Golden River to Golden Road: Society, Culture, and Change in the Middle East [Reprint 2016 ed.] 9781512805376

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Maps and Tables
I. The Middle East as a Culture Continent
II. Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent
III. The Desert and the Sown
IV. The Family
V. The Position of Women and Sex Mores
VI. Cousin Marriage
VII. Dual Organization
VIII. Noble and Vassal Tribes
IX. The Village and Its Culture
X. The Middle Eastern Town
XI. Religion in Middle Eastern, Far Eastern and Western Culture
XII. Social and Cultural Determinants of Middle Eastern Nationalism
XIII. The Dynamics of Westernization
XIV. Resistance to Westernization
XV. The Endogamous Unilineal Descent Group
XVI. Women in a Man's World
Statistical Appendix
Notes
Index

Citation preview

g o l d e n ^ Q i v e r

g o l d e n V o c i c i

SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SOCIETY,

CULTURE,

IN THE MIDDLE

AND EAST

PHILADELPHIA

olden

CHANGE

GOLDEN

BY RAPHAEL

PATAI

Third, Enlarged. Edition

U N I V E R S I T Y OF P E N N S Y L V A N I A PRESS

© 1962, 19691 by the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania Second edition 1967 Third enlarged edition 1969 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 70-84742

SBN 8122-7289-7 Printed in the United States of America

Preface

F

ROM THE Golden River, the Spanish colony of Río de Oro in West Africa, to the Golden R o a d leading from Khurasan to Samarkand in Turkestan, immortalized in English literature by Flecker, stretches the huge land mass of the Middle East. The distance from the Golden River to the Golden R o a d is roughly five thousand miles in a west-easterly direction, while from the Black Sea coast of Turkey in the north to Aden and Sudan in the south is about two thousand miles. T h e land area of the Middle East is about 7,324,815 square miles, or almost two and a half times that of the continental United States. Its population, however, is only 189 million, as against 202 million in the United States. This huge territory, though inhabited by peoples speaking many different tongues and exhibiting many different physical features, is nevertheless the domain of one basically identical culture. The core area of the Middle East, stretching from the Nile to the Tigris, is the locale of the oldest recorded history of mankind. From here, in successive waves, cultural influences spread in all directions, reaching their climax thirteen centuries ago when the new Islamic variety of Arabian culture became superimposed on pre-existent cultural layers all over the Middle East, resulting in the characteristic pattern still predominant to the present day. T o the southwest, Muslim conquests have brought the entire northern third of Africa under the rule not only of Arab dynasties, but also of Arab culture, which rapidly spread from Arabia across North Africa to the territory of Río de Oro on the Atlantic coast. To the northeast, the Golden Road has for centuries been traversed by men who were carriers of Middle Eastern culture, which has become dominant in areas today held by the Soviet Union, notably the former Khanat of Bokhara and the Turkoman Republic. Basic cultural identity, of course, does not mean surface homogeneity or monotony. On the contrary, upon closer inspection significant local differences can be discerned in each part of the 3

4

Golden River to Golden Road

Middle East that give its culture areas a coloration a n d character of their own. But beneath localized developments a n d variants, the observer familiar with the whole of the Middle East recognizes the same basic pattern, the same f u n d a m e n t a l features whose presence sets Middle Eastern culture apart from the cultures of contiguous world areas. Cultural characteristics do not always coincide with international boundaries. It happens, therefore, that p a r t of a country belongs culturally to the Middle East while another part of it extends beyond the limits of this world area. Such countries are the Mali Federation a n d the Republic of S u d a n ; the northern parts of both of them belong culturally to the Middle East, while their southern parts show very close affinities with the great Negro cultures of Africa. T o the east, one finds that beyond the borders of Iran and Afghanistan peoples very similar culturally a n d in mode of life inhabit the western part of West Pakistan, which traditionally goes by the n a m e of Balujistan, while the eastern part of West Pakistan belongs culturally to the I n d i a n subcontinent. T h e present volume deals with three interconnected topics. T h e first of these is Middle Eastern culture in general, including a discussion of the problems presented by the delimitation and subdivision of the Middle Eastern "culture continent." T h e second treats of a number of significant aspects of Middle Eastern social organization. T h e third is devoted to an analysis of the vital sociocultural changes taking place at present in the Middle East. Most of the material contained in this book is printed here for the first time. Several chapters, however, are based on my previously published studies or on papers presented to scholarly conferences and utilized here in a rewritten a n d expanded form. T h u s a shorter version of Chapter i was first published in the Winter 1952 issue of the Middle East Journal u n d e r the title " T h e Middle East as a Culture A r e a . " T h e substance of the first p a r t of Chapter 2, never published, was presented at a supper-conference of the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research on May 2, 1952. Some of the material included in Chapters 4, " T h e Family," 5, " T h e Position of Women a n d Sex Mores," a n d 10, " T h e Middle Eastern T o w n , " was previously published in m y book The Kingdom oj Jordan (Princeton University Press, 1958).

Pre/ace

5

A brief summary of the results of Chapter 7, " D u a l Organization," was presented on December 29, 1952, at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association in Philadelphia. Chapter 10 also incorporates part of a paper presented at the Colloquium on Islamic Culture at Princeton University in September, 1953, and subsequently published in the Bombay magazine United Asia (Vol. 6, No. 4, 1954) under the title "Culture Change in the Muslim T o w n : A Challenge for Research," and in the Arabic volume Al-Thaqaja al-lslamiyya wal-Hayat al-Mu'asira, edited by M u h a m m a d K h a l a f a l l a h , Cairo, 1956; as well as parts of the chapters entitled " T h e T o w n , " written by me jointly with F a h i m I. Qubain, and published in the three handbooks, The Kingdom oj Jordan, The Republic oj Lebanon, and The Republic of Syria (Human Relations Area Files Subcontractor's Monographs, New Haven, 1956) edited by me. Chapter 6, "Cousin M a r r i a g e , " includes a portion dealing with a man's right to marry his cousin, a shorter version of which was published in the Winter 1955 issue of the Southwestern Journal oj Anthropology under the title "CousinR i g h t in Middle Eastern M a r r i a g e . " Most of Chapter 13, " T h e Dynamics of Westernization," was printed in the Winter 1955 issue of The Middle East Journal. Only one single chapter, Chapter 1 1 , "Religion in Middle Eastern, F a r Eastern, and Western Culture," is the unaltered reprint of an article originally published in the Autumn 1954 issue of the Southwestern Journal oj Anthropology. Chapter 12, "Social and Cultural Determinants of Middle Eastern Nationalism," was presented to the Institute on Nationalism in the Middle East held at the University of Chicago in November, 1959. I gratefully acknowledge the permission given to me by the Princeton University Press, the Southwestern journal oj Anthropology, The Middle East Journal, and the magazine United Asia to reprint or to utilize in an altered form these chapters and articles. New York, September, 1961

RAPHAEL

PATAI

For the second edition I wrote a new chapter, entitled " T h e Village and Its Culture." This now is Chapter 9 of the book, while the old chapters 9 to 1 3 have become Chapters 1 o to 14.

6

Golden River to Golden Road

The third edition contains two new chapters (15 and 16). Chapter 15, entitled "The Endogamous Unilineal Descent Group," was published originally in a different form in the Winter 1965 issue of the Southwestern Journal oj Anthropology, whose editors are herewith thanked for their permission to include it in a revised version in the present edition. Chapter 16, entitled "Women in a Man's World," was written explicitly for the present edition in order to offer a fuller picture of the life of the female half of the traditional Middle Eastern world. Also new is the Statistical Appendix, which contains basic demographic data in the form of twelve tables. The table appearing on pages 1 4 - 1 5 has again been updated and minor errors corrected. New York, May, 1969

RAPHAEL

PATAI

Contents

PAGE

PREFACE 1.

THE MIDDLE

5 EASTASACUL

TURE CONTINENT

13

2. SOME PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN CULTURE CONTINENT Characteristics of the Culture Area The "Culture Continent" Character of the Middle East The Boundaries T h e Problem of Subdivision The Culture Areas of the Middle East

40 47 53 62

3.

73

THE DESERT

AND

THE SOWN

39 39

4. THE FAMILY Basic Characteristics "Be Fruitful and Multiply" "Familism" and Socialization Early Marriage Divorce Family and Society Demographic Data Terminology

84 84 94 96 100 105 107 109 113

5. THE POSITION OF WOMEN AND SEX MORES Veiling and Seclusion Social Intercourse Term and Trial Marriage Female Occupations The Emancipation of Women

115 116 120 127 131 132

6. COUSIN MARRIAGE Cousin Marriage outside the Middle East Half-Sibling and Cousin Marriage in Antiquity Extent and Frequency The Bride Price Central Arabia Southern Arabia

135 135 136 138 143 145 146

7

8

Golden River to Golden Road Northern Arabia Fed 'an Case Histories Rwala Case Histories Jordan A Christian Case History Palestine Art as Case Histories Syria Syrian Minorities Iraq An Iraqi Case History Kurdistan Iran Sinai and Egypt Sudan North Africa Positive Motivations Opposition to Cousin Marriage Conclusion

PAGE

147 148 151 153 155 155 157 158 160 161 162 164 166 166 168 168 169 173 175

7. DUAL ORGANIZATION General Characteristics Genealogical Traditions Ethnic Movements and Political Dualism Oman and the East Coast of Arabia The South Coast of Arabia Yemen 'Asir _ The Rub' al-Khali Northern Arabia and the Syrian Desert Syria, Lebanon, Palestine Iran and Afghanistan Egypt and Sudan North Africa Conclusion

177 179 181 183 186 187 195 196 202 216 218 223 226 234 246

8. NOBLE AND

251

VASSAL TRIBES

9. THE VILLAGE AND ITS CULTURE The Origin of Villages and Sedentarization Location and Size The Houses Economy and Work Routine

267 268 271 273 275

Contents

278 282 283 287 292 294 296 298

Food a n d H e a l t h T h e Village Family Social Groupings Village Institutions Political O r g a n i z a t i o n Religion T h e W i n d s of C h a n g e Ethos a n d Attitudes 10. THE MIDDLE EASTERN T o w n a n d Village T o w n s m a n and Peasant Social Organization Culture Change

TOWN

11. RELIGION IN MIDDLE EASTERN, AND WESTERN CULTURE T h e Normative Function T h e Psychological Effect T h e Supernatural Component T h e Religiocentric Aspect T h e Teleological Orientation

3°3 3°3 3'° 313 3l7 FAR

EASTERN

322 323 326 329 333 338

12. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONALISM Western and Middle Eastern Nationalism "Religionism" and Nationalism Familism and Nationalism G r o u p Attitudes and Nationalism T h e Fiihrer Image and Nationalism P a n - A r a b Nationalism Nonracial Nationalism

345 348 35° 354 358 361 362

13. THE DYNAMICS OF WESTERNIZATION T h e N a t u r e of Westernization Cultural Affinity Channels of Western Influence T h e I m p a c t of the West Social Cleavage Creation of an U r b a n Proletariat Middle-Class Development Dislocation of Value J u d g m e n t s

364 364 366 367 369 372 374 377 381

14. RESISTANCE TO WESTERNIZATION T h e Issue of Western Domination Technology, Science, and Medicine

386 386 388

345

Golden River to Golden Road

IO

PAGE

Education Arts and Literature Social Control Mores, Morals, and Values The Realm of Law Islam and the "Infidel" Westernization and Secularization Superficial Westernization Ambivalence Outlook 15.

THE ENDOGAMOUS DESCENT GROUP

JJNILINEAL

A Neglected Subject The Incidence of Endogamous Societies Paternal Authority: The Sons Paternal Authority: The Daughters Cousin Marriage and Ingroup Marriage The Lineage The Mother's Kin The Khamse Structural Differences between the Exogamous and the Endogamous U D G Internal Autonomy 16.

WOMEN

IN A MANS

WORLD

Introduction Early Socialization Circumcision: Male and Female Women's Education Women's Religion "Woman Is a Vessel that Empties" Segregation: Modesty and Honor Outlook STATISTICAL

APPENDIX

389 391 393 396 399 400 402 403 404 405

407 407 409 412 417 419 422 423 425 428 433 437 437 439 444 459 463 469 470 478 481

NOTES

497

INDEX

533

Maps and Tables Maps Page

i. The northern boundary lines of the present-day distribution of three ancient Near Eastern cultural features in Africa 48 2. The culture areas of the Middle East Opposite p. 62

Tables Areas and Populations of the Political Units in the Middle East !4-I5 Percentages of Age at Marriage in Beirut, 1952-53 103 Infant Mortality Rates in Aden, Egypt, Cyprus and Palestine 111 Infant Mortality Rates among the Nuba 112 Number of Children per Mother among the Nuba 113 Kinship Terms 114. Schematic Genealogical Table of the Tribes of Hadhramaut 190 Tribal Structure of the Mus'abayn 191 The Bani Malik Tribes 197 The Yarn Tribes 200 The Traditional Organization of the Murra Tribes 203 The Actual Organization of the Murra 204 The Dual Organization of the 'Aneze Confederacy 209 Structure of the Tauqah Tribe 211 Structure of the Manàjda 215 Structure of the Dushân 216 Tribal Structure of the Jâkî 224 The Tribes of Sharqiyya and Qelyut Provinces 229 Structure of the Hasa Tribe 242 11

I.

The Middle East as a Culture Continent

A

CROSS THE middle of the three continents of the O l d W o r l d k.stretches a vast desert-and-steppe zone, r e a c h i n g f r o m the

West A f r i c a n

littoral

to

Mongolia

and

separating

the

great

northern zone of agriculture extending from Spain to Siberia f r o m the southern zone of agriculture comprising C e n t r a l A f r i c a a n d Southern

and

Southeastern

Asia.1

T h i s central

zone

can

divided roughly into t w o distinct halves: a southwestern

be

half,

reaching across N o r t h A f r i c a and A r a b i a and lying largely to the south of latitude 38° N . ; and a northeastern half, e x t e n d i n g across C e n t r a l Asia, to the north of the same parallel. T h e t w o halves are j o i n e d in the middle b y a relatively narrow isthmus, b o u n d e d b y the Persian G u l f to the south and the C a s p i a n Sea to the north. Students of culture have repeatedly dealt with the p r o b l e m of the cultural identification of the peoples inhabiting these areas, within the context of classifying the cultures of the t w o continents, Asia and A f r i c a . 2 T h e present discussion is confined to the cultural characteristics of the western half of the desert-and-steppe zone of the O l d World, together with the more fertile regions i m m e d i a t e l y contiguous with it or contained islandlike within it. T o delimit it geographically, the entire northern part of A f r i c a from the M e d i t e r r a n e a n d o w n a p p r o x i m a t e l y to latitude

i5°N.

as well as the w h o l e of west Asia is considered. O n the northwest and southeast, this area is bounded by the natural limits of great bodies of w a t e r : the A t l a n t i c , the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, and the A r a b i a n Sea, w i t h the Persian G u l f a n d the R e d Sea as great inland divides. T o the south lies the h u m i d tropical zone of C e n t r a l A f r i c a w i t h the intervening steppe and savanna belt clearly marking the transition not only between t w o distinct geographical regions, but also between two different types of cultures. T o the north, between the Black and the C a s p i a n seas, the Caucasus forms a limit almost as definite as that of the seas '3

Golden River to Golden toad

14

themselves. T o the northeast, the transition is more grachal, though here the northern and eastern limits of the Iranian Plateau and the sudden drop toward the Turkestan and Indian lowlands (separated by the narrow range of the Hindu-Kush mountains) can be taken as the marginal area. It is suggested that the entire area as here described be designated by the name Middle Ecst.3 In the following pages the cultures of the peoples inhabiting this area will be investigated, as far as this is possible within the confines of a short chapter in order to determine the justification of regarding it as a cultural entity distinct from contiguous cultural entities and at the same time sufficiently homogeneous within itself. It has to be stated preliminarily that in such an enormous land mass, many times larger than any of the culture areas determined in the Americas by Wissler 4 or in Africa by Herskovits or Murdock, one will necessarily find a considerable range of internal variation A R E A S A N D P O P U L A T I O N S OF T H E P O L I T I C A L U N I T S

Political

Unit

Area Sq. Miles

Population midyear ig66 {estimated)

397.683 102,703 1 74.47 1 579 82 200,000 9 I 9>59 1 459.073 6 3.378 679.536 49°. 733 386,872 716,205

i ,070,000 48,000 13,725,000 53.0OO 160,000 1,850,000 12,150,000 3.433.000 4,460,000 1,677,000 3.361,000 30,147,000 7,200,000

298,104 71.498 4,015 7.993 37.737 167,568 3.572

31,910,000 5,400,000 2,460,000 2,629,000 2,059,000 8,388,000 603,000

I. North Africa (from west to cast) Mauritania, Islamic Republic of Spanish Sahara (Rio de Oro and Saguia el-Hamra) Morocco (constitutional monarchy) Ifni (Spanish Overseas Province) Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish) Mali (republic; northern part only) f Algeria (republic) Niger (republic) Tunisia (republic) Libya (kingdom) Chad (republic) Egypt (United Arab Republic) Sudan (republic; Northern and Central only) J II.

Asia Minor and the Fertile

Crescent

Turkey (republic) Syria (republic) Lebanon (republic) Israel (republic) Jordan (constituional monarchy) Iraq (republic) Cyprus (republic)

The Middle East as a Culture Continent

15

III. The Arabian Peninsula Saudi Arabia (kingdom) Yemen (republic) Southern Yemen Muscat and Oman (British-protected sultanate) Trucial Oman (seven sheikhdoms under British protection) Qatar (British-protected sheikhdom) Bahrein (British-protected sheikhdom) Kuwait (sheikhdom)

872,722 75. 2 90 112,075 82,000

6,870,000 5,000,000 1,146,000 565,000

32,278 4,000 231 5,800

130,000 71,000 193,000 491,000

636.367 251,000 134,000

25,283,000 15,397,000 1,300,000

7.324>8'5

189,229,000

IV. The Eastern Wing Iran (kingdom) Afghanistan (constitutional monarchy) Balujistan (part of the republic of Pakistan) § Total •Source: United Nations fTotal area, square miles Î " " " " 5 " " " "

Statistical Yearbook, ig/Sy, New York, 1968. 463,947 ; total population : 4,654,000 967.49'; " " 13.940,000 365.529; " " 105,044.000

as one proceeds from one area to another. If, nevertheless, in the following pages the culture of the Middle East is discussed, this does not mean that the significance of these variations is overlooked, or that an attempt is made at unwarranted generalization and artificial schematization. T h e culture of the Middle East is in fact in the sense employed here not of the same order as that of any single culture area of America or Africa. T h e geographic locus of this culture, as delimited above, is of such magnitude and it contains so many internal variations that the term "culture area," coined for the native cultures of America, is too narrow to be meaningfully applied to it. It is therefore suggested that the world area inhabited by the carriers of Middle Eastern culture be termed a "culture continent," a designation that both indicates the huge size of the geographical area concerned and allows for the internal variation among its constituent regions. The concept " M i d d l e Eastern culture continent" can be compared to the long familiar concept of modern Western culture whose geographical locus could be termed "Western culture continent." Both culture continents are characterized by a certain

i6

Golden River to Golden Road

cultural homogeneity that demarcates them against contiguous culture continents, and, at the same time, by considerable internal variations as between one and another of their constituent cultures. It will be shown later that one of the basic features of Middle Eastern culture is the interaction between the population groups inhabiting the desert and people living in the cultivated regions. Utilizing this point of view, the M i d d l e East can be subdivided into four major geographical regions, each with a desert-andsteppe area in its center and with a more fertile, cultivated perimeter encircling it. T h e s e four regions are: North A f r i c a , the A r a b i a n Peninsula, the Iranian Plateau, and Asia Minor. By far the largest, and characterized by the least favorable desert-sown ratio, is North A f r i c a ; second in both respects is the A r a b i a n Peninsula; third is the Iranian P l a t e a u ; and fourth, Asia Minor. Somewhere in the general area of the grazing steppe between the desert and the sown 5 are located, as a rule, the typical old Middle Eastern towns which (in addition to the coastal towns) are the cultural centers of their respective areas. If, in a general overview of the M i d d l e East, the relative extent of the desert and the sown is taken as a basic consideration, the impression gained is one of an arid land mass more than overwhelmingly desert, only a very small percentage of which is utilized for agricultural pursuits. Exact data are lacking, but it is estimated that not more than 5 to 10 per cent of the total area of the M i d d l e East is utilized for cultivation with either hoe or plough, and that the lands actually under cultivation at any given time are considerably less even than this small figure. W i t h regard to surface area, therefore, the M i d d l e East as a whole is an overwhelmingly desert-and-steppe area, and the w a y s of h u m a n adaptation to life in the desert and the steppe through pastoral economies seem to be its most significant characteristics. A very different picture is, however, obtained if the percentage of the population supporting itself by animal husbandry and agricultural pursuits respectively is taken as the basis of estimate. In this case, it is found that the M i d d l e East as a whole is a predominantly agricultural area. Between 65 and 75 per cent of the total working population is engaged directly in agriculture. A n additional percentage either lives in villages rendering services to

The Middle East as a Culture Continent

17

agriculturists, as artisans, teachers, religious personnel, barbers, watchmen, etc., or engages in supplementary or irregular agriculture. Some 12 to 14 per cent of the total population of the Middle East lives in towns and cities. This leaves roughly 10 to 1 5 per cent only for the nomadic and seminomadic peoples who eke out a living on the noncultivable steppes and deserts of the area. Just as each area of the Middle East comprises both desert and sown and transitional zones between these two extremes, so also the demographic picture of each country is composed of at least three types of population elements that constitute a recurrent configuration in every part of the area. The desert is the habitat of the camel nomad, the steppe belt the domain of the sheep and goat nomad, and the sown the home of the agriculturist. Transitional stages and localized variations of these population types make for additional diversification. The camel nomads rely on their camels for sustenance to a degree unparalleled by the exploitation of any other animal species in any other culture. 6 The camel nomads spend their life in seasonal wandering over fairly extensive tribal territories in constant search of pasture for their camels. The nomads of the steppes breed sheep and goats or occasionally cattle in place of the camels of the true nomads. This difference in itself determines the total gamut of divergences in the ways of life of these two groups. Sheep and goats are less hardy than the camels, they cannot stay away from water for days, they need better and softer pasture, and thus their mobility is much more limited. Consequently, the sheep and goat nomads stay within the grazing steppe belt or, more precisely, in that part of the steppe belt which represents the transition between it and the sown. The annual cycle of seasonal wandering is the rule also for them, but their wandering territory is much smaller and their movements are much slower than those of the camel nomads. In the Sudan, south of latitude 13 0 N., cattle-grazing seminomads (the so called Baqqara) take the place of the sheep and goat nomads of the northern outskirts of the desert. Cattle gain in importance also in Southern Arabia. A special kind of nomadism is practiced by the peoples of the

i8

Golden River to Golden Road

mountainous regions of the Middle East, especially around the Iranian Plateau, but also in Morocco. In this type of wandering, called "transhumance," the characteristic annual cycle of movement takes the tribal groups high u p into the mountains in the summer, and again down to the warmer and milder valleys or the lower levels of the plateau in the winter. Transhumance is therefore the vertical variant of the horizontal nomadism discussed hitherto. Characteristic of all the true and seminomads, whether of the horizontal or of the vertical variety, is the black hair tent, the only shelter used by them. The basic identity of the black hair tent all over the Middle East is one of the indications that the entire territory is truly one single culture area. The only place outside the Middle East where the black hair tent is used is Tibet, and its presence there must be accounted for by diffusion. 7 Another characteristic shared by all the wandering peoples of the Middle East, as well as by some of the settled population of the area, is the tribal structure. Each tribe is a homogeneous social unit whose native members are social equals. This definition excludes people who joined the tribe from the outside, and slaves. The tribe as such has little actual significance since tribal affinity constitutes a rather vague tie. The actual functioning unit is the wandering group, which varies greatly in size as well as in standing within the tribal structure. The number of unit-levels or of successively larger groupings of which the tribe consists also varies, so that in one place one may find a small wandering unit that is an independent and unaffiliated tribe in itself, while elsewhere a much bigger wandering unit may be merely a subdivision of a subgroup of a subtribe. In contrast to the classless structure of each tribe in itself, the totality of wandering tribes shows a considerable range of variation with regard to degree of social standing, or "nobility." Distinction is being made between noble and client tribes such as, for example, the Sa'adi and Marabtin tribes of Cyrenaica of whom more will be said in Chapter 8. In general it can be stated that the camel nomads are in most cases regarded as noble tribes, while the artisan groups (the so-called sunna1), attached to them temporarily, count as low-status people or even as vassals. Between

The Middle East as a Culture Continent

19

the two rank the sheep and goat nomads and the semistationary inhabitants of the Iraqi marshes. Despised by all as standing beneath the tribal hierarchy are the settled cultivators, the slaves of the soil. Tribal structure is such an unmistakable hallmark of nomadism that wherever it exists among settled villagers it can be taken as definitely indicating that they are the descendants of nomads who, in the not very remote past, settled down to sedentary agricultural life. Examples can be found all across the Middle East, but the most typical are the Kurds who, though settled in village strongholds, have retained not only the tribal structure but also several other characteristics that distinguish the roaming nomads from the settled cultivators. The interrelationship between one wandering unit and another is governed by certain principles validated by tradition, enjoying unquestioned authority, and constituting everywhere the basis of tribal ethos. Among these can be mentioned the principle of collective responsibility expressed in such institutions as the blood feud, raiding, and the inviolate laws of hospitality and sanctuary, as well as in such concepts as honor, wajh ("face"), and nobility. All these ideas and ideals appear in their most intensive form among the camel nomads, and they successively lose their power and significance as one proceeds across the range from them to the sheep and goat nomads, to the almost sedentary groups, and finally to the completely sedentary cultivators. The main areas of cultivation in the Middle East are those that either receive sufficient rain to make cultivation of field crops possible or can be irrigated from rivers or wells for a more intensive utilization of'the land. One or both of these types of cultivated lands are present in every part of the Middle East, the typical example of the former being found in the more northerly or mountainous countries (Turkey, Iran, Syria, Morocco), while the latter is best exemplified by the riverine agricultures of the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates valleys or the oases of the Sahara and the Arabian Desert. Material equipment, which has to be closely adapted to the nomadic and sedentary modes of life respectively, shows considerable differences between the two sectors of the Middle Eastern

20

Golden River to Golden Road

peoples. Moreover, since material equipment under the technologically backward conditions still prevailing in many parts of the Middle East has to depend on the locally available raw materials, this aspect of culture reveals marked differences not only between nomads and cultivators, but also among the settled villagers themselves from one area to another. T h e nomadic camp is largely the same all over the Middle East: black hair tents pitched at a comfortable distance from one another, and in a definite orderly pattern. T h e village, on the other hand, shows a highly nucleated, closely packed structure, in which house leans against house, with narrow winding paths leading between them, without any plan or design, and in which the limiting influence of the available raw materials is strongly felt. T h e building material of the Middle Eastern village is stone in the mountains, mud or adobe on the plains, reed in the marshes, and palm leaves and fronds in the far south. Despite this diversity of building material, the floor plan of the houses shows an almost identical range in most parts of the Middle East. T h e simplest structure everywhere is the square oneroom building (an exception being the so-called beehive houses in some villages in the Alawite region of Syria), which can be increased by a simple budding process into two, three, four, five, or even more stories and a correspondingly larger number of rooms. T h e common feature of all these houses is that they are inhabited by only one single extended family. In fact, family and house are so closely associated that in'ancient as well as in modern Semitic languages the same word is used to denote both. Comparable variations could be shown to exist with regard to clothing, furnishings, utensils, household articles, and the like; again, however, with the reservation that these differences seem significant only when material objects from different areas of the Middle East are compared with one another; when, on the other hand, they are compared with articles hailing from adjacent culture continents (Negro Africa, Europe, India, or Central Asia), the local differences all but disappear and melt into an over-all Middle Eastern type. Notwithstanding the more obvious variations between the cultures of the Middle Eastern nomads and of the settled agriculturists, conditioned by the difference between a nomadic

The Middle East as a Culture Continent

21

pastoral mode of life and a settled agricultural existence, a considerable number of basically similar or almost identical cultural features can be shown to exist between these two archetypes of Middle Eastern life. The most important of these is undoubtedly the family, which occupies a focal position in Middle Eastern culture and whose structure and functioning are practically identical not only among nomadic breeders and settled cultivators, but also among them as compared with urban populations. T h e family in traditional Middle Eastern society—that is, in every place where Westernization has not yet made appreciable inroads—is patrilocal, patrilineal, patriarchal, endogamous, and occasionally polygynous. It is usually headed by an elderly male, and its membership comprises all his sons with their wives and children, and the unmarried daughters and granddaughters (sons' daughters). The entire family, which may consist of several dozen members, resides together, in a cluster of neighboring tents in the nomadic camp, in a single house, or in several buildings clustered around a common courtyard in the villages and towns. When the grandfather dies, the extended family breaks up into as many new units as there are sons, each of whom will then become the head of a new and separate extended family. Marriage customs, sex mores, the position of women and the division of labor between men and women are completely analogous and in many cases identical in the nomadic camp, the agricultural village, and the town (with the exception of the upper class and the still relatively thin but growing middle class in the town). Marriage is highly endogamous, the preferred mating being between children of two brothers. Polygyny is permissive and sporadic and certainly less than 5 to 10 per cent of the married men have more than one wife simultaneously. The relationship between the sexes is governed by rigid sex mores that place special emphasis on female purity and chastity, both premarital and marital, though veiling and total seclusion of women is practiced mainly in the tradition-directed middle and upper class society of the towns. Men still claim the ancient right to kill their daughters and sisters (but not their wives) if caught in illicit sex relations. A man can easily divorce his wife at will or whim; a woman has no legal way of obtaining a divorce; she can only

22

Golden River to Golden Road

r u n away a n d take refuge with her own consanguineous family. Economically, too, the extended family is the basic unit. I n the n o m a d i c tribe, the extended family holds all property—that is, camels a n d other livestock—in c o m m o n ; in the village, the extended family owns jointly the lands f r o m whose cultivation it derives its livelihood; while in the towns it owns a n d manages jointly the enterprise from which its members make a living. Earnings are pooled as a rule a n d the expenses of the household are defrayed f r o m the c o m m o n purse controlled by the pater familias. T h e w o m e n m a y help in the field, if their husbands work land that they own or r e n t ; otherwise, their place is at home and their m a i n task is to make the meager earnings of the men go as far as possible by working h a r d a n d economizing tightly, sharing the household chores or taking turns in performing them. T h e Middle Eastern b i r t h r a t e is a m o n g the highest in the w o r l d ; b u t it is c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d by a very high rate of infant and child mortality as a consequence of which general life expectancy is cut d o w n to appallingly low averages. Institutionalized schooling in its traditional form means religious e d u c a t i o n ; it is, however, the privilege of the few only, a n d is r u d i m e n t a r y . Social conditioning is usually achieved informally, a n d takes place within the family circle. T h e children begin at a tender age to participate in the work of their parents, whereby an early differentiation between the sexes appears, the boys being introduced into male occupations by their father or elder brothers, a n d the girls into those of w o m e n by their m o t h e r or elder sisters. Girls, when they marry at or frequently before puberty, are whisked away from the p a r e n t a l home, a n d their relationship with their parents then becomes loose a n d remote, except in the case of cousin marriage. O t h e r wise, the M i d d l e Eastern bride becomes absorbed into the household of her h u s b a n d ' s family. T h e tutelage of her own m o t h e r is supplanted by the more rigid one of her mother-in-law, a n d only m a n y years later, after she has given birth to children, a n d especially to sons, a n d these are on their way to m a n h o o d , c a n she begin to assert herself as a mater familias in her own right. T h e achievement of i n d e p e n d e n t status comes as tardily to t h e son as to the d a u g h t e r . H e takes a wife w h e n his father can spare the bride-price. After m a r r i a g e he continues to live within the

The Middle East as a Culture Continent

23

extended family of which his father is either the head or a member. A g e is an asset in Middle Eastern outlook, so that the older a m a n becomes, the smaller the n u m b e r of the males in the extended family older than himself a n d the greater the n u m b e r of those younger than he, the more he grows in esteem, the greater the weight of his opinion, and the more easily he can live according to his own inclinations. T h e family is beyond doubt one of the most important institutions in Middle Eastern culture. It may therefore serve as an example to illustrate, briefly at least, the marked differences between the Middle East and each one of the contiguous culture continents. 8 T o the northwest of the Middle East, in Europe, the typical family is the small biological family in which descent is reckoned bilaterally; as a rule it is neither patrilocal nor matrilocal, but neolocal; in it the role and the status of husband and wife are balanced to a much greater extent t h a n in the Middle East. T h e r e is a great variety in the way of choosing spouses; endogamy, in the sense of marriage between close relatives, is comparatively rare, while the marriage of relations as close as first cousins is not countenanced by the Christian religion. Only monogamy is lawful. However, the relationship between the sexes is m u c h freer t h a n in the Middle East; premarital and to a lesser extent also extramarital sexual relationships are tolerated. Divorce proceedings can be instituted by either husband or wife. T o the south of the Middle East, in Negro Africa, the typical family is the extended one: either patrilineal, headed by the oldest surviving brother in a given generation or matrilineal, headed by the mother's oldest brother. After the death of the original head of the family it does not break up, as it does in the Middle East, but continues to function as a unit u n d e r the new headship of the next oldest brother. Marriage is exogamous, the totemic or rarely nontotemic clan being the exogamous unit. Sexual mores show a wide range of variety. Divorce can be initiated by either the husband or the wife. T o the southeast of the Middle East in the subcontinent of India, the rule is the patrilineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal extended family, though matrilineal descent also occurs. U p o n the father's

24

Golden River to Golden Road

death the oldest son becomes the head of the family; in this respect the Indian family stands nearer to the African than to the Middle Eastern counterpart. The extended family or larger kinship group (gotra) is exogamous; the endogamous unit is the subcaste. Monogamy is the rule among the Hindus, though polygyny occurs, as well as some localized polyandry. Sex mores show a wide range of variation, with the prevalence of purdah or seclusion of women, and sati, the burning alive of widows (now prohibited by law) in direct ratio to caste status. Divorce is not allowed by Hindu tradition. To the northeast of the Middle East, in the Central Asian culture area, the family is patrilineal, patrilocal, extended, and exogamous. Upon the death of the family head, his eldest surviving brother takes his place. Polygyny is permitted, as in the Middle East. Sex mores are lax; there is no emphasis on female purity, no veiling, and no seclusion of women. Women can have no legal recourse to divorce. With respect to marriage and the family the Middle East is thus clearly set off against the four adjoining world areas; while the similarity of traits within it serves as an additional indication of its character as a distinct culture continent. Also with regard to social units larger than the extended family, the three main sectors of Middle Eastern society show a number of basic correspondences. The Middle Eastern towns, however, have been for several decades centers of foreign (Western) cultural influences, as a consequence of which much of the original Middle Eastern tradition in social organization has been obliterated in them (especially in the middle and upper classes) and can be found only in the villages and the nomadic tribes. Nomadic camp and agricultural village, however, must not be conceived as two opposite forms of local aggregates. The existence of a continuous range of transitional forms between the two clearly shows that camp and village are merely the two extreme forms of a variety of possible mixtures of elements taken from both. The presence of these "mixed" forms of local aggregates is due not only to the continued processes of sedentarization; the reverse process is also known to have taken place repeatedly: settled villagers have taken up nomadism, either completely or partially.

The Middle East as a Culture Continent

25

T h e cultivation of the soil and animal husbandry can, moreover, mutually complement each other. When the observer is confronted with the habitat of a h u m a n group making a living in both ways, he may not be able to decide whether it should be counted as a village or as a nomadic encampment. T h e nomadic wandering unit often consists of not just one, but two or even more groups of extended families, each one of which is sometimes called hamula', similarly, also, the settled village may contain two or more groups, each with a great inner cohesion, and varying degrees of mutual tension. T h e nomadic hamula, as a rule, pitches its tents together in one part of the camp; the village group (also called hamula in some parts of the Middle East) inhabits one quarter of the village. T h e hamula, whether in village or camp, is definitely a kinship group, and as such commands the loyalty of its member families. T h e place of the individual within his society is determined, first, by his membership in an extended family, and secondly, by the membership of his extended family in a hamula. This means that in traditional Middle Eastern society participation in social groups larger than the family is a family affair and not an individual concern. Adherence to larger groups can never cut across family ties. O n the contrary, the fact that the family belongs to a larger social group only strengthens the family unity, for the stronger the family as a whole the greater its weight within the larger unit. T h e largest traditional social grouping to be found all over the Middle East is a loose, informal twofold faction which, at the same time, is powerful in its hold over the population, whether nomadic or sedentary. This social grouping resembles in several respects the kind usually referred to by the term "moiety" or "dual organization." In some parts of the Middle East (e.g., in Arabia and the Levant coast) entire tribes and villages belong to one or the other of such dual factions known by name pairs such as Q a h t a n and 'Adnan, Yafa' and H a m d a n , Hinawi and Ghafirl, Qays and Yaman. In other places, the individual villages are split into two sections or moieties. One of the two moieties in a village may be bound by ties of friendship or allegiance to corresponding moieties in other villages, while the other moieties of the same villages form

26

Golden River to Golden Road

another confederation. W h e t h e r the villages as a w h o l e or only one h a l f o f e a c h of t h e m b e l o n g to a moiety, there is usually much competition

and

rivalry,

and

frequently

even

bloody

fights

b e t w e e n the t w o sides. In m a n y cases political initiative has made use of the existing d u a l organization with the result that the moieties t o d a y often h a v e political significance, t h o u g h differences in descent a n d c u s t o m are b y no means forgotten. A

detailed

e x a m i n a t i o n o f M i d d l e Eastern dual organization will be found in C h a p t e r 7. W i t h regard to social control, distinction must be made between the local a n d the higher level. O n the local level, the social control of the t y p i c a l a n d traditional M i d d l e Eastern village resembled until recently (roughly u p to the end of W o r l d W a r I) that of the n o m a d i c tribe to a considerable degree. It was the same kind of semiautocratic and s e m i d e m o c r a t i c , highly variable and informal social control characteristic of the n o m a d i c tribe, w h i c h makes difficult a description in concrete terms. T h e village h e a d m a n (called mukhtar in the Fertile Crescent countries, muhtar in T u r k e y , 'omda in E g y p t , aga in K u r d i s t a n , amin in N o r t h Africa) corresponds to the tribal shaykh; he is usually the head of the most influential f a m i l y or g r o u p of families in the village. T h e office of h e a d m a n s h i p is inherited f r o m a m a n b y a son or another near relative, b u t succession also requires the a p p r o v a l of the elders of the village. T h e s e elders m a k e u p the informally (and recently more f r e q u e n t l y formally) constituted village council, the majlis (jema'a in N o r t h A f r i c a ) . T h e b a l a n c e of p o w e r b e t w e e n the h e a d m a n and the council depends u p o n the personality o f the h e a d m a n . T h e authority of the tribal shaykh rests not on force, w h i c h as a rule does not stand at his disposal, b u t on the esteem, renown, and prestige he enjoys. T h e same is true to a m o r e limited extent of the village h e a d m a n , t h o u g h the latter usually wields more influence over his council, a n d his p o w e r over the simple villagers is also correspondingly greater. O n e of the reasons for this difference m a y be seen in the l a c k o f m o b i l i t y of the cultivators inhabiting the villages as c o m p a r e d to the m u c h greater f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t of the n o m a d i c tribesmen. A dissatisfied tribesman can, if worst comes to worst, l e a v e his tribe a n d j o i n w i t h his family and flocks another tribe,

The Middle East as a Culture Continent

27

even though such a move m a y m e a n loss of status; an agriculturist villager who has been antagonized or even oppressed by his headm a n has no such way out. Another reason is the f r e q u e n t indebtedness of the villagers to the h e a d m a n or to a wealthy absentee landowner whose representative he is; such a situation can easily be exploited by the h e a d m a n to m a k e the debtor subservient to him. In the heyday of Turkish rule over the Middle East the village could and would rely as little on a n y central g o v e r n m e n t a l authority as the nomadic tribe. T h e only difference between the two was that the volatile nomadic tribe was never successfully bent under the yoke of taxation, while the lot of the villagers was to bear a heavy yoke of oppressive taxes. T h e official political or administrative contact between the village and the higher (district or central) authorities was largely confined to conscription a n d tax collection. T h e taxes were (and are) a heavy b u r d e n on the villagers, in return for which they received n o t h i n g : no services, no help, no protection. As long as the village h e a d m a n delivered the taxes, he and his village were left alone a n d could continue undisturbed in their traditional ways of life. In recent decades, this pattern has been undergoing considerable change. T h e nomadic tribe occupies today more or less the position held by the village half a century ago; it has to p a y taxes to the central government as the village does, although there is a marked difference even here: m a n y n o m a d i c tribes receive, in the person of their shaykhs, considerable governmental subventions that sometimes equal the sums collected in taxes. O n e of the results of this development is that the position of the shaykh has become stronger vis-à-vis his council and tribesmen, and that he can assume a more autocratic attitude. T h e village, on the other h a n d , has become a more a n d m o r e integral part of the state, politically, economically, educationally, and in several other respects. T h e old, traditional village institutions such as the mosque, the kuttdb ( K o r a n school), the guest house, the communal threshing floor, a n d the like survive; b u t recent decades have witnessed the great innovation that, for the first time in thousands of years, the villagers receive something from the state in return for their taxes: schools, sanitation, eco-

28

Golden River to Golden Road

nomic aid, police and military protection. These services, however, are still in their infancy. In general, the socioeconomic conditions characteristic of the Middle Eastern cultivators today can be summed up in a few somber lines. Most of the cultivators are subsistence farmers living on their produce, with a predominantly cereal diet which, though perhaps barely adequate in caloric value, is lacking in protein and protective foods. As a consequence of this and the generally low standards of hygiene, the incidence of disease is high, in some areas appallingly so. Adequate water supplies are rare; because of the perennial irrigation method practiced in some riverain tracts and the presence of stagnant waters elsewhere, malaria is the most prevalent single disease in many regions. T h e vast majority of the cultivators in the Middle East are either dwarfholders, sharecropper tenants, or landless laborers. A small number of wealthy, often extremely rich landowning families concentrate in their hands a substantial proportion of the cultivated land, a situation in which land reforms have only recently begun to make a dent. Lands owned by smallholders in villages were until recently often held under the ancient system of communal ownership. 9 It is very difficult to reach valid generalizations with regard to governmental and political forms in the Middle East. A t present, the tendency prevails in most Middle Eastern states to follow Western patterns of government—which is consistent with the readiness of urban upper-class Middle Easterners to adopt Western techniques. Thus we find republics and kingdoms with houses of representatives, ministers of state, and the like. However, these are rarely more than new façades behind which still stand the old structures of autocratic rule exercised by small, wealthy, and powerful feudal groups. Several Middle Eastern countries passed from traditional despotism, through a brief period of experimentation with parliamentary democracy, to modern dictatorship. In some Middle Eastern states, even of the external forms of Western governmental techniques only a few have been adopted: no distinction, for instance, is being made to this day between state income and expenditure on the one hand and the ruler's privy purse on the other. This is part of the age-old M i d d l e Eastern governmental tradition, which also includes the feudal

The Middle East as a Culture Continent

29

rule of the few based on the power of a mercenary army, often of foreign extraction. Under such circumstances, dynastic constancy is rare; the throne or the power is more often usurped than inherited. While on the local level (in tribes and villages) the rule of persons other than of the blood would be unimaginable, on the highest level foreigners can succeed in attaining positions of sovereignty. The relationship of the cities to the countryside in the Middle East today is reminiscent of that between town and country in medieval Europe. The Middle Eastern towns, of which more will be said in Chapter 9, are the undisputed industrial, commercial, financial, political, judicial, educational, literary, recreational, artistic, intellectual, medical, and religious centers of their respective hinterlands. Externally the siiq, or bazaar, is undoubtedly the most characteristic as well as the most fascinating part of the towns, with its narrow alleys, covered with vaulted stone arches or with matting or awning, and with each trade occupying a separate street. Organizationally, the suq is the most tangible expression of the existence and activities of the craft guilds (now largely defunct) such as those of tailors, outfitters, slipper and sandal makers, saddlers, embroiderers, goldsmiths, etc. Each of these guilds has its head, its provost, its council, its grades of apprentices, journeymen, and masters, its constitution, rules, and other organizational trappings. 10 In most cases artisanship, and with it membership in a guild, are hereditary; sometimes, as in Tunis, guild membership as well as the position of guild chief has to be passed on from father to son. The presence of social classes is characteristic of the Middle Eastern towns, in contrast to villages and nomadic tribes. The urban class structure shows great vertical mobility. T h e great majority of the townspeople belong to the lower class, and make their living as craftsmen, shopkeepers, itinerant vendors, unskilled laborers, porters, workers employed in services, fishermen (in coastal towns), beggars, etc. The thin but growing middle class is made up of master craftsmen, merchants, teachers, other professional people who do not belong to the "great" families, minor officials, small house-owners, and others of moderate means. T h e very small but extremely powerful upper class consists in each

30

Golden River to Golden Road

country of a few "great" families whose members, sometimes referred to as "notables," occupy key positions in many fields a n d are the mainstay of the feudal oligarchy. They are, as a rule, the leaders of society, of political life (the political parties often utilizing family affiliations, moieties, or religious orders), of economic, financial, and industrial enterprises. In most cases, the initial wealth of such families is due to the concentration in their hands of landed property. Westernization, which is centered in the towns, is most advanced among the upper class, less so a m o n g the middle class, and has only begun on the lower levels. 11 Nationalism, a modern urban phenomenon in the Middle East, is the result of two trends. One of these, xenophobia, has been a traditional attitude in the Middle East for several centuries. It means hatred of non-Muslims, or even of Muslims not belonging to the locally prevalent sect. This indigenous substratum of sentiment has been overlaid in the course of the last few decades by a Western type of nationalism that is probably the only Western idea deeply to impress itself on the Middle Eastern mind. While in general Westernization means almost exclusively the adoption of nothing but Western material equipment and techniques, an exception was made in the case of nationalism, which happened to fit in well with the pre-existing scheme of ideas. Westernization thus, somewhat paradoxically, means the adoption of Western techniques on the one hand and the upsurge of nationalism and intensification of the traditional hatred of foreigners on the other. Towns are the centers of Westernization, and not only because they are the homes of the few wealthy families who are economically in a position to emulate the manners and customs of the West. Western influences are diffused from the town over the surrounding area as a consequence of the not infrequent visits paid to its bazaars, cafés, banks, stores, motion-picture theaters, law courts, and other offices by both villagers and tribesmen. Interaction, manifested mainly in commercial contacts between nomads and agriculturists, is an important characteristic of Middle Eastern social life everywhere, and a major part of this interaction occurs in the towns. Even when direct trading between a village and a nomadic tribe is precluded by hostile relations, merchants and customers can meet in the town where, as indi-

The Middle East as a Culture Continent

31

v i d u a l s , they feel safe a n d free to d e a l w i t h one another. T h e c o m m e r c i a l c o n t a c t taking place in the towns a c t u a l l y is a threew a y process: the town sells the p r o d u c t s of its crafts and industry; the v i l l a g e its agricultural p r o d u c t s ; a n d the n o m a d i c tribe its a n i m a l s , hides, wool, rugs, clarified b u t t e r (semn), etc.; and e a c h b u y s its necessities from the other two. T h e town, of course, profits in a d d i t i o n from its role of the m i d d l e m a n , b u y i n g f r o m the v i l l a g e r a n d selling to the tribesman a n d v i c e versa. E x p o r t i n g a n d i m p o r t i n g , often on a large scale, are also c o n c e n t r a t e d in the towns. T o pass f r o m the socioeconomic aspects of culture to mental e q u i p m e n t , w e must first consider the question of literacy. L o c a t e d b e t w e e n E u r o p e w i t h its high rates of literacy and N e g r o A f r i c a w i t h its nonliterate cultures, the M i d d l e East is the home of the oldest literate cultures and has p r o d u c e d some of the greatest masterpieces of world literature. Nevertheless it is characterized t o d a y , as it was throughout its six-thousand-year

history,

by

extremely high rates of illiteracy. E v e n in the towns the illiteracy rate reaches 80 per cent; in the villages it c l i m b s u p to over 90 per c e n t ; a m o n g the n o m a d i c tribes it is p r a c t i c a l l y 100 per cent. In recent years, slow changes have b e g u n in ccrtain areas with the opening of elementary schools and the introduction of compulsory education. H o w e v e r , the over-all picture is still that of very high rates of illiteracy, higher a m o n g w o m e n than a m o n g m e n ; a m o n g Muslims than a m o n g non-Muslims (Christians and J e w s ) ; a m o n g nomads than a m o n g settled p e o p l e ; a m o n g villagers than in the u r b a n population. Illiteracy, however, means neither a lack of familiarity with the intellectual a n d spiritual products o f p r e c e d i n g generations nor an ignorance of the events of the c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r l d . M i d d l e Eastern illiterate culture shares with the nonliterate cultures of the O l d World the possession of a rich storehouse o f oral literature, consisting of folk stories and legends, poetry a n d songs, riddles, sayings, and proverbs; it is, moreover, residual heir to the age-old a n d f a m e d " W i s d o m of the E a s t , " lending a flavor of mellow maturity to all aspects of e v e r y d a y life, to activities, j u d g m e n t s , and values. A s to the events of the c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r l d , the grapevine of the bazaars, cafes, markets, village wells a n d threshing floors, council

Golden River to Golden Road

chambers or tents, and caravan serais always surprises the Western observer with its rapidity, efficiency, and penetration. Poetry is so much part of everyday living that the ambulant vendors in the streets of Oriental towns praise their wares in rhymed ditties recited to special tunes. Schoolchildren in the oldfashioned Koran schools compete with one another in composing poems by way of a pastime, and in many lands versification is indulged in by people in all walks of life, rich and poor, literate and illiterate. Inseparable from poetry is music, which is perhaps the most individualistic of arts in the Middle East. Not only will two performers never give the same interpretation of a traditional musical piece, but the same musician will only rarely play or sing the same song twice in exactly the same manner. The performer is usually also his own composer, and even when playing a well-known tune he will inevitably introduce variations and additions of his own, under the spur of the moment's mood. Moreover, the Middle Eastern musician, as a rule, also builds his own musical instrument; his musical training as an apprentice to a master begins by learning how to make for himself an instrument of his own. 12 In the shadow theater, a favorite though at present rapidly declining pastime, the master of the theater makes his own figures, writes his own plays, directs the performance, and plays the main roles. 13 Similarly, the storytellers who can be heard in cafes during the festive nights of the fast month Ramadan, although bound by certain general traditional lines, nevertheless combine the arts of the novelist, the poet, and the actor, and often those of the composer and instrumental performer as well. The distinction sharply drawn in the West between creative artist and performer simply does not exist in the Middle East, where every performance involves the creation of at least a new, individual variation on the original theme. Tradition also determines the framework of the visual arts; but here too the frame can be filled in in varying ways, according to the talents and inclinations of the individual artist or artisan. What is, however, even more significant for the cultural picture as a whole is the fact that in traditional Middle Eastern culture almost all branches of everyday work are permeated with aesthetic

The Middle East as a Culture Continent

33

qualities; the beauty of objects everywhere complements their utility. Art is called upon to embellish everything. The richer a man the more time he spends in practicing and enjoying the arts, but the poor as well, the great masses of the simple people, live a life enriched by aesthetic values. No definite line can be drawn between the arts and crafts in Middle Eastern culture. Articles of clothing such as headgear, mantles, belts, and sandals are in style, color, and decoration closely dependent upon custom fixed by age-old tradition which allows individual talent and taste to express themselves only in relatively minor variations. At the same time, the absence of mass production and the factory system and the corresponding prevalence of handcrafts, mean a greater reliance on trained skill and dexterity, on the ability of the individual artisan to design and execute an article according to the discriminating taste of individual customers. The execution of a piece of work, whether it be a shoe, chair, water pipe, brass tray, rug, lamp, camel litter, basket, or earthenware jug, from its inception to its completion, gives the artisan a deep sense of satisfaction and a keen interest in his work. Most artisans are actually artists whose aesthetic judgment plays an important role in their work. Thus aesthetics is an integral part of artisanship. Aesthetic tradition is closely linked to religious tradition in the Middle East. Although religious rituals may in principle be performed everywhere, they have always been preferably localized at temples and shrines that are highly aesthetic foci of visual and vocal arts all over the Middle East. Annual religious festivals, which are great events in the life of Middle Eastern peoples, are aesthetic-religious-emotional affairs rich in artistic pageantry. Although officially the vast majority (about 95 per cent) of the Middle Eastern peoples belong to one of several sects of Islam, actually their religious life contains many elements going back to pre-lslamic and even to pre-Christian and pre-Hebrew times. T h e belief in and propitiation of various spirits, ghosts, and demons (ghuls, jinns, 'afrits, zars etc.), many of them connected with natural objects; divination and interpretation of dreams and omens; belief in the evil eye; the use of charms and amulets; the practice of making vows and sacrifices; these are in the main the

34

Golden River to Golden Road

more ancient elements of belief and ritual that are often overlaid w i t h only a thin veneer o f Islamic doctrine and practice. T h i s is true of both nomads and sedentary peoples, though the latter are generally more inclined to venerate saints at annual pilgrimages to their tombs and to observe the Five Pillars of the F a i t h , 1 4 w h i c h are almost entirely ignored b y the nomads. T h e absence of ancestor worship from this quasi-animistic religious complex is remarkable. It is a sign of the complexity of M i d d l e Eastern religious culture that, side b y side w i t h the persistence of such early manifestations of religion, one finds such developments as theological schools and colleges, and religious doctrines spiritually and ethically equal to those of J u d a i s m and Western Christianity. Significant in this connection are the religious orders and brotherhoods whose members dedicate their lives to the service of G o d b y voluntarily d e n y i n g themselves worldly goods to v a r y i n g degrees, a n d by following special " p a t h s " and rituals of their own, often for the purpose of i n d u c i n g ecstasy. These confraternities, one of the most important of w h i c h is that of the Senussi in Cyrenaica, sprang primarily f r o m Sufism (Islamic mysticism), but they often became, very soon after their initial success, strongly political and practical in character. M o r e significant, however, than the varieties of religious doctrine and practice, is the basically religious orientation of the M i d d l e Eastern peoples. T h e totality of life is permeated with religion, w h i c h holds supreme sway over the great majority of the population, and especially in the nomadic c a m p and the agricultural village that h a v e been the strongholds of religious traditionalism. R e l i g i o n is thus the f u n d a m e n t a l motivating force behind most aspects of culture, and has its say in practically every act and m o m e n t in life. O b s e r v a n c e of traditional forms and rites, whether of the official or the popular kind, is an integral part of everyday life. R e l i g i o n not expressed in formal observance is inconceivable. M o r a l i t y , too, always appears in the guise of religion and is merely one of its manifestations; moral l a w dissociated f r o m religion does not exist for people steeped in M i d d l e Eastern culture. T h e connection between religion and art has been touched

The Middle East as a Culture Continent

35

upon already, but it goes further than the stimulus given by religion to the arts or the service rendered by them to religion. T h e scope of Middle Eastern art is itself closely circumscribed by religion, to the extent that certain fields are excluded and others concentrated upon intensively. T h e decorative arts and architecture in which the Middle Eastern artistic genius most fully expresses itself are the fields most closely associated with religion. But religion claims its due even in the secular uses of art, as exemplified by the ever recurring use of the n a m e of Allah and of Koranic passages as decorative devices on a multitude of objects including tiles and trays, lamps a n d daggers, vases and plates, etc., made of such divers materials as glass, clay, china, wood, and various precious or common metals. All custom and tradition are basically religious; for whatever is old and customary and traditional is hallowed by religion that itself is mainly tradition and custom, and only to a small extent doctrine and law. T h u s the entire field of custom, wide and infinitely ramified in its permeation of everyday life, is incapable of being divorced from religion either in theory or in practice. Whatever man does in his waking or sleeping hours during his entire lifespan on this earth, and also w h a t is done to him in his prenatal and post-mortem existence, always conform to custom, tradition, and religion. These three, then, religion, tradition, and custom, form an inseparable three-in-one constellation that rule the skies of Middle Eastern life. Another characteristic trait of religion in the Middle East is its distinctly dual aspect of materialism on the one h a n d and spiritualism on the other. T h e two neatly balanced main concerns of Middle Eastern religion are physical well-being in this world and spiritual welfare after death. G o d is expected to dispense material blessings to his people in this life, a n d to compensate the u n f o r t u n a t e but deserving with his blessings in the afterlife. Hence the accent of righteousness, on the purity of the soul, as the only real achievement of m a n , in contradistinction to worldly goods that are viewed as worthless encumbrances. T h e supreme good m a n can acquire is of a moral quality, b u t moralism always involves ritualism. For the great masses of the poor, m a n y of whom live in poverty u n k n o w n in our Western world, religion

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with its moralistic and spiritualist tenets and with its great promise of future reward is an asset of inestimable psychological value. O w i n g to the sway religion holds over performance, and the grooves it cuts into thinking and feeling, life with its vicissitudes and disappointments is appraised from a wider angle, from a longrange perspective, in which sojourn on this earth with all its possible gains and losses appears as a mere lower and lesser half of a great totality of existence whose essentials and ultimates lie in the Beyond. Spiritual outlook thus moves on a higher plane, beyond the reaches of discomfort, pain, anguish, and privation. Hence that composure, that peace of mind, preserved even in the face of great adversity, which ever and again astonish Western observers. T h e other side of the picture is that religious systems able to give this to their followers almost inevitably exercise a powerful hold on them and create a state of mind conducive to intolerance, fanaticism, and cleavage to narrow sectarian lines. T o sum up, the following features characterize traditional Middle Eastern culture: (i) A basic ecologic dichotomy: on the one hand, camel-breeding nomadic tribes living on animal husbandry and, on the other, settled villagers living on agricultural cultivation, corresponding to the desert and the sown regions. (2) T h e presence of transitional or intermediary types of human societies ranging from sheep and goat or cattle herders practicing a limited nomadism, through seminomadic tribes in various stages of sedentarization, to almost completely settled tribes. (3) T h e nomadic and seminomadic groups exhibit a tribal structure that is practically identical everywhere. (4) T h e village is usually divided along kinship lines, but is fairly homogeneous as far as occupational structure is concerned, practically all its inhabitants engaging in agricultural pursuits. (5) Constant commercial exchange takes place between the settled and the nomadic population in each area, with the local town as its focus. (6) Until a few decades ago, however, the nomadic tribes often raided the weaker villagers, regarding them as their legitimate prey. (7) T h e urban population, and more precisely its middle and upper class, though numerically insignificant, takes in every respect the leadership (in religion, education, art, politics, business, etc.).

Tht Middle East as a Culture Continent

37

(8) The triple class structure is pronounced in the towns, rudimentary in the villages, and almost nonexistent in the nomadic camp. (9) Westernization is centered in the towns and, within the towns, is strongest among the upper class, less advanced in the middle class, and incipient in the lower class. (10) The extended, patrilineal, patrilocal, patriarchal, endogamous, and polygynous family is the basic social and economic unit in camp, village, and town, the individual being subordinated to the family, ( n ) Strongly marked double standards of sexual morality prevail, with great emphasis on premarital virginity and female purity. (12) Veiling of women is practiced sporadically, being most prevelant in the conservative middle and upper classes of urban society. (13) In the nomadic camps and the villages, the social units larger than the family are based on kinship lines. (14) In the towns such associations as the guilds arc based on occupation but membership is often inherited. (15) The individual participates in social groupings larger than the family not on an individual basis but through his family membership. (16) Indications of a dual organization can be found everywhere. (17) On the local level (in camps and villages) social control and political leadership are based on family ties and influences, with the powers divided between headman and council. (18) On the higher level, in the capitals and other centrally located towns, the feudalistic, oligarchic, and at times despotic rule is slowly being mitigated by newly introduced Western forms of government, respectively transformed into dictatorship with capitalistic control and a disproportionate accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few "great" families. (19) Poverty, subsistence-level life, with extremely high incidence of disease, high birth rate, high death rate, and low life expectancy are general, with the situation somewhat better in the towns than in the villages and camps. (20) Very high rates of illiteracy all over the Middle East stamp it with the character of an illiterate culture. (21) There is a great preoccupation with folklore: folk poetry, folk song, folk tales, folk music, riddles, proverbs. (22) There is also an intensive permeation of everyday life by the aesthetic element, with the fields and the overall forms of aesthetic expression being determined by tradition. (23) One of the most outstanding characteristics is an all-pervasive

Golden River to Golden Road religiosity, consisting of elements of belief, ritual, custom, and morality, and embracing a wide range of variation regarding concrete content. (24) The belief in God and His will is intense and general, but is accompanied by the belief in spirits, demons, and ghosts and by saint worship in the villages ; ancestor worship, on the other hand, is absent. (25) Finally, a broad outlook on human existence can be found everywhere, including the firm belief in a reward and punishment in an after life and accompanied by detachment from material values and indifference to adversity.

II. Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S OF T H E C U L T U R E A R E A

O

BSERVATIONS ON the culture of the Middle East may be made in the light of four characteristics that are generally taken to indicate a culture area type of spatial distribution. The first of these four characteristics is the existence of a certain correlation between a culture area and the geographical area that is its locus. Culture areas roughly correspond to ecologic areas. Certain elements in the culture evince a dependence on geographic and ecologic factors. There is thus a definite relationship between the culture and its geographic environment. The second characteristic derives from the observation that there are cultures in which traits group themselves geographically, and others in which they do not. 1 This observation was made by Ruth Benedict and, in accordance with it, Herskovits has stated some fifteen years later than "Experience has shown . . . that it [the idea of culture areas] is not adapted to use where the distribution of geographical differences between peoples is overridden by class stratification resulting from a high degree of specialization that . . . characterizes larger population aggregates" such as the literate societies of Europe and America. " T h e typical behavior of social class or occupational group is important here. Categories derived from distinctions drawn empirically on the basis of local differences are obviously inapplicable to such cases, and should be replaced by those that are functionally relevant." 2 Translated into quantitative terms, the second characteristic of the culture area could, therefore, be expressed as follows: the less the social arid occupational stratification in a geographical area, the greater the theoretical applicability of the culture area concept.

39

4o

Golden River to Golden Road

T h e third characteristic of the culture area is that its center is well defined but its margins are rarely, if ever, clearcut. Boas has pointed out that the areal distribution of different aspects of culture, such as technology, beliefs, social forms, religion, art, a n d music, may be nonconcordant. 3 This means that the usefulness of the culture area concept as a classificatory tool is limited, since it frequently leaves doubt as to the borderline that divides two contiguous culture areas from each other. This criticism has been met only partially by stressing the fact that, as Kroeber put it, "the culmination of these [different] aspects [of culture] tend actually to coincide in the same centers" which therefore " a r e to be construed as foci of radiation." 4 Wissler has accordingly mapped his areas in America only schematically, emphasizing their centers in which the culture is most typical and intensive. 5 Implicit in this discussion about the clear-cut center and dubious borders is the quantitative assumption that the greater the cultural homogeneity within an area and the clearer its limits, the less doubtful its culture area character. T h e fourth characteristic of the culture area refers to the time aspect. Wissler stated that "a distribution of narrow range may be suspected of being an innovation, whereas one of wide range would be of respectable age." 6 Kroeber, further generalizing, emphasized that the culture area "is primarily classificatory and descriptive, therefore static; but like every sound 'natural' classification it implies a genetic one." 7 A culture area is thus assumed to be the result of historical processes. O n e could tentatively formulate a quantitative relationship between age and a r e a : the larger the spatial extent of the culture area, the longer the historical processes that went into its making.

THE

" C U L T U R E C O N T I N E N T " C H A R A C T E R OF THE M I D D L E

EAST

Let us now examine the Middle East in the light of these four characteristics. With regard to the first characteristic, the dependence of culture on habitat, it can be stated categorically that there are few world areas in which there is such a close correlation as in the Middle East between the geographic pattern of the natural environment and the cultural pattern of the

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

41

peoples. Between 90 and 95 per cent of the entire area is desert or desert-like steppe, interspersed everywhere, however, as well as surrounded by fertile regions of cultivated or cultivable land. This alternation of desert and sown with a transition either sudden or gradual from the one into the other is the basic ecologic pattern of the Middle East. T o the south this area is bounded by the humid forest region of central A f r i c a ; to the north by the Mediterranean and the Black Seas; and to the southeast by the Arabian Sea and the humid forest region of the Indian subcontinent. T o the northeast, in Central Asia, is found the only contiguous area that to some extent is comparable geographically to the Middle East. However, the Middle East with its true deserts lies south of latitude 38 o N., whereas the Central Asian steppes lie to the north of the same latitude. Differences in elevation, water resources, and climatic conditions further set off the two regions, and make different cultural adaptations necessary. T h e limits of the natural area of the Middle East are thus drawn clearly enough and, as we shall see instantly, are closely concordant with the limits of the Middle Eastern culture continent. When we examine the cultural correspondences to this geographic area and pattern, we are actually shifting our attention from the first to the second characteristic of the culture area, according to which a geographic patterning of cultures within a larger region is a criterium of the applicability of the culture area concept. The Middle East lies in this respect, just as it does geographically, in the middle between Negro Africa and Europe. Negro Africa is characterized by chiefly geographic groupings of cultures almost as suitable for classification on an areal basis as are the native cultures of America. In the Middle East no area shows a cultural homogeneity comparable to that of a typical culture area in Negro Africa. On the other hand, neither does the Middle East partake of the European pattern with its accent on social classes and occupational groupings. The specifically Middle Eastern sociocultural pattern is characterized by the presence in every part of the area of two main population categories, each with a typical ecologic adjustment of its own: nomadic tribes inhabiting the deserts and steppes on the

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one h a n d , and settled groups concentrated in those regions capable of agricultural cultivation on the other. This schematic dichotomy into n o m a d i c and settled aggregates reveals, of course, under closer inspection a m u c h more complicated picture of social structure. W i t h the exception of the townspeople, these further subdivisions show a close correspondence to finer distinctions within subtypes of geographic environment, and thus further corroborate the first characteristic of the culture area, according to w h i c h a definite correlation exists between a culture area and the g e o g r a p h i c area it occupies. Between the true desert and the sown there is in most parts of the M i d d l e East a transitional semidesert belt, barely suited for agricultural purposes but offering much better pastures than the true desert. T h i s semidesert belt is the home of the sheep- and goat-breeding nomads whose wandering territory is m u c h more restricted than that of the true or camel nomads. A g a i n , in the mountainous sections of the M i d d l e East, is found yet another type of seminomads: the mountain nomads w h o practice transh u m a n c e . In the cultivable areas, for example, along the Mediterranean littoral and the great riverbeds of the Nile, the Tigris, and the Euphrates, in the oases and the mountain tracts, are found agricultural villages with a population in m a n y respects different from any of the n o m a d i c varieties. These sedentary peoples w h o form more than 85 per cent of the total population of the M i d d l e East are mostly villagers but, in addition, they range from smalltownpeople to big-city folk with a display of occupational specialization increasing in proportion to the size of the urban aggregates they inhabit. Starting out f r o m a b i g city such as Damascus in Syria, C a i r o in E g y p t , T r i p o l i in L i b y a , or Casablanca in M o r o c c o , one can find first a n u m b e r of agricultural villages situated in the midst of cultivated territory, then a steppe region utilized by goat and sheep herders practicing a limited nomadism, and finally the desert w h e r e are e n c a m p e d the camel-breeding Bedouin tribes, all within a radius of fifty miles or less. Were one to apply the culture area concept to such a narrowly delimited tract alone, one w o u l d find that four separate culture areas can be distinguished in i t : urban, agricultural, seminomadic, and true nomadic. H o w e v e r , as

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

43

one proceeds from one country to another, from one region to another, one finds this same spatial sequence repeated again and again, so that the fourfold division appears as a single unit showing a definite configurational patterning. The entire Middle Eastern culture continent thus appears as a tissue consisting of a number of cells, each one of which has an identical or very similar inner structure. Such a cell pattern in itself is not a uniquely Middle Eastern phenomenon. It is known to exist to a smaller or larger extent in most human societies. In the modern Western world one finds it represented by the ubiquitous range from city to village or farm. But unique for the Middle East is the specific structure of the cell with its four components, the urban, agricultural, seminomadic, and nomadic population elements. In fact, this pattern of social structure with its local heterogeneity that recurs consistently all over the area is so typical for the Middle East that it must be regarded as one of the most important criteria when an attempt is being made to determine its limits. In turning now to the third characteristic, the one that can be reformulated as stating that a culture area is only as good as its boundaries, let us attempt to draw the borderline of the Middle East with both the geographic and the cultural angles in mind. This task is made relatively easy because in no geographic area contiguous to the Middle East is either the typical Middle Eastern desert-sown pattern or the equally typical Middle Eastern sociocultural configuration duplicated. Even if we disregard for a moment the nomadic-and-settled pattern and concentrate on the nomadic element alone, no contiguous geographic area is found to contain a nomadic population sufficiently similar to the Middle Eastern nomads to raise serious doubts as to the delimitation of the Middle Eastern culture continent. The only comparable nomadic culture in any world area contiguous to the Middle East is found in Central Asia. However, in addition to the environmental factors referred to above, cultural factors that can be isolated by a careful perusal of documentation available from both areas show that Central Asial nomadism and Middle Eastern nomadism constitute two very distinct cultures,

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different enough to preclude their inclusion u n d e r one cultural entity. 8 It is sufficient to refer to one complex only t h a t can serve both as a characteristic of the nomadic element in all parts of the Middle East a n d as a clearly marked distinguishing feature between it a n d the Central Asian nomads. This is the type of shelter used all over the Middle East by the n o m a d s a n d seminomads : the black hair tent, which essentially consists of a single large rectangular piece of tent cloth m a d e of camel's and goat's hair, spread u p o n a n u m b e r of poles a n d held in place by long outstretched ropes pegged to the ground. This black hair tent is practically the only type of shelter used by the n o m a d s a n d seminomads of the Middle East, its form a n d construction showing only minor and insignificant variations from Morocco a n d R í o de O r o in the west to Afghanistan a n d Balujistan in the east. In the Indus Valley the nomadic c a m p is replaced by settled agricultural villages that are the westernmost outposts of the cultures of the I n d i a n subcontinent. In the Plain of Turkestan the place of the M i d d l e Eastern black tent is taken by theyurt, the round dome-capped tent built around a complex and solid f r a m e of latticelike rods of willow or beechwood, tied together with rawhide, and covered with white or gray sheep's felt. T h e b o u n d a r y line between the black hair tent and the yurt is sharply d r a w n . T o its northeastern edge the I r a n i a n Plateau is the domain of the I r a n i a n tribes with their black hair tents; down in the plains, beginning with the G o r g a n Valley within the political boundaries of I r a n a n d Afghanistan, and to the northeast for thousands of miles is the territory of the T u r k o m a n , Kirgiz, Kazak, a n d Mongol yur/-dwelling tribes. Wherever yurts appear further to the west, that is, within the M i d d l e East, they belong to isolated T u r k o m a n tribes who in the course of their wanderings reached these western lands. O n the other h a n d , a variety of the black hair tent reappears to the east in Tibet, after a break of several hundreds of miles. W h a t is, however, more significant for a delimitation of the Middle East is the fact that no intermediary or transitional forms exist between the black hair tent and theyurt, and that consequently the spatial distribution of each is even more clearly marked off against the other. T h e black hair tent is, of course, m u c h more t h a n a single item

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

45

in the material equipment of nomadic tribes. It is the symbol and the tangible expression of a highly coordinated, complex, a n d specific way of life: Middle Eastern pastoral nomadism. T h e hair tent means a special set of material equipment; it indicates animal h u s b a n d r y concentrating on camels and/or sheep and goats; it is an evidence of seasonal wandering, tribal organization, and of a definite system of values and social attitudes. Wherever it is found it thus testifies to the presence of the nomadic or seminomadic component of the Middle Eastern sociocultural configuration. T h e nomads and seminomads, however, are only part of the Middle Eastern sociocultural pattern. They have, in every section of the Middle East, clearly patterned contacts with the settled population. T h a t is, the interaction among the different parts of the local cells is largely the same all over the area. In fact, this specific dynamism and functional interdependence among the different population elements is everywhere the inevitable concomitant of the structural patterning referred to earlier. Equally significant for a study of the Middle East from the culture area point of view is the fact that in all those aspects of culture not contingent upon ecologic adjustment a surprising homogeneity can be observed among the population elements inhabiting the area, however different the economic bases of their existence. More about the definiteness of the boundaries of the Middle Eastern culture area can be said within the context of its time aspect. T h e correlation between time and space was stated to be the fourth characteristic of the culture area. T h e problem of Americanists such as Wissler was to reconstruct probable historical processes from a study of geographic distribution. Their age-area concept began with observed data in a geographic area and aimed at reaching an understanding of otherwise unknown occurrences in past ages. I n the Middle East, we are faced with a reversed situation. Owing to the specific trends of interests, first religious and later scientific, an enormous a m o u n t of attention has been focused on the history and archaeology of the Middle East, to the relative neglect of its present-day cultures. T h e result is that we know more about several phases of life in ancient Egypt or in ancient

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Mesopotamia than in modern E g y p t or I r a q . C o m p a r e d to what we know about cultural interchange and influences among the great cultures of ancient N e a r Eastern civilization, our knowledge of the distribution and formation of modern cultures in the area is meager. In such a situation, the quest from the known to the unknown must, obviously, proceed in the opposite direction from the one familiar to Americanists and to anthropologists in general. O u r rich historical knowledge of the area must be brought to bear upon the problems of the spatial distribution and interrelation of the present-day cultures in the area. I f Wissler's dictum that a wide distributional range indicates respectable age is true also in the reverse, the unparalleled age of documented cultures in the core area of the M i d d l e East will lead us to expect an extremely wide spatial distribution of the modern culture that is the end result of this long cultural history. I n other words, w e will expect to find widely diffused over an uncommonly extensive geographic region cultures or cultural complexes going back ultimately to ancient N e a r Eastern origins. Y e t another consideration will strengthen us in this expectation' T h e culture areas in A m e r i c a were found roughly to correspond to ecologic or natural areas. As against the relatively small size of these areas in A m e r i c a , and especially in North A m e r i c a , one encounters in the M i d d l e East a huge area characterized by a more or less uniform overriding geographic pattern, to which a similarly large area of cultural diffusion can be expected to correspond. T h e two factors, historical and geographic, represent an exceptional set of circumstances that facilitated the spread of Middle Eastern culture from the old core area until it reached the present-day dimensions of the Middle Eastern culture continent. In a rough diachronic scheme, three major elements can be distinguished in the cultural configuration of each part of the Middle East: two making for homogeneity and a third for diversity. T h e two homogenizing influences are those of Islam and of the ancient N e a r Eastern civilizations, while the diversifying factor is the local tradition of greatly varying age. Islamic culture started out from A r a b i a in the seventh century and spread over the entire Middle East within a century after the death of M o h a m m e d (632). Islam, it may be reiterated here, is

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

47

more than a religion in the sense in which this concept is known to us from the Western world. It is rather comparable to Hinduism, notwithstanding the basic differences between the two with regard to concrete content, insofar as both Hinduism and Islam are total ways of life. Islam as a total way of life is founded on a tradition that goes back to Mohammed, either actually or fictitiously, or to his companions and first disciples. It incorporates religious, cultic, and doctrinal elements, and was in its very beginnings a mixture of Mohammedan innovation and local HijazI tradition and folk custom, which it disseminated in the course of its conquests from Sind to Spain, from the Golden River to the Golden Road. However, the distribution of Islam is considerably wider than that of Middle Eastern culture. There is, moreover, a marked difference between the cultures of the Middle Eastern Muslim peoples and those of the large Muslim ethnic aggregates residing beyond the boundaries of the Middle East. This brings us to the older, pre-Islamic processes of cultural diffusion that took place in the area. For some four thousand years preceding Alexander the Great, the ancient Near East was the primary center of cultural development and dissemination over a major part of the three continents of the Old World. Influences from this core area emanated in a sequence of waves. It would be extremely fascinating and instructive to collate the available information as to the differences in the spatial spread of ancient Near Eastern cultural influences on the one hand and of Islamic cultural influences on the other, all around the margins of the Middle East. This, however, cannot be done at the present time. Only from one contiguous area, that of African cultures, can a few data be adduced illustrating the problem and at the same time helping to reach a clearer understanding of the relationship between age and area in the Middle East. T H E BOUNDARIES

Historical data as to the spread of ancient Near Eastern culture into Negro Africa are meager, but a study of the spatial distribution of certain cultural elements points the way. There are several cultural traits or complexes that originated in antiquity

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Golden River to Golden Road

somewhere in the general area of the ancient Near East, and which today are no longer found in the Middle East but have survived in Negro Africa. One of these is the extremely significant complex of sacred kingship, which occupied a focal position in ancient Near Eastern

T h e sacred kingship —

_ —

_ _

The myth of the message that failed

M u l t i p l e - h e a d e d spears and staves

Map i. The northern boundary lines of the present-day distribution of three ancient Near Eastern cultural features in Africa

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

49

cultures, a n d spread far beyond the present boundaries of Islam in Africa. Within the Middle East itself, sacred kingship has been obliterated by Islam with the result t h a t sacred kingship and Islam form two mutually exclusive complexes sharply delimited against each other. 9 Although the socioreligious complexes of Islam and sacred kingship respectively are of outstanding i m p o r t a n c e in the life of the peoples concerned, they in themselves would not be sufficient to delimit the southern b o u n d a r y line of the Middle Eastern culture area. However, we find that this b o u n d a r y line is roughly the same as t h a t of several material traits that too originated in the ancient N e a r East a n d were subsequently superseded in the Middle East by more recent developments, to survive in the ancient form only in Negro Africa. Multiple-headed spears are a case in point. Bidents or two-headed spears were ritual objects in ancient Egypt a n d adjoining Libya in prehistoric as well as historic times. I n ancient South A r a b i a n (Sabaean and Minaean) inscriptions bidents, together with tridents, a p p e a r as symbols of lightning. T h e trident as a symbol of lightning a n d as a royal or divine a t t r i b u t e is known f r o m the Hittites, the Assyrians, the Babylonians, a n d later the Greeks. Actual tridents survive from ancient Persia and countries to the southeast. In the m o d e r n M i d d l e East multiple-headed spears do not exist. In one place, Morocco, their ceremonial use disappeared about a h u n d r e d years ago. I n Negro Africa, however, the multiplepointed spear is very m u c h in evidence to this day, as a badge of office, a ceremonial w e a p o n , a royal emblem, or a cult object. T h e northern b o u n d a r y line of its present-day distribution is practically identical with that of sacred kingship. T h e distribution of the multiple-headed spears to the east of the Middle Eastern area is not as clear as one would like to have it. But it seems t h a t the f u r t h e r away one moves f r o m the Middle East, the m o r e recent are the specimens found, until one reaches the East Indies, South East Asia, a n d C h i n a , where bidents and tridents have been in use as ceremonial or actual weapons down to the present time. 1 0 T h e d i s a p p e a r a n c e of multiple-headed spears f r o m secular use can be explained by its suppression by Islam as an emblem of

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sacred kings, and a subsequent extension of this suppression also to its secular use. T h a t sacred kingship itself could not be tolerated by a strictly monotheistic and in its origins highly puritanistic faith such as Islam is easily understandable. T h e monotheistic-puritanistic origins of Islam are responsible for the suppression and complete elimination of yet another important ancient Near Eastern culture complex from most of the Middle Eastern area. T h e plastic representation and portraiture of living beings, animal, h u m a n , and divine, was of such significance in the ancient Near East that without t h e m ancient Near Eastern religions (with the exception of the religion of the Hebrews from the sixth century B.C. onward) would have been inconceivable. And since religion was in its earliest Near Eastern manifestations as much a total way of life as it is today in the Middle East, everyday life in the ancient Near East would also have been unthinkable without the esthetoreligious satisfactions offered by plastic arts, and secondarily also by graphic arts. Masterpieces of ancient Egyptian, Syrian, Mesopotamian, Anatolian, and Iranian plastic art survive to this day as splendid witnesses to highly developed cultures with definite artistic orientations. Islam, continuing the late-Hebrew tradition of aversion against plastic (as well as graphic) representations, p u t an end to this great artistic efflorescence, and forced the artistic genius of the peoples converted to its creed into such limited expressions as afforded by decorative arts. T h e Middle East has thus become artistically an essentially sculptureless area, to such an extent that even the Coptic church, the largest, oldest, and most Middle Eastern of all the Eastern Christian churches, foregoes any plastic representation of Jesus, Mary, and the saints. O n l y to the northeast of the Middle Eastern culture area do we encounter another culture that is likewise devoid of representative art. In Central Asia, Islam has had the same effect in this respect as in the Middle East: it eliminated any plastic art that m a y have existed previously. T o the north, in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n area of Christian Europe, sculpture is a significant element in religious life in the Catholic as well as the Orthodox churches. T o the south, the borderline t h a t marks the limits of the distribution of the sacred kingship and the multiple-headed spear also marks the

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

51

borders of the vigorous Negro sculpture zone. T o the southeast, in I n d i a , sculpture occupies in H i n d u as well as in Buddhist cults a position similar to the one it has in Southern Europe. With regard to music, it is the contention of musicologists w h o studied the Middle East that it is an area with definite musical characteristics of its own. It is pointed out that the same musical instruments are used and the same types of music are produced all over the area. Some of these musical instruments are old in the area, and certainly a n t e d a t e Islam. O t h e r ancient Near Eastern instruments disappeared f r o m the area itself and survive in Negro Africa. A concrete example of the latter is the peculiar ancient Egyptian harp, known f r o m its pictorial representation on ancient monuments, which does not exist any longer in any part of the M i d d l e East but survives in unchanged form a m o n g the A z a n d e and the Baganda in East Africa, and among the J u k u n , Busawa, Igbira, C h a m b a , Verre, and others in West Africa. 1 1 All these tribes are grouped along the southern borders of the Middle Eastern culture continent, and just outside its limits. O u r last example to illustrate the same type of spatial distribution and the same position of the borderline is taken from the world of rnylh. I n the literatures of the ancient Near East there is a type of story or myth known as " T h e Perverted Message" or " T h e Message T h a t Failed." Frazer has shown that the Biblical story of the fall of m a n a n d the loss of his immortality is one version of this story. 1 2 I n the m o d e r n Middle East no traces of this story are known to have survived. But the story of the message that failed reappears in a well-documented distribution in Negro Africa, again just south of the limits of the Middle Eastern culture area.13 If these examples could be sufficiently multiplied, they would show the Middle Eastern culture as occupying that centrally located geographic area in which the Islamic culture has superseded ancient N e a r Eastern culture complexes. J u s t outside its limits, however, m a n y ancient N e a r Eastern culture complexes survive. This m a r g i n a l survival is best documented in Negro Africa. In other contiguous areas more research is needed to demonstrate the same p h e n o m e n o n , although hypothetically its presence seems most probable. T h e Middle Eastern culture

52

Golden River to Golden Road

continent would thus be found to comprise those regions which are Islamic at present and which in the past were under the cultural sway of the great ancient Near Eastern cultures. Regions that were reached by only one of these two great cultural waves are marginal to the Middle Eastern culture continent, and lie outside its boundaries proper. The area thus defined historically is coextensive with the geographically determined desert and sown area, as well as with the ethnographically delimited distribution of the nomadic and settled configuration. The proposed southern delimitation of the Middle East in Africa has recently received important corroboration by the work of George Peter Murdock. After a careful examination of the culture groups of Africa, Murdock compiled three distribution maps of its culture provinces (all the three south of what is suggested above as the southern boundary of the Middle East) as well as a distribution map of East African pastoralists.14 The northern boundary line, resulting from a superimposition of these four maps on one another, coincides generally with the southern boundary line proposed above. This line can thus be considered fairly well established. To the northeast, the limits of the Middle East run roughly along the Caucasus and the northern borders of Iran and Afghanistan. Elsewhere the writer has adduced evidence to show that Middle Eastern nomadism can be clearly distinguished from Central Asian nomadism and that, strictly speaking, the limits of the Middle East should be drawn where the typical Middle Eastern black hair tent is replaced by the yurt, the round, domeshaped felt tent, equally typical of Central Asian nomadism. 15 This delimitation excludes a corner of Iran (the Gorgan valley to the southeast of the Caspian Sea) and part of northern Afghanistan from the Middle Eastern culture continent. We shall, nevertheless, discuss briefly this marginal area at the end of our listing of the culture areas of the Middle East. To the east, the boundary line of the Middle East runs roughly north to south across the middle of Western Pakistan. To the west of this line live the nomadic Balujis who are a definitely Middle Eastern people by all criteria. To the east of it live the Sinds, in every respect a South Asian (Indian) population.

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

53

T H E P R O B L E M OF SUBDIVISION

T h e p r o b l e m of h o w to subdivide the vast l a n d area of the Middle

East

into

cultural

subareas

has

received

only

scant

attention. Especially its Asian part has r e m a i n e d neglected in this respect. T h o s e w h o put forward suggestions as to the m a p p i n g o f c u l t u r e areas in the A f r i c a n part of the M i d d l e East w e r e w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n Africanists, interested more in the " b l a c k " t w o thirds t h a n in the " w h i t e " northern one third of A f r i c a . T h e first attempt to m a p the m a j o r regions of A f r i c a was m a d e b y an ingenious F r e n c h m a n , A . de Préville, in 1894. 1 8 T a k i n g the m a i n a n i m a l species bred by the pastoral peoples as the basis o f classification, he generalized broadly a n d d i v i d e d N o r t h A f r i c a into four roughly horizontal strips, w h i c h he then extended over into the Asian part of the M i d d l e East, g i v i n g t h e m an u p w a r d slant. A s the m a p opposite page 14 in his b o o k shows at a glance, he regarded the entire north coast of A f r i c a as far south as approximately the 30th parallel as the region o f horsemen (cavaliers). In southwest Asia he assigned to this region a b r o a d belt north of a line d r a w n from the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula to the northern end of the Persian G u l f and thence c o n t i n u i n g in a northeasterly direction. South of this lay his second zone, the region of camelmen

(chameliers), w h i c h comprised

most o f the

Sahara,

C e n t r a l A r a b i a , and southern Iran. T h e third one w a s the m u c h thinner region of g o a t m e n (chevriers), stretching f r o m the A t l a n t i c coast of A f r i c a south of R í o de O r o , across the R e d Sea a n d the southern part of the Persian Gulf, to southern I r a n . His southernmost zone within our area was the region of c a t t l e m e n (vachers), corresponding roughly to the area b e t w e e n the 12th and the 16th parallels all through the w i d t h of A f r i c a , t u r n i n g south to include most of Ethiopia and Somalia, then across the B a b e l - M a n d e b along the South A r a b i a n coast, and

finally

across the G u l f o f

O m a n into the southeastern corner of I r a n . A l t h o u g h there is little in this a t t e m p t that c a n stand the test of time, credit must be given to Préville for the i d e a of the geographic plotting of regions in the M i d d l e East on the basis o f types of animal husbandry. T h e next attempt, m a d e b y J e r o m e D o w d in J 907, constitutes

Golden River to Golden Road

54

w h a t w a s in f a c t a step b a c k w a r d as c o m p a r e d to t h e w o r k o f P r e v i l l e . Q u i t e a p a r t f r o m the n u m e r o u s u n t e n a b l e

hypotheses

c o n t a i n e d in D o w d ' s b o o k , he d i v i d e d the e n t i r e n o r t h e r n t h i r d of A f r i c a into two zones o n l y : a northern " c a m e l z o n e " and a s o u t h e r n " c a t t l e z o n e . " H i s d i v i d i n g line b e t w e e n t h e t w o regions w a s d r a w n f r o m w e s t to e a s t s o m e w h e r e in the m i d d l e o f Preville's region of goatmen.17 C o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m these e a r l y a m a t e u r i s h a t t e m p t s w a s the o n e m a d e in 1 9 2 4 b y a n o u t s t a n d i n g A f r i c a n i s t , M e l v i l l e J . H e r s k o v i t s . A l t h o u g h H e r s k o v i t s titled his first p u b l i s h e d p a p e r on the subject " A Preliminary Consideration of the C u l t u r e A r e a s of Africa,"18

he retained

the

general

outline

in

two

subsequent

revisions w i t h a f e w c h a n g e s c o n f i n e d to N e g r o A f r i c a . I n this r e v i s e d f o r m h e r e p r i n t e d his m a p o f the " C u l t u r e A r e a s o f A f r i c a " in his Man and His As

an

Works.19

Africanist, Herskovits'

main

interest as w e l l as field

e x p e r i e n c e l a y in N e g r o A f r i c a . I n the discussion

accompanying

his m a p h e d e s c r i b e d a t s o m e d e t a i l the c u l t u r e a r e a he n a m e d " W e s t e r n S u d a n , " w h i c h c o m p r i s e s the s o u t h w e s t e r n c o r n e r o f the A f r i c a n p a r t o f the M i d d l e E a s t (as d e l i m i t e d a b o v e , p. 1 3 ) , as w e l l as t h e n o r t h w e s t e r n a r e a s o f N e g r o A f r i c a n c u l t u r e s ; b u t he dismissed in a f e w lines t h e areas he t e r m e d " E a s t e r n

Sudan,"

" D e s e r t A r e a , " a n d " E g y p t . " 2 0 A s to the n o r t h c o a s t o f A f r i c a , d o w n to a d i s t a n c e o f o v e r t h r e e h u n d r e d miles f r o m t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n c o a s t l i n e o f T u n i s i a , A l g e r i a , a n d M o r o c c o , he e x c l u d e d it e n t i r e l y f r o m his s c h e m e o n the g r o u n d o f " i t s close a f f i n i t y to Europe."21 T o a n y s t u d e n t o f t h e M i d d l e E a s t it is b e y o n d d o u b t t h a t the N o r t h A f r i c a n c o a s t a l a r e a constitutes o n e o f t h e m o s t c h a r a c t e r istic v a r i e t i e s o f t y p i c a l

Middle

Eastern

culture,

and

that

its

a f f i n i t y to E u r o p e , a l t h o u g h closer t h a n t h a t o f most o f the rest of A f r i c a , about equals in degree that of L o w e r E g y p t and

the

L e v a n t coastal area. The

east-west

dividing

line

Herskovits

draws

between

" D e s e r t A r e a " a n d t h e " W e s t e r n S u d a n " runs d i r e c t l y

through

the very middle of the T u a r e g area and cannot, therefore, regarded

as m e a n i n g f u l .

Similarly,

his n o r t h - t o - s o u t h

the be

dividing

l i n e b e t w e e n " W e s t e r n S u d a n " a n d " E a s t e r n S u d a n " runs t h r o u g h

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

55

the Kanuric-speaking East-Saharan area, and should therefore be moved some three hundred miles to the west. In 1929, the German Africanist, Richard Thurnwald, published a study on the "Social Systems of A f r i c a . " 2 2 Thurnwald did not attempt to map culture areas, but he classified African social systems into nine types, of which, however, only two have representatives in the Middle Eastern part of Africa as well. Conversely, the great majority of the social systems found in this part do not fit into any of Thurnwald's nine categories. Evidently, this prominent Africanist has also paid but scant attention to the northern one third of the continent of his specialization. In 1937, Wilfrid D. Hambly in his Source Book for African Anthropology23 mapped the culture areas of Africa. T h e Middle Eastern part of Africa was divided by him as follows: (1) The Nile Valley; (2) " A region of migration of northern Hamites," occupying the entire north coast of Africa, from Mauretania in the west to close to the Nile delta in the east, and extending approximately 440 miles southward from the Tunisian-Algerian-Moroccan coast line; (3) " T h e Saharan region of camel-keeping cultures," subdivided into (3A) Tuareg (west-central Sahara), (3.Z?) Tebu, Tibbu and Teda of Tibcsti, and (3C) Arabs of the Libyan oases. This No. 3 covers the entire Sahara, and borders in the south on the narrow east-west beltlike area (4), termed " A region of pastoral nomads possessing cattle, sheep, goats, horses, and perhaps camels also." Hambly included in this area most of the region between the Nile and the Red Sea. T o the south of (4), again beltlike in its east-west stretch, lies (5), the dividing line between the two running in a roughly straight line touching the Senegal River, the northern bend of the Niger, and Lake Chad. This is stated to be a "parkland area" and a pastoral region with seasonal migrations. The main advance of this scheme as against the earlier one of Herskovits is in the adumbration of a threefold subdivision of the Sahara area (No. 3). Apart from this, the criticism leveled against Herskovits applies also to Hambly. The most recent mapping of the culture provinces in Middle Eastern Africa has been made by George Peter Murdock in his volume Africa: Its Peoples and Their Culture History.** While the

Golden River to Golden Road

56

writer f o u n d himself in a g r e e m e n t w i t h M u r d o c k w i t h regard to the d e l i m i t a t i o n o f the southern b o u n d a r y o f M i d d l e

Eastern

cultures in A f r i c a , he must d i s a g r e e w i t h h i m as to his classifications. M u r d o c k treats the entire M i d d l e E a s t e r n A f r i c a in three of t h e eleven parts o f this b o o k . I n P a r t 4, entitled " N o r t h A f r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r a l C i v i l i z a t i o n s , " he discusses the B e r b e r s ( C h a p . 15) a n d the

Saharan

Negroes

(Chap.

16);

in

Part

9,

"East

P a s t o r a l i s m , " o n e c h a p t e r deals w i t h the " B e j a "

African

(Chap.

40);

w h i l e P a r t 1 1 , " N o r t h a n d W e s t A f r i c a n P a s t o r a l i s m , " comprises four chapters, "Bedouin A r a b s " ( C h a p . 52); " T u a r e g "

(Chap.

5 3 ) ; " B a g g a r a " ( C h a p . 54), a n d " F u l a n i " ( C h a p . 5 5 ) . T h e over-all classificatory point o f v i e w , therefore, is e c o l o g i c : the p o p u l a t i o n is g r o u p e d into a n a g r i c u l t u r a l a n d a pastoral c a t e g o r y . T h i s in itself is perfectly s o u n d , a n d in a g r e e m e n t w i t h the present writer's o w n e l a b o r a t i o n o f the basic d i c h o t o m y o f all the

Middle

However,

Eastern

peoples

this ecologic

into

nomads

and

cultivators.25

classification is o f little use w h e n

the

p u r p o s e is to isolate criteria w i t h w h o s e h e l p the M i d d l e East c a n b e d i v i d e d into c u l t u r e areas, since, as is p o i n t e d o u t r e p e a t e d l y in the present v o l u m e , b o t h n o m a d s a n d c u l t i v a t o r s are f o u n d in e v e r y p a r t o f the M i d d l e East. M o r e o v e r , for the s a m e reason, the b r e a k d o w n into a g r i c u l t u r a l a n d p a s t o r a l p e o p l e s is not c o t e r m i n ous w i t h linguistic, religious, r a c i a l , or e t h n i c classification, n o r w i t h o v e r - a l l g e o g r a p h i c subdivisions. U n d e r the g e n e r a l ecologic classification i n d i c a t e d in his titles o f parts 4, 9, a n d 1 1 , M u r d o c k nevertheless treats ethnic or linguistic g r o u p s i n h a b i t i n g c e r t a i n geographic

areas.

He

therefore i n v o l v e s

himself in

numerous

difficulties a n d contradictions. T h e first c h a p t e r in the b o o k that deals w i t h a M i d d l e E a s t e r n g r o u p is C h a p t e r 15, entitled " B e r b e r s . " T h i s is o n e o f the c h a p ters c o n t a i n e d in P a r t 4, " N o r t h A f r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r a l

Civiliza-

t i o n s " ( p p . H I ff.). M u r d o c k a d o p t s " a strictly linguistic classification

in s e g r e g a t i n g the Berbers f r o m t h e A r a b s

in

North

A f r i c a " (p. 1 1 1 ) ; in other w o r d s , he r e g a r d s as Berbers only those g r o u p s w h o still s p e a k B e r b e r . T h e s e , he finds, fall i n t o 29 g r o u p s ( t o t a l i n g f o u r a n d a h a l f million p e o p l e ) , p r a c t i c a l l y all o f w h o m are l o c a t e d in n o r t h w e s t e r n A f r i c a , i.e. n o r t h o f l a t i t u d e 15° N .

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

57

and west of longitude 1 5 0 E. Of them, 17 groups (or 3,271,000) are stated to be sedentary cultivators; four groups, numbering 733,000, are semisedentary or practice transhumance; three, numbering 450,000, are nomads. As to the remaining three groups, no data are supplied. Geographically, however, the largest part of the Berber language area is inhabited by nomadic groups, the Tuareg. In fact, the Tuareg are treated again, and in greater detail, in Part 11 under "North and West African Pastoralism." A classification which thus places the same population group into two different categories cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Murdock's explanation, that the Tuareg have adapted to a desert environment involving "so many innovations as well as borrowings from the indigenous Negroes and the Bedouin Arabs, that we shall treat them separately in Chapter 5 3 " (p. 1 1 5 ) , does not eliminate the inconsistency. If his Chapter 15, "Berbers," treats of a population group belonging to "North African Agricultural Civilizations," it is impermissible to include in it Berber-speaking groups which for nearly a thousand years have not been agricultural but nomadic pastoral, and which in addition not only differ from but in fact contrast with the agricultural Berbers in dcscent rules, social organization, sex mores, material culture, etc. It is obvious that in this case the inconsistency was caused by the attempt to utilize simultaneously an ecologic and a linguistic classification. This cannot work, simply because not all Berbers are agriculturalists. The inconsistency resulting from the application of these two conflicting classificatory criteria is even more pronounced in Part 1 1 . Here, as the first group of "North and West African Pastoralists," the "Bedouin A r a b s " (Chap. 5 2 , pp. 392 ff.) are discussed. "Bedouin A r a b s " are, of course, the prototype of desert-dwelling, animal-herding nomads. But the criterion applied by Murdock in listing groups under this heading was, as in the case of his "Berbers," the linguistic one. He lists here all the Arabic-speaking groups of North and West Africa, 42 in number, with a total of 32 to 3 3 million people. Of these, however, only 1 2 groups numbering close to two million arc nomadic pastoralists; three more, numbering a few hundred thousand, arc seminomadic or consist of mixed nomadic and sedentary sub-

58

Golden River to Golden Road

groups; and 21 groups, numbering about 30 million, are sedentary cultivators. T h e ecologic character of the five remaining groups is not stated. A g a i n M u r d o c k tries to smooth over the inconsistency by stating that among the 42 groups listed b y him as "Bedouin A r a b s " " a number of Arabic-speaking peoples w h o are descended from the coastal populations that participated fully in the earlier G r e c o - R o m a n civilization" should " b e segregated." These he terms " L i t t o r a l peoples" (Algerians, Cyrenaicans, Egyptians, J e b a l a , Moroccans, Sahel, Tripolitanians, and Tunisians), and describes as "sedentary and partially u r b a n i z e d , " who, although Islamized and A r a b i z e d in the first period of A r a b political conquest, " r e m a i n e d to a considerable extent aloof from the Hilalian Bedouins" w h o invaded North A f r i c a in the eleventh century and established in it the prototype of Bedouin culture (pp. 396 f.). T h e i r economy is based primarily on cereal agriculture with auxiliary arboriculture, animal husbandry, urban handicraft, and trade. T h e y thus contrast with the Bedouin A r a b s w h o "retained, wherever possible, the nomadic pastoral economy they brought with them from A r a b i a " (p. 397). It is puzzling, to say the least, w h y a language group of 33 million should be named after its smallest component element, w h i c h constitutes about 6 per cent of the total, when over 90 per cent is not Bedouin but sedentary, not pastoral but agricultural, and not even A r a b , as far as descent is concerned, but merely " A r a b i z e d . " I f the Berber nomadic T u a r e g are classed among " N o r t h A f r i c a n agricultural civilizations" because prior to the Hilalian invasion their ancestors were cultivators, then certainly the 30 million "littoral peoples," w h o were cultivators for centuries prior to the Hilalian invasion and remained agriculturalists to this day, should also be classified under the same " N o r t h African agricultural civilizations." T h e first conclusion from the foregoing critical consideration of previous attempts at classifying the cultures in North A f r i c a is that in trying to solve the problem of the subdivision of the M i d d l e East into culture areas one must, first of all, liberate the culture area concept from its close association with the geographic area that characterized it in its original application to native A m e r i c a n cultures and still haunts those w h o are engaged in studies of spatial distribution of non-Western cultures. Culture is, of course,

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

59

carried by human groups, and these, in turn, must have geographic loci as their habitat. I n this sense, clusterings of cultures are correlated to geographic areas in the Middle East as well as in any other part of the globe. But, a mapping of cultural similarities and differences in the Middle East does not result in contiguous and clear-cut geographic areas. Instead of regarding the Middle East with its constituent cultures as a patchwork quilt, one has to regard it as a " K e l i m " rug, that famous woven variety of Persian carpetry in which the patterning is achieved by the skillful w a y in which once the w a r p and once the woof is allowed to emerge to the surface. T h e basic material consists, throughout the entire area of the carpet, of the same two types of y a r n ; yet the patterns can nevertheless show considerable variation when one corner of the carpet is compared to another. This is exactly the case with the specific configuration the component cultures evince in all parts of the Middle East. Unless one were to delimit a culture area extremely narrowly, such as a single oasis cluster or a single nomadic tribal territory, one encounters everywhere both the w a r p and the woof of the cultural texture, both the nomadic breeders and the settled cultivators. A n y attempt at a subdivision of the Middle East into culture areas must find a place in its scheme for both. T h e proportion in which the two are represented in an area or province and the question of cultural predominance that undoubtedly is correlated with i t — these are criteria that can and must be used for purposes of subdivision and classification. T h e predominance of the Bedouin element in Central A r a b i a , for instance, stamps that area with a character greatly differing from that of the Nile Valley with its exclusively sedentary population of fellahin. A phenomenon similar to the one pointed out here has, in fact, been recognized in connection with the mapping of the culture areas of South A m e r i c a . A p a r t from the coastal area to the north and the west, the entire land mass was divided in 1922 by Wissler into a larger northern area called A m a z o n and a smaller southern area called Guanaco. K r o e b e r , a year later, retained Wissler's areas, but renamed them Tropical Forest and Patagonia, respectively. 2 6 In the great Handbook of the South American Indians of the Smithsonian Institution these areas were drastically revised,

6o

Golden River to Golden Road

on t h e basis of a h u g e a m o u n t of a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n gathered in t h e i n t e r v e n i n g years. T h e n e a t , straight lines a n d clearcut, contiguous, almost geometric simplicity of the two areas completely d i s a p p e a r e d . I n s t e a d , a considerable a m o u n t of m u t u a l i n t e r p é n é t r a t i o n of two m a j o r c u l t u r e types is shown. T h e area still called the T r o p i c a l Forest is f o u n d to extend f a r d o w n the west coast, b u t contains several m a j o r a n d m a n y minor pockets i n h a b i t e d by peoples w h o b e l o n g to w h a t is called M a r g i n a l cult u r e type, as well as a smaller n u m b e r of pockets f o r m e d by the C i r c u m - C a r i b b e a n culture type. T h e M a r g i n a l cultures occupy the entire southern tip of the continent, b u t their n o r t h e r n m o s t pockct a p p e a r s as far n o r t h as V e n e z u e l a . T h i s p a t t e r n , t h o u g h complex w h e n c o m p a r e d with the earlier a t t e m p t s , is simplicity itself in relation to the m u c h more involved interlacings found in the M i d d l e East. Carriers of n o m a d i c a n d settled cultures are present everywhere, a n d in m a n y places the picture is f u r t h e r complicated by the prescncc of towns t h a t dot the area with partly Westernized p o p u l a t i o n islands and thereby obscure the differences between their h i n t e r l a n d s . N e x t , the cultural variations evinced by one or both of the constituent ecologic groups in each g e o g r a p h i c area must be considered. Both the bedouins of A r a b i a a n d the T u a r e g of the S a h a r a are, for example, c a m e l - h e r d i n g n o m a d s with all the cultural characteristics that this entails in m a t e r i a l e q u i p m e n t , in food habits, in the a d a p t a t i o n to desert conditions, and even in social organization a n d values. Yet, at the same time, a n u m b e r of significant traits set the two groups sharply off against each o t h e r . T h e r e are, for instance, m a r k e d differences in clothing, l a n g u a g e , descent rules, a n d sex mores. O r , take the differences between two fellah g r o u p s : the Syrian a n d the E g y p t i a n . H e r e the clothing, l a n g u a g e , descent rules, a n d sex mores arc, a l t h o u g h by no m e a n s identical, at least very similar. But there are clear differences in m e t h o d s of work a n d in the availability of leisure, as well as in t e m p e r a m e n t and c h a r a c ter. S u c h are the criteria t h a t can with a d v a n t a g e be utilized for classificatory purposes. T h e available d a t a , meager as they arc, indicate t h a t we have in t h e M i d d l e East a c o n t i n u u m of n o m a d i c culture and a parallel

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

61

continuum of settled culture. Starting out from the North Arabian desert as the presumable center of the Middle Eastern nomadic complex, one finds, upon moving up into J o r d a n and Syria, certain new traits giving nomadic culture there a somewhat different character. Progressing eastward into Iraq, again a new set of traits is added and upon crossing into Iran, yet another one. A similar progression of change can be observed when moving westward across the R e d Sea and along the expanses of North Africa. As a concrete example the black hair tent can again be mentioned with its slight variations from tribe to tribe and more marked ones from area to area. As to the settled cultures, they change in a like manner and even more pronouncedly. Sailing up the Nile from Cairo towards the Sudan frontier and across it, one has a fine opportunity for observing this gradual change. From one village to the next the difference is unnoticeable; having passed twenty or thirty villages and recalling the first one, it becomes discernible; at the hundredth, apparent; south of the Sudan borderline, striking. Thorough studies, including compilations of lists of such progressively increasing differences, will make it possible to plot the Middle Eastern culture areas with a solid factual basis to rely on, instead of conjecture and informed guesswork. T o them have to be added the observations made by old and new local authors and students of Middle Eastern history and society with regard to differences in value culture between one part of the area and another. T o mention only one example of such general characterizations, Maqrizi, the fourteenth century Arab historian, quotes K a ' b al-Ahbar, one of the companions of the Prophet Mohammed, to the effect that when Allah created all things, He gave them each a companion. " I am going to S y r i a , " said R e a s o n ; " I will go with y o u , " said Rebellion. " I am going to the Desert," said Poverty; " I am going with y o u , " said Health. " I am going to E g y p t , " said Abundance; " I shall accompany you," said Resignation. 2 7 Translated into our terminology, this means that the Syrians were regarded as clever but rebellious; the nomads of the Arabian Desert as poor but healthy; and the Egyptians as wealthy and submissive. Another version of this tradition substitutes for the Syrians bravery in the place of clever-

62

Golden River to Golden Road

ness; and adds that the Iraqis are proud and hypocritical, and that the Yemenis are characterized by faith and modesty. Nor must one overlook the interaction between the indigenous local cultures and the cultural influences that spread in successive waves from the core area toward the boundaries of the present-day Middle East. In spite of the power of these waves, and especially the last one, Islam, vestiges of the old local cultures have survived in many places, primarily among the settled rural populations of the regions remote from the core area. Even where no distinct "archaic" traits can be recognized, and where a thorough blending of the old and the new has taken place, the persistent effect of the old local cultures can be discerned in the resultant somewhat different local hue of the over-all color of Middle Eastern culture. Yet another factor that has strengthened the differences among these local entities has been the absence of communications, especially on the folk level, between one localized society and the next. Isolation has not only enabled the old cultural differences to survive; it also favored the development of new differences in the shape of local variants of the superimposed imported cultures. These differences assume significance as soon as we shift our attention from the culture continent as a whole to its component parts. A study of local cultural histories is therefore indispensable for classificatory purposes. These then are the main avenues of research that will have to be followed for a definitive classification of the Middle Eastern culture continent into culture areas: more descriptive ethnographic material is needed from practically every area; this has to be supplemented by anthropological analyses of the historical material, much of which is available to this day only in the Arabic or Persian or Turkish original. T h e task will be an arduous one, but the results will be richly rewarding: a fuller understanding of the present-day mosaic of the Middle East, and of the longest recorded cultural development that went into its making. T H E C U L T U R E A R E A S OF T H E M I D D L E E A S T

For the time being, a preliminary and tentative mapping of the culture areas in the Middle East can be attempted on the basis of the presently available data. Let us begin with the North African

N

1

TURKISH

F

23

S 17

Jg^fSfttJAN,/

KURDISH^

I

JURKOMANUZBEK

^ PERSIAN

.MONSOLi

AFGHANI / UNIM>> HABITED

OASIS

BAUUJI

NORTH ARABIAN» DESERT BEJA

UNINHABITED

CAMELCATTLE

SOUTHWEST ARARIAN

Map 2. The culture areas of the Middle East

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

63

part of the Middle East, and state at the very outset that the following outline could not have been arrived at without the huge amount of material assembled by Murdock in his Africa: Its Peoples and their Culture History, and the excellent detailed " T r i b a l M a p of Africa" appended to that volume. While the author was constrained above to criticize the classifications adopted by Murdock, he wishes to acknowledge fully his indebtedness to Murdock's tribal map and his brief characterizations of the hundreds of tribes plotted on it. Only in a few instances did the author find it necessary to alter the boundary lines of groups drawn by Murdock, as for example in the case of some riverain and oasis groups to whom Murdock assigned unduly large territories. No such careful listing or mapping of tribes was available for the Asian part of the Middle East. The lists and maps of the Arabian Bedouin tribes prepared by Baron Oppenheim 28 were of little help because all the tribes described by him had to be included in one single culture area (No. 10). Of greater usefulness was the ethnic and linguistic map of the Near East published in 1944 in Petermans Geographische Mitteilungen. In most cases, however, the writer had to draw upon his own familiarity with the area in deciding where to draw the boundary lines between what appeared to him as contiguous but different culture areas. An added difficulty was presented by the ethnic complexities of major parts of the Asian Middle East. Especially rugged mountain areas, such as those inhabited by the Kurds and the Lur and Turkic-speaking tribes in western Iran, do not easily lend themselves to a mapping of culture areas. While the natural conditions tend to impose a definite way of life on all the inhabitants, the isolation resulting from lack of communications and from the frequent difficulty of establishing contact even across a single mountain range makes for the retention of cultural traits that may have been brought into the area many centuries ago by the remote ancestors of the present-day population. Thus, the typical picture in these regions is that of simultaneous existence side by side of representatives of two or more cultures, more often than not in overt or quiescent enmity. In western Iran, for example one finds side by side Sunni Muslim Kurdish tribes, Armenianspeaking Christians, Shi'ite Muslim Azerbaijani Turks. Aramaic-

64

Golden River to Golden Road

speaking Nestorian Christians, and Aramaic-speaking Kurdish Jews. In such a case one has no choice but to regard this very mixture itself as a characteristic of the area and to delimit it against neighboring, more homogeneous areas as best possible. For these reasons, and several others too technical to enter into, the mapping of the culture areas in the Asian part of the Middle East must be regarded as even more tentative than the African. 1 . The Nile Area. The material base is intensive irrigated cultivation extending from the delta into the Sudan. Religion is Muslim (with a small Christian minority); the language, Arabic; the physical type shows a mixture of ancient Egyptian stock with the Arabs who arrived in the seventh century from Arabia. Although it is the smallest area in the entire Middle East, it is by far the most populous; in fact, it is one of the most densely settled agricultural areas in the entire world. The nuclear political unit is the village; the family is of the typical Middle Eastern type. No nomads are to be found within this area; on the other hand, in Lower Egypt there are two cities of metropolitan dimensions and several towns. About 80 per cent of the people nevertheless live in villages, many of which are much larger than in any other part of the Middle East. 2. The Coastal Agricultural Area. Cultivation is less intensive, with irrigation applied only exceptionally. Terracing of mountain slopes is practiced. The area forms a contiguous strip along the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts as far east as Tripolitania, and resumes, after a break in the Gulf of Sidra, on the northwestern coast of Cyrenaica. Sunni Islam predominates with a sprinkling of Senussi sectarianism in the east and strong saint cult in the west. The language is largely Arabic with considerable Berber elements in the western part of the area (especially in Morocco) and on its southern fringes. Nomads, in small numbers, practice transhumance and utilize the lands unsuited for agriculture. The biggest cities are located on the coast. Social and family organization is the typical Middle Eastern one. In the west (Morocco) the craft guilds show many archaic traits, 29 and the Arabic dialect has a markedly local character.

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

65

3 . Northwestern Oasis Area. T h e geographic region of the northwestern S a h a r a , characterized by a liberal sprinkling of oases, is inhabited largely by Berber-speaking peoples who practice irrigation agriculture and arboriculture. T h e surrounding steppe and desert is the grazing ground of the camels or sheep and goats tended by nomadic A r a b tribes. T h e Berber-Arab ethnolinguistic division, however, is by no means coterminous with the ecologic one. There is a minority of settled A r a b cultivators as well as of nomadic Berber pastoralists in the area, the latter especially in its western part. Both the Berbers and the Arabs are Muslims, several of the Berber groups belonging to the I b a d i sect. Most of the Berbers practice monogamy. A m o n g the nomads, Islam is followed with varying degrees of laxity. Some of the oasis settlements reach impressive sizes, although large cities are absent. T h e interaction between nomads and cultivators, the family, and social organization are all of the typical Middle Eastern mold. T h e kelim-pattern referred to above (p. 59) is clearly apparent. 4. The Northeastern Oasis Area. This area is in many respects similar to the northwestern oasis area, but the Berber element is small. Practically all the nomads as well as the great majority of the cultivators are Arabs. T h e nomads' domain extends both in the west (the Sirtican coast of Libya) and in the east (the L i b y a n plateau of western Egypt) to the Mediterranean coast. Religion is Islam, with the Senussi sect predominating in the central part of the area. Family and social organization is of the general Middle Eastern pattern, with a certain relaxation, however, of the strict sex mores. 5. The Southwestern Nomadic Area. This area is separated from A r e a 3 by a huge uninhabited desert. Its population consists largely of A r a b nomad tribes, with some small semi-Arabized Berber groups in the southwestern corner. In this area there are no sizable oases as in Areas 3 and 4, and, consequently, it is sparsely populated and the settled element is negligible. T h e southern border of this area coincides with the southern limits of the Middle East. T h e transition to its southern neighbors (Murdock's " N u c l e a r M a n d e " and " F u l a n i " ) is gradual, and southern influences can be felt well up to the north of the area. Neverthe-

66

Golden River to Golden Road

less, in general, the family and social organization is of the over-all Middle Eastern pattern. 6. The Tuareg Area. Inhabited by Berber-speaking nomadic tribes, the Tuareg area has a scattering of oases in which cultivation is carried out by servile classes for their nomadic overlords. Family and social organization differ considerably from the general Middle Eastern pattern: Descent is matrilineal; the society is structured into distinct layers of status groups, which almost amount to castes; women have great freedom (it is the noble men and not the women who wear the veil); marriage is monogamous but sex mores are reported to be lax. Adherence to Islam is lukewarm. More women than men can read and write the old Tuareg script. In place of the usual Middle Eastern black hair tent, the Tuareg use hide tents dyed red or yellow—another archaic trait. 30 7. The East Saharan Area. Separated from Area 4 by a large expanse of uninhabited desert, this area is again richer in oases and, although still a predominantly pastoral area, its southern part receives from 4 to 20 inches of rain annually, and consequently is savanna rather than desert with the importance of cultivation increasing as one proceeds southward. The area is inhabited by Saharan Negroes, many of whom have become converted to Islam as late as the eighteenth century. They speak a number of related languages called " K a n u r i c " by Murdock and "Central Saharan" by Greenberg. 3 1 Most of the area is inhabited by nomadic tribes whose herds consist not only of camels and sheep and goats as in Areas 3 to 6, but in the southeast of cattle in addition: an influence of the adjoining camel-cattle area (see Area 8). Oases are scattered all over the area, but only in its eastern and western extremes do people engage in agriculture in large numbers. 8. The Camel-Cattle Area. This area is inhabited by Nubian tribes of mixed Arab-Negro ancestry whose main intermingling occurred following the Arab conquest of the region in the beginning of the sixteenth century. Most of them are nomadic or seminomadic with the camel as the main animal in the north, cattle in the south. The southern cattle herding tribes are often referred to collectively as Baqqara, Arabic for "cattle herders." Among the

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

67

latter, agriculture plays a considerable role. Family and social organization resemble the general Middle Eastern type; however, a higher incidence of polygyny and an initial matrilocal residence are noted. Also, the Middle Eastern black hair tent is in this area frequently replaced by other types of temporary shelter. This detail illustrates the marginal character of this area in relation to the Middle East. T h e B a q q a r a are warlike and fanatical Muslims. 9. The Beja Area. This lies between the U p p e r Nile and the R e d Sea. Most Beja tribes have retained their own Hamitic language, called tu-Bedawiye, although one of them has adopted Arabic, and sections of another speak Tigre. Racially they are Caucasoid, their economy is pastoral nomadic with camels, cattle, sheep, and goats as the main livestock. Owing to poor grazing conditions, they must move in very small groups. Family and social organization conform to the general Middle Eastern pattern. South A r a b i a n influences can be seen in their grass- and leaf-covered huts. 10. The North Arabian Desert Area. Moving across into Asia, we designate as A r e a 10 the large land mass that is the original home base of the Arabs who, during and following the lifetime of M o h a m m e d , conquered the entire Middle East. It is the birthplace of much of the Muslim way of life that is still followed by the conservative population sectors all over the Middle East. T h e area includes the entire northern part of the A r a b i a n Peninsula, as well as the Syrian Desert, the Negev Desert of Israel, the Sinai Peninsula and the Eastern Desert of Egypt. Although the majority of the population is settled in villages and towns and the sedentarization of the remaining nomads progresses apace, this is still a Bedouin area in two senses: geographically, the vast majority of its surface is utilized only by the nomadic herders, and psychologically it is their ethos and ideals that are still upheld by the entire population. T h e dominant religion in central A r a b i a is the puritanistic WahhabI sect of Islam. T h e core of this area, together with A r e a 1 1 is the least Westernized of all parts of the Middle East. In it are found the typical Middle Eastern forms of family life and social organization at their fullest, with the retention of such elements, outmoded elsewhere, as slavery, large harems, eunuchs, despotic monarchy, bodily mutilation as punishment, and the like.

68

Golden River to Golden Road

1 1 . The Southwest Arabian Area. This comprises the Kingdom of Yemen and some of the territory around it. It is a mixed sedentarynomadic area, with summer monsoon rains over a certain elevation, differentiated from Area 10 also by the physical type, language (or rather idiom), and religion of the people. The dominant sect in the central mountainous region of the area is that of Zaydl Shi'ite Islam, headed by the king or Imam, a combination of secular ruler with charismatic sectarian head. Addiction to the chewing of qat, a stimulant shrub (catha edulis), is prevalent in the area and does not occur outside it. The towns of this area are differentiated from those of Area 10 by the prevalence of high houses—up to five or six floors. In the interior of this area, and especially among the nomads, as far north as 'Asir, the kneelength loincloth replaces the robe or full shirt worn elsewhere by the males. And, what is equally in contrast with the general custom prevalent elsewhere, the men often wear no head covering at all. 12. The Eastern Arabian Area. A mixed agricultural-nomadic area, here there is greater prevalence of cattle than in Area 1 1 . Boating and fishing too play a greater role in the economy than in Area 1 1 . On the other hand, the high houses in the towns are less in evidence here. The dominant religion is the Ibadi sect of Islam. On the Oman coast Iranian influences are felt. 13. The Levant Coast Area.* This area, in many respects similar to Area 2 in North Africa, is characterized by agriculture, mainly rain fed, although in places irrigated, as well as arboriculture on terraced mountains. Practically all the people are Arabic-speaking settled cultivators, living in tightly clustered villages, most of them Sunni Muslims. Family and social organization conforms to the typical Middle Eastern pattern. 14. The Mesopotamian Area. This is another fellah-area like Area 13, but with flatland riverine agriculture and with a greater prevalence of irrigation. Ecologically, therefore, this area occupies a middle place between Areas 1 and 2 in North Africa. A special subarea within it is that of the Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq near • I n the above characterization of Area 13, the changes introduced into it by the J e w i s h immigration and the establishment of the state of Israel are left out of consideration.

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent

69

the Persian G u l f . M o s t of the p o p u l a t i o n is M u s l i m , A r a b i c speaki n g , b u t t o w a r d the south the Shi'ite element p r e d o m i n a t e s over the S u n n i t e . 15. The Turkish Area. T h i s comprises almost the entire extent of the R e p u b l i c of T u r k e y w i t h the e x c e p t i o n of its southeastern corner, w h i c h belongs to A r e a 16. I t is a clearly delimited area w i t h the sea s u r r o u n d i n g it on three sides. Its ecology is p r e d o m i n a n t l y agricultural, w i t h only the faintest traces of n o m a d i s m still discernible in its dry a n d arid central p l a t e a u . U r b a n development

and

Westernization

are

pronounced,

especially

in

the

western part. T h i s is the only area in the M i d d l e East in w h i c h a c o m p l e t e constitutional separation o f c h u r c h a n d state has been carried out, a l t h o u g h practically all the inhabitants are S u n n i M u s l i m s . It is separated f r o m the other areas also b y its l a n g u a g e , T u r k i s h , w h i c h is spoken n o w h e r e else outside its boundaries, a l t h o u g h related T u r k i c l a n g u a g e s are spoken in A r e a s 18 a n d 23. 16.

The Kurdish Area.

Politically bisected b e t w e e n I r a n

and

I r a q , w i t h a little corner of it in S y r i a a n d an o u t l y i n g district in Soviet Russia, this a r e a is i n h a b i t e d b y K u r d i s h S u n n i M u s l i m mountaineers

who

practice

either t r a n s h u m a n t

nomadism

or

agriculture or both, a n d w h o h a v e retained even in their settled groups strong tribal ties; and b y A r a m a i c - s p e a k i n g

Christian

and J e w i s h minorities. Physical prowess, fearlessness, a n d t e m p e r are characteristics for w h i c h the K u r d s pride themselves

and

are k n o w n a m o n g their neighbors. M a r k e d differences b e t w e e n the g a r b of the K u r d s a n d their neighbors facilitate the distinction between t h e m , a l t h o u g h on the borders there are large areas inhabited b y both K u r d i s h a n d T u r k i s h groups on the northwest, K u r d i s h a n d A z e r b a i j a n i groups on the northeast, a n d K u r d i s h and Persian groups on the southeast. 17. The Azerbaijani

Area. T h i s is a b o r d e r a r e a b e t w e e n the

M i d d l e East (Iran) a n d Soviet Russia, largely settled, w i t h the population living chiefly in villages, a l t h o u g h it boasts of several sizable towns a n d has also a sprinkling of s e m i n o m a d i c tribes. T h e d o m i n a n t l a n g u a g e is the so called A z e r b a i j a n i T u r k i s h k n o w n as Azeri,

w h i c h differs considerably f r o m the

also

Turkish

spoken in A r e a 15, and reflects Persian influences. T h e religion is Sunni M u s l i m .

70

Golden River to Golden Road

18. The West Iranian Tribal Area. T h i s is one of the most mixed areas in the entire M i d d l e East as far as ethnic composition is concerned. It is however, precisely this mosaiclike appearance that stamps it w i t h the character of a separate culture area, in addition to the fact that the majority of the population groups, w h a t e v e r their provenance, l a n g u a g e , religious affiliation, and physical a p p e a r a n c e , practice transhumant sheep and goat nomadism. T h e northern half of the area is dominated by the Lurs, a huge tribal confederation of the Shi'ite faith and speaking L u r , w h i c h is an Iranian dialect. T h e southern part is the home of two large tribal confederations, the Bakhtiyaris, another powerful Shi'ite tribal confederation, w h o speak another Iranian dialect a n d whose unveiled w o m e n enjoy greater freedom than is usual a m o n g tribal populations; and the Qashqais, a Turkicspeaking Sunnite M u s l i m tribal confederation, living to the east of the former. 19. The Persian Area. T h i s area comprises most of Iran, as well as a detached smaller area in the northeastern corner of Afghanistan w h e r e the Persian-speaking inhabitants are known as Tajiks. T h e great majority of the population of this area consists of Persianspeaking Shi'ite M u s l i m villagers, practicing, as a rule, extensive rain-fed agriculture. In contrast to the rest of the M u s l i m Middle East, in this area pictorial representation of h u m a n beings and wine drinking is practiced. L o v e of physical exercises, gymnastics, and hot baths seems to be a survival of old Hellenistic influence, while nineteenth-century Russian influences are also discernible, especially in the towns. O n e of the characteristic local features of religion is the performance of annual passion plays provoking great emotional response in the audience. T h e area has developed a high u r b a n civilization with great local refinements in the visual and musical arts. 20. The Mongol Area. L o c a t e d entirely in the central and western parts of A f g h a n i s t a n , the M o n g o l A r e a is inhabited by several groups that exhibit either a clear-cut M o n g o l o i d physical type or a mixture of M o n g o l o i d and Iranian features. T h e H a z a r a Mongols in central Afghanistan are Shi'ite Muslims, live in villages, cultivate the land, and speak an Iranian dialect, described by some students as " a r c h a i c . " H a z a r a splinter groups are found

Some Problems of the Middle Eastern Culture Continent also in western Afghanistan and across the Iranian border, where they are Sunni Muslims, and were until recently nomadic. Another group belonging to this area is that of the Chahar A y m a k (literally: Four Tribes), tribes of a mixed physical type, who live in yurts that indicate their Central Asian origin. 21. The Afghan Area. Southeastern Afghanistan as well as the adjoining area of West Pakistan comprise this area. T h e language is Pushtu (or Pakhtun), related to Persian; religion Sunni Islam. T h e Afghans are the dominant element in Afghanistan, and comprise both nomadic and settled components, as well as townspeople. In the southeast, near the former Indian (now Pakistani) border, where the inhospitable mountains offered no adequate living even when stock breeding and agriculture were combined, the tribes traditionally supplemented their income by raiding caravans or selling them their protection. 22. The Baluji Area. The southeastern corner of Iran and the southwestern corner of Pakistan make up this area. Its inhabitants are Balujis, with the Brahuis forming an island in the middle of the area. Both the Balujis and the Brahuis are pastoral nomads, dwelling in the well-known Middle Eastern type of black hair tent, and practice transhumance, but their main livestock is not sheep and goats, as in the case of most other transhumants, but camels. Along the borders, the Balujis used to raid the Persian villages, and to give "protection" to those who paid for it. The Balujis speak an Iranian language, while the Brahuis speak a Dravidic tongue. 23. The Turkoman-Uzbek Area. This is marginal to the Middle East and extends far into Central Asia. Some Turkoman tribes live in Iran, near the southwestern shores of the Caspian Sea, others in northwestern Afghanistan, while the Middle Eastern Uzbeks are found in northeastern Afghanistan. The Turkomans, relative newcomers in this area, live in the typical Central Asian yurt and practice stock breeding, but supplement it with agriculture. They are Sunni Muslims, speak a Turkic language, and are Mongoloid in physical type. T h e Uzbeks, also of Central Asian origin, are similar to the Turkomans in every respect, but have become more sedentarized and more assimilated linguistically to their Tajik neighbors, with whom they often intermarry.

72

Golden River to Golden Road

The Turkoman culture is differentiated from the Persian (Area ig) by the persistence of certain old features of Islam, by the retention of elements of the old Shamanistic religion side by side with Islam, and other features of Central Asian origin. 32

III.

The Desert and the Sown

A

BASIC GEOGRAPHIC characteristic of the entire Middle East, as has been indicated in Chapter i, is a subdivision into two distinct land types: a region stretching usually along the seashore or the banks of great rivers, Mediterranean in character, with long, hot, and rainless summers, rainy, temperate winters, and a natural vegetation ranging from grass to open deciduous forests; and a second desert region, as a rule at greater distance from bodies of water, with great extremes of temperature, almost no rain at any season, and a very scanty vegetation of low grass and drought-resistant bushes. The first or Mediterranean region is under agricultural cultivation or at least is capable of such cultivation; the second, the desert region, is unfit for cultivation, and serves at the utmost as a seasonal grazing ground for flocks and herds. In each country of the Middle East, from Río de Oro and Morocco in the west to Afghanistan and Balujistan in the east, these two regions can be distinguished; through each there runs a dividing line splitting it into desert and sown. "Dividing line" is, of course, merely a figurative expression, for in reality no such "line" exists. Only rarely, as for instance in Egypt along the banks of the Nile, do the desert and the sown run sharply and clearly against each other so that the boundary line between them can be drawn with an accuracy of a few yards. It has repeatedly been stated of Egypt that it is a country in which one can stand with one foot in the desert and with the other in a garden. More often, the transition between the desert and the sown is gradual; when reaching the outskirts of the cultivated land one usually finds that 73

74

Golden River to Golden Road

the spontaneously thriving vegetation diminishes little by little or that the cultivated patches become rarer, while the alternating unutilized and fallow stretches become larger and more numerous, until the cultivated areas disappear altogether and the only remaining plant life is the typical desert vegetation of scanty shrubs and thorns. In mountainous territories, as in central Anatolia in the north or Yemen in the south, the hills are almost entirely bare, except where patient terracing has transformed the barren slopes into gardens. In such regions, neglect of cultivation for even a single season means immediate reversion of the land to a state of wilderness. In these mountain zones, where ground water usually lies too deep so that the only source of utilizable water is the seasonal rainfall, ingenious devices have been developed to catch every drop of rain and prevent its running off into a deep-lying and stony wadi-bed. But since rainwater can be caught and preserved only where it falls, the crests of mountain ranges often mark the boundary line between an arid region one side that remains dry and desolate and a region on the other side that receives precipitation during the rainy season owing to the prevailing winds. T h e ratio between the desert and the sown varies from place to place in the lands of the Middle East. In general, the entire area is overwhelmingly desert: approximately 90 per cent. T h e least desertlike countries, Turkey and Lebanon, are in the north and on the North African shore, with the exception of Libya. T h e greatest expanse of desert lies in the countries among which are divided politically the Sahara and the Great Arabian Desert. But even in the countries with the most favorable desert-sown balance the presence of the desert is felt everywhere: precipitation is generally poor; humidity low, except on the seashore; the wind, though it has a steady prevailing trend, turns occasionally to bring a fine, powderlike dust from the desert across the sown lands; from time to time locusts invade the sown from their desert breeding grounds; and from practically every high mountain one can discern during the summer season the low black tents of the nomadic desert people, pitched on the borderline between the desert and the sown. Not only is the boundary between the desert and the sown not

The Desert and the Sown

75

s h a r p l y d e l i n e a t e d in most cases; it also shifts considerably. T h e b o r d e r s of the two d i f f e r e n t l a n d types are constantly a d v a n c i n g a n d receding. A few years w i t h insufficient r a i n m a y force t h e villagers to give u p previously cultivated plots of l a n d , which are t h e n swallowed u p by the desert. Conversely, a succession of r a i n y seasons w i t h a b u n d a n t p r e c i p i t a t i o n m a y e n a b l e the a g r i c u l t u r alists to b r i n g u n d e r p l o u g h or hoe some a c r e a g e t h a t was f o r m e r l y b a r r e n desert. I n the case of irrigated lands, best exemplified by E g y p t a n d , to a lesser e x t e n t , b y I r a q , careful r e g u l a t i o n of the g r e a t life-sustaining rivers m e a n s the c o n q u e s t of v a l u a b l e feddans or dunams f r o m the desert, while neglect of the waterworks, cither because of local m i s m a n a g e m e n t or lack of a s t r o n g central governm e n t , results in floods a n d waste or a silting u p of river beds, with a c o n s e q u e n t c a t a s t r o p h i c c u r t a i l m e n t of a r a b l e l a n d . A t h i r d factor affecting the fluctuation b e t w e e n the desert a n d the sown, in a d d i t i o n to w a t e r supply a n d labor, is war. T h r o u g h out all history, desert people w a g e d w a r s against the settled sons of the sown, a n d if they prevailed the settlers h a d to retreat a n d a b a n d o n the outskirts of the sown, which were r a p i d l y incorp o r a t e d into the desert. People of the Western W o r l d have, as a rule, some familiarity with the m o r e c o m m o n varieties of cultivated l a n d , such as fields a n d g a r d e n s . F i r s t h a n d k n o w l e d g e of the desert is m u c h r a r e r . T o m a n y , the very w o r d " d e s e r t " m e a n s endless, softly rolling sand d u n e s absolutely d e v o i d of a n i m a l or v e g e t a b l e life, a concept p o p u l a r i z e d by m a n y m o t i o n pictures. T h e r e are, to be sure, such deserts in the M i d d l e East, in N o r t h Africa, in the A r a b i a n Peninsula, as well as in I r a n ; b u t they h a v e t h r o u g h o u t history r e m a i n e d u n i n h a b i t e d . T r a d i t i o n a l l y , they h a v e been crossed by camel c a r a v a n s t r a v e l i n g a l o n g long-established routes a n d , in recent years, also by m o t o r vehicles. But the b a r r e n , e m p t y deserts c a n n o t provide a h o m e base for even the most r u g g e d nomads. T h e desert in w h i c h the n o m a d s m a k e their h o m e , a n d w h i c h represents for t h e m the " w i d e - o p e n spaces" with f r e e d o m of life a n d m o v e m e n t , is of a d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r . A d m i t t e d l y , it is a very u n f r i e n d l y place, f o r b i d d i n g a n d f r i g h t e n i n g in its desolation. But, b a r r e n t h o u g h it m a y be, it does enjoy some scanty rain a n d c a n

76

Golden River to Golden Road

even boast of a little g r o u n d w a t e r in the f o r m of widely spaced a n d often brackish wells or waterholes. I n the fall, with t h e onset of the rainy season, whose length varies in different p a r t s of the M i d d l e East, the yellow or reddish stony deserts or the grey lava fields become covered with a scanty vegetation a n d actually turn green, a welcome sight to the n o m a d ' s eyes a n d a blessing for his h u n g r y herds. T h e rain a n d the grass lure the n o m a d d e e p into the h e a r t of the desert, a n d only the scorching, p a r c h i n g sun of springtime drives him back again t o w a r d the m o r e fertile approaches of the sown. O n l y this type of desert with its seasonal vegetation is i n h a b i t e d , a n d it is inhabited only d u r i n g t h e r a i n y season a n d for a few weeks after it. H a b i t a b i l i t y is, of course, a relative m a t t e r , a n d areas regarded as h a b i t a b l e by the n o m a d i c desert dweller who displays a r e m a r k a b l e a d a p t a b i l i t y to his e n v i r o n m e n t would be a " c o u r t y a r d of d e a t h , " as the Biblical phrase has it, for other peoples. N o m a d i c h e r d s m e n reside in every c o u n t r y of the M i d d l e East. D u r i n g all historic periods they were a constant m c n a c e to the settled communities within their r e a c h ; b u t being a t h r e a t they were also a stimulant. I n the civilizations of the cultivators several traits c a n be distinguished t h a t have evolved in response to contact with u n p r e d i c t a b l e a n d uncontrollable desert people. O n the other h a n d , m a n y traits of desert civilizations originated f r o m the proximity of settled communities which, a l t h o u g h individually weaker t h a n the n o m a d i c tribes, often proved stronger and superior when organized into a united force. T h e cultivators, or fellahin, as they are called in A r a b lands, are the most n u m e r o u s , p e r m a n e n t , a n d i m m u t a b l e p o p u l a t i o n element in the M i d d l e East. T h e y work their l a n d s t o d a y in m u c h the same m a n n e r as they did several t h o u s a n d years ago. O n c e empires were established in the ancient N e a r East, a n d the cultivators broken into the yoke of taxes, the least i m p o r t a n t events affecting the lives of their great masses were of a political n a t u r e , such as dynastic changes or the conquest of o n e c o u n t r y by a n o t h e r . O f more significance were the periodically r e c u r r i n g n a t u r a l events, such as a period of prolonged d r o u g h t or of a b u n d a n t rain, a plague, or severe onslaught of locusts. But most decisive for the fate of the people as a whole were events of an

The Desert and The Sown

77

intellectual-spiritual nature, such as the a p p e a r a n c e of a new religion. T h i s has remained largely true to this d a y . T h e severe g o v e r n m e n t a l crises, for instance, that " s h o o k " Syria in and a g a i n in 1961, were affairs of minor importance

1949, to

the

S y r i a n population as a whole, of w h i c h the o v e r w h e l m i n g majority are fellahin.

A succession of good rainy seasons, on the other hand,

means the difference between privation and plenty,

between

misery a n d ease, and even between death and life to a considerable n u m b e r of Syrian farmers. T h e rate of survival has always been affected by events such as these throughout the long history of the M i d d l e East, but the mode of life of the population at large has r e m a i n e d practically u n c h a n g e d since the introduction

of

Islam thirteen centuries ago. T h e really important changes were initiated

by

new religions that profoundly

altered

the

entire

tenor of existence. A n d today, again, it is new ideologies—first of all C o m m u n i s m — t h a t threaten to throw out of gear the life of populations quiescent for centuries. T h e fellah and the Bedouin, prototypes of M i d d l e

Eastern

populations, exhibit pronounced differences with relation to every phase of life. T h e y arc highly dissimilar in physical type and character, in religious outlook and degree of sophistication, in mode of life and occupation, in likes and dislikes. Y e t the inhabitants of no M i d d l e Eastern c o u n t r y — e v e n disregarding the t o w n s p e o p l e — c a n be clearly divided into either nomads or cultivators. T h e n o m a d , as exemplified by the proud Bedouin

of

A r a b i a , and the cultivator, as typified b y the h u m b l e fellahin of E g y p t , are b u t the two polar types. Between them can be found in practically every M i d d l e Eastern country, with the exception of such places as E g y p t where the demarcation

between

the

desert and the sown is most abrupt, transitional groups whose mode

of existence

combines

in v a r y i n g

degrees

elements

of

nomadic a n d agricultural life. C a m e l nomadism, entailing the dependence o f m a n almost exclusively on the single species of the d r o m e d a r y , developed only about the end of the second millennium B.C.1 But a l r e a d y a thousand years earlier n o m a d i c

Amorites

roamed the outskirts of the sedentary zones of Syria and Mesopotamia

(modern

Iraq).

The

Amorites

were

organized

into

tribes, headed by chieftains, m u c h as the Bedouin tribes of today,

78

Golden River lo Golden Road

but their means of livelihood was cattle, sheep, a n d goat h u s b a n d r y and their beast of burden was the ass, whereas both these functions are fulfilled by the camel a m o n g the " g r a n d " nomads, as the French call the camel herders. In the absence of the c a m e l , the Amorites of four thousand years ago could not utilize the arid open spaces of the desert in which only the camel can s u r v i v e ; they h a d to remain closer to the cultivable land a n d their mobility was limited. F o r nomads, limited mobility means small tribal groups; any undue increase forces them to split u p and seek separate pastures, as happened in the case of A b r a h a m and L o t whose combined flocks were too " h e a v y " for the land to b e a r . 2 T h e A m o r i t e s also lacked horses, which m a d e them a m u c h less f o r m i d a b l e e n e m y than the Bedouins of later times. S o m e i d e a of the o u t w a r d a p p e a r a n c e of the A m o r i t e s c a n be g a i n e d f r o m the murals of Beni H a s a n , which show a n o m a d i c chieftain, A b s h a , accompanied by his tribesmen and their families. In these murals, dating from about 1900 B.C., both men and w o m e n are dressed in elaborately woven, multicolored woolen tunics; the men w e a r sandals, the w o m e n shoes. T h e arms, carried by the m e n , are composite bows, h e a v y throwing sticks, and spears. A n eightstringed lyre held by one of the men shows that these people were familiar with instrumental music. 3 Tribes of steppe Bedouins, that is, nomads without camcls or with only a few, whose mode of life is similar to that of the Amorites, are found to this d a y all over the M i d d l e East. T h e y are shepherds and goatherds, with limited mobility and a m u c h smaller wandering territory than that of the camel Bedouins. T h e i r life is tied to the outskirts of the sown, which they never can leave f a r behind. T h e y are the enemies of the cultivators for whose fields a g r a z i n g flock means ruin. T h e y must k e e p to the steppe belt between the desert a n d the sown, a n d in m a n y cases they b u y protection f r o m the m o r e p o w e r f u l c a m e l - h e r d i n g tribes to w h o m otherwise they would fall easy prey. T h e i r limited mobility, their closer contact with agriculturalists, the very difference between tending camel herds and sheep or goat flocks, all these result in their occupying an intermediate position between the settled population and the camel nomads. T h e more significant characteristics of the culture of the camel

The Desert and the Sown

79

n o m a d s all over the M i d d l e East can be s u m m a r i z e d as follows: a n i m a l h u s b a n d r y w i t h reliance mainly on the camel as a m e a n s of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , source of food (milk a n d milk p r o d u c t s as well as m e a t occasionally), supply of r a w materials for tent a n d clothing f r o m its h a i r , for l e a t h e r utensils, containers, a n d trappings f r o m its skin, a n d for fuel f r o m its d u n g ; seasonal w a n d e r i n g with the h e r d w i t h i n a certain tribal territory, reaching in the r a i n y season d e e p i n t o the h e a r t of the desert, a n d in the dry s u m m e r s n e a r the steppe a n d the richer settled l a n d ; tribal organization based on real or i m a g i n e d c o m m o n origin a n d family groupings, h e a d e d by chieftains; collective responsibility expressed in such institutions as the blood feud, raiding, a n d the inviolate laws of hospitality a n d s a n c t u a r y , as well as in such concepts as honor, " f a c e , " a n d nobility; g r e a t familiarity with the n a t u r a l features of the desert, a n d a r e m a r k a b l e degree of physical a n d m e n t a l a d a p t a t i o n to the u n p a r a l l e l e d harshness of desert life. It is m o r e difficult to find a c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r underlying the m o r e diversified life forms of the M i d d l e Eastern cultivators. T h e c o m m o n elements characteristic of this g r o u p are relatively fewer, with a g r e a t e r p r e p o n d e r a n c e of regional or local traits. G e o g r a p h i c a n d climatic conditions as well as religious a n d ethnic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n m a k e for g r e a t e r variety. A village in the m o u n tains of K u r d i s t a n is necessarily very different from one on the banks of the Nile which, in t u r n , c a n n o t resemble too closely o n e along the M o r o c c a n coast. Likewise, a M a r o n i t e Christian village in L e b a n o n , a Shl'ite M u s l i m village in I r a n , a n d a D r u z e village in the J e b e l D r u z e each has its own peculiar characteristics. I n a Bedouin tribe each and every family subsists on a n i m a l h u s b a n d r y ; b u t a village has, in addition to its bulk of agriculturalists, also a few artisans such as cobblers, blacksmiths, weavers, or masons, as well as such other specialists as teachers, imams, w a t c h m e n , b a r b e r s , a n d the like. Social stratification parallels o c c u p a t i o n a l specialization, so t h a t in most villages landowners, t e n a n t farmers, a n d d a y laborers occupy a definite place in the social h i e r a r c h y . In the n o m a d i c tribe, whose families traditionally trace their descent either to a real or, m o r e often, to an e p o n y m o u s or

8o

Golden River to Golden Road

mythical c o m m o n ancestor, all m e n are e q u a l ; the power vested in the chieftain of the tribe is given him voluntarily as a practical expedient, a n d he is expected to act always in the interests of the tribe as a whole. O w n e r s h i p of property does not play an important role in the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of personal status, for wealth, reckoned in terms of n u m b e r s of camels, c a n quickly dwindle after a few seasons of d r o u g h t , or even m o r e suddenly disappear in the wake of e n e m y raiders; a n d vice versa, poverty can within a few days t u r n into wealth in consequence of a single d a r i n g raid. T h e status of a m a n within the g r o u p to which he belongs by descent is d e t e r m i n e d by personal courage a n d valor and, later in life, wisdom in counsel; a n d , the greatest blessing of all, a large n u m b e r of male offspring. A m o n g the settled populations the situation is quite different. T h e tradition t h a t all the resident families are descendants from one c o m m o n ancestor is m u c h less frequent. M a n y villages are characterized by the presence of two rival groups. 4 T h e social status of the individual is strongly influenced by his wealth, reckoned in terms of land a n d money. T h e h e a d of the wealthiest and therefore the most influential family is often recognized by the village de facto, a n d by the government de jure, as head of the village. As such, his effort is expended in three directions: increasing his o w n w e a l t h ; furthering the welfare of the village; a n d representing the interests of the g o v e r n m e n t . I n m a n y cases, especially in I r a n , Syria, L e b a n o n , a n d Egypt, the land of entire villages belongs to an absentee landlord to w h o m the cultivators have to p a y often exorbitant rents in crop or cash: a situation that only recently has b e g u n to change owing to governmental land reform measures. T h e relationship between the nomadic tribes a n d the sedentary population must have been very m u c h the same four thousand years ago, in the days of the roving Amorites, as it is today. T h e attitude of the cultivators in ancient Babylonia toward the Amorites was similar to that of the fellah today toward his n o m a d i c neighbors: a feeling of awe, inspired by the nomads' warlike qualities, mixed with a certain c o n t e m p t stemming from an appreciation of his own higher living standards. These ambivalent feelings are a d m i r a b l y summarized in a few lines of an old

The Desert and The Sown

81

Sumerian poem in which the Amorites of the west are characterized as follows: The weapon is [his] companion . . . Who knows no submission, Who eats uncooked flesh, Who has no house in his lifetime, Who does not bury his dead companion. 5 T h e attitude of the nomad toward the settled cultivator, on the other hand, is that of contempt mixed with envy. He feels contemptuous of the fellah because the latter is bound to the soil and subject to constant drudgery, which appears to the nomad's eyes as worse than slavery. T h e nomad also scorns the fellah's submissive nature and subservience to his landlord, to the tax-collector, and to any petty effendi. At the same time, he cannot help envying the fellah his comforts, which he, the proud and free Bedouin, can never enjoy in his life. H e envies him the protection of his stone or m u d house against cold and heat; his better and richer diet; and his relatively greater economic and social security, especially under the somewhat improved conditions prevailing in several Middle Eastern countries today. It is these advantages, whether real or imaginary, that the camel-nomad and even more so the less mobile sheep and goat nomad sees in sedentary life that give him the first impetus towards sedentarization. Sedentarization, if spontaneous as in Syria and J o r d a n , is a gradual and difficult process that can take many years to complete, if not decades, turning the original Bedouin or his son or grandson into a typical fellah who can be distinguished from other fellahin only by a proud tradition of free Bedouin descent. 6 Where the government takes up the cause of sedentarization, the process can be greatly accelerated, and, as happened in Saudi Arabia, entire new villages of "pure-blooded" tribesmen can spring up within a few months or years. 7 The reverse process, that of cultivators turning into nomads, is much rarer, but instances of it can be found both in ancient history and in modern times. In the last century of the kingdom of J u d a h (sixth century B . C . ) , the Rechabites, sons ofJ o n a d a b ben Rcchab, gave up building houses and living in them, sowing seeds and possessing land, planting vineyards and drinking wine, and

82

Golden River to Golden Road

took to dwelling in tents, "so t h a t they m a y live m a n y days on the face of the l a n d . " 8 T h i s " r e t u r n to the desert," which was motivated by purely religious considerations, was an exceptional p h e n o m e n o n in the history of ancient Israel, though the rem e m b r a n c e of the n o m a d i c days of old, clad in legendary colors, was kept alive in the consciousness of the people as the days when Israel " w e n t with God in the desert, in a land that is not s o w n . " 9 Several centuries later, in a similar situation, when the downfall of the Second C o m m o n w e a l t h a n d the Second T e m p l e of J e r u s a l e m was felt to be i m p e n d i n g , a g r o u p of religious extremists again took to the desert, t h o u g h this time it was not a tribal g r o u p like the Rechabitcs, b u t a sect, the Essenes, and instead of pitching tents for dwellings they built themselves houses or sought shelter in caves. It is a m o n g these groups w h o r e t u r n e d to the desert t h a t the famous D e a d Sea Scrolls originated. I n m o d e r n times, both groups a n d individuals have taken to the desert in flight r a t h e r t h a n as an act of religious devotion. O p p r e s sive g o v e r n m e n t a l measures, threats by too powerful adversaries, feuds in which the weaker p a r t y could not h o p e to hold its o w n — these are some of the circumstances t h a t have caused people seek out the lesser d a n g e r s of the desert. According to J . Braslawski, w h o m a d e a special study of the composition of the Bedouin tribes of the Negev (today p a r t of Israel), the n a m e s of several of these tribes or tribal groups b e a r witness to their descent from non-Bedouin or sedentary peoples. T h e Z a g h a r n e families of the T i y a h a tribe c a m e f r o m the town of Z u g h r at the southeastern end of the D e a d S e a ; the Sa'idiyyln in J o r d a n have a tradition that they c a m e f r o m the village of J e b a l near K e r a k . 1 0 S o m e Bedouin tribes trace their descent to the C r u s a d e r s ; 1 1 while others, t h o u g h claiming the noblest descent a m o n g the Arabs, t h a t of the p r o p h e t M o h a m m e d , are actually of A l b a n i a n ancestry. 1 2 In spite of these m o v e m e n t s f r o m the sown into the desert a n d the m u c h m o r e significant c o u n t e r m o v e m e n t s f r o m the desert to the sown, both the settled cultivator a n d the n o m a d i c h e r d s m a n r e m a i n to this d a y the two basic polar types in the M i d d l e East. F u t u r e developments are difficult to foresee. C e r t a i n signs indicate that the sown is a b o u t to m a k e significant e n c r o a c h m e n t s

The Desert and the Sown

S3

u p o n the desert. In E g y p t and in I r a q plans are being m a d e to increase the irrigated areas. In Israel, successful beginnings have been m a d e to bring w a t e r and agriculture to the Negev desert. T h e most valuable pasture land of the fringes of the desert will thus g r a d u a l l y slip out of the hands of the nomads. M o r e o v e r , the processes of sedentarization, sporadic and h a p h a z a r d in the past, seem to be gaining m o m e n t u m at present, a trend that will p r o b a b l y continue and m a y even increase in the future. Y e t all this means neither the vanishing of the desert nor the disappearance of the n o m a d in the M i d d l e East. T h e greatest engineering efforts will in the foreseeable future not achieve more than an increase of the cultivated area by 10, 20, or perhaps 30 per cent, which corresponds to a decrease of the desert area by a mere i , 2, or perhaps 3 per cent. T h e desert people will likewise remain. Most desert tribes live at subsistence level; this means that the numbers of their ranks lost through sedentarization are immediately replenished by a greater natural increase that is also aided by the rudiments of sanitation and hygiene beginning to reach the more accessible tribes now for the first time. O n l y the nomads with their unique adaptation to the rigors of the wasteland and wilderness can live in the desert. Because of their presence in the desert over m a n y centuries, a fine ecologic balance has evolved between the flora, the f a u n a , and h u m a n k i n d — a balance that would be g r a v e l y disturbed if the h u m a n inhabitants were to depart. A different and perhaps more cogent consideration is the right of every h u m a n g r o u p to the w a y of life it has developed for itself and the intrinsic value of each particular culture for its carriers. F r o m the long-range point of view of cultural history, the passing of the desert people would be regrettable, for it would mean the preclusion of even that slight chance still existing today that these people might again in the future, as they did in the past, contribute something unique, original, and valuable to the totalitv of h u m a n cultures in the world.

IV.

The Family

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS

O

F ALL the c o m p o n e n t features of M i d d l e Eastern social organization the f a m i l y is undoubtedly the most funda-

mental and most important. Beginning with the most ancient times from w h i c h historical records are extant and d o w n to the present d a y , the M i d d l e Eastern family has remained basically the same, has been composed of largely the same

personnel,

structured along the same lines, fulfilled the same functions, and c o m m a n d e d the same loyalty of its members. W i t h a few exceptions, o f w h i c h more anon, the traditional family exhibits identical basic characteristics all over the M i d d l e East. W h a t e v e r the religious, ethnic, social, national, or linguistic affiliations of the family, it is unmistakably stamped as M i d d l e Eastern by a series of traits easily recognizable from one end of the area to the other, a n d not to be found again in its totality in a n y of the adjacent world areas. In general, it can be stated that the traditional M i d d l e Eastern family is characterized by

the

following six traits: it is ( i ) extended, (2) patrilineal, (3) patrilocal,

(4)

patriarchal,

(5)

endogamous,

and

(6)

occasionally

polygynous. A n explanation of each of these six terms gives us a m o r e or less adequate picture of the structure and functioning of the M i d d l e Eastern family. 1. T h e traditional M i d d l e Eastern family is extended,

that is, it

is headed b y an elderly m a n and consists of his wife (or wives), his u n m a r r i e d daughters, his u n m a r r i e d as well as married sons, a n d the wives and children of the latter. Daughters, w h e n they m a r r y , depart from their o w n extended families and

become

incorporated into the extended families of their husbands, although 84

The Family

85

their own consanguineal families still remain responsible for their moral conduct. T h e family, although it may comprise a dozen or more members, usually lives either in one house or in a number of adjoining houses or, in the case of the nomadic tribes, in a number of tents pitched next to one another. All property is held in common by the extended family and is controlled by its head. T h e extended family functions as an economic unit: all the men of the family work together in joint ventures such as animal husbandry, agriculture, artisanship, or business, and from the common income all the expenditures of each member and each part of the family are defrayed. V e r y few studies of the size of families or households in Middle Eastern countries are available. Such studies as do exist were made mostly in Lebanon, J o r d a n , Mandatory Palestine, and Egypt, and refer to the settled population of towns or villages. As to the towns, it was found that in Beirut, in a sample of close to 2,000 households studied in 1 9 5 2 - 5 3 , the average was 5.76 persons per household. 1 In J o r d a n , in towns ranging in size from 12,000 to 108,000 inhabitants, the average number of persons per household ranged (in 1952) from 5.48 to 6.57. T h e small Jordanian towns (from 2,500 to 8,500 inhabitants) showed a range of 5 . 1 9 to 6.94 persons per household. 2 In eight Lebanese villages studied in 1953 in connection with the Kasmie R u r a l Improvement Project it was found that the average number of persons per household range from 5.5 to 8.3. 3 An almost identical range (from 5.2 to 7.4) was found in five A r a b villages in southern Palestine, studied in 1944. 4 It should be mentioned that the Lebanese villages referred to above were inhabited by Shi'ite Muslims and the Palestinian villages by Sunnite Muslims. These figures can therefore be taken as an indication of the average number of persons belonging to the Muslim family in the Mediterranean littoral. As to the average size of the Christian families, this can be taken to be somewhat smaller, owing to the absence of polygyny and the lower birthrate. O n the other hand there is reason to assume that in the more remote parts of the Middle East as well as among the nomads the average size of the family is larger than the above averages. In Morocco, an observer noted in the small Berber village of

86

Golden River to Golden

Road

I d i r h in the H i g h A t l a s t h a t the entire p o p u l a t i o n o f the v i l l a g e , a b o u t 200 persons, l i v e d in a b o u t t w e n t y houses. I n o t h e r w o r d s , the a v e r a g e n u m b e r of persons per family was about ten.3 2. T h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n f a m i l y is patrilineal,

t h a t is, a p e r s o n is

r e g a r d e d as b e l o n g i n g to t h e f a m i l y to w h i c h his f a t h e r b e l o n g s , a n d n o t the f a m i l y o f his m o t h e r . A n A r a b i c p r o v e r b c u r r e n t in m a n y countries

expresses

this

s u c c i n c t l y : " T h e p e o p l e rely in

d e s c e n t o n the f a t h e r a n d n o t o n the m o t h e r ; the m o t h e r is like a vessel o f oil t h a t is e m p t i e d . "

I n a s m u c h as social

groupings

l a r g e r t h a n the e x t e n d e d f a m i l y are p r a c t i c a l l y a l w a y s c o m p o s e d o f e x t e n d e d families a n d n o t o f i n d i v i d u a l s , e v e r y person a u t o m a t i c a l l y b e c o m e s a n d r e m a i n s a m e m b e r o f t h a t l a r g e r social g r o u p (such as c l a n , t r i b e , a n d to s o m e e x t e n t e v e n p o l i t i c a l p a r t y )

to

w h i c h his f a t h e r ' s e x t e n d e d f a m i l y b e l o n g s . T h i s is the g e n e r a l rule e v e r y w h e r e in the M i d d l e E a s t i r r e s p e c tive o f religious a f f i l i a t i o n : in o t h e r w o r d s , this r u l e p r e v a i l s n o t o n l y a m o n g the v a r i o u s M u s l i m sects b u t also a m o n g the C h r i s tians a n d J e w s . T h e o n l y m a j o r e x c e p t i o n to the rule o f p a t r i l i n e a l d e s c e n t is t h a t o f t h e T u a r e g in the S a h a r a . A m o n g t h e m d e s c e n t is m a t r i l i n e a l , a n d t h e r e f o r e a m a n ' s status is d e t e r m i n e d by the social g r o u p to w h i c h his m o t h e r b e l o n g s . o u t s i d e her o w n

tribe, the children

If a w o m a n

marries

b e l o n g to h e r t r i b e ,

a l t h o u g h the p a r e n t a l c o u p l e resides w i t h the h u s b a n d ' s

and, tribe,

the c h i l d r e n e v e n t u a l l y r e t u r n to live w i t h their m o t h e r ' s t r i b e . A noblewoman's

children

are

nobles,

irrespective

o f the

father's

s t a t u s ; a n d v i c e v e r s a : a n o b l e m a n ' s c h i l d r e n are n o b l e o n l y if their m o t h e r

too is n o b l e .

I n r e c e n t d e c a d e s , h o w e v e r , it has

b e c o m e m o r e a n d m o r e e v i d e n t t h a t this a n c i e n t m a t r i l i n e a l r u l e tends to b r e a k d o w n . N o b l e fathers, p o w e r f u l e n o u g h to assert t h e m s e l v e s , h a v e o f t e n s u c c e e d e d in passing o f f as n o b l e s their c h i l d r e n b o r n to t h e m o f s e r v i l e w i v e s . 6 S i n c e the p r e f e r r e d m a r r i a g e in the M i d d l e E a s t in g e n e r a l is b e t w e e n c h i l d r e n o f t w o b r o t h e r s (cf. b e l o w , C h a p t e r 6) or f a i l i n g this,

between

children

of other

near

relatives,

or

of

families

b e l o n g i n g to the s a m e l o c a l or t r i b a l g r o u p , p a t r i l i n e a l

descent

o f t e n d o e s n o t a l i e n a t e t h e c h i l d r e n f r o m their m o t h e r . D i f f i c u l t i e s in t h e p a t r i l i n e a l f a m i l y arise w h e n the m o t h e r c o m e s f r o m

a

d i f f e r e n t g r o u p , a n d e s p e c i a l l y w h e n hostilities b r e a k o u t b e t w e e n

The Family

8?

the father's family and the family of the mother's father. In such cases the children are expected to side with their father and to show no hesitancy in actively aiding their father's family in its fight or feud against their mother's family. While such situations may occasionally result in tragedies, or at least in grave psychological conflicts, especially in the case of women who stand between their fathers and their husbands, as a rule the marriage between the son of one family (or tribe or local aggregate) and the daughter of another is regarded as a bond of alliance between the two groups. T h e children issuing from such unions, although by tradition and mores belonging only to the father's group, are regarded with affection by the mother's family as well, and are therefore to some extent a guarantee of mutual friendship and good will for both sides. It has been a policy of long standing in the Middle East, practiced to this day especially by the ruling houses of the Arabian Peninsula, for princes and rulers to marry women of different tribes and peoples and thus to cement their allegiance to them. Another outcome of the patrilineal mode of reckoning descent, combined with the institution of concubinage and the legal recognition of the children of concubincs, was the occasional replacement of "white" by "black" heirs and successors. In various parts of the Middle East, and especially along the West coast of the Arabian peninsula and in North Africa, Somali, Abyssinian, Sudanese, or Negro slave girls have been incorporated into "white" households, and the offspring of these mixed unions have counted as full and equal members of the father's family and social group. If, as it at times happened, the only son of a m a n in ruling position was by such a dark-skinned concubine, there was nothing in the social or cultural traditions to prevent his becoming the heir to his father's position. T h e recently deceased Sultan of Morocco, for example, was as fair-skinned as any northerner, but his children are rather dark complexioned. 7 Discrimination on the basis of skin color is largely absent in the Middle East, and from the earliest days of Islam to the present Negroes and halfNegroes have always been able to rise to the highest positions, such as generals of the army, governors of provinces, and independent rulers. 8

88

Golden River to Golden Road

3. T h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n f a m i l y is patrilocal,

which means that

g e n e r a l l y u p o n m a r r i a g e t h e y o u n g c o u p l e t a k e s u p r e s i d e n c e in (or n e a r ) t h e h o m e o f t h e b r i d e g r o o m ' s f a t h e r . A s a result o f this c u s t o m brothers usually live together and f o r m part of the extended f a m i l y o f w h i c h t h e i r f a t h e r is the h e a d o r a m e m b e r , w h i l e sisters live separately, a w a y f r o m one another a n d f r o m their parents, each with her husband's family. Investigation

c a r r i e d o u t in a P a l e s t i n i a n

Muslim village

1944 s h o w e d t h a t " o n l y o n e - t h i r d o f t h e [ m a l e ] c h i l d r e n their parents'

home

after they

marry."9

In other words,

in

leave two

t h i r d s o f t h e n e w l y m a r r i e d c o u p l e s took u p p a t r i l o c a l r e s i d e n c e . I n E g y p t " a m a r r i e d son c o n t i n u e s to l i v e in his f a t h e r ' s h o u s e , i n t o w h i c h h e b r i n g s his w i f e a n d w h e r e his m o t h e r w e l c o m e s the d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w as a h e l p in h e r h o u s e h o l d t a s k s . " 1 0 4. T h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n f a m i l y is patriarchal,

t h a t is, the f a t h e r is

the m a s t e r o f his f a m i l y , w h i l e the e l d e r l y m a l e w h o is h e a d o f the e n t i r e e x t e n d e d f a m i l y is the u n d i s p u t e d r u l e r o f the entire group. In olden

t i m e s , t h e rule o f the f a m i l y h e a d

comprised

j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r life a n d d e a t h as w e l l as o v e r all o t h e r m a t t e r s w i t h i n his f a m i l y . T h e f a t h e r ' s a u t h o r i t y r e m a i n s s t r o n g , e s p e c i a l l y in the r u r a l f a m i l y . I n t h e s t u d y c a r r i c d o u t in five P a l e s t i n i a n M u s l i m A r a b v i l l a g e s r e f e r r e d to a b o v e it w a s f o u n d t h a t the p r e v a l e n t m o r e s d e m a n d t h a t t h e y o u n g e r m e m b e r s o b e y a n d r e s p e c t the decisions o f t h e s e n i o r , a n d e v e n w h e n the h e a d o f t h e h o u s e h o l d r e a c h e s t h e r i p e o l d a g e o f e i g h t y , a n d his son h a s b e c o m e p r a c t i c a l l y the h e a d o f t h e f a m i l y , h e w i l l still a l w a y s c o n s u l t w i t h his o l d f a t h e r . 1 1 A s to t h e r o l e o f the m o t h e r in p a t r i a r c h a l f a m i l i e s , t h e g e n e r a l observation

has been

made

t h a t l a c k o f self-esteem

o v e r d e f e r e n c e to t h e pater familias, are

characteristic

as women,

and o v e r v a l u a t i o n of the m a l e

o f these families.

"The

companionship

and

r e a l i t y interests d e n i e d to w o m e n [the w i f e ] m u s t c o m p e n s a t e for in h e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h h e r c h i l d r e n . W o m e n in p a t r i a r c h a l c u l t u r e s a r e p r o u d e r a n d m o r e p a s s i o n a t e m o t h e r s , o v e r - t e n d e r to their sons, w h o l a r g e l y c o n s t i t u t e their o w n c l a i m to s o c i a l e s t e e m . " 1 2 I n E g y p t , f o r i n s t a n c e , it w a s o b s e r v e d t h a t " t h e u n d i s p u t e d h e a d o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l f a m i l y is the f a t h e r . H e is t r e a t e d w i t h respect a n d d e f e r e n c e , a n d e v e n g r o w n - u p a n d m a r r i e d sons s u b m i t to

The Family

89

his a u t h o r i t y . " Sons, daughters, and wives kiss the hand of their father and h u s b a n d . 1 3 5. T h e M i d d l e Eastern family is endogamous, meaning that there is a preference for marriages contracted within a relatively narrow circle. I n theory, K o r a n i c law permits a Muslim man to marry any w o m a n , and a Muslim woman to marry any m a n , provided they accept I s l a m : " M a r r y not women who are idolaters, until they believe . . . and give not women who believe in marriage to the idolaters until they believe . . . . " ( K o r a n 2 : 200). Another passage in the K o r a n specifies that Muslims may marry daughters of the "peoples of the book," that is J e w s , Christians, and Zoroastrians: " A n d ye are also allowed to m a r r y free women that are believers, and also free women of those who have received the scriptures before you, when ye shall have assigned them their dower; living chastely with them, neither committing fornication, nor taking them for concubines" ( K o r a n 5 : 7 ) . I n the interpretation of this K o r a n i c law there is a difference of opinion between two of the four Sunnite legal schools: the H a n a f I school holds that marriages between Muslims and non-Muslim women who are not idolaters are permissible. T h e Shafi'I school, however, invoking an additional passage of the K o r a n , regards such unions as unlawful.14 While the legal endogamous circle is thus very wide and embraces all Muslims, even according to the Shafi'I school, in practice traditional custom has narrowed it down considerably. In general it can be stated that each social group in the M i d d l e East tends to behave as an endogamous unit. M a r r i a g e outside one's own group is frowned upon, discouraged, forbidden, and not infrequently severely punished, occasionally even with the death penalty. These endogamous restrictions prevail everywhere in one form or another, and they apply usually with much greater strictness to women than to men. Groups which countenance or accept with disapproval marriage of their own men to women from groups of inferior gtatus powerfully discourage, and often make it completely impossible, for their women to marry men of inferior status groups. Fulanain tells the tragic story of a shaykh of the noble Banl Sabah tribe of the Quraysh who, after having sojourned for twenty years as a fugitive among the Marsh Arabs

go

Golden River to Golden Road

of Lower Iraq, noticed that his only daughter was harboring tender feelings towards one of the youths of a marsh tribe. And although the two young people never met face to face, and the youth asked for the girl's hand in marriage, the old shaykh preferred to kill his only daughter rather than let her marry into a low-status tribe. 1 5 T h e so-called noble (asilin) Bedouin tribes of the Syrian and Arabian Desert (see Chapter 8) guard most jealously their purity of blood, and do not permit either their men or their women to marry members of an inferior tribe. In choosing a marriage partner for either a son or a daughter satisfactory descent is an indispensable prerequisite. 1 6 Members of the noble Rwala, one of the leading tribes of the Syrian desert, cannot marry persons belonging to the Sleyb, Hawazim, Fheyjat, Shararat, or 'Azim tribes which, although camel-breeders like the Rwala themselves, are low-status groups since they are unable to defend themselves, and pay khuwiva, protection-money, to the more vigorous tribes. T h e Rwala hold themselves aloof even from other free A r a b tribes and discourage, though do not absolutely forbid, intermarriage with them. As to marriages with male slaves or slave girls, such occurrences are a legitimate reason for putting the offender to death. A Rweyll marrying a slave girl would be killed by his own kin, ahl, whom he defiled by his act. Intermarriage is forbidden for the Rwala also with the sani' (pi. sunna') groups, those blacksmiths and tinkers who from time to time attach themselves to Rwala (and other Bedouin) camps, and of whom it is known to the Rwala that they have no marriage restrictions. 17 The same restrictions exist also among the powerful S h a m m a r tribes of Iraq and the Syrian Desert. No son of a S h a m m a r tribe can marry a slave girl or a girl from an inferior tribe such as those mentioned above. If he did, his own people would kill him. If a noble tribesman takes u p such trades as blacksmithing, saltmaking, or salt-carrying, lime-burning, charcoal-burning, skinning animals and curing the skins, he makes himself dishonorable and the S h a m m a r and other noble tribes will refrain from intermarrying with him and his. 18 Similar limitations prevail in Southern Arabia where, for

The Family

9i

instance, the Q a r a mountain tribesmen do not intermarry with the Shahara w h o m they regard as no better than slaves. T h e Shahara, again, do not marry outside their own p e o p l e . 1 ' W h e r e different ethnic groups meet, even though all of them are Muslims, marriage limitations often restrict the choice of a mate to one's own group. In Afghanistan, for example, it seems that it is unlawful for a down-country man, that is, one from India, even though he be a Muslim, to marry an A f g h a n . Jewett reports a case where such a marriage was concluded, and the A f g h a n authorities kept the offender, a Muslim Pathan from India, in jail for about a year. 2 0 A t the other or western end of the M i d d l e East, in the town of T i m b u c t o o , which is inhabited by three distinct ethnic elements of differing statuses, men of high status groups can acquire wives or concubines from any status group, but the men of low status are limited by the fact that the high status women do not marry inferiors. 2 1 A n additional limitation in the choice of marriage partners stems from the socioeconomic stratification present to some extent everywhere in the Middle East. T h e three main ecologic groups of the nomads, villagers and townspeople from three distinct social classes among w h o m intermarriage is discountenanced in theory and rare in practice. A s a South-Arabian proverb expresses it: "Qui biTi Nuh: al-hegri luh hegrah, al-laskari luh 'askariyah, wal-'abd luh gariyah." " S a i d Father N o a h : the ploughman to the plough-woman, the retainer to the retainer-woman, and the slave to the slave-woman." 2 ' 2 Y e t another endogamous limitation is imposed upon the people by their preference for finding marriage partners within their own local group. A study carried out in the ig2o's in Artas, a South-Palestinian Muslim A r a b village, showed that the great majority of marriages were contracted by y o u n g men and w o m e n both of w h o m resided in the village or in its immediate vicinity. 2 3 This is not an isolated instance but typical for conditions in the Middle East in general. A m o n g the fellahin of Egypt, for example, " . . . a w o m a n or girl in this country will seldom consent, or her parents allow her, to marry a man who will not promise to reside with her in her native town or village." 2 4 Since a village is often inhabited by members of one or two (rarely more than two)

Golden River to Golden Road

92

extended family groups (called hamula in several Middle Eastern countries), in-village marriage frequently also means in-family marriage. In Egypt to this day marriage to a stranger or to a woman met by chance outside the family's range is rare. 25 T h e narrowest e n d o g a m o u s circle is d r a w n b y the prcfcrence for m a r r y i n g close relatives, if possible a father's brother's d a u g h t e r (bint 'amm). I n tradition-bound social strata a father is not allowed to give his d a u g h t e r in marriage to anyone else unless he has obtained the consent (often in exchange for a consideration) of the girl's cousin. T h e right c a n be renounced by the ibn 'amm for a compensation paid to him b y the suitor of the girl, w h o thus is a source of revenue for h i m . 2 6 In the towns cousin-marriage seems to be most frequent a m o n g the lower classes consisting of workers, artisans, and small employees. 2 7 6. T h e M i d d l e Eastern family, finally, is occasionally polygynous, that is, a m a n m a y m a r r y more than one wife simultaneously. T h e prevalence of p o l y g y n y in the M i d d l e East has been greatly exaggerated

in the past

by

Western

authors, observers,

and

travelers. A l t h o u g h it is true that p o l y g y n y is lawful a m o n g all M u s l i m sects as well as a m o n g the O r i e n t a l Jews, in other w o r d s a m o n g at least 90 per cent of the area's population, it has always been and recently is increasingly the exception rather than the rule. A c c o r d i n g to K o r a n i c law a m a n can lawfully be w e d d e d simultaneously to up to four w o m e n ( K o r a n 4 : 3 ) . In addition to marriage there is also the institution of c o n c u b i n a g e , w h i c h makes it legal for a m a n to avail himself of the sexual services of slave girls owned b y him, without limitation as to their numbers. Since, however, wives are acquired b y p a y m e n t of a bride price, while concubine slave girls have to be purchased forthright, the economic law has always been less permissive with regard to plural marriages than the religious law. L a r g e harems were exceptions in the past and are extremely rare at present. In Saudi A r a b i a the king, the princes, and the rich still have sizable h a r e m s ; in Syria, J o r d a n , Iraq, E g y p t , however, the example of the leading families is that of m o n o g a m y , which cannot fail to have its effect on the upper class of society and ultimately also on the other classes, in the sense of serving as an example to be emulated. Of every hundred married men in the M i d d l e East as a whole there

The Family

93

are probably not more than four or five married to more than one wife at a time. In Cairo it was estimated well over a hundred years ago that " o f one hundred married men in this city there certainly is not more than one who has two wives; and not more than one in five hundred who has more than t w o . " 2 8 In Arabia in general most Bedouins have only one wife. " A s a rule they only take another when the first is barren and they do not want to divorce her. T h e shaikhs often have three or four wives sometimes for political reasons, in order to be related to an influential family, sometimes, but more rarely, to give a home to a w o m a n . " 2 9 In Southern A r a b i a , too, the rule is that a man has only one wife, rarely two. When a man marries a second wife, it is customary for him to pacify his first wife with a gift equivalent to the bride price he pays for the new wife. 3 0 In this manner the second wife costs him at least twice as much as the first one had, a powerful deterrent from plural marriages. Most of the Iranian tribes are monogamous, 3 1 and the same rule prevails among the Berber tribes of North A f r i c a . 3 2 In a random sample of 247 married T e d a men (in the southeastern central Sahara), it was found that 35 had two wives and seven had three, making a total of 17 per cent of polygynous marriages. 3 2 3 In five Muslim A r a b villages in Palestine, a study conducted in 1944 found that 10.6 per cent of the married men had more than one wife each. Of these 9.9 per cent had two, 0.5 per cent three, and 0.2 per cent four wives. Polygynous marriages were more frequent among the older men, and practically absent in the younger-than-thirty age group. 3 3 A relatively high percentage of polygynous marriages was found among a group of A r a b refugees from Palestine who had originally inhabited U p p e r Galilee around L a k e Tiberias and u p into the hills towards Nazareth and Safed, and had been agricultural folk. O f 200 heads of families interviewed in the course of a social survey carried out in J u l y 1949 in the Khiss-Finn refugee camp, 32, or 16 per cent, were found to be polygynous. 3 4 In the S h a r q i y y a province of Egypt in the 1930's 7 . 1 7 to 9.2 per cent of the married Muslim males were polygynous, while in the town of Zagazig this percentage was only 4 . 5 . 3 5

Golden River to Golden Road

94

In a social survey carried out recently in Beirut among a representative sample of almost two thousand families only two plural marriages were found. In the one case the man had two wives, in the other three. T h e author of the report comments: " T h e economics of subsistence militates against plural marriages." 3 6 Data from other places seem to indicate that cultural influences must also be taken into consideration. As against the rights of a man to marry more than one wife, he has ccrtain obligations toward his wives that occasionally may make life difficult for him. Among several tribes of the SyrianArabian Desert a man has to divide his marital attentions equally between his two wives. He must alternately spend one night with one and one with the other. Each of the wives cooks for him a day in turn, and on that day it is the woman's right to have the husband spend the night with her, whether he cohabits with her or not. I f the husband spends the night with one wife out of turn, he must compensate the other with a sheep or a goat as the price for her night. Sometimes the two wives strike a bargain and one of them buys a night from the other whose turn it is. 37

"BE

F R U I T F U L AND

MULTIPLY"

One of the motivations for large numbers of children is the emphasis on family coherence and family strength. Only a family with many children, and preferably boys, can be a strong family. T h e greater the number of children the greater also the prestige of the father and, through him, of the family as a whole. It is therefore the duty of every man in the family to beget as many children as possible. Even among the Christians this is found to be true. In Lebanon, for instance, " . . . a large family is desired . . . and a childless home is regarded as under a heavenly curse. Since the husband cannot divorce [his wife] (being Catholic) he loses all the hope of propagating himself. Children are wanted as a source of riches, comfort in old age, power against enemies, and, after death, to help into heaven. Therefore a bride who is robust, healthy and from a big family herself, is wanted." 3 8 T h e same attitude prevails among the Copts of Egypt. T h e average number of children born to a married couple in

The Family

95

the Middle East is very high, resulting in sizable families in spite of the effects of the high infant and child mortality. Unfortunately, no adequate statistical studies are available on the rate of reproduction of women in most Middle Eastern countries. Some indication as to the results one may expect should such studies be made can be found in data from Palestine, where, according to 1945 figures, the average number of children born to Muslim women during their lifetime was between 9 and 10, of whom about 6 reached adulthood. Both the general conditions and the specific motives believed to foster attitudes that make for large families are found in the Middle Eastern countries in a rarely complete combination. T h e general conditions a r e : illiteracy, great dependence on agriculture, isolation, a generally low standard of life, and a fatalistic outlook; the specific motives comprise religious injunctions to be fruitful and multiply, the specific form of family organization (the extended family), the widespread desire for heirs and especially for male heirs, the high infant mortality as a result of which relatively few children survive even if many are born; also the absence of any economic motivation to limit the number of children since the cost of satisfying the needs of the children is small, and they begin to contribute to the family income at an early age. 3 9 All these factors together constitute an interlocking system of social and family organization resulting in a strong pressure to reproduce. Only in the urban sector, and especially in its middle and upper classes, are the families smaller. In view of the great emphasis placed on having m a n y children, and the growth of the prestige of both man and wife with the increase of the number of their (male) children, it will be understandable that a correlate of these attitudes is a resultant dim view of sterility. A childless woman is regarded with contempt mixed with commiseration, and is often believed to be cursed by G o d w h o is the closer and opener of wombs. Such a w o m a n will search desperately for a remedy and will fall victim to quacks and medicine men or women who still abound among the nomadic tribes, the remoter villages, and even in the slums of the towns. Should this search bring no result, the w o m a n must resign herself to being divorced, or to sharing her husband with a second wife who, if fertile, will hold dominance over her. Although this

96

Golden River to Golden Road

traditional attitude toward childlessness is being gradually mitigated under the impact of Westernization, traces of it are still present even in the u r b a n middle a n d u p p e r classes. Since all the motivations of the traditional Middle Eastern family are directed towards having m a n y children, birth control is something to which a w o m a n would as a rule resort only in great secrecy, and only after she has given birth to a great number of children. If a w o m a n has three or four sons a n d she feels that the frequent a n d continuing childbearing is too great a burden, she m a y try one or more of the traditionally available contraceptive methods, such as prolonged lactation (in the belief that this prevents new conception), or one of the magical means offered by the same medicine men or women whose help is invoked also in the case of childlessness. Needless to say, these means are inadequate, and one cannot speak of a n y effective traditional method of family planning. As to the introduction of modern family planning, the general atmosphere of the M i d d l e Eastern family and society is, for the time being, highly unfavorable to it in spite of official pronouncements m a d e recently by leading religious authorities of the el-Azhar (the highest Muslim institute of religious learning in Cairo, Egypt) to the efTect t h a t there is no religious injunction in Islam against birth control. "FAMILISM" A N D SOCIALIZATION

T h e influence of the family on the life of the individual in the Middle East is very great, much greater t h a n usual in the modern u r b a n society of the Western world. I n fact, the entire culture of the Middle East is so permeated with family loyalty a n d influence that the terms "familism" and "kinship c u l t u r e " have properly been applied to it. T h e individual is m u c h m o r e the product of his family a n d m u c h less that of other socializing factors t h a n is true in the West. Well beyond the onset of adulthood and deep into his middle age, his life is joined to his extended family. Subservience to family authority and reliance on the advice of elders remain characteristic traits of men in their thirties a n d forties. 40 Ingrained habits of family loyalty are so strong that even in public a n d official positions it is extremely difficult for the individual to divest himself of a protective attitude towards his kinsmen, w h o

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as a matter of course expcct him to render special services and favors to them. A most fundamental difference between the Western family and the Middle Eastern family can be found in the educational field: In the Western family efforts are made to educate the child from a very early age for independence. T h e parents take pride in a child who can do things for himself, who can find his way alone, and who therefore in their opinion is well prepared to take his place independently in a competitive society. In traditional Middle Eastern society, on the other hand, the basic educational aim pursued by the family, whether consciously or not, is to mold the child into an obedient member of the family group, able to integrate into the working of his immediate social environment. Only very slowly and gradually, in most cases at a relatively advanced age, is he expected to act independently. T h e growing child, the adolescent boy has to learn to subordinate his wishes to those of his father and possibly to those of his elder brothers. He has to learn that the interests of the family come first and has to govern his actions with the family point of view in mind. Great stress is laid on coherence in the family because a divided family cannot hold its own in collective competition with the interests of other possibly stronger and more powerful families. There is a considerable difference between the early socialization of a boy and of a girl and in this difference can be found one of the basic factors that make for the specific Middle Eastern flavor of the relationship between man and woman in adulthood. In the villages, both boys and girls are still swaddled, although in the cities modern women fight against it. 4 1 T h e period of lactation lasts one to two years in the case of a girl and two to three years in the case of a boy, which means that a boy is breast fed for almost twice as long as a girl. During the period of lactation, the mother as a matter of course is constantly at the disposal of the child, picking him up and giving him her breast. During the midday hour, when she takes a hot lunch to her husband and menfolk working in the field, she carries the baby along with her oil her hip, shoulder, head, or back. With weaning, there is a sudden break in this close intimate relationship between mother and

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Golden River to Golden Road

child; thereafter, the mother no longer picks him up when he cries, no longer stands at his beck and call. When the mother leaves the house for the field or brings water from the well, she now leaves the child at home either in the care of an older sibling or completely alone to play in the dust of the small courtyard of the house. The child now cries unheeded, his customarily solicitous mother nowhere in sight. It is no exaggeration to say that weaning in the life of the Middle Eastern child is something of a traumatic experience. This experience comes in the life of a girl at a very early age, when she is between one and two years old, and the formation of mental habits has not yet reached as advanced a stage as in the case of the boy who is weaned at twice her age. The impressions of the relatively short period during which the girl child is the object of maternal solicitude are very early overlaid by the new and lasting experience of finding herself neglected, of crying without being listened to, of being paid no attention. In later life, this experience is intensified and before long the girl learns that she is a rather unimportant member of the family, that her function is to serve her brothers, her elder sisters, her mother and father. When she is four or five, she is given some simple duties in the household and begins to help her mother in tending her smaller siblings. At about this time the mother very consciously begins to prepare the girl for her marriage, explaining to her whenever occasion arises that soon she will move into the house of her husband's parents and there will serve not only her husband but, primarily, her husband's mother. In this way the girl is conditioned for the subordinate role she will play in the home of her husband where for all practical purposes she will become a servant of her mother-in-law. As to formal schooling of girls, this is still objected to by many Muslim villagers. In the villages studied in connection with the Kasmie Rural Improvement Project in Lebanon in 1952 it was found that 234 boys but only 13 girls attended elementary school. With regard to the ShI'ites in particular it was observed that they "do not encourage their daughters to attend schools. They feel that it is a hindrance to a happy marriage and often encourages disobedience to one's elders." 4 *

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The subordinate position of a girl, first in the house of her own parents, then in the house of her husband and his parents, serves as an additional motive for making a woman want to have as many children as possible and as soon as possible. The servile situation of a young wife changes only when children are born to her. She will still have to serve her mother-in-law, but her prestige increases with the birth of each child and especially with the birth of male children. It is when her sons grow up and marry that the woman reaches a period of life when the burden of everyday work is lightened by her daughters-in-law who now take over her chores. Just as the young girl leams in her parents' home how to behave in the home of her future parents-in-law, so the young wife is taught by her mother-in-law how to behave when she herself becomes a mother-in-law. In this manner both the motherdaughter relationship and the mother-in-law-daughter-in-law relationship is perpetuated from generation to generation. Among the Christians this emphasis upon the desirability of bearing a boy is also present. "When the midwife announces a boy, there is much joy, firing of rifles, dancing, arak drinking. But she does not move if it is a girl, and later receives a small remuneration; everyone goes quietly after his daily task." 4 3 To return now to the first years of a boy child's life. The lactation period lasts, as stated, from two to three years. During this time, certain definite expectations begin to form in the boy's mind. A two- to three-year-old boy who already can speak, walk, run, play, is still the master of his mother in the sense that whenever he wishes he may ask for her breast. As a result of this long period of lactation the boy child becomes imbued with the idea that his mother is there to serve him, that she must heed all his whims and wishes, and as he grows older, that the other womenfolk in the home also are there for the same purpose. The experience of weaning is of course a shock to the boy child as well, but, coming so much later than it comes for the girl, it does not eradicate the first impression he gained concerning his own relationship with the female world, namely that females are meant to serve him. Although corporal punishment is frequent, the boy may roam at will with older children and without the supervision of his parents. When the boy grows older his socialization and

100

Golden River lo Golden Road

education are shifted from the hands of his mother to those of his father. He is taken by his father to the fields and allowed to help with the agricultural work. At the same time the boy notices that his mother or sisters serve him in more or less the same manner in which they serve his father: they bring food for him as well, also make his clothes, and so on. In this manner the impression that females are subservient creatures is reinforced in the male child's mind during the first decade of his existence. When he reaches adolescence and consciously observes the relationship between men and women, this impression is of course reinforced further and with it comes the recognition of the male role of leadership in the family and society at large. Naturally, this is translated into the expectation that, when he marries, his wife will be not so much his equal companion as a subservient fulfiller of his needs. When marriage actually occurs and the young bride is installed in the home that the boy shares with his parents and siblings, this expectation is fulfilled inasmuch as his own mother makes it clear what role his young wife must play in the household. At the same time the boy, now a young husband, remains in an inferior position vis-a-vis his own father. He may accompany his father to his work in the fields and also to the deliberations of the village council, but he will have to take a back scat and is expected to listen quietly to his elders, discouraged from uttering any premature ill-considered opinion. Only when he himself becomes a father does his prestige slowly increase, and with each addition to his family, he is regarded as more of an authority in his own house. EARLY MARRIAGE

Under traditional circumstances, which prevail to this day among practically all the nomads and villagers of the Middle East and many of the townspeople, marriages are arranged by the parents of the young people. A son or daughter is expected to carry out the decision of his or her parents in this, just as in other matters of greater or lesser importance. In view of the very early average age of marriage for girls, there seems to be some justification for the traditionally held view that parents are better judges of the suitability of a match for their daughter than the

The Family

IOI

girl herself. T h e average age of marriage for men is higher, but in this case the fact that the family property is controlled by his father, who alone can make all decisions in connection with the bride price, serves as a powerful factor in making a son submit to parental choice. Moreover, in the extended patrilocal family set-up, for a son to bring into the house of his parents a bride to whom his parents objcct would be all but impossible. In conservative villages and in the tradition-bound sectors of the urban population, very early marriages are still the rule. This is indicated by demographic studies which, unfortunately, are still sporadic. A study carried out in 1944 in five Palestinian A r a b villages showed that 12 per cent of the women aged thirteen to seventeen and 89 per cent of the women aged eighteen to twenty-two were married. A m o n g all Palestinian Muslims the average age at marriage for women was 20.2 in 1 9 3 1 and 19.1 in 1 9 3 8 - 3 9 ; for men 25.8 in 1931 and 26.6 in 1 9 3 8 - 3 9 . 4 4 T a k i n g twenty as the age limit, we find that in the United States, of all the women who were married in 1956, about 37 per cent were under twenty years of a g e ; in England and Wales, about 20 per cent; in Egypt (1955), almost 50 per cent; in J o r d a n ( 1 9 5 7 ) , over 60 per cent; in the provincial and district capitals of T u r k e y , ( 1 9 5 5 ) , undoubtedly under the influence of Westernization, only 33 per cent. In the age of the bridegrooms at marriage, the differences between the Western rates and those of the Middle East are in the reverse. In the United States in 1956, about 10 per cent of the men who married were under twenty years of age; in England and Wales, about 4 per cent; in Egypt, about 4 per cent; in J o r d a n , a little over 10 per cent; in the provincial and district capitals of T u r k e y , between 5 and 6 per cent. In other words, fewer young men can afford to marry in E g y p t , for example, than in the United States; but many more girls are married very young in the Middle East than in the West. 4 5 Such early marriages for girls represent an age-old Middle Eastern tradition. T h e stated reasons often voiced to this day b y conservative parents are: fear of unchastity and of losing the money cxpcctcd in the form of the bride price (which is paid by the bridegroom or his father to the father of the bride who can

102

Golden River to Golden Road

use it as he deems fit, although as a rule all or part of it is invested into the trousseau of the bride) ; preference for educating the girl in the house of her mother-in-law ; preference for a young wife, motivated by the relatively early aging of women; the often present opportunity to exchange women, that is to give in marriage the daughter (or sister) of one to another in exchange for the latter's daughter (or sister) ; the desire of the groom's mother to have household help. Another result of these factors is that the percentage of people remaining unmarried is very small, though somewhat higher among the males than among the females. In Egypt (in 1937), for instance, 99 per cent of the women in the forty to forty-nine age group were married or widowed or divorced, while the corresponding figure for males was 97 per cent. 48 In Turkey (1935), the corresponding percentages were 97.5 per cent and 96 per cent. 47 In recent decades several Middle Eastern countries have passed laws fixing the minimum age of marriage. Article 4 of the Syrian law on the status of the family stipulates that the fiancé must have completed his eighteenth and the fiancee her seventeenth year of age for the marriage to be valid ; and Article 88 of the Turkish civil code prescribes the same ages as a condition of marriage. In Egypt, legislation in 1923 fixed the minimum age of marriage for girls at sixteen and for boys at eighteen. However, the translation of such laws into practice is a difficult matter in view of the persistence of the traditional preferences among the people and the difficulty in enforcement. Thus, as a rule, there is only a negligible difference between the average age of marriage before the enactment of such laws as compared with that several years after it. 48 Such increase as has occurred in the average age of marriage is largely confined to the middle and upper classes of the urban population. In a representative sample of 1,665 male heads of household in Beirut studied in 1952-53 it was found that 0.30 per cent had married at the age of fifteen or under; 1 1 . 2 3 P e r cent between the ages of sixteen and twenty; and 27.33 P e r c e n t between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five, or a total of 38.86 per cent had married up to the age of twenty-five. Among the

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103

fathers of these heads of household, that is, men one generation older, the corresponding figures were as follows: married at the age of fifteen and under, 8 per cent; sixteen to twenty, 24.0 per cent; twenty-one to twenty-five, 20.0 per cent; or a total of 52 per cent married up to the age of twenty-five. In other words, within one generation the percentage of men married up to the age of twenty-five, decreased from 52 per cent to 38.86 per cent, and the percentage of men married up to the age of twenty decreased from 32 per cent to 11.52 per cent. PERCENTAGES OF A G E AT M A R R I A G E IN BEIRUT,

Males

Former generation

Present generation

15 and under 16-20 21-25

8.0 24.0 20.0

0.30 11.23 27-33

25 and under Over 25

52.0 48.0

38.86 61.14

100.0

100.00

TOTAL

1952-53"

Females 15 and under 16-20 20 and under Over 20 TOTAL

28.88 43-97

18.22 44.81

72.85 7- ' 5

63.03 36-97

100.00

100.00

2

Among the mothers of the heads of household, 28.88 per cent had married at the age of fifteen or under, and 43.97 per cent at the age of sixteen to twenty. Among the female heads of household and the wives of male heads of household, the corresponding percentages were 18.22 and 44.81. There was thus a very considerable decrease within one generation in marriages of women at the age of fifteen and under, but no decrease, in fact a slight increase, in marriages at the ages from sixteen to twenty.

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Golden River to Golden Road

T h e s a m e t r e n d of l a t e r m a r r i a g e s seems to c o n t i n u e a m o n g t h e n e x t g e n e r a t i o n ( t h a t is, t h e c h i l d r e n of t h e h e a d s of h o u s e h o l d s t u d i e d ) , b u t t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e d a t a is s u c h t h a t n o d e f i n i t e conclusions can be d r a w n from t h e m . A m o n g t h e f a c t o r s m a k i n g for a h i g h e r a v e r a g e a g e a t m a r r i a g e c a n b e m e n t i o n e d t h e s p r e a d of e d u c a t i o n , as a result of w h i c h m o r e a n d m o r e girls a r e a t school a t a n a g e w h e n t h e i r m o t h e r s w e r e m a r r i e d , a n d t h e i n c r e a s i n g l y l o n g e r p e r i o d r e q u i r e d of y o u n g m e n for e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e m s e l v e s in positions. O f c o u r s e , t h e s e f a c t o r s a r e p r e s e n t to a n a p p r e c i a b l e d e g r e e o n l y in t h e u r b a n u p p e r a n d m i d d l e classes. A m o n g t h e w o r k i n g class a n d t h e r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n e a r l y m a r r i a g e s a r c still t h e r u l e . I n f a c t , in t h e s e l a t t e r circles a girl o v e r t w e n t y - f o u r o r t w e n t y - f i v e w h o h a s n o t y e t m a r r i e d is r e g a r d e d as h a v i n g s o m e t h i n g w r o n g w i t h her. A g a i n , o n l y in t h e m i d d l e a n d u p p e r classes of t h e u r b a n p o p u lation has the traditional family and marriage pattern u n d e r g o n e s i g n i f i c a n t m o d i f i c a t i o n s in r e c e n t years. C h i l d r e n , b o t h sons a n d d a u g h t e r s , w h o h a v e h a d h i g h school o r e v e n college e d u c a t i o n have increasingly e m a n c i p a t e d themselves from the traditional t y p e of p a t e r n a l c o n t r o l w i t h t h e result t h a t n o t o n l y p a t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y b u t also t h e t r a d i t i o n a l e x t e n d e d f a m i l y e x p e r i e n c e s a d e f i n i t e d e c l i n e (or if o n e p r e f e r s : m o d i f i c a t i o n ) in t h e s e circles. S i n c e m a r r i a g e is t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t e v e n t in t h e life of t h e f a m i l y , a brief d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e a t t e n d a n t rites s e e m s in p l a c e . T h e s e rites e x h i b i t a w i d e r a n g e of local v a r i a t i o n s . T h e f o l l o w i n g s u m m a r y refers to t h e E a s t e r n M e d i t e r r a n e a n a r e a , w h e r e in t h e villages a n d in c o n s e r v a t i v e u r b a n circles t w o c e r e m o n i e s p r e c e d e m a r r i a g e . T h e first is c a l l e d khutbeh or u n o f f i c i a l e n g a g e m e n t ; t h e s e c o n d , katb el-ketab or s i g n i n g of t h e c o n t r a c t . I n t h e khutbeh a few relatives a n d f r i e n d s a r e i n v i t e d to t h e b r i d e ' s h o u s e , w h e r e t h e p a r e n t s of t h e b r i d e g r o o m a n d b r i d e a n n o u n c e to t h e g u e s t s t h e i n t e n d e d m a r r i a g e . S o m e t i m e l a t e r , t h e c e r e m o n y of katb el-ketab is h e l d . T h i s c e r e m o n y is a t t e n d e d by a n official of t h e S h a r i ' a M u s l i m C o u r t a n d a l a r g e g a t h e r i n g of villagers. T h e official registers in t h e c o n t r a c t t h e c o n s e n t of t h e c o u p l e t o m a r r y a n d t h e a m o u n t of d o w r y p a i d by t h e b r i d e g r o o m . T h e d o w r y consists of t w o p a r t s : o n e p a i d o n d a t e of c o n t r a c t , a n d t h e

The Family second deferred and paid in case o f divorce. T h e dowry paid on date o f contract may be wholly in money or partly in money and partly in land. T h e money is paid for the purchase o f clothing for the bride, since custom dictates that the bride should take with her a bridal trousseau when she marries. T h e remainder o f the m o n e y is used for the purchase of jewelry for the bride. In general, whenever the father can afford it, he furnishes the expensive clothing and all the dowry is used for the purchase o f j e w e l r y or land for the bride. T h e actual marriage m a y take place immediately after this c e r e m o n y or more frequently, several months later. I n towns, this period is usually longer and m a y extend to a year or even two. D u r i n g the three days or the week that precede the actual marriage ceremony, the women villagers gather and dance in the bride's home. O n the evening o f the wedding a lavish feast is served in the bridegroom's house, attended by most of the villagers and also by guests from outside. Guests usually bring with

them

presents in money and in food such as rice, sugar, or sheep. 5 0

DIVORCE

Divorce in Muslim society is extremely simple. T h e husband can divorce his wife at will by pronouncing the traditional formula, " I divorce y o u , " in the presence o f two witnesses. T h e wife does not have the right either to oppose such a divorce or to initiate it on her own behalf. O n c e the fateful sentence has been uttered, she must go back to her father's (or brother's) family, and can claim that portion o f the bride price which is retained by the husband and paid to her only upon divorce. I f a wife leaves her husband (by returning to her own family) and her husband agrees to divorce her, she forfeits this part o f the bride price. After a divorce a m a n m a y remarry at once, but a woman must wait for three months to make sure she is not pregnant. Should she find herself pregnant, she c a n n o t remarry until she gives birth to the child and weans it. During this time her former husband

(the

father o f the child), must support her and the b a b y . According to Muslim law all the children o f divorced parents belong to the father, and the mother must deliver them up to him, usually at

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Golden River to Golden Road

the age of seven. It is important to note that among Muslim peoples no stigma attaches to divorce, and divorced women remarry, as a rule, soon after they are premitted by law to do so. In fact, among the Bedouins it is not at all rare that a woman marries several men in succession. A girl of the 'Ajman, one of the nobles tribes of Arabia, by the name of al-Jazi bint Muhammed al-Hazam al-Hithlayn, who in her youth was a famous beauty, was married to King Ibn Sa'ud; then to his brother, the Amir Muhammad; then to the king's brother-in-law, the Amir Sa'ud al-'Arafa; then to the paramount chief of the Mutayr tribe, Shaykh Bandar al-Duwish; then to a relative of the latter, Shaykh Mutluq al-Jaba'a of the Qahtan tribe; then to the chief of the 'Ajman, Shaykh Rakan ibn Dhaydan al-Hithlayn. In between the above marriages, she was married two more times to King Ibn Sa'ud who was able, on both occasions, to persuade her then husband to divorce her because " I have not got over my love for her." Al-Jazi was thus married no less than eight times within the relatively short period during which Bedouin women enjoy the youthful attributes and attractions of beauty. 51 No statistical data are available from most Middle Eastern countries as to the frequencies of divorce and subsequent remarriage, but that these frequencies must be high can be gauged from the observation made in Mandatory Palestine where among the women of five Muslim Arab villages aged thirty-eight or more no less than 30.8 per cent have been married twice or more. 65 A glance at the frequency of divorces is also instructive. This can be measured by the number of annual divorces per 1,000 married couples, which in the United States was 8.9 in 1939-41 and 10.4 in 1949-51, the highest rates in the Western world. In the Middle East, however, these rates are higher still. In Egypt, the only country from which relatively reliable data are available, they were 13.6 in 1936-38 and 16.9 in 1946-48. 51 These figures show that in the Middle East relatively more married women get divorced than in America. Nevertheless, there is considerable dissatisfaction in feminist circles in the Middle East with the divorce laws. The Arab Women's Congress

The Family

in Cairo in 1944 resolved to demand reforms of the divorce law in two directions: " T h e right to divorce is to be granted to women as well as men, and no divorce is to come into effect without the decision of the court." No unqualified condemnation of polygyny was resolved, since allowance for it was made in cases of sterility and incurable sickness, a fact that demonstrates how far custom and tradition still influence the Muslim women even of the educated class.64 FAMILY AND SOCIETY

The family in the Middle East is the traditional economic unit. That is to say, in the nomadic tribes the family jointly owns the herds and flocks; in the villages, the family jointly owns and works the land; and in the towns, unless Westernization has changed the situation, the family jointly owns and works in a craft, or trade, or business. Hand in hand with this goes the tradition of passing on occupations in inheritance from father to son or, failing a son, to a nephew or other relative. Where modern influences are prevalent this system suffers a breakdown and, with the disintegration of the traditional extended family, its young male members strike out more and more frequently into new and individual directions. Inheritance of property is regulated in the Middle Eastern countries, with the exception of Turkey, by the religious laws of the community to which the family belongs. As far as the Muslims are concerned, there is a Koranic prescription (Sura 4), according to which, if a man dies, first his debts are paid from his estate, then his wife and other members of his family besides his children get certain shares, then the residual estate is equally divided among his sons (each of whom gets a full share), and his daughters (each of whom gets half a share). This rule is observed primarily among traditional townspeople and villagers. Among the nomads, ancient pre-Islamic usages and customary laws {'urf) still persist, and the rules of inheritance contained in them are followed. Among the Bedouins of Jordan and Syria, for example, daughters do not inherit, and the Turkish government attempted in vain to enforce the shari'a (canon) law. 5 5 In addition to the exclusion of

lo8

Golden River to Golden Road

d a u g h t e r s f r o m i n h e r i t a n c e , t r a d i t i o n a l l a w as f o l l o w e d b y the n o m a d s permits a m a n to dispose o f his entire p r o p e r t y before d e a t h as he chooses, w h i l e a c c o r d i n g to M u s l i m c a n o n law he has t h e r i g h t to g i v e a w a y at will o n l y o n e third o f it. A d o p t i o n is r e c o g n i z e d a n d p r a c t i c e d b y the n o m a d s , w h e r e a s c a n o n l a w rejects it (based o n K o r a n 33 : 4 f., 37). T h e m a i n differences b e t w e e n t h e attitudes o f the rural a n d the u r b a n families c a n b e s u b s u m e d u n d e r the point o f v i e w o f c o n servatism versus m o d e r n i s m . T h e t y p i c a l rural f a m i l y is conserv a t i v e , t r a d i t i o n - b o u n d , a n d averse to c h a n g e . It is suspicious o f i n n o v a t i o n s , a n d values the status quo. It e m p h a s i z e s the i m p o r t a n c e o f the f a m i l y a n d its collective interests as against those o f its i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s . It expects s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f individuals, a n d especially o f the y o u n g e r g e n e r a t i o n , to the interests a n d wishes o f the f a m i l y as a w h o l e as expressed b y its h e a d a n d its o l d e r m e m b e r s . It has g r e a t cohesion, w h i c h continues even w h e n the f a m i l y b r a n c h e s out into several subdivisions l o c a t e d in d i f f e r e n t places o f residence. It protects its i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s a n d helps t h e m e c o n o m i c a l l y , socially, a n d w i t h " s t r i n g p u l l i n g " w h e n e v e r necessary. W h e n a rural f a m i l y m o v e s into the city m a n y o f these traditional features arc lost. T h e i n d i v i d u a l often b e c o m e s s e p a r a t e d f r o m his f a m i l y or the n u c l e a r f a m i l y d e p r i v e d o f the p r o t e c t i v e f r a m e w o r k o f the e x t e n d e d f a m i l y . A s a result, the old

values

represented a n d u p h e l d b y the f a m i l y tend to d i s a p p e a r .

Only

r a r e l y c a n the f a m i l y in the city r e t a i n its tradition-directed t e n o r . Traditionalism and modernism compete with each other

even

w i t h i n the f a m i l y , c a u s i n g not i n f r e q u e n t l y d e e p rifts b e t w e e n t h e conservative

older a n d the m o d e r n y o u n g e r generations.

The

transition f r o m traditional f a m i l i s m to m o d e r n u r b a n l i v i n g a n d the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f f a m i l y mores, w i t h w h i c h the p r o b l e m o f t h e a t t i t u d e t o w a r d religion is intrinsically i n t e r w o v e n , are r e g a r d e d b y t h o u g h t f u l p e o p l e as basic difficulties in the p a t h of W e s t e r n i z a t i o n . A s H o u r a n i p u t it, . . . the patriarchal family system remains in existence, but its days are probably numbered. T h e claims of the family are still prior to those of the individual member of it; but its solidarity is gradually being undermined by the w ays of modern urban life

The Family and by the emergence for large sections of the population of alternatives to the cultivation of inherited land in the ancestral village. T h e structure of the family is being radically transformed by the changc in the status of women. T h e change is particularly great among the urban middle class. Girls' schools have been opened, and it is possible for women to enter an ever-increasing number of occupations, including the liberal professions. But so far only the edge has been touched of the great problem, which like all great problems in this country is closely bound up with religion: how far is it possible in a modern society to retain the traditional Islamic view of women's status—seclusion and the veil, the theory and in a minority of cases the practice of polygamy, the divorce laws and so on? Of all the difficult questions which the process of Westernization raises, this is perhaps the most difficult; and its difficulty and urgency are likely to increase. The process of change is being speeded by one manifestation of Western civilization above all: the film which expresses a way of feminine life, and a conception of the relations between men and women, which are far from those prevalent in the Islamic world. 5 8 DEMOGRAPHIC D A T A

T o s u p p l e m e n t the foregoing analysis of the M i d d l e Eastern family some d e m o g r a p h i c data might be useful. Such data, however, are very scanty in most Middle Eastern countries, and it is consequently neccssary to extrapolate when generalizations are called for. E v e n the most basic of all demographic data, the birth and death rates, are lacking in most M i d d l e Eastern countries. O n l y f r o m two M u s l i m A r a b populations (Egyptians and Palestinian Muslims) do we possess series of data extending over a n u m b e r of years. These figures show that the typical crude birth rate ranges between 40 and 50, placing these countries into the top brackets of the so-called " h i g h fertility countries." N o general trend of either decrease or increase is observable, although the w a r years were accompanied by a definite drop in crude birth rates, the low having been reached in both countries in 1942. T h e birth rates of the Christian population groups in the M i d d l e East (Palestinian Christian A r a b s ; C y p r u s , with its 80 per cent of Greek Christians; and also L e b a n o n with its slight Christian A r a b majority) are lower. T h e y range from 25 to 3 5 . High birth rate is usually accompanied by high death rate, and this is what wc find in the M i d d l e East. T h e E g y p t i a n crude

IIO

Golden River to Golden Road

death rate ranged, in the course of the two decades of 1930 to 1950 between 25 and 29, reaching the low of 19.2 in 1950-52. The death rate of the Palestinian Muslims decreased from over 26 in 1932 to less than 20 by 1942. The Christian populations, characterized by a lower birth rate, show a correspondingly lower death rate, as well as a hesitant but noticeable trend for the decrease of the latter (from 16 in 1932 to less than 10 in 1945 in Palestine, and to 6.7 in 1 9 5 3 - 5 5 i n Cyprus). The differential between crude birth rate and crude death rate gives the crude rate of natural increase, which shows an increasing trend in those populations of the Middle East that evince a decreasing trend in death rate. As to the probable future trends of population movement in the Middle East only a few very general observations can be made. T h e most immediate demographic effect of industrialization, Westernization, and urbanization is a gradual improvement in the rate of infant mortality that can be noticed in several Middle Eastern countries already today. This is followed by a slower but no less definite decrease in general mortality, as a consequence of which the number of births increases over the number of deaths, and the total population embarks upon a more and more pronounced natural increase. After a while, industrialization is followed by a fall in birth rate, as was shown not only in Europe but also in J a p a n . However, the decrease in birth rate in the Middle East may not become significant enough to be felt in the national or regional population movements for many more years to come. This means that for the next few years—possibly up to two decades or more—the increase in the number of children who once born will survive will not be counterbalanced or offset by a decrease in the number of children born. After the lapse of this transitional period, however, the onset of a decreasing tendency in the natural increase can be expected. T h e outlook and values of an ever-growing proportion of the population will undergo a slow and gradual change. T h e present deeply embedded values, powerful in their hold, safeguarded by social sanctions, will slowly and gradually give w a y under the impact of Westernization, of changing and improving economic and social conditions. The end result can well be a

The Family

i n

changed set of demographic traits approximating those of the Western world. A very important figure in vital statistics is the rate of infant mortality, calculated as either the number of children dying under one year of age per every thousand live births during the year or the number of children dying under one year of age per every thousand children under one year of age at the middle of the year. The difference between the two methods is considerable, the second yielding a higher figure than the first. The importance of the rates of infant mortality for drawing a demographic picture of any community lies in the fact that the higher the infant mortality rate the greater the waste of human lives, energy, emotional stress, and economic effort expended by the population in relation to every child who is successfully brought up to the age of maturity. Moreover, high general mortality rates usually go hand in hand with high infant mortality rates as well as with high birth rates; so that the end result (that is, the natural increase) of these three high rates together can be the same or only slightly higher than the end result of low birth rates coupled with low infant and general mortality rates. High birth rate and high infant mortality rate (as well as high child mortality up to five years of age) are conducive to a low standard of living because the earning capacity of the adult members of the family is divided among a large number of small children, many of whom do not reach the age of economic productivity. Only scattered returns are available from a few Middle Eastern countries as to infant mortality, and even those are not reliable because of the probability of incomplete registration. Nevertheless, the figures indicate that infant mortality is on the decrease, as shown by the accompanying data (rates based on live births during the year) : 5 7 People

Aden Colony Egypt Cyprus Palestine Muslims Palestine Christians Palestine Jews

Tear

Mortality

Year

Mortality

1948 '944 1948 1935 '935 '935

' 7 ' -3 1523 66.9 148.1 125.8 64.2

'958 '954 '958 '945 '945 '945

'37-7 140.4 30.0 93-9 89.0 35-8

See Statistical Appendix, Table 3, for infant mortality rates 1963-67.

Golden River to Golden Road

112

T h e main single cause for the decrease in infant mortality which can be assumed to be characteristic for the major parts of the M i d d l e East area, is undoubtedly the greater care, both medical and social, enjoyed b y the newborn. T h e beneficial results of infant care can be demonstrated b y referring to the extremely great difference in infant mortality rates in E g y p t between children under the care of health centers and those not under the care of such centers. In 1945, the infant mortality rate per thousand among children under the care of health centers was 181, among those not under the care of centers, 323; by 1948 the rate of the first group was reduced to 80, while those in the second group showed a decrease to 241 only. It is a remarkable fact that the male infant mortality is in every case higher, in some cases considerably higher, than the female infant mortality, even in Muslim populations w h o traditionally value their male children more than their female children, and who, therefore, presumably pay more attention to the health and well-being of a male infant than of a female. Child mortality rate is the number of children per thousand live births w h o die before they reach their fifth birthday. T h e data for child mortality are even scantier than those of infant mortality, but we know, for instance, that in Egypt the rate is 340, 58 and it can be assumed not to be much different in other Middle Eastern countries in which conditions are similar to those of Egypt. T o put the above figures in the proper perspective, they should be compared not only with corresponding figures from the Western world, but also with those of Negro Africa. In the tribal population of southern Sudan, which culturally has close affinities to Negro Africa, infant mortality seems to be several times higher than in the Middle East. Limited studies carried out among the N u b a mountain tribes resulted in the following infant mortality rates per 1,000 live births: Tribe

Heiban Otoro

Tira

Mortality

423 361

323

The

Family

113

In the same three tribes it was found that the number of children born per mother was low (when compared with the Middle Eastern average), and that the number of children remaining alive per mother was scarcely sufficient to replace the present generation. 59 Tribe Heiban Otoro Tira Koalib

Number of women

Children born per mother

Children alive per mother

100 77 112 33

4.2 5 2.8 3.2

2.3 2.7 1.7 1.7

These figures, when taken in conjunction with the estimated infant mortality of 600 in Mukalla in the Aden Protectorate, 60 indicate that the infant mortality rates of the more advanced regions of the Middle East, high though they are, represent a definite advance over the largely uncontrolled situation prevailing in most of Negro Africa and Southern Arabia. TERMINOLOGY

The importance of the family and of family life is expressed, among other manifestations, in the extremely rich terminology centering around the family and used in the everyday colloquial in Arab countries. There is, for instance, a considerable number of nouns denoting the family, and used sometimes interchangeably, sometimes with fine gradations of meaning. The family consisting of father, mother, and children is called 'ayle (variant: or 'ial; in plural 'iyal, 'ayal, or 'ailat). Another term for the same concept is bet, which, however, may also mean the extended family living in one house. The extended family is called al, or ahl, or finde (variants: fendi, fende), or feriq (also pronounced ferich).

Since one's relationship to a cousin who is one's father's brother's son or daughter is very different from one's relationship to other types of cousins, it is necessary to distinguish between different types of cousins. In fact, the single English word "cousin," when translated into Arabic, must be reproduced by one of eight terms which are listed below:

Golden River to Golden Road

114 ibn 'amm ('ammt) (my) father's brother's soil bint 'amm ('ammt) (my) father's brother's daughter ibn 'amme ('ammti) (my) father's sister's son bint'amme ('ammfi.) (my) father's sister's daughter

ibn khal (khdli) (my) brother's son bint khal (khati) (my) brother's daughter ibn khale (khald) (my) sister's son bint khale (khalti) (my) sister's daughter

mother's mother's mother's mother's

Terms for first-degree relatives are as follows: 6 1 abt, abu'ï bäbä ummt, immï marna akhi, akhul ukhtl züji,jüzi bint 'ammì, marti maddämtl ibnì, bnayyi

my father daddy M mother mummy U brother sister )! 1) husband » wife » ,, (in the cities) son

bintt waladi ulädi 'amm, ('ammi) 'amme ('ammli) khal (khdli) khàle (khâltï)

my ,, ,, „

daughter child (m.) children father's brother „ father's sister „ mother's brother ,, mother's sister

V. The Position of Women and Sex Mores

M

EASTERN society is complex and mosaiclike. It is intricately structured both vertically and horizontally. In many parts of the huge land area of the Middle East lack of communications has favored the emergence of local differences beneath the over-all but often rather thinly spread veneer of Islamic culture. The strong traditionalism characteristic of the area has tended to perpetuate local variants. These conditions have resulted in the presence of a wide variety of sex mores ranging from the extreme of great strictness on the one hand to that of considerable laxity on the other. The picture painted by travelogues and even by more serious studies of the area or of a region within it is often one-sided and distorted. Some writers emphasize the restrictions sexual morality places on women, others include titillating details as to socially sanctioned immorality of which they succeeded in getting a glimpse. Generalizations often follow, and the area as a whole is said to conform to one stereotyped pattern. Islam has, of course, been the most important single factor in determining the traditional position assigned to women all over the Middle East. To this day, the foremost manifestation of the inequality of the sexes can be seen in the different moral standards applied by Islam to men and women. Official Islam countenances a considerable sexual laxity in men while imposing a rigid code of sex mores on women. In a traditional Muslim social environment men and women form two distinct and separate societies that do not mix or mingle. Only in the family circle can closely related men and women meet. Social life in the sense of several IDDLE

J15

né

Golden River to Golden Road

unrelated families or couples periodically meeting in a private h o m e or in a public place (such as a cafe) does not exist, with a few exceptions confined to the thin upper layer of u r b a n society in the countries close to the Mediterranean littoral. T h e Muslim Middle East has been a man's world a n d its society a m a n ' s society, a n d these they remained to a large extent to this very day.

V E I L I N G A N D SECLUSION

T h e official Muslim attitude toward sex is expressed in such institutions as the veiling and segregation of w o m e n (often referred to by the I n d i a n t e r m purdah). T h e two are usually thrown together, although in fact they are two different and often unconnected expressions of the position of women. A w o m a n m a y wear the veil without being secluded, or she m a y live in such extreme seclusion that she rarely if ever has opportunity to use the veil. Veiling is general or, more precisely, has been general until the impact of Westernization, a m o n g townswomen only. As recently as the beginning of the twentieth century, Muslim townswomen wore the veil when leaving their homes for shopping expeditions or for the purpose of paying a visit, and would rarely if ever talk or show their faces to any m a n except their own husbands and close male relatives. " T h e outdoor costume of the Persian women—is m a d e up of three pieces: the big voluminous trousers which slip over the feet a n d cling closely to the shape of the foot but above the ankle fall full and baggy; over these are worn the large black c h u d d a r , the poor wearing black calico and the rich silk; and then, covering the face, is the veil. This veil is a long strip of white calico with open work for the part covering the eyes, and fastened together at the back of the head by brass, silver, or gold and jewelled clasps, according to the rank of the wearer. T h r o u g h the open work part of the veil the w o m a n is able to find her way about, a n d see all that there is to be seen, while no one can see the face behind the veil." 1 I n traditional Turkey the townswoman, when leaving her house, was bundled in her garsaf and veiled beyond recognition. T h e garsaf was a loose, usually black, wrap that covered her

The Position of Women and Sex Mores figure f r o m h e a d to foot, a n d one corner of which used to be d r a w n over the h e a d a n d across the face, revealing only the eyes. 2 I n Afghanistan the burqa is w o r n , a covering that envelops the h e a d , is g a t h e r e d a r o u n d the line of the forehead and falls to the feet, with two holes covered with n e t t i n g for the eyes. 3 T h e higher the social class to which the u r b a n w o m a n belonged, the g r e a t e r was the strictness with which she observed the rules of veiling. Actually, veiling was a m a r k of class distinction r a t h e r t h a n a m e r e M u s l i m religious tradition, as attested by the fact that the practice was observed by Christians a n d J e w s as well as by Muslims.1 Also, the degree of seclusion to which a w o m a n is (or was) subjected depends, within the general traditions of the locality in w h i c h she lives, on the social class to which she belongs. A m o n g the w o m e n of the u p p e r class, as recently as one or two generations ago, there were such w h o f r o m p u b e r t y to d e a t h never left their q u a r t e r s . As a result of this e x t r e m e form of seclusion it was f o u n d , in certain Muslim societies, t h a t the incidence of tuberculosis was greater a m o n g the w o m e n w h o were never exposed to sunshine t h a n a m o n g the m e n . I n a less stringent form of seclusion a m o n g the u p p e r class, w o m e n were never supposed to go o u t to the street in the c o m p a n y of a n y m a n , not even in t h a t of their own husbands, b u t only in the c o m p a n y of one or more elderly w o m e n , all of t h e m , of course, heavily veiled. 5 N o w a d a y s , w o m e n of the middle class a n d to a n even greater extent of the lower or working classes are free to go o u t on shopp i n g expeditions, to visit friends, to go to the hammam (bath), a n d the like, veiled but alone. Since the great m a j o r i t y of townsw o m e n belong to these classes, one can generalize a n d state t h a t in most cases veiling is practiced even w h e n the rules of seclusion are considerably relaxed. A m o n g the J e w s of the M i d d l e East, female seclusion is observed, as a rule, less strictly t h a n a m o n g the Muslims. 6 A m o n g the fellahin of Syria, J o r d a n , Israel, a n d I r a q , in several of the oases of Northwestern A r a b i a , as well as in the smaller towns of these areas, the veiling of w o m e n is not practiced. Also, in m a n y places in southern a n d eastern A r a b i a , including

n8

Golden River to Golden Road

the small towns, the veil is absent. Only in the larger cities, for example, in San'a, capital of Yemen, is veiling practiced. In southern Palestine it also was practiced, probably under Egyptian influence.7 Occasionally it is found among both Bedouins and fellahin that brides are veiled on the day of their wedding but otherwise veiling is not practiced, or that unmarried women go unveiled, but married women have to veil their faces.8 Among the nomads of northern Arabia, in Iraq, among the fellahin in Israel, and the seminomadic tribes of Jordan, women who wear no veil nevertheless frequently cover the lower part of the face with a sleeve or corner of the headkerchief when encountering or speaking to a stranger. 9 Sometimes they merely take a corner of the headkerchief in the mouth. 10 It also happens that, upon encountering a stranger, the unveiled woman turns away and talks to him with her face averted. 11 In Egypt too, village women are always ready at a moment's notice to draw the edge of the headkerchief across the lower part of the face or at least to take a corner of it into the mouth, while in some places they cover the face with a long black veil, glossy or dull, when they go out. In the Qena district this veil is dark brown, while in the Sharqiyya province it is white. 12 No veiling of women is practiced among the Tuareg who regard the veil (litham) as the prerogative of the free men. 13 As we adduce more and more examples, it becomes increasingly clear that no hard and fast rules can be found as to the presence or absence of veiling in a certain region or group. The Rwala, one of the noblest tribes of the Syrian-Arabian Desert, practice no veiling, and girls are even free to let their tresses be seen. 14 Among several other tribes of the Arabian Northwest, such as the Beni Sakhr, Hwetat, Bern 'Atiyya, veiling is absent. 15 In some of the other tribes north of the 'Aqaba-Kuwait line the women cover the lower part of the face up to the nose with a thin black veil (mil/a), while several tribes south of this line, such as the Mutayr, Harb, Sba'a, Reshayda, Ben! Hajir, 'Awazim, 'Ajman, but not the Shammar and some of the Hijaz tribes) wear a longer or shorter black face mask (the so-called burqa) hanging down from the forehead and covering the entire face with the exception of

The Position of Women and Sex

Mores

119

the eyes visible through two eyeholes. The Solubba and other low-status groups share with the noble Rwala the absence of veils. 14 In some of the oases of Arabia, such as Teyma, the women go about unveiled. 17 In southern Arabia, while veiling is practiced in most of the towns, 18 occasionally with a burqa-hke black face cloth with a silver line stitched down the nose and two eye slits,1* among village women, the veil is rarer 20 and in some areas completely absent. 21 Among a few tribes such as the 'Abida in Hadhramaut, a mil/a-type half veil is worn. 22 In the Batina district of Oman in some of the villages the women are unveiled, in others they are veiled. In the interior of Oman veiling is more general. 13 The generalization of Thomas, 2 1 "All the women of the sands in Southern Arabia are veiled," is therefore questionable. All that one can venture to say is that up to the twentieth century veiling was the accepted practice in the middle and upper classes of urban society; that among the lower class townspeople it was largely absent; and that among the villagers and nomads it was (and is) only sporadically practiced. This being the case, the laws and other efforts to abolish veiling affect only a limited sector of Middle Eastern society; although it has to be recognized that as a symbol of the emancipation of women the discarding of the veil is of great moment for the area as a whole. The task the male and female reformers set themselves is still far from being accomplished as the 1960's lead us toward the end of the second third of the twentieth century. In the Arabian Peninsula veiling and seclusion still survive in practically unchanged form. In Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, with the leading families showing the example, these old traditions begin to give way. In these countries, "the real veil that covers completely the whole figure is still carried either by a particularly conservative class of people, or by the ignorant masses in the cities; among the educated middle and upper class it is either totally removed, or else symbolically represented by a scarf to protect the hair, or by a thin veil on the face or on the hair. Yet it should be admitted that the recent removal of the veil in certain circles has not brought about the free association of men and women. This is why marriage is still a family concern. It has to be arranged by parents and to follow certain conditions and for-

I20

Golden River to Golden Road

malities, a l t h o u g h a c e r t a i n a c q u a i n t a n c e c o u l d be m a d e b e t w e e n the t w o parties in strictly liberal circles. W o m e n are still t r e a t e d w i t h the utmost reserve, a n d the t r a d i t i o n a l respect o f w o m e n a n d their

chivalrous

treatment

have

not

been

affected

by

their

emancipation."25 I n E g y p t , the g r a d u a l a n d hesitant d i s c a r d i n g o f the veil, first b y the u p p e r class, then b y t h e m i d d l e class M u s l i m

women,

serves as a n e x a m p l e also for t h e C h r i s t i a n w o m e n o f the s a m e classes. T h e w o m e n o f the l o w e r class, w h o constitute the g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f the f e m a l e p o p u l a t i o n , show themselves m o r e r e t i c e n t in this respect. 2 0 I n I r a n , the veil w a s l a r g e l y d i s c a r d e d in 1936 b y the

Muslim

townswomen;27

but,

f o l l o w i n g the

abdication

of

R i z a S h a h in 1 9 4 1 , there w a s a c e r t a i n resurgence o f c o n s e r v a t i s m . O n l y in o n e c o u n t r y , T u r k e y , h a s the abolition o f v e i l i n g b e e n successfully c a r r i e d out, at least in the t o w n s ; 2 8 in the v i l l a g e s in w h i c h v e i l i n g used to be p r a c t i c e d , the f a m i l i a r f e m a l e m o v e m e n t o f p u l l i n g the e d g e o f the h e a d k e r c h i e f across the f a c e w a s o b s e r v e d b y this w r i t e r as r e c e n t l y as in the s u m m e r o f 1959.

SOCIAL

INTERCOURSE

Just as the seclusion a n d v e i l i n g o f t o w n s w o m e n goes b a c k to p r e - I s l a m i c times a n d even to a n c i e n t N e a r E a s t e r n origins, so also the u n v e i l e d status a n d g r e a t e r f r e e d o m o f m o v e m e n t

en-

j o y e d by v i l l a g e a n d n o m a d i c w o m e n are a n c i e n t traditions in the area. V e i l i n g inhibits w o m e n

in d o i n g their chores

and,

a c c o r d i n g l y , in societies w h e r e the w o m e n ' s o u t d o o r w o r k is a n e c o n o m i c necessity they g o a b o u t u n v e i l e d . T h i s is the case in most a g r i c u l t u r a l villages in the M i d d l e East w h e r e w o m e n help their h u s b a n d s or fathers in tilling the fields a n d in the p e r f o r m a n c e o f other a g r i c u l t u r a l w o r k , as w e l l as a m o n g the n o m a d i c tribes w h e r e the p u t t i n g u p a n d p u l l i n g d o w n o f the tents a n d

the

t e n d i n g o f the flocks is the w o m e n ' s task. T h e a b s e n c e o f the veil a n d o f seclusion m a k e s for a freer dem e a n o r o f the w o m e n in their o c c a s i o n a l e n c o u n t e r s w i t h n o n related m e n . I n ancient A r a b i a the w o m e n o f the desert tribes went

unveiled

and

associated

freely w i t h m e n .

Much

o f this

f r e e d o m of m a n n e r s has been preserved to this d a y a m o n g the

The Position of Women and Sex Mores

121

n o m a d i c tribes primarily, but also a m o n g some of the village folk. Especially a m o n g the goat a n d sheep-breeding tribes of the A r a b i a n Peninsula, where the flocks are entrusted to the care of women and young girls, the shepherdesses feel free to enter into friendly conversation with any wayfarer passing by, w h e t h e r friend or stranger. Such chance encounters are often the occasion of some good-natured banter between m a n and m a i d e n . 2 9 T h e same open and unrestrained friendliness is manifested by women of the oases 30 as well as of the villages of southern Arabia. 3 1 At home, in the tent, in the absence of her husband, the wife is supposed to show hospitality to guests, to invite them to the part of the tent reserved for men, and to supply them with the utensils and wherewithal for preparing coffee. If she is acquainted with the guests, she joins them after supper, drinks coffee with them, a n d amuses herself in their company till midnight. 3 2 Occasionally, some bantering takes place in the tent as well, even in the presence of the husband, between a male guest and the wife of the host; the host takes no offense at such playful courting of his wife. 3 3 This actually is the same custom that I b n Battuta found in the fourteenth century among the Berbers of North Africa and which he reported with considerable indignation. 3 1 A m o n g the Arabian nomads, girls have much premarital freedom in their relations with men. Although virginity is (with certain exceptions, about which later) as highly prized a m o n g them as a m o n g the villagers and townsfolk, Bedouin girls have m a n y opportunities for meeting their lovers outside the c a m p , either during the day while the girl grazes her flock, or at night. O n such occasions, although the traditional mores require of the girl to guard her virginity, flirting and petting take place, and incautious girls may even become pregnant. An unmarried pregnant girl must either try abortion, in which her female relatives help her, or persuade her lover to marry her at once, or run away from her tribe and seek refuge in the settled territory, or commit suicide. Should she be found out by her menfolk, they will be in honor bound to kill her. If she was raped, she may be spared, but her child will be killed. 3 5 While a m o n g the Arabian nomads secrecy and decorum must be maintained, in nineteenth ccntury Egypt it was "not un-

122

Golden River to Golden Road

common to see females of the lower orders flirting and jesting with men in public, and men laying their hands upon them very freely." 3 * Especially on the occasion of certain popular religious festivals, such as the 'Ashura, the tenth day of the month of Muharram, men and women used to mingle freely in the mosques, and it was said by the people of Cairo that "no man goes to the mosque of the Hasanein on the day of Ashoora but for the sake of the women; that is to be justled among them . . . ." 3 7 To the west of Egypt, among the nomads of the Libyan desert, seclusion exists only among the noble tribes. In the other groups, young men and girls mix freely, boys are allowed openly to court the girls, to visit them in their camps, and to sing to them of their love in verses of their own composition, as a preliminary to marriage. 88 Only in isolated places does one find a definite relaxation of the strict rules of sexual morality. As an outstanding example, one may cite the Siwa Oasis on the western fringes of Egypt where, according to observers, extramarital relations, prostitution, and sodomy are rampant. 8 9 Sharp distinction must be drawn between this kind of sexual liberty, which is regarded as immoral by the society itself in which it is practiced, and the traditionally regulated and accepted premarital freedom accorded to women in several places in the Middle East. Apart from a number of extreme cases in which exaggerated notions of hospitality resulted in the sexual accommodation of visiting strangers, 40 where premarital freedom is accorded to women the behavior pattern established shows a certain similarity to the modern Western habit of "dating and mating." Among the westerly neighbors of the Siwans, the Tuareg of the Sahara, ". . . Before marriage, which for oriental women occurs comparatively late in life, Tuareg girls enjoy a measure of freedom which would shock even the modern respectable folk of Southern Europe . . . it is common for a girl who is in love with a man to take a camel and ride all night to see him and then return to her own place, or for a suitor to make expeditions of superhuman endurance to see his lady . . . . Illicit love affairs inevitably occur: if they have unfortunate consequences the man is called upon to marry the woman, but infanticide is not

The Position of Women and Sex Mores

123

u n k n o w n . O n c e married, the w o m a n is expected to behave with d e c o r u m a n d modesty. Public opinion on these matters is strong. T h e married state, however, does not prevent a w o m a n admitting men friends to an intimacy similar to t h a t existing, perhaps, only a m o n g the Anglo-Saxon peoples." 4 1 It is easily recognizable that this T u a r e g custom differs only in degree b u t not in kind from that of the R w a l a and other noble A r a b tribes of the SyrianA r a b i a n desert referred to above. A m o n g the T u a r e g of A h a g g a r in the C e n t r a l S a h a r a , the premarital sex relations are given a more or less institutionalized form and are supposed to lead ultimately to marriage. Around the age of sixteen, both the young men and the girls of the tribes are a d m i t t e d to the ahals, periodic meetings, taking place late in the evening outside the c a m p , a n d usually accompanied by asri, that is a considerable relaxation of the mores (literally: r u n n i n g with loosened bridles). T h e ahal, which attracts young men from neighboring camps, starts with playing the amzad, a one-string instrument played with a round bow, a n d g r o u p singing, but soon the young m e n and girls start r u b b i n g noses, which is the particular T a r g u i form of kissing. L a t e at night, w h e n the ahal ends, everyone is supposed to return to his or her own c a m p , b u t in actuality private trysts follow, either d u r i n g the night or on later occasions. As a result of this institution, pre-Islamic in its origin, both girls a n d young m e n begin their sex life as soon as they reach maturity, and no value whatsoever is placed on virginity. Love affairs leading to marriages usually start at such ahal meetings. After marriage, however, the wife is supposed to remain faithful to her h u s b a n d , w h o is expected to show no jealousy if old aAa/-friends of his wife continue to court her in a Platonic fashion. T h e question w h e t h e r marital fidelity of wives is merely an ideal or is actually adhered to is answered differently by different observers. 4 2 At the extreme west of the M i d d l e East, the O u l e d T i d r a r i n , a nomadic Moorish tribe in the western central part of the Spanish S a h a r a , are reported " t o celebrate exceptionally good harvests with a curious sort of strip-tease dance, a thoroughly pagan performance which begins with the young m e n a n d women lining u p in two ranks facing one another. First a boy steps

124

Golden River to Golden Road

f o r w a r d , places a present of sugar a n d tea or trinkets o n t h e g r o u n d , a n d retires to his place. T h e n a girl steps out b e t w e e n the lines, lets h e r clothes fall to the g r o u n d , picks u p the present, a n d goes back naked to her place. A f t e r this has been going on for a while, to the a c c o m p a n i m e n t of m u c h w h o o p i n g a n d yelling, selfrestraint begins to c r u m b l e a n d eventually n a t u r e takes its course. S u c h doings m a k e one w o n d e r j u s t w h a t the d a y - t o - d a y prem a r i t a l relations between the sexes m a y be like, b u t so far n o o n e w h o knows the Moors well—and there a r e few w h o d o — h a s even m e n t i o n e d the subject." 4 2 * T o the southwest of the T u a r e g a r e a , in the city of T i m b u c t o o , virginity, a l t h o u g h valued in the eyes of M u s l i m law, is f o u n d u p o n m a r r i a g e only a m o n g A r a b girls, a n d is r a r e in the o t h e r ethnic g r o u p s . 4 3 Also in the northeastern parts of the M i d d l e East, tribal societies h a v e preserved m u c h of t h a t a n c i e n t f r e e d o m of w o m e n t h a t prevailed in pre-Islamic A r a b i a . A m o n g the K u r d i s h a n d L u r tribes of western I r a n , " y o u n g m e n a n d girls meet freely, they j o i n in the old folk dances, a n d the c o u r t i n g of the m a r r i a g e a b l e girls goes on in the old forms, in which quick wit a n d r e p a r t e e are c o m b i n e d with spontaneous or t r a d i t i o n a l poetical expression of feelings." 4 4 I n general, a m o n g both the villagers a n d the n o m a d s the w o m e n ' s activities are largely confined to the h o m e or the family circle. However, w o m e n help their h u s b a n d s in ccrtain types of work outside the h o m e as well, such as g a t h e r i n g b r u s h w o o d a n d d u n g , tending the flocks, fetching w a t e r , a m o n g the n o m a d s ; taking food to the menfolk working in the fields, h e l p i n g t h e m in field work, especially at harvest time, etc., a m o n g t h e villagers. T h e v fatten sheep a n d dry the m e a t ; pick lentils a n d spread t h e m to d r y ; p r e p a r e crushed wheat, a n d b a k e their " h a n d k e r c h i e f b r e a d " in the c o u r t y a r d oven fiicd with wood g a t h e r e d by t h e m . T h e y make j a m s and t o m a t o paste for use in stews d u r i n g the winter. Tlicy carry w a t e r from the f o u n t a i n , arc busy with the harvesting a n d winnowing, and in the winter m o n t h s spin with old-fashioned wooden spindles. T o these activities must be a d d e d the participation of women in the t r a d i t i o n a l forms of hospitality in tent and house. All this has resulted in a considerable a m o u n t

The Position of Women and Sex Alores

125

of traditionally sanctioned social contact between nonielated men and women among the nomads and the villagers, and in the participation of both sexes in joint activities such as annual and family feasts. Nevertheless, it is a fact that men and women form two distinct and separate societies, with the family circle as the only locus for meeting on a day-to-day basis. It has been noted by one observer, for example, that three quarters of an hour before the sunset the young men of the village patrol up and down in front of the fountain, but when the girls approach to draw water, retire so as not to stand around oggling the women. 4 5 This feeling of embarrassment in the presence of the opposite sex is characteristic of both men and women in many parts of the Middle East. Matters of sex, though discussed by men among themselves or by women among themselves, can never constitute a subject for public enjoyment or entertainment; sexual and physical modesty are the psychological concomitants of the strict moral code. Aside from the exceptions referred to above, the standard for the Middle East is to regard premarital and extramarital sex relations of women with the utmost severity. In most nomadic tribes such a woman, if discovered, is put to death by her father or brothers (but not by her husband). No information as to the actual administration of such extreme punishment in villages is available, but the severity of the attitude toward female sexual laxity persists in them as well. U r b a n society is in a state of transition in this respect as in m a n y other aspects of social intercourse. For lack of information all that can be said is a rough generalization to the effect that the higher the social class and the more advanced its Westernization, the less attention is paid by it to the traditional sexual code. This being the situation, the majority of men and women have no opportunity for premarital or extramarital sexual activity, because this would immediately bring them into collision with the traditional guardians of female chastity: the women's fathers and brothers. There is an opinion, or suspicion, that this situation is favorable to the development of homosexual practices as well as sodomy, b u t for lack of data no statement can be ventured on this subject. In the towns, and especially in the port cities, prostitution

I2Ó

Golden River to Golden Road

exists, in places in legalized form. During an Arab Women's Congress in Cairo in 1944, a stand was taken against this legalized prostitution, as well as against the white slave traffic. 44 As to sexual relations in marriage, tradition allows complete freedom to husband and wife, with the exception of the days during and immediately after the menses and a longer period after childbirth when relations are tabooed. To what extent these prohibitions are actually observed by the various ecologic and ethnoreligious groups in the Middle East is hard to say, because, again, no data are available. Where a man has two wives, he is traditionally expected to devote his attentions equally and alternatingly to each of them. The spread of education among the young men creates a demand for the education of girls as well. The number of girls receiving primary or secondary education is still much lower in every Middle Eastern country than that of boys. One of the results of this inequality is that a class of educated young men is growing up which does not find equally educated women among whom it could choose spouses. As can be expected, therefore, the demand of the feminists for equal educational opportunities for girls is seconded by the young educated males. Typical of the change taking place at present in the Middle Eastern urban society is the increasing freedom accorded to women. Up to recent times, women in town as well as in country were regarded as inferior to men. In the past, it was considered a disgrace for a girl to work outside her home, but in recent years girls have begun to seek employment in government offices, schools, medical clinics, hospitals, and even in business. Nevertheless, even the educated urbanites, although consciously aware of the equality of the educated woman, have not yet overcome the feeling that she is weaker than man and that she requires help, provision, and protection. Social life in the Western sense of mixed public parties, etc., is only beginning to emerge. The girl is always guarded by her family and chaperoned by her brothers, sisters, or friends. She must always be at home before dark and is never allowed to go home alone at night. A sign of the times is that nowadays an engaged couple is occasionally allowed to walk and talk together as long as they stay within the bounds of

The Position of Women and Sex Mores

I2J

morality, while not so long ago a flaneé was not supposed to see his betrothed until the wedding night. A certain amount of separation between the sexes exists also among the conservative Christians in the Middle East. While the Maronites in Lebanon " d o not segregate their women as do Muslims, and one may ask a man after his wife's health, a reserve is maintained in public or private, and one does not talk to a woman alone. Husband does not give his wife his arm when walking or talk familiarly with her in public. Men go with men, e.g. on Sunday to feasts, the women follow in a group. Even in church they sit separated by a wooden grill." 4 ' T E R M AND T R I A L M A R R I A G E

Special forms of connubium that were practiced in pre-Islamic days and survived in certain parts of the Middle East down to the present time are the term marriage, usually referred to as mut'ah, or "enjoyment," and the trial marriage. T h e first reports about term marriage in the Middle East are contained in Talmudic and R o m a n sources. T h e T a l m u d states unequivocally that among the Jews of Babylonia in the third century A.D. it was legal to marry a woman for a term as short as one day. After the expiration of the specified term the marriage was automatically terminated. In fact, even sages and rabbis w h e n visiting in another town used to practice this custom. O f R a b h (third century A.D.) it is reported that when he visited the town of Dardashir (variant: Darshish) he used to have it announced: " W h o wants to become my wife for one d a y ? " R a b h N a h m a n (early fourth century A.D.) is reported to have done the same on his periodic visits to Shekansibh. 4 8 Contemporary with the above is the report of the R o m a n historian, Ammianus Marcellinus (325-398 A . D . ) , who states (in Book X I V , C h a p . 4, of his history of the Roman empire) that the Saracens of A r a b i a Felix (that is, Southern Arabia) "spend their lives in constant wanderings. T h e y hire their women for money for a certain period according to agreement, and in order to make it a kind of marriage, the future wife offers the husband, under the name of a dowry (dos), a spear and a tent, so as to go a w a y from him after the fixed day . . . . "

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Golden River to Golden Road

T e r m m a r r i a g e seems to h a v e been w i d e l y practiced all over Arabia

in

constrained

pre-Islamic

days,

and

to sanction it. T h e

Mohammed

Koran

therefore

(4 : 28) states,

felt

"such

w o m e n as y e w a n t to e n j o y , g i v e t h e m their hire as a l a w f u l d u e ; for there is n o c r i m e in y o u a b o u t w h a t y e agree between y o u after such l a w f u l d u e . " Nevertheless, term marriages were reg a r d e d as a lesser c o m m i t m e n t than regular marriages and were, consequently, c o u n t e n a n c e d even w i t h partners w h o were unfit for the latter. T h e story is told of a H i m y a r i t e S a y y i d w h o met a w o m a n on the r o a d a n d she offered h i m m a r r i a g e then and there. H o w e v e r , w h e n she f o u n d o u t from h i m that he was a Y e m e n i o f the heretical R á f i d i sect, while she w a s of the rival T a m í m í tribe a n d of the K h á r i j i t e persuasion, she q u i c k l y w i t h d r e w her offer. But the S a y y i d , w h o evidently g o t in the m e a n t i m e keen on the i d e a , b e g g e d h e r : " B e o f good sense a n d let y o u r soul be generous t o w a r d m e a n d let neither of us r e m e m b e r o u r ancestry or r e l i g i o n . " S h e r e t o r t e d : " W h e n a m a r r i a g e is m a d e public, are not private concerns r e v e a l e d ? " T h e S a y y i d then put forward a new i d e a : " I h a v e a different suggestion to m a k e to you . . . n a m e l y mut'ah, of w h i c h no one need k n o w a n y t h i n g . " W h e n the w o m a n replied that term m a r r i a g e is the sister of harlotry, the S a y y i d r e m i n d e d her that it w a s allowed a c c o r d i n g to the K o r a n , a n d the w o m a n finally consented to this form of m a r r i a g e . 4 9 A s to the p a y m e n t a m a n had to render in order to enjoy term m a r r i a g e w i t h a w o m a n , a piece of clothing w a s sufficient. S a b r a , one of the c o m p a n i o n s of M o h a m m e d , reminisced a b o u t such an experience he h a d shortly after the conquest o f M e c c a b y the Prophet. " I w e n t w i t h one of m y friends to a w o m a n o f the Bani 'Amir,

a n d w e i n q u i r e d w h e t h e r she w o u l d be willing to

c o n t r a c t mut'ah. S h e thereupon asked w h a t w e i n t e n d e d to g i v e her, a n d w e offered her our mantles. T h e m a n t l e o f m y friend w a s finer

than m i n e , b u t I w a s more h a n d s o m e than he. W h e n the

w o m a n looked at m y friend's mantle, she w a s visibly inclined t o w a r d it; b u t w h e n she saw me, I evoked her a d m i r a t i o n . T h e r e u p o n she stated that she chose m e , a n d that m y mantle

was

sufficient p a y m e n t . I r e m a i n e d w i t h her for three days, and then the P r o p h e t c o m m a n d e d all those w h o h a d w o m e n in mut'ah to send them a w a y . . . . "

The Position of Women and Sex Mores A c c o r d i n g to the same source, M o h a m m e d ' s c o m p a n i o n s missed their wives d u r i n g a military c a m p a i g n to such an extent that they w a n t e d to castrate themselves. T h i s the P r o p h e t f o r b a d e them to d o , but he permitted them to contract term marriages. 5 0 T e r m m a r r i a g e w a s r e g a r d e d as a safeguard against i m m o r a l i t y , a n d solicitous fathers ordered their sons to contract mut'ah while on p i l g r i m a g e to M e c c a — a t least a c c o r d i n g to one a c c o u n t describing such an event in the first half of the eighth c e n t u r y . 5 1 S u n n ! Islam nevertheless soon o u t l a w e d term m a r r i a g e s . 5 2 A l l the

stringency

of Sunnite jurisprudence

remained,

however,

powerless to e r a d i c a t e another variety o f m a r r i a g e closely related to, a l t h o u g h not identical w i t h , mut'ah.

Many

M u s l i m jurists

a g r e e d that only if a time limit is an expressly stated condition in the m a r r i a g e contract is the marriage mut'ah, and thus f o r b i d d e n ; if a m a r r i a g e is merely c o n t r a c t e d w i t h the intention that it should last only a definite period, it is valid a n d permitted. T h i s type of m a r r i a g e , in w h i c h b o t h parties were fully a w a r e that it w a s a t e m p o r a r y affair, w a s also widespread in pre-Islamic A r a b i a a n d has r e m a i n e d legal to this d a y . T h e most f a m o u s of w o m e n p r a c t i c i n g such provisional or trial marriages in the days of M o h a m m e d w a s U m m K h a r i j a . She w a s reputed to h a v e had forty husbands f r o m t w e n t y different tribes. I f a suitor c a m e to her and said, " W i l l y o u m a r r y m e ? " she answered, " I t ' s a m a r r i a g e , " a n d the m a r r i a g e c o u l d be consumm a t e d w i t h o u t a n y further formality or d e l a y . I t w a s the custom of the w o m e n w h o practiced these trial marriages that if they w e r e satisfied w i t h their new husbands they p r e p a r e d for t h e m food the m o r n i n g after the w e d d i n g n i g h t ; if not, they g a v e t h e m no food, b u t sent t h e m a w a y . T h e m o t h e r of M o h a m m e d ' s g r a n d f a t h e r , it is said, w a s one of these o f t - m a r r y i n g w o m e n . 5 3 I n A r a b i a , i n c l u d i n g the holiest city o f Islam, M e c c a , these customs survived almost to the present time. In H a ' i l a n d its environs in the A r a b i a n Desert, t e m p o r a r y m a r r i a g e s little better than prostitution w e r e c o m m o n d o w n to the 1860's. F r o m other parts of the Peninsula their o c c u r r e n c e is reported as late as the beginning o f the twentieth century. In m a n y cases the t e m p o r a r y marriages w e r e a c o n c o m i t a n t of the p i l g r i m a g e to a holy city in w h i c h n o hotels w e r e a v a i l a b l e , b u t the p i l g r i m c o u l d find

Golden River to Golden Road accommodation in the house of a local woman provided he went through the formality of marrying her. T h e same situation obtained in connection with any other type of travel as well. As long as the man remained in the foreign city he thus had both a home and a wife. Before leaving, he pronounced the divorce formula, thereby ending all mutual obligations. 5 4 In Egypt, a prohibition of prostitution (and of public female dancing) in 1834, bastinado as the mandatory punishment for both culprits if caught, resulted in an increase in legal marriages of extremely short duration. T h e man would ask the woman, "Will you marry m e ? " and she would answer, " Y e s . " His next question would be, "For how m u c h ? " and she would name the sum. T h e man would give her the money and she would therewith become his lawfully wedded wife. Next morning he would pronounce the formula of divorce and go his w a y . 5 5 Trial marriages of a usually somewhat longer duration are practiced to this day among certain tribes in Southern Arabia. T h e Say'ars told Ingrams "that they gave their girls to anyone who wanted them. After about a couple of months' trial the man might marry the girl, otherwise she would be returned with thanks and without ill-feelings." 56 In contrast to Sunni Islam, the ShI'ites retained term marriage as a legal institution to this day. Most of the reports term these mut'ah marriages—a form of legalized prostitution. It is especially in the holy cities of ShI'ite Islam that the mut'ah flourishes. Reliable travelers have observed in the course of the last hundred years that in the shadow of the ShI'ite sanctuaries many women contract this type of short-term union several times a day. 5 7 However, the term marriage can serve also the opposite purpose: to make sure that a marriage does not end prematurely in divorce. T o ensure this, some people contract mut'ah marriage for ninetynine years. Since such a term marriage contract can be terminated prior to its specified expiration only with the consent of both contracting parties, it gives the wife a security she can never enjoy under a regular Muslim marriage. O n the other hand, in a term marriage the husband has the right to refuse marital union which in ordinary marriage would give the woman the right to divorce. Children born of mut'ah marriage have all the right of the offspring

The Position of Women and Sex Mores of ordinary marriages, but the term wife (called sigha), does not inherit from her husband, nor does he from her. 68 F E M A L E OCCUPATIONS

With regard to the occupations of women, the traditional situation all over the Middle East has been for them to be employed in the home and on the fields only. However, even the share of the women in agricultural work is but rarely reflected in statistical returns which, as a rule, do not count women as separate gainfully employed, or economically active, persons in case they merely help the male members of their families in the fields. It is for this reason that in the statistical returns of Egypt in 1937, only 896,950 women appeared as engaged in agriculture as against 5,198,032 men; or that among the Muslims in Palestine in 1 9 3 1 , only 8,451 women figured as engaged in "primary production" (mainly agriculture) as against 107,462 men. 59 A true picture of the situation emerges from the Turkish census only, which in 1935 listed 2,734,025 women as against 2,843,752 men, as engaged in agriculture, and 3,096,799 women as against 3,383,269 men as engaged in "primary production." 60 The average Middle Eastern rural housewife undoubtedly takes her place in agricultural work at the side of her husband. In addition to housework and fieldwork, the third traditional occupation of women in the Middle East is in the so-called "old industries," a term denoting the traditional and largely oldfashioned home industries, handicraft, rugmaking, and the like. In rural areas, the occasionally and sporadically practiced "old industries" are usually as much family undertakings as the tilling of the fields; they are taken up especially in the agricultural low seasons for the sake of augmenting the meager income of the family. In the towns, they are often carried out in small workshops in an employee capacity on a piece basis. The ratio of female to male labor employed in these "old industries" is exemplified by the results of an inquiry undertaken in 1937 in Syria and Lebanon which showed that 58,413 women were engaged in them as against 90,065 men (as well as 22,300 children). 61 As to the so-called "new industries," that is, the recently established modern industrial undertakings, women have been

Golden River to Golden Road much slower to take to them than men. T h e number of women employed in Syria and Lebanon in "new industries" in 1937 was 6,379 as against 24,007 men. T h e number of women employed in industry in Turkey (1935) was one fifth of the number of men, while in Egypt (1937) and among the Palestinian Muslims (1931) it was only one tenth. T h e participation of women in commerce is even slighter. In Turkey 5 per cent, in Egypt 3 per cent of the total number of workers employed in commerce were women. It is only in domestic service that women are represented in some countries, for example in Turkey, by higher figures than men. T h e meager participation of women in industrial work as well as in commerce as against their intensive participation in agricultural work means that the urban laborer, if he is a married man, has to earn enough to support his entire family, while the agricultural worker in the village is, as a rule, helped by his wife to make a living. T h e village-to-town migration and the exchange of agricultural work in favor of urban industrial labor therefore improves the economic conditions of a worker's family much less than would appear from the average income figures of family heads. Another factor to consider in this connection is the difference between the ratio of female and male earnings in village and in town. While in the village the earnings of the women (as expressed in produce) can be as high as those of men, depending on the number of hours spent by each in the field, in urban industrial labor the wages of the women are in most cases much lower than those of men. In Syria and Lebanon in 1937, men earned in the old industries 10.50 francs, while women in simiiar types of work earned only 4.93 francs, that is, less than half. In new industries, men earned 13.40 fr., women 5.05 fr. In Iraq (1933), men earned 50 to 300 fils, women 25 to 50. 62 Similar differences between the wages of men and women exist in other countries. T H E EMANCIPATION OF W O M E N

Within the last forty-odd years Middle Eastern women of the leisure and educated class have been working actively toward raising the status of woman by studying her condition and

The Position of Women and Sex Mores

133

agitating for reform. In Syria, "after World War I when the country became independent of Ottoman Turkey, women were still veiled but not inactive. However, the threats of traditionalists restricted them to rescue work and first-aid. Secondary schools for girls were opened by the Syrian government; some were sent to Europe for further study. The University of Damascus finally graduated two lady doctors from 'very good families' and two more as bachelors of l a w . " A periodical, Al Arousse (7he Bride), was launched and dedicated to women by a woman author. A school for the daughters of Syrian war victims was opened by a woman, and patriotic and national associations for women were organized, among them the "Society of the Tree of Literature," led by a lady of the family of Prince Abd-el-Kader; the "Society of the Drop of Milk," which provides infants with milk; the "Society of the Red Crescent" (emulating the Red Cross), which has branches operated by women, and others. 63 In Lebanon similar efforts were made by the Federation of Arab Women's Clubs (founded in 1921), an organization comprising 28 member societies with more than 2,000 members and representing the various creeds and institutions in that country. 64 In Turkey, the law of 1934 accorded political rights to women. In Iran, where the emancipation of women was proclaimed in 1938, the reform measures lost much of their vigor after the abdication of Riza Shah Pehlevi in 1 9 4 1 . In Egypt, feminist movements led by the Egyptian Feminist Association, have been organized for the purpose of obtaining general suffrage. In 1944, an Arab Women's Congress was held in Cairo. Delegations from several Arab countries participated and important resolutions concerning the status of women in the Arab world were passed. 85 Among the things for which modern Middle Eastern women have been fighting has been the right to enter the professions, for while some women have gained entrance into medicine, dentistry, nursing, law, and education, most of them are still governed by tradition and custom. However, "the new generation is overcoming the old prejudice which 20 years ago thrust the woman doctor down to the level of a midwife and nothing else. Journalism has been attempted by one or two women. The difficulty there is that a woman is somewhat restricted in going about in search of

'34

Golden River to Golden Road

copy. . . . Girls who wished to learn typing and shorthand and go into offices were warned by their parents and guardians that they would probably lose their character if they did anything 'so fast.' However, some more far-sighted people said that if they went to English or American offices they would be quite safe." 88 A discussion of several aspects of the traditional man-woman relationship is found in Chapter 16, "Women in a Man's World," of this volume.

VI. Cousin

Marriage

T

H E MIDDLE Eastern family has been characterized above as patrilineal, patrilocal, patriarchal, extended, occasionally polygynous, and emphatically endogamous. T h e first five of these six basic traits are found also in one or more of the culture areas contiguous to the Middle East. T h e sixth, endogamy, and especially its most conspicuous Middle Eastern form, which is marriage between a m a n and his father's brother's daughter (bint 'amm in Arabic), is practically nonexistent outside the Middle Eastern culture continent.

COUSIN M A R R I A G E OUTSIDE THE M I D D L E

EAST

Outside the Middle East the practice of marriage between children of two brothers is extremely rare. With the spread of Islam it was introduced into India where the Muslims have a definite preference for all types of cousin marriages, with marriage between the children of two brothers being the most common. T h e verbalized motivation is the one usual in the Middle East: cousin marriage keeps the family free from foreign blood a n d retains property within the family. 1 In Madagascar marriage between the children of two brothers also is very common, and is looked upon as the most suitable marriage since it keeps the property in the family. Since descent is matrilineal, however, a m a n marrying his father's brother's daughter is not considered marrying a blood relative. Children of two siblings of opposite sex are allowed to m a r r y after the performance of a rite whose purpose is to remove the impediment of consanguinity; but marriage between the children of two uterine '35

Golden River to Golden Road sisters is r e g a r d e d w i t h h o r r o r as incest. 2 A l t h o u g h there is a strong A r a b i c element in the l a n g u a g e o f M a d a g a s c a r , 3 w h i c h is a c l e a r e v i d e n c e o f the presence o f A r a b influences on the island, this m a r r i a g e preference p a t t e r n is v e r y d i f f e r e n t from the Eastern

one,

in

spite

o f the

frequency

of marriage

Middle between

c h i l d r e n o f t w o brothers. A c c o r d i n g to o n e a u t h o r i t y , a m o n g the B a n t u tribes o f S o u t h A f r i c a the natives o f the m o u n t a i n s " o f the i n t e r i o r " almost as a r u l e m a r r i e d the d a u g h t e r o f their father's b r o t h e r , in o r d e r to k e e p p r o p e r t y f r o m b e i n g lost to the f a m i l y . 4 For l a c k o f m o r e d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n it is not possible to state w h e t h e r this B a n t u m a r r i a g e p a t t e r n resembles the M i d d l e Eastern or the

Mada-

gascan type. I n o t h e r parts o f the w o r l d , cousin m a r r i a g e m e a n s cross-cousin m a r r i a g e ; m a r r i a g e b e t w e e n t h e c h i l d r e n o f t w o brothers is u s u a l l y p r o h i b i t e d , or, in rare instances, g r u d g i n g l y t o l e r a t e d . 5 H A L F - S I B L I N G A N D C O U S I N M A R R I A G E IN A N T I Q U I T Y

I n the M i d d l e East itself the p r a c t i c e o f cousin m a r r i a g e a n d e v e n o f half-sibling m a r r i a g e goes b a c k to a n t i q u i t y . I n ancient E g y p t , the P h a r a o h s m a r r i e d their sisters or halfsisters, a p r a c t i c e c o n t i n u e d b y the Ptolemies. 6 I n R o m a n E g y p t , marriage

between

full siblings a n d

half-siblings o c c u r r e d

fre-

q u e n t l y in the families o f agriculturists a n d artisans. 7 A c c o r d i n g to D i o d o r u s (i, 27), sibling m a r r i a g e w a s a d u t y for E g y p t i a n s . H o w e v e r , it has to be taken into consideration that in a n c i e n t E g y p t the w i f e w a s c a l l e d " s i s t e r , " a n d lovers c a l l e d e a c h o t h e r " b r o t h e r " a n d " s i s t e r , " e v e n w h e n t h e y w e r e not siblings. 8 W h e t h e r there w a s brother-sister m a r r i a g e in a n c i e n t I r a n 9 is o p e n to serious d o u b t s in v i e w o f o b j e c t i o n s raised b y b o t h Parsi s c h o l a r s 1 0 a n d W e s t e r n students. A c c o r d i n g to these authorities, what

the e a r l y I r a n i a n s p r a c t i c e d w a s m a r r i a g e b e t w e e n

cousins, w h i c h is c e r t a i n l y the m e a n i n g o f the m o d e r n

first

Persian

e q u i v a l e n t of the contested a n c i e n t term. In the P e h l e v i

texts,

w h i c h in their present f o r m d a t e f r o m the sixth to the

ninth

century,

marriages

between

parents

and

children

as w e l l

as

b e t w e e n siblings are d e f e n d e d a n d a d v o c a t e d , as t h e y are in t h e later period o f the Sassanian d y n a s t y a n d in s u b s e q u e n t centuries.

Cousin Marriage

137

However, from the fifteenth century on, in the Persian writings called " R i v a y a t , " references are found to marriage of first cousins only, with obscure allusions to marriage between closer blood relations as being long extinct. 1 1 T h e ancient Persians seem to have used the terms "sister," " m o t h e r , " and " d a u g h t e r " both in their proper sense and in a wider sense as did the ancient Egyptians, and great care is required to avoid confusion in interpreting t h e m . 1 2 Similarly, among the ancient Hebrews, and the ancient and modern Arabs, these and other kinship terms were and respectively are used in a wider sense as well. Among the Phoenicians, K i n g Tabnith married his father's daughter (by another mother), Am'ashtoreth, and at T y r e a man was allowed to marry his father's daughter down to the time of Achilles Tatius. T h e same thing occurred at Mecca; and a trace of this kind of marriage has survived to modern times at M i r b a t . 1 3 Paternal half-sibling marriage occurred, and cousin marriage was the prevalent practice among the Hebrews in the patriarchal period. 1 4 Abraham himself married his half-sister Sarah (from the same father but from another mother; cf. Gen. 20 : 12). Isaac married his father's brother's son's daughter (Gen. 22 : 2 3 ; 24 : 47, 48). Nahor married a daughter of his brother, Haran (Gen. 1 1 : 27, 29). Esau married his father's brother's two daughters, Mahalath and Basemath (Gen. 28 : 9; 36 : 3). J a c o b married his mother's brother's two daughters, Leah and Rachel (Gen. 29), who were also his father's father's brother's son's son's daughters. Close in-family marriage was practiced by the Hebrews in later times as well. Amram married Jochebed, his father's sister (Ex. 6 : 20; Num. 26 : 59). Amram's son Aaron married his father's father's father's brother's son's son's son's son's daughter Elisheba (I Chron. 2 : 1 0 ; Ex. 6 : 23). Hezron (a grandson of J u d a h ) married his father's father's brother's son's son's daughter (I Chron. 2 : 4, 2 1 ; Gen. 50 : 23). T h e sons of Kish married the daughters of his brother Eleazar (I Chron. 23 : 2 1 - 2 2 ) . In the days of K i n s David marriage between paternal half-siblings was still legal ( I I Sam. 13). Marriage between brother and sister was still practiced in Judah at the time of EzekicI (sixth century n r.), although the prophet strongly condemned it as an abomination (Ezrk '22 : 1 1 ) .

Golden River to Golden Road

138

T h e hero o f the Book o f T o b i t marries his father's brother's d a u g h t e r , a n d a c c o r d i n g to the angel w h o accompanies T o b i t , it w o u l d h a v e been a mortal sin for R e u e l (Tobit's uncle) to give his d a u g h t e r to a n y b o d y else b u t to T o b i t w h o had the right to inherit from his sonless uncle (cf. Book of T o b i t 6 ; i ff. and 7 : 2, 10-12). I n the A r a b w o r l d itself, while the right of a m a n to the hand of his bint 'amm goes back to pre-Islamic times, 1 5 m a r r i a g e between half-siblings has disappeared following the spread of Islam. T h e only M u s l i m population that has countenanced it until recently seems to be the M o h a m m a d a n South S l a v s . 1 6 EXTENT AND FREQUENCY

T h e custom of cousin marriage has been confirmed and perpetuated by M u s l i m tradition and has remained alive d o w n to the present d a y in all parts of the M i d d l e East. A c c o r d i n g to the H a n a f i t e school of legists, a m a n m a y give his d a u g h t e r in marriage to his brother's son w i t h o u t her consent, and a y o u n g m a n m a y decide for himself w h e t h e r he wants or does not w a n t to m a r r y his bint 'amm.17 T h e fact that marriage between children of t w o brothers is regarded as the ideal marriage and is preferred in practice to all other unions is reflected in e v e r y d a y

linguistic

usage. T h e c o m m o n term a m a n employs in addressing his wife in A r a b i c is bint'ammi, m e a n i n g " d a u g h t e r of my father's b r o t h e r " ; while the wife addresses her husband as ibn 'ammi, son of m y father's brother, w h e t h e r the two actually stand in this relationship to each other or not. T h e preference for cousin marriage is reflected in numerous proverbs and stories current a m o n g the Bedouins of A r a b i a a n d in the lands of the Fertile Crescent. 1 8 M a r r i a g e between

the

ibn 'amm and bint 'amm is well attested from all parts of the M i d d l e East, and in several places the t w o are the usual marriage partners. In T u r k e y also marriages are arranged inside a large f a m i l y c i r c l e . 1 9 In I r a q and all over the A r a b i a n Peninsula, with f e w exceptions, marriage b e t w e e n children of two brothers is cust o m a r y and preferred. 2 0 T h e same custom exists in Iran as well. Ella C . Sykes reports that " i f a girl is w e d d e d to a cousin, w h i c h is constantly done to

Cousin Marriage

139

keep the property of" a family together, she will never have exchanged a word with him since childhood, save in the family circle . . . . " 2 1 Although the author does not state whether the cousin in question is the girl's father's brother's son, this seems to be indicated by the reference to the contact between the two young people in childhood, which would be possible only in case they are the children of two brothers living in one household as members of the same extended, patrilineal, and patrilocal family. Also, the purpose of keeping the family property together is achieved only if the bride and groom are the children of two brothers, in which case the payment of the bride price is actually nothing more than a financial transaction between two brothers within the frame of one and the same extended family. In fact, a Persian proverb states clearly: " T h e marriage of the daughter of the father's brother with the son of the father's brother is tied (i.e. decided upon) in h e a v e n . " 2 2 This being the general view, "marriages between cousins are very much sought after, and the children of such marriages are if anything superior in physique to o t h e r s . " 2 3 T h e practice used to be followed from the lowest to the highest ranks of Persian society. In October 1867 the Crown Prince of Persia was married to his cousin, both being sixteen years of age. 2 4 A m o n g the nomadic tribes of the U p p e r Hclmand R i v e r in Afghanistan " w h e n a boy wants his first wife his mother selects a girl for him, usually one from the same b a n d . " 2 5 T h e reference here is probably to cousin marriage. In Egypt, marriage between ibn iamm and bint 'amm seems to be even more prevalent than in Arabia. L a n e observed in the 1830's that " I t is very common among the Arabs of Egypt and of other countries, but less so in Cairo than in other parts of E g y p t , for a man to marry his first cousin. In this case, the husband and wife continue to call each other " c o u s i n " ; because the tie of blood is indissoluble, but that of matrimony very precarious . . . . A union of this kind is generally lasting, on account of this tie of blood; and because mutual intercourse may have formed an attachment between the parties in tender age; though if they be of higher or middle classes, the young man is seldom allowed to see the face of his female cousin, or even to meet and converse

Golden River to Golden Road

140

w i t h her, after she has a r r i v e d at or near the age of puberty, until she has b e c o m e his w i f e . " 2 6 T o this d a y , in E g y p t , " m a r r i a g e s b e t w e e n c h i l d r e n o f 'amm a n d khal are most c o m m o n ; others are c o n c l u d e d w i t h i n the w i d e r circle of the f a m i l y . " 2 7 I n U p p e r E g y p t also the father's brother's d a u g h t e r is the favorite m a r r i a g e partner. 2 8 S i m i l a r l y , a m o n g the K a b a b l s h , a S u d a n A r a b tribe, the first choice is the father's brother's d a u g h t e r , second choice the m o t h e r ' s brother's d a u g h t e r , a n d third choice the mother's sister's d a u g h t e r . 2 * A m o n g the C o p t s of E g y p t m a r r i a g e b e t w e e n a m a n a n d his father's brother's d a u g h t e r is as c u s t o m a r y as a m o n g the M u s lims. 3 0 I n the Oasis o f S i w a also, close to the western border of E g y p t , the M i d d l e Eastern pattern of cousin-marriage is often f o l l o w e d . 3 1 O n l y in a v e r y few cases d o w e h a v e a n y k n o w l e d g e of the actual f r e q u e n c y o f bint 'amm marriages in a n y period or a n y locality. I n most reports in w h i c h m e n t i o n is m a d e of bint 'amm m a r r i a g e , it is stated that these are " c o m m o n " or " f r e q u e n t " or " u s u a l , " b u t n o precise d a t a as to the percentage of bint 'amm marriages in relation to all the m a r r i a g e s is given. T h e

more

v a l u a b l e are the rare studies that d o contain such figures, a l t h o u g h not in every case c a n one put e q u a l reliance on them. Remarkably

enough,

the

first

numerical

evaluation

f r e q u e n c y of in-family marriages refers not to cousin

of

the

marriage

b u t to brother-sister m a r r i a g e . A c c o r d i n g to E r m a n and R a n k e , u n d e r the E m p e r o r C o m m o d u s ( 1 6 1 - 1 9 2 A.D.) t w o thirds of all the citizens of the township o f Arsinoe in R o m a n E g y p t h a d a sister as w i f e . 3 1 C o u s i n m a r r i a g e in the late pre-Islamic period in the H i j a z was m u c h less f r e q u e n t than the a b o v e

figure.

In M e d i n a , in

the d a y s of M o h a m m e d , a n d w i t h i n one or t w o generations prec e d i n g h i m , m a r r i a g e w i t h bint 'amm w a s practiced but was not too frequent. O f 21 marriages reported b y M u h a m m a d ibn S a ' d (167/8-230 A.H.) as h a v i n g been c o n t r a c t c d b y men b e l o n g i n g to the clan of BanI ' A m i r ibn Z u r a y q , four were with daughters of their father's brothers. In the same period at M c c c a , out o f a total of 71 marriages contracted b y M o h a m m e d ' s own c l a n , 9 were bint 'amm marriages, 23 w e r e w i t h i n the clan, 21 were w i t h

Cousin Marriage

141

other clans of the Q u r a y s h tribe to w h i c h M o h a m m e d ' s

clan

belonged, and only 18 w e r e w i t h other tribes. In another clan of the Q u r a y s h , the M a k h z u m , out o f 25 marriages t w o w e r e w i t h the bint 'amm, one w a s within the clan, 16 were w i t h other clans of the Q u r a y s h , and six m e n (and no w o m e n ) married into other tribes. In late p r e - l s l a m i c H i j a z therefore of the 1 1 3 marriages recorded only 15 w e r e b e t w e e n the children of t w o brothers, or 13.3 per cent of the total. T h i s relatively low incidence seems to be contingent on the absence of one of the m a i n motivations of such marriages, n a m e l y the inheritance of p r o p e r t y b y daughters that was introduced b y M o h a m m e d . It has to be considered also that in the period in question, the term bint'amm w a s not confined to father's brother's d a u g h t e r , but was used loosely w i t h reference to second, third, etc., cousins, as long as the relationship could be traced to two brothers. 3 3 In m o d e r n E g y p t , a c c o r d i n g to F a t h e r A y r o u t h , a lifelong student o f the E g y p t i a n fellahin, 80 per cent of all the marriages contracted by the fellahin take place b e t w e e n first cousins. 3 1 A n o t h e r authority w h o in the 1870's lived for m a n y years in U p p e r E g y p t states that " i n t w o thirds of the cases it has been previously settled that the y o u n g m a n is to m a r r y his female cousin, a n d if he has none, more distant relations are applied to, a n d lastly strangers. 3 5 In one U p p e r

E g y p t i a n C o p t i c family studied b y

Legrain,

there w e r e five brothers w h o a m o n g t h e m h a d six married sons a n d seven married daughters. A l l the six m a r r i e d sons h a d a bint 'amm for wife, a n d only one of the seven m a r r i e d daughters h a d not an ibn 'amm b u t an outsider for h u s b a n d . 3 8 Barth, in his study of social o r g a n i z a t i o n of S o u t h e r n K u r d i s t a n , found that in tribal villages 57 per cent of all the marriages were cousin marriages (48 per cent bint lamm marriages) while in a nontribal village (made u p of recent i m m i g r a n t families) only 17 per cent were cousin marriages (13 per cent bint 'amm m a r riages). T h e f r e q u e n c y of family e n d o g a m y in the tribal villages w a s 71 per cent, in the nontribal village 37 per cent, w h i l e that of village e n d o g a m y was in the tribal villages 80 per cent, in the nontribal villages 78 per cent. 3 7 In t w o normal-sized tribal villages in the H a m a w a n d area Barth found that out of a total of 21

142

Golden River to Golden Road

marriages

nine

were

contracted

between

paternal

parallel

cousins. 3 8 In the South Palestinian A r a b village of Artas in the 1920's, of 264 marriages 35, or 13.3 per cent, were bint 'amm m a r r i a g e s ; 69, or 26.1 per cent, were marriages with bint'amm plus marriages with second cousin or first cousin once r e m o v e d ; 89, or 33.7 per cent, were all the marriages within the hamula ( c l a n ) ; and 151 or 57.2 per cent was the n u m b e r of all the in-village marriages. 3 9 The

Middle

Eastern cousin marriage pattern extends from

E g y p t and the S u d a n all across the northern one third of A f r i c a . I n the oasis-village of Sid! K h a l e d , some 170 miles south of the port of Algiers, the ideal marriage is between children of two brothers. Further to the south, a m o n g the Mzabites, the preferred form of marriage is between children of brothers, a m o n g both the Muslims a n d the Jews. T h e same preference obtains also a m o n g the C h a a m b a , an A r a b n o m a d tribe, and a m o n g the M o o r s of the extreme western S a h a r a . 3 9 a In the town of T i m b u c t o o , a field investigator f o u n d

that

a m o n g the A r a b s one third of the marriages are b e t w e e n cousins. " H a l f of these are with father's brother's daughters.

Slightly

fewer marriages are with mother's brother's daughters. T h e t w o other kinds of first cousins are taken to wife only rarely. . . . It is possible

that

the

frequent

marriage

with

mother's

brother's

daughter is the result of Songhoi i n f l u e n c e . " 4 0 Since the A r a b s in T i m b u c t o o are immigrants from N o r t h A f r i c a a n d their descendants, they must have brought along with them the M i d d l e Eastern preference for bint 'amm marriage. T h e S o n g h o i consist of two groups, both speaking Songhoi only. O n e is the G a b i b i , a group indigenous to the S u d a n , a m o n g w h o m a preference for marriage with mother's brother's d a u g h t e r and a definite dislike for marriage with father's brother's d a u g h t e r is found. T h e other Songhoi g r o u p is the A r m a , w h o are the descendants of sixteenthcentury

Moroccan

Arab

invaders

and

their Sudanese

wives.

A m o n g these there is a preference for marriage with both father's brother's daughter

and

mother's sister's daughter.

The

third

ethnic g r o u p inhabiting T i m b u c t o o is the Bela, w h o are T u a r e g slaves,

and

among

whom

marriage

between

cross cousins

is

Cousin Marriage

143

preferred in principle, while children of two brothers are considered " p r i m e enemies." However, in spite of the stated preference for cross-cousin marriage, marriages between the children of two brothers were found to be as numerous as marriages with mother's brother's daughter. Marriage with father's sister's d a u g h t e r did not occur and distaste for it was apparent. While M i n e r may be right in seeing Songhoi influence in the frequency of marriage with mother's brother's daughter a m o n g the Arabs of Timbuctoo, the d a t a from Egypt, Palestine, etc., seem r a t h e r to indicate that it may ultimately go back to a general Middle Eastern pattern in which the right of the ibn khal to marry a girl is second only to the right of the ibn 'amm. O n the other h a n d , there can be little doubt that the greater frequency of marriages between children of two brothers "in spite of the stated preference for cross-cousin m a r r i a g e " 4 1 must be the result of A r a b Middle Eastern influence. T H E BRIDE PRICE

T h e preference of Middle Eastern society for cousin marriage is expressed in financial arrangements as well. All over the area it is customary for the bridegroom to pay a dowry or bride price to his bride. In effect, the bride price is as a rule paid by the father of the bridegroom to the father of the bride, and the latter is supposed to spend all or most or part of it, depending on the economic status of the family, on the outfitting of his d a u g h t e r . 4 2 An additional provision is that the bride price agreed upon between the two fathers is not paid in full at the time or before the wedding. Part of it (in many cases one third) has to be paid only in case the husband divorces his wife, thus serving both as a deterrent against divorce (which can be effected any time a n d instantly by the husband) and as a trust fund for the divorced wife to draw upon. T h e amount of the bride price varies greatly in different parts of the Middle East, as well as in different economic strata within the same locality. It may also depend on a n u m b e r of additional factors, such as the beauty and age of the bride and, in exceptional cases, differences in status and prestige between the two intermarrying families. But, these other factors apart, the bride price

Golden River io Golden Road

144

is usually a b o u t twice as high if the bride is not a relative of the b r i d e g r o o m as in the case of marriage between cousins or other close relatives. A m o n g the better-off fellahin of E g y p t , for instance, in the 1950's, the bride price of a cousin or other close relative varied from £ E i o o to £ £ 1 5 0 , while in the case of nonrelatives it r a n g e d from £ E 2 0 0 to £ £ 3 0 0 . 4 3 A m o n g poor fellahin (the overw h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y ) the bride price paid for a cousin bride varied f r o m £ E i 5 to £ £ 5 0 . 4 4 T h e custom of g i v i n g a w a y the girl to her ibn 'amm for a reduced bride price is w i d e s p r e a d in the M i d d l e East. 4 5 A m o n g the R w a l a and other n o m a d i c tribes o f the Syrian Desert, the ibn 'amm m a y insist on p a y i n g a greatly reduced bride price for his cousin. 4 6 R e d u c e d bride price in the case of cousin marriage is the rule also a m o n g the fellahin of the Fertile Crescent. 4 7 A m o n g

the

K u r d s also " I t is an a g r e e d privilege for paternal cousins, to less extent also other near kin, to receive the girl at a reduced bride price. T h e n o r m a l bride price for village girls ranges between £30 and £100.

P a t e r n a l cousins generally pay only

wedding

expenses." 4 8 T h e considerable s a v i n g m^de possible by cousin m a r r i a g e is a p o w e r f u l factor in the eyes of the groom's family in favor of such marriages. M i d d l e Eastern families in o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j ority are v e r y poor, and cash expenditure is extremely difficult. A l t h o u g h the family of w h i c h the father is the head acquires, in return for the p a y m e n t of the bride price, a new pair of w o r k i n g h a n d s as w e l l as a hopeful source of future sons, still the outlay requires an e x c e p t i o n a l effort. T h i s is the case not only in the settled sector of the p o p u l a t i o n a m o n g w h o m the bride price is usually paid in cash, b u t also a m o n g the nomads w h o p a y the bride price in v a l u a b l e s and especially in camels. A n d since u n d e r traditional circumstances the choice of the bride lies in the hands o f the g r o o m ' s father w h o is also expected to pay the bride price, it is easy to understand that the economic consideration of being able to save h a l f of the bride price weighs heavily w i t h him w h e n m a k i n g his choice. T h u s it is in the economic interest of the father and of the bridegroom's family in general to choose his cousin for h i m as his bride. As to the bride's f a m i l y , they are expected to spend all or part

Cousin Marriage of the bride price on the outfitting of the bride, or to give her the entire bride price or a considerable p a r t of it. 4 9 Therefore, the purely economic interest of the bride's father in a higher bride price is not as primary as is the economic interest of the bridegroom's father in a lower bride price. Consequently, there is not as strong a financial motivation in the case of the bride's father against cousin marriage as there is in the case of the bridegroom's father for it. In the following sections we shall deal in greater detail with what is probably the most significant aspect of M i d d l e Eastern cousin marriage: the compulsory nature of bint 'amm marriage as manifested in the unwritten law that a m a n has the right to marry his bint 'amm and that nobody else is allowed to m a r r y a girl until and unless her ibn 'amm (that is her father's brother's son) gives his consent. CENTRAL ARABIA

Let us begin our survey with the historical core of Middle Eastern culture, the Arabian Peninsula. In all parts of the Peninsula (with a very few exceptions, of which later) a m a n ' s right to his father's brother's daughter is upheld. This right is not voided even by a great discrepancy in age. T h e force of this traditional right is so strong that when it is infringed and then avenged by the offended male cousin by bloodshed, this meets public a p p r o bation. 5 0 In the reports on the cousin's right, no difference in emphasis can be discovered between the accounts of travelers a n d explorers of the nineteenth century and of the twentieth century, which seems to indicate that no relaxation of this traditional law has taken place in the last one hundred or one h u n d r e d and fifty years. O n e of the early ninetecnth-century accounts is t h a t of J . L. Burckhardt. According to him, "All A r a b i a n Bedouins acknowledge the first cousin's prior right to a girl; whose father cannot refuse to bestow her upon him in marriage. . . . A m a n has an exclusive right to the h a n d of his cousin; he is not obliged to marry her, but she cannot, without his consent, become the wife of another person. If a man permits his cousin to m a r r y her lover,

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Golden River to Golden Road

or if a husband divorces a r u n a w a y wife, he usually says, 'She was my slipper, I have cast her off.' " 5 1 Similarly Burton reports t h a t "Every Badawi has a right to m a r r y his father's brother's d a u g h t e r before she is given to a stranger; hence 'cousin' (Bint Amm) in polite phrase signifies a 'wife'. " 5 2 Doughty, on his way down to Medina, was told that marriage "betwixt brothers' children" was the most lawful. O n one occasion he was asked by a petty shaykh whose wife, Hirfa, h a d r u n away, to persuade her to return to him. U p o n undertaking this mission, Doughty was received by Hirfa's kinfolk, and her young cousin said to h i m : " I am her father (meaning, 'I have thepatriapotestas over her') and Hirfa is mine, Khalil; no! we will not give her more to Z e y d . " 5 3 Wilfrid Blunt had a similar experience when he went to ask for the hand of a girl on behalf of a friend of his in the Nejd. While the negotiations over the bride price were in progress, a cousin " a p p e a r e d on the scene and claimed his right to M u t t r a or an equivalent for her in coin." 5 4 William Robertson Smith, speaking of the township of Taif in Hijaz to the east of Mecca, states that " I t must be understood that the preference for marriage between cousins, which exists also in Egypt, has here the character of a binding custom. A father cannot refuse his daughter to his brother's son, although another suitor offers a m u c h higher dowry, unless the cousin is of weak intellect or notoriously of bad character. T h e cousin, if rejected for a rich suitor, can step in even at the last m o m e n t and stop the w e d d i n g . " 5 5 SOUTHERN ARABIA

T h e same rule holds good generally in Southern A r a b i a . 5 6 However, in the Q a r a Mountains (in the hinterland of the Z u f a r coast in Southern Arabia), the right of the ibn 'amm to m a r r y his father's brother's daughter is insisted upon only a m o n g the M a h r a , a seminomadic cattle-breeding tribe. A m o n g the other tribes of these mountains the sole right of disposal vests in the father of the girl. 57 T h e probable explanation of this exception is that these relatively isolated mountain tribes have not been sufficiently exposed to Muslim-Middle Eastern cultural influences and therefore have retained different (and probably older) customs.

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Also among the Jews of Yemen cousin marriages are frequently practiced and occasionally insisted upon by the ibn 'amm. Several cases are known in which the consent of the ibn 'amm to the marriage of his bint'amm with another man had to be bought. 5 8 In the village of al-Gades in Lower Yemen, studied and described by Goitcin, "the predilection for marriages among cousins had the actual effect of endogamy; the general tendency was to marry close relatives. . . . It has been noted as early as the eighteenth century that San'a Jews regarded it a special blessing if a man had a great-grandchild from his own grandson and granddaughter." 5 9 NORTHERN A R A B I A

The nomadic tribes of Northern Arabia represent in this respect (as in many others) true Arabian traditions. The foremost tribe occupying a large wandering territory in the western section of this area is that of the R w a l a . Among them, the ibn 'amm has the right to marry his bint 'amm. His position in relation to her is so strong that if any other man wants to marry the girl, he has to come to the ibn 'amm, ask his permission, and pay him what he wants. Curiously, Musil makes the statement that the "eben el-'amm is generally a son of her (the girl's) father's cousin," whereas all that is known of this custom makes us expect the ibn 'amm to be among the R w a l a as well the girl's father's brother's son. It would seem that the otherwise meticulous and accuratc Musil made a mistake here. This becomes more likely if we read what Musil says in the same context, namely that if the girl has no ibn 'amm, she falls to the next nearest kinsman in the male line. This makes it the more probable that the ibn 'amm must be the nearest male relative with whom marriage is possible, that is the father's brother's son. If the ibn 'amm does not give his consent to the marriage of his bint 'amm to another man, the girl may be doomed to become an old maid. If the girl refuses to marry her ibn 'amm he may kill her without becoming liable to compensation. Only if the father of the girl gives her in exchange for a woman whom he himself wants to marry does this exchange marriage void the rights of the ibn 'amm.60 Among other tribes also in the same area, if a man marries his daughter to another man

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Golden River to Golden Road

without the consent of her ibn 'amm he risks his life, and there are many instances of blood revenge provoked by such acts. 61 If the girl is in love with another man and the cousin gives her up, that is, foregoes exercising his right to marry her, this is regarded as a noble deed, worthy of praise and of being commemorated in song and story. 62

F E D ' Á N C A S E HISTORIES

The right of the ibn 'amm to the hand of his bint'amm is so strong that even a most powerful shaykh cannot prevail against it. Several case histories reported from the Bedouins of the Syrian Desert bear this out. "Aisheh was passionately loved by two men, the brilliant chief shaykh Jed'án [of the Fed'án] and her cousin Shanteri for whom she had only contempt and aversion. This state of affairs continued for several years, and if Aisheh did not become the wife of J e d ' á n this was not because of lack of consent on the part of her parents, but because Shanteri obstinately refused to give his consent, which was indispensable. A very rigorous law of the desert confers on the first cousin of a girl a right of preference to her hand, an exclusive right which he is free to use or not to use. His female cousin is not forced to marry him, but she cannot marry anybody else until he consents to renounce his right. . . . "Shanteri was a fine young man but he was lazy and idle. He never wanted to participate in an act of war, not even in a raid (ghazzu). He was effeminate, afraid of danger and exertion. H e loved to adorn himself with fine clothes and to strut in the shade in idleness, without any sense of shame; and all these are faults which make a man despised by our women. . . . His rival, on the contrary, had all the qualities which are esteemed in our nomadic society. The aversion Aisheh felt for the one and her passion for the other thus can be explained easily: these sentiments earned for her the honor and sympathy of all, but there was the law which had to be respected and obeyed in spite of all other considerations. "Jed'án made many efforts to make Shanteri give up his right. Persuasion, flatterings, menaces, rich presents, seductive promises, nothing succeeded. Shanteri knew well that he was despised

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149

and detested. But spite, jealousy, and hatred kept his passion alive and gained the upper hand over his greed, love of gain, luxury and idleness. . . . " [ J e d ' a n could do nothing to force the issue, because there is in the desert] a sanction which is based on public opinion and on the solidarity of honor and interest among all without exception, and which is the foundation of nomadic life and its safeguard, and without which a terrible anarchy would reign in the desert. A man who does not respect the laws and customs and does not fulfil the duties imposed by them commits a dishonorable and contemptible act, the scandal and the consequences of which would spread from the individual to his family which accepts only rarely the solidarity [with a dishonest act], and from the family to the tribe which does never accept it. Hence there is a double pressure on the individual, a pressure to which he most often submits, or else he is forced to go to live with another tribe. . . . J e d ' a n and Aisheh did not want to be in such a situation at any price. Also, an elopement does not lead to marriage. T h e consent of the cousin in this case is even more necessary for the validity of the marriage than that of the parents. Shanteri would have refused it without pity; he would have found his vengeance and Aisheh would have become merely the concubine of J e d ' a n , a dishonor to which every noble 'Aneze girl prefers death. A n d for her family this would have been an opprobrium which it could not have left unpunished, even if this had resulted in bloody conflicts. " T o o proud and too superior ever to give herself to her odious and miserable cousin, the beautiful Aisheh, innocent and hopeless victim of an inflexible law, will probably remain an old m a i d . " 6 3 This story was recorded in 1866. T w e l v e years later J e d ' a n again underwent a very similar experience. In the meantime he not only strengthened his chieftainship over the Fed'an, but became the military leader ('aqid) of the S b a ' a , another 'Aneze tribe, as well. He was now a powerful leader of two of the greatest 'Aneze tribes. In 1878, when he was fifty-five years old, he contracted a marriage (his fifteenth) with a thirty-year-old girl from the Sirhan, a small 'Aneze tribe to which also his mother belonged. Thirty years is, of course, quite an old age for a Bedouin girl. T h e reason for this particular pretty girl having remained unmarried

Golden River to Golden Road until so late an age was that her cousin had claimed her for himself in marriage and then had kept her waiting year after year without either marrying her or setting her free. But since J e d ' a n was a powerful shayh, the girl's father was persuaded to disregard the cousin's right, and his daughter's wedding with J e d ' a n was duly cerebrated. However, from the very outset there was some doubt as to whether the marriage was legal, since it was contracted without obtaining the cousin's consent. Soon after the wedding, the girl's cousin, a twenty-three-yearold man, brought action against J e d ' a n for the recovery of his cousin, on the pica that he had not consented to her marriage. This case was of considerable interest, because the two adversaries were a powerful shaykh and a young man of no consequence, who was regarded by everybody as a hotheaded youth and who, in addition, was generally known to have behaved ill to the girl having put her off from year to year until the girl's father grew tired of waiting. Moreover, since he was twenty-three and the girl thirty, it was assumed that his only interest in the matter was a financial one. J e d ' a n , on the other hand, seems to have had no knowledge of the existence of this cousin until after the marriage, and even then he thought that it would be merely a case of damages. But the cousin demanded the girl herself, or four other daughters in her stead: a claim which according to the local custom could be considered legitimate. T h e father of the girl offered him his only remaining daughter in place of the one married to J e d ' a n , but the cousin did not want to hear of this, and, in order to show his anger and insistence, he ran one of the old man's camels through with his spear. Thus the matter had to be referred for arbitration to M u h a m med Dukhi ibn Smeyr, shaykh of the Weld 'All (another 'Aneze tribe, friendly to the S b a ' a ) , a man of about fifty, of considerable importance and influence. T h e deliberations started with a preliminary argument as to whether the case should be tried according to the Bedouin 'urf (i.e., local traditional) law, or by the Muslim sharVa law. According to the 'urf, either the marriage of the girl with J e d ' a n would have to be annulled or the entire dowry received by the girl's father from J e d ' a n (the actual amount was 2,000 piasters) would have to be given to the cousin.

Cousin

Marriage

T h e cousin, of course, a r g u e d t h a t the Bedouin law must a p p l y . T h e a r g u m e n t for the o t h e r side was t h a t the M u s l i m shari'a law s h o u l d a p p l y ; this w o u l d h a v e held the offer of a n o t h e r d a u g h t e r as a sufficient c o m p e n s a t i o n for t h e cousin, on the principle t h a t " a n i n j u r e d m a n , if replaced in the position held before i n j u r y , ceases to be i n j u r e d . " T h i s idea, t h a t the shari'a law be a p p l i e d , s t e m m e d f r o m a jurist f r o m A l e p p o w h o h a p p e n e d to be a guest o f J e d ' a n a n d his tribe. T h e a t t e m p t was d o o m e d to failure, as e v e r y b o d y knew t h a t the Bedouin 'urf law must prevail. W h i l e these preliminaries were in progress, Beteyen ibn M e r shid, s h a y k h of the G o m u s s a section of the S b a ' a , a r r i v e d in the c a m p in o r d e r to be present at the decision of this i m p o r t a n t suit. H o w e v e r , M u h a m m e d D u k h i shirked the responsibility of deciding such a weighty lawsuit himself, a n d the case was referred to t h r e e a r b i t r a t o r s chosen by the two parties. O n e of the t h r e e was objected to by o n e side. T h e second was o b j e c t e d to by t h e o t h e r side. T h e t h i r d , r e m a i n i n g alone a n d a f r a i d of the responsibility, declared t h a t he would be u n a b l e to b r i n g a decision w i t h o u t reference to the s h a y k h of the S i r h a n , the tribe to w h i c h the girl a n d her cousin belonged. It was agreed to a d j o u r n the case until the arrival of the S i r h a n w h o were e n c a m p e d at a distance of several h u n d r e d s of miles in t h e j a u f , in the L o w e r H a m a d in the desert, f r o m w h e r e they c a m e u p n o r t h only rarely. W h e n the S i r h a n finally arrived, the cousin of the girl b r o u g h t his c o m p l a i n t to the s h a y k h of the S i r h a n . His decision was t h a t since the girl h a d t a k e n n o steps p r i o r to h e r m a r r i a g e to J e d ' a n to oblige her cousin to keep his promise a n d m a r r y her, the cousin's rights r e m a i n e d valid. W h e n this decision was a n n o u n c e d to J e d ' a n , he at o n c e p u t his new wife o n a c a m e l a n d sent h e r to the s h a y k h of the S i r h a n . T h e r e u p o n a g r e a t w e d d i n g was solemnized b e t w e e n the girl a n d her cousin, J e d ' a n b e i n g a m o n g the guests a t t e n d i n g , " a n d n o ill-will o n either side m a r r e d the cordial e n j o y m e n t of festivities for three whole d a y s . " 6 4

R W A L A CASE HISTORIES

Even if a m a n is not in a position to m a r r y his bint 'amm forthwith, for lack of f u n d s to p a y the b r i d e price or for a n y o t h e r reason,

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he m a y "reserve" the girl for himself by making a public and formal declaration of his intentions to marry her at a future date. Although ordinarily such a reservation of the bint 'amm would not seem to be necessary, if it is done it clinches the cousin's claim, so to speak, a n d has the character of a formal engagement. T a l a l and S a t t a m were brothers, members of the princely family of the Rwala, the Sha'lan. Talal's son, 'Abdallah, reserved a daughter of Sattam for himself, and "would not permit her to m a r r y anyone else, asserting that as her nearest relative he had the first right to h e r . " 6 5 It can also h a p p e n that a m a n who is not the ibn 'amm of a girl, b u t a more remote relative, reserves her for himself soon after her birth, and in this case he acquires priority. Sa'ud, son of N u r i b. Sha'lan, emir of the Rwala, loved the sister of his mother, a n d she loved him, but he could not marry her because a more distant relative of her, 'Abdallah eben Talal (Nuri's brother's son) had reserved her for himself a few days after her birth. Ever since then the girl belonged to him, and no one could marry her without his consent. T o make the matter more involved, the brothers of the girls (her father seems to have died, a n d therefore her brothers h a d the patria potestas over her) did not permit her to marry 'Abdallah, but declared their readiness to give her to S a ' u d eben Nuri. T h u s the girl was able to m a r r y neither the m a n whom she loved nor the man who had the sole right to m a r r y her. Prince Nuri b. Sha'lan, when he told the story to Musil, r e m a r k e d : " W e could compel him ['Abdallah] to release her, but we do not wish to alienate him. . . . " 6 6 A third case reported from the same princely family throws additional light on the rights and involvements of cousin marriage. Prince Nuri had a brother, F a h a d , with whose approval a certain T r a d al-'Arafa who posed as Fahad's son but who in reality was the son of Khalaf eben Iden, forced one of Nuri's daughters into his tent intending to marry her. T h e girl, however, was able to j e r k herself loose from him, and she fled into the desert where she was found by her brother Nawwaf. Nawwaf was greatly incensed at the injury done to his sister and persuaded Nuri not to tolerate such a disgrace. Nuri, although he was the p a r a m o u n t shaykh of the R w a l a , felt it necessary to be assisted by three chiefs,

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a n d t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e m w e n t to F a h a d to talk the m a t t e r o v e r peaceably.

After

a

long

conference

it w a s

agreed

that

Trad

s h o u l d n o t h a v e N i i r i ' s d a u g h t e r for a w i f e . 6 7

JORDAN

T h e e x a m p l e q u o t e d a b o v e (p. 150) s h o w s t h a t the ibn 'amm c a n l o d g e his c o m p l a i n t a n d o b t a i n redress e v e n a f t e r the c o n s u m m a t i o n o f the m a r r i a g e o f his bint 'amm w i t h a n

outsider.

A m o n g t h e tribes i n h a b i t i n g the a r e a east o f the J o r d a n a n d the D e a d S e a ( w h i c h in the past w a s v a r i o u s l y c a l l e d A r a b i a P e t r a e a or M o a b a n d most o f w h i c h t o d a y f o r m s p a r t o f the K i n g d o m o f Jordan)

t h e ibn 'amm e n j o y s s i m i l a r rights. " I n A r a b i a

Petraea

the ibn 'amm c a n interfere at the last m o m e n t w i t h the m a r r i a g e o f his bint 'amm to a n o t h e r m a n . I n o r d e r to c i r c u m v e n t the c l a i m o f the ibn 'amm, a m a n will c a r r y o f f a girl a n d p l a c e h e r u n d e r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f a n o t h e r t r i b e , a n d t h e n r e t u r n to h e r f a t h e r a n d e n t e r i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s for the m a r r i a g e . " 6 8 A c c o r d i n g to a n o t h e r o b s e r v e r , a m a n n o t o n l y h a s t h e r i g h t to, b u t must c l a i m for himself, to t h e e x c l u s i o n o f e v e r y suitor, t h e h a n d o f the d a u g h t e r o f his p a t e r n a l o r

other

maternal

u n c l e . I t h a p p e n s b u t r a r e l y t h a t a m a n r e n o u n c e s this r i g h t o f his o w n free will. E v e n i f the girl a n d h e r f a t h e r d o n o t w a n t h i m , h e as a r u l e insists, a n d t h e y h a v e to c o n f o r m w i t h t h e c u s t o m . I f a m a n has a n y reason to s u s p e c t t h a t his u n c l e w a n t s to g i v e his d a u g h t e r to s o m e b o d y else, h e resorts to the f o l l o w i n g r i t e : H e takes five c a m e l s a n d leads t h e m to the tent o f the

tribal

s h a y k h . T h e r e , in the p r e s e n c e o f witnesses, he s a y s : " H e r e a r e c a m e l s for m y c o u s i n ; I c l a i m h e r . " T h e f a t h e r o f the girl a n s w e r s : " T a k e t h e m a w a y ; w e d o n o t w a n t it [ n a m e l y the m a r r i a g e ] . " T h e suitor goes, b u t r e t u r n s five d a y s l a t e r w i t h f o u r c a m e l s , a n d s a y s : " H e r e are m y f o u r c a m e l s for the g i r l ; I w a n t h e r . " A g a i n the f a t h e r a n s w e r s , " T a k e b a c k y o u r c a m e l s , w e d o n o t w a n t i t . " A f t e r a n o t h e r five d a y s the suitor presents h i m s e l f a t t h e tent o f the s h a y k h or o f the f a t h e r w i t h t h r e e c a m e l s , o n l y to r e c e i v e t h e s a m e a n s w e r . T h e s a m e e n c o u n t e r is r e p e a t e d t w o m o r e times, a n d t h e n finally the y o u t h b r i n g s a s h e e p or a g o a t to t h e s h a y k h ' s

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tent or to the father's tent, slaughters the animal and says: "This is the sacrifice of the girl." This act gives him the definitive right to take his cousin to wife, and he may even carry her away with him then and there. In particular, this right to the cousin's hand exists and is exorcised among the following tribes: the Beni Sakhr, the Hwetat, the H a j a y a , the Catholic bedouins in the vicinity of M a d a b a (with the dispensation of the Church), and the Fuqara. Differences in age, or the wishes of the girl are thereby completely disregarded. 69 T h e actual working of the law can be illustrated by a number of examples taken from this area. A father arranged for the marriage of his daughter with an outsider, without obtaining the consent of her ibn 'amm. W h e n the marriage procession progressed with the bride toward the house of the bridegroom, the ibn 'amm rushed forward, snatched away the girl, and forced her into his own house. This was regarded by all as a lawful marriage, and the father who originally objected to his nephew because the outsider agreed to pay a high bride price for his daughter now received no bride price at all. 70 In some cases one and the same bride price acquires a girl not only for the ibn 'amm who actually marries her in the first place, but, should he divorce her, for his brothers as well. Jaussen reports such a case in which a man paid a she-ass as the mahr for his bint 'amm, married her, then divorced her, whereupon his brother took her in marriage by virtue of the same she-ass, then he divorced her too, and she was married in succession to the third and fourth brothers, and finally remarried the first brother, all for the one bride price of a single she-ass. 71 In general, at the beginning of the twentieth century the situation with respect to the rights of the ibn 'amm among the tribes of the North Arabian and Syrian deserts was as follows: If a young man desired the hand of a girl who had cousins, one of the cousins who wanted to have the girl would caution the stranger to withdraw. If the latter persisted even after this admonition, it was his task to win, or rather to buy, the consent of the cousin who was the legal suitor of the girl. Otherwise, the stranger would have exposed himself to the enmity of the cousins and to mortal danger. 7 2

Cousin Marriage

155 A CHRISTIAN CASE HISTORY

Jaussen reports a case of which he heard among the Catholic bedouins of Madaba in Transjordan. One of them, Soleyman Shuweyhat, had a daughter, Hadra. In accordance with the cousin's right, his brother's son, Khalaf Shuweyhat, should have married the girl. But at the time when young Khalaf reached the age of marriage, Hadra fell ill: a pimple developed on her cheek, and she appeared to be attacked by a serious illness. Khalaf thereupon took another wife without either making any demand on the father of Hadra or informing him that he renounced his rights to her. Hadra remained in her father's house until the age of twenty-two. She recovered completely, and was demanded in marriage by another member of the tribe. Khalaf, hearing of this event, made immediate use of his cousin's right and claimed the girl for his younger brother. This was the Arab right. But Soleyman summarily rejected this demand saying that Khalaf had dishonored his daughter by refusing to marry her. His daughter was now promised to another man and would not be given to Khalaf's brother. Khalaf then made an appeal of protection to Shaykh Ya'qub, asking him to help him to make the cousin's right prevail. The shaykh could not refuse such a request. But being a relative of Soleyman Shuweyhat he used circumspection, lest Soleyman turn to another more powerful chief and he find himself involved in a serious conflict. After a series of discussions, Hadra was married to her suitor toward whom she inclined, and who was twenty-two years old, while Khalaf's brother was merely fifteen. 73 PALESTINE

Among the Arabs of Palestine "a cousin is by custom the most eligible bride, and a youth has prior claim over all other suitors and their pretensions, if he chooses to demand her in marriage." 7 4 This right is alluded to in a number of proverbs. " I b n al-'amm bitayyih 'an el-faras"—"the ibn 'amm may take down from the mare" (in another version: from the camel), that is he can take the bride down from the animal that carries her in the marriage procession to the house of the bridegroom, thus preventing her

Golden River to Golden Road from marrying an outsider, and marry her himself. 75 Another proverb current among the Bedouins of Southern Palestine as well as among the R w a l a has it: " H e r (i.e. the girl's) binding and her release are in the hands of her ibn 'amm." Still another proverb warns: " T h e girl who is desired by her ibn 'amm is forbidden to a stranger." In the same sense it is also said: " T h e oil which is wanted by its owner is forbidden to be given to the mosque." 7 6 I f a girl has no ibn 'amm, or if the ibn 'amm renounces his right to her, the second in line for her hand is the ibn khal, her mother's brother's son, who, in turn, is followed by the others in the family and the brother of her sister's husband, each having a right of priority in proportion to the degree of his relationship. 77 Jaussen reports that among the inhabitants of Nablus in central Palestine the right of a man to marry his bint 'amm "is religiously respected" and "has an immutable value." 7 8 The same is true elsewhere in Palestine in tradition-abiding circles. 79 T h e present writer's observations among middle-class Muslim Arabs in Palestine, and especially in Jerusalem, up to 1947, showed the cousin's right in decline. There was no longer any question of a suitor having to obtain the consent of the girl's ibn 'amm. Only a vague sense of preference for bint 'amm marriage was still noticeable here and there, but even this was disappearing under the impact of the idea that cousin marriage may result in sickly offspring. The rural population, with its greater conservatism, evinced no such change. The persistence of the cousin's right among the Palestinian fellahin is reported by observers two generations apart. 8 0 In the village of Artas, south of Bethlehem, the cousin's right is verbalized in song and proverb. The songs often praise the ibn 'amm as the ideal husband. If, however, he does not marry his bint 'amm, but allows a stranger to take her away, he is blamed and called a " h e a p of dirt." T h e obligation of an outsider to compensate the ibn 'amm in money, in order to obtain his consent, is a living custom in Artas. Among the proverbs alluding to the cousin's right are found such statements as " T h e ibn 'amm comes first," or " T h e ibn 'amm comes first in the eyes of the government and of the fellahin." 8 1

Cousin Marriage

157

In an account of marriage preliminaries in the villages a r o u n d J e r u s a l e m , the father of the g r o o m discusses the bride price w i t h the father of the bride, and once this is settled the father o f the bride says to h i m : " N o w go and get the consent of her p a t e r n a l uncle and cousins ( " 'ammha w'ulad 'ammha.), b u y clothes for her m a t e r n a l uncle (khalha). . . . " T h e r e u p o n the father of the g r o o m goes to the paternal uncle of the bride and says to h i m : " H o w m u c h d o you w a n t to let us get the g i r l ? " T h e uncle thinks a n d then says: " I w a n t 20 pieces of g o l d . " T h e r e u p o n they discuss the a m o u n t until they settle on a sum. " T h e father of the g r o o m c a n get the bride only if he has the consent of her 'amm a n d his sons, and if he buys a robe for her khal and shoes for his sons." A f t e r this, the father of the g r o o m " m a k e s efforts to get

the

consent of the girl's paternal cousins, b u t he has m u c h trouble with them until he [finally] obtains their consent. . . . " 8 2

ARTAS CASE

HISTORIES

W e h a v e seen (pp. 150, 154) a few examples showing

the

complications that m a y arise w h e n a father wishes to prefer an outsider as a son-in-law in order to secure a larger bride price than he w o u l d receive from his brother's son. T h e m o t i v a t i o n of financial

gain

marriageable

has caused girl a n d

conflicts

between

the father of

his brother's son on several

a

occasions

in Artas. M u s t a f a Salem of Artas found a bride in Bethlehem for his son. T h e y celebrated the betrothal feast, and he g a v e the girl's father a b o u t £ P i o o including presents. A year and a h a l f passed, a n d they were a b o u t to go to the shaykh to conclude the m a r r i a g e contract, w h e n the bride's cousin a p p e a r e d s a y i n g : " I c o m e

first."

T h e girl herself said: " I w a n t to h a v e m y cousin; he comes

first."

W h e n the bridegroom's father heard this, he threatened s a y i n g : " T h e r e are j u d g e s " (i.e. there are fellah j u d g e s w h o will set the matter right). H o w e v e r , the betrothal w a s voided, and the bride's family had to compensate the g r o o m ' s father for all he h a d spent on the girl. A n o t h e r case reported from A r t a s is even more instructive as to the rights of the ibn 'amm. Sma'In A h m e d , originally f r o m A r t a s

158

Golden River to Golden Road

but living in Ehbele, had a daughter w h o m his cousin (his father's brother's son) ' A b d a l l a h wanted to marry. H o w e v e r , an outsider offered £ P i 5 0 as bride price for the girl, and thereupon Sma'In refused to give his daughter to ' A b d a l l a h w h o as a cousin would have had to pay a m u c h smaller amount as bride price. N o w Sma'In's father and ' A b d a l l a h ' s father (who were brothers) had another brother M h a m m a d , and he arranged a nidr, or vow feast, to which he invited his brother from Ehbele, so that the relatives should be able to influence Sma'In in favor of his cousin. " F a r a w a y . . . in . . . Ehbele, it was easy for him to refuse, but not so if he must do it before the whole group of relatives and villagers. . . . " W h e n the evening meal was ready and about to be eaten, up rose Sma'In's father, the oldest and most influential member of the extended family, and said: " I will not eat unless I know whether this is a betrothal feast or a vow feast." His son, the father of the girl, tried to hold his own by mentioning the high bride price offered to him by the stranger, but his father cut him short: " N o t h i n g will come of that. W e are relatives." A n aunt of Sma'In and ' A b d a l l a h (their father's sister) also joined in the discussion and said to ' A b d a l l a h : " I will not eat unless I know whether thou wilt give me a wedding g a r m e n t . " T h e resistance of the girl's father was thus broken down, he gave his consent, a Fatiha (the first chapter of the K o r a n ) was read, and the meal began, it being understood that it was a betrothal feast. Next morning it was said: " T h i s night A h m e d Sma'In [the girl's father's father] has instituted a new rule, that for a clan daughter only £ P 3 5 shall be given. So dear as it is now will not d o . " In yet another case in the same village a girl's parents wanted to give her to her mother's brother's son (ibn khal). But her father's brother's son (ibn lamm) insisted on his rights, and finally got the girl. 8 3 SYRIA

M o v i n g up from Palestine into Syria, we find the same cousin right. Here too the girl's father's brother's son has the first right to her, followed by the right of more remote relatives in the male line. A n d here too the right can be renounced by the ibn 'amm for a compensation paid to him by the suitor of the girl w h o thus is

Cousin Marriage

159

a source of revenue for him. In Syria the right of receiving a compensation belongs to the ibn 'amm alone, and not to the ibn khal who has no special rights in his bint 'amme. The proverb that refers to the cousin right and, as we have seen (p. 155) is current in Palestine, is also current in Syria in a somewhat different version: "Inazzelha min 'ala dahr el-faras." " H e (the ibn 'amm) can take her down from the back of the mare." Another proverb in the same sense is: "Yakhtefha min el-jalweh," " H e can snatch her from the wedding ceremony." 8 1 Among the fellahin of the H a m a , Horns, Aleppo, and Deir ez-Zor regions of Syria the ibn 'amm asserts his right by referring to the traditional saying: "Bent 'ammi, ma etla' men tariqha," " S h e is my bint 'amm, I shall not move out of her w a y . " Among the Syrian bedouins they say: "Bent 'ammi, ma futha," " S h e is my bint 'amm, I shall not release h e r . " 8 5 In the entire Hawran district, as well as among the Syrian bedouins, and especially the tribes of Sulut, BenI Khaled, and el-Weld, the custom of reserving the bride for himself is practiced by the ibn 'amm. From the time a man reserves his bint 'amm for himself and until such time as he actually marries her, she becomes "protected" (majyura) by him, and nobody else has the right to marry her. But even if the ibn 'amm lias not expressly reserved the girl for himself, he has to be consulted before the girl can be given in marriage to someone else. This custom is followed not only in the rural areas and the smaller towns such as Homs, H a m a , Dcir ez-Zor, but, occasionally at least, even in the big cities of Syria, Damascus, and Aleppo. 8 6 In the Syrian towns cousin marriage seems to be most frequent among the lower classes consisting of workers, artisans, and small employees. Here too the proverbs faithfully reflect the views of the people with regard to the rights of the ibn 'amm and of the desirability of cousin marriage. " A tree is found near me; who has more right to it, my neighbor or myself?" asks one of these proverbs. Folk songs also assert the rights of the ibn 'amm: " M y bint 'amm is for me, is for me. . . ." 8 7 As in A r a b Palestine, in Syria too the urban environment is not favorable to the preservation of folk traditions. In recent decades, especially in the big cities, a man could give his daughter in marriage to a stranger even if the girl had several patrilateral

i6o

Golden River to Golden Road

parallel cousins who demanded her hand, and concurrently compensation of the ibn 'amm has also fallen into disuse. This development seems to be characteristic especially of the middleclass townspeople among whom cousin marriage has become much less frequent than among the lower classes. In the upper class, among the leading families, marriage between cousins is again frequent, and the ibn 'amm has the right of preference, here motivated by the wish to preserve the property in the family and by a feeling of superiority to other families. For these reasons, marriage between maternal cousins is less frequent in these classes than marriage between paternal cousins; and more stress is laid on marrying a girl to a cousin than on finding an in-family match for a young man. 8 7 Actually, as late as the 1930's there were still a number of leading families, especially in the small towns of Syria, among whom the old tradition of in-family marriage was faithfully preserved. In Homs and H a m a , for instance, there were still certain families who would not give their daughters in marriage to an outsider, but insisted on their marrying members of the family itself. No such restrictions, however, existed with regard to their male members who were free to find wives for themselves outside their own family circle. In this respect too the Syrian town closely resembled the Palestinian A r a b town. Recently, however, this rule has become weakened in many places. For instance, the rule of the K . family in H a m a , according to which a K . girl was allowed to marry only a K . man, has been repeatedly infringed upon as early as the 1920's. This rule was not confined to families of high standing, but could be found also among some fellah families. T h e 'Abdallah family in Palmyra, for example, and several other families in the H a w r a n and Deir ez-Zor regions, adhered to it down to the 1930's. In the 'AtasI family also husband and wife were almost always from the same family and this was the typical situation as far as the leading families were concerned. 8 9 SYRIAN

MINORITIES

T h e right of the ibn 'amm is upheld also among the Syrian Turkomans, among whom also the payment of compensation to

Cousin

Marriage

I6I

the ibn 'amm has been practiced. A story concerning the rivalry between two paternal cousins for the hand of their bint lamm,

who

was the most beautiful T u r k o m a n girl in Syria, was often heard a n u m b e r of years ago. Both youths d e m a n d e d the girl from her father, H a j j 'All, who, in order to suppress all rivalry between the two (since this would have weakened the family), refused her to both. However, knowing that two cousins had demanded her in m a r r i a g e , nobody else dared to ask for the hand o f the girl. S h e r e m a i n e d an old maid, and died unmarried. T h e same customs are in force a m o n g the Syrian Kurds, both those o f the Damascus area and those of K u r d D a g h .

Among

t h e m , too, the ibn 'amm must be asked for his consent, if the girl is to m a r r y somebody else, and has to be given compensation. T h e story is told of a certain ' A b d o , a K u r d o f the village o f Shikhut in the K u r d D a g h region, who has not received khulla

his

(price of renunciation), and thereupon avenged himself by

first killing the parents o f his bint 'amm and later the girl herself. H e was apprehended, condemned to death, and executed. T h e cousin right does not exist a m o n g the Circassians in Syria. T h e y hold marriages between a m a n and his bint 'amm or bint khal absolutely forbidden, because these cousins are regarded by t h e m as siblings. T h e same type o f family exogamy is practiced also a m o n g the Circassians in the Caucasus, the original h o m e o f the Syrian Circassians. 9 0 IRAQ

I n I r a q as well as in northeastern A r a b i a , "first cousin m a r r i a g e is the rule invariably. A girl belongs o f right to the son o f her father's brother (ibn 'amm) unless he expressly renounces his right to m a r r y her. Even in this case she m a y not m a r r y without his permission. I f the girl breaks this rule or her parents prevail o n h e r to m a r r y someone else, her rightful lord will murder her i f he c a n . T h i s is the cause o f most of the tribal killings o f w o m e n , especially in I r a q . " 9 1 T h i s custom is frequently reflected in I r a q i folk stories. I n one o f these, H a r u n al-Rashid's brother's son does not let H a r u n m a r r y his daughter to anybody else, until finally H a r u n gives her to h i m in marriage. I n another story, a father from the country o f

IÓ2

Golden River to Golden Road

Waq-waq does not want his daughter to marry her ibn 'amm, and therefore flees with her to Iraq. Later, however, the father returns with his daughter to Waq-waq land, whereupon the marriage feast of his daughter with his brother's son is begun. However, the girl's lover arrives in the last minute, kills the ibn 'amm, and then flees with the girl back to Iraq. 9 2 Among the Jews of Iraq, if a man wants to give his daughter in marriage to somebody, he must first persuade the girl's cousin to renounce his right to her. If the cousin does not listen to persuasion, the girl's father pays him a sum of money to buy his consent. This is done in order to prevent enmity and tension within the family. 9 3 In Northern Iraq also the ibn 'amm has the right to marry his bint 'amm. This is "the principal rule of marriage. . . . If they do not care for each other, however, the man will usually accept a present from the outside suitor, and in return will forego his right to his cousin." 9 4 A N I R A Q I CASE HISTORY

The following account, which contains all the elements of the cousin's right, is given by H . R. P. Dickson. The heroine is Binniyah, a sixteen-year-old girl of the al-Gharri tribe, headed by Shaykh Manshad al-Habayib. "Her people lived at Batha, a village on the Euphrates, some twenty miles from Nasiriyah, and she lived happily with her father and mother in their black tent until a short time previously, when they had told her that she was to marry her ibn 'am (first cousin) and that the wedding was to be solemnized on the new moon. The news had come as a terrible blow to her, for she loved another boy of the tribe and he loved her, and had told her of his love for her. In great distress she had told him that her father proposed giving her to her cousin on the new moon, and begged his advice and help. She would die, she had told him, rather than be the wife of anyone but him. The youth had received this calmly, but had been deeply angered, with murder in his heart. He had told Binniyah that he must have time to think out a plan, and would return on the third day and tell her what this was. They had arranged to meet on the river bank where she was accustomed to fetch water

Cousin Marriage

j 63

at midday, and he would find an opportunity of talking to her. "Binniyah had passed three long days in misery and despondency. W h a t chance had her lover, and what hope had she of getting out of the marriage arranged by her powerful father? Moreover, by Arab custom, her cousin has the right to marry her, and she could take no one else in this world unless he waived that right. She knew also that if, in spite of everyone, she married someone other than her cousin, her life would be forfeit and her cousin would be the one to kill her. Her only chance—and it was a very, very slender one—was to run away with her lover, but then she would have to flee far from her home and people and a b a n d o n all hope of ever seeing them again. If they ran away there would be an immediate pursuit, and woe betide her and her boy if the pursuers came up with them. Tribal law never forgave in such matters. " T h r e e days later she had been at the rendezvous by the riverside. O t h e r women had been drawing water also, but her lover had managed to get private word with her as he had walked part of the way home. He had only one plan to offer: to run away, and on that very night. He would appear behind her tent at midnight with a fast mare and, on his giving the cry of a jackal three times, she was to slip out from under the tent curtain, join him at the back, and together they would fly away to Suq ash Shuyukh and take refuge with the M u j a r r a h tribes. There they would get married, and if they could not find safety they would flee farther to distant Basra. . . . " M i d n i g h t had arrived, and Binniyah had crept out quietly to the rear of the tent on hearing the jackal cry. Silently they had got through the sleeping camp unnoticed and then, mounting one behind the other, had sped away into the open country, their objective the palm belt opposite Nasiriyah town. Alas, someone or some dog must have given the alarm. Binniyah could not tell me how it had happened. Suffice to say, when dawn had broken the fleeing pair had seen in the distance behind them a party of horsemen, obviously following hard on their trail. . . . They h a d thrown off their pursuers for a moment, and Binniyah had been almost happy. T h e n what disillusionment! T h e young m a n h a d apparently decided that, handicapped by Binniyah, he would

Golden River to Golden Road

164

never escape, but that he might get away alone. He h a d suddenly told her he was leaving her. It was useless, he had said, for them b o t h to get killed, when he could escape to Suq and reach Basra by way of the H a m a r Lake. H e had not given Binniyah time to argue or even plead. H e had just disappeared into the darkness. Life was sweet, so why throw it away on a bint?" T h e r e u p o n Binniyah fled into Dickson's house. Somewhat later Shaykh M a n s h a d too arrived and d e m a n d e d that Dickson hand the girl over to him. But Binniyah pleaded for her life: " H e is only concerned with getting me out of your h a n d s and the hakuma's protection. Afterwards he will hand me over to my ibn 'am and tribal justice." T u r n i n g to M a n s h a d she said: " I cannot, I dare not go back with you, Ya M a n s h a d , " she sobbed in a way that touched the heart. "You know the tribal law; it is utterly unforgiving in the case of erring girls like me, and you know full well that you must h a n d me over to my father a n d brethren, since they will d e m a n d me of you. I am afraid to die, for I am young." So Binniyah remained for a while with the Dicksons: " I n my predicament as to what to do with her, I sought the help and guidance of Dhari Beg al F a h a d A1 S a ' d u n . I told him the whole story, and he advised me that the only hope for the girl was to have her married to some worthy citizen of Nasiriyah town. According to Dhari, if she were once properly married and settled d o w n in the town, her tribe would no longer a t t e m p t to molest her, and in due course her ibn 'am and parents might forgive her, especially if her husband were to pay over a sum of money by w a y of compensation to the ibn 'am who fancied himself injured. Binniyah herself approved this step, so I acted on Dhari's advice a n d , after some days, found a very respectable m a n who ran a coffee-shop a few doors away from my house, and he agreed to m a r r y Binniyah. T h e wedding was a quiet one and turned out very happily. As my contribution to the h a p p y event I gave the bridegroom six h u n d r e d rupees to be paid over to Binniyah's cousin." 9 5 KURDISTAN

T h e same rule prevails in the Kurdish area of N o r t h e r n I r a q as well. It is the tribal law a m o n g the K u r d s that the cousin " h a s

Cousin Marriage the first refusal of a lady's h a n d , " 9 8 in other words it is he w h o c a n either take her for himself or dispose of her if he so wishes. In the sedentary H a m a w a n d tribe (in the K i r k u k L i w a of Iraq) " p a t e r nal cousins have first rights to a girl, and where the father of the girl contemplates giving her in m a r r i a g e to anyone else, the p a t e r n a l cousin must first release her b y renouncing his c l a i m . " In the southern K u r d i s h feudally organized territory, neighboring on the H a m a w a n d area, the "first rights of paternal cousins are not as strongly e m p h a s i z e d . " Barth, w h o m a d e a special study of this p r o b l e m a m o n g the K u r d s , recorded in the course of his field work cases of violence resulting from a breach o f the father's obligation to obtain his brother's son's consent to the marriage of his d a u g h t e r to somebody else. In one case, an outsider w h o asked for the hand of a girl was refused b y her father on the grounds that (as he said), " I a m afraid m y brother's sons will kill me if I give her to y o u . " 9 7 O n e K u r d i s h case history should suffice to show that murder c a n a c t u a l l y result from the refusal to let a girl m a r r y her ibn 'amm (or amoaza in K u r d i s h ) . In 1920, in a village called

Kapanak

Resh, on the eastern slope of the Q a r a C h o q D a g in the A r b i l region of Iraqi K u r d i s t a n , under the protection of the village headman,

named

K h a l b e k r , lived his w i d o w e d sister,

Amina

K h a n u m , and her beautiful daughter, F a t i m a . In a village on the other side of the hill lived F a t i m a ' s cousins, F a r h a n the L a m e a n d R a h m a n A g h a . F a r h a n sent his brother several times to ask K h a l b e k r for the hand of his niece, but w a s each time refused. Finally, one of the three big D i z a i chiefs, H a j j i Pir D a o u d A g h a , secretly a p p r o a c h e d K h a l b e k r and offered him a large bride price for his niece w h o m he asked in m a r r i a g e for his son

Ma'ruf.

K h a l b e k r g a v e his consent and the preparations for the marriage started but with utmost secrecy. So as to prevent the occurrence of a n y legal hitch, even the consent of the M u s l i m j u d g e of A r b i l w a s obtained. H o w e v e r , as was to be expected, these plans could not for long remain secret, and R a h m a n A g h a planned revenge. O n e night F a t i m a was sleeping with her mother and her maid in a booth of branches just outside their house, w h e n suddenly t w o men a p p e a r e d and stabbed the girl and her maid to death, the mother narrowly escaping with her life. T h e bloody deed horrified

Golden River to Golden Road

i66

the w h o l e tribe, because the traditionally correct thing would h a v e been to carry off the girl by force, or to kill her bridegroom. Since the girl herself had nothing to say in the matter of her marriage, to kill her was a crime b y tribal standards. R a h m a n A g h a was imprisoned, b u t n o proof of his guilt could be found, a n d he was finally released. 9 8

IRAN

I n Persian A z e r b a i j a n the same right is accorded to a m a n with regard to the hand of his amun gyzi, father's brother's daughter. In an account of A z e r b a i j a n i marriage customs reported by an informant from T a b r i z ,

the fourteen-year-old boy says to his

m o t h e r that he wants to m a r r y , w h e r e u p o n the m o t h e r answers: " W a i t until your cousin (amun gyzi) A l i y e grows up, I shall take her for y o u as wife . . . she is your property. . . . " " I f a m o n g the Papis of Iran, a L u r tribe, a girl is married to a stranger, he has to compensate her cousins b y giving each one of t h e m a goat. 1 0 0

SINAI AND

EGYPT

T h e Sinai Peninsula forms the connecting link between

the

A s i a n and the A f r i c a n halves of the M i d d l e East. Ethnologically, the nomads of the Peninsula are the connecting link between the peoples of the A r a b i a n and Syrian deserts on the one hand a n d the tribes of E g y p t and N o r t h A f r i c a on the other. T w o

firsthand

reports a hundred and twenty years apart attest to the prevalence of the cousin's right in Sinai. J o h n Lewis Burckhardt, traveling in the Sinai Peninsula prior to 1816, observed that " T h e A r a b s of Sinai . . . sometimes m a r r y their daughters to strangers in the absence of the cousins. T h i s h a p p e n e d to a guide w h o m I h a d taken from Suez. W h e n we arrived at his e n c a m p m e n t , one d a y ' s j o u r n e y from the convent of Sinai, he expected to m a r r y a cousin of his own, and during the whole j o u r n e y he had extolled to me the festivities w h i c h I should witness on that occasion. He, too, h a d brought with him some new clothes for his intended b r i d e ; a n d was therefore exceedingly disappointed and chagrined on his arrival, w h e n he learned that three days before the girl had been

Cousin

iôy

Marriage

m a r r i e d to a n o t h e r . It a p p e a r e d t h a t h e r m o t h e r w a s secretly his e n e m y ; a n d h a d c o n t r i v e d m a t t e r s in s u c h a m a n n e r as to r e n d e r h i m r i d i c u l o u s in the eyes o f his c o m p a n i o n s . H e b o r e his misf o r t u n e , h o w e v e r , like a m a n ; a n d , i n s t e a d o f e v i n c i n g a n y signs o f d i s p l e a s u r e , soon t u r n e d the tide o f r i d i c u l e u p o n the m o t h e r herself, a n d h e r s o n - i n - l a w . T o

prevent similar occurrences,

a

c o u s i n , if h e b e d e t e r m i n e d to m a r r y his r e l a t i o n , p a y s d o w n the p r i c e o f h e r as a deposit i n t o t h e h a n d s o f s o m e

respectable

m e m b e r o f the e n c a m p m e n t , a n d p l a c e s the girl u n d e r the p r o t e c t i o n o f f o u r m e n b e l o n g i n g to his o w n tribe. I n this case she cannot

marry

another without

his p e r m i s s i o n , w h e t h e r h e

be

a b s e n t or p r e s e n t ; a n d h e m a y then m a r r y h e r a t his leisure, w h e n e v e r he pleases. If, h o w e v e r , he h i m s e l f b r e a k o f f the m a t c h , the m o n e y t h a t h a d b e e n d e p o s i t e d is p a i d i n t o the h a n d s o f the girl's m a s t e r . T h i s k i n d o f b e t r o t h i n g takes p l a c e s o m e t i m e s l o n g b e f o r e t h e girl h a s a t t a i n e d the a g e o f p u b e r t y . " 1 0 1 T h e n o n c h a l a n t m a n n e r in w h i c h B u r c k h a r d t ' s g u i d e r e a c t e d to the m a r r i a g e o f his c o u s i n to a n o t h e r m a n , as w e l l as t h e institutionalized

method

of preventing

"similar

occurrences,"

w h i c h is d i f f e r e n t f r o m the m e r e r e s e r v a t i o n o f the g i r l p r a c t i c e d e l s e w h e r e (p. 152), s e e m to i n d i c a t e t h a t n o g r e a t e m p h a s i s w a s p l a c e d o n c o u s i n r i g h t in those d a y s . I n the c o u r s e o f the subseq u e n t c c n t u r y the a t t i t u d e to the c o u s i n ' s r i g h t m u s t h a v e b e c o m e c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e r i g o r o u s , since M u r r a y in t h e 1930's r e p o r t s that

this r i g h t is g e n e r a l l y

S i n a i as w e l l stretching

as a m o n g

between

the

respected

among

those i n h a b i t i n g t h e Nile

and

the

Red

the B e d o u i n s desert o f Sea.

of

Egypt

Among

the

E g y p t i a n B e d o u i n " e v e r y y o u t h has t h e r i g h t to m a r r y his bint 'amm. . . . T h e r i g h t is a b s o l u t e , a n d i f h e r f a t h e r wishes to dispose o f the girl o t h e r w i s e ,

he must

first

obtain

(and p a y

for)

his

n e p h e w ' s c o n s e n t . T h e v a s t m a j o r i t y o f first m a r r i a g e s

(every

Bedouin

conse-

m a r r i e s s e v e r a l times)

are o f this n a t u r e , a n d

q u e n t l y a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f the p o p u l a t i o n are t h e o f f s p r i n g o f first

cousins. S o also a n ' A b a d i o r B i s h a r i u s u a l l y m a r r i e s his

bint 'amm, b u t the H a d e n d o w a are n o t so p a t r i l i n e a l a n d w h e n c h o o s i n g a b r i d e g i v e no s p e c i a l p r e f e r e n c e to t h a t l a d y . " 1 0 2 A s to the B i s h a r i n , C . G . S e l i g m a n r e p o r t s t h a t a m o n g those in the n e i g h b o r h o o d o f A s w a n in U p p e r E g y p t w h o m h e s t u d i e d ,

Golden River to Golden Road

i68

the bint 'amm "is the best [wife] and a man would consider that he had prior right to the hand of his bint 'amm."103 SUDAN

Moving down south into Sudan, we find that among the Kababish, an Arab tribe, marriage with the bint 'amm predominates. T h e Seligmans found that "it was clear that no other alliance for a girl would be considered if there were an ibn 'amm available for her. Further, if a lad were betrothed to his bint 'amm who was considerably younger than himself, he could not take another wife while waiting for her to grow up. A bint 'amm could not be second to any other woman unless she, too, were bint 'amm to the husband. This rule was demonstrated in the case of the shaykh of the Kababish himself: he married his bint 'amm, then later he married a second wife who was not his bint 'amm. T h e n he wanted to marry another bint 'amm of his, but before being able to do so he had first to divorce his second wife, so that he should have no wife preceding a bint 'amm.101 N O R T H AFRICA

Thanks to the researches of Westermarck and of a number of French scholars we have ample information as to the prevalence of bint 'amm marriage in Morocco, the westernmost outpost of Middle Eastern culture. Both among Arabs and Berbers, marriages between children of two brothers are not only common, but a man is held to have the right to marry his father's brother's daughter. In Andjra, Westermarck was told that the cousin has to be asked before a girl can be given away to another man, and that if this step is omitted, the cousin is entitled to prevent the marriage even on the very day of the wedding by forcibly removing her from the bridal box. Among the Uled Bu'Aziz, a m a n who has contracted marriage with another man's bint 'amm can be compelled to give her up, if he is compensated for his expenses and if he has not yet settled down with her. In the Rif instances are known in which a man who has married his daughter to an outsider has been killed by his brother's son. 105

Cousin

169

Marriage

Also " A M o h a m m e d a n H a u s a has the right to marry the d a u g h t e r of his father's brother," but he has no such right to the hand of any of the other cousins, whom he can marry only if her father agrees. 1 0 6 POSITIVE

MOTIVATIONS

Several cogent reasons have been advanced for the marriage of paternal cousins by the peoples practicing it. O n e of the earliest of these was given by the Persian king Ardeshir who advised his lawyers, secretaries, officers, and h u s b a n d m e n to " m a r r y near relatives for the sympathy of kinship is kept alive thereby." 1 0 7 Although the meaning of marriage between "close relatives" is not defined more fully, it must have referred to brother-sister a n d / o r cousin marriages. T h e same motivation, namely the strengthening of the kinship ties, is given in ancient Arabic sources referring to the practice of marriage between paternal cousins prevalent in pre-lslamic Arabia. 1 0 8 W e read in the Kitab al-Agkani that Qays ibn Dharih, of the stock of Kinana, fell in love with L a b n a , a beautiful maiden of the Q u d a ' a tribe, and when he implored his father for permission to marry her, the father objected saying that he (the father, Dharih) was indeed a rich and wealthy m a n and he did not want his son to take the side of a stranger. 1 0 9 A related consideration in favor of paternal cousin marriage is the assumption that a m a n who grows up together with his bint 'amm within the intimate framework of one extended family knows her and develops a liking a n d a love for her, which in turn a u g u r well for the happiness and stability of the marriage. I n the Middle Ages in A r a b lands, a cousin (father's brother's daughter) was "often chosen as a wife, on account of the tie of blood which is likely to attach her more strongly to her h u s b a n d , or on account of an affection conceived in early years." 1 1 0 Speaking of Egypt of the early nineteenth century, Lane remarks that " a union of this kind is generally lasting, on account of this tie of blood; and because mutual intercourse may have formed an a t t a c h m e n t between the parties in tender a g e . " 1 1 1 I n Syria also in middle-class u r b a n society, although "marriages between

IJO

Golden River to Golden Road

cousins are less f r e q u e n t t h a n in the families of high society," if they occur, " t h e y are dictated more often by feelings of affection which develops easily between male and female cousins who in the town can see each other a n d talk to each o t h e r . " 1 1 2 According to a Syrian proverb, "111 luck which you know is better than good luck with which you get a c q u a i n t e d , " 1 1 3 that is, it is preferable to m a r r y a cousin whose faults you know rather t h a n a strange girl who seems to be better b u t with whose true qualities you will get a c q u a i n t e d only later. A Palestinian A r a b proverb expresses the same feeling: "Follow the circular (that is, normal, or regular) path, even if it is long, a n d m a r r y your bint 'amm even if she is a miserable [ m a t c h ] . " 1 1 1 A M e c c a n proverb encourages the young m a n not to be ashamed of his bint 'amm: " H e who is ashamed of his bint 'amm, will get no boy f r o m h e r . " 1 1 5 Several M o r o c c a n Arabic proverbs likewise emphasize the desirability of m a r r y i n g a bint 'amm because of the advantages of familiarity with h e r : " H e who marries his bint 'amm celebrates his feast with a sheep from his own flock"; or " M a r r y i n g a stranger is like drinking water f r o m an earthenware bottle, b u t marriage with a bint 'amm is like drinking water from a d i s h " : that is, you can see what you drink. T h e Persian p r o v e r b quoted above (p. 139) expresses the view that marriages between paternal cousins are m a d e in heaven, that is, are preordained by God. Another i m p o r t a n t motivation of marriage between paternal cousins is the endeavor to preserve the property in the family. This motivation comes into play as a result of the traditional Middle Eastern system of inheritance, which conflicts to some extent with the rule of patrilineal descent. U n d e r this rule, a w o m a n ' s children belong to the family (and larger kin-group) of her husband only. W h a t e v e r property a woman inherits from her father, and, in turn, leaves to her children, thus passes from her father's family into t h a t of her husband. T h e marriage of a d a u g h t e r with an outsider therefore ultimately results in the alienation of p a r t of the family's property. O n the other h a n d , if p a t e r n a l cousins marry, their children are the offspring of the same g r a n d f a t h e r t h r o u g h both their father and their mother,

Cousin

Marriage

a n d t h u s w h a t e v e r a d a u g h t e r i n h e r i t s f r o m a m a n is p a s s e d o n b y h e r to h e r c h i l d r e n w h o are also the p a t r i l i n e a l g r a n d c h i l d r e n o f t h e s a m e m a n . I n this case, t h e r e f o r e , e v e n t h a t p a r t o f the family property

t h a t is i n h e r i t e d b y the d a u g h t e r s r e m a i n s in

the family. I n f a c t , in o n e o f the earliest M i d d l e E a s t e r n d o c u m e n t s l a t i n g to this s u b j e c t the i n h e r i t a n c e o f d a u g h t e r s is m a d e

recon-

t i n g e n t u p o n their m a r r y i n g m e m b e r s o f the i n - g r o u p , a n d , as it e v e n t u a l l y t r a n s p i r e d , all the five f e m a l e heirs in q u e s t i o n m a r r i e d t h e i r f a t h e r ' s b r o t h e r s ' sons ( N u m b e r s 36 : 1 - 1 2 ) . Although Medina

in

bint

'amm m a r r i a g e

pre-Islamic

days,

was it

can

practiced be

in

assumed

Mecca that

and when

M o h a m m e d r e f o r m e d the l a w s o f i n h e r i t a n c e , a l l o w i n g the d a u g h ters a s h a r e in the f a t h e r ' s estate, this r e s u l t e d in a n f r e q u e n c y o f bint'amm

increased

m a r r i a g e s . 1 1 6 T h e basic K o r a n i c legislation

in this r e s p e c t is f o u n d in S u r a h iv : 1 1 , w h e r e it is s a i d : " A l l a h c h a r g e t h y o u c o n c e r n i n g y o u r c h i l d r e n : to t h e m a l e t h e v a l e n t o f the p o r t i o n o f t w o f e m a l e s , a n d

if t h e r e b e

equi-

women

( o n l y ) , m o r e t h a n t w o , t h e n theirs is t w o t h i r d s o f the i n h e r i t a n c e , a n d if t h e r e b e o n e ( o n l y ) , t h e n the h a l f . " T h i s I s l a m i c l a w is b y n o m e a n s a d h e r e d to b y all M i d d l e Easte r n t r i b a l a n d v i l l a g e societies, w h o in m a n y cases still f o l l o w their o l d , p r e - I s l a m i c c u s t o m a r y l o c a l l a w . I n g e n e r a l it c a n

never-

theless b e said t h a t s o m e p o r t i o n at least o f t h e f a t h e r ' s e s t a t e is i n h e r i t e d , as a rule, b y his d a u g h t e r , a n d t h u s passes o n f r o m h e r to h e r c h i l d r e n . T h e r e f o r e , the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y

in

t h e f a m i l y b e c o m e s a n i m p o r t a n t m o t i v a t i o n for t h e p r e f e r e n c e f o r p a t e r n a l cousin m a r r i a g e , a n d is stated to b e o n e o f its p u r p o s e s in m a n y p a r t s o f the M i d d l e E a s t . 1 1 7 In

many

Middle

Eastern

societies

people

are

conscious

of

s e v e r a l o f the m o t i v a t i o n s for cousin m a r r i a g e . I n K u r d i s t a n , for i n s t a n c e , " G i v i n g o n e ' s d a u g h t e r to a b r o t h e r ' s son is . . . c o n s i d e r e d t h o u g h t f u l a n d p r o p e r . T h e f a t h e r k n o w s his d a u g h t e r ' s s p o u s e w e l l , a n d will also b e a b l e to e x e r t s o m e c o n t r o l o v e r his a c t i o n s t o w a r d h e r after m a r r i a g e ; m a r r i a g e s h o u l d b e b e t w e e n e q u a l s , a n d no o n e is closer in status a n d s e n t i m e n t t h a n a p a t e r n a l c o u s i n . T h e s m a l l c h i l d is p l e a s a n t l y e m b a r r a s s e d w h e n teased f o r b e i n g " i n l o v e " w i t h a p a t e r n a l cousin. T h e i m p o r t a n c e of e n d o -

IJ2

Golden River to Golden Road

g a m y in maintaining family property is also recognized, though the problem only arises with any degree of gravity where Koranic laws of inheritance, giving stipulated fractions of the estate to female descendants, are strictly followed, and this does not generally seem to be the case. . . . Such a pattern of father's brother's daughter marriage plays a prominent role in solidifying the minimal lineage as a corporate group in factional struggle. Marriages of this type thus serve to reinforce the political implications of the lineage system. . . . relative to the first potential lines of fission and segmentation within the minimal lineage itself." 1 1 8 T o sum up, in the Middle Eastern patrilineal kinship system it is of extremely great importance for the head of the family to be assured of the unwavering support of his brothers and their sons. T h e greater the n u m b e r of the male kin on whose unquestioning loyalty he can count, the greater his influence, power, security, a n d prestige. O n e of the time-proved methods of strengthening the ties of kinship and of common interests between the head of a family and his patrilineal kinsmen is to give them his daughters in marriage. These considerations in most cases outweigh by far the loss of money resulting from the reduced bride price paid by a brother's son. T h e same considerations hold good also from the point of view of the young m a n about to choose a wife. If the wife is from a different family, and even more so if she is from a different village or tribe, the husband cannot be sure that the interests of his father-in-law will always harmonize with his own. Contrary interests, especially if they lead to m u t u a l raiding or warfare, put the wife in a difficult and at times tragic situation whereby the inner coherence in the nuclear family of the husband a n d also in the extended family of which he is a m e m b e r m a y be weakened. If on the other h a n d his wife is a bint 1amm, a d a u g h t e r of his father's brother, the likelihood of the occurrence of such a conflict of interests is greatly reduced, and in general the harmonious community of interests between a m a n a n d his fatherin-law is enhanced. Close in-group or in-family endogamy is to this day the prevalent practice in all social strata of the Middle East with the exception of those exposed to m o d e r n Western influences. E n d o g a m y still seems

Cousin

Marriage

*73

to satisfy most y o u n g m e n a n d w o m e n , b e c a u s e y o u n g p e o p l e w h o g r o w u p in the large a n d p r o t e c t i v e e n v i r o n m e n t o f the e x t e n d e d f a m i l y seem to be c o n d i t i o n e d b y their u p b r i n g i n g to h a v e a p r e f e r e n c e for c o n t i n u i n g their lives in the s a m e and

atmosphere;

given

this

preference,

such

environment

close

in-group

m a r r i a g e s as b e t w e e n a m a n a n d his father's brother's d a u g h t e r h a v e all the a d v a n t a g e s as against m a r r y i n g a n o n r e l a t e d outsider. T w o y o u n g p e o p l e w h o g r o w u p in the same e x t e n d e d

family

(or at least in t w o closely related e x t e n d e d families) h a v e in g e n e r a l a pre-existing c o m m u n i t y o f interests a n d a similarity in outlook a n d personality d e t e r m i n a n t s , a n d c a n therefore look f o r w a r d to a m u c h s m o o t h e r a d a p t a t i o n to e a c h other, a d j u s t m e n t to the l a r g e r f r a m e o f the e x t e n d e d f a m i l y , a n d further g r o w t h w i t h i n it, t h a n c a n b e the case in an o u t - g r o u p m a r r i a g e .

OPPOSITION

TO

COUSIN

MARRIAGE

O c c a s i o n a l l y opposition to cousin m a r r i a g e arose a m o n g those w h o p r a c t i c e d it, a n d w a s expressed in the f o r m o f g o o d a d v i c e or p r o v e r b s . a l - M a y d a n i (ii : 250) m a k e s the f o l l o w i n g e x h o r t a tion: " M a r r y

the distant, b u t not the near [in

relationship]."

T h e reason g i v e n for the a d v i s a b i l i t y o f a v o i d i n g cousin m a r r i a g e s is most f r e q u e n t l y the belief that the o f f s p r i n g o f such m a r r i a g e s will b e feeble. In J a u h a r i ' s A r a b i c D i c t i o n a r y a Hadith

(an oral

t r a d i t i o n g o i n g b a c k to the P r o p h e t M o h a m m e d ) is q u o t e d to the e f f e c t that b y m a r r y i n g strangers one will not h a v e feeble posterity. A n o t h e r early A r a b a u t h o r , I b n ' A b d R a b b i h i , in his Kitab 'iqd al-farid

al-

(iii : 290) says in praise o f a h e r o : ' H e is a hero not

b o r n e b y the cousin (of his father), he is not w e a k l y ; for the seed o f relations brings forth feeble f r u i t . " 1 1 9 T h e w e a k n e s s o f such o f f s p r i n g m a y be manifested in their small stature. It is said o f O m a r that w h e n he o n c e asked w h y w e r e the Q u r a y s h i t e s so small o f stature, he w a s told that this w a s the result o f their f r e q u e n t cousin m a r r i a g e s . T h e r e u p o n O m a r is said to h a v e p r o h i b i t e d the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f this p r a c t i c e . T h e s a m e i d e a is expressed in a verse q u o t e d in B a j u r i ' s C o m m e n t a r v to Ibn

Qasim

(ii : 1 5 3 ) :

" I f you want

nobility o f descent

(i.e.,

physical excellence) m a r r y a stranger a n d d o not enter into a tic

174

Golden River to Golden Road

with relatives." A c c o r d i n g to Bajuri, a man's desire for a closelyrelated w o m a n such as his bint 'amm is weak, and therefore the child born of such a union will also be w e a k . 1 2 0 A b u H a m i d a l - G h a z a l i ( 1 0 5 9 - 1 1 1 1 ) in his principal ethical w o r k , the Ihyd 'ulum al-din ( " T h e revivification of the religious sciences"), devotes a section to the properties and characteristics required of a wife. O n e of these is that " t h e w o m a n should not be a n e a r relative of the husband, because near relationship diminishes the sensuous desire. ' M a r r y not near relations,' says the Blessed O n e ( M o h a m m e d ) , 'otherwise one must expect a weak (dawi) progeny.' Dawi means nalnf (thin, weakly). T h e reason for this is that this circumstance results in a weakening effect on the sensuous desire. T h i s latter, n a m e l y , is aroused through sensations of sight and touch, and these are especially strong in the case of a n e w and strange object. If, however, the object in question is f a m i l i a r , and has been in front of one's eyes for a long time, then the sense becomes dulled so that it can no longer completely perceive it and be impressed by it. T h e r e f o r e also the libido will not be excited by i t . " 1 2 1 T h e same feeling was expressed in modern M o r o c c o as well as b y a Berber informant of Westerm a r c k ' s : " H o w can a man love a w o m a n with w h o m he has g r o w n up from c h i l d h o o d ? " 1 2 2 A n o t h e r stated reason for the dislike of cousin marriages was that they might lead to quarreling and disharmony. T h e ancient A r a b i c poet, ' A m r b. K u l t h u m , said: " D o not m a r r y in y o u r own f a m i l y , for domestic enmity arises t h e r e f r o m . " 1 2 3 This f e a r too is expressed in modern M o r o c c a n proverbs. O n e of these says: " Y o u r father's brother will m a k e you blind, and y o u r mother's brother will make you destitute, and keep a w a y from y o u r blood that it shall not visit you with misfortunes." Girls in F e z when wishing to get married go to ask help at the shrine of the saint SidI M b a r a k ben A b a b u , and address h i m : " O Sid! M b a r a k , give me a husband w h o has no friends." This they do in order to a v o i d being given in marriage to a cousin, since cousin marriages a r e supposed to lead to quarrels between the husband's and the wife's families, both of w h o m w a n t to interfere in the m a r r i e d life of the c o u p l e . 1 2 4 In S y r i a also there is a proverb that speaks about the incon-

Cousin Marriage

175

veniences of cousin marriage, which m a y lead to quarrels between the two families: " D o not approach your relatives, their scorpions will bite y o u . " 1 2 5 CONCLUSION

A comparison of the distribution d a t a of the cousin's right with those of preference for bint 'amm marriage shows that there are ethnic groups in considerable numbers within the limits of the Middle Eastern culture continent whose marriage pattern includes preference for bint 'amm marriage without, however, according to a m a n the right to marry his bint 'amm. T h e cousin's right to m a r r y his bint 'amm docs not and cannot exist without preference for bint 'amm marriage; while preference can and does exist without the right, having apparently a wider distribution. T h e fullest form of bint 'amm marriage appears to be the one in which a m a n has the right to m a r r y his bint 'amm. O n the other hand, the existence of the preference for cousin marriage without this right can be taken as an indication of an incomplete, partial form of the institution of cousin marriage. T h e incomplete variety of cousin marriage (prefcrcnce without right) m a y be contingent upon one or more of the following factors and circumstances: a. T h e geographic location of the ethnic group in question may be marginal to the Middle Eastern culture continent and the pattern of cousin marriage m a y therefore not exist in it in the full form developed in the Middle Eastern core culture (example: the Timbuctoo area, or the Fulani in Nupe). This assumption is predicated on the known existence of cousin marriage among the Biblical Hebrews and pre-Islamic Arabs; on the known increase in incidence of cousin marriage in Arabia after M o h a m m e d ; and on its incorporation into Muslim tradition, which secured its acceptance by all (or nearly all) Islamized peoples. It also implies that the cousin's right was a later development in the Middle Eastern core culture, and that therefore it has not yet reached marginally located ethnic groups that have already absorbed the earlier form of Middle Eastern preference for cousin marriage. b. Ethnic groups located geographically well within the central sector of the Middle Eastern culture continent m a y yet occupy

Golden River to Golden Road a position of cultural marginality. Such a g r o u p m a y be influenced by the older a n d less stringent preference for cousin m a r r i a g e a n d m a y h a v e subsequently resisted or r e m a i n e d unaffected by the later specific a n d strict M i d d l e Eastern f o r m u l a t i o n of the cousin's right ( e x a m p l e : the Copts in Egypt). c. As a result of m o d e r n i z a t i o n a n d Westernization, a distance m a y develop between the a c t u a l culture of a sector of the p o p u l a tion in a locality a n d the traditional culture of the e t h n i c g r o u p of which the local aggregate is p a r t . I n such cases, w h i c h can be observed, for example, in the middle-class p o p u l a t i o n of m a n y M i d d l e Eastern cities, the most stringent feature of the t r a d i t i o n a l cousin m a r r i a g e complex, n a m e l y the m a n ' s right to m a r r y his bint 'amm, m a y be discarded because it is felt that it contravenes W e s t e r n ideas t h a t are being consciously absorbed. T h e preference for cousin m a r r i a g e m a y at the same time persist, insofar as both parties, now allowed their free choice of m a r r i a g e p a r t n e r s , m a y still feel t h a t cousin m a r r i a g e has, after all, some of those a d v a n t a g e s that tradition ascribes to it. I n this transitional stage, the frequency of cousin m a r r i a g e m a y still testify to a c o n t i n u e d preference for it, while the cousin's right m a y be ridiculed as obsolete. d. An external circumstance must also be taken into consideration. This is the specific n a t u r e of the sources from which the d a t a concerning the M i d d l e Eastern m a r r i a g e p a t t e r n ( a n d M i d d l e Eastern culture as a whole) are derived. Work in M i d d l e Eastern anthropology on an over-all area basis, a n d especially a t t e m p t s at distribution studies, still h a v e to rely to a considerable extent on accounts of travelers, officials, residents, and other n o n a n t h r o p o logists. These writings, while often containing v a l u a b l e firsthand observations, often fall short as far as detail and completeness are concerned. T h e absence of a n y reference to the cousin's right in a given ethnic g r o u p m a y therefore m e a n not only t h a t the cousin's right did actually not exist, b u t also that the a u t h o r of the a c c o u n t failed to notice it or was not even a w a r e of its possible existence. At least p a r t of the distributional discrepancy between the cousin's right and the preference for cousin m a r r i a g e is p r o b a b l y d u e to this circumstance.

VII. Dual Organization

S

TUDENTS OF culturc in general and of certain world areas in particular have repeatedly devoted their attention to the form of social structure commonly referred to in anthropological literature as dual organization. T h e definitions of what constitutes dual organization v a r y . 1 One of the most comprehensive analyses of the characteristics of dual organization throughout the world is that of Josef Haekel, published in the 1950 volume of Anthropos.2 These can be subsumed as follows:

A Sociological Dichotomy. A division of local aggregates, tribes, or clans into two; an extension of the dual division to larger territories; a dichotomy of the men's clubs, the ceremonial houses, the age groups, classes, or cercmonial groups. T h e existence of the two groups (usually referred to as "moieties") can be overtly manifest or present only in the consciousness of the people, or expressed in certain modes of behavior. It can be either permanent or temporary. Occasionally there is also a tendency to further dual subdivisions within the moieties. In these subgroups a combination with totem clans is frequent. O n the other hand, the dual system can be present without any further subdivision of the moieties. Regulation of Marriage. T h e dual organization cither is or is not accompanied by moiety exogamy. When there are two marriage classes they are, as a rule, the moieties of villages or tribes. Secondarily, exogamy may be lost. Descent. Descent is counted within the moiety in general most frequently in the maternal line, but patrilineal descent occurs also in connection with dual organization.

177

I78

Golden River to Golden Road

Ideology and Symbolism. Pairs of opposites, often expressed in names, figure in the ideology and symbolism of the moieties, such as the symbolic division of n a t u r a l objects into two groups. T h e r e are also associations with districts a n d directions, o r with opposites such as sky—earth, above—below, m a l e — f e m a l e ; or with opposites of colors; with w a r — p e a c e , with contraposited a n i m a l pairs (totemistic or totemizing d u a l systems); w i t h heavenly bodies such as light a n d d a r k m o o n or s u n — m o o n . O f t e n a competitive brotherly pair or some o t h e r ancestral p a i r figures in the moiety. Naming. T h e two moieties are called by opposite names. Antagonism and Rivalry. Symbolic or fictional e n m i t y usually obtains between the two moieties, sometimes d e g e n e r a t i n g into serious strife. Jealousy, m u t u a l ridiculing, j o k i n g designations, competitive fights a n d games are c o m m o n . Reciprocity. This is expressed in m u t u a l services a t feasts a n d funerals. Evaluation and Status. T h e r e is a higher evaluation of one moiety, which is p a r t l y a practical utilization of existing e t h n i c stratification. T h e presence of all or most of these characteristics, with differing emphases, is attested by d a t a f r o m the following world a r e a s : I n d i a , the U g r i c peoples of Central Asia, Indonesia, O c e a n i a , N o r t h America, a n d N e g r o Africa. 3 Woelfel, Jeffreys, a n d H a e k e l also refer to the presence of the d u a l system in N o r t h Africa a m o n g certain Berber groups. 4 As f a r as could be verified, n o a t t e m p t has been m a d e h i t h e r t o to establish the presence of the system in t h e M i d d l e East in general. I n the course of the a u t h o r ' s researches in M i d d l e Eastern social structure it has become a p p a r e n t not only t h a t d u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n is present in m a n y parts of the M i d d l e East b u t t h a t , u p to its present decline as a consequence of the i m p a c t of m o d e r n W e s t e r n sociopolitical forms, it was a highly significant factor in the traditional social organization as well as in the political life of the a r e a as a whole. Specifically, a m o n g the following M i d d l e E a s t e r n peoples were traces of d u a l organization observed: T h e n o m a d i c a n d the settled p o p u l a t i o n of the A r a b i a n Peninsula f r o m preIslamic days to the present, including the m a j o r tribes a n d tribal

179

Dual Organization

federations of Southern and Central Arabia as well as of the Syrian Desert. T h e tribes of Iran and Afghanistan. T h e tribal elements and the settled peoples of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan, including the u r b a n population, and Muslims as well as Christians. T h e Druzes of Syria and Lebanon. T h e u r b a n population as well as the villagers of Egypt. T h e settled and nomadic, Arab and Berber, groups of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. T h e peoples inhabiting the oases of the Sahara, down to the deep south. Data indicating the presence of the dual organization in the Middle East are so a b u n d a n t that one may be justified in assuming that this form of social structure is one of the general characteristics of Middle Eastern culture.

GENERAL

CHARACTERISTICS

Pride in descent forms one of the most significant traits in the ethos of Middle Eastern peoples. Emphasis on noble ancestry is greatest among the nomadic elements, while in the settled population, both villagers and townspeople, it appears to be weakening in recent decades. T h e nomads, among whom ancient traditions have survived in greater force than among other segments of Middle Eastern society, accord the highest prestige not to the richest or most warlike families or tribes, but to those who have the oldest and most noble genealogy and the most famous men among their ancestry. 5 " T o know this pedigree is of practical value to any one who has to deal with Arab nomads, owing to the value which they themselves attach to genealogy, the social distinctions which they base upon it, and the estimation in which they hold those expert in its intricacies." 6 Since among the Arabian nomadic and seminomadic tribes a knowledge of tribal genealogy has remained to this day such a highly prized accomplishment, every older tribesman has, as a rule, at least some rudimentary idea as to his tribal ancestry and can give some account of his genealogy. Folk memory, however, tends to simplify the complex family trees of both individuals and tribes, with the result that several links, representing a generation

i8o

Golden River to Golden Road

each, arc often omitted and several centuries of tribal history telescoped into a few brief generations. 7 This reduction in depth is paralleled by a reduction in breadth, that is, by a simplification of the complicated structure of tribal relationships, and notably by a parallel arrangement of tribal groups into coequal elements, although originally the actual relationship may have been that of subordination of the one to the other. In this manner a complicated vertical structure is transformed by popular tradition into a relatively simple horizontal one. 8 In addition to this simplified tribal genealogy, the more complete and probably more faithful tradition of the origins and relationship of the tribe is also as a rule preserved by one or two individuals in each tribe who are specialists in tribal lore. Since genealogic knowledge is of special importance for the families of shaykhs, whose main claim for chieftainship rests in many cases solely on their descent, these genealogical specialists, called nassaba, usually are members of shaykhly families. 9 A recurrent feature of these genealogic traditions, whether popular or learned, is that in all parts of the Middle East they group the tribes, and in many cases the settled population as well, into two factions or moieties. Both the specialists and the laymen in every tribe know to which of the two locally prevailing groups their tribe belongs. An additional characteristic of this genealogic dichotomy is that frequently it has developed into a political bisection and that often tribes or tribal groups belonging genealogically to one moiety have become politically attached to and incorporated into the other. A third, even more remarkable characteristic is that in spite of the all-pervading importance of religion in Middle Eastern culture as a divisive force, groups belonging to different religious sects or even to altogether different religions are often parts of the same moiety, and conversely, that members of the same sect or faith belong to both moieties. Finally, moiety adherence also cuts across the omnipresent threefold division of Middle Eastern populations into nomadic, agricultural, and urban aggregates. The political-genealogic dichotomy of Middle Eastern society must therefore be regarded as a social phenomenon independent of and at cross purposes with all the other classificatory developments of the area.

I8I

Dual Organization

A f u r t h e r general characteristic of this dichotomy is its rea p p e a r a n c e on various levels of traditional Middle Eastern social structure, beginning with the largest social units produced by Middle Eastern society and down to the hamula, the genetic kinship g r o u p or lineage. T h e prevalent pattern is that of continued bifurcation, dividing the largest unit into two, and so forth, until the smallest group comprising only a few extended families is reached. With regard to the nomadic a n d seminomadic tribes of the A r a b i a n Peninsula (including the Syrian Desert), a preliminary count showed that this type of d u a l tribal structure is at least twice as frequent as all the other n o n d u a l (unal or plural) tribal structures together, or that at least two thirds of all the Arabian tribes possess a dual organization. T h e dual system itself is at least several centuries older t h a n Islam. T h e sixth-century Byzantine historian Procopius mentions that the Homeritae (Himyarites, a subdivision of Q a h t á n ) were the overlords of the M a d d e n i (i.e., the Ma'addites), a northern people. 1 0 T h e A r a b tradition therefore has a solid historical basis in speaking of the early wars in which the M a ' a d d strove to throw off the Himyarite yoke. 1 1 As to the other Islam-dominated countries, one cannot at this stage answer satisfactorily the question of whether the dual organization was introduced into them by the spread of Islam or whether it h a d existed before and was ultimately derived from an ancient Near Eastern, possibly Egyptian prototype. T h e fact, however, remains that local dual organizations exist all over the Middle East, f r o m the Golden River to the Golden R o a d , and that the A r a b genealogists of the Middle Ages unhesitantly assigned every Arab, Arabicized, or Islamicized tribe to one of the two A r a b ancestral stocks.

GENEALOGIC TRADITIONS

As to the Arabian tribes themselves, the efforts of the A r a b genealogists of the first Islamic century were directed toward two goals: first, to assign every A r a b i a n tribe to either of two ancestral lines converging ultimately in two eponymous ancestors; and, secondly, to identify these two ancestors as sons or

Golden River to Golden Road

182

descendants of early heroes mentioned in the Bible, in the Book of Genesis. A l t h o u g h m u c h o f the resulting genealogic structure must be regarded as an artificial device resorted to in order to carry through consistently a preconceived rigid genealogic scheme, there can be no doubt as to the actual division of the early A r a b i a n population into two great stocks, nor as to the persistence in later A r a b i a n p o p u l a r thought o f the tradition of the dual descent. 1 2 Orientalists and Islamists h a v e devoted m u c h attention to the question of w h e t h e r the present patrilineal descent, whose prevalence is well attested since the beginnings of Islam in the seventh century, was p r e c e d e d b y an older matrilineal system. T h i s problem, however, has no direct bearing u p o n the subject dealt w i t h here, for b y the time the p o p u l a r A r a b genealogies b e c a m e crystallized, there w a s an o v e r w h e l m i n g consensus that every tribe was composed of the descendants in the m a l e line of one single m a n : the e p o n y m o u s tribal ancestor. T w o

related

tribes were (and are to this d a y ) generally regarded as the patrilineal descendants of two brothers, whose father, in turn, was the brother of another e p o n y m o u s hero, the progenitor of one or more additional tribes, not quite as closely related to the first one. T h e logical

conclusion

of

this

farther and farther back

speculative

genealogic

penetration

into early legendary history was

to

arrive at two individuals, the first ancestors of the t w o a l l - A r a b i a n moieties. T h e first of these w a s Q_ahtan, ancestor of all the South A r a b i a n tribes, and the second ' A d n a n , ancestor of all the N o r t h A r a b i a n tribes. Q a h t á n was identified with the Biblical Y o q t a n (Gen. 10 : 25), son o f ' E b h e r (in A r a b i c ' A b a r ) , son of Shelah (Shalakh), son of Arpakhshad

(Arfakhshad), son of S h e m (Sam),

son of

Noah

(Nüh) (Gen. 10 : 1, 2 1 - 2 5 ) . A l t h o u g h there is no further correspondence

between

the

sons of Y o q t a n

as e n u m e r a t e d

in

Genesis and as a p p e a r i n g in the traditional g e n e a l o g y of the South A r a b i a n tribes, it is interesting to note that Biblical exegesis identifies several of the Y o q t a n i d e s with South A r a b i a n tribal or regional n a m e s . 1 3 A tribal federation, called Q a h t á n or Y a m a n (meaning south) actually existed in pre-Islamic times, and still occupies a considerable area southeast of M e c c a . E a r l y in the M u s l i m period,

Dual Organization

1*3

Qahtán was divided into two parts: the one, called Kahlán, was the larger group, comprising mostly nomadic and seminomadic tribes, while the other, called Himyar, was a smaller group, consisting mostly of settled peoples. 14 'Adnán, the father of all the North Arabian tribes, is regarded by A r a b genealogists as the son of Ishmael (Ismá'íl), son of Abraham. Of the ten sons of 'Adnán, 1 5 Ma'add, through his son Nizár, became the progenitor of the North Arabians. Two of Nizár's sons, Rabl'a and Mudar, are regarded as the ancestors of most northern tribes, that is, the tribes who inhabited in preIslamic days the northern half of the Arabian peninsula as far south as the 22nd or the 21st parallel N. Probably the most famous and noble of the northern tribes were those known collectively as Qays, after the name of their eponymous ancestor varyingly called Qays 'Aylán, son of Mudar, or Qays son of 'Aylán, son of M u d a r . 1 6 The totality of northern tribes is called either 'Adnan, in which case the southern group as a whole is referred to as Qahtán, or Qays, in which case the opposite moiety is called Yaman (Yemen). The northern tribes, in addition, are also referred to as Ma'add, or Nizár, or Mudar tribes. Since Qahtán belonged, according to the Bible, to the fifth generation after Noah, while 'Adnán lived in the 12th generation after Noah, the Qahtán or southern tribes were regarded as constituting the older or true aboriginal Arab stock (al-'Arab al-áriba), while the northern 'Adnánis were considered as the younger group, as merely Arabicized (al-'Arab al-musta'riba) peoples. 17 E T H N I C M O V E M E N T S AND P O L I T I C A L DUALISM

Whatever the historical kernel of this tradition of dual descent, it seems certain that 'Adnán (northern) and Qahtán (southern) tribal groups were "separated even in pre-Islamic times by racial hatred, perhaps originally mainly based on the opposition between the desert and the sown." 1 8 The original home of the southern tribes was Southern Arabia, and more specifically its southwestern corner, roughly corresponding to the area occupied today by the Kingdom of Yemen. Emigrations of southern tribes from

Golden River to Golden Road

I84

this corner of the A r a b i a n peninsula took place at an early date. T o w a r d the end of the third c e n t u r y A.D., w h e n the famous d a m o f M a ' r i b was destroyed, a Y a m a n i tribe fled the c o u n t r y and settled in the H a w r a n and al-Balqa districts of Syria. Even earlier than

these, several other Y a m a n i

tribes settled in the fertile

region west of the Euphrates (modern I r a q ) , and some of these later moved on to southern L e b a n o n where their descendants profess to this d a y the D r u z e religion. 1 9 W h i l e these examples illustrate the pre-Islamic establishment o f southern tribes in the very midst of northern regions,

the

ethnic movements of the northern tribes can also be followed back to almost as remote a period. A r a b tradition has it that the Q a y s tribe itself, the m a i n prototype northern

division,

originally

and protagonist of the

inhabited

the

low

parts

of

the

T i h a m a district in southwestern A r a b i a and was thus a close n e i g h b o r of the Y a m a n i tribes. In the sixth century,

however,

Q a y s tribes were already found spread over vast areas in northern a n d central A r a b i a .

Mohammed

(570-632)

himself

belonged,

w i t h his tribe, the Q u r a y s h , to the northern group, a l t h o u g h not to the Q a y s , but to its el-Yas b r a n c h . T h e people of

Medina

(north of M e c c a ) , however, w h o were the first supporters (Ansar) of M o h a m m e d after his flight from M e c c a (the so-called H i j r a , in 622), were of Q a h t a n i southern origin whose readiness to rally behind

Mohammed

may

well

have

been

motivated

traditional rivalry between them and the northern

by

the

Qurayshites

o f M e c c a w h o originally opposed M o h a m m e d . T h i s

historical

accident u n d o u b t e d l y played a significant role in s h a r p e n i n g the conflict between the two groups, for each felt that it h a d a v a l i d c l a i m to superiority: the northerners on account of their g e n e a logic relationship to the Prophet, and the southerners on a c c o u n t o f the incontestable merit of h a v i n g been his first supporters. A l t h o u g h Islam b r o u g h t in m a n y places a tremendous superiority to the ' A d n a n (northern) faction, tribal rivalry b e c a m e m o r e pointed as a result of political developments in the first few decades after the death of M o h a m m e d ; a n d after the battle of M a r j R a h i t (in 65/685) the tendency to form tribal federations b e c a m e even more intensified. T h i s was a period of c a l c u l a t e d re-alignments. T h e

powerful tribal groups of T a m i m

(in

Khurasan,

Dual Organization Iran), Q a y s , and M u d a r joined forces and constituted the northern faction, while the A z d , the Y a m a n i s , and later the Syrian Q u d a ' a (or K a l b ) lined up against them as the southern moiety. T h e effects of this dual grouping of the most powerful tribal federations was to bisect the entire A r a b world, and to wipe out, temporarily at least, other local antagonisms. 2 0 T h e spread of Islam and the great social and political upheavals that accompanied it resulted in the uprooting of m a n y tribes and in forced or voluntary migrations. These ethnic movements effected a further throwing together and mixing up of northern and southern tribes. U n d e r the early Caliphs, considerable numbers of southern groups were found throughout Syria, in Mesopotamia (including large factions of the population of a l - K u f a and al-Basra), in Bahrein, in Isfahan. F r o m Basra they penetrated even distant K h u r a s a n where the Azdites and the R a b i ' a (Bakr) were included a m o n g t h e m . 2 1 H a n d in hand with actual dislocations and ethnic movements went the fictitious assignment of northern or southern genealogy to newly conquered or converted populations. In general, all the native peoples of the northern provinces, such as the Nabateans of Idumea, as well as the inhabitants of the northernmost oasis outposts such as Palmyra, came to be regarded as sons o f ' A d n a n , that is, as belonging to the northern stock. While geographically the distinction between southern and northern tribes lost its meaning as a result of such ethnic movements and countermovements, the traditional A r a b emphasis on nobility of descent kept the memory of the dual origin alive down to the present time. As late as the end of the nineteenth century all the noble A r a b tribes regarded themselves as the descendants of either Q a h t a n or Ishmael, 2 2 that is, as either southerners or northerners. U n d e r the U m a y y a d Caliphs, w h o took wives from both factions, the hostilities between the two led to intermittent and often extremely bloody strife. T h e reigning Caliph was constrained to rely altcrnatingly on either the Q a y s or the K a l b ( Y a m a n ) for support. In the latter part of the U m a y y a d period especially, the Caliph appeared to be "rather the head of a particular party than the sovereign of a united e m p i r e . " 2 3 Between 719 and 745,

i86

Golden River to Golden Road

that is, within 26 years, the actual control of the government passed five times from one faction to the other. 14 The repeated alliances of the Qaysite Umayyad dynasty with the Yamanis shows the diminishing importance of the genealogic as against the political factor in the constitution of the two parties. Moreover, it repeatedly happened that individuals and groups, and even the reigning monarch himself, changed party allegiance for material or political reasons. Thus the Caliph Hisham was at the beginning of his rule a YamanI but later declared himself to be a Qaysite for what seemed to be purely pecuniary reasons. In 734, he appointed a Qaysite governor of Africa, who, upon finding only two small Qaysite tribes in Egypt, promptly imported 1,300 poor Qaysi families, thus to strengthen his popular support. 25 In general, however, party allegiance was a serious matter that often led to hostilities and bloodshed in all parts of the expanding domains of Islam. The district of Damascus became the scene of relentless warfare for two years because a Ma'addite (northerner) had stolen a melon from a Yamanite's (southerner's) garden. In Murcia in Spain blood is said to have flowed for several years because a Mudarite (northerner) picked a vine leaf from the yard of a Yamanite. The beginning of the ninth century saw a seven-year war fought between the Yamanites and the Ma'addites. Toward the end of the same century, in the province of Elvira in Spain, the rivalry between the two parties almost cost the Arabs their rule of the entire province. 26 "Everywhere, in the capital as well as in the provinces, on the banks of the Indus, the shores of Sicily and the borders of the Sahara, the ancestral feud, transformed into an alignment of two political parties, one against the other, made itself felt. It proved a potent factor in ultimately arresting the progress of Moslem arms in France and in the decline of the Andalusian caliphate." 27 O M A N AND T H E E A S T C O A S T OF A R A B I A

The preponderance of the political over the genealogic factor characterizes the dual organization of the 1 1 8 tribes of Oman, in the southeastern part of the Arabian peninsula, at the present time. The Oman tribes belong to either of two factions, called

Dual

Organization

H i n a w i a f t e r the p o w e r f u l B e n ! H i n a tribe, a n d G h a f i r i , a f t e r t h e strong BenI G h a f i r tribe, respectively. T h e s e n a m e s h a v e

been

c u r r e n t in O m a n for at least t w o h u n d r e d y e a r s . P r i o r to t h a t time, the H i n a w l s used to b e k n o w n for c e n t u r i e s as Y a m a n l s , a n d w e r e identified as southerners, w h i l e the G h a f i r i s w e r e k n o w n as N i z a r i s a n d northerners. T h e H i n a w i f a c t i o n , w h i c h is t h e m o r e p o w e r f u l o f the t w o , comprises, g e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , tribes o f s o u t h e r n or Q a h t a n i g e n e a l o g y ; w h i l e t h e m a j o r i t y o f the G h a f i r i tribes are o f ' A d n a n I or n o r t h e r n o r i g i n . O f the Oman

111

tribes w h o s e p a r t y affiliation a n d t r a d i t i o n a l o r i g i n

k n o w n , 61

b e l o n g t o d a y to the H i n a w i p a r t y . O f these,

ever,

53 are

only

of traditionally

southern

(Qahtani)

are how-

origin

w h i l e the r e m a i n i n g eight tribes, a l t h o u g h at p r e s e n t b e l o n g i n g to the H i n a w i f a c t i o n , are k n o w n to b e o f n o r t h e r n

('AdnanI)

descent. C o n v e r s e l y , o f the 50 tribes m a k i n g u p the p r e s e n t s t r e n g t h o f the G h a f i r i p a r t y , o n l y 44 are o f n o r t h e r n o r i g i n , w h i l e t h e r e m a i n i n g six are o f southern origin. T h e s e

figures

s h o w t h a t in

the case o f a c o n s i d e r a b l e p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e tribes p o l i t i c a l c o n siderations h a v e o v e r r i d d e n traditional ties o f d e s c e n t a n d resulted in a s w i t c h o f a l l e g i a n c e . T h e f o l l o w i n g p a r t i c u l a r s will c o n t r i b u t e to o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f these r e l a t i v e l y f r e q u e n t c h a n g e s o f f a c t i o n a l a l l e g i a n c e

in

O m a n . T h e l a r g e r a n d m o r e p o w e r f u l tribes o f the s a m e f a c t i o n are m o s t l y in a l l i a n c e or in l e a g u e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r in

each

district. T h e p u r p o s e o f these alliances, c a l l e d in A r a b i c stiff, is p r i m a r i l y p o l i t i c a l : t h e y are defense alliances w i t h m u t u a l c o m m i t m e n t s to c o m e to the aid o f one a n o t h e r if a t t a c k e d . w e a k e r tribes l i v i n g in the p r o x i m i t y o f these p o w e r f u l

The allied

tribes h a v e no c h o i c e but to p l a c e themselves u n d e r their p r o tection in a client-master relationship k n o w n

also f r o m

other

regions of the M i d d l e East. W h a t e v e r the o r i g i n a l d e s c e n t o f s u c h weaker

tribes,

they

must

ally

themselves

politically

with

the

p o w e r f u l suff in w h o s e s h a d o w they d w e l l , a n d u l t i m a t e l y affiliate themselves w i t h their political faction. I n o t h e r cases the r e a s o n for a f f i l i a t i n g oneself w i t h the opposite f a c t i o n lies in

internal

q u a r r e l s b e t w e e n t w o sections of a tribe, as a result o f w h i c h t h e w e a k e r section is constrained to seek the h e l p o f its t r a d i t i o n a l e n e m i e s against its b r o t h e r tribe.

i88

Golden River to Golden Road

T h e district alliances of tribes belonging to the same faction constitute a country-wide coalition of the Hinawi and Ghafiri factions respectively. In spite of the obviously political coloring of these two factions, in the popular thinking of the tribes themselves they are held together by the ties of kinship. The relationship between the two factions is that of traditional hostility and undisguised antagonism, "keeping the country in perpetual turmoil and disruption through their jealous feuds and hatreds, and this undying enmity is the key to the internal history of the land." 2 8 T h e enmity between the two factions is so keen that a stranger wishing to travel among the tribes must take along both a Hinawi and a Ghafiri guide to serve as guarantors of his safety. There is no clear-cut geographic division between the two factions, although the Hinawi predominate in the southeast including the Batina coast, and the Ghafiri in the northwest, as well as in the central tribal block. T h e intermingling of the two factions throughout the country usually takes the form of groups of villages belonging to one of them and maintaining a constant state of feud with a neighboring group of villages belonging to the other. Often a single town or village is split into two by allegiance to the two factions, and the tension and hostility between the two are intensified when, owing to its location, one of the two moieties is able to control the water supply of the whole settlement. T h e town of Nizwa, for example, which formerly was the capital of Oman, was torn for a long time by the strife between the Bern Hina who inhabited the lower town and the Ben! Riyam who occupied the upper town and were able to cut off the water supply from the lower town. 29 The religion of the majority in both factions is the IbadI sect of Islam. But among the Hinawi almost three quarters of the tribes are IbadI and only one quarter Sunni Muslim, while among the Ghafiri some 60 per cent are IbadI and 40 per cent Sunni. A few Ghafiri tribes (notably the BenI Rasib and BenI Bu 'All) follow the puritanistic WahhabI crced of Central Arabia. The Hinawi and Ghafiri division cuts also across Trucial Oman, where, however, the Hinawi are Malik! Sunnls, and the Ghafiri virtually YVahhabls. 30

Dual Organization

l8g

In the eighteenth century there was a civil war and a dynastic squabble over succession in O m a n between the Hinawi and the Ghafiri factions, but the existence of the dual division and the tension still characterizing the relationship between the two, cannot be attributed to this cause alone. Interesting are the instances in which traditions contrary to the generally prevalent belief in the tribal origin of the dual organization of O m a n have remained alive in certain tribes. T h e D a r u ' and the Manahil, for instance, although belonging to opposite moieties, maintain a tradition of common origin. 3 1

T H E S O U T H COAST OF A R A B I A

While the eastern section of the south of Arabia forms part of O m a n , the central and western regions constitute the Eastern and Western Aden Protectorates respectively. This entire region is inhabited by both settled agriculturist and nomadic pastoral populations, both organized on a tribal basis. T h e typical South Arabian social organization is a tribal confederation, headed by a sultan, and consisting of nomadic tribes, agricultural villages, as well as a few towns. Very often these tribal confederations have a dual character. T h e two over-all parties to either of which the individual confederations belong are called in the H a d h r a m a u t ( H a d r a m a w t ; the central part of the South Arabian coastal region) Yafa' and H a m d a n . All the free tribes boast of belonging to one of these two factions, and only the lower classes of society such as the lowcaste inhabitants of Shihr and other nontribesmen are not directly involved in this dichotomy. 3 2 Both the Yafa' and the H a m d a n belong to the southern division, that is, regard themselves as the descendants of Q a h t a n . Saba (who was the son o f Y a s h j u b son of Ya'rub son of Qahtan) had two sons, H i m y a r and Kahlan by name. 3 3 These two are claimed to be the ancestors of the Yafa' and H a m d a n respectively. T h e ultimately common origin of the two sections does not, of course, prevent them from continuing in a state of unceasing rivalry, enmity, and open hostility. T h e most powerful group of the Himyari Yafa' confederation

igo

Golden River to Golden Road

is the section that has retained the original name of Yafa'. The powerful and warlike Yafa' confederation, comprising more than one hundred thousand souls, occupies a considerable tract of land to the northeast of Aden town, just south of the frontier of the Aden Protectorate. It consists of two sections: the Upper Yafa' in the north, and the Lower Yafa' in the south. The chief tribes of the Upper Yafa' are the Mausata, Dhubl, Maflahi, Bo'sl and Da'udi; those of the Lower Yafa' are the Kaladi, Yahari, Sa'di, Yazldl and Ban! 'Afif. Other tribes belonging to the Yafa' group include the Ahl Ardi. 34 Schematic Genealogical Table of the Tribes of Hadhramaut Qahtan

I"

Ya'rub Yashjub Saba

Kahlän

Himyar

Zavd Dheaybi

Yafa'

Upper Yafa'

Yafa'

Ahl Yazid

Fadll

Laqmush

Yahar

Lower Yafa'

Ahi Sa'ad

Mahra

'AwlaqI I

Upper 'AwlaqI

Hamdän

Qa'ayti

Lower 'Avvlaqi

Kathlr

'Amr 'Awàmir

Al-Rashid

Western Kathlrl

Eastern Kathlrl

Bayt I mani

191

Dual Organization

To the northeast of Aden town lies the port of Shaqra or Sughrah, which is the center of another confederation of tribes of Himyari descent constituting the Sultanate of Fadli. The Fadli are divided into numerous sections, one of the largest of which, the Merákash (sing. Merkáshi) was known for the loose morality of its women and the survival of several matriarchal or matrilineal traits. 35 T o the north of the Fadli is the 'Awdhali Sultanate, named after the 'Awdhilla tribe. It includes the Dathlna district, inhabited by two great tribal confederations, the Ahl al-Sa'Id! and the 'Olah ('olah, 'Ulah). The 'Olah again are divided into two groups: the 'Olah al-Kor, inhabiting the Kor (Kawr) Mountain, and the 'Olah al-Bahr, or Sea-'Olah. The former comprises five, the latter eight tribes. According to the genealogic traditions of the 'Olah, they all are the descendants of 'Olah who was the grandson of Madhij, and who had two sons, Sa'Id el-Buqeyrát, from whom three of the 'Olah tribes are descended, and 'All el-Buqeyrat, who became the ancestor of all the other 'Olah tribes. 36 To the north of the 'Awdhali Sultanate, and separated from it by an eastern tongue of Yemen, is the independent territory of Bayhán in the Western Aden Protectorate. This territory comprises two parts: Bayhán al-Asfal (with four districts), and Bayhán al-Qasáb, inhabited by the tribe of al-Mus'abayn. As the name indicates ("the two Mus'abs"), this tribe consists of two moieties, descended from the two sons of the original progenitor, Mus'ab: Ahmed, vulgarly called Homeyd, became the ancestor of the Á1 Ahmed, and 'Arif the father of the Á1 'Arlf. Each of the two sons, in turn, had four sons, to whom the eight subtribes trace their descent. 37 The accompanying diagram shows the structure of the Mus'abayn. Muj'abayn

Ä1 Ahmed

'Abdallah Salim

Ä1 'Arif

Ii L

Ghänim

Na'Im

£ iL Ii li

Mansür

Faraj

Rigäb

Hädi

Golden River to Golden Road T o the northeast of the F a d l i is the ' A w l a q i tribal confederation consisting of Y a f a ' i H i m y a r i t e tribes. It is divided into two sultanates: to the north is that of the U p p e r ' A w l a q i , called ' A w l a q i el-Nisab or ' A w l a q i a l - ' A l i y u , a n d to the south, on the coast, that o f the L o w e r ' A w l a q i , called ' A w l a q i ' A l i Nasir or ' A w l a q i Ba K a z i m . T h e U p p e r ' A w l a q i are again subdivided into two parts, the Ben! M a ' a n (or M a ' a m ; comprising 18 tribes) in the southeast, and the M a h a j i r (23 tribes) in the north, each with a separate ruler of its o w n , b u t both c l a i m i n g Y a f a ' i descent. T h e

Lower

' A w l a q i also fall into t w o sections, each with m a n y subdivisions, called Ba K a z i m and L a q m u s h (or Q u m u s h ) respectively. 3 8 T h e H a m m a m of the W a d l H a m m a m

and W a d l M a r k h a are an

' A w l a q i tribe w h o do not a c k n o w l e d g e

the suzerainty of the

' A w l a q i Sultan of A n s a b ( N i s a b ) . T h e ruling family of Nisab claims descent from a J a u f i ancestry. 3 9 T o the east of the ' A w l a q i on the coast is another H i m y a r i t e confederation, the D h e a y b l (or D h i a y b l , D h i e b i ) , or

Himyar;

they used the w o r d " h i m y a r " as their war-cry. T h i s tribal confederation, w h i c h regards itself as kin to the L a q m u s h ( Q u m u s h ) , is divided into t w o factions: the G r e a t H i m y a r (Himyar al-kubra), whose territory touches u p o n the Y a f a ' to the west, and

the

Little H i m y a r (Himyar al-sughra) w h o inhabit the W a d l H a l b a n a n d its vicinity, and w h o , in turn, are subdivided into five tribes. 4 0 T h e eastern neighbor of the D h e a y b l or H i m y a r is one of the most powerful Y a f a ' i tribes, the Q a ' a y t l , w h i c h occupies the seashore around the towns of M u k a l l a and Shiheir (Shihr), as well as the hinterland as far north as S h i b a m and H a u r a h . A l l these townships, as well as the towns of H o j a r e i n and Q a t a n and the entire intervening territory belongs to the Q a ' a y t l a n d constitutes the Q a ' a y t l sultanate of M u k a l l a . 4 1 East of the Q a ' a y t l , on the coast, the M a h r a , a large tribe n u m b e r i n g several thousands, occupies an extensive steppe area. T h i s tribe does not speak A r a b i c , b u t retains its ancient H i m yarite dialect, as well as several archaic customs (such as taking their mothers' names instead o f their fathers'), a n d prides itself o n the antiquity of its g e n e a l o g y c l a i m i n g descent f r o m ' A d ibn A w s i b n l r e m ibn S h a m (Shem) ibn N u h ( N o a h ) . 4 2 T h i s g e n e a l o g y is, of course, a strongly a b b r e v i a t e d or telescoped version of a

Dual Organization

193

fuller tribal family tree that has been reconstructed as follows: M a h r a b. H e y d a n b. ' A m r b. el-Hafi b. Q u d a ' a b. Malik b. ' A m r b. M u r r a b. Zeyd b. Malik b. H i m y a r . 4 3 T h e M a h r a tribal confederation consists of four divisions called 'usebat: Bin Gesus, Shehshihi, Bin Sar, a n d Bin Boqi bin Ahmed, each one of w h o m comprises numerous tribes. T h e M a h r a confederation is ruled by the Bin Afrar family (claiming relationship with the Beni Alif of the Lower Yafa') which is divided into two branches: the senior branch, called Sa'd bin Towar, residing in Soqotra, and the junior branch, ' A m r bin Towar, ruling for the sultan in M a h r a l a n d itself. 44 While the western part of South Arabia, including the Western Aden Protectorate, is thus found to belong traditionally to the H i m y a r moiety of Q a h t a n (with a few exceptions to be noted later), the predominant element in the central and eastern parts of the Eastern Aden Protectorate is the K a h l a n moiety of Q a h t a n , or more precisely, the H a m d a n elements of K a h l a n . According to the traditional genealogy, H a m d a n , who was a sixth generation descendant of K a h l a n , 4 5 had two sons, K a t h l r and ' A m r . 4 8 T h e descendants of K a t h l r are the Kathlri, the powerful eastern neighbors of the Himyarite Q a ' a y t i in the H a d h r a m a u t , 4 7 who occupy not only the greater part of Central H a d h r a m a u t including the H a d h r a m I towns of Seyyun (or Saiun), T e r i m , and Ghurfa, but also the entire coastal district of Zufar. T h e b o u n d a r y between the two groups runs in a southeasterly direction between the Q a ' a y t i town of Shibam and the Kathlri town of Seyyun, the seat of the Kathlri sultan. These two towns are located at a distance of a mere ten miles from each other. These two tribes " a r e extremely hostile to each o t h e r . " 4 8 T h e K a t h l r i themselves fall into two sections, the western of which, inhabiting Central H a d h r a m a u t , is headed by the Kathlri Sultan of Seyyun (whose traditional rival is the Q a ' a y t i sultan of Mukalla), while the eastern section, located around the Z u f a r coast, is ruled by the governor of Z u f a r who is a representative of the Sultan of O m a n . 4 9 T h e K a t h l r i Sultanate of Seyyun consists, in addition to the towns a n d villages of Seyyun, T a r i m , Taris, al-Ghurfa, M a n a m a , and A1 Gheil, also of a confederation of a considerable n u m b e r of tribal groups, the Kathlri, the

194

Golden River to Golden Road

'Awamir, the Jabiri, and the Bajri. 50 The Eastern Kathlri are again subdivided into two divisions, both of whom are represented in seven villages of the ?ufar coast and are called 'Omar bin Kathir or al-'Umar and 'Amr bin Kathir or Al 'Amr, respectively. The same two tribes inhabit also al-Ghurfa and Ahl Fas (two villages between Shibam and Seyyun) and are constandy at feud with each other. 51 The traditional rivals of the Kathlri are the Qara who are wedged in between them and the al-Rashid, an independent section of the Kathir!. Al-Rashid occupies a territory contiguous to the central portion of the Kathlri country. The traditional enemies of al-Rashid are the Sa'ar (or Say'ar) in the northern Hadhramaut, to the west of al-Rashid and to the northeast of the town of Seyyun. Another independent section of the Kathlri is the Bayt Imani. 52 So much for the Kathir moiety of Hamdan. The 'Amr moiety of Hamdan claims descent from 'Amr ibn Hamdan. The main representative of this moiety is the 'Awamir confederation located in three separate areas: (i) al-Qaff, from the Wad! Hadhramaut as far north as the southern edge of the Rub' al-Khali; (2) al-Zafra between Qatar and al-Burayml; and (3) Oman. Although the three parts of the tribe have little contact with one another, a twofold division into Al Badr and Al Lazz runs through all of them. 53 The genealogic affiliation of the other Hadhrami tribes is not clear, but one can assume that they too belong to the Himyar or Kahlan moieties of Qahtan. This country lies close to the Oman border and the typical Oman dichotomy into Hinawl and Ghafiri is found in it as well. Thus the Harasi, Afar, Manahil, and the 'Awamir and al-Kathir themselves are said to belong to the Hinawl, while the Daru', the Albu Shamis, and even the more distantly western Say'ar are regarded as Ghafiri, their avowedly Qahtan! descent notwithstanding. Here, however, as distinct from Oman proper, these labels have no political significance, and instead of the factional solidarity that is supreme in Oman, allegiance follows genealogic lines. 54 The Say'ar, probably identical with the Ausaretae mentioned by Pliny, claim to be ultimately descended from the Qahtan tribe through an ancestor named Mighdad al-Aswad, who is

Dual Organization

195

said to have been a Companion of the Prophet. O n e of the Say'ar tribes is the al-Junaybir which moved from the Hadhramaut to the N a j r a n area within Saudi Arabia. T h e main tribal area of the Say'ar lies to the east of that of the D a h m and to the north of the Hadhramaut valley. T h e Hadhramaut Say'ar are divided into two sections, a semisettled element (of which the A l 'Abdullah bin ' A u n are a constituent tribe) called Ahl Hatim, centering around a scattered group of hamlets called Raydat A h l Hatim, and ruled by two leading chieftains; and a purely nomadic section called A h l bil-Layth whose chieftain has his semipermanent headquarters, called Raydat A h l bil-Layth, at wells located some 25 to 30 miles east of Raydat A h l Hatim. T h e two village groups together are known as Raydat al-Say'ar in the W a d i Makhya. Another Say'ar tribe is the A l BaqI Msellem one of whose two chiefs resides in Ba Rumeydan due north of Wadi Hadhramaut. 6 5 T o the east of the Say'ar stretches the territory of yet another dual confederation, that of the Mishqas. T h e southern Mishqas confederation embraces all non-Kathlrl elements south of the eastern section of the Hadhramaut valley. T h e Humumi are one of these tribes, with the Ba-Ahsan as one of its clans. T h e northern Mishqas comprise the Manahil, 'Awamir, and T a m i m tribes. 58

YEMEN

T h e available information on the tribal organization in the K i n g d o m of Yemen is very fragmentary. The Handbook of Arabia enumerates 74 tribes or tribal confederations in Yemen, but it states only occasionally how these units are structured, that is how many and what kind of subdivisions they comprise. As to the tribal genealogy—this is mentioned in two or three cases only. Nor is information available as to the presence or absence of the dual organization. A m o n g the tribes claiming a definitely southern origin are the following: Bekll, Hamdan, Hashid, K h a u l a n , Ben! Murra. As against these, the following seem to be of northern extraction: A l 'Absi or 'Absiyah, 'Anaza, Beni Isma'Il, Beni Qays. Dual division within each of the two moieties is found among several tribes. T h e most important of these is that of Hashid and

ig6

Golden River to Golden Road

Bekil. According to tribal traditions, Hamdan begot Jusham who begot Hashid el-Akbar who begot Bekil. Another version of the tradition has it that Hashid and Bekil were the two sons of Babrosham and his wife, the princess Nejema, who came from Anatolia to Yemen. The Hashid tribes counted 22,000 armed men in the first quarter of the twentieth century, while the Bekil at the same time counted 80,000. Both the Hashid and the Bekil follow the Zaydl sect. They live in the area called Balad Hamdan (to the north of the capital, San'a), the eastern part of which belongs to the Bekil and the western to the Hashid. In spite of the traditional close relationship between the two groups, their attitude toward each other has been that of enmity which occasionally erupted into fighting, as, for example, in 1885, when there was a bloody war between the two. 67 It is interesting to note that among the Hashid a threefold division is found, instead of the more common dual one. The whole of the Hashid is divided into three groups: al-Kharif, Beni Suraym, and al-'Usaymat. Al-Kharif again is subdivided into three subgroups, the tribes of Jubar, Kalbiyin, and al-Sayad. The Beni Suraym is subdivided into nine (three times three) groups, called tsi'e or ninth; and the 'Usaymat are subdivided again into three groups. These threefold divisions are called thulth, third. 58 Among several other Yemenite tribes the usual dual division is found. The Ahl 'Amraar, the 'Anaza, the Hamdan, the Khaulan, and the Beni Sa'fan are each subdivided into two groups. In two cases at least this subdivision has a geographic connotation: the two subdivisions of the Hamdan are called Hamdan esh-Sham (Hamdan of the North) and Hamdan el-Yemen (Hamdan of the South), respectively. The two subdivisions of the Khaulan are called Khaulan el-Tawal (Long Khaulan), and Khaulan esh-Sham (Khaulan of the North) respectively. 68 'ASIR

North of Yemen on the west coast of the Arabian peninsula lies the province of 'Aslr. In the southern part of 'AsIr the main tribal elements are comprised in a tribal confederation that falls into two main groups: 'Asir al-Hijaz and 'AsIr al-Tihama, the

Dual

197

Organization

f o r m e r o c c u p y i n g the m a i n r a n g e , t h e latter the transverse r a n g e s a n d v a l l e y s b e t w e e n it a n d the coastal p l a i n ( T i h a m a ) . A c c o r d i n g to i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d b y P h i l b y f r o m the elders o f the v i l l a g e S u d a in t h e h i g h l a n d s o f ' A s l r , the ' A s i r a l - H i j a z c o m p r i s e the f o l l o w i n g four tribes: 1. BanI M u g h a y d ; 2. ' A l k a m ; 3. R a b i ' a w a - R u f a y d a ; 4. BanI M a l i k . T h e ' A s i r a l - T i h a m a c o m p r i s e seven t r i b e s : 1. B a n ! Z a y d ; 2. A h l T h a ' l a b ; 3. B a n ! J u n a ; 4. A I - Q a y s ; 5. B a n I Q u t b a ; 6. a l - S h a b a ; a n d 7. B a n I D h a l i m . E a c h o f these eleven

tribes has a s h a y k h o f its o w n

subdivisions. 6 0

a n d comprises

several

A l t h o u g h P h i l b y does n o t specify the g e n e a l o g i c

c l a i m s o f these tribes, w e k n o w t h a t the B a n i M a l i k are o f Q a h t a n stock as a r e the R a b i ' a w a - R u f a y d a . 6 1 The Batti Màlik Tribes Qahtàn Màlik

Mughämir

Khâlid Sa'îd (KhâlidI (Sa'idi section) section)

Kathir

'Alii (Ahl 'Alil)

Ahi Salma

Ya'la

Raym

Ahi Habs

Haris (Banï Harb)

Southern Northern Ban! Harù Banï Haris

Ahl Akàwïn

Yahya (Yahyawï)

Zaydân (Zaydânï)

Ahl 'Amr

Nukhayf

A c c o r d i n g to p o p u l a r t r a d i t i o n , t h e B a n ï M à l i k are the desc e n d a n t s o f an e p o n y m o u s ancestor c a l l e d M a l i k . T h i s M à l i k is

Golden River to Golden Road said to have had two sons, Mughamir and Kathir, who became the progenitors of the two main branches of the present Ban! Malik. M u g h a m i r again h a d two sons: Khalid, father of the present Khalidl, and Sa'id, father of the present Sa'Idl sections of the Ban! Malik. T h e other son of Malik, Kathir, h a d four sons, 'Alii (father of the present Ahl 'Alii), Ya'la, father of the present Ahl Salma and Ahl Habs), Haris (father of the present BenI Haris) and R a y m . R a y m again had three sons, of whom Yahya became the ancestor of the present Yahyawl section, Zaydan that of the present Zaydan! section, while the third, Nukhayf, seems to have had no descendants. T h e Ben! Haris are divided into a southern and a northern branch, called Haris al-Yamanl and Haris am-Hashr, respectively. T h e southern BenI Haris have two main sections: Akawln and Ahl 'Amr. Malik himself belonged to the Khaulan group, and therefore all the BenI Malik are simply a branch of Khaulan. T h e K h a u l a n are descended from K h a u l a n ibn 'Amir. Both the K h a u l a n and the Q a h t a n tribes are jointly regarded as BanI 'Amir. T h e K h a u l a n themselves are divided into two groups: one is the so called Yahanlya group (descended from Yahnawl, son or descendant of Khaulan), which comprises the BanI Malik, BanI J u m a ' a , Ahl Fayfa, as well as a number of additional tribes. T h e other K h a u l a n group is the al-Furud, which comprises four tribal confederations: the Bal GhazI, BanI M u n a b b a , Ashar, and Naslfa. According to the medieval Arab genealogists, K h a u l a n ibn ' A m r was a descendant of Kahlan and the eponymous ancestor of a large tribe that spread from Yemen to Syria and then to Egypt. 6 2 T o the north of this group is the territory of the Shahran tribes, a large and independent group that seems to derive ultimately from Q a h t a n stock. This large tribal confederation, which is headed by a titular shaykh, is traditionally hostile to its northwestern neighbors, the highlanders of 'Aslr. T h e Shahran tribal confederation consists of a large number of tribes, most of which are again subdivided into several sections. Philby mentions the following Shahran tribes: Mu'awya, BanI Sulum, BanI M u n a b b a , Wahib, K u d , Nahas, Rushayd, BanI Bijad, BanI H a m u d h , Ahl Tindaha, Ahl al-Sham (comprising the M a ' r a j , M a ' j u r ,

Dual

Organization

199

'Askar, Wayla, and other subsections), 'Abs, as well as a related Ban! Shihr tribe. 6 3 The Shahran have both settled and nomadic sections. Although no mention of a bisection of the Shahran group is made by Philby, there are certain indications that seem to point in this direction. First of all, one group of the Shahran are called Ahl al-Sham, that is, people of the north, and said to be the offshoot of the Ban! Shihr of northern 'Aslr. This would indicate that other Shahran tribes may be regarded as belonging to a southern section of the confederation. Secondly, several Shahran tribal names (for example, Bani Sulum, 'Abs) reappear farther to the east as tribes of the Qahtan confederation, which is definitely divided into a southern and a northern moiety. The partial affiliation of one and the same tribe with two larger units is a familiar phenomenon also in other parts of Arabia. Thirdly, dual division is the basic form of social organization among all the tribal units of the area (Murra, Qahtan, 'Aslr, and others) and it seems therefore probable that it also existed or still exists among the Shahran. Another descendant of Kahlan, Hamdan, who, as we have seen, is regarded as the eponymous ancestor of one of the two moieties of the south Arabian tribes, reappears in the genealogic traditions of the tribes of 'Aslr and the contiguous section of the R u b ' al-Khali to the east. Hamdan was the son of Malik who was the son of Zayd, but in popular 'Asiri tradition he is known as Hamdan ibn Zayd. 6 4 In the Jauf area near the Yemen-Saudi Arabian border are the Dahm tribes, while the Wada' hold the Dhahran district just north of the Yemen-'Asir frontier. Both these groups are large independent tribal confederations belonging to the Hamdan stock. 65 Another and very widely dispersed branch of the H a m d a n stock is that of the Yam. According to 'Asm tradition, Yam was the son of Yusba' who was the son of Hamdan. Yam himself had two sons, Jusham (popularly pronounced Cham), and Madhkar, who were the progenitors of the two great branches into which the Yam tribes at present are divided. To the Cham (Jusham) group belong the Rizq, Sulum, Ahl al-Harith, and Ahl al-Hindi groups, as well as the very widespread Murra group of eastern

200

Golden River to Golden

Road

R u b ' al-Khall. T h e M a d h k a r group falls into two parts, the M a w a j i d , of which the Beni Nusayd are a subsection, and the A h l Fatima, comprising the descendants of Fatima, the second wife of Madhkar. T h e Ahl Fatima again are subdivided into two groups, called Hisham and Wasil. No information seems to be available of the Wasil, but Hisham is again subdivided into two groups, called ' A j a y m and Wu'ayl. Nothing is known of the ' A j a y m , but the W u ' a y l comprise the following tribes: al-'Arja, al-Rashid, al-Fahhad, al-Mutliq, al-Futayh, al-Hasan, Ibn 'Isa, al-Zayid, al-Wa'la, Ahl H a m a d ibn Fadil, as well as the large and important ' A j m a n tribal federation. 6 6 T h e Ahl Fatima also comprise the Nisiyin, D h a y b a n , and Ahl Hushaysh sections whose nearer affiliation is not known.

The Tam Tribes Zayd Hamdàn

Dahm

Yusba'

Wada'

Yam

Cham (Jusham)

Rizq

Sulum

Ahi al-Hàrith

Madhkar

Ahi Hindi

Murra

Mawajid

Ahl Fatima

5 subtribes A l 'All

Ä1 Shebib

Hisham

Wu'ayl i subtribes

Wasil

'Ajaym

Dual

201

Organization

W i t h regard to the ' A j m a n (or ' U j m a n ) it should be noted that since the eighteenth century they have lived in the H a s a region near the central part of the east coast o f A r a b i a , 6 7 at a distance of some 500 miles from N a j r a n , and yet the tradition of their N a j r a n home and Y a m descent has been preserved to this d a y not only in 'Asir but also a m o n g the ' A j m a n themselves in H a s a . A c c o r d i n g to ' A j m a n tradition the Y a m tribes comprise in addition to themselves also the M u r r a ,

Manasir,

Manahir,

' A w a m i r , R a s h i d , S a y ' a r and K a r a b . 6 8 S u c h recurrences of basically identical tribal traditions in w i d e l y separated areas,

and

g o i n g back to several generations, are calculated to increase our trust in the existence of a historical kernel underlying them. T h e a l - ' A r j a and the al-Rashid, w h o a c c o r d i n g to Philby's informant belong to the A h l

Fatima,69

a p p e a r as two

'Aslri actual

tribal groups related to the ' A j m a n , living in southern T u w e y q , a n d still preserving the m e m o r y of the N a j r a n ! origin. 7 0 O t h e r 'Asir tribes subdivided into two moieties are the following: ' A i r (or Bal-'Air), divided into the n o m a d i c A l ' A m r , and the sedentary al-Nawashirah sections, a total of about 35,000 persons. 'Alkam

(or ' A l k a m

al-Haul),

north of A b h a , divided

into

' A l k a m al-Sahil and ' A l k a m a l - A ' l u n , a total of a b o u t 20,000 persons. G h a m i d , between A b h a and T a i f , subdivided into the settled a l - H a d r and the n o m a d i c A l Siyah sections, at odds with each other. H i l a l , divided into a western p a r t along the coast and

an

eastern part along Hall, a total of a b o u t 35,000. Q a r n (or B a l - Q a r n ) , from southwest of the Bishah valley to the m o u n t a i n slopes, divided into a settled coastal g r o u p and

a

partly n o m a d i c mountain group, a total of a b o u t 40,ooo. 7 1 Before leaving the 'Asir district for a glance at the interior of S o u t h e r n A r a b i a , w h i c h is the present h o m e of the large M u r r a division of the Y a m , of the Q a h t a n , and of the tribes that retained the n a m e Y a m itself, a word must be said about Z a y d , the father (or grandfather) of H a m d a n , ancestor of this large tribal g r o u p . A c c o r d i n g to P h i l b y , this Z a y d w a s identical w i t h Z a y d Hilali, the most famous legendary hero (also called A b u

al-

Zayd

al-Hil3.1I) 72 of the BenI Hilal, about w h o m m a n y colorful legends

202

Golden River to Golden Road

arc still told in Southern Arabia. 7 3 From Philby's wording it does not become clear whether this identification is his own or was done by his 'Aslri informants, in which case it would be a good example of that merging of different historical or legendary figures into one that is characteristics of the working of popular fancy and tradition. T h e BenI Hilal, who in the early Middle Ages left the Yemen'Asir region, invaded Egypt, and spread all over North Africa, were a northern, Qaysi, tribal confederation. 74 Their tribal genealogy is still remembered in Arabia in the usual abridged form as Hilal b. Hawazin b. Qays, 7 5 while the fuller form according to the medieval A r a b genealogists is Hilal b. 'Amir b. Sa'sa'a b. M u ' a w i y a b. Bekr b. Hawazin b. Mansur b. 'Ikrima b. Khasafa b. Qays. 7 6 Obviously therefore Zayd, the progenitor of the important Hamdan section of the Qahtan, cannot be identical with Zayd, leader of the BenI Hilal, an important Qaysi tribal confederation. THE RUB'

AL-KHALI

Under this heading will be treated briefly the tribes inhabiting the entire southern half of the interior of the Arabian Peninsula. In contrast to the large number of small groups with their intricate interrelationship, characterizing the social structure of the coastal sections of Southern Arabia, the interior, most of which is taken up by the R u b ' al-Khali, the Empty Quarter, the great South Arabian Desert, is but sparsely peopled by a few tribes (with several subdivisions, of course), each one of which is undisputed master of a very large if inhospitable tribal area. T h e entire southern part of the R u b ' al-Khali, from Yemen in the west to O m a n in the east, a territory of roughly 150,000 square miles of sandy desert, is held, as far as one can j u d g e from the scarce data available, by the Murra confederation of tribes who trace their descent to 'All al-Murra. 7 7 As to the genealogic connections of the Murra, we have already seen that they are one of the Jusham groups. According to a native authority quoted by Fu'ad Hamza, the Jusham comprise four groups: A l Dimnan, A l Hetele, A l Murra, and A l Hindi. 7 8 O f these four we have already met the Al Hindi of the Najran dis-

Dual

203

Organization

trict. T h e Al Dimnan and Al Hetele, although in the traditional genealogy offered by the native informant they appear as brothers of the Murra, that is, non-Murra tribes who have a common ancestor with the Murra, are today two small subgroups of the M u r r a , still headed each by a shaykh of its own, but numbering only 60 and 50 tents respectively. 79 This change of status of a tribe or subtribe in relation to the larger unit of which it forms a part is characteristic of the vertical mobility of tribal organization. Popular memory retains the older order of several generations ago with which the actual situation m a y be at wide variance. In connection with the M u r r a , the shifting of the position of individual groups within the entire tribal structure can be shown clearly in several cases. T h e accompanying illustration shows the traditional tribal organization of the Murra with its characteristic preponderance of the dual divisions and subdivisions. 80 Yarn J u s h a m (Cham) Murra

Al 'All

el-Ghiyäthln

Al Sheblb

el-Jeräb'a

Al Sa'id

Al Besmr

Al Ghefrän

Al J ä b e r

Al l'ädel A l Y a h y a Al Breyd

Al Fheyde

Al Edhbe

Let us compare with this the actual organization of the M u r r a as found by Philby: 81

Golden River to Golden Road

204

Murra

L

Ghefrän

Il II II

Edhbe

II Ii

Ii Bchéh

Al

al-Jeräb'a

Il II

Al II II Ii Hetcle Dimnàn Jàber Fheyde

II

'Owér Zäyid Man?ür Jfeysh Sa'Id Jheysh Breyd Jibrän Ghiyäthin

II

Zeqème

A comparison of the two genealogies enables us to make several observations with regard to the changes that took place in the structure of the M u r r a in the course of the last few generations. First of all the over-all division into two groups ( A l 'All and A l Sheblb in the first table) disappeared. Secondly, the vertical structure has been changed into a horizontal one: the A l Fheyde and A l Edhbe, for instance, which traditionally figure as subdivisions of the A l Fadel subgroup of the A l Beshlr subtribe of the A l Sa'Id tribe, now appear as full-fledged tribes occupying the same rank as the other Murra tribes, and independent of the A l Sa'Id tribe. An additional change is the breaking up of groups into subgroups, as a result, no doubt, of their growth: A l Edhbe, originally a subordinated subgroup, is now a tribe consisting of two subtribes, the A l Mansur and the A l Jfeysh. Again, some tribes, formerly independent, became subordinated to another tribe as one of its subtribes, probably as a result of a shift in the power relationship: of the two tribes el-Ghiyathln and el-Jerab'a, who formed the A l 'All moiety of the Murra, the Ghiyathln today appears as merely one of the two subtribes forming the el-Jerab'a tribe. It also happens that both a tribe and one of its own subdivisions become two subtribes of equal status of another tribe; this was the case with the A l Sa'Id and the A l Breyd, who today form parts of the A l Beheh tribe of the Murra. That all this is not merely a local and isolated phenomenon will be seen when similar shifts in the North Arabian 'Aneze confederation of tribes will be considered.

II

Hädi

Dual

205

Organization

T h e western neighbors of the M u r r a are the Q a h t a n , o c c u p y i n g the s o m e w h a t less unfriendly region b e t w e e n

'Aslr

(Shahran)

and R i y a d . T h e s e tribes retained the p r o u d ancient n a m e

of

Q a h t a n , although their actual genealogic connection w i t h the pre-Islamic

Qahtan

is, to say

the

least,

doubtful.82

Qahtan

today is one of the strongest confederations o f tribes in C e n t r a l A r a b i a , and as to its prestige in the desert, a c c o r d i n g to D o u g h t y it is " t h e noblest blood of the South A r a b i a n s , " w h i l e

Philby

remarks that it is " t h e most f a m o u s a n d still possibly the greatest of all the A r a b t r i b e s — t h e J o k t a n of G e n e s i s " a n d is " t h e v e r y c r e a m of A r a b tribal c h i v a l r y . " 8 3 N o satisfactory information on the Q a h t a n is a v a i l a b l e .

In

O p p e n h e i m ' s Die Beduinen, basing on a n older list m a d e b y J . J . Hess, the Q a h t a n are divided into three g r o u p s : the first, ' A b i d e , comprising

14 tribes; the second, A l M u h a m m e d ,

comprising

seven tribal confederations (with the n u m b e r of i n d i v i d u a l tribes in each v a r y i n g from three to eight), a n d t w o single tribes; the third, A l el-Jimel, comprising three tribal confederations

(with

three, two, and two tribes) and t w o single tribes. 8 4 A more detailed picture of the western Q a h t a n c a n be pieced together from m a n y

scattered

remarks c o n t a i n e d

in

Philby's

Arabian Highlands. First of all, it appears that the Q a h t a n of the 'Aslr district and its eastern outskirts ( m e r g i n g into the

Rub'

a l - K h a l i ) , are divided into t w o great groups, the Southern Qahtan w i t h a p a r a m o u n t chief of its o w n , residing in the village of Q a u z , and the Northern Qahtan with their p a r a m o u n t chief residing in the K h a r j district. A s the chief tribal confederations b e l o n g i n g to the southern Q a h t a n Philby mentions the ' A b i d a a n d

the

S a n h a n , the latter comprising the Z a h r a , A h l H i r r a n , al-Jabara, a n d possibly also the S h u r a y f tribes. A n o t h e r g r o u p of the Q a h t a n , the J a u b , claims to be the parent stock o f the ' A b i d a , S h u r a y f , a n d BanI Bishr, so w e can also take the J a u b and the B a n ! Bishr as belonging to the southern Q a h t a n . T o the J a u b belongs a subsection, A h l Hasan. T h e general n a m e of the northern Q a h t a n is J a h a d i r . Philby refers to a n u m b e r o f additional i m p o r t a n t , Q a h t a n tribal confederations such as the Beni K a l b or U k l a b , the S a ' d , the Ben! S u l u m , th? R u f a y d a , the J u h a d i l , the al-Sari', and others, each with a n u m b e r of tribes and subtribes,

but

206

Golden River to Golden Road

unfortunately he fails to mention whether these belong to the northern or southern Q a h t á n . 8 5 A l t h o u g h the information is far from being satisfactory, the by now familiar picture of a bisected tribal organization emerges, with each moiety further subdivided into two or more sections. 86 South of the Q a h t a n , in the southernmost part of Saudi Arabia, is the territory of a tribal confederation that has retained the ancient name of Yarn. T h e Y a m tribes of the W a d i D a w á s i r and the Western R u b ' a l - K h á l i offer one of the few examples of a tribal confederation bifurcated along religious sectarian lines. A t present this division is no longer clear, but until recently the Y a m tribes were divided into a Biyádhiyya and a R u f a d h a half. T h e Biyádhiyya persuasion is a schism that has something in common with the W a h h a b i doctrines, and is of O m a n i origin. T h e various sections of the Mahshil, including the al-Rashid and al-Fahhád, belong or have belonged until their recent conversion to W a h h a b i s m to the Biyádiyya, which apparently dispenses with the adhán and congregational prayer. T h e R u f a d h a , a variety of the Ismá'ílí sect of the Shi'a, is the persuasion of the Fátima and M a d h k a r groups of the Y a m , including the Rizq and the S u l u m section of the Madhkar. 8 7 N O R T H E R N A R A B I A AND THE S Y R I A N

DESERT

Under this heading will be discussed the tribes of the northern half of Saudi A r a b i a , as well as those tribes whose w a n d e r i n g territories lie wholly or partly in J o r d a n , Syria, or Iraq. In this area, too, the dual division is the prevailing form of tribal structure on various levels. All the tribes, in general, relate themselves either to Q.ays or to Y a m a n . In the Syrian Desert and as far south as the H i j á z , in addition, the name-pair Ahí el-Shemál ('People of the North') and Ahl el-Qebli ('People of the South') also are in vogue. 8 8 T h e dual division can also be found in each locality or tribal group. Let us begin with the H i j á z area. O n e of the most pow erful tribes between M e c c a and M e d i n a is the H a r b , w h o are of southern origin; they came in Islamic times from Y e m e n Hijáz. 8 9

to

Dual

Organization

T h e H a r b tribes fall into two g r o u p s : an eastern group, r a n g i n g a b o u t ' A y n I b n F u h a y d and the J a ' l a plain, A s y a h , and

the

D a h n a to the east of Q a s i m ; a n d a western g r o u p r a n g i n g west of Q a s i m in the western N e j d around The

Nafi, Haid,

and

Dahna.

eastern g r o u p comprises three tribes, each headed b y

chief s h a y k h :

I.

Ban!

'All

(subdivided

into

five

a

subtribes);

I I . A l W u h u b (six subtribes); I I I . A l F a r d a (or Frida, F r o d a , six subtribes). T h e western g r o u p comprises two tribes, neither o f w h i c h is headed b y a chief s h a y k h : Ben! Salim and BenI ' A m r . T h e BenI Salim again comprise two subgroups, the M e m u n a n d el-Meraweha.90 Another

HijazI group,

that of the J e h e n e , or J u h a y n a ,

is

composed of t w o moieties: the B e n ! M a l e k with fourteen tribes, and the A w l a d M u s a with nine tribes. 9 1 The

H u d h a y l , an important

HijazI tribe n u m b e r i n g

about

50,000, is divided into a northern g r o u p located east and south o f M e c c a , a n d a southern g r o u p . T h e Q u r a y s h , descendants of the tribe of M o h a m m e d , consists today of t w o w e a k branches, one around ' A r a f a t , the other near T a i f . T h e y are shepherds, n u m b e r i n g a b o u t 9,000. The

' U t a y b a h is a powerful n o m a d i c

tribe east of central

H i j a z a n d west of central N e j d , divided into a l - R u q a h (12,000) and B a r q a h (18,000) sections. 9 2 T u r n i n g now to the Syrian desert, w e find that the dual alignm e n t of the n o m a d i c tribes along the Q a y s and Y e m e n division is characteristic also of this area. In the past, since the BenI K a l b was the leading tribe a m o n g the Y e m e n i moiety in Syria, the t w o parties were k n o w n b y the n a m e s K e l b i t e s and Qaysites. 9 3 In the Syrian Desert, politically divided a m o n g several states, the Q a y s - Y a m a n rivalry is as alive today as it was in past centuries. O f the t w o most powerful tribal confederations of true or c a m e l nomads, the ' A n e z e

(18,000 tents or 72,000 persons) and the

S h a m m a r , the first belongs to the M a ' a d d (Qays) and the second to the Y a m a n or Q a h t a n . 9 4 U p to the consolidation of governmental p o w e r in the Syrian Desert, w h i c h took place only in recent years,

these

two

great

tribal

confederations

were

constantly

f e u d i n g with one another as behooves traditional enemies. Since

208

Golden River to Golden Road

World W a r II, however, raiding has become increasingly difficult, and the tribes have become used to living without this activity, which was both a source of income and a pastime. In addition to the over-all division into Qaysl and Y a m a n i tribal confederations, most of the tribal confederations are in themselves divided into two moieties, which in their turn fall into successively smaller subdivisions, with a diminishing amount of intergroup hostility down the scale. T h e 'Aneze themselves fall into two mutually hostile groups, the Dana Bishr and the Dana Muslim, the last flare-up between whom was quelled by the French in 1929. 95 According to the traditional tribal genealogy as elicited by Oppenheim from old members of the tribes, the Bishr comprise four tribes, the Sba'a, Fed'an, el-Jebel, and el-Dehameshe, the first two forming the ' O b e d group and the latter two the 'Ammar or 'Amarat group. In addition to these four, a fifth tribe, the Weld Suleyman, is now traditionally held to belong to the Bishr group, although originally, in the Nejd, the Weld Suleyman did not belong to the 'Aneze but to the Ja'afera. Small parts of the tribe merely attached themselves to the 'Aneze and became politically dependent on these more powerful tribal groups in the course of their wanderings, which led them from the Nejd up into the Syrian Desert in the eighteenth century. T o the other 'Aneze moiety, the Dana Muslim, traditional tribal genealogy attributes eight tribes whose names are as follows: Weld 'All, el-Hesene, elMesalikh, el-Hajjaj (these four together forming the BenI W a h h a b section of the Muslim moiety); el-Sewaleme, el-Ashaje'a, 'Abdelle, and el-Rwala (these latter four forming the Mejlas of Jelas section of the Muslim moiety). In the actual tribal organization as observed by Oppenheim in the early part of the twentieth century, both moieties of the 'Aneze lost from their original number of tribes, leaving the Bishr with three and the Muslim with six tribes. 96 T h e dual organization is evident on the subtribal level as well. O f the nine actual tribes (qaba'il, sing, qabila) of the 'Aneze, four are subdivided into two subtribes ('asha'ir, sing. 'ashira) each. T h e Fed'an (approximately 5,000 tents) comprise the Weld and el-Khrese (or K h r o a) subtribes; the Sba'a (approximately 2,200 tents) the Qemesa (or Gmosa) and the 'Ebede

Dual Organization

20Ç

subtribes; the 'Amarat (approximately 5,000 tents), the J e b e l and Dehameshe subtribes; the Weld 'All (approximately 650 tents), the Ibn Sumer and el-Tayyar subtribes. Of the remaining five tribes four are very small (150 to 700 tents each), and the last, the powerful R w a l a (variously estimated at 4,000 to 5,000 tents), is divided into five subtribes. The Dual Organization oj the 'Aneze Confederacy I.

' A n n a z ('Aneze)

II.

D a n a Bishr

'Obëd

III.

IV.

D a n a Muslim

I

Sba'a

V.

'Ammär

I

Fed'ân

el-Jebel

el-Dchâmeshe

Benï W a h h â b

4 tribes

Mejlas (Jelas)

4 tribes

Khreçe

Weld

VI.

Dana Mni'

Dana Farid

VII.

4 subdivisions

5 subdivisions

I

Dana Khrey?

Level I Level II Level I I I Level I V Level V Level V I Level V I I

the the the the the the the

Dana Qhel

eponymous ancestor main moieties secondary moieties tribes (qaba'il) subtribes ('asha'ir) afraq " t h i g h s " ) hamä'il (clans)

A word may be said here as to the relationship of chieftainship to the dual organization, which can be illustrated by examples

210

Golden River to Golden Road

drawn from the ' A n e z e confederacy. T h e confederacy as a whole recognizes no paramount chief, nor do the two moieties. O n the tribal level, the bifurcated tribe m a y either recognize the shaykh of one of the two subtribes as the head of the entire tribe (in which case the shaykh of the other subtribe is subordinated to him, as in the ' A m a r a t tribe); or each of the two subtribes m a y have an independent shaykh of its own, in which case the tribe has no paramount chief (as in the Fed'an, S b a ' a , and W e l d ' A l l tribes). W h e n the tribe is divided into more than two subtribes (as in the case of the R w a l a ) , all the subtribes recognize the shaykh of one of them as their paramount chief and as the head of the entire tribe. In the remaining tribes of Syria the following are bifurcated: the el-'Amur (in the Palmyra-Homs-Damascus region) into ' A m u r el-Dire and Mehareshe; the ' A r a b el-Lejah (also known as al-Sulut, in the same area, into the Ben! H a m a d (or al-Sulut al-Qibliyln, i.e., southern Sulut) and the Beni ' A m r (or al-Sulut al-Shimaliyin, i.e., northern S u l u t ) ; the ' A r a b el-Jebel (in the H a w r a n region) into the Z u b e d and the Wessamet el-Bahel; the M a w a l l (in the A l e p p o region, approximately 2,000 tents), into el-Shcmaliyin (northerners) and el-Qibliyin (southerners). T h e subtribes ('asha'ir) are usually further subdivided into subsubtribes {firaq ov afraq or afariqah, sing, firqah); these again into " t h i g h s " (afkhadh, sing, fakhedh); the " t h i g h s " fall into clans (hama'il, sing, hamula); and the latter into extended families (ahal, sing, ahl, also meaning house or tent). 9 7 T h e S h a m m a r , the hereditary enemies of the ' A n e z e , are also divided into two groups: the Western S h a m m a r whose tribal territory is in Syria, and the Eastern or Northern S h a m m a r of Iraq. T h e Western S h a m m a r group comprises three tribes: the T h i b e t (with 1,600 tents, consisting of six subtribes); the F e d d a g h a (with 1,500 tents, eight subtribes); and the e l - ' A m u d (800 tents, three subtribes). T h e Iraqi S h a m m a r also are divided into three tribes: the Khrese (1,650 tents, five subtribes); the Sayih (3,500 tents, two subtribes); and the ' A b d e h (3,000 tents, five subtribes). A m o n g the Northern S h a m m a r of the Northern J a z i r a h in Iraq dual division is in evidence in several of the J a r b a h tribes: T h e D u g h a y r a t are divided into D . al-Badwa (or Desert D.) and D. al-Hadar (or settled D . ) .

211

Dual Organization The The The The

Al 'Ulayyah are divided into Al 'Ikab and Al Subayyah. Hadabah are divided into Al Jad'an and Al Funayfin. Al Burayj are divided into al-Ahasinah and Al Buhayman. Tauqah division is as illustrated. Tauqah

Ä1 Sabihl

al-Sad!d

Al Hurayhah

Al Aslam

5 subtribes

The following Kurdish tribes in Iraq also are subdivided into two sections: Bacelhan, Zengene, Hewramy (into H. Teht and H. Lihon), Shiwan, Pijderiy, Berwariy (into B. Bala and B. Zer). 98 The T a y y confederation, located east of Nisibin in northern Syria, also consists of two tribal groups: the Tayy of Nisibin (with one paramount shaykh with eleven tribes) and the Tayy of Shemamik (under another paramount shaykh with four tribes). In the past, the Tayy were divided into el-Ghauth and Jadila, who were constantly fighting one another." The Hadediyyln (2,000 tents) of Syria are divided into two sections, each with a chief of its own: the al-Kwame (four clans), and the al-Ghanatse (six clans). 100 The Baqqara, between Aleppo, Der, and Mosul, fall into two groups: The Baqqarat el-Zor (with a paramount shaykh, six tribes, divided into numerous subdivisions); and the Baqqarat el-Jebel (with another paramount shaykh, eleven tribes, also divided into many subdivisions). The Nu'em are divided into the Nu'em of Iraq and the Nu'em of Syria. The Nu'em of Iraq again are subdivided into two groups, the Nu'em of the Jazlrah (four tribes) and the Nu'em of Jebel Hamrin (one tribe). The Nu'em of Syria are divided into three groups: the Nu'em of Homs (one paramount shaykh, five tribes); the Nu'em of Ghuta (no paramount shaykh, four tribes); and the Nu'em of Jolan (one paramount shaykh, three tribes).

212

Golden River to Golden Road

The Ben! Jirius and Bení Zaydán in the Jebel 'Ajlün Náhíya in J o r d a n claim descent from two brothers, Jirius and Zaydán. They are Christians (Greek Orthodox and Latin Catholics). The Beni Sa'id of Irjan (in the Jebel 'Ajlün Náhíya) claim descent from Sa'id, whose brother, Sa'ad, went to Hebron where he became the ancestor of the Beni Sa'ad. T h e Maqátlsh and Oweysát in the same Náhíya are the descendants of two brothers, Miqtish and Oweys, who came from Wádl Müsá. They are Greek Catholics, although some of the Oweysát follow the Latin faith. T h e Bashátwa, living on both sides of the Jordan, are composed of two sections: the Shiheymát of Kurdish origin, and the Bakkár of Nu'émát extraction. The Abábna in the Beni J u h m a Náhíya are divided into two sections. The Bsül and Kawáfha in the same náhíya claim descent from two brothers: the Bsül from Huseyn, and the Kawáfha from Shihádeh. The father of the two brothers, Ibráhím, came from the al-Khazála section of the Beni Hasan tribe. The Beni Hamd and Beni Irshéyd clans in the Kura Náhíya are said to be descendants of two brothers, Hamd and Rashld, who came from Khanzlra in the Kerak District. The Falahát and Lawáhma are two clans in the Marad Náhíya of the Ajlun District of Transjordan; both claim descent from Ibráhím, a man who came to their village, Nebí Hüd, more than two hundred years ago. The Beni Hasan, one of the largest tribes of Jordan, derive their descent from Mishqib ibn Hasan who is said to have come from Turba in the Hijáz. His two sons, Amsh and Mishqib, became the ancestors of the original two divisions of the tribe, the Imüsh and the Masháqba. At present, the Beni Hasan are still divided into two large groups, called Hulél (or Beni Hilayil) and Thebte (or al-Sabta). Each of the two has a paramount shaykh of its own and is subdivided into three tribes. The Shuyáb and the Atámna are two small tribes in the Beni 'Obeyd Náhíya of the Ajlün District in Transjordan who claim descent from a common ancestor who originally lived at Hebron. The Saqarát of the Remtha Náhíya in the same district are

Dual Organization

213

divided into t w o : the Saqarat proper, and the D i y a b a t ; both live in a l - R e m t h a . T h e ' A b b a d , a confederation o f tribes in the Belqa District having no c o m m o n ancestor, is divided into two great divisions: the J b u r i y y a , and the J r u m i y y a , also known as al-Qderiyye. T h e A k r a d , thus named after the W a d i al-Akrad quarter in al-Salt in w h i c h they live, are divided into two large sections: a l - A k r a d (three tribes) and al-Basabsa (eight tribes). T h e Q a w a q s h a of al-Salt, a Greek O r t h o d o x tribe that traces its descent to an ancestor w h o came from Salkhad in the J e b e l D r u z e , are divided into two sections: al-Nuweysir and a l - Y a ' q u b . T h e G h a w a r n a in the K e r a k District are divided into those living in G h o r a l - M a z r a ' a and those of G h o r al-Safi. T h e former are again divided into t w o : al-Ahlaf (six sections) and a l - K h a n a z r a (three sections). T h e inhabitants of G h o r al-Safi are also divided into two sections: a l - A w a y s a (six subtribes) and a l - M i h l a f (six subtribes). T h e A k a s h a and the H i j a z i y y l n are two sections united to form one tribe in the K e r a k District. T h e M a a y t a in the same district are also divided into two large sections: a l - R a s h a y d a and a l - Z a q a y l a . T h e former is again divided into t w o : al-Sahir (composed of two subtribes: al-Jubran and al-Rashld) and al-Talib (composed of two subtribes: A w l a d Id and A w l a d K h a l i l ) . T h e Z a q a y l a are also divided into t w o : al-Ibrahim and al-Sallm (the latter again composed of two subtribes, the A w l a d A y a d and A w l a d M u t l a q ) . T h e M a j a l i , the largest tribe in K e r a k , are divided into t w o : the S u l e y m a n (three sections) and the Y u s e f (eight sections). T h e M d a n a t , in the K e r a k District, are divided into D a b a n a of al-Salt and the A m a m i r a or A m a y r a of Husn.

the

T h e Ben! H a m i d a in the same district are divided into alD a ' a j n a and al-Matarfa. A n o t h e r Ben! HamI d a g r o u p lives in the Belqa to the north. T h e N u ' e m a t of the K e r a k District, probably related to the N u ' e m of Iraq and Syria, are divided into two subtribes: the ' A b a b d a (divided into al-Awasa and al-Ja'afra) and e l - A h a m d a (divided into four subgroups). T h e Q a t a w n a of the K e r a k District, said to have come ori-

214

Golden River to Golden Road

ginally from Qatia in Sinai, arc divided into two sections: the Awlad 'All and Awlad Salameh. The Sarayra, in the same district, are divided into Al 'AH and Al Da'ud. The Tarawna in the same district, who came from Wad! Musa, are divided into 'Ayal Jibrin and 'Ayal Jubran. The Town of Ma'an in the district of the same name in southern Jordan is composed of two quarters: Ma'an al-Shamiyya (Northern Ma'an) inhabited by the 'Ayal Mahmud, and Ma'an al-Hijaziyya (Southern Ma'an), inhabited by the 'Ayal Ahmed. The 'Ayal Mahmud and 'Ayal Ahmed are said to be the descendants of two brothers, Mahmud and Ahmed, who lived in the sixteenth century and quarreled over the possession of the fort of Ma'an. The 'Ayal Mahmud are composed of three tribes, while the 'Ayal Ahmed comprise four tribes. The 'Obeydiyyin, one of the tribes of Wadi Musa in the south ofJordan, are composed of two tribes, the Hilalat who claim to be true Layathna, that is indigenous to Wadi Musa; and the Hasanat who claim descent from the Billi of Hijaz. The Sa'idiyyin of the Wad! 'Araba (the boundary between Jordan and the Negev district of Israel), fall into two main groups: the Eastern Sa'idiyyin who live in Jordan, and the Western Sa'idiyyin who used to live west of the Wadi 'Araba, in the Negev. The Eastern Sa'idiyyin are composed of two groups: the Sruriyyln and the Onat. The Western Sa'idiyyin comprise four tribes. The Nu'emat of the Shera Mountains in southern Jordan are divided into two large groups: the Manajda and the Sleymat. The Manajda claim descent from Mansur and their further dual subdivisions are shown in the accompanying chart. The Sleymat are divided into al-Araqda and al-Sbu. The ancestor of the Araqda is said to have been a slave by the name of Ireyqed, and because of their base descent the Manajda do not intermarry with them. The BenI Sakhr, the largest camel nomad tribe in Jordan, are divided into two groups: al-Tuqa or Twaqa (four tribes) and elKa'abene or al-Ka'abna (pronounced Cha'abna; two tribes). All the six Sukhur tribes recognize one single paramount shaykh.

Dual Organization

215 Man$ür

Munjid (Manäjda)

1

S a l ä m (al-Salameh)

'Ileydl

I

(al-'Alayda)

K h a t t ä b (al-Khatätba)

1 1

Awadh

al-Odhät section

; Awdeh

'Abbäs

'Ayäl Awdeh 'Ayäl 'Abbäs section

section

Milhem

Ghanim

al-Malalhim

al-Ghawanma

section

section

Before leaving the tribes of Jordan a word may be said about a supertribal confederation that played an important role in the history of the area. A b o u t 1650 the Sirhan tribe moved down from the Hawran and occupied the area on the present borderline between Jordan and Saudi Arabia called after them W a d i Sirhan. Shortly thereafter, however, the great movement of the 'Anczc tribes from the Hijaz up to the North Arabian Desert took place. T h e 'Aneze forced the Sirhan and their allies, the Ben! Sakhr, to move up into the Belqa. T h e 'Aneze pressed after them and came in conflict with the M u h a f u z , as the paramount shaykh of the Sardlya was called whose followers were known collectively as A h l al-Shamal (People of the North). T h e 'Aneze defeated them too, but soon the A h l al-Shamal confederation was reconstituted under the leadership of the Benl Sakhr and with the participation of the Sardlya, 'Isa, Fheyli, and Sirhan tribes. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Ahl al-Shemal were strong enough to engage the 'Aneze and forced them successively eastward until at the end of the nineteenth century the W a d i Sirhan area was held alternatingly by the A h l al-Shamal in the winter and the 'Aneze during their annual wanderings to and from their summer grazing grounds in Syria. 1 0 1 There are two tribal groups divided between the Negev and the Sinai: T h e Terabln and the Tiyaha. T h e Terabln of the Sinai Peninsula comprise three tribes, while the Terabln of the Negev

2l6

Golden River to Golden Road

have eight tribes. T h e T i y a h a of the Sinai have five tribes, the T i y a h a of the Negev twelve. O n the Saudi-Iraqi border is located the al-Zafir tribe, a large camel-breeding tribe, divided into two sections: the Wahhabite al-Butun in Nejd, and the Sumudah, mostly in Iraq. 1 0 2 T h e M u t a y r of the K u w a i t — e l - H a s a region are subdivided into three major groups, called al-Dushan, al-'Ilwah, and alBurayh. T h e last two of these comprise each three tribes. T h e Dushan show a definite tendency toward a bifurcated structure. 1 0 3 Dushan

'Abdullah

Fay 5a 1

'Amash

Muhammad

Muhammad

al-Humaydi

'Amar

Shuqayr

al-'Amash

al-Sul(an

al-Muhammad

al-Majld

al-Shuqayr

al-Fahad

al-Watban

branch

branch

branch

branch

branch

branch

branch

'Amsha

Fayha

Badr

'Amsha ' A b d u l l a h

I

Faysal

Bandar

T h e Z u b e d of Iraq are divided into three groups. T h e first of these is called el-Jebur and is divided into two groups: t h e J e b u r of K h a b u r (with one paramount shaykh and sixteen tribes) and the J e b u r of the Tigris (with fourteen tribes). T h e second group is that of el-Dulem with one paramount shaykh at its head. T h e main group of el-Dulem is that of the A l b u Rudeni, consisting of thirteen tribes and several attached subgroups. In addition, five more small tribal groups belong to the Dulem (and owe allegiance to its paramount shaykh), counting from 200 to 800 tents

Ridan

Dual Organization

2IJ

each. Finally, the third group belonging to the Z u b e d is el' O b e d , under whose paramount shaykh are six tribes. A similar threefold division is shown b y the A l b u S h a ' b a n group. These live in the upper Euphrates valley, and are divided into three divisions: the Welde, consisting of three subgroups, each with a paramount shaykh of its o w n : ( i ) W e l d e of BabM e n b i j , six tribes; (2) Welde of Shamiye, two tribes; and (3) Welde of the Jazlrah, eight tribes. T h e second g r o u p is that of the 'Afadele under whose paramount shaykh are seven tribes; and the third is el-Sabkha whose p a r a m o u n t shaykh c o m m a n d s a single tribe. 1 0 4 T h e above listing exhausts the m a j o r tribes of the S y r i a n Desert. O f the tribal confederations enumerated the great m a j ority is found to have the dual system as the basis of their tribal organization, with only two showing a threefold division. A s to smaller groups, these generally are not subdivided into two m a i n groups, but fall directly into three to twelve (or more) tribes, with or without a paramount shaykh to head the tribes that make u p one larger unit. T h e dual division is thus found to be, if not the exclusive, the dominant and characteristic structural form of the nomadic tribes of the A r a b i a n and Syrian deserts. T h e Negev of Palestine on the fringes of the Syrian Desert also was the home of nomadic tribes aligned into two moieties. T o w a r d the end of the eighteenth century the Q a y s moiety was here headed by E m i r Hasan el-Wahaydl, surnamed e l - D a y m i , w h o was followed by the J a b a r a t , Q a l a z i n , Sowareke, and ' A m a d l n tribes. Interestingly, the rival Y a m a n i moiety also was headed by a W a h a y d l , a close relative of E m i r H a s a n : E m i r A y a s h el-Wahaydl. T h i s moiety consisted of the T i y a h a , T e r a b l n , Hwetat, and Billi tribes. Tradition has it that in one of the battles between the two W a h a y d l chieftains and their followers, 2,800 men were killed. After Napoleon left Palestine in 1798, the feuding between the two factions increased in intensity. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the son of Hasan, S a l l m e l - D a y m i , w h o inherited the chieftainship of the Q a y s faction from his father, repeatedly attacked the T i y a h a and T e r a b l n tribes. It is remarkable that the followers of the two chieftains saw no contradiction between their o w n traditions, according to w h i c h

2l8

Golden River to Golden Road

membership in the Qays and Yaman factions was genealogically determined, and the fact that two scions of one and the same family headed both factions. The same eighteenth-century source that tells of the feuds between the two factions also contains a brief account of the traditions concerning the origin of the two factions. According to the Negev tribes of the times, the two factions were the descendents of two brothers called Qays and Yemen, both of whom had large families. 105 Can it be that this tradition, which is at variance with the tradition about the origin of Qays and Yemen prevalent in Arabia itself, was influenced by the actual situation in which two kinsmen (in popular parlance two "brothers") headed the two factions ? In the nineteenth century the tribal line-up in the Negev and Transjordan was as follows: Qaysl tribes: Ben! Sakhr, Shararat, Ben! 'Atiyye, Ben! H u m e y d a ; YamanI tribes: Tiyaha, Terabin, 'Azazme, Hanajra, Wheydat, 'Adwan, Mjalll. 106

S Y R I A , L E B A N O N , PALESTINE

In Lebanon and Palestine the Qays-Yaman rivalry remained a living issue until modern times. Pitched battles were fought between the two parties as late as the early part of the eighteenth century, 107 and sporadic fighting continued well into the twentieth. In this area an entire town or village may belong to one faction while a neighboring town or village may belong to the opposite faction; or else, one and the same locality may be split u p between both factions. The village of Blr in the vicinity of Jerusalem was the scene of a fight between the two factions inhabiting it, as late as a short time before World War I. Each faction tried to offend the flag of the other. A Yamani woman took a red cock and beat it within the sight of Qaysls (red being the Qays! color). Thereupon Qaysi women did the same thing with a white cock (white being the Yamani color). Bethlehem (today in Jordan) is a Yamani town, while Hebron (in Jordan), a mere twelve miles to the south of it, is Qaysl. A tree on a hilltop used to mark the boundary between the territories under the sway of each. 108 The factionalism was so strong that these inimical towns had to keep considerable contingents of

Dual Orgam.zati.on

219

armed men in constant readiness for defense and retaliation. Hebron had in the eighteenth century 800 to 900 armed men, and bloody fights between them and Bethlehem were common occurrences.109 Jerusalem, as the largest town in the neighborhood, was divided between Qaysls and Yamanis. In 1838, Robinson found that the majority in the Jerusalem district were Yamanis. 1 1 0 The two foremost families in Jerusalem, who competed for leadership not only in the city but also in the whole of Arab Palestine down to the very end of the days of the British Mandate (1948), were the Yamani Husaynis and the Qaysi Khalidis. 1 1 1 The village population in this area of the Judean hills and as far north as Ramallah is also divided between Qays and Yaman. Bitter wars between the two continued here as late as the nineteenth century. The enmity between the two factions was so keen that the Qaysi headman of the 'Amar family, the shaykh of Durrah village, had all strangers who came into his village questioned: "For whom are you? For Qays or for Yaman?" If he answered, "Qays," he was honored; if "Yaman," he was put to death. 1 1 2 Just as in the days of the Umayyads, the dual organization of the population in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a factor to be reckoned with by administrative officers and military leaders as well. The military expeditions and punitive actions of governors were more than once frustrated because local levies would not fight against rebels of their own factions. An outstanding example was the experience of Othman Pasha el-Sadiq at his attack on the township of Nablus in Palestine in 1764. 1 1 3 In Ramleh in the Palestinian coastal plain, fellahin of rival factions used to destroy each other's valuable olive groves, and in general it became a point of honor to ruin the rival town's crops, to injure its fruit trees, and, on the other hand, to guide, support and, in case of threatened retaliation, to protect the Bedouin raiding parties of one's own faction. As Volney remarked, "This discord which has prevailed throughout the country, from the earliest times of the Arabs causes a perpetual civil war. The peasants are incessandy making inroads on each other's lands, destroying their corn, dourra, sesamum and olive trees, and

220

Golden River to Golden Road

carrying off their sheep, goats, and camels. T h e Turks, who are everywhere negligent in repressing similar disorders, are the less attentive to them here, since their authority is very precarious; the Bedouins, whose camps occupy the level country, are continually at open hostilities with them, of which the peasants avail themselves to resist their authority, or to do mischief to each other, according to the blind caprice of their ignorance, or the interests of the moment. Hence arises an anarchy, which is still more dreadful than the despotism which prevails elsewhere, while the mutual devastations of the contending parties render the appearance of this part of Syria more wrecked than that of any other."114 During the last few decades of Turkish rule in Palestine much was done to subdue the rival elements or, at least, not to let the antagonisms emerge into the open. While as late as the second half of the nineteenth century the Qays and Y a m a n factions, headed by shaykhs and aided by Bedouins, waged feuds and rendered commerce and travel precarious or impossible, by the end of the century this state of affairs was a thing of the past. T h e squabbles, while they lasted, were not confined to Qays versus Y a m a n strife; they broke out, frequently enough, even between groups belonging to one and the same moiety. In the second half of the nineteenth century, for instance, a feud of some seriousness arose between the Christian A r a b villagers of R a m a l l a h and the Christian A r a b villagers of neighboring el-Bire. T h e R a m a l l a h Christians were helped by the R a m a l l a h Muslims, while the el-Bire Christians were supported by the el-Bire Muslims. All the inhabitants of both places belonged to the Qays faction, and normally the relationship between them was amicable e n o u g h . 1 1 5 In addition to the Qays and Y a m a n factions there were in A r a b Palestine a number of other village organizations, more localized in their character, the common feature of all of which was their duality. T h e villages around Jerusalem, for instance, were divided into a group of Ben! Hasan villages, and into a rival group of Beni Malek villages. In the R a m a l l a h district there were Ben! Harith villages (with the village of Bir Zeyt as their center), and Beni Z a y d villages (with Deyr Ghassaneh as their center). Information on this subject is f a r from being adequate,

Dual

Organization

221

a n d it is impossible to tell w h e t h e r these village groupings app e a r e d o n l y in the d u a l f o r m , or w h e t h e r single a n d triple g r o u p ings also e x i s t e d . 1 1 6 N e i t h e r is it clear in most cases w h a t , if a n y , w a s the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n these local g r o u p i n g s a n d the w i d e r Q a y s a n d Y a m a n factions. In the t o w n of R a m a l l a h itself, h o w e v e r , the connection is clear. T h e

entire p o p u l a t i o n of R a m a l l a h

has r e m a i n e d

split

into t w o o p p o s i n g factions d o w n to the present time. O n e is called H a d d a d e h or S h a r a q a

(Eastern), the other H a m a y e l . E a c h is

subdivided into four clans (hamiila-s). T h e story goes that a s h a y k h or emir of a Christian B e d o u i n tribe, n a m e d S a b r a e l - H a d d a d l n , a Q a y s i t e w h o lived in the S h o b a k K a r a k district o f T r a n s j o r d a n , was the original ancestor of all the h a m u l a s of R a m a l l a h . His eldest son w a s R a s h i d whose first wife bore h i m a son H a d d a d , a n d died. H e m a r r i e d a second wife, a w i d o w w h o h a d a son b y her first h u s b a n d , a Y a m a n i . R a s h i d a d o p t e d this boy, S h u k a y r a n d had three m o r e sons b y his second wife. T h e s e four sons o f R a s h l d ' s second wife b e c a m e the ancestors o f the four hamulas of the H a m a y e l moiety in R a m a l l a h ; while H a d d a d , his son b y his first wife, b e c a m e the ancestor of the four H a d d a d e h hamulas of the t o w n , t h r o u g h his four sons. T h u s the p e c u l i a r situation obtains in R a m a l l a h that all the four h a m u l a s o f the H a d d a d e h moiety a n d three h a m u l a s of the H a m a y e l m o i e t y are Qaysites, while the f o u r t h h a m u l a of the H a m a y e l m o i e t y is Y a m a n i t e , and is still referred to as " Y a m a n . " T h e y display the w h i t e color a n d the white flag at w e d d i n g s and on all f o r m a l occasions, in contrast to the red of the Q a y s h a m u l a s . 1 1 7 A m o n g the D r u z e s in L e b a n o n , the Q a y s - Y a m a n duality completely o v e r s h a d o w e d all other divisions. T h e y w e r e c a u g h t by the feuds b e t w e e n the t w o factions to such an extent that their entire history was m o d i f i e d b y it. In the course of several centuries the constant f e u d i n g b e t w e e n the t w o factions depleted the manhood not o n l y o f the D r u z e s , b u t of the L e b a n o n as a whole. In 1698, the Shi'ite

Mutawalis, who inhabited

the

mountainous

country b e t w e e n the S e a o f G a l i l e e a n d S i d o n ( A r a b i c : S a y d a ) , revolted u n d e r the leadership of a Y a m a n i s h a y k h . T h e D r u z e E m i r Bashir I o f the Q a y s p a r t y , in alliance w i t h the Pashas of Sidon and T r i p o l i , put d o w n the revolt a n d installed the head

222

Golden River to Golden Road

of an influential local Qaysi family as shaykh of Safed. 1 1 8 In 1711 a decisive battle took place between the Qaysis and the Yamanis at 'Ayn-Darah, which resulted in the utter defeat of the YamanI faction. M a n y Druzes who belonged to this faction thereupon emigrated to the Hawran region and laid the foundation of a new Druze concentration in that south Syrian district. 11 * Among the Druzes, the Qaysi faction used to carry a red flag and is known to the present day under the name Reds, while the YamanI faction had a white flag and is still known as Whites. 1 2 0 Forthwith, however, two new competing factions emerged in the Lebanon and continued the feuds of the old Qaysi and YamanI moieties. These were in Yesbek and Jumblat factions which, as heirs to Qays and Yaman, rallied the support of the population of these regions in the elections during the mandatory period of the country (1921-1936). 1 2 1 In Palestine, many if not most A r a b villages were divided into two hamulas, although small villages had often only one hamula, while large ones had three or even more. T h e hamula is a group of families tied together by actual or assumed genetic relationship. A hamula usually inhabits a special quarter in the village, called hara, so that a typical two-hamula village consists of two haras. Each hamula is headed by an unofficial head whose office is hereditary within the leading family of the hamula, though it does not necessarily pass from father to son, and can also be acquired by a powerful member of another family belonging to the hamula. In villages whose lands belong to absentee landlords or which are in a status of economic dependence on outside moneylenders, merchants, or others, the headship of the hamula is usually occupied by men who have the confidence of the landowner or the economic potentate. The usual relationship between the two hamulas is one of strife, squabble, and enmity. Every individual difference that is bound to arise from time to time in the course of the social and economic relations between two individuals belonging to two different hamulas becomes immediately a concern of the hamulas in their entirety, and thus a cause for renewed fighting. Most of the hamulas are endogamous, and marriages between two hamulas of the same village are much less frequent than those contracted within one and the same hamula.

Dual Organization

223

T h e hamulas are in most cases subdivided into sub-hamulas which fall into a number of extended families. Most of the hamulas preserve a tradition according to which their ancestors came and settled in the village as a compact group of immigrants. In villages inhabited by members of more than one sect, such as Muslims, Druzes, Greek Orthodox, etc., the religious community takes the place of the usual hamula-structure. 1 2 2 I R A N AND AFGHANISTAN

Several volumes exist in Persian on the tribes of various provinces in Iran. However, of the books available to the author only one contained information on the internal structure of the tribes. This was a volume on the tribes of Kuh-Giluye, a small district in the province of Kuzistan, at the northern tip of the Persian Gulf. 1 2 3 It appears that bifurcation is the rule among the Kuh-Giluye tribes. Almost half the entire district is the domain of the BovirA h m a d tribe, which is divided into Bovir-Ahmad Garmslri and Bovir-Ahmad Sardslri. This name pair, Garmslri and Sardslri (meaning "of the warm place" and "of the cold place" respectively) occurs repeatedly in Kuh-Giluye as well as in its vicinity, as a designation of two moieties. The Bovir-Ahmad Sardsiri is again subdivided into two, the Bovir-Ahmad S. Bala (BovirAhmad of the upper cold place) and the Bovir-Ahmad S. Pa'in (Bovir-Ahmad of the lower cold place). T h e central part of Kuh-Giluye is the home of the Tayyibi tribe, subdivided into T . Garmslri (warm Tayyibi) and T . Sardslri (cold Tayyibi). Just to the north of the Kuh-Giluye district is the tribal area of the Janekl tribe, subdivided into J. Garmslri (to the northwest of Kuh-Giluye) and J . Sardslri (to the northeast). Y e t another name pair, in addition to w a r m — c o l d , u p p e r — lower, is " o f the mountain" and "of the plain." T h e Liravi tribe is subdivided into Liravi K u h (mountain Liravi) and L. Dasht (plains Liravi). T h e entire Liravi tribe forms one of the two moieties of the Jakl tribe, the other being the Chahar Benlche, which, in accordance with its name ("Four B.") falls into four tribes.

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224

Tribal Structure of the Jàki Jàki

Chahâr Benïche

Lïrâvï

4 subtribes

Lîrâvî Kuh

Bahma'ï

Bahma'ï Ahmadi

Bahma'ï Ahmadi Pusht-i-Küh

2

Lïrâvï Dasht

3

4

2

subgroups

Bahma'ï Muhammadi

Bahma'ï Ahmadi Zïr-i-Kûh

The Llravi K u h is subdivided into four groups, one of which, the Llravi K u h Bahma'I, is in turn subdivided into two, the Bahma'I Ahmadi and the Bahma'I Muhammadi. The former is again bifurcated into Bahma'I Ahmadi Pusht-i-Kuh (transmontane Bahma'I Ahmadi), and Bahma'I Ahmadi Zlr-i-Kuh (cismontane Bahma'I Ahmadi). 1 8 4 From other parts of Iran only the most general kind of information is available. Of the Bakhtiyari, one of the largest tribal confederations in western Iran, it is known that they are divided into two groups, the Haft Lang (or Seven Tribes, comprising 55 subtribes) and the Chahar Lang (or Four Tribes, with 24 subtribes). Various traditions are current in the tribes themselves in explanation of their dual division. According to one, they are the descendants of two brothers, one of whom had seven sons and the other four. According to another, Bakhtiyar, the eponymous ancestor of the tribe, had two wives; by one he had seven sons,

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who became the progenitors of the Seven Tribes; by the other four, from whom are descended the Four Tribes. T h e Bakhtiyaris seem to have migrated in the tenth century from Syria to Iran, and the dual division may have been brought along by them at that time. As was pointed out above, the dual factionalism penetrated Iran and reached even distant Khurasan as early as the first century of Islam. The Lurs, another huge tribal confederation in western Iran, are divided into Lur-i-buzurg (Big Lurs) and Lur-i-kuchek (Little Lurs). 1 2 6 The Jaki, mentioned above, is a Lur tribe. The third large tribal confederation, that of the Qashqais, is divided into two parts, or one nomadic and one settled. 126 Crossing over into Afghanistan, we find that the old Afghan traditions as to the origin and structure of the Afghan tribes were collected and put into writing by Ni'mat Allah in his Makhzan-i Afghani (completed in 1613). These traditions regard the Biblical King Saul (Talut or Sarul) as the original ancestor of the Afghans. He, they say, had a daughter, Iramiah, whom he married to King David. Their son was Afghana who helped his father build the Temple in Jerusalem. He had forty sons with whom he trekked to the hills of Ghur, and thence to Afghanistan. One of Afghana's descendants was Qays 'Abd al-Rashid, who became converted to Islam by Khalid, and had three sons: Sarban, Batan, (Bitan) and Ghurghusht. Each of these three became the ancestor of a dual grouping of tribes. Sarban's two sons, Sharkhbun and Kharshbun, are regarded as the progenitors of a considerable number of tribes, among them the most powerful of all Afghan tribes, the Durranis, formerly called Abdali. Bitan's two sons, Warspun and Kajin, are regarded as the joint ancestors of the BitanI tribe, while his daughter Mato (married to Shah Husayn Ghuri) is the mother of the Mati tribes, among whom the Ghalzay were for a long time the traditional rivals of the Durranis. Ghurghusht's two sons, Danay and Mandu, are the ancestors of a third set of dual tribal groups. Dual division occurs on all levels of tribal organization. The Durranis, for example, comprise two principal clans, the Popalzay and the Barakzay (to whom the present royal family of Afghanistan belongs). The Kharshbun moiety of Sarban falls into three

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groups. O n e of these, the K a n d , is bifurcated into two tribes, the Ghori or Ghura, and the K h a k h a y or Khashay. O n e part of the latter is the Yusufzay tribe, which is subdivided into five subtribes. O n e of these, the Akozays, are again subdivided into several sections, including the Ranizays. T h e Ranizays comprise five clans; one of the latter is again subdivided into four subclans. O n e of these, the G h a y b i K h e l , comprises two subgroups, one of which, the N u r M u h a m m e d Khels, are again subdivided into G h a r i b K h e l and D w a r K h e l . In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the two foremost rival groups were the Barakzay and the Sadozay tribes, both of w h o m supplied the country with dynasties of rulers, and whose feuding kept Afghanistan in a constant state of turmoil for most of the past two centuries. T h e Kafirs of Afghanistan (now called the Nuristanls or Jadidls that is, new converts to Islam) are divided into two groups: the Siyah-push or black-clad, and the Safid-push or white-clad. T h e Tajiks, as the Persian-speaking population of Afghanistan is called, fall into two principal groups: the mountain Tajiks (in the high mountain valleys of Badakhshan and in VVakhan, the east tongue of Afghanistan); and plain-dwelling Tajiks, also known as Parsiwans. 1 2 7 T h e Brahuis who inhabit the central area of Balujistan are organized into two main groups, the Sarawan and the Jahlawan. 1 2 8 E G Y P T AND SUDAN

Egypt was the classical example of dual organization in antiquity. In the fourth millennium B.C., the king of Upper Egypt conquered Lower Egypt, and since that time the country is always referred to as U p p e r and Lower Egypt. T h e ancient Biblical name of Egypt, Misrayim, has the dual ending " . . .ayim," thereby indicating the duality of the kingdom. T h e Crown of U p p e r Egypt was white and that of Lower Egypt red, the two colors that symbolize to this day the two moieties in some Middle Eastern lands. T h e white and red crown together formed the characteristic double crown of the Pharaohs, well known from innumerable pictorial and plastic representations.

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W e may begin the tracing of the presence of the dual organization in Muslim Egypt with the Mamluks who ruled Egypt from 1250 to 1517. During the later Mamluk rivalries the population of Egypt, and especially the artisan guilds, were divided into two competing factions, called Sa'd and Haram. The rivalry was so keen and so general that even the 'ulama', the learned religious leaders and authorized expositors of Muslim law, took sides for and against Sa'd and Haram. The division between the two factions continued after the conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans (1517) and even spread into the Egyptian army, which became divided into two rival camps, the Fikarites and the Kassemites. Jabarti (1754-1822), to whom we are indebted for this information goes on to describe the original popular tradition attributed to this dual division of the Egyptian army. There was, he says, an old Circassian Emir by the name of Sudun, who lived at the time Turkish Sultan Selim conquered Egypt, and he had two sons, named Kassem and Zulfikar, both of them great heroes. At the command of the Sultan, the two brothers engaged in a bout, and after a wonderful fight the Sultan divided his army between the two, giving to Zulfikar the greatest part of the Turkish cavalry, while to Kassem he gave most of the brave Egyptian warriors. Furthermore, he gave the Fikarites the white color as their emblem, and to the Kassemites the red color. The two groups engaged again in a fight, but this time the bout degenerated into a real combat, until finally the Sultan gave the signal for retreat. Ever since that day these two parties continued to exist in the Egyptian army, each of them preserving the color that its chief received as their emblem, showing repugnance toward the color of the rival party, down to table ware and kitchen utensils. Soon the Fikarites declared themselves for the Sa'dite party and the Kassemites for the Haramites. The division grew in significance from day to day. It passed from masters to slaves, from fathers to sons, and became the cause of many crimes, massacres, pillages, rapes, and arsons. Another tradition as to the origin of this dual division in the Egyptian army is also recorded by Jabarti. According to this second version, the Kassemites were the partisans of Kassem Bey el-Daftardar, and the Fikarites were the followers of Zulfikar Bey

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el-Kebir. T h i s tradition places the origin of the division into the y e a r 1050 H . (the middle of the seventeenth century). T h e Fikarites excelled b y their generosity, while the Kassemites distinguished themselves b y their riches a n d their avarice. W h e n in arms, the Fikarites carried a white flag whose shaft was surm o u n t e d b y a globe, and the Kassemites a red flag surmounted b y an iron ring. C a r r y i n g on the story of this dual division, J a b a r t i records that at the beginning of the twelfth century H . (eighteenth century), the Emirs of E g y p t were divided into Fikarites and K a s s e m i t e s . 1 2 ' In the eighteenth century, L o w e r E g y p t was constantly torn b y party strife between the S a ' d and the H a r a m factions. E a c h of these two factions was composed of both villagers and n o m a d i c Bedouins. T h e shaykhs of the rival villages used, on the slightest pretext, to arm their peasants against one another, and supported the Bedouins of their o w n factions in their p l u n d e r i n g raids on the villages of the other faction. Horses, too expensive to be employed as draught animals in agriculture, were a highly valued possession because in these intervillage feuds success usually went to the side that had the greatest number of horsemen. In the flood season rival irrigation interests also further embittered these factional strifes and gave opportunity for the display of strength, often resulting in bloody disputes, there being no police to intervene. 1 3 0 Interesting details as to the factional affiliation of E g y p t i a n tribes in the eighteenth century are contained in C h a b r o l ' s study on the mores of the inhabitants of E g y p t , w h i c h forms a part of the monumental Description de VEgypte initiated b y Napoleon. In the province o f B a h y r e h (Buheyra), C h a b r o l states, the N a m i a d y tribe belonged to the first class (or faction) and the A w l á d ' A l l tribe to the second. Both tribes were tent-dwellers, and they were the most redoubtable and most powerful tribes in the whole of E g y p t . T h e y were inimical to each other, separated b y the hatreds of religion, and dominated between them the entire province. O n e of them followed the opinions of a shaykh n a m e d S a ' d , while the other believed in the infallibility of his antagonist, H a r a m . T h e y nourished a deep antipathy toward each other, and the origin of this feeling as well as the origin of the twofold division itself were known to g o back to antiquity. But not only the

22Ç

Dual Organization

Bahyreh province, says Chabrol, the whole of Egypt was divided by the same schism. The partisans of Sa'd and Haram attributed such importance to their opinions that they condemned each other to eternal damnation. The government of the celebrated 'All Bey put an end to these fanatical furors. As a result of this Sa'd and Haram became largely forgotten, but the names of these two chiefs of sects continue to cause discord among the free people of the desert. PROVINCE

OF

SHARQIYYA

Nomadic Tribes First

Class

Second Class

Gomayleh Ben! Ayyüb Jomeylah

Bill! Refa'at Samdàni Awlàd 'All Hiwan

Sedentary Tribes First

Class

Second Class

Qassâsin Samâkîn Suwalyeh Ayd Zomly Awlâd Müsä Lakkam

Awlâd Zehera Motwalli Bawärsheh Waräwra

PROVINCE

First

Class

Swälheh and Geheyni Hweitât

OF

QELYUT

Second Class

A'yadyah Terâbîn

After remarking that the same two factions reappear in Syria under the names of Q a y s and Yaman, and that in all the countries of the Orient these two factions play an important role with their mutual hatred and passion, Chabrol lists the Egyptian tribes, and other groups that belonged to each of them. 1 3 1 Another French scholar whose work forms part of the Description de VEgypte, M . P. S. Girard, supplements the above information with observations of his own. He states that most of the inhabitants of the Nile delta form two inimical parties, known

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under the names of Sa'd and Haram, who constantly harm each other b y all possible means.

When asked about the origin of this division, they tell ridiculous stories, or admit that they are ignorant of it. Moreover, this origin interests them the least; the hostilities are never suspended, and each party has always recent injuries to avenge. Although the existence of these two parties is generally known, the shaykhs of Cairo, who are regarded as knowing best the history of their country, are not in agreement as to the circumstances which gave birth to them. The opinion which I hold to be the most reasonable boils down to the following: During the civil wars which ruined Arabia under the Calif Yezid ibn Hayweh, about the year 65 of the Hegira (685 A . D . ) , the two armies took as rallying cries in one nocturnal combat the names of Sa'd and Haram, by which their respective chiefs' families were known. These names the fighters and subsequently their descendants applied to themselves. In this manner the discord was perpetuated and became an insurmountable obstacle to their reconciliation. The Arabs who in various ages came to establish themselves in Egypt brought along, together with the name of the faction to which their ancestors belonged, their inveterate hatred against the opposite faction, and this hatred has perpetuated itself down to the present from generation to generation. It is to this internal division that one must attribute the influence of the Bedouin Arabs and the terror they inspired in the interior of the Delta: a small number of horsemen could carry off ordinarily without resistance the flocks of a considerable population . . . . These Arabs, always sure of being welcomed and saved by the villages of the party opposing the one they despoiled, and not preserving the liaison with one party longer than dictated by the exigencies of their momentary interests, exercise their brigandage with impunity in the whole province. 1 , 1 The

Sa'd-Haram feuding remained notorious well into the

nineteenth century, when Edward William Lane, making his firsthand observations of Egyptian life in the 1820's and 30's, wrote: " I n many instances, the blood-revenge is taken a century or more after the commission of the act which has occasioned it; when the feud, for that time, has lain dormant, and perhaps is remembered by scarcely more than one individual. T w o tribes in Lower Egypt, which are called 'Saad' and 'Haram,' are most notorious for these petty wars and feuds, (like the 'Keys' and

Dual Organization

23 j

' Y e m e n ' of Syria), and hence their names are commonly applied to any two persons or parties at enmity with each other." 1 3 3 T h e Egyptian Bedouins are divided into two great groups, Se'adI and Salaleme, who trace their descent to Sa'de and Dhib respectively. Most of these became sedentarized in 1898 and some of them migrated to Syria. 1 3 4 As examples of tribes with a dual division among the Bedouins of the Sinai Peninsula the Muzayna and Suwarka can be mentioned. The Muzayna, one of the T o w a r a tribes who inhabit the southern tip of Sinai, claim a certain 'Alwan as their original ancestor. His two sons, 'All and Ghanim, became the progenitors of the two moieties of the tribe. T h e Suwarka, the largest tribe in Sinai (approximately 4,000 persons) claim to be the descendants of two brothers, Nusayr and Mansur, whose original ancestor was Okasha. The progeny of Nusayr are the 'Aradat, also called Ghoz el-'Arab, who have the reputation of exceptional cleanliness in food and dress. Mansur's progeny, twelve sections, are nicknamed Awlad el-Tharwa, "children of the gray-haired woman," because Mansur is supposed to have married a gray-haired woman and she became the mother of his children. 1 3 5 T h e dichotomy into two opposing factions was a characteristic feature of society in Upper Egypt as well. Here, just as in Lower Egypt, a number of villages belonged (and do belong to this day) to one faction, while a similar number belonged to the opposing faction. In the urban sector, on the other hand, and again as in Lower Egypt, members of the two opposing factions lived in one and the same town. T h e earliest mention of the dichotomy of towns in Muslim times in Upper Egypt is contained in the famous travel accounts written by Ibn Battuta (1304-1368/9), who visited the town of A y d h a b in the summer of 1326. T o d a y the town of Aydhab is merely a site of ruins, 12 miles north of the town of Halayb on the shores of the R e d Sea, just south of the Egyptian border. But in the fourteenth century it was a populous town, inhabited by Beja camel-breeders. T h e town was divided into two parts: one part, comprising one third of the town, belonged to the Sultan of Egypt, while the other part, comprising two thirds of the town, belonged to the Beja king, al-Hudrubi. Just at the time of Ibn Battuta's visit the two factions were

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engaged in warfare against each other, arid the Bejas routed the Egyptian troops. 1 " Al-Hudrubi was the head of the Hadarib, the dominant Beja tribe of southern descent (from the Hadhramaut). A more numerous servile class, the Zanafij, acted as their herdsmen. 137 Fights between two opposing villages were common in Upper Egypt as late as the i92o's. According to Winifred Blackman who lived in an Upper Egyptian village in those years, intervillage fights were frequent, the two feuding parties often representing two villages on the opposite sides of a canal. The typical form of these brawls was that a group of men, armed with nabbuts (stout and heavy sticks), and sometimes with even more dangerous weapons, would enter the market place of the "enemy" village and start a fight. On the next occasion the visit would be repaid by the men of the "attacked" village. 138 More information concerning dual organization of villages in Upper Egypt became available recently with the publication of Hamed Ammar's fine study on "Growing Up in an Egyptian Village." According to Ammar, "apart from the towns 'where people are mixed,' " most of the villages of the Aswan Province of Upper Egypt are inhabited by members of two factions: the G'afra and the 'Ababda. The G'afra consider themselves the descendants of G'afar al-Sadiq whose great-grandfather was the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, while the 'Ababda regard themselves the descendants of 'Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr, a member of the Quraysh tribe to which also Mohammed belonged but which was "not so close in kinship or favour to the Prophet." Both the G'afra and the 'Ababda are farmers at present, but farming is considered as the occupation typical of the G'afra, since the 'Ababda were originally camel-drivers. The G'afra consider themselves more hospitable than the 'Ababda. No information is given by Ammar as to the internal subdivisions of the 'Ababda, but he deals in some detail with the G'afra. We learn that they are divided into two parts: the villages of the eastern bank of the Nile are regarded as descendants of Bahr, while those on the western bank of the Nile are regarded as descendants of Bahr's brother, Buhayr. (Bahr means sea or river, and is used in Egypt specifically to denote the river Nile; Buhayr

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233

is the diminutive form of Bahr.) The two brothers "were not in agreement." A group of ten villages, officially known as Silwa, belongs to the Bahr division of G'afra. Silwa falls into two groups: Silwa Bahari (Northern Silwa) comprising five villages, and Silwa Qibli (Southern Silwa) also comprising five villages. All the ten villages together have a population of approximately 11,000. The five villages of Silwa Bahari consider themselves as descendants of two individuals, called 'On and Musa, sons of Bahr; while the five villages of Silwa Qibli consider themselves as descendants of 'Ayyash, another son of Bahr. One of the five villages of Silwa Bahari is the village of Silwa proper, which is the administrative center of all the ten Silwa villages. In this village the population belongs to either of two sections called in Arabic hissa. One of these two sections comprises the descendants of 'On and is accordingly called 'Onab, while to the other belong descendants of 'On's brother Musa, and this section is therefore called Musiab. The 'Onab section is divided into five clans, called qaba'il (in sing, qabila), namely: Diabab, Hasaballab, M'alliab, Waznab, and Gharamab. The Musiab hissa comprises four clans whose names are MarazTk, 'Atamni, 'Amrab, and Brahimab. It should be noted here that the suffix -ab is common among the Beja tribal names, and seems to have nothing to do with the Arabic ab, father. 1 3 9 Each of these clans is composed of several extended families (called 'ayla or bayt). It is the prevalent belief that each of the two sections represents half the population of the village. The majority of the Musiab live in the northern part of the village, while most of the 'Onab reside in the southern part. Members of the two sections are supposed to be distinguished from one another by certain physical and mental characteristics. The Musiab are supposed to be heavily built, inclined to boasting and self-pride, while the 'Onab have the reputation of being comparatively stingy and much inclined to gossip. Each of the two sections of the village elect one of their members to function as "Shaykh hissa" or sectional chief. These two shaykhs are not paid, and each one of them is primarily concerned with the problems of his hissa. They, together with the lOmda, the

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234

official head of the village whose office is both elective and hereditary as well as appointive, form the village leadership whose task is to settle disputes that arise in the village. T h e participation of the villages in the wider political life of the country is channeled entirely b y the dual division into G ' a f r a and ' A b a b d a . T h e G ' a f r a villages traditionally vote for a candidate w h o belongs to their group. T h e ' A b a b d a , of course, have their o w n candidate. O n one recent occasion, the ' A b a b d a encouraged a second G ' a f r a candidate to run against his o w n clansman, and as a result of the splitting of the G ' a f r a vote between the two G ' a f r a candidates, the election was lost by them. Political views have little if anything to do with the elections. 1 4 0 T h e Bisharln, a Beja tribe in northeastern S u d a n , are divided into two main classes: the U m m ' A l l and the U m m Naji. T h e y seem to have a genealogic connection with the A w l a d K a h i l (or K a w a h l a ) , an A r a b tribe that lived near ' A y d h a b in the fourteenth c e n t u r y . 1 4 1 NORTH AFRICA

T h e main problem in connection with the dual organization in North Africa is whether its prevalence a m o n g the Berber tribes is due to A r a b influence or goes back to pre-Islamic times. N o satisfactory answer can be given to this question, which has received much too scanty attention on the part of historians. T h e dual organization of the Arab tribes in N o r t h Africa, so m u c h seems to be certain, was brought along b y them from the east. O f the two main tribal groups, the Ben! S u l a y m and the Beni Hilal, the former is the senior branch. Both came from the N e j d and are of Mudarx (Qaysi) stock. A c c o r d i n g to tradition, S u l a y m , w h o lived in the third century A.D. and H i l a l in the 5th h a d as their c o m m o n ancestor Mansur w h o was the grandson of Q a y s . T h e S u l a y m tribes are spread today from E g y p t to Tunisia and are divided in Cyrenaica into two main branches, the J i b a r n a and the Harabi. T h e Beni Hilal settled in the western part of the same territory; tribes claiming Hilali descent are found today mainly in Tripolitania and Tunisia. Client or vassal tribes as well as noble or free tribes are grouped under the same dual genealogy. T h e secondary tribes have attached themselves to the

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dominant tribes and by a process well known also from the tribal life of the Syrian Desert have grafted their branch of descent onto the family tree of the noble tribes. T h e term used by the Bedouins of L i b y a to describe this process is laf (to connect, to wrap).142 It is not intended to discuss here the extremely intricate problem of the origin of the North African Berber tribes. For our present purposes it will be sufficient to summarize briefly the popular traditions which, just as in Arabia proper, assign a dual origin to the Berber tribes. These popular traditions are reflected in the généalogie speculations contained in the writings of medieval A r a b historians and summarized by Ibn K h a l d u n (1332-1406). T h e traditions are contradictory and confusing, as popular traditions often are, but they all agree on one basic point: that, namely, all the non-Arab North African tribes belong to either of two groups, called Beranes and Botr, respectively. According to information obtained by Ibn H a z m from the son of A b u Yezid, chief of the Zenâta (one of the Botr tribes), and reported by Ibn Khaldun, the descendants of Madghis el-Abter, that is the Botr tribes, "did not belong to the Berber r a c e . " 1 4 3 A number of other genealogists of the Berber people (Sabeq ibn Soleyman el-Matmati, Hani ibn Masdur (or Isdur) el-Kumi, K a h l à n ibn abi Lua) quo; d elsewhere bv i b n K h a l d u n (i : 168) projected further back the factitious ancestiy of the Berbers and connected them with Biblical figures. According to them, the Beranes were the children of Berr, who was the son (or descendant) of Mazigh, the r >n of Canaan, the son of H a m . the son of Noal:. T h e Beranes tvibv-s therefore, are represented as laterally related to the South Arabian Y a m a r " tribes, vhose ancestor, Q a h t à n , was the great-great-grar. ison oi Shem, brother of Ham. According to the same genealogists, the Botr tribes were the descendants of Berr (not identical with the first Berr) who was the son of Qays, a descendant of Ishmael. In this manner the Arabian theory of dual descent was deftly applied to the Berbers. T h e appearance of the name Berr in the traditional lineage of both North African groups of tribes is explained by other traditions as referring to one and the same person. Ibn Hazm, while

Golden River to Golden Road faithfully recording the Zenâta tradition of separate ancestry, was himself of the opinion that Bernes and Madghis el-Abter were brothers, the sons of Berr, who was a descendant of Mazigh, son of Canaan, son of H a m , son of Noah. 1 4 4 This tradition, therefore, assigns to all the Berbers a "Hamitic" origin, and makes them cousins to the South Arabian Yamani tribes. Since, according to the Biblical genealogy (Gen. i o) Canaan was the ancestor of the people who inhabited the Land of Canaan before its occupation by the Hebrew tribes, as well as the coastal districts to the north of it, the assumption that the ancestry of the North African tribes was of Canaanite origin may be a legendary or traditional reflection of the historical fact that North Africa was colonized by Canaanite (Phoenician) tribes. This assumption is supported by a tradition reported by the Arab historian Abu 'Obeyd Allah 'Abdallah el-Bekrl in his Kitâb el-Mesâlik, to the effect that the Berbers originated in Syria where they inhabited Palestine ("Filistin"). They left Palestine after their king Thàlût killed J â l u t (Goliath), crossed Egypt, and settled in the Maghreb. 14 ® The tradition of the Syrian-Phoenician origin of the Berbers was still prevalent among the Saharan tribes in the beginning of the twentieth century. 1 4 8 I t would thus seem that all genealogists up to the fourteenth century agreed that the Beranes were true Berber tribes of Hamitic origin and therefore related to some extent to the South Arabian tribes, while the Botr tribes were, according to some, of the same origin, and, according to others, of Ishmaelitic origin and thus related to the Northern or Qaysï Arab tribes. No unanimity is found in the traditions assigning the individual Berber tribes or tribal groupings a Beranes or a Botr affiliation. Again according to Ibn Khaldun, most genealogists agreed that the Beranes formed seven big tribes: Azdaja, Masmuda, Aurëba, Ajïka, Ketama, Sanhâja, and Aurigha; and that the Botr formed four big tribes : Addasa, Nefusa, Darïsa, and the children of Lua the Elder, all the four the descendants of Zahlik (or Zejjik), son of Madghis el-Abter. T o the Botr group were counted also the Zenâta, who were regarded as the descendants of Yahya, son of Dari, son of Zahlik (Zejjik), son of Madghis el-Abter.

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Not all the genealogists, however, agreed that all the seven tribes enumerated above have to be assigned to the Beranes. According to Ibn el-Kelbi, quoted by Ibn Khaldun, two of them, the Ketama and Sanhaja tribes, did not belong to the Berber race, but were "branches of the Yemenite population whom Ifriqos ibn Sayfi established in Ifrlqiya (that is, North Africa) with the armies whom he left behind to guard the country. . . ." This version, therefore, did not regard the Ketama and Sanhaja as "Hamites," but rather as "Semites," descended from Sem through the South Arabian, Qahtani, or Yamani lineage. To the Azdaja branch of the Beranes tribes were counted the Mestasa (or Mesettasa), the Masmuda, and the Ghomara. The North Arabian descent and affinities of the Zenata tribes seem to be supported by the great similarity of their way of life to that of the Arabs of the Arabian and Syrian deserts. As Ibn Khaldun points out, "In our days, one can notice among this people (the Zenata), many usages proper of the Arabs: they live in tents; they raise camels; they ride horses; they transport their dwellings from one locality to another; they spend the summer in the Tell (the northern mountainous area of North Africa) and the winter in the desert; they raid the inhabitants of the cultivated land and they reject a just and regular government." The Zenata were the most powerful group of the Botr. Their traditional enemies, the Sanhaja (or Senhaja), were counted, as we have seen, by most genealogists among the Beranes. Bloody wars between the Zenata and the Sanhaja were a constant feature of North African history in the Middle Ages.147 The Sanhaja, however, fought with the same bitterness and persistence also a Beranes brother tribe, the Ghomara, a subdivision of the Azdaja branch of the Beranes. The SanhajaGhomara wars took place in pre-Islamic times, that is, long before the Sanhaja-Zenata fights, but they left an indelible impression on popular tradition and imagination to this day. "It seemed that the whole world joined in, every tribe of the Rif belonged to one side or the other, and now even inanimate objects are sometimes divided into Senhaja and Ghomara." 148 It seems possible that the uncertainty in the traditions as to the genealogy of the Sanhaja tribes had something to do with these prolonged struggles of the

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Sanhaja, first with the Ghomara and then with the Zenata. Those who were familiar mainly or only with the SanhajaZenata wars, the bulk of which took place only a few centuries before the times of Ibn Khaldun, were inclined to assign a Beranes status to the traditional enemies of a Botr tribe. Those, however, who remembered also the much earlier Sanhaja-Ghomara fights, excluded the Sanhaja from the Beranes stock and attributed them a Y a m a n i (or Qahtani) descent. In modern times, the social organization in North Africa still reflects the historical and traditional forces that molded it for the past fifteen hundred years. The dichotomy of tribes into two mutually hostile groups still characterizes the area, although under European (French) influence the importance of these traditional rivalries is today definitely on the decline. A n alliance of tribes is called in North Africa leff, while a smaller alliance, composed of related families, is called soff.1** As a rule, two competing leffs are lined up against each other in any larger area of North Africa. In Northern Morocco the two leffs are still called by the traditional name pair, Senhaja and Ghomara. 1 5 0 The political tension between the two notwithstanding, in both of these groups of tribes as well as in the K t a m a (Ketama) group (all the three of whom belong according to "most genealogists" quoted by Ibn Khaldun to the Beranes group), Senhajan and Jebalan cultural traits predominate; while in the eastern part of Morocco and especially among the Ben! Bu Yahyi (let us recall that Y a h y a figures as an ancestral name in the genealogy of the Zenata) and the Metalsa tribes, Zenatan nomadic cultural traits predominate. In between the two areas there is a territory in which both the Zenatan and the Senhajan traits are absent and which has been designated as the center of a Central Rifiian culture. T h e Senhaja and the Ghomara are distinguished from each other by certain differences reminiscent of the differences in custom between the Qays and the Y a m a n villages in Palestine. The Senhaja leave food in the bowl, for shame of taking the last bit, and also in order to keep the baraka, the blessing of plenty, in the house; the Ghomara leave none. The Senhaja are hospitable to strangers, the Ghomara are cold to them. 1 5 1

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I n Ibala and the Rif the dual groups of tribes who are constantly at war with each other have curious totemistic relations to animals and food prohibitions: the Sanhaja are connected with quadrupeds, the Ghomara with birds. 1 5 1 T h e claim of ancestry is, of course, not an infallible guide to the actual descent of North African tribes. Some of the Rifian tribes, for instance, claim Sanhaja, others Zenata ancestry; still others claim that their ancestors were the indigenous heathens of North Africa; and yet others claim foreign, western ancestry. I t is interesting that in one and the same tribe various subdivisions sometimes claim different ancestries. 1 5 3 But to return to the dual division of North African tribes. In the Anti-Atlas region of Southern Morocco the two leffs are called Igezzulen (in the west) and Isuktan or Ahoggwa (in the east); in the Western Atlas Ait Atman and Ait Iraten; in the Atlantic plains of Morocco Sofian and Beni Malek; in the J u r j u r a Kabylia up to the end of the eighteenth century there were two soffs, which however were organizationally similar to the leffs in other places, named Soff Ufella and Soff Bu-Adda. 1 5 4 Among the Masmuda, sedentary Berbers of the Moroccan High Atlas, there are, in addition to strong alliances in the form oi leffs, also larger local organizations grouped into tagbilt-s or cantons, each with a name of its own, engaged pair-wise in keen rivalry with each other and playing an important part in political life. A similar situation prevails in the Aures Mountains. 1 5 5 When neighboring villages are lined u p against each other in two competing and hostile moieties, these groupings may be called either leff or soff. When a village is internally divided into two parties these are usually called soffs. Whatever the name, the two parties are usually about equal in strength, and in case of intermoiety hostilities the moiety solidarity overrides everything else, the entire soff (or l e f f ) rallying to the support of a menaced member. Only when the interests of the village or of the tribe as a whole are menaced by a common danger is the partisan spirit of the soff or of the leff attenuated for a while In some places a group may be broken up into three soffs. Generally, however, there are two soffs in a village, although -ro^-allegiance of individual families is often changed 1 5 6 —a situation resembling the one met with in O m a n .

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T h e two soffs may be called after the names of their leaders or, in accordance with their geographical location in the village, they may be called by such name pairs as Upper Soff and Lower Soff; Eastern Soff (Soff Sherqi) and Western Soff (Soff Gherbl); Central Soff and Outer Soff. 1 5 7 T h e same dichotomy of villages into moieties is found also outside Morocco all over North Africa. In Algeria, for instance, the town of Laghuat is divided into two sections or quarters, the one inhabited by the Ouled Serghina, the other by the Ouled Hallaf. T h e constant feuding and bloodshed that marked the relationship of the two tribes is suppressed today, but the hatred persists, and each tribe still sticks closely to its own quarter. 1 6 8 Occasionally the two quarters of the village are so completely separated from each other that they give the impression of twin villages rather than two sections of one and the same village. Barth in his travels passed through several such Berber villages in Libya. About one of them, Mizda, a hundred miles due south of Tripoli (probably identical with Masti R o m a of Ptolemy), he reports: . . So we proceeded, passing between the widely separated quarters of villages distinguished as the upper 'el fok* and the lower 'el Utah.' . . . " Elsewhere he mentions a couple of villages distinguished as Bega el-Foka and Bega el-Utliyah, that is Upper and Lower Bega. 1 5 9 M u c h the same conditions prevail in the most thoroughly studied spot in the Libyan desert, the Siwa Oasis, just inside the western frontier of Egypt. T h e chief settlement within the oasis is Siwa town, which is divided into two antagonistic factions sharply localized within the Eastern and Western halves of the town and called accordingly el-Sharqiyin or Easterners and el-Gharbiyin or Westerners. According to native tradition, the division of the town resulted from a quarrel about a narrow street that separates the two quarters and took place in 1807. However, in view of the common occurrence of the dual division of towns and villages, one will be inclined to assume that much older traditional rivalries must have underlain that event. T h e Easterners comprise five distinct patrilineal groups, usually tracing their origin to different male immigrants by whose names they are often called, thus closely corre-

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sponding in structure to the hamulas of the Palestinian fellahin. Some of these gentes are undivided, others are subdivided into as much as four sections, believed to be descended from the sons, grandsons, etc., of the supposed ancestor of the whole gens. Similarly, the Westerners are divided into three gentes. Until recently, the most trivial events sufficed to precipitate a battle between the two factions. According to Cline, who studied Siwa in 1926-27, all the Westerners belong to the Senussi sect and order of Islam, while the Easterners in addition to some adherents of this order have many members in the sect called Madaniyah, and this difference in creed has accentuated the conflict between the two. Formerly no intermarriage took place between the factions, but more recently, since the Egyptian government took full control of the oasis and put an end to open strife, marriages between East and West have become frequent. However, even today, preferred marriages are those contracted within the faction, more particularly within the gens, and often they follow the A r a b custom of marriage with the first cousin. 1 6 0 In the Saharan urban centers in general dual groupings, referred to here as well by the term sof, are a striking feature of political organization. T h e basis of the dichotomy is usually economic, but it is mostly couched in cultural or political terms: one sof is formed by the more conservative citizens, the other by the more progressive elements. However, not infrequently, two different ethnic groups are lined up against each other in the two sofs. T o this should be added that the openly avowed reason for the dual system is almost always said to be a matter of theological disagreement. T h e geographical factor, by now thoroughly familiar to us, appears frequently in the Saharan towns as well. A t Laghouat, for instance, on the extreme northern edge of the desert in Algeria, the oasis is cut into two by a high ridge of bare rock; one sof occupies the northwestern, the other the southeastern half of the settlement. A t El Atteuf (pronounced El Atf) in the M z a b , local tradition has it that the people quarreled over a point of religious doctrine, the question of the conjugal fidelity of Mohammed's wife Aisha, and, unable to agree, broke up into two groups, the Sheraga (easterners) and G h a r b a (westerners). T h e presence of

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two mosques, belonging respectively to the two, gives concrete expression to the dichotomy. In the town of El Oued (or El Wed), some seventy miles to the east of Touggourt, and among the Hassaouna of the Fezzan, the main dividing line between the two parties is ethnic, with the Arabs forming the one, and the Berbers the other group. A characteristic of the Saharan dual organization is that it is generally based on the socially predominant groups, with the exclusion of the lowest rungs of society. Some minority groups, however, reproduce, on a small scale, the dichotomy characterizing the ruling classes. The J e w s of Ghardaia (some 300 miles south of Algiers), for instance, although numbering only 1,200 souls, are split into two bitterly opposed factions that disagree violently on nearly all questions of general policy. In their relations with Muslims or Christians they are united, but in internal matters, social or economic, the two parties have as little as possible to do with cach other. The dual organization seems to be most highly developed in the commercial centers of the northern Sahara, and apparently fades out gradually toward the south as the commercial function of sedentary settlements in general becomes more attenuated. Membership in the moieties is, like other social affiliation, hereditary, but members can, and sometimes do, change sides with bewildering suddenness—a phenomenon which, as will be remembered, is not confined to this part of the Middle East. 1 6 0 * Among the tribes of Cyrenaica the al-Hasa can serve as an example of dual organization, as is shown. In fact, the structure of this tribe closely resembles that of the 'Aneze, insofar as the tribe is divided into two subtribes, each of whom is again subdivided into two groups. 1 8 1 al-Hasa

al-Qaläbta (or Qalbät)

Qassàm

I al-Muäsa

al-Mahämda

al-Shabärga

al-Bakhäyit

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Occasionally the dichotomy of a village or the traditional hostility of two neighboring villages survive today only in ceremonial fights in which two halves of the population are lined up against each other and which at times have prognostic significance. T h e Berber Shloh tribe of the Imejjat in the southwestern corner of Morocco celebrate in October the feast of Sid! Hamad u-Musa. After a ceremonial meal "all the people divide into two parties, a northern representing the Gharb and a southern representing Sus, and a fight with slings ensues, which, though only a game, is often attended with serious accidents. It is believed that if Sus wins in this contest the year will be good, and if the Gharb wins, bad."162 Dual division is a characteristic feature of the social organization of the A r a b nomads of the Sahara of whom the C h a a m b a (Shaamba) can be taken as an example. T h e Chaamba area lies in central Algeria, north of the T u a r e g territory. T h e y used to have a well developed jo/"-like dual system which has by now lost much of its former force but clear traces of which still persist. The tents of a single camp, for instance, are usually pitched in two more or less distinct clusters; the two groups are known as Sheraga (easterners) and Gharba (westerners). T h e Sheraga are traditionally progressive in all things; the Gharba, conservative. The two still retain a spirit of profound rivalry. T h e men form two distinct groups in the traditional ceremonial fantasiyas (gymkhanas). T h e boys form two opposing teams in their informal hockey games. Combat teams of warriors usually include men of one party only. As to descent traditions, we find the familiar picture of origin from two brothers. T h e Berazga division of the Chaamba, for instance, are divided intwo two tribes based on Metlili, the Ouled Allouch (Wled Allush) and the Ouled (Wled) Abd-elKader. T h e first, numbering about 4,000, is divided into seven clans, of which the most noble is the Ouled Touameur (Wled Twamr), the supposed descendants of T w a m r , the mythical founder of Metlili. Hanich (Hanish), Twamr's younger brother, is believed to be the ancestor of the Ouled Hanich, the leading clan of the Ouled Abd-el-Kader which number about 3,300 and is divided into five clans. T h e Wled Allush tribe belongs to the

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eastern party, while the Abd-el-Kader is divided between the two, as is the sedentary clan of the Beni Merzoug. Dual structure characterizes also other Chaamba tribes. 14 ** In Mogador, on the eve of the 'Ashura (the Moslem New Year's Day, celebrated on the tenth day of the first month, Muharram, called in Morocco Shar de VAshur, month of 'Ashur), the people divide into two camps that engage in sham battles sometimes assuming a serious character. 1 4 3 In Mequinez this sham fight used to take place two days later, on the twelfth of the month, in the afternoon, between the young men and boys, likewise divided into two parties. 164 Ceremonial fights between two villages take place frequently in Morocco on the 'Ashura-day; or on the day of the 'Id el-keblr, the Great Feast, celebrated on the tenth day of the twelfth month, Dhu el-hijjah; or in the form of a tug-of-war, or racing, on the day of the solar New Year (January i) or the day preceding it; or on Midsummer's day (in the form of pouring water on one another in many places of the country; or in the form of other two-party fights, or on the fourth day before Midsummer (in Salli, a town on the Atlantic coast, in the form of a fight between two parties composed of young men and boys), sometimes with the express purpose of making the rain fall. 145 In introducing the subject of the traces of dual organization among the Tuareg of the Central Sahara, we have to refer again briefly to Ibn Khaldun. According to this Arab historian, four of the six Beranes groups, namely the Lemta, Sanhaja, Ketama, and Aurigha, formed the Muleththemin, or the people of the veil, 144 the ancestors of the present-day Tuareg. This tradition thus assigns a Beranes genealogy to the Tuareg tribes, and any subdivision of the Tuareg would therefore have to be regarded as intramoiety fissions. The Tuareg of the Central Sahara were up to the sixteenth century divided into two groups, the north and the south. The Northern Tuareg, also called Saharan Tuareg, were the Ihaggaren; while the southern or Sudanese Tuareg were called Tademaket and inhabited initially the Adghar (mountain range) of Ifoghas. In the sixteenth century, the Saharan Tuareg broke u p into two groups, the Kel (people) Ahaggar, who retained the

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original name of the group (Ihaggaren is the plural of Ahaggar) and the Kel Ajjer or Azger. These two tribal confederations are close neighbors to this day (the Azger live to the north and to the east of the Ahaggar), and the tradition of their common ancestry is strengthened by the presence to this day among the fourteen tribes of the Ahaggar of the Kel Ahamellen group, which as recently as the beginning of the nineteenth century still belonged to the Azger confederation. 187 The Ahaggar and the Azger form to this day the two great sections of the Northern Tuareg. Each of the two is subdivided into tribes, both noble (ihaggaren) and vassal (imghad). 188 The break-up of the Tademaket moiety began a century later. In the seventeenth century the Aulimmiden group moved from Ifoghas southwestward and established itself to the east of the great bend of the Niger river, in the region of the township of Menaka (Meneka). Subsequendy, several subdivisions of the Tademaket became dependent on the Aulimmiden: the Tuareg of the Ifoghas Range, and the Tuareg of the interior of the great knee of the Niger. In the eighteenth century a subdivision of the Aulimmiden broke away from the main body, moved to the east, and established itself under the name of Kel Dinnik as a semiindependent subgroup of the Aulimmiden, in the region of Tahwa, some 250 miles to the east-southeast of Menaka. 1 8 9 At about the same time also the Ifoghas Tuareg obtained practically complete independence from the Aulimmiden. The direct descendants of the Tademaket are the Tengeregif, who moved to the east of Timbuctoo, established themselves all around the shores of Lake Fagibin, and at one time were the rulers of the city of Timbuctoo itself. By the middle of the nineteenth century the importance of the Aulimmiden in relation to the other tribes of the Tuareg southwest grew to such an extent that the whole group, including the Tademaket, was designated by the name of Aulimmiden. 170 The Kel Geres tribes living south of the Air mountains came at a late date from the north and are composed of the same stock as the Ahaggar tribes. The Kel Owi of the Air or Azben Mountains seem to be the descendants of a group of the Tademaket. 1 7 1 It appears, therefore, that in spite of the present-day multiple

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groupings of the Tuareg, they all can be reduced to two original groups, the Tademaket and the Ahaggar. Evidence of Tuareg dual organization can be found also in the following details: T h e noble K e l Rela were also called K e l Ahem Mellen (People of White Tents), in contrast to another tribe, the Issetafenin, the ancestors of the present-day Aulimmiden, who were called K e l Ahen Settefet (People of Black Tents). A t the present time, the K e l Rela are also called the "upper people" because they inhabit the elevated center part of the A h a g g a r ; while their cousin tribe, the Taitok, are also called the "lower people," because they inhabit the lower western part of the Ahaggar. These two, the K e l Rela and the Taitok, had prolonged fights over the tobol, the large drum that is the symbol of paramount chieftainship of the Ahaggar Tuareg. Although today there is a third noble tribe in the Ahaggar, the Tegehe Mellet, who also claim descent from a daughter of Ti-n-Hinan, there are conflicting traditions as to the origin of this tribe, and if one gives credit to the one that attributes Shamba extraction to it, the Ahaggar nobility is left with a clear-cut dual division. T h e over-all organization of all the Tuareg thus gives the following picture: I. Northern Tuareg 1. Ihaggaren a. K e l Rela b. Taitok 2. K e l Ajjer II. Southern Tuareg 1. Aulimmiden 2. Tengeregif III. K e l Air or K e l Azben or Southeastern Tuareg 1. K e l Geres 2. K e l O w i 1 7 2 CONCLUSION

T o sum up, the main characteristics of Middle Eastern dual organization along the lines indicated by Haekel's study appear to be as follows:

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1. Middle Eastern dual organization is characterized by a dual division of tribal federations and of settled populations inhabiting extensive territories, as well as of single tribes and villages. T h e dual division is present in a. Overtly manifest groupings, as well as in b. T h e consciousness of the people; c. Expressed occasionally in differences in mode of behavior and attributed character traits; and is d. A permanent phenomenon. A n additional ethnologic characteristic of Middle Eastern dual organization is that it does not as a rule contraposit one major ethnic group as against the other, even where the ethnic stratification would be favorable to such a development. In North Africa, for example, it is not the Berbers on the one hand and the Arabs on the other w h o form two moieties. T h e Berbers among themselves are divided into two moieties, as are the Arabs among themselves. Within one and the same ethnic group, however, the dual division transcends other social, cultural, and religious groupings. In Lebanon and Palestine, for example, each of the two moieties, here called Qays and Y a m a n , is composed of nomads, villagers, and townspeople, as well as of Muslims, Christians, and Druzes. 2. Middle Eastern dual organization is characterized by a very frequent subdivision of each of the moieties into secondary and tertiary groupings. O f the two most powerful tribal confederations of the Syrian Desert, one, the 'Aneze, belongs to the Qays moiety, while the other, the Shammar, belongs to the Y a m a n or Q a h t a n moiety. Both the 'Aneze and the Shammar are divided into two submoieties: the 'Aneze into D a n a Bishr and D a n a Muslim; and the Shammar into the Eastern (or Northern) Shammar and the Western Shammar. Again, the D a n a Bishr is divided into four (today only three) tribes. Each of these tribes is further subdivided into subtribes, and each of the subtribes into still smaller groups. 3. In the emphatically endogamous Middle Eastern society, the dual organization cannot play a significant role with regard to the regulation of marriage. A man's preferred wife is his father's brother's daughter, or failing this, another next of kin in the male

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line. On the whole, however, the dual system tends to reinforce this endogamous trend, marriage with the opposite moiety being regarded with varying degrees of disapproval. 4. Since Middle Eastern society in general is patrilineal, moiety membership is inherited in the male line. T h e prevalent belief is that there is an unbroken genetic connection between the present membership of the two moieties and the original two groups or two individuals who are believed to have been their first ancestors. This traditional or mythical ancestry often goes back to preIslamic times. Actually, however, historical evidence shows that there has always been a considerable amount of shifting between moieties or changing of allegiance, of switching of families or larger groups from one moiety to the other. In such cases as a rule very soon genetic connection is assumed between the group in question and the ancestor(s) of the moiety on which it has grafted itself. 5. With regard to ideology and symbolism evidence is scanty. In the central area of the Middle East, the Qays moiety has been associated with the red color and the carrying of a red flag, while in the Yaman moiety white has played the same role. Among the Tuareg and in Afghanistan, the name pair black and white occurs. The distinction between southern and northern moieties or between eastern and western ones in the Middle East is a reflection of actual geographic location which either prevails to this day or which characterized the two moieties in the past. There seems to be some sporadic evidence as to the association of different kinds of animals with the two moieties in North Africa, but pending additional data this cannot be considered as conclusive. The tradition of the descent of the two moieties from two brothers, on the other hand, is found repeatedly in places as distant from each other as Iran and Morocco. 6. As to the presence of name pairs with opposite meanings, only the following preliminary statement can be made at present: In many cases the two moieties have no special names, but are distinguished from each other by names of the localities that they inhabit. For example, the Nu'em of Iraq are divided into the

Dual Organization

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Nu'em o f j a z l r a h and the Nu'em of Jebel Hamrin. Sometimes the two moieties are distinguished only as the eastern and western branches of the same group; or as upper and lower; cold and warm; transmontane and cismontane; mountain and plains. When, in addition to the common name of the tribal federation or over-all group, the two moieties have separate individual names, only thorough linguistic and historical studies could in most cases elucidate the original meaning of these names; even their present-day connotation could only be established by carefully questioning members of the groups themselves as well as of neighboring groups. The author has no knowledge of such studies having been made to date. If one can rely on a superficial impression gained from a cursory examination of a few name pairs that can be relatively easily interpreted, it would seem that the tendency to denote opposites can be discovered in them. (The Yaman-Qays name pair, for example, can be interpreted as meaning fortune and misfortune). 7. The relationship between the two moieties is, as a rule, hostile. Hostility is present from the highest down to the lowest levels of the dual divisions. The hostility is at best latent, but very often leads to open fighting, pitched battles, and even massacres. A major part of the wars that took place in the history of the Islamic East was fought between opposing moieties. Only scanty traces have been found of the more harmless ceremonial type of rivalry that according to some students is characteristic of the dual organization. 173 The prevailing serious nature of the rivalry, enmity, and intermoiety warfare in the Middle East does not seem to bear out the expectation of Murdock that "opposing factions should be more characteristic of peaceful than of warlike communities." 174 8. No traces of reciprocity or mutuality in services at feasts and funerals have been found in connection with Middle Eastern dual organization. 9. Likewise, no traces of an assigned superiority of one moiety and a corresponding inferior status of the other have been found in the modern Middle East. 1 7 5 On the contrary, the two moieties appear everywhere as equals in rank. It is this circumstance precisely that makes the two moieties the most suitable opponents.

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No noble Arab tribe, for instance, would stoop to fight another tribe that is inferior to it in status. How the distinction between noble and vassal tribes fits into the dual organization pattern is not quite clear at present. But it seems certain that it never happens that a noble tribe, or noble tribes, should form one moiety, with a vassal tribe or tribes forming the other. The inferior tribes in general are vassals of a noble tribe that belongs to one of the two moieties but they do not as a rule participate in the intermoiety fighting, which is a strictly noble affair.

VIII. Noble and Vassal Tribes

A

CHARACTERISTIC OF Middle Eastern social organization is the presence among the nomadic population of superior or noble tribes on the one hand and of inferior or vassal or client tribes on the other. As far as geographic location is concerned, this distinction between noble and vassal tribes is also found in practically every part of the Middle East inhabited by nomadic tribes. The noble tribes generally show a much greater organizational coherence than the vassal tribes. A noble tribe, though subdivided into several divisions and wandering units, will generally be found to inhabit a definite geographic area that is regarded as its tribal territory, and under normal circumstances its movements will be confined to the boundaries of this area. The typical vassal tribe, on the other hand, is broken up into many splinter groups, widely scattered over large areas, without cohesion and often without contact among them. One of the best-known and -studied vassal tribes, the Solubba (variants: Sulubba, Sleyb, Salib, Sulaba, Soliba, etc.) are dispersed all over the northern half of the Arabian Peninsula, and further to the north in the Syrian Desert and the adjoining territories, while according to some observers they can be found as far south as Yemen. 1 Solubba splinter groups are attached to practically every tribe within this wide area, and while they all go under the name of Solubba, they can be identified more closely by the name of the tribe of which they are the clients. Thus there are in the Syrian Desert Shammar Solubba, 'Amarat Solubba, Rwala Solubba, Mutayr Solubba, etc. 2 The Mutayr, in addition, have two serf tribes, the Rashayda and their cousins, the Hirshan 3 25'

Golden River to Golden Road T h e same is the case with another vassal group, the Hteym (variants: Hiteym, Hutaym, Heteym, etc., pi. Hitman) of whom J o h n Lewis Burckhardt observed in the beginning of the nineteenth century that "of the innumerable tribes who people the deserts of Arabia, none is more dispersed, nor more frequently seen in all parts of that country, than the Heteym. In Syria, in Lower and Upper Egypt, along the whole coast of the Red Sea down to Yemen, in Nedjd and Mesopotamia, encampments of the Heteym are always to be found. . . I n fact, the name Hteym has become a mere generic descriptive term, something like "serf" or "vassal," and the several Hteym tribes are each called by a name of their own. In the Syrian desert the Sleyb, al-Hawazem, al-Fheyjat, Shararat, 'Azem, are all Hteym tribes. 6 The Shararat themselves are scattered among the Rwala, BenI Sakhr, Hwetat, and Shammar. The 'Awazim, too, are widely scattered.® In the Sinai Peninsula the Hteym are called Rashayda, at Qatira they are called Dawaghra, in Jebel Hilal among the Tiyaha, Orenat; in Egypt, Mutayr, 'Azaza, Qizayz and 'Aqeyl. 7 The 'Azayre of Upper Egypt were also regarded as a Hteym group. 8 Yet another type of vassal tribal group does not possess any tribal name of its own but is called simply sani', that is, artisan or tinker, or in plural sunna' (variant: sana'). The sunna', just as the Solubba or the Hteym, are found at one time or another with each noble tribe, and are called by the name of their protector tribe, for example, Sunna' al-Muteyr, the smiths of the Muteyr. 9 In Southern Arabia, especially in Muscat and Yemen, vassal tribal groups referred to as Akhdam ("serviles"), are scattered among all the other tribes. In the Aden Protectorate the main vassal tribes are the Zatut (sing. Zutti), a kind of gypsy caste, and the Shahara, who were once the lords of the land but are today the vassals of the Qara. 1 0 In Libya, among the tribes of Cyrenaica, both the vassal and the noble tribes are called by collective group names. The vassal tribes are called Marabtin (or Murabitin), the nobles Sa'adl. 1 1 Among the Tuareg in the central Sahara, the noble tribes are called Imoshar, Ihaggaren, or Imuhagh, and the vassals Imghad, singular Amghid. 12

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There are no generally valid criteria of the relationship between the vassal and noble tribes. However, in most cases the vassal tribe is tied to a noble tribe (or to several noble tribes) in such a manner as to leave no place for doubt with regard to the status of the two. The most common expression of the inferior status of the vassal tribe is the payment of a tribute, called khuwwa, or "brotherhood," to a stronger superior or noble tribe. U p to World War I, most seminomadic tribes on the outskirts of the Syrian Desert paid khuwwa to the big and powerful nomadic tribes. 13 The superior tribe that receives the khuwwa undertakes in exchange not to attack or raid the vassal tribe, to protect it from other tribes in case of attack or raid, to restore any property of the vassal tribe taken by a member of the protecting noble tribe, and, occasionally, to allow the vassal tribe to sojourn permanently within the boundaries of its (the noble tribe's) tribal territory and to use its water and pasture. The rendering of such a khuwwa payment in itself is sufficient to stamp a tribe with the mark of inferiority, to make khwan, "brothers," that is brotherhood money-payers, out of it. Usually an inferior tribe (or a section of an inferior tribe) pays khuwwa to a single superior tribe and therewith becomes its protected client. Only occasionally does one and the same group pay khuwwa to several protectors. The R w a l a collect khuwwa from all the Hteym tribes, such as the Sleyb, al-Hawazem, al-Fheyjat, Shararat, and 'Azem, as well as from several villages lying on the outskirts of their tribal territory, such as the Qaryatayn, Tadmor, Sukhne, K a w m , Tayyibe. Each tributary tribe and village has among the Rwala its "brother" (akh) to whom it pays directly a certain annual sum (which in the early 1900's amounted to about 25 Mejidiyyes). For this payment the akh gives protection and is bound to restore all property that fellow-tribesmen may have taken from the vassal tribe or village. 1 1 The stigma of inferiority attaches to a tribe long after it has ceased to pay the khuwwa. In the first half of the nineteenth century the Hwetat and Ben! 'Atiyye tribes paid khuwwa to the Shararat tribe that belonged to the Hteym category and camped with them as their qusard or protected neighbors; consequently,

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more than two generations later (in the beginning of the twentieth century) the R w a l a still regarded the Hwetat and the Beni 'Atiyye as inferior tribes and refused to intermarry with them. 1 6 Similarly, the Hteym between Medina and Hail used to pay khuwwa some generations ago, and although of recent years they fight like any Bedouin tribe, they cannot change their inferior social status. 16 Conditions imposed by a victorious tribe upon another tribe defeated by it in war also can stamp the latter with an inferior status. A b o u t the same time when part of the Hwetat tribe paid khuwwa to the Shararat, another part of the Hwetat defeated the Beni ' U q b a in battle and imposed upon them the following six conditions: (i) T h e Beni ' U q b a , having lost their rights to the land, become-khwan. (2) T h e y give up the privilege of escorting the Hajj-caravan to Mecca. (3) If a Hweti were proved to have plundered a pilgrim, his tribe was to make good the loss, but if the thief escaped detection, the Beni ' U q b a have to pay the value of the stolen property in cash or kind. (4) T h e Beni ' U q b a are not allowed to receive as guests any tribe at enmity with the Hwetat. (5) If a sheikh of the Hwetat fancied a camel belonging to one of the Beni ' U q b a , the latter must sell it to him under cost price. (6) T h e Beni ' U q b a are not allowed to wear the 'aba, the cloak of the Bedouin. 1 7 T h e Hwetat occupy an exceptional position insofar as they are superior with regard to one tribe and inferior in relation to another. T h e general pattern is that a vassal tribe is inferior in relation to all noble tribes, and the only groups inferior to them are gypsylike splinter tribes and small scattered groupings of the sunna', the tinkers and blacksmiths. Some of the noble tribes hold themselves to be superior to other noble tribes and frown upon intermarriage with them, for example, the R w a l a and the 'Aneze in general, or the Shammar. 1 8 Even the Hwetat regard themselves as superior not only to the fellahin, but also to all the nomadic, tent-dwelling Bedouin Arabs. 1 9 This can be explained by the generally prevailing ethnocentrism that is narrowly localized among the nomadic people within the tribe or, occasionally, within a subsection of the tribe.

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A more r e m a r k a b l e feature is the consensus of opinion a m o n g both the noble a n d the vassal tribes with regard to the general dichotomy of the tribal population into these two over-all groupings. T h e attitude of the noble to the vassal tribes is expressed in certain phrases of institutionalized conduct. I n addition to the prohibition of i n t e r m a r r y i n g with t h e m , which has been referred to above, they are regarded as weak a n d unwarlike a n d therefore not a suitable object of attack or raid according to the unwritten code of Bedouin chivalry. " P a y i n g to all m e n a petty tribute, they are molested by none of them. N o Beduwy, they say, will rob a Solubby, although he met him alone, in the deep of the wilderness, a n d with the skin of an ostrich in his h a n d , t h a t is worth a thelul (a good riding c a m e l ) . " 2 0 "By the u n w r i t t e n Bedouin laws, they [the Sleyb] are outside the pale b u t inviolate. . . . T h e y have no allies a n d no other Bedouin tribe is permitted to raid or attack them. . . . " 2 1 For this inviolateness the Sleyb have to p a y with suffering insults a n d c o n t e m p t : " T h e y have never taken p a r t in the wars a n d feuds which have occupied the greater part of the Bedouins' lives for centuries. A Sulubbi, like a w o m a n , was a creature with w h o m it was too inferior to fight. . . . Beduin travelers or raiders invariably called at S u l u b b a tents if they could find t h e m and d e m a n d e d food a n d hospitality. T h e Beduin, w h o is normally a model of sedateness a n d reserved d e c o r u m a m o n g strangers, exhibited the worst aspects of his character in a S u l u b b a camp. H e shouted, bullied, cursed, a n d swaggered in a m a n n e r sometimes shameful. H e d e m a n d e d the best of food, cursed his host, complained of everything, ate all he could a n d then dem a n d e d more food to take with h i m as supplies for his journey. . . . " 2 2 According to a n o t h e r observer, " W h e n raiding tribes pass through their territory a n d chance to stop where their tents a r e pitched, they c a n d e m a n d water of the Salib, a n d coffee, b u t not food."23 O n the other h a n d , if the Solubba come to the c a m p of a noble tribe, they are not received hospitably. O n e of the features in the stereotype of the Solubba is t h a t they will shamelessly beg for food. 2 4 D o u g h t y records t h a t if a Solubbi asks for sour milk a t the tent of a noble Bedouin, " t h e housewife will p o u r o u t leban

Golden River to Golden Road

from her semila [skin], but it is in their own bowl, to the poor Solubba: for Beduins, otherwise little nice, will not willingly drink after Solubbies. . . More liberal-minded noble tribesmen may invite the Solubba to take water and coffee in their tents, but they will sit apart from the rest of the guests, and for the night they will pitch their own little tent where they will prepare their own meal and spend the night. 26 It is in accordance with this general attitude toward the inferior tribes that the penalty for injuring or killing one of them is especially severe: "In Southern Sinai, the penalty for hitting or killing a Hiteimi used to be greater than that for a man, i.e. they were put in the category of women, slaves and the like."" Although the vassal tribes are thus held in general contempt, members of the noble tribes usually admit that the inferior tribes surpass them in certain accomplishments that are very useful in the desert. According to the Bedouins of northern Arabia, the Solubba are excellent hunters who can at will choose the wild game that they wish to fell on a certain day, or that they will keep in reserve for themselves to be hunted in the future. 28 It is also acknowledged by the noble tribes that the Solubba know the desert better than they, and members of noble tribes therefore often employ the Solubba as guides in the desert or consult them regarding routes and grazing or camping grounds. 29 Also the Hteym are regarded as the best hunters in the Hijaz, as well as excellent camel-breeders, 30 and the Shararat as expert guides. 31 The attitude of the inferior tribes toward themselves and toward the superior tribes clearly reflects their low social position. The name Hteymi has been used as an insult by superior tribes to such an extent that even the Hteym themselves came to regard it as such. "To call a man a Hiteimi is an insult even if he is one; and if he is not, it is a serious slander to be expiated by a fine and the building of white cairns." 32 In their approach to members of superior tribes the Solubba exhibit an exaggerated humility. "Sulubba men are in general a miserable, fawning lot, affecting endearing and diminutive Arab terms of address, and are cringing in their manner." 3 3 Other authors us even stronger terms in describing their behavior.

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G l u b b describes an encounter he witnessed: the " S u l u b b a cowered and whined. Long oppression has indeed made them very low class. T h e ingratiating whine in which they address the Beduin as ' Y a Amaimi,' ' O h my little uncle,' makes one ashamed of human nature." 3 4 T h e same attitude can be observed among the H t e y m in their relations to members of other tribes: " . . . when the Fellahs say, Tatahattim (=tatamaskin or tatazalli), they mean, " T h o u cringest, thou makest thyself contemptible as a H u t a y m i . " Moreover, they must pay the dishonoring Akhawat or 'brother-tax' to all the Bedouin amongst w h o m they settle." 3 5 Just as a noble tribe can lose its superior status by being forced into payment of khuwwa to a more powerful tribe, an inferior, Muziwa-paying tribe can move up on the social scale and can become independent if its increased strength enables it to throw off the overlordship of the tribe of which it is a client. This upward social mobility is illustrated by the recent history of the ' A w a z i m tribe whose strength is approximately 4,000 fighting men, excluding those who live in K u w a i t and environs, and which possesses some 100,000 camels and 250,000 sheep. This tribe, which ranges from the northeastern corner of Arabia (Kuwait town) as far south as R a s Bidiya in the Hasa district, is divided into some 20 sections, each with 40 to 150 tents. T h e ' A w a z i m (sing. ' Azimi) were looked upon as the vassals of the powerful and noble ' A j m a n tribe whose tribal territory is to the south of that of the ' A w a z i m . In order to weaken the ' A j m a n w h o were unfriendly to him, K i n g Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia honored the ' A w a z i m with the title of an independent tribe, armed them with modern weapons, and distributed much ammunition amongst them. During 1929-30, the years of the Ikhwan rebellion, over 1,500 new British rifles were thus distributed among the ' A w a z i m . T o d a y the ' A w a z i m are nominally independent, apart, that is, from the allegiance they owe to Ibn Saud, and they regard their former overlords, the ' A j m a n , as their hereditary enemies. 84 In a similar manner other tribes, too, succeeded in shaking off the yoke of khuwwa payment and in establishing themselves as free fighting tribes; for example, some of the Solubba in 1919-22 and the Hteym. 3 7 T o t a l equality with the old noble (asilin)

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tribes, however, could not be achieved by them. While the noble tribe was not powerful enough to prevent its former vassal from attaining independence, it still had one means left at its disposal of which it could not be deprived and by which it continued to assert its superiority over its newly liberated vassal. This means was the prohibition of intermarriage, which has already been referred to earlier. Bedouin society is most sensitive with regard to sex mores in general and marriage regulations and restrictions in particular. Among the settled peoples of the Middle East, and especially the townspeople, marriage restrictions are stringent only as far as women are concerned; while no special stigma is attached to a man marrying lower than his class, the marriage of a woman to a man of lower status would not only be resented but would be a cause justifying forced intervention. This difference does not exist in nomadic society in which neither the marriage of a man with a girl from a lower tribe nor the giving of a girl in wedlock to a man from an inferior group is tolerated. Consequently, the continuation of the marriage prohibition against any tribe on the part of a superior tribe is a much more effective social barrier than it could ever be in a settled community. Thus, although the 'Awazim with the help of Ibn Saud have emancipated themselves completely from the 'Ajman, the latter will still not intermarry with them, which means that the social distance has not appreciably diminished between the two. The Hwetat and the Ben! 'Atiyye are still regarded as inferior by the Rwala, who will not intermarry with them. Marriage between a noble tribe and a Solubba tribe is quite out of the question. "No Arab can marry a Solubba girl. He would be killed by his people if he did, and she also." If a young man from a noble tribe nevertheless loses his head over a Solubba girl, the two have to flee their tribes and seek safety in distance. When the Emir Fawaz of the Rwala took a pretty Solubba maiden into the desert and kept her there as a mistress (without formally marrying her, which would have been impossible even for a prince or chief shaykh of the powerful tribe), he was "roundly cursed by all good Badawin." 38 A Rweyli or any other noble Bedouin cannot marry a girl from the Hteym or Sunna' tribe just as he cannot marry a

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slave. If he were to disregard these prohibitions he would be killed by his own next of kin. 3 * In fact, the prohibition of intermarriage with an inferior tribe is so general among all the Arab tribes that it can be taken as one of the chief criteria of tribal inferiority. This tradition is so strong that it is carried over from the desert into the town, as illustrated by the following occurrence: In 1931 'Abdullah Beg al-Sana' who, though of Sani' origin, attained the high position of Director General of the Ministry of Interior in Iraq, married in Baghdad a girl from the noble Sa'dun tribe. Both the girl and her mother had agreed to the marriage. Shortly thereafter 'Abdullah was killed by the girl's kin because he was admittedly of servile origin. A t the subsequent trial several ministers of the state were called in by the defense to show that the murder was no crime according to the traditional A r a b standards. When the murderer, a shaykh, was nevertheless condemned to death by an Iraqi court, his sentence was commuted to 15 years of imprisonment, and after only 19 months K i n g Faysal pardoned him. 40 Details of the marriage restrictions make one aware of differences in status within the vassal groups themselves. T h e Solubba, Hteym, and other vassal tribes, although despised, are still regarded as free Arabs (horr). As such, they stand higher in the social scale than the slaves who are as a rule black ('abi), and even than the sunna', the blacksmiths who, although white, afe not independent, and therefore inferior to the other vassal tribes. Consequently, no intermarriage is countenanced by the vassal tribes with the slaves and the blacksmiths. Freed slaves marry among the freedmen groups in the towns, or the daughter of a blacksmith. 41 In this connection it may be mentioned that the women of vassal tribes generally enjoy more freedom than the women of the noble tribes. Among the noble tribes there are several who veil their women. The women of the vassal tribes, however, do not wear any veil, and therefore, especially in places where the noble women are veiled, are easily recognizable. T h e Solubba women, for instance, never, veil and rarely wear a milfa (a face or head veil as opposed to the burqa, face mask). A m o n g the Solubba, who are very fond of dancing, it is moreover customary for men and

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Golden River to Golden Road

women to dance together—in itself a highly disgraceful and unseemly thing in the eyes of the noble tribes—and, what is even more shocking for them, in the course of the dance the men occasionally kiss their partners on the mouth before the audience. Also, some Solubba husbands tolerate that their wives prostitute themselves.4* The Hteym, "inhabiting the seaboard about Yambu', are taxed by other Badawin as low and vile of origin. The unchastity of the women is connived at by the men; who, however, are brave and celebrated as marksmen. . . Vassal tribes usually but by no means always engage in occupations different from those of the noble tribes. Sometimes, as in the case of the 'Awazim, the Hazim, the Sulaylat, they pursue the same occupations as the noble tribes, breeding camels and sheep. 44 In most cases, however, members of vassal tribes or splinter groups engage in all kinds of works and tasks that the noble tribes disdain. The Solubba, for instance, are hunters, tinkers, trackers, guides, coppersmiths, leatherworkers, woodworkers, cattle surgeons, doctors for men, women, and beasts; while their women are washerwomen, preparers of poisons and love potions, casters of the evil eye, versed in witchcraft, and even engage in prostitution. 46 Some Shararat live with members of noble tribes, perform the menial tasks of servants and herdsmen, and are excellent guides. 48 The Sunna* are ironworkers, farriers, swordsmiths, gunsmiths, they shoe the horses, beat out the tent stakes of their hosts, etc. 47 The Zatut in Southern Arabia are circumcisers, barbers, bloodletters, auctioneers, ironworkers. The Shahara in Southern Arabia hew wood and draw water for their Qara overlords. 48 The 'Aqeyl are merchants controlling the camel trade between Kassala and Egypt, and agents among the tribes of wholesale merchants who have their establishments in the larger towns on the borders of Arabia, as well as in Egypt and India. 4 9 The Jebeliya in the Sinai Peninsula engage in gardening and some of them are employed as servants of the monastery of Sinai. 80 The Kauliyah or gypsies in Iraq are fortune tellers, palmists, and thieves, while their women perform the female circumcision practiced in Southern Iraq, and among the Muntafiq tribes of the Euphrates and Ban! Tamlm Arabs. 61 The Hteym in Arabia "make, eat, and sell cheese, for which reason that food is

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despised by the Harb. . . . The Khalawiyah (pi. of Khalawi) are equally despised; they are generally blacksmiths, have a fine breed of greyhounds, and give asses as a dowry, which secures them the derision of their fellows." 81 The following traits are thus found to distinguish the vassal tribes from the noble ones: 1. The noble tribes exhibit a coherent tribal structure; the vassal tribes are fragmentized and scattered. 2. The noble tribes are strong enough to protect themselves against enemies; the vassal tribes are unable to do this and pay khuuiwa, brotherhood money, to a noble tribe whose clients they thus become, or to an individual member of such a noble tribe who is then in honor bound to protect them. 3. The noble tribes do not intermarry with the vassal tribes on account of the latters' inferiority. 4. The only occupation befitting a member of a noble tribe is tending the herds. The noblest of the noble tribes are camelherders, the second-class noble tribes have mostly sheep and goats. The vassal tribes, though they too may possess these animals, engage mainly in handicraft, as well as in hunting. 5. A favorite pastime (under traditional conditions) of a noble tribe is raiding and warfare, undertaken either for the sake of booty or as a point of "honor." The vassal tribes, as a rule, do not fight, not only because they are weak, but also because they have no comparable "honor" to defend. 6. The women of the noble tribes conform, in general, to a more stringent code of sex mores than the women of vassal tribes. Women of vassal tribes go unveiled. At the present stage of our knowledge of Middle Eastern social structure it is impossible to answer the question concerning the origin of this division of the nomadic peoples into noble and vassal tribes. All that can be done at present is to adduce some data as to the ideas current among the tribes themselves with regard to this social dichotomy. Since Middle Eastern tribes in Southwest Asia as well as in North Africa are extremely conscious of origin and descent, it will come as no surprise that the noble or vassal status of a tribe is, as a rule, attributed to a noble and a servile descent respectively.

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Golden River to Golden Road

The Solubba, whose name resembles the Arabic word for cross, are regarded by many tribes, as well as by several European students of the Middle East, as descendants of Crusaders, or Crusaders' mercenaries, or their camp followers.53 The theory of the non-Arab ancestry of the Solubba is supported by the nonArab language that they use among themselves (with nonSolubba they speak of course Arabic), and in which some observers thought to have recognized traces of French or Latin roots. 61 Others regard this explanation of the descent of the Solubba and of the frequency of a blond type in their midst as "a modern European fantasia," 5 5 and believe that they are the "oldest inhabitants of the desert." 56 Equally little is known of the actual descent of the Hteym, concerning whom there is not even such a plausible theory current as about the origin of the Solubba. 57 As to the Sunna', according to some they are of Negro origin 58 while in other tribes they are regarded as of white blood, but nevertheless not independent or free. Still others maintain that the Sunna' are of inferior descent simply because nothing is known of their genealogy, and because they themselves have no pride of descent, and marry any newcomer, whether from town or tribe, whether free, vassal, or slave. 59 Of the 'Awazim it is stated that "they are not of pure descent." The Sulaylat are said to be descended from an 'Aneze man who married a Solubba woman. According to another version of this explanation of their inferior status, it was Ibn Ghafil, the grandfather of the present chief of the Sulaylat, who married a Solubba gipsy woman, and therefore his entire tribe lost status. 60 Nothing derogatory is known or circulated about the descent of the 'Aqeyl. The Jebeliya are believed to be descendants of Bosnian and Wallachian serfs who were given by Justinian to the Monastery of St. Catherine in the Sinai Peninsula in the sixth century and who were, of course, originally Christian. 61 The Shahara, the most ancient tribe in the Qara mountain district of Southern Arabia, were vanquished and subjugated by the Qara. 6 2 The Marsh Arabs of Southern Iraq are regarded as inferior by the surrounding desert tribes not on account of inferior descent

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but simply because of their settling down and becoming marsh dwellers. 6 3 Similarly, the still seminomadic riverain A j w a n on the Euphrates around Nasiriyah are regarded with contempt by the true Bedouin. 6 4 In Cyrenaica, the Marabtin (or Murabitin) tribes, although nominally vassals of the Sa'adi tribes, maintain in actuality a much higher status than the typical vassal groups in the Asiatic part of the Middle East. T h e y constitute larger tribal units, that is, they approximate even in this respect the Sa'adi tribes. These larger groups live, in fact, independently and pay no khuwwa or any other dues to the Sa'adi tribes who are the nominal owners of the land. According to a Senussi leader, the Marabtin tribes are the descendants of the Yemeni (South Arabian) tribes w h o colonized North Africa after the first invasion of the continent by the Arabs. In the eleventh century they were subjugated by the Ben! Sulaym who conquered the country and continued in it their nomadic mode of life. 65 A division into noble and vassal tribes is characteristic of the social organization of the Tuareg. According to the traditions of the Ihaggaren, the T u a r e g of Ahaggar, some two or three hundred years ago two Berber women came from Morocco to the Silet oasis. O n e was noble, Ti-n-Hinan by name, and the other was her serving-woman, T a k a m a (or, according to others, Temalek). Ti-n-Hinan settled in Abalessa and gave birth to three daughters: about the father or fathers of these daughters the Targui legend has nothing to say. From the first daughter, K e l l a , descended all the K e l R e l a ; the second daughter became the ancestress of the Taitok, and the third, named Tahenkot, became the progenitress of the Tegehe Mellet. These three are the noble tribes of A h a g g a r , whose chiefs have tobol-s, large drums that are the symbol of chieftainship. T h e servant girl, T a k a m a , also gave birth to two daughters, one of w h o m became the ancestress of the Ihadanaren, a secondrank tribe; while the other became the mother of the two vassal tribes, D a g Rali and A i t Loaien. Ti-n-Hinan gave the oases of Silet and Ennedid to the two daughters of T a k a m a , and their descendants still own them to this day. T h e Ti-n-Hinan legend is an interesting illustration of the

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Middle Eastern tendency to "telescope" history. Excavations carried out at Abalessa unearthed the tomb of the Tuareg queen whom tradition regards as the ancestress of the tribes and calls Ti-n-Hinan. But the archaeological evidence shows beyond doubt that the tomb was pre-Islamic, and that the real Ti-n-Hinan must have therefore lived in a much more remote period than attributed to her by popular tradition. 6 ' However that may be, descent from Ti-n-Hinan is as much a part of living tradition among the Tuareg as is their division into noble and vassal groups. T h e Tuareg themselves commonly speak of "noble clans" and "vassal clans." When the warriors of a noble clan go raiding, they often take along the fighting men of one or more of their vassal class, who subsequently receive a substantial share of the plunder. It is said that vassals also have an obligation to fight at the side of their noble masters in intertribal wars. If this be true, it would constitute an interesting deviation from the general Middle Eastern custom, which keeps vassal groups out of any fighting. The vassals of the Tuareg pay annual tribute to their tribal chiefs or to the Amenokal, the paramount chief of the Ahaggar confederation, or to both. These payments consist, as a rule, of dates, millet, melted butter, young camels, sheep and goats, as well as all kinds of manufactured articles. Also shares are paid from profits the vassal groups make on imported articles and on their caravan commerce. If they go out independently of their masters on raiding expeditions, about one half of the booty is paid over to the nobles. In addition, each vassal family used to contribute toward the upkeep of a particular noble family. A peculiar development of this relationship was that the noble men and women used to go begging from their vassals who could hardly afford to refuse them. "But if this systematic begging became unbearable, as it often did, the vassals would simply pull up stakes and move quietly out of reach of their noble parasites." In recent years, however, the Amenokal and his whole camp has been supported by the French Government, so that these higher nobles are no longer in need of support by their vassals. Traditions and environment combined have evolved a division of labor and responsibilities between the noble and vassal Tuareg.

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" T h e nobles of a tribe, together with the headmen of the vassal clans, ride out in search of new pastures and at the same time act as military scouts, always on the watch for enemy raiders as well as for potential victims, alien camps or caravans which they can raid themselves. T h e vassals in their turn are responsible for the daily management and immediate protection of the flocks and herds, most of which belong to them a n y w a y ; and they contribute an armed reserve that can be called up quickly in case a battle becomes imminent or a good opportunity for a quick raid presents itself." 67 A somewhat similar situation prevails among the T e d a , to the east of the Tuareg, in the Tibesti massif of the southeastern Sahara. T h e y are divided into some forty clans, headed by the noble clan of the Tomaghera (or Tomagra), the G u n d a and the Arna. Beneath them rank the commoners and the vassals, between w h o m there is little if any status difference. T h e lowest ranks comprise, in descending order, the Azza (hunters, smiths, and artisans), the negroid serfs (Harrathin), and the Negro slaves. M a n y vassal clans are divided into two or more fractions, each attached to a different noble clan. T h e tribal chiefs of the noble clans are chosen usually by a council of clan leaders, but, "curiously enough, it is said that they are named sometimes by the council of family headmen of the vassal clan supposed to have been longest resident in the tribal territory." 4 8 A m o n g the nomadic A r a b C h a a m b a (or Shaamba) tribes in central Algeria, each tribe contains noble clans and vassal clans. O n e of the noble clans in each tribe is usually considered as more noble than the rest, its rank being based on its assumed descent from an early and famous or holy ancestor, but clan rank can be changed rapidly if a group is outstandingly successful or the reverse. Below the nobles are the tributary vassal clans which, however, are relatively few in numbers. 6 9 T h e Moors, the pastoral nomadic tribes of the Spanish Sahara and of the adjoining, formerly French, Saharan territory, too, comprise both noble and vassal clans. Vertical mobility is considerable here, too, but sheer numbers and consequent group strength are not always decisive factors in determining rank; in some of the most powerful tribes one finds vassal clans that are

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twice as big as the noble ones. Wealth in livestock does not seem to be the deciding factor either, for some vassal tribes are far richer than their noble masters. As Briggs has observed, "it looks as though an efficient fighting organization, together with the strong leadership and rigid discipline which this implies, is the only thing that can surely raise a nomadic Moorish community above others of its kind." Rank status is greatly influenced by tribute payment. The rule is that the receiver of tribute ranks higher than the payer. But the situation is complicated by the variety of reasons for which tribute is paid. Thus not only do weaker groups pay tribute to stronger ones for armed protection or for economic assistance in times of hardship; also, rich groups pay tribute to poorer ones if the latter are more warlike and therefore useful as mercenaries. Even some Maraboutic clans, whose holiness is, as a rule, sufficient to protect them, pay for protection; these are known as "Marabouts of the shade" in distinction from the independent "Marabouts of the sun." The tribute payment is usually rendered by the headman of a vassal family to the headman of a noble family; in other words, the client-patron relationship is established between families rather than entire clans. The right to such tribute can be sold by the headman of the noble family to the head of another noble family, but this is done only in extreme and sudden emergency. Otherwise, the nobles prefer to go begging to their vassals in a manner similar to the one usual among the Tuareg. 70

IX.

A

The Village and Its Culture

ten thousand years ago, man learned how to produce L food by domesticating certain plants and animals. This development, whose importance for human history cannot be overemphasized, took place in the ancient Near East and led to the establishment of the oldest villages in the world inhabited by farming people. Stone implements, such as sickles, hand mills, querns, mortars, pestles, grinding stones, axes, and hoes, found in Natufian sites in Palestine, in M'leyfat and J a r m o in northern Iraq, in post-Natufian Jericho, and elsewhere, indicate that the people who lived in these villages had well-developed agricultural techniques, while other finds show that they grew wheal and barley and kept domesticated animals such as goats, dogs, and cats. It took some 3,000 years for Near Eastern farming to reach India and the Sudan, and about another thousand years to spread into Europe. T h e oldest farm village in England dates from about 2500 B.C. BOUT

As they settled in permanent villages, the Neolithic Near Eastern farmers developed pottery (this proved invaluable for archaeologists in their efforts to date excavated layers on ancient sites), learned to use animals for pulling the plow, developed techniques for spinning and weaving, relied increasingly on milk instead of meat to supplement their vegetable diet, evolved, for the first time, a social organization larger and more complex than the family and the kinship-based band, and created religious rituals whose primary purpose was to ensure the growing of crops and the increase of flocks. All these cultural features remained basic and essential to Middle Eastern village life down to the twentieth 267

268

GnlHen River In Gnltirn Rnnd

century. And, since some two-thirds to three-fourths of all the people of the Middle East are villagers, it appears that ways of life developed in the area ten thousand years ago continued to hold sway over the majority of the population throughout this period unmatched in its length in human history. T H E O R I G I N OF V I L L A G E S AND S E D E N T A R I Z A T I O N

Although many villages in the Middle East have thus occupied for thousands of years the site on which they are located today, there are numerous villages in the area which are quite new and whose foundation took place within the lifetime of their oldest inhabitants. Still others were established several generations ago, but the historical event of their founding has been retained in the memory of the people in a folkloristic or quasimythological version. In such places there is usually a tradition about the foundation of the village by one individual or by several brothers, whom the villagers consider as their ancestor or ancestors. Nor does the village as a permanent settlement, form everywhere a sharp contrast to the mobile nomadic camp. Between camps and village there are transitional forms resulting from the process of sedentarization (the settling down of nomads in a permanent location) which has been going on in the Middle East wherever the nomadic pastoral and the settled agricultural areas abut on each other. Most typically, the process of sedentarization was, and still is, characteristic of the North Arabian Desert Area (cf. above, p. 67) and is either spontaneous, as in Syria and Jordan, or government sponsored, as in Saudi Arabia (cf. above, p. 81). If sedentarization is spontaneous, it may take several generations before the process is completed. A tribe, or a part of it, may be forced by a more powerful adversary to leave its traditional wandering territory and to confine itself to the fringes of the desert. Or, it may be forced to move out of its old pastures when the latter are being put under cultivation by fellahin who enjoy the protection of the government. Or, the tribe may feel attracted to sedentary life, in spite of age-old prejudices against it, by the greater security and the more constant food supply available to settled cultivators. Or, finally, a tribe may be driven by economic necessity to supplement its livelihood by cultivating

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269

that part of its traditional wandering territory which is capable of yielding some harvest. In the case of camel-nomads, this phase may be preceded by a gradual replacement of their camels by sheep and goats with a corresponding reduction in the size of the wandering territory. O n c e crops are being planted, the tribe finds that it has to guard them against the e n c r o a c h m e n t of others. It is often not feasible to break up a tribal unit into one group that continues to wander with the animals, and another that remains behind to guard the fields, because such a split-up of tribal strength exposes each of the half-units to enemy attacks. T h u s the tribe decides to remain c n c a m p e d on the fields it cultivates from the time of sowing to that of reaping, and then, in the summer, to resume its wandering existence. However, the summer is precisely the time when the desert is most inhospitable and when even in the traditional circumstances of full nomadism the tribe's movements would be restricted to a relatively small area close to the cultivated lands better provided with water and hence with vegetation. Next, a stage is reached in which the tents of the tribe remain pitched on the same spot year after year, which, in turn, gradually leads to the addition of permanent structural features to the tents and around them. Permanent storage facilities for the grain are erected, fences built to prevent the animals from straying, rain water cisterns are dug, and mud walls are built under the tent cloth, resulting in a habitation that is half house and half tent. Before long the tent itself is replaced by a permanent house. O n c e this step is taken, the nomadic c a m p has completed its transformation into a village. W h a t is preserved of the nomadic traditions in such a new village, often for many generations, is the tribal structure and consciousness. T h e people in such villages still consider themselves a tribe, their head the tribal chief (shaykh), and their status as higher than that of the long-settled fellahin. T h e y pride themselves on their Bedouin descent, and uphold, with great emphasis, the Bedouin ethos, comprising such features as " f a c e " (honor), hospitality, blood revenge, generosity, and disdain for the veneration of saints, of which we still have more to say later. In the K i n g d o m of J o r d a n there arc numerous well-documented cases of the settling of nomadic tribes in this manner, and it can be

2 JO

dolden River In Golden Road

assumed that the m a j o r i t y of the villages on the east bank of the J o r d a n developed f r o m such tribal settlements. 1 Not each time, however, d o Bedouins who give up nomadic life become villagers. Occasionally, they move to a city, where they swell the ranks of the unemployed or under-employed, live in slum sections on the outskirts, or, at best, become part of the growing u r b a n lower class. T h i s development has been observed, for instance, in S a u d i A r a b i a . 2 T h e difference between this type of sedentarization a n d the one which results in the foundation of new villages is that the tribe-to-town movement is a l w a y s an individual a f f a i r involving unattached and impecunious male m e m b e r s of the tribes, a n d of the tribes of lower status at that (see a b o v e , pp. 2 5 1 ff.), while the tribe-to-village process is a g r o u p m o v e m e n t in which a tribe or a tribal sub-group in its entirety is involved, and which therefore, does not entail social disorganization. In o r d e r to encourage sedentarization, the K i n g of S a u d i A r a b i a h a d wells d u g a r o u n d R i y a d , his capital, and food distributed a m o n g the tribesmen who converged to water their herds or flocks. Also in other parts of the country, along the oil pipelines, wells were d u g with the same end in view. As a result of these measures, as well as other factors, many tribal units have settled d o w n , a n d tribal villages, in a stage of semi-sedentarization or complete sedentarization, have become numerous in the Nejd, H i j a z , and 'Asir districts of Saudi A r a b i a . 3 E m p l o y m e n t of tribesmen by A r a m c o (the A r a b i a n - A m e r i c a n Oil C o m p a n y ) has also contributed to the same tribc-to-village movement. K i n g I b n S a u d (the founder of Saudi A r a b i a who died in 1 9 5 3 ) i n a u g u r a t e d in the early years of his career the policy of sedentarization, partly for political and partly for economic reasons. By 1 9 2 7 there were more than a hundred agricultural settlements in the country, established and inhabited by the Ikhwan (literally, Brothers), a W a h h a b i confraternity which he encouraged and headed. T h e settlers were given land, seed, and money. Wells were d u g for them, and they were given other advantages as well. S o m e of these I k h w a n villages still exist at the present time. All in all, however, in spite of these efforts, only about 12 per cent of the S a u d i A r a b i a n population consists of settled cultivators. 4

'The

Village

and

¡Is

Cii/lurr

S a u d i A r a b i a is thus the least s e d e n t a r i z e d c o u n t r y in the M i d d l e East, c o n t r a s t i n g in this respect w i t h the rest of t h e a r e a w h e r e the m a j o r i t y of the p o p u l a t i o n is in villages.

LOCATION

AND

SIZE

T h e typical M i d d l e E a s t e r n village consists of a tightly p a c k e d c l u s t e r of houses a m o n g w h i c h w i n d n a r r o w alleys, a n d a r o u n d w h i c h lie t h e l a n d s c u l t i v a t e d by t h e villagers. I n p r i n c i p l e , the site o n w h i c h t h e v i l l a g e is l o c a t e d h a s to satisfy t h r e e basic n e e d s : p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e forces of n a t u r e a n d a t t a c k s by m a n , w a t e r , a n d g o o d soil. As to t h e first, b e c a u s e of the d a n g e r s of flooding d u r i n g t h e o f t e n h e a v y w i n t e r r a i n s , villages a r e as a rule not built in l o w - l y i n g valleys, b u t r a t h e r on hilltops. S u c h a n e l e v a t e d l o c a t i o n also a f f o r d s s o m e p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t e n e m i e s . A l t h o u g h security is a n i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n in b u i l d i n g the village in the f o r m of a n u c l e a t e d a g g r e g a t e , it is r e m a r k a b l e h o w r a r e l y did M i d d l e E a s t e r n villages t a k e the n e x t logical step, n a m e l y to p r o t e c t t h e m s e l v e s f r o m e n e m y a t t a c k by the b u i l d i n g of a wall a r o u n d the v i l l a g e or b y f o r t i f y i n g it in s o m e o t h e r w a y . In t h e plains, the v i l l a g e is a l w a y s o p e n : a r m e d resistance is p r e c l u d e d by this o n e f e a t u r e a l o n e . I n t h e m o u n tains, even if the village is l o c a t e d o n a p e a k , it is r a r e l y f o r t i f i e d . A n e x c e p t i o n is c o n s t i t u t e d by the villages in I r a n a n d A f g h a n i s t a n w h i c h h a v e old fortification walls, n o w c r u m b l i n g , 5 a n d by t h e n e w W a h h a b i villages in t h e N e j d d i s t r i c t of S a u d i A r a b i a w h i c h a r e p r o v i d e d w i t h defensive t o w e r s . 6 As the a b s e n c e of fortifications i n d i c a t e s , t h e t y p i c a l MiddleE a s t e r n village is not a politically s e p a r a t e e n t i t y w h i c h m u s t be r e a d y to r e p e l its e n e m i e s ; it is r a t h e r d e p e n d e n t , as f a r as a r m e d p r o t e c t i o n is c o n c e r n e d , o n t h e force a v a i l a b l e to t h e city-based a r e a c h i e f t a i n ( a n d , in m o d e r n times, t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t ) , to w h o m it pays taxes in e x c h a n g e f o r this single b e n e f i t : p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t o u t s i d e a t t a c k s . O n l y in r u g g e d m o u n t a i n a r e a s , such as K u r d i s t a n , a r e (or w e r e ) the villages politically i n d e p e n d e n t units, r e a d y a n d a b l e to d e f e n d t h e m selves. Villages located o n the f r i n g e s of t h e s e t t l e d a r e a used to be b e h o l d e n to one of the m a j o r n o m a d i c t r i b e s w h o p r o t e c t e d

(¡olden River to (¡olden Road them in exchange for annual dues, which in most cases a m o u n t e d to as much as, or even more than, the government taxes. As far as the availability of w a t e r and the fertility of the soil are concerned, these are rarely present to a completely satisfactory degree, except on the banks of great rivers, such as the Nile or the Tigris-Euphrates system, and in oases rich in wells or springs. In areas of extensive rainfed agriculture, the crop yield depends primarily on the amount of a n n u a l rainfall which can v a r y considerably from year to year. L e a n years are an a l w a y s present threat which the peasant does not know how to counter except by laying aside as much of his harvest as possible f r o m one y e a r to the next. This expedient, however, is a v a i l a b l e only to the few well-to-do cultivators; the great majority even in a normal year gathers barely enough to survive until the next harvest. E v e n drinking water is not a l w a y s easily a v a i l a b l e within the village. Especially in the hilly and mountainous areas the village well is often located outside and f a r below the village so that the fetching of water for household purposes becomes a major time- and strength-consuming task for the village w o m e n . Other things being equal, there is a direct correlation between the fertility of the land and the size of the village. Since the cultivator, as a rule, has to be able to return home for his night's rest, his land must be within such a distance from his house that he can make the round trip daily with his d r a u g h t animals, with enough time to spare for his work in the field and his sleep at home. If the land is fertile and produces much, a peasant needs, and in most cases actually works, only a small parcel to meet his annual food requirements. In E g y p t , for instance, the great majority of the lellahin (72 per cent) own and work less than one Jeddan (or 1.038 acre) of l a n d . 7 T h u s , a large n u m b e r of people, living in one village, can daily walk to their small parcels. Consequently, one finds in E g y p t large villages inhabited by as many as 15,000 persons. 8 Fifteen thousand individuals make about 3,000 families, and the total land worked by such a village (at half an acre per f a m i l y ) w o u l b be 1 , 5 0 0 acres, or an area a little more than two square miles in extent. A n y part of such an area can easily be reachcd from a centrally, or even peripherally, located village.

The Village and Its Culture

273

As against this, in East J o r d a n , the average size of the individual agricultural holdings varies from ten acres in the highl a n d s to 2 7 . 5 a c r e s in l a n d s b o r d e r i n g u p o n the d e s e r t . Correspondingly, the a v e r a g e size of a settlement is 400 persons per v i l l a g e . 9 F o u r hundred individuals make about 80 families. T a k i n g twenty acres as the a v e r a g e size of a holding, the 80 families would h a v e to cultivate 1,600 acres, an area somewhat larger than that providing livelihood to 15,000 (or 38 times as m a n y ) Egyptians. O n e can thus f o r m u l a t e a l a w as to the size of villages in the M i d d l e East: the greater the fertility of the land, the greater the size of the village, because the smaller the a v e r a g e land holdings. T h i s law is g r a p h i c a l l y illustrated not only by the contrast between the E g y p t i a n and the J o r d a n i a n villages, but also by the closely settled oases which are found in many parts of the M i d d l e East. In the oases, the fertility of the land, irrigated by wells and springs, in m a n y cases enables several villages to exist in close proximity, each surrounded by its fields. T h i s is the case with the oases in Saudi A r a b i a , 1 0 and even more so in the S a h a r a Desert, where the oasis of S i w a (just inside the western border of E g y p t ) , for example, contains several villages with a total cultivated area of some 3 5 square miles and a total population of some 4,000.

THE

HOUSES

W h i l e the size of the village is thus related to soil fertility (or to the a m o u n t of food produced per acre), the physical appearance of the village depends on the building materials a v a i l a b l e in its immediate vicinity. O n e therefore finds that in the mountainous areas the village houses are built of stone (ranging from u n h e w n rocks to hewn blocs), a n d have in m a n y cases two floors. O n the plains, the houses are built of m u d or adobe (sun-dried) bricks, a n d mostly h a v e only one storey. In the marshes of southern I r a q , the M a r s h - A r a b s live in reed-huts, some of which are quite large a n d boast elaborate decoration. Also in the 'Aslr province of S a u d i A r a b i a reeds are used for the construction of beehive huts, here under A f r i c a n i n f l u e n c e . 1 1 In the southern reaches of the M i d d l e East, e.g. in Southern A r a b i a , palm leaves

274

Golden River to Golden Road

and fronds are used as building material. In the north, e.g. the Caucasus and T u r k e y , occasionally wood is used. Some primitive village communities in the mountains of North Africa still live in caves, with partly built-up fronts. In the very hot parts of I r a q , Iran, and Afghanistan, some houses have underground cellars in which the temperature remains cooler than in the rooms whose walls and ceilings are exposed to the sun, and where the family lives on hot summer days and also keeps the perishable foods. M o r e frequently, however, the flat roofs provide a cool place for the family to sleep in the summer. In some villages one finds a variety of building materials, especially where the influence of nearby cities makes itself felt. Thus, in a Sudanese village-suburb of K h a r t o u m it was found that while most houses were made of a combination of mud and manure, several were of fired red brick, and there was a tendency to tear down mud houses and replace them by red brick structures. 1 2 As to the floor plan of the house, this ranges from the simplest one-room structure to elaborate multi-room dwellings. In its basic form the four walls of the house enclose a single, rectangular, small room. T h e house of the poor Alawite fellah in Syria, for example, is a ten by fourteen-foot rectangle, about seven feet high, with a single narrow and low door leading into it; it has no windows, and has a mud floor. T h e left side of the room contains the fireplace with a hole over it through the ceiling. T h e left rear corner is the place for the sheep and goats. T h e right side of the floor forms a platform of raised earth about 2V2 feet higher than the left: this is the family room, with the provisions in one corner, and the mats and bedding in another next to the cradle. In the center, a stone column supports the roof. " E v e r y t h i n g is blackened by smoke, without air, without light, without space . . . " 1 S T h e better houses, owned by wealthier villagers, have two rooms: one to receive guests, and the second, the combined family and bedroom. Such a house will also have a separate stable or shed for the animals, as a rule across the courtyard. In Iran the village houses have more frequently three or four rooms, lined up on one side of a courtyard. Rugs, often m a d e by the

The Village and Its

Culture

*75

village women, cover the floors.14 As one moves higher on the economic scale, the number and quality of the furniture increases. Affluence in many villages all over the Middle East, nowadays, usually means the purchase and display of some European-style furniture, such as chairs, sofas, tables, beds. We cannot enter into a discussion of the numerous local variations of the basic quadrangular floor-plan of the Middle Eastern village house, but one peculiar development, that of the so-called bee-hive houses in the Aleppo region of Syria, should not be left unmentioned. Remarkable also are the watchtowers adjoining the better houses in Afghan villages, once important for protection, now only for prestige. 1 6 Extended families often occupy a compound within the village, consisting of several adjoining houses all opening onto one courtyard which in turn has one main gate leading into it from the street. M a n y times, of course, each of the "houses" within such a compound is nothing more than a single room with a separate entrance from the courtyard and with no door between it and the adjoining rooms. Occasionally, a larger compound has a separate guest-room, which is put at the disposal of guests visiting with any member of the extended family. 1 6

ECONOMY AND W O R K

ROUTINE

O n the most elementary level, the village is economically self-sufficient. Its fields and flocks provide all the food it needs; the women use the sheep's wool and the goat's hair to make clothes and other textiles; the animal's skins are used for sandals and other leather trappings. T h e local potter makes pots using the available clay, the carpenter makes plows, harrows, threshing sledges, beams, etc., in exchange for payment in kind. Even the local barber is paid in kind, as is the keeper of the mosque and shrine, if the village has these religious institutions. As conditions improve and the villages produce more food than they consume, they sell the surplus and use the money to buy what is considered most important beyond the most basic needs: coffee, sugar, salt, tobacco, kerosene, metal pots and pans, steel implements, etc. In whatever stage of economic development, the mainstay of

2j6

Golden River to Golden Road

v i l l a g e life is the l a n d , a n d the villagers' d e p e n d e n c e on their land is c o m p l e t e . * T h e land has its periodic d e m a n d s w h i c h must be m e t on time, for a n y neglect must be paid for dearly in r e d u c e d o r r u i n e d crops. It is this servitude to the l a n d , noted b y the n o m a d i c Bedouins, w h i c h m a d e them term the fellahin " t h e slaves of the soil" a n d w h i c h acts as the chief i m p e d i m e n t to attempts a t sedentarization. Y e t the m a l e villagers e n j o y slack seasons w h i c h alternate r e g u l a r l y w i t h those of intensive work in the fields. N o t so the w o m e n , w h o s e routine consists of daily repetition of the same chores: f e t c h i n g w a t e r , g r i n d i n g corn, b a k i n g bread, p r e p a r i n g meals, k n e a d i n g the d u n g for fuel, taking care of the children, spinning, w e a v i n g , e m b r o i d e r i n g , and so forth. S h a r e c r o p p i n g was in the past the most c o m m o n form of f a r m i n g in the M i d d l e East, a n d it has remained so, a l t h o u g h to a s o m e w h a t r e d u c e d extent as a result of land reforms initiated in several countries f o l l o w i n g W o r l d W a r I I . T h e traditional situation in the area w a s that as against the m a n y w h o o w n e d litde or no l a n d , there w e r e a f e w w h o o w n e d e x c e e d i n g l y large tracts c u l t i v a t e d for t h e m , as a rule, by sharecroppers. A n outs t a n d i n g e x a m p l e of s u c h landlordism was that of I r a n , w h e r e it w a s estimated that of the 41,000 villages of the c o u n t r y , 40,000 were o w n e d o u t r i g h t b y l a n d l o r d s . 1 7 T h e division of the crops v a r i e d (and varies) g r e a t l y , b u t in most cases the s h a r e c r o p p e r receives no m o r e than one-fifth to one-third of the harvest. I n Iran, the p r e v a l e n t system of c r o p allocation is the so-called khamseh ( " f i v e " ) , u n d e r w h i c h the landlord gets one-fifth of the c r o p for the l a n d , one-fifth for the water, one-fifth for the seed, and one-fifth for the d r a u g h t animals. T h e sharecropper receives the last one-fifth for his l a b o r . 1 8 A similar five-fold division of the crops is practiced in N o r t h A f r i c a w h e r e the system is called by the same name, khammes. In S y r i a the most w i d e s p r e a d division of the harvest b e t w e e n the s h a r e c r o p p e r and the landlord follows the muraba'a system w h e r e b y the sharecropper receives one quarter (hence the n a m e ) , *It is not possible in the present context to discuss the various types of land

tenure (miri, mulk, mus/ta', malruka, waqf, mawot-mubah, etc.) found in the Middle East, although, to some extent, these have a bearing on the life of the fellahin.

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277

and the landlord, who supplies also the seeds and f a r m animals, three-quarters of the c r o p s . 1 9 In West Pakistan, more than 50 per cent of the cultivated land is worked by sharecroppers, and according to the i960 census there were 1.9 million landless agricultural laborers. T h e sharecropper has to give half of the crop to the landlord, in addition to which he must also defray the cost of collecting it, and has to present gifts to the landlord's family for weddings, births, and funerals, so that the whole share of the landlord often amounts to as much as 70 per cent of the harvest. T h e tenant also has to provide services for the landlord, such as carrying a bride in the landlord's family to the bridegroom's house in a kind of sedan chair, or to send one member of his family to become a servant in the landlord's house for little or no p a y . 2 0 T h e conditions are much better in T u r k e y where 73 per cent of the rural population own the land they cultivate totally, and 21 per cent partially (the remaining 6 per cent of the rural population do not f a r m but are engaged in other occupations). T h e average holding in T u r k e y is 7.7 hectares (or about 1 9 acres), the same as in J o r d a n . 2 1 In addition to sharecropping, indebtedness is a great scourge of M i d d l e Eastern village life. A p a r t from the fact that even in normal years the sharecropper's share is in m a n y cases barely sufficient for him and his family, there is the inevitable occurrence of lean years, which can be disastrous for the sharecropper. In such years he runs short of food before the next harvest, and is forced to borrow either from a moneylender or from the landlord at exorbitant rates of interest which m a k e it well-nigh impossible for him to get rid of his debt. T h e same circumstances compel m a n y a small landowner to sell his land and to continue working it thereafter as the sharecropper of the new landlord. This is one factor that explains how and why the holdings of the great landlords tended in the past to become larger, while the precentage of land owned by smallholders became smaller. Considering the unrelenting economic pressure under which most Middle Eastern villagers spend their entire lives, it is remarkable indeed that they have a l w a y s been and remain to

2j8

Golden Ruer lo Golden Road

this d a y the carriers of a p o p u l a r culture, very m u c h alive, and a f f o r d i n g g r e a t aesthetic satisfaction. Folk music, folk stories, folk poetry, folk dances, a n d various types of visual arts and crafts s u c h as basketry, e m b r o i d e r y , and rug m a k i n g h a v e been e n g a g e d in b y the villagers in every place and at all times, and never fail to astound the visitor with their variety, richness and b e a u t y . E v e n in those villages w h e r e dire poverty prevents most people f r o m p u r c h a s i n g or p r o d u c i n g objects of visual arts or crafts, life is m a d e richer by reciting and listening to a great variety of oral literature, telling of the wondrous exploits of heroes of old, a n d k e e p i n g alive a g l i m m e r of a world beyond the d r a b routine of e v e r y d a y existence. It is largely d u e to these p o p u l a r traditions that life in a M i d d l e Eastern village, with all its poverty, disease and h a r d work offers more than meets the eye, a n d a f f o r d s satisfactions unsuspected by the casual observer.

F O O D AND

HEALTH

In spite of the fact that M i d d l e Eastern villagers spend practically their entire w o r k i n g life in an unceasing effort to produce food for themselves, the diet of a considerable percentage of the population is u n b a l a n c e d , and occasionally insufficient. A c o m parison b e t w e e n the food eaten by the fellahin and that consumed by the townspeople indicates that the former have a m u c h smaller v a r i e t y , and that practically all of their foodstuffs are of v e g e t a b l e origin (see b e l o w , p. 279). T h e staples are cereals and legumes, less f r e q u e n t l y vegetables. M e a t , fish and a n i m a l products (such as milk, eggs, or a n i m a l fats) are very rarely eaten, in most cases only on the occasion of a family feast. A s far as nutritional sufficiency is concerned, it is the concensus of observers that the daily diet is inadequate and unsatisf a c t o r y , 8 8 a n d that considerable sectors of the village population suffer f r o m m a l n u t r i t i o n . T h e E g y p t i a n fellahin's diet, for instance, consists of bread and millet with the addition of a little onion a n d cheese, a n d m i n u t e quantities of sugar and fruit. M e a t is e a t e n only rarely, milk is d r u n k only during illness. T h e food intake is b e l o w m i n i m u m requirements. T h e a v e r a g e rations decreased f r o m 1900 to 1930; thereafter they increased, but not

The Village and Its Culture

279

to a significant e x t e n t . 8 3 T h e conditions are not m u c h different in the countries of the so-called Fertile Crescent. In I r a q , for e x a m p l e , " m a l n u t r i t i o n contributes p e r h a p s the m a j o r h e a l t h p r o b l e m . . . . Actual starvation is rare, b u t for the bulk of the p o p u l a t i o n resistance to disease is lowered by a diet which is deficient in q u a n t i t y , caloric content, a n d b a l a n c e . " 2 4 It is interesting to note that the M a r s h Arabs in Lower I r a q are, on the whole, better fed t h a n their neighbors: in a d d i t i o n to rice, which is the staple food, they eat milk, b u t t e r , cheese, fish a n d wildfowl. However, periodic h u n g e r is not a stranger to them, especially in the early s u m m e r , w h e n the previous year's rice c r o p has been consumed, a n d the flooding waters curtail fishing.26 M a l n u t r i t i o n is the term applied by physicians a n d students of social conditions to most Syrians as well. In Syria the staple diet consists of the traditional flat, r o u n d b e a d (the so-called pita), olives, some g a r d e n vegetables such as peppers, a n d sour milk (leben). M e a t , while highly a p p r e c i a t e d , r e m a i n s out of reach for the average f e l l a h . 2 8 I n I r a n , the staple food is bread or rice, sour milk, cheese, and clarified butter, occasionally s u p p l e m e n t e d with eggs, chickens, rarely m u t t o n , onions, c u c u m b e r , radishes, melons, tree-fruits, nuts, a n d t e a . 2 7 I n sum, the M i d d l e Eastern villagers derive a m u c h higher p e r c e n t a g e of their daily calorie i n t a k e f r o m cereals a n d starches a n d a m u c h smaller one f r o m protein (especially the a n i m a l protein a n d fat consumption are m i n i m a l ) t h a n is the case in Western countries. H o w e v e r , as this a u t h o r h a d occasion to observe elsewhere, "despite the obvious insufficiencies which must n o t be minimized, it has to be b o r n e in m i n d t h a t a population t h a t has lived for m a n y generations in a certain n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t on a certain type of diet can derive greater nutritional benefits f r o m this diet t h a n a p o p u l a t i o n not used to i t . " 2 8 Observers coming f r o m the technologically a d v a n c e d countries of the West, with their stress on hygiene, preventive medicine a n d other public health measures, are often appalled

28o

Golden River to Golden Road

w h e n c o n f r o n t e d w i t h life in the M i d d l e Eastern villages. O n e of these W e s t e r n students of the M i d d l e East had this to say a b o u t the peasants in I r a n : " T h e peasant lives, for the most part, in conditions of grinding p o v e r t y ; the l a n d o w n e r , a l t h o u g h he enjoys c o m p a r a t i v e affluence, is in constant fear of b e i n g despoiled of his w e a l t h by intrigue, or of b e i n g c h e a t e d of it b y a discontented peasantry. . . . " * • E v e n m o r e depressing to the Western visitor are the health conditions in the M i d d l e Eastern village. T h e following observations, m a d e in I r a q , c a n a p p l y to other parts of the area as well, a n d especially to those in w h i c h irrigated agriculture is practiced: " I t is n o t e x a g g e r a t i n g to state that the average agricultural w o r k e r {fellah) is a living pathological specimen, as he is p r o b a b l y a v i c t i m of ankylostomiasis [ h o o k w o r m , leading to a b d o m i n a l pain, intermittent fever, progressive anemia, and emaciation], ascariasis [an intestinal parasite causing diarrhea], malaria, b i l h a r z i a [blood flukes p r o d u c i n g urinal discharge of blood and dystentery], t r a c h o m a [an infectious disease of the eye], bejel [a n o n - v e n e r e a l f o r m of syphilis] and possibly tuberculosis a l s o . " 5 0 It has been estimated that in the south of Iraq as m a n y as 30 per cent of the total population has bilharzia, w i t h even higher incidences in certain provinces. M a l a r i a is c o m m o n in all the irrigated areas of I r a q , w i t h the highest incidence reported in the M o s u l province, w h e r e it contributes to an infant m o r t a l i t y rate as high as 500 per 1,000 live births. A s to t r a c h o m a , the highest incidence (80 per cent) is found in the D u j a y l a h settlement, a c o m m u n i t y development project 25 miles south of the A1 K u t Barrage, on the Tigris, and just n o r t h of the large m a r s h area, w h e r e otherwise the settlers e n j o y a h i g h e r i n c o m e a n d a better diet than d o the ordinary t e n a n t s . 8 1 In S y r i a , in some rural areas 10 per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n suffered f r o m tuberculosis in 1955; 7 per cent of the total p o p u l a t i o n of the c o u n t r y are registered each year as new cases of m a l a r i a ; in the JazTrah—Deir ez-Zor (northeastern) region, in 1954, a 100 per cent incidence of bilharzia was i n d i c a t e d ; in villages of the H o m s district 57 per cent of the inhabitants h a d m a l a r i a a n d the infant mortality was 300 per

The Village and Its Culture 1,000 of live births; mycosis (a scalp infection due to fungus) in some areas reached 50 per cent; bejel afflicted 25 per cent of the children in rural areas of northern S y r i a . 3 2 Health conditions are particularly bad in the E g y p t i a n villages, where the introduction of perennial irrigation caused an increase in water-borne diseases. Foremost among these is bilharzia whose incidence is 45 to 75 per cent in the Delta, where perennial irrigation is practiced, but only 5 per cent in U p p e r E g y p t where there is no perennial irrigation. In five typical villages within 30 miles of Cairo, a Rockefeller Foundation study found that 92 per cent of the villagers had bilharzia, 100 per cent amoebic dysentery, 64 per cent intestinal worms, 6.5 per cent syphilis and 5 per cent pellagra. In addition, 2 per cent of the population annually had typhoid, 6 per cent were typhoid carriers, 2 per cent had active tuberculosis, 6 per cent acute eye infection, 89 per cent trachoma, 6.4 per cent were blind in one eye, and 1 per cent totally b l i n d . 3 3 In an oasis-village in Algeria (Sidi K h a l e d ) a United Nations team of clinicians tested the entire population for tuberculosis in 1950 and found 70 to 80 per cent to be infected. 3 4 H o w e v e r unsatisfactory the health conditions are at present, in comparison with the recent past there has been a marked improvement. U p to the 1940's periodic epidemics took their toll in many countries. In Egypt, a typhoid epidemic killed 16,706 persons in 1942; a malaria outbreak affected a quarter of a million in Upper Egypt (number of dead unknown) in 1942-44; relapsing fever killed several thousand in 1944; and over 10,000 (half of those who contracted the disease) died of cholera in 1947. However, even these numbers of victims are small compared to those who used to succumb to epidemics in earlier decades (for instance, in 1 8 3 5 more than 80,000, or one-third of the total population, died in Cairo alone of c h o l e r a ) . 3 4 By the very nature of the population composition, these epidemics found most of their victims in the villages, causing large fluctuations in the numbers of inhabitants; however, the decrease in the wake of an epidemic was, as a rule, quickly m a d e up again by the natural increase.

Golden River lo Golden Road

2Ö2

These conditions are now a thing of the past, and epidemics no longer occur in the M i d d l e East except in its most traditionbound parts, in the A r a b i a n Peninsula. In most of the area the remaining problem is the control of, not epidemics, but endemic diseases such as those touched upon above.

THE VILLAGE

FAMILY

Not much has to be added on this subject to what is said above (in chapter 4), since in giving a generalized picture of the M i d d l e Eastern family the village families, which outnumber by far all the other types of families, had to receive primary consideration. One question, however, requires some attention: if a considerable percentage of village houses consists of one single room only, how can the typical M i d d l e Eastern extended family find room in them? T h e answer lies in the following considerations: under traditional circumstances, the exceedingly high infant mortality, referred to in the preceding section, effectively counterbalanced the high birth rate, with the result that the population in most parts of the M i d d l e East remained constant until the onset of Westernization and the public health measures introduced with it. T h i s meant that, on the average, a married couple had only one daughter w h o reached adulthood, at which time, or even earlier, she was married to another villager and had moved in with his parents; and one son, who, when he married, brought his wife into his parents' house. In this manner, there was a period in the latter part of the parents' lives, when they had to share their house with their son and his wife, as well as the latters 1 children, whether the house consisted of one or more rooms. Where most people live under such crowded conditions (aggravated in m a n y cases by the animals which are taken into the same one room for the night), while they may not be exactly comfortable, neither do they suffer from a sense of as acute a discomfort as would individual families whose crowded accommodations contrast with more spacious living quarters enjoyed by their neighbors. A n important result of this close symbiosis of the generations is that a child would feel about as close to his paternal grand-

283

The \'iUa°e ami Its (jiltiirr

p a r e n t s as to his own f a t h e r and m o t h e r . T h i s circumstance, in t u r n , explains to some extent the extremely strong cohesion c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the M i d d l e Eastern family. T h e work, of course, is shared by and divided a m o n g all the m e m b e r s of the extended family w h o live u n d e r one roof: f a t h e r and son take care of the agricultural tasks, occasionally helped by the m o t h e r and the daughter-in-law. T h e life of the village w o m a n revolves entirely within a n d a r o u n d her family. She takes care of the children, cooks, fetches water, prepares fuel, grinds the corn a n d bakes the b r e a d , m a n a g e s the household, a n d discharges family obligations at the time of marriages, circumcisions, births, a n d deaths, which are also her m a i n occasions for e n t e r t a i n m e n t . M o r e frequently, w o m e n amuse themselves by visiting one another, gossiping at the village well or while washing the clothes on the riverbank, a n d by visiting the local or n e a r b y shrine of a saint. T h e w o m a n ' s status is d e t e r m i n e d by that of her h u s b a n d , and, in later life, by the position achieved by her sons. M u c h of the h o n o r of the family is in the h a n d s of its w o m e n : a single misstep by a wife or a d a u g h t e r can blacken the " f a c e , " i.e. honor, of her family a n d lead to her d o o m .

SOCIAL

GROUPINGS

As in the n o m a d i c tribes, so in the villages, several related e x t e n d e d families f o r m a larger social unit, a lineage or clan, called hamula (or qabila) in Arabic-speaking countries. A village m a y have one or more h a m u l a s . W h e n a village is inhabited by m e m b e r s of two or m o r e religio-ethnic groups (e.g. Muslims a n d Christians, or Muslims a n d Druzes), each of these groups forms separate h a m u l a s . T h e relationship a m o n g the h a m u l a s is often tense, especially when the village is divided between two h a m u l a s , in which case the competition between the two m a y h a v e its traditionally formalized manifestations (see above, p p . i77ff.). Social stratification in the village is, as a rule, r u d i m e n t a r y . Since the village is divided into h a m u l a s of generally equal status, a n d the m e m b e r s of each h a m u l a are related to one

2 fi 4

Golden River lo Golden Rond

another (often being able actually to trace their patrilineal descent to one single ancestor), there should be, in principle, no class differences among them. In practice, however, economic status differences divide the villagers into clearly recognizable classes. At the top of this socio-economic stratification are the few families who o w n more land than the average villager and cultivate it with the help of sharecroppers or hired hands. T h e houses of these wealthy villagers are larger, and better built and furnished than those of the others; they themselves eat better, dress better, have a higher percentage of polygynous marriages, give more education to their children (sending them to the city for supplementary schooling), and maintain closer ties with the outside world. Whatever inroads Westernization is making in a village is usually expressed first in features found in this class. T h e second class is that of the average landowning families whose crops are just sufficient to enable them to live modestly but satisfactorily by village standards, working their land with the help of members of their extended family only. T h e third class is that of the tenant farmers who own no land, and who consequently have to work harder and be satisfied with less, since a major part of the crops they harvest must be paid over as rent to their landowners. T h e next lower class is that of the sharecroppers who work for others in return for a small share of the crops. If a small landowner needs a hired hand and cannot pay him, one way of obtaining his labor is to give him his daughter to wife in exchange for a specified number of years' labor, in a manner similar to the agreement reached between Laban and J a c o b . 3 6 Even lower on the socio-economic scale than the sharecropper (who at least has a permanent home and works year-in year-out the same land) is the landless seasonal worker, who, in a bad year, remains completely without any livelihood. Starvation is a menace that he and his family may have to face any year. It is primarily from among these people that famines take their toll, as was the case, for instance, in 1942-43 in Pakistan, when most of the 1,700,000 people who starved to death were landless farm workers.

The Village and lis Culture In considering the social structure of the M i d d l e E a s t e r n v i l l a g e , a n d , in particular, w h a t it m e a n s f o r the i n d i v i d u a l to be a m e m b e r of the village society, o n e of the most i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e s is the highly personal c h a r a c t e r of all interpersonal relationship. In a village of a v e r a g e size (say 500 i n d i v i d u a l s ) e v e r y b o d y k n o w s e v e r y b o d y else personally, a n d the life of e a c h i n d i v i d u a l is lived in constant contact w i t h others: m e m b e r s of one's o w n nuclear f a m i l y in the first place, then, in d e s c e n d i n g o r d e r , m e m b e r s of one's e x t e n d e d f a m i l y , one's h a m u l a , a n d lastly of the village. E s p e c i a l l y the g r e a t stations of the h u m a n life c y c l e — b i r t h , circumcision, m a r r i a g e a n d d e a t h — a r e r e a c h e d a n d passed with the fullest p a r t i c i p a t i o n of n u m e r o u s k i n s m e n a n d k i n s w o m e n . A sick person is visited b y m a n y , if a m a n is b u i l d i n g a house for himself he is h e l p e d b y his n e i g h b o r s o r c l a n s m e n , if misfortune befalls one the m a n y a r e there to c o m f o r t h i m a n d help him out. It is literally true that in a v i l l a g e o n e is never alone, never lonely, n e v e r lost. T h e v i l l a g e kinship structure also serves as a basis for settling q u a r r e l s or m e d i a t i n g disputes, either in i n f o r m a l discussion w i t h one or m o r e elders, or by resorting to m o r e f o r m a l i z e d a r b i t r a t i o n . T h e m e m b e r s of one h a m u l a usually live together in o n e q u a r t e r in the village. T h e h a m u l a s m a y also h a v e their fields in one block, a n d each m a y h a v e a s e p a r a t e guest house, threshing floor, oven, etc. T h e h a m u l a is the p r e f e r r e d e n d o g a m o u s unit, a n d its m e m b e r s are tied to one a n o t h e r b y obligations of collective responsibility, such as p r e v a i l in the n o m a d i c tribes (see a b o v e , p p . 19, 79). In m a n y villages one finds c l e a r l y m a r k e d indications of d u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , with its typical m u t u a l a n t a g o n i s m , c o m p e t i t i o n , a n d tensions. Since this f o r m of social o r g a n i z a t i o n has been described a b o v e (pp. 1 7 7 - 2 5 0 ) in some detail, there is no need to g o into it here. O n e e x a m p l e m a y p e r h a p s be a d d e d in o r d e r to s h o w that d u a l division exists even w h e r e it lacks a n y f o r m a l structuring. In the A n a t o l i a n v i l l a g e of S a k a l t u t a n , S t i r l i n g f o u n d that the u p p e r a n d l o w e r quarters into w h i c h the v i l l a g e w a s d i v i d e d " w e r e sharply contrasted a n d expressed their r i v a l r y in ceaseless j o k e s , in quasi-serious r u n n i n g d o w n of e a c h other to m e , in the hiring of s e p a r a t e s h e p h e r d s ; they e v e n spoke of

Golden River In Golden Road fighting, t h o u g h fighting between q u a r t e r s is in fact fighting between lineages u n d e r a n o t h e r n a m e . " 3 8 In most villages only a very few persons are f o u n d w h o engage in n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l pursuits on a full or p a r t time basis. T h e village imam-khatib-teacher (or mulla) is one (in villages which h a v e a m o s q u e ) , the b a r b e r - b a t h keeper a n o t h e r ; a w a t c h m a n (or w a t c h m e n ) , c a r p e n t e r , smith, tinker, store keeper, a n d keeper of the saint's t o m b , m a y or m a y not be found in a village d e p e n d ing on its size a n d economic s t a t u s . T h e religious functionaries m a y enjoy considerable prestige; the other specialists are less regarded, a l t h o u g h in each case their actual status d e p e n d s largely on the economic position they are able to achieve. T h e general rule all over the M i d d l e East is t h a t the more land a villager owns the more he is respected a n d looked u p to. T w o examples m a y illustrate this. I n M o r o c c a n villages the social elite is comprised of the wealthy class, those w h o own relatively large tracts of land a n d considerable livestock, as well as some of the two luxury animals, the horse a n d the camel. However, families which trace their descent f r o m the P r o p h e t M o h a m m e d or f r o m local saints {marabout) also enjoy high ascribed status. C e r t a i n families have the traditional prerogative of supplying the village chieftain (qaid) or the village religious j u d g e (qadi), a n d this too, m e a n s considerable p r e s t i g e . 3 9 A similar pattern is f o u n d at the other end of the M i d d l e East, in West Pakistan. At the top of the social scale are the landlords, one or two a m o n g w h o m are recognized as village h e a d m e n , a n d as such are expected to provide protection, settle disputes, a n d give advice to the others in the village. 4 0 T h e socio-economic stratification of the village can be illust r a t e d by referring to I r a q . In a typical I r a q i village, on the top of the scale is the absentee landlord (mallak) w h o m a y own the entire village or even several villages, but never lives in a n y of t h e m . H e usually has a representative (sargal) in the village, who, a l t h o u g h an outsider, is accepted by the villagers as a m e m b e r of the l a n d o w n i n g class bccause of his power. Small landowners rank highest on the socio-economic scale a m o n g the resident villagers. In m a n y cases they can and do e m p l o y t e n a n t f a r m e r s a n d s h a r e c r o p p e r s . T h e prestige of the small mallak is derived not so m u c h f r o m his economic status as f r o m the fact of his land

The Village and Its Culture o w n e r s h i p , i n d i c a t i n g t o w h a t e x t e n t it is t h e l a n d t h a t d e t e r mines status. N e x t c o m e the i n d e p e n d e n t smallholders w h o o w n j u s t e n o u g h l a n d to m a k e e n d s m e e t , w o r k i n g t h e l a n d t h e m s e l v e s w i t h t h e h e l p of t h e i r families. A t e n a n t f a r m e r or s h a r e c r o p p e r m a y w o r k m o r e l a n d a n d m a k e a living f r o m his s h a r e on a level w i t h t h a t of t h e i n d e p e n d e n t s m a l l h o l d e r , b u t t h e v e r y fact t h a t h e d o e s n o t o w n l a n d places h i m in a l o w e r p r e s t i g e c a t e g o r y . I n n o r t h e r n I r a q m a n y f e l l a h i n o w n a v e r y s m a l l plot of l a n d , a n d w o r k , in a d d i t i o n , a l a r g e r piece as t e n a n t f a r m e r s or s h a r e c r o p p e r s in o r d e r to e a r n a m i n i m a l living. I n t h e S h i ' i t e s o u t h , m o s t fellahin a r e e n t i r e l y landless. If a village h a s c r a f t s m e n o r m e r c h a n t s , these a r e c o n s i d e r e d q u i t e h i g h on t h e social scale, because, although they d o not own land, they usually m a k e a b e t t e r living t h a n t h e i n d e p e n d e n t f a r m e r s , a n d a r e t h u s a b l e to o b t a i n a n d d i s p l a y t h e i n d i c a t o r s of w e a l t h w h i c h a r e s y m b o l s of p o w e r in t h e v i l l a g e : e d u c a t i o n f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n , v e i l i n g a n d h a i r c o v e r i n g f o r t h e i r w o m e n , horses f o r t h e m s e l v e s , a n d i m pressive f a m i l y feasts ( w e d d i n g s , c i r c u m c i s i o n s ) . I n a d d i t i o n to the v e i l i n g of the w o m e n , the p r a c t i c e of p o l y g y n y is a l s o a d i s t i n c t i v e m a r k of s t a t u s a n d prestige, a n d is, in fact, m o s t p r e v a l e n t in t h e small mallak c l a s s . 4 1

VILLAGE

INSTITUTIONS

U n d e r this h e a d i n g w e shall discuss briefly those i n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h f r o m t i m e to t i m e b r i n g t o g e t h e r t h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n villagers a n d t h u s e n a b l e t h e m to e n j o y a m o d i c u m of social life a n d c o n v i v i a l i t y , w h i c h c a n n o t t a k e p l a c e in t h e p r i v a t e h o m e s b e c a u s e of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s e g r e g a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e sexes. F o r it is a r e m a r k a b l e a n d p a r a d o x i c a l s i t u a t i o n t h a t in a society w h i c h u p h o l d s h o s p i t a l i t y as o n e of the g r e a t e s t m a l e v i r t u e s , visits in p r i v a t e h o m e s t a k e p l a c e a l m o s t exclusively a m o n g w o m e n . I n c o n t r a s t t o w o m e n , w h o visit o n e a n o t h e r q u i t e f r e q u e n t l y , 4 2 it is q u i t e r a r e for a m a l e villager to visit t h e h o m e of a n o t h e r . S u c h m a l e visitors as a p p e a r f r o m t i m e to t i m e in p r i v a t e h o m e s are, in g e n e r a l , p e r s o n s f r o m o u t s i d e t h e village w h o h a v e c o m e o n s o m e e r r a n d . It is these o u t s i d e r s o n w h o m o n e is s u p p o s e d to lavish h o s p i t a l i t y .

Golden River In Golden Road T h e kind of social life w h i c h is most typical of the Western world, n a m e l y the get-together of several m a r r i e d couples a n d / o r u n m a r r i e d m e n a n d w o m e n in the h o m e of one of their ranks for the p u r p o s e of p a r t a k i n g together of a meal or refreshments, c h a t t i n g , a n d p e r h a p s d a n c i n g , c a n n o t a n d does not exist in the M i d d l e E a s t e r n village, a n d even in the cities is only n o w being hesitatingly i n t r o d u c e d a m o n g the Westernized elements. O n l y at i m p o r t a n t family feasts, such as a wedding, does a family play host to a large n u m b e r of fellow villagers, with the m e n a n d the w o m e n f o r m i n g strictly segregated groups. W h e r e " t h e bulk of evening sociability takes place in private houses" a n d in "small gatherings of close friends the two sexes i n t e r m i n g l e freely a n d e q u a l l y , " as was observed by Gulick in the L e b a n e s e Christian village of M u n s i f , 4 3 this exceptional d e p a r t u r e f r o m the t r a d i t i o n a l M i d d l e Eastern p a t t e r n is d u e p r i m a r i l y to the inroads Westernization has m a d e in the life of r u r a l L e b a n o n , a n d especially of the Christian villagers, a n d their close c o n t a c t with the largely Westernized city of Beirut. I n general, the absence of social intercourse a m o n g m a l e villagers in the h o m e of one of t h e m is c o m p e n s a t e d for to some degree by the village institutions w h e r e they can get together as f r e q u e n t l y as they wish to e n j o y social contacts. Of these, the village s q u a r e is p e r h a p s the most i m p o r t a n t . This is usually a n o p e n place, located either in the m i d d l e of the village or just outside its c o m p l e x of houses, which serves a great variety of purposes. I n some villages the s q u a r e is the threshing floor, used in t u r n by all the p e a s a n t s as they g a t h e r in their crops. T h e same square serves as d a n c e floor for the occasion when a g r o u p of y o u n g m e n or of girls feels like d a n c i n g a dabke** or a n o t h e r traditional folk d a n c e , such as the T u r k i s h " p u n c h i n g d a n c e " p e r f o r m e d by the m e n in c o n n e c t i o n with w e d d i n g s , 4 4 or the Afghan attan d a n c e d by the village m e n a r o u n d a fire in the evening to the accomp a n i m e n t of guns a n d d r u m s . 4 8 In m a n y villages the square functions also as the m a r k e t place with all that this entails in m e e t i n g friends a n d e x c h a n g i n g small talk. In the m e n ' s life the guest-house (Arabic: madyafa in Egypt, madafa in J o r d a n , mudij in I r a q ; misafir odasi in T u r k e y ) is the most i m p o r t a n t m e e t i n g place. Most villages have such a guest

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289

house w h i c h is used for the reception of i m p o r t a n t guests visiting the v i l l a g e a n d for putting them u p f o r the night, as well as f o r the meetings of the v i l l a g e council, a n d s i m p l y for g a t h e r i n g s of men m a n y an evening, especially d u r i n g the slack w i n t e r season. In some villages, n o t a b l y in E g y p t , the guest house is m a i n tained by the ' o m d a (the v i l l a g e h e a d m a n ) a n d is a statea u t h o r i z e d institution. In others, e a c h h a m u l a m a i n t a i n s its o w n guest house, in w h i c h case the a d u l t m a l e s of the h a m u l a take their c o m m u n a l meals in it d u r i n g the nights of the f a s t - m o n t h R a m a d a n . T h e size, q u a l i t y a n d f u r n i s h i n g of these h a m u l a guest houses often manifest the c o m p e t i t i v e spirit that exists between the h a m u l a s . In yet other villages, the l a r g e r and w e a l t h i e r e x t e n d e d families e a c h h a v e their o w n guest house. In the village of S a k a l t u t a n , for instance, in central A n a t o l i a , w h i c h had 1 0 5 households, Stirling counted in 1 9 5 0 sixteen guest houses (he calls them " g u e s t r o o m s " ) , twelve of w h i c h were in actual use most of the time, p r i m a r i l y as c l u b r o o m s for the v i l l a g e men in w h i c h they gathered after the e v e n i n g m e a l , that is shortly after s u n d o w n , and r e m a i n e d for a b o u t one h o u r a n d a half. In J a n u a r y a n d F e b r u a r y , h o w e v e r , they often sat in the guest r o o m all d a y . M o s t of the men attended the same guest r o o m r e g u l a r l y , a n d did it p r i m a r i l y for w a r m t h , c o m p a n y , a n d i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d in order to escape the discomfort a n d indignity of spending the e v e n i n g with one's w i f e and c h i l d r e n at h o m e w h e r e no m a l e kin or n e i g h b o r w o u l d p a y a visit. S e v e r a l of the guest r o o m s in S a k a l t u t a n were used as household l i v i n g s p a c e w h e r e the m a l e m e m b e r s of the o w n e r ' s f a m i l y ate, a n d the old m e n a n d u n m a r ried boys slept. F o u r of the guest rooms w e r e either c o m m u n a l l y o w n e d by an entire lineage (the largest of w h i c h consisted of twenty households), or at least used by most m e n of the lineage even if o w n e d by one of its m e m b e r s . 4 7 A n o t h e r institution w h i c h serves as a g a t h e r i n g p l a c e for the m a l e v i l l a g e r is the mosque. H o w e v e r , f a r f r o m all M i d d l e Eastern villages h a v e mosques (or c h u r c h e s ) , a n d most villagers g o to the m o s q u e to p r a y only on F r i d a y , a n d e v e n on that d a y (the traditional yawm al-Jumla, D a y of G a t h e r i n g ) , not all of them do so. Nevertheless, m a n y villagers d o m e e t in the m o s q u e quite f r e q u e n t l y , a n d thus h a v e an occasion to c h a t b e f o r e a n d

Golden River to Golden

290 after the prayers. T h e m o s q u e ' s imam

Road

r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r of t h e v i l l a g e is

( p r a y e r - l e a d e r ) w h o also f u n c t i o n s as t h e

the

khatib

( p r e a c h e r ) a n d t h e shaykh ( m a s t e r ) of t h e kuttab ( r e l i g i o u s s c h o o l ) usually a t t a c h e d to the m o s q u e . T h e b a t h - h o u s e ( h a m m a m ) is yet a n o t h e r v i l l a g e

institution

w h i c h is a f o c u s of s o c i a l life, a n d this o n e f o r b o t h m e n

and

w o m e n . H o w e v e r , e v e n f e w e r villages h a v e a h a m m a m

than

h a v e a p l a c e of w o r s h i p . W h e r e t h e r e is a b a t h , its k e e p e r u s u a l l y a l s o s h a v e s t h e m e n . 4 8 A g a i n , as in s e v e r a l o t h e r r e s p e c t s , a n e x c e p t i o n is p r e s e n t e d b y I r a n w h e r e e v e r y v i l l a g e h a s its b a t h , b u i l t , as a r u l e , a t

t h e e x p e n s e of t h e local l a n d o w n e r

c o n s i s t i n g of s e v e r a l r o o m s , in m o s t cases b u i l t b e l o w

and

ground

level. T h e a t t e n d a n t in c h a r g e r e c e i v e s p a y m e n t in k i n d ( w h e a t , f r u i t , s t r a w , f u e l ) f r o m t h e v i l l a g e r s w h o c a n use t h e b a t h as o f t e n a s t h e y w i s h , w i t h c e r t a i n d a y s o r h o u r s set a p a r t f o r t h e men, others for the w o m e n . 4 9 Larger

villages usually

h a v e a c o f f e e - h o u s e (in

Iran

and

A f g h a n i s t a n a t e a - h o u s e ) w h i c h is t h e e x c l u s i v e g a t h e r i n g p l a c e of m e n , a n d a m o n g t h e m , t o o , o n l y of t h o s e w h o h a v e a c h i e v e d a n i n c o m e level a t l e a s t a l i n e a b o v e t h e b a r e s t m i n i m u m . T i m e is w h i l e d a w a y a t t h e c o f f e e h o u s e d r i n k i n g t h e s m a l l c u p s of T u r k i s h c o f f e e , s m o k i n g t h e narghile

(water pipe), playing card

g a m e s o r s h a s h - b a s h (a k i n d of b a c k g a m m o n ) , l i s t e n i n g to t h e r a d i o , o r , o n R a m a d a n n i g h t s , to a visiting kassas

(story-teller)

w h o r e c i t e s o l d , f a m i l i a r , b u t a l w a y s f a s c i n a t i n g p i e c e s of f o l k lore,

and,

above'all,

conversing

with

relatives,

friends

and

neighbors. S u c h l a r g e v i l l a g e s u s u a l l y h a v e also o n e o r m o r e stores, o r e v e n a r o w of s t o r e s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s a r u d i m e n t a r y suq. S i n c e t h e p u r c h a s i n g of m e r c h a n d i s e in a s t o r e is a t y p i c a l l y

male

task in t h e M i d d l e E a s t , t h e village s t o r e h a s d e v e l o p e d i n t o a k i n d of s o c i a l i z i n g c e n t e r f o r t h e m e n . 5 0 As f a r as t h e w o m e n a r e c o n c e r n e d , t h e i r f a v o r i t e p l a c e of m e e t i n g a n d g o s s i p i n g is t h e v i l l a g e well. E v e r y v i l l a g e

must

h a v e a c c e s s to w a t e r f o r d r i n k i n g a n d h o u s e h o l d p u r p o s e s , a n d e x c e p t f o r v i l l a g e s l o c a t e d o n r i v e r b a n k s or on c a n a l s , a n d a few w h i c h

must

rely on

rainwater

gathered

in c i s t e r n s ,

all

v i l l a g e s h a v e a w e l l . T h e f e t c h i n g of w a t e r f r o m t h e well (or

The Village and Its Culture

2gr

the river) is everywhere one of the daily chores of the women, and the well is, therefore, the place where the women meet a n d talk. T h e short time they spend there, exchanging news and gossip, is for most village women the only rest period they enjoy in the busy routine of their dawn-to-dusk working day, and often the only entertainment available for them. While in most villages the women grind their own corn a n d bake their own bread, in the larger and more progressive villages there is a baker, in which case the daily visit to his establishment is an additional occasion for the women to meet, chat and relax for a while. As Gulick observed in the Lebanese Christian village of Munsif, the two bakeries "are intensively used as loci of social interaction on the part of women . . . here the women meet regularly and for protracted lengths of t i m e . " 6 1 Yet another place where the women meet is the cemetery. O n a special day (or days) of the year the women go to the cemetery, to mourn the dead, and on such occasions they take along some food and sit around a m o n g the graves-for quite a long time, shedding tears for the departed dear ones, but also enjoying the outing as a social occasion. T h e shrine, housing the grave of a saint and located either in the village or nearby, is primarily frequented by women. T h e y bring along a small gift, in many cases some foodstuff, which they give to the keeper of the shrine, or place next to the t o m b of the wali (holy man), then pray to him and pour out their hearts in supplication. T h e usual troubles besetting people everywhere in the world, such as illness, childlessness, affairs of the heart, and the like, form the subject of their prayers, as well as such more specifically Middle Eastern issues as the intention of the husband to take a second wife, or the reluctance of a cousin to give up his right to the hand of a girl who wants to marry someone else. Each saint has an annual feast, usually on the traditional anniversary of his birth (mawlid), on which occasion a veritable folk-celebration takes place, occasionally together with popular amusements, markets, competitive games, and dances. A characteristic of many of these shrines is that they are venerated by Christians and Jews as well as Muslims.

Golden River to Golden Road

2Ç2 POLITICAL

ORGANIZATION

Strictly speaking, no distinction can be made in M i d d l e Eastern villages between social and political organizations. K i n ship groups (hamùlas, lineages) are the basic aggregates on a super-familial level, and they determine the residential arrangements as well as whatever rudimentary political structuring exists in the village. As a general rule it can be stated that each hamùla tends to occupy a separate section or quarter in the village. While this has already been stated above, we must repeat it in order that it m a y lead on to a connected and significant feature: the head of each h a m ù l a (who is usually the head of the most important extended family in the h a m ù l a ) acts, to all intents and purposes, as the head of a quarter of the village, a kind of district chief. He represents the interests of his section (not only of the h a m ù l a members but also of individuals outside the kinship structure who m a y reside there) vis-à-vis other quarters of the village. T h e oasis village of Sidi K h a l e d in Algeria can serve as an example. This large village, which numbered 5,300 persons in 1950, is divided into four quarters, each inhabited by one or more lineages. E a c h of these is headed by a kebir (literally " B i g O n e " ) , whose prime function is to settle differences within his own lineage, to deal with other kebirs, and to officiate at weddings. All the kebirs together form the jem'a or village council, an informal body in which, in the past, other men of importance also participated. U n d e r the French rule the council was transformed into an elected body of twelve, which in practice meant that each lineage nominated its leader (the same who had been its kebir), and then the entire slate was voted in by the population. In this manner, what was originally a feature of the traditional social organization of the village became transformed into a political body with little or no difference in its f u n c t i o n s . 5 2 Such village councils, informally organized, composed of hamùla-heads and other elders, and functioning as a deliberating and consultative body, but nevertheless important enough to influence or even determine action by the village head, exist in the villages all over the Middle East. In the A r a b countries they

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293

are called majlis (which, incidentally, is also the n a m e of the p a r l i a m e n t in Iran a n d elsewhere); in T u r k e y ihtiyar heyeti (council of elders). T h e most influential h a m u l a in a village usually has the right to a p p o i n t one of its m e m b e r s to serve as village h e a d m a n . In practice, the office is often h e r e d i t a r y within an extended family, a l t h o u g h , u p o n the d e a t h of a h e a d m a n , the h a m u l a council convenes a n d decides on his successor. T h e functions of the h e a d m a n include the m a i n t e n a n c e of public o r d e r and security (for which purpose he m a y have a few village policemen u n d e r his c o m m a n d ) , the registration of marriages, births and deaths, the collection of taxes, the mediation of disputes, a n d the representation of the village before the higher g o v e r n m e n t a l authorities. H e also entertains official guests. T h e h e a d m a n receives no r e m u n e r a t i o n , b u t he is a m p l y c o m p e n sated by the prestige of his office, a n d certain privileges he enjoys. As the political organization of the Middle Eastern states develops, the village h e a d m a n ' s function is gradually being t r a n s f o r m e d : originally the spokesman of the kingroups inhabiting the village, he becomes more a n d m o r e the representative of the government. In the Sudanese village of Burri a l - L a m a b , for instance, the lomda ( h e a d m a n ) is responsible for obtaining the tax money, which is gathered by his five assistants, called shaykks, each of w h o m lives in one of the five settlements (called a hilla) of which the 'umudiyya (district) is composed. T h e ' o m d a transmits the tax money to the central g o v e r n m e n t , settles minor disputes, calls in the police when necessary, sits on the local district court a n d acts as advisor to the judge, submits requests to the K h a r t o u m N o r t h R u r a l Council, participates in the distribution of lands for developing the New Q u a r t e r of the village, e t c . 4 3 T h i s new development often leads to the refusal of the wealthy a n d influential villagers to accept the position of h e a d m a n , which n o w falls m o r e often to younger a n d less i m p o r t a n t men, with the result that the h e a d m a n s h i p continues to lose prestige. As Stirling aptly put it on the basis of his observations in T u r k i s h villages: " T h e h e a d m a n was no longer the top of the village b u t the b o t t o m of the official State hierarchy. It was not a pleasant position to h o l d . " 5 4

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294

Road

RELIGION

Religion in the villages all over the Middle East consists of an Islamic e l e m e n t * and the local survivals of pre-Islamic forms. In some places the Islamization of village religion has been accomplished with great thoroughness, the non-Islamic features having been almost totally eliminated; in others, Islam is no more than skin-deep and beneath it the pre-Islamic doctrines and practices throb with great vitality. Almost nowhere, however, are the people actually aware of this dichotomy. T a k e a village like Burri a l - L a m á b near K h a r t o u m in the Sudan. Officially its inhabitants profess Sunni Islam of the MalikI legal school. T h e Muslim doctrine of the Oneness of God is upheld, M o h a m m e d is venerated as the Messenger of God; the Muslim prayers are said, although many men, especially the younger ones, do not pray regularly; most of the women do not know how to pray at all. Almsgiving is observed rather irregularly, but the fasting during the month of R a m a d a n is observed by nearly everyone. O n l y a few make the pilgrimage to M e c c a in observance of the fifth of the Five Pillars of the Faith in Islam. M a n y drink alcoholic beverages, although this is forbidden by Islam. W h i l e the official Muslim position is that infibulation of females is forbidden, this pre-Islamic practice persists. Also certain pre-Islamic practices connected with death and burial continue. T h e Islamic prohibition of gambling is ignored. T h e r e is a strong cult of saints (tolerated by Islam everywhere except in Saudi A r a b i a ) , and numerous cults of curing and divination, with a pronounced belief in the evil eye (which is generally Middle Eastern). In spite of disapproval by the official Muslim hierarchy, the zár-cult (the exorcism of evil spirits by a female priestess or shaykha) flourishes. This cult penetrated the Sudan from Abyssinia in the nineteenth century and is still s p r e a d i n g . 6 6 I n sharp contrast to the above are the religious doctrines and practices of a typical Muslim village in, say, J o r d a n , where even folk-religion has become so thoroughly Islamized that one finds barely a trace of non-Islamic influences. Perhaps the strong veneration of saints (this is even stronger in Iraq and North * I n this g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t a b o u t the role of religion ¡11 the life of the M i d d l e E a s t e r n villages it is not possible to dwell on the minority religions. I t c a n be stated in passing, h o w e v e r , that t h e role of Jewish, C h r i s t i a n , Druze, and o t h e r religions closely parallels t h a t of I s l a m .

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295

Africa) could be mentioned as a survival of pre-Islamic cults, b u t then the cult of these walis has been so completely incorp o r a t e d into Islam that its pre-Islamic origin is forgotten a n d of no significance. I n general, it can be stated t h a t the villagers constitute a conservative element as far as religious observance is c o n c e r n e d , certainly more so t h a n most n o m a d i c tribes a n d the semiWesternized townspeople. An i m p o r t a n t manifestation of religious life in M i d d l e Eastern villages is the b r o t h e r h o o d (Arabic tariqah, literally " w a y " ) , which is in m a n y villages the only non-kinship-based association. In I r a q i villages, for instance, all classes m a y join a t a r i q a h , a n d within it, at least theoretically, no class differences exist; however, this does not carry over into o t h e r aspects of life, a n d even in the t a r i q a h it is usually the village leaders w h o wield control.® 8 I n one Sudanese village n o less t h a n five b r o t h e r h o o d s were r e p o r t e d with a total m e m b e r s h i p a m o u n t i n g to 14 per cent of the males over p u b e r t y . 4 7 In some places, these b r o t h e r h o o d s are quite powerful countrywide organizations with special fortress-homes, such as that of the T i j a n i b r o t h e r h o o d at Ain M a d h i , some fifty miles west of L a g h u a t in A l g e r i a . 6 " In E g y p t i a n villages m a n y boys, w h e n they r e a c h adolescence, join the mystic order of N a k h s h a b a n d i y a , w h e r e u p o n they are called " b o y s of the P a t h " (awlad attariq), a n d p a r t i c i p a t e in night prayers a n d the mystic rituals of the zikr in w h i c h a m a i n feature is the repetitive a n d ecstatic u t t e r a n c e of G o d ' s n a m e s a n d attributes. T h e visit of boys of one village to their confreres in a n o t h e r is a joyous a n d festive o c c a s i o n . 8 9 Until quite recently, formal e d u c a t i o n in traditional M i d d l e Eastern villages was a purely religious m a t t e r . Q u i t e often the local religious specialist, associated with the village mosque, would be in charge of the school, g a t h e r i n g the boys for a few h o u r s daily to the mosque court a n d teaching t h e m r e a d i n g (primarily reading the K o r a n ) , as well as some writing a n d arithmetic. For these services, the c h i l d r e n ' s families would give the teacher some wheat or barley at harvest time or o t h e r products they could afford. I n recent decades the governments of most M i d d l e Eastern countries have begun to build a network of e l e m e n t a r y schools

Golden River to Golden Road in t h e villages. I n some ( L e b a n o n , for i n s t a n c e ) , this has b y n o w b e c o m e q u i t e extensive; in o t h e r s it is still r u d i m e n t a r y . I n I r a n , for e x a m p l e , t h e r e is only o n e s u c h maktab for every t w e n t y - f i v e or thirty villages.60 I n l a r g e villages t h e r e m a y b e several t r a d i t i o n a l K o r a n schools w h i c h c o n t i n u e to f u n c t i o n e v e n a f t e r t h e g o v e r n m e n t establishes a n official e l e m e n t a r y school. T h u s , for i n s t a n c e , in t h e U p p e r E g y p t i a n p r o v i n c e of A s w a n , in a g r o u p of villages a r o u n d Silwa t h e r e are five k u t t a b s a n d o n e r e c o g n i z e d m a k t a b . All t h e k u t t a b s a r e a t t a c h e d to o r a d j a c e n t to m o s q u e s a n d r u n b y t h e i r sheikhs, w h o k e e p discipline by a d m i n i s t e r i n g b a s t i n a d o to t h e o f f e n d e r . 6 1 T H E W I N D S OF C H A N G E

T h e w i n d s of c h a n g e , blowing f r o m t h e West w i t h u n a b a t i n g intensity ever since t h e d a y s of W o r l d W a r I I , a r e b e g i n n i n g t o d a y to p e n e t r a t e even the most r e m o t e M i d d l e E a s t e r n villages in M o r o c c o a n d M a u r i t a n i a in the west, A f g h a n i s t a n a n d B a l u j i s t a n in t h e east, t h e C a u c a s u s in t h e n o r t h a n d t h e A d e n O m a n coast in the south. D i s t a n c e , of course, is a n obstacle w h i c h even p o w e r f u l blasts h a v e difficulty in o v e r c o m i n g . In g e n e r a l , the d e g r e e of W e s t e r n i z a t i o n e x h i b i t e d b y a village seems to d e p e n d on t w o factors: the d i s t a n c e of the village f r o m t h e nearest u r b a n center, a n d t h e e x t e n t of W e s t e r n i n f l u e n c e f o u n d in t h a t u r b a n c e n t e r itself. T h e closer the village to t h e u r b a n center a n d the g r e a t e r t h e W e s t e r n i n f l u e n c e in t h e l a t t e r , t h e stronger the W e s t e r n i z a t i o n in the village. I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h this rule o n e finds t h a t in L e b a n o n , whose small size m a k e s for a p r o x i m i t y of all its villages to t h e c a p i t a l , Beirut, w h i c h itself is c o n s i d e r a b l y W e s t e r n i z e d , all villages b e a r t h e s t a m p of m a r k e d W e s t e r n i n f l u e n c e . T h e c o n t r a r y is t r u e for a c o u n t r y like A f g h a n i s t a n , w h e r e s o m e villages a r e so r e m o t e a n d self-sufficient t h a t their i n h a b i t a n t s h a v e never b e e n to t o w n , a n d w h e r e even the t w o biggest cities, K a b u l a n d H e r a t , a r e f a r b e h i n d Beirut or A l e x a n d r i a in W e s t e r n i z a t i o n . Nevertheless, e v e n in A f g h a n villages, s e c o n d - h a n d W e s t e r n clothes, those s h a b b y f o r e r u n n e r s of W e s t e r n i z a t i o n , h a v e a l r e a d y m a d e their appearance.82

The \ illage ami Its Cii/twr A s against this, a v i l l a g e n e a r A l e x a n d r i a in E g y p t was found in i 9 6 0 to contain the f o l l o w i n g modern Western features: a k i n d e r g a r t e n , attended by 1 5 6 boys and 30 girls; a p r i m a r y school with 3 5 0 boys, a n d a n o t h e r with 2 3 0 girls (note the p r o p o r t i o n ! ) ; an a v e r a g e of seven children per f a m i l y (the s u r v i v a l of so m a n y c h i l d r e n is a sign of relatively a d v a n c e d health measures w i t h o u t as yet h a v i n g reached the stage w h e r e the parents w o u l d use c o n t r a c e p t i o n ) ; a g o v e r n m e n t a l m e d i c a l unit for internal diseases; a constable with thirty a r m e d w a t c h m e n ; the constable a n d the ' o m d a (the m a y o r ) read n e w s p a p e r s ; a l o u d s p e a k e r installed in the m i d d l e of the village over w h i c h a n y villager c a n m a k e public a n n o u n c e m e n t s ; n u m e r o u s radios ( b a t t e r y o p e r a t e d ) . A n d the m a y o r , in thoroughly Western fashion, w a n t e d the c a n a l , on w h i c h the village utterly d e p e n d e d , e n l a r g e d a n d the v i l l a g e p r o v i d e d with a resident doctor and a v e t e r i n a r i a n a n d electricity a n d r u n n i n g w a t e r in every h o u s e . 6 3 In a n o t h e r g r o u p of five villages in L o w e r E g y p t (with populations r a n g i n g f r o m 700 to 5,000) it w a s found that a b o u t one half of a r a n d o m s a m p l e interviewed in 1 9 5 8 listened to the radio, a n d a b o u t one fifth r e a d newspapers, their favorite topic being political news. T h i s study took place only a few years a f t e r Nasser h a d b e c o m e president of E g y p t , a n d yet 80 per cent of the males a n d 5 0 per cent of the females knew that he w a s president, that the m o n a r c h y h a d been terminated and a r e p u b lic e s t a b l i s h e d . 8 4 It is surprising, indeed, that the E g y p t i a n villagers, w h o for m i l l e n n i a h a d never k n o w n w h a t was going on b e y o n d the next v i l l a g e (with w h i c h they had reciprocal ties), should w i t h i n the last f e w years h a v e become a w a r e to such an extent of the l a r g e r w o r l d a r o u n d them. P e r h a p s the most i m m e d i a t e reaction shown by the villagers, a n d especially those of the y o u n g e r g e n e r a t i o n , to contact w i t h the m o r e or less W e s t e r n i z e d city is the e m e r g e n c e of dissatisfaction. T h e y o u n g v i l l a g e r , m a d e a w a r e , as a result of visits to the city, of his low subsistence s t a n d a r d s , tends to r e g a r d village life as u n r e w a r d i n g a n d to feel a t t r a c t e d by the u r b a n e n v i r o n m e n t . A t the s a m e time, o b j e c t i v e l y , too, his position in the v i l l a g e becomes m o r e d i f f i c u l t as m o r e of his siblings r e m a i n alive than used to, w h i c h m e a n s t h a t — t o put it in the most e l e m e n t a r y

Golden Rivet to Golden Road t e r m s — l e s s f o o d is a v a i l a b l e

per c a p i t a . A l l this results in a

v i l l a g e - t o - t o w n m i g r a t i o n of y o u n g m e n w h i c h , in t u r n , t e n d s to restore, to s o m e e x t e n t at least, the b a l a n c e b e t w e e n l a n d a n d p e o p l e d i s t u r b e d b y the r e d u c e d i n f a n t m o r t a l i t y . T h e v e r y fact t h a t o n e son r e m o v e s h i m s e l f f r o m the h o m e e n v i r o n m e n t a n d t h e r e b y w e a k e n s the ties b e t w e e n h i m s e l f a n d his p a r e n t a l f a m i l y , tends to also e f f e c t a l o o s e n i n g of these ties b e t w e e n the son w h o r e m a i n s at h o m e a n d his p a r e n t s . T h e v e r y e x a m p l e of the b r o t h e r w h o w e n t a w a y m a k e s the b r o t h e r w h o r e m a i n e d at h o m e , as w e l l as their p a r e n t s , a w a r e of the possibility of secession, a n d this in t u r n w e a k e n s b o t h p a t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y a n d filial s e l f - s u b o r d i n a t i o n to it. A v i l l a g e f a m i l y w i t h o n e son in t h e city h a s s o m e interest in w h a t g o e s o n in the c i t y , is o p e n t o w a r d the o u t e r w o r l d , a n d less resistant to e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s and innovations. In v i l l a g e s close to a c i t y t h e c h a n g e c a n c o m e w i t h t r a u m a t i c s u d d e n n e s s . T a k e the v i l l a g e of B a l g a t , l o c a t e d six miles f r o m A n k a r a , the c a p i t a l of T u r k e y .

In

1950 it took t w o h o u r s to

r e a c h it o v e r a dirt r o a d . E v e r y t h i n g w a s full of d u s t , i n c l u d i n g t h e f u r n i t u r e in the houses. A l l the v i l l a g e r s w e r e f a r m e r s . T h e s i n g l e store s t o c k e d c h e a p c l o t h e s , c i g a r e t t e s , a n d d r i n k s , b a r e l y a n y t h i n g else. T h e o n l y r a d i o b e l o n g e d

to t h e

and

village

h e a d m a n . Y e t all the v i l l a g e r s w e r e satisfied w i t h their lot, a n d felt that they w o u l d kill t h e m s e l v e s r a t h e r than g o to live in another place. B y 1 9 5 4 a p a v e d r o a d h a d b e e n built o v e r w h i c h the v i l l a g e was reached

from A n k a r a

in

twenty

m i n u t e s in a

regularly

s c h e d u l e d bus. M o r e t h a n a h u n d r e d f a m i l i e s h a d r a d i o s , s e v e n h a d r e f r i g e r a t o r s , there w e r e f o u r tractors, three t r u c k s a n d o n e p a s s e n g e r c a r . F e w r e m a i n e d o n the f a r m , m a n y h a v i n g t a k e n j o b s in the city. T h e v i l l a g e r s w e r e m u c h b e t t e r dressed.

The

p e o p l e e x h i b i t e d " a h o p e f u l e a g e r n e s s for b e t t e r d a y s , a n e x u b e r a n t f a i t h in c h a n g e , a n u r g e to a d v a n c e t o w a r d

ETHOS AND

tomorrow."86

ATTITUDES

A m o n g m a n y v i l l a g e r s all o v e r the M i d d l e East there is a t r a d i t i o n to t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e i r a n c e s t o r s w e r e n o m a d i c tribesm e n w h o , b e c a u s e of v a r y i n g c a u s e s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s , settled

The

Village

and Its

Culline

d o w n a n d founded the village in which they themselves still live. Consequently, m a n y of these villages still consider themselves as tribes, no longer nomadic, but tribes nevertheless, with all that tribal organization entails in kinships structure a n d ethos. I n outlying m o u n t a i n areas, such as K u r d i s t a n and A f g h a n istan, a n d on the fringes between the Desert and the Sown in J o r d a n , Syria, a n d Iraq, this tribal ethos is still strong in the villages. While land represents no less a value a m o n g these villagers than it does a m o n g others, the tribal ethos is expressed in a stronger emphasis on kinship, descent, hospitality, honor, revenge—all typically Bedouin values (cf. above, p. 19). T h e one feature of the n o m a d i c ethos which, above all, survives in most villages is hospitality, and this in spite of the fact that with their extremely meager resources, the reception of even a single guest entails considerable sacrifice for most villages. In honoring a guest arriving f r o m outside the village, the villager honors himself and his family, a n d he will at all times choose to go hungry for several days if that is the price he must pay for feeding his guests as lavishly as possible in his circumstances. M u c h of the honor concept in village life (as a m o n g the n o m a d s ) is focused on the women. " . . . honour, namus . . . was directly related to the w o m e n of the lineage households. T o show interest in a w o m a n other t h a n by formally seeking her h a n d in m a r r i a g e was a deadly insult to her menfolk. Most killings, or a t t e m p t e d killings . . . were directly or indirectly the result of the alleged 'insulting' of a w o m a n . " Closely connected with a m a n ' s honor viewed in these terms is his virility, " m a i n l y measured by procreative success." A w o m a n ' s honor, on the other h a n d , "is very largely a m a t t e r of sexual m o d e s t y . " 6 6 While hospitality a n d honor can be considered village values directly derived f r o m the Bedouin ethos, the village value system contains a strong religious element which is lacking in most n o m a d i c tribes. In fact, the village code of behavior is basically a religious-traditional one, which m e a n s that the observance of purely m o r a l precepts a n d ritual duties are not kept strictly a p a r t . A good m a n is decent, compassionate, kind, neighborly,

(.older) River to Golden

Road

forgiving, patient, honest, and respects the rights of others; but he is also ritually observant, says his prayers, performs his ablutions, observes the fast of R a m a d a n and the feasts of Islam. 8 7 Religion continues to command the loyalty of Middle Eastern villagers in spite of the weakening of its hold upon them which has been noted by numerous students of the area. As a very broad generalization it can be stated that traditional religious beliefs and observances are still extremely potent in the Middle Eastern village, while they have undergone a noticeable decline in the urban centers (with the exception of those in the Arabian Peninsula). Of course, even in the villages, where Western influences penetrate, religion inevitably must retrench to a certain degree, as exemplified by the disrepute into which traditional religious methods of curing the sick fall when modern medicine becomes available. What the village itself means to its inhabitants can best be described bv referring to what the villagers themselves have to say about it. In Turkish villages Stirling found that "every village has the best drinking water, and the best climate." And as to the character of its people, "every village is more hospitable, more honorable, more virile, more peaceable, gives better weddings, than any of its neighbors. Other villages are savage, mean, dishonorable, lying, lazy, cowardly." 8 8 Also Gulick noted in the Lebanese Christian village he studied that "there are strong suggestions that to the average Munsifi, the village as a whole is more meaningful as a unit than his particular minimal lineage [i.e. kingroups three to seven generations in depth], and this is unquestionably true as far as the maximal lineage [one of the three large genealogical groups in the village reckoning descent from one of the three sons of the founder of the village] is concerned." 8 9 Thus " t h e village as an institution is a significant focus of loyalty and identification for everyone in it regardless of a g e . " 7 0 In spite of the above assertion it would seem that the typical villager is bound by stronger ties of emotion and loyalty to his kingroup than to his village. Thousands of Middle Eastern villagers have abandoned their villages and settled overseas, but continue to send regular remittances to their kinfolk who remained behind in the village. Or, if one still doubts the

The Village and Its Culture

validity of this statement about the primacy of kinship ties, one has only to look at the frequent intra-village fights or tensions, in which members of one kingroup are always solidly lined up against members of another. In fact, Gulick himself reached this conclusion when discussing changes in values that modern conditions introduced into the life of Munsif: " T h e family and lineage maintain their function as serving as a link between the individual and the village as a whole, a kingroup toward which feelings of utmost loyalty and unity are directed." 7 1 Next to religion and kin, the third traditional village value is the land. However, as a result of modern developments, many villagers must recognize that the cultivation of land is not the only possible way of life. Where infant mortality is being reduced, the larger number of surviving children compels some of them to leave the village and seek livelihood elsewhere—in the nearby town, the capital city, the oil installations, or overseas. As a result, while attachment to the land among those who remain behind is as strong as ever, the knowledge that there are other ways of iife makes the village's emotional dependence on the land less strong than it used to be. In Westernized villages, cspccially in those near a big city, many of the young generation begin to question the desirability of village life as a whole. Before leaving this subject of the village ethos a few words seem in place about fatalism and passivity, two terms that crop u p quite frequently in books and articles dealing with the Middle Eastern peasants. Why have we not witnessed, it is asked, one single peasant uprising in any Middle Eastern country for several decades, in spite of the fact that the lot of the villagers has become not better, but worse, compared to the improvements that have taken place in the city? T h e oft-voiced answer that the fellah is fatalistic and passive is certainly not satisfactory. It would be closer to the truth to say that the poverty and disease, which is the shared fate of most Middle Eastern villagers, do not necessarily seem to them as oppressive and as painful as they appear to the Western observer. For one thing, it is the commonly experienced mode of existence, and, as is well known, a shared ill is easier to bear. For another, they know that their parents, grandparents and more remote ancestors—all highly

Golden River io Goledn Road v e n e r a t e d figures in the t r a d i t i o n a l M i d d l e E a s t e r n v a l u e syst e m — lived in the s a m e conditions, suffered the s a m e fate, a n d this k n o w l e d g e m a k e s the p r e s e n t h a r d s h i p s m o r e tolerable. W e m u s t consider it h o r r i b l e a n d tragic t h a t a b o u t half t h e c h i l d r e n b o r n to E g y p t i a n fellahin die before they r e a c h their fifth b i r t h d a y , b u t if this is the n o r m in a society, a n d h a s b e e n for countless generations, the people living within it d o not find their infant m o r t a l i t y q u i t e as tragic. T h i s is, a c t u a l l y , n e i t h e r fatalism n o r passivity n o r even resignation, b u t a n a t t i t u d e a d j u s t e d to a given f r a m e of existence w h i c h for u n c o u n t e d g e n e r a t i o n s has c i r c u m s c r i b e d life in the village. T o call t h e fellahin fatalistic because they d o not rebel against t h e c i r c u m stances of their lives m a k e s a b o u t as m u c h sense as to call t h e p o p u l a t i o n of E n g l a n d or the U n i t e d States fatalistic b e c a u s e they d o not rebel against the inevitability of work, taxes, or d e a t h .

X.

The Middle Eastern Town

I

N THE Middle East are located the most ancient towns of the world. Sites occupied continuously or intermittently for four thousand years or even longer are nothing exceptional in this world area. Throughout this long period the towns were of central importance to their respective hinterlands, a position they hold to this very day, and therefore the primary goals of all conquerors. A change of hands in them often meant a considerable shift of population, the elimination of the leaders and of the articulate or otherwise important elements either by ruthless liquidation or by exile, and their replacement by new settlers with a view to political reliability and loyalty. T h e fate of the towns was thus always characterized by more frequent and incisive changes than that of the villages. T h e villages, among which too there are many with a history of millennia, have remained largely the same throughout their history, with basically the same way of life carried on largely by the same ethnic group, generation after generation. T h e towns, on the other hand, have often experienced catastrophic ups and downs, they changed rulers, were destroyed and rebuilt, or evacuated and resettled. Their importance increased in one period and decreased in another, depending on their position within the empire to which they happened to be annexed. These great political, social, and cultural upheavals notwithstanding, the towns remained the undisputed centers of every cultural achievement in their areas of influence. T O W N AND V I L L A G E

T h e concentration of all cultural and civilizational achievements in the towns means that in the Middle East there is a considerable

3°3

Golden River to Golden Road contrast between the rural and the urban varieties of culture. Without attempting to probe into the historical origins of this situation, it can be stated briefly that whatever differences had existed between town and country in the Middle East in preIslamic times were greatly accentuated by Islam, itself a religion of townspeople 1 —that turned town and country into veritable opposites. T h e contrast which exists between the rural community and the city in every society was rarely more striking than in the medieval Islamic world. Here it was not merely a contrast between isolation and congregation, between the dispersed economy of the village and the concentrated economy of the town, between oppressed poverty and relative freedom and wealth, between producer and consumer. I t was a contrast of civilizations. T h e medieval Moslem culture was above all a n u r b a n culture. While Islam but lightly touched the secular life of the countryside, it rebuilt and refashioned the cities from their foundations, and stamped them with an individual impress which has persisted even to the present day. Between the Egyptian or Syrian city and its country districts there was little or no tie but the economic one—indeed, the possibility of any stronger tie was all b u t ruled out by the contempt with which the townsman regarded the peasant—while the cities of widely distant countries shared a common culture, a common order of life, a common disposition of mind, and a sense of unity fostered by these joint possessions and traditions, even when physical intercourse between them was relatively limited. There is a marked change of spiritual atmosphere in the cities; though they share in the general decline of the eighteenth century, there is something of independence in the bearing of the townsmen, a conviction of their dignity as citizens of Islam, and a readiness to assert their rights, even though it might degenerate into mere rioting and mob demonstrations. 1 T h e contrast between the town and the country outlined in this passage persists to this day. I n fact, the first outcome of Westernization was an augmentation of the disparateness between the city that showed a relative readiness to absorb Western influences and the village that was not reached by this outside force. Although this initial stage has now been largely left behind, inasm u c h as urban influences, and with them Western cultural traits, tend nowadays to spread more and more into the rural areas, resulting in a diminishing of the age-old gap between city and

The Middle Eastern Town village, the very persistence of this gap for hundreds of years is a noteworthy fact that has to be understood and appreciated in trying to evaluate the role of the town in Middle Eastern culture. For it is remarkable indeed that in the Middle East as a whole, where more than three fourths of the population lives in rural areas, the village should have contributed so little to the culture of the country. Broadly speaking, the role of the rural population has been confined to providing food and taxes, and some raw materials and folklore. Everything else originated in the towns. Only on the lowest economic level is the rural population selfsufficient in the sense that it satisfies all its needs in producing simple utensils, apparel, and housing in accordance with age-old methods of home craft. As soon as a village raises itself over the barest subsistence level, it becomes dependent on wares and merchandise produced in the towns. The higher the standard of living of villagers, the more they rely on the town even for the satisfaction of primary needs such as food, clothing, housing, utensils, and all kinds of consumer goods. In exchange for this the country has only its agricultural products to offer, bought up by the town through a series of middlemen at advantageous prices. In addition to being the economic, trading, manufacturing (and more recently industrial), commercial and financial center, the typical Middle Eastern town is also the seat of all the administrative, political, judicial, religious, and educational institutions, and concentrates within its confines all those elements who devote themselves wholly or partly to occupations pursued in these institutions, or to literary, journalistic, or artistic work, or, in fact, to any other field outside food production. During the last few decades, as a result of Westernization, such institutions as modern universities, hospitals, libraries, academies, scientific and other societies, as well as amusement centers and the like, have been added to the cultural features that are all concentrated in the towns. A particular feature of Middle Eastern social structure has facilitated this development. This feature has been (and is to this day) the preference for urban residence (and, in particular, residence in the capital city) by the owners of landed estates. The actual supervision of these estates has traditionally been entrusted

3O6

Golden River to Golden Road

to managers, while the landlord and his family lived in the city and had no direct contact whatsoever with the people whose work made it possible for him to indulge in leisure and luxury. The residence of these landed proprietors in the towns meant a concentration in them of all those trades, crafts, and arts that depended on the existence of a class of wealthy connoisseurs. In this manner the congregation of absentee landlords in the towns became a powerful factor in the development of a specific, refined, and sophisticated urban culture, separated by a wide gulf from the simple folk culture of the villages. A more recent outcome of the concentration of the wealthy landlord class in the towns was that this same class began to utilize some of its accumulated capital for investment into new economic enterprises such as commercial, financial, and industrial undertakings. Furthermore, when in the wake of continuing Westernization Western forms of government were adopted, it was again this same class whose presence and availability in the capital and district centers enabled it to become the foremost element in the formation of governments, ministerial and other administrative offices, and representative bodies. Thus, while a visitor to the capital at the turn of the century would have found the upper class comprising chiefly great landowning families, half a century later he would have found the upper class still consisting largely of the same families but this time also as leaders in many economic, administrative, and political fields. The outcome of this deep cleavage between town and country has been that the town has been regarded by all those who knew about its existence and had some knowledge of it even though only from hearsay, as the place where one can live a good life, attain status, prestige, satisfaction, and enjoyment, in short, as the seat of everything desirable. The village, in contrast, and especially in the eyes of the townspeople, has become the symbol of backwardness. The attraction the town exerted on the villagers in the past explains at least partly the constant flow of migrants from village to town, a process that has become greatly accelerated as a result of Westernization and the greater employment opportunities offered by the industrial plants established in the towns. A result of this internal migration from village to town has been a

The Middle Eastern Town

307

faster increase of the urban than of the rural population. The village-to-town movement has gathered additional speed during the Second World War as a result of war conditions. In some places it was easier to obtain supplies in the towns than in the rural areas; in others, industrial development spurred by wartime demands attracted unemployed or underemployed agricultural workers; and again elsewhere the villagers were attracted by work provided by the Allied forces. These developments reinforced the general tendency to prefer urban life and employment with its higher prestige to agricultural activities in the rural districts. After the war, there was in some cases a movement back to the countryside, but this was merely a temporary reversal of the general trend which by and large continued. One of the results of Westernization and industrialization is the rapid growth of cities. The largest city of the entire Middle East, Cairo, had only 240,000 inhabitants in the 1830's, according to Lane's estimate. 3 In a century their number increased tenfold, and by 1947 it was more than two and a half millions. Three more cities passed the million mark in recent years: Teheran, capital of Iran (1,500,000 in 1956), Istanbul, former capital of Turkey (1,215,000 in 1955), and Alexandria, the second largest city in Egypt (1,157,000 in 1947). Two more cities were in the half million to million range: Baghdad, capital of Iraq (730,000), and Casablanca, the most important port city of Morocco (700,000). Eleven additional cities had inhabitants whose numbers ranged from one quarter to a half million: Ankara, the new capital of Turkey (453,000); Beirut, capital of Lebanon (450,000); Tunis, capital of Tunisia (410,000); Tel Aviv-Jaffa in Israel (400,000); Damascus, capital of Syria, and Aleppo in northern Syria (400,000 each); Algiers, capital of Algeria (361,000); Oran in Algeria (299,000); Izmir in Turkey (286,000); and the Iranian cities of Tabriz (290,000) and Isfahan (254,000). Another thirty cities had populations ranging from one hundred thousand to a quarter of a million. Thus, of the 156 million people living in the Middle East, only about 15 million or 10 per cent, lived in the middle of the twentieth century in cities of more than 100,000. Nevertheless, the influence of urban civilization in the Middle East as a whole is considerable. Especially in the vicinity of the

3o8

Golden River to Golden Road

cities and towns is their presence strongly felt. The inhabitants of villages within walking distance and, where good transportation is available, within easy traveling distance, are frequent visitors to the town. There they transact business or spend their leisure time sitting in coffeehouses, attending a motion picture performance, or listening to the litigations in the law courts. They familiarize themselves with the ways of the townspeople, become influenced by their clothing habits, their speech forms, their outlook. Some of them will spend some time working in the town or even find permanent employment there and either take up residence in the town or become commuters. The urbanizing influence of the town radiating into its environs is manifested, among other things, in such external changes as the adoption of urban styles of architecture, the installation oj street lights, the introduction of water supply, the erection of a bus station, a coffeehouse, etc. The proximity of the town also brings about certain economic advantages for nearby villagse, such as easier marketing of their products, additional income derived from urban employment, etc. All these effects of the town make a village situated close by very different from a remote village, the urban influences diminishing with the increasing distance. Cultural standards of the town also affect the villages in its vicinity. Schools are built, or children are sent for schooling to town. Interest in political events taking place in the town begins to engross the villagers, and so forth. Until now we spoke of village and town as though they were two clearly distinguishable disparate entities. In fact, however, it is not always easy to distinguish between village and town in the Middle East because the size of the local aggregate does not always provide a reliable criterion. A careful scrutiny of the constant and most outstanding differences between village and town discloses that they boil down ultimately to distinctions in occupational structure. The village is characterized by a largely homogeneous occupational structure: most of the people in the village are engaged in agriculture, with merely a sprinkling of individuals engaged in service occupations, such as a shoemaker, tailor, carpenter, watchman, barber, religious functionary, etc. In the town, on the other hand, one finds a hetero-

The Middle Eastern Town

309

geneous occupational structure, with the majority, moreover, engaged as a rule in nonfarming occupations. The heterogeneous occupational structure of the Middle Eastern town is contingent on a number of factors. The concentration in the town of the landed proprietors, already referred to above, attracts a considerable number of specialists in trades, crafts, arts, and professions to cater to the needs of this wealthy upper crust of society. Since antiquity the town has been a place of exchange, a süq or bazaar, where the villager and the nomad come to sell their surplus products and to buy the town-produced goods. This position of the town as the central place of commerce enables a sizable merchant class to make a living here. The town is usually the administrative center of a province or district or a subdistrict seat, depending on its size and importance. It has a mayor and a municipal council, a district governor or a district officer, law courts of first or second appeal, a police force, some military post, a telegraph and post office, and other paraphernalia of government; consequently in it live numerous government employees, officials, clerks, soldiers (if it is a garrison town), and similar personnel. These, in turn, give work and employment to many more people engaged in service occupations. In contradistinction, the village may or may not have a small police force; otherwise, the only symbol of government is the headman who acts as a representative of both the government and the people. As to the public institutions found in Middle Eastern cities, it is difficult to generalize. The number and character of these institutions seem to show a direct correlation to the size of the city and a reversed correlation with its distance from the Mediterranean littoral. In other words, the larger the city and the closer to the Mediterranean it is located, the more public institutions are found in it and the more Western the character of these institutions. This observation would seem to hold good with reference to such institutions as hospitals, clinics, secondary public or private schools, colleges, museums, newspapers, societies, men's clubs, literary and sports clubs, motion picture theaters, cafés and restaurants, dance halls, night clubs. The same holds good with regard to the availability of electric current and piped water. The general rule is that the larger the town the more Westernized it is,

3io

Golden River to Golden Road

and probably the higher the percentage in its population of the Westernized and semi-Westernized elements. In the largest towns there are whole sections that have a completely Western character; no comparable quarters can be found in the small towns. U n d e r traditional circumstances town life was the culminating refinement of which the local subcultures of the Middle East were capable. O n e of the most typical examples of this was Damascus with its bazaars filled with the finest products of Syrian craftsmanship, with its great concentration of wealth and luxuries on the one hand and of intellectual, artistic, and literary activity on the other. T h e tenor of life in a city such as Damascus, although surpassing by far that of the countryside, was nevertheless part and parcel of one and the same cultural genus. With the impact of Westernization, urban culture in the large Middle Eastern cities has begun to absorb more and more of the traits introduced from a very different cultural genus, that of the modern Western world, and consequently an increasing distance began to develop between u r b a n and rural culture. In fact, increasingly large proportions of the urban population, especially in the coastal towns of North Africa and in the largest cities of Egypt and the Levant, are adopting a way of life which in its external forms consciously copies the West. A villager from the remote hinterland feels almost as lost in the modern sections of Casablanca, Algiers, Alexandria, or Beirut as he would in R o m e or Paris. Only in the most recent years, as indicated above, has this distance begun to diminish again, owing to the fact that the influence of the new Westernized u r b a n culture radiates more and more powerfully into the surrounding countryside, gradually drawing closer to itself the still largely tradition-bound culture of the rural communities.

T O W N S M A N A N D PEASANT

Whatever will be the outcome of this most recent trend, for the time being the situation is that the disparate cultures of town and country endow the townsman a n d the peasant with two greatly differing social personalities. T o be a true townsman means not only to live in a town, but also to adhere to a definite way of life, to enjoy a certain social status, and to engage only in certain

The Middle Eastern Town

3"

types of occupations, to the definite exclusion, in the first place, of agriculture. An urbanite may own land and make a living from income derived from the land, but under no condition will he personally engage in agriculture. On the other hand, it is not an indispensable prerequisite for the maintenance of an urban status to reside in a town or city. A townsman may move to a village, spend decades there, acquire property, conduct his business, raise his children there, contribute to the welfare of the village, and even participate in its social life, yet he will still remain regarded as a townsman both by the villagers and by himself, a man distinct from the villagers (fellahin) and, in a certain sense, an outsider. In Middle Eastern society one of the surest manifestations of status differences is the marriage barrier. Consequently, there has always been a strong tendency for the children of townsmen and of villagers not to intermarry, even though they may be next-door neighbors, play together every day, and grow up together. Only recently, with the general changes in traditional mores, are these restrictions somewhat relaxed. Another characteristic feature distinguishing the townsman from the villager even after a lifetime spent in a village, is that when the townsman retires from active life, he moves back to the town rather than live out his last years in the village. The fellah, although secretly he may be envious of urban life, dislikes certain qualities that he believes characterize the townsman. He regards the urbanite as soft, pampered, and dissipated. Conversely, the latter despises the fellah and regards him as ignorant, backward, primitive, and uncouth. Among the traits that have traditionally differentiated the townsman from the fellah, in addition to occupation, are his clothes, his food, his house, and his social life. The townsman may or may not wear European clothes; the fellah, never. Once he does so, he has ceased, strictly speaking, to be a fellah. (This statement does not apply to some minority groups such as the Circassians who do wear European clothes, and have their own special village and social organization.) The difference in dress is even more pronounced among the women. Fellah women, as has been pointed out, do not wear the veil; whereas many urban Muslim

312

Golden River to Golden Road

women traditionally do. The fellaha (peasant woman) wears a simple black garment of durable cotton material, in some areas with an embroidered front. Urban women wear a conglomeration of European clothes, and the Muslim among them, when leaving the house, were usually covered by a black overdress. The fellah's food is generally very simple. It consists mostly of bread, ground wheat (burghul), lentils, olives and olive oil (depending on the region), some rice, sour milk (leben), some butter, and rarely meat. Very few vegetables are eaten with the exception of onions. Milk is used generally for babies only, although a pudding is made of it sometimes. Goat meat is generally preferred to mutton. A townsman's food is much more varied and more luxurious. Vegetables and fruits are fairly extensively used. Mutton is preferred to goat meat, but beef is also consumed. Some of the wellknown Middle Eastern dishes, such as stuffed grape leaves, stuffed chicken, stuffed squash, kibbeh, various broiled meats, hummus, etc., are strictly urban foods seldom indulged in by the fellah. While pastries are fairly common among the townsmen, the fellahin seldom have them. Traditionally, the house of the fellah is a one-room structure that shelters his family and sometimes his animals. It is generally devoid of even the simplest amenities. The urban house is a stone structure of two or more rooms constructed, until recently, with the seclusion of women in mind. It may be surrounded by a highwalled courtyard. Today, it may have running water, electricity, and a kitchen and bathroom inside the house. As far as social life is concerned, contact between men and women is less restricted among the villagers than among the townspeople. Urban women until fairly recently were completely secluded, restricted to taking care of the home and the children. Village women, in addition to doing their household chores, work side by side with their menfolk in the fields; they are freer, and have a limited amount of social intercourse with men. The relative inactivity of townswomen often results in a tendency.to become fat and flabby. The village woman, on the other hand, is active, works hard, and walks gracefully, being able to carry a heavy water jar on her head without holding it.

The Middle Eastern Town

3'3

T h e ageing process in village women is often accompanied by loss of weight. T h e differences in style of living between the fellah and the townsman amount to almost a class difference. T h e lines, however, are not rigid, and the fellah can and frequendy does pass into the urban group. Furthermore, education, village to town migration, and Westernization are closing the gap at an increasing rate.

SOCIAL O R G A N I Z A T I O N

With regard to social organization, a distinction has to be made between old and new towns respectively, between the indigenous established population of a town and the newcomers. Litde can be said here about the social organization of the newly settled groups or elements: these, to some extent and for a certain length of time, tend to retain the social organization that they brought along from their home locality. In many cases, however, under the impact of the changed conditions, their social organization, and even their family organization, disintegrate to the extent that they appear as an amorphous population aggregate. T h e old sections of the towns are characterized by a tendency toward a mosaiclike clustering of population elements. T h e tangible manifestation of this age-old tendency is the quarter. T h e most important basis of the formation of these quarters may be the hamula (lineage or clan), or else the religious or ethnic group. Thus the typical east-Mediterranean town has a Christian (for example, Greek Orthodox) quarter, an Armenian quarter, a Jewish quarter, a Kurdish quarter, etc., and, of course, several Muslim quarters inhabited by Sunni Muslim Arabs who form the majority of the population. 4 This structure of the Middle Eastern town is an inevitable outcome of a number of factors characteristic of society. A m o n g these can be mentioned the religious-community basis of social organization, recognized and stabilized by the Turkish millet system and the great coherence of minority groups living in the midst of an unsympathetic majority, feeling secure only among themselves and suspicious of every outgroup. T h e result of this quarter system in traditional circumstances

3'4

Golden River to Golden Road

has been to confine social contact within each town largely to the inhabitants of one and the same quarter. This in turn greatly facilitated the preservation of the social identity of the ethnic or religious group as a separate minority. In recent decades considerable changes have begun to manifest themselves in this respect. With the penetration of Westernization, modernization, and industrialization, the separateness and socioeconomic selfreliance of the quarters is gradually giving way to a greater and greater interdependence of the various sections and their inhabitants. While the minorities thus are being brought closer to the dominant majority of the town they inhabit, one must not lose sight of the fact that, compared with the percentage of the minorities in the country as a whole, they constitute a much higher proportion among the urban population. Statistical data are not available, but the concentration of minorities in the towns is apparent to every visitor. In most cases, moreover, the urban minority groups surpass the Muslim Arab or Muslim Persian or Muslim Turkish majority in economic standing, literacy, skills, professional accomplishments, etc. Occasionally the minorities engage in occupations not practiced by the Muslim majority, and conversely, there are occupations engaged in only by the Muslims but not by members of the minority groups. In Damascus, for example, only Christians are engaged in meat-drying and the manufacture of alcoholic beverages. 5 U p to the end of the First World War the Middle Eastern towns were characterized by a two-class system. A small number of rich people on the one hand and a large number of artisans, small shopkeepers, workers (including many agriculturists who lived in the smaller towns) on the other—this was the prevalent social structure of the towns. The life of the first or upper class was a life of opulence, ease, and luxury, while the second or working class exerted itself laboring many hours a day, seven days a week, hardly earning enough to make the barest living on the most meager subsistence level. In spite of this great inequality in standard of living between the few rich and the many poor, and in spite of the spatial proximity of the two groups, there was a certain balance between the

3'5

The Middle Eastern Town

t w o a n d an acquiescence manifested by the poor with regard to their o w n position. T w o factors were mainly responsible for the existence of this attitude a m o n g the working classes: first, tradition a n d religious influence; all situations in w h i c h a person

finds

himself are predestined b y A l l a h , and it is the d u t y of m a n to submit himself to the will of G o d . O n l y G o d knows w h a t is best for m a n , and by submitting to His will in this world m a n acquires merits that will be rewarded b y H i m in the Beyond. T h e second factor was the informal, almost egalitarian character of all contacts between people of different social classes. T h e forms of relationship

between

superior

and

inferior

(such

as

between

employer and employee, master and servant, ruler and subject, etc.) were patterned after those of father and son in the traditional M i d d l e Eastern patriarchal family. T h e equation of all superior statuses with the paternal status and of all inferior statuses with the filial status m a d e it easier for people in inferior positions to subordinate themselves to those in superior positions; the situation presented itself merely as an extension of the family situation in w h i c h the individual developed and in w h i c h his personality received its first and most decisive molding influences. M a n y of these attitudes

still persist to this day, although, of

course, with the emergence of large cities interpersonal contact between the upper and the working classes tends to shift more and more from the personal to the impersonal level. W e a l t h and leadership still show a high correlation: ownership of landed property, of commercial, industrial, and

financial

enterprise on

the one hand, and political, social, and cultural leadership on the other are still frequently concentrated in the hands of single individuals or of members of one family. T h e p o w e r and influence of the great families, however, h a v e been severely challenged and are on the decline. A s a result of incipient industrialization in the M i d d l e Eastern towns the urban w o r k i n g class is undergoing a considerable transformation not only with regard to the objective conditions and circumstances in w h i c h it performs its tasks, but also with reference

to its attitudes

toward

the employer-owner

class.

The

paternal-filial relationship between these two classes is rapidly b e c o m i n g a thing of the past, to be replaced by an impersonal

Golden River to Golden Roaa

relationship in which the regulative influence of laws and rules becomes more and more necessary. The improvement of the working conditions and the impersonalization of the employeremployee relationship are probably the two most important changcs that characterize the transformation of the Middle Eastern working class. The middle class is the most recent accretion to the Middle Eastern urban class structure. It is still relatively small in numbers, although not insignificant in weight. The emergence of a middle class is a direct outcome of Westernization, in the sense that most individuals who belong to this class and are conscious of it are engaged in occupations that emerged as a result of Westernization. Other persons or families who on the basis of their economic level would have to be counted with the middle class (such as merchants, house owners, workshop owners, lower officials of the traditional type, etc.), are actually people not identified with the middle class but aspiring to rise into the ranks of the upper class. The true or new middle class therefore comprises in the main members of the professions (doctors, lawyers, teachers, social workers, writers, journalists, etc.). In this connection it must be remembered that much of the traditional urban upper-class attitude of disdain toward manual labor still survives even in the modern town, and that consequently there is a hesitancy in engaging in occupations such as mechanics or engineering. There are fewer persons engaged in these specialties than needed by the country and those who are engaged in them are counted by public opinion as members of the working class rather than of the middle class. An interesting question of more than theoretical significance is, from where are the members of this new urban middle class recruited? A satisfactory reply to this question would have to be based on statistical studies concerning the occupations of the fathers of those individuals who today form this new class. In the absence of such studies all one can do is make a cautious surmise as follows: seemingly the members of the new middle class come from three main sources: the rural areas, from relatively well-to-do fellah families who have the means to educate their sons, enabling the more ambitious and more talented to continue in high school

The Middle Eastern Town

3'7

in the town and ultimately to become professional workers; the urban working class, as a result of a similar process; the urban upper class, most of whose scions have the opportunity for high school education that leads some of them into the professions. According to the prevailing social values, however, these professional individuals who belong to the "great" families are counted as members of the upper class.

CULTURE CHANGE

Innovations and resultant cultural changes emanate as a rule from the urban centers toward the peripheries. In the cultural exchange between a country and the world at large, it is the centrally located urban aggregates that first receive the impact of new cultural traits introduced from abroad in the technological, organizational, or ideational fields. T h e rural sector receives these changes in a secondhand form, as it were, after their adaptation by the city to the requirements of the urban variety of the local culture. While the above holds good in a general way for the world at large, it is doubly true in the Middle Eastern culture continent. In world areas contiguous to the Middle East the rural sector has played a relatively larger role in the cultural interchange between town and country than in the Middle East itself. In the Middle East, even in most ancient times, the urban centers were practically the sole carriers and advancers of culture. Even in our present day the Middle Eastern village is a more or less passive recipient of cultural changes, improvements, and modernizations, all of which radiate from the town. With the possible exception of Ottoman soldiers in Turkey's imperial days and of a few isolated instances of recruitment of rural labor for modern industrial work (as in the case of Aramco), only the town population of Middle Eastern countries has had the opportunity for firsthand acquaintance with Western culture, or at least with some of its more conspicuous traits. Within the town itself, more than a fleeting and superficial familiarity with what the West has to offer is limited to the members of the upper and middle classes.

Golden River to Golden Road Western culture penetrates the Middle Eastern town in a great m a n y ways: through the offices, business and industrial premises, educational a n d other institutions, and the homes of the upper and middle classes. Members of these classes therefore function as the sieve through which must pass all Western influence before reaching the working classes in the towns and the people in the rural areas. Since foreign influence, in most cases Western, reaches the town first, and only later emanates from it to the rural areas, there is as a rule a considerable time lag between a stage reached in the process of culture change in the town and the corresponding stage in the rural areas. T h e r e is, moreover, also a definite differential in intensity: in the town, and especially in the upper and middle classes of its population, culture change reaches a peak not found in rural areas. Furthermore, corresponding to the heterogeneous social and cultural structuring of the town (in contrast to the m u c h more homogeneous village), the degree and extent of culture change show a much greater diversity; in other words, in the town the different sectors and classes of the population manifest a wide difference with regard to culture change, ranging from the almost completely Westernized element on the one h a n d to sectors very little touched by Westernization on the other. O n e more factor must be mentioned: Since the town is the locus of the almost exclusive concentration of Middle Eastern intellectual life, it is only in the town that we expect to find, and actually do find, a variety of consciously formulated attitudes toward specific a n d concrete manifestations of culture change, toward the total trend of Westernization as a whole, and toward traditional Middle Eastern culture. T h e average villager is more inclined to follow the lead of those whom he respects and holds in authority. Therefore, the village aggregate as a rule will be found to be characterized by one typical attitude, or at the utmost by a very narrow range of attitudes, toward the problems of culture change. I n the town, on the other hand, the heterogeneity of the consciously propounded and advocated attitudes may become a dividing factor a n d the basis for headlong clashes. Another problem has now to be touched upon, albeit briefly.

The Middle Eastern Town

3'9

It has repeatedly been observed that culture change, that is, the adoption of Western culture traits, is inevitably accompanied b y a rejection or disappearance of traditional Middle Eastern culture traits. In some cases we understand a priori that this must be so. If somebody desires to have his house furnished in the Western manner, he can carry out his decision only after he has discarded the old furniture to make place for the new. But here the question arises: why must one make the complete switch to Western furniture? Instead, why does one not introduce only some pieces of Western furnishing, primarily those of undoubted utility, while at the same time retaining some pieces of the traditional Middle Eastern furnishings, primarily those of undoubted beauty, thus accomplishing in the house a combination of the good and desirable features of this facet of both cultures? This simple example conveys some idea as to the problems of culture change in such varied fields as architecture, clothing, food consumption and cuisine, family life, social organization, manners and morals, aesthetics, religious outlook, and Weltanschauung. T h e extent to which Western influence has changed the life of the upper and middle classes in the Muslim towns, and especially in the big cities, can best be gauged by comparing the present-day life of these social groups in a large urban center such as Cairo with the detailed and admirable account given of the same city by Edward William Lane some three generations ago. 6 Living in Cairo in the twenties and thirties of the past century, Lane felt, and with a masterly pen conveyed the feeling to his readers, that he was moving in a world essentially different from his own English background both in basic mentality and the minutest manifestations. Cairo of today—or at least large sections of it—is m u c h more similar culturally to London than Lane would ever have dreamt was possible. This cultural change in the town itself affects directly the towncountry relationship. Even in traditional circumstances, the Middle Eastern town always attracted the country population and its growth was partly contingent upon a slow but steady villageto-town migration. This influx has become immensely augmented as a result of the Westernization of the town itself with its concomitant industrialization and rapidly increasing employment

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Golden River to Golden Road

opportunities. Although the natural increase of the Middle Eastern town population is smaller than that of the villagers, the village-to-town movement results in a proportionately much greater increase of the urban than of the rural sectors. A countrywide result, therefore, of the technologic aspect of culture change in the towns is a definite gradual shift from the traditional Middle Eastern pattern of rural-urban population distribution toward the Western pattern with its typical half-and-half division between rural and urban population. The accelerated processes of culture change that the Middle Eastern town undergoes today confront it with a large number of taxing problems. Leaving aside for the moment the administrative, educational, medical, sanitational, economic and technological aspects of these problems, I wish briefly to dwell only on that aspect that touches upon social psychology in its relation to the changing cultural background. The over-all effect of the cultural innovations introduced from the West into the towns of the Middle East is one of a general rise in the urban standard of living. The almost proverbial scourges of the Middle East: disease, poverty, and ignorance are slowly being forced to loosen their deadly grip. But these highly desirable developments are all too often accompanied by evils that all but cancel out their intrinsic value. Freya Stark, one of the few Westerners who has acquired true insight into the Arab psyche, has stated: "Discontent with their standards is the first step in the degradation of the East. Surrounded by our mechanical glamour, the virtues wrung out of the hardness of their lives easily come to appear poor and useless in their eyes; their spirit loses its dignity in this world, its belief in the next." 7 It must be assumed that there exists a causal connection between the penetration of Westernization, and especially of Western technology, on the one hand, and the deterioration of the satisfactions derived from traditional culture on the other. This is borne out by a number of disquieting social phenomena, including the lure of Communism for certain elements. The why and the how of these undesirable and potentially dangerous concomitants of Westernization have not yet been satisfactorily studied and understood. Nor have the processes of Westernization in the

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Muslim town in general been sufficiently investigated. T o mention only a few of the problems falling under this general heading: W h a t are the processes of adjustment of Middle Eastern villagers to urban life ? W h a t are the cultural effects of industrialization on the working classes in the Middle East? W h a t is the correlation between the adoption of Western culture traits and rejection or disappearance of traditional Middle Eastern culture traits ? T h e great practical significance of research into these and similar problems for the cultural future of the Middle East needs no elaboration.

XI.

Religion in Middle

Eastern,

Far Eastern and Western Culture1

I

chapter an attempt will be made to examine the role of religion in the three cultural archetypes of the Middle East, the Far East and the modern West. Geographically, the Middle East will be taken as delimited in Chapter One; 2 the Far East as composed of the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, China, and J a p a n ; and the modern West as including all the countries in which Western civilization has reached its typical development, notably Western Europe and America north of the Rio Grande. In trying to outline within the confines of a brief chapter the differential roles religion plays in the cultures of these three major world areas, generalization and disregard of detail will be inevitable. Only an attempt at a rough and over-all preliminary typology can be essayed to the neglect of extramodal variants. Nor will particular doctrines and practices be emphasized. Whether divinity is conceived in polytheistic, trinitarian, dualistic, or unitarian terms would appear irrelevant in relation to such a more basic question as: Is the religion centered around a personal deity or not? Similarly, rules of religious ritual must seem unimportant when interest is focused primarily on the degree of influence religious ritual as a whole exerts upon everyday life. The role religion plays and the position it holds in a culture can be discerned by examining various aspects of religion in their relationship to the total context of culture. In the first place, religion functions as a normative force regulating customary behavior, inasmuch as it has both positive and negative commandments with which the individual is expected to comply. The extent to which religious rules and teachings N THIS

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influence human activities and modes of thought varies from one culture to another. The normative function of religion can therefore be recognized as one of the variables in the relationship of religion and culture. Another aspect of the relationship between religion and culture is reflected in the psychological effect of religion on emotional life. T h e quality as well as the intensity of this psychological effect of religion can vary from culture to culture and thus supply us with a second variable. A third variable can be seen in the character of the general orientation of the teachings of religion concerning supernatural beings, forces, or things. As a rule religions deal to some extent with the supernatural and possess certain theologies and metaphysics. A n examination of the general character of the religious teachings concerning the supernatural component yields the third variable. Each religion also has a definite outlook on its own value in relation to that of other religions. Its relationship to other religions may range from complete toleration to the complete lack of it, with a corresponding range of self-evaluation. This variable, best called religiocentrism (on the analogy of ethnocentrism), can serve as an additional avenue of approach to the study of our subject. Lastly, religions channel human ambitions towards different goals, and especially in adversity and suffering hold out to man comforts of varying types. This teleologic or purposive orientation of religion will serve then as the fifth and last variable in examining the role of religion in Middle Eastern, Far Eastern, and modern Western cultures.

T H E N O R M A T I V E FUNCTION

In a study dealing with the general cultural characteristics of the Middle East, the religious component of Middle Eastern culture has been characterized as permeating the totality of life and as holding supreme sway over performance, thinking, and feeling: in brief, over life as a whole. Religion is the fundamental motivating force in most phases and aspects of culture, and is in evidence in practically every act and moment of existence. T h e

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observance of the traditional forms and rites, whether of the "official" or of the popular kind, is an integral part of everyday life. A close connection exists between religion and other aspects of culture in the Middle East. Art in its entire scope is closely circumscribed by religion, and all the arts serve primarily religious purposes. All custom and tradition are basically religious; for whatever is old and customary and traditional is hallowed by religion. Religious practice itself is mainly tradition and custom, so that practically every act and every activity is either in conformity with or contrary to religion.8 These observations hold equally good for Islam, which is the religion of about 90 per cent of the population of the Middle East, for the Eastern Christian churches, and for Judaism in its Middle Eastern form. In brief, religion in the Middle East is the main normative force. In these traits Middle Eastern religion closely approximates Far Eastern religions. Hinduism, the closest major eastern neighbor of Islam, "deals directly with the Hindu's total life, including morals, economics, politics, and even music, medicine, military science, architecture, phonetics, grammar, astronomy and ceremonial. Hindus may include all these in what they call religion." 4 "Correct caste behavior is enforced largely by the weight of religious sanction.. . . Religion enters into all phases of Hindu life. Washing oneself in the morning, preparing and eating meals, sowing the fields take on sacramental quality when performed with the appropriate ritual. Religious merit is acquired as much by simple adherence to one's caste conventions and family obligations as by any special act of worship. . . . The cultural life of the village is almost completely bound up with religious observances and religious holidays. . . . Hinduism and Islam . . . provide the sanction which gives each individual his place in society, his code of social relations, and his guide to personal behavior. . . . " s Similarly Buddhism, the dominant religion of southeast Asia, Ceylon, and Tibet, which is highly influential also in India, China, Korea and Japan, is " a pervasive influence shaping men's attitudes towards life and their ultimate aspirations and hopes far

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more than appears on the surface of things." The Buddhist teachings extend into such fields as the relationship of parents and children, teachers and diáciples, husbands and wives, friend and friend, masters and servants, laymen and monks, and include such details as for example the recreations and luxuries a master should provide for his servant. 4 In China in general, "religion and conduct belong together. . . . Religion in China is connected with politics. It expresses the emotional and esthetic aspects of life while conduct and politics express the active aspects." 7 Taoism, the Chinese philosophical religion, contains, in addition to its mystical element, a set of political principles, a philsosophy of government, a number of economic principles and moral precepts, and gave rise to a large number of societies or brotherhoods that were a powerful ethical force elevating the moral tone of the community, ministering to the wounded, the refugees, and the needy, and often robbing the rich to help the poor. 8 Confucianism, several centuries older in China than Taoism, has ethical teachings close to those of Buddhism. Its relationship to the arts can be gauged from the following saying contained in the Confucianist Book of Rites: "Poetry is what gives the first stimulus to character; ceremonial is what gives it stability; music is what brings it to full development." 8 Confucian doctrines are replete with detailed rules (in the form of good advice or "wisdom") with regard to conduct,, the attainment of happiness, and the ordering of life. 1 0 The "New Life Movement" established by Chiang Kai-Shek at Nanchang in 1934, which has a close kinship with Confucianism, advocates that "life should be artistic"; that "the people are to be trained to take a new attitude toward nature as revealed in modern science"; that "tidiness and truthfulness should be emulated" and the like. 1 1 These few instances suffice to show that basically common features characterize the normative function of religion within the totality of culture in the Middle East and in the Far East. In both areas religion is a major factor, if not the major factor, in directing and regulating life. Religion in the Western world differs from both Middle Eastern and Far Eastern religion insofar as since the onset of the industrial

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revolution it has been on the retreat. T h e dominating religion of the West, Christianity, although originally born in the same region that was the cradle of Judaism and Islam, the central part of the Middle East, and partaking of the same general characteristics that these two creeds have or had in common with the religions of the Far East, has profoundly changed its character since the emergence of modern Western civilization. T h e function of religion, as it can be observed today in the modern Western world, is restricted to a rather narrowly delimited field of its own. Its ritual and its practical precepts have little to do with the everyday pursuits of Western life, and its credos and tenets are equally divorced from the essentially secular goals and values of modern Western culture. Even in the lives of those religiously observant, an hour or two a week set aside for the satisfaction of the traditionally persisting religious needs are deemed sufficient. Furthermore, while both in the Middle East and in the Far East the great majority of the people are religious, and with the exception of those regions where the impact of Westernization has considerably altered the situation, persons whose lives are not dominated by religion are few and exceptional, in the modern West (and especially in the highly urbanized areas) the majority of the population does no longer possess deep religious attachment but is religiously either lukewarm or indifferent. 1 2 Religion in the Middle East and the Far East thus appears as the dominant normative force, while in the modern West it has largely ceased to be a significant normative factor. T H E PSYCHOLOGICAL E F F E C T

In the Middle East, religion is an asset the psychological value of which cannot be overestimated. It is a psychological factor of first-class magnitude, lending unfailing spiritual sustenance to all true believers, that is to the overwhelming majority of the population. T h e religious Middle Easterner appraises life with all its adversities and vicissitudes from a wider angle, from a long-range perspective as it were, in which sojourn on this earth with all its possible gains and losses appears as merely the lower and lesser half of the great totality of existence, the essentials and ultimates of which lie in the Beyond. Spiritual outlook thus moves along a

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higher plane, beyond the reaches of discomfort, pain, anguish, and privation. Hence that composure, that peace of mind even in the face of great adversity which in the Middle East ever and again gives rise to wonderment in the Western observer. 13 Rebecca West noted this phenomenon as far west as among the Muslims of Bosnia. Comparing her Christian Bosnian guide with his Muslim neighbors, she observed: "The lad was worse off for being a Christian; he had not that air of being sustained in his poverty by secret spiritual funds that is so noticeable in the poverty-stricken Moslem." 1 4 In the Middle East proper, no such distinction between Islam and other faiths is apparent with respect to what can be termed the spiritual sustaining power of religion. The different rites of Islam, the semi-Muslim sects (such as the Druzes, the Nusairis, etc.), the various Christian churches, and the Oriental Jewish communities all share this basic characteristic of being able to generate a psychological certainty of possessing the Truth, of following the Right Path, and of wielding the Perfect Key to the gates of the Great Beyond. Among them is the feeling that one does what is right because one observes the commandments of one's religion, and that one is inwardly protected from serious harm because God in whom one trusts keeps an eye on each individual and ultimately metes out just retribution. These convictions give the true believers of every faith, creed, and sect an extraordinary sense of security, an ability to preserve their calm and dignity and detachment, without depriving them of the ability to seek and enjoy whatever pleasures can be wrung from this world. The same psychological effect of religion can be observed in the Far East. In India, where as we have seen religion pervades all aspects of life, it constitutes, just as in the Middle East, a sustaining force of matchless effectiveness. Religion functions as a sort of protecting caul that envelopes the human on his way from birth to death, leaving him psychologically unscathed by the poverty, ill-health, misery, and suffering that are the inevitable concomitants of life for the great majority of Indians. No matter what his religious group, his total life is a religious life, and in its pursuit he attains security and self-confidence.

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T h e "liberated living m a n " who has attained spiritual perfection is characterized in the Yogavisistha as follows: "Pleasures do not delight h i m ; pains do not distress. There is no feeling of like or dislike produced in his mind even towards serious, violent, and continued states of pleasure or pain. . . . H e rests unagitated in the Supreme Bliss. . . . H e is full of mercy and magnanimity even when surrounded by enemies. . . . " 1 6 Farther to the east, the same religious mentality characterizes the followers of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. Younghill K a n g , describing his native Korean village, says: " . . . my family did not seem to mind their helpless poverty, since most of them were indulging in the mystical doctrine of Buddhism, or in the classics of Confucius, who always advocated that a m a n should not be ashamed of coarse food, humble clothing, and modest dwelling. . . . T h e sage said: "Living on coarse rice and water, with bent a r m for pillow, mirth may yet be mine. . . ." My grandmother . . . was a true Oriental woman. T h e quietism of Buddha, the mysterious calm of Taoism, the ethical insight of Confucianism all helped to make her an unusually refined personality. . . ." 1 S Speaking of Asia in general, K u r t Singer remarks: "Oriental harmony . . . is a mood in which Oriental man accepts both peace and strife as he accepts the change from light to darkness, summer and a u t u m n , life a n d death. . . ." Therefore, ". . . life in the Orient is happier a n d more harmonious than in the West. . . ." 1 7 Similarly, N o r t h r o p notes "the equanimity, the poise, the steady, sure peace of mind, and all-embracing calmness and joy of the Oriental. . . ." 1 8 Compared with this gift bestowed by religion upon Middle Eastern and Far Eastern m a n , Western religion must indeed seem pallid and impotent. T h e Bosnian observation of Rebecca West can be generalized, for the impression that religion in the West has remained a sustaining force only in rare cases thrusts itself even upon the most casual observer. In a society in which religion is detached from the chief interests and pursuits of everyday life, in which the principle of separation of church and state is upheld, and where the desire to attain purely secular aims is the main incentive in h u m a n life, religion evidently must have lost any spiritual sustaining power it may have had in the past. Toynbee

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speaks of "the spiritual vacuum which has been hollowed in our Western hearts by the progressive decay of religious belief that has been going on for some two-and-a-half centuries." 19 Minor undulations in the psychological influence of religion can, it is true, be observed. In times of stress and strain there is a certain religious resurgence. But these waves even when at their peak remain far below the high and steady level maintained by the powerful outpour of psychological sustenance emanating from religion in the Middle East and the Far East.

T H E SUPERNATURAL COMPONENT

The supernatural component of religion has to be dealt with on two levels: the doctrinary or official level and the popular level. The official doctrines about the supernatural are contained, in all the three world areas examined here, in voluminous religious literatures the composition of which was effected in the course of several centuries, and the older layers of which have acquired a character of sanctity. The degree of conformity evinced by the actually maintained beliefs as to the supernatural depends as a rule on the extent of the individual's absorption of the traditional literature of his religion. On the popular level, that is among the great masses of the people, where the familiarity with the traditional literature is minimal, the conformity of the concept of the supernatural with that of the official doctrine is very slight. Middle Eastern religions in their supernatural aspect occupy an intermediary position between the religions of the Far East and of the modern West, inasmuch as on the popular level their typological affinities definitely lie with the Far Eastern religions while on the official doctrinary level they and the Western religions belong to one group. That the popular religious beliefs and practices of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in the Middle East are practically identical did not escape the keen eye of Lane well over a hundred years ago. " I t is a very remarkable trait," he wrote in the 1830's, "in the character of the people of Egypt and other countries of the East, that Muslims, Christians and Jews adopt each other's superstitions, while they abhor the leading doctrines of each other's

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faiths." 80 Likewise, a more general similarity can be observed, not in the concrete details, but in the over-all type of popular religious beliefs and practices of the Middle East as a whole on the one hand and of the Far East as a whole on the other. Popular religious belief in both world areas can best be described as polytheodemonistic, with complementary practices carried out at innumerable shrines, temples, and sanctuaries. A large plurality of gods, godlings, heroes, demons, ancestors, and patron saints are believed in, sculpturally or symbolically represented, and served in a great variety of rites in Japan, China, Indonesia, Indo-china, and India. In China, ancestor worship added considerably to the number of the available deities, while in India to the hosts of gods and goddesses are added sacred animals, rivers, and the like. In the Middle East, the worship of holy or merely haunted spots marked by springs, trees, and stones, or of shrines supposed to be the tombs of saints, is the popular institutionalized and formalized expression of a polydemonistic belief in spirits, ghouls, afrits, jinns, and other demons whose numbers are legion and who constantly interfere with the lives of men. Formless powers and forces such as the much-sought-after baraka or holiness or the greatly feared evil eye round up the picture of popular Middle Eastern religion. Little of this type of popular religiosity has survived in the modern West. T o be sure, in countries or regions where old local folk cultures still linger on, as for instance amid the agricultural peasantry of Europe, the popular veneration and worship of saints as well as the belief in demons and spirits, in the evil eye, and other supernatural powers, are the truly forceful elements of religious life. T h e spiritual distance between this type of religion and that of the official exponents of the faith can be visualized if one thinks of the Christianity of an Italian fishing village in comparison with that of the Vatican. In the urban population of industrialized Western Europe or in America north of the Rio Grande, however, this type of popular religion is practically extinct or is on its way to becoming so, and the chief difference between the religion of the people and that of the official religious leadership is one of degree rather than one of kind. It is only the religious leadership whose life is mainly concerned with religion,

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while in the life of the simple people religion plays, as has been pointed out above, a negligible role. T h e average individual, even if he is a member of a church or a religious community, will know very little of the officially sanctioned religious doctrines of his f a i t h ; but he will as a rule not hold beliefs or practice religious rites contrary to those of his church (as this is the case in the Middle East). He will simply neglect out of ignorance or indifference the rites of his church, and will have little knowledge of and even less interest in the doctrines of his church concerning the supernatural. While with regard to the popular side of the relationship to the supernatural in the three world areas the line of demarcation thus clearly runs between the West and the Middle East, the official doctrine concerning the supernatural shows a basic typological homogeneity in the West and the Middle East setting both apart from the religions of the F a r East. F a r Eastern religions, with the exception of J a p a n e s e Shintoism which, however, need not concern us in this context, are basically nontheistic in their original unadulterated doctrines, while Middle Eastern and Western religions in the official formulation of their tenets are theistic, or more precisely monotheistic. Theism in religion, as defined by Northrop, "is the thesis that the divine is identified with an immortal, non-transistory factor in the nature of things, which is determinate in character. A theistic G o d is one whose character can be convcyed positively by a determinate thesis. His nature is describable in terms of specific attributes." 2 1 Monotheism, therefore, is the doctrine of one theistic God whose nature is dcscribable in terms of specific attributes. T h e belief in such a God, as characterized by his determinate attributes, is the basic creed of the theistic religions. Students of F a r Eastern religions (again with the exception of Shinto) arc unanimous in describing them not merely as nontheistic but also as noncreedal. J o h n Clark Archer has commented upon the noticeable absence from Hinduism of formalized creed and characterized it as "theologically non-creedal." 2 2 Of the six recognized Hindu religiophilosophical systems only one, the V e d a n t a , is concerned with the concept of the divine. According to the V e d a n t a doctrine, however, Brahman (God) is in-

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definable, since every predicate, even the most general and indefinite, implies a contrary, an opposite, and besides Brahman there is non-else; he is all-pervading, all-comprising. In Shankara's formulation of the Vedanta there seems to be no place left for "faith" as a positive experience, 23 or a positive belief in some eternal that is determinate in character. 24 It is difficult to reduce to a common denominator the teachings of the numerous schools of thought of Buddhism in the several countries in which they developed. Reischauer states that "there are a good many of the better educated and liberal leaders [of Buddhism] who claim that the very essence of true Buddhism is not a fixed or unchanging doctrine but rather a certain attitude of mind, a spirit of free inquiry and passion for truth." 2 5 This noncreedal character of modern Buddhism is completely in keeping with the original noncreedal and nontheistic formulation of Buddha's teachings. As a Japanese authority on Buddhism put it, "Buddhism teaches that there is no personal creator or ruler of the world." 24 Confucianism, although it enjoins the worship of Heaven and Earth, of Confucius himself, of imperial and other ancestors and heroes, has never attained a theistic quality, and does not concern itself with the supernatural. It recognizes the divine, but as the divine is not determinate, it cannot have a concept of it, only a name for it. Moreover, it can realize it in experience but not say what it is in terms of determinate qualities.24 Taoism centers around "the physical concept of the way of the heavens in relation to earth, transfigured and deepened by the mystic trance. The Tao is universal but not transcendent. 27 It produces all and yet is not above all. It is not a person or an individual. It is the basic, cosmic energy which informs all." 28 The numerous religious societies that spring up in China to meet critical situations, "have no creed but they have a ritual." 29 Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism are thus in their uncorrupted form nontheistic and noncreedal, all of them holding that the divine is indeterminate and that no specific attributes can be ascribed to it. In contrast to them the religions of the Middle East and the West are both theistic and creedal. The chief source of Muslim religious doctrine, the Koran, as

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well as later theological writings, is replete with divine appellatives and attributes the study of which developed into a formidable science at a relatively early date in the history of Islam. The determinate attributes of Allah are grouped under the seven headings of Life, Knowledge, Power, Will, Hearing, Seeing, and Speech, 3 0 in addition to which he is described as merciful, gracious, the guardian over all, the reviver, the deliverer, and other such terms totaling ninety-nine in number. Similarly in Christian theology God is described as a supreme being whose attributes include, to mention only a few, infinite power, wisdom, goodness, who has an inscrutable will and holds sovereign dominion over the world. 3 1 Much of both the Muslim and the Christian doctrines of God goes ultimately back to the Hebrew Bible in which God is described by a rich variety of moral excellencics, including power, wisdom, foresight, righteousness, love, mercy, and loving-kindness. Post-Biblical Jewish literature repeatedly contains lengthy enumerations of these and other divine attributes. With regard to the supernatural aspect, Far Eastern religions are thus found to be polytheodemonistic on the popular level and nonthcistic on the higher doctrinary level; Middle Eastern religions, polytheodemonistic on the popular level and monotheistic on the higher doctrinary level; Western religions, polytheodemonistic on the folk-culture level, indifferently monotheistic on the modern popular level, and exclusively monotheistic on the official religious level.

T H E RELIGIOCENTRIC ASPECT

One of the significant characteristics of the Far Eastern nontheistic religions is the high degree of toleration they display toward other religions. This trait is usually accompanied by a merging or fusion of different religions. Religious jealousy or exclusiveness, the conviction that one's own religion is the only valid and true one and that all other faiths are necessarily erroneous, is rare and is frowned upon. While Europe (and the West as a whole) is predominantly Christian, and the Middle East is equally predominantly Muslim,

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no such exclusive and homogeneous religious characteristic exists in the F a r East. Religious pluralism is the rule, however narrowly one tries to define the geographic unit subjected to scrutiny. M e m b e r s of the same family, or even single individuals, often belong to two or more religions simultaneously, or, in other cases, alternatingly. Not only is there no stigma attached (as there is in the West and the M i d d l e East) to such religious changeovers; they are taken as manifestations of a commendably sincere quest for the T r u t h . Seekers for truth are likened in an ancient Oriental parable to people setting out from different starting points to climb a high mountain. T h e peak is too steep for the climbers to aim directly u p w a r d , so each o f them begins spiraling the slopes in different directions. W h e n two of the climbers meet somewhere, both m a y be convinced that the other is on a false track since he is going in an opposite direction. But actually, of course, though following different paths, both and all aim toward the same truth symbolized by one and the same lofty summit. Just as Far Eastern religions are noncreedal and nontheistic, they are also nonaggressive, tolerant, and nonproselytizing. T h e y do not require of their adherents, as Western and M i d d l e Eastern religions do, to believe that their own teachings are the embodiment of the only true and perfect faith and that all other religions are bogged down in ignorance and error. T h e y freely borrow from one another, and incorporate even substantial teachings taken from different schools. I n India, " H i n d u i s m . . . is as much Buddhist as it is B r a h m a n . T h e Tantric doctrines . . . appear as m u c h in the Buddhism of T i b e t as they do in the Hinduism of India. Recently, Surendranath Dasgupta, the leader of the contemporary Indian philosophical and religious thought, has proposed an actual practical unification of Buddhism and H i n d u i s m . " 3 2 A s a modern I n d i a n philosopher has put it, " E v e r y seeker of truth and perfection is allowed in Hindu society to pursue his o w n method freely, and n o b o d y is expected to interfere or meddle with it. . . . This tolerance of differences of opinion and creed within its o w n fold and even outside itself is an essential characteristic of Indian culture."33

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The same open-minded receptiveness characterizes the Hindu approach to Western religions. As M a x Weber already has pointed out, a Hindu could accept the most specifically Christian sectarian doctrines without ceasing to be a Hindu. In fact the extreme religious "tolerance" characteristic of Hinduism appeared to Weber to have reached such a level as to make him conclude that "Hinduism is something different from 'religion' in our sense of the word." 3 4 In Indo-China, in Annam, Cochin China, and Tonkin, " a peculiar combination of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism prevails. . . . " The official religion of the Annamese empire included Confucianist, Buddhist, and Taoist elements all intermixed, yet it remained essentially a combination of magic, animism, and ancestor worship. 3 5 Passing on to China, we again find that "religion in China does not follow the pattern of interreligious exclusiveness of the West. . . . The temples are dedicated to a variety of gods. . . . There is one temple in this region which houses Confucius, Lao-tze (Founder of Taoism), and Buddha. This mixture is seen everywhere in China. . . , 3 6 Individual Chinese or Korean families are often composed of Confucians, Taoists, and Buddhists . . . and even single individuals accept all three religions at once." 3 7 Some of the numerous religious societies the emergence of which in times of crisis is characteristic of China "placed above their old gods the God of all religions. Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism were viewed as ways of salvation under the direction of the God of all Religions." 3 8 The same is reported of J a p a n . " J a p a n e s e . . . rarely accept one religious sect to the exclusion of others ; almost everyone considers himself at once a Buddhist, a Shintoist, and a Confucian. Individuals worship any deity regardless of cult affiliation. . . , " 3 9 Or, as observed by another student of Far Eastern religions: " . . . in countries like China and J a p a n many of the adherents of Buddhism at the same time give allegience to the original national faiths. . . . " « All this sounds as alien to anyone brought up in one of the three monotheistic religions that originated in the Middle East

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as the monotheistic religious exclusiveness and aggressiveness appears " n a r r o w , intolerant a n d provincial" 1 1 to Far Easterners reared in one or more of their nontheistic religions. As Krishnalal Shridharani wrote, " I t is forgivable to insist on one God, b u t to insist u p o n The Prophet a n d The Law is intellectually wrong. T h e assertion of Louis X I V that 'I am T h e State' is quite innocent compared to anyone's assertion that 'I am T h e Law.' . . . This exclusiveness is antispiritual inasmuch as it is overweening in the light of the limitations of h u m a n perception." 4 2 Western observers as well noted the "enormity of intolerance a n d persecution [which] has shown its hideous countenance, almost without fail, whenever and wherever a higher religion has been p r e a c h e d , " 4 3 such as Biblical Judaism and its daughter religions, Christianity a n d Islam. In Christian Europe, religious conformity was a m a t t e r upon which the local secular power felt called upon to rule, if necessary by armed force. " I n Central Europe . . . the secular princes did successfully use their power to force down the throats of their subjects whichever of the competing varieties of Western Christianity the local potentate happened to f a v o u r . " 4 4 Speaking of the theistic religions of the Middle East and the West, N o r t h r o p observes: "All the theistic religions are aggressive, all except recent J u d a i s m are dominated by a missionary zeal, a n d all tend to regard religious views other than their own as heathen, erroneous, or inferior. Each tends to have a provincial self-righteousness which assumes that its doctrine is completely perfect, and consequently that its adherents are divinely commissioned and by d u t y bound to replace all other religions with 'the one perfect religion.' " 4 S T h e basically different self-evaluation of theistic religions in relation to other religions from that of nontheistic religions explains the significant difference in geographic distribution between the two types of religions. Since theistic religions are by their very nature doctrinary, creedal, aggressive, intolerant, a n d proselytizing, each one of them as occasion arose tended to establish itself as the only religion in the territory or region in which it won for itself a majority position or in which it attained the physical ability of doing so. Adherents of other religions were either ex-

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pelled, or forcibly converted, or, in exceptional cases, allowed to remain as "tolerated" and "protected" peoples, in residentially and socially segregated, despised and disliked groups. As a result of this, Europe and America became compactly Christian continents, all the natives of the former (with the exception of a small Muslim island in the Balkans) and practically all the latter having been converted to one or another variety of Christianity. T h e fate of the Jews in Europe, as a group stubbornly adhering to an alien religion, at times persecuted and at times tolerated, is too well known to need more than passing mention. T o the south and the east of Christian Europe, Islam established itself in a similarly compact and definite block. The Islamization of the entire Middle East from Morocco and Río de Oro in the west to Turkestan, Afghanistan, and what is today Pakistan in the east was a rapid process accomplished in a phenomenally short time. In close analogy to the Christian Ecclesia militans, the spread of Islam by force was made a principle: Din Muhammad bissayf-—the religion of Mohammed with the sword. T h e result was a geographic region as exclusively Muslim as Europe became Christian. Where the two met, they fought, until one of them was completely defeated and had to retreat, as best exemplified by medieval Spain, or the flow and ebb of Turkish power in Hungary in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. After the Muslim retreat from those European countries no trace was allowed to remain of its long rule: no Muslim community or group was left behind; the population as a whole reverted to Christianity or was replaced by Christians. In the south and the east, on the other hand, Islam was more successful than Christianity in its proselytizing activities. In the twentieth century its boundaries are still pushing southward across the Sudan belt into Negro Africa, and are being strengthened in Indonesia and other parts of the F a r East. What is happening to Islam's Central Asian outpost is little known; the Iron Curtain guards its secrets well. While the traditional adherent of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam remains to this day convinced that only his religion or, more narrowly, only his own particular sect is the sole holder of the truth, including the only true ritual, the general attitude towards religious and sectarian differences, at least as far as

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Christianity is concerned, underwent a decisive change since the second half of the seventeenth century. " I n this half century the Catholic and Protestant factions . . . seem to have become aware that they no longer cared sufficiently for the theological issues at stake to relish making any further sacrifices for their sake. They repudiated the traditional virtue of "enthusiasm" (which by derivation means being filled with the spirit of God) and henceforth regarded it as a vice." 4 6 This toleration of religions in Christian Europe, however, was based on "disillusionment, apprehension and cynicism. It was not an arduous achievement of religious fervour but a facile byproduct of its abatement." 4 7 We thus recognize that in the Far East religious toleration is a result of the deep religiosity characteristic of its cultures, while in the West, and to some extent in the Middle East as well, religious tolerance emerged as a result of a general and successive liberation of the cultures from the grip of religion. I n the Far East, the more religious a person is the more tolerant he is of other religions, the more ready he is to concede that other religions also have their values, their truths, and their "paths." In the Middle East and the West, tolerance of other religions stands as a rule in reverse ratio to the fervor with which an individual follows the precepts of his own religion. T H E TELEOLOGIC ORIENTATION

The last aspect of religion to be considered here is its ideological or purposive orientation, with respect to which it again is found that Middle Eastern religion has close affinities with Western religion, while both differ greatly from Far Eastern religions. The ultimate aim of religion is to satisfy certain spiritual needs of which man is aware at varying frequencies, and to help him in the crises and other difficulties that he inevitably meets as he makes his way from cradle to grave. In the three world areas under scrutiny we find that this basic purpose is served either by supplying psychological satisfaction to this-worldly aspirations of man, or by giving his ambitions an other-worldly orientation, or by a combination of both.

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Confucianism exemplifies the first of these three ways. Although in every other respect it belongs closely together with the other Far Eastern noncreedal and nontheistic religions, "it has almost no other-worldly content, confining itself to practical maxims on the sensible conduct of life in this world." 4 8 Confucianism offers its followers a satisfactory cosmology, and detailed ethical doctrines, concentrating especially on the duties and obligations of people standing in certain social or familial relationship to one another. A worship of Heaven and Earth, of imperial ancestors and heroes with appropriate and well ordered ritual rounds out the picture. 4 9 This is a religion eminently suited to human needs as channeled by Chinese culture: as long as things are more or less in good order. Chinese observers themselves noted, however, that when confronted with tragedy and death, their compatriots tend to become Buddhists 50 or Taoists. In funeral processions, for example, Confucianist families often employ a group of Taoist and/or Buddhist monks. 5 1 Moreover, it can be stated that Confucianism pure and undiluted is a relatively rare phenomenon; in most cases it is merely one of the threads that go into the texture of religious life in China. With the exception of Confucianism (and Shintoism, which on account of its theistic content and aggressive character is not considered in this paper among the Far Eastern religions), Far Eastern religions typically satisfy human psychological needs by giving them an other-wordly orientation. This world is regarded as a vale of tears into which man is born against his will. T h e ultimate goal that man can obtain and that he therefore should try to achieve lies in the Beyond, in a remote state of peace that man can reach either directly upon his death, or, in accordance with most teachings, after a series of rebirths and reincarnations in various human or other forms. This other-wordly orientation given to life by religion goes in the case of Hinduism hand in hand with a basically pessimistic attitude toward this world. According to Shankara, only the spiritual has reality, all else is sheer illusion, or maya. Life goes on by karmic repetition; deeds and rebirth are causally related. M a n has to accept his lot, and "live at best within it in the distant hope that the round would eventually be broken and his spirit would

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escape to another, agreeable portion of the fixed universe, whence he would not come back again to birth." 5 2 Only if one is able to find the true self can one escape karma and yet remain in the world bringing spiritual equanimity into it. 2 4 T h e same idea is further developed in Buddhism. Buddha is told to have said: " I have obtained emancipation by the destruction of desire. . . . I have obtained coolness (by extinction of passions) and have obtained Nirvana. . . . " 8 3 H u m a n life is predominantly an existence of suffering. Conditions of individual existence are painful; whatever pleasures and satisfactions may exist in life are overshadowed by pain and sorrow. The best in life is fleeting and impermanent. This is the first of the "Four Noble Truths" of Buddha. The second is that the cause of human suffering is human desire and cravings. T h e third and the fourth truths state that man can conquer his craving thirst by following the "Noble Eightfold Path," which includes the renunciation of the life of pleasure, the nurturing of the spirit, moral conduct, peaceful occupations, the suppression of evil states of mind, strict self-discipline, a concentration of mind and meditation, until an understanding of the nature of the self is achieved, with a complete freedom from all passions and fetters binding one to this life. Thus prepared, the enlightened self can enter a state of peace, or Nirvana, and thus "gain release from 'rounds of existence' in this evil world." Nirvana, however, remains a distant hope. In the meantime, man's efforts should be directed toward attaining a more favorable rebirth into this world. This can be effected by following certain ideals of conduct, namely the "five precepts" forbidding the destruction of life, theft, unchastity, falsehoods, and strong drink. 5 4 Also according to Taoist doctrine, the sensuous world is a mere appearance. "Long life was not in the tradition of Taoism. The ancient Taoists regarded the body as not worth preserving. . . ." Under the influence of Buddhism, also in Taoism a "moral relation was established between this life and the condition of the soul beyond this life by the theory of karma, the equivalence of deed and reward. This proved a great boon in easing the tensions of life. Poverty and wealth, sickness and health, happiness and misfortune were not only explained by this formula, but were made endurable."

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T h e northern school of Taoism in modern China "emphasizes meditation, and metaphysical speculation, and practices breathing."55 For all these religions Kurt Singer's generalization holds good: " I t is a basic tendency of the Asiatic mind to keep aloof from every thought that hinders him in his great movement of withdrawal from the world, an illusory veil to be cast off by him who is awakened, a tiny shore which must be left in order to reach the infinite expanses of the Great V o i d . " 5 4 No such other-worldliness, no such exclusive concentration on spiritual or meditational detachment characterizes the three theistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. These three Middle Eastern and Western religions emphasize more or less equally the material well-being of the individual in this world, and the spiritual well-being or salvation of his individual soul after the death of the body. They therefore represent a combination of this-worldly and other-worldly orientations. While spiritual and moral values are stressed, these are underlined or reinforced by concretely formulated and tangible promises of rewards in the future life for good conduct, or alternatively, punishments for rebelliousness and disobedience. The amount of stress put in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as well as in the different sects of the latter two, on the belief in Paradise or Heaven for the good and on Purgatory or Hell for the evil, varies; but common to all is the accent on divine justice tempered with mercy that measures out reward and punishment to each individual according to his deeds which after death are carefully weighed and evaluated. It is, therefore, in the well-conceived selfinterest of every individual (inasmuch as he is a believer) to pay as much attention as he can to the salvation of his soul. This can be achieved by following the precepts of one's church or religion or sect with regard to one's duties toward fellow-men and toward the deity. The duties toward one's fellow-men are mainly deedal, that is, consist of do's and don't's, while the duties toward God are both creedal and deedal in varying combinations. Simultaneously, however, both deed and creed aim at a second, and often more important, end: to assure and secure the material well-being of the individual and his society in this world. One

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must believe in the particular credos of one's religion or sect and fulfill the various do's and don't's in relation to both God and fellow-men in order to be blessed as a reward by God with all the material benefits that are valued in this life and are striven for also in other, more direct ways. This is expressed succinctly in the Christian supplication for the daily bread contained in the "Lord's Prayer" (Matthew 6 : i i ) . It is dwelt upon in greater detail in the Jewish " S h e m a " in which material blessings are made directly contingent upon the observation of God's commandments (Deut. II : 1 3 - 2 5 ) , and in the "Eighteen Benedictions," the main portion of every Jewish service, in which God is asked, among other blessings, for forgiveness, redemption, health, good crops, the rebuilding of Jerusalem, the coming of the Messiah, etc. This prayer is repeated by observant J e w s three times every weekday and four times on Saturdays and holidays. The Koran, too, is explicit with regard to Allah's reward of those who pray to him: O ye who have believed when proclamation is made for the prayer on the day of the assembly [Friday] endeavor to come to the remembrance of Allah, and leave off bargaining; that is better for you, if he have knowledge. Then when the prayer is finished scatter abroad in the land and seek the bounty of Allah, but call Allah frequently to mind; mayhap ye will prosper (Koran 62 : 9 - 1 0 ) . In the popular religion in the Middle East manifested in saint worship and the institution of the (visitation of shrines), the quest for material blessings is even more predominant. These three theistic religions, therefore, are oriented toward two goals: to secure immediate material blessings in this world and to hold out the promise of the Beyond, the happy life after death. With regard to teleologic orientation, religion in the Far East is other-worldly, while in the Middle East and in the West it is equally concerned with this world and with the Beyond. One of the factors that militate against religion retaining its influence in the modern West is the definite this-worldly orientation of modern Western culture in which religion with its promise of a life in the Beyond seems out of tune. But as far as religion is still

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alive or again comes alive in the Western world, it displays the same orientation toward the same two foci of well-being in this world and rewards in the other world that is the common heritage of all religions that originated in the ancient Middle East. In summary, the function of religion within the total cultural context of each of the three world areas considered can be characterized as follows: 1. In the Far East and in the Middle East religion is the dominant normative force regulating behavior; in the West it has largely lost its normative function. 2. Psychologically, in the Far East and in the Middle East religion is a powerful sustaining influence; in the West it has also largely lost this function. 3. On the popular level of the supernatural aspect, in the Far East and in the Middle East religion is polytheodemonistic; in the West this character of religion is on the wane with the decline of folk cultures. 3a. On the higher doctrinary level of the supernatural aspect, in the Far East religion is nontheistic and noncreedal; in the Middle East and in the West it is both theistic and creedal. 4. Religion in the Far East is characterized by the absence of religiocentrism: there is a marked toleration of other religions and a mutual borrowing and influencing; in the Middle East and in the West there is a high degree of religiocentrism, with intolerance and scorn of other religions: each religion is exclusive and regards itself as the "one and only" true faith. 5. As to teleologic orientation, in the Far East religion has a distinctly other-worldly orientation often accompanied by a definitely negative attitude toward this world; in the Middle East and in the West religion is characterized by a dual orientation toward both this world and the other world. The place of Middle Eastern religion in this scheme is intermediary. Religion is the dominant normative force in Middle Eastern culture as it is in the Far East. It has a powerful psychologic influence as it has in the Far East. On the popular level its supernatural component is polytheodemonistic as in

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the Far East. On the other hand, on the higher doctrinary level, it is theistic and creedal as is religion in the West. It displays a high degree of religiocentrism as does religion in the West. And it shares with the West a dual, this-worldly and other-worldly teleologie orientation.

XII.

Social and Cultural Determinants of Middle Eastern Nationalism WESTERN AND M I D D L E EASTERN NATIONALISM

T

HE

STORY

of the penetration o f the Western-born idea o f

nationalism into the M i d d l e East has attracted considerable

attention

Following

on

the

part

of E u r o p e a n

the pioneering study

and

American

o f Hans K o h n ,

scholars.

A History

of

Nationalism in the East, originally published in G e r m a n in 1928 a n d in English in 1929, the history of M i d d l e Eastern nationalism has been studied from various angles. Its origins, g o i n g back to the Napoleonic occupation of E g y p t in 1798, h a v e been unraveled, and its place within the context of the general process of Westernization duly noted. Attention was given also to the w a y in w h i c h nationalism transformed c o m m u n a l and political life in the m a j o r and even minor states witin the area. Similarly, the historical sequence of nationalistic developments in the M i d d l e East, from the first emergence of p a r l i a m e n t a r y governments in emulation of the W e s t to their decline in certain countries and replacement b y dictatorial rule, has been investigated. On

the other

hand,

certain

important

aspects of

Middle

Eastern nationalism h a v e received l a m e n t a b l y scanty attention. T h e writer, for instance, knows of n o exhaustive or detailed study of the specific traits that characterize M i d d l e Eastern nationalism, nor of a probing into the question of w h i c h of these features can be found also in the Western world a n d w h i c h of them are specific to the M i d d l e East or to some countries in it. W h e n w e come to the problem of the causes, the m o t i v a t i n g factors that g a v e M i d d l e Eastern nationalism its specific flavor, we find not only no answers but, in most cases, not even questions raised. T h e present c h a p t e r will attempt to deal w i t h at least p a r t of these issues. It will try

345

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to isolate some of the social a n d cultural determinants that went into the m a k i n g of modern Middle Eastern nationalism and gave it its special character. T o begin with, it should be stated that even within the immediate geographic vicinity of its European birthplace, nationalism has manifested a wide range of variations in orientation, emphasis, a n d general character. It is, of course, possible to give a generally valid definition of nationalism, such as " a state or condition of m i n d characteristic of certain peoples with a homogeneous culture, living together in close association on a given territory, and sharing a belief in a distinctive existence and a c o m m o n destiny." 1 However, to a n y such general definition one must unfailingly a p p e n d , as was in fact done by the author of the one quoted, the caution t h a t nationalism "varies all the way f r o m the healthy patriotism of the Swiss nation to the fanatical intolerance of Nazi G e r m a n y . " 2 Nationalism is generally regarded as a " h e a l t h y patriotism" w h e n the positive, affirmative elements predominate in it, and w h e n it is coupled with democracy and liberalism. It is b r a n d e d as " f a n a t i c a l intolerance" when it appears in the c o m p a n y of exclusivism, racism, fascism, or any form of totalitarian dictatorship, and when its emphasis is largely negative, expressed in anti, r a t h e r t h a n pro, policies, aims, and slogans, directed primarily against other peoples, ideas, and endeavors. I n Europe, generally speaking, liberal nationalisms emerged in the nineteenth century; fascist or totalitarian nationalisms were the p r o d u c t of the twentieth century, following World W a r I. This observation leads directly to the formulation of the first problem that arises in a consideration of the characteristics of Middle Eastern nationalism. T h e Middle East was reached by the nationalist tide well before the onset of its second period in Europe, that of fascist or totalitarian nationalisms. O n e would, therefore, have expected that, when emulating the Western example, the Middle Eastern peoples would develop their own b r a n d of nationalism in keeping with the general trend of "healthy patriotism" of the period. Yet this was not the case. Q u i t e on the contrary, the Middle Eastern nationalist movements started out with a strong antiemphasis. This is what h a p p e n e d with early Turkish nationalism,

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which had a clear-cut aim in opposing the rule of the Sultan b u t a m u c h hazier idea as to what it was to strive for. As for the Arabs, H a z e m Zaki Nuseibeh, a keen analyst of A r a b nationalism, and himself an A r a b , pointed out " h o w p r e d o m i n a n t the negative element was" in the early phases of their nationalism, which lasted roughly until the eve of W o r l d W a r I; " t h e impelling f o r c e , " according to Nuseibeh, "was either fear of a n a d v a n c i n g E u r o p e a n imperialism a n d the inability of the state to withstand it, or distrust of the Turkish intentions and designs." 3 Following the above observation, one could go on to isolating additional i m p o r t a n t specific characteristics of Middle Eastern nationalism until one felt that one had a more or less complete portrait of it, a n d then reviewing the factors in traditional M i d d l e Eastern culture that would seem to explain these characteristics. Such a procedure, however, would be too cumbersome a n d complicated, since it would have to deal with two sets of extremely complex p h e n o m e n a , and a t t e m p t to establish a correlation between them. Let us, instead, switch our attention at this point to those aspects of traditional Middle Eastern culture a n d society that can be assumed to have h a d an influence on the development of the first trait of Middle Eastern nationalism discussed above. After having dealt, albeit briefly, with these aspects, we can go on to a discussion of the traditional determinants of a second, and then a third, special feature of modern Middle Eastern nationalism. I n this m a n n e r we shall deal with only one trait at a time, a procedure that should prove both simpler a n d clearer. I n sum we shall nevertheless arrive at an over-all view of Middle Eastern nationalism in toto with its manifold determinants anchored in traditional M i d d l e Eastern society and culture. Such a national trait as xenophobic dislike a n d distrust of foreigners must evidently be a resultant, a m o n g possible other factors, of those forces which in the past molded traditional ingroup-outgroup attitudes a m o n g the peoples of the area. T h e r e are, in particular, two ruling institutions in traditional Middle Eastern culture that not only shaped the traditional ingroup-outgroup attitudes but, more t h a n that, were of basic importance in the very process of group formation itself. Both are

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heavily value-laden, closely interrelated, and mutually support and reinforce each other. Both are, in fact, more than institutions; they are ideologies, powerful motivations, and ends in themselves. They are phenomena nonexistent in modern Western culture whose designation requires the coining of new terms: religionism and familism. " R E L I G I O N I S M " AND NATIONALISM

Religionism can be defined as the domination by religion of life as a whole, on all levels, individual, familial, social, cultural, and even national and political. T o what extent politics were dominated by religion down to the last years of the Ottoman Empire can be shown by adducing as an example an event that took place as late as 1913. In that year a revolt broke out in Macedonia against the Sultan, who wanted to dispatch troops to suppress it. But this would have amounted to a war of Muslims against Muslims, which is forbidden by religion, and can be undertaken only if a special fetwa, religious decision, is issued by the Shaykh ul-Islam, the chief religious authority in the Empire. The Sultan, Abdul Hamid, could not obtain the fetwa, and thus was unable to order his troops to Macedonia. Once the impotence of the Sultan became thereby manifest, his ministers were able to pressure him into granting a constitution. This was the effective end of the Sultan's rule in Turkey. 4 A concomitant of the religion-centered outlook is the conviction that only one's own religion, that is to say the religion of one's own family, tribe, or larger social aggregate is the right one, while other faiths are, with equal sincerity, regarded as inferior, mistaken, and wrong. As far as Islam is concerned, it teaches that Mohammed was the last and greatest of prophets, that the Koran is the ultimate revelation of God's will, and that not to accept Islam is a sinful shortsightedness, for which idolators have to be punished by death and the ahl al-kitab, the monotheistic People of the Book, by subjugation and reduction to the quasi-vassal status of dhimmis. For centuries Islam almost unfailingly helped the true believers to victory after victory over the infidels in the three continents of

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the old world. The march of history appeared to the Muslims to fall into a clear pattern: infidels were defeated by the Sword of Islam and converted to the true faith. Thereupon, having become Muslims, they in turn achieved victories over other infidels. In this way the Dar al-Islam, the pacified House of Islam, continued to expand, and the Dar al-Harb, the House of War, to recede. These circumstances engendered in the Muslims a feeling of contempt for the unbelievers which, with the passage of generations, became an ingrained and organic part of Muslim religionism. Of the many facets of the Muslim outlook on the infidels the one that most directly influenced the formation of the antiforeign component in Middle Eastern nationalism was their attitude to the dhimmis, the subject People of the Book. The Muslim, to put it succinctly, viewed the dhimmi dimly. The less able the Muslims became, from the seventeenth century on, to withstand the onslaught of the Christian world, the more unkind their attitude became to the dhimmis who continued to live in their midst. Since the traditional conviction that the infidel was inferior could no longer feed on new victories over him, it had to be maintained instead by a constant reassertion of Muslim superiority over the dhimmis. If this was the case among the Turks and the Persians who, in spite of the rising tide of Christian power, remained independent and masters of their own destiny, it had to be even more so among the Arabs who themselves had become the subjects of the Ottoman Turks and were treated by them as ra'iya, flocks, as human cattle, to be shepherded for the benefit of the conqueror, to be milked, fleeced, and allowed to live their own lives so long as they gave no trouble. 5 For these Arabs it was a psychological necessity for the maintenance of their self-esteem and for at least a partial fulfilment of the expectations of their traditional religionism to have, near at hand, another human group to look down upon, to pity, to distrust. Religionism had yet another important effect on Middle Eastern nationalisms. In spite of certain superficial resemblances between the Fuhrer-centered nationalism in several Arab countries and the European Fascist-type nationalisms, there is one significant difference between the two: Fascism, Nazism, and Communism all felt constrained to turn against religion and to try to break or at least

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to weaken the hold of the c h u r c h o n the people. T h e n e w n a t i o n alist ideology, w i t h its o w n b r a n d of ethos a n d mythos, w a s supposed to s u p p l a n t the Christian teachings a n d ethics. N o t so M i d d l e Eastern nationalism w h i c h , in spite of its alien origin a n d n o n a u t o c h t h o n o u s n a t u r e , k n e w h o w to b u i l d o n the old religious f o u n d a t i o n of M i d d l e Eastern culture, a n d to a p p e a r as the g e n u i n e offspring of the local, i n d i g e n o u s t r a d i t i o n . 8 I n this m a n n e r the simple, average M i d d l e E a s t e r n e r was s p a r e d the d i l e m m a into w h i c h the t o t a l i t a r i a n nationalist m o v e m e n t s forced t h e E u r o p e a n Christian w h o h a d to choose b e t w e e n Catholicism a n d Fascism, between L u t h e r a n i s m a n d N a z i s m , b e t w e e n P r a v o slavism a n d C o m m u n i s m . I n s t e a d , the n e w n a t i o n a l i s m s o u g h t to convince t h e M i d d l e Easterner t h a t the m o r e enthusiastically he followed his p a r t i c u l a r n a t i o n a l leader, the b e t t e r a M u s l i m he w o u l d b e ; or, if he h a p p e n e d to be a Christian A r a b , t h e b e t t e r a Christian A r a b h e would be. T h u s , u n d e r t h e q u a s i - c h a r i s m a t i c leadership of a military Fiihrer, M i d d l e E a s t e r n n a t i o n a l i s m has b e c o m e a new religious creed, a new stage in the d e v e l o p m e n t of the faith, i m b u e d with all the a t t r i b u t e s of a religiocentrism of w h i c h there is m o r e today in the M i d d l e East t h a n in a n y W e s t e r n , Westernized, or semi-Westernized world a r e a .

FAMILISM A N D N A T I O N A L I S M

Closely related to M i d d l e E a s t e r n religion is f a m i l i s m . F a m i l i s m c a n be defined as the centrality of the family in social o r g a n i z a t i o n , its p r i m a c y in the loyalty scale, a n d its s u p r e m a c y over i n d i v i d u a l life. All the six basic characteristics of t h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n family h a v e a close correlation to f a m i l i s m : a f a m i l y t h a t is p a t r i a r c h a l , patrilineal, patrilocal, e n d o g a m o u s , polygynous, a n d e x t e n d e d m u s t needs be central, p r i m a r y , a n d s u p r e m e in b o t h social a n d individual life. 7 Negative a n d in the larger sense d i s r u p t i v e correlates of this type of familism a r e interfamilial tension, c o m p e t i tion, a n d enmity which, in t h e centuries of A r a b a n d M u s l i m history, h a v e repeatedly caused p r o t r a c t e d a n d f a r - f l u n g blood feuds, a n d have occasionally developed or, if you will, d e g e n e r a t e d , i n t o largc-scale bloody internecine wars s a p p i n g the s t r e n g t h of the people in m a n y a p a r t of t h e M i d d l e East.

Social and Cultural Determinants of Middle Eastern Nationalism

35'

One of the numerous proverbs that express with admirable succinctness basic features in the Arab self-stereotype reflects on both sides of the old Arab coin of familism. Variants of this proverb are current in the non-Arabic speaking areas of the Middle East as well, and it has more than once been quoted by Western writers as a Kurdish, Persian, or Afghan saying. It states: " I and my cousins against the world, I and my brothers against my cousins, I against my brothers." Translated into sociologese, this proverb verbalizes the existence of a clearly marked hierarchy of loyalties in which the closer kin group takes precedence over wider kin groups. The principle of familism has been so strongly embedded in the Middle Eastern consciousness that social aggregates larger than the family have traditionally been conceived of as mere extensions of families. The actually functioning family has for uncounted generations consisted of the descendants in the male line of one common grandfather who occupied the position of family head. The tribe or the village in an un-Westernized Middle Eastern district is regarded by its members to this day as consisting of several such extended families related to one another and descended from one common ancestor. Villages located in one area or tribes wandering in one another's proximity are, again, considered to be the progeny of a more remote but still common ancestor. 8 This popular tendency has received the stamp of scholarly approval when learned medieval Arab genealogists, building upon popular traditions, set up a highly speculative but everywhere readily accepted genealogic schemc, tracing back all the Arabs to a single pair of forefathers and, through them, ultimately to one original ancestral progenitor. 9 We have only to think of the stories of the Book of Genesis to realize that this tendency has not been one peculiar to the Arabs, but had its prototype in the ancient Near East as well. 10 Another important feature shared by the ancient Hebrews and the more recent peoples of the Middle East and having a direct bearing on the centrality of familism in the formation of any ingroup-outgroup dichotomy is the attribution of a kin-group character to groups of patently nonrelated individuals who happened to engage in one and the same occupation. In Biblical

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times all the harp and pipe players were regarded as the descendants of one single common ancestor, and so were the forgers of brass and iron and the tent-dwelling cattle owners (Gen. 4 : 2 0 - 2 2 ) . Josephus Flavius, in the first century A.D., using undoubtedly expressions based on popular views still current in his days, speaks of "the tribe of prophets." A n d Evliya Chelebi, the famous Turkish traveler, writing less than three centuries ago, reports of several of the numerous guilds into which the artisans, tradesmen, and professional people of Constantinople were organized in his day that they venerate certain historical or mythical individuals as the original progenitors of all the members of their particular guilds. 1 1 T h e effects of this concept complex were significant and farreaching with regard to Muslim state organization, to prenationalistic attitudes to the non-Muslim world, and, most recently, to the specific forms assumed by nationalism in the A r a b and other Middle Eastern states. T h e effect of familism on Muslim state organization was, as could be expected, that the state was from the very outset of its development considered a mere extension of the family, enlarged this time not tenfold to a hundredfold as in the case of a tribe or the village, but a thousandfold to ten thousandfold. T h e entire Muslim realm was, from its very inception, regarded as a familial grouping, gigantically enlarged but in its essence nevertheless a social body similar to the family. Therefore, the same loyalty scale that was the guiding principle in the familial and social organization and demanded diminishing loyalty with increase of group size was applied also to the state. Loyalty to the state could thus never approximate the level of intensity characterizing close in-group loyalties. T h e tenuous ties that thus existed between the subject tribes, villages, and urban aggregates on the one hand and the Caliph, the remote "father" enthroned in his faraway capital on the other, could never supersede the more immediate pull that direct loyalties to locally present "fathers" such as the actual family head, the tribal chieftain, the village headman, the landlord, etc., continued to exert. In fact, the limited imagination of the simple peasant, for instance, could not even conceive of a greater or higher power position than that of the highest local

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official with whom he had direct personal contact, such as the mudir, the district officer, in Egypt. T h e story is told of such a peasant that when for the first time in his life he had an opportunity to prostrate himself in front of the Khedive (viceroy), he pronounced a blessing over him, saying, " M a y Allah make you as powerful as our Mudir V T h e same family-patterned relationship between sovereign and subjects made it necessary for the Caliph and other rulers in the Muslim realm to rely in the first place on that group among their subjects on whose loyalty they could count in their capacity of immediate chieftain rather than as the Caliph, king, or overlord. Similar situations are known to have existed in other empires, outside the Middle Eastern culture continent, but they reached a comparable extent only when based on a similar intensity of familism. Be this as it may, the fact remains that the Caliph ruled through his kinsmen: his immediate and more remote relatives, his tribesmen, and last but not least, his slaves, who were indoctrinated to see in him their pater familias, and who, in turn, were regarded as family members. This was the method by which the Ottoman Turks were able for centuries to hold sway over a far-flung empire peopled by Arabs, Kurds, Greeks, Armenians, Copts, Berbers, Druzes, and dozens of other minority groups. T h e entire population of the Ottoman Empire was thus divided into two sectors: there were the ruled groups who constituted the vast majority, and then there was the ruling minority of the Ottoman Turks, organized and considered, by the ruled peoples as well as by themselves, as one family with the Caliph at its head. T y r a n n y and despotism too appear in a different light when viewed against the background of a familistic society. W h a t son dare question the commands and exactions of his father ? It is not for him to weigh and consider but to obey and be judged. T h e duty of the son is to serve the father. T h e father in return protects the son. Without the father's protection the son is lost; he could never hold his own against inimical outsiders. Similarly, the duty of the subjects was to serve the Caliph by paying taxes, by indented labor, by conscription. In exchange, they received protection against enemies who otherwise could have destroyed them. Bribery, the pattern of both giving and accepting gratuities

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either for services rendered by a superior to an inferior or simply for receiving from a superior what is one's due by traditionsanctioned custom, can also be explained as an extension of the familial relationship between the mighty father and the dependent sons. You want something from your father? The way to getting it is to perform a special service for him, to become a favorite, for the occasion at least. This is how Isaac's two sons competed for the blessing of their blind old father, and this is how the simple subject of a ruler attempts to gain his ear. In the family situation, after all, there is rarely a clear-cut right or wrong, independently of the will of the father. Whatever the competing sons feel and opine, the father's decision is the final factor that makes the point of view of one right while rendering the argument of the other wrong. And both sons, the one toward whose present the father did not turn as well as his more fortunate brother, know that soon a conflict may arise between them and an outsider, and in that case they will have the unquestioning support of the father. This is the family situation in which are rooted all types of interaction between subject and ruler in the traditional House of Islam. GROUP ATTITUDES AND NATIONALISM

Some general features of the prenationalistic attitudes toward the non-Muslim world can also be considered as extensions of traditional attitudes that developed in and around Middle Eastern familism. In a familistic situation the attitude of a given group, whether an actual extended family or a larger aggregate molded after its pattern, to an equivalent out-group can be twofold. As long as the out-group is independent of the in-group, the two are rivals, competitors, actual or at least potential enemies. In the interests of self-preservation, the in-group feels impelled to attack the out-group, to reduce its strength, and to make it subservient to itself. Once this is achieved, a new attitude tends to replace the first: that of benevolent toleration, mixed with condescension or even contempt. The best example of the working of this interaction on a level

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broader than that of the extended family can be found among the tribes of the Syrian Desert. T h e more powerful among these tribes were able to reduce the weaker tribes to a status of vassaldom and to exact the payment oikkuwwa or protection money from them. 1 2 A free or noble tribe will not intermarry with a vassal tribe, this would be beneath its dignity. Nor will it attack or engage in fighting with a vassal tribe, whether its own or that of another free tribe; this again would be beneath its dignity. If the vassal tribe is attacked by an outsider, its protector tribe will rise u p and defend or avenge it. It would be an interesting task to work out in detail the analogies between this intertribal situation and the conditions in which interfamilial rivalries were utilized by energetic and fortunate family heads to advance themselves, to strengthen their own family by extending their protection to poor and weak relatives, by inviting nonrelated families to become their clients, and by acquiring many slaves and interbreeding with them, and in this manner to assure their own ascendancy over other families. While such a procedure lies beyond the scope of the present subject, it is well within it to point out certain parallels between the attitudes, arrangements, and institutions developed around the intertribal situations on the one hand and those characterizing traditional Muslim conduct in international situations on the other. 1 3 An international situation—and the following remarks will largely be confined to international situations and interactions between the Muslim and the Christian worlds—used to be encountered by the Muslims with attitudes and reactions predetermined by the intertribal experience. That is to say, the outside world, the Christian world, was approached by the Muslim world as a whole as one tribe would be by another: it was an encounter with a potential or actual enemy. From the earliest days of the foundation of the new faith, when Muslim Arab conquerors swept with astounding rapidity over the entire Middle East, they viewed the world as being divided into two parts: the Dar al-Islam, the House of Islam, containing that part of the world pacified by the sword of Mohammed's religion on the one hand and, on the other, the Dar al-Harb, or House of War that

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lay outside the former realm and against which to engage in Holy W a r was regarded as a sacred religious duty, invoked as late as the years of World W a r I. M o h a m m e d himself enjoined upon his followers to fight both idolaters and monotheistic peoples " w h o believe not in A l l a h " ( K o r a n 9 : 29). However, while the former had either to be exterminated or converted to Islam, the latter, "those who have been given the Scripture," had to be fought only "until they pay the tribute readily, being brought l o w " (ibid.). These "people of the Book" came very soon to be known as people under protection, or dhimmi-s, in Arabic. In a very ancient Muslim document, said to be the testament of the Caliph O m a r II (who died in 720, that is, merely 88 years after the death of Mohammed), the duties of the Muslims toward the dhimmis are spelled out: " . . . and I commend to your favor the people under 'protection.' D o battle to guard them and put no burden on them greater than they can bear, provided they pay what is due from them to the Muslims, willingly, or under subjection, being humbled. . . . " This of course is the application of the same principle that governed in pre-Islamic days, and has continued to govern down to the present the relationship between a strong, free noble tribe and its subjected, protection-money-paying, vassal tribe. W h e n the idea of nationalism became the ruling doctrine in a modern Middle Eastern country, the people of that country were required or at least expected to expand the familistic attitude so as to include the entire population of their country. A good Egyptian Muslim, for instance, was now supposed to regard not only the Egyptian Muslims but also the Copts and the other religioethnic minorities as members of his national family. As a result of this changed situation the nearby close-at-hand traditional objects of the out-group hostility suddenly disappeared. There were now no more dhimmis to look down upon and thereby to strengthen one's own feeling of superiority. T h e attitude of contempt and suspicion of outsiders that was an age-old complement of familism had to look for new objects. T h e foreigner, the intruder, in all his variegated appearances, was the new peg on which the old hostilities could most conveniently be hung. While these processes took place inside several Middle Eastern

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countries, the latter simultaneously found themselves confronted with the irresistible ascendancy of a Christian Europe. In the earlier encounters, during the Crusades, and in the centuries of Ottoman expansion in Europe, the feeling of Muslim cultural superiority was repeatedly reaffirmed and strengthened. In the nineteenth century for the first time Christian Europe appeared to the Muslim world not only as a superior opponent in armed clashes but also as a possessor of cultural attainments superior to those had by the House of Islam. It was an unfortunate coincidence as far as the Arab countries were concerned that, before they had time truly to integrate Western culture into their traditional cultural configuration, they were brought under the control of the same Western powers which up to that period were the chief profferors of Western cultural imports. 1 4 A result of this coincidence was the emergence of a tense ambivalent attitude: on the one hand, Western culture continued to exert its magic pull, and even increased it; on the other, the carriers of these cultural enticements came to be regarded as hated oppressors. Thus the two main facets in Western culture that were unquestioningly accepted by the Arab countries—technology in the realm of reality culture and nationalism in that of value culture—were both utilized for the end of ridding themselves of the bearers of these gifts. The nationalistic aim of independence became paramount and it was subserved by everything that could be learned from the West. In fact, the feeling of many was that the more Westernized they became the greater the likelihood of their liberation from Western dominance. However, in order to understand the roots of Middle Eastern and particularly Arab anti-Westernism, it is not enough to refer to the coincidence of Westernization and Western domination. One has only to mention the case of India to realize that the simultaneous occurrence of these two phenomena in itself does not automatically result in a violent anti-Western attitude. The outcropping of the anti-Western xenophobia in the Arab countries had to draw on a third root as well. This can be found in the Arab cultural complexes of religionism and familism discussed above. For a people whose national personality was conditioned

Golden River to Golden Road by this type of value syndrome it was much more intolerable to be dominated by a Christian government than for a people such as the Indians whose religions are nontheistic and tolerant, and whose family dynamics are suffused by the laisser faire engendered by a general other-worldly orientation. 1 6 In contrast, the Arab ethos with its imperative emphasis on in-group cohesion, on outgroup enmity, and on the exclusive values and undoubted superiority of Islam was a fertile soil for the luxuriant growth of a nationalistic xenophobia once the seeds of Western dominance were sown in it. Foreign domination, for the same reasons, was resented by the Arabs even when it was exercised by the Ottoman Turks. Yet, while the Turkish yoke weighed heavily on Arab necks and the desire to throw it off was always present, to carry it was not felt an indignity. It was, after all, merely the domination of one Muslim group by another. On the other hand, to be subjected and ruled by Christians was regarded as shameful in particular because it made them into bad Muslims who did not fulfil one of the basic commandments of their religion: to fight the People of the Book and turn them into submissive dhimmis. When the new ideas of nationalism are added over and above all this, there stands before us the full complement of the main factors making xenophobia one of the pivotal facets in Arab nationalism.

T H E FUHRER

IMAGE AND NATIONALISM

Another feature of Middle Eastern nationalism is its tendency to embody itself symbolically in an autocratic father image. Middle Eastern autocracy appears in two typical forms, of which the older is clearly a heritage of the past, of the local Middle Eastern millennial sociopolitical development, while the younger is a focusing on a father-image reshaped after modern Western Fuhrer-type leaders. The old Middle Eastern father image is, of course, that of the paternalistic absolute monarch, the theocratic ruler, who still functions in more or less the same sociocultural context as he used to for many centuries in the past. From the head of the extended family to the shaykh of the tribe, to the Caliph of all the Muslims,

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to the Sultan or Emir of a given population aggregate, and finally to the king of a twentieth-century Muslim theocratic state, there leads an unbroken line of inner historical sequence. T h e last representatives of this old type of father-ruler image can be found in Yemen a n d Saudi Arabia and in the smaller Sultanates and shaykhdoms ringing the Arabian Peninsula. T h e r e is little reliable information on nationalism in the Arabian Peninsula in general. However, it so happens that there, more than in any other Middle Eastern country, the inhabitants of each political entity largely share the same religion, the same language, the same descent traditions, the same racial characteristics, the same attitudes and values, thus forming homogeneous population aggregates which, even in their prenationalistic phase, had come very close to resembling the typical nation-states in the Western world such as, say, Italy or Sweden. W h a t the rulers of these states try to achieve is the consolidation of their power over areas within their political boundaries that lie outside the traditional d o m a i n of the tribes proper, which used to be headed by them or their fathers. I n those territories they have to overcome the traditional in-group loyalty a n d out-group enmity that for centuries kept A r a b i a in a state of utter political fragmentation. T h e y are trying to attain this aim by the use of both old Middle Eastern a n d m o d e r n Western methods. T h e former include the h a n d i n g out of " p u r s e s " to the chiefs of the tribes whose loyalty must be secured, of marrying their daughters for longer or shorter periods, and of inviting them to sit in council. T h e latter consist mainly of acquiring superior Western arms such as airplanes and tanks, which prevent uprisings by making them utterly hopeless; of utilizing Western means of mass communication, especially the radio (the press only to a negligible extent since most of the people in the peninsula are still illiterate), for the inculcation of a feeling of solidarity with the ruler a n d his house. T h e m o m e n t the delicate balance of loyalties is tipped definitely in favor of the ruler r a t h e r t h a n of the local chieftain, the kingdom or principality has crossed the b o u n d a r y f r o m traditional Middle Eastern tribal organization to m o d e r n nationalism. As far as the new Fiihrer-type father image is concerned, it is interesting to note t h a t in no Middle Eastern country has he

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directly taken the place of or evolved from the old type of paternalistic monarch. Everywhere a longer or shorter period o f experimentation with parliamentary government intervened. A t first, the power of the paternalistic ruler was curtailed, and the leaders of political parties gained predominance. (This is the stage that Afghanistan has only just entered, while Iran and J o r d a n are well advanced in it.) T h e n the king was altogether eliminated, and a period of republican parliamentarianism began in which, however, the old upper class, the same that used to support the king and was in turn favored b y him, continued to o c c u p y a powerful position. T h e next phase was the emergence of the new leader, w h o was not a member of the upper ruling class but an army officer of middle-class background. E g y p t , Syria, and Iraq have all reached this stage after h a v i n g passed through the previous one, while T u r k e y has left it behind and introduced a democratic parliamentary two-party system. In the dictatorship stage, the FUhrer-hgure, of course, symbolizes the nationalistic aspirations of the people. A l l these aspirations and ideas are purposely fostered, disseminated, and b y unceasing reiteration made part of the people's consciousness. U p to this point M i d d l e Eastern totalitarian nationalism closely follows G e r m a n Nazism, Italian fascism, and the C o m m u n i s t nationalisms. W h e r e the original M i d d l e Eastern elements enter this picture is at the level of contact with religious tradition. Just as the nationalist idea cannot come in conflict with religion, so its leader must remain a religious figure. T h e modern E g y p t i a n or Iraqi leader, although a Westernized m a n b y education and inclination, bent on the speedy introduction of reforms in the social and economic life of his people, bends his knee and touches his forehead to the prayer rug in the mosque together w i t h all the true believers, in strict accordance with old religious tradition just as the early A r a b and Turkish kings and sultans did for thirteen hundred years. Europen nationalist leaders m a y h a v e been regarded as anti-Christs in the secret hearts o f a fearful but faithful minority in the totalitarian countries in the 1920's, 3o's, and 40's. N o M i d d l e Eastern nationalist leader in the 1950's g a v e cause to be regarded as an a n t i - M o h a m m e d , be his teachings and acts as modern and as nontraditional as they may.

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P A N - A R A B NATIONALISM

A third factor that distinguishes A r a b nationalism from Western nationalism is its superstate character. T h e r e are, to be sure, inter-Arab rivalries and hostilities, and there are particularistic trends in A r a b nationalism, and these can be strong under certain conditions. 1 8 T h e baiting Jordanian K i n g Hussein and his country suffered at the hands of President Nasser of E g y p t resulted in a strengthening ofJ o r d a n i a n particularistic nationalism in not insignificant sectors of the Jordanian population. But apart from such special reactions, the general trend of A r a b nationalism runs in the direction of Pan-Arabism, that is to say, its ultimate aim is to achieve the unification of all the Arabic-speaking peoples in one A r a b superstate. This trend is clearly noticeable not only in those A r a b countries that have achieved a predominant position in the A r a b world and strive to establish their hegemony b y uniting all the other A r a b countries under them. This in itself would be consonant with the more extreme forms nationalism has occasionally taken in the Western world, of which the Nazi G e r m a n nationalistic drive to rule Europe can be cited as the most blatant example. W h a t is not readily understandable without reference to the specific A r a b sociocultural background, is the endeavor of true A r a b nationalists in the smaller and weaker A r a b countries to unite their countries w i t h a larger and stronger A r a b state which, as they only too well know, means in practice the submergence of their o w n countries in the larger A r a b body politic in question. In view of the world-wide trend of nationalism to seek its fulfillment in the breaking u p of large political entities into smaller ones peopled b y ethnically, linguistically, and culturally homogeneous populations, one must look for very specific factors powerful enough to counter this trend. T h e only explanation that suggests itself is the still forceful cultural and genealogic tradition that m a n a g e d to survive and become incorporated into the modern ideologies of A r a b nationalism. T h e Arabs or, to put it more cautiously, m a n y A r a b s in every A r a b country, small or large, still hold that all the A r a b s are the descendants of one or two common ancestors and therefore form but a widely furcated

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family of tribes. The application of nationalistic ideas to such, a situation must inevitably result in the conviction that the summum bonum of any Arab state, shaykhdom, territory, or unit of whatsoever description lies in the unification of all Arabs in one PanArab state. 17 Considering that as recently as until the end of World War I, that is, well within the memory of many persons still alive, all the Arab states were merely administrative provinces within the Ottoman Empire, it is not at all difficult to understand the attraction of the Pan-Arab idea. Those who have deeper historical knowledge look back beyond the inception of the Ottoman rule when there were Arab empires administered from a centrally located seat of government such as Damascus, or Baghdad, or Cairo. T h e aim of Pan-Arabism is thus regarded as a mere reunification of territories cut up into separate political entities by European power machinations. The old cultural ties have continued to reach across the newly established international boundaries and have, in fact, been intensified by the use of Western methods of mass communication such as the newspapers, the radio, and the motion pictures.

N O N R A C I A L NATIONALISM

We can touch only briefly upon one additional specific characteristic of Middle Eastern nationalism. This is the remarkable absence of racism even in the midst of the most excessive culminations of nationalistic fervor. With the Nazi example close at hand, and with the tendency to imitate nationalistic European dictatorships in many other respects, it is truly significant that racial intolerance has been added by no Arab dictatorship to its methods of whipping u p popular enthusiasm. The explanation lies in the absence of racial intolerance, of even racial consciousness, in Arab and Muslim history. In the traditional Middle East, religion was the thing in judging an individual or a group, not racial antecedents, and thus the application of race as a criterion of distinction between man and man has remained foreign to the Middle East to this very day.

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T h e sum total of these observations concerning the social and cultural determinants in Middle Eastern nationalism seems to add up to the following: The Middle Eastern peoples have received nationalism from the Western world, because they saw in this idea a tool they were able to put to good use in the cause of their own advancement as they understood it. But in shaping the precise forms of nationalism for home consumption they were directed by ideas and values anchored in their own sociocultural past and still constituting powerful motivating forces at the present time.

XIII. The Dynamics of Westernization T H E NATURE OF WESTERNIZATION

A

the dynamics of Westernization in the Middle East can best be opened by stating that Westernization is a specific variety of culture change. Since culture change is the process by which the material equipment, the techniques, the organization, the attitudes, the concepts, the points of view, and the values of a culture are transformed as a result of contact between its carriers and those of a different culture, Westernization is the culture change that takes place in any non-Western society under the impact of contact with Western groups or individuals. It is, therefore, a cultural process in the course of which a society or part of it adopts Western culture either totally or partially. It involves the discarding of elements and complexes of the traditional culture in order to replace them with Western cultural elements and complexes. In theory, when two groups of individuals with different cultures come in contact, changes can result in the cultural patterns of either or both groups. 1 In practice, however, when carriers of Western culture establish contact with non-Western societies the chances are heavily weighted in favor of the acculturation of the non-Western group to Western culture. Of the large number of factors that bring this about, the following seem to be among the most important: Western people often arrive on the non-Western scene as conquerors or occupy positions of power and leadership, and form a ruling class. This is what happened in the Middle East in the former and present colonial areas (Pakistan, Southern Arabia, Cyprus, North Africa) and in the former mandated territories DISCUSSION OF

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(Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan). Elsewhere (Afghanistan, Iran, T u r k e y , Saudi A r a b i a ) Western penetration has been mainly economic, but even this was sufficient to secure for the Westerners high positions as employers and as possessors of superior techniques and technical equipment. In addition, their financial situation was incomparably better than that of the average native, and they formed a closed society from w h i c h the natives were excluded. T h e prestige that these foreigners thus acquired among the natives was transferred to the culture they represented, and especially to the overt manifestations of their civilization, that is, their technology, their material equipment, and all the other external trappings with which they surrounded themselves. Especially among members of the urban upper class w h o had official business, and more rarely, social contact with the Westerners, and also had the requisite financial means, the desire was thus engendered to emulate the Westerners b y acquiring their paraphernalia and learning how to use it. Incidentally, the traits adopted in this manner were in m a n y cases of practical usefulness in addition to their prestige value, a circumstance which, of course, added to their attractiveness. For the last two or three decades the manifestations of Westernization in the Middle East have literally forced themselves upon the attention of students of the area. A t least scattered references to them can be found in nearly every book or article dealing with any aspect of M i d d l e Eastern life. As a result, the phenomenology of Westernization is sufficiently well attested, and it would be a simple task to draw up a long list showing w h a t traditional features in M i d d l e Eastern culture have been replaced in the course of the past 100 or 150 years b y w h a t new features introduced from the West. T h e situation is different with regard to the d y n a m i c s of Westernization. W h a t is the nature of the forces which, in m a n y contact situations, caused Western culture to prevail and traditional Middle Eastern culture to s u c c u m b ? W h y and h o w did the Westerners attempt to make M i d d l e Easterners accept their culture, and what were the motivations of the M i d d l e Easterners in welcoming and often seeking out these changes? W h y were certain facets of Western culture more readily accepted than

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others, while some were rejected altogether? What were the effects of the acceptance of certain specific Western cultural elements on the total context of Middle Eastern culture? T o these and many other related questions no satisfactory answers can be found in the available literature. In the present chapter an attempt is made to outline very briefly some of the main features, forces, and processes the interplay of which resulted in the Westernization observable today, especially in urban aggregates in many Middle Eastern countries. A discussion of the resistance and opposition that are also incident to Westernization in the Middle East will be left to the subsequent chapter. CULTURAL AFFINITY

When attention is focused on a comparison of traditional Middle Eastern with modern Western culture as typified by their most characteristic representatives (for example, the United States and England with their urbanized majority as prototypes of modern Western culture, and Iraq, Iran, or the Arabian Peninsula with their agricultural and seminomadic majority as those of traditional Middle Eastern culture), they appear as significantly different and even contrasting in many respects. 2 In such a purview basic affinities can receive little notice. But as soon as the horizon is widened so as to include, for instance, the F a r East as well, certain similarities become apparent against the more markedly different textures of those remoter culture areas. 3 T h e culture of the West then appears as more closely related to that of the Middle East than to the cultures of either central and southern Asia or Negro Africa. T h e cultural affinity between the West and the Middle East has historical roots. Disregarding the prehistoric and earliest historical connections between the two world areas, the Middle East was in ancient times for several centuries under Greek and Roman domination and thus absorbed much of those cultural influences that so decisively molded the culture of Europe. Soon after, the West was subjected to powerful religious influences emanating from the Middle East in the form of the young faith of Christianity. At a later age, Islamic culture penetrated deeply into the West through the Iberian Peninsula and the Danube Basin,

/ he Dynamics of

Westernization

resulting in cultural exchange, another phase of which was a concomitant of the Crusades. As a result of these interchanges, at about the end of the Middle Ages the cultures of the two adjoining areas evinced considerable similarities of a general nature. It was only with the advent of the Industrial Revolution and the subsequent technologic, economic, and social development in Europe that these similarities began rapidly to diminish. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the distance between the two cultures increased as a result of the relative cultural stability of the Middle East throughout this period and the cumulative and accelerating changes that were taking place in the culture of the West. Thus, when toward the middle of the nineteenth century the two cultures entered a new phase of their more than twothousand-year-old intermittent contact, the situation was somewhat as follows: The Europeans, as they became familiar with the culture of the Middle East, recognized in it similarities with certain aspects of the medieval phase of European culture, and noticed the absence of practically all those developments to which they were wont to point proudly in their own culture as significant accretions. From this discernment it was but one step to the formulation of the reproach of backwardness, and only one more step to the endeavor to fill in with their own Western achievements those facets of Middle Eastern culture which, they felt, were lacking or lagging. The Middle Easterners, on the other hand, were in the possession of a culture still sufficiently similar in several basic aspects to the one brought to them by the Westerners to be able to recognize without too much difficulty that in certain fields the West was definitely ahead of them. Having for centuries used water for irrigation, clay for vessels, iron for utensils, wool and cotton for clothing, stone and bricks for building, ships for water transport, etc., it was much easier for them to appreciate the Western improvements in these and other such activities than for the carriers of a culture completely lacking these elements. CHANNELS OF WESTERN INFLUENCE

Broadly speaking, the channels of Western influences on Middle Eastern culture fall into two main categories: impersonal or

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mechanical influences and personal contacts. In the case of impersonal influences, the group or the individual exposed to Westernization has no direct contact with personal exponents of any aspect of Western culture. Such persons, to be sure, are present somewhere in the background, but they are unseen and unfelt. T h e s e impersonal or mechanical influences a r e : ( i ) equipment, supplies, and consumers' goods; (2) newspapers, magazines, and books; (3) the r a d i o ; (4) motion pictures; and (5) phonog r a p h records. As to personal contacts, these can be subdivided into three groups that c a n be called respectively p r i m a r y , secondary, and tertiary sources of Westernization. Primary sources of Westernization in personal contacts are represented b y those individuals w h o c o m e to the M i d d l e East from the Western world and are, therefore, fully saturated with their specific brand of Western culture. S u c h persons either purposely or involuntarily impart something of their culture to the people w i t h w h o m they come in contact. T o this category belong the members of diplomatic corps stationed in the M i d d l e Eastern countries; members of religious, medical, educational, technical, economic, and other missions; m e m b e r s of Western philanthropic institutions; also, Westerners w h o h a v e settled in the M i d d l e East for business purposes or w h o are sent there temporarily to represent or to work for Western firms; and finally, tourists. Secondary sources of Westernization b y personal contact are provided b y natives of M i d d l e Eastern countries w h o h a v e spent some time in the Western world a n d w h o , after their return to their native land, become (again either intentionally or unintentionally) Westernizing agents. T o this g r o u p belong emigrants returning from overseas countries; returning students; returning diplomatic personnel and, to some extent at least, religious pilgrims w h o make for a certain a m o u n t of cultural interchange between various M i d d l e Eastern and neighboring countries. As tertiary sources of personal Westernization must be regarded all those M i d d l e Eastern individuals or groups w h o , having themselves absorbed a certain amount of Western cultural traits in the course of their contact with primary and/or secondary sources, become disseminators of Western influences in their social environment.

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Apart from the returning emigrants and the members of various missions and philanthropic institutions, whose personal contacts include the native peasant and working classes, all the other primary and secondary personal Westernizing agents affect directly only the members of the urban upper class. The great majority of the Middle Eastern populations, the nomads, the cultivators, and the workers (unless they happen to be employed by a Western concern such as Aramco or the defunct AngloIranian Oil Company) are exposed to the Westernizing influences of tertiary personal sources and of impersonal or mechanical sources only. It is almost impossible to make any statement as to the differential degrees of Westernization in the various countries of the Middle East and within each country in the various social classes or occupational or other social groupings without courting the danger of undue generalization and schematization. Illustrative rather than generalizing statements will therefore have to serve the purpose. The differences in the extent of Westernization between country and country can best be illustrated by referring to Turkey on the one hand and Yemen on the other, the former having gone a relatively long way, while the latter is still poised hesitantly on the crossroads. Again, the differences within a single country can be made comprehensible by stating that the ruling class in a country like Egypt is well advanced in Westernization, while her peasant majority has barely budged from the traditional mode of life followed by their grandfathers. These two observations, by the way, also indicate how difficult it is to speak of Westernization in the Middle East in general.

T H E IMPACT OF T H E W E S T

A complete analysis of the diverse ways in which the Western impact has made itself felt on the Middle Eastern scene would have to include a discussion of the roles of several Western institutions in the contact situations between the two cultures. Western institutions, for instance, played an important part in shaping the reforms introduced in the Tanzimat period in the Ottoman Empire and by M u h a m m a d 'Ali in Egypt. Also, certain Western

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political concepts, n o t a b l y t h a t of n a t i o n a l i s m , as well as several principles characteristic of W e s t e r n d e m o c r a c y (for example, t h e right of self-determination, sovereignty of the people, social obligations of t h e state) f o u n d their w a y to the M i d d l e East t h r o u g h e d u c a t i o n a l a n d p h i l a n t h r o p i c channels, a n d w e r e echoed in M i d d l e Eastern ideologic d e v e l o p m e n t s . I t is proposed, however, to limit the present discussion to t w o o t h e r m a j o r b u t h i t h e r t o largely neglected aspects of W e s t e r n influence on t h e M i d d l e East, n a m e l y the aspects of technology a n d prestige, a n d to a n analysis of the widening r a n g e of c h a n g e s resulting f r o m these p r i m a r y points of i m p a c t . Westerners, h a v i n g oncc set themselves u p in the midst of the M i d d l e East, b e g a n to display their technology a n d to s p r e a d , b o t h purposely a n d incidentally, certain elements of it a m o n g the natives of the area. T h e technologic aspect of c u l t u r e is the o n e t h a t c a n most easily be loaned a n d b o r r o w e d . T h i s g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , of course, holds good only w i t h r e g a r d to t h e use of technologic e q u i p m e n t , not its p r o d u c t i o n . I t m a y n o t be easy to learn h o w to m a k e a motor-driven p u m p , b u t in a few m i n u t e s one c a n learn how to use it a n d recognize its a d v a n t a g e s over the old m e t h o d of lifting water with the shaduf. In addition to its high degree of transmissibility a n d its f u n c t i o n as a n a p p a r e n t index of a d v a n c e m e n t , the a c c e p t a n c e of t h e products of Western technology b y the natives of the M i d d l e East was facilitated by the fact t h a t in their o w n c u l t u r e technology did not occupy a focal position. T h e r e f o r e , the M i d d l e Easterners, like the carriers of m a n y o t h e r cultures, initially r e g a r d e d the switch to the use of Western e q u i p m e n t as a c h a n g e of m i n o r i m p o r t a n c e only, which would n o t affect their focal values. O n l y later, in fact w h e n it was too late, did it d a w n u p o n t h e m that the a d m i t t a n c e of even a single W e s t e r n c u l t u r e element inevitably b r o u g h t in its wake more a n d m o r e new elements with m o r e a n d more changes, resulting in serious d i s t u r b a n c e s in the vital t e x t u r e of their traditional culture. W h i l e the technological beginnings of W e s t e r n i z a t i o n explain m u c h of the success of this w o r l d w i d e c u l t u r a l process, o t h e r factors significantly supported a n d bolstered it. A m o n g these must be m e n t i o n e d in the first place the new prestige order thai

The Dynamics of Westernization

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developed after the appearance of the Westerners on the native Middle Eastern scene. Having in many cases achieved ruling and controlling or at least leading and dominant positions in the Middle Eastern countries they penetrated,. the Westerners superimposed themselves upon the native social order and became something like a topmost or upper-upper class. It is not easy to analyze the various components that go into the making of Western prestige. The power element must have been the most important in the earlier, "imperialistic" days, to be replaced, as time went by, by varying combinations of such components as wealth, the possession of strange gadgets and aweinspiring equipment, specialized knowledge in new fields of increasing importance (such as medicine and agriculture), positions of trust and influence given to Westerners by the local government, and entrance to and free association as equals with the highest elite of native leadership. The aura of prestige surrounding the Westerner soon enveloped his culture as well, with the result that the acquisition of Western culture became a matter of social desirability over and above its recognized utility. Whatever the specific context of the social stratification in an area, the rich native upper class had the most opportunity for firsthand and close contact with Westerners, had the amplest financial means necessary to acquire the trappings of Western civilization, and was the first to succumb to the lure of the West. Once this movement was on the way, the other native social classes that were ranked beneath the native upper class had an additional incentive for the adoption of a Western style of life so far as this was possible within their limited means: the desire to climb up the native social ladder by acquiring at least some of the same characteristics that the upper class itself had only recently acquired from the Westerners. For instance, in the native garb there were well-defined class differences: the urban effendi, the member of the urban lower class, the fellah, or the Bedouin each had his own distinctive garb that "placed" him as soon as his figure was discerned at a distance. Now, however, the effendi had adopted the Western suit ; if the urban worker was able to follow his example, he achieved two aims at once; he demonstrated his advanced social status vis-à-vis his more backward countrymen by dressing

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like a European, and he also assimilated to the new-style effendi, thus achieving an approximation, in outward appearance at least, of the coveted upper class status. In this manner the acquisition of Western cultural trappings became a symbol of identification with the foreign ruling group for the native upper class and of social advancement for all other classes.

SOCIAL CLEAVAGE

Generally speaking, however, Westernization in its impact upon the traditional Middle Eastern social structure resulted in a widening of the distance between the top and the bottom layers of society. Prior to its inception, the style of life of the native upper class represented the highest culmination of which the local culture was capable. Having concentrated in its hands most of the wealth of the area, the upper class was able to make use of the best cultural forces available in Islamic lands. The best Muslim architects built their palaces, mosques, and madrasahs; the best tailors sewed their clothes; the best sandalmakers made their shoes; the best swordsmiths forged their blades; the best artists and craftsmen provided them with decoration of body, lodging, and furnishing, and with exquisite objets d'art; the best poets, storytellers, musicians, dancers, and mimes entertained them; in brief, while greatly surpassing in quality and refinement anything that was within the reach of the lower classes, the culture of the upper class was identical with the culture of the masses. Thus, there existed what can be termed a lower-class-upper-class cultural continuum. This continuum was disrupted with the impact of Westernization, which hit first and foremost the upper class. Members of this class, to the extent to which they were attracted to Western culture, ceased to be creators, inspirers, and consumers of native cultural products. The local culture became to all practical purposes nonexistent for them, and they became avid consumers in all fields of importations from the countries of the West. A general decline in native arts and crafts was one of the consequences of this situation. Since the number of customers who insisted on and could pay for high quality rapidly diminished,

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quality itself declined. There was a vulgarization and deterioration of the traditional arts and crafts, soon to be followed by an adaptation of the native skills to patterns and styles imported from the West in an efTort to compete with the imported products themselves, which constantly gained in popularity. This competition in turn resulted in an increased spread of the cheaper kind of Western-style consumers' goods now offered in both an imported and a locally made variety. However, what the lower classes were able to afford by way of Western-style goods was extremely meager in comparison with the all but wholesale switch to a Western style of life effected or at least attempted by members of the upper class. Especially in the rural areas, where something like four fifths of the total population of the Middle East still lives, the generally low standard of living enabled the people to acquire only a fraction of even those limited offerings of Western-style products that reached them via the weekly markets, the itinerant pedlars, or the local stores. Thus, while under traditional circumstances the upper class, sitting on the narrow top of the social pyramid, was connected with the lower classes forming the pyramid's broad and massive base by a cultural continuum, Westernization successively severed the vital cultural arteries running between the top and the bottom and created a cultural discrepancy between the two. The elite was now no longer the top exponent of the traditional culture of the same masses, upon the continued existence of which its upper-class status depended. It was Western-oriented, and having like its European preceptors identified Westernization with progress, it regarded the members of the lower classes who still represented the poor version of the traditional culture as backward and primitive. In the reaction of the lower classes to the widening cultural gulf between them and the native controlling group, certain ambivalences were demonstrated. O n the one hand, the traditional resentment felt by the needy at the display of wealth and waste by the idle rich increased when this display included a growing number of newfangled Western traits objectionable to the more tradition-bound outlook of the poor. O n the other hand, there was the irresistible attraction exerted by the glitter of

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Western cultural trappings, which, however, remained mostly unattainable for the poverty-stricken masses. The frustration thus engendered was not infrequently channeled into one of the special Middle Eastern varieties of nativistic movements of which the Muslim Brotherhood is the best known example.

C R E A T I O N OF A N U R B A N PROLETARIAT

One of the earliest outcomes of Westernization was thus to throw into disequilibrium the traditional social balance and to disturb the age-old, well settled social strata of the Middle East by culturally alienating the native upper class from the rest of the population. Two additional changes effected by the impact of Westernization on the native society were both urban developments. They were the creation of a rudimentary urban proletariat and an urban middle class. The social class or the occupational group in traditional Middle Eastern society that came closest to what is generally understood by an urban proletariat was that of the artisans. Yet an artisan or a craftsman, even though he may have been employed for many years, first as an apprentice, then as a journeyman, counted as a person on the way to becoming a master craftsman, and this potential position, as well as membership in the corporation or guild, defined his status as something very different from that of the urban proletarian laborer. Furthermore, in many cases the apprentice who embarked on a career of artisanship was a son, nephew, cousin, or other close relative of the master craftsman under whose guidance and control he acquired the skills of his trade. This hereditary or familial character of the crafts and guilds placed the urban artisan in a definitely higher position than that of the rural agriculturist, whether the latter was a day laborer, a tenant sharecropper, or even a smallholder. The fact of the matter was that under traditional circumstances there was no urban element which in status and social position corresponded to the rural proletariat, which constituted the majority of each country's population. Such an urban proletariat has begun to come into being as a result of Westernization. The onset of industrialization created a

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demand for a labor force that was recruited partly from the towns themselves and partly from the surrounding countryside. T h e new industrial laborers received low wages, h a d to p u t u p with hard working conditions, and were crowded into suburban slums of which the North African "bidonvilles" (or " t i n - c a n " towns) are today the worst examples. All the conditions for the emergence of a depressed and underprivileged u r b a n proletariat are present, and the labor aspect of industrialization has been characterized by all those evils which to overcome took the modern West several decades. Compared with the growth of Western industrialization, Middle Eastern industrialization, though limited in extent, was sudden and spurtlike. Moreover, it did not grow organically out of local conditions, but was imposed or introduced from the outside. It was therefore likely to be accompanied by grave tensions a n d disturbances concomitant upon an all too rapid transition from the traditional forms of social interaction characterized by familism, personal relationships, and the prevalence of a kin-oriented ascribed status, to the modern Western forms of social interaction with its impersonal relationships and preponderance of individually achieved status. These difficulties were further aggravated by the equally sudden disappearance from the life of this new proletariat of m a n y of those emotional, aesthetic, and spiritual satisfactions that gave it color, content, and interest as long as it r a n in its old traditional channels. In the old setting there were the friendships formed in childhood, the colorful feasts of family life accompanying birth, circumcision, marriage, and death, the annual festivals of the Muslim or the agricultural calendar, the birthdays of saints, the enjoyment of story, song, dance, and other traditional forms of aesthetic entertainment, and the trust, the peace of mind, and the equanimity that were the spiritual rewards of unquestioning compliance with the simple and few rites of Islamic worship. I n a culture in which the extended family was the traditional protective frame of life and the prime locale of practically all activities, these satisfactions were severely strained by the severance of the family ties and the submergence of the uprooted individual in the disillusioned crowd of slum inhabitants.

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These negative features were, h o w e v e r , o u t w e i g h e d b y several compulsive factors t h a t c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e steady g r o w t h of the u r b a n proletariat. O n e of these was the p r o n o u n c e d status difference between t o w n a n d c o u n t r y . I n the t o w n (with the possible exception of L e b a n o n ) , a goodly a m o u n t of c o n t e m p t was felt t o w a r d the village a n d t h e villager, as manifested in the derog a t o r y c o n n o t a t i o n of the t e r m " f e l l a h " a n d in t h e i n v a r i a b l y comic a n d foolish figure t h e fellah cut in the s h a d o w t h e a t e r a n d o t h e r forms of p o p u l a r e n t e r t a i n m e n t . I n the villages, a high status was ascribed to the town a n d to e v e r y t h i n g a n d everybody connected with it. This resulted in a c o n s t a n t t h o u g h n o t very sizable village-to-town m i g r a t i o n t h r o u g h o u t the past centuries. W i t h the spread of Westernization this m o v e m e n t increased, for the town now m e a n t g r e a t e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s for industrial employm e n t , to which was a d d e d the g l a m o r a n d a t t r a c t i o n of the Western style of life. A n o t h e r c h a n g e owing to W e s t e r n i z a t i o n t h a t resulted in an increased migration of villagers to t h e cities was t h e slowly b u t perceptibly i m p r o v i n g sanitary a n d hygienic conditions, especially in villages not too distant f r o m u r b a n centers. T h e s e improvements enabled a larger p e r c e n t a g e of children b o r n to survive a n d rcach m a t u r i t y , without, for the time being at least, affecting the traditionally high b i r t h r a t e of the a r e a . T h i s resulted in a rural p o p u l a t i o n pressure not experienced b y previous generations. Some of the surplus p o p u l a t i o n , u n a b l e to find a livelihood in the villages, h a d to migrate to the towns, a n d for lack of skills or other opportunities, swelled the n u m b e r s of the u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t . T h u s a social class c a m e i n t o being t h a t was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a greater dissatisfaction with its own status t h a n a n y p o p u l a t i o n element u n d e r traditional circumstances. O n e of the causes of this proletarian resentment has been discerned by T o y n b e e : the consciousness of being disinherited f r o m one's ancestral place in society. 4 A n o t h e r is the spatial p r o x i m i t y to higher social classes a n d the familiarity with their style of life. T h e tension c r e a t e d in rootless underprivileged g r o u p s as a result of this p r o x i m i t y , k n o w n f r o m m a n y other parts of the world, is a g g r a v a t e d in the M i d d l e East by the cultural gulf that separates the t w o element ,. Moreover, luxuries and wealth in the traditional M i d d l e East

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were kept indoors, to be enjoyed in the privacy of walled-in palaces and gardens, unsuspected by those who happened to pass by the simple and d r a b frontage facing the street. In contrast, luxurious living in the Western style means public display to be seen and envied by all. As Carleton Coon has put it, " T h e West has tended to widen the social gulf between rich and poor in the Middle East by dangling in the faces of the poor conveniences and luxuries of which they had never before heard and which they now cannot have, while giving the rich new and expensive tastes, and the need for more a n d more income." 3

MIDDLE-CLASS DEVELOPMENT

T h e second u r b a n development resulting from Westernization was the creation of a new and increasingly numerous middle class. It is true, of course, that in the traditional Middle Eastern town there was an established and highly specialized array of craftsmen, merchants, and professional people, whose position roughly corresponded to that occupied by the middle class in the modern West. W h a t Westernization effected, therefore, was not so much the crcation of a new class as a transformation of this traditional sector of the population into a middle class more and more similar to its Western equivalent. Since the traditional Middle Eastern craft, commercial, and professional guilds comprised literally hundreds of highly specialized occupations, their transformation, or "modernization," was a complicated a n d ramified process characterized by great differences in speed and extent. These differences depended, first of all, on the effective causes that brought about the transformation itself. With reference to the craft guilds, it appears that their decline and partial or total disappearance was caused mainly by the impact of Western technology and/or Western fashions of consumption. T h e adoption of Western clothing, for instance, contributed in every part of the Middle East to the decline of local clothing industries. Occasionally it has happened that local crafts declined and disappeared not as a result of the shrinking of their markets but in consequence of the competition of goods produced in Europe in cheap imitation of the local styles.

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Articles imported from the West were the products of a superior technology with which local artisanship was unable to compete. Of later origin, but today of increasing importance, is the competition of industrial undertakings established in the Middle Eastern towns themselves, first by foreigners, then by members of the indigenous minorities, and most recently by the state and rather hesitatingly also by members of the Muslim upper class. In some cases these so-called "new industries" in the Middle East were new also in the sense that they engaged in types of production not previously practiced in the area (for example, the extraction of minerals, chemicals), in which case they did not directly contribute to the decline of the traditional crafts. In other cases, however, they were new only in the sense that they introduced Western methods of production, while the products themselves or their equivalents had been both manufactured locally and consumed in the area for many generations (for example, certain foods and textiles, especially in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt), in which case they powerfully competed with and caused the decline of the old native industries. If in the case of the craft guilds the changing fashion, which is a matter of taste and preference, was a contributing cause of their decline, in the case of commercial guilds the same fashion changes resulted not in a decline, but in a transformation of the character of many business establishments. For the craftsman it was a matter of grave importance if he had to cease producing a certain type of merchandise, and only in rare cases could he switch to the production of the same basic goods but in a modern, that is, Western style. For the merchant, on the other hand, it was a matter of relative indifference what type of wares he carried in his store as long as he knew how to handle them and was able to make his profit. For this reason, while the external appearance of stores and shops has in many cases become modernized, with the plate glass shop window replacing the old wooden shutters, and while the contents of the stores also reflect the changing times, the merchant has suffered less from Westernization and Western competition than the craftsman. On the other hand, deep inroads were made by changes of fashion, taste, and preference in the traditional professions of the

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Middle East. Gone from the urban scene are most if not all of the bloodletters, leeches, surgeons, barbers, bonesetters, healers, readers, exorcists, diviners, soothsayers, fortune tellers, astrologists, dream interpreters, and many other professionals who ministered in traditionally accepted and specialized ways to man's desire to better his physical or mental condition. Not so long ago the confidants, advisers, and companions of kings and princes, they are gone, not in the sense of having completely disappeared, but gone, as it were, underground, withdrawn to the slums, to the quarters inhabited by the villagers recently attracted to the towns, or gone altogether from the larger cities where they could no longer find clients to the more remote small towns relatively untouched by the new ideas brought in from the West. This development surely reflects a radical change in mental attitudes dominant for centuries. But in probing for its causes, one cannot help doubting that this change was actually accomplished by a sudden conversion to more rational thinking. The clearly demonstrated "miracles" of Western medicine had of course much to do with the abandonment of the traditional methods of improving the physical condition of the body. But even this had to be preceded by some inclination to weigh rationally and unemotionally the evidence for and against both competing systems. Whence did this inclination come ? And as to those specialists who administered to the mental comfort of rich and poor alike, of both educated and ignorant, their efforts were summarily dismissed by the Westerners as "sheer superstition" without, however, having anything positive to offer in their stead. Whence, therefore, the inclination to adopt this Western attitude as well, without the backing of any new empirical evidence as to the futility of occult practices, and without anything Western to take their place ? The answer seems again to lie in the prestige of the Westerners and their culture, to which reference was made earlier. The prestige enjoyed by everything Western in the eyes of the natives created in the latter a propensity to emulate all the ways of the West. In fact, it often led to a subservient desire to acquire not only Western equipment, but also Western behavior, mannerisms, and attitudes. Consequently, Western medicine was accepted not only because it was demonstrably superior to traditional Middle

3

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Golden River lo Golden Road

Eastern medical practices, b u t also because it was W e s t e r n ; and the Western contemptuous attitude toward traditional

Middle

Eastern mantic and m a g i c a l practices was adopted on its face value only, merely because it w a s v o u c h e d for b y Western prestige. T h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y aspect of the decline of the

traditional

M i d d l e Eastern guilds and corporations is the emergence of new professional elements whose totality forms the new m i d d l e class. A n increasing section of the u r b a n population aspires or is compelled to j o i n the ranks of this new and vigorous social class, the importance of w h i c h for the cultural development of the M i d d l e East as a w h o l e is still g r o w i n g . A m o n g the members o f the old craft guilds w h o w e r e forced out of their professions b y the i m p a c t of Westernization, some had no choice b u t to j o i n the ranks of the u r b a n industrial p r o l e t a r i a t ; others m a n a g e d to survive the c h a n g i n g conditions, retain their independent positions, and take their places in the n e w order b y a d a p t i n g their products to the new consumers' demands. A n even greater percentage of the m e m b e r s of the old c o m m e r c i a l guilds succceded in retaining or even i m p r o v i n g their positions as independent owners of stores of v a r y i n g sizes w i t h v a r y i n g n u m b e r s of employees. T h e s e merchants, too, are today solid m e m b e r s of the middle class in the larger cities of the M i d d l e East. T h e professional sector of the middle class is its newest element. O n l y rarely were members of the old professions able to fit into the life of the Westernized city or to a d a p t themselves to the c h a n g e d conditions. A s a rule, the new professional class is recruited from a m o n g the sons of members of the other classes or sectors of the u r b a n p o p u l a tion, or of the better-to-do rural population. It has been observed in m a n y M i d d l e Eastern countries, as well as in other parts of Asia (for example, in India a n d Pakistan), that the a i m of the great m a j o r i t y of y o u n g people w h o c a n afford a college or at least a high school education is to g o into l a w , politics, journalism,

administration,

or

at least into

clerical,

religious, and teaching positions, and to practice these professions in the towns only. E d u c a t i o n in their eyes is the o p e n sesame to city life and to a livelihood earned not with one's hands. T h i s aversion to rural life and any type of labor that they consider to be m a n u a l is a heritage of the traditional M i d d l e Eastern u r b a n

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mentality that saw in the ability to escape working with one's hands the clinching proof of social advancement. It is interesting to note that this prejudice against village life and "manual" work is retained even in circles that otherwise pride themselves with their thorough Westernization. As a result of this attitude the new Middle Eastern middle class is lop-sided when judged by Western standards: it has a profusion of white-collar workers and intellectuals, many of whom are chronically unemployed, or underemployed and underpaid, while on the other hand it lacks a sufficient number of doctors, engineers, architects, chemists, technicians. Another consequence is the marked concentration of professional people in the cities, which greatly contributes to the growth of the cultural distance between town and country.

DISLOCATION OF V A L U E JUDGMENTS

In a traditional and well-settled culture such as that of the Middle East, reality (that is, tangible) ingredients and value ingredients, to use Kroeber's terminology, 6 are usually well adjusted. The two categories reinforce each other, and the extent of their mutual support lends the culture coherence, balance, and inner consistency. Take, for example, the matter of wealth and poverty. The typical situation in the Middle East was for centuries the concentration of great riches in the hands of a very few, with great poverty the share of the many. This was and in many places still is a factual reality. The ideologic counterpart of this situation was that the division of worldly goods is willed by God, that the possession of wealth is not one of those really important things for which man should strive, that there is a certain religious virtue in poverty, and that it is a religious duty of the rich to dole out alms to the poor. 7 In this manner extreme economic inequality was organically incorporated into the culture, not only by being accepted realistically but also by being underpinned ideologically. In a contact situation such as Westernization presents, this old balance between reality culture and value culture is disturbed. As Kroeber has emphasized, the reality ingredients of a culture can be loaned and borrowed much more readily than its value in-

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gradients. Therefore, very often there is a lag in the acceptance of value culture, while reality culture is accepted readily. One of the causes of this lag is the emotional attachment of society to its own value culture and its resistance to the introduction of new, foreign value ingredients. Since, however, reality culture and value culture are interdependent, the reality ingredients of one culture cannot be expected to fulfill the same function in another culture if the latter retains its own value ingredients. This thesis can be illustrated by examples from almost any field in which Western influences are felt in the Middle East. Take, for instance, the factory system introduced from the West. The adoption of all the technical equipment, the learning of all the skills and tricks of the trade, will not ensure the operation of a factory with the precision, reliability, and efficiency attained in the West as long as the basically negative attitude toward manual labor persists and the value of the work and the worker is not recognized. In other words, reality ingredients alone cannot guarantee the satisfactory functioning of an institution that in its home environment comprises value ingredients as well. All this, of course, does not mean that reality ingredients of a culture can be transplanted into another culture without causing changes in the values of the latter, or that values from one culture can be superimposed on another culture without causing changes in its reality ingredients. Quite the contrary. The close coordination and interdependence between reality culture and value culture make it impossible to introduce changes in the one without creating changes, with some delay perhaps, in the other. Thus, once the establishment of factories introduced new reality ingredients into the life of Middle Eastern towns, it became only a question of time until changes in values would follow. As a matter of fact, some signs of these changes already are visible here and there. In eastern Saudi Arabia, for instance, where the Arabian American Oil Company offers excellent working conditions to the still largely nomadic population of the peninsula, the tribesmen, until recently utterly contemptuous of all manual labor with the exception of the only noble task of breeding camels, flock in increasing numbers to the company's recruiting stations without suffering loss of prestige.

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In general, the approach of the West to the M i d d l e East, especially in recent years, has been characterized by a careful avoidance of ideologic issues and a concentration instead on a n u m b e r of practical problems. T e c h n i c a l , economic, a n d related missions sent in recent years to the M i d d l e East b y the United Nations or the U n i t e d States, as well as by private business enterprises working in the area, h a v e adopted the principle of noninterference with traditional ideologies and values as a f u n d a m e n t a l directive. In the case of Western religious missions, the abstention from ideologic influencing was not as much a matter of free choice as a matter of prudcnce in view of the hostility with which Islamic society would have reacted to open attempts at conversion. 8 T h e result was that while religious missions healed and treated tens of thousands of Muslim sick, gave education to other tens of thousands of M u s l i m children, and m a y h a v e influenced by precept and e x a m p l e the ethical outlook of m a n y others, they converted very few natives. Religion being a focal concern in the culture of the M i d d l e East, 9 conversion was regarded as apostasy and resulted in an open brcach with f a m i l y , society, and value culture. T h e convert to Christianity was ostracized b y his peers and, w h a t is equally important, since Islam was held with unshakable conviction to be the only true religion, to leave it was regarded as an evidence of utter folly. M o r e recently, to the 150-year-old impact of the Western world on the M i d d l e East has been a d d e d a new attack coming from the Russian totalitarian subvariety of Western culture. In contrast to its West E u r o p e a n predecessor, the Soviet impact is directed mainly at the ideologic facet of the traditional M i d d l e East culture. Part of the Communist effort is to convincc the people w h o m it seeks to win that the doctrines of C o m m u n i s m and Islam are not only compatible, but that actually C o m m u n i s m is the true interpretation of the original and pure form of Islam. A n d , as B e r n a r d Lewis has shown, certain external resemblances can, in fact, be discerned between the traditional Islamic forms of autocratic-theocratic social structure and the Soviet totalitarian-dictatorial state f o r m . 1 0 While there is no need to exaggerate the d a n g e r of a Communist revolution in any M i d d l e Eastern country, the Communist attack on the native culture at its ideo-

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logic roots is a serious threat that can create grave disturbances in the traditional cultural and social equilibrium even short of a political overthrow. While the direct impact of Christian missions on the religious life of the Middle East has been negligible, Westernization has indirectly resulted in an increasing coolness toward religion as a whole. It has been emphasized repeatedly that religion in the Middle East under traditional circumstances was a total way of life. 11 The craft guilds, for instance, were religious organizations; the wearing of the locally customary garb was religiously sanctioned; medicine was a religious vocation, as was teaching. Sovereignty itself was a religious office. While there was no hierarchy or priesthood in any sense comparable to those of the Catholic and Episcopalian churches, a considerable percentage of the urban population was engaged in directly religious professions. Many additional families, both in town and country, were supported by religious foundations that concentrated in their hands a considerable proportion of each country's landed property. The most important instrument through which religion exercised its hold on the individual was the traditional Middle Eastern patrilineal, patrilocal, patriarchal, endogamous extended family. The dependence of the individual on his family and his integration into it were so intense that Middle Eastern culture was rightly termed a kinship culture. 12 And since this family system itself was a religious institution, sanctioned and supported by religion, family and religion mutually strengthened each other. As we have seen, Westernization brought about a decline of paternal authority; a break-up of the extended family; a movement from village to town; a change-over in the towns themselves from the family economy of the old-fashioned crafts to the impersonal economic system of the factory with its employment of individuals as such, irrespective of family ties, and with its considerable labor turnover; and a conscious imitation, especially in the middle and upper classes, of Western family and social forms. All this resulted not only in a crucial change in the character of family life itself, but also in a trend away from religion and toward secularism. When the individual, and as a rule the young male individual, extricated himself from the hold of his family, he left behind an

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intrinsically religious atmosphere, the rejection of which thenceforward became a part of his negation of the old, tightly knit family system itself. Another point to make is that under traditional circumstances leadership, wealth, position, power, and control belonged, with very few exceptions, to members of the ruling religion, Islam, who all vied with one another in the public demonstration of their orthodoxy and piety. Religiosity was thus one of the hallmarks of the traditional upper crust, and consequently no question could arise in the minds of the other classes as to the importance, value, and obligatory nature of religious observance. On this scene appeared the prestige-laden Westerner, occupying superior positions, carrying a culture that evoked the desire to emulate it. These foreigners were not only adherents of a different faith, but their attitude toward their own Christian religion was, on the whole, lukewarm. Among those Middle Easterners whose general attitude toward Westernization was positive, the emulation of Western ways therefore meant, among other things, to display unconcern about their own religion. On the other hand, among those whose ties to their own religion-centered traditional culture proved stronger than the Westerly pull, Western irreligiosity became an additional cause to reject whatever the West had to offer and to seek refuge in "return to Islam" movements.

XIV.

Resistance to Westernization

T H E ISSUE OF W E S T E R N D O M I N A T I O N

A

s MANY Middle Easterners understand it, the basic motivation of the Western world in establishing contact with the Middle East was the endeavor to dominate it politically and exploit it economically. T h e Middle Eastern view is that for several decades the Western powers controlled the Middle East with the help of the Middle Eastern ruling classes who were either coerced or bribed into serving the Western interests. As a result, the peoples of the Middle East have remained poor and oppressed ; in fact, their poverty and oppression have even increased. By the end of World War I I however, the patience of the people became at long last exhausted; they burst forth in movements against foreign domination, against misery and poverty, and against those of their own rulers who, under the auspices and with the blessing of the foreign governments, had oppressed and exploited them. They produced strong and fearless leaders, nationalized their natural resources and the large foreign-owned industrial and commercial establishments, and declared many of the foreign residents as unwelcome. They sincerely felt, and never tired reiterating, that " W e would rather die than accept British or Russian or any other domination over our fatherland." As against this, the Western argument is as follows: Without Western initiative the natural resources of the Middle East would have remained unutilized. The Western powers were invited by the rulers of the Middle Eastern countries themselves to find and exploit their natural resources and to introduce Western technology. The Western companies that thereupon were set up shared their profits with the legal owners of the natural resources, 386

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the kings and governments of the Middle Eastern countries. These rulers, however, instead of passing on at least part of the benefits to the people themselves, pocketed all the income. They are, therefore, responsible for the poverty and degradation in which nine tenths of the Middle Eastern peoples live. They direct and foment the hatred of the West, of the "foreigners," in the hope of thus making the foreigners responsible in the eyes of the masses for the "animal-like standard of living forced on their people . . . by their own corrupt, greedy selves."1 In the leadlong clash of these two opposite views, the minimum measure of agreement that exists between them is apt to pass unnoticed. The fact of the matter, however, is that a major share of the direct responsibility for the poverty and misery of the people is laid by both sides at the door (or rather the luxurious portals) of the local ruling classes, whether their actions and attitudes are held to be instigated by foreigners or by their own selfish attitude. Resentment against effendis, pashas, agas, shaykhs, beys, deys, notables, landowners, and other traditional overlords is increasingly felt by the people, is more and more overtly expressed by their educated and articulate spokesmen, and is becoming a stronger and stronger impetus for social and land reforms. Although protestations against landlord exploitation still go hand in hand with a display of antiforeign sentiments, from the view of ideologic development it has to be pointed out that the very concepts of land reform and of a more equitable sharing of material benefits were born in the West whence they have penetrated the Middle East in recent years. The traditional Middle Eastern idea, which, by the way, made poverty and misery much more easily bearable, is that the landlord or the chieftain is a sort of family head, that all his tenants or vassals are subordinate members of his quasi-family, and that therefore it is not only actually inevitable, but also right in principle for the peasants to live on the barest subsistence level while sustaining their lords in luxury. To wish for a change in this situation, to revolt against a landlord, to threaten to kill him (as actually has happened several times lately in Iran), would have been as inconceivable in the past as it would be for a son in a traditional Middle Eastern patriarchal family to take a stand against his father. A great measure

Golden River to Golden Road of Western mentality had to be acquired before the people became receptive to reform ideas with reference to these important areas of entrenched traditionalism.

T E C H N O L O G Y , SCIENCE, AND M E D I C I N E

Of all the different aspects of Western culture that are being introduced in the life of the Middle East, the acquisition and use of technical equipment and methods encounters the least resistance. There is, of course, an innate disinclination to change old techniques that were inherited from one's ancestors and knowledge of which was acquired in early youth. A peasant father whose son returns home after three years in an agricultural school will not readily discard the old methods of cultivation that enabled him to make a living (and, incidentally, to send his son to school) for the new ones fervently advocated by the youngster. His resistance to change will be based on a preference for the familiar and a distrust of everything new, unknown and untried. Experience, shows, however, that if the son succeeds in demonstrating to the father the superiority of the method or the implement he recommends, the father soon changes his mind. Readiness to give up initial distrust and to accept demonstrated improvement was observed repeatedly in various Middle Eastern countries by social workers among the rural population.* Demonstrated advantages in technical improvements tipped the scale in favor of acceptance of superior Western machinery and the discarding of the old traditional implements in Palestine among the Arab weavers of Majdal. 3 Once the initial resistance is overcome, the readiness to accept demonstrated improvements soon turns into eagerness to benefit by them. This explains the numerous petitions sent by peasants from remote villages in Turkey or in Syria to the central authorities clamoring for a road, a hospital, a motorized pump, and many other technical improvements. 4 In addition to demonstrating in practice the good results of the suggested change rather than explaining them in theory, there is a second prerequisite for successful culture change in the technologic field: innovations must be introduced gradually. A change that if sprung upon the people precipitately would meet with

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determined resistance can become acceptable without any noticeable repercussion if protracted over a n u m b e r of years. T h e law that forbade the Turkish people to wear the red fez, with immediate effect, resulted in m u c h unnecessary resentment and bitterness. In several other Middle Eastern countries the oldfashioned headgear, together with the veil, is disappearing gradually; in the absence of sudden compulsion, the discarding of these traditional items of clothing spreads by the spontaneous process of voluntary imitation. T h e sum of these observations is that of all aspects of Western culture it is the material equipment that meets with the least resistance in the Middle East, a n d that further changes in this field can best be effected by demonstrating their advantages and by introducing them gradually. T h e situation with regard to the introduction of the exact sciences and the scientific method is similar. These facets of culture ipso facto touch directly upon the lives of the small u r b a n upper and middle classes only, whose contacts with Western culture are close and manifold. T h e great Western advances in all branches of science are fully acknowledged by these groups, and with the increasing recognition of the role a n d function of science in the life of a modern state there is a growing readiness on the p a r t of the young educated group to take u p the study of sciences in place of the traditional academic concentration on theology and law. As a m a t t e r of fact, the endeavor to get rid of Western interference and domination is an additional factor directing m a n y young people into those scientific and technical occupations which until recently were the exclusive domain of Westerners. It goes without saying that the attitude toward medicine and sanitation is the same as that toward Western technology and science. T h e demonstrated advantages of modern medicine and sanitation meet little resistance, a n d in m a n y cases, even in the most remote villages, there is a d e m a n d for more of these modern miracles of the west t h a n the local government can supply. EDUCATION

T h e changeover from traditional Middle Eastern to modern Western educational methods and aims can serve as an additional

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illustration of the practicability of introducing any change, even the most far-reaching one, if it is preceded by careful demonstration and is made gradually. Both these conditions were fulfilled in the course of the modest beginnings and the slow growth of modern educational institutions in the Middle East. Thus there was little organized resistance on the part of traditional forces who would have preferred to retain the outmoded kuttabs (Koran schools) as the only educational institutions. The first modern schools were founded by Western educators or patterned after a Western (French, British, American) model. In a short time modern Muslim schools were founded, until eventually they outnumbered the traditional Koran schools. 5 Another effect of the introduction of modern education was the increase in the percentage of children attending school. The Koran schools could never boast an enrollment of more than a small percentage of the male school-age population. Since the establishment of modern schools this percentage has been steadily on the increase in every Middle Eastern country. Since no corresponding increase has taken place in the Koran schools, the result is that an ever-growing majority of the children attend modern schools while a decreasing percentage of them is still sent by their parents to Koran schools.® Although the modern educational effort of the Middle East is still far from having reached its goal, several countries have passed laws of general compulsory elementary education, and thus have officially adopted the principle that every child is duty bound to acquire a system of knowledge much of which has been adopted from the West only recently. At the same time, however, in the curriculum of the modern Middle Eastern elementary schools (outside Turkey) great emphasis is put on the Koran, on Islam, on Islamic history, and the history of the country in which the school is situated (including its pre-Islamic phase). Expanding modern education thus creates in ever-increasing numbers of children and youths a much greater appreciation of their own culture than was ever the case under the old kuttdb education. The rudiments of Western learning are absorbed together with an increased religionational consciousness that potentially contains the seeds of anti-Western feelings.

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A R T S AND L I T E R A T U R E

In the realm of technology, it is relatively easy to demonstrate the superiority of a modern Western achievement over the traditional Middle Eastern one. It is not too hard to convince an Arab weaver that the wide fly-shuttle loom is superior to the old narrow-width hand loom, or to show a village population that if it cleans up a polluted source of water its health improves. Because of this, the introduction of Western technical improvements meets with least resistance. In other aspects of culture, such as the arts, music, and literature, it is not possible to demonstrate the superiority of one culture over another. What an individual or a group prefers in these fields is largely a matter of taste and education, and the end result of cumulative previous experience. When therefore Middle Easterners rave about the greatness of Beethoven and Tchaikovsky while deprecating the primitivity of their own music, they clearly have allowed their judgment to be influenced by factors extraneous to the musical enjoyment itself. There can be little doubt that the ostensible enjoyment of jazz music by the urban Turkish youth 7 originates in the wish to be regarded as modern and fashionable. Eventually, of course, a few years of listening to a new musical variety may result in a genuine preference for it. The great majority of the Middle Easterners, however, still enjoy their own traditional music only, still sing their old folksongs and popular songs, and still prefer to hear familiar tunes in radio broadcasts. 8 They show interest, although without too much appreciation, when "modern-Oriental" songs sung by such famous performers (that is, famous in the cities) as Abdul Wahhab or U m m Kulthum are broadcast, but have neither interest in nor understanding for the Western music to which the Westernized musical directors of the Middle Eastern broadcasting stations devote a considerable proportion of the program time. As with music, so with the visual arts, and especially their rich decorative varieties. On the one hand, traditional tastes still predominate among the "simple people"; and on the other, some of the more enlightened Middle Eastern governments have initiated measures to insure the survival of the fine crafts in which decora-

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tive a r t has traditionally f o u n d its expression. O n l y in the cities are foreign art forms, i n t r o d u c e d f r o m the West, b e c o m i n g fashionable a m o n g the sophisticated groups. It m a y be a r g u e d t h a t the resistance to the p e n e t r a t i o n of Western musical a n d visual art forms is a r a t h e r u n i m p o r t a n t aspect of the resistance to Westernization in the \ l i d d l e East. It must, however, b e r e m e m b e r e d t h a t it is precisely in the arts t h a t the regional a n d local c h a r a c t e r of a n y culture most overtly a n d specifically manifests itself. A loss of the traditional c h a r a c t e r of the M i d d l e Eastern arts would not only m a k e the life of the area's peoples poorer a n d d r a b b e r , it would also detract f r o m the sum total of m a n k i n d ' s artistic creativity. L i t e r a t u r e in M i d d l e Eastern p o p u l a r culture is of m u c h smaller significance t h a n the visual arts a n d music. T h e e n j o y m e n t of written literature is confined to a still very small e d u c a t e d u r b a n class, a n d the active p a r t i c i p a t i o n in it is the privilege of a very few individuals. Poetry, both in its artistic a n d p o p u l a r forms, is still very m u c h alive, a n d t h e old traditions of the great medieval A r a b a n d Persian poets are still followed, a l t h o u g h the resultant products are recognizedly inferior. But the Western literary forms of the novel a n d the short story are used almost exclusively b y m o d e r n M i d d l e Eastern writers of prose, a n d it is the consensus a m o n g M i d d l e Eastern literati themselves t h a t the original works of these local a u t h o r s are less enjoyable t h a n the translations of E u r o p e a n a n d A m e r i c a n prose p r e p a r e d b y the same writers. T h e only persons in a position to p u t u p a considered resistance to this form of Western c u l t u r a l p e n e t r a t i o n are t h e religious functionaries a n d the traditionally e d u c a t e d and t r a d i t i o n - b o u n d elements whose n u m b e r is d w i n d l i n g rapidly. T h e y d o not object to the perusal p e r se of W e s t e r n literary products in the original or in translation; neither d o they oppose in principle the fashionable trend a m o n g the y o u n g generation of authors to write in a style a n d in prose forms imitative of Western literatures. T h e y protest these m o d e r n developments because Western literary f o r m s are usually filled w i t h a W e s t e r n spirit; because the heroes of t h e novel a n d short story, as a rule, either a r e Westerners o r behave, think, a n d feel like W e s t e r n e r s ; a n d because thereby belles lettres as a whole serve as a p r o p a g a n d a i n s t r u m e n t for Western attitudes,

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mores, and values. More has to be said on this very sensitive issue ; but first it seems necessary to discuss the contrast between Middle Eastern and Western social control and intercourse that constitutes the background against which the clash over mores and values takes place. SOCIAL C O N T R O L

The next aspect of Western culture that encounters a more definite resistance is social control including organization, administration, and governmental forms. In traditional Middle Eastern society, social control and political organization are based on family ties, or at least are modeled after the structural pattern characterizing the family. The tribal or village headman, and even the landowner who owns entire villages, occupies a position vis-à-vis his people not unlike that of the patriarch of the family. Even King Ibn Saud kept to this tradition as long as it was physically possible for him. Western observers have often remarked at the ease with which the simplest tribesman could gain entrance to the King, and the familiarity with which he conversed with the powerful monarch of the Arabian Peninsula. In this "kinship culture" 9 the parallelism between familial and social structure goes even further. In the family, the son has no clearly defined rights of his own, for all his rights are vested in and defended by his father. In the social order, the individual lacks legally circumscribed rights apart from those which are represented by the headman of the larger social group to which he belongs. However, just as the son can always count on the love and protection of his father, the individual is in accordance with the prevailing ethos sure of the benevolence and help of his chieftain, headman, landlord, or other leading personality. This situation becamc somewhat complicated with the appearance on the Arab scene of Turkish, that is, foreign governors and other officials, but even the relationship between these and their Arab subjects was never as impersonal as is the case in a Western-type governmental and administrative set-up. It would therefore be shortsighted to attribute the resistance to the changeover from the traditional to modern Western organizational, administrative, and governmental forms to vested interests of the ruling classes

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alone. These undoubtedly constitute a powerful contributing factor; but it will take a great educational effort to accustom the governed classes to the impersonal Western organization with its insistence on equal rights and duties for everybody, instead of the personal Middle Eastern approach 10 with its emphasis on kinship, friendship, benevolence, and conveniently purchasable good will. The great emphasis put by traditional-minded Middle Easterners on the accustomed forms of social control and intercourse is a motivation, among those of them with sufficient insight to recognize indirect causal connections, for resistance to even the most innocuous aspects of Westernization. They observe that the acceptance of such unobjectionable elements of Western culture as technology, sanitation, industrialization, and the like inevitably brings about the penetration of Western social forms and behavior patterns as well. A young man who is sent by his father to a modern school, acquires a trade or profession, and subsequently finds employment in a factory or office, earns probably more than his father and gets accustomed to moving around in a world in which his father is a complete stranger. Such a young man will rarely exhibit to the full those traits of filial obedience, of selfsubordination to the joint interests of his family, as expressed and represented by his father or possibly his grandfather, which are highly prized values in the traditional mores of the Middle East. To engage in a new occupation invariably means that the individual doing so removes himself from the closed circle of joint family endeavor. Occupational change thus brings about economic separation, and this in turn results in the creation of a social distance that would have been unthinkable in the traditional set-up. The next step usually is the assertion of a certain independence by the young man in the choice of a wife, contrary to the traditional custom according to which the parents of the young people take the initiative and make the decision with regard to the marriage of their children. This is followed by the setting up of a separate household by the young people, again contrary to the custom which demands that the young couple become integrated into the household of the bridegroom's father. In this manner, educational and occupational changes, in themselves features of Western culture desirable from the Middle Eastern point of view,

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result in the breakdown or at least in a considerable weakening of the traditional extended family system that is one of the mainstays of Middle Eastern society. The substitution of the Western family pattern is regarded by most people (at least by those of the older generation) as highly undesirable, and is therefore resisted. Nor is the effect of education and occupational change confined to the breakdown of the traditional extended family. In the Middle East, as we have seen, all the larger social units, whether one of the two famous moieties, an urban trade guild, or a new political party, are firmly founded upon the extended family which, as a rule, has been committed for many generations to supporting them. In the past, since the individual was a member of an extended family, and the extended family as a whole derived its strength from its membership in such a larger unit, he was, as a rule, not able to break ranks, to change affiliation or allegiance. The result was a certain stability in the entire social structuring of the population. Up to a certain point, the changes brought about by modern times could be accommodated within this pre-existing social system owing to its inherent flexibility. When, for instance, voting and "modern" political parties were introduced, which in itself was done in emulation of Western political forms, the groups economically dependent on the great landlords and residing in their villages were transformed without much difficulty into political constituencies: instruction had only to be handed down to all those who had newly acquired the right to vote that they cast their ballot either for the landlord or for the man to whom he in turn owed allegiance. With the increase of literacy and of the occupational, economic, and social independence of the individual from his own extended family, the political system that had retained its traditional Middle Eastern content under the newly introduced Western forms began to crumble. Once the primary bond to one's extended family was weakened, the loyalties that the family as a whole owed to a larger group and its leaders also lost much of their hold. For this reason, if for no other, the family heads and all those who under the traditional system hold positions of importance and wield

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influence must be opposed to the changeover from the traditional Middle Eastern social forms to newfangled ones introduced from the West. MORES, MORALS, AND VALUES

Before entering the very sensitive area of mores, morals, and values, a general remark seems to be in place about a n all too often encountered preconception that makes difficult if not impossible the understanding of any resistance to Westernization. T h i s preconception is the conviction that Western ways of life, Western mentality a n d behavior are superior to their Middle Eastern counterparts. T o the average Westerner who visits the Middle East or w h o has any dealings with the area from a distance, the situation is a clear-cut o n e : " n a t i v e " peoples are given an opportunity to benefit by the vast storehouses of Western experience ; they are presented with the end results of a long and laborious civilizatory development; they can therefore learn within a short time w h a t it took the West several centuries to achieve, and thus are enabled to step out of the Middle Ages right into the twentieth century. If they do not want to learn, if they do not wish to be helped, if they are "choosy," rejecting this and accepting only p a r t of that, this is b u t a n additional manifestation of their backwardness a n d stubbornness. As against this rule-of-the-thumb explanation of any opposition to Westernization, it is well to consider that Middle Eastern cultures, as the other great cultures of the Orient, " a r e thousands of years older than the W e s t . . . with aesthetic, religious, and social values in m a n y respects superior." 1 1 Middle Eastern opposition to Westernization can, therefore, stem from the apprehension, even if not often clearly articulated, that a wholesale adoption of Western civilization would entail the displacement a n d loss of m a n y greatly cherished traditional Middle Eastern cultural values. T h e issue of modern versus traditional mores and morals often result in conflict even within the context of one single culture between the old and the young generation. When the old generation is in addition the exponent of the traditions of one culture and the young one that of the dominant moral tenor of another

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very different culture, the conflict between them can become much more pronounced and embittered. Although from Chapters 2 and 5 it became apparent that considerable variations exist between one culture area in the M i d d l e East and another in several important facets of the traditional mores and morals, precisely those areas that have hitherto become exposed to Western influences share a certain f u n d a m e n t a l value syndrome negated in its entirety by modern Western culture. I n m a n y cases the contrast between the two systems of mores and values is explicit and b l a t a n t ; in others, it is implicit and latent, but its existence is nevertheless felt by those w h o m their own full awareness and appreciation of traditional M i d d l e Eastern values sensitize even to differences in emphasis. A few areas can be indicated, albeit with sketchy brevity. T r a d i t i o n a l M i d d l e Eastern mores insist on segregation between the sexes to v a r y i n g degrees; the modern West has built its entire social life on the mingling of the sexes, allowing and even prescribing intimate bodily contact between members of the opposite sex barely acquainted with each other as, for example, at dances. T h e M i d d l e East has developed a g a r b that reveals neither the feminine nor the masculine body f o r m ; in fact, the long robes traditionally worn reveal the sex of the w e a r e r only by their color and decorative pattern, and not by outlining the shape of the physical f r a m e . In the modern West, clothes emphasize rather than hide the difference between the physical shapes of the two sexes, a n d , on certain occasions, reveal almost the entire body. I n the traditional M i d d l e East age is a v a l u e ; the older a person becomes the more he is honored and the more prestige he has. I n the Wrest, age is considered a d r a w b a c k and, with few exceptions, the older a person is the less his importance for society and even for his own family. Education and socialization in the M i d d l e East aim at m a k i n g the young ones into obedient members of their families. Both during maturation and after having reached adulthood, the y o u n g e r generation must follow the instructions of the elders, and subordinate its own interests to those of the f a m i l y . I n the West, the purpose of education is to make the youngsters independent as e a r l y as possible; it is anticipated that they will soon " f l y the

Golden River to Golden Road coop," make their own decisions, find their own way, and fight their own battles. Family cohesion is minimal and neither expected in actuality nor upheld in theory. In the traditional Middle East, the drive for material success is mitigated and balanced by a religious outlook that stresses the need to be prepared for afterlife. In the Modern West, work for success here and now, measured primarily in income and property, completely absorbs most people. The above items are merely examples of a long list of contrasting values whose sum total is the ethos in each of the two cultures. That people steeped in traditional Middle Eastern culture object to the abandonment of their own value system for that of the modern West should not be difficult to appreciate. Most people, and especially those who are carriers of traditional cultures, tend to regard their own values as " r i g h t , " and different values as "wrong." This tendency becomes even more pronounced in a culture permeated by religion to the extent to which the Middle Eastern is. For Middle Eastern religiocentricity the adoption of Western value culture appears not merely as the exchange of a proved set of values for an inferior one, but as a fatal deviation from the "straight path" (Koran 1 : 5 ) . In traditional Middle Eastern society, whether rural or urban, nomadic or settled, the daughter's place is at home until such time as she is safely married off by her parents to a man as closely related to the family as possible. Formal schooling for girls is a Western innovation the acceptance of which still lags behind that of the schooling of boys. 1 2 But those girls who are sent to school are by this single act placed in a position largely similar to that of the educated young man in relation to their families. Outside the family circle itself, the educational facilities granted to varying percentages of the women in Middle Eastern countries bore results that were alarming to those who clung to traditional social forms and mores. In one country only, namely in Turkey, complete political equality of women with men was made law in 1934. In other countries women are still demanding such rights with varying intensity. In Egypt, for instance, there is a strong feminist movement, but there is also strong opposition to it on the part of the 'ulamd of el-Azhar and other orthodox Muslims who

Resistance to Westernization maintain that woman's place is in the home and that according to Islamic law public authority is confined to men. In Syria only literate women won the franchise (in 1949) while both literate and illiterate men are permitted to vote. Any change in the traditional position of women in the Middle East is a step in the direction of Westernization and is advocated by feminists in their desire to secure for women a position similar to that held by them in the Western world. On the other hand, opposition to these feminist aspirations stems from the socioreligious attitude of the conservative elements who see in the feminist movement an infringement of traditional religious law and custom. T H E R E A L M OF L A W

Religious conservatism is the ideological and emotional foundation also of the opposition to the introduction of new systems of laws. Law in the Middle East has been the domain proper of religion for the past five thousand years. T h e Islamic versions of religious law, although the youngest of indigenous legal systems in the area, are by now about a thousand years old and therefore do not cover all the contingencies of later developments. They are especially out of touch with the legal needs arising as a result of Westernization. In the more Westernized states Islamic Canon Law (shari'a) has been supplemented by a modern civil law taken over from the West, while in the more tradition-bound countries the older tribal or local ('urf, 'ada, izref, ittifaqat) law is still adhered to by the nonurban population. These three legal systems function independently and without coordination, and the observance of one of them occasionally entails a breach of the other. The survival of the 'urf after thirteen hundred years of Islamic legal domination is an eloquent testimony to the religiolegal conservatism of the Middle East. In relation to the problem of further modernization of the realm of law this conservatism is expressed by the opposition to any additional expansion of the domain of modern civil law at the expense of traditional Islamic law. In most countries the present stage of legal development is considered satisfactory, whether modern civil law has made

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considerable headway as in Egypt, or is still completely excluded as in Yemen. Secularization of the law is opposed in many countries not only by individuals and public bodies with vested religious interests, but also by thoughtful people who are otherwise not particularly conservatively minded. As to the conservative element, they feel keenly that Westernization, as von Grunebaum put it, "develops what secularizing tendencies there are in the Islamic heritage, it relegates the Canon Law, in a sense the greatest achievement of traditional Islam, to the background and it assails the social basis of traditional society by changing the status of women, introducing democratic procedures, and a new kind of education." 13 ISLAM A N D THE " I N F I D E L "

Islam, the ruling Middle Eastern religion, is thoroughly Oriental insofar as it exercises as strong a hold over the thoughts and emotions of the great majority of the population as do the great religions of southeast Asia, in sharp contrast to the modest place of religion in the modern Western world. In one fundamental aspect, however, Middle Eastern religion is basically different from the other major Oriental religions, and falls into one category with Western religion (Christianity), in keeping with the common origin of the two. The major South Asian and Southeast Asian religions (with the exception of Shinto) are nontheistic and tolerant of other faiths. Islam, like Christianity and like the parent religion of both, Judaism, is theistic, proselytizing, 14 aggressive, and often intolerant. Common to all theistic religions is the tendency to regard "religious views other than their own as heathen, erroneous, or inferior." 15 Thus while in South Asia and Southeast Asia the presence of Europeans who were of a different religious persuasion did not arouse resentment on religious grounds, the appearance of Christians in the Muslim world evoked the typical impatient reaction of a theistic religion to an encounter with members of another faith. The appellative "Christian" (like that of "Jew") has remained to this day an expression of contempt in the more isolated parts of the Middle East. The traditional attitude of Muslims to "infidels" has almost the same quality that characterized the missionary and inquisitorial zeal of the Spaniards after

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their arrival in the New World: the "infidel" (in the Middle East) or the "idolatrous pagan" (in New Spain) must be saved by conversion to the only true faith (Islam in the Middle East, Catholicism in New Spain) in his own interest and even against his will. This attitude explains the periodic outbreaks of violence, subsiding only when formal conversion was accomplished, perpetrated by Muslim mobs against Christians and Jews living in their midst who, in normal times, were merely treated with varying degrees of contempt as dhimmi, tolerated subject people. Violence against foreigners has been rare even in those countries of the Middle East that have preserved much of their isolation, but the feeling of contempt against those who are not "believers" is still present. The self-assurance of these foreigners in the superior positions they occupy, their impolite manners, 1 6 and even their eagerness to teach and instruct are in striking contrast to the accustomed submissive behavior pattern of the dhimmi, the native Christians and Jews. And not only does the foreigner do all the things from which a dhimmi (if he ever dreamt of presuming) would be immediately and most effectively discouraged, he cannot even be reproached for it. Here is an unbeliever who is an adherent of the same churches (regarded by the Muslim as places of semi-idolatrous worship since they are decorated with pictures and statues) as the native Christian. Yet instead of following the customary pattern of dhimmi submissiveness, his bearing betrays his pride; he expects all and sundry to comply with his wishes, and to follow his instructions; instead of asking for favors, he has the power to grant them. In this emotion-guided chain of reactions there is little place for such practical considerations as the actual usefulness of the foreigner or the economic advantages and material benefits his presence means for the country at large. An emotional tension is thus built up that can find no outlet (apart from rare outbreaks of violence usually discouraged by the authorities) and therefore leads to what to the Westerner appear as completely unreasonable demands aiming not at the benefit of the Middle Eastern people concerned but at the elimination of the "stone of offense," the foreigner. Like all other phenomena connected with Westernization, the variations of this religiously grounded antiforeigner feeling con-

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stitute a scale of fine gradation from the "most intense" on the one end to the "minimal" on the other. Nor must it be forgotten that the population of no Muslim country is homogeneous, and that considerable differences can be found in the attitude to foreigners among the various classes and groups of the urban population, as well as among the urban people in general on the one hand and the inhabitants of the villages, especially the more remote ones, on the other. WESTERNIZATION AND SECULARIZATION

This antiforeign feeling is a heritage of past centuries when the whole world was in Muslim eyes divided into the Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, the House of Islam or Peace, and the House of War. In this view, every country and individual not belonging to the Dar al-Islam was to ipso an enemy. In modern times, increasing familiarity with people who were characterized above as primary personal sources of Westernization, and many other kinds of contact with the Western world, have rendered this view obsolete. In the meantime, however, a new motivation started to serve as fuel for the old fire. It has been observed by Middle Eastern people in the last two generations that wherever Westerners and with them Western civilizatory attainments penetrate, traditional religiosity suffers a setback. This has proved to be the case even if nothing but the most external and mechanical phases of Western civilization were introduced. Not as if these were accompanied by a danger of conversion to Christianity (in no other culture has Christian missionary activity been crowned with less success than in the Middle East) but because the adoption of Western civilizatory trappings tended to loosen the hold religion traditionally has had over all aspects of life, and to make people negligent in the fulfillment of religious ritual. Westernized Middle Easterners will assert that they are good Muslims in their feeling and thinking even though they do not observe the Fast and the Prayers, the prohibition of drinking wine and eating pork, and other ritual injunctions of Islam. Tradition-bound Muslims, however, attach to these assertions even less value than similar statements by non-

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403

practicing Catholics have in the eyes of practicing Catholics. To the average Middle Easterner, in whose life religion is still the fundamental motivating force 17 —religion not expressed in formal observance is unthinkable. There is therefore an opposition even to the culturally "harmless" or "neutral" components of Western civilization such as technical and organizational improvement, not because these in themselves are deemed undesirable, but because it is understood that they are almost inevitably followed by a decline of religious observance. It is felt that a breakdown or even a mere cracking of the religious-spiritual-emotional edifice, a total or partial loss of the traditional mental climate, and a narrowing down of the wide outlook would be too high a price to pay for mere material betterment.

SUPERFICIAL W E S T E R N I Z A T I O N

It has been noticed by both Western and Middle Eastern observers that the first effect of Westernization is to focus the interest of those caught in it on the overt manifestations of Western culture, such as technology and organizational know-how; that a true absorption of Western cultural patterns with their implicit ideational mainsprings takes place very rarely; and that in many cases the individual nevertheless tends to abandon his own traditional cultural values, and becomes rootless and superficial.18 Especially younger people often suffer serious personality damage because, having acquired the external trappings and mastered the overt mannerisms of the Westerners, they feel free to throw off the traditional restraints of their old culture without having first grasped and often without even suspecting the existence of the different set of restraints invisibly controlling Western behavior patterns and directing them into morally sanctioned channels. In contacts between males and females, parents and children, teachers and pupils, elders and youths, employers and employees, the rejection of the old social forms, a seemingly unavoidable concomitant of Westernization, often means the complete disappearance of any check or constraint. It is not hard to see why thoughtful Middle Easterners should be disquieted by these developments, and why some of them

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should advocate a policy of cultural isolationism. It simply amounts to rejection of the honey for fear of the bee's sting.

AMBIVALENCE

Complete rejection, however, of everything offered by Western culture is rare. It is an extreme, polar position. More frequent is an attitude that can best be described as ambivalent, as composed of both negative and positive factors. O n the positive side there is the irresistible glitter of many features dangled by the West before the eyes of the Middle East. The reaction to these is a strong desire to acquire them, to imitate them, to master them, to enjoy them, and to profit by them. Hand in hand with attraction, however, goes repulsion; there is the feeling that the people who seem so ready to teach and to impart these good things are themselves not virtuous, that any or all of the following objections apply to them: they are unbelievers; they are foreigners; they wish to gain (or retain, or strengthen, or renew, as the case might be) domination over the country; their ultimate aim is exploitation; their mores and morals are undesirable. There is, in brief, the fear that if the peoples of the Middle East swallow the bait of the attractive offerings of the West, they will soon be unwittingly influenced by Western thinking, outlook, points of view, behavior, and will in the process lose their own values, individuality, ideals, concepts, which make them the true sons of their fathers and bring them honor, status, and respectability. Thus the desire to learn from the West in the material and other fields in which Western supremacy is unquestioningly acknowledged is powerfully counteracted, or at least inhibited, by the fear of being contaminated by those Western traits against whose acceptance traditional, moral, ethical, religious, emotional, and ideational scruples militate. Few are the people in the Middle East who are consciously aware of this ambivalence in their attitude to Western values. Fewer still are those who are able to resolve the conflict created by it. In many cases one of the two contrasting attitudes gains dominance in consciousness while the other is forced back, repressed, and relegated into the subconscious where it becomes an irritating factor and a source of frustration.

Resistance to Westernization

405 OUTLOOK

In conclusion it should be pointed out that the development of the traditional Middle East appears to have lingered for several centuries close to the beginning of that road which, according to Redfield, led precivilized h u m a n society toward its bifurcation into urban civilization and folk society. 1 * Furthermore, in accordance with Redfield's generalized statement to the effect that the technical order is the destroyer of the moral order, 2 0 the increasing new ramifications of the technical order in the cities have m a d e the ancient walls of the Middle Eastern moral order begin to crack and crumble. T h e literati of the Middle Eastern u r b a n society have viewed this breakdown of their highly prized moi al order under the impact of Westernization with understandable alarm, and have issued impassioned pleas for resistance. It is difficult to foretell what the results of these efforts will be, especially in view of the fact that the growing "intelligentsia," as Toynbee calls those members of the native community who " h a v e learned the tricks of the intrusive civilization," 2 1 exerts a powerful pull in the direction of Westernization. But certain signs indicate that the Middle Eastern developments will bear out the correctness of Redfield's observation that "the effects of the technical order (also) include the creation of new moral orders." 2 2 This constructive and recreative effect of the introduction of a new technical order lags behind its immediate effect, which is destructive, but its manifestations are becoming more and more evident each day, and in them lies the justification for looking with confidence towards the cultural future of the Middle East. As to the future relationship between the Middle East and the Western world, the experience of the last two decades has shown that economical aid and technical assistance, though i m p o r t a n t and even imperative, are in themselves not sufficient to make for understanding and cooperation between peoples belonging to two different cultures. Aid offered on the basis of w h a t is important and desirable in Western culture can meet with conditional or grudging acceptance or even forthright refusal by people sharing a different culture and having therefore a different scale of values. T h e air lift organized by the U.S. Air Force a few years ago to

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help thousands of pilgrims reach Mecca in time and thus fulfill a lifelong dream undoubtedly did more to create among the peoples of the Middle East an appreciation of the sincerity of America's attitude towards them than millions of dollars of economic aid could have done. In order properly to evaluate what Middle Eastern culture will willingly accept from the embarrassingly rich storehouses of Western civilization, a better and sounder understanding of Middle Eastern culture must first be acquired. The same prerequisite is necessary in order to gauge the probable effects of newly introduced traits on the cultural context of traditiondirected peoples. Also, the ways and means in which new cultural offerings can be made palatable must be studied much more thoroughly than was hitherto the case. In brief the only way in which the Gordian knot of resistance to Westernization in the Middle East can be unraveled is that of studying the Middle East, of obtaining a fuller picture of its traditional culture, a better understanding of the processes of change taking place in it at present, and a deeper insight into the psychology of human groups brought up in Middle Eastern culture. The task is taxing, but the prize, harmony between the West and a neighboring world area of crucial importance, is well worth it.

XV.

The Endogamous Unilineal Descent Group

A

of endogamous unilineal descent groups is long overdue because the very existence of such groups has hitherto been either largely overlooked or else explicitly denied in general structural studies dealing with the unilineal descent group (in the following: U D G ) , and because the identification of exogamous marriage patterns with the U D G has led to certain distortions in the latter's generalized portraiture. DISCUSSION

A

NEGLECTED

SUBJECT

Let us begin with a few examples ol the neglect of the endogamous variety of UDGs. Of general texts in anthropology, those of Herskovits and Slotkin can illustrate two approaches to the phenomenon. Herskovits, in his Man and His Works discusses exogamy in some detail but says absolutely nothing about endogamy, although in a chapter on "Social Organization: the Structure of Society" one would expect at least a brief reference to the fact that in some societies marriage preference is endogamous. Slotkin 2 divides hereditary kinship groups into (a) unilateral and exogamous and (b) bilateral and either open or endogamous; he does not mention the third possibility, namely, that a hereditary kinship group can be unilateral and endogamous. This omission is the more remarkable since in giving his only example of a unilateral, exogamous, patrilineal, and patrilocal kinship group, he refers to the Arabs of the South Palestinian village Arfas, 3 who, however, are endogamous. O f general theoretical discussions devoted to UDGs, we can take Fortes' influential paper, " T h e Structure of Unilineal 407

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Descent Groups," as typifying the silence with reference to endogamous LiDGs. 4 In this paper, Fortes summarizes the findings of British anthropologists (including his own) in the field of African kinship studies and gives an excellent outline of the main features of the U D G . As will be pointed out below, roughly one half of continental Africa is inhabited by peoples with endogamous U D G s . Yet while Fortes refers repeatedly to the exogamy of the African societies south of the Sahara 5 and also to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, 0 nowhere does he even as much as hint that these Bedouin practice endogamy (in fact the term " e n d o g a m y " or "endogamous" does not appear even once), so that the reader is left with the false impression that the Cyrenaican Bedouin share the practice of exogamy with the societies south of the Sahara. Of theoretical papers dealing with certain aspects of descent groups and overlooking the existence of endogamous U D G s there is no dearth. T w o examples, both published in the 1964 volume of the American Anthropologist, will suffice. Coult, 7 basing himself on Firth 8 and Murdock, 9 repeats the fallacious dichotomy we already met in Slotkin: "Unilineal descent groups tend to be exogamous, whereas ambilineal descent groups tend not to be so." T h e somewhat flexible "tend to be" soon becomes an actual differentiating criterion: " T h e absence of exogamy is an important feature differentiating the two types of descent groups,'" 0 namely, the unilineal and ambilineal. What is implied here is practically identical with Slotkin's proposition: descent groups are of two types : either unilineal and exogamous, or ambilineal and nonexogamous. Apart from the curious avoidance of the term "endogamous," which seems called for in a discussion ot marriage patterns, it is baffling that the possibility of the existence of a third type of descent groups - one which is unilineal and endogamous is again excluded from a theoretical classification of descent groups. T h e second paper, by Moore," opens with the statement: " K i n s h i p networks involve a paradox. On the one hand marriage links exogamic kin groups . . . " creating the distinct impression that all kinship networks are "exogamic." A few pages later, 1 2 in commenting on Lévi-Strauss' argument that

Endogamous Unilineal Descent Group animal species, which are endogamous, are nevertheless suitable symbols of exogamous groups because totemism puts its emphasis ' not on the animality but on the d u a l i t y , " M o o r e says, " T h i s part of the Lévi-Strauss argument is superfluous. T h e e n d o g a m y of animal species makes animals not less, but more appropriate as emblems of descent groups. This is obiiously not because of any (utual endogamy in descent groups, but because descent groups are symbolically self-perpetuating" (emphasis mine, R . P . ) . T h u s w e are offered a neat distinction between animal and h u m a n g r o u p s : animal groups are endogamous. while h u m a n descent groups "obviously" are not.

THE

INCIDENCE

01

ENDOGAMOUS

SOCIETIES

Is this neglect of endogamous U D G s justified on the basis of iheir relatively insignificant incidence in relation to the frequency of exogamous U D G s ? S o m e students of social structure w h o noticed the lack of endogamous U D G s seem to be inclined to answer this question in the affirmative. M u r p h y and K a s d a n , for e x a m p l e , comment that comparatively little interest has been devoted to the study of preferential patrilateral parallel cousin marriage and kin group endogamy. T h i s is understandable when one considers that the contemporary occurrence of this practice is limited to the A r a b s and their immediate Muslim neighbors, while the reverse phenomena of e x o g a m y and crosscousin m a r r i a g e recur throughout the w o r l d . 1 3 Let us consider whether this alibi for the neglect of e n d o g a m y actually holds. W e m a y turn, to begin with, to M u r d o c k ' s " W o r l d Ethnographic S a m p l e . " Of 564 or 565 societies listed by M u r d o c k in this sample, he found cross-cousin (patrilateral, matrilateral, and symmetrical) marriage preference in 1 5 3 societies. 1 4 T h e s e 1 5 3 societies are the sum total of no less than twelve different types of societies and marriage preferences. O n the a v e r a g e , therefore, one type of society with one type of cross-cousin marriage preference comprises 1 2 . 7 5 groups. In the same table on which the above calculation is based, M u r d o c k lists twelve societies with patrilineal descent with preferential marriage with a parallel cousin. T h i s type of

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marriage preference is confined to societies with patrilineal descent and is absent in the three other types of descent groups, the matrilineal, the double descent, and the bilateral. Comparing equivalent units of classification, we find that, according to Murdock's evidence, preferential marriage with a parallel cousin in patrilineal descent groups has approximately the same incidence as the average of any single type of cross-cousin marriage preference in any single type of descent group. Nor is this all. For Murdock himself can be added to the list of those students of social structure who pay little or no attention to endogamy. Although he recognizes and lists preferential parallel-cousin marriage, he establishes no category of endogamy. In columns 10 and u of his "World Ethnographic Sample," where he lists several categories of exogamous patrilineal and matrilineal kin groups, the category of endogamous kin groups is missing. In the absence of such a category, let us have a closer look at Murdock's category " P " (preferential marriage with a parallel cousin) which figures in his column 10. Although in Table 3 he gives twelve as the number of societies practicing preferential parallel cousin marriage, in his Table 1 he lists thirteen such societies (Beja, Hausa, Kababish, Berabish, Egyptians, Shawiya, Ulad Nail, Kurd, Afghan, Iranians, Sindhi, Merina, and Guahibo). 1 5 More importantly, however, a scrutiny of the cultures listed by Murdock in his Moslem Sudan, Sahara, North Africa, and Near East areas reveals that these include at least eight additional societies which practice (or practiced) preferential parallel (patrilateral) cousin marriage and which were incorrectly assigned to other categories. They are as follows: 1. The Songhoi (Moslem Sudan) are identified by Murdock as a society in which "marriage with a parallel cousin [is] disapproved but not specifically forbidden." Miner, however, found at least one Songhoi group, the Arma of Timbuctoo, among whom there is equal preference for marriage with both father's brother's daughter and mother's sister's daughter. 16 2. The Mzab (Sahara) are listed by Murdock as a society concerning whose marriage preference no information is avail-

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411

able. It is known today that the Mzabites prefer patrilateral parallel cousin marriage. 17 3. T h e Siwans (Sahara) are listed by Murdock as a society in which "marriage with a parallel cousin [father's brother's daughter] is allowed but not preferred." Walter Cline reported as long ago as 1936 that marriage with FaBrDa (father's brother's daughter) was the preferred pattern in Siwa. 1 8 4. T h e Riffians (North Africa) are stated by Murdock to be a society practicing "lineage exogamy, that is, marriage [is] forbidden with any lineage mate (or with comparable refatives in the absence of lineages) but permitted with remoter unilinear kinsmen." In fact, the Riffians not only prefer marriage with FaBrDa, but ego has the right to marry her, and the infringement of this right by ego's FaBr (by giving his daughter in marriage to an outsider) results in his being killed by his brother's son. Preference for patrilateral cousin marriage is general in Morocco, among both Arabs and Berbers. 19 5. The Bedouin (Rwala, Near East) are listed by Murdock as a society in which "marriage with a parallel cousin is forbidden, unilinear exogamy being absent." The emphatic preference for FaBrDa marriage among the Rwala, and Bedouins in general, is so well known 20 that one must assume that this particular entry is due to a printer's error, and that " p " (preferred) should be substituted for the " f " (forbidden). 6. The Hebrews (800 B.C., Near East) are listed by Murdock as a society in which "marriage with a parallel cousin (FaBrDa) was allowed but not preferred." M y own studies have amply shown that among the ancient Hebrews FaBrDa marriage was strongly preferred. 21 7. T h e Lebanese (Munsif, Near East) arc categorized by Murdock as a society in which "marriage with a parallel cousin [is] forbidden, unilinear exogamy being absent." The true situation, much too complicated to be summarized in a brief sentence, is as follows: In the Lebanese Christian Arab village of Munsif 2 2 as well as in other Christian Arab communities in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and so forth, the church forbids all types of first-cousin marriages. Popular custom, however, prefers it. If a man wants to marry a first cousin, he merely

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applies to the bishop for permission. T h e frequency of such marriages, which often are entered into without church dispensation, attests to the existence of the general Middle Eastern preference for marriage with a patrilateral parallel cousin among the Christian Arabs as well. 2 3 8. The Turks (Anatolia) are listed by Murdock as a society in which "marriage with a parallel cousin" is "allowed but not preferred." The available evidence, however, shows that FaBrDa marriage is (or was) preferred among the Turks in the traditional order. 24 If these eight cases are added to the thirteen listed in Murdock's table, we obtain a total of twenty-one societies with preference for FaBrDa marriage. Moreover, since this type of marriage preference is always the most emphatic expression of patrilineal endogamy, it follows that the corrected number of societies with preference for such marriage also indicates a wider incidence of patrilineal endogamy. Obviously, the above number, which is merely the corrected figure of the societies practicing parallel cousin marriage preference among the 565 societies selected by Murdock, for his sample, does not give a complete picture of the incidence of this practice the world over. The data gathered above in Chapter 6 (pp. 135-76) indicate that this type of preference characterizes the marriage pattern in the entire Middle East. The African part of the Middle East extends over the entire northern half of the continent. It would therefore seem desirable that a trait (endogamy) characterizing this half of Africa be given the same consideration in a study of African U D G s as the alternative trait (exogamy) found in sub-Saharan Africa.

PATERNAL

AUTHORITY:

THE

SONS

The identification of unilineal descent with exogamy and bilateral descent with the absence of exogamy (which include endogamy), a notion that has become almost axiomatic, has led to attempts to show that the Arab kin group which is undeniably endogamous and, indeed, exhibits a strong preference for marriage with a father's brother's daughter, is not really

Endogamous

Unilineal

Descent Group

4'3

unilineal. T h e fact is that the Arab kin group, as well as the typical kin group in the Middle East in general (including such non-Arab and/or non-Muslim ethnic groups as the Christian Copts of Egypt, the Christian Nestorians of Kurdistan, the Jews of every Middle Eastern country, etc.), is emphatically unilineal. O n e striking expression of this unilineality is the great stress on paternal authority or potestality. At the same time, there is in Middle Eastern families and kin groups a considerable degree of informality, and especially in noinadic family and social life on all levels. It is a well known fact, surprising to Western observers, that the lowliest Bedouin was able to sit down next to mighty King 'Abdul 'Aziz Ibn Saud in the council tent or chamber, addressing him a s " Y a Sa'ud (literally " O , S a u d , " but carrying overtones 01 familiarity; a man would address a son, a servant, or a slave with the same word, " Y a " ) . Does this mean that the king had no authority? Certainly not. As to paternal authority, a vast array of documentation is available to prove beyond d o u b t not only that it is exercised within the family but also that there is an actual subordination of a son's personal interests to those of the family as represented by the father or grandfather. Indeed, the entire system is calculated to subordinate son to father. The son's dependence on his father is hammered into him during the course of his entire education. H e early learns that his position in the larger society (tribe, village, etc.) depends upon the status of his father. And even when he begins to earn money, his entire income goes to his father, who also controls all property. It is the father who decides when and whom his son should marry, and who pays for him the bride-price to the bride's father. Thus, beyond all apparent informality, there is an almost total concentration of power in the hands of the father over both his sons and daughters. As to the actual authoritarian posture of the father in the Middle Eastern family, the available evidence is so ample that in the present context it is only possible to sample it. T h e Rwala Bedouin: "If they [the young children] deserve it, they are spanked with a stick, not only by their mother or father, but by the slaves both male and female. T h e Rwala believe that the rod originated in Paradise . . . and that it also leads man

4'4

Golden River to Golden Road

back to it. . . . |When the son reaches the age of 14 to 16] the father would not think of punishing the disobedience of his son simply with a stick but uses a saber or a dagger instead. By cutting or stabbing them the father not merely punishes the boys but hardens them for their future life. In the opinion of the Bedouins, the son who disobeys is guilty of rebellion for which the proper punishment is the saber. . . T h e K u w a i t Bedouin: " [ T h e mother] will fly at her husband if he attempts to punish their child. . . A man had his own son put to death because the boy had killed his tent-neighbor in the heat of a foolish quarrel. " T h e rights of a Bedouin father over his children are absolute." " A son does not greet his father as he would another man. He must show proper modesty, and especially amongst strangers must take a back seat and appear to obliterate himself in the presence of his parent. . . . On the other hand, a father will greet his small sons with effusive affection, and the youngsters will always run to him to be kissed and fondled . . . girls are not so fondled. . . ." 2 6 In I r a q : " T h e eldest male in the Bedouin clan, the village, or city household has absolute authority. He makes all decisions within the household unit, receives income, including that earned by married sons, and disburses it for the benefit of the unit. He bears the sole responsibility for discipline within the family . . ." 2 T " . . . among Moslems and Christians alike the family is the paramount social unit and family authority is vested in the father. . . . Ultimate authority in the extended family generally rests with the oldest male. . . . In the rearing o! the Iraqi child, strong emphasis is placed on teaching him to conform to the patterns laid down by his elders and to be an obedient member of the family group. Family solidarity is stressed and the child learns early that his wishes are subordinate to the interests of the family. Corporal punishment is employed, but more commonly among urban dwellers than in rural families. . . . the mother, in her role as the compassionate figure in the family, may temper through discreet intervention any undue severity on the part of the father. . . . In rural families sons even after marriage are expected to give obedience to their fathers." 2 8 In the A r a b countries of the East Mediterranean littoral

Endogamous Unilineal Descent Group

4'5

(Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Arab Palestine) the father is the master of his own nuclear family, while the elderly male who is the head of the extended family is the undisputed ruler of the entire group. In olden times the rule of the family head comprised jurisdiction over life and death as well as other matters within his family. T h e father's authority remains strong, especially in the rural family, in the nomadic tribe and the village. T h e prevalent mores demand that the younger members of the family obey and respect the decisions of the senior. 2 9 In Egypt: '"Corporal punishment is not uncommon, either by beating, striking, whipping or slapping. Such punishment is inflicted upon the child normally after he has committed a serious misdemeanour, such as talking back at his parents while being rebuked. . . T h e father's authority cannot be flouted: and a change in the tone of his voice must be seriously considered. Although his punishment might be less frequent than that of the mother, yet it is more severely administered. While the former pinches the ear, or the thigh, and seldom slaps, the latter normally slaps and thrashes with a rope or a cane. It is also worth noting here that very little chance is given to the child to justify his misdemeanor . . . childhood is the most appropriate period for punishing and disciplining the child. . . . T h e only form of corporal punishment administered to adolescents on some rare occasions is slapping." " T h e absolute authority of the father over children is due to the fact that they belong to him and his family. . . . " T h e emphasis on paternal authority is so great that, " i n order to be respected and obeyed" a man "avoids excessive intimacy" with his children and with his wife. A son must observe " m a n y avoidances," especially in public, which manifest his subordination to his father. H e must even avoid arguing face to face with his father, and has to send a messenger instead. Respect for a family head is so strong that if he publicly humiliates a younger member of, not only his own, but another family, e.g., by slapping his face, the latter is not allowed to retaliate in kind, but has to go with his complaint to his own family head. 3 0 In Burri al-Lamab near Khartoum, Sudan, the father is usually "severe and a l o o f ' and "controls the family wealth."

Golden River to Golden Road •'In the past, from the age of seven until the middle or late teens a boy was constantly disciplined by his father, who beat him with a stick." Today, with independent employment available to adolescent boys in Khartoum, they are less dependent on their fathers and less subservient. Nevertheless, "physical punishment such as pinching, twisting an ear, or slapping with the hand is common for younger children, while older ones, who are expected to be mifaddab, are sometimes whipped or beaten with a stick "31 In Algeria, in both oasis and city, 'methods (of punishment administered by mothers) are less severe than those administered by men to boys of six or more. . . . it was initially clear that the Arabs were comparatively brutal toward children. . . . Beating [was] the preferred punishment for boys. . . . T h e Arabs operate on the principle that sons must be made to fear their fathers." 3 2 Among the T e d a of Tibesti (in the southeastern central Sahara), "children respect their parents, the father absolutely and the mother relatively. . . . T h e father pays all family expense, including the price of his sons' brides; but he can also beat his sons until they reach the age of fifteen and his daghters even after they are married, although he rarely does so. . . " 3 : i At the other end of the Middle East, in Afghanistan, "Some Afghan fathers are friendly with their children, some are aloof. All, however, demand complete obedience and respect. . . . boys stand in awe of their fathers. . . . T h e father is in charge of discipline and punishment. For this reason the mother can be more indulgent. . . " 3 4 These references, which could be multiplied at will, show clearly that paternal authority and discipline, frequently expressed in severe corporal punishment, are the unquestionable rule among the Arab Bedouin, settled Arab, and other Middle Eastern families. Authority is concentrated in the hands of the oldest male member of the family, that is, the head of the extended family; or, if the family is not extended, it is wielded by the head of whatever the actual family grouping happens to be. We can thus state categorically that internally exercised authority is normative in the Middle Eastern family; in fact, it is strong enough to make the family, whatever its actual size

Endogamous Unilineal Descent Group

4'7

and structure, the fundamental building block of any and every larger social unit. As far as this point is concerned, the A r a b and M i d d l e Eastern social structure, therefore, exhibits the same features of authority w h i c h Fortes found characteristic of the African U F G s in general.

PATERNAL AUTHORITY:

THE

DAUGHTERS

In m a k i n g a girl the ward of her father, Middle Eastern folk custom and Muslim shari'a law mutually reinforce each other. O f the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, three require that a w o m a n be contracted in marriage by her guardian, who, in the case of y o u n g girls, is invariably the father if he is alive. O n l y one school, the HanafI, allows a Muslim woman to enter on her own into a marriage contract, on condition that she chooses a husband w h o is her equal in social standing. 3 5 In Southern A r a b i a : " I n O m a n . . . a girl, unmarried or married, w h o had willingly transgressed and was with child, would be killed by her father, brother or paternal cousin, but not her husband. . . . For a girl's first marriage it is the inviolate rule for her father to provide a husband without consulting her. T h i s rule in IbadI O m a n is so rigorous among the elect that it would be shameful for a father to consult the wishes of his daughter. . . . T h e right of ¿in 'am, the paternal cousin, elsewhere in A r a b i a universally accepted, is not insisted upon in these mountains, except by the M a h r a , where the sole right of disposal vests in the f a t h e r . " 3 6 A s far as the actual extent of the patria potestas over marrying off a daughter is concerned even in relatively Westernized segments of A r a b society, a poignant illustration is supplied by the Algerian feminist F a d e l a M ' r a b e t , whose book La Femme Algerien was published in Paris in 1965. In it she reveals that in 1964 " n o less than 175 y o u n g Algerian girls had chosen suicide rather than marry the m a n selected for them by their parents." 3 7 T h a t by " p a r e n t s " M m e M ' r a b e t means "fathers" becomes clear from a letter she wrote, in the same year in which her book was published, to Le Monde, stating among other things that 'the greater n u m b e r of marriages are still forced unions; fathers

4i8

Golden River to Golden Road

are still all-powerful, and can interrupt at will the studies of their daughters (in order to marry off or cloister them). . . . " 3 S The right of the girl's father's brother's son to her hand is in many cases supported by the hamula elders who are interested in strengthening the cohesion within the hamula by cousin marriage and other forms of endogamy. If the father has other plans for his daughter, he can, however, resort to the expedient of not allowing her to marry at all. T h e illustration of this point is a case described in detail by Abner Cohen from the A r a b village of Bint el-Hudud in the Triangle Area in Israel. When Fatima was asked in marriage by both her cousin Ibrahim, an uneducated unskilled laborer, and the nonrelated Khalid, a teacher and highly educated man, her father wanted to give her to the latter. But not daring to go against the wishes of his hamula, whose elders insisted on the traditional cousin marriage, all the father could do was not to give his daughter to either of the suitors. Long delays, several postponements and repeated interventions, representations, and intrigues by the notables of the hamulas of the girl's father and of Khalid ensued, until the girl's father was brought to the point where he refused to give permission to his daughter to marry Khalid. T h e two hamulas came near to large scale group fighting, and the bride's brother (who sided with Khalid) was actually severely beaten by men of his own hamula. T h e police and other outside authorities, including the military officer of the area, were brought into the picture, until finally the two hamulas made peace between themselves, and Fatima was married to Khalid. 3 9 Another case illustrating the father's ability to deny his daughter to his brother's son if he so wishes is supplied by Emanuel Marx. " A man can do little to obtain his father's brother's daughter unless he is supported by his section. When a man of the Abu Qwedar peasant group (Abu R q a i q tribe) claimed his cousin's hand, her father demanded the exorbitant bride-wealth [i.e., bride-price] of I L . 12,000, over four times the average payment, and as the section did not support the suitor he had to relinquish his claim." 4 0 As we see from the two cases quoted, the support of the section

Endogamous Unilineal Descent Group ( h a m u l a ) is a decisive f a c t o r in case there is a d i s a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n the father of the girl a n d her ibn 'amm (cousin; m o r e precisely father's b r o t h e r ' s son).

H e w h o m the h a m u l a ,

as

represented b y its elders, supports is likely to w i n out. H o w e v e r , the final decision still r e m a i n s in the h a n d s of the girl's f a t h e r , and all the elders or the h a m u l a c a n d o is to try to pressure h i m into c o n s e n t i n g to the m a r r i a g e . T h u s these e x a m p l e s ,

while

they a f f o r d a n insight into the p o w e r relationships b e t w e e n the head of a f a m i l y a n d his h a m u l a , as well as b e t w e e n t w o c o m peting

harnulas,

basically

c o n f i r m our

interpretation

of

the

father's potestality o v e r his d a u g h t e r . L o c a l variations a p a r t , t h e g e n e r a l rule is as follows: (a) A m a n has the right to m a r r y his bint 'amm. (b) A girl c a n n o t m a r r y a n y b o d y else unless h e r ibn 'amm gives his consent w h i c h , as a rule, c a n be b o u g h t for a consideration, such as camels, cash, a n d so forth, (c) If the f a t h e r of the girl objects, the ibn 'amm c a n n o t m a r r y her a g a i n s t the father's will, a l t h o u g h in s u c h a case t h e girl c a n n o t m a r r y a n y b o d y else either, (d) T h e r e f o r e , the ibn 'amm's right to m a r r y his bint 'amm does not p r e c l u d e the p r e r o g a t i v e of her father either to g i v e her to h i m or to w i t h h o l d her f r o m him. (e) T h i s b e i n g the case, the father does exercise c o n s i d e r a b l e patria potestas o v e r his d a u g h t e r in respect of her m a r r i a g e . H e has, in fact, three choices: ( i ) H e either c o n f o r m s to e x p e c t a t i o n a n d g i v e s his d a u g h t e r to her ibn 'amm, receiving a g r e a t l y r e d u c e d bride-price for her b u t insuring the increased l o y a l t y of his ibn akh ( n e p h e w ) to him. (2) O r , he p a y s off the n e p h e w w i t h p a r t of the full bride-price he receives f r o m a m o r e distantly related or n o n r e l a t e d suitor of his d a u g h t e r . (3) O r , he refuses his d a u g h t e r to his n e p h e w a n d lets her r e m a i n u n m a r r i e d until such time as the n e p h e w , possibly as a result of persuasion b y the h a m u l a elders, d e c l a r e s himself ready to receive c o m p e n s a tion for g i v i n g u p his rights in his bint 'amm.

COUSIN

MARRIAGE

AND

INGROUP

MARRIAGE

W h i l e a f a t h e r ' s b r o t h e r ' s d a u g h t e r is thus the ideal c h o i c e throughout

the

Middle

East,

among

Arabs and

non-Arabs

M u s l i m s a n d n o n - M u s l i m s alike, in practice only a relatively

Golden River to Golden Road small percentage of men actually marry (or did marry in the past) a girl related to them in this manner. T h e available statistics, admittedly fragmentary and often unreliable, nevertheless show that nowhere do such marriages constitute even as much as one half of all marriages. T h e figures range from a maximum of 48 per cent (an exceptionally high figure) in certain tribal villages in Southern Kurdistan, through 17 per cent among the Arabs of Timbuctoo, down to 13.3 per cent, which happens to be the figure for both late pre-Islamic Hijaz and the South Palestinian A r a b village of Artas in the 1920's, 12.6 per cent in the Israli A r a b village of Bint el-Hudud (in the 1960's), and to 11 per cent in the Sudan. 4 1 In the great majority of cases in all Middle Eastern societies, marriages take place between a man and a woman who are either members of one and the same lineage but whose common patrilineal ancestor, if he can be traced at all, is several generations removed, or they belong to the same aggregate (tribe, village) but to different lineages comprised in it. T h i s — t h a t is, lineage or local endogamy, and not father's-brother's-daughter marriage—is the actual meaning of endogamy in the Middle Eastern context. Moreover, it should be clearly understood that Middle Eastern endogamy, even in this sense, is not the precise opposite of what students of social structure as a rule understand by exogamy. A society is exogamous if marriage within the same U D G is forbidden. Middle Eastern society is not endogamous in the sense that marriage outside one's own U D G is forbidden; it is endogamous merely in the sense that marriage within one's own U D G is given first preference, that second preference is given to other U D G s which form part of the same local aggregate, and that choices made outside the local aggregate are regarded with increasing disapproval as the distance from the in-group increases. T h e criteria for reckoning social distance differ from group to group, but as a broad generalization one can state that differences in descent traditions, religious affiliation, and the economic basis of livelihood are considered serious impedimenta. Non-Muslims are, as a general rule, beyond the pale. T h e extent of in-village versus out-village marriage can be gauged from the following sample figures:

Kndogamous Umlineal

Descent Group

421

In Southern Kurdistan 78 and 80 per cent of the marriages were found to be in-village marriages. 4 2 In M o r o c c o it was 79 per cent. 4 3 In the Sudan, in a village suburb of K h a r t o u m , where 79 per cent of the marriages were locally endogamous (with only one half of these between relatives), Barclay observed that the general principle of preferred lineage endogamy characteristic of A r a b social structure is limited or reinforced according to the relative prestige of the lineage. Lineage e x o g a m y may actually be preferred over endogamy where a marriage might establish ties to a more powerful and wealthy lineage. O n the other hand, an already powerful lineage may seek to compound its power through endogamy. 4 4 W e thus find that Middle Eastern endogamy as it actually operates is an institution which brings together people who, in the great majority of cases, are not patrilateral parallel cousins. This means that in Middle Eastern society the officially sanctioned patrilineal reckoning of descent is the only one w h i c h can and actually does count, because any attempt to figure ego's descent matrilineally would, in most cases, lead immediately out of the patrilineage to a group of maternal biological ancestors who constitute a separate descent group to which ego does not belong. Even in cases where a person's parents are patrilateral parallel cousins, he will, as a matter of actual fact, reckon his descent through his father only. In traditional A r a b society great emphasis is placed on one's paternal geneology, that is, the line leading from ego, through his male progenitors only, to an outstanding ancestor. In such a chain of descent there will be men who married their fathers' brothers' daughter, men whose wives were more remotely related to them, men whose wives were not related to them at all, and men w h o begot their son (or sons) of slave-concubines. This being the case, it would be almost impossible to find a man whose patriline and matriline are identical over several generations. Descent is important in the M i d d l e East for establishing the ascribed status of an individual, for providing him with the basis of his claim to position, occupation, property, a girl's hand, economic help, armed support, social, legal, or religious

422

Golden River to Golden Road

functions, a seat in council, membership in larger social units, and so on. In all this, and in many more respects or purposes, a m a n ' s patrilineal descent counts for everything: his matriline counts for nothing.

THE

LINEAGE

H o w is the Middle Eastern endogamous L1)G delineated? T h e answer to this question is simple and can easily be obtained from any lineage m e m b e r anywhere in the Middle East: T h e lineage is the group within which there exists the knowledge, the consciousness, and the sentiment of being a distinct unit, and whose members actually cooperate in numerous institutions and undertakings. In a village comprising, for example, three lineages, all the people, including children, know very definitely to which lineage they belong, are proud of their lineage, and share a self-stereotype of their own lineage as well as stereotypes of other lineages. T h e interlineage demarcation is s h a r p ; the accident of birth determines lineage membership, which cannot be changed. In daily life, the power ot the lineage to hold people together is great. In a nomadic tribe, the actual wandering unit may be composed of several patrilineages which camp, march, fight, hunt, graze their camels, sit in council, and so on, in close association with, but at the same time separately from, one another. In the village, composed of several hamulas, each has its fixed land share, 4 5 its guest house, its threshing floor, its evening parties; at occasions such as circumcisions, weddings, or funerals, the entire patrilineage attends as a rule, members of other patrilineages only rarely. Each lineage has its own head and elders, 4 0 who exercise strong and effective, although informal, social control over their constituent families. T h e lineage has traditional forums, such as councils, which settle disputes a m o n g its constituent extended families and represent them toward the outside. 47 In some places, the intralineage cohesion is so strong that all members of a lineage are considered as one family and can enter any house of a fellow member, either through the men's or the women's door. 4 8

I-.ndogamous Umltneal Descent Group

423

As to the s t r u c t u r a l b a l a n c e b e t w e e n c o n s a n g u i n e a l a n d affinal relationship, this is m a i n t a i n e d in t h e M i d d l e Eastern e n d o g a m o u s U D G by exactly the s a m e m e c h a n i s m s which m a i n t a i n it in e x o g a m o u s U D G s . Since in the m a j o r i t y of cases h u s b a n d a n d wife a r e merely r e m o t e c o n s a n g u i n e a l relatives, the m a r i t a l b o n d b e t w e e n t h e m ties together t w o clearly distinct a n d s e p a r a t e families.

THE

MOTHER'S

KI.\

I n all M i d d l e E a s t e r n e n d o g a m o u s U D G s the m o t h e r ' s kin occupies a special place in ego's life. T h e m o t h e r ' s kin a n d the f a t h e r ' s kin a r e not identical even in those few cases in w h i c h t h e t w o a r e p a t r i l a t e r a l parallel cousins, because the m o t h e r h a s her o w n b r o t h e r s a n d sisters w h o a r e directly related to ego t h r o u g h h e r a n d qot t h r o u g h ego's f a t h e r . It is these relatives, d e n o t e d by the special t e r m khuala, w h o f o r m the kin g r o u p to w h i c h ego is tied by c o m p l e m e n t a r y filiation. If ego's p a t e r n a l g r a n d f a t h e r a n d m a t e r n a l g r a n d f a t h e r a r e p a t e r n a l half-siblings, the process of c o m p l e m e n t a r y filiation c a n go back to the g r a n d p a r e n t a l g e n e r a t i o n , to the u t e r i n e siblings of the m a t e r n a l g r a n d f a t h e r . As indicated above, however, in most cases m o t h e r ' s kin is a family g r o u p s e p a r a t e f r o m f a t h e r ' s kin, a n d t h e r e is t h u s n o c i r c u m s t a n t i a l obstacle w h a t s o e v e r to c o m p l e m e n t a r y filiation. I n fact, c o m p l e m e n t a r y filiation to m o t h e r ' s kin assumes a p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t a n c e precisely because of the t r a d i t i o n a l l y exercised stern a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m of the f a t h e r . In contrast to h i m . t h e m o t h e r assumes the c h a r a c t e r of the loving, c o m p a s s i o n a t e , forgiving p a r e n t figure, a n d these traits, by t r a n s f e r e n c e or extension, a r e a t t r i b u t e d to the m o t h e r ' s entire kin g r o u p . T h e m o t h e r ' s kin thus is expected t o be, a n d actually b e c o m e s , a g r o u p of most s y m p a t h e t i c relatives on whose help ego c a n rely in situations w h i c h r e q u i r e i n f o r m a l o r psychological, r a t h e r t h a n f o r m a l , physical, legal, o r a r m e d , s u p p o r t , w h i c h is always f o r t h c o m i n g f r o m the p a t r i k i n . " O n e of the most salient f e a t u r e s , " says A m m a r , " t h a t underlies t h e s t r u c t u r a l relationships [in t h e E g y p t i a n village] is t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e f a b r i c f o r m i n g t h e ideo-

4*4

Golden River to Golden Road

logical basis for the social structure is entirely patrilineal as far as descent, inheritance and prestige are concerned, yet it is dyed in a sentimental and emotional colouring which is p r e p o n d e r antly m a t r i l i n e a l . " 4 0 T h u s while ego fears his f a t h e r more, he loves his m o t h e r more, 5 0 a n d this feeling is transferred f r o m the m o t h e r to her relatives. This is not merely an observed fact but also felt and verbalized by the Middle Easterners themselves, as in the Sudanese A r a b saying: " E v e r y o n e loves this khaal (mother's brother) very m u c h because he is o u r mothers's relative, and everyone loves his mother most." 5 1 Such a situation c a n , of course, prevail even in a family in which the p a r e n t s are patrilateral parallel cousins, and it is an e x a m p l e of how complem e n t a r y filiation can and does work in any e n d o g a m o u s U D G . Also the existence of special terms to d e n o t e ego's father's kin (e.g., lasaba\ lit. " b a c k b o n e " ) and m o t h e r ' s kin (e.g., lahma: lit. " f l e s h " ) , 5 2 is indicative of the tendency to recognize complem e n t a r y filiation. In sum, c o m p l e m e n t a r y filiation is possible in M i d d l e Eastern unilineal and e n d o g a m o u s descent groups, because the mother is only in a minority of cases the patrilateral parallel cousin of the f a t h e r ; its function is, in most cases, to link ego, through the mother, secondarily to a kin g r o u p of which he is not a m e m b e r ; and its significance is recognized by being given formal expression in the existence of a separate set of kinship terms and psychological expression in a special emotional relationship to the m o t h e r ' s k i n d r e d . While c o m p l e m e n t a r y filiation exists a n d plays a considerable role in Middle Eastern social structure, it is not however, the primary mechanism by which segmentation of the lineage is brought about, though Fortes 5 3 found this to be the case in sub-Saharan Africa. While it h a p p e n s t h a t subgroups are formed on the basis of their separate m a t e r n a l descent within a patrilineage, the p r i m a r y mechanism for segmentation is the division of the lineage into groups (sublineages) each of which traces its descent back to one of the sons of the f o u n d e r of the lineage. Such segmentation, as a rule, is the transitional stage for the break-up of the lineage into as m a n y new lineages as there are sublineages. Nevertheless, c o m p l e m e n t a r y filiation provides, in

Endogamous Unilineal Descent Group the M i d d l e Eastern context as well, " t h e essential link between a sibling g r o u p a n d the kin of the p a r e n t w h o does not d e t e r m i n e d e s c e n t , " 5 4 t h a t is the m a t r i k i n . T h e extent to which the rule of c o m p l e m e n t a r y filiation is used in Middle Eastern societies " t o build d o u b l e unilineal systems" 5 5 is doubtful. T h e fact is t h a t , however close a consanguineal relative ego's mother m a y be of his father, matrilineal ancestry is considered entirely negligible. T h i s lack of i m p o r t a n c e is best illustrated by the inability of even the best tribal genealogists to recall the names of their g r a n d m o t h e r s or g r e a t - g r a n d m o t h e r s , although they are able to r a t d e off the n a m e s of their male ancestors u p to ten or m o r e generations.

THE

KHAMSE

T h e unilineal c h a r a c t e r of the Middle Eastern (and, in particular, the Bedouin A r a b ) kin g r o u p is f u r t h e r emphasized t h r o u g h the khamse, the blood responsibility group. T h e khamse is always composed only of ego's patrilineal relatives. T h e exact composition of the khamse varies f r o m tribe to tribe, but c o m m o n to all is the exclusively m a l e linkage. As the n a m e khamse, m e a n i n g " f i v e , " indicates, it is composed of those male relatives of ego w h o are r e m o v e d f r o m him by no more t h a n five male links. T h u s , a m o n g t h e Bedouins of the Negev, ego's khamse consists of all the males w h o are his own descendants (sons, son's sons, etc.), a n d the d e s c e n d a n t s of his father, his father's father, his father's father's father, his f a t h e r ' s father's father's father. 5 6 T h a t is, in this case, the khamse is figured on the basis of five generations of ascendants, ego c o u n t i n g as one, and all their descendants. A m o n g the R w a l a , the khamse is reckoned differently, resulting in a considerably smaller g r o u p : it comprises all those male agnates of ego w h o are connected to him by not more than five links, a n d who, moreover, a r e removed f r o m him by no more t h a n t h r e e generations. T h u s a Rweyli's khamse consists of his sons: son's sons; sons' sons' sons; his f a t h e r ; father's father; father's f a t h e r ' s f a t h e r ; a n d the m a l e descendants of these u p to five links. I n this system, second cousins (father's father's brothers' sons' sons) are the most r e m o t e collaterals w h o belong to ego's

426

Golden River to Golden Road

khamse.57 Jaussen's description of the khamse a m o n g the n o m a d i c tribes of southern T r a n s j o r d a n 5 8 is confused, and it is best to t a k e no account of it. W h a t e v e r the precise constitution of the khamse, the most significant feature characterizing it is t h a t it always consists of a g r o u p of closely related m e n w h o belong to the same lineage. E a c h m a n has, within the larger g r o u p of relatives which constitutes his lineage, a smaller g r o u p of closer relatives w h o f o r m his khamse. T h e m e n of the khamse form the contingent which g u a r a n t e e s ego's safety a n d to which he is responsible, because a n y criminal act on his p a r t would expose his khamse to revenge. If a m a n is killed, it is his khamse which is in d u t y b o u n d to avenge him, by h u n t i n g d o w n and killing the m u r d e r e r or a m e m b e r of his khamse; if a m a n commits a m u r d e r , it is a m o n g t h e m e m b e r s h i p of his khamse t h a t the avengers will seek a victim in accordance with t h e principle of "blood d e m a n d s b l o o d . " If there is a possibility of a r r a n g i n g for the p a y m e n t of blood-money, the two parties between w h o m the m a t t e r has to be negotiated consist of the two khamses: that of the victim a n d t h a t of the m u r d e r e r . Since it is always in the interest of the khamse to a r r a n g e for a settlement r a t h e r t h a n to allow blood revenge to take place, the very existence of the khamse makes for greater stability in both intralineal and interlineal relations. If the victim a n d the m u r d e r e r belong to the same lineage, the two khamses go into action a n d , by a r r a n g i n g for a settlement and thereby p r e v e n t i n g f u r t h e r strife which m a y d i s r u p t the lineage, they actually strengthen the lineage structure. If the victim and the m u r d e r e r belong to two different lineages, the sociolegal work of each khamse serves ultimately to strengthen the position of its lineage vis-á-vis t h a t of the other by bargaining for as a d v a n t a g e o u s a compensation as possible u n d e r the circumstances. As far as the internal structure of the lineage is concerned, the khamses contained in it act like interlinked rings in a c h a i n mail, reinforcing the fabric of the lineage. F r o m this point of view, the lineage a p p e a r s as the sum total of interrelated khamses, a n d the total male contingent of a lineage can be arrived at by ascertaining the blood responsibility g r o u p of any lineage m e m b e r a n d

Endogamous Unilineal Descent Group

4*7

then taking each m e m b e r of this khamse a n d establishing t h e m e m b e r s h i p of their respective khamses, and so forth. W h e n , in this m a n n e r , one has listed all the m e n w h o are p a r t of a n interlocking khamse system, one has e n u m e r a t e d all the m a l e m e m b e r s of the lineage. T h e s e males, together with their mothers, wives, sisters, a n d daughters, form the lineage. Since n o khamse cuts across lineage lines, the khamse structure is, in fact, a n aid in isolating one lineage f r o m a n o t h e r . T h u s , in respect of a c o r p o r a t e obligation which is of p a r a m o u n t inportance in Bedouin society (in other.sectors of traditional M i d d l e Eastern society it is of lesser, though still considerable, significance), the lineage is the b o u n d e d and stable g r o u p with which the individual is totally identified. I n this connection, the question of interchangeability must be touched upon. According to Fortes, in the lineage as a c o r p o r a t e g r o u p "all the m e m b e r s . . . are to outsiders jurally e q u a l , " a n d it is this feature which "underlies so-called collective responsibility in blood-vengeance and self-help." 5 9 Like several others of Fortes' observations on U D G s based on s u b - S a h a r a n Africa, this too must be modified somewhat in order to make it applicable to the M i d d l e Eastern e n d o g a m o u s U D G s . T h e r e is, to be sure, a certain degree of " j u r a l " equality a n d hence interchangeability " t o outsiders" of all m e m b e r s of t h e M i d d l e Eastern e n d o g a m o u s U D G . For one thing, a lineage c a n occasionally be so young a n d small t h a t it consists of one single khamse only a n d yet forms a discrete unit. I n such a case, there will be to outsiders a complete j u r a l equality of all the lineage members. Beyond this, however, and here is w h e r e the necessity for modification enters, the j u r a l equality is replaced by the principle of concentric preferential degrees. T h e clearest expression of this principle is found in connection with m a t e selection. It will be recalled that cousin m a r r i a g e was recognized above as the most preferred type of marriage, followed by successively less a n d less preferred categories as the concentric circles of more and more remote consanguineal relatives g r a d u a l l y widen. I n a n analogous m a n n e r , f r o m the point of view of personal safety, the g r o u p u p o n which ego c a n most reliably count is t h a t of his closest consanguineal relatives (i.e., Fa,Brs,Sos);

Golden River to Golden Road second, that of consanguineal relatives once and twice removed (FaFa, SosSos, BrSos, FaBrSos); third, that of the still larger and more remote patrilateral relatives comprised in the khamse; and fourth, that of the entire lineage. In any actual case, the duty of avenging a murder devolves on the nearest available consanguineal kin of the victim: if he has brothers, it is their duty to seek out and kill his murderer; if the nearest male patrilineal consanguine is a third cousin (i.e., a person outside the khamse as commonly counted), it is his obligation. T h e weight of responsibility does not diminish with the increase of the distance between the victim and the avenger. In the same manner, if the blood avengers cannot find the murderer, they will try to kill one of his brothers; if no relative nearer than a third cousin or even more remote kinsman is available, his killing will still be considered as the proper way of avenging the victim and of restoring the honor of his family and lineage. It is in this sense that the membership of a lineage is interchangeable, one for another: every member of the lineage may be called upon to substitute for any other member, if a more closely related, that is, more preferred, patrilineal consanguineal male is not available. By the logic of this arrangement, the more remote the closest available relatives are from ego, the larger the number of those who are interchangeable and can, consequently, become the target of the blood avengers' fury; in the same way, the more remote the closest patrilateral relatives of a girl the larger the n u m b e r of young men who are considered as having preference in asking for her in marriage. W h a t unmistakably emerges from these considerations is the principle of concentric circles in the lineage structure. Every ego is the epicenter of his own world, and the closest concentric circles of each ego usually differ from those of others. But the larger the circles, the more they tend to be coterminous; and the largest, that of the lineage as a whole, has equal validity for all its members. S T R U C T U R A L D I F F E R E N C E S BETWEEN THE AND

THE

ENDOGAMOUS

EXOGAMOUS

U D G

A fundamental question remains to be examined: W h a t , if any, structural differences exist between exogamous and endoga-

Endogamous Umlineal Descent Group

429

mous UDGs? Taking Fortes' analysis of the exogamous U D G and my own studies of the endogamous UDG as the basis for comparison, we can begin by recalling what Fortes noted about the incidence of the exogamous UDG. H e observed that exogamous UDGs "are not of significance among peoples who live in small groups, depend on rudimentary technology, and have little durable property." 6 0 Many such peoples live in the Middle East, on the peripheries of the R u b ' al-Khall desert in Southern Arabia, for example, yet the available evidence shows that UDGs are of as great significance among them as among the tribes of the .North Arabian and Syrian deserts who live in much larger groups, whose technology is more advanced, and who have considerably more durable property. According to Fortes, UDGs "break down when a modern economic framework with occupational differentiation linked to a wide range of specialized skills, to productive capital and to monetary media of exchange is introduced." 6 1 T h e Middle Eastern endogamous UDGs do not break down under such conditions; they merely become weakened or modified. In the Middle East, occupational differentiation, a wide range of specialized skills, productive capital, and monetary media of exchange are not recent introductions accompanying the erection of a modern economic framework. They are parts of local traditional developments which went on for centuries in its cities and which never caused a breakdown in the UDGs. T h e endogamous urban extended family and the U D G of the Middle East were always the social framework within which all economic development took place. In fact, in seventeenth century Constantinople, to mention only one example, each of the hundreds of guilds into which the artisans, tradesmen, and professionals were organized considered itself as a lineage descended from the mythical or historical founder of its occupational specialization. 62 Fortes' observations about the relationship between lineage and political structure 6 3 have to be modified with reference to the endogamous UDGs in the Middle East. Here, too, the lineage "is the basis of local organization and of political institutions." But the fact that the Middle East has had national governments "centered in kingship, administrative machinery and courts of law" has not resulted in a "primary emphasis . . . on

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the legal aspect of the lineage." O n the contrary, the political systems in the Middle East either grew out of the lineage structure and retained its characteristics or, if they had no lineage basis, artificially assumed what can be called a lineage camouflage. T h e most typical example is the Middle Eastern variety of the dual organization which, whether or not so anchored in history, was everywhere considered an alignment of two superlineages, each traditionally descended from a single ancestor, opposed to each other and largely political in their actual functioning. 6 4 Because of this, the Middle Eastern situation does not bear out the statement Fortes appends to his aforementioned observation that " t h e more centralized the political system the greater the tendency seems to be for the corporate strenth of descent groups to be reduced or for such corporate groups to be nonexistent." In the Middle East, where even occupational groups, in order to be able to function effectively, considered themselves, and acted as if they were, UDGs, a centralized political system was compelled to base its power on the actual or assumed UDGs. T h e feudal order of traditional Middle Eastern states and societies made it imperative for the central political power to base itself ultimately upon the power structure of the UDG, and hence the greater the latter's corporate strength the greater the support they were able to give to the central, most paternal, most patriarchal authority. It was precisely because of this close interrelationship between U D G and state that the Muslim state could find no room in its structure for non-Muslim groups, such as Christians or Jews, who could not belong to the quasi-familial corporate body of the state but remained indigenous foreigners, millets, for hundreds of years. Nor does the Middle Eastern political community "assert [its] common interest . . . as against the private interests of the component lineages through religious institutions and sanctions." 6 5 T h e Middle Eastern church-state (of which, as indicated, the non-Muslims were not members) was the ultimate extension of the U D G system. Its institutions and sanctions, therefore, asserted nothing against the private interests of its component lineages but, on the contrary, were the sum total of the latter. Again the situation can be visualized with the help of the inter-

Endogamous

L'mlineat

Descent

Group

43'

locking links of the chain mail: ego's lineage forms one link; all the lineages and quasi-lineages (such as the guilds) form the interlocking fabric of the whole which is the state. T o pass now from the position of the lineage within the general social context to its particular features, let us consider Fortes' observations that in the U D G , which "is an arrangement of persons that serves the attainment of legitimate social and personal ends," there is generally a "connection between lineage structure and the ownership of the most-valued productive property of the society" and the "control over reproductive resources and relations as is evident from the common occurrence of exogamy as a criterion of lineage differentiation." 6 6 A conspectus of the Middle Eastern endogamous U D G bears out the first part of this observation. In the Middle East, the " connection between lineage structure and the ownership of the most-valued productive property of the society" finds its expression in the claim the lineage as a whole has to the ownership of the wandering territory (or a definite share in it) or, among the settled agriculturists, to a definite area within the village lands. In both types of traditional Middle Eastern society, the land is the single most important productive property; whether used as pasture for camel herds or goat flocks, or for cultivation, the land is the basis of livelihood. It is therefore significant t h a t it is precisely this property which is held jointly by the lineage, although in villages the lineage usually assigns usufruct to its constituent families. As to "the control over reproductive resources and relations,'" or, to put it simply, the regulation ot marriages, this too. characterizes the Middle Eastern endogamous U D G . However, it is expressed not by " t h e common occurrence of exogamy as a criterion of lineage differentiation," but, on the contrary, by the emphatic preference for in-lineage endogamy. T o use Fortes' terminology, the Middle Eastern U D G exercises "control over the reproductive resources and relations" by insisting that these must subserve the supreme end of the replenishment and increase of its own human contingent. In other words, the common occurrence of endogamy is as much a criterion of lineage differentiation in the Middle East as exogamy is in sub-Saharan Africa. In general,

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then, all U D G s endeavor to exercise control over the reproductive resources, b u t the problem of how to attain this in practice is solved either by exogamy or by endogamy. Yet another observation m a d e by Fortes points to one more difference between the exogamous U D G which he discusses and the endogamous U D G which prevails in the Middle East. " I n an exogamous lineage system," he writes, it "is very conspicuous" that " a married person always has two mutually antagonistic kinship statuses, that of spouse and parent in one family context and that of child and sibling in a n o t h e r . " 6 7 T h a t this should be true in the case of a married woman is evident; it is less so in the case of a married man, w h o may be in patrilocal residence with his wife and children and be a m e m b e r of a patrilineal extended family headed by his own father, in which case there is no reason why his two kinship statuses should be 'mutually antagonistic." In the Middle Eastern e n d o g a m o u s lineage system, the closer the consanguineal relationship between a wife and her husband, the smaller the likelihood that even in the case of a women her two statuses, that of wife and mother and that of daughter and sister, can become " m u t u a l l y antagonistic." In fact, whether or not one accepts the frequently voiced traditional Middle Eastern explanation of the preference for F a B r D a marriage that it tends to promote h a r m o n y in the family, such marriages actually tend to prevent the occurrence of the antagonism between the two female statuses which Fortes found to be conspicuous in sub-Saharan Africa. Apart from the above differences between the exogamous and endogamous UDGs, the observations of Fortes on the former hold equally true for the latter. T h e emphasis may not be identical on each point, but essentially the two types of U D G s show a homogeneous visage. T h e lineage as a corporate g r o u p : the individual having " n o legal or political status except as a member of a lineage;" the "exercise of defined rights, duties, office and social tasks vested in the lineage as a corporate u n i t ; ' the emergence of the lineage " m o s t precisely in a complementary relationship with or in opposition to like u n i t s ; " the tendency to use personal kinship " t o define and sanction a field of social relations for each individual;" the continuous process of f u r t h e r and further segmentation; the hierarchically organized seg-

h.ndogamous Unilineal

Descent

Group

433

ments ""by fixed steps of greater and greater inclusiveness, each step being defined by genealogical reference;" the patterning of lineage segmentation after the model of the parental family; and the spatial (or local) characteristics of the lineage 6 8 - all this applies to the Middle Eastern endogamous U D G as well. We have shown above in some detail that the Middle Eastern endogamous U D G "exhibits a structure of authority" very much in the m a n n e r described by Fortes. This authority, we may now add, is formally wielded by the heads of segments whose prestige and influence is the greater the larger the groups they head, although consultation, counsel, and suasion rather than arbitrary, autocratic decision is on all levels the mechanism of leadership. This, too, has been recognized by Fortes. 69 T h a t the model of the lineage is the parental family 70 can be illustrated by Middle Eastern examples probably as well as by any other. In fact, the lineage, and even a tribe, and ultimately the entire A r a b nation are considered as simply an enlarged family. This can best be exemplified by the process of tribal fusion. When a lineage or a larger unit (A) attaches itself to a more powerful unit such as a tribe (B), an association which is usually secured for reasons of safely, even if the two groups were originally unrelated, within two or three generations the ancestor of g r o u p A will have been incorporated into the tribal genealogy of group B as a son of group B's progenitor. Or, as another example, of two originally equal sub-tribes (A and B), conceptualized in the persons of two brothers who figure as their eponymous ancestors, one, A, becomes weakened and must subordinate itself to its brother sub-tribe. Soon thereafter this change in relative status will be reflected in the emergence of a new traditional genealogy in which the ancestor of A appears as the son of the ancestor of B.71 Thus, not only is existing lineage structure projected "backward as pseudo-history," 72 but this backward projection constantly changes in order to keep up with the changing structure of lineages and larger units.

INTERNAL

AUTONOMY

Finally, the most important difference between the exogamous and the endogamous U D G s lies in the differential effect which

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exogamy and endogamy have on the relationship of the U D G to its social environment and on the issue of its internal social autonomy or self-sufficiency. T h e exogamous U D G cannot exist without the proximity of, and interrelations with, other similar groups, or at least one such group. In theory, an isolated exogamous U D G cannot survive: within one generation it must either die out or cease to be exogamous. T h e relationship between two or more intermarrying exogamous UDGs need not necessarily be friendly or neighborly, but some structural relationship must exist between them. The effects of the existence of such a relationship between neighboring exogamous UDGs cannot fail to be felt in many areas of economic, social, political, moral, and religious life. T h e endogamous UDG, on the other hand, is genetically self-sufficient. This means, first of all, that there is no necessity for it to maintain any social relations with outgroups, since it replenishes and augments its human contingent by inbreeding. It also provides itself with sustenance by the common effort of its membership, and it guarantees its own safety by the numbers of its adult males. O n the simplest level, the endogamous U D G can actually sustain itself in complete isolation from all outside society, in a total bio-social autarchy. This situation is the background of numerous ancient Near Eastern (including biblical) myths which represent catastrophes or other events that befell a U D G as if they had affected mankind as a whole: for its members the U D G simply is all of humanity. Such isolated U D G s can still be found in some parts of the Middle East. As far as the mechanics of cultural transmission are concerned, the endogamous U D G is the most favorable social matrix for the development and perpetuation of cultural variants. T h e cultural differences between UDGs living in proximity may appear minor when viewed from a perspective, but they are considered highly significant by the members of each U D G . Cases have been known of a Bedouin tribesman recognizing even from the gait of others glimpsed at a great distance whether they belonged to the same or another tribal group. Such keen discernment may be vital in a social configuration in which members of all outgroups are likely to be enemies. T h e perpetua-

Endogamotis Unilineal Descent Group

435

tion of the cultural variant of the U D G resulting from isolation and inbreeding has undoubtedly something to do with the oftcited "immovability" of the Middle East, which in anthropological terms means that the processes of culture change in the Middle Eastern endogamous U D G were exceptionally slow until the post-World W a r II irruption of Westernization. T h e social isolation and self-sufficiency concomitant to endogamy are responsible to a considerable degree for the hostile attitude to all outgroups frequently evinced by the UDG. In an economically inhospitable physical environment, the competition for natural resources is keen, often ruthless, and the endogamous UDG, which has no use for outgroups, tends to consider them simply as depletors. Hence the traditional Bedouin institution of raiding outgroups, that risky but rapid method of instantly replenishing the U D G s only source of livelihood, the herds. As against these in-turned interests, which if left alone would result in complete fragmentation if not anarchy, the endogamous UDG system has certain built-in checks and balances. T h e most important of these is the valuation of patrilineal descent which extends beyond the U D G itself and binds together several UDGs. T h e UDG multiplies by fission. When it grows too large (the criteria of "too large" may be in economic, social, or other terms), it divides into two or more new UDGs which retain the knowledge (i.e., tradition) of their common origin, typically conceptualized in the form of related founder-progenitors. T h e same process when carried on and repeated many times results in huge pyramidal structures. Such processes of fission projected back into the past give the traditional genealogical structure of entire nations: e.g., the twelve tribes of the biblical Hebrews who believed themselves to be the descendants of twelve brothers; or the twelve tribes of the 'Aneze confederacy of the North Arabian desert who are considered the descendants of twelve individuals who were the sons of two brothers ('Obed and 'Ammar) and of the latter's FaBrSos, another pair of brothers (Wahhab and Mejlas). 7 3 T h e effect of this comprehensive genealogical system is to counterbalance the isolationist tendencies of the U D G and tie it

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Golden River to Golden Road

to similar UDGs, to assign it a place in the larger society, and to make it aware of the identity of its natural allies. T h e situation can, again, be made tangible by referring to the concentric circles: the fewer the generations which separate ego's U D G from the common ancestor from whom both his UDG and another UDG are traditionally descended, the smaller the circle to which both groups belong, and hence the closer the relationship between the two. This also explains the very great emphasis placed in a system of endogamous UDGs on descent. Descent, which in Middle Eastern culture means patrilineal descent, is the only factor through which ego can relate to individuals or groups outside his own small world represented by his UDG. This provides the explanation for the kingroup-like appearance of all social, political, occupational, religious, and other groupings produced by traditional Middle Eastern society, and the justification of designating the culture of the Middle East a "kinship culture."

XVI.

Women in a Man's

World

INTRODUCTION

T

o KEGIN WITH, let it be stated clearly and emphatically that the preoccupation of this volume (in Chapters 4 and 5 above, and in the present chapter) with the formal, tradition-determined structural and dynamic aspects of the man-woman relationship and with the place of women in family and society in the Middle East must not be taken as indicating that love between boy and girl, bride and bridegroom, husband and wife is less of a moving force or a source of inspiration there than it is in our Western world. Q u i t e to the contrary, it could easily be shown that in the Middle East, where romantic love has to overcome formidable barriers erected b y tradition between the sexes, it must be a more powerful motivation. T h i s could be attested by marshaling the unequivocal evidence of a great love poetry from pre-Islamic times to the present, of a prose literature in which romantic love and intrigue play an important role, of true case histories in which love caused great tragedies or inspired extraordinary feats, of a record of elopements flying into the face of all tradition, of interviews with men and w o m e n of various age groups for w h o m love is or was the shining star on life's horizon. Since, however, all this is not the subject of the present anthropological inquiry, we must remain content with this briefest allusion to the presence and power of romantic love in M i d d l e Eastern society, and now turn to a discussion of its socio-cultural setting. For an understanding of the extraordinary difficulties confronting Middle Eastern society in granting equal rights to 437

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w o m e n and in f e m a l e emancipation (in the Western sense) it is necessary to b e c o m e a c q u a i n t e d , first of all, with the traditional mores and values that h a v e governed the position of w o m e n and m a n - w o m a n relations in the past and that are operative in large sectors of the area's p o p u l a t i o n to this d a y . S o m e facets of this subject have been discussed briefly above, especially the veiling and seclusion of w o m e n , the traditional varieties of social intercourse between men and w o m e n and the changes o c c u r r i n g in t h e m under the impact of modernization, the t e r m and trial marriages, the traditional occupations of w o m e n , and the early steps taken in a few countries toward their official e m a n c i p a t i o n b y law (see above, pp. 1 1 5 - 3 4 ) . In addition to these issues, however, important though they are in themselves, there are several others w h i c h should be discussed in order to lay the p r o p e r g r o u n d w o r k for a fuller appreciation of the pangs of transition gripping at present m a n y w o m e n as well as men in M i d d l e Eastern society. T h e first of these issues to be discussed will be some of the differences in the early treatment of male and female infants. W e shall try to correlate these differences with those characterizing the m o d a l adult male and female personalities and the m u t u a l expectations and power relationships between men and w o m e n in traditional M i d d l e Eastern society. T h i s will be followed b y an analysis of the psychological significance of circumcision, to w h i c h all Muslim, C o p t and Jewish males and a considerable proportion of M u s l i m and C o p t females are subjected. T o w h a t extent, w e shall ask, does this important e v e n t impress boys and girls with the differential roles expected of t h e m in a d u l t life? In seeking an answer to this question w e shall h a v e to describe in some detail the most important local variants of the c e r e m o n y , as well as the differences in the public or festive c h a r a c t e r given to the operation in the cases of boys and of girls. Next, the issue of formal education will be taken up. T h e central question in this area will b e : T o w h a t extent has the absence of institutionalized schooling for girls contributed to the relegation of w o m e n to a culturally separate world of their own? T h e r e a f t e r , w e turn to religion, that all-pervading factor in

Women in a Man's

World

439

traditional M i d d l e Eastern culture (cf. above, pp. 3 3 - 3 6 . 294"96' 3 2 2 ~ 4 4 , 348-50, 3 8 3~ 8 5> 400-02), w h i c h , however, means quite different things in the lives of men and w o m e n . T h e central questions in this connection will b e : T o w h a t extent have the w o m e n , largely excluded irom participation in the official practices of Islam, found compensation for this deprivation by participation in cults, rituals, and ceremonies of their own? W h a t beliefs are expressed in these cults? A n d w h a t is the attitude of the men and their official religious leaders to this extra-Islamic religious world? Lastly, w e shall discuss the degree to w h i c h the worlds of men and w o m e n , though coexisting side by side, form t w o separate entities. W e shall look into questions such as: W h a t are the forces that make for this separation? W h a t are the areas of contact between the two? H o w d o men view w o m e n , h o w d o w o m e n view men, and how d o men and w o m e n v i e w themselves in relation to the opposite sex? A n d w h a t traces of the early socialization processes can be found in the m a n - w o m a n relationship?

EARLY

SOCIALIZATION

It is by now a c o m m o n p l a c e in psychologically oriented antropological studies that the quality of early socialization (or child-care customs) decisively molds the personality of the infant and child, and that m u c h of w h a t the individual absorbs in this manner in the early years remains with h i m t h r o u g h o u t his life. 1 In the last twenty years or so, several studies d e a l i n g w i t h A r a b populations have discussed in lesser or greater detail the early child-care customs and their effect on the A r a b adult personality. 2 In fact, the influence of early childhood training on personality did not escape folk observation and has been expressed in numerous proverbs current a m o n g the A r a b s of Palestine and other countries: " C h a r a c t e r impressed b y the mother's milk c a n n o t be altered by a n y t h i n g but d e a t h . " 3 O r : " T e a c h i n g the g r o w n u p is like writing in the sand; t e a c h i n g the y o u t h is like engraving on stone." 4 O r : " A child's heart is like a precious jewel without inscription; it is therefore ready to absorb what-

Golden River to Golden Road

ever is engraved upon it." O r : " T h e tail of a dog remains curved even if it is put into a hundred pressers." 5 Yet these studies and popular sayings, while pointing up the influence of childhood conditioning on later life, d o not deal specifically with the effect the differential treatment accorded to male and female infants has on the development of the typical male versus female personality. This is the subject to which we shall now address ourselves. T o begin with, it should be pointed out that in traditional Middle Eastern society, much more so than in the modern West, both men and women are the product of an enculturative process administered exclusively by women in the early years of a child's life. T h e mother herself is, of course, a product of her society and culture, and in her treatment of her children she is narrowly circumscribed by the strictures and expectations of her own cultural background and actual environment. Yet whatever the sources and causes of her own behavior patterns (of which child care is one facet), the fact remains that in the early formation of the Middle Eastern personality the mother plays the central, dominant, and overwhelming role. There can be no doubt that the differences in the male and female personality, as well as in the mutual role expectations and fulfillments, can be traced back, in part at least, to disparities in the treatment accorded boys and girls in early infancy by their mother. T h e unequal treatment of the two sexes does not begin at birth, but, in fact, antedates it. Father and mother, as well as uncles, aunts, grandparents, cousins and other relatives, hope the baby will be a boy. If, indeed, the baby is a boy, he is greeted with great rejoicing. His birth is the occasion for as lavish a family feast as circumstances allow. It evokes the feeling on everybody's part that the family has been enriched by the addition of an important new member. T h e birth of a girl, on the other hand, is regarded as one of those inevitable evils of life which cannot be helped. Whatever the mother's feelings toward her newborn daughter, institutionally her position in the family improves only if she subsequently gives birth to sons; a woman who has daughters only is not much better off than one who remains childless: the ignominy of divorce

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threatens her a n d often becomes a reality. Consequently, the emotional a t t i t u d e of the mother to her offspring is inevitably influenced by the child's sex; if it is a boy, she will be m u c h more lenient with him, will take better care of him, devote more attention to him, a n d be more ready to fulfill his wishes. A basic pedagogical principle in the A r a b family, applied from earliest childhood, is to p a m p e r the boy but not the girl." This is expressed, a m o n g other ways, in the difference in the duration of the period of lactation discussed above on pages 97-98. While the prolonged lactation of a male infant as compared to a female is t h e general custom in most Middle Eastern societies, the opposite also occurs. I n the U p p e r Egyptian village of Silwa (Aswan Province), H a m e d A m m a r observed that " a boy is usually nursed less t h a n a girl." T h e shorter period of a boy's nursing is taken by A m m a r to be " a clear indication of the accelerating process of boys' g r o w t h . " 7 However, in Silwa, people believe t h a t to cut short the period of lactation makes a child "obstinate a n d disobedient," 8 a n d therein may lie the explanation. A male infant is nursed for a shorter period, since obstinacy and disobedience in a boy are personality traits viewed as positive values, since they are related to desirable male characteristics such as having a strong will, being domineering, determined, brave, and the like. In the case of a girl, all such tendencies would be considered most undesirable; consequently, she is nursed for a longer period so as to make her pliable and obedient. Even in early infancy the process of concentrating female ministrations to the male in the sexual or erotic area begins. While n o t h i n g is d o n e by the mother to quiet down a crying girl child w h o has been weaned, in many parts of the Muslim world the m o t h e r soothes her crying boy, whether before or after weaning, by playing with his penis. In the Lebanese Muslim village of Buarij, for instance, Anne H . Fuller observed that both " m o t h e r s a n d g r a n d m o t h e r s handle the genitals of a boy infant in order to sooth h i m . " 9 Similarly, in Silwa, A m m a r found that not only the mother b u t also visitors " t r y to win a smile from t h e b a b y by tickling or caressing fit] . . . or in the case

Golden River to Golden Road of a boy by playing with his genitals." 1 0 Although Dr. Ammar does not state that the visitors who thus stimulate the baby boy are women, the social situation in an Egyptian village makes it most unlikely that any man would engage in such acts, or even that he would pay a visit to a woman. At a later age, in preparation for circumcision, which is performed on boys at the age of three to six years, the mother will "prepare him gradually for the event by caressing his organ and playfully endeavoring to separate the foreskin from the glans. While doing this, she would hum words to the effect that what she is doing will help him become a man amongst men." 1 1 In this manner erotic pleasure becomes early associated in the boys' mind with the availability of a subservient female willing to minister to his needs, arid, indeed, his whims. This is the role a man grows up to expect, above all, from his wife. In the patriarchal order of the Arab family structure, the girl-child's position (as shown above on pages 98-99) is no different from that of a handmaiden who has to serve every one else in the household—mother, father, brothers, and elder sisters, as well as the members of the extended f a m i l y - grandparents, uncles, aunts. In order to accustom the girl-child to serving her husband and his family, it is considered advisable to send the little girl to live with her future in-laws as early as possible so that she get from them what is called by the Arabs a "second education," in addition to the first one she received from her own mother. Considering this difference in upbringing between boys and girls, it is small wonder that the modal male and female character is formed in such a manner that the marital relationship is one of domination on the part of the husband and submission on the part of the wife. Childhood conditioning also explains to some extent the parent-child relationship in later years. Compared to the veryclose relationship between mother and child, that between the father and his offspring appears loose and remote. T h e father, of course, wields all the authority, and consequently is feared and respected by son and daughter alike. His word is law and his will is done. Not only in the early years, but also in youth and adulthood, there is a closer relationship with, and a more

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emotional attachment to, the mother than the father. This is the great reward, and in many cases the only reward, that a woman has in A r a b society, and it comes very late in life. T h e demonstrations of love, respect, and devotion from sons a n d daughters, but especially from sons, to their mother, are varied and numerous. T h e parental blessing—which in A r a b society still retains something of its ancient holiness and efficacyis valued much more highly if it comes from the mother t h a n f r o m the father. It is a well-known fact that in any unusual difficulty or predicament, a person gets support and help from the mother rather than from the father. T h e father is respected and obeyed, because this is the unchangeable tradition; the mother is loved because in the early years of life she was the only one to whom the child could turn. 1 2 Because the A r a b family is patriarchal, patrilineal, and patrilocal, only the boys maintain a continued close relationship to their parents. T h e daughters leave the parental home upon marriage, and, as the A r a b saying has it, while they ruin their fathers' houses, they build u p the houses of their husbands and their families. T h e parent-child relationship is thus a very brief one in the case of girls, most of whom marry at an early age. In the case of boys, on the other hand, it lasts quite long; it is, in fact, m u c h longer a n d also closer than is customary in Western society. T h e son brings his wife into the home of his own parents in which he continues to live, and the wife is submerged by his parental family and absorbed into it. In this situation the affectionate attachment of the son to his mother becomes an additional factor making for the subordination of the wife and her domination by the husband. Not only must the wife, especially the young wife, remain subordinate to her husband's mother in matters of prestige and authority and share her husband's esteem and affection with her mother-in-law, b u t also the mother actually takes precedence over the wife. Should any difference of opinion or will arise between the mother and the wife, the m a n will take the side of his mother. T h e wife, cut off from her own parents and confronted by the closely knit mother-son team, has no choice but to submit, to accept her role of a h a n d m a i d e n to the entire family of her

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husband, and hope that her position will change for the better as the years pass and her own sons grow up. The brother-sister relationship in the Arab family has fewer institutionalized and formalized aspects than the relationship patterns between parents and children or between husband and wife. Only rarely are there generally accepted customs regulating the duties or rights of brothers with regard to their sisters or vice versa. The jealous guardianship of the sister's honor cannot be adduced as an example, for this is the duty not only of the brother but also of any male member of the extended family. One of the few formal expressions of the brother-sister relationship is the obligation of the brothers to give presents to their sisters on certain important religious occasions, even if they live in a distant village. The true significance of sibling affection appears only after marriage. Conflicts and even serious disturbances can occur between spouses because of their attachment to brothers or sisters. If a sister is not married, she continues to live in the parental household where her brother's wife assumes the position of female head after the mother's death. Nevertheless, when a quarrel between his wife and his sister occurs, the husband is expected to take the side of his sister, whether she is married or not. More favorably situated, with regard to the brother's affections, is the married sister who visits her brother's house only rarely. Custom entitles her to gifts of food on these occasions, making her feel that she continues to have a greater share in what was her parents' home than has the woman whom her brother brought into it.

CIRCUMCISION : M A L E

AND

FEMALE

T h e central event in the lives of Middle Ecistern children, contributing decisively to the differential personality development of men and women, is circumcision. Male circumcision is general and obligatory for all Muslims, Jews, and Copts. Female excision, reportedly practiced widely in many parts of the Middle East among the Muslims, as well as among the Copts of Egypt, is in all probability more prevalent than would

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appear from its reported incidence. It is generall/ practiced among numerous non-Middle Eastern Muslim peoples and tribes in the Sudan belt of Africa, as well as to the south of it a m o n g non-Muslims. In many places in the Middle East the people show a certain reluctance to discuss the subject. Excision usually consists of clitoridectomy, that is, the ablation of the clitoris; often it involves the excision of the labia minora, and occasionally, of the labia majora as well. Both male and female circumcision are pre-Islamic in origin. T h e earliest reports on the male operation come from ancient Egypt, Phoenicia, and Syria, 1 3 and from the Bible. 1 4 By the first century A.D. the practice was established among the Arabs, who, according to Josephus Flavius, circumcised their sons after the thirteenth year because Ishmael, the founder of the nation, was circumcised at that age. 1 5 Josephus also reports that the Judean rulers Hyrcanus and Aristobulos forced circumcision on the Idumaeans and the Ituraeans, respectively. 1 6 W h i l e circumcision is not mentioned in the K o r a n , it was practiced by the pre-Islamic Arabs, and M o h a m m e d adopted it unquestioningly. T h e various Sunni Muslim schools of jurisprudence differ as to whether it is indispensable (the Sháfi'í and the Shi'ite view) or merely commendable (the Malik! position), but the fact remains that all Muslims at all times and in all places (with a few marginal exceptions) have practiced it. 17 T h e earliest reference to female circumcision, seems to be one contained in an Egyptian Hellenistic papyrus which also states that it was performed on adult women in the midst of considerable festivities. 18 T h e Greek geographer and historian Strabo (ca. 64 B . C . - 1 9 A . D who was with Aelius Gallus in E g y p t and Arabia and devoted an entire book of his great Geography to Egypt and Libya, repeatedly states that both the Egyptians and the Jews (whom he considered to be Egyptian in origin) practiced circumcision of males and excision of females. 19 In view of the complete absence of any other testimony as to excision among the Jews, Strabo's reference to them in connection with this practice must be discounted. As to the prevalence of the operation among the Egyptians, on the other hand, his report is corroborated by independent evidence, some of which

Golden River to Golden Road was assembled by the late seventeeth- early eighteenth-century Orientalist Adrian Reland. 2 0 That clitoridectomy was an old A r a b custom long antedating not only Islam but also the pre-Islamic Arabic literary documents is attested by the existence of a special Arabic root. b^r, which in its noun form means clitoris and in its verbal form its excision. 21 T h e existence of such terminology indicates that the operation was performed in Arabic-speaking peoples even before its first mention in extant literary sources. T h e name of the woman who performed the operation on girls was muba^irah.22 T h e operation seems to have been performed, just as it was in ancient Egypt, shortly before marriage. T h e instrument used was a blade or razor. 2 3 In late pre-Islamic and early Islamic times, excision was considered, at least among some A r a b tribes, as an indispensable prerequisite for marriage. T h e Hudhaylite poet Khalid ibn Wathila considered it an impossibility that he should marry and settle down among the Himyarites " w h o do not circumcise their women." 2 4 It is reported, of Khalid al-Qasrl, the wellknown governor of Iraq appointed by the Caliph Hisham (reigned 724-43), that he had his mother, a Christian woman, circumcised in her old age so that he should not be called "son of the uncircumcised w o m a n . " 2 5 In modern times, female circumcision has been reported from various parts of the Middle East. Since our main interest is in the present-day incidence of the practice, we shall mention only briefly that it was observed, in the seventeeth century by Sir Thomas Herbert and Sir J o h n Chardin in Persia; 2 6 in the eighteenth century by Adrian Reland and Carsten Niebuhr in Mecca, Oman, the shores of the Persian Gulf, Basra, Baghdad, and Egypt (both Muslims and Copts); 2 7 and in the nineteenth century by an increasing number of explorers and travelers. Numerous Orientalists have noted in general terms that the operation is still widespread in the twentieth century. 2 8 T h e general trend has been to perform circumcision at a progressively earlier age in males. In ancient Egypt, according to the testimony of murals, the operation was carried out on fullgrown boys. In the Bible there is an indication that circumcision

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was a preliminary to marriage: the term hatan damim (bridegroom of blood) was applied to boys undergoing the operation (Exodus 4:24-25). T h e same Semitic root from which the Hebrew nouns hatan (bridegroom) and hatunah (marriage) are derived developed in Arabic into khtan, khilan, or khilana (in Morocco: khtana), meaning circumcision. An alternative term for circumcision is tahara or tuhur (in Morocco: thara), literally "cleansing," which is expressive of the view that through circumcision the boy becomes clean and capable of performing the religious exercises of praying and entering the mosque. 2 " In numerous Middle Eastern ethnic groups circumcision retains its connection with marriage, and occasionally it is a direct preliminary to marriage, a kind of test of the groom's courage, with the bride looking on. 3 0 In other places, the operation is performed at puberty or thereafter, and the presence of marriageable girls, who often perform provocative dances at these rites, leaves no doubt that it signifies the entrance of the boy into the phase of life in which he can claim sexual access to the women of the tribe. Circumcision at the age of fourteen or later is practiced in some parts of Arabia, on the Island of Soqotra, in the Libyan Desert, and in other areas. 31 In most parts of the Middle East, however, the circumcision of boys takes place between the ages of three and seven. Recently, the tendency has been to perform it in the first few months of the boy's life. 3 2 Also, modernization and the increasing availability of modern medical facilities in the larger cities of the Middle East have resulted in a preference for the performance of the operation during early infancy. T h e amount of public attention accompanying the ceremony is one of the most significant features distinguishing male from female circumcision. T h e circumcision of boys is always a public, joyous, and festive occasion, often assuming a group character, and it is performed on several or even many boys at a time. That of girls, by contrast, is a private affair, often done furtively or secretly. It is frequently "covered with a veil of mystery: sometimes no males are allowed to assist at i t . " 3 3 In turning now to a description of circumcision ceremonies in various parts of the Middle East today, we shall repeatedly have

Golden River to Golden Road opportunity to illustrate this basic difference which has been observed by Niebuhr some two hundred years ago. 3 4 Let us begin with the central area of the Middle East, and proceed from there first to the west and then to the east. Lebanon. Among the Lebanese Muslim Arab villagers it is the generally accepted view that circumcision makes a male socially acceptable for intercourse. T h e women unequivocally state that no decent woman would have intercourse with an uncircumcised Christian, for such a man is considered dirty. Muslim men, on their part, like to boast that circumcision makes a man more potent. 35 In other words, the operation enables a man to engage in socially sanctioned sexual activity, when the time for it arrives, and ensures that he will be able to function in that area with distinction. Circumcision in the Lebanese village is a group ceremony, performed usually once a year, on boys any time after their first year of life up until adolescence. There is no female circumcision in Lebanon. But a girl, on first menstruating, may embrace the large-bellied flour jar, a symbolic little rite witnessed only by her mother. 36 Palestine and Transjordan. Among the Arabs of Palestine and Transjordan, most of the boys are circumcised at the Nebi Musa feast, the traditional Muslim celebration of the birthday of the -i prophet" Moses. Also, the Muslim sanctuaries of Jerusalem and Hebron are favorite places for group circumcision ceremonies. 37 Hilma Granqvist described in detail the elaborate and pompous ceremonies that accompanied circumcision in the Palestinian Arab village 01 Artas. She personally witnessed two ceremonies in each of which three brothers were involved. T h e boys circumcised were from eight months to five years of age. T h e feast was a public affair in which the entire village participated and which lasted six or seven days. There was much dancing and singing; processions marched through the village, parading the boys seated on horseback or carried by a relative. Also a pitchfork wrapped in a woman's bridal garb was carried along (ostensibly to deflect the evil eye from the boys, but actually symbolizing the original significance of the ceremony, namely to make the boys marriageable). Occasionally, at the very hour

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of circumcision, a betrothal was actually arranged for the boy. and as soon as the wound was healed he married the girl. 38 As to female circumcision among the settled Muslim Arab population of Palestine to the west of the Jordan, Father Antonin Jaussen supplies some information. Among the inhabitants of the city of Nablus, whom he studied in the 1920's, he found that the operation, universal in the past, was still performed on "some girls" as well as on barren women. The increasing neglect of the operation was regretted by Shaykh Ahmad, Jaussen's informant, and attributed by him to a general decline of religious sentiment. "'According to the simna (the traditional religious custom)," he said, "the circumcision of girls is as necessary as that of boys." The operation used to be performed by a woman called khafidah or mubgirah, and consisted of the ablation of the clitoris. According to Jaussen's informants, it was still performed unfailingly by the Shi'ites, as well as by the two subdivisions of the Balabshah clan in Nablus, the al-Qawsh and the al-Qamhawi. The operation was carried out on girls aged two to six, and if it was not done in childhood, it was performed prior to marriage. If a Balabshah. man married a girl from another clan and she was not circumcised, she had to submit to the operation before the wedding. A female informant reported a case to Jaussen in which the head of the Balabshah clan demanded that a young woman from another clan, whom a member of his clan had married, undergo the operation. The young wife refused and escaped back to her father's house. Thereupon the husband, who loved the girl dearly, left his own clan and renounced his parentage. 39 Among the Bedouins of the Palestine-Transjordan region the custom is well attested. T w o explorers, both publishing the results of their studies in 1908, reported that they found both male and female circumcision practiced by the 'Amarin, Azazme, Hama'ideh, Hwetat, Terabln, and Tiyaha tribes, whose traditional wandering territories were in southern Transjordan and the Negev Desert, as well as among most tribes of Kerak and Ma'an. The operation was performed, by a female circumciser, as the time of a girl's marriage drew near. Among the Ma'an tribes, it was called sirr (a hidden and mysterious thing), since it was done in secret, by the women among them-

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selves. Among the other tribes, both the male and female operation was called taher (purification). I n no case was female circumcision an occasion for public feasting and rejoicing as that of the boys, which was accompanied by the slaughtering of an animal, the women's zagharit trilling, the singing of special songs, and so on. T h e boys were circumcised in a group ceremony, between the ages of one to five, once in two years. 40 Arabia. In the Hijaz province of Arabia, including the holy city of Mecca, the circumcision of boys, performed at the age of three to seven years, is the occasion of a lavish and elaborate feast. T h e circumcision of girls, on the other hand, is done very quietly, with only women present. 41 In some Arab tribes (such as certain divisions of the Kuraysh in the Hijaz, the Kabakab, the Talaha, and other tribes of the T i h a m a region of the 'Asir district), the circumcision of boys, performed at puberty or thereafter, and in the presence of the boy's betrothed, takes the form of an extremely cruel operation involving the removal of the skin of the entire male organ and of its environs on the belly and inner thighs. While this is being done, the youth must show unflinching fortitude, standing upright, shouting "with a mighty j o y " and brandishing a long dagger. The bride sits before him, beats a drum, and trills the zaghrata, the shrill, sustained cry of joy (also called zaghrut in Arabia, zogharuta in the Sudan, zgharit in Morocco, etc.), which is produced by rapidly moving the tongue from side to side or up and down in the mouth while a high-pitched, squealing cry is emitted from the throat. Should the youth so much as whimper, she has the right to refuse to marry him. 4 2 In Southern Arabia both male and female circumcision is practiced, at ages which vary from area to area. In the Q a r a Mountains (running parallel to the Zufar coast), boys are circumcised on reaching adolescence, and girls on the day they are born. In O m a n , boys are circumcised at about six, and girls at ten years of age. In the M a h r a tribe (which is spread over a large area to the north and west of the Q a r a Mountains) male circumcision used to be performed in the past on the eve of a man's marriage, that is, after puberty, but "today a decent interval is allowed." The same was the custom among the

Women in a Alan's World al-Rashld and Bayt Imani tribes, although recently they adopted the practice of circumcising their boys at the age of five or six. Male circumcision in the Q a r a Moutains is an elaborate group ceremony, and as soon as the operation is done, the boy promptly rises, bleeding, and runs around the assembled men and women raising and lowering a sword as if oblivious to pain, to show his manliness. T h e women open their upper garments "as a gesture of baring their breasts." Among the Mahra, "eight or ten of the most presentable females are paraded." Female circumcision among the M a h r a and the other tribes of the central part of Southern Arabia involves clitoridectomy; among the Arabs of O m a n it is merely an incision into the top of the clitoris. No "manifestations of joy, indeed no manifestations at all, accompany the clitoridectomy of the infant female, which is done in secret." 4 3 Nevertheless, the operation is considered of such p a r a m o u n t importance that it is an almost unimaginable disgrace for a woman to remain uncircumcised. T h e insult which, as we have heard, the govenor of Iraq tried to avoid in the eighth century, can still be heard in Southern Arabia: " O h you misbegotten of an uncircumcised mother!" 4 4 Kuwait and Iraq. Among the Bedouins of the K u w a i t area circumcision is performed when the boy is between three and a half and seven years of age and is accompanied by a great family feast. Among the townspeople of Kuwait and the Nejd (the north-central part of the Arabian Peninsula) the circumcision festivities are even more elaborate and last for several hours every day for seven days. Female circumcision is widely practiced in Southern Iraq, for example, among the Shammar, the Muntafiq shepherd tribes of the Euphrates, the gypsies (Kauliyah) of Iraq, as well as in the city of Basra among the Sunn! Muslims, who hold it to be an old tradtion of their BanI T a m i m ancestry. Among the Shammar, the circumcision of girls is done "quickly and without any fuss." N o one except the female members of the family is told, even the neighbors know nothing about it. 4 5 Egypt. In Egypt circumcision is often performed in connection with a moulid, the celebration of a saint's birthday. Well in advance of the moulid, big framed pictures showing circumcisers

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at their work are put up over the barbers' shops or circumcision booths, often with a notice that the operation will be performed free of charge. 4 6 The circumcision processions often join up with a zejfa, the great festive procession in which the moulid celebrations culminate. Both boys and girls are circumcised, and, or so it seems, both sexes are operated on by the same male practitioner. In Cairo, the operation assumes not merely a group, but a mass character, with a thousand or more performed within a few days in connection with a single moulid.*1 In general terms, the circumcision of boys in Upper Egypt takes a similar turn. T h e boys are usually between three and six years old, and there is a great public celebration in honor of the occasion which is "the greatest experience that the child undergoes." There is a striking similarity, Dr. A m m a r observes, between the public celebrations of circumcision and marriage. The boy is supposed to endure the operation without crying or showing any signs of pain: it is a true initiation into manhood. In contrast to the public and festive character of the circumcision of boys, that of girls is accompanied only by some modest observance "confined purely to women, and no m a n , not even the father, is expected to participate, or to show an interest in it." Moreover, the girl is allowed, and even expected, to cry. Female circumcision is believed to remove the center of excitability from the genitals of the girl and thus "is deemed necessary to ensure premarital chastity." 4 8 Also in the Egyptian village of Sirs el-Layyan, it was believed that the sexual appetite of women was twenty times that of men, and that clitoridectomy, which is performed on all women, effectively reduces desire in them. 4 9 Among the Copts of Egypt, whose ancestors had practiced both male and female circumcision for centuries prior to the Arab conquest and the Islamization of the country (seventh century), the survival of both customs was, of course, facilitated by the fact that they coincided with the Muslim rites. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Lane found that excision was "still universally practiced in every p a r t of Egypt, both by

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the Muslims and Copts, except in Alexandria and perhaps a few other places on the shore of the Mediterranean: it is also common, if not equally prevalent, in A r a b i a . " Subsequently Lane states that while "most of the Copts circumcise their sons," female circumcision "is observed among the Copts without exception." T h e boys, he says, are usually seven to eight years old when they are circumcised in a private rite. He does not state how old the girls are when the operation is performed on them. 50 In 1 9 4 1 , however, Marie Bonaparte found that most of the Muslim and Copt women in Egypt were usually subjected to excision between the ages of five and ten, that the operation consisted of the ablation of the glans clitoridis and of the labia minora, and that its stated purpose was to " c a l m d o w n " the women, that is, to diminish their libido. At the same time it was considered a disgrace for a woman not to be circumcised, and the supreme insult hurled by Muslims at European women was " M o t h e r of Clitoris." 5 1 In various places in the Middle East, the circumcision of a boy is celebrated in combination with his wedding. Among the Ababda, for instance, in the Eastern Desert of Egypt, a hut is pitched for the circumcision ceremony, where the bride and groom take up residence afterwards. Both marriage and circumcision are called Hrs (literally: wedding) among the ' A b a b d a . 5 2 Sudan. Among the Sudanese villagers of Burri al-Lamab, male circumcision and female infibulation are practiced. Boys are circumcised when they are three to ten years of age, and the attendant ceremonies, lasting from two to five days, are patterned after a wedding. As in a wedding, the entire village, both men and women, participate. On the first day, after the meal, there may be an entertainment in which "unmarried village girls connected with the family perform the traditional Sudanese women's d a n c e . " This highly suggestive and erotic performance seems to indicate that circumcision is the prerequisite for a youth to have a claim on the sexual services of the related girls, one of whom will within a few years become his wife. 6 3 This claim on the women is expressed in a much more unrestrained manner among another Sudanese group, the Rubatab. Here, the boy is fourteeen to sixteen at circumcision,

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a n d d u r i n g the operation he is expected to show his manliness by shouting loudly "ana bashir," t h a t is, " I rejoice." After the operation, he takes his penis in his left h a n d a n d a sword in the right a n d a p p r o a c h e s the women before w h o m he is supposed to shake the sword a n d smile, while they trill the zagharuta. T h e n the boy struts before the men a n d cracks a whip. In contrast to this public demonstration of manliness expected of a newly circumcised boy, " t h e girls are usually circumcised without any feast," a l t h o u g h " t h e y too, rarely utter any cry at the pain of the o p e r a t i o n . " 5 4 But to r e t u r n to Burri a l - L a m a b in t h a t village, as in all parts of the S u d a n , female circumcision takes the form of infibulation. T h i s involves the removal of a large portion of the labia m a j o r a a n d mons veneris and the paring of the labia minora. Thereafter, the girl's legs are strapped together for forty days to make the w o u n d s on the two sides grow together by contact d u r i n g the healing process, except where a reed or t u b e has been inserted immediately after the operation to allow for the passage of urine a n d the menses. During the first fifteen days, the girl is treated m u c h like a mother in childbed. However, whatever festivities are performed are less elaborate t h a n those for a boy. T h e 'ulatna, the oflicial expositors of Muslim law, expressly forbid this o p e r a t i o n ; nevertheless most men in the village believe that Islam prescribes it for girls just as it does circumcision for boys. 5 5 Consequently all, or almost all, girls are subjected to this operation, as a rule between the ages of four and ten. As a r u l e the girls are quite h a p p y in anticipation of the event, because they then become centers of attention for the first time in their lives. A girl w h o is not circumcised in this m a n n e r is teased by other girls, a n d accused of being a baby. All over the S u d a n , as in other areas where female circumcision is practiced, it is believed that the operation reduces t h e girl's proclivity to becoming sexually excited. M a n y m e n also believe t h a t infibulation protects the girl f r o m being a t t a c k e d sexually, t h a t it ensures that she will r e m a i n a virgin until marriage, a n d that, u p o n marriage, intercourse with her will be more enjoyable for the h u s b a n d . W h a t in fact results f r o m

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infibulation is that it may m a k e sexual intercourse almost impossible and reduce a w o m a n ' s sexual pleasure. 5 6 Sahara. G r o u p circumcision for boys aged five to seven is the rule a m o n g the T u a r e g of the S a h a r a . T e d a boys are circumcised between the ages of twelve and fourteen, and the g r o u p ceremony is held at the date harvest and a c c o m p a n i e d by " g o a t sacrifices and feasts w h i c h not infrequently degenerate into drunken b r a w l s . " " G i r l s are not circumcised, but u n d e r g o a puberty rite which consists of shutting them up in groups for a few d a y s , and tattooing their lips and gums b l u e . " A m o n g the C h a a m b a A r a b nomads, too, boys aged six to seven or older are circumcised in a g r o u p ceremony, the boys being expected to m a k e some ritual demonstration of their courage. A m o n g the M o o r s of the Spanish S a h a r a (descendants of A r a b invaders and nomadic B e r b e r tribes) boys are circumcised in groups between the ages of six and seven. T h e ceremony marks the transition f r o m maternal to paternal control over the boy. Sometimes Moorish girls, too, are subjected to circumcision, that is. the excision of the clitoris and the labia minora.*' Timbuctoo. In T i m b u c t o o , a m o n g the Songhoi, the circumcision of boys, usually before puberty, is a large-scale g r o u p ceremony held once in three to five years. T h e circumcision of Songhoi girls was discontinued centuries ago. U s u a l l y about 1 5 0 boys are circumcised at one time. T h e c e r e m o n y is called a "'boy's first m a r r i a g e , " and indeed it includes numerous rites which occur also in weddings. A t the same time, the ceremony also reflects traits reminiscent of primitive (non-Muslim) A f r i c a n initiation rituals, for example, the terrifying aspect of the barbers w h o perform the operation and whose faces are painted white (indicative of ghosts or devils) with black on the forehead a n d cheeks and around the eyes. A m o n g the B e l a of T i m b u c t o o , the ceremony is similar: it takes place when the boys are about eight years old. 5 8 Morocco. In M o r o c c o the circumcision of boys takes place between the ages of two to seven years, although in some places it is performed when the boy is but a few months old. T h e operation is a c c o m p a n i e d by elaborate ceremonies and feasts, often at the shrines of saints. In T a n g i e r , for instance, the g r o u p

45^

Golden River to Golden

Road

circumcision of boys takes place on the day following the feast of Sidi Muhammed 1-Hajj, the patron saint ot the city. It is in most cases a group occasion, and it has many features resembling marriage ceremonies. Among the Uled Bu'Aziz, for example, it is called " t h e wedding of the circumcision," and the boy is termed "bridegroom." 5 9 Iran. T h e early seventeenth-century British traveler, Sir Thomas Herbert, describes circumcision in the Persia of his day as follows: Men, and sometimes Women, conform to it (circumcision]; the Men for Paradise, the Women for honours sake, or Ben-sidi-Allj Fables whose paraphrases: from nine to fifteen the Females m a y ; and in Cairo and the adjacent parts, at this day it is frequently practised: nor is this a recent custom, for Strabo lib. 16 in that case makes this physical observation, (Juemadmodum viri praeputium habent, mulieres habent etiam quondam glandulosam carmen quam Nympham vacant, non ineptam accipiendo characteri Circumcisionis. T h e Male at ¡ZmaeFs age . . . are enjoined it.

In the sequence Sir Thomas describes the pomp and circumstance of the ceremony among the wealthy Persians. 60 In the eighteenth century, Sir J o h n Chardin found the practice of female circumcision " a m o n g a few nomad tribes" of Persia. 61 Still later, in the nineteenth century, however, J a k o b Eduard Polak could not longer find any trace of the practice. 62 On the other hand, it has been reported to be still extant among the Kurds of Iran. 6 3 T h e circumcision of boys which was performed in Persia at adolescence in the past, has gradually been advanced to early childhood. It is a group ceremony, with care being taken that the number of boys circumcised at the same time should be odd, lest misfortune befall. T h e feast is a public one, lasting for several days. 0 4 A field study undertaken by Fredrik Barth from December, 1957, to J u l y , 1958, among the Basseri tribe of the Khamseh confederacy in southern Iran, found that boys were generally circumcised by a village barber or physician before the age of two months and that there was no corresponding operation on girls. 6 5

Women in a Man's

World

457

Conclusions. T h e circumcision of a boy, the greatest event in his early life, makes h i m the center of attention for a few days at a highly impressionable stage of his life. Even at the early age in which circumcision is nowadays performed, he is aware that this attention is d u e to the fact that he is a male; it is, moreover, localized with threatening precision upon his penis. In this m a n n e r the boy is definitively reinforced in the feeling, which had gradually developed in him as a result of the ministrations of his mother u p to that d a y (including in some places the handling of his genitals for pacification as well as in preparation for circumcision), that his superiority to woman is d u e to the fact that he has a male organ. W h e n puberty sets in, within a fewyears following the ceremony (or about the same time), this by then deep-rooted sense of superiority is joined by a powerful drive toward the sexual possession of women. In this manner, a close correlation soon develops in the male psyche between two drives, both of which are focused on the w o m a n : the drive to d o m i n a t e her—to bend her to obedience and subservience- and the drive to possess her sexually. If male circumcision is calculated to impress the boy with his own importance as the proud possessor of a male physique, female circumcision, which, as indicated above, is probably practiced more often t h a n it is reported, achieves a preciselyopposite effect: it impresses the girl with her own inferiority in relation to boys. I t is performed in secret, as if it were a shameful thing. While the male operation serves the assumed purpose of increasing the men's virility, its female equivalent is performed in order to reduce the w o m a n ' s femininity in terms of her sexual desire. As Marie Bonaparte p u t it, it serves to " i n t i m i d a t e " the girls' sexuality, while f r o m the male point of view it "feminizes to the utmost" the w o m a n by removing that slight semblance of a r u d i m e n t a r y penis that she possesses in the clitoris, 96 and thus reassures the m a n in his sexual superiority. T h e girl is told that she must undergo the operation—which is m u c h more painful t h a n male circumcision—in order to prevent any suspicion on the p a r t of her future bridegroom t h a t she is not a virgin. 6 7 In other words, she must suffer pain, a n d be subjected to a diminution of her libido, for the sake of her future husband. She must,

Golden River to Golden Road moreover, accept, and resign herself to, the implied reproach that she is a creature u n a b l e to control her sexual desires which are easily a n d illicitly aroused, a n d therefore must be deprived of that p a r t of her body in which these illicit desires are localized. T h e surgery is. indeed, a painful object lesson for the girl in the imperative of molding her life, even at considerable personal sacrifice, to the desires of the m a n ( w h o m she m a y not even have met at the time) w h o will soon b e c o m e her husband a n d d o m i n a t e her life. In the Egyptian village he studied, H a m e d A m m a r observed that the circumcision of girls is p e r f o r m e d in a m a n n e r reminiscent of childbirth. T h e girl is seated " o n a c h a i r or vessel, while three w o m e n assist her by holding the girl's legs a p a r t as well as supporting her back, a posture very similar to that assumed at c h i l d b i r t h . " 6 8 T h e circumcision of the girl thus assumes the form of a rehearsal of p a r t u r i t i o n : the position, the pain, the blood, the exclusion of the m a l e the basic ingredients are all there. It is this event, the c e n t r a l event in the women's life, for which the operation prepares the girl: for the successful fulfillment of the w o m a n ' s role - to serve " a s the vessel t h a t e m p t i e s . " T h e circumcision of boys, on the o t h e r h a n d , has the character of a rehearsal of m a r r i a g e a n d is, in fact, termed in some places the boy's first marriage, while he himself is called bridegroom. Circumcision, moreover, impresses the boy with t h e necessity of being b r a v e which is t h e price he must pay for acquiring the socially sanctioned prerogative of d o m i n a t i n g t h e women. By circumcision his generative o r g a n is given t h e a p p e a r a n c e of m a t u r i t y a n d t h u s establishes h i m as a m e m b e r of the male half of his society, a n d as a master over the female. T h i s significance of the operation becomes especially clear in those ethnic groups in which the boy p a r a d e s his bleeding penis in front of the assembled w o m e n , b r a n d i s h i n g a sword m e a n while. In those parts of the M i d d l e East w h e r e female circumcision is not practiced, the a t t e n d a n c e of t h e girls at periodically performed festive male g r o u p circumcision ceremonies is sufficient to p u t the s t a m p of finality on their awareness of the m e n ' s superiority a n d their own s u b o r d i n a t e status. T h e w o m e n ' s role

Women in a Man's World.

459

in the male circumcision ceremony is not merely passive. T h e y not only are present, watching the elaborate ceremony with fascination, they are not only the spectators before whom the boy parades his newly-won manhood, or objects on which he exercises his sword-brandishing threats. T h e y engage in two types of activities calculated to make the boy (and all the men present) feel important, superior, aggressive, and, in a word, manly. One is the provocative dancing, and the other the oftrepeated, shrill, trilling sustained cries of joy. While the dances symbolize the willingness of the marriagable girls to be taken by the boy (and, by implication, by the other men in the company), the women's trilling indicates their joy over yet another member of the male sex having passed through the indispensable prerequisite of manhood. Whether it comes in early childhood or in adolescence, the great, frightening, and yet exhilarating ceremony of circumcision is thus the one central event which, more than any other single occurrence, contributes to the formation of the differential personalities of the two sexes.

WOMEN'S

EDUCATION

If Westernization has created a distance between the modernized urbanites and the tradition-bound rural folk ot the Middle East (cf. above, pp. 3 7 2 - 7 4 ) , the cleavage it has brought about between the womenfolk of the two sectors is by f a r more pronounced. Perhaps the best indicator of this differential effect of Westernization on the male and female halves of the population is literacy. A m o n g pre-Westernized men, there has always been a certain percentage of literacy. T h e effect of Westernization in this respect was simply an increase in the literacy rate. A m o n g pre-Westernized women, on the other hand, the traditional situation was general illiteracy. Therefore, the introduction of education for girls created a completely new phenomenon in the world of Middle Eastern w o m e n : the emergence of a class of literate women, a group whose entire orientation as a consequence of literacy had become basically different from that of their i l l i t e i ^ k m o t h e r s and sisters. ^ f i u l a i r i ^ ^ ^ B t i o n a l M i d d l e East, since women were not ex-

460

Golden River to Golden Road

pected to take an active part in the official Muslim (or Christian or Jewish) religious rituals and ceremonies or even to attend them, it was unnecessary to let them acquire the knowledge required for such participation. Therefore, in the traditional Muslim world only boys were sent to the Koran school, the kuttab (in Arab lands) or maktab (in Iran), which was the only elementary-level indigenous educational institution developed by Muslim society. Since it was considered a religious duty to enable boys to acquire at least the rudiments of education needed for praying, reading the Koran, and related religious activities, the boys of those families which could afford it were usually sent to school for at least two or three years in the towns, and to a lesser extent in the villages as- well. Girls, on the other hand were sent to school only in exceptional circumstances. In traditional Muslim society therfe was no such thing as a girls' school, and to let girls sit in the same class with boys was considered forbidden by religion. As a result, the men (or at least some of them) were literate, while the women were illiterate. This generalization can be readily illustrated by examples from any part of the Middle Eastern culture continent. Until 1951 no one in the Turkish village of Sakaltutan in Central Anatolia had had more than three years "of the most elementary type of elementary schooling." Only one woman in the entire village of about six hundred people was literate. The one-class school of the village, however, included a few girls. 69 In the Upper Egyptian village of Silwa, studied by Haned Ammar in 1950-51, all the five unsubsidized Kuttabs were attended only by boys. The sixth Kuttab, which was recognized and aided by the government, had a few girl pupils as well, who began to attend it shortly prior to the time of Ammar's field work in the village. 70 In Egypt as a whole, in 1 9 1 3 - 1 4 , girls constituted 14 per cent of all pupils in all schools. By 1944—45 their percentage had risen to 40 per cent, indicating the great strides forward made by the women of that country within one generation. Yet all this advancement notwithstanding, in 1947 only 12.7 per cent of all Egyptian females over the age of five could read and write as against 32.8 per c e i ^ ^ ^ ^

Women in a Alan's

World

Similar advances have been m a d e by w o m e n in other Muslim countries. I n I r a q , in 1930, only 20 per cent of the elementary school pupils were girls; in 1955 they accounted for 25 per cent. In T r a n s j o r d a n in 1 9 2 2 - 2 3 , 10 per cent of all pupils were girls; in ' 9 5 5 ^ 3 1 - 4 P e r cent. 71 As to the proportion of girls attending school in relation to the total female school-age population, a 1963 report of the U n i t e d Nations shows that in t h a t year 29 per cent of the school-age girls a t t e n d e d school in I r a q and Syria, 37 per cent in J o r d a n , 39 per cent in Egypt, a n d 44 per cent in L e b a n o n . 7 2 T h e traditional wing of the Middle Eastern spectrum registered no c o m p a r a b l e advances in the education of girls. A typical position on female education is that of Saudi Arabia, w h e r e a governmental school system was introduced in the 1930s. Public education is free on all levels, moreover boys f r o m needy families are given monthly allowances to enable t h e m to go to school. Girls, however, are barred f r o m all state p r i m a r y a n d secondary schools, although several private girls' schools have recently been established at Mecca a n d M e d i n a . 7 3 While no d a t a or even estimates seem to be available on the percentage of literacy a m o n g males, female literacy is generally taken to be almost nil. In Afghanistan, a n o t h e r r a t h e r tradition-bound country, most of the women are illiterate; schools for girls are a recent innovation, and only a few girls have had an o p p o r t u n i t y to a t t e n d them. As late as i960, of the 175,600 pupils in elementary schools only 19,900 were girls; of the 11,300 students in middle a n d secondary schools, 2,500 were girls. 74 T h e problem of women's education in the Muslim world is rooted not merely in the traditional absence of incentives to make t h e m literate. T h a t alone could be overcome with relative ease by the emergence of such new interests as the increasing desire of the young male generation to find wives w h o c a n be life companions as well as sexual partners. But the education of w o m e n was actually countermotivated by old, established Muslim views on the God-given inferior n a t u r e of w o m e n which had the religious sanction of the authority of M o h a m m e d a n d which happened to coincide in m a n y places with pre-Islamic p o p u l a r traditions. These views will be discussed later in this

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Golden River to Golden Road

chapter, and they are mentioned here only in order to make it clear that in the traditional Muslim view the education of girls was considered not merely unnecessary and superfluous, but positively wrong, and that it is this still widely prevalent position that the political and cultural leaders of most countries must overcome (in addition to the numerous correlated economic and technical problems) before they can make elementary education universal for both boys and girls. What has already been achieved in this area in recent years can be elicited from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook ig6y and Statistical Yearbook ig6y (both published in New York in 1968), which contain informative material showing the number of children enrolled in elementary schools (in 1965) in most countries of world. This table was utilized to extract the data for the Middle Eastern countries (see T a b l e 8 in the Statistical Appendix). T h e figures indicate that in no country in the area (except Cyprus, Ifni, and Israel; the female school enrollment in Lebanon was not available) has the number of girl pupils approximated that of boy pupils in elementary schools. This, of course, means that even in the next generation of adults the number of illiterates wiH remain higher among women than among men. T h e United Nations statistical sources do not show what percentage of the school-age population in the countries listed is actually enrolled in schools; however, they contain a breakdown of the male and female populations into five-year age groups (including the five-to-nine and ten-to-fourteen-year age groups), and these figures were utilized to calculate the eight-year age group of six to thirteen, which is the optimum minimal period of school attendance. On this basis the percentage of children attending school in the total school-age population was calculated. As the table shows, many Middle Eastern countries are still a long way from translating into practice the ideal of general elementary education which most of them embrace in theory. T h e fact that, despite the deeply rooted traditional views on female education, an increasing percentage of girls is attending elementary schools is an indication of both the power of the modernizing influences and the ability of Muslim society to adapt itself to the inevitable changes brought

Women in a Man's

World

4%

a b o u t by t h e r a p i d l y i n c r e a s i n g interaction b e t w e e n the M i d d l e East a n d t h e W e s t .

WOMEN'S

RELIGION

N o carriers of a folk c u l t u r e c a n live w i t h o u t the sustaining p o w e r of a b o d y of religious p r a c t i c e s a n d tenets. W o m e n in Islamic lands h a v e l a r g e l y b e e n e x c l u d e d f r o m a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a tion in M u s l i m religious p r a c t i c e s a n d h a v e t r a d i t i o n a l l y been denied

any

institutionalized

education

in the officially

sanc-

tioned d o c t r i n e s of I s l a m . T h i s , h o w e v e r , does not m e a n that w o m e n of the t r a d i t i o n a l sectors of M u s l i m society h a v e had n o religious p r a c t i c e s a n d tenets to o b s e r v e . It m e a n s only t h a t their religion is n o t identical w i t h t h a t of t h e m e n . In fact, w o m e n h a v e a religion of their o w n , h i d i n g u n d e r a thin veil of c o n f o r m i t y with the r e q u i r e m e n t s of official I s l a m , b e n e a t h w h i c h it throbs with a great vitality. T h i s religion of the simple, illiterate, and uneducated women

( w h o c o m p r i s e the g r e a t m a j o r i t y of the

female sex in the M i d d l e East g e n e r a l l y ) has p r e s e r v e d a surprising a m o u n t of pre-Islamic or e x t r a - I s l a m i c beliefs a n d rituals. T h e men, if they d e i g n at all to t a k e notice of these beliefs and rituals, s h r u g t h e m off as w o m e n ' s folly, not w o r t h y of the attention, or even the censure, of m e n . T h e w o m e n ' s religion in I s l a m i c l a n d s c o m p r i s e s a vast a r r a y of beliefs a n d ritual activities w h i c h c a n n o t be discussed even cursorily in the present c o n t e x t . I h a v e , therefore, selected one specific w o m e n ' s ritual

for s o m e w h a t d e t a i l e d

consideration,

that of e x o r c i z i n g the zàr (a t y p e of evil spirit) w h i c h is p r o b a b l y the most o u t s t a n d i n g e x a m p l e of a s e p a r a t e w o m e n ' s cult in the entire M i d d l e East, a n d w h i c h is w i d e l y p r a c t i c e d in n u m e r o u s countries of the a r e a to this d a y . Before e n t e r i n g into a discussion of the zàr c u l t a n d its related belief system, I will say a f e w w o r d s a b o u t o t h e r d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n the m e n ' s a n d the w o m e n ' s religion. T h e

women's

world, in g e n e r a l , is a p l a c e m u c h m o r e r e p l e t e t h a n

man's

w i t h m a g i c forces, evil a n d g o o d spirits, h a r m f u l a n d beneficial influences, h a u n t e d springs, rocks, trees, c a v e s , a n d t h e like. A s A b d u l l a M . L u t f i y y a o b s e r v e d in a J o r d a n i a n v i l l a g e , " t h e

Golden River to Golden Road villagers, especially w o m e n , hardly ever pass or enter a place that is believed to be h a u n t e d w i t h o u t seeking protection from these spirits b y invoking the f o r m u l a 'By y o u r permission, O masters of the p l a c e s . ' " 7 5 Similarly, A n n e Fuller noted in her study of B u a r i j , a L e b a n e s e M u s l i m v i l l a g e : Women are more concerned with the world of evil spirits than men are, since their primary function is to rear the tender young whose lives are most endangered by the unseen world. . . . Women cling to the belief in evil spirits and to the body of folk and nature practices more tenaciously than men, who often mock at many of these practices. Women, through child-bearing and child-rearing, feel greater exposure to the capricious agencies of life, and since they do not attend the mosque, thev must look elsewhere for support.' 6 R e l a t e d to the belief in evil spirits is the faith in the power of d e a d saints w h o c a n c o u n t e r a c t the baleful d e m o n i c influences and give blessings and benefits to those w h o v e n e r a t e them. T h e cult of saints itself has been repeatedly referred to above (pp. 294-95, 330, 342, 375), w h e r e it has been pointed out that it is a p h e n o m e n o n t y p i c a l of the settled villagers and townspeople, b u t largely absent a m o n g the n o m a d i c tribes (pp. 34, 38), and t h a t p i l g r i m a g e s to saints' shrines are one of the rare opportunities for village w o m e n to find e n t e r t a i n m e n t outside their homes (p. 283, 291). It has, h o w e v e r , not been sufficiently emphasized t h a t visits to saints' shrines, and the veneration of saints in general, is typical of the religious life of w o m e n rather than of men. 7 7 A correlative of the belief in, and propitiation of, evil spirits and the v e n e r a t i o n of saints is the belief in, a n d practice of, magic in its manifold and endless manifestations. I t is not that M i d d l e Eastern men, a n d especially their non-Westernized majority, a r e free of proclivities to m a g i c , but the hold magic has over w o m a n is infinitely greater. T h i s m a y h a v e something to d o w i t h the fact that the life of w o m e n , their happiness or unhappiness, depends to a m u c h g r e a t e r extent on elusive, uncontrollable factors than that of m e n . F o r instance, if a c o u p l e has no children, it is u n q u e s t i o n i n g l y the w o m a n w h o is considered as b e i n g barren, and it is her life.

If omen in a Marts

World

not t h a t of her h u s b a n d , t h a t is being t h r e a t e n e d with disgrace, divorce, a n d r u i n . Again, it is w o m a n m u c h m o r e t h a n m a n w h o is threatened by the d a n g e r of something going w r o n g with the m a r r i a g e : it is the h u s b a n d , not she, whose love m a y cool off. whose interest m a y be directed to a n o t h e r w o m a n , w h o may legally bring a co-wife into the house, a n d who, in a m o m e n t of anger, may send her packing. Also, it is the m o t h e r m o r e t h a n the father w h o is closely a t t a c h e d to the children, whose love tor the children is greater, a n d whose personal happiness a n d status in the h o m e d e p e n d s to a considerable extent u p o n the survival of the children. F o r all these reasons, a n d m a n y more, it is the w o m a n w h o t u r n s to magic, to p o p u l a r remedies a n d incantations, to potions a n d concoctions a n d the like, in the vain but unceasing a t t e m p t to control those factors of life over which neither insight, nor intelligence, nor practical measures c a n have any influence. T h u s it is a m o n g w o m e n t h a t age-old magical practices survive, a n d it is w o m e n m u c h m o r e frefrequently t h a n m e n w h o fall victim to those psychosomatic ailments which, in m a n y countries, are believed to be manifestations of zar or other spirit possessions. T h e .-ar cult, of African origin, has its devotees not only in Negro Africa, 7 8 Abyssinia, 7 0 a n d Somalia, 8 0 b u t also in the Sudan, 8 1 E g y p t (both L o w e r a n d U p p e r ) , 8 2 S o u t h e r n A r a b i a 8 3 including the A d e n P r o t e c t o r a t e , 8 4 the H i j a z province, including the holy city of M e c c a , 8 5 a n d the ' U t a y b a h Bedouins between H i j a z and N e j d . 8 6 In contrast to all M u s l i m religious ceremonies, in which the leader is invariably a m a n a n d the p a r t i c i p a n t s are either exclusively or in their m a j o r i t y men, the zar rituals a r e always led by a female mistress of ceremonies, called 'alima ( " k n o w i n g w o m a n " ) in Egypt, umm az-zar, ( m o t h e r of zors) in S o u t h e r n Arabia, shaykha ("sheikess") in the S u d a n ; a n d their p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e only or mostly w o m e n . T h e essence of t h e c e r e m o n y is t h e exorcism of t h e zar w h o likes to e n t e r into the b o d y of a person, thereby causing all kinds of painful s y m p t o m s . Afflicted individuals, mostly w o m e n , b u t occasionally m e n as well, c a n a n d d o seek out the " m o t h e r of ^¿r," begging her to help t h e m by driving the t o r m e n t i n g d e m o n out of their bodies. Snouck

466

Golden River to Golden Road

H u r g r o n j e observed t h a t " t h e fight with the zar constitutes both the saddest and the merriest sides of the life of t h e Meccan w o m a n . " W h e n a person is afflicted, the men as a rule recommend the use of remedies or a religious ceremony to get rid of the devilish power t h a t causes the illness. T h e women, however, insist on a zar ceremony, and they prevail. H u r g r o n j e , moreover, found that each of the ethnic groups of the city h a d a special variety of zar ritual: thus there was a M a g h r e b i t e (Northwest African), Sudanese, Abyssinian, Turkish, a n d so on, zar exorcism. T h e feature c o m m o n to t h e m all was t h a t the shekhet ez-zar (mistress of zars) who functioned as the exorcist was always an elderly woman. Also identical were the basic features of asking the zar for his identification, then inquiring w h a t gift he wished to receive in return for leaving the body of the patient (the usual answer is a new dress or some jewelry), a n d the handing of the gift to the patient. In late nineteenth-century Mecca, studied by Hurgronje, zar possession was both an epidemic and a fad among the women. 8 7 Some fifty years later B e r t r a m T h o m a s described the zar ritual of O m a n . H e found that, although it was prohibited by the official religious functionaries, the cult of the zar flourished in all the fishing villages of O m a n . T h e ceremony, performed in a palm-frond hut, "is presided over by a priestess or witch or medium . . . who is not infrequently an old negress" and called umm az-zar (mother of zars). T h e devotees, p e r h a p s a hundred or so, usually almost all women, assemble at night. Much incense is burned, the ^¿r-possessed is b r o u g h t in a n d laid down in the middle of the floor, the devotees sit a r o u n d h i m in rows, while the umm az-zar occupies a chair. T h r e e d r u m s begin to beat a slow r h y t h m ; those present gently sway their bodies and, as the r h y t h m quickens, so d o their movements. T h e umm az-zar now chants her formula, the devotees respond, and the music and movements become more a n d more vigorous. " T h e patient himself becomes infected," sits up, a n d begins to nod his head in harmony with his neighbors; this is taken as a sign that the zar in him begins to respond and can be a p p r o a c h e d . T h e umm az-zar now asks the zar w h e t h e r he is male or female and w h a t he wants; then, his n a m e a n d his father's n a m e . T h e

Women in a Alan's World

467

zar replies through the m o u t h of the patient, usually asking first for the blood of a sacrifice. I n most instances, the ceremony is not concluded in one night, b u t continues through a second and third night, with seven the m a x i m u m . T h e d r u m m i n g increases in intensity, a n d finally the women present, one after another "fall swooning in an intoxication of voluptuous ecstasy." W h e n such a condition finally overtakes the patient, this "is regarded as the ^¿r's final throw before leaving his body." T h e r e u p o n , immediately, the patient's body is invaded " b y the spirit's opposite sexual n u m b e r , for the zars are male and female and work in pairs." Moreover, there are free and slave -cars, and each of t h e m can possess m a n y people simultaneously. T h e names of the most popular .car-pairs are W a r a r and M u g ; Saif Shungar and Of M a m i d (sometimes called T u l u b i z a n ) ; Alem Sejjed and either M u g or Ingalul. O t h e r male zars are D u m f u r , Bursait, Nuray, Dira, A1 Qust, D a i r Sejjed, A m Bessu, Fasil: female ones, Suriq, Iskander, Dai K a t u , T a i z a r , and Wilaj. T h e exit of the first zar is the sign for a coffee break. " T h e coffee-cup goes round a n d the incense burners are replenished," after which a cow or a sheep (these are the animals usually d e m a n d e d by the is slaughtered, some of its blood being allowed to fill a coffee c u p which the patient promptly drinks. T h e sex of the a n i m a l slaughtered must be the same as that of the zar possessing the patient. T h e carcass of the animal is then roasted whole, brought to the patient, who starts eating the head. " T h e r e a f t e r the assembly partakes of the b u r n t sacrifice." 8 8 Barclay characterizes the zar cult in the Sudan as "predominantly a w o m a n ' s religious activity, having little or no relation to formal Islamic practices and being frowned upon by the official Muslim hierachy." M e n may be brought to a zar ceremony if they are possessed, b u t male zar possession is rare. Ideally, men should not be present at the ceremony, and, in fact, few men in the S u d a n have ever seen a zar session. T h e ceremony itself largely takes the form described by T h o m a s from O m a n . It seems, however, t h a t in the S u d a n there is an even greater assortment of zars of various descriptions than in Southern Arabia. T h e cult itself is the basis for a kind of women's association, which " m a y be viewed as a functional counterpart to the

468

Golden River to Golden Road

men's religious brotherhoods" (p. 203). Psychologically, the zar cult affords women an opportunity to act out unconscious stirrings, to give free rein to aggression or masochistic feelings, to indulge in a degree of nudism (in the "cannibal zar" ceremony), to dance in a highly erotic and suggestive fashion, and the like. 89 It is quite clear that in the Sudan, and probably also in other countries in which it is practiced, the zar cult provides the women, who are completely excluded from the male Dionysian brotherhoods and largely so from the Apollonian orthodox Muslim ceremonies, with a counterpart of their own for everything they miss in the male cult varieties. As has been suggested by Barclay, women constitute a class of marginal participants in the Muslim community (p. 207), and especially so in the religious realm. For this they are compensated by the zar cult which is completely dominated by them and in which it is the menfolk who are, at best, marginal. The cult of the zar has attracted the displeasure and censure of orthodox Muslim men as early as the turn of the century. In 1903 Muhammed Hilmi Zain ed-DIn published in Cairo a treatise entitled Madarr az-zar ("The Harmfulness of the Z a r " ) , and about the same time a sixteen-page Arabic pamphlet was printed, likewise in Cairo, entitled The £ar: Contains an Interesting Humorous zagal (song) Which Describes Everything Done by the Shaykhs of the ^ar From the Things Which Turn the Face of the Educated People Red and Many Anecdotes and Songs 0/ Exorcism.90 The pamphlet contains quotations to show the folly of the zar exorcisms. Nevertheless, in the face of all opposition, reproach and prohibition, written and oral, the zo-r cult continues to flourish among the women of the southern half of the Middle East, and it can be foreseen that it will continue to do so until either one of two developments takes place: either the women will be enabled to participate with men in the official practices of Islam on a more or less equal footing, or they will become Westernized to a degree where they will no longer need the emotional experience and satisfaction they now derive from the zar.

Women in a Alan's World "WOMAN

IS

A

VESSEL

THAT

EMPTIES"

'Women is a vessel that e m p t i e s " - this Arabic proverb, current in many lands and in several variants, epitomizes the traditional Muslim view on the role of the mother between the father and his children. T h e children belong to the father; the mother has no rights whatsoever in them. It is the father's seed out of which the child develops, although this development takes place in the mother's body. The woman's body, like a vessel, holds the child until birth, when, its task accomplished, it empties. In accordance with this view, which is codified in old Muslim religious law, when a man divorces his wife the children remain with the father. Very small children, who are still in need of their mother's care, go with her, but only temporarily; when boys reach the age of two years (and girls the age of seven), they must return to their father. This, at least, is the practice of the Shi'ites. T h e schools of Sunni law allow the children to remain with the mother for longer periods. 91 T h e forcible separation of mother and children at divorce or soon thereafter means that when a woman is divorced by her husband, who can effect the act in a matter of minutes (cf. above, pp. 2 1 - 2 2 , 95, 105-07), she is deprived not only of her husband but of her children as well. T h e exclusion of the mother from the legal continuum that runs from the father to his children has even wider consequences in that women in general are excluded from all corporate entities, such as the khamse, the hamula, and so on, which are strictly patrilineal. This is the overall rule for the Middle East as a whole with the exception of the Tuareg of the Sahara, who reckon descent matrilineally (cf. above, p. 66, No. 6). In all other areas of the Middle East, the patrilineal descent means that a woman, although born into the patriline of her father, does not count as a .full member in it; she bears no share of the responsibility for the conduct of each member of the patriline, which devolves only upon the males. On the other hand, if she herself becomes guilty of misconduct, especially in the ultra-

Golden River to Golden Road

47O

sensitive area of sexual modesty, all the male members of her patriline are responsible, bear the consequences, and must take remedial action. A w o m a n does not transmit the patrilineal heritage to her children they belong to her husband's patriline so that from the point of view of her parental family she represents a dead end, and from that of her conjugal family she is an outsider. T h i s exclusion of the woman is further underlined by the disregard for the mother in assigning a place to a m a n in the corporate group of his father. All sons of a man are considered jurally equal in status, without regard to their mothers' status. T h i s is w h y a man's sons by his legally wedded wives and by his concubines are jurally equal, and inherit from their father identical status and also identical shares in his estate. As to inheritance, it has been pointed out above (pp. 107-08) that despite the K o r a n i c prescription, many tradition-bound Middle Eastern social groups, especially the nomads, still follow the pre-Islamic 'urj (customary law) w h i c h deprives daughters of all inheritance. If a daughter were to inherit, she in turn would leave her share to her children, who, however, belong not to the family of her father but to that of her husband, and in this manner a part of the family's estate would become alienated. Therefore, the principle followed is: only he w h o inherits status inherits property. n "

SEGREGAHON:

MODESTY

AND

HONOR

These, then, are some of the major elements in the traditional man-woman relationship in the M i d d l e East. As we have seen, their origin goes back in many cases to the ancient N e a r Eastern world or at least to pre-Islamic A r a b i a . But it was only after Islam had swept across half the world that the M u s l i m - A r a b elaboration and crystallization of the male-female interaction became firmly embedded all over the Middle East into the matrix of folk tradition of which it has remained an integral part d o w n to the present time. T h i s traditional man-woman relationship is the cultural baseline from which all change in the direction of Westernization and modernization must start out.

I) omen in a Man's

W orld

47'

The centuries-old enculturation of each successive generation to this tradition resulted not only in an unquestioning acceptance of its mores and values, but also in a tendency to oppose and reject any attempt to introduce alterations into it. One way of measuring the degree to which a culture is successful is by observing the extent to which its carriers are satisfied or dissatisfied with its mores and values. As far as the Middle Eastern women are concerned, their great majority seems satisfied with the traditional framework of their lives. That this should be the case in village society (three fourths of the total population of the area) is not surprising since, in rural communities, most women are still illiterate and know very little, if anything at all, of the modern world that has begun to break into the capital and other large cities of their country. Much more remarkable is the fact that the traditional mores and values are upheld to a considerable degree even in that smaH'and select group of young women who are in the forefront of modernization, namely, girls at coeducational colleges and universities. This has been shown to be the case by a study conducted in the late 1950's by Dr. Ibrahim Abdulla Muhyi, a professor of psychology at the University of Baghdad. He circulated a questionnaire among students of both sexes in representative colleges and secondary schools in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, J o r d a n , and Egypt, all countries in which women students constitute a very small percentage within their age group. Moreover, the very lact that their parents permitted them to enroll at secondary and higher institutions of learning (in the latter in coeducational classes) indicates that their parents, too, were considerably removed from the conservative A r a b position on women. This exceptional background and environment notwithstanding, a high percentage of the girl respondents exhibited a remarkably conservative attitude. For instance, 80 per cent of the Muslim and 50 per cent of the Christian girls questioned felt that dancing with boys should not be allowed. It is interesting to note that the views of men students largely coincided with those of the girl students in all questions of freedom from traditional restraints, with the Christian boys consistendy taking a more liberal attitude than the Muslim boys.

472

Golden Rirer to Golden Road

On the question of dancing, for instance, 60 per cent of the Muslim men and 30 per cent of the Christians felt that it should not be allowed. Forty-eight per cent of the Muslim men and 28 of the Christians thought that girls should not be allowed a free choice of friends; 62 per cent of the Muslim men and 25 per cent of the Christians thought that girls should not be allowed to go out with mixed groups of boys and girls: 50 per cent of the Muslim men and 45 per cent of the Christians felt girls should not be allowed to do paid work; 70 per cent of the Muslim men and 65 per cent of the Christians thought girls should not be allowed to go to the cinema alone. Related to the question of freedom is that of sex acceptance. Here the returns showed that both the Muslim and Christian college girls were more dissatisfied with the traditional roles assigned to them by their society than their approval of the same traditional limitations on their freedom would indicate. T o the question whether they sometimes felt they would be happier as boys, 53 per cent of the Muslim and 48 per cent of the Christian girls answered in the aflirmative (as against 28 per cent of United States girls). On this Dr. Muhyi comments that since " M i d d l e Eastern woman lives in what is essentially a man's world" these findings are not surprising. They " m a y mean that for any Middle Eastern girl who seeks higher education there are basic frustrations." 9 3 We may add that the results of the study indicate that while there is a general and diffuse dissatisfaction with their female status among the college girls who have had a chance to glimpse a freer world, this dissatisfaction has not yet been concretized to the extent where it would express itself in a wish to change any of the specific traditional limitations. In order to make tangible the traditional forces which the Muslim woman confronts in her fight for emancipation, let us summarize at this point the conservative argument for keeping women in their traditionally sanctioned place as expounded and recapitulated by Hajji Shaykh Yusuf in a Persian book published in 1926. In this book the author states that "the physical and animal side in woman is stronger than in m a n , " while " t h e spiritual and angelic is greater in man than in w o m a n . " Also,

Women in a Man's

World

473

she is "deficient and in need of a helper, sponsor a n d g u a r d i a n , since w o m a n in origin, creation, body, propriety of conduct, opinion, intelligence a n d action is inferior to m a n . " As the Muslim "writers on ethics have d e c l a r e d , " w o m a n "is overcome by fleshly desires . . . the characteristics of love for a m u s e m e n t , addiction to imaginations, approval of intrigue a n d revolutions a n d fickleness are more p r o n o u n c e d in w o m a n t h a n in m a n . " W o m e n " a r e great babblers, more inclined to irritation and to the following of injurious beliefs t h a n m a n . " T h i s being the condition of w o m e n h o o d , the a u t h o r continues, Islam has e x e m p t e d w o m a n f r o m all kinds of religious obligations which a r e m a n d a t o r y for men, a n d also deprived women of certain rights t h a t are the prerogative of men. T h u s women do not have to go to Holy W a r , or participate in Friday observances or perform other religious precepts t h a t are beyond their strength; they c a n n o t have more t h a n one h u s b a n d , they d o not have the gift of prophecy, they c a n n o t be I m a m s , c a n n o t initiate divorce, must be veiled a n d secluded, and must not read treatises on "love a n d passion." T h e y receive only half as m u c h of the estate of their father as their brothers, and their testimony is worth only one half that ot a m a n . Both men a n d women, however, have certain rights over the opposite sex. M a n has the right to expect the w o m a n to obey h i m ; she must not give alms f r o m his property a n d must not fast or leave the house without his permission. T o these is a d d e d one more right which, however, the translator found " u n p r i n t able." W o m a n , on the other h a n d , is entitled to receive food, drink, clothing, a n d shelter f r o m t h e m a n , a n d also a personal maid, if he can afford it. T h e m a n , moreover, must forgive the woman's sins a n d must be pleasant to her. In defense of the veil, the a u t h o r says t h a t since m e n are " d r a w n by c a r n a l desire a n d by n a t u r e " to beautiful women, the unattractive a m o n g t h e m would be at a great disadvantage if women were not veiled: no m a n would m a r r y t h e m , which, in turn, would lead to a decrease of the population. Also, men unable to p r o c u r e beautiful wives would be d r a w n to homosexuality.

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Golden River to Golden Road

If w o m e n are refractory, says H a j j i S h a y k h Y u s u f , quoting K o r a n 4:38, m a n has the right first to a d m o n i s h a n d then to beat them.94 T h a t w o m e n are " b y n a t u r e " inferior to m e n , t h a t A l l a h preferred m a n o v e r w o m a n , a n d t h a t w o m e n a r e consequently d e p r i v e d of certain religious, legal, a n d social prerogatives, is a n old M u s l i m v i e w often e x p o u n d e d b y jurists a n d expositors of religious l a w , c o m m e n t i n g u p o n K o r a n 4:38, w h i c h reads in p a r t : " M e n stand superior to w o m a n in that G o d h a t h preferred the one over the other. . . , " 9 5 Because, m o r e o v e r , the prevalent M u s l i m v i e w since the later M i d d l e A g e s w a s that a w o m a n must not e n g a g e in a n y activity that m i g h t a t t r a c t p u b l i c attention toward her, w o m e n w e r e generally e x c l u d e d f r o m seeking Islamic learning, in spite of the early hadith w h i c h m a d e this e n d e a v o r i n c u m b e n t u p o n every M u s l i m w o m a n as w e l l as man. 9 ' 1 T h e traditional u r b a n ideals c o n c e r n i n g the interrelationship of m e n and w o m e n in the M u s l i m w o r l d r e q u i r e d a c o m p l e t e separation of the sexes. T h e world outside the h o m e

belongs

in its entirety to men. W o m e n w e r e supposed to v e n t u r e out of the h o m e only w h e n there w a s a c o m p e l l i n g reason for such an excursion. E v e n the p u r c h a s e of food for the f a m i l y meals w a s not considered a purpose j u s t i f y i n g a w o m a n ' s a p p e a r a n c e in the suq ( b a z a a r ) . T h e r e g u l a r a n d usual a r r a n g e m e n t w a s that t h e h u s b a n d , or a n o t h e r m a l e m e m b e r of the h o u s e h o l d , m a d e these purchases. In the home, on the other h a n d , t h e h u s b a n d , a l t h o u g h in theory still t h e master, in fact often assumed the c h a r a c t e r of a guest. T h i s w a s especially p r o n o u n c e d in the case of a m a n w h o had suflicient m e a n s to m a r r y m o r e t h a n one w i f e ; then he quite definitely assumed the c h a r a c t e r of visiting h u s b a n d in relation to e a c h of his wives. T h e physical separation of the men's r e a l m f r o m the w o m e n ' s r e a l m (harlm in A r a b lands, harem in T u r k e y , enderun in I r a n ) w a s parallelled b y a similar d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n the m e n ' s a n d the w o m e n ' s worlds of interest. T h e h u s b a n d ' s m a i n c o n c e r n s a n d p r e o c c u p a t i o n s w e r e all directed o u t w a r d : his w o r k ,

his

ambitions, his position in the h a m u l a or f a m i l y structure, his relationship w i t h his m a l e friends, his e n t e r t a i n m e n t s , his c u l t u r a l a n d religious pursuits. In all this the wife had n o p a r t or p l a c e .

Women in a Man's World

475

T h e husband did not expect her to be his intellectual companion, nor could she, being mostly illiterate and also otherwise uneducated, expect or hope to share his interests. When a husband entered his house, and especially when he sought the company of his wife, he left outside not only a physical world which was unknown to her, but also a whole network of affairs of which she knew nothing, and which she could not understand even if he had taken the trouble to discuss them with her. 9 2 Thus, the one area of life that husband and wife could and did fully share was that of sex and procreation. As a result, the sexual aspect of the husband-wife relationship assumed an inordinate importance, a development for which both sexes were thoroughly predisposed by their respective childhood and youth conditioning. Nor did the experience that awaited them in the actual marital situation contribute to a modification of this attitude. O n the contrary, the typical husband-wife relationship reinforced the expectation among both men and women that the members of the opposite sex considered them primarily as sex objects. A similar attitude, although perhaps not quite as emphatic as in the Middle East, has been observed in the Latin world, both around the Mediterranean and in Latin America. In southern Italy, for instance, it is a commonly held belief " t h a t the woman will, of necessity, 'fall victim to temptation,'" and this belief "brings about its own realization. In a society where everyone believes that a man or woman will inevitably make love unless prevented, a man who finds himself alone with a woman is practically forced to proposition her, since otherwise her attractiveness or his virility would be questioned. In such circumstances, the southern woman, knowing that women forget moral standards when confronted with temptation, easily gives in." 9 7 In the traditional Middle East, the same beliefs were reinforced by the traditional practice to segregate women, which was surrounded by a complex value system centering on the virginity and chastity of women and the virility and honor of men. In Turkey, for instance, it was found in a recent study carried out in two social classes in Ankara " t h a t the concept of woman as the weaker sex, unable to govern itself and therefore in need of

476

Golden River to Golden R»ad

unceasing control by the men of the family, has been internalized to a very high degree. . . . T h e situation amounts to a veritable "virginity cult" that manifests itself in various forms but is clearly present in all strata of society. Male superiority, on the other hand, provides the basis and justification for double standards in sexual morality." 9 8 Similarly, in Arab villages, Richard T . Antoun has found that there are two disparate belief patterns concerning women: one has it that "women are physically weak and legally and economically inferior to men. Their honor, their property, and their lives are, therefore, susceptible to exploitation by the arbitrary whims of males. This is particularly true since men are by nature aggressive and women are by nature vulnerable. Women must, therefore, be protected; the function of the modesty code is to offer this protection." The other belief pattern runs on a different track: "women are driven by inordinate sexuality. They are animalistic in their behavior. They manifest exaggerated aggressiveness. They are informed by evil forces. They bring discord to the body social." 99 The foregoing analysis pointed to some of the forces and events through which such beliefs are inculcated into each successive generation. It also showed that there is no basic conflict between the two belief patterns found by Antoun. On the contrary, the two are mutually complementary, and the adherence to either of them carries with it the inner necessity to embrace the other one as well. Woman is physically smaller and weaker than m a n this, to begin with,.is a fact of nature. Since she is weaker, she must be protected by the men—first by the father into whose house she is born, then by the husband who acquires almost all the rights the father had in her by paying him the bride-price and making her his wife. In the traditional view, the physical weakness of the woman extends also to her mind and personality: she is weak also in her intellect, and this, in turn, has a number of weighty consequences. First of all, she is not a suitable subject for intellectual training (she is not sent to school and her illiteracy, in fact, renders her inferior to the literate male contingent). Second, she does not have to observe the laws and rules of religion (she is excluded from traditional Muslim

Women in a Man's World

477

worship). Third, she does not have the intellectual capacity to control her sexual desires (she must be subjected to infibulation or clitoridectomy, or at least, kept in seclusion and away from men). Woman's sexuality, it then appears, is more powerful than that of man, not because it is stronger per se, but because woman is less capable than man of controlling it. This point was clearly expressed by Antoun's informant when he said: "When a man kisses a girl, her eye is broken [she loses her capacity for shame]." 1 0 0 T h e words in brackets are Antoun's explanation of the expression 'her eye is broken." I would venture that a more accurate explanation would be: she loses her capacity to resist; her will is broken, so that thereafter the man can take advantage of her. Of course, in the popular view the inability of woman to control her sexual drives is often expressed by simply saying that woman's lust is greater than that of man. 101 Since this is the case, folk mores build a protective fence around woman's sexuality: the fence of modesty which narrowly limits woman's mobility and, indeed, visibility, and which makes even the slightest, most remote, and most innocuous contact between her and a man a grievous offense. On the other hand, the popular view does not exempt the men either from the taint of lust. On the contrary, all the sayings of folk wisdom concerning the greater sexuality of women notwithstanding, the entire pattern of life in the Middle East bears unmistakable testimony to the solidly entrenched assumption that it is a part of man's innate proclivity to take sexual advantage of every woman if he has an opportunity to do so. T h e entire system of segregation between the sexes makes sense only if it serves to protect woman against man who is endowed with an aggressive and ruthless sexuality. This view came through quite clearly in the responses to Dr. Muhyi's questionnaire referred to above: more than 75 per cent of the boys agreed " t h a t young women should not be allowed to go to the movies alone, because, as the interviews suggest, alone, she might be molested." T o which Dr. Muhyi adds that " t h e Middle Eastern girls have been taught that men are not to be trusted, and they are duly cautious. . . . Whereas the parent

Golden River to Golden Road

478

generation responded to the male threat by erecting defenses about their women, the young women of today are more frequently insisting that they themselves are c a p a b l e of acting with discretion.'" 0 2 T h e picture emerging from such observations is one entirely different from that given in the usual traditional explanations of the restrictions placed upon women. T h e true Middle Eastern male view, we now understand, is not that women are more prone to succumb to carnal desires than men and must therefore be secluded. O n the contrary, it is the men who, having been brought up to emphasize their virility and sexual aggressiveness, must be prevented from taking a d v a n t a g e of the women. O n e way of achieving this is tacitly to tolerate masturbation (which boys learn in groups), homosexuality, and sodomy a m o n g boys and unmarried young men. 1 0 3 Another way is to protect women by imposing on them the d u t y of keeping out of the men's sight. Moreover, in order to make doubly sure that the women obey the rules of segregation, and that the men are not too eager to seek opportunities to violate the same rules, the tradition has m a d e the chastity of women the pivot on which the honor of their menfolk turns: the slightest immodesty in a w o m a n causes an immeasurable loss of honor to her father a n d brothers. T h u s the preservation of female modesty is surrounded by such intensely emotional safeguards that its perpetuation is practically guaranteed. OUTLOOK

Every culture, in a sense, is caught in a vicious circle of its own making f r o m which it can break out only by dint of unrelenting effort sustained at least over two generations. T h e foregoing discussion dealt with some of the main features of t h e traditional Middle Eastern male-female relationship which an increasing n u m b e r of women as well as m a n in more a n d more countries of the area consider just such a vicious circle. T h e efforts to break out of it have been directed to n u m e r o u s points of attack, such as legal equality, religious reform, economic change, occupational penetration, medical progress, and, last but not least, educational facilities for women. W h e r e v e r a

H'omen iti a A Jan's World

479

feminist movement was able to emerge in the Middle East, both its female leaders and male supporters rightly felt that, in the particular cultural configuration characterizing the area, the one key that can open more doors and windows than any other is that of education. Educational development, an almost Sisyphean task in view of the high birth rate in the Middle East, must, in the eyes of many, receive first priority. Only after an entire generation of pupils, future mothers and fathers, has gone through school where it was inculcated with a new view of the total spectrum of the man-woman relationship, can it be expected to introduce basic changes in the early processes of infant enculturation and child socialization. T h e s e changes will have to include, in the first place, a replacement of the traditional preferred treatment of male children with equality for boys and girls so as to prevent the formation of the old male and female stereotypes in the children's minds and to discourage the re-emergence of the corresponding modal male and female personalities. When this second generation grows up and enters the age of parenthood, then, and only then, can the first, crucial phase of modernization be considered accomplished, and the new view of the manwoman relationship be assumed to have been internalized. Nor, as has been recognized by thoughtful Middle Easterners quite some time ago, are educational reforms and the contingent improvements in the women's position merely to the advantage of the female half of the population. O n the contrary, the men have as much to gain from it as the women. T o put it in the simplest terms, educated and emancipated women will make better wives and mothers. T h i s new insight underlies the increasingly evident preference shown by educated young men in the Middle East for marrying educated young women, which in turn has become an important additional motivation for many girls to seek education and for their parents to permit them to do so. Although, as T a b l e 8 in the Statistical Appendix clearly shows, the school attendance of girls in most Middle Eastern countries still lags markedly behind that of boys, there can be no doubt that as the schooling of boys becomes more general the number of girls in schools will come closer to equaling that of boys.

4S0

Golden River to Golden Road

In fine, n u m e r o u s indicators show that the process of the emancipation of women is on its way and that changes in the m a n - w o m a n relationship have begun. At this point, it has become largely academic for either students of the Middle East or the area's own cultural, social, and political leaders to discuss whether these changes are desirable or not. Instead, or so it seems to this veteran student of the area, as thorough an investigation as is still possible today should be u n d e r t a k e n of the traditional texture of the Middle Eastern m a n - w o m a n relations with a view to isolating those of its constituent features whose retention can enrich the newly emerging social a n d familial patterns and prevent t h e m f r o m becoming a c a r b o n copy of those of the West with all their oft-lamented and too-well-known ills a n d woes.

Statistical Appendix

O

NE OF the numerous difficulties that confront the student of Middle Eastern society derives from the nature of its statistics. For several countries in the area, the available statistical information is most scanty. In certain cases, even when statistical data for a country are contained in the United Nations publications, they are unreliable or incomplete. Take, for instance, the data pertaining to the number of males and females in certain age groups. It is well known that in the low age brackets the number of males, though as a rule greater than that of females, does not exceed the latter by more than 5 or 6 per cent. In other words, for every 100 girls there are no more than 105 or 106 boys. Yet many Middle Eastern countries report a disproportionate numerical preponderance of boys over girls. For the five-to-fourteen-year age group this relationship is 126:100 in the Sudan, 1 1 8 : 1 0 0 in Niger, 1 1 6 : 1 0 0 in Chad, 1 1 4 : 1 0 0 in Jordan and Pakistan, 1 1 3 : 1 0 0 in Syria and Morocco, 1 1 0 : 1 0 0 in Libya, Turkey, and Iran, 109:100 in Mali, and 108:100 in Iraq and the United Arab Republic. The probable explanation for this seems to be the underregistration of girls for one or more of the following reasons: the failure by fathers to report the number of their daughters because no importance is attached to them or because the presence of an unmarried daughter over the age of fifteen in the household is considered shameful; the impossibility of inquiring into the number of wives, which is considered a private matter unsuited for discussion with an outsider.1 In Afghanistan, "in both villages and urban centers only the males could be counted, 481

482

Golden River to Golden Road

since religious feeling and an intense concern for family privacy make it impossible to inquire how many women there are in a household." 2 In spite of these shortcomings, the statistical material compiled by the United Nations is useful. Thus Table 1 shows that the Middle East as a whole is an area of high birthrates and high deathrates (although occasional under-registration clouds the picture), as well as high natural increase and relatively low expectation of life. It also shows the wide variations that exist in each of these rates as between one country and another in the area. Table 2 shows the high annual rates of population increase, Table 3 the high infant mortality rates, again with a considerable range from country to country. Table 4 shows the very wide range of the number of inhabitants per physician, from one doctor to every 73,330 inhabitants in Chad to one doctor to every 4 1 0 inhabitants in Israel. It appears that high infant mortality goes together with a small number of doctors and with low life expectancy. In all these respects the southern tier of the Middle East is, in general, considerably worse off than its northern countries. Table 5 shows that the average size of households in the Middle East is between 5 and 6 persons, or about twice as large as the West European and American average. This confirms statistically our findings that the extended family is still a widely prevalent institution in the area. Table 6 shows that, in spite of the generally very low annual per capita national income characterizing most countries in the Middle East, the area also includes the one country with the highest such income in the world : Kuwait. T h e explanation lies in the small population of this sheikhdom and its very sizable oil revenues which are counted in figuring the per capita national income, although in fact, only a minor portion of it filters down to the population at large. Table 7 indicates that as far as daily calorie intake is concerned, of those countries from which data are available, it ranges from a definitely inadequate 1,720 calories (Sudan) to a more than adequate 3 , 1 1 0 calories (Turkey). T h e protein intake exceeds the daily dietary allowance of 70 grams recommended by the

Statistical Appendix

4*3

Food and Nutrition Board of the United States National Research Council in 1948 in all countries except Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, J o r d a n , Libya, Pakistan, and Sudan. T h e sizable T a b l e 8 shows the number of male and female teachers and of boys and girls enrolled in elementary schools in the countries of the Middle East, as well as the percentage of the latter in the total male and female school-age population. This percentage is not supplied in the United Nations Statistical Yearbook, which contains only the absolute figures for boys and girls enrolled in schools and, for most countries, for all the boys and girls aged five to fourteen (given in two five-year age groups, five to nine, and ten to fourteen). On this basis the estimated number of boys and girls aged six to thirteen (an eight-year age group) was calculated, and from it the percentage of those enrolled in schools within this age group. Since several Middle Eastern countries require elementary education for a period shorter than eight years, the percentages in the last three columns of T a b l e 8 show, not what proportion of those children who by law are supposed to be in school actually go to school, but the proportion of those children who actually g o to school in the total number of children aged six to thirteen, which is the period of life that, by common and practically worldwide consensus, a child should spend studying in school. Here it should be repeated that all these figures and percentages are merely very rough approximations. Tables 9 through 12 require no individual comments. Taken together they indicate the extraordinary width of the range exhibited by the countries in the area in those cultural activities whose medium is the written word (books, pamphlets, and daily papers), oral mass communication (the radio), and the motion picture.

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Statistical Appendix

TABLE 2. Annual Rates of Population Increase* Estimates for 1963-67 in Percentages Country Afghanistan Algeria Bahrain Ceuta Chad Cyprus Ifni Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Mali Mauritania Melilla

Per cent 2.0 3-5 2.0 '•5 [ .0 1.0 3-1 2-5 2.9 4' 7.6t 2-5 3-7 1 9 2.0 - 0 . 3j

Country

Per cent

Morocco Niger Pakistan Qatar Saudi Arabia Southern Yemen Sudan Syria Trucial O m a n Tunisia Turkey United A r a b Republic Yemen ( ( 9 6 3 - 6 6 ) France Italy United K i n g d o m United States

*Source: United Nations Demographic Tearbook t H i g h rate due partly to immigration.

2.8 2.7 2.1 8. i f '•7 2.2 2.8 2,9 5-2 2-3 2-5 2-5 1.6 1.0 0.8 0.6 '•3

igSy, New York, 1968.

Golden River to Golden

486

Road

TABLE 3. Infant Mortality Rates* (Death of Infants under 1 Year of Age per 1,000 Live Births. Excluding Foetal Deaths) Country

Year

Rate

Aden Algeria Ceuta Chad Cyprus Ifni Iraq Israel " (Jews) Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Mali Mauritania Melilla Morocco Niger Pakistan Southern Yemen Sudan Syria Tunisia Turkey United Arab Republic

>965 1963 1966 [963/64 •9 6 5 1960

75-8 70.1 61.4 160 27.6 53-2

France Italy United Kingdom United States

'965 1966 1965 1966 1960/61 1964/65 1966 1962 1959/60 1963 1966 '955

27-4 21.6 42.0 37° 123 185-191 23.2 •49 200 .45.6 79-9 93- 6

Year

Rate

'965 1967

86.3 56.2

1967

26.7

1966 1966

2

•959/63

363

1967

,3.6t

1964/65 1967

• 87 27.1

'965

142 93-6 28.1 110 161 83.2 17. i 34-3 19.0 22. i

1960

74-3

1963

118.6

•95 6 1967 '959 1966 1967

1966 1966 1966 1966

21.7 34-3 19.6 23-4

1967 1967 1967 1967

' S o u r c e s : U n i t e d N a t i o n s Demographic Yearbook rg6y, N e w Y o r k , 1968.

fObviously incomplete registration.

'7-9+ 5-3

Yearbook ig66 a n d ig6y a n d

Statistical

Statistical

Appendi x

TAUIK

4S7

4.

Number of Inhabitants per Physician*

Countn

Yea1

Xumber

Afghanistan Chad Cyprus Ifni Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Iibya Morocco Muscat and Oman Niger Pakistan Qatar Saudi Arabia Southern Yemen Sudan Syria Tunisia Turkey United Arab Republic

1966 1965 '965 1964

22,140

'965 1964 1965 1966 1965 '965 1966 •9 6 5 >965 1964 •965 1966 1964 1966 1964 1963 1964 1965 1964

73.330 1,320 2,880 3,880 4,760 410 4,040 810 '.39° 3,160 12,120 23.54° 64,740 6,200 1,180 13,000 2.140 30,720 5.1 1 0 8,990 2,860 2,380

United States

'965

670

*Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook ig6y, New York. 1968.

Golden

4&'8

TAHI K

5.

River

to Golden

Average S i / e of Private H o u s e h o l d s *

Country

Year

Bahrain Cyprus Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Libya Mali Melilla Morocco Niger Pakistan Sudan Syria Turkey United A r a b Republic

>965 i960 1966 1966 1963 1961

France Italy United K i n g d o m United States

1962 1961 1966 i960

•965 1964 1960/61 1962 i960 1959/60 i960 1964/65 1961/62 i960 i960

\umber oj persons per household 5-9 4.0 5° 5-0 3.8 5-3 6.7 4-7 5-3 4-9 4.8 4-4 5-4 5-5 5-9 5-7 5-0 3- 1 3-6 2-9 3-3

*Source: U n i t e d Nations Statistical Yeatbook rg6y, New York, 1968.

Road

Statistical Appendix

TAHI.K

6. Estimates of Per C a p i t a National Income* (In U . S . Dollars)

Country

Year

Afghanistan Algeria Chad Cyprus Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Mali Mauritania Morocco Muscat and O m a n Niger Pakistan Saudi A r a b i a Southern Y e m e n Sudan Syria Tunisia Turkey L T nited A r a b R e p u b l i c Yemen

1963

'965 1966 1965 1958

France Italy United K i n g d o m L'nited States

1966 fg66 1966 1966

•965 '965 1966 >965 '965 1966 >965 1966 •965 1966 1963 1965 •965 .958 1965 1965 1958 1963 1965 .963

$ 52 •93 66 642 207 217 '.'55 112 3-257t 338 680 66 106 180 58 82 95 60 120 88 163 .61 276 161 4" '•542 944 1 >5 1 7 3-'53

*Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook ig6y. New York. 1968. tlncludes oil revenues.

Golden River to Golden

490

TABLF.

7.

Country

Road

Net Daily Food Supplies Per Capita* Tear

Calories

% Animal origin

Protein grams

Afghanistan Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Lebanon Libya Pakistan Sudan Syria Turkey United A r a b Republic

1961-62

2,050

'3

68

I960

2,050

12

60

1960-62

2,140

•4

62

1964/65

2,820

20

86

1964

2,39°

>965 >964

2,700

7 '3

1,910

8

1965/66

2,280

11

59 74 50 52

1966

1,720

22

60

>963

2,360

•4

72

10

98

1963/64

2,93°

6

84

France Italy United Kingdom United States

•965

3.25°

41

103

1965/66

2,820

18

84

1965/66

3-250 3''4°

42 38

89

1960/61

»965

•Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook ig6y, New York, 1968.

92

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Golden River to Golden

Road

T A B L E g. Book Production* (Total annual number of titles, including books and pamphlets, published in 1964-66)

Number

umber of books published per 100,000 of population

Country

Year

Afghani-tan Algeria Cyprus Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Pakistan Syria Tunisia Turkey United Arab Republic

•965 1964 1964 •965 1964 1964 1966 1964 1966 >965 •965 1964 •965 1966

'58 438 2,027 458 107 5.442 3,060

0.70 1.30 28.19 3-89 3-4° 3948 '•3 1 321 7 17.80 1.92 8.48 2 -39 1705 10.18

United States

1966

58>5>7

3°-79

108 1 5®t 170 985 a86f 1,038

'Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook ig67, New York, 1968. column calculated by author, t First editions only.

Last

Statistical

493

Appendix

T A B L E IO. Daily Newspapers* ( Number, estimated circulation, and copies per 1,000 of population)

Circulation Per 1,000 population

Country

Ï ear

A umbei

Total

Afghanistan Algeria Chad Cyprus Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Mali Morocco Niger Pakistan Saudi Arabia Sudan Syria Tunisia Turkey United A r a b Republic

1966 •9 6 5 >965 1966 1961 1963 1963 •9 6 5 1964 '965 1966 1966 1963 '965 .965 1966 1962 [966 1966 1961 1964

18 5

4 37 4 2 10 1 95 7 7 8 5 472 12

101,000 i 70,000 1,500 82,000 312,000 85,000 701,000 I 7,000 12,000

6 '5 0.4 136 '5 12 2 43 8 28

8,000 3,000 220,000 1,300 ' .839,000 55.00° 64,000 62,000 120,000 1,299,000

5 °-5 '7 0.4 18 8 5 11 27 45

France Italy United Kingdom United States

1964 1965 1966 1966

128 92 106 '.754

11,872,000 5,811,000 26,700,000 61,397,000

[

1 1 27 8 24 /

245 "3 488 312

*Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1967, New York, 1968. column calculated by author.

Last

Golden River to Golden Road

494

Table

i i. R a d i o Broadcasting Receivers*

( N u m b e r o f licenses issued, o r e s t i m a t e d n u m b e r of receivers in use. 1 9 6 4 - 6 6 ) Receivers per Country

Year

Afghanistan

•965 [964

Algeria Bahrain

.Xumber

100 of population

200,000

1.29 ,2-34

104.66

1966

i ,500,000 202,000

Chad Cyprus

1966

30,000

0.89

1966

139.000

Iran

1966

i ,700,000

2325 6.72

Iraq Israel

'965

2,500,000

29.80

•965

743,000

28.26

Jordan

•965 1964

269,000

13.06

i 75,000

Lebanon

1966

450,000

35-64 18.29

Libya Mali

1966

74,000

4.41

1966

30,000

0.64

Mauritania

1964

31,000

2.89

Morocco

1966

748,000

Niger Pakistan

1964

100,000

5-44 2.91

1964

549,000

0.52

Southern Y e m e n

1965

300,000

26.17

Sudan

1964

225,000

1.61

Syria

1,745,000

Tunisia

•965 1966

370,000

32-3' 22.06

Turkey

1966

2,637,000

8.26

United States

1966

262,700,000

138.26

Kuwait

* S o u r c e : U n i t e d N a t i o n s Statistical column calculated by author.

Yearbook 7967. N e w Y o r k .

1968.

Last

Statistical Appendix

TABI>

12.

495

Number of Cinemas and Annual Attendance* Annual attendance per inhabitant

(,'uuntr j

Year

A umber

Afghanistan Algeria Bahrain Chad Cyprus Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Mali Mauritania Morocco Pakistan Southern Yemen Spanish Sahara Sudan Syria Trucial Oman Tunisia United Arab Republic Yemen

•965 '05 '965

'9

0.4

81

4 7

France Italy United Kingdom United States

10

1966

8

1966

'5°

1961

238

•965 1961 1965 1964

'965 •963 1964

84 172

55 7 165

'9 7

0.2

'4 3 1 '3 3 '4 0.8

1964

226

1964

325

'963

18

1966 1961

4 47

'5

1966

112

4

I960

2

'965 >965 '965

128

1966

12

1966

7)35° >3.3°° >,847

'965

14,000

12

1966

'7' 17

•Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1967 New York. 1968.

'•5 0.2 0.8

2 0.4

5 5

Notes CHAPTER

i—

i. The latest and best cartographic representation of this basic trichotomy of the Old World can be found in the Atlas International Larousse, 1950, p. 23A. •2. M. J . Herskovits, "The Culture Areas of Africa," Africa, Vol. I l l , London, 1931; idem., Backgrounds of African Art, Denver, 1945; idem., Man and His Works, New York, 1948, pp. 190-93; G. P. Murdock, Africa: Its Peoples and Their Culture History, New York, 1959; E. Bacon and A. E. Hudson, "Asia (Ethnology)," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1945, Vol. II, pp. 523-25; E. Bacon, " A Preliminary Attempt to Determine the Culture Areas of Asia," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 1946, I I : 1 1 7 - 3 2 ; W. Schmidt and W. Koppers, Voelker und Kulturen, Regensburg, 1924. 3. This delimitation is at variance with the presently accepted one. Generally, only the Asiatic part of this area plus Egypt is regarded as the Middle East or the Near East. Cf., for example, R. Linton (ed.), Most of the World, New York, 1949, where a separate article deals with the Near East and another with North Africa. W. B. Fisher, in his recent geography of the Middle East (The Middle East: A Physical, Social and Regional Geography, London and New York, 1950), includes also Cyrenaica in addition to the above in the Middle East. 4. Clark Wissler, The American Indian, New York, 1922, pp. 217-57. 5. The expression is taken from the title of Gertrude Bell's well-known book, Syria: the Desert and the Sown, London, 1907. 6. R . Patai, "Nomadism: Middle Eastern and Central Asian," Southwestern Jotcmal of Anthropology, 1951, Winter. 7. Feilberg, La Tente Noire, Copenhagen, 1944; Patai, "Nomadism." 8. A similar comparison between each significant culture trait discerned as characteristic of the Middle Eastern culture continent and the equivalent elements in the contiguous culture continents of Europe, Africa, Central Asia, and India, would be highly desirable. 9. R. Patai, "Musha'a Tenure and Cooperation in Palestine," American Anthropologist, 1949, Vol. 51, No. 3 ; Fisher, The Middle East, pp. 180-81. 10. R . Maunier, The Sociology of Colonies, London, 1949, Vol. II, 613-35. 1 1 . This brief description could make no allowance for local variations, of which there are many. 12. Edith Gerson-Kiwi, "The Musicians of the Orient," Edoth: A Quarterly for Folklore and Ethnology, Jerusalem, 1946, Vol. I, pp. 227-33.

497

498

Golden River to Golden

Road

13. Jacob, M . Landau, "Shadow Plays in the Near East," Edoth, 1947, Vol. I l l , pp. xxiii-cliv; idem., Studies in the Arab Theater and Cinema, Philadelphia, 1958. PP- 9-4714. In Arabic: arkan ad-din. T h e five pillars of the faith are: confession of the faith (shahada), pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj), legal alms (zakat), daily prayers (salat), and fasting in the month of R a m a d h a n ( f a w m ) .

C H A P T E R 2— 1. Cf. R u t h Benedict, Patterns of Culture, Boston and New York, 1934. p. 230. 2. M . J . Herskovits, Man and His Works, New York, 1948, p. 199. 3. Franz Boas, General Anthropology, New York, 1938, p. 671. 4. A. L. Kroeber, in Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Vol. IV, pp. 646-47. 5. Cf. Clark Wissler, The American Indian, New York, 1922, pp. 217-57. 6. Clark Wissler, The Relation of Nature to Man in Aboriginal America, New York, 1926, p. xv. 7. Kroeber, loc. cit. 8. These differences are treated in greater detail in R. Patai's "Nomadism: Middle Eastern and Central Asian," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 7, No. 4, Winter 1951, pp. 4 0 1 - 1 4 . 9. Cf. T o r Irstam, The King of Ganda: Studies in the Institutions of Sacral Kingship in Africa, T h e Ethnographical Museum of Sweden, Stockholm, New Series, Publ. No. 8, 1944; Raphael Patai, " H e b r e w Installation Rites," Hebrew Union College Annual, Cincinnati, 1947 (Vol. xx), pp. 1 4 3 - 2 2 5 ; idem., Man and Temple in Ancient Jewish Myth and Ritual, Edinburgh, 1947, p. 207. 10. Cf. K. G. Lindblom, "Spears with T w o or More Heads Particularly in Africa," Essays Presented to C. G. Seligman, London, 1934, pp. 149-81, 175-77. 11. Cf. Robert H a r t m a n , Les Peuples de l'Afrique, Paris,. 1886 ( ?), p. 165, with two figures on p. 164; C. G. Seligman, Egypt and Negro Africa, London, 1934, pp. 12, 63-65, with pictures; C. K . Meek, A Sudanese Kingdom, London, 1931, p. 458. 12. Cf. Sir J a m e s George Frazer, Folk Lore in the Old Testament, London, 1919, Vol. I, pp. 52-65. 13. Cf. Hans Abrahamsson, The Origin of Death, Studies in African Mythology, Uppsala, 1951. 14. G. P. Murdock, Africa: Its Peoples and Their Culture History, New York, '959. PP- 7 ' , 223, 272, 315. 15. Cf. R . Patai, "Nomadism: Middle Eastern and Central Asian," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 7, pp. 401-11. 16. Cf. A. de Préville, Les sociétés africaines: leur origine, leur évolution—leur avenir, Paris, 1894. 17. Cf. Jerome Dowd, The Negro Races, Vol. I, New York, 1907. 18. American Anthropologist, Vol. xxvi, pp. 50-63. 19. New York, 1948, p. 191, a n d subsequent editions. 20. Cf. M . J . Herskovits, Backgrounds of African Art, Denver, 1945, pp. 15 ff. 21. Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., p. 192. 22. Cf. Africa: Journal of the International Institute of Afiican Languages and Cultures, London, Vol. 2, 1929, pp. 2 2 1 - 4 3 , 352-78.

.Votes

499

23. Field Museum of Natural History, Anthropological Series, Vol. 26, Chicago, 1937, pp. 325 fF. 24. New York, 1959. 25. See Chapter 3 " T h e Desert and the Sown." 26. YVissler, The American Indian, op. cit., pp. 217-57; A. L. Kroeber, Anthropology, New York, 1923, pp. 335-39. 27. Cf. Henry Ayrout, Fellahs d'Egypte, Cairo, 1952, p. 171. 28. Max v. Oppenheim, Die Beduinen, 3 volumes, Leipzig, 1939—Wiesbaden, '952.

29. Cf. R . Maunier, The Sociology of Colonics, London, 1949, I I : 634. 30. E. F. Gautier, Le Sahara, Paris, 1928, pp. 209 fr.; C. G. Seligman, Rh es of Africa, London, 1930, pp. 142, 146-52; C. G. Feilberg, La Tente Noire, Copenhagen, 1944, p. 144; J . Greenberg, The Influence of Islam on a Sudanese Religion, New York, 1946, pp. 1 - 2 ; R. Patai, "Nomadism." 31. Murdock, Africa, op. cit., pp. 14, 129; Joseph H . Greenberg, Studies in African Linguistic Classification, New Haven, 1955. 32. A. Vambery, Skizzen aus Mittelasien, Leipzig, 1868; idem., Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, V I I I : 888. CHAPTER 3 — 1. Cf. W. F. Albright, From the Stone Age to Christianity, Baltimore, 1940, pp. 120 -21. 2. Genesis 1 3 : 6 . Cf. v. 2. 3. Albright, op. cit., p. 121. 4. See below, Chapter 7, " D u a l Organization." 5. E. Chiera, Sumerian Religious Texts, 1924, pp. 20 f. 6. Alec Kirkbride, "Changes in Tribal Life in Trans-Jordan," MAN March-April, 1945, No. 23, London. 7. K. S. Twitchell, Saudi Arabia, Princeton, 1953, pp. 47 ff., 171 ff. Ameen Rihani, Ihn Saud of Arabia, His People and His Land, London, 1928. Cf. also Dwight Sanderson, The Rural Community, 1932, Chapters 2 and 3, on transition from the nomadic tribe to the subagricultural state. 8. Jeremiah 35: 1-10. 9. Jeremiah 2 : 2 . 10. Joseph Braslawski, " T h e Composition of the Bedouin Tribes of the Negev," Edoth, A Quarterly for Folklore and Ethnology, ed. Raphael Patai and Joseph Rivlin, Jerusalem, 1946, Vol. 1, No. 2, in Hebrew with English summary. 11. Op. cit., p. 95. 12. Cf. C. S. Jarvis, "Southern Palestine a n d Its Possibilities for Settlement," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. xxv, J a n . 1938, p. 205. C H A P T E R 4— 1. Charles W. Churchill, The City of Beirut: A Socio-economic Survey, Beirut, >954, P- 42. Hashemite Kingdom of J o r d a n , 1952 Census of Housing. 3. Lebanese Ministry of National Economy, Kasmie Rural Improvement Project, Beirut, 1953, p. 8.

5°°

Golden River to Golden Road

4. G o v e r n m e n t of Palestine, " S u r v e y of Social a n d E c o n o m i c Conditions in A r a b Villages," General Monthly Bulletin of Current Statistics, 1945, p. 432. 5. Bryan Clarke, Berber Village, L o n d o n , 1959, p p . 7 5 - 7 6 . 6. Francis R . R o d d , The People of the Veil, L o n d o n , 1926, p p . 148, 150; cf. 136. 7. R o m L a n d a u , Moroccan Journal, L o n d o n [1952], p. 55. 8. Gerald d e G a u r y , Arabian Journey and Other Desert Travels, L o n d o n , 1950, p. 92. 9. Survey 1945: 435. 10. Ilse Lichtenstaedter, " A n A r a b - E g y p t i a n F a m i l y , " The Middle Hast Journal, Vol. 6, N o . 4, A u t u m n 1952, p . 382. 1 1 . Survey 1945: 436 12. I a n D. Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate, New York, 1952, p. 105. 13. Lichtenstaedter, op. cit., p. 385. 14. K o r a n 60: 1 0 ; CT. R e u b e n Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, C a m b r i d g e . ' 9 5 7 . P- >315. Cf. F u l a n a i n , The Marsh Arab, Philadelphia, 1928, pp. 2 5 1 - 7 3 . 16. Bräunlich, " Z u r Gesellschaftsordnung d e r heutigen B e d u i n e n , " Islamita, Vol. vi, 1934, p p . 186-87. 17. Alois Musil, Manners and Customs of the Ku ala Bedouins, N e w York. 102ÌJ. p p . 1 3 6 - 3 7 , 139. 18. H . R . P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, L o n d o n , 1949, p p . 1 4 0 - 4 1 , 602-3. 19. B e r t r a m T h o m a s , Arabia Felix, N e w York. 1932, p. 6 7 ; cf. G . W y m a n Bury, The Land of Uz, L o n d o n , i g i 1, p. 278. 20. A. C. J e w e t t , An American Engineer in Afghanistan, Minneapolis. 194Ü, p. 262. 21. H o r a c e M i n e r , The Primitive City of Timbuctoo, Princeton, 1953, p. 1O0. 22. G. W y m a n Bury, op. cit., p. 278. 23. H i l m a G r a n q v i s t , Marriage Conditions in a Palestinian Village, Helsingfors, 1931-3524. YV. E. L a n e , Manners and Customs of the Afodern Egyptians, E v e r y m a n ' s L i b r a r y , L o n d o n - N e w York, C h a p , xiii, p. 301. 25. Lichtenstaedter, op. cit., p. 387. 26. Weulersse, Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient, Paris, 1946, p. 2 2 1 . 27. K a z e m Daghestani, Etude sociologique sur la famille Musulmane contemporaine en Syrie, Paris, 1932, p p . 2 1 - 2 2 ; cf. below, C h a p t e r 6, Cousin M a r r i a g e . 28. B u r c k h a r d t , Arabie Proverbs, L o n d o n , 1830, p. 118. 29. Encyclopaedia of Islam (old edition), s.v. A r a b i a . 30. B e r t r a m T h o m a s , Arabia Felix, N e w York, 1932, p. 97. 3 1 . William S. H a a s , Iran, N e w York, 1946, p . 58. 32. Encyclopaedia of Islam (old edition), s.v. Berbers. 32a. Lloyd C a b o t Briggs, Tribes of the Sahara, C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d U n i versity Press, 1960, p. 174. 33. Survey 1945: 443. 34. Cf. Survey of t h e Khiss-Finn C a m p . U . N . Doc. No. M E / 3 S / 2 0 . 35. Cf. A b b a s M . A m m a r , A Demographic Study of an Egyptian Province (Sharqiya), L o n d o n , 1942, p . 36.

501

Notes

36. Churchill, op. cit., p. 5. 37. Alois Musil, Arabia Petraea, Wien, 1908, Vol. I l l , p. 207; idem., Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins, p. 230. Cf. the story of Rachel, Leah, and the mandrakes, Genesis 30:14; cf. R . Patai, Sex and Family in the Bible and the Middle East, New York, 1959, pp. 43 ff. 38. Michel Feghali, " L a famille Catholique au Li ban," Revue d'Ethnographie, Paris, 1925, pp. 291 f. 39. Kingsley Davis, Human Society, New York, 1949, p. 51. 40. Sania Hamady, Temperament and Character of the Arabs, New York, i960, pp. 28, 94. 41. Gertrude Joly, " T h e Woman of the Lebanon," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 38, 1951, pp. 17 ff. 42. Kasmie 1953: 25. 43. Feghali, op. cit., 292 f. 44. Survey 1945: 441. 45. United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1958, pp. 321 ff. T h e marriage rates, that is, the number of marriages registered annually per 1,000 population, cannot serve as a basis of comparison. In the United States the marriage rate in 1957 was 8 . 9 ; in Jordan, 1957, 1 1 . 5 ; in Aden Colony, 1950, 16.1. In other Middle Eastern countries they are lower than in the United States: in Iraq, for example, as low as 3 . 8 in 1955, which only shows how incomplete is the registration of marriages, just as that of births and deaths. Cf. loc. cit. 46. U . N . Economic and Social Council Document No. E/CN.g/82, 24 April 1951. 47. U.N. Demographic Yearbook 1949-50. 48. Ammar, op. cit., 1:257. 49. Churchill, op. cit. 50. Survey 1945:440. 51. H. R . P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbors, London, 1956, pp. 84-86. 52. Survey 1945:442-43. 53. U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1958, pp. 472 ff. 54. Arab Women's Congress in Cairo '5^:320. 55. Antonin Jaussen, Coutumes des Arabes au Pays de Moab, Paris, 1908, p. 20; Victor Müller, En Syrie avec les Bedouins: Les Tribus du Desert. Paris, 1931, p. 270. 56. A . H. Hourarii, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay, London, 1946, p. 92. 57. Sources: United Nations Demographic Yearbook 1949-50, 1958; Statistical Abstract of Palestine, 1942, 1944-45. 58. U . N . Social Welfare Seminar, Cairo 1950:298. 59. Nadel, The Nuba, Oxford University Press, 1949. 60. United Nations General Assembly. Information from Non-SelfGoveming Territories, Doc. No. A/126g, 20 July, 1950. 61. Cf. R . P. Davies, "Syrian Arabic Kinship Terms," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 5, 1949, pp. 244-52.

CHAPTER

5—

1. M . E. Hume-Griffith, Behind the Veil in Persia and Turkish Arabia, London, 1909, pp. 96-97. 2. Eleanor Bisbee, The New Turks, Philadelphia, 1951, pp. 23-34, 31.

502

Golden River to Golden Road

3. Jewett, Afghanistan, p. 48. 4. For example, among the Copts in Egypt, Cf. Lane, The Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, Everyman's Library, 5 3 7 ; C. B. Klunzinger, Upper Egypt: Its People and Its Products, London, 1878, p. 90; S. H. Leeder, Modern Sons of the Pharaohs, London (ca. 1918), p. 2 1 . Among the Christian Arabs of Palestine and Syria, cf. F. J . Bliss, The Religions of Modem Syria and Palestine, New York, 1912, p. 284, note 1. Among the Jews in Egypt, cf. Lane, op. cit., p. 559. 5. Bisbee, op. cit., p. 37. 6. E.g. In Dhahran in Saudi Arabia, Cf. H. St. J . Philby, Arabian Highlands, New York, 1952, p. 389; Egypt: Lane, op. cit., p. 561. 7. Cf. Sources adduced by Josef Henninger, "Die Familie bei den heutigen Beduinen," Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie, Leyden, 1943, Vol. 42, pp. 94-958. Ibid., p. 94. 9. Ibid., p. 95. 10. The writer's observations in Palestine. 1 1 . Henninger, op. cit., p. 95; Encyclopaedia of Islam (old ed.), s.v. litham. 12. Klunzinger, op. cit., pp. 4 1 , 122; Winifred Blackman, The Fellahin of Upper Egypt, London, 1927, pp. 59-60; Ayrout, Fellahs d'Egypte, op. cit., p. 99. 13. Rodd, The People of the Veil, op. cit., p. 67. 14. Alois Musil, Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins, New York, 1928, pp. 122-124. 15. H. R . P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, London, 1949, p. 155. 16. Dickson, op. cit., pp. 154-55. 17. Charles M. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Déserta, Cambridge, 1888, I: 336. 18. C. Wyman Bury, The Land of Uz, London, 1 9 1 1 , pp. 198-99. 19. Freya Stark, The Southern Gates of Arabia, New York, 1936, p. 136. 20. H. St.-J. B. Philby, Sheba's Daughters, London, 1939, p. 2 1 1 . 21. Bury, op. cit., pp. 189-90; Stark, op. cit., picture opp. p. 226. 22. Philby, op. cit., p. 410. 23. Bertram Thomas, Alarms and Excursions in Arabia, p. 1 5 1 . 24. Bertram Thomas, Arabia Felix, New York, 1932, p. 227. 25. George Haddad, Fifty Tears of Modern Syria and Lebanon, Beirut, 1950, p. 198. 26. Leeder, op. cit., pp. 2 1 - 2 2 . 27. Donald N. Wilber, Iran, Past and Present, Princeton, 1955, p. 218. 28. Bisbee, op. cit., pp. 23-24. 29. Doughty, Arabia Deserta, 1 : 350, 367. 30. E.g., Teyma, cf. Doughty, op. cit., I : 336. 3 1 . Philby, op. cit., pp. 79, 2 1 1 . 32. Musil, Rwala, p. 232. 33. Cf. Doughty, op. cit., I : 365. 34. Voyages d'Ibn Batouta, ed. Defremery, Vol. iv, pp. 388 ff. 35. Musil, Rwala, p. 240; Philby, Sheba's Daughters, p. 356. 36. Lane, Modern Egyptians, Chap, iv, p. 184. 37. Ibid., Chap, xxiv, p. 435-37. 38. Cf. A. M. Hasanein, The Lost Oases, London, 1925, p. 101, as quoted by Le\-y, The Social Structure of Islam, p. 109.

Notes 39. Cf. Walter Cline, Notes on the People of Siwah and El Garah in the Libyan Desert, General Series in Anthropology, No. 4, Menasha, Wis., 1936, pp. 42-43. 40. Cf. Patai, Sex and Family, op. cit., pp. 138 ff. 4 1 . R o d d , People of the Veil, op. cit., pp. 173-75. 42. Cf. Henri Lhote, Les Touaregs du Hoggar (Ahaggar), Paris, 1944, pp. 288-94; cf. C o u n t Byron K h u n de Prorok, In Quest of Lost Worlds, New Y o r k , 1935, pp. 45-46. 42a. Lloyd C a b o t Briggs, Tribes of the Sahara, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, i960, pp. 220-21. 43. Horace Miner, The Primitive City of Timbuctoo, pp. 176-77, 192. 44. William S. Haas, Iran, New Y o r k , 1946, p. 58. 45. Gertrude Joly, " T h e W o m a n of the Lebanon," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 38, 1951, pp. 179 ff. 46. " A r a b W o m e n ' s Congress in Cairo 1944," Moslem World, 1945, p. 322. 47. Feghali, " L a famille Catholique au L i b a n , " op. cit., pp. 292 ff. 48. B. Y e b a m o t 37b; B. Y o m a 18b. 49. Kitäb al-Aghäni, V I I , 18; as quoted by Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, C a m b r i d g e , 1957, p. 116. 50. Muslim's Collection of Traditions with Nawawi's Commentary, I I I , 309-14; as quoted by G . A . Wilken, Das Matriarchat (Das Mutterrecht) bei den alten Araben, Leipzig, 1884, pp. 1 1 - 1 4 . 51. CS. C o u n t Carlo Landberg, Etudes sur les dialectes de l'Arabie méridionale, Leiden, 1909, II/2, p. 935. 52. Cf. Ignaz Goldziher, Die Richtungen der Islamischen Koranauslegung, Leyden, >9ao, p. 13. 53. Cf. Wilken, op. cit., pp. 23, 25. 54. Hamilton, New Account of the East Indies, I : 52-53 (about San'a, capital of Y e m e n ) ; G u a r m a n i , Neged, 1 1 3 - 1 6 ; Alois Musil, The Northern Nejd, New Y o r k , 1928, pp. 85, 253; Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka, 1 1 : 109 f.; Heffening, Encyclopedia of Islam (old ed.), I I I : 838a; Henninger, "Familie," p. 47; G . - H . Bousquet, La morale de l'Islam et son ethique sexuelle, Paris, 1953, p. 104. 55. Lane, Modem Egyptians, p. 384. 56. Harold Ingrams, Geographical Journal, Vol. 88 (1936), p. 537. 57. Arminius V â m b é r y , Meine Wanderungen . . . in Persien, Pesth, 1867, p. 71 ; Dr. A . M . D j a m d u d i Djahausouzi, Les Pelerinages de l'Islam Schiite, Paris, 1930, p. 85; G . - H . Bousquet, op. cit., pp. 103-4; S. G . W . Benjamin, Persia and the Persians, London, 1887, pp. 4 5 1 - 5 3 ; Marie Anastase, "La Femme du désert autrefois et aujourd'hui," Anthropos, V o l . 3 (1908), p. 186. 58. R e u b e n L e v y , The Social Structure of Islam, Cambridge, 1957, p. 117, and sources there, in Notes 1 and 2. 59. U.N. Demographic Yearbook 1949-50, p. 254; Census of Palestine 1931. 60. U.N. Demographic Yearbook 1949-50. 61. Cf. "Conditions of W o r k in Syria and L e b a n o n , " International Labour Review, April, 1939, p. 513, as quoted in I L O Regional Meeting for the Near and Middle East, Cairo, N o v . 1947, Report on Protection of Industrial and Commercial Workers, p. 21. 62. Cf. I L O Report of Regional Meeting for the Near and Middle East, Cairo, 1947, p. 32.

5°4

Golden River to Golden

63. Widad Sakakini, " T h e Bombay, May-June, 1949, Vol. 64. " A r a b Women's Congress 65. " A r a b Women's Congress 66. Joly, op. cit., p. 178.

CHAPTER

Road

Evolution of Syrian Women," United Asia, 1, pp. 531 ff. in Cairo 1944," 316 ff. in Cairo 1944," 320.

6—

1. Cf. Gait, Census of India, igu, Vol. I (India) Report, pp. 252, 256; Matin uz-Zaman Khan, Census of India, igu, Vol. X X (Kashmir), Report, p. 139; quoted after E. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, Vol. II, p. 71. 2. Cf. Sibree, The Great African Island, p. 248; Grandidier, Ethnographie de Madagascar, Vol. II, p. 167. 3. Cf. Sibree, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute I X (1880), p. 50; quoted after Brenda Z. Seligman, "Studies in Semitic Kinship," Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies III (1923-25), pp. 277-78. 4. G. McCall Theal, The Yellow and Dark-Skinned People of Africa South of the Zambesi, London, i g i o , p. 219; idem., History of the Boers in South Africa, pp. 16 ff., quoted after Westermarck, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 71. 5. Cf. Westermarck, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 71-81. 6. Ayrton, Curelly, and Weigall, Abydos, I I I : 44; Pausanias, Descriptio Graeciae, I, 7, 1; Johannes Nietzold, Die Ehe in Ägypten zur Ptolemaisch-Römischen Zeit, Leipzig, 1903, pp. 12 ff.; Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, V I I I : 444; Erman, Life in Ancient Egypt, p. 153; Westermarck, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 91. 7. Nietzold, op. cit., pp. 12 ff.; Erman, op. cit., p. 153; Griffith, in Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, V I I I : 444. 8. Cf. Nietzold, op. cit., p. 14, and Song of Solomon 4:9. 9. In the royal family after the time of Cambyses, cf. Herodotus I I I : 31; Spiegel, Eranische Altertumskunde I I I : 678 f.; otherwise: Rapp, Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft X X : 112 f.; Hubschmann, ibid., X L I I I : 308 fr.; Gray, in Hastings, Enclyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics V I I I : 457; Westermarck, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 86. 10. Darab Dastur Peshotan Sunjana, Next-of-kin Marriages in Old Iren, p. 16 ff. and passim; Westermarck, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 87. 11. West, Sacred Books of the East, X V I I I : 427 f.; Moulton, Early Z0T°astrianism, p. 207; Westermarck, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 87. 12. Darab Dastur, op. cit., p. 45; Westermarck, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 89. 13. William Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia, p. 163. 14. Cf. R . Patai, Sex and Family, op. cit., pp. 23 ff. 15. Robertson Smith, op. cit., p. 192, and also pp. 82, 138, 164, 285; Wellhausen, Nachrichten der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, Göttingen, 1893, No. 11, pp. 436 f.; Wilken, Das Matriarchat bei den alten Arabern, p. 59. 16. Krauss, Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven, pp. 221 f., quoted after Westermarck, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 97. 17. Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, Cambridge, 1957, pp. 102 f. 18. Cf. Bruno Meissner, "Neuarabische Geschichten aus dem Iraq," Beiträge zur Assyriologie, Vol. v (1906), pp. 48-51; idem., "Neuarabische

Notes

505

Gedichte aus dem I r a q . " Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen zu Berlin, Vol. V , 2 (1902), p. 1 0 1 ; Enno Littman, "Märchen und Legenden aus der Syrisch-Arabischen Wüste," Nachrichten von der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften und der Georg-August Universität zu Göttingen, 1 9 1 5 , pp. 4 - 1 7 ; Schmidt und Kahle, Volkserzählungen aus Palästina, Vol. I, Göttingen, 1918, pp. 1 2 6 - 3 5 , >58-61, 200, 203, 2 0 4 f . ; Vol. I I , Göttingen, 1930, pp. 72, 77, 95, 195; E. S. Stevens, Folk Tales of Iraq, Oxford-London, 1 9 3 1 , pp. 194, 2 3 3 ; T . Ashkenazi, Tribus Semi-Nomades de la Palestine du Nord, Paris, 1938, pp. 57 ff. ; Leo Haefeli, Die Beduinen von Beerseba, Luzern, 1938, p. 106. 19. Eleanor Bisbec, The New Turks, Philadelphia, 1951, p. 4 1 . 20. Among the Mandaeans of Iraq and Iran, cf. E. S. Drover, The Mandaeans of Iraq and Iran, Oxford, 1937, p. 59: "Marriages between cousins are usual, and the paternal cousin is preferred to the maternal cousin." In southern Arabia, cf. Landberg, Etudes, op. cit., II/2 : 8 4 t f.; Bent, Southern Arabia, London, 1900, p. 144. Among the Kababish, Beni Amer, and Hadendowa of L'pper Eçypt and the Sudan, cf. Brenda Z. Seligman, "Studies in Semitic Kinship," op. cit., pp. 268, 279. 2 1 . Ella C. Sykes, Persia and Its Peoples, New York, 1910, p. 2 0 1 ; cf. also idem., "Persian Family Life," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 1 g 14, Pt. I, p. 7. 22. 'Aqd dukhtar 'amu wapesar 'amu ra dar behesht basta and; communicated by a Persian student in Philadelphia to Mr. William Stockton, J r . , to whom the author is indebted for it. 23. C. Colliver Rice, Persian Women and Their Ways, London, 1923, p. 68; cf. Bess Allen Donaldson, The Wild Rue, London, 1938, p. 48: "Marriage between cousins is common." Cf. also Henri Massé, Persian Beliefs and Customs, New Haven, 1954, PP- 4 0 - 4 1 : "Unions between cousins are quite frequent in the upper classes." 24. H. N. Hutchinson, Marriage Customs in Many ¡Mnds, New York, 1897, p. 67. 25. Ernest F. Fox, Travels in Afghanistan, 1937-1938, New York, 1943, p. 195. 26. Lane, Modern Egyptians, pp. 161-62. 27. Ilse Lichtcnstadter, " A n Arab-Egyptian Family," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 6, No. 4, Autumn 1952, p. 387. 28. Winifred Blackman, The Fellahin of Upper Egypt, London, 1927, p. 37. 29. C. G. and Brenda Z. Seligman, The Kababish, A Sudan Arab Tribe, Harvard African Studies, II, Cambridge, Mass., i g i 8 , p. 1 3 1 . 30. Oral information supplied by my Coptic student Mr. Fawzi Fahim Gadallah. Cf. also C. B. Klunzinger, Upper Egypt, London, 1878, p. 90; Brenda Z. Seligman, op. cit., p. 276. 3 1 . Cf. Walter Cline, Notes on the People of Siwah and el Garah in the Libyan Desert, General Series in Anthropology (ed. Leslie Spier), No. 4, Mcnasha, Wis., 1936, p. 46. 32. Adolf Erman und Hermann Ranke, Aegypten und aegyptisches Leben im Altertum, Tübingen, 1923, p. 180. 33. Cf. Gertrude H. Stern, Marriage in Early Islam, James G. Forlong Fund Vol. xviii, The Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1939, pp. 60, 65-66, 172, >77-78. 34. Henry Ayrout, Fellahs d'Egypte, op. cit., p. 143.

5o6

Golden River to Golden Road

35. Klunzinger, Upper Egypt, op. cit., p. 196. 36. Georges Legrain, Une Famille Copte de Haute Egypte, Brussels, 1945, PP- 33-3937. Fredrik Barth, Principles 0/ Social Organization in Southern Kurdistan, Oslo, '954. P- 68. 38. Fredrik Barth, "Father's Brother's Daughter Marriage in Kurdistan," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 10, 1954, p. 167. 39. Hilma Granqvist, Marriage Conditions in a Palestinian Village, Helsingfors, 1931, Vol. I, pp. 8 2 - 8 3 , 1 9 2 - 9 5 39a. Horace M . Miner and George de Vos, Oasis and Casbah : African Culture and Personality in Change, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, i960, pp. 37, 43, 57, 61 ; Lloyd Cabot Briggs, Tribes of the Sahara, Cambridge, Harv ard Univ. Press, i960, pp. 86, 9 1 , 198, 220. 40. Horace Miner, The Primitive City of Timbuctoo, Princeton, 1953, pp. •43-4441. Ibid., p. 154. 42. Cf. for example Lane, Modern Egyptians, op. cit., p. 166. 43. Ilse Lichtenstadter, op. cit., p. 388. 44. Ayrout, op. cit., p. 144. 45. Cf. J o h n Lewis Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, London, 1830, p. 1 5 4 ; K a z e m Daghestani, Etude sociologique sur la famille Musulmane contemporaine en Syrie, Paris, 1932, p. 22. 46. Alois Musil, Manners and Customs of the Ricala Bedouins, N e w York, 1928, pp. 4 4 4 - 4 5 ; Cf. also Charles M . Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta, Cambridge, 1888, I : 491 (the M u w a h i b in northern Hijaz); P. Antonin Jaussen, Coutumes Arabes au Pays de Moab, Paris, 1908, pp. 46 f. (Moab in Transjordan). 47. Granqvist, op. cit., I = 2 3 - 3 2 , 6 9 - 7 1 , 75 note 3, 122 f.; Daghestani. op. cit., 22, 2 7 ; Khaled Chatila, Le Mariage chez les Afusulmans en Syrie, Paris, '933. PP- '84, '9248. Fredrik Barth, "Father's Brother's Daughter Marriage," op. cit., pp. '67-7149. Cf. Josef Henninger, "Die Familie bei den heutigen Beduinen," Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie, Leiden, 1943 (Vol. 42), pp. 73 f. 50. Bertram Thomas, Alarms and Excursions in Arabia, London, 1931, p. 275. 5 1 . Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, London, 1830, pp. 6 4 - 6 5 , 154. In a footnote Burckhardt refers to the Biblical parallel of R u t h 4 : 7 - 8 . 52. Richard F. Burton, Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah, London, 1 9 1 3 , II : 84. 53. Doughty, op. cit., I : 2 3 1 , 236. 54. Lady Anne, Blunt, A Pilgrimage to Nejd, London, 1881, I : 42. 55. William Robertson Smith, Lectures and Essays, London, 1 9 1 2 , p. 563. 56. L. W. C. van den Berg, Le Hadhramaut et les colonies Arabes dans VArchipel Indien, Batavia, 1886, p. 4 5 ; Theodore and Mrs. Bent, Southern Arabia, London, 1900, p. 144; Bertram Thomas, Alarms and Excursions, op. cit., p. 275. 57. Bertram Thomas, Arabia Felix, op. cit., p. 99. 58. Ailon Shiloh, private communication from Beit Mazmil, Israel, based o n field observations among Yemenite Jewish immigrants. 59. S. D. Goitein, "Portrait of a Yemenite Weavers' Village," Jewish Social Studies, January 1955, p. 20.

Notes

507

60. Musil, Rwala Bedouins, op. cit., pp. 137-140. 6 1 . Lady Anne Blunt, Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates, New York, 1879, p. 308 ; le Comte de Pcrthuis, Le Disert de Syrie, l'Euphrate et la Mésopotamie, Paris, 1896, pp. 98-102; L. Bouvat, " L e droit coutumier des tribus Bédouines de Syrie," Revue de Monde Musulman, Vol. 43, 1921, p. 39; Musil, Rwala Bedouins, op. cit., 137. 62. Cf. J . G . Wetzstein, "Sprachlichcs aus den Zeltlagern der syrischen Wüste," Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, xxii (1868), pp. 1 0 2 - 1 2 ; F. H. Weissbach, Beiträge zur Kunde des Iraq-Arabischen, Leipzig, 1908-30, pp. 41 f.; 25; Musil, Rwala Bedouins, op. cit., 137 f.; idem., Northern Xegd, New York, 1928, pp. 1 1 2 f.; Burckhardt, Notes, op. cit., 64 f.; G. A. Wallin, "Probe aus einer Anthologie neuarabischer Gesänge in der W üste gesammelt," Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, iv, 1852, p. 125; Victor Muller, En Syrie avec les Bedouins, Paris, 1931, p. 227. 63. Perthuis, op. cit., pp. 98-102. 04. Blunt, Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates, pp. 308, 322-24. 65. Alois Musil, Arabia Deserta, New York, 1927, p. 175. 66. Ibid., p. 285. 67. Ibid., p. 240. 68. Alois Musil, Arabia Petraea, Wien, 1908, I I I : 174. 69. Antonin Jaussen, Moab, op. cit., pp. 45-47; Jaussen and Savignac, Coutumes des Fuqara, Paris, 1914, p. 24. 70. Jaussen, Moab, op. cit., p. 46. 71. Ibid., pp. 46-47. The case happened in the Hajäya tribe. 72. P. Marie Anastase de St. Elie, " L a femme du désert autrefois et aujourd'hui," Anthropos, Vol. 3, pp. 186, 189. 73. Jaussen, Moab, op. cit., p. 47. 74. G. Robinson Lees, The Witness of the Wilderness, London, 1909, p. 1 2 1 . 75. Omar el-Barghuthi, "Judicial Courts among the Bedouin of Palestine," Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society, Vol. 2, 1922, p. 28; Antonin Jaussen, Coutumes Palestiniennes. I. Naplouse et son district, Paris, 1927, p. 62; T. Canaan, "Unwritten Laws Affecting the Arab Woman of Palestine," Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society, Vol. 1 1 , 1931, p. 178; Granqvist, Marriage Conditions, op. cit., p. 72. 76. Canaan, op. cit., p. 178; Musil, Rwala Bedouins, p. 137. 77. Barghuthi, op. cit., p. 28. 78. Jaussen, Coutumes Palestiniennes, op. cit., p. 62. 79. Philip J . Baldensperger, "Women in the East," Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement, London, 1900, p. 1 8 1 ; T . Ashkenazi, Tribus seminomades de la Palestine du Nord, Paris, 1938, p. 63. 80. F. A . Klein, "Mitteilungen über Leben, Sitten und Gebräuche der Fellachen in Palästina," schrift des deutschen Palästina Vereins, 1883, p. 84; Philip J . Baldensperger, The Immovable East, London, 1913, p. 1 2 1 ; Jaussen, Coutumes Palestiniennes, op. cit., p. 62; Granqvist, op. cit., p. 72. 8 1 . Granqvist, op. cit., pp. 67-72. 82. Enno Littmann, Neuarabische Volkspoesie, Berlin, 1902, pp. 32-33 (Arabie text) and 1 1 9 — 1 2 0 (German translation). 83. Granqvist, op. cit., pp. 72-75.

5 O8

Golden River to Golden Road

84. Daghcstani, Etude, op. cit., pp. 2 1 - 2 2 ; Jacques Weulersse, Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient, Paris, 1946, p. 221. 85. Daghestani, Etude, op. cit., p. 22; Musil, Arabia Petraea, p. 174. 86. Daghestani, op. cit., p p . 2 1 - 2 3 ; cf. above, p. 152. 87. Chatila, op. cit., p. 93. 88. Ibid., pp. 9 1 - 9 4 ; Daghestani, op. cit., pp. 21-22. 89. Leonard Bauer, Volksleben im Lande der Bibel, Leipzig, 1903, p. 98 ; Jaussen, Coutumes Palestiniennes, op. cit., p. 66; Daghestani, op. cit., pp. 18, 19, »7390. Daghestani, op. cit., p p . 20, 23, 24, 32, 173; J . Castagné, " L e mouvement d ' é m a n c i p a t i o n de la f e m m e m u s u l m a n e en O r i e n t , " Revue de Monde Musulman, Vol. 43, 1921, p. 261. 91. H . R . P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, op. cit., p. 140; cf. also George L. Harris ^ed.), Iraq : Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New H a v e n , 1958, pp. 272 f. 92. Bruno Meissner, " N e u a r a b i s c h e Geschichten aus d e m I r a q , " Beiträge zur Assyriologie, Vol. 5, 1906, pp. 48-49, 74-75. 93. J a c o b M . L a n d a u , Private written communication from Jerusalem, based on field work. 94. J o h n B. G l u b b , " T h e Bedouins of Northern I r a q , " Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, L o n d o n , Vol. 22, 1935, p. 24. 95. H . R . P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, London, 1956, pp. 228-235. 96. W . R . H a y , Two Tears in Kurdistan, London, 1921, p. 45. 97. Barth, " F a t h e r ' s Brother's Daughter M a r r i a g e , " p p . 167, 169; idem., Principles of Social Organization in Southern Kurdistan, p. 26. 98. H a y , op. cit., pp. 71-72. 99. H e l l m u t Ritter, "Aserbcidschanische Texte zur nordpersischen Volksk u n d e , " Der Islam, Vol. 11. 1921, p. 185 (Turcic text) a n d 198 (German, translation). 100. C. G. Feilberg, Les Papis, Copenhagen, 1952, p. 136. 101. Burckhardt, op. cit., pp. 154-55. 102. G . W. M u r r a y , Sons of Ishmael: A Study of the Egyptian Bedouin, London. '935. PP- I79-8O. 103. Charles G . a n d Brenda Z. Seligman, The Kababish, p. 81. 104. Ibid., p. 131 ; Brenda 7.. Seligman, op. cit., pp. 269-70. 105. E d w a r d Westerniarck, Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco, L o n d o n , 1914, P- 53106. Cf. M a j o r A. J . T r e m c a r n e , The Ban of the Bori, L o n d o n , n.d. [1914'J, p. 121. 107. Dozy (ed.), Commentaire historique sur le poème d'Ibn 'Abdan, p p . 27, 29, as quoted b y I. Goldziher, " E n d o g a m y and Polygamy a m o n g the A r a b s , " The Academy, L o n d o n , J u l y 10, 1880, p. 26. 108. Cf. J u l i u s Wellhausen, Machrichten der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göltingen, 1893, No. 11, p p . 437 f. 10g. Kitäb al-Aghäni, ed. Bulaq, viii : 113, as quoted by I. Goldziher, op. cit. 110. E. W . Lane, Arabian Society in the Middle Ages, L o n d o n , 1883, p. 227. 111. Lane, Modern Egyptians, op. cit., pp. 161-62. 11a. Chatila, op. cit., p. 92.

Notes 1 1 3 . J . R . J e w c t t , " A r a b i c Proverbs a n d P r o v e r b i a l P h r a s e s , " Journal of tinAmerican Oriental Society, 15 (1893), p. 86. 1 1 4 . B a r g h u t h i , op. cit., p . 28. 1 15. S n o u c k H u r g r o n j e , Mekkanische Sprichwörter, H a a g , 1886, p. 17. I 16. G e r t r u d e H . Stern, Marriage in Early Israel, op. cit., p p . 60, 158 ff. 1 17. C h a t i l a , op. cit., p. 9 1 ; W e s t e r m a r c k , op. cit., p p . 5 3 - 5 4 ; E l l a C . Sykes, Persia and Its Peoples, op. cit., p. 2 0 1 ; etc. 1 13. B a r t h , " F a t h e r ' s Brother's D a u g h t e r M a r r i a g e , " op. cit., p p . 167, 169, 171 ; idem., Principles, op. cit., p p . 69 f. 1 19. G o l d z i h e r , op. cit., p . 26. 120. W i l k e n , Matriarchat, op. cit., pp. 59, 6 1 . 1 2 1 . G h a z ä l i , Ihyd 'ulüm al-din, Book xii, C h a p t e r , ii; cf. the G e r m a n translation b y H a n s B a u e r , Von der Ehe. Das 12. Buch von al-Gazali's "Neubelebung der Religionswissenschaften," H a l l e a.S., 1 9 1 7 , p. 66. 122. W e s t e r m a r c k , op. cit., p p . 5 4 - 5 5 . 123. G o l d z i h e r , op. cit., p. 26. 124. W e s t e r m a r c k , op. cit., pp. 5 4 - 5 5 ; idem., Ritual and Belief in Morocco, I . o n d o n , 1926, I : 164. 125. C h a t i l a , op. cit., p. 93. CHAPTER

7—

1. T h e f o l l o w i n g is a partial a n d i n c o m p l e t e list o f the most i m p o r t a n t studies in w h i c h d u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n is treated a n d d e f i n e d : W . H . R . R i v e r s , Social Organization, L o n d o n , 1932, pp. 2 9 - 3 0 ; A . M . H o c a r t , The Progress of Man, L o n d o n , 1933, pp. 2 3 8 - 4 4 ; R . L i n t o n , The Study of Man, N e w Y o r k , 1936, p. 2 0 7 ; B. M a l i n o w s k i , Crime and Custom in Savage Society, L o n d o n , 1940, pp. 2 4 - 2 6 ; I. S c h a p e r a , in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th c d . , V o l . 8, p. 70; M . D . W . J e f f r e y s , " D u a l O r g a n i z a t i o n in A f r i c a , " in African Studies, V o l . 5 (1946), p. 84; G . P . M u r d o c k , Social Structure, N e w Y o r k , 1949, p p . 47, 90, 1 2 4 - 2 5 . 2. J o s e f H a e k e l , " D i e D u a l s y s t e m e in A f r i k a , " Anthropos, 1950, p p . 1 3 - 2 4 . 3. A g a i n o n l y a selective list c a n be g i v e n : I n d i a : W . K o p p e r s , " I n d i a a n d D u a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , " Acta Tropica, Basel, 1944, V o l . i, H e f t 1 - 2 ; U g r i c p e o p l e : J . H a e k e l , " I d o l k u l t u n d Dualsysten bei d e n U g r i e r n , " Archiv für Völkerkunde, W i e n , 1947, B d . I ; I n d o n e s i a , O c e a n i a a n d N o r t h A m e r i c a : W . J . P e r r y , The Children of the Sun, L o n d o n , 1923, passim-, N e g r o A f r i c a : J e f f r e y s , op. cit.; H a e k e l , op. cit. 4. D o m i n i k J o s e f W o e l f e l , " D i e H a u p t p r o b l e m e W e i s s a f r i k a s , " Archiv für Anthropologie, B r a u n s c h w e i g , 1942, p. 1 1 8 ; J e f f r e y s , op. cit., p p . 1 5 9 - 6 2 ; H a e k e l , op. cit., p. 18. 5. B r ä u n l i c h , E . , " B e i t r ä g e z u r G e s e l l s c h a f t s o r d n u n g d e r A r a b i s c h e n B e d u i n e n s t ä m m e , " Islamica, V o l . 6, p. 185. 6. Handbook of Arabia ( N a v a l I n t e l l i g e n c e D i v i s i o n ) , O x f o r d - L o n d o n , 1920, I : 43. 7. O n e is t e m p t e d to c o m p a r e w i t h this p o p u l a r t e n d e n c y the B i b l i c a l a c c o u n t o f the ten generations f r o m A d a m to N o a h , a n d the ten g e n e r a t i o n s f r o m N o a h to A b r a h a m , telescoping the entire history o f the w o r l d f r o m Genesis to the first ancestor of the H e b r e w s into a m e r e 20 generations. 8. B r ä u n l i c h , op. cit., p p . 7 7 - 7 8 . 9. Ibid., p. 69.

Golden River lo Golden Road 10. Cf. Procopius, History of the Wars, I, xix. Loeb Classical Library, London, 1944, I : 181. 11. Wm. Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia, Cambridge, 1885, pp. 7, 247. 12. Ibid., p. 7. 13. E.g., Ha$armaweth, Hadhramaut; Sheba, Saba; Yerah, Mahra, etc. Cf. Gunkel, Genesis, 4th ed., Göttingen, 1917, pp. 91-92. 14. Cf. Encyclopaedia of Islam (old edition), s.v. Kah(an. 15. Cf. Wüstenfcld, Genealogische Tabellen, Göttingen, 1852, table A. 16. Cf. Encyclopaedia of Islam (old ed.), s.v. Kais-'Ailän; (new ed.), s.v. al-'Arab, Djazirat, p. 544; Wüstenfeld, Gen. Tab., D. 17. Cf. R. Dozy, Spanish Islam, London, 1913, p. 65; Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, London, 1937, p. 32. It is remarkable that this important and patent fact escaped the authors of the otherwise thorough Handbook of Arabia; on p. 44 (Vol. I) both the Qahtän and the Ishmaelite tribes are stated to be the descendants of Abraham. Prof. Majid Khadduri repeats the same statement in his Area Handbook on Iraq, xerographed preliminary edition, New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956, p. 122. 18. Encyclopaedia of Islam (old ed.), s.v. Kahfän: cf. also new ed. s.v. al-'Arab, Djazirat, p. 545. 19. Cf. Philip K. Hitti, Origins of the Druie People and Religion, New York, 1928, p. 21. 20. Cf. Julius W'ellhausen, Das arabische Reich, Berlin, 1902, pp. 44 f. I. Goldziher, Muhammedanische Studien, Halle, 1890, I : 94 ff. 21. Wcllhausen, op. cit., pp. 44 f.; Encyclopaedia of Islam (old ed.), s.v. Kais'Ailän; Dozy, Spanish Islam, op. cit., p. 68; Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 280. 22. Charles M. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta, New York, 1937, I : 282; cf. p. 418. 23. Hitti, History of the Arabs, op. cit., p. 281. 24. Encyclopaedia of Islam, loc. cit. 25. Dozy, Spanish Islam, op. cit., p. 126. 26. Ibid., p. 66, quoting Abu al-Fidä' II : 64 and Ibn 'Idhäri's Bayän, II : 84; 265. 27. Hitti, History of the Arabs, op. cit., p. 281. 28. S. B. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, London, 1919, II : 419. The above account of Omani dual organization is based on data contained in this book. Cf. Encyclopaedia of Islam (new ed.), s.v. al-'Arab, Djazirat, p. 545. 29. British Admiralty, Handbook of Arabia, London, 1916-17, p. 273. 30. Handbook of Arabia, op. cit., pp. 240-41, 334-35; Bertram Thomas, Arabia Felix, New York, 1932, pp. 1 1 1 - 1 2 , 273. 31. Thomas, op. cit., p. 273. 32. Ibid., p. 26. 33. Wüstenfeld, Gen. Tab. 1. 34. Thomas, Arabia Felix, op. cit., p. 26; Harold Ingrams, Arabia and the Isles, London, 1942, pp. 179, 223, 3 1 2 ; Handbook of Arabia, op. cit., I, 213. 35. S. B. Miles and M. W. Muenzinger, "Account of an Excursion into the Interior of Southern Arabia," Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, London, 1871, Vol. 41, pp. 234-36.

Notes 36. Landberg, Arabica, Leydcn, 1897, IV* : 12-16. 37. Landberg, Arabica, Leyden, 1898, V : 3, 5, 12; Encyclopaedia of Islam (new ed.), s.v. Bayhän aI-Ka?äb. 38. Miles and Muenzinger, op. cit., p. 234; Landberg, Arabica, Leyden, 1897, I V : 52; Handbook of Arabia, op. cit., I : 214. But according to G . W y m a n Bury (Abdullah Mansur), The Land of Uz, London, 1911, p. 164, " t h e B a - K a z i m with its numerous sub-divisions composes the entire tribal population of Lower A u l a k i . " 39. Bury, Land of Uz, op. cit., p. 216. 40. Miles and Muenzinger, op. cit., pp. 229, 234; Landberg, Arabica, V , Leyden, 1898, p. 230. 41. Sir Bernard Reilly, " T h e Aden Protectorate," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, London, April, 1941, p. 139; Handbook of Arabia, I, 229, 232. 42. T h u s according to an early authority, S. B. Heines, " M e m o i r of the South and East Coasts of A r a b i a , " Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, London, 1841, V o l . 15, p. 112; cf. Thomas, Arabia Felix, op. cit., pp. 47-48, 142-43. Wüstenfeld, Register, 1853, 280. 43. Wüstenfeld, Register, p. 280. Although none of the three names appearing in the popular tribal genealogy of the M a h r a is found in Wüstenfeld's list, the claim to be a Noahide tribe makes this genealogy more plausible than the alternative of ' A d n ä n l descent. 44. Ingrams, op. cit., p. 223. 45. Wüstenfeld, Gen. Tab. 1 and 9, op. cit. 46. Thomas, Arabia Felix, op. cit., p. 269, note. 47. Leo Hirsch, Reisen in Südarabien, Mahra-Land und Hadramaut, Leiden, 1897, p. I i . 48. Handbook of Arabia, op. cit., I, p. 229; H. St. John Philby, Sheba's Daughters, London, 1939, p. 154. 49. T h o m a s , Arabia Felix, op. cit., p. 36; Sir Bernard Reilly, op. cit., p. 139. 50. Ingrams, op cit., p. 204. 5 1 . Miles II, op. cit., p. 5 1 5 ; Ingrams, op. cit., pp. 189-90; Philby, Sheba's Daughters, op. cit., p. 167. 52. Miles II, op. cit., p. 5 1 5 ; Thomas, Arabia Felix, op. cit., pp. 4, 13, 112, 181, 269. 53. Encyclopaedia of Islam (new ed.), s.v. 'Awämir. 54. T h o m a s , Arabia Felix, op. cit., pp. 112, 142-43, 269, 273. 55. Philby, Sheba's Daughters, op. cit., pp. 35, 60, 65, 66; Ingrams, op. cit., pp. 288, 319, 320-22. 56. Philby, op. cit., p. 218. 57. Encyclopaedia of Islam (old ed.), s.v. Hashid and Bakil; cf. Amin Rihani, Arabian Peak and Desert, Boston and New Y o r k , 1930, p. 235; Carl Niebuhr, Beschreibung von Arabien, Copenhagen, 1772, p. 260. 58. Encyclopaedia of Islam, loc. cit. 59. Handbook of Arabia, op. cit., pp. 479 ff. 60. H . St. J o h n Philby, Arabian Highlands, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952, p. 161. 61. Handbook of Arabia, op. cit., pp. 430, 441. 62. Wüstenfeld, Genealogische Tabellen, 4; idem., Register, p. 132; Philby, Arabian Highlands, op. cit., pp. 405, 494, 502, 503, 537-38, 561.

Golden River lo Golden Road 63. Philby, Arabian Highlands, op. cit., pp. 36, i n , 1 1 6 , 1 1 9 , 1 2 1 , 123, 134, 129, 130, 133, 139, 144, 177, 449, 454, 456, 458. 64. Wüstenfeld, Gen. Tab., 4; Philby, Arabian Highlands, op. cit., p. 225. 65. Philby, Arabian Highlands, op. cit., pp. 225, 384, 388, 405. 66. Ibid., pp. 150, 2 1 7 , 225, 242, 245. 67. Oppenheim, Die Beduinen, Leipzig, 1952, Vol. I l l , pp. 142-43. 68. H. R . P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, London, 1949, pp. 264, 284, 36369. Philby, Arabian Highlands, op. cit., p. 245. 70. Oppenheim, op. cit., I l l : 149-50. 7 1 . Harry W. Hazard, Saudi Arabia, Subcontractor's Monograph (xerographed), Human Relations Area Files, Inc., New Haven, Conn., 1956, pp. 58, 60, 6 1 , 64. 72. H. St. John Philby, Sheba's Daughters, op. cit., p. 19; idem., Arabian Highlands, op. cit., p. 405. 73. Cf. for example Bertram Thomas, Arabia Felix, 208 if.; Philby, Sheba's Daughters, op. cit., pp. 19, 26-27, 333. 74. Cf. Encyclopaedia of Islam (old ed.), s.v. Hilal. 75. Cf. Handbook of Arabia, op. cit., p. 44. 76. Wüstenfeld, Genealogische Tabellen, F ; and Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. Hilal. 77. Cf. H. St. J o h n Philby, The Heart of Arabia, New York-London, 1923, I I : 23, 2 1 7 ; idem., The Empty Quarter, New York, 1933, Index, s.v. M u r r a ; Thomas, Arabia Felix, op. cit. 78. Fu'ad Hamza, Qalb Jeziret al-Arab, Cairo, 1352/1933, pp. 195 f., as quoted by Oppenheim, Die Beduinen, I I I : 159. 79. Oppenheim, Die Beduinen, op. cit., I I I : 160-61. 80. Ibid., I I I : 159. 8 1 . Philby, The Empty Quarter, op. cit., pp. 409 fr. (Table). A somewhat different account of the Murra divisions is given by H. R . P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, London, 1956, p. 96. 82. Cf. Oppenheim, Die Beduinen, op. cit., I l l : 106; Encyclopaedia of Islam (old ed.), s.v. Kahtan. 83. Doughty, Arabia Deserta, op. cit.,- I : 4 1 8 ; Philby, Arabian Highlands, op. cit., 109. 84. Oppenheim, Die Beduinen, op. cit., I l l : 1 1 2 - 1 5 . 85. Philby, Arabian Highlands, op. cit., pp. 18, 30, 34, 1 1 0 , 128, 136, 144, 1 6 1 , 1 8 1 , 193, 196, 352, 366, 374, 442, 444, 445. 86. An older enumeration of the Qahtän tribes of 'Asir (Rufaydat el-Yemen, Beni Bishr, Senhän el-Hibab, 'Abidah, Wada'ah and Shereyf, six separate tribes), found in the Handbook of Arabia, I : 430, is also unsatisfactory. 87. Philby, The Heart of Arabia, op. cit., I I : 228-29. The inconsistencies between the structure of the Yarn as appearing above and the one appearing in the 'Asir district can be explained by the different tribal traditions prevalent in 'Asir on the one hand and in inner Southern Arabia on the other. 88. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins, London, 1 8 3 1 , I : 1, 10, 2 7 ; I I : 6. 8g. Encyclopaedia of Islam (old ed.), s.v. Harb. 90. Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis, pp. 393-94; Oppenheim, Die Beduinen, op. cit., I l l : 65-66, 362 f., 379. 91. Oppenheim, op. cit., I I : 362 ff., 379.

Notts

513

92. Harry W . Hazard, op. cit., pp. 61-62, 64, 67. 93. Cf. Dozy, Spanish Islam, op. cit., p. 68. 94. Cf. Robert Montagne, Le Civilisation du Disert, Paris, 1947, p. 51. 95. Encyclopaedia of Islam (new ed.), 1957, s.v. 'Anaza. 96. Cf. Oppenheim, Die Beduinen, op. cit., I : 113, 114-23. 97. Cf. R . Patai (ed.), The Republic of Syria, H R A F Subcontractor's Monograph, New Haven, 1956, I : 160 ff., 170 ff., 181 ff. 98. Oppenheim, Die Beduinen, op. cit., I : 159-63; Henry Field, The Anthropology of Iraq (Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology), Harvard University, Vol. 46, No. 1, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, pp.19-21 ; Vol. 46, No. 2, 1952, pp. 89 f. 99. Oppenheim, op. cit., I : 169, 176-77 100. Alois Musil, Palmyrena, New York, 1928, p. 151. 101. Oppenheim, op. cit., I : 245 fr., 264-65, 335-36; II : 203 fr., 244 fr.; Frederick G . Peake, History and Tribes of Jordan, University of Miami Press, 1958, pp. 143-221; R . Patai (ed.), Jordan, Country Survey Series, Human Relations Area Files, New Haven, 1957, pp. 181-88. 102. Harry W . Hazard, op. cit., p. 67. 103. H. R . P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, op. cit., pp. 97-101. 104. Oppenheim, op. cit., I : 196 ff., 211 ff. 105. Cf. Macalister and Masterman, Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement, 1905, p. 343; 1906, pp. 33-34. 106. Michael Assaf, History of the Arabs in Palestine (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv. 1941, II : 279. 107. Hitti, History of the Arabs, op. cit., p. 281. 108. A . N. Haddad, Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society, I : 210-13; F.. Robinson, Biblical Researches in Palestine, London 1841-1856, III : 283. 109. C. F. Volney, Travels Through Syria and Egypt in the Tears 1783, 1784, and 7755, London, 1788, II : 325; Robinson, op. cit., II : 17. 110. Cf. Robinson, op. cit., II : 344. i n . Cf. Assaf, op. cit., II : 279. 112. Ibid., II : 278. 113. Volney, II : 177, as quoted by G i b b and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, Oxford, 1950, I : 268, English translation, II : 302. 114. Volney, II : 203; English translation I : 325-26, 333-34; Gibb and Bowen, op. cit., I : 268. 115. Cf. Elihu Grant, The Peasantry of Palestine, New York, 1907, pp. 159, 225. 116. Cf. Y a ' q o v Shim'oni, 'Arve Eres Tisrael, Tel Aviv, 1947, p. 175; O m a r cl-Barghuthi, Judicial Courts among the Bedouins of Palestine, reprint from the Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society, Jerusalem, 1922, p. 9. 117. M a r i a m Zarour, 'Ramallah: M y Home T o w n , " The Middle East Journal, Autumn 1953, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 431-32. 118. G i b b and Bowen, op. cit., I : 222. 119. Cf. Hitti, The Origins of the Druze People and Religion, op. cit., p. 8; cf. also Niebuhr, Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und andern umliegenden Ländern, Kopenhagen, 1778, II : 447. 120. Cf. Niebuhr, loc. cit. 121. Cf. R . Montagne, La Civilisation du Disert, op. cit., p. 62.

5'4

Golden River to Golden Road

122. Cf. Shim'oni, op. cit., pp. 172-73; Granqvist, Marriage Conditions in a Palestinian Village, Helsingfors, 1935. 123. Mahmud, Bavâr, Kûh-Gilûyë wa Iläte än (Kûh-Gilûyê and Its Tribes), Gachsârân, 1324 (1945), 158 pp. 124. Ibid., 86 ff., 116 f., 130 ff. 125. C. S. Coon, Caravan, New York, 1951, pp. 217-18; Herbert H. Yreeland (ed.), Iran. Country Survey Series, Human Relations Area Files. New Haven, 1957, p. 42; Encyclopaedia of Islam (new ed.), s.v. Bakhtiyàrî. 126. Cf. Henry Field, The Anthropology of Iran, p. 123, quoting Sykes. 127. Encyclopaedia of Islam (new ed.), s.v. Afghan, Afghanistan, and Abdäli; Donald N. W'ilber, Afghanistan, Human Relations Area Files Subcontractors Monograph, New Haven, 1956, I : 73, 81-85; S. G. W. Benjamin, Persia and the Persians, London, 1887, pp. 142-43. 128. Encyclopaedia of Islam (new ed.), s.v. Balücistän. 129. Cheikh Abd-el-Rahman el-Djabarti, Merveilles Biographiques et Historiques ou Chroniques du . . . Traduites de l'Arabe. . . . Le Caire, 1888, Tome I, pp. 50-54, 209; II : 157. 130. Gibb and Bowen, op. cit., pp. 268-69, citing Girard, Chabrol, and Volney. 131. M. de Chabrol, Essai sur les moeurs des habitants modernes de l'Egypte, Description de l'Egypte, Paris, 1822, Tome Seconde, Ile partie, p. 372-73. 132. M. P. S. Girard, Mémoire sur l'Agriculture, l'Industrie et le Commerce de l'Egypte, Description de l'Egypte, Paris, 1823, Tome Seconde, p. 514. 133. Lane, Modem Egyptians, op. cit., p. 202. 134. Oppenheim, Die Beduinen, op. cit., I : 295. 135. G. W. Murray, Sons of Ishmael: A Study of the Egyptian Bedouin, London, '935. PP- 253. 264-65. 136. Ibn Battuta, Travels in Asia and Africa, ed. Gibb, London, 1929, pp. 53-54137. Encyclopaedia of Islam (new ed.), s.v. Bedja. 138. Winifred Blackman, The Fellahin of Upper Egypt, London, 1927, pp. 129-31. 139. Cf. C. G. and Brenda Seligman, The Kababish: A Sudan Arab Tribe, Harvard African Studies, 1918, II : 113. 140. Hamed Ammar, Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, London, 1954, pp. vii, 44, 45, 47, 61. 141. Encyclopaedia of Islam (new ed.), s.v. Bishärin. 142. Cf. G. Marçais, Les Arabes en Berberie du xie au xive siecle, Constantine & Paris, 1913, p. 59; E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, London, '949, PP- 48» 49, 56. 143. Ibn Khaldun, Histoire de Berberes, Paris, 1934, Vol. iii, p. 181. 144. Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., I : 168-69; III : 181. 145. Cf. Leo Africanus, Description d'Afrique, Paris, 1896-1898, I : 327; English edition : History and Description of Africa, London, 1896, 3 vols. 146. Cf. Henri Lhote, Les Touaregs du Hoggar, Paris, 1944, p. 115, referring to a note sent by a Marabout of the Tuareg tribe Kel es-Suq in 1907 to Captain Cortier and reprinted in the latter's volume D'une rive a l'autre du Sahara, p. 394. 147. Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., I : 169, 170, 172; II : 11 ff.; I l l : 180, 181, 190, 300.

Notes

515

148. C. S. Coon, Tribes of the Rif, Harvard African Studies, Cambridge, Mass, Vol. ix, p. 17. 149. Cf. Eugène Guernier, La Berberie, l'Islam et la France, Paris, 1 9 5 0 , 1 : 338; Marçais, op. cit., pp. 643-44, 709; Bryan Clarke, Berber Village, London, 1959, p. 96. The term soff, in the form suff, was met above as designating the factional alliances in Oman. The same term, pronounced saff, is used by the Terâbîn Bedouins of the Negev (today in Israel), for warlike alliances. Cf. Aaref el-Aaref, The History of Beersheba and Her Tribes (Hebrew translation), Tel Aviv, 1937, p. 65. 150. Robert Montagne, Les Berberes et le Makhzen dans le sud au Maroc, Paris, 1930, p. 197. 1 5 1 . Coon, Tribes of the Rif, op. cit., pp. 18, 169, 172-73. 152. Josef Haekel, "Die Dualsysteme in Afrika," Anthropos, 1950, p. 18, quoting Montagne, Les Berberes. 153. Coon, Tribes of the Rif, op. cit., p. 19. 154. Montagne, Les Berberes, p. 197, 2 1 2 ; idem., La Civilisation du Desert, 261. 155. J e a n Despois, L'Afrique du Nord, Paris, 1949, p. 145; Haekel, op. cit., p. 18. 156. Cf. Despois, op. cit., p. 145; Haekel, op. cit., p. 18; Montagne, Les Berberes, op. cit., p. 197; Clarke, loc. cit. 157. Montagne, Les Berberes, p. 2 1 2 ; idem., La Civilisation du Desert, p. 261. 158. R . Turnbull, Sahara Unveiled, London, 1940, p. 25, as quoted by Jeffreys, African Studies, Vol. 5 (1946), p. 159. 159. Dr. H. Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa, London, 1867, I : 99, 100, 148; as quoted by Jeffreys, op. cit., p. 162. 160. Walter Cline, Notes on the People of Siwah and El Garah in the Libyan Desert, General Scries in Anthropology, Menasha, Wis., 1936, No. 4, pp. 12, 46. 160a. Lloyd Cabot Briggs, Tribes of the Sahara. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, i960, pp. 78-80. 161. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, op. cit., p. 58. 162. Edward Westermarck, Ritual and Belief in Morocco, London, 1926,1 : 178. 162a. Lloyd Cabot Briggs, Tribes of the Sahara, op. cit., pp. 195-96. 163. Doutté, Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord, Alger, 1909, p. 509. 164. Westermarck, op. cit., II : 72. On other ceremonial fights between children in Morocco, cf. op. cit., I : 601; II : 65; between men and women, II : 72. 165. Ibid., II : 73, 1 1 5 , 1 3 1 - 3 3 . 1 7 1 » "88, 197-98, 272. 166. Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., I : 273. 167. Francis R . Rodd, The People of the Veil, London, 1926, pp. 349-53; Lhote, op. cit., p. 127. if)8. Henri Duveyrier, Les Touareg du Nord, Paris, 1864, p. 329. 169. Lhotc. op. cit., p. 156. 170. Cf. H. Barth, Travels in Central Africa, London, 1859, I V : 552 f. 171. Rodd, op. cit., p. 387. 172. Cf. Henri Lhote, Les Touaregs du Hoggar (Ahaggar), 2d ed., Paris, 1955, pp. 2 1 6 - 1 8 , 239, 248. 173. Hocart, The Progress of Man, London, 1933, p. 241. 174. G. P. Murdock, Social Structure, New York, 1949, p. 80.

Golden River to Golden Road 175. Perry, in Appendix I I I to Rivers, Social Organization, London, 1932, pp. 208 ff., maintains that the superiority of one moiety over the other was one of the original traits of ancient Egyptian dual organization which became diffused from there as an integral part of the "Archaic civilization." C H A P T E R 8— 1. Cf. H. R . P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, London, 1949, p. 5 1 5 ; Charles M. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta, New York, 1937, I : 324 ff.; John B. Glubb, The Sulubba and Other Ignoble Tribes of Southwestern Asia, General Series in Anthropology (ed. Leslie Spier), Menasha, Wis., 1943, No. 9, p. 14. 2. Cf. Dickson, op. cit., p. 516. 3. H. R . P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, London, 1956, p. 102. 4. John Lewis Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, London, 1831, II : 19-20. 5. Alois Musil, Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins, New York, 1928, p. 136. 6. Glubb, op. cit., pp. 1 5 - 1 6 . 7. Cf. G. W. Murray, Sons of Ishmael, London, 1935, pp. 269, 285. 8. Burckhardt, op. cit., I I : 15. 9. Cf. Carleton S. Coon, Caravan, The Story of the Middle East, New York, 1 9 5 ' . P- 200. 10. Bertram Thomas, Arabia Felix, New York, 1932, pp. 46 f.; Richard F. Burton, The Land of Midian (Revisited), London, 1879. I : 161. 1 1 . Cf. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Senusi of Cyrenaica, Oxford, 1949, p. 5 1 : G . W. Murray, Sons of Ishmael, op. cit., pp. 273 ff. 12. Cf. Henri Lhote, Les Touaregs du Hoggar, Paris, 1944, p. 150; Encyclopaedia of Islam (new ed.), s.v. Ahaggar. 13. Cf. M a x Freiherr von Oppenheim, Die Beduinen, Leipzig, 1939, I : 23. 14. Cf. Musil, op. cit., p. 60. 15. Ibid., p. 136. 16. Glubb, op. cit., p. 16. 17. Burton, op. cit., I : 170-71. 18. Musil, op. cit., p. 137. 19. Murray, op. cit., p. 245. 20. Doughty, op. cit., I : 325. 21. W. B. Seabrook, Adventures in Arabia, New York, 1927, p. 53. 22. Glubb, op. cit., p. 14. 23. Seabrook, op. cit., p. 53. 24. Musil, op. cit., p. 453. 25. Doughty, op. cit., I : 324; also Musil, op. cit., pp. 452-53. 26. Cf. Seabrook, op. cit., p. 52. 27. Murray, op. cit., p. 268. 28. Doughty, op. cit., I : 325. 29. Glubb, op. cit., p. 15. 30. Murray, op. cit., p. 269. 3 1 . Glubb, op. cit., p. 15. 32. Murray, op. cit., p. 268. 33. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, op. cit., p. 515. 34. Glubb, op. cit., p. 14.

Notes 35. Burton, op. cit., II : 118. 36. Dickson, op. cit., pp. 5 7 1 - 7 2 . 37. Glubb, op. cit., p. 15. 38. Dickson, op. cit., pp. 5 1 6 - 1 7 . 39. Musil, op. cit., pp. 136-37; Glubb, op. cit., p. 16. 40. Cf. Ernest Main, Iraq From Mandate to Independence, London, 1935, pp. 253 ff.; John Van Ess, Meet the Arab, New York, 1943, pp. 69-70. 41. Cf. Musil, op. cit., p. 282; Coon, op. cit., p. 201. 42. Dickson, op. cit., p. 5 1 6 ; Glubb, op. cit., p. 14. 43. Burton, Personal .Xarraiive of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah, London, 1893, II : 121. 44. Glubb, op. cit., pp. 15, t6. 45. Pierre Ponafidine, Life in the Moslem East, New York, 1 9 1 1 , p. 1 3 3 ; Dickson, op. cit., p. 5 1 7 ; Musil, op. cit., pp. 1 1 8 , 134, 325,406-7; Coon, op. cit., p. 200; Glubb, op. cit., p. 15. 46. Glubb, op. cit., pp. 1 5 - 1 6 ; Musil, loc. cit. 47. Musil, op. cit., pp. 281-82; Coon, op. cit., p. 200. 48. Bertram Thomas, Alarms and Excursions in Arabia, London, 1931, p. 152; idem., Arabia Felix, p. 47. 49. Musil, op. cit., pp. 278—81; Coon, op. cit., p. 203; Murray, op. cit., p. 285. 50. Murray, op. cit., pp. 265-66. 5 1 . Dickson, op. cit., p. 518. 52. Burton, op. cit., II : 1 2 1 . 53. Cf. Dickson, op. cit., pp. 5 1 6 - 1 7 ; Coon, op. ext., p. 200; Jarvis, Desert and Delta, London, 1938, pp. 154-55; Seabrook, op. cit., pp. 5 2 - 5 3 ; Ponafidine, op. cit., p. 132; Gerald dc Gaury, Arabian Journey, London, 1950, p. 140. 54. Jarvis, op. cit., p. 153, Seabrook, op. cit., p. 53. 55. Glubb, op. cit., p. 14. 56. Coon, op. cit., p. 200. 57. Cf. for example Murray, op. cit., pp. 268-69: " . . . these Hiteim represent ancient broken clans, who have lost their independence. . . . Some may contain non-Arab elements, but these must be rare." Glubb, op. cit., p. 16, says, " . . . they are known to be of base descent." 58. Coon, op. cit., p. 200. 59. Musil, op. cit., pp. 136-37, 282. 60. Glubb, op. cit., pp. 1 5 - 1 6 ; Gerald de Gaury, Arabia Phoenix, London, 1946, p. 143. 61. Cf. Murray, op. cit., p. 265; Jarvis, op. cit., p. 119. 62. Thomas, Arabia Felix, op. cit., pp. 46-47. 63. Fulanain, The Marsh Arab, Philadelphia, 1928, p. 254. 64. Dickson, op. cit., pp. 550-51. 65. Cf. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., pp. 48 f.; Murray, op. cit., pp. 272 fT. 66. Henri Lhote, Les Touaregs du Hoggar (Ahaggar), 2nd ed., Paris, 1955, pp. 145, 166, 188, 2 1 3 - 1 4 , 239, 247. 67. Lloyd Cabot Briggs, Tribes of the Sahara, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 126-27, 136-38. 68. Ibid., pp. 168-71. 69. Ibid., pp. 194-95. 70. Ibid., pp. 2 1 6 - 1 7 , 219.

518

Golden River to Golden

Road

C H A P T E R 9— 1. R a p h a e l Patai, The Kingdom oj Jordan, Princeton, N . J . 1958, pp. 186-98. 2. George A. Lipsky (ed.), Saudi Arabia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, N e w Haven, 1959, p. 64. 3. Ibid., pp. 78-80. 4. Ibid., pp. 2 1 2 - 1 3 , 267. 5. Donald N. Wilber, Afghanistan, Subcontractor's Monograph, Human Relations Area Files, New Haven, 1956, Vol. I, p. 284; idem, Iran Past and Present, Princeton, N . J . , 1958, p. 169. 6. Lipsky, op. cit., p. 8 1 . 7. The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey, London and New York (Royal Inst, of Intern. Affairs), 3rd ed., 1958, p. 2 1 9 : Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East, Oxford, 1962, p. 24. 8. Henry Ayrout, S. J . , The Egyptian Peasant. Boston. 1963, p. 88. 9. Patai, op. cit., pp. 122, 2 0 1 . 10. Lipsky, op. cit., p. 82. 1 1 . Ibid., p. 82. 12. Harold B. Barclay, Buurri Al Lamaab: A Suburban Village in the Sudan, Ithaca, N . Y . , 1964, p. 4. 13. J a c q u e s Weulersse, Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient, Paris, 1946, pp. 2

34-3514. Wilber, Iran Past and Present, op. cit., p. 170. 15. Wilber, Afghanistan, op. cit., I, 286. 16. Hamed A m m a r , Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, London, 1954, p. 45. 17. Manfred Halpern, The Politics oj Social Change in the Middle East, Princeton, N . J . , 1963, p. 8 1 . 18. Wilber, Iran, op. cit., pp. 2 4 1 - 4 2 . ig. Gabriel Baer, Population and Society in the Arab East, London, 1964, p. 148; Weulersse, op. cit., p. 124. 20. Area Handbook for Pakistan. D A P a m (Dept. of the A r m y Pamphlets) no. 550-48, Washington, D . C . , 1965, pp. 3 8 2 - 8 3 . 2 1 . Nuri Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow, N e w York, 1963, p. i l l . 22. U . N . sources, quoted in Baer, op. cit., pp. 2 0 - 2 1 . 23. Mirrit B. Ghali, Siyasat al-ghad, Cairo, 1944, pp. 58-62, as quoted by Baer, op. cit., p. 2 1 ; Charles Issawi, Egypt in Mid-Century, London, 1954, p. 86. 24. George L. Harris (ed.), Iraq: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven, Conn., 1958, p. 259. 25. Ibid., p. 260. 26. R a p h a e l Patai (ed.), The Republic of Syria, Subcontractor's Monograph, H u m a n Relations A r e a Files, New Haven, 1956, V o l . I I , p. 573. 27. Wilber, Iran Past and Present, op. cit., p. 172. 28. Patai, The Republic of Syria, op. cit., Vol. I I , pp. 569-70. 29. A . K . S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia, London, 1 9 5 3 , pp. 394-9530. A . Michael Critchley, " T h e Health of the Industrial Worker in I r a q , " British Journal oj Industrial Medicine, V o l . 12, 1955, as quoted by Halpern, op. cit., p. 85. 3 1 . Harris, Iraq, op. cit., pp. 21 I, 260, 262. 32. Patai, Syria, op. cit., Vol. I I , pp. 5 7 7 - 8 5 . 33. Doreen Warriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle East, London, 1948,

Notes

5'9

pp. 4 1 - 4 2 , c i t i n g t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of D r . M o h a m m e d Aeu

York

Times,

M a y 5, 1 9 5 2 . as q u o t e d b y Halpern.

34. H o r a c e M . M i n e r a n d G e o r g e de V o s . Oasis and Personality

in Change.

East.

and Casbah:

Algerian

Culture

pp. 2 1 - 2 2 .

2C): 1 5 f f . : R a p h a e l P a t a i . Sex and Family

in the Bible

and the

Middle

N e w Y o r k , 1958, p p . 6 0 - 6 1 .

37. H a l p e r n . op. cit., 38.

The

p. 85.

A n n A r b o r , i 9 6 0 , p. 35.

35. C f . B a e r . op. cit., 36. (>enesis

Ahd el-Khalik;

op. at.

p. 83.

P a u l S t i r l i n g . Turkish

39. Area

Handbook

for

Village.

L o n d o n . 1965. p. 2 3 7 .

Morocco.

DA

Pam

(Dept. of the A r m y

Pamphlets)

no. 5 5 0 - 4 9 . W a s h i n g t o n . D . C . . 1Q65. p. 95. 40. Area Handbook 41.

for Pakistan,

op. cit..

M a j i d K h a d d u r i ( e d . ) . Iraq.

tions A r e a F i l e s . 1956. pp. 9 6 - 9 7 . 42. Ibid.. 43.

pp. 9 5 - 9 6 .

Subcontractor's Monograph. Human Rela104.

p. 107.

John

Gulick.

Social

X e w York, 1955. pp.

Structure

44. W e u l e r s s e . op. cit., 45. S t i r l i n g , op. cit.,

Culture

Change

in a Lebanese

Village.

p. 2 2 9 : G u l i c k . op. cit.. pp.

100-01.

pp. 1 8 2 - 8 3 a n d p l a t e s 11 a n d 12.

46. W ' i l b e r . Afghanistan, 47. S t i r l i n g , op. cit.. 48. C a r l e t o n

and

iot-02.

op. cit..

V o l . 1, p. 268.

pp. 238-46.

S. C o o n .

Caravan:

The

Story

of the

Middle

East.

New

York,

1965. p. 1 8 1 . 49. W i l b c r . Iran.

op. cit..

50. G u l i c k , op. cit.. 5 1 . ibid..

p. 1 7 1 .

pp. 7 0 - 7 1 .

p. 7 1 .

52. M i n e r a n d de V u s . op. cit.,

pp. 3 7 - 3 9 . I c h a n g e d t h e F r e n c h s p e l l i n g of

the A r a b i c w o r d s used by t h e a u t h o r s . 53. B a r c l a y , op. at.,

pp. 4 3 - 4 5 .

54. S t i r l i n g , op. cit.,

p. 254.

5 5 . B a r c l a y , op. cit., 56. H a r r i s , op. at.,

pp. 136, 209. pp. 7 5 - 7 6 ; K h a d d u r i , op. cit.,

5 7 . B a r c l a y , op. at.,

58. L l o y d C a b o t B r i g g s , Tribes 5 9 . A m m a r . op. cit., 60. W ' i l b e r . Iran.

pp.

op. cit.,

6 1 . A m m a r , op. cit.,

The Arab

World

York

Today,

64. B e r g e r , op. at., 65. D a n i e l

Lerner.

of the Sahara,

p. 1 7 2 . op. cit.,

V o l . I , pp. 283, 288.

Times. J u n e 4. 1960. as s u m m a r i z e d b y M o r r o e B e r g e r . X e w Y o r k , 1964, pp. 5 8 - 5 9 .

pp. 68-69. The

Passing

oj

as s u m m a r i z e d b y X u r i E r e n , op. cit., 66. S t i r l i n g , op. cit.. 6 7 . Ibid.,

p. 2 3 1 .

68. Ibid.,

p. 29.

69. G u l i c k , op. cit., 70. Ibid.,

p. 139.

71. Ibid.,

p. 1 5 5 .

72. H a l p e r n . op. cit..

C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . , i 9 6 0 , p. 101.

187fr.

p. 20.

62. W i l b e r , Afghanistan, 63. Cf. I he \en

p. 106.

p. 1 7 7 .

Traditional p. 165.

pp. 168. 232, 233.

p. 135.

p. 86.

Society,

Glencoe.

111.,

1958.

Golden River to Golden Road CHAPTER

io-

1. G u s t a v e E . v o n G r u n e b a u m , " T h e Structure of the M u s l i m T o w n , " Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition. C o m p a r a t i v e Studies o f C u l t u r e s a n d C i v i l i z a t i o n s , N o . 4. T h e A m e r i c a n A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l Association, M e m o i r N o . 8 1 , A p r i l , 1955, p. 142. 2. H . A . R . G i b b , a n d H a r o l d B o w e n , Islamic Society and the West, L o n d o n , R o y a l Institute o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1950, V o l . I, p. 276. 3. W . E . L a n e , Modern Egyptians, E v e r y m a n ' s L i b r a r y , p. 4. 4. C f . R . P a t a i (ed.), The Republic of Lebanon. S u b c o n t r a c t o r ' s M o n o g r a p h , H u m a n R e l a t i o n s A r e a Files, N e w H a v e n , 1956, V o l . I, pp. 223 ff. 5. C f . R . P a t a i (ed.), The Republic of Syria. S u b c o n t r a c t o r ' s M o n o g r a p h , H u m a n R e l a t i o n s A r e a Files, N e w H a v e n , 1956, V o l . I, p. 3 4 1 . 6. L a n e , op. cit. 7. F r e y a S t a r k , Winter in Arabia, L o n d o n , 1945, p. 44.

CHAPTER

il —

;. T h e a u t h o r is i n d e b t e d to Professors H . H . R o w l e y , F. S. C . N o r t h r o p , E d w a r d J . J u r j i , D a v i d B i d n e y , a n d D r . Everett R . C l i n c h y for their c o m m e n t s on this c h a p t e r . 2. C f . a b o v e , p p . 13 f. 3. C f . a b o v e , C h a p t e r 1, p p . 33 ff. 4. J o h n C l a r k A r c h e r , " H i n d u i s m , " in E . J . J u r j i (ed.), The Great Religions of the Modern World, P r i n c e t o n , 1947, p. 49. 5. D a n i e l a n d A l i c e T h o r n e r , " I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , " in R a l p h L i n t o n (ed.), Most of the World, N e w Y o r k , 1949, pp. 5 7 1 , 574, 577, 646. 6. A . K . R e i s c h a u c r , " B u d d h i s m , " in The Great Religions of the Modern World. pp. 138, 105-06. 7. L e w i s H o d o u s , " T a o i s m , " in The Great Religions, pp. 4 1 - 4 2 . 8. H o d o u s , op. cit., p p . 2 4 - 4 3 . 9. H o d o u s , " C o n f u c i a n i s m , " op. cit., pp. 6 - 7 . 10. Ibid., p p . 7 - 1 8 . I I. Ibid., p. 20. 12. J o a c h i m W a c h , Sociology of Religion, C h i c a g o , 1944, pp. 274 ff. 13. C f . a b o v e , p. 36. 14. R e b e c c a W e s t , Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, N e w Y o r k , 1943, p. 298; as q u o t e d b y F. S. C . N o r t h r o p , The Meeting of East and West: An Inquiry Concerning World Understanding, N e w Y o r k , 1946, p. 4 3 1 . 15. B. L . A t r e y a , " I n d i a n C u l t u r e ; Its Spiritual, M o r a l a n d S o c i a l A s p e c t s , " in Interrelations of Cultures, U N E S C O p u b l i c a t i o n , Paris, 1953, p. 144. 16. Y o u n g h i l l K a n g , The Grass Roof, N e w Y o r k , 1931, pp. 7, 1 2 ; idem, East Goes West, N e w Y o r k , 1937, p. 2 3 3 ; as q u o t e d b y N o r t h r o p , op. cit., p. 3 1 4 . 17. K u r t S i n g e r , The Idea of Conflict, M e l b o u r n e , 1949, pp. 5 0 - 5 2 . 18. N o r t h r o p , op. cit., p. 388; cf. also p. 496, w h e r e in the closing sentence of the book the s a m e s t a t e m e n t is repeated with slight variations. 19. A r n o l d J . T o y n b e e , A Study of History, a b r . ed., O x f o r d , 1947, p. 487. 20. E d w a r d W . L a n e , The Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, E v e r y m a n ' s L i b r a r y , p. 241.

NoUs 2 1 . Northrop, op. cit., p. 401. 22. Archer, op. cit., p. 5 1 . 23. E. S. Geden, " G o d (Hindu)," in James Hastings (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 6, p. 285; Archer, op. cit., p. 76. 24. Passages followed by this reference number are based on written communications from Professor F. S. C. Northrop. 25. Reischauer, op. cit., p. 139. 26. M. Anesaki, "Prayer (Buddhist)," in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 10, p. 166. 27. One must carefully distinguish between this Western term and the Eastern concept of "transcendence." In the Eastern sense the T a o transcends sense objects. Cf. Northrop, " T h e Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosopy," in Philosophy—East and West, ed. Charles Moore, Princeton, 1944, p. 219. 28. Hodous, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 29. Ibid., p. 40. 30. Edward Sell, " G o d (Muslim)," in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 6, p. 300. 3 1 . W. T . Davison, " G o d (Biblical and Christian)," op. cit., Vol. 6, pp. 265 ff. 32. F. S. C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, op. cit., p. 40g. 33. Atreya, op. cit., p. 126. 34. Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, 2d ed., Tübingen, 1923, Vol. 2, pp. 22, 24. 35. Raymond Kennedy, "Southeast Asia and Indonesia," in Most of the World, pp. 675, 677. 36. Francis L. Hsu, " C h i n a , " in Most of the World, p. 766. 37. Northrop, op. cit., pp. 409-10. 38. Hodous, op. cit., p. 41. 39. Douglas G. Haring, " J a p a n and the Japanese," Most of the World, p. 856. 40. Reischauer, op. cit., p. go. 41. Northrop, op. cit., p. 412. 42. Krishnalal Shridharani, My India, My America, New York, p. 298. 43. Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 299-300. 44. Ibid., p. 485. 45. Northrop, op. cit., p. 4 1 1 . 46. Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 300-301. 47. Op. cit., p. 553. 48. F. S. C. Northrop, The Taming of the Nations: A Study of the Cultural Bases of International Policy, New York, 1952, p. 77. 49. Hodous, op. cit., pp. 1 - 2 3 . 50. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, p. 339. 51. Oral information supplied by my student, Mr. Timothy Lin. 52. Archer, op. cit., pp. 62, 75, 88. 53. Reischauer, op. cit., p. 97. 54. Ibid., pp. 98-100, 103, 105. 55. Hodous, op. cit., pp. 27, 32, 37, 39. 56. Singer, op. cit., p. 52.

Golden River to Golden

522 CHAPTER

Road

12-

1. Prof. J o h n B. Whitton of Princeton University, in the Encyclopedia Americana, article "Nationalism and Internationalism." 2. Ibid. 3. H a z e m Zaki Nuseibeh, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1956, p. 203. 4. Cf. Hans Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East, London, Routledge, >929> PP- 2 3 1 - 3 2 . 5. Philip K. Hitti, History of Syria, New York, Macmillan, 1951, p. 667. 6. After the above was written, my attention was directed to a statement by Shaykh Mustafa al-Sibä'i that expresses basically the same idea. Advocating " T h e Establishment of Islam as the State Religion of Syria," the shaykh says in an article published in the Syrian newspaper al-Manär (in February, 1950): "Although it is understood that the nationalism of Europe decrees as a fundamental tenet the expulsion of religion, that step is not incumbent on us, the Arabs. Nazi Germany may have found in Christianity a religion which was foreign to it. T u r a n i a n Turkey may find in Islam a religion foreign to it. But the Arabs will never find in Islam a religion foreign to them. In fact they believe that A r a b nationalism was born only when they embraced Islam. . . ." Trans. R . B. Winder, The Muslim World, X L I V (i9")4), p. 223. Quoted also by G. E. von G r u n e b a u m , "Problems of Muslim Nationalism," in Richard N. Frye (ed.), Islam and the West, T h e Hague, 1957, p. 22. 7. Cf. R . Patai, The Kingdom of Jordan, Princeton University Press, 1958, pp. 136 ff.; Idem., Sex and Family in the Bible and the Middle East, New York, Doubleday, 1959, pp. 19 fT. 8. Cf. R. Patai, The Kingdom of Jordan, pp. 275, 287 f. 9. Cf. above, Chapter 7, " D u a l Organization." 10. R . Patai, Sex and Family, op. cit., p. 17. 11. Cf. for example Alexander Pallis, In the Days of the Janissaries: Old Turkish Life as Depicted in the "Travel Book" of Evliya Chelebi, London, 1951, p. 120. 12. Cf. R . Patai (ed.), The Republic of Syria, I : 154 ff. 13. Cf. Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, Cambridge University Press, 1957, p. 66. 14. Cf. below, p. 350. 15. Cf. above, p. 307. 16. Cf. Nabih A. Faris and M o h a m m e d T . Husayn, The Crescent in Crisis, Lawrence, T h e University of Kansas, 1955, pp. 130 ff. 17. T h e creed of Pan-Arab nationalism has been summarized by G . E. von Grunebaum, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

C H A P T E R 13— 1. Cf. Melville J . Herskovits, Man and His Works, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, p. 523. 2. Cf. Raphael Patai, Israel Between East and West, Philadelphia; Jewish Publication Society 1953, pp. 27 ff. 3. Cf. above, Chapter 10, pp. 286 ff.

Votes

523

4. Arnold J . Toynbee, A Study of History (abr. ed.), New York a n d London, >947. P- 3775. Carleton S. Coon, " T h e Impact of the West on M i d d l e Eastern Institutions." An address before the A c a d e m y of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, 1952. 6. A. L. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture, Chicago, 1952, pp. 152 ff. 7. Cf. p. 36. •>• Cf. pp. 364-659. C.f. p. 34. 10. Bernard Lewis, " C o m m u n i s m and I s l a m , " International Affairs, Vol. 30 ( J a n u a r y , 1954), pp. 1-12. 11. Cf. p. 34. 12. Ali O t h m a n and Robert Redfield, " A n Arab's V i e w of Point I V . " University of Chicago R o u n d Table, No. 749, Aug. 5, 1952. CHAPTER

14-

1. T y p i c a l a n d forceful expressions of these two opposing points of view were given in a meeting of the American A c a d e m y of Political and Social Science, held in Philadelphia in the spring of 1952. Cf. N. Saifpour Fatemi, "Tensions in the M i d d l e East," and R a y Brock, "Report from the M i d d l e East," in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, J u l y , 1952, pp. 5 3 - 5 9 a n d 64-68. T h e two quotations arc found on pp. 57 and 65. 2. This w a s the experience, for example, of M r . Abdel-Aziz Allouai w orking in S y r i a under the auspices of the Near East Foundation in the V i l l a g e Welfare Service, a n d of M r . M o h a m m e d Shalabi working in Egyptian villages under the sponsorship of the Egyptian Association for Social Studies. (Oral communication from both.) These examples could easily be multiplied. 3. R a p h a e l Patai, On Culture Contact and Its Working in Modern Palestine, Memoir No. 67, American Anthropological Association, October, 1947, p. 42. 4. Oral communication from M r . Nuri Eren, Director of the Turkish Information Office in New York, and M r . Farid Zeineddine, Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations. 5. R o d e r i c D. M a t t h e w s and M a t t a A k r a w i , Education in the Arab Countries of the Near East, Washington, 1948, pp. 540-41, a n d passim. 6. In Iran, for example, 28,ggi children attended Maktabs (Koran-schools) in 1942-43, while no less than 152,168 attended modern schools. T h e total number of school-age population (children aged six to fourteen) in Iran was estimated at more than 3 millions. Cf. A b d u l l a h Faryar, " R u r a l Education in Iran." The Iran Review, J a n . - F e b . , 1950, p. 22; U N E S C O Publication No. 133, p. 27. 7. Eleanor Bisbee, The New Turks, Philadelphia, 1951, p. 154; E. W . F. Tomlin, Life in Modern Turkey, London a n d New York, 1946, p. 63. 8. T h e entire issue of preference for the old a n d the new (Western) in music has received much attention in The Passing of Traditional Society : Modernizing the Middle East, by Daniel Lerner, Glenco, 111., 1958. 9. Cf. An Arab's View on Point IV: a n NBC R a d i o Discussion by Ali Othman a n d Robert Redfield, T h e University of Chicago R o u n d T a b l e , No. 749, August 3, : 95 2 > P- I0 > where the dispositions that developed in A r a b kinship culture are discussed.

Golden River to Golden Road t o . Cf. Sania H a m a d y , Temperament and Character of the Arabs, N e w York, i960, p. 229. 11. F. S. C. N o r t h r o p , The Meeting of East and West: An Inquiry Concerning World Understanding, N e w York, 1947, p. 4. 12. This is shown statistically by the m u c h higher n u m b e r s of boys enrolled in schools in all M i d d l e Eastern countries as c o m p a r e d with those of girls. 13. G . E. von G r u n e b a u m , " P r o b l e m s of Muslim N a t i o n a l i s m , " in Richard N. Frye (ed.), Islam and the West, T h e H a g u e , 1957, p. 23. 14. I n m a n y places, as for instance in Africa south of the S a h a r a , in Central Asia, in I n d i a , a n d in the East Indies, Muslim missions or missionaries have been more successful t h a n Christian. 15. N o r t h r o p , op. cit., p. 411. 16. Since the M i d d l e East a n d the Western world have two different sets of etiquette, the Westerner m a y be behaving impeccably according to his own pattern, a n d still be regarded as offensively impolite by M i d d l e Eastern standards which, of course, are t h e only ones a M i d d l e Easterner c a n apply, unless he has h a d sufficient experience to become a c q u a i n t e d with w h a t the Westerners regard as polite m a n n e r s . 17. Cf. above, p. 34; Carleton S. Coon, " T h e I m p a c t of the West o n Middle Eastern Social Institutions," The Academy of Political Science, C o l u m b i a University, New York, 1952, p. 7: " . . . religion provides the d o m i n a n t tone to Muslim civilization. . . . " 18. As an example of how conservative M i d d l e Easterners view w h a t we called above "superficial W e s t e r n i z a t i o n , " let us quote a passage from an editorial in the conservative Pakistani paper, Al-Islam: An Independent Exponent of Orthodox Islam ( K a r a c h i , Pakistan, J a n . 1, 1955, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 1; as quoted by G . E. von G r u n e b a u m , op. cit., pp. 2 3 - 2 4 ) : " O u r intelligentsia, utterly ignorant of the scientific implications of the progress m a d e by the West, sing the praises of Western culture only because it gives t h e m opportunities of indulging in frivolous a n d vulgar pursuits. . . . " These p h e n o m e n a are not confined to the Middle East. Very similar processes have been observed in Indonesia where the new factor m a k i n g its impact on the old traditional native cultures of the islands is Islam. Cf. J u s t u s v a n dci Kroef, " P a t t e r n s of Western Influence in I n d o n e s i a , " American Sociological Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 (August, 1952), pp. 4 2 1 - 3 0 . 19. R o b e r t Redfield, The Primitive World and Its Transformations, I t h a c a , N.Y., •953, P- 2320. Ibid., p. 77. 2 1 . A r n o l d J . T o y n b e e , A Study of History, a b r . ed., New York a n d L o n d o n , •947. P- 39422. Redfield, op. cit., p. 77. CHAPTER

15—

1. Melville J . Herskovits, op. cit., pp. 289-309. 2. J . S. Slotkin, Social Anthropology, N e w York, 1950, p. 440. 3. Op. cit., p. 441, q u o t i n g H i l m a Granqvist, Marriage Conditions in a Palestinian Village, I I : 5 1 . 4. M e y e r Fortes, " T h e S t r u c t u r e of Unilineal Descent G r o u p s , " American Anthropologist, 1953, Vol. 55, p p . 1 7 - 4 1 .

Notes

525

5- E.g., p p . 35, 37, 38. 6. E.g., pp. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 38. 7. A l l a n D . C o u l t , " R o l e A l l o c a t i o n , Position S t r u c t u r i n g and A m b i l i n e a l D e s c e n t , " American Anthropologist, V o l . 66, 1964, p. 35. 8. R a y m o n d Firth, " A N o t e on Descent G r o u p s in P o l y n e s i a , " Man. - 57. 1957, PP- 4 - 8 9. G e o r g e P. M u r d o c k (ed.), Social Structure in Southeast Asia, V i k i n g F u n d Publications in A n t h r o p o l o g y , N o . 29. 10. Op. cit., p. 36. 1 1 . Sally Falk M o o r e , " D e s c e n t and S y m b o l i c Filiation," American Anthropologist, V o l . 66, 1964, p. 1308. 12. Op. cit., p. 1316. 13. R o b e r t F. M u r p h y and L e o n a r d K a s d a n , " T h e Structure of Parallel C o u s i n M a r r i a g e , " American Anthropologist, V o l . 6 1 , 1959, p. 17. 14. G e o r g e P. M u r d o c k , " W o r l d E t h n o g r a p h i c S a m p l e " American Anthropologist, V o l . 59, 1957, pp. 667, 687. 15. Op. cit., pp. 6 7 7 - 7 8 , 680, 685, 687. 16. H o r a c e M i n e r , The Primitive City oj Timbuctoo, p. 136. 17. L l o y d C a b o t Briggs, Tribes oj the Sahara, pp. 86, 9 1 . 18. W a l t e r Cline, Notes on the People of Si a ah and el Garah, p. 46. 19. E d w a r d W e s t e r m a r c k , Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco, p. 5 3 ; W i l l i a m D . Schorger, in E l m a n R . Service (ed.), Profiles of Primitive Culture. N e w Y o r k . >95 8 . PP- 39 6 > 399i c f - above, p. 168. 20. C f . a b o v e , pp. 147, 1 5 1 - 5 3 . 21. R a p h a e l Patai, Sex and Family in the Bible and the Middle East, pp. 2 7 - 3 1 : above, pp. 137-38. 22. J o h n G u l i c k , Social Structure and Culture Change in a Lebanese Village, p. 120. 23. Cf. a b o v e , pp. 141, 154, 155. 24. P a u l Stirling, private c o m m u n i c a t i o n in 1965. 25. Alois Musil, The Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins, p. 256. 26. H . R . P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, pp. 57, 129, 174, 234. 27. M a j i d K h a d d u r i (ed.), Area Handbook on Iraq, pp. 123-24. 28. G e o r g e L . H a r r i s (ed.), Iraq, pp. 2 7 1 - 7 3 . 29. G o v e r n m e n t of Palestine, " S u r v e y of Social and E c o n o m i c C o n d i t i o n s in A r a b V i l l a g e s , " op. cit., p. 4 3 6 ; P a t a i (ed.), The Republic of Syria, I, pp. 3 7 6 - 7 7 ; Patai (ed.), The Republic of Lebanon, 1 : 259 ; Patai, The Kingdom of Jordan, p. 137. Vo1

30. H a m e d A m m a r , Growing Up in an Egyptian

Village, pp.

1 3 7 - 3 9 , and

5 3 - 5 4 . 5831. H a r o l d B. B a r c l a y , Buurri Al Lamaab, pp. 109, 110, 228, 231. 32. G e o r g e de V o s and H o r a c e M i n e r , " A l g e r i a n C u l t u r e and Personality in C h a n g e , " Sociometry, V o l . 21, 1958, p. 265: M i n e r a n d de V o s , Oasis and Casbah. p. 89. 33- B « g g s . °p. P- « 7 1 • 34. D o n a l d N . W i l b e r (ed.), Afghanistan, pp. 200-01. 35. C f . J . N . D . A n d e r s o n , Islamic Law in the Modern World, L o n d o n , 1959. pp. 43-44, 47, as q u o t e d by G a b r i e l Baer, Population and Society in the Arab East, p. 62. 36. B e r t r a m T h o m a s , Arabia Felix, pp. 9 8 - g g . 37. A s q u o t e d by A r s l a n H u m b a r a c i . Algeria: The Revolution that Failed, N e w Y o r k , 1966, p. 250.

526

Golden River to Golden Road

38. Le Mondt, August 15, 1965, as quoted by Humbaraci, loc. cit. 39. Abncr Cohen, Arab Border-Villages in Israel, Manchester, 1965, pp. 71-93 The case itself took place in 1958. 40. Emanuel Marx, Bedouin of the A'egev, New York, 1967, p. 228. 41. Cf. above, pp. 141-42, Cohen, op. cit., p. 1 1 1 ; Barclay, op. cit., pp. 119-20. 42. Fredrik Barth, Principles oj Social'Organization in Southern Kurdistan, p. 68. 43. Schorger, op. cit., p. 396. 44. Barclay, op. cit., 21. 45. Patai, "Musha 'a Tenure" op. cit., pp. 438-39. 46. Raphael Patai, "The Middle East as a Culture Area," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 6, 1952, p. 6. 47. Ammar, op. cit., pp. 57-60. 48. Barclay, op. cit., p. 85. 49. Ammar, op. cit., p. 55. 50. Raphael Patai, "Relationship Patterns among the Arabs." Middle F,astern Affairs, Vol. 2, 1951, p. 183. 51. Barclay, op. cit., p. 112. 52. Ammar, op. cit., pp. 56, 258. 53. Fortes, op. cit., p. 33. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid, p. 34. 56. 'Äref el 'Äref, Die Beduinen von Beerseba, Aus dem Arabischen übersetzt von Leo Haefeli, Luzern, 1938, p. 47. 57. Musil, op. cit., pp. 48, 489. 58. Antonin Jaussen, Coutumes des Arabes au Pays de 'Moab, pp. 158-62, 220. 59. Fortes, op. cit., p. 26. 60. Ibid, p. 24. 61. Ibid. 62. Cf. above, p. 352. 63. Fortes, op. cit., p. 26. 64. Cf. above, pp. 177-250. 65. Fortes, op. cit., p. 28. 66. Ibid., p. 35. 67. Ibid., p. 37. 68. Ibid., pp. 25-26, 27, 28, 29, 3 1 , 32, 36. 69. Ibid., p. 32. 70. Ibid. 71. Patai, "Nomadism" op. cit., p. 411 ; Patai. The Republic of Syria, 1:190-93. 72. Fortes, op. cit., p. 27. 73. Cf. above, p. 209.

C H A P T E R 16— i. A. Kardiner, "The Concept of Basic Personality Structure as an Operational Tool in the Social Sciences," in Ralph Linton (ed.), The Science of Man in the World Crisis, New York, 1945, pp. 107-22; J . W. W. Whiting and I. L. Child, Child Training and Personality, New Haven, Conn., 1953, pp. 61 ff.

Notes

5*7

2. T h e most important of these studies are H a m e d A m m a r , Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, L o n d o n , 1954, passim, and especially pp. 99-106, and E d w i n T e r r y Prothro, Child Rearing in the Lebanon, H a r v a r d M i d d l e Eastern M o n o g r a p h s V I I I , C a m b r i d g e , Mass., 1961. Cf. also A . A . al-QasIml, Hadhi hiya 'l-aghlai (These A r e O u r Chains), C a i r o , 1946, p. 162; H i l m a Granqvist, Birth and Childhood among the Arabs, Helsingfors, 1947, pp. 107 FF., 175 FF.; S. M . Z w e m e r , Childhood in the Moslem World, N e w Y o r k , 1915, pp. 1 5 - 1 6 ; S a n i a H a m a d y , Temperament and Character oj the Arabs, N e w Y o r k , I960, pp. 220-21.

3. C a r l o Landsberg, Proverbs et dictons du peuple Arabe, Leiden, 1883, p. 104, as quoted by H a m a d y , op. cit., p. 2 2 1 ; G r a n q v i s t , op. cit., pp. 1 1 1 , 171. 4. G r a n q v i s t , op. cit., p. 165. 5. H a m a d y , op. cit., p. 220-21. 6. A s E . T . Prothro p u t it in his study of child rearing in several ethnic groups in the L e b a n o n {op. cit., p. 66), " i n pvery group boys were treated more w a r m l y than were girls . . . the boys, o n the average, received more w a r m t h than did the girls." 7. A m m a r , op. cit., p. 101. 8. Ibid. Also Prothro found in his study of Lebanese child-rearing practice that mothers encouraged aggression in male children more than in female c h i l d r e n {op. cit.,

pp. 96-98,

121).

9. A n n e H. Fuller, Buarij: Portrait oj a Lebanese Muslim Village, C a m b r i d g e , Mass., H a r v a r d University Press, 1961, p. 40. 10. A m m a r , op. cit., p. 105. r 1. Op. cit., p. 1 2 1 . 12. Cf. A b d u l l a h M . L u t f i y y a , Bay tin, A Jordanian Village: A Study of Social Institutions and Social Change in a Folk Society. University Microfilms, A n n A r b o r , M i c h . , 1962, pp.

198-201.

13. Herodotus ii, 36, 37, 104; E n c y c l o p a e d i a of Religion and Ethnics, I I I : 671-75. 1 4 . E x o d u s 4 : 2 4 - 2 5 ; G e n e s i s 1 7 : 1 0 - 1 4 , 2 4 - 2 7 ; 2 1 =4; 3 1 : 1 3 - 1 4 ¡ J o s h u a 5-.2FF.

Leviticus 12:3, etc. 15. Josephus Flavius, Antiquity oj the Jews, I : 12:2; cf. Genesis 27:25. 1 6 . J o s e p h u s , op. cit.,

13:9:1 and

13:11:3.

17. R e u b e n L e v y , The Social Structure oj Islam, p. 251. 18. Cf. Ploss-Bartels-Reitzenstein, Das Weib, n t h ed., Berlin, 1927, V o l . 1, p. 378, and sources there. T h e c h a p t e r d e a l i n g with the subject, op. cit., p p . 3 7 7 96, contains a large a m o u n t of information on excision, infibulation, a n d related practices in all parts of the w o r l d . 1 9 . S t r a b o , Geography,

16:2:34,37;

'6:4:9;

17:2:5, L o e b Classical

Library

ed., V I I : 2 8 I , 285, 323, a n d V I I I : I 5 3 . T h e notion that the ancient H e b r e w s practiced excision crops u p in a lengthy footnote a p p e n d e d by R i c h a r d F. Burton to his A Plain and Literal Translation oj the Arabian Nights' Entertainments, etc. Benares, 1885, V : 2 7 g . B u r t o n says, " T h i s rite is supposed by Moslems to have been invented by S a r a h , w h o so mutilated H a g a r for jealousy and w a s afterwards ordered by A l l a h to h a v e herself circumcised." T h e n Burton goes on to say, without a d d u c i n g a n y proof, that he believes that excision is still practiced by several o u t l y i n g or remote Jewish tribes. 20. Cf. A d r i a n R e l a n d , De Religione Mohammedica, Ultrajecti, 1705, pp.58-59.

528

Golden River to Golden Road

21. Cf. Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Dictionary, London, 1863 s.v. baçr. 22. Cf. Lane, ibid., and Reland, op. cit. 23. Cf. Kitäb al-Aghäni, X I X . 59, lines 11-12. 24. Julius Wellhausen, Reste Arabischen Heidentums, Berlin, 1897, p. 176; William Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia, p. 76 n. ; both quoting Diw. Hudh. 57,2 and 147,2. 25. Wellhausen, op. cit., p. 176. 26. Cf. Henri Massé, Persian Beliejs and Customs, p. 3 1 . Sir Thomas Herbert, Some Tears oj Travels into Divers Parts oj Africa and Asia the Great, 4th impression, London, 1677, p. 306. 27. See Reland, op. cit.-, Carsten Niebuhr, Description de rArabie, Amsterdam, 1774, pp. 70, 71. 28. E.g., Levy, op. cit., p. 252; cf. also Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, I I I : 667, 679. 29. Cf. e.g. Klunzinger, Upper Egypt, p. 195; Charles Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta, London, 1936, I: 386, 437; Edward Westermarck, Ritual and Belief in Morocco, I I : 433. 30. Doughty, op. cit., I : 170,457; Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka, Haag, 1889, I I : 1 4 1 ; Westermarck, op. cit., I I : 431. See also below. 31. Cf. sources in Westermarck, op. cit., I I : 431, and below. 32. Cf. sources in the long footnote of Westermarck, op. cit., I I : 4 3 1 - 3 2 , to which have to be added the sources quoted further on in this section. 33. Encyclopaedia of Islam, ist ed., 1925., s.v. Khitân. 34. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 71. 35. Fuller, op. cit., pp. 41-42. 36. Ibid., p. 42. 37. Cf. Patai, Sex and Family, pp. 201 ff. 38. Hilma Granqvist, Birth and Childhood among the Arabs, Helsingfors, 1947, pp. 184-209. 3g. Cf. Antonin Jaussen, Coutumes Palestiniennes, pp. 40-41. 40. Cf. Alois Musil, Arabia Petraea, I I I : 219,222; Antonin Jaussen, Coutumes des Arabes au Pays de Moab, pp. 35, 3 5 1 , 363-64. 41. Cf. Hurgronje, op. cit., I I : 141-43. 42. Eldon Rutter, The Holy Cities of Arabia, London and New York, 1928, pp. 55-56; Josef Henninger, "Eine eigenartige Beschneidungsform in Südwestarabien," Anthropos, 1938, pp. 952-58; Henninger, "Nochmals: Eine eigenartige Beschneidungsform in Südwestarabien," Anthropos, 1940-41, pp. 370-76; Philby, Arabian Highlands, pp. 449-50. 43. Bertram Thomas, Arabia Felix, pp. 71-72, 224 n. 44. Bertram Thomas, Alarms and Excursions in Arabia, p. 163. 45. H. R. P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, pp. 175-78, 518. 46. J . W. McPherson,. The Moulids of Egypt, Cairo, 1941, pp. 52, 191, 205, 235-3 6 . 2 4547. Ibid., pp. 67-68, 191-92, 220. 48. Ammar, op. cit., pp. 116, 118, 121, 122. 49. Jacques Berque, Histoire Sociale d'un Village Egyptien au XXe Siècle, Paris, 1957. P- 4450. Edward William Lane, The Manners and Customs of thè Modem Egyptians, op. cit., p. 60, 537, 541.

.Voies

529

5 1 . M a r i e B o n a p a r t e , '"Notes on E x c i s i o n , " in G é z a R o h e i m (ed.). Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences, N e w Y o r k , 1950. II : 70,82. 52. G . W . M u r r a y , op. cit., p. 176. 53. B a r c l a y , op. cit., pp. 2 4 1 - 4 3 . 54. J . W . C r a w f o o t , " C u s t o m s of the R u b a t ä b , " Sudan Notes and Records, 1918, I : 1 3 2 - 3 3 . 55. B a r c l a y , op. cit., pp. 1 5 7 - 5 8 , 2 3 7 - 3 8 . 56. B a r c l a y op. cit., pp. 237-40, partly q u o t i n g P. D . R . M a c D o n a l d , "Female C i r c u m c i s i o n in the S u d a n : A P a p e r Delivered at the S u d a n B r a n c h British M e d i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n " (mimeo, 1936). 57. Briggs, Tribes oj the Sahata, pp. 128-29, '7 2 > ' 9 8 - 9 9 , 220. 58. M i n e r , Timbuctoo, pp. 158, 161, 164. 59. W e s t e r m a r c k , op. cit. I : 1 7 7 ; I I : 4 1 7 , 423, 426. 60. C f . H e r b e r t , op. cit., pp. 306 ff. 61.

Voyages du Chevalier Chardin en Perse et autres Lieux de l'Orient,

nouvelle

edition . . . par L . L a n g l é s , Paris, 1 8 1 1 , 1 1 1 : 1 6 5 , as quoted by Massé, op. cit.. P- 3 ' 62. C f . J a k o b E d u a r d Polak, Persien, das Land und Seine Bewohner, L e i p z i g . '865, I : 197-9863. C f . H . A r a k é l i a n , " L e s K u r d e s en P e r s e , " in Verhandlungen des XIII. Internationalen Orientalisten Kongresses, p. 150. 64. Massé, op. cit., pp. 3 1 - 3 3 . 65. Fredrik B a r t h , Nomads oj South Persia: The Bassen Iribe oj the Khamseh Conjederacy, Boston, 1961, p. 138. 66. B o n a p a r t e , op. cit., p. 82. 67.- C f . A m m a r , op. cit., p. 118. 68. Ibid. 69. P a u l Stirling, Turkish Village, p. 24. 70. A m m a r , op. cit., p. 206. 7 1 . G a b r i e l Baer, Population and Society in the Arab East, pp. 49-50. 72. C f . C h a r l e s C h u r c h i l l , " T h e A r a b W o r l d , " in R . P a t a i (ed.), Women in the Modern World, N e w Y o r k , 1967, p. 1 1 7 . 73. G e o r g e A . L i p s k y (ed.), Saudi Arabia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, N e w H a v e n : H R A F Press, 1959, p. 278. 74. C f . D o n a l d W i l b e r , Ajghanistan, pp. 85, 93. 75. C f . L u t f i y y a , op. cit., p. 85. 76. C f . Fuller, op. cit., pp. 58, 83. 77. L u t f i y y a , op. cit., p p . 89-90. 78. C f . A . J . T r e m e a r n e , The Ban oj the Bori, pp. 280 ff. ; T r e m e a r n e , The Tailed Headhunters oj Nigeria, L o n d o n , 1912, pp. 254 ff. ; T r e m e a r n e , Hausa Supersititions and Customs, L o n d o n , 1913, pp. 145 ff. ; B r e n d a Z . S e l i g m a n , in Folk Lore, V o l . 25, 1914, pp. 300 ff. 79. Cf. W . C h . P l o w d e n , Travels in Abyssinia and the Galla Country, L o n d o n , 1868, pp. 259 ff. ; J . Borelli, Ethiopie méridionale, reprinted b y D e G o e j e , in Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1890, p. 480; C . C o n t i Rossini, " N o t e sugli A g a u , " in Giornale della Societa Asiatica Italiana, V o l . 18, 1905; G . R . Sundström, Le Monde Orientale, 1909, I I I : 1 4 9 - 5 1 ; A . Z . Aescoly, " L e s noms m a g i q u e s d a n s les a p o c r y p h e s chrétiens des E t h i o p i e n s , " in Journal Asiatique, V o l . 220, 1932; E n r i c o C e r u l l i , Etiopia Occidentala, R o m e , 1933,

jjo

Golden River to Golden Road

Vol. I I ; Encylcopaedia of Islam, s.v. £ar; Leiris, " L e culte des Z a r s à G o n d a r , " in Aethiopica, I V : 9 6 - 1 0 3 , 1 2 5 - 3 6 ; Leiris, " L a c r o y a n c e a u x génies zar en Ethiopie d u n o r d , " Journal de Psychologie, 1938, p p . 1 0 8 - 2 5 ; Wolf Leslau, An E t h i o p i a n A r g o t of People Possessed by a S p i r i t , " in Africa, Vol. 19, no. 3, L o n d o n , J u l y 1949, p p . 204-12 (includes a brief description of a .jar-ceremony a m o n g t h e F a l a s h a s ) ; S i m o n D . Messing, " G r o u p T h e r a p y a n d Social Status in t h e Z a r C u l t of E t h i o p i a , " American Anthropologist. Vol. 60, no. 6, Dec. 1958. pp. 1120-26. 80. Cf. E n r i c o Cerulli, " N o t e sul m o v i m i e n t o m u s u l m a n o in S o m a l i a , " in Rivista degli Studii Orientali, Vol. 1 0 ; Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. " S o m a l i l a n d . " 8 1 . J . S p e n c e r T r i m i n g h a m , Islam in the Sudan, L o n d o n , 1949, p. 174: Sophie Zenkovsky, " Z a r a n d T a m b o u r a as Practiced by W o m e n in O m d u r m a n , " Sudan Notes and Records, Vol. 3 1 , 1950, p. 68; Barclay, op. cit., p p . 196-207. 82. Cf. K l u n z i n g e r , op. cit., p p . 3 9 5 - 9 7 ; J a c o u b A r t i n Pasha, in Bulletin de l'Institut Egyptien, I I . 6, 1885, p. 185 (footnote); K a r l Völlers, " N o c h einmal d e r Z ä r , " Z D M G , Vol. 45, 1891, p p . 3 4 3 - 5 1 ; P a u l K a h l e , " Z ä r Beschwörungen in E g y p t e n , " Der Islam, Vol. 3, 1 9 1 2 , p p . 1 - 4 1 , 189-90, a n d literature there on p. i ; B r e n d a Z . Seligman, " A n c i e n t E g y p t i a n Beliefs in M o d e r n E g y p t , ' ' in Essays and Studies Presented to William Ridgeuay, C a m b r i d g e , 1913, p p . 4 4 8 - 5 1 ; id., " O n t h e O r i g i n of the E g y p t i a n Z â r , " Folk Lore, Vol. 25, L o n d o n , 1914. pp. 3 0 0 - 2 3 . 83. T h o m a s , Alarms and Excursions, p p . 2 6 0 - 2 6 2 ; T h o m a s , Arabia Felix. pp. 194-9784. Cf. D o r e e n I n g r a m s , A Survey of Social and Economic Conditions in the Aden Protectorate, p r i n t e d by t h e G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t e r . British A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , E r i t r e a . 1949, p p . 5 8 - 5 9 . 85. H u r g r o n j e , op. cit., I I : 1 2 4 - 2 8 , English translation, Leiden, 1931. pp. 1 0 0 - 0 3 ; D e Goeje, Z D M G , vol. 44, i8go, p. 480; A r n o l d Nöldeke, Z D M G . ibid, p. 701 ; S. Z w e m e r , The Influence of Animism on Islam, L o n d o n , 1920, a n d its review by G . Levi délia V i d a , in Bilychis, Vol. 10, 1921, p p . 7 5 - 7 9 . 86. Cf. J . J . Hess, Von den Beduinen des Innern Arabiens: Erzählungen, Lieder. Sitten und Gebräuche, Z ü r i c h , 1938, p p . 1 5 8 - 5 9 . 87. H u r g r o n j e , op cit., I I : 1 2 4 - 2 8 . 88. Cf. T h o m a s , Alarms and Excursions pp. 2 6 0 - 2 6 2 . A similar zär c e r e m o n y a m o n g t h e M u r r a tribe of t h e H a d h r a m a u t region (today S o u t h e r n Y e m e n ) is described by t h e s a m e a u t h o r in his Arabia Felix, p p . 1 9 4 - 9 7 . 89. Barclay, op. cit., p p . 1 9 6 - 9 7 , 2 0 1 - 0 2 , 2 0 4 - 0 5 . 90. Q u o t e d a f t e r K a h l e , op. cit., p p . 189-90. 91. Cf. Levy, op. cit., p p . 1 4 0 - 4 1 . 92. Cf. E m a n u e l M a r x , Bedouin of the Negev, N e w York, 1967, p p . 1 8 5 - 8 6 . 93. C f . I b r a h i m A b d u l l a M u h y i , " W o m e n in t h e A r a b E a s t , " journal of Social Issues, 1959, no. 3 ; r e p r i n t e d in R i c h a r d H . Nolte (ed.), 7he Modern Middle East, N e w York, 1963, p p . 1 3 5 - 4 0 . 94. H a j j i S h a y k h Yusuf of N a j a f a n d G i l a n , The Means of the Chastity'of Women: A Volume on Chastity (in Persian), R e s h t , I r a n , 1926, p p . 294 ff., translated by C . R . P i t t m a n , in The Moslem World, Vol. 33, 1943, pp. 2 0 3 - 1 2 . 95. Cf. B a y d â w l ' s c o m m e n t a r y ( 1 3 t h c e n t u r y ) ; I b n K h a l d u n , Prolegomena (Paris, 1858 fr.), 1: 3 5 4 ; as q u o t e d b y Levy, op. cit., p p . 98-99. 96. Levy, op. cit., p. 132.

Notes

531

97. Cf. Tullio Tentori, " I t a l y , " in Patai (ed.), Women in the Modern World. p. 167. 98. Nermin Abadan, "Turkey," in Patai (ed.), Women in the Modern World, p. 93, quoting Serim Yurtören, "Fertility and Related Attitudes among Two Social Classes in Ankara" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Cornell University. 1965); cf. also Lutfiyya, op. cit., p. 186. 99. Richard T. Antoun, " O n the Modesty of Women in Arab Muslim Villages," American Anthropologist, Vol. 70, 1968, pp. 690-91. 100. Antoun, op. cit., p. 679. 1 0 1 . Antoun, op. cit., pp. 678-79. 102. Ibrahim Abdulla Muhyi, op. cit., p, 135. 103. Cf. Lutfiyya, op. cit., pp. 203-04. Statistical Appendix— 1. Cf. Gabriel Baer, op. cit., p. 2. 2. Cf. Wilber, op. cit., p. 33.

Index Note: Arabic proper names preceded by the article are listed under at-, even when in the text the spelling el- is used, in order to approximate more closely its pronunciation.

Aaron, 137 'Aba, cloak, 254 'Ababda, tribe, 213, 232, 234. 453 Ababna, tribe, 212 'Abadi, tribe, 167 Abalessa, locality, 263-64 'Abar, son of Shalakh, 182. See also 'Ebher 'Abbad, tribal confederation, 213 'Abd, slave, 259. See Slaves Abdali, tribe, 225 'Abdeh, tribe, 210 'Abd-el-Kader, Prince, 133 'Abdelle, tribe, 208 'Abdul Hamid, sultan, 312 'Abdul W a h h a b , singer, 355 'Abdullah Beg al-Sana', 259 Abha, locality, 201 'Abida, tribe, 119, 205, 422 Abraham, 78, 137, 183. 419 Abs, tribe, 199 'Absiyah, tribe, 195 Abu Qwedar, subgroup, 418 Abu R q a ' i q , tribe, 418 Abu Zayd, legendary hero, 201 Abyssinia, 465-66. See also Ethiopia Achilles Tatius, rhetorician, 137 'Ada, customary law, 399 Adam, 419 Addasa, tribe, 236 Aden, 5, 296,486 ;-colony, 15, 111,375; -protectorate, 15, 113, 189-95. 252, 465 ;-town, 190-91 Adghar, mountain range, 244 Adhdn, call to prayer, 206 'Ad ibn Aws, tribal ancestor, 192 'Adnan, tribal ancestor and moiety, 25, 182-85, 187, 421 Adoption, 108 'Adwan, tribe, 218 Aclius Gallus, 445 Aestheticism, 32-33, 37, 319, 375, 396 Afadele, tribe, 217 Afar, tribe, 194

Afghana, tribal ancestor, 225 Afghanistan, 6, 15, 44, 52, 70, 71, 73, 91. 117, 139, 179, 223, 225-26, 248, 271. 274, 275, 290, 296, 299, 337, 360, 365, 416, 461, 481, 483, 485, 487. 489-95 Afghans, 17, 91, 225-26, 288, 351, 410 Ajrdq, term for subtribe. See Firqah Africa, 5, 13-15, 24, 47, 49, 52-56, 63, 142, 166, 186, 408, 412, 417, 424, 427, 431, 445, 455, 465; Central, 13, 41 ;—cf. Negro Africa ;-East, 51, 52, 56;-North, 5, 13, 14, 16, 26, 53-58, 61-63, 68, 74, 75, 87,'93, 121, 168, 178, 202, 234-48, 261, 263, 274, 276, 294-95, 310, 364, 375, 410-11South, 136 ;-West, 5, 13, 51, 56, 57 .1[frit, demon, 33. See also Demons. Ghûl, Jinn, £âr Aga, h e a d m a n , 261, 387 Aging, 397 Agriculture, 16, 17, 36, 66, 68, 69, 71, 78, 85, 120, 124, 131, 267, 275-76, 305, 307-8, 311, 314, 374. See also Cultivation Agriculturists, 17, 20, 30. See also Cultivators, Fellàhïn Ahagger, district, 123, 246, 263-64 Ahal, meeting, 123 AU, pl. ahàl, family, 90, 113, 210 Ahl Akàwïn, tribe, 197-98 Ahl al-tfàrith, tribe, 199-200 Ahl al-Hindl, tribe, 199-200 Ahl 'Alîl, tribe, 197-98 Ahl al-kitâb, People of the Book. 312. See also Dhimmï Ahl al-Qeblï, moiety, 206 Ahl al-Sa'Idl, confederation, 191 Ahl al-Shâm, tribe, 198-99 Ahl al-Shemdl, moiety, 206, 215 Ahl ' A m m a r , tribe in Yemen. 196 Ahl 'Amr, tribe, 197-198 Ahl Ardi, tribe, 190 Ahl bil-Layth, tribe, 195

533

534 Ahl Fatima, tribe, 200-201 Ahl Fayfa, tribe, 198 Ahl Habs, tribe, 197-98 Ahl H a m a d ibn Fadil, tribe, 200 Ahl Hasan, tribe, 205 Ahl tfatim, tribe, 195 Ahl Hirran, tribe, 205 Ahl Hushaysh, tribe, 200 Ahl Sa'ad, tribe, 190 Ahl Salma, tribe, 197-98 Ahl T h a ' l a b , tribe, 197 Ahl Tindaha, tribe, 198 Ahl Yazid, tribe, 190 Ahoggwa, tribal section, 239 Ain Madhi, 295 Air, mountains, 245 'Air, tribe, 201. See also Bal-'Air Aisha, M o h a m m e d ' s wife, 241 Ait Atman, tribal section, 239 Ait Iraten, tribal section, 239 Ait Loaien, tribe, 263 'Ajaym, tribal federation, 200 Ajika, tribe, 236 'Ajlun, district, 212. See Jebel 'Ajlun 'Ajman, tribe, 106, 118. 200-201. 25758 Ajwan, tribe, 263 Akasha, tribal section, 213 Akhawat, "brother tax". 257. See also Khuwwa Akhdkm, "serviles", 252 Akozay, tribe, 226 Akrad, tribe, 213 Al 'Abdallah, tribe, 191 Al 'Abdullah bin 'Aun, tribe, 195 Al 'Absi, tribe, 195 al-Ahamda, tribe, 213 al-Ahasinah, tribe, 211 al-Ahlaf, tribe, 213 Al Ahmed, tribe, 191 al-'Alayda, tribe, 215 Al 'All, tribe, 200, 203-4. 214 Al al-Jimel, tribe, 205 Al 'Amr, tribe, 201 al-'Amud, tribe, 210 al-'Amur, tribe, 210 al-'Arab aX-Anba, " t r u e " Arabs, 183 al-'Arab al-musla'riia, "Arabicized" Arabs, 183

Index al-Araqda, tribe, 214 Al 'Arif, tribe, 191 al-'Arja, tribe, 200-201 Al Arousse, periodical, 133 al-Ashaje'a, tribe, 208 Al Aslam, tribe, 211 Al Atteuf (El Atf), town, 241 al-Awasa, subtribe, 213 al-Awaysa, tribe, 213 Alawite, region, 20 Alawites, 274 al-Azhar, Muslim university, 96, 398 Al Badr, tribe, 194 al-Bakhayit, subgroup, 242 al-Balqa, district, 184. See also Belqa Albanians, 82 Al Baqi Msellem, tribe, 195 al-Basabsa, tribe, 213 al-Ba$ra, city, 185. See also Basra Al Beheh tribe, 204 al-Bekri, historian, 236 Al Beshir, 203-4 al-Bire, village, 220 Al Breyd, tribe, 203-4 Al Buhayman, tribe, 211 al-Burayh, tribal federation, 216 Al Burayj, tribe, 211 al-Buraymi, oasis, 194 Albu Rudeni, tribe, 216 Albu Sha'ban, tribe, 217 Albu Shamis, tribe, 194 al-Butun, tribal section, 216 Al Da'tid, tribe, 214 al-Dehameshe, tribe, 208-9 Al Dimnan, tribe, 202-4 al-Dulem, tribe, 216 al-Dushan, tribal federation, 216 Al Edhbe, tribe, 203-4 Aleppo, 151, 159, 210, 271, 275 Alexander the Great, 47 Alexandria, 296, 307, 310, 453 Al Fadel, tribe, 203-^t al-Fahhad, tribe, 200, 206 Al Faraj, tribe, 191 Al F a r d a (Frida, Froda), tribe, 207 Al Fheyde, tribe, 203-4 al-Fheyjat, tribe, 252-53 Al Funayftn, tribe, 211 al-Furud, tribal confederation, 198

Index al-Futayh, tribe, 200 al-Gades, village, 147 Algeria, 14, 54, 55, 58, 179, 2 4 0 ^ 1 , 243, 265, 281, 292, 295, 307, 416-17, 484-6, 489, 491-5 al-Ghanâtse, tribe, 211 À1 G h à n i m , tribe, 191 al-Gharri, tribe, 162 al-Ghauth, tribe, 211 al-Ghawànma, tribe, 215 al-Ghazali, philosopher, 174 Al Ghefran, tribe, 203-4 A1 Gheil, village, 193 al-Ghiyàthïn, tribe, 203-4 Algiers, 142, 242, 307, 310 Al Hàdi, tribe, 191, 204 al-Hadr, tribal section, 201 al-Hajjâj, tribe, 208 al-Hasa, province, 216 al-Hasa, tribe in Cyrenaica, 242 al-Hasan, tribe, 200 al-Hawàzem, tribe, 252—53 al-Hesene, tribe, 208 Al Hetêle, tribe, 202-4 Al Hindi, tribe, 202 'All al-Murra, tribal ancestor, 202 'All Bey, 229 Al 'Ikâb, tribe, 211 'Alii, tribe, 197-98. See also Ahl 'Alii al-'Ilwah, tribal federation, 216 'Alima, "knowing w o m a n , " 465 al-Ja'àfra, subtribe, 213 al-Jabara, tribe, 205 Al J a b e r , tribe, 203-4 Al J a d ' à n , tribe, 211 al-Jâzî bint M u h a m m e d al-Hazàm alHithlayn, 106 al-Jebel, tribe, 208-9 al-Jebur, tribal confederation. 216 al-Jeràb'a, tribe, 203-4 Al Jfeysh, tribe, 204 Al Jheysh, tribe, 204 Al J i b r à n , tribe, 204 al-Jubràn, subtribe, 213 al-Junaybir, tribe, 195 al-Ka'àbene (or al-Ka'àbna), tribe, 214 'Alkam, tribe, 197-201 'Alkam al-A'lun, subtribe, 201 'Alkam al-Haul, tribe, 201

535 'Alkam al-Sahil, subtribe, 201 al-Kathlr, tribe, 194 al-Khanazra, tribe, 213 al-Khatatba, tribe, 215 al-Khazala, tribe, 212 al-Khrese (Khro?a), tribe, 208 al-Kufa, town, 185 Al K u t Barrage, 280 al-Kwame, tribe, 211 Allah, 35, 61, 171, 315, 333, 342, 353, 356, 474, 527. See also God Al Lazz, tribe, 194 al-Mahamda, subgroup, 242 al-Malalhim, tribe, 215 Al Mansur, tribe, 191, 204 al-Matarfa, tribe, 213 al-Maydani, 173 al-Meraweha, tribe, 207 al-Mesalikh, tribe, 208 al-Mihlaf, tribe, 213 al-Muasa, subgroup, 242 Al-Muhammed, tribe, 205 Al M u r r a , tribe, 202. See also M u r r a , BenI M u r r a al-Mus'abayn, tribe, 191 al-Mutliq, tribe, 200 Al Na'im, tribe, 191 al-Nawashirah, tribe, 201 al-Nuweysir, tribe, 213 al-'Obed, tribe, 217 al-Odhat, tribe, 215 Al O u e d (El Wed), town, 242 Al 'Ower, tribe, 204 al-Qaff, district, 194 al-Qalabta, tribe, 242 Al Qays, tribe, 197 al-Qderiyye, tribe, 213 al-Rashayda, tribe, 213 al-Rashid, tribe, 190, 194, 200-01, 206, 213, 451 al-Remtha, sub-district, 213. See Remtha Nahiya Al Rigab, tribe, 191 al-Ruqah, tribe, 207 Al Sablhi, tribe, 211 al-Sabkha, tribe, 217 al-Sabta, tribe, 212. See also Thebte al-§adld, tribe, 211 al-Sahir, tribe, 213

Index

536 AI Sä'id, tribe, 203-4 al-Salameh, tribe, 215 AI Sälim, tribe, 191 id-Salt, town, 213 al-Sari', tribe, 205 al-Sbu, tribe, 214 al-Sewäleme, tribe, 208 al-Shaba, tribe, 197 al-Shabärga, subgroup, 242 Ä1 Shebib, tribe, 200, 203-4 Ä1 ¡jiyäh, tribal section, 201 Ä1 Subayyah, tribe, 211 al-Sulüt, tribe, 210, See also Sulüt al-Tälib, tribe, 213 al-Tayyär, tribe, 209 al-Tüqa, tribe, 214. See also Twaqa Ä1 'Ulayyäh, tribe, 211 al-Wa'la, tribe, 200 al-Weld, tribe, 159 Ä1 Wuhub, tribe, 207 Ä1 Yahya, tribe, 203 al-Ya'qüb, tribe, 213 al-Yäs, tribe, 184 al-Zafir, tribe, 216 al-Zafra, district, 194 al-Zaqayla, tribe, 213 al-Zayid, tribe, 200 Ä1 Zäyid, tribe, 204 Ä1 Zeqeme, tribe, 204 'Amadln, tribe, 217 Amämira, tribe, 213. See also Amayra 'Amar, family, 219 'Ämarät, tribe, 208-10, 251 'Amärin, tribe, 449 Am'ashtoreth, 137 Amayra, tribe, 213. See also Amämira Amazon, area, 59 Amenokal, paramount chief, 264 America, 14, 15, 39-41, 46, 106, 322, 330, 337, 392, 401, 406 ¡-North, 46, 168, 419;-South, 19 Amin, headman, 26 Amir Muhammad, brother of King Ibn Saud, 106 Amir Sa'üd al-'Arafa, 106 'Amm, "uncle", 114, 140, 157 Ammar, Hamed, 232, 423, 441-42,452, 458, 460

Ammar, tribe, 208-9, 435 Amme, "aunt", 114 Ammianus Marcellinus, 12n Amoaza, "cousin", 165 Amorites, 77, 78, 80, 81 'Amr, tribal ancestor and tribe, 190, 193, 194 'Amr b. Kulthum, poet, 174 Amrab, tribe, 233 Amram, 137 Amulets, 33 Amun Gyzi, cousin, 166 'Amur el-Dire, tribe, 210 Amzad, muscial instrument, 123 Anatolia, 50, 74, 196, 285, 289, 412, 460 'Anaza, tribe in Yemen, 195-96 Ancient Near East, 46-48. 50-52. 76, 181, 351 Andalusia, 186 Andjra, village, 168 •Aneze, tribe, 149-50, 204, 207-10, 215. 242, 247, 254, 262, 435 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., 369 Animal husbandry, 16, 45, 78. 79, 85. 124 Ankara, 298, 307, 475 Annam, 335 'Annaz, tribal ancestor, 209 Ansab (or Nisab), town, 192 Ansar, "helpers", 184 Anti-Atlas, mountains, 239 Antoun, Richard T., 476-77 'Aqaba, town, 118 'Aqeyl, tribe, 252, 260, 262 'Aqid, military leader, 149 Arab countries, 76, 352, 357, 361,414-5. 460, 474 'Arab el-Jebel, tribe, 210 'Arab el-Lejah, tribe, 210 Arab Women's Congress, 106, 107, 126. 133 Arabia, 5, 13, 25, 58, 60, 64 67, 77, 93, 106, 117-18, 128, 138-39, 147, 161, 175, 179, 181-82, 184, 201, 218, 235, 252, 256-57, 260, 268, 359, 417, 435, 447, 450, 453;-ancient, 120, 124, 129, 169 ¡-Central, 53, 59, 145-46, 188, 205 ¡-Felix, 127 ¡-North, 61, 147-48, L

Index 182-83, 204, 206-18, 237 ;-Petraea, 153;-South, 17, 49, 53, 67, 90, 91, 93, 113, 119, 121, 127, 130, 146-47, 182, 189, 202, 205, 235-36, 252, 260, 262, 364, 417, 429, 450-1, 465, 467, 505, 512 Arabian culture, 5 ¡-Desert, 19, 61, 74, 90, 94, 118, 123, 129, 154, 166, 215, 217, 237 ¡-Peninsula, 15, 16, 67, 75, 87, 119, 121, 129, 138, 145, 178, 181, 186, 202, 251, 282, 300, 359, 366, 393, 451 ;-Sea, 13, 41 Arabic, 64, 67-69, 86, 113, 136, 262 Arabs, 55, 57, 58, 64-67, 82, 88, 91, 93, 101, 106, 124, 137-39, 143, 155, 168, 179, 220, 230, 234, 237, 2 4 2 ^ 3 , 247, 254, 259, 263, 313-314, 347, 349-51, 353, 361, 392, 407, 409, 411-12, 416-17, 419-20, 424, 433, 441, 443, 445, 449, 451-52, 476, 522 'Aradat, tribe, 231. See also Ghoz al'Arab 'Arafat, plain, 207 Aramaic, 63, 64, 69 Aramco, 270, 317, 369, 382 Arbil, town, 165 Archer, J o h n Clark, 331 Architecture, 35, 372 Ardeshir, king, 169 Aristobulos, 445 Arkan al-dln, 408. See also Five Pillars of the Faith Arma, ethnic group, 142, 410 Armenians, 63, 313, 353 Arms, army, 28, 29, 78, 227, 309 Arna, clan, 265 Arpakhshad, 182 Arsinoe, town, 140 Art, arts, 32-35, 50, 70, 306, 309, 324, 372-3, 391-393 Artas, village, 91, 142, 156-58, 407, 420, 448 Artisans, artisanship, 17,' 18, 29, 33, 79, 85, 159, 227, 252, 260, 265, 314, 374, 378 'Asaba, backbone, 424 Ashar, tribe, 198 'Ashira, pi. 'ashd'ir, "tribe", 208-10 'Ashura, feast-day, 122, 244

537 Asia, 13, 67, 166, 341, 366, 380 ¡-Central, 13, 20, 24, 41, 43, 44, 50, 52, 71, 72, 178, 337, 407, 434 ¡-Minor, 14, 16,-South, 13, 52, 400 ¡-Southeast, 13, 49, 322, 324, 400¡-Southwest, 261 Asilln, nobles, 90, 257 'Âsïr, district, 68, 196-202, 205, 270, 422, 450 'Asir al-Hijaz, tribes, 196-97 'Asïr al-Tihâma, tribes, 196-97 'Askar, tribal section, 199 Asri, "relaxation", 123 Asses, 78, 154, 261 Assyrians, 49 Astrologists, 379 Aswan, 167, 232, 296, 441 Asyah, locality, 207 Atâmna, tribe, 212 'Atamnï, clan, 233 Atlantic coast, 5, 53, 64, 244¡-Ocean 13 ¡-plains, 239 Atlas, mountains, 86, 239 Attitudes, 298-302, 318, 354-58, 359, 379, 392 Aulimmiden, tribal group, 245—46 Aureba, tribe, 236 Aures, mountains, 239 Aurigha tribe, 236, 244 Ausaretae, tribe, 194. See also Say'ar 'Awamir, tribe, 190, 194-95, 201 'Awâzim, tribe, 118, 252, 257-58, 260, 262. See also 'Azem, 'Aiim 'Awdhalï, sultanate, 191 Awlâd 'All, tribe, 214, 228-29 Awlâd Ayâd, tribe, 213 Awlâd el-Tharwa, tribe, 231 Awlâd Id, tribe, 213 Awlâd Kàhil, tribe, 234. See also Kawâhla Awlâd Khalïl, tribe, 213 Awlâd Musâ, tribe, 207, 229 Awlâd Mutlaq, tribe, 213 Awlâd Salameh, tribe, 214 Awlâd Zehera, tribe, 229 'Awlaqï, tribe and sultanate, 190, 192, 511 A'yadyah, tribe, 229 'Ayâl 'Abbâs, tribe, 215 'Ayâl Ahmed, tribe, 214

538 'Ayal Awdeh, tribe, 215 'Ayal Jibrin, tribe, 214 'Ayal J u b r a n , tribe, 214 Ayal M a h m u d , tribe, 214 Ayd, tribe, 229 Aydhab, town, 231, 234 'Ayla, 'Ayle, "family", 113, 233 Aylan, tribal ancestor, 183 'Ayn-Darah, village, 222 'Ayn Ibn Fahayd, locality in the Nejd, 207 Ayrouth, Father Henry, 141 Azande, East African tribe. 51 Azayre, tribe, 252 'Azaza, tribe, 252 'Azazme, tribe, 218, 449 Azben, mountains, 245 Azd, Azdites, tribe, 185 Azdaja, tribe, 236-37 'Azem, 'Azim, tribe, 90, 252-53, 25^ Azerbaijan, 63, 69, 166 Azeri, language, 69 Azza, tribe, 265 Ba-Ahsan, clan, 195 Bab el-Mandeb, 53 Bab Menbij, locality, 217 Babylonia, 49, 80, 127 Bacelhan, tribe, 211 Badakhshan, district, 226 Baganda, East African tribe, 51 Baggara, tribe, 56. See also Baqqara Baghdad, 259, 307, 362, 446, 471 Bahma'I, tribe, 224 Bahrain, island, 15, 185, 485, 488, 491, 494-95 Bahyreh (Buheyra), province, 228-229 Bajri, tribal group, 194 Bajuri, commentator, 173-74 Ba Kazim, tribe, 192, 421 Bakhtiyari, tribe, 70, 224-25 Bakkar, tribal section, 212 Bakr, tribe, 185. See also Rabi'a Balabshah, clan, 449 Balad Hamdan, area, 196 Bal-'Air, tribe, 201. See also 'Air Balgat, 298 Bal Ghazi, tribal confederation, 198 Balkans, 337

Index Bal-Qarn, tribe, 201. See also Q a r n Balujis, 52, 71 Balujistan, 6, 15, 44, 73, 226, 296 Bandar al-DuwIsh, Shaykh, 106 Banl-Äi also under Beni Bani 'Afif, tribe, 190 Banl 'Ali, tribe, 207 Bani 'Amir, tribe, 128, 198 Bani 'Amir ibn Zurayq, tribe, 140 Bani Bijad, tribe, 198 Bani Bishr, tribe, 205, 422 Bani Dhalim, tribe, 197 Bani H a m u d h , tribe, 198 Bani Hans, tribe, 197-98 B a n i j u m a ' a , tribe, 198 Bani J u n a , tribe, 197 Bani Malik, tribe, 197-98 Bani Mughayd, tribe, 197 Bani M u n a b b a , tribe, 198 Bani Q u t b a , tribe, 197 Bani Sabah, tribe, 89 Bani Shihr, tribe, 199 Bani Sulum, tribe, 198-99 Bani Tamim, tribe, 260, 451 Bani Zayd, tribe, 197 Bantu tribes, 136 Baqqara, tribes, 17, 66, 67, 211. See also Baggara Baraka, blessing, virtue, 238, 330 Bärakzay, tribe, 225-26 Barbers, 17, 79, 308, 379 Barclay, Harold B., 421, 467 Barqah, tribal section, 207 Barth, Fredrik, 141, 165, 456 Barth, H., 240 Ba Rumeydan, village, 195 Basemath, Esau's wife, 137 Bashätwa, tribe, 212 Basra, city, 163, 164, 446, 451. See also al-Bajra Basseri, tribe, 456 Batan, tribal ancestor, 225 Bath, 117, 290. See also ffammam Batha, village, 162 Batina, district, 119, 187 Bawärsheh, tribe, 229 Bayhän, territory, 191 Bayt, house, 233. See also Bet Bayt Imäni, tribe, 190, 194, 451

Index Bazaars, 29-31, 310, 474. See also Suq Bedouin(s), 42, 56, 57, 58, 60, 63, 67. 77, 79, 81, 82, 93, 106, 118, 121, 138, 145-46, 149, 156, 159, 167, 219-20, 228, 230, 235, 254-56, 258, 269, 270, 276, 299, 371, 408, 411, 413-4, 416. 425, 427, 434-5. 449. 451. See also Nomads Bega, village, 240 Beirut, 85, 94, 102-3, 288, 296, 307, 310 Beja, tribes, 56, 67, 231-33, 410 Bekil, tribe, 195-96 Bela, ethnic group, 142, 455 Belqa, district, 213, 21 5. See also al-Balqa Benedict, Ruth, 39 B e n i - 5 « also under Bani Beni 'Amr, tribes, 207, 210, 415 Beni 'Atiyye, tribe. 118. 218. 253-54, 258 Beni Ayyub, tribe, 229 Beni Bu 'All, tribe, 188 Beni Bu Yahyl, tribe, 238 Ben! Ghafir, tribe, 18"7 Beni Hajir, tribe, 118 Beni H a m a d , tribe, 210 Beni Hamd, tribe, 212 Beni Hamida, tribe, 213 Beni Harith, villages, 220 Beni Hassan, tribe, 78, 212, 220 Beni Hilal, tribe, 201-2, 234 Beni Hilayil, tribe, 212. See also Hulel Beni Hina, tribe, 187-88 Beni Humeyda, tribe, 218 Beni Irsheyd, tribe, 212 Beni Isma'il, tribe, 195 Beni Jirius, tribe, 212 B e n l j u h m a , tribe, 212 Beni Kalb, tribe, 205, 207 Beni Khaled, tribe, 159 Beni M a ' a n (or M a ' a m ) , tribe, 192 Beni Malek, tribe, 207, 220, 239 Beni Merzoug, tribe, 244 Beni M u r r a , tribes, 195. See also Al Murra, M u r r a Beni Musayd, tribe, 200 Beni 'Obeyd Nahlya, 212 Beni Qays, tribe, 195 Beni Rasib, tribe, 188 Beni R i y a m , tribe, 188

539 Beni Sa'ad, tribe, 212 Beni Sa'fan, tribe, 196 Beni Sa'Id, tribe, 212 Beni Sakhr, tribe, 118, 154, 214-15. 218, 252. See also $ukhur Beni Salim, tribe, 207 Beni Sulaym, tribe, 234, 263 Beni Sulum, tribe, 205 Beni 'Uqba, tribe, 254 Beni Wahhab, tribe, 208-9. 435 Beni Zayd, villages, 220 Beni Zaydan, tribe, 212 Ben-sidi-Ally, 456 Berabish, 410 Beranes, tribes, 235-38, 244 Berazga, tribal division, 243 Berbers, 56-58, 64-66, 85, 93, 121, 168. 174, 178-79, 234-37, 239-40, 24243, 247, 263, 353, 411, 455 Bernes, tribes, 236. See also Beranes Berr, tribal ancestor, 235-36 Berwariy, tribe, 211 Bet, house, 113. See also Bayt, House Bethlehem, town, 156-57, 218-19 Bible, 76, 171, 182-83, 225-26, 235-36. 333, 336, 351. 445-47. 506. 509 Bidents, 49 Bidney, David, 520 Bidonvilles, 375 Bill!, tribe, 214, 217, 229 Bin Boqi bin Ahmed, tribe. 193 Bin Gesus, tribe, 193 Bin Sar, tribe, 193 Bint 'amm, "cousin", 92, 114, 135, 13842, 145-47, 151-54, 156, 161-62, 167-72, 174-76, 419. See also Cousin Bint el-tfudud, village, 418, 420 Blr, village, 218 Birth control, 96;-rate, 22. 37. 85, 109-11, 376, 482, 484 Bir Zeyt, village, 220 Bishah, valley, 201 Bishari(n), tribe, 167, 234 Bishr, tribal group, 208 BitanI, tribe, 225 Biyadiyya, sect, 206 Blackman, Winifred, 232 Black Sea, 5, 13, 41

Index

540

Blacksmiths, 79, 90, 254, 259, 261, 265. See also Sáni'

Blood fetid, 19, 79 ¡-letting, 379; revenge, 148, 168 Blunt, Wilfrid, 146 Boas, Franz, 40 Bokhara, 5 Bonaparte, Marie, 453, 457 Book production, 492 Bo'si, tribe, 190 Bosnia, 327-28 Botr, tribes, 235-36, 238 Bovir-Ahmad, tribe, 223 Brahimáb, clan, 233 Brahman, 331-32, 334 Brahuis, ethnic group, 71, 226 Braslawski, J., 82 Bride-price, 22, 101-2, 104-5, 143-45, 151, 154, 413, 418. See also Dowry. Mahr

Briggs, Lloyd Cabot, 266 British, 219, 386 Brotherhoods, 295 Bfother-sister relations, 444 BsQl, tribe, 212 Buarij, 441, 461 Buddha, 328, 340 Buddhism, 51, 324-25, 328, 332, 33435, 339-40 Burckhardt, John Lewis, 145, 166-67, 252 Burqa, veil, 117-19. 259. See also Veiling Burri al-Lamáb, 293. 294. 415-16. 453-54 Burton, Richard F., 146 Busawa, West African tribe. 51 Byzantium, 181 Cafés, 31, 32, 116, 308-9 Cairo, 42, 61, 93, 96, 101, 122, 126, 133, 139, 230, 281, 307. 319, 362, 452, 456, 468 Caliph, 352-53, 358 Cambyses, 414 Camel nomads, 17, 19, 60, 77, 81, 214, 260, 269 Camels, 17, 22, 45, 55, 66, 67, 71, 78, 79, 153, 155, 260-61, 264, 269, 382

Canaan, 235-36 Caravans, 32, 265 Carpenters, 308 Qarsaj, cloak, 116 Casablanca, 42, 307, 310 Caspian Sea, 13, 52, 71 Castes, 66 Catholic church, 50, 384 Catholicism, 338, 350 Catholics, 94, 154-55, 212, 403 Cattle, 17, 66, 67, 78 Caucasoids, 67 Caucasus, 13, 52, 161, 274, 296 Cemetery, 291 Ceremonial fights, 425 Ceuta and Melilla, 14, 484-86, 488 Ceylon, 324 Cha'abna, tribe, 214. See also Ka'abene, al-Ka'abna Chaamba (Chamba, Shamba), tribe. 51, 142, 243-44, 246, 265, 455 Chabrol, 228-29 Chad, lake, 55 ¡-republic, 14, 481-82. 484-87, 489, 491, 493-95 Chahar Aymak, tribe, 71 Chahar Beniche, tribes, 223-24 Chahar Lang, tribe, 224-25 Cham, tribe. 199. 200, 203. See also Jusham Chardin, Sir John, 446, 456 Charms, 33 Chelebi, Evliya, traveler, 352 Chiang Kai-Shek, 325 Chieftainship, 79, 80, 209-10, 265, 359, 387. See also Shaykh Childbirth, 22, 99, 126, 285, 375 Child care, 439-43, 527 Child mortality, 22, 95. 112. See also Infant mortality Children, 94-95 China, 49, 322, 324-25. 330. 332, 335. 339, 341 Chivalry, 255 Christianity, 23, 34, 324, 326, 329-30, 333, 335-38, 341-42, 366, 383-84, 400, 402, 522 Christians, 31, 63, 64, 69, 85, 86, 89, 94, 99, 109, 110-11, 117, 120, 127, 179, 212, 220, 242, 247, 283, 288, 291,

Index 300, 313-14, 327, 329, 358, 385, 400-1, 411-14, 430, 448, 460. 471-72. 502 Christian world, 349, 355 Circassians, 161, 311 Circum-Caribbean culture, 60 Circumcision, 260, 285, 375, 422, 438, 442, 444-59 Cities, 17, 29, 42, 64, 108, 118, 159,176, 301, 304, 307, 319, 376. See also Towns, Townspeople Class structure, 37, 314-15. See also Lower class, Middle class, U p p e r class, Working class Client tribes, 18. See also Vassal tribes Clinchy, Everett R., 520 Cline, Walter, 241, 411 Clitoridectomy, 445, 477. See also Circumcision Clothing, 20, 33, 60, 69, 78, 79, 100, 116 311, 319, 371-72. 377, 384, 397 Cobblers, 79, 308 Cochin China, 335 Coffee, 121, 256 Coffee House, 290 Cohen, Abner, 418 Collective responsibility, 19, 79 Commerce, 30, 31, 36, 132, 305-d, 309, 378 Commodus, R o m a n emperor, 140 C o m m u n a l ownership, 28 Communications, 359, 362 Communism, 77, 320, 349-50, 360, 383 Concubines, 87, 89, 91, 92 Confucianism, 325, 328, 332, 335, 336 Conscription, 27 Constantinople, 352, 429. See also Istanbul Coon, Carleton, 377 Copts, 50, 94, 140-41, 176, 353, 356, 413, 438, 444, 446, 452-53, 502 Coult, Allan D., 408 Council, 27, 31, 37, 265, 309, 422. See also Majlis Cousin marriage, 23, 92, 135-76, 241, 419-20, 505 Cousins, 142-43, 421, 425 Crafts, 33, 107, 306, 309, 372-73, 377. 384, 391. See also Arts, Artisanship

54' Crusades, 82, 262, 367 Cultivation, 16, 25, 36, 41, 66, 70 : 73-75, 388. See also Agriculture Cultivators, 19-21, 28, 65, 76, 79, 81. See also Agriculturists, Fellahin Culture areas, 14-16, 3 9 ^ 0 , 46, 64-72: -change, 317-21, 364. See also Westernization ;-continents, 20, 23 Customs, 35, 324. See also Morality, Sex Mores Cyprus, 109-11, 364, 462, 484-89. 491-95 Cyrenaica, 18, 34, 58, 64, 234, 242, 252, 263, 408, 497 Da'äjna, tribe, 213 Dabana, tribe, 213 Dabke (dance), 288 Dag Rail, tribe, 263 Dahm, tribe, 195, 199, 200 Dahnä', district, 207 Damascus, 42, 133, 159, 161, 186, 210, 307, 310, 314, 362 Dana Bishr, tribes, 208-9, 247 Dana Farid, tribe, 209 Dana Khreyç, tribe, 209 Dana Mni', tribe, 209 Dana Muslim, tribes, 208-9. 247 Dana Qhël, tribe, 209 Dancing, 259-60, 288 Danube Basin, 366 Dar al-tfarb, House of War, 349, 355, 372 Där al-Isläm, House of Islam, 349, 355, 402 Darïça, tribe, 236 Daru', tribe, 189, 194 Dasgupta, Surendranath. 334 Dathlna, district, 191 Da'üdi, tribe, 190 David, king, 137, 225 Dawäghra, tribe, 252 Dead Sea, 82, 153 ;-Scrolls, 82 Death, 285 Death rate, 37, 109-11, 484 Deir ez-Zor, town, 159-60, 280 Democracy, 28, 370 Demons, 33, 38. See also 'Afrit, Ghül, Jinn, Zôr

54s Descent rules, 21, 23, 26, 57, 60, 66, 86, 87, 135, 170, 177, 182, 248 Description de rEgypte, 228-29 Desert and Sown, 16, 17, 43, 73 Deserts, 16, 17, 41, 61, 66, 299 Dehameshe, tribe, 209 D e y r Ghassaneh, village, 220 D h a h r a n , town, 199, 502 D h a y b a n , tribal section, 200 D h e a y b ! (or Dhiaybi, Dhiebi), tribes, 190, 192 Dhimmi(s), 3 4 8 ^ 9 , 356, 358, 401. See also Ahl al-kitab, People of the Book D h u b l , tribe, 190 D h u el-hijjah, month, 244 D i a b a b , tribe, 233 Dickson, H . R . P., 162, 164 Dictatorship, 28, 37, 362 Dm Muhammad bissayf, 301 Diodorus, 136 Discrimination, 87 Divination, 33 Divorce, 21-24, 95, 102, 105-7, 130, 143, 440-1 Diyabat, tribe, 213 Dizai, tribe, 165 Doughty, Charles M., 146, 205, 255 Dowd, J e r o m e , 53-54 Dowry, 261. Set Bride price Dravidic languages, 71 D r e a m interpretation, 33, 379 Druzes, 79, 179, 184, 221-23, 247, 283, 327, 353 D u a l organization, 37, 80, 177-250, 285, 430, 509, 516. See also Moieties D u g h a y r a t , tribe, 210 D u j a y l a h , 280 D u r r a h , village, 219 D u r r a n i , tribe, 225 Eastern Christian churches, 50 East Indies, 49, 524 ' E b e d e , tribe, 208 ' E b h e r , son of Shelah, 182. See also 'Abar Ecclesia militans, 301 Economy, 275-78 Education, 22, 36, 97, 102, 104, 126, 133 295-96, 305, 308, 316, 380, 384,

Index 388-90, 394, 397-98, 403, 438, 45963, 479, 483, 491, 523-24 Effendi, 81, 371-72, 387 Egypt, 14, 26, 42, 45, 46, 49-51, 54, 61, 64, 65, 67, 73, 75, 77, 80, 83, 85, 88, 91-94, 96, 101, 102, 106, 109, 11112, 118, 120-22, 130-33, 139-44, 146, 166-69, 176, 179, 186, 198, 202, 226-34, 236, 241, 252, 260, 272, 273, 278, 281, 288, 289, 295, 296, 297, 302, 304, 307, 310, 329, 345, 360-61, 369, 378, 398, 413, 415, 4 2 3 24, 441-42, 444-46, 451-53, 458, 460-61, 465, 471, 497, 502, 505, 523; - a n c i e n t , 136, 181, 226, 516. See also United A r a b Republic Egyptians, 58, 60, 64, 356, 4 1 0 ; ancient, 136-37 ;-Bedouins, 231 Ehbele, village, 158 Elders, 26 '£/