Governance and Societal Adaptation in Fragile States [1st ed.] 9783030401337, 9783030401344

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-ix
Introduction (Helen Ware, John Idriss Lahai)....Pages 1-9
The Realities of Governance: Conflict and Context Across Africa (Helen Ware)....Pages 11-63
State Institutions and the Consolidation of Popular Government in Nigeria (Ibraheem Oladipo Muheeb)....Pages 65-94
Local Institutional Designs and Reforms in Rwanda and Burundi (Paul Odhiambo)....Pages 95-118
Community-Based Organisations and the Development Agenda in Zimbabwe: The Case of Marange Development Trust, 2014–2017 (Bernard Kusena)....Pages 119-141
Framing Resilience and Adaptability: A Critical Discourse Analysis of ZANU PF Policy Texts in the Zimbabwean Post-2000 Context (Tsiidzai Matsika)....Pages 143-169
Good Governance Under Zuma Administration: Fad or Reality? (Mbekezeli Comfort Mkhize, Kongko Louis Makau, Phathutshedzo Madumi)....Pages 171-188
Claiming the State: The Political Economy of Social Welfare Access in Rural South Africa (Andrew Skuse)....Pages 189-209
Prospects for Linguistic and Cultural Diversity to Enhance African Political Governance (Finex Ndhlovu)....Pages 211-236
The Struggles of Adoption and Adaptation in the Governance Space of Vanuatu: The Incorporation of Jifly Authority and Kastom Governance into the Legal-Rational System (Gregoire Nimbtik)....Pages 237-268
Back Matter ....Pages 269-275

Citation preview

GOVERNANCE AND LIMITED STATEHOOD

Governance and Societal Adaptation in Fragile States Edited by John Idriss Lahai Helen Ware

Governance and Limited Statehood

Series Editor Thomas Risse Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science Freie Universität Berlin Berlin, Germany

This ground-breaking monograph series showcases cutting edge research on the transformation of governance in countries with weak state institutions. Combing theoretically informed and empirically grounded scholarship, it challenges the conventional governance discourse which is biased towards modern developed nation states. Instead, the series focuses on governance in Africa, Asia and Latin America including transnational and trans-regional dimensions. Located at the intersection of global governance and international relations, on the one hand, and comparative politics, area studies, international law, history, and development studies, on the other, this innovative series helps to challenge fundamental assumptions about governance in the social sciences.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15020

John Idriss Lahai · Helen Ware Editors

Governance and Societal Adaptation in Fragile States

Editors John Idriss Lahai University of New England Armidale, Australia

Helen Ware Development Practice University of New England Armidale, Australia

Governance and Limited Statehood ISBN 978-3-030-40133-7 ISBN 978-3-030-40134-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40134-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Alamy, A4X3FH Photographer: NASA/digitaleye This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

Introduction Helen Ware and John Idriss Lahai

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The Realities of Governance: Conflict and Context Across Africa Helen Ware

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State Institutions and the Consolidation of Popular Government in Nigeria Ibraheem Oladipo Muheeb

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Local Institutional Designs and Reforms in Rwanda and Burundi Paul Odhiambo

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Community-Based Organisations and the Development Agenda in Zimbabwe: The Case of Marange Development Trust, 2014–2017 Bernard Kusena

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Framing Resilience and Adaptability: A Critical Discourse Analysis of ZANU PF Policy Texts in the Zimbabwean Post-2000 Context Tsiidzai Matsika Good Governance Under Zuma Administration: Fad or Reality? Mbekezeli Comfort Mkhize, Kongko Louis Makau, and Phathutshedzo Madumi

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Claiming the State: The Political Economy of Social Welfare Access in Rural South Africa Andrew Skuse

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Prospects for Linguistic and Cultural Diversity to Enhance African Political Governance Finex Ndhlovu

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The Struggles of Adoption and Adaptation in the Governance Space of Vanuatu: The Incorporation of Jifly Authority and Kastom Governance into the Legal-Rational System Gregoire Nimbtik Index

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Notes on Contributors

Bernard Kusena is a Lecturer in Economic History at the University of Zimbabwe and a Doctoral fellow at Rhodes University. His research interests include food security and rural development. Dr. John Idriss Lahai is an applied development studies scholar; and a research fellow in the Social and Philosophical Inquiry (SPI) programme at the University of New England. He is the author and editor of about a dozen books—all published by internationally reputable presses. His research is motivated by the desire to understand the intersectional, engendered, sociological, political and economic drivers, and contexts of state fragility, societal resilience and statehood in the Global South, especially in sub-Saharan African countries. Phathutshedzo Madumi is a Lecturer in the Department of Military Economics at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Kongko Louis Makau is a Lecturer in Military History at Stellenbosch University, South Africa with an interest in xenophobia and black women in politics. Tsiidzai Matsika lectures in English at the University of Zimbabwe and the University of the Free State in South Africa. Her special interest is in critical discourse analysis of political texts in the English language. She has

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published women’s accounts of the Zimbabwe Liberation Struggle and how they conflict with the male accounts promoted by the Government. Mbekezeli Comfort Mkhize is a researcher at the Centre for Military Studies, Stellenbosch University. He wrote his prescient masters’ politics thesis in 2008 on the lack of viability of South Africa’s strategy of quiet diplomacy with Zimbabwe. He has also researched and written on the impact of community gardening on alleviating rural poverty and on reappraising illegal artisanal mining in South Africa. Ibraheem Oladipo Muheeb has published extensively on the 1999 Constitution and governance in Nigeria including his study of “The Legislature and Representative Government in Ogun State”. He has a special interest in the relationships between legislative provisions as written and actual practices on the ground at both the national and the sub-national (State) level in Nigeria and how these matters impact upon corruption and the pursuit of corruption even to the level of impeachment. Finex Ndhlovu is an Associate Professor of Language in Society at the University of New England, Australia. His six books and over fifty journal articles and book chapters focus on language policy and politics, postcolonial African identities, multilingualism and multilingual citizenship and African migrant languages and lives. His 2017 radio interview with Power FM in Johannesburg is typical in addressing “Why Africa must discard borrowed robes and embrace its rich cultural resources”. Gregoire Nimbtik writes about the governance space and chiefly (jifly) authority and custom (kastom) in Vanuatu based upon his extensive expertise from both a traditional and a governmental perspective. He is one of the twenty-one children of the famed late Paramount Chief Virambat of Amok of North West Malekula who had ten wives. His mother gave him her life savings of fifty US dollars so that he could take up foundation studies at university. He went on to complete a Ph.D. on the topic of “Worlds in Collision: An Inquiry into the Sources of Corruption within Vanuatu Government and Society”. In Vanuatu he has held a range of senior advisory positions as well as being Director of the Department of Strategy, Policy, Planning and Aid Coordination. Paul Odhiambo is a consultant who has worked extensively on governance issues in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa.

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Andrew Skuse is Professor and Head of the Department of Anthropology and Development Studies at the University of Adelaide, South Australia. His professional work focuses on how the poor interact with information resources and how these resources affect areas such as livelihoods, health, education, peacebuilding and social equity. He has consulted widely on the role of communication for the development for a range of international development agencies and regularly publishes in both applied and academic fields. Helen Ware is the Foundation Professor of Peace Studies at the University of New England, Australia. She has knowledge of governance from a broad range of perspectives having been an Australian development aid bureaucrat, a diplomat, a statistical consultant and a human rights advisor. She is currently an academic researcher with a special interest in working with Ph.D. students who are researching peacebuilding, governance and development in countries searching for sustainable futures for youths of all genders in the coming generations.

Introduction Helen Ware and John Idriss Lahai

This book is concerned with governance in fragile states and how societies adapt to the challenging conditions they face. A common feature of many of the chapters is the extent to which they address familiar issues from new viewpoints. A number of the authors have demonstrated courage in addressing issues of abuse of power and corruption which are difficult themes for those who want to go on living in the countries they write about. Whilst Westerners may be constrained by libel laws, Africans and other researchers in areas where the rule of law is at best selective may face a range of acute disincentives from threats to their chances of future promotion or employment to actual physical assaults by the supporters of those who feel their privileges and illicit gains to be under attack. Most writers—about governance in regions where systems do not, cannot work; public services are only sporadically delivered; and the laws are honoured more in the breach than in the observance—are looking for more than academic renown. They want to see a change towards a world where governments, politicians and public servants are fulfilling their duties and delivering on their promises. They are only too familiar with the barriers which stand in the way of achieving a more just and equitable system from the grassroots up to the international level. Yet some

H. Ware · J. I. Lahai (B) University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia © The Author(s) 2020 J. I. Lahai and H. Ware (eds.), Governance and Societal Adaptation in Fragile States, Governance and Limited Statehood, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40134-4_1

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optimism remains to back the belief that where there is knowledge and understanding of what is happening now, there is hope for a better future. One theme common to many of the chapters is the difficulty of finding champions for positive changes in systems which survive precisely because they reward negative behaviours by the greedy and unprincipled. Few would question that more rewards for virtue are needed and that democracy, even with relatively open information, does not necessarily result in the election of more virtuous candidates. Several chapters explicitly explore the worldviews and promises of the political parties and politicians in power to see what the leaders perceive as the best offerings for motivating a growing support base. Unless he (rarely she) has access to a very effective secret police force, a president cannot stay in power for decades without understanding how to garner and maintain a group of loyal followers. The authors of the individual chapters were not given fixed definitions of the core terms to adhere to rather they were encouraged to focus on the local views of how the people themselves see governance and fragility. The aim was to get away from stereotypes and ask, using local evidence, how far the reality backs up the theory. For both Zimbabwe and South Africa there are contrasting but parallel chapters which deal with governance in the capital at the national level and out at a distance in a specific rural area.

Synopsis of the Book The introductory chapter by Helen Ware and John Idriss Lahai canvasses some of the core issues for this edited volume. Detailed definitions of governance are rarely helpful because what matters about governance is less what it is said to be than what it delivers. As specified by the laws and regulations the system may be ideal and/or unrealistic or just good enough, what counts is what gets delivered from healthy babies in clinics with adequate resources to licit income-earning opportunities for youths. Indeed, across 34 African countries the Afrobarometer data show that, when allowed three open choices, 40% of people questioned saw unemployment as one of the three most important problems facing their country as compared with 12% for both crime and insecurity. Whilst it is possible to debate the meaning of such responses, these answers do come from the ordinary people who are rarely asked, and they do reflect a clear concern with outcomes rather than methods.

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This chapter further questions a number of academic preoccupations, including the position that the World Bank is always the enemy. Much is written in very general terms about national and local elites but without discussing what it is exactly that they do. Where possible, the selection of sources drawn upon favours local writers describing their own cultures and localized studies which describe the fine-grained reality of day-to-day living and survival in what is often a harsh world where the odds are stacked against the majority of the people and especially against youth and women. Academic commentators on Nigerian politics often give up in despair when faced by the tortuous machinations involved; the sheer weight of corruption brought to bear; and the unrelieved gloom of a landscape apparently entirely without heroes. Undeterred, Ibraheem Muheeb begins with the military-to-civilian transition of 1999 and follows through on examining how the new Federal Constitution was supposed to lead to a revitalized era of thirty-six states with each being a microcosm of the federal structure. In a smaller and less populous country there might have been some hope that such a devolution of power might lessen corruption as the governed came closer to their governors. But in Nigeria this was not to be the case and the personalized leadership styles undermining the viability and independence of governing institutions persisted. The system worked to give weighty advantage to those most skilled in political manoeuvring. Cases abounded of impunity, arising from the arbitrary deployment of executive, legislative and judicial powers. As a classic example, Muheeb examines the intermittent operation of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) from marginal success (2003– 2007), to quietude and then actual recess (2007–2015). Impeachment campaigns abounded but only succeeded in undermining legislative institutions and halting areas of governance in most States. Burundi and Rwanda are like fraternal twins, sharing many common experiences but facing very different outcomes. Rwanda has become the unlikely hero of the world’s development agencies, repeatedly touted as a model of good governance by the World Bank. Whilst President Paul Kagame, who argues that his country has far too many churches, basks in international approval, very few would have a good word for Burundi under President Pierre Nkurunziza who maintains that he is kept in power by God and that rather than demonstrate in the streets his opponents should pray against him. Paul Odhiambo’s chapter discusses local institutional designs and reforms in these neighbouring countries. The Rwandan

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Government has been very keen to make traditional practices of collective action and self-help legally enforceable requirements of citizenship. The chapter describes some of these many programmes and their remarkable reach (over 250,000 families have benefitted from the Girinka cows for poor families programme). In contrast, Burundi only has the institution of the Bashingantahe, the traditional judges who are frequently subject to political interference but whose decisions are not recognized by the government. It is a chicken and egg question whether more use of traditional institutions would make Burundi a better-governed country, or whether a better-governed Burundi would offer more scope for traditional institutions to help make the country more united. The question still remains as to how far traditional institutions which offer limited scope for participation in decision-making by women and younger men can be ‘modernized’ into more democratic formats. There have been relatively few studies of how community-based organizations actually work in Africa, especially under despotic regimes. For Zimbabwe, Bernard Kusena provides a brave study of the Marange Development Trust which operated in a militarized area of diamond mining. Here the government was faced with the need to address declining rural incomes, on the other side the affected rural communities were pushing hard for a more substantive role in the management and exploitation of the diamond resources, which, typically, the elite and the mining giants were unwilling to concede. In this context, there was both turbulence and, surprisingly, some cooperation between the government in Harare and the local communities. Interviews with participants from all sides: affected communities, mining companies and state officials showed the communities to be able to bargain from a position of some strength and to a degree difficult for outsiders to predict, resulting in the award of the interdict sought by the Trust against the Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC) to secure the environmental impact assessment to which they were entitled. Knowing that sometimes the ‘small people’ can win, and how they can do so even where democracy is largely nominal, but the law still has some force, is invaluable. Jean-Pierre de Sardan describes ‘The Eight Modes of Local Governance in West Africa’ (2011) mostly based upon his experiences in francophone West Africa. Yet there are remarkable similarities with the diamond mining area of Zimbabwe as described by Bernard Kusena. Of the eight forms described by de Sardan: chiefly, associational, municipal, project-based, bureaucratic, sponsorshipbased, religious and merchant, Kusena describes at least six, and

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possibly seven, all working sometimes together and sometimes in competition within the limited space of Marange. Many writers have attacked the multiple failures of the Mugabe regime over the years, remarkably few have addressed the question of what ZANU-PF, the party under and behind the leader, was actually trying to do. In the context of framing the failures of resilience and adaptability, Tssidzai Matsika offers a critical discourse analysis of the Party’s policy texts in the post-2000 crisis years. Mugabe has now been dethroned, but his party still reigns and his long-time minister and successor has shown no evidence of a radical change of political direction. As the analysis demonstrates, Zanu-PF’s institutional, political and knowledge processes interact and ‘close down’ on challenges, frequently with disastrous results for the ordinary citizens of Zimbabwe who are always offered such a splendid future by the Zanu-PF rhetoric. Sometimes it appears as if local politicians on all sides are trying to change social reality by changing the discourses that shape that reality, as if verbal commitments constitute action and can right a revolution that went wrong and betrayed its own ideals. This chapter reveals how a development discourse that headlines the ‘Indigenisation and People’s Empowerment Program’ in reality conceals the continuing reproduction of hierarchical power relations which excludes the great mass of rural peasants and urban unemployed. Thus land ‘reforms’ which have benefitted a tiny black Zanu-PF elite are still represented as a new wave of the heroic struggle of the ongoing antiBritish revolution. It is remarkable that so much of the discussion of political parties in Africa concerns personalities and internal and external squabbles and fights. Because the days of significant ideological differences appear to be largely past, little attention is paid to party manifestos or programmes. This chapter helps to rebalance the emphasis and, although the father of the nation is now just a shadow figure, the ideas expressed on behalf of his party are still significant. South Africa is often an outlier in discussions of governance in Africa. Even under Apartheid, state institutions, including the courts, generally functioned at a level superior to that found in other countries south of the Sahara. Three South African researchers: Mkhie, Makau and Madumi address the question of how far good governance under the Zuma administration could be seen to be a fad or a reality. For many South Africans the very question would evoke laughter. Citizens saw themselves as living in a state whose leader was so corrupt as to believe that there was no

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distinction between state property and his private property, and no division between the welfare of his business cronies and the welfare of the nation. The authors stress that awareness, down to the street level, of the government going beyond daily corruption at all levels to state capture at the top of the political pyramid had brought South Africa to the point of state fragility. After a detailed account of the failings of the Zuma regime and the links between his party’s fanatical desire to hold onto power and its unwillingness to address state capture, the authors put forward their recommendations for institutional changes with strong optimism. For rural South Africa, Andrew Skuse presents a frank analysis of how social welfare provision actually works on the ground and how corruption is faced by those at the grassroots who find themselves most hurt by those immediately above them. Disadvantaged people need not only to have access to the publicly available information about the system, they also need to know all the unwritten rules about how to prove one’s identity and work through the powerful local networks that determine access. Based upon ethnographic studies in the rural areas of Eastern Cape Province, the chapter examines the ‘everydayness’ of the state in contexts where everyone may have a right to speak, but many cannot make their voices heard where they might have some impact, and so are excluded. The specific case here involves the corruption associated with access to disability payments, where too often the poor and handicapped are not able to get the money they are entitled to because of illiteracy and a lack of knowledge of how bureaucracies work, whilst the able-bodied and betteroff literate villagers score through networks such as the village social welfare committees. Ironically, paying a hefty fee for a private consultation with the doctor who certifies disability will also secure a healthy person the disability grant. Strikingly, this is a system that benefits women rather than men, as they are the ones who maintain the networks (although the main corrupt doctor is a man supported by the women who benefit from his dishonest certification). Almost all African social scientists are in a position to contribute to the debates over good governance and state fragility. Yet, to date, there have been few contributions by linguists. Finex Ndhlovu’s chapter on ‘Prospects for linguistic and cultural diversity to enhance African political governance’ offers a new perspective. It asks two vital questions: ‘what affordances do Africa’s cultural and linguistic resources provide for creativity and innovation in our quest for good and inclusive political governance systems?’ and ‘What would Africa’s political governance system

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look like if we were to recognize the diversity of African languages as an opportunity and not a liability?’ Ndhlovu discusses the little-explored question of the probable impacts of the greater use of African languages in African governance. He is optimistic, and presents evidence to support his optimism. Others wonder how far language divides rather than unifies and how far the use of African languages may cut people off from the good ideas associated with globalism as well as the bad. Does an African president who regularly prefers his native tongue in his public speeches signal national pride, an ethnic bias or just a lack of Western education? There are also questions of technology—how far has the very widespread use of mobile phones changed patterns of language use? (During the fighting in the Ivory Coast mobile phone data proved invaluable in tracking the movements of internally displaced people and refugees as they fled before advancing violence). Although located in the Pacific, Vanuatu presents many similarities to the smaller African states. Like Cameroon it was formerly divided between British and French colonialists and so experienced both forms of administration. Cameroon has a population of 25 million and 277 languages, Vanuatu has a population of 284,000 and some 111 living languages (Ethnologue data for 2018). As explored by Gregoire Nimbtik, Vanuatu provides a very interesting test case for the role of traditional chiefs because the country is a small island state with some very remote islands. Indeed, it consists of some eighty islands scattered along an 800 km axis, most without any access by public transport. It could well be argued that if chiefs cannot survive in a politically active (rather than ceremonial) role in Vanuatu, then they are unlikely to be able to survive anywhere else in the modern world. As Gregoire describes, there is an enduring dialectical tension between aspirations for a more locally embedded system of government in Vanuatu and the legal-rational model of sovereignty and powered justice imported by colonial powers and colonizers, to which most modern power elites are wedded. Whilst the modern state system is based on majority rule and free and fair elections, varying from island to island, the traditional system relies upon decisions by consensus or by hereditary chiefs. The role of the chiefs is enshrined in the Constitution of Vanuatu. However, chiefs require the concrete support of the Government of the day to be able to meet and receive administrative back-up. At first glance, chiefs in Vanuatu might appear to be in a highly advantageous position, especially since, owing to the constant pursuit of personal and ethnic advantage in contexts ranging from the violent to the

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tragi-comical, politicians lack respect. Still, even in Vanuatu chiefs face problems. One is the potential for conflict between the traditional religious base, which provides the deep-down support for the role of the chiefs, and Christianity, which acknowledges quite different authorities (under colonialism there were indeed special ‘missionary chiefs’). Another is that the traditions which support the chiefs, as is so often also the case in Africa, preclude any significant roles for women, youths and people from the ‘wrong’ families. Chiefs thus need to walk a very narrow line to maintain their authority. A wife who is regularly beaten by her abusive husband may appeal to the chief who supports the husband’s right to beat his wife but calls for less violence. The chief then tells the wife that, however violent, she has to stay with her husband because she will lose her children if she leaves. Some women then commit suicide. There are many disputes over the right to use certain plots of land (land holding in Vanuatu is generally communal). The chief will adjudicate and name the rightful party, the opposing, unsuccessful party can then appeal to a Western-style legal authority. Since it is uncommon for the loser to accept the chief’s decision, conflict is widespread even in situations where the chief is a totally honest and fair-minded man. Where the chief is open to accepting special gifts, the situation is even more difficult. It is a measure of the fluidity and complexity of the system and of the importance of the interactions between bureaucratic and traditional systems that there is a continuing debate as to whether there are such people as female chiefs. There is no dispute that there are women who take up the chiefly duties of their deceased husbands and that in some ethnic groups there are women who have a special status as advisers on ritual and custom, but the question is whether these widows and/or advisers qualify as chiefs and who is to decide. The National Council of Chiefs (NCC): the Malvatu Mauri says it would accept female chiefs if their names were put forward by the area councils and they had proper chiefly names and titles (Island Life 7/4/2017). In a striking mixture of the modern and traditional, chiefs are elected to be members of the NCC and the President of the NCC is elected by the members.

Conclusion Each of the chapters of this book explores issues of governance within a particular national or local context. It may be a cliché to repeat that there is no ‘one size fits all model’ of governance even for sub-Saharan African

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countries, but it is nevertheless true. This is one reason why the donors’ passion for governance training along standardized lines is often so very much misplaced. Actually, the government officials and politicians who receive the training are often very happy because it is accompanied by per diems and free meals and even accommodation (for Malawian public servants, perks associated with training have been calculated to be equivalent to one month’s salary per year). This is just one example of how even attempts to combat bad governance and corruption may have the opposite effect if not designed with an intelligent and cynical appreciation of local conditions. More needs to be done: to ask the locals both whether they see a need to improve governance and, if so, how they, who have to live within the system, think that it can be done. Like architects planning a settlement, designers of governance systems need to know how the inhabitants live, what their priorities are and how far people can be led to change their ways for their own good. The extent to which global religions have largely supplanted localized traditional religions, features of which are adopted into the new faiths, demonstrates that people can be very flexible in adopting changed behaviours, but only when they can see the rewards in front of their eyes. People are won over less by rational arguments than by the demonstration of results in a familiar context: as the Chapters show, Zimbabwe is not Rwanda, is not Nigeria.

The Realities of Governance: Conflict and Context Across Africa Helen Ware

Back in 1992 Ali Mazrui wrote that: The political dilemma in Africa is avoiding the danger of tyranny on one side and the risk of anarchy on the other. Tyranny is too much government and frequently features a centralization of violence: anarchy is too little government and features decentralized violence – often neighbour against neighbour. Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and Liberia have experienced both centralized and anarchic violence. The economic dilemma in Africa is avoiding the risk of economic dependency (a truncated capacity for selfreliance) on one side and the peril of economic decay (a truncated capacity for development), on the other. The crisis of governance in Africa concerns the relationship between the political evils of tyranny and anarchy and the economic evils of dependency and decay. (Mazrui 1992: 550)

At that time Mazrui was concerned that one-party states rapidly became tyrannical but that full democracy in multi-ethnic states sometimes led to anarchy, but almost always led to economic decay through corruption and economic privatization of the state by a dynasty or an ethnic group or a general free for all, as in Nigeria under Shagari. Mazrui thus flirted with

H. Ware (B) University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia © The Author(s) 2020 J. I. Lahai and H. Ware (eds.), Governance and Societal Adaptation in Fragile States, Governance and Limited Statehood, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40134-4_2

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the idea of an engineered two-party system in which voters had the choice between two nation-wide parties, one to the left and one to the right. As with many social science concepts that have a history, governance does not have a clinical or universally accepted definition (Makinda 2017). From 1992 to 2007 the World Bank’s definition of governance moved from: ‘governance is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development’ (World Bank 1992: 1) to: ‘the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services’ (World Bank 2007: 1). The 1992 definition has the virtue of hinging on how power is exercised. The 2007 text benefits by making it plain that authority and implementation are necessarily exercised by persons or institutions, thus ‘good governance’ requires good persons and good institutions and ‘bad governance’ occurs when the bad guys are in charge and the institutions to control them are badly designed or too weak. It is the premise of this chapter that the discussion of governance relies more upon a family resemblance between understandings of governance than on any one exact definition, and that there is little point in discussing governance without a pragmatic focus on who exactly delivers what to whom and under what circumstances. Governance should only be measured by what it actually delivers (problems of measurement are discussed further below). In any state where there is good governance citizens, irrespective of race, religion, region, language, gender or income can access basic services without experiencing discrimination in the availability or the quality of the service. They do not have to fear an emergency dash to a remote clinic only to find no staff in attendance and no drugs on the shelves. In face to face interactions with bureaucrats and applying for government employment they know that their ethnic background and political affiliations will not make a difference. In other words, there is a clear understanding that public resources are indeed to be shared equitably. For UNDP, somewhat idealistically, ‘Good governance is, among other things, participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and equitable. And it promotes the rule of law. Good governance ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources’ (UNDP in Gisselquist 2012: 6).

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Mazrui (1986) stressed the triple heritage of Africa: African traditions, Islamic influences and Western values. In discussions of governance, Western values are often pitted against African traditions or proposals are made to attempt an amalgamation of the better elements of both traditions. However, little is heard of Muslim modes of governance, with the exception of limited experiments within the geographic borders of a disintegrating Somalia. Several West African States provide interesting case studies of countries where the northern regions are Muslim and the southern regions predominantly Christian but there have been very few studies that have tried to examine patterns of governance across religious boundaries within nation states. Much of this chapter is devoted to discussion of conditions in Africa and of issues relevant to Africa. This reflects the fact that all but one of the chapters to follow relate to Africa and that the author is most familiar with African conditions having worked there as an academic, as a diplomat and as a development assistance consultant. However, it is also undeniably the case that Africa is at the centre of issues relating to governance. Of the United Nations 19 complex peace operations since the end of the Cold War 10 have been in Africa. Governance data from the US Millennium Challenge Account in 2006 showed that 75% of the worst performers and 90% of states ‘struggling on many fronts’ were African. In the 2006 Fund for Peace Failed States Index 53% of the most failed (and 6 out of the top 7) were also in Africa (Englebert and Tull 2008). Since the 1990s the study of governance has been a significant academic growth industry. The Online Contents journals catalogue had 24 hits in 1990, 510 in 1999 and 603 in 2000 (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004). ‘By the 2000s, a significant portion of the development agenda was related to good governance: international development agencies created departments of governance, employed a small army of governance advisors and researchers, included governance components in their assistance packages, and increased funding for good governance initiatives’ (Grindle 2010: 1). Even by 2000, it was clearly impossible for anyone to be familiar with all of the literature. Hirst (2000) clarified the field by distinguishing between a range of areas of focal interest within the literature. These included ‘good governance’ as defined by the World Bank and others interested in economic development which could be divided into corporate ‘good governance’ within the private sector as defined by the OECD’s non-binding principles and ‘good governance’ in the public sector as found in the New Public Management literature. Common

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themes across many countries included issues of governability, accountability and legitimacy as created by inputs (e.g. legislative mandates) and by outputs (e.g. services actually delivered). Some commentators have criticized the very idea of governance for being ‘polluted’ by normative definitions of ‘good governance’, especially those produced by the World Bank, which are considered to be tainted by their links with the dreaded neo-liberalism and/or the ‘depoliticization’ of public affairs so as to create a purely technocratic vision which is both illusory and misleading (de Sardan 2011; Hermet et al. 2005). However, this author takes the view that it is possible to discuss governance from a range of different viewpoints, including those of the governed and those most directly affected, without accepting the burden of set, and ever more extensive and detailed ideologically biased definitions of what constitutes good governance. For many who write about governance, especially economists and development experts, good governance is less of an end in itself than a means of achieving the prized goal of ‘development’. Actually, although there is a clear correlation between per capita gross national income (GNI) and the quality of governance, it is certainly possible to raise GNI without improving governance. This chapter is concerned with good governance as an end in itself, in the sense of the rule of law and the delivery of basic services to the whole populace, irrespective of poverty or remoteness from the capital city and the centres of power. It is worth pointing out that it should be possible to radically improve governance without any change in total national wealth ‘simply’ by making the distribution of wealth fairer and preventing sections of the elite from creaming off vast wealth destined for Swiss bank accounts, with Nigeria being a perfect example of where this has not happened. Economic growth does not bring better governance without a commitment to the sharing of wealth. Better governance with greatly extended delivery of services, both across the country and to the poorest groups and minimization of corruption will not necessarily lead to economic growth but it will greatly improve many peoples’ lives. An issues paper on ‘Corruption and Economic Growth’ prepared for the G20 Summit in St. Petersburg in 2013 found that: While the direct link between corruption and GDP growth is difficult to assess, corruption does have significant negative effects on a host of key transmission channels, such as investment (including FDI), competition,

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entrepreneurship, government efficiency, including with regards to government expenditures and revenues, and human capital formation. Furthermore, corruption affects other important indicators of economic development such as the quality of the environment, personal health and safety status, equity (income distribution), and various types of social or civic capital (‘trust’) – which impact significantly on economic welfare and, in the case of trust, also a country’s development potential. (G20 2013: 1)

This chapter discusses a selection of specific themes relating to governance, which are of particular relevance to fragile states, especially in Africa, a continent which by 2050 will be home to a quarter of the world’s population.

Rebuilding the Governance Truck ‘Debt relief for the very poor nations makes sense. It should be extended regardless of bad governance. Would you collect a pound of flesh from a dictator if the flesh is actually going to come from his emaciated and oppressed subjects?’ (Bhagwati and Gambari 2005). Where governance has broken down and is failing to deliver benefits to anyone except a small section of the elite, there are a number of interlinked questions which immediately arise. Did the country in question ever have good governance, especially in the remote border regions away from the capital? Is the need to rebuild a system which once worked, or is a new system needed to replace an old system which never delivered for the mass of the people? Many would argue that the majority of African states have never achieved full statehood in the sense meant by Westerners who expect to find repositories of power and authority within state borders and general suppliers of political goods (Englebert and Tull 2008: 111). Is it possible to build from the grassroots up or does there have to be a major change at the top before any significant change can be achieved? If we think of reforming governance in terms of rebuilding the truck of state, where are the genuine new parts to come from? Or, since existing politicians and bureaucrats are very reluctant to abandon their lucrative posts, are there any genuine new parts to be had? There is a widespread African belief that in democracies each newly elected government spends its first term exposing the corruption of the previous government; its second term working out how to benefit from the opportunities for corruption made available by the departure or

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occasional imprisonment of members of the former government; and the third term exporting gains to overseas tax-havens before the cycle begins again with elections in which a by-now notoriously corrupt government is voted out. Actually, there is limited evidence that notoriously corrupt politicians are routinely voted out even in European countries such as Italy. Whilst it is relatively easy to understand how corrupt individuals can drag a once honest system down, as is currently happening in Botswana, it is much more difficult to envisage how honest individuals can clean up a system where corruption is the norm. Laws may exist to make bribery and other forms of corruption illegal, or they may be introduced anew, but they then have to be enforced by police forces and judicial systems where every day corruption has been normalized. Corruption is infectious but honesty is rarely catching. In the international debates, sometimes it seems as if ‘good governance’ is just being used as code for ‘minimal corruption’. There is general agreement that countries with widespread corruption cannot have good governance. However, there is little discussion as to how far there are real-life examples of countries with minimal corruption which still suffer from poor governance, perhaps because their institutions are badly designed and/or their public officials and bureaucrats have not been adequately trained for their roles. The reality appears to be that the elements of bad governance cluster together and countries tend to be generally good or generally bad, rather than good in some areas of governance and bad in others. This can be seen from the multiple governance indexes available. Thus amongst the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators for 2007, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption are correlated at 0.94, the Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption Indicators at 0.93 and the Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law at 0.92 (Kaufmann et al. 2008). Despite the use of 340 variables from 32 sources it would appear that a single broad concept of good governance is what is being measured. In principle, if a country has laws against corruption and these are being effectively enforced then one would expect the two aspects to go together to create effective governance. It is a measure of how remote the majority of the discussion of African governance is from the realities on the ground that so little attention is paid to what people at the grassroots actually say. It is ironic that, although there are some 1800–2000 language across Africa (with the 8 most common being, in descending order: Swahili, Amharic, Yoruba, Oromo, Hausa, Igbo, Zulu and Shona), very little public or academic

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conversation addresses how these languages are actually used in the contexts being discussed. For example, there are debates about the role of the state, but no one asks whether in the local vernaculars it is actually possible to distinguish between the government and the state. In many cases, even the word for government will be a corruption of the French, Portuguese or English term with inevitable colonial overtones. It would be an interesting exercise to ask villagers about the local words used to describe what a chief actually does and how far these same words would apply to a politician or a government official. Issues of language, ethnicity and conflict often overlap although it should be noted that Somali is spoken across Somalia and Kinyarwanda by Hutu and Tutsi alike. In his chapter, Finex Ndhlovu discusses the little-explored question of the probable impacts of the greater use of African languages in African governance. He is optimistic, others wonder how far language divides rather than unifies and how far the use of African languages may cut people off from the good ideas associated with globalism as well as the bad. Does an African president who regularly prefers his native tongue in his public speeches signal national pride, an ethnic bias or just a lack of Western education? There are also questions of technology—how far have the very widespread mobile phones changed patterns of language use? (During the fighting in the Ivory Coast mobile phone data proved invaluable in tracking the movements of internally displaced people and refugees as they fled.) Remote from the countries themselves, the Quality of Government Institute (QGI) based in the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg has created a remarkable body of work examining the nature of what constitutes ‘good government’ (The Quality of Government Dataset http://www.qog.pol.gu.se). This group of academics regard ‘quality of government’ and ‘good governance’ and ‘state capacity’ as close cousins which have become prominent in international policy circles since the mid 1990s. Thus the IMF declared in 1996 ‘promoting good governance in all its aspects, including by ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption, as essential elements of a framework within which economies can prosper’ (IMF 2005). Despite the fact that poor governance is normally presented as a problem associated with poor non-Western countries, Greece and Italy score lower than a number of much poorer non-European countries including Botswana and Tanzania (Rothstein and Holmberg 2014: 9). This is important evidence that ‘good governance’ is heavily dependent upon national culture. Avoiding

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paying taxes is allegedly the Greek national sport and the consequence is an unworkable system where the rule of law fails in the area of tax collection. For the members of the QGI neither democratization nor marketization has delivered the economic benefits for the ordinary citizens which were hoped for. Instead many elections remained ‘drenched in corruption, patronage, favouritism, and abuse of power’ (Diamond 2007). Marketization did not work because the countries affected did not have enough of the formal and informal institutions taken for granted in neoclassical economics. They lacked ‘a regulatory apparatus curbing the worst forms of fraud, anti-competitive behaviour, and moral hazard, a moderately cohesive society exhibiting trust and social co-operation. Social and political institutions that mitigate risk and manage social conflicts, the rule of law and clean government’ (Rodrik 2007: 97). The institutional approach which QGI supports is based on the belief that the character of a society’s political institutions determines its economic and social development rather than the causal link operating in the opposite direction. For QGI ‘neither the absence of corruption, nor representative democracy, nor the size of government, nor the rule of law, nor administrative effectiveness capture what should be counted as quality of government ’ (QGI 2011: 16). What they choose, instead, is the basic norm of impartiality in the exercise of public power.

Governance and Democracy Proponents of good governance are often unclear as to whether the aim is ‘to generate growth, alleviate poverty or bring effective democracy to people in poor countries’ (Grindle 2010: 2). Indeed, there is little clarity as to whether democracy is to be seen as a requirement for, or an outcome of, good governance. Certainly, one of the most debated governance issues is whether ‘good governance’ necessarily can only occur within a democratic system. To test this proposition it is necessary to take care to use a definition of good governance which does not prejudge the issue. As Nanda (2006: 269) notes: ‘There are no objective standards for determining good governance: some aspects include political stability, the rule of law, control of corruption and accountability’. As Australia was recently downgraded for poor governance due to the frequency of its changes in prime minister, absent national elections, it might be asked just how much political stability is required and how often a country

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should ideally change leader to balance stability against corrupt hanging on to power. Few would debate that Mugabe, Mbasogo, Biya, Nguesso, Museveni and al-Bashir stayed on far too long. In the private sector it is certainly possible to think of major corporations which are very well run by highly autocratic leaders but they are usually required to leave if they fail to deliver. In the case of a nation state, the World Bank, which long tried to remain a-political, maintains that to have good governance the national administration must be accountable to the people. ‘Governance is epitomized by predictable, open, and enlightened policy making (that is, transparent processes): a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs, and all behaving under the rule of law’ (World Bank 1994: vii). It is very difficult to envisage how these conditions could be met, except under a democracy. Neither Singapore nor Hong Kong are free democracies yet both are generally considered to have excellent governance in terms of the maintenance of order and the delivery of services. It is thus not clear whether widespread requirements for a strong civil society have a fully valid justification. The claim is that a strong civil society can hold officials and governments to account and thus ensure good governance but, here too, badly crafted definitions can result in circular arguments—civil society groups are defined as being strong precisely because they are able to hold their governments to account. It is more productive to look for empirical evidence of countries which are not noted for vibrant civil society groups but deliver fair public services with little corruption or discrimination across the country. A number of countries in Asia, which have demonstrated that it is less the size of the state apparatus than its quality, immediately come to mind. Many researchers have found that the relationship between democracy and quality of government is not a simple one. Arguing that it is necessary to view the issue in terms of both supply and demand, Charron and Lapuente (2010), demonstrate that democracy only delivers quality efficient government without corruption once a certain level of economic development is achieved (see their Figure 1 covering 153 countries page 446). Up to that point, they argue, both leaders and followers are operating within short time horizons which preclude quality government. Also, poor democracies may have less politically active voters and less press freedom (Back and Hadenius 2008), although modern information technologies may have changed this.

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Thus intertwined with the relationship between good governance and democracy is the role of a free press/media. Jefferson is reported to have said that: ‘Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter’. A free press is supposed to bring to light and disseminate the information that informs the electorate and holds powerful people and institutions accountable. In many fragile countries, where the political opposition is weak and/or available to the highest bidder, the media is almost the only check on corruption, excesses and stupidity in government. Historically, in Western Europe, free press campaigns were able over time to improve standards of governance independently of formal political processes. In 2018 World Press Freedom Day had a special focus on the relationship between press freedom and holding governments accountable. For UNDP, Pippa Norris has specialized in studying: ‘The role of the free press in promoting democratization, good governance and human development’ (2006). She has argued that the media can play three roles in promoting good governance: as a watchdog over the abuse of power through promoting accountability and transparency; in providing a civic forum for multiple voices in the public debate about how the country should be governed (which might, or might not, facilitate well-informed political choices) and in highlighting problems which need to be addressed to strengthen governmental responsiveness to social problems. Norris’s statistical analysis examined the relationships between national scores on the Freedom House Index of Press Freedom, and the Worldwide Press Freedom Index and a range of measures of levels of democracy and the Kaufmann/World Bank Five Indicators of Good Governance (political stability; the rule of law; government efficiency; regulatory quality and level of corruption). In her 2002 data, Benin in West Africa, despite its poverty, stood out as doing well on both press freedom and good governance (as did Mali). Overall, all five indicators of good governance showed significant and consistently positive relationships with the level of press freedom even after controlling for a range of economic and social factors. Having someone to speak out in public and tell truth to power does matter. In 2016 ‘Nigeria says it has recovered US $9.1 billion in stolen money and assets’ (Washington Post 4 June 2016). That the government of former General Muhammadu Buhari works hard to publicize such claims is evidence that publicity can be a good disinfectant for corruption. The Afrobarometer Survey of 1600 Nigerians in 2017 showed a significant improvement in public perceptions

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of the success of the government’s fight against corruption since the 2015 Survey, from 40% saying the government was performing ‘fairly well’ or ‘very well’ in 2015 to 59% in 2017. However, 69% of citizens still said the ‘most’ or ‘all’ police officials and 60% that ‘most’ or ‘all’ members of the National Assembly were corrupt. Some 51% held that judges and magistrates were corrupt but just 43% held this view of the President and his office. Those outside the government fared somewhat better with ‘only’ 44% of business executives and 40% of non-governmental organizations seen as corrupt. Whilst 54% thought that ordinary people could make a difference, 77% feared retaliation should they report an incident of corruption (Cleen Foundation 2018). Qualitative researchers often despise sample surveys, but how else is it possible to gain a valid indication of what proportions of the population hold certain views?

Rwanda, Free Speech, Democracy and Good Governance The issue of the role of democracy as a requirement for good governance runs parallel to the issue of the role of human rights more generally (Maldonado 2010). Once again, China is a case which comes immediately to mind. Within Africa, Rwanda is an obvious test case. In its recent Global Report Improving Public Sector Performance Through Innovation and Inter-Agency Co-ordination (2018) the World Bank examines fifteen model projects only three of which are from Africa. Mozambique scores one, but Rwanda scores two. This is highly problematic since Kagame’s Rwanda (the possessive being highly appropriate) is a country with so little free speech that only ten persons nation-wide dared speak out against the President’s term being extended potentially until 2034 (Reyntjens 2016). The vote was 98.3% in favour. Thus Rwanda is only notionally a democracy, yet the World Bank, which insists that democracy is required for ‘good governance’, now regularly cites Rwanda as the paragon of examples of ‘good governance’ for Africa and indeed the rest of the world. Rwanda presents the classic case of a country with minimal protection for human rights where the government and the bureaucracy can certainly deliver with great efficiency in areas such as pre-natal checks. This is far from being reassuring given Rwanda’s recent history of high levels of efficiency in the delivery of malign outcomes. Mussolini made the trains run on time, Kagame ensures that babies are delivered in clinics.

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Making the Rwandan state more effective and efficient is only praiseworthy if there are guarantees that the state will protect the individual human rights of all, irrespective of group membership or political views, but this is not currently the case. If the World Bank is intent on finding an African good governance success story, Ghana or Malawi might offer good news stories with fewer human rights concerns (Malawi 2016). Until very recently, South Africa has been a test case in a different sense. As the Chapter by Mbekeeli Mkhize and colleagues explains, under Jacob Zuma South Africa was a democracy under the rule of law with a free press and vibrant civil society groups yet it had an exceedingly corrupt and unchecked government to the point of state capture. Only the future can tell how far South African voters at all levels of government will do more to deny their votes to corrupt political leaders, irrespective of their desires to continue to support their party right or wrong.

Governance and Security For the citizens probably the greatest benefit of ‘good governance’ is the ability to live in security under a predictable and equitable system providing for the rule of law. Beginning with freedom from civil war, this should extend from protection from violent robberies to having access to fair and timely judgements in cases of disputes over land (which are extremely common across much of Africa). Isima (2007) has studied the privatization of violence and security sector reform (SSR) in Nigeria and South Africa and argues that ‘given the environment of improved democratic governance, a crucial challenge for SSR is how to bolster physical security as a precondition for human security and sustainable development’ (p. 25). Weak states fail to deliver good governance (or, at the remote borders, possibly any governance at all, as in the case of the Central African Republic) because they lack the control and the institutional capacity. There needs to be a police force on the ground with vehicles and money for fuel and the police officers have to be willing and trained to keep the peace. (Remarkably, Rwanda has had police officers assisting UN peacekeeping efforts in Darfur, South Sudan and Haiti.) The capacity of states to exercise control and deliver services depends upon ‘despotic power’ to control the territory and the population and ‘infrastructural power’ which requires government officials to be present and willing and able to deliver services (Thomas 1989: 182). Despotic power as delivered by governments and UN peacekeepers comes first, not least because governments need control over an area to raise taxes or to exploit natural

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resources so that they can fund their activities. Services can only come second, and the more effective services the state can deliver the less the need for despotic power. The Niger Delta provides a classic example of this inter-relationship, because the Nigerian Federal Government cannot or will not deliver services to the settlements in the Delta, they are faced with constant violent threats. Those in control in Abuja chose to pay off the Delta’s youth militias but they could rather have built schools and clinics if the local administration had not been so corrupt. In the Delta politicians have long compounded corruption by using their corrupt gains to finance private militias.

Governance in War Zones The most fragile states are those which are actually experiencing civil war. In 2017 these included Afghanistan, DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen (Fragile States Index 2018). The past decade has seen a growing interest in how governance works in wartime especially in rebelheld areas (see World Bank 2017: 131–132 for references). Knowing how rebels rule their territories leads to many insights into the bare bones of governance and how governance works more broadly. ‘Despite common depictions of war as chaotic and anarchic, order often emerges locally’ and ‘although fear and violence are common in conflict areas, chaos is seldom the norm because clear rules often exist’ (Arjona 2014: 1360, 1374). Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that very few areas with human populations are entirely without governance of some form. Thus with ISIS the problem was not a lack of governance but rather too much, too effective, too harsh governance. Somalia offers a fascinating study in contrasts between the areas very weakly controlled by the government; Somaliland quite effectively governed by an alternative government and Puntland striving to achieve an alternative form of effective governance (Menkhaus 2006; Renders 2007; Lahai 2019). Based on his studies in Colombia, which revealed a very wide range of variations in local forms of wartime social order, Arjona (2014) has proposed a typology of wartime institutions and an associated research agenda. The typology includes three groups: disorder, rebelocracy and aliocracy. Disorder is where there are indeed no clear rules and it is virtually impossible to predict the behaviour of the rebels (say wartime Sierra Leone, Liberia and parts of Somalia). Rebelocracy is where the rebels have rules and their behaviour, however violent, is relatively

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predictable and goes beyond the maintenance of some form of public order and the collection of material contributions. Aliocracy is where the rebels maintain a form of order and levy contributions of cash, food and even fighters but leave traditional authorities, state officials or civic leaders to govern the area on a day-to-day basis (for example Renamo in Mozambique or SPLM in parts of South Sudan). In Colombia Arjona (2014) found that guerrillas and paramilitaries regulated mobility in more than half of the locations where they were present and regulated free speech in 90% of cases. They even regulated personal appearance (the wearing of skirts by women or ear-rings by men) and homosexuality and prostitution in two-thirds of cases. In about half of the communities where a guerrilla group was present the commander presented the rules that everyone was expected to follow at public meetings. For countries with at least five years’ experience of internal war, Mamphilly (2007) studied three rebel civil administrations intensively and 12 in less detail. His criteria for effectiveness covered the provision of police and legal dispute settling mechanism (9 cases); basic health and education services (5 cases) and a feedback mechanism for civilian complaints. (5 cases). The only rebel group to provide all three services was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. The groups to provide none of these services were the Communist Party of Burma (CPB); the National Patriotic Forces of Liberia (NPFL) and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). Mamphilly’s judgements of the effectiveness of these rebels’ civil administrations has been overtaken by the passage of time, also there is the question of what exactly these movements were attempting to achieve. Those who were aiming to take over the central government could believe that they would inherit the services provided, however imperfectly, by the existing government; those aiming at succession had a stronger motive to start setting up services in advance of taking over the government of their region. Mamphilly’s research also demonstrated the importance of leadership, strong leaders could ensure the delivery of at least some services, however unpropitious the circumstances. Another factor was the relationship between the rebels and the local civil society, with the researcher emphasizing that civilians generally maintain some choice in their level of collaboration with the rebels even if only whether to run away or not. Also pre-conflict levels of service provision, whether by government officials or churches and other NGOs, are often determinative of what the rebels are able to support or provide.

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Whilst there has been growing interest in how governance is practised by rebel groups, there has been remarkably little examination of just how it is that governments lose control of areas of their national territory. The rebels may gain control by force of arms but often the prior question is: what was the failure of the government that made such a seizure possible and even sustainable? Was the government ever really in control? Did the local officials who ran the system switch sides voluntarily? What was the influence of cross-border elements with long-standing interests in governance on both sides of the border—perhaps in relation to smuggling of goods or labour?

Grey Areas: The Fine Grain of Poor Governance To really understand how poor governance comes about and is maintained it is necessary to look at the fine detail of how it works in a day-to-day setting. Chris Willott (2014) spent nine months carrying out ethnographic fieldwork in a university (pseudonym USEN) in an Igbo-speaking area of south eastern Nigeria. He explains how the Department of Social Policy where he worked was split into two factions: a left leaning-group which was relatively honest, and a for-profit group who sold a range of favours such as university admission and the course hand-outs required to pass their units for illicit fees. The two groups had originally been divided by ideology with the left leaning being avowed Marxists but over time they had mellowed and the distinction had become one between those who wished to preserve academic standards and those who prioritized making a profit. Nigerian English has a number of terms specific to academic corruption such as ‘sorting’ for the sale of grades; ‘lobbying’ for the sale of university places. Willott is at pains to demonstrate that in this ‘game’ there were still limits. Prospective students could buy university entry, but only if their marks were reasonably acceptable. Honest staff with good publication records could find their promotions blocked but only for so many years (17 in the extreme case). Corruption really flourished in the grey areas, where the gap between two candidates for promotion was not too large or the Ph.D. applicant not too badly qualified. Factions are not unique to non-Western universities, they are to be found across the globe. In the Western cases, the rewards for those who belong to the ascendant faction (a division often based on arcane ideological differences within each academic discipline) will still include promotion and involvement in

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activities which will support claims to future promotion, but will rarely involve actual cash transfers which are too easily monitored and proven. Factionalism, defined as competition for power, positions and prestige between two or more similar groups, is found in many settings: political parties, bureaucracies, chiefdoms, trade unions, employers’ clubs and religious groups (Bayart 2009). The USEN case was unusual in that one faction was corrupt but the other was not. It is remarkable that both could survive within one institution even though the corrupt faction, which had secured the appointment of their candidate as Head of Department, devoted much energy to trying to drive out their more academically focused colleagues who fortunately maintained the support of their Vice Chancellor. This case is a good example of the fact that there are different kinds of corruption which may well have different impacts on economic growth and the welfare of the general population.

Attacking the World Bank on Governance It is very easy to attack the World Bank, especially on the issue of governance. As its 2007 Annual Report trumpeted, just between 2002 and 2007 the Bank loaned $22.7 billion for projects related to public sector governance and the rule of law. By 2003, the World Bank had listed no less than 116 requirements for good governance (Grindle 2010). As a target the Bank is enormous and often highly unpopular and when its staff do fight back, the response is often in the arcane language of mathematically fixated economists (Kaufmann et al. 2008; Hamilton and Hammer 2018). Worse, the World Bank is attacked for promoting neo-liberalism which has become a catch-all term for everything which anti-capitalists and many academics abhor, often with a near-religious fervour but with remarkably few suggestions for workable alternatives. Governments, or groups within governments, often have mixed feelings about their relationships with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (together constituting the International Financial Institutions or IFIs). Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) have been almost universally condemned, including on the grounds that poor countries are forced into them, and then have to cut their provision of services, notably for health and education. However, there has been very little discussion of the one alternative which is usually available—reducing military budgets, which would leave much greater freedom of choice to the individual poor countries. (However, Japan is said to have raised this issue at private

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intergovernmental talks.) Having the World Bank as a whipping boy is often to the advantage of corrupt elites who have stolen monies meant for public projects: ‘we are not to blame that the school roof/hospital generator has not been mended/replaced – World Bank austerity is to blame’. In terms of how governance is measured, the World Bank’s ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’ (WGI) are very widely used by academics and aid agencies. The US Millennium Challenge Account, established by the George W. Bush administration to target grants of hundreds of millions of dollars to well-governed countries, used the WGI to help decide which states were well-governed (Thomas 2009: 33). The WGI use some 340 variables from 32 different sources to create measures of: Voice & Accountability; Political Stability and Lack of Violence; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption. There are also World Bank Governance Surveys which provide assessments of individual countries. The indicators have been criticized on the grounds of lack of reproducibility and comparability over time and space; complexity; arbitrariness; hidden biases against household surveys and in favour of expert surveys. It is also argued that they lack conceptual clarity because they are not based on a clear, generally accepted theory of good governance. For example, one of the indicators concerns whether ‘Environmental regulations hurt competitiveness’. Who is to decide when taxes, labour or environmental regulations are at an appropriate level? Both a liberal democracy and an authoritarian dictatorship can agree on the importance of ‘the rule of law’ but the former believes in ‘a state where everyone, including the president, is constrained by fixed rules’ whereas the latter believes in a state ‘where citizens obey government edicts’. In contrast to the World Bank’s approach is the African perspective of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). The IIAG has four categories: Safety & Rule of Law; Participation & Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunity and Human Development. In South Africa the Democratic Alliance opposition party used this Index to attack the Government’s record on safety and security. The inclusion of the human development dimension measures what governments actually deliver. This means that Gabon, which has a poor political participation and human rights record, can still rank eighth across the continent because of its good human development indicators.

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A Second Airport for Sierra Leone? It is often argued that the varying opportunities for corruption can have a very bad influence on a government’s choice of which development projects to finance. The case of the proposed second airport for Sierra Leone provides an excellent example. As has already been noted, one feature of a well-governed state is that the press is free to discuss and reveal potential corruption. In 2016 the Sierra Leone Telegraph published a three-part series: ‘Sierra Leone Mamamah airport project: A twist in China’s tail’ by Saad Barrie. The proposed airport in the North of the country was to be financed by ‘a whopping $400 million loan from China’. There was massive opposition including that from the World Bank, whose officials said that the country simply could not afford the increased debt. With an adult population of three million, the debt represented $13 per capita (10 days income) for people who would never get to use the facility (the existing airport only gets 100,000 passengers a year and this had dropped to 200 a day). As the series pointed out, this is in a country with a life expectancy of 52 years (30% of children do not even survive to age 5). Fewer than 30% of the population have access to electricity and clean drinking water. Yet the government, whose members were allegedly going to get a percentage for themselves, was supporting borrowing to build an airport that would largely benefit Chinese mining staff. Iron ore contributed 24% of Sierra Leone’s GDP in 2013. The Tonkolili Iron Ore Mining Project had been taken over by the Chinese in 2015. The two main shareholders were the Shandong Iron and Steel Group (SISG) and the Bermuda registered African Minerals Limited (AML). In turn, another Chinese SOE, China Railway Materials (CRM) is a major shareholder in AML and its principal marketing agent in China. Sales to SISG and CRM accounted for 82% of iron ore sold by AML in 2013. By March 2015 SISG was in full control of Tomkolili and ARPS with a 25 year concession to mine 12.8 billion tonnes of iron ore reserves. Unlike the AML executives, who could easily be persuaded to pay taxes in advance whenever the government needed to close a financing gap, the new Chinese owners were much less helpful. The whole complex Chinese involvement was highly questionable. One rumour was that the Chinese wanted to clear the site of the existing airport for a military base for the PLA Navy (Daily Maverick, June 2016). More plausibly, the existing airport conflicts with the proposed Tangrin Port where the ore could most cheaply be exported. This case is thus an excellent example

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of the complex of varied factors which go to make up ‘bad governance’; the vital role of the media in raising conflicts of interest and querying the role of the Chinese in Africa; and just why the ‘tick a box’ approach to measuring governance has so many weaknesses.

Leaders Without Constraints? One of the core questions about governance in developing countries is how far the leader at the very top, usually the president, is responsible for the quality of governance across the country. Students of European history are very familiar with the belief that a change of ruler can change everything, think of King Henry VIII in England or King Louis XIV in France. Whoever their choice of president, the 84 million Nigerians who have registered to vote in the 2019 elections believe that whoever gets to be president really makes a difference to how the country is governed. Writing fifty years before the French Revolution, the French Judge and political philosopher Montesquieu argued that at the inception of a new regime, leaders mould institutions whereas later in the cycle it is the institutions which mould the leader (The Spirit of the Laws 1748). The core problem with Nigeria, as with many African and other developing countries, is that the stage at which institutions mould leaders has, sadly, yet to arrive. A perfect, and readily measurable, example of this is the extent to which presidents refuse to accept constitutional limits to the number of terms which they can serve. There are endless debates about the weaknesses of leadership in Africa. This volume is more concerned with the weaknesses of the followership. Leaders, even dictatorial ones, cannot survive without a body of followers, especially in the armed services. This is where ethnic rivalry can play such an important role. Followers who belong to the same ethnic grouping as the leader may be well aware of his (very rarely her) multiple faults, but still continue their support given the reality, or the hope that some of the rewards of access to power will trickle down to them even at fourth or fifth remove. A common religion can operate in the same way and will be especially powerful where religious and ethnic divisions coincide. Religion is often more powerful than ethnicity in motivating groups and holding them together, especially where long-term physical courage is required. The continuing tragedy is that so often the fight is not to achieve a fairer and more equitable system, but simply to change who controls the national coffers and positions of power and thus who will benefit from the

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existing highly unfair system for the division of the spoils. Even movements which appear to begin as a fight for a new and fairer system (as with university student groups) can very rapidly transform into campaigns for personal benefit. In the Niger Delta the politics of local resistance are said to be ‘directed at blocking further alienation, expropriation and environmental degradation, and forcing through a mass project of restitution and self-determination’ (Obi 2007: 137). However, the reality is that the young militants are willing to be paid off by the government with sitdown money and then do nothing to support their cause. The leaders have the good sense to realize that that an environmental cloak for their personal rapacity plays well internationally, but their actions in bunkering (stealing oil) demonstrate how little concern they have for the environment. Montesquieu believed that a stable monarchy or republic is very difficult to attain since it requires ‘a masterpiece of legislation, rarely produced by hazard, and seldom attained by prudence’. On the other hand, producing a despotism is easy since there is no need to balance powers against each other; no requirement to create and maintain effective institutions; no idealistic motivations to be created for the citizens; and no restraints on absolute power to be kept in place. All despotism requires is sufficient force and brutality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018). Whilst corruption is a risk to which all forms of government are exposed, despotism actually embodies corruption. There is also the problem that people who have become accustomed to living in a despotism often lose the ability to imagine how to create a state where the rule of law prevails and democracy flourishes. Such citizens have been corrupted by their experience of life without the rule of law. Montesquieu saw educating the people as the only way to secure effective government with the fair rule of law for everyone. In these respects, his views of the world appear very valid for modern fragile countries such as Zimbabwe or Burundi.

How Long Can Colonialism Be Blamed for Present Misrule? All of the chapters in this book are about former colonies. They include lands colonized by the British, the French and the Belgians. Vanuatu was actually colonized simultaneously by both the British and the French with a Spanish Judge to deal with conflicts between the two systems. Today, the local ni-Vanuatu do not spend much time blaming their former colonial

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masters, they are much more concerned with current economic incursions from outside of their country which put national sovereignty in question. Many critics of colonialism in Africa appear obsessed with the question of ‘misdrawn borders’ for which the colonial governments can certainly be blamed. However, as the case of South Sudan all too sadly demonstrates, new boundaries create new problems, and ethnic groups appear capable of almost endless sub-division where there are valuable offices and physical wealth to be fought over. Another problem for the critics of colonialism is that they are often staunch Christians which makes criticism of Western values somewhat invidious and creates the need for any defence of traditional customs to be highly selective. Communal family or village values, as opposed to rampant Western individualism, have much to recommend them but often such values did not include people at a distance nor those regarded as servants or slaves. Many of the new national elites who took over from the colonialists at independence could imagine nothing better than taking over the privileges of the whites (even to being able to take ‘home leave’ in Europe). They did remarkably little to address the dualism of the colonial era marked by the coexistence of traditional institutions and formal state structures (Isima 2007: 29.) So the artificiality and remoteness of the colonial state often lives on (Azarya and Chazan 1987). As economic and social conditions deteriorate, citizens can adopt a range of strategies: suffer and manage, escape (that is emigrate—in the 1970s two million out of six million Guineans left the country; in 2010 295,000 Zimbabweans applied for permits to stay in much better governed South Africa). Mass emigration, even when those leaving are not strictly speaking refugees, is usually evidence of very poor governance. People can also use parallel systems: black markets, smuggling, corruption and the use of alternative methods of justice, such alternatives are known in Ghana as kalabule. In the early 1970s, it was estimated that 150,000 people working 150 days a year were needed to move the half million tons of Ghanaian cocoa which illegally crossed into Togo and the Ivory Coast. Moving away from state governance involves almost everyone. ‘Farmers and manual laborers, professionals and government employees, students and clerks have all joined in. The net effect of the expansion has been to make virtually everyone into a speculator, cheat, corruptor, or lawbreaker. By-passing the rule of law has become a form of survival and has institutionalised a dual system. The formal economy is shadowed by a non-formal one in which official mores and structures have their unofficial and binding

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counterparts. Beneath the surface, another contiguous, interweaving, and frequently overlapping network persists’ (Azarya and Chazan 1987: 126). (People can also choose ‘self-enclosure’ returning to rural areas or moving from public sector employment in town to the private sector.) Tusalem (2016) has examined in detail, with a worldwide sample, the relationship between prior colonial experience and subsequent state fragility and failure. He is unusual in examining the potential for colonial regimes to deliver benefits as well as negative impacts, an even-handedness which is very much out of fashion. What he is able to demonstrate is that the different colonial regimes had distinctive impacts; that the length of colonial rule makes a difference; as does the level of European settlement that occurred during the colonial period. In general terms, British and Spanish colonialism had a more positive impact on state capacity than the more unvaried exploitative style of the French and Portuguese systems. The duration under British and Spanish colonial rule both had positive effects in terms of lowering the chances for state failure. Having a sizeable settler population often put the colonial power under pressure to develop accountable administrative methods which were then inherited by the former colonies at independence. One way of thinking about the benefits and disbenefits of a colonial heritage is to examine the ’transversal objects’ created in the transmission of an institution from the colonial power to the colonized area (Espagne quoted by Bierschenk and de Sardan 2014: 21). African bureaucracies are excellent examples of such transversal objects. A picture arises of the dark interior of the near derelict Central Post Office in Freetown, Sierra Leone with some twenty counters each neatly labelled with a separate function but staffed with a total of only two clerks, one of whom kindly explained that: ‘Yes, it is possible to buy stamps – but if you post a letter it won’t go anywhere’. Wai (2012) argues that Europeans expect African countries to perform within unreasonable time frames. He points out that the US Civil War occurred nearly a century after the Revolutionary War and that France took the better part of a century after the Revolution (to the Battle of Sedan in 1870) to settle down to a state of peace and political order. In his eyes, at independence most African states (including Rwanda) were ‘unfinished political projects’. Much of his text is taken up with largely justified attacks on European writings from Weber (1905) to Bayart (1999). However, this leaves very little space for discussing commentaries on Africa of which he approves. His heroes are Fanon (1963), Mamdani

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(1996), Mudimbe (1994) and Olukoshi (2005), this last, significantly, was published in Buenos Aires. From his lecturing position in a Canadian university, he argues with conviction that Western commentators ignore the impact of colonialism and justify current Western interventions from their viewpoint of neopatrimonialism and failed states. But he himself offers no alternative vision of Africa. Even whilst holding that each African state is different, he could at least have presented his own vision of Sierra Leone, his homeland. There is still a great lack of African research on African governance. Criticism is easy, proposing viable new paths is much more difficult, as many would-be charismatic politicians have found. Almost all African politicians promise that they will create new jobs for the youthful voters, very few have ever succeeded. Typically, in Zimbabwe the median age is 19.1 years which means that a vast number of new jobs is needed each year. In 2017 John Sentamu, the Archbishop of York claimed that 90% of Zimbabweans were out of work, by which he meant that only 10% were formally employed with the remainder being subsistence farmers or scraping a living on the streets.

Solving the Mystery of the AFRICA Dummy Pierre Englebert (2000) has provided his explanation of why Barro (1991: 436) found that ‘there appear to be adverse effects on growth from being in Sub-Saharan Africa’ which remain despite controlling for the level of investments, government consumption, school enrolments and political instability. This AFRICA effect was associated with an annual decline in per capita GDP of as much as 1.14% during 1960–1985. Ekeh (1975) argued that the morality which Africans displayed in the precolonial period did not apply to the postcolonial period. The state became either a potential resource to be appropriated, or a possible instrument of domination to be used by other groups and therefore to be resisted. Englebert claims that the elites not only disagreed about the rules of the political game, but also about whether they were prepared to play the game at all since, in his view, the players had never chosen to come together. Elites who feared that they would lose out under new rules not only argued about the rules but went much further and argued against the government as a whole, or even the existence of the state itself. Hence Englebert’s broad concern with the question of the legitimacy of African states. According to him, there are only ten legitimate sub-Saharan African states viz Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Ethiopia,

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Lesotho, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles and Swaziland. The criteria for being legitimate is that there was a precolonial kingdom/chief in control or that there was no significant indigenous population in precolonial times. Ethiopia is the only state of significant size on the list and it was never colonized apart from the brief Italian incursion. He could show that across the world, the legitimate states functioned much better in economic terms because they had better policies (with governments providing more education, more telephones, less government spending as a percentage of GDP, more openness to international trade, deeper financial sectors and a better policy index). The problem with states which were constructed by the colonial powers is that after independence their elites adopt neopatrimonial policies because these are the most rewarding. Government spending is on current benefits (pork barrelling and large bureaucracies) rather than long term infrastructure. The only notable infrastructure spending tends to be on the assertion of sovereignty as in the new Nigerian capital at Abuja or Ivory Coast’s Yamamoussoukro. Equally barriers to trade are popular because they provide the rents needed to finance patron–client relationships. Overall Africa’s growth tragedy is that the incentives which motivate the elites are rarely associated with good economic policy. Leaders of particular groups perceive that they can maximize the benefits to themselves and their followers by breaking the legal rules and taking some resources or rent for themselves exclusively, thus creating endless: ‘my ethnic group wins, yours loses’ situations. In Africa, as elsewhere, few really believe that virtue is its own reward.

Neopatrimonialism---What Is It? Neopatrimonialism is a difficult word to define. Patrimonialism is essentially a system of social hierarchy where patrons use state resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients. It can stretch from the top of the society down to the village level. Warlords in Northern Pakistan refuse to let clinics be built in ‘their’ villages because, for as long as they control the only motorized transport, they can create moral debts, which can last for up to three generations, by transporting the seriously sick relatives of their clients to hospital. In neopatrimonial systems what counts is ‘who you know’ not ‘what you know’. It is not sufficient to know someone’s rank in the bureaucratic system, it is also necessary to know who their relatives are and what their links to powerful bosses are. There is

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a core agreement that the ‘neo’ refers to modern, postcolonial practices. Before colonialism there was just patrimonialism defined by Max Weber in Economy and Society in 1922 as a form of political domination in which authority rests on the personal and bureaucratic power exercised by a royal household, where that power is formally arbitrary and under the direct control of the ruler. A modern example would be in the Ghanaian constitution which gives the president the right to appoint every mayor in the country (Sigman and Lindberg 2017). The Liberian President is given similar powers on the grounds that Liberia is too poor to afford local elections. Neopatrimonialism differs from earlier patrimonialism in two core ways. Firstly, there have to be modern institutions with at least the appearance of having legal-rational foundations (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997) even although authority remains highly personalized. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organizations, it is just that they are not used for public service but as a form of private property. It is not only the office four-wheel drive which is at the disposal of the bureaucrat, but the whole functions of the office including the employment of staff. Secondly, the traditional basis of patrimonial authority and the respect for the patron tends to be watered down. There may even be a transactional aspect. ‘Is “neopatrimonialism” a pathology, analogy, cause, effect – or a term for all of Africa’s troubles?’ ask Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009: 125). The problem with many of the thousands of studies which refer to neopatrimonialism—Google Scholar lists 9600 including duplicates—is that they appear to assume that it is enough to say that a regime, usually in Africa, is neopatrimonial but they do not contain any explanation of what the neopatrimonialists actually do. There are surprisingly few studies which map out how the elite use their power to control national assets through nepotism and ethnic bias in the senior ranks of the national bureaucracy or the army. Lindberg’s study of Ghana, entitled ‘It’s Our Time to “Chop”: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism rather than Counter-Act It’ (2003) is very useful because the author presents clear data on what electoral candidates actually do to try and secure votes. From his survey data he is able to show that the amount of money candidates spend on securing support has been rising rapidly from election to election and that, with most of this money coming from the political parties, this appears to be associated with increases in overall corruption levels. However, one highly debatable feature of Lindberg’s analysis is that he includes ‘personal assistance in dealing with the authorities, whether

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police, courts, headmasters, local government officials or ministries’ as a part of the unacceptable content of neopatrimonialism. To him, this ‘is an institutionalized behaviour signifying willingness to take care of “your people”, namely the constituents’. Yet, such looking after constituents is a standard and acceptable, even required, behaviour in Western democracies. There is a significant moral difference between paying school fees for a voter and helping her to get a government department to respond to a complaint. Lindberg argues that such personal assistance wastes the politicians’ time and energy, which they should be spending on holding the other elected officials and the system accountable. He does not discuss how far listening to and acting on personal complaints alerts the politician to areas where the system is inequitable and does not work and the rules and laws need to be amended and/or more government money and resources need to be spent on providing services. Democracy does require individual complaints to be listened to. This is contrary to the claim that ‘MPs will spend a large chunk of their time and energy on local and personal matters, finding personal or state resources to meet demands from constituents. The MPs’ functions as law and policy makers, watchdogs of the government and opinion leaders in society, decay as a consequence’ (p. 128). It is obviously a matter of degree, but it is normally Ministers who make policy and the time actually spent by rank and file MPs in making laws is quite limited. MPs do need to divide their time between making speeches and attending public events and dealing with constituents’ issues in what are often known as Constituents’ Clinics in the Westminster system. There can be a problem, as would appear to be the case in Ghana, that elections with more candidates can be less democratic because more money is spent by all sides on bribery. One core difficulty is that most African elections (and, some would maintain, many Western elections) are virtually ideology-free. The 2018 elections in Zimbabwe would be a case in point. The leader of the opposition’s first claim was simply that he had no relationship with Mugabe, beyond that, he was offering impossible lists of undeliverable goodies not policies. If neopatrimonialism is near universal across sub-Saharan Africa (some would exclude South Africa and Botswana) then to say that a given African country is neopatrimonial is hardly any more informative than to say that it is in Africa. ‘Coming in various guises and forms. Neopatrimonialism has become a catch-all conceptual staple in Africanist scholarship for accounting for and explaining nearly every perceived African sociopolitical malaise, difficulty or problem – corruption, institutional decay,

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communication breakdown, authoritarian rule, development failure, economic dysfunction, poor growth, civil and political unrest and especially armed conflicts all of which are the markers of so-called state failure’ (Wai 2012: 360). Wai provides an entertaining, if not quite fair, list of neopatrimonialism’s contradictory evils such as creating states that are either too strong or too weak. Many of these contradictions stem from a confusion as to what actually constitutes ‘the state’ and how far it is reasonable to write of states performing a wide range of functions actually performed by a government comprising a president and, possibly, a number of his/her ministers. Conversely, for Bierschenk and de Sardan (2014: 14–15) ‘the “state” should be seen not as an entity but as a bundle of practices and processes in a field of complex powers’. Some have rejected explanations of bad governance as being due to neopatrimonialism on the grounds that ‘bad governance is neither inherent in the culture or traditions of the people of poor countries nor a product of poverty. It is rather the result of the ways in which state authority in the South has been constructed – and is being maintained – through economic and political interaction with the rest of the world’ (Moore 2001: 386). In this view, the North is to blame for the way in which it buys products such as oil and diamonds; provides aid; and sells arms to Southern countries so that their governments do not need to rely on the goodwill of their citizens to raise taxes and govern.

Development? Alternative Futures There is a debate as to whether the term ‘development’ has been so misused as to make it unusable. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was adopted by all United Nations Member States in 2015. It sets out the agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As the first SDG is ‘No Poverty’ the question arises as to how many of the other goals are actually required. If no one was poor (SDG 1) would anyone be required to live without access to clean water and sanitation? (SDG 6). On governance, SDG 16 is to: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Just as achieving SDG 1 and eradicating poverty would appear to imply, indeed require, solving the majority of the world’s problems, so too would the governance goal 16 quoted above. At least, measuring progress towards the eradication of poverty would appear to be much

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easier than measuring the attainment of effective, accountable and inclusive institutions. The Institute for Economics and Peace (2018) has pioneered the possibilities in its ‘Assessment of Data Availability of SDG16I Indicators across the Pacific’ which found that no country could provide even a third of the necessary indicators and many could only provide one in seven. Because the SDGs had to be agreed by all UN member states there is no reference to democracy or elections. At least, for the first time, through the UN the international community has set out a sort of shared vision of the centrality of good institutions in enabling development. Peace, inclusion and the delivery of basic services all depend on power being exercised responsibly. Whaites (2016) maintains that there are five elements that influence the pace of policy reform: the political settlement as agreed by the elites; the rate of economic growth; the quality of international assistance; the presence of eternal incentives and global norms. He was writing for an OECD audience which probably explains the emphasis on international assistance. Googling ‘African Reformer’ and excluding Afro-Americans, the top finds relate to a nineteenth-century Liberian preacher or to economic reforms in Rwanda neither ideal signposts to the future.

Why Good Governance Is a Bad Thing Even the World Bank (2017) is no longer invariably the advocate of ‘best practice’ in governance, rather arguing for the ‘best fit’ for local conditions, that may well be second or even third best but actually feasible. …. Governance challenges in Africa are not fundamentally about one set of people getting another set of people to behave better. They are fundamentally about both sets of people finding ways to act collectively in their own best interests. (APPP 2012: vii)

In 2012 the African Power and Politics Programme (APPP 2012) published Director David Booth’s insights in ‘Development a collective action problem: Addressing the real challenges of African governance’. One of Booth’s core arguments was that the rules of good governance, as promoted by many aid donors, did not really work in developed countries and certainly could not be made to work in developing countries. Further, viewing the problem from the other end, looking at the African success stories, there was little enough evidence that they practised good

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governance, yet, despite this, they had achieved prolonged periods of economic growth. Conventional good governance theory requires either a government which, top down, imposes rules of good practice and/or a civic society with the knowledge and power to keep the government and bureaucracy accountable from the bottom up. Either way, there is a basic assumption that there are many people involved who are un-complicatedly committed to the objective of the public good—an assumption that rarely appears to match African conditions on the ground. Donors’ call for voice, empowerment and accountability. This is the principal–agent approach to public management reform which recognizes that the interests of the politicians and bureaucrats are often not the same as those of the general public. The APPP argued that realism requires governments, civil society and reformers to ‘work with the grain’ and base themselves on current African behaviour patterns (which stem from precolonial traditions) to effect gradual transitions which could deliver economic growth and development. APPP argued that ‘the “grain” of popular demand in contemporary Africa is not a desire for “traditional” institutions, but rather for modern state structures that have been adapted to, or infused with, contemporary local values’ (APPP 2012: xi). APPP saw this as a solution to institutional blockages caused by widespread collective action problems, which they believed to be far more significant than the much-cited resource shortages or funding gaps. Helpfully, they provided some examples of the solving of collective action problems (Kelsall 2013). One example is the maternal mortality programme in Rwanda which has dramatically cut mortality by raising rates of pre-natal check-ups and births in medical centres, a programme enforced by local administrators (normally males) who commit to performance targets through a system similar to the Inahigo oaths sworn to the Rwandan king in precolonial times (note the extreme patriarchalism of this model). Another, less authoritarian, example is the creation of town chiefs in Malawi who deal with issues of justice, reconciliation, road mending and even funerals in a multi-ethnic setting. These chiefs are traditional because they are chiefs, but they are modern because they serve multi-ethnic communities and may be elected to their positions. The Malawi example is particularly interesting because it could potentially be adopted across the many regions of Africa and the developing world which traditionally had chiefs (de Sardan 2011: ‘The “chiefly” mode of local governance’). However, the question remains how Malawian town chiefs are kept honest and focused on the public welfare when so many

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African chiefs have become corrupt and exploit their positions for the private benefit of their families and clans. Overall, the findings of the APPP are bad news for supporters of democracy since they appear to show that to achieve prolonged economic growth what an African country needs is a ‘strong man’ ruler who delegates economic policy to skilled technocrats (e.g. Houphet- Boigny in Ivory Coast, Paul Kagame in Rwanda). They claim that these national systems may contain high levels of corruption but this is pro-development corruption rather than simple parasitic rent claiming. In the eyes of the APPP analysts, democracy is highly problematic because there are far too many supporters to be bought off. Also, they find democratic cycles in which each new government denounces the corruption of the previous government when starting out, only to become equally corrupt when the next election is pending. The APPP came up with two conclusions: 1. Good development institutions permit an adequate provision of public goods by solving locally specific collective action problems. 2. Hybrid forms are useful in this context as they reduce the costs of institutional innovation by combining modern professional standards or scientific criteria with local cultural borrowings (APPP 2012: 14). Hybridity is very much in favour, it is said to increase the ‘imaginability’ of change. Thus ‘town chiefs’ in Malawi or key performance indicators guaranteed by traditional oaths in Rwanda are said to work because they bring in new realities presented in old familiar clothes. It is necessary to avoid being too simplistic. Calling a government official a ‘chief’ will not work in a society without chiefs or a society where chiefs are no longer respected, because anyone with enough money can buy a chiefly title, or where politicians take on titles to burnish their threadbare reputations. Interestingly, both the Rwandan and the Malawian examples are biased against women.

Governance Without Gender Most discussions of governance are remarkably gender free. (One exception is the Ibrahim Index of African Governance [IIAG] which includes a gender component.) Often international institutions and academics

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discuss what states do in the area of governance in a framework which is highly abstract, theoretical and gender-neutral. Moving the discussion over to the level of what governments do, at least allows for an analysis of the gender composition of the government. However, that there are women in the government tells little about their actual power. (In the Rwandan case there are 13 women out of 26 in the cabinet, but none of them wields the power once exercised with such lethal effect by Madame Agathe Habyarimana, the wife of the President in the years leading up to the genocide.) In October 2018 Ethiopia became the first African country to have equal numbers of female and male ministers. It was rapidly followed by Rwanda. However, women ministers appointed by male Presidents in search of a liberal image, rather than female politicians who have had to fight every step of their way up the political greasy pole to attain the office, are rarely in a position to combat the constant sexist impact of local culture, indeed they may support it. Perhaps the most highly debated issue relating to gender and governance is whether women are measurably less corrupt than men. Dollar and colleagues originally made this claim in a 1998 article which now has 816 Google Scholar citations. There are several strands to this debate. If women are indeed less corrupt than men, should their participation be encouraged for that reason or as a matter of simple human rights? (Collier 1988). Are women less corrupt simply because they play a lesser role in government and therefore have fewer opportunities to be corrupt and fewer mates with whom they need to exchange favours (since ‘old girls’ networks are much rarer and less powerful than ‘old boys’ networks)? Some of the best data on gender and corruption is available on a stateby-state basis for Mexico. Overall this data shows that states with more women in elected positions are less corrupt—but this does not hold in the case of the poorest states (Wangnerud 2012). The headline in the Lusaka Times of May 6th 2018 is ‘Lusaka Chiefs refuse to endorse Nkomeshya’s resolution on land policy’. The article goes on to describe how a meeting of chiefs in Lusaka Province chaired by Senior Chieftainess (sic) Mukamambo II of the Soli people became deadlocked. Of the five Traditional Leaders (capitalized in the original) objecting to the resolution, two were women. The article is accompanied by a striking photograph of Chieftainess Nkomeshhya wearing a traditional beaded headdress and an enigmatic smile. It is highly refreshing that the article can report the women’s participation without making an issue of it. Zambia has an excellent National Gender Policy (Ministry

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of Gender 2014) with the vision of ‘a nation where there is gender equity and equality for sustainable development’ together with the ‘Core Cultural Value’ that ‘Stakeholders are expected to uphold and advance cultural values and practices that promote respect for both women and men’. The Policy promotes almost every good cause one can think of from ending child marriage to ensuring that women farmers get access to subsidized farm inputs (especially necessary given that, according to the Zambian Labour Force Survey 2012, 61% of agricultural labour in Zambia is provided by female farmers). However, signing international treaties is sadly no guarantee that the practice on the ground will match the obligations. The Gender Policy still reports that ‘women are largely underrepresented in decision-making at all levels in institutions including the Executive, Legislature, Local Government, Quasi Government institutions, political parties, the private sector, religious bodies and traditional establishments’. At the highest level women represent 45% of judges, but lower down the system, 9 out of 33 magistrates are women and ‘only’ 97 out of 808 local court justices are female. Such a gender distribution is not ideal but it still represents a significant achievement. The African Development Bank has produced gender profiles for twenty-three African countries. These profiles have the advantage of having somewhat more of an African perspective than many international reports on gender in Africa which reflect the views of donors rather than the countries themselves (the Zambian Gender Policy has a forty-nine item directory of Working Definitions to ensure that local readers understand terms such as Gender Biased or Gender Blindness). In the African context, as elsewhere, the very use of the term gender can be problematic. Kim Foulds (2014) has explored ‘Buzzwords at play: gender, education, and political participation in Kenya’. She worked with school children on their perceptions of images of voters from school textbooks which demonstrated an imperfect commitment to gender equity. Some children thought that a photograph of voting must be of a hospital or clinic because the female voter was carrying a baby. In their exploration of the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals in Kenya Unterhalter and North (2011) found that the government saw the process as one which required formal acknowledgement rather than a ‘terrain for policy dialogue and engagement of the ways gender is defined and/or produced in education’ (p. 504). As Smyth (2010) argues, the use of the term gender in contexts where it lacks nuance, leads to ‘real women and men, power and conflict all disappear (ing) behind bland talk of “gender”’

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(p. 583). Such criticisms are often unreasonable. Asking governments to work to ensure equal representation of female and male students at all levels of education is clear and presents a measurable target to aim for. Asking for an examination of gender roles is far more complex even where there is a political will to attempt such a task. The 2010 Kenyan Constitution provides that no more than two-thirds of elected bodies should be of one gender but lively debate continues as to how to ensure this after the 2017 elections showed only a fifth of successful candidates to be female. Many female African academics and public figures are uncomfortable with feminist language and feminist goals. Some perceive Western feminists as being anti-men, anti-religion and/or anti-traditional culture. Some prefer the term ‘womanism’ others prefer to emphasize women’s roles as mothers. Nnameka, a Nigerian who teaches at Indiana University, has attacked the Western undervaluing of motherhood in her collection The Politics of (M)othering: Womanhood, Identity, and Resistance in African Literature (1997). She argues for Nego-feminism—a feminism of negotiation or the non-ego form of feminism which would challenge the duality of public/private spheres and of male/female spaces contending that the African sense of identity is located within the communal rather than individual space. One valid and little explored question which she raises is what are young African women and men negotiating about these days. One practical measure which demonstrates that such negotiations actually take place, is the number of children which young women are bearing. Excluding cases of infertility, small families generally do not occur without negotiation (average family size is now 5.6 in Burundi, 5.0 in Nigeria and 4.4 in Kenya). From Western Nigeria there is a Yoruba riddle: ‘You are a man in a canoe with your wife and your mother. The canoe overturns. Neither woman can swim. Who do you try to save first?’ The undisputed answer is: ‘your mother. You can always get another wife but you only have one mother’. Interestingly, there does not appear to be any Third World study which takes an emphasis on motherhood to its logical conclusion for example by looking to see how many women politicians are also mothers. (Julia Gillard, the former Australian prime minister, was repeatedly attacked for being unsuited to the role because she was not a mother—no Australian prime minister has ever been attacked for not being a father.) Another life-cycle stage for women is being post-menopausal, in many African cultures women who have reached this stage are seen as elders and beyond needing to be defined by their gender. Being a grandmother,

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especially in cultures where grandmothers are supposed to give up sex, may also offer a release to women who want to take up new roles, for example in politics.

Why Don’t Small Countries Work? The colonial powers are frequently blamed for the ‘irrational’ borders of African countries. Yet these complaints rarely extend to the apparent creation of countries too small to be viable. Indeed many of the criticisms of colonial boundaries imply the creation of yet more small countries with populations of less than five million people. Burundi has a population of 11.2 million people and a land area of 25,680 square kilometres, giving a population density of 437 persons per square kilometre yet only 13% of the population lives in towns or urban areas. Belgium has a population of 11.35 million and a land area of 30,528 square kilometres giving a population density of just 374 persons per square kilometre despite the fact that 98% of Belgians live in towns or urban areas. Both countries face problems of governance across ethnic groups. Burundi is very heavily dependent upon aid: 24.7% of its Gross National Income comes from Overseas Development Assistance. In Burundi ‘weak, arbitrary, or no justice at all is not necessarily or exclusively a god-given state of nature, but something that serves the interests of the powerful and the well-connected, and it is in many ways maintained by them to their own advantage. Even lack of capacity and resources are not simply a direct product of the simple fact of being a poor country, but are also, at least in part, a politically created situation’ (Uvin 2008: 115). In March 2016 the European Union suspended aid to the Government of Burundi due to concerns over its poor human rights record, but continued humanitarian aid and aid to civil society. President Nkurunziza, a former rebel leader and born-again Christian stood for and won a third term, in circumstances which many believed were contrary to the law. Suspending aid is always problematic because this tends to punish the people in need rather than corrupt elites (one-third of Burundi’s population is estimated to need humanitarian assistance in order to have enough food to survive, one in two households, that is 4.6 million people, are food insecure and 56% of children suffer from chronic malnutrition). Although heavily dependent on aid, Burundi has been spurning international engagement, withdrawing from the International

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Criminal Court in October 2017 and rejected UN resolution 2303 which authorized the deployment of 228 UN police officers. In October 2018 the Government announced that it was suspending the operations of almost all INGOs in Burundi on the grounds that they were not meeting ethnic quotas as required by the Constitution (Devex 2018). When Presidents change the law so that they can stay on in power, and work to close down INGO operations so that there are fewer independent witnesses of human rights abuses, and many citizens have fled as refugees (some 400,000), these are clear signs of exceptionally poor governance.

Donor Influence Donors have very good reasons for liking good governance projects. Indeed in 2000 an UNCTAD discussion paper suggested that the new governance mandate ‘arrived at a moment when growing doubts regarding the purpose and effectiveness of the IFIs seemed to threaten their funding, and even their continued existence’ (Kapur and Webb 2000: 18). Governance projects have covered a transition back from a situation in which the private sector was the almost exclusive focus to a recognition that the state and its institutions does make a very significant difference for the good or the bad. Such projects also offer a ‘fig leaf’ for interfering in other countries’ political fights, which is supposed to be forbidden, especially for multilateral agencies. They also entail the use of vast numbers of consultants from the donor organization. Good governance also offers a broad awning to cover a very broad range of projects. The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) of the United Nations University reviewed the use of good governance as a concept in 2012, covering a very wide range of donor organizations and discussing why this matters for development policy (Gisselquist 2012). The review identified seven core components: ‘democracy and representation, human rights, the rule of law, efficient and effective public management, transparency and accountability, developmentalist objectives and a varying range of specific economic and political policies, programmes and institutions’ (p. 2). Many would query the inclusion of some of the items on this list, some would argue that efficient and effective public management is really the core issue. However, the final contention by WIDER was that ‘given the weakness of the concept’ development analysts should instead focus on the seven disaggregated components of good governance.

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However, in the event, donors have stuck with the ‘catchy shorthand’ of the term good governance which has become a widely acceptable cover for interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Thus, donors have three near reflex responses to governance issues: capacity building (with participation, empowerment and accountability thrown in as a bonus in every planning document); bypassing existing public institutions and supporting NGOs. Bypassing public institutions usually involves creating committees to represent the people, the committees are then highly resented, sabotaged, undermined, co-opted, captured and/or marginalized by the old guard in the local and national governments who know all too well when they are missing out. Where committees do work it is almost invariably because of outstanding leadership which cannot be replicated or scaled up. Worse is that the committee approach tends to reinforce the unaccountable clientist nature of the system, doing nothing to change the evil way in which politics works. Supporting existing NGOs may be a better approach but they often have little reach outside the capital and they may well be more focused on serving the donors than on serving their clients. Besides, being generally funded for projects not programmes, NGOs are precariously circumstanced and always looking for the next grant. For Malawi, Eggen (2011) describes how ‘The numerous orphan support groups, HIV/AIDS groups, youth groups, self-designated VDCs [Village Development Committees] or other types of organisation in most villages demonstrate expectations and strategic positioning for access to government [or Donor] resources. Such groups often do little other than produce a constitution and hold some meetings, simply waiting for funding. At infrequent intervals, their efforts pay off in the form of a project grant’. Borehole grants are often provided but the maintenance is then left to the village committee which cannot afford to replace the water pipes which have been stolen to make window bars to protect against theft. Unrealistic donor policy not to fund maintenance then leaves the countryside littered with non-functioning boreholes. In 2012 the Government of South Sudan published its ‘own’ Fragility Assessment with the photograph of a bare-chested laughing citizen on the front. The Assessment process had support from the Capacity Building Trust Fund, Denmark, the G7 Secretariat, the ODI Budget Strengthening Initiative, UNDP and the World Bank. The Assessment covered a remarkable range of indicators under five peace and state-building goals set out under the New Deal of the Government, that is: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations and revenues and services.

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The assumption appears to be that it is somehow possible to examine the scores for all these measures, and, even more importantly, the trends in these scores, and thence assess the level of and trends in fragility. The Deal is said to build on ‘the recognition that conventional humanitarian and development assistance, while providing a boost in the short term, has often failed to deliver results that are sustainable in the long term. The New Deal aims to address previous shortcomings by prioritizing national ownership and leadership in the development process’ (South Sudan 2012: 1). That said, apart from the flag on the front (which the Kenyans claim stole its design from their own), there appears to be nothing specifically South Sudanese about the document. The one exception might appear to be the overall optimistic tone: ‘The overall assessment results suggests(sic) that the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) has made sufficient progress on all five PSGs since the CPA interim period and independence in July 2011 to move beyond the crisis stage of the fragility spectrum’. Yet ‘Moving forward, key challenges include sustainable internal political settlement, the transformation of the security sector, reform of justice institutions, the creation of diversified economic foundations and strengthened capacity for accountable and equitable service delivery’. The sting is clearly in the items listed under ‘moving forward’ which still remain largely stalled or actually moving backwards in 2018. No one could realistically expect a country to describe itself as being increasingly fragile (although with Riek Machar as one of those who workshopped the report, maybe one could). A small chart shows DRC as doing worse than RSS with Timor Leste doing a little bit better and Sierra Leone significantly better in all areas of PSGs except economic foundations and revenue and services. Under security the measures are [A] Security conditions (1) Violent deaths per 100,000 population; (2) Major and minor assaults per 100,000 population; (3) The incidence of cross-border violence; (4) Internal displacement (number of IDPS by conflict); (5) Perception of security conditions. Then there was [B] Capacity and accountability in the security sector which was to be measured by a capacity to monitor, investigate and prosecute police misconduct for which, unsurprisingly, the data was ‘not yet available’. Finally, for the security sector there were performance and responsiveness which were to be measured by the level of confidence in police/security and the perception of corruption of security forces: both being measured by the High Frequency Survey. One measure of the unreality of the Assessment is the statement under Revenue—Challenges.

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‘Before the oil shutdown in January 2012, 98 percent of Government revenue was derived from oil…. Corruption and impunity of revenue collectors are perceived to be a prevailing problem’ (RSS: 11). Donors requirements for endless lists of indicators hinder rather than help the progress they hope to see, in situations of intermittent civil war they are ludicrous.

The European Union Security, Governance and Development Triangle in Africa Since the early 1990s, the international community has been developing a broad approach to development stressing the linkages between the core triangle of security, good governance and economic development. For the European Union the view, set out in the European Security Strategy of 2003 known as the Solana Document, is that development can only be achieved in a secure and democratic environment conducive to long term investments (Council of European Union 2003). This view clearly ignores the experience of first China and then Vietnam. Further ‘The EU security policies are at least as much determined by the bureaucratic affiliations of the concerned EU actors… as they are by African realities’: as Bagoyoko and Gibert (2009) demonstrate in detail. The enlightened self-interest of the Europeans promoting development and good governance is in the interest of the international community as a whole since such promotion should prevent local conflicts and insecurity from spilling over. Hence the Cotonou Agreement sets out terrorism, migration, drugs and organized crime, environmental protection and the management of natural resources as areas of joint concern which should be jointly addressed by developed and developing partners. For a time it appeared that Western powers felt more threatened by ‘public bads’, that is collapsed or ‘rogue’ states whose political disorder or aggressive policies might put their security at risk, than by other Western powers. The European Commission classifies its conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts as direct and indirect. Direct moves range from humanitarian activities to support conflict resolution activities and institutional reforms whilst indirect initiatives are supposed to involve the mainstreaming of conflict prevention objectives into sector programmes, from development to trade. The Commission receives six-monthly reports on eight factors seen as related to the root causes of conflict these are: the legitimacy of the state; rule of law; respect for fundamental rights; civil

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society and the media; relations between communities and dispute-solving mechanisms; sound economic management; social and regional inequalities; and the geopolitical situation. This inclusive list clearly overlaps with much of the good governance agenda. It is striking how, because concerns for security and good governance come from different bureaucratic and academic areas and are published in quite different journals, there is so little overlap in the discussion of security and good governance.

What Can the Local Do? What Is ‘Empowerment’ and How Can It Be Recognized? Since the end of the Cold War there has been a great fashion for supporting the local in peacebuilding. Thus Lederach (1997: 94) claims that ‘the greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture’. The immediate question then becomes: ‘so what went wrong to stop these wonderful local resource people from having an impact to prevent the current conflict?’ This question becomes even more pertinent when the recommendation is to empower and develop ‘local peacemakers’ and to build on indigenous sociocultural structures and practices. Why do the peacemakers need ‘empowering’ and developing? The very idea of ‘empowerment’ is a trap. If ‘empowerment’ meant appointing someone to a position where they had the powers to issue orders that would be obeyed and to manage resources then it would be both meaningful and measurable. At least South Sudan measures the empowerment of women by the number of women elected to political positions. But that is not what most of those who use the term empowerment in a thousand documents a year mean. Alexander et al. (2016: 433) define the political empowerment of women as ‘the enhancement of assets, capabilities, and achievements of women to gain equality with men in influencing and exercising political authority worldwide’. Drawing on a World Bank Report (Malhotra et al. 2002), they acknowledge that elements of women’s empowerment should include: political knowledge, voting, participation in support of candidates and campaigns, interest group activities and representation in local, regional and national offices. The advantage of the World Bank list is that it can also be used to examine how groups of men or mixed sex minorities are represented in politics. However, the Alexander, Bolzendahl and Jalalzai definition fails to explain how the exercise of political authority, let alone influence, is to be measured. Across the world, the wives of

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presidents often exercise vast political influence. As widows, some actually become presidents themselves, but even amongst the widow-presidents some exercise full presidential powers whilst others remain as essentially figureheads for the male leaders in their political parties. Equally, within any cabinet, there are ministers who are extremely powerful and there are ministers who have been allowed a seat at the cabinet table only to find that they have little to no meaningful influence on the progress of national affairs. Mugabe’s cabinets were very much a case in point. ‘“Engendering” politics: The impact of descriptive representation on women’s political engagement in sub-Saharan Africa’ (Barnes and Burchard 2012) is a study which demonstrates that, both across countries and across time, women are more likely to engage in politics as the percentage of women in the national legislature increases. Once women occupy somewhere between 25 and 35% of the legislative chamber seats the predicted probability of the average woman’s political engagement is not statistically different from that for males (Barnes and Burchard 2012: 783). This is based on data from Afrobarometer surveys of almost 90,000 respondents from twenty African countries from 1999 to 2008. Engagement was coded as (i) discussing politics with friends or neighbours; (ii) attending a demonstration or protest march; (iii) being interested in public affairs (iv) contacting a parliamentary representative; and (v) contacting a political party official. From a governance perspective, what is most remarkable is the high proportion of both men and women who have engaged in various political behaviours. Africa now has the widespread use of electoral gender quotas. Of the world’s 20 countries with the greatest female representation in their parliaments 7 are in Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of female parliamentarians doubled between 2000 and 2016 from 12 to 24%, better than the United States and many European states (Wambua 2017). Seven African countries have had women in top executive positions. As indicated, the Afrobarometer public opinion surveys are a splendid resource for seeing how politics are actually practised in Africa. The data in the country reports is routinely presented in tables which contrast the responses of urban and rural respondents and of males and females. Some questions are about opinions, others are about practices, especially in the political sphere. What often emerges is that the differences between the urban and rural populations are greater than those between the sexes. Governments across most of Africa still have to try to reconcile the often very different needs of the growers and purchasers of food.

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For Niger 48% of urban, 41% of rural, 44% of male and 42% of female respondents in 2017 felt that the country was moving in the wrong direction. Thus the urban–rural split clearly exceeds the gender division. Questioned as to whether the government should be able to proscribe any organization which opposed its politics, 22% of the urban, 32% of the rural, 28% of men and 32% of women agreed. Thus, roughly a third of the population would accept a repressive one-party state, whilst two-thirds considered that they should have the freedom to join whatever organization they liked whether the government was in favour or not. A fascinating series of questions asked respondents how likely they thought it would be that they could secure the information necessary to keep organizations accountable. Only a quarter thought they could access the school’s budget and expenditures, only 18% thought they could find out who owned a local plot of land but 31% thought that the town office would tell them how to register a new business (urban 40% rural 29%; men 34% women 28%—this in a strongly Muslim country). When it came to actually voting in the most recent election, 65% of urban, 73% of rural, 79% of men and 63% of women had voted with 13% of women not being able to vote because they were not on the electoral lists, as compared with just 5% of men. It would have been very good to know more about the deficits in the electoral lists and why 7% of urban as compared with just 4% of the rural respondents actually decided not to vote. It is encouraging that it is possible to conduct a form of Afrobarometer Survey even In Niger, the country with the largest land area in West Africa and the lowest Human Development Index ranking in the world (189th out of 189) with 71% of the population illiterate and a democracy, of sorts, since 2010.

Governance and the Law The 2017 World Bank World Development Report was on Governance and the Law. The Report reflects the Bank’s frustration with the fact that even where countries had in theory adopted the right policies, they were not necessarily implemented. The Foreword stressed ‘the global community needs to move beyond asking: “what is the right policy?” and instead ask: “What makes policies work to produce life-improving outcomes?”’ Their answer was better governance. This time their definition of governance was: ‘the process though which state and nonstate actors interact to design and implement policies within a given set of formal and informal rules that shape and are shaped by power’. Power, in turn, was defined

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as: ‘the ability of groups and individuals to make others act in the interest of those groups and individuals and to bring about specific outcomes’ (World Bank 2017: 3). These definitions are not particularly user-friendly and would be hard to translate into many African languages. They are easier to understand in the context of specific examples. The Overview lists the challenges facing developing countries: poor service delivery, violence, slowing growth, corruption, and the ‘natural resource curse’ all of which require improved governance. Their specific examples include the contrast between Somalia mired in constant violence and Somaliland with two decades of stability and economic growth; as well as corruption and the resource curse in Nigeria (where Afrobarometer data show that 78% of the population believes that the government is doing badly in fighting corruption). They also discuss the apparently anomalous case of China, a country with great economic success but poor or perhaps misunderstood governance. India’s cities and their 49,000 slums feature as an example of a total failure to secure any form of co-ordinated planning whilst Brazil featured as a success story at the time. Finally, the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom is cited as an example of those feeling disenfranchised and excluded voting against their rational economic interests. The Report stresses that commitment, coordination and cooperation are the three core functions of institutions (i.e. organizations and their rules) that are needed to ensure that rules and resources yield the desired outcomes. Clearly it is much easier to define these requirements than to achieve them. As the authors point out, failures of commitment often result in a loss of even the most basic security as where rebels fail to accept the authority of the state. In Nigeria ‘best practice’ rules that worked in other contexts failed because government officials were overcome by short term interests. They cite the case of state governors uncertain about whether resources would still be there in future who therefore had the incentive to spend them straight away. Such uncertainties are actually present in most democracies since new governments can usually choose to change the rules. The Report attempts to demonstrate how power asymmetries matter for security, growth and equity. It covers exclusion, often on the basis of ethnicity; captured as by the friends of Suharto in Indonesia and successive governments in Pakistan; and clientism where material goods such as subsidized fertilizer are exchanged for electoral support. Kenya is cited as an example of clientism—only NGOs could improve the performance of teachers, and hence of students, because only NGOs were prepared to

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sanction bad teachers by sacking them whereas politicians needed teachers’ and their families votes and education bureaucrats needed teachers’ support to stay in their jobs. In describing what should be done, the Report provided a Table contrasting traditional approaches as against principles for rethinking governance practices for development which covered three main areas: thinking about the functions of institutions as well as their forms; thinking about power asymmetries as well as capacity building and thinking about the role of law as well as strengthening the rule of law (new elements in bold). Introducing the Report in London, the Minister responsible for overseas aid, Rory Stewart asked whether the Report should have said more about human rights and democracy. Many believe that these ‘inclusive institutions’ are essential elements in achieving benefits like stability and growth or are an intrinsic aspect of economic development or, indeed, are both. The UN High Commissioner said human rights ‘are not, as some would have you believe, the outcome of postwar bureaucratic doodling, they were woven together from the screams of many millions who died violently or suffered horribly over many centuries’ (Rimmer 2017).

Corruption and Culture There are very few, if any, presentations of what an ideal state run under non-Western cultural rules would look like although Singapore, China and Malaysia offer some pointers. From an African perspective, one of the most disputed areas is whether the Western preoccupation with fighting corruption is just a disguised form of neo-colonialism. Under the striking title of ‘Does African “Corruption” Exist’, William de Maria (2007) argues this case, joining forces with ‘a minority scholarship that connects “corruption” to culture, as a counterpoint to the current conceptual orthodoxy’. De Maria is a strong supporter of Ekeh’s (1975) arguments in ‘Colonialism and the two publics in Africa’. In many ways, the drama of colonialism is the history of the clash between the European colonizers and (African) bourgeois class. Although native to Africa, the African bourgeois class depends on colonialism for its legitimacy. It accepts the principles implicit in colonialism but it rejects the foreign personnel that rule Africa. It claims to be competent enough to rule, but it has no traditional legitimacy. In order to replace the colonizers and rule its own people it has invented a number of interest-begotten theories to justify that rule. (Ekeh 1975: 96)

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In their pursuit of independence the bourgeois class had disparaged and demonized the colonial administration or Westernized order as amoral whilst the ‘native sector’, whose modernized form was the new ethnic group, became the reservoir of moral obligations ‘a public entity which one works to preserve and benefit’ (Ekeh 1975: 100) hence the split into ‘an amoral civic public from which one seeks to gain. If possible in order to benefit the moral primordial public’ (ibid.). The consequence was that the lack of loyalty to the public state which made it difficult to persuade the citizens to be patriotic, work hard and be faithful to public service, pay taxes and meet other duties to the state. The civil service, police and military were part of the civic public but without loyalty to it. The problem with the ‘civic public’ is a continual crisis of ownership. Most of the ordinary people, especially those at the grass roots do not feel that they own the public resources. As Osaghae (2006) stressed there is a constant ‘us’ versus ‘they’ in which the Government and all bodies associated with the government are ‘they’ unless the people in the government are relatives, from the same home village, or from the same ethnic group. Whether fellow members of the ethnic group are ‘us’ or ‘them’ depends on the context and how local the reference is. During the author’s field work in Cameroun, people from the next village were ‘they’ when respondents were in their home villages but ‘us’ when these villagers had moved to the capital (Ware 1977). Ekeh (1975) strongly argued that for many, ethical requirements only applied in the primordial public. Stealing from shared village resources such as a home town or church fund was wrong but in the public sector it was acceptable to steal and be prebendalist, corrupt and plundering. ‘Embezzlement of public funds, is permissible to the extent that the larger group directly or indirectly benefits from the loot’ (Osaghae 2006: 239). A plunderer of public funds ‘would not be a good man were he to channel all his lucky gains to his private purse. He will only continue to be a good man if he channels part of his largess from the civic public to the primordial public’ (Ekeh 1975: 108). It is an interesting question how far the obligation to share the loot is still felt by the looters themselves. There have certainly been examples in the Nigerian Delta region where the young bodyguards of politicians made ‘big’ by looting the public purse, have attacked their sponsors for a perceived failure to share out enough of their ill-gotten gains. In this context, the youths will only see the gains as being ill-gotten because they are not shared out. It is often said that it is hard to measure corruption but the Delta offers a perfect

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example on the ground. Every village without a school, a clinic, a decent water supply offers a perfect measure. In Indonesia many villages display a board outside the local council offices which shows how much funding has been received from the government and how it has been spent. For example, one million rupiah from the Department of Education 500,000 rupiah spent to date on repairing the primary school roof. In order to work, transparency has to be very specific and very local. Another area which appears to have changed since the 1970s is the declining importance of home town associations. It can be debated how far harambee still active or is it a case from Harambee to Nyayo. On 22 October 2018 New Zimbabwe featured the striking headline ‘Zimbabwe “soldiers” invade shops, impose own prices’. The story which followed recounted how three men clad in army uniforms had gone on a rampage forcing Mutasa shop owners ‘at knife point’ to reduce the prices of selected goods which they went on to purchase paying their own prices, to a total of $62.85 for grocery items marked to a value of $110.20. What is really remarkable is that the soldiers, who could certainly just have taken the goods at knife point, calculated their own prices at a little more than half of the marked prices and then handed over the money. ‘The incident comes amid a wave of price increases of goods and services by local businesses in the wake of Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube’s recent policy pronouncements that have seen the Treasury boss introduce a 2% tax on all electronic transfers, coupled with a decision to downgrade bank balances previously in US dollars to the “much dreaded” Zim-dollars. Foreign exchange shortages and austerity measures have left consumers facing long queues for everything from fuel to bread and sugar, and sent prices soaring’. The local MP said ‘shop owners were justified in hiking prices of their goods to cushion themselves from a fast emerging financial disaster’. However, his further comments implied that if the soldiers had been forcing prices down for everyone, they too might have been justified. This is just one incident in a country which has become infamous for poor governance, but it demonstrates individuals still prepared to enforce their own sense of justice.

What Is Working and Why? The World Bank (2018) argues that improved governance often requires up to five interconnected drivers of success: political leadership to overcome inherent opposition; institutional capacity building to create

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sustainable institutions; effective incentives to motivate civil servants; increased transparency to break down silos and demonstrate performance and technology at the right level to be workable and efficient. The pockets of effectiveness (PoE) approach researches areas of government which, despite all barriers, manage to deliver government services and examines why they succeed when so many other areas fail or do not even appear to try. Michael Roll’s 2014 study in Nigeria covered seven organizations with a particular focus on the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), at 70% effective, voted the most effective government agency in a nation-wide poll and the National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP). To 2009 NAPTIP had rescued 3500 victims and achieved 57 convictions. Looking at factors in the success of these PoEs, political support from the very top, that is the President, was vital (NATIP was founded due to the efforts of the Vice-President’s wife). Only the President could have got NAFDAC systematic access to the ports which had been denied by the military. Which raises the question as to how many government bodies in developing countries could expect the support of their president against the military? Effective organizations in Nigeria face powerful and ruthless enemies prepared to threaten the lives of their leaders. In a highly presidentialist system only the President can ensure their continued existence, and if the president changes they may well lose their autonomy and wither away. NAFDAC has the great advantage that it charges for its services and raises two-thirds of its budget through its fees. Both organizations recruited senior staff through written and oral exams and used international training as a reward for good service including reporting colleagues who accept bribes. Their staff also receive wages above the norm and the equipment they needed, including cars and diesel. At crucial points both organizations were headed by women, which is relatively unusual in the Nigerian context. These women explicitly said that they regarded themselves as the ‘mothers’ of their staff. Akunyili, head of NAFDAC, had watched her diabetic sister die from an injection of fake insulin and she looked for staff with equally strong motivations. The tragedy is that PoEs, which require exceptional advantages to deliver effective services, cannot serve as models for the public service in general.

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Conclusion There are many excellent studies of what is wrong with governance in the third world and especially in Africa (See the Bibliography below). Studies of the day-to-day realities of local situations are especially valuable (Eggen 2011). However, there are remarkably few studies which come up with realistic and positive proposals about what can be done to achieve good governance. One approach is to stop aiming for the perfect, best examples and settle for ‘good enough’ governance (Grindle 2010). Both Westerners and reform-minded locals find the situation deeply frustrating. Westerners are used to systems where, once you know exactly what is wrong, then it is a relatively simple matter to fix it. Governance in corrupted systems does not work like that. Most people are involved in the existing system and their complaint is not against the system itself but against the reality that they, and their families, and their fellow ethnic group members are not the ones who are currently benefitting from the goodies which are available. The G7 New Deal sets out an excellent set of sectors for action and means of measuring movement in either direction whether towards good governance or away from it. One measure which understandably does not appear is that of political will for change either at the top national or local level. Many of the recent studies in the ‘can democracy survive’ mode (Kuttner 2018) are in agreement, democracy is less dependent on formal rules than on its guiding spirit. Developing countries may have the ‘right’ formal rules, it is the spirit that is lacking. The fate of two-term presidential limits across Africa provide excellent examples of both factors in operation (Vencovsky 2007). There has been much governance research already, perhaps even too much research (Grindle 2010). Yet there is still a need to devote more attention to establishing priorities, sequences and timing. As previously noted, Botswana and Rwanda are frequently put forward as examples worthy of consideration, but Tanzania which can not boast diamonds, ethnic homogeneity nor a unified culture of firm obedience to the leadership might offer a more modest example of economic success but one with greater applicability across the continent.

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Bibliography African Development Bank. 2008 onwards. Country Gender Profiles. Abidjan: ADB. African Power and Politics Programme. 2012. Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing the Real Challenges of African Governance. London: APPP/ODI. Alexander, A., et al. 2016. Defining Women’s Political Empowerment. Sociology Compass 106: 432–441. Arjona, A. 2014. Wartime Institutions: A Research Agenda. Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (8): 1360–1389. Azarya, V., and N. Chazan. 1987. Disengagement from the State in Africa: Reflections on the Experience of Ghana and Guinea. Comparative Studies in Society and History 29 (1): 106–131. Back, H., and A. Hadenius. 2008. Democracy and State Capacity: Exploring a J-Shaped Relationship. Governance 21 (1): 1–24. Bagoyoko, N., and M. Gibert. 2009. The Linkage Between Security, Governance and Development: The European Union in Africa. Journal of Development Studies 45 (5): 789–814. Barnes, Tiffany D., and Stephanie M. Burchard. 2012. “Engendering” Politics. Comparative Political Studies 46 (7): 767–790. Barnes, T., and M. Taylor-Robinson. 2018. Women Cabinet Ministers in Highly Visible Posts and Empowerment of Women: Are the Two Related? In Measuring Women’s Political Empowerment Across the Globe, ed. A. Alexander et al. Geneva: Palgrave. Barro, R. 1991. Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (2): 407–444. Bayart, J.-F. 2009. The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. New York: Longman. Bhagwati, J., and I. Gambari. 2005. Political Will Not Just Aid, Can Lift Africa Out of Despair. Financial Times. July 5, p. 5. Col.2.t. Bierschenk, T., and J.P.O. de Sardan (eds.). 2014. States at War: Dynamics of African Bureaucracies. Leiden: Brill. Blundo, G., and P.-Y. Le Meur. 2009. The Governance of Daily Life in Africa: Ethnographic Exploration of Public and Collective Services. Leiden: Brill. Booth, D. 2012. Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing the Real Challenges of African Governance. London: African Power and Politics Programme. Bratton, M., and N. Van de Walle. 1997. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Charron, N., and V. Lapuente. 2010. Does Democracy Produce Quality of Government. European Journal of Political Research 49: 443–470.

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State Institutions and the Consolidation of Popular Government in Nigeria Ibraheem Oladipo Muheeb

Preamble A state presupposes an all-encompassing structural framework while governance revolves around issues, values, problem solving, improving the quality of life and life chances of the people. Increasing global prosperity and other dynamics of globalization inform the pressure on modern governments to restructure their respective polities, address inequality and to give hope to the citizenry through purposeful and reassuring governance. The Millennium Development Goals followed by the Sustainable Development Goals, open government, fiscal responsibility, and governments’ commitment to socio-economic and political reforms are global prescriptions that have internationalized otherwise local problems. States’ responses to these and similar initiatives underscore the phenomenon of adaptation in governance, as in other spheres. The reality of the global political economy signifies an end to the era of closed systems and rigid internal control policy initiatives, in the same manner that policy formulation transcends state borders to include the international environment, which is relatively broad and elastic.

I. O. Muheeb (B) Brothers of Charity Services, Curra West, Galway, Ireland © The Author(s) 2020 J. I. Lahai and H. Ware (eds.), Governance and Societal Adaptation in Fragile States, Governance and Limited Statehood, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40134-4_3

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Variations abound in the development sequence of countries with similar histories and common antecedents. There are ample variables to either justify success or account for the failure of countries to effectively integrate into the global system. Having her share of these externally propelled pressures, successive civil administrations in Nigeria have been under an obligation to initiate, nurture and bequeath concrete and focused development of the economy and other spheres of national life. The political arena still leaves much to be desired. The character and personality of the successive presidents have consistently determined the energy brought into governance and the economy, raising questions as to the sustainability of gains and achievements in the event of future development without strong personalities to lead the country. This accounts for the need to revisit the conception of the Nigerian state, interrogate the institutional inertia and the circumstances of recruitment of public officials, patronage and performance vis-à-vis the dictate of globalization on the nation’s political economy. The Obasanjo administration blended technocrats with global orientations as ministers, advisers, heads of institutions and policy initiators and started the facilitation of meaningful reintegration of the nation into the global system after a prolonged lull occasioned by military dictatorship. The conduct of government business arguably depicted a radical departure from the authoritarian past, given the antecedents of Nigerian statecraft relative to global standards. Virtually all of Nigeria’s new credentials: a democratic leadership succession plan, a new clean bill of health from multinational financial institutions, a new international credit rating, an increasing revenue profile, transparency, accountability and other positive indicators of accelerated growth radiated significant global influence.

Background Nigeria has a relatively short history of viable governmental institutions, justice systems and popular government reflective of its chequered history. The reality of the status of any political or governmental institution is a function of the extant state system, history, prevailing ideological leaning of the political class, economic orientation and social constructions. In popular government, viable institutions hold far-reaching implications for the people as well as for the system of rule. It is on this premise that this paper explores the combined theories of institutionalization and prebendalism to interrogate the trajectory of institutions and institution

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building in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic to advance the discourse of popular government. Nigeria’s 1960 independence Constitution established a parliamentary system of government. The Republican Constitution of 1963 was a slight improvement on the 1960 Constitution although both were very similar. The parliamentary system of government was retained, as the three arms of government, the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary continued to function under a fusion of powers. Nigeria’s parliamentary democracy came to an abrupt end on January 15, 1966 with the first military incursion into governance between 1966 and 1979 when the legislature, as an effective arm of government was suspended or completely abolished while the executive and the judicial arms were appropriated by the military authorities (Ojo 1997). Nigeria exited authoritarian dictatorship for civilian rule in May 1999 with the inauguration of the Obasanjo administration. As discussed elsewhere (Muheeb 2016a, c), former President Obasanjo was Nigeria’s military Head of State between 1976 and 1979. Obasanjo’s military administration midwifed the political transition that ushered in the Second Republic administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979. Military rule was synonymous with the reign of a few strong, powerful and influential military elite members and their civilian collaborators. There was a preponderance of weak and compromised institutions, lack of transparency, probity and accountability in governance. Impunity thrived as the rule of law was held in abeyance. The military ethics of command, unquestionable obedience and absolute loyalty percolated through the elite. The ruling class also caught the bug of profiteering from, and appropriation of government business and the welfare of self before others reigned supreme. The political and governmental institutions including the justice system were manipulated to match the wishes and dictates of those with interests to protect. Exhausted and disenchanted with military rule and its many vices, Nigerians clamoured for popular government in the hope that viable political and governmental institutions would supplant the whims and caprices of the few strong and powerful individuals typical of the authoritarian rule of the military. Like the 1979 Constitution, the 1999 Constitution provides for an executive presidency, a bicameral legislature of two chambers: the Senate and House of Representatives at the national level, and a unicameral assembly, a State House of Assembly in each of the thirty-six States of the federation. Section 4 of the Constitution enjoins separation of powers and checks and balances. Separation of powers among the three arms

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of government: the legislature, executive and judiciary accounts for the limit on the exercise of powers that should characterize inter-institutional and inter-governmental relations. Separation of powers implies that each of the three arms of government is virtually independent of the others in functions and personnel and ideally none should be in a position to act with impunity. Separation of powers, functions and personnel limits executive influence over the legislature. The Constitution nonetheless recognizes the relative independence of the judicial arm of government in all circumstances for the public good (Hague and Harrop 2004; Nyong 2000; Lijphart 1992; Muheeb 2015a). The legislature is charged with lawmaking and oversight over the executive, the executive was to implement the law and the judiciary to interpret the laws and to serve as final arbiter. They are to jointly deliver good governance to the citizenry while seeing to the maintenance of law and order. The constitution also favours multiparty politics and periodic elections to effect leadership transitions on a regular basis. Following Hans (2000), most indicators of democracy focus on the performance of either the institutions available or on the quality of democratic procedures and quite often, the institutional fabric of democracy is considered to be the end-result of democratization. This chapter makes the case for institution building and the consolidation of internalization of the domesticated prescriptions and governance instruments. It examines Nigeria’s Fourth Republic and highlights areas where institutional intervention or lack of it has made significant differences in government and administration, as regards popular participation, leadership transition, transparency, probity and accountability. It references the legislature as the foremost crucial institution for representation and oversight. It explores the frequency of impeachment campaigns in explaining executive interference and stability or otherwise and the associated undermining of legislative institutions. It also references the intermittent operation of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), amidst marginal successes recorded by institutions like the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), and interrogates the probity of the Nigerian Police. This chapter follows on from existing works on Nigeria’s Fourth Republic by the author. It builds on the author’s earlier study on Nigeria’s legislative institutions with a report on the performance of subnational legislatures in representation and oversight between 1999 and 2015. The essentials of legislative institutionalization, namely, autonomy, internal complexity and universalism are important in contextualizing the theoretical framework.

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Analysis and discussion in this chapter revolves around the objectives of highlighting the importance of institutions in the consolidation of the system of rule vis-à-vis exploring the essentials of institutionalization to explain and appreciate how institutions operate in different contexts. The chapter does not intend to run a detailed inventory or history of the many challenges faced by democratic governance or the intractable inter and intra-institutional crises in the ongoing Fourth Republic; neither does it intend to embark on an assessment of governmental institutions and institutional practices. Nigeria’s Fourth Republic commands greater elasticity, as an ongoing discourse. Similar single-subject-area titles with coverage by this author include: “Characterizing Nigeria’s Fourth Republic Legislature”, “The Legislature and Party Politics in the Nigeria’s Fourth Republic”, “The Frequency, Substance and Procedural Shortcomings of State-Level Impeachment Campaigns”, “The Nigerian Legislature and the Political Economy of the Obasanjo Presidency”, “Executive Presidency and Institutional Manipulation in an Emerging Federal Democracy”; “Voting and Violence in Nigeria’s 2015 Elections”, “The Subnational Legislature and the Challenge of Vertical Relationships in Nigeria”; and “Fragmented Assemblies and the Constraint of Institutional Instability”; and “The Legislature and Governance” among others. All this work draws inspiration from the theory of legislative institutionalization.

Legislative Institutionalization Contextually, but not exhaustively, institutions include political and governmental structures such as the cabinet, the courts, political parties and the parliament. They also include state instruments such as the armed forces, the police, paramilitary institutions and allied bodies of political and governmental significance. As Obando-Camino (2013) reports, Huntington (1965) defined institutions as “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior”, and institutionalization as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability”. Institutionalization also implies “the process of converting something into an institution or establishing an institution”. Institutionalization thus strengthens organizations, while enabling them to set themselves apart from the environment. Huntington characterized institutionalized organizations by their adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence, but he did not provide standards to identify and measure these criteria. On the strength of Huntington’s definitions, Polsby (1968) applied institutionalization

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theory to the American Congress, focusing on behavioural patterns that characterized an institutionalized legislature, namely: how it distinguishes itself to a high degree from the environment; its internal complexity; and how it relies on universalistic and automated decision-making to perform legislative functions (Muheeb 2015a; Obando-Camino 2013). Legislative institutionalization implies the organization of legislative institutions within the framework of governmental institutional development. Industrialization and modernization have brought with them “a large expansion and development of the role of government within society, particularly into areas seen previously as the sphere of the private. It also connotes an important part of the process of modernization in developing countries, involving again the expansion and improved organization of government structures”. Polsby’s (1968) examination of institutionalization in the USA offers a useful organizational framework to assess how legislatures develop. He identifies three dimensions of institutionalization, namely: autonomy (differentiation from the environment), internal complexity (intra-legislature rules and modus operandi) and universalism (application of global best practices in the conduct of internal affairs). Polsby projects the “long-run process whereby the U.S. House of Representatives has become highly institutionalized” with far-reaching implications for the system by patronizing different measures of institutionalization. Legislatures have remained a critical element of institutional analysis and a fertile area, to empirically apply the concept of institutionalization (Peters 1999). More importantly, in legislative studies, the concept of institutionalization has been used to identify an evolutionary process by which an organization becomes an institution through the acquisition of persistence and stability. When a political institution becomes highly institutionalized, it tends to be perceived as static, stable and immutable (Capano 2003). Variation in the dimensions of institutionalization produces different institutionalized patterns of behaviour and different institutional identities. It is generally assumed that the legislature exercises greater political power with regard to policy-making, and has a stronger role to play vis-à-vis other arms of government. Studies have identified the diverse areas of performance used to evaluate and analyse an institutionalized legislature. These include: representation, deliberation, control over budget, lawmaking and oversight functions. Also included are such variables as: available constitutional and legal powers for the legislature,

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the level of involvement of the legislature in the decision-making process, resources, expertise and information available for the legislature to perform, as well as the power and the political will to hold the executive accountable for its actions (Muheeb 2015a, 2016a, b; Born and Urscheler 2002). Legislative institutionalization has been criticized on several grounds, from its methodology to the application of its principles. The theory has, however, survived these attacks. Obando-Camino highlighted Cooper and Brady’s (1981) arguments against Polsby’s exposition based on the premise that institutionalization underestimates the relationship between the internal characteristics of the legislature and the environmental influences on congressional change. They therefore held that organization theory explained congressional change better than legislative institutionalization theory (Obando-Camino 2013). Polsby (1981) underscores the importance of external influences on the institutionalization process, by admitting the impact of the environment on legislatures, and he rejected organization theory, as it could not accommodate both the horizontal authority structure and the conflict management function of the legislature (Obando-Camino 2013). Again, Obando-Camino noted that legislative institutionalization engenders recognition of legislatures as political actors to be reckoned with by the other arms of government particularly the executive. By being self-regulatory, it provides members with sense of identity that is conducive to their handling of legislative business, which emerge from internal regulations, both formal and informal, that establish legislative procedures and an incentive structure for members (Muheeb 2015a; Obando-Camino 2013).

Political Institutions Political institutions, which include political parties among other nongovernmental political units, can be defined as “formal arrangements for aggregating individuals’ preferences and regulating their behaviour through the use of explicit rules and decision processes enforced by an actor or set of actors formally recognized as possessing such power” (Levi 1990). As Robert Putnam reiterates, political institutions influence strategies and distribute power, and they also influence how different groups come to define their political interests (Steinmo and Thelen 1992; Dowding and King 1995). For a better understanding of institutions,

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three important variables feature prominently, namely: strategies, preferences and social capital. Most approaches would agree that institutions influence actors’ strategies, that is, the way actors try to reach their goals. This is an important part of institutional analysis, as it has been shown that small and seemingly unimportant changes in institutional rules affecting strategy greatly influence the outcome of the political process (Ostron 1995). Putnam’s “Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy” (1993) offers another intervention using the concept. Putnam (1993) investigated why public institutions, such as the democratic system, function so differently in Italy’s twenty different regions simply classified as being North or South. Putnam observes that democracy, and by implication the economy works better in the north than in the south. In accounting for this variation, Putnam’s study points out that it is the density and weight of the local organizational networks that is decisive for establishing and securing efficient political institutions. The more people have been organized in socio-political, religious, sporting and related voluntary associations at the local level, the better democracy works. This position tallies with Tocqueville’s classical analysis of the young American republic arguing that a functioning democracy requires a developed civic spirit. Citizens must, when deciding on common affairs or engaging in politics, be made to see reasons to be selfless and to see not just to their own short-term interests, but also to the common good (Offe and Preuss 1991) and as Putnam correctly argues, people can develop this capacity by taking part in voluntary associations. Putnam’s feat involves demonstrating that this participation factor is more significant than traditional socio-economic variables for explaining how democracy works. He claims that the differential development of civic spirit in the various regions better accounts for the variation in the economic standing of the regions. Thus, it is the civic spirit that produces economic growth and functioning democratic institutions as against economic growth producing civic spirit. Participation in organizational life creates social capital, which enables interactions between citizens to be built on trust. That is to say, people choose to co-operate with their neighbours because they trust that the latter will reciprocate the gesture. In the various networks of associational life, a binding element arises in the form of norms facilitating co-operation. Expressed in economic terms, social capital reduces transaction costs in the economy, costs associated with ensuring that contracts are kept (Coleman 1970). Concretely, this is a matter of whether agreements can be confirmed with a handshake or

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whether scores of lawyers and stacks of insurance policies are needed to consummate transactions. On institutional stability, a central idea in all accounts of institutions is that they are enduring entities: they cannot be changed immediately at the will of the agents. This is central to all schools of institutional analysis. If institutions change only as the structure of power or other social forces surrounding them change, then there would simply be no need for a separate analysis of institutions (Krasner 1984). Ultimately some institutions, such as constitutions, attain an almost sacred status. Meaningful discussion on institutional viability premised on institutionalization, no doubt promises firm insights into the understanding of institutions and their environments including complementary institutions and the public. While not being oblivious of its many drawbacks, which include its emphasis on institutions at the expense of process among other psycho-social and economic variables as earlier identified, it is necessary to state that as a general theory, institutionalization is of value in explaining how legislative institutions have become highly differentiated from other political institutions (David 2003). Relying on the theory of institutionalization by adapting such variables as the external environments shaping the legislative institution’s performance as well as the internal characteristics of legislatures is of the essence in appreciating the representativeness of legislative institutions. The manipulation of state institutions including legislative assemblies for selfish ends by vested interests outside the institutions themselves makes an appreciation of the Richard Joseph’s conception of the Nigerian state and politics relevant to this discourse.

“Prebendal” State and Institutions Richard Joseph’s prebendalism theory intends to explain and offer an understanding of the ease with which individuals and groups manipulate and undermine state institutions. In the Church of England a prebend was both the official and the share of the income of the Cathedral he served to which he was entitled. Thus prebendalism is a political system where both elected officials and public servants believe they have a right to a share of government revenues which they in turn use to benefit their supporters, co-religionists and/or members of their ethnic group. This is usually not perceived as being corrupt by those participating—corruption to them would entail taking more than one’s share. Joseph’s (1987) exposition is of relevance because it cuts across writings on corruption. Nigeria as a

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state is the creation of conquest and domination rather than an entity that evolved through a gradual process of aggregation or expansion of indigenous societies. The state remains disproportionately important in the struggle for resources to advance upward mobility and primitive accumulation. Within this context, the Nigerian state and politics become fertile grounds for corruption, as captured by Claude Ake in his exposition to the effect that “the Nigeria state appears to intervene everywhere and to own virtually everything including access to status and wealth. Inevitably, a desperate struggle to win control of state power ensues since this control means for all practical purposes being all-powerful and owning everything”. Joseph (1987) noted that the Nigerian state thus becomes a magnet for all facets of political and economic life, consuming the attention of everyone who has an interest to promote including politicians and other politically motivated individuals. In such an environment, it may amount to double standards, to make any attempt to exclude a particular segment of the society from the desperate struggle to capture the state and manipulate its institutions for sectional interest (Muheeb 2016a, b, c). Thus, the politics of oil and gas deeply entrenched the culture of Joseph’s “Prebendalism” that engenders corruption, lack of accountability and transparency in governance and furthers the amenability of state institutions to manipulation. The Nigerian state became an instrument of domination for the few beneficiaries of the oil wealth. The Nigeria state, politics and institutions have not only been systematically affected by oil wealth and attendant consequences but have consistently been shaped by it. O’Connell’s (1967) view of “The inevitability of instability”, which revolves around ethnicity and politics of resources allocation in Nigeria also applies to institutional and governmental instability. Thus, nothing has sparked off more constitutional, legal, political controversies and sometimes, violent clashes, than the desperate quest for the control of the authoritative allocation of the revenue from oil wealth. Perhaps, given the intensity of political competition and the zero sum approach to politics of access to oil revenue and its redistribution, oil and gas has fundamentally altered the evolution and development of state institutions nearly all of which are manipulated by individuals and groups with interest to protect or selfish causes to advance. Personalities that benefit from government patronage favour the continued subversion of state institution in ways that stultify institutional viability and efficiency in the delivery of public good (Siollun 2013; Udeh 2002; Joseph 1987). Thus, viable institutions like

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the Nigerian Army, and the Police are as crucial as representative institutions in as much as they are not so amenable to subversion and they can function effectively and in ways that suggest that at least in part they are nationalistic rather than purely prebendial.

The Trajectory and Complexity of Institution Building The civilian administration inherited a number of challenges in which the palpable weakness of state institutions is manifest. These included youth restiveness, violence and threats of war, armed robbery, kidnapping and ransoming. Conflicts and violence became manifest in militancy, insurrection and terrorism by ethnic militias. Critical governmental institutions like the armed forces, the police and the judiciary were stretched beyond their limits with palpable inadequacies in combat readiness and effective delivery of justice (Muheeb 2015b). In the 1990s up to the early 2000s, the Niger Delta region was the scene of recurring violence between members of different ethnic cum militia groups competing for recognition and patronage as well as political and economic power (Muheeb 2005, 2015b, 2016g). The leaders of groups of young men were paid off not to attack the oil pipe lines. In spite of the extant institutional frameworks, a series of systemic inadequacies constituted major obstacles to guaranteeing effective oversight and public sector accountability that could entrench fiscal discipline and reduce insecurity. These inadequacies included a lack of confidence in the state security and the criminal justice systems. The nation’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) oscillated between second and third most corrupt countries in the world according to Transparency International’s (TI) Reports. Nigeria occupied an unenviable 144th position on Transparency International’s Global Corruption Perception Index Report for 2004 and it slipped to 152nd position in 2005 sharing that position with Cote d’Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea. This demonstrates the enormity of the challenges of a political economy with a history of institutional and systemic inadequacies as bequeathed to the Obasanjo administration by the military in 1999. As a civilian president with a popular mandate at inception in 1999, Obasanjo’s manner suggested a frontline partaker in Nigeria’s governance and administration, with a possible understanding of the over politicization of social life with a corresponding increase in the degree of intensity of

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political competition, which could make the consolidation of popular government an Herculean task. Ake had correctly observed that the premium on political power was so high that Nigerians were prone to taking the most extreme measures to win and to maintain political power. On the strength of public goodwill, the Obasanjo administration’s reconstruction initiatives needed to bring the Government’s nationalist claims to bear to avoid a repeat of the unimpressive past and the seeming tendency to sustain the status quo. This required mitigating the palpable sectional leaning and attendant political upheavals, arresting the choking culture of patronage, primordial loyalties and the prevalence of sectional cleavages in party politics while strengthening constitutional government (Muheeb 2016g; Theen and Wilson 1986; Sklar 1983). This thus required reviving existing moribund institutions or putting in place complementary instruments. These included initiatives that would facilitate the restoration of confidence in government, instil discipline, reduce waste and align the administration’s reform initiatives with the reality of the global economic system. Juxtaposing Nigeria’s experience in government and administration under the military and the democratic regimes, this author is of the view that functional institutions are of immeasurable significance. The Obasanjo administration established the Independent Corruption Practices Commission (ICPC) and the EFCC to prosecute proven cases of corruption by state officials and citizens. The administration established the Due Process Office (DPO) to re-screen and vet all public sector contracts to arrest the scourge of corruption, and supported the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency initiative (NEITI) and the Oil and Gas Unit (OGU) to facilitate transparency and corporate governance in the oil and gas sector. The DPO was reported to have saved the nation over 900 billion Naira within the first three years of its operation while the EFCC claimed that successive governments is Nigeria have altogether misappropriated some US$400 billion since independence. In 2001 alone, Nigeria was reported to have made as much as US$16.2 billion, an equivalent of about US$1.35 billion per month or US$45 million per day from oil and allied products exports. In 2004, Nigeria witnessed yet another oil boom with crude oil prices rising above US$50 per barrel amounting to US$25 above the US$25 benchmark for the 2004 budget. The international market price of crude oil as at 2006 was between US$65 and US$70 per barrel. Reports reveal that the Federal government recorded the sum of US$10.27 billion, about N1.43 trillion, accruable revenue

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into the excess crude oil account, as at the end of August 2005 (Muheeb 2005, 2016c, g).

Public Sector Corruption and Institutional Inertia of Government Although the list is endless, notable cases of public sector corruption included those involving the former Inspector-General of Police under the Obasanjo presidency, Tafa Balogun. There was also the National Identity Card Project scam involving Obasanjo’s former Minister of Internal Affairs, S.M. Afolabi, and the Halliburton scandal over tax fraud with the active connivance of some Nigerian public officials. The Ajaokuta debt buyback fraud and the controversial joint venture contract between the Nigerian government represented by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and Shell Oil Development Company (SODC), over the multibillion dollars Agbami deep-water project and the alleged tax evasion by Chevron-Texaco Nigeria were among the omissions or commissions that cost the nation billions of dollars in cash, investments and credibility which were not pursued to a satisfactory conclusion. Apart from negative publicity, low investment inflow, poor domestic productivity, institutional failure, failed projects, and spiralling poverty, public sector corruption and financial mismanagement promoted a zero sum approach to politics in Nigeria (Muheeb 2016g). At the “national sensitization campaign” to mobilize support for the anti-corruption campaign, Nigeria’s Minister of information and Culture, Lai Mohammed alleged that fifty-five people, including former state governors, cabinet ministers, civil servants, bankers and businessmen stole $9 billion dollars from Nigeria’s treasury between 2006 and 2013. This amount, which was more than a quarter of the 2015 national budget, could have been channelled into meaningful infrastructural development (Faul 2016). Following Popoola’s (2016) account, fifteen former governors allegedly stole 146.84 billion Naira, four former ministers shared 7 billion naira and 12 former federal and state officials shared N14 billion. Eight bankers allegedly stole 524 billion Naira while 11 businessmen allegedly stole a further 653 billion Naira. Using World Bank rates and costs, the minister alleged that just one-third of the stolen funds could have provided 635.18 kilometres of road, built 36 ultra modern hospitals at one hospital per state, built 183 schools, educated 3974 children from primary to tertiary level at 25.24 million per child and built 20,062 units

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of 2-bedroom houses (Muheeb 2016e; Faul 2016; Channels Television 2016).

The EFCC and the Constraint of Its Operational Environment Nigeria’s successive anti-corruption campaigns have attracted doubts and condemnation through accusations and counteraccusations of witchhunts and vendettas, which make a mockery of the justice system when the accused are culpable. The Obasanjo administration (1999–2007) made strong statements and recorded modest successes in its anticorruption campaign with the controversial impeachment of five sitting governors on allegations of corrupt practices and abuse of office amidst investigation of many others. While the Economic and Financial Crimes unit (EFCC) under the leadership of Mallam Nuhu Ribadu attempted to raise Nigerians’ consciousness to the scourge of corruption, Ribadu’s EFCC is remembered as an instrument of vendetta for politically motivated trials and convictions. The judiciary was perceived, ostensibly to be “more interested in the exhibition of legalism over (the) administration of justice”, giving lawyers the leeway to latch onto technicalities and the many lacunas in the legal framework to extricate culpable individuals for fat fees. One of the instances of such circumvention of justice which made a mockery of the country’s institutions was the case involving a former governor of Delta State who was eventually found guilty by a court in London of the charges he was discharged and acquitted of by the Nigerian judiciary. The extradition to and prosecution of the accused in the UK at the instance of the British government was the height of the setbacks suffered by Nigeria’s anti-corruption campaigners. It signalled the contradictions in Nigeria’s justice system particularly as regards corrupt practices and abuse of office. Public sector corruption is not unique to Nigeria as many countries are grappling with it as TIs annual reports attest. The incidence of corruption and the need for the political will to tackle the menace are putting governments on the spot. The administration of President Muhammadu Buhari has had to take drastic measures to fight corruption beyond the mundane level to circumvent many systemic and institutional inadequacies. This is the first time that the fight against corruption is leadership centred. The leadership of President Buhari has been responsible for the positive turn in the fight against corruption in Nigeria. Lai Mohammed has reiterated

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that the judiciary is crucial to the success of the anti-graft campaign; otherwise pending cases of corruption could drag on until they outlast the Buhari administration. The Buhari administration’s anti-corruption initiative has attracted reactions, controversies and outright condemnations. Allegations against the All Progressives Congress (APC) administration of witch-hunt and vendetta against the opposition are rife, as the government insists that everyone who had stolen public funds, including those with pending cases of corruption before the courts must face the consequences irrespective of political affiliations (Faul 2016; Channels Television 2016). Elsewhere in a related study on the desirability of virile institutions (Muheeb 2017, 2016e), the author undertook a global survey of public sector corruption, the incidence, shared features and the peculiarities of the environment, governments’ responses and tolerance levels of select countries (Muheeb 2016e). The findings revealed that corruption scandals account for failed projects in Italy, just as three cabinet ministers resigned in a day in a sweeping scandal in Turkey. An Iranian received a death sentence for corruption, while Brazil’s political economy suffers amidst major corruption scandals. Widespread corruption and government’s indifference accounted for the frustration, disenchantment and a reported loss of confidence in government in México. Scandals and attendant collapsed infrastructure and governments’ abysmal performance in human security have threatened public confidence in the political and governmental processes in Nigeria and Malaysia. Scandals have also threatened public confidence in political and governmental institutions. Countries’ experiences in strategy, the deployment and efficacy of institutional frameworks vary. China’s record of far-reaching investigations, prosecutions and conviction nevertheless affirms the centrality of virile institutions, focused leadership, discipline, and political will needed to combat the menace and extricate Nigeria from its web of institutional inadequacies (Muheeb 2016e). According to CBS/AP (2016) China’s ruling Communist Party claimed it punished nearly 300,000 officials for corruption in 2015, 200,000 of whom were given light punishments and 82,000 handed severe penalties, including demotions within the bureaucracy. More than 400,000 civil servants were disciplined in 2013 and 2014 in connection with the anti-corruption drive, a significant increase over previous years (CBS/AP 2016). China’s record of success is a function of viable institutions and complementary political will, a feat Nigeria must aspire to attain in order to consolidate representative governance.

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INEC, the 2015 Elections and the Imperative for Viable Institutions The 2015 general elections conducted by the INEC were one single exercise the showcased the many benefits of firm governance and political adaptation. INEC was one institution in Nigeria’s recent history which underscored the fact that elections and electioneering are crucial to popular government. As Disu Kamor noted, voting is a crucial avenue to effect positive changes in the polity. Voters must be free to exercise their right to vote based on their assessment of candidates’ track-records, competencies, disposition and action plans on issues of concern to the society. Elections also afford the citizenry opportunities to hold political actors and candidates accountable and demand their commitment on vital issues (Disu 2015). The electoral umpire is crucial just as the police and other security agencies are. As Adele Jinadu reiterated, the electoral umpire holds a crucial position in determining not only the success or failure of an entire transition process but also the peace and orderliness of the polity as well as the legitimacy of the victor. The umpire’s own self-definition of the institution’s role is crucial for the substantive and procedural content of the transition programme (Nwosu 1991). Elections for representative institutions should be manifestly free, fair and credible to be violence-free (Muheeb 2015c). The 2015 general elections conducted with minimal acrimony stand out in the history of Nigerian elections since 1999. This is against the background of a chaotic leadership transition in which winners emerge can in an election they never contested for. Going by the outcome of the 2015 elections, there is a consensus of opinion that the performance of INEC has improved in terms of the transparency and logistics of the electoral processes. INEC demonstrated considerable determination to ensure free, fair and credible election and for Nigeria to overcome the cycle of controversial elections. This it did through thorough coordination of information, strategies and operations among relevant stakeholders including the various security agencies, politicians and the general public with harmonized views prior to the elections (Olokor 2012). It is therefore noteworthy that INEC was able to live up to this consciousness, and meet the expectations and yearnings of the electorate, in the general conduct of the elections against all odds. As a prelude to the peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections, the Commission effectively deployed the

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tremendous advantage—of considerable credibility—it had over its predecessors with its commitment to fair play. In an enviable effort to be transparent; INEC’s worthy initiatives to forestall controversy included effective collaboration with the media, institutional partners and professional colleagues while at the same time guarding its autonomy (Muheeb 2015c). The changes introduced by INEC to enhance the credibility of the 2015 general elections succeeded in a number of ways to checkmate the massive figures of electoral victory usually associated with Nigerian elections. The Smart Card Reader (SCR) simply helped to put a limit to figures that could be fabricated and falsely declared at the polls by perpetrators of election rigging witnessed in times past. For example, none of the 36 States and the FCT was able to declare even as much as 50% of the votes cast as measured against total voter population figures claimed by each of the States prior to actual elections. Kano and Lagos, which emerged with the highest voter population figures, claiming about 4 million in the past, would certainly have been higher without the use of the card readers, which automatically pegged the figure any state could declare outside SCRs, thereby effectively reducing the chances of excessive manipulation of figures that was the hallmark of previous elections. Kano, with close to five million registered voters and over four million Permanent Voter’s Cards (PVCs) claimed could only return less than 2 million actual votes while Lagos with about five million registered voters with PVCs was only able to return about 1.4 million at the end of voting (Muheeb 2015c; Daniel 2015a). INEC effectively engaged the media, which helped in the enlightenment campaign explaining the use of SCRs and PVCs for the elections. This initiative paid off in ensuring the success of the entire electoral process. It facilitated a coordinated nationalist approach, particularly in ensuring that voters were duly informed of the importance of the SCRs and the PVCs. The media also helped in propagating the message of peace before, during and after the elections, leading to non-violent outcomes. The media performed well in raising the confidence of the electorate before the elections and effectively took up the cause of non-violent polls and regularly called on candidates to publicly take the non-violence pledge (Daniel 2015b). The repercussions could have been grievous were the elections for any reason declared inconclusive. This implies INEC proactively addressed crucial administrative and logistics issues before voters could resort to self-help to register their grievances, which could spur

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violence (Muheeb 2015c). INEC was also able to reduce to the barest minimum, the desperate attempts by politicians to manipulate the process, either through compromised staff or, worse still, ad hoc staff, like collation officers disappearing with results sheets. This was unlike the prior situation when the previous electoral umpire’s laxity gave room for individuals unhindered to mass thumbprint ballot papers and to allocate arbitrary figures for their favourite candidates. INEC insistence on due process changed the narrative of elections, particularly voters’ ability to determine the outcome, resulting in the more dignified and credible outcomes that were a departure from the previous “landslide” victories (Ebegbulem 2015). INEC was widely acknowledged and appreciated for conducting relatively successful elections that elicited the spirit of sportsmanship in conceding defeat by virtually all the critical stakeholders. The numbers of cases and magnitude of violence reported by the media during the 2015 general elections were far less than during previous elections. INEC’s success story was a function of its autonomous posture, resourcefulness, quality leadership and a resolute workforce committed to reform, modified internal complexity, availability of resources, strict domestication of global best practices, the co-operation of the law enforcement agencies, especially the police, which has the constitutional mandate to guarantee peace, orderliness and arrest electoral offenders among other essential variables of an institutionalized institution. Interinstitution synergy also played a role with the co-operation of, and collaboration with local and foreign governmental and non-governmental partner agencies, organizations and institutions (Muheeb 2015c).

Inter-Institutional Relations and Institution Building This section examines how inter-institutional relations undermine or strengthen institution with particular reference to accountability, oversight and representation. The political instability brought about by military incursions into politics disrupted representative rule in the immediate post-independence period. Hence, the preponderance of political actors craving for conquest, command, obedience and loyalty as opposed to cordiality, mutuality, tolerance, bargaining and compromise that could have enhanced institutional cohesion. This state of affairs was bolstered by the politics of the “godfathers”, in which prospective public office seekers wove their political aspirations around personalities and individuals with

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political and financial prowess to deliver victory by whatever means possible, including taking the most extreme measures to grab power. Elections became do-or-die affairs and the survival of the fittest was the order of the day. The ensuing politics of personality has had damnable consequences for the much desired effective inter-institutional relations, quality representation and effective government and administration. There is no gainsaying the fact that former President Obasanjo exhibited a military posture in his disposition towards other political and governmental institutions and their component units. In the inter-institutional relationship dynamic, the legislature marginally served to neutralize the dictatorial tendencies of the Obasanjo presidency. For example, Aiyede (2006) recalls that the National Assembly passed the Niger-Delta Development Commission Bill and the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act into law on the strength of their two-thirds majority power even against the refusal of presidential assent to both Bills by Obasanjo. The legislature also exhibited an independent disposition towards Obasanjo’s Third Term bid in 2007 by successfully dismissing the Third Term or the Tenure Extension Bill. Obasanjo’s body language occasionally suggested that the legislature was held in contempt and lawmakers penchant for the culture of “settlement” often in cash did not help matters. As Aiyede (2006) recalls “money was openly displayed on the floor of both the Senate and the House of Representatives as bribes being distributed by the executive to … enforce its will on the parliament ”. Consequently, lawmakers compromised their integrity and lowered the reputation of the institution of the legislature. The presidency had a finger in the parliamentary politics that produced and removed principal officers at short intervals in quick succession. The Senate had three Presidents between 1999 and 2003, and two between 2004 and 2007 (Muheeb 2016c). The result was institutional instability and the undermining of legislative institutions. The foregoing, therefore underscores the importance of the legislative-executive relation in Nigeria.

Executive Presidency as a Constraint to Viable Institution Building The desire for unity in diversity, the identifiable inadequacies of the parliamentary system and the institutional requirements of a modern state necessitated the consideration of an executive presidency that could muster the requisite political will, offer a rallying point for diverse interests

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and stabilize the polity. However, widespread impunity amidst arbitrary deployment of executive powers negates the spirit of the constitution and undermines the development of viable institutions. These signs were evident at both the vertical and horizontal divide of the inter-governmental and inter-institutional relations. The abysmal showing of a number of state assemblies due to crises and conflicts had their roots in presidential incursions (Muheeb 2015a; 2016a, b, c, d). The presidency played prominent roles in producing and removing elected representatives in the National Assembly and in determining the fate of legislative institutions and elected executive officials at the subnational level. This situation was given a push by the fact that some state assemblies were ready tools at the disposal of the presidency, either willingly or perforce through unhealthy compromises. For example, Bayelsa, Ekiti, Oyo and Plateau States had their Governors arbitrarily removed from office in hasty and controversial impeachments clandestinely supported by federal executive instruments such as the EFCC in ways that compromised, and stultified the growth of the affected institutions (Muheeb 2016a, b, c, d). The militarization of impeachment campaigns against many Governors through massive deployment of security forces; huge funding for the removal plots and support for the manipulation of the numerical requirements for, and supremacy in the exercise of the impeachment power by the legislature (Muheeb 2016f) speaks volumes of the extent to which the will of the president determines the consolidation or truncation of the representative government processes. Many state legislatures suffered from the burden of successive presidential interventions which figured in many of the controversies that bedevilled the polity and were a major factor in the interinstitutional relations crisises at the State level rendering most legislative institutions uncoordinated and ineffective (Muheeb 2016a, b, c, d). The record of impeachment campaigns across the state assemblies reveals a widespread affliction with institutional instability. Lack of autonomy, inadequate human and financial resources and inexperience on the part of lawmakers, the pursuit of selfish agenda at the expense of institutional cohesion took its toll on State legislatures, many of which equated impeachment with oversight. This is not to discountenance the fact that impeachment campaigns helped to keep many State Governors on their toes, in addition to giving due recognition to the institution of the legislature. Such campaigns have sent strong messages on governmental efficacy, questioning the technical competence of victims, the embezzlement

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of public funds and the sheer display of arrogance by elected representatives. Impeachment became a reminder of the need for representatives to be mandate-conscious in public service, accountability and representation. In some cases, impeachment was predicated on the need to sanitize and benchmark representative institutions against minimum standards in public office (Muheeb 2016c, f). While these legislative initiatives are a testimony to the vitality and essence of viable institutions, the confusion that trailed many of the impeachments culminated in the declaration of a state of emergency in Plateau and Ekiti States by the national executive. This resulted in the appointment of administrators for these States for six months, in the first instance, using constitutional provisions under Section 305 of the Constitution. This, by implication, meant the dissolution of all democratic structures and institutions in the affected States (Muheeb 2007).

The Nigeria Police, Partisanship and the Challenge of Institution Building The partisan disposition of the often-overzealous Nigerian security apparatus particularly the Nigeria Police under the command and control of the presidency can hardly be over emphasized. The power vested in the executive by provisions under Sections 214 and 215 of the Constitution becomes more pronounced and counterproductive with an amenable and compromised police structure. Beyond constitutional provisions that aid the president’s desire to deploy power arbitrarily are other socio-cultural factors that are manifest in the jaundiced understanding of the nature of the state and the ends to which state institutions could be exploited. The presidential powers, much beyond what the constitution envisaged, have been deployed arbitrarily and at will by successive occupants of the office of the President between 1999 and 2015. The presidency through executive agencies and institutions under its supervision, displayed a false sense of superiority over component arms and levels of government and their respective institutions. The Nigeria Police was reputed for being a hopelessly biased national institution in such circumstances going by accounts of its interventions in issues of inter-institutional and inter-governmental relations since 1999. By omission or commission, the Police authorities through the Inspector-General of Police (IGP) became a willing tool at the disposal of the executive, at the state and national levels (Muheeb 2016c).

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The Jonathan Presidency like the Obasanjo administration 1999–2007 accounted for a considerable share of attempts at undermining popular government. By its actions and inactions, the Police’s disposition put representative government in jeopardy in Plateau, Ekiti, Ogun and Rivers States, where the Police tacitly gave security support to minority members against the majority to further legislative actions. In Rivers State, a group of five minority lawmakers who moved against twenty-seven colleagues considered to be loyal to the State Governor allegedly had the tacit support of the State Police Command. A similar scenario was reportedly played out in Edo State where the Police were instrumental to the factionalization of the state assembly into pro and anti-governor’s groups, a development that grounded the legislative institution and prevented it from functioning (Muheeb 2015a, 2016a, d). The identifiable instances of interference revealed rampant incursions of arms-wielding security agencies’ into the legislature’s sphere at executive instance. These incursions had resulted in constitutional breaches, chaos, and lawlessness. The November 20, 2012 invasion of the National Assembly by officers of the Nigeria Police under the provisions of Sections 214 to 216 of the Constitution, which resulted in commotion following the throwing of teargas canisters at the assembly complex by police personnel under orders, was a clear case of subversive executive recklessness. The police reportedly laid siege to the National Assembly Complex, prevented some lawmakers from gaining access into the complex under the pretext that there was an “intelligence security report”, to the effect that some “hoodlums” planned to invade the complex. The legislative institution was put into disrepute and its public reputation nosedived (Muheeb 2016a, b, c, f, g).

Making Institutions Work Nigeria is making steady progress in democratic consolidation and institution building across sectors. It has experienced four civilian-to-civilian leadership transitions, the latest being the transfer of power from the ruling party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) to the consolidated opposition party, APC after sixteen years of the former in the saddle. The military and authoritarian background of the system of rule cannot be wished away, as their remnants still pervade the polity. The need for institution building and reorientation of the citizenry to appreciate the core values of representative government including the rule of law to complement the

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commitment to sustainable development is of the essence. The Obasanjo transitional presidency could perhaps justify some of its omissions or commissions on the grounds that certain matters of national interest required expeditious political decisions, actions and solutions. The myriad of economic problems were such at to call for urgent and concrete executive action. Obasanjo and his supporters could also claim the preponderance of weak institutions as well as a commitment to “quick dispensation of justice” against erring public officials, particularly the State Governors in order to circumvent the immunity clause, which could shield them from immediate prosecution. This does not remove the fact that Obasanjo’s leadership style undermined the development of autonomous viable institutions, a legacy that was to become a reference point for subsequent administrations. Effective institutions are necessary prerequisites for public accountability and popular participation. Incorporating viable institutions or consolidating the modest achievements recorded by the existing ones as opposed to promoting powerful personalities and individuals is desirable for representative government to thrive. This would require that political actors observe constitutional provisions and respect the rule of law. In spite of real and perceived misgivings, the 1999 Constitution made adequate provisions for the independence and effective functioning of governmental institutions. It is imperative for political actors and public office holders to consciously subscribe to the strengthening of both political and governmental institutions. Trustees of institutions should equally strive to extricate their institutions from the vices of the Nigeria state, especially those that promote the manipulation and appropriation of state institutions to selfish ends. Institutional actors should promote institutional cohesion and maintain internal discipline among other public service and professional ethics. The general public however has the balancing role to play in policing institutions by ensuring their compliance with the rules of engagement through public advocacy. The electorate could take-up the challenge of finding and electing representatives with the requisite professional competence and capacity to function effectively. However, the most important criterion is simply that those standing for election should be motivated by a desire for the general welfare rather than any desire for personal benefit much less corrupt rewards. Recruitment into state institutions should not be through patronage but through merit and a credible selection process. The desperate pursuit of election and re-election into the representative institutions often makes

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elected representatives vulnerable to financial inducements from the executive and patronage from overbearing party leaders, which invariably hinders the independent execution of official duties to the detriment of their mandates and the legislative institution. This author agrees with Barkan (2008, 2009) that among the factors that determine the relative capacity of the legislature to become more attuned to its responsibilities and provide effective representation are: presence in the legislature of members that are committed to internal reform of the legislative institution. Such members, either on account of exposure or sheer understanding of their powers perceive that their assembly is deficient in comparison to similar more effective institution elsewhere and thus, resolve to improve their game; such legislatures could also parade the leadership that constitutes formidable forces for or against change; an executive, who invariably opposes the strengthening of legislative capacity for whatever reason; and civil society groups and partners that are committed to institutional capacity building through legislators’ training and encouragement of legislators’ desire to make the institution stronger and more effective. All of these variables are equally relevant to many other institutions, including those under the control and supervision of the executive. By and large, the costs of weak institutions or no relevant institutions include but are not limited to, widespread corruption, frustration, disenchantment and loss of confidence in government. The recurring mob actions and resort to self-help including public lynching to get justice depict more worrisome manifestations of lawlessness and the reenactment of the Hobbesian state of nature witnessed in countries with a prevalence of weak institutions. Nigeria is not alone in this, as the growing sense of hopelessness shared by many in Mexico, where a vast number of criminal cases remained unresolved and the state is virtually absent in some areas also appears. Such a sense of insecurity breeds a festering confusion and weariness with the tendency for people to take the law into their own hands. Self-defense groups appear to fight organized crime, filling the void created by weak governmental institutions either incapable of confronting sophisticated criminal gangs, unwilling to act or willfully compromising their professional ethics. Nigeria cannot afford the enormous cost of undermining both political and governmental institutions for the people and the system of rule.

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Concluding Remarks This chapter specifically highlights the state of affairs prior to and moments after the takeoff of the Republic to underscore the centrality of institutions in Nigeria’s quest for good leadership, good governance, accountability, the rule of law and the deepening and the sustenance of representative government. It responds to concerns about what becomes of a representative government without established institutions. It points to the legacies of authoritarian rule that have sustained the tendencies to manipulate political and governmental institutions for selfish ends. It juxtaposes the era of the preponderance of weak institutions supportive of popular government, bequeathed by the military to the seasons of modest achievements recorded by select political and governmental institutions revived or put in place between 1999 and 2015. The paper answers the question of how Nigeria could consolidate these achievements to further the cause of popular government by proposing that the government bring the variables of patriotism and the de-politicization of appointment of heads of critical state institutions to bear. In this vein the chapter acknowledges the modest achievements of select strategic institutions such as the INEC through which the importance of autonomy, quality leadership, teamwork, expertise, political will, patriotism and the supremacy of national interest over and above primordial considerations were evident. Similarly, the cumulative performance of an anti-graft agency, the EFCC was particularly useful in explaining how institutions function in different contexts. Despite what is sometimes implied in the international media, corruption is not the exclusive preserve of Nigeria. Nigeria’s case has remained peculiar, because of the prolonged leadership deficit and the preponderance of weak institutions with minimal dispositions to address the menace. The chapter examines institutional effectiveness using Polsby’s three dimensions of institutionalization. His theory requires that an institution must be adequately catered for, to function effectively. This entails putting in place the requisite constitutional and legal powers for the institution; resources and expertise as well as the complementary power and political will for the institution to perform. Institutions must be peopled by experienced individuals and merit, precedents and internal rules among other impersonal universally acknowledged decision criteria must take precedence. This is opposed to the peculiar and particularistic criteria of favouritism, nepotism and partisan politics. There is no gainsaying

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the fact that a resource deficit hampers efficiency and effectiveness and compromises institutional autonomy. Hence, an institution must not be dependent on other complementary institutions but must be adequately equipped with the requisite financial, human and material resources to function effectively. Such an institution must be free to manage its own affairs and work independently of any encumbrances and interference in the national interest. This is not to discount supervision, checks and balances by higher authorities where and when necessary; but such must not be to the detriment of or to undermine institutional efficiency. There should be conscious effort to promote capacity building for officers. This implies that institutions should be in a position to handle the recruitment, training and re-training of its staff independent of external influence. Discipline among members and/or staff is of the essence in institutional effectiveness. There must be respect for the internal workings of the institution including the appointment of principal officers as well as the internal procedural rules and powers (for example a seniority rule when and where applicable). These also include the rule governing the conduct of officials, and limitation on the powers of principal officers, particularly as regards available checks and balances. Rules of engagement with the environment of the institution should not be breached and the means and channel of communication with the public must be clear and unambiguous. There should be continuous conscious efforts to comply with global best practices, which should be domesticated and adhered to, acknowledging that new media offers novel resources for monitoring governmental performance in fighting corruption.

References Adele Jinadu cited in Nwosu, H.N. 1991. Conduct of Free and Fair Elections in Nigeria: Speeches, Comments and Reflections. Lagos: National Electoral Commission. Aiyede, Remi Emmanuel. 2006. Legislature-Executive Relations in Nigeria’s Democracy. In Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria, ed. Emmanuel O. Ojo. Ibadan, Nigeria: John Archers Publishers Limited. Barkan, Joel D. 2008. Legislatures on the Rise? Journal of Democracy 19 (2, April): 124–137. Barkan, Joel D. (ed.) volume Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies. Lynne Rienner, 2009. 277 pp. Cited in Melia, Thomas O. 2010. What Makes Legislatures Strong? Journal of Democracy 21 (2, April).

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Born, Hans, and Marlene Urscheler. 2002. Democratic Accountability and Parliamentary Oversight of Multinational Peace Support Operations: Powers and Practices of Parliaments in 17 Countries. Paper presented at the 4th Workshop on “Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight of International Military Cooperation and Institutions,” held in Brussels 12–14 July, and organised by the Working Group on Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Capano, Gilberto. 2003. The Long Hard Struggle to Change a Resilient Institution: The Case of Italian Parliament Viewed from a Diachronic Perspective. A Paper Prepared for ECPR Joint Sessions, Edinburgh, UK, 28 March–2 April, 35. Coleman, James S. 1970. The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa. In The Politics of Developing Areas, ed. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cooper and Brady. 1981. Cited in Obando-Camino, Iván Mauricio. 2013. Legislative Institutionalization: Historical Origins and Analytical Framework. Estudios Políticos, 42, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Universidad de Antioquia, 180–195. David, Judge. 2003. Legislative Institutionalisation: A Bent Analytical Arrow. http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/gao/2003. Hague, Rod, and Martin Harrop. 2004. Comparative Government and Politics— An Introduction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hans, Kema (ed.). 2000. Comparative Democratic Politics: A Guide to Cotemporary Theory and Research. London: Sage. Joseph, Richard. 1987. Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. Levi 1990, Krasner, 1984, Coleman 1990, Offe and Preuss 1991, Steinmo and Thelen 1992, Dowding and King 1995, Ostron 1995, cited in Goodin, Robert E. and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.). 1998. A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lijphart, Arend (ed.). 1992. Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government, 1– 157. New York: Oxford University Press. Muheeb, Ibraheem Oladipupo. 2005. Oil and Gas and the Nigerian Political Economy in the Twenty-First Century: Prospects, Challenges and Vulnerabilities. An unpublished thesis (Master of Science, M.Sc. Degree) submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Lagos, Nigeria, October 2005. Muheeb, Ibraheem O. 2007. Anti-Corruption War: Legislatures’ Weak Points and Its Implications for an Emerging Federal Democratic Polity. Journal of Arts and Humanities 4 (3): 94–102. Muheeb, Ibraheem O. 2015a. The Legislature and Representative Government in Ogun State Nigeria, 1999–2011. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan.

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Muheeb, Ibraheem O. 2015b. Representative Government and the Political Economy of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation 4 (1, September): 133–156. University of KwaZuluNatal Pietermaritzburg South Africa. http://adonisandabbey.com/edition_ toc.php. Muheeb, Ibraheem O. 2015c. Voting and Violence in Nigeria’s 2015 Elections. A paper presented at the Two-Day National Conference on: “The 2015 General Elections In Nigeria: The Real Issues”, hosted by the Electoral Institute (TEI), an organ of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), July 26–28, in Abuja Nigeria. Muheeb, I.O. 2016a. Characterizing Nigeria’s Fourth Republic Legislature (1999–2015). Occasional Paper Series, No. 78, The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS), Cape Town (University of South Africa), South Africa. Muheeb, Ibraheem O. 2016b. The Subnational Legislature and the Challenge of Vertical Relationship in Nigeria. In Reflections on Politics, Governance and the Economy in Contemporary Nigeria, ed. D.A. Yagboyaju. Ibadan: University Press. Muheeb, I.O. 2016c. The Legislature and Party Politics in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, 1st ed. Lagos: Concept Publications Limited. Muheeb, I.O. 2016d. The Nigerian Experience in Legislative Practice, Process, and Legislation. African Journal of Politics and Society 2 (3, July): 49–97. Muheeb, I.O. 2016e. Public Sector Corruption in a Global Perspective. UNILAG Journal of Politics 8 (1 & 2, June): 81–130. University of Lagos (UNILAG), Nigeria. Muheeb, I.O. 2016f. Frequency, Substance and Procedural Shortcomings of State Level Impeachment Campaigns in an Emerging Federal Democracy. The Journal of Social Sciences, 12 (2, June): 117–128. https://doi.org/10.3844/ jssp.2016. Muheeb, I.O. 2016g. The Nigerian Legislature and the Political Economy of Obasanjo Presidency. African Journal of Politics and Society 2 (1, January): 5–35. http://ajpsquarterly.org/images/AJPS_VOL_2_NO_1.pdf. Muheeb, I.O. 2017. Executive Presidency and Intra-Institutional Crisis in Nigeria, 1999–2015. Global Journal of Human Social Sciences 16 (4, February): 46–57. Version 1.0, Year 2016, released 2017. Nwosu, H.N. 1991. Conduct of Free and Fair Elections in Nigeria: Speeches, Comments and Reflections. Lagos: National Electoral Commission. Nyong, B.E. 2000. Relationship Among the Three Arms of Government for a Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria. In Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria, ed. Okon E. Uya. Calabar: Institute of Public Policy and Administration.

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Obando-Camino, Iván Mauricio. 2013. Legislative Institutionalization: Historical Origins and Analytical Framework. Estudios Políticos, 42, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Universidad de Antioquia, 180–195. O’Connell, James. 1967. Cited in Akinsanya, Adeoye A., and John A. A. Ayoade. 2005. Readings in Nigerian Government and Politics. Gratia Associates International. ISBN: 9783799215, 9789783799219. Ojo, Timothy Ibikunle. 1997. The Nigerian Legislature: Historical Survey, 60– 183. Badagry, Lagos: Administrative Staff College of Nigeria. Peters, 1999. Cited in Gilligan, Thomas W. Performance of an Institutionalised Legislature. http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/3/1/1. Polsby, Nelson. 1968. cited in Squire, Peverill. 1992. Theory of Legislative Institutionalisation and the California Assembly. http://links.jstor.org/sici?. Polsby, Nelson W. 1981. Studying Congress Through Time: A Comment on Joseph Cooper and David Brady, ‘Toward a Diachronic Analysis of Congress.’ American Political Science Review 75 (4): 1.010–1.012. Cited in ObandoCamin and Iván Mauricio. 2013. Legislative Institutionalization: Historical Origins and Analytical Framework. Estudios Políticos 42: 180–195. Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Universidad de Antioquia. Putnam, Robert. 1993. Cited in Boix, Carles, and Daniel N. Posner. 1996. Making Social Capital Work: A Review of Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. The Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Paper No. 96-4, June 1996. Siollun, Max. 2013. Soldiers of Fortune: Nigerian Politics Under Buhari and Babangida (1983–1993), 184. Abuja: Cassava Republic Press. Sklar, Richard L. 1983. Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, xiv–xxi. New York: NOK Publishers International. Theen, Rolf H.W., and Frank L. Wilson. 1986. Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Six Countries, 512. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Udeh, John. 2002. Petroleum Revenue Management: The Nigerian Perspective. Oil and Gas Mining and Chemical Department; WBC and ESMAP Workshop on Petroleum Revenue Management. Washington, DC, October 23–24.

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Daniel, Soni. 2015a. 2015: As Buhari’s Victory Covers INEC Flaws…, May 2. See more at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/05/2015-as-buharisvictory-covers-inec-flaws/#sthash.RtS6eJZA.dpuf. Accessed 9 April 2015. Daniel, Soni. 2015b. 2015 Polls: Media’s Role on PVC Use, Card Readers, Made Difference—Entwistle, May 5. Disu, Kamor. 2015. Election 2015: MPAC Recommendations and Guidelines. Lagos: MPAC Newsletter, January 17. http://mpac-ng.org/specialtopic/ 740-election-2015-mpac-recommendations-and-guidelines-.html. Accessed 9 Feb 2015. Ebegbulem, Simon. 2015. 2015 POLLS: Electoral Offenders Will Go to Jail— INEC Chief Igini, May 3. See more at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/ 2015/05/2015-polls-electoral-offenders-will-go-to-jail-inec-chief-igini/# sthash.4PxzJk3H.dpuf. Accessed 9 May 2015. Faul, Michelle. 2016. Nigeria: Minister Alleges $9 Billion Stolen from Economy. Lagos, Nigeria (AP). http://news.yahoo.com/nigeria-minister-alleges9-billion-184803747.html. Accessed 19 Jan 2016. Olokor, Friday. 2012. NSA Predicts Violence in 2015 Elections, August 30. Abuja. http://www.punchng.com/news/nsa-predicts-violence-in-2015-elections/. Popoola Latifat. 2016. 55 People Stole N1.3tr in 7 Years—Fed Govt, January 19. http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/general/55-people-stole-n1-3tr-in7-years-fed-govt/129701.html. Accessed 19 Jan 2016.

Local Institutional Designs and Reforms in Rwanda and Burundi Paul Odhiambo

Introduction Rwanda and Burundi are geographically small countries at the heart of Africa’s Great Lakes region covering an area of 26,338 square kilometres and 27,883 square kilometres respectively. Ruanda-Urundi territory was under tBelgian-controlled mandate under the League of Nations from 1922 to 1945. After the end of the Second World War, Ruanda-Urundi became a Trust Territory of the United Nations, still under the Belgian control. The mandate was granted political independence as two sovereign states countries on 1 July 1962. The two countries share a similar ethnic composition: approximately 85–90% Hutu, 10–14% Tutsi and 1% Twa. The two countries had turbulent experiences in the first three decades of their postcolonial statehood. Uvin (1999) contends that the dynamics that led to mass violence in the two countries should be seen as entirely different processes. Even though the social structure of domination was similar in the two neighboring states, it could not explain the dynamics of violence as the social composition of the elites

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was different. The political elites in the two countries employed divergent strategies of state control and legitimization to perpetuate their authoritarian rule. The mass violence in the two countries reached its climax following the assassination of democratically elected President Melchior Ndadaye of Burundi in October 1993 and the genocide in Rwanda following the shooting down of the plane carrying Rwanda’s President Juvénal Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart Cyprien Ntaryamira as it prepared to land in Kigali on 6 April 1994. The two states have made considerable efforts in the post-conflict transition period that culminated in constitutional and governance reforms in early 2000s.

Theoretical Framework The fragility-to-resilience approach is employed in this chapter to explain and understand how Rwanda and Burundi made efforts in mitigating state fragility at different paces to preserve their respective statehood and remain resilient. State fragility is a condition of the state manifesting attributes such as the loss of physical control of its territories, erosion of legitimate authority and inability to provide reasonable public services to the citizens (Christensen 2017). Fragile states also manifest a broken social contract, low social cohesion and weak governing institutions (Ingram and Papoulidis 2017). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines a fragile state broadly as a vulnerable society in which the government cannot and will not deliver core functions to the majority of its citizens (Dutta and Roy 2016). Such a state lacks the political commitment or capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies. This could apply to both conflict or post-conflict countries and non-conflict countries. Manyena and Gordon (2015) contend that state fragility can be attributed to several factors including colonial legacy; political identity fragmentation and weak institutions; depletion of community social trust; adoption of inappropriate western models of governance; structures and laws that might negate local/traditional institutions, norms, governance systems, history and social relationships; identity divisions and asymmetries in social capital. A combination of these factors is likely to cause low resilience in fragile states. On the other hand, strong states have the capacity to command loyalty from their citizens; and are able to extract resources like taxes and to provide public services (Holsti 1996). Moreover, such states are capable of guaranteeing territorial integrity and sovereignty; hold the monopoly

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over the legitimate use of force within their defined territories and operate within the context of a consensus-based political community. Both vertical legitimacy and horizontal legitimacy are crucial in ensuring that the social contract (governor–governed relationship) and the political community (society–society relationship) are effective and harmonious within the sovereign state. A strong state concept refers to a condition in which a state has developed efficient political institutions, has a solid economic basis and a substantial degree of national unity (Jackson and Sorensen 2003). A fragile state suffers from low empirical statehood. In such a state both vertical legitimacy and horizontal legitimacy are relatively weak. Broadly, resilience refers to the ability of an individual or community to cope positively with rapid onset shocks or significant and protracted sources of stress (Manyena and Gordon 2015). Resilience can also refer to the durability of social systems in the face of shocks and stresses and their capacity to recover or to bounce forward after a disturbance. According to Westley (as cited in Carpenter 2008), there are four discrete responses on the part of a system to external shocks namely growth, conservation, collapse and reorganization. Collapse and reorganization are referred to as “back-loops” in which the system faces such a severe shock or stress that it collapses or the system undergoes fundamental changes in its organization. The system can be reorganized either within the same regime; change into a different regime or it can transform completely. Carpenter employs the “back-loop process” model to understand fragile or weak states. While some fragile states could be in the collapse phase, others are progressing through reorganization. The resilience theory focuses on how citizens and communities who live in those systems respond when state institutions face severe stress or eventually collapse. Citizens and communities can either promote state collapse or play a role in a state’s reorganization or recovery. The “back-loop process” model is vital in understanding how Rwanda and Burundi remained resilient during the first three decades of independence and how the states reorganized in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Efforts to Mitigate State Fragility in Rwanda Both internal and external factors played a considerable role in mitigating state fragility in the 1950s and in the first three decades of post-independent Rwanda. Following tensions and widespread violence

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in Rwanda between 1957 and 1960, the United Nations (UN) sponsored reconciliation conferences to find lasting solutions to the conflict (Melvern 2000). The UN also attempted to supervise the referendum on the principle of the monarchy and national assembly elections. However, it faced opposition from the dominant PARMEHUTU (Mouvement Democratique Rwandais/Parti du Mouvement et de l’Emancipation Hutu) that argued that external institutions should not meddle in Rwanda’s internal affairs. In October 1959, Gregoire Kayibanda transformed the Mouvement Social Muhutu (Hutu Social Movement) of MSM into PARMEHUTU. The Hutu-based party’s main intention was to champion an end to the Tutsi “colonization” before liberation from Belgium (Melvern 2000). The continuing violence in Rwanda and the escalating refugee crisis prompted the UN General Assembly to form a special commission of five member states in February 1962 to oversee Rwanda’s independence from Belgium. The commission was also tasked with ensuring that Rwandese who had gone into exile in neighbouring countries returned home. Other mandates of the UN commission included ensuring human rights, maintenance of law and order in the country and withdrawal of the Belgian military forces from Rwanda. As the agitation for the struggle against the colonial power gained momentum, several political parties were founded in Rwanda. In June 1957, Gregoire Kayibanda formed the Mouvement Social Muhutu (Hutu Social Movement) or MSM. Founded in November 1957, the Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse (Association for the Social Promotion of the Masses) or APROSOMA, distinguished itself as the party of the masses across the ethnic divide. The Union Nationale Rwandaise (Rwandese National Union) or UNAR was formed in August 1959. UNAR was seen as the party of monarchists but had an external policy that forged alliances with Patrice Lumumba’s MNC, People’s Republic of China and communist countries in the UN Trusteeship Council (Mamdani 2001). As a result, the Belgian authorities viewed it as pro-communism party (Rusagara 2009). The Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais (RADER) was created in September 1959. Chief Bwanakeri’s RADER projected an image of a political party that would shake off old customs but not cut ties with Belgium. RADER’s key objective was economic and cultural development of both Batutsi and Bahutu. However, critics argue that RADER was created to divide the support base of UNAR. As noted, Kayibanda transformed MSM into PARMEHUTU in October 1959 (Melvern 2000).

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The opposition unity in the early 1960s that transcended Hutu/Tutsi divide was seen as a critical step in which Rwandese from different political and ethnic persuasions came together. After the June/July 1960 communal elections that were overwhelmingly won by the PARMEHUTU party, the opposition parties including UNAR, RADER and APROSOMA formed a “Front Commun” in opposition to the Kayibanda-led provisional assembly (Mamdani 2001). The pressure by the united opposition not only challenged the proponents of Hutu power but also persuaded UNAR to participate in the UN-initiated parliamentary elections in 1962. UNAR had previously boycotted the June/July 1961 communal polls. The unity of political opposition was crucial in cultivating the culture of political resilience amidst emerging authoritarian rule. Rwanda formally became independent on 1 July 1962 under a republican government led by President Kayibanda. The coalition government formed during the First Republic between May 1962 and November 1963 comprising members of PARMEHUTU, UNAR and APROSOMA contributed to relative peace for 18 months. Though exclusion had dominated Rwandan politics between 1959 and 1962, a growing force of coalition favouring politics of accommodation might have influenced President Kayibanda to incorporate members of other political formations into his first cabinet. However, intensified invasion of Rwanda’s territories by armed exiles in November and December 1963 undermined the nascent coalition government as the local opposition was viewed as collaborators with the insurgents. The invasions provided the proponents of exclusion within the dominant PARMEHUTU to execute repressive measures against the opposition that eventually led to the collapse of the coalition government. The Kayibanda regime not only thwarted the insurgent invasion but also intensified efforts towards the elimination of internal opposition. The government enforced extreme security measures including the establishment of numerous roadblocks, enforcement of travel permits for Rwandese moving from one prefecture to another; a curfew from 6.00 p.m. and acts of brutality against the opposition UNAR party officials including mass arrests, torture and murder with the aim of eliminating the UNAR (Melvern 2000). The massacres of the civilian population from the minority group continued unabated. It is estimated that 10,000 Rwandese of Tutsi origin were eliminated between December 1963 and January 1964 (Prunier 1995).

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While the Second Republic during the Habyarimana regime continued with the quota system meant to direct education and job opportunities to the majority community, the implementation of the policy did not apply to the foreign diplomatic and business community in Rwanda. As a result, the minority Tutsi had opportunity to excel in certain sectors of society and accessing employment opportunities in non-governmental organizations. The actions of non-state actors played an important role in mitigating the effects of marginalization-related policies that could have affected the minority adversely. Moreover, the post-independence Church also contributed in ensuring that the minority had the opportunity to acquire education. It was during the Second Republic that there was a shift from viewing Hutu and Tutsi as races to being ethnicities, hence the lifting of the ban on Tutsi participation in the civil and political sphere, though their modest gains were largely visible in the civil sphere. The shift contributed to recognizing all ethnicities as Rwandans unlike the race narrative that led to perceiving the minority as “outsiders” to the Rwandan state. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) commenced the armed struggle against the Habyarimana regime in October 1990. The invading forces from Uganda were led by Major-General Fred Rwigyema along with other senior officers who had been serving in Uganda’s National Resistance Army (NRA). As they deserted the NRA to launch the struggle, they took with them considerable military equipment. The RPF faced a relatively well-equipped Rwanda National Army, Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR). The killing of Major-General Rwigyema on the second day of the war was a big blow to the guerilla movement. However, the stepping into the RPF leadership by Major Paul Kagame played a significant role in stabilizing the movement. As the war went on, the international community put pressure on the government of Rwanda and RPF to initiate peace talks, which commenced in July 1992, in Arusha, Tanzania. After thirteen months of negotiations, the comprehensive and wideranging Arusha Accords were signed in August 1993. This was seen as an important step in restructuring political power and promoting an inclusive governance structure with a broad-based transitional government. Some of the key features of the Accord included the integration of the Rwanda military and RPF; a largely ceremonial presidency; deployment of a neutral international force; withdrawal of the French soldiers; allowing Rwandese refugees to return home and holding a democratic election no more than twenty-two months from the time transitional government

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was formed. Despite the gains realized, there were outstanding issues that faced the Accords. The Peace Accords had the potential of mitigating state fragility as both the government and the RPF agreed to create a transition cabinet in line with the envisaged power-sharing arrangement. However, the power-sharing was undermined by extremist forces in the country and destroyed by the shooting down of the plane carrying President Habyarimana on 6 April 1994.

Independence and the Formation of the Burundi State Burundi faced a challenging transition from colonial administration to self-rule in the early 1960s due to the politics of factionalism among the political elite especially the Baganwa clans; the rivalry between the Hutu and Tutsi communities; and Cold War geopolitics. Between 1957 and 1966, tensions intensified between the leading Banagwa dynasties (Bezi and Batare) and the monarchy. The Bezi dominated UPRONA (Parti de l’Unite et du Progres National) party while the Batare-dominated Parti Democrate Chretien (PDC) party. Mwami’s son Prince Louis Rwagasore was the unofficial leader of the UPRONA party under the slogan of “unity and progress”. UPRONA won the legislative elections on 8 September 1961 due to its opposition to colonial rule, the charismatic leadership of Rwagasore and the party’s alignment with the Mwami (Daley 2007). Prince Rwagasore was declared as the prime minister and asked to prepare the country for full independence. However, there were concerns about Rwagasore’s association with Patrice Lumumba and Julius Nyerere. Rwagasore was assassinated on 13 October 1961. Mwami Mwambutsa IV chose Andrea Muhirwa as prime minister after the death of Rwagasore (Lemarchand 2008). Burundi obtained independence on 1 July 1962 as a constitutional monarchy with Mwami Mwambutsa IV as the king. Between 1962 and 1965, Mwami Mwambutsa appointed five prime ministers namely Andre Muhirwa, October 1961–June 1963; Piere Ngendandumwe, June 1963– April 1964, January 7–15, 1965; Albin Nyamoya, April 1964–January 1965; Joseph Bamina, January–September 1965 and Leopold Bihagumugani, October 1965–July 1966 (Boshoff et al. 2010; Daley 2007). In May 1965, there were parliamentary elections that were won by the Hutu majority. Appointment of Bihagumugani as prime minister, a Tutsi, did not go down well with the majority. In October 1965, there was

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an attempted coup by Hutu-dominated police that prompted the king to flee into exile. In July 1966, King Mwambutsa’s son Prince Ntare V deposed his father to claim the crown. In a nutshell, postcolonial Burundi has been markedly unstable due to four successful coup d’états in 1965, 1976, 1987 and 1996; attempted coups, ethnic polarity; assassinations of high profile leaders and armed conflicts (Daley 2007). Burundi has been ruled by three strong leaders namely Captain Michel Micombero (1966– 1976), Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza (1976–1987) and Major Pierre Buyoya (1987–1993) before the democratic election of President Melchior Ndadaye of Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) party in June 1993. As noted, Ndadaye was assassinated in October 1993, sparking a new wave of violence and armed conflict in the country.

Efforts to Mitigate State Fragility in Burundi Prince Louis Rwagasore has been described as a Burundian nationalist in the struggle against colonial domination due to his charismatic leadership that brought leaders and citizens across the board to UPRONA through the slogan of “unity and progress” leading to cross-ethnic consensus in the party (Daley 2007). As a result, the legislative elections in 1961 seem not to have been fought on ethnic lines but UPRONA won primarily on ideological grounds, opposing colonial rule in Burundi. Secondly, King Mwambutsa IV employed various strategies to stabilize the country by appointing five prime ministers from different ethnic groups after Rwagasore’s death to the time he fled to exile into Zaire in 1965 (Stalgren 2005). The King also managed to provide leadership between 1961 and 1965/1966 as the country seemed to lack a national leader after the death of Prince Rwagasore. President Buyoya’s National Commission to Study the Question of National Unity and to investigate atrocities committed against Burundians was a positive move in understanding what had hindered the nurturing of a “cohesive” state since independence. The Commission was also a good gesture from a leadership concerned about loss of lives of citizens during August 1988 (Daley 2007). While some observers viewed the Commission’s usefulness in acknowledging the existence of ethnic problems, others criticized the Commission’s report for placing the blame for ethnic divisions entirely on the colonial administration. However, the Report’s recommendations led to the approval of a Charter of National Unity by a referendum in February 1991. As a result, President Buyoya

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established a Government of National Unity. There were also changes made in the education sector to make it more inclusive. The formation of coalition governments was a strategy that Presidents Buyoya and Ndadaye employed to mitigate state fragility. Under this arrangement, the presidents were able to include state officers from different ethnic backgrounds in their respective administrations. In October 1988, Major Buyoya ensured that both the majority and the minority had the same number in the cabinet. However, there was little attempt to reform the security sector during the Buyoya regime especially the military and the police that were perceived to be dominated by the minority. When he took over power after having been democratically elected, President Ndadaye formed a Government of National Unity despite his landslide win in both presidential and parliamentary elections. He also appointed Prime Minister Sylvie Kinigi from the minority community. A political amnesty was offered Former President Bagaza to return home from exile. The initiation of the Burundi peace process by the Regional Peace Initiative and the international community in the 1990s played a considerable role in mitigating state fragility in Burundi. The UN took the first major initiative after the 1993 tragedy in the country to commence negotiations on a new power-sharing arrangement among the elites (Boshoff et al. 2010). The UN designated a distinguished diplomat: Amadou Ould-Abdullah to facilitate the power-sharing between UPRONA and PRODEBU political parties. However, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda worsened the situation in Burundi as ethnic polarization, intercommunal fears and insecurities escalated in the country. In 1995, regional states began showing interest in finding a lasting solution to the Burundian crisis. The neighbouring countries were concerned about the protracted nature of the Burundi conflict and its destabilizing effect on the region (Daley 2007). The Organization of African Unity summits in Cairo and Tunis approved the need to have some form of intervention in Burundi. The regional initiative obtained the backing of the UN Security Council with two resolutions in 1996. Former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere was named by the regional states and the wider international community to help the people of Burundi in finding means to achieve peace, stability and reconciliation. The first negotiations began in Mwanza, Tanzania in April 1996. The negotiations were later shifted to Arusha in June 1998. After the death of Nyerere in October 1999, former South Africa President Nelson Mandela agreed to continue with the facilitation of the peace

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process although the situation in Burundi was very different to the South African case (Wolpe 2011). Despite significant challenges in the negotiations, the Arusha Peace Accord was finally signed by most of the delegations in August 2000. The three fundamental issues included leadership of the thirty-six-month transition; military reform and the integration of the armed groups into the national army; and bringing on board the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and PALIPEHUTU’s armed wing, the Forces for National Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL). It was agreed that President Pierre Buyoya would lead the first eighteen months of the transition government, which was launched on 1 November 2001. The CNDDFDD joined the transition administration in October 2002. Afterwards, Domitien Ndayizeye became the president for the remaining period of the transition (April 2003–August 2005). In February 2005, a new constitution was adopted and Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the CNDD-FDD, was elected by the National Assembly to take over as the president at the end of the transition administration. President Nkurunziza officially ascended to power on 25 August 2005.

Transformation in Rwanda The civil war in Rwanda and the subsequent genocide devastated the state. The economy was in a shambles as state institutions were severely paralyzed. The economy shrunk by 50%, inflation was 64% while per capita income dropped to US$143 (Porter and Mccreless 2008). Poverty reached 78% of the population in 1994. Most of the human development indicators were at their lowest in the country. However, the resilience of the Rwandan state enabled the country to transition from the turbulent period to post-conflict transition. The new government had to plan on how to jumpstart the economy and rebuild the state institutions. At the same time, the government had to deal with the humanitarian crisis in the country as tens of thousands of citizens had been displaced internally during the war. The threats posed by the defeated Rwanda National Army and the interahamwe militias could not be underrated by the RPF administration. Moreover, the state had to plan for promoting national unity since the armed conflicts had exacerbated tensions and mistrust in communities hence there was an urgent need to commence justice and reconciliation processes. In order to make progress, the government focused on

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rebuilding institutions that led to significant improvements in economic outcomes and social indicators (World Bank Group 2009). Extensive economic and governance reforms spearheaded by the RPF administration between 1995 and 2008 contributed to an average GDP growth rate of 8.6% annually. Stability and security were critical in the reconstruction process. Resettlement, national reconciliation, reintegration of former ex-combatants and repatriation of Rwandese refugees have been imperative in enhancing not only security and stability but also peaceful coexistence and national cohesion. The government prioritized the establishment of a new Rwandan identity, not based on ethnicity. To achieve this, the government created the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission in 1999 (Porter and Mccreless 2008). The government not only introduced new national identity cards without ethnic designation but also a new flag and national anthem came into force in 2001. On the economic front, the government-initiated macroeconomic reforms to bring inflation under control. Other reforms were geared towards improving public administration, budgeting and financial management and stimulating the development of the private sector. Other reforms included deregulation of the exchange rate in 1995; passing of a new income tax in 1997; the creation of the Rwanda Revenue Authority in 1998 to strengthen the collection of taxes and custom duties; setting up of the National Tender Board in 1998 to enforce procurement rules; the creation of a legal framework for privatization in 1996; the establishment of the Anti-corruption Commission in 1999; setting up of the Rwandan Investment Promotion Agency (RIPA). In 1998, Rwanda also led in passing a law exempting foreigners who invested $100,000 or more from import and sales taxes. The RPF government promulgated a more progressive constitution in 2003 that endeavours to establish a democratic, social and secular state in which power belongs to the people (Articles 1 and 2). Every Rwandan has the right to his or her country (Article 24). This is crucial as it intends to address the problem of statelessness that began in November 1959 when thousands of Rwandese took refuge in regional countries and elsewhere. Under the supreme law, the Rwandan State commits to fight the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations and eradicate ethnic, regional and other forms of divisions (Article 9). The state endeavours to promote national unity, equitable sharing of power, gender equality, rule of law, a pluralistic, democratic government, social welfare and social justice. Under the constitution, Rwanda will seek to resolve challenges through

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dialogue and consensus. The constitution also establishes the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (Article 178) and the National Commission for the Fight against Genocide (Article 179) geared towards promoting national unity and fighting against genocide.

Rwanda’s Home-Grown Solutions Framework Rwanda is known to have incorporated indigenous practices into its governance system and socio-economic development processes including Umuganda, ubudehe, girinka, abunzi, gacaca courts, umushyikirano and imihigo. The local institutions have played a critical role in enhancing participation in community development and solidarity; the social protection system; the conflict resolution and alternative justice system; local democracy; reconciliation and national cohesion.

Participatory Community Development Umuganda: This concept can be traced back to the Rwandan culture of self-help and cooperation. In traditional Rwandan culture, members of the community would call upon their families, relatives, friends and neighbours to support them in performing certain tasks including farming, construction of a house and providing transport for those in need of medical assistance. According to Uwimbabazi (2012), Umuganda was a traditional practice and cultural value of working together to solve social and economic problems for mutual benefit. The Umuganda was also critical for the aged, the sick and the most underprivileged members of the society. The practice of Umuganda contributed to the enhancement of human security and increasing household income. In the late 1990s, the government of Rwanda reintroduced Umuganda as one of the homegrown solutions to advance socio-economic and political development in the country. Umuganda was institutionalized in 2007 with the enactment of Organic Law Number 53/2007 Governing Community Works. In 2009, Umuganda was reinforced with the Prime Ministerial Order Number 58/03. Today, Umuganda is compulsory for every adult and is undertaken on the last Saturday of every month. Nonetheless, there are instances in which informal Umuganda activities can be organized in the middle of the month. All able persons between the age of 18 and 65 years participate in Umuganda activities. Umuganda is generally employed to

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implement government policies and programmes such as decentralization, economic development, poverty reduction initiatives and promotion of national unity and reconciliation. Umuganda is also a priceless value that promotes the spirit of collective action and togetherness in the Rwandan society. The national leadership contends that Umuganda is not only civil works but also about self-sufficiency and dignity (Crisafulli and Redmond 2012). Through the Umuganda, Rwandese are encouraged to appreciate the principle of self-reliance. Ubudehe: It refers to the traditional practice and culture of collective action, mutual help and reciprocity to solve communal or societal problems (Shah 2011). The Ubudehe concept was adopted by the Ministry of Local Government in order to promote local democracy and participatory governance at the grassroots. The Ubudehe has been instrumental in promoting active citizenship, building a strong civil society and creating social capital among members of communities. The concept of Ubudehe can be compared with deliberative democracy that emphasizes the need for citizens to listen to, debate and deliberate on each other’s positions and agree on public choices.

Social Protection Programme The Girinka Programme emerged as a pro-poor programme to help poor families in improving their social and economic welfare. The term Girinka comes from a Rwanda model of greeting meaning “May you have cows”. A cow is a precious gift in Rwandese culture as it is a symbol of wealth, social status and also a source of nutrition. Therefore, the Girinka programme aims at giving a dairy cow to every poor household to increase milk production, improve nutrition and to provide manure for soil fertility (Crisafulli and Redmond 2012). The Girinka programme is also known as “One cow per poor family”. The giving of a cow to household is a sign of guaranteeing their security and status. The Girinka programme can be traced to the seventeenth-century social protection measure in favour of children. It was an offering of milk for children. The Girinka programme was introduced in 2006 as a measure to address the problem of malnutrition and stunting among Rwandese children. The overall objective of the programme was to reduce children malnutrition and to increase household incomes for poor families by providing a heifer to a family. By providing a cow to poor households, the Girinka programme also intends to reduce poverty through dairy farming

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and improving agricultural productivity by using mature to increase soil quality and enhance good farming methods geared towards soil preservation. An increase in milk production and high-quality soil for crop farming are key in boosting agriculture entrepreneurship across the country. The Girinka programme also plays a role in community building as a household that has received a cow is expected to give its calf to a neighbour. The Girinka programme is coordinated by the Rwanda Agricultural Board, a state agency in charge of the selection, certification and distribution of cows, management of the budget and training of the beneficiaries in animal husbandry and monitoring and evaluation of the entire Girinka programme. Since its inception, the programme has been implemented in all the thirty districts across the country. By 2016, over 259,087 families had benefitted from the decentralized Girinka programme. In a nutshell, Girinka has considerably contributed to poverty alleviation through improving agricultural productivity, enhancing food security, fighting malnutrition, strengthening social cohesion and reconciliation, employment opportunities, increasing use of biogas and increasing citizens’ participation and inclusivity in government socio-economic and political programmes (Anastase et al. 2016). While Girinka is a commendable programme in poverty alleviation and enhancing the livelihoods of poor households, its success depends on the availability of land, water and fodder for the livestock. Moreover, the households need to be able to access extension services from public livestock officers.

Alternative Justice System Abunzi: The term Abunzi in traditional Rwanda referred to men within their communities who were known for personal integrity, trustworthiness, impartiality, problem-solver and would be asked to intervene in resolving disputes. Literally, Abunzi means “those who reconcile” (Mutisi 2011). Traditionally, the Abunzi institution played a critical role in settling disputes, reconciling conflicting parties hence restoring harmony and peaceful coexistence in affected communities. Abunzi derives its significance from the traditional mediation and reconciliation approaches that were employed to mediate domestic conflicts, land disputes and criminal cases.

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The government of Rwanda has incorporated the concept of Abunzi through the establishment of Mediation Committees (Abunzi). The Abunzi committee system can be seen as part of Rwanda’s decentralization process and making justice affordable and accessible at the grassroots. The Abunzi committee system was reintroduced in 2004 as a form of home-grown solution to reduce the backlog of court cases by decentralizing an alternative justice system and making justice more affordable and accessible to ordinary citizens without incurring the cost of going to the courts. Abunzi can also be referred to as proximity justice. Abunzi is progressively developing into an effective conflict resolution mechanism since it is seen as less threatening and more humane than the courts (De Winne and Pohu 2015). Today, the Abunzi justice system receives capacity building and logistics support from both government and non-state actors especially non-governmental organizations. Abunzi can be seen as a hybrid form of justice integrating traditional with modern methods of conflict resolution and mediation. Gacaca Courts: originate from the traditional system of conflict resolution called Gacaca in Rwanda society (Republic of Rwanda 2012). Traditionally, the Gacaca system dealt largely with civil, social, economic, conjugal conflicts and inheritance matters among members of communities in Rwanda. Etymologically, Gacaca meant a physical green space (umucaca—grass) in which elders in the community, individuals of integrity and wisdom used to meet to discuss and resolve conflicts within the affected community. During the arbitration of conflict cases, the families of the warring parties could be invited to the traditional Gacaca to reconcile them. Following the 1994 Rwanda Genocide, the state judicial system was overwhelmed with the sheer number of genocide and war crimes cases. As a result, the government resorted to the alternative justice mechanism called Gacaca. Morality and the respect of the right to life were the foundations on which the Gacaca alternative justice system was built (Butera 2005). In the Gacaca proceedings, respected community personalities and elders served as judges. It was only the most difficult cases that were referred to the King. The government of Rwanda found it wise to use the Gacaca system to deal with genocide cases as a means of rebuilding the social fabric that had been destroyed by the atrocities of war. The Gacaca courts system was formally established by the Organic Law of 2001. The Gacaca courts were set up to realize three specific objectives: to fill the gap

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left by the ordinary justice system; to eliminate the culture of impunity and to rebuild national cohesion and enhance reconciliation through a participatory justice system (De Winne and Pohu 2015). Gacaca courts were responsible for the trial and judgement of lesser cases against persons accused of the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994.

People-Centred Governance Umushyikirano: The National Umushyikirano Council (NUC) is anchored in the 2003 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda. It is contained in article 140 of the supreme law. Since 2003, NUC has been held annually in the City of Kigali. Umushyikirano is one of the homegrown solutions that brings together leaders across the country who meet once a year to publicly address national issues affecting them and to promote national unity. In particular, NUC participants include the President of the Republic; representatives of district councils; members of the two chambers of parliament; governors and the Mayor of Kigali City; cabinet ministers and permanent secretaries, representatives of the Judiciary; Military and Police chiefs; leaders of registered political parties; representatives of the private sector, faiths, the Diaspora and heads of institutions of higher learning. Heads of diplomatic missions and other representatives of international institutions working in the country are also invited (Anastase et al. 2016). The resolutions of the NUC are submitted to relevant state institutions for actions that are largely geared towards improving service delivery. The NUC’s thematic areas focus on governance and development issues including public participation, accountability, transparency and service delivery performance; home-grown solutions in governance matters; self-reliance, agriculture, entrepreneurship, and infrastructure development; social affairs such as healthcare, education and social protection and reconciliation, national cohesion and justice issues. Evaluations by the Government of Rwanda and citizens’ responses in nationwide surveys show that majority of resolutions of NUC meetings are implemented. Today, the NUC is viewed as one of the key drivers of transformative governance in Rwanda hence enhancing citizen ownership of subnational and national development agenda. The NUC is considered as a productive platform in which various programmes are conceived and implemented. Some of the programmes often cited by citizens as outcomes of

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the NUC include the Girinka Programme, the Electricity Access Rollout Programme (EARP), Nine and Twelve Years Basic Education (9 & 12 YBE), Umwalimu SACCO and Abunzi Committees. Imihigo: It refers to a traditional cultural practice in Rwanda in which an individual sets targets to be achieved within a specific period of time. The person endeavours to realize the goals by following guiding principles and being determined to overcome challenges that might derail the process. Since the introduction of decentralization in Rwanda in 2000, the local government authorities have been empowered in service delivery, promotion of participatory governance and active citizenship in community development. Imihigo was a form of performance contract in precolonial times in which a person could publicly state their intended goals before traditional chiefs and the rest of community (Crisafulli and Redmond 2012). In order to improve accountability and efficiency in service delivery, the government introduced performance contracts (or Imihigo). Imihigo has been hailed as a milestone in improving accountability, transparency and the speed of citizen-based development programmes at the grassroots. Imihigo also aims at ensuring stakeholder ownership of the development agenda; instilling innovation and encouraging competitiveness; promoting zeal and determination to achieve set targets; engaging stakeholders in policy formulation and evaluation and instilling the culture of regular performance evaluation. Imihigo focuses mainly on results, hence it is an invaluable tool in planning, accountability, monitoring and evaluation processes. The local governments in Rwanda have employed Imihigo as they determine their objectives taking into consideration the country’s broad national development goals as enshrined in Vision 2020 and other national development plans. The principles of Imihigo include voluntariness, ambitiousness and excellence. While the inclusion of traditional institutions in governance systems has been hailed in several African states, there are concerns that they could be politicized by elites for a variety of reasons. Moreover, traditional institutions may not handle every type of conflict in Africa as their applicability is confined to specific conditions. There are always questions as to the coverage of traditions across ethnic and linguistic groups. Rwanda has the good fortune to speak a single African language Nonetheless, efforts to incorporate indigenous institutions into Africa’s governance systems and development processes are laudable.

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Burundi’s New Chapter After the 2000 Peace Accords Despite extensive economic and social reforms since the mid-2000s to stimulate growth and regional integration, Burundi still faces numerous challenges in infrastructure development, the security sector, governance and the elements of the human development index among others (African Development Bank 2011). Due to the 13-year armed conflict, Burundi faced economic stagnation of revenue growth for almost two decades. However, Burundi established the Office Burundais des Recettes—OBR (Burundi Revenue Authority) in 2009 in order to reduce poverty through an improved public revenue collection and improved business environment. Domestic resource mobilization has been at the core of Burundi’s fiscal policies. By 2017, 70% of the country’s budget came from internal revenues. The OBR launched the Electronic Single Window System (ESS) in 2015. ESS allows traders to access online standardized information and documents with a single entry point to answer or obtain regulatory requirements. The OBR implemented the EAC Single Customs Territory that has minimized the internal border controls on goods moving between EAC Partner States. The revenue agency has also implemented the One Stop Border Post (OSBP) throughout the country’s entry points especially on the borders with Tanzania and Rwanda. The OBR also implemented the Customs Curriculum Programme, in collaboration with the Higher Institute of Business Management, that aims at providing Customs administrations in the EAC with customs courses in their training programmes. Burundi’s private sector is relatively young compared to the private sector in other EAC Partner States. Challenges facing the private sector in Burundi include the inadequate transport network, the high cost of power, a weak legal system, a lack of qualified human resources and difficulties in accessing finance and corruption. The government made a major step in the establishment of Burundi Agency for Investment Promotion (API) in 2010. The investment agency is charged with promoting investment and facilitating market entry for investors. The API offers a range of services to potential investors including assistance in acquiring the licences, certificates, approvals, authorizations and permits required by law to set up and operate business enterprises in the country.

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Burundi established the National Commission on Land and Other Assets (CNTB) in 2006 to manage public land and address land disputes. As a result, CNTB functions as a mediator between contesting factions. The Ombudsman institution has also been established in the country to contribute to the development of a democratic culture. The government passed an anti-corruption law in 2006 and established an anti-bribery brigade and anti-corruption court in the same year. While the anti-corruption brigade investigated 605 cases of corruption and recovered more than US$ 4 million between 2007 and 2011, most of the cases were brought against low and middle-level civil servants charged with corruption, misappropriation, diversion and fraudulent management (Tate 2013). Burundi has made modest achievements in the social sector namely in the education and health sectors. Free basic education was announced immediately after President Nkurunziza ascended to power in 2005. Since then, the number of pupils increased by 57% from 1,309,385 in 2005 to 2,059,212 in 2013. During the same period, Burundi has built 1600 primary schools and doubled the number of classrooms from 15,172 to 30,082. Similarly, the government has taken measures to provide free healthcare for children under five and pregnant mothers or those who opt for giving birth in public health facilities. The improved healthcare system has contributed to the reduction of maternal mortality and mortality for children under the age of five. The government also plans to check the perceived population explosion by imposing birth control by 2020. The executive initiated community work every Saturday which has led to construction of classrooms, health centres, hospitals and roads.

Burundi’s Sustainable Peace Burundi’s negotiations centred on a number of peace determinants including power-sharing, an ethnic quota system, security sector reforms, transitional justice, land dispute resolution, poverty reduction; and reconciliation, healing and dialogue. It has been observed that most of conflict resolution mechanisms tend to focus on the political elite. There has been modest progress in the security sector reforms that include reintegration of the army, disarmament of a highly armed citizenry and demobilization of combatants. Burundi’s Vision 2025 emphasizes the importance of social cohesion and national foundation for economic growth and development. The vision also supports traditional mechanisms for the

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resolution of conflict and societal management (Wielenga and AkinAina 2016). However, some analysts contend that Burundi’s slow transformation has been undermined by the lack of strong and inclusive national leadership, inadequate commitment to implement the Arusha Peace Accords, state capture by parochial elite, muted response by the international community to address the Burundi’s protracted armed conflict, state rent extraction, corruption and mismanagement among others (Nkurunziza 2018).

Ubushingantahe in Burundi Traditionally, the Bashingantahe institution was the traditional legal system in Burundi (Dexter and Ntahombaye 2005). The wise men who were part of the Bashingantahe Council played a critical role in conflict resolution among members of communities. The Bashingantahe played a significant role in the maintenance of cohesion and harmony in society. In the aftermath of mass violence and protracted armed conflicts, Burundi is increasingly recognizing the role of the traditional transitional justice system in resolving conflicts among communities that have borne the wrath of war. While non-state actors have recognized the value of Bashingantahe institution in promoting social cohesion and conflict mitigation, the State has not embraced it as an effective alternative justice system. Proponents of alternative justice mechanisms argue that Rwanda has made considerable progress by embracing home-grown solutions to their governance and socio-economic development processes while Burundi still lags behind in this endeavour. Even though Burundi has acknowledged the significance of traditional mechanisms in conflict resolution, it remains to be seen how the government will ensure that alternative justice system is incorporated in the country’s governance and conflict resolution mechanisms.

Lessons for EAC Partner States Rwanda and Burundi have had a unique political history since their independence in 1962. Though the two had a turbulent history for over three decades, they remained resilient through support from both internal and external actors. Other EAC Partner States including South Sudan,

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Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania have experienced some forms of fragility in their nation-building processes. South Sudan is yet to emerge from an armed conflict that began in December 2013. The political instability and conflict in the country has led to the breakdown of law and order in several parts of the country. Moreover, the country has generated many internally displaced persons and refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries. The August 2015 peace agreement is yet to be fully implemented. While Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are regarded as relatively stable, they tend to exhibit some levels of fragility. It is critical that the three original members of the EAC and the new entrant: South Sudan appreciate the political history of Rwanda and Burundi and draw lessons of resilience, conflict resolution and adoption of indigenous governance systems and values that could be incorporated into their political systems across ethnic boundaries in order to create viable states that are strong foundation for the EAC.

Conclusion This chapter has underlined the histories of post-independent Rwanda and Burundi, two neighbouring states that share several similarities in terms of geography, colonial legacy and ethnic composition of their respective populations and both are relatively smaller states in the region. The two states obtained independence from Belgium on 1 July 1962. They both joined the East African Community in July 2007. However, power dynamics, their conflicts and the post-1990s recovery from armed conflicts have been quite different. Rwanda seems to have made more progress in human development indicators, promotion of national unity and reconciliation. While Rwanda is facing challenges in enhancing its democracy and constitutional governance, it has incorporated homegrown solutions including several traditional institutions in its governance reforms and socio-economic transformative agenda that might have helped the country to stabilize after the first three decades of political instability and conflicts. It remains to be seen how Burundi’s local and indigenous institutions will enable the country to build a more cohesive, stable and viable polity.

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Community-Based Organisations and the Development Agenda in Zimbabwe: The Case of Marange Development Trust, 2014–2017 Bernard Kusena

Introduction While scholars have attempted to estimate the impact of efforts exerted by sub-Saharan Africa’s fragile states towards improved rural livelihoods (Hilson et al. 2013); Ellis (2000), and Bryceson (1996), more research is still required to unpack and discern the contribution made by community-based organisations (CBOs) in articulating subaltern interests. Based on the case of Marange Development Trust (MDT), a CBO duly registered in March 2014, this chapter examines the role of grassroots organisations in lobbying for sustainable livelihoods among Zimbabwe’s disadvantaged communities. Given the volatile and sensitive nature of the Marange diamonds issue, the MDT’s risky navigations in such militarised environments require critical appraisal in order to illustrate the dynamic and complex relationship between the state and mining communities. On the one hand, the state has been faced with the growing demand for action against declining rural incomes caused

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by prolonged periods of economic mismanagement and the unending bickering among the country’s main political rivals since the turn of the New Millennium. On the other, affected communities have been pushing harder and harder for more substantial involvement and inclusion in the management and exploitation of diamonds discovered in Marange not so long ago, but to which the state and mining capital have apparently been unwilling to concede. As a result, there have been both turbulence and co-operation between the state and local or host communities over which beneficiation structure would place the interests of locals, the wider community and the state on a better economic pedestral. Therefore, the thrust of this chapter is to re-situate the political economy of voluntary organisations in re-mapping and co-ordinating community efforts towards effective participation in the thriving diamond-based local economy. The study restresses that bargaining firmly from such a position of combined strength can influence current and future capacity building and can have even greater implications for rural development.

Historical Background Located in Mutare district in Manicaland Province, Marange was initially a “reserve” in which Africans were settled under the gruelling terms of the 1930 Land Apportionment Act. The implementation of this Act pushed many Africans into generally arid and infertile labour reservoirs countrywide. Other discriminatory pieces of legislation such as the Maize Control Act (1931) and the Land Husbandry Act (1951) consolidated minority control over land and agricultural markets; hence, confining the black majority to increasingly overcrowded areas of poor soils and low and erratic rainfall (The Zimbabwe Human Development Report 1998: 5). The fact that this area was ecologically disadvantaged, and that it was overcrowded, meant that the question of African livelihood was further written off by colonial legislation. For a living, the people in Marange have had to resort on crop cultivation (though with frequent poor harvests), basketry and remittances from family members and relatives working in local cities and the diasporas. And proceeds from artisanal mining became an important source of income since 2006 for some households whose members had the capability and audacity to proceed into the Chiadzwa diamond fields. Apparently, Government has had some challenges in improving rural livelihoods for a number of reasons, including absence of clear mechanisms to implement the otherwise sound rural

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development policies. However, there has been some attempt at addressing food security challenges through engaging Plan International, Christian Care, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs). For instance, Plan International resumed operations in 1986, focusing on Marange and Zimunya Programme Units (Plan International-Mutare Correspondence 2002). This has had an important impact on ameliorating the food crisis which continued to threaten Marange; although this has had an (un)intended consequence of promoting a donor syndrome within rural producers. To avoid cases of doubledipping where some sections of Marange benefitted from this voluntary intervention, there has been a great deal of effort to delimit areas of focus. For instance, CRS narrowed its focus on northern areas of Marange (such as Chipfatsura), while Plan International has had to work with those areas in the south, including the infamous Chiadzwa where diamonds were “discovered” in mid-2006 (Nyamunda and Mukwambo 2012; Saunders and Nyamunda 2016). The post-2006 period witnessed a drastic change in the livelihood patterns in Marange. Shortly before the commencement of full-scale formal diamond mining in early 2009, local villagers embarked on artisanal mining of alluvial diamonds. The state had not yet moved into evict them. Although this “free-for-all” phase was short-lived, it had provided unlimited opportunities for thousands of gwejas (as they were called) (Ruguwa 2016), vendors and buyers of pieces of diamond to swarm the fields for the gem. This stop-gap relief was soon to be followed by a 2007 police blitzkrieg under Operation Chikorokoza Chapera (a countrywide call to end all forms of artisanal mining) and a more vicious Operation Hakudzokwi (No return to Marange) Phase 1 in late 2008 to flush out illegal dealers and gwejas (Nyamunda and Mukwambo 2012). Initially, Mbada Diamonds, Marange Resources (formerly Canadile) and Anjin Investments were the first to get the licences to operate. Other companies like Diamond Mining Company (DMC), Kusena Diamonds and Jinan were later added. All these mining concerns were, however, disbanded in 2016 when the state reacted to concerns that there was too much leakage of diamonds. By his own admission, Robert Mugabe, the country’s President, shocked viewers and listeners during celebrations to mark his 92nd birthday when he intimated that the lack of transparency and accountability in the exploitation of Marange diamonds explained the huge loss of

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revenue to the tune of US$15 billion.1 These companies were expected to deliver tangible results to the local communities within which they operated under the corporate social responsibility initiative as enshrined in their terms of reference. According to the laws of the land, any mining venture was supposed to lay out its plans about how it sought to support local communities within its jurisdiction. Some of the pledges made by these companies remained unfulfilled seven years later. This placed local communities at the frontier of suffering because they had to bear the brunt of water and air pollution, forced relocation, land appropriation and ill-treatment by security personnel. In fact, there were many contestations to the ownership of the Chiadzwa diamonds, including the wrangle between African Consolidated Resources (ACR) and the state over operating licensing (Maguwu 2016). The state also had to deal with its changing policy over how to proceed with diamond exploitation, at one point stressing the need for local companies to partner foreign entities on a controversial joint venture formula, and, at another, letting independent companies operate and pay royalties to Government. While these shenanigans were under way, the local people, along with other artisanal miners from across the country and beyond, descended on the diamond fields. The state responded by erecting security infrastructure through seconding units of the army and the police, who, in turn, and unbeknown to the state, formed syndicates with artisanal miners to extract the stones and clandestinely sell them to buyers who were milling around. While some immediate gains could be achieved, it was a disaster in some cases. There were some police and army reaction teams which pounced on these syndicates at particular intervals, putting the lives of both the gwejas and their uniformed accomplices to risk. For example, some people would be shot at or injured as they tried to run away from the reaction teams. Interestingly, when caught red-handed by the reaction teams, some officers would immediately turn against their fellow syndicate civilians and appear as if they had captured them with loot in order to give the impression that they were securing the fields. These unfortunate civilians would then be punished severely for “trespassing” into the “protected” area. In most cases, such victims were thoroughly beaten until they could hardly move. The overall result of this entire phenomenon for the political economy of livelihoods for

1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQq9takyASg.

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the local people was that of an unstable and risky temporary relief on the one hand, and victimisation by security personnel on the other. The implementation of Operation Hakudzokwi brought an end to illegal diamond mining and all ancillary activities connected with it such as vending. Villagers were, therefore, thrown back to the former times where basketry and crop cultivation did not yield quick financial results. The entry of the MDT into the whole equation was informed by the desire of local communities to move beyond anticipation of diamond-linked activities and rethink rural livelihoods. It was becoming increasingly evident that the role of diamonds in changing their lives had diminished and that more sustainable projects of self-reliance and income-generation were the surest way to forge ahead with development in general and food security in particular. Against this compelling background, the MDT was established in March 2014 under the chairmanship of Malvern Mudiwa. A closer look at the scope of the organisation reveals ambitious targets for the people of Marange. While a sister organisation, the Chiadzwa Development Community Trust (CCDT), focuses largely on ways to mitigate the negative impact of diamond mining on those people within Chiadzwa, the MDT has sought to expand its coverage to all parts of Marange. This is because the Chiadzwa ward in which diamonds are concentrated is just one of the eleven wards within Marange; hence, the limited focus on it would definitely exclude the rest of the greater area of Marange from accessing services rendered by such organisations. But, the CCDT was a force to reckon with because it reminded Government of its role in pushing the mining giants into fulfilling their commitments to serve local communities. Melanie Chiponda, CCDT’s Projects Coordinator, spoke passionately about the need to leave the door open for dialogue between locals and the mining companies in order to reduce conflict and hostility as well as promoting the respect for human dignity. Although the CCDT’s primary concern was human rights, it paved way for the MDT in exposing local residents to the possibilities of improving their economic well-being through income-generating projects. Looking at the question of fragile states, however, the issue of adaptation springs into discussion with regard to the impact of CBOs. Defined as states that are “unable or unwilling to perform the functions necessary for poverty reduction, the promotion of development, protection of the population and the observance of human rights” (OECD 2007), fragile states are unable to address issues of security, rule of law and basic social services. These are low-income countries which are characterised by weak

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state capacity to shield their citizens from being vulnerable to a range of shocks. The MDT has been in the lead in identifying areas of mutual cooperation with other CBOs, civil society organisations (CSOS), NGOs, and Government, through its Mutare Rural District Council (MRDC), the responsible authority for the area. Such a move finds justification in the fact that the people who are in the grassroots and are bonafide residents of the area have ideas about how to transform their lives. This bottom-up approach has been consistent with international trends which place the interests of the local people ahead of any other in streamlining viable programmes and projects that address key developmental objectives within their areas. It “allows the local community and local players to express their views and to help define the development course for their area in line with their own views, expectations and plans”.2 This realisation comes in the wake of the obvious fact that local and indigenous people know their environments better than outsiders and also that they require institutional and financial support for programmes that they consider effective in addressing their plight as marginalised groups. CBOs have an important strength in their ability to capture the aspirations of the local communities and to suggest appropriate intervention to halt further vulnerability. It is within this broader framework that the role of MDT in spearheading sustainable projects and lobbying stakeholders for alternative solutions to livelihood matters is contextualised.

Adaptation and Fragility: The MDT and the Livelihood Focus In as much as Government approved the operations of NGOs, particularly Plan International, to address shortfalls in the area of food security and rural infrastructure development such as construction of school blocks, the MDT emerged on the scene to fight poverty. Founded by Malvern Mudiwa, a local community member from Betera village, Marange, the Trust has trustees who include Abigail Musiya and Susan Muchena representing women interests. According to its Notarial Deed of Trust, the MDT’s purposes and vision include creating platforms for Marange communities to organise themselves, regardless of political affiliation or creed, to meaningfully contribute to the development discourses of Marange;

2 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rur/leader2/dossier_p/en/dossier/chap4.pdf.

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inspire all peoples of Marange to reach their full potential in developmental; and, work co-operatively with marginalised groups, including vulnerable children and women (MDT Deed 2014). Backed by this legislative support, the organisation quickly mobilised meetings with the community members in Marange to chart the way forward regarding empowerment issues. As a legal entity with full powers to speak on behalf of these communities, the MDT followed legal channels in doing its work. These included introducing its mission to the now deceased Chief Gilbert Marange, and later on to the incumbent, Chief Bernard Marange. The Trust also made efforts to reach out to many headmen and village heads. For instance, formal introductions were made to headmen such as Hondo Mukwada, Robert Chiadzwa, Piano Chipindirwe and others. In mobilising these people, the MDT mainly used its own coffers. However, its partnership with the Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association (ZELA) enabled the MDT to carry out most of its work that touched on environmental issues. ZELA also assisted the MDT in conducting field data capture and analysis to come up with more accurate reporting on the situation in Marange, especially the environmental degradation in the mining areas. In support of its ambitious vision, the MDT outlined a number of objectives which it strove to meet as part of efforts to improve livelihoods. The overarching objective is to provide developmental programmes which raise the quality of life of all peoples of Marange, “particularly the vulnerable and the marginalised”, including women and children (ibid.). This concern has surfaced from a range of factors, particularly those to do with the failure of the area to support crop cultivation. The communities are disadvantaged through the failure by the state to establish road and health infrastructures that match with the growing population. For instance, the main road that links Chiadzwa and Mutare is largely a dust one, while the rural electrification programme did not serve the bigger area of Marange. In addition to these challenges, the schools in Marange, save for a few, are not adequately funded, although Plan International has had a lot of impact through its construction of classroom blocks and teachers’ houses in a number of primary and secondary schools. The absence of incomegenerating projects has also frustrated the ability of parents and guardians to raise appropriate school fees for which Plan International has chipped into assist selected households. MDT, therefore, came in to create dialogue among stakeholders in Government and civil society where it seeks to highlight the plight of disadvantaged households across the areas of

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the economy and society of Marange. In some cases, text books and writing material have been donated, and this gesture has gone a long way in supporting teaching and learning in schools. In looking at the quality of life, the MDT’s primary objective is to harness developmental opportunities through forming synergies with other like-minded organisations, as well as the Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC) which replaced the numerous companies which were mining diamonds before being disbanded. Such synergistic relationships have been seen to be critical in enhancing the livelihoods of people in Marange while they remain a necessary tool with which to alleviate and eradicate poverty. In tandem with its objective enshrined in Clause 4.1.9 of its Notarial Deed of Trust, the MDT has already demonstrated that it is able to transform its objectives into reality. For instance, it is stated in this Clause that the MDT would “fight against conduct that undermines the livelihood of all peoples of Marange, and conduct that undermines all peoples in the catchment area…” (ibid., Clause 4.1.9). When the newly incorporated ZCDC took over mining from the disbanded companies, it did not follow due process with reference to issues of environmental impact assessment (EIA). The law provides that companies which intend to carry out mining ventures should provide an elaborate outline of how they plan to assess the impact of its mining activities on both human and animal populations in their areas of operation. The ZCDC, for reasons best known to itself, proceeded into fully fledged mining of diamonds without the EIA certificate. The Environmental Management Agency (EMA) is responsible for issuing these EIA certificates after satisfying itself that full compliance with the law has been met.3 In an interview with Mudiwa, MDT’s Chairperson, it was revealed that, despite calls for the ZCDC to engage with MDT in order to address the issue of EIA, the company was uncooperative.4 On 19 January 2017, for example, a letter was written to the ZCDC demanding compliance with the law and cessation of mining activities, but no response was given.5 After all dialogue had failed, the MDT was left

3 The Environmental Management Agency [Chapter 20:27 ] empowers EMA to certify companies with impact assessments before any mining commences. 4 Interview with Malvern Mudiwa, MDT Chairman, Mutsago Rural Business Centre, Marange, 15 December 2016. 5 MDT Running File/2014–2017/Correspondence with Mining Companies: Letter Dated 19 January 2017, From MDT Chairman To The Chief Executive Officer, ZCDC.

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with only one option; to engage the courts for an interdict which would halt further mining activities in the absence of the EIA. On the strength of the cause of action which the MDT had as a bonafide legal entity, the matter was brought before the High Court of Zimbabwe in Harare. This pitted the MDT as the Applicant and the Zimbabwe Consolidated Mining company as the First Respondent and the Environmental Management Agency as the Second Respondent (Harare High Court Case No. 9451/12). In his founding affidavit, Mudiwa, in his capacity as Chairman of the Trust, raised his submissions in which an application for an interdict was made to stop the ZCDC from “carrying out mining operations in Marange communal lands until it has carried out an environmental impact assessment and obtained a certificate from the second respondent, as required by the law” (ibid.). Certainly the MDT has the capacity to sue and to be sued in its own name, but still this was a very bold move made by a CBO in the history of Marange. Although the EMA was cited as the second respondent, no relief was sought by the MDT from it, except to demonstrate that it had an interest in the matter since environmental issues were being discussed. In addition, Section 9 of the EMA Act provides that no activity listed in its schedule is supposed to be implemented unless the developer has conducted an EIA and obtained a certificate certifying that the project may be implemented, and mining is clearly one of the listed activities. The purposes of an EIA include identifying the environmental, social, economic, and cultural impacts of any proposed project. It then should plan measures to avoid the impacts and to mitigate those unavoidable impacts, a process that speaks to international best practices in promoting sustainable development. Matters came to a head when people living in Tinoengana village in Chiadzwa were being pressured to relocate from the mining area without compensation. This irked villagers who engaged the Trust in order to voice their disdain of the eviction threats consistently laid on them. Other important concerns were also raised in the MDT’s founding affidavit before the High Court. For instance, it was argued that dust pollution was affecting local communities, exposing them to hazards such as respiratory problems and other diseases associated with open cast mining. For some people, mining was being carried out a few metres away from homesteads, and suffocating clouds of dust were emitted into the environment. The issue of open pits that were increasingly becoming a danger to livestock and humans was also raised. The environment was being damaged in the process. In their defence, the ZCDC argued that

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they were in the process of acquiring an EIA even though they had already commenced mining. The Courts, in their wisdom, do not support an illegality; hence, the ZCDC’s argument lost favour. The law was clear that only after the granting of the EIA should a company start operations and not the reverse. To this end, Justice David Mangota held that: “The first respondent (ZCDC) is hereby interdicted and ordered to desist from conducting any mining operations in Marange District until it has conducted an environmental impact assessment process in accordance with the law”, and “obtained an environmental impact assessment certificate from the second respondent”. The first respondent was also ordered to “pay costs of suit” (Harare High Court Case No. 9451/12). At this point, the ZCDC suspended operations forthwith, and its workers were temporarily disbanded while it ran around to engage its partners such as SIRDC6 to quicken the process of acquiring the EIA certificate. It also made strides to engage with the leadership of the MDT and its legal services providers to find each other and iron out areas of contestations with regard to the community mobilisation and engagement processes (ibid.). For its part, the MDT reassured the communities that the full force of the law was behind them and that they were expected to highlight to the ZCDC that kind of works that improved livelihoods in Marange. This was clearly an unprecedented achievement for a CBO to successfully institute a lawsuit which involved state interests. Previous attempts by the CCDT and the stillbirth Zimunya-Marange Community Share Ownership Trust (ZMCSOT) to hold the companies to task were unsuccessful. For example, when the ZMCSOT was launched, companies that used to operate in Marange pledged support to the tune of US$I million to jump-start efforts towards community participation in the economic and social development of their areas. However, the promises were never fulfilled by the companies and the envisaged projects were not implemented. This riled communities to the point of publicly criticising the state and its agencies at a public forum in Marange in 2015. Similarly, the CCDT frantically made attempts to halt relocations of residents close to the Chiadzwa diamond fields to ARDA Transau. These initiatives were commendable given the complexities of the Marange diamonds issue in which the state demonstrated interests which it sought to protect at all 6 The Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre (SIRDC) was established in 1993 to provide technological expertise in diverse areas of the country’s industrial enterprises.

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costs. Any reading of CCDT’s documents provides the impression that, somehow, its mission was hijacked by powerful forces resulting in its initial function being changed. For instance, Newman Chiadzwa, CCDT’s inaugural Chair appeared to have been calling for the Government’s return to the original agreement to work closely with it. Formed “with the advice from Minister of Mines, Honourable Obert Mpofu, we reiterate CCDT’s support for Government and its programmes”, writes Chiadzwa. Hence, “the community’s decision to send its Chairman to the Kimberly Process Plenary meeting in Namibia in 2009 was intended to defend Government position to market diamonds, in the hope that the community will equally benefit out of the proceeds” (CCDT 2012). This was in direct response to the impending relocation in which no agreement about compensation was reached. The High Court case discussed above provides a window to our understanding of the nature of the relations that exists between CBOs, mining companies and the Government. CBOs are apparently held in low esteem in spite of the huge efforts which they put into articulating community needs and problems. Working in Marange in the capacity of a CBO is not an easy task, claimed Abigail Musiya, a founding trustee. The opposing forces are difficult to negotiate with for dialogue even if the invited stakeholders are not the ones sponsoring the meetings. For instance, Musiya cited the example of the failure by DMC to come forward and discuss environmental degradation. The MDT dispatched a letter to DMC authorities on 15 September 2015 to deliberate on how to minimise environmental degradation in the Zengeni area of Chiadzwa. No response was tendered up before the company was disbanded.7 Susan Muchena, the Trust’s Projects Co-ordinator, echoed the same sentiments when she indicated that the Government departments such as the MRDC were bureaucratic and slow in sending officials to important MDT meetings. For example, it was sometimes procedurally lengthy to engage local councillors who were mostly members of the ruling party ZANU-PF to attend village development meetings before they were cleared by Council. However, the MRDC was forthcoming in many instances in providing the necessary support where development issues were being deliberated on. For example, in a crucial meeting held at Mukwada Primary School in July 2016, the MRDC quickly responded by seconding Councillor Whatmore 7 Interview with Abigail Musiya, MDT Vice-Chairperson, Mutsago Rural Service Centre, Marange, 17 April 2017.

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Gamunorwa to officiate at the function. The topic was about the community’s use of a scorecard to assess delivery of service by staff at Mukwada Clinic and update local authorities on how best to tackle health-related problems.8 This process was partly funded by ZELA and it went a long way in shaping the nurse-patient relationship which was said to fragile before the monitoring and evaluation exercise using the scorecard was implemented. Local CBOs continued to rally communities against forced relocation which the state, in collusion with the mining giants, pushed hard to recommend but which denied victims their much-needed compensation. The only stipend which was extended to relocated villagers was a once-off US$1000 disbursed as a disturbance allowance. Villagers accepted it on condition that more substantive compensation would come, which never happened. Although Arda Transau “is a better region in terms rainfall, it has no sufficient grazing land for livestock, no functioning schools, no hospital, and no reliable source of water, no land for agriculture, no transport and no income-generating projects for settlers”, argued Chiadzwa. Without grazing pastures, “butchers and speculators are having feast days by pouncing on settlers’ livestock and pay peanuts for them as one cannot keep large herds under the circumstances. We cannot imagine the future being faced by these former cowboys and ranchers in the next five years”, concluded Chiadzwa (ibid.). These remarks further demonstrate the arrogance with which the state and mining giants addressed the question of livelihoods for the relocated villagers. At the new site, the relocated villagers faced extreme difficulties over food security and other livelihood matters. The CCDT played its role in alerting Government to these challenges, but the companies were already focusing on the production and sale of diamonds for their own benefit. Having constructed some houses for the new settlers, the overall impression among the mining giants was that they had done their part and the rest was up to the villagers to fend for themselves. In trying to move the Tinoengana village from Chiadzwa in 2017, the ZCDC was met with stern opposition from the MDT. This is because the forced relocation which was unaccompanied by compensation could not be repeated eight years later because of lessons learnt.

8 Interview with Susan Muchena, MDT Projects Coordinator, Mutsago Rural Service Centre, Marange, 15 July 2016.

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MDT and the Bus Service One of the achievements recorded by the MDT was the lobbying it did for a bus service to ply the Mutare-Chiadzwa route where public transport systems were long forbidden during the Operation Hakudzokwi era in 2008. In trying to control the movement of people within Marange, the state initially recommended the setting up of many roadblocks on the roads leading into and out of Marange. Body searches were conducted at each of these roadblocks with a view to effecting arrests if anyone was found in possession of the gems, whether clear or industrial diamonds. At one point, there were over ten roadblocks between Chiadzwa and Mutare, a distance of about 120 kilometres. For example, the first roadblock was at Mutare Teachers’ College, followed by another at Zimunya Turnoff (along the Mutare Masvingo highway), and then at Rowa Shopping Centre. The fourth roadblock was at 22-Miles Turnoff, then before and after Bazeley Bridge. The seventh one was situated at Matongo Turnoff before Marange High School, then followed by the other one at Bambazonke Police Post. The next roadblock was at Mukwada (which was still in existence in 2017), then the tenth one at Chipindirwe Turnoff and the last one at Zengeni Shopping Centre adjacent to the area formerly mined by Mbada Diamonds.9 For travellers, this was the most difficult thing to do because the buses which they boarded were stopped at all these blocks and everyone had to disembark and queue for a thorough body search. All bags were opened and contents inspected while intimidation was rife. Later on, the authorities banned all public transport from proceeding into Chiadzwa, citing as the reason that this promoted artisanal mining because the gwejas would find easy access into the protected area. It was the Marange communities that bore the brunt of this ban as villagers had to walk long distances to catch lifts to town. Against this background, the MDT organised the communities affected for a meeting which was held at Mukwada in July 2015. Councillor Gamunorwa was the director of ceremonies, a sign that the Government, through the MRDC, had sanctioned the meeting. Headmen Mukwada and Chipindirwe also graced the occasion, also present were local village heads and community representatives and church organisations. This was an interesting agenda considering that nearly nine years had lapsed 9 The researcher had first-hand experience in going through these many roadblocks in his research missions in 2008 and 2009.

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without an effective bus service for such a vast area. Travellers had been fleeced of their hard-earned cash by commuter omnibuses and private cars which charged exorbitant fares because of the absence of alternative transport. The MDT leadership proposed to engage two bus company operators, Mwayera Pvt. Ltd. and the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO). The community resolved that since Government had stakeholder interests in ZUPCO, it was going to be more strategic to request its services first before engaging private operators like Mwayera. In addition, it was considered that the fares for private companies were higher than those charged by ZUPCO for the obvious reason that they did not enjoy a subsidy as was the case with ZUPCO. Following the input by the communities, the MDT was able to send its representatives to Mutare for a discussion with ZUPCO management to which a favourable response was given. Again, this was unprecedented because a public transport system was restored after it was muted for years on end. The importance of community participation cannot be overemphasised and its impact is strongly felt when local members work as a team. Following the bus service resolution, the next key task was to mobilise the communities to rebuild the road that stretched from Matongo in the north to Hotsprings in the south. There were many volunteers to the project. The onerous rehabilitation work included trimming branches of trees overhanging the road, clearing the shoulders of the dust road, removing boulders and debris deposited over time by agents of weather, filling up potholes and gulleys, redirecting sections of the road to newer and firm margins spared by erosion, and widening the dust road to accommodate the full width of the bus where the road narrowed excessively. The ZUPCO management stressed the urgency of this exercise and promised to do a test run as soon as the work on the road was complete. True to its word, ZUPCO provided a bus to the people of Marange at the initiative of the MDT. Celebrations were conducted by the MDT with the support of its strategic partners in order to give feedback to the communities. The reintroduction of a public transport system in Marange has already yielded important results, particularly in terms of the movement of goods and people. School pupils have benefitted while markets for local tomatoes and vegetable perishables could be linked much more quickly. Whereas it was expensive to travel to Mutare using private taxis, it was becoming more and more affordable to visit Mutare for various errands because of the subsidised fares charged by ZUPCO. Even the rate of information transfer improved significantly because of improved transportation.

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Linked to the enhanced mobility brought about by the re-emergence of public transport is the issue of vendors. As hinted above, communities have had to move into market gardening to be able to produce vegetables and fruits to earn a living. In its annual budget for disadvantaged communities in Marange, Plan International advocated the utilisation of fenced and watered gardens in community clusters. This important experiment with horticultural products was recommended as a measure to disperse the risk of crop failure. While the discovery of diamonds was welcomed as a route to escape poverty and food insecurity, the outcomes failed to measure up to expectation. People shifted to horticulture in order to avoid depending solely on food aid. “The main way people are able to access food is through what they themselves produce”, argued David Phiri, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Sub-regional Co-ordinator for Southern Africa (The Herald, 30 July 2016). With this spirit in mind, many households started growing horticultural produce. Having noted the unreliability of rainfall in Marange, coupled with the fact that climate change stressed out crops, many organic tomato growers began to identify cultivars that were well adapted to local conditions. While other areas enjoyed the advantages of ecological diversity, and were connected to reliable markets, the focus on commercial gardening paid dividends in the short to long-term for the people of Marange. By ignoring all the manmade and natural factors that inhibited capacity to steer socio-economic development, the communities relied more intensively on the efficient transport system to ferry their produce to more paying markets in Mutare, thereby heightening the possibility of self sustenance in the face of ecological and man made adversity. Socially, the improvement of the public transport system in Marange promoted the interdenominational, inter school and community to community interaction that had almost been put on halt by the long absence of buses. For instance, schools in the northern areas of Marange/Zimunya such as Chinyauhwera, Matanda, Marange, Gomorefu, Mweyamutsvene, Masvaure and Karirwi were able to organise return matches and other sporting galas with those in the south such as Chiadzwa, Banda, Gonora, Betera, Mukwada, Mutsago, Masasi and Kurauone. In addition, church congregations were possible which attracted visitors from the different areas of Marange and beyond. Members would be connected more easily than before. For instance, the United Methodist Church (UMC) must have welcomed the services rendered by ZUPCO because its annual conference at Chiringaodzi Shrine, near Bazeley Bridge suffered transport

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problems due to the 2008 ban on public transport utilities. The Johane Marange Apostolic Church which holds its biggest annual Passover festival at the Mafararikwa shrine in Marange also embraced the transport improvements initiated by the MDT. Many travellers from as far afield as Harare, Bulawayo, Chimanimani and Mutare used to get stranded as soon as they tried to connect to Marange. However, the MDT has received calls for further negotiation with ZUPCO to increase its fleet, particularly when such annual programmes are being conducted. It also received instructions to engage with the MRDC to find ways of improving the roads leading into Marange. In response, the MDT leadership has already hinted to ZCDC about the criticality of the Mutare—Chiadzwa road which require to be tarred in all sections to facilitate the easy and faster delivery of goods and services within the Marange community. It remains to be seen how the ZCDC will react to these requests, considering its litigation loss at the High Court as it might naturally flow that it might be holding grudges against the MDT for the role it played in halting its mining activities for a time.

The MDT and Its Synergies with Other Organisations In its mission to change lives, the MDT works closely with partner organisations in order to provide a more pronounced impact. The central concern has been to work towards strengthening productive sectors and expanding employment; improving the social well-being of communities; transferring knowledge, technology and skills while also enhancing use of traditional wisdom and culture and building local capacities; and, empowering people to participate in decisions that affect their lives (UNDP 1993). ZELA has stood with the MDT from the time of its inception in 2014, providing support in its quest for visibility. Each year ZELA organises a number of workshops in which it invites several CBOs to share experiences and chat the way forward towards community empowerment. ZELA’s training workshops are aimed at equipping communities to approach environmental issues within their localities from an informed vantage point. Its mission is to empower CBOs through seminars and workshops so that they are more conscious of their needs (sic). They awaken communities to the realities of the impact of their surroundings on livelihoods and how to operate within the confines of the law in

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exploiting the same. ZELA “is a public interests law organisation which uses the law to protect and conserve the environment” (ZELA 2017). It specialises in various focal points that are pertinent to sustainable socioeconomic development such as extractive industries and mining, local service delivery and governance, climate change and energy, land and natural resources and investments (ibid.). Throughout its operations in Marange, the MDT has mobilised community support, a huge task requiring financial devotion and ZELA has lent its full weight in these initiatives. The MDT also works closely with the International Alliance on Natural Resources in Africa (IANRA). IANRA is a network of non-governmental and CBOS in many parts of Africa. According to its mission, IANRA “combines community organising, research, and evidence-based advocacy to collectively strive for more just and sustainable use of natural resources that can lead to more inclusive development in Africa” (IANRA Website 2017). It grapples with the impact of extractive industries on communities in five countries which are Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo. Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Other international partners are CIVICUS and Green Grants. The MDT expressed gratitude for the grant that was extended by Green Grants to spearhead projects targeted at restoration of the environment in Marange. Although this grant was quite limited, it went a long way in shaping the goals of the organisation, in addition to providing funds to support part of its litigation. The MDT partners the CBOs such as Save-Odzi Trust and the Arda Transau Trust when dealing with matters that straddle boundaries. The ARDA Trust was actually formed by relocated members who were initially settled in Chiadzwa and Chirasika areas of Marange. In addition to all these, the MDT partners with the Centre for Research Governance (CRG) which is led by James Mupfumi and is based in Mutare. Farai Maguwu’s Centre for Natural Resources Governance (CNRG) also engages with different CBOs such as CCDT and MDT, although no memorandum of association has been entered into between these various organisations. CRD and CNRG are other partners which share common interests with the MDT, though the relationship with these civil society organisations still has to be strengthened and streamlined.

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Problems Faced by the MDT At this point, a review of constraints, in particular, the political framework in which these institutions operate, is important insofar as it assists us in analysing the performance of the MDT vis-a-vis these obstacles. The major shortcoming in the execution of MDT programmes is limited financial backing. In order for the MDT to reach all the areas of Marange, it requires funds which, however, are not forthcoming. Although political independence might have been achieved in post-colonial African states, quite a number of them have been unable to sustain not only major projects, but even more confined corporate efforts, because of their inability to consistently deliver the goods to their various constituents, and they have sought security in repressive regimes (Raftopoulos 1991: 4). In light of this, the urge by the state to control independent bodies and organisations frustrates the effective and free operation of civil society organisations and CBOs in fragile states such as Zimbabwe. Yet for rural development to succeed, “it is important for the rural population, particularly the poor majority to participate in the design, implementation and even evaluation of projects meant to benefit them” (Silitshena 1989: 43). There should be some reform to the conduct of some policy-makers who push hard for the censorship of CBOs. The CBOs should be applauded for their efforts at co-ordinating participation of every member of the community. Defined “as generally denoting the involvement of a significant number of persons in situations or actions which enhance their well-being, such as their income, security or self-esteem” (Cohen and Uphoff 1980: 214), participation is key to transforming communities because of the sense of ownership due to running projects that arises in community participants. Such planning is consequently “bottom-up” as against the usual “top-down” planning, characterised by the introduction of new structures for communal decision-making, the granting of a higher degree of self-determination to rural and other peripheral areas; and egalitarian societal structures and a collective consciousness (Stohr 1981). The problem of state bureaucracy has been slowing the pace at which the MDT has been conducting its business. For example, all meetings had to be sanctioned and permission sought to address community gatherings under the censorship laws of the land. For this reason, CBOs and civil society organisations can be viewed as potentially subversive by both the local elites and the central government, and as targets for co-option

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(Esman and Uphoff 1974). Some Government officials were not forthcoming to attend special meetings intended to share notes on the events within the rural environment for fear of being labelled opposition party members. While Esman and Uphoff (1974) concluded that “local organisation is necessary if not sufficient condition for accelerated rural development, the ability of CBOs such as MDT to forge ahead with proposed reform agendas was clipped by these laws as they prohibited mass gatherings that attracted large groups of people. The whole idea behind the establishment of the CBOs has been to come up with development which emphasised improvement in the productivity and welfare of the majority of rural people”. Esman and Uphoff (1974) see local institutions as intermediaries between rural residents and central government and the private sector. Participatory organisations can, thus, be an effective force in representing the interests of their people and asserting their claims on government for scarce resources. In attempting to co-opt the CBOs so that they may be pliant to state interests, they are likely to play potentially negative roles as vehicles; (a) for perpetuating inequitable social systems; (b) for controlling the rural population; and (c) for weakening or even destroying viable local cultures (Gow et al. 1979: 201–202). This approach to the treatment of CBOs demoralises genuine effort at redressing gaps which emerge as fragile states attempt to adapt to prevailing situations, while the animosity that might exist between the state and CBOs compromises service delivery. The issues to do with financing of operations have led many CBOs to remain mostly talk-shops. For the MDT, its establishment came as the country’s economy was largely skewed towards the informal sector in the wake of unemployment and company closures, a situation that has largely been spurred by tight liquidity. Indeed, local institutions need Government support of one kind or another if they are not to be incapacitated by what Montgomery (1979) has termed “acute localitis”. This scenario arises from a number of possibilities, including co-optation of organisation by local elites and the discrimination against all but the “deserving poor”. It also includes isolation and a lack of economies of scale. “Economies of scale and spatial continuities”, argues Montgomery, “require links to other villages and new technologies; beyond a certain minimum level of self-improvement, villages cannot be effectively developed by local leadership” (Montgomery 1979: 59). But, most importantly, the inherent lack of financial resources and management

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capabilities for many CBOs limits the potential such organisations may have in executing their work. They need some financial and political autonomy if they are to play their roles effectively. These roles include keeping the bureaucracies in check; to enable an effective information exchange; to mobilise resources; and, to improve and maintain social harmony (Esman and Uphoff 1984: 38–40). And, the MDT is not alone in this financial quagmire. A myriad of institutions, which include the cooperatives, farmers’ organisations, women’s organisations, parents and teachers’ associations (PTAs) and burial societies, struggle with financing. There is also a worrying trend and culture demonstrated by the state with its failure to highlight the good work of CBOs, particularly those that interrogate the policies of the state with a view to bring back transparency and accountability in the management and exploitation of local resources. In most cases, the work of CBOs is muted in spite of the immense contribution that such organisations make towards capacity building and economic empowerment of disadvantaged groups. For instance, the recent High Court award of the interdict sought by the MDT versus the ZCDC in order to facilitate the procurement of the EIA was considered beneficial to the people of Marange. In fact, Government is expected to appreciate the role of CBOs in as much a way as it considers the work of local councils and organs with the mandate to organise community efforts for development. For example, in trying to achieve the goal of integrated rural development and to combat hunger and poverty, the Government in the early 1980s established new administrative structures at village level designed to increase the involvement of local communities in development. A total of 6094 village development committees (VIDCOs) with a membership of 36,294 and 1048 ward development committees with 15,720 members were formed throughout the country. The VIDCOs are the basic unit of organisation under the new structure which has been broadened to create opportunities for greater participation by village communities (Moyo et al. 1985: 53). This dovetails with observations made by rural development scholars about the tenets of good governance, accountability and transparency in dealing with communities. They argue in favour of political accountability which establishes a link whether through elections or other direct link between the rulers and the ruled, in addition to participation and ownership by all members of communities (Woods 1998). By these criteria, Zimbabwe has scored low on good governance since the 2000s, rendering it a fragile state. While there is

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political accountability in the sense that elections are held after every five years, there have been problems over the fact that the playing field has not been level (Sachikonye 1997).

Conclusion Writing from the perspective of rural and settlement geography, Silitshena has summed up the role of local institutions by arguing that these ought to be given the policy framework that emphasise real self-help and participation of local people if they are to remain viable. Human development should incorporate notions of both material and non-material welfare aspects of the human condition. As a result, this goes a long way towards the process of enlarging people’s choices in ways that enable them to live long, healthy and creative lives (UNDP 1993). The 1994 Human Development Report Linked to this is the need to create environments in which people could expand their capabilities and opportunities, both for current and future generations (UNDP 1994). This is the broader context in which the MDT has couched its campaign since its inception in 2014. By 2017, it had become quite clear that the MDT was on course in articulating local issues affecting the people of Marange. Its mission, notwithstanding the challenges highlighted above, has been to identify the interdependence of environmental, economic, social, cultural and political factors in improving and maintaining the standards of living of current and future generations in line with universal trends as charted by the United Nations Development Programme and its own Deed of Trust. There should be a paradigm shift in the state’s response to the affairs of local communities and there is a need to embrace the role of CBOs as agents of change in fragile states like Zimbabwe. The organisation continues to formulate strategies to reduce poverty, create an enabling environment for greater participation and accommodation of diverse views. This bodes well with its primary mission of providing checks and balances towards good governance and its various manifestations such as political accountability at all levels, transparency, ownership of decisions by people who are affected by them, rule of laws, and an economic system that provides material and social well-being to the population on a fair and equitable basis (Zimbabwe Human Development Report 1999: 78).

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Bibliography Bryceson, D.F. 1996. Deagrarianisation and Rural Employment in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Sectoral Perspective. World Development 24 (1): 97–111. CCDT. 2012. Chairman’s File: Board Meeting Deliberations. Cohen, J.M., and N.T. Uphoff. 1980. Participation’s Place in Rural Development: Seeking Clarity Through Specificity. World Development 8: 213–232. Ellis, F. 2000. Rural Livelihoods and Diversity in Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Esman, M.J., and N.T. Uphoff. 1974. Local Organisation for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience. Ithaca: Cornell University. Esman, M.J., and N.T. Uphoff. 1984. Local Organisations: Intermediaries in Rural Development. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gow, D.D., et al. 1979. Local Organisations and Rural Development: A Comparative Reappraisal, vol. 1. Washington: Development Alternatives (President Mugabe’s 92nd Birthday Speech). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= IQq9takyASg. Accessed 17 Sept 2017. Hilson, G., R. Amankwah, and Ofori-Sapong. 2013. Going for Gold: Transitional Livelihoods in Northern Ghana. Journal of Modern African Studies 5 (1): 109–137. IANRA Website. 2017. http://www.ianra.org. Maguwu, F. 2016. Marange Diamonds and the Kimberley Process: An Archivist Account. In Facets of Power: Politics, Profits and People in the Making of Zimbabwe’s Blood Diamonds, ed. R. Saunders and T. Nyamunda, 58–92. Harare: Weaver Press. Marange Development Trust. 2014. Notarial Deed of Trust. Protocol No. 0000406, March. Montgomery, J.D. 1979. The Populist Front in Rural Development: Or Shall We Eliminate the Bureaucrats and Get on with the Job. Public Administration Review 39 (1): 58–65. Moyo, S., N.P. Moyo, and R. Lowenson. 1985. The Root Causes of Hunger in Zimbabwe: An Overview of the Nature, Causes and Effects of Hunger, and Strategies to End Hunger. Harare: Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies (ZIDS). Nyamunda, T., and Patience Mukwambo. 2012. The State and the Bloody Diamond Rush in Chiadzwa: Unpacking the Contesting Interests in the Development of Illicit Mining and Trading, c.2006–2009. Journal of Southern African Studies 38 (1): 145–166. OECD. 2007. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series Applying Strategic Environmental Assessment: Good Practice Guidance for Development Co-operation. OECD, July 23, Paris. Plan International-Mutare Correspondence. 2002. File PO#2983/2984/2. Government Departments and Other NGOs.

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Raftopoulos, B. 1991. Beyond the House of Hunger: The Struggle for Democratic Development in Zimbabwe. Institute of Development Studies Working Papers No. 17, Harare. Ruguwa, M. 2016. The Social Impact of Mining on Schools in Marange, 2006– 2013. In Facets of Power: Politics, Profits and People in the Making of Zimbabwe’s Blood Diamonds, ed. R. Saunders and T. Nyamunda, 113–135. Harare: Weaver Press. Sachikonye, L. 1997. “The State and Union Movement in Zimbabwe”: Cooptation, Conflict and Accommodation (Unpublished Mimeo). Saunders, R. 2016. Introduction: The Many Facets of Marange’s Diamonds. In Facets of Power: Politics, Profits and People in the Making of Zimbabwe’s Blood Diamonds, ed. R. Saunders and T. Nyamunda, 1–15. Harare: Weaver Press. Saunders, R., and T. Nyamunda (eds.). 2016. Facets of Power: Politics, Profits and People in the Making of Zimbabwe’s Blood Diamonds. Harare: Weaver Press. Silitshena, R.M.K. 1989. Village Level Institutions and Participation in Botswana. Review of Rural and Urban Planning in Southern and Eastern Africa: Journal of the Association of Rural and Urban Planners in Southern and Eastern Africa 1: 43–62. Stohr, W.B. 1981. Development from Below: The Bottom-Up and Periphery Inward Development Paradigm. In Development from Above or Below, ed. W.B. Stohr and D.R. Fraser Taylor. New York: Wiley. UNDP. 1993. The Zimbabwe Human Development Report. Harare: IDS. UNDP. 1994. Human Security: Human Development Reports. New York: Oxford University Press. UNDP. 1998. The Zimbabwe Human Development Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press. UNDP. 1999. The Zimbabwe Human Development Report. Harare: IDS. Woods, M. 1998. Rethinking Elites: Networks, Space, and Local Politics. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 30 (12): 2101–2119. ZELA Website. 2017. https://www.zela.org.

Framing Resilience and Adaptability: A Critical Discourse Analysis of ZANU PF Policy Texts in the Zimbabwean Post-2000 Context Tsiidzai Matsika

Introduction Resilience and adaptability entail grappling with complex intersecting socio-economic, ecological and political challenges that threaten human livelihoods and nation states. The capacity to withstand pressure, absorb shock and recuperate and the degree of preparedness to build pathways to recovery in a complex dynamic world are usually part of what people define technically as resilience. One of the most useful characteristics of resilience is its ability to frame challenges and transformative interventions within a systemic approach. Political agents are implicated in the construction and (re)production of structures and discourses that react to external forces and pressures. In the context of the protracted socio-economic decline and power struggles in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe African National Unity (Patriotic Front) (ZANU PF, the ruling government’s) attempts to shape the nation’s an adaptability, promoting resilience in the context of the post-2000 era generally referred to as the ‘era of crises’ are central. Policy texts such as #Team ZANU PF 2013 (the election campaign manifesto) and Zimbabwe Agenda for

T. Matsika (B) The University of the Free State, Qwaqwa, South Africa

© The Author(s) 2020 J. I. Lahai and H. Ware (eds.), Governance and Societal Adaptation in Fragile States, Governance and Limited Statehood, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40134-4_6

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Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim Asset, 2013–2018 economic blueprint) reflect how ZANU PF’s institutional, political and knowledge processes interact and ‘close down’ on challenges, influencing national political systems, power dynamics and socio-economic processes. Policy documents are some of the best sites to encounter reflections of participatory processes and power relations: politics and governance in practice. Interventions envisioned through ZANU PF’s framing and narratives highlight processes, practices and their style of governance. The dominant discourses in a nation state frame perceptions, thoughts and affect mindsets, actions and ways of ordering the world. Discourse embedded through dominant narratives, terminology, metaphors, language use and repetition, influences both policies and practice in development. Negotiation of pathways to transformative development, sustainable development (the ultimate goal) in dynamic, complex systems must entail focusing on framings and their properties—recognising divergent epistemological and ontological positions associated with different characters and interests. Thus, studying how language and narratives are deployed in relation to context gives a sense of the historical shifts in development thinking and priorities. It helps people to reflect on what is going on and where they are going (or could go) in the future. The crisis characterising Zimbabwe in the post-2000 era has given prominence to varying forms of hybrid texts, discourses and identities. Policies have to be understood at best as ‘projects of discourse intervention’, an effort to change social reality by altering the discourses that help constitute that reality, as they are political acts or ‘textual interventions into practice’. The underpinning approach to political texts in this paper is framed around theorisations in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This chapter is concerned with exploring the texts of ZANU PF discourses on the crisis and interrogates the political significance of varying interpretations, in the context of both the technology-driven changing face of political communication/campaign and the glaring schism between nativist and liberal/‘democratic’ politics. #Team ZANU PF 2013 and Zim Asset as policy texts are imbued with national nature of being commitments that make them ideally suited to liberal forms of governance. The political constructions, resilience and adaptability discourses (narratives) are central to the government’s transformative interventions to meet national challenges. As Genus (2014: 283) highlights, debates on resilience bring to the fore questions regarding the effective governance of the transition to sustainability. Here, governance entails the

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shaping of society in anticipated progression or, more fully, systems of rule i.e. control or steering all levels of human activity, aimed at modifying behaviour and involving principles, norms and decision-making procedures. In ZANU PF discourse, resilience is infused with nationalist values of heroic resistance, autonomy, achievement and survival against unprecedented odds. This chapter will highlight the paradoxes of resilience in the context of ZANU PF policy processes and the adaptability of the discourse to contexts. Policy texts in this analysis will be given a critical and literary approach. There will be critical appreciation and appraisal of resilience through the analysis of dominant discourse in policy texts.

Background The post-2000 phase in Zimbabwean history dramatically captured by many as the ‘era of crisis’ (Bond and Manyanya 2003; Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009; Sachikonye 2012) presents a new and complex socioeconomic and political terrain. It is characterised by socio-economic meltdown during which ZANU PF, the ruling party since 1980 (when the nation attained its independence) and various other political parties attempted to set out the rationale for their political project(s). What makes this period unique is that at the peak of the crisis there emerged a strong opposition: the Movement for Change Democratic (MDC). So besides the quest to address the socio-economic crunch, ZANU PF was also ‘literally fighting for its survival after the constitutional referendum defeat in 2000 and the substantial erosion of its majority in the 2000 election’, (Sachikonye 2012: 99). This quest to survive rivalry and ensure dominance has influenced the adaptability of ZANU PF discourse as their discourse is central in attempting to construct meaningful narratives of being in control of the Zimbabwean situation and to convince those within and without of their legitimacy as sole custodians of the nation. As expressed by Tendi (2010), the crisis that has engulfed Zimbabwe since 2000 is not just a struggle against absolutist rule but also a struggle over ideas and deep-seated historical issues still unresolved from the independence process. Central to the concept of resilience and adaptability is the quest to meet the needs of the people, political promises to eradicate poverty, protect the environment, address equity imbalances and safeguard national sovereignty. Underlying current political discourses are numerous conflicting assumptions and guidelines for action. Such contradictions emanate from

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the fact that terms and narratives are subjectivity given narrow interpretations which are political and politicised. Agendas are (re)packaged, (re)modelled and (re)presented in a contingent and expedient way. That Zimbabwe has been experiencing an economic and political crisis is not in debate, but how issues are framed, how the crisis is narrated, what is heightened or downplayed about the situation varies with individuals, thus producing conflicting and often polarised views. In the introduction of #Team ZANU PF 2013, the text highlights that: ‘Zimbabwe has truly come of age with a proud global reputation of resilience, survival and real achievement in winning the goals of the people against unprecedented odds’ (11). This romanticised tone of resilience and confidence can only be perceived within the esoteric discourse of ZANU PF. Many scholars echo Raftopoulos and Mlambo’s (2009) sentiments that: Zimbabwe has been in the throes of a severe crisis in the past decade or so; one which has seen a once vibrant and dynamic society and economy virtually collapsing as political instability, lawlessness, misgovernment and a relentless economic melt down transformed this erstwhile leading southern African nation into an international pariah and the proverbial basket case…. The crisis has been evident in the country’s economic and socio-political life and the negative ripple effects that emanated from a progressively dysfunctional state. While those directly and most severely affected have been Zimbabwean citizens who have endured the worst effects of the country’s decline into collapse, the Zimbabwean crisis has had widespread negative regional repercussions. (1)

This pervading tone of a revolution that went wrong, of a nation grappling with complexities is predominant in most chronicles. The way the Zimbabwean situation is captured by many invokes images of Dambudzo Marechera’s House of Hunger (Bond and Manyanya 2003). As Kress (1993), asserts, ‘the everyday, innocent and innocuous, mundane text is as ideologically saturated as a text which wears its ideological constitution overtly’ (174). In light of this assertion, the wider post-2000 socio-economic and political discourses are key to our understanding of the politics behind the rhetoric in political texts to shed light on issues of power, social relations and institutionalisation. With different competing discourses both locally and internationally, the country’s economic crisis has attracted various forms of explanations and analysis. ZANU PF texts

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are not neutral texts and should not be treated as such. Like any other political text they reflect and refract complexities at the heart of power, legitimacy, culture, ideology, identity and history. In this chapter Joseph’s (2013) view of resilience, related to the way that societies adapt to externally imposed change, is adopted. As he explains, the adaptive capacity of social systems depends on the nature of their institutions and their ability to absorb shocks. It is important to appreciate the constructive role of the crisis in resource management, compelling people to consider issues of learning, adapting and regeneration. The World Resources Institute defines resilience as ‘the capacity of a system to tolerate shocks or disturbances and recover’ and argues that this depends on the ability of people to ‘adapt to changing conditions through learning, planning, or reorganization’. The World Resources Institute in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Bank, World Resources 2008: Roots of Resilience—Growing the Wealth of the Poor (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute 2008), defines resilience as the capacity to thrive in the face of challenge. Resilience, in Zimbabwean approaches, is a linguistic configuration that moves from the dynamics of the crises to emphasising individual responsibility, adaptability and preparedness.

Critical Discourse Analysis A political text is, just like a work of art, ‘conditioned by time, and represents humanity in so far as it corresponds to the ideas and aspirations, the needs and hopes of a particular historical situation’ (Fischer 1978: 12). Political texts are both narrative and discursive, and are also rich, fruitful sites for literary criticism. This discussion is largely premised on Fairclough and Fairclough’s (2012) approaches to analysing political discourse. They argue that analysis of political discourse should be centred on analysis of practical argumentation. Thus texts have to be analysed primarily in relation to action and context, i.e. based on what is really happening on the ground, and not focusing on texts in isolation. Thus: Crises have an objective or systemic aspect …, but they also have a necessary and indeed crucial subjective aspect, which is agentive and strategic. In a crisis, people have to make decisions about how to act in response and

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to develop strategies for pursuing particular courses of action or policies which will hopefully restore balance and rationality… Agents’ choices, decisions and strategies are political in nature, they are contested by groups of people with different interests and objectives, who are competing to make their own particular choices, policies and strategies prevail. (3)

This informs our understanding of the framing of resilience by ZANU PF. Accounts of the socio-political and economic meltdown, ways of thinking about issues and how the given aspects of ‘reality’ are talked about influence practices relating to reality. The narratives and explanations are action oriented as they provide the electorate with reasons for acting in particular ways. Discourse analysis is concerned with issues of knowledge, truth and power. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 6) define discourse as, ‘a form of power, a mode of formation of beliefs/values/desires, an institution, a mode of social relating, and a material practice’. Thus, in seeing language as discourse and as social practice, one is committing to analysing texts, and the relationship between texts, processes and social conditions. This applies to both the immediate conditions of the context and the more remote conditions of institutional and social structures (Fairclough 1989: 26). ‘Discourse’ refers to particular ways of organising meaning-making practices. Discourse analysis studies the circulation and the imposition of values through organised, socially constructed and maintained systems of domination. ZANU PF declared that ‘Only Indigenisation and People’s Empowerment reform programme can meet the goals of the people. There’s no other alternative’ (#Team ZANU PF: 4). (Emphasis the author’s). The tone itself is too narrowing for the complex, dynamic reality of the Zimbabwean situation and the ZANU PF simplistic approach closes down alternative pathways to sustainable development. This denies ‘resilience’, being resistant to alternatives. In the Zimbabwean context, the generalising and universalising approaches to the crisis itself and the simplistic solutions that would only when all conditions are in place are key to ‘unsustainability’ itself. Genus’ (2014) asserts that resilience urges a turn from a concern with the outside world to a concern with one’s own subjectivity, adaptability, reflexive understanding, risk assessments, knowledge acquisition and, above all else, responsibility for decision-making. Although there are undoubtedly pressures from outside, nation states can arrive at an assessment on how best to govern society through greater

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awareness of their own behaviour. Most of the dominant arguments and narratives in Zimbabwe lack the reflexivity that understands the dynamics at the heart of the problem and the realistic transformative interventions needed. ZANU PF narrows the whole debate on the Zimbabwe situation to the Western machinations, ‘illegal economic sanctions and illegal regime change machinations’ whilst the opposition parties’ discourse is steeped in the ‘Mugabe must go’ discourse that emphasise failed leadership and state repressiveness. Given the complexity of policies, organisations and management in dynamic settings there is need for reflexive understanding of how and why ‘frames’ are constructed. All this reflects reductionism, determinism and spurious quantification of development that promotes state fragility. The aim of ‘analyses of discourse’, according to Foucault, more than making information publicly available, is an attempt to interrupt and ‘problematise’ things taken for granted in our habits of thinking. He goes further to suggest other possibilities, to be developed in public discussions—other ways of conceiving and amplifying questions posed to ‘politics as usual’, thus opening it up to experimentation (Chomsky and Foucault 2006: xiv). As Leach et al. (2010: 18) put it: …the simple, generalized often equilibrium based models, and aggregative statistical approaches remain resistant to development as they become locked in with particular institutional and policy frameworks and associated practices.

In policy arenas, authors and modellers of policy often defer complexity, uncertainty and variability and prefer focusing on underlying aggregative, consistent patterns deep rooted in cultural understandings of ‘nature’. This naturalisation is the construction of commonsensical knowledge which makes some ways of ordering to be seen as natural and not open to questioning. Embedded ways of conceptualising debates shape the direction taken by progress. One of the key features of the development discourse is to conceal the continuing reproduction of hierarchical power relations. To make sense of the dominant discourse it has to be seen in the context of the struggle for dominance. Discourse delimits an array of possible practices and organises the articulation of these practices within time and space although in different ways and often unequally for different people

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(Gale 1999). Discourse demarcates fields of relevance, allocates legitimate perspectives and fixes standards for concept elaboration and the expression of experiences. Other downplayed paradoxes of resilience as can be deduced from ZANU PF texts. Discourse deployment enables the Party to label things as something that they are not, rather than call them what they are, as a means to reinforce ideology. ZANU PF sums the post-2000 crisis in general as the result of the ‘illegal economic sanctions imposed by the Western countries’ (Zim Asset, ix) and ‘illegal regime-change machinations of the British government and its allies’ (#Team ZANU PF 2013: 11). Land reform is dubbed the Third Chimurenga, an ongoing liberation struggle, a follow-up after the First and Second Chimurengas that were waged during the colonial period to overthrow the white colonial regime. Being in opposition is christened as being an enemy of Zimbabwe’s heroic struggle (ibid.). This reuse of the liberation struggle discourse then justifies the attendant political violence, as violence was a justified means to the end in the fight against colonial forces. Just as Fanon (1961) explains in The Wretched of the Earth concerning violence, national liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth; whatever the headline on new formulas introduced might be, decolonisation is always a violent process. Processes such as indigenisation as expounded by ZANU PF can therefore be best understood as a form of decolonisation. Thus the Zimbabwean crisis is seen as caused by western machinations as opposed to ‘national interests’. As explicated in #Team ZANU PF 2013: Only the Indigenisation and People’s Empowerment reform programme can meet the goals of the people… the ideological of Indigenisation and People’s Empowerment arises from the historical fact of our independence and sovereignty as Zimbabweans, as an expression of our heroic liberation struggle that was waged by Zimbabweans to attain the freedom and democracy we all enjoy today…ZANU PF’s ideological thrust to indigenise the ownership of Zimbabwe’s natural and economic resources that fell into foreign hands as a consequence of colonialism… (31–32)

This phenomenon of metaphorically connecting events and expediently tagging processes is what Pepetela (1980) refers to as the ‘fetishism of labels’ (81). We have to appreciate that ZANU PF, like any other political party is concerned, primarily, with justifying new forms of governance and is also driven less by their system biases. The reality, therefore, is that the

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governments have other agendas they have to push that have nothing to do with national development. For example, if we are to look at the raging ongoing succession wars in ZANU PF1 ‘Far from giving power back to civil society, the government is constructing a sphere of governance which it oversees from a distance through the use of power’ (Joseph 2013: 44) and for power. Political discourse does not work through the imperative of ‘truth’ but through social production of truth so there is that need to demystify terms if we are to assess echelons of resilience and adaptability in nation states. Whilst organisations construct the condition for development there is a need to take account of environmental and institutional realities. That is precisely the point of critical analysis of organisations, it seeks to problematise autonomy and the institutions that are required to make things work. Fairclough (1992: 94) refers to ‘the colonisation of public domain by the practices of the private domain’ as conversationalisation of public discourse. This he explains as the appropriation of private domain practices by the public domain for the complex processes of negotiating relationships and identities. He further submits that ‘the ambivalence of conversationalization is often synthetic personalization associated with promotional objectives in discourse and linked to technologization of discourse’ (76). It is ironic in Zimbabwean context and in ZANU PF discourse application although sustainability is contextualised to encompass human well-being, socio-economic equity and integrity, it also overtly emphasises the maintenance of systems and personalities capacitated by specific normative implicatures. In the introduction of #Team ZANU PF 2013 it is overtly reckoned that ‘Under ZANU PF and President Mugabe’s leadership, Zimbabwe has become one of the most indigenised and empowered countries in the developing world in terms of the untold livelihood opportunities that have been availed to the indigenous population’ (11). The paradox of resilience illuminates that the ideas of autonomy, responsibility and independence play key roles, albeit in a negative sense at times. As Joseph (2013) explicates, resilience is ‘the capacity [or lack] to positively or successfully adapt to external problems or threats’. Quoting Chandler, he explains that, 1 ZANU PF. has been deeply embroiled in internecine succession politics since 2013. Though Zimasset, the economic blueprint is to run 2013–2018, what dominates the headlines are not policy programmes but intra-party fights punctuated by purging of forces who consent that Mugabe’s age has advanced and there is need for a successor.

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The resilient subject (at both individual and collective levels) is never conceived as passive or as lacking agency…but is conceived only as an active agent, capable of achieving self-transformation. (46)

This idea of active agency depends on the granting of the illusion of autonomy, individual ingenuity and innovativeness. This constitutes the social construction of consistent subjects over time that work through policies that establish a particular institutional framework. This conception of active agency does not always translate to things such as state-building and poverty reduction strategies but could end up crystallising structures and social systems that may lack enough passion or the capacity for reformulation. This means we need to carefully examine what resilience is actually doing in practice. The positivity and rosy picture evident in ZANU PF texts downplay the gloomy Zimbabwean situation.2 The chronicles, the images are all smiles and they do not reflect the deteriorating state of affairs. As evident there is a gap between sustainable development in Zimbabwe and exercises for transformation as part of development or state-building programmes. Zim Asset (2013– 2018) gives the promise that all energies will be directed to agendas of socio-economic transformation but taking precedence, are internecine power squabbles and preparations for the next election, scheduled for 2018. All processes work though wearing the face of ‘national’ interests. Discourse analysis is the gateway to exploring the gaps between rhetorical representations of socio-economic issues and contemporary social realities in Zimbabwe. Ignoring reality, which is potentially disruptive for an established order, is quite an effective way of preventing the replenishing 2 In 2017, Zimbabwe’s socio-economic woes persist spiralling unemployment rate accentuated by graduates being churned out of higher learning institutions every year at the backdrop of a weak industry, lack of Foreign Direct Investment. There are cash shortages characterised by long bank queues. The government struggles to pay civil servants salaries with bonuses of the previous year being staggered and being paid in the larger part of the following year due to low cash flows. There has been a series of protests especially in 2016, by disgruntled Zimbabweans, main led the #Tajamuka/Sesjikile protest group in which people were demanding the promised reforms such as the 2 million jobs. Corruption continues unabated, with police officers extorting money from roadblocks spread all over towns and highways. Some people feel very disgruntled with the Head of State’s endless foreign trips gobbling millions whilst masses are wallowing in poverty. There is continued political and economic crisis as overt political power struggles take precedence over the pressing need to improve the welfare of suffering Zimbabweans. Hope for recovery is quite distant as parties seem to be focused on the next election more than any meaningful social reforms.

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of this order by something more democratic and rational. CDA harbours the hope for transformation through critical understanding. A challenge that threatens the lives or well-being of many in contemporary Zimbabwe is the problem of what Pepetela sees as ‘schematism in politics’. He expounds that politics is like a religion where things and individuals become sacred that people are made to believe in them to give meaning to their lives and there are preconceived notions of optimism though at times the reality contradicts the conception(s). Exploring and assessing rhetoric in relation to the socio-political realities is tantamount to a revolution audit as it highlights the processes of socio-economic transformation or lack thereof (Melber 2003).

The Narrative Turn: A Tale of Resilience According to Fischer (1978) humans are essentially storytellers, and all forms of human communication are most usefully interpreted and assessed from a narrative perspective. Fischer postulates that ‘beneath the learned and imposed structures by means of which we give discourse such forms as “argument”, “exposition”, “drama” and “fiction”, the human species is always pursuing a narrative logic’ (ix). Narration is explained as ‘symbolic actions—words and/or deeds—that have sequence and meaning for those who live, create, or interpret them’ (Fischer 1978: 58). This narrative turn is evident in ZANU PF policy texts as they tell their story, especially that of resilience through their words and images. Basically the complete tale is: Under ZANU PF and President Mugabe’s leadership, Zimbabwe has become one of the most indigenised and empowered countries in the developing world in terms of the untold livelihood opportunities that have been availed to the indigenous population…the opportunities have widened and deepened since independence as a direct result of ZANU PF’s pro-people policies such as the hugely successful land reform programme which is now widely acknowledged as a major source of economic prosperity for the country. ZANU PF’s empowerment policies have not been diminished by the daunting challenges that have come in the way over the last decade such as illegal economic sanctions and the illegal regime-change machinations of the British government and its allies… (#Team ZANU PF 2013: 11)

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The narrative turn entails giving form and meaning to events and state of affairs so as to accommodate incongruities and offer alternative forms of knowledge, narrative rationality. The tale of consistency, success and heroic escapades is illuminated in ZANU PF texts. This narrative relies on ideological positioning around the revolutionary project. History is awakened to emotions. The narrative circulates around party ideology, policy and strategies. Whilst the causal—effects of the post-2000 situation remain a topic of serious debate, ‘characterisation of the county’s politics and development trajectory mostly depend on the narrator’ (Murisa and Chikweche 2015: xiii). As Murisa and Chikweche (2015) highlight, in essence, ‘any discussion on Zimbabwe has mostly been contested terrain’. This is mainly because though the accounts of the socio-economic crisis are reflected objectively in policy texts, they also have dominant subjective aspects. Fairclough and Fairclough (2012: 4) explain narratives as elements of practical arguments incorporated within ‘circumstantial premises of practical arguments (premises which represent the context of action); imaginaries for possible and desirable state of affairs […] incorporated in account(s) within goal premises’. Storytelling and story making are adaptive means that political groups in organisations sustain rationalities and shared meanings to make sense of the Zimbabwean situation. Party manifestoes and policy documents such as Zim Asset appear serious, organic, scientific and factual documents but looking at these as thus robs the texts of their narrativity and power of storytelling which is quite apparent. This making of the texts less literary renders critical literary analysis insignificant and makes these documents less engaging as people are expected to accept the lingo as given and take this for granted and/or as natural. Accounts in the policies, the political responses to the crisis have an inherently semiotic and discursive dimension characterised by ‘narratives’, ‘mental conceptions’ and ‘imaginaries’ (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012: 4). The way resilience and adaptability are incorporated in the narratives are a result of this, they are arbitrary. It is quite important to understand the centrality of narratives touted in ZANU PF statements to people’s perceptions and the interplay of power in resilient discourses. In accordance with Fairclough and Fairclough (2012: 6), ‘which narratives of the crisis come to prevail will strongly affect which strategies and policies win out and what the effects of the crisis and the longer-term effects are’. In the ZANU PF narrative, there is a dominant ‘masterplot’, ‘master fiction’ or archetype that legitimise

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agency and actions. ZANU PF narrative strategy consists of ‘“appropriating the now” by stating that the country is in transition, and that this transition, the third Chimurenga is a continuation of the glorious fight against the Rhodesian and British colonial and neo-imperialist forces that aim at dispossessing the Zimbabweans in a re-enactment of the original colonial occupation’ (Christiansen 2004: 80). Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) expand that ‘a narrative which imposes itself in the discursive ideological competition which the crisis opens up will determine a general perception of the crisis’ (4). Zimbabwean politics have always been prone to single mega-narratives, candidates reducing complex issues to simple legends. The dominant liberation struggle narrative automatically excludes other forerunners in the race to govern the nation and stamps who has the mandate to run the nation. It closes debate on nationalistic issues. Narratives provided by ZANU PF agents lend meaning to representations and contextualise the environment to imbue evolvement in a sense of charisma within the constraints of the Zimbabwean challenges. The ZANU PF narrative strategy is depicted as consisting of ‘“inappropriating the now” by stating that the country is in transition, and that this transition, the third Chimurenga is a continuation of the glorious fight against the Rhodesian and British colonial and neo-imperialist forces that aim at dispossessing the Zimbabweans in a re-enactment of the original colonial occupation’ (Christiansen 2004: 80). Looking at the dominant narratives, one is bound to challenge the view that all our challenges are rooted in failed national democracies, as well as the claim that the prevailing situation is solely entrenched in imperialistic machinations. In Zimbabwe, we have the patriotic, nationalist storyline by ZANU PF and the dominant democracy plot(s) by the oppositional MDCs. Fairclough and Fairclough (2012: 3) explain that, many accounts of the crisis recognise ‘the importance of the subjective aspect though there is little agreement on its precise nature’. They further explain that the subjective aspects of narratives and explanations of the crisis as well as imaginaries function as action as they ‘provide people with reasons for acting in particular ways’ (ibid.). Narratives are embedded with practical arguments like how the nation can transcend the current impasse which feeds into agents’ premising of decisions and developing strategies and policies in response to crisis. Bhabha (1990) delineates the nation as a narrative strategy which deploys the people, the nation in a linear historical narrative of events, ideas and cultural traits. Narratives become expedient vehicles to handle

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problematic aspects of the contemporary nation. As Leach et al. (2010: 45) elucidate, ‘particular system framings often become part of narratives about a problem or issue and these are simple stories with beginnings defining the problem, middles elaborating its consequences and ends outlining the solutions’. Thus dominant narratives can be totalising and liberating if they are extensive but can also narrow the horizon in which scope of things is allowed to make sense through varying framings. In conceptualisation of pervading national narratives, it is critical to explore how the nation’s narrative(s) is intertwined with national history and to what effect. Trouillot (1997) explains history as what happened in relation to the context and the task at hand. The meaning and relevance of the narratives and metaphors peddled by varying political actors are affected by conceptual and argumentative ‘baggage’ acquired through history. Narratives generate, maintain and legitimate past, present and future actions and consequences. Boje (2011) explains that organisational storytelling is the collective rehistoricising (memory) of the institution, the ongoing (re)negotiation as the present is unfolded into the past (attention) and the (re)visioning (expecting) the future. Christiansen (2004: 9) asserts that political discourses of ZANU PF and other agents such as the opposition, intellectuals, civil society groups and others occupy a discursive field in which ‘national history is politicised as a sign of national identity’. She views this as, ‘mapping out the nation’s imagined space and nation’s imagined community’ as defined over time by different agents through narrative. Organisational narratives such as #Team ZANU PF 2013 and Zim Asset have subsistent series of development, progress, regeneration and reformulation ‘in the interests of the nation’ which are tailor-made to ensure dominance and relevance.

Resilience as Embedded in ZANU PF Discourse (Framing Resilience) To understand issues of development in Zimbabwe there is a need to examine the interaction of socio-economic resilience and adaptability in our complex systems. Analysis of the concept of resilience in ZANU PF literature assesses its potentials and limitations in policy planning for sustainable development. Policy narratives have to be understood as strategic constructions of reality promoted by actors that are seeking relevance and dominance in public policy battles. Zhou and Zvoushe (2012) assert that in post-2000 Zimbabwe, policymaking reverted to interventionism;

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political expediency and survival rather than long-term socio-economic welfare being the driving force. They explain that policy interventionism is inspired by the need to control the apparatus of the state and safeguard political turf. Political blue-prints serve as machineries of crisis management, harnessing and harmonising competing values and interests within the nation and individuals who hold different and often conflicting values on what problems, goals and options should be prioritised at a given time. Anderson (1978: 23) argues that ‘the deliberation of public policy takes place within a realm of discourse…policies are made within some system of ideas and standards which is comprehensive and plausible to the actors involved’. Policy narratives consist of generalisable strategic policy constructions with instrumental goals. This insight is valuable in analysis of the politics of discourse and in exploring the relationship between policy texts and their historical, political, social and cultural contexts. It shows how ‘truth effects’ or ‘matters-of-fact’ are created. I believe that in development discourse there is a real danger of misuse or abuse of terms as they are increasingly co-opted to accommodate rather than challenge some economic or political status quos. As Bene (2017) highlights, though some would argue for support to the concept of resilience, some institutions are supporting business as usual, possibly with the objective of making communities more resilient to the shocks and inequity created by dominant economic and/or political models. He argues that, in these conditions, resilience fails to support the process of transformation that may be necessary for the long run and is inadequate as a guiding principle for foresight. Evident at the heart of ZANU PF discourses are complexity, selforganisation, functional diversity and non-linear ways of behaving. In the face of the post-2000 crisis, the ZANU PF government reflects a high degree of resilience. Its texts and social structures, as echoed in its discourses, are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life. As Joseph (2013) explains it, ‘resilience provides these complex systems with the ability to withstand and survive shocks and disturbances. It also emphasises the capacity for renewal’. It is critical to analyse if the intervention strategies are aimed at improving the situation within the current trajectory or if there is acknowledgement of the need for development in a more responsive way that can drive durable progressive shifts. The problem is that some interventions

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emphasise short-term eradication efforts as the ‘existing strategies are conventionally built on assumptions of internal stability, in which the fundamental dynamics are assumed to stay the same’ (Leach et al. 2010: 60). ‘Taking back the economy, Indigenise, Empower, Develop and Create Employment’ overtly sums up ZANU PF’s strategy for the ‘agenda for sustainable socio-economic transformation’ of the nation as reflected in #Team ZANU PF 2013 and the economic blueprint Zim Asset. The first bold step towards this definitive action post-2000 was the land reform programme. Even with its many controversies, land has been at the core as the defining resource of post-2000 Zimbabwean politics. Since 2000, the radical land reform programme had become a theatre of contests, policy attention and government interests, especially in nationalistic and development discourses. Land was a major reason why blacks fought to overthrow the white colonial rule having been dispossessed of their land and pushed to dry infertile, unproductive lands. Land has always been an emotive, central issue that defines the livelihood of Zimbabwean people. The land reform programme represents the most radical form of resilience as ‘it radically altered people’s lives and livelihoods’, Therefore, the land reform programme was not simply about land, but also about Zimbabwean values as expressed in beliefs about land. If we accept the argument that behind every text lies motive, intentionality and functionality, we realise that recognition and analysis of the relations between discourse, power and practices effectively contributes to the understanding of development issues in Zimbabwean politics. Whilst most criticism of ZANU PF government and their programmes as reflected in their texts look at the policies’ pronouncements in relation to action, the real definitive pointers lie in the nuances of language and its usage, in the silence on certain things and in the pictures/images that their texts popularises. According to Foucault (1980: 100): Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.

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ZANU PF as a party has highly invested in controlling the discourse; narratives, language, messages and images of communications. As Joseph (2013) explains, we have to understand that in the politics of adaptation and adaptability integral to resilience, nation states are centrally important agents in framing and narrating development paths. The nation state continues to shape and control the levels of autonomy, scope and resources available for subnational institutions to conceive and implement strategies of adaptation or adaptability. Value judgements and political choices are bound up with definitions of adaptation or adaptability and decisions concerning appropriate strategies and pathways. State authority exerts powerful roles in scripting the narrative, so often contested, of what adaptation and adaptability could or should mean. Introductory remarks in #Team ZANU PF 2013, from the party President, Robert Mugabe emphasise the role ZANU PF played in liberating the country and highlights that the revolutionary fire should be centralised in national development. The manifesto reiterates that the 2013 harmonised election and the prevailing challenges ‘comes against the background of the enduring and unforgettable fact that it is ZANU PF which liberated Zimbabwe after prosecuting a heroic armed struggle. It was this people’s resort to the bullet that won Zimbabweans the right to the ballot that everyone enjoys today as a legacy of our liberation struggle’ (7). That legacy is depicted as permanently connecting the past, present and future generations of the nation. The ongoing crisis and challenges are depicted as part of the ongoing struggle against imperial forces thus identifying ‘agendas of regime change and the illegal economic sanctions as blighting development’ (ibid.). This nationalistic discourse asserts and stamps legitimacy, frames the causes of the crisis and shifts any blame for the crisis from the ‘nationalist revolutionaries’. Most of the defining words at the centre of ZANU PF discourse such as empowerment, indigenisation, development democracy that are presumed to present pathways to conquering the nation’s upheavals and arresting shocks resemble the complexity and fluidity of development discourse itself. They are not assigned concrete meaning, they acquire their meaning as they are used by the authors. Zimbabwe’s indigenise and empower slogan goes: Pamberi neZanu PF! /Pamberi neIndigenisation! /Pamberi neEmpowerment! /Pamberi nekuhwina maElections ! (9) (Forward with Zanu PF! /Forward with Indigenisation! /Forward with Empowerment! /Forward with winning Elections!). The irony herein is that the words themselves are not ‘indigenised’ yet the #Team ZANU PF

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2013 manifesto later refers to the quest to, ‘give national languages the same status as English in accordance with the new Constitution’ (15). Looking at the complexity of issues in Zimbabwe and how the nation’s progress is anchored on those very words, one feels that they deserve simplification to demystify how exactly the party is going to practically save the nation from the contemporary quagmire. The English-coding of the words becomes evasive and it takes them away from the people, together with distancing practice from them as well. These words are highlighted as mystic words that will deal with the country’s problems. Yet, we feel that the first step, which the manifesto fails to take, is to talk to the people in their language, to present clear, realistic and credible methods towards addressing ‘bread and butter’ of sustainable development. At the heart of indigenisation is nationalisation of the country’s resources, land, industries and systems to achieve total socio-economic independence. Pepetela (1980) approves nationalisation as the only solution to real sustainable development, and asserts that ‘as long as there are not mistakes nor much embezzlement of funds, the living will rise’ (81). The dominant discourses affect how issues are articulated and also influence possible pathways of practical solutions and inclusive sustainable development for Zimbabweans. It is quite noticeable that the power of ZANU PF as a party is in their application of words to the extent of even overriding all local and standard definitions. Power has been derived from normalising meanings that are party-specific, making the transformation agenda(s) limited within party constructs. The pervasiveness of promotional language and market-inspired vocabulary in the sphere of manifesto writing is made clear (Savola 2006). The relationship between words and images should be recognised: “words provide the facts, the explanations, the things that need to be said in so many words; images provide interpretations, ideologically colored angles” (Van Leeuwen 2008: 136). Glossy pictures punctuating the manifestos’ messages, figures and graphs bring into sharp focus the value that images have in capturing attention and in speaking to the electorate. True to the adage that a single picture is worth a thousand words, a scrutiny of the dominant pictures in ZANU PF’s 2013 Election Manifesto both portrays and betrays underlying party ideologies. The images and the dominant message portrayed in the document are glossy, the quality of pictures, the figures projected in the issues, the universal smiles all downplay the crisis. The historical issues and controversial hyperbolic achievements

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are highlighted and the state of affairs on the ‘potholed ground’ toneddown. Asserting that ‘under ZANU PF and President Mugabe’s leadership, Zimbabwe has become one of the most indigenised and empowered countries in the developing world in terms of the untold livelihood opportunities that have been availed to the indigenous population’ is most hyperbolic as statistics on the ground reveal a very different reality. Progressive resilience is all about action and where there is a mismatch between what is being said and what is on the ground, then discourse is governed by principle rather than the ‘reality’. ZANU PF is the chief appropriator of history and nationalistic discourses. In Christiansen’s (2004) words, ‘the ZANU PF discourse of patriotic history draws on the imaginary archive of Zimbabwean cultural heritage […] made up of a specific interpretation of liberation war history and narratives of the primary resistance movements which link them together’ (80). The centrality of history in ZANU PF narratives and discourses as the main resource for resilience is dominantly reflected, evidently in the cover pictures of the texts such as #Team ZANU PF 2013 and Zim Asset. Dominating the cover pages is the Great Zimbabwe monument, re-emphasising history as the sustaining nerve of the party. Almost as an afterthought on Zim Asset, and to stress its subordination to issues of the nationalist past, images of the economic key drivers like agriculture, transport and mining make up the lower and smaller part of the picture/cover. This suggests that focus is on history, on reminding the electorate and the governed that they owe the party for their liberation and that they should show some allegiance during the crisis and in elections. ZANU PF resorts to an appropriation of history and nationalistic discourses where it conflates its role relative to that of other political players. Nyambi (2013: 6) expounds that ‘the official narrative of the nation is characterised by discernible politically-motivated exclusions, deletions and censorship of other narratives’, what Tendi (2010) refers to as ‘rewriting of history’. However, sustainable development at best demands ‘need to be able to learn from history not hide behind it, forever cleaning our wounds. To heal we need to use history to act on the present to change our future’ (Ngugi 2003: 24). Ngugi further explains that history has to be relevant, alive and should be an instrument in regulating change. Change itself is at the heart of development and that is why in Zim Asset, the agenda ‘for sustainable socio-economic’ development is qualified with words like transformation, growth, reposition, progress, etc.

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The ZANU PF manifesto follows up with a map of Zimbabwe with three collages: the first is dominated by eminent historical figures, first of King Lobengula and Mbuya Nehanda, then centre stage the nationalist leaders, Joshua Nkomo, Josiah Tongogara, Jason Moyo, Simon Muzenda, with Robert Mugabe at the centre and lastly the ordinary Zimbabweans. All the collages are linked from the first to the last by an arrow and a baton passed to each subsequent generation by the one preceding it. The caption, ‘safeguarding and passing on the liberation baton’ helps to explain the images and how they are related. They serve as a useful reminder of the collective memory and history of the country’s past success and of the relay journey through which it is passing. This effectively encapsulates the dominant understanding of sustainability as ‘development which meets the needs of current generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland 1987: 43). This actually resonates with ZANU PF’s accentuated focus on the youths recently, in terms of their emphasising their needs and engagement in the political arena. This is a relatively timely priority, particularly in light of recent events and democratic transitions, in Zimbabwe especially in the post-2000 context. The theme of ‘Unlocking the value in the youth’3 torches the importance of youth participation in decisionmaking. Youth in Zimbabwe are some of the most hard hit by poverty, limited employment prospects and opportunities as industries shut down and most of them were not beneficiaries of the land reform programme. As highlighted in the United Nations report on Youth, Political Participation and Decision Making, youths can be a creative force, a dynamic source of innovations and they have undoubtedly, throughout history, participated, contributed and even catalysed important changes in political systems, power-sharing dynamics and economic opportunities. Even the majority of the now old war veterans, were youths when they joined the liberation struggle that won the nation its liberation. This inclusion of the youth in critical programmes signifies a renewal of the party whose backbone is mainly the war veterans. Meaningful youth participation and leadership in nation states require that young people and young people-led organisations have opportunities, capacities and benefit from an enabling environment and relevant evidence-based programmes and policies at all levels. This focus on youth is a form of resilience in

3 This has been the running theme in 2017 ZANU PF youth functions.

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itself as realising young people’s right to participate and be included in democratic processes and practices is so vital in refreshing development agendas, ensuring continuity and the achievement of development goals. The adaptive ZANU PF creation has been the emphasis on the focus on the youths in national development issues, the adoption of youth responsive programmes such as Science, Technology, Education and Mathematics (STEM) education programme, loan facilities for tertiary students and offer of housing stands to youths. The images in the document are predominantly of the party leadership with the ordinary people on the periphery, and in fewer of the pictures. Rather than centralise the intended beneficiaries of the election, the people, concentration on the leaders casts the party as self-immersed and given to leadership cultism. Where development policies thrive on horizontal power and influence distribution, the top-down structure suggested here casts doubt on the inclusivity of people, who, however, are the source of the much-needed votes. As Pepetela in Mayombe (1980: 80) argues, the problems start with ‘lies’ that the ordinary masses have power, as ‘who takes power is a small group of men, on the best of hypotheses representing the proletariat or seeking to represent it’. ZANU PF’s immersion in its own inner circle especially looking at the ongoing dominant party succession wars make its projected reforms, policies and transformative agency render questions on what is being sustained to a greater extent, the party itself, the party leaders or the civil. If the images are reflective of its policy and implementation thrust, the party seems to be focused on revolutionary intellectuals and apotheosis. Any meaningful development seems to be dependent on ‘a narrow nucleus, because there is a shortage of cadres’ (ibid.). The goals of ZANU PF in Chapter 3 of #Team ZANU PF 2013 are depicted as Independence, Sovereignty, Unity, Security, Respect for the values and ideals of the liberation struggle, Patriotism, Gender equality, Respect for the elderly, Economic prosperity, Achievement, Equity, Peace, Freedom and democracy, Non-violence, Tolerance, Stability, The youth as the future, Employment, Housing for all, Respect for persons with disabilities, Development, and Freedom of worship. There is great arbitrariness in these terms but since they come across as highly normative and as symbols of happiness, they become acceptable to the electorate as part of the basis for national resilience.

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Issues of policy framing reflect promises for process oriented and political sensitive, understanding of sustainable development and agendas characterising it. It is critical to understand how terms like sustainability, indigenisation, empowerment, sovereignty, democracy, transformation and many others invoke frames and dominate debate. Such words are applied relative to context and conceptual frames. ZANU PF, as a party has highly invested in controlling the narratives, the language, the messages, the communication and in other words, the frame that they evoke, at all times. The relationship between discourse and ideology is eminent. The function of ideology basically, is defending existing systems against any serious critique, legitimising them as direct expression of human nature (Zizek 2008). In terms of ideology, the exercise of power within society is crucial, as the masses, through inculcation, accept and enact the metaphor (discourse) of an organisation as a machine. Inculcation spawns people, ‘to “own” discourses, to position themselves inside them, to act and think and talk and see themselves in terms of discourses’ (Fairclough 2003: 208). A stage towards inculcation is rhetorical deployment: people adopt discourses and, ‘use them for certain purposes while at the same time self-consciously keeping a distance from them. One of the mysteries of the dialectics of discourse is the process by which what begins as self-conscious rhetorical deployment becomes “ownership”—how people become unconsciously positioned within a discourse’ (Fairclough 2003: 208). This is akin to what Jonathan Moyo in a SAPES Public Seminar ironically referred to as naming party organisations ‘chinhu chedu’4 (our thing). This is ironic because ZANU PF—the party to which Jonathan Moyo belongs—discourse has been identified as the ‘chief culprit’ in the appropriation of nationalistic and patriotic discourses. Tendi (2010) details, how ZANU PF appropriates national history (patriotic history)

4 Jonathan Moyo presenting on the topic, ‘Whither the Nationalist Project in Zimbabwe?’ In his discussion he focused on successionist forces within ZANU PF which is basically Team Lacoste vs G40 (a group to which Jonathan Moyo is pinpointed as one of the chief architects). He was dissed Team Lacoste which is accused to be harbouring interests of succeeding the President, Robert Mugabe and the group allegedly backs Mnangagwa as the successor. So Moyo was explaining that Lacoste was not legitimate as they were trying to subvert democracy (means of getting into power) by harbouring an ambition for Presidency. He emphasised the contenders were trying to personalise power making it ‘chinhu chedu’ because they had fought the liberation struggle.

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and culture “in its relentless effort to convince the citizenry that the ongoing crisis in Zimbabwe is a continuation of the liberation struggle”, over which ZANU-PF alone is qualified to preside. The analysis of the models of development, such as #Team ZANU PF 2013 and Zimasset is quite imperative because the framing of policy texts in general is ‘not only part of the solution but also part of the problem’ (Waas et al. 2011: 1650). Leach et al. (2010: 5) expound that in discoursing development issues: […] there is a pervasive tendency – supported by professional, institutional and political pressures – for powerful actors and institutions to ‘close down’ around particular framings, committing to particular pathways that emphasise maintaining stability and control. In so doing, these often create universalising and generalising approaches. These can in turn obscure or deny the reality of alternatives.

This is accentuated by the fact that the prevailing articulations of development ‘lend themselves to technical finesse and administrative intervention which makes the managerial ‘fiction’ and mastery itself part of the problem’ (Crush 1995: xvii). Bauman (2009) explains that in development discourse, the plight cast in a setting is not made easier by the conceptual nets that have been used to grasp the elusive realities by the vocabularies commonly deployed. Conventional metaphors of resilience just like development have the power to define reality. They do this through a coherent network of entailments that highlights some feature of reality and hide others (Lakoff and Johnsen 2003). The acceptance of a metaphor which focuses on the highlighted aspects of experiences leads people to view those entailments of the metaphor as being the absolute truth. It is quite noticeable that the power of ZANU PF as a party has been in its application of words to the extent of even overriding all local and standard definitions. Power has been derived from normalising meanings across words such as democracy, indigenisation, empowerment and devolution which speak to different agents’ reality. Accepting an argument requires accepting central parts of the metaphor, as truth can only be truth relative to the reality demarcated by the metaphor (ibid.). Contending that ZANU PF stalwarts are nationalists par excellence and have power to change the state of affairs has its basis on the fact that they were key drivers of the liberation struggle against colonial forces. Political texts typically parade as objective ultimate

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truths and representations of reality but most of its content is imposed by the framing of concepts and issues. Held views of reason and good sense tend to be unique to particular groups.

Conclusion Instabilities such as the post-2000 Zimbabwean crisis have the capacity to modify systems leading to significant restructuring. All policy practice is based on framing, highlighting what and who are actually included, and what and who are downplayed, disregarded and excluded. This framing cannot be reliant on instrumental rationality because the logic is framed through the dominant narrative(s), discourses, images and metaphors. In relation to political texts such as #Team ZANU PF 2013 and Zim Asset, discourse analysis offers an opportunity to open up the governance of transitions to expose sources of influence, persuasion and dominance. Through these expedients, policies generate meanings and parade as selfcontained and contingent. The conception of language used to assess resilience should be open to diverse interpretations. In political texts and party manifestoes it is evident that the intentional, technological use of language is primarily for power and dominance. Using a systematic review focusing on the Zimbabwean post-2000 era, shows that diverse views of what resilience means and how it is best used (as a goal or as a conceptual/analytical framework) to compete in political texts. Underlying the views put forward are various (and sometimes diverging) interpretations of what constitutes the crisis and what forms of interventions are needed to address these issues. People need to be better aware of these different interpretations if they want to be in a position to customise resilience and maximise what resilience can contribute to their exertions. As this paper highlights, notions of resilience often lack adequate acknowledgement of the political economy of policies and consequently do not challenge the status quo which is socially unjust and environmentally unsustainable. As such it runs the risk to be seen as simply making communities more resilient to the shocks and inequity created by the dominant paradigms rather than address risks and ambiguities that can drive long term, robust shifts in nation states. Although nations such as Zimbabwe face crucial constraints. There is a need for a holistic approach that demonstrates how particular sociotechnical configurations and consequent institutionalised trajectories can open up or close down pathways to progressive transitions.

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Primary Texts Zimbabwe African National Unity (Patriotic Front) (ZANU PF). 2013. #Team ZANU PF 2013. Zimbabwe: Zanu PF 2013 Election Directorate. Zimbabwe African National Unity (Patriotic Front) (ZANU PF). 2013. Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim Asset ). Zimbabwe: Government of Zimbabwe.

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Gale, Trevor. 1999. Policy Trajectories: Treading the Discursive Path of Policy Analysis. Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 20 (3): 393– 407. Genus, Audley. 2014. Governing Sustainability: A Discourse-Institutional Approach. Sustainability 6: 283–305. Hammar, A., B. Raftopoulos, and S. Jensen (eds.). 2003. Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis. Harare: Weaver Press. Joseph, Jonathan. 2013. Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism: A Governmentality Approach. Resilience International Policies, Practices and Discourses 1 (1): 38–5. Kress, Gunther. 1993. Language as Ideology. London: Routledge. Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnsen. 2003. Metaphors We Live By. London: The University of Chicago Press. Leach, Melissa, Ian Scoones, and Andy Stirling. 2010. Dynamic Sustainabilities: Technology, Environment, Social Justice. London: Earthscan. Melber, Henning. 2003. Re-Examining Liberation in Namibia. Nordic Africa Institute. Murisa, Tendai, and Tendai Chikweche (eds.). 2015. Beyond the Crises: Zimbabwe’s Prospects for Transformation. Harare: Weaver Press. Ngugi, wa Mukoma. 2003. Conversing with Africa: Politics of Change. Harare: Kimathi Publishing House. Nyambi, Oliver. 2013. Nation in Crisis: Alternative Literary Representations of Zimbabwe Post-2000. PhD thesis, Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch University. Pepetela, Artur. 1980. Mayombe. Harare: ZPH. Raftopoulos, Brian, and Alois Mlambo (eds.). 2009. Becoming Zimbabwe. A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008. Harare: Weaver Press. Sachikonye, Lloyd. 2012. Zimbabwe’s Lost Decade: Politics, Development and Society. Harare: Weaver Press. Savola, Paulina. 2006. More Than Words? An Analysis on the Language and Structure of General Election Manifestos of the British Labour Party 1983–2005. Tendi, Blessing M. 2010. Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, vol. 4. Nationalism Across the Globe. Oxford: Peter Lang Publishing Group. Trouillot, M. 1997. Silencing the Past. Haiti: Beacon Press. Van Leeuwen, Theo. 2008. Discourse and Practice. New York: Oxford University Press. Waas, Tom, Jean Huge, Aviel Verbruggen, and Tarah Wright. 2011. Sustainable Development: A Bird’s Eye View. Sustainability 3 (10): 1637–1661. World Resources Institute in collaboration with United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme, and World Bank, World Resources. 2008. Roots of Resilience—Growing the Wealth of the Poor. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.

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Good Governance Under Zuma Administration: Fad or Reality? Mbekezeli Comfort Mkhize, Kongko Louis Makau, and Phathutshedzo Madumi

Introduction Poor governance is not a newly found vexation in South Africa’s political economy. National governance has been characterized by a list of factors hindering progress towards economic development and good governance. South Africa is plagued by political and economic challenges such as lack of service delivery, poor financial management, weak business confidence, low growth, massive unemployment, inequality, racism, cronyism and corruption which continue. Martin and Solomon (2017) argue that political power is seen as a mechanism that can be used to extract financial benefits from the state, and not necessarily to foster an environment where the needs of ordinary citizens are met. They further assert that power is interest driven in South Africa and the economy is becoming increasingly centralized, where only a small segment of society is benefiting from it. State capture is one of today’s most widely discussed and controversial issues in South Africa. Its argument has drawn in not only academics, but also the general public from all walks of life. Whilst corruption is on the rampage and is a barrier to economic growth, state capture provides the writing on the wall. Bhorat et al. (2017) maintain that

M. C. Mkhize (B) · K. L. Makau · P. Madumi Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 J. I. Lahai and H. Ware (eds.), Governance and Societal Adaptation in Fragile States, Governance and Limited Statehood, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40134-4_7

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the decomposition of South African state institutions has long been blamed on corruption, but it is imperative to note that state capture is a far greater, systemic threat. Bhorat et al. further emphasize that state capture is almost a silent coup and must, therefore, be understood as a political project that is given a cover of legitimacy by the vision of radical economic transformation. It is important to realize that without anti-corruption measures, open decision-making, unbiased allocation of funding, measures to combat nepotism and strict financial control, it will be nearly impossible to promote good governance. There is no escaping the fact that although there are anti-corruption measures in place, corruption in South Africa is increasingly becoming endemic. It is also becoming an obstacle to good governance. Not surprisingly, state capture, and the abuse of entrusted power for the private benefit, costs the people of South Africa billions of rand annually. Whilst South Africa was grappling with the upsurge in corrupt activities, then President Jacob Zuma acted unilaterally (albeit as is his constitutional prerogative) on March 2017 when he reshuffled Cabinet. There were mixed reactions to his decisions and his reshuffling decision was not fully endorsed by some of the members of his ruling party. In this context, it is argued that this reshuffling was done without any reason other than vested political interests and was not based on merit. Instead, most political analysts were of the view that it was done with the intent to control and loot public resources for personal gains. The president along with his friends (the Guptas—widely perceived as the shadow state) were able to manipulate and influence appointment decisions especially at the top management level of the public enterprises. This included, among others, the reappointment of Brian Molefe as Eskom’s chief executive officer (CEO) after he had unceremoniously left the state-owned entity to become a Member of Parliament (MP). Mr. Molefe also left parliament unceremoniously with a view of being reinstated when he was promised a massive pension payout of R30 million after serving only 18 months. There followed a notable growth in a number of protests in the country. In the political arena, the increase in the number of votes for the motion of no confidence along with growing calls for President Zuma’s impeachment gained momentum. Calls for the President to step down grew from the civil rights, opposition parties, civil society organizations and the chapter 9 Institutions (such as the Public Protector). Eventually, on 14 February 2018, then President Zuma finally stepped down when

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faced by the reality that the ANC was finally prepared to back a parliamentary “no confidence” motion against him. Against this backdrop, this chapter argues that South Africa is susceptible to poverty, unemployment and social inequality given the pace with which corruption and maladministration is increasing. In advancing this argument, the chapter outlines and critically assesses the state of corruption and its catalysts in South Africa. In so doing, the chapter employs corruption theories such as cronyism, neopatrimonialism and politics of patronage as conceptual/theoretical lens through which to examine the extent to which corruption has undermined the principle of good governance. In determining when and how corruption began, the chapter makes a comparative analysis of President Jacob Zuma’s administration and his predecessors (Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Kgalema Motlanthe). It then takes into consideration the socio-economic and political challenges which are perpetuated by weak and dishonest government administrators.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework Good Governance Good governance is a term, first popularized by the World Bank in 1989 that is now popular well beyond the academic literature. Indeed, good governance is an important issue that shapes national debates among economists, politicians, public administrators and philosophers in many countries around the world. Boeninger (1992: 268) pointed out that the World Bank coined the word “governance” in the context of subSaharan Africa when the term was used to define the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development. Despite the wide array of academic definitions, there are common denominators. Thompson (1996 cited in Pillay 2004: 587) defines governance as the act or manner of governing, of exercising control or authority over the actions of subjects, a system of regulations. According to Kaufman et al. (1999 cited in Pillay 2004: 587), governance consists of traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for [the] common good. These provisions include the process by which governments are selected and replaced; the capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound policies effectively; and the respect of citizens for the institutions that govern economic and social

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interactions among them. Fitzgerald et al. (1997) describe governance as working and listening to citizens in order to manage the public’s resources and respond directly to the needs and expectations of citizens as individuals, interest groups and society as a whole. Inexorably, governance thus includes active cooperation and engagement in policy processes among all stakeholders, including citizens. Van Niekerk (2001) defines governance more broadly as the connections and interconnections between central, provincial and local authorities, including the general public. Governance can thus be said to involve more than one actor and extend beyond government institutions to include stakeholders from the private sector and civil society organizations. Cheema (2000) combines these concepts together in an effort to define governance as a broad concept that refers to a set of values, policies and institutions by which society manages the economic, political and social processes at all levels through interaction among the government, civil society and the private sector. Therefore, put succinctly, governance is the process of decision-making and how the decisions are carried out. Governance can be good or bad. Thus, most people believe that bad governance is one of the root causes of poverty and inequality within our societies. In this regard, Maserumule (2014) suggests that the fundamental distinction between good governance and governance is that the former is expressed in terms of “ought” (values) whereas the latter is in terms of “is” (fact). Omoyefa (2010) links good governance to the notions of good and common good, He states that the outcome of good governance ought to be “the good of all, i.e. common good” (2010: 111). According to Leftwich (1993), the concepts of good governance along with substantive democracy can be associated with the theory of a developmental state, which emphasizes that government ought to play an interventionist role in the economy in the interest of the development needs and the welfare of the citizens. For him, it is crucial to recognize that bad governance is on the rise and that the world is becoming more unjust. Although good governance may be understood differently in different contexts, there are many similar characteristics and expectations. First, there is a general consensus that good governance should be participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and follows the rule of law (UNESCO). Second, those aiming to achieve good governance need to strive to assure that corruption is minimized at all levels, the views of minorities are taken into account, and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are

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heard in decision-making. Good governance principles seek to respond directly to the present and future needs of society. As Godbole (2001) points out good governance depends upon the ethical grounding of governance although how good governance is adjudged to be is often measured, in a somewhat circular fashion, by the outcomes which are delivered. Cloete (2000) thus observes that good governance discussions often assume that public service delivery through the implementation of public policies aimed at providing concrete services to citizens demonstrates good governance, In a more critical vein, Maserumule (2014) contends that good governance is a multi-dimensional, value-laden, nebulous, normative [prescriptive rather than descriptive] and trans-contextual concept, which means different things to different people, depending on the bias of the user. In accordance with scholars, the former United Nations Secretary-General (Kofi Annan) defined good governance as a process that ensures respect for human rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; and promotes transparency and capacity within public administration (Annan 2012). Finally, it is imperative to point out that where there is no good governance countries are largely characterized by political and social instability, there is no progress, and such countries are basically in limbo when it comes to development. Neopatrimonialism, Kleptocracy and Cronyism It is not easy to reliably identify countries whose governance is bad when no relevant theoretical lenses are used. It is within the context of understanding good governance that corruption theories are used. In so doing, this chapter considers neopatrimonialism, kleptocracy and cronyism. Interestingly, these concepts are closely related to each other in that they all point to individual/s and their friend/s. Neopatrimonialism has become a commonly used concept in the field of political science. It is crucial to note that it is a concept mostly used to analyze the exercise of political power. Its widespread use results from the fact that it is the prevalent form of governance in most African countries. Nevertheless, this does not imply that it is practiced exclusively by African countries. Darnton (1994) argues that whilst claimed by many to be fundamental (and even inherent and inevitable), neopatrimonialism is the principal impediment that prevents African societies from evolving from their primary export economies. Aidoo and DeMarco (2009) demonstrate that in sub-Saharan Africa, neopatrimonialism has been employed extensively to explain the

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threats to good governance and levels of corruption. Similarly, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) claim that neopatrimonialistic practices are not just a characteristic of the African regimes, but rather “the core feature of postcolonial politics in Africa”. Further, Pitcher et al. (2009: 128) argue that the evident popularity of this type of regime persists because it is being presented by leaders as “an inevitable stage in some linear progression”, necessary to evolve away from the “backwardness” label imposed on sub-Saharan countries after decolonization. According to Beekers and van Gool (2012), the term “neopatrimonialism”, introduced by Eisenstadt, has gained widespread currency since the late 1980s. Erdmann and Engel (2006: 105) define neopatrimonial systems as “a mixture of two coexisting, partly interwoven, types of domination: namely, patrimonial and legal bureaucratic domination”. Neopatrimonialism has extensively been conceptualized to cover the nature of the African state including the level of authority, power politics, political legitimacy, elections, corruption, nepotism, paternalism, cronyism, privatization and presidentialism (Brobbey 2014). Neopatrimonial politics have extended the capacity for being able to divert public resources (from national tax revenues and aid funds) for private lucrative gain, thereby “undermining development possibilities already restricted by social and economic constraints” (Cromwell and Chintedza 2005: 3). Put differently, neopatrimonialism is patrimonialism combined with a modern state bureaucracy (Budd 2004: 2). Riggs (1964) argued that postcolonial bureaucracies, far from being merely administrative apparatuses for the execution of policies often developed into the focal employers for the job hungry and ambitious; prime providers of material benefits and social prestige and primary sources of political patronage. As a consequence, the offices and barracks of the modern, urban and small-town civil and military bureaucracy, rather than the agricultural estates of rural landlords or the meeting halls of newly founded political parties, legislative assemblies and elected executives, came to act as the postcolonial political arena par excellence (Shamsul Haque 2010). The crucial point to be emphasized is that neopatrimonialism has dire consequences which can threaten and destroy the nation. As observed by Aidoo and DeMarco (2009), many political dysfunctions are attributable to neopatrimonialism. They contend it is a system which can survive only by cannibalizing itself. In most cases, neopatrimonialism produces democratic instability rather than democratic consolidation. Thus, it could be argued that the government that neglects the needs of the masses is

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bound eventually to fail and political instability becomes the order of the day. The South African context provides a classic example. Thus Lodge (2014) argues that the African National Congress (ANC) has transformed from being a mass-based party into a party where private interests shape the internal dynamics of the party. This deep entrenchment of neopatrimonialism is evidenced by the gradual breakdown of distinctions between public and private concerns; the growth of personality-based factional politics; and increasing incidences of “the affirmation by the ANC leadership of ‘traditionalist’ representations of indigenous culture, whereby moral legitimation is sought more and more from appeals to ‘Africanist’ racial solidarity and nostalgic recollections of patriarchal social order rather than on the basis of the quality of government performance” (Lodge 2014: 2). Leaders manipulate their public offices for private gain; promote rent-seeking in the form of outright theft, kickbacks, and straddling defined as public officials using public office to secure employment or other assets in the private sector. In neopatrimonial systems, politics tends to become “a kind of business with two modes of exchange: connections and money. The state creates a fertile ground for accessing resources and everyone wants a share in the state resources” (Médard 1982). Neopatrimonial indicators in South Africa include the acquisition of business interests by leading politicians and their families, most notably the proliferation of the presidential family’s business concerns since President Jacob Zuma’s ascension to the presidency (Lodge 2014). Neopatrimonialism has very serious effects on the economy. These include hindrance or stifling of economic growth and germinating civil unrest and perpetuating poverty among the masses. Habib (2013) asserts that “…the relationship between politics and economics has become ever more apparent and explicit. The nature of economic policy is determined by political variables, and economic interests influence state priorities as much as the availability of material resources. Thus, the adoption and legitimation of economic policies represent the advancement of political as well as economic interests, and the implications of economic policy are as much political as they are socio-economic”. (Habib 2013: 73)

We turn now to kleptocracy. Charap and Harm (1999) argue that the existence of the kleptocracy state results from the maximization of

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his/her welfare by the ruler. Many countries have multiple characteristics of “kleptocracy”. They are governed and ruled by individuals or small groups who use government resources for their own benefit and ignore the majority, who are the poor.

Challenges Facing Good Governance in South Africa A year after President Jacob G. Zuma was sworn in as president of the Republic of South Africa, in May 2010, he appointed an advisory body consisting of 26 experts who largely came from outside the government, tasked to draft a vision and National Development Plan (NDP) for the country. This body was called the National Planning Commission (NPC) and at the end came up with the NDP vision 2030. The NPC identified nine major problems that faced South Africa and one of those identified was the rampant and high levels of corruption. The appointment of the NPC was seen as a step in the right direction, however, since issues like corruption have long been identified as a drawback upon the gains made by the post-apartheid government, it was mainly the lack of political will to stamp out corruption at all levels that would unite the opposition parties and the civil society to confront Zuma. According to Kondlo and Maserumule (2010), from that point onwards President Zuma’s administration was a “seriously challenged one”. These concerns had grown exponentially since President Zuma had assumed office. There had been an outcry from many quarters that corruption in all the three levels of government, viz. national, provincial and local (municipality level) has been spiralling out of control. According to Carbone (2016: 37), a survey conducted in 2015 by Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer revealed that “South Africa has the largest proportion of citizens who thought that corruption was getting worse and that their government was not combatting it effectively”. Even before Zuma became president in 2009, he was facing 783 corruption charges which were dropped on the eve of his ascendency to power (Carbone 2016). However, given the mounting pressure from the opposition parties, these charges have since been revived when the Democratic Alliance challenged the manner in which the charges were dropped. To the surprise of many, the court ruled that it was irrational for the prosecuting authority to have dropped the charges and they must be reinstated. The President and the National Prosecuting Authority

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(NPA) appealed the ruling. The 783 charges were followed by yet another scandal involving irregular expenditure on the President’s homestead in Nkandla. Nkandla is Zuma’s home town where he has built his home. This homestead was upgraded with the taxpayers money allegedly to the tune of R240 million. When the matter first surfaced, the opposition parties wanted the president to pay the full costs from his own account. When the matter was debated in parliament, the president said that he has used his money for the homestead and that he had secured a bond from the bank for the construction and security upgrade at his homestead. After much debate, the matter was submitted to the Public Protector Adv. Thuli Madonsela, who upon investigation, recommended in her Secure in Comfort—Report on an investigation into allegations of impropriety and unethical conduct relating to the installation and implementation of security measures by the Department of Public Works at and in respect of the private residence of President Jacob Zuma at Nkandla in the KwaZulu-Natal Province, Report no. 25 of 2013/2014 that the president has to repay some money (a certain percentage) for non-security upgrades. (Public Protector, Secure in Comfort 2014: 442.) The Public Protector is an organ of the state, recognized as one of the chapter 9 institutions in the country’s constitution which seek to strengthen democracy by playing an oversight role. This body investigates complaints by the public against the state agencies and state officials in all the three levels of government (Public Protector Website). However, despite the recommendations of the Public Protector, the then president and his political party which had a majority in the South African parliament, defied the recommendations of the Public Protector’s report and said the recommendations of the Public Protector were not binding, thus the president was not liable to pay for the non-security features that were upgraded. The opposition parties took the matter to the highest court in the land—the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court ruled in favour of the opposition parties and adjudged that the recommendations of the Public Protector were binding, overruling the stance of parliament. In passing judgement on 21 March 2016, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court found that by refusing to abide by the recommendations of the Public Protector, the President “failed to uphold‚ defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the land” (Carbone 2016: 35). It was then that the president agreed to pay as per the recommendations of the Public Protector.

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Under President Zuma Government departments and state entities were seen as cash cows for those in leadership. One immigrant family from India that arrived in South Africa in 1993 comprising of three brothers Ajay, Atul and Rajesh Gupta was named as benefiting from state tenders because of its close links with the president (Carbone 2016). The family was alleged to be so powerful as to have an influence in the appointment of government ministers, officials and boards of directors to state entities like the country’s Electricity Supply Commission (ESKOM), rail agency: Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), national broadcaster: and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) to name only the most significant. Zuma’s family, according to a wide range of reports, benefitted from this because his son, Duduzane, sat on the Boards of many of the Gupta-run businesses. His nephew, Kulubuse Zuma, is also involved in the Gupta businesses (Carbone 2016). In the midst of these allegations, information began to emerge on the Guptas’ influence in making government appointment after the then Minister of Finance, Nhlanhla Nene, was fired. His deputy, Mr. Mcebisi Jonas, came out in public to make allegations that the family approached him to take over the soon to be vacant Minister of Finance post even before the minister was fired. These allegations came after one former Member of Parliament (Vytjie Mentoor) made the allegations that she was also offered a ministerial position by the Gupta family. These allegations prompted complainants concerning the involvement of the Gupta family in government affairs to the office of the Public Protector. According to the report released by the Public Protector, two complaints were received on 18 March 2016 from Father S. Mayebe representing the Dominican Order and Mr. Mmusi Maimane, the leader of the opposition party—the Democratic Alliance (DA), asking the Office of the Public Protector to investigate the allegations made by Mr. Mcebisi Jonas that he was offered a position of Minister of Finance long before the minister was fired. The subsequent report on the findings and remedial actions by the Public Protector was titled: State of Capture Report on an investigation into alleged improper and unethical conduct by the President and other state functionaries relating to the alleged improper relationships and involvement of the Gupta family in the removal and appointment of Ministers and Directors of State-Owned Enterprises resulting in improper and possibly corrupt award of state contracts and benefits to the Gupta family’s businesses (Public Protector, State of Capture Report 2016).

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The Public Protector investigation found that the President failed to act when he was informed of the allegations of involving the Gupta family improperly in government business. By his failure to act, Zuma may have violated the Executives Ethics Code by which the President and his Cabinet are constitutionally obligated to act and behave in conduct of government business. The Public Protector thus recommended, as remedial action, that a Commission of Inquiry be established as follows: “The President to appoint, within 30 days, a Commission of Inquiry headed by a judge solely selected by the Chief Justice who shall provide one name to the President” and that the Judge heading the Commission be given powers to appoint his staff (Public Protector, State of Capture Report 2016). These measures were included since the president was implicated. Based on foreseeable encroachment on his powers, the President challenged the report by taking it to court for review. President Jacob Zuma was the first president to have faced a motion of no confidence in parliament since it first came in 2010. He faced a range motions of no confidence which he survived because his party had the majority seats in the National Assembly (NA) (Carbone 2016). The numerous motions of no confidence indicated the level of uneasiness and dissatisfaction not only from the opposition parties, and civil rights groups and civil society, but even from his own party, where about 26 members voted with the opposition parties in support of the motion of no confidence on 8 August 2017. In 2013, as his popularity among the veterans waned, Zuma received a hostile reception at the memorial service of the former President Nelson Mandela (Carbone 2016). This resurfaced when he received a hostile reception at the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) May Day rally in Bloemfontein in 2017 where he was not even allowed to speak and he was then barred and shunned by the ANC’ s alliance partners—COSATU and the SACP who have called for his removal, something that has resulted in tension within the tripartite alliance which dates back to the struggle years in exile. One of the developments which made the Zuma administration appear to be tolerant to corruption was its attack on anti-corruption institutions. Soon after Zuma took over as the President of the ruling African National Congress, the ANC dominated parliament disbanded the Directorate of Special Operations which was commonly known as the Scorpions on 23 October 2008. The ANC had resolved to disband the Scorpions, for the role they played in charging Zuma with the 783 alleged payments associated with the arms deal. Thus, when Zuma took office as President of the country, there was no specialized unit that dealt with corruption.

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Correspondingly, according to the Times Newspaper (2017), factionalism and corruption became the twin dangers facing the ANC. Since the 2007 Elective Conference in Polokwane when former President Thabo Mbeki unceremoniously left the ANC, the ruling party has been embroiled in factionalist politics. According to Mukwedeya (2015: 117), “factionalism became a defining characteristic of African National Congress (ANC) intraparty politics during the lead up to the 2007 Polokwane conference”. Other scholars (Fikeni 2009; Sarakinsky and Fakir 2015; Gumede 2009) noted the growing elements of factionalism within the ANC. After the Polokwane conference, a breakaway party (Congress of the People) was formed owing to factionalism. Moreover, after the 2012 national elective conference of the ANC held in Mangaung, yet another splinter party (Economic Freedom Front) was formed by the disgruntled members who were in support of the former President of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), Julius Malema, who was expelled by Jacob Zuma. The President’s ill-advised Cabinet reshuffling was also heavily influenced by factionalism. Dr. Blade Nzimande, Minister of Higher Education and SecretaryGeneral of the South African Communist Party (SACP) acknowledged that: Inside our own movement we are faced with the destructive challenge of factionalism. Even more disturbing is that the factions have nothing to do with ideological or tactical differences on how best to achieve the objectives of our struggle. (Blade Nzimande cited in Times Newspaper, 8 January 2017)

He further went on to say: It is factionalism largely based on competition for control over organisational power and its use as a step ladder for access to and control over public power and resources and dispense patronage. (Blade Nzimande cited in Times Newspaper, 8 January 2017)

Not surprisingly, going into the national elective conference of the ANC in December 2017, there was a factional split. One fraction supported the Deputy President (Cyril Ramaphosa), and the other faction supported the incumbent’s ex-wife (Nkosazane Dlamini-Zuma). As is now known, Ramaphosa won.

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Implications of State Capture on Good Governance The impact of corruption is best summed up by Carbone who quotes Munzhedzi, 2016 as follows: When billions of Rand are lost or mismanaged in the public sector, there is a very direct cost borne by citizens in the form of a lack of or inadequate service delivery. With high levels of economic inequality and high unemployment, the poorest South Africans rely on targeted government programmes to address the basic needs of housing, healthcare, sanitation and social grants. These programmes are undermined by corruption that diverts much-needed public funds from the most vulnerable. (Carbone 2016: 40–41)

The allegations investigated by the Public Protector revealed or confirmed that a number of government departments and state-owned enterprises seemed to be captured by the Gupta family where many of the contracts are awarded to their businesses. It is only the Commission of Inquiry, as suggested by the Public Protector’s report, which can confirm the allegations and the extent to which state capture has gone. The negative impact of state capture tarnishes good governance and shows the collapse of effective governance. The revelations suggest that the government institutions have been weakened and the president has, by his failure to act, abrogated his responsibilities conferred on him by the constitution. Between the removal of the former Minister of Finance Mr. Nene on 9 December 2015, until August 2017, the Department has had three ministers. Mr. Nene’s replacement Mr. Van Rooyen, who was widely speculated to have been appointed by the President on the recommendations of the Gupta brothers was in the position from 10 December 2016 to 13 December 2016 (only three days) and was succeeded by Mr. Pravin Gordhan (14 December 2015–31 March 2017) (Carbone 2016) and Mr. Malusi Gigaba from 31 March 2017. The South African Rand has suffered from this instability. This was followed by the downgrading of the country into junk status by some of the rating agencies. The economic outlook was bleak. Several companies then announced job cuts in the mining and retail industries.

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Matters involving corruption and corrupt activities have been taken to the South African courts by individual members, civic groups and political parties. Hoffman quotes the Constitutional Court ruling regarding corruption as follows: There can be no gainsaying that corruption threatens to fell at the knees virtually everything we hold dear and precious in our hard won constitutional order. It blatantly undermines the democratic ethos, the institutions of democracy, the rule of law and the foundational values of our nascent constitutional project. It fuels maladministration and public fraudulence and imperils the capacity of the State to fulfil its obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfil all the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. When corruption and organised crime flourish, sustainable development and economic growth are stunted. And in turn, the stability and security of society is put at risk. (Hoffman 2012)

Public confidence in the government has declined and mistrust, disillusionment and anger has grown against the elected officials, political parties and other democratic institutions and people feel democracy is not delivering in the face of growing poverty and unemployment (Carbone 2016). Hoffman (2012), argues that by 2012 South Africa was faced with three major problems, viz. “poverty, inequality and unemployment”. Unemployment stood at 25.5% in 2015 when 5.4 million South Africans were unemployed with a further 14.9 million citizens not economically active (http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=5681). Contrary to his 2009 victory promises for improved service delivery and poverty alleviation (Kondlo and Maserumule 2010) it was under the Zuma administration that service delivery protests spiked as services failed to reach the poor because of corruption. Poverty levels in South Africa were also spiralling out of control. Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) in 2011 released poverty statistics that revealed that approximately 10.2 million people lived in extreme poverty in 2011 and 53% of the country, or 28 million people are “poor” (Cilliers and Aucoin 2016). In 2017 in a population of 55 million, 30.4 million citizens lived in poverty or below upper poverty line. This was an increase of 3 million citizens from the 2011 statistics. The Stats SA report revealed that poverty had declined between 2006 and 2011 but increased in 2015. (Poverty Trends in South Africa: An Examination of Absolute Poverty Between 2006 and 2015.)

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Conclusion and Recommendations The chapter has outlined some of the challenges facing South Africa and how they have made the country susceptible to being a fragile state. Whilst corruption is ubiquitous in South Africa, President Zuma, along with his family and friends, has benefitted extensively. As seen from a neopatrimonialist perspective, Zuma used his influence as the Head of State to loot state resources for private gains. The other challenge was that the President allowed the Gupta family to run the country in such a way that they even appointed Ministers. These challenges diverted the government’s attention away from the marginalized and the poor citizens to addressing factionalist politics inside the ruling party. No matter how one views South African politics, these challenges did not bode well for any attempt to achieve good governance. The lack of basic services was been demonstrated through a sharp rise in service delivery protests. As shown in the chapter, the President has been able to defy and breach his oath of office, and ignored the Public Protector when he was asked to appoint the Commission of Inquiry. Instead, he reluctantly took the State of Capture Report to court for review which was widely perceived as a delaying tactic. In March 2018 the Commission into State Capture was appointed and it is due to start hearing witnesses in August 2018. Whilst some are cynical as to what such a commission can achieve (there have been so many commissions before), it is still remarkable that state capture will be the topic of public hearings, something which would be unthinkable in most African countries and in many Asian and Western ones too. In view of the governance challenges facing South Africa, the authors make several recommendations. These include (1) the strengthening of chapter 9 institutions to ensure transparent and accountable government. Also (2) the protection of whistle-blowers who act as watchdogs who are helpful in democratic state because they serve as checks and balances. (3) The separation of powers and judiciary independence is also key in terms of ensuring good governance. South Africa out performs many other African countries precisely because the judiciary is independent and still dares to speak truth to power. (4) The appointment of key senior managers in state-owned enterprises must depend upon merit, be openly discussed and be inclusive of all those who are affected. If all four of these recommendations were to be fully implemented, the most disadvantaged South Africans could advance at a faster pace towards true freedom and economic independence.

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References Aidoo, K.O., and P. DeMarco. 2009. The Neopatrimonial Framework and Military Coup. D’état in Africa: Reflections. Accra: Asempa Publishers. Annan, K. 2012. Inaugural Address: International Conference for Governance for Sustainable Growth and Equity. Hosted by the United Nations, July 28–30, New York. Retrieved July 19, 2017, from http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/ icg97/ANNAN.HTM. Beekers, D., and B. van Gool. 2012. From Patronage to Neopatrimonialism Postcolonial Governance in Sub-Sahara Africa and Beyond. ASC Working Paper 101, African Studies Centre Leiden. Bhorat, H., M. Buthelezi, I. Chipkin, S. Duma, L. Mondi, C. Peter, M. Qobo, M. Swilling, and H. Friedenstein. 2017. Betrayal of the Promise: How South Africa Is Being Stolen. The State Capacity Research Project. Retrieved August 19, 2017, from https://www.outa.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ Betrayal-of-the-Promise-25052017.pdf. Boeninger, E. 1992. Governance and Development: Issues and Constraints. In Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, Apr 25–26, The World Bank, Washington, DC. Bratton, M., and N. van de Walle. 1997. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brobbey, C.A.B. 2014. Neopatrimonialism and Democratic Stability in Africa: A Case Ghana’s 1992 Re-democratization [Special edition]. European Scientific Journal 2: 98–108. Budd, E. 2004. Democratization, Development and the Patrimonial State in the Age of Globalization. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Carbone, G. 2016. South Africa: The Need for Change. Milano: Ledizioni Ledi Publishing. Charap, J., and C. Harm. 1999. Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State. In Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance, ed. G.T. Abed and S. Gupta, 2002, 135–158. Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund. Cheema, G.A. 2000. Good Governance: A Path to Poverty Reduction. New York: UNDP. Cilliers, J., and C. Aucoin. 2016. Economics, Governance and Instability in South Africa. ISS Paper No. 293, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria. Cloete, F. 2000. At Full Speed the Tiger Cubs Stumbled: Lessons from South East Asia About Sustainable Public Service Delivery. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council. Cromwell, E., and A. Chintedza. 2005. Neopatrimonialism and Policy Processes: Lessons from the Southern African Food Crisis. IDS Bulletin 36 (2): 103– 108.

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Darnton, J. 1994. ‘Lost Decade’ Drains Africa’s Vitality. The New York Times, Sunday, June 19. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/19/ world/lost-decade-drains-africa-s-vitality.html?pagewanted=2. Accessed 15 Aug 2017. Erdmann, G., and U. Engel. 2006. Neopatrimonialism Revisited—Beyond a Catch-All Concept, Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems. GIGA Working Papers, nº 16. Retrieved from www.giga-hamburg.de/ workingpapers. Accessed 14 Aug 2017. Fikeni, S. 2009. The Polokwane Moment and South Africa’s Democracy at the Crossroads. In State of the Nation Address 2008, ed. P. Kagwanja and K. Kondlo. Cape Town: HSRC Press. Fitzgerald, P., A. McLennan, and B. Munslow. 1997. Managing Sustainable Development in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. Godbole, M. 2001. Report of the One Man Committee on Good Governance (s.l.):(s.n.). Gumede, W.M. 2009. Modernising the African National Congress: The Legacy of President Thabo Mbeki. In State of the Nation Address 2008, ed. P. Kagwanja and K. Kondlo. Cape Town: HSRC Press. Habib, A. 2013. South Africa’s Suspended Revolution: Hopes and Prospects. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. Hoffman, P. 2012. The Effect of Corruption on Poverty. A Paper delivered at the Towards Carnegie 3 Conference at UCT (www.carnegie3.org.za). Retrieved from accountabilitynow.org.za/effect-corruption-poverty/. Kondlo, K., and M.H. Maserumule. 2010. The Zuma Administration Critical Challenges. Cape Town: HSRC Press. Leftwich, A. 1993. Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World. Third World Quarterly 14 (3): 605–624. Lodge, T. 2014. Neo-Patrimonial Politics in the ANC. African Affairs 113 (450): 1–23. Martin, M.E., and H. Solomon. 2017. Understanding the Phenomenon of “State Capture” in South Africa. Southern African Peace and Security Studies 5 (1): 21–35. Maserumule, M.H. 2014. Epistemic Relativism of Good Governance. Journal of Public Administration 49 (4): 963–994. Médard, J.F. 1982. The Underdeveloped State in Africa: Political Clientelism or Neopatrimonialism? In Private Patronage and Public Power, ed. C. Clapham. London: Frances Pinter. Mukwedeya, T.G. 2015. The Enemy Within: Factionalism in ANC Local Structures—The Case of Buffalo City (East London). Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 87: 117–134. Omoyefa, P.S. 2010. Democracy and the Quest for Responsible Governance in Southern Africa. Journal of Social Science 22 (2): 107–114.

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Kaufman, D., Kray, A. and Lobaton, P.L. 1999 cited in Pillay, S. 2004. Corruption—The Challenge to Good Governance: A South African Perspective. The International Journal of Public Sector Management 17 (7): 586–605. Pitcher, A., M. Moran, and M. Johnston. 2009. Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa. African Studies Review 52 (1): 125–156. Public Protector. Secure in Comfort—Report on an Investigation into Allegations of Impropriety and Unethical Conduct Relating to the Installation and Implementation of Security Measures by the Department of Public Works at and in Respect of the Private Residence of President Jacob Zuma at Nkandla in the KwaZulu-Natal Province. Report No. 25 of 2013/2014. Public Protector. State of Capture Report on an Investigation into Alleged Improper and Unethical Conduct by the President and Other State Functionaries Relating to the Alleged Improper Relationships and Involvement of the Gupta Family in the Removal and Appointment of Ministers and Directors of State-Owned Enterprises Resulting in Improper and Possibly Corrupt Award of State Contracts and Benefits to the Gupta Family’s Businesses. Report No: 6 of 2016/17. Richard, S., and J. Oelbaum. 1999. Reforming the Political Kingdom: Governance and Development in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. Accra: Center for Democracy and Development. Riggs, Fred W. 1964. Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Sarakinsky, I., and E. Fakir. 2015. A Brief History of Factionalism and New Party Formation and Decline in South Africa: The Case of Cope. Journal of African Elections 14 (1): 60–84. Shamsul Haque, M. 2010. Rethinking Development Administration and Remembering Fred W. Riggs. International Review of Administrative Sciences 76 (4): 767–773. Statistics South Africa. 2017. Poverty Trends in South Africa: An Examination of Absolute Poverty Between 2006 and 2015. Available at: http://www.statssa. gov.za/?p=5681. Accessed 28 Aug 2017. Thompson, D. 1996 cited in Pillay, S. 2004. Corruption—The Challenge to Good Governance: A South African Perspective, The International Journal of Public Sector Management, 17(7): 586-605. Thompson is cited in page 587 of Pillay’s article. Times Newspaper. 2017. Factionalism and Corruption—The Twin Dangers Facing ANC. Available at: https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-0108-factionalism-and-corruption–the-twin-dangers-facing-anc-says-nzimande/. Accessed 10 Aug 2017. Van Niekerk, D. 2001. The State and Government. In Governance, Politics, and Policy in South Africa, ed. D. Van Niekerk, G. Van der Waldt, and A. Jonker. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Claiming the State: The Political Economy of Social Welfare Access in Rural South Africa Andrew Skuse

Introduction The interface between publicly held information, local gendered networks and social welfare access in the context of rural South Africa is revealing of the extent to which some South Africans are able to actively access the ‘state’ and participate in it, while others are actively excluded. In adopting a political economy approach to social welfare access this chapter garners insights into how the South African ‘state’ is understood, constructed and contested at the local level and in turn, how the state struggles to adapt to such responses. In doing so, analysis draws upon academic concern to elaborate upon how the state is experienced in an everyday and localised sense (Gupta 1995; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Herzfeld 1992). In this respect, Hansen and Stepputat argue that: … stateness does not merely grow out of official […] strategies of government and representation. The attribution of stateness to various forms of authority also emerges from intense and often localized political struggles over resources, recognition, inclusion, and influence. […] Everyday forms

A. Skuse (B) Department of Anthropology and Development Studies, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA, Australia © The Author(s) 2020 J. I. Lahai and H. Ware (eds.), Governance and Societal Adaptation in Fragile States, Governance and Limited Statehood, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40134-4_8

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of state power, in other words, are always suffused with and mediated by politics: contestation of authority, open defiance, as well as attempts to divert or privatize resources. (2001: 9)

A focus on the ‘everydayness’ of states, how they are experienced and how they are constructed through public discourse stands at odds with conventional analysis, which tends to position them as entities that are somehow elusive, abstract and hard to pin down (Foucault 1977, 1979; Gramsci 1994; Gupta 1995; Herzfeld 1992). Gupta (1995) suggests that the state obtains ‘in the minute texture of everyday, a texture made tangible and imaginable through a range of discrete and discursive practices’ (1995: 375). He contends that it is critically ‘important to situate a certain symbolic construction of the state with respect to the particular context in which it is realized’ (Gupta 1995: 392). From this perspective, the state can be understood as a ‘translocal’ entity that reflects the negotiation of various forms of local capital (political, economic, cultural), institutions and social networks. Building on this conceptualisation, analysis reveals the extent to which locally grounded institutions, practices and discourses coalesce to generate a specific construction of the ‘state’ within the context of rural South Africa. Of particular concern is how the social welfare system is understood and negotiated and accessed at the local level and how access to the system reflects inclusion in the state, whereas denial of welfare implies exclusion. In considering the articulation of local politics with poverty it is seductive to imagine that poor people are ‘most literate’ or ‘competent’ in their interactions with the institutions, organisations and networks that exist at the local level. However, such notions tend to belie the degree to which bodies such as local government offices, community organisations, villagelevel welfare committees and local networks may purposefully exclude or ‘gate keep’ access, especially for the poorest. With respect to social welfare payments in South Africa Waddell observes that unequal ‘access to constitutionally endowed social security transfers for poor families … indicates the persistence of selective citizenship entitlements’ (2003: 1). Likewise, Samson et al. (2002) reveal that only 43% of eligible claimants in South Africa are successful in obtaining the grants to which they are legally entitled. More recently, Maistry and Vasi (2011) and Govender et al. (2015) have highlighted that constraints associated with welfare access persist, especially with respect to what welfare clients perceive to be unhelpful staff, high levels of corruption and enduring problems associated with

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understanding the relevant grant mechanism, as well as proving one’s identity. Govender et al. note that poor understanding and ‘misconceptions of the grant process and the eligibility criteria’, as well as ‘unhelpful and even discriminatory providers’ contributes to a wider sense of disillusionment with the welfare system (2015: 6). Such constraints intervene, confuse and confound poor people’s efforts to competently interact with and therein negotiate the intricacies of the state. In the context of the social welfare system in South Africa, securing information concerning rights, benefits and application processes does not guarantee access. Having the ‘right information’ while lacking the appropriate ‘social capital’ may leave individuals and households incapable of negotiating entry into the key social networks that serve to gatekeep access to the system (cf. Du Toit et al. 2007). Consequently, the ability of individuals to mobilise various forms of capital implies a range of carefully nurtured, negotiated and maintained social relationships and networks (De Haan 1998, 1999). China and Robins’ (1996) work on ‘literacy brokers’ within township gangs in Cape Town, Western Cape, reflects a similar set of contextualised sociocultural constraints that act to define not whether one has the right to speak or the right information, but whether one will be heard and have the agency to act upon it. Clearly, engaging in social networks or accessing institutions of the state requires a certain degree of literacy or competency (cf. Dilley 1999). ‘Competency’ in the context of accessing welfare payments in contemporary South Africa reflects processes of mediation, inclusion and exclusion and by association aspects of poverty and the workings of political economy (Nattrass 2004; Samson et al. 2002). In addressing the political economy of social welfare access in rural South African this paper draws on two distinct research and data acquisition processes. First, it draws upon primary ethnographic data derived from individual interviewing and focuses on group discussions undertaken in the Mount Frere District of rural Eastern Cape in 2005. Second, a review of government Internet resources and contemporary academic literature on the social welfare system in South Africa was undertaken in 2017. This secondary data serves to further contextualise and make relevant the primary data cited in this chapter. In South Africa fieldwork was conducted in the small village of Gibson Mission, a forty-five minute drive from the town of Mount Frere along an unsealed road. The village contains a locally respected school that draws in pupils from surrounding villages and offers a few ‘formal’ jobs to local people as teachers. However, the village is dependent on meagre agricultural production,

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remittances sent from relatives that have successfully migrated to large urban centres or the receipt of social welfare grants.1 In keeping with ethnographic practice the names of informants and locations cited in this chapter have been modified to provide a degree of anonymity for informants who participated in the research.

Social Welfare in the Republic of South Africa In South Africa, social welfare support comprises a range of different non-conditional and non-contributory grants (child support, foster care, disability, older persons, war veterans and grant-in-aid), to which citizens have a right to claim providing they are eligible (Wright 2015). In rural locations such as Gibson Mission, child support payments (currently R380 or US$29), old age pensions (currently R1600 or US$122) and in particular disability grants (currently R1600 or US$122) were found to play a fundamental role in reducing poverty (Govender 2009; Maistry and Vasi 2011). Albeit, for as long as a child remains a child, an old age pensioner stays alive and a disabled person is capable of maintaining proof of disabled status. Given the extremely high rural unemployment rates in the Mount Frere District, social welfare payments have come to be seen as a key opportunity for bolstering household incomes and ensuring household viability (Standing and Samson 2003; Wright 2015). Research on poverty in Eastern Cape has highlighted that only 23% of adults in the Mount Frere District have paid work (Du Toit 2005), while a more recent study by Maistry and Vasi (2011) shows unemployment across a range of urban and rural locations to be in excess of 25%. Within contexts in which employment opportunities are extremely limited, such as in the Mount Frere District, it is perhaps unsurprising that poor households should strive to secure social welfare payments (Sogaula et al. 2002; Maistry and Vasi 2011). Importantly, the value of the welfare payments outlined above has not risen by more than one or two US dollars since 2005, when the original primary research for this study was undertaken.

1 Primary data was collected under a UK Department for International Development (DFID) Social Science Research Scheme study of how poor households in rural and urban South Africa access and utilise information and information technologies, and how this contributes to poverty reduction. Small grant funding from the University of Adelaide supported the literature review.

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This means that in relative terms the value of social welfare grants in South Africa has been in significant decline over the past decade. On the face of it, accessing social welfare payments should be straightforward and is subject to simple rules. For example, if currently applying for a disability payment the applicant must: 1. Be a South African citizen or permanent resident or refugee and living in South Africa at the time of application; 2. Be between 18 and 59 years old; 3. Not be cared for in a state institution; 4. Have a 13-digit, bar-coded identity document (ID); 5. Not earn more than R73,800 (US$5604) if you are single or R147,600 (US$11,206) if married; 6. Not have assets worth more than R1,056,000 (US$80,175) if you are single or R2,112,000 (US$160,350) if you are married; 7. Undergo a medical examination where a doctor appointed by the state will assess the degree of your disability; 8. Bring along any previous medical records and reports when you make the application and when the assessment is done.2 The onus of ‘proof’ lies partly with the applicant in producing relevant identity documents (ID) and if necessary, birth, marriage or death certificates, as well as proof of income status for means tested grants. In addition, the local South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) office that process applications also try to ensure that the applicant meets the appropriate criteria, for example, as outlined above with regard to disability payments (Kelly 2016). Medical practitioners work at the interface between these two groups and are responsible for the assessment of a claimant’s disability. Govender et al.’s (2015) recent work on disability grant claimants in Bishop Lavis, Cape Town, suggests that most practitioners lack the specialist training and knowledge to determine the degree of impairment, functional capacity and disability. Despite this, the decision to categorise a person as disabled and therein suitable for either temporary or long-term disability grants support, rests solely with the assessing practitioner. Within the claimant-SASSA-doctor nexus lays significant scope for abuse of the system and numerous studies and official probes attest to 2 http://www.gov.za/services/social-benefits/disability-grant, accessed 1 August 2017.

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widespread levels of corruption associated with the assessment and provision of the disability grant (De Paoli et al. 2012; Joseph 2012; Kelly 2016; Reddy and Sokomani 2008). Corruption, which is widespread in Eastern Cape, plays a significant role in rendering the social welfare system difficult to access for poorer people, as do simple economic constraints such as being unable to afford telephone calls to pursue claims or to pay for transport costs to visit local SASSA offices in Mount Frere town. In discussion of the disability grant application process, the District Head of the SASSA, Mrs. Tom, reveals that: … there are many people who deserve the grant, who are disabled, but who are struggling to get to town maybe to pay the taxi fare to get to town, but there is also this issue of many people who are not actually disabled, we heard about this on the news as a problem in the Eastern Cape and the country generally, that there are many people who are on the disability grant system through underhand means, and this is weighing down the system.

High levels of corruption and abuse have been a feature of the social welfare and assistance system in South Africa, especially since its rapid expansion from 3.1 million recipients in 2001–2011 million in 2006 and 17 million recipients in 2017, 11 million of whom are under 18 years of age (Reddy and Sokomani 2008).3 Over the past twenty years the South African Government has promoted a wide range of anti-corruption measures and has held a number of commissions to look into the problem of abuse by claimants, key gatekeepers such as doctors, as well as SASSA staff (Reddy and Sokomani 2008). This work has resulted in a tightening of eligibility rules and increasing the burden of proof in terms of identity. However, public knowledge concerning how various welfare schemes work remains low in many places, and some of the poorest and most vulnerable would-be claimants still face difficulties interacting with government agencies because of remoteness, their relative poverty and their inability to prove identity (Govender et al. 2015). Despite such constraints, many actors within the social welfare space are quick to adapt to welfare ‘opportunities’ or to rule changes and therefore ‘gaming’ of 3 See http://theconversation.com/why-social-grants-matter-in-south-africa-they-support -33-of-the-nation-73087.

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the welfare system presents an ongoing challenge for the Government of South Africa, as often it works to exclude those in most need. From this perspective, the social welfare system in South Africa can be understood as a process that is inherently local, adaptive and always emergent. With such concerns in mind it is towards a fine-grained political economy analysis of social welfare access in rural Eastern Cape that analysis now turns.

Negotiating the State and Village in Rural Eastern Cape The extent to which people are able to ‘game’ the system depends largely on their orientation to locally influential people, their own ability to exert influence and their interactional competence with state bureaucracies. These qualities help to enliven the social networks that need to be mobilised in order to make a successful welfare claim (cf. Govender et al. 2015). The extent to which the social welfare system may be perceived as locally ‘adaptive’ of government welfare protocols is well demonstrated with reference to a single household within the aforementioned village of Gibson Mission, near the town of Mount Frere in Eastern Cape Province. The household in question and the two women that feature therein, provide a powerful example of differentiation by wealth, class and occupation. The women, one a relatively affluent household head, the other their livein domestic servant, were both actively seeking welfare payments at the time fieldwork was conducted. Though each had different stories to tell, both of which remain highly relevant to the contemporary analysis of differential access to formal social safety nets (De Paoli et al. 2012; Joseph 2012; Kelly 2016). The family of Ma Maseko live in a large compound with a mix of building types from rectangular ‘flat roofs’ to an interpretation of a ‘rondavel’ (Afrikaans: thatched circular mud huts), complete with modern shiny zinc roof. The household has eleven occupants, including a domestic, and is complex and fluid in its make up, as revealed by Ma herself: In this house there is me and another boy but he’s not mine, he’s from my relative and I’ve also got another girl, she’s eleven years old … her mother, we do not know where her mother is, because it’s a long time since we lost touch with her. There’s another boy, the boy is my son’s. But here at the back there’s a lady [domestic servant], she always helped my son and there’s a boy to look after the sheep.

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Ma was born in 1946 in the nearby village of Makleli and still refers to the wider region as the Transkei, a reference to the former Apartheid era Bantustans or homelands that have since been incorporated into the post1994 Republic of South Africa.4 Ma Maseko vividly remembers the era of restricted movement and deportations, both of which were common even in the late Apartheid era. She recalls how, during an attempt to return to Cape Town where she had previously worked in the 1980s, she ran into trouble for not having the appropriate paperwork to make the journey: While I was there in the train station, the inspectors just came in while I was in the waiting room. They came to look if our passes were right and they saw my pass wasn’t right. They asked me where I was going to and I said East London [to catch the train to Cape Town], then they just said to the people from here in Transkei that they must go back to the Transkei.

Such experiences were common in Apartheid South Africa. Despite longterm urban residence or being natal to a major city, many black South Africans were nonetheless ‘returned’ to homelands with impunity. The creation of Bantustans resulted in a number of legacy problems that have affected access to the social welfare system over the past 20 years. One of these relates to the ongoing struggle poor rural people face in simply proving who they are. The incorporation of the Bantustans into the Republic of South Africa made all Transkei-issued identity documents invalid. The immediate effect of which was that a great many people in the Bantustans no longer possessed valid identification in the eyes of the South African state. Efforts to address this issue have been significant, but the Home Affairs Ministry in Pretoria remains slow to process new South African ID cards, while the often chronically poor rural populations struggle with the difficulties of getting to nearby towns to initiate the application process. Being unable to fully prove one’s identity or the 4 The history of the Mount Frere District is, in part, a construct of the legislation that created the Bantustans or Homelands as repositories for the ethnic ‘others’ of the Apartheid State. Many of these ‘others’, such as in the case of ethnically Xhosa people residing in Cape Town, were forcibly deported if their right to reside and work in urban areas could not be legally established. The Homeland of Transkei was established in 1963 and was granted quasi-independence from the Republic of South Africa in 1976. Along with independence came the revoking of South African citizenship for the residents of Transkei, an act designed to place further restrictions on economic migration and rights to residence in cities such as Cape Town (The Surplus People’s Project 1984; Worden 1994).

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identity of those in one’s care, as well as providing other key documents and information such as proof of income or a child’s ‘Road to Health Card’, remains a key stumbling block for poorer households trying to negotiate the complex social welfare process (cf. Govender et al. 2015). Evidence suggests that the poorest are least competent in dealing with social welfare processes simply because they lack the experience and literacy in dealing with state bureaucracy (cf. Reddy and Sokomani 2008). If proving one’s identity is a key constraint to accessing the social welfare system, it is a constraint that has been successfully negotiated by certain households in villages such as Gibson Mission; often these households are better off. The ability to become literate in ‘the ways of the state’ is constructed historically and reflects a household’s or individual’s ability to successfully manage rural to urban migration strategies and the elite-dominated rural social networks that police access to welfare. The social history of the Maseko household is revealing of such success, though as it has for many other rural families, it has come at a high cost. Ma Maseko’s father died before she was born, having been stabbed by his brother over a petty dispute over money. This resulted in her mother being forced to look for work, which, like many others from rural Eastern Cape she secured as a domestic worker for a white family in the city of Cape Town. During the ten years in which her mother worked away, Ma lived with her relatives; this representing a common displacement of care obligations is typical to labour systems in which rural to urban migration is the key response to ongoing livelihood insecurity (Hochschild 2000). Despite the poverty of her family Ma attended school to Standard 8 (age 16), after which her mother advised no more money was available for schooling, so she was forced to leave and help out in the household of the relatives that had been caring for her. After leaving school at the age of 19 (in 1965) Ma married and received ‘a little lobola (brideprice) of a cow and some money’, which she said had made her mother happy. Once married, Ma moved to her husband’s house and soon after he too made the long trip to Cape Town to seek employment, finally securing a menial position at Dairy Bell, a large dairy company in Salt River, a mainly ‘coloured’ (mixed race) suburb of Cape Town. During this period Ma Maseko remained in the village and communicated with her husband only through letters, as at that time there were no public phones available in the countryside. Ma’s husband Zuko worked in the same Dairy Bell for 14 years until the late-1970s, during which time he resided in the inner-city township of

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Langa. He died in middle age in 1979 and during his 14-year period of work in Cape Town was visited only twice by his wife. Ma herself migrated to Cape Town in 1981 after a family friend residing there found her a job as a domestic in the white suburb of Goodwood. During this time she too resided in Langa since her husband’s residence in the suburb had forged strong connections there, while Langa is also relatively close to Goodwood and a short commute. Though she had each weekend off, she chose to work for another white family to supplement her income and increase the remittances, including small parcels of clothes and food that she was able to send back to the village each month. Ma felt acutely the pain of separation during this period. Her children were growing up in the care of relatives and she seldom had an opportunity to speak with them or to visit them. She revealed that she always tried to get home for Christmas and would occasionally return for family funerals, though this still meant she was only in the company of her children for a few days each year. Nonetheless, Ma’s work in Cape Town, as well as her husband’s work before her, created a lasting impact upon the contemporary geographic dispersal of her immediate family. Of her seven children, five now live in the township of Khayelitsha; Cape Town. Only two still reside in the village, where one works as a teacher within the Mount Frere district and another is still attending school. Her children, through the long years of sacrifice borne by Ma, have been educated and have jobs, which in rural terms equates to success in negotiating rural to urban migration and therein, a relatively wealthy household within the village. This is evidenced by their ability to pursue diversification in terms of income earning strategies. In this respect, the household runs a small public cellular phone business from one of the many buildings in their compound. The Maseko household’s relative wealth is revealing of how the acquisition of certain forms of capital, information and access to social networks affects their interactions with the state, but in turn also affects other households in the village that are less well-off. Ma is not yet old enough to receive the state old age pension of R1600 (US$122), though she recalls that when she left her last employer in Cape Town to return to Gibson Mission she was given a ‘a little bit’. Though not old enough for a pension Ma and her extended family is wealthy enough and ‘literate’ enough in dealing with the state to have secured herself a disability grant to the same monthly value of R1600 (US$122). Historically, she has worked hard to

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position herself within key village networks, as well as buying the educational capital necessary for her children to negotiate formal employment in the urban and rural nodes of her extended household. The complex interweaving of literacy in bureaucratic processes, investment in social and kinship networks, as well as the acquisition of key information regarding the ‘gaming’ of social welfare processes manifests itself in the successful disability grant claim that she managed to secure. The story of that success and the related attempts of Ma’s less well-off domestic servant to claim the same grant is revealing of the relative abilities or inabilities of certain households or individuals to effectively negotiate the local political economy, engage with bureaucracy and therein ‘claim the state’ via social welfare access.

The Sociality of Claiming Disability Support: Information and Agency Ma first heard about the disability grant from Mrs. Gwiliza, her relative and the influential head of the village social welfare committee. Another more distant relative, Mrs. Jafta, the local village health worker (VHW) is responsible in the area for making an initial assessment of individuals for certain types of welfare support such as the short-term social relief from distress and the disability grant, which is conducted as part of her routine rounds of household visits. The VHW is a role that embodies considerable social power and status. VHWs are critical in referring people who are sick to the local nurses at the village and in spreading news about social welfare payments, vaccinations and free family planning services, as well as providing commodities such as condoms. Mrs. Jafta reveals that during her rounds of the village she: … makes sure that everyone has their toilet clean and then going around each and every house I go to give advice. If there is a house where someone is sick, I take that person to the clinic, and at the clinic we can help them … and then I also clean the cuts for the children till they are in the right state.

At the time research was conducted, each VHW was responsible for collecting the names of people who they think may be potentially eligible for certain grant payments and this list is then supplied to SASSA who crosscheck would-be claimants with the village welfare committee assessment

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of priority cases. The nurse in charge of the village clinic explains the need for VHWs in terms of their critical outreach activities. Sister Sigala reveals that: … because there are so many villages around, they send the village health workers to sort of collect people to the doctor. So as you can see we’ve got ten locations here, so each one must only have ten people on her list. So by the time they go down to the hospital, they’ve got 30 clients for this area … and they are only going to go there once a month. So that means if you are number 11, you have to wait until it is another period to go and register with the village health worker. The social workers down there they want names already. It works better that way. Because it is a long procedure. You go to the doctor, you go to the social workers, you go back to the doctor, you go back home.

The prioritising or ranking of cases through the creation of periodic ‘would-be’ grant seeker lists is designed to allow for some form of local needs assessment and filtering to occur. Following collection by the VHW the individuals who make it on to the list, which may include potential claimants for other grants such as the grant-in-aid or foster child allowance, are assessed by the village welfare committee. Mrs. Gwiliza, chair of the social welfare committee for the village notes that: … the health worker has to take those names to the ward committee meeting, and there the ward committee has to select and see those who are most immediately needing this grant because some of the people say I am coughing, I need the grant, and then you can see that this person is young and this person is fit. You have this 50 people, so now we take this 50 people and the doctor has given us 50 [claimants], then we must select from these 50 who must get it first.

The extent to which priority cases reflect an immediate medical problem or long-term disability is a moot point. Evidence garnered during fieldwork from existing and would-be claimants of the disability grant highlights that gender and kinship are the defining factors in terms of accessing relevant social networks, decision-making bodies such as the village-level social welfare committee and in turn, to state-supported social welfare more broadly.

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With extremely high levels of unemployment present in the village, many men who are unable to work due to a fundamental lack of opportunity see social welfare grants as a viable opportunity for securing an income and sustaining their livelihoods. However, the welfare system is significantly mediated by women for other women, which, given the long history of powerful rural matriarchs resulting from generations of male economic migration to the cities, serves to marginalise men. Many men, young and old, revealed that they feel disenfranchised in contemporary South Africa. Their marginalisation from social welfare reflects a basic lack of experience and competency in negotiating the bureaucracy involved. This perceived exclusion does not imply that men are not active politically or in community life, but rather that in terms of social welfare, a gendered social network exists that actively excludes many men, and also many women unable to mobilise the social capital or financial capital necessary to stake a claim to the state through the social welfare system. While experience of negotiating the social welfare system is clearly gendered, information about how the social welfare system can be ‘gamed’ is openly held, but only some have the ability to act on that information. Rumours of corruption in all forms of public service delivery are rife in Eastern Cape and it was common knowledge amongst social workers, rural elites and the rural poor that disability grants could be ‘bought’ with the ‘right type’ of medical consultation and facilitated with the right kind of connection to local power brokers. Those who have the financial means or social capital to overcome the political and economic barriers that restrict poorer people’s access to social welfare are able to act upon such public knowledge. Ma Maseko, the affluent household head previously discussed, has been very successful in negotiating such access. She has the social connections and capital to ‘make it’ on to the social welfare committee list, and has the money to visit the local administrative centre and pay for a medical consultation. Her perceived health problems have been of long standing: Sometimes if I am feeling very sore, like here, under my feet, I don’t do anything. I go to the doctor and he said I’ve got rheumatism. I got the money [disability grant] last December.

Ma revealed that she had heard from her daughter-in-law that a doctor in town could provide a ‘favourable’ assessment for the disability grant

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in return for a very high consultation fee. The doctor in question, as evidenced by many other informants with whom the issue of disability grants was discussed is the District Surgeon at Mount Frere hospital. Ma Maseko revealed that the consultation at Dr. Ndlovu’s private practice had cost R650 (US$50) and that this constituted a one-off payment in return for a favourable diagnosis and ‘disability letter’ that could be submitted to the SASSA as the key supporting evidence necessary to lodging a disability grant application. The Government set fee for a consultation for the purposes of establishing disability is low at approximately R13 (US$1); a cost that once combined with the financial outlay for transport is significantly restrictive for the poorest rural people, i.e. up to R130 (US$10) in total. More disturbing was evidence that many patients are referred from the District Hospital to Dr. Ndlovu’s private practice where a far higher consultation charge can be realised. Due to the relative local power that the District Surgeon holds the local SASSA in Mount Frere seemed reluctant or unable to challenge this abuse. The District Head of SASSA, Mrs. Tom, was less forgiving and revealed that the issue of fraud and abuse of the system was firmly on her agenda: We took a sample of about ten disability grant applicants, and we have a district doctor, then we called those people, the ten of them, the ones that we suspected were fraudulent. We called them in and the doctor would say - you are suffering from a chronic heart disease, and the symptoms are that you have short breath, and the person would say that I have never ever had that problem. The problem that I have is, maybe a totally different problem. Then he would call the second one, you are applying for a disability grant and your problem was that you are diabetic and arthritis. The doctor said that this person would come in walking fast and he would say what has happened to your arthritis? Then the person would say I have never ever suffered from arthritis. So those are the issues.

It is widely held by residents of Gibson Mission that one’s best chance of securing a disability grant is to see the District Surgeon, potentially because of the influence that he yields, but also because stories circulate about successful disability grant applications. The District Head of the SASSA, Mrs. Tom, has tried to counter claims of corruption by licensing other doctors to sign-off on disability grant applications, though a preference for the District Surgeon persists:

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You know recently the Home Affairs office has been trying so hard to convince the people in Mount Frere that there are other two doctors that are being paid by the department to see people that are applying for disability grants, but because they are following the procedure, if you qualify you get, if you don’t qualify you don’t get, they don’t want to go there. But where they are paying R650 (US$50), they are not even supposed to go there, to pay the R650, but they know that whether they are sick or not sick, disabled or not disabled, if they pay that R650, they are told that they are given sicknesses, that are made up, that is the bottom line.

Access to information and one’s ability to act on it, as the example above significantly highlights, is mediated by the related ability to enlist and mobilise kin and social connections, to negotiate the process and appear literate or competent therein and to have the necessary financial capital to invest in the required ‘positive outcome’. The example shows us that accessing social welfare and by association the state is deeply rooted in a localised political economy that serves to highlight the broad politicoeconomic differentiation that exists within locales deemed to be representatively poor by virtue of their remoteness, their lack of employment opportunities or social welfare dependence.

Poverty and Exclusion: ‘Knowing’ but Not Acting Cynthia, the middle-aged domestic servant for the Maseko household has a markedly different experience of the welfare system in Eastern Cape. Her story is not unusual: she is able to reflect and recite aspects of how to successfully negotiate the system, but is largely unable to act upon the information. Working as a domestic is low paid and effects a painful separation from her teenage children who reside in another village. Cynthia reveals that: I am sick, it’s my legs, I can’t stand for a very long time and then my arms, they always get tired, weak [echoing the symptoms of Ma Maseko]. I don’t have money for the doctor because I work here and then I have children who are schooling. They must wear a uniform, I must buy food for the children, and so I just don’t have money for the doctor. The first girl is in Standard 8, but because I couldn’t spare the money to pay the school fees she had to stay at home. The second one is doing Standard 7, and I’m also struggling to get the fees.

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Though she has three children they are all too old to receive a child support grant, but are too young to work (at the time of fieldwork children up to 14 years old were entitled to child support grants). The removal of child support grant payments forced Cynthia to seek work and abandon her own compound and though her husband has worked in Johannesburg for the past ten years the couple are estranged from each other and she hasn’t ‘seen or heard from him in more than two years’. She notes that he used to send money each month, up to R400 (US$33), but she hasn’t received any remittances since they lost contact. Because of this Cynthia started working for the Maseko household, as she already knew Ma Maseko’s daughter, who was the teacher in her children’s school in the nearby village of Petani. Chancing her luck she decided to visit the Maseko compound seeking employment and relief from her family’s hardship. Though she enjoys her work in the household, it is very poorly paid, as is most domestic work in rural areas. Cynthia earns a low R500 (US$41) a month, though has little food expense, and typically works everyday of the week. She reveals that: If I want to go home to see my family I do go. I just get a weekend off. I tell them [employer] that I am going to go home this week then they give me the weekend off and the money is not deducted.

Having her child support grant removed has resulted in her attempting to seek alternative sources of income from the welfare system to fill the gap, though Cynthia admits that it is hard to deal effectively with the SASSA in Mount Frere because: … they just tell you to go to the doctor, Dr Ndlovu, and it is too expensive, it’s R650 (US$50) and I don’t have that kind of money, each month the money must go the children. I know that Dr Ndlovu will write the letter [based on the experience of Ma Maseko] and then you will get the grant. So it is like a short cut. If you are sick he will say you deserve it and he will write you a letter and tell you to take it to the social workers.

When asked whether she knew if the doctor would write her a favourable letter she suggested that: … he has done it before and that’s why everyone wants to go to him because if you are sick he just writes you a letter and then you can get the disability grant.

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Cynthia has visited the local clinic and received tablets for her illness (which is non-specific), but she hadn’t told the local nurses that she needs a disability grant and she hasn’t spoken to the town social workers when they visit the ‘Great Place’ (the local village residence of the chief) each month to pay a variety of welfare grants.5 Cynthia contends that the social workers are powerless to act on queries relating to disability payments without a letter from the District Surgeon, Dr. Ndlovu and that it is her own relative poverty that excludes her from making a successful application. She notes that: I never heard of anyone who got a grant with a letter from another doctor. You get a letter from the doctor from the hospital but the signature is Dr Ndlovu and he is very rich … and the wife of this guy is also a doctor and she is in Mount Ayliffe, she has a surgery in Mount Ayliffe and he also has a wholesale shop next to his house. Everyone is talking about trying to get this grant. When I meet someone on the road we talk about this treatment, you must have this treatment [to get a grant]. Go to Dr Ndlovu and you will get the grant.

Cynthia suggests that many other people from around Mount Frere know that ‘favourable’ disability letters can be bought and that despite having a ‘relative’ working in the SASSA in Mount Frere she feels unable to mobilise his support because he is too distant a relation as they ‘only have the same surname’. She concedes that ‘we only believe in helping someone if you are really related’. Being largely unable to mobilise the support of people in positions of authority, be they local or in town, and not having access to the required financial capital to invest in claiming social welfare Cynthia is effectively excluded from the system. Like many, she knows what to do, but is unable to formally act. The example shows 5 In pursuit of improved service delivery, on the 7th of each month local officials from the Social Development Department visit Gibson Mission to pay out grants in cash and impart advice. An armoured truck with armed guards arrives and sets up in the grounds of the chief’s compound, thereafter claimants arrive, have their ID bar codes scanned and the data is recorded as proof of payment. A buzz of subsidiary trading and transactions also occur on grant payday including livestock trading, the settling of rotating credit schemes, advice sessions held for would-be grant claimants and specific grant application processes. The grant payday and the roving trucks that supply both money and advice is an example of the South African Government’s commitment to taking services to previously disadvantaged groups. Regardless, many villagers remain disempowered from even seeking advice due to perceived structural constraints relating to the application process.

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us that Cynthia’s orientation to local structures of authority and influence is very different from that of Ma Maseko. Though she has information she is unable to negotiate successful entry into the essential social networks that facilitate welfare access and because of this, is not recorded by villagelevel committees as a ‘worthy’ recipient of welfare support, despite her situation being far more pressing than some villagers already in receipt of disability grants.

Conclusion The detailed qualitative study presented in this chapter highlights several critical and highly unequal facets of accessing the social welfare system in rural South Africa. First, income differentiation in rural villages affords wealthier households better access to social welfare because they have the income necessary to negotiate corrupt processes, such as those connected to being signed off as ‘medically unfit’. Despite living in relatively wealthier households, the means test associated with claiming such grants are individualised and therefore easily sidestepped. Second, wealthier households have better access to important social networks and influential committees within the village, which simultaneously act to deny many worthy claimants access. The functioning of these networks and committees is highly gendered, being dominated as they are by female rural elites. Men, by virtue of their non-involvement in key village networks associated with health, welfare and care-giving, are especially ill-equipped to negotiate the social welfare system, which leaves many vulnerable to broader exclusion from state support (Nattrass 2004; Samson et al. 2002). In essence, it is women who have adapted more successfully to the opportunity presented by the availability of social welfare grants. While it would be too harsh a criticism to claim that local social welfare committees or the SASSA have no sense of civic duty, the extent to which this duty is directed at the poorest and most vulnerable is debatable. After all, if it is widely known that people able to afford a R650 (US$50) corrupt medical consultation are more easily able to access the disability grant. Yet, the example of the domestic servant Cynthia highlights that people on the margins of key local networks may share information, but are incapable of acting upon it. This in turn reveals the extent to which certain social literacies and competencies are both facilitated and denied by networks. The ability of some, relative to others, to stake a claim to

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social welfare is significantly mediated or facilitated by gendered local networks. Ultimately, access to social welfare in Eastern Cape is stark in its inequality and poor individuals and households have fewer opportunities to negotiate the system. They are less able to mobilise support, less able to commit money to negotiate the system and less able to penetrate networks that exclude non-caregivers. For such groups, the state is elusive. It is not experienced in the same way as a benevolent provider. Rather it is difficult to engage, hard to understand and fraught with hurdles that restrict access. While the rural population of areas such as Eastern Cape have been quick to respond to social welfare ‘opportunities’, some individuals and households are more able to adapt to or manipulate the rules that frame access. For the South African state, the continued tightening of welfare rules, conditions and burdens of proof represents the foil to widely acknowledged corruption. In essence, the state and its citizens are engaged in a constant dialectic of adaptation that frames how provisions such as social welfare are understood accessed and claimed and ultimately, how the state is experienced.

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Foucault, M. 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Pantheon. Foucault, M. 1979. The History of Sexuality. London: Penguin. Govender, T. 2009. The Profile of Disability Grant Applicants in Bishop Lavis, Cape Town. South African Family Practice 51 (3): 228–236. Govender, T., J. Fried, S. Birch, N. Chimbindi, and S. Cleary. 2015. Disability Grant: A Precarious Lifeline for HIV/AIDS Patients in South Africa. BMC Health Services Research 15 (227): 4–10. Gupta, A. 1995. Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State. American Ethnologist 22 (2): 375–402. Gramsci, A. 1994. Hegemony, Intellectuals and the State. In Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader, ed. J. Storey. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Hansen, B., and F. Stepputat. 2001. States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State. Durham: Duke University Press. Herzfeld, M. 1992. The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Symbolic Roots of Western Bureaucracy. New York: Berg. Hochschild, A. 2000. Global Care Chains and Emotional Surplus Value. In On the Edge: Globalization and the New Millennium, ed. A. Giddens and W. Hutton. London: Sage. Joseph, D. 2012. An Assessment of the Strengths and Weaknesses of the South African Social Security Agency in the Northern and Western Cape Provinces. PhD thesis (Social Work), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus. Kelly, G. 2016. Hard and Soft Medicine: Doctors’ Framing and Application of the Disability Category in Their Assessments of Grant Claimants’ Fitness to Work in South Africa. CSSR Working Paper No. 384, University of Cape Town. Maistry, M., and S. Vasi. 2011. Social Development Including Social Grants. East London, South Africa: Fort Hare Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Fort Hare. Nattrass, N. 2004. AIDS and the Disability Grant: Further Reasons for Introducing a Basic Income Grant in South Africa. Cape Town: University of Cape Town. Reddy, T., and Sokomani, A. 2008. Corruption and Social Grants in South Africa, Monograph 154. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Samson, M., O. Babson, C. Haarmann, D. Haarmann, G. Kathi, K. MacQuene, and I. Niekerk. 2002. Social Security Reform and the Basic Income Grant for South Africa. Geneva: International Labour Organisation. Sogaula, N., R. Niekerk, M. Noble, J. Waddell, C. Green, M. Sigala, M. Samson, D. Sanders, and D. Jackson. 2002. Social Security Transfers, Poverty and Chronic Illness in the Eastern Cape: An Investigation of the Relationship Between Social Security Grants, the Alleviation of Rural Poverty and Chronic Illnesses—A Case Study of Mount Frere in Eastern Cape. Oxford: Centre for the Analysis of South African Social Policy, University of Oxford.

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Standing, G., and M. Samson. 2003. A Basic Income Grant for South Africa. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press. The Surplus Peoples Project. 1984. Khayelitsha: New Home—Old Story. Cape Town: The Surplus Peoples Project. Waddell, J. 2003. A Dream Deferred: Access to Social Security and Social Citizenship in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Washington, DC: IWPR Conference Women Working to Make a Difference. Worden, N. 1994. The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and Apartheid. Oxford: Blackwell. Wright, S. 2015. Persons Living on a Disability Grant in Mpumalanga Province: An Insider Perspective. Curationis 38: 1–7.

Prospects for Linguistic and Cultural Diversity to Enhance African Political Governance Finex Ndhlovu

This chapter seeks to contribute some new ideas on how Africa’s rich and diverse linguistic heritage could potentially be leveraged towards developing an innovative framework for political governance and greater pan-African understanding. I posit that unless languages are mobilized negatively and manipulated instrumentally to cause divisions in Africa, they remain a rich resource that can facilitate the task of fashioning a sense of common African identity and citizenship. The chapter argues that instead of focusing on the ‘problems’ of language diversity, we need to pay attention to the prospects, and spheres of possibilities for good political governance presented by the language resources at our disposal. This means we need to work within a framework that can harness interand cross-cultural similarities among the African people within and across different national borders in order to maximize the potential benefits of Africa’s linguistic resources, especially in the domains of regional economic integration, cross-border trade and political integration. What affordances do Africa’s cultural and linguistic resources provide for creativity and innovation in our quest for good and inclusive political governance systems? What would Africa’s political governance systems

F. Ndhlovu (B) University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia © The Author(s) 2020 J. I. Lahai and H. Ware (eds.), Governance and Societal Adaptation in Fragile States, Governance and Limited Statehood, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40134-4_9

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look like if we were to recognize the diversity of African languages as an opportunity and not a liability?

Introduction---Framing the Problem The concept of governance has been widely defined in both scholarly research reports and international policy documents. Daniel Kaufmann from the Brookings Institution and Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi from the World Bank have, since the late 1990s, produced a series of policy research working papers on governance indicators, or what we might call international benchmarks for good political governance. Drawing on data covering over 200 countries since 1996, Kaufmann et al. (2010) developed a set of worldwide governance indicators (WGI). They posit six indicators of good governance as follows: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Based on these indicators, Kaufmann et al. (2010: 3), define governance as The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.

This is quite a broad and wide-ranging definition of the concept of governance. It is shared by several other scholars such as Graham et al. (2003); and resonates with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)’s policy briefs on governance and sustainable development. For example, UNDP (1997), identified four principles of good governance that are essentially a slightly different rendition of Kaufmann et al.’s (2010) list. These are participation, consensus orientation, equity and rule of law. The overarching theme in these key words is emphasis on transparency, effectiveness, efficiency and inclusivity in the process of decision-making and in the ways such decisions are implemented. This means the voices of the entire spectrum of citizens, including those from linguistic, ethnic, religious and other minority groups have to be taken into account in governance—more specifically in political governance. The bottom line is that good political governance rests on ensuring that all people, particularly

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the most vulnerable minoritized groups, have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being and do not feel excluded from the rest of society (United Nations, n.d). What is most worrisome in the African context is that these cornerstones of good political governance are evidently in short supply in most countries, thus giving rise to persistent political tensions, contested election outcomes, civil wars and social unrest. Current African systems of political governance that are premised on the Westphalian model of the nation-state are flawed and untenable in many ways. They are tied to the modernist catechism of ‘one nation, one language’, ‘one people’ in a manner that not only fails to recognize the natural diversity of political, cultural and linguistic identities, but also tries to erase them. African political governance systems adopt a limiting and limited idea of Africa—with all nation-states being looked at with the prism of territorial spaces carved by colonialists while ignoring the complex linguistic and cultural tapestry that constitutes the heart and soul of being Africa. Such a conceptualization of Africa narrows and misdirects complex issues of multilingual African identities, steering them in the direction of monolithic and reified political governance systems that are constantly contested. There is little surprise about the contested nature of African political governance systems because they owe their existence to a template that was never meant to be consensual. Transparency, inclusivity and integrity are the cardinal points of good governance but these are always in short supply on the African continent. In fact, I would dare say it would be unreasonable for anyone to expect these parameters of good governance to be realized unproblematically in an environment that is by its very nature designed to be intolerant of inclusivity and diversity of opinions. This is because national political consensus is often informed by exigencies of narrow inward-looking, autochthonous, parochial and ethno-nationalist imaginings of national identity and belonging. The language of such forms of narrow nationalisms is generally racist, nativist and exclusionary; and tends to present identity imaginings in terms of binary oppositions: citizens versus aliens; indigenous versus nonindigenous; black versus white; nationals versus foreigners; minority versus majority and legal immigrants versus illegal immigrants (Ndhlovu 2018). Therefore, like those that obtain elsewhere in multilingual and multi-ethnic regions of the world, nation-state-centric African political governance systems are the subject of constant disputation both from below and from above. From below, the nation-state is challenged by the increasing discontent and dissension of minority groups while forces of globalization and

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transnationalism constitute a potent threat from above. Consequently, imaginings of African governance systems are dramatically shifting from the agenda of consolidating the political sovereignty and separate development of individual nation-states to that of cultivating stronger economic and political ties at continental and global levels. African regional and subregional economic and political blocs are being promoted and propagated as building units in the pursuit of governance systems that accord with the realities of the present world system. The now archaic and increasingly obsolete idea of the nation-state as the unit of social and political analysis in the discourse and praxis of governance has increasingly become untenable. The artificial nature of colonially imposed African national borders that most people are prepared to die in their defence is now too well known to rehearse. It suffices to remind the reader from the outset that the current configuration of the African governance systems is a recent phenomenon that dates to the Berlin Conference of 1884,1 which is not a long time ago—at least in terms of historical time. One hundred and fifty years ago is quite recent. The drawing of African national political boundaries that took place at the Berlin Conference on 15 November 1884 was motivated by the desire to bring about order in the European colonial powers’ scramble for Africa. These boundaries and the political geographies they produced remain in place to the present day. Because it was not meant to serve the interests of Africans, the process of carving boundaries for different African countries was done in an arbitrary fashion that was insensitive to local cultural and linguistic realities. The three consequences of the Berlin Conference were: a. The splitting of ethnic/linguistic communities that belonged together into two or more groups that were subsequently forced into different nation-states. b. The lumping together of distinct ethnic/linguistic groups into imagined homogenous communities that were subsequently forced to adopt a uniform national identity.

1 The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 provided an opportunity to channel latent Euro-

pean hostilities towards one another outward, provide new areas for helping the European powers expand in the face of rising American, Russian and Japanese interests, and form constructive dialogue for limiting future hostilities. For Africans, colonialism was introduced across nearly all the continent. When African independence was regained after World War II, it was in the form of fragmented states that still remain to this day.

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c. The emergence of multiple cross-border languages known by different and sometimes similar names across different national boundaries (Ndhlovu 2009b). Therefore, the popular forms of national identity that African people carry today and that underpin the conceptual architecture of existing governance systems are products of colonial processes that were ostensibly designed to enhance colonial administrative convenience, manipulation and political control. They were never meant to serve the interests of the African people—never mind the fact that many Africans have died and some continue to die in defence of these invented national identities and political systems. When the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), was formed in 1963, a pragmatic decision was taken in declaring that colonially inherited national boundaries and, by extension, the prevailing political governance systems and state institutions, were inviolable (Organisation of African Unity 1976). Therefore, when we talk of current African political governance systems, we are essentially referring to political arrangements that have not been delinked from the colonial matrices of power, domination and control—or what the Italian social theorist Antonio Gramsci (1971) called egermonia (hegemony). The question of pan-African political governance systems has, however, remained at the centre of debates among African states at various forums. In January 2007, the African Heads of States and Governments adopted the Accra Declaration in which they agreed ‘to accelerate the economic and political integration of the African Continent including the formation of a Union Government for Africa with the ultimate objective of creating the United States of Africa’ (Ghana Centre for Democratic Development 2007: 1). Since then, there has been a series of high-level discussions around this issue, the latest being the Symposium on the United States of Africa and the Forum on the Role and Place of Africa in World Governance that were held concurrently in Dakar, Senegal from 27–30 July 2009. The 2009 Symposium in Dakar, which I was privileged to attend, sought to integrate intellectual ideas into these political debates on African integration. It centred on five thematic areas, namely, the federalism and sovereignty of states; federalism, cultures and national languages; federalism, economic development, science and technology; federalism, African peoples, the civil society and the Diaspora; and the union authority. Of these five themes, the issue of the federalism and sovereignty of

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nation-states was the most contentious, and attracted a lot of debate. With the independent nation-state seen as the end of the evolution of any other state, it was argued that a union of states is the finite reality to aspire to. However, questions still remain particularly in regard to what form and structure the continental federal African government should take. What will be the modalities of power dispersal in a federated Africa? What will be the role of regional groupings such as economic/political blocs in a federated Africa? Will they be willing to lose some of their influence to the federal authority? How will the common management of African resources be achieved? A major contention was about the fears that the existing African nation-states and regional economic blocs had of losing their sovereignties to the sovereignty of the continental African government i.e. how the tensions between the nation-state sovereignty and continental government sovereignty would be handled. It was surmised that rather than becoming a panacea for the challenges currently besetting the nation-state, the African continental government was likely to be more brutal and tyrannical if not well managed. Admittedly, these questions do indicate that the project of African continental integration has a political dimension, which means the political questions associated with it have to be addressed. Drawing on insights from the sociolinguistics of Africa, this chapter provides an alternative intervention into this debate on African political governance. The intention is to break new ground on this topic of research by traversing previously uncharted territory on the role of language in political governance. With estimates of between 2000 and 2500 languages (or 30% of the world’s living languages) (Batibo 2005), Africa is endowed with a rich and diverse resource that is often erroneously misconstrued as constituting bedrock for political tensions and ethnic secessionism. Civil wars and other political tensions that continue to ravage various African nations are sometimes seen as connected to linguistic, cultural and ethnic differences. Persistent questions have been and continue to be raised about the perceived divisive nature of African linguistic diversity. This chapter takes a different turn from this commonly held view and argues that linguistic diversity is in itself not a problem. Rather, it is struggles over power, wealth and control of the state that have triggered some of the bloodiest conflicts in Africa. Linguistic and cultural differences are, unfortunately, often appropriated by some African politicians who become more and more divisive and divided in their tactics by whipping up ethnic and language-based emotions to boost

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their support (Ndhlovu 2011). It is uncommon in mainstream political governance research reports to find studies that search for answers to contending questions of statecraft and political instability by focusing the laser light on the benefits of harnessing linguistic and cultural diversity. In pursuing this grand agenda, the chapter addresses the following key questions: How can African linguistic diversity be deployed in order to facilitate realization of inclusive African political governance systems in the twenty-first century and beyond? What affordances do African cultural and linguistic resources provide for creativity and innovation in our quest for home-grown political governance systems for Africa? What would Africa’s political governance systems look like if we were to recognize the diversity of African languages as an opportunity and not a liability? How can we make the global principles of good political governance work in Africa and for the African people? I try to address these questions by looking at the promises the incidence of language diversity holds for a more inclusive, participatory, transparent and consensus-oriented system of political governance in Africa. But first, let us look at two types of communities that are generally produced by political governance regimes.

Types of Communities and Political Governance Systems The previous body of sociological and political science literature has suggested that there are generally two types of communities that governance systems produce: namely, political community (nationalism), and sociological community (nationism) (Fishman 1968; Lee and Newby 1983; Crow and Allen 1994; Smith 2001). Joshua Fishman (1968) noted that these concepts require rather more careful differentiation than they have usually received because they each have very definite implications. He defined a sociological community ‘as a socio-cultural entity that may have no corresponding politico-geographic realization. Its discriminanda are essentially at the level of authenticity and solidarity of group behaviors and group values, rather than at the level of governmental, politicogeographical realizations and implementations’ (Fishman 1968: 39). On the other hand, unlike in the sociological community, social solidarity ‘is not a precondition for the existence of a political community and for how a national political community can attain such solidarity in successive steps’ (ibid.: 39).

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The two permutations flagged above produce different sets of outcomes when considered in the context of debates around political governance systems. First, if the nationalism model is embraced as the underpinning conceptual framework, then the cultivation of a strong continent-wide political community will be paramount. In other words, notwithstanding the relevance of cultural and economic considerations, the quest for cultivating shared political systems across the entire continent will be at the forefront. In this context, language policies, for example, will be tailored to achieve the desired political ideals of a panAfrican system of political governance. Under this permutation, national languages will be assured of a significant role by virtue of them being languages that gained their status through deliberate political processes that fashioned a sense of unity and cross-cultural integration during the era of the nation-state. This means the form, structure and conceptual architecture of twenty-first post-national Africa will be more or less similar to that of the nation-state—the only difference being that the balkanization of the continent and economic regions into small suboptimal units will no longer be the main consideration. The political significance of national languages under this permutation would derive from their long history as effective means of building a sense of horizontal and vertical comradeship (Anderson 1991) among the diverse polities, spanning from colonial, through the moments of liberation struggles, to the postcolonial period. The utility of African national languages in building some form of both vertical and horizontal political comradeship in postcolonial Africa is captured very well by Mazrui and Mazrui (1998). In The Power of Babel: Language and Governance in the African Experience (1998), Mazrui and Mazrui, give a detailed exposé on how processes of language policy formulation in postcolonial Africa have been shaped by multiple forces, including: nationhood, ethnicity and tribalism; the dichotomy of linguistic frontiers and colonially inherited national boundaries; the microlinguistics of identity vis-à-vis linguistic diversity in a polycentric world; functional complementarity and competition between local and foreign languages; the interplay between language and religion; linguistic exclusion and the legislative process; linguistic rights and legal rights and the anomaly of African nationalism and linguistic purism. Mazrui and Mazrui (1998) explored at length how the rise of competitive multiparty politics in postcolonial Africa was simultaneously accompanied by strategic manipulation and deployment of standardized national languages that were

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selected and promoted to achieve purely political goals. They describe the processes of linguistic appropriation in the following terms: The ethnicization of politics in a plural society may exert pressure on party leaders and functionaries to invoke certain symbols of ethnic identity partly as a way of seeking and maintaining the allegiance of members of particular ethnic groups. This inclination of politicians to use local, ethnicallybounded languages when addressing audiences from different parts of a country may be stronger in a multi-party polity than in a single-party system. Ethnic languages become symbols of solidarity and support, of cultivating a patron-client relationship, between political parties and different sections of the electorate. (Mazrui and Mazrui 1998: 102)

Mazrui and Mazrui examined the language policies of postcolonial Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Ethiopia to illustrate the way national languages have been successfully used by African political leaders to achieve the desired political goals of the postcolonial nation-state. They cite the political circumstances surrounding the rise of Swahili as a lingua franca for East Africa (Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya). Over and above other factors to do with economics and trade, the utility of Swahili in political governance, particularly in postcolonial Tanzania under founding President Julius Nyerere, is probably the one that contributed most to the uncontested acceptance of this language as a lingua franca for the entire East African subregion. What we see here is the successful deployment of Swahili to build a transnational East African political community, even during the golden age of nationalism when the sovereignty of the nationstate was still at the forefront of the African dream. Today, Swahili—which is an African indigenous language—can still play an equally important role in promoting the twenty-first-century African dream of building a pan-African political community. As regional economic/political groupings such as COMESA, SADC and ECOWAS have been prioritized as the building blocks for African political governance, Swahili sits strategically in the East and Central African regions as a language that can lead to the cultivation of bigger political communities feeding into the twenty-first-century dream of an integrated African political community. The same can be said of other African national languages spoken across different national boundaries in their respective regions— for example, the Nguni, Sotho/Tswana and Chewa/Nyanja groups of languages in SADC, Arabic and Berberéé in North Africa and the Fulfulde group of languages in West Africa.

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It is clear from the foregoing discussion that in the twenty-first-century post-national era, several African languages can be unlocked and positively deployed towards further strengthening an African sense of political unity and social cohesion. This can be done both within and beyond the geographical confines of the waning nation-states. The second permutation of political governance systems is one motivated by the desire to build a sociological community (nationism), which will yield different outcomes and roles for African languages in political governance. As pointed out by Fishman (1968), the sociological model of community is characterized by existence of ‘ideological emotional components of attachment to nationality and nations’ (p. 40). In this chapter, I conceive the two concepts of nationality and nation more broadly to also refer to the traditional fractures of ‘ethnic’ group, cultural group, village, chiefdom and the problematic notion of ‘tribe’, among others. There is legion of both theoretical and empirical studies that consider the sociological model of community from a range of perspectives. The first clear conceptualization of the sociological community was developed in the early 1900s by C. J. Galpin (Smith 2001), after which followed a number of competing but somewhat related views. Taking after the work of Lee and Newby (1983), and Crow and Allen (1994), Smith identifies three key parameters that define understandings of sociological community: a. Place—referring to a territorial community where people have something in common, and this shared element is understood geographically (locality). b. Interest —here, the underpinning principle is one where people have a shared characteristic other than geographical location. The difference in spatial location is not decisive, but factors such as religious belief or ethnic origin are. c. Communion—this has to do with a sense of (emotional) attachment to a place, group or idea. It entails a profound meeting or encounter—both in physical and spiritual terms (Smith 2001: 2). In summarizing the above, Smith says sociological communities are best approached as ‘communities of meaning’, and the boundaries between one community and another do not necessarily have to be physical, as they may as well exist in the minds of the beholders. ‘This is the symbolic aspect of community boundary and is fundamental to gaining an appreciation of how people experience community’ (Smith 2001: 2).

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In the two sections that follow, I provide a brief survey of the African language ecology and then use notions of sociological community and political community to propose a language-based model for African political governance systems that I hope will be more inclusive and less contested.

A Survey of the African Language Ecology2 As already indicated in the introduction section, the African continent is endowed with a complex language ecology that eschews any easy generalization. Diverse mixes of languages belonging to different genetic families straddle the entire African continent. There are varying degrees of language diversity among the more than 50 African countries, with each nation-state having a unique language ecology punctuated by different language use patterns. Some African countries have dense levels of language diversity (for example, Nigeria has 485 languages; Cameroon, 274 languages; and the Democratic Republic of Congo, 209 languages) while others are relatively quasi-monolingual (for example, Burundi with 3 languages; Lesotho, 2 languages; Rwanda, 3 languages; and Swaziland, 4 languages) (Batibo 2005). However, as will be shown later in this chapter, the complexity of the African language ecology does not necessarily mean that there are no clear patterns of language use across different African nations. In the midst of multiple languages, there exist clearly definable patterns of language use that are determined by the usefulness of each language (or category of languages) in specific domains such as political governance, economics and trade. For convenience of analysis, historical linguists including Greenberg (1966) and Guthrie (1967, 1971) classified the languages of Africa into the following four major groups that also have subfamilies ranging from 4 to 10 each: • Niger-Congo/ Congo-Kordofanian languages . This group has 1436 languages (including 500 Bantu languages) stretching from the Atlantic coast in West Africa to the Indian Ocean in eastern Africa.

2 Some of the material in this section appears in my 2011 article ‘Proposing and language-based framework for the form and structure of a United States of Africa’. South African Journal of African Languages 30(2), pp. 243–253.

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• Afro-Asiatic languages . This family has 371 languages spoken in what is traditionally known as Maghreb in North Africa, and extends into the Abyssinian Mountains and into parts of eastern Africa. Some languages in this phylum spread into the Middle East, hence the name Afro-Asiatic. • Nilo-Saharan languages . This group has 196 languages spoken mainly in Sudan and in some parts of the Sahara and West Africa. • Khoesan languages . Predominantly found in southern Africa, with pockets in parts of East and Central Africa. Conservative estimates put the number of these languages at 35 (Batibo 2005: 4). The above is a genetic classification of languages considered as ‘indigenous’ to the African continent. The major criterion for this classification is a linguistic one (that is, relatedness of languages in terms of their structural features—morphology, syntax and phonological features). It is important to observe that this way of classifying the languages of Africa is not exhaustive as it excludes some groups of languages or language varieties that are not necessarily ‘indigenous’ to but are widely spoken in Africa. These include trade and ex-colonial languages that constitute an age-old phenomenon in the African linguistic landscape. The presence of multiple ex-colonial languages such as English, French, Spanish and Portuguese adds not only to the diversity of language but also to the patterns of language use in different African settings. Consequently, the language ecology of Africa can be further mapped out at four levels reflecting the geographical extents of different languages. If we are to use the sociolinguistic criteria of demographic numbers, socio-economic prestige, social influence or status, attraction of second-language speakers and cultural influence, we can come up with the following categories of languages in Africa. • Areally (locally) dominant languages. These consist of languages of intra-group communication widely spoken within the geographical confines of relatively small speech communities at district or provincial levels within the existing African nation-states. A huge majority of such languages are traditionally categorized as ‘minority languages’ in mainstream sociolinguistic discourses and national level language policy frameworks. Examples of such languages include Tonga, Venda and Kalanga in Zimbabwe; Malinke and Soninke in

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Senegal; Nupe, Efik, Izon and Tiv in Nigeria; as well as Maasai, Bukusu and Meru in Kenya. • Nationally dominant languages. This category includes languages accorded the functional status of ‘national languages’ especially following the attainment of political independence from colonial rule. Most African countries have this category of languages that are promoted and propagated by their respective governments for their perceived role as a rallying point for national unity, nation building, sociopolitical integration and the fashioning of a common national citizenship. Governments promote such languages as a medium of intercultural communication across different ethnolinguistic groups within different nation-states. Examples of such languages include IsiZulu, IsiXhosa and Sesotho in South Africa; Siswati in Swaziland; Setswana in Botswana; Kiswahili in Tanzania; Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo in Nigeria; Amharic in Ethiopia; Somali in Somalia and Chibemba, Chinyanja and Chitonga in Zambia. • Regionally dominant languages. These are cross-border languages that are widely spoken in more than one country in different regions of Africa. Regions in this context have to be understood as referring to geographical extants that coincide with existing African economic/political blocs such as the East African Economic Community (EAEC), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Each of these regional blocs has one or more languages spoken across the borders of member states. Some such languages may be known by similar or slightly different names in each country although they have a high degree of similarities. Examples of African regional languages include Kiswahili in East and Central African countries (Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, southern Somalia, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, northern Mozambique and eastern and northern Malawi); Arabic in the entire of North Africa and the Horn of Africa region (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Mauritania, Chad, Djibout, Somalia and Eritrea); the Fulfulde cluster including sister languages such as Fula, Pulaar, Peul, Tuculor, Fulful, Fulbe and Fulani in West Africa (Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, Gambia, Senegal, Guinea, Mauritania and the Central African Republic); and Afrikaans and the Nguni and SothoTswana clusters in the southern African region. In fact, the Fulfulde

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cluster is the largest group of transborder languages, crossing more than 13 West African national borders (Prah 2009). • Continentally dominant languages. These include ex-colonial languages mainly English, French and Portuguese, which have assumed the role of languages of widest communication (or lingua franca) in the African continent to the extent that Africa has traditionally been divided into English-speaking (Anglophone), French-speaking (Francophone) and Portuguese-speaking (Lusophone) Africa. The greater part of southern and eastern Africa is largely Anglophone with some Lusophone pockets (Mozambique and Angola). Much of West Africa is predominantly Francophone, with some pockets of Anglophone countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone and parts of Cameroon. In North Africa, Arabic appears to be the sole predominant language of widest communication in the midst of some areally dominant indigenous languages such as Berberé in Algeria and Morocco. Most languages in each of the above categories are variants of some core or proto language and have very high degrees of similarities to the extent that speakers of the different varieties can easily understand each other without resorting to interpretation. For instance, in the Sotho-Tswana cluster, speakers of Sesotho of Lesotho, Northern and Southern Sotho of South Africa and Setswana of Botswana feel at home with each other’s languages (Makalela 2009). The same applies to the Nguni varieties of the Zimbabwean Ndebele, SiSwati of Swaziland and IsiZulu and IsiXhosa of South Africa. In West Africa, we have the Fulfulde cluster of Fula, Pulaar, Peul, Tuculor, Fulful, Fulbe and Fulani in which one can circulate effectively socially, using any one of these varieties in any country that falls within this cluster of languages (Ndhlovu 2009a, 2013, 2017). Recent research carried out under the auspices of the Centre for the Advanced Study of African Society (CASAS) in Cape Town, South Africa, suggests that when using the criterion of similarities, there are no more than 15–17 core languages in Africa spoken by 80–85% of the continent’s population as first, second and third languages (Prah 2009: 12). There are two informative observations that come out of this scenario. That the: • relatedness of most African languages shows the incidence of language diversity in the continent is not that difficult to untangle and

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does not necessarily constitute a major barrier to cross-cultural and intercultural understanding required in political governance • harmonization of African languages which show high levels of similarities is possible and would greatly facilitate the economies of scale in the development of educational, media and cultural materials necessary for the strengthening of African social, political and economic cooperation (ibid.: 12). In short, the differences among some languages of Africa have unnecessarily been overemphasized; otherwise, the levels of similarity far outweigh the divergences. What has been described above reveals the possibility of coming up with some kind of a generalization on patterns of language use across the African continent, which could potentially provide a conceptual architecture for overcoming perceived language barriers in the formation and implementation of an overarching model for African political governance. The form and structure of the proposed framework is discussed below.

Proposed Language-Based Framework for African Political Governance To ensure that a huge majority of African populations have a place within the structures of an integrated Africa, a language policy framework with multiple levels of language use is proposed. See Fig. 1. At its 2008 conference held in Addis Ababa, the African Academy of Languages (ACALAN) recommended the use of multiple cross-border languages as follows: in the Southern Region the selected languages are Chinyanja and Setswana; Kiswahili, Somali and Malagasy in East Africa; Fulfude, Dyula and Hausa in the Western Region and Arabic and Berberé in the Northern Region (ACALAN 2009). The framework proposed in this article is to some extent consistent with the ACALAN model but recommends some additional languages for the Southern and Western Regions. Languages of widest communication such as English, French, Arabic and Portuguese and Kiswahili will be used as the official languages for intercultural communication and political administration at the federal level. Below this, a spectrum of regionally dominant languages is recommended as official languages of administration in regional governments. These include Afrikaans, Chinyanja, a harmonized Nguni variety and a

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Connental Polical Governance (English, French, Portuguese, Kiswahili, Arabic) │ │ Regional Polical Governance │ │ _________________________________________│________________________________________ │ │ │ │ │ Southern East-Central │ Western Northern Region Region │ Region Region (Afirikaans, Chinyanja, (Kiswahili) │ (Fulfulde, Dyula, Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba) (Arabic, Berberé) Nguni, Sotho-Tswana) │ Naonal Polical Governance (Respecve Naonally Dominant Languages) │ │ Local (District/Provincial) Governance (Respecve Local Languages)

Fig. 1 Language-based model for African political governance (adapted from Ndhlovu 2011)

harmonized Sotho-Tswana variety (Southern Region); Kiswahili (EastCentral Region); Arabic and Berberé (Northern Region); and a harmonized Fulfulde cluster, Dyula, Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba (Western Region). Below the regional governments will be national governments in which the nationally dominant languages of each respective country are recommended as languages of administration. This will be followed by the use of all other languages as local and/or community languages for administrative purposes in districts or provinces where they are areally dominant. The proposed language use regime for African political governance is not oblivious to some contentious issues, particularly those pertaining to harmonizing the Nguni and Sotho-Tswana language varieties. Although the idea of harmonization is not popular on account of it being perceived as too idealistic, previous work reveals that there are high degrees of similarities among the Nguni and Sotho-Tswana groups of languages that could provide scope for meaningful harmonization.3 Makalela’s (2009) investigation of the degrees of similarities among three structurally related South African languages, namely, Sepedi,

3 See for example, Alexander (2000) in the South African context and Prah (1998) in the broader African context.

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Sesotho and Setswana presents a compelling case that supports the possibility of harmonizing the orthographic representations and spelling systems of these languages towards a standard Sotho. In the context of the political governance model proposed here, the allocation of different languages to different levels of governance does not in any way suggest any order of importance. Rather, it is a reflection of, and is guided by the need for strategic deployment of the multiple language resources according to the appropriateness of their social capital value. Social capital theory (Bourdieu 1991; Putnam 1995, 2000; Lin 2001; Print and Coleman 2003) tells us that different languages have different forms of social capital (or value): some have more value as bonding capital, some as bridging capital and others as linking media in a range of social networks. With multiple levels of administration in which different language resources are used depending on the amount of social capital value they have within and across national boundaries, the proposed framework provides greater scope for the devolution of power and decision-making within a politically integrated Africa. In this way, the framework attempts to resolve tensions around the contentious issues of sovereignty, active citizenship participation and adequate representation in governance and decision-making. Whereas sovereignty under the current political arrangements of the postcolonial African nation-state is in practice erroneously conceived as the property of elected officials (purportedly in the name of the people), the above framework presents sovereignty as a diffuse entity both in practice and in principle. The overall goal of the model is to counteract the hegemony of current political governance structures that are vestiges of colonial matrices of power and that continue to hang like a nightmare on the postcolonial African body politic. Whereas the current conceptualization of nation-state sovereignty is one issue that has forced some African heads of states and governments to drag their feet regarding the pan-African political governance project, the framework proposed in this article does not advocate the abolition of the nation-state. Rather, it is a proposal for the dispersal of power and political authority. Under the proposed model, sovereignty is conceptualized as something that resides in African nationalities and peoples and not in the hands of mostly self-serving elected officials. The only thing that will change is the spatial extent at which political communities are imagined and different levels of sovereignties exercised. Otherwise, the fears of the nation-state and those residing in them remain unfounded as the

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pan-African political governance project is not motivated by the desire to annihilate the nation-state and usurp its authority and political influence. The feasibility of the existence of a continent-wide federal government alongside regional or state governments is evidenced by the abundance of similar arrangements in other parts of the world including Australia, India, the United States of America, Canada and the United Kingdom. In these federal systems of governance, it is very uncommon to find tensions between federal and state authorities emanating out of sovereignty issues as the jurisdictions of each level of government are clearly spelt out in law. In those very rare and exceptional cases where tensions arise, the disagreements are often resolved by recourse to existing provisions of devolved political governance, thus minimizing the incidence of nascent civil wars and conflicts. By virtue of having their multiple language resources being part of the conceptual architecture of a pan-African political governance system, different African ethnolinguistic groups are assured of having a say in the way they are governed. Furthermore, the proposal provides a solid foundation for proportional representation in different levels of administration. This means unlike the ‘majority rules’ principle underpinning most postcolonial African systems of governance, ethnic and linguistic minorities have a greater chance of active participation in national affairs under the proposed language-based framework. The other advantage of the proposed framework is that it avoids the eclecticism and lack of commitment to unconditional recognition of African linguistic diversity characterizing the current AU language policy. In the current AU, language policy issues are addressed in Article 25 of the Constitutive Act (2002), which states that ‘the working languages of the Union and all its institutions shall be, if possible, African languages, Arabic, English, French and Portuguese’. This policy framework is patently equivocal on the role and place of African languages. Whereas the roles of English, French, Portuguese and Arabic are clearly spelt out in the AU language policy, those of African languages are presented in vague terms betraying lack of commitment to the speakers of such languages. Therefore, the framework presented in Fig. 1, and discussed in the entire body of this article, is a counter-discourse aimed at avoiding the pitfalls of the AU language policy and the diverse language policies of different African nation states. If Africa embraces a monolingual ideology in its pursuit of a pan-African system of political governance,

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the continent will be doing so at its own peril for there is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct, savvy or progressive about insisting on a framework that is built around the old and tired catechism of ‘one nation, one language, one culture’.

Recap---Motivations for a Language-Based Framework Why a language-based framework for political governance, one might ask? Far from being driven by my subjective disciplinary interests as a language practitioner, a language-based framework for the structure for African political governance is justifiable on four grounds. • The centrality of languages as prime markers of identities is well known. Countless studies have examined the language-identity nexus in diverse multilingual and multi-ethnic settings.4 Highlighting the role of language as a marker of ethnic identity, Stephen Barbour (2000: 9) observes that the ‘cultural coherence of an ethnic group is often partly expressed by language [in the sense that] a distinctive language may help to demarcate the ethnic group from other groups, and a common language may facilitate communication and hence coherence within an ethnic group’. With specific reference to the role of language as a symbol of national identity, Carlo Ruzza (2000) reminds us that both historically and in the recent past, the feeling of common belonging that has sustained nations and national identity, has often been enhanced by a common language. It becomes apparent that language is the pivot around which common (group) identities are imagined. In the case of the idea of an African system of political governance, which is basically about the formation of a collective pan-African identity in the midst of multiple language resources, the centrality of a language-based framework cannot be overemphasized. Languages are the wellspring of African group identity as they help define who is and is not a member of

4 See for example Barbour (2000), Ruzza (2000), Joseph (2004), Anderson (1991), Dorian (1998), Vikør (2000), May (2001), Ndhlovu (2007, 2009a), Batibo (2005) and Brown and Ganguly (2003).

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the group, and what the boundaries of the group are (Brown and Ganguly 2003). • Language is important in the sense that it is one of the key determinants of success and survival particularly in situations of intergroup competition for access to and control of resources and state power. In typical multilingual contexts such as the ones found in most African countries, access to socio-economic and political opportunities is contingent upon access to particular language varieties elevated to prestigious statuses of official and national languages. This implicates the role and place of language policies in shaping intergroup relations as well as in determining people’s educational, economic and political fortunes. As Brown and Ganguly (2003: 4) point out: In multiethnic countries, language policies can determine who has access to schools, who has opportunities for economic advancement, who participates in political decisions, who has access to governmental services, and who gets treated fairly by governmental agencies. Language policies can determine who gets ahead and who gets left behind. Language policies affect the prospects for ethnic success – for ethnic groups and for individuals in these groups.

The prevailing situation in Africa today is one in which there is language hierarchization with both symbolic and practical ramifications—symbolic in the sense that languages that enjoy the prestigious official language status (and by extension their speakers) are perceived as superior to those that have a lower status. Language hierarchies also have practical ramifications in that speakers of minority languages are not given an equal opportunity in the affairs of everyday life. This places the spotlight on issues of human rights, democracy and active citizenship participation. For instance, when we talk of freedom of speech and freedom of association as the hallmark of good political governance, we need not simply focus on the extent to which individual and collective freedoms are upheld or recognized. We should rather focus on which and on whose language the people are associating and expressing themselves, and whether all ethnolinguistic polities in specific African language ecologies have equal access to languages of association and wider communication. If not, we should determine what the implications for the exercise of these freedoms by different groups of citizens would be.

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A paradigm shift is needed in the way we conceptualize the place of language in our dialogue on African political governance, leading us to the third justification for a language-based framework. • Languages have the capacity to tie together diverse disciplinary perspectives on African social, political and economic development. With the aid of information communication technologies (ICT), the existing theories and methodologies of computational linguistics, lexicography and natural language processing can be easily applied to terminology development and standardization for biomedical sciences, mathematics, environmental studies, natural sciences, agriculture, law, commerce and other specialist fields. ICT can be used to make African languages amenable to processes of modernization through term creation thereby bringing about synergy in development strategies. Rather than being confined to the role of media of communication in dialoguing about African politics, economics, democracy and human rights, Africa’s multiple language resources should be seen as presenting opportunities for enriching the mega project of a pan-African system of political governance. The rainbow of African language resources that come tightly stitched with activities, identities, knowledge systems and discourses do indeed provide a potential framework for an inclusive imagination of political governance. This is precisely because ‘contemporary African identities must be intimately linked to and forged out of a quest for inclusion, power and empowerment, equality and access, and accommodation and respect for linguistic and cultural diversity’ (Ndhlovu 2009b: 1). Disregarding this premium will be tantamount to replicating the homogenizing and intolerant catechisms of both the colonial and postcolonial African postcolonial nation-state that oversaw the persistence of political inequality, which is the source of internecine civil strife and conflict. • Development is first cultural (which implies linguistic too) and then economic and political. Wherever there is development, it has to show immediately in aspects of the people’s everyday social and cultural life. In the words of Prah (2009: 7), ‘culture is the central location for answers to the challenges of underdevelopment’. Prah goes on to observe that since language is the main feature of culture in which all social and human activities are transacted, it constitutes to be an important ingredient in the development matrix. Languages

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are the means of organizing everyday life in the community—serving as essential media for getting by, carrying out economic transactions, social functions, etc. Writing almost 70 years ago, and with specific reference to the languages of Africa, Hailey (1939: 98) cautioned that ‘only experience will show the extent to which the African languages … will assert themselves in the face of the influences to which they are being subjected’. This was indeed a prophetic statement about the rise of major African languages such as Kiswahili, whose influence in African integration and political governance is evident in the East and Central African region of the continent.

Conclusion This article has proposed a language-based framework for the structural arrangement of a pan-Africa system of governance in a democratic manner in which there is devolution of power and decision-making from the highest to the lowest levels of political administration. The proposed framework is one in which the multilevel structure of political governance will converge with the geolinguistic boundaries of areally dominant languages at four different administrative levels: continental, regional, national and local. This proposal is made against the background of well-known patterns of language use at different spatial levels throughout the African continent that can potentially be harnessed to converge with and define the administrative boundaries of a federated Africa. Unlike the current AU and national language policy regimes that have persistently marginalized the speakers of smaller or socio-politically weak languages, the framework discussed in this chapter recognizes the need for the use of all language varieties existing within the African linguistic ecologies, including those that have traditionally been banished to the fringes of mainstream sociolinguistic and political discourse. Organizing the administrative structures of African political governance using a language-based framework is important because when one looks at language, one would see hundreds, perhaps, thousands of years of experience; a people experiencing life on earth where they interacted among themselves, with outsiders and with the environment. These forms of interactive engagements among themselves and with nature allow people to develop an array of wisdoms and ways of coping with the environment, wisdoms about politics and ideologies, and strategies of survival,

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all of which are preserved and transmitted through the medium of language (Ndhlovu 2009a). Therefore, rather than dismissing African linguistic diversity as another curse for the continent, we should embrace it as an opportunity for developing more inclusive and culturally responsive political governance structures.

References ACALAN. 2009. Report on ACALAN’s Synthesis Conference on National Policies on the Role of Cross Border Languages and the Place of Less Diffused Languages in Africa. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Available at www.acalan.org/ eng/accueil/synthese.pdf. Accessed 24 June 2010. African Union. 2002. Constitutive Act, Article 25. Ethiopia: Addis Ababa. Alexander, N. 2000. Why the Nguni and Sotho Languages in South Africa Should Be Harmonised. In Multilingualism and Government—Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Former Yugoslavia, South Africa, ed. K. Deprez and T. du Plessis, 171–175. Pretoria: Van Schaik. Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Barbour, S. 2000. Nationalism, Language, Europe. In Language and Nationalism in Europe, ed. S. Barbour and C. Carmichael, 1–17. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Batibo, H.M. 2005. Language Decline and Death in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Challenges. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Bourdieu, P. 1991. Language and Symbolic Power. Oxford: Polity Press. Brown, M., and S. Ganguly (eds.). 2003. Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia. Cambridge and Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Crow, G., and G. Allen. 1994. Community Life: An Introduction to Local Social Relations. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Dorian, N.C. 1998. Western Language Ideologies and Small Language Prospects. In Endangered Languages: Current Issues and Future Prospects, ed. A. Grenoble and L.J. Whaley, 3–21. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fishman, J.A. 1968. Nationality-Nationalism and Nation-Nationalism. In Language Problems of Developing Nations, ed. J.A. Fishman, C.A. Ferguson, and J. Das Gupta, 3–21. New York: Wiley. Ghana Centre for Democratic Development. 2007. A United States of Africa by 2015? CDD-Ghana Briefing Paper, vol. 8, no. 3. CDD-Ghana, Accra. Graham, J., B. Amos, and T. Plumptre. 2003. Principles for Good Governance in the 21st Century. Policy Brief No. 15, August 2003. Institute on Governance. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/ documents/UNPAN/UNPAN011842.pdf.

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Gramsci, A. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Greenberg, J. 1966. The Languages of Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Guthrie, M. 1967. Comparative Bantu: An Introduction to the Linguistics and Prehistory of the Bantu Languages. Farnborough: Gregg. Guthrie, M. 1971. Comparative Bantu, vol. 2. London: Gregg. Hailey, L. 1939. An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara. London: Oxford University Press. Joseph, J.E. 2004. Language and Identity: National, Ethnic, Religious. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2010. The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues. Policy Research Working Paper. http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5430. Lee, D., and H. Newby. 1983. The Problem of Sociology: An Introduction to the Discipline. London: Unwin Hyman. Lin, N. 2001. Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Makalela, L. 2009. Harmonizing South African Sotho Language Varieties: Lessons from Reading Proficiency Assessment. International Multilingual Research Journal 3 (2): 120–133. May, S. 2001. Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language. Harlow: Pearson Education. Mazrui, A.A., and A.M. Mazrui. 1998. The Power of Babel: Language and Governance in the African Experience. London: James Currey Ltd. Ndhlovu, F. 2007. The Role of Discourse in Identity Formation and the Manufacture of Ethnic Minorities. Journal of Multicultural Discourses 2 (2): 131–147. Ndhlovu, F. 2009a. The Limitations of Language and Nationality as Prime Markers of African Diaspora Identities in the State of Victoria. African Identities 7 (1): 17–32. Ndhlovu, F. 2009b. The Politics of Language and Nation Building in Zimbabwe. Bern: Peter Lang International Publishers. Ndhlovu, F. 2011. Proposing and Language-Based Framework for the form and Structure of a United States of Africa. South African Journal of African Languages 30 (2): 243–253. Ndhlovu, F. 2013. The Burden of ‘National Languages’ and the Bondages of Linguistic Boundaries in Postcolonial Africa. In Bondage of Boundaries and Identity Politics in Postcolonial Africa: The ‘Northern’ Problem and Ethno-Futures, ed. S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and B. Mhlanga, 79–98. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

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Ndhlovu, F. 2017. Southern Development Discourse for Southern Africa: Linguistic and Cultural Imperatives. Journal of Multicultural Discourses. https://doi.org/10.1080/17447143.2016.1277733. Ndhlovu, F. 2018. Language, Vernacular Discourse and Nationalisms: Uncovering the Myths of Transnational Worlds. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Organization of African Unity. 1976. Cultural Charter for Africa. Addis Ababa: Organization of African Unity. Prah, K.K. 1998. Between Distinction and Extinction: The Harmonisation and Standardisation of African Languages. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press. Prah, K.K. 2009. The Burden of English in Africa: From Colonialism to Neocolonialism. In Keynote Address Delivered at the International Conference on Mapping Africa in the English Speaking World, University of Botswana, June 2–4. Print, M., and D. Coleman. 2003. Towards Understanding Social Capital and Citizenship Education. Cambridge Journal of Education 33 (1): 123–149. Putnam, R. 1995. Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital. Journal of Democracy 6 (1): 65–78. Putnam, R. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. Ruzza, C. 2000. Language and Nationalism in Italy: Language as a Weak Marker of Identity. In Language and Nationalism in Europe, ed. S. Barbour and C. Carmichael, 168–182. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Smith, M. K. 2001. Community. The Encyclopedia of Informal Education. Available at www.infed.org/community/community.htm. Vikør, L.S. 2000. Northern Europe: Languages as Prime Markers of Ethnic and National Identity. In Language and Nationalism in Europe, ed. S. Barbour and C. Carmichael, 105–129. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. UNDP. 1997. Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/258/hdr_1997_en_ complete_nostats.pdf. United Nations. n.d. What Is Good Governance? Bangkok: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. http://www. unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf.

Finex Ndhlovuis Associate Professor of Language in Society at the University of New England. His research interests sit at the cutting edge of contemporary linguistic and sociocultural theories around language, identity and sociality in relation to transnational African migrant and diaspora communities; language and development and language and everyday forms of exclusion. Most recent major

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publications include Becoming an African Diaspora in Australia: Language, Culture, Identity (2014); Hegemony and Language Policies in Southern Africa: Identity, Integration, Development (2015); Language, Migration, Diaspora: Challenging the Big Battalions of Groupism (2016); Language, Vernacular Discourse and Nationalisms: Uncovering the Myths of Transnational Worlds (2018).

The Struggles of Adoption and Adaptation in the Governance Space of Vanuatu: The Incorporation of Jifly Authority and Kastom Governance into the Legal-Rational System Gregoire Nimbtik

Introduction There is an enduring tension between aspirations for a more locally embedded system of governance in Vanuatu and the legal-rational model of sovereignty and power de jure, imported by colonial powers and colonisers, to which most modern power elites are wedded. In the postcolonial Vanuatu state, kastom 1 authority structures are forced to coexist with a still relatively new, and arguably ‘alien’, set of political institutions. Modern state institutions are based on the liberal political principles of

1 The Bislama word which loosely translates as tradition. The term Kastom in Bislama and its English cognate ‘custom’ is referring to two different understandings. Kastom is understood in Vanuatu context as a total way of life (Bolton 1999; Jolly 1997).

G. Nimbtik (B) Port Vila, Vanuatu © The Author(s) 2020 J. I. Lahai and H. Ware (eds.), Governance and Societal Adaptation in Fragile States, Governance and Limited Statehood, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40134-4_10

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majority rule and free and fair elections, while the traditional jifly 2 leadership system found in different islands is either based on decision-making through consensus or on the hereditary right to rule. Increased social friction is the consequence of the aggressive imposition of rival colonial systems. A new authority structure was imposed by Europeans to establish law and order in the archipelago, on European terms. The organisation of chiefs, institutionalised into an administrative council, came partly to regulate law and order in the local community, but most importantly to fulfil the objectives of the religious denominations and the colonial authority to modernise and rationalise what they viewed as irrational and parochial leadership and political systems that existed in local communities. As such, the appointment of the ‘missionary chiefs3 ’ and the ‘assessors4 ’ by the Europeans as new additional political leaders in the local communities insulted kastom authorities and created leadership fractures that still continue today (Rodman 1977; Daily Post 2005). Governance in Vanuatu should therefore be interpreted in a context of multiple and overlapping authorities, each with distinct and frequently conflicting priorities and value orientations. This chapter provides an analysis of how the adoption of an imported model of governance in Vanuatu creates tensions with local embedded system of governance and authority. The first section illustrates how the imported model of political, social and economic development in Vanuatu exhibits little consideration for existing traditional institutions, in particular the jifly system, and how they can be blended with international expectations and norms. The second section provides an overview of the

2 The Bislama term for kastom leader and it is used throughout this chapter to refer to traditional authority. The Article 29 of the Constitution makes explicit distinction with the prefix Kastom in front of the term jif- Kastom jif. Thus the term jif or Kastom jif is used to denote a traditional leader who, according to the 1983 national policy of the MNCC, has inherited their position through a bloodline; who follows the proper kastom fashion and has a nasara, nakamal, land and people; who is known by the whole village and has killed the pigs at the nasara and people from his village have followed him and participated in his pig killing ceremony and; his title name and meaning is on his original language (Lindstrom and White 1997). 3 The term that referred to an individual who was appointed by the missionary in the colonial days as a leader in the local community (Rodman 1977). 4 This is a new leadership position created by the two colonial powers (French and British) in the local communities to act as a middleman between local communities and colonial authority (Rodman 1977).

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colonial attempt to adapt kastom authority and traditional values of social obligation in Vanuatu. The third section deals with the incongruity in the way the Constitution was drafted to adapt kastom authority and shape a new social order in Vanuatu. The final section demonstrates how the complexities of redesign or adapting kastom authority and its governance system into a new fabric of political governance in Vanuatu have created a governance space.

Ideal Model: Political Governance The persistent failure of international institutions to recognise the importance of adjusting their governance principles to local conditions is one of the root causes of the governance challenges confronting Vanuatu. In the South Pacific region, and more specifically in Vanuatu, the state has imported Western ideas and models of democracy and, as a consequence, institutional design and practices reflect a strong Western influence. In the case of Vanuatu, the British Westminster system is the model upon which the country’s constitution is founded (Larmour 2002). There was obvious utility in this approach in forming a viable structure of government for Vanuatu. In discussions about constitutional drafting in Vanuatu, Professor Zorgbibe, a French government representative and a Technical Advisor to the Constitutional Committee, made the following comments: I agreed with Professor Ghai [British representative and Technical Advisor to the committee] that the constitution for the New Hebrides [Vanuatu] should draw more from the British political system with its simplicity and deeply democratic inspiration, rather than from the French, which tended to be more complicated. (Minutes of the Constitution 1979: 24)

This quotation illustrates the colonial approaches to decolonisation in the Pacific, where the Euro-centred notions of the state and democratic statehood were simply transferred into a landscape of great diversity and complex socio-political structures. This transplanted political model was never fashioned to accommodate the socio-cultural and political realities of Vanuatu. For example, this model failed to take into account the traditional bases of political authority, which varied across the culturally and geographically diverse country. This failure to consult is one of the root causes of enduring social division and conflict in Vanuatu.

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The Vanuatu Constitution created a common political space in which there existed multiple sources of authority, each having a distinct worldview concerning the appropriate relationship between rulers and ruled. As a result, in practice their coexistence has been uneven and difficult to maintain (Howell and Hall 2010; Maltali et al. 2009). In the preamble to the Constitution the principles of kastom governance and Christianity were enshrined as the two additional pillars of legal-rational state governance in Vanuatu. The term kastom in Bislama and its English cognate ‘custom’ differ in meaning and understandings. Bolton (1999: 11) observes, in English ‘custom refers to specific practices, rather than to the whole interlocking network of knowledge and practices denoted by culture’. Kastom, as understood in the context of Vanuatu, is a total way of life, which encompasses knowledge and practices that are critical for human survival and well-being (Jolly 1994). People believe that kastom governance encompasses traditional values of social obligation and authority, and these traditional values include collective entitlements, subsistence living, holistic life, traditional politics, strong kinship ties and restorative justice. The recognition of kastom in the preamble of the Vanuatu Constitution implies that the state has accepted the whole interlocking network of traditional knowledge and values of social order and authority as part of the state governance system but it does not explicitly spell out how this could work in practice: We, the people of Vanuatu, proud of our struggle for freedom, determined to safeguard the achievements of this struggle, cherishing our ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity, mindful at the same time of our common destiny, hereby proclaim the establishment of the united and free republic of Vanuatu founded on traditional Melanesian values, faith in God, and Christian principles, and for this purpose give ourselves this constitution. (Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu 1980: 6)

However, Vanuatu’s Constitution also embodies a state-centric political model that does not always work to the benefit of Vanuatu and its people. As stated above, there are tensions in Vanuatu between religious faith and kastom practices. For instance, the worship addressed to the spirit of

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ancestors, and transaction and consumption of pigs and kava 5 are against religious doctrine of churches such as Seventh Day Adventist and Assembly of God to name a few (MacClancy 2002). Some eighty per cent of the population live in rural areas and retain a deep attachment to kastom governance, and accord greater legitimacy to kastom authority than to the state legislative authority based upon legal-rational principles of government (Regenvanu 2009). Many people hold that the executive and parliament should be accountable to kastom authority and the people on how they control and manage national socio-economic and political affairs. The ensuing contradictions present major governance challenges for Vanuatu on all development fronts. In the last three decades there have been some elected politicians who have claimed the jifly title and held a ministerial position in the state. Most importantly, it is now becoming a political norm that whoever holds the position of Prime Minister and Head of State or becomes a Member of Parliament has to be endowed with a jifly title. This is to provide authority for elected leaders to command public support at the village, sub-regional, regional and national levels. It is argued in this chapter that this is a classic example of traditional values of social obligation and authority being entangled with legal-rational forms of authority and, as a consequence, complicating the emergent state-centric political model. The traditional values of social expectations and authority work in contradiction to some values of the legal-rational forms of authority premised on democratic values of election, competition, leadership impartiality and impersonalisation of roles and authority. For instance, in the traditional political governance system, leadership roles are either won or inherited rather than going through an election process whereby individual candidates have to compete with each other. In Vanuatu people are familiar with kastom governance and use it in their daily life (Regenvanu 2009; Wairiu 2006). Kastom governance, as discussed in this chapter, is a holistic way of life that encompasses traditional ways of dealing with socio-economic development and political relations in the local communities of Vanuatu (Bolton 1999; Jolly 1992; Regenvanu 2009). In this sense ‘governance’ extends beyond the realm of political decision-making and reaches into the daily routine and actions of people living by their 5 The drug that comes from the roots of the plant Piper Methysticum. It is consumed as a drink on special occasions in traditional society of Vanuatu. However, the uses and culture of kava drinking have changed drastically in the last three decades (Crowley 1995).

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accepted traditions. On this understanding, governance is ‘the multiple ways by which people manage their common affairs’ (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 2) in a particular context, and as such it does not need an external order to dictate how they manage their lives. Transplanting a governance model of best practices may not be suitable for another context. The transplanting of liberal forms of democratic government and governance in the Pacific region was done so abruptly that local communities saw it as an intrusion into their social and political rights and way of life. For instance, increased land disputes and demands for state compensation for lands are examples where conflict arises due to an introduced land tenure system and the local perception of government as a representative of a colonial authority that came to steal lands and properties (MacClancy 2002). It is argued here that the government in Vanuatu falls short of social expectations. This is because the legal-rational system fails to connect with kastom governance system and hence it becomes an obstacle to the delivery of services and most importantly bringing the government to the people. The traditional political system is much more extensive and is regulated not by codified law but based upon kastom principles. Hence, people hold that kastom authority is crucial to the political authority of Vanuatu’s elected leaders, carrying with it high expectations from local communities of official duties and responsibilities, such as a social obligation to contribute to marriage ceremonies, birth celebrations and pay school fees of family members, and these social contribution should be carried out according to local social norms, values, and practices. For these reasons, political power is strongly personalised (Lawson 1993); and it is either inherited through bloodline, or achieved through alteration of status and must instead be ‘won’ (Allen 1984). Tensions between traditional and legal-rational forms of political organisation are thus an enduring feature of Vanuatu’s political and cultural landscape. Government and governance refer to different types of relationships between the state and citizens. According to Bevir and Rhodes (2003), while government refers to a hierarchical mode of governing, governance encompasses a wide range of formal and informal processes through which common problems are discussed and addressed. In other words, governance is no longer a synonym of government, but has become an antonym (Bevir and Rhodes 2003). For the purpose of this chapter, I have used Douglas’ (2000: 1) understanding of governance, in which he

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refers to ‘governance’ as ‘the myriad ways in which people organize themselves, attempt to relate to each other, and represent what they do in the process’. Given that Vanuatu is diverse and complex in its governance system there is a difficulty of creating uniformity and applying a standard definition of governance. Contextual differences, including cultural divergences, render formal control by a single system of governance very difficult to achieve in practice (Chhotray and Stoker 2009). What we have witnessed in post-colonial times is that the processes of establishing liberal democratic institutions in many developing countries have collided with local obligations and expectations, especially where limited attention has been given to the cultural context. For instance, a new emerging culture is easily melted down in the two urban centres (Port Vila and Lugainville) but becomes difficult when you move away from the centres into peripheral areas where 75–80% of population live (VNSO 2009). Not only has the shift to central state authority been problematic, but any move to decentralise power is likely to be very complicated because state capacity is very limited, and the power, roles and relationships of the existing authorities are not clearly defined. This situation is compounded by the diverse nature of a traditional socio-political system that is entrenched along the lines of local values of social obligation, which work in contradiction to legal-rational governance expectations. In the constitution, the kastom jifs are recognised and mandated to preserve and promote kastom governance in all spheres of life. The term jif, or kastom jif, is used to denote a traditional leader who, according to the 1983 national policy of the Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs (MNCC), has inherited his/her position through a bloodline (Lindstrom and White, eds. 1997: 2). The kastom jifs have promoted kastom values of social collectivism, kinship and reciprocal relationships, based on customary values of strong family support and respect for local tradition. These traditional values exist in tension with the legal-rational state authority and liberal expectations of individual property rights, a free market system, democracy, merit, specialised professions, and retributive justice through a courts system. Kastom values of social order have now been grafted onto state political organisations and development but with no clear demarcation of how the two systems can be used complementarily. For instance, the Constitution and new land legislation used kastom laws as a criteria for determining landowners and management of land disputes at all levels of government administration (Daily Post 2005; Garae 2015). Vanuatu politics can be viewed usefully through the lens of

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a patron–client relationship model or family networks. The patron–client network model helps in understanding how informal powers undermine formal legal-rational authority and institutions (Scott 1972). This includes instances where the elected leader is endowed both as a state minister and chief and in the event where the two worlds clash in front of his/her eyes, the chances would be that social norms would prevail against rule of laws (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1998). Christian theology constructs yet another worldview that rejects local values and beliefs, particularly the practices associated with worship and ancestors and eating of allegedly unclean food.6 A woman wanting to leave a violent husband may find that she is being opposed by his family, her family, the local jif and local church leaders and that no one in the village considers that she should have any say in the matter. The state’s Constitution creates and works within a discordant political space that generates conflict and divides Vanuatu societies. In this context, conflict is defined as a state of disharmony between two institutions, or incompatible values, norms and processes that operate in contradictory ways. In all societies there are social structures that determine which values and norms dominate, as well as how different resources are used and distributed (Abrahamsen 2000). Local communities or groups have their own social norms and values, and they will always strive to preserve their existing values and social order. Therefore, it is natural that they will react when there is external interference in their traditional jurisdiction, and they will exploit all the available avenues to maintain their status quo. However, some groups perceive some merit in elements of the introduced ways. For example, this may be the case at times for commoners or women or youths as tradition tends to favour older, titled males in decision-making. Thus tradition, in contrast to democracy, may exclude three-quarters of the population from political participation. The local values of social order and authority are significant pillars within local communities throughout the Vanuatu archipelago, and people rely upon these as a governing system in their daily life. Where the presence of the state is limited and there is no state delivery of

6 Unclean foods are certain products that are defined in Leviticus 11. This belief system is promulgated by the Seventh Day Adventist Church which promotes vegetarianism. Other Christian groups adopt the Old Testament taboos set out in Leviticus which explicitly name pigs as being unclean whereas pigs are very valuable animals that Vanuatu communities use in most of their traditional ceremonies and feasts.

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services to people, local values of social order and authority are critical to the maintenance of social order and the socio-economic well-being of the people. Kastom authority plays an important role in keeping the peace. In some parts of Vanuatu kastom jifs still work as volunteers taking care of the socio-economic and political needs of their respective communities. The implication is that in these communities where the roles of kastom authority are strong there is a strong resistance to legal-rational authority from those who enjoy kastom status and who interpret state-led modernization as a threat to their social and political roles. This situation is compounded by the fact that the Constitution has recognised traditional authorities and state as having their own governance systems, and that these were seen as legitimate foundations for the building of the post-colonial state, resulting in tensions between these two systems. For example, the traditional land tenure system and principles of reciprocity sit incongruently with formal authority and state institutions on many development fronts.

Traditional Society of Vanuatu Vanuatu has 83 inhabited islands with 110 languages and diverse sociopolitical structures that vary within and between each island (Crowley 2000). The people of Vanuatu are sensitive to interference or external pressure and variable in reaction to proposed development trajectories. Within Vanuatu there are many layers of social practices and social expectations; and a significant cultural distance between the legal-rational values of the urban elites and rural-based traditional communities. Such diversity creates an almost insurmountable challenge for Vanuatu as a nation to reconcile with a Westminster style system of government through an elected parliament. Traditional society embraces certain values and practices that sit in tension with both legal-rational expectations and the principles of liberal market economy. In addition to these ‘two worlds’ (traditional society and legal-rational state), Christianity constructs another set of particular values and social institutions that also clash with traditional ideas and traditional beliefs (MacClancy 2002). In some places Christianity has been adopted with such fervour that decisions contested by Church groups are said to be attacking ‘traditional values’. The ‘traditional economy’ is the holistic way of life in the traditional societies of Vanuatu today largely observed only in the traditional local

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communities and remote islands of Vanuatu, and revolves around traditional practices of subsistence farming, social reciprocity, leadership by consensus and inheritance and communal rights. People clear areas of forest, grow yams and taro in their gardens, raise pigs and fowls, gather nuts, collect shellfish and are very skilful at fishing and hunting wild animals (MacClancy 2002). Reflecting back on my life experiences, I was born into a jifly family on the island of Malekula, north Vanuatu. I grew up in a traditional local village in the interior of the island and we got all our food from our garden and the forest.7 Although we were not close to the sea, our relatives who lived in the coastal areas supplied us with all the sea resources that we needed. This social reciprocity system and community support formed an important network that bonded and united our family, and we cherished and valued these exchanges in our local community. At all levels of the community there is a strong sense of collective responsibility to support those who are in need. Indeed, social reciprocity is seemingly one of the embedded social principles across all Vanuatu societies, and often it transcends leadership governance at national levels (Morgan 2004). This is manifest where state leadership and authority are infused with customary practices of social reciprocity between leaders and their communities. As such, cooperation within the communities based on family and kinship, and covering all aspects of development, could be construed as acting against the legalrational state expectations of fairness, equity, and justice.

Building a Post-colonial State The structure of most post-colonial states has been inherited from European colonial powers (Dinnen 2008; Henderson 2003; Larmour 1994). As such, the structure builds on the principles of liberal democracy, which put great emphasis on political participation, competition, and liberty as fundamental objectives of democratic institutions (Fry 2010; Dinnen 2008; Lawson 2010). Larmour (1994) cites the Westminster system as

7 The experiences of different levels of conflict of institutions and clashes of values that

I encountered in my childhood and at the workplace in three different departments of government, in church and village levels prompted me to write about the challenges of adopting and adapting new institutions in a local context. The purpose of my writing is to try to plot a way through the complexities of religion, authority, language and custom in order to find a possible strategy to address the challenge of development in Vanuatu.

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an example of colonial created institutions where one of the requirements was for individual countries to develop their own constitutions. In this model the power is clearly separated between three important institutions: the state legislature or parliament, the executive and the judiciary, with the intention that each institution will provide a check and balance on the other’s performance. Their roles are independent but complementary. According to Bevir and Rhodes (2003), they are meant to facilitate the operation of the market; encourage participatory development and participatory democracy; and empower the state to generate an income to support its operations. Having participatory development and participatory democracy as an ultimate goal of state-building, this dictates the design of democratic institutions in developing states, and influences the development programmes of the multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations (Dinnen 2008; Henderson 2003; Kabutaulaka 2008). These biases have become evident in building post-colonial states in most countries in the South Pacific (Dinnen 2008). In the South Pacific region, Saldanha (2004) argues that the structures adopted in post-colonial constitutions have generally reflected the biases and influence of the colonial masters. Thus the post-colonial states have incorporated the institutional principles and structures of Western democracies, with limited consideration of existing traditional governance institutions. For instance, Larmour (2002: 40) argues that ‘in British, Australian and New Zealand colonies in the Pacific, independence was achieved by transferring executive power from a Governor or High Commissioner to a local executive, responsible to a local legislature’. In a similar vein, Kabutaulaka (2008) notes that in the Solomon Islands the government system was introduced by the British, beginning with government by a committee, called the governing council, which replaced the legislature and executive council. In the case of the South Pacific region, Larmour (2008: 42) notes that the era of decolonisation began in the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in a ‘heyday of Westminster constitution-making’ in which new political values were embedded into constitutions with little input from the local communities. This view is shared in Dinnen’s account of the post-colonial state in Melanesia, where he argues that:

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…[c]olonial powers created arbitrary borders and imposed external systems of governance with little, if any, consideration as to their fit with existing polities and other forms of indigenous social organisation. Colonial states were external creations with (initially, at any rate) an inherently non-democratic character. (2008: 6)

Moreover, Larmour (2008) notes that many ingredients of the postcolonial states’ system in the South Pacific are borrowed from outside or transplanted from experiences elsewhere into the Pacific context. Lamour argues that the introduction of a Westminster style constitution was predominantly influenced by the technical experts and advisors who worked in the best interests of the European colonial powers to hamper the process of political liberation and allow French citizens to permanently settle in Vanuatu. Because of the limited local capacity, local input into constitution making was very minimal, and what are perceived as local ingredients in the constitution were introduced to appease the local political needs of the elite at that time (Dinnen 2008). In the Solomon Islands, Dinnen (2008: 7) notes that at ‘the time of independence in 1978 there were only about a dozen university graduates’. This reflection can also be made on other neighbouring states that were decolonised in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (Dinnen 2008; Lawson 2010; VanTrease 1995). Initially, as is argued by Dinnen (2008), the building of post-colonial states occurred when neither the colonial authority nor the indigenous local authorities were ready to accept new political challenges. Some commentators refer to the approach of development agencies in the Pacific as a ‘hands-on approach’, where they bring foreign personnel to occupy the senior positions and run most of these institutions on behalf of the locals (Dinen 2008; Lawson 2010). In this scenario, the sustainability of these institutions and associated reforms is questionable, when aid agencies and development assistance leave the recipient country, as has been demonstrated in the case of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) (Dinnen 2008; Kabutaulaka 2008). Similarly, the question of sustainability also arises with the promotion of ‘participation’ through projects and, as McGee (2002) points out, the sustainability of participation will always be challenged once a project reaches its conclusion. The political adoption and adaptation of democratic institutions in Vanuatu confronts the challenge of finding a local connection between kastom governance and authority and the legal-rational state system and

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elected legislative authority. This creates a governance gap with the incongruity between the social reciprocity of customary (kastom) practices, and the expectations of the state governance and the principles of a rational market economy (McLeod and Morgan 2007).

Constitution and Kastom Governance The jifly Administrative Council is an example of a mistake that has been made in adapting kastom authority and power within Vanuatu. It was conceived and designed by European colonial authorities as an administrative agency to mediate between locals and the colonial state. As such, it elevated a structure out of its local context and created a hybrid system in which legal-rational and democratic values were intended to mix with local social order and authority, as reflected in the election of kastom jifs. The election of jifs to political office impacted on the voluntary roles of jifs in that the now elected jifs were remunerated to perform their national duties as well as their normal duties at the village level. The colonial authorities bypassed the kastom authorities and created two new leadership positions, that of missionary chief and of assessor,8 to serve as members of the jifly administrative council in local communities (Allen 1984). In addition, a new code of conduct of practices, such as restraining work on Sunday and requiring marriage in churches, was enacted by the Europeans and enforced by the Administrative Council, which went against the kastom authorities and social order in the local communities (Bonnemaison 1975; Guiart 1954). For instance, the churches banned polygamy, drinking kava and dancing for the spirits of ancestors of which it created ill-feeling with the traditional leaders. Thus it can be argued that the colonial approach to law and order in the pre-independent era was as indifferent to local context as is the current World Bank model of good governance. However, as noted above, many Ni-Vanuatu adopted the values of the churches to the point of regarding them as being indigenous, which is hardly the case with the World Bank’s prescriptions. The formation of Vanuatu’s jifly Administrative Council during the colonial era can be read as an aggressive move to undermine local values of social order, norms, processes and the kastom authorities. It was an 8 This is a new leadership position created by the two colonial powers (French and British) to act as a middleman between local communities and colonial authority (Rodman 1977).

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aggressive move because terms and conditions of the Council reflected bureaucratic legal-rational forms of administration. Jifs were placed in an awkward if not untenable position, as icons of tradition and kastom within an antagonistic state apparatus. The state only used jifs in times of conflict to resolve differences between two cultural groups and bring back peace and order as in the case of the conflict between the Tanna and Ambrym communities 2007 (Garae 2007). One of the major challenges that the local political leaders dealt with during the constitutional drafting in the pre-independence period, was to ensure that the institutional design of the jifly council was grounded on traditional values of social order and pre-existing norms, and processes. The emergent power struggle between European-centred notions of state authority and those of kastom authority was clearly displayed in the discussions of the constitutional drafting committee. The analysis of the minutes of constitutional drafting committee demonstrates the challenge of embedding legal-rational system with that of kastom governance and authority. In the preparations for independence, a constitutional drafting committee was established by the Representative Assembly in April 1979, and was given a six months timeframe to design the whole political and institutional framework for the newly independent state of Vanuatu. This committee was composed of four major groups, as depicted in Table 1: kastom jif representatives; Conseil des Ministres (Council of Ministers); Assemblée Representatives (Representative Assembly); and members of the Vanuaaku Party (Minutes 1979). During the drafting of the Constitution the debates were not so much on how to transpose the legitimacy of individual kastom jif s, and of kastom authority in its multifarious forms, to a jifly institution where jifs were agents of the state at the local and national levels, but rather the discussions and negotiations of the constitutional committee concerned the need to find a space for jifly institutions within the state apparatus. In other words, the Minutes of the Constitutional Committee suggest that the state approach to building post-colonial institutions was more assimilationist than transformative, and thus there remained two forms of authority that operated on different principles and embraced two different sets of social orders and leadership expectations. Hence, in Vanuatu as elsewhere, the colonial effort to assimilate legal-rational authority with that of kastom authority did not work. The inclusion of the kastom jifs representative on the Constitutional Committee was important because they remained a crucial political force at the local level and people still relied on them to address their daily

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Table 1

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Members of the constitutional drafting committee of Vanuatu

Names

Position

Affiliation

1. W. Lini

VP Presidenta

2. D. Kalpokas 3. G. Prevot 4. L. Dini 5. A. Malere 6. G. Kalkoa 7. T. Reuben 8. J. Naupa 9. G. Laymang 10. M. Carlot 11. W. Bangmatur 12. F. Timakata

Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member UMP Presidentc Interim President Member

13. 14. 15. 16.

M. Tacemata J. Tambe J. Nerua G. Cronstead

Member Member Member President

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

T. Tungu J. Quarani J.M. Leye V. Boulekone G. Pakoa G. Molisa K. Matas B. Sope J. Natuman L. Vatu G. Kalsakau S. Regenvanu J. Stepen Prof. Yash Ghai Prof. Zorgbibe

Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Leader Leader Secretary General Leader Technical Advisor Technical Advisor

Conseil des Ministres (Council of Ministersb ) Conseil des Ministres Conseil des Ministres Conseil des Ministres Conseil des Ministres Conseil des Ministres Conseil des Ministres Conseil des Ministres Conseil des Ministres Conseil des Ministres Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefsd Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs Assemblée Representatives (Commission Ad Hoc) Assemblée Representatives Assemblée Representatives Assemblée Representatives Assemblée Representatives Vanuaku Party (VP) Vanuaku Party Vanuaku Party Vanuaku Party Vanuaku Party Tabwemassana Natatok Efate New Hebrides Christian Council Nagriamel British Government Representative French Government Representative

Source Minutes of the Constitution (1979) a Vanuaku Party (VP) represented the English speaking section of Vanuatu population who educated in English schools and affiliated to religious grouping that are English speaking. Their roles is to fight for the interests of Vanuatu to reclaim back their lands from the two colonial governments b The Council of Ministers were appointed by the two colonial governments to represent the interests of Vanuatu population c Union of Moderate Party (UMP) represented the majority of French speaking section of Vanuatu population d The representative of jifs was selected based on his ability to speak either French, English, or bislama fluently and hold senior government position during the ruling of the two condominium governments

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needs. Their presence and influence in the local communities in Vanuatu is still very real, and therefore the success or failure of the Vanuatu democratic experiment in some ways depends on how this traditional political institution is incorporated into the new political order. However, kastom authority was from the outset construed by the constitution framers as a ‘threat’ to the state, which had to be neutralised rather than accommodated, with the ‘balance of power’ reoriented away from the local community level institutions towards the centre (Minutes 1979). Colonialist perceptions and priorities had a defining impact on the design of the jifly administration and thus the institutional responsibilities of the jifs were restricted to advice and consultation. The Constitutional Committee provided an opportunity to redress this power ‘imbalance’, but the chance was not taken. At the beginning of the discussions, the Chairman of the Constitutional Committee, Gerald Laymang, requested Professor Yash Ghai to prepare a submission paper on the role of chiefs and experiences in different countries (Minutes 1979: 19). This submission paper did indeed allow an opportunity for the Constitutional Committee to explore different models and practices around the globe in order to have a better knowledge of various ways to incorporate the jifly institution into state structures. The discussions centred on how West Africa (particularly in the Hausa provinces of Nigeria) had integrated the traditional institutions of chiefs within the state apparatus (Miles 1993). In Niger, the French had incorporated pliable chiefs into their own bureaucracy, strictly as executors of French administrative policy. The British, on the other hand, conferred great autonomy to the chiefs within their own colonies (Miles 1993). As William Miles points out, chiefs under British colonial rule emerged at independence with greater power and authority vis-a-vis the national government than did their counterparts in former French territories (1993: 33). In Nigeria, chieftaincy retained control of local government as head of the Native Administration, previously known as the Native Authority. However, the joint influence of the two European countries (France and Britain) in Vanuatu resulted in a different institutional outcome in which kastom authority remained independent, albeit with an unclear framework, as to their interaction with the state. Their power, roles and boundaries at the national, regional and sub-regional levels were not defined with clarity or respect to tradition and this became an emerging challenge for the formal authority and institutions.

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The following are excerpts from the deliberation of the Committee on the power struggle between kastom authority and a legislative state authority. In discussing how to adapt kastom authority of jifs into the state system, the Committee agreed that, while a position needed to be found for the jifs, their role in the conduct of national affairs should be limited. The discussions were intense, as members expressed their views on how best the kastom authority could be incorporated within the state, and what sorts of power and role the jifly institution would have at the national level (Minutes 1979: 19). There were two opposing positions presented during the discussions. Firstly, the local elites who were on the Committee argued that Jifs’s roles need to be recognised at the state level and that they should form a second chamber in the Parliament (Minutes 1979: 19). Without fleshing out how this would work in practice, the colonial representative on the committee foresaw a risk that jifly inclusion at the state levels may cause conflict of power. Professor Yash Ghai discussed the role of chiefs in a number of countries and summarised the previous discussion on chiefs. He felt that the role of chiefs in the New Hebrides was somewhat different from that of chiefs in other countries. He felt it would be wise not to take any firm decision for the time being (Minutes 1979: 19). These positions illustrate the tensions between conceptions of the legitimacy of legislative and kastom authority, and the place of each within a single nation. The proposals to have the jifly institution as an upper house or to establish reserved seats for jifs in the National Assembly generated divided opinions on the powers and roles of the jifly institution. Some committee members felt that it was important to give equal consideration to the powers and authority of jifs with that of the legislative authority in the development of Vanuatu. When it came for the consideration of power allocation between the two authorities, again there were two alternative positions presented (Minutes 1979: 29): One of the committee members, Andre Malere, argued ‘that the power and the functions of the chiefs should be defined first of all’ (Minutes 1979: 19). Malere’s proposal, if considered, could have provided a starting point. Prof. Zorgbibe said ‘he examined the possibility of having a second house for chiefs in the legislature and explained the nature of the House of Lords in England and the Senate in France. He said there appeared to be at least two possibilities in the New Hebrides: an upper house for the chiefs; or a reserved number of seats for chiefs in a single-chamber

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Assembly. In the second alternative, he said, thought would have to be given to the powers granted to the chiefs—to give them the same powers as the democratically elected people’s representatives could create problems and conflicts. (Minutes 1979: 19)

These positions indicate the determination of local political elites to maintain kastom authority on an equal footing or recognition of power-sharing in decision-making with legislative authority. However, their views clashed with European notions of state-centred authority, as clearly expressed by Professor Zorgbibe. The two systems of authority rested on two distinct sets of expectations of leadership and social order. Because there was little room to reach a consensus on having equal powers and authority between kastom authority and legislative authority, the Chairman of the Committee and member of the Conseil des Ministres , Father Gerald Laymang, sought the consensus of the committee to quarantine the discussions on the traditional institution of jifs until there was a clear concept of the state political structure (Minutes 1979). The implication of this decision would be that the incorporation of kastom authority within the state would be determined by the type of political model that the Committee ultimately agreed upon. Indeed, at the end of the discussions the committee agreed on one assembly, as was reflected in the summary of the Committee discussions, which showed: [a] consensus existed within the constitutional committee in favour of one assembly, one government, one state, one Constitution and decentralisation. This was because the committee did not think that the model of a federal state would be possible to unite all the people of the New Hebrides [Vanuatu]. (Minutes 1979)

This decision did not put to rest the fight for equal recognition of traditional powers at national, regional and sub-regional levels. The kastom authority pressed strongly for their powers to be recognised at the national level and, as such, they opted for the position of the Head of State to be reserved for jifs. This was a proposal that put the Committee into a challenging if not awkward position, and as such it generated deeply frustrating discussions, as reflected in the Minutes (Minutes 1979: 55).

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The Minutes show that the chances of the local political elites who were pushing for equal recognition of the two authorities in the newly established political institution of Vanuatu were slim, as the British representative on the committee argued strongly that this would create conflict between the legislative and kastom authority (Minutes 1979: 55). The flow of the discussions was more towards the European model of a liberal democracy, and the kastom authority was perceived by the two colonial representatives on the committee as a threat to a newly democratic institution. This view influenced the design of the Constitution and the political institutions that emerged in Vanuatu, and this resulted in the kastom authority being simply located in the Constitution as a separate and independent institution with an advisory role. In the final stage of the constitutional drafting in September 1979, jif Bongmatur, interim president of MNCC at the time, made the following comments: I appreciated that the Committee had decided not to go back to any of the agreements already reached; however, that it should be aware of the possible consequences of the decision made concerning the role of chiefs. The right of chiefs had not been clearly stated in the draft chapter on the national Council of Chiefs: the chiefs had, rather, been reduced to an advisory body and would find it difficult, as a consequence, to continue to play a leading role in the villages. (Minutes 1979: 124)

This quotation illustrates that the Constitution set a power imbalance that without specifying how it would empower jifs at the national and village level the jifs would find it very difficult to make decisions on certain issues such as murder, theft or trespasses. This is because the Constitution provided an avenue for jif’s decision to be challenged in court using western legal frameworks. This has implications for the roles of jifs at the village and the national levels. The kastom jifs were not satisfied with the way the Constitution dealt with their power and roles. They felt that their rights to govern their lands and people were infringed by imposed political institutions. For instance, the new land tenure system of leasing implied that individual landowners have the power to make decisions on land without the consent of jifs. This foreign interference in the rights and roles of the kastom authority was a continuing political issue: local communities felt that foreigners were taking away their rights over land and resources through imposed

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institutions. The introduced system of leasing land is a case in point, it leaves traditional authorities with no capacity to claim back the land when the lease expires. As was stated by jif Bongmatur, the kastom authorities would continue to fight for their rights and roles to be recognised at all levels of state administration in Vanuatu. It would be viewed as a mistake for the Constitution to suppress the power and role of the kastom jifs to one of merely consultation and advice. Consultative status meant the kastom authority would have no law-making powers; it would be kept outside parliament, and thus have only a status outside of the three arms of state, executive, legislative and judiciary. It left in place, however, the political bases of traditional power exercised through kastom authority, derived though indirect elections of members by the district/village and island councils of jifs. Restricting the role of kastom jifs to the village, island and regional levels would not therefore restrict their de facto power (Minutes 1979). Walter Lini, the leader of the pro-independence movement and the first Prime Minister of Vanuatu, said that the Constitution was prepared in the best interests of colonial authorities rather than of the people of Vanuatu since it affirmed democratic values as compared to kastom values: He felt that a Constitution was being prepared simply to satisfy France and Britain. The danger of preparing a Constitution to satisfy France and Britain was that, once the New Hebrides [Vanuatu] tried to alter it after their independence to suit their needs and culture, they would find themselves already trapped in international, rather than New Hebridean practices. He concluded by feeling that the Committee was confused by the need on the one hand, to satisfy international requirements and, on the other hand, New Hebridean values and culture. (Minutes 1979: 30)

Lini believed that Vanuatu was to be saddled with the legacy of an institution that did not ‘fit’ into its socio-cultural landscape and yet within which jifly members were able to exercise considerable informal power. The informal powers of jifs are uncodified in the law but yet are respected widely within each kastom jurisdiction. These include powers to distribute resources and lands, impose penalties, and resolve disputes. What was not realised at the time was that this tension created the potential for abuse and the furtherance of individual political interests.

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For instance an elected member of Parliament who has the title of jif can use kastom laws to cover his/her illegal behaviour when holding public office (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1998). At the national level as well as the institutional level, the ambiguities surrounding the power of the legislative authority alongside the kastom authority are an ongoing challenge that Vanuatu will need to make serious decisions about in order to advance its governance reform and development objectives. Although expressing some frustration and self-interest, Lini’s quotation illustrates the views of a number of participants, namely that the jifly institution was dropped into the Constitution for the sake of satisfying local political interests but with no real intention of allocating any formal powers to it. Lini said that there were three issues deliberately side-tracked by the Constitutional Committee and these issues still pose major challenges to the whole governance framework within Vanuatu. Firstly, equal power-sharing in the development of Vanuatu between kastom authority and the legislative authority was not factored to the design of the Constitution, and as such the power struggle between the two institutions is an ongoing challenge. Secondly, the shifting function of jifs from an individual authority to the function of jifs as institution lacks clarity regarding their working relationship and powers at different levels on the Council. Thirdly, the Western political elements employed in the jifly Council such as election of jifs did not work well given the opposed values of the two systems. For instance, the election of jifs challenges the traditional political structure where leadership are either inherited or won through consensus (Allen 1972).

Governance Space The Malvatumaori National Council of Chief (MNCC) was formally established in 1980 as per the Constitution. The Constitution restricted the members of the council to kastom jifs only, and this was intentional to avoid confusion with missionary chiefs and assessors. However, this provision did not establish any basis for electoral legitimacy. The 1983 MNCC policy guidelines defined the criteria for kastom jifs as follows (Lindstrom 1997: 219): The position of jif must be inherited through a bloodline.

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• A true kastom jif is someone who follows the proper kastom fashion and has a nasara,9 nakamal,10 land and people. • A true kastom jif is someone who is known by the whole village and has killed the pigs at the nasara, and people from his village have followed him and participated in his pig killing ceremony. • His title name and meaning must be in his original language. Those specifications can be interpreted as an attempt by the local political elites to keep kastom authority in its authentic form and to grant them more power in the development of Vanuatu. However, as was pointed out by Father Walter Lini, once the local political elites realised the need to amend the Constitution after independence in favour of their traditional and cultural needs, they would find themselves already trapped in an international model rather than Vanuatu practices. This is still the present dilemma, in which Vanuatu as a state is juggling between the notions of either putting tradition within modernity or modernity within tradition. While kastom authority figures continue to pressure the state to grant them formal power in the development of Vanuatu neither time nor equity is on their side.

Election of Kastom Jifs The Constitution provides that the National Council of Chiefs shall be composed of custom chiefs [kastom jif ] elected by their peers sitting in District Councils of Chiefs. (2) The Council shall make its own rules of procedure. (3) The Council shall hold at least one meeting a year. Further meetings may be held at the request of the Council, Parliament, or the Government. (4) During the first sitting following its election the Council shall elect its Chairman (Constitution of Vanuatu 1980). The MNCC and Island Council of Chiefs are composed of the elected kastom jifs, and this is a strict criterion. The representatives of the Urban Council of Chiefs are

9 Nasara This is a consecrated area and a house where a chief conducts the pig killing ceremony, and also it is a place where the head of clans performed the leadership ranking ceremony. 10 Nakamal This is a traditional house in a village that symbolises the functional leadership structure of a village. It is where members meet and dialogue over certain issues affecting their welfare and also discuss ceremonial activities such as marriage, circumcisions, funerary services, and birth celebration (Huffer and Molisa 1999b).

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not elected, but the law makes provision for the Island Council of Chiefs to appoint them to become members of the MNCC. This clearly suggests a hybrid system of government that is not appropriate in the Vanuatu context. While the value of elections was acknowledged, voting rights for the election of MNCC representatives is limited to the kastom jifs, which denies any popular mandate for decision-making (Allen 1972). The codification of the inheritance principle arguably also contradicts useful flexibility inherent in jifly rule, and represents the adoption of western European notions of aristocracy and royalty into Vanuatu’s independence Constitution. This is indeed a political model that does not work well in practice and arguably works against the grain of the traditional political value of leadership through community consensus, because the decision to appoint MNCC members excludes the communities that kastom jifs are supposed to serve. An important element of community oversight or accountability is lost in the process. There are twenty members of the MNCC, who are elected by the twenty Island Councils of Chiefs. The state, through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, can by order provide for the regulation and conduct of elections of members of the Council, at national and island levels. The first election was held in 1979, and the process of election and the total number of members of the Council were prescribed through the order made by the Minister of Internal Affairs, in which it was agreed that five kastom jifs would come from each district. There was no record of the kastom jifs throughout the archipelago, and the election had many irregularities in voter registration and the number of voters. It is often the case that, prior to an election, the Island Council of Chiefs have already decided on their candidate through ‘consensus’, and the selections are done on a rotating term basis, which gives the opportunity for all area councils to become members or the President of the MNCC. The ordinary citizens are excluded from voting and participating in this election process, and therefore they have no voice or ability to decide who should be the members of the Island Council and MNCC. Indeed, the limited financial resources and the capacity of the kastom jifs prevent them from competing in elections, which means that the election is done by consensus rather than competition. Thus, the limited participation of kastom jifs and the exclusion of the population in the election of the jifly councils was deliberately intended to protect traditional political values of hereditary rule; but it contradicts the principal values of democracy. Thus, an opportunity to use kastom authority to build the foundation

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of a democratic society has paradoxically been sacrificed in the interests of administrative convenience and state-building, as opposed to nation state-building. The other feature that was confused was the decentralisation function of jifs, which was demarcated by the two colonial powers based on the principle of administrative efficiency. This has not worked because of different traditions and cultures being mixed together within one vaguely defined boundary, and there is no clear understanding of specific rules as to which culture and traditions take precedence in local political affairs. The ambiguities and tensions this created have merely increased opportunities for the abuse of power.

Functions of MNCC The Constitution spelled out two primary functions of the jifly councils: • A competence to discuss all matters relating to custom and tradition and make recommendations for the preservation and promotion of ni-Vanuatu culture and languages; • Provide inputs and answers on any question relating to traditional land and custom, in connection with any bill before parliament. These two principal functions have been further elaborated in the MNCC Act of 2006, and the functions now include: ‘resolve disputes according to local kastom; prescribe the value of exchange of gifts for a kastom marriage; promote and encourage the use of kastom and culture; promote peace, stability and harmony; and promote and encourage sustainable social and economic development’ (National Council of Chiefs Act 2006). The rest of the sections in the Act confine the functions of the Council to the registration of kastom jifs and advice on matters relating to custom, as well as overseeing the operation of the Island Council of Chiefs and the Urban Council of Chiefs. There is no mention of the working relationship of the MNCC with the state, except the provision that the Constitution provided for an opportunity for ‘consultation’ between the two institutions, Parliament and MNCC. In this framework, the working relationship of the jifly council with the state is pitched at the advisory and consultative level. The potential for kastom jifs to play an active role in the development of Vanuatu received insufficient attention during the constitutional

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design. Father Walter Lini said that if the jif wanted a leadership role in the development of the state they had the choice of becoming the political leaders and contesting the national parliamentary seats (Minutes 1979). To date, the kastom jifs have proven beyond doubt that they can make a meaningful contribution to the development of Vanuatu without contesting elections for national parliamentary seats. At the local and national levels the jifs play an important role in taking care of the socio-economic needs of their community, and people rely on them to address their needs. In the everyday lives of rural people, the prime institution of authority remains the kastom jifs, and to a limited extent the state (Howell and Hall 2010). Several studies on the role of jifs in the rural areas suggest that jifs play an important role in realising customary law, addressing disputes about landownership, and maintaining peace and social order within and among tribes (Howell and Hall 2010; Maltali et al. 2009).

MNCC Status The MNCC has an independent status. In April 1982, the council held its annual meeting and invited the Attorney General to provide a full explanation of the status and the work of the council of chiefs. At the end of the meeting, the council requested the Attorney General to write up and send the explanation to council. Thus on 9 June 1982, the Attorney General wrote a four-page letter outlining the status, functions and powers of the Council and its relationship with the state. The letter confirmed the following: The MNCC is an independent body and it does not come strictly into any of the usual constitutionally recognised arms of the state [the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary]. At the same time, however the Constitution does contain many references,11 express and implied, as to how and when the council may function in relation to other state institutions. The question then: is the national council of chiefs a state institution or not? The answer to this question is important because it determines whether

11 Chapter 5 of the Constitution is about the establishment of the National Council of Jifs. Chapter 8 is about the establishment of judiciary and again article 51 made provision about the rules of custom. Chapter 9 is about land management and development and custom governance remains as one of the main determinants of land ownership.

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or not the council is entitled to amongst other things, state financial assistance. As mentioned, the council is an independent body therefore it cannot be part of the government of the day. It therefore certainly cannot be part of the Ministry of Home Affairs. (Department of Attorney General 1982)

This legal view clearly underlines the constitutional ambiguities surrounding the adoption of the role of kastom authority. The Attorney General’s views were based on the then status of the Constitution, which remained the same from the time of its inauguration on the 30th of July 1980. It is evident from the aforementioned quote that the Constitution did not achieve its objectives to integrate the kastom authority with the state. However, a major development occurred in 1982 when for the first time the state, through the Parliament, committed state finances to support the operation of the MNCC and accepted it as one of the state’s institutions. While the Constitution enshrines an independent status to the council of chiefs, since 1982 the MNCC has begun to operate as part of the state bureaucracy. In each financial year the council submits to the Minister of Finance its expenditure estimates relating to its functions. Under this working relationship, the Parliament and the Executive have a powerful influence on the operation of the Council in that the Council of Ministers has the power and the final say in the drawing up of the national budget before the Parliament considers it. This means that although the MNCC has a constitutional and legal right to be funded by the state, how much money the Council actually receives in the annual budget allocations depends on what the Executive and the Parliament deem are relevant and viable activities to be undertaken by the council. The change of MNCC’s status to that of a functional bureaucracy has altered the power dynamics between the MNCC and Executive, in that the MNCC is now assigned its administrative roles by the state and thus it is accountable to the state and not to the people. This is critical because the MNCC as an institution is now being absorbed into the government machinery as one of the state’s administrative agents, and as such it has not got a popular mandate. While, in democratic theory, the state is the embodiment of the people’s sovereignty, and in being accountable to the state the MNCC is being accountable to the people, this link is not obvious in the eyes of the majority of kastom jifs at the local level who are not members of the MNCC.

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The kastom jifs are not happy with the integration of the MNCC as an administrative agent of the government (Cullwick 2013). They wanted the MNCC institution to be separated, as was implied in the Constitution, and to have a strong formal authority and power to actively participate in the development of Vanuatu rather than become a follower of the government. The kastom authorities are still struggling to find their rightful space within the current state political institution. This is an ongoing issue and a factor in current Vanuatu politics. It also demonstrates that the merging of the jifly institution with state administration organs has further exacerbated the complexities surrounding the continuous conflict of powers between kastom authority on the one hand and the executive and parliament on the other hand. The frustrations of the kastom authority with the ways in which the ways in which the Constitution has been interpreted have diminished their independent authority and reduced their role to that of an advisory panel is still an inherent governance challenge for Vanuatu. At present kastom authority is pressuring the state to amend the Constitution in order to spell out clearly the power relationship between state legislative authorities and the jifly institution. such as the case of 2014 where the constitution was amended to make it compulsory for government to consult the kastom authority. Indeed, the jifs want to have some form of formal authority over the manners and ways Vanuatu is planning and managing its development programmes. One of the kastom jifs from East Pentecost, jif Viraleo Boborenvanua, argues that: [c]hiefs [jifs ] in Vanuatu must be given the necessary power to safeguard Vanuatu’s resources. This means giving power to the chiefs and making sure they are responsible for our lands, our customs and our country. He questioned government: Why is it that the picture of the coat of arms printed on the front of the Vatu [Vanuatu’s local currency] symbolises the chief, who is paramount, but the chiefs do not hold the power of this country? He said the picture on the Vatu is clear and explained that the government is an institution under the chiefs, and Members of Parliament should take their rightful place as workers, working for chiefs in Vanuatu. (Lini 2005: 3)

This illustrates a view shared by the kastom authorities, who felt that the state is actually taking away their rights and power to govern Vanuatu, and make important decisions that will impact on the local communities.

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For instance, the decision to amend land laws and introduce a lease system impacted on the traditional land tenure system. This debate is serious because it illustrates the magnitude of frustration that the kastom authority has with the state legislative authority and, most importantly, it is similar to the argument made three decades ago when the constitutional committee deliberated on the power and authority of the two institutions (Minutes 1979). Critically, the kastom authority has a view that the jifly council is a supreme institution that the parliament and other state institutions should be subordinate to (Lini 2005). There is a deeply held view that the jifs do not view the government as the sovereign authority, and this is critical because it impacts on the legitimacy of the state. As far as democracy and the sovereign state model are concerned, the central government is the supreme authority exercising legislative and executive power. The present battle of power between the kastom authority and the legislative authority illustrates that the jifs claiming significant executive authority for themselves to ensure that their traditional power to govern resources and people at their local level is not disrupted. This is a lasting power struggle that the Constitution drafting committee failed to resolve. Indeed, the question remains as to whether any Constitution could possibly enshrine both democracy and the role of traditional, non-elected chiefs. In Botswana, for example, a chief who wishes to stand for elective office has to resign as a chief (Miles 1993). While acknowledging the limitations of kastom governance, especially its conservative, patriarchal and hierarchical structures of authority, the MNCC institution of jifs at least enjoys a measure of legitimacy with the general population (MacClancy 2002). This chapter offers an insight into how the way the Constitution was designed created an opportunity for politicians and public officials in the legal-rational state of Vanuatu to enjoy substantial patronage power as a consequence of their positions within the kastom authority network. The distinction between tradition and modern legal-rational system reveals the contrast in authority-making practices, between jifly clans, exemplified by nakamal, and the legalrational processes of the state, exemplified by the use of patronage power: both affect the directions of state resources (Ron 2011). The nation of Vanuatu is built on two systems of authority that work in contradiction to each other. This gap, between kastom authority and traditional values of social order on the one hand, and those of state legislative authority and governance expectations on the other hand, provides room for practices that are frequently deemed as moral and sensible

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in traditional local communities of Vanuatu, but have been interpreted at the state level as immoral. Thus there are complex governance and government shortfalls that cannot be easily solved by implanting institutions without consultation and negotiation with targeted recipients.

Conclusion The efforts to transform and fully integrate jifly institutions into a legalrational state architecture failed, and as a consequence Vanuatu continues to embrace two distinct forms of authority that are based on two different sets of social order and expectations. The design for the MNCC as an institution was based on the concepts of modern administrators and the needs of a modern administration, and it was intended to bridge a gap between kastom authority and state authority. However, the shift in the functions of the kastom jifs as individual authorities within their respective jurisdictions to the functions of jifs as an institution created a wider gap of understanding between the functional relationship of the individual kastom jifs with MNCC. In other words, the boundary between kastom jifs at the village levels with councils and the state is blurred, because the democratic values of the state and the pre-existing values of the traditional political authority of jifs overlap and blend together, and come into conflict in ways that are contradictory and mutually transforming. In Vanuatu the jifs have advocated for equal powers and authority with the state, and have wanted to become an equal partner with the state in all development implementation. This is a plea the Constitution failed to accommodate, and as such it remains a recurrent governance challenge for Vanuatu. Kastom authority and governance are lively and resilient institutions that serve well the socio-economic and political needs of eighty percent of the population who live in rural and remote islands of Vanuatu. They also contribute to effective government and the well-being of communities under social and economic stress across the nation (Howell and Hall 2010; Maltali et al. 2009). The jifs continue to promote a governance model based on traditional values of social order and authority that fail to work consistently in parallel with rational-legal state governance expectations. The governance space between these two sets of values and expectations at the state administration level too often creates an empty space into which there is a significant opportunity for malpractices to emerge within Vanuatu government institutions. An understanding of the governance space, in terms of the two sets of social relations and orders in a

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localised political context, engenders a greater appreciation of how some elements of kastom authority and governance can be woven together with that of best international practices as a new fabric for Vanuatu.

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Index

A Abunzi, 106, 108, 109 Afghanistan, 23 African Academy of Languages (ACALAN), 225 African Consolidated Resources (ACR), 122 African governance, 7, 16, 17, 33, 214 African language ecology, 221, 230 African languages, 7, 17, 52, 111, 212, 217, 220, 224–226, 228, 231, 232 African Minerals Limited (AML), 28 African National Congress (ANC), 173, 177, 181, 182 African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), 182 African Power and Politics Programme (APPP), 38–40 African research, 33 African systems of political governance, 213

African traditions, 13 African Union (AU), 215, 228. See also Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Afro-Asiatic languages, 222 Afrobarometer data, 2, 52 Alleviate poverty, 18, 126 Alternative justice system, 106, 109, 114 Alternative vision of Africa, 33 Amharic, 16, 223 Angola, 11, 135, 224 Anti-British revolution, 5 Assemblée Representatives , 251. See also Representative Assembly Assessment of Data Availability, 38 Association for the Social Promotion of the Masses (APROSOMA), 98, 99 B Bad governance, 9, 12, 15, 16, 29, 37, 174

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. I. Lahai and H. Ware (eds.), Governance and Societal Adaptation in Fragile States, Governance and Limited Statehood, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40134-4

269

270

INDEX

Bantustans , 196. See also Homelands Bashingantahe, 4, 114 Berlin Conference of 1884, 214 Botswana, 16, 17, 33, 36, 57, 223, 224, 264 Bureaucratic, 4, 8, 34, 35, 48, 49, 53, 129, 176, 199, 250 Burma, 24 Burundi, 3, 4, 30, 33, 43–45, 95–97, 101–104, 112–115, 221, 223

C Cameroon, 7, 221, 223, 224 Capacity Building Trust Fund, 46 Cape Verde, 33 Central African Republic, 22, 223 Centre for Research Governance (CRG), 135 Centre for the Advanced Study of African Society (CASAS), 224 Chad, 223 Chiadzwa Development Community Trust (CCDT), 123, 128–130, 135 Chiefs, 7, 8, 39–41, 111, 238, 252–255, 257, 259, 261–264 China Railway Materials (CRM), 28 Christian, 13, 31, 44, 240. See also Christianity Christianity, 8, 240, 245 Civil society, 19, 22, 24, 39, 44, 49, 88, 107, 124, 125, 135, 136, 151, 156, 172, 174, 178, 181, 215 Clientist, 46 Colombia, 23, 24 COMESA, 219 Communal family, 31 Communion, 220 Communist Party, 79

Community-based organisations (CBOs), 119, 123, 124, 127–130, 134–139 Conseil des Ministres , 250, 251. See also Council of Ministers Constitutional Committee, 239, 250, 252, 254, 257, 264 Control of Corruption, 16, 18, 27, 212 Core Cultural Value, 42 Corruption, 1, 3, 6, 9, 11, 14–21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 40, 41, 47, 52–54, 73, 74, 76–79, 88–90, 112–114, 152, 171–176, 178, 181–185, 190, 194, 201, 202, 207 Council of Ministers, 250, 251, 262 Cronyism, 171, 173, 175, 176 Culture, 3, 17, 37, 41, 43, 44, 53, 57, 74, 76, 77, 99, 107, 110, 111, 113, 134, 137, 138, 147, 165, 177, 215, 231, 240, 243, 256, 260 Cyril Ramaphosa, 182

D Delta, 23, 54, 78 Democracy, 2, 4, 11, 18–22, 27, 30, 36, 38, 40, 51, 53, 57, 67, 68, 72, 106, 107, 115, 150, 155, 159, 163–165, 174, 175, 179, 184, 230, 231, 239, 243, 244, 246, 247, 255, 259, 264 Democratic Alliance (DA), 27, 178, 180 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 23, 47, 135, 221, 223 Depoliticization, 14 Dictator, 15 Dominican Order, 180

INDEX

E East African Community (EAC), 112, 114, 115 Eastern Cape Province, 6, 195 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), 3, 68, 76, 78, 84, 89 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 219, 223 Economic decay, 11 Economic dilemma, 11 Economic Freedom Front, 182 Economic growth, 14, 26, 38–40, 52, 72, 113, 171, 177, 184 Elected government, 15 Elections, 7, 16, 18, 29, 35, 36, 38, 43, 68, 80–83, 98, 99, 101–103, 138, 139, 161, 176, 238, 256, 259, 261 Electricity Access Rollout Programme (EARP), 111 English, 17, 160, 222, 224, 225, 228, 237, 240, 251 Ethiopia, 11, 33, 34, 41, 219, 223 Ethnicization, 219 European Union (EU), 44, 48 Everydayness, 6, 190 Exclusion, 52, 99, 161, 190, 191, 201, 206, 218, 235, 259 Executive, 3, 19, 21, 28, 42, 50, 67, 68, 71, 83–88, 113, 176, 241, 247, 256, 261–264 F Failed States Index, 13 Farmers, 33, 42, 138 Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 133 Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR), 100 Fragility, 2, 6, 32, 46, 47, 96, 97, 101, 103, 115, 149

271

French, 7, 17, 30, 32, 100, 224, 225, 228, 238, 239, 248, 249, 251, 252 Fund for Peace, 13

G G20 Summit, 14 Gabon, 27 Gacaca, 106, 109, 110 Gambia, 223 GDP, 14, 28, 33, 34, 105 Ghanaian, 31, 35 Gibson Mission, 191, 192, 195, 197, 198, 202, 205 Girinka cows for poor families program, 4 Girinka programme, 107, 108, 111 Good governance, 3, 5, 6, 12–22, 26, 27, 38, 39, 45, 46, 48, 49, 57, 68, 89, 138, 139, 171–176, 183, 185, 186, 212, 213, 249 Good institutions, 12, 38 Good persons, 12 Government Effectiveness, 16, 27, 212 Grass-roots, 15, 16 Gross National Income (GNI), 14, 44 Growth, 13, 14, 18, 33, 34, 37, 52, 53, 66, 84, 97, 105, 112, 161, 171, 172, 177 Guinea, 75, 223 Guinea-Bissau, 223

H Hausa, 16, 223, 225, 226 HIV/AIDS, 46 Homelands, 33, 196 Human development, 20, 27, 51, 104, 112, 115, 139

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INDEX

I Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), 27, 40 Igbo, 16, 226 Imihigo, 106, 111 Impartiality in the exercise of public power, 18 Improving Public Sector Performance, 21 Incentives, 34, 38, 52, 56, 71 Institutional capacity building, 55, 88 Internal displacement, 47 International development agencies, 13 International Financial Institutions (IFI), 26, 45 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 17, 26 ISIS, 23 Islamic influences, 13 Ivory Coast, 7, 17, 31, 34, 40

J Jifly, 238, 241, 246, 249, 250, 252, 253, 256, 257, 259, 260, 263–265 Judicial powers, 3

K Kastom authorities, 238, 249, 256, 263 Kenya, 42, 43, 52, 115, 135, 219, 223 Khoesan languages, 222 Kleptocracy, 175, 177, 178

L Lack of Violence, 27 Land policy, 41

Language diversity, 211, 217, 221, 224 Legal-rational model of sovereignty, 7, 237 Legislative, 3, 14, 50, 68–71, 73, 83–86, 88, 125, 176, 218, 241, 249, 253–257, 263, 264 Lesotho, 34, 221, 224 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 24 Liberia, 11, 23, 35, 224 Linguistic and cultural diversity, 217, 231, 240 Local political elites, 254, 255, 258 Lusaka, 41

M Malawi, 22, 39, 40, 46, 223 Malema, Julius, 182 Mali, 20, 223 Malvatu Mauri, 8 Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs (MNCC), 238, 243, 251, 255, 257–265 Manual laborers, 31 Marange Development Trust (MDT), 4, 119, 123–132, 134–139 Marxists, 25 Mauritania, 223 Mauritius, 34 Modern information technologies, 19 Mouvement Democratique Rwandais/Parti du Mouvement et de l’Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU), 98, 99 Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), 24 Mozambique, 11, 21, 24, 223, 224 Muslim, 13, 51 Muslim modes of governance, 13

INDEX

N National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), 56 National Assembly (NA), 21, 83, 84, 86, 98, 104, 181, 253 National Commission on Land and Other Assets (CNTB), 113 National Development Plan (NDP), 111, 178 National Patriotic Forces of Liberia (NPFL), 24 National Planning Commission (NPC), 178 National Umushyikirano Council (NUC), 110, 111 Nation states, 13, 143, 151, 159, 166, 228 Neo-liberalism, 14, 26 Neopatrimonialism, 33–37, 173, 175–177 New Public Management, 13 Niger, 51, 75, 252 Niger-Congo/Congo-Kordofanian languages, 221 Niger Delta, 23, 30, 83 Nigeria, 3, 9, 11, 14, 22, 25, 29, 43, 52, 56, 66–68, 73–80, 83, 85–89, 221, 223, 224, 252 Nigerian, 29, 34, 43, 56, 66, 67, 73–77, 80, 81, 85 Nilo-Saharan languages, 222 O ODI Budget Strengthening Initiative, 46 Ombudsman, 113, 244, 257 Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, 121 Operation Hakudzokwi, 121, 123, 131 Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 215

273

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 13, 38, 96 Oromo, 16 P Pacific, 7, 239, 242, 247, 248 Participation, 4, 27, 41, 42, 46, 49, 68, 72, 87, 106, 108, 110, 128, 132, 136, 138, 139, 162, 212, 227, 228, 230, 244, 246, 248, 259 Participatory community development, 106 Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), 180 Per capita, 14, 28, 33, 104 Political dilemma, 11 Political economy, 65, 66, 69, 75, 79, 122, 166, 171, 189, 191, 195, 199, 203 Political leadership, 55 Political stability, 18, 20, 27, 212 Politics, 3, 30, 44, 46, 50, 51, 68, 69, 72–74, 76, 82, 83, 99, 101, 144, 146, 151, 153, 157–159, 173, 176, 177, 182, 185, 190, 218, 231, 240, 243 Portuguese, 17, 32, 222, 224, 225, 228 Poverty, 14, 20, 37, 77, 104, 107, 108, 112, 113, 124, 126, 133, 138, 139, 145, 152, 162, 173, 174, 177, 184, 190–192, 194, 197, 205 Power asymmetries, 52 Privatization, 11, 22, 105, 176 Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP), 56 Public opinion, 50 Public Protector, 179–181, 183, 185

274

INDEX

Puntland, 23

Q Quality of Government Institute (QGI), 17, 18 Quasi Government, 42

R Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais (RADER), 98, 99 Regulatory quality, 20, 27, 212 Reified political governance systems, 213 Religious boundaries, 13 Representative Assembly, 250 Resilience, 5, 96, 97, 99, 104, 115, 143–148, 150–154, 156–159, 161–163, 165, 166 Ritual, 8 Rule of law, 1, 12, 14, 16–20, 22, 26, 27, 30, 31, 45, 48, 53, 67, 86, 87, 89, 105, 139, 175, 184, 212, 244 Rwanda, 3, 9, 21, 22, 32, 34, 38–41, 57, 95–100, 103–112, 114, 115, 221, 223 Rwandan Investment Promotion Agency (RIPA), 105 Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 100, 101, 104, 105

S Safety, 15, 27, 195 Sao Tome and Principe, 34 Secret police force, 2 Self-determination, 30, 136 Senegal, 215, 223 Seychelles, 34 Shagari, Alhaji Shehu, 11, 67

Shandong Iron and Steel Group (SISG), 28 Shona, 16 Sierra Leone, 23, 28, 32, 33, 47, 224 Single Customs Territory, 112 Social protection programme, 107 Social welfare access, 189, 191, 195, 199 Social welfare provision, 6 Somali, 17, 223, 225 Somalia, 13, 17, 23, 52, 223 Somaliland, 23, 52 South Africa, 2, 5, 6, 22, 27, 31, 36, 135, 171–173, 177, 178, 180, 184, 185, 189–196, 201, 206, 223, 224 South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), 180 South African Communist Party (SACP), 181, 182 South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), 193, 194, 199, 202, 204–206 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 219, 223 South Sudan, 22–24, 31, 46, 47, 49, 115 Special status, 8 State capacity, 17, 32, 124, 243 Statehood, 15, 95–97, 239 Stateness, 189 Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), 26 Sustainable Economic Opportunity, 27 Swahili, 16, 219 Swaziland, 34, 221, 223, 224 Syria, 23 T Tanzania, 17, 57, 100, 103, 112, 115, 219, 223

INDEX

Technocratic vision, 14 The African Development Bank, 42, 112 The National Council of Chiefs (NCC), 8, 255, 258, 261 Togo, 31 Traditional institutions, 4, 31, 96, 111, 115, 238, 252 U Ubudehe, 106, 107 Umuganda, 106, 107 Unfinished political projects, 32 Union Nationale Rwandaise (Rwandese National Union), 98 United Methodist Church (UMC), 133 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 12, 20, 46, 134, 139, 212 United Nations (UN), 13, 38, 45, 95, 98, 103, 162, 213, 247 UN peacekeeping, 22 V Vanuaaku Party, 250 Vanuatu, 7, 8, 30, 237–246, 248–250, 252, 253, 255–261, 263–266 Village development committees (VIDCOs), 138 Village health worker (VHW), 199, 200 Village values, 31 Voice & Accountability, 27 W Warlords, 34

275

Wealth, 14, 31, 74, 107, 195, 198, 216 Western values, 13, 31 Womanhood, 43 World Bank, 3, 12–14, 19, 21–23, 26–28, 38, 46, 49, 52, 55, 77, 147, 173, 212, 247, 249 World Bank Five Indicators of Good Governance, 20 World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), 45 World Press Freedom Day, 20 Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 16, 27, 212

Y Yamamoussoukro, 34 Yemen, 23 Yoruba, 16, 43, 223, 226

Z Zambia, 41, 42, 223 ZANU-PF, 5, 129, 143–146, 148–165 Zimbabwe, 2, 4, 5, 9, 30, 33, 36, 55, 135, 136, 138, 139, 143–146, 149–155, 159–162, 165, 166, 222 Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC), 4, 126–128, 130, 134, 138 Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO), 132–134 Zulu, 16 Zuma, Jacob G., 22, 172, 173, 177–179, 181, 182