission (GIC), which serves state employees and other groups by providing them with health care and other benefits. Cities and towns have saved millions of dollars by joining. This initiative was a direct result of MAPC’s Municipal Health Insurance Working Group, a two-year effort facilitated by MAPC that brought together regional stakeholders to propose a solution to the rising cost of providing health care benefits to municipal employees. More recently, MAPC’s energy division is negotiating with a Regional Energy Ser vices Company (ESCO) to offer “energy management ser vices” to communities.

Capacity Building: Technical Expertise— Data, Mapping, Planning, and Convening MAPC also builds power by providing planning support to communities. Although the local communities in the MAPC region often face similar pressures, different communities adopt varying policies. The differences in how communities plan reflect the views of elected and appointed town officials, variations in community values, and participants in local legislative bodies (particularly town meetings). Professional planners in these communities have traditionally taken their cue from public officials and volunteer boards rather than looking to MAPC for solutions. MAPC has been working to change this by being helpful to local planners by reviewing draft bylaws, assisting with visioning efforts, preparing buildout analyses, providing planning assistance and data, conducting studies, convening stakeholders, and developing a “visual preference poll” (by showing pictures of different development types). The staff of MAPC helps member communities think about what types of development they would like to see. The MAPC has the expertise to show citizens and local planners what their bylaws allow for and prevent. This can be very useful, particularly in places where volunteer boards, which are not necessarily experts, are responsible for much of the planning. However, one of the challenges MAPC faces is quantifying its impact. According to one executive committee member, “MAPC doesn’t keep a good scorecard on what cities and towns do based on MAPC influence. Staff know, but there is no scorecard.” When asked to rate MAPC’s effectiveness in assisting local planning, staff members pointed to the number of

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zoning bylaws that they have helped to write. According to the 2006 Annual Report, “The agency has helped over 70 cities and towns rewrite zoning bylaws, evaluate smart growth uses for key parcels, keep traffic under control and expand transit, deal with crime, and prepare for natural disasters.” Often communities will hire MAPC to take care of the mapping components of their development plans. They can also ask for assistance with community visioning (Sharon and Wrentham); natural resources, housing, and community development plans (Winthrop); and transportation planning. In 2007 MAPC helped several communities with their mixed-use zoning bylaws (Millis, Southborough, Stoughton, Bedford, and Stow). One of them, the Town of Stoughton, had cluster zoning on the books, but it was not usable the way the bylaws were written, so MAPC helped to rewrite them. Th ree of the communities passed the town meeting (no easy feat; local planners who were interviewed all observed that getting zoning bylaws approved at a town meeting can be difficult). Funding from the Sustainable Communities Regional Planning grant supported the development of a Housing Production Plan for the communities of Bellingham, Foxborough, Sharon, Belmont, Watertown, and Lexington. In an age of Big Data, MAPC’s expertise in GIS and data analysis is increasingly important for local and regional decision making. MAPC worked with the Boston Foundation to develop an online GIS mapping tool that can be used by citizens and local planners to better understand the planning challenges they face. The website www.MetroCommondata.org (now www .metroboston.datacommon.org), launched in 2006, is an important resource for local communities because it brings together census data and demographic, housing, and economic information on the Internet that the 101 cities and towns in the region want and need to use. Access to this type of data is particularly helpful for smaller communities that may not have staff dedicated to data collection and GIS. MAPC can also help communities recognize the impacts of their planning decisions in the context of regional and sub-regional trends. Through MAPC’s eight sub-regional councils, local planners have a forum to discuss the challenges they face, to hear what neighboring communities are doing, and to advise MAPC on the effectiveness of its policies. The sub-regional councils help to spot shared concerns and come up with solutions to local problems. One local official described the value of these committees: “The community exchange part of the sub-regional committee agenda is helpful because communities can share information about projects.” Another

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local official acknowledged wanting to be at the sub-regional meetings to make sure that transportation projects that are important to his town’s development get on the sub-regional agenda: “I attend these meetings because on a bi-annual basis there is a discussion about sub-regional transportation priorities. I go to the meetings and talk to people. There are too many projects in the region and not enough money so I need to constantly lobby and sell my town’s projects.” Local planners also receive training in GIS and other technical assistance at the sub-regional level. Th is helps planners develop the expertise they need to develop effective planning documents at the local level. The sub-regional councils allow MAPC to respond to the unique challenges facing the various parts of the region. For instance, the most pressing inter-municipal issues in the I-495 region, the ring road around Boston, are sewage treatment, drinking water supplies, and transportation. Since most I-495 communities are not connected to the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA), which provides drinking water and wastewater treatment for most of Greater Boston, they cannot accommodate significant new development with concurrent investments in water and sewage infrastructure. Serious concerns about protecting aquifers and drinking water supplies in the I-495 region have led some communities to adopt laws governing development near wetlands that are stricter than state standards. MAPC provides technical assistance and serves as a convener of stakeholders around environmental issues and an educational resource for these communities. MAPC has also played a key role in developing a process to assess Community Priority Areas of Regional Significance as a part of the Massachusetts’s Land Use Priority Plan Process (started in 2008). Local officials first determine local priority areas and then MAPC applies a Priority Development Area Scoring to each proposed site that takes into account a site’s travel options, walkability, importance for open space preservation, importance for watershed health, existing assets, and potential for growth. MAPC has worked with fi ft y-two communities to help them determine these priorities. According to MAPC, the composite score was developed “in direct response to the Commonwealth’s Sustainable Development Principles (www.mass .gov/envir/smart _ growth _toolkit /pdf /patrick-principles.pdf), the South Coast Rail Economic Development and Land Use Corridor Plan, MAPC’s regional plan MetroFuture: Making a Greater Boston Region, OCPC’s [Old Colony Planning Council] regional plan Regional Policy

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Plan: A Guide for Shaping Our Communities, and the OCPC Region and other RPA work programs.” Having a tool to evaluate the regional “value” of various development projects is an important way for MAPC to review local plans for their consistency with MetroFuture and other statewide sustainability goals. For the 495/MetroWest Development Compact, MAPC worked in conjunction with the Central Massachusetts Regional Planning Commission, Mass Audubon, the 495/MetroWest Corridor Partnership, and the Executive Office of Housing and Economic Development to develop a sub-regional process of identifying future development priorities. Since the 495/MetroWest region is part of what Mass Audubon identifies as the “sprawl frontier,” this sub-region has been the focus of much of MAPC’s work. The plan identified several growth districts: 82 acres at Worcester’s Innovation Square, 500 acres at the Foxborough Growth District, and a 4,000-acre redevelopment project at Devens on a former Army base. In 2014, various MAPC sub-regional councils put out Priority Mapping Reports that identified Priority Development Areas (PDAs), Significant Transportation Investments (STIs), and Priority Preservation Areas (PPAs). MAPC worked in a multi-year collaborative planning process with the communities in the sub-regions to identify areas that should be the focus of local, regional, and state investment. The strength of this approach is that the broad-brush goals set out in MetroFuture can be replaced with a set of feasible development and preservation projects that match with state goals and are eligible for government funding. In addition, the process forces communities to work with each other to set and evaluate priorities across the sub-region.

Influence of MAPC on Projects of Regional Significance An effective regional planning agency should also have a means of influencing projects of “regional significance,” large-scale projects that will have inter-municipal impacts (both positive and negative). While more recently MAPC has been involved in the Priority Development Area planning helping to proactively plan for regional development, another mechanism that MAPC has traditionally used to influence projects of regional significance is the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). If MAPC determines that a project will have a regional impact, it submits a letter to MEPA

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commenting on the draft and final Environmental Impact Reports (EIR). The challenge of this approach is that “by the time the draft EIR is written, a lot of the decisions have already been made. When a project reaches the stage of draft EIR, they have already gone through much of the public local process. They have been reviewed by the local planning board. MAPC arrives at a late hour, late in the process.” As a result, for MAPC to attempt to stop a project, it has to be convinced that something within it is egregious. MAPC officials recognize the limits of indirect authority: “We don’t have authority to say ‘no.’ Communities don’t have to listen to MAPC, but sometimes the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs can listen to MAPC and require that the developers take their recommendations into account. We try to leverage our influence. It isn’t direct authority because we don’t have veto power, or the ability to say, ‘You can’t do this.’ ” However, the good news for MAPC is once the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs includes MAPC’s concerns in a certificate, it becomes a state mandate and has the force of law behind it. MAPC’s influence on regional projects can depend on who is the Secretary of the Environment because some are more in tune with MAPC’s regional vision than others. Over the course of a permitting process, a project can be forced to change as a result of the certificate, which may be influenced by comments made by MAPC, but not directly because of MAPC. To show the range of influence that MAPC has had over projects of regional significance, I examine its role in the redevelopment of the South Weymouth Naval Air Station, Westwood Station, and the Somerville Assembly Square and Ikea Project. These three case studies were all large-scale development projects that had major regional transportation and land use impacts. In South Weymouth (Case Study 1), MAPC was an active participant in the early planning stages. Its role in Westwood Station (Case Study 2) and Assembly Square (Case Study 3) was much more limited. In all three cases, MAPC played a role in the planning phase; however, these three cases demonstrate the challenges of regional planning, particularly highlighting how vulnerable large-scale regional projects are to market conditions. While MAPC was able to comment on the proposals and make recommendations, the ultimate design of the projects was a function of market forces. In all three cases the economic downturn of 2008–2009 significantly impacted the scale and scope of the project. For the Assembly Square project, the success of the development is reflective of new development pressures in older

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communities adjacent to Boston. However, MAPC’s support of the transportation investments certainly supported the redevelopment.

Case Study 1: South Weymouth Naval Air Station Redevelopment

When the South Weymouth Naval Air Station closed in 1997, it was clear that any redevelopment of the site would take years, involve many stakeholders, and impact the region as a whole. Since the air station straddles South Weymouth, Rockland, and Abington, in the 1990s, through state legislation, a South Shore Tri-Town Development Corporation (SSTTDC) was formed with its own charter to act on behalf of the three towns. The SSTTDC was in charge of the zoning for the project. MAPC appointed one member to the eleven-member SSTTDC Advisory Board. The SSTTDC assumed some of the regulatory powers of the three towns regarding zoning, public infrastructure, schools, and water. The initial proposal for the redevelopment of the 1,400-acre South Weymouth Naval Air Station was a regional mall that would have increased traffic in the area significantly and required a direct highway connection to Route 3 that would have cost $50 to $70 million. Describing the process, one MAPC official said, “The question was should we be spending all this money for infrastructure development for another regional mall? There is already one that is down the road from the South Weymouth site.” While in this case MAPC was involved in pre-draft Environmental Impact Report (EIR) planning, MAPC’s comments on the draft EIR acknowledged the strengths of the project and suggested a number of improvements. Marc Draisen’s MAPC letter to MEPA concluded: “In sum, MAPC believes that this project merits careful review and analysis, and that if properly developed it can yield significant benefits to the region. Our comments above are offered in that spirit, and I hope you will take them into consideration as you prepare your Certificate on this Draft Environmental Impact Report and in subsequent phases of review.” While MAPC made recommendations in the MEPA letter, MAPC was in favor of the development overall. In fact, Marc Draisen emphasized the economic benefit of the project at a community meeting with neighboring towns in 2005: “The project supports itself. . . . Compared to other projects, this is an exceptionally good deal for the communities from

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a fiscal perspective. . . . The advantages to the communities as a whole are not limited to how much revenue will be made. Other favorable impacts include jobs, affordable homes, recreation amenities, and increased property values in surrounding areas.” MAPC made a number of recommendations regarding the placement of single-family homes at the eastern end of the airbase, a critical habitat for box turtles and a dragonfly on the endangered species list. In the final EIR, the developer decided not to put houses there and significantly altered the footprint of the project. In addition, the initial proposal was for a four-lane highway at the intersection of Route 18 and Route 3. The road would have crossed the wetlands and required a variance in accordance with the Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act. The plan was changed primarily because the developer was “legitimately concerned that they wouldn’t get the variance and permit under the Natural Heritage and Endangered Species Program.” Since the state contributed money for the road, the state also had a say in the plan. The revised proposal by the developer, LNR Property LLC, provided for development on 400 acres along with the preservation of about 1,000 acres (some of it would be a golf course). LNR moved the development to a different part of the site in order to avoid the wetlands since the local conservation commission, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), and the Natural Heritage and Endangered Species Program (NHESP) would have to issue permits. LNR wanted to avoid complications with these regulatory agencies. Here it is important to note that in the final EIR, the developer made many of the changes suggested by MAPC including the use of Low Impact Development (LID) strategies, a focus on wildlife conservation, particularly managing the turtles, and the relocation of the home sites. Although MAPC did not wield a heavy stick, it played an important role in improving the project so that it met environmental and smart growth criteria, which the 2005 LNR Master Plan acknowledges. The current master plan for the development, known as SouthField, reserves 1,000 acres for open space and recreation and features small, clustered neighborhoods. The development team won the Massachusetts Office for Commonwealth Development Smart Growth award for an “environmentally-sensitive, master planned, and mixed-use development.” SouthField is working toward LEED Neighborhood Design Platinum consideration with a focus on sustainable practices. With 3,800 planned housing units, a substantial proportion of affordable housing, and two million square feet of commercial and industrial uses proposed, the project will raise significant tax revenue.

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The SouthField story demonstrates how MAPC was able to influence the planning process through its early engagement and its ability to formally voice the agency’s concerns in the draft review of the EIR. As of 2015, the South Weymouth Airfield Station was not completed as originally planned, in part because the project did not generate the amount of money that was expected; as a result, the state had to pick up the tab on extending the road. The developers have had more difficulty than expected attracting the level of commercial and residential development to the project. However, despite setbacks, the project has been developed according to many of the principles of “smart growth” for which MAPC advocated in the initial review.

Case Study 2: Westwood Station

In January 2007, developers Cabot, Cabot, and Forbes submitted a draft EIR under the MEPA for the development of Westwood Station, a 4.5 million square foot mixed-use development. Although the project was located at an Amtrak stop, MAPC argued that it was not a “smart growth” approach at that location for two reasons: (1) the project was too big for the site; and (2) it would have negative impacts on the regional transportation and water systems. MAPC could not force the developer to change its plans, but it made its objections known in a letter to MEPA: “While this project has significant smart growth elements MAPC believes that it has not reached its potential— and the State must move it further along that path.” At Westwood Station, MAPC was particularly concerned about regional impacts. The property is located in the Town of Westwood, but it borders the Town of Canton. The predicted traffic would be on local roads and Route 128. MAPC came out against a decision by the Town of Westwood (proposed by Westwood to Norfolk County) to close Canton Street to traffic. This would have cut off neighboring communities from one another. Norfolk County, where the communities are located, agreed to do a “trial run” of the street closure. MAPC based its comments on its expertise in traffic modeling and therefore avoided doing too much political damage to its relationship with the Town of Westwood. In 2015, the 130-acre project now known as University Station looks quite different than originally planned, primarily because of the economic downturn and resulting market forces. It continues to be a residential development near the train station; however, the hopes that it would have a mixed-use main street have not come to fruition. MAPC

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officials anticipate that over time, as market forces shift, this too will be redeveloped with smart growth principles in mind.

Case Study 3: From Assembly Square Ikea Project to Assembly Row

The Assembly Square project consisted of 1.4 million square feet of retail, 5 million square feet of research and development and office space, and 3 million square feet of residential space in Somerville. According to MAPC’s 2007 MEPA letter, “When fully developed, this project will be consistent with many of MAPC’s Smart Growth Principles. Specifically, the project has undergone an extensive public process; it is located on a brownfield site; at full build-out it will be transit oriented; it will provide a mixture of uses including jobs and housing, and 12.5  percent of the housing units will be affordable. In addition, the project will incorporate some innovative techniques for handling storm water: the project will incorporate green roofs and will store storm water for irrigation needs. LEED certification will be sought for the IKEA store.” Although in 2007 MAPC viewed the project as consistent with regional goals, the project was not always a model of transit-oriented development. The project had a number of earlier iterations that called primarily for big box retail development. Stalled in court by community activists, it was only after years of negotiation that the project reemerged as a mixed-use transit-oriented project. Over the course of project evaluation, MAPC helped with the analysis of the impacts of different types of development on transportation and employment. Although MAPC did not take a public stand on the project, both proponents and opponents used MAPC’s data. The Mystic River Task Force that opposed the initial project used the data that MAPC provided, particularly the transportation impacts of the project, to make its case. On October 17, 2006, Somerville mayor Joseph A. Curtatone announced that an agreement had finally been reached between the City of Somerville and the developers. The Planned Unit Development (PUD) plan for the site was approved in December 2006. A new Orange Line Station was planned and IKEA and Federal Realty Investment Trust would contribute $15 million toward design and construction of the new station (an additional $25 million to be paid by the federal New Start Program). In 2015, due to shifting market demands, the project changed significantly. IKEA is no longer

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involved; however, it is interesting to note that the development has many smart growth components. In addition, in 2015, there were plans for the expansion of the project reflecting regional demographic and housing trends: a growing number of residents are looking for multifamily housing in closein cities near public transit.

From Capacity Building to Policy Making As the story of MAPC demonstrates, over time regional planning agencies without authority can use their capacity building as a tool to influence policy. As one MAPC executive committee member said: “The perception is that MAPC has no regulatory influence . . . no teeth and we are not effective. There are other regional planning agencies with more direct influence, but in light of the fact that we don’t have authority, we have had increasing influence through good work.” The more that MAPC can help communities save money on the purchase of police cars and on municipal services, can demonstrate its influence on the legislature, can provide technical assistance to local planners, and can bring in federal funds, the more it has been able to demonstrate the value of regional cooperation. If we measure the effectiveness of MAPC solely in terms of the extent to which local communities adopt its regional plan, then its influence is uneven. There is limited consistency between MAPC’s plans and local planning and zoning. However, if we look at its broader impact, we see that MAPC has been increasingly effective in shaping the development conversation in the region. It serves as an opinion shaper, a place where local officials can convene and discuss issues of concern, and a resource providing communities with data, planning, and technical assistance. MetroFuture has not had an automatic influence on local planning decisions, but it has made a difference in the region. It serves as an important political tool that MAPC uses to influence state agencies that have greater authority. The infusion of federal money from the Sustainable Communities Regional Planning grant has also been critical for the implementation of the plan. The grant allowed MAPC to connect MetroFuture with a diverse group of stakeholders in the region and also to expand the conversation about regional planning to include critical concerns, such as affordable housing and social equity. MAPC’s story offers lessons for metropolitan planning agencies across the country that rely on capacity building to influence regional planning.

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Through innovation, leadership, expertise, and an understanding of how to influence other stakeholders who have more authority, MAPC has reinvented itself and become more relevant. However, despite progress, MAPC still operates in the context of a relatively weak state-planning framework in which localities are each struggling according to a local logic (often based on fiscal constraints). Without direct authority over the allocation of transportation funds or the power to reject local plans, the implementation of MetroFuture’s goals may continue to be more haphazard than in places with plan consistency and MPO status. Still, the story of MAPC offers hope for other metropolitan planning agencies to reinvent themselves and build momentum for smart growth and regional approaches.

CHAPTER 3

Becoming a Regional Player in Denver Our senses tell us that the Colorado that we once knew is rapidly changing. Denver used to be a compact, attractive city with clear air and a magnificent view of the Front Range. Now, coming in for a landing at Stapleton Field, we see down below a metropolitan area sprawling toward the horizon in all directions— often covered by a blanket of smog obscuring the Front Range. Is this Denver? —Colorado Land Use Commission, “A Land Use Program for Colorado: Report by the Colorado Land Use Commission” (1973).

In 1973, the Colorado Land Use Commission was concerned that the state was changing. Denver was no longer the small cattle town that it had once been. Instead it was “sprawling toward the horizon in all directions.” In 1970, the population of the Denver metropolitan region was 1,235,936; by 2000, it had reached 2,400,580 and the sprawl would continue. In 1999, when asked by the Pew Center for Civic Journalism about their key concerns, 60 percent of the respondents in the Denver region cited traffic, growth, and sprawl. And there was reason to be alarmed. In a two-year period between 2000 and 2002, a shocking 22 square miles of open space in the Denver metropolitan region was developed. While the rate of population growth and land use change has slowed down since 2002, the challenges facing the Denver region are still large. The Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG), the council of governments and MPO for the region, predicts that between 2015 and 2040, the population of the Denver region will grow from 3.1 million to 4.3 million people. Even without an additional million-plus people, congestion in the Denver metropolitan region is already ranked the third worst in the nation,

Figure 2. DRCOG Planning Boundaries. Courtesy of the Denver Regional Council of Governments.

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according to the Texas Transportation Institute. Water is also a major concern for the region because demand is predicted to outpace supply, particularly with climate change. The fear of congestion, air pollution, water depletion, uncontrolled growth, possible state-led regulations, and federal penalties for non-compliance on air pollution has led citizens and leaders in the Denver region to adopt a more regional approach, and the results have been impressive. Denver and DRCOG are considered to be “a model of regional cooperation, with municipalities and counties working together improve infrastructure and accommodate growth.” Among the fruits of this cooperation are the Central Platte Valley Light Rail Line, Union Station development, the T-REX project, the region’s first large-scale light rail project, which created nineteen miles of new track and expanded Interstate 25 and I-225 at a cost of $1.67 billion, the passage of FasTracks (in 2004), a light rail system funded by a $4.7 billion dollar bond measure approved by the region’s voters, the Mile High Compact, DRCOG’s Metro Vision Regional Plan, and a voluntary Urban Growth Boundary. Speaking about support for FasTracks, Denver mayor John Hickenlooper (2003–2011) said: “Th is strong consensus really defines the metro area as a region that works together.” The fact that 58 percent of the region’s voters had decided to tax themselves (through an increase in sales tax from .06 to .1  percent) $4.7 billion in order to fund a regional light rail project signaled that citizens saw the value of acting at the regional level, at least when it came to transportation investments. For policy makers and scholars, the idea that a metropolitan region such as Denver, with a history of sprawl and political conservatism, could embrace a regional approach is seen as evidence that voluntary approaches could gain significant traction elsewhere. The fact that Denver is considered a leader in regionalism is somewhat surprising given that in the 1990s Denver’s development patterns were being compared to those of Los Angeles, a national symbol of sprawling development. In addition, Denver is considered more conservative than other parts of the country where more progressive planning policies have typically taken hold. But in the 1990s something happened in Denver. Writing in 1997, Bill Hornby, chairman of DRCOG, wrote that he was optimistic about DRCOG’s new regional plan, Metro Vision, because “what’s important about any major plan such as Vision 2020 is as much the public relations punch of its concepts as the planning merit of its details.” He described a plan that citizens, environmentalists, and the business community could all get

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behind. Uncontrolled urban growth had gotten so bad in Denver that there was now political support for metropolitanism: “What’s different about metro planning in 1990s is that the whole climate of communications and politics has fundamentally shifted. Citizens are tremendously concerned about the changes population growth will bring to all of Colorado, and there is new pressure for responsible planning on legislators and administrators, whether city, county, or state.” Myron Orfield, writing in 2000, explained Denver’s rise in regionalism as a reaction to the increasingly complex challenges facing the region: “ There has been a growing recognition of the benefits of a regional approach to addressing metropolitan problems.” A local planning director I spoke with agreed: “Usually people cooperate when things are so great or so bad that they will do something together.” Bob Ewegen, in a 1999 Denver Post article, also pondered why regionalism was taking hold in Colorado: “As newcomers to this state quickly learn, Colorado doesn’t have anything approaching regional government. Even today, metro Denver more closely resembles the warring city states of ancient Greece than a cohesive community of interest. Yet, we’ve managed to regionalize certain specific ser vices including RTD [Regional Transportation District], sewage, flood control, cultural facilities, and our new baseball and football stadiums.” Ewegen attributed some of the success of regionalism to DRCOG, whose “only real power is the power to seek a consensus.” Th is chapter focuses on the role that DRCOG, a voluntary association of governments and the MPO for the region, has played in promoting regionalism. DRCOG includes fift y-six county and city governments that each pay membership dues and have local elected officials who serve on the DRCOG board of directors. One local planning director described DRCOG “as local government” because it is made up of local elected officials. The governor appoints three non-voting members to the board, and the City and County of Denver each have one representative (because Denver pays for two memberships). DRCOG is funded through membership dues, state and federal grants, in-kind ser vices, and ser vice income. However, Ewegen’s framing of DRCOG as just an entity with “the power to seek consensus” is not entirely true, since DRCOG’s role as the MPO gives it an added level of authority that Boston’s MAPC lacks (see Chapter 2). The Denver region turns out to be an excellent case study for understanding how being the MPO for the region influences the ability of a metropolitan planning agency to shape land use planning decisions. If we define metropolitan authority as the presence of money and power, DRCOG has more

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authority than Boston’s MAPC—since DRCOG is also the MPO for the region—but less than Portland’s Metro, because it does not operate in the context of a strong state land use planning framework. (Although Colorado state law requires that local jurisdictions have comprehensive plans, they are currently only advisory.) According to one local planning director, “DRCOG is not a regulatory agency and they are the first ones to tell you that.” In fact, DRCOG staff members highlighted the progress they had made using non-regulatory tools.

The Power of a Vision: Metro Vision When planners, scholars, and policy makers attempt to explain the success of Denver’s regionalism, they point to Metro Vision, a major regional visioning and planning process that DRCOG initiated in the 1990s. In 1992, DRCOG adopted the Metro Vision 2020 Vision Statement, Principles, and Policies, and in 1993, it adopted the 2015 Interim Regional Transportation Plan outlining future transit and road improvements. In 1997, after two years of committee work and public input, DRCOG adopted the Metro Vision 2020 plan outlining the goals for the future development of the region without regard to fiscal limitations. These goals include (1) compact and efficient future development, (2) safe and environmentally friendly mobility choices that are integrated with land use planning, (3) the development of mixeduse, pedestrian-oriented urban centers in the region, (4) maintaining the Cities of Boulder, Longmont, Brighton, and Castle Rock as distinct freestanding communities, (5) minimizing semi-urban, large-lot development on the region’s edges, (6) creating a permanent, linked park and open space system, (7) developing senior-friendly communities, (8) maintaining and improving air and water quality standards, and (9) minimizing exposure to excessive noise from land and transportation uses. Metro Vision was designed to be “voluntary, flexible, collaborative, and effective” because, according to Bob LeGare, an Aurora city councillor at the time of adoption, they recognized that “there’d be mass exodus if [the plan] became a mandate” and DRCOG “wouldn’t exist if we didn’t all pay dues, so they’re not going to do something that upsets half their members.” Larry Mugler, DRCOG’s Director of Development Ser vices at the time, acknowledged that they could punish municipalities that did not comply with the plan by denying them TIP funding, but “the board’s position is that we’re

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not going to have some hammer . . . on communities. . . . It has to get kind of extreme before . . . a board like ours is willing to use that kind of power against a single member.” However, other DRCOG board members also pointed out that the transportation money was connected to the plan, so it was not entirely voluntary. They recognized that there was always a threat that DRCOG could deny them transportation funding if they did not play along. As a part of the Metro Vision process, DRCOG also pioneered an innovative idea: a voluntary Urban Growth Boundary/Area (UGB/A). The UGB/A was originally proposed to limit the development of the region to 750 square miles by 2030. It was considered a “ belt tightening” for the region, which was expected to reach 1,100 square miles if all the communities were built out according to their existing zoning. The creation of the UGB/A was contentious, and even today, with its expansion to 980 square miles, there is ongoing discussion about how to determine the UGB/A and what to do about communities that are not in compliance (discussed more later in the chapter). Assistance in getting communities to take Metro Vision and the voluntary UGB/A seriously came in the form of another innovative planning idea: the development of the Mile High Compact (MHC), which its authors described as “a landmark voluntary agreement.” By signing on to the MHC, jurisdictions take an extra step in the adoption of the goals outlined in Metro Vision, DRCOG’s voluntary regional plan, and commit themselves under Colorado state law to work together “to manage and direct growth throughout the Denver region by adhering to the principles outlined in Metro Vision.” The MHC was signed in 2000 by twenty-five cities and five counties that are also members of DRCOG. In 2015, forty-six communities representing about 90 percent of the regional population signed the MHC. Peter Kenney, co-founder and principal of the not-for-profit Civic Results, which started the Metro Mayors Caucus (MMC), a coalition of mayors from fortyone cities and towns in the region that worked together with DRCOG on the development and execution of the MHC, describes it as “voluntary regionalism that’s working.” While in many ways the Denver case tells the story of innovation in U.S. regional planning, the effectiveness of voluntary regionalism such as the MHC and the voluntary UGB/A is not always clear, even when transportation dollars are at stake. The MHC “makes good press, but it is not a useful tool for enforcement” since there are numerous examples where signatories

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have either not followed Metro Vision’s principles or have had different interpretations of its meaning. Communities that signed the MHC may participate in the DRCOG meetings and agree to plan in the spirit of the regional plan, but without enforcement, the regional planning direction continues to be dictated by local concerns. Similarly, there is significant debate about the effectiveness of the UGB at limiting urban sprawl.

History and Institutional Development of DRCOG To begin, it is worth understanding the history of DRCOG and other regional efforts because the story is similar to other U.S. metropolitan regions where ad hoc regional organizations have morphed into official regional entities with significant influence over regional decision making. Over time and through several iterations, DRCOG developed into its current orga nizational form to respond to development pressures in the region. As the Denver region grew to a population of 620,000 in the 1950s, local jurisdictions saw the need for a regional approach to planning. The InterCounty Regional Planning Association (ICRPA) was created in 1955 with representatives from Adams, Arapahoe, and Jefferson Counties and the City and County of Denver. Not surprisingly, transportation was one of the first regional issues it tackled, and one of its foremost initiatives was support of a major east-west highway connection now known as Interstate 70. In 1957, ICRPA called for the construction of a freeway around the metropolitan region (now I-25), and in 1958 it approved its first regional transportation plan. The Valley Highway, which is now I-25, opened in 1958 and I-70 opened in 1964. ICRPA’s 1956 study of the region’s sewage and water needs led to the creation of the Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal District in 1960. ICRPA also conducted a 1959 study on how to relieve congestion at Stapleton International Airport by providing alternative airports for private aircraft. In the 1960s, as the region continued to grow to 937,677, ICRPA (which changed its name to ICRPC, where the “C” stands for “Commission”) produced Metro Growth Guide (1961), the first regional plan. ICRPC signed the first memorandum of agreement with the Colorado Department of Highways in 1963 in order to meet new federal planning requirements for the 3C (continuing, cooperative, and comprehensive) planning process. In 1966, ICRPC was reorga nized and in 1968 it was renamed the Denver Regional

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Council of Governments (known as DRCOG and pronounced “doctor cog”). In 1969, DRCOG supported legislation for the development of the Regional Transportation District (RTD) and the Urban Drainage and Flood District, both of which were later created by state law. The RTD could tax the region to “develop, operate, and maintain a system of mass transit.” This taxing authority has been critical in the funding of the region’s light rail system, now known as FasTracks. In the 1970s, DRCOG expanded to include the eight counties in the region and produced a regional housing plan. In 1971, the Joint Regional Planning Program was created, bringing together DRCOG, the RTD, and the Colorado Highway Department (now known as the Colorado Department of Transportation, or CDOT) to conduct joint land use and transportation planning. In 1973, under the Older Americans Act, DRCOG was designated the Area Agency on Aging. In 1975, in response to the oil crisis, DRCOG started a carpool-matching program and has subsequently focused on providing alternative means of transportation in the region. In 1977, the governor designated DRCOG as the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) for the region. In order to meet the federal MPO requirements, DRCOG, the RTD, and Colorado Highway Department signed a Memorandum of Agreement that they would jointly plan for the Denver region. In 1978, DRCOG adopted the Regional Growth and Development Plan, which provided the first comprehensive database of environmental resources for the region. In the 1980s, DRCOG expanded its scope of ser vices to include elevator and escalator safety programs, providing meals to the elderly, conducting studies on jail overcrowding and energy emergencies, and identifying ways that communities could share ser vices. It also produced the Transportation Planning Prospectus (1981) and the Regional Framework Plan (1985) and began the process of integrated assessment plans combining the annual updates for the Clean Water Plan, the Regional Transportation Plan (RTP), and the Regional Development Framework (RDF). During this time, DRCOG identified the need for transportation improvements on the I-25 corridor and recommended the construction and financing of a new convention center. In 1990, DRCOG’s control over regional transportation planning was increased by Colorado Senate Bill 208, requiring DRCOG board approval for RTD transit projects. DRCOG’s 1990 approval of the RTD proposal for the Metro Area Connector, a 3.2-mile light rail corridor downtown, served as the beginning of the region’s light rail system.

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The adoption of federal legislation known as the Intermodal Surface Transportation and Efficiency Act (ISTEA) in 1991 provided local governments with more control over federal transportation funds and strengthened the role of MPOs. ISTEA increased DRCOG’s influence over regional transportation funds. In its capacity as the MPO, DRCOG works with the Regional Air Quality Council and the Colorado Department of Health to develop transportation projects that improve regional air quality. DRCOG also works with the CDOT and the RTD on transportation planning for the region (discussed later). The DRCOG board of directors and a smaller Transportation Committee do the work of the MPO. The Transportation Committee is composed of ten voting members: the DRCOG executive director, the DRCOG chairman, two DRCOG board members, the chairman of Colorado’s Transportation Commission, a governor-appointed member of the Colorado Transportation Commission, the executive director of CDOT, RTD’s chairman of the board, RTD’s general manager, and another RTD board member. In addition, a representative from the Colorado Air Quality Control Commission and the Regional Air Quality Council serve as non-voting members. The DRCOG board can accept or reject the Transportation Committee’s recommendations; however, all MPO decisions must be approved by the DRCOG board and the Transportation Committee. This allows local elected representatives who serve on the DRCOG board to influence DRCOG’s transportation funding decisions.

Becoming a More Effective Institution Planners, citizens, DRCOG members, and staff members all said DRCOG has become more effective over time. One staff member said that, in the past, “being a DRCOG Board representative from a local government was not considered a very attractive assignment, but that has changed.”  Some of the reasons given for DRCOG’s success by interviewees were leadership, the Metro Vision Plan, a shared enemy, a common understanding of the problem of growth, and/or a common goal. In the late 1990s, there was growing concern in the region that Denver was on its way to becoming Los Angeles. Population growth was at around 2.2 percent, which was two times the national average. Rapid development in the region was coupled with growing traffic jams. Citizens started to be

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concerned. Environmental groups and citizens got together to propose stronger state land use regulations. A statewide ballot initiative (called the Responsible Growth Initiative, or Amendment 24) that would have given Colorado stronger state land use planning regulations is cited by many officials at DRCOG as one of the reasons that the elected officials at DRCOG started to work together. Amendment 24 would have required “cities and counties over a certain size to prepare maps of future growth areas, accounting for all the costs of roads, water, and sewer systems planned for the next ten years.”  The ballot initiative failed in part due to the $6 million of advertising against the initiative financed mostly by the real estate community. Officials in the region realized that one way to stave off the citizen initiative for stronger statewide planning was to develop their own regulations. This was one of the reasons given for why the Mile High Compact (MHC) was signed in 2000: fear of more top-down regulation prompted local officials to regulate themselves. Although the citizen ballot failed, it did have the effect of getting the elected officials to start seeing DRCOG as a mechanism for designing their own planning agenda rather than having it imposed on them by the state. Local officials are quick to point out that the reason that regionalism is working in Denver is not because of the heavy hand of state authority, but because of local control. At a Colorado state senate meeting in 1999 about growth management, Mayor Ed Tauer of Aurora said, “It is the opinion of the Metro Mayor’s Caucus that local control is what is making Metro Vision 2020 successful.”  As an alternative to state regulation, the MHC allowed local jurisdictions to agree to voluntarily commit themselves to certain planning goals and demonstrate that they did not need a statewide mandate. A DRCOG official described what it means to sign the MHC: “Those that haven’t signed the Mile High Compact understand that when they do sign it, they are committing themselves to plan in cooperation with neighboring jurisdictions. There may not be any teeth to it, but there is a certain amount of peer pressure to adhere to the tenets of it.”  The Metro Vision plan was also credited with the newfound effectiveness of DRCOG. One official said, “There have always been regional plans dating back to 1955 when DRCOG was formed, but the Metro Vision version of the regional plan was new and . . . included innovative features like the Urban Growth Boundary and Urban Growth Centers. It occurred at a time when there was both nationally and locally a resurgence of interest in regional planning and part of that was a recognition that local problems are regional

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problems and vice versa.”  The Metro Vision plan borrowed ideas from places like Portland, which had engaged in regional visioning. In the planning process, four different development alternatives were presented for discussion and evaluation. The initial plan was created after two years of public meetings and negotiations among DRCOG board members. In terms of implementation, the fact that the Metro Vision plan was linked to the allocation of TIP funding through a point system was also cited as an impor tant reason that it was taken more seriously than previous plans. Bill Vidal, DRCOG’s executive director in the late 1990s, was also mentioned as an important agent of change. The success of DRCOG was attributed to “a combination of Bill Vidal’s leadership and a convergence with an interest in regional planning in 1990s.”  Vidal brought a new perspective on collaboration and instituted some reforms at DRCOG. He also changed committee structures to provide more opportunities for local elected officials to participate. This reform was important because previously the advisory committees had been composed primarily of local planning staff members, who were not always in step with the elected officials. According to one DRCOG official, even though these local planning directors and senior planners work for the member governments, they are not always on the same page as their own elected officials. So there was a disconnect. Here these recommendations were coming forward from these advisory committees composed of planners, and their own elected officials didn’t necessarily agree with them. Because as savvy as some of the planners are, . . . they don’t always have the political fi lters that the elected officials have, they are not involved in the board dynamics and compromising so there was an intentional effort to involve the elected officials, Board members, in the decision making at the advisory committee. They wanted to them to be involved earlier on. The shift in DRCOG to more actively involving elected officials in policy making made a difference in the perceived political legitimacy of the organization. It also had the effect of making it easier to implement policies that had been agreed to by the local elected officials, who would ultimately have to be accountable to the voters. However, this change also had some negative consequences. Local planners acknowledged that the move further distanced them from the organization. One planner who used to serve on the Regional

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Planning Advisory Committee, DRCOG’s standing committee made up of planning directors and their designees, said, “The amount of information that we have from DRCOG is probably not the same as when I went to a standing meeting once a month.” Several DRCOG board members also talked about the importance of the Transportation Expansion Project (T-REX) project as a turning point for DRCOG, saying it “proved the importance of regionalism.” While the FasTracks project gets more media attention, the T-REX project was the first attempt by the region to invest in regional public transit. The initial idea for the project came from a 1992 DRCOG study on traffic congestion. Working with the RTD and CDOT, DRCOG developed a series of studies called Major Investment Studies (MIS), which examined the region’s major transportation corridors. The proposal was for the development of a light rail line and a highway. In order to secure funding for the project, local officials had to make their case to Washington; they succeeded and project construction began in 2001. During the T-REX project, officials felt that they had learned how to work together and that DRCOG had played a crucial role in this. DRCOG’s planning work was also cited as important to its influence in the region. According to COPIRG, “Those [MIS] studies charted the course for the development of FasTracks, an extensive network of multi-modal transportation options, including commuter rail, light rail, bus rapid transit and High Occupancy Vehicle Lanes. RTD Denver included the visions and plans set forth in Metro Vision 2020 and these series of Major Investment Studies in its proposed FasTracks Plan.” Since the development of FasTracks will dramatically change regional development by providing an alternative means of transportation and many opportunities for TOD projects, DRCOG’s role in planning for FasTracks is certainly an important indicator of its influence. A 2013 study by Keith Ratner and Andrew Goetz found that “all of the development in transit-served locations is having an effect on the land use and urban form of the Denver metropolitan area. Increased density, one of the critical objectives of the regional land use and transportation plan, including the FasTracks program, is clearly evident.” The success of other regional projects such as DIA were also cited as indicators of DRCOG’s regional impact; however, there was no agreement over how much influence DRCOG had. Some officials gave DRCOG credit, saying that the idea for DIA came from years of DRCOG planning for the region. Others were surprised when I asked about DIA: “What does DRCOG have to do with DIA? It was the City of Denver.” One official said, “DRCOG had

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no part to play in the siting or construction of DIA. It was a bi-lateral agreement between Denver and Adams County.” Both assessments may have some truth to them. DRCOG did help with the initial selection of the site for DIA (the DRCOG study proposed two sites), but during the political maneuvering that took place after the planning stage, the City of Denver and Adams County were the principal stakeholders. After years of negotiation, the final agreements that made the DIA project possible were between the two of them. Adams County agreed to annex land to Denver for the construction of the airport access road, known as Peña Boulevard, after Mayor Federico Peña (1983–1991), who was instrumental in putting the DIA deal together. Denver and Adams County agreed to share sales tax revenue for future retail and hotel development along Peña Boulevard. Without this cooperation, the project would never have happened.

Metro Vision: Encouraging Communities to Work Together Metro Vision, DRCOG’s long-range regional plan that offers direction for local communities, “protects and enhances the region’s quality of life,” “respects local plans,” “encourages communities to work together,” and “is dynamic and flexible.” Metro Vision is careful to point out that “the plan does not replace the vision of any individual community; it’s a framework for addressing common issues. Metro Vision is sensitive to the decisions local governments make in determining when and where growth will occur. Metro Vision also recognizes that each community is confronted by a variety of issues and has its own view of growth”; for example, communities like Denver and Englewood face very different challenges from the suburban communities at the region’s edge, and the City and County of Boulder are much more focused on growth management than the rest of the region is. The document is consistent in its language with other voluntary regional plans that agencies across the country have adopted, and it outlines a series of goals and recommendations for how local communities can help achieve these goals, but it does not mandate local compliance. Metro Vision describes the region, discusses what happens if no policy change is made, outlines agreed-upon goals for more compact development, and suggests methods for local implementation of regional goals. However, DRCOG is careful to acknowledge that the real planning decisions happen at the local level. Here

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we assess the strengths and weaknesses of Metro Vision, demonstrating the process of plan adoption and implementation. The Metro Vision plan is in many ways a consensus document that focuses on issues that are agreed upon by DRCOG board members. Consensus documents are considered easier to enforce because the majority of the stakeholders agree to them, but there is also the danger that these documents can be weak and unenforceable. As one board member put it: “If you look at Metro Vision, one of the things that is a real tension is the fact that it is a voluntary document. The fact that it is voluntary and that people can opt out of participating causes the document itself to be watered down substantially. It is not like you can adopt a set of policies by majority vote. It has to be something approaching universal consensus; other wise people just walk away.” Because DRCOG has to get buy-in from jurisdictions with opposing views on planning, in many cases the Metro Vision plan does not challenge municipalities to make hard decisions about planning and growth management. One local elected official described the relationship between DRCOG and local government this way: “As an elected official I can use DRCOG as a guideline and philosophy, but if DRCOG’s planning process is contrary to the beliefs of the constituents in my district, guess what . . . I have to be electable.” However, this same official stated, “DRCOG is a guideline and we do every thing we can to try to adhere to it.” Without the power to enforce most of the guidelines, implementation depends on how well guidelines fit with local goals, which are primarily set by the local elected officials, who set the tone for local planners. In a debate at DRCOG over the expansion of the UGB/A, DRCOG board member and Jefferson County commissioner Kathy Hartman stated, “DRCOG should have limited ability to determine the development plans of independent entities like the county. We’ve been abiding by the growth boundary in practice, but I’d say my fellow commissioners are not comfortable with the concept.”  Hartman’s comment aptly describes the tension between DRCOG and local politicians, whose opinions are still critical for the adoption of any land use policy. One challenge of Metro Vision implementation is that DRCOG’s interests as an institution are not always the same as local concerns and this can cause tension. One local planner said that DRCOG is not focused on “the realities that local government face. That is not their business. They are on a much higher plane.”  Another local planning director questioned DRCOG’s policy-making process by saying that they “cherry-pick opinions of communities and they put this forward as consensus.”  A DRCOG staff member

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recognized the challenge of metropolitan planning, noting that “local governments all across the country are critical . . . The MPO is the gatekeeper in distributing money. There are rules and people don’t always get what they want.” He acknowledged that “there are some legitimate criticisms. Our member governments know their business. We try to include them in all the decision making advisory committees. They have the expertise. They know what is happening on the ground. But it is not a perfect process. Even among themselves, one jurisdiction may disagree with another jurisdiction about how best to do things.” Since DRCOG is a council of governments, local elected officials who sit on the DRCOG board make decisions. Not all communities will be happy with the board’s decisions. However, at least the fact that the decisions are made by local elected officials lends a level of legitimacy to DRCOG’s decisions. In 2005, DRCOG updated Metro Vision 2020 to Metro Vision 2030, focusing on the development of more pedestrian-oriented development and redevelopment of the region’s urban centers. Metro Vision 2035 was updated in 2011 with a focus on the following sustainability goals: “Increase urban density by 10%; Locate 50% of new housing and 75% of new employment in urban centers; Protect a total of 880 sq. mi. of state and local parks and open space; Cut greenhouse gas emissions by 60%; Lower single-occupant vehicle (SOV) trips to work from 74% to 65%; Reduce daily vehicle miles traveled (VMT) per capita by 10%.” The DRCOG board approved these sustainability goals after several years of input involving more than a hundred stakeholders in “sustainability cafés,” where they were asked to define sustainability concepts for the Denver region. In 2011, DRCOG also won a $4.5 million dollar Sustainable Communities Regional Planning (SCRP) grant to help implement the plan and better connect transportation and development opportunities. A series of “corridor stakeholder committees” have developed Corridor Blueprints for each transit station outlining strategies for TOD projects. The SCRP grant has been impor tant for DRCOG because it forced the agency to develop partnerships with non-profits and other agencies (a total of eighty-six organizations) and to expand their mission to include a stronger focus on regional equity. As a result of the grant, DRCOG helped develop a Regional Equity Atlas that is available online for communities to understand equity challenges facing them. The Regional Economic Strategy and Regional Housing Strategy reports produced will help inform the Metro Vision 2040 update. In addition, the Boomer Bond Toolkit is helping to inform communities about strategies to help baby boomers “age

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in place.”  In May 2015, the DRCOG board approved the Sustainable Communities Regional Principles: “Housing Opportunity, Healthy Places, Economic Vitality and Resiliency, Transit Accessibility, and Transit-Oriented Communities.”  The principles are designed to guide Metro Vision and local land use planning documents by promoting planning that takes equity and sustainability into account.

Implementing Metro Vision as the MPO Using its control over transportation dollars and planning, DRCOG has actively worked to link the Regional Transportation Plan (RTP) that it produces as the MPO for the region with the goals of Metro Vision. The Metro Vision 2020 RTP, Fiscally Constrained (adopted in 1998), outlined the regional transportation priorities that can be met with the state, local, and federal funds available. The RTP, now known as the 2035 Metro Vision Regional Transportation Plan (2035 MVRTP), adopted by the DRCOG board in February 2011, “reflects a transportation system that closely interacts with the growth, development, and environmental elements of Metro Vision.”  The 2004 approval of $4.7 billion dollars for RTD’s expansion of light rail was factored into the Metro Vision plans and serves as a defining element helping to focus development on urban centers. As the MPO, DRCOG has oversight over TIP funds for regional transportation projects that receive regional transportation funding. Between 2012 and  2015, $12 billion in TIP funding was allocated to two hundred transportation projects in the region. From 2016 to 2021, $4 billion will be allocated to one hundred projects. When asked if being the MPO made a difference in the level of local participation in regional governance, one DRCOG official said, “Absolutely, they come for the money!” The fact that DRCOG is the MPO for the region is critical in getting officials to come DRCOG board meetings. Unlike MAPC, there are very few vacant board member seats and the DRCOG meetings are well attended by local elected officials. They attend the DRCOG board meetings because they want to be at the table when the criteria are set for how the TIP money is spent. One local planning official said, “If you are not at the table, you might get screwed. There is a healthy amount of mistrust.” A DRCOG staff member emphasized why local officials show up: “It is important to be at the table so you are participating and people know you. That is the nature of politics.”

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DRCOG also uses its control over transportation funding as a mechanism for gaining compliance with Metro Vision. One key reason that counties and cities have signed the MHC is because they believe that the more they are in agreement with the principles of the Metro Vision, the more likely they are to receive TIP money from DRCOG. One local planning director described DRCOG this way: “The institution exists to appropriate federal money for transportation funding and in order to get that funding, we make sure we follow the rules.” Cities and counties that have signed the MHC and that follow the principles of Metro Vision are given more points toward their TIP applications. There are a total of 100 points given to projects applying for transportation funds, and complying with Metro Vision and the MHC is worth up to 26 points. Some of the factors that are considered in TIP funding are (1) whether the proposed project serves an urban center or is within the UGB/A; (2) whether the community has signed the MHC; and (3) whether the local comprehensive plan acknowledges the relationship between the UGB/A and local planning. In the context of scarce resources, every point counts and the fact that signing the Mile High Compact and adopting the components of Metro Vision could help communities in their TIP applications did not escape local officials. This helps explain the early willingness of communities to sign onto the Mile High Compact and adopt Metro Vision and the UGB/A. For example, at a city council meeting in 1999 in the City of Louisville, Paul Wood, the city’s planning director, noted, “A jurisdiction can earn additional evaluation criteria points by adopting an urban growth boundary. The City has submitted four TIP applications for transportation improvements. Projects must attain 100 points, on average, to be eligible for TIP funding. By adopting the urban growth boundary as an amendment to the City’s Comprehensive Plan, the City improves its chances for funding.” Subsequently, the City of Louisville adopted a UGB, a key component of Metro Vision 2020, and signed the MHC.

Local Consistency with Metro Vision Local consistency with Metro Vision is strategically rewarded. According to Metro Vision, “To the extent possible, DRCOG should recognize consistent local plans with regional incentives, such as discretionary capital improvement funds and technical planning assistance. . . . Each local government is asked, on a voluntary basis, to accept or incorporate the plan as an element

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of its own comprehensive plan to address the regional perspective.” To promote consistency, two DRCOG subcommittees, the Metro Vision Policy Committee and the Regional Planning Advisory Committee, created a checklist of relevant components of Metro Vision that should be included in every local comprehensive plan. By 2000, twenty-two communities in the DRCOG region had changed their comprehensive plans to meet Metro Vision’s goals; by 2010, that number had increased to forty-six. Theoretically, local governments report on their consistency and inconsistency with the elements of Metro Vision. If a community is not in compliance, either Metro Vision can be changed or the DRCOG board will work with the local community to suggest revisions to their comprehensive plans that would be consistent with regional goals. However, in practice, DRCOG does not actively evaluate the consistency of local plans with Metro Vision, and local planning officials said that even when they adopted Metro Vision, it had very little influence on day-to-day local planning decisions. Most communities at least acknowledge Metro Vision in their comprehensive plans. In the City of Denver, Metro Vision 2020 was adopted as a part of the Denver Comprehensive Plan 2000. Denver’s strategy for growth management is to “lead in supporting the adoption and implementation of DRCOG’s Metro Vision 2020 Plan for regional growth and report annually on compliance with Plan 2000.” Smaller cities also follow suit in their planning documents. For instance, the City of Longmont’s Comprehensive Plan states, The City is part of the larger Denver Metropolitan Region. Longmont’s growth and development decisions can affect others in the region and their quality of life, and the actions of others can affect Longmont and its quality of life. Consequently, the City is a member of the Denver Regional Council of Governments, a voluntary organization of local governments. The City acknowledges that Metro Vision 2020 is the comprehensive guide for development of the region and that it provides a regional framework for local decisions on growth and development within the Denver Metropolitan Region. Finally, the City has adopted the Mile High Compact, an intergovernmental agreement between jurisdictions in the Denver Regional Council of Governments. The Longmont Area Comprehensive Plan supports many of the core elements of the Mile High Compact, including designating a specified area for urban development; creating

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a balanced multi-modal transportation system; participating in a regional open space system; and incorporating public participation processes into all planning efforts. Like the City of Longmont, the City of Lone Tree’s Comprehensive Plan emphasizes the importance of DRCOG, Metro Vision, and the Mile High Compact: The City supports and participates in regional planning efforts through the Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG). The City is a signatory to the Mile High Compact, an agreement that sets forth thirteen stipulations for regional planning. That agreement incorporates by reference DRCOG’s Metro Vision Plan, a long-range regional growth strategy for the Denver Metropolitan Area that includes an Urban Growth Boundary. This boundary identifies the preferred extent of urban development in the metropolitan area through the year 2030. The area slated for urban development on the City’s General Land Use Plan map is recognized by and consistent with the DRCOG’s Metro Vision 2030 Plan. Similarly, Douglas County’s Comprehensive Master Plan acknowledges that “the Urban Land Use Section also draws from the Metro Vision 2020 Plan, adopted by the Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) in recognition and support of regional goals and objectives for open space, freestanding communities; a balanced, multi-modal transportation network; urban centers; and environmental quality.” The plan also cites the Metro Vision goals of maintaining the City of Castle Rock as a freestanding community as one of the reasons for reevaluating the Eagle Ridge development: “The development of Eagle Ridge as an urban community in unincorporated Douglas County is inconsistent with the County Comprehensive Master Plan and the Metro Vision 2020 Plan to maintain Castle Rock as a freestanding community.” When siting a solid-waste facility, the Douglas County Comprehensive Master Plan suggests, “Critical land use concerns considered when evaluating the suitability of a landfill or transfer site include: compatibility with surrounding land uses and the Denver Regional Council of Governments Metro Vision 2020 Plan.” Although jurisdictions in the Denver region acknowledge Metro Vision goals in their comprehensive plans, land use planning is still primarily

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determined by local elected officials’ interpretation of the comprehensive plans and fiscal concerns. When a community updates its comprehensive plan, there is usually consistency between zoning and the comprehensive plan; however, over time and depending on how local elected officials view planning, this can change. According to one local planning director, It is more the vision and the issues of the community, which change over time. For short hand, you might call it politics. . . . A comprehensive plan is basically a vision. If the city were the perfect community, what kind of community would we be? The comp plan 1) publicly sets out what the vision and goals are and 2) through a public process allows the appointed (Planning Commission) and the elected officials to [weigh in] in these times, in this situation, which are the public goals that are compelling? It is a visioning document of what we want to become and it is implemented by a variety of other documents. For example, if we are in tough economic times we are probably going to be more amenable to a commercial development than other times. Since DRCOG is advisory only and communities typically do not fear DRCOG’s reprisal if regional goals are not met (except when it comes to transportation funding), planning in the Denver region continues to be primarily driven by local concerns and appears to be open to interpretation.

The Urban Growth Boundary The fact that municipalities in a metropolitan area would “voluntarily” agree to limit development without a state mandate is impressive. Many DRCOG communities have adopted the language of the UGB/A in their local comprehensive plans. In this sense, the UGB/A (see Figure 3) may have helped reshape the way that local officials talk about development, but it appears to be less effective at actually changing development patterns. Local officials talked about development within their UGB/A allocations and going to DRCOG to get more UGB/A allocations. However, DRCOG “ hasn’t stopped us from growing or affected us in many ways. DRCOG is never mentioned when we look at approving development projects. We ignore the UGB.” Determining and administering the UGB/A has been a source of tension at DRCOG. “We all jockeyed around at the start of the UGB,” one local

Figure 3. 2035 Urban Growth Boundary and 2006 Urban Area. Courtesy of the Denver Regional Council of Governments.

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planning official said. “The issue was basically everyone overstated their existing amount of urbanization in the mid-1990s because we didn’t know if we should trust DRCOG. It has worked well. We have updated the boundaries to the 2025 and the 2030 without adding any significant square miles because we overestimated in 1995. We have kept the physical boundaries about the same from [the] 2020 to [the] 2030 line and now we have to figure out [the] 2035 line.” In fact, the 2035 line was expanded to 980 square miles. Another local planning director recognized that “we got a very generous number because it really reflected trend lines. We were also a beneficiary of being a major player at the Metro Vision table. Our mayor was a major player at generating support for Metro Vision.” In the case of determining the initial UGB/A allocation, local officials acknowledge the payoff that came with being an active participant on the DRCOG board. The UGB/A is flexible to the point that several officials described it as “barely meaningful.” Although one of the key selling points is the fact that it is flexible and voluntary, the problem with this kind of policy is that it really does not have any teeth. Rich McClintock, director of the Livable Communities Support Center, said, “It’s good news that (DRCOG) said, ‘Let’s keep the growth boundary at 750-square miles. That’s a very strong symbolic goal. But the boundary . . . doesn’t achieve the goal of limiting sprawl.” A DRCOG board member stated, “Essentially with the UGB, you have communities that really believe that we should be attempting to have compact development and the UGB should be a true boundary and as you grow over time you should be attempting to grow within that boundary and then there are communities that have never really supported the idea. They have been willing to have a UGB as long as it is flexible. And any time they want to do any development outside of it, it gets expanded.” Some communities view the UGB/A as a real constraint while others recognize it more as a guideline and are not opposed to asking DRCOG for more UGB/A when they reach their allocation. Since the UGB/A is flexible, different communities have adopted different approaches for managing their allocations. An example of the different local interpretation of DRCOG’s UGB/A policy can be seen in the Urban Growth Areas (UGA) approach adopted by several cities and counties. The UGA approach allows jurisdictions to keep an urban growth bud get without mapping it to specific locations. Most DRCOG staff members see the flexibility of the UGB/A as an advantage. One DRCOG staff member said,

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Everyone so far has been playing by the rules of the UGB. No one has thumbed their nose at us. Partly because we give them flexibility. . . . We have the ability to move the UGB around and this has been one key to our success politically. We don’t have a mandate to create a UGB so we . . . have to be moderate in keeping people in the fold and participating in this. One way of doing this is providing flexibility. The ultimate flexibility is this UGA approach where they don’t have to draw a boundary. But it is still meaningful that those communities are living within a budget. There are also some other flexibility provisions that allow communities that have a UGB to move it around. But there are some caveats. Specifically, if these regional funds have been invested in transportation facilities or wastewater facilities it makes it more difficult to move the boundary around. DRCOG staff members are extremely aware of the political limits of planning without state mandated authority over land use. They recognize that they do what they can given the tools they have. It is this realistic approach about the limits of regional planning that at once allows DRCOG to be effective in certain areas and at the same time prevents it from tackling controversial issues. Although the UGB/A as a growth management tool is innovative, in practice its effect is difficult to quantify. It is described more as documenting existing conditions rather than limiting growth. According to DRCOG’s own assessment, the UGB/A policy has had mixed results: the boundary has been expanded to 980 square miles, density has increased by 5.3  percent (with the possibility that with newer data the numbers could be higher), but the region has not yet met the 10  percent increased density target. Metro Vision 2035 has been able to complement the UGB/A policy by helping to promote development in urban centers. As of 2014, Metro Vision designated 103 urban growth centers in the region, which “captured 21  percent of the region’s housing growth between 2005 [and] 2010.” Considering that “between 2000 [and] 2004 less than 10  percent of all housing units built in the region were located in urban centers,” this is a noticeable improvement. In fact, the trends suggest that new residential development may be focusing on urban centers: “[In] 2009 and 2010, 40  percent of the housing units built were in urban centers.” FasTracks and the focus on TOD projects have helped concentrate housing in urban centers.

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As a voluntary organization, DRCOG can only be effective if local officials are on board. Although local jurisdictions appear to be “playing along,” DRCOG has weak mechanisms to ensure compliance. Technically, communities that have signed the MHC should be following Metro Vision and the UGB/A, but so far the MHC has not been used as an enforcement document. Without regulatory authority, DRCOG depends on the localities to individually implement the UGB. When asked whether DRCOG had a map of the UGB/A posted on its website, one official told me, “We do have a generalized map of the UGB. We are a little reluctant to post more detailed maps. The boundary is ultimately administered by the local governments. We don’t want to give wrong information about that. We prefer that developers talk with the local jurisdiction. We do our best to keep track of the changes made by the local jurisdiction, but there is sometimes a lag time.” Since the original Metro Vision 2020 plan was adopted in 1997, the UGB/A has been expanded several times. This fact is seen by some of the slow growth officials as being problematic. “There is a continual willingness to expand it,” said one DRCOG board member; “essentially any time a community asks for more they get it. . . . The reason is very much because of this necessity for consensus. It basically means when staff is negotiating with a community on a growth boundary, they are to a large extent scared to say no because the community can just walk away. . . . There is some meaning to the UGB, but it’s pretty marginal.” However, officials from more progrowth communities saw the flexibility of the UGB/A as its strength. Arapahoe County Commissioner Rod Bockenfeld said, “This is a voluntary growth boundary. It’s never been a hard line.” In the 2005 update of Metro Vision 2030, a UGB/A “bank” of twenty square miles was added giving communities flexibility to ask DRCOG for more land if they need it. Other communities who do not need their UGB allocation are encouraged to put their excess UGB/A into the bank to be shared in the region. However, since there is no mechanism to replenish it, one board member referred to it as more of a “store.” In fact, according to DRCOG’s report, in 2007, when five communities requested an additional 21.8 square miles of UGB/A, “the Board formally allocated the full amount of additional UGB/A requested by all five communities.” Here it is important to note other challenges facing the UGB/A policy. To make the UGB/A meaningful, communities need to upzone their urban areas to intensify development within the UGB/A; however, the Metro Vision requirement that communities increase their density by 10  percent is very

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limited considering that some of the communities have very low densities to begin with. In addition, the fact that properties of more than one acre are exempted from the UGB/A means that developers have an easy loophole around the requirement: they can promote less dense developments. In Adams County, a 2,000-unit development was approved on 1.1 acre lots. Adams County officials argued that the approval of this project did not violate the UGB/A or Metro Vision because in Colorado parcels of more than one acre are not considered urban. The Metro Vision Implementation Committee (MVIC) discussed how the approval of this project should not have happened, and the mayor of neighboring Thornton and county commissioners of Boulder County also agreed that what Adams County did was in violation of the Metro Vision plan, but DRCOG could not stop the development because it only has teeth through transportation funding and “no state highways or significant transportation money [was] needed for their development.” DRCOG acknowledges in Metro Vision 2035 that a “limited amount of low-density large-lot development will continue to occur beyond the urban growth boundary/area, contributing to the region’s diversity of land uses.” But these are contentious issues. DRCOG’s own assessment of the process highlights the disagreements among communities: “During the plan adoption process several jurisdictions, individuals and interest groups commented that Metro Vision policies should more strongly discourage this type of development. Others complained that the policies and text went too far in limiting this type of development and unfairly characterizing it as undesirable.” Members of DRCOG are still struggling to define the terms of the UGB/A. One of the challenges they face is that land that has been zoned for development but has not yet been built out is exempted from the UGB/A; as a result, the UGB/A does not change development patterns that have already been approved. The DRCOG Ad Hoc Committee on Semi-Urban Development has been debating how best to address the region’s semi-urban lots. Another challenge is deciding what to do with the land that is outside the UGB/A: “We don’t have any idea what to do with the area right past the line,” one local planning official said. A major challenge to the UGB/A was the fact that much of the rapid greenfield development in the Denver metro region was happening outside of DRCOG’s MPO area. Weld County, to the northeast, was the fastest growing county in Colorado, but it was not in the MPO and was not a member of DRCOG, and so the UGB/A did not apply. Without the cooperation of Weld

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County, DRCOG’s attempt to draw a UGB/A was constantly frustrated by the county’s rapid development. However, with the 2000 census definitions of the metropolitan region, four Weld County municipalities were required to become a part of the MPO in 2008. In 2009, DRCOG worked with the Weld County municipalities to redraw the boundaries, add them to Metro Vision, and redraw the UGB/A. Theoretically, the mechanism that keeps communities in check around Metro Vision and the UGB/A is peer pressure. DRCOG members should feel embarrassed if their communities are not performing up to the norm. However, this is a weak compliance mechanism for an institution whose survival depends on cooperation. Officials on the DRCOG board are reluctant to point to neighbors they believe are violating the spirit of Metro Vision. Some officials said their communities are implementing the Metro Vision plan, but commented that their neighboring communities “were not in compliance with the UGB.” This suggests that compliance may be in the eye of the beholder.

A Regionally Significant Project: The Lowry Range Project Tests the UGB/A DRCOG’s ability to influence a “project of regional significance” is one measure of its ability to shape regional growth. In the Denver region, the project of regional significance that was on everyone’s mind in 2007 (before the recession) was the Lowry Range Project, a forty-square-mile former military property, to the east of the Denver region. In 1991, the Lowry Range was designated a Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS), and in 1998, 23,000 acres of the site were placed into Colorado State Land Board Stewardship Trust for conservation. The situation, however, was complicated because the Colorado State Land Board, which owned the Lowry Range, was charged with selling off property it owns to create a perpetual revenue stream for K–12 education in Colorado. The former bombing range was considered a prime site for redevelopment, particularly after the creation of DIA and the opening of highway E-470 in 1999. A proposal was created for 13,000 residential units sited on 3,000 acres (260 acres would be reserved for commercial development, 705 acres would be reserved for open space, and the rest of the 23,000 acres would remain undeveloped). The development price tag for the project was estimated at $1.5 billion. The State Land Board was expected to bring in

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between $100 million to $300 million over twenty years from leasing, property taxes, and fees. The Lowry Range Project represented a potential direct challenge to DRCOG’s authority over regional land use planning because it would be development of greenfields on land outside the UGB/A. Environmentalists described the land as the last open prairie in the region and questioned the development of open space not connected to the transportation network, particularly any mass transit. Since the State Land Board property was outside of DRCOG’s UGB/A, stakeholders had very different views about what role DRCOG should play. A staff member described the Lowry Range Project as a “dramatic example of a potential development that is not currently covered by UGB, but that would need to apply for UGB. It is also an example of the cooperation that exists between the State Land Board and Arapahoe County. They are working in our process to obtain more UGB in the next update.” However, it was not a smooth process. In 2007, Mayor Ed Tauer of neighboring Aurora was quoted in the Denver Post questioning the Lowry Project: “If you are going to add more land, there should be a compelling reason and have these answers already worked out. . . . The effect on roads and water and wastewater . . . are basic questions you’re supposed to answer before you move forward with development.” Aurora city councilor Bob Broom was even more negative about the value of the project: “We don’t see anything good about it at all. . . . What happens in 20 years? They’ll come knocking to Aurora.” The Aurora city council unanimously voted down the project over concerns over water, transportation, and costs. The State Land Board pointed to the fact that most of the land would be conserved as an argument for the environmental nature of the project. But according to Environment Colorado, a statewide environmental lobbying group that branched out of Colorado Public Interest Research Group (COPIRG), the Lowry Range Project, as it was proposed, was an egregious example of leapfrog development. Speaking about the State Land Board, Matt Baker, the director of Environment Colorado, said, “It’s very, very unusual for an agency of the state of Colorado to be promoting sprawl and ex-urban development at all, let alone at this scale.” If the project went through, COPIRG and Environment Colorado argued that DRCOG’s ability to manage growth in the Denver region would be severely compromised because it would signal that the UGB/A is essentially meaningless: development can happen outside of the UGB/A because DRCOG has no implementing authority.

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In 2007, one DRCOG official talked about the process: I wouldn’t say we have stopped development. The state has been moving fairly slowly. We have been working with the city and the county so that hopefully when the State Land Board finally decides what they want to do we can incorporate it into our plans and they will address the issues we want addressed. . . . There are some members of the DRCOG board who are looking to the new governor to reexamine what is being planned at the Lowry Range, more from the infrastructure point of view more anything else. Yes, there is no urban growth boundary that we have allotted to development, but the bigger issue is that we can’t afford to maintain the transportation infrastructure that we have today let alone set aside new funds to build for development that could be coming in the future. How do we say that it is OK to build so far out when we are having this problem in the more urbanized area right now? DRCOG staff and board members deliberated about how to respond to the Lowry Range development. Lend Lease, the project developer, negotiated with the City of Aurora and Arapahoe County over how much of the land would be conserved and protected, since part of the land contains the City of Aurora’s aquifer. Environmental advocates also objected. Pam Kiely from Environment Colorado voiced her organization’s opposition to the process: “The Land Board is light years ahead of where they should be. Currently they are evaluating what the housing mix, street layout, and town center design should look like in a development at Lowry. Yet, as a state and as a region we still need to answer the fundamental question of whether or not development should even occur at all on this property.” As the regional planning agency, DRCOG would be the appropriate organization to answer the question of whether the development fit into the Metro Vision plan. Arapahoe County, which has authority to approve or reject plans, prepared a sub-area plan that addressed some of DRCOG’s concerns. According to a May 2007 report, “DRCOG staff is monitoring these activities as the Metro Vision 2035 Plan is being prepared. The scenario modeling conducted in late 2006 did include alternatives that had development at the Lowry Range. As the process continues, the Board may consider additions to the UGB/A, which could include a proposal for a portion of the Lowry Range.” Arapahoe County asked DRCOG for the expansion of the

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UGB by 5.16 miles in Metro Vision 2035 to accommodate the project. Rod Bockenfeld, a commissioner for Arapahoe County, was adamant that the boundary should be expanded and reminded DRCOG that “we do have local control.” After intense negotiations, particularly focusing on “transportation, water, and waste water,” the City of Aurora agreed to vote in support of the UGB/A expansion, reversing its initial opposition. In October 2007, DRCOG expanded the UGB/A to include the Lowry Range. Susan Thornton, former mayor of Littleton and a Denver Post reporter, described the decision as “highly controversial, pitting cities against counties and those wanting to stop the spread of development into new areas against those who see growth as inevitable.” However, in 2009, after the economic downturn, Lend Lease abandoned the project, citing the difficulty of accessing an affordable water supply for their project as the primary obstacle to development. In a turn of events, plans for residential development of Lowry Range have now been all but abandoned for oil and gas exploration, which has gained momentum with new hydraulic fracturing (hydro fracking) technology. The State Land Board leased 21,048 acres of the Lowry Range to ConocoPhillips. The State Land Board estimates that about $400 million will be raised for the School Trust over thirty years from royalties from shale oil. Another report estimates that it will be $500 million. Communities in the DRCOG region have been responding to the new pressure for gas drilling with local moratoriums on fracking, but such moratoriums have not held up in court. DRCOG has hosted seminars on fracking and started to host conversations; however, as of 2015, it did not appear to have a defi nitive policy. Like other planning issues, DRCOG leaves the final say to the localities. It should be noted here that the fallout from the Lowry Range Project continues. Since DRCOG expanded the UGB/A for Arapahoe County but the Lowry Range Project was no longer viable, county officials engaged in policy debates with DRCOG about the amount of UGB/A available to use for future development. In a letter to an Arapahoe County commissioner, DRCOG’s estimation was that Arapahoe County had 4.97 square miles of available UGB/A, arguing that Centennial, a city in the county, had annexed part of Arapahoe County’s UGB/A allocation and several developments (Byers and Strasberg) were out of compliance with the UGB/A. Arapahoe County’s calculations were 8.85 square miles. According to a letter to the Arapahoe Board of County Commissioners, Arapahoe County has several options for how to deal with the discrepancy between their numbers and DRCOG’s including

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requesting more UGB/A allocation. It is interesting to note the ongoing debate about the UGB/A. The positive is that DRCOG is engaged with local planners and elected officials and is forcing them to justify their urban growth expansion. According to a May 2015 DRCOG Board Update, Arapahoe County’s request for more UGB/A was denied in a tie vote.

DRCOG as a Voice for the Region Metro Vision, the MHC, and the UGB/A are viewed as national models of innovative regional planning; however, DRCOG’s effectiveness as a leader in the region is less certain. According to one board member, “DRCOG tries to fall over backwards not to impose itself on people. They are there to help, but they are not there to tell you what to do.” As one local planner evaluated DRCOG: “It is difficult to make regional planning relevant unless . . . the regional planning goals that we are asked to support are not difficult, and so COG doesn’t become a hindrance and therefore it remains pretty irrelevant.” This observation suggests that DRCOG can accomplish goals that are agreed upon, but these are not always the hard-to-tackle policy issues. Another board member described DRCOG’s role: A lot of their concepts are good, but to get decisions made and to get planning done, you’ll see the old adage about turning a battleship. You have to make very slow progress and DRCOG does do that. What DRCOG focuses on is what we can agree on together that are good concepts, best management practices. DRCOG is an educational program. . . . They are trying to get the best information possible out to the planners and elected officials so that they can make the best decisions based on the information they receive. Would we look to DRCOG for direction on how to manage or operate the planning process in our County? No. They are a guide. They [can offer] practices that we follow, but we are never going to turn to DRCOG and ask, “What should we do?” The fact that local officials are listening to ideas about best practices is in itself important. However, the foregoing quote suggests that the kind of change that DRCOG is making to local development plans is incremental. Another planning director also doubted DRCOG’s impact saying that “DRCOG is less

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effective than the United Nations. There is a great deal of political posturing, making examples of whoever is not there.” At the same time that board members and local planners questioned the effectiveness of DRCOG, they also acknowledged that participation in DRCOG is impor tant. When local elected officials sit at the table with one another this can create a sense of understanding and commonality that does not other wise exist. One local planning director said, “The most impor tant thing that DRCOG does is [get] the county commissioners and mayors [to] know one another.” Officials who sit at the DRCOG board meetings cannot hide the development of projects from one another and are forced to talk about some of the shared impacts. One board member discussed why being on the DRCOG is impor tant: I get different perspectives. My county is fairly conservative. I find it interesting to go and meet with some of the other mayors who are from cities that are a little more progressive. It is kind of interesting to see their concepts and how they look at things. Personally, it is a good educational tool for me just to see how people think. . . . I find it amazing how some of the perceptions are entirely different in their area than what I see historically in the district that I represent. But if I can understand . . . why they feel the way they do, when I have to interact with them on an issue that is important to my county or to my constituency . . . then I know why they feel the way they do and what we can do to mitigate some of our differences so we can make progress together. . . . If we want to make progress together. Sometimes we just don’t want to. Local elected officials who sit on the DRCOG board use participation on the board as a way to better understand different perspectives about regional issues, learn more about particular projects, and, in some cases, when they want to, work together. DRCOG can also act as an important voice for the region when it comes to state policy and in par ticu lar the allocation of Colorado state funds. DRCOG advocates for particular issues of regional significance at the state house. DRCOG’s Legislative Principle Statement says, “The organization assumes the responsibility for identifying and promoting regional interests in its various fields of planning and management to state and federal legislative and administrative bodies.” Particular issues such as transportation and

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air quality, which clearly cut across boundaries, were identified as regional concerns. One local planner said, One of the big things that COG does, by working with the regional air quality council, is it tries to promote regional air quality issues. Those seem to be the hardest issues for municipalities to take ownership over. They seem too big. Metro air quality seems too big for every community. Highway and transit means things to people. It means money, and capital projects, and shapes land use. Things like UGBs and other cooperative things are the price to pay for having a regional voice. The other benefit that is accrued to all the cities is that DRCOG is the vehicle used to fight CDOT for money. Not surprisingly, in addition to TIP funding, it is the tangible benefit that local officials attribute to regional cooperation that keeps them coming to the regional table. Discussing the impor tant role that DRCOG plays in helping to secure state resources for the Denver region (often referred to as the Front Range region), that same planning director said, “Naturally we think that the rest of the state is getting too much money and we are not getting enough. . . . There is the constant dynamic that you would expect between the Front Range and the rest of the state. And having this club of more than 45 jurisdictions who can sometimes speak as a whole can be real effective. There is an equity sharing agreement that they have negotiated with CDOT which is probably based solely on the participation of 45–50 municipalities.” In 2004, DRCOG scored an important win for the region when they campaigned for a more equitable distribution of the Colorado gas sales tax to the Denver region. According to DRCOG, “[The] Denver region’s proportional share of the state’s long-range transportation funding from CDOT has been reduced from 43  percent to 28  percent.” As a result of this campaign, DRCOG signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Colorado Department of Transportation as follows: the Transportation Commission (1) agrees to consult with DRCOG before finalizing the state long-range plan, (2) creates a congestion relief program that DRCOG will help model, (3) allows for “pooled” strategic project funding in the long-range plan which has helped DRCOG allocate $1 billion to projects that relieve air pollution, and (4) adopts methodology for allocating incremental revenues and emphasizes mobility. Having a common goal of getting more transportation money

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from the state certainly gave local officials reasons to work together and helped build regional goodwill.

Capacity Building at DRCOG Here it is also impor tant to recognize how DRCOG’s technical expertise helps it stay relevant. Local elected officials and planners rely on the DRCOG staff for data about travel demand, population, and employment, as well as planning support and technical assistance. One local planning director said, “DRCOG is very good at technical matters, demography, forecasting, and trip generation. From a policy standpoint, it is a less useful institution.” A local official stated, “You have planners from the whole region in the DRCOG area who are giving input on these issues. You are getting the best information possible. You have staff who are doing the research to verify and bring in better facts and information.” Another planning director said, “We use their employment data. . . . We ask them for what they have and we look at it, but we don’t usually stop there.” One planning director was critical of DRCOG’s data: “We use some of [it]. We disagree with quite a bit of it. We do a bottom up approach and they do a top down.” As the MPO, DRCOG is charged with constructing a travel demand forecasting model, which local government officials admit they do not have the capacity or resources to build. Since DRCOG’s goal is to locate “50  percent of all new housing units and 75 percent of all new jobs in regionally designated urban centers between 2005 and 2035,” DRCOG also allocates TIP funding for station area and urban center planning. Local communities rely on DRCOG and RTD for help with new station area planning connected to the FasTracks expansion. DRCOG’s Transit-Oriented Development Program is impor tant because rather than telling communities what it thinks they should be doing, it offers them information and provides opportunities for informed dialogue. DRCOG helps communities better understand the process of developing TODs, the challenges they are likely to face, and tips for how to overcome them. DRCOG has worked with numerous communities to promote TOD projects near the new stations. One planning director appreciated the work DRCOG was doing: “To be honest with you I never thought in my career that I would be working on TOD in my community. There is no reason that each jurisdiction that is going to be on FasTracks needs to reinvent the wheel. That

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is something that I can say is a real ser vice that they are providing.” Other planning directors who were generally critical of DRCOG policies appreciated its help providing technical assistance about TOD projects. Since DRCOG does not have state-mandated authority over local land use plans, its influence is sometimes subtle and it takes time to see its effect. It is through ongoing planning work with local communities that DRCOG can help change the development framework. One DRCOG staff member described regional planning in Denver as ad hoc regionalism: We definitely are looking long range because you can see the effect of our [regional] plans on local plans over time. A good example is urban centers. They have been in our plans in one way or another for several iterations, but that term now shows up in local plans when they are looking at their own development, where they expect urban centers to be. We are seeing the same thing now with respect to the urban growth boundary. It has been around long enough. As folks are updating their comprehensive plans, they are incorporating that into their process. We were out meeting with the Jefferson County planning staff yesterday and they now in the unincorporated areas are saying that development has to be consistent with their ‘community plans,’ their sub-area plans, and with the urban growth boundary and they are expecting that those two are the same.” DRCOG planners recognize that through persistence, planning ideas that were originally promoted at the regional level will be adopted at the local level. Rather than viewing effectiveness as the short-term adoption of regional goals, they understand that changing local perceptions about what is desirable development takes considerable time and effort. Perhaps it is this understanding of the incremental nature of regional change that helps make DRCOG relevant in the absence of a state mandate.

Regional Cooperation and Revenue Sharing However, as in the Boston region, a major challenge DRCOG faces to regional cooperation is the way that local jurisdictions are financed. The Gallagher Amendment restricts the amount of property taxes communities can

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raise, which makes sales tax a critical driver of development in Colorado. The creation of Broomfield City and County is a result of a debate over sales tax. Broomfield used to be a part of Boulder County, which had a “no growth” policy. However, in an effort to promote more commercial development, the City and County of Broomfield were created so that the land would no longer be under the jurisdiction of Boulder County. Driving on Route 36 from Boulder to Broomfield, there is a clear line (marked by new residential and commercial development) where Boulder County ends and Broomfield begins. Boulder County has made a concerted effort to buy up much of the land on either side of the highways for open space. Broomfield, on the other hand, has a much more intense development pattern that focuses on commercial development. Broomfield officials are not alone in their desire to maximize sales tax; many officials mentioned its importance. One local planning director said, “Revenues are highly dependent on sales tax so even if it isn’t a good planning decision, projects get approved because other wise you don’t get the revenue.” Without revenue sharing, many question the ability to change the development pattern of the region. One local planner mentioned that “years ago they [DRCOG] did a really good study about retail sales tax sharing in the early 1980s. It was probably the best piece of work that I saw them do, but it was very controversial and it disappeared.” Despite this, there are examples of localities that are sharing revenue. In 2003, the City of Denver and the City of Aurora agreed to share revenue at the 1,800-acre, $1.5 billion High Point Project, located five miles from DIA and twelve miles from downtown Denver. The High Point Project will eventually be 1,600 single-family homes and 1,400 multifamily residences, more than 500,000 square feet of retail, and more than 1,500 hotel rooms. According to the High Point website, the regional impact of the High Point Project will be significant: “At full build-out, this $1.5 billion project will help bring an estimated 30,000 new jobs to the area, provide unique and exciting homes for thousands of new residents and create a vibrant new gateway for visitors coming in and out of the metro area.” Mayors John Hickenlooper of Denver and Ed Tauer of Aurora helped create the revenue sharing agreement. It was a major accomplishment given the history of tension between the two cities. According to Mayor Hickenlooper, “It’s a model of cooperation. When Ed Tauer and I started talking about how we’re not going to poach— this is an area where we can start. Too often projects are driven by economic

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needs rather than good planning.” This revenue-sharing agreement was an impor tant step for regional cooperation between two jurisdictions with a long history of rivalry over sales tax. Although the agreement may have been more a product of the leadership of two local elected officials who acknowledged the importance of regional cooperation, DRCOG played an impor tant role in planning the TOD around the High Point Commuter Rail Station. While there are notable examples of cooperation, when revenue is at stake, conflicts between cities and counties in the region remain high. In 2013, Adams County sent a letter to Denver Mayor Michael Hancock demanding that Denver return the fift y-four square miles it had annexed in 1988 for the DIA. The letter was in response to a 2012 proposal by Denver to build an “airport city” (or “aerotropolis”) outside of DIA on that annexed land. Officials from the surrounding county and cities (Adams County, Brighton, Commerce City, and Thornton) demanded that Mayor Hancock outline the “tangible benefits” they would receive from the project. Adams County officials claimed that the development violates the terms of 1988 intergovernmental agreement with specific terms restricting the non-airport use of the land. Mayor Hancock responded to Adams County’s concerns with an offer of a special tax district where the revenue collected would be used by Aurora, Commerce City, Adams County, and the City and County of Denver. However, officials from Adams County said that the tax deal was not good enough; they expected that the “aerotropolis” development would bring with it residential development that they would have to ser vice. Aurora Mayor Steve Hogan questioned the impacts of the development on the City of Aurora: “Guess what? Residential development never pays its own way. . . . So while we get the population, we also get the expense of the police departments, fire departments and water and sewer extensions. We are not getting the head taxes, we are not getting the income taxes from those companies, the property taxes from the development, the sales taxes that come from the development. We are just getting the bodies, and we have to pay for them.” In 2015, after nineteen months of professional mediation among the stakeholders, Denver agreed to pay Adams County and communities located in Adams County $10 million and to share tax revenue from the development of 1,500 acres. It is estimated that tax revenues from the project over the next thirty years will be between $160 million and $270 million. Th is example demonstrates the tension that still exists around

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large-scale development in the region and the limits to regional planning without tax sharing.

So What Are the Outcomes? According to DRCOG’s 2014 analysis of Metro Vision, there are some important successes and challenges: • The UGB/A has been expanded to 980 square miles, reflecting the continued demand for more greenfield development. • In addition, semi-urban development outside of the UGB/A continues to be a problem: “Of the 1,126,500 housing units in the region in 2010, 40,020 or 3.5 percent were located in semi-urban areas beyond the UGB/A. This exceeds the target set in Metro Vision. The 3  percent target was established based on analysis completed in 2006. The 2006 analysis indicated data limitations may impact the accuracy of the original benchmark. In the intervening years DRCOG’s parcel databases have improved and it’s conceivable the 3 percent benchmark did not reflect an accurate accounting of the number of housing units in semi-urban areas.”  • However, DRCOG is optimistic because “Between 2000 and 2010, residential density within the UGB/A increased by 5.3  percent. This suggests the region has made significant progress toward the established goal. Given the dominance of the multifamily housing sector in recent years, there is a very real possibility that the 5.3 percent figure based on 2000–2010 change is lower than if density change was measured using more current data.” • Furthermore, housing density in the UGB/A has increased from 1.76 Dwelling Unit (DU)/acre in 2005 to 1.84 DU/acre in 2009. There have also been some important successes connected to transportation: • The number of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) has declined since 2006. • Single occupancy vehicle (SOV) mode share declined from 77.10 percent of trips in 2005 to 74.90 percent in 2012.

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• DRCOG “far surpassed” its goal of reducing “the fatal crash rate from 1.13 to 1.00 per 100 million VMT by 2035.” They reached a goal of 0.68 and set “a new goal of 0.60 fatal crashes per 100 million VMT.” • For GHGs, “Between 2005 and 2010 the region achieved a 5 percent reduction. If the region were to continue that trajectory and reduce emissions by 5  percent every five years, the resulting GHGs would be 8,684 lbs. (3.93 metric tons) per capita—for a total reduction of 26.5 percent.” These statistics highlight some important successes at the same time that they demonstrate that regional planning is a slow process, particularly when, as in Denver and Boston, the majority of the goals are being implemented at the local level in the context of a weak state planning framework, when the regional planning agency is voluntary, and when the appearance of regional cooperation is valued more than implementation. However, the major difference between Denver and Boston is that DRCOG can use its control over the MPO to create incentives for communities to adopt Metro Vision. This means that a greater number of communities have incorporated components of Metro Vision into their comprehensive plans. Since local elected officials meet regularly at the DRCOG board meetings, there is also a degree of peer pressure to comply with some of the regional goals. Metro Vision serves as a guideline rather than a mandate for local communities. It informs local planning, but it does not dictate it. Local communities in the Denver region may sign the MHC and integrate Metro Vision goals into their comprehensive plans, but they are free to interpret those broad goals without significant consequences. In Denver, it is clear that different communities continue to have their own planning cultures, values, and goals. The values held by the mayors, city councillors, and/or county commissioners in each jurisdiction determine to what extent communities adopt the guidelines laid out in Metro Vision. Local planning is not fundamentally different because of Metro Vision or DRCOG. Local decisions still come first. For example, just because the City of Boulder and the City of Thornton have both signed the MHC, are members of DRCOG, and abide by the UGB/A does not mean that planning priorities in these two cities are the same. In fact, the City of Boulder maintains a strict UGB and growth management policy while the City of Thornton has different priorities. To accommodate the different types of communities that are

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its members, DRCOG promotes policies that are flexible enough that communities with vastly different local planning cultures can all participate. The upside of this flexibility is that DRCOG is able to bring a diverse group of stakeholders together. If DRCOG were not flexible and voluntary, many of the communities might not participate. The downside of being so accommodating is that DRCOG avoids tackling controversial subjects, is uncertain about how to influence projects of regional significance like the Lowry Range Project, and is reluctant to confront jurisdictions that are not in compliance with Metro Vision. Despite these drawbacks, at least local elected officials recognize the importance of participating in DRCOG and acknowledge the goals of Metro Vision, if only because DRCOG is the MPO and controls transportation funds. A key role DRCOG plays is in the planning and development of largescale regional transportation infrastructure projects such as the light rail system and improvements to the highway system. DRCOG has worked to integrate these projects into the overall vision for the region. Metro Vision’s implementation is strengthened by the fact that large-scale infrastructure projects are connected to its land use planning activities. The FasTracks project, in par ticu lar, provides DRCOG with an opportunity to promote transit-oriented development throughout the region. Capacity building in the sense that DRCOG is providing data and planning expertise is important to local communities that do not have the same level of resources. The role of capacity building in influencing local land use planning is difficult to measure since it takes place over long periods of time. Persistent and patient planners at DRCOG watch as ideas that were once present only in regional discussions fi lter their way into local comprehensive plans. Over time, the vocabulary of planning that DRCOG helps establish and the capacity building tools it provides help change the planning framework. However, what appears to be more important to changing local land use planning is the participation of local elected officials on the DRCOG board. Because DRCOG is the MPO, it brings local elected officials to the table and provides them a place to meet and have a regional dialogue. It is clear from DRCOG board members and observation of the DRCOG meetings that being an active member of DRCOG is important because it can have the effect of changing the way that local elected officials perceive planning at the local and regional level. As DRCOG board members, local elected officials begin to understand how local planning decisions have regional impacts. They also

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learn how to cooperate with their peers from neighboring communities. Active participation of local elected officials in regional planning also means that the decisions DRCOG makes are viewed as more legitimate than those made by regional planners, who are not elected. Although this fi nding is consistent with the idea of voluntary regionalism that is popular in the literature, I argue that in Denver, what we see is not entirely voluntary because something is at stake. The fact that DRCOG controls the allocation of transportation money makes the difference between being an irrelevant or relevant regional institution. One mechanism for making voluntary regional planning agencies more relevant is to better connect them with transportation funds and create innovative ways (such as the point system in the allocation of TIP funding) to create compliance.

CHAPTER 4

A Nested System in Transition in Portland

Do We Really Have to Keep Studying Portland? It is not surprising that Portland is the final case in a book about regional planning to promote sustainability. However, one may wonder why we have to keep studying Portland. I argue that we need to look more closely at Portland to see what really happens when we give regional planning agencies financial and regulatory tools to influence regional land use and transportation decisions. In Portland, the story is complicated. Authority creates the conditions for cooperation, but the process of working together takes time and requires ongoing negotiation. Portland Metro is a collection of twenty-five cities and three counties in the Portland metropolitan region covering roughly 460 square miles and home to more than 1.5 million people. As the only directly elected metropolitan council in the country with a mandated Urban Growth Boundary (UGB) and MPO responsibilities, Portland has been the focus of numerous studies. According to Myron Orfield, “The Portland metropolitan region is often held up as a national model of how to plan for growth in ways that keep communities attractive and a region livable. Our elected regional government, state land use and planning system, urban growth boundary, investment in mass transit and bicycle and pedestrian systems, protection of open spaces, and environmental quality standards are all praised as innovative, visionary, and effective.” In the urban planning literature the Portland case is touted as the most successful case of metropolitan intergovernmental coordination in the United States; however, Portland is increasingly viewed as a unique political, cultural, and institutional experiment that cannot be reproduced.

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DATA RESOURCE CENTER 600 NORTHEAST GRAND AVENUE PORTLAND, OREGON 97232-2736 [email protected] gis.oregonmetro.gov TEL (503) 797-1742 FAX (503) 797-1909

Figure 4. Metropolitan Portland. Courtesy of Portland Metro.

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One argument against viewing Portland Metro as a model for metropolitan governance is that people in Portland are different: they are whiter, more liberal, more environmentally conscious, and more homogenous; this makes them able to “do” regionalism. David Bragdon, the former president of the Metro Council, cautioned against attempting to replicate the Portland experience, arguing that the success of Portland Metro is due to a number of unique factors: the homogeneity of the region, the relative youth of political institutions, a tradition of policy innovation in the 1970s, the importance of agriculture and forestry to Oregon’s economy and proximity to urban areas, and finally to recognition that “urban problems were going unsolved.”  While there is a strong tradition of civic environmentalism in the Pacific Northwest, which may have helped in the initial adoption of progressive land use policies; whether this is a necessary precondition for developing a stronger metropolitan and state planning framework is debatable. Arthur C. Nelson disputes the idea that the Portland experience cannot be copied: “Although some may contend that Metro’s rise is attributable to metropolitan Portland’s unique political economic climate and the governance concept it represents is not generalizable, this is a mistaken view. Metro’s rise is attributable more to finding ways to solve problems common to all regions than to anything peculiar about metropolitan Portland.” Part of the problem of studying Portland is that since it is such an iconic place, researchers often are not objective about it. Robert Bruegmann argues that many studies evaluating Portland’s successes or failures appear to be ideologically tinged. Since it “has become the prime symbol of the anti-sprawl campaign,” Bruegmann writes, “the question of whether the ‘Portland system’ works has enormous ideological significance.”  Critics of Metro, who are often opponents of strong regulatory approaches to regional governance, cite evidence that the UGB creates unintended negative effects such as boosting housing prices and triggering sprawl in other parts of the region. Samuel Staley and Gerard Mildner argue that housing became increasingly unaffordable in the Portland Metro region. They found that “more than 80,000 single-family homes became ‘unaffordable’ to Portland residents as a result of housing-price inflation.” They also concluded that densities did not increase at the expected rate: “Actual densities inside the growth boundaries, for example, ranged from two-thirds to one-fourth below the levels permitted by local plans.” The National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) also blames the strict UGB policy for Portland’s ranking near the bottom of the Housing Affordability Index (HAI). However, Philip Langdon argues

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that the HAI (which divides housing price by income) underestimates incomes in Portland resulting in a skewed housing affordability ranking. According to Langdon, if the true income measures were used, Portland would not be considered as unaffordable as the NAHB study suggests. Similarly, Anthony Downs disputes the notion that housing prices have risen faster in Portland than in other metropolitan regions. Although the effectiveness of some of the policies may be debatable—in part because, as Bruegmann points out, “no one has figured out how to sort all the variables”—what is certainly true is that the debate about Portland Metro reflects the divisive nature of land use policy in the United States. For those who question the replicability of Portland Metro, the fact that Measure 37 was approved in 2004 by Oregon voters with 61  percent of the vote was offered as evidence that the political moment that created Portland’s metropolitan council has been lost. Measure 37 allowed landowners who purchased their land before Oregon’s landmark agriculture or forest use zoning was adopted in 1973 to develop their lands according to the original land use zoning or to be compensated. According to Oregon’s Department of Land Conservation and Development (DLCD), Measure 37, as provided under ORS [Oregon Revised Statutes] chapter 197, states that the owner of private real property is entitled to receive just compensation when a land use regulation is enacted after the owner or a family member became the owner of the property if the regulation restricts the use of the property and reduces its fair market value. In lieu of compensation, the measure also provides that the government responsible for the regulation may choose to “remove, modify or not apply” the regulation. The Reason Policy Institute, a property rights advocacy group, argued that “Measure 37 represents a major advance for the national property rights movement by establishing a system that restores the rights of private landowners that had previously been taken away via regulatory action.” Not surprisingly, when Measure 37 was passed in 2004, it was considered a setback for Metro, which manages the Portland region’s UGB, and for regional planning more generally. If Metro determined that land outside the UGB should not be developed, but the landowner could sue for compensation or develop land according to previous zoning designations, then there was concern that Metro would have difficulty maintaining a tight UGB. Since cities and counties that

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are members of Metro do not have the funds to fully compensate landowners who file a claim under Measure 37, planners worried that they would have to allow landowners to develop their properties despite being outside of Metro’s UGB designation. However, while advocates of Measure 37 claimed that Portland Metro and Oregon’s strong land use planning days were numbered, the true impact of Measure 37 was much less dramatic. Measure 49, a statewide special election ballot that passed in 2007, undid much of Measure 37. Measure 49 prohibits commercial and industrial property owners from filing claims, allows residential property owners to build one to three homes on their land (or up to ten homes on land that is not deemed high value agricultural), and requires claimants to demonstrate a monetary loss in land value due to regulation by presenting appraisals from a year before and after any new law is enacted. Measure 49 has tempered Measure 37 and responded to questions of fairness pertaining to the government determination of which land could be in the UGB. However, the fact that these debates over land use policy continue demonstrates that even in Oregon, strong land use regulations that impact property values are the target of political opposition.

History of Metro While scholars argue about the replicability of the Portland model, there is also debate about the political forces that led to the creation of such a strong system of land use planning and metropolitan governance. Carl Abbott asserts that one reason for the success of Metro is the fact that it was created incrementally: “Incremental policy making has allowed Portlanders to develop a habit of planning. Portland’s civic community is comfortable and familiar with planning processes, issues, and terminologies.” Abbott sees a “series of small decisions” as critical to Portland’s success. He emphasizes the importance of the creation of stable political coalitions and citizen support to back the innovative intergovernmental arrangement: “Metro is the product of continuing interaction among a concerned public, elected officials, and agency staff. Both an organization and an idea, Metro and its predecessor agencies have evolved with the help of hundreds of citizens who have dealt with the issues of metropolitan government.” In addition to citizen involvement, Abbott argues that the coalition between the suburbs and the city were impor tant to Metro’s initial development. Instead of pitting these two interests against each other, as is often the case in metropolitan

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regions, there was an understanding that there was enough growth in the region that they could negotiate a fair share for both city and suburb. Here a brief history of Metro helps to underscore the incremental approach that Abbott references. From the mid-1950s to the present, there have been several metropolitan arrangements aimed at promoting regional cooperation in the Portland region. In 1960, the League of Women’s Voters produced a study of the region called A Tale of Three Counties that exposed the region’s uncoordinated and inefficient management. From 1957 to 1966, the Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC) was established to make use of federal housing funds for regional planning allocated by the Housing Act of 1954. The MPC was charged with conducting data inventory (of the supply of industrial, commercial, and recreational lands), population projections, and baseline studies. According to Abbott, “It also provided a forum where politicians such as Portland’s William Bowes, Multnomah County’s  M. James Gleason, and Washington County’s Clayton Nyberg could meet to discuss regional issues.” In 1959, the Oregon State Highway Commission created the Portland-Vancouver Metropolitan Transportation Study (PVMTS), which consisted of three counties, the Port of Portland, the MPC, and other cities in the region. The PVMTS was charged with conducting area-wide highway planning that would meet federal requirements. In 1961, the Oregon legislature created the Portland Metropolitan Study Commission (PMSC) with thirty-eight staff members. The PMSC recommended the creation of the Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District (TriMet) to act as the regional public transit authority and a metropolitan ser vice district to provide urban ser vices to the region. The importance of these institutions was that stakeholders were learning to work together and plan at the regional level. In 1966, the Columbia Region Association of Governments (CRAG) replaced the PVMTS and served as the region’s Council of Governments developing regional transportation and land use plans. The timing of its creation coincided with the federal requirements for MPOs; CRAG became the MPO for the region. From 1966 to 1973, membership in CRAG was voluntary. Interestingly, the organization was largely considered to be ineffective and communities opted out and did not pay their dues. However, in 1973 membership in CRAG was mandated by the state; this move increased local participation. Most importantly, CRAG was engaged in a comprehensive regional planning effort and proposed the first UGB for the region in 1977. According to Arthur C. Nelson, “Despite its shortcomings, CRAG became the nation’s first

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regional body granted legislative authority to require cities and counties to conform their land use plans to regional standards.” In addition to planning for the region, CRAG served as the A-95 clearinghouse (1967) and was the area-wide planning agency for HUD (1967), the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) Regional Planning Unit, and the 208 Wastewater Management Agency (1974). These roles and responsibilities were impor tant for capacity building and developing a regional institution with a purpose. In 1977, the Oregon State Legislature approved the development of the Metropolitan Ser vice District (MSD), which was charged with regional solid waste planning and management and operating the Washington Park Zoo (now the Oregon Zoo). The idea behind the MSD was to create more efficient delivery of regional ser vices. Together, CRAG and the MSD laid the foundation for regional governance in the Portland region. Metro in its current form began to take shape on January 1, 1979. It was established after the voters from Clackamas, Multnomah, and Washington Counties approved a 1978 ballot measure creating Metro, a directly elected metropolitan government charged with functional planning, management of the UGB, solid waste operations (1981), and management of the Convention Center and Metropolitan Exposition-Recreation Commission (1986–1987). The ballot mea sure, “Reorga nize Metropolitan Ser vice District, Abolish CRAG,” passed with 55  percent of the vote. Essentially, CRAG and the MSD were merged and renamed Metro. The 1978 ballot measure created Metro, with a twelve-member elected regional council. It was and continues to be the first and only elected metropolitan government in the country. Metro inherited the UGB that CRAG had proposed, and in 1979 Oregon’s Land Conservation and Development Commission certified that the UGB was consistent with statewide planning goals. In addition, Metro and the Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT), which was composed of local elected officials and representatives from transportation agencies, were designated the MPO for the region by the federal government. While the structure of Metro was now in place, the organization had a much smaller staff and focused more on regional service delivery and transportation planning than on land use. In fact, although the UGB was adopted in 1979, until 1990 Metro had only one half-time person working on the UGB. In 1992, voters in metropolitan Portland adopted a home-rule charter to allow Metro to expand its role from metropolitan ser vice delivery to regional planning and growth management. According to several Metro officials,

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local mayors played an impor tant role in expanding these functions. However, critics of Metro argue that when they made this decision, they never intended for Metro to take on all the additional roles that it currently has. The home-rule charter established Metro as an “elected, visible and accountable regional government that is responsive to the citizens of the region and works cooperatively with our local governments.” The charter was important because Metro was granted its authority by the citizens in the region rather than by the state. And since the citizens had voted for the expansion of Metro’s role, it could claim that it represented the interests of the citizens and was not just an arm of the state. The charter thus shifted Metro’s focus to growth management and required that it adopt a future vision, “a long-range statement of the region’s outlook and values. It also required a comprehensive set of regional policies on land use, transportation, water quality, natural areas and other issues of ‘regional significance’ called the Regional Framework Plan.” The regional framework had to be adopted by the end of 1997. These initial planning documents serve as the foundation of Metro’s current planning framework, although it is important to note that they have been amended to meet changing regional concerns, including climate change.

The Critical Role of the State In Oregon, a system of strong state planning spells out a number of statewide goals that set the stage for what happens at the metropolitan level. In the late 1960s, there was growing concern about rapid and unplanned growth in Oregon. In 1969, the state legislators passed Senate 10 Bill, which mandated that localities adopt comprehensive planning and set forth ten goals they should embrace. Although the law was a critical first step, it lacked the necessary tools for implementation (enforcement and technical assistance), so many communities did not develop comprehensive plans. In 1973, Governor Tom McCall and a coalition of farmers and environmentalists campaigned for the reform of Oregon’s land use planning laws. Senator McCall made an impassioned plea to the 1973 legislature to pass legislation against uncontrolled growth: Sagebrush subdivisions, coastal “condomania,” and the ravenous rampage of suburbia in the Willamette Valley all threaten to mock Oregon’s status as the environmental model for the nation. We are

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dismayed that we have not stopped misuse of the land, our most valuable finite natural resource. We are in dire need of a state land-use policy, new subdivision laws, and new standards for planning and zoning by cities and counties. The interests of Oregon for today and in the future must be protected from grasping wastrels of the land. We must respect another truism: that unlimited and unregulated growth leads inexorably to a lowered quality of life. McCall spent the year traveling the state campaigning for the regulation of land use and building legislative support for land use planning. Within the state senate, an unlikely pair—a farmer from Linn County, Hector MacPherson, and a liberal Democrat from Portland, Ted Hallock—were the key sponsors of the bill. In May 1973, the legislature passed Senate Bill 100, which created two state-level agencies: the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC)—a seven-member commission of citizen volunteers appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state, and the Department of Land Conservation and Development (DLCD). LCDC and DLCD were asked to “define and attain very specific land-use objectives both in cities and in the countryside.” The goals they came up with form the basis of Oregon’s now famous Statewide Planning Program. Subsequently, Senate Bill 101 created further statewide protections for agriculture. The setting of these statewide goals was critical to changing the way that land use planning is accomplished in Oregon. They require the following goals: (Goal 1) citizen involvement in land use planning; (Goal 2) a comprehensive local plan created by citizens and local officials and reviewed and ‘acknowledged’ (approved) by the Land Conservation and Development Commission; (Goal 3) the restriction of agricultural lands to full-scale farming; (Goal 4) forest conservation planning that restricts the use of forest lands; (Goal 5) local government inventories of natural resources, open space, and scenic and historic places; (Goal 6) consistency of local plans with state and federal environmental regulations; (Goal 7) careful planning in areas that are prone to natural disasters and or hazards;

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(Goal 8) coordination of the local, state, and federal governments with the private sector to protect recreational opportunities; (Goal 9) local planning for economic development; (Goal 10) all types of housing to be allowed in all communities along with the continued supply of land for residential use; (Goal 11) public facilities planning for guiding growth; (Goal 12) a connection between comprehensive plans and transportation plans; (Goal 13) communities to manage growth in ways that are energy efficient; (Goal 14) the creation of an urban growth boundary that determines which land will be urbanized and which land will be reserved for agriculture and forestry; (Goal 15) the restriction of development in each community along the Willamette River and the providing of access for recreation; (Goal 16) the inclusion of estuary plans in coastal communities; (Goal 17) the planning for and protection of communities’ coastal shorelands; (Goal 18) the restriction against building on beaches and the providing of access for recreation; and (Goal 19) coordination among state and federal agencies to protect ocean resources. The statewide goals make planning a priority in Oregon’s communities. All communities must adopt comprehensive plans, zoning, and codes that are in compliance with the statewide goals. In the Portland region, Metro’s Regional Framework Plan, which “must comply with statewide land use planning goals,” was approved by the LCDC in 2000. In addition, “Under the Metro Charter and state law, cities and counties within Metro’s boundaries are required to comply and be consistent with Metro’s adopted Urban Growth Management Functional Plans and the Regional Framework Plan. The Charter also required adoption of a Future Vision [the regional visioning statement].” In order to make sure that local plans are in compliance with both state and regional goals, there is a periodic review, a state-run process that all communities must go through, which can take several years. For communities in the Portland region, the state’s LCDC and Metro take a look at their codes, ordinances, and plans and compare them to changes in state law and regional requirements. Although this process takes a long time, the result is that

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local communities “should be assured that the rules and plans comply with federal and state and regional regulations.” This helps provide local officials with a degree of certainty about their future direction and can serve as a way for them to legitimize what might be unpopular local planning decisions. Local planners recognized that Oregon’s consistency requirements were powerful planning tools. When asked to compare the Oregon planning framework with that of Massachusetts, which in many communities requires a two-thirds vote at an Open Town meeting in order to change a local zoning ordinance, one local planning director in the Portland region said, “If we had to do planning at two-thirds vote, nothing would change. Citizens are opposed to change.”  This is a telling statement, suggesting that citizens in Portland are not necessarily more enlightened or inclined to vote for progressive planning, as some have argued. Instead, a strong state land use planning framework forces the adoption of a more rigorous planning process and insulates it from the local political opposition that typically makes regional planning more difficult. Local politics is still important but it is limited by certain requirements that each community has to meet. Goal 14, that every community have a UGB, has been key to Metro’s relevance. The UGB policy was put in place in an effort to retain Oregon’s strong agricultural economy and forest industry. It provides a clear line of demarcation between urban and rural areas. All the land throughout the state was classified and zoned according to soil type to ensure that rich soil types would not be lost to urban and suburban development. Land that is given exclusive farm use (EFU) zoning is supposed to remain agricultural (and outside of the UGB) unless there is a compelling reason for its development. Rather than each community formulating its own UGB, the state grants Metro the authority to administer one UGB for the whole Portland metropolitan area. Land within the UGB is developable (as “urban”), while land outside of the UGB, with some exceptions, is reserved for agriculture and forestry. Metro is responsible for ensuring that there is a twenty-year land supply in the Portland region to support housing and industrial development.

Metro Authority and Legitimacy Metro’s legislative and fiscal authority make it a unique example of intergovernmental coordination in the area of metropolitan growth management. Metro’s authority comes from the following:

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(1) the ability to determine the UGB for the Portland region; (2) oversight over local planning to ensure consistency with the regional plan; (3) a voter-approved home-rule charter that grants Metro “authority to assume responsibility for issues of ‘metropolitan concern’ ”; (4) an elected Metro Council that gives Metro more political legitimacy than any other metropolitan body in the United States; (5) participation of local elected officials in the Metropolitan Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC) and the Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT); (6) participation of local planning directors in the Metropolitan Technical Advisory Committee (MTAC) and local technical experts in the Transportation Policy Alternatives Committee (TPAC); (7) its capacity building role of producing and disseminating regional data and providing planning and technical assistance to local governments; (8) its role as the MPO for the region: its authority over regional transportation funds and its ability to link the regional land use plan with regional transportation investments; (9) its ability to ask voters for “broad-based revenue sources such as a property tax, sales tax or income tax”; and (10) its role as the Metropolitan Ser vice District (providing regional services such as solid waste disposal, recycling, regional parks, the Oregon Zoo, the Oregon Convention Center, as well as regulation of solid waste in the metropolitan area).

Metro’s Home-Rule Charter Although the state planning system grants Metro significant authority over regional land use policy, its home-rule charter is a “bottom up” source of authority coming from the voters. According to one Metro official, the homerule charter, elections, and ballot measures make Metro a political player in the region: When you talk to local government officials you hear the word “home-rule” charter pretty readily. It rolls off their lips. . . . We had to have a state constitutional amendment that the voters statewide

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had to approve to allow us to have a “home-rule” charter. . . . We had to have an independent charter commission draft that “home-rule” charter and refer it out to the voters. So our accountability to the public and the authority that the “home-rule” charter created went farther than the state mandated authority. We have that accountability to our public, which gets reinforced daily by having an elected council. We have been on the ballot on a very regular basis and when you are on the ballot a lot you get a higher consciousness by the public. . . . So we are not invisible. . . . We are on the ballot . . . for elected officials. We have been on the ballot for money measures probably a dozen times over the course of the years. We have been on the ballot for the charter and a charter amendment. There were . . . land use measures we have been on the ballot for (neighborhood density). . . . There is a pretty high level of understanding. If you poll the word Urban Growth Boundary, there is 95  percent name recognition— unbelievable. Metro’s political visibility and accountability to voters allow it to take on tasks that in other regions are considered the sole responsibility of local officials. Citizens are involved in Metro’s decision making because it has asked citizens what they want at the ballot box. In addition, there has been pushback from citizens, and Metro has had to consistently negotiate its authority with citizens through the ballot.

Elected Metro Councillors The fact that Metro’s councillors are specifically elected by a regional constituency to deal with regional issues lends Metro a level of democratic legitimacy that other regional planning agencies do not have. Metro is governed by a council of six councillors who are elected by district and one president elected region-wide every four years. Each district consists of constituents from different parts of the region, so Metro councillors often represent a diverse range of “regional” interests. Since they may represent constituents from urban and suburban communities, they are charged with creating policies that address the needs of both. Metro councillors argue that this gives them more legitimacy to make regional decisions than even local officials who sit on regional councils, because they are engaged in a dialogue

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with a diverse range of constituents about how they want the region to develop. One Metro councillor described their unique role: “We have a lot of legitimacy. We are elected. And we are elected in elections in which growth management is the primary issue. Local officials are elected in elections which turn on issues such as law enforcement or the local scene, the installation of a stop sign or something.”  While local elected officials run on a platform of helping their specific communities, Metro councillors run on a regional platform, which they argue makes them better qualified to make regional decisions.

Capacity Building Role In the late 1980s, Metro created the Regional Land Information System (RLIS), a geographic information system (GIS) that links publicly available data with a base map. According to regional planning scholar Ethan Seltzer, the RLIS “provided regional planners with a number of ‘firsts’ essential for supporting existing and emerging regional planning efforts. It provided the first parcel-base map for the region, showing the impact of the UGB in bold relief, region-wide, for the first time. It provided the first composite comprehensive plan and land use maps for the metropolitan region.” The data and geographic expertise that Metro offers continues to be an important resource for local governments that do not have the financial resources or expertise to maintain and gather such data. Metro also conducts studies of transportation alternatives, which are impor tant for localities that do not have the capacity or resources to conduct them.  In addition, Metro provides much needed funding to local governments to help them plan for regional plan implementation through its Community Development and Planning Grants. These grants are funded by the regional construction excise tax, which taxes construction permits. When land is brought into the UGB, Metro often helps communities coordinate and pay for the planning process. This was the case in the Damascus/Boring area, where 12,000 acres were brought into the UGB in 2002 (this is discussed in more detail later in the chapter). Metro also assists local communities to meet statewide goals by helping them inventory their streams and natural habitat (Goal 5). This particular activity landed Metro in political hot water when local governments disagreed with its stricter Goal 5 classifications. At fi rst, Metro approached Goal 5  in traditional regulatory

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fashion, but after considerable pushback from local officials, it shifted to a more voluntary approach and worked with communities to help them comply. Metro councillors and staff also play an important educational role, giving presentations to neighborhood groups about the history of Metro and the state land use planning law, and answering questions about Metro’s 2040 Growth Concept and the Regional Framework Plan. Metro also runs a program called Get Centered!, “a multi-year campaign dedicated to helping visionary developers, architects, and elected officials spur investment and build the region’s vibrant downtowns and main streets.” Metro’s Get Centered! program offers events, case studies, and reports to help those interested in building downtown centers to find the necessary tools and resources. In addition, Metro produces handbooks and reports about best practices and guidelines for how to build more livable communities; in some cases it is able to supplement these educational activities with funding. Metro’s TransitOriented Development (TOD) program acquires sites and helps write down the cost of land to promote more TOD projects, particularly near TriMet’s MAX light rail stations.

Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) Program Established in 1998, Metro’s TOD program has helped a number of communities with hard-to-develop projects near the light rail stations. Between 1998 and 2015, the program supported the development of 31 TOD projects, 3,296 residential units, 399,769 square feet of commercial space, protected 479 acres from single family development, increased transit trips, and “leveraged $9,711,000 of direct investment in support of $528 million of development activity.” According to Metro’s 2011 Transit-Oriented Development Strategic Plan, over the life of the program it has allocated $14.9 million to real estate improvements in TODs; $8.5 million to land banking around transit stations; roughly five Full Time Equivalent employees (FTEs), costing about $600,000 in FY 2009/10 and $165,000 in FY 2009/10 for tenant improvement grants for commercial operations; $480,000 in green building improvements; $270,000 in implementation costs; and an unspecified amount in staff time for education. The TOD program is designed to develop new building types and push the market to encourage transit ridership. Metro helps write down the cost of development and also helps with the planning and implementation

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of projects. For instance, Metro helped the City of Beaverton conduct a study with local real estate developers about the challenges of TOD projects, and worked with Beaverton to buy a TOD site for $2 million and to conduct a review of its parking regulations. In the City of Gresham, several mixed-use projects (Gresham Civic Neighborhood, the Crossings, and Gresham Station) have been built with the help of Metro’s TOD program. Since Gresham wanted to capitalize on the development of light rail, the city planned for new uses around it. The Gresham Civic Neighborhood Plan (1995) was supportive of more transitoriented development and required adjustments to local zoning. According to Ed Gallagher, Gresham’s planning director, the Gresham Station development came about because “a civic neighborhood plan, strong vision, market demand and a good developer came together to make it happen. The city worked closely with Metro, applied resources to public streets, and transit oriented tax credits.” The success of Gresham Station is attributed in part to Metro’s focus on capacity building and support of local planning. One Metro staff member saw the value of the TOD program in that “communities see a different side of Metro. We bring money to the table. We bring money to the project. We have added some street credibility to Metro as an organization that is on the ground and not just in an ivory tower.” However, Metro’s 2011 Transit-Oriented Development Strategic Plan identifies a lack of funding as an impediment to the success of Metro’s TOD program. While the number of TOD-eligible sites has increased by seven times since the program started in 1998, funding has not even doubled. In addition, the 2011 study finds that the market conditions for TOD projects across the region vary greatly. And geography matters. In areas that are close to Portland’s city center, TOD projects are easier to support, but in more suburban communities “there are many challenges hindering the development of these areas, including high suburban land supply with limited market demand, a lack of road, bicycle, and pedestrian infrastructure, superblocks that need to be retrofitted and a lack of retail and ser vice amenities to promote district living.”  According to the Strategic Plan, the good news for Metro’s TOD program is that its goals align with the HUD-EPA-DOT Partnership for Sustainable Communities. Notably, the City of Beaverton, in collaboration with university and community partners, was awarded a $1,000,000 HUD Community Challenge Grant in 2011 for the Beaverton Creekside District Master Plan. The funding was, in part, to support planning for more infi ll, low-

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income, and TOD housing. Metro anticipates seeing future interest in TOD investment as more people want to live close to transit.

Programming Transit Projects The ability to link land use and transportation planning is one of Metro’s strengths. Metro serves as the lead agency for metropolitan rail projects, which are implemented by TriMet, the operator of the regional rail system. Metro is in charge of project design and the Environmental Impact Study (EIS). The initial idea for Portland’s light rail system came about as a means of reprogramming federal transportation dollars that had originally been slated for the Mt. Hood Freeway, a five-mile highway project that would have sliced through the city, displacing residents and businesses. The mayor of Portland and the governor proposed an alternative plan for light rail investment, and Metro planned for it. After construction of the light rail, subsequent regional land use plans have been connected to the significant regional investments in public transit. As a result, the connection between transportation and land use planning is stronger in Portland than in other metropolitan areas. One Metro official described Metro’s integrated strategy: We set priorities and stick to those priorities and we have a greater level of influence over the land use patterns around the stations than just the UGB itself. Our 2040 Growth Concept is very much designed around emphasizing higher density development around the transit stations. From a zoning and regulatory point of view, our framework for the region is mirrored by the local zoning to implement that framework which really emphasizes the zoning around those stations, our parking policy, our MTIP [Metropolitan Transportation Improvement Program] funding (we allocate other categories of federal funds towards a wide variety of transportation projects throughout the region: streets, bike paths, sidewalks), the criteria for allocating that money emphasizes those centers. We have a TOD program, which actually buys land adjacent to rail stations [for] development. We use that land value to actually underwrite that development.

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Metro’s authority over land use and transportation combined with its ability to provide capacity building assistance all come together to influence regional land use and promote more compact development.

MPO Role and Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation Since Metro serves as the MPO for the region, it programs federal (and some state and regional) funds for regional transportation projects, so local officials searching for scarce funds turn to it. As one Metro official put it: “Local elected officials have to have a table that they sit around to make decisions. And you’ve got money [to put] on the table. Money on the table produces the need to at least communicate. And if you can communicate, you might be able to coordinate.”  The Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT), composed of a seventeen-member advisory committee of elected officials and representatives of agencies that are involved with regional transportation planning, submits its recommendations to the Metro Council on which transportation projects should be funded. It meets once a month and decisions are made by majority vote of a quorum (the chairperson only votes in the event of a tie). JPACT’s mission is “to coordinate the development of plans defining required regional transportation improvements, to develop a consensus of governments on the prioritization of required improvements and to promote and facilitate the implementation of identified priorities.” The Metro Council either has to approve JPACT’s recommendations or send them back for revision. Here it is important to note that the Transportation Policy Alternatives Committee (TPAC), whose twenty-one members are primarily technical staff from local governments and transportation agencies, informs JPACT’s work. Meeting every month, they help advise JPACT on funding priorities and transportation planning and help connect regional transportation planning and funding with local needs. One local planning director described the importance of being the MPO for the region as follows: “If you hate Metro, it only goes so far because the regional share of transportation money goes through Metro.”  The 2035 Regional Transportation Plan programs an estimated $20 billion in funding between 2010 and 2035. Approximately $1.7 billion from local, regional, state, and federal sources will be spent on transportation in the Portland metropolitan area between 2015 and 2018. Every four years, JPACT makes

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recommendations to the Metro Council regarding how to program the federal Metropolitan Transportation Improvement Program (MTIP), “including funds the Oregon Department of Transportation allocates through the State Transportation Improvement Program (STIP), public transportation funds administered by the transit agencies TriMet and SMART [South Metro Area Rapid Transit], and regional flexible funds that Metro allocates through its ‘Transportation Priorities’ process.” For FYs 2016–2018, the regional flexible funds (RFF) amount to $94.58 million. In 2016, Metro anticipates that the regional flexible funds amount to about $125 million every three years. The ‘Transportation Priorities’ process is of considerable interest to local officials who submit applications for regional flexible funds that can be used for any project other than local street construction. Metro uses its authority over transportation funds to promote its regional land use and transportation goals by basing the MTIP funding criteria on the 2040 Growth Concept and the 2035 Regional Transportation Plan. The six goals of the 2035 Regional Transportation Plan (“vibrant communities, economic prosperity, safe and reliable transportation, leadership on climate change, clean air and water, and equity”) are used to determine which projects receive funding. So projects that are “transit oriented” and located in centers are more likely to succeed than projects that do not meet regional planning goals. As a result of Metro’s Climate Smart Strategy, sustainable transportation projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions are also increasingly prioritized. Local officials and planners recognize the importance of proposing transportation projects that meet the 2040 goals and following Metro’s land use guidelines. One local planning director said, “If you meet the criteria, you are more likely to score points. Metro basically says, ‘If you want the money, you play our game.’ ” Another said that Metro uses its authority over transportation funding sparingly, but it has “hinted that the MPO is where the real leverage comes from, so for instance, if you want TIP money, you probably want to play by the rules.”

Local Participation in Metro Policy Making Creates Legitimacy (But Is Sometimes Ignored) The Portland system integrates local officials into metropolitan policy making by involving them on four impor tant committees: JPACT, TPAC, the Metro Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC), and the Metropolitan Technical

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Advisory Committee (MTAC). MPAC, a twenty-five-member “charter mandated committee of local government representatives and citizens” from the region, serves as the policy advisory committee to Metro Council. One member of MPAC said, “Metro does not ignore MPAC.” Although the Metro Council makes many of the final decisions on policy, much of Metro’s legitimacy comes from having the participation of local mayors, other elected officials, representatives from special districts, and citizens who sit on the MPAC and these other committees. Part of the importance of MPAC is historical. In the 1990s, when Metro was taking on a stronger land-use planning role, local officials on MPAC played a major role in determining the scope of Metro’s work. A key group of local mayors was instrumental in creating the 1991 Regional Urban Growth Goals and Objectives (RUGGOs), the goals that guided Metro’s later work. Interestingly, as a result of local officials’ participation, in some instances Metro’s policies are stricter (than they would have been) because the local officials wanted them to be. As one Metro official acknowledged: The local officials ended up getting us to adopt mandates on local government that were more aggressive than we would have adopted on our own initiative because our mandates get resisted. If you are being told what to do, the natural instinct at a local government level is to say, “Don’t tell me what to do.” Even if the medicine is good for you, you still resist. But if local officials say, we want this to happen and the only way it is going to happen is if Metro mandates it, then it is a different political dynamic. According to Metro officials, Metro would never have adopted some of the requirements such as stricter parking regulations if it had not been for the mayors who understood the important role that Metro could play in helping them meet their own goals. For example, the mayor of Gresham at the time, Gussie McRoberts, supported an increase in regional parking densities because it would help accomplish her goal of making downtown Gresham denser. There would be little incentive for people to come to downtown Gresham if it adopted stricter parking requirements on its own and if cheaper parking were available in other communities. However, if Metro mandated regional parking minimums and maximums in other communities, it would help level the playing field for Gresham. A Metro official describes the relationship between localities and Metro: “For example, we adopted parking minimums and maximums

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where they [local mayors] are the ones [who] pushed this. . . . Metro would never have gotten away with that. But they were able to have us adopt them as requirements that all the local governments had to adopt.” Since local officials on MPAC set the terms of Metro’s policies, they could not say they did not have a voice in regional decision making. In fact, they were at the table when the policies were negotiated. The role that MPAC played in the formation of Metro and the continued participation of local elected officials in MPAC is not trivial because mayors and other local elected officials feel that they helped determine the terms of metropolitan governance. One Metro councillor described the participation of local mayors in MPAC as the “building blocks for Metro.” Several of the mayors have been actively involved since the early 1990s, when Metro took on a stronger land use role. In addition, a few MPAC representatives have been associated with Metro longer than the Metro councillors. MPAC meets two times a month and makes policy recommendations about the regional plan. Metro’s authority is critical to the participation of local elected officials who tend not to participate unless something is at stake. Here it is impor tant to emphasize that without metropolitan authority, elected officials are less likely to participate in regional decision making. Like many other regions (including Boston and Denver), all of the mayors of suburbs in the Portland region are part-time except for the mayor of Beaverton, who is full-time. Given their part-time status, mayors’ time is limited so their active participation in MPAC is all the more remarkable. When asked why they participate, some local elected officials responded that they were committed to the idea of regional governance and wanted to play an active role in determining it. They attend the MPAC meetings because they benefit from being at the table and feel they may lose out if they do not attend. They also see MPAC as a check on the Metro councillors. However, not all local elected officials feel that the Metro Council listens to MPAC, which is sometimes a source of contention. Although MPAC’s subcommittees do much of the policy work for Metro, one local official also complained about the influence that Metro councillors have on the subcommittees: “Often the Metro councillors are actively engaged in subcommittee work. There is a feeling that there is a lack of independence. The Metro councillors have agendas. They can greatly influence the work.” An example of the tension between MPAC and the Metro Council occurred during the 2004 expansion of the UGB. When the City of Cornelius, a small, increasingly immigrant city at the western edge of the UGB (with a

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weak tax base), asked Metro to expand the UGB so Cornelius could add industrial land, the Metro Council denied the request despite MPAC’s overwhelming support of the expansion (it should be noted here that industrial land in the Portland region is more important than commercial land because there is no sales tax in Oregon ). The Metro Council denied the request because the land that Cornelius wanted to reclassify as industrial was classified under the Oregon State land use planning system as exclusive farm use zoning (EFU). Mayors and local officials were frustrated that Metro councillors had ignored their recommendation. They felt that no one had listened to them and that the environmental interests on the Metro Council had essentially overridden the consensus decision made by MPAC (subsequent disputes between Cornelius and Metro over the UGB expansion are discussed later). MPAC representatives’ collective frustration with Metro in this case can be interpreted in two ways. First, it can be seen as a collective push against Metro: local jurisdictions coming together to argue that another local jurisdiction should have the right to self-determination. On the other hand, it can be seen as an example of regional cooperation. City officials who typically think in terms of their own cities’ well-being (above those of other parts of the region) joined together to help out another jurisdiction. Local officials understood the economic situation in Cornelius because they met together on a regular basis to talk about their concerns. There is probably a little bit of both motives at play. The fact that local elected officials on MPAC work together all the time allows municipalities to cooperate and make a statement about how they think the region should develop and the importance of regional equity. In addition, they recognize that regional policies impact their bottom lines and they do not want Metro to overlook local concerns, particularly financial ones. Jurisdictions do not want Metro to fully determine the land that is available to them for development as they did in Cornelius. This example also demonstrates the decision-making power the Metro Council has over land use. Localities on the edge of the UGB that want to expand need permission from Metro. Metro has the ability to grant or reject changes to the UGB and the communities are obligated to abide by its decisions.

Metro Technical Advisory Committee Metro does not have the staff to become actively involved in the details of local planning, so it builds planning capacity through the involvement of

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thirty-five local planners, citizens, and business people in MTAC, the committee that advises MPAC. One local planning director who serves on MTAC said, “Frankly, a handful of us are around the table who have been doing this for a long time. There is a lot of problem solving horsepower.” He is on a firstname basis with the Metro councillors and staff members, in part because MTAC meets at Metro’s offices twice a month. He described working with Metro as “part of the routine.” During the UGB amendment process, he has a full-time staff member assigned to Metro; because the issues are so important to his community, it is usually himself. The planning director attends these meetings because it is important to be at the table to tell Metro which land to bring into the UGB and which to leave out. “In years past, Metro used to say, ‘Here’s the new UGB, now make it work,’ ” but now Metro is more open to input from local planning officials. Another planning director said, MTAC is an important group. A lot of bright people sit on it who are immersed in the issues. There is a lot of brainpower sitting around the table. It does a good job of shaping policy in the region. . . . It is called a technical advisory committee so people think that we are a bunch of technocrats, but most [of us] are also political people. The planning director is a position that is not free from politics. So you have knowledgeable people, who are political, sitting around the table. You also have some advocates, for example a representative from 1000 Friends, so you get different viewpoints. Yet another participant said that MTAC “helps you understand what is going on in the region . . . like you are a part of a greater whole.” Planning directors said MTAC was an important committee and it was important to be involved with it.

Influencing Regional Land Use: From Vision to Reality Under Oregon law, Metro was required to develop goals and objectives. In 1991, Metro adopted the RUGGOs to help guide its long-range planning efforts. In 1992, voters approved the home-rule charter that shifted Metro’s focus to regional land use planning. From 1992 to 1994, a public visioning process known as Region 2040 examined several different scenarios for the future development of the Portland region. Computer modeling found that

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if Portland continued to develop in the same way it had been, by 2040 the UGB would have to be expanded by 120,000 acres. In order to find out what Portland residents wanted, in the spring and summer of 1994 Metro sent questionnaires to 500,000 households in the region (responses were received from 17,000). The Region 2040 planning process was similar to regional planning initiatives like Envision Utah, Chicago 2020, Denver’s Metro Vision 2020, and Boston’s MetroFuture. These regional visioning exercises, which aim to promote shared understanding of issues and a culture of cooperation among stakeholders, have become the norm for how metropolitan governance is conducted in the United States. However, although the Region 2040 visioning process was similar to that in other parts of the country, Metro’s power to implement it is unique. Oregon state law mandates that local comprehensive plans and the zoning that implements them be consistent with the regional plan. In December 1995, the 2040 Growth Concept, which grew out of the visioning process, was adopted unanimously by MPAC and the Metro Council. The 2040 Growth Concept encouraged development of centers and corridors, redevelopment within the UGB, cooperation with communities outside of the UGB in order to keep them separate (promoting multi-modal regional transportation systems), protection of open space and farmland inside and outside the UGB, and the promotion of a range of housing options. In December 1996, Metro approved the Urban Growth Management Functional Plan, which it described as a “toolbox of planning policies for local governments to use to implement the 2040 Growth Concept.” The Urban Growth Management Functional Plan consists of a number of titles or “requirements” to guide local development, some of which are binding and others that are recommended: TITLE 1: REQUIREMENTS FOR HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT ACCOMMODATION TITLE 2: REGIONAL PARKING POLICY (Repealed Ord. 101241B, § 6) TITLE 3: WATER QUALITY AND FLOOD MANAGEMENT TITLE 4: INDUSTRIAL AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT AREAS TITLE 5: NEIGHBOR CITIES AND RURAL RESERVES (Repealed, Ord. 10-1238A, § 4) TITLE 6: CENTRAL CITY, REGIONAL CENTERS, TOWN CENTERS AND STATION COMMUNITIES

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TITLE 7: AFFORDABLE HOUSING TITLE 8: COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES TITLE 9: PERFORMANCE MEASURES (Title 9 is repealed) TITLE 10: FUNCTIONAL PLAN DEFINITIONS TITLE 11: PLANNING FOR NEW URBAN AREAS TITLE 12: PROTECTION OF RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS TITLE 13: NATURE IN NEIGHBORHOODS  These titles set the benchmarks for urban development that cities and counties must follow. According to the language of the plan, Regional policies which are adopted by this Urban Growth Management Functional Plan recommend and require changes to city and county comprehensive plans and implementing ordinances. The purpose of this functional plan is to implement regional goals and objectives adopted by the Metro Council as the Regional Urban Growth Goals and Objectives (RUGGO), including the Metro 2040 Growth Concept and the Regional Framework Plan. The comprehensive plan changes and related actions, including implementing regulations, required by this functional plan as a component of the Regional Framework Plan, shall be complied with by cities and counties as required by Section 5(e)(2) of the Metro Charter. After the Urban Growth Management Functional Plan was adopted, cities and counties had twenty-four months to change their plans, codes, and local zoning to meet the targets for population and housing set by Metro’s plans. According to the language of the original plan, communities should do the following: Accept regional 20 year growth targets for residential and employment; Change local plans to increase permitted densities to assure [sic] sufficient capacity to be consistent with the 2040 growth concept; Adopt minimum residential densities—providing for no less than 80% of the permitted density; Change local codes to provide for reductions in parking minimums and maximums consistent with regional standards to encourage more efficient use of land; Manage the location of new “big box” retail, so that investment and reinvestment in retail commercial in existing centers are maintained

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and transportation impacts are minimized; and, Raise levels of acceptable congestion on the road system in high density areas with good transit and/or pedestrian networks. As conditions have changed over time, the plan has been amended to reflect community concerns. Communities that upzoned to meet Metro’s requirements have not always been happy with the results. A backlash against Metro’s density requirement was a 2002 ballot measure proposed to strip Metro of its authority to require local governments to increase density. Metro countered with its own measure, Measure 26-29 which said it would not require increase in density in neighborhoods, but would allow it to increase density in centers. Metro’s measure passed 60-40. As a result of Measure 26-29, Metro has agreed to focus on increasing density in the town centers and leave other parts of communities alone. However, local planners still mentioned density requirements as a potential threat: “If they [Metro councillors] come back with new mandates, this community is adamant that we don’t want to increase density to accommodate mixed use, higher density.” Another local planning official echoed this sentiment: “Citizens don’t want to live on 4,500 square foot lots. We are capped so we can’t get bigger lots. Maybe the community doesn’t want development in the centers.” However, yet another planning director saw the importance of Metro’s density promotion: “There is a tendency for everyone to want the feel of the country, but there is a huge need to urbanize. Compact urban growth numbers force communities to examine closely their growth over time and to ramp up their densities. If not under Metro, these communities wouldn’t do this.” In 2014, Measure 26-160 reaffirmed Metro’s commitment not to upzone areas with single-family housing. Tom Hughes, president of Metro, argued that Measure 26-160 “would continue this existing policy of leaving single-family neighborhood zoning and density questions to cities and counties. You may not have heard much about this charter measure because it has been non-controversial. It reflects what is good about how we have managed growth.” According to Hughes, what is “good” about how Metro manages growth is that it does it in partnership with localities and there is room for local determination. While increasing density can be a flashpoint for many communities, there are also cases where communities hoped that rezoning to meet Metro’s requirements would help them create a stronger tax base by attracting commercial and industrial development. For instance, to comply with the goals

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of the 2040 Growth Concept, Gresham changed its zoning to provide for denser urban retail developments; however, these projects did not materialize without some help. Development of regional town centers takes investment and expertise, and Metro has played an important role in making these projects happen, particularly through its TOD program (discussed earlier). In Gresham, Metro relied on capacity building and fi nancial incentives to help change market conditions and bring about the development that they initially hoped to see through rezoning. Metro’s influence over local land use is the subject of debate. In 2006, officials from the City of Hillsboro were frustrated with Metro’s ability to determine par ticu lar regional land uses. Hillsboro officials argued that corporations come to the Portland region looking for 100-acre lots, which are difficult to find because of the UGB and Portland’s strict land use regulations. Amendments to Metro’s 2004 Title 4 “regionally significant industrial areas” (RSIA) regulations further restricted the ability of localities to determine their own industrial land development criteria by setting certain restrictions and requirements on these parcels. Ordinance No. 04-1040B was adopted to limit the retail and office use of RSIA. Hillsboro officials argued that Metro overstepped its mandate because its strict regulations reduced the ability of the Portland region to compete with other regions that do not have strong land use regulations: “Metro got [into] the detail of telling how many square feet. They went too far, but this was what got adopted.” Hillsboro challenged Title 4 in court. However, the Land Use Board of Appeals and the Court of Appeals upheld Metro’s authority, sending a signal to other communities that it could force them to change their zoning to comply. When asked about how this incident affected the relationship between Hillsboro and Metro, one Hillsboro official said, It is a partnership that is evolving. We have had our rough spots with Metro and we have made some good progress with them in the past year or so to try to repair what was somewhat of a strained relationship that is a result of a direct challenge that we did based on new industrial lands protections that were adopted in 2004, the Title 4 industrial land protection. We challenged that on the basis that it seemed to be an exercise of Metro’s authority beyond what they really were given statutorily, by their own charter or the Oregon Constitution. They were in effect doing what looked to us like zoning. It was our stance that their role was coordinating land use matters in the

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region among the jurisdictions, maybe setting some broad policy goals to their framework plan, performance standards, but not getting down to the level of specificity where this parcel of land has these restrictions and it is going to be zoned [a] regionally significant industrial area. We lost that case even going through as high as the Court of Appeals. The court decided that Metro did have that type of authority. Hillsboro officials may not agree with Metro, but they have learned to work within its framework. This is critical and replicable for other places. Learning to resolve conflicts and work together is one of the strengths of Portland’s metropolitan governance. If Metro councillors want to stay out of court and off the political hot seat, they have to maintain a working relationship with a community despite previous disagreements. Here it is interesting to note the importance of politics and policy shifts in Metro. In 2011, when Metro expanded the UGB, it included a 330-acre site to the area north of Hillsboro for industrial development. Tom Hughes, former mayor of Hillsboro, was the president of Metro (elected in 2011) and had long been an advocate for more industrial lands there. Although Hillsboro officials might have been pleased with the 2011 UGB expansion, Mayor Jef Dalin from Cornelius and the planning commissioner chair, Sheila Griffie, were not. They sent a letter to the governor asking for intervention in Metro’s denial of additional UGB for the neighboring city of Cornelius, arguing that Metro was preventing Cornelius from creating a housing development, its first high school, and a community park/soccer space. Other mayors were also displeased because Metro did not accept MPAC’s recommendations to add industrial lands near Forest Grove and Tualatin. Mayor Pete Traux from Forest Grove expressed his frustration with the process of UGB expansion: “We thought we’d done every thing we were supposed to do. . . . A number of Washington County mayors are not happy with how things are shaking out.” It might seem that a regional planning agency with regulatory authority should automatically be able to force localities to adopt goals, targets, and guidelines, but as the stories above demonstrate, the reality is more complicated (and actually much more interesting). According to a 2004 Metro Annual Compliance Report, “The region has reached a compliance rate of 99% for Titles 1 through 6 requirements.” The 2012 and 2014 Compliance Reports paint a similar picture of a region where most communities are either in compliance or qualify for an exemption because they are working toward

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compliance or have a good reason. Metro’s response to non-compliance is to call a public hearing and ask those communities to explain why they have not complied. One local planning director said Metro has “a massive list of deadlines for changing local land use, parking requirements, building height standards, etc. Metro threatens to do something if communities don’t comply, but they never really do. They do have authority, but they don’t really use it.” The same planning director admitted, “The easiest thing is to adopt their standards, but if you are different, you want to use a different approach. It is a time-consuming thing to convince Metro that your ordinance is as good as theirs.” Many local planning directors said it was easier to cooperate with Metro than to actively work against it. When asked about enforcement, one local planning director emphasized the subtle way that Metro uses its authority, saying that as far as he knew “the 2040 process had never taken on any local community to force them to change zoning.” He argued that this is “a credit to Metro’s political ability. Metro clearly has authority, but it doesn’t want to use it. Instead, Metro has a cooperative, how-can-we-solve-the-problem approach.” Metro technically could focus attention on communities that have not complied, but it is reluctant to do so. A Metro councillor said, “The fact that we are not reviewing their zoning decisions is a healthy thing. The enforcement mechanism is that if there is a party that thinks that something they have done is not in compliance, it can be taken to the Land Use Board.” Another planning director explained Metro’s disinclination to use its regulatory authority: It is politically difficult to call out cities. There have been past attempts by citizens to reduce the authority of Metro councillors. Metro councillors are elected and they don’t want to have local elected officials bad-mouthing them. Metro is reluctant to actually enforce something. So it is a matter of persuasion rather than enforcement. The further you get down the enforcement trail, the more hardened positions become. Tension increases or decreases depending on what is going on. When Metro assumes a regulatory role, tension goes up. When they take on the convener role, tension goes down. The historical pushback that Metro has had from local governments, particularly over UGB expansion, density, housing targets, natural resource protection, and Measure 37, has led to the realization that it needs to be more cooperative. Increasingly, Metro is trying to take on more capacity-building

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roles and develop policies in conjunction with communities rather than relying as much on their regulatory mandate. Communities in the Portland region all have to comply with the state regulations as well as Metro’s. The periodic review of local plans and zoning by Metro and LCDC helps ensure a certain level of compliance. However, one local planning director compared Metro’s relationship with different communities to a big family: “If you were a big family, each kid would have a different personality. Every jurisdiction is doing something right. There is a lot of fighting and a lot of disagreements.” Local politics still matter to local planning. One Metro councillor, describing the different approaches of local governments to planning, said, “The values that they hold are very much the same. It is how they define those values that is different.” Local planning directors acknowledged that they were still accountable to their city councillors before Metro. The challenge for local planners was helping city council members understand Metro’s regulations so they would adopt policies that Metro would recognize as in compliance with its guidelines.

Managing the UGB and Regulating Land Use Metro could not function in its current form without the support of Oregon’s strong state land use planning system. State law gives Metro the authority to manage the UGB for the region. According to one Metro official, All local governments have to have an Urban Growth Boundary. There are rules on how you establish an Urban Growth Boundary and expand [it]. There are protections on what happens outside of the UGB. We don’t have to regulate what happens outside of the UGB because the state does. Our actions within the UGB happen within this context. Finally, the state essentially said that there is really only one UGB in the metropolitan region. There is no reason to have dueling UGBs. That all emanates from the authority under the State Land Use Program. As a result of the authority that Metro has from the state, localities have to defer to it when it is time to decide where development can and cannot occur at the region’s edge. Metro’s role in administering the UGB is not

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entirely unwelcome by local officials. One local planning director described the policy: The UGB program helped create a perfect need for a metropolitan agency to administer the expansion of the UGB. If there wasn’t a Metro, you can imagine that it would be an absolute disaster because each community in the region would be trying to maintain its own UGB and there would be conflicts over who is going to provide services, etc. for a new area that is incorporated into the UGB. It makes sense for Metro to administer the UGB for the twenty-five cities . . . in one big chunk. Although control over the UGB is an important source of Metro’s authority, as previously noted, it is an ongoing source of conflict between Metro officials and local officials, who do not always see eye to eye. One local planning director described determining the UGB as “one of the most controversial activities in the region.” There is often political tension around UGB expansion. One Metro councillor described the pushback from local communities: “If we expand the UGB, then it is the local government’s responsibility to plan and provide ser vices for the area. In some cases, they are opposed to growth. That is the case in the suburbs of West Linn.” The City of West Linn sued Metro and LCDC over the 2002 expansion of the UGB. In 2005, the Court of Appeals upheld the majority of Metro and LCDC’s 2002 UGB expansion decisions but sent Area 37 (to the west of West Linn) back to Metro and LCDC for additional review. “In other cases,” the Metro councillor added, “it is a financial issue; cities do not want to extend ser vices to people who aren’t even here yet. There is a breakdown in how we pay for growth in this state. The fiscal mechanisms of our local government financial system are broken when it comes to paying for new growth.” The suburb of Tualatin disagreed with Metro over the 2002 UGB expansion. Over the past thirty years, Tualatin experienced intense growth, going from a community of 750 in 1970 to 22,000 in 2000. Its citizens were concerned that more growth would mean more traffic congestion and a decrease in their quality of life. During the 2002 expansion of the UGB, Tualatin’s city council agreed that “we don’t want this, but we will take a share of this.” They identified and approved 400 acres of land to be brought in for additional industrial expansion, but Metro brought in 22 more acres of industrial land over the objection of the city councillors. The fact that Metro brought in

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land over the objections of the city was a source of contention since it was a direct challenge to Tualatin’s home rule. Another conflict occurs when communities request UGB expansion and Metro denies it. Many communities want to grow their industrial bases (in order to increase their tax revenues). The City of Hillsboro (with a 2006 population of 84,445) has been described as “wanting to develop to the Pacific Ocean.” One Metro councillor said, “Hillsboro feels more restricted by being part of Metro. Almost every session of legislature, they try to get laws changed to reduce Metro’s authority to tell them what to do.” Home to Intel and a number of other high-tech corporations, Hillsboro is in good financial condition because of its strong industrial base and the tax revenue it generates. In 2003, Hillsboro had a total taxable real property value of $5,402,285,960. However, Hillsboro lies at the western edge of the UGB, and in order to meet the growing demand for more industrial lands they have to turn to Metro to expand the UGB. Many officials in Hillsboro argued that they should be able to increase the amount of industrial land in their own jurisdiction without relying on Metro. In 2004, the two clashed when Metro denied the addition of a parcel (known as the Evergreen site) into the UGB and instead added a different site. The Evergreen site was later added to the UGB after the LCDC asked Metro to reconsider its decision. Since Metro has the ability to tell Hillsboro where it can expand and where it cannot, the desire for more industrial lands often pitted Hillsboro against Metro. At the same time that Metro had the authority to reject or approve UGB expansion, it dealt with Hillsboro carefully because Metro officials did not want to be perceived as not caring about local concerns. As an institution, Metro gains its legitimacy from the fact that it provides a forum for local officials in the region. Mayors from other cities take note of the way that the Metro councillors treat Hillsboro and other communities. Part of the tension between localities and Metro comes from having a different focus. Metro councillors are more concerned with the overall development of the region and making sure that the demand for developable land in the region is met. Metro has to provide a twenty-year land supply for housing and employment. Metro’s UGB decisions are also hamstrung by state land use regulations that require the protection of farmland. According to state law, lands that are classified as “exception lands” should be added to the UGB before exclusive farm use zoning (EFU) land, which is supposed to be preserved for farming. However, some localities argue that the state soil classifications that guide UGB expansion do not make sense when planning for

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a jobs/housing balance in the overall region. They also complain that the “magic numbers that Metro has to reach” in order to provide a twenty-year supply of residential and industrial land do not make sense for some communities. Metro councillors may sympathize with the complaints of local officials, but they are often unwilling to make exceptions because that will make future governing more difficult. They recognize that special treatment for one community will not go unnoticed by the others. However, given the highly contested nature of UGB expansion and the growing number of court battles over UGB decisions, Metro has to be careful to make decisions that will stand up in state court. As will be discussed later, Metro’s urban and rural reserves approach to planning for the UGB is a much-needed response to the numerous conflicts between Metro and local governments.

Damascus/Boring Case The idea behind the UGB is that it will help to concentrate development in urban ser vice districts. Rather than each community permitting new development on greenfields that will require additional infrastructure, the UGB attempts to focus development in areas where there is already additional infrastructure capacity. However, the logic behind the UGB policy is increasingly being tested, particularly as Metro has been forced to bring in large areas of undeveloped land in order to meet the state mandate of ensuring a twenty-year land supply looking forward and not developing prime agricultural lands. Metro’s experience expanding the UGB in the Damascus/ Boring area demonstrates the political challenge of bringing lands into the UGB and providing funds for the planning and development of new infrastructure. In 2002, Metro added 18,700 acres to the UGB, about 12,000 acres of which were in the Damascus/Boring region. This resulted in the creation of the City of Damascus in 2004 by a vote of the people. In order to plan for the Damascus/Boring area, Metro worked on the concept plan for two and half years with Clackamas County, the City of Happy Valley, the City of Gresham, and the new City of Damascus. A twenty-six-member advisory committee of residents and representatives from the different affected jurisdictions led the planning process. Metro did the transportation modeling and Clackamas County took care of the land use and public meetings. They worked as one project team. Metro and Clackamas County applied for a

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grant from the Oregon Department of Transportation for the process. The Damascus/Boring Concept plan was approved in November 2005. Describing the process in 2007, one local planning director said, The decision to bring it into the boundary was a result of a visionary county commissioner . . . and the hard work of the administrative staffs at Metro and the county. . . . This was the biggest adjustment in the state and the region so it was a collective experiment. We won’t know for twenty-five years whether the experiment worked. A new city was created and how that fits into an attempt to manage growth is a question. Another planning director described the addition of Damascus as a “political compromise.” Around 10,000 people live in Damascus and there is “not much enthusiasm for the Damascus/ Boring Concept Plan.” The land was brought into the UGB because it was not zoned as exclusive farm use and the “ethic about protecting farmland in Oregon is still strong.” Since the “regional government is obliged to follow statewide goals,” Metro was put in a strange position where it ended up bringing thousands of acres of “crummy land, with no ser vices, that is hard to develop” into the UGB. The planning process is described as “a daunting task . . . very slow.” Whether or not the decision to bring in the land was the right one, Metro has been a partner in the planning process: “Metro has been extraordinarily generous with its time and resources.” Still, the question of where the estimated $1.6–$3 billion (there is considerable dispute over this figure) necessary for new roads, sewer, water, fire ser vices, and so on will come from plagues the project. The ongoing story of Damascus demonstrates the difficulty of implementing large-scale regional planning and development. Moving from the 2005 concept plan to a comprehensive plan for the City of Damascus was fi lled with political infighting. Voters approved a tax increase to fund the planning of the city’s comprehensive plan, which was approved by the city council on December 2, 2010, and then overturned by referendum (65 percent of voters) in May 2011. One of the key reasons that voters overturned it was their concern over cost. Some estimates had the plan costing $3 billion. In response to what they saw as a lack of citizen involvement in the process, Ask Damascus, a citizens group, pushed for Measure 3-389, requiring a citizen vote on all comprehensive plans submitted to Metro, LCDC, and DLCD. Since there was no comprehensive plan or zoning in effect, the LCDC initiated

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enforcement proceedings if the city did not adopt a plan by August 2013. In November 2013, citizens were asked to approve the new comprehensive plan and/or disincorporate the City of Damascus to let land use control go back to the county. Some landowners pushed for plan approval since without a comprehensive plan or zoning they were not able to develop their land. Proponents of city disincorporation argued that $6 million has been spent on planning for Damascus with nothing to show for it. They were frustrated by a planning process that started in 2002 and was still not finished in 2013. The conflict surrounding the City of Damascus is very much tied to Metro’s decision to add the area to the UGB. According to Heather Steeves, a reporter covering the Damascus story for years: Damascus has experienced waves of political conflict nearly from the time residents voted to incorporate in 2004 as a way to maintain local control amid Metro’s largest ever expansion of Portland’s urban growth boundary. Regional planners designated the [12,000] acres of farms, forests and crossroads communities as the area’s next big suburb. Voters approved a tax increase to fund planning their new city. Then the recession hit, the infighting began, and the good-time projections of growth and rising property values began to look like fantasy. Even some Metro councillors questioned the wisdom of the decision to bring the land into the UGB. In 2012, Metro councillor Carl Hostika acknowledged the difficulties facing Damascus: “It was a serious question about whether we should have done as large an expansion as we did in the Damascus area because of the lack of transportation to get people to jobs, and jobs themselves in that area. . . . In hindsight, we probably made too big an expansion.” The challenge for Metro is that if it cannot make development work in Damascus, then Metro really has not accomplished its goal of meeting the regional twenty-year land supply. In fact, the 2014 Urban Growth Report highlights this tension: With its ongoing community and political challenges, how much of Damascus’ growth capacity should be counted during the 2015 to 2035 time frame is more of a policy question than a technical question. For this analysis, Metro staff followed the advice of its technical

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advisory group and used a market-based model to determine that about half of Damascus’ estimated buildable land inventory capacity could be counted in the “market-adjusted” residential supply. For modeling purposes, it was assumed that development challenges will persist in Damascus for another decade, delaying its availability to the market. If Damascus’ capacity is not available, it may become somewhat more difficult to provide new single-family housing inside the existing urban growth boundary. Does the region have other options for making up for Damascus’ capacity if it is not counted? The Damascus project has brought home an important lesson for Metro: it is one thing to bring land into the UGB and it is quite another to pay for it to be planned and developed. In addition, market conditions dictate whether or not areas are ripe for development and these can change. The recession changed the calculations of Portland’s growth dramatically and changed demand for development in Damascus. Although Metro may have control over the designation of which land is “in” or “out” of the UGB, Metro officials have become increasingly aware that designating land for development does not mean that development will happen. By concentrating large-scale greenfield development in one area, there are economies of scale, but the price of servicing such areas can be enormous and the politics can be challenging. Metro struggles to figure out how to finance the planning and development of new lands that have been brought into the UGB. Adjacent communities feel that it is unfair to them to have to bear the brunt of planning for and providing infrastructure for areas that are designed to address the growth needs of the whole region. In early 2016, the tensions between the City of Damascus and Metro were ongoing. In addition, citizens from Boring, an unincorporated community in Clackamas County, have asked to be removed from Metro’s jurisdiction in response to the struggles over the UGB. However, the good news for Metro is the 2014 regional growth projections predict that the Portland region has enough UGB to meet its future development needs, making the Damascus/Boring UGB expansion land less impor tant. As evidenced by the Damascus/Boring case, a key challenge for Metro is how to fund planning and infrastructure development in areas brought into the UGB. One Metro councillor said, “We have to ultimately become more of a financier of growth whether through urban renewal or other mechanisms and less of an abstract planner and regulator. If we are really going to

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accommodate one million more people in the region, it is going to take an active investment strategy rather than plans and regulations.” To address the challenge of planning for land that is brought into the UGB, in 2006, Metro worked with the Home Builders Association of Metro Portland (HBAMP) to develop a construction excise tax on building permits in the region. The funds raised by the tax go to help finance planning in new UGB areas. This was considered by Metro officials to be a major coup because the HBAMP was brought in as a partner. Traditionally, the association has been opposed to Metro, arguing that the strict land use regulations in the Portland region have limited the supply of land and made development much more costly and difficult. However, in this case, they recognized that the construction excise tax would help speed up the planning and development process of lands that are brought into the UGB. As of 2013, $11.7 million had been collected. The fact that Metro and the HBAMP are working together is indicative of Metro’s increasingly collaborative approach to regional planning.

Urban and Rural Reserves As a result of ongoing tension around the UGB highlighted above, the failure of the Damascus/Boring expansion and other UGB expansions, and the passage of Senate Bill 1011 (in 2007), Metro embarked on a collaborative process of developing urban and rural reserves and leaving other areas undesignated. The idea is to help target future UGB expansion in the Portland region by identifying areas known as urban reserves, which make sense for future urban development (over the next fift y years), or rural reserves, “lands that are high value working farms and forests or have important natural features like rivers, wetlands, buttes and floodplains.” Lands outside the UGB that are classified as urban reserves will be the first lands that the Metro Council will look to for future UGB expansion. Since these lands will already be designated as urban reserves, it will be less of a surprise when they are added, and counties and cities can plan accordingly. Similarly, lands that are designated as rural reserves will be protected and not targeted for UGB expansion. The goal is to have a more systematic approach to UGB expansion using criteria that do not rely primarily on the state’s zoning of land according to soil quality (such as the EFU zoning), is conducted in conjunction with the counties and other local stakeholders, and takes infrastructure development and market considerations into account. After the passage of SB 1011 in

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2007, Metro worked in an inclusive, multiyear planning process with local and regional stakeholders to develop the urban and rural reserves with consideration of local concerns. However, despite an extensive planning process, there was significant disagreement, and in several instances the state has had to intervene. In fact, in March 2014, House Bill 4078 was passed in order to “validate four 2011 Urban Growth Boundary expansions, add approximately 1,150 acres to the urban growth boundary immediately, and provide certainty about urban and rural reserve designations in Washington County.” In Clackamas County, the 2010 urban reserves designation of the Stafford area, an area near the cities of Tualatin, West Linn, and Lake Oswego, is still contested. While Metro and the Clackamas County Commission agreed to the Stafford urban reserve designation, Tualatin and West Linn sued, arguing that the traffic impacts had not been adequately considered. In 2014, the Oregon Court of Appeals remanded the Stafford urban reserves designation back to Metro and Clackamas County, which means they need to justify their decision. As a result of the Stafford area, and several other contested urban and rural reserves, as of February 2016, the final urban and rural reserves were still undecided. The urban and rural reserves process highlights Metro’s interest in rationalizing the UGB expansion to address existing governance and financial challenges. Here, as in other cases, Metro has learned from past confl icts with local governments (particularly in Damascus) and tried to adjust their approach to be more proactive and collaborative. Eventually, the urban and rural reserves process will be worked out, but Metro, the counties, and local governments are currently struggling to determine the final terms.

Controlling Growth Between 1979 and 2014, population increased by 61 percent while the UGB expanded by 14 percent. This is due to a concerted effort to redevelop the area inside the UGB and expand the boundary only as a last resort. The UGB has expanded about 31,400 acres to accommodate about 500,000 new residents. The 2002 expansion of 18,638 acres was the most notable and also the most controversial. UGB expansion has slowed since then. In 2011, Metro expanded the UGB by 1,985 acres in anticipation of the need for future housing and employment opportunities. Notably, in 2015, for the first time, Metro decided not to expand the UGB, arguing that there was already

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enough land in the UGB to meet future housing and employment needs. The fact that Metro did not need to add additional acreage to the UGB to meet the twenty-year supply is considered an indicator of success. The “2014 Urban Growth Report (Revised Draft)” describes the success of the UGB policy, but also highlights the challenges of managing growth: From 1998 to 2012, 94 percent of the new residential units were built inside the original 1979 boundary. During these 14 years, post-1979 UGB expansion areas produced about 6,500 housing units compared to the approximately 105,000 units produced in the original 1979 UGB. With a couple of notable exceptions, UGB expansion areas have been slow to develop because of challenges with governance, planning, voter-approved annexation, infrastructure financing, ser vice provision, and land assembly. Development of Wilsonville’s Villebois and Hillsboro’s Witch Hazel communities [which were successfully added to the UGB] demonstrates that new urban areas can be successful with the right combination of factors such as governance, infrastructure finance, willing property owners, and market demand. There are also challenges in our existing urban areas. Infi ll and redevelopment have been focused in a few communities while many downtowns and main streets have been slow to develop.

Promoting Density A key question about the Metro experiment is whether all Metro’s planning work promotes density. From 1996 to 2002, new housing primarily took place on smaller lots. The number of lots under 5,000 square feet increased from 14% (1,041 units) of the 7,193 units built in 1996 to 51% (1,614 units) of the 3,178 units built in 2002 while all larger lot sizes decreased. Lots larger than 5,000 square feet decreased as follows: Units built on 5,000–7,500 square feet lots declined from 44% of the total to 30%; units built on 7,501–10,000 square feet lots declined from 23% of the total to 9%; and units built on lots above 10,000 square feet declined from 19% of the total to 10%.

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According to a 2010 compliance report, residential density in the region increased significantly from 1995 to 2006, from 5.5 units to 10.7 units per acre. In addition, the median residential lot size has also decreased during the same period, from 6,738 to 4,300 square feet. The “2014 Urban Growth Report (Revised Draft)” finds that between 2007 and 2012, there were almost equal numbers of single-family (12,398) and multifamily (12,133) residences built. The “average density of new single-family development was 7.6 units per acre (5,766 square foot average lot size) and multifamily development was 41.8 units per acre.”

Promoting More Sustainable Transportation Denser development has been aided by Portland’s strong public transportation system, whose funds are allocated through Metro. According to a 2011 Metro Travel Behav ior Survey, in 2011 the number of trips in the Portland region made by car dropped to 81  percent from 90  percent in 1994, while transit ridership increased from 2.9 to 4.2 percent. Between 1971 and 1996, Portland’s TriMet ser vice increased by 140  percent and ridership was up 220 percent. From 1990 to 2002, the number of riders on the light rail and bus increased “at a rate (65%) significantly higher than population (29%) and vehicle miles traveled (35%).” The investment in TriMet, the regional transit agency, and the connection between land use and transportation planning can be attributed in part to Metro’s ability to act as the MPO as well as the regional planning agency. Substantial development in the Portland region has taken place along the light rail corridor. Metro has helped promote the development of regional centers and corridors along the light rail through its TOD and Get Centered! programs. Metro’s 2014 Climate Smart Strategy, which aims to reduce per capita green house gas emissions by 29  percent, will further strengthen Metro’s commitment to promoting public transit that supports denser and more walkable communities.

Protecting Open Space While Metro is known primarily for its UGB, Metro’s Open Spaces Program has also been an impor tant mechanism for protecting natural areas and

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open space in the region. It was approved by voters in 1995 and funded with $135.6 million. It was reauthorized in November 2006 for $227.4 million. As of April 2004, Metro had used the bond money to acquire 8,015 acres of open space and 444.87 acres bought with Metro and local share funds. By 2012, the Open Spaces Program had protected more than 12,000 acres, but the program has not been without controversy. In 2012, when the Metro Council approved unanimously to increase the rate of taxation to 9.2 cents per $1,000 of home valuation, nineteen mayors from the region sent a letter stating their objection. Regional voters, however, sent a different message in 2013 when they approved a five-year levy for open space and parks estimated to raise $10 million per year. In February 2016, Metro released a draft Parks and Nature System Plan highlighting their successes, the need to continue to build partnerships, and the renewed importance of funding.

Promoting Affordable Housing Providing adequate affordable housing in the Portland metropolitan area is a growing challenge that Metro has struggled to address. Between 1993 and 2008, median home prices of owner-occupied single family homes in the Portland-Vancouver region increased by 160  percent. Between 2007 and 2011, 49.4  percent of households in the Portland region spent more than 30  percent of their income on rent, the definition of being housing burdened. Rents in the region between 2006 and 2015 increased by 63 percent while incomes increased only by 39 percent. Officially, Metro does not wield authority over affordable housing, but regionwide and statewide policies have influenced housing development. The Metropolitan Housing Rule requires that each community in the Portland region provide for a full range of housing types. According to 1,000 Friends of Oregon, an environmental group that focuses on land use, statewide Goal 10 (that local communities allow all types of housing in their communities and the continued supply of land for residential use) is responsible for increasing the number of buildable units in the Portland region from 129,000 to over 301,000. However, a challenge in the Portland region is that until 2016 the state of Oregon banned mandatory inclusionary zoning, a tool used in other regions to connect market rate construction to affordable housing development.

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As part of the Regional Framework Plan, Metro conducted a Housing Needs Assessment Report and created an Affordable Housing Technical Advisory Committee (HTAC) in 1998 to advise the Metro Council in consultation with MPAC. HTAC estimated that by 2017 there would be a need for 90,479 affordable units to house families making less than 50 percent of median household income. The Regional Affordable Housing Strategy (RAHS) created “fair share” housing goals for each community to develop a portion of the region’s affordable housing stock. These voluntary goals were incorporated into the Regional Framework Plan and Urban Growth Management Functional Plan in 2001. However, a 2004 report on compliance with Metro’s affordable housing recommendations showed that many of the recommendations made by Metro were not considered, adopted, or followed, demonstrating the difficulty of implementing voluntary programs. As the City of Fairview made clear, “The City does not believe that additional incentives to attract more affordable housing are necessary or appropriate.” The Cities of Lake Oswego and West Linn, which together had just 0.1  percent of the region’s affordable housing, also did not add the targets to their policies. Lake Oswego’s city council argued that adding them “would not be of any practical value for the community or the region.” Other communities in the Portland region also complained that they had taken more than their “fair share” of affordable housing. Since the affordable housing program is voluntary, Metro cannot legally force localities to adopt the affordable housing goals. But, if there were political will, Metro could threaten to withhold transportation funds to communities not meeting their targets. So far, the political will has not been there and the problem of affordable housing has only intensified in the Portland region. However, with growing regional concern about rapid gentrification in downtown neighborhoods, the situation is becoming more of a crisis. Metro recognizes that affordable housing is key to its goal of promoting equity, diversity, and regional sustainability. A January 2015 Metro report, “Equity Baseline Report: Part 1: A Framework for Regional Equity,” argues that “The lack of affordable, stable, diverse, accessible, and high quality housing options for people of color and people living on low incomes is a root cause of inequity in our region.” In 2015, Metro launched an Equitable Housing Initiative. The goal is to engage a diverse group of stakeholders in the region to develop a regional affordable housing strategy. Metro admits that affordable housing is an area where it needs to do more and that the only way it can be effective is to work collaboratively with numerous public and private

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stakeholders. However, without authority over housing targets, this work is challenging.

Why Is the Portland Model Impor tant? If we want to plan for regional sustainability, we will need models of metropolitan governance that promote cooperation among local governments. The Portland model is impor tant because it provides a combination of capacity building and regulatory and fi nancial incentives that induce cooperation. Local officials know that if they do not show up at meetings, they will still have to abide by decisions made by Metro. They also recognize that Metro can help them accomplish their own goals. Local officials work with the region to come up with standards and rules. One Metro councillor said, “If you think of Metro, the negative version is that we are imposing a regional will on the poor local cities and government. The other view, which is more accurate, is that we are playing the role of the referee for the region.” According to this councillor, being the referee can help create buy-in from stakeholders because communities “realize that no city or county is an island. They want to have the ability to not have a city run a freeway into their bedrooms. We end up in some odd situations where at the same time, for example, the Metropolitan Home Builders Association doesn’t like what we do about the density, but they want us to slap down cities who don’t want to expand the boundaries.” Metro finds itself in complicated relationships with regional stakeholders like the HBAMP and local officials who appreciate when Metro uses its authority to help them accomplish their goals and who balk when they think Metro’s guidelines are interfering with what they perceive as their best interest. Although local officials often complain about Metro, they also know there are financial benefits associated with being an active player in the metropolitan planning system: Metro offers local governments access to transportation funds, technical assistance, and grants to promote certain types of development. In Portland, local planning takes place within a nested system. There are statewide and metropolitan-wide rules and regulations that guide local planning and decision making. The state mandates that all communities prepare comprehensive plans that are consistent with state land use planning goals. Oregon’s Land Conservation and Development Commission acknowledges local plans that are consistent with state goals. In addition, localities must

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submit compliance reports to Metro demonstrating that their comprehensive plans, and any changes to them, are consistent with Metro’s Urban Growth Management Functional Plan. Local planners in Portland had very different responses from their Boston counterparts to questions about how they plan. They often pointed to the regional plan and how their local comprehensive plan fit into it. They talked about their relationship with Metro. They regularly attended meetings at Metro. Although overall there was agreement that Metro plays an important role in the region, each local official expressed some frustration with the Metro councillors (and sometimes the Metro staff ). Often the frustration was with the amount of paperwork they were required to submit to Metro in order to be in compliance. Some local planning directors viewed Metro more negatively; one said, “Metro abused its authority through the years. It has grown to the point where they are ruling through too many regulations and mandates and forcing you to do all this minutiae. Metro got carried away with too many details and did not allow enough flexibility.” Metro councillors were often described as pursuing a more environmental agenda than local officials. Local officials sometimes remarked that they were more representative of the populace than the Metro councillors because they actually represented a community with par ticu lar needs rather than the councillors’ districts. However, in most cases the issues that local officials raised concerns about were also being studied by a committee at Metro, and new policies were being developed to address their concerns. So the lines of communication were open. Despite their differences with Metro, almost all local elected officials and planners recognized the important role that it plays and that it was critical to their work. Local planning officials (even the ones who did not like Metro) knew what was happening at Metro because they met regularly at the MPAC, MTAC, TPAC, and/or JPACT meetings and were well aware of Metro’s decisions. Local planning in the Portland region is certainly more consistent than it is in Boston or Denver. Communities have comprehensive plans that are consistent with the state land use planning goals and the regional plan. Local planning is not done in a vacuum; instead it has to respond to state and regional demands. The adoption of regional planning goals is not as haphazard as it is in Boston and Denver because there are certain minimum requirements. At the same time, localities continue to have their own planning culture and to interpret Metro’s policies according to their own framework.

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They also continue to push back on Metro, thereby forcing Metro to adopt new strategies for policy implementation. Metro does have a unique advantage. Local officials have an incentive to cooperate and participate in dialogues about regional planning because communities that want to grow, particularly with regard to their industrial lands, need Metro’s approval in order to convert lands that are outside the UGB into developable land (although theoretically this should be more systematic with the new urban and rural reserves process). In addition, the state mandates that local comprehensive plans be consistent with statewide goals and Metro’s Urban Growth Management Functional Plan. However, despite state mandated consistency requirements and control over the UGB, communities still insist on local autonomy and often challenge Metro’s authority over local land use. Is the Portland case fundamentally different from areas with weaker metropolitan governance? Metro clearly impacts local land use planning decisions. However, as in Boston and Denver, there are limits to Metro’s ability to shape regional land use. For instance, without regional revenue sharing, localities continue to want to build up their own tax revenues, even if this means expanding the UGB. This can be seen in the case of the fight for UGB expansion for industrial lands. Although Metro’s control over the UGB has the effect of determining where growth will go, it also presents a series of new challenges of funding the planning of the area and figuring out how to finance the infrastructure necessary for development. Metro struggles with this component of regional planning. The authority that Metro has from the state, its power as the region’s MPO, its involvement of local elected officials in governing, and its connection to the electorate are all essential mechanisms for encouraging municipal involvement in regional policy formation and plan making as well as local adoption of regional goals. Metro is careful to use all the tools available to it: it offers capacity-building assistance to local governments, including help with planning, data gathering, application of GIS tools, financial and technical assistance for TOD projects, and educational workshops about effective planning. In addition, Metro uses its ability to allocate transportation funds to encourage municipalities to develop transportation projects that will help implement the regional plan and link land use and transportation. Finally, Metro uses its authority over land use to ensure that communities adopt key regional goals.

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Typically, the literature on metropolitan planning describes Portland as a “top-down” model in which the only reason localities implement the regional plan is because they “have to.” However, just because Metro is a more relevant political player does not mean that it always gets its way. There is still a considerable degree of variation in the level of local commitment to implementing Metro’s plans. In addition, contrary to the traditional view of statutory authority as a means of excluding local officials from the planning process, Metro’s formal authority draws more active participation of both elected officials and local planners. As a result of having more authority, local officials recognize that they need to be actively engaged in the management of Metro’s activities. A number of institutional arrangements built into the structure of Metro encourage local input, regional capacity building, and shared responsibility over regional governance. This is not to say that local officials adopt the regional planning requirements set out by Metro out of “good will” or that all requirements are adopted; instead, the Portland model combines a number of bottom-up features. In most instances, local officials adopt regional planning requirements because they are required to do so by law, but financial incentives, such as Metro’s control over MTIP funding, also help create local compliance. In addition, in the case of Metro, communities adopt regional policies because they also helped to develop the policies that they are working to put into effect. What allows local officials to work together is not a higher level of enlightenment about their common interests, but the fact that they understand that to some extent their fate is decided by Metro. Th is increases the importance of participating in regional decision making. Metro becomes relevant to local stakeholders because it has the authority to implement its plans and to provide transportation money to connect land use to transportation funding. As a result, Metro is better able to engage with local officials. One local elected leader, who played a major role in regional planning in Portland, argues, “Top down planning doesn’t work, but when people help make rules they won’t object to them.” The history of how Metro was formed is very much about an emerging institutional relationship between it and local officials. Of course, despite Metro’s authority and more robust institutional relationships with localities, it still has its ups and downs: it has been more effective at implementing its plans at particular moments than at others; it has had more success implementing certain policies than others; and some communities are more willing to work with it than others.

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There is considerable debate inside as well as outside Metro regarding the most effective way to plan for the region. Indeed, in certain instances, local officials have voiced considerable opposition to Metro’s decisions. Councillors, who are elected by district to serve on the Metro Council, and local elected officials do not always see eye to eye, although for the most part they have learned to work together. One local planning director put it succinctly: local officials and Metro have “a long-term agreement to work through disagreements.” This ongoing learning that takes place within Metro is critical to its success. Local officials learn how to be diplomatic when they interact with the regional body. They also learn how local decisions affect the whole region. By the same token, Metro councillors have also learned more about the constraints facing local officials. However, planning in the Portland region is not as seamless as many have described; it can be a messy, often complicated process. The many layers of regulations from the state and Metro provide guidelines for local officials to follow. They limit the number of planning choices local governments can make and necessitate a degree of consistency among the local jurisdictions in the region. At the same time, local politics are still at play and each community has a different relationship with Metro: some are on board with the regional vision while others argue that Metro limits local autonomy and burdens local governments with additional rules and regulations. Metro is also reluctant to draw negative attention to local governments that are not in step with regulations. Although the mixed sentiment about regional planning is similar to Boston and Denver, what separates Portland is the fact that whether or not local officials like Metro, they still participate. They cannot ignore Metro. Through JPACT, MPAC, TPAC, and MTAC, local elected officials and planners are involved in setting the regional planning and transportation priorities. They do this work through ongoing negotiations with the Metro Council and staff members about what is best for localities and for the region. At some points during Portland Metro’s history, it has emphasized a more explicitly regulatory approach, while at other times it has focused on being helpful to localities. One official summed up Metro’s complicated and constantly evolving roles: We go from being demanding, to being collaborative, to being financially helpful, to being regulatory. We have gone through all of those phases over time. I guess the phase we are in now is our Council is

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probably more aggressive on goals than any previous Council, but they recognize better that they need allies, that they need collaboration, they will never be able to regulate their way into accomplishing their ideals, they need to convince their partner that their partner should be pursuing their ideals, and they recognize the importance of incentives and financial incentives so they are much more aggressive at pursuing those kinds of tools rather than regulatory mandates. That is on a base of having a fair amount of regulatory mandates in place so it is not like they need to go and dream up new ones. That base is already there. The balance between mandating a regional orientation and encouraging it through capacity building and incentives can be hard to maintain. When Metro uses its authority, local officials push back. Then, to maintain its political viability Metro must emphasize a more cooperative approach. But it is Metro’s ability to select from among different techniques that is important to its success. By offering capacity building assistance, managing financial incentives, and applying regulatory authority, Portland Metro has become an impor tant regional player that local officials cannot ignore. Over the past decade, a number of legal and political battles with localities have forced Metro councillors to rethink Metro’s overall strategy. Rather than relying entirely on regulatory mandates, they are increasingly viewing capacity building as the key to a more cooperative regional government. However, Metro does this work with the regulatory framework already in place and with control over transportation money, which makes it easier to be cooperative.

CHAPTER 5

Lessons for Metropolitan Planning

If we want metropolitan planning agencies to be effective at planning for regional sustainability, we have to give them the tools they need. Authority matters for metropolitan planning agencies because it shapes the nature and quality of participation, the types of decisions that are reached, the ability to connect transportation and land use planning, and the willingness of local officials to implement the regional vision at the local level. If one compares metropolitan authorities that use capacity building; capacity building and financial incentives; and capacity building, financial incentives, and statemandated authority, it is striking that who participates in the regional dialogues is noticeably different, and this plays an important role in determining the effectiveness of the metropolitan authority at shaping local and regional land use policy. In the case of Boston, without state-mandated authority or authority over transportation funds, the people who participate in MAPC are often not local elected officials. Since elected officials are seen as having the authority to make local planning decisions, it matters when they are not consistently involved in regional decision making. The vacancies on MAPC’s board, the composition of MAPC’s board, and comments from local officials are all evidence that without authority, metropolitan planning agencies have a difficult time getting the right people to the table, which makes it more difficult to translate regional policies into local action. Metropolitan planning without authority (regulatory and fi nancial) is perceived as being nice if you have the time to attend some extra meetings, but is not really relevant to the day-to-day governing of local municipalities. In addition, since elected local officials do not play a key role in designing and adopting the policies, they often argue that regional policies are made

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by technocrats (usually staff of the metro planning agencies) at the regional level who do not understand local constraints. Without fiscal or regulatory authority, the metropolitan planning agency relies only on capacity building to influence local planning: some communities, particularly those that are more inclined to adopt smart growth policies in the first place, turn to the metropolitan planning agency for advice about planning. However, the adoption of regional goals and the local adoption of policies necessary to implement them are haphazard. Metropolitan planning agencies without state-mandated authority or control over transportation funds have to be creative about coming up with other means of encouraging cooperation. MAPC has been successful at relying on capacity building. Even without authority it provides a critical forum for learning about issues. It also tries to make itself useful to localities. For instance, MAPC provides data to communities, technical assistance, rewriting of bylaws and amending plans, help with joint purchasing of police cars and other equipment, and assistance with coordinating emergency planning. MAPC also serves as a place for local planning staffs, particularly at the sub-regional level, to meet and discuss their common concerns. In addition, MAPC has become increasingly engaged in promoting legislative reforms that help cities and towns in the region. The Metro Mayor’s Coalition has been an important mechanism for engaging local elected officials and demonstrating that MAPC is committed to improving the state regulations so they better meet local needs. Based on the agenda set by the Metro Mayors Coalition, MAPC staff researches topics such as municipal finance and helps draft and advocate for legislation and funding that supports cities and towns and helps advance regional goals. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the MetroFuture project, the regional visioning initiative, has provided an important forum to discuss the future of the region. The participation of thousands of citizens and local officials has led to an increased interest in regionalism and state-level policy change. However, MAPC is challenged with implementing the MetroFuture vision in the context of a weak state-planning framework, significant barriers to municipal cooperation, and only indirect influence over projects of regional significance and over transportation funding. To build power, MAPC has been strategic about connecting MetroFuture’s goals and scenarios to state agencies and the MPO for the region. This has been critical to their efforts to be relevant. In addition, MAPC has also been able to leverage federal money for implementation of MetroFuture through the Partnership for Sus-

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tainable Communities. Here it is important to note the role that the federal government can play in regional planning, a role that has been largely absent before the Obama administration’s new initiative. Metropolitan agencies that move from capacity building to being the MPO for the region are able to increase the participation of locally elected officials who recognize that there is regional transportation money at stake. In both the Denver and Portland cases, officials were candid about participating in regional decision making because transportation money was at stake. Since many local communities are strapped for resources, the limited funds that the MPO controls can be an important source of local infrastructure investment. Access to transportation funds is enough to cause local elected officials to at least participate in agency governance and/or pay lip ser vice to regional planning goals. This is critical because who represents communities on the metropolitan planning agency boards is very important for the perceived legitimacy of the agency. When local elected officials play a role in determining regional policies, they may be more willing to support the implementation of regional goals at the local level. In Denver, in particular, where the DRCOG board of directors is made up of locally elected officials, it was not uncommon for them to express a sense of ownership, saying, in effect, “We make DRCOG decisions.” When local elected officials make the rules, this can also reduce the tension between those who are primarily concerned with their local jurisdictions and the staff of the metropolitan planning agencies who are often perceived as being more interested in large-scale regional trends. The staff at Metro and DRCOG are consistently clear that they do not make the regional rules, locally elected officials do. In addition to changing the dynamics of who participates, metropolitan planning agencies that are also the MPO for the region have an easier time linking land use and transportation planning. MAPC is not the MPO, which makes it much harder for the agency to directly connect the regional plan to transportation financing. However, MAPC is represented on the Boston MPO and MAPC works to influence regional transportation decision making through expertise in planning and data management. By demonstrating that the numbers used to create MetroFuture, the regional land use plan, are solid, MAPC has been able to make the case to the state Executive Office of Transportation (EOT) that these numbers should be used for the modeling that goes into the regional transportation plan. In addition, some of the points on the MPO’s TIP funding application are tied to MetroFuture’s goals.

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These are impor tant steps for MAPC to take to integrate land use and transportation planning; however, it should be noted that it is not the same as being the MPO and the planning agency for the region. When the metropolitan planning agency is also the MPO and transportation money is tied to the regional plan, communities are more willing to integrate parts of the regional plan into their local plans. Communities also propose transportation projects that are more likely to be in line with the regional planning goals because these projects are more likely to be funded. In Denver, as in most US regions, getting TIP funds is a very competitive process. Each transportation project is given a certain number of points; projects with more points are more likely to receive funding. One strategy that DRCOG uses to incentivize local adoption of regional goals is to offer more TIP points for transportation projects to communities that sign the Mile High Compact and agree to the Urban Growth Boundary and other components of the Metro Vision plan. Noticeably, local planners and elected officials also discuss the fear of not getting transportation funds if they are not on good terms with the DRCOG board and staff. DRCOG’s planning assistance and approval of the FasTracks light rail system, a role granted to it by the state, has also shaped the future development of the region. A key component of Metro Vision is the development of urban centers and DRCOG’s TOD program helps communities plan to maximize development around the new light rail stations. A significant portion of recent development in the Denver region has been focused in these urban centers. DRCOG’s effectiveness primarily comes from the fact that it is the MPO for the region, it can determine the distribution of transportation funds, and it has the active participation of local elected officials on its board. In the Portland region, since Metro is the MPO, it controls the regional transportation planning and funding. Strong state land use regulations also require local plans, zoning, and codes to be consistent with the regional plan. As a result, Metro is able to help promote connections between transportation and land use planning. TriMet, the regional light rail, is also planned by Metro so there is a link between the land use planning and infrastructure investment in transit. As in Denver, there are real successes in Portland when it comes to TOD: Metro invests funds in helping to promote TOD projects and also provides technical assistance to communities. Through these efforts, Metro demonstrates that it is a helpful organization that does more than just regulate. This is particularly important for Metro since in Portland there has been a backlash against strong regulation.

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Like DRCOG and MAPC, the data that Metro provides is very important to its work. It has the ability to model land use and transportation in the region. It also helps local planners comply with the statewide regional planning goals and Metro’s functional plans. This can be particularly useful because planners in the Portland region say that the statewide and regional requirements for compliance can be burdensome. The two Metro programs that local officials mentioned most often as helpful are those that provide technical assistance combined with resources: the program that provides funds for open spaces acquisition and the TOD program, which helps buy, plan for, and develop land near transit stations.

Governance Structure, Participation, and Policy Making The complicated and multilayered structure of governance of Portland Metro is critical to its ability to mediate local and regional concerns. Since Metro councillors are elected by districts, they have to run for office on platforms about regional issues. Metro councillors’ districts often consist of parts of different types of communities, so they argue that they have a better understanding of regional concerns than local elected officials. However, there is sometimes an underlying tension between the Metro councillors, who see themselves as elected specifically to address regional issues, and local elected officials who sometimes view themselves as “more elected” than the Metro councillors because they govern established jurisdictions. The relationship between Metro and local officials is key to its success. Historically, local elected officials and planners in the Portland region played a critical role in creating Metro; they ensured that they had an ongoing and institutionalized role in Metro’s governance through their participation in the Metropolitan Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC), composed of local elected officials. MPAC makes policy recommendations to the Metro Council. Locally elected officials also serve on the Joint Policy and Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT), which along with the Metro councillors makes regional transportation funding decisions for the MPO. MPAC and JPACT serve as feedback loops between the elected representatives on the Metro Council, who often take the regional view, and the local elected officials, who tend to be more concerned with local issues. There are some cases where MPAC’s recommendations are contrary to the Metro Council’s final decision. Still, this appears to be more of an exception than the rule because

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Metro councillors know that the more they listen to MPAC, the more localities are likely to buy in. When elected officials participate in the governance of metropolitan agencies, they come to know each other and begin to see how their interests are interrelated. This supports the idea in the literature on deliberative democracy and consensus building that stakeholders are transformed by their interactions with other stakeholders. However, the transformative effect of deliberations becomes more likely when there is something at stake and local elected officials participate. This calls into question some of the literature on “voluntary regionalism” by suggesting that stakeholders need incentives to participate in “voluntary” efforts. They participate in regional activities that they perceive will impact their communities (either positively or negatively). Although there are certainly benefits to participation in regional dialogue, local elected officials made it clear in Boston, Denver, and Portland that dialogue for the sake of dialogue was not enough to consistently bring them to the table. They were interested in participating in planning processes that led to tangible outcomes. Agencies with more power had a much easier time getting consistent participation. Here it is also important to recognize that bringing locally elected stakeholders to the table does not necessarily mean that the metropolitan planning agency will be able to radically alter regional land use planning or systematic translation of regional goals to the local level. Local elected officials noted that they had to be electable, so their first loyalty was to their communities. In order to get all the stakeholders on board and to allow local elected officials to take the plan back to their constituencies, a regional plan is often a “consensus document” consisting of broad goals (i.e., more livable communities and sustainability) and allowing for flexibility when it comes to locally implementing these goals. Although many communities adopt the official goals of the regional plan in their planning documents, even in regions with more authority, implementation at the local level is still a challenge. Land use decisions have real fiscal implications for communities so there is a lot at stake. The result is that different communities want different outcomes and interpret the rules accordingly. In Portland, with state-mandated consistency between local and regional plans, the adoption of regional planning goals and the changes to local zoning and codes necessary to implement them becomes more regularized. Every community has to acknowledge the regional planning goals and answer questions about consistency. However, even in Portland, when there are

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inconsistencies between the regional and local plan, Metro is reluctant to resort to legal authority to ensure compliance. Since Metro, in most cases, does not want to flex its muscle, local communities have some flexibility when it comes to implementation. This finding runs counter to the belief that Portland has a completely regulated system in which municipalities are in lockstep with the regional government.

Influencing Projects of Regional Significance One measure of the ability of a metropolitan planning agency to effect planning is the influence it has over large-scale projects that shape regional development. In the Boston region, the Assembly Square redevelopment, Westwood Station, and the South Weymouth Naval Air Station redevelopment all demonstrate the limited direct role that MAPC plays in influencing projects of regional significance. MAPC can submit letters to the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) office about the draft and final Environmental Impact Reports (EIR) for regionally significant projects, but these letters are advisory in nature. MAPC’s concerns only become legally binding when the MEPA office formally raises them in the Environmental Certificate that it issues. MAPC has to appeal to the authority held by other state agencies in order to have its concerns addressed. Depending on the agenda of the governor of Massachusetts or the relationship between MEPA and MAPC, MAPC can have more or less influence. Since MAPC has the technical capacity to help evaluate the regional impacts of projects, it can help frame the way that large regional projects are evaluated. MAPC’s technical expertise can also make it an important stakeholder in the planning process. Although MAPC is comfortable with providing technical expertise, it can be reluctant to take firm stands on projects. The challenge for MAPC with taking positions on large-scale regional projects is that one community may be for it and another against it and both communities are members of MAPC. MAPC staff makes every attempt to be perceived as objective and impartial. As the MPO, DRCOG can determine whether or not regional transportation funds should be spent to make a project feasible. Proponents of a project that needs certain transportation improvements to be approved will need to make their case to the MPO for funding. For DRCOG, being the MPO, managing the voluntary UGB/A, and having state authority over certain

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functions, such as previously approving regional water and sewer plans, are impor tant means of having a say in projects of regional significance. Yet there appear to be limits even to this authority. DRCOG is able to raise questions, but not necessarily to stop projects. The Lowry Range Project is an example of how DRCOG served as a forum for discussion about regional scale development; however, when it came to making a decision, DRCOG officials did not stop the development of Lowry Range even though it was located outside of the agreed upon UGB (outlined in Metro Vision) and was inconsistent with the regional water plan. DRCOG staff members expressed concern about the project, but were reluctant to say that they were for or against it. Ultimately, DRCOG expanded the UGB/A to include the project in part because the development decision was really up to the local authorities. However, it was not without conflict. Since locally elected leaders approve DRCOG’s policies, in most cases it is unlikely that they will adopt policies that run counter to local interests. DRCOG depends on the political will of local leaders in order to be relevant and does not want to be viewed as using a heavy hand. It stresses that its plans are voluntary and flexible. The UGB/A is an example of where DRCOG takes a much more laissez-faire approach than Portland Metro, primarily because it lacks formal authority. DRCOG leaves the implementation of the UGB/A to local communities. The fact that some communities have adopted an Urban Growth Area rather than a boundary is indicative of an agency that is trying to keep everyone on board. The boundary can also be expanded when needed, so some DRCOG board members think it is meaningless. Unlike in Denver, Portland Metro has the state mandated authority to determine the UGB for the metro region. Since most projects of regional significance will need land to be added to the UGB, Metro is very influential. Local officials at the edge of the region, where Metro determines whether land is either in or out, have been frustrated by the amount of authority that Metro has. The City of Hillsboro has been particularly antagonistic toward Metro. Hillsboro officials wanted to expand the UGB to add more industrial land, but Metro prevented them from doing so. Hillsboro also challenged Metro’s ability to set requirements for “regionally significant industrial areas” because local officials thought that this amounted to zoning. After a legal battle, the court ruled that Metro did have this authority. Metro also clashed with the City of Cornelius over the expansion of the UGB onto prime farmland, and Metro won.

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The Damascus/Boring addition of 12,000 acres of new development to the UGB and the creation of a new community demonstrates the influence that Metro has over the planning of the region, but it raises questions about whether Metro can help turn planning into real development. Although Metro brought this land into the UGB and assisted with the planning for it, it is important to note that Metro has been less successful at helping to plan for and pay for the infrastructure provision necessary for development. The ongoing controversy over planning and development in Damascus demonstrates that even in Portland, regional and local planning are contentious and extremely political. Although Metro has strong authority over land use, it lacks the fi nancial resources necessary to transform land from one use to another. This burden continues to rest on the local communities. The urban and rural reserves process is an effort to resolve much of the conflict between Metro and communities by involving local stakeholders in long-term planning for UGB expansion for the next fift y years. However, even this process is controversial.

Local Implementation of Regional Plans The story of the implementation of regional plans at the local level in Boston, Denver, and Portland is this: without fiscal or regulatory authority to influence local planning, regional plans often have to be vague about recommendations in order to get all the communities on board, and this means they are often weak. Specific recommendations about density and requirements tend to be avoided. When the metropolitan planning agency produces a regional plan that communities have no incentives (sticks or carrots) to follow, then good planning is determined more by the planning culture of each community than an acknowledgment of a set of regional planning goals. In Boston, local planners were constrained by local politics and fiscal pressures. They rarely mentioned MAPC when it came to thinking about how to plan their communities. What is considered good planning in one community may be completely different or at odds with other communities in the region. There is no standard set of planning goals or baseline criteria set at a higher level that local officials measure themselves against. Adoption of regional planning goals is still haphazard. However, MAPC has made progress. Whereas, MAPC’s Boston MetroPlan 2000 had little name recognition

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or direct influence, MAPC has connected MetroFuture to state agencies with more authority. The more that MetroFuture’s planning goals become a part of the state planning framework (with corresponding carrots and sticks), the more likely communities are to adopt them. Because DRCOG cannot mandate adoption of the regional plan, it has two mechanisms to encourage its adoption: (1) make it flexible enough that all the different stakeholders will get on board; and (2) use control over TIP funding to create incentives for plan adoption. Since adoption of some of the criteria from Metro Vision is a prerequisite for receiving points on TIP applications, many communities have adopted parts of it in their local plans. However, there is still a large degree of variation in the implementation of the Metro Vision goals. Some communities pay lip ser vice to it and others take it more seriously. Since the criteria for implementing Metro Vision are flexible, most communities argue that they are following it, but there is considerable disagreement about whether this is the case. Many interviewees mentioned the fact that Metro Vision is so flexible as a challenge. Although TIP funding can be an important tool to get localities to adopt the regional vision, even promises of increased TIP funding are not enough to fundamentally change local land use planning. Without the ability to mandate change to local regulations, DRCOG continues to rely on voluntary local implementation of the plan.

State Land Use Regulations Since metropolitan planning agencies get their authority from the state government, they should be seen as a part of a nested system. States mandate planning requirements for the region and each municipality. In states with plan consistency between regional and local plans, it is easier to implement regional plans. Oregon mandates plan consistency, while Massachusetts and Colorado do not. The state gives Portland Metro a mandate to require that local plans are consistent with Metro’s regional planning requirements. In theory, this should mean that local implementation is easy. Metro is able to determine the criteria for “good planning” and localities are required to adopt regional planning goals in their comprehensive plans, zoning, and codes. For the most part, this is true. However, despite Metro’s authority, it is politically undesirable to get into fights with communities over plan implementation.

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Instead, Metro takes a more cooperative approach and tries to be helpful to communities. Challenges like Measure 37—and other ballot measures aimed at undermining planning, state authority, and density requirements—remind Metro to be careful about exercising its authority (for fear of backlash) and to work more on capacity building, providing resources, coalition building, and consensus planning. State land use planning regulations and other state legislation can also change the playing field and encourage or discourage smart growth policies. For instance, under Massachusetts state law, Chapter  40B mandates that communities provide at least 10 percent affordable housing or their land use regulation can be overlooked by developers who provide a certain amount of affordable housing. Chapter 40B has greatly influenced land use decision making in the Boston region. MAPC has capitalized on the fear of Chapter 40B to promote more proactive affordable housing production planning. MAPC has also successfully lobbied for more state regulation and incentives that promote smart growth.

Other Critical Factors to Success: Leadership and Coalitions There are a number of factors besides authority that contribute to the success of a metropolitan planning agency in shaping local and regional land use decisions. Although authority gets people to the table, in all three case studies discussed here, leadership was critical. MAPC, DRCOG, and Portland Metro have either been more or less effective based on the leadership of the organization and its ability to adapt to meeting the changing needs of the region. The missions of all three metropolitan agencies have evolved and expanded significantly since they were first established, and a new group of dynamic leaders were charged with changing their institutional culture. In Boston, Denver, and Portland, the planning agency that was traditionally involved with the technical details of land use planning became more politically active and hence more relevant. At MAPC, under Executive Director Marc Draisen’s leadership, MAPC has moved from a technocratic to a more political role in the region. Draisen’s experience in state politics informs his understanding of how policy change is made, and he understands that MAPC needs to promote a stronger state-planning framework in order to be a more effective planning institution. At DRCOG, former executive director

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Bill Vidal played a similar role in the late 1990s. Changes to DRCOG’s organizational structure helped involve more local elected officials. In Portland Metro, David Bragdon, former Metro Council president, understood the need for more business involvement. He recognized that Metro’s authority over regional planning was not enough because politics matter. Bragdon was the first to admit that the Metro Council needed the involvement of local mayors and other regional stakeholders. Although Metro is stronger than other metropolitan planning agencies, Bragdon understood that support for Metro could shift quickly. The passage of Measure 37 made Metro officials recognize that they are vulnerable to political swings and need allies in order to accomplish their goals. They also recognize that regulation is not enough. Regional planning is about getting everyone on board in some way and building coalitions. The story of MAPC, DRCOG, and Metro confirms the importance of coalition building, advocacy, voter outreach, and the use of the media in regional planning. In Denver, FasTracks, the regional light rail project, came about as a result of a coalition of urban and suburban communities as well as business and environmental interests. However, the project was only made possible because the coalition used the media to frame FasTracks as beneficial to the voters across the region. In Portland, political coalitions of environmentalists, farmers, and citizen groups at the local and state level were important for setting the groundwork for the state land use planning framework and the creation of Metro. But they also needed the votes to create Metro. Building regional coalitions also means expanding the constituency and the role of the planning agency. In Boston, through the Metro Mayor’s Coalition, MAPC helped develop an understanding that “we are all in this together” to help bolster MAPC’s political legitimacy. If mayors see MAPC doing something that helps them on issues that are impor tant to them, they are more likely to support MAPC’s overall mission. MetroFuture is also building a coalition of suburban and urban communities, NGOs, governments, and businesses that recognize that the future outlined in MetroFuture benefits them all. As a result of broadening the coalition and also being extremely media savvy, MAPC has expanded the base of support for the MetroFuture vision. Recently, through the Sustainable Communities Regional Planning (SCRP) grant, MAPC has expanded its coalition to include nonprofits and community development groups interested in equity, housing affordability, education, climate change, and environmental justice. In

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Portland, to keep Metro relevant, when there was concern about a land shortage because of tight UGB regulations, Bragdon worked with the Home Builders Association of Metropolitan Portland (HBAMP) to come up with methods (including a construction excise tax) to ensure there is enough land available for development. Coalition building can be a critical role for regional agencies like MAPC, DRCOG, and Metro. These institutions perform an impor tant function as forums for discussion about regional issues. Elected officials sitting on committees get to know each other and work together. Even though they may not necessarily agree with each other, they can at least understand where they are coming from. Officials start to recognize that they share many of the same problems. However, without authority, it is much more difficult to bring people to the table. This is certainly the case in Boston with the MAPC Council and Executive Committee. Local elected officials are busy enough dealing with their own constituencies that they are not interested in attending another meeting unless it benefits them in some way. In Boston, Denver, and Portland, most of the elected leaders are volunteers, so they are already stretched to the limit in terms of time and energy. They will not actively participate in an institution that does not offer them something in return. While involving many stakeholders in deliberative forums is an important part of the success of regional agencies, it can limit the type of policies that metropolitan planning agencies recommend. When building coalitions is the focus, efforts to include all the stakeholders may sometimes come at the expense of innovative planning policy. For instance, in Denver, the Metro Vision plan and the UGB/A are very much compromise agreements. The extent to which they radically change the behav ior of local officials is open to debate. Because DRCOG staff and board members are so concerned with being cooperative, they are reluctant to castigate localities whose plans are judged to be in violation of the regional plan and the UGB/A policy.

The Limits of Regional Planning To understand what factors impact the effectiveness of regional planning, we also need to recognize what is missing in this story. Although much of the literature on sprawl focuses on urban form and public policy, how municipalities are financed is critical to the land use planning that they allow and even promote. Municipalities privilege certain types of development based

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on their tax-generating capacities. Each state has different municipal financing structures; for instance, in Denver sales tax revenue is a critical component of local budgets. In Boston commercial and industrial lands are desirable because of the property taxes they bring in. In Portland, where there is no state sales tax, industrial land is the development that communities seek to attract. With a national trend toward local fi nancing of ser vices, municipalities in all three of these case study regions are struggling to balance their budgets. Since each municipality in Boston, Denver, and Portland is concerned with the cost of providing ser vices, municipal officials promote development that helps their bottom line. Reliance on development to fund municipalities is an impor tant barrier to regional cooperation and sustainable regional planning. In Denver, sales tax revenue drives urban development and creates competition among counties, cities, and neighboring municipalities. Schools in Oregon and Colorado are primarily financed with state funds so local zoning is not used as a tool to limit the number of children in communities the same way it is in Massachusetts. In the Boston region, school financing is critical to planning decisions since it represents a major portion of local revenue expenditures. In the 1990s, as small but rapidly growing municipalities in the Boston region found they had to build new schools to accommodate the growing number of school-aged children, citizens and officials recognized that singlefamily homes were not pulling their own weight in tax revenue. Increasingly, officials in Boston communities are trying to attract older populations and also singles without children: those who will not burden the school system. Even in Portland, without regional revenue sharing, regional planning is constrained by the fiscal realities that municipalities face. For example, Hillsboro has a strong industrial base and Cornelius, an adjacent municipality, is a poorer community without an industrial tax base (however, Cornelius is where many of the employees who work in Hillsboro live). If there were regional tax sharing, then the City of Cornelius could share in the benefit of the industrial development in Hillsboro. This might also help reduce the tensions around the designations of urban and rural reserves. Comparing across the cases, metropolitan planning agencies that have more tools than capacity building are more influential because they have an easier time bringing the relevant stakeholders to the table and because stakeholders have incentives to adopt regional policies. Metropolitan planning agencies that rely entirely on capacity building need to be creative and

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connect to other sources of authority in order to be relevant. Th is is a much harder task that requires leadership and coalition building. It can be done, but the net effect amounts to planning at the margins. It is clear that giving metropolitan planning agencies the tools they need to influence local planning—both fiscal and regulatory—is important. It is also important to note that there are many barriers to sustainable regional planning that cannot be resolved by authority alone. This is addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

Governing More Effective Regions

Metropolitan areas across the United States are politically fragmented, and each community plans according to its own logic. As a result, development can use larger amounts of open space than necessary, promote inefficient use of energy and water, increase social inequality, and lead to a variety of other negative externalities. Regions suffer when land use is determined purely by local logic. In addition, local communities struggle to balance their budgets and provide ser vices to their constituents that might be provided more costeffectively at the regional scale. One way to prevent this type of development is to promote coordinated land use planning at the metropolitan level. Metropolitan coordination is a challenge, however, in a country with a history of making most land use decisions at the local level. The perception that regulatory approaches—in which metropolitan planning agencies have the authority to tell communities what they can and cannot do—are not in the interest of local officials has led to voluntary approaches to regional governance. Voluntary regionalism— where communities work together without state-mandated authority—is increasingly viewed as a successful mechanism for metropolitan governance. Proponents argue it is better at stimulating creative problem-solving and compliance than regulatory models because it better represents local interests. Part of the reason for the growing reliance on voluntary regionalism is the pushback from local officials. Rather than recognize that there may, in fact, be benefits to cooperation that will help make their jobs easier, many local officials view regulatory approaches as a threat to their autonomy. It is assumed that localities should be wary because regulatory regional approaches lead to top-down decision making that threatens autonomy and

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leads to negative outcomes for local officials. In part, this view has been used as justification for voluntary approaches, which are considered to be more responsive to local concerns. Local planners and elected officials often do not view the problems they face as resulting from a system of planning that imposes undue burdens on local communities and creates a collective action problem. Without any urgency on the part of local officials for regional solutions, it is no surprise that voluntary regionalism is the policy of choice. However, the case studies in this book suggest that voluntary regionalism is not superior to regulatory approaches in meeting the needs of local officials. Metropolitan planning without authority tends to be driven more by the demands and constraints on localities rather than on a shared vision for the region. Without statutory authority over transportation funds or land use decisions, metropolitan planning agencies have difficulty getting local elected officials to participate. When local elected stakeholders are absent from the governance of metropolitan planning agencies, the agencies lack sufficient political legitimacy to translate ideas into action at the local level. This is the case with MAPC in Boston. Without the capacity to convene the necessary stakeholders, particularly local elected officials, MAPC has limited ability to convince communities to take regional growth management goals seriously. This means that the adoption of regional goals, which may help communities plan in more efficient and sustainable ways, is haphazard. Communities typically adopt regional goals only when they match with the communities’ existing goals and objectives. However, regional planning advocates in Boston have been strategic, figuring out ways to convince local elected officials that they can benefit from being involved in regional planning. The capacity-building ser vices that a regional planning agency like MAPC offers serve as an important mechanism to demonstrate that there are tangible benefits to cooperation. However, officials in regions of this type need to lobby the state for more incentives (carrots and sticks). Regional planning agencies with financial and regulatory incentives at their disposal become more relevant and local elected officials are more likely to participate in their governance. Part of the challenge of getting local officials to lobby for more authority for regional planning agencies is dispelling the pervasive myth in American land use planning that stronger forms of regionalism are always in opposition to local objectives. The Portland case demonstrates that more authority does not necessarily generate more resistance and hostility on the part of

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those who are regulated. Local officials may be staunch believers in home rule; however, when a metropolitan planning agency has statutory authority, these same officials want to participate in metropolitan decision making. They want to play an active role in metropolitan governance so they can influence decisions that affect them. They may, for instance, be interested in making sure that the regulations that are passed help them accomplish certain goals. In fact, the Portland case demonstrates that some of the most effective regional policies are those that local elected officials agreed to because they felt it would help them meet their own goals. The participation of local elected officials in the preparation of regional growth management plans is essential; however, it is very difficult to get local elected officials involved when metropolitan planning agencies do not have decision-making authority over transportation funds or land use. In addition, even when a metropolitan planning agency without authority does get local officials to endorse goals, compliance is not guaranteed. Local officials may agree in principle with goals like increased density in city and town centers, more transit-oriented development, or greater regional equity, but this does not mean that they can or will reorient local land use decisions in their own community to help implement these loft y goals. Not surprisingly, local compliance with metropolitan goals is mostly due to fear of punishment, the incentive of financial rewards, or the opportunity to pursue local goals that have already been set. The main reason that local officials give for being cooperative is that they benefit from it or they are afraid of not cooperating. In cases where a policy runs counter to local interests, they are unlikely to comply unless forced to do so. Without rewards or punishments to ensure compliance—despite efforts at capacity building by metropolitan planning agencies—localities will continue to operate primarily according to local logic, which results in the haphazard adoption of regional goals. This does not imply that metropolitan planning agencies without authority are useless. In fact, as with the case of MAPC, if they are creative, they can strategically use their technical expertise to influence state and local land use decisions. Even without statutory authority, metropolitan planning agencies can advance ideas about smart growth by demonstrating the economic and environmental impact of business as usual, lobbying for smart growth policies with lawmakers, convening meetings, and assisting local officials and planners who want to change municipal plans and zoning. Th is type of influence depends on the political credibility of the leadership of the

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metropolitan planning agency. It also depends on the willingness of local officials to follow the agency’s lead and the agency’s level of expertise. An agency that casts itself as a capacity-building resource for local communities (by providing technical know-how) will be more effective at influencing planning in communities that are already inclined to pursue smart growth objectives, but less effective in communities that are not receptive. Although the overall impact of regional planning agencies that rely on capacity building may not be as dramatic as those with formal authority or control over regional transportation funds (when the agency is also the MPO), these agencies are still an impor tant start for regional planning. Rather than dismantling them, the state government should increase their authority so they can accomplish metropolitan planning goals. The more the state bolsters the authority of these agencies, the more effective they will be. When regional planning agencies are also the MPO, local elected officials have an incentive to participate in agency governance. They willingly acknowledge that they come to meetings because transportation dollars are at stake. Although such agencies are better able to bring local elected officials to the table, they still have to rely on voluntary means for the adoption of land use policies. As a metropolitan planning agency moves from capacity building to being the MPO, participation by local elected officials increases, but here it is important to note that increased stakeholder participation does not necessarily translate into the local implementation of unpopular and/or controversial policies. In the case of DRCOG, the presumption that voluntary approaches are effective at implementing unpopular and/or controversial land use or growth management policies because they are the product of stakeholder participation was not true. In fact, since the goal of DRCOG is to bring people together, the agency tends to avoid controversial subjects altogether for fear of alienating its membership. DRCOG’s policies are purposefully “voluntary and flexible” to make sure that all the different communities are on board. This often limits their effectiveness at controlling urban sprawl in the region. Participation of local officials in regional decision making is not sufficient to ensure implementation of regional plans. Instead, the real source of regional authority is the state. Unless the state grants statutory powers to metropolitan planning agencies, they will be hamstrung in their efforts to implement regional plans. Without authority from the state, those parts of the plan that are consistent with local agendas, of course, may be adopted by

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some localities. However, there are likely to be gaps and exceptions that undermine the larger effort. When the metropolitan planning agency has the authority to mandate that all communities—not just the ones that agree—have to adopt and implement policies, local officials take the agency seriously. Since the agency has the power to determine certain types of land use, local elected officials are keen to be a part of the metropolitan decision-making process. Since they know they will have to follow them, local officials want to be a part of setting the regional rules. As a result of their participation, local officials tend to view the decisions made by the agency as more legitimate. Local officials also look to the metropolitan planning agency as a referee that sets regional standards for land use. If communities know that all the other communities in the region have to comply with regional standards, they are more likely to comply themselves. The metropolitan planning agency can also help level the playing field for local communities that fear that they will lose out if they cooperate and their neighbors do not. In this context, implementation of regional policies is more consistent across the region. An argument against increasing the authority of metropolitan planning agencies is that local planners will be threatened by it. In Boston, Denver, and Portland, local planners appreciated the planning framework set by metropolitan agencies as long as there was some room for local interpretation and a clear demarcation between local and regional responsibilities. In some cases, local planners even used the metropolitan planning agency as a scapegoat to justify local growth management policies that were locally unpopular but were necessary to meet mandated regional goals and requirements. Stronger state level land use regulation also allows planners to make the case for best planning practices, which must often be set aside in the face of demands from citizen groups and local elected officials who may be more concerned about short-term goals like balancing the budget. Having a regional plan with some compliance mechanisms can also make it easier for local planners to work more effectively with neighboring localities and simultaneously hold them accountable when their community’s land use decisions stray from regional goals. Here it is important to note that most local planners have some regional sensibility and want to participate in the shaping of regional policies. They participate more actively when the regional planning agency has more authority over land use. However, tension mounts when local planners feel the regional planning agency has adopted policies that do not respect local concerns.

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Metropolitan planning agencies with greater authority have to be careful about being “heavy handed” or ignoring the interests of local officials or communities. In Portland, since Metro’s decisions sometimes make communities unhappy, Metro has to be careful to walk the line between being forceful and being cooperative. Despite Metro’s statutory authority, it still has to be “helpful” to its member communities, so it engages in capacity building, funding, technical assistance, and relationship building. Currently, Portland Metro is focusing on the need to build extensive multiparty coalitions among regional stakeholders in the public and private sector to plan for land brought into the UGB and develop a regional affordable housing strategy. The presumption is that strong regulatory authority at the metropolitan level homogenizes local planning. This belief leads local officials to view stronger metropolitan governance as a threat to local autonomy and community values. However, even in a “strong” regional system like Portland, different localities in the same region have very different planning cultures and interpret regional goals quite differently. Although the metropolitan plan may require localities to adopt certain area-wide goals and objectives, there is still considerable room for local interpretation. Even in regions with more formal authority, getting officials from different localities to work together—when they have very different conceptions of what is good development and what is bad development—can be challenging. Since the areas of agreement among communities are small, even metropolitan planning agencies with more authority may need to choose carefully which battles they want to fight at any given time. Small wins now may provide them opportunities for larger wins later. It is also impor tant to note that it is not necessary to adopt politically controversial statewide policies like the UGB to create effective metropolitan governance organizations. Although the UGB policy has been important to Portland Metro, other state regulations that require consistency among local, metropolitan, and statewide goals give Metro the authority it needs to do its work. Policies regarding consistency between regional and local plans and between local plans and local zoning are not as controversial as the UGB and could be supported in other states. This is good news for states in which it is politically impossible to adopt controversial land use regulations. Similarly, the voluntary UGB/A approach in Denver may be viewed as a model. It does not hold the development line as tightly as in Portland, but it starts a formal, regional conversation about how local development on greenfields in one community impacts neighboring communities and the region. It

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also raises awareness about the costs of supplying infrastructure to new development. While Portland was more effective at engaging local stakeholders and translating the regional plan to the local level, without regional tax sharing or municipal finance reform, even Portland Metro is not able to fully implement its regional plan. Without regional revenue sharing, the logic of local land use planning will continue to be shaped mostly by local financial constraints and opportunities. Planning in a comprehensive way as in Portland (where Metro added an enormous area to the UGB) can require the region to come up with large outlays of money to pay for infrastructure development (Damascus/Boring area is a good example of this). Unfortunately, Metro can add area into the UGB, but if the area that is “planned for growth” remains without infrastructure because financing is not available, it is difficult to argue that the regional vision is being implemented. In addition, promoting affordable housing, reducing sprawl, and promoting equity continue to be difficult goals to achieve through regional planning. In Portland, the UGB was drawn so that even within it there are predominantly single-family developments. Nevertheless, the Portland region is doing a better job than Denver and Boston at reducing lot sizes and mandating that there be higher density and different types of development in each community. In Boston, Denver, and Portland, the metropolitan planning agencies have not traditionally made promoting fiscal equity among communities and promoting racial and socioeconomic integration primary goals. Race, class, and equity are only starting to become an accepted part of the regional agenda. Presumably, in the past, these topics were too controversial for the agencies to tackle. However, discussions about equity and tax sharing will have to be a part of future metropolitan planning efforts.

Policy Recommendations The first challenge to creating more effective metropolitan governance in the United States is helping communities to recognize the benefits of a regional approach. Evidence that localities actually benefit from metropolitan governance may help convince local officials to give up some of their authority to regional planning agencies. Of course, it will be difficult to convince local elected officials that it is in their best interest to create more powerful regional institutions. The first step is to change the nature of the debate about

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metropolitan governance so it more adequately portrays the existing landuse planning framework in the United States. The cases in this book demonstrate that planning agencies with authority can be built from the bottom up. They can help communities accomplish goals that are in their best interest and can be more effective at engaging local officials and addressing their needs. What needs to be questioned are assumptions about local land use planning and its relationship to metropolitan planning agencies. The more that a case can be made that metropolitan planning agencies are working with communities rather than against them, the more likely it will be to create political support for empowering these institutions so they can influence regional development. Next, the important role of the state in metropolitan planning needs to be recognized and promoted. States can and should be the leaders in creating a regulatory and fiscal setting conducive to metropolitan cooperation. It is impor tant to think of local, regional, and state planning agencies in a nested framework. It needs to be asked what state policies enable metropolitan planning agencies to work effectively and which policies are barriers to their effectiveness. Rather than focusing on voluntary regionalism as a singular solution, planning agencies should concentrate on formulating model state-level planning legislation that gives metropolitan planning agencies the power they need to help municipalities meet regional objectives. For starters, state policy requiring that local comprehensive or master plans are consistent with local zoning is a must. The next step is to promote consistency between regional and local plans so that regional goals are implemented at the local level. In addition, the impact of municipal finance on land use planning must be carefully examined since the way that communities are financed is often the primary reason they develop in certain ways. Without reforms in state-level planning frameworks and intergovernmental financial arrangements, metropolitan planning efforts will continue to be secondary to local land use planning that pays the bills. The tendency in the literature is to dismiss the ability of regions to move to more regulatory models of regional planning because there is no political will to adopt strict land use regulations. When it looks like more regulatory approaches are politically impossible, voluntary approaches are adopted. Rather than view voluntary approaches as the fallback position, the cases in this book demonstrate that it may be possible to think more incrementally about creating the framework for stronger regional planning. Sometimes the most effective policies are not the most dramatic or politically controversial.

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So while there may not be the political will to overhaul the state land use planning system, it may be politically possible to take intermediary steps. In Portland, although the UGB is the most studied policy, it may not be the primary reason for Metro’s effectiveness. In fact, administering the UGB may be a headache for Metro and end up making it the focus of negative attention. It may be that other policies, such as requirements for consistency with regional plans, transit-oriented development, and new parking requirements (policies that are not particularly interesting to researchers because they are not as controversial) allow Metro to implement its regional plan. The impact of less controversial land use policies needs to be studied further. The literature often overlooks the importance of the federal MPO structure as a mechanism to promote more sustainable regional planning. When the MPO function is disconnected from metropolitan planning, a key incentive for cooperation (transportation money) is lost. MPOs provide a large revenue stream that can help make metropolitan planning agencies relevant to local officials. Without the carrot of access to transportation funds, local elected officials are more likely to question why they should bother devoting time to metropolitan planning. In addition, an opportunity is missed to consolidate regional roles since metropolitan planning agencies have all the necessary skills to model future land use, forecast demographics, and assess transportation needs. Since the largest infrastructure investments that any region will make are in transportation, they should support regional planning goals. When regional planning agencies are the MPO, they help ensure that land use and transportation decisions are complementary. Denver and Portland have successfully connected the expansion of their light rail systems with regional planning goals. DRCOG’s connection of the TIP criteria to the adoption of parts of the regional plan has helped promote the local adoption of regional goals. More metropolitan planning agencies should follow DRCOG’s lead and link their visioning efforts to the allocation of transportation funds. It is clear that there is an important role for regional visioning and for consensus building: bringing together diverse stakeholders and asking them to reevaluate current conditions and imagine how they want the future to be. However, when regional visioning is done by purely voluntary organizations, the tools for implementation are often missing. The result is that much of the political capital and momentum that is built during the visioning stages is often not channeled into the plan’s implementation. The organizers of regional visioning processes need to think carefully about how they will use

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the outcome. Metropolitan visioning is really only the first step. It needs to be used to help create a constituency of voters and policy makers that can influence state land use and fiscal policy. If voters hear the message of the regional vision, they may help push for state level policies to support that vision. If the regional planning agency can link the plan with fi nancial and regulatory incentives, it is more likely to be adopted. Similarly, connecting the plan with state policy can be an effective implementation tool. Authority over transportation funding and land use makes metropolitan planning agencies relevant. The participation of local elected officials (who are interested in transportation funds) makes these organizations more legitimate and effective at translating regional goals into local action. Without these types of authority, metropolitan planning agencies are confined to using capacity building and voluntary approaches, which are likely to be much less effective. Demonstrating political and technical expertise and convening stakeholders are certainly valuable roles, but they are not enough to create incentives for local adoption of regional goals.

New Federal Leadership While the cases focus primarily on the role of the state, the federal government plays a critical role in supporting metropolitan governance. Under the Obama administration, there has been increased attention to promoting metropolitan planning and connecting land use, housing, and transportation. In 2009, the secretaries of HUD, EPA, and DOT announced the Partnership for Sustainable Communities. The partnership is charged with “coordinating investments and aligning policies to support communities that want to give Americans more housing choices, make transportation systems more efficient and reliable, reinforce existing investments, protect the environment, and support vibrant and healthy neighborhoods that attract businesses.” In its first three years, more than 700 communities across the country received more than $3.5 billion of support. The recognition that federal money can be a catalyst to promote metropolitan planning and implementation is a step in the right direction. In 2010, HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan went to Portland to announce the creation of HUD’s Office of Sustainable Housing and Communities, a $200 million initiative aimed at promoting affordable housing near transit. Praising Portland’s ability to connect land use and transportation, Donovan said, “We at HUD are big admirers of

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what you’re doing here.” This infusion of federal money to support regional planning and implementation is exciting to witness, especially as it becomes more and more apparent that regional solutions to climate change are needed. It is also exciting to see that the federal government recognizes the importance of the MPO for sustainable regional planning. A 2009 MPO Peer Workshop on Planning for Climate Change sponsored by the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration found that MPOs have taken on the role of addressing climate change. Some MPOs have done this silently through their existing work and others have been more proactive. Part of the reason for the silence may be the uneasy role that MPOs and regional planning agencies play when it comes to mandating that local communities behave in certain ways. Although MPOs have the ability to withhold money from communities that are not meeting certain standards, in practice many MPOs adopt policies that meet the interests of all their constituents because there is a tradition of majority voting and a culture of quid pro quo. Th is translates into weaker policies and a tendency to avoid the language of regulation and the use instead of voluntary means. Another challenge facing MPOs is that the issue of climate change is polarizing in regions where both political parties are strong, with the result that the need to meet climate change requirements (particularly when mandated by the federal government) is interpreted in political terms. Although the debate about “smart growth” no longer is a political firestorm, climate change is.

Final Thoughts The challenges facing our nation’s metropolitan regions are enormous: demographic change, aging infrastructure, climate change mitigation and adaptation, urban sprawl, spatial segregation, gentrification, education, housing affordability, regional equity, and more. Many of these challenges can be addressed only through the coordination of local and regional efforts. The ability to capitalize on and strengthen existing metropolitan planning agencies will be critical to making this happen. We will need to be creative in how to connect capacity building, financial incentives, and regulatory authority. The lessons from the Boston, Denver, and Portland cases provide a starting framework. We see from these studies that effective regional planning means combining expertise, capacity building, financial incentives,

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and regulatory muscle to develop robust institutions that respond to local and regional concerns. Metropolitan planning agencies that are effective are relevant: they have a purpose, they operate using carrots and sticks, and most importantly they engage with local stakeholders through collaboration and authority.

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NOTES

Chapter 1 1. Carl Haub, “U.S. Population Could Reach 438 Million by 2050, and Immigration Is Key,” Population Research Board, accessed January 23, 2015, http://www.prb .org /Publications/Articles/2008/pewprojections.aspx. 2. Reid Ewing and Shima Hamidi, “Measuring Sprawl 2014,” accessed September 10, 2015, http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/measuring-sprawl-2014.pdf. 3. Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees, Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth, No. 9 (Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 1998). 4. Alan Altshuler, William Morrill, Harold Wolman, and Faith Mitchell, eds., Governance and Opportunity in Metropolitan America (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999), 23. 5. An excellent book about this phenomenon is Tom Daniels, When City and Country Collide: Managing Growth in the Metropolitan Fringe (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1999). 6. David Mckee and Gerald H. Smith, “Environmental Diseconomies in Suburban Expansion,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 31, no. 2 (April 1972): 181–188, 185, 182. 7. Ibid., 185. 8. Real Estate Research Corporation, The Costs of Sprawl: Environmental and Economic Costs of Alternative Residential Development Patterns at the Urban Fringe, 3 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), 7. 9. A. C. Nelson, “Regulations to Improve Development Patterns,” in Metropolitan Development Patterns: 2000 Annual Roundtable (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2000), 73. 10. As quoted in Douglas E. Morris, It’s a Sprawl World After All: The Human Cost of Unplanned Growth—and Visions of a Better Future (Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 2015), 23. 11. Robert Burchell, “Costs and Benefits of Alternative Development Patterns: Sprawl Versus Smart Growth,” in Metropolitan Development Patterns: 2000 Annual Roundtable, 43.

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12. Mckee and Smith, “Environmental Diseconomies in Suburban Expansion,” 185. 13. Peter Drier, John H. Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom, Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-first Century (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 99. 14. An example of developments that generate revenue might be high-end overfi ft y-five communities that pay high real estate taxes, but their residents do not need costly publicly provided ser vices like schools. 15. Paul G. Lewis. Shaping Suburbia: How Political Institutions Organize Urban Development (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), 61. 16. William Fulton, Rolf Pendall, Mai Nguyen, and Alicia Harrison, Who Sprawls Most? How Growth Patterns Differ Across the US (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, 2001), 1, accessed October 6, 2015, https://planning.unc.edu/people/faculty/mainguyen/fulton _ sprawl.pdf. 17. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Report on the Environment: Urbanization and Population Change, accessed January  24, 2016, http://cfpub.epa.gov/roe /indicator_pdf.cfm?i=52. 18. Sierra Club, “Sprawl: The Dark Side of the American Dream” (1988), accessed August 29, 2015, http://www.sierraclub.org /sprawl/report98/report.asp. 19. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Summary Report: 2012 National Resources Inventory” (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Conservation Ser vice; Ames, IA: Center for Survey Statistics and Methodology, August 2015), accessed January  24, 2016, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE _DOCUMENTS/nrcseprd396218.pdf, 2-5. 20. Robert W. Burchell and Sahan Mukherji, “Conventional Development Versus Managed Growth: The Costs of Sprawl,” American Journal of Public Health 93, no. 9 (2003): 1534–1540, abstract, accessed January 24, 2016, http://ajph.aphapublications .org /doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.93.9.1534. 21. Matthew E. Kahn, “The Environmental Impact of Suburbanization,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 19, no. 4 (2000): 569–586. 22. “Sprawl Overview,” Sierra Club, accessed August 29, 2015, http://vault.sierra club.org /sprawl/overview/. 23. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “A New Economic Analysis of Infrastructure Investment. A Report Prepared by the Department of the Treasury with the Council of Economic Advisers. March 23, 2012,” accessed August 29, 2015, http://www.treasury .gov/resource - center/economic -policy/ Documents /20120323InfrastructureReport .pdf. 24. “State of the Air,” American Lung Association, accessed October 6, 2015, http:// www.stateoft heair.org /2015/key-findings/. 25. Myron Orfield and Baris Gumus-Dawes, “MPO Reform: A National Agenda for Reforming Metropolitan Governance,” University of Minnesota, Institute on Race and Poverty (2009), accessed October 6, 2015, http://community-wealth.org /content /mpo-reform-national-agenda-reforming-metropolitan-governance.

Notes to Pages 7–10

177

26. Reid H. Ewing and Shima Hamid, “Measuring Sprawl 2014,” accessed September  10, 2015, 9, http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org /documents/measuring-sprawl -2014.pdf. 27. Anthony Downs, ed., Growth Management and Affordable Housing (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004), 19. 28. Anthony Downs, New Visions for Metropolitan Amer ica (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 19. 29. David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 134. 30. Ibid. 31. John  A. Powell, “Race, Poverty, and Urban Sprawl,” in Growing Smarter: Achieving Livable Communities, Environmental Justice, and Regional Equity, ed. Robert D. Bullard (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 51–72, 60. 32. Myron Orfield, Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997); Arthur Maass, ed., Area and Power (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959); Neal R. Peirce, Citistates: How Urban America Can Prosper in a Competitive World (Newport Beach, CA: Seven Locks Press, 1993). 33. Scott Greer, Governing the Metropolis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), 113. 34. Robert  C. Wood, 1400 Governments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961). 35. Matthew Holden Jr., “The Governance of the Metropolis as a Problem in Diplomacy,” Journal of Politics 26, no. 3 (August 1964): 627–647. 36. Luther Gulick, “Metropolitan Organization,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 314 (November 1957): 59. 37. Maass, ed., Area and Power, 11. 38. Raymond Vernon, “Myth and Reality of Our Urban Problems,” in City and Suburb: The Economics of Metropolitan Growth, ed. Benjamin Chinitz (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964), 102. 39. Greer, Metropolitics: A Study of Political Culture (New York: Wiley, 1963), 9–10. 40. Maass, ed., Area and Power, 60. 41. Ibid., 65. 42. Anthony Downs, “Metropolitan Growth and Future Political Problems,” Land Economics 37, no. 4 (November 1961): 311–320, 315. 43. Drier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom, Place Matters, 176. 44. Bruce Katz, “Connecting Community Building to Metropolitan Solutions,” Shelterforce Online (January/February 1998), accessed October 6, 2015, http://www .nhi.org /online/issues/97/katz.html. 45. Orfield, Metropolitics, 148. 46. Myron Orfield, “Building Regional Coalitions Between Cities and Suburbs,” in Growing Smarter, ed. Robert D. Bullard (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 323–344, 324.

178

Notes to Pages 10–15

47. Myron Orfield, “Regional Coalition-Building and the Inner Suburbs,” Shelterforce Online (January/February 1998), accessed August 19, 2007, http://www.nhi.org /online/issues/97/orfield.html. 48. Allan Wallis, “New Regionalism,” in Encyclopedia of Urban Studies, ed.  R. Hutchison (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2010), 547–549, doi: 10.4135/9781412971973.n198. 49. Lamont C. Hempel, “Conceptual and Analytical Challenges to Building Sustainable Communities,” in Toward Sustainable Communities: Transition and Transformations in Environmental Policy, ed. Daniel  A. Mazmanian and Michael  E. Kraft (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 43–74, 67. 50. Richard Feiock, Jill Tao, and Linda Johnson, “Institutional Collective Action: Social Capital and the Formation of Regional Partnerships,” in Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation, ed. Richard Feiock (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 147–158, 149. 51. Harvey Jacobs, “Social Conflict over Property Rights” (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, April 2007), 14–19, 15. 52. Ronald Oakerson, “The Study of Metropolitan Governance,” in Feiock, Metropolitan Governance, 17–45, 20. 53. Ibid., 41–42. 54. Elinor Ostrom, “The Danger of Self-Evident Truths,” PS: Political Science and Politics 33, no. 1 (March 2000): 33–46, 33. 55. Allan Wallis, “The Third Wave: Current Trends in Regional Governance,” National Civic Review 83, no. 3 (1994): 290–310. 56. Judith E. Innes and David Booher, “The Impact of Collaborative Planning on Governance Capacity,” Institute for Urban and Regional Development, Working Paper 2003–03 (Berkeley: University of California, April 2003), 7, accessed October 6, 2015, http://escholarship.org /uc/item/98k72547#page-7. 57. Ibid., 25. 58. Judith Innes, “Evaluating Consensus Building,” in The Consensus Building Handbook, ed. Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKearnan, and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999), 631–675, 636, 641. 59. Innes and Booher, “Impact of Collaborative Planning,” 21. 60. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 177. 61. Jane Mansbridge, “Practice-Thought-Practice,” in Deepening Democracy, ed. Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (New York: Verso, 2003), 175–199, 179. 62. Patsy Healey, Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), 67. 63. “Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grants,” HUD, accessed May 18, 2015, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program _offices/economic _ resilience/sustainable _ communities _ regional _ planning _ grants; “Six Livability Principles,” HUD, accessed August 29, 2015, http://portal.hud.gov/ hudportal/HUD ?src =/program _offices/economic _resilience/Six _ Livability_ Principles.

Notes to Pages 16–25

179

64. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Transportation Planning Capacity Building Program, “The Transportation Planning Process: Key Issues. A Briefi ng Book for Transportation Decisionmakers, Officials, and Staff,” September 2007, Publication Number FHWA-HEP-07-039, accessed May 18, 2015, http://www.planning.dot.gov/documents/ briefi ngbook / bbook.htm. 65. “Regional Councils, COGs, and MPOs,” National Association of Regional Councils, accessed May 19, 2015, http://narc.org /about-narc/cogs-mpos/. 66. David Collier, “The Comparative Method: Two Decades of Change,” in Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives, ed. Dankwart Rustow and Kenneth Erickson (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 7–31, 10–11. 67. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 68. I would like to thank Judith Layzer for providing me with this valuable framework for policy evaluation. 69. See Innes and Booher, “Impact of Collaborative Planning.” See also Ostrom, “Danger of Self-Evident Truths”; Oakerson, “Study of Metropolitan Governance”; Barber, Strong Democracy; Mansbridge, “Practice-Thought-Practice”; and Feiock, Tao, and Johnson, “Institutional Collective Action.” 70. In each region, I conducted about thirty interviews with policy makers and experts. Interviews began in 2005, when I worked as a Rappaport Fellow at MAPC. They continued in 2006 and 2007. Follow-up interviews were conducted in 2010 in Denver and Portland and in 2015 in Boston. In all cases, I have continued to follow the progress of the regional planning agencies by examining their documents and websites, consulting with experts, and following news reports. 71. Some states are governed by home rule, which means that local governments can assume roles that are not specifically prohibited to them by state statutes and the state constitution; others are governed by Dillon’s rule that grants more authority to the state. For more information, see League of Women Voters Education Fund, “Dillon’s Rule: Good or Bad for Local Governments?” (October 2004), accessed August 7, 2015, http://www.lwv-fairfax.org /fi les/lwv-dillon-dtp-99041.pdf. 72. Kathleen McCormick, “Regional Thinking,” Urban Land (September 2006). 73. Portland Metro, “Metropolitan Transportation Improvement Program 2006– 2009, Metro Resolution, No. 05-3606,” 1–4, accessed October 6, 2015, http://rim.metro -region.org /webdrawer/webdrawer.dll/webdrawer/rec/151594/. 74. Portland Metro, accessed May 7, 2007, http://www.metro-region.org /article .cfm?articleID =277. 75. H. V. Savitch and R. K. Vogel, “Paths to New Regionalism,” State and Local Government Review 32, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 158–168; Stephen Wheeler, “The New Regionalism: Key Characteristics of an Emerging Movement,” Journal of the American Planning Association 68 no. 3 (2002): 267–278; Orfield, Metropolitics; Innes and Booher, “Impact of Collaborative Planning”; J. Innes and David E. Booher, “Consensus Building

180

Notes to Pages 26–29

and Complex Adaptive Systems,” Journal of the American Planning Association 65 (1999): 412–423.

Chapter 2 1. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “MAPC Strategic Plan 2015–2030,” accessed May 27, 2015, http://www.mapc.org /sites/default/fi les/FINAL%20StrategicPlan %2012-2-14-web.pdf. 2. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, “Chapter 40B: Regional Planning Metropolitan Area Planning District,” accessed October 6, 2015, https://malegislature.gov /Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleVII/Chapter40B/Section24. The full text reads: “Section 24. There shall be a metropolitan area planning council, in this section and in sections twenty-five to twenty-nine, inclusive, called the council. Said council shall consist of one representative from each city and town of the metropolitan area planning district who shall be appointed by the mayor or, if the city has a manager, by the city manager, and in the case of a town, by the board of selectmen or, if the town has a manager, by the town manager, twenty-one persons to be appointed by the governor of which number there shall be sufficient representation of minority and low-income groups so as to substantially represent their viewpoints in the area to be served by the council; and the following officers or their respective designees who shall be members ex officiis:—the chairman of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, the chairman of the Massachusetts Port Authority, the chairman of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, the commissioner of the metropolitan district commission, the chairman of the board of directors of the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, the commissioner of highways, the director of economic development, the director of housing and community development, the commissioner of environmental protection, the chairman of the Boston Redevelopment Authority, the commissioner of public works of the city of Boston and the executive director of the Boston Water and Sewer Commission. Upon the expiration of the term of any appointed member, his successor shall be appointed in like manner for a term of three years. The appropriate appointing authority shall fi ll any vacancy for the remainder of the unexpired term.” 3. Commonwealth of Massachusetts State Ethics Commission. Confl ict of interest opinion EC-COI-95-2, accessed July 25, 2007, http://www.mass.gov/ethics/COI _95_ 2 .pdf. 4. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “Population and Housing Demand Projections for Metro Boston,” accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.mapc.org /sites/default /fi les/MetroBoston%20Projections%20Final%20Report _1_16 _ 2014 _0.pdf. 5. In the FY 2015 budget, the governor and Massachusetts legislature approved an increase of 50 cents per person for the MAPC Municipal Assessments. This money is designated for the Planning for MetroFuture technical assistance and the District Local

Notes to Pages 29–32

181

Technical Assistance Program (DLTA). For more information, see Marc Draisen’s October 20, 2014 memo to MAPC Council Members and Other Local Officials, http:// www.mapc.org /sites/default/fi les/TA%20letter%20to%20communities%202015.pdf. 6. Metropolitan Area Planning Council Bylaws, accessed July 26, 2007, http://www .mapc.org /about _ mapc/Bylaws _ 200705.pdf. 7. Central Transportation Planning Staff, “Appendix B: MetroFuture Overview,” Appendix B-1, http://www.ctps.org /data/pdf/plans/LRTP/needs/2035NA _ AppB.pdf. 8. In order to allow people to speak freely about policies in their regions, the quotes are coded by the city (B for Boston, D for Denver, and P for Portland) and a number determined by the order in which they were interviewed. Personal Communication 3B, 2007. 9. Personal Communication 3B, 2007. 10. “TIP Evaluation Scoring Sheet,” Central Transportation Planning Staff, accessed June 11, 2015, http://www.ctps.org /drupal/data/pdf/plans/TIP/TIP_ Evaluation _ Scoring.pdf. 11. Barry Bluestone, Eleanor White, Noah Hodgetts, Michael Gleba, Nancy Lee, Monika Kondura, and Tim Davis. “Greater Boston Housing Report Card 2013: What Follows the Housing Recovery?,” Boston Foundation, October 2013, pp. 7–8. 12. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “Boston MetroPlan 2000,” section 2, pp. 34, 39, no longer available on website. 13. Ibid., 43. 14. Boston Indicators Project, accessed July 26, 2007, http://www.bostonindicators .org /IndicatorsProject/Housing /Content.aspx?id=750. 15. As reported by Deirdre Fernandes, “Housing Affordability Worsening in Boston Area, Study Finds” Boston Globe, March 18, 2015, accessed May 21, 2015, http:// www.bostonglobe .com / business /2015/03/17/ housing- out-sync -with -region -needs /Pf6yhGhHs8bb5bF0yFXk0N/story.html. Barry Bluestone, Catherine Tumber, Nancy Lee, Alicia Sasser Modestino, Lauren Costello, Tim Davis, James Huessy, William Reyelt, and Rebecca Koepnick, “The Greater Boston Housing Report Card 2014–2015” (2015), accessed September  21, 2015, http://www.tbf.org /~/media /TBFOrg /Files /Reports/2014%20-%202015%20Housing _ Report.pdf. 16. Deirdre Fernandes, “Housing Affordability Worsening in Boston Area, Study Finds.” 17. Massachusetts Housing Partnership Housing Affordability Initiative at the MIT Center for Real Estate, “Large-Lot Housing Construction in the Greater Boston Metropolitan Area,” p.  2, accessed August  19, 2007, http://www.mhp.net /uploads /resources/mhp_mit _1_ 30_06.pdf. 18. Ibid. No data were available for the Town of Shirley. 19. Edward Moscovitch and Courtney Koslow, “Open Space, Housing Construction, and Home Prices: What’s the Payoff from Smart Growth?,” Massachusetts Housing Partnership (2005): 11, accessed August  29, 2015, http://www.massgrowth.net /writable/resources/document/cape _ ann _report.pdf.

182

Notes to Pages 32–37

20. Ibid., 2. 21. Edward Glaeser, Jenny Schuetz, and Bryce Ward, “Large Lots and Other Requirements Drive Up the Cost of Bay State Homes,” Commonwealth Magazine, January 1, 2006, accessed June 11, 2015, http://commonwealthmagazine.org /uncate gorized / how-large -lot-zoning-and- other-town-regulations -are - driving-up -home -prices/. 22. Aviva Rothman-Shore and Kara  E. Hubbard, “Land Use Regulations and Housing Segregation,” Poverty & Race (May/June 2009), accessed June 11, 2015, http:// www.prrac .org /full _ text .php ?text _ id =1227& item _ id =11754 & newsletter _ id =105 &header =Race +%2F+Racism&kc =1. 23. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “2012 Calendar and Annual Report,” accessed September 23, 2015, http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/128581, Forms of Municipal Governance Map. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Allison O’Leary Murray, “Towns Spar over Road Improvements in Mall Expansion,” Boston Globe, West Edition, July 15, 2004, 1. 27. Matt McDonald, “Developers Reach a Deal with Wayland,” Boston Globe, West Edition, March 17, 2005, 1. 28. Steve LeBlanc, “Boston Sues Gaming Commission over Wynn Casino in Everett,” January 5, 2015, CBS Boston Online, accessed June 17, 2015, http://boston.cbslocal .com/2015/01/05/ boston-sues-gaming-commission-over-wynn-casino-in-everett/. 29. Personal Communication 2B, 2007. 30. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “Boston MetroPlan 2000,” p. 4, accessed August 19, 2007, http://www.mapc.org /regional _planning /MetroPlan.html. 31. Ibid., section 1, 7. 32. Ibid., section 1, 15–16. 33. In some states there is a requirement that zoning be consistent with the master plan, but in Massachusetts this is not the case. In Massachusetts, the master plan may propose a change to the zoning, but this change will not take place unless the proposal is taken to the municipal legislative body, typically the town meeting, and approved by two-thirds vote. Since changing zoning in Massachusetts is a difficult political process, many master plans serve as a general guide for the community rather than as a blueprint for future development. 34. Personal Communication 15B, 2007. 35. Town of Lexington, “Comprehensive Plan, 2002,” 10, accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.lexingtonma.gov/planning /compplan.cfm. 36. Conservation Commission, “Draft 2001 Open Space and Recreation Plan for Bellingham, Blackstone, and Franklin,” vol. 1, June 2001, accessed October 6, 2015, http://franklinma .virtualtownhall . net / Pages / FranklinMA _ Planning /initiatives /2001openspaceandrecreationplan.pdf. 37. Personal Communication 17B, 2007.

Notes to Pages 38–42

183

38. Personal Communication 19B, 2007. 39. Personal Communication 18B, 2007. 40. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “Strategic Plan, July 1, 2005–June 30, 2010,” 5, no longer available on website. 41. Personal Communication 15B, 2007. For a list of the MAPC representatives, see http://www.mapc.org / board-council, accessed January 27, 2016. As of January 27, 2016, the following cities and towns did not have representatives (they are listed as vacant): Carlisle, Concord, Dedham, Dover, Everett, Foxborough, Glouster, Hamilton, Holliston, Lincoln, Marlborough, Maynard, Nahant, Norwell, Randolf, Rockport, Stow, Sudbury, Waltham, Weymouth, and Wrentham. 42. Cherry sheets notify communities about how much state aid they will receive in the next fiscal year and what fees they will owe. 43. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “Strategic Plan 2015–2020,” 29, accessed October 5, 2015, http://www.mapc.org /sites/default/fi les/FINAL%20Strategic Plan%2012-2-14-web.pdf. 44. Sarah Schweitzer, “Plan Envisions Bustling Town Centers: ‘MetroFuture’ Puts Focus on Suburbs,” Boston Globe, May 1, 2007, accessed July 24, 2007, http://www.boston .com/news/local/articles/2007/05/01/plan_envisions_bustling _town_centers/. 45. Ibid. 46. Personal Communication 17B, 2007. 47. Through the generous support of the Rappaport Summer Public Policy Fellowship, I worked at MAPC with Amy Cotter and later participated in the early meetings of the MetroFuture Implementation Task Force. 48. Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act (MEPA), “NPC (Notice of Project Change) Certificate EOEA #I2565,” p. 2, accessed August 1, 2007, http://www.mass .gov/envir/mepa/pdffi les/certificates/071107/12565npc.pdf. 49. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “Metro Boston Population and Housing Projections,” 2011, accessed April  13, 2015, http://www.mapc.org /sites/default /fi les /MetroBoston%20Projections%20Final%20Report _1_16 _ 2014 _0.pdf, 1. 50. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “2013 Calendar and Annual Report,” accessed September  24, 2015, http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/ bitstream/handle/2452 /205592/ocm03603629-2013.pdf ?sequence =1& isAllowed=y, 4. 51. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “MetroFuture: Making a Greater Boston Region—Goals,” accessed January 24, 2016, http://www.mapc.org/metrofuture goals#Housing_Choice. 52. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “MAPC 50 Years: 2013 Annual Report and Calendar,” accessed September 16, 2013, http://www.mapc.org /sites/default /fi les /MAPC _Calendar_ Annual _ Report _ low_res-web.pdf. 53. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “Sustaining Communities ProgramAchieving Results in Greater Boston,” 2014, 3, accessed May 21, 2015, http://www . mapc .org /sites /default /fi les /Sustainable%20Communities%20Accomplishments .pdf.

184

Notes to Pages 42–45

54. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “Sustaining Communities Program– Achieving Results in Greater Boston,” 2014, accessed May 21, 2015, http://www.mapc .org /sites/default/fi les/Sustainable%20Communities%20Accomplishments.pdf. 55. Ibid., 5. 56. Ibid., 7. 57. Ibid., 8. 58. Ibid., 13. 59. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “Strategic Plan 2015–2020,” 2014, accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.mapc.org /sites/default/fi les/FINAL%20StrategicPlan%2012-2-14-web.pdf, 1. 60. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, 2014, “Metro Boston Regional Climate Change Adaptation Strategy Report,” accessed September 24, 2015, http://www.mapc .org/sites/default/fi les/RCCAS _ full _ report _ rev_ 8-28-14.pdf. 61. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, 2011, “South Shore Coastal Hazards Adaptation Study,” accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.mapc.org/sites/default/files/FINAL _ South _ Shore _Coastal _ Adaptation _ Planning _ Report _12-31-11_ sm.pdf. 62. For more information on EO 418, see http://www.mass.gov/hed /community /planning /executive-order-418.html, accessed May 28, 2015. 63. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “2006 Planning Council Calendar and 2006 Annual Report,” accessed September 24, 2015, https://ia801305.us.archive .org /26/items/metropolitanpers00mass/metropolitanpers00mass.pdf. 64. “Mark Racicot,” Metropolitan Area Planning Council, accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.mapc.org /about-mapc/staff/mark-racicot. 65. Personal Communication 1B, 2007. 66. If a Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) does not approve a Chapter 40B project, the developer can make a case to the State Housing Appeals Committee. The State Housing Appeals Committee can overrule the local zoning decision. For more information see, “Chapter 40B: The State’s Affordable Housing Law,” CHAPA, accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.chapa.org /sites/default/fi les/40%20B%20fact%20sheet.pdf. 67. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “Fair Housing and Equity Assessment for Metro Boston,” 103, accessed August 29, 2015, http://www.chapa.org/sites/default /fi les/Full _ Fair%20Housing%20and%20Equity%20Assessment%20for%20Metro%20 Boston _0.pdf. 68. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “Sustaining Communities Program– Achieving Results in Greater Boston,” 2014, 8, accessed May  21, 2015, http://www .mapc.org /sites/default /fi les/Sustainable%20Communities%20Accomplishments.pdf. For the Housing MA website, please see http://www.housing.ma. 69. Ann Verrilli and Jennifer Raitt, “The Use of Chapter 40R in Massachusetts: As a Tool for Smart Growth and Affordable Housing Production,” October 2009, 5, accessed August  29, 2015, http://www.mass.gov/hed/docs/dhcd/cd/ch40r/theuseofch40rin-ma.pdf. 70. Ibid., 6.

Notes to Pages 45–48

185

71. Ibid., 10. 72. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “Sustaining Communities Program– Achieving Results in Greater Boston,” 2014, p. 8, accessed May 21, 2015, http://www .mapc.org /sites/default/fi les/Sustainable%20Communities%20Accomplishments.pdf. 73. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “2006 Planning Council Calendar and 2006 Annual Report.” 74. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “2013–2014 Legislative Session, MAPC Highlights,” October 10, 2015, http://www.mapc.org /sites/default/fi les/2013-2014%20 session%20legislative%20accomplishments.pdf. 75. “Metro Mayors Coalition,” Metropolitan Area Planning Council, accessed May 21, 2015, http://www.mapc.org /metro-mayors-coalition. 76. Personal Communication 19B, 2007. 77. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “2006 Planning Council Calendar and 2006 Annual Report,” accessed September 24, 2015, https://ia801305.us.archive .org /26/items/metropolitanpers00mass/metropolitanpers00mass.pdf. 78. “Metro Mayors Shannon Grant Community Safety Initiative,” Metropolitan Area Planning Council, accessed September 23, 2015, http://www.mapc.org /shannon -grant- 0. 79. “Metro Mayors Coalition,” Metropolitan Area Planning Council, accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.mapc.org /metro-mayors-coalition. 80. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “2006 Planning Council Calendar and 2006 Annual Report.” 81. Ibid. 82. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “MetroFuture, Strategy 4: Build Regionalism,” 4, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www. mapc .org /sites/default /files/ MF4 _ Regionalism _11_ 21.pdf. 83. “Regional Energy Ser vices Company Procurement,” Metropolitan Area Planning Council, accessed October 11, 2015, http://www.mapc.org /regional-esco. 84. For more detailed studies on local community planning in the region, see Christina Rosan and Lawrence Susskind, “Land-Use Planning in the Doldrums: Growth Management in Massachusetts’ I-495 Region,” Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston, 2007, accessed September  18, 2015, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers /rappaport /research -and -publications /working-papers / land -use -planning-in -the -doldrums. For more in-depth case studies, see Christina Rosan and Lawrence Susskind, “Land Use Planning in the Doldrums: Case Studies of Growth Management in the I-495 Region: Case Studies of Growth Management in the I-495 Region,” February 2007, prepared for the Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston by the MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning and the Consensus Building Institute, accessed October 9, 2015, http://web.mit.edu /publicdisputes/pdf/rappaportCases tudies10 -1- 07.pdf. 85. Buildout analyses demonstrate to communities what their current zoning allows and what would happen if the community fully developed according to these

186

Notes to Pages 48–51

codes. The benefit of these studies is that they help citizens and officials visualize the positive and negative impacts of their current zoning codes. 86. Personal Communication 18B, 2007. 87. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “2006 MAPC Annual Report.” 88. Lexington Housing Production Plan, March 2014, http://www.mass.gov/ hed /docs/dhcd /cd /pp/ lexington.pdf, accessed September  23, 2015; Metropolitan Area Planning Council; “Annual Report 2013,” accessed September 24, 2015, http://archives .lib.state.ma .us/ bitstream / handle/2452/205592/ocm03603629-2013.pdf ?sequence =1 & isAllowed=y. 89. Personal Communication 20B, 2007. 90. Personal Communication 17B, 2007. 91. In the I-495 region, the only communities ser viced by the MWRA are Northborough, Southborough, Framingham, Marlborough, Ashland, and Natick. For a map of the MWRA ser vice area, see http://www.mwra.state.ma.us/02org/html/0606cc map.pdf. 92. Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research and Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston, Massachusetts Housing Regulation Database, prepared by Amy Dain and Jenny Schuetz, 2005, http://www.masshousingregulations.com/, accessed August  19, 2007. 93. MAPC and the 495/MetroWest Corridor Partnership produced “Once Is Not Enough: A Guide to Water Reuse in Massachusetts,” http://www.mapc.org /sites /default /fi les/Once _ is _ Not _ Enough _ _ a _Guide _to_Water_ Reuse _ in _ Massachusetts _-_ November_ 2005.pdf, accessed September 18, 2015. 94. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “South Coast Rail Priority Area Review Process to Determine ‘Regional Significance,” accessed September 23, 2015, http:// www. mapc .org /sites /default /files / Priority%20Screening%20Process _ South%20 Coast%20Rail _1%20of%202.pdf. 95. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “2014 Annual Report,” accessed October 11, 2015, http://2014.mapc.org. 96. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “South Coast Rail Priority Area Review Process to Determine ‘Regional Significance,” accessed September 23, 2015, http:// www. mapc .org /sites /default /files / Priority%20Screening%20Process _ South%20 Coast%20Rail _1%20of%202.pdf. 97. 495/Metrowest Partnership, “495/MetroWest Development Compact Plan,” March  2012, accessed September  23, 2015, http://www.495partnership.org /assets /Compact/FinalPlan/newfinalcompactplansmall.pdf. 98. Mass Audubon, “Losing Ground: Planning for Resilience,” 5th ed. of the Losing Ground Series, June 2014, accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.massaudubon.org /our - conservation -work /education - community - outreach /sustainable -planning -development/losing-ground-report. 99. “Our Conservation Work,” Mass Audubon, accessed September  23, 2015, http:// www . massaudubon . org /our - conservation -work /education - community

Notes to Pages 51–56

187

- outreach /sustainable -planning - development /preservation - development-toolkit /development. 100. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “NSPC Priority Mapping Project Report,” January 2014, accessed September 23, 2015, http://www.mapc.org /sites/default /fi les/ NSPC _ PriorityMappingFinalReport _ Narrative _ FINAL _ Jan2014 _ FINAL .pdf; Metropolitan Area Planning Council, 2014, “Metro North Land Use Priority Plan: Planning Ahead for Growth in MetroNorth Communities,” October 2014, accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.mass.gov/ hed /economic/eohed /pro/planning /metro north/metronorthfinalreportsep2014.pdf. 101. Personal Communication 3B, 2007. 102. Personal Communication 1B, 2007. 103. Personal Communication 2B, 2007. 104. Letter from Marc Draisen to Robert W. Golledge Jr., Secretary ofExecutive Office of Environmental Affairs, re: Redevelopment of Former Naval Air Station, S. Weymouth and Associated Transportation, December 11, 2006, EOEA # 11085R, DEIR. 105. South Shore Tri-Town Development Corporation, accessed July  23, 2013, http://www.ssttdc.com/news _development.htm. 106. Personal Communication 1B, 2007. 107. Final Draft Environmental Impact Review, accessed July 25, 2013, http://www .ssttdc.com/feir/feir.pdf. 108. “The Village Center Plan: The Master Plan. A 12 Year Plan for the former South Weymouth Naval Air Station,” March 7, 2005, Advocates for Rockland, Abington, Weymouth, and Hingham, http://arawh.pdesignsite.com/documents/2005SSTTDCMaster Plan.pdf, accessed July 25, 2013. 109. “Master Plan,” Southfield, accessed July 25, 2013, http://www.southfield.com /about/master-plan/. 110. “Smart Growth,” Southfield, accessed July 25, 2013, http://www.southfield .com/about/smart-growth/. 111. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, “Growing Station Areas: The Variety and Potential of Transit Oriented Development in Metro Boston,” June 2012, accessed July 25, 2013, http:// boston.uli.org /wp-content/uploads/2012/07/MAPC-TOD -Report.pdf. 112. Westwood Town Hall, accessed July 30, 2007, http://www.townhall.westwood .ma.us/index.cfm?pid=15900. 113. Letter from Marc Draisen to Ian Bowles, Secretary, Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, RE: Westwood Station, Westwood, March 29, 2007, EOEA # 13826 DEIR. 114. Follow up discussions with several MAPC staff members in May 2015. 115. Boston Metropolitan Planning Orga ni zation, “TransReport: A Newsletter of the Boston Metropolitan Planning Orga nization,” November 2006, 2, accessed October 5, 2015, http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/37432/ocm1056 1343-2006 -11.pdf ?sequence =1.

188

Notes to Pages 56–61

116. Letter from MAPC Executive Director Marc Draisen to Ian Bowles, Secretary, Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, re: Assembly Square, Somerville, April 6, 2007, EOEA # 13989 EENF. 117. Personal Communication 3B, 2007. 118. Boston Metropolitan Planning Organization, November 2006, “TransReport: A Newsletter of the Boston Metropolitan Planning Organization,” p.  2, accessed October 5, 2015, http://archives.lib.state.ma .us/ bitstream / handle/2452/37432/ocm 10561343-2006 -11.pdf ?sequence =1. 119. Personal Communication 18B, 2007.

Chapter 3 1. Colorado Land Use Commission, “A Land Program for Colorado: Report by the Colorado Land Use Commission” (Denver: Colorado Land Use Commission, 1973), xi. 2. Data from the MetroDenver data center, accessed July  23, 2007, http://www .metrodenver.org /dataCenter/Demographics/population.icm. 3. Jennifer Pitt and Carl Castillo, “Sprawl in the Denver Region,” Environmental Defense (Boulder: 2000), p. 2, accessed July 23, 2007, http://www.environmentaldefense .org /documents/1302 _ DenverSprawlReport.pdf. The Pew Center for Civic Journalism study was published in 2000, accessed August  19, 2007, http://www.pewcenter.org /doingcj/research/r_ ST2000nat1.html#sprawl. 4. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Measuring Progress: Regional Performance Measures and Indicators” (April 2005), accessed August 19, 2007, http:// www.drcog.org /documents/Measuring%20Progress%20final%204- 05.pdf, 5. 5. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Fiscally Constrained Regional Transportation Plan,” accessed July 8, 2015, http://www.co.weld.co.us/assets/96CC8464395 C69425bb6.pdf. 6. Kathleen McCormick, “Regional Thinking,” Urban Land (September 2006): 90. 7. PowerPoint presentation by Larry Mugler, DRCOG Planner, at Transplex 2007 conference, “Smart Growth Implementation,” accessed October 8, 2015, http://transplex .org /conference _ 2007/presentations/mugler.pdf. 8. McCormick, “Regional Thinking,” 88. 9. Regional Transportation District, “Central Platte Valley Light Rail Line,” accessed October 11, 2015, http://www.rtd-denver.com/FF-CentralPlatteValleyLRT.shtml. 10. Accessed August  19, 2007, http://www.metrodenver.org /DataCenter/City CountyProfiles/. 11. As quoted in Jeff rey Leib, “Voters Climb Aboard FasTracks Tax Boost—YES: 57.2% NO: 42.8% PRCTS: 88.4%.” Denver Post, November 3, 2004, B01. 12. Smart Growth, accessed July 2, 2007, http://www.smartgrowth.org /news / bystate.asp?state = CO& res =1024.

Notes to Pages 61–64

189

13. The cost of the FasTracks project was subsequently increased due to changing costs and market conditions. 14. Bill Hornby, “Metropolitan Denver Looks at the Future with 2020 Foresight,” Denver Post, March 29, 1997, accessed October 8, 2015, http://search.proquest.com .libproxy.temple.edu/docview/410542617?accountid=14270. 15. Ibid. 16. Myron Orfield, “Denver Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability” (April 2000), 10, accessed July  23, 2007, http://metroresearch.org /maps /region _maps/DV_report.pdf. 17. Personal Communication 10D, 2007. 18. Bob Ewegen, “ ‘Dr. Cog’ Wrote Rx for Denver,” Denver Post, April 12, 1999. 19. Personal Communication 13D, 2007. 20. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Directors and Staff,” accessed July 18, 2007, http://www.drcog.org /index.cfm?page =DirectorsAndStaff. 21. For more information on Colorado local land use, see Colorado Government, accessed January 6, 2016, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/dola/land-use-survey. 22. Personal Communication 16D, 2007. 23. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “DRCOG Policy Statement on State Legislative Issues for 2007,” 1, accessed August  19, 2007, http://www.drcog.org /documents/2007%20State%20policy%20statement%20web.pdf. 24. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Metro Vision 2020,” 3, accessed October 8, 2015, https://drcog.org /documents/2020_ Metro_Vision _ Plan-1.pdf. 25. Aurora councilman Bob LeGare as quoted in Renate Robey, “Staying True to a Vision at Issue DRCOG Pushes Metro Growth Plan,” September 21, 1996, Denver Post, B01. 26. Larry Mugler, DRCOG Director of Development Ser vices, as quoted in ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Metro Vision 2020,” 10, accessed January 8, 2016, https://drcog.org /documents/2020_ Metro_Vision _ Plan-1.pdf. 29. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Mile High Compact,” accessed August 19, 2007, http://www.drcog.org /index.cfm?page =MileHighCompact. 30. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Metro Vision 2035,” accessed June 26, 2013, http://imagineadamscounty.com/images/uploads/documents/2011_ MV _ 2035_ Plan _for_Web5-12-11.pdf. 31. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Planning a Great Region,” accessed July 6, 2015, https://drcog.org/planning-great-region/metro-vision/mile-high-compact. 32. Metro Mayors Caucus, accessed May 4, 2016 http://www.metromayors.org/index .aspx?NID =90. 33. Alliance for Regional Stewardship, “Alliance Leadership Forum, Meeting Notes and Summary, La Jolla California, May 2–3, 2002,” accessed July 5, 2007, http:// www.regionalstewardship.org/Documents/ForumNotes(SD).pdf. 34. Personal Communication 16D, 2007.

190

Notes to Pages 65–72

35. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “DRCOG History,” accessed July 18, 2007, http://www.drcog.org /documents/50th%20DRCOG%20history%20.pdf. 36. Denver University Study, “Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) Overview and Structure,” accessed July 6, 2007, http://www.du.edu/transportation /Resources/pdfs/Vol _ II _ Sec _VI _ D.pdf. 37. Ibid., 4. 38. In this capacity, DRCOG approved the siting of wastewater treatment facilities and recommended them for state approval, and they generally did not endorse new wastewater treatment plants that were located outside of the voluntary urban growth boundary. However, as of the end of 2010, DRCOG is no longer playing this role. 39. “The (RTD) Board shall take no action relating to the construction of a regional fi xed guideway mass transit system until such system has been approved by the designated Metropolitan Planning Orga nization. Each component part or corridor of such system shall be separately approved by the Metropolitan Planning Orga nization. Such action shall include approval of the method of fi nancing and the technology selected for such projects” (32-9-107.7 CRS). As quoted in Denver Regional Council of Governments, “The Review of RTD’s FasTracks Plan. Final Report,” April 21, 2004, accessed August 19, 2007, http://www.drcog.org /documents/SB208 _ Report _ Final _4 -21- 04.pdf. 40. Denver Regional Council of Governments’ 1993–1995 Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) met the air quality standards laid out in the Clean Air Amendment and ISTEA’s guidelines. 41. Denver University Study, “Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) Overview and Structure.” 42. Personal Communication 1D, 2007. 43. State of Colorado, “Interim Study on Development and Growth, October 4, 1999,” accessed July 7, 2007, http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg _dir/lcsstaff/1999 /comsched/99DevGrow1004sum.htm. 44. McCormick, “Regional Thinking,” 97. 45. Ibid. 46. State of Colorado, “Interim Study on Development and Growth, October 4, 1999.” 47. Personal Communication 2D, 2007. 48. Personal Communication 1D, 2007. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Personal Communication 10D, 2007. 52. Personal Communication 5D, 2007. 53. Steve Moler, “Collosal Partnership: Denver’s $1.67 Billion T-REX Project,” Public Roads 65, no. 2 (September/October 2001), accessed September 28, 2015, https:// www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/01septoct/trex.cfm. Accessed August 20, 2007, http://www.tfhrc.gov/pubrds/septoct01/trex.htm.

Notes to Pages 72–75

191

54. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, “Smart Growth Hall of Fame 2001, Ten Examples of Good Planning Decisions in Colorado,” accessed July 6, 2007, http:// www.copirg.org /sprawlaction/halloffame/CFastracks.html. 55. Keith A. Ratner and Andrew R. Goetz, “The Reshaping of Land Use and Urban Form in Denver Through Transit-oriented Development,” Cities 30 (2013): 31–46, 45, doi:10.1016/j.cities.2012.08.007. 56. Personal Communication 16D, 2007. 57. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Metro Vision 2030 Plan,” adopted January 19, 2005, p. 2, accessed August 19, 2007, http://www.drcog.org /documents /WebMetro%20Vision%202030%20plan%20final%201- 05.pdf. 58. Personal Communication 3D, 2007. 59. Personal Communication 6D, 2007. 60. As quoted in Stewart Steers, “Growth Predictions Spurs Boundary Debate,” Rocky Mountain News, July 19, 2007, accessed July 20, 2007, http://www.rockymountainnews .com/drmn/local/article/0,1299,DRMN_15_ 5636824,00.html. 61. Personal Communication 10D, 2007. 62. Personal Communication 18D, 2007. 63. Personal Communication 1D, 2007. 64. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Metro Vision 2035,” accessed January 31, 2016, https://drcog.org /planning-great-region/metro-vision-2035. 65. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Incorporation of Sustainability into Metro Vision,” accessed June 26, 2013, http://www.drcog.org/documents/Incorporation %20of%20Sustainability_ Nov_09_ 2010%20%20.pdf. 66. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Planning a Great Region,” accessed on July 6, 2015, https://drcog.org /planning-great-region /sustainable-communities -initiative62. 67. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Our Shared Vision, January 2015,” accessed October 11, 2015, http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs103/1103768220405 /archive/1119683636114.html. 68. Economic and Planning Systems, Inc., Prepared for Mile High Connects and Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Final Report. Equitable Growth Evaluation for the Denver Region,” accessed July 8, 2015, http://milehighconnects.org /wp - content /uploads /2014 /12 / Equitable - Growth -Evaluation -for -the -Denver -Region -FINAL- 09-29-14.pdf. 69. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Our Shared Vision, January 2015.” 70. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Board Update, May 20, 2015,” accessed July 8, 2015, https://drcog.org/sites/drcog/files/resources/2015mayUpdate.pdf. 71. Denver University Study, “Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) Overview and Structure,” 8. 72. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Regional Transportation Plan,” accessed June 26, 2013, http://www.drcog.org /index.cfm?page =regionaltransportatio nplan(rtp).

192

Notes to Pages 75–81

73. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “2012–2017 Transportation Improvement Program,” accessed July 6, 2015, https://drcog.org/programs/transportation -planning /transportation-improvement-program/2012-2017-transportation. 74. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “2016–2021 Transportation Improvement Program,” accessed July 6, 2015, https://drcog.org/programs/transportation -planning /transportation-improvement-program/2016 -2021-transportation. 75. Personal Communication 2D, 2007. 76. Personal Communication 7D, 2007. 77. Personal Communication 1D, 2007. 78. Personal Communication 16D, 2007. 79. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Policy on Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) Preparation, Procedures for Preparing the 2012–2017 TIP, Metro Vision Implementation Committee (DRAFT),” July 7, 2010, accessed June 26, 2013, http://www.drcog.org/agendas/DRAFT%202012-2017%20TIP%20Policy -MVIC%20Version.pdf. 80. See ibid., Appendix F and Appendix G. Up to 6 points are allocated for projects that are located in Urban Centers or Rapid Transit Centers; up to 4 points are granted if the Urban Centers near the proposed TIP project have zoning, parking, housing requirement, and capital requirements that promote mixed use, density, affordable housing, and infrastructure investments; up to 3 points are allocated for projects that are located in the UGB/A; 1 point is available if the project is located within a half-mile of Denver International Airport; and up to 4 points are given to projects located in strategic corridors identified by Metro Vision. An additional 8 points are allocated to projects in communities that have adopted components of Metro Vision: (1) 1 point for adopting Metro Vision community design components; (2) 1 point for adopting alternative mode plans for transportation; (3) 2 points for signing the Mile High Compact; (4) up to 4 points for communities that made a PM10 (particulate matter less than 10 microns in size) conformity commitment if they have been asked to do so; and (5) up to 4 points for communities that were not asked to make PM10 reductions for projects that would promote reductions. 81. City of Louisville, “City Council Meetings,” August 17, 1999, accessed July 20, 2007, http://www.ci.louisville.co.us/Council/1999Minutes/17August1999.htm. 82. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Metro Vision 2020,” 40, accessed July 2, 2007, http://www.drcog.org /documents/2020_ Metro_Vision _ Plan-1.pdf. 83. Jan Schenk, “How Are Local Governments Planning for Growth?” Denver Post, January 6, 2000, H01; Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Mile High Compact,” accessed July 6, 2015, http://archive.drcog.org /index.cfm?page =MileHigh Compact88. 84. City of Denver, “Denver Comprehensive Plan 2000: Metropolitan Cooperation,” 211, accessed July 2007, http://www.denvergov.org/Portals/146/documents/PLAN 2000/METCOOP.pdf.

Notes to Pages 81–85

193

85. Ibid., 215. 86. City of Longmont, “Longmont Area Comprehensive Plan (adopted August 26, 2003),” p. 13-1, accessed July 20, 2007, http://www.ci.longmont.co.us/planning / lacp /pdfs/government.pdf. 87. City of Lone Tree, “Comprehensive Plan, City of Lone Tree, Approved by City Council on April 17, 2007,” pp. 2–6, accessed July 20, 2007, http://www.cityoflonetree.com /DocumentView.asp?DID =146. 88. “Douglas County 2020 Comprehensive Master Plan,” May 2001, p. 4-1, accessed August 19, 2007, http://www.douglas.co.us/CMP2030/Existing _ 2020_CMP.html. 89. Ibid., 5–35. 90. Ibid., 10–16. 91. Personal Communication 10D, 2007. 92. Personal Communication 18D, 2007. 93. Personal Communication 7D, 2007. 94. Personal Communication 13D, 2007. 95. As quoted in Chuck Plunkett, “Growth Plan Fails to Limit Large-lot Sprawl ‘Exurb’ Boom Not Addressed,” Denver Post, December 15, 2004, A01. 96. Personal Communication 3D, 2007. 97. Personal Communication 1D, 2007. 98. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Metro Vision Growth and Development Supplement” (adopted on January 18, 2012), accessed July 6, 2015, https://drcog .org/sites/drcog/fi les/resources/MV2035GDS _ Approved _ Jan18 _ 2012.pdf. 99. Ibid., 4. 100. Personal Communication 1D, 2007. 101. Personal Communication 3D, 2007. 102. As quoted in Daily Staff Report, “Front Range Officials Debate Metro-Area Growth Boundaries,” July 28, 2007, Vail Daily, accessed October 8, 2015, http://www .vaildaily.com/article/20070728/NATIONAL01/107280078. 103. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “A History of the Development and Expansion of the DRCOG’s Urban Growth Boundary/Area,” May 2008, accessed January 31, 2016, https://drcog.org /documents/MVShortCourse2009_ Item09_UGBA History_ May2008.pdf 104. Ibid., 3–7. 105. Personal Communication 4D, 2007. 106. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Denver Metro Vision 2035 Plan,” p. 17, accessed August 29, 2015, https://drcog.org /sites/drcog /fi les/resources/2011%20 MV%202035%20Plan%20for%20Web5-12-11_0.pdf. 107. Denver Regional Council of Government, “Chapter 4: Large Lot Development,” accessed October 8, 2015, https://drcog.org /documents/mvgds _ adoptedaug08 _ch4largelot.pdf. 108. Personal Communication 7D, 2007.

194

Notes to Pages 85–87

109. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “2007 Annual Report,” 3, accessed on October  14, 2015, https://drcog.org/sites/drcog/files/resources/2007%20DRCOG %20Annual%20Report.pdf. 110. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “2009 Annual Report,” accessed October 14, 2015, https://drcog.org /sites/drcog /fi les/resources/2009%20DRCOG%20 Annual%20Report.pdf. 111. Arapahoe County, “Lowry Range Sub Area Plan,” January 21, 2007, accessed January  21, 2007, http://www.co.arapahoe.co.us/Departments/PW/Lowry_ Range _ Final.pdf. 112. Todd Hartmann, “State Picks Parcel for 3,000 Acres: Critics Saying Parcel Outside of Aurora Is Getting ‘Steamrolled,” Rocky Mountain News, December 21, 2006, accessed July  28, 2007, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/ local/article /0,1299,DRMN_15_ 5227866,00.html; John Rebchook, “Development Plan OK’d for Lowry Range,” Rocky Mountain News, June 15, 2007, accessed June 28, 2007, http:// www . rockymountainnews . com /drmn /real _ estate /article / 0,1299,DRMN _ 414 _ 5601871,00.html. 113. Shaun Boyd, “State Land Board OKs Development the Lowry Range,” CBS-4, Denver, June 25, 2007, accessed July 4, 2007, http://cbs4denver.com/seenon/local _ story _176202210.html. 114. Personal Communication 1D, 2007. 115. As quoted in Carlos Illescas, “Lowry Project Draws Fire: Aurora Concerned About Impacts from Massive Redevelopment of Former Bomb Range,” Denver Post, July 10, 2007, p. B01, accessed January 8, 2016, http://www.denverpost.com/newshead lines/ci _ 6336408. 116. Ibid. 117. As quoted in Boyd, “State Land Board Oks Development the Lowry Range.” 118. Personal Communication 17D, 2007. 119. John Rebchook, “Lowry Range Bombing Range Process Criticized,” Rocky Mountain News, November 9, 2006, accessed June 28, 2007, http://www.rocky mountainnews.com/drmn/real _estate/article/0,1299,DRMN_414 _ 5131535,00.html. 120. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “The Lowry Range and State Land Board Proposal. DRCOG Issues Paper,” May 2007, accessed June 28, 2007, http:// www.drcog.org /documents/IssuesPaperTheLowryRange5- 07.pdf. 121. PowerPoint Presentation by Arapahoe County to the DRCOG Board on August 15, 2007, accessed August 19, 2007, http://www.drcog.org /documents/Lowry%20 Range%20-%20Arapahoe%20County.PDF. 122. As quoted in Cathy Proctor, “DRCOG Asked to Push Borderline,” Denver Business Journal, October  14, 2007, accessed June  25, 2013, http://www.bizjournals .com/denver/stories/2007/10/15/story1.html?page = all. 123. Cathy Proctor, “Aurora to Support Expansion of Denver’s Boundary,” October  17, 2007, Denver Post, accessed October  14, 2015, http://www.bizjournals.com /denver/stories/2007/10/15/daily33.html.

Notes to Pages 87–91

195

124. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Agenda, Board of Directors,” September 21, 2011, accessed June 23, 2013, http://www.drcog.org /agendas/Board%20 Agenda%2009-21-2011%20comment%20enabled.pdf. 125. Susan Thorton, “Lowry Range Development Underway,” Denver Post, July 3, 2008. 126. Denver Business Journal, “Lend Lease Quits Lowry Range Project,” January 9, 2009, accessed June 25, 2013, http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2009/01 /05/daily54.html?page = all. 127. Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners, “Lowry Range: Integrated Resource Management Plan,” April 2012, 12, accessed October 8, 2015, http://trustlands .state.co.us/Projects/Stewardship/Documents/CORRECTED%20IRMP%202012 _ 08 _08.pdf. 128. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Presentation of State Land Board to MVIC,” accessed June  26, 2013, http://www.drcog.org /documents/DRCOG%20 State%20Land%20Board%20Intro%20with%20Lowry%20PAT%20C1.pdf. 129. Cathy Proctor, “Colorado Land Board OKs Conoco Phillips Deal on Lowry Range,” Denver Business Journal, March 2, 2012, accessed October 8, 2015, http://www .bizjournals.com/denver/news/2012/03/02/state-land-board-oks-conocophillips-deal .html. 130. John Tomas, “Coalition Forms to Push Back Drillers from Oil and Gas Loving Denver,” Colorado Independent, accessed January  24, 2016, http://www.colorado independent .com /151640/coalition-forms -to -push-back-drillers -from- oil-and-gas -loving-denver. 131. Arapahoe County, “Arapahoe County Board Summary Report, December 15, 2014, through Jan Yeckes, from Julio Iturreria, Long Range Planning Manager, and Larry Mugler, Planner. Subject: DRCOG UGB/A Discussion,” accessed October 8, 2015, http://www.co.arapahoe.co.us/AgendaCenter/ ViewFile/Agenda /12162014 - 481 ?packet = true. 132. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Board Update,” May  20, 2015, accessed September 29, 2015, https://drcog.org /sites/drcog /fi les/resources/2015 mayUpdate.pdf. 133. Personal Communication 15D, 2007. 134. Personal Communication 7D, 2007. 135. Personal Communication 6D, 2007. 136. Personal Communication 4D, 2007. 137. Personal Communication 16D, 2007. 138. Personal Communication 6D, 2007. 139. DRCOG is not the only forum for local elected officials. The Denver Metro Mayors Caucus (MMC), an initiative of Civic Results, a Denver-based not-for-profit organization, also brings together local elected mayors to discuss regional issues. In some ways, it presents direct competition to DRCOG because many of the mayors who serve on DRCOG also serve on the MMC. On the other hand, since the MMC is

196

Notes to Pages 91–95

working toward many of the same goals as DRCOG, the MMC has been able to help advance a regional agenda. The MMC and DRCOG partnered on the Mile High Compact. While DRCOG relies on its authority as the MPO to bring local elected officials to the table, the MMC is a vehicle for local mayors who want to see more regional cooperation to come together and act politically. Although DRCOG is often reluctant to make political stands, the MMC can. In this sense, MMC complements the work of DRCOG. 140. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Policy Statement on Legislative Issues for 2007,” accessed August 19, 2007, http://www.drcog.com/documents/2007 %20State%20policy%20statement%20web.pdf. 141. Personal Communication 7D, 2007. 142. Ibid. 143. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “DRCOG Regional Report” (March 2004), 1, accessed July 21, 2007,http://www.drcog.org/documents/RR%203-04.pdf. 144. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Transportation Equity Funding,” accessed August 19, 2007, http://www.drcog.com/index.cfm?page=TransportationFu ndingEquity. 145. Personal Communication 16D, 2007. 146. Personal Communication 6D, 2007. 147. Personal Communication 10D, 2007. 148. Personal Communication 18D, 2007. 149. Denver Regional Council of Governments, accessed July 8, 2015, https://drcog .org /planning - great-region /implementing -metro -vision /station - area - and -urban -center-planning-funds. 150. Personal Communication 10D, 2007. 151. Personal Communication 17D, 2007. 152. Personal Communication 18D, 2007. 153. Personal Communication 10D, 2007. 154. Press Release, June 29, 2004, accessed July 4, 2007, http://www.destination highpoint.com/PDFs/HighPointGeneralPressRelease.pdf. 155. Accessed July 4, 2007, http://www.destinationhighpoint.com/Residential/ and http://www.destinationhighpoint.com/Retail/. 156. Highpoint, Frequently Asked Questions, accessed January 31, 2016, http:// www.highpointcolorado.com/ business/faq.htm. 157. As quoted in Erin Johansen, “Denver, Aurora Partnership Sets New Standard,” Denver Business Journal, May  10, 2004, accessed July 4, 2007, http://www .destinationhighpoint.com/PDFs/PC _ 5.7.04 _ DBJweb.pdf . 158. Jeremy Meyer, “Adams County Demands That Denver Return Land Annexed in 1988 for DIA,” Denver Post, June 7, 2013, accessed June  26, 2013, http://www .denverpost.com/ breakingnews/ci _ 23413723/adams-county-demands-denver-return -land-annexed-1988?source = pkg. 159. Yesenia Robles, “Denver Proposes Revenue Sharing Plan for Development on Airport Land,” Denver Post, May 31, 2013, accessed June 26, 2013, http://www.denverpost

Notes to Pages 95–102

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.com/breakingnews/ci_ 23365742/denver-proposes-revenue-sharing-plan-development -airport-land?source=pkg. For a link to the letter, see http://extras.mnginteractive.com /live/media/site36/2013/0501/20130501_073729_LettertoDenverMay2013.pdf. 160. Meyer, “Adams County Demands.” 161. As quoted in Jeremy Meyer, “Aurora Mayor Steve Hogan Blasts Denver’s DIA Revenue Sharing Plan,” Denver Post, June 5, 2013, accessed June 26, 2013, http://www .denverpost . com / breakingnews /ci _ 23398528 /aurora -mayor - steve -hogan - blasts -denvers-dia-revenue?source = pkg. 162. Jon Murray and Carlos Illescas, “DIA Growth Deal: Denver Would Pay Neighbors $10 million, Split Tax Proceeds,” Denver Post, June 3, 2015, accessed July 8, 2015, http://www.denverpost .com /news/ci _ 28243627/dia-growth-deal-denver-would-pay -neighbors-10m. 163. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Regional Snapshot: Metro Vision 2035 Goals,” accessed January 31, 2016, https://drcog.org /sites/drcog /fi les/resources /Regional%20Snapshot%20 -%20Metro%20Vision%202035%20Goals.pdf. 164. Ibid. 165. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Metro Vision 2035 Goals and Status,” accessed July 10, 2015, https://drcog.org/documents/Metro%20Vision%202035%20 Goals%20Status _ Revised%2002 _09_12.pdf. 166. Ibid. 167. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “Regional Snapshot: Metro Vision 2035 Goals.” 168. Denver Regional Council of Governments, “2010 Annual Report on Traffic Congestion in the Denver Region,” p. 9, accessed July 10, 2015, https://drcog.org/sites /drcog /fi les/resources/2010%20Annual%20Report%20on%20Traffic%20Congestion .pdf. 169. Ibid.

Chapter 4 1. Metro, “Regional Leadership,” accessed February 3, 2016, http://www.oregon metro.gov/regional-leadership. 2. Myron Orfield, Portland Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability. A Report to the Coalition for a Livable Future, July 1998, p. 1. 3. Of course, Portland is also much more racially diverse today than it used to be. There are other parts of the country with similar demographics, but it is interesting to hear how Portland is often considered to be different. Many planning academics seem to think Portland is an anomaly. 4. David Bragdon, “Case Study in Regional Planning: Portland’s Metro Council,” SPUR Newsletter, September 2003, 1, accessed August  18, 2015, http://www .spur.org /.

198

Notes to Pages 102–106

5. Arthur C. Nelson, “Portland: The Metropolitan Umbrella,” in Regional Politics: America in a Post-City Age, ed. H. V. Savitch and Ronald Vogel (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996), 253–268, 254. 6. Robert Bruegmann, Sprawl: A Compact History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 207. 7. Samuel  R. Staley and Gerard  C.S. Mildner, “Urban Growth Boundaries and Housing Affordability: Lessons from Portland,” Reason Public Policy Institute Policy Brief 11 (October 1999), accessed August 27, 2015, http://reason.org /files/65590101cc8 2afbe097e264f97deb13b.pdf. 8. Philip Langdon, New Urban News, March 2005, accessed April 17, 2007, http:// www.newurbannews.com/PortlandMar05.html. 9. Anthony Downs, “Have Housing Prices Risen Faster in Portland Than Elsewhere?” Housing Policy Debate 13, no. 1 (2002): 7–31. 10. Bruegmann, Sprawl, 210. 11. Oregon State Government, accessed August 17, 2007, http://www.oregon.gov /LCD/MEASURE37/index.shtml. 12. Leonard Gilroy, “Statewide Regulatory Takings Reform: Exporting Oregon’s Measure 37 to Other States,” Reason Policy Institute, Study 343, Executive Summary, April 2006, accessed August 17, 2007, http://www.reason.org /ps343.pdf. 13. Department of Land Conservation and Development, “Measure 49 Guide,” accessed February 16, 2016, http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/MEASURE49/docs/general/m49 _ guide.pdf. 14. Carl Abbott, “The Portland Region: Where City and Suburbs Talk to Each Other—And Often Agree,” Housing Policy Debate 8, no. 1 (1997): 11–51, 42. 15. Ibid., 41. 16. Carl Abbott and Margery Post Abbott, “Abbott: A History of Metro, May 1991,” accessed January  20, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/sites/default /fi les/abbott-a _ history_of_ metro_ may_1991.pdf. This is a very good history of the region that goes into much more detail. 17. Abbott, “The Portland Region,” 43–44. 18. Nelson, “The Metropolitan Umbrella,” 259. 19. Abbott and Post Abbott, “Abbott: A History of Metro, May 1991.” 20. Ibid. 21. Nelson, “The Metropolitan Umbrella,” 259. 22. Ibid., 261. 23. Portland communities also recognized the importance of having a regional voice when in 1973 they fought against the proposed Mt. Hood Freeway, a five-mile highway that would have cut through heart of Portland. In 1975, they were able to cancel plans for the Mt. Hood Freeway and use the money for other transportation projects, in par ticu lar, the light rail project. For more information, see TriMet, “Max: A Transportation Transformation,” accessed February 3, 2016, https://trimet.org /pdfs /publications/MAX _ A _Transportation _Transformation.pdf.

Notes to Pages 106–110

199

24. Metro, accessed August  17, 2007, http://www.metro-region.org /article.cfm ?ArticleID =277. 25. Nelson, “The Metropolitan Umbrella,” 262. 26. Abbott and Post Abbott, “Abbott: A History of Metro, May 1991.” 27. Nelson, “The Metropolitan Umbrella,” 262. 28. Personal Communication 9P, 2006. 29. The charter reads: “We, the people of the Portland area metropolitan ser vice district, in order to establish an elected, visible and accountable regional government that is responsive to the citizens of the region and works cooperatively with our local governments; that undertakes, as its most impor tant ser vice, planning and policy making to preserve and enhance the quality of life and the environment for ourselves and future generations; and that provides regional ser vices needed and desired by the citizens in an efficient and effective manner, do ordain this charter for the Portland area metropolitan ser vice district, to be known as Metro.” Quoted from Metro, accessed April 16, 2007, http://www.metro-region.org /article.cfm?ArticleID = 629. 30. Personal Communication 9P, 2006. 31. Metro, accessed April  16, 2007, http://www.metro-region.org /article.cfm ?ArticleID = 629. 32. Metro, “The Nature of 2040: The Region’s 50-Year Plan for Managing Growth,” accessed February 3, 2016, http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article =1033&context = oscdl _ metro, 3. 33. The Regional Framework Plan was amended in 2005, 2011, and in 2014 in response to the Climate Smart Strategy. See Metro, Regional Framework Plan, accessed February 3, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/regional-framework-plan. 34. Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development, “History of Oregon’s Land Use Planning,” accessed January  20, 2016, http://www.oregon.gov/ lcd /pages/history.aspx. 35. Quotation from Governor McCall’s opening address to the 1973 legislature, January 8, 1973; Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development, “History of Oregon’s Land Use Planning,” accessed January 20, 2016, http://www.oregon .gov/LCD/pages/history.aspx. 36. Ibid. 37. Robert Liberty, “Give and Take Over Measure 37: Could Metro Reconcile Compensation for Reductions in Value with a Regional Plan for Compact Urban Growth and Preserving Farmland,” Environmental Law 36 (2006): 191, accessed August 17, 2007, http://www.lclark.edu/org /envtl/objects/36 -1_ liberty.pdf. 38. Department of Land Conservation and Development, “Goals Appendix,” accessed April 16, 2007, http://www.lcd .state.or.us/ LCD/docs/goals/goalsappendix .pdf. 39. Oregon Statewide Land Use Planning Program, Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development, Brochure, accessed January  20, 2016, http://www .oregon.gov/LCD/docs/publications/ brochure.pdf

200

Notes to Pages 111–116

40. Metro, Regional Framework Plan, 2011 Update, accessed February 3, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/sites/default /fi les/01132011_ regional _ framework _ plan _ 2011_update _table _of_contents _introduction _0.pdf. 41. Ibid. 42. Personal Communication 10P, 2006. 43. Ibid. 44. Here it is impor tant to note that the City of Vancouver to the north of Portland is within the Portland metropolitan statistical area (MSA), but because it is in the State of Washington, Metro does not have authority over its development. The City of Vancouver does not have an urban growth boundary. 45. Metro, accessed August  17, 2007, http://www.metro-region.org /article.cfm ?articleid=211. 46. Ibid. Metro’s property tax levy goes toward operation of the Metro’s Oregon Zoo. In addition, Metro has asked voters to fund limited-time measures such as the Open Space Acquisition Bond fund and the construction of the Portland Convention Center. The Construction Excise Tax passed in 2006 is a tax charge on new construction in the region that is used to raise money for planning of areas brought into the UGB. 47. Personal Communication 9P, 2006. 48. For information on the structure of the Council, see Metro, “Metro Council,” accessed January  25, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/regional-leadership/metro -council. 49. Personal Communication 13P, 2006. 50. Ethan Seltzer, “It’s Not an Experiment,” in The Portland Edge: Challenges and Successes in Growing Communities, ed. Connie Ozawa (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2004), 35–60, 41. 51. The study of the expansion of the streetcar conducted by Metro has been important to inner-ring suburbs like Lake Oswego. 52. Metro, “Community Planning and Development Grants,” accessed February 3, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/tools-partners/grants-and-resources/community -planning-and-development-grants. 53. Several officials mentioned this as an example where Metro changed course, moving from a regulatory to a voluntary approach. 54. Metro, accessed June  12, 2007, http://www.metro-region.org /article.cfm ?articleid=12285. 55. Metro, “Transit-Oriented Development Program, 2014 Annual Report,” accessed February 3, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/sites/default/files/TOD-program -AnnualReport-2014.pdf. 56. Center for Transit- Oriented Development, “Transit- Oriented Development Strategic Plan Prepared for Metro,” 2011, accessed June 13, 2013, http://ctod.org /pdfs /2011PortlandTODweb.pdf. 57. Personal Communication 17P, 2006.

Notes to Pages 116–122

201

58. Metro, “Get Centered! Gresham, March 31, 2005, Center for Advanced Learning Case Study Presentation,” accessed August 18, 2007, www.metro-region.org/library _docs/ land_use/greshamsummary.doc. 59. Personal Communication 17P, 2006. 60. Center for Transit-Oriented Development, “Transit-Oriented Development Strategic Plan,” 9. 61. Ibid., 10. 62. Ibid., 12. For more information about this grant, see HUD, “Community Challenge Grants,” accessed February 1, 2016, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD ?src = /program _ offices /economic _ resilience / HUD -DOT_Community_Challenge _Grants. 63. For more information, see TriMet, “Max: A Transportation Transformation,” accessed February 3, 2016, https://trimet.org /pdfs/publications/MAX _ A_Transpor tation _Transformation.pdf. 64. Personal Communication 9P, 2006. 65. Ibid. 66. Metro, Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation Bylaws, accessed April 17, 2007, http://www.metro-region.org /library_docs/trans/jpact_bylaws.pdf. 67. Metro, Transportation Policy Advisory Committee, accessed February 3, 2016, http:// www . oregonmetro . gov /regional - leadership /metro - advisory - committees /transportation-policy-alternatives-committee. 68. Personal Communication 15P, 2006. 69. Metro, “Regional Transportation Plan,” accessed February 3, 2016, http://www .oregonmetro.gov/regional-transportation-plan. 70. Metro, “2015–2018 Metropolitan Transportation Improvement Program,” December 2014, 34, accessed February 7, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/sites/default /fi les/mtip-pubdraft _fy15-18 _pb032014.pdf. 71. Metro, accessed April  16, 2007, http://www.metro-region.org /article.cfm ?articleid=3814. 72. Metro, accessed June 13, 2013, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/index.cfm/go/ by .web/id=19681. 73. Metro, “Regional Flexible Funding for Transportation Projects,” accessed February 3, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/public-projects/regional-flexible-funding -transportation-projects. 74. Metro, accessed June 13, 2013, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/index.cfm/go/ by .web/id=19681. 75. Metro, “Climate Smart Strategy,” accessed February 3, 2016, http://www .oregonmetro.gov/climate-smart-strategy. 76. Personal Communication 11P, 2006. 77. Personal Communication 10P, 2006. 78. Metro, accessed March  2, 2007, http://www.metro-region.org /article.cfm ?articleid= 8878.

202

Notes to Pages 123–126

79. Personal Communication 7P, 2006. 80. Personal Communication 9P, 2006. 81. Ibid. 82. Personal Communication 3P, 2006. 83. Personal Communication 16P, 2006. 84. Several interviewees provided the same example of Cornelius. 85. Personal Communication 10P, 2006. 86. Personal Communication 14P, 2006. 87. Personal Communication 11P, 2006. 88. Metro, “The Nature of 2040: The Region’s 50-Year Plan for Managing Growth,” 3. 89. Ibid., 5. 90. For more information about visioning processes, see John Parr, “The Chattanooga Process: A City’s Vision Is Realized,” in The Consensus Building Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement, ed. Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKearnan, and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999). 91. Metro, “The Nature of 2040: The Region’s 50-Year Plan for Managing Growth,” 5. 92. Quoted from Metro, “Chapter 3.07, Urban Growth Management Functional Plan,” accessed February 1, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/sites/default/fi les / 307%20Eff%2009102014%20%20Maps%20Title%204%20%206%20%2014%20 maps%20final.pdf. 93. Ibid. 94. G. B. Arrington Jr., “Beyond the Field of Dreams: Light Rail and Growth Management in Portland,” Tri-Met Report (September 1996): 26, accessed August 18, 2007, http://trimet.org /pdfs/publications/ beyonddreams.pdf. 95. Multnomah County, “Metro Measure No. 26-11,” accessed February 3, 2016, https://multco.us/elections/metro-measure-no-26 -11. 96. Multnomah County, “Measure 26-29,” accessed February 3, 2016, https:// multco.us/elections/may-21-2002-measure-26 -29. 97. Personal Communication 11P, 2006. 98. Personal Communication 16P, 2006. 99. Personal Communication 15P, 2006. 100. Tom Hughes, “Metro Charter Measure Leaves Neighborhood Planning to Cities: Guest Opinion,” Oregonlive.com, October 30, 2014, accessed July 15, 2015, http:// www.oregonlive .com /opinion /index .ssf /2014 /10/metro _ charter_ measure _ leaves _ n .html. 101. Metro, “Land Use. Exhibit B,” accessed August  20, 2007. http://www .metroregion.org /library_docs/land _use/exhibit _b.pdf. 102. Personal Communication 1P, 2006.

Notes to Pages 126–132

203

103. The text from the Court of Appeals from the State of Oregon, filed July 6, 2005: “Because the ordinances permit Metro to perform the same functions that the statutes allocate to cities, Hillsboro contends, the ordinances must give way. The flaw in this logic is apparent. Metro’s ordinances themselves are authorized by statute. Thus, Metro’s ordinance creating a plan or imposing a zoning regulation that confl icts with a city’s plan or regulation, pursuant to ORS 268.390(5), cannot be preempted by Hillsboro’s statutory authority to perform the same functions. Both Metro and Hillsboro derive their authority from statute, but the statute authorizing Metro’s authority explicitly states that Metro has the authority to bring cities like Hillsboro into compliance”; as quoted in http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/A127336.htm, accessed August 20, 2007. 104. Personal Communication 1P, 2006. 105. Metro, accessed June 13, 2013, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/index.cfm/go/by .web/id/37518. 106. Letter to Honorable John Kitzhaber, October 17, 2011, accessed June 13, 2013, http://library.oregonmetro.gov/editor/cornelius-letter-kitzhaber.pdf. 107. As quoted in Nick Christensen, “Cities Frustrated by Limited UGB Expansion; Cornelius Asks Governor to Help,” Metro News, October  19, 2011, accessed June  13, 2013, http://news.oregonmetro.gov/1/post.cfm/cities-frustrated-by-limited-ugb -expansion-cornelius-asks-governor-to-help. 108. Metro, “Urban Growth Management Functional Plan Annual Compliance Report,” December 23, 2004, revised August 31, 2005, September 26, 2005, 1. 109. Metro, 2012 Compliance Report: Metro Code Chapter 3.07 Urban Growth Management Functional Plan and Metro Code Chapter 3.08 Regional Transportation Functional Plan, March 2013, accessed July 7, 2015, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/sites /default/fi les/032013_ 2012 _ affordable_ housing _compliance_report.pdf. Metro, “2014 Compliance Report,” March 2015, accessed January 25, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro .gov/sites/default/fi les/2014%20Compliance%20Report%20FINAL .pdf. 110. Personal Communication 11P, 2006. 111. Personal Communication 10P, 2006. 112. Personal Communication 13P, 2006. 113. Personal Communication 14P, 2006. 114. Personal Communication 15P, 2006. 115. Personal Communication 3P, 2006. 116. Personal Communication 9P, 2006. 117. Personal Communication 10P, 2006. 118. Personal Communication 14P, 2006. 119. Personal Communication 13P, 2006. 120. Metro, accessed August 17, 2007, http://www.metro-region.org /article.cfm ?ArticleID =266. 121. Personal Communication 13P, 2006.

204

Notes to Pages 133–137

122. U.S. Census, “CensusViewer,” accessed February 7, 2016, http://censusviewer .com/city/OR /Tualatin. 123. Personal Communication 16P, 2006. 124. Hillsboro Economic Development Department, accessed September 9, 2007, http://www.ci.hillsboro.or.us/EconomicDevelopment/Business.aspx. 125. Personal Communication 12P, 2006. 126. Metro Planning Department, Exhibit A to Resolution No. 04-3513, “2004 Performance Measures Report: An Evaluation of 2040 Growth Management Policies and Implementation” (December 2004), 19, 9, accessed June 26, 2007, http://www.metro -region.org /library_docs/land_use/full_2004_perf_meas_report_.pdf. 127. Personal Communication 16P, 2006. 128. The Eco Tipping Points Project, “USA-Oregon (Portland)-Sustainable City,” February 16, 2016, http://www.ecotippingpoints.org/our-stories/indepth/usa-portland -sustainable-regional-planning.html. 129. Personal Communication 14P, 2006. 130. Personal Communication 15P, 2006. 131. Estimate by Portland consultant Jeff Tashman. Dennis McCarthy, “The Dual for Damascus: ‘Green System’ Plan Draws Ire of Landowners,” The Oregonian, March 31, 2006, Local News, A1. 132. Nick Bjork, “Damascus Citizen Group Raises Stakes in Fight Against Comprehensive Plan,” Daily Journal of Commerce (Oregon), July 8, 2011, accessed June 25, 2013, http://djcoregon.com/news/2011/07/08/damascus-citizens-group-raises-stakes -in-fight-against-comprehensive-plan/. 133. For more information, see http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/pages/damascus _ acknowledgement.aspx. 134. Heather Steeves, “Damascus Residents Take First Steps to Disincorporation,” Oregon Live, December 6, 2012, accessed June 25, 2013, http://www.oregonlive.com /happy-valley/index.ssf/2012/12/damascus _residents _take _ first.html. 135. Heather Steeves, “Damascus City Manager Resigns Under Pressure from City Council,” Oregon Live, May 24, 2013, accessed June 19, 2013, http://www.oregonlive .com/happy-valley/index.ssf/2013/05/damascus _city_ manager_resigns.html. 136. Steeves, “Damascus Residents Take First Steps to Disincorporation.” 137. Metro, “2014 Urban Growth Report. Revised Draft , September 2014,” 22, accessed July  15, 2015, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/sites/default /fi les/2014 -urban -growth-report-Revised-Draft-FINAL .pdf. 138. Ibid. 139. Personal Communication 13P, 2006. 140. Metro, “Metro Construction Excise Tax,” accessed February 15, 2016, http:// www.oregonmetro.gov/metro-construction-excise-tax. The tax first went into effect in 2006 and was reauthorized in 2009 and 2014. 141. Metro, accessed June  13, 2013, http:// library.oregonmetro.gov/fi les//cet _transmittal _q2 _fy_ 2012-13.pdf.

Notes to Pages 137–139

205

142. Metro, “Urban and Rural Reserves,” accessed February 7, 2016, http://www .oregonmetro.gov/urban-and-rural-reserves. 143. For more information about the criteria used, see Department of Land Conservation and Development, “Division 27, Urban and Rural Reserves in the Portland Metropolitan Area,” accessed February 7, 2016, http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/pages /rules/oars _ 600/oar_ 660/660_027.html. 144. Washington County, “Urban and Rural Reserves,” accessed February 3, 2016, http://www.co.washington.or.us/reserves/. 145. Nick Christensen, “Metro Council Opens Debate on Stafford Urban Reserves, but French Prairie Takes Center Stage,” Metro News, October 12, 2015, accessed February 7, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/news/metro-council-opens-debate -stafford-urban-reserves-french-prairie-takes-center-stage. 146. Metro, “2014 Urban Growth Report,” 8. 147. Ibid. 148. Metro, “2004 Performance Measures Report,” 4. Acres brought into the UGB: 1998, approximately 3,500 acres; 1999, approximately 380 acres; 2002, approximately 18,638 acres; and 2004, approximately 1,940 acres. 149. Metro, accessed June 13, 2013, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/index.cfm/go/by .web/id=277. 150. However, according to Orfield, in Portland Metropolitics, critics of the Portland model argue that there should be no need to expand the UGB because when the UGB was established, it was drawn very large; its initial designation was described as a “big skirt.” He also notes that much of the development that was incorporated into the UGB was already developed at low densities, so the challenge is trying to densify already existing neighborhoods. 151. Metro, “2014 Urban Growth Report,” 8. 152. Metro, “2004 Per for mance Mea sures Report: An Evaluation of 2040 Growth Management Policies and Implementation,” December 2004, p. 9, accessed August 29, 2015, http:// library.oregonmetro.gov/fi les/full _ 2004 _ perf _ meas _ report _.pdf. 153. Metro, “2010 Compliance Report. Metro Code Chapter 3.07 Urban Growth Management Functional Plan,” accessed June 20, 2013, http://library.oregonmetro.gov /fi les//070611_compliance _report.pdf. 154. Metro, “2014 Urban Growth Report,” 9. 155. Metro, “Metro Travel Behav ior Survey, 2011,” accessed June 21, 2013, http:// library.oregonmetro.gov/fi les//hhtravelsurvey_ final.pdf. 156. Arrington, “Beyond the Field of Dreams.” 157. Metro, “2004 Performance Measures Report,” 69. 158. Metro, “2014 Climate Smart Strategy for the Portland Metropolitan Region,” accessed February 3, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/sites/default /fi les/Climate SmartStrategy-FinalVersion-2014.PDF. 159. Metro, “2004 Performance Measures Report,” 9.

206

Notes to Pages 139–140

160. Willamette Week, “Mayors Urge Metro to Delay Planned Bond Measure,” December 6, 2012, accessed June 21, 2013, http://www.wweek.com/portland/ blog-29532 -mayors _urge _metro_to_delay_planned _may_bond _measur.html. 161. Metro, “Natural Areas Bond Measures and Levy,” accessed July  15, 2015, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/public-projects/natural-areas-bond-measures-and-levy /levy. 162. Metro, “Parks and Nature Investment,” accessed February 3, 2016, http://www .oregonmetro.gov/public-projects/parks-and-nature-investments/shaping-future. 163. Metro, “2010 Compliance Report. Metro Code Chapter 3.07 Urban Growth Management Functional Plan,” June 2011, 6, accessed June  20, 2013, http://library .oregonmetro.gov/fi les//070611_compliance _report.pdf. 164. Greater Portland Pulse, Housing Cost Burden, accessed June 21, 2013, http:// www.portlandpulse.org /housing _cost _burden. 165. Metro, “Opportunities and Challenges for Equitable Housing,” 13, January 2016, accessed February 3, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/sites/default /fi les /EquitableHousingReport-20160122.pdf. 166. According to Robert Liberty, “The Metropolitan Housing Rule required nineteen of the twenty-four cities, as well as the unincorporated parts of the three counties inside the metropolitan urban growth boundary, to meet combined density targets (namely densities resulting from averaging single-family and multifamily housing) for new construction of six, eight, or ten units per acre. The five cities not required to meet a target density for new residential development were exempted because they had populations of less than 2500.” See “Abolishing Exclusionary Zoning: A Natural Policy Alliance for Environmentalists and Affordable Housing Advocates,” accessed August 26, 2015, http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/law/lawreviews/journals / bcealr/30_ 3/07_ FMS.htm. 167. Robert Liberty, Director, 1000 Friends of Oregon, “Overview and Accomplishments of the Oregon Metro Portland Planning Programs” (September 1997), accessed August 26, 2015, http://www.landwatch.org/pages/perspectives/accomplishments.htm. 168. Ibid. 169. Metro, “Regional Affordable Housing Strategy, Chapter  1, June 2000,” accessed June 21, 2013, http://library.oregonmetro.gov/fi les/fchapterone.pdf. 170. Metro, “Summary of 2004 Compliance of Metro Urban Growth Management Functional Plan Title 7 (Affordable Housing), in Attachment 1: Title 7 (Affordable Housing) Component of the 2004 Annual Compliance Report of the Urban Growth Management Functional Plan” (Metro, December  14, 2004, revised September  26, 2005), 1. 171. Brad Schmidt, “Low-Cost Housing Shut Out amid Riches of Lake Oswego and West Linn: Locked Out, Part 3,” Oregon Live, June 5, 2013, accessed June 20, 2013, http://www.oregonlive .com /portland /index .ssf /2012/06/amid _ abundance _ of _ lake _oswego.html.

Notes to Pages 140–172

207

172. Metro, “Equity Baseline Report, Part 1: A Framework for Regional Equity,” January 2015, accessed February 3, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/sites/default /fi les/Equity%20Framework%20Report _ final%20012715small.pdf, 9. 173. Jennifer Park, “Metro Looks to Unite a Regional Vision for Affordable Housing with New Equitable Housing Initiative,” Metro News, April 22, 2015, accessed January 25, 2016, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/news/metro-looks-unite-regional-vision -affordable-housing-new-equitable-housing-initiative. 174. Personal Communication 3P, 2006. 175. Personal Communication 11P, 2006. 176. Personal Communication 30P, 2006. 177. Personal Communication 10P, 2006. 178. Personal Communication 9P, 2006.

Chapter 6 1. HUD, “Partnership for Sustainable Communities,” accessed October 2, 2015, http://portal .hud .gov/ hudportal / HUD?src = /program _ offices /economic _ resilience /Partnership_for_ Sustainable _Communities. 2. HUD, “Partnership for Sustainable Communities,” accessed October 2, 2015, http://www.sustainablecommunities.gov/mission/achievements. 3. As quoted in Amy Hsuan, “HUD Chief Comes to Portland to Unveil Sustainable Community Program,” The Oregonian, February 4, 2010, accessed June 5, 2013, http://www.oregonlive .com / business/index .ssf /2010/02/ hud _ launches _ community _progam.html. 4. In the Portland region, the City of Beaverton was awarded a $1 million Sustainable Communities Challenge Grant, and Washington County was awarded $2 million. MAPC was awarded a $4 million Sustainable Communities Grant (through the Metro Boston Consortium of Sustainable Communities, a coalition that included MAPC) to help implement the goals of MetroFuture. The grant supports developing data and tools, local capacity building, and promoting policy dialogues. HUD also awarded DRCOG $4.5 million in funding to promote the implementation of Metro Vision. Here it is interesting to note the way that the federal government uses grants as a way of influencing planning policies. HUD’s application process for the Sustainable Communities Grants encourages communities to adopt sustainability principles. Communities that are granted the Preferred Sustainability Status are eligible for larger grants. 5. Federal Highway Administration, “Summary Report—MPO Peer Workshop on Planning for Climate Change,” March 6–7, 2008, accessed January 26, 2016, http:// www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning /processes/metropolitan/mpo/seattle _ mpo/index.cfm.

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Page numbers in italics followed by t and f indicate tables and figures. Abbott, Carl, 103–4 Adams County, Colorado, 71, 83, 94–95 Affordable Housing Technical Advisory Committee (HTAC) (Portland Metro), 140 American Farmland Trust, 4 Arapahoe County, Colorado, 82, 85, 86–88 Area and Power (Maass, ed.), 8–9 Ashland, Massachusetts, 34 Ask Damascus (Oregon citizens group), 132–33 Aurora, Colorado, 85, 86, 87, 93–94 authority, regulatory, 2, 17, 18–20, 19t, 147–48, 163–68; arguments for increasing, 163–68; Boston’s MAPC and challenges of planning without, 23, 26, 30, 36–37, 40–41, 52, 57–58, 147–48, 159, 163; “bottom-up,” 110–11, 144; building power without, 26–27, 57–58; and COGs, 15–16; DRCOG, 62–63, 66, 81, 82; Portland Metro, 2, 17, 23–24, 109–11, 126–27, 130, 143–44, 163–64, 167; Portland Metro and the city’s home-rule charter, 105–6, 110–11, 121, 198n29; “top-down,” 144 Baker, Matt, 85 Barber, Benjamin, 13–14 Beaverton, Oregon, 114–15, 119, 207n4 Bellingham, Massachusetts, 37 Blackstone, Massachusetts, 37 Bockenfeld, Rod, 82, 87 Booher, David, 12–14 Boston Foundation, 49 Boston Globe, 31–32 Boston Indicators Project, 31 Boston MetroPlan 2000, 31, 32, 35–37, 40, 43, 155–56

Boston’s MetroFuture, 14, 23, 30, 39–43, 57, 122, 148–50, 156, 158 Boston’s Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC), 18, 19t, 22–23, 26–58, 27f, 147–50; Boston MetroPlan 2000, 31, 32, 35–37, 40, 43, 155–56; capacity building, 22–23, 26, 36, 42, 48–51, 57, 148, 163; challenges of planning without authority, 23, 26, 30, 36–37, 40–41, 52, 57–58, 147–48, 159, 163; climate change strategies, 43, 47; coalition building, 158–59; as COG, 28; context of weak state-planning system and home rule tradition, 22, 26, 30–31; cooperative purchasing and cost-sharing with communities, 47–48, 57; creation, role, goals, and mission statement, 28–29, 180n2; Draisen’s leadership, 23, 37, 40, 157; eight sub-regional councils, 49–51; EIRs and letters to MEPA, 51–57, 153; equity and social justice mission, 42; funding and budget, 29, 180n5; housing affordability issues, 31–33, 41, 43–46, 157; housing equity, 42; increasing effectiveness and political relevance, 37–39, 41–43, 58, 158–59; large-scale projects of regional significance, 51–57, 153; local implementation of goals, 35–37, 155–56; meetings, officers, and basic operations, 29, 38–39; and Metro Mayors Coalition (MMC), 46–47, 148, 158; MetroFuture (2007 vision), 14, 23, 30, 39–43, 57, 122, 148–50, 156, 158; Municipal Health Insurance Working Group, 48; promoting density, 32–35; region and sub-region map, 27f; relationship with the Boston MPO, 22, 28, 29–30, 40–41; schools and

224

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Boston’s Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) (continued) tax revenue, 33–34, 160; SCRP grant funds, 41–43, 45–46, 49, 57, 148–49, 158–59, 207n4; smart growth programs and principles, 35–37, 42, 45–46, 55, 56; and state regulations, 43–46, 157, 184n66; and TIP funding, 22–23, 29–30, 40–41, 149–50; TOD planning and transportation reform, 42, 91–92, 150; transportation planning, 46, 149–50; usefulness to local governments, 46–48; water and sewage infrastructure assistance, 50; zoning and tax revenue issues, 34–35 Boulder, Colorado, 71, 96–97 Boulder County, Colorado, 93 Bowes, William, 104 Bragdon, David, 101, 158, 159 Broom, Bob, 85 Broomfield City and County, Colorado, 93 Bruegmann, Robert, 101–2 Burchell, Robert, 4, 5–6 Canton, Massachusetts, 55–56 capacity building, 160–61, 165; Boston’s MAPC, 22–23, 26, 36, 42, 48–51, 57, 148, 163; DRCOG, 91–92, 97; GIS mapping and data analysis, 39, 49, 112; Portland Metro, 24, 110, 112–13, 127–28, 143, 151 Castle Rock, Colorado, 77 Central Massachusetts Regional Planning Commission, 51 Central Transportation Planning Staff (CTPS) (Boston), 29 Chicago 2020 (visioning exercise), 14, 122 Cities Without Suburbs (Rusk), 7 Civic Results (Denver organization), 64, 195n139 Clackamas County, Oregon, 105, 131–32, 136 climate change, 2–3, 172; Boston’s MAPC, 43, 47; DRCOG and Denver region concerns, 61; Portland Metro’s sustainable transportation projects, 117, 138 coalition building, 158–59. See also voluntary regionalism Colorado: Amendment 24 (Responsible Growth Initiative), 68; sales tax revenue debate, 92–95; state land use regulations, 81, 82

Colorado Air Quality Control Commission, 67 Colorado Department of Highways, 65–66 Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT), 66, 67, 90 Colorado Land Use Commission, 59 Colorado Public Interest Research Group (COPIRG), 70, 85 Colorado State Land Board, 84–87 Colorado Transportation Commission, 67, 90 Columbia Region Association of Governments (CRAG), 104–5 Committee on Improving the Future of U.S. Cities Th rough Improved Metropolitan Area Governance, 3 common pool resources (CPR), management of, 12 Community Development Corporation (CDC), 42 Cornelius, Oregon, 119–20, 126, 154, 160 councils of governments (COGs), 1–2, 15–16; Boston’s MAPC, 28; DRCOG, 73; reliance on capacity building, 15–16 Curtatone, Joseph A., 56 Dalin, Jeff, 126 Damascus, Oregon, 131–35, 155 deliberative democracy, 13–14, 152; and local officials’ participation in policy making, 152; and metropolitan visioning exercises, 14–15 density, residential. See zoning Denver, Colorado: citizen concerns about congestion and population growth, 59–61, 62, 67–68; Comprehensive Plan 2000, 76; sales tax revenue agreements/ confl icts, 93–95 Denver International Airport (DIA), 70–71, 94–95 Denver Post, 62, 87 Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG), 18, 19t, 23, 59–98, 60f, 149, 150, 165; Ad Hoc Committee on Semi-Urban Development, 83; as Area Agency on Aging, 66; authority, 62–63, 66, 81, 82; capacity building, 91–92, 97; as COG, 73; density and the UGB/A policy, 82–84, 95; and Denver International Airport, 70–71, 94–95; FasTracks light rail system, 61, 66, 70, 91–92, 97, 150, 158;

Index flexibility of Metro Vision, 63–64, 97, 154, 156, 165; flexibility of the UGB/A, 80–81, 154; history and institutional development, 65–67; and the ICRPA/ICRPC, 65–66; and Joint Regional Planning Program (1970s), 66; Legislative Principle Statement, 89–90; local elected officials on effectiveness and influence, 69–70, 88–92; local elected officials’ participation in, 62, 67, 69–70, 73, 88–89, 97–98, 149; local implementation and consistency with Metro Vision, 71–78, 156; Lowry Range Project, 22, 84–88, 97, 153–54; map of planning boundaries, 60f; map of UGB/A, 79f; and Metro Mayors Caucus, 23, 64, 68, 195n139; Metro Vision 2020 adoption and goals, 63; Metro Vision 2030, 73, 77, 82; Metro Vision 2035, 23, 73–74, 81; Metro Vision 2040 and Regional Economic Strategy/Regional Housing Strategy reports, 73; Metro Vision Implementation Committee (MVIC), 83; Metro Vision Regional Plan, 14, 23, 61–62, 63–65, 68–69, 71–78, 95–98, 122, 150, 156; as metropolitan planning agency and MPO, 23, 62, 66, 74–75, 96; Mile High Compact and signatories, 23, 61, 64–65, 68, 75, 76–77; process of becoming a more effective institution, 67–71; promotion of urban centers, 81, 92, 150; regional air quality issues, 67, 90; Regional Equity Atlas, 73; Regional Transportation District (RTD), 66–67, 70, 190n39; Regional Transportation Plan (2035 MVRTP), 74; relationships with local governments, 71–74, 96–97; sales tax distribution campaign (2004), 90–91; sales tax revenue debate and revenue sharing, 92–95; SCRP grant, 73–74, 207n4; successes, 95–98; sustainability goals, 73–74; taxing authority for transit, 66; TIP funding oversight, 23, 74–75, 90, 91, 150, 156, 170; TOD projects, 73; Transportation Committee, 67; transportation planning and infrastructure projects, 61, 66–67, 74, 91–92, 95–96, 97, 150, 158; T-REX light rail project, 61, 70; Vidal’s leadership, 69, 157–58; voluntary regionalism, 23, 61–63, 64–65, 68–71, 88, 98; and the voluntary UGB/A, 23, 61, 64, 78–88, 79f, 95, 154,

225

159, 167–68. See also urban growth boundary/area (UGB/A) (DRCOG) Department of Homeland Security, 47 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 105; Office of Sustainable Housing and Communities, 171; and Partnership for Sustainable Communities, 15, 114–15, 171–72, 207n4 Department of Land Conservation and Development (DLCD) (Oregon), 102, 107 Department of Transportation (DOT): MPO Peer Workshop on Planning for Climate Change (2004), 172; and Partnership for Sustainable Communities, 15, 114, 171 Dillon’s rule, 179n71 Donovan, Shaun, 171 Douglas County, Colorado, 77 Downs, Anthony, 7, 9, 102 Draisen, Marc, 23, 37, 40, 53–54, 157 DRCOG. See Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) Drier, Peter, 4–5, 9 Englewood, Colorado, 71 Environment Colorado, 85, 86 Environmental Impact Report (EIR), 51–57, 153 Environmental Impact Study (EIS), 115 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 15, 114, 171 Envision Utah, 14, 122 Equitable Housing Initiative (Portland Metro), 140 equity issues, 5, 168; Boston’s MAPC, 42, 45; DRCOG, 73; Portland Metro’s Equitable Housing Initiative, 140. See also housing, affordable Ewegen, Bob, 62 Ewing, Reid, 6–7 Fair Housing and Equity Assessment for Metro Boston, 45 Fair Housing Toolkit (Boston), 42 Fairview, Oregon, 140 FasTracks light rail system (Denver), 61, 66, 70, 91–92, 97, 150, 158 Federal Highway Act (1962), 16 Federal Highway Administration, 172 Feoick, Richard, 11

226

Index

fi nancing, municipal, 159–60 Forest Grove, Oregon, 126 Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS), 84 495/MetroWest Corridor Partnership, 51 495/MetroWest Development Compact, 51 fragmentation and urban sprawl, 3–8, 9–10; environmental and health impacts, 5–6; and lower density development, 3–7; and tax-dependent approaches to planning, 4–5 Framingham, Massachusetts, 34 Franklin, Massachusetts, 37 Fulton, William, 5

housing, affordable: and Boston’s MAPC, 31–32, 41, 43–46, 157; and fragmented communities, 5; housing equity, 42, 140; and large lot sizes, 32–33, 137–38; Massachusetts state regulations, 43–46, 157, 184n66; Portland Metro and, 101–2, 139–41 Housing Act (1954), 104 Housing Affordability Index (HAI), 101–2 Housing Production Plans (HPPs), 45, 49 Hubbard, Kara E., 32 Hughes, Tom, 124, 126 hydraulic fracturing (hydro fracking), 87

Gallagher, Ed, 114 Gallagher Amendment, 92–93 geographic information systems (GIS), 16; Boston’s MAPC, 39, 49; Portland Metro’s Regional Land Information System (RLIS), 112 Get Centered! campaign (Portland Metro), 113, 138 Glaeser, Edward, 32 Gleason, James, 104 Goetz, Andrew, 70 Greer, Scott, 8, 9 Gresham, Oregon, 114, 118, 125, 131 Griffie, Sheila, 126 Group Insurance Commission (GIC) (Massachusetts), 48 Gulick, Luther, 8

Innes, Judith, 12–14 Inter-County Regional Planning Association/Commission (ICRPA/ICRPC) (Denver), 65–66 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), 16, 67

Hallock, Ted, 107 Hamidi, Shima, 6–7 Hancock, Michael, 94 Happy Valley, Oregon, 131 Hartman, Kathy, 72 Healey, Patsy, 13–14 Hickenlooper, John, 61, 93–94 Hillsboro, Oregon, 125–26, 130, 154, 160, 202n103 Hogan, Steve, 94 Holden, Matthew, 8 Home Builders Association of Metro Portland (HBAMP), 135, 141, 159 home rule, 179n71; Massachusetts, 22, 26, 30–31; Portland’s home-rule charter, 105–6, 110–11, 121, 198n29 Hornby, Bill, 61–62 Hostika, Carl, 133

Jacobs, Harvey, 11 Johnson, Linda, 11 Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT) (Portland Metro), 105, 110, 116–18, 151 Joint Regional Planning Program (Denver), 66 Kahn, Matthew, 6 Katz, Bruce, 9–10 Kenney, Peter, 64 Kiely, Pam, 86 Koslow, Courtney, 32 Lake Oswego, Oregon, 136, 140 Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) (Oregon), 105, 107–9, 129 land use regulation. See state land use regulations; urban growth boundary/area (UGB/A) (DRCOG); urban growth boundary/area (UGB/A) (Portland Metro); zoning Langdon, Philip, 101–2 Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) Regional Planning Unit, 105 Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED), 54, 56; LEED Neighborhood Design Platinum, 54

Index LeGare, Bob, 63 Lewis, Paul, 5 Lexington, Massachusetts, 37 Livable Communities Support Center (Denver), 80 Lone Tree, Colorado, 77 Long Range Transportation Program (LRTP), 16–17 Longmont, Colorado, 76–77 Louisville, Colorado, 75 Low Impact Development (LID) strategies, 54 Lowry Range Project (Colorado), 22, 84–88, 97, 153–54 Maass, Arthur, 8–9 MacPherson, Hector, 107 Major Investment Studies (MIS), 70 Mansbridge, Jane, 13–14 MAPC. See Boston’s Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) Mass Audubon, 51 Massachu setts: affordable housing regulations, 43–46, 157, 184n66; home rule tradition, 22, 26, 30–31; Land Use Priority Plan Process (and Priority Development Area planning), 50–51; no state requirement for zoning consistency, 31, 36, 182n33; Open Town meetings, 33, 109 Massachu setts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), 54 Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), 51–57, 153 Massachusetts Executive Office of Housing and Economic Development, 51 Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety, 47 Massachusetts Executive Office of Transportation (EOT), 40–41, 149 Massachusetts General Law (MGL) Chapter 40B, 28, 157, 180n2 Massachusetts Office for Commonwealth Development, 54 Massachusetts Smart Growth Alliance, 46 Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA), 50 Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act, 54 McCall, Tom, 106–7 McClintock, Rich, 80 Mckee, David, 4

227

McRoberts, Gussie, 118 Metro Boston Sustainable Communities Consortium, 41–42, 207n4 Metro Mayors Caucus (MMC) (Denver), 23, 64, 68, 195n139 Metro Mayors Coalition (MMC) (Boston), 46–47, 148, 158 Metro Technical Advisory Committee (MTAC) (Portland), 110, 117–18, 120–21 Metro Vision Regional Plan (DRCOG), 14, 23, 61–62, 63–65, 68–69, 71–78, 95–98, 122, 150, 156; Metro Vision 2020 adoption and goals, 63; Metro Vision 2020 RTP, Fiscally Constrained, 74; Metro Vision 2030, 73, 77, 82; Metro Vision 2035, 23, 73–74, 81; Metro Vision 2040 and Regional Economic Strategy/ Regional Housing Strategy reports, 73; Regional Transportation Plan (2035 MVRTP), 74. See also Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) Metro-Boston Climate Change Preparedness Commitment, 47 Metro-Boston Regional Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, 43 MetroFuture (Boston’s MAPC), 14, 23, 30, 39–43, 57, 122, 148–50, 156, 158 metropolitan governance, 1–25, 147–61, 162–73; and authority/challenges of planning without authority, 2, 17, 18–20, 19t, 147–48, 163–68; bottom-up and top-down models, 8, 10–12; climate change challenges, 2–3, 172; comparing processes and arrangements (case studies), 2, 18–20, 19t, 21–25; early reformers (1960s), 8–9; explaining re sis tance to reform, 7–8; factors critical for success, 147–61; federal role in sustainable regional planning, 171–72, 207n4; future optimism for, 3; historical debate over best strategy for, 8–15; interviews with local and regional stakeholders, 21–22, 179n70; and leadership, 157–58; measuring effectiveness, 20–21; policy recommendations, 168–71; promoting “compact and connected” regions, 6–7; thinking incrementally about frameworks, 169–70; “third wave” in metropolitan studies, 12–13; variety of arrangements, 1–3, 15–17; voluntary regionalism, 10–15, 21, 27–28, 162–63

228

Index

Metropolitan Housing Rule (Portland), 139, 205–6n166 metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), 1–2, 16–17, 149, 165, 170. See also Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG); Portland Metro Metropolitan Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC) (Portland Metro), 110, 117–20, 151–52 Mildner, Gerald, 101 Mile High Compact (MHC), 23, 61, 64–65, 68, 75, 76–77 Minneapolis–St. Paul, Minnesota, 18 MIT’s Center for Real Estate, 32 Mollenkopf, John, 4–5, 9 Moscovitch, Edward, 32 Moving Ahead Toward Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), 17 Mt. Hood Freeway (Portland region), 115, 198n23 MTIP. See Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) funds Mugler, Larry, 63–64 Mukherji, Sahan, 5–6 Multnomah County, Oregon, 105 Natick, Massachusetts, 34 National Association of Home Builders (NAHB), 101–2 Natural Heritage and Endangered Species Program (NHESP), 54 Nelson, Arthur C., 4, 101, 104–5 Nyberg, Clayton, 104 Oakerson, Ronald, 11–12 Obama administration, 3, 15, 41–43, 149, 171 Old Colony Planning Council (OCPC) Regional Policy Plan, 50–51 Older Americans Act, 66 1,400 Governments (Wood), 8 1,000 Friends of Oregon, 139 Open Space and Recreation Plan (Boston region), 37 Open Spaces Program (Portland Metro), 138–39 Open Town meetings, 33, 109 Oregon: land use planning goals, 107–9, 112–13, 141–42; land use planning legislation, 24, 106–9, 112–13, 128, 135–36, 141–42, 156–57; private property

rights (Measures 37 and 49), 102–3, 157, 158; State Transportation Improvement Program (STIP), 117; Statewide Planning Program, 107; UGB policy requirements, 24, 109, 128. See also Portland Metro Oregon Department of Transportation, 132 Oregon State Highway Commission, 104 Oregon Zoo, 105, 110, 200n46 Orfield, Myron, 6, 10, 62, 99, 205n150 Ostrom, Elinor, 12 participation of local elected officials, 151–53, 159, 164–66, 171; and deliberative democracy, 152; DRCOG board, 62, 67, 69–70, 73, 88–89, 97–98, 149; Portland Metro policy making, 110, 117–21, 141–43, 144, 151–53 Partnership for Sustainable Communities, 15, 114–15, 171–72; six livability principles, 15. See also Sustainable Communities Regional Planning (SCRP) Grants Patrick, Deval, 41, 46, 48 Peña, Federico, 71 Pew Center for Civic Journalism, 59 Portland Metro, 18, 19t, 23–24, 99–146, 100f, 150–53; authority and legitimacy, 2, 17, 23–24, 109–11, 126–27, 130, 143–44, 163–64, 167; capacity building, 24, 110, 112–13, 127–28, 143, 151; city challenges to land use ordinances, 125–26, 202n103; Climate Smart Strategy, 117, 138; Community Development and Planning Grants, 112; Damascus/Boring UGB expansion project, 22, 112, 131–35, 155; elected Metro Council and councillors, 24, 110, 111–12, 113, 118–20, 130–31, 133, 142, 145, 151–52, 158; Future Vision (regional visioning statement), 108; Get Centered! campaign, 113, 138; history of, 103–6, 118–19; and home-rule charter, 105–6, 110–11, 121, 198n29; JPACT recommendations on transportation, 105, 110, 116–18; and the LCDC, 107–9, 129, 141–42; local communities’ comprehensive plans, 142–43, 156–57; local officials’ participation in policy making, 110, 117–21, 141–43, 144, 151–53; map (2040 Growth Concept Plan), 100f; Metro Charter, 108; Metro Technical Advisory

Index Committee (MTAC), 110, 117–18, 120–21; as metropolitan planning agency and MPO, 17, 24, 99, 105, 110, 116–17; Metropolitan Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC), 110, 117–20, 151–52; as Metropolitan Ser vice District (MSD), 105, 110; Open Spaces Program, 138–39; promoting affordable housing, 101–2, 139–41; promoting residential density, 101–2, 124, 137–38, 204–5n150; promoting sustainable public transportation, 114, 115, 117, 138; question of Portland Model’s replicability, 2, 24, 99–103, 197n3; the Regional Framework Plan, 106, 108–9, 113, 123, 140; Regional Urban Growth Goals and Objectives (RUGGOs), 118, 121–22, 123; SCRP grants, 207n4; and state land use planning legislation, 24, 106–9, 128, 135–36, 141–42, 156–57; and state property rights measures, 102–3, 157, 158; and statewide land use planning goals, 107–9, 112–13, 141–42; taxable development and zoning, 124–25; taxing authority, 110, 200n46; taxrevenue sharing issues, 160, 168; TIP funding oversight, 24, 115, 116–17, 144; TOD projects, 113–16, 117, 125, 138, 150; Transit-Oriented Development Strategic Plan (2011), 113–14; transportation planning, 105, 110, 115–17; Transportation Policy Alternatives Committee (TPAC), 116, 117–18; TriMet, 24, 104, 113, 115, 138, 150; 2004 Metro Annual Compliance report, 126–27; 2014 Urban Growth Report (Revised Draft), 137, 138; 2040 Growth Concept plan, 14, 100f, 113, 115, 117, 121–22; UGB/A management, 24, 99, 101–3, 105, 109, 121–35, 143, 167–68; Urban Growth Management Functional Plan, 108, 122–24, 140, 142–43; why the Portland model is impor tant, 23–24, 141–46. See also urban growth boundary/ area (UGB/A) (Portland Metro) Portland Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC), 104 Portland Metropolitan Study Commission (PMSC), 104 Portland-Vancouver Metropolitan Transportation Study (PVMTS), 104 Powell, John, 7

229

property rights and land use planning, 7; Portland Metro, 102–3, 157, 158; and voluntary regionalism, 11–12 Ratner, Keith, 70 Real Estate Research Corporation’s “Costs of Sprawl” study (1974), 4 Reason Policy Institute, 102 Regional Affordable Housing Strategy (RAHS) (Portland Metro), 140 Regional Air Quality Council (Colorado), 67 Regional Analyses of Impediments (Boston), 42 Regional Development Framework (RDF) (Denver), 66 Regional Energy Ser vices Company (ESCO), 48 Regional Fair Housing and Equity Assessment (Boston), 42 Regional Planning Agencies (RPAs) (Boston), 43 Regional Transportation District (RTD) (Denver), 66–67, 70, 190n39 Regional Transportation Plan (RTP) (Denver), 66, 74 Regional Urban Growth Goals and Objectives (RUGGOs) (Portland), 118, 121–22 regionally significant industrial area (RSIA) regulations, 125, 154 regionally significant large-scale planning projects, 21, 22, 153–55; Boston’s MAPC, 51–57, 153; DRCOG, 22, 84–88, 97, 153–54; Lowry Range Project, 22, 84–88, 97, 153–54; Portland Metro’s Damascus/ Boring UGB expansion project, 22, 112, 131–35, 155; Portland Metro’s Regional Framework Plan, 106; Somerville Assembly Square, 52, 56–57, 153; South Weymouth Naval Air Station redevelopment, 22, 52, 53–55, 153; Westwood Station, 52, 55–56, 153 regulatory authority. See authority, regulatory Rothman-Shore, Aviva, 32 Rusk, David, 7 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU 2005), 17

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schools/school districts: Boston region, 33–34, 45, 160; and funding/tax base, 7, 33–34, 160; zoning, 5, 45, 160 Schuetz, Jenny, 32 SCRP grants. See Sustainable Communities Regional Planning (SCRP) Grants Seltzer, Ethan, 112 Shannon Grant Community Safety Initiative (Boston), 47 Sierra Club, 5 SMART (South Metro Area Rapid Transit), 117 Smith, Gerald, 4 Somerville, Massachusetts, 56–57 Somerville Assembly Square project, 52, 56–57, 153 South Coast Rail Economic Development and Land Use Corridor Plan, 50 South Shore Coastal Hazards Adaptation study (Boston), 43 South Shore HOME Consortium (Boston), 42 South Shore Tri-Town Development Corporation (SSTTDC), 53 South Weymouth Naval Air Station redevelopment project, 22, 52, 53–55, 153 sprawl. See fragmentation and urban sprawl Staley, Samuel, 101 state land use regulations: Colorado, 81, 82; Massachusetts’s affordable housing, 43–46, 157, 184n66; and Massachusetts’s home rule, 22, 26, 30–31; Oregon, 24, 106–9, 112–13, 128, 135–36, 141–42, 156–57; Oregon’s property rights measures, 102–3, 157, 158; Oregon’s UGB policy requirements, 24, 109, 128; role in effective metropolitan governance, 156–57, 165–66, 169 Steeves, Heather, 133 Stoughton, Massachusetts, 44, 49 Stronger Region scenarios (Boston), 41 Sustainable Communities Regional Planning (SCRP) Grants, 15, 171–72, 207n4; Boston’s MAPC and MetroFuture plan, 41–43, 45–46, 49, 57, 148–49, 158–59, 207n4; DRCOG and Metro Vision 2035 plan, 73, 207n4; Portland Metro, 207n4 Swanstrom, Todd, 4–5, 9

Tao, Jill, 11 Tauer, Ed, 68, 85, 93–94 taxes: Boston’s MAPC and town lawsuits over development and zoning, 34–35; DRCOG and sales tax revenue debate in Colorado, 92–95; DRCOG’s gas sales tax distribution campaign, 90–91; equity issues and tax-dependent approaches to planning, 5; Portland Metro and regional revenue sharing, 160, 168; Portland Metro and zoning, 124–25; school fi nancing, 7, 33–34, 160 Texas Transportation Institute, 6, 61 Thornton, Colorado, 83, 96–97 Thornton, Susan, 87 TIP. See Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) funds TOD programs. See transit oriented development (TOD) programs transit oriented development (TOD) programs: Boston’s MAPC, 42, 91–92, 150; DRCOG, 73; Portland Metro, 113–16, 117, 125, 138, 150 Transportation Efficiency Act of the 21st Century (TEA-21), 16 Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) funds, 16–17, 170; Boston’s MAPC and lack of authority over, 22–23, 29–30, 40–41, 149–50; DRCOG’s allocation of points for, 75, 150, 156, 192n80; DRCOG’s oversight, 23, 74–75, 90, 91, 150, 156, 170; Portland Metro’s oversight, 24, 115, 116–17, 144 Transportation Investment Coalition (Boston), 46 Transportation Policy Alternatives Committee (TPAC) (Portland Metro), 116, 117–18 transportation projects/planning: Boston’s MAPC, 46, 149–50; DRCOG, 61, 66–67, 70, 74, 91–92, 95–96, 97, 150, 158; Portland Metro, 115–16, 117, 138; Portland Metro’s JPACT, 105, 110, 116–17. See also transit oriented development (TOD) programs Traux, Pete, 126 T-REX light rail project (Denver), 61, 70 TriMet (Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District) (Portland), 24, 104, 113, 115, 138, 150

Index Tualatin, Oregon, 126, 129–30, 136 208 Wastewater Management Agency, 105 urban and rural reserves approach (Portland Metro), 135–36, 155 urban centers (Denver), 81, 92, 150 urban growth area (UGA) approach, 80–81 urban growth boundary/area (UGB/A) (Denver/DRCOG), 23, 61, 64, 78–88, 79f, 95, 154, 159, 167–68; “bank” of additional square miles, 82; density challenges, 82–84, 95; dependence on voluntary implementation, 82, 154; enforcement through peer pressure, 84; expansions/expansion debates, 64, 78–80, 82, 86–88; flexibility of, 80–81, 154; and greenfield development outside the MPO area, 83–84; and lack of state regulatory authority over land use, 81, 82; and Lowry Range Project, 22, 84–88, 97, 153–54; Metro Vision 2030, 82; Metro Vision 2035, 81; mixed results, 81; promotion of urban centers, 81; and zoning, 83 urban growth boundary/area (UGB/A) (Portland Metro), 24, 99, 101–3, 105, 109, 121–35, 143, 167–68; authority to require plan compliance, 17, 110, 120, 125–28; cities’ challenges to, 125–26, 202n103; Damascus/Boring expansion project, 22, 112, 131–35, 155; exclusive farm use (EFU) zoning, 109, 120, 130–31; expansion debates, 129–31, 132–35, 143, 154–55; expansions, 112, 120, 126, 129–37, 143, 154–55, 168, 205n150; and home builders’ associations, 101–2, 135, 141, 159; and Regional Land Information System (RLIS), 112; Regional Urban Growth Goals and Objectives (RUGGOs), 118, 121–22, 123; required twenty-year supply of land, 24, 109, 130–31, 133; state UGB policy requirements, 24, 109, 128; and 2040 Growth Concept plan, 14, 113, 115, 117, 121–22; the 2004 Metro Annual Compliance report, 126–27; urban and rural reserves approach, 135–36, 155; Urban Growth Management Functional Plan, 108, 122–24, 140, 142–43; zoning and density requirements, 124; zoning and property

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rights debates, 102–3; zoning and taxable development, 124–25 USDA’s Natu ral Resources Inventory (2012), 5 Vancouver, Washington, 199n44 Vernon, Raymond, 9 Vidal, Bill, 69, 158 visioning exercises, 14–15, 18, 122, 170–71; Boston’s MetroFuture, 14, 23, 30, 39–43, 57, 122, 148–50, 156, 158; DRCOG’s Metro Vision Regional Plan, 14, 23, 61–62, 63–65, 68–69, 71–78, 95–98, 122, 150, 156; Portland Metro’s Future Vision, 108; Portland Metro’s Region 2040 process, 121–22 voluntary regionalism, 10–15, 21, 27–28, 162–63; arguments for, 10–15; Boston’s MAPC, 27–28; as bottom-up model, 10–12, 162–63; collaboration and participative approaches for consensusbuilding, 12–13, 152; and deliberative democracy, 13–14, 152; Denver and the DRCOG, 23, 61–63, 64–65, 68–71, 88, 98; and property-rights issues, 11–12; regulation issue and regulatory models, 12; and the “third wave” in metropolitan studies, 12–13; and visioning exercises, 14–15 Wallis, Allan, 10, 12 Ward, Bryce, 32 Washington County, Oregon, 105, 126, 136, 207n4 Wayland, Massachusetts, 34 Weld County, Colorado, 83–84 West Linn, Oregon, 129, 136, 140 Westwood, Massachusetts, 55–56 Westwood Station project, 52, 55–56, 153 Wood, Paul, 75 Wood, Robert, 8 zoning: Boston’s MAPC and affordable housing, 43–46, 157, 184n66; Boston’s MAPC and residential density, 32–35; Boston’s MAPC and tax revenue issues, 34–35; DRCOG’s UGB/A policy and residential density, 82–84, 95; exclusive farm use (EFU) zoning, 109, 120, 130–31; and fragmentation/urban sprawl, 3–7;

232 zoning (continued) lot sizes and residential density, 32–33, 137–38; Massachusetts’s lack of state requirement for consistency, 31, 36, 182n33; Portland Metro’s promotion of residential density, 101–2, 124, 137–38, 205n150; Portland Metro’s UGB

Index management, 102–3, 109, 120, 124–25, 130–31; and schools, 5, 45, 160; and taxable development/tax revenue, 34–35, 124–25. See also urban growth boundary/ area (UGB/A) (Denver/DRCOG); urban growth boundary/area (UGB/A) (Portland Metro)

. Hodgson

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to thank all the people who helped make this book possible. I am so lucky to have had the chance to work with Lawrence Susskind at MIT. To say he has been influential would be an understatement. Jerold Kayden encouraged me to think more critically and make the research more practical. Judith Layzer pushed me to dig deeper, asking me, “What is your puzzle?” I miss her sharp mind, wit, and friendship dearly. We can all only hope to be as smart and wonderful as Judy. At MIT, special thanks go to JoAnn Carmin (whom I also miss dearly), Diane Davis, Bish Sanyal, Lawrence Vale, Nimfa DeLeon, Sossi Aroyan, and David Marks. They all believed in me and helped get me through. Craig Steven Wilder (now also at MIT) deserves a big thank you for showing me early on that research and writing could be fun. I also want to thank Mario J. Molina and Luisa Molina and the MIT Mexico City Project for supporting me. I am grateful for additional funding from the Martin Family Society of Fellows for Sustainability at MIT, the Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston Fellowship, and the Consensus Building Institute. I particularly want to thank David Luberoff at the Rappaport Institute for his interest in the project. This book would not have been possible without the input from policy makers in Portland, Denver, and Boston (as well as academics who study metropolitanism) who took time out of their busy days over the course of many years to explain to me how metropolitan policy making and local land use planning work. I hope that I have adequately reflected the process (or at least provided a window into the challenges they face). Amy Cotter at MAPC has been particularly helpful to me since I was a Rappaport Summer Public Policy Fellow at MAPC years ago. Amy took the time to read the Boston chapter and make recommendations. Tim Reardon, Mark Racicot, and Marc Draisen at MAPC have also been very accessible and interested in the book. Jennifer Schaufele at DRCOG and Andy Cotugno at Metro were open to

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being studied and helped connect me to policy makers in their regions. Kacey Wilkins and Michael Leccese at ULI Colorado served as impor tant first contacts for me in Denver. Connie Ozawa and Ethan Seltzer gave me good advice about what I was seeing in Portland. Special thanks to Ethan for reading the Portland chapter and providing suggestions. The opinions expressed in the book are mine, as are the mistakes. Peter Agree at the University of Pennsylvania Press was very supportive of this project throughout the publication process. From the first time I pitched the book to him, he thought it was a good idea. Many editors might have shied away from a book about metropolitan planning and governance. I am very grateful he did not. Thanks also to Eugenie Birch and Susan Wachter, the series editors, and the Penn Press editorial board, who saw the value in this project. Many thanks go as well to the outside reviewers, who read several versions of the manuscript and sharpened its arguments. Thanks to Leah Florence and Eric Schramm for copyediting assistance and Erica Ginsburg and Elizabeth Glover at the Press for their careful project management. Holly knowles produced the index. At Temple University, the College of Liberal Arts provided me with a summer research grant, a grant-in-aid, and a sabbatical to update my research and work on the manuscript. Many thanks to my excellent chairs, Melissa Gilbert, Michele Masucci, and Sanjoy Chakravorty, and many wonderful colleagues in the Department of Geography and Urban Studies. Ben Kohl (whom I also miss dearly) encouraged me to write a book. Special thanks to Carolyn Adams (who reviewed the manuscript), Tycina Cousin (for her administrative help), and Hamil Pearsall, Robert Mason and Rickie Sanders for their publishing advice. I also want to thank my many inspiring Temple students who have made it fun to teach there. I want to thank all my family and friends for their love and support. My parents, Nancy D. Rosan and Richard M. Rosan, have been true cheerleaders, always encouraging me. They both are passionate about making cities better places to live. They started out in the New York City Planning Office, and their love of cities and place-making has never wavered. My grandfather, Richard A. Rosan, was a huge advocate of my education and an inspiration to me. My other grandparents, Elizabeth and Newlin F. Davis and Helen M. Rosan, nurtured my curiosity throughout my childhood. I am extremely lucky to have had the support of my many family members and friends: my wonderful sister and brother, Elizabeth Rosan Kirkwood and Peter Rosan, and their spouses, Pete Kirkwood and Megan Rosan; my great stepdad, Jere

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Lucey; my fantastic in-laws, Virginia and Richard Munkelwitz; Michael and Britta Perry, Caroline and Brian Coffay, Wendy and Luis Costa (whom I also miss dearly), and Iona Sinclair; and my friends Meriel Tulante, Catherine Ashcraft , Sarah Brennan, Lyssia Merriman, Isabelle Anguelovski, Ryan Allen, Ariel Bierbaum, Daisy Ha, Hope Fang, Victoria Briggs, Annie Steffenson, Megan Barber, Rosie Dudley, Erica Chan, Betsy Sweet, Blair Ruble, and Allison Garland. Special thanks to Andrea Mosko and Mamatha Naraparaju and their team at Saint Mary’s Nursery School. To all my other friends, colleagues, and family members: you know who you are. Thank you. Finally, Karl Munkelwitz, my husband, has been an amazing partner. There is no one who is happier to see this book in print than Karl. I owe you big time! My kids, Owen, Anya, and Eli, three of my most favorite people, are also happy that the book is finished and we can get back to playing! I’m so lucky to have you all. Thank you.

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